

CAPTURED BY CONVENTIONS

On objectivity and factuality
in international news agency discourse

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*Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission
of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki in lecture room 13,
Main Building, on the 25th of February, 2011 at 12 o'clock.*

Pragmatics, Ideology and Contacts Monographs 7
Department of Modern Languages
University of Helsinki
2011

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Series published by the interdepartmental PIC project at the University of Helsinki

Place of publication and publisher: University of Helsinki, The PIC project
The acronym PIC is amoebic and stands for (P) pragmatics, prosody; (I) ideology, interaction; (C) contacts, constructions, culture, etc.

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Preface

When I resumed my university studies in the early 1990s, my intention was to learn some Spanish. In addition, I decided to test my English translation skills, as my MA degree in the 1960s had included English philology as a minor subject. What little Spanish I learned then, I have totally lost by now, whereas my English studies became a project for decades.

My second visit to the academia would probably have remained short-lived, had I not asked one of the translation course lecturers, Andrew Chesterman, about possibilities to study news language. Chesterman advised me to read Teun van Dijk's book *News as discourse*, and to contact Professor Jan-Ola Östman. Van Dijk's book proved, indeed, to be very useful – I have referred to it in almost every study over the years –, but it was the latter recommendation that was 'fatal'. It did not take long before I was engaged in writing my second MA thesis – on metaphors in news agency language – and in struggling to pass various courses and exams of the Advanced Studies. And soon after finishing the Advanced Studies, I became a Ph.D. student with Jan-Ola Östman as my supervisor. I cannot stress hard enough that none of these steps would have been taken without his encouragement and his unfailing support. As all his students know, he is always busy with many commitments, but when needed, he is there to help. Besides, I have witnessed on several occasions that just a few words from him have been sufficient to put me on the right track. My debt to Jan-Ola is thus enormous, and I can only express my heartfelt thanks.

I am also grateful to Jan-Ola for including me into the PIC (Pragmatics, Ideology and Contacts) Group, which at that time contained – in addition to him – the following researchers: Diana ben-Aaron, Salla Lähdesmäki, Anna Solin, Pekka Kuusisto and Jarno Raukko. I thank them all for their company and for helping me in my studies. I have also been lucky to share office with Diana and Salla for some time. Later, I have greatly enjoyed the company of two more recent PIC-members, Ulla Paatola and Taija Townsend.

When I retired from my job at YLE TV news in 2002, I was fortunate enough to be accepted into The Research Unit for Variation, Contacts and Change in English (VARIENG), which has provided me with the working premises. VARIENG has also enabled my participation in various conferences by giving me travel grants. Most importantly, I have been able to work in a friendly and inspiring research atmosphere, for which I am grateful to every member of the research unit. My special thanks go to the leaders of VARIENG, Professor Terttu Nevalainen and Professor Irma Taavitsainen, who have always made me feel a welcome member of the unit. I have also had interesting discussions with Dr. Leena Kahlas-Tarkka, Dr. Seija Kerttula, Docent Matti Kilpiö, Docent Anneli Meurman-Solin, Dr. Minna Nevala, Dr. Arja Nurmi, Maura Ratia, Professor Emeritus Matti Rissanen and many others. I thank all my ‘roommates’ for their good company. In addition to Diana and Salla, I have shared an office with, among others, Dr. Heli Tissari, Marianna Hintikka, Dr. Mikko Laitinen and Teo Juvonen. I am especially grateful to Marianna and Mikko for solving many instant problems, often caused by my computer which has a nasty habit of behaving in an unexpected manner! I am also indebted to Tuuli Tahko, who did a great job scanning two articles included in my thesis. I am enormously thankful to Jukka Tyrkkö and Dr. Turo Hiltunen for sharing their computer expertise with a less knowledgeable colleague like me, and for their endless patience. I simply don’t know how I would have met all the deadlines without Turo’s help, when finalizing the manuscript of my thesis. Dr. Anna-Liisa Vasko I thank profoundly for being such a good friend all these years, and for always encouraging me to continue my research.

I am very grateful to Professor Paul Chilton and Dr. John E. Richardson for reading my manuscript; for their kind words of encouragement and for providing insightful suggestions for improvement. In the course of my news agency research, I have contacted several foreign scholars with questions concerning either news discourse or the news agencies; the two foci of my interest. They have always been kind enough to offer their advice. Professor Teun van Dijk provided me with a list of useful references; Pro-

fessor Roger Fowler read my first article and suggested it to be published; Dr. Peter R. R. White gave me access to a website with relevant articles, and so on. I am grateful to all of them, and also to Dr. Chris Paterson, with whom I have often discussed news agency matters.

Throughout my work, access to the library of YLE, my former employer, has been an invaluable asset for my research. I am indebted to the outstanding staff of that library. Two employees, in particular, Pirkko Manninen and some years ago Pekka Toikka, have provided me with excellent background material. My thanks go also to my former colleagues at YLE TV news, for helping me to collect data on news agency language and for answering my various questions on news agencies. I am grateful especially to Erkki Asu (who has been my main ‘assistant’), Kristian Åberg, Harry Isaksson, Matti Heikkilä, Matti Pitsinki, Paula Herztman, Martti Lyyra and Tarmo Määttänen. I thank YLE TV news foreign editors for giving me their views on news agencies; my special thanks go to the managing editor of foreign news, Reijo Lindroos, who has always answered my e-mails so promptly. I have also been in contact with a number of my former colleagues living abroad. I thank Mienke Rothfusz and Pierre Peyrot for their comments, and Bruno Beeckman for sending me a compelling story of his experiences with TV news agencies reporting on the war in Chechnya.

Over the years, my good friends have always believed in my work far more than I have myself. I thank them all warmly for their encouragement. Furthermore, this work could not have been accomplished without support from my husband Arto. I am truly grateful to him for being so understanding. I also thank my daughter Laura for interesting discussions, my granddaughters Linda and Jessica for the joy they bring, and my son-in-law Peter for doing a big job with the final layout of this book.

Helsinki, January 2011.

Maija Stenvall

ABSTRACT

This work explores the discourse of two international news agencies, the Associated Press (AP) and Reuters. These two global news agencies are generally regarded as the world's leading news distributors; together with the French AFP (Agence France-Presse) they are often referred to as "the Big Three". A glance at the guidelines given by AP and Reuters to their journalists shows that these two news agencies make a lot of effort to strive for objectivity – the well-known journalistic ideal, which, however, is an almost indefinable concept.

Journalism textbooks have tried to define "objectivity" by attributing to it, e.g., the following components: "detachment, nonpartisanship, a style of writing called the 'inverted pyramid', facticity, and balance" (Mindich 1998). AP and Reuters, too, in their guidelines, present several other ideals besides "objectivity", viz., reliability, accuracy, balance, freedom from bias, precise sourcing, reporting the truth, and so on. Other central concepts connected to objectivity are neutrality and impartiality. However, "objectivity" is, undoubtedly, the term that is most often mentioned when the ethics of journalism is discussed, acting as a kind of umbrella term for several related journalistic ideals. It can even encompass the other concept that is relevant for this study, that of factuality. These two intertwined concepts are extremely complex; paradoxically, it is easier to show evidence of the *lack* of objectivity or factuality than of their existence.

I argue that when journalists conform to the deep-rooted conventions of 'objective' news reporting, facts may be blurred, and the language becomes vague and ambiguous. As global distributors of news, AP and Reuters have had an influential role in creating and reinforcing conventions of (at least English-language) news writing. These conventions can be seen to work at various levels of news reporting: the ideological (e.g., defining what is regarded as newsworthy, or who is responsible), structural (e.g., the well-known 'inverted pyramid' model), and stylistic (e.g., presupposing that in hard news reports, the journalist's 'voice' should be backgrounded). On the basis of my case studies, I have found four central conventions to

be worthy of closer examination: the conventional structure of news reports, the importance of newsworthiness, the tactics of impersonalisation which tends to blur news actors' responsibility, and the routines of presenting emotions. My linguistic analyses draw mainly on M.A.K. Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1994), on notions of *transitivity*, *ergativity*, *nominalisation* and *grammatical metaphor*. The Appraisal framework, too, has provided useful tools for my analyses; I have dealt, in particular, with the values of *Affect* and with those of *Intensification*.

My six case studies deal with the following topics: metaphors in political reporting, terrorism discourse, terrorism fears, emotions more generally, unnamed sources as rhetorical constructs, and responsibility in convention attribution. Although most of these studies do not deal with a specific convention of news agency discourse, they give ample evidence of conventions that undermine the objectivity or factuality of news agency discourse, such as vague and ambiguous language, the blurring of news actors' (and journalists') responsibility, and the distorting power of news values.

1 Introduction

But what is “objectivity” anyway? That depends on whom you ask. For some it is a vague point to strive for, like the North Star. For others it involves specific practices. Still others define it in the breach, citing journalists who break its rules. And lately “objectivity” has come under fire, a casualty of a bitter battle over the future of journalism. But even as some journalists celebrate it and others call for its end, no one seems to be able to define it.

David T.Z. Mindich: *Just the Facts: How “Objectivity” Came to Define American Journalism* (1998)

This work explores the discourse of two international news agencies, the American AP (the Associated Press) and the originally British Reuters¹. These two global news agencies are generally regarded as “the leading news suppliers around the world” (Tunstall 1999: 191); together with the French AFP (Agence France-Presse) they are often referred to as “the Big Three”. A glance at the guidelines given by AP and Reuters to their journalists² shows that these two news agencies strive for objectivity; for them it is not “a vague point ... like the North Star”, rather it is something that “involves specific practices” (cf. the quote from Mindich above). Further, my approach to the nearly indefinable concepts of objectivity and factuality comes close to defining them “in the breach”. I argue that when journalists conform to the deep-rooted conventions of ‘objective’ news reporting, facts may be blurred, and their language becomes vague and ambiguous. Thus, the alleged objectivity and factuality of news agency discourse is undermined.

¹ In 2008, the Canadian Thomson Corporation merged with Reuters Group PLC, and the company was renamed Thomson Reuters. However, Reuters general news and some other Reuters services have maintained their traditional names.

² See e.g. www.ap.org. and *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* on Reuters website.

1.1 Overview

Mueller (2007) asks in the title of a recent article, whether it is time to abandon the ideal of “journalistic objectivity”. Mueller (p. 14) claims that a “fair and accurate yet honest” partisan press would be better than “the pose of neutrality” which newspaper journalists have assumed today. The big international news agencies, too, might well be blamed for “the pose of neutrality”. However, as they “act as a sort of common currency” for other media all over the world (White 1998: 122), one cannot seriously suggest that they ought to be “partisan”. Since their birth in the 19th century, news agencies have been forced to distribute ‘objective’ news, because they have supplied news to newspapers representing various political stripes (Carey 1989: 210). Being consciously “partisan” would violate the very essence of news agency reporting.

Journalism textbooks have tried to define “objectivity” by attributing to it, e.g., the following components: “detachment, nonpartisanship, a style of writing called the ‘inverted pyramid’, facticity, and balance” (Mindich 1998: 2; see also p. 8). When outlining their guidelines to journalists, AP and Reuters, too, present several other ideals besides objectivity: reliability, accuracy, balance, freedom from bias, precise sourcing, reporting the truth, and so on. In Study A and Study B of the present work, I have continuously referred to the (alleged) neutrality of news agency discourse. Another central concept connected to objectivity is that of impartiality. “Objectivity” is, undoubtedly, the term that is most often mentioned when the ethics of journalism is discussed, acting as a kind of umbrella term for several related journalistic ideals. I have nevertheless included another term, “factuality”, in the title of this work, because I consider factuality to be a somewhat more specific concept than objectivity; factuality is related to the news journalists’ basic quest, the quest for reporting facts. At the same time, an analyst looking for the evidence of the lack of objectivity or factuality will notice that the two concepts are intertwined and extremely complex. Though it may be easier to detect examples which show that factual-

ity has been undermined, there is also a multitude of cases where one cannot clearly see which of the two concepts – objectivity or factuality – has been affected.

As global distributors of news, AP and Reuters have had an influential role in creating and reinforcing conventions of (at least English-language) news writing. Conventions work at various levels of news reporting: the ideological (defining what is regarded as ‘newsworthy’), structural (e.g., the well-known ‘inverted pyramid’ model), and stylistic (e.g., presupposing that in hard news reports, the journalist’s ‘voice’ should be backgrounded). In chapter 4, I deal with all these three aspects: newsworthiness, the conventional structure of news reports, and the tactics of impersonalisation. In addition, I tackle a fourth convention: the routines for presenting emotions in news agency reports. Although such conventions as ‘detachment’, or the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure, are in journalism textbooks marked as components of objectivity (Mindich 1998), my analyses show that they, on the contrary, can contribute to undermining objectivity or factuality. When speaking of the deep-rooted conventions and their seemingly inescapable power, it is important to note that news journalists do not apply them consciously; as White (1998: 281) points out, journalists are “just as subject to the rhetorical influence of those conventions as their audience”.

Since my studies have dealt with a variety of topics within news agency reporting, such as metaphors, terrorism discourse, emotions, conventions of attribution, and responsibility, I have, besides linguistics, also drawn on research in several other disciplines: e.g., in sociology, psychology, political science, even in economics. In my quest to examine *news agency* discourse, I began my research by looking for studies on news discourse, on the one hand, and on news agencies, on the other. There were not many books or articles on the news agencies, and none at all which would have studied news agency discourse as a specific form of ‘independent’ news discourse³. However, Boyd-Barrett (1980) and later Boyd-

³ Most news agency studies concentrated on the *content* of news agency distribution. Or news agencies were explored as *sources* for other media; often from the point of view of

Barrett and Rantanen (1998) gave ample information on the history as well as on the present activities of the big international news agencies. As for news studies – and media studies more generally – there has been a growing interest in them since the 1970s, though no systematic theories of news as a specific type of discourse were developed before the 1980s. The first steps towards CDA (*Critical Discourse Analysis*) were also taken in the late 1970s, when Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge and Tony Trew published their well-known study *Language and Control* (1979)⁴.

In the field of news research, I found several studies that have been of primary importance for me. The oldest of them, the famous study by Galtung and Ruge on ‘newsworthiness’, was published as early as in 1965, but those *news values* presented 45 years ago still seem to persist. The other works, to which I have repeatedly returned, are the following (not in order of importance but in that of year of publication): Hartley (1982), van Dijk (1988a), Bell (1991), Fowler (1991) and White (1998). In the study of political metaphors (cf. Study A and chapter 4 below), I have largely relied on Lakoff and Johnson’s influential book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). In chapter 4, though, when ‘revisiting’ metaphors, I also explore *metaphors of intensification*, on the basis of Appraisal theory (see White 1998).

My linguistic analyses of news agency reports draw mainly on M.A.K. Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1994; see also chapter 4 and Studies B to E). I consider three central notions of Functional Grammar – *transitivity*, *nominalisation* and *grammatical metaphor* – to be useful tools, especially when examining issues of responsibility and agency. In chapter 4 (section 4.3.1), I introduce a fourth tool: *ergativity*,

selection, but there was also, e.g., van Dijk’s analysis looking at the differences in the discourse of newspaper stories and the corresponding news agency dispatches, used as the source (cf. van Dijk 1988b).

⁴ The approach of Fowler and the other authors of *Language and Control* is known as *critical linguistics*, based on the functional model developed by M.A.K. Halliday and his colleagues. Other notable scholars in the field of CDA from the 1980s onwards include Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun A. van Dijk, Paul Chilton and Theo van Leeuwen. Recently, van Dijk has begun to advocate the broader term CDS (Critical Discourse Studies) to replace CDA, “e.g., so as to emphasize that critical study is not a ready made “method” of analysis, but also has theoretical and applied dimensions” (see Research in Critical Discourse Studies - Website Teun A. van Dijk).

which, in Halliday's view, is a semantic model connected to causativity. Transitivity and ergativity belong to the *ideational metafunction* of language, and deal with 'the clause as representation'. The question of choice is essential; the writer has to choose between various options of transitivity (or, choose an ergative point of view). When examining the responsibility of news actors, the vital question is not so much that of a choice in *process* type⁵; more often it is that of agency. If, for instance, a nominalised emotion (fear, worry, anger, etc.) has been given the Actor role in a material process, the 'real' actor(s) remain hidden. We can, of course, try to 'unpack' the grammatical metaphor (the nominalised emotion), but even then it may not be possible to deduce who the Senser – the one who is feeling – of the original mental process is, or furthermore, who is really responsible for the action(s) denoted by the material process.

The ideational choices and nominalisations that obscure the role of news actors conform to the 'objective' style of journalists writing hard news reports, such as news agency dispatches. The Appraisal framework (for extensive information on Appraisal, see The Appraisal Website), which is an extension of M.A.K. Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar, provides an *interpersonal* perspective on the style which White (1998) calls "reporter voice". The Appraisal framework explores the evaluative use of language, and consists of three interacting systems: Attitude, Engagement and Graduation. Attitude, further, has three sub-types: Affect (construing emotional responses), Judgement (evaluating human behaviour, dealing with ethics and morality) and Appreciation (evaluating entities, 'by reference to aesthetics and other systems of social value') (The Appraisal Website; Martin 2000). Of these three sub-types, Affect has least con-

⁵ As I have explained in my studies (cf. Studies B to E), transitivity, according to Halliday (1994: 106), "construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES". The grammar of the clause consists of three elements of the process: the process itself (typically realized by a verbal group), participants in the process, and circumstances associated with the process. The main types of process are: *material processes: processes of doing*; *mental processes: processes of sensing*; and *relational processes: processes of being* (pp. 107–138).

straints in journalistic discourse; in other words, such values appear quite frequently even in reporter-voice texts. Thus, Affect has been a useful tool for my studies, especially for Study E, which focuses on analysing emotions. Chapter 4 (cf. section 4.4) discusses Affect vis-à-vis news journalists. My analyses have also dealt with values of *intensification*, which belong to the Appraisal system of Graduation. Certain types of these values, e.g. metaphors of intensification, are typical of reporter-voice stories (see White 1998: 111–114).

1.2 Material

Before the days of the Internet and the ensuing emergence of online news, news agency dispatches could be accessed only by the agencies' paying clients, that is, other media. The mass audience saw the big international news agencies, AP and Reuters, mainly as famous and trusted news brands. This lack of direct contact was, in fact, beneficial for AP and Reuters (cf. Paterson 2007: 61), helping them to maintain “an image of plain, almost dull, but completely dependable professionalism” (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998: 6). The difficulties of access to a great extent explain the fact that there were almost no studies on news agency discourse at that time. After the mid-1990s, selected news agency dispatches became available via web portals; the first “strategic relationship” was developed between *Yahoo* and the Reuters news agency (Paterson 2007: 58). Today Reuters and AP also distribute a wide selection of their respective news stories on their own websites; in addition, AP provides links to the websites of its member newspapers. However, though a variety of news agency reports are now available on public websites, there has not been any noticeable growth in the number of news agency (discourse) studies⁶.

⁶ In March 2009, I received an e-mail from a Brazilian journalist, who was finishing his post-graduate research on the use of the words ‘ideology’, ‘populism’, and ‘nationalism’ in AP and Reuters dispatches. Together with his supervisor he had, without any result, tried to find other studies on news agency discourse. After writing to Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, he got the answer that the only study they could find at the moment, dealing specifically with the discourse of Reuters, was my study on the role of ‘terrorist’ (Study B from 2003).

I have taken a few dispatches from the Reuters website and from Yahoo, when needing fresh examples for chapter 4. However, all the other material in my corpus – nearly 4.8 million words – comes from AP and Reuters newswires, as provided for the television news department of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE). Amid all recent developments, e.g., the rapidly expanding online and other multimedia services of both AP and Reuters, the traditional news agency product – a flow of general news dispatches transmitted to media companies – may have lost some of its earlier high status, but so far, at least, it has survived⁷. Reuters still calls its World Service “[o]ur flagship text newswire” (cf. Thomson Reuters website). For my research, having access to AP’s and Reuters’s flow of news reports has been crucial⁸. Though my studies are qualitative, the starting point has often been quantitative, since I have wanted to leave as little space as possible for intuition (see e.g. Study B). This kind of systematic analysis would not have been possible, if one had had to rely only on the agencies’ online selection. For instance, when I examined the characteristics of “breaking news” reports (cf. chapter 3), I started from one- or two-line “news alerts” and gathered all the consecutive AP and Reuters reports on that subject during one day. As I have explained in most of my studies (cf. Studies A, B, C, D and F), one of the essential features of news agency reporting is the continuous flow of dispatches. On a major story, updated versions follow each other, with new information, but also including a lot of repetition from the earlier reports. And unlike the online agency reports, these dispatches begin with additional information: priority or category codes, reference numbers, bylines, datelines, editor’s notes, and so on.

The data for my first study (Study A) were collected from AP and Reuters news dispatches between July 19 and 25, 1993. I took all the re-

⁷ Both the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) and the biggest Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat are still subscribers of AP and Reuters traditional newswires (confirmed on April 7, 2010, by emails from Reijo Lindroos/YLE and Kari Huhta/Helsingin Sanomat). Lindroos further said that relying on the news via the free websites would mean a delay which they cannot afford.

⁸ I worked all my professional life, for over 35 years, as a journalist in the TV news department of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE).

ports (printed as hard copies) related to the final debate and the last votes of the Maastricht ratification process in the British Parliament. In the total number of dispatches there was a natural bias in favour of the British Reuters; Reuters had 32 reports on this topic, against 26 from AP. In 2002, when I resumed my studies, it was possible for me to retrieve agency dispatches as soft copies; thus, after that, my corpora for the respective studies have tended to get much bigger than the one printed out in 1993. The data were in most cases collected by using a search word: for instance, *terrorist*, *terror*, *fear*, *quake*, *Iraq*, or *anonymity*. I applied, as meticulously as possible, the same criteria (e.g., the same time frame) for both agencies. Nevertheless, I ended up with having much more words from AP than from Reuters. The difference was especially conspicuous regarding the files collected by using *terrorist* or *terror* as the search word. There were at least two reasons for the American AP's bigger volume in this respect. First, the 'anti-terrorism discourse' (cf. Study B) after the September 11 attacks in 2001 was much livelier in the United States than in Britain. Secondly, the Reuters journalists tried to avoid the *referential* use of the word "terrorist", since they had been told, in an internal memo, not to label any news actors as "terrorists" (see Study B for details). However, given the special nature of news agency discourse, counting 'words' or 'pages' is a problematic task; in most cases it is hardly relevant.

1.3 Structure of the study

The study consists of five chapters and six case studies. The five chapters are *Introduction*, *The power of the news agencies*, *Breaking news – a staple of news agency distribution*, *Conventions vis-à-vis factuality and objectivity*, and *Findings*.

Chapter 2 – *The power of the news agencies* – explores the factors that have helped AP and Reuters become the two most influential news distributors in today's media world. After taking a brief look at the first, rather modest, steps of AP and Reuters, as well as of AFP's predecessor Havas, in the 19th century, I summarize the scope of the present activities of the "Big Three" (AP, Reuters and AFP), showing how all three have

hugely expanded their activities both geographically and to comprise a wealth of new topics and forms of media. The chapter also discusses two other important factors related to the power of AP and Reuters: the competition (and sometimes cooperation) between the news agencies and their position in the process of globalisation.

Chapter 3 focuses on the very essence of news agency reporting, presenting how a story of breaking news develops during one day period. By examining AP and Reuters reports on a big earthquake in Indonesia on May 27, 2006, I show how the “death toll”, i.e., the figures denoting casualties, for many hours has the leading role in the consecutive news reports. The meticulous reporting of the slowly rising casualty figures obscures the overall picture of people desperately needing help. Only when the toll has reached 3,000 do the agency journalists abandon their ‘factual’ style, and resort to writing emotionally charged texts. Besides the analysis of the quake story, chapter 3 also discusses the category of breaking news more generally.

In chapter 4, I relate the conventions of news agency reporting to the concepts of objectivity and factuality. As mentioned above, I have chosen the following four central conventions for closer examination: the conventional structure of news reports, the importance of newsworthiness, the tactics of impersonalisation vis-à-vis responsibility and the routines of presenting emotions. Although I have largely relied on my Studies (A to F) both in discussing these conventions and in presenting examples of them, I have also gathered fresh data and added some new analyses into chapter 4. For example, since my first study on political metaphors (Study A) was written many years ago, I wanted to ‘revisit’ them (cf. section 4.2), exploring if news agency journalists still resort to the same kind of metaphors (e.g. to metaphors of WAR), when trying to enhance newsworthiness. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the study. It also gives a summary presentation of the findings of the following six studies that are included as appendices to the study:

Study A:

Stenvall, Maija. 1995. The Last Round of the Maastricht Poker Game: A Study of News Agency Language. *Language Forum* 3(1-2), 1–57.

Study B:

Stenvall, Maija. 2003. An actor or an undefined threat? The role of ‘terrorist’ in the discourse of international news agencies. *Journal of Language and Politics* 2, 361–404.

Study C:

Stenvall, Maija. 2007. ‘Fear of terror attack persists’: Constructing fear in reports on terrorism by international news agencies, in: Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep (eds). *Discourse, War and Terrorism*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 205–222.

Study D:

Stenvall, Maija, 2008. Unnamed sources as rhetorical constructs in news agency reports. *Journalism Studies* 9:2, Special Issue “Language and Journalism”, 229–243.

Study E:

Stenvall, Maija. 2008. On emotions and the journalistic ideals of factuality and objectivity – tools for analysis. *Journal of Pragmatics* 40:9. Special Issue “Pragmatic and discourse-analytic approaches to present-day English”, 1569–1586.

Study F:

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2 The power of the news agencies

This chapter explores the position of the two news agencies, AP and Reuters, in the field of global news distribution. AP and Reuters are generally defined as being the two largest of the ‘Big Three’ news agencies. Although I have not analysed the language of the third ‘big’ news agency – the French AFP – in Studies A to F, I have found it relevant to include some information on AFP into the present chapter; especially as AFP’s predecessor Havas as the oldest one enjoys a special position in the history of news agencies.

First, I will briefly outline the development of the big news agencies from their modest start in the mid-1800s to the giant organizations they are today, and give some facts and figures to illustrate the scope of their present activities. When looking into the competition and cooperation between the news agencies, I present some examples of the competition (and the cooperation) in the TV news agency sector, too. Secondly, I discuss the concept of globalisation and, in particular, the role of the international news agencies in the globalisation of communication.

2.1 From the Big Four to the Big Three (or just Two?)

It is generally acknowledged that the number of powerful news agencies has come down in the late 1990s, after the decline of the American UPI, so that we can now speak of the Big Three (i.e., AP, Reuters and AFP) instead of the former Big Four (cf. Study A on the Big Four). AP and Reuters are often considered to be even more influential than AFP. According to Tunstall (1999: 199), these two news agencies, as major representatives of “Anglo-American duopoly”, “bestride the news agendas and news flows of the world”. AP and Reuters have further strengthened their role as important agenda-setters for other media by providing news videos worldwide

via their own television news agencies, APTN and Reuters Television, respectively.⁹

2.1.1 The birth and the development of the news agencies

On May 24, 1844, Samuel F.B. Morse sent the first official telegram from the Supreme Court Chamber in Washington D.C. to his partner, Alfred Vail, in Baltimore (cf. e.g. U.S. House of Representatives website). The invention of the telegraph and the gradual expansion of the lines¹⁰ provided the technical bases for the birth of news agencies, or “wire services”, as they are also called. Another important factor contributing to the emergence of news agencies was the growing demand for news during the first half of the 1800s (see Rampal 1995: 36). Both in America and in Europe (in Britain and France), newspapers were now less expensive than before. Thus, they were accessible to middle-class people, who had become interested in the news. As Rampal (p. 36) states, “the birth of the mass-oriented penny press was a very important factor in the development of news agencies”. Since the news agencies were able to serve a large number of newspapers simultaneously, the expenses for newsgathering per one newspaper did not rise too high, even if the new technical facilities, such as the telegraph, were costly.

The oldest of the Big Three news agencies is the French AFP, the direct successor to Havas, founded in 1835.¹¹ Charles-Louis Havas, a young Frenchman, had a few years earlier started distributing news mostly to merchants and government officials, but along with the emergence of cheap press he could expand the scope of his activities, especially after the telegraph was invented. In 1879, Havas combined his news service with

⁹ AFP has since 1985 provided news photos to its clients, and since 2002 it has together with “Visiware”, made videos. However, it does not compete with APTN and Reuters TV for TV news customers.

¹⁰ By 1856 “a straggling web of lines ...covered the more populous area of the country” (see e.g. http://www.acmi.net.au/AIC/MORSE_SCIAM.html. The article “The Morse telegraph of 1844” is based on an article in *Scientific American* from 1896.)

¹¹ For the discussion on the early phases of the news agencies below I have used information given in Rampal 1995, Rantanen 1990, and on the websites of AFP, AP, Reuters, Wikipedia, Britannica and Ketupa.net.

advertising. If a newspaper had no money to pay for the news delivery, it could give free space from the paper to Havas, who could then sell it to his advertising clients. World War II brought further changes to the French news agency, and in 1944, after the end of the Nazi occupation, the Havas Agency was renamed Agence France-Press (AFP).

In May 1848, representatives of six New York newspaper publishers, meeting in New York, reached an agreement “to pool efforts for collecting international news, and to offset the prohibitive cost of the telegraph” (The Associated press/History/Archives). These six newspapers together paid for setting up a “telegraphic relay of foreign news brought by ships to Boston” (Britannica Concise). Thus the Associated Press (AP) news agency (originally “Harbor News Association”) was born as a news-gathering cooperative, an operational policy which AP has retained until today.

After having undergone some organizational changes, AP had, by the mid-1890s, expanded considerably and had 700 newspapers as its subscribers. In 1900, AP’s regional associations merged, incorporating the modern AP “as a not-for-profit cooperative in New York City” (The Associated press/History/Archives). In 1945, after a court ruling (see e.g. Cooper 1959: 281–283 on the Government vs. AP legal proceedings), new memberships became open to all qualified American newspapers. AP members could no longer block the admission of a competitor wanting to join the cooperative, as they had done earlier.

The new undersea telegraph cable from Dover to Calais was an important incentive in the birth of the Reuters news agency. Just before the cable was opened, in autumn 1851, Paul Julius Reuter had moved to London and set up a two-room office near the London Stock Exchange. Reuter, who earlier operated in Germany and had used carrier pigeons to bridge a gap in the telegraph link, now started transmitting stock market quotations between London and Paris via the new cable. In a few years’ time, Reuter extended his service to other countries besides Britain, serving no longer only financial institutions but also the press. The content was expanded, too, to include general and economic news. Along with the spreading of the international telegraph network, Reuters “[b]ranch offices

sprang up throughout Europe and beyond” (Rampal 1995: 39), so that by 1861 Reuters had agents in Asia, South Africa, and Australia.

In the 20th century, the company underwent several structural changes. Reuters “remained in private hands until 1925” (Britannica Concise), when the Press Association, representing UK provincial newspapers, took a majority holding in Reuters Ltd. In 1941, Reuters was reorganized as the Reuters Trust, a cooperative owned by the British national and provincial press. According to the Reuters website, the restructuring aimed at deflecting the pressure coming from “the British government to serve British interests” during World War II; the Trust would help Reuters to preserve “independence and neutrality”. In 1984, Reuters was floated as a public company on the stock exchange (under the name “Reuters Group PLC”). At the same time, a new rule was included in the constitution of the company: no single shareholder was allowed to hold more than 15% of the company. In this way, it was thought, “the company’s tradition for objective reporting” could be maintained (Wikipedia).

However, in May 2007, information was sent out that that the Canadian financial data provider Thomson was to buy the Reuters group “in a deal worth about £8.7bn” (BBC news website, May 15, 2007). A BBC journalist stated: “The tie-up will create the world's biggest financial news and data firm, allowing the new company to leapfrog its main rival, US-based Bloomberg.” At the same time, the BBC’s business editor Robert Peston (BBC website, “Peston’s Picks”, May 15, 2007) raised the question about “Reuters’ editorial principles of integrity, independence and freedom from bias” now that the Thomson family would end up owning 53 per cent of the company. In 2008, the merger between the Thomson Corporation and Reuters Group PLC was completed, and the company was renamed Thomson Reuters. However, Reuters general news and some other Reuters services maintained their traditional names, as these had over the decades become well-known brands all over the world.

2.1.2 The scope of the present activities

The data for my studies (A to F) have been taken from AP and Reuters newswires, as provided for the television news department of the Finnish Broadcasting Company. This is the traditional product of the news agencies, i.e., general/political news reports transmitted to a media company. Along with the economic newswire, this product can be linked directly to the early days of the news agencies in the mid-1800s.

A glance at the websites of AP, Reuters and AFP¹², however, shows that the Big Three have expanded their activities, not only into new geographic areas worldwide, but also into different forms of media and so as to comprise new topics. In addition to news texts, they supply photos, videos and graphics to their clients, and via the online services they today make at least some of their products available to private people, and not only to media or commercial companies as before. As for Reuters, only a minor part of the company revenue comes from the news services; its financial services are far more profitable.

One of the new key concepts on the websites of the news agencies is “tailored” service. In addition to the basic newswire service transmitting general and political news, some of the wires focus on sports news, others on entertainment or business news, and so on. Or news is tailored to the needs of the customers living in a specific region, or to cover the events of a specific region, but transmitted also to clients elsewhere. The spectrum of languages has widened as well. Originally AFP’s telegrams were sent in French, AP’s and Reuters’s in English, while today all of them operate in several additional languages, too.

Below I give some key facts and figures for each of these news agencies, as these are presented on their respective websites. However, like Boyd-Barrett, I want to stress that one has to treat this kind of statistics “warily”. As Boyd-Barrett (1998: 29) puts it, “different agencies define and count things differently”.

¹² The figures and other information below have been gathered almost exclusively from the websites of AP, Reuters and AFP, latest checked in August 2008, after the Thomson Reuters merger. The double quotes refer to the website of the agency in question.

AP

Headquarters and main branches:

- corporate headquarters in New York
- in New York:
 - the National Desk, where editors “select edit and file the news, write national roundups and direct coverage for stories of national interest”.
 - the International Desk, where editors “write, edit and direct coverage for stories of global interest”.
- regional editing desks in London and Bangkok
- APTN (video news service) headquarters in London

Staff:

- 4,100 editorial, communications and administrative employees worldwide (3,000 are journalists)
- a total of 243 bureaus in 97 countries
- over 80 APTN (video news service) bureaus

Products:

- newswires (since 1848): international, national, state, sports, business and entertainment news
- photos (launch of AP Wirephoto service in 1935): AP “delivers more than 1,000 photos a day”.
- graphics (AP launches GraphicsBank, online archive for TV news programs, in 1991)
- audio (AP news broadcast on radio for the first time in 1920)
- video (launch of APTV, a global video newsgathering agency, in 1994; became APTN in 1998 when APTV bought WTN): news, sports and entertainment
- online multimedia services (by AP Digital).

AP offers news in five languages: English, German, Italian, French and Spanish. In addition, its international subscribers translate the reports into many more languages.

Clients:

- 121 countries served by AP
- 1,700 U.S. daily, weekly, non-English and college newspapers (this figure includes 1,500 U.S. daily newspaper members, i.e. owners of AP)
- 5,000 radio/TV outlets taking AP
- 850 AP Radio News audio affiliates

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- 550 international broadcasters receiving AP's global video news service (APTN, and SNTV, which is a sports joint venture video service)
- more than 8,500 international subscribers for AP news and photos
- since March 2000, AP Digital (a division of the Associated Press) has provided news and information to "Web sites, wireless operators, corporate and government desktops, information distributors and other commercial and new media applications". In 2004, AP digital launched "AP Financial News", an expanded business news service which covers "top companies and financial markets around the world".

Furthermore, AP claims that more than one billion people every day make use of AP's services, in one form or another. Due to online distribution, all Internet users can access a limited choice of AP (or some other news agency) reports.

Reuters Media

Headquarters and main branches:

- Thomson Reuters Corporation headquarters in New York
- "major operations" in London:
 - Reuters Media newswire service
 - Reuters Television video news service

Staff:

- over 2,400 "seasoned Reuters journalists"
- 197 bureaus, serving 132 countries
- Reuters Television staff "in more than 80 locations"

Products:

- newswires (since 1851); 6 newswire categories: World, Business, Lifestyle, Sports, Health, Topical; "World Service" in 5 languages: English, German, French, Spanish and Arabic
- pictures: breaking news photos and archive; every day a "team of more than 600 photographers and editors... distributes up to 1,500 pictures"
- graphics: "Reuters News Graphics Service provides media clients with
- editable news and information graphics on the world's top news stories in Arabic, English, French and Spanish."
- television and video (in the early 1990s, Visnews was bought by Reuters and renamed Reuters Television in 1993): transmitting raw news footage with natural sound, ready-to-air packages, or live coverage; supplies around 100 stories daily
- online services: multimedia news for websites (reports, financial news, "other services", e.g. weather reports, and videos) Reports can be chosen by region,

or by topic, and they are available in 9 languages (English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian, Japanese, Chinese, Russian and Arabic).

The traditional English language newswire service for (print, radio or television) media is called “Reuters World Service”, and Reuters Television presents “Reuters World News Service” as its “flagship” service. At the other end of the cline (be it public–private, or general–specific) we find the online services, which show examples of rather far-going “tailoring”. If you would like to have, for instance, “Brazil Online Report – Oddly Enough” delivered to your web server, you could “[e]ntertain and amaze your audience with offbeat stories that depict the surprising, bizarre and quirky side of life”, and all this in Portuguese.

Clients:

The Thomson Reuters website concentrates on presenting staff and products; as for the clients, the references remain rather vague, e.g., as follows:

- “Reuters is the world’s largest international multimedia news organization providing indispensable news and information tailored for media and business professionals.”
- “Reuters news seen on over 400,000 screens around the world and viewed by over 1 billion people every day.”

AFP

Headquarters and branch offices:

- headquarters in Paris
- regional centers in Washington, Montevideo, Nicosia and Hong Kong

Staff:

- 2,900 staff and stringers
- “spread across 165 countries”
- 200 staff photographers
- 5 regional headquarters, bureaus in 110 countries, 50 countries covered by local correspondents
- 40 dedicated video reporters for AFPTV

Products:

- text (newswires since 1835, “Agence Havas”): general newswires, business news, sports; 400,000–600,000 words every day, in 6 languages (Arabic, English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish)
- online: offers e.g. AFP News Online (“a specially-crafted real-time news service”), Lifestyle Europe! (“The inside track on modern European living”), AFP Slide Shows (“Breaking news in pictures”)

- image: Graphics Service, ImageForum and Photo Service Graphics service was launched in 1988; around 80 news graphics per day, Photo service, launched in 1985; 2,000 to 3,000 photos per day (“An award-winning service that is leader in its field”)
- audio service launched in 1984
- video/AFPTV (“an international video service in English or French”): established in 2001. In 2002 AFP joined forces with Visiware, a French interactive TV/gaming company. Over 150 news packages per month; “puts an exceptional emphasis on exclusive angles, in-depth, original analysis and storytelling features”.

Clients:

No exact figures for the AFP clients could be found on the website; the agency only says that it “continues to expand its operations worldwide, reaching thousands of subscribers via radio, television, newspapers and companies”.

On its website, AP claims to be “the largest and oldest news organization in the world”, and above, I have quoted Reuters as saying that it is “the world's largest international multimedia news organization”. Which of them, then, is the largest? The facts and figures on their respective websites do not give any clear answer to that question. As we have seen, AP presents rather accurate figures of the number of various clients, whereas Reuters puts more emphasis on describing the (large) quantities of its products (so and so much “every day”, for example). Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen (1998: 15) present Reuters as “the strongest”, but that is “mainly because of its financial service”. AFP, being the direct successor to “Agence Havas”, is usually regarded as the oldest. The Wikipedia website gives the following definition, which can be taken to reflect the common view: “Agence France-Presse (AFP) is the oldest and third largest news agency in the world, behind the Associated Press and Reuters.”¹³

¹³ This definition was retrieved on the Wikipedia website (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agence_France-Presse) in November 2006. However, Wikipedia in May 2010 has a more ‘neutral’ interpretation: “**Agence France-Presse (AFP)** is a French news agency, the oldest one in the world, and one of the three largest with Associated Press and Reuters.”

2.1.3 Competition and cooperation

Each of the three big news agencies certainly wants to be the largest; to make its old clients renew their contracts, and to convince new media outlets or other companies of the superiority of its services. Since such ideals as reliability, objectivity, factuality, accuracy or credibility, which are advocated by AP and/or Reuters in their policy statements, cannot be easily assessed, the agencies resort to advertising more concrete achievements, like scoops (i.e., having been the first to report some breaking news), awards (e.g. Pulitzer Prizes), or technical innovations (see the websites of AFP, AP and Reuters).

In the present sub-section, I look first into the past of the big news agencies, which gives evidence that, despite the intense competition, news agencies have also cooperated with each other, whenever they have found it useful.

After that, I will briefly present a special field in which the two biggest agencies, AP and Reuters, compete visibly at the grass-root level: the Eurovision News Exchange, into which both APTN and Reuters Television try to get their items accepted. But here, too, we may find examples of the cooperation which benefits both parties.

The news cartel

The most noteworthy example of the news agency cooperation is, undoubtedly, the cartel formed by Reuters, Havas and the German Wolff in the 19th century. The need for this kind of cooperation between the news agencies, which otherwise competed with each other, can be attributed to two factors.¹⁴ First is the economic aspect: by sharing telegraphic and some other costs the agencies were able “to cover the greatest possible number of countries” (Rampal 1995: 40), and to avoid the costly competition with

¹⁴ I have mainly drawn on Rantanen (1990) and Ingmar (1973) in the discussion on the news cartel's history below. Rantanen (pp. 37, 38) points out that most scholars who have written on this cartel have relied on secondary sources, whereas she herself has studied the archives of the respective news agencies. She also mentions Ingmar's dissertation as the “most notable exception” (Rantanen 1990: 37).

each other. Secondly, somewhat paradoxically, the cooperation helped them in their policy of exclusivity.

The first steps in the agency cooperation go back to the late 1850s. In the 1860s, the signing of mutual agreements between two of the three cartel members was characteristic; Rantanen (1990: 40) draws attention especially to the Havas-Wolff contract in 1867, which, as she states, “set new terms that later became established in use”. The emphasis was no longer on “a cost-free exchange”, but rather on exclusivity. Each agency was prohibited from operating in the other’s territory. The agreement concerned economic and political telegrams alike.

In view of exclusivity, the most important agreement was the one signed between Reuters, Havas and Wolff on 17 January 1870, allowing the three agencies to divide the world news market into spheres of exclusive interest. In its own territory, each of the cartel parties could, on the one hand, collect news and, on the other hand, hold the exclusive rights for selling the news in that area (Ingmar 1973: 4). Reuters was given control over England and Holland, and their colonies; Wolff received Germany and Scandinavia, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg; the exclusive areas of Havas were the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese empires. Furthermore, Havas and Reuters divided the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Belgium among themselves. All other regions were “neutral territories”, where all three news agencies had the right to operate. Though the central term in the new agreement was “exclusive exploitation” (i.e., in regard to *selling* the news in one’s own territory) (Ingmar 1973: 28), the principle of a cost-free exchange was not totally abandoned; by paying just telegraphic costs, any of the three agencies could receive news from the territories of the other two. This reimbursement helped the agencies increase the news supply to their clients (p. 28).

The agreements from the late 1880s onwards were marked by outside political interference. The three news agencies had formed the cartel mainly for economic reasons, but now the political leaders of the respective countries began to see them as agents of potential power, as possible vehicles of propaganda (cf. Ingmar 1973: 42, 47, 48). Extensive regulations

concerning political news were included in the contracts. In the late 1880s, central figures in this struggle for power were the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and the Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi. These two leaders wanted to break the power of the Havas news agency and to bring together German, Austrian and Italian news agencies, with the support of Reuters. The attempt, however, failed; the cartel of the three news agencies, which had even survived the war between France and Germany in the early 1870s, proved to be strong once more. As Ingmar (1973: 81) states: “The international news cartel was a power that could defy the attacks coming from the highest political level” [my transl., MS]¹⁵.

At the time of the cartel dominance, until World War I, AP did not hold an equal position with the three cartel parties. No wonder then that AP struggled to break the cartel, and eventually its efforts were successful (see Rantanen 1990: 50). AP had signed an agreement with Reuters as early as in 1861, and after that several separate contracts were made between AP and the cartel parties. AP had exclusive rights for the U.S. distribution of the news that it got from Reuters, Havas and Wolff, and the three European news agencies received U.S. news from AP. As Ingmar (1973: 26) notes, Reuters had a key position in the cartel’s relations with AP. All traffic went via London, and the other two paid Reuters for its services. On the basis of its contracts with the cartel, AP could not independently operate outside North America, but gradually it expanded its activities abroad. AP took perhaps its most important step forward after World War I, when it succeeded in getting into the South-American market, which had earlier been exclusively allotted to Havas (cf. Rantanen 1990: 50).

The demise of the cartel began after World War I, though the formal breakup did not take place until 1934 (cf. Rampal 1995: 40; Boyd-Barrett 1997: 133). AP’s struggle against the cartel rules was intensified after it got a competitor on the U.S. market; especially as this new American news

¹⁵ Originally in Swedish: ”Den internationella nyhetsbyråkartellen var en maktfaktor som kunde stå emot attacker från högsta politiska nivå.”

agency, the United Press (UP), paid no attention to cartel regulations, starting soon after its birth (in 1907) to sell its news outside the U.S., to Britain and to Japan (Rampal 1995: 40), and during World War I to South America (cf. Fenby 1986: 46). AP's battle against the cartel, Rantanen (1990: 50) states, "later helped lay the basis for the doctrine of the free flow of information".

For about 60 years, the three news agencies, coming from three powerful European states, dominated the world news distribution. Even the territories that were defined as "neutral" could be used freely only by the cartel parties (Ingmar 1973: 41). In an exclusive cartel territory, the national news agency was tied to the respective big news agency. The national agency could access the global agencies' service via the rights holder in question, and distribute it further within its own territory. In return, it transmitted news from its home area to the cartel party, and also paid for the cartel's news. Rantanen (1998: 36, 37) stresses that even if researchers often present the role of the national news agencies as having been subordinate to that of the cartel parties, it was rather a question of "bi-directional dependency", of "two different kinds of exclusivity", which she calls "global" and "domestic", respectively. The national agencies, too, benefited from the mutual agreement in that they could distribute foreign news exclusively in their own country.

Eurovision News Exchange and TV news agencies

"The agencies whatever their name was were always very aggressive towards each other". This statement was included in the email I received from one of my former colleagues, who worked for years as a Eurovision News Editor and, thus, as a kind of 'gate-keeper' for the TV news agencies.¹⁶

¹⁶ Unless otherwise stated, the present subsection is based on my personal professional experiences, and on the discussions with and email messages from my former colleagues, both in Finland (YLE) and abroad. I worked for over 35 years as a journalist in the TV news department of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), dealing with the international news exchanges (Eurovision News, most notably). For research on the TV news agencies, see e.g. Paterson (1997, 1998).

From a modest start in the early 1960s, the Eurovision News Exchange (EVN) – the exchange of TV news items within the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) – has expanded to comprise over 100 broadcast sources, with about 44,000 news items exchanged per year (an average of 120 items per day)¹⁷. While the general idea is the principle of reciprocity between “primarily the public broadcasters of Europe” (cf. www.eurovision.net), it has, nevertheless, since the early 1960s, offered the international TV news agencies a quick forum for transmitting a big selection of news items to their subscribers. This was especially valuable in the early years, when the agencies (Visnews and UPI/UPITN at that time) otherwise had to resort to servicing their clients by time-consuming airfreight. But even today, when the present TV agencies, Reuters Television and APTN, have their own 24-hour satellite services, they contribute to the EVN exchanges with several thousand news items every year.

For AP and Reuters, the Eurovision News Exchange is probably the only forum where they compete *concretely* every day, at the grass-root level. In 1995, Stephen Claypole, the managing Director of the newly founded TV news agency APTV, wrote:

Somebody once said – and it wasn't Marshall McLuhan – that if television was the global village then the agency sector was a gang-fight in a global alleyway. (Claypole 1995: 24)

Claypole clearly disagrees with this view, referring to the TV agency sector as having expanded by about 50% in five years and predicting a similar growth in the years to come, especially as the new on-line services and multimedia platforms could be expected to prosper. Claypole's predictions, in fact, proved to be quite realistic. However, many of those who could follow the activities of the news agencies in the field of the EVN Exchange, in the 1990s and before (and after that, too), would probably claim that the connotations evoked by the gang-fight metaphor were not far from reality. One important reason that contributed to the fierce competition was the

¹⁷ The figures on the exchanged items are based on the minutes from the EBU News Assembly meeting in Valencia, November 2008.

fact that it was not up to the agencies to decide which of their items were fed into the EVNs; there has always been some kind of ‘gate-keeper’ in-between.

In the earlier years, the EBU member services had to state their interest (i.e., to say “yes” or “no”) in every single news item that was offered, since that affected the sharing of the circuit costs between the members. If there were three or more takers, then the item in question was accepted and could be transmitted. Cost-sharing procedures and daily Eurovision routines changed over the years, especially as satellites came to replace the costly landline circuits. In 1995, the introduction of the Permanent News Network (PNN) meant that there now was a 24-hour network available for EVN-transmissions, with the participants paying an annual subscription fee¹⁸. There was no point anymore in checking the interest in the individual items – or even in marking withdrawals from various transmission blocks, i.e., fixed EVN-exchanges, as had been done at some stage. Moreover, that would have been a time-consuming task, given the huge volume of the EVN offers and the prospective takers. All these changes have given more and more power in the ‘gate-keeping’ task to the Eurovision News Editors, who bear the journalistic responsibility for the news exchanges¹⁹.

While EBU News Editors and news contacts, sitting in the safety of their newsrooms, might have listed “competition” and “pushiness” as conspicuous features of the news agencies’ work, other EBU colleagues – those who worked as field producers in the crisis spots – saw them in a different

¹⁸ Information given in an internal EBU document (“Special Notice EV 95/5, Permanent News Network”).

¹⁹ As early as in the 1960s, a predecessor of the Eurovision News Editor – a person then called “Eurovision News Coordinator” – supervised the news exchanges, making requests to member services, checking interest in the offers, presiding in the daily conferences held on a special 4-wire circuit, and so on. Until the end of 1996, this group of between 10 and 20 Eurovision News Editors worked on a voluntary basis; i.e., these journalists were put forward by their respective member organizations, to be accepted by the EBU News Working Party. Each of them took care of her/his own period in a rotating schedule, working out of her/his national TV-company. In the 1990s, the duration of one duty period was seven days (each day from early morning until at least 20.00 cet); before that it was 10 days, or even longer. In January 1997, a new system was introduced, so that there were only four News Editors, ‘leased’ by the EBU, but still stationed in their home countries. From the year 2000 onwards, the four News Editors have worked at the EBU headquarters in Geneva, together with the EBU’s administrative staff.

light. One of them does recall “several occasions where competitiveness was bordering on the silly and dangerous”, but adds that the agencies “at times managed to find solutions (such as the Sarajevo Agency Pool) that was beneficial to both”²⁰. Another producer, Bruno Beeckman²¹, wants to give them “due credit... as the unsung heroes of television journalism”. Beeckman²² points out that when news breaks, the agencies usually are the first to provide the pictures; furthermore, unlike the public or private broadcasters, who often pull out immediately after the newsworthy event is over, the agencies may keep their staff on spot for follow-up stories.

Beeckman gives a powerful example of a case where the agencies finally reached cooperation, but only the hard way. On December 8, 1994, during the (first) Chechen war, the Eurovision team, headed by Bruno Beeckman, established a satellite dish in central Grozny, having crossed the border just a couple of hours before the Russian army did. For the next twelve days that was the only feedpoint for all coverage coming from the war zone, for all TV services. The group included the television news agencies, too, and this time there were three of them, as AP had just some weeks before launched its own video news agency APTV. The two ‘old’ agencies, Reuters TV and WTN (Worldwide Television News), “had agreed to make APTV’s entry into the market as difficult as possible”, refusing to cooperate, Beeckman writes. Thus, even when the situation became more and more dangerous, and public and private broadcasters started “pooling” cameramen so that one cameraman, in turn, worked with six or seven journalists, the three agencies stuck to their “exclusive” pictures. Along with the dangers and the fact that two cameramen were wounded, the

²⁰ Email message from Pierre Peyrot, September 11, 2008. Peyrot has worked at the EBU offices in New York and Geneva, and as a news producer at several EBU feedpoints in crisis areas, areas like Sarajevo and Baghdad.

²¹ Bruno Beeckman first worked several years at the EBU Moscow office, and later e.g. at the EBU headquarters in Geneva. Like Peyrot, he was sent to many crisis spots (such as Chechnya and Afghanistan), to help both EBU services and TV news agencies feed their material to home bases.

²² Email message from Bruno Beeckman November 14, 2008. The double quotes in this subsection refer to Beeckman’s email.

pressure on the agency pool grew, and there were some signs of budding cooperation.

On December 20, “as flares were being dropped literally on our dish”, the small group of courageous journalists – ITN, BBC, SKY-TV, the three agencies and Eurovision – that had stayed behind in Grozny had to leave Chechnya, and the satellite dish was relocated to Khassavyurt, a town near the Dagestani-Chechen border. The correspondents and cameramen, after that, had to cross the border, when making their daily journey from Khassavyurt to Grozny and back. At the same time, there were a few journalists who were still in Grozny, and one of them, a young woman working for Time magazine, became the first journalist to be killed in the Chechen war, in a Russian bombing raid. When her body was brought to Khassavyurt and all journalists joined in an “impromptu church service”... “it suddenly dawned on the most hardened that a pool situation [for the three news agencies] had become a necessity”. I end the story with Beeckman’s own words:

And every morning, the pool cameraman and pool producer of the day would gather at the Eurovision feedpoint for a cup of coffee and a bit of music to try and make it seem like any normal day when normal people go to work. Hardly any words were spoken during this morning coffee breaks, in order to keep this illusion of normalcy intact. I have yet to see more astonishing pictures than the ones which were delivered to the feedpoint on a daily basis from December 1994 until March 1995 by the Moscow/Kiev/Tbilisi/Paris based cameramen from Reuters, APTV and WTN.

More than ten years ago, Cohen et al. (1996: 149) called the relationship between the Eurovision News Exchange and the video news agencies “complicated but beneficial”; complicated because the agencies transmit their material both through EVN and via their own satellites to their subscribers (many of which are EBU members as well), and beneficial because, on the one hand, “EVN needs the agencies to extend its reach into areas where there are no EBU members” and, on the other hand, the agencies thus get another outlet for their product and a cost-free means to transmit part of their material to their head offices in London (see p. 149). Even today EBU members do need the agencies’ coverage for their news

bulletins, but the vital question is, how many members still record the agency material only via EVN, and not directly from the agency satellite. The statistics have shown that roughly 50 per cent of the annual EVN items come from the agencies, which means a considerable load of administrative and technical work for the EBU. For the agencies, arguably, the main advantage of the cooperation with the EBU is publicity; EBU offers them a perfect forum for showing their clients – and prospective clients – how good their product is. In the present tight economic situation, many EBU services have had to choose only one of the two agencies, that is, either APTN or Reuters TV. The agencies, naturally, strive to keep their old subscribers happy and hope to attract new ones. At the time of writing, the EVN is undergoing considerable changes, which may also affect the long-lived relationship between the EBU and the news agencies.

2.2 News agencies and globalisation

The question of when – and by whom – the term *globalisation* was coined is highly controversial; a search on the Internet gives a time span of at least 40 years (from the 1940s to the 1980s) for its first appearance. According to Giddens (2002: 7), “in the late 1980s the term was hardly use. It has come from nowhere to be almost everywhere [in the 1990s]”.

The meaning of the term *globalisation* is equally ambiguous, especially as it is used in a wealth of different fields; media and communication, culture, politics, and economy being among the most central of them (cf. e.g. Rantanen 2005). The big news agencies, AP and Reuters, present themselves as ‘global’, and, indeed, it can be argued that they have contributed to ‘globalisation’ since their very birth in the last half of the 1800s; in other words, long before the term itself was coined.

In the present subsection, I look first at scholars’ views on globalisation in general, and then at the big news agencies’ role as ‘agents’ of globalisation. In fact, there seems to be a close correspondence between the public debate on media imperialism/globalisation and the researchers’ interest in the big (print and video) news agencies. “[T]here was a modest boom in the growth of news agency studies” between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s

(Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998: 2), which coincided with the UNESCO's NWICO (the New World Information and Communication Order) debate, reflecting concerns about 'media imperialism'; and after a lull of some years, "[i]nterest was revived in the mid-1990s" – the interest in the role of global video news agencies, in particular (p. 11). More generally, there has been an abundance of studies combining globalisation and media from the 1990s onwards.

2.2.1 *Views on globalisation*

In globalisation studies, researchers (e.g., Sreberny-Mohammadi et al 1997; Giddens 2002; Cameron 2002; Rantanen 2002, 2005) seek answers, for example, to the following questions:

- How should we define 'globalisation'?
 - What are the main domains in which the term occurs?
 - Is it "more or less identical to Americanisation", as 'anti-globalisation' demonstrators often claim (Giddens 2002: xxi); or could it be "the latest stage in the exploitation of the third world by the West" as it is "widely seen in the developing world" (p. xx)?
- Which factors have contributed to its birth?
 - industrialization?
 - modernity, in general, and late modernity in particular?
- Who are the 'agents' of globalisation?
 - big multinational companies?
 - media conglomerates, such as the international news agencies?
- How does globalisation affect people's daily life?
 - Is globalisation a good or a bad thing?
 - Can we agree with Giddens's argument that it "lies behind the expansion of democracy" (p. 5)?
 - Does it lead to homogeneity?
 - Does it increase (economic) inequality?
 - Can globalisation be connected to the rise of international terrorism and to the creation of world-wide criminal networks?

When answering the last sub-question, we can surely subscribe to Giddens's view of global terrorism and various world-wide forms of organized crime as being "all parts of the dark side of globalisation" (p. xvi). The effects of globalisation may also be highly visible in the economic sphere: When the United States was hit by a bank crisis in 2008, the markets all over the world started fluctuating; and journalists called experts to presage, whether 'we' (in other parts of the world) were likely to suffer losses, too. By October 2008, market turbulence, and economic downturn in general, had reached such proportions that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned us that "the global financial system was on the brink of meltdown" (Reuters business news, Oct. 11, 2008). However, given that globalisation is such a complex and multi-layered phenomenon, the debate on globalisation, understandably, encompasses numerous, much more controversial issues. For instance, in the field of economic globalisation, the issue of inequality has generated a wealth of studies, often leading to contrasting conclusions. The process of homogenisation would seem to be another disputatious subject: is it an inevitable outcome of globalisation, and if so, is that kind of development positive or negative?

Sociologist Anthony Giddens (2002: xxvi–xxix) presents a rather positive outlook of the effects of globalisation on world economic inequality, although he admits that inequalities *within* some countries with high growth rates, such as China, certainly have increased. Giddens (p. xxix) also stresses that globalisation "has to be managed more effectively and equitably than has happened over the past two decades". Among the economists, there is a "Pollyannaish" mainstream view that construes globalisation "as a benign and automatic force that... will inexorably lead countries and individuals to a state of economic bliss" (cf. Milanovic 2003: 668). Galbraith (2007: 605), however, points out that inequality both within and between countries, in fact, increased during the last two decades of the twentieth century, which were "the years of debt crisis, communist collapse, and neoliberal globalization". Other critics stress the complexity of globalisation. Milanovic (2003: 668) argues that globalisation "presents different faces to different people": one is "benign", but the

other has “malignant features”, being “based on coercion and brute force”. Furthermore, one cannot always say that whenever inequality has increased, globalisation is to be blamed; or – in the opposite case – that the decline of poverty, evidenced in some countries, would be a positive result following from globalisation (see e.g. Bardhan 2007). China, for example, is generally seen as a model nation of benign effects of globalisation, but, as Bardhan (2007) states, its success “may have more to do with the 1978 land reforms and other internal factors than with foreign trade or investment”, and with China ignoring “Western rules of good behavior” (Rodrik 2002).

As stated above, along with economic inequality, homogenisation is one of the controversial issues in the globalisation debate. On the one hand, the threat posed by globalisation is often seen as a driving force towards increasing homogeneity (of some group, e.g., a nation), as people fear losing their jobs to immigrants, or they fear cultural standardisation, and so on. According to Giddens (2002: 13), sometimes local cultural identities have been revived because of globalisation: for example, those of the Scots in the UK and the Quebec separatists in Canada. Giddens argues that “[l]ocal nationalisms spring up as a response to globalising tendencies, as the hold of older nation-states weakens” (p. 13). On the other hand, there is the basic question of whether or not globalisation really leads to homogenisation; and if so, whether that is good or bad. In discussing the teaching of ‘communication skills’, Cameron (2002: 70) sets to oppose “the new rhetoric of global communication”, which aims at the “dissemination of ‘global’ [i.e., Western] communicative norms and genres” across speakers of different languages, representing different cultural backgrounds. Many communicative strategies, advocated by experts, Cameron (p. 80) argues, “are problematic in cultures [for instance in that of Japan] whose notions of personhood and modes of social organization diverge markedly from the Western/Anglo mode”. This kind of homogenisation – or rather the homogenising aspirations of various experts – could thus be regarded as a negative effect of globalisation.

2.2.2 News agencies – agents of globalisation?

Globalisation studies, as discussed above, present globalisation as a complex, multifaceted issue, which is often construed as an economic process. The role of the media and communication tends to be neglected, or at least it remains vague (Rantanen 2005: 4). However, Rantanen (2002: 1) argues that “[t]here is no globalization without media and communications”. Rantanen (2005: 8) defines globalisation as follows:

Globalization is a process in which worldwide economic, political, cultural and social relations have become increasingly mediated across time and space.

The news agencies can be said to have contributed to every dimension of globalisation (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998: 2). Thus it is not surprising that the role of the news agencies was brought up in debates and studies on media imperialism and globalisation. And as in the globalisation debate in general, here, too, *inequality* and *homogenisation* became central issues.

The NWICO debate – demands for equality in communication²³

Inequality between the developed countries in the North and the Less Developed Countries (LCD) in the South became a subject which generated heated and emotional debates in the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, several African nations had gained independence, and, in 1961, the non-aligned movement – engaged in helping to solve problems following decolonization – held its first official meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.²⁴ The economic inequality between the industrialized North and the less-

²³ Unless otherwise stated, I have drawn on the information from Boyd-Barrett and Thussu (1992) in the present subsection.

²⁴ This is how the BBC news website (2008) describes the non-aligned movement: “The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is made up of 118 developing countries and aims to represent the political, economic and cultural interests of the developing world. The NAM traces its origins to a meeting in 1955 of 29 Asian and African countries at which heads of state discussed common concerns, including colonialism and the influence of the West... A meeting in 1961 set up the criteria for NAM membership.”

developed South was uppermost on the agenda: a need for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was expressed in the early 1970s. In the wake of the economic demands came concerns on the North-South imbalance of information and communication, which was closely linked to the economy, as the LCDs lacked the necessary means for acquiring new technology. Thus, aspirations for NIEO were followed by those for NWICO (a New World Information and Communication Order) in the late 1970s. When promoting these two projects, the non-aligned movement could take advantage of its numerical superiority in the various bodies of the United Nations.

The NWICO project was initiated by UNESCO, whose Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, in 1977, set up a 16-member international commission headed by Sean MacBride from Ireland. The final report of the MacBride Commission was submitted in 1980 by the name of "Many Voices, One World". Boyd-Barrett and Thussu (1992: 17) state that "[f]rom its inception NWICO has been a vague concept". In the preface of the Commission report (MacBride et al. 1980: xviii), MacBride defines the "New World Information and Communication Order" as a process, whose "particulars ...will continually alter", while "its goals will be constant – more justice, more equity, more reciprocity in information exchange, less dependence in communication flows, less downwards diffusion of messages, more self-reliance and cultural identity, more benefits for all mankind".

As for news circulation, according to the report (p. 36), there are clear inequalities and imbalances: instead of "free and balanced" flow, the developing countries are submitted to "one-way flow". The Commission report refers to "the predominance of the major transnational agencies", whose "massive world operations give them a near monopoly in the international dissemination of news" (p. 145). This kind of one-way flow can be linked back to the colonial periods; to the time when the news cartel formed by Reuters, Havas and Wolff had the world market divided into areas of exclusive interest. As Boyd-Barrett and Thussu (1992: 12) note, that was the beginning of "the process of perceiving the information about

the ‘peripheral’ world through the prism of the Western news agencies which were based in the major ‘centres’ of the world”. For the final NWICO report, the MacBride Commission prepared 100 background papers, some of which represented opposing viewpoints. Maybe the strongest and the most influential paper in support of the position of the Third World in the NWICO debate was that of Mustapha Masmoudi, the Tunisian member of the Commission. Masmoudi points out that both the events taking place in the developing countries and the news from abroad reported to them are transmitted via the same channels, that is, via the transnational media. Masmoudi (1979: 174) continues:

By transmitting to the developing countries only news processed by them, that is, news which they have filtered, cut, and distorted, the transnational media impose their own way of seeing the world upon the developing countries ...Moreover, [they often] present these communities – when indeed they show interest in them – in the most unfavourable light, stressing crises, strikes, street demonstrations, putsches, etc., or even holding them up to ridicule.

The demands for a more balanced flow of information and the critical voices blaming the transnational (Western) media for monopolising and distorting the news generated heated debates in the 1970s and the early 1980s, in particular. The Western media organizations saw the aspirations for a NWICO mainly as a threat to freedom of information. As Boyd-Barrett and Thussu (1992: 22) note, they tended “to reduce the issue of a new and more just international information order” to concern only “the journalist’s right to report without let or hindrance”. The Western nations feared, among other things, that UNESCO, in promoting the NWICO project, was in fact supporting Third World dictators, helping them in their propagandist purposes. NWICO was one of the reasons that led to an insurmountable dispute between the United States and UNESCO, so that the US withdrew from that organization in December 1984; the United Kingdom and Singapore followed suit one year after that. The economic implications for UNESCO were serious, since with these three nations about 30 per cent of its budget disappeared.

From the 1990s onwards – globalisation is “almost everywhere”

In the latter half of the 1980s, the NWICO debate “collapsed”, and accordingly, “social scientists, having taken a brief look, rather lost their interest in news agencies” (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998: 3). But from the 1990s onwards, news agencies have often been related to globalisation, for instance in the following books: *Global Journalism: Survey of International Communication* (Merrill 1995), *Media in Global Context: a Reader* (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1997), *The Globalization of News* (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998), *Practising Global Journalism* (Herbert 2000) and *News in a Globalized Society* (Hjarvard 2001). The focus has shifted from “media imperialism” to globalisation, and, at the same time, *homogenisation* – instead of *inequality* – has become a central issue.

From the days of the late 1800s, when cables came to replace Julius Reuters’s carrier pigeons, the news agencies have been eager to adopt new communication technologies (cf. Hachten 1992; Boyd-Barrett 1998). In the 1990s, the technical development – that is, the growing number of communication satellites, innovations in computer technology, and the possibilities offered by digital convergence – opened up new global vistas for the news agencies. They could now become “complex multi-media organizations principally using satellite for delivery of print, audio and television news and online news services” (Boyd-Barrett 1998: 32).

In the 1990s, as mentioned above, Reuters became the sole proprietor of Visnews TV news agency, renaming it Reuters Television; AP founded a TV news agency of its own, APTV, which later became APTN, after AP had bought another big TV news agency WTN. These new acquisitions have strengthened the news agencies’ role as agenda-setters for TV broadcasters all over the world, thus contributing to homogenisation. It can be assumed that as soon as a TV news journalist finds an interesting news text, sent by the Reuters or AP wire service, s/he starts looking for video pictures on that subject. And if pictures are available, it is then most likely that the story will be included in the news bulletin. Further in the 1990s, due to the Internet and digitalization, Reuters and AP could produce “tailored” online multi-media packages, or just send their print news

dispatches to various commercial web sites, and thus, for the first time, reach a mass audience directly, without the ‘intervention’ of traditional media (see Paterson 2001: 84).

During that decade (the 1990s) – and after that, too – the number of both TV news broadcasters and Internet news sites has grown immensely worldwide, which could lead us to assume that the global news supply has become more diversified than before. But for instance Paterson (1997; 2001) argues that diversity is an illusion; that “the public diet of international news”, in fact, is limited, and that “e-journalism follows a distribution model more closely akin to broadcasting than other aspects of cyberspace” (2001: 85). Paterson continues (p. 85):

[A] few large organizations generate and broadcast – with essentially no feedback loop – most of the content for most of the audience. Further, it is a very limited and homogenous content dictated by the ideological, structural, and cultural nature of these organizations.

The global news agencies, AP and Reuters, are, undoubtedly, the most influential of these large organizations. This is partly due to the fact that although they today make some of their products available to a mass audience, they are essentially news “wholesalers” (see e.g. Boyd-Barrett 1997), whose texts and TV-pictures are source material for media outlets all over the world. Thus, we find the same news agency texts and pictures repeated in media over and over again. And often the source remains hidden, even in cases where credit should be given to the agencies. Paterson’s example (1998: 85) refers to the story of the famine in Ethiopia in 1984: the story was discovered and “essentially produced”, by a Visnews photographer, “but the BBC, and the American NBC, took the credit for it”.

But naturally, homogenisation of the news that can be attributed to the international news agencies goes much beyond the 1990s and the new technologies which have helped them to spread their products even wider than before. Since the last decades of the 1800s, the news agencies as global actors have shaped both the form of news discourse and the very concept of news (Boyd-Barrett 1980: 19). As Boyd-Barrett (1997: 132)

argues, they have greatly contributed to the fact that news today is mainly “about events, elite people, elite nations, their international conflicts and interests”.

2.3 Bases of the news agency power

Two concepts are closely related to the concept of power, namely those of *dominance* and *influence*, and both of them are highly relevant when the power of the big news agencies – AP and Reuters – is examined.

Being global multi-media conglomerates, which in addition to the traditional print news distribution today dominate both Internet news and the TV news sector (cf. Paterson 2001; 2007), AP and Reuters are certainly endowed with a great amount of institutional power. As discussed above, Reuters had a central position already in the days of the news cartel, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when the world news market was divided into areas of exclusive interest. Since the late 1900s, its costly media sector has been supported by the growing financial services. Until the last decade of the 20th century, AP had a strong competitor – UPI – at home, in the United States. In this struggle against UPI, which was a commercial company, AP’s cooperative structure tended to protect it; “newspapers were more likely to stay within the membership “family” if faced with a choice between the two services [due to economic problems]” (Fenby 1986: 72). In its international activities, too, AP enjoyed a similar advantage: it could spend the surplus it got from the cooperative members into fighting with UPI abroad (cf. Fenby 1986). And in the TV news sector, AP’s success has been notable; only a few years after it had entered that market, it came into possession of WTN, a TV news agency that had a long tradition in the area of TV news distribution.

