


The Catholic Internet discussion on cloning



A study in cognitive rhetoric

Jussi E. Niemelä

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Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Helsinki in Small Hall on the 24th of November, 2007 at 10 o'clock.

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Abstract

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The Catholic Internet discussion on cloning. A study in cognitive rhetoric.

This work combines the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought with the classical Aristotelian theory of artistic proof in rhetoric. The first half of the work discusses the common ground shared by the elements of artistic proof (logos, pathos, ethos) and the elements of folk-theoretical thought (naïve physics, folk biology, folk psychology, naïve sociology). Combining rhetoric with the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought creates a new point of view for argumentation analysis.

The logos of an argument can be understood as the inferential relations established between the different parts of an argument. Consequently, within this study the analysis of logos is to be viewed as the analysis of the inferential folk-theoretical elements that make the suggested factual states-of-things appear plausible within given argumentative structures.

The pathos of an argumentative structure can be understood as determining the “quality” of the argumentation in question in the sense that emotive elements play a great part in what can be called a distinction between “good” and “deceptive” rhetoric. In the context of this study the analysis of pathos is to be viewed as the analysis of the emotive content of argumentative structures and of whether they aim at facilitating surface- or deep cognitive elaboration of the suggested matters.

The ethos of an argumentative structure means both the speaker-presentation and audience-construct that can be discerned within a body of argumentation. In the context of this study, the analysis of ethos is to be understood as the analysis of mutually manifest cognitive environments in the context of argumentation.

The theory is used to analyse Catholic Internet discussion concerning cloning. The discussion is divided into six themes: Human Dignity, Sacred Family, Exploitation / Dehumanisation, Playing God, Monsters and Horror Scenarios and Ensoulment. Each theme is analysed for both the rhetorical and the cognitive elements that can be seen creating persuasive force within the argumentative structures presented.

It is apparent that the Catholic voices on the Internet extensively oppose cloning. The voices utilise rhetoric that is aggressive and pejorative more often than not. Furthermore, deceptive rhetoric (in the sense presented above) plays a great part in argumentative structures of the Catholic voices.

The theory of folk-theoretical thought can be seen as a useful tool for analysing the possible reasons why the Catholic speakers think about cloning and choose to present cloning in their argumentation as they do. The logos utilized in the argumentative structures presented can usually be viewed as based on folk-theoretical inference concerning biology and psychology. The structures of pathos utilized generally appear to aim at generating fear appeal in the assumed audiences, often incorporating counter-intuitive elements. The ethos utilised in the arguments generally revolves around Christian mythology and issues of social responsibility. These structures can also be viewed from the point of view of folk psychology and naïve sociological assumptions.

Foreword

Of all the possible metaphors used to describe a scientific research project, the imagery of a journey is certainly among the more often used ones. When a given research is described in terms of a journey, there are usually several different parts in the story: it is described how the traveller takes up the journey in the first place, the different parts of the journey are detailed, and finally, the story ends with the arrival to the destination. My research can not really be described through the metaphor of a journey – or rather, the journey described is an untypical one. Concerning my research the most suitable metaphor akin to a journey I have come up with is a plane crash with no casualties.

Let me elaborate this a bit further. There are several things that make the metaphor of a plane crash particularly suitable for describing my research. Starting a journey by boarding an airplane is a very typical way of commencing one's holiday or business trip. Flying can also be considered one of the most comfortable ways of travelling: it is quick and safe. However, in the unlikely event when an airplane crash-lands in unknown territory, far from civilization, the nature of the journey is dramatically changed – the journeyman is suddenly cast in an unforeseeable situation. Since there are no casualties in the crash, the situation is really not that tragic, it's just a new type of an adventure. After the crash the metaphor of a journey proceeds differently: the journeyman faces new situations, problems and challenges, and has to get by the best he is able to. Eventually, (at least in this metaphor) the journeyman is saved from the wilds through cunning, help and some luck. The journey ends by returning from the wilds back to civilization, but not exactly to the place the journeyman was originally trying to reach.

This type of a metaphor would describe the course of my study pretty accurately. For those who don't enjoy metaphors suffice it to say that my original idea was to make an unproblematic thesis with as little trouble as possible. I finished with a thesis that combines two different theoretical worlds in a way that has not been done before and tests this combination on a large corpus of virtual-ethnographical material concerning a very complex issue. Looking at this setting the only thing I can think of is that I must have been unconsciously looking for trouble. Consequently, during my research I encountered many unforeseen problems, both in the theoretical worlds I chose to examine and in my personal qualities as a researcher. The process turned out to be quite different from what I originally signed up for when commencing my doctoral studies. Nevertheless, working on this project has been immensely educational in many different ways. I have learned a great deal about science and about making science, about myself as a scholar and about the workings of the community of those who do scientific research.

This educating plane crash would not have been possible without the support of several individuals and institutions. First of all, I'd like to thank Professor Juha Pentikäinen, whose broad-minded approach to different kinds of scholarly pursuit under his supervision has given me the room I needed to elaborate my theoretical ideas. I'd also like to thank him for his comments, especially concerning the ethnographical aspects of my work. Many thanks are due to my supervisors, Ilkka Pyysiäinen and Tuula Sakaranaho, who have both been invaluable in the process of my scholarly career. They were the researchers who initially introduced me into the worlds of cognitive science and rhetorical studies, and they have been exceedingly patient with me as I have stumbled around in these theoretical worlds. They have

supported me by discussing and criticising my work and by always helping me in the constant struggle for funding.

I also want to thank my pre-examiners Jaana Hallamaa and Tom Sjöblom for their cruelly effective but fair treatment of my work. Their comments and remarks have helped to make this study significantly better. Tom Sjöblom has also offered me many important insights concerning the cognitive study of religion over the years. Additional thanks are in order to Jaana Hallamaa for allowing me to take part in her project “Toward a Sustainable Stem Cell Culture. Creating the Ethical, Cultural and Legal Prerequisites for a Stable Stem Cell Research Environment”, funded by the Academy of Finland. I also want to express my gratitude to the other researchers in the project – working with social ethicists has certainly broadened my views concerning the debate surrounding the issue of genetics. Very special thanks are also in order to my long time friend and colleague Jaakko Närvä, whose steadfastness and perseverance in scientific issues has always been an inspiration to me. During the time I have spent studying, I have had the pleasure of getting to know many other theologians, comparative religionists as well as scholars and students of other subjects who have shared their ideas with me. I can not thank all of you in person, lest this foreword grow too long. So, I’ll just express a big collective thank you to you all.

This work would not have been possible without the financial contributions of several institutions. These include the Finnish Cultural Foundation, Oskar Öflunds Foundation, Ella and Georg Ehrnrooths Foundation and the Academy of Finland. I wish to extend my warmest gratitude to these institutions for giving me the opportunity to do this research.

There are several people outside of academic world that have enriched my life in many ways and deserve thanks. My boyhood friends Mikko Kaikkonen and Teemu Yli-Elsilä have shared many struggles with me and made them more bearable in their unique ways, thus also contributing to this project. It would appear that nothing aids a scholar’s personal growth more than having long time friends with whom one can behave antisocially during the yearly festival days. Teemu Isokääntä, Lasse Jääskeläinen and Tero Yliselä, with whom I have shared many things since commencing my studies at the University of Helsinki, also ought to be thanked. Without the great extracurricular activities we have devised over the years I might be even less sane than I am now. In the same strain I would like to express my gratitude to the entire crew of the WetVet-festival for adopting me as a part of their community. And, of course, thanks are also due for establishing the undeniably best music festival in Finland. I have had the fortune of making many important friends during the time spent on this project, and again there is no room to thank each one of you separately. As you read this text, you will know that you are being given heartfelt thanks.

I want to express an especially deep gratitude to my mother, Aino Niemelä, and to my father, Kauko Niemelä. In my childhood and adolescence they never disdained even my more peculiar insights, thus ushering me along the path of individual thinking and invention. No small part of my achievement originates in their gentle way of upbringing.

And finally, my deep gratitude to you Elisa, for making things complicated and interesting.

1. Introduction

“All men by nature desire knowledge.”

- Aristotle, Metaphysics

The task – the research interests

Genetic engineering, cloning, new medical techniques involving stem cells, genetically manipulated food. Some predict that the breakthroughs in genetics will bring new medical techniques that will make several previously impossible things possible: for example, miraculous regeneration of nerve pathways, broken bones and even brain tissue. Some argue that genetics will solve the global problem of insufficient food supply and other environmental crises. Evidently the cloning technique offers the possibility of producing biological offspring for those who are, for one reason or another, unable to procreate normally. In the genetic horizon there is the promise of an unending supply of spare organs with no negative side effects for the patient. Positive views concerning genetics predict extended lifespans, more effective vaccines, more healthy, intelligent and stronger human beings. Genetics even seems to suggest a solution for the problem of the extinction of species.

On the other side of the coin looms a darker picture: a genetic industry, cloning, mass murder of unborn children for the benefit of the wealthy, endangering the ecosystem with genetically altered crops. The sceptics claim that genetics means more luxury for the haves of the rich Western countries at the expense of the less privileged. For those who oppose the idea of cloning, it represents a chance of having biological offspring for those who were not supposed to procreate in the first place. Wider negative visions of the future of genetics depict the brutal utilization of humans as research material in the laboratories of eugenic madmen. The negative imagery includes ideas such as a new genetically enhanced super-race that makes normal humans obsolete, a breakdown of values concerning family and of understandings concerning what it really means to be human, and different kinds of disasters born out of human immorality. Those who fear that meddling with genetics has bad consequences predict a world that turns into a totalitarian nightmare where people are valued based on their genetic capability.

Genetic engineering in general and cloning in particular are issues with many different faces. It can be safely said that no other issue of our time generates more varied, opposing opinions and different understandings. Where genetic technologies are concerned, the opinions of people can range from utopian fantasies where the ills of the world are healed by miraculous new medical techniques, to absolute horror and woe for what is being done to creation. The issue of cloning in particular often takes on the face that the person presenting it wants it to wear: the agendas of the speakers describing cloning create totally opposite pictures of what is going on. The tug-of-war around cloning reaches to the highest echelons of legislative bodies, to the chambers of ethicists, to the boards of business moguls and maybe

most significantly, to the breakfast tables and evening news of each and every one of us.

The news concerning genetics and cloning can be found in many places. However, few know precisely what genetics or cloning really means. News concerning cloning and genetics usually revolves around legislative issues or focuses on the informing of new technological breakthroughs in layman's terms. Genetics and cloning in particular are complex issues with ideological and ethical ramifications – issues that are not easily tackled even by the specialists. Consequently, there is much misunderstanding, uncertainty and even fear surrounding the subject. When faced with disturbing issues many people try to find out what is going on, or in other words they try to obtain information concerning the issues that perplex them. And there is one place above all else where a modern Western person turns when in need of information: the Internet. However, there are problems in obtaining information from the Net. The most significant of these is that the information superhighway is one big free-for-all for any given voices that forward any given agendas. And this means that the information obtained from the Internet can and will give genetics and cloning any face imaginable.

These faces given to the issue of cloning on the Internet are one of the main subjects this study is about. The study is based on three different research interests. The first of these is a virtual-ethnographic one: to find out what kind of picture a typical English-speaking Internet user gets of Catholic opinions concerning cloning when using the Internet as the source of information.

The second research interest in this study is theoretical. The goal of the theoretical interest is to create a new method of argumentation analysis by combining rhetorical ideas with ideas from cognitive science. The rhetorical ideas used for this purpose come from Aristotle. In his theory of rhetoric he outlines *inventio*, which is the art of discovering the best possible arguments to convince any given audience. *Inventio* is divided into three parts. The first of these is *logos*, the art of presenting factual claims in such a way as to make them appear plausible. The second is *pathos*, the art of inducing emotional responses in such a way as to make people act. The third part of *inventio* is *ethos*, the art of making oneself appear as a person of sound understanding and benevolence. The theoretical research interest is to combine these elements of Aristotle's remarkable theory of rhetoric with cognitive science's theory of folk-theoretical thought.

The third research interest is to put the theory to work. The purpose is both to test the theory and to see if the folk-theoretical cognitive mechanisms can be seen as affecting the Catholic cloning argumentation. In other words, the third research interest is to analyse the ethnographic material gathered in order to answer the first interest. The analysis will proceed with the theory created in order to answer the second research interest. The analysis will both reveal the usefulness of the theory and, in case the theory proves functional, tell of the effect that folk-theoretical mechanisms of thought have on Catholic conceptualizations and persuasive strategies concerning cloning.

Obviously, this type of cognitive-rhetorical theory could have been tested on many different materials. Three factors came together in the decision to choose this particular avenue of research. First of all, the study is in the field of the scientific study of religion, and as such it is focused on finding out how religious people think and argue concerning topical issues. The Catholic community is arguably the largest body of people in the Western world sharing a common doctrinal ground,

it was the logical choice. Secondly, there is no issue more topical than cloning, so it was a logical choice as well. Thirdly, the meaning of the Internet as a cultural phenomenon is increasing explosively. A huge new cultural field has sprung up from nothing in the past fifteen years or so, and the sciences studying cultural phenomena are just starting to cope. Ethnographic research on the Internet is a pioneering business with its own unique problems and challenges. The Internet mixes and confounds everything, erodes authority, hides identity, is in a constant state of flux, and so on. The challenge proved too tempting to be resisted.

The structure of the study

The study is divided into three parts. The first part, “What is being studied and how”, describes the material under study and the tools used in the analysis. First, the nature of virtual-ethnographic study and the composition of the actual materials gathered for this study are discussed. The purpose of the first two sections is to create an understanding of the virtual environment where the Catholic views concerning cloning exist. Cyberspace is a place with its own rules concerning interaction, expression, authority, identity and community. Anything that exists in the virtual world cannot really be understood without understanding the rudiments of the information superhighway. The first two sections discuss the rules and peculiarities of the Internet and of virtual ethnography, virtual materials and virtual communities. After discussing the problematic of the virtual world in more general terms, the discussion focuses on the particular material analyzed in the study, and on the particular problems it presents for the analysis later on.

The four sections following the presentation of the material focus on describing the probable real-life contexts that affect the virtual materials studied here. The first of these, “The bioscientific context”, briefly discusses a few central terms of genetics and cloning that are necessary in order to understand the Catholic discussion. The purpose of the section is to provide a basic knowledge of the bioscientific terminology which is often used in Catholic argumentation. The next two sections, “The Catholic community” and “The theological context” very briefly describe the real-life (as opposed to virtual) community that is reflected on the Internet. The sections describe the actual social and doctrinal elements that contextualize the argumentation that can be found on the Net. The fifth section discusses bioethical philosophy. Bioethics is not a theoretical starting point or subject of research in this study. It is nevertheless important to briefly discuss bioethics as it can be understood as one of the factors that contextualizes the Catholic Internet discussion. The chapter ends with a summary of the contextualizing elements.

The second chapter of part one presents the theoretical approach utilized within this study. The first two sections briefly outline the histories of the theoretical approaches, rhetoric and cognitive science that are combined to create the new method of argumentation analysis. After that, in the sections concerning the domain-specificity of cognitive processes and folk-theoretical thought, the main cognitive elements used in the theory are presented. After the cognitive elements have been discussed, each of the parts of Aristotelian *inventio* - *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* - is discussed in detail. The presentation of the parts of *inventio* proceeds in three steps: first the classical meaning of the terms is discussed. Then the discussion proceeds to the meaning and use of the elements of *inventio* in modern rhetoric. Finally, the

terms are discussed in relation to the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought. The chapter ends with a summary of the theory.

The next part contains the actual testing of the theory by analysing the Catholic cloning argumentation. The analysis proceeds in three chapters: the Official, Professional and Lay voices¹. The chapters are further divided into themes. The themes represent the most recurring topics found in the Catholic Internet discussion. The first chapter, the Official voices, contains three themes. These are “Human Dignity”, “The Sacred Family” and “Exploitation / Dehumanization”. In these themes the Catholic speakers who present themselves as authorities of the Church defend the inherent dignity of human beings, claiming that cloning destroys family values and that it dehumanizes people by exploiting them horribly.

The chapter discussing Professional voices contains two themes, “Playing God” and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”. The professionals are speakers who do not necessarily have Church standing but present themselves as figures of authority nevertheless. In their themes the Professionals claim that cloning is an attempt to usurp the Creator, a rebellion against the Christian God which is bound to lead to catastrophe. The third chapter, the Lay voices, contains only one theme, “Ensoulement”. Within the theme of “Ensoulement” the laity discusses their views on whether or not a cloned person would have a soul and what type of soul might there be.

Each theme is divided into four parts. In the first three parts of each theme the rhetorical strategies of Aristotelian *inventio* - *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* - are discussed. The fourth part of each theme discusses the cognitive elements or folk-theoretical mechanisms that are relevant to the theme.

The third and final part of the study summarizes the analysis and reflects on the functionality of the theoretical approach tested. The first chapter discusses the rhetorical strategies and cognitive mechanisms that were found in the analysis of the different voices. The second chapter first summarizes the findings in three tables and then casts a critical reflection on the benefits and problems of combining the approaches of rhetoric and cognitive science.

¹ The names of the categories (Official voices, Professional voices and Lay voices) are typed with capital initial letters. This has been done in order to underline their function as artificial categories. The real officials, professionals and lay persons of the Catholic Church are much larger groups and the virtual representations of those entities categorized in this study should not be directly identified with them.

Part I:

What is being studied and how

“The creation of something new is not accomplished by the intellect but by the play instinct acting from inner necessity. The creative mind plays with the objects it loves.”

- Carl Jung

2. The Catholic Internet discussion as a subject of study

2.1. The methods used for finding and classifying Internet materials

The ethnographic interest that led to the decision to utilize Internet materials in this study was to find out what kind of information a normal English-speaking Internet user gains when searching the Net for Catholic argumentation concerning cloning. The materials analyzed within the study were collected and selected to approximate, as best as possible, the point of view of an average English-speaking Internet user, who has no special theological education and who is not a specialist in the fields of bioethics or genetics. What this means in practice is that the restricted forums that specialists use to communicate with one another were excluded from the study. Specialists use various Internet resources to communicate with their peers (journals, discussion forums, databases etc.), but since access to these resources is typically limited for normal Internet users, it was reasonable to exclude them from this study. As stated in the introduction, the virtual-ethnographic point of the study is to find out how the Catholic cloning argumentation appears to an average Internet user, with little or no specialist knowledge, who uses the free resources on the Internet as his primary source of information.

In a primarily topical and extensively content-based starting point (the English-speaking Catholic community's cloning discussion) it becomes necessary to face an immense amount of texts available on the Internet (see Mitra & Cohen 1999, 194-197). However, the study's goal is not to explore all the possible ways cloning is discussed on the Internet by the Catholic community (as this would obviously be impossible), but to identify the dominant voices and the most recurrent themes of the discussion. The actual outcome of this type of approach will be a virtual-ethnographic reflection of the Catholic cloning argumentation that any non-specialist using the Internet to find information concerning that particular subject would face.

The first necessary step in any study with a focus on a given body of argumentation is to locate the places where the argumentation takes place. In this study the methods used for finding the relevant discussions were determined by the ethnographic task at hand: if the point is to find out what an average Internet user faces when seeking information concerning Catholic cloning argumentation, then one must gather material like an average user would. As the typical Internet user has no access to specialist forums or previous specialist knowledge to guide his search, he will probably rush headlong onto the information highway. That is, he will use the most popular Internet search engines with search strings that match his query.

So, it can be said that since the virtual-ethnographic point of the study was to approximate, as close as possible, the material an average Internet user would find, the method for gathering material was dictated by the research task. In this study the method for gathering materials, or the virtual-ethnographic survey of Catholic

argumentation, was a very simple and straightforward one. The materials presented and analyzed within the study have been gathered using the most common Internet search engines (Google, AltaVista, etc.) with different strings of search words (genetic & Catholic, Catholic & cloning, etc.) to find the relevant pages on the World Wide Web (WWW). As might be imagined, the survey produced a wide variety of Internet pages. The pages ranged from clearly official pages such as the homepage of Vatican (www.vatican.va) or the homepage of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (www.usccb.org) to the almost bizarre like the web pages of “The Second Coming Project” (www.clonejesus.com), which quite clearly has little to do with Catholicism.

The survey of the discussion groups (Google Groups, BeliefNet, etc.) and message boards was done with similar methods. The examination of message boards and discussion forums was focused on the largest Christian forums on the Net (BeliefNet, Christian Yahoo groups, etc.), but if the search engines produced results outside these forums, these links were also examined. The survey was continued until the material reached the point where it started to overlap to a significant extent. That is, the links the engines found started to direct to Web pages already visited and even pages that were not previously visited begun to contain pieces of the discussion already found on previous pages. This is the closest possible approximation that can be made to a normal Internet user’s extensive search for information on any given subject.

After the material had reached the point of saturation (e.g. the search strings started producing results that increasingly overlapped), it was divided into three categories depending on how “official” the speaker in the given argument presented him/herself. The three categories that the material was classified into are “The Official voices”, “The Professional voices” and “The Lay voices”. This categorization will be discussed further in the section “The Catholic context”, as the hierarchy of the Catholic Church is the primary reason for this categorization. However, the basic issues concerning the classification of material under study will be discussed here in order for the reader to gain a better grasp of what this study is about.

The method by which the themes discussed were established was likewise quite simple and straightforward. After dividing the material into the different voices (by official presentation) the further classification of the material under study was done by categorizing the material in each of the three voices into “themes”. The themes have been sorted out from the material by the method of close-reading and comparing the texts many times over in order to identify recurrent patterns – a method much used in the classification of qualitative textual materials. For example, while reading the arguments gathered from the net, following expressions start to appear in arguments by different speakers in different situations:

The danger with cloning is that we easily lose sight of the dignity of the person... (s2040, Fr. William Saunders.)

I believe that such technologies as cloning and in vitro fertilization, insofar as they treat the child as a thing to be “copied” or “made” in a Petri dish, do not foster an appreciation of the fragility and dignity of human life. (s2038, Mark S. Latkovic, Assistant Professor of Moral Theology and Systematic Theology, Sacred Heart Major Seminary.)

At first glance, human cloning may not seem to threaten respect for life because it is presented as a means for creating life, not destroying it. Yet it shows disrespect for life in the very act of generating it. (s1034, Richard M. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

This exploitation of human beings ... retains all its ethical repugnance as an even more serious offence against human dignity and the right to life, since it involves human beings (embryos)... (Archbishop Renato Martino, Address to the U.N. International Convention Against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings.)

Over many centuries the Church has treated in depth the human dignity of each and every individual human being from the beginning of life to natural death. It is this human dignity that is violated, we assert, by the cloning of human beings. (Father Albert S. Moraczewski to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in Washington, D.C., on March 13, 1997.)

By comparing the arguments presented above, it is quite easy to discern that the speakers are essentially building their arguments on the concept of “human dignity”. The selection of the themes analyzed in this work was achieved by identifying the most common themes of argumentation within the Internet materials.

So, the argumentation by each voice has been divided into themes on the basis of the most common subjects and points of focus inherent in the argumentation available on the Net. The things that are emphasized within the different themes are not totally exclusive regarding the themes to which they are presented – they are simply the most emphasized ones. Thus, the three main themes discussed under the heading of Official voices are also present in argumentation waged against cloning by Professional Catholic voices. The same themes that are the most important in Official argumentation are not, however, as prominent in Professional argumentation and there are other themes that gain emphasis.

As a point of reflection concerning the categorization presented above, one further issue must be mentioned. Overall, there is much less discussion within the Catholic community on the Internet that falls under the heading of Professional voices than there is Official or Lay discussion. This may be partially due to the heuristic nature of the category of Professional voices, which is a sort of “leftover category”. That is, voices that express authority and specialist knowledge but are not officially tied to the Catholic Church have been categorized as Professional voices. A partial explanation for the need of a category of Professional voices may be found in the relatively centralized and authoritarian structure of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church itself. This thematic falls outside of the problematic of Internet research, and will be discussed in more detail in the section concerning the Catholic context.

The first category of arguments analyzed within this study, the Official voices, contains three main themes. These are “Human Dignity”, “Sacred Family” and “Exploitation / Dehumanization”. The analysis of the Official speaker-stances focuses on those voices that benefit from the full backing the Catholic tradition offers.

In other words, the Official voice is more easily understood as a part of the apostolic succession, and therefore as a voice speaking with the authority bestowed upon it by the presence of the Holy Ghost. Arguments that were classified as Official voices were most often found on Web pages that can be clearly understood as promoting the official stances of the Catholic Church. These include, naturally, the homepage of Vatican, and the documents by different bishops' committees, archdioceses, etc. Also, if the Pope or a Cardinal was quoted on a different forum (a Web newspaper, for example), the quoted argument was considered an Official voice.

The second category of arguments is the Professional voices, within which two themes, "Playing God" and "Monsters and Horror Scenarios" are analyzed. The Professional speakers do not have the full backing of apostolic authority, and thus must use other means to establish themselves as authorities and to distinguish themselves from the rows of the laity. As a result, the speaker-stances for official identification and the lay perspective remain quite straightforward and unproblematic, while the category balancing between the official Church and lay persons remains rather narrow. A highly centralized authority would seem to suggest that it is beneficial for the speakers to identify themselves as Official voices of the church as often as possible. In that way, they can adopt a part of the centralized authority as their own when establishing their characters in the argumentation.

In comparison with the argumentation by the Official voices, the cloning themes discussed by the Professional voices proved much more scattered. There were about half as many topics that were quite relevant to the Professional voices and so it took about twice as much material to establish the quantitative primacy of the themes analyzed here. Where the central themes within the Official voices were easily identifiable within a corpus of about 150 original sources and the final material was comprised of about 200 original sources, the initial analysis of the Professional voices demanded something approximating 300 sources. Even after the analysis there remains some arbitrariness as to whether the two selected themes are indeed the most common ones. They certainly rate with the top three candidates at any time, but the line between the second and the third most common theme of discussion remains slightly blurred.² Still, the themes discussed here are certainly among the most common within the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning by the Professional voices.

The Web sites where Professional voices were found are also very varied. The pages include, for example, texts on official Pro-life sites with no clear author, Priests and Deacons quoted on secular Internet newspapers or other secular forums, texts in which it is explicitly stated that they represent only the opinions of the author (who nevertheless presents him/herself as having specialised theological expertise), and so on. The problematic of the category of Professional voices will be discussed further later in the work.

The last category of analyzed argumentation is named the Lay voices. Within the category one single theme, "Enslavement", surfaces as extremely dominant. All in all, the amount of Lay Catholic voices arguing about cloning proved slightly surprising. The magnitude of the material that can be found in Internet discussion forums is staggering. There is a large number of discussion forums for Christians debating many topical issues and the topics of genetic sciences and human cloning

² The third Professional theme that was excluded from this study was named "Conspiracy". The theme consisted mainly of ruminations concerning the hidden ungodly agendas working against Christianity in today's society.

have given rise to forums of their own. In comparison to the material browsed for the Official and Professional voices, which were comprised of some hundreds of sources, the analysis of the discussion forums demanded browsing between two and three thousand opinions. These were sited in between two to three hundred discussion threads, ranging from a few opinions to several hundred opinions in length.

The Lay voices were found in several different discussion forums, some of which are especially designed for discussing religious matters (for example, www.beliefnet.com). However, all public and open discussion forum sites contain many discussion areas that focus on religious questions. The largest Internet search engine used in this work was Google (www.google.com), which is the most popular search engine in the virtual world (with 18.7 million search hours per month in 2003) (<http://www.1cog.com/search-engine-statistics.html>). Google is one of the largest suppliers of free discussion group services. Google Groups Discussion Forums with thousands of discussion areas was one of the important sources for the Lay discussion in this work. In Google Groups alone, the search word “catholic” produces 573 discussion groups (June 2007). The groups are free to use, so anyone can register with the server and start a discussion group, and all registered users are free to join the discussion threads. Other discussion group forums that work with similar principles and were used in this study are Yahoo! groups (<http://groups.yahoo.com/>) and MSN groups (<http://groups.msn.com/>).

The discussion of “Ensoulement”, of whether or not a cloned human being would have a soul, is by far the most common theme found in Christian discussion forums. This is a problem generally left for the laity to ponder, as the Professional and Official voices of the Catholic Church have bypassed the issue with few decisive statements (See, for example, Childress 1999, 79-80). In general the Official and Professional speakers of the Catholic community have been unanimous in saying that a human being, cloned or not, has a unique human soul. As a consequence, little attention has been given to the questions that seem to come to people quite naturally when they come across phenomena that apparently violate the conventional form of such an enormously important thing as altering the perceived rules of procreation.

The next sections will first focus on the nature of Internet research. The problems most commonly associated with virtual ethnography and using Internet sources as material will be discussed in some detail. The following sections will also describe the different real-life contexts⁵ that affect the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning. The purpose of the sections outlining the real-life context of the Catholic community is not to give a comprehensive picture of the Catholic community, Catholic theology or of Catholic social action. The purpose of the contextualizing information is rather to help the reader understand the Catholic argumentation analyzed in this study. As the primary context for the materials analyzed is virtual, the significance of the real-life contexts is problematic. What is certain, however, is that having some basic information concerning the real-life elements of Catholicism will help to understand the virtual presentation.

⁵ The term ‘real-life’, or ‘rl’ is widely used in Internet jargon. NetLingo dictionary defines ‘rl’ as “real life”. An acronym, it usually refers to when you are not chatting. (<http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?term=RL>)

2.2. The virtual context – the Internet and virtual ethnography

“Usenet is like a herd of performing elephants with diarrhea -- massive, difficult to redirect, awe-inspiring, entertaining, and a source of mind-boggling amounts of excrement when you least expect it”

- Gene Spafford, 1992

What Spafford said concerning the Usenet, a forerunner of the Internet as we now know it, can easily be attributed to the modern-day WWW as well. In this thesis the material under study is first and foremost outlined and characterized by the complex virtual environment of the Internet. Very early on in the process of this work it became clear that the decision to use Internet materials would leave its mark on many of the main problems as well as the informative outcomes of the whole study. First of all, studying the Internet gives rise to many problems that are connected to questions like “Who are we studying when we study Internet materials?”, “How can we be sure people are who they claim to be in virtual settings?” and “How is it possible to avoid information overload when using the Net as a resource?” Secondly, Internet materials are primarily and uniquely virtual, which makes them strangely disconnected from their concrete social surroundings. Although virtual sources appear ephemeral, they are connected to real-life contexts in many ways. That is to say, Internet materials do not belong to their real-life contexts as clearly as printed materials do (consider, for example, a religious publication vs. a religious web site), yet their connection to real-life contexts is undeniable. However, it is not always clear in what particular ways virtual texts are related to real-life contexts. This section will discuss these problems and offer some possible solutions.

Although the Internet has existed since the beginning of the 1960s, the most used application, the WWW is a little over a decade old.⁴ Since the establishment of the WWW, the number of Internet users has grown from an estimated 16 million in 1995 to more than 500 million in 2002 – explosive growth to say the least. (Dawson & Cowan 2004, 5.) The rather recent but enormously and rapidly progressing emergence of the Internet has not gone unnoticed by scholars working in many different fields of research.⁵ The Internet has become both an object of study and a tool of research. According to Ekhlund et al. (2003), the WWW has generated an explosion in network-mediated information exchange:

Its ubiquitous nature and technical strengths, in particular, the flexible hypermedia document format and the general communication protocols, have given users a powerful infrastructure for sharing knowledge and for

⁴ The term ‘Internet’ is routinely used in everyday language to denote the use of the WWW.

⁵ The history of the Internet is not a central issue in this study. However, readers interested in knowing more about the emergence of the Internet and the WWW in relation to religion should see, for example, Helland 2004. See also: <http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml>.

interactive communication. This has created new research questions with respect to how people conceptualize the Web, and how the use of this medium is embedded in their professional activities. (Eklundh et al. 2003, 97)

The impact of the WWW has not gone unnoticed by religious specialists either. Pope John Paul II himself recognized the crucial importance of the Net in the transmission of religious information in his address “The Church must learn to cope with computer culture” in 1990. (O’Leary 2004, 37.) The Pope was right; people use the Internet to acquire religious information in extensive amounts. The WWW contains inclusive, specialist sites for religious specialists, but also a huge medium of religious information for the average web surfer. For example, Elena Larsen found that over 28 million Americans are “religion surfers”, which is the term coined for people using the Net to obtain religious information. Of these people, 67 per cent have accessed information concerning their own faith, and 81 per cent report that their religious faith is “very strong”, which is a considerable amount compared to the American general public (61% report that religion is “very important” in their life). Three million people a day access religious web sites. For an interesting comparison, religious information on the Net is used more than the popular Internet dating services. So it is safe to say that the Internet has become something of a superhighway of religious information. (Larsen 2004, 17-20.)

As should be expected considering the rather recent explosive growth in WWW use, the ethnographic study of the phenomenon is still very much in the process of finding its way. The study of Internet materials is a complex new area of ethnography, one with its own distinctive challenges and obstacles. One of the most acute problems a researcher faces when researching Internet materials is the relative arbitrariness associated with the communities formed by the users.

The term ‘community’ is quite arbitrary in itself even when it is used in research concerning real-life social groups. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines ‘community’ as a social group of any size whose members reside in a specific locality, share government, and often have a common cultural and historical heritage. Another possible definition for ‘community’ is that it is a group sharing common characteristics or interests and perceiving itself as distinct in some respect from the larger society within which it exists. (Random House, 1987, 414.) Howard Rheingold has advanced a notion of ‘virtual community’ as “social aggregations that emerge from the Internet when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” (Rheingold 1993, 7). In the case of communities that exist both in the real world and in cyberspace, the term becomes bewilderingly ambiguous; in fact Fernback (1999, 204) even compares it with the definitions of ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. In any case, even while laden with arbitrariness, the term ‘community’ seems to be the best one available to describe the loose, irregularly anonymous social networks that exist in the Net:

The term “online community” is becoming increasingly popular when discussing about the communities that exist primarily on the internet. With the growth of the Internet, millions of people are taking part in online communities. These may include, for example, support communities for people with similar illnesses or circumstance, or groups for hobbyists. In reality, online communities are neither designed nor do they just emerge. (Lazar and Preece 2003).

The Internet is a continually changing, huge, evolving social community, a “network of networks” that constantly spawns new forms of communication and interaction. The communities in the Internet environment, as compared to real-life communities, are fluid, with a different sense of persona and identity as well as of structure and time of the communication situations. (see Costigan 1999, xviii-xxii.) According to Lazar and Preece:

The way people interact in a community contributes strongly to its long-term evolution. People’s behavior cannot be controlled but it can be influenced. The community’s purpose, people’s roles in the community, and policies set-up to guide behavior, influence how people behave. The web can support multiple forms of communication, each with its own criteria, each with its own form of “community.” (Lazar and Preece 2003, 127).

No matter how fluid the definition of an Internet community, the term seemed difficult to put into use within the setting of this particular study. What was striking in the context of the study was the apparent non-connectedness of the “community” under scrutiny. There was a problematical feeling that the grouping of thematic texts used as material in the study did not qualify as a “community” or even “pseudo-community” (see Beniger 1987). For example, a great number of both Official and Professional voices were situated in what seemed quite random pages of the WWW, quoted here and there with no feeling of a “community” to hold the material together. The situation was not helped by the following fact sharply expressed by Watson:

As often as Internet scholars argue that they have discovered a virtual community, it is also argued that those researchers are uncritical about the notion of community. Their detractors often accuse them of being overly excited to assign “community” as a descriptor for their favorite and newly discovered online-discussion group. (Watson 1997, 103.)

The only part of the material under study that seemed to qualify as an Internet community in an unproblematic way were the Lay voices that argue in Christian discussion groups, as the groups can be considered something akin to communities in themselves. The Official and Professional voices most often seemed only like disembodied, detached voices crying out in the virtual desert. What remained apparent, however, was that all the Internet Catholic voices on cloning were connected by a common interest, if not by anything else. According to Watson (1997), the communities which naturally form online do so with such apparent ease because they are based upon a trait which is also central to real-life grassroots representation movements. Online communities are primarily communities formed around a common interest. (Watson 1997, 124.) This loose definition of a virtual community fits the material under study perfectly. The same idea about virtual communities is expressed by Fernback as follows:

...they thrive on the “meanwhile”, they are forged from the sense that they exist, but we rarely directly apprehend them, and we see them only out of the

comer of our eye... Second, they are imagined as parallel, rather than serial, groupings of people, which is to say that they are not composed of people who are necessarily connected, even by interest, but are rather groupings of people headed in the same direction, for a time. They may read the same things, occupy the same chat rooms for a time, view the same World Wide Web pages, in fact have the same interests and imagine that they are part of larger groups, “Internet users” in the main and subgroups from that... (Fernback 1997, 17.)

So, in the end, an answer to the problem of community surfaced. The “community” that is really under study here is the community of Internet users that utilizes the Net to find information on Catholic stances towards cloning. However, the textual content that is studied here is only partially created by the lay persons who search for information – there are also Official and Professional voices in the fray. So the primary material under study does not speak of any clear-cut community that has created the materials. The primary Internet content examined here is information given to those united by a common interest, who study the material presented as “Catholic” and form their understandings of Catholic attitudes based on it. In other words, the community under study is those people who use the Internet to access Catholic argumentation concerning cloning. And what we can learn about that community of Internet users united by a common interest in Catholic argumentation concerning cloning is what they come to know through their use of the Net. So, this is a study of Internet content which is created by Catholics or otherwise “tagged” Catholic for Internet search purposes, from the point of view of the community that wants to know about that content⁶.

While the communities on the Internet are somewhat dauntingly opaque from the point of view of traditional ethnography, the study of the Net offers opportunities that are irresistible:

For scholars with an interest in discourse analysis, literary criticism, rhetorical studies, textual analysis, and the like, the Internet is a research setting par excellence, practically irresistible in its availability. But the social issues surrounding the Internet are far more difficult to untangle than its texts. (Jones 1999, 13.)

Jones sees the materials the Internet offers as “irresistably available”. While this may be true in some sense (giving the term “armchair anthropology” a whole new horizon), the apparent availability of material is still only a partial truth. One can easily lose one’s way in the torrent of information and sheer rubbish the Net offers. The problem is not that the material for anthropological study is scarcely present on the Net; the real problem is the availability of all sorts of materials, which tends to make research cumbersome and frustrating. This “information overload” and the unclear contextual relations the materials gathered from the Net have to the real social world outside cyberspace are the two biggest problems associated with

⁶ For further information on Internet-communities see, for example, Dawson 2004, Berger & Ezzy 2004.

Internet research. While it is a reasonable notion that a researcher must be aware of the special problems associated with Internet material, the scientific community can hardly ignore the Net as a growing new field of anthropological material, the importance of which is increasing explosively.

The ethnographic study of the Internet can be divided into two broad categories: user-based and content-based. The same division applies to more technically orientated research (e.g. virtual design, accessibility, etc.) as well as to virtual anthropology and ethnography. User-based analysis is just what one might imagine: the examination of the population using the Internet. This study, however, is a typical case of the content-based type. In the case of content-based research the Internet is viewed as a multifaceted mass medium, and the analysis of the contents is not so different from an analysis that could be done based on other mass media, such as newspapers or television. In content-based analysis the focus is on the text, messages and discourses that the communicators exchange. (see Mitra & Cohen 1999, 180-181.) As an analogy, the official statements published on the Internet pages of various institutions (churches, for example) can be seen as analogous to the articles published in a religious newspaper, while the discussions and comments in various newsgroups and discussion forums can be seen as analogous to the opinion pages of religious newspapers. Religious web sites edit and monitor what they publish much in the same way as newspapers, which control their articles as well as opinion pages.

The discussion groups on the Net are usually moderated to weed out offensive and inappropriate language, so even they are not completely free of editing. However, the discussion forums on the Net are probably the most free and the least edited public mass media in existence. The discussion forums offer a unique chance for research: there, printed materials are spontaneously produced by people and unedited by any authority. Any content-based study that utilizes the opinion pages of newspapers as material is inevitably a study of the editorial line of the newspapers in question. Any study utilizing interviews as material has to count for the fact that the materials are not spontaneously produced: they are answers to the questions set out by the researcher. In this sense the forums offer unique possibilities that are especially interesting from the cognitive point of view.

Although this study does not employ the methods used in user-based research, a short detour to that side of Internet research helps to understand the similarities and differences between content- and user-based studies. As a good example of a user-based study, Sundweeks and Simoff (1999) put forward a fairly complex methodology called CEDA (Complementary Explorative Data Analysis), that integrates quantitative and qualitative data analysis. CEDA is a user-based methodology for the study of Internet materials, namely for analysing the unilateral communication in Internet communities. In CEDA, the qualitative analysis of materials proceeds in three steps. The first step is very similar to the thematic classification of material used in this study: the messages were reviewed to identify and categorize major dimensions or regularities that occurred throughout the data. Sundweeks and Simoff labelled five different qualitative dimensions as salient:

1. Issues: the topics to be discussed and resolved
2. Leadership: the inclination to conform or reject leadership and authority
3. Debate: argumentativeness, criticism, or aggression among

- participants
4. Relationships: expressions or avoidance of friendship or intimacy among participants
 5. Action: goal-directed or task-directed activity (Sudweeks and Simoff 1999, 49.)

The second step of analysis was to further categorize the communication based on its function. The communication of participants was reviewed to identify how communication behaviours were managed and what the actual communication content was. The contents were divided into three broad categories: conceptual, socio-emotional and action (task oriented). The third and final step was to create a typology of Dimensions and Communication, in which the texts were divided into time periods. (Sudweeks and Simoff 1999, 49-52.) Through CEDA, Sudweeks and Simoff were able to make an in-depth analysis of the social functions in an Internet community.

While the approach suggested by Sudweeks and Simoff is innovative, it is focused on studying the users of the Internet. As such, it is a good example of a user-based study. While many of the aspects considered within this approach could be combined with a rhetorical approach (the division of power within the Internet communities, for example), the CEDA model is not applicable in a primarily content-based study. In a content-based study of Internet argumentation it is more fruitful to apply more traditional methods of text analysis⁷.

As previously described, the acquisition of materials for this study followed a rather straightforward virtual-ethnographical method. The preliminary categorization of the materials was likewise straightforward: after the material had reached an adequate point of saturation⁸, it was categorized into themes on the basis of its contents. The basic analysis to discern the most recurrent discussions was identical to any content-based study aiming to identify common themes within a corpus of textual material. The only possible way to establish the recurrence of thematic content in any corpus of qualitative material is simply to compare the texts long enough for patterns to begin to emerge. This is the general approach one would utilise when using sources like newspaper content as one's material. One marked difference to analysing texts, in newspapers, for example, is the constantly changing nature of the Net:

...it is true that much Internet research relies on a conceptualization of the Internet as a storage medium, as one that "fixes" communication in a tangible (typically textual) form, making it seem ripe for the picking by the scholars. ...Yet the Internet is not nearly as "fixed" in these terms as one might believe, given that it is a constantly changing medium. (Jones 1999, 6.)

7 For a good examples of a content-based Internet study of religion see O'Leary 2004, 46-57, Campbell 2004.

8 As mentioned before, the saturation point in this case was the point when the different combinations of search strings directed to web pages already visited or to discussion threads already documented.

The materials foraged from the Internet are textual, but they behave in a manner somewhat similar to fieldwork material gathered in a unique social situation. Think of a researcher studying a religious cult. While with the cult, the researcher can make notes, use audio recordings, cameras or video to record the fieldwork situation. However, when he returns to the site years later, it will not be the same. When another researcher goes to the site to verify the study the previous researcher conducted, he may notice that many things have changed. It is the same with the texts on the Internet, although instead of years, some minutes may be enough for huge changes to have occurred. As the fieldworker has to rely on his notes and recordings, the “Internet-worker” must rely on the saved texts he has collected⁹.

In addition to the rapidly changing nature of the WWW, studying the Internet introduces several other special problems from the point of view of a content-based study. One apparent problem concerning Internet material is that even the explicitly expressed identities of the speakers may be easily faked and there is little in the way of source critique one can apply besides being aware that the speakers may choose to present themselves falsely to justify their own ends. However, this is not that big a problem, because from the focus-on-content point of view and from the point of view of the theory presented in this study it is more relevant to ask how the speakers want to present themselves and why is it that they wish to present themselves as they do. Whether the expressed identities of the speakers are falsified, and whether they correspond to the real-life situations of the speakers, the processes of constructing identity within the texts portray the social-cognitive functions that are of interest in this study. Secondary assumptions can then be drawn towards the real world with the idea in mind that even constructed identities can tell us something about how things are evaluated and argued about in the real world surrounding the virtual space. Even falsified speaker presentations can tell us about the opinions, attitudes and value attributions of other people. In the end, the identity of a person appearing on an opinion page of a newspaper may be falsified, people can be untruthful in interviews and so on. As long as people use the Internet as a source of information, the authenticity of speakers is a secondary problem. In the words of Christine Hine:

Rather than treating authenticity as a particular problem posed by cyberspace that the ethnographer has to solve before moving on to the analysis, it would be more fruitful to place authenticity in cyberspace as a topic at the heart of the analysis. Assuming a priori that authenticity is a problem for inhabitants of cyberspace is the same kind of ethnographic mistake as assuming that the Azande have a problem in dealing with the contradictions inherent in their beliefs about witchcraft. (Hine 2000, 49.)

Furthermore, from the point of view of cognitive analysis, it is not crucially important whether the texts are written by people who really are who they claim to be. In the cognitive sense the most important factor is that the texts on the Internet are produced by human beings. If the author is a human being, then human cognitive abilities have been involved in the process of creating the text and the

9 For additional information on issues of fieldwork see Laaksonen, P., Knuuttila, S. and Piela, U. 2003; 2004; Johnson 1975; Spradley 1980.

imprint (mental fingerprints, if you will) of the cognitive process involved can be seen in the text. Even if a person cheats (a lay person claims to be a priest, for example) in order to appear appealing, the means of appeal can still be analyzed. This is true as certainly for virtual texts as for conventional printed texts. However, the arbitrariness of virtual identities does create a problem from the point of view of Official / Professional / Lay voice categorisation used in this study. Consequently, the examples and arguments presented in this work should not be understood as presenting a wholly reliable picture of all the possible stances towards cloning Catholic Cardinals, priests and lay persons may have. What they present are the most common virtual stances. The problematic will be discussed further in the end of the section.

The materials available on the Internet have several further biases one must be aware of. One such bias is created by the English language, which has become the dominant language of the Net.¹⁰ Some areas of the world have severely limited access to the Net, and this creates a bias towards Western states with a relatively high standard of living and the churches and believers in these states. As Jones (1999, 15.) remarks: “One obvious critique is that electronic communities are, and will continue to be, elitist, no matter that it is widely believed that ‘community’ implies some sort of ‘openness’ and sense of belonging”. Because English is the dominant language on the Net, this study is comprised of materials written in English, which from the viewpoint of the Catholic community creates a further bias. The English-speaking community is but a part of the cultural whole that might be labelled “Catholic Christianity”. Encyclopaedia Britannica (2005) estimates there were more than 1,100,000,000 Catholics in the world in the year 2004. It is impossible to tell precisely how many of these Catholics both know the English language and have Internet access. North American Catholics form a tiny part of the world’s Catholics, but have the best statistical Internet access (<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm>). As they are also English-speaking, it can be supposed that their voices are strongly present in the material as compared to Catholics globally.

Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind that using sources written in English focuses the study on English-speaking Catholics. It is, of course, by no means impossible that many Catholics in South America, for example, have a knowledge of English and have Internet access. The point is that when we cannot know for certain, we must assume that the Western, English-speaking world is “over-represented” in the material. Even though the language barrier creates an “elitist” language environment on the Internet, the Christian community in general and Catholic community in particular have been extremely eager to utilize the possibilities the Net offers. According to Miller and Slater (2000, 2001) this use of the Internet develops from a core aspect of the whole Christian Church itself. It can be seen as the contemporary and most literal version of Weber’s (1958) characterization of Protestant Churches as looking to the world itself for evidence that they are saved:

So the Church looks to the most contemporary idiom for its routes to salvation.
It is clear from their materials that they were already using the language of

¹⁰ Global Reach Web service estimates the number of Internet users who accessed the Web in English to be 280 million in 2004. In comparison, the combined amount of users in all other languages was 680 million. English-speaking Internet users make up 35.8% of the world’s online population. The second largest group is the Chinese-speakers, who make up for 14.1% of Web users. (<http://global-reach.biz/globstats/index.php5>)

commerce and the free market in a similar fashion, as something that could express their potential as a global Church. The Internet was quickly seen to push still further the possibilities of this self-understanding of what the Church or (as it would see it) the message of God must be, and the net was therefore appropriated as the imagination of the Church. (Miller and Slater 2000, 2001, 189)

From the point of view of the scientific study of religion, one extremely important feature of Internet communication became clear in the opening stages of this research. It seems that the Internet creates a forum extensively ruled by the language of “Little Tradition”.¹¹ It is a known fact in Internet research that the pluralistic and ephemeral nature of the voices on the Net tends to erode religious authority. (see Dawson & Cowan 2004, 3; Helland 2004, 30-32.) The explicit religious authorities are not, of course, the whole truth of religions offline either. It is a known fact in the scientific study of religion that all religious traditions can be divided into a “Great” tradition and a “Little” tradition. ‘Great Tradition’ means the doctrinally correct expression of religion, where highly sophisticated theological concepts are used. ‘Little Tradition’ denotes the actual belief systems of the devotees of a given religion. Little Tradition can and usually does differentiate greatly from the Great Tradition.¹²

What was strikingly clear in the analyzed material was that within the texts on the Internet, religious expression takes on the style of the Little Tradition. Little Tradition seems to be emphasized on the Net to an overwhelming degree. This is not surprising in the discussions of lay people, but even the Official voices of the Church and the Professional speakers that want to present themselves as having theological expertise have apparently utilized very little expert theological knowledge or language in their Internet argumentation. This leads to the conclusion that the expert discussions (e.g. where experts communicate with peers through expert language) on the Internet are held in forums with restricted access and membership. Consequently, when the experts address the imagined audiences on the Internet they use the language of Little Tradition (e.g. no sophisticated theological concepts etc.). This dominance of Little Tradition has an impact on understanding the discussion and also on the relevance of the real-life contexts of the Catholic voices.

The picture of the Catholic argumentation concerning cloning represented by the material in this study is an approximation of the picture any average, English-speaking user of Internet would get after extensively searching the Net for information concerning this subject. The materials included present an informative account of the attitudes of English-speaking Catholics towards cloning

11 The concept of “Great” and “Little” tradition was originally proposed by anthropologist Robert Redfield in 1956 in his book *Peasant Society and Culture*. Later on the division, although much debated, has become something of a norm in understanding religious traditions. For further discussion concerning the idea see the article by Ronald A. Lukens-Bull in: <http://web.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journal/mjr/lukensbull.html>. See also Pyysiäinen 2004a, 124-127; Tremliin 2005, 70-80.

12 In the cognitive study of religion the topic of ‘doctrinal correctness’ or ‘theological correctness’ versus everyday, spontaneous religious thought has received much attention. While not exactly the same as the “Little tradition” – “Great Tradition”, the conceptualizations share common ground. See Boyer 2002, 101-105; Barrett 1999; Whitehouse 2000; Pyysiäinen 2001, 78-79; Pyysiäinen 2004a, 2004b; Whitehouse & McCauley 2005.

as it is presented on the Internet. However, it is quite risky to generalize that the themes prevalent on the Internet are the only topics concerning cloning that are of significance for the whole real-life Catholic community. Although the link between RL and virtual reality remains difficult to map out in its entirety, the rhetorical link between the worlds is undeniable:

Where authenticity and identities are performed, a link between the offline and the online is also rendered. People speaking about who they are and what is the case are making a statement about a feature of the offline world. Rather than the Internet severing links with the offline, these links are strategic performances. The offline world is rendered as present within the online spaces of interaction. It is not true to say, then, that the virtual automatically transcends the real. The spaces of interaction might be differently configured and differently experienced, but they do not lose all reference to offline realities. (Hine 2000, 144.)

Although the real-life relations of information on the Internet are often unclear, it seems unlikely that the materials present on the Net would be completely detached from the actual world of the Catholic Church and Catholic believers. (see Dawson & Cowan 2004, 1.) However, an observant user of the Net must remain attentive to the biases that the freedom of the medium may produce. From a scientific point of view, in a content-based study this also creates a need to discuss the probable real-life contexts of the Internet materials studied.¹⁵

Ultimately the materials present on the Net are a real source of information for the people using the Internet, no matter how biased they might be. (see Larsen 2004) Even this single self-evident fact makes the Net an extremely relevant and important source of material for many presumable research settings of virtual ethnography and anthropology. The relevance of the Net as a source of material increases in proportion to the topicality of the given research interest, so it is easy to see why Net material is of particular interest for a study of social impact caused by genetic technology. In the following sections we look into the real-life contexts that are relevant for the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning. The contextualizing information which is presented is of a very basic level, e.g. the information concerning genetic engineering and cloning is very commonsensical. The same applies to the theological context information. This is reasonable because of the dominance of the Little Tradition and the absence of expert discussion in the material analyzed. In other words, only basic information on cloning and theology is necessary to better understand the Internet argumentation.

¹⁵ Actually, the bias the freedom of the Internet creates may not be a bias at all, but rather a lack of bias uncommon to religious forums. As Dawson and Cowell remark: "The substitution of a cyberspace for a real place, of a virtual community for a physically present one, often has a strange levelling effect on religions". (Dawson and Cowell 2004, 5. See also Beaudoin 1998: 56-58.) As the Internet erodes religious authority, it erodes the biased views typical for religious realities.

2.3. The bioscientific context: genes, genetics and cloning

As was mentioned in the last section, the Internet context of the cloning discussion seems to create an environment of Little Tradition. That is to say, expert discussion is restricted in two different ways. People either need to be specialists in order to access the discussion, or the argumentation by those who have special knowledge is explicitly directed to people who do not have expert knowledge. Consequently, in Catholic discussions on the Internet, expert knowledge of the actual processes of cloning or genetics in general is very seldom demonstrated. Even if this is the case, some very basic knowledge about genetics and cloning is beneficial in order to better understand the Catholic argumentation analyzed within this study. The following information is very general in nature and can be found in virtually any modern biology textbook. The web resources of the Human Genome Project have been used as an outline for the information in this section, mainly because it is the most up-to-date site for basic data about genetics and biotechnology. The site is also relevant in the context of this study because of its focus on human genetics and because of its visibility. It is conceivable that a great amount of average users who utilise the Internet as an information resource concerning Catholic views on cloning utilize this site as their resource for biological information concerning cloning. It is arguably the best possible site for anyone who does not possess expert knowledge on genetics but who wishes to know more about cloning and genetic technology.¹⁴

To understand the basics of genetics and cloning one must understand the basic cellular structure of living organisms. Nearly all living things are composed of cells (excluding some special cases like viruses). Thus it can be said that cells are the fundamental working units of every living system, the building blocks of life, as it were. All the instructions needed to direct the formation and activity of every cell in an organism are contained within the chemical DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). DNA is a molecule that encodes genetic information. There is an identical DNA storage in the nucleus of every cell of a biological organism, e.g. all biological information required for the birth and growth of a being is stored in the nucleus of every single cell.¹⁵

So, the entire set of instructions – known as a ‘genome’ – for the construction of any living creature, is present in each of a human being’s approximately 10¹⁴ cells (with the exception of red blood cells). The DNA that makes the genome has four different chemical building blocks. These are called ‘bases’ and abbreviated A, T, C, and G.¹⁶ In the human genome, about 3 billion bases are arranged along the

14 The web site of the Human Genome Project can be found at: http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml. Also, for anyone who has no prior knowledge of biological sciences but is interested in genetics, Tara Rodden Robinson’s “Genetics for Dummies” (Wiley Publishing, 2005) is a great source of information.

15 For more information concerning the structure of eukaryotic cells see, for example, Robinson 2003, 108-115; Blum 2002, 119-122; Robinson 2005, 19-36. For more information concerning DNA see, for example Sinden 2003, 215-220; Sullivan 2002, 222-224; Robinson 2005, 79-158.

16 DNA is a double-stranded molecule held together by weak bonds between base pairs of nucleotides. The four nucleotides in DNA contain the bases adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine

24 chromosomes¹⁷ in a particular order for each unique individual. To get an idea of the size of the genetic information present in each of our cells, consider the following analogy: if the DNA sequence of the human genome were compiled in books, the equivalent of 200 volumes the size of a Manhattan telephone book (at 1000 pages each) would be needed to hold it all. It would take about 9.5 years to read out loud (without stopping) the 3 billion bases in a person's genome sequence. This is calculated at a reading rate of 10 bases per second, equalling 600 bases/minute, 36,000 bases/hour, 864,000 bases/day, 315,360,000 bases/year (resource: http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/faq/faqs1.html).¹⁸

The DNA of all living organisms is made up of the same chemical and physical components. The DNA sequence is the particular side-by-side arrangement of bases along the DNA strand (e.g., ATTCCGGA).¹⁹ This order spells out the exact instructions required to create a particular organism with its own unique traits. A genome is an organism's complete set of DNA. Genomes vary widely in size: the smallest known genome for a free-living organism (a bacterium) contains about 600,000 DNA base pairs, while mouse and human genomes have some 3 billion.

DNA in the human genome is arranged into 24 distinct chromosomes that are physically separate molecules ranging in length from about 50 million to 250 million base pairs. Each chromosome contains many genes, the basic physical and functional units of heredity. Genes are specific sequences of bases that encode instructions on how to make proteins. Genes comprise only about 2% of the human genome; the remainder consists of non-coding regions, whose functions may include providing chromosomal structural integrity and regulating where, when, and in what quantity proteins are made (the part of DNA not actually containing data for making proteins is often referred to as "junk" DNA). The human genome is estimated to contain 30,000 to 40,000 genes. You may have heard someone say that they do not want to eat genetically altered food because "it contains genes". This is, of course, a misunderstanding. Everything people eat contains extremely large

(T). In nature, base pairs form only between A and T and between G and C; thus the base sequence of each single strand can be deduced from that of its partner.

- 17 The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology defines chromosomes as follows: "chromosome a structure composed of a very long molecule of DNA and associated proteins (e.g. histones) that carries hereditary information. Chromosomes are especially evident in plant or animal cells undergoing mitosis or meiosis, where each chromosome becomes condensed into a compact, readily visible thread. In nondividing cells chromosomes typically assume a more dispersed form called chromatin. The number of chromosomes is characteristic for the species concerned. In a bacterium only one chromosome is evident as the cell is about to divide. After DNA replication, the two new chromosomes attach to a specialized site on the bacterial plasma membrane for segregation to the two daughter cells." (Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 116.) For more information concerning eukaryotic chromosomes see, for example, Guidi & Imbalzano 2003, 132-139.
- 18 For more information concerning genome see, for example, Krawiec 2003, 112-117; Meyer 2002, 140-141. For more information concerning genotypes and phenotypes see, for example, van der Valt & Vance 2003, 125-129.
- 19 The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology defines base pairs as follows: "base pair: any of the possible pairings between two bases in opposing strands of double-stranded DNA or RNA molecules. Adenine forms a base pair with thymine (in DNA) or uracil (in RNA) and guanine with cytosine, hence the number of adenine residues equals the number of thymine (and/or uracil) residues while the number of guanine residues equals that of the cytosine residues." (Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 69.)

quantities of cells, and thus DNA, and consequently protein-encoding sequences of genetic information, or genes.²⁰

Although genes are the information base vital for life, it is the proteins that perform most life functions and even make up the majority of cellular structures. Proteins are large, complex molecules made up of smaller subunits called amino acids. The chemical properties that distinguish the 20 different amino acids cause the protein chains to fold up into specific three-dimensional structures that define their particular functions in the cell. A protein's chemistry and behaviour is specified by the gene sequence and by the number and identities of other proteins made in the same cell at the same time. The process of protein production brought about by the functional DNA units – genes – is the fundamental base process of all life.²¹

The research to uncover the functional genes within human DNA is called The Human Genome Project. The Human Genome Project (HGP) began as a collaboration between the US Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health in 1990. From the very beginning, its organizers were aware that genetic information resulting from the project would have profound and perhaps unintended consequences for society. Each year they set aside a small portion of the project's budget to investigate the ethical, legal, and social implications of the HGP. (see http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/elsi.shtml; see also Meyer 2003, 171-178.)

The sequencing of human DNA became ready in 2003. After the preliminary sequencing was done, the actual research into the functions of human genes began on many different fronts. Some of the emphasis of the upcoming research will be to develop technology for the comprehensive analysis of gene expression and for large-scale protein analyses. The important milestones of the sequencing process are reported at: http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/progress.shtml.)