While the *dominance* of AP and Reuters is an easily detectable fact, it is more difficult to measure their *influence*, as much of it remains hidden. Already in the late 1800s and early 1900s, news agencies were seen “as powerful, but hidden, and, because hidden, perhaps even more powerful than commonly suspected” (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998: 7). That the power has remained “hidden” is partly due to the fact that, in spite of their

central and long-standing position as global news distributors, news agencies have not attracted much academic interest. Being “barely visible actors” in the analysis of news (p. 7) before the time of online news helped the big news agencies create a public image which served their ideals of objectivity and factuality: while they were seen as “plain, almost dull”, their professionalism was considered indisputable (p. 6).

When Richstad and Anderson (1981: 31, 32) refer to the transnational news agencies (TNNAs) as key actors in the NWICO-debate, they name four predominant news agencies – AP, UPI, Reuters and AFP – and the two largest television news enterprises – Visnews and UPITN (p. 31). As we have seen, that list would be shorter now; along with the concentration of power it contains only AP, Reuters and AFP. However, what Richstad and Anderson (p. 32) write about the influence of the TNNAs is still a valid view and can be taken to concern news (agency) reporting more generally, and not only on the issue of the Third World:

These TNNAs are influential not only in effectively transmitting news around the globe but also, more subtly, in defining news values and styles. Journalism in much of the Third World is patterned after Western perceptions, values and practices, especially the TNNA-style writing.

The “TNNA-style” and the “values and practices” of AP and Reuters have been key issues in all my studies.

In the present chapter, I have explored the position of AP and Reuters as powerful actors, who have a long history as distributors of printed news and who, during the last two decades, have expanded their activities to comprise some less traditional forms of news distribution. A further aspect of the power of the news agencies can be examined by focusing on their central product: news agency *discourse*. As stated above, these two global news agencies, AP and Reuters, have influenced both the ways of writing news stories and the concept of news itself. Thus, they have created a wealth of conventions, which their clients – other media – then have adopted.

Chapters 3 and 4 below look more closely into these conventions. Chapter 3 presents an example of a typical hard news story, “breaking

news”, which is a story of something that happens unexpectedly and often gives rise to a flood of dispatches. New details are fed to readers little by little, following a conventional formula. In order to demonstrate how this kind of story unfolds, I have studied AP and Reuters news reports of a big earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006, through collecting all dispatches on this subject during one day. The analyses of four other conventions in chapter 4 give further evidence of the – somewhat paradoxical – fact that when news (agency) journalists resort to deep-rooted conventions of news writing, they tend to undermine the very ideals that have contributed to the creation of these conventions: the ideals of objectivity and factuality.

3 Breaking news – a staple of news agency distribution

News agency reporting contains dispatches representing a wealth of different categories. *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* (pp. 37, 38), for example, presents a list of nearly 30 common story forms: analysis, chronology, diaries, factbox, feature, and interview, among others²⁵.

But, undoubtedly, it is the hard news stories – “breaking news”, in particular, – that is the very essence of news agency reporting. The characteristics of breaking news reports can best be studied by following the development of one such continuing story; in other words, by looking at the reports sent by the news agencies to a media client, e.g., during the first day after the first “news alerts” have gone out. This kind of examination also brings forth many features that are typical of news agency reporting in general (and not only of breaking news stories).

For the example to be studied in the present chapter, I have chosen AP and Reuters news reports on a major earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006. My material contains all AP and Reuters dispatches sent on this earthquake during about 24 hours after the first “news alerts”, as received by one media client of these news agencies, the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE).

3.1 The continuing narrative of the Indonesian earthquake

The earthquake took place on May 27, 2006, six minutes before 6 a.m. local time. The epicenter was in central Java, near the city of Yogyakarta; the magnitude of the quake was 6.3 on the Richter scale. According to the official numbers of casualties announced 10 days later, 5,782 people died, 36,299 were injured, and hundreds of thousands lost their homes.

²⁵ For a sample of “news analysis”, see the appendix of study A; and for an analysis of “feature”, see study E.

The material: AP and Reuters wire reports

The data from AP consist of about 22,000 words and that from Reuters of about 13,000 words. It has to be noted, though, that these successive reports contain a lot of repetition, which is a typical feature of news agency discourse. In addition, the word count includes, besides the actual news text, a wealth of other information: “priority codes” and “category codes” (see Goldstein 2000), reference numbers, bylines, datelines, editor’s notes, and so on.

The first line of a dispatch specifies its type, in the case of breaking news this has to do with the “priority”. “The Alert” is “the highest priority item for Reuters services” (*Handbook of Reuters Journalism*: 32); in Reuters dispatches, this “long headline” is written completely in upper case (notably, the word “alert” is not mentioned). In AP breaking news reports, we find the word “APNewsAlert” on the first line.²⁶ “NewsAlerts”, says AP (Goldstein 2000: 404), “must be followed quickly by a bulletin or urgent”. As for the Reuters’ reports, the second stage of priority after an Alert is a “Newsbreak” or an “Urgent”. The longer AP reports, following “bulletins” or “urgents”, are “leads” and often have the tag “Ld-Writethru”, while Reuters calls its subsequent stories “UPDATES”. The central dispatch types of breaking news reports are summarized in Table 1; the uppermost stage – stage 1 – being the one with the highest priority/urgency.

Table 1: Breaking news reports: *three stages of urgency*

Breaking news /AP	Breaking news/Reuters
1. NewsAlert	1. Alert, written in upper case
2. bulletin/urgent	2. Newsbreak/Urgent
3. lead/Ld-Writethru	3. UPDATE

²⁶ The very highest priority item for AP is “flash”. However, that occurs rarely, as can be deduced from the following advice: “Use as an underline immediately below the AP NewsAlert slug on the rare occasion when an APNewsAlert represents a transcendent development” (Goldstein 2000: 401). AP’s example of a “flash” reads as follows: “**SPACE CENTER, HOUSTON – Man lands on the moon.**”

In addition to “NewsAlerts” and “urgents”, AP sent 40 “leads” – about a half of them “Ld-Writethrus” –, and various other stories (on the world reaction, aid work, etc.) on the first day of the Indonesian earthquake. Reuters, too, transmitted several “Alerts” and “Newsbreaks/Urgents”, plus 14 “UPDATES” and some side stories (on chronology of earthquakes, U.S. reactions, aid, etc.). The transmission times shown on the first or on the second line of some AP and Reuters examples below refer to the Finnish Summer Time, which is UTC/GMT+3, Indonesian time being UTC/GMT+7.

The news is breaking: Alerts and Urgents

The first alert came to YLE from Reuters exactly one hour after the earthquake had hit Indonesia²⁷:

```
(1)  POWERFUL EARTHQUAKE IN INDONESIA'S YOGYA    REU016
      REUoecf      27.05.2006 02:54:00
      ---
      POWERFUL EARTHQUAKE IN INDONESIA'S YOGYAKARTA,
      SOME CASUALTIES - WITNESSES
      REUTERS
```

After some minutes AP sent its first NewsAlert:

```
(2)  BC-AS-GEN—APNewsAlert 0002 APTNixxb      27.05.2006    03:06:45
      BC-AS-GEN—APNewsAlert
      JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- Powerful earthquake shakes central Java
      province, some buildings damaged, media report says.
```

As we can see, the first estimates of the damages are extremely cautious, and they are sourced to “witnesses” and “media report”. The first urgents and new news alerts have adopted a similar ‘factual’ vein. In examples (3–6), I have underlined the first estimates of the human victims;

²⁷ As for the time of the earthquake, the U.S. Geological Survey Website (<http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/eqinthenews/2006/usneb6/>) gave the following information: Friday, May 26, 2006 at 22:53:58 (UTC) = Coordinated Universal Time; local time at epicenter: Saturday, May 27, 2006 at 5:53:58 AM. The GMT (=UTC) time given by AP in example (3) should thus read 2254 (and not 2354).

in addition, the careful sourcing has been marked in italics. (Notably, all sources are unnamed).

- (3) BC-AS-GEN--Indonesia-Ear 0015 APTNixxb 27.05.2006 03:17:19
BC-AS-GEN--Indonesia-Earthquake

URGENT

**Powerful earthquake rocks Indonesia's Central Java province,
no word on casualties**

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- People fled their homes in panic after a powerful earthquake rocked Indonesia's Central Java province early Saturday, *witnesses and media reports said*. There were no immediate reports of casualties.

The U.S. Geological Survey said the 6.2 magnitude earthquake struck at 5:54 a.m. (2354 GMT) 25 kilometers (15 miles) southwest of the city of Yogyakarta. No other details were available.

Witnesses said residents fled their homes after the temblor hit, damaging some buildings Yogyakarta.

- (4) BC-AS-GEN--APNewsAlert 0023 APTNixxb 27.05.2006 03:35:41
BC-AS-GEN--APNewsAlert

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- At least three people killed, scores injured in Indonesian earthquake, *witness says*.

- (5) REUoecf 27.05.2006 03:06:51

WITNESS SAYS SOME DEAD IN YOGYAKARTA QUAKE, HOSPITAL OFFICIAL SAYS 50 INJURED

- (6) QUAKE-INDONESIA (URGENT) REU0182 REUovrb
27.05.2006 03:09:44

54 (AFA CSA LBY RWSA RWS REULB GNS G RBN ABN C D E M O U
MTL GRO SOF OIL RNA RNP PGE SXNA ASIA EMRG ID DIS)
JAK165392

Quake hits Indonesia's Yogyakarta, some casualties

YOGYAKARTA, Indonesia, May 27 (Reuters) - A strong earthquake shook Indonesia's ancient royal capital of Yogyakarta on Saturday morning, sending people fleeing from their homes and causing casualties, *witnesses said*.

One witness said he saw some people killed, and *a hospital official told a radio station* that 50 people had been admitted for treatment.

The rising toll – headlines and leads

Examining how the story of the Indonesian earthquake develops after the first alerts and urgents, I will look into the most important part of the reports, namely the headlines and lead paragraphs. Headlines in news agency discourse are somewhat more straightforward than those in newspapers, where headlines are often formulated *after* the journalist has finished the story, and by another person; for instance, by a copy-writer (cf. Toolan 2001; Bell 1998). News agency headlines usually have to be composed in a hurry, but nevertheless, as *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* on its website advises, they “must be sharp, clear and informative” (p. 84).

For several hours, almost the only detail that changes in the AP and Reuters headlines and leads is the number of dead. For instance, after AP had raised that number to 13, it sent as many as 12 dispatches, in which the headline and the lead are formulated as follows:

(7) **Powerful earthquake rocks Indonesia's Java island, kills at least (X)**

--

YOGYAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- A powerful earthquake rocked Indonesia's Central Java province early Saturday, flattening buildings and killing at least (X) people, (Y/or Y and Z) said [or reported]. Scores of other people were injured. (AP May 27, 2006)

(X) here stands for the number of dead, while (Y) and (Z) mark the sources of the information. For (X) we get the following slowly rising numbers: 13, 15, 46, 104, 114, 160, 211, and 309. The sources (Y and Z) are given as “witnesses and a media report”, “authorities”, “two hospitals”, and “hospitals and officials”. As many studies have shown, news journalists aim at factuality for instance by presenting exact numbers, and since the AP journalist has added the adverb “at least”, even these low numbers are, undoubtedly, ‘factual’.

During many hours, the headlines and leads of Reuters earthquake reports also follow a similar formula as those of AP. The wording may vary a little more, and the figures denoting casualties are not always the same as AP has given. Here is one typical example:

(8) **At least 193 dead, hundreds hurt in Indonesia quake**

--

YOGYAKARTA, Indonesia, May 27 (Reuters) - At least 193 people were killed and many more injured when an earthquake shook Indonesia's ancient royal city and tourist centre Yogyakarta and the surrounding area early on Saturday, hospital staff said. (Reuters May 27, 2006)

Victims are construed as numbers, and when the figures rise markedly (from 266 to 1,325), the Reuters journalist writes in a headline:

(9) **Indonesia quake death toll jumps to 1,325 people**

News agency headlines cannot be too long; for instance, the Reuters handbook says that they should not exceed 50 characters. No wonder then if journalists resort to a short noun like “toll”, which denotes the total number of deaths “that occur in a particular period of time” (cf. Sinclair 1995: 1763).

If we look at the AP and Reuters headlines from the point of view of *transitivity* (referring to Halliday’s Functional Grammar 1994), we find that “toll” can ‘act’ in various ways; and the verb following “toll” can be either intransitive or transitive, as other Reuters headlines with “toll” show:

- **Indonesia quake toll exceeds 1,000 – official**
- **Indonesia death toll now tops 1,500 – official**
- **Indonesia quake death toll climbs to 2,276**
- **Indonesia quake death toll passes 3,000**

The process type shown in example (8) (*X*) *dead in the quake* already puts some distance between the cause and the effect (*quake kills people*), but giving the Actor role to “toll” takes obscuring even further. In addition, some of the verbs used in these headlines might rather bring to mind *financial* news reports; shares or share prices can “jump”, or “climb”, for example.

Detailed ‘facts’ and meticulous sourcing

Three, four hours after the earthquake news agency journalists speak only fleetingly about “chaos” and “widespread panic” and “people fleeing”. The overall style of writing remains highly ‘factual’: bodies are counted almost one by one, hospitals are referred to by their names, and the source of the information explained as well as possible, as examples (10) and (11) show (the numbers of deaths have been underlined; the sources of information are in italics):

(10) APTNixxu 27.05.2006 06:36:52

**BC-AS-GEN--Indonesia-Earthquake, 9th Ld-Writethru
Powerful earthquake rocks Indonesia’s Java island, kills at least 46**

At the city’s Sardjito hospital, there were at least 36 dead bodies, a *Staffer at the morgue* said. At least 10 other corpses were laying in Bethesda hospital, *state news agency Antara quoted the hospital director* as saying.

Earlier, *an official in Jakarta* said 15 people were killed and *a witness* saw three bodies trapped under rubble, but it was not clear whether those fatalities were also brought to the two hospitals. (AP May 27, 2006)

(11) QUAKE-INDONESIA-DEAD (URGENT) REU0400 REUovrb
27.05.2006 05:29:06

At least 51 dead reported in Indonesian quake

Sumarno, an official in the morgue at Sarjito hospital in Yogyakarta, told Reuters “36 bodies have been brought to the morgue room” there.

In the town of Bantul near Yogyakarta, *the local hospital’s information officer, Kardi*, said: “At least 10 people are dead, hundreds are hurt.”

Earlier, *a nurse at Muhammadiyah hospital* in Yogyakarta had reported at least five deaths there from the quake, which happened just before 6 a.m. (2300 GMT) and had a magnitude of 6.2 according to the U.S. Geological Survey. (Reuters May 27, 2006)

This kind of detailed reporting is, of course, ‘factual’, but we can ask how *relevant* all these ‘facts’ are, when it must have become obvious that under the rubble there are many more bodies than in the hospital morgues, and that even greater numbers of people have been trapped under the collapsed houses, now waiting for an urgent rescue.

Shift in style: emotions take over

In the first telegram, when there was “no word on casualties”, AP’s lead begins: “People fled their homes in panic”, in other words, the focus is on the victims, but when the news of deaths starts to arrive, the changing figures take the leading role in the narrative. After several hours, when the toll is given as being 385 people, the phrase “overwhelmed doctors begging for help” enters into AP leads. However, only when the number of dead is given as over 3,500 people, does the AP journalist abandon the ‘factual’ style used so far in the headlines and leads.²⁸ Even the headline is now emotionally charged, as example (12) shows (intensified lexis in italics):

(12) **Hospitals *overflow* as *fear* and *death pervade* quake-ravaged Indonesian region**

YOGYAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- Hundreds of injured men, women and children *packed the grounds* of Sardjito Hospital in this historic city Saturday, stretched out *on pieces of bloody cardboard* as *cries of agony* pierced the evening air.

Several relatives read the Quran to victims as they *anxiously* awaited treatment. But the staff was *stretched to its limits* by a magnitude-6.3 earthquake that killed at least 3,000 people and injured thousands when it struck central Java island. (AP May 28, 2006)

The headline and the lead paragraph in example (12) are both loaded with emotion (*fear* and *agony*); and the lexis throughout is intensified: *overflow*, *pervade*, *quake-ravaged*, *packed*, *pierced*, and so on. The much-repeated facts of the earthquake are presented only in the second paragraph.

During the first day after the earthquake, the Reuters headlines of UPDATES report on the rising numbers of deaths, but when the toll has reached 3,000, Reuters, too, focuses more on the victims and their emotions. In the longer reports, Reuters – unlike AP – often divides the text

²⁸ Note that this day according to the AP bylines the same journalist worked from morning until night, so the shift in the style was not due a change of writer. However, we can assume that the journalist travelled (from Jakarta?) to the earthquake area during that day. Reuters gave several names contributing to the reporting, and the name in the byline was also changed during the afternoon.

into two or three sub-sections, and one of these sections in the earthquake dispatches has now been named “FEAR”²⁹. In the first paragraphs – and throughout the reports – the language has become more emotive and intense, and ordinary people, too, are given the possibility to express their feelings (my italics):

(13) **UPDATE 13-Indonesian quake kills more than 3,000 people**

(Adds details and quotes throughout)

By Achmad Sukarsono

YOGYAKARTA, Indonesia, May 28 (Reuters) - A dawn earthquake killed more than 3,000 people around the Indonesian city of Yogyakarta on Saturday, burying many under the rubble of their homes in *a scene survivors said was like the end of the world*.

As night fell, *terrified residents huddled* outside their *ruined houses* or in the grounds of mosques, churches and schools in the heartland of Indonesia's main island of Java.

The wards and corridors of Sarjito hospital in Yogyakarta city were *crammed with injured survivors*. Many more lay on the hard ground outside under the night sky.

“Oh my god, where is the doctor, where is the doctor?” *cried one old man with a bruised face*.

Farmer Karjiman from Bantul town lay in a corridor with his injured wife and three-year-old daughter.

“My daughter here was buried under the rubble. We got her out, but *we could not save my other daughter ... it was just horrible*,” he said.

(Reuters May 28, 2006)

Reporting on a sudden and unforeseen disaster, like the Indonesian earthquake, is an extremely challenging task, bringing with it special problems for the news agencies. Without delay, they are expected to start sending dispatches to other media, despite the fact that no one can yet judge

²⁹ Reuters introduced this kind of sub-headlines in the 1990s (they did not yet appear in my corpus of 1993). Reuters *Handbook of Journalism* gives the following definition of these “cross-heads”: “Cross-headings are used in all stories of 500 or more words to break the mass of copy into more digestible morsels. Cross-heads are sub-headlines of two to four words, all in upper-case. Aim for something simple, informative and unbiased... Make sure that cross-heads don’t break the flow of the story, for instance by breaking up a speaker’s quote” (<http://handbook.reuters.com>). These cross-heads do not affect the overall structure of a news report.

the real scope of the disaster. The figure depicting the magnitude of an earthquake is not directly related to the destruction the quake causes; in addition, this earthquake – as is often the case – took place in a remote place, at least when seen from a Western perspective. News agency journalists here, in a way, became captives of their ideals of factuality and objectivity; their meticulous reporting and sourcing of every little ‘fact’ for so many hours obscured the overall picture.

3.2 Characteristics of breaking news

Despite the fact that my analysis focused on one subject only, I consider it possible to outline some characteristics that can be attributed to the category as a whole, – especially as breaking news reports of big, unexpected natural catastrophes like the Indonesian earthquake appear quite frequently in news agency dispatches, and can thus be regarded as representative of the category in question.

Often the events that qualify for breaking news take place unexpectedly: a natural disaster (earthquake, flooding, hurricane), a bomb attack, a plane crash, the sudden resignation (or death, or even assassination) of a political leader, an illegal coup, and so on. At the opposite end of the cline, with unexpectedness and expectedness as end poles, we find fixed events like elections, summit meetings, important press conferences, announcements of the Nobel Prize winners, or the winners of Oscar Awards, etc. In these cases, it is the outcome of the event, and not the event itself, which generates breaking news reports. In sum, there is one basic rule: the event(s) must be regarded as highly newsworthy.

From the point of view of (news) *genre*, breaking news clearly belongs to the category of “hard news” reports. White (1997: 101, 102) argues that the hard news report has “two key distinguishing features”: “the generic structure” – a special non-linear structure, which White calls “orbital” (for the structure of news reports, see chapter 4 and Studies A and F)

– and “the construction of a journalistic register in which certain interpersonally charged register variants are severely circumscribed”³⁰.

Most individual news agency dispatches (e.g., “Ld-Writethrus” or “UPDATES”) give evidence of the first point, the special “generic structure”. At the same time, owing to the fact that news agency reporting is a continuous process, readers often have to go through several consecutive reports to capture the story as a whole. Any big event can generate a wealth of agency dispatches, but this feature is especially characteristic to breaking news stories, and – as we have seen – these reports are transmitted according to a typical outward formula. The narrative starts with “News- Alerts” and “Urgents” or “Newsbreaks”, and is then followed by “Leads”, “Ld-Writethrus” or “UPDATES”. Further Alerts and Urgents are sent in-between, when new newsworthy details, e.g. a notable rise in the death toll, have been retrieved. Alerts and Urgents give the essential details of the event in a nutshell, resembling “headlines” or “leads” of longer dispatches.

The special “journalistic register”, mentioned above, is also characteristic of the breaking news stories of AP and Reuters, and of the news agencies’ hard news reports, in general. The examples of the Indonesian earthquake give evidence of the “dichotomy” discussed by White (1997: 108) – between impersonalising and intensifying. News agency journalists’ impersonalising tactics are clearly demonstrated in that the victims, for many hours, are referred to mainly as figures, even as a “toll”. The intensification – the other prevalent feature of that register – becomes conspicuous in the earthquake reports sent towards the end of that day; the lexis in them is intensified, emotionally charged. On the basis of just one breaking news story, one cannot deduce how typical of the whole category such shift in style might be, but this kind of shift can be hypothesised to appear in cases like the Indonesian earthquake, where the magnitude of

³⁰ The “journalistic register”, discussed in White (1997) as being typical of hard news reports, is later (cf. White 1998) named “reporter voice” (see also chapter 4 and Studies E and F on reporter voice). On the one hand, the register of hard news reporters is “interpersonally neutral”; on the other hand, the lexis in hard news reports often “encodes a sense of intensity”, and can be emotionally charged (White 1997: 108).

the disaster is known only after some time – and where it takes a few hours for the journalists to arrive at the site.

In the analysis of the breaking news story above, I have referred briefly to many conventions of news writing: the importance of the beginning of a news report (headline and lead), the careful sourcing (though often to unnamed speakers), the impersonalising tactics, intensification, the role of emotions, and so on. In chapter 4, I will discuss these and other conventions more in depth, relating them to the journalistic ideals of objectivity and factuality.

4 Conventions vis-à-vis factuality and objectivity

The present chapter seeks to tie the conventions of news agency writing to the concepts of factuality and objectivity. I have argued that the big international news agencies AP and Reuters have had a central role in creating journalistic conventions and in spreading them to other journalists, when serving their clients all over the world. At the same time, it is difficult to say exactly how – or when – today’s ‘objective’ style of hard news reports, or the typical structure of news stories, has developed (for a discussion on this development, see Study F).

The discussion on the conventions in this chapter relies largely on my studies A to F. While each of those studies focuses on one subject only, evidence of one specific *convention* affecting factuality and/or objectivity can be found in several of them. The studies will be presented in chapter 5, but I give here, too, a short list of their respective subjects:

- In **Study A** I discuss metaphors in AP and Reuters political news reports, tying together metaphors and *news values*
- **Study B** discusses changes in the role of “terrorist”, and in the meaning of the word “terrorist”, as evidenced in news agency (AP and Reuters) reports
- **Study C** discusses how emotions of fear, worry and concern are constructed in AP and Reuters news reports on terrorism
- **Study D** tackles the use of unnamed sources in the rhetoric of AP and Reuters
- **Study E** deals with emotions and the ideals of factuality and objectivity
- In **Study F** I discuss conventions of attribution in view of responsibility in news agency discourse

Below, I will examine the following specific conventions of news agency reporting in relation to the concepts of factuality and objectivity (key concepts are marked in italics):

- conventions related to the *structure* of news reports: generalization and specification (cf. 4.1)
- enhancing *newsworthiness* (cf. 4.2):
 - news values
 - metaphors
- tactics of *impersonalisation* (cf. 4.3):
 - transferring news actors' *responsibility*: transitivity, ergativity and
 - nominalisation
 - backgrounding journalists' 'voice': the use of quotes
- presentation of *emotions* (cf. 4.4)

Although I have chosen four conventions for closer examination, discussing them in separate sections, it has to be noted that in news texts, these conventions are, of course, intertwined. They work at various levels of news reporting – structural, ideological and stylistic –, and, e.g., such central ideological conventions as *newsworthiness* and *responsibility* affect both the structure and the style of news writing, and even the customs of construing emotions.

4.1 Conventions related to the structure of news reports

As discussed in chapter 3, news agency reporting is a continuous process, and breaking news stories, for example, generate a wealth of dispatches of different types: from one- or two-line “alerts” to long summaries, called “Ld-Writethrus” by AP, and “UPDATES” in Reuters wires. In addition, Reuters often summarises the top stories of day by sending “wrap-ups”³¹.

Defining the overall structure of a typical news agency report requires detailed analysis of a large set of data, but it is not directly relevant to the purposes of my study. There are, however, some structural conventions which can affect the journalistic ideals of objectivity and factuality, one of

³¹ A “wrapup”, according to *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* (p. 56), is “a synthesis of significant news developments with the necessary context, colour, background and reaction, not a long list of everything that was said and done”.

the most significant being the pattern of generalization and specification. In other words, a news report often starts with general, abstract information, which is then elaborated and specified later, as the report proceeds. But before examining the routines of specification, I will first look, more generally, into definitions of a ‘typical’ news report structure.

4.1.1 *The ‘typical’ structure of news reports*

News journalists who want to write a professional hard news story are often advised to apply the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure. *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* (p. 27) gives the following instructions (my italics):

The tried and tested “inverted pyramid” method - ordering the elements of the story *in declining order of importance* - is hard to beat. Who? What? When? Where? Why? How? So What? Answers to all the basic journalistic questions *need to be clear to the reader from the first sentence*. The story should be written so it is self-contained, *no matter where the reader stops or the sub-editor makes the cut*.

In other words, in the “inverted pyramid” model the most important – the most newsworthy – information is put first, and because of the “declining order of importance”, the story can easily be shortened at the end (on the inverted pyramid, cf. e.g. Scanlan 2000: 153).

Scholars (cf. van Dijk 1985, 1988a; Bell 1991, 1998; White 1998, White & Thomson 2008) who have set out to define the structural qualities of a typical news report do not call their respective models “pyramids”³². Both van Dijk and Bell present the discourse structure of news stories in the form of a tree diagram. There are different ‘branches’ in their respective ‘trees’, but they seem to agree on a general principle – “the top down principle of relevance organization in news” (van Dijk 1988a: 43) –, which is reminiscent of the inverted pyramid structure. White, at the same time, wants to put distance between his own “orbital” model and “the journalistic common-sense view that the structure of the news story can be explained simply by reference to a notion of relative importance” (1998:

³² I have discussed van Dijk’s model in Studies A and F; White’s orbital model is briefly presented in Study F.

70). According to White & Thomson (2008: 8, 9), texts are organised in a way “involving a relationship between a central ‘nucleus’ (the headline/lead) and a set of dependent sub components which can be thought of as ‘satellites’ to that ‘nucleus’”.

Intuitively, one could say that a hard news report in news agency wires conforms to “the top down principle of relevance organization”, so that it would be possible to cut the end paragraph(s) without losing any relevant information. News agencies, however, transmit other types of stories, too, with a more flexible structure than that of general news reports. Features, for example, may have a kind of ‘sandwich structure’; often the dispatch begins with a traditional narrative focusing on one person or a family and, after several paragraphs, picks up that story again in the end³³. Editing the end paragraph(s) would spoil the whole story.

When exploring *discourse patterns*, Östman (1999: 91–95) found that, in addition to the “traditional” hard news formula, which he calls “the News pattern”, there are two other patterns, “the Human interest discourse pattern”, and “the Friendly news pattern”, which do not allow the habitual cutting off the end of the story. Should the final paragraph(s) in the reports following these patterns be left off, this would mean losing important, or at least interesting, information. According to Östman (pp. 93–95), the Friendly news pattern is “a combination of the two basic discourse patterns for news items”, hard news and soft news; reports applying this pattern could be said to be hard news reports ending with a human-interest section.³⁴ White (1998: 206), too, points out that some news stories do have an ‘ending’ (“final satellite” in White’s orbital model) which is

³³ This is how *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* (p. 44) defines features: “Feature gives a correspondent the chance to report in depth and against a more relaxed deadline. Features must conform like any other story with the Reuters values of accuracy, objectivity and precise sourcing.” For an analysis on feature stories, see Study E.

³⁴ Östman (p. 93) states that this discourse pattern seems to have become popular in the US broadsheet newspapers in the 1990s. In order to retain their share in the market, newspaper publishers had to think of new ways to attract readers who began to show increasing interest in human interest stories. In my view, this could be put into a larger frame, that of general development: as e.g. Fairclough (1995) notes, in the media of the 1990s, boundaries between public and private, as well as those between information and entertainment, were becoming more and more blurred.

significant to the report; he sees it as a kind of “wrap-up”. Sometimes this ending “coincides with the ‘natural’ end-point of the activity sequence in question”; or it can “involve values of appraisal and provide a sense of resolution by retrospectively placing the events previously described in a wider social context or evaluating them in aesthetic or ethical terms” (p. 206). (For an extensive discussion on different news story structures, see also ben-Aaron 2005: 82–95).

4.1.2 *Routines of specification*

Even if the overall structure of news reports has generated differing views among scholars, there seems to be a consensus on the following central structural qualities [of the hard news reports]: the *instalment* character of topic realization and the tendency of giving high-level, abstract information first, followed by lower-level information, that is, specifying details (cf. van Dijk 1988a: 43, 44; see also White 1998).

Below, I will focus on two aspects of the specification routines. The first one is related to attribution, i.e., to the presentation of a speaker or speakers that are quoted (directly or indirectly) in a news agency dispatch. In line with the typical discontinuous structure of a news report, the speaker is often presented in general terms in the beginning of the dispatch (headline and/or lead), while the reader has to wait for the later instalments to learn his/her name (if any), or other details. If the speaker is important enough, it is possible that s/he is quoted several times in that dispatch, so that the quotes are separated by paragraphs containing other speakers’ sayings, or some other information. Secondly, I look into other examples of generalization (i.e. besides those of attribution) in report headlines, exploring the consequences this could have for the objectivity and factuality of news agency reporting.

4.1.3 *Conventions of attribution*³⁵

We can regard the beginning of a news story – whether we call it “nucleus” (White 1998, White & Thomson 2008), “Summary” (van Dijk 1988a), or

³⁵ See Studies D and F for a more detailed analysis of the attribution routines.

“abstract” (Bell 1991, 1998) – as its most important part. According to White & Thomson (2008: 5, 6), the beginning presents “the maximally newsworthy heart of the issue under consideration”.

The attribution in the headline/lead depends on two, sometimes contending, factors: generalization and newsworthiness. Thus, it is not surprising that a ‘speaker’ in the headline is often a state (e.g., “Iraq says”, “U.S. warns”) instead of a person or persons – the state is more ‘general’, and it is usually more newsworthy, too. The whole is here used for the part, as a synecdoche – a rhetorical trope that is often seen as a special type of metonymy (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Chandler 1995). Furthermore, the state in these headlines has been personalised, applying a state-as-person metaphor (cf. e.g., Chilton and Lakoff 1995). Though the state is often supposed to have more authority than an individual speaker, there are speakers who seem to be newsworthy enough to overrule the tendency for generalization. In the following Reuters headline the U.S. president George W. Bush is contrasted with the state of Iraq:

- (1) **Bush vows Arab friendship, Iraq urges resistance**
(Reuters Sept. 10, 2002)

Attributing the sayings of individual speakers to a personalised state in the headline of a news report affects the news (agency) rhetoric in several ways. Chilton and Lakoff (1995: 39) note that when states are conceptualized as having personalities, “they can be trustworthy or deceitful, aggressive or peace-loving, strong- or weak-willed, stable or paranoid, cooperative or intransigent, enterprising or not”. In the news agency headlines under examination, Iraq, for instance, has been defined as “defiant”, it “slams” or “urges”, and speaks “in mixed signals”. In Appraisal terms (see chapter 1 and section 4.4 on the Appraisal framework), the writer has evaluated the ‘human’ behaviour of the person-state Iraq: it is seen to be “defiant” (value of Judgement), and as it speaks “in mixed signals”, it looks inconsistent (Token of Judgement). “Slams” and “urges” are examples of *intensification*, which is common especially in the important headline/lead section of a hard news story (cf. White 1998: 287).

Another important issue related to factuality and objectivity is that this kind of ‘step-by-step’ (from general to specific) attribution often leads to ambiguity. When a state is put into the role of the speaker in the headline, the speaker’s real identity is sometimes revealed already in the lead paragraph, but quite often it is given much later, or it remains hidden among the identities of several speakers in the text. Furthermore, the reader cannot deduce on the basis of the headline, how representative the “part” speaking for the “whole” is. It can be the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister of a state, or a country’s U.N. ambassador, who are de facto entitled to speak for the country in question, but I have also found it to be, e.g., a news paper article (see Study F), or an unnamed official (see example (4) below).

As news agency reporting implies a continuous flow of dispatches, it can be especially challenging for a reader to detect the relationship between the generalized speaker presented in the headline and the real speaker(s), whose words have been either quoted or indirectly referred to. Examples (2) and (3) show the beginnings of two AP dispatches, sent on the same day, on the same topic (speakers are marked in italics):

(2) ***Iraq says it wants peace and stability***

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- Iraq wants business, not war, with the United States, its *foreign minister* said, while *Saudi Arabia* on Tuesday joined European countries in saying Washington should work through the United Nations to contain any possible Iraqi threat. (AP Sept. 10, 2002)

[NB. There are as many as nine rather long paragraphs, containing e.g. quotes by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, before the name of the Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri is given.]

(3) ***In mixed signals, Iraq calls on Arabs to “confront” America, says it wants business, not war, with the U.S.***

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- In conflicting signals, *a senior official* on Tuesday called on Arabs to rise and «confront» America, barely a day after *another official* said Iraq wanted to be a trade partner, not a battlefield foe, with the United States. (AP Sept. 10, 2002)

[NB. “A senior official” is “Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan”, whose name is given in the 5th paragraph, and “another official” is Foreign Minister Najji Sabri, who is presented even later, in the 8th paragraph.]

The speaker “Iraq” in the headline of example (3) is no longer the same as in example (2); it now comprises the sayings of both the Vice President and the Foreign Minister. As the two Iraqi officials have presented differing views on the Iraqi/U.S. relations, the journalist has deduced that Iraq has spoken “in mixed signals”, at least implicitly judging the ‘state-person’ Iraq to be inconsistent. Both the headline and the lead paragraph in example (3) begin with the reference to the Vice President’s statement; it is new, and it is more belligerent, and thus more newsworthy than Sabri’s peaceable words are. We can of course claim that when the Foreign Minister and the Vice President of some country give contradictory statements, one coming “barely a day after” the other, the policy of that country seems to be inconsistent. At the same time, the reader learns only much later who the two unnamed officials, presented in the lead, really are, since the report proceeds in a discontinuous manner, following the routines of specification.

Often the anonymous “officials” or “analysts” mentioned in the lead paragraph are named further down in a report, as had been done in the dispatch of example (3). Sometimes, though, even when a state, for instance, issues an important warning in the headline, the name of the speaker remains unidentified in the text body. The “official” in the following example from Reuters has been allotted several quotes in the dispatch (the details of the speaker marked in italics):

(4) **U.S. warns of "worrisome" rise in Peru coca crop**

By Jude Webber

LIMA, Peru, Dec 20 (Reuters) - Peru's cultivation of coca leaf, the raw material for cocaine, will show a "worrisome" rise in 2002, despite better-than-expected eradication efforts in the world's No. 2 cocaine producer, *a U.S. official* said.

After a slow start to the year -- only around 5,440 acres (2,200 hectares) had been eliminated by September -- Peru

picked up the eradication pace dramatically and this week hit its goal of 17,300 acres (7,000 hectares) for the year.

But a *U.S. official, who declined to be named*, said Peru was far from being able to rest on its laurels.

“We expect a net increase in spite of the eradication,” said *the official, who gave no figures*. “It’s worrisome.”
(Reuters Dec. 10, 2002)

In the dispatch, there are three more references to this official (“the official said”, “he added”, “the U.S. official said”). But as we can see, the specifying details only reveal his gender and nationality; there is nothing which could boost his authority and thus better justify the attribution *U.S. warns*, used in the headline.

4.1.4 *Generalizing other news actors in headlines*

Above I have explored how the instalment character and the specification routines of news reports affect the attribution. Looking at the examples from the point of view of *transitivity* (Halliday 1994), we can say that the Sayer of a verbal process has been generalized in the headline of the report so that the role of the ‘speaker’ has been given to the state and not to the person(s) in question who do the actual speaking.

Below I will show how participants of other processes, such as Sensors in mental processes or Actors in material processes, are presented in headlines following similar ‘rules’; also here, in addition to generalization, maximal newsworthiness is an important issue. The Sensor of the mental process in example (5) is the largest possible, the whole “world”:

(5) **World mourns Sept. 11 victims, but Arabs accuse United States of spreading terrorism threat**

CAIRO, Egypt (AP) -- Victims of the Sept. 11 attacks were mourned worldwide Saturday, but in the Middle East, Arabs said Washington's support for Israel and the war on terror that began in the aftermath of the World Trade Center's collapse only fueled anger and violence.

U.S. Army soldiers in Iraq held small ceremonies to coincide with the moment the first jetliner slammed into the World Trade Center. Sgt. Dionna Eves, 23, a medic from Clearwater, Florida, said the anni-

versary “reminds you of why you're here” because “we lost a lot of people in that one incident.” (AP Sept. 11, 2004)

Describing collective mourning in a news report naturally involves interpretation on the part of the writer, as emotions are fundamentally individual experiences (cf. Studies C and E on emotions). The specifying expression “were mourned worldwide” in the lead is somewhat more factual than the highly intensified and generalized *world* in the headline. However, the rather long dispatch contains mostly reactions from Arabs blaming the United States for its policies in the Middle East and for “filling people with anger”. The only clear reference to mourning is the short extract on U.S. Army ceremonies in Iraq, included in example (5). It can also be noted that, probably unintentionally, the AP journalist has excluded Arabs from “world” in the headline, by contrasting them with the ‘mourners’ (*but Arabs...*).

Nominalised emotions, such as *fears* or *worries*, are popular Actors of material processes in headlines: they are abstract, and *negativity* makes them newsworthy³⁶. Example (6) comes from the field of financial news (*italics are mine*):

(6) **Eurostocks slip as *attack fears hit travel, insurers***

By Marie Maitre

LONDON, March 12 (Reuters) - Insurers and travel-related stocks led European shares to two-month lows on Friday as *fears* that more terror attacks will follow Thursday's deadly blasts in Madrid *sent investors rushing* out of equities.

Spain's IBEX Index led European bourses lower with a 1.6-percent fall after a *purported al Qaeda letter*, published overnight, claimed responsibility for the attack and said a big attack on the United States was nearly ready.

The ten simultaneous *bombings* of four packed commuter trains in Madrid killed 198 and injured 1,430 in Europe's bloodiest guerilla attack for more than 15 years. (Reuters March 12, 2004)

³⁶ *Negativity* is one of the best-known *news values* (cf. Galtung and Ruge 1970). News values will be discussed in sub-section 4.2.

One of the most striking features in example (6) is the nearly total absence of human agents. Admittedly, “investors” are presented as “rushing”, but “investors” are also affected participants (Goals in the material process), since “fears” have *sent* them “rushing”. The two paragraphs after the lead specify the reasons for the abstract “fears”; that is, the reader is told *why* investors fear. However, *what* they fear is a more complex question. When we ‘unpack’ the noun phrase “attack fears”, appearing in the headline, into a mental process, we can deduce that the Phenomenon (what is feared), is a (terror) attack. But given that investors are in the role of Sensors, the most imminent fear would not be for becoming targets of a terror attack; rather the investors can be assumed to fear mainly the economic consequences of such an attack.

4.1.5 Discussion

Researchers generally agree on the importance of the news report opening and on the tendency for starting the report with general, abstract information. White & Thomson’s definition of the *second* phase also conforms in many central aspects to the structural features outlined by van Dijk in 1988a:

The second phase of the contemporary news report - the body which follows the headline/lead - acts to specify, elaborate and comment on the various strands of information presented in the opening. It is noteworthy that this specification and elaboration is typically presented non-chronologically and discontinuously. (White & Thomson 2008: 6)

But while for van Dijk specification takes place cyclically, “in decreasing order of relevance” (van Dijk 1985: 83), White & Thomson (2008: 9) state that specification concerns the relationship between individual sub-components and the headline/lead, i.e., the “nucleus”, and not the one between a sub-component and textual elements that immediately precede or follow it.

The specification in *attribution*, though, seems to be linear rather than ‘orbital’, proceeding from one step to another. Let us examine once more the dispatch whose beginning has been presented in example (2) and

where the second speaker in the lead paragraph (in addition to the Iraqi Foreign Minister) was “Saudi Arabia”. The next three steps of attribution follow in the third and fourth paragraph (speakers in italics):

- (7) *Arab nations* have staunchly opposed any military action against the Iraqi leader, *saying* it would throw the Middle East into turmoil. *The Saudi foreign minister* on Tuesday expressed fears an attack would lead to the dismemberment of Iraq -- but he suggested his country would follow the United Nations' lead. «If there is an operation, the decision has to be taken by the United Nations,» *Prince Saud al-Faisal* said in Paris after a meeting with French President Jacques Chirac. (AP Sept. 10, 2002)

After that there are two more steps of attribution: “Al-Faisal” and “he”. All these details form a logical path for a reader who is familiar with the established pattern of attribution: *from general to specific*. At the same time, if we assume that the reader would tie the specifying details, one by one, directly to the lead paragraph, in this case to “Saudi Arabia”, the fact that “Prince Saud al-Faisal” is the “Saudi foreign minister”, for example, might not be quite clear.

Above I have shown how generalization can make headlines interpersonally charged. As it conforms to the routines of news reporting, it may look only natural that emotions have become powerful Actors, or that states appear as speakers and can be appraised as if they were human beings. The gradual mode of attribution, which contains several successive steps, also opens up rhetoric possibilities to the journalist for boosting the speaker’s expertise and her/his credibility.

4.2 Newsworthiness – a staple of news rhetoric

In a sense my entire study on the conventions of news agency writing is ‘about’ news rhetoric; at least if the word “rhetoric” is understood in a broad sense to refer to “the potential of all texts, whether explicitly argumentative or not, to influence, reinforce or to challenge reader/listener’s assumptions, beliefs, emotions, attitudes and so on” (White 1998: 3). In the present sub-section, however, I look at news rhetoric from a somewhat

narrower point of view, examining how news agency journalists have sought to persuade their audience of the *newsworthiness* of their reporting. First, I explore the factors generally known as *news values* (cf. 4.2.1), focusing on the best-known of them, namely *negativity* (cf. 4.2.2). After that, I discuss metaphors in political news reports in view of newsworthiness (cf. 4.2.3 and 4.2.4).

Newsworthiness is one of the central goals of news rhetoric. It has an important role in the *selection* process, but, as we have seen, it is also a crucial factor in the *structural organization* of news stories. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the way news reports are *written* can raise their newsworthiness. News journalists seem to regard newsworthiness as a more or less inherent quality of news reports, as something that is self-evident and therefore not worth mentioning. Thus, the two news agencies AP and Reuters do not explicitly refer to “newsworthiness” as one of their rhetorical goals, when announcing their editorial principles or giving guidelines to journalists on their respective websites. Instead, they stress “accuracy”, “reliability” and “impartiality”, and say that their reports should be “balanced” and “informed”.

Researchers argue that there is a set of well-established factors which ‘guide’ news journalists in the process of selection, as well as in that of presentation. These factors – news values – are *values*, so they “are not neutral, but reflect ideologies and priorities held in society”, as Bell (1991: 156) notes. For journalists, these are *underlying* values. Thus, journalists probably do not try to satisfy them consciously; they just cannot escape their “institutionalized force”, even when they contest their ideology (cf. Hartley 1982: 81).

The most influential study on newsworthiness is that of Galtung and Ruge, originally published in 1965, reprinted in 1970. Galtung and Ruge present twelve factors, on the basis of which it is possible to make some conclusions of the media as “international image former” (1970: 260). Galtung and Ruge tested their hypotheses by looking at the newspaper articles on three foreign crises in four Norwegian newspapers in the early 1960s. A detailed discussion on the Galtung and Ruge study can be found in Study

A, but as news values have a central role in the ensuing sub-sections of 4.2, I will give a brief overview on them below.

4.2.1 News values – a brief overview

The central news values presented by Galtung and Ruge have remained largely unchanged since the 1960s; a point which also my studies have confirmed. In addition to Galtung and Ruge, several other scholars (see e.g. Hartley 1982; van Dijk 1988a; Bell 1991; Fowler 1991; White 1998) have explored the issue of newsworthiness, either adding new categories to Galtung's and Ruge's list, or looking at it from a different point of view.³⁷ As an example of the latter 'group', I want to quote White's definition of newsworthiness:

To be deemed 'newsworthy', the subject matter typically needs to be assessed as actually or potentially damaging, aberrant or transformative of social roles and power relations (and hence often involves conflict) in ways that are significant to society as a whole – hence the primary focus of news on politics (power-relational transformation) crime (aberration and/or damage) and misadventure (damage, aberration in cases of human negligence). (White 1998: 266)

White (p. 266) adds that the fact that some events, developments, decisions, proposals etc. are regarded as “potentially damaging, aberrant or transformative” implies “rehearsing, reinforcing or redrafting the presumed norms”.

Below is the list of Galtung and Ruge's (1970: 262–270) twelve news value factors with brief explanations³⁸:

- **FREQUENCY.** This refers to the time-span needed for an event to take place and acquire meaning. For instance, economic or social trends or complex political processes are under-reported, as they take a long time to unfold and become meaningful.

³⁷ For an extensive overview on the various 'newsworthiness' studies, see e.g. ben-Aaron 2005.

³⁸ Galtung and Ruge themselves speak of “factors” or “categories”, and not of “news values”, as they are referred to in later research.

- THRESHOLD – the size of the event. The bigger the event – the more likely it is to pass the “threshold”. However, there is no absolute ‘bigness’; this factor depends on other news values, and on competing events of the day in question.
- UNAMBIGUITY. The clarity of an event is an important factor; “the less ambiguity the more the event will be noticed” (p. 263).
- MEANINGFULNESS. *Cultural proximity* and *relevance* are two dimensions of this factor. Bell (1991: 157) notes that “geographical closeness can enhance news value”, but even if the place is geographically distant, “cultural proximity” can make an event meaningful. Or an event taking place in a culturally remote country can become relevant if e.g. one’s own well-being is threatened. Hartley (1982: 77) refers to the oil crisis of the 1970s as such an event.
- CONSONANCE. The news is more easily accepted if it fits “a pattern of expectation” (Galtung and Ruge 1970: 287).
- UNEXPECTEDNESS. This means both ‘unexpected’ and ‘rare’. According to Galtung and Ruge (p. 264), this factor does not contradict what has been said above; it only “brings a corrective” to the two preceding factors: To be newsworthy, events have to be unexpected, but “*within the meaningful and the consonant*” (p. 264).
- CONTINUITY. When something has been accepted as ‘news’, it will continue to be reported for some time. The related stories, too, may be more easily accepted; the “threshold” becomes lower (p. 264).
- COMPOSITION. This concerns also the “threshold” value. Sometimes different types of news can be selected for the sake of a ‘balanced’ whole. Or the news editor may want to combine similar stories to form a ‘round-up’ (cf. Hartley 1982: 78).
- REFERENCE TO ELITE NATIONS; REFERENCE TO ELITE PEOPLE. These two factors belong together, and are especially conspicuous in north-western media. News simply is *elite-centred*, Galtung and Ruge say (p. 266).
- REFERENCE TO PERSONS (PERSONIFICATION). In western media, events are often presented as actions of individuals (of one person, e.g.

President Obama, or of a small group of people, e.g. the U.S. Government). One reason for this could be *identification*. As Hartley (1982: 78) notes: “Individual people are easier to identify – and to identify with – than structures, forces or institutions.”

- REFERENCE TO SOMETHING NEGATIVE. *Negativity* is probably the best known news value. “Negative events make the basic stuff of ‘spot news’” (Bell 1991: 156).

According to Galtung and Ruge (1970: 265), the first eight factors are more or less universal, while the last four are culture-bound; they are important especially in the north-western media. With today’s new technology and the ensuing information ‘explosion’, values like negativity, personification or elitism are even more prominent now than they were in the 1960s.

Some of the news values (e.g., *threshold*, *composition*, *consonance*, or *continuity*) are mainly factors of selection, whereas others more clearly also affect *presentation*. In one of their “hypotheses”, Galtung and Ruge (p. 270) speak of “distortion”, stating: “Once a news item has been selected what makes it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated.” *Negativity*, as will be discussed in 4.2.2, is a good example of a value that, indeed, can be “accentuated” by presentation.

4.2.2 *Negativity as a rhetorical construct*

Discussing the ‘popularity’ of *negativity*, Galtung and Ruge (pp. 267, 268) point out that negative news tends to encompass several other news values: e.g., *frequency* (the positive in life usually takes more time than the negative), *unambiguity* (negative news is more unambiguous than positive), *consonance* (negative news can be assumed to be “more *consonant* with at least some dominant pre-images of our time” (p. 268)), and *unexpectedness*. Galtung and Ruge (p. 268) add that this presupposes a culture where progress is “regarded as the normal and trivial thing” so that it can be under-reported, as there is nothing ‘new’ in it (cf. White’s definition on newsworthiness cited in 4.2.1).

These examples by Galtung and Ruge refer to the *selection* of news. Below I explore how negativity can be enhanced by rhetorical ‘devices’³⁹ of *presentation*. The following list of presentational ‘strategies’ – which should not be taken as comprehensive – is collected on the basis of my empirical studies (A to F):

- Warnings or negative prophecies are presented, usually attributed to unnamed speakers.
- Negative intensifying lexis is used.
- Negative emotions, e.g. terrorism fears, are referred to as powerful, free-floating entities.
- When justifying the use of anonymous sources, the existence of an imminent (potential) danger or the possibility of other negative effects is implied; alternatively, an ‘aura of secrecy’ is created.
- Journalists resort to metaphors: structural metaphors (e.g. POLITICS is seen as WAR), or metaphors of intensification, etc. (Metaphors vis-à-vis *news values* will be discussed separately in 4.2.3 and 4.2.4).

Enhancing negativity in news agency reports often entails combining two or three of these ‘devices’ in one sentence or one paragraph. For instance, when journalists refer to anonymous “analysts”⁴⁰ who present negative prophecies, they may use a negatively charged reporting verb, e.g. “doubt” or “warn”, instead of the neutral verb “say” (which, however, is the most popular); or they transform verbal processes into mental processes, describing negative feelings of the analysts (e.g., “analysts fear”, or “worry”). The following examples on negative prophecies also give evidence of intensifying (negative) lexis, which is marked in italics (negatively charged reporting expressions are underlined):

³⁹ I have put the terms ‘devices’ and ‘strategies’ in *scare quotes* to indicate that I regard them as features to which news agency journalists resort more or less subconsciously.

⁴⁰ For a more detailed analysis on “analysts” and other unnamed sources in AP and Reuters reports, see Study D.

- (1) Analysts have warned of a *bloodbath* unless the international community and the Iraqi government pay more attention to settling the city's disputed status. (Reuters Oct. 11, 2007)
- (2) MOSCOW, Sept 10 (Reuters) - Russia's parliament will launch an inquiry into a school siege that killed over 300 hostages, President Vladimir Putin said on Friday, but analysts doubt it will satisfy those who blame *the carnage* on security services. (Reuters Sept. 10, 2004)
- (3) However, analysts fear a militia resurgence once British troops draw down, and warn that Iran may attempt to step up its influence in the region. (AP Feb. 22, 2007)

Analysts' warnings and prophecies often bring forward a contrasting view and are preceded by the conjunction "but" or the conjunctive adverb "however", as examples (2) and (3) show. Mental reporting expressions, like "fear" in example (3), tend to be interpretative (cf. Bednarek 2006: 562). We cannot know whether the unknown "analysts" have really expressed their feelings of "fear" to the AP journalist, or whether the choice of the verb is based on the journalist's interpretation.

The economic world is replete with both negative and positive prophecies; it can even be asked whether some of these prophecies are, in fact, self-fulfilling. In the financial news, too, all kinds of "outlooks" are reported, often followed by prophecies from e.g. "analysts" or "strategists". At the same time, dramatic events *outside* the economic world also have a considerable effect on the 'markets'. As Palmer et al. (1998: 62) point out, almost anything that happens – or is anticipated to happen – in the world that is considered worth reporting is seen to have financial consequences. For instance, terrorist attacks are thought to make investors fear new attacks, and thus negative emotions like "fears" become powerful 'actors' in financial news reports, as example (4) shows:

- (4) LONDON, March 12 (Reuters) - *Fears of a new wave of deadly terror attacks overhung* financial markets on Friday, a day after bombs in Spain killed nearly 200 people, *adding to worries* that the U.S. economic recovery is waning. (Reuters March 12, 2004; my italics)

The deduction chain in example (4) can easily be detected: After the terrorist attacks in Spain, “markets” fear new “deadly” attacks, and these fears increase earlier worries about the U.S. economy.

“Fear” and “worry” are emotions that focus on the (uncertain) future. After the bomb attacks in Spain, nothing new has happened, but these “fears” have, nevertheless, affected investors’ behaviour:

- (5) HONG KONG - Stocks fell after the deadly bomb blasts in Madrid rattled investor nerves around the world, although a late rally for China commodity plays helped limit losses.
(Reuters March 12, 2004)

Negative emotions in example (4) are presented “as affectual states”, “as simply reflecting reality” (cf. White 1998: 271, 272), which is typical of news reporting; they are free-floating entities, with no clear connection to those who fear or worry. We can only assume that Sensors in the mental process are investors and that they, probably, are mostly worried about losing their money. Negativity in these examples is not enhanced just by referring to negative feelings (fear, worry, nervousness), but also by reminding the readers of the fact that terrorist attacks are often “deadly”.

My last point on the negativity ‘strategies’ – before dealing with metaphors – concerns a special aspect in the presentation of unnamed sources: the reasons for anonymity (cf. Study D). Anonymous speakers appear quite frequently in news agency reports, although both AP and Reuters, in their guidelines to journalists, strongly stress the ‘weakness’ of such sources (see APME⁴¹ website and *Handbook of Reuters Journalism*). When the AP managing editor and the executive editor, in June 2005, reminded their staff of the long-standing AP policy concerning the use of unnamed sources, they wrote as follows (italics mine):

⁴¹ APME stands for “the Associated Press Managing Editors, an association of U.S. and Canadian editors whose newspapers are members of The Associated Press” (APME website). In the autumn of 2004, the APME credibility committee decided to make a study on unnamed sources, and for that purpose they chose one day in November 2004 and one day in February 2005 to check the stories from The Associated Press, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, the New York Times News Service and the Washington Post. As a result, AP in June 2005 sent its staff a ‘reminder’ about policy on unnamed sources.

In some quarters, there is a mistaken notion that using anonymous sources adds an air of exclusivity to our reporting and makes it seem more like a scoop. Some people think when we talk about our journalists doing “source reporting” that we expect or even prefer these sources to be anonymous in our copy.

Nothing could be further from the truth. A story that identifies its sources is a better piece of journalism, more complete and more credible, than the very same story pegged to unnamed sources.

And when we do put anonymous material on the wire, our policy says that we must describe for the reader why a source insists on going unnamed. Without this explanation, the granting of anonymity starts to appear casual and routine. (Silverman and Carroll 2005)

My AP corpora show that at least the part italicized above has greatly affected the presentation of anonymous sources in AP news reports after June 2005. In my files collected before the 2005 reminder, there were only a few examples which referred to reasons of anonymity, whereas the AP files after that date contain a wealth of different kinds of anonymity explanations. Similar expressions appear in Reuters files, too, but on a much smaller scale than in AP reports.

When AP editors advise journalists to explain the reason for a source’s anonymity, they, undoubtedly, just want them to give more information to the readers. And sometimes the reason is ‘factual’ enough: anonymity depends on (government, embassy or ministry) policy, and the reason is expressed by adding the word “customary” (“on customary condition of anonymity”), or by clauses like “in line with ministry policy”, “because of government policy”, “following protocol”, and so on. But when it is the speaker her/himself who wants to hide the identity, explanations of reasons tend to be much more ambiguous, opening up all kinds of rhetorical possibilities for the writer. Journalists can, for instance, stress the negative consequences the speaker might be facing; or they can hint at the situation being problematic by presenting the “sensitivity” of the topic as the reason for anonymity.

Often we find that whatever reason the journalist has given for the anonymity of the speaker, there is an underlying meaning suggesting that the person in question *should not* have spoken to her or him at all. This is

clearly implied by the (overwhelmingly) most popular reason for anonymity in my data: [the speaker is] “not authorized”. Quite frequently, too, the speaker or speakers are said to have requested anonymity because they “feared reprisals”. Example (6) from AP combines these two frequently used explanations (my italics):

- (6) Witnesses and local authorities offered a fuller picture. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity *because they were not authorized to speak to media and feared reprisals*

According to their accounts, at least one car -- and possibly others -- rigged with explosives was driven on a kamikaze mission at dawn into the concrete outer barriers around the Army base, a former Iraqi police station taken over by American troops late last year. (AP Feb. 20, 2007)

Negativity in example (6) is enhanced by suggesting that the “officials” did something that was forbidden and that they could be in danger. At the same time, these two explanations are apt to give rise to several questions: (1) Who had told the officials that they should not speak to the media? (2) Why were they prohibited from talking? (3) Why did they fear reprisals? (4) Was the possibility of reprisals somehow connected to the fact that they spoke to the media?

Sometimes, though, the reason for not giving names is clear enough:

- (7) The Mahdi Army commanders who spoke to the AP did so on condition of anonymity because *their organization is viewed as illegal by the American military and giving their names would likely lead to their arrest and imprisonment*. (AP April 12, 2007; my italics)

Although the negative emotion “fear” is not referred to in example (7), the presence of an imminent danger is evoked, which adds to the newsworthiness of the anonymous Mahdi Army commanders’ sayings.

When unnamed speakers are presented as fearing or as being in danger, they are evaluated with negative Appraisal values, with those of explicit or implicit Affect. Explanations of reasons focusing on the *topic* of quotations – and not on the speaker – can also involve negative evaluation, namely values of Appreciation. In some cases, the speaker has asked to remain anonymous, because s/he is revealing “confidential informa-

tion”. However, most often, in my data, the topic is said to be “sensitive”; or the journalist refers to the “sensitivity of the talks/ issue/subject/ matter” etc., when justifying the use of an unnamed source. “A **sensitive** subject or issue”, according to CCED (Sinclair 1995: 1511), “needs to be dealt with carefully because it is likely to cause disagreement or make people angry or upset”. Thus, the situation is evaluated as problematic, and this negative Appreciation value can also provoke feelings, that is, values of Affect. There are also a few examples which give evidence of the underlying meaning mentioned above (“*should not* have spoken at all”); the topic is not just “sensitive”, it is “classified” and should therefore be kept secret (my italics):

- (8) In Israel, security officials said the country's embassies and consulates had been alerted to possible attacks or kidnappings following media speculation that Israel was behind the Iranian general's disappearance. The security officials spoke on condition of anonymity *because such security measures are classified*. (AP March 6, 2007)
- (9) The trial is to begin later this year or in early 2008, officials said on condition of anonymity *because the information is classified under French law*. (AP April 6, 2007)

These examples show that “officials” (even “security officials”) are ready to break the law or regulations, if only they can speak anonymously.

When Silverman and Carroll (2005) in their reminder, cited above, ask AP journalists to explain the reason of anonymity, they argue that anonymity otherwise “starts to appear casual and routine”. Furthermore, they strongly refute the “mistaken notion” that their journalists resorting to unnamed sources, in fact, want to add “an air of exclusivity” to their reporting. Anonymity may no longer “appear casual and routine”, but, as we have seen, the extra clause that is added as an explanation often serves to enhance negativity or secrecy, thus suggesting “an air of exclusivity”. Somewhat accentuating, it could be said that an unnamed speaker – especially in AP dispatches – is construed as a person who speaks on condition of anonymity, because s/he is not authorized to talk to the media, but, nevertheless, often reveals confidential or even classified information on a

sensitive subject, fearing reprisals, or not wanting “to jeopardize his job” (AP April 4, 2007). “AP statement on anonymous sources” (see APME website) also says that “when it’s relevant, we must describe the source’s motive for disclosing the information”. However, though there are several hundreds of examples on unnamed speakers in my AP data, the source’s motive remains hidden in all of them. It is, for example, quite understandable that “two intelligence officers” spoke to AP “on condition of anonymity because of the secretive nature of their job” (AP March 6, 2007), but why “the secretive nature of their job” did not *prevent* them from talking to the media is left unclear.

4.2.3 *Metaphors revisited*

In Study A, I examined metaphors in the political news reports of Reuters and AP, linking metaphors to *news values*. My topic was the ratification of the Maastricht treaty in the British Parliament, the long process, which in 1993 caused considerable problems to the Conservative government, and to Prime Minister John Major, in particular. The first reading of my corpus, collected between July 19 and 25, 1993, showed that three types of structural metaphors, which I examined as metaphorical *scripts*, could be indentified as prevalent: metaphors of WAR (the most popular script), GAME and JOURNEY. The metaphors highlighted several news value factors, especially those of *negativity* and *personalisation*.

As I wanted to explore whether similar metaphors are still used to enhance newsworthiness in political news agency reports, I set out to collect new data on a (nearly) corresponding topic: the problems of the British Labour government and Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the early summer of 2009, when the British Parliament was shaken by the “law-maker expense scandal”. It was revealed that some MPs had made excessive, unjustified expense claims. Some of the Labour ministers, who were among the ‘wrong-doers’, chose to resign, and Gordon Brown was forced to reshuffle his government. Just before the 2009 European Parliament elections in June, during the disastrous world economic situation, the Prime Minister’s popularity was rated so low that it was asked in the media

whether or not Brown will “survive”. Going through my new corpus, collected between June 1 and 8, 2009, my first impression was that it contained fewer metaphors than the old one, collected in 1993, or, at least, that the metaphors seemed to be more conventional, less novel. Here, too, one of the prevalent metaphorical ‘scripts’ was that of WAR. Thus in subsection 4.2.4, I will, to a great extent, focus on metaphors of WAR, exploring, in particular, how they have been used to stress *news values*.

In news texts, experiential metaphors are typically used for *intensifying*. The function of intensification enhances newsworthiness, often stressing the news value of *negativity*. From the point of view of the Appraisal framework (see e.g. White 1998: 111–114), metaphors of intensification are *amplifiers*⁴², where “the value of intensification is fused with, or entailed by an experiential value, typically a Material Process” (p. 111). In White’s example *prices skyrocketed*, the metaphor relies on “the conventionalised association between a skyrocket and rapid movement”, and the sense of ‘very’ (intensification) “is fused with that of upwards movement – to skyrocket = to rise very rapidly” (p. 111). *Intensification* is not, thus, the only semantic function of such metaphors. Metaphors of intensification are especially popular in financial news reports (*economy crumbles, markets crash*, and so on), but my 2009 corpus on political metaphors also contains a wealth of such metaphors, as will be discussed below.

4.2.4 *Metaphors in political news reports: is POLITICS still WAR?*

When analysing political metaphors in the 2009 corpus, I have also looked at the metaphors of intensification, but otherwise I rely mainly on the cognitive views as presented e.g., in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) (for a more detailed discussion on these views, see

⁴² As explained above (see chapter 1), Appraisal is divided into three systems: Attitude, Graduation and Engagement. *Amplifiers* belong to Force, which is a sub-system of Graduation.

Study A). Thus, my basic assumptions on the functions and the nature of conceptual metaphors⁴³ can be summarized as follows:

- In a metaphorical process, we understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5); we can more easily conceptualize abstract and nonphysical things when we reason about them in terms of something that is concrete or physical.
- There are two domains in every conceptual metaphor: the ‘concrete’ *source domain* and the ‘abstract’ *target domain* (Lakoff and Turner 1989). Thus, for example, in the metaphor POLITICS IS WAR, the structure of the WAR schema from the source domain is mapped onto the target domain of POLITICS.
- Metaphorical structuring, however, is always *partial* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 13). It is important to understand that while metaphors highlight some aspects, other aspects remain ‘hidden’.
- Metaphors do not only help us to understand; they also “have persuasive power over us” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 63).

Chilton writes that

metaphorical mappings can enter into quite complex bundles of meaning that involve other cognitive factors, in particular frame representations that are in effect stores of structural knowledge such as knowledge about transport, the structure of houses, what illness is and what doctors do. A further important point about the cognitive theory of metaphor is that metaphorical mappings, which are usually unconscious, are used for reasoning, reasoning about target domains that are ill understood, vague or controversial. This is so because the source domains are intuitively understood and have holistic structure, so that if one part is accepted other parts follow. Such ‘entailments’ can be mapped onto the unstructured target domain, in order to derive inferences that would be otherwise not conceptually available, or vague in some way. (Chilton 2004: 52)

In Study A, I looked at the structural metaphors from the point of view of one specific “frame representation”, namely as *scripts*, drawing

⁴³ When using the term *metaphor*, we have to keep in mind that there, in fact, are two ‘levels’ of metaphor: that of the conceptual metaphors (WAR, GAME, JOURNEY etc.) and the superficial level of *linguistic expressions*, representations of those metaphors.

mainly on Schank and Abelson's influential study published in 1977. Lakoff and Turner (1989) speak of *schemas*, which – as defined by them – seem to be much more general than scripts. Schemas, however, have optional components, 'slots', which can be filled in by more specific information (p. 64). For instance, in my corpus on John Major's problems during the Maastricht ratification process (Study A), most WAR metaphors referred to a special 'slot', which I regarded as a GUERRILLA WAR script. How this relates to Schank and Abelson's notion of script and what implications such notion could have on metaphoric understanding and on news rhetoric, will be discussed below.

In the much quoted "restaurant script" (Schank and Abelson 1977: 39–40), John went to a restaurant, talked to the waitress, made his order ("coq au vin"), paid the cheque and left. We can easily understand this concise story on the basis of our background knowledge; the restaurant script provides the necessary connectivity. Why there is an 'actor' called "the waitress" is clear to us; neither are we puzzled by the fact that John had to pay "the cheque" after eating his meal. There are also some details which have been left out, but which can easily be assumed: that John looked at the menu and that he ate his coq au vin, and so on. The *causal chain* provided by a script offers a mechanism for evoking all the steps by mentioning just one slot (p. 38). Every script contains a number of 'actors'; however, a "script must be written from one particular role's point of view" (p. 42), which is also a vital point when exploring metaphorical scripts vis-à-vis news values.

As described in Study A, the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty on European Union in the British Parliament was an extremely complex political spectacle, with endless heated debates and numerous votes in the House of Commons in 1992 and during the first months of 1993. In 1991, the Conservative Prime Minister John Major had negotiated an opt-out from the so-called "social chapter" that contains guarantees of labour rights. On July 22, 1993, the government was still facing two votes: the Labour Party wanted the social chapter to be *included* in the treaty, and after the first vote, the whole treaty had to be endorsed once more. In

addition to the ‘official’ opposition, John Major had about 25 anti-Maastricht “rebels” in his own party. These Conservatives were expected to vote for the detested social chapter, since they hoped thus to scupper the whole treaty, while the opposition parties were ready to vote against the treaty (which they wanted), if it did not include the social chapter. The government won the first vote, but lost the main motion. One more vote was needed: Major called a vote of confidence which was worded to endorse the Maastricht treaty. The party “rebels”, fearing a possible new election, now decided to support the Prime Minister. Accordingly, the government won the vote of July 23, and on August 2, the treaty could finally be ratified.

Given that the ratification of the Maastricht treaty in the British Parliament was an unusually ambiguous process, it is not surprising that news agency journalists used a wealth of different kinds of metaphors to make sense of its various stages, and also to make the long process look more ‘dramatic’, i.e. more newsworthy⁴⁴. And as there was more than one conflict going on in British politics, WAR metaphors could be expected to abound. Just by looking at the headlines of Reuters dispatches, we can follow a narrative depicting a ‘warfront’, with Prime Minister John Major in the role of a general:

- 1 **Major readies alliances ahead of crucial British vote** (Reuters July 20, 1993)
- 2 **Major battles to avert last-minute defeat over Europe** (Reuters July 21, 1993)
- 3 **Major locked in tense battle for Maastricht** (Reuters July 22, 1993)
- 4 **Major in last-ditch battle with rebels on Maastricht** (Reuters July 22, 1993)
- 5 **Major bloodied in victory, leadership questioned** (Reuters July 24, 1993)

Words like “battle”, “defeat” or “victory” could refer to a general WAR schema, and not to a GUERRILLA WAR script, although Major is pre-

⁴⁴ As I wrote in Study A (see Stenvall 1995: 5), “it was never likely that the treaty would be abandoned, although its ratification could have been delayed. And despite his problems, Major was hardly in real danger losing his job... after all, as he said, the treaty had been practically endorsed by the earlier votes.”

sented as battling with “rebels”. But in fact, the ‘frame’ for the GUERRILLA WAR is established already in the first Reuters dispatches of my corpus, as examples (10) and (11) show (my italics):

- (10) If Major wins, it will be victory after a tortuous year-long *battle of attrition with about 25 anti-Maastricht members of the ruling Conservative Party* (Reuters July 20, 1993)
- (11) The one certainty was that neither Major nor the opposition is confident of victory in the climax to *just over a year of guerrilla warfare in parliament* over closer ties with Europe. (Reuters July 20, 1993)

Wars lead to casualties, but the entailments of a GUERRILLA WAR script differ from those of a general WAR schema, in that in a guerrilla war, there are seldom clear winners. As the Reuters headline (5) shows, the journalist has already done the reasoning, predicting negative consequences to the Prime Minister, in spite of his “victory”: John Major is seen “bloodied” and his leadership is “questioned”. On the same day, AP writes in a similar vein⁴⁵:

- (12) But next Thursday, the Conservatives seem likely to lose a special parliamentary election in Christchurch, a south England district that was among their safest seats. If so, Major’s majority would be down to 17, *that much more vulnerable to the next mutiny*. (AP July 24, 1993; my italics)

In Study A, I defined the relationship between *news values* and the *metaphorical script* as follows:

The notion of metaphorical *script* is also important. To sum up, scripts are CONSONANT; they look at the events from the point of view of one actor, which can enhance PERSONALIZATION; their *causal chain* can lead to NEGATIVE implications, and thus the events become more MEANINGFUL. (Stenvall 1995: 39)

Another prevalent metaphorical script, the GAMBLING GAME script, presents John Major as a lonely gambler, “playing the last round of high stakes poker over European union” (AP July 22, 1993), “Stakes” vary

⁴⁵ However, as I noted in Study A (cf. Stenvall 1995: 30), the WAR metaphors in AP dispatches were somewhat different from those of Reuters in that they rather referred to a “mutiny”, and not to a real “guerrilla war”.

from Major's or his government's "survival" to "his political credibility" (AP). Both Reuters and AP have resorted to this metaphor, but it is especially conspicuous in AP reports, because it often appears in headlines and leads, e.g., "Major Stakes Government's Survival on Treaty Vote Today" (AP headline July 23, 1993). In the media, Prime Minister John Major was generally called "the grey man" of British politics. In contrast, the GUERRILLA WAR and the GAMBLING GAME scripts, stressing the "tenseness" of the battle and the high risks of the poker game, and thus aiming at accentuating newsworthiness, would seem to construe their only 'actor', John Major, as a resolute general, or as a bold gambler. The image of Major as a weak and unpopular leader is, nevertheless, maintained by other means: for instance, by uttering negative predictions of his uncertain future, and by using other metaphors (e.g., according to AP July 23, Major had made "humiliating deals with Northern Ireland Protestants" and had tried "fruitlessly... to woo other minority parties").