Cloning

The term 'cloning' basically refers to copying genes and other pieces of chromosomes to generate enough identical material for further study.²² In a nutshell, cloning a gene means to make many exact copies of a segment of a DNA molecule that encodes a gene. This is usually done because to study genes in laboratory conditions, it is necessary to have many copies of the same DNA molecule on hand to use as samples for different experiments. Gene cloning is an

20 The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology defines genes as follows: gene: in classical genetics, a statistical entity that correlates with a particular phenotypic characteristic; the functional unit of heredity. (Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 257.) For more information concerning genes see, for example, Carlson 2003, 50-54; Jungck 2002, 117-124.

21 For more information concerning protein sequencing see, for example, Stephenson & Abilock 2003, 196-198. For more information concerning proteins see, for example, Small 2003, 198-204; Anderson 2002, 7-15.

22 The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology defines molecular cloning as follows: "molecular cloning or DNA cloning: the isolation in a bacterial cell of a fragment of any heterologous DNA in covalent linkage with a replicon (plasmid, phage, etc.) in order to obtain a homogeneous population (i.e. clone) of DNA molecules from the progeny of such a cell. The DNA to be cloned may be a fragment of genomic DNA obtained by restriction endonuclease digestion, or a complementary DNA (cDNA). (The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 425.)

important technology, because it enables scientists to manipulate and study genes in isolation from the organism they came from. This allows researchers to conduct many experiments that would be very difficult if not impossible without cloned genes. For example, concerning research on humans this is clearly an advantage, as direct experimentation on humans has many technical, financial, and ethical limitations. (Muhlrad 2003, 152.)

The ability to clone a gene is not only valuable for conducting research, it also carries pharmaceutical importance. Many pharmaceutical drugs and industrial enzymes are produced from cloned genes. For example, insulin, clotting factors, human growth hormone, cytokines (cell growth stimulants), and several anticancer drugs in use are produced from cloned genes. (Muhlrad 2003, 153.) Other types of cloning can aim at, for example, producing complete, genetically identical animals. The first cloning of a vertebrate by nuclear transfer was reported by John Gurdon of the University of Cambridge in the 1950s (he cloned South African frogs). (De Stasio 2003, 161.)

The types of cloning utilised for cloning organisms are blastomere separation and nuclear transfer. Blastomere²³ separation (sometimes called “twinning” after the naturally occurring process that creates identical twins) involves splitting a developing embryo soon after fertilization of the egg by a sperm (sexual reproduction) to give rise to two or more embryos. The resulting organisms are identical twins (clones) containing DNA from both the mother and the father. The world’s first mammal that was successfully cloned using a technique other than twinning was the ewe Dolly, who was born in the Roslin Institute in Scotland on February 22, 1997. The method used for her inception was ‘somatic cell transfer’, which produces an organism carrying the DNA of only one parent.²⁴ In nuclear transplantation, the nucleus of an unfertilized donor egg is either mechanically removed or it is destroyed by ultraviolet light in a process called enucleation. The original nucleus is then replaced by a nucleus containing a full set of genes that has been taken from a body cell of an organism. This procedure eliminates the need for the fertilization of an egg by a sperm. (De Stasio 2003, 161-162.)

To summarize, cloning can be divided into three different types of processes. The first consists of copying strands of amino acids that make up DNA, and is consequently referred to as cloning DNA. The resulting cloned (copied) collections of DNA molecules are called clone libraries. The second type of cloning exploits the natural process of cell division to make many copies of an entire cell. The genetic makeup of these cloned cells, called a cell line, is identical to the original cell. The third type of cloning produces complete, genetically identical animals such as the Scottish sheep, Dolly. A ‘clone’ can be defined as an exact copy made of biological material such as a DNA segment (e.g., a gene or other region), a whole cell, or a complete organism.²⁵

As we are examining the discussion on human cloning, two further definitions must be looked at. These are ‘reproductive cloning’ and ‘therapeutic cloning’.

23 A blastomere is a cell formed in the first stages of embryonic development, after the splitting of the fertilized ovum.

24 For more about Dolly and the Roslin Institute visit: <http://www.roslin.ac.uk/public/01-12-98-dnt.html>.

25 For more information concerning gene cloning see, for example, Muhlrad 2003, 152-158. For more information concerning cloning organisms see, for example, De Stasio 2003, 161-165. See also Robinson 2005, 299-312.

Reproductive cloning is a technology used to generate an animal or human that has the same nuclear DNA as another currently or previously existing creature. In the process of “somatic cell nuclear transfer” (SCNT), genetic material from the nucleus of a donor adult cell is transferred to an egg whose nucleus, and thus its genetic material, has been removed. The reconstructed egg containing the DNA from a donor cell is then treated with chemicals or an electric current to stimulate cell division. Once the cloned embryo reaches a suitable stage, it is transferred to the uterus of a female host where it continues to develop until birth. Reproductive cloning or “live-birth cloning”²⁶ is the technology that could be used, for example, by infertile or homosexual couples wanting biological offspring. Of course, there are multiple other possible uses like using cloning to save endangered species. (Rodden Robinson 2005, 311.)

Therapeutic cloning, which is also called “embryo cloning”²⁷, means the production of human (or animal) embryos for use in research. The goal of therapeutic cloning is not to create cloned human beings, but rather to harvest stem cells that can be used to study human development and to treat disease. Mammalian embryonic stem (ES) cells have the property of being able to differentiate into virtually every cell type. Because ES cells can be genetically manipulated in vitro and can be transplanted into embryos and adults, they may hold promise for future medical therapies. (Grant & Strathdee 2003, 3.)

Therapeutic cloning involves embryos that are in very early stages of development, usually referred to as ‘blastocysts’. Human development is usually summarized by the following four phases: (1) fertilization; (2) implantation; (3) gastrulation; and (4) embryogenesis. In the fertilization phase the cell membrane of a sperm fuses with the oocyte (egg), injecting its nucleus. Next the egg undergoes its second division (meiosis), and the resulting haploid nucleus fuses with the haploid sperm nucleus to re-form the diploid number of chromosomes. Then the fertilized egg, now termed a “zygote”, continues to move down the oviduct to the uterus, where it lodges in the wall. (Sandra 2003, 82.)

In the implantation phase the the cells that will form the embryo proper divide and organize themselves into a bilaminar (two-layered) disc. The cells that form the placenta and the embryonic sac also separate from the actual embryonic cells during this time. The implantation phase begins during the second week of development. During the third week, the embryo undergoes the process of gastrulation, forming a trilaminar (three-layered) disc. Gastrulation establishes the three germ layers—the endoderm, ectoderm, and centrally placed mesoderm—all of which will give rise to the various organ systems. (Sandra 2003, 82.) The embryonic stem cells utilised in therapeutic cloning are extracted before the cells start to differentiate in gastrulation.

The ability to differentiate into all cell types, a property known as pluripotency, arises from the fact that ES cells are isolated from in vitro outgrowths of early stage embryos (in the mouse, for example, at three and one-half days, at the blastocyst stage). These growths are cultured in specialized conditions—often in the presence of support cells, called feeder cells, which do not proliferate, and specific growth factors. The ES cells proliferate rapidly in culture, and clonal (identical) populations

26 The process was also called “Cloning-to-Produce-Children” by President Bush’s council on bioethics in 2002.

27 The process was also called “Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research” by President Bush’s council on bioethics in 2002.

can readily be initiated from single cells. (Grant & Strathdee 2003, 3.) Stem cells are typically extracted from the egg after it has divided for 5 days. The egg at this stage of development is called (also in humans) a blastocyst²⁸. The extraction process destroys the embryo, which raises a variety of ethical concerns and has caused much discussion within the Catholic community.²⁹

Because of the nature of the discussion analyzed within this study, further information concerning the biological and technological processes used in cloning is not necessary in order to understand the Catholic argumentation concerning cloning. Next, we take a look into the real-life Catholic contexts of the Catholic Internet discussion.

28 The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology defines blast cells as follows: “blast cell or blastocyte: any undifferentiated embryonic cell. Such cells characteristically have a cytoplasm rich in RNA, and are actively synthesizing DNA. (The Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 74.)

29 The official web page of the Human Genome Project has been used as an information resource for this part of the text. For further and more precise information refer to <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/>.

2.4. The Catholic community

A few words need to be said about the concrete real-life structure of the huge and diverse community under study. The Christian religion as a whole is the largest of the world's religions. It has been estimated that about 1700 million people belonged to different Christian communities at the end of the twentieth century (Räisänen 1999, 157). The Christian religion is still growing: the Center for the Study of Global Christianity estimates the global number of Christians of all the different churches and faiths would have been 2,090,763,000 in mid-2004. (See [http://www.gordonconwell.edu/ockenga/globalchristianity/.](http://www.gordonconwell.edu/ockenga/globalchristianity/))

The estimates concerning the actual number of Christian adherents are, of course, indicative at best and riddled with several problems, the largest of which is the extreme heterogeneity and syncretism inherent in the Christian tradition. One can hardly think that 2000 million people coming from all imaginable cultural backgrounds could share exactly the same religious customs, beliefs and perceptions. As discussed before, the differences between the Great Tradition and the Little Tradition can be significant. Furthermore, the actual doctrines, the Great Tradition of different Christian groups varies significantly.

The heterogeneity inherent in Christianity is partially due to the several great divides the Christian community has experienced during its 2000-year history. The first of these happened during the 4th century, when the church divided into two distinct spheres of power: the western sphere governed from Rome and the eastern sphere governed from Constantinople. The division deepened further during the 11th century, when the spheres uttered mutual anathemas, which were in force until 1965. This division gave the Orthodox Church of the east and the Catholic Church of the west separate "ecological pockets" in which they evolved, at least partially, in different directions (see Smart 1989, 255-262; Räisänen 1999, 160-161).

The second great divide occurred during the 16th century, when emerging new ideas and technologies led to the formation of nation states and made many of the old authorities objectionable. The Catholic Church was one of the monopolies of the day to lose in the transaction of ideas that marked the beginning of modern individualism and the "democratization of knowledge". The process is known as the Reformation, which has largely been associated with the name of one of its proponents, Martin Luther. The Reformation marked the beginning of the pluralism and fragmentation of the western Christian community (see Smart 1989, 315-327; Räisänen 1999, 162-163; Wallace 2004.)⁵⁰.

The developments briefly outlined above resulted in the three major Christian groups of today, the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church and the Protestant denominations. Of these three Christian groups the Catholic community has been chosen as the subject of this study because it is the largest and arguably the oldest Christian denomination⁵¹.

50 For additional information on the history of the Christian Church see Hastings 1999; Marty 1987; Bokenkotter 2004.

51 For additional information on the Catholic Church see Küng 2001; Noonan 2005; Allen 2004. For information on Catholic Church in America see Carey 2004.

Although it is not generally evaluated as being as fundamental as the two great divides, the religious immigration to North America from the 17th century onward and Christianization through colonialization can be seen as the third great change in the history of Christianity³². This development finally laid the foundation to a great extent for the pluralism and syncretism inherent in the Christian tradition of today. American Christianity has its own character and emphasis, and since the use of the Internet is fairly common in North America, it is very probable that a large part of the material analyzed for this study has been written by the descendants of the third great divide. Thus, in the context of this study the third great divide of Catholicism is of greater importance than the previous two, and will be discussed in more detail.

The third great divide of the Catholic Church happened at the time of the Great Migration, in the mid-1900s, when the immigration to US peaked. The impact of the Great Migration on the Catholic community in America was enormous. The Roman Catholic Church has a very long history in America. However, no major church in America experienced a more decisive break between its colonial phase and its development after the Revolutionary War. The Roman Catholic Church began a distinctively different second history in the period following the Great Migration. The flow of immigrants was so large that by 1850 Catholics, once a tiny minority, had become America's largest religious communion. During the later nineteenth century the main ethnic groups in the church had been the English-speaking Irish majority and a large, highly self-conscious German minority with great strength in the Midwest. After 1880, however, this situation began to be altered by a steady stream of immigration from eastern and southern Europe. By 1920 there were about 3.3 million Americans of Italian parentage and about 3 million Polish, as well as many Hungarians, Portuguese, Croatians, Bohemians, and Ruthenians. (Ahlstrom 1972: 998-999.)

The Revolution changed the Church's legal and social situation so that Catholics could participate with few legal restrictions in a free and democratic society. As a side effect, the American cultural ethos in its totality constituted so immense a break with Catholic tradition that even after several decades of explaining by American bishops, it remained an enigma to popes and curial officials in Rome. At the end of the nineteenth century "Americanism" would become a serious doctrinal issue for Catholics both in Europe and America. (Ahlstrom 1972, 527.)

Actually, the term "Americanism" can be traced back to 1899, when Pope Leo XIII published an encyclical letter, *Testem Benevolentiae*, which condemned a number of opinions collectively labelled "Americanism". Leo XIII regarded the American Catholic willingness to regard natural virtues more highly than supernatural ones and the willingness to adapt to the theories and methods of modern popular culture as degenerative Americanism. The Pope was also worried about the American Catholic tendency toward individualism in religion, whereas traditional Catholicism stresses the role of the Church in salvation. (Albanese 1999, 93.) Handy (1976) describes Americanism as follows:

The Americanist movement had not been deeply concerned with theological issues; it was primarily an effort to show the compatibility of Catholic and American principles. Even among the Americanists there was no close parallel

³² For additional information on the history of the Christian Church in North America see Ahlstrom 1972; Handy 1976; Marty 1986, 1991.

to the liberal and modernist theological movements of Protestantism. One scholar observed that the American Catholic clerical mind, when placed in contact with secular sciences, ‘vacillated between granting the probability of evolution without fully accepting it and rejecting it without fully condemning it’. (Handy 1976, 325.)

It can be said that in the early twentieth century, Catholicism came of age in America. In 1908 the American Catholic church was removed from the jurisdiction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, and its missionary status ended. The participation of Catholics in the First World War established their “Americanism” and laid the groundwork for diminishing tensions between different Catholic ethnic groups. Furthermore, the National Catholic War Council (1917) proved to be an effective instrument of consolidation and advance. The Council was retained as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, which became the dynamic centre of “Catholic Action” in the United States. (Walker 1992, 675.) The Roman Catholic Church in the US became to think of itself as a distinctive minority with a special sense of mission, and this partially caused it to be largely spared the debilitating effects of the spiritual depression of 1925-35 that so affected Protestantism. Catholicism gained greatly in national prestige during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt; a number of Catholics were prominent during his long administration (1933-45). (Handy 1976, 399.)

According to Ahlstrom, by 1920 there were about 3.3 million Americans of Italian parentage and about 3 million of Polish, as well as many Hungarians, Portuguese, Croats, Bohemians, and Ruthenians. The Catholic Church faced difficult problems of expansion to reach these poor, unskilled, and often illiterate people who often formed separate ethnic enclaves, usually in the cities. In their basic religious attitudes the new immigrants varied widely, but the total phenomenon had an enormous impact on the situation of Catholicism in America. There were vast institutional problems involving schools, seminaries, hospitals, and convents, as well as agencies for immigrant aid. Less tangible, but equally important, was the way in which immigration prolonged the Church’s role as a protector of new Americans and thereby prevented it from assuming a constructive role in public affairs. (Ahlstrom 1972, 998-999.) This early “deprivation” both in the relation to Rome and to the new society that Americanized Catholicism was trying to cope with can be seen as very important considering the later societal developments and argumentative positions the Catholic community has adopted in the US.

The weakening of the institutional bonds towards the Vatican became topical in 1958, according to sociologist of religion Thomas O’Dea’s assessment of Americanized Catholicism in *The American Catholic Dilemma*. The long-established Catholic patterns of formalism, authoritarianism, clericalism, moralism, and defensiveness did not fit into the new Catholicism that had become “Americanized”. (Ahlstrom 1972, 1015.) In *The American Catholic Dilemma*, O’Dea provided a timely assessment of Catholicism’s apparent anti-intellectualism, and the likely prospects for changes in this situation. O’Dea theorized that the American Catholic Church was at a major turning point: the institution was faced with the dilemma of responding to a modern, rapidly changing sociocultural context that placed a high value on dynamism and liberality, thus questioning traditional Church authority. According to O’Dea, the historical Church emphasis on formalism, authoritarianism, moralism, and cultural

defensiveness left the church and its individual members poorly prepared to meet the religious and sociocultural expectations and needs of the modern age. Without the proper institutional supports, Catholic voices would be further restricted not only from American intellectual discourse but also from societal decision-making. (<http://hrr.hartsem.edu/ency/O'Dea.htm>)

No matter how distinct from the Roman mother Church the American Catholic community became, it can still be reasonably argued that the social and moral positions American Catholicism adopted in the following decades remained very traditional, and are still so to this day:

...as increasing polarization beset the American Catholic church, still other Catholics embraced more adamantly an ethic that resembled that of the conservative and evangelical version of late-twentieth-century Protestant America. Here they did not advocate a new sexual morality. Instead, they taught and lived out old positions –especially against abortion and homosexuality– in new ways and with new and effective political articulation. (Albanese 1999, 96.)

The Catholic tendency to adhere to the most conservative associations and groups of social action continues to the present day. A good example of this development are the multiple social and political connections the Catholic Church in America has with associations and movements that can be seen as “fundamentalist”. The term ‘fundamentalism’ is understood here in a very general sense, as an ideological stance that advocates the return to more traditional morals and ways of life. Good examples of these groups are the Christian Coalition³³, the Christian Voice³⁴, the Concerned Women for America³⁵ and the Moral Majority Coalition³⁶. These organizations, among many other religiopolitical movements, make up what can be called “the New Christian Right”, for whom the Christian Coalition has become the authoritative voice. (Albanese 1999, 378-379.) The coalition has also established a Catholic wing (Catholic alliance³⁷) which later on merged with the Priests for Life, essentially a Catholic anti-abortion movement. The rhetoric and social stance of the New Christian Right in general and of the Pro-Life movement in particular, are especially important as a context for the material analyzed in this study, because it seems that much of the quoted Professional voices are contextualized by associations that can be linked to the movement. This is understandable considering that although the mission of The New Christian Right is to oppose “secular humanism” in general (Albanese 1999 378.), surprisingly many of the questions that the associations within the New Christian Right have tackled with deal with matters of a biological nature, such as abortion, euthanasia and genetics.

Good examples of social movements that take a fundamentalist stance concerning biological issues within social decision-making are the above-mentioned Pro-Life movement. In a nutshell, the Pro-life movement is a loose collection of social

33 <http://www.cc.org/>

34 <http://www.christianvoiceonline.com>

35 <http://www.cwfa.org/main.asp>

36 <http://www.moralmajority.org/>

37 <http://www.priestsforlife.org/government/cathalliance.htm>

movements that focus on opposing abortion, euthanasia, human cloning and genetic procedures that involve human embryos³⁸. The Pro-Life community has strong ties with conservative Protestant and Evangelical movements, as well as with Catholic and Orthodox Jewish groups. The Pro-Life movement is ecumenical in the sense that it does not exclude members on the basis of church affiliation (for example, there is a solid Mormon following) but rather the common interests act as a catalyst fusing the different faiths into a common front, which is quite powerful in a political sense. The political struggle over abortion legislation in the US is a good example of the social power of the Pro-Life movement (see O'Connor 1996). Another good example of Pro-Life ideology affecting political decision-making is the ethical inquiry carried out by President Bush's council on bioethics in 2002 (<http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/>).³⁹

The rhetoric of the Pro-Life movement binds Protestants and Catholics together in a prophetic mesh: it is impossible to distinguish "particularly Catholic" or "particularly Evangelical" voices within the Pro-Life movement. It is noted by Albanese (1999, 97.) that a "prophetic inclination" is more often a part of charismatic Evangelical movements than a part of Catholic religious piety. Nevertheless,

Cloaked in the traditionalism of Marian piety, Catholic antiabortion advocates and those who supported related causes, in this context, were acting much like prophets. A prophet in the history of religions was a figure who criticized the existing state of things, striving to purify it of perceived corruption and to restore what the prophet saw as fundamental truth. (Albanese 1999, 96.)

The Americanization of the Catholic community in the US that already worried Leo XII has an overtone important in the context of this study. As Catholicism Americanizes, in some issues and social action it tends to take on the rhetorical outlook of charismatic Protestantism. It has been noted by researchers that the "Protestant style" has affected Americanized Catholicism, and especially so regarding legislative questions surrounding biological issues:

In one important expression from the seventies through the nineties... the Protestant style spread to Catholics. With the cooperation of Orthodox Jews and conservative Protestants, they led a crusade for the "right to life," a national protest against legalized abortion. Here both a felt need for moral purification and prohibition as well as perceived demands of extraordinary religion were uppermost. (Albanese 1999, 414.)

38 See <http://www.prolife.com/> and <http://www.prolife.org.uk/>

39 For more research connected to the Pro-Life movement: see Dillon 1993; for a review of abortion discourse, Lim Tan 2004; for Pro-Life and Pro-Choice discourses on the fetus, Carlton, Nelson & Coleman 2000 and Norrander & Raymond 1998 for a study on gender and politics within the Pro-Life movement.

The spreading of the Protestant style has helped the ecumenical co-operation between multi-faith interest-groups such as Pro-Life.⁴⁰ It must be concluded that Pro-Life rhetoric has become as much the property of Catholics as it is the property of anyone else opposing cloning or arguing about matters of genetics. Thus, for the purposes of this study, all Pro-Life rhetoric can be considered Catholic as long as the primary methods utilised for gathering materials (e.g. search strings on the most popular Internet search devices) indicate so.

The Catholic hierarchy and understanding of authority has some relevance for understanding the Catholic Internet argumentation. Despite the divides the Catholic Church has experienced, it remains the largest and arguably the most centrally directed of the Christian Churches. The uniting factors of the Church are (in addition to doctrine) tradition and hierarchy. The Catholic hierarchy is of particular interest within this study since it has been used as a guideline for categorizing the material under study. Although the way information is exchanged on the Internet tends to erode authority and authenticity, the Catholic hierarchy is still present in many structures of self-presentation that can be read in arguments concerning cloning. According to the *Lumen Gentium*, the Vatican II statement on the dogmatic constitution of the Catholic Church (by Pope Paul VI), the official hierarchy of the Catholic Church can be divided into four levels. The first level of authority belongs to the Pontiff of Rome, the Pope, who wields the highest and most absolute authority of the Catholic Church. The Pope is an incarnation of Christ in the world, divine and infallible. The second place in the hierarchy belongs to the bishops, who are perceived as “authentic teachers” of the word of God. They have great authority in expressing the divine truth, but they are not infallible as individuals:

Although the individual bishops do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they nevertheless proclaim Christ’s doctrine infallibly whenever, even though dispersed through the world, but still maintaining the bond of communion among themselves and with the successor of Peter, and authentically teaching matters of faith and morals, they are in agreement on one position as definitively to be held... This is even more clearly verified when, gathered together in an ecumenical council, they are teachers and judges of faith and morals for the universal Church, whose definitions must be adhered to with the submission of faith. (*Lumen Gentium*, chapter III.)

Beneath the bishops are the priests. The priests operate under the bishop in a given congregation and depend on the bishop for their authority. The greatest mandate of the divine authority of a priest is the ability to celebrate the Eucharist and other Catholic sacraments. The precise duties and responsibilities assigned to a priest may vary greatly:

Priests, although they do not possess the highest degree of the priesthood, and although they are dependent on the bishops in the exercise of their power, nevertheless they are united with the bishops in sacerdotal dignity. By the power of the sacrament of Orders, in the image of Christ the eternal high

⁴⁰ It can also be argued that although Americanization has led to ecumenical co-operation within religiously motivated interest groups, it has also created deep controversies between these groups. The battle lines have not disappeared; they have just moved elsewhere. (see Marty 1999.)

Priest, they are consecrated to preach the Gospel and shepherd be faithful and to celebrate divine worship, so that they are true priests of the New Testament. (Lumen Gentium, chapter III.)

Beneath the priests in the Catholic hierarchy work the deacons, whose duties are more concrete in nature. The deacons do not possess the same authority to teach the scriptures as the priests do, nor do they have the same access to the sacraments:

At a lower level of the hierarchy are deacons, upon whom hands are imposed “not unto the priesthood, but unto a ministry of service.” For strengthened by sacramental grace, in communion with the bishop and his group of priests they serve in the diaconate of the liturgy, of the word, and of charity to the people of God. ... Dedicated to duties of charity and of administration, let deacons be mindful of the admonition of Blessed Polycarp: “Be merciful, diligent, walking according to the truth of the Lord, who became the servant of all”. (Lumen Gentium, chapter III.)

Outside the official ranks of the Church is the laity. The laity is primarily defined by the fact that they have secular professions and occupations, and are not bound to the Church by official occupation. Lay persons live in the ordinary circumstances of family and social life as opposed to the priests, who cannot marry or have offspring. The laity is not, however, left completely outside the mystical Catholic unity that is the basis of all Catholic authority:

The term laity is here understood to mean all the faithful except those in holy orders and those in the state of religious life specially approved by the Church. These faithful are by baptism made one body with Christ and are constituted among the People of God; they are in their own way made sharers in the priestly, prophetic, and kingly functions of Christ; and they carry out for their own part the mission of the whole Christian people in the Church and in the world. (Lumen Gentium, chapter IV.)

As discussed earlier, the Catholic speakers appearing in the analyzed texts have been categorized into three groups, based on how “official” they present themselves and their arguments. If a speaker claims he is acting as an Official voice of his patron church, he will be categorized as an “Official” voice. Official voices include those with theological education who have official rank in the church, and who in the context of their argumentation explicitly identify themselves as “speaking with the voice” of a particular church, denomination or a church-related organization (The Conference of Catholic Bishops of North America, for example).

The second step of identification by official commitment is called the Professional voice. Professional voices are those who present themselves as possessing specialized theological education but do not hold church offices, and do not present themselves as an Official voice of any church. Professionals may even hold church

office, but present their arguments as opposed to or as undecided with regards to the official standing of their church, so they adopt a standing outside of the official attitudes of their mother church. This category can include, for example, theologians who are proponents of “religious bioethics”⁴¹. The category of Professional voices is something of a leftover category, comprised of those not quite qualifying as Official voices but definitely identifying themselves as possessing more theological expertise than the laity.

The voices that do not claim to possess specialized theological knowledge, church rank, position in associations of Catholic social action etc. might be called “religious believers”. To put an emphasis on the significance of official ties, the group of voices containing the least amount of official ties will be called Lay voices. The speakers appearing under the heading of Lay voices encompass just about everyone who claims to hold religious beliefs of the Catholic type, but does not explicitly claim to hold an official Church position or specialized theological knowledge. These people voice out their attitudes and opinions with a clear explicit religious commitment (“I am a Catholic”, “I am a devout Catholic”, for example) or simply express their opinions in Catholic discussion forums, but do not act as Official voices of any church or organization directly tied to a church and, as mentioned above, do not claim to possess any specialized theological knowledge. So in this categorisation, a quotation from President George W. Bush in the discussion forums falls into the category of a Lay voice, while the secretary of the Pro-Life organisation expresses a Professional voice of the Catholic Church. The preliminary classification of the material under study can be summarized as follows:

1. Arguments attributed to the Pope, the Cardinals or the Roman Curia are always considered Official voices.
2. Arguments attributed to Priests, Monks etc. are considered Official voices if they speak as the voices of an explicitly Catholic organization or interest group. If arguments attributed to Priests, Monks etc. appear on other public forums (an interview on a Web newspaper, for example) where the speaker presents his views as an individual person with specialised theological knowledge, they are considered Professional voices.
3. Arguments attributed to persons that have no ordination but present themselves as having specialized theological knowledge are considered Professional voices. Lay persons speaking on behalf of Catholic organisations are also considered Professional voices.
4. Speakers that present themselves as having no ordination, no official ties to the Church and no specialized theological knowledge are considered Lay voices.

The three-level heuristic categorization used in this study exists primarily to make the presentation of the analysis more accessible. It is meant to function as an analytical tool, not to represent a precise typology of the hierarchies of the churches

41 Bioethics will be discussed further in the chapter “Religious bioethics”.

in question. In practice the commitments and official obligations of the speakers may be many times more complex than can be told on the basis of a few arguments presented, say, in some Christian discussion forum. As can be easily discerned from the summary above, especially the category of Professional voices remains quite vague. In the analysis chapter, footnote discussions will be used to explain the categorisation of the not so self-evident examples.

While categorizing materials in this study by how official the speakers appear is problematic, it would also have been problematic to exclude the religious tradition and official standing of the speakers, because they themselves like to express them and explicitly identify themselves by them more often than not. The categories presented here should not, in any case, be understood as direct indicators of the explicit and official standing of the Catholic Church, but as the explicit stances of the people who want to appear as Official voices of the Church on the Internet. Similarly, it should not be concluded from the given categories that all who possess some theological knowledge by necessity think and argue as presented here. These categories, themes and combinations thereof are just simply the most common forms of the Catholic cloning discussion on the Internet.

As was established earlier, the ambiguity of the authority of a writer of textual materials on the Internet is not a real problem in the context of virtual ethnography or in the context of this study. It can, however, be a real problem for Church authorities and for the consumers of religious materials, as was mentioned when discussing the “Little Tradition” nature of the Internet. (see Dawson & Cowan 2004, 3.) This is obviously more of a problem for churches with a strong central leadership, as has been duly noted by Internet researchers Miller and Slater:

Established religions, just as much as the other institutions already discussed, are faced with an Internet that seems to represent a new potential for freedom. In most religions the authority of their establishment is closely bound to arguments about authorship. Ultimately, religious text is either directly or in some mediated form an expression of the authorship of God or Gods. The religious establishment becomes the mediator of divinely-inspired law or precept. Institutionalized religion thereby insinuates itself as part of the production of text, putting the lay person in the role of the consumer. But the authors of material on the Internet are often not those officially ordained. (Miller and Slater 2000, 2001, 179.)

Miller and Slater continue:

So even in such a deeply historical and established organization as the Catholic Church the Internet problematizes and to a degree dissipates earlier dichotomies between the local and the global Church and between who is a producer and who a consumer of religious materials. (Miller and Slater 2000, 2001, 181)

Furthermore, as Helland (2004) remarks, while the Vatican offers a wealth of information online, there are other, unofficial, Catholic sites that challenge the virtual Vatican in popularity. The discussions on unofficial Catholic sites can veer

far from doctrinal correctness, and as they are extensively used as an information resource, they can become something of a nightmare for the doctrinally correct. (see Helland 2004, 30-31.) Still, when understood critically, the categorization of virtual material through different levels of “officiality” is the best available means for establishing some form of order within the voices on the Internet. This is particularly true from the point of view of a rhetorical approach, since the expressions of authority can be considered a significant tool of persuasion.⁴²

Although, as discussed before, highly sophisticated theological concepts are not extensively used in the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning, some basic notions of Catholic doctrine make it easier to understand the argumentation by the Catholic voices. Even when the Little Tradition dominates the field of Internet discussion on cloning, some core concepts of Catholic theology are very widely shared by all the voices appearing on the Internet. Next we take a brief look at these basic theological concepts that are either used in the Catholic discussions or silently affect the arguments in the background.

⁴² This thematic will be discussed further in the chapter “Ethos”.

2.5. The theological context

Several themes at the very core of Catholic theology appear to be relevant to an understanding of the Catholic voices on genetics and cloning. The Catholic Catechism has been used as the main resource for these doctrines. This is reasonable because the Catechism is the essential collection of the most central points of Catholic teaching⁴³:

This catechism aims at presenting an organic synthesis of the essential and fundamental contents of Catholic doctrine, as regards both faith and morals, in the light of the Second Vatican Council and the whole of the Church's Tradition. Its principal sources are the Sacred Scriptures, the Fathers of the Church, the liturgy, and the Church's Magisterium. It is intended to serve "as a point of reference for the catechisms or compendia that are composed in the various countries". (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P4.HTM)

While there is a great amount of Catholic literature on moral issues, the issues presented in the Catechism are meant to function as the central source and authority of the Church around the world. All in all, the Catholic Catechism is a rather new collection of doctrines. It originated with a recommendation made at the Extraordinary Synod of Bishops in 1985. The Pope appointed the Commission of Cardinals and Bishops to develop a compendium of Catholic doctrine in the following year, and in 1989 the Commission sent the text to the world's Catholic bishops for consultation. After the consultations in 1990 the Commission examined and evaluated over 24,000 amendments suggested by the bishops. The final draft became considerably different from the original that was circulated in 1989. In 1991 the Commission prepared the text for the Pope's official approval. On June 25, 1992 the Catechism was officially approved by the Pope as the definitive version of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. (CCC 1-7.)

The Catechism does not represent the highest scholarly theology of the Catholic Church, but is more like a commonsensical collection of basic ideas meant for all Catholic believers. (CCC 11-12.) A further factor that makes the Catechism a good theological point of reflection for this study is that the doctrinal issues presented in the Catechism constitute the most probable theological source that all the Catholic speakers, whether they be bishops or lay persons, are familiar with. We cannot, of course, be certain that the speakers appearing on the Internet and arguing Catholic views know the Catechism – it is just the most probable widely shared basis of theological knowledge for any given Catholic voice. As mentioned before, the Internet creates an environment where the language of Little Tradition

⁴³ The WWW-version of the Catholic Catechism is used as the primary source for the present study (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM). This is reasonable considering the point of view of this study, which is that of a person who uses the Internet as a source of information. The reference to the printed Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) is included for the sake of completeness.

is emphasized. The absence of specialist discussion from the material combined with the Internet-accessibility and wide distribution of the Catechism makes it the best possible assumption of the theological context shared by any and all voices analyzed here.

It is important to underline that the following presentation by no means is nor aims to be an exhaustive account of Catholic moral theology, nor is it to be taken as a presentation highly versed in Catholic doctrine. Since the discussion under analysis proceeds by the rules of Little Tradition, it is reasonable to focus the theological contextualization on the basic issues presented in what follows. The parts of doctrine presented here comprise but a tiny fraction of the total amount of the essential Catholic doctrine pertaining to moral issues⁴⁴. The elements of Catholic doctrine briefly outlined in this work are presented because they contextualize, to some extent, the Catholic voices analyzed later on.

The Apostolic Tradition as a source of authority

The ultimate backing for the authority of the Catholic voices stems from the belief that they, Official and Lay alike, are special in the sense that the Holy Spirit speaks through them. According to the Bible, the original authority to speak with the voice of God was handed to the apostles, the original disciples of Jesus of Nazareth. According to the tradition of the Catholic Church, the gift of the Holy Spirit has continued through the centuries in a process the Church calls the apostolic succession. The apostolic succession means that the apostles left bishops as their successors. The bishops were given the position of a teaching authority. The apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the inspired books as well as oral transmission, was to be preserved in a continuous line of succession until the end of time. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___PK.HTM) The position of authority provided by the succession is more evident in the upper layers of the Catholic hierarchy. However, the guidance provided by the Holy Ghost is not limited to the bishops, but is considered to be manifested in the lives of all believers. (Lumen Gentium, chapter IV.)

The living transmission of theological knowledge and authority is called the Tradition, since it is seen as distinct from Sacred Scripture (the Bible), though closely connected to it. The sayings of the Holy Fathers are seen as especially inspired by the Holy Spirit. The origin of the sense of authority that the Catholic officials entertain is well illustrated in the following brief statements:

96 What Christ entrusted to the apostles, they in turn handed on by their preaching and writing, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to all generations, until Christ returns in glory.

100 The task of interpreting the Word of God authentically has been entrusted solely to the Magisterium of the Church, that is, to the Pope and to the bishops in communion with him. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___PN.HTM) (See CCC 29-35.)

⁴⁴ For further information on Catholic moral teaching see, for example, Noonan 2005, Curran 2005, Mehl 1970.

The opinions and arguments voiced by those who are in positions of authority in the Catholic Church gain a lot of emphasis. It seems that the arguments of the Pope and of the bishops tend to be quoted over and over again very literally by the lower hierarchies of the Church. The reason for this is the special authority bestowed on the higher hierarchies of the Church by the Catholic tradition. The strong central authority of teaching and interpreting the biblical position concerning social issues, including genetics and cloning, is one of the reasons that makes it especially interesting to include many different levels of the Catholic hierarchy in one analysis.

God – the Creator

The Catholic doctrine dictates that an omnipotent God created the natural universe and everything within it in the beginning of time itself. This is the cornerstone belief that typically creates a tension between the Church and secular society, which at least partially aims to understand and manipulate the natural world from a scientific point of view. Being created by God, the natural universe is inseparably embedded in a metaphysical mystery, and in the eyes of the Church ultimately inaccessible to the natural sciences. The view that the origins of the natural world are supernatural is, however, in principle not seen as opposed to the scientific study of the natural universe and its origins:

283 The question about the origins of the world and of man has been the object of many scientific studies which have splendidly enriched our knowledge of the age and dimensions of the cosmos, the development of life-forms and the appearance of man. These discoveries invite us to even greater admiration for the greatness of the Creator, prompting us to give him thanks for all his works and for the understanding and wisdom he gives to scholars and researchers. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P19.HTM) (see CCC 82-86.)

The Church teaches that with the scientific approach to the world, humanity can attain a greater appreciation of the process of creation. This does not, however, extend to the unlocking of the actual mystery of creation. In addition, while the natural sciences can study the natural universe, the questions concerning the origins of the universe are seen as inseparably connected to many existential questions that are very common among people. Questions such as "where do we come from", "where are we going", "what is our origin", "what is our end" and "where does everything that exists come from and where is it going" are seen as the crucial point where Catholic faith impacts with the scientific understanding of the processes of the natural world:

284 The great interest accorded to these studies is strongly stimulated by a question of another order, which goes beyond the proper domain of the natural sciences. It is not only a question of knowing when and how the universe arose physically, or when man appeared, but rather of discovering the meaning of such an origin: is the universe governed by chance, blind fate, anonymous necessity, or by a transcendent, intelligent and good Being called

”God”? and if the world does come from God’s wisdom and goodness, why is there evil? (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P19.HTM) (see CCC 82-86.)

The scientific approach is seen as necessary and compatible with the Catholic faith, but with a somewhat limited mandate. The natural sciences can find answers to the questions of “how” things happened at a certain level of creation, while the Catholic doctrine offers the superstructure of meaning by answering the “why” questions.

In the Catholic view, the powers of human thought and achievement are certainly not undervalued; quite the contrary, human abilities are seen as capable of active co-operation in God’s plan. In fact, humanity is given a great role in God’s continuing plan:

306 God is the sovereign master of his plan. But to carry it out he also makes use of his creatures’ co-operation. This use is not a sign of weakness, but rather a token of almighty God’s greatness and goodness. For God grants his creatures not only their existence, but also the dignity of acting on their own, of being causes and principles for each other, and thus of co-operating in the accomplishment of his plan. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P19.HTM) (see CCC 89-95.)

However, it seems that according to the Catholic view the special role human beings have in God’s plan creates some uneasy tensions concerning the proper way of collaborating with the Creator. According to the Catholic doctrine this is because of the sinfulness of man. The combination of elements that exists in human beings can have dangerous consequences: humans are endowed with both responsibility and a free will. And it is the free will that can go awry:

311 Angels and men, as intelligent and free creatures, have to journey toward their ultimate destinies by their free choice and preferential love. They can therefore go astray. Indeed, they have sinned. Thus has moral evil, incommensurably more harmful than physical evil, entered the world. God is in no way, directly or indirectly, the cause of moral evil. He permits it, however, because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it: For almighty God. . . , because he is supremely good, would never allow any evil whatsoever to exist in his works if he were not so all-powerful and good as to cause good to emerge from evil itself. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P19.HTM) (see CCC 89-95.)

The free will of human beings seems to create a situation in which all the actions men perform in the world can be seen in a dual perspective. On the one hand, any action a human being performs may be the result of the sinful nature of man, which causes the actions to be directed against the will of God. On the other, the actions of a human being may be actions performed in accordance with the will of God. Furthermore, there is a third perspective: any actions performed by men may be evil, but mysteriously, God can intervene in a way as to make their effects

beneficial. The complex situation gives rise to a frame of interpretation that might be called “the mystical triple-axis of morality”. This mystical triple-axis between the naturally adept intelligence of man, the inherent sinfulness of man and the mystical influence of God appears to form the fundamental basis of all Catholic moral theology and ethical consideration. It places humanity in three different positions at once. Firstly, human beings are co-operators in the Divine Plan, are meant to work with the Creator. Secondly, human beings are sinners, who by their sinful natures work against the will of the Creator. Thirdly, human beings are immersed in a Divine Plan of mystery, which makes men spectators in the Divine Play, and in the end of the process the things willed by God will turn out good by His act. The basic design and setting of morality in Catholic thought is a Divine mystery, and this seems apparent in all Catholic views of Moral Law and the Commandments.

Moral Law

In the Catholic view it is said that all men and all societies are bound by the same moral requirements in the eyes of God. By his fallen nature a human individual is bound to break or lose the moral principles required by God. The moral code the Catholic Church upholds is traditionally expressed in the form of a “Moral Law”, which is seen as a divine help for those willing to live by the rules God has set forth. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6S.HTM) The moral law that binds all, whether they submit to it or not, is divided into three parts: the Natural Moral Law, Old Law and Law of the Gospel. Beyond these laws stands the eternal Law of God, and derived from these are civil and ecclesiastical laws. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6T.HTM)

The Natural Moral Law is the faculty in a human being that gives him mastery over his acts and the ability to govern him/herself with a view of what is true and good. The natural law means the moral sense which enables human beings to discern through reason what is good and what is evil. The Catholic Church sees that the natural law is engraved in the soul of each and every human, because it is natural human reasoning which prods him to do good and forbids him to sin:

1955 The “divine and natural” law shows man the way to follow so as to practice the good and attain his end. the natural law states the first and essential precepts which govern the moral life... The natural law is nothing other than the light of understanding placed in us by God; through it we know what we must do and what we must avoid. God has given this light or law at the creation.

1956 The natural law, present in the heart of each man and established by reason, is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all men. It expresses the dignity of the person and determines the basis for his fundamental rights and duties: For there is a true law: right reason. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6U.HTM) (see CCC 527-529.)

According to Catholic belief, the natural law provides the solid foundation on which man can build the structure of moral rules to guide his choices. It also provides

the moral foundation for building the human community. Finally, it provides the basis for the civil law with which it is connected, whether by a reflection that draws conclusions from its principles, or by additions of a positive and juridical nature. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6U.HTM) In other words, it appears that the natural reasoning of human beings is seen in the Catholic view as the basis of all decent living and moral decision-making.

However, the precepts of natural law are not perceived by everyone clearly and immediately in the present situation of the sinful man. That is why further moral guidelines are needed. According to the Catholic Church, these are expressed in the Old Law (see CCC 529-530.) and in the Law of the Gospel (see CCC 531-533).

In Catholic doctrine the Old Law is considered the first stage of revealed Law. The Old Law is expressed in the Old Testament of the Christian Bible, and its moral prescriptions are summed up in the Ten Commandments. The guidelines offered by the Decalogue lay the foundations for the vocation of man fashioned in the image of God; they prohibit what is contrary to the love of God and neighbour and prescribe what is essential to it. It might be said that the Ten Commandments is a booster for the conscience of man to make the Natural Moral Law more readily heard by the fallen being. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6V.HTM)

The Old Law is seen in Catholic theology as the preparation for the Law of the Gospel. According to Catholic tradition, the Law is holy and good but still imperfect in that it shows what must be done, but does not of itself give the strength to fulfil it. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6V.HTM) Some of the Commandments (like the fifth: thou shall not kill) are quite central for the Catholic discussion of cloning. These will be discussed more thoroughly later on.

The New Law or the Law of the Gospel is expressed in the New Testament, especially in the work of Christ and is expressed particularly in the Sermon on the Mount. The Catholics view the New Law as the perfection of the divine law here on earth, natural and revealed:

1968 The Law of the Gospel fulfills the commandments of the Law. the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, far from abolishing or devaluing the moral prescriptions of the Old Law, releases their hidden potential and has new demands arise from them: it reveals their entire divine and human truth. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6W.HTM) (see CCC 531-533.)

The Law of the Gospel requires men to make a decisive choice between "the two ways" (good and evil) and to put into practice the words of the Lord. The New Law is summed up in the Golden Rule, "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; this is the law and the prophets." In the Catholic doctrine the entire Law of the Gospel is contained in the "new commandment" of Jesus, that humans should love one another as he has loved them. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6W.HTM)

It seems that the New Law on the one hand simplifies matters, replacing a cumbersome compilation of commandments with a relatively simple and sound principle. On the other hand it appears to represent a return to the Natural Moral Law and the multiple interpretations it makes possible. The principle of the Golden Rule offers much flexibility in interpretations of moral issues. How to evaluate when the basic drive for good and when the basic sinfulness of man is responsible for the

issues under debate also remains very vague. Consequently, the Golden Rule and the interpretative flexibility it creates offer an enormously versatile rhetorical tool.

The dignity of the human person

In the Catholic view, the doctrines related to the dignity of the human person are closely tied to both the teachings concerning the family as well as the teachings about God as the Creator. The basic Catholic idea seems to be that the dignity of the human person stems from his/her origin in creation; the Catholic view holds that each and every human person is individually created by a direct act of God in the image and likeness of God. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P5F.HTM)

An essential factor in human dignity is rationality, peoples' God-given ability to make their own decisions to control their own actions:

1730 God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own actions. "God willed that man should be 'left in the hand of his own counsel,' so that he might of his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him." Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master over his acts. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P5M.HTM) (see CCC 481-482.)

However, as mentioned before, after the Fall human beings became inclined to evil and subject to error. A human being still desires that which is good, but his nature is tainted by original sin. In the Catholic view human beings are divided in themselves, subjects of both good and evil intentions. As a result the entire life of men, both individual and social, shows itself to be a struggle, and a dramatic one, between good and evil. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P5G.HTM) This dual orientation in human morality appears to be the basis of the "mystical triple-axis of morality" discussed earlier. Thus, although a human being is dignified by his nature as a creature of God, not all the actions or aims he advocates are to be appreciated.

Respect for the human individual is also the core of the Catholic ideal of social justice. In the Catholic view social justice can be obtained only by respecting the transcendent dignity of the individual:

1930 Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his dignity as a creature. These rights are prior to society and must be recognized by it. They are the basis of the moral legitimacy of every authority: by flouting them, or refusing to recognize them in its positive legislation, a society undermines its own moral legitimacy. If it does not respect them, authority can rely only on force or violence to obtain obedience from its subjects. It is the Church's role to remind men of good will of these rights and to distinguish them from unwarranted or false claims. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P6O.HTM) (see CCC 521-525.)

By its vocation the Church sees itself as the defender of human dignity. Since in the Catholic view the dignity of an individual is based in his transcendent nature, a given society that does not share the same beliefs can go morally astray. So it seems that in its own view the Church acts as a moral lighthouse for society. Based on the Catechism it can be understood that the Catholic vision of a good society is inseparably tied to the idea that in order to be a 'good' society, any given society must share the transcendentally based moral guidelines of the Church. Societies and individuals with different orientations are under the same law, and the same moral evaluation befalls all:

1933 This same duty extends to those who think or act differently from us... Liberation in the spirit of the Gospel is incompatible with hatred of one's enemy as a person, but not with hatred of the evil that he does as an enemy. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P6O.HTM) (see CCC 521-525.)

It can be seen as a Catholic core belief that it is godly to oppose the things done contrary to the Catholic view of morality. This is exemplified by looking at some Catholic interpretations of the Ten Commandments. The Commandments presented here are those bearing more or less direct consequences for the Catholic opinions on cloning.

Family and Marriage

Honour your father and your mother, that your days may be long in the land which the Lord your God gives you.

The Fourth Commandment is addressed especially to children in their relationship to their parents, because in Catholic doctrine this relationship is seen as the most important universal social relationship. The commandment also concerns the ties of kinship between members of the extended family. Finally it extends to other social relationships where the other participant can be seen as the 'elder', such as the duties of pupils to teachers, employees to employers, citizens to their country, and to those who are in administrative positions. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7R.HTM)

The ties that are expressed in the Fourth Commandment are the basis of many important Catholic teachings. One of the most relevant in the context of this study is the Catholic teaching concerning the family union. (see CCC 587-601.) As can be reasoned from the Catholic interpretation of the Fourth Commandment, the tradition of the Church places special emphasis on the importance of the family union and marriage. The Church sees that the call to marriage is written in the very nature of man and woman and has come directly from the hand of the Creator. It is thought that since God created man and woman, their mutual love becomes an image of the absolute love with which God loves humans. As in many other relationships that God meant to work in a certain way, the sinful nature of human beings complicates matters, causing discord in the relationship between man and woman. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P51.HTM) To ensure

the continuity and appeal of the marital union, different social systems have been introduced in different cultures. Although the institution of marriage is seen as good in all of the different cultural forms it takes, the dignity of the marital bond is not the same in every case:

1603 ...Marriage is not a purely human institution despite the many variations it may have undergone through the centuries in different cultures, social structures, and spiritual attitudes. These differences should not cause us to forget its common and permanent characteristics. Although the dignity of this institution is not transparent everywhere with the same clarity, some sense of the greatness of the matrimonial union exists in all cultures. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P51.HTM) (see CCC 446-448.)

Marital union is seen by the Church as the only proper place for human sexual expression and procreation. The marital union is a union of responsibility – parents are considered the principal and primary caretakers and educators of their children. In this sense the fundamental task of marriage and family is to be at the service of life. Married love and the whole structure of family life that results from it are directed to disposing spouses to co-operate with the Creator. In the Catholic view, married persons are in a co-operative relationship with God who through them will increase and enrich his family from day to day. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P55.HTM) Because of the metaphysical link observed between marital life and God's plan the Catholic Church does not approve of family planning or contraception, although the matter has been debated inside the Church:

2366 ...the Church, which "is on the side of life" teaches that "each and every marriage act must remain open 'per se' to the transmission of life." "This particular doctrine, expounded on numerous occasions by the Magisterium, is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act."...

2370 ..."every action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible" is intrinsically evil... (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P86.HTM) (see CCC 628-630.)

The conjugal union is considered by the Catholic Church to be a calling into co-operation with the Creator. Contraception is thus seen as a denial of the co-operative responsibility to create new life. The creation of new life must be given precedence over other matters, and no agency, not even society, has the right to intervene in the procreative mystery. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P86.HTM) Children are seen as the fruit of marriage, as its fulfilment and as a gift from God. Hence, certain medical techniques aimed at overcoming infertility are seen as legitimate by the Church, while others are frowned upon:

2375 Research aimed at reducing human sterility is to be encouraged, on condition that it is placed "at the service of the human person, of his inalienable rights, and his true and integral good according to the design and will of God."

2376 Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and wife, by the intrusion of a person other than the couple (donation of sperm or ovum, surrogate uterus), are gravely immoral. These techniques (heterologous artificial insemination and fertilization) infringe the child's right to be born of a father and mother known to him and bound to each other by marriage. They betray the spouses' "right to become a father and a mother only through each other." (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P86.HTM) (see CCC 630-631.)

The Catholic attitudes towards medical solutions concerning procreation appear to be strongly tied to the belief that the marital relationship is established by God as a natural law. Fertility treatments involving only the married couple (homologous artificial insemination and fertilization) are seen as less reprehensible, yet remain morally unacceptable. They dissociate the sexual act from the procreative act, which breaks the way God intended things to be.

The overt use of technological means in procreation is also viewed as morally wrong. This appears to be primarily because such domination is not considered the proper terrain for man to tread. Technological control over procreative matters is described in the Catechism as follows:

2377 ...entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents and children. (http://www.vatican.va/archive /ENG0015/___P86.HTM) (see CCC 630-631.)

The Catholic doctrines concerning the proper ways of procreation hinge on the concept of the dignity of the human individual. Since the marital union is seen as a mystical union having transcendent elements, it is considered the properly dignified environment for co-operation between humans and their creator as well as the properly dignified way for a human being to be conceived. The dignity of a new creation depends on the marital union of his/her parents and on the act of conjugal union by which he/she is begotten:

2377 Under the moral aspect procreation is deprived of its proper perfection when it is not willed as the fruit of the conjugal act, that is to say, of the specific act of the spouses' union Only respect for the link between the meanings of the conjugal act and respect for the unity of the human being make possible procreation in conformity with the dignity of the person. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P86.HTM) (see CCC 630-631.)

The marital union is seen as the order of Creation, which still persists, though seriously disturbed after the Fall. The institution of marriage is also seen as helping to limit the damaging effects of sin. Christian marriage is seen as a reflection of the spousal love of Christ and the Church. Marital conjugation is a mystery, and since it signifies and communicates grace, marriage between baptized persons is held to be a true sacrament of the New Covenant. The Catholic Church does not approve of divorce, insisting on the indissolubility of the marriage bond. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P51.HTM) In the Catholic view, the Christian family life is evangelization in itself:

2205 The Christian family is a communion of persons, a sign and image of the communion of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit. In the procreation and education of children it reflects the Father's work of creation. It is called to partake of the prayer and sacrifice of Christ. Daily prayer and the reading of the Word of God strengthen it in charity. the Christian family has an evangelizing and missionary task. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7S.HTM) (see CCC 589-590.)

It appears that the family is seen by the Catholic Church as the original and natural cell of social life. Authority, stability, and a life of relationships within the family constitute the foundations for freedom, security, and fraternity within society. In the Catholic view, family life is an initiation into life in society and thus a good family life is the basis of a good society. The Catholic Church teaches that because the family is so important for the life and well-being of society, society has a particular responsibility to support and strengthen the institutions of marriage and family. Civil authority should consider it a grave duty "to acknowledge the true nature of marriage and the family, to protect and foster them, to safeguard public morality, and promote domestic prosperity" (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7T.HTM)

The Catholic expectations directed at civil authorities in the context of family life are a part of the larger tension between religious and secular ethics hinted at earlier. In the Catholic view, the exercise of authority is meant to give outward expression to a just hierarchy of values. Any exercise of authority is measured morally in terms of its divine origin, its reasonable nature and its specific object. The Church teaches that one cannot command or establish what is contrary to the dignity of persons and the Natural Law. On the contrary, the citizen is obliged by conscience not to follow the directives of civil authorities when they are contrary to the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of persons or the teachings of the Gospel. Therefore, in the Catholic view, the real authority stems from the Catholic tradition, and it is legitimate for people to defend their own rights and those of their fellow citizens against the abuse of civil authority within the limits of the Natural Law and the Law of the Gospel. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7W.HTM)

Societies that part from the divinely inspired doctrine of the Catholic Church are, according to the Catholic view, in danger of turning into totalitarian societies:

2244 ...Most societies have formed their institutions in the recognition of a certain preeminence of man over things. Only the divinely revealed religion

has clearly recognized man's origin and destiny in God, the Creator and Redeemer. the Church invites political authorities to measure their judgments and decisions against this inspired truth about God and man:

Societies not recognizing this vision or rejecting it in the name of their independence from God are brought to seek their criteria and goal in themselves or to borrow them from some ideology. Since they do not admit that one can defend an objective criterion of good and evil, they arrogate to themselves an explicit or implicit totalitarian power over man and his destiny, as history shows. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7W.HTM) (see CCC, 600-601.)

Thus it seems that because of the unique self-perception of the Church as a divinely rooted social force it is part of the mission of the Church to pass moral judgments in social and political matters. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7W.HTM) Catholics are given the duty to work with civil authority to build up society in the spirit of truth, justice, solidarity, and freedom. The other side of the coin obliges them not to follow the directives of civil authorities when these are contrary to the demands of the moral order. This principle is summed up in the New Testament quote "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7X.HTM)

Human life

Thou shall not kill.

According to the Catechism, the Catholic Church considers human life sacred because it is seen as involving the creative action of God from its beginning. Human life remains in a special relationship with its Creator. God is the Lord of life; no one can, under any circumstance, claim for himself the right to directly destroy an innocent human being. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7Y.HTM) The Church stresses the point very explicitly:

2261 Scripture specifies the prohibition contained in the fifth commandment: "Do not slay the innocent and the righteous." The deliberate murder of an innocent person is gravely contrary to the dignity of the human being, to the golden rule, and to the holiness of the Creator. the law forbidding it is universally valid: it obliges each and everyone, always and everywhere. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7Z.HTM) (see CCC, 602.)

The only possible instance where the use of lethal force is seen as legitimate in the Catholic view is self-defence, or the defence of other innocents against lethal injury. Legitimate defence is seen not only as a right but as a grave duty. A good society strives to contain the spread of behaviours that are injurious to human rights and corresponds to the requirement of watching over the common good. Capital

punishment is approved of in the Catholic doctrine if it is the only practicable way to protect the lives of human beings effectively against aggressors. In any circumstances other than these, intentionally taking the life of another human being is seen as gravely sinful – murder is described as “a sin that cries out to heaven for vengeance”. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7Z.HTM) Taking lives in the context of family and procreation is seen as an especially serious crime:

2268 ...Infanticide, fratricide, parricide, and the murder of a spouse are especially grave crimes by reason of the natural bonds which they break. Concern for eugenics or public health cannot justify any murder, even if commanded by public authority. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7Z.HTM) (see CCC, 605-609.)

The Catholic Church sees abortion as murder. In the Catholic view, human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. It is thought that from the first moment of existence a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person:

2271 ...Direct abortion, that is to say, abortion willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law: You shall not kill the embryo by abortion and shall not cause the newborn to perish. God, the Lord of life, has entrusted to men the noble mission of safeguarding life, and men must carry it out in a manner worthy of themselves. Life must be protected with the utmost care from the moment of conception: abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes.

2272 Formal cooperation in an abortion constitutes a grave offense. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7Z.HTM) (see CCC, 606-608.)

The human right to live depends neither on single individuals nor on parents; nor on society or the state. The right to live is seen as belonging to human nature and as inherent in the person by virtue of the creative act from which the person took his origin. The most fundamental, natural rights the Catholic Church attributes to human beings are the right to live and right to maintain physical integrity from the moment of conception until death. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7Z.HTM)

The Catholic doctrines concerning abortion appear to have a direct relationship to Catholic teaching concerning genetics. The central issue in both questions is the status of the child as a being created by God. Since the child is seen as a unique creation of God from the first embryonic states onwards, the physical existence of the embryo seems to gain a certain metaphysical justification and sanctity. As a consequence, it is conceivable that the Catholic community generally views the genetic manipulation of embryos as a deliberate violation of the child's rights. As the child has a fundamental right of “retaining physical integrity”, which is metaphysically rooted in the creative act of God, manipulating God's design is seen as a violation of the child's rights as a creature. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/___P7Z.HTM) From this point of view it is easy to see that the Catholic

attitude towards many aspects of genetics is by necessity negative. One exception is genetic screening, which may, according to the Catholic view, be legitimate in some instances:

2274 ...Prenatal diagnosis is morally licit, "if it respects the life and integrity of the embryo and the human fetus and is directed toward its safe guarding or healing as an individual... It is gravely opposed to the moral law when this is done with the thought of possibly inducing an abortion, depending upon the results: a diagnosis must not be the equivalent of a death sentence." (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7Z.HTM) (see CCC, 607.)

The Church also offers some rather vague medical guidelines, which can be seen as legitimizing genetic manipulation of the embryo in some cases. However, the guidelines seem to leave much open for debate and stress the interpretations given of individual cases of prenatal medicine:

2275 "One must hold as licit procedures carried out on the human embryo which respect the life and integrity of the embryo and do not involve disproportionate risks for it, but are directed toward its healing the improvement of its condition of health, or its individual survival." (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7Z.HTM) (see CCC, 607-608.)

On the other hand, some issues that fall within the domain of genetics are seen as unconditionally immoral and morally unjustifiable:

2275 ...It is immoral to produce human embryos intended for exploitation as disposable biological material."... "Certain attempts to influence chromosomic or genetic inheritance are not therapeutic but are aimed at producing human beings selected according to sex or other predetermined qualities... Such manipulations are contrary to the personal dignity of the human being and his integrity and identity" which are unique and unrepeatable. (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7Z.HTM) (see CCC, 607-608.)

The views that Catholic teaching has towards genetic techniques can be understood in relation to the basic moral teachings, previously named the "mystical triple-axis" of morality. It is not always clear in Catholic doctrine why some genetic states are open to human meddling while others are not. Altering some genetic states seems to be within the domain of the acceptable while other procedures seem utterly unacceptable. As to where the line is drawn between violating the God-created dignity of human beings and practicing acceptable medicine seems to depend on other doctrines the Church has adopted previously. Thus even genetic screening is seen as problematic to some degree because the Church stands opposed to abortion – finding out serious genetic disorders before birth might encourage abortion. On the other hand, screening must be accepted because it is the only way to discover some genetically transmitted diseases the treatment of which falls into the category of acceptable medicine. Cloning animals is viewed as much less problematic than

cloning humans because doctrinally the creation of human beings is radically different from the creation of the natural universe. Stem cell research is seen as murder because, in the issue of abortion, the Church has adopted the position that a human being is a full-fledged person as of conception.

The doctrines of moral laws apparently give the Catholic voices some leeway in deciding what is good and godly in different cases. Some issues are, however, very strictly and categorically prohibited on the basis of Catholic doctrine. Live birth cloning and therapeutic embryo cloning both fall into this class of genetic technologies. So, based on the theological context examined here, it should be expected that the Catholic view of human cloning be unconditionally negative. What remains a point of interest, however, are the actual argumentative strategies the Catholic voices use to connect their religious views with the biological reality of cloning. As mentioned, it seems that based on the mystical triple-axis of morality, moral interpretations can always be made in many different directions. This leaves the field of Catholic argumentation open for multiple different argumentative strategies.

2.6. Bioethics and Catholic bioethics

One additional feature having an effect on the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning is the extensive philosophical debate revolving around the biosciences, called 'bioethics'. Bioethics is defined in the 1985 edition of Webster's, for instance, as "a discipline dealing with the ethical implications of biological research and applications especially in medicine". A similar definition is advanced by O'Connell and Marty:

Generally understood, bioethics is the systematic identification, analysis, and resolution of ethical problems associated with the biomedical sciences and their application, especially in the practice of medicine. As such, bioethics strives to generate moral insight and offer practical guidance in relevant areas, ranging from the care of individual patients to the development of social policy. (O'Connell & Marty 1999, 219.)

Both of the above-mentioned definitions emphasize a feature in bioethics that sets it slightly apart from the understanding of ethics as an ethical theory. According to Rachels (1998), the relation between ethical theory and bioethics is like the relation between biology and medicine. A physician who knows nothing of biology, and approaches her patients in the spirit of a car mechanic with a kit-bag of practical techniques, may do a generally serviceable job. However, the knowledge of relevant sciences makes her a better doctor, more capable of handling complex issues when they arise. So it can be said that bioethics is orientated to solving the concrete problems biosciences create on medical and social levels. (Rachels 1998, 22-23.)

The field of bioethics is not, however, as simply defined as the above descriptions lead one to understand. The definitions grasp the actual point of focus of any given bioethical approach well enough, but leave unresolved a big problem inherent in the field. This is the problem of bioethics based on different accounts of reality. When theorists in the field speak about bioethics, they seem to divide the discipline into three distinct camps: philosophical, theological and religious bioethics. (see, for example Childress 1999; Campbell 1999; Zoloth 1999.) Religious bioethics is something explicitly built on a religious frame of reference, e.g. 'Catholic bioethics'. Philosophical bioethics is a bioethical approach explicitly built on a non-religious frame of reference. Theological bioethics seems to be either of the two, or something in between, depending on who is doing the bioethical work and who is defining it. The dominance of the different starting points of bioethical theory has also changed during the discipline's history:

Although theologians had central roles in the emergence of modern bioethics, religious discourse became marginalized within bioethics before being partially restored. Bioethicists now commonly attend to religious beliefs and practices, particularly in settings where clinicians need to consider their patients' religious beliefs in order to determine how to respect them as persons, or where they need to consider the implications of their own religious beliefs. (Childress 1999, 65.)

The marginalization of religious voices in bioethics came about through philosophical critiques of religiously based arguments. According to Campbell (1999), these critiques are chiefly of three main types. One philosophical critique is that religious arguments in bioethics borrow intellectual legitimacy and credibility from the very questions they mean to answer. The problem in the philosophical view is that the “questions” that religion attends to may not be terribly significant in the first place, and the “answers” may turn out to be inseparable from broader metaphysical frameworks and traditions that are largely inaccessible, perhaps even incomprehensible, to the general public. A second critique offered by philosophical bioethicists is that religious arguments get their intellectual legitimacy and credibility from the limits of scientific discovery. That is to say, that in argumentation about biology and ethics the deity of the Abrahamic religious traditions usually becomes a “God of the gaps”. For example, God is used as an explanation for the gaps in scientific theory concerning the origins of human life. The third philosophical critique of religious argumentation in bioethics outlined by Campbell is that religious argumentation tends to borrow selectively from authoritative sources which usually are formative narratives, texts, or practices. (Campbell 1999, 22-23.)

As this work is not a work of philosophy or ethics, the field of philosophical bioethics is of no further interest on this occasion. To be more precise, the fields of philosophical bioethics or theological bioethics are of interest in this study only as far as they are present in the material analyzed. The fields of religious and theological bioethical thinking are therefore relevant in the sense that they contextualize the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning to some extent. However, the same issues that marginalized theological special knowledge in virtual contexts seem to affect the use of bioethical specialist knowledge. Highly specialized philosophical concepts are rarely utilized in the Catholic Internet discussion concerning cloning. As was mentioned, it is typical for the proponents of religious bioethics to base their argumentation on frameworks of religious tradition and authority. Although specialized theological knowledge is also marginalized by the virtual context, religious frames of reference tend to be more common than highly sophisticated philosophical discourses. As the frameworks of discussion are Catholic, this is doubly understandable:

It is well known that the Catholic Church attaches great importance to its tradition, even in questions of ethics; it is even better known that it officially prescribes a Catholic moral doctrine, and so likewise a Catholic medical ethics, as its obligatory doctrine. This is connected to its understanding of the Church’s tradition: within the Church’s fellowship with its tradition, there is an official and thus valid exposition and interpretation of this tradition. Further, inasmuch as tradition is always understood in an ultimate relationship to the doctrine of the faith of the Church, the official teaching in questions of ethics, which is upheld in each period and today as valid - e.g., in questions of medical ethics - is seen as standing in an ultimate relationship to the doctrine of the faith of the Church. It is precisely for this reason that the Church, as the guardian of the faith, intervenes in an official way in questions of moral theology, including those of medical ethics. (Fuchs 1989, 90.)

From the point of view of Catholic medical ethics and of bioethics (O'Collins & Farrugia 2003), the issue that is perceived as perhaps the most disturbing in biomedical issues is the question of limits. It is considered that the same genetic techniques that can potentially cure disease might also be used to enhance human embryos to produce people with superior traits. This would enable, for example, wealthy parents to buy desirable characteristics through gene enhancement and so produce children with a biologically higher potential for 'success'. Taken a step further, this could result in the emergence of a new social class, comprised of those whose parents can afford to purchase genetic endowments:

Biotechnology firms are already busy creating and cultivating a market for their products and services, which promise to turn human reproduction into commercial breeding. Alongside new generic engineering, old eugenics has appeared in fresh forms but with the original project of altering the human race by breeding for inherited characteristics deemed to be desirable and eliminating those deemed to be unwanted. For the 'greater good of humanity' people who harbour 'dangerous' genes must be prevented from begetting children or the foetuses they produce must be aborted. Embryos are to be selected for implantation or destroyed because they display the 'right' or 'wrong' characteristics, respectively. By promoting on its own terms the 'needs' of society, the new eugenics makes the alleged 'greater good' of society dominate over the rights and dignity of individuals. (O'Collins & Farrugia 2003, 361.)

The Catholic view of the inevitability of evil outcomes should genetic engineering be allowed is one of the chief elements in Catholic bioethics and this is clearly reflected in the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning. As will become apparent later on in the analysis, the distinct role of a "doomsday prophet" becomes emphasized when analysing the voices that have been categorized as Professional. This is not surprising, since one of the aims of religious bioethics seems to be to make ethicists prophets. Christie (1999) argues that the function of the professional theologian is firstly to function as a prophet. In Christie's view the theologian begins with the premise that a particular religious tradition is valid, or at least defensible, and the primary focus of the theological prophet is to communicate with those who do not share the particular belief system. For Christie, a theologian is a bridge builder with the awesome responsibility of articulating clearly and effectively to the greater community the particular perspectives that his or her religion espouses. (Christie 1999, 102-103.) A similar view is forwarded by Zoloth:

Of all the tasks that religious theorists and theologians must take as central and one of the most important reasons to have the theological voice about in the field, is the responsibility of the frankly prophetic voice. Religion ought not to be content with sweet pastoral explanation: at its heart theology is a lot of trouble. (Zoloth 1999, 263.)

The limits of the new technologies are, however, not the only problems religious bioethicists face. The scope of religious bioethical problems is extensively outlined by Chairman Leon M. Kass in the foreword of "Human cloning and human dignity. The report of the President's Council on Bioethics" (2002). In the report the ethical issues are first divided into two classes depending on what is the alleged purpose of cloning. The first class is called "cloning-to-produce-children", which means:

...the production of a cloned human embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of initiating a pregnancy, with the (ultimate) goal of producing a child who will be genetically virtually identical to a currently existing or previously existing individual” (Kass 2002, XLIII).

The second class of ethical issues revolves around “cloning-for-biomedical-research”, which means:

Production of a cloned human embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of using it in research or for extracting its stem cells, with the (ultimate) goals of gaining scientific knowledge of normal and abnormal development and of developing cures for human diseases (Kass 2002, XLIII).

In the ethics that concern ‘Cloning-to-Produce-Children’, the council identifies five categories of ethical issues. The first of these issues concerns the manufacture of embryos. In the council’s view, cloned children might come to be considered more like products of a designed manufacturing process than as “gifts” whom their parents are prepared to accept as they are. Such an attitude toward children could also contribute to an increased commercialization and industrialization of human procreation, which is the second ethical issue. The council’s third concern is the prospect of new eugenics. In their view, cloning, if successful, might serve the ends of privately pursued eugenic enhancement, either by avoiding the genetic defects that may arise in human reproduction, or by preserving and perpetuating outstanding genetic traits. As a fourth concern, cloning-to-produce-children might result in troubled family relations. In the council’s view, by confounding and transgressing the natural boundaries between generations, cloning could strain the social ties between generations. As the fifth and final concern, Kass mentions the effects of cloning on society. In the council’s opinion, cloning-to-produce-children would affect not only the direct participants but also the entire society that allows or supports this activity. The possible effects on society could include the way society looks at children, or the emergence of new forms of control by one generation over the next. (Kass 2002, XLIX.)

In the “Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research” the President’s council outlines several reasons why biomedical research on human embryos is morally wrong (although it is mentioned that the council was not unanimous in this regard). Firstly, the council builds on the uncertainties that genetic technology faces. The possibility of medical benefits through embryonic research is conceptualized as purely speculative and at the same time it is asserted that the council believes it is morally wrong to exploit and destroy developing human life, even for good ends. The moral condemnation of embryonic research is further constructed on three issues. The first of these revolves around the moral status of the cloned embryo. The council holds that the case for treating the early-stage embryo as simply the moral equivalent of all other human cells is mistaken because it denies the continuous history of human individuals from the embryonic, to foetal, to infant stages of existence. Thus the embryo must be granted the same moral status as an adult human being. (Kass 2002, LIV-LV.) The second ethical issue follows from the

first and is called “the exploitation of developing human life”. In the council’s view, to engage in cloning-for-biomedical-research requires the irreversible crossing of a very significant moral boundary: the creation of human life exclusively for the purpose of its use in research that necessarily involves its deliberate destruction. As a third reason crossing this fundamental boundary would entail moral damage to the whole of society. (Kass 2002, LV-LVI.)

It can be reasonably argued that the above issues mostly form the core of any and all religious and theological bioethical considerations. The Catholic Internet discussion also echoes many of the issues presented above. To conclude the discussion on the RL contexts of the Catholic Internet discussion, a short summary is in order.

2.7. Contexts – a summary

In the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning, bioscientific terms meet religious terminology and ethics, and the voices of religiously motivated social institutions clash with technological forces they perceive as threatening and dangerous. The authorities of the Catholic Church direct their warnings and persuasions to the laity, and the Lay voices talk to each other, creating an environment of Little Tradition, or in other words “an environment of limited doctrinal correctness”. All this is mediated and characterized by the WWW, making the discussion seem detached from the concrete world of real life. It can be argued that in many ways the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning indeed is detached from all other forums of religious cloning debate. Not only is it an environment easily accessible to speakers from many different layers of the Catholic hierarchy, it is also a forum that cannot be edited or extensively controlled by authorities. Thus the WWW is detached from doctrinal constraints and official dominance, as well as from specialist control.

That the discussions are detached from specialist control creates a unique situation for the speakers and for the audiences. It is the free choice of any speaker to which extent he/she wants to identify his/her voice with one of the specialist contexts that surround the discussion (e.g. identify him/herself as a bioscientist, theologian etc.). It is also up to any given audience member to which extent he/she wants to obtain contextualizing information concerning the argumentation found on the WWW. As the contexts are not easily accessible (because they are dominated by specialists), it is quite probable that the importance of single, detached, arguments and opinions is increased. The Catholic Internet discussion on cloning and the relevant specialist contexts can be summarised in figure C1.

The only voices on the Net that show some recurring theological contextualization of their arguments are the Official Catholic voices. The Official voices are also contextualized by the Catholic teachings of the hierarchy. It must again be stressed that the theology employed in argumentation by the Official voices is of a quality which makes the argumentation clearly directed at lay audiences, not to peers with specialized knowledge. Of all the voices, however, doctrinally correct theology plays the greatest part in the arguments by the Official voices. All of the voices contain a small contextual reference of bioscientific discourse, which is often quite superficial (not presented in the diagram above). The presence of the bioscientific context in all categories of Catholic argumentation is simply due to the fact that bioscientific matters are under debate and some amount of bioscientific terminology is inevitably present. In other words, as ‘cloning’ is a bioscientific term, the bioscientific context is present in all categories.

The unique aspect of the Professional voices is that they are, to some extent, contextualized by Catholic “social action”, meaning that they appear to share rhetorical similarity with the discourses of anti-abortion movements and the Pro-Life movement in general. This means that the rhetorical style of the social action context has affected the rhetorical style of the Professional voices, although it is not necessarily possible to say how much real life social contact the Professional voices have with, say, the Pro-Life movement. Traces of the context of social action can




Figure C1: The Catholic Internet discussion and RL contexts

also be found in all categories, but the importance of the rhetoric of the Pro-Life movement is somewhat emphasized in the category of the Professional voices.

The Lay voices are quite varied in opinion and rhetorical style but are unified by theological incorrectness. Some Lay voices emphasize theological principles, but they are a minority. Some Lay voices have a resounding resemblance to the “prophetic” theological outlook of the Professional voices, but they also remain a minority. Most Lay argumentation includes some very general and “folkish” theological principles, which have been previously termed the context of Little Tradition. As mentioned before, the whole Catholic Internet discussion seems to work by the rules of relative theological incorrectness. In the Lay voices, however, the departure from strictly correct theological principles becomes most apparent. It is important to acknowledge and to underline the fact that when studying Internet materials, the more diverse the nature of the material becomes, the less possible it is to know all the contextualizing real life factors.

All in all, it is impossible to say just how relevant the above-mentioned real life contexts are to the material under study. For example, based on one detached piece of argumentation it is impossible to say how much theological or bioethical special knowledge a speaker might possess. What can be said for certain, however, is that the above-mentioned contexts affect and characterise the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning to some extent. The contextualizing factors presented here are not to be understood as definitive indicators of the real life associations of the Catholic voices on the Net. Rather, they should be understood as tools for the reader that make the Catholic Internet discussion more accessible and easier to

understand. The next chapter will discuss the theory utilized in the analysis of the Catholic cloning argumentation.

3. Theory: The tools of the trade

“Do not become archivists of facts. Try to penetrate the secret of their occurrence, persistently search for the laws which govern them.”

- Ian Pavlov

3.1. Rhetoric – a brief history

The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. (When we know a thing and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it.) This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do something, as when we scold a man for his conduct or try to change his views... (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book 2, 1391b.)

The roots of both the practice and methodology called ‘rhetoric’ dig deep into history. Inaugurated by the Sophists of the Ancient Greece, elaborated by Plato and embodied by the tremendous work of Aristotle, the discipline has travelled through dark medieval times and the uproars of modernity to the present. This chapter presents a short account of the history of rhetoric, focusing on Aristotelian *inventio* and the modern theories of rhetoric that utilise the ideas Aristotle included within *inventio*⁴⁵.

As it happens with many scholarly terms that have been in use for extensive periods of time, the term ‘rhetoric’ has been laden with many meanings. Everyone has heard the term being used, probably in many different senses of the word. One of the most usual intuitions about ‘rhetoric’ or ‘rhetorical’ is probably the idea of a somewhat dubious discourse that is meant to manipulate the audience. The other common notion pertaining to rhetoric is the idea of “empty” discourse, often expressed as “mere rhetoric” (Sakaranaho 2001, 9).

To track rhetoric back to its original meaning one must travel back to ancient Greece, where ‘classical rhetoric’ was invented. Classical rhetoric was associated primarily with persuasive discourse, on how to convince an audience to think or to act in a certain way. Later the principles of rhetoric were extended from direct persuasion to apply also to informative or expository forms of discourse. (Corbett & Connors 1999, 16.) This is a reasonable development, because the distinction between persuasive and non-persuasive discourse is quite misleading. An explicitly persuasive discourse is not the only one containing persuasive force, quite the contrary. Informative and expository forms of discourse contain a certain view of reality, of the states-of-things, which can alter the reader’s views almost unconsciously. In a way, all use of language and every discourse aimed at some

⁴⁵ For further information on the historical development of rhetoric see Conley 1994; Kennedy 1999; Bizzell and Herzberg 2001; Corbett & Connors 1999.

audience can be seen as potentially persuasive. (see Kaakkuri-Knuuttila 1999; Kennedy 1999.)

The most important works of classical rhetoric date back to ancient Greece. Among the many important rhetoricians and philosophers of that time, Aristotle emerges as the most important innovator and scholar of rhetoric.

Rhetoric embodied – Aristotle’s system

According to Aristotle, there are five canons in classical rhetoric. These are *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria* and *pronuntiatio*. The first term, “*inventio*”, means the method of finding the right kind of arguments, or ‘artistic proof’ for arguments in situations where absolute certainties are unreachable. *Dispositio* means the arrangement or organization of the material that the orator or writer presents, the way of making the whole of the oratory more than its constitutive parts. *Elocutio*, for the classical rhetorician, meant “style”. Its subject was the division of performance into different stylistic formats, such as plain, forcible and florid. *Memoria* was about the technique of remembering speeches and *pronuntiatio* about the actual delivery of the speech, including the management of the speaker’s voice and the gestures of his body. (see Corbett & Connors 1999, 18-23.)

The present work deals mainly with the Aristotelian idea of *inventio* and the later fruits of insight it has produced in rhetorical studies. This is mainly for two reasons. First of all, the elements of persuasion Aristotle associated with *inventio* are very profound in nature, and of all the ideas he presented concerning rhetoric have the most to do with abstract structures of argumentation (in comparison to, for example, *memoria* or *pronuntiatio*). Thus the starting hypothesis is that combining modern cognitive science with the ideas Aristotle presented with *inventio* will produce a working methodology for argumentation analysis. The other four Aristotelian canons of rhetoric are more concerned with the art of oratory and performance, as well as with offering pragmatic guidelines for the public speaker.

Secondly, there are several inconsistencies within the texts of Aristotle, as they were never compiled in their present form by Aristotle himself. The works have been written in different times and perhaps for different audiences. The major inconsistencies in the texts revolve around Aristotle’s discussions of emotions and of “topics” described in Book Two of *Rhetoric*. The consistency of his use of *inventio*, or of the terms ‘*ethos*’, ‘*pathos*’ and ‘*logos*’ is, however, generally intact. (see Kennedy 1999, 78-79.) Aristotelian *inventio* has been chosen as the core of the theoretical approach in this work both because of its applicability and its textual coherence.

Aristotle begins explaining *inventio* by stating that there are two types of general argumentation available for any speaker: non-artistic and artistic. The non-artistic way of presenting arguments relies either on presenting factual proof in the right manner or certifying the truth of the matters through dialectical reasoning. This form of argumentation is actually not rhetoric in the deepest sense of *inventio*. The basis of non-artistic argumentation is mechanistic and blatant: unquestionable physical evidence and formal-logical deduction are not really forms of argument – they are the end of argumentation. (see Kennedy 2001, 112.) In non-artistic proof the only room left for rhetoric is in the presentation of the material, and this is

where the artistic type usually steps in.⁴⁶ Needless to say, logical certainties or unshakable proof are rare situations in everyday life where issues are argued.

Aristotle divides *inventio* into three forms of artistic persuasion a speaker can use to convince his audience: *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*:

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. (Rhetoric, Book 1, 1356b.)

Thus in classical rhetoric Aristotle clearly associates *ethos* with the apparent nature of the speaker, or with the means a speaker uses to seem convincing and trustworthy in the eyes of a given audience. *Pathos* has to do with the emotional states of the audience, and *logos* with the credibility of the proposed states-of-things.

The artistic way of presenting arguments is based on making the audience appreciate your view when there is no undeniable proof available, or making the audience more receptive when you have some facts at hand but not enough to present a conclusive argument. Since this is a typical situation it is normal for any speaker to find himself in situations where he must find a right formula, a right balance for delivering their arguments. In these situations the best possible way of presenting arguments is based on the speaker's knowledge of the predispositions of the audience and of their knowledge concerning the matter under debate. The speaker must manipulate the facts of the issue under debate in such a way as to make the predispositions of the audience support his arguments. Thus the line between *inventio* and proof by fact is a thin and important one: too much artistic persuasion can actually harm the credibility of an argument if it also has great factual support and vice versa. (See Kennedy 2001.)

Aristotle's theories of persuasion have surfaced time and again in the cross-currents of Western intellectual history. They have been rediscovered, re-invented and, on rare occasions, even reified. The rhetorical studies of today are not the same as in Aristotle's day, and of this we owe thanks to the work of many innovative scholars who have modernized rhetorical studies into what is called 'the new rhetoric'. The discussion on the subject of new rhetoric will focus on situating the theoretical approach of this particular study in a theoretical continuum within the field of rhetoric. The more precise theoretical discussion concerning the methods used in the analysis (Aristotelian *inventio* and its later revisions) will be discussed in detail in chapters concerning *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*.

46 Aristotle's division of the processes of knowing can also be seen as a division into productive knowledge and theoretical knowledge. While theoretical knowledge aims at establishing certain and logical relations in the knowledge we possess of the states-of-things in reality, productive knowledge is concerned with the indeterminate and possible. In contrast to the theoretical mode of knowledge, productive knowledge is decisively instrumental and uncompromisingly situated. Whereas theoretical knowledge aims at rising above the contingencies of time and circumstance, productive knowledge thrives on situationality. (Atwill 1998, 194-195.)

The New rhetoric

The origins of rhetoric as we understand it today go back to nineteenth century, although the actual beginnings of what can be called “the new rhetoric” are best located in the late 1950s. Finnish comparative religionist Tuula Sakaranaho (1998) defines the new rhetoric as a manifold discursive approach, which does not form a unitary theoretical model but rather shares a common set of concerns. Rhetoric can be seen as parallel to discourse analysis as they are both concerned with discovering the principles used by communicators to generate and understand speech, or communication in general, be it oral or textual in nature. (Sakaranaho 1998, 42.) Thus it can be argued that generally the rhetoric of modern times represents a return to the original aims of Aristotle, further spiced with a theoretical knowledge of sociology and psychology that was not available to the ancient Greeks.

The work of Kenneth Burke (1897-1993), the pioneer of the new rhetoric, embraces the fields of sociology, literary theory, journalism, composition and speech communication. Burke offered a new encompassing view of rhetorical action and influence that placed humans into an interactive relationship with their language as well as through their language. Burke describes humans as symbol-using and misusing creatures, whose whole being is infused and transformed by linguistic motives arising out of the naming, abstracting and negating capabilities of language (Campbell 2001, 504). For Burke, the world of social action is a jungle of interrelated motives that are born, acted upon and adjusted in language. What he named new rhetoric focuses on the symbolic action by which people create cooperation and ‘consubstantiality’ (See Burke 1945; 1950). Here ‘consobstantiality’ can be seen as denoting the process where common experience is explicated as common meaning through the use of multilaterally persuasive and influencing language.

Burke’s theories are not used as a basis for the methodology in this study. This is, first of all, because Burke is something of a virtuoso of cultural analysis, and his work offers little methodological advice for the less gifted. Burke has been called “the interpreter of the human mess” with good reason. Secondly, Burke does not use Aristotelian *inventio* to build his theory of rhetoric in any essential sense.

After Burke, several theorists of rhetoric have made themselves heard in what has become called “the rhetorical turn” (Sakaranaho 1998, 41-42.) The 1960s and 1970s can be seen as the hey day of rhetorical protest and critique, although during this time the discipline acquired some very aggravated and pejorative forms. The classical theory of argumentation was seen as obsolete and incapable of dealing with the strong social protests that were emerging on the 60’s and 70’s. The status of rhetoric as a scholarly discipline was also questioned. As a counter-reaction this brought forth a critical rereading of the ancient classical rhetoricians.⁴⁷ The classical tradition of argumentation was reinvigorated by the work of the physicist and philosopher Stephen E. Toulmin in *The uses of Argument* (1958) and by philosophers and legal scholars Cha m Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in *Traité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique* (1958, translated into English in 1969).

47 On “rhetorical turn” see Campbell 2001.

Both above-mentioned approaches are important for this work, because they have significant connections to Aristotelian ideas and revise the ideas he presented in *inventio*. For example, Barilli (1989) sees Perelman as a neo-Aristotelian who propounds the rightness of dialectic and rhetoric for certain areas that concern all human beings, such as politics and ethics. Perelman relaunches the program proposed by Aristotle well over two thousand years ago, suggesting that the issue is not whether analysts or rhetoricians should rule, but of putting both into their proper places. (see Barilli 1989, 104-106.) Both Perelman's and Toulmin's work are important from the point of view of Aristotelian *inventio*, and they will be discussed in some detail in part two of this study.

Through the developments brought about by modernity the rhetorical approach has gone through a series of interrelated shifts in focus that markedly separate it from the theorizing of previous times. New rhetoric can be seen as an umbrella term covering a variety of disciplines having different research interests. The most important of these are cognitive, expressive and epistemic rhetoric, new historicism and modern taxonomies, along with cultural criticism and feminist rhetoric. These have surfaced primarily because of modernism and the interest in epistemology fostered by linguistics and post-structuralism. (Burnham 1996, 461). New rhetoric can also be seen as a reaction against the positivistic view of language presented by "current-traditional" rhetoric, which greatly emphasized grammatical and mechanical correctness and algorithmic modes of composition (Burnham 1996, 462; also see Crowley 1990)⁴⁸.

During the theoretical developments after the 1960s modern rhetoric has benefited from advances in language studies⁴⁹, philosophical studies⁵⁰ and literary theory⁵¹. (See Campbell 2001, 501-503.) As a result, the canons of rhetoric have become quite separate and their areas of application have drifted further away from each other. One line of rhetorical studies can be traced to North American Pragmatism and Philosophy of Language, other to Poetics where the traditional canons of delivery are still very much relevant. A third line of rhetorical studies can be found in the European "literature-analytic" tradition that in a manner of speaking culminates in the work of Roland Barthes and critical culture studies. For a brilliant review of the division and revival of the rhetorical tradition in Anglo-American criticism, literature studies and technological media, see Barilli 1989, pages 102-129.

In the Finnish field of rhetorical studies Sakaranaho (2001) outlines three possible approaches to constructing rhetorical theory. The first is to concentrate on examining how meaning is constructed within texts. Here the focus is mainly on the rhetorical means utilized to guide the interpretations of the readers or listeners concerning the states-of-things proposed by the speaker. The aim of this type of rhetorical approach is to gain an in-depth understanding of the communication in question, within the context of the particular text. (Sakaranaho 2001, 18.)

48 For a more detailed explanation of 'Epistemic Rhetoric' see Scott 1996, 252-253; Burnham 1996, 463. For more information on 'Current-Traditional Rhetoric' see Crowley 1990; Crowley 1996, 156-157.

49 For example, see Eco 1976; Morris 1947.

50 The most influential part of philosophical studies as a whole has, for rhetoric, naturally been the philosophy of Language and Pragmatics. See for example Wittgenstein 1953; Austin 1962; Searle 1969.

51 See for example Wimsatt 1963; Frye 1957.

The second possible approach to building rhetorical theory is more oriented towards establishing an understanding of the historical and social connections as a part of the critical interpretation of communication. In this type of approach the given argumentation is analyzed with rhetorical methods but the interpretation the researcher gives is contextually integrated with the relevant social issues and positions. This type of rhetorical reading aims at a critical understanding of social situations and chains of events, which affect the dispositions of thought and action that the people concerned possess. (Sakaranaho 2001, 19.)

The third possible emphasis for a rhetorical theory is more concerned with the mechanisms that make the construction of reality in argumentation possible in the first place. Communication, like the thinking process, is extremely complex and many-layered and cannot be thoroughly understood without grasping the basic mechanisms of human cognition. The third approach focuses on the basic parameters of persuasiveness: the use of terms and the interrelations of thought, language and reality. By explaining the processes the human mind uses to categorize reality, an explanatory element can be introduced to the rhetorical interpretation of communication. (see Sakaranaho 2001, 20; Niemelä & Sjöblom 2001, 62-86.)

The present study is clearly situated within the third category of building rhetorical theory discussed by Sakaranaho. The combination of cognitive science and the theory of rhetorical persuasion situates the explanatory force of this work in a deeper understanding of the mental mechanisms that make persuasion work. The analysis presented here is not primarily contextualized within texts themselves nor within society and culture, but within the naturalistic understanding of the human mind. However, there also are some cultural and social connections that affect the interpretations and explanations. While the primary context of analysis is the cognitive machinery of the analyzed voices, Catholic doctrine and tradition have deeply affected the speakers, and thus both must be included in the analysis as contextualizing factors.

Concerning the theoretical approach of this study, the field of cognitive rhetoric is of particular interest. The central question driving cognitive rhetoric is how do rhetors, as goal-directed agents and complex social beings, construct meaning and communicate with others within an immense and little-understood social context. (Long and Flower 1996, 108.) The researchers of cognitive rhetoric have emphasized two different lines of enquiry: the nature of the writing process and the nature of the social-cognitive web surrounding any given speaker. The aims of the study of the writing process have been largely pedagogical in nature, to understand the process better in order to be able to teach writing more effectively:

Cognitive rhetoric is committed to pedagogy that speaks to the needs of individual writers, especially those student writers who traditionally have not been well served by the educational system's policies and practices. As part of an ongoing effort to refine its praxis, cognitive rhetoric has recently begun inquiring into the ways writers actively negotiate language, discourse conventions, social structures, and material influences. These negotiations are considered crossroads where individuals and social forces are not only active but also often in conflict. Analysis of these points of conflict works to identify discursive practices, options, goals, and constraints and their impact on literate action. (Long & Flower 1996, 109.)

In cognitive rhetoric the study of the social-cognitive web addresses the question of how does the rhetorician operate as an agent and meaning-maker within the social and cultural structures, assumptions, conventions and settings that allow and shape meaning. (see Burnham 1996, 461-462.) While the research on the cognitive dimensions of the writing process is “cognitive rhetoric” in a very real sense, it has very little in common with the theory proposed here. However, taking into account the un-monolithic structure of both cognitive science and rhetoric, this is hardly surprising. It is only probable that combining two multi-disciplinary avenues of scientific enquiry produces innovations with different points of focus. The cognitive rhetoric of Long and Flower is pedagogical, while the cognitive rhetoric proposed in this study is a tool for recognizing persuasive structures and inferential assertions within discourse. Fahnestock and Secor (2005) also approach rhetoric and the theory of argumentation from a (pedagogical) point of view that incorporates elements that are tied to the cognitive elements used in this work. Particularly interesting is their conceptualization of “agency” as an integral part of building convincing arguments (Fahnestock & Secor 2005, 174-185).

Since the study utilizes the Internet as the source of its material, rhetorical theories that have been applied to the study of the Net are also of particular interest. Rhetorical analysis has indeed made advances into the world of hypertexts. For example, Sosnoski (1999) suggests a model for the rhetorical analysis of Internet material that he calls ‘configuring’:

As a mode of analysis, configuring is a “figuring out” through analogies, an attempt to describe in general the contour of similar interactions that suggests how specific instances work. ...To put the matter as simply as possible, a configuration offers an analogy from one realm of experience to suggest the shape that an experience might take in another (Sosnoski, 1994, p. Xxxi). Configuring is a style of thinking whose domain is largely rhetorical. It is often used (e.g., in ads) to persuade persons to believe or do or experience something in a particular way. It is often used in the construction of the Web pages we commonly read/view from our computer screens. (Sosnoski 1999, 138-139.)

Sosnoski builds on Stephen Toulmin’s argumentation analysis⁵² to create his model of “configuring”. In configuring the traditional analytic model of “if we assume this warrant, given this data, then we can draw this conclusion” is altered to an analogical model, which suggests a configuration of a particular experience. (Sosnoski 1999, 129-130.)

While Sosnoski’s model is innovative and probably very well suited to a thorough reflection on the diverse and complex hypertexts, it is not applicable in the approach used in this work. This is mainly because the materials under study are as close to “plain text” as one can find on the Internet. The more or less official statements gathered on the Catholic community’s views of genetics very rarely incorporate anything but plain text. Therefore the utilization of the traditional analytic model spiced by a cognitive approach is more suitable in this instance. Configuring is well applicable as a tool for rhetorical analysis, but centres on the study of hypertextual

⁵² Toulmin’s model will be explored in detail in chapter “Logos”.

features used in the web pages that incorporate graphics, animation etc. While the means of persuasion that hypertextuality offers are certainly a valid object for rhetorical analysis, that would be an entire study in itself.

In Finnish studies utilizing the rhetorical approach both the use of the elements of Aristotelian *inventio* and the study of the Internet have not been central research interests. The original revival of the subject on the Finnish scientific scene occurred in the social sciences⁵⁵ (Sakaranaho 1998, 41). There have been a few studies in anthropology and folklore, but the approaches are very different from the one suggested in this study. (see, for example, Viljanen 1994.) Recently the rhetorical approach has been utilized in increasingly in Finnish comparative religion, mainly by Sakaranaho (see for example Sakaranaho 1998; 2001; 2002) and lately by Pesonen (for example see Pesonen 2001; 2004). The only Finnish studies directly incorporating elements of Aristotelian *inventio* are by Pesonen and Lassander (2001). The cognitive elements of rhetoric have been briefly discussed by Niemelä and Sjöblom (2001).

After briefly examining the different theoretical applications and interests of rhetorical studies it becomes apparent that this particular study is easy to situate in terms of its interests, but difficult to place in terms of previous rhetorical studies. This is mainly because of three reasons. First, the theoretical approach combining rhetoric and cognitive science has been tried on very few occasions, and where it has been done, the focus of the study has been different (as discussed above). The ideas of cognitive anthropology utilized in this study have not been combined with rhetoric before. This makes the rhetorical analysis applied in the context of this study quite unique.

The second reason making the rhetorical approach in this study difficult to situate is the fact that the elements of rhetorical theory used here are very particular and sharply outlined (the Aristotelian ideas of *inventio* and their later revisions). The rhetorical studies that essentially focus on the same part of the theory of rhetoric are not that numerous. The third reason that makes it difficult to find a continuum of previous studies for this particular study is the fact that there are few if any rhetorical studies on the subject of religious persuasion concerning genetics. Further problems are created by the additional questions related to the study of the Internet. In a nutshell, the present study is difficult to situate because it combines several novel ideas and approaches.

In addition to the difficulty associated with situating this study in a theoretical continuum of rhetorical approaches, the term 'rhetoric' itself remains somewhat ambiguous. This is mainly because of the immense variation within the field of new rhetoric. Additional ambiguity arises from the use of the term 'rhetoric'. It denotes both the object under study and the method of study. (Bizzell and Herzberg 2001, 1.) Rhetoric as the application, both deliberate and intuitive, of the means to make one's claims more persuasive is the object of the study. Rhetoric as the theoretical construct of the possible methods of making one's claims more persuasive is the method of rhetorical analysis of rhetorical devices. Further ambiguity is brought about by the fact that even when rhetoric is used to analyse other cases of applied rhetorical means, the process contains both deliberate and intuitive structures of persuasion. (see Gross, 2005.)

⁵⁵ For examples of Finnish rhetorical approaches in social sciences see Summa 1989. For the rhetorical approach in social psychology see Vesala 1996.

There is a difference, however. Even if it can be said that the structures of rhetorical persuasion are present everywhere, the cases where rhetoric is used analytically to reveal these structures are not the norm. Every case of analysis utilizing the theory of rhetoric contains rhetorical structures, but every case of speech containing rhetorical structures does not contain the rhetorical analysis of those structures. This ambiguity has sometimes caused problems concerning the scientific status of rhetoric. As Stephen Fuller writes, it can for example be argued that the rhetorical attitude reduces the scientific approach to a hegemonic ideology, or that science reduces the rhetorical approach to a preoccupation with the margins of evolutionary psychology⁵⁴. (Fuller 2001, 711.)

Aristotle himself was already aware of this problematic dual position of rhetoric. It can be said that Aristotle sees rhetoric as ambiguously suspended between form and content, theory and practice. Rhetoric is already in Aristotle both an art and an analytic discipline dealing with the world and mechanisms of discourse, and the line between these two is blurred at best. (see Barilli 1989, 10-13; Sakaranaho 2001.) One possible way of viewing Aristotelian *inventio* is to view it as a method to discern general mechanisms to make argumentation as universally appealing as possible.⁵⁵ And if argumentation can be made universally appealing, it is conceivable that the minds appealed to also have universal tendencies. So, in this sense the study of persuasiveness is never far away from the study of mental dispositions. In the context of this study it is assumed that the folk-theoretical dispositions of thought have effect on what is considered persuasive and what is not: a position not far away from Aristotle's own view.

There are some examples of a search for rules and structures, or mechanisms of appeal, by researchers interested in rhetoric. Stephen Toulmin's work can be viewed as a philosophical defence of practical reasoning, against the view that only analytical reasoning is valid. Toulmin suggests a model that is formal, yet more easily applicable to everyday situations of argumentation than the traditional syllogism (Nothstine 1996, 506). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) also hint at the structural nature of everyday argumentative structures. Their view is that there are general categories of quantity, quality, order, existence, essence and value that "a person wishing to persuade another will have to draw, whether he likes it or not" (p. 84). A similar view of practical, everyday logic is proposed by Gilbert Harman:

Logic and probability theory are not directly theories of rationality and reasonableness and, furthermore, it is a misuse of language to say that violations of principles of logic and probability theory are indications of irrationality or unreasonableness. We do not normally consider someone to

⁵⁴ According to Fuller (2001), the most notable modern strategy for overcoming the conceptual impasse surrounding a "science of rhetoric" stems from the sociology of knowledge, which demystifies the difference between contingency and necessity – the one traditionally associated with rhetoric, the other with science. In practice, this means that scientific laws come to be treated much like civil laws, in which juridical precedent and case-based reasoning are decisive in specifying the use to which laws are put. In this study, rhetoric is naturalized in the sense that the specific interest is focused on the apparent mechanisms responsible for rhetorical forms. So the impasse Fuller describes has in this case been overcome by veering to the side of naturalistic interpretation.

⁵⁵ Aristotle's view of the mechanisms that affect persuasion encompassed many levels of psychological, sociological and cultural elements. This work will focus mainly on the cognitive dimension of these mechanisms, but this is not to say that Aristotle confined *inventio* to mean only cognitive or psychological dimensions of persuasion.

be ‘irrational’ or ‘unreasonable’ simply because of a mistake in arithmetic, or probability theory, or logic. Instead we use the words ‘irrational’ and ‘unreasonable’ in a rather different way; for example, for those who refuse to accept ‘obvious’ inductions, or for those who jump to conclusions on insufficient evidence, or for those who act knowing that they are frustrating their own purposes, or for those who are uncooperative. (Harman 1999, 45.)

Perelman, on the other hand, proposes dialectical reasoning as a substitute for the formal logic characteristic of mathematical reasoning (Campbell 2001, 507). This development is similar to that in cognitive science, where the problematic of everyday reasoning versus logic has been tackled by establishing different modes of everyday reasoning. One of the possible solutions for the problematic of “everyday logic” is the division of everyday thought into normative and descriptive models of human reasoning and decision-making (Stanovich and West, 2000.) While neither the view of Perelman or even Toulmin should be named ‘cognitive rhetoric’ in a literal sense, they can be seen as containing a drive towards establishing a view combining the mechanisms of human reasoning and rhetoric in everyday situations of argumentation. When Toulmin and Perelman abandon formal logic as the basis of the analysis of everyday argumentation it seems that they do not have a clear alternative explanation as to how the human mind actually works when creating persuasive argumentation. In other words, it seems that including a crucial piece of the relevant cognitive mechanisms – the mental basement, so to speak⁵⁶ – might bring additional vigour to their theories.

As can be seen in the above examples, it is not unheard of for the rhetorical studies to engage in some kind of search for structures and rules that could be seen as the reasons for the everyday rules of argumentation and persuasion. In the theories of rhetoric some kinds of systems of thought that affect persuasion are sometimes assumed to exist, but more often than not, the examination of the assumed systems themselves is left very vague.⁵⁷ It is suggested here that one partial answer to this vagueness can be achieved by enriching Aristotelian *inventio* with the theory of folk-theoretical thought and of the cognitive tendencies it produces in relation to persuasion.

Rhetoricians have seldom been interested in trying to combine ideas from cognitive science with the rhetorical approach. (Fahnestock 2005, 160-161.) However, this should not necessarily be the case. Jeanne Fahnestock (2005) writes concerning the relationship between cognitive science and rhetoric:

...these two disciplines, because they deal with dovetailing or overlapping phenomena, should eventually be compatible. They should “touch” at certain points, the one handing off its accounts to the other, cognitive science to rhetoric, though they operate on different scales and answer to different systems of explanation. Ultimately an understanding of the brain should lead

56 The term is originally from Boyer 2001. For a good description of cognitive mechanisms see Boyer 2001, 106-154.

57 For example, theorists of rhetoric often speak about the “situationality” or “occasionality” of rhetoric (see Fahnestock 2005; Jasinski 2001, 694-697; Kirby 2001, 529-532). It can be argued that all rhetoric is always situated first and foremost in the brain. So, it is conceivable that rhetoric being situated in the brain means that brain has quite a lot to do with the form and content of rhetorical situations.

to a better understanding of language, and that in turn should lead to a better explanation of effective language, of persuasion, and hence of the complex behaviours and historical processes, mediated by language, that rhetoricians study. (Fahnestock 2005, 160-161.)

Despite the differences between rhetorical and cognitive approaches, the disciplines share common ground. The problems expressed by Fuller (as mentioned earlier) remain valid, but they need not prevent cross-disciplinary theorization between cognitive science and rhetoric. Fahnestock continues:

Rhetoricians themselves need not and should not imitate cognitive neuroscientists. As humanists, they should continue to concentrate on historically situated texts and the political, social, and cultural events and trends they embody. But rhetorical scholars should not be hostile to potential scientific grounding either. In the days of Campbell, rhetoricians did predict that their discipline could be made compatible with then current scientific explanations of the mind... The prospects for such convergence are perhaps better now than they were two hundred years ago, thanks to the impressive functional characterization of the brain coming from neuroscientists. This characterization should enrich rhetorical theory in the long run. For no matter how sophisticated our studies of culturally situated, planned, or spontaneous rhetorical acts, they all come down to human brains acting on human brains. (Fahnestock 2005, 175.)

In the context of this work, the “human brains acting on human brains” is presented in the form of cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought and its relation to Aristotelian *inventio*. The following sections will explore how the intuitive assumptions people entertain can be linked with rhetorical devices, and how these natural patterns of thought serve to effect credibility and persuasiveness. The theory of folk theoretical thought has sprung up several times already, so before going deeper into Aristotelian *inventio*, it is necessary to take a look at the cognitive approach. The next section will briefly outline cognitive science in general and present the cognitive toolbox utilized in this study in some detail.

3.2. Cognitive science – A brief history

“Cognition sets the limits and boundary conditions for the social, cultural and religious activities of humans in thought and action. Thus, cognitive studies and theorizing are crucial contributions to the explanation and understanding of social, cultural and religious activities, for cognition is the ‘basic stuff’ - individual and universal - upon which humanly constructed worlds become possible as higher-order phenomena.”

- Jeppe S. Jensen

The scientific discipline interested in mental processes, mechanisms of representational minds and information processing is called cognitive science. The deepest historical roots of the cognitive approach can be found in classical philosophical questions such as the mind-body problem, which dates back to Rene Descartes (1596-1615) and to the rationalism versus empiricism debate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (Wilson 1999, xv-xvi.) The roots of cognitively oriented psychology date back to around 1850, when the first systematically conducted empirical psychological tests took place. The tests of Weber and Fechner, for example, measured the relations between objective changes in physical stimuli, such as brightness or weight, and subjective changes in the internal sensations the stimuli generate. In the first half of the twentieth century cognitively oriented psychology went into decline, overshadowed by behaviourism, only to emerge again in the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s and 60s. (Holyoak 1999, xli-xliv.)

Cognitive science as we know it today began to form after the Second World War, partially as a counterpart to the prevailing psychological (behaviourist) ideas of the time, and partially as a theoretical approach made possible by the new computational discoveries (Gardner 1987, 11-16). Advances in such diverse areas of science as computer technology and neuroscience made it possible to begin conceptualizing information processing in a totally new way. During the 1960s several disciplines of scientific enquiry started acting on the new ideas concerning the creative mechanisms of the human mind for the categorization and construal of information. It might be said that the concept of the human mind as we now understand it was born following the 1950s. During its first decades the new vision of the mind attracted six main disciplines under the umbrella of ‘cognitive science’: psychology, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. (Gardner 1987, 28-38.)

The start of cognitive cultural studies dates back to the 1950s, so it occurs around the same time as the proponents of the new rhetoric formulated their ideas (see Campbell 2001; Gardner 1987. See also chapter 3.1.). In the fields of study called ethology (see Marler 1999, 288-290.) and ethnosemantics, researchers undertook the systematic collection of data concerning the abilities of classifying, categorizing and concept-forming in different cultures. A new vision of a fundamental cognitive similarity between different cultural groups began to emerge. (Gardner 1987, 30.) There was a paradigmatic shift in thought concerning racial or cultural differences

in cognitive abilities between cultural groups. Whereas previously considered fundamentally different and culture-specific, a theory of cognitive human universals now emerged.

Cognitive science has a relatively short history as a discipline, but the accumulation of ideas put to use in its practice has a long past. It can be said that without the agendas of epistemologists throughout the history of the Western philosophical tradition, there would be no such thing as cognitive science (Gardner 1987, 7). The questions that cognitive science deals with are deeply rooted in the philosophical problematic of knowledge and knowing. Cognitive scientists today tackle much the same questions as did the philosophers of ancient Greece: what it means to know something, and having beliefs that are consistent with the states-of-things in reality. Cognitive science seeks to understand the relationships between that which is known and the knowing subject. In a nutshell, it might be said that cognitive science studies the mechanisms by which reality becomes represented in the minds of sentient beings, and the modes and qualities of the processes of representation (see Gardner 1987, 4-5). Maybe the most central development the “cognitive revolution“ brought was that the theory of the human mind changed from a view where the mind was considered a passive storage of information to a theory where the mind is understood as an active platform of information processing.

Several developments that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century can be seen as contributing to the new emergent vision of the human mind as an active processor of information. Important discoveries were made in the fields of mathematics and computation, neurology, cybernetics and information theory (Gardner 1987, 16-23). Anthropological advances were made in the discipline of ethnosemantics, and, at the other end of the spectrum of the scientific study of knowledge, artificial intelligence took its first steps. Finally, the emergence of the “Logic Theory Machine”, the computer we nowadays have such an everyday love-hate relationship with, was theoretically established. The theoretical possibility of a machine that could process information in a relatively simple and effective way created a new metaphor for the human mind. It is at this point of culmination that psychologist George A. Miller fixed the date of the official recognition of cognitive science: September 11, 1956. (Gardner 1987, 28-31.)

Be that an accurate date for the discipline’s conception or not, today cognitive science can be seen as having been formed out of the six main disciplines mentioned above. The basic agenda connecting these disciplines was formulated in the State of the Art Report commissioned by the Sloan Foundation in 1978:

What has brought the field into existence is a common research objective: to discover the representational and computational capabilities of the mind and their structural and functional representation in the brain. (SOAP 1978, quoted in Gardner 1987, 36.)

The selection of the disciplines could also have been different. As Gardner remarks, anthropology and neuroscience are “borderline” disciplines that might have been excluded from the endeavour altogether. On the other hand, disciplines such as sociology or economics might have been added into the fold. (Gardner 1987, 7.) Because of the wide spectrum of the six disciplines included in cognitive science, the research made in its name can vary tremendously. Rather than approach the

field in a way as to give a comprehensive picture of any and all research possible within its fold, it is reasonable to focus on a few key features that the cognitive point of view encompasses. The first of these “symptoms of cognitivism” is the concept of ‘representation’. ‘Representation’ can be seen as a level of analysis posited between neurological functions of the brain and the cultural and social influences of external reality, as a level where the mechanisms of information processing and external phenomena become knowledge. The cognitive scientist rests his discipline on the assumption that it is informative to describe human cognitive activity in terms of ‘symbols’, ‘schemas’, ‘ideas’ or other forms of mental representation. (Gardner 1987, 38-39, 383-384.)

Secondly, from a cognitive point of view, active organisms are primarily considered to be “information-processing systems”. In this account the computer can be seen as a more or less effective metaphor for the mind; computers are also used in some forms of cognitive study to simulate cognitive activity. (Gardner 1987, 40-41.) The issue of the metaphorical value of “human cognition as a supercomputer” remains under debate, as we cannot yet be sure of how similar the processes are. The human mind clearly uses some kinds of rules to sort out and process relevant information, but not enough is known yet to be precise about how these “rules” function and are formed in the first place. The different views of mental architecture are discussed in more detail further on.

However, there are views according to which the human mind is never a blank slate, having innate, hard-wired capabilities and dispositions that can be seen as “computer-like” in a more or less metaphorical sense.⁵⁸ The “computer-likeness” of the brain is, at its strongest, in theory commonly known as the “computational theory of mind”. (see Horst 1999, 170-171.) The essential claim of the theory is that human minds, at an appropriate level of abstraction, are computers. In cognitive science, the label “computational” is usually associated with specific classes of cognitive or information-processing architectures (see van Gelder 1995). The computational model is by far not the only systems theory within cognitive science:

This classic symbolic architecture is defended, for example by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), because of its claimed superiority in dealing with the systematicity, productivity, and compositionality of high-level thought. Its very specificity, however, especially in contrast with the wide variety of architectures increasingly deployed in computational practice, seems responsible for a variety of self-described “non-” or even “anti-” computational movements that have sprung up in cognitive science over the last two decades: ‘connectionist or neurally inspired architectures... shifts in emphasis from computational models to cognitive neuroscience; embodied and situated architectures that exploit various forms of environmental context dependence... so-called complex adaptive systems and models of artificial life, motivated in part by such biological phenomena as random mutation and evolutionary selection; interactive or even merely reactive robotics... (Smith 1999, 154.)

No matter the specific theory, it is safe to generalize that all cognitive theories depend on an idea that all intentional beings have some information-processing cognitive

58 For a concise history of the theory of the computer-likeness of thought see Mayer 1992.

systems, and that the understanding of these systems is necessary to understand the beings. This is true most of all in the case of humans, because of our extremely complex cognitive architecture. Especially from the point of view of anthropology and probably of some schools of psychology, it may seem that cognitive science has a problematic de-emphasis on questions of affect, context, culture and history. (see Sjöblom 2001, Shore 1999, Lightfoot 1999.) While partially true, this de-emphasis is largely provisional and mostly the result of the field's young age. When initiating a new field of study one has to learn to walk before one can fly; one has to do one's homework carefully and aim at finding elementary facts that can be empirically proved and tested. To work out the basics of mental machinery in this manner one needs minds; this pretty much rules out history. The mechanisms of affect and emotions, while most certainly the bread and butter of cognitive study, are probably the most complex and overarching processes in human cognition – not a good starting-point.⁵⁹

The apparent de-emphasis of context and culture is due much to the division of cognitive studies. To study culture one must be a scholar dedicated to cultural studies. To do this from a cognitive point of view one has to take a step beyond the traditionally understood theories and methodologies utilized in the humanities. While assuming new ideas may be slow, the disciplines of anthropology and the scientific study of religion are catching up, and as they are, the de-emphasis on context and culture is slowly starting to correct itself. (see Gardner 1987, 41-42.) One of the main reasons for combining rhetoric and cognitive science in this work is to test whether the cognitive approach can be given more contact-surface with cultural material by this combination.

The third fundamental assumption prevalent in the cognitive approach is the belief in the explanatory force of interdisciplinary studies. Interactions between scholars from different fields with their own specialized knowledge who are interested in the same matters can be tremendously enlightening. Furthermore, it is easy to see that among all possible fields of scientific study and interest the human mind clearly exceeds the boundaries. It seems nonsensical to claim that we could learn everything there is to know about the human mind through neurology or anthropology alone. (Gardner 1987, 42.) As stated before, cognitive science is not monolithic, but capable of integrating and extending other points of view. The interdisciplinary nature of cognitive science supports the idea of a 'cognitive rhetoric', as rhetorical studies are also interdisciplinary.

Finally, as mentioned, the questions eminent in any study done from the cognitive point of view are rooted in the classical philosophical problems of epistemology (Goldman 1999, 280-282). The natural world, the human mind and cultural reality are all connected and intertwined in the processes of cognitive activity. Material reality sets the stage and the basic rules for the mind, and the mind categorizes and processes information, sometimes bending the rules. Cultural reality is the external expression of cognitive activity that remains interactive with the mental processes, further moulding and embellishing them. Cognitive science aims to find out the rules and modes governing these interactions, to find out what it is to know and to act as a knowing subject.

The part of cognitive science most relevant to this work is cognitive anthropology. It can be said that the cognitive revolution was more indirect in its effect on

⁵⁹ Emotions and the cognitive theories concerning emotion are discussed further in the chapter 'Pathos'.

anthropology than on psychology and linguistics. This was because before the cognitive revolution anthropology had been less behaviouristic in its orientation than psychology and linguistics, and so the revolutionaries had less to change. However, the changes within anthropology were by no means less pervasive, and the whole agenda of anthropological study was changed with the arrival of the cognitive paradigm. In fact, by the time the cognitive revolution hit psychology, anthropology had already begun to move towards more ideational, mental, and cognitive concerns – the study of ideas, beliefs, values, and cosmologies. (D’Andrade 1995, 12; also see Ketola 1998.)

Cognitive anthropology started by studying the task originally given to ethnosemantics: mapping out the categorizing taxonomies within different cultures. To quote an example from D’Andrade (1995), it is a common belief in many Western cultures that certain things are the way they are because of some essence. Thus, tigers are said to have a certain essence which makes them tigers, which is not the same thing as the various features tigers have, like stripes, tails, whiskers, claws, etc. One can bleach the stripes, clip the tail, whiskers and claws, yet the creature still has the essential property of being a tiger. Slightly differing doctrines of essence have been propounded at different times by Aristotle, Aquinas, and various Scholastics. (D’Andrade 1995, 176.) Cognitive anthropology can be defined as a subfield of cultural anthropology, whose principal aim is to understand and describe how people in societies conceive and experience their world (Casson 1999, 120.) A principal assumption is that any given culture creates taxonomies and categorizations, and that studying these can give researchers insights into the workings of human cognition.

The principles of cognitive categorization are astutely presented by Scott Atran (1990):

Humans, let us suppose, are endowed with highly articulated cognitive faculties for “fast-mapping” the world they evolved in, and for which their minds were selected. The “automatic” taxonomic ordering of phenomenal species, like the spontaneous relational ordering of colors, would then be a likely product of one such faculty. (Atran 1990, 65.)

Humans appear to be inherently disposed to classify living kinds (for example) according to presumptions about their underlying physical natures. Cross-cultural evidence indicates that people everywhere spontaneously organize living kinds into rigidly ranked taxonomic types despite wide morphological variation among those presumed to exemplify the nature of their type. (Atran 1990, 70-71.) It will be later argued that the universal cognitive mechanisms of categorization are one element of the persuasiveness of certain rhetorical strategies. According to Brown (1999) human universals include:

...those features of culture, society, language, behavior, and psyche for which there are no known exceptions to their existence in all ethnographically or historically recorded human societies. Among the many examples are such disparate phenomena as tools, myths and legends, sex roles, social groups,

aggression, gestures, grammar, phonemes, emotions, and psychological defense mechanisms.⁶⁰

The existence of human universals has been noted from the points of view of many different disciplines. Ethology approaches human universals as species-typical behaviour, while sociobiology explains such universals as kin altruism (Marler 1999, 288-290, Dunbar 1999, 783-784). Evolutionary psychology as well as different cognitive theories such as modularity theory have given explanations where the mental architecture of humans is seen as the fundamental factor behind human universals. (Cosmides and Tooby 1999, 295-298; Brown 1999, 383.)

Some researchers of human cognition have also been interested in rhetoric. These include, for example, G. H. Elder (1999), who has created a basically neuroscientific model of rhetorical persuasion. In his book Elder outlines a complex system of neurological functions which is triggered by persuasive discourse, as well as systems that govern decision-making, motivation and schematic activation. Elder's theory, while innovative, is focused on significantly more micro-level phenomena than the theory presented here.

What has become known as 'cognitive rhetoric' stems from the tradition of cognitive linguistics. Indeed, Hamilton and Schneider (2002) go as far as to say that "going cognitive" has become a trend in literary studies and that the term 'cognitive' can in this context be seen as synonymous with 'cognitive rhetoric'. (ibid., 1.) Freeman (2002) defines cognitive linguistics in the following manner⁶¹:

...cognitive linguistics is concerned with the conceptual workings of the embodied mind, all aspects of human experience and behavior, whether from the perspective of the writer, from the perspective of the reader, or from the perspective of the text itself, are relevant and are integrated into a cognitive understanding of the literary experience. In addition, cognitive linguistics further contributes to literary studies by revealing the extent to which the imaginative powers that both create and comprehend literary works reflect the general workings of the human mind. (Freeman 2002, 1.)

One of the most prominent figures in the cognitive revolution of rhetoric has been Mark Turner, who developed an approach that combines linguistics, literary criticism, and cognitive science. Turner (1989; 1991) along with Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that metaphor, metonymy, irony, and other tropes are not linguistic distortions of literal, mental thought, but constitute basic schemes⁶² by which people conceptualize their experience and the external world (Gibbs 1999, 315). In Lakoff and Turner's terms: "metaphor allows us to understand our selves and our

60 A well researched anthropological theory of human universals might have great significance for the rhetorical theory of universal audience.

61 On cognitive linguistics see van Hoek 1999, 134-135; Fauconnier 1985; Lakoff & Johnson 1980.

62 According to "schema theories" knowledge is packed into units. These units are the schemata. Embedded in these packets of knowledge is information about how this knowledge is to be used. A schema is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts: objects, social situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. (Rumelhart 1994, 163.)

world in ways that no other modes of thought can.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989, xi). In Turner’s words:

Language and literature are suffused by the full human world of the everyday. That is their basis. This full human world, the world that comprehends language and literature, exists for us independently of any academic theory. Whether the academic theory is invented or not, whether it attains an ascendancy or vanishes, the full human world, its language and literature, abide, exactly because our grasp of this world and our operation within it depend not upon academic theories but upon a commonplace conceptual apparatus that is textured and powerful. Literature is the highest expression of our commonplace conceptual and linguistic capacities. Literary criticism touches home base, the full human world, to the extent that it sees literature as the expression of everyday capacities and helps us to understand them. (Turner 1991: 4)

So, in brief, Lakoff and Turner view figurative language and metaphor as schematic structures of cognition that people utilize to make sense of the world. Metaphoric structures help people to grasp abstract concepts that are not easy to conceptualize, such as time and love. Abstract concepts are metaphorically structured, understood, and discussed in terms of other concepts that are more concrete in experience, such as money, travel, and foods (Casson 1999, 121.) Literary criticism with a cognitive focus is for Turner the key to understand experience as mediated by textual form. In a slightly similar vein social psychologist Derek Edwards (2001) builds a theory of discursive psychology, illustrating the relation between discourse, cognition and reality. Edwards’ work deals extensively with such questions as what is the place of reality when assessing the workings of the human mind and vice versa, how do shared knowledge structures impact discourse and what is the function of emotion in rhetorical persuasion. (see Edwards 2001.)