Gordon Brown, the main 'actor' of my 2009 corpus, became Labour leader and Prime Minister after Tony Blair in 2007. At first, "dry, serious Brown... lauded for his no-nonsense, back to basics manner" was generally regarded as "a popular departure from Tony Blair's flashy internationalism" (Reuters June 4, 2009). In 2009, Brown also won international praise for his resolve in handling the global economic crisis.

At the same time, "his awkward, serious manner has alienated many at home" (Reuters Sept. 24, 2009), and along with the decline of the Labour Party popularity, Brown has had to face "rebellion" in his own party, too. The deep recession and rising unemployment, as well as the lawmaker expense scandal in the British Parliament, have further added to Brown's problems. In June, 2009, Reuters gives the following summary of Brown's situation (metaphors italicized):

- (13) The leader of the country since June 2007, when he succeeded Tony Blair without an election, Brown has had *an unsteady ride* over the past two years and now *faces a determined revolt*, with ministers quitting and *electoral defeat on the cards*. (Reuters June 4, 2009)

Example (13) contains three metaphorical expressions, representations of three different structural metaphors: JOURNEY, WAR and GAME. When comparing these metaphors to those depicting John Major in 1993 (in the role of a general or of a gambler), we see that all of them construe Gordon Brown as somewhat passive; in other words, not as a determined ‘actor’. In the GAME script he is not a gambler; in fact, “cards” here could refer to a visit to a fortune-teller, who foretells “defeat” to be Brown’s inescapable fate. On a “ride”, Gordon Brown has been given the role of a passenger, and at ‘war’, he is opposed by resolute ‘rebels’.

In contrast to my corpus on the Maastricht ratification process, my 2009 data contain rather few examples of JOURNEY⁴⁶ and GAME metaphors, but there are frequent instances of WAR metaphors. Like John Major in 1993, Gordon Brown is presented as “battling” and “fighting” against the “rebels” in his own party, but also “to save his job” (AP June 4, 2009). The GUERRILLA WAR script, which emerged clearly from the Reuters dispatches on Major and the Maastricht debate, is not so evident in the 2009 data; the prevalent ‘script’ could rather be that of REBELLION, REVOLT, or MUTINY. Still, this “gathering rebellion against Brown” (Reuters June 5, 2009), also entails the use of fire arms, as example (14) shows:

- (14) The performance [of the Labour Party in European elections] *gave fresh ammunition to Brown's critics in his party* after a traumatic week in which one departing minister, James Purnell, called on Brown to step aside and said he was an electoral liability. (Reuters June 8, 2009; my italics)

Brown’s “survival” is questioned, and journalists set to ponder the “mutineers” and their problems:

- (15) *Mutineers who seek Brown's ouster* are poised to decide whether to mount an attempt to *depose the struggling leader* after he holds a meeting

⁴⁶ The various subparts of the JOURNEY schema in my 1993 corpus mainly referred to the Maastricht ratification process itself. For instance, votes in parliament were seen as “hurdles” that the “bill” had to clear. Sometimes, though, even this script was looked at from John Major’s point of view. After his government had lost the second vote on July 22, AP writes: “But on Thursday he [Major] failed at the final parliamentary hurdle on closer European union...” (AP July 23, 1993)

with his lawmakers at Britain's House of Commons.
(AP June 8, 2009; my italics)

After the excessive expenses scandal and the government reshuffle, topped by the disastrous results both in local and in European elections, Gordon Brown was seen as “damaged” (AP), his authority “wounded” (Reuters), and his government “limping” (Reuters). In spite of the negative prophecies, he “survived”, but we can assume that the “rebellion” – or even a “guerrilla war” – continued, since a Reuters journalist wrote more than three months after the June crisis:

- (16) While the talk of a leadership coup has subsided -- even some former party rebels say an acrimonious challenge would only worsen Labour's chances – *the sniping hasn't stopped*.
(Reuters Sept. 24, 2009; my italics)

With their focus on Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the WAR metaphors, and the REBELLION script, in particular, stress the news values of *negativity* and *personalisation*. As a Reuters journalist notes on June 3, 2009, “this is a dangerous time for Brown”. But *meaningfulness* (i.e., *relevance*), too, is enhanced, since “Brown’s ouster” might lead to new parliamentary elections, which again could be disastrous to the increasingly unpopular Labour Party. Above, I have regarded verbs like “battle” or “fight” or “struggle” as (conventional) WAR metaphors, but they could also be seen as *metaphors of intensification*, since they are commonly used in everyday language to denote a person’s “determined effort”⁴⁷. Below, I examine other metaphors of intensification, concentrating on such metaphors which refer, more generally [than WAR metaphors], to the domain of VIOLENCE. These *amplifiers* (in terms of the Appraisal framework), which have their ‘physical’ basis in the acts of hitting or beating, appear frequently in my 2009 data. The focus in these examples is more often on the Labour Party or on Brown’s government than on the Prime Minister himself.

⁴⁷ When analysing *metaphors of intensification*, and discussing the ‘meaning’ of the respective words, the references (in quotation marks) come from the Merriam-Webster Online dictionary (www.merriam-webster.com).

White (1998: 150) argues that intensifying metaphors “in reporter voice may have sufficient salience so as to act as a characterising feature of this sub-register”. From the point of view of news rhetoric, they can be assumed to enhance newsworthiness. When journalists in my data use, for example, experiential verbs denoting physical violence, fused with the value of intensification, this underlines *unambiguity*, but also *negativity*. To present Brown’s government as “battered” is a rather common metaphor in Reuters dispatches:

- (17) Brown's government has been *battered by the expenses row and the worst recession since World War Two*. (Reuters June 2, 2009; my italics)

In the physical sense, “batter” is said to mean “to beat with successive blows so as to bruise, shatter, or demolish”. Examples (18–20) show other metaphors of intensification that denote ‘hard beating’ (italics mine):

- (18) The government *faces a further drubbing* when European election results are released Sunday. (Reuters June 6, 2009)
- (19) Brown's Labour Party is well behind the centre-right Conservatives in opinion polls, and *suffered a mauling* in local elections on Thursday. (Reuters June 6, 2009)
- (20) His [Brown’s] government has been *hammered by weeks of leaked details* about lawmakers’ expense claims, which have fueled public anger at politicians. (AP June 5, 2009)

The following meanings of these three verbs are based on the Merriam-Webster Online dictionary:

to drub = *to beat severely*

to maul = *to beat, bruise, mangle, handle roughly*

to hammer = *to strike blows especially repeatedly with or as if with a hammer: pound*

“Drub” and “hammer” as well as “batter” are also given abstract meanings in the dictionary so that they are, undoubtedly, conventional metaphors.

Above I have categorized them as metaphors of VIOLENCE, but it is not easy to say in which specific *domain* of violence they belong. Examining metaphors in the financial news, Charteris-Black and Musolff (2003:

166) give an example of “the battered euro” and see the euro “as a victim of violence as in familiar collocations such as ‘battered wife’ or ‘battered child’”. In examples (17–20), too, the Labour Party and Brown’s government are construed as victims of violence, rather than as participants in a physical combat. The ‘culprits’ (‘bullies’?) in the case of “battering” have been unambiguously named: *the expenses row* and *the recession*. “Lawmakers’ expense claims” are also blamed for the “hammering”. “Drubbing” and “mauling”, in connection with the elections, could refer to the domain of *punishment*, i.e., voters punishing the Labour Party. The following prediction by Reuters on the outcome of two coming elections gives support to this interpretation:

- (21) All the main parties are involved [in the expense scandal] but *voters look set to punish Labour*, the party of government since 1997, at European Parliament and local elections on Thursday. (Reuters June 1, 2009; my italics)

The analysis of the 2009 data proved that my first impression that I would find relatively *few* metaphorical expressions was not quite correct. However, I still argue that the metaphors were not so ‘strong’ as in the 1993 corpus; that they were more conventional. Of course, one should not draw any general conclusions on the basis of two rather small corpora, but in this specific case, one reason for the discrepancy could be that because the Maastricht process was so long and complex, journalists resorted to metaphors to make it more understandable and more newsworthy in several ways. In other words, metaphors could make it less ambiguous, more dramatic (because of negativity), more consonant, more relevant, and so on. Metaphors could also *create structure* in the ongoing process, thus ‘helping’ the *frequency* factor, as reporters could describe various stages of the “guerrilla war”. Gordon Brown’s problems in 2009 were, after all, more easily understood. As for the metaphorical conceptualization of politics, one prevalent feature has remained unchanged over the years: conflicts in politics are still most often seen as a WAR, or at least as involving physical VIOLENCE.

More generally though, the comparison between the two corpora brought one conspicuous *change* forward: the symbiosis between politics and economy seems to have tightened. In 1993, the few references to the interaction between John Major's problems and the status of the British economy put Major in the 'victim' role, much in the same way as Brown's government is construed in example (17). AP, for example, wrote as follows:

- (22) Major has been undermined by a long recession which is only now ending. (AP July 23, 1993)

The news reports from June 2009 present a much more complex relationship between the political powers and the economy, which is most often referred to as "markets". Here are some Reuters examples from my 2009 corpus (my italics):

- (23) LONDON (Reuters) - British Prime Minister Gordon *Brown backed down* from replacing his finance minister on Friday in a bid to hold his government together and *end a political crisis that has knocked sterling*. (Reuters June 5, 2009)
- (24) There was some *relief for the market*, however, from news that finance Minister Alistair Darling is to remain in his job. This will offer continuity in what is *the most important political portfolio for markets*. (Reuters June 5, 2009)
- (25) *Markets and voters* are looking for strong government and clarity on when the next parliamentary election will be held. (Reuters June 6, 2009)

In example (23), the metaphor of intensification [*to knock = to strike sharply*] presents "sterling" as the victim of the political crisis. However, the overall impression, emerging from these examples, is that it is the economy, i.e. "the market", who takes the upper hand. The metaphorically personified "markets" (able to feel "relief") have to be kept happy, even if it means that the Prime Minister has to 'back down'. Moreover, "markets" seem to have equal rights with "voters" to express their wishes about the government, and, in particular, about the Minister holding "the most important political portfolio" for them.

Some other aspects in the presentation of the financial news will be discussed in sub-section 4.3, which deals with tactics of impersonalisation.

4.3 Obscuring responsibility: tactics of *impersonalisation*

In Study F, I explored the issue of responsibility in light of conventions of *attribution*, showing, for example, how the traditional structure of a news report – from general to specific – opens up rhetorical possibilities for blurring the identity of the speaker. Below, I look at responsibility more generally, focusing on the construction of news actors' responsibility (cf. 4.3.2). My analysis gives evidence of news journalists' tactics of *impersonalisation*, a feature which is typical of reporter voice in news reporting (cf. White 1998: 271–288). When striving for objectivity and factuality, news agency journalists tend to leave open, or at least respond vaguely to the question of responsibility – not wanting to blame anyone who might be innocent. As a result, the alleged factuality of the news report is undermined.

Before giving examples of how news agency journalists have dealt with issues of responsibility, I discuss some theoretical tools that I have used in the analysis.

4.3.1 Theoretical aspects – Functional Grammar

The semantic concept of *transitivity*, which belongs to the ideational metafunction in Functional Grammar (cf. Halliday 1994: 106–146), is an important tool in the analysis of news actors' responsibility. The system of transitivity like any system in Functional Grammar is closely tied to linguistic choice. As Fowler (1991: 171) notes, it “makes options available, ...so the choice we make – better, the choice made by the discourse – indicates our point of view, [and so] is ideologically significant”. In responsibility, the question is not so much one of choosing between various *processes*; rather it is vital to examine how the Actor of the (usually material) process is construed in the text. Sometimes the Actor of a material process, in fact, encompasses another type of process; for example, when nominalised emotions, such as fears or concerns, are presented as Actors, the original

mental processes and their participants remain hidden. I will not discuss *transitivity* in detail in the present sub-section, since I have presented it in almost all of my studies (cf. Studies B, C, D and E). Instead, I look into two other concepts from Functional Grammar: *ergativity* and *nominalisation*.

Ergativity⁴⁸

An *ergative* point of view, Halliday (1994: 162, 163) states, is different from a *transitive*: instead of looking for differences, it focuses on the similarities, on the basis of just one variable: that of causation. Every ergative process has at least one participant, “the one through which the process is actualized, and without which there would be no process at all”, Halliday (p. 163) says. This “key figure” is called the Medium. A central issue in an ergative process is finding the *source* of the process; in other words, has an external agency caused the process, or does it seem to have ‘happened by itself’? As an example of the ergative pattern, Halliday (p. 163) gives the following ergative/non-ergative pair: *the lion chased the tourist/the tourist ran*. In both clauses, ‘tourist’ is the one experiencing the process, the Medium, while the external agency of the first clause, ‘lion’, is the Agent.⁴⁹

Halliday looks at transitivity and ergativity as two interchangeable points of views. According to Halliday (1994: 163), there are, in the language, such much used verbs forming transitive/intransitive pairs that also have an ergative relationship, and such processes can be analysed either in transitive or in ergative terms: e.g., *Tom broke the glass/the glass broke*.

⁴⁸ *Ergativity* here refers to the term in Functional Grammar (Halliday 1994: 163–172); in other words, it is a narrower concept than *ergativity* in typological studies. For Halliday, it is a semantic concept, connected to causativity.

⁴⁹ I have not referred to the system of ergativity in my Studies. However, in Study C, I have introduced a similar tool from Toolan’s ‘toolkit’: “[s]uppletion of agentless passives by intransitive clauses” (Toolan 1988: 239). In Study C, I wrote: “This feature refers to “clauses with the semantic pattern of an affected participant followed by the process that participant has experienced” (239), i.e. the process expressed by an intransitive verb. We can say, for example, that “a bomb went off,” instead of saying “a bomb was detonated;” or that “the prize went to X,” instead of stating that “the prize was awarded to X,” and so on.” (Stenvall 2007: 210)

Thompson and Ramos (1995) draw on Halliday's semantic model of ergativity, but find Halliday's view too "broad", and therefore they set out to develop a more 'delicate' tool for the ergative analysis. One of their central aims is to show how ergativity differs from transitivity; they want to distinguish clauses encouraging an ergative interpretation from those where transitivity analysis would be a more appropriate option (p. 2).

When refining their tools for the ergativity analysis, Thompson and Ramos (1995: 6) added a lexical aspect to the semantic one, and looked at the verbs forming ergative/non-ergative pairs. Highest on the 'cline of ergativity', they argue, are "identical ergative pairs". These are verbs like *break*, *broaden*, or *cook*; verbs that in common use, have the label 'both transitive and intransitive' so that the same verb can be used in ergative and non-ergative clauses (Halliday 1994: 163; Thompson and Ramos 1995: 6). According to Thompson and Ramos, "the question of agency or absence of agency... is strongest when a member of an identical pair is selected" (p. 6). (The question of "absence of agency" will be dealt with more closely in 4.3.2, when examples of non-ergative clauses are presented.) Moving down the cline of ergativity, we find the following three categories: *matched ergative pairs*, *distant ergative pairs*, and *transitives/ intransitives*. In fact, in the last category, the lowest on the cline, there are no ergative/non-ergative pairs at all (p. 6).

In my analysis below, I will follow the views of Thompson and Ramos in taking transitivity and ergativity to be two complementary systems, two possible sets of options (p. 6). However, choosing an appropriate option for the analysis is not a simple task. Sometimes one member of the pair of verbs encourages an ergative interpretation, whereas the other member can better be interpreted in terms of transitivity, depending on the focus of the analyst. To clarify this point, I give an example of a matched ergative pair *kill/die* (cf. examples (12–14) below). If *X dies*, something happens to 'X', so that 'X' is the one experiencing the process, the Medium. In other words, this is a non-ergative process, as no external cause is given. If the writer says that *Y killed X*, we learn that 'Y' caused the process which resulted in 'X' dying, so 'Y' could be the Agent in an ergative process. But

since my focus is on the *responsibility* of the news actors, I want to emphasize the active role of ‘Y’. Therefore I take ‘Y’ to be someone who ‘does something to another entity’ (to ‘X’), i.e., the Actor in a (transitive) material process.

Nominalisation

In examining how critical discourse is written, Billig (2008: 783) discusses nominalisation in detail. His criticism of earlier studies can be summed up as follows:

- 1 Analysts define nominalisation as a process, but, nevertheless, “frequently treat it methodologically as a syntactic or grammatical entity” (p. 791).
- 2 Analysts fail to “specify what sort of process nominalization is”; that is, “If verbs are said to be transformed into nouns, then how, when and by whom is this transformation accomplished?” (p. 787).
- 3 When analysts – even well-known and respected critical analysts like Roger Fowler or Norman Fairclough – speak about ‘concealing’ and ‘distorting’ effect of the nominalisation, they do it by using nominalisations in their own text (pp. 791–793).

Billig (p. 788) adds a further critical note stating that “[r]ecent analysts continue to quote approvingly Fowler’s comment about nominalization being potentially mystificatory (Kuo and Nakamura, 2005; Stenvall, 2007)”. In Stenvall 2007 (p. 210), I defined nominalisation as follows:

Nominalization transforms processes (verbs) or properties (adjectives) into nouns after metaphorical rewording ([Halliday 1994:] 352). The shift from ‘process’ or ‘property’ to ‘entity’ (a ‘thing’) also means that the nominalized word now can function as a participant in processes, or as a part of a prepositional phrase (cf. Halliday 1998: 197; Fairclough 1995: 112). From the point of view of news agency discourse and its alleged ‘factuality’, it is important to note that nominalization is “inherently, potentially mystificatory” (Fowler 1991: 82). In addition to obscuring the participant roles, it can leave open the tense of the verb (of the original process), the type of the process, etc.

Billig criticizes the analysts who examine “the semantic effects of these linguistic forms [i.e., nominalisations] that are taken as completed entities” (Billig 2008: 791), but “do not specify what sort of process they are describing” (p. 795). However, I argue that looking at the nominalised words, first, as entities – as ‘things’ – has proved more relevant for my analysis than examining the processes of transformation. The second step for me is to deduce what kind of process is hidden in a nominalisation. Though nominalisation is *potentially* mystificatory, as Fowler says, it is not always the main reason for the resultant ambiguity. Let us compare the following two examples (I have underlined rather ‘unambiguous’ instances of nominalisation, while marking ‘mystifying’ nominalisations in italics):

- (1) A yearlong U.S. recession has already destroyed 2.7 million jobs, pushing unemployment up to 6.7 percent, with many economists expecting it to rise above 8 percent in 2009. (Reuters Dec. 31, 2008)
- (2) The comments reflect rising *concerns* about possible *friendly fire killings* that could threaten to undermine the U.S. strategy of seeking alliances with local Sunni and Shiite leaders against insurgent factions to fill the vacuum left by a national police force that has been plagued by *allegations of corruption* and infiltration by militants. (AP Oct. 8, 2007)

In example (1) the nominalised “recession” – an Actor in a material process – is blamed for the rise unemployment. If we reword it as a congruent clause (see e.g. Halliday 1998: 207), we can say that “because the U.S. economy has receded during the past year, unemployment has gone up...”. Both the original clause and the congruent clause are, admittedly, vague, but I do not consider nominalisation to be the ‘mystifying’ factor in this case. Rather, the vagueness is due to the fact that the “recession” has been given the Actor role, though it cannot, surely, be the only culprit for the lack of jobs (see section 4.3.2 on the issue of *responsibility*). Example (2), by contrast, shows ample evidence of the ‘concealing’ powers of nominalisation. In contrast to some relatively unambiguous cases (*comments* [by “Maj . Gen. Rick Lynch”], *alliances*, *infiltration*), such nominalisations as *concerns*, (*friendly fire*) *killings*, *allegations* and *corruption* open up several questions concerning the participants of the original processes

(who has alleged; what exactly has been alleged; who is feeling concern; who is ‘possibly’ killing, and so on).

Billig (2008: 788) stresses that his aim has not been to subvert the work of the respected critical analysts, but, referring to Halliday’s approach, he wants to remind analysts and other language users of the importance of the act of making choices (p. 797):

If Halliday is correct, then we do not have to nominalize processes and use passives: there are always other possible options. With effort, we can try to avoid the standard habits of academic writing. This will not be easy.

When analysts themselves resort to the same kind of strategies as they are analysing, they do it “unselfconsciously” (p. 789). However, we as analysts have no reason to suspect that news agency journalists using such nominalisations, as, for instance, example (2) shows, consciously try to hide something. In fact, their style only follows the conventions of ‘objective’ news writing.

4.3.2 Construing news actors’ responsibility

When examining the issue of news actors’ responsibility in AP and Reuters news dispatches, I looked for answers to a central question in news reporting: who or what has been construed as responsible; what is the cause, who is the culprit? Roughly, three different types of answers – all of them affecting factuality – could be found:

- a. One decisive, often collective, factor was seen as responsible.
- b. No one was responsible; it ‘just happened’.
- c. The issue of responsibility remained vague.

Though transitivity is an important tool for my overall analysis, some examples (those of group (b), in particular) are looked at from an ergative point of view, and the examples on ‘vagueness’ in group (c) often involve nominalisations.

Preferring one alternative

Below, I examine news reports representing two different types of news: political news reports (on the Iraqi situation in 2007) and financial news

(on the economic crisis that started in 2008). In both cases, one collective alternative is often preferred over all other alternatives: in Iraq *sectarian violence* is blamed for all killings, and the ‘culprit’ for the economic problems in 2008 is the *recession* (or the *crisis* itself, or *the year 2008*). In the analysis, I draw on both transitivity and ergativity.

The overall picture of the ongoing violence in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 has been extremely complex. The perpetrators of various attacks have come from a large number of groups. In addition to the three sects (Sunni and Shiite Muslims and Kurds), there have been rival factions within the sects; there is a possible connection to al-Qaida; criminal gangs carry out kidnappings and murders, etc. Iraqi and U.S. troops chasing “insurgents” have often killed Iraqi civilians, too.

Reporting on the Iraq violence in a consistent way has thus been a challenging task for the news teams. On the one hand, when news agency journalists report e.g. on a bomb attack, they usually refer to perpetrators by generic terms (*gunmen, insurgents, suicide bombers/attackers*, etc.); or give the Actor role to inanimate objects or nominalisations (*bomb(s), bombing(s), bomb attacks*, etc.). They are also cautious about categorizing the attack or blaming any specific group. On the other hand, in longer dispatches, where the attacks are placed in context, we see more explicitly how journalists have interpreted the overall situation. Often journalists unify the otherwise vaguely defined acts of violence under a single label. In my data of 2007, the most popular label of this kind is *sectarian violence*.

In February 2007, one year had gone since the bombing of the Golden (Shiite) Mosque in Samarra. The consequences of that attack are presented in example (3) from Reuters and example (4) from AP as follows:

- (3) It was one of the lowest tolls since *the bombing of a Shi'ite shrine in Samarra a year ago unleashed a wave of sectarian violence* that has killed tens of thousands of people.
(Reuters Feb. 18, 2007; my italics)

- (4) *That attack by al-Qaida in Iraq militants [on the Golden Mosque in Samarra] set off the torrent of sectarian bloodletting that has turned Baghdad and much of central Iraq into a battleground.* (AP Feb. 12, 2007; my italics).

Both agency journalists describe violence with WATER metaphors; AP's "torrent" being somewhat more intensive than "wave" in the Reuters example. These two metaphoric expressions are Goals of material processes; "bombing" and "attack", respectively, are Actors. As for the relative clauses, which depict the consequences of the "sectarian violence/ bloodletting", I take them to call for two different interpretations: transitive for the Reuters example and ergative for AP. In the Reuters example, "that", referring to "a wave of sectarian violence", can be seen as an Actor of a material process. Violence has "done" something to "people"; in other words, "killed tens of thousands". The AP journalist has chosen the verb "turn", a verb that can be either transitive or intransitive and thus can be used both in ergative and non-ergative clauses (cf. 4.3.1). The focus is therefore more on what has happened to "Baghdad and much of central Iraq" (the Medium) than on the 'active' role of "bloodletting".

Focusing on a single narrative blurs the past. Since the bombing of the Golden Mosque is seen to present a 'clear' cause for sectarian violence, other possible causes remain obscure. Furthermore, despite the complexity of the Iraqi situation, other alternative sources of violence are ignored, when "sectarian violence" alone is blamed for having killed "tens of thousands of people". But, as Hartley (1982: 24) argues, news discourse is "hostile to ambiguities" – after all, *unambiguity* is one of the basic *news values* –, and it "seeks to validate its suppression of alternative possibilities".

By the end of the year 2008 it had become evident that the world economy was in a crisis and global recession was threatening. Accordingly, news journalists striving for objectivity could refer to these two generic concepts – "crisis" and "recession" as Actors or Agents, when reporting on new company losses, or layoffs, or crashing markets. Example (5) shows "crisis" as an Agent:

- (5) *The crisis of 2008 has radically changed the financial landscape, bringing down U.S. investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, saddling other banks with huge losses and freezing the credit system that keeps world business humming.* (Reuters Dec. 31, 2008; my italics)

The “financial landscape” (the Medium) has changed because of the “crisis”, and that change has caused severe, often fatal, economic problems. Resorting to these kinds of generic nouns (such as “crisis”) can blur the participant roles so that it is not clear anymore what is the cause and what is the effect. U.S. investment banks, like Lehman Brothers, which originally have been held partly responsible for instigating the crisis, are now construed as victims of the crisis (as Mediums of an ergative process). The year 2008 often appears as a participant in a (transitive) relational process. In such clauses we find reference to a quality which is attributed to this entity: the year 2008. They are what Halliday (1994: 120) calls *intensive, attributive processes*. Example (6) from Reuters simply states:

- (6) 2008 could be the worst year ever for Wall Street (Reuters Dec. 28, 2008)

In this clause, “2008” is the Carrier, and “the worst year ever” is the Attribute. In example (7) from AP, the year is blamed for causing huge losses of wealth to investors:

- (7) The last trading day of 2008 on Wall Street provided a merciful end to *an abysmal year* -- the worst since the Great Depression, *wiping out \$6.9 trillion* in stock market wealth. (AP Dec. 31, 2008; my italics)

In example (7), the “abysmal” year is given the Attribute “the worst since the Great Depression”, but in addition it gets the Actor role in a material process of “wiping out” stock market wealth.

The examples above show how “one evaluative accent over another” is preferred, which is an ideological choice (Hartley 1982: 24). When one alternative is taken for granted so that all other alternatives are suppressed, the journalistic ideals of objectivity and factuality are undermined.

Events ‘just happen’ – non-ergative clauses

Putting the responsibility on generic concepts like “crisis” or “recession” does not give much factual information on the real causes of the economic problems. Sometimes even this scarce information is omitted: events are seemingly happening without any external Agent or Actor.

Example (8) from AP contains three members of an identical ergative pair (*crumble, crash, shake*). Moreover, one verb (*disappeared*) belongs to the category which Thompson and Ramos (1995: 6) call “distant ergative pairs”:

- (8) Six years of stock gains disappeared as the economy crumbled and markets crashed around the globe, shaking the confidence of professional and individual investors alike. (AP Dec. 31, 2008)

The first three processes – *disappeared, crumbled* and *crashed* – are non-ergative; the Mediums are “gains”, “economy” and “markets”, respectively; no external agency is given. The clause with “shaking” is ergative, but, notably, the construction with the present participle leaves the question of agency unclear, especially as the Medium – “the confidence” – is obscure, too, as a nominalised emotion. From the point of view of the cause and effect, the clauses “as the economy crumbled and markets crashed around the globe” are crucial: because of these processes “gains disappeared”, and probably also confidence was shaken. At the same time, the crumbling of the economy and the crashing of markets are presented as self-engendering, with no outside agency.

When journalists make such abstract nouns as *crisis* or *recession* into Actors or Agents, these nouns become metaphorically personified. In financial news, in particular, these kinds of rhetorical tropes are widely used, and, accordingly, human actors are rarely referred to. Example (9) presents ‘personified’ metonyms as Mediums, and contains metaphorical non-ergative and ergative processes, but there are also ‘real’ people – investors – as Actors in a transitive (material) process:

- (9) Industrial metals, crude oil and even grains took it on the chin as the world fell into recession and investors sold anything liquid or risky to cover deep-

ening losses elsewhere or sock away cash for a brighter day, wiping out six years of nearly unbroken gains in the space of months.

(Reuters Jan. 2, 2009)

Let us try to deduce what kind of causal chain these clauses could form; what has happened and when and why:

1. **The world fell into recession**

Process: non-ergative, Medium: the world

2. **Investors sold some assets** (“anything liquid or risky”)

Process: transitive, (material) process, Actor: Investors, Goal: liquid or risky (assets)

3. [because investors wanted] **to cover some losses or “sock away-cash”**

Enhancement: causal-conditional, expressing purpose: in other words, ‘because investors’ intention was to minimize their losses, they sold assets’ (cf. Halliday 1994: 234))

4. As a consequence of the recession and of the investors’ actions, **the stock markets (of industrial metals, crude oil and grains) suffered severe losses**

Process: non-ergative, Mediums: metals, oil, grains

5. **Six years of nearly unbroken gains disappeared** (“wiping out...”)

Process: ergative, Medium: six years (of gains). Agent: obscure, but could be ‘recession’ + investors’ actions

I have chosen the transitivity analysis for only one clause. When “investors sold anything liquid or risky”, they ‘did something to some other entity’, and “investors” are thus Actors in a material process; especially as they acted on purpose, wanting to save at least some of their money. *Metals*, *oil*, and *grains* are metonyms, used to refer to the respective stock markets; and according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, the metaphorical expression “take it on the chin” means ‘to suffer from the results of a situation’. The key clause here is the non-ergative “as the world fell into recession”. The clause seems to be an unquestionable ‘agent’ causing all the other events, but happening by itself, without any external agency.

Blurring or distancing responsibility

“It is by turning verbs and other parts of speech into nouns ...that we increase the possible content of our text, and thus increase its **lexical density**”, Eggins (2004: 97) states. In news language, packaging information into compressed noun phrases has been a popular convention since the 18th century (Biber 2003: 170). This kind of economic style saves space, and it also conforms to the demands of news journalists’ ‘objective’, impersonalised style. At the same time, the meaning of the compressed sequences, which often contain nominalisations, can be far from explicit. By analysing noun phrases and nominalisation, it is thus possible to deduce whether or not news actors’ responsibility has become blurred; and if it has, what could remain hidden.

Examples (10) and (11) come from financial news reports. The two nominal groups (shown in italics) are Actors in material processes:

(10) *The dismal holiday shopping season* may sink some retailers and could take down some U.S. malls... (Reuters Dec. 29, 2008)

(11) Declining consumer confidence took a bite out of restaurants' sales and profits in 2008... (AP Dec. 31, 2008)

Looking at these nominal groups as *grammatical metaphors* (cf. Halliday 1994: 342–367), we can try to ‘unpack’ them into congruent clauses. (It has to be noted that in order to be able to do so we need some specific background knowledge):

Example (10): During Christmas time many people are on holiday and normally use much time and money for shopping, but now this season has been particularly bad for shops, and therefore...

Example (11): Because of the recession, consumers trust less and less that they will have enough money in the future, and now want to save, and therefore...

The actual material processes in both examples are metaphorical; the Actors (“season” and “confidence”) have been personified. Both nominal groups contain present participles, and the Head in example (11) is a nominalisation. The nominal group in example (11) hides a mental process

(‘consumers trust less’), and that of example (10) at least one relational process (‘the season has been bad’).

Nominalisations and other nouns may thus blur the Actor role. In addition, by resorting to vague expressions, journalists can *distance*, for example, the perpetrators of a violent act and the negative consequences of such an act. As discussed above (cf. e.g. chapter 3) news agency reporting is a continuous process, and a major event (a natural catastrophe, a military attack, a bomb explosion, etc.) generates a wealth of dispatches. Besides giving new information, the consecutive reports repeat extracts from the earlier dispatches, sometimes word-for-word, but often as slightly reworded. Examples (12–14) are AP news reports in October 2007, when the U.S. troops in Iraq, targeting al-Qaida “insurgents”, killed 15 civilians. The examples show (in time order) how the perpetrators and the victims are construed, and how, after some time, the relationship between the Actors (or the Agents) and their victims becomes more and more distant⁵⁰. In examples (12–14), Actors/Agents are underlined, the processes are marked in bold, and Goals/Mediums are given in italics:

- (12) BAGHDAD (AP) -- U.S. troops backed by attack aircraft **killed** 19 *suspected insurgents and 15 civilians, including nine children*, in an operation Thursday targeting al-Qaida in Iraq leaders northwest of Baghdad, the military said. (AP Oct. 11, 2007)
- (13) BAGHDAD (AP) -- U.S. air power and ground troops Thursday **killed** 19 *insurgents and 15 civilians -- including nine children -- an attack* that **left behind** *one of the heaviest civilian death tolls* in an American operation in recent months. The U.S. military said it was targeting senior al-Qaida senior [sic] leaders northwest of Baghdad. (AP Oct. 12, 2007)
- (14) The U.S. military, meanwhile, said it **was working** with local Iraqi officials and tribal officials **to investigate** *the killings of 15 civilians -- six women and nine children -- as well as 19 suspected insurgents* Thursday in a U.S. ground and air assault targeting al-Qaida in Iraq northwest of Baghdad.

⁵⁰ All in all, I found eight dispatches referring to this attack in my AP files. The first three were on the attack itself, while the main topic in the next three was a car bomb in a Baghdad shopping district, and the last two included comments from the Iraqi government on the civilian victims of this specific attack and, more generally, “in the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq” (AP Oct. 13, 2007).

The U.S. military operation near the man-made Lake Tharthar, about 50 miles (80 kilometers) northwest of the capital, **inflicted** *one of the heaviest civilian death tolls* in the offensive against the terror network in recent months.

Nineteen insurgents and 15 civilians, including nine children, died in the raid, the military said. (AP Oct. 12, 2007)

In all these reports, the basic facts concerning the issue of responsibility are unambiguous: the U.S. troops attacked, and they killed 19 insurgents and 15 civilians. At the same time, these examples show clearly that it is possible to put distance between the perpetrators and the victims. Only in examples (12) and (13), the act of killing is directly connected to “U.S. troops” as Actors (note that in (12) this information is attributed to an outward source: “the military said”). The role of the Goal in the material process is given to “insurgents” and “civilians”. The first steps towards distancing can be seen in example (13), where the journalist has added an alternative interpretation, introducing a less active way of expressing the fatal outcome of the U.S. attack. In the postmodifying expression, consisting of the noun “attack” + the subordinate relative clause, “attack” has become an Agent, which just “left behind”, instead of killing. The Medium of this ergative process is the rather abstract noun “toll”⁵¹, which thus hides the human victims. The fact that this is said to be “one of the heaviest civilian death tolls” enhances *negativity*; in other words, *newsworthiness*.

Example (14) is taken from a dispatch, which begins with a new headline and lead, referring to a car bomb explosion in Baghdad. Compared to the earlier reports on the U.S. troops killing 15 civilians, the U.S. military has now received a somewhat different role; it is “working to investigate the killings”. The nominalisation (“killings”) helps to distance the responsibility of the U.S. troops, especially as the cause of the civilian deaths is given only in a circumstantial element of the process (cf. Halliday 1994: 149–161 on *circumstantial elements*): “killings” happened *in a U.S.*

⁵¹ One of the three meanings given by the Merriam-Webster Online dictionary for the noun “toll” is: “a grievous or ruinous price <inflation has taken its toll>; *especially* : cost in life or health”.

ground and air assault. In the last sentence of example (14), the outcome of the attack is presented as a non-ergative process: the insurgents and the civilians (Mediums of the process) *died*⁵². The external cause for the deaths is given only indirectly: they died in the (U.S.) *raid*. However, it is by comparing the perpetrators and the victims, presented in example (12), to those construed in the second paragraph of example (14) that we find the strongest evidence of the (obscuring) power of transitivity/ergativity choices and nominalisation. While the original AP report simply states that “U.S. troops... killed 19 suspected insurgents and 15 civilians, including nine children”, the AP journalist in the later report has given the Agent role (in an ergative process) to the nominalised “U.S. military operation”, which has caused “one of the heaviest civilian death tolls” (the Medium). It is also notable that though the central issue, that of responsibility, has been left vague, other ‘facts’ are presented in great detail, for example, that Lake Tharthar is “man-made” and located “about 50 miles (80 kilometers) northwest of the capital”.

4.3.3 Discussion

Above I have discussed news journalists’ tactics of impersonalisation in the construction of Actor or Agent roles; that is, in defining who are responsible for the events that are reported.

I have noted that strategies of impersonalisation are especially conspicuous in the area of financial news, where human actors are seldom referred to in news reports, and where cause-effect relationships in real life, too, are often complex. Thus, in financial news dispatches, as we have seen, the responsible actors or agents are either not mentioned at all – events ‘just happen’ –, or the role is given to a generic noun, such as “crisis” or “recession”, or to an ambiguous noun phrase, sometimes including nominalisation(s). From the point of views of news agencies’ objectivity or

⁵² While I have here regarded “dying” as a non-ergative process, I have taken “killing” to be a (transitive) material process, and the U.S. troops, accordingly, to be Actors, since my focus has been on news actors’ responsibility. Given that the attack was said to be “targeting al-Qaida in Iraq leaders” (cf. example (12)) and not civilians, an ergative interpretation (with the civilians as a Medium) might also have been appropriate.

factuality, it is clear that these kind of ideational choices make the language vague and obscure, and contribute to hiding the real actor(s) or agent(s).

Examples (12–14) give evidence of the tactics of *distancing*. In this specific case, distance was put between the perpetrators (U.S. troops) and their act of killing civilians in Iraq. The originally unambiguous responsibility was blurred, when wordings were changed in the successive news agency reports. Once more, though, I want to stress that I consider the ‘tactics’ or ‘strategies’ of impersonalisation to be *unconscious* conventions of news writing.

4.4 Journalists and Affect

In Study C, I discussed the construction of the emotions *fear*, *worry* and *concern* in AP and Reuters reports on terrorism. Study E relates emotion to the concepts of factuality and objectivity, presenting two methods – one based on Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar and the other on the Appraisal framework – that can be used for such analyses. I have argued that the use of emotive words often makes news agency language vague and ambiguous, despite the journalists’ efforts to adopt a factual and objective writing style. For instance, when nominalised emotions are parts of compressed noun phrases, or Actors in material processes, the connection between the one who feels (the Sensor of the original mental process) and the emotion itself becomes obscure.

In the present sub-section, I look more closely at the relationship between the journalist and the emotions that appear in her/his text. Drawing on Affect, a sub-system of the Appraisal framework, I seek answers to the following interrelated questions: 1. When a journalist refers to emotions, *whose* feelings are they? 2. If they are not her/his own emotions, how can s/he *know* what another individual – or a group of people – really feels?

The overwhelming majority of the news agency reports analysed in my studies belong to the category of hard news. Accordingly, they follow the conventions of the ‘objective’ reporter voice (cf. White 1998), which presupposes that the journalist’s voice is backgrounded. This gives at least

a partial answer to the first question: the journalist's own emotions have to be excluded from the reports. The second question touches upon the basic property of emotions: as discussed in Studies C and E, emotions are basically subjective and individual experiences. Thus, a journalist describing other people's emotions is necessarily an outsider. After a brief outline (in 4.4.1) of how Affect is presented in Appraisal Theory, I will discuss this 'outsider role' in 4.4.2. Is the journalist writing hard news stories an 'observer', as Thomson et al. (2008) want to suggest?

4.4.1 Affect in Appraisal Theory

Although the Appraisal framework has been discussed in most of my studies (cf. Studies C, D, E and F), with Study E containing a rather detailed presentation of Affect, I will below recapitulate the main aspects of (especially) the sub-system of Affect.

This is how Martin and Rose (2003: 22) define the Appraisal framework:

Appraisal is concerned with evaluation: the kinds of attitudes that are negotiated in a text, the strength of the feelings involved and the ways in which values are sourced and readers aligned.

The system of Attitude comprises three sub-systems, "three regions of feeling" (Martin and White 2005: 35): Affect, Appreciation and Judgement. Affect is concerned "with resources for construing emotional reactions" (p. 35), Appreciation with "resources for construing the value of things, including natural phenomena" (p. 36) and Judgement with assessing human behaviour "according to various normative principles" (p. 35). In a way, Affect is the basic sub-system of Attitude, since the other two also "encode feeling" (Martin 2000: 147). Attitude values can be either explicit or implicit, or even somewhere in between (see The Appraisal Website). In Appraisal terms, explicit values are called "inscribed", implicit values are "evoked" (or "invocations" or "tokens" of Attitude). Values that are in between explicit and implicit evaluation are called "provoked". "Provocations" are triggered by values that belong to another Attitude sub-type; for instance, values of Affect often 'provoke' Judgements.

Evaluations are inherently either positive or negative; that is a feature common to all three sub-systems of Attitude. This aspect comes first, when Martin and White (2005) set to “classify” the sub-system of Affect. In all, Martin and White (pp. 47-51) find the following six factors to be relevant when Affect is analysed:

- (1)
 - positive affect the captain was **happy**
 - negative affect the captain was **sad**
- (2)
 - behavioural surge the captain **wept**
 - mental process/state the captain **disliked** leaving/the captain felt **sad**
- (3)
 - reaction to other the captain **disliked** leaving/leaving **displeased** the captain
 - undirected mood the captain was **sad**
- (4)
 - low the captain **disliked** leaving
 - median the captain **hated** leaving
 - high the captain **detested** leaving
- (5)
 - realis the captain **disliked** leaving
 - irrealis the captain **feared** leaving
- (6)
 - un/happiness the captain felt **sad/happy**
 - in/security the captain felt **anxious/confident**
 - dis/satisfaction the captain felt **fed up/absorbed**

Martin and White (p. 46) call “the conscious participant experiencing the emotion an Emoter, and the phenomenon responsible for that emotion a Trigger”.

Factors (1–6) show us how Affect in a text can be examined from several, overlapping angles. For my analysis, which focuses on the ‘outsider’ role of news journalists reporting on other people’s emotions, factor (2), “behavioural surge” vs. “mental process/state”, is of special interest.

Therefore, before moving on to sub-section 4.2.2, I quote the whole explanation of that particular point, as given in Martin and White (p. 47):

Are the feelings realised as a surge of emotion involving some kind of embodied paralinguistic or extralinguistic manifestation, or more internally experienced as a kind of emotive state or ongoing mental process? Grammatically this distinction is constructed as the opposition between behavioural (eg *She smiled at him*) versus mental (eg *She liked him*) or relational (eg *She felt happy with him*) processes.

4.4.2 *Affect – Attributed, Observed or Interpreted?*

When analysing news agency journalists' relation to Affect, I will focus on explicit, i.e. *inscribed*, Affect in hard news reports. White (1998: 271, 272) notes that Affect values are widely used even in reporter-voice texts, but that they typically appear as “affectual states”; in other words, they are presented as Mental processes, “and hence as an experiential category, as part of the view of external reality provided by the language” (p. 271). More recently, White and other scholars⁵³ have introduced the term “observed” Affect (as opposed to “authorial” Affect), to refer to the relationship between news journalists and the expressions of Affect in news texts. Thomson et al. (2008: 225) give the following short definition for “observed affect”: “the reporter describing the emotional responses of third parties”.

From my own specific point of view – factuality and objectivity of news agency discourse – the term *observed Affect* is, however, too broad. We can, of course, see news journalists as ‘observers’ of other people’s feelings, but it is also evident that the distance between the ‘observing’ journalist and the Emoter (the ‘third party’) is not always the same. Roughly, there are three options. First, the news actor (the Emoter) is *quoted* in the news report, so that s/he either expresses her/his own feelings, or speaks about other people’s feelings. Secondly, the reporter can be close enough to *observe* news actors’ emotions, for instance, on the basis of the “behavioural surge” (tears, smile, etc.). However, it is the third alternative that is

⁵³ cf. White and Thomson (2008), Thomson et al. (2008), and White’s presentation in a seminar for the Varieng Research Unit at the University of Helsinki, April 3, 2009.

the most typical: journalists set out to *interpret* emotional reactions of a large group of people, even of a whole nation⁵⁴ so that it is no longer clear who the Emoters actually are. Thus, I suggest dividing the term “observed” Affect into three parts: *attributed*, *observed* and *interpreted*⁵⁵. I will test the application of those terms by exploring examples from AP and Reuters news reports, proceeding from ‘factual’ and/or ‘objective’ towards ambiguity and vagueness on an imaginary cline. It can be hypothesized that *attributed* Affect is on the ‘factual’ end of the cline, whereas *interpreted* Affect would take up the opposite end. (In my examples below, I will italicize *attributed* Affect, underline *observed* Affect, and mark *interpreted* Affect in bold.)

Since authorial emotions have to be excluded from hard news reports, and emotions are individual and subjective experiences, we can assume that the only ‘objective’ way left for the journalists is to let the news actor speak of her/his own feelings in a direct quote. In example (1) from Reuters, Shizue Takahashi, whose husband had been killed in a doomsday cult’s gas attack in Tokyo nine years earlier, speaks to the reporters before the final verdict is expected after eight years of trial:

- (1) “I hope he [the cult guru] gets the death penalty and am sure he will, but *I feel empty* because he never spoke during the trial,” said Takahashi, who lost her 50-year-old husband, an assistant stationmaster at a subway station.
 “He was responsible for not only taking my husband’s life, but for an act of terrorism. I don’t have *hatred* towards him, but am *angry* at him for not talking about it.” (Reuters Feb. 25, 2004)

⁵⁴ Cf. Studies C and E on ‘group emotions’, which, according to sociologists, can be problematic. Kemper, for example, states: “Thus when we speak of a group emotion, we can mean only that some aggregate of individuals is feeling something that is sufficiently alike to be identified as the common emotion of that aggregate.” (Kemper 2002: 62)

⁵⁵ John E. Richardson (personal communication) has suggested that the term ‘interpreted Affect’ could be replaced by ‘constructed Affect’. According to Richardson, that would stress “the rhetorical dimension of the journalist’s descriptive account”, making the demarcation between the three sub-types clearer. In addition, it would “utilise the principle of linguistic/argumentative externalisation” instead of “imputing a cognitive process to the journalist” (quotations from Richardson’s examiner’s report to the Faculty of Arts, University of Helsinki). Though I have retained my original term ‘interpreted’ here, I find Richardson’s suggestion very apt, and will reconsider the terminology in my future research.

Sometimes the journalist wants to ‘verify’ the news actor’s comments by adding her/his own observations based on the Emoter’s “behavioural surge”. The funeral of Pope John Paul II in Rome gave rise to emotional reactions, with many spectators shedding tears. Example (2) comes from AP:

- (2) Poole, who now lives in Rome where her husband studies theology, was among many pilgrims who *expressed their deep devotion and affection* for John Paul.

“He was personal, like a father, like a grandfather. *I felt that close* to him. *I miss him*,” she said, tears streaming down her face.
(AP April 8, 2005)

In examples (1) and (2), the speaker that is quoted describes the way she herself feels; in other words, the speaker is the Emoter. In some cases, though, the news actor speaks about other people’s emotions, taking the role of an ‘observer’ or, even more generally, interpreting the situation. I have chosen four examples (3–6) to illustrate the distance between the speaker and the Emoter(s).

- (3) “There was a man *full of fear and despair*, it was really *despair in his eyes*,” Bendlin said. (AP Sept. 11, 2002)
- (4) “It’s amazing. The atmosphere here was really good,” said Anna Tombarkiewicz, 16, from Krakow. “In Poland, people are just *sad*. Here there were *tears*, but also *laughter*.” (AP April 8, 2005)
- (5) “People are *tired*, they are *frustrated* because they didn’t expect this to go on so long,” said Laura Bonham, a spokeswoman for Progressive Democrats of America, which lobbies lawmakers to support a withdrawal [from Iraq]. (Reuters Oct. 3, 2007)
- (6) “The fact is Afghan civilians are *angry* about the security situation today,” said John Sifton, a researcher on terrorism for Human Rights Watch. (AP March 7, 2007)

In example (3), the spokesman of a German school speaks about the former student Mounir El Motassadeq, now charged “of accessory to murder and membership in a terrorist organization” (AP Sept. 11, 2002). Bendlin had met El Motassadeq personally in 2001 after the September 11 attacks, thus being able to observe his emotions at close range. Attending Pope

John Paul's funeral, Anna Tombarkiewics, in example (4), describes the general atmosphere and comments on other people's feelings, based on observations of their "behavioural surge", whereas examples (5) and (6) rely largely on the speaker's interpretation.

An analyst might want to claim that these examples (in particular examples (5) and (6) that are not based on direct observations of "behavioural surge") are less factual or objective than examples (1) and (2) which refer to the Emoters' own feelings. However, from the point of view of news journalists, they still present 'facts', or at least 'news facts'⁵⁶. They are all direct quotes of news actors' words; furthermore, all the sources are named.

The first task, when analysing *observed* Affect, is to decide how broadly the concept of 'observing' should be taken. I consider the following two definitions of the verb *to observe* in the Merriam-Webster online-dictionary to be relevant in this respect:

1. to watch carefully especially with attention to details or behavior for the purpose of arriving at a judgment
2. to come to realize or know especially through consideration of noted facts

In other words, in order to be able to observe Affect, both the outward signs of emotion (cf. example (2)) and the behaviour of the Emoter(s) have to be taken into account. The expression "through consideration of noted facts" opens up other possibilities; suggesting, in fact, that the line between *observed* and *interpreted* Affect tends to be fuzzy.

News agency journalists are not often in the position to directly look at the "behavioural surge" of an Emoter. Furthermore, the relationship between 'emotion' and its 'signs' is far from unambiguous. Let us consider the emotion *fear*, which is frequently referred to in news agency dispatches

⁵⁶ Fishman states in his well-known definition of "the fundamental principle of news fact" that *something is so because somebody says it*. (Fishman 1980: 92; see also Studies B, D and F).

(cf. Study C). What could be the outward signs of fear? There might, for example, be a look of fear in a person's eyes; or the person who fears could be trembling or shivering. Such examples of journalists' observations could not, however, be found in my AP and Reuters files. According to psychologist Robert Plutchik (1980: 16), the typical behaviour of a person who fears is "running or flying away". Example (7) from AP shows that kind of reaction to fear:

- (7) In Saddam-era Iraq, the country's estimated 800,000 Christians were generally left alone, but after U.S. forces toppled the regime and sectarian clashes broke out, their situation grew more precarious.
In the summer of 2004, insurgents launched a coordinated bombing campaign against Baghdad churches, sending some Christians fleeing in fear. (AP Oct. 14, 2007)

Seeking safety in closeness is another reaction to fear, as example (8) from Reuters suggests:

- (8) On Monday night, the Ghanems and three other families in their apartment block, about 25 people in all, huddled together in fear in one room when the Israeli army stormed in. (Reuters March 12, 2002)

Mostly, though, as I have discussed in Studies C and E, *fear* in news agency reports is construed as a collective state, which is only loosely connected to those who concretely experience the feeling. It is often referred to in the plural form *fears*. Nevertheless, these unspecified fears can be powerful Actors, cancelling flights, or affecting investors' behaviour on financial markets like they do in example (9) from Reuters:

- (9) **Fears** al Qaeda may have been behind Thursday's Madrid train blasts, which killed 200 people, **have helped drive investors** out of stocks and into traditional safe havens such as government debt, the Swiss franc and gold. (Reuters March 16, 2004)

As stated above, it can be difficult to decide whether Affect in a news report is *observed* or *interpreted*, since *observed* Affect, too, often depends on journalists' deductions and interpretation (cf. Merriam-Webster's definition). However, I argue that an analyst can make the ap-

appropriate categorization by considering the facts that the journalist has given in the report in question. I have chosen two examples on *anger* to depict how I see the difference between those two Affect types:

- (10) BAGHDAD (AP) -- Hundreds of angry Baghdad squatters living in a complex of residential buildings that once belonged to Saddam Hussein's information ministry took to the streets Tuesday to protest alleged government plans to evict them.

The demonstration in the Iraqi capital took place in the Salihiya neighborhood, with the protesters carrying Iraqi flags and banners in Arabic and English denouncing the eviction which they claim would be unconstitutional.

"Why us?" and "No to eviction," read some of the banners.

(AP Oct. 2, 2007)

- (11) ANKARA, Oct 11 (Reuters) - Turkey's prime minister will ask parliament to authorise a military push into north Iraq to fight Kurdish rebels **amid Turkish anger** on Thursday at a U.S. vote branding Ottoman Turk killings of Armenians genocide. (Reuters Oct. 11, 2007)

In example (10), there is a clear connection between anger and a specified group of Baghdad squatters. These squatters have been 'observed', marching in the streets with banners denouncing the eviction. However, in example (11), the premodifier "Turkish" does not specify who the Emoters are, in spite of the fact that the reason for the "anger" is said to be "a U.S. vote". Like "terrorism fears", which have been discussed in Study C (cf. Stenvall 2007: 219), this anger is construed as a free-floating entity with no visible connection to those who are supposed to feel this emotion.

Above I have explored the rather complex relationship between news journalists and news actors' emotions, as presented in news agency reports. Dividing Affect into three types – *attributed*, *observed* and *interpreted* – proved useful to the analysis, though the demarcation line between *observed* and *interpreted* was rather fuzzy. Because I aimed at defining these three types and finding differences between them, I included here only two clear examples of *interpreted* Affect. However, my earlier studies (cf. Study C and Study E) have shown that *interpreted* Affect appears frequently in news agency reports; furthermore, it is the most rele-

4 Conventions vis-à-vis factuality and objectivity

vant type of Affect when objectivity or factuality of news agency discourse is examined.

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The global news agencies have always been keen to adopt new communication technologies, welcoming the rapid technical development, which over the past two decades has resulted in communication satellites, digital convergence, innovations in computer technology, and so on (see chapter 2). New technologies have helped AP and Reuters expand their activities into new areas; e.g., via the Internet their dispatches can now reach a mass audience directly, or they can produce “tailored” online multi-media packages to their commercial clients. From the point of view of news agency power, AP’s and Reuters’s success in the TV news agency sector has been of great significance; the possibility to combine text with video is apt to strengthen their role as important agenda-setters for other media.

Although AP and Reuters have on the surface undergone marked changes during their recent history, their central product – the news dispatches – has remained virtually unchanged. The conventions of news writing, examined in chapter 4, certainly go back several decades. Two of them – the inverted pyramid structure and the ‘objective’ writing style – have sometimes been connected to the invention of the telegraph and the ensuing birth of news agencies, which took place as early as in the mid- and late-1800s (cf. Carey 1989; Scanlan 2000). It is, though, more probable that these conventions did not really come into use until the 1900s (Errico et al 1996; White 1998; cf. also Study F), but they can nevertheless be regarded as long-standing routines. And thanks to the studies of Galting and Ruge, clear evidence of the still existing central *news values* can be traced back to the early 1960s.

As stated in chapters 1 and 4, the four central conventions that I chose for closer examination have been found to work on various levels of news reporting: on the structural, ideological and stylistic levels. Furthermore, though I looked at each of them separately, in news texts they are clearly intertwined. The convention of stressing newsworthiness and that of blurring news actors’ responsibility are closely related to the structural

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qualities of hard news reports; emotions in news reports can be used to hide the role of real actors, or to enhance newsworthiness, and so on.

Looking at the typical structure of news reports, I focused on the routines of specification. As e.g. van Dijk (1988a: 43, 44) has shown, topics in news reports are typically realized discontinuously, in instalments, and there is a tendency to give general, abstract information first, followed by more precise, specific details. I consider these two features to be especially relevant from the point of view of factuality and objectivity. The news actor – for instance a speaker that is quoted – is often presented in general terms in the headline and/or the lead of the dispatch, and due to the discontinuous structure of the report, the reader has to look at later, specifying instalments in order to learn her/his identity. This tends to lead to ambiguity, as the identity may not be revealed until after several instalments, or it can even remain hidden among the identities of other speakers that have been quoted.

As the beginning of a news report is its most important part (cf. van Dijk 1988a; Bell 1991; White 1998), newsworthiness, in addition to the tendency of generalization, also affects the order of presentation. Thus it can be expected, for instance, that such negative emotive words like *fears* appear as Actors of material processes in headlines – they are both abstract and newsworthy. Transferring the responsibility from human agents to vague emotions is typical, in particular, of financial news reports. The ‘speaker’ role in the headline is often given to a political state (e.g. “Iraq says”, or “U.S. warns”); a state is ‘general’, and it has authority. But attributing sayings of individual persons to a state clearly affects the factuality of news reporting. First, one has to consider whether the speaker, whose identity is revealed later, can really be seen to *represent* the state presented in the headline. If s/he is, for instance, the Prime Minister, s/he is certainly entitled to speak for the country in question, but I have also found the real ‘speaker’ to be a news paper article, or an unnamed official that in this manner takes on the role of speaking for the state (see chapter 4 and Study F). Secondly, when a state is construed as a speaker, it is metaphorically personalised, and its ‘behaviour’ can be judged. Thus, it is

said, for example, that “Iraq” – rather than its ministers – is “defiant”, or speaks “in mixed signals”. The conventional structure of news reports makes this kind of presentation look quite natural.

Newsworthiness is a staple of news rhetoric (cf. section 4.2). As mentioned above, for the news agencies it is such a basic, self-evident feature that it need not even be mentioned as a goal worthy of pursuing; after all, their mission is to distribute *news*. AP has a “statement of news values and principles” on its website, but its “news values” have nothing to do with those presented by Galtung and Ruge, discussed above. Instead, AP speaks of “the [traditional] privilege of bringing the truth to the world” and of “the news... reported quickly, accurately and honestly”. *Handbook of Reuters Journalism* has several references to the word *newsworthy*, but a closer look at them reveals that Reuters journalists are supposed to know what newsworthiness means without needing any further explanations. For instance, Reuters simply advises journalists to *look for a newsworthy subject*, when they have to choose topics for Feature stories (p. 44).

In my studies, I have regarded *news values* as factors of presentation, and not so much as factors of selection. In chapter 4, I examined the news value of *negativity*, which is a good example of a value that affects selection, but that can be greatly accentuated by presentation, too. As stated above, negative emotions (*fear, worry, concern, anger*, etc.) have often been given an Actor role in a material process; also intensifying negative lexis is used (*deadly attacks, bloodbath, carnage*, and so on). In addition, I find the following two ‘strategies’ making the language negative and less factual: (1) journalists present negative prophecies and warnings, usually attributing them to unnamed speakers; and (2) journalists justify the use of anonymous sources by implying the existence of an imminent, potential danger. In news agency dispatches, generic “analysts” warn of “a bloodbath” (Reuters), or they “fear a militia resurgence” (AP). Since these quotes are indirect, it is impossible to know what exactly these “analysts” have said, and to which extent these prophecies or warnings depend on the journalists’ own interpretations. Furthermore, it is equally uncertain whether or not the prophecies will ever be fulfilled. The second ‘strategy’ –

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the justification of the use of anonymous sources – is prominent especially in AP dispatches (cf. chapter 4 and Study D). In June 2005, AP journalists were advised to explain the reason for anonymity, if they had to use a quote from an unnamed source (see Silverman and Carroll 2005). The main goal, undoubtedly, is to give readers more information. At the same time, these explanations open up all kinds of rhetorical possibilities for boosting *negativity*. Often there is an underlying meaning suggesting that the anonymous speaker *should not* have spoken at all because of the potential negative consequences: s/he is in danger (“feared reprisals”), or s/he is “not authorized” (the most popular reason in my data), or the topic in question is “sensitive”.

The second part of section 4.2 examines how metaphors could be linked to news values, comparing the findings of Study A to new data from 2009. In Study A, I analysed conceptual metaphors in AP and Reuters political news reports on the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty in the British Parliament in July 1993. The process had been extremely long, causing considerable problems for the Conservative government, and for Prime Minister John Major. Three types of structural metaphors were prevalent: metaphors of WAR, GAME and JOURNEY; WAR metaphors being the most prominent. The metaphors could be tied to several news value factors, but especially to those of *negativity* and *personalisation*, as the reports focused on John Major, whose position as the Prime Minister was seen to be in danger. In June 2009, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the Labour Party was in power, facing somewhat similar problems as Major in 1993; it was frequently asked in the media whether or not Brown will “survive”. In my new corpus, too, metaphors of WAR (and REBELLION) were the most popular, and with their focus on Gordon Brown, they, too, stressed the news values of *negativity* and *personalisation*. However, I found two features which were much more conspicuous now than in my 1993 data. The first of them is the use of *metaphors of intensification* denoting physical VIOLENCE (cf. White 1998: 111–114 on metaphors of intensification); Brown’s government was presented as *battered*, or it faced a *further drubbing*, or *suffered a mauling* (examples from Reuters), and AP

saw it as *hammered*. Secondly, the news agency reports from 2009 gave evidence of a very close, almost symbiotic, relationship between politics and economy; Brown's government was, for instance, urged to "end a political crisis that has *knocked the sterling*" (Reuters June 5, 2009; my italics).

Above I have discussed how news actors' responsibility can become obscured when journalists follow the conventional structure of news stories. But I have also looked at it more generally, exploring the connection between responsibility and the tactics of impersonalisation (see section 4.3). I argue that news agency journalists sometimes leave matters of responsibility open, because they do not want to blame anyone who might be innocent. For the analysis, I used tools from Halliday's Functional Grammar, those of *transitivity*, *ergativity* and *nominalisation*, and examined data on the Iraq violence in 2007 and on the world economic crisis of 2008. The results show that AP and Reuters journalists have found at least three different types of solutions as to who are the 'culprits': journalists choose one collective factor that is seen as responsible, or they do not blame anyone, events 'just happen', or responsibility is left vague.

Both the situation in Iraq and the world financial crisis that started in 2008 were extremely complex, and the list of potential culprits was long. When reporting on various attacks in Iraq, news agency journalists were cautious with respect to blaming any specific group, using generic terms like *gunmen*, *insurgents*, *suicide bombers*, etc., as actors. However, in longer dispatches, putting the attacks in context, journalists often use a single label: *sectarian violence*. The bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra in 2006 is seen as a clear cause for this type of violence, which means that other possible causes remain hidden. As "sectarian violence" is blamed for having killed "tens of thousands of people" (Reuters), other options, i.e., alternative sources of violence, are ignored. Similarly, when generic concepts like "crisis" or "recession", or the year 2008 itself, have been chosen as culprits for the world economic crisis, the participant roles – the cause and the effect – become blurred.

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Putting the responsibility on one collective cause is often misleading, or at least it does not give much information on the real causes of, for instance, the economic problems. But in financial news reports, even this scarce information tends to be omitted: events are presented as ‘just happening’, without any external cause. In other words, financial news reports contain a multitude of examples of *non-ergative clauses* (*ergativity* as a Hallidayan concept is discussed in 4.3.1). Human beings are seldom referred to in financial news so that even the Mediums (those which are affected by the events that happen seemingly without Agents) are non-human, e.g., “gains”, or “economy”, or “markets”. This is how the cause of the economic crisis is construed in a Reuters dispatch on January 2, 2009: “Industrial metals, crude oil and even grains took it on the chin, as *the world fell into recession*” (my italics).

The third ‘solution’, the one that leaves the responsibility vague, is linked to another popular convention of news writing: packaging information into compressed noun phrases (cf. Biber 2003: 170). When long compressed sequences, which may even contain nominalisations, have been put into Actor roles in material processes, ‘unpacking’ them into congruent clauses may be difficult, usually needing some specific background knowledge. My data from financial news reports contained, for example, the following Actors which were blamed for economic losses: *The dismal holiday shopping season* (Reuters Dec. 29, 2008), and *Declining consumer confidence* (AP Dec. 31, 2008). A further ‘strategy’ for blurring responsibility is to *distance* the perpetrators from the (negative) consequences of their act. Examples (12–14) in section 4.3.2 show how AP journalists state, in the first dispatches, that U.S. troops in Iraq *killed 19 suspected insurgents and 15 civilians*, whereas, on the following day, they put some distance between the U.S. troops and the civilian victims by subtle changes of wordings in the consecutive reports.

Above I have referred to the role of emotions both in connection with the conventional news report structure and in stressing newsworthiness. In section 4.4, my focus is on the relationship between news journalists and news actors’ emotions. This relationship tends to be rather complex,

for two reasons. On the one hand, emotions are individual, subjective experiences, hidden in people's minds; on the other hand, the 'objective' style of news writing presupposes that the journalist's voice is backgrounded (in other words, her/his own emotions have to be excluded). But as my studies (cf. Study C and Study E) have shown, the journalist, describing other people's feelings, can choose between various options of presentation. S/he can, e.g., let the news actor speak, or s/he can observe the behaviour of the news actor, or s/he can interpret emotional reactions of a large group.

When a reporter describes the emotional responses of third parties, Thomson et al. (2008: 225) want to use the term "observed" Affect (as opposed to "authorial" Affect). However, I find this term too broad, and I want to suggest, on the basis of my corpora, that the term "observed" should be divided into three parts: *attributed*, *observed* and *interpreted* Affect. In order to test the application of these three terms, I set out to explore my examples from AP and Reuters news reports, proceeding from the most 'factual' examples (examples which contained quotes from news actors describing their own feelings) to the least 'factual', that is, to examples where journalists interpreted emotions of large groups, even those of a nation as a whole. There seems to be an imaginary cline, starting with *attributed* Affect, having *observed* Affect in the middle, and going towards ambiguity and vagueness we finally end up with *interpreted* Affect. In principle, this division into three types proved useful; there were, however, some problems of demarcation between *observed* and *interpreted* Affect. News journalists are seldom close enough to observe news actors' behaviour (tears or laughter, for example); usually they have to interpret what they see. The analyst, thus, faces at least the following problem: How broadly should s/he take the concept of 'observing'; when does it change into 'interpretation'?

I started this work by quoting Mindich, who asks: *But what is "objectivity" anyway?* Media researchers generally agree that journalistic objectivity is an ideal that cannot be achieved; a view to which I also subscribe. The fact that the main aim of my studies has been to show that AP and Reuters news reports are not objective or factual, may thus seem some-

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what contradictory; in other words, why prove something which has already been taken for granted? However, even if there is no such thing as *absolute* objectivity or factuality, it is possible to explore these two concepts as relative, gradable concepts; to look for the factors that make news discourse *less* factual or objective. For instance, when categorizing different types of Affect, I have above regarded *interpreted* Affect as the *least* factual; further, one could claim that tabloids are *less* objective than quality newspapers, and so on.

Through systematic analyses of AP and Reuters dispatches, I have revealed the effects of some deep-rooted conventions of news writing, which contribute to making news agency discourse vague and ambiguous, and reproduce many stereotypes of Western news journalism. Journalists are captured by these conventions, the more so because they stick to the old routines more or less subconsciously. Furthermore, the increasing competition and the growing volume of news distribution are likely to put more and more pressure on the news agency journalists, who have to distribute their reports at a maximum speed. In these circumstances, we can surely expect the influence of the traditional conventions to survive, or even get stronger, in the coming years.

Findings of the case studies

With the exception of Study F, which deals with the convention of attribution vis-à-vis responsibility, my case studies each focus on one specific subject, and not on one specific convention. Thus, evidence of several conventions of news writing can be found in all of them. In each case, my basic aim has been to explore how the objectivity or factuality of news agency reporting is affected in everyday journalistic reports.

Study A, which examines metaphors in the political news reports of AP and Reuters in 1993, was also discussed in chapter 4, where I compared its findings to the new data, gathered in 2009. The topic of Study A is the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty in the British Parliament, which took place in July 1993. My material was gathered from AP and

Reuters dispatches between July 19 and 25, i.e., during the time when the final debates and votes took place. The overall situation was extremely ambiguous; it was even considered to be critical for the Conservative Prime Minister John Major. In my data, I found three types of structural metaphors to be prominent: metaphors of WAR, GAME and JOURNEY. I examined them as metaphorical *scripts*.

One of the main aims of Study A was to see how these metaphors could be linked to *news values*. The central question was whether metaphors make news agency language less neutral. Both AP and Reuters journalists used a considerable number of metaphors in their reporting. One reason for that was in my view that metaphors could *create structure* for an ambiguous process, like the complex situation in the British Parliament. Thus, the news value of *unambiguity* and that of *frequency* were satisfied in these news agency reports. However, newsworthiness was mostly enhanced by *personalisation* and by stressing *negativity* (for instance, by focusing on John Major and his problems). Especially in Reuters dispatches on the Maastricht ratification process, Prime Minister John Major was cast in the role of a general facing rebels, so that instead of general WAR metaphors, Major's 'battle' could rather be depicted in terms of a GUERRILLA WAR script: Major had, for instance, *to withstand constant sniping from a band of Conservative rebels* (Reuters July 21, 1993).

Study B explores the use of the word *terrorist* in AP and Reuters dispatches in 2002. As the September 11 attacks in New York in 2001 had brought this word into the public discussion in an unprecedented manner, it seems fair to assume that the role of *terrorist*, and even the meaning of the word *terrorist*, had changed. Drawing on M.A.K. Halliday's Functional Grammar, e.g., the concepts of *transitivity* and *grammatical metaphor*, I set out to analyse three collocations which had *terrorist* as a premodifier: *terrorist attack*, *terrorist threat*, and *terrorist suspect*. In addition, I looked at the noun phrase *terrorist network* as a conceptual metaphor.