Of particular interest in the context of this study is cognitive anthropologist Dan Sperber. Sperber’s theory is of interest to us for two main reasons. Firstly, Sperber has entered in a direct debate with the tradition of rhetorical studies from the point of view of cognitive anthropology. In his article “Rhetoric and relevance” (1990) he and Deirdre Wilson suggest that actually Rhetoric as an analytical discipline is based on a faulty understanding of relevant mental mechanisms, and as such has no actual subject of study at all:

For what this solution implies is that metaphor and irony are ordinary exploitations of basic processes of verbal communication, rather than devices based on codified departures with the ordinary use of language. Moreover metaphor and irony exploit quite different basic processes and are more closely related, the former to loose talk, the latter to a variety of echoic uses, than to one another. The very notion of a trope is better dispensed with. If so, then rhetoric has no subject matter to study, or to teach. (Sperber & Wilson 1990, 154.)

What Sperber and Wilson suggest is that rhetoricians are chasing will-o'-the-wisps with their distinctions and terms. According to him, the classical rhetorical “devices” like metaphor and the trope (figurative use of an expression) are “empty” or dysfunctional terms.⁶⁵ They suggest that the linguistic phenomena traditionally approached with these terms from the viewpoint of rhetoric be replaced with the cognitive approach, to a great extent at least. (see also Sperber 1996, 25-27; 49-54.)

Sperber is certainly right in asserting that the use of language, and thinking metaphorically or ironically, utilize the same mental machinery as regular, everyday thought. He is also right in demanding that the cognitive processes involved in the phenomena mentioned should be studied. But to acknowledge that mental mechanisms are responsible for certain matters is not to say that the level of mental functions is the only relevant level at which matters can be studied. It is possible to say that every aspect of human expression and culture could be expressed in terms of mental functions and cognition. But it does not follow that all non-cognitive terminology and studies that explore phenomena on different levels should be dismissed. What this means is that a better understanding is achieved when the level of mental functions is integrated into the study of different phenomena.

The point here is that rhetorical studies engage in the exploration of one of the same things as do cognitive studies, but on a different heuristic level. The point is not if one methodology is possible, or better or worse than another, it is what do we want to know about the subject. Studies on different heuristic levels produce different kinds of information. To say that the heuristic level of rhetorical studies is not informative enough in an explanatory sense may be a sound argument, but it requires other grounds than only to assert: “because it can be studied on another heuristic level”. Everything can be studied from many different points of view, and not all of the possible views need to focus only on mechanisms of the mind.

When Sperber and Wilson argue that rhetorical analysis has no subject of its own, because all studies of discourse are studies of rhetoric and all acts of speech are fundamentally occasions of rhetoric, different points of view must be acknowledged. While it can be justifiably said that rhetoric is an integral part of all speech, not all speech is as relevant to the study of rhetoric in the sense of persuasion or of mental mechanisms of persuasion, for that matter. In other words, a view of rhetoric that incorporates a view of the mental machinery of persuasion and becoming persuaded in analysis also proves that in the rhetorical use of speech some mental mechanisms are used in a specialized manner. This is not to say that the rhetorical use of language produces unique mechanisms of cognition, but merely that in it some mental mechanisms perform their functions in emphasized manners. And this in turn proves that cognitive rhetoric indeed has its own subject of study.

This brings us to the next point that makes Dan Sperber of interest in here. Despite his criticism of rhetoric it may be that his own theory of cognitive environment can be used to enrich the rhetorical idea of ethos. Interestingly, he invents, in a way, an answer to his own critique. Sperber and Wilson’s theory of cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 38-42.) and its relation to Aristotelian ethos will be discussed later on, in chapter “Ethos”. (see also Sperber 1996.)

Although the concepts utilized in rhetoric and in cognitive linguistics have been combined successfully, no previous study combines the ideas of Aristotelian

65 For more information concerning metaphors see, for example, Coe 1996, 438-444; Nate 2001, 493-496. For more information on tropes see Burke 1969, 503-517; D’Angelo 1992, 91-107.

invento with the cognitive theory of folk theories. Next we take a brief look at the theories of human cognitive architecture in general and the cognitive theory of universal folk theories used in this study.

3.3. A small cognitive toolbox: Domain-specificity and intuitive ontology

The main cognitive idea used in the present study is the theory of “folk theories”. In a nutshell, folk theories are domains of explanative inference that people use to make sense of the world they live in. For example, people have ways to explain the actions as well as interpret the motivations and intentions of other people. To achieve this they utilize a commonsensical apparatus of psychological knowledge. Similarly, people have theories about the physical world surrounding them – theories such as “solid objects are constant”, and so on. These theories are applied almost automatically in everyday thought: if you see a person doing something, you most probably activate some sort of an innate explanation for the activity you observe. Furthermore, if you see a physical object, say a snowball, flying, you automatically project its trajectory as well as you are able. This projection demands that you have a rudimentary theoretical grasp of the properties of physical objects and about the laws of nature that affect them. It is very difficult to attempt to explain the actions of humans and objects using the same theories, so there are different cognitive domains of causal explanation.⁶⁴

“Domain-specificity” is the term coined for this tendency in human reasoning. Put simply, the domain specificity of mental processes means that the mind is not a general, all-purpose information-processing (explanative) device, but rather a conglomeration of different, task-oriented and specified (explanative) devices. The view that thought is domain-specific contrasts with a position long dominant in psychology that humans are endowed with a general set of reasoning abilities (e. g., memory, attention, inference) that they apply to any cognitive task, regardless of specific content. For example, Jean Piaget’s (1983) theory of cognitive development is a domain-general theory, according to which a child’s thought at a given age can be characterized in terms of a single cognitive level. (Gelman 1999, 238.) The discovery of the domain-specific structure of thought has great implications for the theories of human cognition. It is also relevant to the theory of rhetoric, which also ultimately is a theory of human thinking and of the rock and sway of that thinking in the tides of persuasion and different social contexts.

There are many theories concerning the domain-specificity of mental processes. Many cognitive scientists think, for example, that the ways in which language is learned and represented are distinct from the ways in which other cognitive skills are learned and represented. (see Frazier 1999, 557-558; see also Fodor 1983.) In addition to a domain-specific language faculty, domain theories have postulated such domains as number processing, face perception, and spatial reasoning. (Gelman 1999, 238.) The views on domain-specificity usually differ not as to whether or not human thought is domain-specific but as to how specific the domains actually are. The approach supposing the most clear-cut and powerful domain-specific configuration of the mind is called modularity theory⁶⁵. According to modularity theory the mind consists of separate systems (for example the language faculty,

64 Folk theories are defined by Proffitt 1999, 577-578; Baker 1999, 319-320; Atran 1999, 317-318; Hirschfeld 1999, 579-581. The theories will be discussed later in some detail.

65 For modularity theory see, for example, Fodor 1983, Garfield 1987, Karmiloff-Smith 1992, Pinker 1994. For discussion see Marslen-Wilson, W. D., and L. K. Tyler, 1987.

visual system, facial recognition module, etc.) with their own rather specialized functions (Chomsky 1988, 161. See also Cosmides & Tooby 1995; Pinker 1997). There are several differences inside the modularity theories as well –differing views on whether modularity is restricted to perceptual processes or affects reasoning processes as well, and whether modularity is innate or constructed. (Gelman 1999, 238.)

The term “module” is used in several different ways by neuroscientists and cognitive scientists, which has led to a considerable amount of debate in interdisciplinary discussions concerning language and the brain⁶⁶. When a neuroscientist uses the word “module”, he is usually trying to underline the conclusion that the brain is structured, with cells, columns, layers and/or regions that divide the labour of information processing in a variety of ways. A definition of modularity often quoted in cognitive science comes from Jerry Fodor’s book “Modularity of Mind” (Fodor 1983). In Fodor’s theory, modules are considered to be innately specified, their processing is seen as mandatory and encapsulated, and their representational outputs are conceptualized as insensitive to revision via experience. In this sense Fodor sees modular structures as different from schematic knowledge and beliefs, since these can be revisited through experience. The structures that are accessible to experience work in unison with the encapsulated modular structures to the extent that experience provides specific inputs to modules, which yield mandatory representations of inputs. Furthermore, Fodor asserts that certain experiential inputs may be necessary to trigger the working of a given module in the first place, but the processes by which the module arrives at its representations are mandatory rather than revisable. (Fodor 1983; also see Gelman 1999, 239.)

In Fodor’s analysis, modules are seen as innately specified systems that take in sensory inputs and yield necessary representations of them. Fodor applies the logic of modules to cognitive abilities quite broadly, and it can be argued that his account of the relations between strictly modular and “communicative” knowledge structures is somewhat unclear (see Pinker 2005). The clearest examples of mental devices with a domain-specific way of handling information are the perceptual systems. Fodor excludes central logical thinking processes from domain-specificity, but even mental systems that are not domain-specific per se are, for Fodor, always dealing with representations provided by domain-specific systems in the brain. In this view it can be said that all information processing in any brain system is at least supported by domain-specific modules (see, for example, Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie 1994; Fodor 2000).

Elaborating on Fodor, several writers have argued that modularity extends to conceptual processes as well, not just perceptual ones (Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Sperber 1994. See also Fodor 2000). In these theories some innate abilities like the face recognition system in humans and other primates, echo location in bats, or fly detection in the frog can be thought of as domain-specific. Learned systems can also be domain-specific (e.g. typing, driving, ice-hockey or playing Chess). For the most part, cognitive modules are viewed like Fodor’s perceptual ones, except that:

...perceptual processes have, as input, information provided by sensory receptors, and as output, a conceptual representation categorizing

⁶⁶ See, for example Garfield 1987, Pinker 1994; 1997; 2005, Fodor 2000.

the object perceived... conceptual processes have conceptual representations both as input and as output. (Sperber 1994, 40.)

There is wide acceptance of the theory of domain-specificity in cognitive science in spite of the variety of views concerning the modularity theory. The different views on cognitive architecture are not a primary concern of this study, as the idea of folk theories utilized here can be based on different accounts of cognitive architecture.⁶⁷ In the context of this work, however, it can be said that it is quite important that the domain-specific functions of information processing extend to conceptual processes as well. To create an explanatory bridge between brain systems and persuasion as it is understood in the terms of rhetorical analysis, it is crucial to accept that conceptual processes can be thought of as domain-specific or at least as supported by modular structures, and thus susceptible to some rather mechanical cognitive rules.

This “mechanical” quality does not imply strict modularity of cognitive processes relevant for argumentation. The cognitive rules relevant to the theory of argumentation presented here are quite general in nature, meaning that, for example, when arguing about the physical world or the social world, different conceptual structures and mechanisms of inference are used automatically. These conceptual domains are affected by experience but born innately. In other words, experience changes the conceptual domains used to make sense of the physical world as well as the domains utilized to make sense of the social world, but acquiring these domains is automatic as are some core rules that govern the inferential processes inherent to the domains. So, you can learn to become better at kicking a football and you can learn to tell better jokes, but the cognitive core rules of these processes are different, and there is absolutely nothing that can be done about it. A similar “mechanical” division governs the process of arguing about things that belong to different categories of conceptual inferential rules. For further information on domains, see for example Karmiloff-Smith 1992⁶⁸.

For a theory of argumentation, domain-specific principles become relevant through the effect they have on everyday thought. Everyday thought is not totally random but has structures that have been compared to scientific theories. Everyday thought can be seen as theory-like in its resistance to counterevidence, ontological commitments, attention to domain-specific causal principles, and coherence of beliefs (Gelman 1999b, 239; see also Carey 1985; Gopnik and Wellman 1994). In other words, like modules, folk theories that are used in everyday life are also domain-specific, because they make use of domain-specific ontological

67 For readers interested in the debate on cognitive architecture: On computational theory of the mind see Horst 1995, 170-172; Pylyshyn 1984; Fodor 1987, 2000. For a good discussion on the complexity of the concept of computation see Pinker 1997; Fodor 2000; Pinker 2005. On connectionism see Ramsey 1995, 186-188; Greenwood 1991; Dennett 1991.

68 Evidence for domain-specificity comes from multiple sources. The discussions vary according to the central points of interest in various studies. The various studies on domain-specificity include, for example, variability in cognitive level across domains within a given individual at a given point (see Gelman and Baillargeon 1985), neuropsychological dissociations between domains (see Baron-Cohen 1995), innate cognitive capacities in infants (Spelke 1994), evolutionary arguments (Cosmides and Tooby 1994), coherent folk theories (Gopnik and Wellman 1994), and domain-specific performance in areas of expertise (Chase and Simon 1973.) (Gelman 1999b, 238). For critiques of domain-specificity, see Bates, Bretherton, and Snyder (1988); Elman et al. (1996). See Gelman 1999b.

assumptions. What this means in a nutshell is that folk theories produce recurring causal explanations utilizing the rules of their particular domains of reasoning.

Modules are generally assumed to be innately constrained (e.g. visual information is encoded by a certain module, which module has limited access to other types of information), biologically determined and invariant. In contrast, folk theories are thought to undergo a radical restructuring over time, and to be informed by knowledge and cultural beliefs (Gelman 1999b, 259).⁶⁹ So, domain-specific reasoning is not as restricted as (strictly understood) modular processes. Conceptual thought is different from face recognition, but even domain-specific folk theories can be understood as being supported by modular processes. This view is also very important for building connections between cognitive mechanisms and rhetorical structures. It might be said that the basic mental furniture is innate, but cultural content and persuasion can have an effect on the patterns of decoration, e.g. the order in which pieces of the mental furniture are set in different contextual circumstances. In this sense rhetoric and persuasion can be seen as suggestions that someone re-decorate, or rearrange the pieces of his mental furniture. The basic blocks of cognition are the essential element of the analysis, but the context matters as well.⁷⁰

Whatever the final outcome of research on modularity will be (e.g. how restricted the information flow between modules is, for example), it is safe to say that innate tendencies of the human mind create several automatic, or near-automatic cognitive mechanisms for categorizing information in a very specific manner. This is the essential assumption crucial to the theory developed in this study. The human tendencies to perceive and categorize in a certain manner can be called intuitive domain-specific assumptions (see Boyer 1994, 103-113; Pyysiäinen 2002). Boyer describes the workings of these assumptions in the following manner:

We spontaneously assume that the shape of particular tools is explained by their designers' intentions rather than as an accidental combination of parts... We find that it is impossible to see a tennis-ball flying without spontaneously explaining its trajectory as a result of a force originally imposed on it. If we see someone's facial expression suddenly change we immediately speculate on what may have upset or surprised them, which would be the explanation of the change we observed... It seems that our minds constantly produce such spontaneous explanations. (Boyer 2002, 19.)

Boyer continues:

Note that all these explanation-producing processes are 'choosy', for want of a better term. The mind does not go around trying to explain everything and it does not use just any information available to explain something. We don't try to decipher emotional states on the tennis-ball's surface... We do not

69 On the construal of domain-specificity, candidate domains include psychology (also known as theory of mind; Wellman 1990), physics (McCloskey, Washburn, and Felch 1983), and biology (Keil 1994); see Wellman and Gelman (1997). (For a more comprehensive listing of research concerning domain-specificity see Gelman 1999b, 259.)

70 For a view supporting the modularity of conceptual processes see Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Baron-Cohen 1995.

spontaneously assume that the animal leapt up because it was pushed by a gust of wind. (ibid. also see 112-117.)

As long as the minds to be persuaded are constructed in a certain way, any persuasive description of the states-of-things must pass the test of an inferential scrutiny in order to become convincing. Some arguments are simply more convincing than others, and there are cognitive rules with respect to the differences. This is not to say that people would, in normal circumstances, always stop and make a throughout analysis of what is being said. Quite the contrary. If a persuasive assertion goes along the lines of folk-theoretical thought, people are likely to consider the assertion plausible. If an assertion goes against what is considered folk-theoretically plausible, it must either be scrutinized or taken at the speaker's authority. Specialized knowledge can make some folk-theoretically unlikely concepts plausible. Furthermore, there are concepts that cannot become folk-theoretically plausible no matter the amount of special knowledge or scrutiny applied. Implying something that violates the intuitive inferential assumptions people have often encourages reflection (e.g. "Did he really say he walked on water to get here?"). Concepts that violate the intuitive assumptions people have are called "counter-intuitive". (Boyer 2002, 90-101.)

Next it is necessary to focus on the domains of causal explanation that are relevant in the context of this study. These folk-theoretical domains of thought can be viewed as supported by domain-specific properties of the mind in such a way as to be intrinsic and universal. It is argued here that these modes of causal explanation or 'folk theories' are the unifying principles behind many forms of human interaction, including rhetorical persuasion⁷¹.

⁷¹ This is not to say that folk-theoretical thought is the sole thing responsible for all the forms of persuasion. Rather, it is suggested that folk-theoretical cognitive tendencies affect and shape persuasive strategies.

3.4. Folk-theoretical thought

“Indeed, Aristotle could be called the first cognitive theorist of emotions...”

- Richard Lazarus

Essentialism

Essentialism is probably one of the most overarching and important inferential tendencies in intuitive, folk-theoretical thought. For example, in inferential thought concerning biology, it stands for the human tendency to think that the hidden, identity-determining aspect of an organism that remains unchanged through growth, morphological transformations, and reproduction determines the category where the phenomenon belongs (Gelman and Hirschfeld 1999, 404). According to the theory of essentialism, humans are predisposed to notice that members of a biological kind have a hidden essence that remains unchanged across outward changes such as growth and reproduction (see Atran 1990; Pinker 1994). For example, Pinker (1994) refers to this essence as what determines that “a caterpillar, chrysalis, and butterfly are in a crucial sense the same animal” (p. 422).

People can form essentialistic categories in several different ways. The three most common ways to form essentialistic categories are achieved by postulating that a group of phenomena has a sortal essence, a causal essence or an ideal essence. The sortal essence is the set of defining characteristics that all members, and only members, of a category share. For example, the essence of a grandmother would be the property of being the mother of a person’s parent (rather than the accidental or characteristic properties of wearing glasses and having gray hair (Gelman and Hirschfeld 1999, 405.)

The term ‘causal essence’ denotes the substance, power, quality, process, relationship, or entity that causes other category-typical properties to emerge and be sustained, and confers identity. Most accounts of psychological essentialism focus on causal essences (Gelman 1999, 283). Whereas the sortal essence could apply to any entity (pencils, wastebaskets and tigers are all categories for which certain properties may be “essential,” i.e., crucial for determining category membership), the causal essence applies only to entities for which inherent, hidden properties determine observable qualities:

Causal essentialism has important implications for category-based inductive inferences, judgments of constancy over time, and stereotyping. By two to three years of age, children expect category members to share nonobvious similarities, even in the face of salient perceptual dissimilarities. For example, on learning that an atypical exemplar is a member of a category (e.g., that a penguin is a bird), children and adults draw novel inferences from typical instances to the atypical member. (Gelman 1999, 283.)

The term ‘ideal essence’ refers to situations where people essentialize important abstract qualities that most often have social implications. As an example, the idea of ‘goodness’ is ideal in the sense of not having a real, absolute instantiation in the world. The essence of “goodness” is some pure, abstract quality that is imperfectly realized in real-world instances of people doing good deeds. (Gelman and Hirschfeld 1999, 406.) In the context of the material analyzed in this study an important ideal-essential quality is attached to the concept of ‘god’. The concept of an omnipotent, all-good divine being who still allows for evil things to happen is an ideal-essential concept in the sense that the postulated qualities of being omnipotent and totally good have no inferential force.

The different types of essentialistic category-attribution are utilized to construct categories and to form ways to determine the category memberships of different phenomena. It has been suggested, for example, that essentialistic attribution is an important factor behind social stereotyping and group postulation, and consequently is a factor behind prejudice and discrimination. (Yzerbyt, Judd & Corneille 2004.)⁷² Another interesting hypothesis concerning essentialism and social categorization is presented by Boyer (1994). He suggests that essentialist interpretations of social positions are exceptionally pervasive in people’s representations of religious social categories (Boyer 1994, 156). The essentialist understanding of religious social categories (prophet, priest, Cardinal, for example) has several implications concerning the causal expectations connected to these categories. Firstly, the specific causal potential attributed to the members of a category with “special” essence is strengthened. In other words, because of the attribution of “special” essence, people expect the members of the category to behave in a manner that is different from the non-members of the category, express special capabilities and so on. (Boyer 1994, 177; 2002, 328-331; see also Ketola 2002, 56-58; 149-153; Barrett 2005, 114-119; Sørensen 2005, 169-177.)

Take the Catholic religious specialists, for example. The religious specialists (priests) who have access to the sacraments (special powers) must be celibate (different behavior). There is something different in the essence of a priest (as compared to ordinary folk) that enables the Holy Spirit to function in what the priest does and says. The different essence is mediated by the apostolic succession, which goes back all the way to Jesus, the Son of God. So, in the Catholic belief system the special essence originates in a direct act of God and is later mediated by those whose essence has been altered by the Holy Spirit. The special essence exists in all who take part in the apostolic succession (and, to some extent, in all believers), but is somehow more powerfully present in Cardinals and even more powerfully present in the Pope, who is the substitute of Jesus on earth. The greater this mystical special essence is, the more power the words and the deeds of the person carry (consider a blessing by the Pope versus a blessing by a common priest). And, consequently, the more different the person’s behavior must be in relation to those who are not members of the essentialistic religious category. For example, it is not generally considered a bad thing if a Catholic priest enjoys a pint of beer at the local pub, but in the case of the Pope this would certainly rise some eyebrows. (see also Boyer 1994, 161-163.)⁷³

⁷² For an interesting study discussing essentialism in relation to the idea of genetic determinism and the relation of these to social cognition see Keller 2005.

⁷³ For a throughout discussion concerning essentialist social categories see Boyer 1994, 155-184.

The essentialist attributions function as one of the central inferential principles of 'folk theories'. The most commonly observed folk theories are naïve physics, naïve sociology, folk biology and folk psychology. It is suggested here that the human tendency to form essentialistic categories of thought carries important implications for building connections between rhetorical analysis and cognitive science.

Naive Physics

Naive physics refers to the common sense beliefs that people hold about the way the physical world works. People have several general modes of thought that orientate their spontaneous assumptions concerning the natural world. For example, solid objects tend to remain solid, not to phase in and out of existence spontaneously. Solid objects are in one place at a time; if propelled by a force they tend to follow certain trajectories, etc. (Proffitt 1999, 577.)

When observing the adult behaviour of adults, it may seem on the surface that their conceptions about how the world works are inconsistent and situation-specific. However, it can be argued that there are a few core beliefs that underlie all dynamical reasoning concerning the physical surroundings of human beings. Studies with infants have shown that, by around 2 1/2 months of age, infants can reason about the continuity and solidity of objects involved in simple events. Spelke et al. have proposed that continuity and solidity are the core principles that direct the development of people's naive physics. (Proffitt 1999, 587; see also Baillargeon 1993, Spelke et al. 1992, Spelke 1994.) Interestingly, researchers of rhetoric Fahnestock and Secor describe these natural understandings as follows:

We need a word to stand for this most basic connection between a cause and an effect. Let us use the word agency for this "touching" of cause and effect, this link between them. In a sense, agency is the smallest unit of cause. The simplest kind of agency is literal physical contact: the mother's hand touches the child's back; lightning strikes a dry tree to ignite it; a car bumps into a store window and shatters it. We intuitively understand such physical agencies of force, motion, resistance, and reaction. (And, of course, there are many other chemical and physical agencies in nature, such as light, heat, motion, and chemical reagents.) Even if we are not scientists, we have a common-sense understanding of how things work in the natural world. (Fahnestock & Secor 2005, 175.)

For example, let us assume that we are on the shore of a frozen lake. One of us wants to cross the lake but the other objects, asserting that the ice is not strong enough to carry our weight. A situation of argumentation arises and we resort to testing the ice. While testing the strength of the ice, our sensory systems bring information to the brain, and the brain integrates the information with the representative structures we have concerning this particular piece of reality. Now, it may turn out to be that the ice actually is strong enough to support us, or it may turn out to be just as weak as one of us suspected at the beginning of the argument. Now, what is extremely unlikely is that after testing and "seeing with our own eyes" how the ice cracks under the stick, we would still disagree on the status of the ice. If my friend saw the

ice breaking under the light pressure of the stick and then told me: “I told you so! It’s OK, the ice is strong enough, we can walk across the lake”, I would be stupefied. How could he possibly think like this? It would seem that his representation of the reality of the lake is something totally different from mine. It might even be said that he does not live in the same world at all. Or even while he lives in the same world in the physical sense, something in the collaboration of his mind and the states-of-things in his physical environment is totally different from mine.

As is apparent, we can easily notice situations in which people draw conclusions in an untypical manner. If the ice truly cannot sustain the light pressure from a probing stick, how could it possibly bear two grown men? Typically we take this for granted. All this “reasoning” is an automatic mechanism of the mind, the function of ‘ontological intuitive assumptions’. These ontological tendencies of the human mind set the minimal requirements any argument must fulfil in order to appear plausible.

In the context of this study the concept of naïve physics is the least important of the folk-theoretical categories. It seems that when it comes to argumentation and persuasion, the relative simplicity of physical phenomena restricts the applicability of rhetoric. This phenomenon will be discussed in some detail in the chapter “Logos”.

Folk biology

Humans everywhere classify animals and plants into species-like groups that are as obvious to a modern scientist as to a Maya Indian. The study of folk-biological thought is the cognitive study of how people classify and reason about the organic world. (Atran 1999a, 317.) The central questions asked in the study of folk biology focus on how people understand the world of plants and animals (including humans as biological beings) and the specific ways in which these understandings vary with culture, experience, or expertise. Other important questions include studying what are the modes of knowledge and mental models used in biological categorization as well as what is universal, what is not, and what are the implications of such observations for our understanding of the development of biological cognition. (Medin and Atran 1999, 1-2.) The findings tend to underline the universal nature of biological taxonomies:

The universal character of folkbiological taxonomy does not mean that folkbiological categories are culturally irrelevant. On the contrary, insofar as they reflect a cognitively biased, phenomenal appreciation of the surrounding environment, they help to set the constraints on life that make a culture possible... folkbiological taxonomies tend to be among the most stable, widely distributed, and conservative cognitive structures in any culture. (Atran 1999b, 120.)

Atran (<http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/23/>) describes four different ways of folk-biological thinking that share common ground with scientific biological classification. First, people in all cultures classify plants and animals into species-like groups that biologists generally recognize as populations of

interbreeding individuals that have adapted to an ecological niche. Atran calls the species-like groups (e.g. redwood, rye, skunk or robin), “generic species”. Generic species are usually as obvious to a modern scientist as to local folk, and share a conceptual history with a scientific explanation of the organic world in that different theories have sought to account for the apparent constancy of “common species” and for the processes of their development (evolution). (ibid., 2.)

Secondly, according to Atran, there is a recurring common sense assumption that each generic species has an underlying causal nature, or essence. This essence is perceived as being uniquely responsible for the typical appearance, behaviour and ecological preferences of the kind. The hidden essence is crucial for the organism, as it maintains the organism’s integrity even as it causes the organism to grow, change form and reproduce. (ibid., 2.) It has been argued that essentialism in human thought is an important factor behind folk-biological taxonomies, as it is in other classes of folk-theoretical thought. A crucial aspect of the way living kinds are organized and reasoned over is explicable only when an essentialist presumption is acknowledged. Adults generally construct highly articulated essentialist discourses about biological things. Children seldom if ever articulate their essentialist assumptions about living things (or other domains, for that matter), yet it has been discovered that their reasoning is imbued with essentialism. (Gelman and Hirschfeld 1999, 438.)

For an example of the essentialist quality, a tadpole and frog are in a crucial sense the same animal, although they look and behave very differently, and live in different places. The third element of folk-biological thought mentioned by Atran is that of folk taxonomy. The classification of generic species into higher- and lower-order groups is not arbitrary, but has a definite and recurring structure. The structure of these hierarchically included groups, such as white oak/oak/tree or mountain robin/robin/bird, is referred to as “folk-biological taxonomy.” (<http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/23/>, 2.) Boyer (2002) describes the taxonomical structure of living kinds as ‘templates’ and ‘concepts’. Concepts are species-specific packets of information and templates are conceptual frameworks of inferential rules that govern the reasoning concerning the concepts. Thus a skunk [concept] falls under the inferential rules of an animal [template] (46-51). This is to say that if a cat [animal] has baby cats, needs to eat, has a mind etc., then a skunk [animal] also has baby skunks, needs to eat and so on. These things need not be learned separately for each concept as long as the concepts are linked to the right template supplying the inferential framework.

As his fourth element of folk-biological thinking, Atran discusses the inferential frameworks Boyer calls templates. Folk taxonomies not only organize and summarize biological information, they also provide a powerful inductive framework for making systematic inferences about the likely distribution of organic and ecological properties among organisms. To quote Atran’s example, given the presence of a disease in robins one is “automatically” justified in thinking that the disease is more likely to be present among other bird species than among nonbird species. (<http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/23/>, 3.) In the context of this study the inferential mechanisms of biological concepts are important because in cases of argumentation concerning biological matters it should be easier to persuade people with arguments that correspond to their intuitive biological inferences than with arguments that violate these intuitions.

Research also suggests that the level of taxonomical categorization affects the inferential principles applied to the interpretation of a given situation. The taxonomical folkhierarchy can be outlined as follows (from general to specific): folk-kingdom (plant or animal), life-form categories (tree, bird), folk-generic rank (oak, robin), folk-specifics (red oak, rainbow trout) and folk-varietals (northern rainbow trout) (Coley et al. 2004, 218.) As Atran (1999b) remarks, the universal character of folkbiological taxonomy does not mean that folk-biological categories are culturally irrelevant. Insofar as the categories reflect a cognitively biased, phenomenal appreciation of the surrounding environment, they help to set the constraints on life that make a culture possible (ibid., 120). However, Coley et al. (2004) found that the general-level principles of inference are extremely dominant in reasoning concerning living kinds; much more so than in reasoning concerning objects and artefacts. (ibid. 243.) In other words, even in situations where people have specialized knowledge about specific living kinds, they tend to infer on the basis of general-level taxonomic principles.⁷⁴

The domain-specific principle behind the universal biological taxonomy is an essentialist concept, which carries an invariable presumption that the various members of each generic species share a unique underlying nature, or biological essence. This type of essential reasoning may be considered domain-specific insofar as:

...it is an intrinsic (i.e., nonartifactual) teleological agent, which physically (i.e., nonintentionally) causes the biologically relevant parts and properties of a generic species to function and cohere "for the sake of" the generic species itself. (Atran 1999a, 318.)

Folk-biological reasoning is very important in the context of this particular study. It will be later argued that the intuitive assumptions governing causal reasoning about biological matters have a tremendous effect on rhetorical persuasion concerning genetics. This is, of course, very understandable as genetic technology calls biological intuitions into question in many different ways.

Intuitive Psychology

One of the most important elements of human cognition at work in the rhetorical process that Aristotle named *inventio* is 'intuitive psychology' or 'folk psychology'. Intuitive psychology is the underlying instrument of the human ability to assess the representational and motivational states of other people. Intuitive psychology is a tendency every healthy human is born with, and it lays the basis for learning social behaviour. The tenets of intuitive psychology are clearly present in young children:

... children have rudimentary, yet precise notions concerning causality in mental events. They know that perception causes beliefs, which can cause intentions, and that these causal links are not reversible... normal adult intuitive psychology includes the assumption that a human mind stores

⁷⁴ For more information on cross-cultural comparison of folk-biological thinking see Atran & Medin 2004. See also Casagrande 2004. For information on the effect of the devolution of practical biological knowledge on folk-biological reasoning see Atran, Medin & Ross 2004.

descriptions of states of affairs that the person believes to be the case. (Boyer 1994, 109.)

Although the cognitive abilities of children are not the subject of this study, the innateness and naturalness of folk-theoretical thinking is best understood through observing the remarkable ease with which young children grasp folk-theoretical concepts. Even very young children are sensitive to behavioural expressions of mental states. Much experimental evidence supports the view that small children begin to differentiate between people and inanimate objects during the first year of life and that they develop domain-specific knowledge concerning the behaviour of human beings very early on. (Pyysiäinen 2002, 74.) Thus it can be said that even children between 2½ to 4 years of age are able to envisage the “mental stages” of other people. By the age of five, children have acquired a “representational model of mind” as their folk-psychological apparatus of understanding the behaviour of others. (Pyysiäinen 2001, 15; see also Perner 1991.)⁷⁵ The human tendency to acquire a representational understanding of “agency”, that is, that other people are intentional agents who have motivations, goals and perceptions, also contributes to the basis for evaluating rhetorical discourse.

Having folk-psychological intuitions means that generally competent humans are able to grasp the basic concept that other humans (and animals to some extent) have “minds”, that is, they have perceptions, motivations, aims, experiences and so forth. Intuitive psychology is the mental mechanism by which we postulate intentional explanations; we are certain a dog jumped because it wanted to, not because a gust of wind moved it. We know that our neighbours know something, and probably they know something we do not (and something we do not want them to know). Pascal Boyer describes the functions of intuitive psychology in the following manner:

...what we call ‘intuitive psychology’ or ‘theory of mind’ is a federation of brain structures and functions, each of which is specialized in particular tasks: detecting the presence of animate agents (which may be predators or pray); detecting what others are looking at; figuring out their goals; representing their beliefs. (Boyer 2001, 140.)

Thomas Lawson describes the cognitive tendency to postulate agency in the following manner:

Finally, and most importantly, agents have cognitive (or intentional) properties, and their behavior is informed by such properties. To attribute intentionality to an agent is more than simply attributing purposes to the candidate for agency. Purposes are non-propositional; they are not about anything. Intentions are propositional. So if the lion were capable of representing “The gazelle is good food and knows that I regard him as a possible lunch” propositionally, we

⁷⁵ For accounts on child development from the point of view of ontological categories see Gelman 2003. See also Hirschfeld 2001 for children and naïve sociology and Giles & Heyman for children and folk-psychological inferences. See also Nichols (2004) for an account of folk-psychological free will attribution and agent-causation in children.

would say that the lion is capable of having purposes with propositional content and, in fact, is attributing intentionality to the gazelle. Of course, human beings do this every day, both to themselves and to other people. They even do it to animals. People adopt what Dennett (1987) has called the intentional stance, and they attribute both to themselves and to others a “Theory of Mind” (ToM).” (Lawson 2001, 153.)

It is easily understandable that powerful mental machinery for perceiving agency and recognizing agents is very important for human cognition. Intuitive assumptions extend all the way from physical assumptions to biological and finally to psychological assumptions concerning agents. All these systems of intuitive inference form a complex network of presuppositions that people use to interpret the social world around them. Fahnstock and Secor describe the intuitive understandings concerning human sociality as follows:

What are some of these accepted agencies of human behavior? We believe that people do things to imitate one another, and that they also do things to be different from one another. We believe that people usually act to maximize their own good (as they see the good) with the least amount of effort. We also believe that people act to avoid pain... certain fundamental motives, causes, or agencies of human action are widely accepted. And these same agencies that move individuals also move groups, communities, and even nations. They too imitate, rebel, seek their benefit, and minimize pain and expense. (Fahnstock & Secor 2005, 175.)

Ostrom (1984) lists ten different intuitive psychological modes discussed in cognitive science. First, people assume that others have a sensory capacity that enables them to see, hear, smell, taste and feel as we do. Secondly, people assume that others have cognitive capacities, that they learn, think, make inferences and judgments, and that they remember. Thirdly, people assume that other people have motives, emotions, drives, goals, and a wide variety of dispositional attitudes. Fourth, people assume that cognitive and affective internal states are more important in understanding behaviour than are external factors (i.e., that people can initiate action, or have “agency” or are “causal agents”. (Ostrom 1984, 11.) Furthermore, people assume (fifth) that overt behaviour can be misleading in what it tells about the person’s internal state. The sixth proposed factor is that people assume that the meaning of an act is context-dependent. The seventh factor of intuitive psychology as presented in the literature is that people assume that other people differ in their capacity (or potential) to engage in specific acts, that is, education and physical capacities enable some people to do things others cannot do. Eighth, people assume that other people can duplicate a previous act at a later point in time and in different contexts. Ninth, people assume that other people identify one another, that others are discriminable and significant elements in the stimulus field. And the tenth and final factor: people assume that persons have a unity over time and that despite changes in outward appearance the holistic essence of each person remains unchanged. (Ostrom 1984, 11.)

For any person to be able to “present himself as a reliable person”, which is a fundamental thing in persuasive activity, that person must possess the above-mentioned assumptions concerning the mental dispositions of the agents he is attempting to persuade. For any speaker to be able to move an audience in a desired direction, the same assumptions must be present. The speaker must have an intuitive understanding of the motivations and goals of the given audience, he must represent assumptions about the things the audience probably likes and hates. The same remains true of a given audience: the above-mentioned intuitive assumptions are used to evaluate a given speaker and the quality of a given argument.⁷⁶

There is wide agreement in cognitive science concerning the existence of folk-psychological thought but several differing views on how people actually “make” the intuitive psychological inferences. The main lines of argument can be divided into two camps which can be called the ‘theory theorists’ and the ‘simulationists’. In a nutshell, the theory theory supposes that our folk-psychological practice – principally, our explanations, predictions and descriptions of the actions of others – draws upon a body of psychological knowledge, however we understand that body of knowledge to be structured.⁷⁷ (Davies & Stone 1995, 13.) In simulation theory, on the other hand, it is suggested that people do not possess structures of tacit psychological knowledge, but that they rather “simulate” the psychological states of others. In other words, to understand behaviour, people generate what Dennett (1987, 100.) calls “make believe beliefs”. People, so to speak, put themselves in somebody else’s shoes. (Davies & Stone 1995, 44.)⁷⁸

Whether the folk-psychological induction is done through implementing a tacit theory or by simulating does not change the fact that understanding this induction is of fundamental importance for understanding persuasion. In fact, persuasion theories seem to implicitly contain the same division as cognitive theory. It is a widely discussed issue whether persuasion occurs primarily through the effect of outside stimulus or through “self-persuasion”. (see Nienkamp 2001). The “theory - simulation” / “persuasion - self-persuasion” issue will be given some attention in the analysis section of the present study.

Naive Sociology

People love to pass on rumours, scheme behind each other’s backs and generally know what is going on in other people’s lives. Social behaviour is extremely important for people, and human beings have the most advanced and complex social patterns in all known species. Humans possess elaborate and articulate knowledge of the social world surrounding them. Central to this knowledge is the recognition of and reasoning about groupings of individuals that constitute the social world.

76 For a discussion on how the folk-psychological concepts of desires, beliefs, and preconditions relate to each other and how they relate to attributions of goals and actions, see Boonzaier, McClure and Sutton 2005.

77 The main suggestions for the structure of psychological knowledge are that it is structured like linguistic ability or similarly to the structure of scientific knowledge and scientific concepts. See Davies & Stone 1995; Fodor 1987; Fodor 2000.

78 For a good summary on the debate between simulation theory and theory theory see Gordon 1999, 765-766. See also Carruthers & Smith 1996; Davies & Stone 1995. For a simulationist view of folk psychology (and sociology) see Barker 2002.

The cognitive processes underlying these everyday beliefs about human groups and human group affiliation and their study are called naive sociology. (Hirschfeld 1999, 579.)

The intuitive assumptions used to make sense of the social world are much like the assumptions utilized to understand the functions of the physical world. The main difference is the infinite complexity of the social world. Two major differences between social and nonsocial knowledge are usually described, the first pertaining to the prominence of static versus labile properties. Nonsocial objects show very little change in appearance over time whereas the social world is in a constant state of flux. The second significant difference between social and nonsocial objects has to do with the forces that produce change. Most of the changes observed in nonsocial objects can be attributed to such external forces. Additionally, most of the changes recorded in social objects cannot be attributed to external forces. Thus a specialized inferential ontology is required. (Ostrom 1984, 9-10.)

Much of the study carried out concerning naïve sociology reveals the importance of domain-specific and modular mechanisms to social understandings in humans. In an infinitely complex environment, people always have to act on a basis of incomplete information. In other words, people must make quick guesses concerning the complex agents appearing in their social environment. Adaptation to any environment requires that living organisms evolve to resolve recurrent problems facing the organism. It is extremely likely that several social adaptations emerged in response to recurring social problems that ancestral human populations faced (see Baron-Cohen 1995.):

Relevant evolved adaptations include specialized mechanisms in both humans and nonhuman animals (particularly primates) such as a theory of mind; domain-specific devices for the recognition of faces, voices, and affective states; cheater detectors; and capacities for representing social dominance. (Hirschfeld 1999, 580.)

The existence of sociological folk theories in human social thinking and adaptation is extremely relevant for any theory of rhetoric and persuasion. Hirschfeld (1996) has proposed the existence of specialized knowledge structures dedicated to social group understanding. He suggests that identifying social relationships and reasoning about “natural” groupings (i.e., groups such as race and gender that stem from essentialism) depend on mental mechanisms that are unique to social reasoning. For example, it seems that very young children are unusually quite adept for their age at making abstract evaluations concerning their social environments. Hirschfeld found that children as young as 3 years of age distinguish “natural” human kinds from other ways of sorting people and attribute group membership to unique, underlying essences that are transmitted from parent to child. (Hirschfeld 1999, 581; Hirschfeld 1996.)

Group identifications and social categories are in many ways important for rhetorical persuasion. It will be later argued that natural human tendencies for making causal judgments in the social sphere of life affect rhetorical persuasion. Causal judgements concerning the social environment have a connection to argumentation concerning social issues, ethical questions, for example. Thus it can be argued that folk-theoretical inferential mechanisms play an important

role in thinking about more abstract questions, such as existential matters and moral decisions. (see Bering 2003, Nahmias et al. 2005.) As the fields of ethics and existential questions are important and much debated in human societies, they are certainly very important subjects of rhetorical analysis. Consequently, the importance of the theory of folk theories for rhetorical analysis partially depends on the possibility to interpret ethical and existential discussions in the light of folk theoretical inferences.

Counter-intuitiveness

The inferential ontologies that express themselves as folk theories are human universals, the basis of what makes it possible for humans to live in their physical and social environments (see, for example, Fiske and Taylor 1991). The principle of naïve physics, for example, gives individual representations concerning causality along with the properties of physical objects and of general physical reality an astounding similarity across cultures (Proffitt 1999). In any culture, a person who is convinced that he is able to fly and is bent on acting according to this representation that gravity has no effect on him, is recognized as extraordinary and would probably be kept in custody. In any culture a person who has a representation that solid objects are not constant, but shift in and out of existence on a random basis, and acts according to this mental structure, is perceived as having an untypical relation to his/her surroundings.

However, it seems that there is another class of ideas concerning the natural environment as well as supposed social agents that does not quite conform to the folk-theoretical intuitions. In many religions, for example, it is typical to think that certain physical features of the landscape have cognitive abilities. In religions (as well as in common ghost stories) it is often assumed that certain social agents have no physical bodies. Sometimes it can be thought by people that a disembodied agent has taken over someone else's physical body and so on. (see Boyer 2002, 60-61.)

In cognitive studies of religion "religious" beliefs, or "counter-intuitive" beliefs, have received a lot of attention. It must be stressed here that the term 'counter-intuitive' does not denote ideas that are merely strange or out of the ordinary. There are many strange ideas that have little to do with counter-intuitiveness. Likewise, some counter-intuitive ideas may seem quite commonplace to the people harbouring them. Counter-intuitive ideas are ideas in which the category-specific inferential rules associated with the ideas in typical, intuitive thought are violated. (Boyer 2002, 74-75.) The primary focus of this study is not on counter-intuitiveness but on the intuitive folk-theoretical principles of human thinking and their effect on persuasion. However, the persuasive structures utilized in the Catholic argumentation concerning cloning made it necessary to include a short description of the concept of counter-intuitiveness, since in many cases of Catholic argumentation persuasion is achieved by utilizing counter-intuitive ideas. The concept of counter-intuitiveness can be easily understood after examining the folk-theoretical inferential principles discussed in the previous pages, since folk theories describe the typical, intuitive, way of the workings of the human mind. (Pyysiäinen 2001, 19.) Counter-intuitive concepts rely on intuitive knowledge in the domains of psychology, biology, and physics, but mix and bend in a certain manner the inferential rules typically associated with the domains. (see Boyer 2002, 70-90.)

Counter-intuitive concepts can be construed in all ontological categories of thought (Boyer 2002, 74). (For the sake of recall, the categories previously discussed are natural object, artefact, plant, animal and person.) The intuitive inferential rules can be bent in two different manners: either by describing a member of a category with some essential inferential factor missing or radically changed, or by making category transfers, where important category-specific inferential features are moved from one ontological category to another. If a member of the category ‘person’ is described as having no physical body, for example, we have a counter-intuitive idea of a spirit, or a ghost, or God for that matter. If a physical situation where someone walks on water is described, an inferential property of a natural object (a body of water) is violated. Intuitively we think that persons are in physical bodies; this is the way we have learned to think since we were small children and all persons we have ever met have had bodies. (Boyer 2002, 58-105.) It is thus an automatic, universal and functional idea to associate persons with bodies. If someone tells you (or me) that his uncle went fishing, you do not need to ask “by the way, does your uncle have a body or not?” If the same person continues the tale and tells you his uncle fell from the boat while fishing, you do not need to ask “did he walk home on the surface of the lake he was fishing on?” This demonstrates how automatically we draw intuitive inferences. If the fisherman fell from his boat, we are interested whether he managed to swim to shore or get back into the boat before drowning.

Category transfers are the other mentioned way to violate intuitive ideas in a suitable manner for them to become counter-intuitive. A category transfer means that an important, category-specific inferential principle is transported into another category. For example, we know that persons have minds, which means they have perceptions, ideas, motivations and so on. That a person has a mind is an important inferential rule: it is very risky to try and take a person as if he/she would have no mind. A counter-intuitive idea brought about by category transfer is, for example, a natural object or artefact with a mind. A mountain that watches over your family and has to be kept in a good mood or the statue of Madonna that can hear prayers are good examples of category transfers. (Boyer 2002, 79-82.)

The basic inferential mechanisms folk-theoretical principles rely on are violated in a precise manner when construing religious concepts. The core assumption of the idea of counter-intuitiveness is that the basic beliefs (those concepts following the natural inference-structures) must be violated in a quite precise, optimal manner for them to become successful religious, or as Sperber would say, epidemic, representations. The optimal situation is reached when one natural, ontological knowledge-structure is combined with one entirely unfamiliar situation. A good example of the counter-intuitive optimum is the above-mentioned statue of Madonna. In the idea that a statue has perceptions, a counter-intuitive category transfer is in effect. This way of forming religious concepts seems rather universal in nature, so in Sperber’s theory it would be called an epidemic idea. So, the statue has a mind, which means it is supernatural. However, when people pray to the statue, they like to be within hearing distance of it. There are no epidemic ideas of statues that have minds and that have a counter-intuitive ability of omnipresent perception. That would be combining two counter-intuitive elements into one idea, and so it seems that universally this is too much. (Boyer 2002, 98-100.) The optimal counter-intuitiveness makes cultural representations very attention-demanding and easily memorable. This explains their recurrence and partially, their persuasive force. For a full account see Boyer 2001, 58-105; Pyysiäinen 2001.

Counter-intuitive ideas can be construed in all folk-theoretical domains, both by category transfer and by describing essential inferential principles as radically changed. Counter-intuitiveness in the domain of naive physics, for example, would take the form of physical objects behaving against the typical inferential rules they normally obey. Bodies of water carrying walking persons or substances changing into other substances spontaneously are familiar examples. Counter-intuitiveness in the domain of folk biology can be construed by presenting ideas where biological kinds spontaneously change into other biological kinds (a man into an animal, for a familiar example) or by attributing biological inferential features to, say, natural objects (a mountain with digestion). (Boyer 2002, 75-79.) What is more interesting in the context of this particular study is the essential inferential principle of biological descent. It is intuitive to think that cats give birth to kittens, but if suddenly a cat would give birth to a puppy, biological intuitions would certainly be violated. Similarly, if a biological being was not born, but made (like an artefact), inferential domain-specific intuitions would be violated. Very common and universal counter-intuitive ideas in the domain of folk psychology include such instances as ghosts (a person without a physical body), zombies (a person with the inferential rules of having a mind radically altered) and gods (a mind with radically altered capabilities). Of particular interest within this study is the essential idea of a 'soul'. It seems that the concept of the 'soul' is connected to biological and psychological intuitions that are easily violated in the process of cloning⁷⁹.

As said before, any persuasive description of states-of-things must pass the test of inferential scrutiny. This does not mean that people would, in normal circumstances, always stop and make a thorough analysis of what is being said. Folk-theoretical categorisation and intuitive inference are, in fact, so quick and automatic they usually happen tacitly, without explicit reflection.⁸⁰ In contrast, implying something that violates the intuitive inferential assumptions people have often encourages reflection (e.g. "Did he really say he walked on water to get here?"). (Boyer 2002, 90-101.) The above-mentioned 'optimal counter-intuitiveness' certainly makes ideas more attention-grabbing and there has been substantial discussion on whether such ideas are more easily remembered and transferred. (Pyysiäinen 2001, 102-109.) Be that as it may, the mere attention-grabbing quality of ideas containing counter-intuitive inferential cues has the potential to make them extremely effective rhetorical tools.⁸¹ For example, it is probable that counter-intuitive ideas can be linked to fear appeal (Pyysiäinen 2001, 135-136.), which is extensively used in Catholic rhetoric concerning cloning.

It is suggested here that, to some extent, folk theories can be combined with rhetorical analysis. Combining neurological studies and the rhetorical analysis of, say, President Bush's speech would be a far cry indeed (see for example, Fahnestock 2005). But combining knowledge of the basic functions of human cognition as a point of reflection for a rhetorical analysis of what makes President Bushes' speech seem reliable starts making much more sense. The furthest reaches of both

79 This topic will be discussed to some extent in chapter "Ensloulment".

80 For further information concerning the automaticity of intuitive inference and beliefs see, for example, Schneider 1999, 63-64; Sperber 1996, 89-97. Also see Whitehouse 2000.

81 For further accounts concerning counter-intuitiveness see Boyer 1994a, 1994b, 2001; Pyysiäinen 2001, 2002, 2004a; Ketola 2002; Franks 2005 (draft). For articles concerning empirical evidence for the concept of counter-intuitiveness see Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett 1998; Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; Pyysiäinen, Lindeman & Honkela 2003; Knight, Sousa, Barrett & Atran 2004.




Figure 2: The Rhetorical and the Cognitive

rhetorical studies and the study of the human mind are truly far apart. But the other ends of these wide families of academic pursuit actually come quite close to each other.

In the opposite ends of the above schema rhetorical studies as the teaching of public oratory has little to do with, for example, neuroscience. Neuroscience or Artificial Intelligence as such are very difficult to apply to the analysis of cultural phenomena. Both the theory of persuasion and the studies of cognitive functions (psychology, psychiatry, etc.) come a bit closer to the mark. The theory of persuasion is clearly connected to the disciplines of psychology, social psychology, anthropology and sociology.⁸² It takes all these disciplines to fully understand the multifaceted nature of persuasive interactions. Rhetorical analysis is connected to linguistics, anthropology and philosophy, disciplines that share a common history and many common interests with rhetoric. As discussed, rhetorical analysis represents what can be considered the most analytical part of the field of rhetorical studies, which incorporates a critical philosophical view of the human use of language in persuasive interactions. Cognitive science as applied to the study of culture represents the most vague and unphysiological part of the study of the human mind, which possesses unique applicability to cultural research within the cognitive field of study.

⁸² See Dillard & Pfau 2002. For a sociological approach see Simons 2001. For social cognitive approach see Wyer & Srull 1984.

The strength of the cognitive approach to the human mind and the philosophical approach to language is in their relative exactness.⁸⁵ The philosophical method ensures a certain amount of logical cohesion and the analytical tools of modern cognitive cultural studies are often built on testable hypotheses.⁸⁴ Furthermore, since the mental mechanisms of human cognition are by and large universally shared and fairly invariable in their base functions, they provide a better ground for testing than typical cultural materials. On the other hand, because of the generalness of human mental mechanisms, the applicability of the results of cognitive studies is easily impaired. It is often not easy to see how to bring the highly abstract data produced by cognitive research to bear on specific cultural phenomena. The use of the results that cognitive studies have provided may benefit from being used jointly with other disciplines that have a different contact surface with the highly variable surface layer of human cultural activity. This is one of the big challenges that a culture-analytical methodology built on cognitive science faces.

85 Turner (2001) says the cognitive approach has two advantages over most other critical theories. Firstly it is committed to data, thus it should be possible to prove it wrong, and secondly it is not monolithic, but is able to integrate insights from other theories, to take over where they left off. Integrating a primarily constructivist theory like rhetoric and “positivistic” cognitive science can give rise to many questions pertaining to the philosophical differences between “hard” and “soft” sciences. However, rationalistic (read: “positivist” to many) and constructivist points of view are not impossible to combine in cases where neither aims to be monolithic.

84 For examples of cognitive testing done on religious inferences see Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Barrett 1998; Bering 2002; Barrett, Newman & Richert 2003; Knight et al. 2004.

3.5. Aristotelian inventio – the methodological trinity

“Cognition and reality are like two sides of a coin. If we want to know about cognition, we need to take account of the world, hold reality constant, or vary it systematically, so that we can discern the workings of mind. If we want to know about reality, it is cognition and other human foibles that have to be held constant or under control.”

- Derek Edwards

3.5.1. Logos – the power of inference

We shall now take a look at the first aspect of Aristotelian inventio, logos. The section is divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the historical roots of logos, and the second with the meanings associated with logos in the New rhetoric. In the third part the relation between the concept of logos and the inferential folk-theoretical tendencies of human cognition is explored in some detail. The purpose of this section is to establish a connection between rhetorical argumentation analysis and the relevant folk-theoretical cognitive mechanisms that make given argumentative structures plausible to audiences.

The classical view of logos

In ancient Greece rhetoricians considered themselves the teachers of *orthos logos*, the way of speaking correctly. The Greek word ‘logos’ refers to language, discourse, reasoning or to those situations in the world that one might want to reason about. Later on in the history of the Greek rhetoricians, ‘logos’ refers to a discursive domain within which propositions may be asserted and discovered. Rhetorical logos might be considered the stepbrother of classical logic, and from the philosophers of ancient Greece there has been continuing discussion concerning the relationship of logic and rhetorical logos.

In particular, the philosophical school of the Sophists theorized that by studying logos one is able to understand possible relations among propositions, which enables one to create completely logical fields of argument. The Sophists conceived of logos as an independent realm of discourse, with vast power to control external reality. In the Sophists’ opinion, the things logically said about external reality were persuasive, even if the discursive realm of logos was not identical to the external reality. Thus, by creating plausible relations between propositions within a discourse, one had the power to make the world what one wanted it to be. The ancient Greeks thought that it is by the power of logos that people are made helpless before the persuasive expertise of the rhetoricians. Indeed, so was the power of persuasion perceived that it was compared with the power of drugs that make the body unable to function. (See Wells 2001, 456-458.)

The Sophists' claims of power and control through logical manipulation of causal relations utilizing rhetoric were not endorsed by all of their colleagues. Plato, for example, transported the concept of *logos* to the privacy and safety of philosophical worlds. Plato disconnected *logos* entirely from the field of rhetoric and left the practice of rhetoric as a storehouse of techniques used to persuade people this way or that, with no connection to the actual truth of matters. In this manner Plato likened *logos* to logic. Discourse concerning truth is for Plato to be the sovereign territory of philosophers putting *logos* and logic to good use. In Plato's opinion, *logos* was the only part of rhetoric that shared the ability of philosophy to approach the essential domain of certain knowledge. Seen this way, in a scientific or analytic framework rhetoric (minus *logos*) could exist only as a subject of study, unreflective and devoid of analytic power. (see Gorgias 453C2-4, Wells 2001, 457-458.)

Opposing Plato in this division, Aristotle established the place of *logos* in rhetoric and through this connection gave a place to rhetoric as a valid, analytically capable discipline. It is apparent in the writings of Aristotle that the Greeks felt great respect for and even fear of the power of the discursive world. But instead of emphasizing the power of discourse over reality through *logos* like the Sophists or artificially removing *logos* from rhetoric like Plato, Aristotle aims at stability through holism. Aristotle sees the threatening powers of persuasive discourse mainly in *ethos* and *pathos*, in their power to create appearances and stir the moods of audiences. What in Aristotle's theory controls this threat is that he assumes there must be a correspondence between the arguments presented by the orator and the accepted facts and knowledge about the world that the audience possesses. Thus the power of *logos* is constrained by reality, more so than in the cases of *ethos* and *pathos*. This can be viewed as the first point in history where the discipline's concepts take the direction of the modern rhetorical views such as the theory of the audience. (see Yoos 1996, 412; Wells 2001, 458-460.)

In Rhetoric, Aristotle establishes rhetorical studies as a discipline orientated to *logos*. He redefines *logos* as being one of the three important "artistic" modes of persuasion, thus creating the *ethos-pathos-logos* trinity. In Rhetoric, *logos* is presented as a form of artistic persuasion (separating it explicitly from the method of syllogistic induction and deduction), separate from logic, yet connected to truth or apparent truth. For Aristotle, this connection establishes rhetoric as an analytic discipline that is related to philosophy but distinct from it. The separation is apparent in the status of certainty that the methods of philosophy and rhetoric are capable of attaining:

Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. (Rhetoric, Book 1, 1356b.)

Logos as a rhetorical technique concerns situations where theoretically there might exist concrete, factual proof or even philosophical certainty, but in the given situation of argumentation such certainty cannot be reached. In philosophical argumentative structures and in some debates concerning the external world or the states-of-things as they are, it is possible to reach a form of logical or physical proof so strong that further argument is impossible. In rhetoric, logical proof is artistic in the sense that it has to be invented or artistically produced. In rational

persuasion (*logos*) the audiences use their rational judgement more than in the cases of ethical or emotional persuasion, but their assessment is still not a form of syllogistic deduction. The utilization of *logos* does not guarantee the truth, but it guarantees plausibility and probability, an approximation of truth. By *logos* one cannot approach the certainty of philosophical truths, but one can approach states in the external world that are true, or that at least can be made to seem true for a given audience. Aristotle has a great trust in the abilities of a given audience to assess the basic plausibility of arguments, which guarantees that it is easier to persuade audiences of the things that correspond with the universal understandings of what is true or probable. In a sense, the Aristotelian universal factors are much the same as the universal folk-theoretical properties of the human mind discussed earlier. In any case, rhetoric for Aristotle deals with issues that must be decided on the basis of probability when it is impossible to reach the safe haven of philosophical, syllogistic certainty. (See Wells 2001, 457-459.)

The rhetorical use of *logos* does not guarantee that argumentation corresponds with actual states-of-things in reality. For Aristotle, *logos* becomes false when something that does not belong to an object is predicated to it. False *logoi* result, for example, when the definition of a circle is attached to the term “triangle”. In a sense, every state-of-things in reality has but one proper *logos* (meaning the correct statement of the essence of the thing, or “of how the thing is”) but in another sense it can acquire many *logoi*, meaning the other true descriptions of what it may be. In other words, any *logos* is susceptible to rhetorical descriptions, for any *logos* that expresses what a thing is, may be false. (Modrak 2001, 57-58.)

In short: in different contexts, Aristotle develops a picture of the world, language and human cognitive capabilities that makes the exemplification of universal features by concrete particulars the basis for meaning and knowledge. The concrete substance is a compound of matter and form. Perceptions of the individual prompt (in human beings under favourable conditions) concepts of the compound universal (a generalized notion of the instantiated form and matter) that is the meaning of the name of the individual’s kind. (Modrak 2001, 204.)

By using the term ‘*logos*’ both in a universalizing and particularizing way, Aristotle created a suggestive picture of the connections between cognitive states and the world. The world is shared and intelligible because it is so structured as to be accessible to human minds. The accessibility depends upon the possibility of realizing in perception and thought the same structures as are found in the world. (Modrak 2001, 261.) It can be said that Aristotle creates a good starting point for connecting the theory of folk-theoretical inferential tendencies of the human mind with the theory of *inventio*.

When exercising rational appeal, the speaker tries to persuade the audience’s capabilities of reason or their understandings concerning the states-of-things. This means either drawing conclusions from some affirmative or negative statements that are held to be true or making generalizations on basis of some instances. There seems to be some type of “logic” involved, but it is not a formal one. The argumentative structures used in real-life (or virtual) rhetorical situations are not “transparent” by definition. So, to analyse argumentative structures the structures must first be brought out into the open. It will be suggested in what follows that a functional formula for achieving this can be reached by adding together the ideas of one of the most original theorists of “New rhetoric”, Stephen Toulmin, and the

concepts adopted from cognitive studies. Next we will look into the use of logos in New rhetoric generally and focus particularly on the theory of Stephen Toulmin.

Logos in the New rhetoric

In classical rhetoric, argumentation was often seen as following the lines of formal logic, yet separate from it. It can be said that in a general sense classical rhetoric still approaches argumentation in a very formal way. It is assumed that strict logical schemas underlie all argumentative structures, and that these schemas can be put into a sort of a “rational reconstruction”. (Daneš 1999, 4.) The relationship of the New rhetoric to logos has not always been so simple.