On the basis of my AP and Reuters examples, I could identify some typical features of the "anti-terrorism discourse". The most conspicuous of them were modality, futurity, general vagueness of expressions and stress-

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ing negative scenarios. It was notable, too, that similar modal expressions appeared both in quotations from politicians (e.g., from U.S. President George W. Bush) and in the wordings of news agency journalists. The analysis of the three collocations showed that the role of *terrorist* had, indeed, changed; in the news agency reports, terrorists were now seen more as an undefined threat than as actors of violent attacks. Furthermore, the word was likely to evoke even stronger and more persistent negative emotions (such as fear and terror) than before the September 11 attacks. *Terrorist networks* were construed as “clandestine” and “shadowy”, suggesting that no one in the world should feel safe anymore. I argued that the continuous news agency reports of undefined – or loosely defined – threats, and the quotes from authorities telling people what may happen, or what might have happened, were likely to make citizens fear, instead of adding to their feeling of security.

Study C looks at the construction of fear in AP and Reuters dispatches, based on data collected in 2002 and in 2004. I focused on three nouns denoting the emotion of fear: *fear*, *fears*, *worry*, *worries*, *concern*, *concerns*, taking them to be *nominalisations*, and, moreover, *grammatical metaphors* (cf. Halliday 1994). In the analysis, the concept of *transitivity* also had a central role; in addition, I used one tool from Toolan’s “basic toolkit” (Toolan 1988: 238), when looking at the function of a linguistic feature that Toolan calls “[s]uppletion of agentless passives by intransitive clauses” (p. 239). All these tools help to reveal strategies that news agency journalists use for blurring their own ‘voice’ and the news actors’ responsibility.

The emotion of fear and other related emotions have been salient actors in terrorism discourse since the September 11 attacks in 2001. In March 2004, there was a special reason for the frequent appearances of *fear* words in the media: 191 people, representing 17 countries, were killed in several different, nearly simultaneous, train bomb blasts in Madrid. However, the narrative of fear kept surfacing for other, much more abstract reasons, too. September 11 anniversaries, for example, often trigger new “warnings” and announcements of “security threats” from the authori-

ties, causing fear in ordinary citizens. Or people's feelings are explored through interviews for polls. In September 2004, AP made a poll of its own, which resulted in a newsworthy headline, stating: "Fear of terror attack persists; Sept. 11 memories almost universal" (AP Sept. 9, 2004). In sum, Study C gave evidence of the fact that terrorism fears, at least in news agency reports, are often construed as some kind of powerful, free-floating entities, for instance, as Actors in material processes. The almost continuous warnings from authorities and threats relayed in the reports are apt to create fear even in people who have no personal experience of terrorist attacks. Neither have these ordinary citizens much concrete means to overcome their fear.

Study D deals with the use of unnamed sources in news agency reporting. As one type of claim to objectivity and factuality, journalists quote a wealth of sources – either directly or indirectly – in their reports. Even anonymous sources appear frequently, notwithstanding the fact that both AP and Reuters clearly stress the 'weakness' of such sources in their guidelines to journalists. In June 2005, AP sent its journalists a special reminder concerning the use of unnamed sources, urging them to tell the readers the *reason* for anonymity, too. In the latter part of my data, collected between 2002 and 2007, the consequences of AP's reminder are conspicuous; the AP files after June 2005 contain a great variety of anonymity explanations (Reuters journalists, too, sometimes give a reason for the speaker's anonymity, but much more seldom than their AP colleagues).

In the analysis, I have drawn both on Halliday's Functional Grammar (the concepts of *transitivity* and *nominalisation*), and on the Appraisal Framework. The first part of the analysis examines the role of unspecified collective speakers, such as *officials*, *analysts*, and *witnesses*, in AP and Reuters reports. In the second part, I focus on the various expressions stressing the anonymity; on those which are used to express the speaker's wish (e.g. *s/he spoke on condition of anonymity*), and on the reasons for such wishes. By boosting the standing of unnamed speakers and explaining the reasons for anonymity, the news agencies surely just aim at giving the readers more information. At the same time, the study gave clear evi-

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dence of the fact that this kind of strategies open up possibilities for a multitude of rhetorical constructions. Such formulations as *on condition of anonymity*, or (the speaker) *was not authorized to speak to the media*, certainly sound ‘official’ and ‘authoritative’, maybe also ‘factual’, but I have argued that they tend to hide more than they reveal. Attributions of unnamed sources (a *senior* U.S. official) and explanations of anonymity reasons (*for fear of reprisals*) often enhance newsworthiness, the value of *eliteness* and that of *negativity*, in particular.

In Study E, I present some tools for analysing emotions in news discourse, drawing on two complementary approaches that help to reveal what is hidden under news texts. One of them relies on three central concepts of Functional Grammar (*transitivity*, *nominalisation* and *grammatical metaphor*), and the other is based on the Appraisal Framework. The special purpose of the study was to combine three elusive concepts to each other, namely those of *emotions*, *factuality* and *objectivity*. Reporting on emotions poses problems especially for journalists writing hard news reports, because emotions are basically subjective experiences, while news journalists, at least those of AP and Reuters, strive for an objective writing style. Resorting to a direct quote, where the news actor can herself or himself tell the reporter how s/he feels, is strictly the only objective way to report on other people’s feelings. However, much more often than doing precisely this, news journalists set to *interpret* emotions of a large group, even a whole nation, e.g., “Iraqis fearful and angry” (AP Sept. 11, 2002), which of course challenges the ideals of objectivity and factuality.

The tools from Functional Grammar proved to be especially well suited for examining issues of responsibility. When, for instance, a nominalization designating an emotion, e.g. *fear*, is the head noun of a complex noun phrase, the relationship between the nouns becomes obscure. For instance, when Reuters (Dec. 18, 2002) writes in a headline that **Terror arrests heighten UK’s pre-Christmas fears**, the reader needs “well-developed pragmatic knowledge” (cf. Biber 2003: 179, 180) to decode the meaning. *Negativity* being newsworthy, negative emotions, such as *bomb fears*, occur frequently as powerful Actors in financial news reports. But

here, too, the relationship between the two nouns remains vague: the reader cannot be sure whether the investors fear more the potential bomb attack, or the possibility of losing their money. In the second part of Study E, I looked at invocations of Affect and the question of reader alignment. Since I wanted to demonstrate how the journalist's voice, even in allegedly objective news reports, could be retrieved by looking into inscribed Affect values and invocations of Attitude, I analysed two rather long extracts, one from each agency, belonging to the category of Features. The analysis showed that by using tools from the Appraisal Framework, and by exploring longer passages of text, it was possible to see patterns of evaluation that give evidence of the journalist's subjective point of view, although not of her or his *own* feelings.

Study F focuses on the conventions of attribution in news agency discourse from the point of view of *responsibility*. The notion of responsibility is discussed in various contexts; on various intertwining levels. At the macro-level, the global news agencies AP and Reuters bear responsibility as powerful distributors of news; they are important agenda-setters for other media. Furthermore – though this aspect may often be overlooked – they are, to a great extent, responsible for *creating* and *reinforcing* conventions of news writing. At the micro-level, two kinds of responsibility in the attribution are analysed: the responsibility of news actors, i.e. of those who have been quoted in news reports), and that of journalists, in particular.

The first part of the analysis examines how the traditional structure of a news report affects the attribution routines. It shows how the discontinuous topic realization, together with the tendency of proceeding from general to specific, opens up various rhetorical options to the journalist. Further, it is discussed how the status of the quoted source – newsworthiness – influences the way s/he is construed in a report, e.g., defines the order of presentation. From the point of view of the reader this mode of attribution can be ambiguous. If the headline of the report, for instance, quotes the sayings of “Iraq”, detecting the identity of the actual speaker may take some time and effort from the reader. In my examples, “Iraq”

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could be the Foreign Minister or the Vice-President, but also a newspaper article, or the head of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate. The latter part of the study deals with the complex issue of sharing responsibility between the journalist and the news actor. For journalists, the use of quotations is the most efficient way to hide their own voice and, moreover, to transfer responsibility to someone else. If the source that is quoted wants to remain anonymous, the journalist alone is supposed to be responsible for the quoted words; however, even in this case, the journalist can try to shift part of the burden to the speaker by referring to the speaker's own wishes and to her/his reasons for wanting to remain anonymous. As for named sources, the credibility and the ensuing degree of journalistic responsibility largely depend on the status of the speaker, on how 'elite' or well-known s/he is. Accordingly, the less well-known the speaker, the heavier burden of responsibility falls on the journalist.

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<http://www.ap.org/newsvalues/index.html> (The Associated Press Statement of News Values and Principles)

<http://about.reuters.com/aboutus/editorial> (Reuters website 2007: Reuters About Us: Editorial Policy; accessed September 27, 2007; could no longer be retrieved in May 2010)

http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/media/brand_guidelines/ (Reuters Brand Attribution Guidelines)

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The early stages of the “Big Three” news agencies:

AFP history:

<http://www.afp.com/afpcom/en/content/afp/our-history>

AP history:

http://www.ap.org/pages/about/history/history_first.html

Reuters history:

http://thomsonreuters.com/about/company_history/

<http://ketupa.net/reuters.htm>

<http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-9376791> (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia; accessed December 9, 2006)

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reuters>

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL1849100620080219>

The scope of the present activities:

AFP:

<http://www.afp.com/afpcom/en/activity/press>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agence_France-Presse (AFP “the oldest one in the world”)

AP:

<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html> (AP: Facts & Figures)

Reuters:

http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/media/media_products/

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6656525.stm> (on Thomson/Reuters merger)

The invention of the Morse telegraph:

http://www.acmi.net.au/AIC/MORSE_SCIAM.html (“The Morse telegraph of 1844”)

http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/technology/telegraph.html (U.S. House of Representatives website)

Non-Aligned Movement:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2798187.stm> (Profile: Non-Aligned Movement)

Online dictionary (the Merriam-Webster online):

<http://www.merriam-webster.com/>

APPENDICES:
Studies A to F

Study A: The Last Round of the Maastricht Poker Game: A Study of News Agency Lan- guage¹

1 Introduction

This is a study of metaphors in news agency discourse. Both elements – *metaphors* and *news agency discourse* – are of prime importance in this paper, but my emphasis is slightly on the latter concept, since I aim at examining metaphors as part of *news rhetoric*. My data present examples of *political news* reporting; a further aspect to be discussed below.

A few years ago van Dijk (1988b: 1) claimed that “both traditional and more recent approaches to media reporting” have, to a great extent, ignored and neglected the fact “that news reports, whether in the press or on TV, constitute a particular type of discourse”. The first systematic theories on *news discourse* were not developed until the 1980s, when some researchers, e.g. van Dijk, Hartley and Fowler, set out to find analytic ‘tools’ for describing important textual structures of news reports. The most systematic of these approaches is that of van Dijk, who presents a kind of “overall syntax” (van Dijk 1988a: 49) for news discourse, by defin-

¹ Stenvall, Maija. 1995. The Last Round of the Maastricht Poker Game: A Study of News Agency Language. *Language Forum*, 3(1-2), 1–57. Used with kind permission from the publisher.

ing its global structures. But van Dijk (182) states that his “study only gives outlines, hence a macrostructure of a theory, its microstructural details still need much research”. By studying the role of metaphors in news rhetoric, I wish to provide some evidence on those “microstructural details”.

In this paper I speak of (news) *rhetoric* “in its original, broader meaning” which “involves all features of a discourse that may make it more effective, and not only the specific ‘figures of speech’” (van Dijk 1984: 184). One of the important aims of news rhetoric is to persuade readers/listeners to accept news reports as ‘factual’; as being ‘true’ (see van Dijk 1988a: 83, 84). But it is also vital that news is found to be ‘newsworthy’. As Hartley (1982: 75) notes; to get into the news, events “must fulfill a certain number of criteria; in short they must be seen as newsworthy”. The well-known study by Galtung and Ruge in 1965 presents a set of such criteria, so-called *news values*, which are “probably more or less unconscious in editorial practice” (Fowler 1991: 13). One of the central questions of my study is: since the presence of these factors can be claimed to *persuade* journalists, and their audiences, of the ‘newsworthiness’ of a story; and since also metaphors have *persuasive* power (cf. Section 4), is there any connection between these two? In other words, can metaphors, in news discourse, be claimed to further highlight these qualities that are generally known as *news values*?

My main data come from *news agency* reports: from the British Reuters and the American AP (the Associated Press). I have looked at their dispatches between July 19 and 25, 1993, in order to study what metaphors the journalists use to describe the British ratification process of the EC Maastricht treaty, and especially its “last parliamentary hurdle”, the final debate and votes on July 22 and 23. For the first part of my analysis, which is an overview of the Maastricht reporting in the British press, I have also looked at the texts (but not the metaphors) of the following British newspapers: *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *Financial Times* and *The Sunday Times* during the same period: from July 19 to 25.

Reuters and AP are two of the “Big Four” international news agencies. The big news agencies are seen as ‘agenda-setters’ (see e.g. Boyd-Barrett 1980) which, during many decades, have influenced the form of news discourse, and also the very concept of ‘news’. Most studies of news agencies have concentrated on the *content* of agency news; or researchers have examined selections made by other media of agency dispatches (Bell 1991: 50). Also qualitative analyses have been undertaken, e.g. by van Dijk (see van Dijk 1988b). In those studies, news agency discourse (e.g. the news schema) has been compared to that of newspapers. In this paper, however, I do not look at news agency dispatches as source texts for other media, but as one form of ‘independent’ news discourse. After all, news agency reports are often copied in newspapers without any changes (van Dijk 1988a: 130).

News values are not neutral; they are claimed to be “an ideological code” (Hartley 1982: 80), which can contribute to an imbalanced image of the world (see also e.g. Galtung and Ruge 1970; van Dijk 1988b). The international news agencies select and produce their news “on the basis of the same set of values” as the other journalists (van Dijk 1988b: 39), and as ‘agenda-setters’ their role is central also in this respect. At the same time, however, their *language* is often seen as more ‘neutral’ than that of newspapers; or “intentionally factual”, because agency dispatches “must be used by many newspapers in the world” (van Dijk 1988a: 134, 135). So they “try to remain as neutral as possible” (van Dijk 1988b: 122). *News values* are mostly regarded as factors of *selection*; my thesis, however, examines how the *presentation* of a news story can enhance its ‘newsworthiness’; and how this then could affect the neutrality of news agency discourse.

My corpus, the news agency reports on the Maastricht ratification process in the British Parliament, can also be seen as an example of political news reporting. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have argued that many human activities are metaphorically structured. I want to investigate the extent to which this holds true for *political activities*. Politics often resembles a game or a business transaction. Politicians form parties, they compete in elections; there are winners and losers. Sometimes they ‘make

deals' which, instead of resulting in financial losses or gains, can affect the lives of thousands of people. A political 'game', as opposed to a real game, often leaves open the question of the actual winner; it has no clear end, either, as the possible consequences cannot be known until much later.

Political news mainly concentrates on reporting these 'metaphorical', competitive events of the political spectacle (elections, legislative battles, treaty negotiations, summit meetings etc.), as they "involve both some element of surprise and personalities who win or lose" (Edelman 1988: 102). Edelman (92) notes that "the long-term effects of public policies" seldom appear in news reports, as they "cannot be known until long after the policy has been established", and, besides, they are often complex and difficult to report.

In my data, I have identified the main types of structural metaphors (or metaphorical 'scripts') as metaphors of WAR, GAME and JOURNEY (for theoretical background on metaphors and scripts, see Section 4). The metaphors are examined in two sections. In the first section, each metaphor is studied separately. In the discussion, after the presentation of evidence, relative frequencies of each type of metaphor are shown and compared. Implications of the different metaphorical scripts are also discussed. In the second section, metaphors are linked to *news values*.

Some comparisons between the two news agencies – Reuters and AP – will be made. However, the findings of such comparisons should not be taken as conclusive, since the very subject of this study, the Maastricht ratification process in Britain, brings a certain 'bias' to the comparison. Although both are *international* news agencies, the fact that Reuters is based in London cannot be neglected. It can be expected to be more interested in covering the stages of the process, even those involving the political 'game'. Also, it can be hypothesized to put more effort into its rhetoric. But as mentioned above, the aim of my study is to show what metaphors can reveal of *news agency* language; not of the language of one agency.

2 The Maastricht ratification process in the British Parliament

In February, 1992, the Maastricht treaty on European union was formally signed; for Britain it included an opt-out from the so-called “social chapter” that contains guarantees of labour rights. On July 22, 1993, two days after the ratification bill had been signed into law by Queen Elizabeth II, the Conservative government led by Prime Minister John Major was still facing an extra debate and a final vote in the Parliament on an amendment forced by the opposition; the Labour Party claimed that the ratification could not take place until Britain reversed its opt-out.

For Major, the ratification process had been a “15-month Maastricht nightmare” (to use one of the many metaphors appearing in agency dispatches). The national elections in April 1992 left only an 18-seat majority for the Conservatives in the House of Commons, and after that Major was “at the mercy of die-hard opponents of European union in his own party” (AP June 23, 93). In June 1992 Denmark rejected the Maastricht treaty in a referendum, strengthening anti-Maastricht feeling in Britain. The government decided to suspend its ratification process. The suspension was, according to commentators, a grave error which added to Major’s problems. When the process was resumed in November, the government won a crucial vote by only three votes. That was the start of endless debates (more than 200 hours according to Reuters) and numerous votes in the House of Commons; the start of a real political spectacle.

Scheming and ‘horsetrading’ were at their peak during the last few days before the final votes of July 22, 1993. The government had to win two votes: in addition to the Labour Party’s motion on the social chapter, the House of Commons had to endorse the whole treaty once more. The political scenario was confusing. The (about 25) anti-Maastricht Conservatives were expected to vote for the social chapter they detested, in the hope

of scuppering the whole treaty. The opposition parties, in spite of wanting the treaty, were ready to vote against it, if it did not include the social chapter; besides, the Labour leader John Smith hoped to force John Major to resign. The government won the first vote by one (the Speaker's) vote, but lost the main motion. John Major then called a vote of confidence which was worded to endorse the Maastricht treaty. The party 'rebels', fearing a Labour government after a possible new election, now had to back Major. The government won the vote, which was held on the following day. On August 2, the treaty could finally be ratified, after a private court challenge had been resolved. Despite the opponents' hopes, it was never very likely that the treaty would be abandoned, although its ratification could have been delayed. And despite his problems, Major was hardly in real danger of losing his job, since the complex scenario offered him more than just one option; after all, as he said, the treaty had been practically endorsed by the earlier votes.

3 Background to news research

This section deals with theoretical approaches to news discourse. In the first section (3.1) I look at research into news discourse in general; focusing, in particular, on news *rhetoric*. Special attention is given to *news values*, which have a central role in my analysis of news agency language. Subsection 3.2 presents background information on news *agency* discourse, presenting also some special features of its rhetoric.

3.1 Analytical approaches to news discourse

3.1.1 Finding the way to news discourse: a few notes on news research and its history

The history of news research is rather short. Considering the amount of attention the media – and news in particular – is given today, it is surprising how few of the news studies mentioned in bibliographies (see e.g. van Dijk 1988a; Epstein 1973) were written before the 1960s. Interest in the

news as a specific type of discourse is even more recent. Though the first steps in this kind of analysis were taken at the end of the 1970s (see e.g. Fowler et al.: 1979), no systematic theories on news discourse were developed before the 1980s.

The British media researchers of the 1970s see news primarily as a 'social product' (see e.g. van Dijk 1988a; Fowler 1991). They claim that "the media ... essentially help reproduce preformulated ideologies" (van Dijk 1988a: 11). While American studies often set out to reveal distortion or 'bias' in some unique case of reporting, British studies (e.g. Connell's study on TV news in 1980, as reported in van Dijk 1988a) show that this kind of view is too simplistic. If news is accused of being distorted or biased, it is presupposed that there exists, in comparison, "some kind of objective reality or ... neutral or correct image. Yet, this reality represented in or through the news is itself an ideological construct" (van Dijk 1988a: 11). Many studies deal with media reports on demonstrations, outgroups, crime waves, drug use and other social issues; some focus on the representation of class struggle in the media.

Van Dijk (p. 13) points out that although studies like Connell's, and especially the well known research by the Glasgow Media Group on 'bad news', are critical by nature, the British media researchers of the 1970s seldom look at these ideological processes as part of news discourse structure. Their approach is usually sociological. Fowler (1991: 223) calls this neglect of the discourse aspect a regrettable "linguistic gap". He claims that it is "discourse structure which does the work of shaping reality which is assumed by the media specialists" (p. 222). In the 1980s, some researchers in Britain (and also e.g. in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria) set out to study news as a specific type of *discourse*. Although they all stress the importance of textual analysis of news discourse, their approaches – their theoretical methods – often differ considerably. The most systematic approach is presented by van Dijk, who sets out to analyze news reports (news in the press) as a public discourse in its own right, "as a type of text or discourse" (van Dijk 1988a: 1); using the methods of *discourse analysis*. Van Dijk aims at combining the micro- and macrolevels of news analysis,

and linking the news discourse structures to the processes of production and understanding (p. 181). His important contribution to news theories is the definition of global structures of news discourse. (See further, subsection 3.1.2).

Van Dijk also analyzes the ideological aspects of news discourse on various levels. He stresses the importance of explaining “the links that bind news structures with the social cognitions of journalists” (1988b: 30). Some other researchers of the 1980s and the early 1990s, e.g. Hartley and Fowler, focus wholly on ‘decoding’ the dominant underlying ideologies of news texts. Hartley’s book *Understanding News* (1982) brings *semiotic* concepts to the analysis of news discourse. His social criticism follows the tradition of the British media researchers of the 1970s; for him, too, news is a reality-constructing “social product”, very much “part of the social relations it seeks to report” (Hartley 1982: 47). But much like van Dijk and Fowler, Hartley stresses the importance of textual analysis, which had been neglected in earlier research. And he also analyzes the ‘text’ of TV news, not only that of newspapers. Hartley sees news discourse as a system of semiotic *signs* and *codes*. He claims that “news is a myth-maker” (p. 30). Fowler (1991: 3) supports Hartley’s semiotic approach to news as a “social and ideological product”, but argues that news discourse analysis needs more ‘linguistic apparatus’ than that offered by semiotic theory. He uses a specific approach, called *critical linguistics*, which is based on the functional model developed by M. A. K. Halliday and his colleagues and aims at bringing to consciousness “the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language” (p. 67) and generally remain unnoticed. The text is analyzed by looking into small details of linguistic structure (e.g. words and sentences), and examining the connections between these structures and social values.

Critical news analysis has been criticized by other media researchers (see e.g. Bell 1991) for imputing “to news-workers a far more deliberate ideological intervention in news than is supported by the research on news production” (p. 214). The method of critical linguistics is seen to result in a “conspiracy theory of news-workers’ application of syntactic rules” (p.

214). However, at least Fowler and Hartley, although they want to show how news discourse tends to reflect the ideologies of the ‘powerful’, stress that news reporters are not especially ‘biased’ or ‘partisan’. News does not *produce* ideologies; it “re-produces dominant ideological discourses” (Hartley 1982: 62). Fowler (1991: 8) states that news is “particularly important example of the power of *all* language in the social construction of reality”.

3.1.2 *Special features of news rhetoric*

While the basic function of a news report is to give new information, the effectiveness of news discourse, news rhetoric, largely depends on how well the following two aims are realized:

- 1) the audience has to be persuaded of the ‘newsworthiness’ of the news story; in other words, that it is NEWS.
- 2) the argumentation also has to ensure that the propositions are accepted as true or plausible: “the factual nature of events” has to be emphasized (van Dijk 1988a: 84).

The basic question in news production is that of selection: what makes events into *news* events? As Fowler (1991: 13) notes, “news is not simply that which happens, but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy”. In fact, there are certain ‘signals’ which help people, and especially news people, to recognize a story as a news story. First, the events included in a news report have to fulfill certain criteria which affect both the selection and, to a great extent, also the presentation of news. These underlying factors, generally called *news values*, were formulated by Galtung and Ruge in 1965 (see subsection 3.1.3). Second, news reports have a special structure which is called *relevance* (top-down) structuring. Thus, the typical structures of news discourse contribute to its ‘newsworthiness’, emphasizing important content (van Dijk 1988a: 84); and, more basically, helping readers to recognize a news story (see p. 151). But, as Bell (1991: 155) notes, news form and news content cannot be separated. He claims: “We may account for the way news stories are structured only with

reference to the values by which one ‘fact’ is judged more newsworthy than another”.

The top-down structuring of news texts began to develop at the end of the last century (see section 3.2). It can be ‘blamed’ for another conspicuous feature of topic realization in news discourse: its *instalment* character (van Dijk 1988a: 43). Because “the most important or relevant information is put in the most prominent position, both in the text as whole, and in the sentences” (p. 43), each topic is typically presented in a discontinuous way, in instalments. High-level, abstract information is given first, followed by lower-level, specifying details. Owing to relevance structuring, the most important *schematic* categories (superstructures) are *Headline* and *Lead*, the beginning of a news story (see van Dijk 1988a: 53). The *Headline* is supposed to express the highest macroproposition (topic), and the *Lead* will include, in a few sentences, the full macrostructure (all macropropositions) of the news report (van Dijk 1983). Van Dijk claims that from a ‘critical’ point of view, headlines can be revealing; e.g. in some cases they are “misleading”, as they do not express the macrostructure of the text. The news story itself can be analyzed into several superstructure categories, such as *Main Events*, *Context*, *Background*, *Verbal Reactions* and *Comments*. (Appendix 1 shows the ordering of these categories, as presented by van Dijk (1988a: 55) in a tree-diagram). Van Dijk (p. 57) stresses that both thematic and schematic structures are “abstract, underlying structures” of news discourse, and therefore they may appear in different ways; e.g. not every news text need include all schematic categories.

Van Dijk (p. 86) claims that the “real rhetoric of the news seems to reside in conditions relating to *Emphasizing the factual nature of events*”. Of the five most popular ways used by news people (pp. 84, 85), the following two seem to be the most important in political news reporting: 1) “Using evidence from other reliable sources (authorities, respectable people, professionals)”, and 2) “Using direct quotes from sources, especially when opinions are involved”. As van Dijk points out, reporters seldom are direct observers of the reported event; they get a major part of the news from e.g. the news agencies or other media, press releases of institutions, firms etc.;

or press conferences which they are invited to attend. Therefore, a very popular rhetorical strategy for assessing the factuality of news is “a subtle use and quotation of sources” (p. 87). Usually elite sources are considered more reliable and more newsworthy than ‘ordinary’ people, but even “the members of the public” can be quoted, “if they enter the news arena by some other door” (Fowler 1991: 22); if they are eyewitnesses to an accident or witnesses in a court case. In political news reporting, the credibility is often enhanced by references to “government officials”, “political analysts” or simply “commentators”. Menz (1989: 236) calls this kind of unspecified source “mythical groups of reference”. Direct quotations or quasi-quotations are, according to van Dijk (1988a: 87), regarded as “more reliable than events descriptions by the reporter”. It does not matter much that quotations seldom are fully correct. “They should merely suggest that they are true, hence their rhetorical function and effect” (p. 87).

3.1.3 *News values*

The famous study of Galtung and Ruge on ‘newsworthiness’ (reprinted 1970) was first published in *Journal of International Peace Research* in 1965. The basic question of Galtung and Ruge is: how do ‘events’ become ‘news’? They answer the question by presenting twelve factors which can be claimed to affect the selection and presentation of news events. (It should be noted that although later research generally refers to these factors as “news values”, Galtung and Ruge themselves speak of “factors” or “categories”). On the basis of these factors it is then possible to make some deductions of the media “as international image-former” (1970: 260). Galtung and Ruge tested some of their hypotheses by analyzing the presentation of three foreign crises in four Norwegian newspapers in the early 1960s.

Four of the factors (F9–F12) presented by Galtung and Ruge are culture-bound; they are claimed to be important especially in the north-western corner of the world (p. 265). The first eight are more general; as the researchers state, they “are based on fairly simple reasoning about

what facilitates and what impedes perception” (p. 265). Below is their list of the factors with short explanations (pp. 262–270; see also Hartley 1982: 76–79):

F1: FREQUENCY refers to the time-span needed for an event to take place and acquire meaning. The ‘frequency’ of an event has to fit that of a daily newspaper or a TV news bulletin (Hartley 1982: 76). A murder or an accident does not take much time to happen; “a meaningful story [of it] can be told from one day to the next” (Galtung and Ruge 1970: 262). This factor accounts for under-reporting of e.g. economic or social trends which take a long time to unfold and become meaningful. In order to get into the news these have to reach some kind of climax (e.g. the inauguration of a big dam or the release of statistics) (p. 262; see also Hartley 1982: 76).

F2: THRESHOLD is related to the size of an event. The bigger the dam, the more disastrous the accident, the more they will be reported; the bigger the headlines will be. This is the most basic of the twelve factors; if the event does not ‘pass’ the threshold, it will not be reported at all (Galtung and Ruge 1970: 263). However, defining how high or low the threshold for some specific news event should be is not that simple; there is no absolute ‘bigness’. This factor depends on other news values, and on competing events for that day.

F3: UNAMBIGUITY: The clarity of an event is an important factor; “the less ambiguity the more the event will be noticed” (p. 263). The event need not be simple, but it should be easily interpreted, without inconsistent implications (p. 263). This factor offers another explanation for under-reporting of e.g. complex economic processes.

F4: MEANINGFULNESS. This factor has two dimensions: CULTURAL PROXIMITY and RELEVANCE. Bell (1991: 157) notes that “geographical closeness can enhance news value”; a minor accident is usually reported only in the local newspaper. Galtung and Ruge, who are studying the structure of *foreign* news, speak about cultural proximity, which means that particular attention is paid to the culturally familiar; even if geographically distant, that is found to be meaningful. Still, an event can be relevant for the reader or listener, although it happens in a culturally re-

mote country. Usually this is due to a conflict which involves one's own group (Galtung and Ruge 1970: 264), or a threat to one's own well-being, such as the oil crisis in the 1970s, which made the lifestyle and customs of the OPEC countries "suddenly fascinating for Western journalists" (Hartley 1982: 77).

F5: CONSONANCE. Galtung and Ruge (1970: 264) state that 'consonant' news events are actually 'olds'. They are easily accepted and received since people (journalists and their audiences) either 'predict' or 'want' them to happen; they are consonant with people's existing attitudes or opinions (see also van Dijk 1988a: 121,122). Especially for the news from a distant country, it "should fit a pattern of expectation" (p. 287). Thus the news of a military coup in Latin America is sure to make news; it is just what people expect.

F6: UNEXPECTEDNESS. 'Unexpected' here means both 'unexpected' and 'rare'. This factor would seem to contradict what has been said above, but, in fact, it only "brings a corrective to the fourth and fifth [factor]" (p. 264). To be really newsworthy, events have to be unexpected, but "*within the meaningful and the consonant*" (p. 264).

F7: CONTINUITY. According to this factor, when something has been accepted as 'news', it will *continue* to be reported for some time, even if its amplitude is reduced; in other words, the threshold for accepting the related stories has become lower (p. 264).

F8: COMPOSITION also concerns the 'threshold value' of news items. Galtung and Ruge (p. 265) hypothesize that some news items with rather low value may be included, "because of a desire to present a 'balanced' whole", e.g. to present domestic and foreign news in a 'proper' proportion. But the COMPOSITION factor may affect selection quite differently, too. Instead of creating a balance by selecting different types of news, the news editor may want to combine similar stories to a 'round-up' (see e.g. Hartley 1982: 78). If there is a big storm in France, reports of somewhat minor storms in e.g. Belgium or Germany might be included, which would then make a round-up of bad weather in Europe.

F9: REFERENCE TO ELITE NATIONS; F10: REFERENCE TO ELITE

PEOPLE. These two factors, which are especially important in Western (or actually north-western) media, belong together. News simply is *elite-centred* (Galtung and Ruge 1970: 266). The actions of elite nations and elite persons are assumed to be more consequential than the activities of low-rank nations or ordinary people. Secondly, elite people serve as objects of identification for other people who ‘in an elite-centred news communication system ... are not even given the chance to represent themselves’ (p. 266).

F11: REFERENCE TO PERSONS (PERSONIFICATION). There is a tendency in Western media to present events as actions of individuals (of one person, e.g. Prime Minister Major ..., or of a small group of people. e.g. the British government...). Galtung and Ruge (p. 266) state that “the alternative would be to present events as the outcome of ‘social forces’, as structural more than idiosyncratic outcomes of the society which produced them”. One reason for PERSONIFICATION could be *identification*: (see Hartley 1982: 78): “Individual people are easier to identify – and to identify with – than structures, forces or institutions”.

F12: REFERENCE TO SOMETHING NEGATIVE. *Negativity* is probably the best known of the news values. As Bell (1991: 156) states: “Negative events make the basic stuff of ‘spot’ news”. Trying to find reasons for the ‘popularity’ of this factor, Galtung and Ruge (1970: 267, 268) point out that negative news often satisfies several other criteria. First, *frequency*: the positive in life usually takes more time and is more difficult than the negative. There are several examples of this; much more time is needed to bring up an adult person than to kill him in an accident; or to build a house than to destroy it in a fire, and so on (p. 267). Second, negative news is more *unambiguous* than positive. Third, negative news is assumed to be “more *consonant* with at least some dominant pre-images of our time” (p. 268). Fourth, it is more *unexpected*, less predictable. Galtung and Ruge (p. 268) note that this presupposes a culture where progress is “regarded as the normal and trivial thing” so that it can be under-reported, as there is nothing ‘new’ in it. They add that the “test of this theory would be a culture with *regress* as the normal”, in which case one

would expect over-reporting of positive news. In fact, the recent reporting of economic recession e.g. in Finland confirms their theory: the smallest signs of economic growth, or even outlooks predicting a better future, are widely published.

Galtung and Ruge also present some hypotheses of how these factors operate. Their *additivity hypothesis* claims that the more of the criteria mentioned above are satisfied by an event, the more likely it is that it will become news, and make headlines (pp. 270, 271). This affects the selection of news items. The following hypothesis refers to presentation (distortion): “Once a news item has been selected what makes it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated” (p. 270). The third important hypothesis is the *complementarity hypothesis*. Galtung and Ruge reason (p. 272) that if an event is low on one factor, it will have to be high on some other factor, in order to make the news at all. Out of the 66 possible pairs, they select a number of crucial pairs which they regard as particularly important “in terms of their consequences for the kind of image of the world that they will promote” (p. 286). Thus, e.g., they hypothesize that “the more distant a nation is, the more will an event have to satisfy the frequency criterion” (p. 286), in order to be taken as newsworthy.

On the basis of their analyses and hypotheses, Galtung and Ruge (p. 291) claim that the consequence of all these operating factors is “an image of the world that gives little autonomy to the periphery but sees it as mainly existing for the sake of the centre – for good or bad – as a real periphery to the centre of the world”. The distant, low-rank nations are seen mainly as “dangerous, ruled by capricious elites”. Events there occur suddenly, without warning and with no follow-up afterwards. Further, news from such countries will have to be “preferably negative and unexpected, but nevertheless according to a pattern that is consonant with the ‘mental pre-image’” (p. 291).

Although one of the hypotheses quoted above refers to the presentation of the news, claiming that the ‘newsworthiness’ is *further accentuated* after the selection, Galtung and Ruge do not stress the difference between selection and presentation. It could, however, be reasoned that

while some of their factors affect mainly selection (e.g. THRESHOLD, COMPOSITION, CONTINUITY, REFERENCE TO ELITE NATIONS AND PEOPLE), some others are more 'flexible' in this respect. Thus the complementarity effect could be produced by *presenting* some aspects as more NEGATIVE or UNAMBIGUOUS, by PERSONIFICATION, and so on. Also Fowler (1991: 19) emphasizes that news values are "rather to be seen as qualities of (potential) reports ... they are not simply features of selection but, more importantly, features of representation".

Researchers stress that the factors presented above are *values*; that they "are not neutral, but reflect ideologies and priorities held in society" (Bell 1991: 156). It is also emphasized that journalists probably do not consciously try to satisfy these criteria, but that these factors seem to have an "institutionalized force" which journalists cannot escape, even when they contest their ideology (Hartley 1982: 81). On the other hand, some handbooks of news writing advise beginning journalists by defining some "elements of news" which "must be present" (Dary 1973: 35). These are: TIMELINESS, PROXIMITY, PROMINENCE, AFFECT and HUMAN INTEREST (pp. 36, 37); or they can be: INTEREST, IMPACT, TIMELINESS, PROXIMITY (Cardownie 1987: 99–100). These factors are perhaps not so different from those of Galtung and Ruge.

Galtung and Ruge (1970: 292) end their article by presenting "some policy implications"; in short, their advice is: "try to counteract all twelve factors", and thus create a less stereotyped image of the world. Their article was written about 30 years ago. Technical developments during the last three decades have been impressive; new possibilities for bringing the distant countries 'closer' have been created. But even a superficial analysis of news reporting shows that the factors presented 30 years ago are still valid.

In fact, it can be claimed that some of the values are even more prominent today, just as a result of new technologies. The number of radio and TV news bulletins in many countries has been greatly increased; this makes the FREQUENCY criterion even more important than before. The new technologies have brought the media all over the (north-western)

world 'closer' to each other. Thus, the 'bigness' of a news event can be enhanced just because of the attention it gets in the media; the CONTINUITY effect is therefore strengthened. And there is also the other side of the coin: when the CONTINUITY effect diminishes (when, e.g., the interest of the media is captured by another, 'bigger' news story), there is not much follow-up on the original story. Famine in an African state may still be nearly as bad as before; or fighting in some distant area still raging, but they will no longer be reported on, unless something 'new' happens there. Galtung and Ruge (p. 293) also suggest, as one 'counteracting' factor, that there should be "more emphasis on follow-ups even if the chain of events has been interrupted for some time". However, they refer to cases where something negative has happened, and been widely reported on, but where no one tells later "about how it has been counter-acted" and become more positive.

The distorting qualities of the factors discussed above can be claimed to be explicit, in particular, in the 'spot news'. But there are, of course (in newspapers, magazines, radio and TV), also longer news reports, commentaries, news analyses etc. which have at least some 'counteracting' effect and thus can contribute to a more balanced image of the world. In the 1960s, Galtung and Ruge (p. 293) noted that "one might say that all or much of this [counteracting] is what the elite paper tries to do, and that is probably true". But much in the same way as they remarked that "elite papers are probably mainly read by elite people", one could claim today that the flow of 'spot news' gets much bigger audiences than more in-depth stories.

3.2 Special features of news agency discourse

International news agencies can be claimed to serve as "newspapers for newspapers" (Hachten 1992: 42). Their clients are other media; not only newspapers, but also e.g. national news agencies, and radio and television companies. In this section I set out to examine how the big international news agencies have influenced the structure of a news story and the very

concept of *news*; and, in particular, what special features, compared to other media, news agency discourse might have.

The main international (Western) news agencies are usually referred to as the “Big Four”. The oldest of the surviving world agencies is the French AFP, direct successor to Havas, which was founded in 1835. Then came the American AP in 1848 and the British Reuters in 1851. The youngest of the “Big Four” is UPI (also from the United States), which started in 1907 by the name of UPA. (For details see e.g. Boyd-Barrett 1980). Hachten (1992: 47) claims that the “history of today’s international system of news distribution is essentially the story of the world news agencies and their utilization of technological innovations”. Wishing to distribute more and more news at a maximum speed, the news agencies have been eager to employ every new technical device as soon as possible. Such examples from older times are telegraph and teletype; and more recently agencies have welcomed computers and the possibilities offered by communication satellites.

While enhancing the efficiency of news distribution, these technical innovations have affected the ‘product’ itself: news discourse and its structure. What could be called the initial stage of the ‘top-down’ (relevance) structuring of the news story came about out of necessity. During the American Civil War in the 1860s, it was not unusual that, after a major battle, half a dozen or more newspaper correspondents all demanded precedence on a single telegraph wire to send their reports home (Fox 1977: 14, 15). According to Fox, the problem was solved by the harried telegraph operators devising a kind of rota system: each reporter sent first the initial paragraph of his story, and after that “the go-round would begin again with another paragraph” (p. 15). This resulted in the constructing of an ‘inverted pyramid’ structure; the ‘lead’, a general summary, was transmitted first, and thus it did not matter so much if, due to a break-down in communications, the rest (the minor details) failed to reach the home newspaper on time.

The studies carried out by van Dijk in the beginning of the 1980s show that the general news schema in present-day agency dispatches, too,

is very similar to that of newspaper stories (van Dijk 1988a: 134). However, van Dijk argues that some of the superstructure categories (see section 3.1.2) are more typical of press articles than of agency dispatches. He claims that “Headlines and Lead are omitted from dispatches for obvious reasons, and Comments are absent because of the intentionally factual nature of agency news” (p. 134). At the same time, when agency dispatches are used as a source text for newspaper reports, much of their Verbal Reactions and Context is deleted in the final press article. Van Dijk further notes that the first paragraph(s) of agency dispatches “do seem to have lead functions” (p. 134). In my data (Reuter and AP dispatches), there are a few short messages without a headline, but most dispatches have, after the ‘catchline’, a separate line which I regard as a headline (see Appendix 2).

The introduction of computers and communication satellites has not brought any marked changes to the traditional schema of dispatches, but it has greatly influenced the agency news distribution in many other ways. At the global level, this has widened the gap in the quality of agency news services between the advanced and developing nations, as the latter simply cannot afford the costly new technologies (Boyd-Barrett 1980: 54). In addition, the fact that news “can now be communicated almost instantly to almost anywhere has profound implications for international organization and interaction” (Hachten 1992: XV).

The use of these new technologies can also be claimed to enhance *repetition* in agency news discourse: parts of earlier dispatches (expressions, sentences or entire paragraphs) are included in successive reports of some major, continuing event. As the news text is processed on computer, it is easy and quick to mark the relevant parts of a previous report and copy them on the dispatch which is being processed. In addition, as the transmission of a dispatch takes only a few seconds, the agencies often repeat the whole dispatch, even if only a minor correction (of a misspelt name, for instance) is needed. All this repetition naturally adds to the total volume of agency output dedicated to some specific event, and thus can enhance the ‘newsworthiness’ of that event. However, my data are far too limited to be used as real evidence on this aspect.

Boyd-Barrett (1980: 19) sees the agencies as ‘agenda-setters’ that have not only influenced the form of news discourse, but the very concept of ‘news’. Aiming “to satisfy the news appetite of as many daily retail media as possible, regardless of political persuasion,... they promoted the idea of ‘impartiality’ as a valued journalistic objective” (p. 19). Further, Boyd-Barrett (pp. 19–21) claims, the news agencies ‘help’ their client media to decide what is news; e.g. to make judgements about the relative importance of different kinds of news; to select between various categories. They also affect the client media’s own newsgathering, both abroad and at home. News editors of client newspapers may evaluate the work of their own foreign correspondents according to what has been ‘sanctioned’ as ‘news’ by the agency reporters. Domestic reporters may be sent to cover some local aspect of a story evoked by wire services.

News agency reporting means a continuous flow of information. Although in a daily newspaper there may be several reports on a major news event, presenting somewhat different aspects, each of these stories can be regarded as a separate *unity*. Every day (or night) there is a special deadline by which the story has to be ready. In agency reporting, there is a ‘*continuous deadline*’ (p. 74); or it can be said that there is “a deadline every minute” (Cardownie 1987: 8). World news agencies have clients in different time-zones; moreover, they are servicing also radio and television companies which even have news bulletins almost every hour. The news schemata of agency dispatches are often rather similar to those of press articles; and a single agency report can be copied in a newspaper as such, or with minor changes (see e.g. van Dijk 1988a: 134–137). However, a major news event generates a flow of dispatches. These can either be short, successive messages with the story continuing from one dispatch to the next; or longer stories, seemingly separate unities, presenting a new development, but at a closer look repeating much of what has been told in the previous dispatches. The overall view on some specific ‘story’ might not be too easy to grasp.

One of the most evident consequences of the ‘continuous deadline’ in agency journalism is the emphasis on speed. “Agency journalists do not

wait to integrate, explain and package. They send *now*.” (Boyd-Barrett 1980: 75). Each of the “Big Four” wants to be the first to tell a breaking news story; and all the better if it is their own ‘scoop’; something which the rivals have not found out at all (p. 75). There is also a constant (commercial) pressure from their clients – other media – who want to be fed with ‘new’ events. These factors explain why all the big agencies concentrate on ‘spot news’, and do not give much space to separate background analyses or commentaries (p. 26). However, Boyd-Barrett (p. 26) notes that some agencies have also increased this kind of material to serve their clients better, but that “this kind of journalism in the agencies’ case may strike the observer as relatively low-key in tone”. What Boyd-Barrett wrote almost 15 years ago still seems to be true, at least as regards Reuters and AP. Both agencies send “news analyses” and different kinds of “features”, but often their “news analysis” seems to offer just a little more background than their ‘normal’ dispatches on that event; in addition, there probably are even more quotes than usual, especially from “the military analysts” or “political scientists”, or other authorities. (see Appendix 3).

The news agencies, as stated above, hold the idea of “impartiality” as a valued objective. Often their information (their language) is thought to be more ‘neutral’ than that of other media (see e.g. van Dijk 1988a: 135). In their *rhetoric*, however, we meet the same factors as in news rhetoric in general; they wish to be ‘newsworthy’, credible (‘factual’) and speedy. But the news agencies who represent the ideal of ‘pure news’ – and work under a considerable commercial pressure – value these factors maybe even more than the other media. Therefore, it could be claimed, paradoxically, that while aiming at neutrality, the agencies tend to reproduce many stereotypes of Western news journalism, and this, again, could affect the very neutrality of their news discourse.

4 Metaphors and scripts: the theoretical background

This section presents theoretical approaches to metaphor. The first subsection (4.1) aims at exploring what is behind metaphorical structuring. What do Lakoff and Johnson (1980) mean when they emphasize that our understanding, our whole conceptual system, is metaphorically structured?

In a metaphorical process, we understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another” (p. 5); or, as Thornborrow (1993: 100) has put it, “an unfamiliar or complex situation may come to be interpreted in the common-sense terms of a familiar, more accessible frame structure”. As some of these “familiar” structures could be e.g. ‘scripts’ or ‘schemas’, I will give some information on such knowledge structures in section 4.2.

The last subsection (4.3) looks into the two domains of metaphor: the “target domain” and the “source domain”, as Lakoff and Turner (1989) call them. Lakoff and Turner (p. 63) claim that “metaphors have persuasive power over us”. Since in news discourse this power could be linked with the *news values* (see ch. 3), this *persuasive function* of metaphor needs to be discussed in more detail.

4.1 Metaphorical structuring

Metaphor has become an important topic in recent research in many fields of science: e.g. in philosophy, linguistics, psychology and the social sciences. Cooper (1986: 44) claims that it has even “come to enjoy a privileged position” in regard to the other categories of traditional rhetorics.

Aristotle, according to Chilton, was the first to refer to metaphor in cognitive terms, when he wrote that “it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh” (Aristotle; as quoted in Chilton 1988: 39). In recent years, Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theories, published in the book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), have greatly influenced this research, proving

that “metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 6). In the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, ARGUMENT is consistently conceptualized (thought and spoken of, maybe even carried out) in terms of WAR (p. 4). Lakoff and Johnson call such systematic sets of metaphors *structural* metaphors. These conceptual metaphors “allow us ... to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another” (p. 61). Lakoff (1991) explains that in a specific situation metaphorical understanding functions in two parts; in addition to the ‘general’ level of metaphor systems (structuring our thoughts), there is a more specific level of metaphorical definitions which can be applied to fit the situation in question.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 59) claim that “we typically conceptualize the nonphysical *in terms of* the physical”. Thus a rational argument is seen as a WAR; “in terms of something that we understand more readily, namely, physical conflict” (p. 61). To show how this kind of metaphor might be grounded, Lakoff and Johnson (p. 62) reason in the following way: When animals want something, they fight to get it; or fight to stop other animals from getting it. We (human animals) fight for similar reasons; “except that we have developed more sophisticated techniques for getting our way”. One of our ‘institutionalized’ ways of problem solving is war. But whatever the technique, the basic pattern still remains the same. Like the fighting animals, we attack, defend, counterattack; sometimes we are forced to retreat, or even surrender. But physical conflicts can be dangerous; therefore, being “rational animals”, we have invented other practices that help us to get what we want: “the social institution of verbal argument” (p. 62). But, according to Lakoff and Johnson, our knowledge and our experience of physical battles affect the way we carry out these verbal arguments. The fact that we conceptualize argument through this metaphor is reflected in a number of expressions in our everyday language (p. 4). We *defend* our claims, we *attack* weak points, we *win* or *lose* arguments. To speak of arguments in this way is so natural that we hardly notice that these expressions are metaphorical. At the same time, because metaphorical concepts (and our language) are systematic, we can study

them by examining these linguistic expressions, and thus “gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities” (p. 7).

It is, however, important to keep in mind that metaphorical structuring is always *partial*. As Lakoff and Johnson (p. 13) point out, if it were total, the two concepts would be identical; one would not just be understood in *terms* of the other. Thus there is always something which does not ‘fit’; which remains hidden. When we perceive ARGUMENT as a WAR, we *highlight* the battling aspects of the concept, and “often lose sight of the cooperative aspects” (p. 10). When journalists see POLITICS as a GAME, they ignore “the long-term effects of public policies”, and focus on suspense and drama; following the pattern which, according to Edelman (1988) is typical of political news reporting.

4.2 Background knowledge structures

Background knowledge structures, called frames, scripts, schemas etc., have a central role in my analysis of metaphor. But before combining them with the notion of metaphor, I will give a brief preview of this field of research and its terminology. Here I rely mainly on the texts of Tannen (1979) and Brown and Yule (1983). Since the notion of *script* seems to be relevant for the purposes of this paper, I will look into it more closely, on the basis of Schank and Abelson’s well-known book *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding* (1977).

Tannen (1979: 137, 138) mentions the following disciplines which, besides linguistics, have shown a wide interest in the study of knowledge structures: artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology and anthropology. Somewhat confusingly, different researchers (even within the same field of science) use different terms (and sometimes more than just one term) to denote more or less the same concepts. And also the other way round: those who use the same term do not always give it exactly the same meaning (the notion of “schema” seems to be the most flexible in this respect). The most popular terms are *frame*, *script* and *schema*, but there are others who speak e.g. of *scenarios*, or of (mental) *models*. Brown and Yule (1983: 238) suggest that the “different terms are

best considered as alternative metaphors for the description of how knowledge of the world is organised in human memory, and also how it is activated in the process of discourse understanding”.

One of the pioneers in this research is Bartlett, who in his book *Remembering* (1932) as the first psychologist uses the term *schema* (Tannen 1979: 139). Bartlett wanted to stress the dynamic quality of the schema; it did more than just organize people’s past experiences, it “remained ‘active’ and ‘developing’” (Bartlett 1932: 201; as quoted in Brown and Yule 1983: 249). The term “schema” has later been used by e.g. Rumelhart (1975) in psychology and Chafe (1977) in linguistics.

The notion of *frame* was introduced by Bateson in anthropology in 1955; later it has been widely used by other researchers in various disciplines. Minsky’s *frame theory* in the field of artificial intelligence is famous, but also Fraake in anthropology, Hymes and Goffman in sociology, and Fillmore in linguistics, have chosen the term “frame” to describe background knowledge structures (Tannen 1979).

Minsky’s frame is “characteristically a fixed representation of knowledge about the world” (Brown and Yule 1983: 239). Also other AI researchers emphasize, even more explicitly than Minsky, the *static* nature of a frame. But at the same time, the anthropological/sociological view, e.g. that of Fraake, brings frames very close to Bartlett’s ‘active’ schema (Tannen 1979: 142). Minsky’s frames represent stereotyped situations such as birthday parties, voting procedures etc.; or they express expectations about settings or objects (e.g. the HOUSE-frame contains such slots as “kitchen”, “bathroom”, and so on) (Brown and Yule 1983: 239). Minsky’s “narrative frames” which denote event sequences are very similar to Schank and Abelson’s scripts (see e.g. Tannen 1979). Like Minsky, Schank and Abelson are mainly interested in the organisation of knowledge in a computer’s memory; in making a computer ‘understand’ discourse. But all these theories have had a great influence on the study of human thought processes in many fields of science.

Schank and Abelson (1977: 67) claim that in order to understand, we need two kinds of knowledge: general knowledge (about people and the

world) and specific knowledge, which is provided by scripts. Their notion of *script* can be illustrated by the (much quoted) example of the restaurant script (pp. 39, 40). They ask us to compare the following two stories:

1. John went to a restaurant. He asked the waitress for coq au vin. He paid the check and left.
2. John went to a park. He asked the midget for a mouse. He picked up the box and left.

As Schank and Abelson note, the latter story is not very clear because we are unprepared for the reference to “the” midget and “the” box; furthermore, we have problems in connecting the last two sentences. We cannot understand the story, they claim, simply because we have no background knowledge to assist us. For that we would need “a standard ‘mouse buying script’ that averred that only midgets in parks sold mice which were always packed in boxes” (p. 40). In the first story the restaurant script provides the necessary connectivity. Thus we are not puzzled when “the” waitress and “the” check are mentioned. The relationship between asking for the coq au vin and paying is equally clear. Further, there are some details which are brought up by the script, although they are not mentioned in the text. We can e.g. assume that John looked at the menu, that he ate his coq au vin, and so on. In addition, as Schank and Abelson point out, the fact that John ordered coq au vin (and not e.g. a hamburger) refers to a particular *track* of the restaurant script, namely a ‘fancy restaurant track’ which includes “the possibility of maitre d’, a wine steward, tablecloths, paying with credit cards, fancy desserts and so on” (p. 40).

A script can thus be defined as “a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation” (p. 41). A script can be evoked by mentioning just one of its slots; scripts offer “a mechanism for recovering steps that have been left out of a causal chain” (p. 38). A story with a reference to a script can be understood as long as the writer/speaker mentions “certain crucial items”. The missing information can be filled in by the readers/listeners; but, as Schank and Abelson note, it is understandable only for those who know that script (p. 41).

Every script contains a number of ‘actors’, who assume certain roles within the script; whether or not they are specifically mentioned. E.g. in the restaurant script, we assume the presence of a waitress; and if she is referred to (as in the example presented above), the definite article is used. Schank and Abelson (p. 42) point out that a “script must be written from one particular role’s point of view”. In the example just quoted, John as a customer sees the restaurant one way, the waitress in another way.

Sanford and Garrod (1981) have chosen the term *scenario*, which refers to the same kind of stereotyped background knowledge as Schank and Abelson’s scripts (see e.g. Brown and Yule 1983: 245). These two psychologists claim that texts which activate a coherent scenario can be processed more easily and faster than such texts where a scenario cannot immediately be found. The scenario can be activated by an appropriate title, such as “In court”, or “At the cinema” (pp. 246, 247). Compared to Schank and Abelson’s concept of scripts, I take scenarios to be somewhat more general. Like scripts, scenarios bring into representation certain ‘role’ slots (e.g. the waiter slot in a restaurant scenario). The difference between these two notions could, however, be that while scripts are written from one ‘actor’s point of view (as noted above), scenarios present a more general setting, combining several scripts (the waiter’s, the customer’s, the cook’s etc.).

Tannen (1979: 138) wants to “uncomplicate matters” by referring to all these somewhat confusing terms and approaches as “structures of expectations” [definition adopted from R. N. Ross, 1975]. Relevant to these notions is “an expectation about the world, based on prior experience, against which new experiences are measured and interpreted” (p. 140). Tannen (p. 144) further adds that in this process, structures of expectation “also reflect back on perception of the world to justify that interpretation”.

4.3 The two domains of metaphor

Metaphoric conceptualization, as discussed above, means that something is seen and described in terms of something else; thus there are two *domains* in every conceptual metaphor. Chilton (1988) calls these domains

“problematic” and “known”; Lakoff and Turner (1989) speak of the “target domain” and the “source domain”.

The problematic (target) domain in my data is the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty in the British Parliament (and all the problems it brought to the Conservative government and Prime Minister John Major). News agency journalists have seen this process e.g. in terms of WAR, GAME and JOURNEY; in the known (source) domain of the analyzed metaphors these three are the ‘familiar’ structures that occur most often. Since they are used to describe a process, “a sequence of actions” (Schank and Abelson 1977: 41), I will call them *metaphorical scripts*. How they relate to Schank and Abelson's notion of script and, on the other hand, what implications such notion of script could have on metaphoric understanding, will be discussed below (in section 6). At the end of this section, I will briefly look at my target domain to see whether structures of background knowledge are relevant in that domain, too.

Lakoff and Turner (1989: 62) claim that our conceptual system “includes an inventory of structures, of which schemas and metaphors are established parts”. They speak about “metaphorical mappings”. Thus e.g. in the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the structure of the JOURNEY schema from the source domain is mapped onto the target domain of LIFE. Further they argue that “conventionalized schemas and metaphors have *persuasive* power over us” (p. 63), because we use them so automatically, even unconsciously. Simply by having learned them, and using them, we accept their validity. Lakoff and Turner (pp. 64, 65) specify some “sources of the power of metaphor”. The most basic of these is the one just described, which they call *the power of being there*; the fact that conventional conceptual metaphors are so natural that we hardly even notice them. But I will look more closely also at two other of these sources which I find relevant for my analysis. First is *the power of options*. Schemas, as defined by Lakoff and Turner, are very general, but they include optional components which can be further specified. While at the general level a journey may have e.g. a vehicle, a traveller or a path, at lower levels these optional components, “slots”, can be “filled in by more specific informa-

tion” (p. 64). For example, the vehicle could be a car; or the journey could take place by train or by air. Schank and Abelson’s scripts, being more specific, might correspond to the ‘slots’ of this kind of schema. Secondly, Lakoff and Turner present *the power of reason*. By this they mean that metaphors “allow us to borrow patterns of inference from the source domain to use in reasoning about some target domain” (p. 65). Thus we can e.g. use our knowledge of journeys when we reason, and make decisions, about our lives. Chilton’s idea of a *metaphor morphism* is rather similar, only more ‘mathematical’. Chilton (1988: 63) argues that it is possible to draw conclusions about a complex domain by constructing a morphism; in other words “you transfer the basic term of the problematic domain into the terms of some domain which has a more familiar schema..., then you draw some relevant deduction... and translate the deduction back to the first, ‘literal’, domain of primary concern”. Here Chilton (p. 62) refers to, and further elaborates, the ideas of an artificial intelligence researcher (Hobbs), who in his study brought together the notions of *metaphor* and *script*.

In a script there are, fewer options than in a schema; and everyone who is familiar with that particular script, knows what the options are, even if only one or two of its slots are mentioned (see section 4.2). When e.g. POLITICS is seen as a GAME, the metaphor usually refers to a specific ‘track’ of that script; it can be a poker game, or a game of chess, or some sport, and so on. In every game there are rules which define how the game is carried out, and thus provide a basis for the *causal chain* of the script. The number of players, ‘actors’ in the script, may also be fixed, or otherwise known. Further, it is important to remember that a script is always presented from some actor’s (one player’s) point of view.

In the news reports under investigation, the last votes of the Maas-tricht ratification process are often metaphorically called “the final hurdle”. This immediately evokes the whole script: the RACE script which, in this specific case, I regard as a slot in the JOURNEY schema (for details see ch. 6). The “hurdle” here refers to a particular track of the RACE script, namely STEEPLECHASE. On the basis of this script we can assume that

the process has been difficult; that there have been many “hurdles” on the way. It can also be presupposed that once the last hurdle has been cleared, the race will soon end. As Schank and Abelson (see section 4.2) point out, the script provides the connectivity; it is enough just to mention one of its slots in order to recover the steps that have been left out.

Before examining the other domain of metaphor, the target domain, I can now summarize the main factors that account for the *persuasive power* of scripts in the source domain of metaphor. First, one single metaphor, referring to one slot of a script, can evoke the whole script, so that all missing stages (and actors) can be recovered, if needed. Second, the script provides connectivity between its various steps; there is a causal chain. Third, the script is seen from one actor’s point of view. How these factors affect news agency language, will be discussed more closely in section 6.

In news agency dispatches on the Maastricht ratification process, journalists use metaphors to make sense of an ambiguous situation. But also in this ‘problematic’ target domain, background knowledge structures can be claimed to be important. The situation in Parliament, and in the Conservative party, is ambiguous, because it *deviates* from the ‘normal’, expected pattern. The Maastricht bill on its way towards ratification has met with unexpected “hurdles”; the traditional division between the government and opposition parties does not seem to be valid any longer. Some of Major’s party members are expected to vote with the opposition; they are unloyal to their own party. But we *know* how things should be; there is a schema for that. However, here I would speak of a parliamentary *scenario* rather than of a script. As mentioned above (see section 4.2) I take scenarios to be somewhat more general, less stereotypic, than scripts. Besides, the notion of scenario includes the whole parliamentary ‘setting’ with its various actors; not just one actor’s point of view.

5 The material and the methods

5.1 Material

Since the final debate and the last votes of the Maastricht ratification process took place on July 22 and 23 (and a few days before that were filled with political scheming), my main data are collected from the Reuter and AP dispatches distributed on this subject between July 19 and 25, 1993. It should be stressed, however, that I had access only to the dispatches which were *received* by one client of these agencies; the Finnish Broadcasting Company.

The Reuter catchline for these reports is usually BRITAIN-MAASTRICHT, which in some cases is followed by a specifying word, e.g. MAJOR or VOTE. In five reports after the votes, the catchline is BRITAIN. The total number of Reuter reports in my corpus is 32. The result of the first vote was announced late on July 22; before that Reuters had already sent 15 reports on the ongoing political 'game'.

Most AP dispatches on this issue have BRITAIN-EUROPE as the catchline; in addition there is one with the catchline ANALYSIS-BRITAIN-MAJOR'S DILEMMA and another with EUROTREATY GLANCE. AP transmitted only five reports before the first vote during that week. 26 reports have material for the purposes of my analysis. In these reports there is, however, so much repetition from earlier dispatches (as often in agency reporting), that only 16 of them are relevant from the point of view of *new* metaphors.

The newspaper reports used for the first part of my analysis have been taken from four British newspapers: *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *Financial Times* and *The Sunday Times*. These all published several news reports, commentaries and editorials on the Maastricht process during that week in July. The newspaper reports are not analyzed in any systematic way; they are only used to give a wider view of the political events and their background, and also of the way these events were presented in political reporting.

5.2 Methods

As mentioned above, the first part of the analysis is an overview of the press reports on the final Maastricht debates and votes. These are studied as an example of political news reporting, but – what is more relevant to my study – they also show evidence of how ‘newsworthiness’ can be enhanced by presentation (this aspect of *news values* was discussed in section 3.1.3). The main part of the analysis deals with metaphors. After the first reading of the material, the news agency texts, three types of structural metaphors (or metaphorical scripts) could be identified as most prevalent: metaphors of WAR, GAME, and JOURNEY. Representations of these three metaphors will be analyzed in the following section. One point of terminology has to be clarified here: although my analysis actually deals with only *three* (conceptual) *metaphors*, the word *metaphor* is also, quite often, used to refer to individual *linguistic expressions* (representations) of such a metaphor.

Some comparisons of the relative frequencies will be made, both between the three types appearing in the language of one agency and also between the two agencies. Since my main aim is to study *news agency* language in general, not to compare the language of Reuters to that of AP, such findings are perhaps not very important for present purposes. But as my corpus – news agency texts – cannot be easily accessed by all, in the same way as data in newspapers, I judged it to be useful, anyway, to list all metaphorical expressions belonging to these three types. The lists are presented in Appendix 4, and the results will be briefly commented on in section 6.

In selecting the metaphors for my list, I met with at least three kinds of difficulties. The first problem has been recognized also by other researchers on metaphor. So (1987: 624) states that “there is no clear-cut distinction between metaphors and non-metaphors”, which may bring ‘personal bias’ into the coding of metaphors. Furthermore, the line of demarcation between the GAME and the WAR metaphors is not always clear; such words as ‘win’, ‘lose’, ‘victory’, ‘defeat’ etc. could be part of either group. The third problem is more specifically linked with news agency dis-

course (see section 3.2). As mentioned above, parts of earlier dispatches, including metaphors, are often repeated in successive reports, and this also complicated selection.

In making the list I have proceeded in the following way:

1. As I want to study metaphors as part of news rhetoric, i.e. metaphors used by news agency journalists, all metaphors included in quotations have been omitted.
2. Expressions whose metaphorical 'function', or type of metaphor, is not clear have not been selected. This means that I have discarded e.g. such words as 'win', 'lose', 'victory' and 'defeat', and also the much used word 'rebel', unless they have been part of a longer, clearly definable expression.
3. Repetitions of metaphorical expressions are indicated by a number in brackets after each such expression; a (1) means that a metaphorical expression has been repeated once, i.e. that there are two occurrences of it in the data.
4. WAR metaphors are divided into two categories; the second category includes expressions which taken out of context might not be conceptualized as a WAR metaphor, but which in these texts clearly belongs to that type.

In the analysis, the data is examined in two stages. In the first stage I look at each metaphor separately, presenting examples and discussing possible implications. Special attention is given to the notion of 'script'; how the 'familiar' structures on the source domain of the metaphors correspond to Schank and Abelson's scripts, and what this means to metaphoric understanding (cf. ch. 4). In the discussion after the first stage, the findings of comparison between the three metaphorical scripts are presented and commented on. The second stage focuses more on news discourse; on how the persuasive power of metaphors 'operates' in news agency language: how metaphors can be linked to *news values*.

6 Analysis and discussion

6.1 The construction of the political spectacle in news reports

The final stages of the Maastricht ratification process in Britain were unusually ambiguous, and that sets the whole tone for the reporting of those events. A vote in parliament is normally an unambiguous news event; the result of the vote is expected to tell everybody who has won or lost. In this case, the upcoming votes of the Maastricht ratification process in the British Parliament generate a lot of scenarios in the press: ‘what would happen if ...’ (Guardian 22.7.), because there are several possibilities, depending on the result of the two votes, but even more on the course of action Prime Minister John Major and his government would take afterwards. As The Guardian (22.7.) puts it: “Tonight’s Maastricht manoeuvres in the dark resemble one of those three dimensional games of noughts and crosses with a seemingly endless sequence of permutations”.

“Doomsday scenarios” (The Guardian 19.7.) are evoked for the Maastricht treaty, but, in particular, for John Major. The view expressed by The Guardian (22.7.), is commonly shared: “Only one thing seems certain through the fog: the PM’s leadership has been seriously dented”. After the last vote – the vote of confidence which Major won – newspapers still claim that Major’s victory “failed to move the question mark over his premiership” (Financial Times 24.7.). But as Edelman (1988: 94) notes “the scenarios for the future that news accounts evoke are rarely acted out according to their scripts”. And, in fact, there are a few more cautious commentators who warn that “in political punditry, beware what ‘everybody says’” (The Guardian 24.7.); or even advise that “the shrewd investor with cash to spare could do worse than buy a few Majors, especially when the price is so low” (The Sunday Times 25.7.).

As mentioned above (see ch.1), political news concentrates on reporting the competitive events of the political spectacle rather than complex, slow processes. The Maastricht ratification process had been long and te-

dious, but in the British Parliament it had involved all the elements which make a political spectacle ‘worth reporting’: heated debates and ‘crunch’ votes, political allies and enemies, suspense and uncertainty of the outcome. News agencies with their ‘low-key’ analyses (see section 3.2) do not much try to look beyond the politicians’ game. But in newspapers, editorials and special commentary columns offer a forum for deeper analyses. The editorial of *The Independent* (20.7.) points out that although “Thursday’s vote will touch on very big issues” on one level, on another level, “it may or may not settle a tiresome squabble by overwrought politicians with mixed motives over a treaty that is already half dead”. The writer adds that the whole process “has eaten up so much parliamentary time at the expense of more urgent issues” that it must be “persuading some people that the sooner more power passes to the European Parliament the better”.

All in all, the culmination of the ratification process was one of those “institutionalized contests” (Edelman 1988: 102) which did not much influence people’s life and, according to the press, did not interest them, either. The *Guardian* leader page on July 24 claims that the ratification process “has served as an advertisement for alienation” [of the people from politics]. Also both news agencies, AP and Reuters, state that the long process and the whole conflict are “of scant interest to the average voter” (AP 20.7.).

The two ‘levels’ of the political events mentioned above are both relevant, when the evidence of *news values* in the Maastricht reporting is discussed. From the point of view of *selection* the ‘higher’ level, the one which refers to the ‘big issues’ (the fate of the treaty), is more important. It satisfies the THRESHOLD criterion better than the aspect of the political game, or even the question of Major’s uncertain future, could be expected to do. This point is illustrated e.g. by the wording of the news agency catchlines: BRITAIN-MAASTRICHT, BRITAIN- EUROPE. These catchlines are used, despite the fact that the actual headlines mostly refer to Major’s ‘dilemma’. Moreover, these catchlines help to fulfill the CONTINUITY criterion; after all, the issues concerning the Maastricht treaty and European union are, in international news reporting, more lasting than Major’s

problems (although these, too, have continued for months). The other 'selection' factors, such as REFERENCE TO ELITE NATIONS and ELITE PERSONS, seem to be valid on both levels. And the events can, of course, be regarded as MEANINGFUL (RELEVANT) in both cases: whether it is the treaty that is in danger or 'only' Major's position.

In the reports under investigation, however, MEANINGFULNESS is greatly enhanced by *presentation*. It was not certain at all that the treaty (or Major's job, either) was really threatened. But the 'doomsday' scenarios created by the press point to those possibilities, which would, of course, affect people's lives. At the same time, this kind of presentation contributes to the aspect of NEGATIVITY, stressing that something negative might soon happen, at least to John Major. One of the gloomiest prophecies sees "a wounded Major drifting into the coma before political death, unable to ratify and unable to escape" (The Guardian 19.7.). The two news agencies, Reuters and AP, repeatedly remind their readers of Major being "Britain's most unpopular leader of modern times" (Reuters 21.7.).

One of the basic functions of the journalists' scenarios here is to 'make sense' of the ambiguous events; thus the presentation essentially contributes to the factor of UNAMBIGUITY. It is easier to understand what 'fatal' event could happen to John Major (that he could be forced to resign, and his Conservative party would have to face a new, probably disastrous, election) than to grasp all the complex procedures related to the ratification or non-ratification of the Maastricht treaty, with or without the social chapter. Focussing on Major also means PERSONIFICATION of the news events.

The criterion of FREQUENCY is, of course, satisfied by the votes. But before the final debate and the votes on July 22 and 23, nothing really newsworthy is happening. Various stages of the political 'game', however, create an illusion of 'something going on', and thus help to fulfill the FREQUENCY factor, providing the press with something which can be reported from day to day. The political game is also CONSONANT; politicians are expected to be scheming and 'making deals'. And in this case, the

fact that Major's own party members threaten to vote for the opposition motion, against Major, brings along the aspect of UNEXPECTEDNESS.

Thus, while the 'higher' level of the Maastricht issues is important for the aspect of selection, the other level – the level of political game – greatly contributes to presentation, so that practically all news value criteria are explicit in the news texts.

6.2 Metaphorical expressions used by Reuter and AP journalists

In this section I analyze structural metaphors used in news agency dispatches by journalists to describe the Maastricht ratification process. The three main types that could be identified in the analyzed texts are metaphors of WAR, GAME and JOURNEY.