Although Aristotle emphasized the meaning of ethos and pathos, it has become clearer and clearer in modern studies of persuasion and rhetoric that things other than rationality affect what people come to think of as true. Instead of pure rationality or logic, decision-making seems to follow other rules (Hawkinson 1999, 490). For example, as will be discussed in chapter “Pathos”, emotions seem to have a central role in the process of persuasion (see Breckler 1999, 504).

It may be that this problematic relationship between rhetoric and logic, which becomes most apparent when discussing the topic of logos, has discouraged modern theorists of rhetoric from exploring the concept. Few theorists of New rhetoric dwell on the subject of logos. On one hand, rhetoricians cannot emphasize the logical structure of everyday thought because they want to underline the difference between logic and everyday argumentation. On the other, the logic of causal relations and restrictions is all too apparent, although flexible, in everyday argumentation. In the end, if everyday human thought is not restricted by any formal logic yet neither totally open to any and all arguments, it becomes problematic to state exactly what the restricting principles are.

A good example of the relative difficulty modern theorists of rhetoric seem to have with the concept of logos is provided by Ricca Edmondson. Edmondson (1984) mostly follows Aristotle in her definition of ‘logos’. First she states that ‘logos’ represents the “abstract, intellectual structure of the argument itself” (15), and later on, describes ‘logos’ as follows:

...logos is most concerned with the subject-matter of discussion. Its function is to prove some point – or to appear to prove it, since it cannot be assumed in advance that all arguments are of necessity admissible and correct (19-20).

Edmondson’s definition of logos is quite arbitrary – at least in the sense of establishing a working method for analysing the structures of logos within a given body of argumentation. First Edmondson starts with an Aristotelian definition, but when she extends or unformalizes the concept of logos it becomes somewhat vague.

A more detailed approach to what might be called logos is put forward by Perelman (1958). Perelman does not use the term ‘logos’, nor does he discuss logos in particular. However, Perelman dedicates a third of his extensive work to the discussion of argumentation about reality, which can be understood as a discussion

about rhetorical logoi. The first and central aspect that he examines is the use of the causal link in argumentation:

It is immediately apparent that the causal link must allow argumentation of three types:

- a) argumentation tending to attach two given successive events to each other by means of a causal link;
- b) argumentation tending to reveal the existence of a cause which could have determined a given event;
- c) argumentation tending to show the effect which must result from a given event. (Perelman 1958, 263.)

Perelman goes on establishing a multitude of relations and possible links between everyday thought and argumentation. Despite the extensiveness of his list he says: "Let us emphasize that we are convinced that the various types of relations we have mentioned do not exhaust the riches of living thought, and that one kind of relation shades into another" (ibid. 263). Although the notions of Perelman are undeniably sharp (as are those of Aristotle when he discusses similar relations), the problem is the relative complexity of the lists of possible links that the theorists of argumentative thought provide. As Perelman states, as comprehensive as one makes a listing of quasi-logical structures, it still is not comprehensive enough. With the tendency of "relations to shade into one another" this makes listings of argumentative structures quite useless as analytical tools. The same "cumbersomeness" discussed in his theory of argumentative fallacies by Aristotle troubles Perelman when he tries to create a theory of the logic of argumentation. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 261-350.)⁸⁵

The reason for this difficulty in devising a theory of logical argumentation is that, as Perelman says, no amount of logical rules seems enough to cover the argumentative strategies people utilize, yet there always seems to be an underlying logic (e.g. argumentative structures are perceived as argumentative structures because of a logical structure that seems to "argue" something). It is suggested here that the apparent multitude of logical rules used in everyday argumentation comes about because, actually, there are no logical rules of everyday argumentation. Rather, there are very general cognitive principles that an argument must fulfil to seem logical to a given audience. These general principles can give rise to any number of argumentative structures that seem logical in the sense of everyday thought.

The problem of formal logic, from the point of view of rhetoric, is that it is not an easily applicable method of analysis for cultural materials. The Aristotelian system of logical fallacies of argumentation is more applicable, but still quite cumbersome. The "cumbersomeness" of the Aristotelian analysis becomes clear when one tries to apply it to the analysis of persuasive text. However, it is important to note that the

⁸⁵ For further information concerning fallacies of argumentation see, for example, van Eemeren 2001, 295-301; Johnson 1996, 255-258.

“logic” of everyday thought discussed here diverges slightly from the philosophical definition of ‘logic’. The cognitive mechanisms discussed in this study do not make people “logic machines”, but rather instil structures in everyday thought that create coherence and a certain sense of “logic”. While this is not formal-logical in nature, it would be unjust to say that the everyday, working logic of human beings is totally illogical. This everyday logic includes such modes of thinking as causal reasoning (see, for example, Cheng 1999.), and deductive reasoning (see, for example, Rips 1999).⁸⁶

Formal-logical structures are by nature completely transparent; that is to say, their strict make-up and quasi-mathematical rules make it easy to distinguish between “good” and “bad” logic. Although the principles of rational appeal in rhetoric are much the same as in logic, their relative precision is by necessity much more vague. This certain vagueness extends to the analysis of texts by the method of isolating logical structures and “fallacies of deduction and induction”. It is rather unfruitful to analyse normal speech and argumentative structures using formal logic; the mathematics of syllogistic analysis just betrays the complexities and nuances people use to rationally convince each other in everyday argumentation. The rhetorical equivalent – tracking rhetorical fallacies in deductive and inductive form of appeal – also seems a bit cumbersome to become an effective tool for argumentation analysis. In order to analyse the logos of an argumentative structure, the argument should be presented in a quasi-logical form and then subjected to a thorough examination including all the possible exceptions normal language has to offer compared to formal logic. And these exceptions are numerous.

So, it can be argued that the field Aristotle named rhetorical logos has been somewhat dominated by philosophers and logicians who have devoted their attention to study the relations between language and reality, and, more recently, by cognitive psychologists and anthropologists who have studied the ways the human mind categorizes and interprets reality. Perhaps the hesitancy of rhetoricians to step in the ring where the questions of “reality”, “states-of-things” or “logic” are fought out is due to the feeling that this is an area having more to do with logic than rhetoric. Consequently, when it comes to defining ‘logos’, the border between rhetoric and logic has been disputed since the days of Aristotle. Here again, an understanding of the mental mechanisms that make the surrounding reality accessible to us might be helpful. The mechanisms may provide at least one missing piece between logic, persuasiveness, states-of-things and everyday thought. The basic mental mechanisms, in this case folk-theoretical thought, are responsible for the shared basis that makes us accept one line of argumentation as plausible and others as not credible.

In everyday interactions, people seem to infer on the basis of the interrelations between the propositions at hand, with no recourse to a complex and formal mental logic. This everyday use of “spontaneous” logic might be called something along the lines of von Wright’s “practical” or “instrumental” logic. (von Wright 2004 (1971), 96-118; see also Johnson-Laird 1983.) Even in questions dealing with the actual states-of-things in the world, the rational truth of matters is usually not the most forceful or powerful persuading factor. The most significant factor in the success of

86 It is suggested in this study that the folk theories discussed earlier form a basis for the coherent “logic-like” structure of everyday thought. For further reading on rationality see for example Evans, Over and Manktelow 1995; Mayer 1992; Manktelow and Over 1995. For an account of causality, causal explanation and formal-logical structures see von Wright 2004 (1971), 54-82.

any given argumentation is the amount of socio-cultural relevance people can find in the arguments from their own points of view (see Aldo di Luzio 1998.) In Norman Maier's view, rhetorical devices are always situated in both the social context and in the inferential context of the actual issue under argumentation, and are always functions of both (Maier 1999).

An alternative to formal logic and relativism has also been suggested in studies of logic and language: the theory of limited or partial rationality, which is based on evolutionary, anthropological, psychological and sociological data. (see Maier 1989.) Limited rationality means that in normal circumstances humans operate with incomplete information. That is to say, all the possible factors affecting any given situation are very seldom known. However, people do have "good" reasons for making decisions and forming opinions, although they are probably not able to eliminate all contradictions from their logical reasoning. Multiple elements come to bear on the practical logic utilized in the process of partial rationality: experience, reflecting on the socio-cultural context, self-reflection, etc. One of the characteristics of everyday reasoning is that it is orientated to decision-making and the achievement of goals – it is more concrete than formal-logical logic. (Evans, Over & Manktelow 1995.) Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that logical structures do exist, embedded in the intricacies of social and epistemic relations characteristic of social contexts. (Maier 1999, 193-195.) It is further suggested here that the "partial rationality behaviour" logicians study and the logos of argumentative structures can be traced back to the folk-theoretical intuitive ontologies of human cognition.

It will be suggested in what follows that the cognitive theories discussed earlier combined with Stephen Toulmin's model for argumentation analysis can help to reveal the logic of everyday argumentation.

Stephen Toulmin's geometrical analysis

In a sense, Stephen Toulmin is something of a deviant theorist in the field of New rhetoric. He comes from a background of logic and analytical philosophy (and physics, originally), and his purpose for studying argumentation is to establish a "working logic" as a scientific methodology (see Toulmin 1958, 1-10).

From the time of Aristotle logicians have found the mathematical model enticing, and a logic which modelled itself on jurisprudence rather than geometry could not hope to maintain all the mathematical elegance of their ideal. Unfortunately an idealised logic, such as the mathematical model leads to, cannot keep in serious contact with its practical application. (Toulmin 1958, 147.)

Toulmin (1958) does not refer to theorists of rhetoric (only to Aristotle, and only to his writings on logic) and does not discuss many topics that are usually important to the proponents of New rhetoric. There is no mention of 'ethos', 'pathos' or 'audience', for instance. Toulmin does not explicitly identify his study of argumentation as a study of Aristotelian 'logos', although the connection between the two is evident.

Toulmin develops a powerful tool for examining the "logical" structure of arguments. The "logic" revealed by Toulmin's analysis is not the formal, syllogistic logic of philosophers, but the "working logic" of everyday thought and argumentation. Although everyday thought and argumentation contain much variety and the structures utilized can be extremely informal, there are structures

and interrelations between the necessary parts of an argument. Toulmin, in his own way, brings forth what Aristotle named the art of “laying out arguments in such manner as to make them appear as describing plausible states-of-things”.

As has been established, there has been some debate concerning the logic of argumentation with the weight being on the illogicalness of human argumentation and thinking. But what if it was proposed that even if humans tend to be illogical and contradictory, they tend to rely on certain “logical” structures when delivering arguments? It might be argued that even if a human being in the totality of his life acted as illogically and chaotically as possible, he would still try to maintain a certain feeling of logic within a single argument or situation as a natural way of thinking and acting. In other words, even the illogical arguments must follow some kinds of rules in order to be recognizable as arguments in the first place.

Stephen Toulmin suggests in his main work concerning argumentation (*The Uses of Argument*, 1958), that the structures of an argument can be described in a geometrical form. The validity and relevance of any given argument depends on its geometrical layout and on the logical balance between its different parts. In Toulmin’s theory the structure of argumentation follows the line of Aristotle’s theory of arguments ‘minor premise, major premise, so conclusion’, but is much more complex and elaborate. It of course makes sense that if arguments are in any way structured, it should be possible to describe them in the form of patterns. The question remains whether these patterns can be heuristically beneficial, or do they stumble on their own complexity. The Aristotelian system discussed earlier tried to sort out the logical structure in common argumentation, but was rendered somewhat cumbersome in the process.

In Toulmin’s account the core structure of any argument consists of three main parts. These are the data, the warrants and the conclusion. ‘Data’ denotes the bits of situation-specific information that allow for the argument in the first place. ‘The conclusion’ means the actual claim made, and the warrants are the general rules that relate the data to the particular conclusion presented. In short, arguments are conclusions based on some data made relevant for the occasion by some general warranting factors. The basic structure of an argument according to Toulmin is presented in figure T1.

This is the basic structure of an argument in Toulmin’s theory (also see Summa 1996, 77-81). The different parts of the Toulmin model will be explored in some detail next.




Figure T1: Toulmin's geometrical analysis (Toulmin 1958, 94-100.)

The beginning and the end - Conclusion

Consider the following example of the Vatican's response to human stem cell research⁸⁷:

The principle that de facto has been introduced [stem cell harvesting], in the name of health and well-being, sanctions, in fact, a true and proper discrimination among human beings based on the measure of time of their development (thus an embryo is worth less than a fetus, and a fetus less than a child, a child less than an adult), overturning the moral imperative that imposes, instead, the greatest care and maximum respect precisely of those who are not in a condition to defend themselves and to show their intrinsic dignity. (s1064, Communique on announced cloning of human embryo in U.S. Vatican City, Nov 27, 2001).

An argument is an assertion, a claim that says something about the states-of-things in existence. An argument might be called the 'conclusion' of the inferential chain

⁸⁷ This involves a technique where human embryos are cloned and their development halted before their cells start to differentiate. Stem cells are pluripotent cells that have the potential to be "directed" to develop into specific types of cells. There are two types of stem cells. Adult stem cells are those obtained from fully developed tissue, such as bone marrow, blood, or umbilical cords. Embryonic stem cells are obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst stage and this requires the destruction of the blastocyst. Also see the section on cloning (section 2.3.).

along which the assertion has been built. In the above example, the conclusion (argument) is that stem cell harvesting creates inequality and overturns a “moral imperative” that imposes protection of the weakest. This is the evident “tip of the iceberg” of the argument above.

In most cases the inferential steps by which the final form of the argument is reached are implicit, hidden, and not readily available for scrutiny. It is not a grand discovery to say that any argument rests on the shoulders of a huge implicit structure – this is commonsensical (see, for example, Toulmin 1958, 94-145). It would be unreasonable to assume that in human communication we might at any given point communicate with absolutely explicit argumentative structures. That would mean, first of all, that both communicators should possess a complete and immediate knowledge of the states-of-things in existence. Secondly, they should have a total telepathic connection and knowledge about the view and predispositions of each other concerning the states-of-things under argumentation. So, if by necessity our argumentative assertions are only the tips of the icebergs of our inferential reasoning, how should we proceed to study the parts below the surface? Clearly there is nothing evil or devious in the fact that communicative structures are not totally transparent. This is simply the fact that we face because of our cognitive systems; human knowledge and communication is imperfect.

Whenever there is a counter-argument and someone challenges the assertions made by another person, the hidden structures of the arguments at hand are called into question. This argumentative duel is very common, everyday business, and is our social bread and butter. Human beings, being extensively social animals, literally feed on argumentation. Although the basics of argumentation are easily enough grasped by anyone, and some naturally excel in the business, the foundations are rarely understood in depth. It seems that to utilize argumentative tactics efficiently, a speaker does not need to know anything about the explicit theory of argumentation – tacit knowledge is sufficient. (see Toulmin 1958, 11-22.) However, in Stephen Toulmin’s geometrical schema it is possible to make explicit the structures that the presenters of arguments implicitly use.

Data

The Data of an argumentative structure is the basic cornerstone on which the whole argument rests. Whenever anyone claims or asserts something, they must have something to base this on. (Toulmin 1958, 97-99.) Consider again the example of the Vatican’s response to human stem cell research presented previously.

In the previous example, as Data, it is implied first that such a technique as ‘stem cell harvesting’ exists and secondly that it has been presented in the name of health and well-being. It is also pivotal for the argument to include the additional information that embryos are destroyed when stem cells are harvested. Any factual counter-argument aimed at the Data of this argument should either deny the existence of the technique or the claim that it has been presented as a benevolent medical technique. So it is easy to notice that any proponent of stem cell harvesting cannot easily attack the Data without seriously damaging his own argument.

For example, we have seen for a fact that scientists claim to have a deep knowledge of the human cellular structure and genome. Any argument proposing that in the core of human cells there exists an enormously complex sequence of

amino-acids, called DNA, which contains the guidelines for producing the proteins to build a human body, tends to be taken fairly seriously. If one was to suggest that stem cell harvesting is acceptable because stem cells are made of raspberry jelly, one would be facing a difficult time. Some suggested Data simply are more credible than others, e.g. it seems that some arguments are more easily integrated into everyday induction and deduction. In this example, folk-theoretical thought supports the essentialist idea of species-specific cores that are transmitted from generation to next and that are responsible for the manifest features of the members of the species. That the biological element responsible for the transmission is something called “DNA” seems plausible even though (and probably because of) the function of DNA is not deeply understood by the audience. The inferential assertion is accepted partially through intuitive folk-biology and partially on the authority of scientists. The claim that raspberry jelly is the crucial factor in biological procreation does not benefit from folk-theoretical intuitions or the backing of scientific authority, and thus seems very incredible from the start. Of course, there are always more or less relevant inferential data for any given argument depending on the context of the discussion. For now, let it suffice that any argument needs some data and a shared folk-theoretical inferential basis between debaters to be an argument at all.

Warrants

Sometimes in a situation where an argument arises just producing simply topic-relevant data is enough to satisfy both proponents and the argument is solved. However, usually just producing some data does not yet guarantee that both proponents consider the argument solved. When our assertions are being questioned, several different tactics of argumentation may be used. The most typical counter-argument is usually aimed at the Data of an argumentative structure. In this case the person making the counter-argument asks the straightforward question “what do you have to go on”, which challenges the data our assertions stand on. But the inferential step from the Data to our assertion can also be subjected to criticism. Now the counter-argument is not “what have you got to go on”, but “how do you get there”. (See Toulmin 1958, 13; 97-100.)

When the Data of an argumentative structure is being questioned the counter-argument is directed at the proponent’s view of the states-of-things in reality. False facts and misguided knowledge of course produce faulty arguments. But in many cases of argumentation both sides hold much the same views about the facts, or of the states-of-things that are relevant to the discussion at hand. What they do not agree on is what the legitimate steps from the Data to the conclusions are. In other words, what they disagree on are the inferential steps the Data makes legitimate. These inferential steps are often left implicit in the argumentation: they are the inferences one makes about certain facts. In Toulmin’s theory these inferential assertions are called ‘Warrants’. (Toulmin 1958, 97-100.)

The human universals of cognitive categorization and folk-theoretical inference can be seen as making certain legitimizing causal steps quite universal and self-evident. For instance, if we both know for a fact that my hair is black, the data lets us draw the self-evident argument “Mr. Niemelä’s hair is black”. This is because of a very basic cognitive system of categorization, which tells us that if something is black, it is not red, blue or yellow at the same time. Complex knowledge is

categorized in the same way: although many of us do not have a very deep understanding of human DNA, we certainly think that the claim “it’s made of amino acids” and “it’s made of raspberry jelly” are not compatible. The human cognition tends to categorize things in a way that “if it’s that, it’s not that other thing at the same time” (see, for example Medin & Aquilar 1999).

The shared cognitive rules concerning categorization form the basis for any successful communication or comparison between the views of different persons. These shared rules create a massive, universal and extensive similarity of views that in the end is necessary for instances of difference to be possible in the first place. If there wasn’t a massive basic agreement, we would never notice any differences. This massive agreement springs forth, at least partially, from the shared cognitive tendencies. Disagreements and arguments become possible when the proponents are in a massive agreement but disagree on small details within the massive agreement. This is what happens when determining whether a step from some given data justifies a certain conclusion. In any argument, in any reasoning, warranting structures of some kind are in use. Without these inferential, everyday-logical steps, it would be impossible to subject arguments to rational assessment (Toulmin 1958, 100).

In the above example of Catholic argumentation the leap from the claimed benevolence of stem cell harvesting (Data) to the conclusion that it is morally offending and creates inequality (Conclusion) is warranted by an intuitive inferential understanding of what harvesting would mean in relation to the view concerning human fetal development: “thus an embryo is worth less than a fetus, and a fetus less than a child, a child less than an adult”. If embryos in different stages of development are seen as “worthy” as adults, the technique of harvesting stem cells by destroying embryos can be seen as degrading. The argument where the essential qualities of “being human” are associated with a very early embryo probably gain credibility from folk-biological intuition where the individuals of a species are perceived as having an “essential core”. This feature of folk-biological intuitive inference will be discussed in more detail later in the analysis.

In Toulmin’s geometrical analysis the Vatican’s argument against stem cell research that has been used as example would appear as in figure T2. If anyone wishes to challenge the argument, he must challenge the Warrant. This is only the core structure of Toulmin’s diagram, which has more elements, but since the aim is to discover the general patterns of arguments and not to analyse situation-specific arguments, only one additional part will be included: the Backing⁸⁸.

88 Arguments concerning specific situations and occasions seldom aim for explicit universality. That is to say, although the warrants of a specific argument may propose universality, the situation at hand may require some limiting of our claim’s universal force. This is done by adding a modal qualifier (Q) and some conditions of rebuttal (R) to the structure of the argument. The modal qualifier suggests the extent that the universal warrants apply to the specific situation at hand. Qualifiers are simple expressions of the relative level of doubt that particular situations may cast on the universal validity of any given argument. The qualifiers take the form of ‘unless’, ‘presumably’ and ‘or’, for example. The conditions of rebuttal (R) are pieces of situation-specific data, that if given, will affect the relevancy of the data our argument stands on. The final piece of the structure is Backing (B), which states the conditions upon which certain Warrants are plausible in a given situation of argumentation.




Figure T2: Vatican on stem cell research.

Usually it will be necessary to defend the warrants of an argument in a general sense. All our warrants, be they fully self-evident, can be challenged. When the general validity of a warranting structure is being put to the test, it requires some backing (B) to retain its warranting force. In the current case of the critique of stem cell research the warrant was an assumption that all should agree to the idea that the value attributions concerning an embryo are not dependent on the developmental stage of the embryo. However, this warranting assertion can be challenged. For instance, the challenger can imply that before the cells of an embryo start to differentiate, it is not a human being. The merits of the warranting structure are therefore dependent on the Backing, in this case supplied by the Catholic tradition (presented on next page in figure T3).

Here we have a rather thoroughly established Catholic argument on the degrading nature of stem cell research. It is easy to notice that the Backing (B) affects whether or not the argument rings true with the chosen audience. If the shared cognitive environment they entertain is completely different concerning the view of human embryonic development, the different ethical disposition decreases the appeal of the warrants upon which the argument stands.

Clearing out the iceberg below the surface of an argumentative structure will help make transparent the whole inferential systems of thought on which the arguments stand. This again will help to make the arguments easier to analyse by clearly showing the central inferential relations suggested within the argumentative structure. When the suggested inferential relationships within the argument are clear, it is also easier to see the further implications of arguing in a certain way.




Figure T3: Vatican on stem cell research with backing

This, in turn, makes locating the arguments in the field of genetic discussion more informative.

Cognitive aspects of logos

The connection between the mental structures termed folk-theoretical cognitive mechanisms and mind-independent reality is already very apparent in the theories of the philosophers of ancient Greece, Aristotle in particular. In other words, theorists of human thinking have often postulated different kinds of relationships between the human mind and the world outside it. There has been a good deal of variation, however, with respect to how direct this relationship has been perceived to be. Aristotle states that the physical realizations of certain structures determine the nature of mind-independent reality. The structures having physical realizations are cognitively accessible. Because the human mind is such that it is affected by the external logos presented in perception, the logos that is grasped at the end of the inductive process is the actual essence of the state-of-things in question. So there is a possibility, through the information obtained via the senses, that the logos grasped in thought is the same as is emergent in the actual substance under scrutiny (Modrak 2001, 176-177.)

We seem to intuitively hold certain factual claims and inferential assertions as more plausible than others. In other words, some claims are more in line with our mental representations concerning things than others. The folk-theoretical inferential assumptions discussed earlier put their mark on how we perceive ourselves as well as our surroundings. Consequently, all folk-theoretical spheres

of inference can be seen as very important in the process of logos, or in assessing the inferential plausibility of claims, as it can be defined. As discussed earlier, naïve physics, for example, directs our understandings concerning the causalities and properties of physical objects:

For instance, the principles of continuity (objects move in continuous paths) and solidity (objects do not coincide in space) seem to be present in children as young as four months... Other principles, for example, that unsupported objects go downward and that objects that meet no obstacles continue to move appear later (around six months)... (Boyer 1994, 105.)

Folk biology is another aspect of intuitive assumptions where the inferential relations of concepts are quite straightforward. The division of the world between unintentional and intentional instances is a fundamentally important inferential human universal. The causal inferences of physical objects and biological creatures, called ‘living kinds’ are presented as follows by Boyer:

Another domain that seems structured by specific principles is that of living kinds. Important distinctions between expectations concerning living beings as opposed to artefacts, and animate as opposed to inanimate objects, are present from an early age... the implicit ontological category living kind carries quasi-theoretical assumptions about the underlying causal structure that makes animals different from, for instance, artefacts. (Boyer 1994, 106.)

As previously discussed, the human mind has an inherent tendency to categorize and form taxonomies, as well as to utilize different types of inferential reasoning in different categories of representations. Folk biology and naïve physics are very natural tendencies – they are properties of cognition that result from the domain-specificity of the mind as discussed earlier. In every human society and culture, people create taxonomies of the living kinds around them. (Pyysiäinen 2001, 199; see Atran 1998, 547-549.) The categories are formed around assumptions of underlying causal natures, or essences, shared by the respective members of the categories (Pyysiäinen 2001, 200). It can be assumed that the tendency to form certain types of causal explanations makes certain arguments more plausible than others: explanations and arguments that follow the pattern of our folk-theoretical cognitive tendencies are more readily believable⁸⁹.

For instance, if someone tries to tell you “the bus is not coming this way”, but at the same time you can visibly perceive the bus speeding dangerously close, you are greatly tempted to trust your perceptions over the argumentation of your friend. If your friend is standing with his back towards the bus, your intuitive folk-psychological abilities inform you that the perception of your friend is, in this case, false, and his argument is not to be considered valid. Similarly, if someone tries to convince you that “the ice on the lake is very strong, let’s take a shortcut across it!”

⁸⁹ It should be noted that the more easily believable arguments and explanations are not necessarily the most interesting ones. This again brings us to the concept of counter-intuitiveness utilized in the cognitive study of religion. The attention-grasping quality and memory effect that counter-intuitive ideas have, arguably make them very good rhetorical tools.

but just five minutes ago you observed someone falling through the ice, you are likely to discard your friend's argument as unsound.

The examples of the speeding bus and the frozen lake give a simplified picture of arguing about states-of-things in cases where intuitive domain-specific assumptions form a great deal of an argument's credibility. They give an accurate but simplified view of the normal human inferential tendency or everyday reasoning. The basic ontologies of inference are always present in thinking, and indeed form the basis of understanding causal relations between phenomena. But the frozen lake is simple and easily testable. The ice will either hold us or not, period. The question of genetics is complex. There is no simple way of testing the ice of this new technology, and so the argument stands open to countless argumentative tactics. It doesn't help that when arguing about complex issues people can choose different frameworks for their inductive principles, as discussed before.

When arguing about complex issues there is no way of telling which form of intuitive reasoning a given person may choose. The folk-theoretical intuitions do not offer ready answers to complex issues, rather they become tools for argumentation. They may be used, as happens in the Catholic cloning argumentation, to back up arguments that arise from cultural models (or the rules of a discourse community)⁹⁰ that support a framework of counter-intuitive thinking. It is thus impossible to tell what will be the "good" or "right" way of intuitive reasoning concerning any given complex topic. People might reason logically or they might think in the completely opposite manner. What is essential, however, is that people will pick a framework of inferential rules to think and argue by, and the more universal the framework, the more universally appealing the argument. By analysing argumentative structures in Toulmin's schema it may be possible to outline the modes of intuitive reasoning that are in effect within the argumentative structure. Furthermore, it may be possible to discern which folk-theoretical principles are in effect and how the inferential folk-theoretical rules are implemented within the argumentative structures.

Earlier on, Ricca Edmondson defined *logos* as the part of the argumentative structure which is "...most concerned with the subject-matter of discussion. Its function is to prove some point – or to appear to prove it...". (Edmondson 1984, 19-20.) The general definition of *logos* seems to be that it is something that is concerned with "the actual content of the argument". However, in the sense of persuasion, this is not saying anything else than "people are persuaded by the actual contents of the argument". That is not saying much. It is suggested here that the concept of *logos* should rather be associated with the natural ability of human beings to make estimations concerning the inferential relations within argumentative structures. This inferential uniformity (consubstantiality, if you will) is, at least partially, a result of their built-in systems of inference. What makes persuasion and affecting the views of other people possible is that the speakers, being part of humanity and sharing the same cognitive capacities, have intuitive knowledge of these shared systems of inferential thought.⁹¹

The collaboration of the mental mechanisms that make the processes of persuasion and becoming convinced possible can probably be revealed by examining the interaction between the different parts of an argument. Toulmin's schema by itself would go a long way in illustrating the inferential cognitive

⁹⁰ The concept of 'discourse community' will be discussed in the chapter "Ethos".

⁹¹ See, for example, Fiske 1993; Hirschfeld 1999; Baker 1999. Also see section 3.4.




Figure 3: the intuitive ontology of an argumentative structure

principles inherent in argumentative structures. However, to make the cognitive analysis of argumentative structures clearer, the additional element of ‘intuitive ontology’ is added to the schema above.

The intuitive ontology at the centre of the argumentative structure underlines the folk-theoretical mechanisms that are integral to the “logic” of the structure. The inferential connections that are established between Backing, Warrants, Data and finally the Conclusion are drawn by utilizing intuitive causal thinking. In a sense this is self-evident, but the actual effects that intuitive ontology have on the structures of argumentation and ultimately on the persuasiveness of arguments are not self-evidently apparent.

The problematic relation between logic and rhetorical *logos* has made the use of *logos* complicated and has even led some to a form of relativism in their studies of rhetoric and argumentation. Both the view that people think like logic machines and the view that there is no “everyday logic” are incomplete. Even if the normal argumentative process is not governed by the rules of formal logic, there certainly are constraints and patterns that recur in all argumentation. As stated before, without shared implicit rules there would not be any agreement or disagreement, no comparison or distinction, only chaos. It is suggested here that intuitive reasoning, namely domain-specific thought and folk theories, contains some implicit rules that make persuasion and argumentation in general possible. Folk-theoretical structures may prove to be important for communication and argumentation; it may even be that without them the intended arguments would not register as arguments for the listeners in the first place. However, no matter how important *logos* and the structure inherent in argumentative assertions may be, they are not the only things that make persuasion and argumentation possible and effective. In the next

section we look at the second aspect of Aristotelian *inventio*, namely *pathos*, and the modern developments concerning this concept.

3.5.2. Pathos – the appeal of emotion

Here we consider the emotional side of swaying the opinions of audiences. In the first two parts of this section the historical roots of the rhetorical theory of emotions are briefly examined, both in classical rhetoric and the New rhetoric. In the third part the rhetorical theories of emotional persuasion are combined with a cognitive view of emotion. The purpose is to discuss rhetorical theories of emotional persuasion in relation to some psychological and cognitive theories of emotion. A central issue is to make the idea of emotional persuasion more concrete. In other words, the point is to make elements of emotional persuasion more easily recognizable and easier to analyse within argumentative structures.

The classical view of pathos

Of all the basic concepts of rhetorical studies, the idea of *pathos*, emotional persuasion, has occasioned the greatest amount of controversy. The term has been used in many different senses throughout the centuries, starting before the time of the great theoreticians of rhetoric, Plato and Aristotle. For some writers *pathos* is a negative term, denoting the instances where the minds of audiences are fogged and rationality superseded thus preventing correct decisions from being made. For others, the study of *pathos* can be seen as the cornerstone of rhetorical studies, indeed as the key to understanding the broader relations between the human mind, perception and argumentation. (Green 2001, 555.)

The consensus around the use of the term ‘*pathos*’ can be best described as a loose amalgam of contradictory interpretations. However, one central question emerges as constitutive in this crossfire. Since Aristotle, it can be said that all the writers on rhetoric share roughly the same idea of the interrelations between *pathos* and *logos*: people are moved to *pathos* through *logos* (Green 2001, 568). In modern rhetoric as well, emotional appeal has been regarded as an attempt to sway the opinions of audiences by presenting data in such a way as to affect their emotions and passions rather than their reason. In classical rhetoric the most extensive analysis of *pathos* is provided by Aristotle. In his works *De Anima*, *Nichomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric* he looks at *pathos* from the viewpoints of the general psychological make-up of human beings, the problematic of happiness and the technique of public argumentation. For Aristotle, *pathos* is particularly useful in the process of juridical, forensic rhetoric, where men pass judgement on the basis of their feelings concerning the problem at hand. (Green 2001, 559.) The same use of *pathos* in juridical proceedings was apparent in the Roman Empire, where the attempts to create emotional response often reached comic proportions (see, for example *De Oratore* 1.53, 2.47; *Institutio Oratoria* 6.1.40 sq.).⁹² However,

⁹² Very interesting in this respect are the outrageous talk shows and reality television of our times. The blatant exhibition of tasteless material seems to have lost none of its appeal.

the similarities between Aristotelian pathos and the juridical plays of the Romans end on the surface.

Aristotle sees pathos in accordance to the budding psychology of his day.⁹⁵ In *Rhetoric* he discusses pathos in two ways, and the idea of the importance of pathos in stirring an audience to action is relevant to both. First, pathos can be seen in the sudden and perceptible movements of the soul as it returns to its natural state or is moved away from it. The return is felt as pleasure, the leaving as pain (*Rhetoric* 1.11). These pleasant and painful states of the soul can lead men to act in a number of ways, and thus a skilled orator can hold a frightening sway over an audience. The psychology of the ancient Greeks has a distinct behaviouristic quality; the pleasure and the pain manifest in the process of pathos can trigger such behaviour as the orator wishes. It can lead men to do deeds both vile and noble (*Rhetoric* 1. 10-12) or sway their judgement of the actions of others (*Rhetoric* 2.2-12). (see Green 2001, 557-558.) The second important way pathos can be used is described by Aristotle as follows:

Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. (*Rhetoric*, Book 1, 1356b.)

Aristotle's account of emotions focuses on what people feel as "pleasant". To feel pleasure, men may resort to wrongdoing, wrong thinking and so on. Aristotle's concept of pathos as a force of the movement of the soul focuses on the social concepts of behaviour, e.g. in his account of different situations of wrongdoing, the majority centres on wrongs committed against other people. (see *Rhetoric*, Book 1, 1371a-1375a.) In his work on emotions, Aristotle attempts to classify different situations and certain forms of emotional responses and their causes: different situations, attitudes and personality traits that cause people to feel certain emotions. Aristotle considered emotion to be an entity in and of itself, and it is this very entity that causes men to act when provoked rhetorically (Levinson 1999).

The analytical touch of Aristotle in the study of pathos was lost for more than a millennia, only to surface on the tides of the confessional debate in the seventeenth century. The insights of Philippus Melanchton (1497-1560) serve as a good example:

Acoustic and visual sense impressions are converted into physical wave patterns within the nerves and travel to the brain, where they are combined with perceptions language, memories of particular experiences, and universal understandings implanted by God. These new wave patterns then travel to the heart, the seat of the soul where God has implanted love of good and hatred of evil. These new waves beat against the heart, causing it to swell or contract as it senses injury or welfare, and so pour a spiritus into the blood vessels leading to the muscles. (Green 2001, 565.)

⁹⁵ Lazarus (1991) writes that Aristotle practically invented folk psychology (Lazarus 1991, 14-15).

The tendency to think that emotions are entities in themselves, and powerful ones at that, is as apparent in Melanchton as in Aristotle. Since resurfacing from medieval darkness the concept of emotion has been debated in countless philosophical discussions. Modern rhetoric is not an exception. Next we examine the stances vis-à-vis emotion and emotional persuasion that theorists of modern rhetoric have adopted.

Pathos in the New rhetoric

In Aristotelian *inventio* the elements of *ethos* are always associated with a view of a constructed knowledge of what might be held as proper, worthy of pursuing or noble within a given group of listeners⁹⁴. Similarly, the ways of rational appeal, or *logos*, are always seen as dependant on some constructed systems of fact. Both of these systems affecting the credibility of argumentative structures are relatively easy to bring into the open. With emotional appeal it is different. Elements of emotional appeal or argumentative structures intended to rouse emotions appear to be inherently embedded in both *logos* and *ethos*. This is why the ways of presenting data and creating estimations of different aspects of common *ethos* are much easier to see as structures within systems of argumentation. It is also why *pathos*, especially in written argumentation, appears as ancillary to *logos* and *ethos*. This is, however, not to say that it is any less important or effective.

The ancillary or interrelated nature of emotional persuasion has been noted by the theorists of modern rhetoric. This is particularly clear in the theory of Perelman, who sees emotive factors of persuasion as directly linked to the context of argumentation. Perelman discusses the emotive elements of notions as follows:

What has been called the “emotive meaning” of notions is a component that the theoretician concerned with registering the complexity of the effects of language is obliged to introduce when he wishes to correct, subsequently, the idea that the meaning of notions is essentially descriptive, that is, when they have been envisaged in a static manner. But if the meaning is viewed dynamically, in terms of the uses of the notion in argumentation, it will be seen that the field of application of the notion varies according to these uses and that the plasticity of notions is related to them. (Perelman 1958, 140.)

The use of labelling notions is related to both the abstractness of the applied notions (*ibid.* 147.) and the context of the notions that form, in Perelman’s words, the “word-families” of those present (*ibid.* 149-150). Other than underlining the complexity of emotive elements, Perelman notes that emotional display can benefit a speaker by instilling in him an air of sincerity (*ibid.* 456-457).

Perelman suggests that the elements of emotional persuasion are first and foremost relevant for a certain audience that shares knowledge concerning “word-families” and their proper meanings. In other words, emotive cues are, for Perelman, a function of notions that become emotive for audiences sharing certain inferential understandings. This is interesting in the sense that although Perelman does

94 Ethos will be discussed in the next chapter.

not discuss universal emotions, they seem to be crucial to his idea of a universal audience. It seems that the suggested dynamic nature of the notions can be true for universal audiences only if there are emotional cues that can be expressed and understood universally. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 149-154.)

The factors of emotion Perelman discusses seem connected with the cognitive elements suggested in this study. The shared “word-families” that form the emotional context for the use of emotionally charged notions can be seen as a surface element of the “mutually manifest cognitive environment”⁹⁵, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter “Ethos”. Particularly for Perelman, pathos and ethos are very strongly intertwined in the sense of emotional persuasion. If an audience is already positively disposed towards a speaker because it knows, for example, that it shares an agenda, it can be assumed that the audience is more open to the emotional cues given by the speaker.

The interconnectedness of pathos and ethos is also apparent in other theorists of modern rhetoric. Edmondson (1984) calls pathos “sensitisation’, putting the audience into certain frame of mind” (ibid, 17). She continues by saying that “The function of sensitisation is to create conditions in which the hearer’s personal faculties function to promote rather than to inhibit appreciation of what is being said” (ibid, 19). Further on, she makes a surprising distinction between emotional responses and cognitive phenomena:

Sensitisation, then, directly concerns the interconnections between cognitive and non-cognitive responses to arguing; it is that aspect of communication which deals with the hearer’s or reader’s reception of what is said, and treats this as performed by the person as a whole. (Edmondson 1984, 19, emphasis added.)

Edmondson makes a somewhat dubious claim that emotional responses are not wholly cognitive, but rather something non-cognitive that is “interconnected” with something else that is cognitive (a position similar to that upheld by the Behaviourist school of psychology in the early 1900s). She also gives no clue as to how to apply this “reception performed as a whole” as a method of analysing the techniques of pathos within spoken or written persuasive discourse. Furthermore, it is difficult to tell what difference there is between Edmondson’s use of ‘ethos’ (self-presentation, 16.) and ‘pathos’, since the speaker’s self-presentation of course also aims “to create conditions in which the hearer’s personal faculties function to promote rather than to inhibit appreciation of what is being said...” (ibid., 19). In the end, the biggest difference Edmondson postulates between the concepts of ‘ethos’ and ‘pathos’ is that ethos is most concerned with the character of the speaker and pathos with the listener. This division is incompatible with the social and psychological mechanisms discussed earlier. Pathos must be associated equally with the speaker and with the audience, in the sense that the speaker supplies the emotional cues and the audience interprets them.

Another theorist of modern rhetoric, Michael Billig (1984), does not discuss pathos explicitly but does offer some interesting views on emotional elements

95 The concept is somewhat similar to the concept of “discourse communities”. Within given social groups certain forms of discourse can be seen as emotionally charged, while they might not be so emotionally significant to other groups. A good example of this is religious language.

of persuasion. He is an unusual theorist of rhetoric in that he utilizes a number of psychological theories of persuasion, like the theory of central and peripheral brain routes of information processing⁹⁶. However, he remains sceptical of the real analytical value these different ways of processing information might have:

Fundamentally, there is little new in this synthesis of the contrary tendencies in previous research... The practical orator still has no firm rules, but must pay attention to the competing demands of two voices of experience: one whispers seductively that people can be fooled and the other warns that the audience can argue back. (Billig 1984, 78-79.)

Billig is certainly correct in his assessment in the sense that the discovery of different mental mechanisms of persuasion does not remove the problem of heterogeneous audiences, which have a multitude of orientations, motivations and attention spans. What is surprising, however, is that Billig focuses his attention on the practical orator, not on the analyst who studies the means of persuasion. Texts and speeches can be analyzed for elements that aim to activate either central or peripheral brain routes. In fact, this is very significant if pathos is to be understood as an analytical category that is compatible with the findings of modern cognitive psychology. The brain routes and their effect on persuasion will be discussed in more depth shortly.

The emotional element is embedded deep within every act of rhetorical persuasion and argumentation. It does not, however, exist independently of the logos and ethos that are utilized to make arguments convincing. The emotional element is somewhat elusive to analysis. The emotional value of a given utterance could be defined as the complex of emotions associated with it, in the given situation of communication, by both the speaker and the receiver (Daneš 1999, 6). In rhetorical appeals the speaker may try to evoke a certain emotional response from an audience. However, in this case the orator is using methods of ethos or logos to appeal to his listeners and the emotional responses emerge in the audience as either positive or negative reactions to this effort. Consider the following example:

In China, where a repressive government has tried to make its people almost insensible to the ugliness of immorality, scientists forge ahead, creating cloned embryos by combining human DNA and rabbit eggs and then killing them for their stem cells. We can't help but look on this with horror, while cloning proponents wish we would just look away. (s2026, Cathleen Cleaver, Director for Planning and Information at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

Here the speaker aims, in three different ways, to emote his audience. The primary emotive function is to cause fear or abhorrence of the methods the speaker claims are already in use in the genetic industry. The secondary emotive function is realized when the speaker expresses her own horror and gives the audience a clear emotive cue – an example of how it is proper to feel concerning the matters

⁹⁶ The central and peripheral brain routes and their effect on persuasion will be discussed under the cognitive aspects of ethos and pathos.

presented. The third and not so self-evident emotive function is to create feelings of contempt and detestation towards the repressive government of China and towards the cloning proponents who accept the horrid actions of this “monster government”. The speaker utilizes the assumed prejudices her audience has of a foreign culture to inspire fear and negative emotional content towards cloning by drawing on negative sentiment the audience already holds towards China. It is quite apparent that the speaker’s assumed audience is not Chinese. The particular style is used in emotional persuasion often, and is called ‘fear appeal’:

Fear appeals have been another long-standing focus of research interest in persuasion. A fear appeal is a message designed to arouse a sense of threat in the audience, in the hope of motivating acceptance of the communication’s recommended course of action, which is aimed at alleviating or avoiding fear. (O’Keefe 1996, 575.)

The emotional responses of the potential audiences vary when they respond to logos or ethos in persuasive discourses. It is arguable that producing an emotional response from a given audience purely by stimulating their emotions is impossible. The assumption held already by Aristotle that people are moved to pathos through logos (see Wells 2001) seems all the more credible in the light of modern psychology. This would mean that in persuasion pathos is something ancillary. This does not suggest that emotions are not powerful or potentially crucial for persuasion. What this suggests is that emotional persuasion cannot exist by itself, nor can emotions become persuasive or argumentative without additional information attached. Emotions, or rather transmitting emotional cues from speaker to audience, require information, be it logos or ethos in nature. In this sense emotional cues in argumentative structures might be called symbiotic, or viewed as embedded in other information. On the other hand, emotional persuasion somehow detaches the audience from the inferential relations being claimed within a given argument, forming a sort of “smoke screen” in between the audience and the factual content of the claim in progress:

Persuasion apart from argument is effected through the audience when the speech arouses emotions in the audience that affect its judgments... It is somewhat as in dreams, in which the dreamwork distorts the way things appear, but cannot distort the emotions, which are always real and appropriate to the underlying thought. And because the emotions are real, they have propulsive force. The speaker invents the emotion in the sense of bringing it into existence, and the emotion is inventive in the sense of bringing what is thought by the audience into conformity with its demands. (Watson 2001, 394.)

Even if the ways of manipulating human emotion are diverse and difficult to put under the magnifying glass, they can be made more transparent by analysing the argumentation. One can probably imagine arguments that are just factual text, almost purely rational in their makeup. Reports on results in the natural sciences and statistical calculations are an example of arguments with very little if no

emotional appeal. One can probably also imagine someone quite unemotionally stating facts about proper behaviour and, for example, codes of etiquette. It is much more difficult to imagine a purely emotional appeal without some rational or ethical meaning attached to it. If you witnessed something like this, it would not appear to you as a case of communicated information that says something about something else; it would seem like a random outburst of emotion.

This kind of random outburst of emotion can be made sensible by associating it with some elements of the environment. But in this case the argument (so to speak) has already moved on to the side of *logos*; the additional elements that rouse the emotional reaction have become the actual information carried by the event, and the emotional display has become something underlining the data, something that stands in relation to the information. The elements that emotional persuasion and reaction attach to can be both inferential assertions (*logos*) and/or things that have to do with the authority and self-presentation of the speaker (*ethos*). In both cases the emotional persuasion and display as well as emotional reaction only underline, give additional meaning to, and point towards, a certain stance the proponent of the emotional persuasion wishes others to adopt.

What can be concluded from the theorists of modern rhetoric is that emotion is interwoven into acts of persuasion, but the interpretation of emotive cues is dependant on a shared understanding of what the emotional impression is meant to underline. This shared understanding of meanings will be called in the next chapter, “*Ethos*”, a ‘mutually manifest cognitive environment’ (Sperber 1995; see also Sperber 1996, 101-108). The emotive cues in any given argument must have some contextual factors that are mutually manifest to the audience in question – otherwise the emotive elements within the argumentative structure will seem irrational and irrelevant considering the *logos* of the structure. Furthermore, it is much more difficult to transmit emotive cues via text than in face-to-face communication, because people tend to interpret facial expression, body movement, tone of voice and the like as emotive signals⁹⁷. Virtual or asynchronous interaction without immediate social contact is difficult because the communicating parties are continuously faced with the task of building an interactive cognitive environment. A great deal of information that is typically conveyed by face-to-face contact is derived from such things as tone of voice, expressions and appearance. The lack of visual information reduces the social cues available to the participants, making expression and persuasion more difficult. (Järvelä & Heikkinen 2003.)⁹⁸

For instance, when delivering a speech the speaker may shudder with revulsion and let his voice shiver slightly when describing states-of-things that are to be understood as extremely unwanted. To inspire the same emotive effect in a text the writer must rely on additional information. He can, for example, describe his emotional state when he first encountered the repulsive thing, or try to inspire fear in his readers through gruesome examples. Whatever the case, it would seem that

97 On emotional expression see Darwin 1965; Tomasello and Call 1997. On face recognition see Rodman 1999.

98 In Internet communication a novel way of transmitting facial expressions has been invented: the smiley. The original smiley first appeared in 1963 when it was invented by one Harvey Ball for an insurance company named State Mutual Life Assurance. The attempt to trademark the image failed, as the smiley became public domain too quickly. Today there are innumerable different smileys denoting different emotional stages or orientations. For further information on smileys and their use see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smiley> and <http://www.smileyworld.com/>.

reaching the emotions of a given audience is very much dependent on input other than raw emotional display. The need for additional information increases when the medium of communication is written text.

What is also apparent in the theories of pathos is that the theorists do not explicitly discuss what they mean by emotion in a psychological or cognitive sense. They seem more interested in describing the ways and implications of emotive persuasion at a very general level. However, it can be reasonably argued that ‘emotion’ is essentially a psychological and cognitive concept, and to use it without discussing these aspects leaves the concept vague and uninformative. Next we take a look at cognitive theories of emotion and emotional persuasion.

Cognitive aspects of pathos

As discussed in the previous section, Aristotle saw pathos in argumentation as a technique to bring about action. Pathos was associated with a person’s state of “pleasantness”, with trying to reach a state of being where the soul is in a state of peace (Rhetoric 1.11). While the concepts utilized for describing emotion in cognitive science are different, the actual meaning of Aristotelian pathos and the definition of emotion in modern understanding are remarkably similar:

An emotion is a psychological state or process that functions in the management of goals. It is typically elicited by evaluating an event as relevant to a goal; it is positive when the goal is advanced, negative when the goal is impeded. The core of an emotion is readiness to act in a certain way; it is an urgency, or prioritization, of some goals and plans rather than others. (Oatley 1999, 273; also see Frijda 1986.)

In contemporary usage, the term ‘emotion’ has two aspects: one pertains to a certain kind of subjective experience, or “feeling”, and other relates to expression, the public manifestation of feeling. (Brothers 1999, 271.) If rhetorical logos can be seen as the study of how people use folk-theoretical inference to evaluate the plausibility of the claims presented by other people, pathos must be seen as the study of the psychology of human emotions and of their significance for persuasion. Furthermore, pathos is closely connected to ethos in the sense that in persuasive communication emotions are expressed and communicated, and speakers strive to evoke emotional reactions in their audiences. This many-layered connectedness between the individual psychology of emotions and the social expression/manipulation of emotions makes both pathos and ethos very complicated matters from both the rhetorical and the cognitive points of view.

As briefly mentioned earlier, in cognitive science the study of emotion, when compared, for example, with research on learning or perception, has been delayed (see section 3.2.). However, in more recent cognitive studies emotions are considered very important. With support from evidence from social and developmental psychology, as well as animal neuroscience and human neuropsychology, there is a growing consensus: emotions are managers of mental life, prompting heuristics that build connections between the flow of daily events and the goals and social concerns of persons. (Oatley 1999, 275; see also Lazarus 1991b; Scherer &

Ekman 1984.) A theory of emotions and emotional persuasion on the cognitive level might be an important part of rhetoric. As discussed in the sections concerning the general outlook of rhetorical studies and cognitive science, rhetoricians do not make a habit of intruding into the territory of neuroscience and cognitive science, and cognitive scientists do not easily venture into the realm of rhetorical studies (Fahnestock 2005).

Cognitive studies of emotion have a wide range in the sense of research interests. Some studies have been interested in the somatic interrelations (bodily states) and neurological configurations that affect emotion. Studies of the somatic basis of emotion include, for example, the research done on the relationship of feedback from bodily processes, particularly from expressions of the face to emotions. (see Tomkins 1995; Ekman & Davidson 1994, 417-418; 424-426; Damasio 2001.) A good example of the research on neurological configurations and emotion is the work carried out in the study of brain damage and its effects on emotion (see, for example, Damasio 1994; Brothers 1999, 271-273). The study of facial expressions and their relation to emotions has been notable both developmentally and cross-culturally. Some aspects of such expressions are agreed to be human universals, and as such they are important for a theory of persuasion. (Oatley 1999, 273-275.)

In this research the main interest is not the somatic or neurological basis of emotions, but rather their expression and effect in persuasive contexts. While the studies of neurological configurations and emotional appeal⁹⁹ as well as studies of facial expression in relation to emotional reaction are most relevant for a theory of rhetoric, in the scope of this study they are not of primary significance. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, virtual communication (as textual communication in general) effectively decreases the significance of facial expression and body language in persuasive discourse. Secondly, rather than focusing on the neurological basis of emotions, this study is focused on the expression and effect of emotion, for which the theory of folk theories offers a good framework. An extensive understanding of the neurological processes of emotion and the interrelations within the logicoemotional system (Elder 1999, 184-185.) is very complex and difficult to transform into an effective method of argumentation analysis. Although understanding the neurological micro-phenomena of emotion helps to understand the level of emotion that rhetorical studies deal with, it is probably not crucial for understanding structures of emotional persuasion. The relevant cognitive systems can be understood on a general level, say in relation to communication or persuasion, and still contribute to the analysis in an informative manner without the analysis of the relevant neurological functions.

From the point of view of analysing the cognitive side of pathos, the most relevant questions are how emotion affects persuasion and how emotions are intertwined with the systems of folk-theoretical thought discussed earlier. The problematic can be formulated as follows: can emotional factors be seen as affecting inferential preferences and can it be shown how these factors are implemented in argumentative structures? Some recent cognitive research is concerned with

99 For example, classical Topics laid out by Aristotle (Rhetoric, Book II, chapter 23.) can be roughly mapped in modern neurology's view of the mental schemas and templates (see Elder 1999, 209-233). The classical teachings on arrangement and style also find their counterparts in modern neurosciences (see Elder 1999, 243-277; 291-311). One must wonder at the sharpness of vision of the ancient Greeks; although their views are far from perfect or exact, they still manage to give stunningly accurate descriptions of the functions of the human mind.

how emotions bias cognitive processing during judgment and inference, giving preferential availability to some inferential structures rather than others. For instance, anxiety focuses attention to features of the environment concerned with safety or danger and sadness prompts recall of incidents from the past that elicited comparable sadness (Oatley 1999, 275).

It is conceivable that from the point of view of persuasion and rhetoric the most important emotions are the so-called ‘primary emotions’. Despite the different research interests concerning emotion in cognitive science, a fair consensus exists on the theory of primary emotions. It is suggested here that the primary emotions can be seen as an important part of emotional persuasion. This is chiefly because of two reasons. Firstly, primary emotions are the most basic of emotions that manifest themselves in all typical humans in all cultures (Damasio 2001, 131-134); hence they are important for the idea of a ‘universal audience’. Secondly, primary emotions are strongly rooted in the biological responses of the body (electro-chemical reactions like hormone output) and can have a significant effect on several cognitive faculties, such as attention and memory¹⁰⁰. Based on this it can be assumed that arousing primary emotions can have great persuasive force. The primary emotions are so widely shared and so basic compared to more complex emotional configurations, it would seem likely that in general, persuasion evoking some of these primary emotions would be more successful. D’Andrade (1995) describes the study of primary emotion as follows:

The idea that the sensate side of emotion is limited to just arousal (i.e., the sensations produced by the autonomic nervous system) has been controversial. Most psychologists of emotion believe that the sensate side of emotion includes more than just the physical sensations caused by the reaction of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system; however, just how much more varies from theorist to theorist. For Nico Frijia there are just two kinds of response; an evaluative response (good-bad) and arousal. For Oatley and Johnson-Laird there are five primary sensations; joy, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust. Paul Ekman, who bases his typology on universal facial expressions, postulates seven basic emotions; joy, surprise, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and contempt. Carol Izard proposes ten primary emotions; joy, surprise, interest, distress (sadness?), fear, anger, disgust, contempt, shame, and guilt. (D’Andrade 1995, 219.)¹⁰¹

Neurobiologist Antonio Damasio (see Damasio 2001, 131-134.) closely follows Ekman’s view that there are six so-called primary or universal emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust. It would seem likely that if a speaker would like to arouse emotion in his audience and facilitate quick, surface elaboration of the suggested states-of-things, these primary emotions would be the right target to strike. First of all, they are emotional states that are for certain potentially present in any given audience. Second, since they are primary and not dependent on other emotional states already present, they are easier to evoke. Thirdly, they require less assessment and appraisal than more complex states of emotion:

¹⁰⁰ See, for example Schachter and Singer, 1962; Brothers 1999.

¹⁰¹ See D’Andrade 1995 for a review of the basic emotions controversy.

Even for “simple” emotions like sadness, or anger, or fear, some appraisal seems to be a part of the definition of the emotion. Sadness implies an appraisal that some kind of loss has happened, anger implies an appraisal that something frustrating or unfair has happened and that the responsible agent should be attacked, fear implies an appraisal that danger is present and that one should flee. According to the folk model, one can feel joy for no particular reason, but this would be likely to be associated with an appraisal that the world is a good place. (D’Andrade 1995, 220.)

While many researchers suggest that primary emotions and the ways they are expressed (facial expression etc.) can be considered universal, some ambiguity remains as to how universal the interpretive nuances of emotional expression are (Oatley 1999, 274).¹⁰² Catherine Lutz and Geoffrey White have suggested that anthropologists wrestling with culture-specific experience and expression of emotion should resort to what they call “common sense naturalism” (Lutz and White 1986, 415.) They suggest that the basic faculties of feeling are universally shared, in their physical-mental sense at least. The specific cultural nuances (which may cause more or less significant misinterpretations) can be worked out only by the assumption of shared fundamental structures. Anthropological work has shown that the cultural theories of emotion vary more than the actual emotional experience of human beings in different cultures (see Pollock 1999). Although the interpretive nuances of emotional expression, persuasion included, vary culturally, it can be argued that the basic emotions that are expressed and interpreted by folk theoretical inference remain universal.

A necessary human capability that makes emotional persuasion and evaluating emotional states in others possible is the folk-theoretical tendency for reasoning about human mind, the ‘folk psychology’ and ‘naive sociology’ discussed earlier. (see section 3.4.) Folk psychological thought gives human beings an ability to discern and interpret the emotions of others. This ability makes it possible in the first place for a speaker to transmit emotional cues to a given audience. It also makes it possible for people to discern motivations, orientations and attitudes. (see Lazarus 1991a, 116-126.) All these facets of expression are transmitted and interpreted in an act of persuasion, and all of them are intertwined with emotions, both those of the speaker and those of the audience. This is somewhat self-evident; what needs to be addressed here is what actually happens within the human emotional system when one becomes persuaded as well as what are the different roles that emotion can play in this process.

It was previously noted that in modern rhetorical studies the view of what is really important in persuasion has changed from emphasizing the role of the speaker to emphasizing the role of the audience. This is in line with contemporary psychologists who believe that in situations of oratory a speaker alone actually does not persuade anyone. The more realistic view of persuasion is that people “self-persuade” on the basis of the elements provided by the situation. The elements available for “self-persuasion” have been classified as follows:

102 For a good discussion on primary emotions see Ekman & Davidson 1994, 5-47.

1. the speaker as an individual-one who shares common demographic or psychological characteristics,
 2. the speaker's experiences or references that ignite memory for the audience,
 3. a symbol, code, or form that the speaker employs, verbally or nonverbally, and is recognized by the audience member and awakens his or her interest,
- or
4. the speaker's passion or emotional intensity that then causes the audience member to be swayed by his or her own emotional reaction to the speaker. (Hawkinson 1999, 490-491.)

What can be considered fundamentally important for the self-persuasion of an audience is that the speaker expresses his or her intensity through the use of strong and vivid emotional expression, effective literary devices (symbol, code or form that the audience can understand). It is important to note that no matter how significant emotional reactions may be for the persuasion of an audience, in textual form emotional "cues" cannot be transmitted in an intelligible manner by themselves alone. As argued earlier, where text is concerned, emotional cues must be attached to information. This is also true, as previously discussed, for virtual environments (see section 2.2.). Understood in the above manner, self-persuasion seems to have something in common with the theory of simulation discussed in the section on cognitive mechanisms (see section 3.4.). This issue needs to be discussed somewhat further, but before this can be done we must look at the theories of cognitive appraisal.

There are several different psychological theories of how emotion and other stimuli are interconnected. The primary difference in the theories centres on cognitive appraisal. Some theories suggest the primacy of cognitive appraisal, while others strictly deny it. The bulk of the discussion on the processes of emotion is centred on the role of conscious appraisal in the formation of emotional orientation. As an example of the theories associating appraisal and cognition as a necessary part of the emotional process is psychologist Magda Arnold's Appraisal Theory (AT). Arnold suggests that when a stimulus enters the cortex, an unconscious appraisal takes place. The appraisal is automatic and very fast (as brain processes tend to be). If the stimulus connects with a specific action tendency, like the tendency to escape from the claws of a predator or the tendency to avoid a snake, it is felt at the conscious level of brain processes as fear. Further reflection also becomes possible after the feeling has become conscious, because people have some degree of introspective access to their subconscious processes. (LeDoux 1998, 49-50; Arnold 1960.) Further, appraisal theorists have held somewhat different positions on how much weight should be put on the conscious side of the emotional process (see, for example Lazarus 1991b).

In contrast to the appraisal theory, other researchers support the Affective Primacy Theory (APT). The APT suggests that unconscious stimuli may be the cause of consciously experienced feelings. The proponents of the APT tend to conclude

that emotion is not dependent or necessarily interactive with other cognitive processes. The appraisal of the unconscious effects that the received emotional cues have caused can occur, but it is not necessary in order for the feeling to surface. (LeDoux 1998, 53-55; Zajonc 1984.)

The relation between emotion and appraisal has considerable significance with respect to the theory of pathos. Following the lines of the discussion concerning the primary processes relevant to the formation of feeling, there are two major theoretical views concerning the makings of persuasion within the individual brain. The first can be called the “elaboration likelihood model”, developed by Richard Petty and John Cacioppo (1986) and the second the “heuristic-systematic model”, developed by Shelly Chaiken and Alice Eagly (1989). Both models share the same predisposition that people in general want to hold correct and valid attitudes. Both models are also similar in that they recognize two ways of becoming persuaded: one through a relatively extensive cognitive elaboration or systematic processing of the persuasive information, the other through a fairly superficial adaptation to situations. The way of extensive elaboration leads to a change in the recipient’s cognitive structure, and it is in these occasions of persuasion that the main evaluative weight is set on the quality of the arguments presented. To become persuaded through extensive elaboration requires that the persuasive information be interesting enough to be spared the cognitive effort required. (Breckler 1999, 505.)

It would seem that all the six factors of emotional persuasion presented above (persuasion vs. self-persuasion, AT vs. APT and deep elaboration vs. surface elaboration) are connected, but the connections are not entirely self-evident. First of all, in the discussion of AT versus APT, both sides seem to acknowledge that an appraisal of emotional reaction can occur. What they disagree on is how automatic and inevitable the cognitive appraisal of emotion is for the person experiencing the emotional state. For now, let us assume that the AT is right in the sense that the information that is used to make a self-reflective appraisal of one’s emotional states is automatic. However, let us also assume that the APT is right in the sense that the reflective information concerning one’s emotional states is, although automatically available, not necessarily consciously accessed in all occasions.

This would entail two different processes of emotional persuasion, where the person to be persuaded can be seen as chiefly responsible for the way his emotions affect his cognitive processing of the proposed assertions. If the person wants to spend considerable cognitive effort to assess the argumentative structures he is faced with, it would seem probable that he also accesses the available information concerning the emotional responses the given assertions arouse in him. If this is the case, a deep-elaborative stance towards an assertion would entail a reflective emotive process, as suggested by the AT.

On the other hand, if the person under the persuasive effort does not want to deeply reflect on the suggested arguments, it would seem probable that he will not engage in deep reflective thinking concerning the emotional states the proposed assertions arouse in him. In other words, although the information necessary for the self-evaluation of his internal emotional states is available, the person does not access the information. This would lead to a surface elaboration of the suggested assertions as well as to an emotive process suggested by the APT. Now, it is important to remember that even though the APT considers the reflection on one’s emotional

states possible, the main difference compared to the AT was that the reflection is not automatic or necessary for experiencing feelings.

The AT and the APT give two different accounts concerning what happens to people when they are persuaded or when they self-persuade. These are important for the analysis of pathos, because they represent different rhetorical tactics and different cognitive processes. People can be emotionally persuaded either to reflect on and deeply elaborate the arguments they are faced with, or they can be persuaded to surface-elaborate and accept the arguments without deep reflection. On the other hand, people can self-persuade in two similar ways. They can analyse and reflect on arguments they are faced with, and self-persuade in a manner that is more tied to the inferential plausibility of the arguments themselves. On the other hand, people can self-persuade by emoting themselves to act along the suggested lines without deeply elaborating the argumentative structures they are following. Consider the previous example on cloning and China once again:

In China, where a repressive government has tried to make its people almost insensible to the ugliness of immorality, scientists forge ahead, creating cloned embryos by combining human DNA and rabbit eggs and then killing them for their stem cells. We can't help but look on this with horror, while cloning proponents wish we would just look away. (s2026, Cathleen Cleaver, Director for Planning and Information at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

It seems unlikely the emotive tactic in the example above was meant to encourage deep elaboration. If the argumentation aims at getting the audience to engage in extensive systematic elaboration and reflection, it would first require that the people familiarize themselves with the culture and political system of China. It seems probable that if the debater was aiming at in-depth elaboration, she would have enclosed some data concerning the cultural system she utilizes as the epitome of horrors of genetic technology. It seems that her aim is to create relatively superficial representations of the horrors genetic technology brings, by using emotive elements she deems effective for the assumed audience.

It is often the situation that, consciously or unconsciously, people do not wish to engage in deep processing of the persuasive data offered. They may rely on simple inferential strategies like “experts can be trusted” instead of actually processing and systematically analysing the persuasive elements offered. Of course, it is often easier to persuade people this way: they do not want to waste time pondering what you say, and take it as it is. But the persuasive effect achieved in this manner is not as strong or durable as the one gained through the deep elaboration of information. (Breckler 1999, 504-505.) It has been suggested that emotional persuasion favours the simple heuristic inferences while rational argumentation tends to result in a systematic elaboration of data. Making distinctions here is not simple because the systems are, of course, intertwined and collaborative. It could be argued, however, that while emotional expression may increase the attention value of persuasion and thus make it more relevant situationally, the more reasonable and well-formulated arguments invite systematic elaboration and lasting changes in attitude (Breckler 1999, 506-507.)

One essential factor in becoming persuaded is memory. While there are multiple theories concerning memory, there is common ground between the competing theories concerning the importance of memory in relation to persuasion. In order to adapt new ideas, associations or orientations, an effective recall of the new data that are received is necessary. It has been suggested in psychological studies (see LeDoux 1998; Damasio 1999) that the release of adrenaline helps one to remember situations more vividly. Thus if a persuasive discourse causes great fear, excitement or anger, it is more likely that the audience will remember it and will later be affected by the persuasion. (Pyysiäinen 2001, 104-105; see also Whitehouse 2000, 119-122.) In fact, in the study of emotion anxiety and fear are widely treated as primary, often the main motivating forces in human affairs (Lazarus 1991a, 234-240). This brings us back to the issue of self-persuasion. It seems likely that the theories of persuasion vs. self-persuasion and the cognitive theories of simulation vs. theory-theory have something in common. At least this seems plausible in the sense of emotional persuasion.

It was established earlier that deep elaboration, which is possible if arguments contain a lot of topic-relevant information, affects a deep and lasting cognitive change. Surface elaboration, which is achieved through emotional persuasion and with little topic-relevant information, affects a quick but superficial cognitive change that is bound to change again easily (see the discussion above). The problem is that we see many attitudes that are both lasting and resistant to change, but not based on a rational assessment of facts. It sometimes seems that the most persistent attitudes are precisely those having little or no actual factual information content concerning the topics they are attitudes of. It seems that people are able to create cognitive states that resemble deep elaboration in their lasting quality and resistance to change, but without the need for laborious deep elaboration.

Here is a hypothetical answer: people can create cognitive changes that resemble deep elaboration by emotional simulation. If emotional arousal can affect memory and if emotive rhetoric can, so to speak, divert the attention of a given audience from the factual content of the argument, deep and lasting cognitive effects might be possible without an actual change in the amount of knowledge a given audience has concerning the topic under argumentation. The most universal rhetorical emotive cues for achieving this should be tied to primary emotions and psychological and social folk theories. As well, the rhetoric aiming to affect this “simulative emotional elaboration” might be a case where the rhetorical expression extensively calls upon other people to imagine themselves “in other people’s shoes” (see section 3.3.).¹⁰⁵ This type of simulation effectively combines social and psychological intuitions and potentially makes people sensitive to the possible emotional states the imagined person would feel. This way, the role of emotional persuasion in argumentation could be explained in a way that satisfies the theories of rhetoric, and the cognitive cues in argumentative structures could be analyzed in the sense of what type of elaboration they aim for.

This, however, is only a hypothesis, and it is very probable that the materials analyzed within this study cannot give conclusive evidence as to whether or not emotional simulation can be used in the suggested manner. In any case, it will be

¹⁰⁵The “theory-theory” approach to cognition is the more probable explanation of human capabilities of folk psychological inference. However, the cognitive simulation theories suggest could be understood as a specialized form of thought that people utilize in special situations. The suggested “simulative emotional elaboration” would then be such a situation.

very interesting to see whether the materials analyzed suggest anything that either supports or opposes the hypothesis.

Be that as it may, the element of assessment and appraisal is still present in any emotional reaction. In this sense the emotional reactions are dependent on other cognitive processes, parallel or even parasitic as has been previously suggested. Without an element of appraisal or assessment, any emotional reaction would only be meaningless cognitive “background noise”. It is the audience’s faculties of appraisal that a speaker manipulates when arousing emotion in any given situation of persuasion. The actual persuasion, be it self-persuasion or persuasion in the sense of the more traditional view where the audience is seen as the subject, occurs through a clever manipulation of facts, expression and the emotional states of the audience. Many theorists of rhetoric seem to think that deceptive rhetoric is such that people can be persuaded into wrong or false decisions by presenting either the facts or the person of the speaker in such a way that the states-of-things proposed seem to require the actions the speaker proposes. Although it is generally accepted that persuasion works better if people do not know they are being affected, it is precisely by manipulating or blinding the audience’s faculties of appraisal that this state is achieved. (LeDoux 1998, 57; Packard 1977.)

The rhetorical approach to persuasion seems to implicitly contain both the psychological AT and the APT. If a speaker is able to induce emotions that propel people to act in a preferred way without affecting their faculties of appraisal, affective primacy is achieved. If persuasion is achieved through affecting the rational and ethical cognitive processes of a given audience, then the appraisal theory of emotion can explain the situation. However, in rhetoric, emotion is never seen as totally separate from cognitive processing: emotions could not be affected by oration or by written text if *logos* and *ethos* were separate from emotive systems. Any given rhetorical act contains a lot of information that could be used to make appraisals concerning the emotional states the rhetorical act generates. This information is carried by *logos* and *ethos*. However, as stated before, it is always up to the individual audience member to decide whether or not to access the information that enables appraisal. Furthermore, as also mentioned earlier, it is extremely unlikely that the processes described by AT and APT are clearly separate or clear-cut. More likely the appraisal of emotional states is always a matter of degree, and total appraisal as well as total affective primacy is merely a heuristically postulated end of a wide spectrum of emotional cognition.

Of course there are some special situations where the APT seems to be the only possible solution for explaining emotional reactions. As a commonsensical example, a strong group unity, atypical circumstances and a great display of raw emotion can bring about situations like mass hysteria. In these situations it can be seen that people self-persuade when they are quite driven by emotional states, and the emotional function is primary. These situations are, however, not to be considered as the norm of emotional persuasion, but as the exception. (see, for example, Snow & Paulsen 2000, 553-562.)

Ultimately emotion in itself and as connected to persuasion and becoming convinced remains a complex issue. Considering the theory of rhetorical persuasion, the concept of emotion gains still further complexity from its interrelatedness with an equally complex concept: ‘*ethos*’. Next we look at the third and final aspect of Aristotelian *inventio*.

3.5.3. Ethos – the art of appearance

This chapter is divided into three parts, the first of which discusses the classical interpretations given to the concept of ‘ethos’. Then we take a look at modern rhetoric and the concept of ‘ethos’, with the emphasis being on the modern theories of ‘audience’. The third part introduces some theoretical views of social cognition. The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the concepts of ‘speaker’ and ‘audience’ as they have been understood in rhetorical studies. Furthermore, the concepts will be discussed in relation to some aspects of social cognition to establish a connection with the theory of ‘ethos’ and the theory of folk theories.

The classical view of ethos

In the Aristotelian division of the ‘artistic proofs’ the form of artistic persuasion called ethos is also named ‘the ethical appeal’. The previous elements of inventio were called “the rational appeal” (logos) and “the emotional appeal” (pathos). Compared to these previous definitions, it may be slightly misleading to call ethos “the ethical appeal”. This is because the word ‘ethical’ brings to mind associations with moral issues and philosophical ethics. By ethical appeal it is not necessarily meant that the debater presents arguments highly steeped in philosophical ethics. The ethical appeal is created by presenting oneself as a person of sound understanding and good intention. Put simply, ethical appeal is just an attempt by the speaker to appear good in the eyes of his audience.

In Phaedrus originally, Plato uses the word ‘ethos’ differently than most theoreticians after Aristotle. For Plato the meaning of ethos is inseparably tied to his essentialist philosophy. In Platonic definition the “right rhetoric” in its totality seeks to discover and express the truth of the soul. Ethos, for its part, describes the inner harmony between language, character and truth. For Plato, ethos defines the space where language and truth meet and are made incarnate within the individual. (Baumlin 2001, 264.) Later, Isocrates (436-338 BCE) sees the same inseparability in the quality of oratory and the qualities of the speaker in *Antidosis*:

...for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument that is made by a man’s life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words. (*Antidosis*, 339.)

Isocrates goes as far as to assert that the power to speak well may be taken as the best proof of the orator’s sound understanding:

The power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and lawful soul. (*Antidosis*, 327.)

Quintilian called ethical appeal *auctoritas*. In his opinion, there cannot be a sound argument without a convincing speaker: “For he who would have all men trust his judgement as to what is expedient and honourable, should possess and be regarded as possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character” (*Institutio Oratoria*, III, viii, 15). As with many other aspects of Platonic philosophy, the meaning of *ethos* is changed in Aristotle. Aristotle located the occasions of ethical appeal to situations where the speech itself impresses upon the audience the notion that the speaker is a person of sound sense (*phronésis*), high moral character (*areté*) and benevolence (*eunoia*).

[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [*epieikeia*] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor of persuasiveness. (*Rhetoric* 1356a)

To appear credible, the speaker must be able to present himself as “fair-minded”, or in other words as a person wanting good. Consider the presentation of oneself in the following example:

If cloned children never know a loving mother, a proud father, and doting grandparents, will there be love on this earth at all? The system of cloning is not designed to increase love on earth. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) declared that God must necessarily forbid us from doing things which endanger the welfare of the human race. (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD)

The speaker calls for love and speaks against things he presents as endangering the welfare of the entire human race. In this way, he presents himself as a definitive benefactor, wishing love and good welfare for all. The speaker certainly makes a great effort to appear fair-minded and benevolent. Furthermore, the reference the speaker makes to typical family ties may sensitize several listeners, making the speaker appear as a person with strong and appreciable family values. On the other hand, if the audience accepts the inference implied in the argument, anyone opposing the argument risks appearing as opposed to widely shared family values, which is not a good self-presentation for many conceivable audiences. The problematic of audiences will be discussed in more detail later in this section.

Contrary to Isocrates, Aristotle defines the methods of artistic proof as being completely separate from the earlier actions of the speaker and asserts that the moral character of the speaker is to be construed solely on the basis of the oratory at hand (*Rhetoric* 1355b-1356a; Baumlin 2001, 265). Aristotle sees *ethos* in its ideal form, where the audience has no prior knowledge of the orator or author whose speech or text they address. Even the best speech that portrays the speaker

in the best possible light might hide malevolent intent or flawed reasoning. What is essential is that these taints must not be made apparent to the audience.

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. (Rhetoric, Book 1, 1356b.)

Thus the moral character and credibility of the speaker must be determined solely by the image projected in the speech itself. Needless to say, this is not usually the case in the acts of oratory in normal life; usually the audiences have some prior knowledge about the dispositions and social links the speaker has. A modern audience is bound to exercise a kind of grassroots-level source criticism when listening to politicians, scientists and the like. It might be said that the modern culture of communication consumption has become very "savvy". The scholar of persuasive language and the typical audiences under study have become increasingly aware of the recurring reflexive structures in the media which might be called the "I-know-that-you-know-that-I-know" game. Persuasive media, commercials, humour and the like are built around structures of "I-know-that-you-know-that-I-know" to an increasing extent (see Jones 1999). Interestingly, virtual expression on the Internet seems to create an ideal environment in the Aristotelian sense of ethos: when one's identity cannot be ascertained and the earlier actions of the speaker are not easily available for assessment, the speech itself is the only possible criterion of credibility.

Aristotle outlines some problems associated with the concept of 'ethos', although his concerns focus more on the pragmatic level of teaching oratory, not on the abstract level of analysing persuasive mechanisms. One of these pragmatic problems an orator faces is the culture-specificity of certain signals that determine the cultural attractiveness of a given speaker. In Rhetoric, Aristotle goes on to describe different kinds of government and some exemplary cultural patterns, for example the long hair worn by Spartan men. Their having long hair is considered the mark of a free man since it is difficult with long hair to do menial chores. Being long-haired would thus constitute the merit of credibility to the Spartans, because it is for them a sign of a certain political standing within society. Some personal traits are as opaque: harshness may be interpreted as courage and extravagance as generosity, for example. (see Rhetoric, Book 1, 1367a-1367b.)

So what Plato sees as the true essence of the soul inevitably manifesting itself in speech, Aristotle turns into the art of "seeming" the way it is beneficial to seem. By the dawn of modernity and with the rise of pre-modern scepticism towards the morality of humans, the idea of ethos had moved even further from the Platonic idea of "being" towards the direction of "seeming". A good example is Machiavelli, who goes further than Aristotle in postulating an "ethos of appearing" in the Prince (1513). Machiavelli states that a ruler does not benefit from such virtues as mercy, loyalty, humaneness, honesty and Christian faith, although it is essential that he appears as having these qualities:

Men, in general, judge more with their eyes than with their hands. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and these few do not dare

oppose the opinion of the many who have the majesty of the state to defend them. (Machiavelli [1513] 1988, 92.)

Machiavelli sees a direct link between the power of appearance and the power to control masses of people. This is one of the main ideas of modern critical studies that use rhetoric and the idea of ethos as a factor in persuasive discourse. In twentieth century contexts the critical “revealing” of the persuasive, even manipulative ethos hidden in discourse, along with the concepts of ‘ideology’ and of the ‘self’, have been used to “bring into open” structures of power and appearance. (Craig 1999, 130.)¹⁰⁴ The factors of persuasion cannot be assumed to be as simple and clear-cut as they are to classical and pre-modern theoreticians, because several scientific disciplines have increased our knowledge concerning the complexities of human motivation and argumentation. However, when we are concerned with texts and oratory, the core factors of the elements of ethos in persuasion remain essentially the same. This can be seen in the theories of the modern-day proponents of the New rhetoric.

Ethos in the New rhetoric

In the ethos form of rhetorical persuasion the speaker attempts, within the speech, to ingratiate himself with the audience by evincing himself as a capable and trustworthy person. The speaker utilizes his knowledge of the probable attitudes prominent in his audience and attempts to project a favourable image of himself. As expression can make factual claims of situations and inferences seem plausible through explicit and implicit assumptions, so it can create personal appearances that seem credible. It is well known in modern culture replete with commercials, politics and celebrities that the personal features of a speaker are all-important. In addition, it has been said that of all the devices given to the use of the orator, appeal through ethos can be the most effective (Corbett & Connors 1999, 72.) As can be read in the ideas of the classical theorists, where there cannot be absolute certainty on the basis of generally justified facts, the character of the speaker gains emphasis.

Although Kenneth Burke is not one of the primary theorists used in this study, his views of ethos must be mentioned. Of all three forms of building argumentation that Aristotle introduces, Burke pays the most attention to ethos, adding a modern-day spice by associating it with the ideas of identity and identification:

You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his. Persuasion by flattery is but a special case of persuasion in general. But flattery can certainly serve as our paradigm if we systematically widen its meaning, to see behind it the conditions of identification or consubstantiality in general. (Burke 1950, 55.)

Actually Burke sees ethos as a dangerous tool typically used in social settings for demonizing “the other”. Ethos is for Burke essentially the combined potential of all cultural stereotypes, prejudices and unconscious projections. To form groups that function with a feeling of unity and importance, human beings need something to stand opposed to. “The other” for this type of ethos is the demonized enemy,

104 For more information on critical discourse analysis see Fairclough 1995; 2003; vanDijk 1995; 1998.

against which the group in question fashions and defends its idealized self-image. A manipulative, charismatic authority can utilize this hidden potential that Burke sees as inherent in all sorts of social groups, but that is most emphasized in racial or religious questions (see Burke 1969, Baumlin 2001, 275). While demonizing groups of people can be seen as the most typical use of ethos in the Burkean sense, other things can also be attacked this way. The other targets for demonization can be, for example, institutions, technologies and forms of art.

While the demonizing tendency in the rhetorical use of ethos certainly exists, it would not benefit the study of rhetoric to restrict it to the study of rousing zealous mobs where racial and religious debates emerge. The creation of “the other”, by demonizing it to a greater or lesser degree, is but one possible use of the rhetorical technique of ethos. Furthermore, the rhetorical technique of demonization is a somewhat self-evident concept – similar to saying that when one argues against something, one does one’s best to make it look not so desirable. The thing that is truly of interest is how demonization is achieved, or what are the means a speaker can use to make certain that his target is demonized. It will be later argued that the folk-theoretical assumptions discussed earlier can shed some light on this matter.

Other theorists of the New rhetoric have also discussed ethos. Ricca Edmondson (1984) refers to ‘ethos’ as “self-presentation” (p. 16). Self-presentation has three main functions. The first two deal with the personal grasp of practical reasoning that a speaker propounds and with his social role in a particular situation (for example, a political speaker from a certain party, a professor, etc.). The third element is the well-intentioned stance towards the listener the speaker presents; the listeners need to be able to feel safe in the presence of the speaker and to be able to believe that he will refrain from efforts that may be detrimental to them. (Edmondson 1984, 16-17.)

Michael Billig (1984), who looks at rhetoric from the point of view of social psychology, does not use the term ‘ethos’ to describe the interplay between an orator and his audience. Instead, he echoes Kenneth Burke and speaks of “identification with the audience”:

All the classical textbooks emphasize that the successful orator should understand how an audience thinks, and, before addressing an audience, the orator should be well aware of its opinions... In effect, Aristotle was urging the orators to emphasize the similarity between themselves and their audiences. (Billig 1984, 194.)

Billig continues:

Therefore, the orator, wishing to persuade an audience, should not emphasize the gulf that separates their respective opinions. Instead, orators should try to slide their controversial views into categories which are familiar and well-valued by the audience. (ibid, 194.)

Consider the previously used example again:

If cloned children never know a loving mother, a proud father, and doting grandparents, will there be love on this earth at all? The system of cloning is not

designed to increase love on earth. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) declared that God must necessarily forbid us from doing things which endanger the welfare of the human race. (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD)

It is clear that the speaker is attempting to pave the way for his argument against cloning by drawing on resources he believes are familiar and highly valued by the audience he wants to reach. In this case family relationships, a widely shared concept and usually perceived as desirable, function as the vehicle of unanimity in a controversial issue. It must be stressed that it is in no way established by the argument that a cloned person would be deprived of a family, the assumption is just presupposed in the argument as a fact. Were persons cloned, they would in all likelihood be born to parents very eager to have them and have a normal family union. But in this particular case it is important for the ethos of the argument to present things otherwise.

Billig's view of ethos is one of orators and audiences as well as of social groups with contradictory interests seeking common ground and shared understanding. As orators and audiences, different groups of people also seek to solve situations of contradiction and debate by finding compatible identifications (see Billig 1984, 234-235; 238-243.) However, Billig's social-psychological analysis is not interested in the questions of how people manage to do all this assessing, just as the other theories of ethos have not been. A particular point of interest in this study is to offer explanations of how is this assessment and adjustment of identifications so readily available to us? It is possible that the folk theories of physics, psychology and social relations can offer at least a partial answer. The section "Cognitive aspects of ethos" will offer some suggestions that incorporate theories of social cognition to the theory of ethos.

To sum up, whenever someone wishes to appear convincing in the eyes of a group of listeners, he must somehow identify himself as a "street-credible" person who is close enough to the group in question. In live situations where a speaker tries to gain the favour of an audience a delicate interaction can be observed: everyone is covertly measuring the reactions and attitudes of everybody present, both the speaker and the members of the audience. When arguments are presented in a literal form, the interactive elements are not so emphasized, and adjusting the arguments to suit the particulars of the given situation becomes impossible. This is why the debater must, while writing, carefully consider the image of himself he wishes to bestow upon his readers.

It would seem that to succeed in catching the appropriate style for a given audience, the speaker must possess some rudimentary knowledge of the shared cultural background of the group in question. Aristotle made an attempt to categorize in a general sense all the possible groupings of people according to their age, gender and life conditions (see Rhetoric, Book II, Chapters 12-17). However, the amount of possible cultural orientations is huge and the possible knowledge a speaker can have of any given audience is always limited. Many interesting questions are hiding in the backyard of the theory of ethos. For instance, how is it possible that the speakers can know so much about the mental stances of their audiences? How is it possible that even in the present torrent of diverse cultural forms, speakers and writers are able to walk a fine line and find the right kind of rhetoric to suit their audiences? How can humans be so adept at knowing what other humans like?

Before trying to shed some light on these peculiar competences, an acquaintance with the concept of ‘audience’ used in New rhetoric needs to be made.

Chaim Perelman and the concept of ‘audience’

The necessity of speakers and writers taking note of the audience they are addressing has been recognized since Plato, who noted that in order to be a competent speaker one must understand one’s audience. The assumptions of the hearers are the point to which the speaker focuses his own position. Certain audiences consider as facts some things other audiences would laugh at. Some people are swayed by emotional input that others would find irritating or ridiculous. Not everyone considers the same things to be vile or virtuous.¹⁰⁵

Of the proponents of the new rise of rhetoric Chaim Perelman is important for this work because of his elaborations of the concept of ‘audience’. ‘Audience’ may sound simple enough a concept to be bypassed as something trivial or self-evident, but looking more closely it is revealed as anything but simple. Every oration, every attempt at persuasion, every statement on how the states-of-things are, contains an implicit assumption of the audience.¹⁰⁶

Perelman’s theory of rhetoric mentions ethos only once, which is surprising because the problematic of ‘audience’ is very central to his work:

If the person of the speaker provides a context for the speech, conversely the speech determines the opinion one will form of the person. What the ancients used to call oratorical ethos can be summed up as the impression which the speaker, by means of his words, gives of himself. (Perelman 1958, 319.)

As a concept, ‘audience’ is not unproblematic. Definitions of the term usually refer to a real person or collection of people who see, hear, or read of an event or work (Jarvis 2001, 59). At one hand the definition of ‘audience’ is self-evident: anyone receiving a signal can be seen as an audience for that signal or for the sender. On the other hand, things are much more complicated. Proper definitions of ‘audience’ contain features such as “plurality” – when two or more listeners are present and become a source of stimuli for each other; “homogeneity” – the extent to which members of the group share a common background of experience, attitudes and so forth; “orderliness” – the state of organization and the context of the listeners; and “common focus of attention” – the extent to which the individuals are attending to the same signal, to name but a few of the recurrent themes in the definition of ‘audience’. (Jarvis 2001, 60; see also Pesonen & Lassander 2001.)

Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) emphasize that whatever the case in the details of defining ‘audience’, any case of argumentation must be adapted to suit the beliefs accepted by the receivers. However, one seldom has the luxury of knowing exactly what kind of beliefs or predispositions one’s audience cherishes. In fact, one can never really have perfect knowledge concerning a given

¹⁰⁵However, as was previously noted, people tend to form functional groups on the grounds of shared structures in ethical understandings. At least these factors seem more determinative in forming groups than the emotional configurations of similarities in factual knowledge bases.

¹⁰⁶For a critique of Perelman’s concept of ‘universal audience’ see Summa 1996, 67-69.

audience. All that the speaker can do is to act on his best hunch regarding the situation at hand. One of the main interests here is how and why speakers can have such precise intuitions concerning the mental and social dispositions of others. This is a central question since the audience of any given situation of oration is primarily a mental construction of the speaker:

For this reason we consider it preferable to define an audience, for the purposes of rhetoric, as the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation. Every speaker thinks, more or less consciously, of those he is seeking to persuade; these people form the audience to whom his speech is addressed. (Perelman 1969, 19.)

If the speaker wishes his speech to be effective, he must form as clear and thorough a concept of his audience as possible:

In real argumentation, care must be taken to form a concept of the anticipated audience as close as possible to reality. An inadequate picture of the audience, resulting from either ignorance or an unforeseen set of circumstances, can have very unfortunate results. (Perelman 1969, 20.)

Consider the now familiar example one more time:

If cloned children never know a loving mother, a proud father, and doting grandparents, will there be love on this earth at all? The system of cloning is not designed to increase love on earth. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) declared that God must necessarily forbid us from doing things which endanger the welfare of the human race. (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD)

The audience of this particular oratory is composed of persons who have a good grasp of typical Western family values. This would suggest that they are primarily those who at the moment identify themselves as mothers and fathers, or as the ones responsible for ensuring the continuation of the family union. On the other hand, the argument seems directed at all who share an interest in the welfare of the human race. This construction of many different audiences within an argumentative structure is quite usual. Because of the variables of the situation-specific cultural data, audiences are usually of a composite nature. Very rarely can a speaker be so certain of the responses of his audience that he feels he is safely on the “home soil” of his argued topics. This does, however, sometimes happen and it seems that very exclusive religious communities are a good example of rather homogenous audiences. In normal situations even religious rhetoric has to be tailor-made for people with different value systems and beliefs. But some small, very tightly organized groups of believers seem to be prone to developing their own language and veer far from the ideas of the average believer. And of course, their specialist speakers know their flock and use a highly specialized rhetoric for persuading them. (see, for example, Wheelock 1987.)

Who then is the “average person” or “average believer”? How and on what basis can we say that there is a greater “common ground” on which most of us agree? Regarding the problem of unanimity, Perelman speaks of a ‘universal audience’:

[t]he value of this unanimity depends on the number and quality of those expressing it. Its highest point is reached when there is agreement of the universal audience. This refers of course, in this case, not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into consideration those who are not part of it. (Perelman 1969, 31.)

In defining ‘universal audience’ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca draw on Immanuel Kant’s notions of conviction, which state that there are judgements that can be grounded on objectivity and appear as valid for every rational being. These are the “legitimate reasons” that justify not considering those who do not comply, because they are apparently unable to make rational evaluations. Then Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca expand these notions associating persuasive rhetoric with action, and conviction with intelligence (see Jarvis 2001, 61). Thus, it may be concluded that Perelman’s “universal audience” is one of people intelligent enough to make rational evaluations. It follows, then, that the universal trait of ‘intelligence’ that these rational arguments appeal to should be defined.

With religious rhetoric the case of a heuristic division of listeners into universal and particular audiences becomes interesting. In Christianity it is believed that the word of God and the teachings of the Christian religious specialists belong to everybody. Thus the universal audience is basically everyone. However, the universality of this audience is implicitly broken into at least three parts. Firstly, there are always those who do not share the same understanding of the proposed truth as do the believers. These potential receivers of the message are those who have different beliefs and who can even be directly oppositional to the things proposed. Secondly, there is the audience of those who are largely indifferent, who have not adopted a stance in favour of or against the system of belief of the Christian voice.

Thirdly, the audience of Christian rhetoric always contains those who have already assimilated the Christian view of the world as their view of reality. These persons usually form the actual audience the oration is directed to, and in a way form a universal audience in themselves. Most often, Christian rhetoric contains expressions and metaphors only this specialized audience can understand (see, for example, Kennedy 1999). The audience of this type of oration can be called the “elite audience”:

Those who pride themselves on possession of a supernatural revelation or mystical knowledge, as well as those who appeal to the virtuous, to believers, or to men endowed with grace, show their preference for an elite audience... The elite audience is by no means always regarded as similar to the universal audience. Indeed, the elite audience often wishes to remain distinct from the common run of men... (Perelman 1969, 33-34.)

The concept of 'elite audience' outlined by Perelman is similar to the concept of 'community audience', which has recently emerged in the post-modern research as a new term to mark a middle ground between total individualism and the concept of 'universal audience':

New terms for the audience emerge from postmodern research, including the audience as subcultures, interpretive communities, and taste publics... The conceptualization of audience as a community provides a middle ground between perspectives that see audiences as homogenous (such as the universal audience) and those that see all audience members as idiosyncratic, autonomous individuals. This model, too, offers a way to characterize audiences generally, while at the same time accommodating differences between and within communities. (Jarvis 1996, 66.)

Porter (1996) even says that the reconceptualization of an audience according to post-modern notions of community has been the most significant development in the audience theory of modern rhetoric. Central to the theory of community is the proposition that the rhetor's use of speech and writing is not original, but guided by the conventions of various communities whose discourse patterns influence discourse production, and even construct the very identity of the rhetor (*ibid.*, 48). The audiences have, along the lines of the concept of 'community audience', also been called 'discourse communities' (see Long & Flower 1996.) For example, religious groups have been referred to as "communities of moral discourse." (Gustafson 1975, 17.) The meaning conveyed by the term 'discourse community' is much the same as in 'community audience'. 'Elite audiences' proposed by Perelman can also be seen as discourse communities that utilize a specialized form of expression.

Another interesting development in the theory of audience is the emergence of virtual audiences. Walther (2001) outlines several ways virtual audiences differ from traditionally conceptualized ones. The first and most dramatic way is in their potential interactivity: in the case of computer-mediated communication (CMC), each reader is also a writer. The same media that allow people to consume the messages of others, easily allow them to send messages to the same audience. Secondly, in CMC there are no immediate signs of a messenger's status or expertise. This tends to "democratize" communication. That is, according to Walther, since one need not come forward as explicitly as in face-to-face situations, and since no one is immediately perceived as any different until their text is read, writers are not subject to the inhibitions common in face-to-face interaction. These inhibitions might be due to a lower social role, hierarchical position, minority status and so on. A third difference concerns the durability of the responses. While a "live" audience member's response to a rhetor may be fleeting, the virtual audience member's written response has a different forum that offers much potential visibility over time. A fourth and final characteristic of a virtual audience is that individuals aggregate from all over the world, not on the basis of geography but on the basis of shared interests, as long as they share a common language. Shared interests can be seen as offering greater cohesion and expertise, and in larger numbers, than is typical of a non-electronic group. On the other hand, there is more potential diversity of

membership within virtual groups that may span thousands of members and cross several continents. (Walther 2001, 73-74.)

Also of interest from the point of view of this study is the claim that CMC makes the cognitive fingerprints of the authors of virtual texts more visible than they are in traditional media:

Many theorists now describe electronic writing as more dynamic, speechlike, and representative of writers' and readers' (usually non-linear) mental constructions of physical texts. Though this view agrees with modern cognitive theory, however, computer-produced texts also introduce new communicative limitations and suggest new criteria for effective writing. (Clark 1996, 135.)

What remains the same in all of the approaches to the concept of 'audience' is the idea that any speech act directed to someone else contains a construction of both the assumed group of receivers and the speaker himself. Based on the ideas of the proponents of the New rhetoric, these can be found and analyzed. When these hidden constructions are revealed many interesting points can be seen concerning the assumptions of the speaker; we can distinguish something about his assumptions concerning the audience he is trying to reach. By his methods and agendas and by the relation he forms with the receivers he reveals something about his own views and attitudes; maybe even things he would better have left unsaid. Next we take a look at the cognitive mechanisms that are relevant to social interaction and persuasion in a social context.

Cognitive aspects of ethos

The way Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca conceptualize 'universal audience' leaves it a somewhat problematic issue. The "Kantian conviction" they build on is probably not the best possible tool for argumentation analysis, mainly because of the controversy over the concept of 'intelligence'. The idea that a universal audience would be composed of those intelligent enough is simply problematic in itself (people do not need to be intelligent in order to be persuaded). In this study 'universal audience' will not be considered as a concept for making moral evaluations (e. g. the things that are persuasive to the largest audiences are not by necessity morally superior). The expressed convictions of audiences can be taken as indicators providing valid distinctions concerning social groupings, discourse communities etc., but little can be said about the relative universal goodness or faultiness of those convictions. In other words, while one can discover what the underlying ethical dispositions of discourse communities are, one cannot go on and claim whether the dispositions are essentially good or bad. So, no universal ethical or moral constraints can explain ethos. It is suggested here that the theory of folk theories can supply concepts that lay new ground for the theory of 'universal audience'.

Human societies are made from an interaction between numerous cognitively complex agents, human beings. Ethos as a technique of argumentation tries to locate common interests and elements that can tie human beings together as

audiences. One extremely universal feature that can be said of all human societies in all times is that people are the best possible allies, and worst potential enemies, of other people. (Atran & Norenzayan 2004.) This is why the social evolution of human beings has made it possible for people to forge and maintain large social units as well as deep and lasting relationships. But the same fact has also made people socially cunning: social units are anything but simple and fair, and knowledge pertaining to relationships and motivations of others is something of a necessity for social survival. This complexity has developed hand in hand with the capabilities of intuitive psychology and naive sociology: to be able to interpret the agendas of others and to be able to relate this “strategic information”¹⁰⁷ to wider social contexts.¹⁰⁸

Because of this common evolutionary background people share patterns of thought and understanding, and these are reflected in social interactions, including argumentation. (see Sanderson 2001, 143-157; Boyden 2004, 1-17; 81-92; Low 2000, 23-27.) As previously discussed, the shared patterns of inference are apparent when arguing about matters in the mechanistic-material sphere of human existence as well as when people reason about the mental processes of other people. The same folk-theoretical inferences that make it possible to understand physics, biology and individual psychology also make it possible to understand larger social groups. However, when people argue about matters in the social-ethical sphere of their reality, things get more complex than, for example, in the arguments about a frozen lake. The cognitive restrictions and basic rules that constrain folk-theoretical inferences are always present, but when argumentation moves to more complex subject matter (from mechanistic to end-orientated, if you will) the rules become more difficult to see. The intuitive assumptions that map the social reality and chart emotional spaces are as profound as those connected to the interpretation of the physical world, but they are also different:

Two major differences between social and nonsocial knowledge are described. The first difference pertains to the prominence of static versus labile properties. Nonsocial objects show very little change in appearance over time. Vases and rocks retain their basic physical appearance and composition for years and years. A person, in contrast, is in a constant state of flux... The second difference between social and nonsocial objects has to do with the forces that produce change. A vase may appear different in the sunlight versus the shadows, its color might fade if scrubbed with a strong detergent, it might break if pushed off the table. All these forces are external to the object. Most of the changes observed in nonsocial objects can be attributed to such external forces. On the other hand, most of the changes recorded in social objects cannot be attributed to such external forces. (Ostrom 1984, 9-10.)

While the social intuitive assumptions are more complex than mechanistic ones (because they are assumptions about something that one cannot see), it is by sharing the same external reality that people arrive at similar social understandings. As

¹⁰⁷ For further reading on the concept of ‘strategic information’ see Boyer 2001, 137-146; 174-175; Boyer 2002, 77-81.

¹⁰⁸ For further information concerning the biological basis of culture and human behaviour see, for example, Buss 1996, 3-38; Low 2000; Sanderson 2001, 143-157.

mentioned before, Dan Sperber's idea of 'cognitive environment' might shed some light on the problematic of individual yet shared assumptions:

An individual's cognitive environment is the set of all the facts he can perceive or infer: all the facts that are manifest to him. An individual's total cognitive environment is a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities. (Sperber & Wilson 1995, 39.)

In Sperber and Wilson the similarities in the cognitive environments that people share are due to similarities in the physical world we all share. They stress that cognitive environments are not identical, because the abilities of perception and cognition vary between individuals. (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 38-41.) The main idea of the things "manifest" is that while cognitive environments differ between people, they still have the potential to form mutual grounds for cognitive understandings:

Any shared cognitive environment in which it is manifest which people share it we will call a mutual cognitive environment. In a mutual cognitive environment, for every manifest assumption, the fact that it is manifest to the people who share this environment is itself manifest. In other words, in a mutual cognitive environment, every manifest assumption is what we will call mutually manifest. (Sperber & Wilson 1995, 41-42.)

The cognitive environment is more than just a collection of knowledge about the physical environment. It is knowledge about knowledge shared by others, of mutual ideas and interests. It can be argued that it is in the mutually shared cognitive world that structures of ethos emerge and are used in argumentative discourse. What is important is that even between mental frameworks of values that are markedly different in the sense of the particular cultural values they entertain, arguments can be disputed. This entails that a common ground of thought must exist below the culturally differing structures of thought. It can be reasonably argued that it is the mutually manifest cognitive environment that makes the rhetorical technique of ethos possible in the first place – no mutually manifest ideas, no guessing what others might find attractive or plausible.

In the light of Sperber and Wilson, we might view any situation of persuasion as an effort to create or to manipulate the mutually manifest assumptions in an audience. This can only mean, as earlier hinted at, that beneath the explicit differences in cognitive environments a similarity of mental mechanisms is in effect; the basic capability to manifest similar ideas is due to the shared inferential similarity of the human mind. (See sections 3.3. and 3.4.) In this sense argumentation and persuasion can be seen as softening out the explicit differences within a mutually shared world of representations.

As has been noted more than once, it is very typical for people to form different kinds of groups where they have roughly similar value systems at least on some fronts; the differences in manifest ideas have been "softened" to some extent. In Sperber's words these might be called "groups of mutual manifestation", while Perelman calls them "elite audiences". These types of functional groups where

certain similarities in the value-systems of the participants are underlined can be called, for example, ‘discourse communities’, as discussed in the previous section. In Boyer’s words:

Coalitional dynamics. This is another common feature of human interaction. People will spontaneously form groups where a certain degree of trust ensures co-operation and mutual benefits. Biologist Matt Ridley coined the term ‘groupishness’ to describe the human tendency to join groups. Modern ethnic conflicts, but also the harmless social dynamics of fashions or the minor coalitions within any large classroom, office, congregation, etc., illustrate the power of this propensity. (Boyer 2001, 30.)

Such products of human “groupishness” include, of course, political and religious groups. Within these groups it is typically easier to recognize the “right rhetorical moves”, or the explicit structures of meaning associated with values and social behaviour. If one knows one’s audience, if one knows the mental value-framework or, in other words, the values that are mutually manifest in the group one addresses, one knows the legitimate ways to back up one’s argument. Furthermore, if you are very familiar with the explicit forms of expression characteristic of the group you intend to persuade, it will be easier to supply the right “cues” (be they emotional, inferential or expressive) to summon the wanted configurations and dispositions in your audience.

From the point of view of persuasion, the groupishness of human beings has some relevance to the theory of elaboration likelihood that was discussed earlier. For the sake of recall, the elaboration likelihood model supposes that there are two different brain routes for becoming persuaded. The first, or central route, involves cognitive effort, whereby the person draws on prior experience and knowledge to carefully assess and evaluate the central merits of the persuasive message. In deep elaboration the message recipient actively scrutinizes all of the information presented. In contrast, being persuaded by a peripheral route happens without much thinking about information central to the merits of the argument at hand. Persuasion through the peripheral route recognizes that it is not possible for people to exert considerable mental effort in thinking about all of the persuasive messages to which they are exposed. To function in life, people sometimes must act as “lazy organisms” or “cognitive misers” and employ simpler means of evaluation. (Petty, Priester & Wegener 1994, 88-89.)

When elaboration likelihood is low, persuasion-relevant variables like the attractiveness of the source or the convention of the group influence attitudes regardless of whether persuasive discourse contains strong or weak arguments. Specifically, when the elaboration likelihood is low, majority/minority source status is most likely to serve as a persuasion cue. That is, source status, by influencing perceptions of source credibility, competence, or trustworthiness, can provide message recipients with a simple decision rule as to whether they should agree with the message. (Ibid., 103.) When the elaboration likelihood is low, people know that they do not want and/or are not able to evaluate the factual inferential structures of the arguments presented. In this case, if any evaluation is formed at all, it is likely to be the result of relatively simple associations or inferences. When the elaboration likelihood is high, people know that they want to evaluate the

suggested inferential relations of the arguments presented and that they are able to do so. In these high-elaboration situations, persuasion-relevant variables (like source attractiveness) have relatively little impact. (Ibid., 98.) Thus a speaker who has no strong argument (e. g. the argumentative structure would not withstand high-elaboration scrutiny) must try to focus the attention of the audience on low-elaboration cues (authority, convention, appealing to primary emotions etc.). (See chapter 3.5.2. for more discussion on elaboration likelihood.)

It is a rare occurrence that a speaker can know for sure the detailed dispositions of his audience. This happens, for example, when a specialist, say, a genetic scientist, addresses an audience of fellow specialists. In this case an elite audience can easily evaluate the speaker's arguments by the way of deep elaboration. Another possibility is that the speaker is familiar with some of the conventions and shared knowledge that a community audience possesses. The shared knowledge, a mutual manifestation, can then be used to facilitate deep elaboration by building meaningful connections between that which is already known to the audience and the new information presented. It is conceivable that mutually manifest realities can also be used in the opposite manner: to facilitate surface elaboration by substituting facts in the subject-matter being argued with irrelevant material from those conceptual structures which are already known to the audience, and held to be true.

It is possible that in cases where the speaker is actually not very sure about the dispositions of the audience, surface elaboration can best be achieved by appealing, as directly as possible, to folk-theoretical thinking (because everyone does it) and to primary emotions (because everyone has them). In other words, if the speaker can get the intuitive inferential mechanisms of his audience to work in favour of his argument, a persuasive effect in the sense of surface elaboration can be achieved. In this case people operate from the starting point of mutual manifestation. So, it can be theorized that at least in some cases of persuasion, people form conclusions about the given matter under debate through the shared intuitive assumptions about the world and about each other. Their actual deep elaborated knowledge concerning the matter under argumentation (*logos*) is not increased, but conclusions are made based on emotional appeal and social dynamics.

As was discussed previously, the central point of the theory of 'audience' and of *ethos* as a whole is that any situation of oratory or writing directed to someone else contains a construction of both the assumed group of receivers and of the speaker himself. These constructs come to be, at least partially, through the mechanism of intuitive folk psychology and become able to carry persuasive force through mutually manifest cognitive worlds. The mental principles that enable us to postulate agency and hypothesize about the points of view of other people are a significant factor in any occasion of persuasion.

In the *ethos* of persuasion, the speaker attempts to convince his audience that he is a morally sound, reliable person, and so are his listeners, and to remain so they should adopt the suggested ideas. *Ethos* functions as a kind of a platform or frame within which the rational and emotional persuasion takes place. As an analytical concept 'ethos' follows the implicit traces of mutually manifest cognitive environments present in situations of persuasion. In the analysis to follow, it should be possible to see at least three things that pertain to rhetorical *ethos*. Firstly, how the speaker presents himself to the audience (e.g. his speaker-presentation). Secondly, the mutually manifest things in the minds of the audience members upon which the speaker lays weight (e.g. the speaker's construction of the audience). Thirdly,

whether or not the speaker is attempting to facilitate deep or surface elaboration of the proposed assertions. The third factor of ethos (ethos as a whole) is very closely tied to pathos, since, as discussed in the chapter “Pathos”, the appeal to primary emotions can be seen as an effective way to facilitate the surface elaboration of arguments.

3.6. The Toolbox summarized

At this point it is quite easy to see what particular rhetorical and cognitive elements can be combined to create an interesting theoretical starting point for looking at persuasive rhetoric and argumentation from the point of view of folk-theoretical thought. The following is a short summary of the theoretical ideas and the methods of analysis presented above.

Logos

In the analysis of the logos of an argumentative structure the rhetorical part will be a presentation of the different constituting elements (Data, Warrants, etc.) of the argument in question. Revealing the logos of an argument is in a way “anti-rhetoric”. This is because on many occasions rhetorical devices are used to “gift-wrap” arguments in order to obstruct the actual inferential assertions within the argument to some degree. If the core arguments are not fully obstructed, rhetorical devices can sometimes be used to divert the audience’s perceptions away from the probable consequences of the suggested states-of-things. In other words, sometimes rhetorical appeal is used in order to prevent the audience from seeing the bigger picture a given argument belongs to. Presenting the arguments stripped of all decorations has the effect of revealing the internal logic of a given argument and of making the actual inferential assertions within the argument more transparent for evaluation.

The accounts of logos generally define logos as the “facts”, the “grounds” or the “subject-matter” of the argument. While this is partially correct, the logos the analysts aspire to unfold from the tangles of argumentative structures is more than this. The logos of an argument is to be understood as the inferential relations established between the different parts of an argument. The inferential relations inside an argumentative structure are inherently connected with the factual states-of-things suggested in the argument. The factual states or conditions suggested cannot be analyzed in a meaningful manner unless the chains of reasoning utilized to justify the suggested states are analyzed as well.

The inferences within argumentative structures – not formal-logical, but everyday-logical or folk-theoretical in nature – can be analyzed using Stephen Toulmin’s analytical schema in combination with an understanding of the intuitive ontologies people use to categorize their world. The cognitive aspect necessary for the analysis of logos is, as suggested earlier, already imbedded in Stephen Toulmin’s geometrical pattern of analysis. Because Toulmin’s schema outlines the inferential relations between the different parts of an argumentative structure, it can be seen as a template of folk-theoretical reasoning in its own right. However, to make the relevance and connection of the ontological inferential assumptions clearer, an extra layer of analysis, the “inferential ontology”, is added to the pattern.

The use of emotive elements	Encourages rational assessment, induces calm, contemplative emotional states	Encourages impassioned emotional states, diverts attention from facts
Cognitive effect	Deep cognitive elaboration, lasting change in opinion	Surface elaboration, quick adoption of suggested matters, opinion subject to quick change
The rhetorical nature of the persuasion	"Good" rhetoric	"Deceptive" rhetoric

Figure Th1: the emotional systems and rhetoric

Inferential ontology adds a folk-theoretical perspective to the rhetorical analysis of logoi. By looking at argumentative structures from this perspective, it should be possible to outline which natural systems of reasoning affect the persuasiveness of claims. Consequently, within this study the analysis of logoi is to be understood as the analysis of the inferential folk-theoretical elements that make the suggested factual states-of-things seem plausible within given argumentative structures.

Pathos

The analysis of pathos will proceed in an equally simple manner. First the emotional content of the themes will be discussed on the level of rhetorical analysis. This consists of first discerning what type of emotional response is being roused by the argumentation in question, a quite commonsensical procedure. Then the emotive content will be discussed in relation to the factual content (logoi) and social context (ethos). This is necessary because it was established that the emotional element of persuasion is closely embedded in, or in some cases even supplemental to, the other categories of persuasive techniques. This analysis enables us to estimate whether the speaker wishes to use emotive force to facilitate a deep elaboration of facts or a quick surface elaboration of his own agenda. See figure Th1.

The cognitive level of emotions has relevance for the concepts of "deceptive" and "good" rhetoric suggested by many analysts up to and including Aristotle. Rhetoric that has been labelled "deceptive" has to do with obscuring the facts and deriving the persuasive force of an argumentative structure from sources other than factual claims. Rhetoric aimed at facilitating a quick surface elaboration which is brought

about by stressing the emotional content, especially the primary emotions, can be seen as deceptive rhetoric in many occasions. The rhetoric where emotive content is used to create an atmosphere of lucid evaluation can be seen as the opposite, or as “good” rhetoric, aimed at creating lasting cognitive orientations through a deep elaboration of suggested assertions.

While this schema is a greatly simplified outline of what really occurs in emotional persuasion, it can be used to discern the general “feel” of the argumentation. It can be used to see whether the general orientation of an argumentative theme is to draw attention to the problem in order to encourage the audience to mull it over or to encourage a quick decision by obscuring the complex matters involved. Within this study the analysis of pathos is to be understood as the analysis of the cognitive aims and effects of the emotive strategies used within argumentative structures.

Ethos

The third element of Aristotelian *inventio*, *ethos*, is by far the most complex of the three. As discussed, *ethos* includes many layers of social context as well as individual social cognitive elements. In the light of the rhetorical analysis and of the cognitive theories presented, *ethos* can be defined in figure Th2 (see next page).

As already stated, this study does not include social-psychological theory or analysis beyond what must be included within the theoretical boundaries of rhetorical analysis. The rhetorical analysis of *ethos* in this study will be a rather typical analysis of the apparent elements of a speaker’s identification in the themes under study. In other words, the speakers appearing in the statements will be analyzed in the sense of the speaker presentations they wish to give of themselves. At the same time, the kinds of audiences the speakers postulate in their argumentative structures, and how folk-theoretical thought affects the processes of speaker presentation and audience-postulation, will be analyzed.

Within this study the cognitive elements introduced concerning *ethos* have the smallest role in the three categories of *inventio*. The difference brought about by the cognitive approach is apparent only in the introduction of the term ‘mutually manifest cognitive environment’ and in the reflection of the folk-theoretical principles relevant to *ethos*. It is argued here that the idea of the mutually manifest cognitive environments is capable of enriching the idea of *ethos*. Furthermore it is necessary to enrich the rhetorical approach to *ethos* with the idea of mutually manifest cognitive environment to counter the previously discussed criticism by Dan Sperber. The rhetorical technique that Aristotle named *ethos* can be understood as the use and study of mutually manifest cognitive environments in the sense that they form contexts for rhetorical persuasion. If this appears to be the case, Sperber’s criticism of rhetoric that was discussed earlier falls short of mark.

The folk-theoretical mechanisms of thought that are relevant to *ethos* somewhat overlap those already discussed under *logos* and *pathos*. Intuitive psychology is the basis of the human capability to postulate agency, and assess and evaluate social stances, motivations and the points of view of other people in general. So it is by necessity the basic heuristic level of any analysis concerned with human social understandings or persuasion. Shared cognitive environments, “mutual manifestation” and moral feelings become possible because folk-psychological inferences motivate people to function in a certain manner towards other people.




Figure Th2: The ethos-pyramid

The mental level of human ethos should be roughly similar in any human culture, because it is difficult to imagine any society being able to survive without sharing these basic capabilities. Consequently, in argumentative structures that strive to reach a universal audience, structures of ethos that are built on cognitive human universals should emerge.

The higher layers of the “ethos-pyramid” presented above mostly fall outside the scope of this study. Cultural modes of behaviour can be seen as cultural categories of agency that people use as social tools to orientate their behaviour and to adapt to different situations. They incorporate cultural knowledge into the framework of shared cognitive environments. They are cultural patterns for building identity, a set of cultural archetypes, if you will. They give culture-specific guidelines for people in social interaction. For instance, one may opt to identify oneself as a professional, a renegade, a co-operator, a leader, a clown, or what have you.¹⁰⁹ The problematic of social roles and group dynamics are the area of social psychology, and as discussed before, the theoretical approach of this work has been limited to exclude social-psychological theories. The material under study also sets some limitations, since the cultural modes of behaviour are slightly different on the Internet. The behavioural modes are present in interaction and text, but not as prominently as in face-to-face group dynamics. In a nutshell, the complex analysis of ethos will in this study be confined to discerning what kind of mutually manifest cognitive structures the speakers assume of their audiences. And at the same time, what kind of manifest realities they reveal about themselves.

¹⁰⁹This type of sociological theorizing is often termed ‘role theory’ in sociological studies. See, for example, Biddle 2000; Bailey & Yost 2000.

The theoretical research task that was set at the beginning of the study can now be formulated in a more precise manner. The theoretical task was to see whether Aristotelian rhetorical *inventio* and modern cognitive science's theory of folk-theoretical thought can be combined. Now the theoretical task can be formulated as follows:

- 1) Can *logos* be seen as the study of folk-theoretical inference and in what way(s) can folk-theoretical inference be seen as affecting the persuasiveness of claims?

- 2) Can the cognitive theory of elaboration explain the emotive elements of rhetoric Aristotle named *pathos* and in what way(s) can different emotive strategies be discerned within argumentative strategies?

- 3) Can the theory of folk-theoretical social cognition deepen the analysis of *ethos* and in what way(s) can social cognition be seen as affecting the speaker-presentations and audience constructs within argumentative structures?

Although the theoretical discussion concerning *inventio* and the theory of folk-theoretical thought seems promising, the combination must be tested before anything can be said about the functionality of the proposed approach. The third research task remains the same: to test the theory and to find out how rhetorical devices and cognitive folk-theoretical systems of thought are used in Catholic argumentation concerning cloning. The next chapters will present the analysis that both tests the theory and completes the final research task.



Part II: The Analysis

”One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one’s work is terribly important.”

- Bertrand Russell

4. The dominant Official Catholic voices

4.1. Human Dignity

4.1.1. The logos of Human Dignity

The danger with cloning is that we easily lose sight of the dignity of the person, and the sanctity of the act of conjugal love in marriage. We slip into a selfish vision of creating our own kingdom, instead of striving to live in God's kingdom. (s2040, Fr. William Saunders.¹¹⁰)

At first glance, human cloning may not seem to threaten respect for life because it is presented as a means for creating life, not destroying it. Yet it shows disrespect for life in the very act of generating it. Here human life does not arise from an act of love, but is manufactured in the laboratory to preset specifications determined by the desires of others. (s1034, Richard M. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

Therapeutic cloning, the production of human ... embryos to be used in the treatment of certain illnesses and then destroyed, must be addressed and prohibited. This exploitation of human beings ... retains all its ethical repugnance as an even more serious offence against human dignity and the right to life, since it involves human beings (embryos) who are created in order to be destroyed. (Archbishop Renato Martino, Address to the U.N. International Convention Against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings.)¹¹¹

The theme of "Human Dignity" occupies a special place in the field of Catholic Internet discussion of cloning.¹¹² Of the many interesting themes analyzed in this study, "Human Dignity" is by far the most fundamental and pervading. This

¹¹⁰This quote is from a site called "Arlington Catholic Herald", which identifies itself as follows: "... Arlington Catholic HERALD, the official newspaper of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Arlington, Va..." The speaker is presented as "Fr. Saunders is dean of the Notre Dame Graduate School of Christendom College and pastor of Queen of Apostles Parish, both in Alexandria". It is quite probable that many casual browsers might categorise the voice as "Official".

¹¹¹All of the quotations presented in this study are presented in their precise original form. Any syntactical and/or other errors in the textual forms have been preserved. This can sometimes make the quotations difficult to understand, at least in the case of the Lay Voices.

¹¹²The Official themes discussed in this work are "Human Dignity", "Sacred Family" and "Exploitation / Dehumanisation". There were several other Official themes discernible within the material, but they were not as prominent. Some of the other themes were named "Manufactured Humans", which was mostly about the technological nature of the would-be-clones, "Conspiracy", which discussed the differences between the Catholic Church and secular societies in biomedical issues and "Human / Animal Eugenics", which was about the genetic enhancement of animals and humans.

is partially because the idea of human dignity is rather abstract in nature and comprised of several different lines of thought that are rooted in many different Catholic beliefs. The idea of human dignity is a part of, for example, Catholic beliefs concerning what it is to be human, what the meaning of family is, what a good society is and so on. (see section 2.5. Also see CCC, 481-482; 521-525.) Therefore the basic idea of human dignity pervades, one way or another, almost all the Catholic discussion concerning cloning, more so with official themes but also with Professional and Lay themes to a degree. On the other hand, the abstractness of the concept of human dignity makes it a good rhetorical tool. Since the abstract idea of “value” that can and must be associated with human beings is not solely a Catholic idea, the concept of ‘human dignity’ can be used as an argumentative tool in several different contexts where cloning is debated. So, for example, a person approaching the question of cloning from the perspective of Catholic faith and theology can hear the arguments based on human dignity as arguments on behalf of the plan God has made for human beings. At the same time, a person viewing the problematic of cloning from the point of view of secular anti-abortion activity can hear the same argument as an expression of, say, inherent human uniqueness.

As is apparent in the examples above, cloning is seen as harmful to human dignity in two main ways. This is chiefly because the arguments based on dignity are aimed against two fundamentally different processes: live-birth cloning and therapeutic cloning. These two opposed techniques translate into two different lines of argumentation. First, there are arguments stating that the method of creating human beings by cloning is degrading in itself, irrespective of the actual outcome or purpose of the cloning process. The other line of argumentation is aimed at stopping “therapeutic cloning”, a stem cell harvesting procedure where embryos are destroyed for their “raw material”. (see chapter 2.3.) In the second argumentative structure the factor causing the loss of human dignity is not primarily the mechanical process of procreation but the purpose and the aim of the cloning process.

The first Catholic Official voice to be analyzed within the theme of “Human Dignity” calls for the cloning industry to stop because cloning as a method of human procreation damages human dignity. As a Catholic concept, the idea of human dignity arises from many different doctrinal roots, but most clearly from the teaching according to which each human being is created as an individual by a unique creative act of God. (See section 2.5.; see also <http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p4.htm>.) The argument where cloning as a means of procreation is seen as degrading to human dignity utilizes as its warranting factor the assumption that the natural conjugation of male and female DNA in sexual intercourse (after marriage) is the dignified way of procreation. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 587-601). In Toulmin’s schema the argumentative structure appears as in figure D1 (see next page).

It is emphasized in the above argumentative structure that procreation by cloning is contrary to what God designed and planned for human beings. The backing for the warrants stems from the Catholic tradition: since the dignity of a human being is due to his/her status as a creation of God, replacing the process of procreative mystery with technological processes is considered as damaging to this status. Hence, it damages the dignity of the person, who in the Catholic view has the right to be conceived in the manner God intended.