6.2.1 WAR metaphors

Much in the same way as ARGUMENT is conceptualized as WAR, also POLITICS can be seen metaphorically as WAR, especially when there is a conflict. During the Maastricht process there was a special kind of conflict: a split inside the Conservative Party, which – in addition to more general WAR metaphors – generated many metaphors referring to a special 'slot' of the WAR schema, a GUERRILLA WAR.

In Reuter dispatches between July 19 and 24, 1993, WAR metaphors are often used in headlines, so that they form a kind of narrative, a story of a 'battle' with Prime Minister John Major cast in the role of a general, facing rebels in his own country; even in his own 'army'. On July 20, "Major gears up for Maastricht show-down", the next day "Major battles to avert last-minute defeat over Europe". On July 22, "Major locked in tense battle for Maastricht", and later same day "Major in last-ditch battle with rebels on Maastricht". On July 23, "Rebellion against British government starts to crack"; and finally, on July 24, "Major bloodied in victory, leadership questioned". The long process of ratification is conceptualized as "a year-long battle" (Reuters July 22), and Major is seen as "fighting one of his toughest political battles" (Reuters July 21); or "he battles to get the Maastricht union treaty past its last parliamentary hurdle" (AP July 20). In this

battle Major “has survived opposition ambushes by the skin of his teeth” (Reuters July 21).

The GUERRILLA WAR script is much more dominant than these general WAR metaphors, especially in Reuter dispatches; Major is more likely to be ‘ambushed’ by his own party than by the opposition. The whole process is described as “just over a year of guerrilla warfare” (Reuters July 20), or “war of attrition with the rebels” (Reuters July 23), during which Major has had “to withstand constant sniping from a band of Conservative rebels” (Reuters July 21). Finally, on July 24, “after 15 months spent ambushing Major over the Maastricht treaty, the rebels acknowledged they had been outmanoeuvred” (Reuters).

To illustrate the idea of metaphorical script and Chilton’s metaphor morphism (as presented in section 4.3), we could reason in the following way: the basic term of the problematic domain (conflict in the Conservative Party) is transferred into terms of some domain which has a more familiar schema (guerrilla war), a relevant deduction is drawn (war leads to casualties) and the deduction is translated back to the first, ‘literal’ domain (as Major is ‘wounded’, his position as the Prime Minister is in danger). In fact, the Reuter journalists have already done the reasoning, as on July 23 the Conservative party is presented as “shell-shocked” and on July 24, Major as “bloodied in victory”, and his “leadership questioned”.

“Rebels” are prominent ‘actors’ also in AP’s reporting. On July 22, AP writes that Major “pleaded ... for rebels to get into line”; on July 23, the AP writer states that “Major was left at the mercy of a band of up to 40 Conservative rebels”. But AP’s ‘rebellion’ never seems to become a real guerrilla war; it remains a ‘mutiny’. On July 23, AP reports on “the complete collapse of the 23-member rebellion”; and after stating that the Conservatives are likely to lose one more seat in Parliament after the next by-election in Christchurch, AP adds that Major would then be “that much more vulnerable to the next mutiny”.

As discussed in section 4.3, in the source domain of metaphor, ‘familiar’ knowledge structures have a vital role. A war can hardly be called a script in such a specific sense as e.g. a game; and even the GUERRILLA

WAR schema, which is widely used in my data, could be claimed to be too 'general' for a script. On the other hand, the language of war is, unfortunately, familiar to news agency reporters and their clients, other journalists; and the wars of today are mostly guerrilla wars or civil wars. To test this hypothesis, I searched on computer through the incoming news agency wires (of the Finnish Broadcasting Company) for one day, looking for reports of guerrilla wars. I repeated the test several times, choosing different days at random. Every time I found references to guerrilla activities in about ten different places, e.g. in Turkey, Lebanon, Cambodia, Algeria, Sudan, Peru, Rwanda etc. Besides, as Brown and Yule suggest (see section 4.2), various terms referring to background knowledge structures can well be regarded as "alternative metaphors".

By speaking of the GUERRILLA WAR *script*, I wish to highlight such implications of this WAR metaphor as are typical of scripts. After all, this metaphor is used to refer to a *sequence of action*, and the whole script can be evoked by mentioning just one slot (e.g. 'rebel'). In addition, there are certain 'actors' in this script; and, which is perhaps the most relevant point for my analysis, some kind of *causal chain* can be detected: we know, for instance, that a war leads to casualties.

6.2.2 GAME metaphors

Some aspects of politics resemble a game. Thus it is not surprising that politics, in general, can be thought of, and talked about, in terms of GAME. The GAME metaphor in political language often comes from the field of sports. So (1987: 625) notes that in press reports on US-Soviet summit talks there are metaphorically "two teams playing against each other". Hobbs (as reported by Chilton 1988: 62) looks at the correspondence between a baseball schema and a US congress schema.

But politics can also be conceptualized as a game of cards or chess (see e.g. Palo 1993). In the analyzed news agency reports, the Maastricht process is most often, almost exclusively, perceived as a poker game, with Prime Minister Major as a lonely gambler. The stakes vary from Major's credibility and premiership to "his government's survival" (AP 23.7.), and

even to the Maastricht treaty. Before the final votes Major is seen as “playing the last round of high stakes poker over European union” (AP July 22). In order to defeat his opponents he “also played the economic card” (Reuters July 23). And after the vote, AP writes (July 23): “For Major, the gamble ended an enervating, 19-month struggle...”. On July 24, the Reuter writer states: “Staking his future as British prime minister, John Major has won a tense parliamentary poker game...”. According to this metaphorical script Major is, of course, playing poker with his political opponents: the opposition parties and the Conservative rebels. But as Schank and Abelson note (see section 4.2), the script has to be seen from one ‘actor’s’ point of view. Thus it is only Major who is really gambling, placing the stakes. Major is forced to call a vote of confidence after losing the second vote on July 22 “in an ultimate gamble for a prime minister” (Reuters July 23), but he is likely to win that, “simply because he has raised the stakes so high” (AP July 23). After the confidence vote “senior Conservatives rallied around Major, saying that he had shown great courage in calling ... the rebels’ bluff” (Reuters July 24).

The other players are left in the background; the rebels are keeping “their cards close to their chest” (Reuters July 19). The only reference to the rebels’ gambling is made by the Reuter journalist, who calls their intention to vote for the opposition motion “a calculated gamble” (Reuters July 21). The rebels hope to “wreck or at least delay the full ratification”. Their stakes are not mentioned, but it can, of course, be deduced that what they risk is the possibility of having to accept the treaty *and* the social chapter, both of which they detest.

The RACE script, e.g. several references to “the last parliamentary hurdle” (Reuters July 19), could be seen as a part of the SPORT-GAME metaphor. However, in this case, I rather take it to be a slot in the JOURNEY schema, which will be discussed below.

6.2.3 JOURNEY metaphors

We hardly notice that we are speaking metaphorically when we say that a *bill passes* the House of Commons. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) would, however, claim that *passing* here refers to the structural JOURNEY metaphor. Structural metaphors have sets of ontological metaphors as subparts (p. 219). Ontological metaphors allow us “to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind” (p. 25). In news agency reports, the Maastricht ratification process is seen as a PASSAGE, PATH, RUN, RACE with HURDLES, or even as a RAILROAD. These ontological metaphors are subparts of the JOURNEY metaphor; in other words they are slots in the JOURNEY schema (see Lakoff and Turner 1989: 63).

The RACE script, which has been briefly discussed in section 4.3, is prominent in the texts of both agencies. HURDLES refer to a STEEPLECHASE, but in this ‘race’ there is only one runner at a time; there is no competition. Votes in parliament during the ratification process were extremely tight, and even more so in July, causing problems to the government; therefore they are seen as ‘hurdles’ which have to be cleared. In this metaphorical script the treaty itself, or actually the ratification bill, mostly has a leading role; it is the bill which has to jump the hurdles. But the script is also seen from Major’s point of view. Before the final votes Reuters (July 19) states that “it would need only 10 rebel Conservatives to thwart Major’s bid to clear the last parliamentary hurdle”; and after the government has lost the second vote on July 22, AP (July 23) writes: “But on Thursday, he [Major] failed at the final parliamentary hurdle on closer European union ...”.

The ratification process is consistently conceptualized as a STEEPLECHASE; this metaphorical script provides a connectivity between the various stages: votes in the Parliament. On May 21, 1992, the bill “passes its first important parliamentary hurdle” – the first vote in the Parliament (Reuters July 23). On July 20 – after several votes during those 14 months – the bill “passes its last routine hurdle” (gaining a majority in the House of Lords). On July 22, AP writes that the ‘vote marks the last parliamentary

hurdle for the union treaty'. But as the government fails to win that vote, there is still more to come; on July 23, Major's government wins a confidence motion, "clearing the final parliamentary hurdle" (Reuters July 23). And even after that, on July 23, AP finds at least two "remaining hurdles" for European union: one legal challenge in Britain, another in Germany.

The treaty has had "a tense and protracted passage through parliament" (Reuters July 21); besides 'hurdles' it has met other metaphorical obstacles. "Time and again over the past year the bill seemed to have a clear run to ratification, only for another trap to open up in front of the government" (Reuters July 21). Before the final votes the Conservative rebels plan to vote for the social chapter "in hopes of derailing the entire treaty" (AP July 20); and according to Reuters (July 22) they wish "to block the treaty". The bill has been actively 'pushed' forward by John Major; and "difficulties in pushing a bill ratifying the Maastricht treaty through parliament" (Reuters July 21) have damaged Major's 'political reputation'.

As mentioned above, ontological metaphors are entities; thus these scripts presuppose a clear start and finish. The ultimate goal is, of course, the ratification of the Maastricht treaty; European union. After Major wins the vote of confidence on July 23, the Reuter journalist can finally write: "This cleared the way for Britain to join the other 11 European Community members on the path to union ...".

Compared to the STEEPLECHASE script discussed above, metaphorical scripts involving a PASSAGE, PATH, or RUN mostly look at the ratification process from a different point of view. The obstacles which have to be 'cleared' are not part of the scripts themselves; rather they are 'interferences' in these scripts, deviations from the normal parliamentary 'scenario' (see section 4.3). These 'obstacles' (e.g. "traps") are, in fact, more unexpected than "hurdles"; some of them are also potentially more dangerous, since the whole treaty could be "blocked" or "derailed". "Derailing the treaty" refers to an 'interference' in the RAILROAD script. But another example shows this script in its 'basic' sense: after Major has won the con-

confidence vote, AP states that Major “railroaded a reluctant House of Commons into approving a treaty of European union on his terms” (July 24).

Above I have regarded as JOURNEY metaphors also various obstacles (hurdles, blocks, traps) which the opposition, and especially the Conservative rebels, have placed in the way of the ratification bill, wishing to hamper, or even to stop, its progress. The bill, or the treaty, which is ‘travelling’ through Parliament, is metaphorically viewed as a *container*, as a concrete object, although it is not physically present (on container metaphors, see Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In the news reports under investigation, this is evidenced also by other metaphors, which cannot, however, be classified as JOURNEY metaphors, although they, too, refer to a possible premature end to the ratification process. Besides “derailing” or “blocking” the treaty, the Conservative rebels, according to Reuter dispatches, want to “bury the whole treaty”, “wreck the treaty”, “destroy the treaty as a whole” (July 20); they see “voting with Labour as the best route to killing the treaty altogether” (July 21). But as Major starts to ‘gamble’ and makes them face the confidence vote, they have to “choose between swallowing the hated treaty or bringing down the government” (AP July 23).

6.2.4 Discussion

Besides the three main types of metaphor presented above, also other scripts are evoked to describe the ratification process, and especially the last-minute activities before the final votes. When Major loses the crucial vote on July 22, a Reuter headline states: “Vote prolongs Major’s 15-month Maastricht nightmare” (July 23). Before the vote, the government tries to head off the defeat by starting “horsetrading over Maastricht”, or “48 hours of backroom bargaining and arm-twisting” (Reuters July 20). And according to AP (July 20), “government is furiously twisting arms and romancing Northern Ireland Protestants to win a House of Commons vote Thursday”.

However, the three types of metaphorical scripts, analyzed above, dominate the reports. The total number of these metaphorical expressions is 240, as can be seen below from Table 1, which presents schematically

the distribution of metaphors. The figures shown below should not be taken too categorically; they are suggestive rather than conclusive. Besides, they should be compared to the list of metaphorical expressions in Appendix 4.

TABLE 1
Types of metaphors used by news agency journalists

	REUTERS	REUTERS /REP	AP	AP/REP	TOTAL
WAR I	48	9	15	17	89
WAR II	19	3	7	8	37
GAME	11	1	13	17	42
JOURNEY	31	12	17	12	72
TOTAL	109	25	52	54	240

As can be seen from Table 1, I have separated repeated expressions from the 'original'. The lists presented in Appendix 4 show that I have accepted even the slightest difference in *wording* or *syntactic form* to be sufficient for inclusion into the 'original' category, although the expression could be claimed to be basically the same as in some other example in the list. By doing so I wanted to avoid the demarcation problem between the metaphorical expressions. But I had also another reason, which is more important from the point of view of news discourse: I wished to present some evidence of the effects of new technologies on the editing of a news story.

The aspect of copying longer extracts of texts, which results in repetition, has been discussed above. But there are also some other aspects, like reordering and rewording. Bell (1991: 74) states that "some kinds of opera-

tion are easier on screen than on paper – and vice versa”. On computer screen, he claims, “sentences and sentence constituents can be shifted around much more easily”. This is explicit, in particular, in Reuter reports. Although it sometimes ‘borrows’ whole paragraphs as such from its earlier dispatches; more often, instead of just copying, it makes some minor changes: rewording, small additions or deletions, slightly revised metaphors etc. The aspect of direct copying (of entire paragraphs, sometimes almost the whole dispatch), on the other hand, is more marked in AP reports. This is also reflected in the figures of the ‘repetition’ categories; AP has twice as many repetitions as Reuters. *All* repeated metaphors are not the result of copying; in some cases only the words put in italics – the metaphorical expression itself – have been repeated, while the rest of the sentence, or at least of the paragraph, has been different in successive reports. However, about 80% of AP’s repetitions (but less than half of Reuters’s) are due to the copying of entire paragraphs.

Above I have given the number of analyzed Reuter reports as 32, and that of AP reports as 26. The total volume of the output is, however, almost the same in both agencies, as many AP reports are longer than Reuter texts (an example of a ‘typical’ Reuter and AP dispatch can be seen in Appendix 2). Why Reuters has many more metaphors (at least those of the ‘original’ category) than AP, can only be hypothesized. First, the Maastricht ratification process is an issue of *national* politics for Reuters; it is more ‘involved’, which might make its language more persuasive, and thus generate more (and stronger) metaphors. Secondly, as mentioned above, Reuters transmitted as many as 15 reports before the first vote, while most AP reports were sent within 24 hours, on July 23 (which also partly accounts for the amount of repetition). Thus Reuters reports on all stages of the political ‘war’; and, in fact, 51 out of its 79 WAR metaphors come from those pre-vote reports.

Comparison between the three types shows that an overwhelming majority of Reuter metaphors are WAR metaphors, GAME metaphors being the smallest group of the three. The distribution of metaphor types is more even in AP reports, but WAR metaphors are the most popular type

there, too. But, of course, the mere figures do not tell much. For instance, it can be hypothesized that since news discourse is defined by relevance structuring, the *place* of metaphors is very important. The GAME metaphor of Major, or his government, as a gambler is often presented in headlines and leads of AP dispatches. Thus, despite the many WAR metaphors, the uppermost impression after reading all these reports is that the Maastricht ratification process is conceptualized by AP as a *poker game*. In Reuter reports, headlines and leads often include WAR metaphors, and thus enhance their strong influence. The first – and the only – time when Major as a poker player hits the headlines is after the last vote; after he has won the “parliamentary poker game” (Reuters 24.7.). (Metaphors in news discourse will be discussed more in detail below in section 6.3).

Two of the three dominant metaphorical scripts – GAME and JOURNEY – include a promise of a ‘happy end’ for Major and his government. The poker game, although risky, brought a victory to Major; and whatever stakes his opponents had placed, they lost. According to the JOURNEY script, once the bill has cleared the final hurdles, or the other obstacles, it can be expected to reach the goal; and Major can stop ‘pushing’ it. The WAR script is much more problematic for Major. As already mentioned, the wars appearing in today’s news texts often are either guerilla wars or civil wars. Of course ‘winners’ suffer, also in a traditional war, but in this kind of war (e.g. in Bosnia), it is likely that none of the parties will win. Thus, Major is described as being “bloodied” and “wounded”. The WAR script implies that his position really has been damaged. Though he has made some kind of truce with the rebels, new ‘wars’ may erupt.

As we have seen, journalists use different kinds of metaphors to depict the same events. Since these metaphors highlight different aspects of the same process, and can have contradictory implications (did Major really win?), this alone might affect the “intentionally factual nature” of agency news (see section 3.2). The GAME and WAR scripts both highlight the same aspect of *politics*: the scheming, the political spectacle. In that respect, they are probably revealing rather than misleading, since the actors in the real ‘Parliament scenario’ also seem to have forgotten that poli-

tics is (or should be) something more than a game. But as Chilton (1988: 67) claims, “once the metaphor is well established, it is not that easy for that to be challenged”. Thus these metaphors make also this Maastricht ‘game’ look natural, almost inevitable.

In stressing the excitement of the political ‘game’ (or ‘war game’) these metaphors naturally hide other aspects of politics. They widen the gap between the spectacular activities, of politicians and the long, complex political processes which often have more influence on the lives of ordinary people, but which are so difficult to report. In the case of the Maastricht ratification process, these metaphors help journalists to forget those “more urge issues” (see section 6.1) which could have been discussed in the Parliament during these months of the ‘guerrilla war’. Furthermore, the use of WAR metaphors, “macho rhetoric”, as Novek (1992: 225) calls it, creates an illusion of vigorous action, which also seems to make the events more newsworthy. We hardly notice that there is no ‘physical’ action going on; that the events involve only communicative acts.

6.3 Metaphors and news values

How the Maastricht reporting, in general, shows evidence of *news values*, was discussed above in section 6.1. This section focuses on the role of *metaphors* in news rhetoric; how they can add to its effectiveness and make it seem more newsworthy. In other words, I set out to examine how *presentation*, through metaphorical scripts, can enhance the qualities known as *news values*.

6.3.1 Analysis

As mentioned above, the events during the ratification process, and especially during the few days before the votes, were most ambiguous. As metaphor “allows us to understand a relatively abstract or inherently unstructured subject matter in terms of a more concrete, or at least more highly structured subject matter” (Lakoff 1993: 245), this could be one of the reasons why journalists use such a lot of metaphors in reporting on the Maastricht events.

UNAMBIGUITY is one of the *news values* discussed above in section 3.1.3. Hartley (1982: 77) argues that “in news, the intrinsic *polysemic* (ambiguous – capable of generating many meanings) nature of both events and accounts of them is reduced as much as possible; in literature it is celebrated and exploited”. Trying to make sense of the complex Maastricht process, news reporters create all kinds of scenarios (see section 6.1). But it could also be claimed that metaphors of WAR, GAME and JOURNEY serve the same purpose; they are, in fact, often used in those scenarios. Furthermore, these *scripts* provide a connectivity between the events; they even predict what could happen next. In this sense, metaphors here have a ‘double’ function; they help to understand, but they also *persuade* in stressing the factor of UNAMBIGUITY.

The events of the Maastricht ratification process are low on FREQUENCY before the votes on July 22 and 23; complex, long political processes are not normally found to be newsworthy (see 6.1). Still, metaphors (metaphorical scripts) can *create* structure in such processes. Referring to the mapping of the JOURNEY schema onto the domain of LIFE, Lakoff and Turner (1989: 62) claim: “Part of the power of such a metaphor is its ability to *create* structure in our understanding of life.” When the Maastricht ratification process is perceived as a WAR, various ‘battles’ can be picked out and reported from day to day. As already mentioned above, Reuters is telling how Major “gears up”, or is “locked in tense battle”; or is “in last-ditch battle with rebels”. Also the other two metaphorical scripts, GAME and JOURNEY, help to structure this process. The final votes can be seen as the “last round” of the poker game or as the “final hurdle” of the ratification ‘race’.

From the point of view of the FREQUENCY factor, however, these two are not so important as Reuters’ WAR metaphors, since the votes (to which they refer) happen quickly, anyway; and can thus satisfy the FREQUENCY criterion. But they contribute to the UNAMBIGUITY factor, discussed above, and to some other factors, too; e.g. they make the events seem more MEANINGFUL (RELEVANT). Frequent references to the “last” or “final hurdle” stress that those votes are decisive for the whole process.

Major's "ultimate gamble" during this "last round of high stakes poker" also points to the far-reaching consequences that the result of the votes could bring.

The basic fact that all three types of metaphor rely on 'familiar' knowledge structures, which I have called *scripts*, accounts for the news value of CONSONANCE. Politics as a GAME has been widely discussed above; and in a conflict, politics can be expected to be an ARGUMENT, and hence a WAR. In fact, Chilton (1988: 62) claims more generally that "*politics is argument in Western democracies*".

Closely related to the CONSONANCE factor is the value of UNEXPECTEDNESS. As mentioned in section 3.1.3, Galtung and Ruge stress that *unexpectedness* 'needs' *consonance* to be really newsworthy. In the analyzed texts, especially the GUERRILLA WAR script with all its references to *rebels* brings an aspect of *unexpectedness* into the 'normal' political WAR. In the scripts related to the JOURNEY schema, all metaphorical obstacles, such as *hurdles*, *blocks* or *traps*, have a similar function. After all, the ratification process was *expected* to be less complicated; "the bill seemed to have a clear run to ratification", as Reuters states.

In the reports under investigation, however, the 'newsworthiness' is mostly enhanced by PERSONALIZATION and by stressing NEGATIVE aspects; and metaphors are important in both perspectives. The analysis shows that in all three metaphorical scripts Prime Minister John Major has a central role, although in the JOURNEY schema also the Maastricht treaty, or the ratification bill, is sometimes given the leading part. In the WAR script Major is presented mostly as an 'actor', an army commander facing the rebels, but especially after the votes he is also seen as an affected participant ("wounded" or "bloodied"). The GAME script is almost entirely perceived from Major's point of view; he is the lonely gambler, staking his "credibility", "job", "future" or "survival" (see also 6.2.2).

The *negative* prophecies of the WAR script have already been discussed. But also the GAME script, in spite of its 'happy end', includes an aspect of NEGATIVITY. Gambling, especially with such high stakes as Major had, is dangerous; there is always the possibility of losing. The obsta-

cles in the JOURNEY schema enhance the NEGATIVITY factor from another point of view; the treaty itself could be “blocked” or “derailed”.

6.3.2 Discussion

Galtung and Ruge (1970: 270) claim that “these twelve factors [the news values] are not independent of each other: there are interesting inter-relations between them”. One of these inter-relations is expressed in their *complementarity hypothesis* (see section 3.1.3), which says that a low factor can be compensated for by some other factor being very high. The FREQUENCY factor in the Maastricht ratification reports remains rather low, although it is, to some extent, ‘helped’ by the WAR metaphors. The votes on July 22, which as such satisfy this criterion, do not, on the other hand, offer any definite solution to Major’s problems (or to those of the treaty), which means that also the UNAMBIGUITY factor needs to be corrected. It seems that these low factors are mainly compensated for by enhancing NEGATIVITY and PERSONALIZATION. And there is more evidence of “interesting inter-relations”; when these two factors are stressed, the events also become more *meaningful*, and maybe more *consonant* and *unexpected*, too.

The results of the analysis lend support to the hypothesis that at least in this kind of political news reporting metaphors enhance ‘newsworthiness’ and can be directly linked to news values. The findings also tell us something of the mechanisms behind this connection. Such basic cognitive functions of metaphor as *helping to understand complex matters* and *creating structure*, can be claimed to be in connection with the factors of UNAMBIGUITY and FREQUENCY respectively. The notion of metaphorical *script* is also important. To sum up, scripts are CONSONANT; they look at the events from the point of view of one actor, which can enhance PERSONALIZATION; their *causal chain* can lead to NEGATIVE implications, and thus the events become more MEANINGFUL.

7 Concluding remarks

In this paper I have only looked at the metaphors used by journalists to depict the Maastricht ratification process; the politicians' metaphors have not been analyzed. However, it is worth noting that, compared to the journalists' metaphors, the main 'actor', Prime Minister John Major, saw the process, and especially his own problems, quite differently. Speaking in Parliament before the confidence vote, Major said: "Parliament must put this stalemate over Europe behind it. I am not prepared to let it poison the political atmosphere any longer. The boil must be lanced and it must be lanced today" (Reuters July 23). Major sees his problems as a DISEASE, as a poisonous boil. "The stalemate" originally caused it, but the metaphor does not tell what led to this stalemate. Major can now act as an efficient doctor and lance the boil; and lancing a boil usually means speedy recovery. DISEASE metaphors can be very convenient for politicians; Chilton's example (1988: 66–67) shows how politicians in the mid-1960s claimed that Japan suffered from "nuclear allergy". This metaphor was used to prove that nuclear arms are "harmless to normal people"; as a result, "politicians seeking: to 'eliminate the allergy' are cast in the role of doctors".

In the field of politics, different metaphors used by *politicians* can also have 'dividing' power. Probably the strongest argument so far, in support of this power, has been presented by George Lakoff in his article "Metaphor and War" (1991). Lakoff claims that metaphors used in discussion before the Gulf War were hiding vital truths, and also that metaphors were highlighting the difference between the United States and Iraq. According to Lakoff, those metaphors proved that there was no real justification for the war. Other researchers (see e.g. Chilton 1988) stress that metaphors in the area of politics really matter. Above I have argued that metaphors in *political news reporting* also have an important role. While they help us to understand ambiguous events, they affect news rhetoric in many subtle ways. And when different metaphors are used to depict the same event, that can lead to contradictory scenarios.

The point here is not so much what the different metaphorical scripts predict of Major's future. What matters more is that journalists, in general, use such a lot of WAR and GAME (or SPORT-GAME) metaphors in political reporting. As discussed above, the selection of political news favours the competitive elements of political life (elections, parliamentary conflicts, summit meetings), and these metaphors further highlight the suspense and drama in such events. This can lead to a "distortion of reality" which, according to Gastil (1992: 488), is the "clearest danger with over-used or overextended metaphors".

Besides metaphors in *political* news reporting, I wanted to study metaphors as a part of *news (agency) discourse*; one of the relevant aspects was to examine the presence and effects of *news values* in news agency rhetoric. One of Galtung and Ruge's hypotheses on news values claims: "*Both the process of selection and the process of distortion will take place at all stages in the chain from event to reader (replication)*" (1970: 270). According to this hypothesis, "the longer the chain, the more selection and distortion will take place". News agencies then, being one of the first links in this chain, would be relatively 'neutral'. This study cannot compare news agencies to e.g. newspapers; to tell which of them is *more* neutral. Besides, my data are from only one section of the news: that of political news reporting. There are, however, some features in news agency reporting which could speak against Galtung and Ruge's hypothesis. As discussed above (in 3.2), the agencies concentrate on the 'spot news'. Besides 'factuality', 'newsworthiness' is an important objective in their rhetoric. Finally, aiming at 'impartiality' and speedy delivery, they do not transmit much commentary or analysis; thus it is more difficult for them, than e.g. for newspapers, even to try to "counteract" the effects of the *news value* factors (see section 3.1.3).

The results of this research show that both agencies, but especially Reuters, used a lot of metaphors in describing the Maastricht process. Some other researchers have come to the conclusion that the "straight news" (So 1987: 625) contains a relatively *low* proportion of metaphors. Above I have hypothesized that the explanation for the high number of

metaphors here could be the *ambiguity* of the events, or the 'lowness' of some news values, such as *frequency*. However, although the figures, intuitively, seem to be exceptionally high, nothing definite can be said without comparing these texts to agency reports on some other events. In the presentation of the Maastricht process, the metaphors used by the two news agencies 'accentuated' several *news value* qualities. Galtung and Ruge, in one of their hypotheses, speak of "distortion" (1970: 270); thus metaphors, in this sense, could be claimed to make the news agency language less 'neutral'.

For journalists, news values are "fundamental social and cognitive constraints upon the interpretability of incoming foreign news and the selection processes of agency news" (van Dijk 1988b: 39). Van Dijk claims that "routinized, and hence effective, accomplishment of journalistic practices is not possible without such a value framework". But he adds that "this does not mean that the existing framework is necessary"; it is not, however, easy to change it. The persistence of these values, presented by Galtung and Ruge in 1965, has been proved by many studies since that time; also by this research.

Referring to "pernicious" metaphors used in the political discussion before the Gulf War, Lakoff (1991) writes: "Metaphorical thought, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it is simply commonplace and inescapable". In news discourse, metaphors could be claimed to be both 'good' and 'bad'. They are 'good' for readers/listeners in helping them to understand; they are 'good' for journalists in making their rhetoric more effective. In addition, they can be 'good' for the language from the 'aesthetic' point of view. But metaphors can also be 'bad' when they are used to strengthen existing stereotypes. For instance, politics *could* be depicted by more constructive and less military metaphors; it is not necessary to see it always as a GAME or WAR.

Appendix 1 – tree-diagram presenting hypothetical structure of news schema (van Dijk 1988a: 55)




Figure 2.5. Hypothetical structure of a news schema.

Appendix 2 – Example of a Reuters news agency dispatch

BC-BRITAIN-MAASTRICHT 3RDLD

Major in last-ditch battle with rebels on Maastricht

(Eds: Updates with Major's latest remarks)

By David Storey

LONDON, July 22 (Reuter) – Prime Minister John Major made a powerful appeal for unity in his shell-shocked Conservative party on Thursday as he struggled to crush a revolt against British ratification of the EC Maastricht treaty.

Hours before one of the most crucial parliamentary votes of his 32-month rule, Major told the rebels to examine their consciences before voting tactically with the opposition Labour party to block the treaty.

Speaking to backbench Conservative Party MPs in a closed meeting after strongly defending Maastricht before a packed House of Commons, he said: "We must be seen to be united for the sake of the party and the country."

The vote, due at 2100 GMT, will either secure final British parliamentary clearance for the treaty or, if Major loses, pile pressure on him and raise questions over his hold on power.

Major's popularity has dropped to a record low after a year of policy U-turns and mistakes in which he has been dogged by rows over Maastricht. The party looks set to lose a by-election in one of its safest parliamentary seats next Thursday.

Asked on leaving the meeting whether he believed his address would be enough to persuade the rebels to vote with the government, he said: "I hope so."

As the vote approached there were signs that some of the rebels were wavering, but neither the government nor the opposition was confident of winning. Major called a cabinet meeting late in the evening to discuss possible consequences.

Earlier he told a tense and noisy debate in the House of Commons: "If we fail to (ratify the treaty) no British government will have influence in Europe for many years."

Major said he expected to win the vote – on a motion by the Labour Party seeking to reverse Major's opt-out of the Maastricht treaty's Social Chapter, which covers closer integration of labour and social laws.

About 15 Conservative rebels, enough to overturn Major's 18-seat majority in the 651-seat House of Commons, have said they plan to side with the opposition motion despite the damage it would deal the premier.

Major said it was "a matter of national interest" that Britain should finally ratify Maastricht after a year of bitter parliamentary debate that has undermined his authority and the unity of his party.

Party managers in parliament spent the day pressuring the rebels to fall into line. The government was also seeking a deal with nine Northern Ireland MPs in the Ulster Unionist party to persuade them to vote with it.

Although the debate is formally about Labour's demand that the government adopt the Social Chapter, the rebels say they will vote with Labour as a tactic, confident that Major would rather ditch the treaty as a whole than adopt the chapter.

Major sought to counter the rebels' fears that the European Community was moving towards becoming a European superstate.

The EC was moving towards the British position on many issues, including agricultural subsidy reform, free and open trading, the single mar-

ket and immigration, he said.

Even if it clears parliament on Thursday night, British ratification of Maastricht will still be delayed, probably for some months, pending a judicial review ordered in response to an application by Lord Rees-Mogg, a former editor of The Times.

The government is confident it can rebuff that challenge.

Appendix 2 – Example of an AP news agency dispatch

BC-Britain-Europe, 1st Ld-Writethru,

Major Stakes Government's Survival on Treaty Vote Today

Eds: SUBS 6th graf to CORRECT 48-hour work week, sted 45-hour:
Vote scheduled for 1500 GMT

By ROBERT BARR

Associated Press Writer

LONDON (AP) -- Prime Minister John Major has staked the survival of his government on a vote of confidence Friday after losing a critical vote on a European unity treaty.

Major called for the showdown Thursday after losing the second of two critical votes on a treaty that has become the albatross of his term in office.

His opponents within the Conservative Party faced a choice of continuing their battle against the treaty or forcing an election.

With Major's popularity at the lowest levels for any prime minister in a half-century, few Tories would relish facing the voters now.

The call for a vote of confidence capped a night of high drama and emotional debate over a Labor Party motion to force Major to sign up to the same charter of workers' rights adopted by Britain's 11 partners in the European Community. Some Conservatives voted with Labor as a tactic intended to kill the whole treaty.

Major, who says charter provisions such as paid paternity leave and a maximum 48-hour work week are too costly for industry, defeated the Labor motion as Speaker of the House Betty Boothroyd broke a 317-317 tie in the government's favor.

But on the main motion supporting the treaty without the charter, Major lost by a vote of 316 to 324.

"Tonight's debate has shown that there is no majority in this house for the United Kingdom to join the social chapter. There is, however, as we know, a majority in this house in favor of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty," Major said after the second vote.

"We must resolve this issue and it cannot be permitted to fester any longer," Major said after the second vote.

"I notice that the prime minister has been driven to use the confidence factor because he cannot win the vote on any other (basis)," said opposition Labor Party leader John Smith.

Major said the confidence motion would be worded to also endorse the treaty. Smith said he would seek yet another vote on the workers' charter.

Major would have lost the first vote on Thursday but for the support: of nine Ulster Unionists, the largest Protestant-based party in Northern Ireland.

It wasn't clear what the government promised in return, but one Cabinet official mentioned the possibility of creating a House of Commons committee on Northern Ireland.

John Taylor, an Ulster Unionist lawmaker, said his party would support Major on Friday because it fears an election which might bring the Labor Party to

power. A Labor Party proposal for joint British-Irish government of Northern Ireland infuriated unionists.

Proud of its imperial past and jealous of its security of an island nation, Britain has long been the most reluctant partner in the European Community.

Arguments about ceding powers to Europe have bitterly divided Conservatives as well as Labor, and led to the downfall of Major's predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, in 1990.

In treaty negotiations the following year in the Dutch town of Maastricht, Major took great pride in negotiating a British exemption from the so-called "social chapter."

But after winning the national elections in April 1992 with a sharply reduced majority, Major was at the mercy of die-hard opponents of European union in his own party.

Major got a ratification bill through the House of Commons only by agreeing to one last vote on the social chapter – and that came Thursday night.

Beyond the parliamentary battle, the treaty is being challenged in court by Lord Rees-Mogg, a former editor of *The Times*. When Rees-Mogg began his action this week, the government said it would not formally ratify the treaty until the courts had disposed of the case.

The other EC nations are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.

Appendix 3 – ‘News analysis’: Reuter dispatch

BC –TRADE-CHINA-MILITARY (NEWS ANALYSIS, SCHEDULED)
Does U.S. really want to hit China army on MFN?

By Andrew Quinn

BEIJING, May 25 (Reuter) – The People’s Liberation Army .may seem an easy target as U.S. President Bill Clinton ponders whether to revoke or trim China’s low-tariff trade privileges on human rights grounds.

But diplomats and military analysts in Beijing said on Wednesday that hitting the military to retaliate for overall human rights problems could do more harm than good.

“Basically, it’s a really dumb idea,” said one Western diplomat who watches military affairs.

“Partly, this is because it would be impractical and impossible to enforce, but also because it would kill any idea of reviving military contacts between the two sides.”

U.S. officials say selective sanctions – possibly targetting the PLA – might be one way to compromise on Clinton’s vow to revoke China’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status this June unless human rights are improved.

Clinton, who said on Tuesday he would announce his decision on MFN within a week, faces intense pressure from U.S. businesses seeking to protect their access to the booming China market.

Raising tariffs on PLA-made goods is seen as an attractive option. It gives Washington a way of appearing tough on Beijing without scuppering overall trade, which soared last year to US\$27.7 billion.

But analysts say the economic impact on the PLA would be minimal. The army has undertaken an extensive campaign aimed at revamping many out-moded military factories to civilian use and is skilled at masking their ownership through middlemen and front companies.

Large military companies run trading operations, build ships and planes and have entered into joint ventures. The official People’s Daily said in March that over 70 percent of defence firms now have civilian operations.

By Beijing’s own admission, army factories churn out more than half of China’s cameras, 65 percent of its bicycles and 75 percent of its ubiquitous yellow minicabs. Knowing which products to hit with tariffs would be a logistical nightmare.

Moreover, the political costs could be great.

Military analysts say any U. S. move to swat China’s generals might alienate an important group in the communist power structure that is already wary of U.S. intentions.

“In general, the military tends to be much more worried about the U. S. than most of society,” said one foreign scholar who has studied the internal dynamics of the PLA.

“They are already redefining their strategic assessments of the United States and this (targeted sanctions) would certainly not help the atmosphere.”

Many of Washington's most pressing problems with China hinge on the attitude of the military – ranging from the future of Taiwan to arms proliferation, such as missile sales to Pakistan.

As China strives to modernise its army and emerges as a regional military and economic superpower, such concerns can only multiply, according to diplomats.

“The military already has a large voice in U.S. policy, particularly on issues dealing with Taiwan,” the Western diplomat said.

“The natural human reaction (to sanctions) would be for them to act nasty back.”

The military establishment is also important – probably pivotal – as China prepares for the day when it is no longer ruled by 89-year-old patriarch Deng Xiaoping.

Having helped keep the Communist party in power through its quick crushing of the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy protests, the PLA is a key to the party's future and is treated with respect.

Military analysts say President Jiang Zemin, Deng's choice to lead both state and party, has cultivated PLA ties to shore up his support – which could in turn give greater voice to people like top general Liu Huaqing, thought not to be well-disposed to Washington.

On the positive side, however, are younger, middle-ranking officers who might see any U.S. sanctions in their domestic political context and would not risk longer-term links, which promise access to U.S. technology and military expertise.

“If sanctions were applied, there would be some rash rhetoric and a cooling immediately afterwards,” the military analyst said, noting that such recently revived contacts as a joint defence conversion commission might be scrapped.

“But the long-term interests for continued connections are still strong on both sides.”

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Appendix 3 – ‘News Analysis’: AP dispatch

BC–ANALYSIS–US-China–Colliding Interests,0573

Dollars and Human Rights Compete in Clinton's China Decision

An AP News Analysis

By DONALD M. ROTHBERG

AP Diplomatic Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) – The China trade debate began as a U.S. crusade for “human rights and human decency” in the world's most populous nation. But as President Clinton nears a decision, the original idealism has collided with powerful economic interests that have reshaped the dialogue.

What once looked like a matter of evaluating Chinese progress on human rights and deciding if it was enough to merit renewal of trade privileges has become far more complex.

The debate has begun to sound like a more fundamental struggle, over redefining U.S. foreign policy and determining how to incorporate economic interests.

At a recent presidential news conference, a reporter pointed out that early in the debate Clinton had made it sound as if the China trade issue would be easy to resolve.

“It's a decision of great moment for this country,” replied the president, ticking off some of the broad issues involved.

He started with “the economic interests of the American people, and the people of China” and went on to include “the human rights interests of the people of China and the human rights commitments of the American

people and our government.”

An increasingly vocal element in the debate would agree with the order Clinton chose – whether deliberately or inadvertently.

In a Senate speech Thursday, Sen. Bill Bradley, called the linkage of trade and human rights a “Cold War straitjacket.”

Rep. Tom Lantos took the opposite tack, arguing that to separate human rights from China’s access to U.S. markets at the lowest available tariff rates would “give up an enormously powerful weapon. If we de-link, we are reduced to conversation.”

The intensity of the debate little more than a week before Clinton must decide whether to renew or revoke most-favored-nation trade privileges for China reflects a sense that his decision will establish the future course of U.S. relations with a nation of more than 1 billion people and one of the world’s fastest growing economies.

Like so many power struggles in this political city, the China-trade debate often is carried on through whispered rumors of who is up and who is down.

Backers of separating human rights from trade suggest that Winston Lord, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific is losing influence to White House economic advisers. A former ambassador to China, Lord is a strong advocate of using MFN as leverage to gain human rights concessions from Beijing.

Another voice in favor of requiring progress on human rights is that of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who is charged with evaluating Chinese performance and making a formal recommendation to Clinton.

Rep. Gary Ackerman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Asia subcommittee, said economic engagement is a far more effective way of getting progress on human rights than what he called “silly demands.”

“The linkage caused three people to be let out of prison in the last month,” he said. “That’s not a success story.”

Nevertheless, Ackerman predicted the administration would renew MFN. “They’re just trying to find an excuse and dress up whatever China has done as a human rights success,” he said.

EDITORS NOTE: Donald H. Rothberg covers diplomatic affairs for The Associated Press.

THE METAPHOR LIST: REUTER DISPATCHES 19.–25.7.1993

I WAR metaphors:

1. Major ... *fought to defend* a key pillar of his premiership.
2. Major met ... to work out how best to *defeat revolt* by anti-Maastricht Conservative MPs ... (1)
3. Major's bitter condemnation ... has made it impossible to *defuse* the row ... (1)
4. ...debate ... will be a showdown between Prime Minister John Major and his party *rebels* – a *clash he has struggled* for months to avoid.
5. If Major wins, it will be *victory* after a *tortuous* year-long *battle of attrition* with ...
6. This would *trigger* a furious political row ...
7. ...neither Major nor the opposition is confident of *victory in the climax* to just over a year *of guerrilla warfare*
8. ...said a source close to the *rebel camp*.
9. ...but the Conservative government's *year-long ratification struggle* remains far from over.
10. Major *battles to avert* last-minute *defeat* over Europe.
11. ...Major *battled to bring Conservative rebels into line* and *avert ... defeat ...*
12. ...Major could *lose* if Conservative *rebels form a strategic alliance* with opposition ...
13. It could take only a small *rebellion* to erode ... majority ...
14. With up to 25 *rebels ready to go against him*, Major is *vulnerable ...*
15. The vote was *forced* on Major during an earlier crisis *in his 18-month struggle ...*
16. ...Major is *fighting one of his toughest political battles ...*
17. He has had to *withstand constant sniping from a band of Conservative rebels ...*
18. ...and has *survived opposition ambushes* by the skin of his teeth.
19. ...the government engaged in a hectic ... consultation to *counter a rebellion* by anti-Maastricht...
20. ...a dramatic climax to a *year-long battle* to get the treaty approved. (1)
21. ...it [the government] seeks *final victory over* a stubborn group of anti-Maastricht *rebels ...*
22. ...John Major's *battle* to have the Maastricht treaty ratified took a new twist...
23. Major, who *has fought* for a year to get the treaty approved, faces ...
24. Major *locked in tense battle* for Maastricht
25. Major in *last-ditch battle with rebels* on Maastricht
26. Major made a powerful appeal for unity in his *shell-shocked* Conservative Party ... (2)
27. ...as he *struggled to crush a (the) revolt ...* (2)
28. Major was *thrown on the defensive* after the opposition Labour Party, helped by a *rebellion ...* (1)
29. The *strategy* put the heat on the anti-Maastricht *rebels...*
30. ...a *15-month battle* by Major to win approval of the treaty. (1)
31. ...key dates in Major's *struggle to overcome* a hard-core of anti-Maastricht *rebels...*
32. This is start of more than 200 hours of parliamentary debate ...involving *war of attrition with the rebels*.

- 33 ...*rebels who have defied Major in a 15-month war of attrition over the treaty...*
34. But Major ...was unlikely to face much of a *mutiny in his own ranks*.
35. ... *rebels ...whose opposition ... triggered the vote...*
36. *Battling to win the first confidence motion since ... he [Major] told parliament... ..*
37. *Rebellion against British government starts to crack*
38. A *rebellion* by Conservative party MPs opposed to the EC Maastricht treaty appeared*to be crumbling...*
39. Britain's Conservative government, *forced on the defensive by a rebellion within its own ranks...*
40. ...Major threatened his ... party with ... election *to crush a rebellion* by ...
41. Major had *been forced on the defensive by a rebellion* by anti-Maastricht Conservative MPs...
42. After 15 months spent *ambushing Major* over the Maastricht...
43. ...the *rebels* acknowledged they *had been outmanoeuvred*.
44. Major *bloodied in victory...*
45. Britain's Conservative government, *nursing its wounds after a bitter feud* over its policy on Europe...
46. *Wounded* British Prime Minister John Major faced...
47. ...he [Major] had to threaten a general election to *crush a party mutiny* against...
48. ...*rebels* made clear they *were not giving up their fight...*

II WAR metaphors (more contextual)

1. Thursday's crunch parliamentary *confrontation* ... (1)
2. ...Major's Conservative government faces possible *defeat at the hands of his own party's rebels...*
3. ...*rebels threatening to deal* the government a potentially *devastating defeat*.
4. Major *gears up for Maastricht show-down*
5. ...managers are working hard to convince potential *rebels to toe the party line..*
6. Major *readies alliances* ahead of crucial British vote
7. Major demanded loyalty as he *confronted* two dozen party *rebels* ...
8. The *rebels* threaten to vote with Labour in ... attempt *to destroy the treaty* as a whole.
9. Major faces possible *defeat at the hands of Conservative rebels* ...
10. ...the government *approached the confrontation* with party 'Euroscptics' ...
11. Major *allies* pile pressure on *rebels* ...
12. ...*rebels* who are *threatening to deliver* Prime Minister John Major a potentially *fatal defeat...*
13. But party managers' efforts to *whip the rebels into line* ...
14. ...Major's party managers ... were applying heavy pressure on the *rebels to come on board*.
15. ...Party managers ... spent the day putting pressure on the *rebels to fall into line* ... (1)
16. ...Major was ready with his response, ... after frantic efforts to *pull the rebels on board* had failed.
17. ...Major ... his Conservative Party *in disarray* ...
18. A threat to call an election ... *brought party rebels to heel* .../Major brought anti-Europe *rebels ... to heel*
19. ...despite his [Major's] success in having *dragged party rebels into line in a showdown* ...

III GAME metaphors

1. The rebels ... kept *their cards close to their chest*. (1)
2. Major's aid decline to say how the government will react to ... *stalemate* in the vote ...
3. Some 'Eurosceptics' are expected to vote ... in a *calculated gamble* that...
4. ...he [Major] made clear the future of the government *was at stake*, *risking* a possible end...
5. *In the ultimate gamble* for a prime minister, Major was...
6. ...in a vote on Thursday night that *stalemated* the treaty...
7. But ministers and officials said they were sure the government would win Friday's vote, apparently *gambling* that. ..
8. The prime minister, 50, also *played the economic card* ...
9. Major *wins parliamentary poker game* over Maastricht
10. *Staking his future* as British prime minister, John Major *has won a tense parliamentary poker game* ...
11. But senior Conservatives rallied around Major, saying that he had shown great courage in *calling ... the rebels' bluff*.

IV JOURNEY metaphors

1. ...to thwart Major's bid to *clear the last parliamentary hurdle* ... (1)
2. ...rebels trying to *block the ratification process*.
3. ...after the ratification *bill has cleared all normal parliamentary stages* ...
4. The *legislation* ... would *clear parliament* ...
5. Maastricht *treaty clears British House of Lords*
6. The Maastricht *treaty cleared one of its last British hurdles* ...
7. *Legislation* ... *passed almost unnoticed through the House of Lords* ...
8. The upper house *propelled the treaty through one of its final hurdles* ...
9. ...leaving Britain on the brink of ratifying the treaty after a *tense and protracted passage through parliament*.
10. ...rebels see voting with Labour as *the best route to killing the treaty* altogether ...
11. ...including difficulties [for Major] in *pushing a bill* ratifying the Maastricht treaty *through parliament*.
12. Major's *crusade* for a non-federal Europe ...
13. ...in votes during *the bill's passage* ...
14. ...bill seemed to have a *clear run to ratification* ...
15. ...only for another *trap to open up in front of the government*.
16. ...vote ... will either *secure final (British) parliamentary clearance for the treaty* ... (2)
17. Even if it [ratification] *clears parliament* ... (3)
18. The result ... will either *clear the path* for final parliamentary approval of the treaty...
19. ...if Major wins it should *pave the way* for final parliamentary ratification.
20. ...Major told the rebels to examine their consciences before voting tactically ... to *block the treaty*.
21. ...a government motion *clearing the way* for ...ratification .../Major's attempt to pass a motion *clearing the way* for ... (1)/ ... government ...won a confidence motion ..., *clearing the way* for it to ratify... / ... Major won ... confidence vote ..., *clearing the way* for British ratification
22. ...bill ... *passes its first important parliamentary hurdle* ...
23. ...bill *passes its last routine hurdle* ...
24. ...rebels voted ... with the *ultimate aim of blocking Maastricht*.
25. ...government won the first stage of a two-part confidence vote ... , called to

clear the way to ratification ...

26. ...government won a confidence motion ... , *clearing the final* parliamentary hurdle ...

27. ...*clears* Maastricht's way/*clears way* for Maastricht (1)

28. This *cleared the way* for Britain to join the other ... members

29. *on the path to union* ...

30. An inability to *push through the bill* ... has crippled the government (1)

31. The government's travails over Maastricht still *face another hurdle*.

THE METAPHOR LIST: AP DISPATCHES 19.-25.7.1993

I WAR metaphors

1. ...as he [Major] *battles to get* the Maastricht union treaty past...

2. A *defection* by only 10 Conservatives *would be enough to defeat* Major.

3. That would *trigger* a no-confidence vote ...

4. ...Major, his debilitating *struggle* to ratify a European union treaty *reaching a tense climax* ...

5. ...Major won a key first vote ... in a *major boost for his struggle* to ratify ...

6. Underlining the *bitterness of the long fight*, Major... (4)

7. The alternative would be *fighting* a general election...

8. ...government, which has been *struggling* with the ratification process *for 19 months* ... (2)

9. Thursday's *defeat was the culmination of long struggle* by Major ...

10. ...Major was left *at the mercy of a band of* up to 40 Conservative *rebels*.

11. His opponents ... faced a choice of *continuing their battle against the treaty* ... (4)

12. Beyond the *parliamentary battle*, the treaty is being challenged in court ... (4)

13. ...ended an enervating, *19-month struggle* to ratify ... (1)

14. With the complete *collapse of the 23-member rebellion* on Friday, Major defeated ... (1)

15. If so, Major's majority would be down to 17, that much more *vulnerable to the next mutiny*. (1)

II WAR metaphors (more contextual)

1. ...his [Major's] best hope of *averting defeat by government rebels* ...

2. ...because *rebels would step into line* rather than ...

3. Major ... also pleaded ... for *rebels to get into line*.

4. Major's fate essentially is *in the hands of rebels* in his own party ... (1)

5....*rebels* who voted for it *as a tactic intended to kill* the whole treaty. (2)

6. ...*rebels* faced the choice of *getting into line* ... (4)

7. ...*rebels*, hoping to *kill the treaty* ... (1)

III GAME metaphors

1. Nine months after *staking his political credibility*... , Prime Minister John Major...

2. ...Major is *playing the last round of high stakes poker* over European union.

3. Major's *chances of winning* hung on last-minute conversion...

4. Major then called for a vote of confidence..., *putting his government's survival at stake*.

5. ...Major *Stakes Job* on Friday Vote (2)
6. ...Major *staked his government's survival* on a vote ... (2)
7. He [Major] appeared likely to *win ... simply because he has raised the stakes so high.*
8. Major *has staked much personal credibility* on...
9. Major *Stakes Government's Survival* on Treaty Vote Today (8)
10. Major *has staked the survival of his government* on ... (4)
11. *Staking his survival* on a vote of confidence... Major...
12. ...Major on Friday challenged rebel legislators ...*staking survival* on a confidence vote...
13. For Major, *the gamble ended* an enervating ... (1)

IV JOURNEY metaphors

1. ...[Major battles] to *get* the Maastricht union *treaty past its last parliamentary hurdle...*
2. ... *bill...*, *having passed the Commons* ... (3)
3. ...as one of (his/the) many compromises to *get the bill through the Commons* ... (2)
4. ...Major's options would be a *risky course of ignoring* a defeat ...
5. ...plan to vote for the social chapter ...*in hopes of derailing the entire treaty.*
6. The vote *marks the last parliamentary hurdle* for the union treaty.
7. ...planned to vote ... as a *ploy to derail the entire treaty.* (1)
8. ...Major hinted at a potentially *explosive course of ratifying* the treaty without the social chapter ...
9. The vote *marked the final parliamentary hurdle ..*
10. [Major] may *take the potentially explosive course of simply ignoring* the vote.
11. ...which *eased the bill through the House of Commons.*
12. ...[Major] *failed at the final parliamentary hurdle* ...
13. Major *got a ratification bill through the House of Commons* ... (4)
14. The *votes cleared the way* for ... (1)
15. *Remaining hurdles* to implementation ...
16. ...Major ... *railroaded* a reluctant House of Commons into approving ... (1)
17.*the way was then clear* for the prime minister's victory ...

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Study B:

An actor or an undefined threat?

The role of “terrorist” in the discourse of international news agencies¹

1 Introduction²

This is a study on the role and use of the word *terrorist* in the reports of two international news agencies, AP and Reuters. The attacks on September 11, 2001, made the word enter the vocabulary of English speakers in an unprecedented manner. It is not far-fetched to assume that the incidents of September 11 changed the role of *terrorist*, and the meaning of the word. A more general issue dealt with in the study is the discourse of the international news agencies themselves; more precisely, if *terrorist* now is construed differently than before the attacks, does this affect the factuality of the news agency discourse?

A survey of Internet articles on terrorism after the September 11 attacks in the United States shows that problems of definition of terrorism are widely recognized and discussed. On the one hand, “[t] here is a new sensitivity about language”, (as Gregory Iverson, professor of linguistics,

¹ Stenvall, Maija. 2003. An actor or an undefined threat? The role of ‘terrorist’ in the discourse of international news agencies. *Journal of Language and Politics* 2, 361–404. Used with kind permission from John Benjamins Publishing Co.

² The research was supported in part by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence funding for the Research Unit for Variation and Change in English at the Department of English, University of Helsinki.
I am grateful to Jan-Ola Östman for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this study.

says) (Loohaus 2001); on the other hand, it is claimed that words like *terrorist* “have created tensions or taken on new meanings since the events of Sept. 11” (Onion 2001).

When the Islamic foreign ministers met in Malaysia in the beginning of April 2002, one of their principal goals was to come up with a consensual definition of terrorism. They failed in this endeavour and ended up with stating that “the United Nations was best-placed to rule on the concept” (Reuters April 2, 2002).

However, the terminology problem is nothing new. As early as in 1937 the League of Nations tried to form an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism, but the convention that was drafted never came into force. Since the attack at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, the United Nations has put forward “12 international conventions relating to terrorism but an explicit definition is still missing”

(http://www.undcp.org/odccp/newsletter_2001-12-01_1_page006.html).

The European Union and several individual states, inside and outside the Union, have published lists of “terrorist” groups and persons. For instance, the U. S. State Department’s list of “foreign terrorist organizations”, after updating on October 23, 2002, included names of 35 organizations (<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12389.htm>). But even the U. S. governmental agencies (e.g. the FBI and the State Department) have not been able to agree on a common definition of terrorism among themselves (Libaw 2001).

The definition problems described above relate to the “meaning”, the *sense*, of the words *terrorism* and *terrorist*. But also the *referential* use of *terrorist*, i.e. the question of labelling some persons or groups as *terrorists*, has been vividly discussed in newspapers and on the Internet (on *sense* and *reference*, see e.g. Lyons 1977: 174–206). A Reuters internal memo where journalists were asked to avoid labelling any news actors as “terrorists”, seems to have further incited that debate. The memo was first cited by media critic Howard Kurtz (2001) in the Washington Post. Especially the sentence “[w]e all know that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter” evoked angry reactions in America, and Reuters later

apologized “for the insensitive manner” in which its policy had been characterized in the memo (Burns 2001). In an earlier media statement (September 25, 2001), Reuters refers to its “150-year-old tradition of factual, unbiased reporting” and “long-standing policy against the use of emotive terms, including the words ‘terrorist’ or ‘freedom fighter’” (<http://about.reuters.com/statement2.asp>).

In the media, especially in newspaper headlines, the word *terrorist* is often replaced by the shorter word “terror”. A reporter of St. Petersburg Times quotes George Lakoff on this issue, writing: “According to Lakoff, by using the phrase “terror attack”, emphasis is placed on the terror produced” (Schreiber 2001). The use serves to “create an emotion that the person in the audience is supposed to feel” and thus helps the terrorists, Lakoff is quoted as saying. The dictionary entry in the Collins COBUILD English Dictionary (1995: 1723) does define *terror* as “very great fear”, but that is only one of the uses given there. (The difference between the use of *terrorist* and *terror* in my data is discussed briefly in Section 7).

A further linguistic problem appeared soon after the September 11 attacks; viz. how to find an appropriate term to refer to those attacks. Many people seem to have felt that the metonym “Sept. 11” or “September 11” provided “the right approach to naming the unnameable”... because “it was all those things [attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the crash in Pennsylvania] and more” (Angwin 2001).

After the September 11 attacks, the international anti-terrorist campaign was intensified; it became a U. S. led “War on Terrorism”, or “War against Terrorism”. The war rhetoric has been particularly prominent in the speeches of President George W. Bush. In the media, this has brought also the meaning of the word *war* into the limelight. For instance, the question arose as to whether *war* in this expression is still a metaphor; the actions of the U. S. government, like sending troops to Afghanistan, have blurred the line between what can be conceptualized as “metaphorical” and what is “literal”. It is also claimed that speaking of the anti-terrorist campaign as a “war” helps the U. S. government e.g. in getting funds quickly for that campaign, or in justifying its actions. Professor Richard

Leeman, author of the book *The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, is reported as saying: “The word ‘war’ signals to other nations we’re not going to respect their sovereignty. Treat it as a crime and if, say, France doesn’t want to extradite someone, we disagree but we honor their laws. But we have used the line ‘any nation that gives them safe harbor’. ‘War’, better summarizes the purpose.” (Loochauis 2001)

It can be hypothesized that the U. S. anti-terrorist campaign, after the attacks in September, has changed the role of *terrorist* in public discourse: while *terrorists* traditionally have been seen as active perpetrators of violent acts, they are now, more and more, conceptualized as a static threat. Metaphorically, the “hunters” are becoming “hunted”. This shift of emphasis in the role of *terrorist* would be ideologically significant; if the “threat” is undefined, and continuous, who can say what measures politicians really need to take in order to “prevent” the (unpredictable) acts of terror? In an AP dispatch (June 11, 2002) a psychiatry professor at Washington University is quoted indirectly as saying that talk of (among other things) terrorist threats is “propelling the fear”, the fear of citizens is de facto being exploited. The result of a Gallup poll presented in the same dispatch (AP June 11, 2002) indicates that people, in fact, are willing “to give up some freedoms to gain security”.

Below I examine the linguistic strategies used in what I call the “discourse of anti-terrorism”. What are its special linguistic characteristics in the dispatches of the two international news agencies AP and Reuters? The rather ambiguous term “discourse” (on the various uses of this term, see e.g. Solin 2001: 30–36) can here be defined as the Western way of speaking of terrorism and terrorists after the September 11 attacks. This “discourse” is based on the rhetoric that the US leaders and their associates use in the “War on Terrorism”. In news reports, the “discourse of anti-terrorism” is most often included in direct or indirect quotes from politicians, but as the international news agencies are a vital link between the politicians and other media (newspapers, radio, television), these have an important role in reproducing the “anti-terrorism discourse”.

Intuitively, we can say that the word *terrorist* is emotive, and that

its *evaluative accent* is highly negative (see Hartley 1980: 21, 22 on Saussure's term *evaluative accent* and on the “boo-value of *terrorist*”). When looking at a possible change of the meaning of *terrorist*, my main focus is on the *negativity* of this word. It can be assumed that it is still extremely negative, but the *nature* of negativity may now be different.

2 Data

2.1 Two major news agencies

My data are collected from the wires of two big international news agencies, AP (The Associated Press) and Reuters, as received by one client of these agencies, the Finnish Broadcasting Company. AP is an American news agency; it has its headquarters in New York. Reuters is British in origin, based in London. While associated with these two countries, the United States and Great Britain respectively, AP and Reuters can be called “global” in regard to the scope of their activities (cf. Boyd-Barrett 1998: 19).

For several decades in the 20th century, the distribution of international print news was dominated by the “Big Four”; the other two agencies, besides AP and Reuters, were the French AFP (Agence France-Presse) and the American UPI (for details see e.g. Boyd-Barrett 1980). However, by the 1990s, the role of UPI had notably diminished and, accordingly, the world news stage today is considered to contain only three global news agencies: AP, Reuters and AFP (Boyd-Barrett 1998: 19, 20). The fact that I have chosen not to analyse data from AFP is due to the focus of my study: I want to see how the basically *English language* “anti-terrorism discourse” is construed in news agency reports – and how that affects the role and the meaning of *terrorist*. Each of the “Big Three” news agencies reports in several languages, but only AP and Reuters have English as their native language. Furthermore, according to Tunstall (1999: 191), AP and Reuters are “the leading news suppliers around the world”; they do not provide only text, but also still photographs, foreign video news for TV, financial

news, etc. The world news flow, in fact, comes dominantly from the US and Britain; Tunstall (1999) speaks of “the strong tendency towards Anglo-American duopoly”.

Boyd-Barrett (1980: 19) notes that the international news agencies are “agenda-setters” that have shaped the form of the news reports and, more importantly, the very concept of “news”. Aiming “to satisfy the news appetite of as many daily retail media as possible, regardless of political persuasion, ...they promoted the idea of ‘impartiality’ as a valued journalistic objective”. On its Web site (<http://about.reuters.com/aboutus/editorial>), Reuters states that it is “committed to accurate and balanced reporting, ... to reporting the facts”. AP’s editorial policy (<http://www.ap.org/pages/aptoday/>) is formulated in a similar vein: “AP’s mission is to provide factual coverage to all parts of the globe for use by the media around the world.” The news distributed by AP are claimed to be “accurate, balanced and informed”. If journalists adhere to these principles, it is clear that the language of the news agencies cannot in any simple fashion be taken as conforming to the discourse used by the leaders of the anti-terrorism campaign. As stated above, the aim of the present study is to look at the “terrorist” reporting of AP and Reuters against this background: the alleged “factuality” or “neutrality” of news agency discourse. (On the language of news agencies, see also van Dijk 1988: 135; Stenvall 1995.)

2.2 The corpus

For selecting the relevant dispatches, the word “terrorist” was used as a search word. The first period of five days, March 11 through March 15, 2002³, coincided with the six-month commemoration of the September attacks, so the word *terrorist*, as could be expected, occurred frequently. For comparison, I collected another five-day batch of data three months

³ To be exact, this is a period of four and a half days, from (approximately) 1000 GMT, March 11, onwards.

later, June 10–12 and 20, 21.⁴ It turned out that the use of the word *terrorist* had not decreased during the three months; rather the opposite was the case. All in all, my material contains almost 1,200 “pages” of agency news dispatches; AP having about 300 “pages” more than Reuters. The corpus of June is almost twice as large as that of March.

Counting words or reports or even “pages” in agency news is a difficult task. The flow of information in news agency reporting is continuous. The reports do not form any separate unities with a clear beginning and end, as newspaper stories do. A major news agency story may have as much as over 20 updated versions, so that the same expressions, e.g. with the word *terrorist*, are repeated in all of them. Sometimes a new dispatch is sent just to correct a misspelled word, or to add a short quote. The figures I mention in the analysis below thus have to be considered as merely suggestive.

3 The syntagmatic axis of choice: collocations

Collocations – “the lexical co-occurrence of words” (Sinclair 1991: 170) – have an important role in the analysis below.

Discussing the “horizontal” – *syntagmatic* – axis of choice, Hartley (1982: 21) states that “terrorists *liberated*” is an unlikely syntagm, because “the sign ‘terrorist’ and the sign ‘liberated’ belong to two opposing discourses in social use – to the extent that there is a ‘general acceptance’ of the value of ‘terrorist’ which precludes notions of approval”. How to combine the words on the syntagmatic axis, how to make their linguistic values “fit”, is as much an ideological as a linguistic choice, Hartley (pp. 21, 22) argues, adding that “just as the people signified as terrorists in the news have no intrinsic properties which require the use of that sign to describe them, so there are no intrinsic properties in the sign *terrorist* which re-

⁴ A small part of the AP dispatches, in fact, comes from June 19, to compensate for a break of several hours on June 20, due to a technical failure on the receiving end.

quire it to be used with a boo-value”.

To get an overview of what kind of words in my data have been combined with the word *terrorist*, I first looked at its collocates in noun phrases (NPs), i.e. Heads of the NPs with *terrorist* as a premodifier. In the data covering March 11 through March 15, 2002, the following seven collocations had a minimum of ten occurrences (from the most frequent to the least frequent): *terrorist attack(s)*, *terrorist group(s)*, *terrorist organization(s)*, *terrorist network(s)*, *terrorist activity(-ies)*, *terrorist threat(s)*, *terrorist suspect(s)*. The period of five days in June (June 10–12 and 20, 21) gave a slightly different list of frequent (i.e. minimum of ten) occurrences: *terrorist attack(s)*, *terrorist organization(s)/organisa-tion(s)*, *terrorist group(s)*, *terrorist network(s)*, *terrorist plot(s)*, *terrorist activity(-ies)*, *terrorist act(s)*, *terrorist threat(s)*. After these, just under the “ten line”, follow *terrorist state(s)*, *terrorist suspect(s)* and *terrorist action(s)*. The relatively high frequency of the collocation *terrorist plot(s)* – which does not appear at all in the first batch of data – is due to several repeated quotes from U. S. Attorney General John Ashcroft commenting on the arrest of a “dirty bomb” *plot* suspect.

Of the collocations above, I have selected the following four for closer analysis: *terrorist attack(s)*, *terrorist threat(s)*, *terrorist suspect(s)* and *terrorist network(s)*. All of these can be regarded as central concepts in the present “antiterrorism discourse”. In analysing the collocations *terrorist attack(s)*, *terrorist threat(s)* and *terrorist suspect(s)*, I mainly draw on M.A.K. Halliday's functional grammar (Halliday 1994). (The definitions of the relevant terminology are given below in Section 4).

The NP *terrorist network* will be approached differently, as a concep-tual *metaphor*.

The basic method of the analysis presented in Section 5 – a corpus-based analysis making use of concordance lines – is rather similar to the one Channell (2000: 38–55) uses in analysing the evaluative function of words and expressions on the basis of “concordanced examples”. The value of this method, according to Channell (p. 39), is “that analysis of evaluation can be removed from the chancy and unreliable business of linguistic

intuitions and based in systematic observation of naturally occurring data”. Extracting her examples from a huge corpus – the same corpus as was used in the compilation of the Collins COBUILD English Dictionary (CCED 1995) – Channell focuses on the positive/negative polarity of the selected items.

The positive/negative polarity of a word is not relevant here, given that the word *terrorist* has been “generally accepted” as having connotations of *negative* evaluation; in addition, my concordance lines are drawn from a much smaller corpus than those of Channell's. However, it can be argued that a systematic method, which leaves very little space to intuition, is especially suitable for a study of an emotional word like *terrorist*. As Channell (2000: 41) states “the researcher [in this kind of study] cannot start by ‘thinking of an example’ and then look for citations of it”. In the analysis below, I have proceeded according to the method Channell calls “bottom up”; i.e. having first collected the corpus, I have examined all the concordance lines containing the word *terrorist*, then looked for its collocates and, finally, studied the typical linguistic features and patterns of discourse in the immediate lexical environment of the selected collocations (NPs with *terrorist* as a premodifier). Thus, starting from a quantitative basis, I will move on to a qualitative analysis, in order to identify patterns of the “anti-terrorism discourse”, and possible changes in the role of *terrorist*.

4 Functional grammar

The whole entry of the word *terrorist* in the CCED (1995: 1723) reads as follows:

A terrorist is a person who uses violence, especially murder, kidnapping, and bombing, in order to achieve political aims; used showing disapproval. *One American was killed and three were wounded in terrorist attacks.*

In terms of M.A. K. Halliday's functional grammar (Halliday 1994: 106–

175), *terrorist* in the CCED explanation is an *Actor*. The predicate (“uses”) represents a *material process*, and the words “violence”, “murder”, “kidnapping” and “bombing” – objects according to traditional grammar – function as *Goal*. In the CCED example above, the *Actor* is left implicit, but as the noun *attacks* in the prepositional phrase denotes action (a *material process*), *terrorists* can also here be claimed to be *Actors*, perpetrators of the attacks and responsible for killing the American and for wounding three persons.

Halliday’s terms belong to his semantic concept of *transitivity*. Halliday (p. 106) says that “[t]he transitivity system construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES” and presents three main types of process: *material processes: processes of doing*; *mental processes: processes of sensing*; and *relational processes: processes of being* (pp. 107–138). In addition, the analysis of the news agency reports below shows examples of a fourth type, *verbal processes*; these processes, according to Halliday (p. 138), share characteristics of mental and relational processes. The clause, its “meaning as representation”, has a central role in the transitivity system. The grammar of the clause consists of three elements of the process: the process itself (typically realized by a verbal group), participants in the process, and circumstances associated with the process. Fowler (1991: 71) points out that “transitivity makes options available, ...so the choice we make – better, the choice made by the discourse – indicates our point of view, is ideologically significant”. For instance, as the CCED entry shows, the persons labelled *terrorists* can be presented as *Actors* either explicitly or implicitly. In the explanation part of the entry *terrorist* is “a person who uses violence”, i.e. clearly a violent *actor*, whereas the example refers to the consequences of the attacks so that the *actor* role is “hidden” in the NP *terrorist attacks*.

As noted above, the central participant, “the one that does the deed” (Halliday 1994: 109), in material processes is called an Actor, and the second (optional) participant is a Goal. Halliday (p. 110) mentions that there is also another term – Patient – for the latter function, “meaning one that ‘suffers’ or ‘undergoes’ the process”. Other participant roles relevant

for the present study are Token and Value for relational processes (Halliday 1994: 124–127), Sayer and Verbiage for verbal processes (pp. 140–142) and Senser and Phenomenon for mental processes (pp. 117–119).

Following Halliday, I take “non-derived” nouns designating processes to be *nominalizations*. In my data, a central example of this kind of nominalization is the word *attack*, in Halliday's examples (see e.g. Halliday 1994: 352), nouns like *lack* and *appeal* are presented as nominalizations.