Figure D1: Catholic view of procreative dignity

The second recurring argumentative structure built on the assertion that cloning violates human dignity opposes therapeutic cloning. Human embryos are cloned and then destroyed for stem cells in the process of therapeutic cloning, and this is perceived as a serious violation of human dignity by the Catholic voices. The conclusion is similar to that of the previous example, that the procedure violates human dignity. The warranting force behind the argument is, however, quite different:

The principle that is introduced, in the name of health and well-being, in fact sanctions a real and proper discrimination among human beings, in virtue of the time of their development (thus an embryo is worth less than a fetus, and a fetus less than a baby, and a baby less than an adult)... (s1013, Vatican Press Office statement 26.11.2001.)

Here the warranting force establishing the cloning procedure as degrading is based on the assumption that human embryos are just as valuable and human as adult human beings, and as such possess the same human dignity. The argumentative structure is based on the Catholic belief that a human being is a full-fledged person from the moment of conception. In Toulmin's schema the argumentation appears as in figure D2.




Figure D2: Catholic view of stem cell degradation.

While the concept of ‘human dignity’ is quite abstract and ephemeral in nature, the logos of the Catholic voice demanding human dignity is rather straightforward in both of its forms. The first variation where the whole process of cloning in itself is considered degrading is firmly rooted to an important element of Catholic theology. As was mentioned in the discussion of Catholic theology, in Catholic understanding humans are seen as born according to God’s plan, which includes being created by God, being born as the result of the “procreative mystery” and being conceived in a traditional core family. (see section 2.5. See also CCC 630-631.) The second line of argumentation is more rooted in a very generally shared ethical idea, where the use of persons solely as a means to an end is considered inhuman and degrading. The “dignity” expressed in the arguments is conceived in two different manners.

First of all, human dignity depends on following the divine plan, or at least the dignity of human beings is violated if the plan of God concerning reproduction and the idea of family is compromised. Thus it might be said that in the logos of the theme Human Dignity the concept of ‘human dignity’ is a function of following the Divine Will. On the other hand, even if the plan of God is compromised, the blastocysts produced in the manner described as “undignified” are still as dignified as blastocysts fertilized in the traditional manner. What can be concluded here is that the dignity of an embryo is never in question, the voices are more worried about insulting the Divine Will by either compromising God’s plan for proper procreation or mass murdering ensouled human beings in the embryonic state. Therefore, what has become the argumentative structure about “Human Dignity” is actually about obedience to Divine Will and about heeding the Fifth Commandment.

4.1.2. The pathos of Human Dignity

Thus, instead of the normative fertilization that takes place with the cooperation of the male and female, there would be chance fertilization imposed by scientists on the enucleated egg. We would have then the scientific rape of an enucleated ovum versus the loving, normative merging of male and female gametes. (s1087, Position of the Catholic Medical Association on Human Cloning.¹¹³)

Human cloning must also be judged negative with regard to the dignity of the person cloned, who enters the world by virtue of being the “copy” (even if only a biological copy) of another being: this practice paves the way to the clone’s radical suffering, for his psychic identity is jeopardized by the real or even by the merely virtual presence of his “other”. (s1060, Pontifical Academy for Life.)

It is not untypical for anyone to witness argumentative discourse where questions of the “value” of human beings are debated. Such discussions might include questions concerning social equality, free speech, euthanasia or pre-arranged marriage, to name a few random examples. Discussion concerning the “dignity” of human beings is another example of discourses on the value of human beings. What is common in questions concerning the value of human beings is that they seem to easily stir emotions. This is certainly true for both the matter of human cloning and general discussions about the dignity of human beings. The talk concerning human dignity stirs emotional responses because as humans we are usually interested in what is said about our worth as human beings – about what brings our human dignity about and what it entails. If and when points of view differ, an emotionally heated argument easily surfaces.

Catholic Internet discussions on cloning are generally combative in nature. This is partially because the Internet context tends to aggravate dichotomies (see chapter 2.2.), and when emotionally charged concepts are debated in a combative environment, things can and will become ugly. “Human Dignity”, however, is not exceptionally harsh in the pathos utilized when compared, for example, to the Professional voices analyzed later on. The Catholic emotive strategy within the theme of “Human Dignity” is twofold. The first strategy, which recurs throughout the Catholic discussion, is aimed at making the technological aspect of cloning seem as ugly as possible. The second focuses on describing the undignified nature of the possible situations that the would-be clone might have to face in life.

In the first emotive strategy the proponents of human dignity attempt to make the process of cloning seem as disgusting as possible by comparing it to sexual crime and presenting it in stark contrast to ‘normative’ procreation. Looking at

¹¹³ The position of the Catholic Medical association is expressed by Paul A. Byrne (M.D.) who is identified as the President of the association. The text from which the quote is taken from starts with: “Catholic teaching on the dignity and uniqueness of every human is founded upon Biblical truths...” It is likely that many readers associate the argumentation within the text as representing the official stance of the Church.

the quoted examples above, the rhetoric of disgust is most apparent in the position of the Catholic Medical Association, where the process of cloning is portrayed as a “scientific rape” of an ovum versus a “loving, normative merging of male and female gametes”. The point of the argument is to create an emotional transfer: the dignity of the cloning procedure is the same as the dignity of a rape. In addition, there certainly are many possible audiences who view rape as a most undignifying act; it is extremely improbable that anyone in any given audience would hold rape in high regard. Thus, if the inference between rape and cloning is accepted, the argument gains emotive strength. The argument plays on the natural human social tendency to abhor unnecessary violence and on the natural fear of being a target of random violence, sexual or otherwise. The emotive strategy does not encourage an assessment of facts but aims at instilling a profound fear and transfer of negative emotive content.

The emotional cue is effective, although in the context of Catholic teaching (see the discussion on Catholic theology) a child born as a result of a rape would not be considered any less dignified than a child born as a result of “loving, normative merging”. Since the argument is aimed at establishing that indignity is inherent in the process of cloning, not in the cloned person himself, the argumentation proceeds in line with Catholic teaching. The rhetoric of disgust is also utilized in underlining the degrading nature of stem cell research:

It is all too obvious that this appeal to the criterion of health is counting on the complicity of collective selfishness: the linguistic ploy used to blunt the moral significance of human cloning (the reason why today the term “embryoid body” has been invented for an embryo grown in vitro by means of cloning and intended to be deliberately destroyed) expresses the basic unease in knowing that plans are being made to produce, use and eliminate some of us. (s1068, Centre of Bioethics of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy.¹¹⁴)

“Therapeutic cloning” or “cloning-for-medical-purposes” creates an emotionally charged field of argumentation because of the Catholic idea that blastocysts are ensouled from the moment of fertilization. It is noteworthy that in order to underline the repugnance of stem cell research, it is necessary to emphasize the humanity of the blastocysts. In the above example the debater adopts a position where blastocysts are considered fully human and expresses his repugnance at their destruction. This has the important effect of creating an emotional transfer where the emotions pertaining to the destruction of innocent persons are transferred to concern the destruction of blastocysts. As a side note of ethos in the argument, the speaker brings his emotional persuasion closer to the audience by referring to the destroyed blastocysts as “us”.

The second emotive strategy concerning the violation of human dignity that cloning would create is not aimed at the technological processes involved. The strategy focuses on describing the detrimental elements inherent in the situation a cloned person would face in life:

114 The text this quote has been taken from is explicitly identified as being published by the Vatican.

...since the "clone" was produced because he resembles someone who was "worthwhile" cloning, he will be the object of no less fateful expectations and attention, which will constitute a true and proper attack on his personal subjectivity. (s1066, The Pontifical Academy for Life, Statement on Cloning, June 25, 1997.)

The cloned child would be produced without genetic parents, as a copy of some existing person, perhaps someone who had recently died (a replacement child), or perhaps someone still alive (a 'designer baby'). Even if the clone survived to live a healthy life, he or she would live in the shadow of the person cloned, under pressure to be like the person he or she was made to resemble. (s1082, Rev David Jones, Director, The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics.¹¹⁵)

The emotional problems people have and the stress an individual faces when confronting the expectations of society are quite common subjects of discussion. It is safe for the speaker to assume that many potential audiences are familiar with this discourse and probably have experienced unpleasant stress at some point in their lives. The statement of the Pontifical Academy plays on commonly shared fear of underachievement and on a shared understanding of how unpleasant stress feels. The statement displays a scary picture of the unpleasant expectations a clone would have to face as a person designed for a certain task or as a genetically manipulated "superman".

A similar argumentative strategy combining ethos and pathos can be found in the example by the Pontifical Academy quoted previously (s1060), where the clone's mental health as a "copy" of another human being is put to the question. The Catholic voices argue that existing as a "copy" of another person is not dignified and may cause mental problems for the cloned person. In this case the cloned person is imagined as being under unfair expectations, perhaps expected to copy the achievements of the genetic predecessor.

All in all, the emotive factors in the Catholic Official voice calling for human dignity can be grouped into two categories. The first stands on the central tenet of Catholic doctrine: humanity has fallen and has a tendency to go the wrong way; more indignity to the whole of humanity would be caused if cloning were not to be stopped. The emotive appeal is enhanced with general remarks on the repugnance and horridness of the cloning industry. In this case the dignity of the clone is compromised because the method of procreation involved in his birth resembles rape, not the act of love God intended it to be. In the case of the stem cell industry the creation of blastocysts is likened to the utilitarian murder of adult persons. This activity is seen as fundamentally damaging the dignity of the cloned blastocysts who are denied the basic rights of existence and hence all human dignity. The second emotive strategy aims at rousing sympathy and emotional identification with the undignified situation of a would-be clone. The course of the cloned person's life is imagined as shadowed by pressing expectations and faltering identity, which may prove mentally disastrous.

¹¹⁵The site this quote has been taken from is identified as follows: "The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics exists to help Catholics and others to explore the Church's position on bioethical issues..."

As a whole, the emotive strategy in “Human Dignity” projects a threat to the dignity of all humanity. There seems to be an underlying emotive hint of a “slippery slope”: if this undignified action is tolerated, then humanity will drift further into oblivion where dignity becomes forgotten and humans are treated as merchandise. This strategy is meant to facilitate a mentality of anxiety in the audience: opposing the issues of cloning now is presented as the action whereby the frightening future may be averted. So, the pathos of “Human Dignity” is a form of fear appeal, although not nearly as clearly as the structures of pathos in many other themes within this study.

4.1.3. The ethos of Human Dignity

The Catholic Church encourages efforts to find new ways to reduce human suffering and treat life-threatening illness. However, human cloning violates fundamental ethical and moral norms, and is to be condemned unequivocally. (s1011, Bishop Wilton D. Gregory of Belleville, The President of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

Over many centuries the Church has treated in depth the human dignity of each and every individual human being from the beginning of life to natural death. It is this human dignity that is violated, we assert, by the cloning of human beings. The foundation for this dignity, as the Church sees it, is the fact that each human being is called into existence and, maintained in existence, by a unique creative act of God. (Father Albert S. Moraczewski to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in Washington, D.C., on March 13, 1997.)

The logos and pathos of the theme “Human Dignity” were built on two distinct lines of argumentation. The central tenet of the voice is, on the one hand, that human beings “deserve” to be born in the normal biological manner, through the natural means of procreation set by God. If this is not the case, multiple problems follow. On the other hand, human dignity is seen as compromised in medical research that uses human embryos as the biological material for the research. As mentioned before, the theme of human dignity is in one way or another entwined into almost all Catholic Official argument, and in several cases it is the central structure of the arguments. It can be reasonably supposed that the theme of dignity recurs so often in discussions because the speakers perceive it as a thematic that can reach a wide variety of audiences.

The speaker appearing in the argumentative structure of “Human Dignity” has a very authoritarian tone more often than not. The Official Church voices defending their vision of human dignity adopt the position of moral shepherds of the world.¹¹⁶ This is at least partially due to the fact that the idea of human dignity is rooted in many central doctrines of the Church. Where the matters argued stand on essential

¹¹⁶The authoritarian style Catholic Official and Professional voices use is by no means an unique feature of Catholic rhetoric. In fact, it has been argued that authoritarian rhetoric is a common feature of all religious rhetoric (O'Rourke Boyle 2001, 662.)

points of Catholic doctrine, the expression of Catholic authority and apostolic succession appear to take precedence in the self-presentation of the speakers. The Official Voices assume the position of those who possess absolute truth, with minimal room for discussion left for their audience. More so than in other Internet materials, within the theme of “Human Dignity” the speaker-constructions of the Official Voices seem to reflect the Catholic hierarchy. There is a gap between the debaters and their supposed lay audiences – Catholic speakers that present themselves as Official Voices of the Church express authority because it is their mandate by tradition. The manner the voices address their supposed audiences suggests that the speakers are certain that their audiences share the same core of moral beliefs as well as a belief in traditional authority. The vision of the universality of the Church is evident in Father Moraczewski’s statement: “Over many centuries the Church has treated in depth the human dignity of each and every individual human being from the beginning of life to natural death.” Here it is emphasized for the audience that the actions of the Church have been the pivotal centre for the preservation of human dignity for many centuries.

The same vision of apostolic authority is evident in the argumentation of the Catholic Medical Association:

The human cloning project represents a terrible aberration -- science without ethics, technology without morality, man without God. This aberration replaces the sanctity of life of a human person with a "quality of life" judgment about the human person. (s1087, Position of the Catholic Medical Association on Human Cloning.)

In the above example the arguments on “quality of life” are not seen as ethical arguments at all, establishing the “sanctity of life” as the only plausible ground of ethical discussion. In the context of Catholic theology, this is a good example of the tension that exists between the Church and society. The principle expressed in the Catholic Catechism states that the actions of civil authorities and society in general are to be weighed against the Catholic view of what makes human beings dignified. (see section 2.5. See also CCC 600-601.) The basis of becoming dignified is ultimately rooted in mystery. For some audiences the argument for the “quality of life” might be quite acceptable in the context of the concept of ‘human dignity’. However, this argumentative structure leads to the conclusion that scientific research defending “quality of life” without Catholic ethics is unethical and thus an aberration to be resisted. The argument seems to be directed at audiences who are predisposed to be oppositional to arguments that regard “quality of life” as a valid ethical value.

According to the views of the Catholic Medical Association “The cloning of human beings would be a violation of the natural moral law. Research in cloning as it applies to man is degrading”. Here the debater claims that in the sense of Catholic theology, cloning is something that human beings find unacceptable and naturally resist. So the position presented here is that by their innate moral orientations humans find cloning evil. The speaker appearing in the voices calling for human dignity is, first and foremost, an apostle standing on succession who expresses the fundamental way things in the world are supposed to work. The argumentative stances the speakers adopt are strongly rooted in Catholic theology.

The invitation to join those upholding human dignity is also extended to the scientific community:

The most urgent need now seems to be that of re-establishing the harmony between the demands of scientific research and indispensable human values. The scientist cannot regard the moral rejection of human cloning as a humiliation; on the contrary, this prohibition eliminates the demiurgic degeneration of research by restoring its dignity. The dignity of scientific research consists in the fact that it is one of the richest resources for humanity's welfare. (s1066, The Pontifical Academy for Life, Statement on Cloning, June 25, 1997.)

Argumentation addressed to the community of science reflects the Catholic teaching according to which science as such is a good thing, but can sometimes go awry and reach too far. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 82-86.) The voice in the above example seems uncertain of the effectiveness of the ethical position based on apostolic succession, and therefore the argument is built around "indispensable human values". As a result, the argumentation assumes a slightly less authoritarian tenor. However, adopting a position contradictory to that of the Catholic Church is seen as "demiurgic degeneration", which is understood as a false vision of the godhead of science, brought about by the sinfully proud nature of human beings. As stated in the Catechism, in the Catholic view humans are active co-operators in God's plan, scientific enquiry included. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 89-95.) The argumentative structure outlines for the audience the Catholic position on to what extent humans can co-operate in God's plan. As an interesting note, it seems that the things presented as those of value within the argument (science as a resource for humanity's welfare) seem to be aimed at an audience that might well regard "quality of life" arguments as valid ones. So the argumentation appears to be aimed at a different audience than that of the previous example.

The primary audience assumed within the argument, consistent with the view of science expressed in the Catechism, is seen as a group potentially gone terribly astray, that might still be able to hear and take heed of the divine warning. The scientific community is perceived as wanting what is good, but also as subject to original sin, which causes it to aspire too far. This is why the Church draws the line of co-operation to exclude cloning. The same theme is echoed by the Catholic Medical Association:

It [cloning] destroys the dignity of human nature by treating the human person as a material commodity to be manipulated according to whim and fancy. Man appoints himself to displace God in creation. The attempt to displace God in the creation of the human person is an extreme example of arrogance. (s1087, Position of the Catholic Medical Association on Human Cloning.)

In addition to arguments directed at an elite audience of Catholic believers and the scientific community, there are other arguments more clearly directed at a universal audience:

Cloning is not wrong because cloned human beings lack human dignity... it is wrong because they have human dignity, and deserve to come into the world in ways that respect this dignity. (s1018, Cardinal William Keeler of Baltimore.)

As discussed, the process of cloning is seen in Catholic thought as a technological violation of God's will. In the Catholic view the essential dignity that God has bestowed on the natural processes of procreation is damaged by the technological elements of cloning. The argumentative position expressed above encloses the whole of humanity under the same rule of dignity, and associates this concept of dignity with a certain biological and social process. The potential audience encompasses all people included within the described processes, making it extremely universal in nature.

The audience manifest in the assumptions of the speakers is typically of two different qualities. The first and foremost assumption according to which the speakers construct themselves is an assumption of a elite audience of Catholic believers that is seen as easily appreciative of the authority conveyed by the tradition of apostolic succession. Other assumed audiences are the scientific community and a universal audience that is approached through appealing to ethical positions and humanistic ideals considered widely shared. The more the core arguments on human dignity are based on the specific Catholic doctrinal grounds, the stronger is the authoritarian note of the self-presentation of the speakers. The more universal the assumed audience is, the less authoritarian the expression becomes. The arguments directed to a more universal audience also seem to be based on something widely shared other than theological beliefs.

4.1.4. Cognitive view of Human Dignity

Logos

The most fundamental theme in the Catholic cloning discussion incorporates many interesting and equally fundamental elements of folk theories. As discussed before, the first structure within the theme suggests that cloning as a process of procreation offends human dignity, and the second opposes the therapeutic implementation of cloning in stem cell harvesting. The voice opposing stem cell harvesting is often built on an ethic not explicitly based on Catholic doctrine. This is possible because it is generally accepted that killing people for the medical benefit of others is wrong, or at least not unproblematic. The voice arguing for everyone's right to be born in a proper and dignified way is more theological, and is essentially based on Catholic doctrine.

However, although the argumentation for human procreative dignity is presented as profoundly rooted in religious ethics, the theological and religious backings offered leave a few questions open. First of all, what is this "dignity as a creature" that is tarnished if sexual procreation is replaced by a technological process? Why is it so important for God, according to the voices, that people are born as the result of sex? How and why is essential human dignity defined by the processes utilized in biological procreation?

The key word here is ‘essential’. The theological expression of the concept of ‘human dignity’ is primarily a form of cognitive essentialism discussed earlier (see chapter 3.4.). In the argumentation concerning “Human Dignity” the idea of “dignity” is conceptualized in an ideal-essential way. For the sake of recall, ideal-essential concepts are used in reasoning about abstract instances that are understood as having an essential core. Thus, as already discussed, the essence of ‘goodness’ is a pure, abstract quality that is imperfectly realized in real-world instances of people doing good deeds. In this case, ‘dignity’ is seen as the abstract, essential core element of humanity that both defines the way human beings should be treated as well as how they should treat themselves. The abstract concept of ‘dignity’ is inferred about by both causal- and sortal-essential inferences. For example, the voices that claim that “people have the right to be born in a dignified manner” (meaning through normal processes of procreation) incorporate a causal essence into the concept of ‘dignity’. In this case the ideal-essential quality of ‘dignity’ is seen as somewhat dependent on biological causality, or on the causal-essential process perceived in procreation via folk-biological inference.

On the other hand, the voices that claim that “blastocysts should not be destroyed because they are fully human despite the manner of their procreation” are arguing on the basis of a sortal essence. In this case the blastocyst is described in ways that give it sortal-essential qualities that make it resemble a person. In folk-biological reasoning the apparent features of a member of a given species are intuitively attributed to result from an essential core that all members of the species share. (see chapter 3.4.) In attributing human features to a blastocyst, Catholic speakers are appealing to intuitive inference that the blastocyst is essentially human. So, the two lines of argumentation within the theme of “Human Dignity” actually lead in different ways to the attribution of an ideal essence. The arguments focusing on God’s plan and on the right to be born in a dignified manner gain persuasive force from causal-essential inference and folk-biological causal reasoning. The arguments that focus on the inherent humanity of blastocysts utilise elements of sortal-essential thinking which is connected with the ideal-essential attribution of human dignity. Because ideal-essential concepts are very abstract and ephemeral, both lines of argumentation are possible.¹¹⁷

In the quoted examples an essential feature of ‘being human’, in this case ‘dignity’, is passed on in procreation. The transmission of this essential feature by biological processes is perceived as normative: the preservation of the essential feature is not possible without the biological process. If there is no sexual procreation (an intuitively natural biological process) but a technological process instead, the essential feature of the “dignity” of the child is compromised. However, this ‘dignity’ is not lost, only damaged. What loses the dignity attributed to it is the idea of procreation itself. It can be assumed from the examples that the Catholic concept of ‘procreation’ has an ideal essence.¹¹⁸ The essential features of being human (having a soul in Catholic thought) are transmitted no matter the means of conception, but

¹¹⁷Interestingly, it seems that in the cases of ideal essentialism where the idealized essential feature is linked to biology (such as ensoulment or ‘human dignity’), other forms of essentialistic reasoning typically support the ideal-essential inference. Although highly hypothetical, examining the connections between different kinds of essentialistic reasoning might shed some light on the persuasiveness of religious rhetoric.

¹¹⁸This is by no means a great find. In Catholic teaching sexual procreation is essentialised by directly linking it with the Divine plan and with the relationship between God and man. (see CCC 446-448.)




Figure D5: Causal-essential thought in “Human Dignity”

the essential dignity which belongs to the process of procreation as a result of Divine Will is tarnished in cloning. Using Catholic terms, it might be said that the essentialistic nature of the child as a creature of God is compromised in cloning (or to a lesser degree in artificial insemination). What is utterly destroyed in this case is the ideal essence attributed to the process of procreation. The opposition to cloning offered by the Catholic speakers is undeniably rooted in theological principles, but it strongly appears that the theological principles themselves are based, at least partially, on intuitive essential reasoning.¹¹⁹ So it appears that the ontological reasoning about the ‘essence’ of the human being and the theological reasoning about ‘dignity’ in the procreative process are interconnected. The suggested pattern of folk-theoretical reasoning is presented in figure D5.

As previously discussed, according to the human tendency to draw folk-biological conclusions, members of a given species are seen as sharing a similar essence, and this essence is transmitted via biological procreation. In biological intuition cats beget cats; kittens are not built, nor are other living kinds. Being made or manufactured by technological processes is a property of artefacts. It seems that when people think about cloning this intuitively upheld essential chain of inference is broken. The argumentative structure in ‘human dignity’ claims that the essential features of a biological organism are lost if processes that seem natural to folk-biological reasoning are replaced by technological processes. If a given audience follows the inferential cues given in the argument, the claim gains credibility through folk-biological intuitive reasoning. This appears to be at least one of the

¹¹⁹This is a big assumption, and making it scientifically valid would require much further study of the Catholic doctrine from the point of view of cognitive science. Still, the idea is fascinating.




Figure D4: Essentialistic reasoning in “Human Dignity”

reasons why ‘human dignity’ is perceived to be so dependent on “normative” biological reproduction. Sexual intercourse is an essential part of the natural process of procreation, so separating it from procreation violates the natural folk-biological assumptions. In Catholic tradition, the intuitive categorization of biological causality has been transformed into a doctrine: the natural processes necessary for biological procreation are seen as an expression of Divine Will.

The second line of Catholic argumentation focused on the degrading nature of stem cell research. The harvesting procedure that results in the destruction of large amounts of blastocysts was considered as going extremely against what is considered dignified for human beings. It is essential for the integrity of the argumentative structure opposing stem cell research that folk-biological essentialism determines the status of the blastocysts. As discussed before, people tend to hold that biological features themselves do not determine the essential nature of an organism. Thus a cat is a cat even if it has no tail, has lost its whiskers, has only three legs, no fur etc. (see chapter 3.4.) What is important for the biological intuitive inference to categorize the creature as a member of the species “cat” is the fact that it was born from a cat. Blastocysts share no biological or psychological similarity with the adult human beings they are being compared with. So, the likening of blastocysts to persons cannot easily be made, for example, by describing the feelings of a blastocyst. The likening of blastocysts to adult humans in a credible manner demands that the essentialistic intuitions of the possible audiences be activated. The activation of essentialistic inference becomes possible, because no matter the sortal quality of the blastocysts, their biological origin makes them human for folk-biological reasoning. By activating folk-biological essentialism it becomes possible to categorize the blastocysts as persons despite their apparent lack of the sortal-

essential qualities that would qualify them as persons. In this manner the biological intuitions give the argumentation backing force, although they might also be activated in the opposite manner. This is presented in figure D4.

The argumentative structures that are presented as a religiously based ethic are, at least partially, based on intuitive assumptions concerning the essential nature of living kinds. In “Human Dignity” both central lines of argumentation can be seen as depending on essentialistic inferences and are backed by Catholic doctrines which in turn can be seen as based on essentialistic inferences. It is conceivable that the widely shared ground of these mental mechanisms gives the arguments persuasive force and appeal beyond the scope of the actual facts or data they carry.

Pathos

As was noted in the examination of the rhetorical side of the pathos of “Human Dignity”, discussions of human value easily rouse emotional responses and thus make good grounds for emotional appeal. The emotional persuasion within the theme was implemented in three different ways: by demonizing cloning technology, by emphasizing the humanity of blastocysts (in cloning-for-medical-purposes) and by describing the situation a cloned person would face in life as inherently damaging to his dignity. All three lines of argumentation can be seen as gaining persuasive force from essentialist accounts of natural biological processes in the sense that natural processes. The increased persuasive force can be seen as resulting from the presentation of natural processes as emotionally rewarding and the presentation of deviations from the natural norm as disgusting, frightening or outright evil.

An emphasis on the violation of folk-theoretical intuitions can be seen in the line of argumentation that demonizes cloning as a technique so far removed from normative biological procreation that the metaphor of “technological rape versus normative, loving merging” is used. As discussed, the conceptualization that living kinds reproduce through biological “merging” and give birth to their own kinds (cats to kittens etc.) is a widely shared folk-biological universal. (see chapter 3.4.) When the argumentation focuses on emphasizing the technological, unnatural elements of cloning, the main point is to aggravate the natural feelings of oddness that people experience when intuitive ontologies are violated. To say that people automatically experience fear as a result of such violations may be an overstatement, but the feelings brought about by situations where folk-theoretical intuitions are broken certainly create an environment ripe for fear appeal. The argument gains emotive force by associating human value (ideal-essential attribution) with folk-biological intuitions and contrasting those intuitions with the process of cloning.

The argumentative structures where the essential qualities of “being human” are associated with a very early embryo are also built, at least partially, on folk-theoretical intuitions. The argument against the destruction of blastocysts has much to gain from folk-biological intuitions where the individuals of a species are perceived as having an “essential core”. By emphasizing the biological and psychological humanity of blastocysts, the speakers aim to activate the folk-biological, naive sociological and folk-psychological intuitions people utilize when reasoning about human beings in general. If the blastocyst was conceptualized as “biomass”, it would be much more difficult to emote any given audience to feel sympathy for it or to be horrified at its destruction. In other words, activating the

folk-psychological inference of the given audience helps to facilitate emotional appeal. To associate a blastocyst with a full person is to influence the intuitions of listeners in such a way as to make the emotional responses of the audience serve the argumentative aim. In healthy social cognition the destruction of defenceless human beings is, under normal circumstances, regarded as repugnant. An effective emotional transfer is created by activating the social emotive structures that oppose wanton destruction and associating them with the intuitive feelings of strangeness produced by the concept of cloning.

The third method of emotional persuasion used within the theme was to emote the audience by describing the undignified situation the clone would face after birth. “Existing as a copy of someone else” was seen as a violation of a person’s value as a human being. In this case the emotional appeal is achieved in two different ways. Firstly, it can be supposed that the example causes an emotional response from a given audience because the way the situation of a cloned person is described violates their social and psychological intuitions. Intuitively people are conceptualized as individual agents with their more or less unique motivations and personal qualities, including the physical features that make them recognizable. To think of a group of people who are just “copies” seems intuitively at odds with the way individual value is attributed to persons. This way the argumentative structure gains emotional force. Furthermore, the quality of “being a copy” is a feature of artefacts, not living kinds.

The second aim of the third emotive strategy is to persuade listeners to feel sympathy for the clone who must face “fateful expectations and attention” from his surroundings. It is plausible the argumentation calls to play intuitive folk-psychological assumptions and also appeals to the primary emotion of compassion. (see chapter 3.5.2.) People are able to imagine the suggested situations and the emotional distress described by their intuitive folk-psychological capabilities. The emotive cue persuades people to oppose cloning by making them feel that nobody should have to face the distress the would-be clone would face in life.

The argumentative position concerning “human value”, in this case expressed as “human dignity”, is very abstract in a conceptual sense. It is interesting to note that it seems that the processes of value attribution rely heavily on folk intuitions. This may mean that commonsensical value systems in general are strongly driven by folk-theoretical reasoning and essentialism. This is, however, a too big a generalization to be effectively tested within this study. Yet what becomes apparent, when examining the inferential structures of Catholic arguments on ‘human dignity’, is that cloning violates many intuitive cognitive principles. Human cloning has the potential to generate fear because it is a deviation from the intuitive accounts that humans entertain concerning the reproduction of natural kinds (mostly folk-biological accounts, but in the case of human reproduction, naive sociological and folk psychological accounts as well). Cloning seems to challenge widely shared intuitive understandings of what it means to be a person, and this creates an effective channel to utilize fear appeal.

The pathos of the Official Catholic voices calling for human dignity is not, however, mainly intended to cause fear and revulsion, nor is it chiefly meant to facilitate a quick surface elaboration of the suggested states-of-things. In fact, the pathos of the “Call for Human Dignity” is very temperate compared to many

Catholic voices on the Internet, which are extensively built around fear appeal, as will become apparent further on in the analysis.¹²⁰

Ethos

The speaker appearing in the Official Catholic voices of the theme “Human Dignity” presents himself in two main ways. The first is very authoritarian, drawing directly from the tradition of apostolic succession. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 29-35.) The authoritative argumentation appears to be directed at those perceived as sharing the mutually manifest inferential basis (see section 3.5.3.) of the Church’s authority and infallibility. As the authoritative self-presentation is the primary presentation that the Official voices adopt, it can be concluded that the primary audience the speakers are trying to persuade is one of Catholic believers. Thus it also can be concluded that the primary effort of the Catholic voices in “Human Dignity” is to fortify the opinions of the elite audiences who already belong to its ranks, and therefore share the mutually manifest beliefs that justify the style the speakers adopt.

It may seem rather surprising that argumentation built around a concept like ‘human dignity’ is meant primarily for an elite audience. It is easy to see that such a concept is an efficient rhetorical tool for approaching a universal audience: humans generally like to be highly valued, and arguments that seem to promote that value should be well accepted by many possible audiences. What becomes apparent, then, is that the Catholic voices are in a certain way “suspicious” of the universal audience. While everyone likes to be highly valued, in the context of Catholic theology it is not necessarily the case that people know how to best dignify themselves. In other words, the mutually manifest conceptual environments of Catholic believers and the “general public” may vary tremendously when it comes to questions of what determines ‘value’ or ‘dignity’. Thus the essentialist assumptions concerning ‘dignity’ in the core of the argumentative structure also make the Catholic concept of ‘dignity’ less usable (in a rhetorical sense) than, for example, the concept of ‘quality of life’.

This orientation towards the elite audiences can also be seen as an attempt at “good” rhetoric. The speakers are not trying to sell their merchandise based on wrappings, so to speak. To explicitly contrast the Catholic concept of ‘dignity’ with ‘quality of life’ is what might be called a fair rhetorical move. It would be easy for a speaker to superficially equate the Catholic concept of ‘dignity’ with ‘quality of life’ in an attempt to reach a wider audience base. However, as it stands in the primary presentation, the concept of ‘human dignity’ is connected to an ethical configuration that the speaker presents as noble and virtuous, while any other opinion is implicitly connected to brutal and ugly things, such as “infanticide”. This is a typical rhetorical device, one that Burke would call “demonization”. (see chapter 3.5.3.) It increases the unifying force of mutual manifestation for those who agree, while leaving those who oppose with the difficult task of justifying their views, thus creating an oppositional elite audience.

¹²⁰The theological ground that gives the Catholic cloning discussion its context is quite well suited to facilitate fear, because the intuitive accounts that are being violated are also central building blocks for the doctrine itself. This will be discussed further in the chapters of analysis to come.

The secondary self-presentation of the speaker evident in the texts discussing “Human Dignity” is based less on the idea of authoritative apostolic succession and appears more “generally humanistic”. The arguments presented here are aimed at the wide audience base that the apostles in the primary presentation chose not to approach. Here the malleability of an abstract concept like ‘dignity’ becomes apparent: while it was contrasted to the utilitarian conceptualization of ‘quality of life’ when speaking to elite audience, it is easily identified with such utilitarian thinking when approaching a more universal audience base. The universal appeal in the argumentative structures in question is brought about by the way they utilize intuitive cognitive assumptions – folk biology and –psychology – and so can be considered extremely useful in persuading a universal audience.

To sum up, the Official Catholic voices calling for human dignity are authoritarian and uncompromising when addressing an elite audience. In a nutshell, it can be said that both speaker and audience constructs within the theme of “Human Dignity” revolve around the ‘sanctity of life’ and the ‘quality of life’. In the case of persuading elite audiences and affecting their mutually manifest belief-environments, ‘dignity’ takes the appearance of ‘sanctity’. When the Catholic voices approach a universal audience, ‘dignity’ takes the appearance of ‘quality’. The unreflexive construction of the authoritarian position the voices adopt is more appealing to those already sharing the mutually manifest reality of the infallibility of the Catholic Church and apostolic succession. In terms of naive sociology the speakers align themselves in an authoritarian way when addressing an audience they assume to share the same mutually manifest belief-environment. In the elite environment the generally held intuitive social values (like quality of life) can be criticized and presented as contradictory to the “divine truth”. When addressing other audiences, the speakers adopt the position of the generally held intuitive social orientations (e.g. destroying helpless human beings is wrong) to appeal to a universal audience. The argumentative structures built around dignity in the sense of sanctity activate the essentialist inferences of the elite audience, while the argumentative structures built around dignity in the sense of quality activate universal social and psychological intuitions.

Because the arguments in question arguably play on the intuitive assumptions all people share, it is plausible to assume the audience that feels the tug of the argumentation is quite universal in nature. But the argument about the ways cloning defiles human dignity is taken even further. The clone is seen as a result of conditions that violate his/her dignity as a human being. This condition is also postulated as detrimental to the mental well-being of the cloned person. Intrinsic human dignity is a good rhetorical concept because anyone with normal capability of social cognition is able to grasp the concept of equal basic rights between agents that intuitively share a similar essential quality. The idea of a clone as a “copy” violates the basic social intuitions we entertain of human individual agents. In the context of the problematic of biological causation, playing on intuitive assumptions concerning the individuality and uniqueness of agents is a clever rhetorical move.

As discussed, the thematic of human dignity is a Catholic core argument against cloning. It can be found, in one form or another, as background noise in all argumentative lines, regardless of their specific focus. At the same time the theme of dignity always incorporates some of the other focal points offered in opposition to cloning by the Catholic community. One of the themes with its own distinct emphasis, yet closely tied to the idea of human dignity, is the idea of the “Sacred Family”.

4.2. The Sacred Family

4.2.1. The logos of the Sacred Family

The affront to human dignity comes about because the coming into existence of a human being is, by God's decree, through the loving procreative embrace of a husband and wife ("...and the two shall become one body" [Gen. 2:24b]). But by procreating a human being through cloning the child begins life in a laboratory "dish" instead of his mother's body, and is of unclear parentage. (Father Albert S. Moraczewski to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in Washington, D.C., on March 13, 1997.¹²¹)

In truth, every human being has the right to be conceived in love and within marriage. Granted, conception does not always happen under these conditions; however, it is both human and Christian to expect it to happen this way. In human cloning, the two no longer need to become one, and interpersonal relationship is replaced by technology. (s1079 Rev. Richard W. Shoda, Judicial Vicar, Tribunal Office.¹²²)

One does not need to be a cell-line researcher to recognize why noble ends cannot justify morally repugnant means. Cloning, even so-called therapeutic or experimental cloning, creates a new life without a father, and reduces a mother to the provider of an almost emptied egg. (s1127, Bishop Daniel P. Reilly.)

The Catholic Church takes strong argumentative positions in several social matters. Among the most important of these are issues of family life, marriage and family planning. The idea of family is given a strong theological ground in Catholic teaching and there are social institutions that support the Catholic view of strong, traditional family values. Thereby it is not surprising that on the Internet the second most dominant Catholic Official voice concerning the problematic of cloning is a voice warning about the threat cloning presents to the family union. Although the concept of human dignity pervades almost all the Catholic voices in one way or another, there are clear differences as to what are emphasized as the particular circumstances that are necessary in bringing dignity about. In this sense the themes of "Human Dignity" and "Sacred Family" are the two most closely tied themes present in the whole Catholic discussion concerning cloning.

¹²¹Although the speaker is not a Cardinal and consequently is not high enough in the hierarchy to merit automatic categorisation as an "Official" voice, presenting the issue to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission most likely causes the voice to be considered official by many readers.

¹²²The speaker is presenting his arguments in the context of the official website of the diocese of Wheeling-Charleston. As such he is using the voice of the diocese. Additionally, the text the quote has been taken from builds on the text "Reflections on Human Cloning" by The Pontifical Academy for Life.

As was the case with “Human Dignity”, there are two different approaches within the logos of the “Sacred Family” that emphasize different factual assertions as the core of their respective argumentative structures. The first type of argumentative structure is built on a theological basis and is rooted deep in the Catholic understanding of human sexuality and the sacred rules of procreation. As is apparent in the Catholic Catechism, in Catholic doctrine the family union is considered as an extremely important and fundamental facet of human life and of a good human society in general. (see section 2.5.) The factual basis used in this type of argumentative structure is related to many other topics outside the immediate problematic of cloning, such as in vitro fertilization, abortion and contraception. These are issues that in many cases create tension between the Catholic ideals concerning family and the ideals of the secular societies wherein the Church operates.

Theologically focused voices emphasizing that cloning threatens the family union appear as follows:

Also, attempts or hypotheses for obtaining a human being without any connection with sexuality through “twin fission,” cloning or parthenogenesis are to be considered contrary to the moral law, since they are in opposition to the dignity both of human procreation and of the conjugal union. (s1014, *Donum Vitae*.)

As a form of unnatural asexual reproduction, it [cloning] represents a radical manipulation of the constitutive relationship and complementarity that are at the origin of human procreation as a biological act and an exercise of human love. (s1111, *Vatican’s Mission to the United Nations February 2003*.)

The theological arguments concerning family do not generally speak of the clone or of the family situation of the cloned person. The voice defending the sacredness of the family union focuses on the dignity of the parents and of the “conjugal union”. In other words, the dignity of human sexuality is dependent on marriage and, to some degree, the dignity of marriage is dependent on sexuality. This is presented in Toulmin’s schema as in figure F1 (see the next page).

In the Catholic teaching the sanctity and value of a marriage is to a large degree associated with the openness for the creation of children through normal sexual reproduction. However, as discussed before in the section about the theological context of the cloning discussion, the Catholic Catechism states that a marriage can be good and godly even if the parents are unable to beget children. In a sense this inability to achieve the highest purpose of marriage is considered an indicator that God has planned something else for the couple. (see <http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p2s2c3a7.htm>, 1654.) The parents are even called upon to utilize any means available in conventional medicine to be able to produce children. Cloning, however, is considered a means too radically different from the normative manner of procreation set forth by God. In this case the argumentative structure stands on the assumption that following God’s rules brings about marital dignity. Hence the warranting force driving the conclusion is that marital dignity is achieved in the fullest sense through begetting children by normal sexual means. God can change the rules for a given couple, but the only way to discover that this has happened is




Figure F1: Conventional sexual procreation as a factor in marital dignity

to, after testing, find out that procreation and having children is not possible. In this case the Church would most probably conclude that God has called the couple for some other task (such as adoption), which makes their marriage as full and dignified as having children.

Quite understandably, the theme of family is mostly associated with the opposition of live-birth cloning, and vice versa, the arguments against therapeutic cloning relatively seldom utilize the concepts of family and parenthood. It is rhetorically reasonable to focus discussion of family and parenthood on those cases where the cloning procedure would actually aim at establishing a family with siblings, in other words cloning to produce children. The voices against therapeutic cloning have a different emphasis. However, in some cases the argument of parental dignity is also associated with the commercial aspect of therapeutic cloning:

In human cloning for therapeutic or commercial purposes, the role of the "parent" is distorted, reduced to that of a donor of biological material for producing a child/twin intended to be used as a source of spare organs and tissues. (s1068, Centre of Bioethics of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy.¹²⁵)

While the theologically based Catholic voices on family predominantly focus on the parents and the sanctity of the union itself, there are also voices that focus their

¹²⁵Although the original source of the text this quotation was taken from falls outside the "Official" voices of the church, the text was reprinted in Vatican's official newspaper, *L'osservatore Romano*.




Figure F2: Normative family union and social order

attention on the possible situation the cloned child would have to face as well as on the “confusion” cloning brings to family relationships:

Catholic teaching opposes reproductive cloning for a number of reasons. It offends against the personal and unique identity given to each individual by God. It denies an individual the right to have two parents, and confuses family relationships. (s1092, The Nathaniel Centre.¹²⁴)

The same voice that was worried about the “confusion” in family relationships is more prominent when the whole argumentative structure is taken in a more pragmatic direction:

Reproductive cloning would confuse family relationships. A cloned child would have only one parent, who would be its genetic twin. Would the clone be the person’s child or sibling? This would also pose great problems of inheritance (What status would the clone have versus other family members?). Finally, cloning could mean more children would grow up in single-parent households, without the benefit of married parents. (s1128, Illinois Right to Life Committee.¹²⁵)

¹²⁴The Nathaniel centre is identified on the Web as follows: “The Nathaniel Centre – the New Zealand Catholic Bioethics Centre – was established in 1999 as an agency of the New Zealand Catholic Bishops’ Conference...” It is highly likely that most readers will assume the centre upholds the official agenda of the Bishops’ Conference.

¹²⁵This particular text was very difficult to categorise. On the one hand the Illinois Right to Life

The idea of “confusion in family relationships” caused by reproductive cloning is presented in Toulmin’s schema in figure F2.

As mentioned when looking at the theological context of the cloning discussion, in Catholic teaching about family relationships a distinct emphasis is placed on the concept of ‘nurture’. The family union is seen as the primary context in which to bring up children in a good and orderly manner. Cloning would increase the possibilities of begetting children for those who in the Catholic view are not meant to have children according to God’s plan. Furthermore, cloning would confuse the genetic relations between parents and children.

In Catholic theology concerning proper living and the orderly existence of an individual human being an extremely important role is given to the family unit. The family unit is regarded as something of an ideal environment for the expression of many basic human needs, such as sexuality and procreation. The family unit is also regarded as the basic unit of a good society, and orderly family life is the first and most important step that connects an individual with that larger society (see http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7T.HTM). If the normative ideal of family union is compromised on a large scale, the Catholic speakers claim that the repercussions reach far into the upper echelons of society, creating chaos and uncertainty. So, for Catholic voices, the ideal of a well-ordered nuclear family is extremely important, and cloning is seen as a threat to this order in the ways outlined above.

4.2.2. The pathos of the Sacred Family

Cloning completely divorces human reproduction from the context of a loving union between man and woman, producing children with no ‘parents’ in the ordinary sense. Here human life does not arise from an act of love, but is manufactured to predetermined specifications. (s1018, Cardinal William Keeler of Baltimore.)

From the dehumanizing nature of this technique flow many disturbing consequences. Because human clones would be produced by a means that involves no loving relationship, no personal investment or responsibility for a new life, but only laboratory technique, they would be uniquely at risk of being treated as “second-class” human beings. (s1054, Richard M. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

If cloned children never know a loving mother, a proud father, and doting grandparents, will there be love on this earth at all? The system of cloning is not designed to increase love on earth. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) declared that God must necessarily forbid us from doing things which

Committee is clearly a site for “Professional” voices. On the other hand, the site and the specific text the quote was taken from is identified as in line with the official Catholic Pro-Life stance. Because of the authoritarian and official outlook of the site and of the particular text this quote has been taken from, it is very likely that many readers will associate the text with the official Catholic Pro-Life stance.

endanger the welfare of the human race. When the danger of harming the race is serious, the obligation to avoid threatening behavior becomes grave (cf. *Summa Theologica*, II, II, 153,3). (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD.¹²⁶)

There seems to be one dominant strategy of emotional persuasion in the Catholic voice proclaiming the sacredness of the family union. As noted earlier, the concept of ‘family’ is an extremely widely shared idea crossing cultural boundaries, although the specific forms of the family institution differ somewhat. Catholic teaching also incorporates the idea of the universality of the basic idea of family, although not all forms of the institution are perceived as imbued with the same degree of dignity. However, positive emotional value is typically attached to the idea of a “good” family life, both inside and outside Catholic thought. Thus, if anything is presented as a threat to this emotionally charged concept, negative emotional value is easily associated with the threatening concept. If we assume that positive family values typically deal with positive feelings such as those of safety, love and peacefulness, anything presented as adverse to the family might be perceived as dangerous, unloving and selfish.

In order to attach a negative emotional value to the idea of cloning, it is therefore a good idea to present it as a threat to the idea of family. By explicitly underlining the deviations from the normative procreative relationships, a sense of threat and a feeling that something is seriously out of place can be induced:

In the cloning process the basic relationships of the human person are perverted: filiation, consanguinity, kinship, parenthood. A woman can be the twin sister of her mother, lack a biological father and be the daughter of her grandmother. In vitro fertilization has already led to the confusion of parentage, but cloning will mean the radical rupture of these bonds. (s1060, Reflections from the Pontifical Academy for Life.)

The same emotional effect can be achieved by emphasizing the “unnaturalness” of cloning as opposed to the natural procreative process. The idea of “confusion in family relationships” was discussed in the previous section. In the above example, the idea of confusion is used as an emotional cue to inspire feelings of “something seriously out of place”, or “dread”, for lack of better words. In general it seems that the emotional persuasion Catholic voices utilize in issues of cloning relies heavily on the human tendency to feel unsafe in the face of something unfamiliar or out of the ordinary. In the theme “Sacred Family”, the idea of family bonds, something familiar to most people, is presented as mixed beyond recognition. Here cloning presents an abstract threat to something that is familiar and seen as ordained by God.

In addition to the abstract threat cloning presents to the idea of family bonds, in some emotive strategies the Catholic voices use a more concrete approach to underline the unnaturalness of the cloning process. In these emotive strategies

¹²⁶ Although the speaker does not belong to “Official” voices by his position in the hierarchy, the original text this quotation has been taken from discusses the official position of the Catholic Church.

within the theme the role and place of a parent is depicted as facing a severe threat:

Cloning is, in fact, the perfect reproductive technology for dead people. So divorced is it from any human relationship that it doesn't matter whether the "parent" (the template? the original?) is living or dead, consenting or unconsenting. All one may need is a nail clipping or the hair left behind in a comb. (Remember Jurassic Park?) (s2028, Mr. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

The emotive function of the persuasion in the above examples is to induce fear and to underline the unnaturalness of procreation through cloning. The emotive factor is rooted deep in the natural fear of something portrayed as seriously out of the ordinary, in other words "the fear of the unknown". In the sense of the Catholic concept of "Natural Moral Law", the things that people intuitively feel as "natural" are seen as serving the good, or as aligned with the will of God. Whether understood in the terms of Catholic doctrine or in general terms of "family values", imagining a nail clipping in the place of a parent is bound to raise emotional responses that people experience when facing "unnatural" or unfamiliar situations.

Furthermore, the emotive appeal gains momentum in that it manipulates emotions in a context people generally consider personally important and where most audiences can be expected to experience personal emotional attachments. This emotional load is then annexed to underline the difference between "good" and "natural", meaning the normative Catholic doctrine of family life, and the "unnatural" and frightening, meaning cloning.

Although it is very infrequent compared to the general fear appeal induced through impeaching a social structure familiar to everyone, the emotive element of the "Sacred Family" can in some occasions be built on theological grounds. This is rare because of the "Little Tradition" -nature of Internet environment, but it exists nonetheless:

What follows is the inspiring truth that we are in immediate partnership with God when we become parents. Humans cannot reproduce their kind by their own power. When humans become parents, they work in a breathtaking partnership with God. Because procreation necessarily involves this awe-inspiring partnership with God, human partners are obligated to keep the divine rules. God's rules specify that every child has a right to have a father and a mother who are joined in marriage. The divine Partner does not approve of fornication, adultery, rape, cloning or in vitro fertilization. (s2043, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman, STD.¹²⁷)

Here theological concepts are used as a point of reflection for the emotional abhorrence of cloning. The "divine partner" equates rape, fornication and cloning. Identifying cloning with rape is a powerful tool for emotional persuasion because

¹²⁷ Although the speaker does not belong to "Official" voices by his position in the hierarchy, the original text this quotation has been taken from discusses the official position of the Catholic Church.

forced sexual acts are generally considered wrong and appalling. It is quite safe to assume that almost all persons in any given audience accept as fact that rape is a disgusting thing. As happened in the last theme “Human Dignity”, the speaker attempts to associate cloning with a mode of behaviour that generally causes strong feelings of repugnance within the majority of people. Further pathos is brought about by the dramatic description of the loftiness of the procreative act and its equally dramatic comparison with the less ardent aspects of human sexual behaviour.

In the Official Catholic voices that induce people to oppose cloning on the grounds that it threatens family union the dominant strategy is to appeal to emotions in a context of extremely widely shared emotional attachments. The emotive strategy that Official Catholic voices use is an effective one, since the primary purpose is not to draw attention to the facts of cloning, but cause fear, and most of all, feelings of insecurity. In the context of the cloning debate, feelings of fear and insecurity work as effective rhetorical tools urging people to embrace the claim that cloning truly threatens the family, the most basic unit of human emotional attachments.

4.2.3. The ethos of the Sacred Family

In human cloning, a new human being does not arise from the loving union of a man and woman but is manufactured to specifications. The very concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’ are distorted and rendered meaningless in the process. By depersonalizing procreation, cloning demeans what it creates, treating a member of the human family as an object. (s1019, Mr. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the NCCB Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities.)

But who will bear this responsibility for a human person who is the product of cloning? A human person is meant to grow up soundly in the home provided by one’s parents, and eventually to take one’s place in society. A cloned person would be deprived of all these privileges. (S1020, The Standing Committee of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Japan.)

...one of their genetic ‘parents’ or someone else might adopt the cloned child –indeed they might be cloned specifically to provide someone with a child. But the relationship of the clone to his or her adoptive parents is not established by who they are – natural parent and child – but who they decide to be – parent and child by law or social consensus or personal choice. That is, the bond between them is not something they are subject to but something that the parents make subject to themselves. (s1083, Archdiocese of Vancouver.)

As previously mentioned, the Catholic argumentation defending the “Sacred Family” has the feel of a well-beaten track. This is due to a number of reasons. First of all, some elements of Catholic teaching concerning the family differ from the generally held attitudes of many secular Western societies. For example, divorcing and marrying again is accepted by the social authorities in many of the countries where the Catholic Church operates. Secondly, the theme of family life is clearly a

much discussed topic in the strong tradition of Pro-Life activity within the Catholic community. The voice proclaiming the sacredness of the family in the context of the cloning debate echoes the other themes disputed by Pro-Life in other contexts, such as discussions concerning abortion and in vitro fertilization.¹²⁸ Even so, the problematic of cloning has given rise to a clearly distinct tone of shock in the proclamation of Christian family values.

The speakers appearing in the themes proclaiming the sacredness of the family have two main methods of self-presentation. The first voice is that of a concerned parent who is deeply worried about the family circumstances of the would-be clone:

The clone embryo would have no genetic parents, and would be created like a product to precise specifications. Having no parents in the normal sense, the clone would have no natural human protectors, and would be still more vulnerable than the IVF embryo today. (s1082, The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics Submitted by Rev David Jones, Director.)

Not procreated by the marital act of two parents who have a stable commitment to each other, cloned human beings do not have a family. It is not at all clear who the cloned persons parents are or if they even have parents. Who might these be – the person or persons who provided the genetic code or the ovum or the womb? (s1083, Archdiocese of Vancouver.)

The voices worrying about the family relationships of a clone are like the voice of a concerned father who speculates about the lot of an underprivileged child. The speakers establish themselves as benevolent forecasters of misfortune for those who consider procreative cloning. As discussed before, in Catholic teaching the concept of family is strongly associated with an ideal of bringing up children in a safe and favourable environment. (see CCC 589-590.) It can be safely assumed that wanting to protect one's progeny is a universally shared feature of human social behaviour. Units of social life where children are nurtured and educated can be considered universal, although they are not identical in all aspects. However, since the family as a social unit exists in one way or another across cultures, it can be safely assumed that the argumentation defending the concept of family is appealing to very many possible audiences.

The voice of the concerned parent who promotes family values is probably perceived by many possible audiences as a voice upholding values both familiar and beneficial to most. This being the case, the debaters easily fulfil the primary function of rhetorical ethos: establishing themselves as trustworthy. Where the voice calling for human dignity boomed with infallible authority, the voice worried about the family circumstances of a clone coos with concern. The audience for the voice concerned with the family of a cloned child is probably as close to Perelman's idea of a universal audience as is possible. It is an extremely typical form of rhetoric to associate the "good of the child" to a form of normative family union. Any voice proclaiming that a family is not a good growth milieu for a child would

128 For a great example of a Pro-Life website, see <http://www.illinoisrighttolife.org/index.html>.

be considered exceptionally deviant. Therefore the debaters in the above example are addressing a very wide audience; it might be said that focusing one's arguments on the assumed deprivation in a clone's family environment is a rhetorical master move.

The other voice concerning the sanctity of the family is more authoritarian, rooted in the theological principles that Catholic doctrine places on the family union:

The illicitness of cloning is derived from the relationship of domination over the corporeity of the cloned subject, from the absence of a personal act of procreative love since it involves asexual, agamic reproduction and, in short, from the offence to the Creator's design. (s1112, Pontifical Academy for Life.)

Genesis also indicated the means of human reproduction. In Chapter 2, when God takes Eve from his side, Adam says, "This one at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh..." Then the story continues: "Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife and they become one flesh." That term "one flesh" is understood to mean intercourse. So husband and wife are joined, and through intercourse children are procreated... Then this means that cloning, as a way of producing another human being, is completely opposed to God's will. We would be exceeding our stewardship, exceeding our mastery, if we produced a human being by other means. (s1070, Rev. Albert Moraczewski, Catholic World Report.¹²⁹)

The voice of the theological expert is not so concerned with the well-being of the cloned child, but with that of the "Creator's design" that is perverted in the cloning procedure. The nature of a human being as a being both created by God and created by a means designed by God creates the feeling of a unified ethos encompassing the whole of humanity. The themes of dignity and the importance placed on sexual procreation discussed previously grow more pronounced when the general approach of the speaker gets more theological. The association between the concepts of 'human dignity' and sexual reproduction becomes weaker when the tone the speaker uses becomes less theological. This reflects the focus of the argumentation: Catholic teaching on the mystery of sexual reproduction better serves the elite audiences while the more common concepts of, for example, "confusion in family relationships", are better tools for creating the feeling of a universal ethos.

The social concerns that Catholic associations have voiced before the emergence of the cloning debate have created an elite audience already familiar with the central tenets of friction between the Catholic community and the secular societies it lives in. This elite audience is more easily approached through themes already familiar

¹²⁹The speaker is presented as follows: "Father Moraczewski, a Dominican priest who holds a PhD in pharmacology as well as master's degrees in both philosophy and theology, has devoted most of his career to an exploration of the moral issues involved in bio-medical developments. He was the first president of the Pope John XXIII Center for Medical-Moral Research, and still serves that organization as Senior Research Fellow. "It is quite likely that many readers will consider the speaker as an "Official" voice of the Church.

from previous debates. The Official voice of the theological expert on the sanctity of the family is that of a teacher who tells people under which circumstances God wants human beings procreated and which family circumstances satisfy the Creator's design. The theological expert is a medium of the will of God, who views the act of procreative love and the family union as pivotal elements of His design.

It seems that the voice focusing on the sanctity and importance of conjugal union is primarily targeted at the elite audience mentioned above. As was the case with "Human Dignity", in the context of such an elite audience the authoritarian identification of the debaters and theological basis for the sanctification of the family union are powerful rhetorical tools. The elite audience listening to the voice of God on the sanctity of the family union shares a belief that the "Creator's design" is literally stated in the first chapters of the Bible. The elite audience is seen as sharing a belief that the limits of tampering with the Creator's design can be drawn in the inviolability of the procreative act.

Because the Catholic ideals concerning family are in a controversial relationship with the ideals of the civil authorities in many societies, it becomes necessary for the speakers to adopt a different stance from time to time. The speaker who departs from the theologically framed presentation of himself appears as the concerned parent, an identification familiar to many. In the theme of the "Sacred Family", the parent becomes the teacher and vice versa.

4.2.4. Cognitive view of the Sacred Family

Logos

Humans tend to form social groups and attachments based on their biological descent. 'Family' seems to be one of the most fundamental core units in social and biological cognition used for determining crucial relationships. Family relationships are typically ordered in terms of the closeness of descent: the closer the biological bonds between individuals, the closer their social bond is. (see, for example, Low 2000, 146-162.)

The main arguments of the voices proclaiming the sanctity of the family union were that either cloning as a form of reproduction separated from sexuality would "violate the dignity of marriage" or as a form of building the family would instigate "confusion in family relationships". Both arguments seem to be constructed on similar folk-theoretical biological inferences although their essentialist core concepts are slightly different. The structures of folk-theoretical biological inference are more apparent in the argument about "confusion" in family relationships. It seems the "confusion" that the Catholic voices oppose is not primarily about the structure of the family itself, but about biological causality. It is, after all, not uncommon for children to grow up in all kinds of families: some with single parents and some extended families with grandparents or other relatives. On the other hand, many people wishing to clone themselves are persons living in a nuclear family who are unable to procreate in the traditional manner. While it is clear that the Catholic Church does not endorse divorce, the argument against cloning is not really targeted at criticizing the confused nature of single parenting or non-normative family relationships in general. The "confusion" seems to be about the




Figure F3: Intuitive folk biology as a basis for well ordered family relationships

unclear biological causality inherent in a cloned person, which goes against the intuitive folk-biological accounts we typically entertain about the biological world around us. This is presented in Toulmin’s schema in figure F3.

The primary argument utilized by Catholic voices in the theme of “Sacred Family” defends the sanctity of the reproductive union itself. The argumentative structure is based on Catholic theology, but ultimately is just an expression of the feelings caused by natural intuitive ontology concerning biological reproduction. In a sense, what Catholic tradition calls “Natural Moral Law” is indeed a natural law – for the way human cognition works. Intuitive folk-theoretical thought dictates that sexuality and the procreative process are connected: they form a biological causality. The second type of argument discussed above, calling for “clear” or “well-ordered” family relationships, ultimately derives its persuasive force from the intuitive assumption that all biological creatures have a mother and a father. This assumption is a basic building block not only for the biological causality people perceive as natural, but also for the natural “groupishness” of people and for the accounts of naive sociology. (see chapter 3.4.) While the intuitive assumptions our minds entertain are by no means a sound basis for ethical rulings, it is easy to see how the argument of “confusion in family relationships” gains momentum, because the idea of cloning violates these intuitive biological and sociological assumptions. Consequently, the folk-theoretical inference used in the different argumentative structures claiming that cloning violates family gain persuasive force from the same folk-theoretical intuitions.

What appears to be different in the two accounts is the primary essentialistic concept they are built on. The theologically focused argument of the “sacredness” of the family union can be viewed as a theologically contextualized ideal-essential

argument. In the previous discussion concerning arguments about ‘human dignity’, human beings were bestowed with an ideal essence called “dignity”. In this argument the concept of ‘family’ is given an ideal essence which is backed by theological ideas, e.g. the family as a unit ordained by God, the family as a means of mission, the family as a basic building block of a Godly society etc. As the concept of family is idealized, the natural biological processes that are a part of natural procreation are also seen as having an ideal essence, as “set by God”, and technological interventions are perceived as violations. The same general essentialistic pattern of thought can also be seen in Catholic thought concerning contraception, which is considered a violation of marital dignity as well. (see CCC 628-630.)