Halliday (1994: 352) calls nominalization “the single most powerful resource of creating grammatical metaphor”. In a *grammatical metaphor*, meaning is “construed in a different way by means of a different grammatical construction” (<http://folk.uio.no/hasselg/systemic/metaphor.htm>). A clause with processes (verbs) and properties (adjectives) becomes a nominal group, after metaphorical rewording (Halliday 1994: 352). Fowler (1991: 82) argues that nominalization is “inherently, potentially mystifying”; when a clause is “packaged” into a noun denoting a process, the participants of the process are typically deleted.

However, it is possible to “unpack” the nominal group; to try to reword it as a congruent clause (see e.g. Halliday 1998: 207). This method can help us retrieve at least some of the information that has been hidden through the nominalization; it enables us to look at the nominal group from the point of view of transitivity, as the analysis of collocations below will show.

5 Three NPs with *terrorist* as a pre-modifier in news agency reports

Below I will look more closely into the following three collocations: *terrorist attack*, *terrorist threat* and *terrorist suspect*. The head nouns of all three are *nominalizations*, i.e. nouns designating processes. At the same time, they represent different aspects of *negativity* and, moreover, they can be claimed to be central concepts in the construction of *terrorist* in the present political and media discourse.

5.1 Terrorist attack

The NP *terrorist attack* is, by a big margin, the most common of the NPs with *terrorist* as a premodifier in my corpus of news agency reports. A computer search for concordance lines of the word *terrorist* gave nearly 350 occurrences of the NP *terrorist attack/terrorist attacks*. After deleting repetitions, I came down to about 200 lines of examples.⁵

As a grammatical metaphor, the NP *terrorist attack* can be reworded either as *terrorists have attacked* or *terrorists (may) attack*. In both cases, *terrorists* are *Actors*, and the process type is *material process*. The first alternative refers to a specific attack. In my data, a typical example is “Sept. 11 terrorist attack/attacks”, which can be reworded as “terrorists attacked on September 11”. Other examples are “the recent terrorist attacks”, “six months after terrorist attacks”, “terrorist attacks on Israelis”. The CCED example quoted above could also similarly be “unpacked” into *terrorists have attacked*.

Almost half of the 200 concordance lines relate to the September 11 attack, either by mentioning the date or by using some other means of identification, such as “six months after”. As mentioned above, the word *terrorist*, with its highly negative value, is likely to attract other negative words into its syntagmatic axis, and a collocation of two negative words – *terrorist* and *attack* – can be expected to have a similarly negative effect on its immediate linguistic context. Table 1 below presents a selection of 20 concordance lines on the September 11 attack and its negative consequences (the negative expressions are given in italics). Only one of the examples (line 9) comes from Reuters, all the others are taken from the AP wires.

As we can see, the example in line 1 is the only one where the collocation *terrorist attack* is preceded by a premodifying adjective that expli-

⁵ As mentioned earlier, it is a typical feature of agency news discourse that parts of the previous reports are repeated several times during the day, depending on the “newsworthiness” of the subject in question. In the calculations I have not counted exact repetitions of this kind.

citly evaluates the attack as negative, *the worst in U. S. history*. The other examples present negative consequences, which can be called either “direct” (lines 2–9) or “indirect” (lines 10–20). In other words, the attack is construed as a human disaster, causing suffering to ordinary people, but also as an economic catastrophe, affecting “nonhuman” industries (but, naturally, indirectly ordinary people, too).

Table 1. Negative expressions in connection with September 11 attacks

1 commission to investigate the events that led to *the worst terrorist attack*
 2 *in U. S. history*. «We are on a mission to
 3 ceremony marking the six-month commemoration of the **terrorist**
 4 **attack** that *killed 125* in the military headquarters
 5 retired firefighter John Vigiano, who *lost both his sons* in the **terrorist**
 6 **attack**. The filmmakers, brothers Jules
 7 Muslims *view Britain more negatively* than they did before the Sept. 11 **ter-**
 8 **rorist attacks** on the United States and
 9 after Sept. 11 by writing a book in *angry reaction* to the **terrorist attacks**
 10 in New York, where she lives. Critics
 11 Golf association plans to honor those who *lost their lives* in the **terrorist**
 12 **attacks** during a ceremony Wednesday
 13 a moment of silence to honor the *victims* of the **terrorist attacks** in the
 14 United States, which *killed several thousand*
 15 organized several sessions on dealing with *stress* in the wake of the Sept. 11
 16 **terrorist attacks**, said parishioner Jo
 17 due to *security fears* following the September 11 **terrorist attacks**. No-
 18 body was more *disappointed* than King at
 19 tourism industry worldwide *took a huge hit* in the wake of the Sept.11 **ter-**
 20 **rorist attacks** in the United States,
 21 but *the economic difficulties* in the industry since the Sept. 11 **terrorist**
 22 **attacks** *forced* a rethink of the strategy,
 23 insurance industry for *property losses* and *interruption of business* as a
 24 result of the Sept. 11 **terrorist attacks**
 25 assessment procedures. The Sept. 11 **terrorist attacks** on New York's
 26 World Trade Center *cost Lloyd's 1.98*
 27 The airline industry *won't recover* from the **terrorist attacks** for another
 28 year, the government says, but growth
 29 *drop in business* as other travel book publishers. But while the **terrorist**
 30 **attacks** and lethargic economy *crippled*
 31 *new claims* filed in late September after the **terrorist attacks** *triggered a*
 32 *wave of layoffs* in tourism-related industr
 33 Business for all three companies *founded* after the Sept. 11 **terrorist at-**
 34 **tacks**, and each is determined to cut cos
 35 labor market, which saw *layoffs surge* in the weeks following the Sept. 11
 36 **terrorist attacks**. Even with the small
 37 *slump in advertising revenue that accelerated* after the Sept. 11 **terrorist**
 38 **attacks**. But the move could be only Part
 39 sending the major indexes *near the Sept. 21 lows* that followed the **terror-**
 40 **ist attacks**. In the first hour of trading,

The loss of life, and negative emotions such as anger and fear, are traditional effects of “terrorist attacks”, so the expressions in lines 2–9 form a likely syntagm with this NP. By contrast, a combination of business news vocabulary and the collocation *terrorist attack*, in lines 10–20, is more unexpected. In connection with this specific attack, however, the “metonymic” date September 11 is often presented as a watershed, dividing the time into what was “before” (see line 4) and what is “after” or “following” or “since” the attacks (e.g. lines 9, 11, 16 and 17). Thus the news agency journalists in the field of economic news also often refer to the September attacks, whether they report on continuing problems or on signs of recovery.

Even the short and incomplete examples in Table 1 show that the indirect, negative effects on individuals (for instance those who are left without a job after layoffs) are backgrounded in these reports; it is the “industry” that has taken “a huge hit” or “won’t recover”. The text is full of nominalizations: *hit*, *property losses*, *interruption* of business, *drop* in business, *slump* etc. As stated above, a nominalization can delete participant roles; it also “turns processes and activities into states and objects, and concretes into abstracts” (Fairclough 1992: 182).

Let us look more closely at line 12 to see what could be behind the grammatical metaphors “property losses” and “interruption of business”. The extract is part of an AP report (March 13, 2002) with the headline “Swiss firm says last year’s disasters cost property insurers dlrs 34,4 billion”. The sentence in question reads as follows:

It [a report from Swiss Reinsurance Ltd.] said the total cost to the insurance industry for property losses and interruption of business as a result of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States remained dlrs 19 billion.

There is no indication in the report of the persons or companies who had lost property, or of the companies that had to interrupt business. Only the phrase “as a result of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks” helps the reader (who has background knowledge of the Sept. 11 disaster) interpret the metaphors. An explication could be something like: “When terrorists attacked

on September 11 using hijacked planes, they destroyed two World Trade Center buildings, and a part of Pentagon, and many companies lost a major part of their staff and their premises and had to interrupt business for some time". The attempt of "unpacking" the metaphors gives evidence of the "mystifying" power of nominalization. This kind of concise construction is, of course, useful for the news reporter, as a lot of information can be "packaged" into a few words. But, at the same time, the text becomes so abstract that the reader may have a difficulty in decoding it. In addition, "property losses" in the September 11 attacks were so immense that accounting for all of them explicitly would need several congruent clauses.

Above I referred to the possibility to reword the grammatical metaphor *terrorist attack* as *terrorists (may) attack*. This "modal" alternative is also very frequent in my data, and I claim that it is endemic to the "discourse of antiterrorism". The modality in these examples is *epistemic modality*, i.e., related to various degrees of certainty (cf. Lyons 1977; Huddleston 1984). Thompson and Hunston (2000: 5) use "the broad cover term" *evaluation* "for the expression of the speaker or writer's attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about"; i.e. modality is "a sub-category of evaluation".

Thompson and Hunston (2000: 25) present four parameters of evaluation: "good-bad, certainty, expectedness, and importance". They stress that the good-bad (positive-negative) parameter is the most basic one, "the one to which the others can be seen to relate". The mere possibility of a *terrorist attack* is something negative, but the degree of negativity can be argued to rise when the degree of likelihood increases. This is reflected in the modal nouns⁶ occurring in my data: *possibility* > *risk* > *threat* of an attack. The focus in these news reports is on what (negative) *might* happen in the near future, not on what really has happened.

⁶ I have defined the nominalizations *threat* and *suspect* as "modal". Cf. the respective entries in the CCED (1995): 1. "A threat to someone or something is a danger that something unpleasant *might happen* to them." 2. "A suspect is a person who the police or authorities *think may be guilty* of a crime" (my italics).

Table 2 presents 20 concordance lines showing how modal expressions (marked in italics + bold) and other expressions that are typical of the “discourse of anti-terrorism” (marked in italics) are used in my data. These expressions can be claimed to reinforce the general atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, even if the “writer's or speaker's stance” in these examples, in most cases, is that of the person or institution that is quoted (either directly or indirectly), and not that of the writing news agency journalist.

Table 2. Modal expressions and other markers of “anti-terrorism discourse”

- 1 securing the northern city said *his biggest fear* was a **terrorist attack**.
“We have confirmed information that they
- 2 which **could help** protect Americans exposed to radiation from a **terror-**
ist attack or an accident at a nuclear power
- 3 which is not altogether clear, to the **risks of an additional terrorist at-**
tack that are *perceived by many* and by what
- 4 As U. S. government officials *raise the specter of further* **terrorist**
attacks, the debate over the security of the natio
- 5 **could be** nuclear. Blair, too, said this week the **threat of terrorist**
attacks *was still high* and *warned against*
- 6 *associated with al Qaeda* and was “*involved in planning future* **terrorist**
attacks on *innocent American civilians* in
- 7 “The two young women were **apparently** married to Saudi nationals *pre-*
paring **terrorist attacks** in the Mediterrane
- 8 “**Obviously** there is *concern* in our society about **possible terrorist**
attacks. **I think** most people in America know
- 9 **threats** to U. S. and Israeli targets. But *concerns* for **possible terrorist**
attacks in the country *have intensified* earl
- 10 Government announces *arrest of man* **suspected** of plotting a **terrorist**
attack EDs: SUBS lead to lift element of
- 11 the Algerian government and has **allegedly** been involved in *deadly ter-*
rorist attacks in Algeria and elsewhere.
- 12 where **investigators say** they have *foiled plans for fresh* **terrorist at-**
tacks, Schroeder said. Fischer also stressed
- 13 Mueller said, «*Our principal interest* is in *preventing future* **terrorist at-**
tacks. This instance is an example of
- 14 Schroeder said Tuesday there was no reason *to warn of an impending* **ter-**
rorist attack in Germany, and his spoke
- 15 law enforcement authorities **claimed** they *thwarted a major* **terrorist**
attack by ETA during a summit of Latin
- 16 *heightened security* after the U. S. Coast Guard *warned of a* **possible ter-**
rorist attack by either swimmers or diver
- 17 have been *warned to tighten security* against a **possible terrorist**
attack by *al-Qaida*, a top police official said
- 18 dive shops around the country out of *concern* the *next wave* of **terrorist**
attacks could be carried out by scuba
- 19 *voiced fears* Thursday that supporters of Israel **could be** targets of

20 **terrorist attacks** *anywhere in the world if th*
said intelligence **pointed to an increase** in the **threat** of *al-Qaida*
terrorist attacks. It **appears** Abu Zubaydah's

The examples in lines 1–8 are from Reuters, lines 9–20 are from AP. Only two lines (1 and 9) come from the data of March 2002, all the others are from June 2002, which is representative of the intuitive impression that the negative “terrorism scenarios” in the media seem to increase rather than decrease as the time distance to the September 11, 2001 attacks grows. The total number of the “modal” occurrences of *terrorist attack(s)* in my data (repetitions excluded) is 91; 24 examples are from March 2002 and 67 from June 2002.

The NP *terrorist attack* has as premodifiers several classifying adjectives of *futurity*. *additional, fresh, future, further* and *impending*. Futurity is also demonstrated by other lexical items: the verbs *preparing* and *plotting*, the noun *plans*, the NP *next wave*. Lyons (1977: 677) defines *futurity* in the following way: “Futurity is never a purely temporal concept; it necessarily includes elements of prediction or some related modal notion.” In the lexis of the examples below, the elements of modality, futurity and negativity are intertwined. For instance, the modal noun *threat* is negative, and it also includes a notion of futurity; *fear* expresses negative emotion that focuses on an uncertain future, and so on.

If we look “beyond” the lexical items, even these few lines can be argued to show a clear pattern of conceptual features that are typical of the “discourse of anti-terrorism”. First, “the specter of further terrorist attacks” is raised. In the examples in Table 2, this is achieved by stressing the negative scenarios (*Americans exposed to radiation, his biggest fear, increase in the threat*) and by issuing “warnings” (*warned to tighten the security, the threat was still high*). Secondly, the need to “protect” and “prevent” is taken for granted; it is seen as a natural consequence of the generally accepted “threat” (*foiled plans for fresh terrorist attacks, could help protect Americans*). Thirdly, this need inevitably leads to arrests (*man suspected of plotting was arrested, but so were also the two young women who were apparently married to Saudi nationals preparing ter-*

rorist attacks).

Above I have referred to modality and futurity as typical linguistic manifestations of the “discourse of anti-terrorism”. A third general feature is the vagueness of expressions: the agency is often left implicit, as in the following examples (from the statements of the FBI and the US administration): *concern in our society, perceived by many, our principal interest, most people in America*. It is not clear whose “concern” or “interest” is referred to, neither do the indefinite pronouns “many” and “most” tell us the exact (or even approximate) number of those who “perceived” or “knew”.

Most of the examples are extracts of direct or indirect quotes so that the modal expressions have to be attributed to the quoted source and not to the agency news journalist. However, there are (at least) two examples of the journalist “hedging”⁷. *Allegedly* in line 11 suggests that the writer does not regard as proven that the extremist group in question has been “involved in deadly terrorist attacks”. This extract (and the whole dispatch) leaves the source of “allegations” unclear, but as the group is active in Algeria, the source could be assumed to be the “Algerian government” or “Algerian authorities”. In line 15, the selected reporting verb expresses doubt about the statement made by the authorities; the authorities *claim* to have prevented “a major terrorist attack”. This, in fact, brings up a relevant point in the reporting of the “anti-terrorism campaign”. If there is no attack, should one believe – and report – that a “major” attack has been “thwarted”? Or how can one verify that there really is “an increase in the threat” (see line 20)? In line 12, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany is quoted indirectly as stating: “investigators say they have foiled plans for fresh terrorist attacks”. Here, too, there seems to be uncertainty either about the existence of the plans or of their “foiling”, since Schröder (or the agency reporter) avoids saying explicitly “investigators have foiled”.

⁷ Thompson and Hunston (2000: 10) define hedging as “the role of evaluation in adjusting the truth-value or certainty attached to a statement”.

5.2 Terrorist threat

Along with *terrorist attack*, *threat* is one of the central elements in the discourse of terrorism (or anti-terrorism), and the word *threat* often appears as a collocate to the NP *terrorist attack*. The collocation *terrorist threat(s)*, however, has relatively few occurrences in my data: a total of 27, which after the deletion of repetitions came down to 22 (18 from AP and 4 from Reuters).

As a grammatical metaphor, *terrorist threat* can be reworded as *terrorists threaten (are threatening, have threatened)*. From the point of view of transitivity, two interpretations – depending on the context – are possible. In the first alternative, *terrorists threaten* is *verbal process*, *terrorists* are *Sayers*. This can further be “unpacked” into *terrorists make (utter) threats*; here *threat* is a *Verbiage*. The second alternative is that of a *relational process*: *terrorists are (pose) a threat*. *Terrorists* here are *Tokens* and *threat* is a *Value*. There is, of course, a significant ideological difference whether “terrorists” are presented as making concrete “threats” or as constantly “threatening” the whole society, as the examples from my data below show.

In two examples from AP (March 2002), *terrorist threat* refers to a verbal process. However, these cannot be regarded as examples of the alternative “terrorists make threats”. Here the whole NP *terrorist threat* is a *Verbiage*, and the individuals charged with making threats are *Sayers*:

- (1) Brown [former NFL star Jim Brown] was convicted of misdemeanor vandalism. Jurors acquitted him of the more serious charge of making a *terrorist threat* during a June 15, 1999, argument with his wife.
- (2) Sebastian Bach, former Broadway star and lead singer of the metal band Skid Row, was charged with making *terrorist threats* and drug possession after a dispute with a bartender at a restaurant.

The premodifier *terrorist* in these examples refers to the *nature* of the threats, and not to the *Sayers*. The “threats” have been uttered during private arguments (with the wife or a bartender) and do not belong to the “discourse of antiterrorism”. They can be assumed to have made it into the

news only because the Sayers are newsworthy as “former stars”.

In my data, there were no examples of *terrorists* as Sayers, i.e. of somebody making *concrete* threats. In all the examples (except the two presented above), *terrorists* are construed as Tokens in a relational process, as an *abstract* threat. I have selected the following ten concordance lines to illustrate this alternative of the collocation *terrorist threat* in my data:

Table 3. The collocation “terrorist threat” as a relational process

- 1 «We believe that there is a *continuing terrorist threat* that ***requires the vigilance of citizens and freedom-loving***
- 2 Spanish authorities, in preparation for any possible **terrorist threat** have spared no expense ***to seal off the summi***
- 3 who said talk of the war in Afghanistan, airline security and **terrorist threats** is propelling the fear. The study was
- 4 «We still have to ***maintain our vigilance*** because the **terrorist threats** *remain*. If we celebrate now and then tomor
- 5 Ridge on Tuesday unveiled a ***color-coded system ranking the severity of terrorist threats***, responding to critics
- 6 AMERICAS: TERRORISM. U. S.attorney general warns of *continued long-term terrorist threat* BUDAPEST, Hun
- 7 «He made it dear that there are *no grounds for thinking that the terrorist threat has disappeared,*» a spokesman
- 8 Russia appreciates U.S. ***help in liquidating*** the **terrorist threat** in Afghanistan but will seek to put time limits on t
- 9 as the Bush administration ***steps up its focus*** on the **terrorist threat posed by Iraq**, even though many European
- 10 but that ***U.S. forces would stay*** in the region for *as long as it takes to eliminate* the **terrorist threat**. (*pvs/vi/dgs*)

Only line (5) comes from Reuters (March 2002), all the others are from AP (lines 2 and 7 are from March, the rest from June 2002). I have marked in italics the words and expressions stressing *threat* as a relational process; the expressions suggesting various means of “eliminating” the threat are marked in italics + bold.

Line 3 refers to a terrorism poll in which Americans were asked (in March 2002) about their “terrorism worries” and about the need for added security. The main result of the poll, according to the AP dispatch in June 2002, was that “four in five Americans would give up some freedoms to gain security and four in 10 worry terrorists will harm them or their family”. These two points are mentioned in the lead of the report, and the

need for security is stressed in the headline, too. The comment by a psychiatry professor about the effects of all “talk” on people’s fears is backgrounded; it is included in a subordinate clause towards the end of the report.

Traditionally, as also the CCED example showed, *terrorists* have been conceptualized as Actors; the NP *terrorist threat* as a relational process transforms the action into a (continuous, negative) state. In the lexis of the agency news examples (in the quotes from politicians), *threat* is described as *continuing* and *long-term*, it has not *disappeared* and will *remain*. At the same time, its whereabouts become very abstract. Although *threat* in the examples above is pointing towards states like Iraq and Afghanistan, in principle, it can be anywhere. U. S. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s statement in line 1 continues: “freedom-loving people *around the world*”.

Given that *threat* in most cases is abstract, also the means of “eliminating” the threat are vague. The example in line 2 is the only exception: a possible *threat* here concerns the European Union Summit in Barcelona, so the Spanish authorities have been able to take concrete action by “sealing off” the summit site. Other security methods range from a “colour-coded” alert system to the *vigilance* of citizens. As we saw, John Ashcroft calls for the vigilance of “freedom-loving people around the world”. This suggests a dichotomy in terms of “Us vs. Them”; the people who follow “our” instructions are endowed with good qualities, they are “freedom-loving”. As van Dijk (1998: 33) states, the “strategy of polarization”, among other things, emphasizes “our good properties/actions”.

5.3 Terrorist suspect

The NP *terrorist suspect(s)* occurred only 18 times in my data; after the deletion of repetitions the figure came down to 14. All of these NPs were from the AP wires; Reuters had none. But as “suspecting” can be expected to be a central concept in the “discourse of anti-terrorism”, I also decided to count the overall number (i.e. *including* repetitions) of the forms *sus-*

pect, *suspects* and *suspected*, for comparison. The most frequent of these forms was *suspected*; it appeared 179 times in the AP dispatches and 136 times in the Reuters wires. The form *suspects* had a total of 154 occurrences in my data (three of them were verbs, all the others were nouns); *suspect* occurred 105 times (18 verbs and 87 nouns).

From the point of view of transitivity, the NP *terrorist suspect* is ambiguous. “Suspect” refers to a *mental process*, but the nominalization hides the role of a *Senser*. The role of a *Phenomenon* is not clear, either. The simplest way of “unpacking” the grammatical metaphor would be to put the word *terrorist* in the *Phenomenon* role: *a terrorist is suspected*. In this case, the person in question has already been labelled as a “terrorist”; for instance, because s/he is suspected to be a perpetrator – or one of the perpetrators – of some specific “terrorist” attack, or because s/he is known to be a member of some “terrorist group”. But also another, more “modal”, interpretation is possible; the *Phenomenon*, rather than *terrorist*, could be an idea in a projected clause (cf. Halliday 1994: 252–261). The NP would then be reworded in the following way: *it is suspected that a person is a terrorist*. As for the reason of these suspicions, there is, again, more than one possibility. A person can be suspected of being a “terrorist”, e.g., because s/he is thought to be planning an attack, or because s/he is assumed to belong to a “terrorist group” (or just to be “linked” to some “terrorist group”).

Whatever the causes of becoming a *terrorist suspect* are, the next stage – the natural consequence of being “suspected” – can be expected to involve different kinds of legal action like arrests and trials. The following ten concordance lines from my data (from AP dispatches) have been selected to show what kind of “legal expressions” typically appear as collocates to the collocation *terrorist suspect* (the expressions are marked in italics).

Table 4. Examples of legal consequences of being a “terrorist suspect”

- 1 Schroder says U. S. will accept German limits on *evidence against*
terrorist suspect By STEPHEN GRAHAM
- 2 being when the information might *hinder police from catching a terrorist*
suspect. There are various alert systems
- 3 largest Muslim country is gearing up for «possible *action against terrorist*
suspects within its borders». Mueller
- 4 *Court extends custody of terrorist suspects* for further three months Eds:
AMs; CORRECTS Trabelsi is jailed in
- 5 remain in Ramallah for a «limited time» and *had arrested seven terrorist*
suspects overnight. Also, soldiers *detaine*
- 6 suicide bomber. He also said the *defendants* had close contacts with **ter-**
rorist suspects arrested elsewhere in Euro
- 7 *rules and procedures for trying foreign terrorist suspects*, saying the
war on terror has created *unprecedented leg*
- 8 said *the purpose* of the latest incursion *was to arrest terrorist suspects*.
This time the Israelis did not head straight
- 9 gestures as Israeli troop pullbacks and Palestinian *detention of terrorist*
suspects. «No one should act in ways
- 10 Philippines and transcripts and summaries of *police interrogations* with
terrorist suspects. Sen. Rodolfo Biazon

Lines 4 and 6 are related to the arrest and custody of two Frenchmen who, according to prosecutors, “helped prepare a planned suicide attack against the [U.S.] Paris embassy by a Tunisian-born former professional soccer player, now under arrest in Belgium” (AP March 14, 2002). The accusations against these two men seem to be rather loosely defined; they are, in fact, grounded on futurity (“prepare”, “planned”), on an attack that was never made. The *terrorist suspects* in line 4 can be identified as the two Frenchmen, but nevertheless, depending on the vagueness of the accusations, it is difficult to decide which of the two alternatives of rewording the grammatical metaphor *terrorist suspect* should be chosen.

The NP *terrorist suspects* in the example of line 6 refers collectively to unidentified persons “arrested elsewhere in Europe”. In the AP dispatch, from which the examples in lines 4 and 6 are taken, the reporter mentions “a global sweep by police agencies for anyone linked to the attacks in New York and Washington”, and that suspects are held in many countries in Europe (AP March 14, 2002). Thus the appropriate rewording of *terrorist suspects* in line 6 would seem to be *persons suspected of being terrorists*.

In fact, only the example in line 1 can be taken to concern a person

“known” to be a member of a “terrorist group”. The *terrorist suspect* in question, Zacarias Moussaoui, is “the only man currently charged in connection with the [September 11] attacks” (AP June 11, 2002). In the other examples, e.g. in those concerning the Middle East conflict in lines 5, 8 and 9, the suspects facing arrests and trials can be interpreted to be charged of “being terrorists” and not of any specific act of terrorism.

5.4 Discussion

I have identified some typical linguistic features of the “anti-terrorism discourse”. The most prominent of these seem to be modality, futurity, general vagueness of expressions and stressing negative scenarios. The Heads of all three NPs – *attack*, *threat* and *suspect* – are inherently negative; in addition, the nominalizations *threat* and *suspect* are modal, and *threat* also contains elements of futurity. On the syntagmatic axis of the NPs, in particular on that of the collocations *terrorist attack* and *terrorist threat*, we could find several expressions of modality and futurity.

As grammatical metaphors, all three collocations can be argued to be ambiguous, i.e. the “unpacking” of the nominalizations resulted in two alternative interpretations each, which, roughly, could be called “traditional”⁸ and “modal”. Of the grammatical metaphors *terrorist attack* was the most frequent. Furthermore, this phrase can be argued to be the most basic one of the terrorism/anti-terrorism discourse; without attacks (or possible attacks) there would be no threat, and nobody would be suspected or arrested. In other words, there is a causal relationship between the concepts defined by the collocations *terrorist attack*, *terrorist threat* and *terrorist suspect*.

In the “anti-terrorism discourse” the “modal” alternatives of these three collocations can be seen to form a causal chain: i.e., because terror-

⁸ The word “traditional”, here as opposed to “modal”, refers to the (hypothetical) role of *terrorist* before the Sept. 11 attacks; i.e. *terrorist* seen as an actor, or as a temporary threat (or making verbal threats), or as being suspected for some specific attack. “Non-modal”, the natural opposite of the word “modal”, could not be used, since the words *threat* and *suspect* as such can be defined as being “modal” (see note 5 above).

ists may attack, they pose a threat; some people are suspected of being “terrorists” and have to be arrested (the threat has to be eliminated). From the point of view of ordinary citizens, the “chain” could be interpreted differently. For instance, it could have the following “steps”: 1. news reports + other talk on possible terrorist attacks make people feel threatened, talk is “propelling the fear” (see Section 5.2 above); 2. citizens want more security; 3. they are “willing to give up some freedoms to gain security” (as the result of the poll cited in Section 5.2 shows); i.e., they accept the legal measures taken by the authorities.

Comparisons between the two news agencies, AP and Reuters, are not among the central aims of the present study. However, it has to be noted that the search word *terrorist* brought far more occurrences from AP than from Reuters: 739 and 349, respectively. There are (at least) two reasons for this difference in numbers. The first could be a national “bias”; AP as an American news agency can be expected to be more interested than Reuters in reporting on the economic consequences of the September 11 attacks in the United States. The second reason goes back to the Reuters internal memo, mentioned above, where the journalists were asked to avoid the *referential* use of the word *terrorist* in their news reports.

In fact, the figures indicating the use of the word *terrorist* cannot be trusted to reflect the number of news reports related to “terrorism” in the Reuters wires. For instance, instead of speaking about Sept. 11 *terrorist* attacks, Reuters journalists have come up with a large number of circumlocutions. Most of the alternative expressions are simple enough; as attributes to the head word *attack*, they give the date (“September 11”, “Sept. 11”) and/or the target of the attack (“on America”, “on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon”, “on U.S. cities”, and so on). In some cases, the location (“in the United States”) is mentioned. However, there are several more complex – and more ambiguous – constructions: “the hijacked airliner attacks, in which more than 3,000 people were killed”, “the suicide jetliner attacks on New York and the Pentagon”, “the September 11 attacks by Arab suicide hijackers on the United States”, “the attacks that shook the world”, etc.

The infrequent occurrences of the collocation *terrorist attack* give evidence of the fact that Reuters journalists have conformed to the instructions of the Reuters internal memo. As for the “modal” alternative of *terrorist attack*, the difference between AP and Reuters is rather small (AP 53, Reuters 38), whereas the numbers of the “specific”, i.e. *referential*, use differ notably: AP 100, Reuters 10. A comparison between the figures of the March and June data shows that the use of the “modal” alternative of *terrorist attack* has increased in the dispatches of both news agencies. However, the trend is especially conspicuous in the Reuters data: out of the ten examples of the “specific” use, only two come from the June dispatches, while the numbers of the “modal” alternative are ten for March and 28 for June. Due to the frequent references to “September 11 terrorist attacks”, AP has more examples of the “specific” than of the “modal” use both in March and in June, but here, too, the “modal” alternative appears more often in June (the figures are 14 and 39, respectively).

6 Terrorist network as a threat

“National security” is often metaphorically seen as a CONTAINER, and one of the important entailments of this schema is the need to “close the container” (see e.g. Chilton 1996, 2001). “This logic”, says Chilton, “... has lead to a possibly unaccomplishable quest for a defence “shield”. The September 11 attack made this logic, as so far implemented, totally beside the point” (Chilton 2001: 3.3). The new “enemy””, especially after September 2001, is conceptualized as forming a (terrorist) NETWORK. If we think of the two structures behind these metaphors – container and network –, they are in certain respects in conflict with each other. In particular, one can hardly speak of “closing a network”, since “openness” is one of the basic qualities of a network.

In a metaphorical process, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) argue, we understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another”. When we see an ORGANIZATION as a NETWORK, we bring the concepts from

one domain to another. Lakoff and Turner (1989) call these two domains the “source domain” and the “target domain”. The “source domain” here is “network”. However “open” it is, it is still, originally, a concrete, physical structure. The “target domain”, the “terrorist organization”, is more abstract. In a “metaphorical mapping”, as Lakoff and Turner (1989: 62) call the process, the structure of the NETWORK schema from the source domain is mapped onto the target domain of ORGANIZATION. The “cells” of a “terrorist network” – the “nodes” in a “net” – can be conceptualized as being connected to each other with transparent links, and as the structure is not “closed”, new “cells” (or other “terrorist groups”) can easily be “linked” to the organization, as will be shown below.

In his speech on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush, announcing the start of a “war on terror”, defined the “enemy” in the following way: “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them”(http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01092051.htm). In the address of March 11, 2002, after nearly six months of his “war on terror”, the rhetoric of President Bush is the same: “In the current stage of the war, our coalition is opposing not a nation, but a network. Victory will come over time, as that network is patiently and steadily dismantled” (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html).

Speaking of a “network” President Bush refers to the al-Qaida organization, which is blamed for the September 11 attacks. The U. S. Department of State, in its Fact Sheet of October 5, 2001, gives the following list of alternative names for al-Qaida (or: al-Qa’ida): al Qaeda, “the Base”, the Islamic Army, the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, the Usama Bin Laden Network, the Usama Bin Laden Organization, Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites (http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/10/fr100501.html). In my corpus – the agency news wires – AP uses the form “al-Qaida”, while Reuters has chosen the alternative “al Qaeda”. Although there are a few references to

the al-Qaida/Qaeda “organization” or “group”, both news agencies most often conceptualize al-Qaida as a NETWORK.

In Section 6.1, I look more generally into the NETWORK metaphor. First of all, I want to explore how the source domain of the metaphor, a “network”, could be defined. What is the structure of a network, what other qualities does it have? Another point of interest is to see what other examples (besides the “terrorist network”) of the usage of this metaphor can be found in the discourse. Section 6.2 contains the analysis of the metaphor “(terrorist) NETWORK” in my data, and is followed by a discussion in Section 6.3.

6.1 NETWORK as metaphor

“The metaphor of the last century was the factory; the one of this century is the network.” The quotation (Cohen 2002) is taken from a review of Albert-Laszlo Barabasi's book *Linked: the New Science of Networks*. *Network* can, indeed, be seen as one of the slogans of Post-modern society. Below I will briefly discuss Barabasi's NETWORK theory, and the NETWORK metaphor of another prominent scholar, Manuel Castells, author of the book *The Rise of the Network Society* (1996).⁹ First, however, I will look into the source domain of the NETWORK metaphor: what kind of structure, and what other qualities, does a concrete, physical network have?

If we study a map of a country, or look down from a window of an airplane flying over industrialized areas, we can see roads and railways, maybe even waterways (rivers, canals) forming networks. In addition, we know that underneath, there are other, “hidden”, networks, such as plumbing, sewerage and heating systems, cables etc. The most conspicuous common feature in the structure of all these networks is its flexibility. The “links” of

⁹ Albert-Laszlo Barabasi is Professor of Physics at the University of Notre Dame, while Manuel Castells is Professor of Sociology and Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley. Castells's book *The Rise of the Network Society* is the first volume in the trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*.

the networks (roads, rails, pipes and so on) vary in length and breadth; they can form straight lines or they can be winding. The “nodes” of the networks can be small crossroads and junctions in the countryside, or they can be big cities where many roads come together, and central railway stations where several tracks intersect. A second important quality is the “openness” of the networks; the networks have an ability, even a tendency, to expand. For instance, when a new house is built, it needs to be “linked” to several networks (plumbing, sewerage, maybe also heating and cable TV, etc.).

Castells’s definition of a “network” is simple enough: “A network is a set of interconnected nodes” (Castells 1996: 470). A “node”, according to him, is “the point at which a curve intersects itself”. According to Castells, nodes can be stock exchange markets in the global financial network, or they can be national councils of ministers in the political network of the European Union. In the area of global crime (in the network of drug traffic) they can be coca or poppy fields, clandestine laboratories, money-laundering financial institutions and so on. He describes the qualities of a network structure as follows:

“Networks are open structures, able to expand without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they are able to communicate within the network, namely as long as they share the same communication codes (for example, values or performance goals). A network-based social structure is a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance.” (Castells 1996: 470)

On the basis of this definition one could conceptualize a “network society” as being a dynamic community that offers its members a variety of possibilities for positive development. However, Castells rather stresses the negative effects of “networking” (see also Nas and Houweling 1999). Today's networks, to a large extent, rely on new technologies, which means that a large part of the world, the poor and the uneducated (the “Fourth World” as Castells calls them), are excluded. And some of the “excluded” even “disuse” the new technologies by joining global criminal networks. While Nas and Houweling (1999: 37, 38) admit that Castells’s points of view represent “a strong analytical force ... as a support for all those con-

cerned with democracy and the excluded”, they criticize his view as being too negatively biased. According to them, this “leads to implicit pessimism clouding the undeniably sparkling promises offered by the new communication technologies as well as their neutral effects”.

The physicist Barabasi looks at networks from a different point of view than the sociologist Castells. Barabasi argues that if people came to grasp the importance of networks, and to understand how the networks work, they could solve many fundamental questions (Barabasi 2002a). Barabasi and his students became interested in networks when they studied the structure of the Internet in 1998.¹⁰ They then continued by looking into other kinds of networks, and discovered similar structures between the networks. Barabasi (2002a: 8) says that one can see “amazing similarities among such diverse systems as the economy, the cell, and the Internet, using one to grasp the other”.

The central structural feature of networks, according to Barabasi’s theory, is that networks are “scale-free”; i.e. some nodes in a network, the “hubs”, are bigger in scale and much more important than the others. The hubs are connectors that link several nodes together. Hubs in today’s social life are persons who have unusually many friends and acquaintances and thus can serve as links between hundreds of other people. Hubs on the Internet are such popular sites as Yahoo!, or search engines like Google. While hubs have a tendency to get more powerful over time, they are the most vulnerable parts of the networks. When Web sites with just a few links are eliminated, the users of the Internet are not likely to notice any difference, but should the more popular sites like Yahoo! fall, navigation would become much more difficult. The Sept. 11 attacks almost succeeded in crippling the whole “network” (the U. S. economy), when they hit hard

¹⁰ For background information and analyses of Barabasi’s ideas I have used Internet articles; in particular, the following two: *Lessons From Networks, Online and Other*, by William J. Holstein, *New York Times*, June 23 2002: (www.nd.edu/~networks/linked/nytimes1.html) and *Net Gain, A review of Albert-Laszlo Barabasi’s Linked*, by Nicholas Thompson, *The Washington Monthly*, July/August 2002:(www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0207.thompson2.html) (both accessed November 6, 2002).

on a major “hub” in New York. (On the vulnerability of networks see Barabasi 2002a: 109–122.)

Barabasi says in an essay that “society is a very densely connected network in which we are nodes, and links represent our numerous social, professional, or family relationships” (Barabasi 2002b). This quotation, in fact, contains a central idea of how the NETWORK metaphor is conceptualized in today’s society: people are “connected”, they have “links”. A search on the Internet with the word “network” gave so many results that it was impossible to go through them all, but I picked out some popular words appearing in the presentation/description part of the various Web sites. In addition to the word “links”, words like “welcome (to)”, “free (access)”, “(your) gateway” and “non-profit” appeared frequently. It can thus be argued that the following qualities are highlighted in the NETWORK metaphor: networks are open, they expand freely, and they offer links – connections – to other networks.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 13) point out that metaphorical structuring is always *partial*; there is always something that remains “hidden”. Above we have seen that Castells was concerned about people who are “excluded” from the “network society”, because new technologies do not reach them and are far too costly. In fact, all networks are both open and exclusive. As quoted above, Castells states that networks are open to take in new nodes *as long as they share the same communication codes*. The physical networks, the source domain of the metaphor (roads, railways etc.), cannot even today be accessed by everybody. Similarly, the traditional metaphorical networks – families, tribes, or circles of friends – leave you outside, unless you “belong” to them. Very little evidence of this quality of networks could be seen in the Internet examples. However, I did find a few expressions like “exclusively for women” or “exclusively for the over 50 age group”.

George Lakoff wrote before the Gulf War that “[m]etaphorical thought, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it is simply commonplace and inescapable” (Lakoff 1991). The same applies to networks; they are neither “good” nor “bad”, but they can be used for good or bad purposes.

6.2 The metaphor “terrorist NETWORK” in news agency reports

President Bush, in his two speeches quoted above, emphasizes that Americans and their allies are fighting against a “network”. The use of the metaphor serves a special purpose in the “war on terrorism”. Since networks are commonly construed as open structures, the arrests can be justified by claiming that the suspects either “belong” to a “terrorist network” or, at least, are “linked” to it. The fact that Bush still in his speech of March 11, after six months of the “war” and hundreds of arrests, sees the enemy as a somewhat organized “network” could be due to the knowledge that the big “hubs” of the network had not been captured. The fates of the al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and his top aide Ayman Al-Zawahiri were unknown, and also Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, head of bin Laden’s military command, was at large.

In this section I will examine manifestations of the metaphor “ORGANIZATION as a (terrorist) NETWORK” in news agency dispatches. Speaking of the popularity of the word *network*, Barabasi (2002a: 7) notes that “witnessing the deadly power of terrorist networks [after September 11, 2001], we had to get used to yet another meaning of the term”. The first part of my analysis focuses on this aspect: I will examine whether the NETWORK metaphor, when used to refer to such a “bad” network as a “terrorist network”, emphasizes some other qualities of a network than the ones discussed above. Secondly, I look into various kinds of “links” that a “terrorist network” is conceptualized as having. The third point of interest is to see how the efforts of demolishing a “terrorist network” are shown in news agency discourse.

In my data there were 246 occurrences of the singular form *network*; the plural form *networks* appeared 31 times (these figures include repetitions, too). Nearly 90% of these referred to what I have called “bad” networks, i.e. either “terrorist networks” or financial networks suspected of funding terrorists; the figure could, of course, be expected to be high in view of the subject of my material. Further, in a majority of “bad network” occurrences (in more than 80%), the network in question could be identi-

fied as being al-Qaida.

Sometimes the news agencies use simply the NP “al-Qaida network” (AP) or “al Qaeda network” (Reuters), but more often the word *network* has several modifiers, which vary considerably depending on the news agency. AP may define al-Qaida as “terrorist” or “terror” network, while Reuters, wanting to avoid the referential use of *terrorist*, resorts to NPs like “guerrilla”, “militant” or “Islamic” network. The network is usually linked to its most famous “hub”, Osama bin Laden, especially in the Reuters wires, which may lead to rather complicated constructions like “the al Qaeda guerrilla network of fugitive Osama bin Laden” (June 11, 2002) or “Saudi-born militant Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda guerrilla network – blamed by the United States for the Sept. 11 attacks that killed more than 3,000 people” (June 10, 2002).

6.2.1 *Special qualities of “terrorist networks”*

“Bad” activities (be it terrorism or criminal activities like drug trafficking or illegal money laundering) are likely to lead to punishment. Thus it is not surprising that these networks, however “open” they may be for the initiates, appear as “clandestine” for the outsiders. The source domain of the metaphor in these cases could be, for instance, a network of sewerage, hidden underground.

Special methods (italicized in the following examples) are needed for taking a look at this kind of metaphorical network:

- (1) Partial confession in Frankfurt terror trial as suspect *lifts veil on* North African network of contacts. (AP June 20, 2002)
- (2) The reports *shed light on* how Osama bin Laden’s Islamic network, blamed by the United States for the September 11 suicide attacks on American cities, may have been able to operate in a Muslim environment. (Reuters June 12, 2002)

As we see, networks are conceptualized as operating under a cover, in darkness, and this is conveyed by using other metaphorical expressions, entailments of the (terrorist) NETWORK metaphor (on *entailments* of a

metaphor; see Lakoff and Johnson 1980): *lifts veil on, shed light on*.

But often the “clandestine” quality of the network is expressed more explicitly, by placing adjectives like *clandestine, shadowy* or *fugitive*, adverbs like *covertly*, verbs like *hole up* or *hide* or nouns like *sanctuary* into the linguistic environment of the word *network*:

- (3) The Treasury said the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation’s office in Somalia was linked to the al Qaeda network as well as a Somali *clandestine* network. (Reuters March 11, 2002)
- (4) Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network has lost its “*sanctuary*” in Afghanistan and may look to Southeast Asia or the Middle East to relocate its terror headquarters, the head of the FBI said Friday. (AP March 15, 2002)

The way the demolishing of “terrorist networks” is construed in my data is discussed in detail below. However, the following example gives evidence of general principles guiding the “war on terror” and the containment of “terrorist networks”:

- (5) U. S. officials believe it is ***impossible to deter or contain shadowy, multinational networks*** such as al Qaeda, the group led by Saudi-born exile Osama bin Laden that the United States blames for September attacks, and so *are searching for new strategies* to protect the United States. (Reuters June 12, 2002)

I have marked with italics and bold the qualities highlighted in the “terrorist NETWORK” metaphor; the expression marked in italics refers to the methods applied in the “war on terrorism”. The networks are seen as secretive (*shadowy*), and it is stressed that they have spread all over so that containing them is regarded as impossible. *New strategies* would mean that the U. S. military can strike first to counter “terrorists and tyrants”, as Bush is quoted as saying (Reuters June 12, 2002); Reuters adds that Bush’s phrase appears to include not only groups like al Qaeda, but also countries like Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

6.2.2 “Linked” to a “terrorist network”

The U. S. Department of State, in describing the strength of al-Qaida, states that al-Qaida “serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network” (www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2450.htm).

This might explain the fact that persons or groups or states that, in the “discourse of anti-terrorism”, are referred to as being “linked” to al-Qaida, often are not seen as “nodes” of that specific network. Al-Qaida is rather conceptualized as an important hub (“focal point”) in “a worldwide network”, connecting various “bad” persons or networks. In addition, this hub is implied to have “ties” to several states which are suspected of training and protecting “terrorists”.

In the “anti-terrorism discourse”, as illustrated by the examples from news agency dispatches below, having “links” to terrorist networks (usually to al-Qaida) are mentioned as a justification for making arrests, or for other “containment methods”:

- (6) The Frankfurt suspects *are believed to belong to* the so-called Meliani group, which *has been linked to* a larger group of predominantly North African extremists known as Nonaligned Mujahideen, *with ties to* Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network. (AP June 20, 2002)
- (7) Officials also said police were ready to travel to Singapore to question 13 Muslims *with connections to* Indonesia detained there because of *suspected links to* Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda and regional terror networks. Indonesia has been under pressure for failing to show the same vigour as Singapore and Malaysia in tracking down *alleged terror suspects linked to* bin Laden’s al Qaeda network – blamed for the September 11 attacks in the United States. (Reuters March 12, 2002)
- (8) Cheney, who spoke at a political fund-raiser here [Detroit], stopped short of saying there were any *established ties* between Baghdad and the al Qaeda network, or the Sept. 11 attacks that took about 3,000 U.S. lives. But he said the possibility of *such links* was too great to ignore, especially in light of Saddam’s defiance of U.N. weapons inspection programs and international oversight. (Reuters June 20, 2002)

As we see from the expressions marked in italics, “links” to the al-Qaida network tend to be both complicated and ambiguous. This is manifest, in particular, in example (6), but the other examples, too, show that it is not

always clear whether the “links” really exist; and it is not said who has made such allegations (*has been linked to, suspected links, alleged terror suspects linked to, etc.*). All in all, the language of the news agencies is full of modal expressions: *are believed, suspects, alleged, possibility*, and so on. In example (8), Reuters has formulated the reference to possible ties between Iraq and al-Qaida in a very subtle way; how close to tying Iraq to al-Qaida the U. S. Vice President really came, is unclear without access to the transcript of his speech.

The following incident can be seen as a tragic example of the power of the “network thinking”:

- (9) The U. S. military has disclosed that American fighter jets attacked a vehicle in eastern Afghanistan on March 6, killing 14 people, including women and children. One child was wounded. –
A Central Command spokesman, Air Force Lt. Col. Martin Compton, said it has not been determined whether all 15 people were civilians, but he said U. S. officials *believe they were somehow affiliated with* the al-Qaida terrorist network. (AP March 12, 2002)

Central Command’s statement explained that the area in which the attack took place was a “suspected sanctuary for the al-Qaida and Taliban” and therefore the people in the vehicle were “believed to be linked to al-Qaida activities” (AP March 12, 2002).

In the “financial war on terrorism”, terrorist networks are seen as having “links” to banking networks and other financial institutions. Financial networks differ from terrorist networks in that they are not, as such, “hidden”; however, they can be accused of criminal, clandestine activities, viz. money laundering and funding of terrorists. And since these networks have their public side, they can be “contained” to a certain extent. One can, for instance, shut down a financial network (or a part of it) and/or freeze the assets, and thus cut the suspected link to a terrorist network, as the following examples show (the acts of containment are marked in italics and bold, the grounds for the acts are in italics):

- (10) Somalia’s foreign minister on Monday proposed a U. S. bank take over its Al Barakaat financial network, ***shut down by the United States*** for *alleged terrorism links* but needed for exiles to transfer

money home. (Reuters March 11, 2002)

- (11) Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill said on Monday that ***the blocking of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation's offices in Bosnia and Somalia*** was being taken jointly with the Saudi government, a fresh sign of growing international cooperation in the financial war of terrorism. – The Treasury Department said the charity's office in Somalia *is linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorist network and to Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a Somali terrorist group.* (AP March 12, 2002)

The “financial war on terrorism” has given rise to a special kind of collocation. In news agency discourse, the following collocations could be found: “terrorist money”, “terrorist financing”, “terrorist financing network”, “terror financing”, “terror finance case”, “terror finance blacklist”, “the war on terrorist financing” and “the war on terrorism finance”. Short – and ambiguous – collocations are used, in particular, in the catch lines and the headlines of the dispatches: “US-Terror Money” (AP March 11, 2002; my italics); “Somali nationals linked to *suspect money group*” (AP September 11, 2002; my italics).

6.2.3 Fighting against a “terrorist network”

President Bush, in his speech of March 11, 2002, used the expression of “dismantling” the [al-Qaida] network “patiently and steadily”. This kind of slow method would seem to be consistent with the NETWORK metaphor. The more dramatic verbs chosen by the news agencies illustrate the goals of the antiterrorist campaign, not the methods that can be used, as the following two examples show (the italics in examples (12)–(17) are mine):

- (12) The Afghanistan campaign to overthrow the Taliban government and *crush* Islamic militant Osama bin Laden's *al Qaeda network* is the opening phase in the U.S.-led war on global terrorism. (Reuters March 15, 2002)
- (13) As American forces made new advances against the last known major pocket of al-Qaida resistance in Afghanistan, the president planned to offer a more detailed outline of the administration's plans to *stamp out the terrorist network.* (AP March 11, 2002)

The next example is from June 2002, and contains the verb “dis-

mantle”. The statement expresses a belief that the goal of destroying the entire al-Qaida network has not yet been reached:

- (14) Moroccan police have *dismantled a terrorist cell* with links to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network, arresting three Saudi nationals, key government officials said Monday. (AP June 20, 2002)

The “dismantling” of the whole al-Qaida network is a slow process; it involves, among other things, “hunting” for the members and backers of the network:

- (15) In December, Yemen *launched a manhunt* for two Yemenis and other suspected backers of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network in the first military effort against the group outside Afghanistan. (Reuters March 12, 2002)

“Hunting” is perhaps the most common metaphorical expression used to illustrate the search for hiding network members. But there are also other metaphorical expressions that stress similar aspects of the “terrorist NETWORK” metaphor, i.e. that the terrorists are hiding and have to be “forced out” so that they can be arrested (and the “network” ultimately dismantled):

- (16) A Yemeni official welcomed on Tuesday U. S. President George Bush’s remarks on preventing Yemen from becoming “another Afghanistan” as a pledge to help the Arab state *root out backers of the al Qaeda network*. (Reuters March 12, 2002)
- (17) The U. S. mission is to train and equip Georgian armed forces *to flush out guerrillas with suspected links to the al Qaeda network*, who Washington says may be hiding in the remote Pankisi Gorge. (Reuters March 15, 2002)

6.3 Discussion

The examples above show that the “terrorist networks” are construed as being “open” in the sense that they are thought to have “links” to several other entities (individual persons, groups, networks, states). At the same time, it is stressed that their operations are “clandestine”. Furthermore,

it is not possible to say who actually “belongs” to any given “network”. These qualities, as discussed above, may be useful to those who participate in the U. S.-led “war on terrorism”. However, they can also be claimed to prevent the governments from reaching their final goal; or at least, from knowing whether the (al-Qaida) network has really been “stamped out”. In March 2002, a Pentagon spokesman said that “commanders in the field have stressed to allied Afghan fighters that they will pursue their plan *to destroy remnants of the al-Qaida terrorist network and former Taliban government...*” (AP March 12, 2002; my italics). Six months later, on September 11, 2002, AP refers to Bagram in Afghanistan as “the headquarters of U. S.-led forces *hunting remnants from Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network and his supporters*” (my italics). How long can “remnants” be conceptualized as forming a “network”? There have been some attacks “linked” to al-Qaida even after the September 11, 2001, but it is difficult to say whether they have been made by a small group (e.g. one “cell”), or whether the presumed “network” as a whole has been involved in planning them.

Discussing the difference between the words *terrorist* and *terror*, La-koff claims: “By saying terror attack, you’re helping the terrorists, because their job is to increase terror” (Schreiber 2001). This could be applied to the use of the concept *network*, too. It is difficult to know what the current situation of al-Qaida is; i.e. how many “nodes” are still connected to the “network” and whether its important “hubs” are still alive. However, speaking of the al-Qaida *network* takes for granted that the group is more or less “organized”. And references to “shadowy, multinational networks such as al Qaeda” which, according to U.S. officials, cannot be contained (cf. example 5), could be claimed to “help the terrorists”. They seem to emphasize that the network is still powerful, notwithstanding several months of the “war on terrorism” and the arrests of hundreds of suspected “terrorists”.

7 “Terrorist” versus “terror”

In Section 1, I have referred to some linguistic problems that have been debated in the press and on the Internet after the September 11 attacks. For instance, some writers criticize the apparent trend of the media to use the word *terror* to replace the word *terrorist* or *terrorism*. According to Solomon (2003), this shorter word “has become a linguistic staple in news media”. When it is used instead of *terrorism*, it serves to keep “the fearful pot stirred. The shortened word has an ongoing ring to it”, Solomon says. Above in Section 1, I quoted Schreiber (2001), who discusses the difference between the words *terror* and *terrorist*. Lakoff, cited in his article, claims that the use of *terror* as a premodifier of *attack* shifts the emphasis from the perpetrators of the attack to the emotion it causes (terror or fear).

Below I examine to what extent – if at all – these two words, *terror* and *terrorist*, can be regarded as interchangeable, when used as a premodifier in an NP. What other reasons could there be, for instance, to call an attack a *terror* attack – and not a *terrorist* attack – except for *terror* being a shorter word? And, more generally, what is the difference between the words *terror* and *terrorist* on the basis of the evidence given in my data?

The CCED entry (1995: 1723) gives the following principal meanings to the word *terror*:

1. **Terror** is very great fear. *I shook with terror whenever I was about to fly in an aeroplane... The day of terror ended after police used teargas and stormed the house.*
2. **Terror** is violence or the threat of violence, especially when it is used for political reasons. *The bomb attack on the capital could signal the start of a pre-election terror campaign.*
3. A **terror** is something that makes you very frightened. *As a boy, he had a real terror of facing people ... the terrors of violence."*

Sense (2) of the word *terror*, in fact, comes very close to the explanation of the word *terrorism* (CCED 1995: 1723):

“Terrorism is the use of violence, especially murder, kidnapping, and bombing, in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to do something: used showing disapproval.”

In my data, there were about 950 occurrences of the word *terrorist*, and about 300 occurrences of *terror*, as a premodifier in an NP (these figures include the repetitions). The most frequent Head in these NPs, by a big margin, is the word *attack(s)*. As mentioned in Section 5.1 above, there were around 350 occurrences of *terrorist attack(s)* in my data; the corresponding figure for *terror attack(s)* is 112, which came down to 59 after the repetitions were deleted.

The meaning of the word *terror* in this NP can be argued to be ambiguous; both explanation (1) and explanation (2) of the CCED entry seem to be possible. The nominalization of the process *attack* here mystifies the Actor role. When trying to “unpack” the grammatical metaphor *terror attack*, I will use “x” to denote the Actor. The first alternative, conforming to the explanation (1) above, could read as follows: “x has attacked/may attack, and that causes great fear (terror)”. The second alternative could be reworded as “x has attacked/may attack using violence (i.e. resorting to “terrorism”)”. By implication, on the basis of the violence used in the attack, or of its effect (“terror”), the Actor (x) could be defined as being a “terrorist”.

The following two examples from my data give evidence of the fact that journalists, indeed, sometimes use the word *terror* in the headline just because it is shorter, and replace it with the longer word *terrorist* in the lead paragraph (the italics in the examples are mine):

- (1) **Blair says threat of *terror attacks* still high**
LONDON, June 20 (Reuters) – British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on Thursday the threat of *terrorist attacks* was still high and warned against complacency. (Reuters June 20, 2002)

- (2) **Syrian minister says Syria has helped save American lives from *terror attacks***
By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press Writer
UNITED NATIONS (AP) - Syria has helped save American lives from

terrorist attacks since Sept. 11 and strongly denies Israel's charge that it is part of an international terror axis that supports Palestinian terrorist acts, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa said Friday. (AP June 21, 2002)

As we can see, the respective propositions in the headline and in the lead are rather similar; besides the interchange between *terror* and *terrorist*, the only difference is the use of the present tense (“says”) in the headline. In addition, it can be noted that although the words *terror* and *terrorist* in both examples are included in an indirect quote from a politician, it is not possible to deduce which of the two NPs should be attributed to the politician in question. *Attacks* in these examples can be defined as “modal”, i.e. as something that “may happen” or “might have happened”. These short extracts do not specify who the perpetrators might be (or might have been), but further down in the reports there are clear references to “al-Qaida”.

In many cases, however, the explanation based on the respective length of the two words appears to be too simple. For instance, in the AP dispatches, attacks by the Palestinians are more often called *terror* attacks than *terrorist* attacks. The days of my June data happened to be extremely violent in the Middle East, including two suicide bombings in Jerusalem, in which 26 people were killed. This could explain the relatively large number of *terror attack(s)* – 25 (AP 23, Reuters 2) out of 59 – referring to Palestinians. But at the same time, my data include only 15 (AP 9, Reuters 6) occurrences of *terrorist attack(s)* related to this subject, out of the total of about 200 examples. The perpetrators of these bombings, in the reports of both AP and Reuters, are typically called e.g. *bombers*, *suicide bombers*, *fighters*, *guerrillas*, *gunmen* or *militants*, and not *terrorists*. Thus the NP *terror attack* could be preferred because the (AP) journalists regard this NP as less “labeling” since it leaves the Actor implicit.

Besides *terror attack(s)*, my data include the following NPs that can also have *terrorist* as a premodifier: *terror act(s)*, *terror bombing(s)*, *terror financing*, *terror group(s)*, *terror network(s)*, *terror plot(s)*, *terror suspect(s)*, *terror threat(s)*. But there are, of course, other NPs where *terror* could not be replaced by *terrorist* without changing the whole meaning

of the NP, and this kind of NPs can give evidence of the real difference between the two words. To illustrate my point, I have selected the following two NPs with *terror* from my data: *terror mastermind* and *terror axis*.

In some dispatches, AP refers to Osama bin Laden as a *terror mastermind*:

- (3) Americans at one point cautioned U.S. networks to be careful about broadcasting bin Laden tapes shared by Al-Jazeera, saying the accused *terror mastermind* could be using them to pass coded messages to his followers. (AP March 14, 2002)

The NP *terror axis* is included in a direct quote from the Israeli premier Ariel Sharon, in an extract of Sharon's address to the 34th Zionist Congress on June 20, 2002. The original speech was held in Hebrew, and the official English translation (see <http://www.isracast.com/zc/>) reads as follows:

- (4) The difference is the fact that this time, behind the terror and murder activities, stands a terrorist Palestinian authority, by an axis of global terror, Teheran-Damascus-Bin Laden.

This is how the two news agencies have quoted the speech:

- (5) ... but "the difference is that this time, behind the acts of sabotage and murder, is a terrorist Palestinian Authority with the support of the international *terror axis* – Tehran, Damascus, Baghdad and (alleged terror mastermind Osama) bin Laden". (AP June 20, 2002)
- (6) "... but this time standing behind the terror is the Palestinian terror authority with the support of a *terror axis* – Iran, Syria and (Osama) bin Laden," Sharon said. (Reuters June 20, 2002)

As we see, in the official translation of the speech, Baghdad is not mentioned, and that is also missing from example (6) from Reuters. But note the following Reuters quote, which it attributes to Sharon (according to Reuters this statement was given later in the evening of June 20, after another Palestinian attack):

- (7) "We are facing a coalition of terror led by the Palestinian Authority and backed by an axis of evil – Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus and (Osama) bin Laden." (Reuters June 21, 2002).

Terror in these NPs can be interpreted as "terrorism". A *terror master-*

mind could be defined as a person planning and putting into operation devious terrorist attacks, *terror axis* as a group of countries and persons sponsoring terrorism. However, the word *terror* in these examples, especially as it is repeated several times (and given the nearly mythical reputation of Osama bin Laden), can be argued to be even more emotive, more “ominous” than is the longer word “terrorism”.

For comparison, I present two corresponding examples of NPs with *terrorist* as a premodifier:

- (8) Bush gave Cheney’s hosts a clear pointer on Monday that his priority is to persuade governments to “remove the *terrorist parasites*” linked to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network. (Reuters March 11, 2002)
- (9) «We are on a mission to prevent the events of Sept. 11 from ever occurring anywhere on our planet,» said Katy Soulas, whose husband Tim died at the World Trade Center. «To do that we must investigate every crack these *terrorist snakes* slither through.» (AP June 11, 2002)

Since these examples are, specifically, meant to refer to (despicable) *persons*, the word *terrorist* here has an important rhetoric role. Replacing the word *terrorist* by *terror* would make the metaphors totally incomprehensible.

On the basis of my data, it is not possible to decide if – or when – the word *terror* as a premodifier in an NP should be interpreted according to sense (1) of the CCED entry; i.e. as a great fear. However, since the word *terror* is less specific – and thus even more ambiguous – than the word *terrorist* (or *terrorism*), politicians, in their rhetoric, can certainly exploit it to create an atmosphere of fear, as examples (4–7) above show. The excessive use of *terror* in the media also could help “keeping the fearful pot stirred”, as Solomon (2003) says. But if a *terrorist* today, as I have argued above, is more and more construed as an undefinable threat, that word, too, in an NP (such as *terrorist attack*) will trigger emotions of fear in the audience.

8 Concluding remarks

The analysis of the collocation *terrorist threat* has shown that “terrorists” in news agency dispatches are construed as a “continued long-term” threat (see Table 3), and the examples in Table 2 related to the “modal” alternative of *terrorist attack* also give evidence of an increasingly felt threat and of ensuing fears and concerns. The elements of threat inherent in the *terrorist network* metaphor largely depend on the secrecy and unpredictability of these networks. *Terrorist networks* are presented as “clandestine” and “shadowy”; and since they are “multinational”, it is implied that no one in the whole world can feel safe. Accordingly, it can be argued that the *sense* of the word *terrorist* in public discourse really has changed, in that the word today evokes even stronger – and more persistent – negative emotions (such as fear and terror) than it did before September 11, 2001.

Not only expressions that could be attributed directly to news agency journalists, but also expressions appearing in quotations were included in the analysis. Direct and indirect quotations of news actors’ words are an essential part of news discourse. Bell (1991: 209) argues that indirect speech is much more common than direct quotation in news stories. However, news agency journalists seem, intuitively, to use more direct quotes than their colleagues working in newspapers. One reason for this could be the news agencies’ strict aim at “factuality”; “*something is so because somebody says it*” is, according to Fishman (1980: 92), the basic principle of “news fact”. Whatever the reason for quoting the news actor’s words is, the quotation is published because the news agency journalist has so decided and, furthermore, it will be distributed to other media all over the world. Thus the modal expressions included in the examples discussed in this study are reproduced by many news outlets, and can be argued to mould the (anti-terrorism) discourse accordingly. At the same time, the analysis shows that the expressions in quotations and the wordings of

journalists tend to have similar features. In Table 2 we found the following two concordance lines:

- 8 “**Obviously** there is *concern* in our society about **possible terrorist attacks**. **I think** most people in America know
 (quote from President Bush, Reuters June 21, 2002)
- 9 **threats** to U. S. and Israeli targets. But concerns for **possible terrorist attacks** in the country *have intensified* (AP journalist March 15, 2002)

The persistence of expressions like “concern/concerns about/for possible terrorist attacks” is evident, considering that there is a three months’ time span between these two examples.

A further indication of the “non- factual” language in these reports is the use of the past participle *alleged* as adjective, and of the adverb *allegedly*. The Reuters (internal) *Style Guide* (1995) gives the following guidelines for the use of *allege*;

allege Avoid. Do not report allegations without saying who made them. Use of the word *allege* before a defamatory statement does not provide immunity against an action for libel. Do not use *allegedly*.

AP is not quite as categorical as Reuters. However, the *AP Stylebook* (2000: 12) says that “[t]he word [*allege*] must be used with great care”. It also advises, among other things, that the source of the allegation should be specified, and adds: “Avoid redundant uses of *alleged*”. In my data, Reuters had 40 occurrences of *alleged* (as adjective) and 31 of *allegedly*; AP’s figures were 141 and 61, respectively (these figures *include* repetitions). Admittedly, my corpus from June 2002 is almost twice as large as that of March 2002, but this alone does not account for the discrepancy between the numbers of those two months: *alleged* appeared 39 times in the data from March and 142 times in the data from June, while the respective figures for *allegedly* were 19 and 73.¹¹ Again, this supports the finding that the use of modal expressions in the reports related to terror-

¹¹ The figures for Reuters were as follows: *alleged* 14 March and 26 June, *allegedly* 5 March and 26 June, while AP’s figures were as follows: *alleged* 25 March and 116 June, *allegedly* 14 March and 47 June.

ism increased during those three months.

The further attacks made after the September 11, 2001 date, have shown that the terrorist threat is a fact, and vigilance of officials and, to a certain extent, of ordinary citizens, too, is needed. At the same time, the continuous reports of undefined – or loosely defined – threats and the quotations of the authorities telling people what may happen, or what might have happened, are likely to add to the citizens' fears rather than their security. In any case, this kind of reporting makes news agency discourse less factual.

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Study C:

‘Fear of terror attack persists’: Constructing fear in reports on terrorism by international news agencies¹

1 Introduction²

Major terrorist attacks like the one in Madrid in March 2004 tend to “fuel”, “renew”, “spark”, “stoke” or “trigger” fears, just to mention some of the expressions that are widely used in news agency reports. It is not only new attacks that bring the issue of “heightened” fears into the news; an official warning of unspecified but “credible” threats or the anniversary of the September 11 attacks may call for extra security measures, too. Overall, the emotion of fear and other related emotions, such as worry and concern, have had a prominent role in terrorism discourse since the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the ensuing U.S. led ‘War on Terror.’

My focus is on the construction of fear in the dispatches of two big international news agencies, the American AP and the British Reuters. The data are collected from their wires in 2002 and in 2004. Researchers of

¹ Stenvall, Maija. 2007. ‘Fear of terror attack persists’: Constructing fear in reports on terrorism by international news agencies, in: Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep (eds). *Discourse, War and Terrorism*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 205–222. Used with kind permission from the publisher.

² The research was supported in part by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence funding for the Research Unit for Variation and Change in English at the Department of English, University of Helsinki. I am grateful to Jan-Ola Östman for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this study.

news media (see e.g. Hartley 1982; Fowler 1991; White 1998, 2003) have shown that although journalists strive for objectivity, factuality, and neutrality, and often themselves are convinced of their success in this, news reporting is, in White's (2003) words, "necessarily subjective ... conditioned by a complex set of ideologically-determined assumptions, beliefs and expectations about the nature of the social world" (p. 61). The global news agencies AP and Reuters, as "leading news suppliers"(cf. Tunstall 1999: 191), share an extra burden of responsibility; and in their editorial policy statements, published on their websites, both stress the ideals of being "accurate" and "balanced." Further, AP sees as its "mission" to provide "distinctive news services of the highest quality, reliability and objectivity" (Associated Press 2004), and Reuters says that it is "committed to reporting the facts" (Reuters 2004).

Emotions are, basically, subjective experiences, something that is hidden in people's mind. Thus, while it is an uncontestable fact that many people fear terrorism, the actual reporting of that fear involves a great deal of interpretation on the part of the writing journalist. In this sense, we can see the media involved in the on-going process of constructing a press narrative around the fear of terrorism. Press narratives, according to Toolan (1988), "construe and reconstrue newsworthy facts and events" (p. 237). Toolan also notes that "changes of emphasis, over time, are very likely" (p. 237). The narrative of fear of terrorism in news agency reports indeed shows some – at least temporary – "changes of emphasis" when the reports of the first and the third anniversary of the September 11 attacks are compared. At the same time, as will be shown, the basic narrative of fear remains unchanged and very much alive, affecting the alleged factuality of news agency discourse.

Defining fear

While interest in the study of emotions before the 1970s was primarily limited to the fields of psychology and philosophy, today it attracts researchers from several other academic disciplines: linguistics, sociology, anthro-

pology, political science and neuroscience (e.g. Abu-Lughod & Lutz 1990; Berezin 2002; Tudor 2003).

Given the vast literature on emotions, it is understandable that scholars have difficulties in agreeing on what an emotion is (cf. Berezin 2002: 37). Many of them have sought to identify the so-called ‘basic’, ‘primary’ or ‘fundamental’ emotions, with fear appearing on every such list (cf. Kövecses 2000: 4; Tudor 2003: 241). Psychologist Robert Plutchik (1980) defines emotions as “the end results of a complex cognitive process” (p. 15). His table of “the complex, probabilistic sequence of events involved in the development of an emotion” (p. 16) includes eight primary emotions. The following sequence is presented for the emotion of fear: “*stimulus event*: threat; *inferred cognition*: danger; *feeling*: fear, terror; *behavior*: running or flying away; *effect*: protection.”

Plutchik’s sequence of events, as such, presupposes that fear is aroused by a relatively *immediate* threat. In regard to terrorism fears, it could apply, for instance, to a hostage situation. But Plutchik’s ‘frame’ for fear could also be widened to concern the public warnings of threats of terrorist attacks that are common in the media, and the seemingly natural “protection effect” of such a mediated danger: the increased security measures. Fear focuses always on the future, on the negative events that may take place; but, as Tudor (2003) points out, the flexibility of its “temporal dimension” is an important factor in that “fear experienced and articulated over an extended period is likely to be more open to socially patterned processes of reinforcement and routinisation” (p. 241). This is a vital aspect in the study of terrorism fears, too.

The Appraisal framework, which is an extension of M.A.K. Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar, offers a linguistic model for analyzing emotions.³ APPRAISAL is divided into three interacting systems: ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION. One of the three sub-systems of ATTITUDE,

³ The Appraisal Website: Homepage (<http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/index.html>) presents the Appraisal framework in rich detail.

called AFFECT, deals with “resources construing emotion” (Martin 1997: 18). Table 1 below compares the emotions of fear, worry and concern according to variables outlined in the Appraisal framework (cf. Martin 1997: 20–23; 2000: 148–151).

Table 1. Evaluating *fear*, *worry* and *concern*

variable	fear	worry	concern
positive/negative	negative	negative	negative(+positive)
scale of intensity	high	‘median’	low
realis/irrealis	irrealis	irrealis	irrealis

As Table 1 shows, these emotions would all belong to the AFFECT group of “irrealis”, which here means that these feelings refer to the future; the feared state has not yet been realized (or may not be realized at all, especially if the fear that is felt is irrational.) Fear and worry are negative, while concern could have a positive streak in it. Concern could mean that the person in question has an interest in taking some positive action in order to remove the source of concern (cf. Coston 1998). Of these three emotions, fear has the highest intensity, worry has ‘median’, and concern has low intensity.

Data

My corpus consists of about 6,000 “pages” (over 2.7 million words), collected in several batches during 2002 and 2004 from the news wires of AP and Reuters. I have mostly used “terror” or “terrorist” as the search word. However, one file of about 500 pages has been gathered with “fear” as the search word, and another file of about 1,000 pages contains all incoming dispatches for 24 hours from both AP and Reuters (i.e. one hour each day on 24 consecutive days.)

To get an overview of the words denoting the emotion of fear (*fear/fears*, *worry/worries*, *concern/concerns*), and of the context of these words in my data, I have made use of computerized concordance lines. Thus in the analysis below, I sometimes refer to (relative) frequen-

cies of some word or expression, although my focus is on the qualitative analysis. I want to stress that the quantitative findings should be taken as merely suggestive.

In fact, the very nature of news agency reporting would pose difficulties for reliable quantitative analysis. First, the flow of reporting in the global news wires is continuous, and the total volume of the reports, even for one day, is huge. Second, unlike newspaper stories, news agency reports cannot be regarded as separate unities. A major event, such as a terrorist attack, generates several dispatches during one day. These can be, for example, short, successive messages, each giving new information; or longer summaries, repeating much of what has been reported earlier. The stories start with a keyword slug line⁴, followed by a headline and a lead, but the beginning of a dispatch also contains a wealth of other information which does not belong to the story itself: “topic codes” (cf. Wood 1995), notes to the receiving media, and so on. This special feature of news agency reporting would have to be taken into account when counting words or pages.

In this paper I focus on the nouns denoting the emotion of fear: *fear*, *fears*, *worry*, *worries*, *concern*, and *concerns*. Table 2 shows the distribution of these six nouns in the data gathered with the search term “terror/terrorist” in 2002 and 2004 (about 4,500 pages; the corpus of AP being much larger than that of Reuters.)⁵ Table 3, for comparison, gives the number of the occurrences in the data collected by using the search term

⁴ Before the actual headline, on the first line of a news agency report, there is a “slug line” consisting of at least one word, but usually two or three words. This “slug,” as Reuters says, “uniquely identifies that story.”

⁵ The differences between the two news agencies regarding the size of their corpora are simply due to the fact that during a given time period one of them sent more reports than the other containing the search word in question (“terrorist”, “terror” or “fear.”) The size of the “pages” in news agency reports may vary a little, depending on the breadth of the columns. In view of the number of pages, the font size is relevant, too; in my files it is (Arial) 10.

“fear” in 2004 (about 500 pages; the corpus of Reuters being now larger than that of AP).

Table 2. *Fear* words in “terror/terrorist” -files

	fear	fears	worry	worries	concern	concerns
AP	140	178	12	29	180	159
Reuters	60	137	5	19	76	91
Total	200	315	17	48	256	250

Table 3. *Fear* words in “fear”-files

	fear	fears	worry	worries	concern	concerns
AP	67	153	1	11	21	33
Reuters	62	353	14	56	51	70
Total	129	506	15	67	72	103

The tables suggest that *worry* is the least popular of these six words. It has to be noted, though, that contrary to the other words shown in the two tables, *worry* appears more often as a verb than as a noun. Nearly the whole “fear”-file was collected in March 2004, just after the major terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11. Therefore, as could be expected, the *fear* words in Table 3, too, are almost exclusively connected to terrorism discourse. Especially in Reuters dispatches, a major part of those “fears” – and “worries” and “concerns” – come from financial and economic reports. The “markets” have naturally reacted to the attacks, and to the news that there could be an al Qaeda connection; there are also fears of new attacks that could affect the global economy or “could disrupt oil supplies” (Reuters March 19, 2004, report), and so on.

Above all, the comparison between the two types of files shows evidence of the special characteristic of news agency discourse that was discussed above. A newsworthy event – such as the Madrid attacks – gives rise to an abundance of reports in which whole paragraphs from earlier dispatches tend to be repeated, and this may lead to an overrepresentation of some words or expressions.

Tools for analysis

In my analysis, I draw on three central concepts of M.A.K. Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar: *nominalization*, *grammatical metaphor* and *transitivity*.

Following Halliday (cf. 1994: 352), I take the nouns *fear*, *worry* and *concern* to be nominalizations and, moreover, grammatical metaphors. The grammatical systems of nominalization, grammatical metaphor and transitivity are, in fact, intertwined. Nominalization, according to Halliday (1994) is "the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor" (p. 352). In a grammatical metaphor, meaning is "construed in a different way by means of a different grammatical construction" (Hasselgård 2000). When we 'unpack' a nominalized grammatical metaphor, trying to reveal the 'original' construction, we often find a process with participants, which then can be analyzed by looking into transitivity.

Transitivity is a semantic concept belonging to the *ideational metafunction* of Functional Grammar. The meaning of the "clause as representation" is essential in the transitivity system, which "construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES" (Halliday 1994: 106). In our discourse, we choose between various options of transitivity, and "the choice we make – better, the choice made by the discourse – indicates our point of view, [and so] is ideologically significant" (Fowler 1991: 171).

The grammar of the clause consists of three elements of the process: the process itself (typically realized by a verbal group), participants in the process, and circumstances associated with the process. The main types of process are: *material processes: processes of doing*; *mental processes: processes of sensing*; and *relational processes: processes of being* (Halliday 1994: 107–138). The central participant in material processes – "the one that does the deed" (p. 109) – is called an Actor, and the second (optional) participant is a Goal. Another term for the latter function is Patient, "meaning one that 'suffers' or 'undergoes' the process" (p. 110). The participant roles for relational processes are Token and Value (or Carrier and Attribute) (pp. 124–129), and for mental processes Senser and Phe-

nomenon (pp. 117–119). My analysis also refers to a fourth type of process; verbal processes, where the main participants are Sayer, Receiver, Verbiage and Target (pp. 140–142).

Nominalization transforms processes (verbs) or properties (adjectives) into nouns after metaphorical rewording (p. 352). The shift from ‘process’ or ‘property’ to ‘entity’ (a ‘thing’) also means that the nominalized word now can function as a participant in processes, or as a part of a prepositional phrase (cf. Halliday 1998: 197; Fairclough 1995: 112). From the point of view of news agency discourse and its alleged ‘factuality’, it is important to note that nominalization is “inherently, potentially mystificatory” (Fowler 1991: 82). In addition to obscuring the participant roles, it can leave open the tense of the verb (of the original process), the type of the process, etc.

Let us consider two nouns – nominalizations/grammatical metaphors – that have a central role in terrorism discourse (cf. Stenvall 2003): *attack* and *threat*. When a reporter writes, for example, that “the attack killed 100 persons,” the original material process (of attacking) has become an Actor in a new material process (of killing), and the real perpetrators may remain hidden. The ‘unpacking’ of the nominalization “attack” would result in ‘X attacked/has attacked.’ But often, in terrorism discourse, journalists speak of “new” or “future” or “possible” attacks, i.e. of attacks that have not yet happened (or may never happen). The grammatical metaphor “an attack” would then be reworded differently: ‘X may attack/will attack.’ When the verb *threaten* is nominalized into *threat*, even the type of the process can become ambiguous. For example, *terrorist threat* (see Stenvall 2003: 376) could – depending on the context – mean either ‘terrorists are/pose a threat’ or ‘terrorists make (utter) threats.’ In other words, the original process could be either relational or verbal.

Since the major part of my analysis focuses on the strategies news agency journalists use for blurring their own ‘voice’ and the responsibility of the news actors, I have also chosen one tool from Toolan’s “basic toolkit” for analyzing political discourse (Toolan 1988: 238). In addition to the aspects of nominalization/grammatical metaphor and transitivity, I look into

a linguistic feature which Toolan calls “[s]uppletion of agentless passives by intransitive clauses” (p. 239). This feature refers to “clauses with the semantic pattern of an affected participant followed by the process that participant has experienced” (p. 239), i.e. the process expressed by an intransitive verb. We can say, for example, that “a bomb went off,” instead of saying “a bomb was detonated;” or that “the prize went to X,” instead of stating that “the prize was awarded to X,” and so on. A common feature to the “important lexicogrammatical systems” included in Toolan’s “toolkit” (which also includes nominalization and transitivity), is that all of them are systems “where choice of formulation, or ‘slant’ is possible” (p. 238).

Constructing collective fear on September 11 anniversaries

Emotions are fundamentally individual experiences. Therefore, speaking of a group emotion, according to Kemper (2002), only means that “some aggregate of individuals is feeling something that is sufficiently alike to be identified as the common emotion of that aggregate” (p. 62). Commemorations, like those that have been held on September 11 every year since 2001, can be seen as ritual action generating collective emotions, or as what sociologists call *communities of feeling* (see e.g. Berezin 2002: 44–45). However, such solemn ceremonies are likely to foreground other emotions than fear: feelings of common sorrow, solidarity, maybe anger. Furthermore, the physiological signs of fear are not for everybody to see (unless the fear is extreme, for example panic), in the way tears could stand for sadness, and holding hands for solidarity.

Given the immense effects of the September 11 attacks, it is not surprising that September 11 anniversaries differ from other commemorations in the magnitude of the ceremonies. The events marking the first anniversary of the attacks in 2002 were extensively covered by both AP and Reuters, and in addition to the commemorations in the United States, the reports focus on reactions all over the world, and on threats and security. The solemnity and the emotionally charged atmosphere of the day are reflected in the writing style, as examples (1) and (2) from AP show.

- (1) A cascade of memorial events marked a moment whose echoes still resound from New York to Afghanistan, and everywhere in between -- a moment that even a year later left many transfixed by the horror, burdened by sadness, plagued by fears.
It was a day of jitters and heightened security. Officials issued a “code orange” – the second-highest level of alert -- and warned that terrorists might strike again. (AP Sept. 11, 2002, report)
- (2) And overshadowing memorials was a now familiar fear. Citing “credible and specific” threats, some U.S. embassies in Asia, Africa and the Middle East were closed, and U.S. military bases and embassies in Europe enforced tightened security. (AP Sept. 11, 2002, report)

The emotion of fear in these examples can be conceptualized as being collective. Example (2) reports on world reaction, especially on the feelings of Americans working abroad, but it does not specify whose fear has led to tightened security measures. Neither does the reporter in example (1) define to whom the word ‘many’ refers. In contrast to these abstract fears, the grief of the ordinary people participating in the U.S. memorials is usually described in a more concrete manner; as Reuters says in one of its reports in 2002, “many wept seemingly inconsolably” (Sept. 11, 2002, report).

Two years later, on September 11, 2004, ceremonies were smaller and “more subdued” (Reuters Sept. 11, 2004, report) than on the two preceding anniversaries. The emotion of sadness still prevailed among the family members of the attack victims in New York, who, according to an AP report (Sept. 11, 2004, report), “descended a long ramp into ground zero, sobbing, embracing each other.” The mourning is presented as “world-wide”, but due to the U.S.-led Iraq war, anger, especially among Muslims, also “runs high” (AP Sept. 11, 2004, report).

The emphasis in the narrative of fear had, at least temporarily, shifted from the US – and the Americans at home and abroad – to other areas, due to the recent school tragedy in Beslan, North Ossetia, and the suicide car bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. This was reflected in the keyword slug lines containing two central concepts of the fear frame: threat and security. In September 2002, the following slug lines appear frequently: “ATTACK-ANNIVERSARY-SECURITY”,

“ATTACK -THREAT”, “ATTACK-ANNIVERSARY-THREATS” (Reuters) and “SEPT 11-WORLD SECURITY”, “SEPT 11-US-ATTACKS-THREATS” (AP). Two years later, in September 2004, no slug lines with THREAT can be found, while SECURITY is still common, especially in Reuters slug lines. The word SECURITY in Reuters reports is included in a variety of combinations. Mostly, though, it is followed by the word INDONESIA, whereas AP has many reports slugged as “RUSSIA-SECURITY.”

As we have seen, collective fears in news agency dispatches are mostly presented rather vaguely or they are left implicit so that the reports just speak about “threats” and “security measures” without mentioning the word *fear*. Even if fear as a negative emotion is, undoubtedly, newsworthy,⁶ ordinary people’s subjective fear is rather seldom described. However, especially in connection with the September 11 anniversaries, people’s feelings are often explored through interviews for polls, the results of which then get into the news. In 2002, both AP and Reuters reported on such surveys. Based on the results of four different polls, AP (Sept. 11, 2002, report headline) states in a headline: “Poll: Public optimism, patriotism high despite continuing fear of attacks,” while in the Reuters headline one day earlier (Sept. 10, 2002, report headline), the focus is on the fear: “9/11 – Poll shows Americans fear more attacks.” Two years later, in September 2004, AP had made a poll of its own. The headline of an AP report (Sept. 9, 2004, report headline) summarizes its results as follows: “Fear of terror attack persists; Sept. 11 memories almost universal.”

Polls rely on precise figures, and figures can certainly be regarded as being ‘factual.’ But as these three headline examples show, the results of polls leave space for interpretation, and the journalist is in a position to choose one particular focus. In September 2004, by making a poll of its own, AP could bring up two newsworthy aspects that otherwise could not

⁶ *Negativity* is probably the best known of the factors generally known as *news values*. In their influential study of newsworthiness (published in the *Journal of International Peace Research* in 1965, reprinted in 1970), Galtung and Ruge presented twelve factors, which could be claimed to affect both the selection and the presentation of news. Besides negativity, the list of news values includes, for instance, *eliteness*, *personification*, *unexpectedness*, *consonance* and *continuity*.

be expected to be as visible during this anniversary as one year after the September 11 attacks: the emotions of solidarity and fear. People interviewed for the poll were asked where they were when they learned about the attacks. Collective memory, thus awakened, is likely to produce “a feeling of solidarity,” that “we were all there together” (cf. Berezin 2002: 45). In addition, the narrative of the “persisting” fear among the Americans surfaced again, even if major threats at that time were felt to be in other parts of the world.

Blurring responsibility

When analyzing political *news* reports, we have to keep in mind that they are examples of a special kind of political discourse, and as such are affected by values and conventions typical of news writing. For example, the – often unconscious – choices of formulation that news journalists make when they write ‘hard news’ reports aim at backgrounding their own voice. For that purpose they adopt “a tactic of impersonalisation” (White 1998: 267). As part of this “tactic” they often tend to blur the role of the human agents, as will be shown below.

The first part of this section examines the options of transitivity that news agency journalists have selected in their reports on the fear of terrorism. The second part gives evidence of two linguistic features that also help to obscure the responsibility of news actors in news agency stories, namely, agentless passives and intransitive clauses.

Fear and the options of transitivity

The Reuters headline from Sept. 10, 2002, quoted above, gives an example of fear as a mental process:

(3) 9/11 – Poll shows Americans fear more attacks

‘Fearing’ is clearly a process of feeling, and thus “mental” (cf. Halliday 1994: 117); “Americans” who fear are Sensers, and “attacks” are what they fear, i.e. the Phenomenon. It is notable, though, how this simple assertion,

in accordance with the impersonal style of ‘hard news’ reports (White 1998), is attributed to the results of the “poll”, and not to the writing journalist.

In examples (4) and (5), fear has been nominalized:

- (4) But the police chief in charge of securing the northern city [Ayodhya, India] said his biggest fear was a terrorist attack.
(Reuters March 11, 2002, report)
- (5) “...The bombs are our biggest fear. If I want to go to the market [in Baghdad], I get scared.” (Reuters March 18, 2004, report)

The noun *fear* has become a Value, a participant in an identifying relational process. In other words, “a terrorist attack” and “the bombs” (Tokens in the process) are identified as (his, our) “biggest fear.” If the grammatical metaphors – “his/our biggest fear” – in the clauses were ‘unpacked’ into a mental process, we could say, for instance: ‘a terrorist attack is what he fears most’/‘The bombs are what we fear most.’ Despite the nominalization of fear, the Sensers and the Phenomenon of the original mental processes are easily recognized in these examples. But just as in example (3), the word “fear” here occurs in an attributed clause: in an indirect and a direct quote, respectively.

In unattributed statements, it is typical of news journalists to present emotions as “affectual states” or “as simply reflecting reality” (White 1998: 271, 272) so that the connection between the emotion itself and the one who feels it is blurred. News agency journalists, in my data, speak more frequently of (indefinite) *fears* than of *fear* in the singular. These fears – or fear – are mostly participants in material processes. The events that are reported on sometimes take place “amid”, “on” or “over” fears; in other words, fear has become a part of the “circumstantial element” of a material process (Halliday 1994: 149–161), only loosely tied to the Actor of the process in question. Similarly, when reporters write that terrorist attacks, threats, or warnings, etc., “stoke”, “spark”, “heighten”, “raise”, “renew” or “revive” fears, putting the emotion in the role of a Goal, it is not always

clear whose fears are referred to; at the same time, the existence of fears is presupposed, taken for granted.

The following example, which shows “fears” as a Goal, includes as many as seven nominalizations altogether (nominalizations are marked in italics):

- (6) Any *indication* that al-Qaida or other Islamic terrorist groups were behind the *bombings* stokes renewed *fears* about the *sophistication* of international *terrorism* and potentially intensifies the *fallout* on global markets from the Madrid *attacks*. (AP March 11, 2004, report).

The nominalizations in this sentence make the language extremely imprecise. If we look at the nominalizations as grammatical metaphors and try to ‘unpack’ them, we find several processes ‘hidden’ underneath. The participant roles in these processes, accordingly, become obscure. The Actor of the material process is a rather vague nominalization “indication”, which is said to be responsible for potentially intensifying “the fallout on global markets,” and not only for stoking the fears. Finally, who are the Sensors of the original mental process of fearing? Since the reporter speaks about the possible negative effects that the “indication” could have on global markets, we can deduce that those who fear are primarily the investors acting on those markets. What is feared – the Phenomenon of the original mental process – is not very clear, either. Instead of simply referring to “terrorism”, the journalist speaks about its “sophistication.” And if we give the role of Sensors to investors, we can further presume that they ultimately fear losing their money because of “the sophistication of international terrorism.”

From the point of view of the ‘factuality’ of news agency reports, the most significant process choice, arguably, is the one illustrated by the following two examples:

- (7) LONDON, Jan 2 (Reuters) – Europe’s biggest airline, British Airways, cancelled a London-Washington flight on Friday as security fears grounded a U.S.-bound plane for the seventh time in just over a week. (Reuters Jan. 2, 2004, report lead)

- (8) **British Airways flight to Washington delayed, after security concerns stop service two days in a row.**
(AP Jan. 3, 2004, report headline)

Emotions have become Actors in material processes. In these examples, fears and concerns are premodified by *security*, which is a central concept in the anti-terrorism discourse; in my data it is, by a huge margin, the most popular pre-modifier of these two emotive words. “Security fears” refer to the possibility of ‘losing security’, but “security concerns” could also mean – more positively – concerns of the authorities for *maintaining* security. As consumers of the present day news media we can figure out that these nominalized fears and concerns do not refer to flight security in general, but, more specifically, to the possibility of terrorist attacks.

The material processes in examples (7) and (8) have, besides an Actor, also an affected participant, a Goal (“a U.S.-bound plane” and “service”, respectively). The verbs “grounded” and “stop” are ‘transitive’ in traditional grammar. In Halliday’s words (1994), “some entity ‘does’ something...‘to’ some other entity” (p. 110). When the emotions – “fears” and “concerns” – in this way are presented as Actors, the human agents, and their responsibility, remain hidden in the important introductory parts of these news reports: the lead in example (7), and the headline in example (8).

This kind of reporting can be argued to rely on the conventions of news writing (cf. Stenvall forthcoming). The traditional structure of a news report has two main features. Van Dijk (1988: 43) speaks of “relevance organisation in news,” and of the *installment* character of topic realization. In other words, the most important – or at least the most newsworthy – piece of information is presented at the beginning of a news story, and the information is delivered discontinuously, in installments, proceeding from general to more specific details. Fears as Actors appear in all parts of news stories, but given these two general principles of news writing, it is hardly surprising that this kind of material process is popular, especially in the headlines and leads. First, fear as a negative emotion is certainly a news-

worthy ‘actor’; and second, it is a general, abstract term, which then can be specified later. The lead in example (7) gives – besides “fears” – another Actor for cancellations: British Airways. The specifying details in the reports, from which examples (7) and (8) have been taken, reveal that the airline has acted on the “advice” of the U.K. government and U.S. authorities.

Nominalization leaves the role of the Senser of the original mental process (of fearing) unspecified. Who is the one who ‘fears’ or is ‘concerned’? Is it British Airways; or is it those who have given advice to the airlines, the U.K. government and U.S. authorities? In either case, these officials do not fear for their own security but for that of the potential flight passengers, which further adds to the ambiguity of these expressions.

Threats and security – agentless passives and intransitive clauses

As discussed above, the narrative of fear tends to surface in the media on September 11 anniversaries. Even if no fresh attacks are made, there are always new “warnings” and “threats”, causing fear and calling for “stricter security.” The warnings and alerts may come from “the U.S. government” or just from “officials”, but often – at the beginning of the news reports in particular – journalists resort to the use of agentless passives or to intransitive clauses, which obscure the role of human agents. Things just ‘happen’ or ‘are made’, as example (9) shows (agentless passive and semantically intransitive clauses marked in italics):

(9) ***Security boosted across the world on anniversary of Sept. 11 attacks***

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) -- *The world went on terror alert* Wednesday, as memories of the Sept. 11 attacks last year intensified fears surrounding numerous new but unconfirmed threats.

U.S. embassies and those of America’s closest allies closed in nine countries. Police and troops wielding automatic rifles, sometimes backed by armoured vehicles, patrolled outside diplomatic compounds.

Jitters about new terrorist attacks also translated into stricter security at airports, government and private offices, American social clubs, tourist spots and other key sites that could become targets.

(AP Sept. 11, 2002, report opening)

In this extract, the only human agents are “police and troops,” who are “wielding rifles” and “patrolling.” Other Actors that are ‘doing’ something “‘to’ some other entity” (Halliday 1994: 110) in material processes are mental states, “memories” and “fears”, which ‘intensify’ and ‘surround’, respectively. Human agents are, of course, needed for giving a terror alert, and for closing the embassies. The humans could be, for instance, “U.S. authorities”, but here the use of constructions with intransitive verbs serves to hide their role. The Actors (grammatical subjects) of these two intransitive clauses – the “world” and the “embassies” – are, semantically, ‘affected participants’ (cf. Toolan 1988: 239): the world has been alerted, and the embassies have been closed.

At the beginning of the last sentence in example (9), the Actor (“jitters”) has undergone the process of being “translated into stricter security.” In addition to the intransitive verb, the two nominalizations – “jitters” and “security” – contribute to blurring the identity of the real actors, as well as the cause-effect relationship. Who – which authorities – have been nervous and feared “new terrorist attacks”, and who, as a result, have ordered stricter security measures? The hidden ‘actors’ in the final part of that sentence are easier to retrieve. According to the AP dispatch, security is increased at certain key sites “that could become targets”, i.e. *terrorists* might attack them.

Weaker than fear: the emotions of worry and concern

The nouns *fear*, *worry* and *concern* can, broadly speaking, be taken as synonyms. As Tables 2 and 3 suggest, *fear/fears* appears in my data more often than *worry/worries* or *concern/concerns*. One reason for the popularity of using expressions referring to fear is presumably the fact that as an emotion fear has the highest intensity of the three (cf. Table 1). Thus it is associated with a high degree of *negativity* and, according to Galtung’s and Ruge’s *news values*, it can be regarded as being more newsworthy than concern or worry.

At the same time, especially in the figures for the files given in Table 2, *concern* and *concerns*, too, have relatively high frequencies, despite their lower intensity. Concern, as mentioned above, differs from fear and worry in being potentially less negative than the other two emotions. But, as Coston (1998) – speaking of the fear of crime – points out, even if ‘concern’ means that a person is interested in the matter that engages her/his attention, that “does not automatically result in action on the part of the one who is effected [sic].” In example (8), *security concerns* had stopped the flights; the concerns (of authorities?) had resulted in action. In addition to appearing in the (popular) noun phrase *security concerns*, *concern* is often preceded by the verb *express*, i.e. it functions as a Verbiage in a verbal process. The Sayers in these processes – those who are construed as showing interest in a positive action – are usually politicians, officials, governments, nations, etc.

In example (10) below, “concern” seems to have led to “scattered protests,” although the vague language tends to blur the participant roles and the causal relations. This Reuters dispatch is about the commemoration of the first September 11 anniversary in Asia (nominalizations are marked in italics):

(10) ***Fears mingle with prayers on Sept 11 anniversary***

SINGAPORE, Sept 11 (Reuters) - Flags flew at half mast, churches offered prayers and choirs sang requiems in Asia on Wednesday as a wave of memorial ceremonies for the September 11 dead swept round the world amid *fears* of further violence. But *concern* about Washington’s international role one year after the deadly suicide *hijackings* intruded on the collective *remembrance*, with scattered *protests* in a handful of Asian cities by opponents of a new war on Iraq.

(Reuters Sept. 11, 2002, report opening)

In September 2002, the United States and its allies were looking for proof of weapons of mass-destruction in Iraq, and the threat of a possible U.S. attack generated hard feelings and protests in Asia. Both AP and Reuters took note of this discord in the otherwise worldwide sympathy towards Americans on the September 11 anniversary. It is notable, though, how the

Reuters journalist resorts to several nominalizations and noun phrases to hide the criticism of the possible U.S. plans to attack Iraq, which the reporter calls “Washington’s international role.” The only ‘actor’ in the second paragraph is the (weak) emotion of concern, which is presented as “intruding” on another mental state (remembrance.) The stronger – and thus more negative – emotion of fear appears in the headline and the lead of the report. Despite the imprecise language, we can deduce that “concern” and “fears” here refer to two different potential causes of ‘fearing.’ “Fears” are construed as collective emotions, haunting the memorial ceremonies “round the world;” what is feared is “further violence,” i.e. new terrorist attacks. At the same time, “concern” of a possible war on Iraq touches only “a handful of Asian cities.”

All the three emotions of ‘fear’ are, in my data, often connected to financial matters, but this feature is especially conspicuous in the case of the word *worries*, which as a noun can seldom be found outside the financial or economic reports. I have chosen one example from each news agency:

- (11) Tokyo stocks closed lower, with tech stocks hit by concerns that security worries would hurt leading economies. Retail and property shares rose as investors bet on Japanese recovery. (Reuters March 16, 2004, report)
- (12) **Investors shop for bargains despite worries about Sept. 11 anniversary**
NEW YORK (AP) -- Investors smarting from last week's sharp Wall Street decline shopped for bargains Monday, sending stocks higher despite concerns about the upcoming anniversary of the terrorist attacks. (AP Sept. 9, 2002, report opening)

Although worries in examples (11) and (12) are said to be about “security” or the “Sept. 11 anniversary”, respectively, they primarily concern the investors’ finances. Concerns – whether on “security worries” or “about the upcoming anniversary” – also focus on the looming financial loss. However, the interplay between the words “concerns” and “worries” can be argued to affect the news *rhetoric*. In example (11), the reporter underlines the vulnerability of the economic situation by presenting two negative

emotions – concerns and worries – as powerful actors, who “hit” and could “hurt.” In example (12), the two words are, in fact, interchangeable; it seems that the journalist has just wanted to avoid tautology with her/his word choice.

Some examples in my data do show clear evidence of the “positive streak” in *concern* (see the section on “Defining fear” above). At the same time, examples of terrorism *fears* and *worries* in news agency reports do not support the common view of worry being some kind of unspecified anxiety and fear being a “response to an *immediate* situation” (Stout 2004; Coston 1998).

Concluding remarks

Furedi (2002) claims that “Western societies are increasingly dominated by a culture of fear” (p. vii). Fear, according to Furedi, has long been “a big thing” since before the September 11 attacks, and one important consequence of “society’s disposition to panic” (p. 45) is its “worship of safety” (p. 8). In terrorism discourse, as news agency reports on terrorism show, fears (or worries or concerns) are often combined with the concept of security. As Tudor (2003) notes, we know from history how “whole regimes of domination” have been based on citizens’ fear (p. 244). In the United States, people’s fear and the ensuing quest for security could help the authorities to win the citizens’ acceptance for stricter security measures. In fact, the result of a Gallup poll in 2002, according to AP (June 11, 2002, report lead), showed that as many as “four in five Americans would give up some freedoms to gain security.” Towards the end of that dispatch, AP has an indirect quote from a psychiatry professor, who argues that “talk of the war in Afghanistan, airline security and terrorist threats is propelling fear.”

Terrorism fears, at least in news agency reports, are often construed as some kind of powerful, free-floating entities with little or no visible connection to those who fear. At the same time, the almost continuous warnings from authorities and threats relayed in the reports certainly are apt to create fear even in people who have no personal experience of terrorist attacks. The ‘sequence of events’ of these fears differs considerably from

the model presented by Plutchik (see the section on “Defining fear” above.) First, the “stimulus event” (threat) comes from the authorities via the media. Second, flight as “behavior” is of no use; and third, “protection” (security measures) is also mostly left to the authorities. In other words, individuals with “cognition of danger” and “feelings of fear” cannot do much to overcome their fear.

Paradoxically, the events do not always have to be ‘unexpected’, i.e. ‘new’, to get into the news. In their famous study on newsworthiness, Galtung and Ruge (1970: 264) have included *consonance* and *continuity* in the list of twelve factors, generally known as *news values*. They argue that the threshold of reporting is lower when the event in question fits “a pattern of expectation” (p. 287), and when something has once been accepted as ‘news’, it continues to be reported (p. 264). In news agency reports, the frequent occurrences of warnings and “unconfirmed” threats repeat a well-known pattern, and so, in regard to terrorism threats and fears, a seemingly never-ending narrative of fear has been established. The examples from AP and Reuters news reports have shown how abstract “fears” and “concerns” and “worries”, together with other nominalizations, have become ‘actors.’ The use of this kind of vague language hides the role of the real actors. At the same time, it undermines the ‘factuality’ of news agency discourse.

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Study D:

Unnamed sources as rhetorical constructs in news agency reports¹

1 Introduction²

When, in June 2005, the managing editor and the executive editor of the Associated Press (AP) news agency reminded their staff about AP policy concerning the use of unnamed sources, they wrote the following:

In some quarters, there is a mistaken notion that using anonymous sources adds an air of exclusivity to our reporting and makes it seem more like a scoop. Some people think when we talk about our journalists doing "source reporting" that we expect or even prefer these sources to be anonymous in our copy.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

(Silverman and Carroll 2005)

In their guidelines to journalists (cf. APME³ website; Reuters 2007a; Wood

¹ Stenvall, Maija, 2008. Unnamed sources as rhetorical constructs in news agency reports. *Journalism Studies* 9:2, Special Issue "Language and Journalism", 229–243. Used with kind permission from Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group.

² The research was supported in part by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence funding for the Research Unit for Variation, Contacts and Change in English at the department of English, University of Helsinki.

³ APME stands for "the Associated Press Managing Editors, an association of U.S. and Canadian editors whose newspapers are members of The Associated Press" (<http://www.apme.com>, accessed July 25, 2007). The AP news agency (= The Associated Press) is owned by 1500 US daily newspaper members, as the AP website states (<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html>, accessed July 25, 2007). In the autumn of 2004, the APME credibility committee decided to make a study on unnamed sources, and for that purpose they chose one day in November 2004 and one day in February 2005 to check the stories from The Associated Press, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, the New York Times News Service and the Washington Post. The results of this survey generated many

1995), the global news agencies AP and Reuters clearly underline the “weakness” of unnamed sources, and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. Yet, anonymous speakers appear frequently in news agency reports, and even if they are not meant to add “an air of exclusivity” to reporting, they affect the news rhetoric in various ways.

On their websites (Associated Press 2007; Reuters 2007b), the two news agencies present, e.g., the following journalistic aims: their reports should be “accurate” and “balanced” (AP and Reuters), “informed” (AP), and “clearly sourced” (Reuters). In addition, AP stresses “objectivity” and “reliability”, and Reuters, too, speaks about aiming “to report objectively” and about being “committed to reporting the facts”. In pursuit of these elusive aims, quotations – both direct and indirect – have a central role. As Fishman (1980: 92) states, the basic principle of a “news fact” can be expressed in the following way: *something is so because somebody says it*.

However, one central goal of news rhetoric remains implicit in the AP and Reuters policy statements, namely “newsworthiness”. As many researchers (cf. Bell 1991; Fowler 1991; Galtung and Ruge 1970 [1965]; Hartley 1982) have shown, underlying *news values* affect both the selection and the presentation of news events. Thus, for instance, “somebody” who is quoted in a news report most often is “some competent knower or observer” (Fishman 1980: 93); in other words, an “elite” source. Even anonymous sources are usually construed as “elite”, as possessing an authoritative, official status. Adding such premodifiers as “top” or “senior” into their labelling can be seen as a further attempt to “claim standing” for the anonymous speakers (cf. Bell (1991: 193). In news agency reports, unnamed speakers not only get “labels” to boost their standing, but sometimes news agency journalists – especially AP journalists as a result of the 2005 “reminder” – add wordy explanations of the reasons for anonymity after the attribution.

reactions from the members; for example, AP in June 2005 sent its staff a “reminder” about policy on unnamed sources.

On News Rhetoric

Following White (1998: 3), the word “rhetorical” is used “in the broad sense to reference not a narrow notion of ‘argumentation’, but more generally to reference the potential of all texts, whether explicitly argumentative or not, to influence, reinforce or to challenge reader/listener’s assumptions, beliefs, emotions, attitudes and so on”.

News journalists, as noted, try to persuade the audience especially of the factuality and objectivity of their reports, but as media researchers agree, achieving these ideals is simply not possible, for several reasons. One of the reasons depends on the deep-rooted conventions of news writing. According to White (1997: 129), the text type that is typical of hard news stories serves “to naturalize and to portray as commonsensical” an ideological “model of the social order”. News reports have a special structure, and in writing the stories, journalists try to background their own voice, which leads, for instance, for extensive use of quotations.

The basic values according to which journalists, more or less subconsciously, decide what is “newsworthy” seem to be long-standing and universal. In 1965, Galtung and Ruge published their influential study on newsworthiness, presenting 12 factors, generally known as *news values* (see Galtung and Ruge 1970 [1965]). News values have been “revisited” in a wealth of studies since that time, but the central values remain largely unchanged. In the construction of unnamed sources as credible and newsworthy speakers such well-known news values as *negativity* and *elitness* have an important role.

Functional Grammar and APPRAISAL Framework

In this section I will first introduce two intertwined systems of Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar, *transitivity* and *nominalization*, and also present some terms of the APPRAISAL framework; terms that are used in my analysis below.

Transitivity, according to Halliday (1994: 179), belongs to the *ideational metafunction* of language. “A central insight of Halliday’s ... is that

transitivity is the foundation of representation ... transitivity has the facility to analyse the same event in different ways” (Fowler 1991: 71). In Halliday’s (1994: 106) view “[t]he transitivity system construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES”. He presents three main types of processes: (1) *material processes: processes of doing*; (2) *mental processes: processes of sensing*; and (3) *relational processes: processes of being* (pp. 107–138). In addition, a fourth type, *verbal processes*, which share characteristics of mental and relational processes (p. 107), is relevant for my analysis. The clause, its “meaning as representation”, has a central role in the transitivity system. The grammar of the clause consists of three elements of the process: the process itself (typically realized by a verb phrase), participants in the process, and circumstances associated with the process. In verbal processes the central participant is a Sayer; in mental processes, the corresponding participant is called a Senser.

Nominalization transforms processes (verbs) or properties (adjectives) into nouns after metaphorical rewording (Halliday 1994: 352). These nominalized words can then function as a participant in processes, according to various options of transitivity, or as a part of a prepositional phrase (Fairclough 1995: 112). *Anonymity* – a central word in my analysis – is a nominalization, as it is a noun derived from an adjective (cf. Sinclair 1995: 61). Fowler (1991: 82) talks about nominalization as being “inherently, potentially mystificatory”. When a clause with a process (verb) is “packaged” into a noun, the participants of the nominalized process are typically hidden. Similarly, when a “property” denoted by an adjective becomes a “state”, the relation between the nominalized word and, for instance, the person who was supposed to have that “property” can be blurred. For example, when *anonymity* appears in a prepositional phrase (“X speaks *on condition of anonymity*”), it is linked to the speaker only loosely (see the analysis section below).

The APPRAISAL framework is an extension of M.A.K. Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar. “Appraisal” can, briefly, be defined as “the

evaluative use of language” (see the APPRAISAL Website⁴). The Appraisal framework consists of three interacting systems: ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION. In this study I refer to the system of ATTITUDE, which comprises three sub-systems: AFFECT (construing emotional responses), JUDGEMENT (evaluating human behaviour, dealing with ethics and morality) and APPRECIATION (evaluating entities, “by reference to aesthetics and other systems of social value”) (APPRAISAL Website; Martin 2000). A simple outline of APPRAISAL is presented in Figure 1.




FIGURE 1

APPRAISAL systems and the three sub-systems of ATTITUDE

APPRAISAL values can be either “inscribed” or “evoked”, or even “provoked”; in other words values can be “explicit”, “implicit” or “somewhere in between”. Inscribed APPRAISAL draws on overtly evaluative lexical items (“a happy day”, “the corrupt minister”, “an interesting book”, and so on), and thus it can be easily detected, whereas analysing evoked or provoked APPRAISAL is a much more complex task. Basically, evoked values – or “tokens” of ATTITUDE as they are also called – rely largely upon “the reader’s social/cultural/ideological reading position”, and on shared memories (APPRAISAL Website). Thus, if the writer and the reader possess similar so-

⁴ See <http://www.grammatcs.com/appraisal>, accessed July 25, 2007.

cial norms, JUDGEMENT values can be triggered by seemingly “factual” descriptions of events or behaviour. When the mother of a convicted Muslim in an AP news report (see example 13 below) tells the reporter that the son “had been supporting his six siblings since the death of his father”, learning of this kind of morally recommendable behaviour is likely to evoke a positive JUDGEMENT by the reader (“he is a good boy”).

Provoked APPRAISAL values lie “somewhere in between” explicit and implicit evaluation (APPRAISAL Website). These values are usually triggered by values belonging to another ATTITUDE sub-type; most typically, judgments are being provoked by values of AFFECT. For example, if the speaker or writer tells us about people reacting to some event with a strong negative emotion, anger, horror or deep sorrow, we are invited to share the emotions, to feel empathy with these persons. But we may also be “provoked” to judge the culprit(s) causing such emotions, or at least to ask who is to be blamed.

The Corpus

In the late 1990s, following the decline of UPI, the number of powerful news agencies was reduced from the “Big Four” to the “Big Three” (to AFP, AP and Reuters) (Boyd-Barrett 1998), and in that group AP and Reuters are generally considered to be the most influential (cf. Tunstall 1999).

My data are collected between 2002 and 2007 from the news wires of AP and Reuters, as received by one of their media clients, the Finnish Broadcasting Company. In that process, I have used several search words; for instance, *terror/terrorist*, *fear*, *Iraq*, and *anonymity*. The total number of words in my corpus is about 4 million (over 8,000 “pages”): roughly 2.5 million from AP and 1.5 million from Reuters.

News agency reporting means a continuous flow of information. A big event, such as a major earthquake, generates several updated versions, even up to 40 or more on one day. These successive reports contain a wealth of repetition, which should be taken into account in a quantitative analysis.

My focus is on a qualitative analysis, but nevertheless I have found it useful to look at the frequencies of some relevant words and expressions, to get an overview of their popularity in my data.

Analysing Unnamed Sources in AP and Reuters News Reports

From the guidelines AP and Reuters give to their journalists concerning anonymous sources, we can infer that they look at the “labels” of attribution somewhat differently than researchers do (cf. Bell 1991): as a matter of giving information and not as that of boosting the unnamed speaker’s standing. AP says that “[w]e should be as descriptive as possible” (APME website), and Reuters handbook (Reuters 2007a) advises journalists to give “as much context and detail” as possible about sources (whether named or unnamed), “to authenticate information they provide”. AP, furthermore, stresses the necessity of explaining the reason for anonymity, and maybe even “the source’s motive for disclosing the information”.

The first section of my analysis examines the unspecified collective speakers in news agency reports. As will be shown, in addition to the pre-modifying “labels”, the reporting verbs, too, have an important role in the construction of these anonymous speakers. The second section looks at the various expressions underlining the anonymity; first at those which refer to the speaker’s wish to remain unnamed, and then at those which try to explain the reason for that wish. In the final section, I present two examples where the journalists have given so much information of the unnamed sources that the speakers’ anonymity is at risk.

Mythical Groups of Reference

Menz (1989: 236) calls unspecified collective sources, frequently referred to in the news, “mythical groups of reference”. Examining the concordance lines of the simple collocation⁵ “X said”, I found that the most popular collective anonymous speakers preceding “said” in my Reuters data were *police*, *officials*, *military*, *sources*, *witnesses* and *analysts*. AP’s list was

⁵ Collocations, according to Sinclair (1991: 170), are “the lexical co-occurrence of words”.

slightly different: *officials, military, police, witnesses, authorities* and *sources*.

Sources is the most generic of these words; a *source* in news reporting, according to Collins COBUILD English Dictionary, is, simply, “a person ... that provides information” (Sinclair 1995: 1595). In their guidelines to journalists, both AP and Reuters present several reservations concerning the use of *source/sources* as unnamed speakers; for instance, Reuters (Wood 1995: S10, S11) advises its journalists not to use the expressions *reliable sources* and *well-informed sources*, or the plural form *sources* as such. However, in news agency reports, sources often attract vague expressions that are not too far from the clichés mentioned by Reuters. Sources can be “knowledgeable”, e.g. *about the Taliban and al-Qaida* (AP June 12, 2002) or, in Reuters reports, they are said to be “familiar with” *the decision, the U.S. Israeli talks, the matter, the situation*, and so on.

Admittedly, it may not be easy to construe generic “sources” as authoritative and credible anonymous speakers. Their rhetorical potential rather relies on creating some kind of “aura of secrecy”, which then enhances the newsworthiness of the quoted information, especially as the word is often premodified by the nouns *intelligence, security, or military*.

For my analysis below, I have selected three groups of speakers – *officials, witnesses* and *analysts* – which can be argued to have different roles in news rhetoric.

Officials, who are a staple of named and unnamed speakers in the news, are quoted in news agency reports because of their “official” capacity, but given the huge volume of these speakers, it is not at all clear that all of them could hold “a position of authority in an organization” (cf. the definition of “official” in Sinclair 1995: 1145). The status of unnamed officials ranges from political leaders to policemen or hospital workers. Examples (1) and (2) illustrate the two ends of the (imaginary) “authority” axis:

- (1) *Top administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney,* used claims of a relationship between al Qaeda and prewar Iraq to suggest that Saddam could have had a role in the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

Senior officials at the time, including former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, were dissatisfied that the CIA assessment did not more closely link Iraq and al Qaeda. (Reuters Feb. 9, 2007; my italics)

- (2) BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- A suicide car bomber struck a police checkpoint near a market Wednesday in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, killing at least eight people and wounding 43, *police and hospital officials said. (AP Feb. 21, 2007; my italics)*

The high standing of *officials* in example (1) has been boosted by such premodifiers as *top* and *senior*; in addition, these officials are suggested to be equal in rank with the U.S. Vice President and the former Defense Secretary, respectively. Reciprocally, the “claims” and the feelings of the two named politicians get support from an undefined number of anonymous officials. It is worth noting, too, that the presentation of the officials’ sayings and thoughts on this important issue – the justification of the Iraqi war – has involved a great deal of interpretation on the part of the writing journalist. The reporting expressions (*used claims* and *suggest*) are far from neutral (see e.g. Bednarek 2006 on reporting expressions in media discourse), and in the second paragraph, the journalist has replaced the verbal process with a mental process (cf. Halliday 1994), describing how the officials felt (*were dissatisfied*). In example (2), the function of police and hospital officials is simple: they provide “facts” to journalists. From the point of view of news rhetoric, the exact figures – eight and 43 – are important; they make the report more “factual” – even if the figures may change in the new versions of the story.

Given the large number of sources included within the group *officials*, it can be argued that the basic expression *officials say/said* is almost as generic and “secretive” as the corresponding expression with *sources*. Nevertheless, it is sometimes used for framing rather contentious claims, as in example (3) from Reuters:

- (3) Officials say hundreds of foreign militants, including Chechens, Uzbeks and Arabs, are hiding in the region inhabited by Pashtun tribesmen, many of whom sympathise with al Qaeda and have fought against security forces to protect them. (Reuters Sept. 13, 2004)

This news report on the clashes between Pakistani troops and militants contains several other quotes (named and unnamed) on the casualties of the fighting, but none of them sheds any light on the identity of the officials who have given information on the hiding foreign militants.

Generally, though, the word *officials* is likely to appear as a head noun in a long noun phrase, attracting several premodifiers. These premodifiers can depict the field of activity (*military, government, security, hospital*, and so on), or the nationality (*U.S., American, Iraqi, Palestinian*), or they boost the status of the speaker (*senior, top, key*). Strings of four nouns/adjectives are quite common: “Top Bush administration officials” (Reuters Feb. 9, 2007), “senior Iraqi police officials” (AP Feb. 21, 2007), etc.

Analysts are esteemed news actors in their own right. They are regarded as experts in their respective fields of activity and do not – like officials – need several premodifiers to enhance their standing. Sometimes that special field is announced; in my data, these speakers are, for example, *military, security, political, or intelligence* analysts. More often, though, the word *analysts* is preceded by an indefinite quantifier *some* or *many*.

Analysts are often used to bring forward a contrasting view, usually a negative prophecy, which thus adds to the newsworthiness of the report. This is conspicuous especially in my Reuters data, where such collocations as *but analysts say or said, believe, doubt, remain concerned* are rather popular. Example (4) from AP shows analysts in a similar role:

- (4) British troops have mounted operations against Shiite militia – notably using bar mines and plastic explosive on Dec. 26 to destroy Basra's Jameat police station, run by a rogue police squad.

Soldiers freed 70 people that had been captured and held there by the officers, before demolishing the sand-colored landmark. *However, analysts fear a militia resurgence* once British troops draw down, *and warn* that Iran may attempt to step up its influence in the region.

(AP Feb. 22, 2007; my italics)

As noted, noun phrases with premodifiers are not very important in the construction of unnamed analysts as newsworthy speakers, whereas

the choice of a reporting expression following the word *analysts* has a central role. The neutral verb *say/said* is the most frequent, but in contrast with the other groups, e.g. officials, the present tense *say* is the more popular of the two forms. Analysts do not tell what has happened in the past; their job is to evaluate the present situation. Often, like in example (4), journalists describe the mental states of (anonymous) analysts, instead of reporting what they say. In Hallidayan terms (Halliday 1994: 112–142), verbal processes have been transformed to mental processes; *Sayers* have become *Sensers*. Mental reporting expressions tend to be interpretative (cf. Bednarek 2006: 562). In any case, they are highly ambiguous, as only the one who experiences “a mental event can judge its authenticity” (2006: 562). We cannot even say, whether the analysts in example (4) have really expressed their “fears” to the journalists, or whether they have just described the situation more generally in negative terms, which has given rise to the journalists’ interpretation.

News sources described as witnesses are usually ordinary people, who have happened to see, for instance, an accident or a bomb attack. Witnesses are only seldom provided with explanatory premodifiers; in my data, the words that appear most frequently before or after *witnesses* are *said* and *and*. In other words, if the journalist feels that the standing of witnesses needs enhancing, it is done by adding a word representing some other “mythical” group like *officials*; or *police sources*, as in example (5):

- (5) Two bombs exploded near popular markets in Baghdad on Monday, killing at least nine people and wounding dozens, *police sources and witnesses said*. (Reuters Feb. 12, 2007; my italics)

Example (5) shows the unspecified “witnesses” in a typical role; the ‘factual’ style of the news agencies presupposes that the number of casualties (of bomb attacks, accidents, or natural catastrophes) is confirmed by an attribution.

Stressing the Anonymity

The following section focuses on expressions of wishes for anonymity and explanations of reasons. The constructions can sometimes become rather long and cumbersome, as example (6) shows:

- (6) Victor Cha, President Bush's top adviser on North Korea, met Tuesday with the country's top nuclear negotiator, Kim Kye Gwan, *according to a U.S. official with knowledge of the meeting who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the talks.*
(AP April 7, 2007; my italics).

*Expressions of wishes for anonymity*⁶

In analysing the expressions that are used to emphasize the speaker's wish to remain anonymous, I draw on the concepts of Halliday's functional grammar. My special focus is on the widely used expression *on condition of anonymity*.

The simplest way of stating that a speaker wants to remain unnamed is to say that "X did not give her/his name". In this material process, the speaker (X) is an Actor, "her/his name" is a Goal. "To give her/his name" could also be a verbal process – that is, "to *say* the name", but in the context of a news agency report, the phrase can be deduced to mean "to reveal the name so that it can be made public". A speaker can also "refuse or decline to give her/his name", or s/he may ask or wish "not to be named/identified", and so on.

Anonymity, in a few cases, appears in such expressions as "X who requested/asked for/demanded/insisted on *anonymity*"). Example (7) shows the beginning of a financial news report, where the Reuters journalist has really observed the "source's" request for anonymity, giving almost no information of her or him:

- (7) LONDON, April 7 (Reuters) – The private equity group eyeing UK supermarket chain J. Sainsbury is "very likely" to walk away from the 10 billion pound (\$19.7 billion) deal after the company's board rejected a bid of about 560 pence a share, *a person familiar with the situation* said on Saturday.

⁶ For a more detailed analysis on these expressions, see Stenvall (2004).

“It’s all but dead,” said *the source, who requested anonymity* because of the confidential nature of the negotiations.
(Reuters April 7, 2007, my italics)

Despite the nominalization – anonymity – it is clear in example (7) that it is the speaker (“the source”) who wants to be unnamed. However, the most popular way of stressing a speaker’s wish to remain anonymous – “on condition of anonymity” – is much more ambiguous in this respect. The prepositional phrase “on condition of anonymity” is almost exclusively connected to the verb “speak” in my data; from the point of view of *transitivity*, it is a *circumstantial* element in a verbal process (Halliday, 1994: 149-161). The circumstantial elements are connected to the process only indirectly; “a circumstantial element”, says Halliday (1994: 151), “is itself ...a process that has become parasitic on another process”. In other words, the connection between the speaker “X” and the prepositional phrase “on condition of anonymity” remains loose. The construction itself possesses no elements that would definitely link the nouns *condition* or *anonymity* to the Sayer (the speaker “X”).

Ordinary Versus Elite Speakers

As we have seen above, some of the expressions have a rather simple grammatical structure. The vocabulary, correspondingly, comes from “everyday language”, with words like *name* and *give*. In contrast, the word *identified* could be said to belong to an “official register” and, similarly, the (ambiguous) words *condition* and *anonymity* are often used in legal or medical language. Thus it can be hypothesized that in news agency reports, the simple expressions correlate with the speakers representing “ordinary people”, while the expressions like “on condition of anonymity” tend to stress the wishes of officials, and other elite speakers.

Roughly speaking, this kind of division does exist. At the same time, owing to the role of ordinary people in news (agency) discourse, it may be difficult to collect enough data for drawing valid conclusions. First, ordinary people are seldom quoted. As many researchers have stated, news simply is *elite-centred* (Galtung and Ruge 1970 [1965]: 266), and so ordi-

nary people are quoted only if they have entered “the news arena by some other door” (Fowler 1991: 22), for example in connection with wars, bomb attacks, natural catastrophes, and so on. Secondly, the news journalists’ conventions of construing ordinary people as speakers are such that do not attract separate expressions stressing the anonymity. When anonymous, ordinary people are mostly presented as generic groups, for example, as *refugees*, *witnesses* or *residents*. If individual speakers are quoted, their “function” is usually to symbolize the other members of the group in question (cf. Tuchman 1978: 122). Paradoxically, journalists then try to make them “factual” as individuals by publishing their names and as many other details as possible (like age and occupation).

“On condition of anonymity” occurs more than 500 times in my AP files, and nearly 70 times in Reuters files, excluding the files – two from each agency – where *anonymity* has been used as the search word. Roughly 70-80 percent of these speakers are *officials*, and most of the others, too, can be put into the “elite” category; they are *diplomats*, *officers*, *spokesmen/spokeswomen*, *experts*, *ministry sources*, and so on. The simple expression ‘who did not give her/his name’ has as few as seven occurrences; those who have not given the name are “one man” (five occurrences) and “the woman” (twice). Officials are connected to nearly all expression types, but it can be noted that officials that simply “refuse to give” the name, are likely to represent a somewhat lower level (“local police”, “county government”, etc.). At the same time, even an ordinary “witness” can speak “on condition of anonymity”, if s/he gives really newsworthy information, as example (8) shows:

- (8) *A witness in Fadhil, speaking by telephone to The Associated Press, said the two men were executed in a vegetable market rather than a mosque. The man, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear for his safety, said dead bodies were still scattered in the area on Wednesday morning, and residents were scared to come out of their homes. (AP April 7, 2007; my italics).*

Notably, the journalist has also explained the reason for the anonymity – “fear for his safety”, which implies that even his telephone call is potentially dangerous, and thus makes the quote even more newsworthy.

Reasons for anonymity

The final part of this section analyses the reasons for anonymity; a feature that has become prominent especially in AP news reports after June 2005, when AP reminded journalists about its policy on anonymous sources.

The effects of this reminder are evidenced by my AP corpora. In the files collected before June 2005, I found only a few examples referring to reasons for anonymity; for instance, the journalist might say that an official spoke on “customary condition of anonymity”, or that a speaker wanted to be unnamed “for fear of reprisal” (AP Sept. 11, 2002). In contrast, the AP files after June 2005 offer a great variety of anonymity explanations; and Reuters, too, seems to have adopted a similar trend, though on a much smaller scale. The most frequent explanations for anonymity can be summarized as follows:

1. Anonymity depends on (government, ministry, embassy, etc.) policy
2. The speaker ‘should not talk’ to media at all, or s/he speaks ‘too early’; s/he fears, s/he may be in danger
3. The topic is sensitive, confidential, secret, etc.

The first point is rather unambiguous; a higher authority wants the employees to remain anonymous when they speak to the media. The – earlier popular – adjective “customary” is still sometimes used, but more often these sources request anonymity “because of government policy”, “in line with ministry policy”, “following protocol”, or “under military rules” (all examples from AP reports). Resorting to nominalization can, however, make this simple explanation more ambiguous, as when AP (March 7, 2007) refers to “a party official, who spoke on condition of anonymity *citing prohibitions* on dealing with the media” (my italics).

The second point focuses on the speaker, at least superficially. Typically, s/he is “not authorized” *to speak to the media*, or *to the press*, or

about the matter, to talk with reporters, to make media comments, or to disclose the information, and so on. I have chosen example (9) to demonstrate that this kind of explanation tends to raise several questions:

- (9) By Wednesday, 13 of the 16 wounded Americans had returned to duty, according to *a senior U.S. military official* who spoke on condition of anonymity *because he was not authorized to speak about the matter*. Twenty suspected insurgents were killed and 30 wounded, he said. (AP April 11, 2007; my italics)

Officials – especially “senior U.S.” officials – are supposed to have “authority”, so why is this official “not authorized”? Who gave him the order to remain silent? Does the prohibition concern only this particular “matter”? And even more relevantly, why did he, nevertheless, want to speak to the press?⁷ Like in the expression “on condition of anonymity”, the vocabulary in the numerous explanations containing “not authorized” comes from an “official register”. The passive voice makes these reasons even more ambiguous, hiding the identity of the higher authority who is suggested to be responsible for the prohibition.

An additional clause explaining the reason opens up possibilities for *evaluating* the speaker, in appraisal terms, for inscribed (explicit) or evoked (implicit) affect values. Often speakers want to remain anonymous, because they fear for “reprisals”, for “jeopardizing” their job, for “hurting relations with the countries involved” (AP April 4, 2007), or “because of security concerns” (AP April 8, 2007). Nominalized “fears” and “concerns” tend to make the language – and the reasons accordingly – rather vague and unspecific (on emotions of *fear*, *worry* and *concern* in news agency reports, see Stenvall 2007). In some cases, however, the reason for anonymity is well-founded, although the fear is not explicitly expressed:

⁷ The chair of the APME credibility committee commented on a somewhat similar case in *the New York Times* as follows: “Readers understand that military officers aren’t supposed to discuss classified material, and that’s why they’re anonymous. But on the flip side, should this story have said why the officers told secrets to a reporter? Wouldn’t readers be interested in knowing their motivation?” (Buel 2005).

- (10) The Mahdi Army commanders who spoke to the AP did so on condition of anonymity because *their organization is viewed as illegal by the American military and giving their names would likely lead to their arrest and imprisonment*. They said Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards was running the training operation in Iran. (AP April 12, 2007; my italics)

In view of the news rhetoric, the fact that a speaker is connected to (either implicit or explicit) negative affect values – when s/he is presented as being in danger or “fearing” – is liable to enhance the newsworthiness of the report.

Explanations of reasons focusing on the *topic* of the report may also contain negative evaluation, APPRECIATION values, in particular. In my AP data, the reason for the speaker's anonymity is often said to be *the sensitivity of the subject/information/ issue/matter/case/talks/ discussions/ incident*, etc.; either the noun *sensitivity*, or the adjective *sensitive* is used. Example (11) shows one of the few explanations for anonymity reasons found in my Reuters data:

- (11) “There's been no real explanation for those remarks,” *a senior administration official* told Reuters late on Wednesday.
“In public they have been defended and reiterated by the foreign ministry,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity *because of the sensitivity of the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter*. (Reuters April 12, 2007; my italics).

Example (11) refers to the critical remarks King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had made on the United States and the Iraqi war. The “sensitivity” that has prevented the “senior” official from giving his name does not concern only the subject of the report, but also the relationship between the two countries more generally. Notably, the additional postmodifying remark about “oil” suggests one important reason for keeping good relations with the Saudis.

“A sensitive subject or issue”, according to Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary (Sinclair 1995: 1511), “needs to be dealt with carefully because it is likely to cause disagreement or make people angry or upset”. Thus this APPRECIATION value, which evaluates the situation as sensi-

tive (i.e. problematic), might also provoke affect. Besides the “sensitivity” of the issue, the reason for anonymity can be, for example, that “the investigation” is still “ongoing”, or that the information is “confidential”, or even “classified under French law” (AP April 6, 2007).

Named or unnamed?

In this section, I take a closer look into two examples, which show how the journalist’s wish to convince the readers almost puts the speaker’s anonymity at risk. (The various details referring to the speaker in question are marked in italics.)

- (12) While the focus remained on the Shahi Kot fighting, *a senior Afghan military official* said Taliban and al Qaeda rebels had also regrouped in four eastern provinces, including Wardak, Khost, Ghazni and other locations in Paktia province.

The senior Afghan official who warned of other rebel pockets, said thousands of government troops were already on the way to the areas to head off trouble.

“We have intelligence that remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda are armed and still active in these (four) regions,” *the official*, who is *a top aide of Defence Minister General Mohammad Fahim but who declined to be identified*, told Reuters. (Reuters March 12, 2002)

- (13) Monday, about 100 relatives, mainly wives and mothers, many of them fully veiled, waited at the gates of the military base and heard the verdicts from reporters.

“All he did was pray and a be true Muslim, but this is a dirty government,” *the mother of 21-year-old Ashraf Ahmed Mokhtar Ibrahim* said when she learned he had been sentenced to three years for belonging to an illegal group.

The woman, who did not give her name, said Ibrahim, a computer specialist, had been supporting his six siblings since the death of his father. (AP Sept. 9, 2002)

As we see, the speaker in example (12) is presented in three different instalments. He is: (a) “a senior Afghan military official”, (b) “[t]he senior Afghan official who warned of other rebel pockets”, (c) “the official... a top aide of Defence Minister General Mohammad Fahim”. He has categorically

“declined to be identified”; at the same time, the expression “told Reuters” denotes that the information has been given exclusively to the Reuters correspondent (and not, for instance, at a public press conference). Since the quotations of this unnamed speaker contain rather important information, we can assume that the details of attribution aim at enhancing the credibility of the news actor’s words – at stressing that he is giving “facts”. In this respect, the label with the appreciation value – “top aide” – is the most significant. It stresses the elite status of the speaker, and it also establishes him as a “competent knower”, as one who has access to the information of the Afghan Defense Ministry.

On the basis of the detailed attribution given in the Reuters dispatch, it might be rather easy to find out the name of the “top aide”, would one wish to do so. In example (13), the expression of anonymity (“did not give her name”) seems to be even more superfluous, since the speaker is presented as “the mother of 21-year-old Ashraf Ahmed Mokhtar Ibrahim”. The mother has been chosen to symbolize the feelings of the relatives of 51 men sentenced “in one of Egypt’s biggest Islamic militancy cases in years” (AP Sept. 9, 2002). The details in the attribution refer, in fact, to the convicted son, but from them we learn that the mother is a widow, who has counted on the help of his son in raising six other children. The quotes in this example are evaluations; although they are values of (attributed) judgement, they can be said to provoke affect, that is, emotive reactions. Presenting individual speakers as members of a family appeals to readers and offers them “potential points of identification” (Hartley 1982: 90). Thus, in example (13), the mother’s positive evaluations of her son invite compassion. The label added by the reporter of Ibrahim being “a computer specialist”, supports the mother’s positive words, that is, that Ibrahim is a good boy.

As a summary, Table 1 compares how these two different speakers have been construed:

TABLE 1

Construction of the speakers in examples (12) and (13)

	Example (12)	Example (13)
Status of the speaker	Elite person	Ordinary person
Role of the speaker	Top aid of the Defense Minister	Mother of convicted Ibrahim
Speaking for	Afghanistan Defense Ministry	Relatives of suspected militants
APPRAISAL values	Unattributed inscribed APPRECIATION	Attributed inscribed+ evoked JUDGEMENT
Function of quotes	Giving “facts”	Evaluating (the son)
Expression of anonymity	“Declined to be identified”	“Did not give her name”
Rhetorical potential	Enhancing credibility	Evoking emotions (compassion)

These two examples give further evidence of the central functions that the attribution of unnamed sources can have in news rhetoric. Besides giving the reader “context and detail” (cf. Reuters’ advice to journalists), it can be used to categorize the speakers and, together with the quoted words, it can enhance the credibility of an unnamed source or evoke emotions in the reader, etc. Although the two news actors, according to the reports, have asked to remain unnamed, the wealth of details the journalists provide of them may undermine their anonymity.

Concluding remarks

Reuters states in its online handbook: “Anonymous sources are the weakest sources... We alone are responsible for the accuracy of such information” (Reuters 2997a). Thus, the various explanations surrounding the attribution of unnamed sources could reflect the journalists’ wish to reduce their own responsibility (on responsibility in attribution, see Stenvall,

forthcoming). And as we have seen in examples (12) and (13), sometimes an anonymous source, as a result, becomes almost named against her/his own wish.

At the same time, “a senior military official” presented in the lead of a news report need not be an unnamed source at all. News stories typically begin with general information and proceed from general to specific, in instalments (cf. van Dijk 1988), and so the name may be published in the second – or even third – quote from the official in question. Similarly, sayings of the collective unspecified “analysts” or “officials” appearing at the beginning of a report can be backed up by naming one or two of them further down – a strategy suggested also by the AP managing editor (Silverman 2005) for avoiding extensive quoting of anonymous speakers. This kind of “step-by-step” presentation looks quite natural, as it conforms to the conventions of news writing. But as it is realized discontinuously – in instalments – so that one speaker may be quoted several times, separated by paragraphs containing other speakers’ sayings, it is not always so easy to establish, for instance, which two or three named “analysts” or “officials” are the ones referred to in the lead paragraph. Moreover, the reader cannot know whether the generic word that is used includes a larger group (of analysts, officials, etc.), or just the two or three that are later named.

Expressions discussed above do not always succeed in giving an explicit explanation for anonymity, and they invariably leave open the reason why the speaker in question disclosed confidential information, sometimes even against the law. To say, for instance, that a speaker “was not authorized” may sound “official” and “authoritative”, and thus “factual”, but the expression hides more than it reveals. In any case, since it is often combined with another ambiguous expression – “on condition of anonymity” –, it contributes to making the language vaguer.

From the point of view of AP and Reuters, stressing the anonymity and boosting the standing of unnamed speakers are meant to give the readers as much information, that is, “facts”, as possible. However, the more copiously journalists surround the anonymous sources with various expressions, the more possibilities they open up for their rhetorical con-

struction. As the analysis has shown, these expressions contain evaluation (of the speaker or the issue in question, for example), which then accentuates newsworthiness – in other words, basic news values. And these values, as researchers say, are not neutral; they “reflect ideologies and priorities held in society” (Bell 1991: 156). Thus, this kind of attribution can be argued to undermine the factuality and objectivity of the news agency discourse.

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Study E:

On emotions and the journalistic ideals of factuality and objectivity – tools for analysis¹

1 Introduction

This paper seeks to relate three problematic concepts – *emotion*, *factuality* and *objectivity* – to each other in a cohesive manner. The complexity of these concepts, however, is due to different factors. While journalistic ‘objectivity’ is generally regarded as a myth, and ‘factuality’ in reporting may be elusive, too, there is no doubt about the existence of emotions. But as the study of emotions, since the 1970s, has spread to include a wealth of researchers, representing several academic disciplines, finding common definitions for the concept of emotion has proven difficult.

Section 2 looks into ‘factuality’ and ‘objectivity’, which, over the years, have become established ideals of news writing (see e.g., van Dijk 1988; White 1998). Emotions will be discussed in section 3, which also seeks to demonstrate how the inherent ‘subjectivity’ of emotions can affect the journalists’ quest for ‘objectivity’ or ‘factuality’.

The main aim of this study is to introduce some linguistic tools for media analysis; tools that can be used to examine the challenge that reporting on emotions poses to journalistic ‘objectivity’ and ‘factuality’. For

¹ Stenvall, Maija. 2008. On emotions and the journalistic ideals of factuality and objectivity – tools for analysis. *Journal of Pragmatics* 40:9. Special Issue “Pragmatic and discourse-analytic approaches to present-day English”, 1569–1586. Used with kind permission from Elsevier Ltd.

this purpose, section 4 presents two complementary approaches; one of them draws on central concepts of M.A.K. Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1994), while the other is based on the Appraisal framework (see The Appraisal Website: Homepage), which is an extension of Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar. Halliday's grammatical systems of *nominalization*, *grammatical metaphor* and *transitivity* are especially useful tools when looking into 'hidden' responsibility and into some other issues that mostly depend on the routines of 'objective' writing (see subsection 4.1). The subsection of Appraisal (subsection 4.2) deals mostly with (invoked) Affect values, but also two longer texts are examined in order to retrieve patterns of evaluation and writer–reader alignment; and to reveal the news journalists' subjective points of view, accordingly.

My examples come from the wire reports of two big international news agencies, AP and Reuters, which together with two other news agencies (AFP and UPI) have had a central role in shaping the form and the (objective) style of news reports, and also the very concept of 'news' (cf. Boyd-Barrett 1980, 1998). Examples from my data show that their language is not so objective or factual as it is often claimed to be, and as journalists themselves would like to believe.

2 News agencies and the ideals of objectivity and factuality

This section examines the concepts of journalistic *objectivity* and *factual-ity*. The pursuit of these ideals in news writing involves many kinds of rhetorical devices. Furthermore, what is regarded as factual or objective by a journalist, may look vague and obscure, or even ideologically determined, from a media researcher's point of view (cf. White 1998: 281 on 'objectivity' and journalists).

The two news agencies, AP and Reuters, have set high goals for themselves. This is the AP's "mission":

AP's mission is to be the essential global news network, providing distinctive news services of the highest quality, reliability and objectivity with reports that are accurate, balanced and informed.
(AP website: "Facts & Figures")

The following extract comes from the Reuters "Editorial policy":

We are committed to reporting the facts and in all situations avoid the use of emotive terms. The only exception is when we are quoting someone directly or in indirect speech. We aim to report objectively actions, identity and background and pay particular attention to all our coverage in extremely sensitive regions. (Reuters website: "About Reuters")

As can be noticed, these extracts include the words "objectivity" (AP) and "objectively" (Reuters). Reuters also speaks about "reporting the facts" and about avoiding "the use of emotive terms". However, it remains unclear what is meant by *emotive terms*; at least *emotion words* are widely used outside quotations, as examples from Reuters news reports below (in sections 3 and 4) show.

Although the news agencies, no doubt, strive for objectivity, media researchers seem to agree that achieving such goals as 'objectivity' or 'factuality' in reporting is a nearly impossible task (e.g., Hartley 1982; van Dijk 1988; Fowler 1991). It can also be hypothesized that news journalists and media researchers define these concepts somewhat differently. For journalists, direct quotes from news actors are a sure guarantee of 'factuality' (cf. Fishman 1980; Sigal 1986); furthermore, allowing all (that is, at least more than just one news actor) to present their views equally would certainly count as 'objective' reporting, and so on. At the same time, media researchers – especially those who analyze news discourse – argue that journalistic objectivity "denotes a set of rhetorical devices" (Sigal 1986: 15). Notably, it presupposes that the voice of the reporter is backgrounded, or at least blurred (White 1998). According to White (1998: 267), journalists writing hard news reports have adopted a special "tactic of impersonalization", which he calls "reporter voice". Using quotations is an important part of this kind of impersonalization strategy, but in unattributed statements, too, the author role can be backgrounded so that meanings are rep-

resented “as more generally or communally based, as somehow given by the community as a whole” (White 1998: 271).

News agency reports can be regarded as good examples of hard news stories (although news agencies do transmit dispatches belonging to other categories, for instance, to “news analysis” or “feature”). Their voice aims at being objective; in White’s terms, they are typical representatives of ‘reporter voice’. When analyzing emotions in news agency texts, and examining how the conventions of reporting affect the alleged ‘objectivity’ or ‘factuality’, it is not always easy to say categorically which of the two intertwined concepts has been undermined. If the language has become vague, and the responsibility of news actors has been blurred, as is often the case (see sections 3 and 4), ‘facts’ have surely been distorted, but it may be more difficult to decide if or how objectivity, too, has been affected.

3 Emotions and news discourse

The first part of this section gives a brief overview on emotion studies; focusing on the researchers’ attempts to find a definition for the concept of *emotion* and to list the so-called ‘basic emotions’.

As definitions by “leading theorists” relate emotions to the *individual’s goals* (Oatley et al 2006: 29), emotions can be deduced to be basically subjective experiences. This inherent challenge for the alleged objectivity/factuality of news discourse will be discussed in the second subsection, before introducing tools for linguistic analysis in section 4.

3.1 Emotion studies

Before the 1970s, the study of emotions was mainly limited to the fields of psychology and philosophy, whereas today the interest is shared by researchers from several other academic disciplines: anthropology, linguistics, neuroscience, political science and sociology, for example (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990; Berezin 2002; Tudor 2003). Understandably, it is

not easy to find a common definition for such a complex concept as emotion, given the wide spectrum of researchers representing a great variety of disciplines.

Oatley et al (2006: 28, 29) present “definitions of emotion by leading theorists”, summarizing that “one may treat **emotions**, at least to start with, as *multi-component responses to challenges or opportunities that are important to the individual’s goals, particularly social ones*” (original bold face and italics). The “components” have to do with physiological responses (facial movements, gestures, etc.), with our thoughts and talk, and even action. Some researchers see emotions as social constructions, others stress the validity of the appraisal theory, and there has been a debate between the proponents of the “prototype approach” and those of the “classical view” (on this debate, see e.g., Russell 1991; Clore and Ortony 1991), and so on. Often when controversies arise, the opponents find that they have been “speaking at cross-purposes”, and that, after a minor change of focus, reconciliation could be possible (cf. Russell 1991: 37).

When scholars from various disciplines have sought to compose a list of “basic emotions”, most emotions seem to be negative.

Here are some of those lists:

- Ekman (2003: 58): sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust, contempt, happiness (these emotions “each have a distinct, universal, facial expression”, Ekman says)
- Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987: 33): happiness, sadness, anxiety (or fear), anger, disgust
- Kemper (2002: 56): anger, fear, sadness, joy
- Kövecses (2000: 3): anger, sadness, fear, joy, love
- Plutchik (1980: 16): fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, anticipation, surprise

As we can see, the rate of negative emotions, in the respective lists, varies between 50 and 80 per cent, whereas the highest rate for positive emotions is 40. Ekman (2003: 58, 59), however, remarks that resorting to “a simple dichotomy” (positive/negative) is not unproblematic; “we must examine the specifics of each emotional episode before we can tell whether it is pleasant or unpleasant for the person feeling it”.

3.2 Emotions and journalistic objectivity

The ‘subjectivity’ of emotions naturally poses problems especially for journalists writing hard news reports. As noted above, the ‘objective’ style of such reports presupposes that the journalist’s voice is backgrounded, which means that authorial emotions ought to be totally excluded. Strictly speaking, the only way to report *other* people’s individual feelings ‘objectively’ is to resort to direct quotes, that is, to let the person in question describe how s/he feels. The following example from AP gives an emotional reaction of an ‘ordinary’ Spanish citizen after the terrorist bombings in Madrid in 2004:

- (1) “I came with a lot of fear,” said a tearful Isabel Galan, 32, her makeup streaked on her cheeks. “I saw the trains and I burst into tears. I felt so helpless, felt such anger.” (AP March 3, 2004)

As we can see, Isabel Galan herself ‘labels’ as many as three emotions: fear, anger and helplessness. “I burst into tears” could refer to a fourth emotion, namely sorrow, but in this case, this physiological response has probably been triggered by a mixture of several feelings – anger, helplessness, sorrow, etc. Notably, the reporter ‘verifies’ Isabel’s emotionally charged comments by describing how she looks (“tearful”, with “makeup streaked”).

Direct quotes that let one individual speak of her or his feelings appear, however, very seldom in news agency reports. More often, journalists try to *interpret* emotions, not only those of one person but also emotions of a big group; collective events, such as elections rallies, funerals or anniversary commemorations, are a central part of daily news reporting. Descriptions of people’s factual behavior, that is, of outward signs of emotions (tears, cheering, applause, etc.), lead the reader to deduce that people really ‘feel’. Example (2) refers to common emotions experienced on the third anniversary of the September 11 attacks (the outward signs of emotion are marked in italics):

(2) NEW YORK (AP) -- Their *voices breaking*, parents and grandparents of those lost on Sept. 11 stood at the World Trade Center site Saturday and marked the third anniversary of the attacks by reciting the names of the 2,749 people who died there.

The list took more than three hours, punctuated by *tearful dedications* when the readers reached the names of their own lost loved ones.

Hundreds of family members descended a long ramp into ground zero, *sobbing, embracing each other* and *tossing a layer of roses* onto two square reflecting pools meant to evoke the fallen twin towers.

(AP Sept. 11, 2004)

Sociologists, in particular, have been interested in this kind of ‘group emotions’ (Kemper 2002), or in ‘communities of feeling’ (Berezin 2002). From the point of view of sociology, emotions are “unproblematic until they result in social or collective action” (Berezin 2002: 37). Repeated rituals, such as annual commemorations, tend to create a feeling of solidarity (“we are all here together”) (Berezin 2002: 44, 45), and spontaneous gatherings – when people, for instance, come to mourn the sudden death of a beloved person (like Princess Diana) – generate “emotional energy”; something that politicians exploit for their own purposes. However, because emotions are individual, the outcome of this kind of gatherings – ‘communities of feeling’ – can be far from the expected. Kemper (2002: 62) writes of ‘group emotion’ in a similar vein:

Only individuals experience emotions. Thus when we speak of a group emotion, we can mean only that some aggregate of individuals is feeling something that is sufficiently alike to be identified as the common emotion of that aggregate.

In a large group, Kemper (2002: 63) further says, there may be a big ‘silent majority’ which does not fully feel the emotion, but nevertheless “these bystanders ... add substance to any observation that it is the emotion the group is feeling”.

In news agency reports sometimes the whole nation is construed as having common feelings, for example, when AP (Sept. 11, 2002) speaks

about “Iraqis fearful and angry”. Those who ‘feel’ can also be left unspecified, as the following example from Reuters shows:

- (3) The arrest of Zamili, sparked *anger from Sadr's political movement*, which accused the U.S. military of trying to provoke a confrontation. It urged the government to free the official.
(Reuters Feb. 8, 2007; my italics)

The “movement” as such cannot be expected to experience emotions, so the identity and the number of angry persons remain unclear. Obviously somebody from “Sadr’s political movement” has accused the U.S. military of provocation, and thus the journalist has deduced that the person or persons in question are ‘angry’. Example (3) also gives evidence of the journalistic convention which makes news journalists present emotions as “affectual states ... as simply reflecting reality” (White 1998: 271).

4 Tools for analysis

This section presents linguistic tools that media analysis can draw on when emotions are examined. Some of the tools are central concepts of M.A.K. Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1994), while others belong to the Appraisal framework (see e.g., The Appraisal Website: Homepage), which is an extension of that grammar.

As noted, my examples come from the wire reports of AP and Reuters news agencies. The central task of the international news agencies is to distribute so-called ‘spot’ or ‘hard’ news as quickly as possible, nearly in real time; a major part of their recipients being journalists of other media. However, their print news service also comprises categories which do not depend so much on the speed of the delivery, e.g., ‘features’, and these, too, are discussed in some examples.

4.1 Emotions and functional grammar

In this subsection, I will introduce three central grammatical systems of Halliday's Functional Grammar – *transitivity*, *nominalization* and *grammatical metaphor* – that are useful tools when emotions in news discourse are analyzed. These three systems are intertwined; nominalization and grammatical metaphor, in particular, are so closely tied that they need to be presented together.

4.1.1 Nominalized emotions in grammatical metaphors

Following Halliday, I take nouns designating emotions – even those that are 'non-derived' words – to be *nominalizations*. After metaphorical rewording, a clause with processes (verbs) and properties (adjectives) becomes a nominal group (Halliday 1994: 352). In other words, emotions realized as qualities (adjectives) or processes (verbs) become 'states' (nouns); for instance: angry>anger, joyful>joy, happy>happiness, to fear>fear, to love>love, to hate>hatred.

In a grammatical metaphor, meaning is "construed in a different way by means of a different grammatical construction" (Hasselgård 2000), and nominalization, according to Halliday (1994: 352), is "the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor". Halliday (1998: 211) further states that the noun is "the most metaphorically attractive category" so that "everything else can end up as a noun". In view of the factuality and objectivity of news discourse, this kind of transformation is significant for at least two reasons. First, the nominalized word, e.g., an emotion, can now function as a participant in processes, or as a part of a prepositional phrase (cf. Halliday 1998: 197; Fairclough 1995: 112). (This point will be discussed in connection with *transitivity* below). Secondly, nominalization is "inherently, potentially mystificatory" (Fowler 1991: 82); when, for instance, a process of feeling becomes a 'thing', it might not be clear anymore, who is the one that has experienced the emotion, and what has caused it.

The second point can be illustrated by looking at grammatical metaphors which consist of noun phrases having a nominalized emotion word

as the head noun. Packaging information into compressed noun phrases is a journalistic convention that has prevailed since the 18th century (Biber 2003: 170). Biber (2003: 180) presents two central factors that have contributed to the popularity of noun phrases: new production facilities, which offer opportunities for editing and revising the text, and the “pressure to communicate information as efficiently and economically as possible”. The use of vague noun phrases also serves to impersonalize the text, helping journalists to background their own voice.

There is, however, a clear drawback in this economic style; the meaning of compressed sequences is often far from explicit. Biber (2003: 179, 180) notes that “noun-noun sequences can represent a bewildering array of meaning relationships”; for decoding the relationship between the nouns the reader needs “well-developed pragmatic knowledge”. The obscuring effect is especially conspicuous when the head noun of the noun phrase is a nominalization designating an emotion. In the following examples, the head noun is ‘fears’, an emotion word which appears frequently in my data (noun phrases are marked in italics; report headlines – as throughout the present paper – are in bold):

- (4) The 8.7-magnitude quake hit off off [sic] Indonesia's Nias island Tuesday, triggering *tsunami fears* and killing at least 330 people (AP March 29, 2005)
- (5) More than 140 people have died in violence already this year, underlining *security fears ahead of the vote*. (AP March 14, 2004)
- (6) **BC-EU-GEN--Germany-Spain-Tourism Fears**
Madrid terrorist attacks raises fears that tourism won't rebound (AP slug line + headline March 12, 2004)
- (7) GLOBAL MARKETS-**Oil, gold jump on Iraq fears, dollar choppy** (Reuters headline Sept. 9, 2002)
- (8) **Terror arrests heighten UK's pre-Christmas fears** (Reuters headline Dec. 18, 2002)

Examples (6)–(8) give evidence of the fact that space-saving compressed noun phrases are especially popular in the headlines and ‘keyword slug lines’ of news agency reports².

When we try to ‘unpack’ the grammatical metaphors (the noun phrases), we find that the following four issues have to be dealt with:

1. Who are the ‘fearing’ people?
2. What is feared, i.e. what is the ‘object’ of the fears?
3. What has now triggered the fears?
4. What is the meaning relationship between the head noun ‘fears’ and the pre-modifying noun?

By reading the news agency reports from which the examples have been taken and by adding some “well-developed pragmatic knowledge” (cf. Biber 2003: 180), it is possible to get the answers to these four questions. However, clarifying the first point, i.e., the identity of those who are supposed to experience the emotion of fear, may prove extremely difficult. In any case, one would have to refer to very large groups of people, such as “Indonesians”, “investors”, “representatives of Europe’s travel industry”, or “British people”. It has to be noted, too, that some of these ‘fears’ seem to be weaker than the others; they could rather be called ‘worries’ or ‘concerns’. None of the examples refer to an immediate danger or threat; all the ‘fears’ focus on something negative which could happen some time in the future, but here again the danger of a tsunami could be more imminent than the other threats.

Only example (4) gives clear answers to questions number 2–4. What is feared is the “tsunami”, and a new earthquake in Indonesia has triggered the fears. An additional explanation is provided later in the AP dispatch; the journalist refers to memories of another earthquake and the resulting disastrous tsunami in December 2004. In examples (5), (6) and (8), “fears” are not directly related to the pre-modifiers – “security”, “tourism” and

² News agency headlines – at least those of Reuters – are restricted in length: the Reuters handbook (on the website) says that they should not exceed 50 characters. The ‘slug line’ is the topmost line of a news agency dispatch, and consists of a few keywords (sometimes only one), which are meant to summarize the whole report.

“pre-Christmas”, respectively – ; the basic fears in them concern a possibility of terrorist attacks.

Explaining the relationship between the two nouns in examples (5)–(8) is not a simple task. When, for instance, the Reuters headline in example (7) talks about “Iraq fears”, it does not mean that the state (or the nation) of “Iraq” is feared. The writer elaborates in the lead paragraph of this financial news report that the market disturbances are caused by “the standoff between the United States and Iraq and the impending anniversary of the September 11 attacks”, which “spooked investors” (Reuters Sept. 9, 2002). That is, although investors certainly fear that the United States might attack Iraq, they are, ultimately, worried about the consequences of such an attack: a possible tumult in financial markets.

However, it is probably the grammatical metaphor in example (8) – “UK’s pre-Christmas fears” – that poses the hardest challenge for a reader. Why “Christmas”, in particular, should be feared, is not specified in the dispatch at all; the reader has to rely on “well-developed pragmatic knowledge”, i.e., on the assumption that “terrorists” could be especially active before Christmas, because people are known to travel and go shopping more than usual during the Christmas holidays. Why one should ‘fear’ especially in the “UK” is, at the same time, explained by the Reuters journalist, who writes that Britain is “assumed to be high on the hit-list of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network due to London’s support to Washington [in the Iraq-policy]” (Reuters Dec. 18, 2002).

4.1.2 Emotions and transitivity choices

The transitivity system focuses on the meaning of the “clause as representation” and “construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES” (Halliday, 1994: 106). The main types of process are *material processes: processes of doing*; *mental processes: processes of sensing*; and *relational processes: processes of being* (Halliday, 1994: 107–138). In addition to the process itself (i.e., the verbal group), the process consists of two other elements: participants in the process, and circumstances associated with the process. The central participant in material

processes is called an Actor; the second participant, a Goal, is optional. The participant roles for relational processes are Token and Value (or Carrier and Attribute), and for mental processes Senser and Phenomenon.

Feeling is a process of sensing and thus “mental”. In the following example from Reuters, both participants of the mental process can be clearly identified (italics are mine):

- (9) Soldiers, veterans and local residents staged two counter-demonstrations, but there were military veterans and families among the anti-war groups.
"I hate George Bush and everything he stands for and this war of vanity," said Don Marshburn, 72, a disabled Navy veteran from Newton Grove North Carolina. "I'm sick of bombs. It didn't do anything over there and it didn't do anything over here." (Reuters March 20, 2004)

Don Marshburn had expressed his feelings to Reuters during an anti-war demonstration in Texas, on the first anniversary of the Iraqi war. He is the Senser, the one who feels, while the Phenomenon – the object of his hatred – comprises, besides U.S. President George Bush, also the ideology President Bush is supposed to represent, as well as the war in Iraq. But as mentioned above, news journalists do not often report on the emotions of just one individual. The role of a Senser becomes obscure when it is given to a large group of people (“world”), or to unspecified groups (“poor and powerful”), as in examples (10) and (11):

- (10) **World mourns Sept. 11 victims, but Arabs accuse United States of spreading terrorism threat** (AP headline Sept. 11, 2004)
- (11) **Poor and powerful mourn Pope at emotional funeral** (Reuters headline April 8, 2005)

In example (12), the process of fearing has been nominalized:

- (12) When al-Sadr preaches at a mosque in Kufa, a town near Najaf, his security officers send out decoy convoys to confuse would-be attackers. *His main fear* is said to be *an attack by rival Shiites*, but he is also worried about the Americans and assassins hired by Sunni religious extremists who consider Shiites to be heretics. (AP Feb. 15, 2007; my italics)

The noun *fear* is a Value, a participant in an identifying relational process. In other words, “an attack by rival Shiites” (a Token) is identified as “his main fear”. If the grammatical metaphor “his main fear” were ‘unpacked’ into a mental process, we could say, for example: ‘an attack by rival Shiites is what he (al-Sadr) fears most [it is said]’. Despite the nominalization of fear, the Senser and the Phenomenon can be easily recognized in example (12).

Nominalization of emotions, however, tends to distance the participants of the original process (of feeling). In my study on terrorism fear in news agency reports (Stenvall 2007), I found that journalists spoke of (indefinite) *fears* more frequently than of *fear* in the singular. These fears were often participants in material processes. They could be part of the “circumstantial element” (cf. Halliday 1994: 149–161) so that the events took place “amid”, or “on”, or “over” fears. The emotion was only loosely tied to the Actor of the process; “a circumstantial element”, Halliday (1994: 151) states, “is itself... a process that has become parasitic on another process”. It was not clear anymore whose feelings were reported on.

Presenting emotions as some kind of free-floating entities in material processes is especially typical of financial news reports. In some rare cases, human actors (“investors”) would seem to be in command, as in example (13), which shows ‘fears’ in the role of a Goal:

- (13) Asian stock *investors put aside security fears* and chased Friday's Wall Street rally, sending most major indices higher. (Reuters March 15, 2004; my italics)

More often, though, we find a reversed set-up: human agents (investors, insurers, etc.) are those who are affected, i.e., they have been put in the role of a Patient or a Goal, while emotions are construed as Actors.

Negativity being newsworthy³, it is not surprising that ‘fears’ in financial news reports tend to be more powerful – and occur more frequently –

³ In 1965, Galtung and Ruge presented 12 factors affecting ‘newsworthiness’ (the study was reprinted in 1970). The groundbreaking study has since then been revisited by several

than positive emotions, but sometimes ‘hopes’, too, can reach the headline, as example (15) shows:

- (14) **Bomb fears sink stocks, dollar; lift bonds, oil**
(Reuters headline March 15, 2004)
- (15) **Security hopes lift European stocks; Raisio soars**
(Reuters headline March 19, 2004)

Instead of human actors, “fears” and “hopes” are said to be responsible for the changes in the market. When we ‘unpack’ the noun phrase “bomb fears” in example (14) into a mental process, we can deduce that what is feared, i.e. the Phenomenon, is a “bomb” (attack). But given that the role of Senser goes to investors, it is obvious that they do not fear becoming targets of a bomb attack, but rather fear losing their money. While “security fears”, in example (5) above, could be taken to mean ‘fears of losing security’, the noun phrase “security hopes” in example (15) presents a different kind of relationship between the two nouns: ‘security’ is the object of ‘hopes’ and worth preserving. Again, ‘investors’ are the Sensers, and the hopes” have been triggered by the news that “Pakistani forces were closing in on a key al Qaeda figure” (Reuters March 19, 2004).

4.2 The Appraisal framework and the sub-system of Affect

Appraisal theory is rather complex; in addition to three main systems, it contains several sub-systems and sub-categories, most of which are not relevant when emotions are studied in view of journalistic objectivity. Appraisal is divided into three interacting systems: Attitude, Engagement and Graduation. Attitude comprises three sub-systems: Affect (construing emotional responses), Judgement (evaluating human behavior, dealing with ethics and morality) and Appreciation (evaluating entities, ‘by reference to aesthetics and other systems of social value’) (The Appraisal Web-

news researchers. Probably the best-known of these factors, generally known as *news values*, are *negativity*, *eliteness* and *personification*.

site: Homepage; Martin 2000). Engagement has to do with “sourcing attitudes and the play of voices around opinions in discourse” (Martin and White 2005: 35), and Graduation with “[a]mplifying the force of attitudes” and with “the sharpening and softening” of focus (Martin and Rose 2003: 38-41). In a sense, Affect is the basic Attitude sub-system (Martin 2000: 147), because the other two – Judgement and Appreciation – also “encode feeling”. Appraisal values can be either explicit (*inscribed*) or implicit (*evoked/invoked/provoked*).

As my study concerns emotions, I will mainly deal with the sub-system of Affect, and because of my focus on the relationship between emotions and objectivity, I look more closely into *implicit* Affect values and writer–reader alignment in news agency texts. Martin and White (2005: 63) suggest that “a text naturalises a reading position” so that, from the point of view of evaluation, the text “will be fairly directive in the kinds of **attitude** it wants readers to share”. However, hard news stories, which form the major part of my corpus, are not very well suited for analyzing attitudes in longer stretches of texts. They are not entities in the same way as, for example, newspaper stories; furthermore, they are often written in a hurry and contain a lot of repetition and include extracts written by more than one journalist. Therefore, I have also chosen some examples from another category, namely that of ‘features’. Features are in-depth stories on various topics, ranging from human interest, arts and entertainment to science and politics (cf. Wood 1995: F2).

4.2.1 Invoked Affect and reader alignment

According to Martin and Rose (2003: 28), there are four options in categorizing Affect: Affect can be positive or negative, direct or implicit. Implicit Affect can be realized by descriptions of “extraordinary behaviour”, or by metaphor. As an example, Martin and Rose (2003: 27) cite a text where one person (Helena) speaks about the “extraordinary behaviour” of another person, who would “wander from window to window”, or “rolls this way, that side of the bed”. Together with direct expressions denoting

negative emotions and physical behavior these (and other) implicit signs of emotion “build up a picture of her [Helena’s] second love’s living hell”. Martin and Rose (2003: 27) argue that interpersonal meanings “tend to sprawl out and colour a passage of discourse, forming a ‘prosody’ of attitude”. A further similar instance is the issue of reader alignment, i.e., how readers are invited to feel with the Emoter⁴.

Invocations of emotions by referring to an individual Emoter’s behavior are not very common in hard news reports. However, in connection with funerals or anniversary commemorations, for instance, the reporter sometimes describes the extraordinary behavior of big crowds, and thus tries to convey the emotional atmosphere to the readers. In example (16), Reuters reports on how ordinary people experienced the funeral of Pope John Paul II in the Vatican:

- (16) During his almost 3-hour funeral, *hundreds of thousands of people* who had crammed into the streets around St. Peter’s *stood quietly*, crossing themselves and murmuring along with prayers. When it ended *they burst into 15 minutes of applause* for a man who helped make history and touched millions personally.
(Reuters April 8, 2005; my italics)

The patient silence of this huge crowd of people speaks for their sorrow, only the spontaneous applause breaks the silence. News journalists often refer to (exceptional) silence, when they want to stress the emotion of sadness. Official moments of silence, which provide people with a chance to mourn collectively, are common in Western culture; moreover, silence as such might be considered “extraordinary”. This Affect value is often evoked by contrasting the silence with ‘normal’, busy life, or with crowds of people around, as in example (16). On the first anniversary of

⁴ Martin and White (2005: 46) call “the conscious participant experiencing the emotion an Emoter, and the phenomenon responsible for that emotion a Trigger”. In mental processes, they say, “both the Emoter and the Trigger of the emotion are participants (Senser and Phenomenon)” (Martin and White 2005:47). However, as examples from news agency reports show, the question of ‘Trigger’ can be rather complex, at least in connection with such emotions as ‘fear’ or ‘hope’ which refer to the future. For instance, when news agencies speak about “tsunami fears” (cf. example (4)), people, undoubtedly, *fear* a tsunami, but the ‘trigger’ in this case includes the new earthquake, too.

the September 11 attacks, the headline of an AP report read: “**Sept. 11 anniversary: Quiet descends on the city that never sleeps**” (AP headline Sept. 11, 2002).

Invocations of emotion in news reports frequently seem to rely on ‘the rhetoric of contrasts’. In example (17), the contrast is between ‘before’ and ‘after’ (the September 11 attacks). An explicit sign of sorrow (tears) further ‘directs’ readers to feel (contrasts are marked in italics):

- (17) Tears brimming in his eyes, Bush lingered nearly two hours
Wednesday *in the dirt* where the footing of New York's *World Trade Center north tower once stood*. (AP Sept. 11, 2002)

4.2.2 Retrieving the journalist's ‘voice’ in feature stories

I have chosen rather long extracts of two feature stories, one from each agency (AP and Reuters), to demonstrate how the journalist's voice – even in allegedly objective news reports – could be retrieved by looking into inscribed values and into ideational meanings invoking Attitude, and inviting the reader to feel. Both stories analyzed below were written to mark the first anniversary of the Iraqi war. The AP report was transmitted on March 12, 2004, while the Reuters story came six days later.

AP (Goldstein 2000: 234) says that feature stories can include – what it calls – ‘special literary effects’, but notes at the same time that ‘[m]ost feature material should follow the same style norms that apply to regular news copy’. Reuters handbook (on the website) states that “[f]eatures must conform like any other story with the Reuters values of accuracy, objectivity and precise sourcing”, although they give journalists “the chance to report in depth and against a more relaxed deadline”. The structure of feature stories shows more variation than that of hard news reports, which usually are said to resemble an inverted pyramid⁵. Features often begin

⁵ According to a simple definition (Scanlan 2000: 153), in the “inverted pyramid”, the most newsworthy information is put at the top, and “the remaining information follows in order of importance, with the least important at the bottom”. The big news agencies have had a central role in developing this popular structure. However, the existence of this kind of linear structure has also been disputed in recent research; White (1998: 186), most notably, has presented a model, according to which the opening of a news story is “a tex-

with a traditional narrative focusing on one individual, and sometimes the story of this person is picked up in the end, forming a kind of ‘sandwich structure’. In other words, the topic of the feature in question is personalized, a strategy that can evoke feelings (of empathy) in the reader through identification.

The AP feature on the Iraqi war anniversary is very long, containing quotes from several persons; from representatives of ordinary Iraqis as well as those of the U.S.-led coalition, etc. However, it begins and ends with a story of one person, a tailor called Mohammed Abed (inscribed Affect underlined):

(18) **BC-ME-FEA-GEN--Iraq-A Year Later,1669**
A year after war, life in Iraq improves slowly, but hope is scarce and fears of disaster loom

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- In Iraq, glimmers of hope can be found in the unlikeliest of places.

Few suffered as much in the war as Mohammed Abed, the tailor who found the bodies of his wife, his mother, his sister and his cousin in the rubble of a Baghdad slum after a missile struck the marketplace outside his shop last March.

For Abed, as for the rest of Iraq’s 25 million people, it has been a tumultuous year in which their country was invaded and Saddam Hussein, once their all-powerful leader, was pulled from a hole in the ground and arrested. A land held together for decades by force and dictatorship has shattered into fragments, often rivalrous. Insurgency and terrorism continue to take American, European, Asian and Iraqi lives.

Yet for all the hardships that have compounded Abed's grief -- jobless brothers, power cuts that shut down his sewing machines -- Abed, 31, exhibits little of the anger he sometimes betrayed in previous conversations with The Associated Press.

Having never known anything but Saddam's suffocating rule, he sees the beginnings of democracy and economic revival, and with U.S. soldiers on patrol he feels protected. "Their presence lets us sleep at night," he says.

tual nucleus”, which “enters into an orbital relationship of dependency with a set of satellites”. Nevertheless, even a quick survey of the instructions given on the Internet shows that those who want to learn how to write a professional news story are still advised to apply the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure. And the beginning of the story – “the headline/lead nucleus” (White 1998: 194) – is the most important part even in the White’s ‘satellite’ model.

Abed, the tailor, looks at the future largely through the eyes of his first-born, a baby girl he pulled from the arms of his wife's battered corpse.

In a marketplace filled with bodies torn apart by shrapnel, Fatima was protected by her mother's body.

She was sickly and thin for most of the year because of unclean water and the lack of her mother's milk. Today, she's a smiling, chubby 18-month-old. And as she grows, Abed said, it will be in nation [sic] that is finally free.

"When I look at the child I remember her mother. It has been a sad year," Abed said. "But it has also been a happy year, because we got rid of a tyrant." (AP feature report March 12, 2004)

The headline is illustrative of this long report. Throughout the report, especially in the long 'middle' part that could not be presented here, the journalist tries hard to find a balance between the pros and cons of the war; between "hope" and "fears", as the headline suggests. The lexis, too, gives ample evidence of the journalist's balancing act. There are adversative conjunctions (*yet, still, but, however*); or the contrast is stressed by temporal adverbs: *at first vs. now*. Three of the four ordinary Iraqis quoted in the report seem to have lost their hopes for a better future. Two of them stress how happy they were to get rid of Saddam, whereas now, as one of them says: "We are going from bad to worse. There is chaos. There is no security" (AP March 12, 2004).

However, the fact that the journalist has given the leading role to Mohammed Abed tips the scale toward 'hope'. Inscriptions of Affect in these two extracts, in fact, support the positive impression: (glimmers of) *hope, (Abed's) grief, little of the anger, feels protected*. 'Anger', of course, is negative, but there is less of it now than before, and *grief* refers to the past. In the last paragraph, Abed himself speaks about the past year, which he evaluates as "sad" and also "happy"; these Appreciation values certainly "encode feeling", too. Notably, the journalist refers to the same year as "tumultuous", which is an example of "intensifying lexis", typical of news discourse (cf. White 1997: 108, 109).

Readers are aligned into feeling empathy for "Iraq's 25 million people", but especially for the tailor, Mohammed Abed. The reporter describes how much Abed suffered in the war – losing his wife, his mother and sister

and cousin –, and what other “hardships” he has endured during one year; thus evoking Affect. Empathy is also invoked via counter-expectation and contrast. First, Abed’s “little” anger is measured against his hard sufferings, and, secondly, the intensifying metaphor “Saddam’s suffocating rule” is set against “the beginnings of democracy and economic revival”.

It is also notable that readers are *not* invited to experience any negative feelings towards people that can be supposed to have caused Abed’s “hardships”. Besides Abed himself, the only human actors in these extracts are “U.S. soldiers on patrol”, who make him feel “protected”. The journalist has resorted to several rhetorical strategies; inanimate objects (“a missile”), or abstract nouns (“hardships”, “force”, “dictatorship”, “insurgency”, “terrorism”) have been made responsible for negative actions; or the journalist has used agentless passive (“was invaded”, “was pulled” and “arrested”), or an intransitive verb (“A land ... has shattered into fragments”).

When the feature report in the last paragraphs picks up Abed’s story, such strong images as “his wife’s battered body”, and “bodies torn apart by shrapnel”, are likely to invoke the reader’s empathy. Although “hope” is no more explicitly mentioned, it is invoked by the image of Abed’s “smiling, chubby 18-month-old” baby girl, symbolizing the Iraqis’ hope for a better future.

The strategy of personalizing is even more apparent in the Reuters feature on the Iraqi war anniversary. Although the headline says “**A year on, Iraqis struggling to make sense of war**”, the reporter tells almost the whole story from the point of view of a young man called Haider Samir, and of his mother, Selwa Hassan. There are only four or five short paragraphs in the middle of the report which speak more generally of the continuing violence and of how “Washington was unprepared to handle post-war Iraq” (Reuters March 18, 2004). In line with the ‘objective’ style of the news agencies, the journalist attributes the latter claim to “many officials”.

The feature starts with a dramatic narrative of Haider walking in the streets of Baghdad one year earlier (omissions of paragraphs are marked with three dashes; direct inscriptions of Affect are underlined):

(19) **FEATURE-A year on, Iraqis struggling to make sense of war**

BAGHDAD, March 18 (Reuters) - On the first night the Americans bombed Baghdad, a frightened 23-year-old got into a taxi to join his family at his uncle's house across town. The cab got a puncture, he got out to walk.

A plane flew overhead, there was a huge explosion followed by smoke and panic. When a bomb fell on a nearby building, Haider Samir lost his eye and his arm.

Across the world, people watched live pictures of Baghdad's skyline red with flames. Haider Samir saw nothing.

A year later, he sits at home, his good eye glazed over, his face expressionless. His right leg is full of shrapnel, his mind full of fear.

"What is there to think now? I don't have any thoughts about the Americans, about war. I'm just tired."

Haider's mother cries when she talks about her eldest son. Widowed months before the war, Selwa Hassan relies on two of her children for money -- a son working as a guard for the health ministry, a daughter earning \$5 a week in a photocopying shop.

"When my husband died I thought at least I have a son," she said, wiping her eyes with her headscarf. "Now see what happened to him. If there's an explosion he gets so scared, he says he can hear the noise in his ears all the time. All he does is sit at home and smoke, smoke."

Like many Iraqis, they are too tired of war and too resigned to chaos to have a strong opinion. Selwa is scared of the bombs, worries how to feed her family, is anxious about the political parties proliferating across the country.

But for families like 44-year-old Selwa Hassan's, concepts like democracy or freedom mean little. She and her children repeat many times that they hope for a better future, but it seems a long way off.

In many ways, the family should epitomise the vision Washington says it has for Iraq -- son Ahmad, 21, has joined the new security forces and works at the ministry of health; daughter Numa, 25, is excited about the freedom promised to women.

Selwa herself is a Kurd who married an Arab. One of her daughters goes to a Christian church. All say they believe in freedom and that ethnic and religious communities should mix.

But at the same time, the family has been turned on its head

by a war that still dictates everything they do.
(Reuters feature report March 18, 2002)

As we can see, these extracts contain a wealth of direct inscriptions of Affect; most of them being the journalist's interpretations.

One of the distinctions Martin and White (2005: 46-51) present, when classifying (inscribed) Affect, is between "surge of behaviour" and "disposition"; that is, they examine whether feelings involve "some kind of embodied paralinguistic or extralinguistic manifestation", or whether they are "more internally experienced as a kind of emotive state or ongoing mental process" (Martin and White 2005: 47). In the Reuters feature, surges of behavior denoted by the expressions *his good eye glazed over* and *his face expressionless* confirm Haider's disposition; as he later says, he is "just tired". The same feeling – or maybe we should speak of a lack of feeling, as he is nearly apathetic – is evoked, when his mother describes the son's 'extraordinary' behavior: "All he does is sit at home and smoke, smoke". The other two surges of behavior refer to Selwa Hassan's emotions (grief, maybe disappointment): *Haider's mother cries; wiping her eyes with her headscarf*.

Only two of the inscribed Affect values in these extracts can be defined as positive: *they hope, is excited*. At the same time, 'hope' in this case is a mere wish, which is not likely to be fulfilled in the near future. The negative emotions are either different degrees of fear (*frightened, panic, fear, scared, worries, anxious*), or expressions of resignation (*just tired, tired of war, resigned to chaos*). The last paragraph of the story invokes the feeling of resignation and hopelessness via metaphor: the family has been *turned on its head* by the war.

All these negative emotions can certainly align readers into feeling empathy for Samir Haider and for his mother and sisters and brothers. But what can be expected to make the readers' identification even easier – and the feelings of empathy stronger – is the fact that these individuals are presented as members of a family (cf. Hartley 1982: 90). Here are some of the details that are likely to evoke empathy (note that not all of them could be included in example (19)):

- Haider’s “mother and seven siblings are still trying to make sense of what happened”
- The “mother cries when she talks about her eldest son” [Haider]
- Haider’s mother, Selwa Hassan, is a widow and relies on her children for money, but she cannot hope for help from the eldest son anymore
- After Haider was hit by the bomb, it took more than a week “until friends found him in hospital”

The two feature stories discussed above differ, not only in their structure, but also in some ideological aspects, including the distribution of Attitude values. While Mohammed Abed in the AP feature “sees the beginnings of democracy and economic revival”, for families like Selwa Hassan’s in the Reuters story, “concepts like democracy or freedom mean little”. “Glimmers of hope” in the first sentence of the AP report obviously refer to Abed, who, moreover, feels protected because of the U.S. soldiers. At the same time, Haider Samir and Selwa Hassan are scared and “full of fear”, and a better future for which they hope “seems a long way off”. Thus, the fact that the two news agency journalists have chosen just these Iraqis for the leading roles of their stories shows that they have evaluated the outcome of the Iraqi war somewhat differently in March 2004.

5 Concluding remarks

‘Objectivity’ and ‘factuality’ in news reporting are extremely complex concepts; furthermore, they are intertwined. While it is difficult to define them in a few words, it is easy enough for an analyst to find examples of the news language that is *not* objective or factual. Reporting on emotions – or evoking them – inherently challenges these two notions, as discussed in section 3.2.

Functional grammar and Appraisal theory (which has been developed on the basis of Functional grammar) have to be regarded as complementary approaches. Both of them examine the linguistic choices that

journalists have made (for instance, when they have opted for a special type of transitivity, or for inscribed or invoked Attitudes), but due to somewhat different tools, the underlying subjectivity and the vague language obscuring ‘factuality’ get a different emphasis in the two approaches.

As the examples from news agency reports have shown, the Hallidayan approach is especially well suited for examining issues of responsibility, for revealing information that is ‘hidden’ underneath. Journalistic choices that make the language vague and ambiguous cannot, however, just be regarded as evidence of the subjective choices of the reporter in question. I would rather put the blame on the intentionally objective writing style applied by all news journalists; on the routines of news reporting that call for such impersonalizing strategies.

At the same time, it can be argued that by using tools from the Appraisal framework we can reveal something of the social, cultural and ideological norms and values of an individual journalist; that is, of her or his ‘hidden subjectivity’. However, I want to stress that when a journalist evokes Affect or uses Affect values to provoke other values (e.g. Judgment), we cannot say anything of her/his *own* feelings. But by exploring longer passages of text – such as news agencies’ feature stories in examples (18) and (19) –, we may see patterns of evaluation which give evidence of the journalist’s subjective point of view. In particular, we can discover the strategies s/he has used for aligning the reader into feeling, (or, at least, for trying to convince the reader of her/his own interpretation).

But it is of course never certain how (or if at all) an individual reader really feels when reading the journalist’s text. Here one danger, in particular, is obvious: compared to inscribed Appraisal, evoked Appraisal presents “a wider range of reading positions” (Martin 2000: 155); some readings of evoked Affect, Martin argues “may work against the responses otherwise naturalized by the text”. When invoked evaluation is analyzed, it is “critical to specify one’s reading position as far as possible” with respect to certain variables; and “to declare whether one is reading a text compliantly, resistantly or tactically” (Martin and White 2005: 62). Since news agency reports are primarily targeted at other journalists, these clients can

be expected to read them ‘compliantly’, whereas an analyst’s reading position would have to be ‘tactical’.⁶

Acknowledgements

The research was supported in part by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence funding for the Research Unit for Variation, Contacts and Change in English at the Department of English, University of Helsinki.

I am grateful to Jan-Ola Östman for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this study.

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⁶ Martin and White (2005: 62) explain further that “tactical reading” is “a typically partial and interested reading, which aims to deploy a text for social purposes other than those it has naturalised, ... while compliant readings subscribe to it”.

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Study F:

Responsibility and the conventions of attribution in news agency discourse¹

1 Introduction²

Being ‘big’ in the world of media can be equated with having power, but power calls for responsibility. According to Tunstall (1999: 191), the American AP (The Associated Press) and the British Reuters are the world’s “leading news suppliers”. Together with the French AFP, these global news agencies are commonly called the ‘Big Three’ (cf. Boyd-Barrett 1998). When defining its editorial policy, AP announces that its “mission” is to provide “distinctive news services of the highest quality, reliability and objectivity with reports that are accurate, balanced and informed” (About AP; website), and Reuters gives the following policy statement: “The world relies on Reuters journalists to provide accurate, clearly sourced accounts of events as they occur, wherever they occur, so that individuals, organizations and governments can make their own decisions based on the facts” (Reuters About Us; website).

¹ Stenvall, Maija. (Forthcoming) Responsibility and the conventions of attribution in news agency discourse, in: Jan-Ola Östman and Anna Solin (eds). *Discourse and Responsibility in Professional Settings*, London: Equinox. Used with kind permission from the publisher.

² The research was supported in part by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence funding for the Research Unit for Variation, Contacts and Change in English at the Department of English, University of Helsinki. I am grateful to Jan-Ola Östman and Anna Solin for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this study.

Since the mid-1800's, the big international news agencies have had a key role in shaping the form of news reports and, even more importantly, the very concept of news. As White (1998: 122) notes, news agency reports “act as a sort of textual common currency for the media around the world and clearly have the potential to establish conventions and ‘standards’ for journalistic textuality”. In the analysis below, I look into one central convention of news reporting: into routines of attribution. I will show how the typical structure of a news story and the news agency journalists’ traditional writing style affect the presentation of speakers, often leading to ambiguity and vague language, which thus can contribute to undermining the alleged factuality or objectivity of news agency discourse.

In this study I examine the notion of responsibility in various contexts; on various intertwining levels. There is, first, the macro-level, which could be called ‘institutional’ responsibility: the big question of the responsibility of news agencies as powerful distributors of news, and their responsibility in view of the conventions of news writing, e.g. attribution. Although the policy statements of AP and Reuters cited above show that these news agencies acknowledge their responsibility as important ‘agenda-setters’ for the world media, the latter aspect – their role in *creating* and *reinforcing* traditions of news reporting – may be overlooked. At the micro-level, in the analysis of attribution, two kinds of responsibility are explored: the responsibility of news actors (i.e., of those who are quoted in news reports) and that of journalists, in particular.

2 Conventions of news reporting

This section examines the role of the big international news agencies in the development of the typical structure of news reports and in that of the conventional objective style. I will also look into some details of news story structure and discuss the notion of journalistic objectivity.

The quest for objectivity is a sign of taking responsibility. Paradoxically, though, the more the journalists strive for objectivity, the more they

resort to strategies that tend to obscure the issue of responsibility (e.g. to the use of quotations from unnamed speakers).

2.1 The conventional structure of news reports

Those who want to learn how to write a professional hard news story are commonly advised to apply the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure. Out of several rather similar instructions found on the Internet, I have chosen the following two for illustration:

Understand the inverted pyramid structure. Know how to write the traditional AP, or summary lead. (Kearsarge website)

You are expected to apply AP style, the inverted pyramid, and appropriate lead-writing skills. (Media communications; website)

Scanlan (2000: 153) gives a simple definition of the inverted pyramid structure: “The inverted pyramid puts the most newsworthy information at the top, and then the remaining information follows in order of importance, with the least important at the bottom”. The “bottom” corresponds to the narrow tip of the pyramid.

Journalism historians have expressed different views about the origin of the inverted pyramid. According to a popular anecdote (see e.g. Fox 1977: 14, 15), this form was invented during the American Civil War (1861–1865). The war correspondents wanted to send the most important part of their report first (a kind of general summary), because they all shared a single telegraph line, which could break down any minute (and was very expensive to use). However, research on the American newspapers of the late 19th century has shown that whether or not the inverted pyramid structure was *invented* during the Civil War, it was not much used before the turn of the century (cf. e.g. Errico et al. 1996). According to Scanlan (2000: 153), “the invention of the telegraph sparked its development so that it had entered into common use by newspapers and the newly-formed wire service organizations by the beginning of the 20th century”.

Van Dijk’s well-known model of the structure of a news report, developed in the 1980s, is also based on the inverted pyramid; he speaks of “the

top down principle of relevance organisation in news” (1988: 43). Since van Dijk’s study is discussed in several other studies (see e.g. Bell 1991; White 1998; Stenvall 1995), I will not go into detail here. However, one point is of special relevance for this study: the *instalment* character of topic realization in news discourse. Van Dijk (1988: 43) states that “each topic is delivered in parts, not as a whole, as is the case in other discourse types”. High-level, abstract information is given first, followed by lower-level information, specifying details. This kind of discontinuous presentation can mean, for instance, that the same speaker is introduced in two (or even three or more) steps, proceeding from general to specific (see the analysis in section 3).

White’s model (1998: 186) of the typical structure of a news story is somewhat different from the inverted pyramid format. The opening of the news story (that is, the headline and lead) is “a textual nucleus”, which “enters into an orbital relationship of dependency with a set of satellites”. The second phase – the satellites which follow the nucleus – then specifies the meanings “through elaboration, contextualization, explanation and appraisal” (p. 194).

2.2 The convention of objectivity

Besides contributing to the birth of the inverted pyramid format, the invention of the telegraph has been credited for another important development in the history of news discourse: a shift in writing style. Scanlan (2000: 195, 196) mentions two important factors as leading to this shift: the high cost of sending telegrams and the appearance of “a new type of news organization, named ‘wire service’ after the technology used to transmit the news”. According to Scanlan, the new writing style was “concise, stripped of opinion and detail”, distinctive from “the flowery language of the 19th century”. Speaking of the invention of the telegraph and the ensuing birth of the news agencies, Carey (1989: 210) states that the wire services were forced to “generate ‘objective’ news”, because they supplied news to newspapers of “any political stripe”.

However, the shift in writing style was by no means drastic; the change was not clearly seen in the language of newspapers until several decades had passed since the invention of the telegraph (cf. White 1998: 156–168, for a survey of US, UK and Australian newspapers in the late 19th and early 20th century). According to White (1998: 168), news discourse has undergone a “fundamental reorganisation” in the 20th century in view of its *interpersonal* aspect (on ‘interpersonal metafunction’, see Halliday 1994: 36). White (1998: 168) further claims that the ‘objective’ voice of today’s news reports is “very much a modern invention”.

In news reporting, the convention of objectivity presupposes, above all, that the reporter removes her/his own voice from the story, or at least backgrounds it. Sigal (1986: 15) argues that “[o]bjectivity in journalism denotes a set of rhetorical devices and procedures used in composing a news story”. A central means of backgrounding the role of the journalist is the use of indirect and direct quotes; as Sigal (p. 15) puts it: “[n]ews is not what happens, but what someone says has happened or will happen”. In a similar vein, Fishman (1980: 92) argues that “the fundamental principle of news fact” is that *something is so because somebody says it*. He adds that, naturally, this “somebody” cannot be “just anybody”; s/he must be “some competent knower or observer” (p. 93).

This is how Tuchman (1978: 83) describes some intertwined notions related to objectivity when exploring what she calls “the Web of Facticity”:

[N]ewswriters state that finding facts entails demonstrating impartiality by removing oneself from the story. Impartiality includes demonstrating that one does everything possible to be accurate so as to maintain credibility and avoid both reprimands from superiors and the omnipresent danger of libel suits.

Objectivity, whether we look at it from the point of view of journalists or from that of researchers, is a complex concept. In addition to the notions referred to by Tuchman – impartiality, accuracy and credibility –, it can be argued to encompass other ideal notions, too: factuality (or facticity) and neutrality, for example.

3 Conventions of attribution in news agency reports

In this section I examine some of the rhetorical possibilities that journalistic conventions can offer for a reporter when s/he introduces a news actor s/he wants to quote. The discontinuous presentation of a speaker that is discussed in the first part of the section is connected to the typical structure of a news story, to what van Dijk calls its “instalment character” (cf. above, section 2). It is argued that this kind of presentation often leads to ambiguity by obscuring the responsibility of the speaker in question.

Another important question related to responsibility and attribution concerns the relationship between the news journalist and the news actor who is quoted: i.e., how to share the responsibility between these two parties. In one specific case, the answer is simple: if the news actor has been left anonymous, then, according to Reuters (Wood 1995: S10), the responsibility belongs to the journalist alone. The second part of this section examines the shifting burden of responsibility and some strategies that journalists use to make it lighter for themselves.

3.1 From general to specific: ‘Iraq says...’

As discussed above, the beginning of a news story – the headline and lead – is its most important part. White (1998: 288) argues that the “angle” included in the “nucleus” is presented “as inherently newsworthy, as having compelled itself upon the reporter as obvious subject matter for a report and an unavoidably appropriate starting point”. Each satellite then “elaborates, contextualises, explains, justifies or appraises some element of that opening burst of informational and interpersonal impact” (p. 288). However, it has to be noted that, strictly speaking, the latter part of this definition does not always apply to news agency reports. News agency reporting differs from newspaper stories in that it is an ongoing process. A big topic, especially a continuing crisis like the one shown in the examples below – i.e. the Iraqi situation – generates a continuous flow of dispatches, none of which can, as such, be regarded as a unity like a single newspaper story.

They are often summaries which include several news actors' statements, usually interspersed with activity sequences. Paragraphs from earlier reports are repeated and reorganized; the headline and the lead paragraph may change during the day, when a new, more newsworthy statement or event comes up.

At the same time, even the summarizing reports tend to conform to the instalment character of a news story, according to which the important information included in the headline/lead is specified later with details given in several instalments. The typical structure of a news report thus makes it possible that a news actor (the source of a newsworthy statement) is presented in general terms in the headline and in the lead, but her/his true identity is not revealed until much later in the report. The later instalment then includes more quotes, giving the full name and title of the speaker and adding other details, such as "speaking to reporters in Jordan", or "told reporters Monday". An important speaker, making a newsworthy statement, is often allotted several instalments within the text body.

The examples below come from AP and Reuters wires, transmitted in September and December 2002.³ At that time Saddam Hussein still controlled Iraq, but the United States led by President George W. Bush was, together with its allies, already waging the possibility to attack Iraq. The role of the United Nations in the impending war was under vivid discussion. A central question was whether or not Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and the U.N. was urging Iraq to let the U.N. inspectors return into the country. The following two examples illustrate one stage in the reporting of that ongoing crisis (attributions are marked in italics):⁴

³ My corpus of news agency (AP and Reuters) reports has been collected in several batches between 2002 and 2007, as transmitted to one media client of these agencies, the Finnish Broadcasting Company. The total number of the words is around four million, but as discussed above, news agency reports contain a lot of repetition.

⁴ Since I only want to show the various steps of attribution, I have not included all the quotes (from Iraqi Vice-president Ramadan and Foreign Minister Sabri) that were included in the two dispatches cited below. The byline and the notes to editors between the headline and the lead paragraph have been omitted.

(1) **In mixed signals, Iraq calls on Arabs to «confront» America, says it wants business, not war, with the U.S.**

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- In conflicting signals, a *senior official* on Tuesday called on Arabs to rise and «confront» America, barely a day after *another official* said Iraq wanted to be a trade partner, not a battlefield foe, with the United States.

In the most belligerent Iraqi remarks in the current standoff with the United States, *Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan* said: «We categorically believe that the aggression on Iraq is an aggression on all the Arab nation [sic].»

Speaking to reporters in neighboring Jordan, *he* said: «It is the right of all the Arab people, wherever they are, to fight against the aggression through their representatives and on their soil ... by all means.»

His remarks came less than 24 hours after *Foreign Minister Naji Sabri*, speaking in Baghdad Monday night, said: «We do not want to fight anybody, we do not hope that a war is waged against our country. We'd like to live in stability. We'd like to live in peace.» (AP Sept. 10, 2002)

(2) **Iraq urges Arabs to hit back if U.S. attacks**

AMMAN, Sept 10 (Reuters) - *Iraq* called on Arabs on Tuesday to strike U.S. interests in the Middle East if Washington attacked Baghdad, and *the foreign minister* denied his country was trying to produce nuclear weapons.

Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan said U.S. and British claims that Iraq was rebuilding its banned weapons programmes were lies, and restated the Iraqi position that U.N. weapons inspectors could return to Iraq only as part of a comprehensive deal with the United Nations.

“We call for confronting the aggression and aggressors not only by the Iraqi capability but we call on all the Arab masses...to confront the material and human interests of the aggressors...” *Ramadan* told a news conference in Amman.

Foreign Minister Naji Sabri told CNN in an interview late on Monday “...there is no physical existence of anything that is now being promoted by warmongers in Washington and the single

warmonger in London who is Mr Tony Blair.

“It is not only that Iraq has not the material (for a nuclear bomb) but Iraq has no intention in the first place.” (Reuters Sept. 10, 2002)

In view of news values⁵ – especially the value of negativity – it is hardly surprising that both AP and Reuters have chosen the ‘belligerent remarks’ of Iraqi Vice-President Ramadan as the new angle to be included in the headline and the lead of their respective dispatches. At the same time, the two news agencies look somewhat differently at the statement by Iraqi Foreign Minister Sabri, which also gets a prominent position in both reports. (AP does not mention CNN as its source like Reuters does, but we can presume that Sabri’s quotes have been picked from the same long interview.) In Reuters’ example (2), the speaker named “Iraq” (in the headline and in the lead) refers only to Ramadan; the views of “the foreign minister” are seen to be consistent with Ramadan’s remarks, even if they are less ‘belligerent’. In the headline of example (1), AP attributes both Ramadan’s and Sabri’s sayings collectively to “Iraq”; in the lead the speakers are presented separately, as two “officials”. The statements are regarded as ‘conflicting’, which has compelled the writer to add an implicit, unattributed value of JUDGEMENT⁶ in the headline: Iraq speaks “in mixed signals”. When Sabri’s words were cited in the headline of earlier versions, the perspective was more positive: “Iraq says it wants peace and stability” (AP Sept. 10, 2002).

The writer who introduces an individual speaker as a state, e.g. as ‘Iraq’, resorts to synecdoche; in other words, the whole is used for a part.

⁵ The most influential study of newsworthiness is that of Galtung and Ruge, published in *Journal of International Peace Research* 40 years ago (1965; reprinted 1970). Galtung and Ruge present twelve factors, which are generally known as *news values*: negativity, eliteness, personification, unexpectedness, among others.

⁶ JUDGEMENT values refer to the APPRAISAL framework, which is an extension of Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar. APPRAISAL focuses on “the evaluative use of the language” (see The Appraisal website on a detailed presentation of the APPRAISAL framework). It is divided into three interacting systems: ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION. JUDGEMENT (evaluating human behaviour) is one of the three sub-systems of ATTITUDE; the other two being AFFECT (construing emotional responses) and APPRECIATION (evaluating entities). Values of all three ATTITUDE sub-systems can be either “inscribed” (explicit), or “evoked” (implicit). They can also be “provoked” by values belonging to another sub-type; typically JUDGEMENTS are triggered by AFFECT values.

Synecdoche is often regarded as a sub-category of metonymy (see e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36; Chandler 1995). In the field of international sports, it is quite common to say that ‘France’ – and not the French team – won a football game, a relay in athletics or skiing, and so on. In international politics, the ambassadors at the United Nations or in the national embassies around the world represent their respective countries so that it is only natural to refer to them by using the name of their home country. However, in those cases the connection between the whole and the part can be easily figured out, because of the unambiguous context. But when a state in a news report headline is given the role of the speaker, the reader has no ready-made context frame to tell her/him who the speaker actually is. Sometimes the identity is revealed already in the lead paragraph, but often it is hidden among the identities of several other speakers within the text body. One could, of course, claim that the ‘Vice President’ and the ‘Foreign Minister’ are entitled to speak for Iraq, but as we see, their words in example (1) are construed as ‘conflicting’ so that there is not just one ‘Iraq’ talking.

In my data, there are other examples of this routine of attribution – from general to specific – which, compared to examples (1) and (2), show an even looser connection between ‘Iraq’ in the headline and the actual speaker mentioned later in the text:

(3) Iraq says Sept. 11 attacks were “God’s punishment”

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) – The Sept. 11 attacks were remembered Wednesday as “God’s punishment” on America among Iraqis fearful and angry at the possibility the United States might attack to topple their president. (AP Sept. 11, 2002)

(The speaker “Iraq” is specified later as “The state-owned weekly Al-Iktisadi”.)

(4) Defiant Iraq says has no arms of mass destruction

BAGHDAD, Dec 4 (Reuters) – Iraq defied Washington’s threats of war, saying it had no weapons of mass destruction to confess to but promising to meet a U.N. weekend deadline to declare all arms programmes. (Reuters Dec. 4, 2002)

(The speaker “Iraq” is specified later as “Hussam Mohammed Amin, head of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate”.)

(5) **UN experts at work, Iraq slams US-British “lies”**

BAGHDAD, Dec 20 (Reuters) – U.N. experts resumed their hunt for banned weapons in Iraq on Friday and a Baghdad newspaper said U.S. and British “lies” were aimed at justifying war.

(Reuters Dec. 20, 2002)

(The speaker “Iraq” is specified later as “Iraq’s Baath Party newspaper al-Thawra”.)

To use the name of a state to denote an individual speaker in the headline and the lead may look quite natural, since it conforms to the conventional discontinuous structure of news reports. But this, in fact, is a writer’s choice, which can be argued to be significant from the point of view of ‘rhetorical potential’ (cf. White 1998). In the examples above, ‘Iraq’ – being able to ‘speak’ – has been personalized; in other words, a state-as-person metaphor is used. Chilton and Lakoff (1995: 39) point out that when states are conceptualized as having personalities, “they can be trustworthy or deceitful, aggressive or peace-loving, strong- or weak-willed, stable or paranoid, cooperative or intransigent, enterprising or not”. State-persons can also be appraised by JUDGEMENT values, which are used to evaluate human behaviour; for instance, “Iraq” in example (4) is said to be “defiant”. As we see in the examples above, the evaluations in the headlines focus on the state-person Iraq, and not on the individual speaker or writer behind the – sometimes aggressive – statements.

In examples (2) and (5) from Reuters, Iraq does not just speak, it “urges” and “slams”. This kind of intensification is common especially in the important headline/lead section of a hard news story (cf. White 1998: 287). In (2), the proposal attributed to Iraq – “urges Arabs to hit back” – is also intensified; it is more concrete than AP’s “calls Arabs to ‘confront’” in example (1). As a person such a speaker could be described as rather aggressive, but also as purposeful and strong-willed. At the same time, “Iraq” in example (1) appears to be inconsistent, speaking “in mixed signals”,

which can be interpreted as implicit JUDGEMENT on the part of the journalist. In the lead paragraph, the expression “barely a day after” underlines the inconsistency of Iraq’s behaviour.

Distinct from the other examples, the dispatch cited in example (3) looks at the Iraqi crisis from the point of view of ordinary people living in Iraq. On the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, AP sent a rather short report including quotes from two ordinary Iraqis: “Ali Ahmed, a 47-year-old who owns a Baghdad stationary shop” and “Sameera Kadhim, a 53-year-old housewife”. In addition, there is a quote from the weekly Al-Iktisadi and another quote from the daily Al-Jumhuriya. Of these four sources, Al-Iktisadi is the only one using the expression “God’s punishment”, which has been chosen as the headline, and thus gets a prominent position. Notably, the lead of this dispatch differs from the common pattern of attribution in that it does not give a more detailed account of the speaker or her/his words. Instead, the AP journalist has transformed the Verbal Process of the headline (what “Iraq says”) into a Mental Process⁷, depicting how the Iraqis ‘remember’ the Sept. 11 attacks (as “God’s punishment”) and describing how they feel. This kind of process shift involves interpretation on the part of the journalist. Furthermore, the explicit AFFECT values (“Iraqis fearful and angry”) could evoke feelings of empathy – or even provoke values of JUDGEMENT – in the reader.

The custom of starting with a general term (‘Iraq’) is just one of the routines of attribution in news agency reports. Above I have noted that while this mode of attribution opens up a variety of rhetorical choices to the writer, it can be ambiguous from the point of view of the reader. Furthermore, as we have seen above, transforming an individual speaker to a state often involves interpersonal APPRAISAL values, or ideational changes

⁷ Verbal and Mental Processes refer to the semantic concept of *transitivity*, which belongs to the ideational metafunction in functional grammar (cf. Halliday 1994: 106-146). “The transitivity system construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES” (p. 106). All processes have three elements: the process itself (typically realized by a verbal group), participants of the process, and circumstances associated with the process.; for instance, in Verbal Processes the central participant is a Sayer, and in Mental Processes it is a Senser.

like the one in example (3), which can be argued to affect the objectivity of news agency discourse.

3.2 Manipulating the shifting burden of responsibility

Below I look more closely into the relationship between the news agency journalists and their sources, analyzing the sayings of both named and unnamed speakers. According to the Reuters (Internal) *Style Guide* (Wood 1995: S10), named and unnamed sources are different from the point of view of responsibility: “[B]y reporting what a named source says you share responsibility for his or her remarks. The weakest sources are unnamed ones. Responsibility for reporting what they say is yours alone.” However, in either case, as will be shown, news reporters resort to various strategies which aim at making the quoted source more credible, and which could thus ease the journalists’ burden of responsibility.

3.2.1 Named sources

The named sources in news agency reports can be roughly divided into three major categories, on the basis of the different modes used in the presentation of the respective news actors. I have named these groups “major figures”, “officials” and “ordinary people”. As for the credibility and the ensuing degree of journalistic responsibility, it can be argued that this issue is related to the status of a speaker; i.e. to how ‘elite’ or well-known s/he is. The less well-known the speaker, the more responsibility falls on the journalist.

- major figures

Major figures are newsworthy persons whose names are supposed to be recognized by readers all over the world. In news agency reports, these speakers are most often prominent politicians. The presentation of a major figure need not conform to the attribution mode analyzed above (from general to specific). In fact, the name of the speaker is usually given at the beginning of the headline, which also stresses the newsworthiness of the – direct or indirect – quote that follows:

(6) **Bush urges Congress to pass spending needed to pay for war**

WASHINGTON (AP) -- President George W. Bush shrugged off...
(AP Feb. 14, 2007)

(7) **Castro says Bush presence in Italy hypocritical**

HAVANA, April 7 (Reuters) - Cuban President Fidel Castro eulogized Pope John Paul as a fierce critic of savage capitalism during a speech on Thursday night and said it was hypocritical of U.S. President George W. Bush to attend his funeral. (Reuters April 7, 2005)

Example (6) refers to a press conference given by President Bush, and example (7) to President Castro's 'televised address'. In both cases, the news agency journalist's burden of responsibility can be argued to be rather light. The speakers are well-known, and the correctness of these indirect quotations can be verified from an audio or a video tape. In addition, verbatim transcripts of the press conferences and television addresses by political leaders can usually be found on several websites.

● **officials**

This is, by far, the largest of these three categories. I take 'officials' to include all speakers that give information to journalists in their official capacity, as – what Fishman (1980: 93) calls – competent knowers or observers. Besides 'officials', this category includes military officers, policemen, spokespersons, analysts, diplomats, and so on. Should the information given by an official be important enough to make the headline of the report, the presentation usually adopts the 'step-by-step' model discussed above (the steps of attribution are shown in italics):

(8) ***U.S. Army general sees no new insurgent tactics in helicopter shootdowns in Iraq***

BAGRAM AIR BASE, Afghanistan (AP) -- There is no basis for believing that insurgents' recent success in shooting down U.S. helicopters in Iraq means they have developed new attack methods or discovered new U.S. vulnerabilities, *the U.S. Army's vice chief of staff* said Saturday.

“I see no change in trends” on the part of the insurgent’s targeting efforts, “and I see no capability gaps” on the part of U.S. forces, *Gen. Richard Cody* said in an interview en route to Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital.

Cody, 56, a career helicopter pilot who flew an Apache attack mission on the opening night of the 1991 Gulf War, said... (AP Feb. 10, 2007)

In example (8), typically, the name of the speaker is not mentioned until the third step. This kind of gradual mode of attribution opens up several possibilities to the journalist for boosting the expertise of the speaker, and thus her/his credibility. In this case, the vital detail concerning general Coby’s career as an experienced helicopter pilot, comes towards the end of the dispatch, as some kind of final confirmation of the speaker’s special competence in the topic area.

- ordinary people

Ordinary people appear very seldom in news reports; usually elite sources are thought to be more newsworthy and more reliable. However, even ordinary people can be quoted, “if they enter the news arena by some other door” (Fowler 1991: 22); for instance, if they are victims of a bomb attack, eyewitnesses to an accident or witnesses in court. Elite persons as news actors are often personalized, which adds to the newsworthiness of what they say (see e.g. Galtung and Ruge 1970). At the same time, ordinary people as individuals are rather *depersonalized*; as Tuchman (1978: 122) argues, “people are presented symbolically... made to typify all members of their particular group or class”. As individuals they have no news value, but, paradoxically, they are described in very accurate detail. This kind of detailed presentation can make them more ‘factual’; as individuals, with a name and age and maybe profession, they become less anonymous and thus more responsible from the journalist’s point of view. Representatives of this category are seldom quoted more than once in a news agency report, so the ‘step-by-step’ attribution discussed above is not relevant here.

The following example from AP describes the feelings of ordinary Spaniards one week after the train bombings which killed about 200 people near Madrid:

- (9) “I come here many times,” said Antonio Ruiz, 68, stopping by the vigil at El Pozo station. “One’s soul falls to the ground.”

Pedro Valdia, 53, said, “I felt the blow.... Before, this neighborhood had joy. Now people are scared.”

“Fear has been taken away by pain,” said Marco Antonio Heras, a 28-year-old window dresser. Echoing a slogan from last week’s peace rallies that drew millions across Spain, he added, “We were all on that train.”

(AP March 18, 2004)

Example (10) is taken from a report transmitted one year after the bombing of a revered Shi’ite shrine in the city of Samarra, which triggered “a wave of bloodletting” in Iraq (Reuters Feb. 22, 2007):

- (10) Many worried whether it would be possible to heal the divisions that the bombing had sown.

“It was not just the holy shrine that was targeted, it was the unity of Iraq,” said Qasim Haddad, 65, a Shi’ite retired teacher sipping tea in a Baghdad cafe.

“Those evil terrorists realised how to break the warm ties between Sunnis and Shi’ites. It will take years to repair these sectarian feelings and for Iraqis to forget their agonies.”

Added Ahmed Wael, 35, a Sunni pharmacist:

“Ties that had linked Iraqis together for ages were destroyed. Families who lost loved ones will never forgive.” (Reuters Feb. 22, 2007)

In example (9), the special function of the quotes is to symbolize the feelings of ordinary Spanish citizens; the only aspect in the attribution that matters is the fact that the speakers are all Spanish. In example (10), the attribution itself is more important in that one of the speakers is presented as “Shi’ite” and the other one as “Sunni”, so that each of them can be said to typify all members of his respective Moslem group. At the same time, the professions given in these examples (“window dresser”, “retired teacher”, “pharmacist”) do not make the speakers more credible, as none of them has been interviewed as a ‘competent knower’ in his own field.

3.2.2 *Unnamed sources*

Above I quoted Reuters Style Guide (Wood 1995: S10), which stresses the ‘weakness’ of anonymous sources. In June 2005, AP reminded the staff about its policy concerning anonymous sources, stating that “[a] story that identifies its sources is a better piece of journalism, more complete and more credible, than the very same story pegged to unnamed sources” (Silverman and Carroll 2005). Further, according to AP guidelines, if a source insists on remaining anonymous, the journalist has to tell the reader why that happens. Yet, despite the journalists’ good intentions, news agency wires contain a wealth of unnamed speakers, presented, for instance, as generic “officials”, “experts”, or “analysts”; or more specifically, as a “senior Afghan official”, who speaks “on condition of anonymity” (AP March 7, 2007), or as “a senior U.S. military analyst, at an off-the-record briefing” (Reuters Feb. 14, 2007), and so on.

Referring to this “curious category ... that of unnamed speakers”, Bell (1991: 193) points out that the labellings in the attribution “claim standing for their anonymous sources” (for unnamed sources as rhetorical constructs, see Stenvall 2008). However, the guidelines AP and Reuters have given to their journalists present the function of the ‘labels’ from a different aspect. “AP statement on anonymous sources” says that it is not allowed to simply quote ‘a source’; the journalists should be “as descriptive as possible”. Reuters (Wood 1995: U3) advises its journalists to “give the reader as much guidance as possible about the possibility of bias”, e.g. by telling the reader that the source is “a NATO official”, or “a U.S. Treasury official”.

When the journalist adds an expression stressing the speaker’s wish for anonymity and even explains the reason for that, s/he shifts the responsibility of quoting an unnamed source to the speaker, while s/he still retains the responsibility for the quoted words. Sometimes, though, the identity of the speaker is clear enough despite the missing name, and the additional explanations seem superfluous:

- (11) Blair's official spokesman, speaking on customary condition of anonymity in line with policy, acknowledged that British officials "still believed Iranian-supplied ordinance is coming across the border." (AP Feb. 21, 2007)

In this case, it is obvious that the journalist's burden gets lighter, as the readers either know the name of Prime Minister Tony Blair's official spokesman or can get it from the Internet by a simple search. Moreover, the spokesman does not speak for himself, but for the well-known Prime Minister.

In my data, AP tends to explain the reason for a speaker's anonymity more often than Reuters does. A rather common explanation is that the news actor in question actually was not "allowed" or "authorized" to speak to the media; or that s/he spoke "too early". These kinds of explanations raise further questions of journalistic responsibility; at least if the reporter has persuaded the speaker to break the law, as example (12) from AP seems to imply:

- (12) Agents from the French anti-terrorism agency were trying to identify the computers from which the e-mails were sent, the official said. The official spoke on condition of anonymity *because under French law information about investigations is secret.* (AP April 5, 2007; my italics)

Ordinary people, as discussed above, are presented with their names and other details, whenever possible. When only one name is given, the reason is often said to be the custom of the country in question. This applies especially to Indonesian people; the journalist may refer, for instance, to "Dr. Alexander who like many Indonesians uses only one name" (AP May 28, 2006). But sometimes the journalist changes the name of the speaker, as example (14) shows – a strategy that could not be found in the category of 'officials'. Here, too, several other details have been added to enhance the factuality and credibility of the story:

- (14) One teacher, who asked to be called Aman, said he was paid \$100 a month to prepare children for their Rukhnama exams. ---
"During lessons I explain parts of the book and the children take notes," said Aman. "The children are not interested in the philosophical

parts, but I can't just do the stories in the Rukhnama [book by the late Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov] all the time.”

Dressed in a suit, the 41-year-old asked to have his name changed for personal security and spoke to Reuters in a cafe away from school.
(Reuters March 5, 2007)

4 Concluding remarks

On the basis of the two news agencies' policy statements, cited in section 1, we can assume that for them a vital part of responsibility consists of distributing “balanced” and “accurate”, “clearly sourced” reports. Today, increased competition poses new challenges; news must be delivered instantaneously, in ‘real-time’; “the world of instant news places huge responsibilities on media organizations and their journalists”, Stephen Jukes, the Global Head of News for Reuters, writes. Jukes (2002) stresses that to ensure “accuracy, objectivity and freedom from bias”, one now has to be “more vigilant than ever”. However, it can be argued that ‘vigilance’ alone will not help, since some of the very traditions of news writing – starting from the persistent news values – work to undermine its objectivity.

For journalists, the use of quotations is probably the most efficient way to hide their own voice and, in that manner, to transfer responsibility to someone else. White (1998: 278) notes that the media, in this respect, has adopted “an extreme view”, according to which the “authorial voice” is never “responsible for any subjectivities it imports into its texts through extra-vocalisation” (e.g. quotations), notwithstanding the fact that it is the writing journalist who has selected the quotation and maybe even given it a prominent position in the report. Thus, despite explicit evaluation, e.g. JUDGEMENT values included in the quotations, the media advocates that “its texts are neutral, impartial and value-free” (p. 278). The choice of a reporting verb in the attribution can be important, revealing “the degree of alignment” between the journalist and the quoted source; for instance, ‘demonstrate’ denotes alignment, while ‘claim’ puts a distance between the two, as White (p. 275) notes.

My analysis on attribution shows how the traditional structure of a news report – from general to specific – opens up rhetorical possibilities for a journalist, and how the status of a source affects the way s/he is construed in a report. When an individual speaker is transformed into a state, e.g. into “Iraq”, in the headline, this leads to a second transformation; the state in question becomes, metaphorically, a person. After that it is possible to evaluate this state-person – instead of an individual speaker – e.g. with implicit or explicit JUDGEMENT values, as demonstrated in section 3.1. In section 3.2, I have shown that sharing the responsibility between the journalist and the news actor is a complex issue. News agency journalists resort to various strategies to transfer at least some portion of responsibility to the speakers they quote.

News values are often seen to have an inescapable “institutionalized force” over journalists (cf. Hartley 1982: 81), and some other conventions of news reporting, too, seem to have a similar effect; i.e. the journalists apply them more or less subconsciously. White (1998: 281) states that journalists are perhaps more “subject to the rhetorical influence of those conventions” than their audience, “since their continued professional employment relies on them enacting the conventions successfully day after day”. For the news agencies, the increasing competition in the “world of instant news” means an increase in the volume of news distribution, which again puts even more pressure than before on the agency journalists. In these circumstances – and given the news agencies’ committed pursuit of objectivity – , one can expect that “the rhetorical influence” of such conventions, including the routines of attribution, on news agency discourse will rather be strengthened than weakened in the coming years.

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