The argument about the “confusion” that cloning brings to family relationships is not built on a similar ideal-essential conception, but rather on causal- and sortal-essential inferences. The family has a certain sortal essence, that is, it is composed of a mother and a father who are the biological siblings of their respective mothers and fathers, they have children etc. The sortal qualities in a family are determined by biological causalities, e.g. who is the father or mother of whom. As cloning very much disrupts these biological causalities, folk-theoretical biological reasoning is also violated. When the factors that violate folk-biological thought are emphasized in arguments, the structure borders on what can be called counter-intuitive.

Furthermore, it seems that the concept of ‘family’ is something that is a constitutive factor in systems of human social behavior. As a universal biological and sociological unit, family membership probably fundamentally informs many universal folk-theoretical intuitions that have to do with social categories. Typically, the family is biologically determined, and is the first and primary social and psychological environment a human being faces. So it can be concluded that the family is something fundamentally important to biological, sociological and psychological folk theories. For example, it is probable that anyone who knew that two persons are a father and a son would draw a folk-psychological inference that their relationship is different from other relationships not involving the biological bond. Because of this inferential significance, arguments that claim cloning would create a confusion that would diminish or take away this inferential potential seem strong in a persuasive sense.

Pathos

One does not need to be a sociobiologist to acknowledge the universal significance of the family as a social unit. The biological, psychological and social bonds that physical descent facilitates are a cross-cultural norm, although socioeconomic factors tend to affect the amounts of emotional investment parents can afford. (Sanderson 2001, 215-248.) Because of the extraordinary significance that close biological relations have to most people, the context of the family union is a good cognitive environment to appeal to many primary emotions. Primary emotions can be understood as having a large role in the social evolution of the human species, as they are partly responsible for the human tendency to form small units that work together to attain common goals (the “groupishness” discussed earlier; see chapter 3.5.3.). Biological bonds, core family ties most of all, are the source of strong emotional attachment mutually manifest to a great number of possible audiences.

Thus the rhetorical context of family ties is possibly one of the best contexts in which to appeal to primary emotions and cause a persuasive effect through manipulating them.

As discussed before, fear appeal is a rhetorical tool which is extremely useful in bringing about a quick surface elaboration of suggested assertions in audiences (see chapter 3.5.2.). The Catholic emotive strategy chiefly focuses on showing in what ways cloning would threaten the family both as an idealized concept and as a folk-biologically important inferential context. However, the discussion on the threat cloning presents to ‘family’ is not wholly based on fear appeal, as it also requires the listeners to reflect on their folk-biological and naive-sociological intuitions as well as on the precise deviations of these that cloning would bring about. So the emotive strategy does not aim at frightening people into accepting what is argued, but rather at persuading them to follow their biological and sociological folk-theoretical intuitions. The emotive strategy is to enforce folk-theoretical inference and to create a deep elaboration of suggested things by utilizing folk-theoretical thought.

The important position that biological, social and psychological intuitions give to the idea of the family has immense social effects. As suggested before, across the cultural spectrum the basic relationships in a family can be seen as something normative. Deviations from the normative roles in a family can easily be defamed, as has been apparent, for example, in Catholic discussions on the rights of sexual minorities (marriage, adoption, etc.). Since a great majority of people appreciate the ideal picture of the family union, any deviation from the norm should prove an effective device for giving rise to strong emotional reactions.

The “naturalness” of the arguments is, as discussed, built on intuitive assumptions in social cognition and folk biology: it is natural to assume that biological creatures have biological parents. If this is not so, something “unnatural” must be under way. Human beings as well as all animals “beget” progeny, they are not “made” as artefacts. Emphasizing the difference of the cloning procedure from the normal intuitive expectations people entertain concerning procreation underlines the feelings of fear that something alien typically produces. Within the current example, the Catholic voices make folk-theoretical assumptions work in favour of their arguments, building emotive effect through “civilized” fear appeal and having audiences emote in a manner that follows their intuitions.

Ethos

The rhetorical use of intuitive ontological structures in the “Sacred Family” is something of a schoolbook example of summoning a mutually manifest cognitive environment that involves many people. The universally shared tendency towards folk-biological reasoning makes every living human being a possible member of the audience for the argumentation in the “Sacred Family”. In other words, the potential audience is any and all who are, one way or another, members of a family. In fact, the universality of the argument reaches even further, because even people who have never had typical family ties can be assumed to have the cognitive potential to understand the psychological and sociological significance family ties have. On the other hand, the argumentative structure where the procreative act is directly associated with the dignity of both marriage and the progeny demands

some previous contact with the Catholic tradition to become fully understood and to achieve the intended persuasive effect. It can be safely assumed that this particular argumentation is aimed at an elite audience of Catholic believers.

In addition to the persuasion through folk biology, the voices hint at another strategy: persuasion through folk psychology. Some arguments focus not on the biological distortions caused by cloning, but on the suffering that the confused situation would bring to the clone. First, the speakers present the idea of the family as the most beneficial environment possible for a child. Then they establish that it would be impossible for a would-be clone to enjoy such an environment because of the confusion caused by cloning. By challenging the would-be clone's possibility to enjoy the benefits of this environment, the debaters utilize a structure which is mutually manifest to a great number of people. The actual emphasis of the argument is to make the audiences manifest the distressing situation of the clone, which is achieved, at least partially, through manipulating their folk-psychological capabilities. This is very similar to what the Catholic voices utilized in "Human Dignity", with the exception that in the cases where sanctity of the family is the locus of argumentation the traditional, normative family union is seen as the primary factor for a person's well-being. In "Human Dignity" the primary factor was that the clone should not have to live as a "copy" of someone else.

The theme of family has a huge potential for mutual manifestation in the potential audiences that the debaters address, as well as a clear ground in the theological tradition of the Catholic Church. In the cognitive sense the previously discussed theme of "Human Dignity" could be seen as a form of essentialistic thought. The theme of the "Sacred Family" can be viewed as representing the cognitive processes where biological causality is seen as essential for the transfer of the essential qualities. The relationship between the relevant cognitive mechanisms corresponds to the relationship between the theological concepts used in the argumentation. The most fundamental facet of the cognitive mechanisms in question is the tendency to think that species share essential cores that are transferred through biological procreation, which incorporates typical social relationships (e.g. mother - father - child). Catholic theology states that humans possess a core quality of dignity, that to a significant degree is brought about by following the rules of procreation set by God, which include biological procreation and normative family relationships. The normative social setting for, as well as the normative process of, procreation can also be approached from a different argumentative angle, to be discussed in the next chapter.



4.3. Exploitation / Dehumanization

4.3.1. The logos of Exploitation / Dehumanization

Creating human life in the laboratory by cloning should be condemned because it reduces human beings to mere products of a manufacturing technique. (s1015, Cardinal Bevilacqua to U.S. Senate.)

Some researchers want to use cloning to produce human embryos, then kill the embryos for their stem cells. Proponents of cloning are trying to obscure this fact. If a woman delivered a baby solely to obtain his or her kidney for transplantation into someone else, would we say she had given birth to a kidney? (s1044, Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

This term [Therapeutic cloning] is already being discarded by researchers, since the idea that anything "therapeutic" may come from this procedure is speculative at best. This is another euphemism for experimental cloning in which embryos are created to be destroyed. There is, of course, nothing "therapeutic" in the cloning process itself, or in the lethal harm that will be done to the cloned embryo. (s1044, Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

...the argument that cloning must be used to produce human embryos for destructive experiments if medical research is to advance lacks a basis in fact. That argument has been called "far-fetched" and "conjectural" even by experts who share the biotechnology lobby's dismissive view of unborn human life. (s1042, Cardinal Bernard Law, Chairman of the NCCB Committee for Pro-life Activities.)

The second ethical problem can be formulated thus: Is it morally licit to engage in so-called "therapeutic cloning" by producing cloned human embryos and then destroying them in order to produce ES cells? The answer is negative, for the following reason: Every type of therapeutic cloning, which implies producing human embryos and then destroying them in order to obtain stem cells, is illicit... (s1093, Prof. Juan de Dios Vial Correa, The President of Pontifical Academy for Life.)

The main focus of argumentation within the two previous themes has been the problematic of live-birth cloning. Contrary to the previous themes discussed, the Official Catholic voices condemning cloning and genetics as dehumanizing and exploitative of human beings almost always address the problematic of therapeutic cloning, not that of live-birth cloning. For the sake of recall, therapeutic cloning is a

medical procedure where the process of germination is first begun artificially and then stopped at a certain point to harvest stem cells (typically before 14 days, which is the point where the cells start to differentiate). The harvesting procedure results in the destruction of the blastocyst. (see chapter 2.3.) The technique has roused a great amount of debate and opposition within the Catholic community.

The most common line of argumentation in Official Catholic voices concerning the dehumanizing nature of therapeutic cloning states that it is dehumanizing to create a clone for the sole purpose of destroying it. In a theological sense the Catholic opposition to therapeutic cloning is based on respect for human life. The Church teaches, as discussed previously, that all human life is sacred and that human life starts from the moment of conception. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC606-608.) So, ultimately, the Catholic objections to stem cell harvesting are based on the Fifth Commandment, “Thou shall not kill”. In the context of the Catholic community the argumentative structure has much in common with the discourse of the Pro-Life movement where abortion is opposed as murder.¹⁵⁰ It is quite typical for the Catholic voices to perceive stem cell harvesting as mass abortion and hence as mass murder.

The argumentative structure stands on clear theological and ethical grounds. The essential points that make up the argument are that the blastocyst must be equated with an adult human being and that adult human beings must be considered as possessing inherent value and an indisputable right to exist. Few would argue against the latter, but the idea of the complete humanity of blastocysts has roused critical discussion. This idea rests on the implied inference that blastocysts and born human beings are equal and similar in every way, a notion that can be challenged to some degree in an argumentative sense.

The second claim the Official voices make is that therapeutic cloning instrumentalizes human beings. The instrumentalization of human beings means the utilization of human beings (or parts of them) as a means to an end, for the medical benefit of others, for example. The concept also refers to a way of thinking in which people are understood as “tools” rather than persons. This type of thinking is seen in Catholic argumentation as dehumanizing. The instrumentalization of people for medical purposes is also viewed as a radical form of exploiting human beings. The concepts of exploitation and dehumanization are usually intertwined within the argumentative structures:

The value of human life, a source of equality among human beings, forbids any purely instrumental use of the life of a fellow creature who is brought into being only to be used as biological material. (s1068, Centre of Bioethics of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy.¹⁵¹)

When cloning is done to pursue medical research, the reduction of human life to a mere instrument is even more complete, for a new human being is created solely to be destroyed for his or her cells and tissues. Even if medical benefits could be derived from such destruction, it is never morally permissible to achieve good ends through evil actions. (s1015, Cardinal Bevilacqua to U.S. Senate.)

¹⁵⁰See, for example, <http://www.prolife.com/>.

¹⁵¹Although the original source of the text this quotation was taken from falls outside the “Official” voices of the church, the text was reprinted in Vatican’s official newspaper, *L’Osservatore Romano*.




Figure E1: The instrumentalizing nature of therapeutic cloning

Since the argumentative structures concerning instrumentalization and dehumanization are closely interwoven, it is possible to present them in one diagram. In Toulmin’s schema the instrumentalizing nature of stem cell research appears as in figure E1.

The argument concerning the instrumentalizing nature of therapeutic cloning seems quite solid. If a cloned embryo in very early stages of development is considered a full human being, it is easy to see that the function of its existence differs radically from that which is typically considered “worthy” of a human being. It can easily be argued that an embryo created for the sole purpose of harvesting stem cells seems more an instrument than a person. As long as a given debater agrees with the belief that embryos in a very early stage of development should be considered persons with rights equal to those of born human beings, it is impossible to deny that therapeutic cloning dehumanises people. Any counter-argument aiming to deny the dehumanizing and exploitative nature of therapeutic cloning must therefore proceed by denying the core belief the argument stands on. This is not easy, since it is generally agreed even within the medical science community that human life begins at the moment of impregnation. (see, for example, Dusheck 2002, 32.)

The argumentative structures presented above focus on how the early embryos are made into instruments and hence dehumanized. There is also a quite different and important argumentative strategy present in “Exploitation / Dehumanization” that cannot be found in any of the other common Catholic themes opposing cloning:




Figure E2: The instrumentalisation of women

Forget for the moment that these claims are simply wrong. Not one therapeutic benefit has come from such research; every beneficial result has come from morally acceptable adult stem cell research. Leave aside too the serious moral and ethical problems. Instead, focus on another aspect –the fact that cloning would exploit women on a massive scale. (s1053, Gail Quinn, Executive Director of the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

The new view and type of argument that the voice on the dehumanizing nature of cloning brings focuses on women. Because of their general position concerning procreative issues this is an extremely important rhetorical change for the Catholic voices. As was examined in the discussion on the social context of the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning, it is not typical for the Official Catholic voices to speak of the rights of women in reproductive matters. This is due to the tradition of the anti-abortion policy (Pro-Life) the Catholic Church advances. (see section 2.5.) It is not easy to argue or appeal on the grounds of the “rights of women” when you oppose abortion and even contraception. This is because defending the possibility of choice for women is generally seen as upholding the rights of women. The voices arguing on the grounds of the rights of women are typically pro-choice and anti-Catholic. In the case of cloning as exploitation, the Catholic voices have found a rare opportunity to appeal to women and women’s rights in matters of reproduction. This is presented in Toulmin’s schema in figure E2.

The Catholic argumentation concerning the exploitative nature of stem cell harvesting proceeds on three fronts. The first is a unified front with the Pro-Life movement and with Catholic opposition to abortion and contraception. The second front is battling the cloning industry with the claim that mass murder is committed and human beings are dehumanized and exploited in order to fill the vaults of the cloning companies. The third front is directed to defending the rights of women who are depicted as exploited by the same industry.

4.3.2. The pathos of Exploitation / Dehumanization

Another scientist says, “[Cloning] is the easiest thing you can do. Just get the damn nucleus, and put this damn nucleus into this enucleated oocyte, and pray to God something happens, and put it back into the surrogate mother, and wait. The easiest thing we could do right now, believe me, is clone a damn human being.” Sitting here at Mass today, this may sound like bad science fiction. But of course it isn’t. Since the 1930s, we’ve been learning to see human beings as objects and as accidents. For 70 years, we’ve been teaching ourselves to believe that the ends justify the means. In the past, we saw the unborn baby as a child of God. We used a vocabulary grounded in love. Language is revealing, and today our language has changed. Now the unborn child is a “damn nucleus” carried by a woman who may or may not have anything to do with the child’s conception. (s1063, Archbishop Chaput, the Legatus Convention in Naples.)

Surely it would not be pleasant to enter the world in a laboratory, instead of being the fruit of the union of our parents. Neither would it be pleasurable to be the survivor among tens or even hundreds of our twin siblings eliminated as ‘defective.’ Still less would it be pleasant to be manipulated for producing ‘pieces’ that someone else needs (for example, the kidneys), then to die after a brief and anguished life which had been ‘produced’ precisely for this reason. (s1114, Cardinal Alfonso López Trujillo.)

There are two main voices of emotional persuasion in the Catholic official theme claiming that therapeutic cloning is exploitative and dehumanizing. The first voice aims at inducing feelings of sympathy concerning the extremely inhuman situation a clone would face. The emotive effect with this voice is somewhat similar to that discussed under the themes of “Human Dignity” and “Sacred Family”. In these themes the negative emotive force was created by describing the emotionally stressing circumstances a cloned person might have to face in life. In the current theme, a similar effect is brought about by describing the situation of the clone as utility for some other person’s needs. The primary difference from the previous themes is that in them the unpleasant situation was brought about by social expectations or deviations from the norm. Within the current theme the expectations are much harsher: the clone is depicted not as having to face the reality of a socially deprived person but as having to function as a collection of spare parts or as cellular material utilized for the needs of someone else.

The second emotive voice aims at creating an image of a society to be feared, cold and unfeeling society, which would be ready to approve of such an exploitative use of humans as therapeutic cloning. In the above example a scientist is portrayed as almost humorously vulgar and unappreciative of human life, calling an unborn child a “damn nucleus”. The scientist is also a person with a somewhat dubious attitude towards God, and it may be that in the example the scientist is presented as using the name of God in a sarcastic manner. In most of the arguments claiming experimental cloning is exploitative the emphasis is on the indisputable and equal humanity of the blastocyst and adult human beings. The undeniably harsh language of the alleged scientist contrasts with this emphasis and is likely to rouse feelings of anger and contempt towards an unfeeling scientific community.

The same contrasting tendency can be found in most of the Catholic voices that portray the possibility of a society where cloning is accepted:

It is said that cloning could be used to create “copies” of illustrious people, or to replace a deceased loved one, or even to provide genetically matched tissues or organs for the person whose genetic material was used for the procedure. Each such proposal is indicative of a utilitarian view of human life, in which a fellow human is treated as a means to someone else’s ends -- instead of as a person with his or her own inherent dignity. This same attitude lies at the root of human slavery. (s1034, Richard M. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

Therapeutic cloning is identified with slavery or other negatively perceived human institutions. The comparison of cloning with slavery effectively underlines the point of human exploitation. Comparing cloning with undesired cultural institutions and forms from the history of humanity is likely to create an emotional transfer: if you oppose slavery and agree with the argument that cloning is similar to it, the negative emotions you experience towards slavery are transferred to the topic of cloning.

The element that is extremely typical in this particular Catholic strategy of persuasion is the vision of a twisted society. As discussed before, the Catholic vision of a good society is based on following a moral agenda where the value of human beings arises from the metaphysical mystery of creation. Societies that forsake this belief are considered evil and oppressive, and in danger of becoming totalitarian. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 600-601.) Cloning and stem cell research are repeatedly likened to negative examples of oppressive and brutal societies. One such emotional transfer can be created by identifying the cloning industry with, for example, the eugenic projects and human testing of Nazi Germany. As the atrocities of the Nazis are something of a schoolbook example of a society gone astray, a powerful emotional transfer can be created by likening it to the cloning industry. Another much used means of inducing emotions is painting an exceedingly bleak image of a technologically dominated culture of procreation where “perfect” people are cloned and those not quite up the standard are dispatched as deficient:

Cloning understands children as a product of human design. Life is not a gift from God but something we fashion according to our desires. Naturally abortion awaits those who are beyond our techniques of producing the

“perfect” baby. Society can easily become indifferent and even hostile toward those who suffer from various genetic disorders. Far being good for society, cloning can weaken the common good as well as a sense of responsibility toward those in need. (s2035, Father William Maestri, Clarion Herald.¹³²)

Human cloning does not treat any disease but turns human reproduction into a manufacturing process, by which human beings are mass-produced to preset specifications. The cloning procedure is so dehumanizing that some scientists want to treat the resulting human beings as subhuman, creating them solely so they can destroy them for their cells and tissues. (s1011, Bishop Wilton D. Gregory of Belleville, The President of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

The apocalyptic visions of a society where cloning would be the norm and human beings would be “mass-produced to preset specifications” are unnerving enough to induce feelings of fear and ominous foreboding. Portraying gloomy visions of a would-be future if cloning were currently permitted has an important function for encouraging people to act now, before it all becomes reality. As earlier discussed, the main function of emotive rhetoric is to induce action. The power of the emotions to move people into action has always been understood as an important function of emotional persuasion. Fear appeal is connected to motivation; by describing a future to be feared the Catholic voices hope to make people act in a way as to prevent the future from happening. The imaginary future conditions that are presented as factual rouse fear of the future and motivate the desire to avoid a bleak situation.

The exceptional topic of the exploitation of women is also present when the dehumanizing nature of cloning is being argued through emotional persuasion:

The exploitation wrought by human cloning would not be limited to the cloned human, but extend to the countless women whose eggs would be needed to make cloned embryos. It’s grisly – millions of women giving up their eggs to scientists who will use them to create human beings whose sole purpose in life is to be killed. What an ugly contrast to God’s beautiful plan. (s2026, Cathleen Cleaver, Director for Planning and Information at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

The recurring emotionally persuasive element in the Catholic voices pointing to the exploitative nature of cloning is the emphasis on the creation of human beings for the sole purpose of killing them. The apocalyptic note that often rings from the Catholic voices dominates this particular persuasive discourse. The horrific visions of the future magnitude of cloning are used to produce a growing fear of embryonic research. Additional emotional weight is added to the argument by emphasizing the “grisliness” of the whole process.

¹³² Although the speaker is not an “Official” voice by his position in the Catholic hierarchy, the context of the text this quotation has been taken from appears to increase his authority. The Clarion Herald is identified as follows: “The Clarion Herald is the official newspaper of the Archdiocese of New Orleans. The Archbishop of New Orleans is the publisher and president.” In addition the text builds on Papal authority.

An additional point of emotional identification is given by describing the emotionally stressing choices the nursing staff and patients would have to face if therapeutic cloning were allowed:

Cloning and stem cell research create serious problems of conscience for doctors, patients, researchers and those asked to donate material to produce embryos for research. For example, a patient who supplies a cell for the purpose of creating a clone would be intending the destruction of the clone for the sake of harvesting its cells. (s1082, The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics, submitted by Rev. David Jones, Director.¹⁵⁵)

The pathos of “Exploitation / Dehumanization” focuses on creating negative emotional transfers on multiple fronts. The most important of these fear appeals is the idea of a society or establishment that would treat human beings as usable material having only medical or commercial value, and the idea of a future where such practices might become the norm. Another important emotive strategy is that of women being described as victims utilized in the name of the same fearful institutions. In a nutshell, the emotive message transmitted is that therapeutic cloning would not be good for anyone included in the process: certainly not the embryo, the women who donate the eggs, or even the medical staff involved in the process.

4.3.5. The ethos of Exploitation / Dehumanization

One proposition receiving almost universal support in years of public policy debate is this: human embryos must never be created solely as research material, to be experimented on and destroyed. Therefore it is a cause for amazement that Congress is hesitating to enact a genuine ban on human cloning on the grounds that some biotechnology companies say the law must protect the use of cloning to produce and then discard ‘research embryos. (s1017, Cardinal Bernard Law, Chairman of the Bishops’ Committee for Pro-Life Activities.)

By approving a law against human cloning, Congress will send a clear signal that we are not merely the victims of technical advance, that we can limit and direct our technological powers to serve and not demean human dignity. It will be especially important to express and strengthen this resolve as our lawmakers face issues such as embryonic stem cell research, genetic discrimination, and proposals for creating human beings solely for research purposes. (s1016, Cardinal William Keeler, Chairman of the Committee for Pro-Life Activities.)

¹⁵⁵The site this quote has been taken from is identified as follows: “The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics exists to help Catholics and others to explore the Church’s position on bioethical issues...”

If the human cloning project intends to stop "before" implantation in the womb, trying to avoid at least some of the consequences we have just indicated, it appears equally unjust from the moral standpoint. A prohibition of cloning which would be limited to preventing the birth of a cloned child, but which would still permit the cloning of an embryo-foetus, would involve experimentation on embryos and foetuses and would require their suppression before birth—a cruel, exploitative way of treating human beings. (s1066, The Pontifical Academy for Life, Statement on Cloning, June 25, 1997.)

The speaker appearing within the theme "Exploitation / Dehumanization" emphasizes the distress that the process of stem cell research would cause to other human beings, potentially large groups in the future. The voices present themselves as benevolent humanitarian agents who invite the audiences to ponder the moral gravity of the consequences of stem cell technology. The main audience the voices present themselves to can be considered universal in the sense that their argumentative structures incorporate few if any theological elements that would require special knowledge on the part of the audience. A more specified audience is reached for with the arguments underlining the situation of the women supplying the necessary ova for the research, but also in these cases both the speaker and the assumed audiences stand on the grounds of very general "humanistic" ethics, not on the grounds of theological ethics.

Of all the Catholic Official voices concerned with cloning, the speakers condemning therapeutic or experimental cloning as dehumanizing and utilitarian are addressing the audience as equals. There is almost no trace of the apostolic authoritarianism that is pronouncedly evident in the stances of the speakers in the previous two themes discussed. The speaker condemning cloning on the basis of the dehumanizing nature of stem cell harvesting is strictly "one of us": a concerned citizen who reaches out for the attention of his fellows on a grave matter that concerns all in an equal way:

What our generation decides to allow now through the UN will affect the future of humanity in ways we cannot predict. To allow the cloning of human lives is to separate life and love, and a grave step towards the treating human life itself as a product to be ordered rather than something to be revered. (s1115, Peter Smith, Archbishop of Cardiff.)

Attempts to clone a human being should be a punishable offense. Human cloning would constitute a violation of the rights of the person being engendered and would endanger the common good since it would subject one class of human beings to domination and exploitation by others. (s1065, Statement of the Catholic Leadership Conference on Human Cloning November 1, 2001.)

The softening tone in the authoritarian identification of the speakers is consistent with the other themes discussed in the sense that the authoritarian note present in them was directly in proportion to the theological emphasis of the argumentative structures. Within the current theme the theological emphasis has been replaced

with “general humanistic” argumentative stances. The speakers assume that the repugnancy of the idea of using human beings as instruments to an end is widely shared by any given audience. When there is an assumption of almost universal acceptance of the claimed fact, the mantle of authority can be safely shed in the matter. In other words, emphasizing a speaker presentation that is found appealing only by a select elite audience is a bad rhetorical move when there is reason to believe that the assertions suggested within the argumentative structure have universal appeal.

The special audience that Catholic speakers attempt to reach in this theme is composed of women and those interested in the rights of women. As noted earlier, the Catholic discussion concerning many social issues like abortion, contraception, equality of the sexes and so on, is not perceived by all audiences as a discussion defending women. This is true at least in a rhetorical sense: for example, Pro-Life rhetoric sets certain normative rules that override the freedom of choice of pregnant women. While there is no doubt Pro-Life speakers in their own view defend what is best for women, an absolute ban on abortion, for example, would most likely be viewed as a limitation of the rights of women by many audiences. As Catholics oppose contraception, abortion and female priesthood it is easy to see why a primary argumentative strategy that would be generally perceived as defending the rights of women escapes Catholic speakers on many occasions. Since the same limitation on female freedom of choice generally surfaces in the Catholic cloning discussion, it is unlikely that women not sharing the precise doctrinal context of the Catholic Church would consider the claims of “sacredness of the family” and emphasizing the dignity of blastocysts as upholding the rights of the women themselves. In the theme of “Exploitation / Dehumanization”, however, a rare opportunity arises: the Catholic voices aim at representing the cloning industry as a threat to the audience which is interested in women’s rights:

One does not need to be a cell-line researcher to recognize why noble ends cannot justify morally repugnant means. Cloning, even so-called therapeutic or experimental cloning, creates a new life without a father, and reduces a mother to the provider of an almost emptied egg. (s1127, Bishop Daniel P. Reilly.)

That it is always a reasonable rhetorical move to appeal to the audience perceived as the most problematic when standing on the safest grounds possible is self-evident. The idea of using humans as instruments is as repugnant to both sexes and possibly even more powerful for women in this particular context since it is female eggs that would be used as the material for therapeutic cloning. It is understandable that Catholic Official speakers choose to address women as a special elite audience only when the process of cloning is viewed as exploitation of female bodies. It is even claimed that providing eggs for medical purposes makes women’s bodies “a commodity”:

Cloning objectifies human sexuality and commodifies the bodies of women. Moreover, women are deprived of their innate dignity by becoming suppliers of eggs and wombs. (s1111, Vatican’s Mission to the United Nations February 2003.)

Although far less common, there are Catholic voices that judge the process of cloning as dehumanizing on theological grounds:

Our ancient creeds express the equal dignity of God the Father and God the Son by saying that the Son was “begotten, not made.” The radical distinction between divine and human is dramatized in the Book of Genesis when God makes Adam and Eve by His own hands. Should we now act as “gods” to our children – making rather than begetting them? Will we then still see them as our equals, or as our inferior “creations”? (s2028, Mr. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

The above example is strongly tied to the theological teaching of the Catholic Church. It is clear that the argument is primarily aimed at a different type of audience than in many of the previous examples. In this case the target is an elite audience of Catholic believers with knowledge of Biblical stories.

The Catholic official ethos of exploitation and dehumanization is built on two fronts. The first is a universal appeal to the general humanistic values that can be assumed as shared by many people. If any ethical stance can be assumed as universally shared, then it can also be safely assumed that mass murder of innocents is repulsive to most. This emotive appeal is used primarily to arouse the sense of compassion in the universal audience. The second primary tactic is to appeal to women and through women by portraying the donor of ova as an exploited victim of the medical industry. The speaker appeals without the apostolic authority that was so rife in the previous themes, portraying himself as a concerned fellow citizen. The rhetorical tactic is reasonable: the stronger the appeal and probable audience base, the less authority is required on the part of the speaker.

4.3.4. Cognitive view of Exploitation/Dehumanization

Logos

It is both plausible from the point of view of the folk-theoretical assumptions as well as from the point of view of the great majority of all ethical systems of thought that an intentional creature possesses some inherent rights of existence. Our intuitive conceptualisation of agency seems to incorporate an assumption that intentional beings aim at self-preservation and survival. The very basic social instincts that enable people to live in societies and to give intrinsic value to other people’s intentions and motivations most likely enable human beings to postulate rights of existence for other human beings. If humans were unable to intuitively postulate other people’s motivations of survival and self-preservation, any type of organized social behaviour would become very difficult indeed. The cognitive facilities of naive sociology and folk psychology discussed earlier (see section 3.4.) are a part of the intuitive mental machinery that has made humans such successful social animals, and most likely one part of this success is the ability to intuitively postulate for other human beings both the will and the right to live.

Consequently, it is probable that the extremely widely shared ethical consensus according to which it is wrong to kill other people without sound reasons has been affected by the generally shared intuitive reasoning, which makes it possible to identify with other human agents. Because human beings are able to identify with the situation faced by an intentional agent whose rights and possibilities for existence become radically limited, they are capable of sympathy and co-operation. Thus it is easy for most people to intuitively grasp the idea that it is unethical to produce personal beings for the sole purpose of their destruction. This ethical consideration is typically applied only to humans, where the mass production of animals for the sole purpose of consumption is generally agreed on. This is consistent with the assumption presented above, since the intentional qualities inferred by ontological reasoning are intuitively more important in other human agents than in animals: as previously discussed, human beings (personal agents) belong to a different ontological category of folk-theoretical inference than animals (see sections 3.3 and 3.4.).

So it can be hypothesized that the folk-theoretical intuitions we have about other persons are an important factor behind generally held ethical principles. This is not to say that ethical-philosophical systems of thought could be directly reduced to folk intuitions. Rather, it can be assumed that folk-theoretical intuitive inferences are an important part of everyday reasoning concerning moral and ethical questions. Sophisticated ethical systems of thought are to folk ethics what religious doctrine is to everyday religious faith. Only rare specialists know the precisely right canons of religious doctrine, but many people entertain religious ideas of a similar type, that have some core concepts from the doctrine and a great variance on the interpretation of the whole dogma. This is the ‘Great Tradition / Little Tradition’ variance that has been discussed earlier. It appears that ethical thought functions in a similar manner: some people are experts of ethical thought, but a great many have ideas concerning the rights and wrongs of given matters. While the general effect that intuitive systems may have on systems of ethical thought is hypothetical at best, it seems to work in the Catholic discussion opposing stem cell research and therapeutic cloning. In Toulmin’s schema the structure of the argument opposing therapeutic cloning looks as in figure E3 (see the next page).

On some occasions stem cell harvesting has been compared to organ donations. But as intuitive reasoning goes, there is a radical difference between an embryo and, say, a human kidney. A kidney is an organ that is understood and categorized through essentialist taxonomies in a different way than a potential agent. In other words, intuitive folk-theoretical taxonomy places organs and human embryos in different categories of intuitive inference: there are inferential rules for kidneys and there are inferential rules for persons, and the rules are different. As discussed before, membership in a species is not intuitively determined by biological features, but by descent. A blastocyst is a human being at a very early stage in the process of development, and thus a being in the essentialist category of “intentional human person”, or a being that shares the essential core of being human. A blastocyst can develop into an intentional being, achieve agency, as it were, whereas a kidney will never develop into a being with any intentions or thought processes.




Figure E3: The intuitive basis of the dehumanizing nature of cloning

While a blastocyst has no human features or visible traits that make it an agent, it can become an agent. Nevertheless a blastocyst causes problems for folk-theoretical inference. Folk-psychological intuitive assumptions that are normally used when reasoning about agents are not easy to utilize when reasoning about a blastocyst: it is not yet an intentional agent. The difficulty in placing blastocysts under a clear-cut inferential category is probably because of the specialized scientific knowledge that is necessary in order for us to know there are such things as blastocysts in the first place. The intuitive folk theories have risen based on everyday sensory information. The mental sensitivity to acquire biological inferential intuitions has developed during countless generations of observing biological procreation, descent and existence. However, biological development before birth is a process largely opaque to pre-scientific perception. Only the advances in bioscience have made it possible to even know about the early developmental stages of fetuses, and thus it is not intuitively clear in what category blastocysts, for example, belong.

What becomes instantly clear in Catholic argumentation is the attempt to use folk-biological essentialism in such a way as to place the blastocyst in a category where ethical decisions should be made as if it was a human being, not as if it was a kidney or a lump of biomass. This is extremely important for further argumentation because our intuitive folk-psychological assumptions tend to tell us that where there is biological human existence there also is a mind and a personality. One problem that immediately rises in this type of “persuasion of the inferential template” is what type of biological being, mind and personality counts as fully human? Previously, even black people were denied full human status although the intentional qualities of a person are fully apparent in all human beings irrespectively of skin tone. The relation of a blastocyst to intentional humanity is not intuitively

self-evident, although on the basis of folk biology it is natural to conclude that the essential qualities of a species are already present in an embryo, no matter how small. Again, the actual persuasive power of the argumentative structure comes about by emphasizing the humanity of the embryo and by underlining that it is a person. Emphasizing the personhood of the blastocyst is necessary because intuitive psychological assumptions are not automatically activated where an embryo as early as a blastocyst is concerned.

In other words the problem of the blastocyst's humanity can be stated as follows: causal-essential thought would seem to suggest that the blastocyst is human. It is, all things considered, the progeny of a human being and thus the intuitive inferential rules of folk-biological causality make it a member of the human species and thus subject to the causal inferences that human beings are subject to. On the other hand, the blastocyst has no sortal-essential qualities of a human being that typically inform us of the presence of a personal agent. If someone was shown a blastocyst, the intuitive thought of "a person" would most certainly not be the first to spring to the observer's mind. In previous examples both sortal- and causal-essential inferences informed the ideal-essential concepts used in the Catholic cloning discussion. In the current example, the sortal-essential features fall short of the mark and are compensated for rhetorically by extensively underlining the personal quality of the blastocysts. As suggested before, this "persuasion of the inferential template" is necessary in order to make people include blastocysts in the same value or right-to-exist attribution as they do infants of adult human beings. If folk-psychological or naive sociological principles were not activated in the case of blastocysts, they could not be ethically evaluated with the same "folk-ethical" inferences as adult human beings. This would fundamentally damage the Catholic argumentative strategy.

It seems plausible that the intuitive assumptions that make us postulate essential biological and psychological qualities for a human embryo are also the building blocks behind many of our generally held ethical beliefs. The essential question particularly in the case of therapeutic cloning is the embryo's status as a person. While the depth of the general relationship between ethical thought and ontological reasoning remains speculative at best, it is conceivable that intuitive psychological assumptions can be used rhetorically to make embryos appear more or less human, and this in turn is the rhetorical building block behind the persuasive force in the logos of "Exploitation / Dehumanization".

Pathos

Making people imagine the emotional stress of the would-be clone in situations of controversy is an emotive strategy much used by Catholic voices throughout the cloning discussion. It seems that in situations where persuasion is attempted making people imagine the emotional states of others works as a way of activating the folk-psychological mechanisms that people have. Within the present study this seems to be concurrent with situations where persuasion is attempted through having the audience emote to feel sympathy for clones, or fear and revulsion towards the situations clones might face. It is possible that the feeling of identification, of "walking in someone else's shoes", can lead to experiences of similar stress and thus work as a persuasive emotional element within the argumentation. As was

noted before, anxiety and fear are often considered very important motivating factors in all human affairs (Lazarus 1991a, 234-240). It is important to note that it is easier to call forth emotional identifications to adult persons than embryos – it is clearly impossible to identify with the emotional world of a blastocyst. As has been suggested, the arguments that emphasize the humanity of an embryo are usually either built on folk-biological, essentialistic value-attributions or otherwise the embryo is rhetorically portrayed as the equal of a full-grown person. Portraying embryos or even blastocysts as persons seems to be necessary for folk-psychological identification to become possible. It is intuitively salient to claim that an embryo is “one of us” on the basis of essentialistic assumptions, but intuitive psychology fails to register the embryo as a person unless additional rhetorical means are utilized.

As theorized before, the difficulty of postulating a folk-psychological agency for an embryo is probably due to the peculiar nature of its sensory perception, motivation and intentional abilities. As a blastocyst in itself is too far removed from the typical cases in which folk-psychological reasoning is applied, it becomes extremely important to use rhetorical means to enforce the feeling that a blastocyst is in essence the same thing as an adult human being. The concurring nature of the emotive strategy brings forth an interesting possibility: activating folk-psychological inferences in cases where they do not spontaneously emerge may be a form of simulation as discussed in the section concerning cognitive theories. For the sake of recall, there are two main theories about folk-psychology: simulation theory and theory-theory. Simulation theory assumes that people make assumptions concerning the mental states of other human beings by simulating the situation other person faces – by “walking in the other person’s shoes” so to speak. Theory-theory assumes that people have a tacit psychological theory that they intuitively apply to interpret the mental world of other people (see sections 3.3. and 3.4.).

The Catholic voices seem to aim at activating some sort of simulation when it comes to having audiences emote concerning the situation a blastocyst meant for stem cell harvesting or a cloned baby would face. Furthermore, the emotive strategy does not resemble the fear appeal aimed at inducing quick surface elaboration. It rather resembles an attempt to make the audience ponder and think deeply through the emotional identification (or simulation) of the situation a blastocyst is faced with. This seems to suggest that in persuasive situations, emotional simulation can be used as a way to induce deep elaboration where the factual inferential potential of the argument is not enough. A blastocyst can not be conceptualized as an agent utilizing psychological intuitions in the sense theory-theory suggests. It is far too different from typical situations where people use their folk-psychological inference. However, an emoting audience effectively benefits from the activation of folk-psychological inference, in fact, having an audience emote to feel sympathetic towards a blastocyst depends on the activation of folk-psychological mechanisms. If the situation is too far removed from typical folk-theoretical inference (see the previous section) this activation needs to be brought about in a different manner. And at this point emotive simulation, rhetorically making the audience think of the blastocyst as an adult person, is what may activate the folk-psychological inference.

Theory-theory is generally accepted as the more probable explanation of the folk-psychological abilities humans have. The examples of the Catholic cloning discussion seem to suggest that simulation can be used as a special technique for evoking folk-psychological inference (in the sense the theory-theory suggests)

where it does not occur spontaneously. This in turn can be used to induce an emotive persuasion that works like deep elaboration but without the inferential coherence (logos in rhetorical sense) normally required for deep elaboration to occur. In other words, by emotionally simulating the situation of a blastocyst, the audience members create a mental state that resembles a deep elaboration typically achieved through scrutinizing persuasive claims. The result may be that the change in their systems of thought is lasting and resilient, contrary to that which is normally achieved by surface elaboration.

The idea of “deep-elaborative emotional simulation”, as this suggestion might be named, is only speculative. It does seem credible, however, that making audiences emotionally sensitive to blastocysts by depicting them as personal beings, is an effective persuasive strategy. Whether the persuasive effects achieved through this type of emotive strategy are more resistant to change than, say, those achieved through fear appeal, is impossible to test within this study. However, it does seem that emotive simulation resembles a deep elaborative process more than a quick surface elaboration.¹⁵⁴

Be that as it may, emphasizing biological descent to activate folk-biological taxonomies where psychological qualities are not present seems the best possible rhetorical way to emphasize the humanity of the embryos. However, emphasizing psychological qualities over biology whenever it is possible is a wise rhetorical move because it is easier to attach emotional elements to arguments that function on the basis of intuitive folk-psychological assumptions. The same effect was seen in both previous themes: value attribution seems to be tied to folk-psychological inference. The Catholic emotive strategy in “Exploitation / Dehumanization” works on both folk-biological and folk-psychological fronts, but a stronger emphasis is put on the essential psychological qualities of the blastocysts. This emphasis allows the speakers to induce a greater emotive appeal by their argumentative structures. In addition to the emotive strategy of identification with embryos/blastocysts, the theme has some traces of fear appeal through depicting a cold, unfeeling society or a catastrophic future. These elements of fear appeal have, however, a much greater role in the themes to come, where they will be discussed more closely.

¹⁵⁴This idea is related to several other theoretical advances. For example, literary theorist Ellen Spolsky (1995) has studied how people typically utilise abductive inference to creatively bridge gaps in knowledge structures, be they events or literary presentations in nature. On the side of the philosophy of mind Paul Thagard (2000) has studied how people aim at preserving cognitive coherence and generally making sense of the world they live in. Thagard’s work is relevant in the context of the idea presented above because he sees emotion as an important tool people use to “patch” their knowledge structures when their coherence is endangered. Psychologists Keith Oatley and Philip N. Johnson-Laird have researched (among other things) how emotion works in communication concerning goal-directed action (see, for example Oatley & Johnson-Laird 1998). An additional point of view that must be considered is Gilles Fauconnier’s and Mark Turner’s theory of conceptual blending (2002). The theory of conceptual blends was not integrated into this study, but might provide an interesting avenue for future research, since some things concerning the relation between communication and cognitive mechanisms suggested in this study come close to those suggested by Fauconnier and Turner. I wish to extend a special thanks to my pre-examiner Tom Sjöblom for pointing out my oversight concerning the theories mentioned here.

Ethos

The ethos of “Exploitation / Dehumanization” is built on many essentialist intuitive factors that have a huge impact on social cognition. On the grounds of intuitive folk-psychological assumptions it can be quite safely assumed that almost any person would detest being used (or seeing his children used) solely as a means to an end. This mutually manifest orientation gives a very universal nature to the argumentative structure which asserts that cloning makes human beings instruments. The disposition of not wanting to be taken as an instrument may be considered a human universal. In other words, the tendency to attribute value to the self and structures of thought that give value to a human being (including the self) are very widely mutually manifest structures of thought. This universal ground on which the voices within the theme can build their arguments seems to have a notable effect on the self-presentation of the speakers. As discussed previously, the authoritarian self-presentation that was common in the previous themes is much rarer within the current theme.

So, it can be argued that the lessening of authoritarian self-presentation occurs when the universal appeal of the argumentative structure increases. For an argumentative structure that is built on such a universal feature as the human tendency to value the self, it might damage the argument if the speaker chose to appear as a figure of divine authority. Consequently, when the intuitive grounds for a claim are felt to be strong enough to appeal to a universal audience, the speakers choose to appear as “one of us who share the same ethical beliefs”. In the cases of “Human Dignity” and “Sacred Family” the mutually manifest intuitive assumptions are not as self-evident as in the case of “Exploitation / Dehumanization”. The grounds for the previous argumentative structures were more strongly built on Catholic theology and less aimed at a universal audience, although the aim for universality was also present in them.

The stances of the speakers within the current theme, the general humanistic tone of the argumentation and the inclusion of an atypical elite audience, women, sets the ethos of “Exploitation / Dehumanization” apart from other themes. Comparing the speaker-stances in other dominant Catholic official themes and the stance apparent in the current theme gives interesting insight into the controversial relationship the Catholic community has with the potential audiences on the WWW. The more marginalized the argued points are in the context of secular civil authorities, the more the presentation of the speakers takes on the mandate of divine authority. In marginalized issues the assumed audiences turn increasingly elitist and the language used in the argumentative structures specializes. In other words, a rhetoric suitable for the Catholic community audience or Catholic discourse communities is emphasized in controversial issues. The more generally accepted the argued points are in the eyes of other social institutions, the more humanistic the Catholic argumentation becomes in style.

This reflects the controversial position of the Catholic community on multiple social issues. Where you are already losing, it is reasonable to cut your losses and focus on those who manifest a cognitive environment similar enough to be open to your arguments even if they are controversial. Where the topics under discussion are still open for multiple different social institutions and audiences, it is reasonable to adopt a stance most probably pleasing to as many possible audiences as can

be imagined. The dual position of the Catholic community is balanced between the tradition and the teaching of the Church and appealing to as many audiences in secular society as possible. While this duality is probably not restricted to the question of cloning in any way, it gives an informative point of reflection for understanding the stances that the Official Catholic voices assume in the cloning discussion.

So concludes the analysis of the three most common Official voices in the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning. The themes will be discussed somewhat further in the chapter “Conclusions and comparisons”. Next are the two most dominant Professional Catholic voices on the Internet: “Playing God” and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”.

5. The dominant Professional Catholic voices

5.1. Playing God

5.1.1. The logos of Playing God

Adam and Eve were the first to try it, but certainly not the last. It is the reason why evils like abortion, physician-assisted suicide, in-vitro fertilization and euthanasia exist today, and why an evil like human cloning may be on the horizon. What is “it” you ask? It’s called “playing God.” (s2141, Fr. Raymond Suriani.¹⁵⁵)

A half dozen companies are now cloning various animals. The science of cloning human embryos is now relatively straightforward. Science is in a realm of danger in this. Human cloning is not just “playing God” but trying to be Him. (s2165, Cavalry Contender.¹⁵⁶)

The theme of “Playing God” is very common within the Catholic Internet discussion concerning cloning.¹⁵⁷ Argumentative structures based, one way or another, on elements that can be categorized as warnings against human striving for the godhead, can be found in all voices, from Official to Lay themes. There are two probable reasons for the popularity of the argumentative strategy. First of all, the thematic where human beings aspire to become as powerful as God with horrible consequences has a solid backing in biblical stories. Secondly, multiple different arguments actually exist behind the explicit structures of “Playing God”. By now it is already clear that it is common for the themes analyzed in this study to include several argumentative structures that emphasize slightly different aspects of the matter under argumentation. Two main lines have been the norm so far, but in “Playing God” four main lines of argumentation can be found. These are: “stealing God’s creative power”, “Divine retribution”, “the need to restrict human power” and “fear of human error”.

155 This quotation has been taken from Fr. Suriani’s personal webpage. It is a piece of his homily that was reportedly given on July 18, 1999 at St. Pius X Church, Westerly, R.I.

156 The “Cavalry Contender” website actually belongs to Calvary Baptist Church, situated in Huntsville. The quotation is from a page titled: “NEWS & VIEWS, NOTES & QUOTES, TO WARN & INFORM”. The web search of Catholic cloning discussion returned the page, but the identity of the actual speaker remains uncertain.

157 The Professional themes discussed in this work are “Playing God” and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”. There were several other Professional themes discernible within the material, but they were not as prominent. Some of the other themes were named “Sacred Family”, which was essentially the Professional equivalent of the Official theme by the same name, “Conspiracy”, which expressed several near-paranoid theories about the hidden agendas of institutions that wish cloning to become reality and “Eugenics”, which expressed repugnance towards the idea of men trying to improve God’s creation.




Figure G1: Stealing God's creative power

These lines of argumentation are paired in such a way that the arguments of divine retribution usually accompany those warning against stealing God's power, and the call for restrictions on human power are accompanied by warnings of human fallibility. The first line of argumentation focuses on the question of the right to create. In this line of argumentation it is claimed that the power to create human beings is a power that belongs solely to God. Cloning is perceived as a form of creating human persons and the claim is that by taking that capability into his hands man is playing God. The Professional Catholic voices claim that by acquiring the means to create human beings man is actually trying to become God, aspiring to usurp the Creator in some sense. In Toulmin's schema the first line of argumentation appears like in figure G1.

In Catholic theology God is understood as the sole creator of the universe and of human beings. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 89-95.) Although humans have the right and the duty to care for and to rule the world and the right to intervene in instances of disease, for example, cloning is perceived by the Professional voices as something categorically different than the practice of medicine. While treating disease (biological intervention) is well and good, taking biological intervention to the point where the word "create" can be used appears to be a violation of divine rules. In the opinion of the Catholic voices, compromising the sovereign position of God the Creator is bound to cause problems. A similar argumentative structure was found in the theme of "Human Dignity". However, the theme of "Human Dignity" focused on the right of a human being to be born as a result of an act of creation by God, and the theme warning about playing God focuses on defending the rights of God. This line of argumentation is especially rich with imagery of the Fall, with

Adam and Eve harvesting the forbidden fruit compared to scientists harvesting stem cells in their laboratories.

As discussed in the section concerning Catholic doctrine, one of the theological core assumptions of the doctrine of the Fall is that the fundamental reason for the Fall of man was his prideful urge to surpass his creator. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 89-95.) In the biblical story of the Fall, the pride and curiosity of man leads to disobeying the rules God has set and this in turn evokes horrible divine retribution. Man is cast out of Paradise and cursed many times over along with the world he is forced to inhabit. (see Genesis 3: 1-24.) In the Catholic argumentation the same prideful urge and wanton curiosity are seen as affecting those who would like to have the power to clone humans. On the one hand the argumentative structure is backed by a somewhat dubious assumption, which seems to say that God really needs defenders: otherwise scientists can take God's privilege to create away from Him. Although this position is difficult to defend on the basis of Catholic theology, it seems that the actual message in these voices is that human beings should deliberately restrict their advancement or else they really risk stepping on God's private terrain:

God created man to be divinized, to share in the divine nature, but he had to wait until God gave it to him as a gift. The first man's sin is a refusal to wait for God's initiative in granting him a share of his life, his wisdom and his knowledge. Cloning is to become like God the Creator and refuse to wait for his initiative in claiming a dominion over life and not waiting for God's creative action. (s2080, Fr. Bryce Sibley.¹⁵⁸)

Although the worries the Professional speakers have are difficult to justify on the basis of abstract theological principles, biblical mythology is a different story. In the story of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9), for example, God has to intervene and stop the actions of the people in order to prevent human beings from becoming too powerful. In the story God says: "Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do." God confounds the language of human beings and scatters them around the globe. The modern theological interpretation usually given of the story is that God was protecting the people against their own pride. The Professional Catholic voices warning those who would clone about playing, or attempting to be, like God echo the same attitude. Be the argumentative structure as theologically correct as it may, what remains the argumentative structure is that breaking the categorical rules of procreation results in divine retribution.

The second dual line of argumentation warning against playing God focuses on a vision where human beings wield godlike powers and on the possible disastrous outcome of that enterprise. The core of the argument is that if humans acquire the godlike power to create human beings, this power is not readily accompanied by godlike wisdom to control that power:

¹⁵⁸The text this quotation has been taken from is called "Catholic Exchange". It is identified as follows: "Catholic Exchange is a non-profit media organization that seeks to bring the Good News of Jesus Christ as proclaimed by the Catholic Church to the world through the modern tools of mass communication." However, the official ties between Vatican and the site remain unclear.




Figure G2: Divine power without divine understanding

In addition to being stewards, we are called to be instruments of God's creation. This is related to stewardship, but the emphasis here is more bold, and indeed very relevant to questions about cloning. Although God is and remains the creator, God has chosen to use humanity (as God did in and through Jesus) to be instruments of God's ongoing creativity in this world. ...part of what is wrong with human cloning is that it does not fit with our charge to be stewards of creation, but rather seems to involve an inappropriate form of manipulation and domination. (S2071, Russell, B. Connors.¹³⁹)

Unfortunately, everything in life (except God's grace) comes at a price; we have not yet, I think, debated the price of gene conquest. Is it just the latest phase in medicine's ongoing mission to treat disease and thereby alleviate human suffering, or is it something quite different and possibly sinister - an attempt to remake life in man's own image? (s2117, Ian Hunter.¹⁴⁰)

In Toulmin's schema the argument where human beings wield godlike powers appears as in figure G2. The argument focuses on the fallen nature of human beings. In Catholic theology it is often stressed that human nature, although

¹³⁹The site this quotation has been taken from is called "American Catholic". The speaker is identified as a "Catholic ethicist".

¹⁴⁰The site this quotation has been taken from is called "Catholic Educator's Resource Center". The speaker is identified as "professor emeritus in the faculty of law at the University of Western Ontario".

basically desiring good, is often driven to err because of the false pride inherent in the human soul. In the context of the Catholic Internet discussion, probably the most quoted example of the disastrous effects of that pride is the already mentioned biblical tale of the Tower of Babel. The advances made in genetic technology and cloning are often likened to the process of building the Tower: both are magnificent accomplishments but for all the wrong reasons. Because of their inherently prideful and sinful nature, human beings should not be trusted with fantastic powers. In the opinion of Professional Catholic voices, to do so will inevitably lead to an ending similar to that of the Tower of Babel.

In the very end the Professional Catholic voices underline the dangers of human pride with both argumentative lines present in the theme of “Playing God”. The centrality of the idea of dangerous pride is, however, often present only when reading between the lines. The explicit structures around which the arguments are constructed tell a different story than the abstract explanation given about the deeper meanings hidden within the argumentative structures.

5.1.2. The pathos of Playing God

You see, the very word CLONING sends chill up and down one’s spine. It is politically correct to condemn cloning, but not politically correct to condemn abortion. Visions of mad scientists working in their labs, trying to play God -- creating life and then destroying that life for what they claim is for the good of mankind is difficult to ignore. (s2142, Dr. Frank Joseph.¹⁴¹)

...cloning does not help us to see that we are to be cooperators with God, but rather makes us “conspirators” against God’s plan for human life. It is, therefore, one more lethal weapon in the arsenal of those who want to expand the “culture of death” against the “culture of love and life.” (s2038, Mark S. Latkovic, Assistant Professor of Moral Theology and Systematic Theology, Sacred Heart Major Seminary.¹⁴²)

The mental image of someone “playing God” is in itself charged with strong emotive elements. The vision of a human being assuming the position of God brings to mind frightening images of megalomania and madness that are rife in the already mentioned biblical stories where people rebel against God, but also in Western fiction, from Goethe’s Faust to modern movies. The single most pronounced element of emotive content in the theme of “playing God” is the fear appeal induced in two different ways that correspond to the two dual argumentative structures analyzed earlier. Fear is induced in two ways: by describing divine retribution or either the

¹⁴¹The site this quotation has been taken from is called “The Daily Catholic.” The site identifies Dr. Joseph as follows: “We have enlisted him to write a weekly column on pro-life from a doctor, a parent and a loyal Catholic’s point of view”.

¹⁴²Although the title of the speaker does not qualify him as an “Official” voice of the Church, the article the quote has been taken from has been written from the point of view of the Catholic Church. The speaker builds on Papal authority and discusses the official stance of the Catholic Church. This was one of the most difficult cases to categorise.

success or failure of the cloning enterprise. The warning of the Catholic voices rings out against both the disposition to strive for godlike powers and against the possible consequences that success or failure in such endeavours might trigger. As mentioned previously, the biblical tradition of prideful human megalomania offers abundant backing for such warning voices.

Why the vision where other people wield vast powers without the proper control is so readily frightening for us can be partially explained by Catholic theology. If human beings are by nature prideful and sinful, what is there not to fear should someone gain godlike powers. In this doctrinal context of human behaviour it is natural to be suspicious of someone we can intuitively comprehend as wielding powers we cannot understand. It is very important for the emotive strength of “Playing God” that the powers of genetic manipulation are portrayed as “godlike”. This magnifies the natural tendency we have to be suspicious of the abilities of judgement of other people and of the sincerity of their motivations, or, as it might be expressed in Catholic language, of their sinful natures. Emphasizing the “godlikeness” of the power that cloning brings about has a further effect on the many-layered fear appeal built on the current theme. People are naturally suspicious of alien things they know little about. By emphasizing the power that the ability to clone would give to those ready to do it, the feeling of potential threat and danger is also emphasized. Finally, using biblical language to call the power to clone a “godlike” power, the voices build a conceptual bridge from the biblical stories that offer backing to their argumentation to the modern technology of cloning.

When godlike attributes of power and requirements for decision-making are annexed to genetic technology it is of course underlined that they do not come packaged with godlike powers of moral reasoning and evaluation. When religious people think about God, it is typical to assert, at least in the Catholic context, that God has unlimited power but also unlimited reason and benevolence. Thinking about the power of God without the capabilities that assure the proper use of those powers is a good way to inspire fear:

I wish, in fact, we would play God... How does God relate to us? God loves us, God brings healing, God does what is best for us. God loves us so much he gave his only son over to death to save us... We're not playing God. If we were, we would be doing exactly what we're asked to do: be like God. What we're doing is trying to replace God, to make ourselves gods. And we are much worse, whimsical and capricious gods. (s2101, jesuit Father Kevin T. FitzGerald.)

Humans would make “whimsical and capricious gods”, and who would want godlike powers to fall into the hands of mere humans? Although the emotive tactic inherent in imagining men wielding the powers of God is frequently used to inspire feelings of a threat, it is not the only emotive element present in the pathos of “Playing God”. Further fear is inspired within the theme by describing the bleak consequences that result if humans are allowed to play God:

Cloning aims to turn life from a gift into a product of our desires. It is the timeless temptation to replace God with only ourselves. The words of St. Paul are crucial: “None of us lives to himself, and none of us dies to himself... in life

and death we are the Lord's" (Rom 14:7-9). (s2035, Father William Maestri, Clarion Herald.)

Like the serpent in the Garden of Eden, the cloning industry tempts us today by assuring us that "Ye shall surely not die...ye shall be as gods" -- the classic gnostic exhortation! Yet while promising us godlike powers to "create", to "recreate", or to design our own new humanity and immortality through such technologies as human cloning and human genetic engineering, they lay waste the human people and human culture around them. (s2114, Dianne N. Irving.¹⁴⁵)

Apocalyptic imagery and the biblical vision of the inevitable outcome of the rebellious, sinful nature of man are rife within the theme. Allowing genetic engineering to continue is seen as a road to the destruction of human culture and as a serious disregard of the value of human life. The "cloning industry machine" and the commercial market are presented in the voices as the new "evil". When talking about playing God the Catholic voices often present the commercial aspect of cloning research and the companies that favour genetic engineering as the serpent of Eden. There is a powerful rhetorical tool in the reinterpretation of biblical stories: as the serpent seduced Adam and Eve in Paradise, so the cloning industry now hisses into the ears of those easily corrupted by the promise of financial gain or by the hope of immortality.

In some arguments the stem cell industry emerges as the evil behind the advancement of cloning techniques. The utterly negative emotive persuasion present in the theme of "Playing God" is brought to a last judgement by calling the genetic science "the culture of death" and underlining the horror of the destruction of human life for monetary purposes:

We do know that adult stem cells have already been shown to be much more reliable to attain the same goals. But of course, no human being has to be killed by using adult stem cells, however, since we are the culture of death, there are many who prefer playing God. (s2142, Dr. Frank Joseph.)

Academic kudos for a few scientists who delight in 'playing God' and megabucks for medibusiness are being given precedence over reverence for human life. Embryonic human beings are being treated like lab rats, mere

¹⁴⁵The site this quotation has been taken from is called "lifeissues.net". The site is identified as follows: "Our purpose is to promote a "Culture of Life" in which human freedom will find its authentic meaning by joining forces with truth, life and love". The organization behind the site is identified as: "The Oblate Missionaries of Mary Immaculate are a group of Catholic Priests and Brothers who belong to The Congregation of Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI)". The speaker is identified as follows: "Dr. Irving's professional activities include teaching positions at Georgetown University, Catholic University of America, and The Dominican House of Studies. She represented the Catholic Medical Association of the United States, and the International Federation of Catholic Medical Associations, at the Scientific Conference in Mexico City, Mexico, October 28, 1999 and presented a paper on "The Dignity and Status of the Human Embryo". Dr. Irving is a former career-appointed bench research biochemist/biologist (NIH, NCI, Bethesda, MD), an M.A. and Ph.D. philosopher (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.), and Professor of the History of Philosophy, and of Medical Ethics."

‘cells’ or products to be used at will by others. And it is all being veiled with deceitful language and extravagant promises. (s2161, Fr. Fisher.¹⁴⁴)

With the distinct tone of a “conspiracy theory”¹⁴⁵ the Catholic voices emphasize that “embryonic human beings” are treated like lab rats, and present scientists as persons who actually delight in the destruction of human life and who even prefer to destroy it when alternatives are present. The claims of “deceitful language” (which actually was the third most prevalent theme in the Professional Catholic voices) and the looming presence of the serpent-like medical corporations behind it all paint a frightening picture. The result is an emotive rhetoric that is extremely pejorative and demonizing, even more so than the emotive tactics of the Official voices discussed before.

5.1.3. The ethos of Playing God

If ever there was an issue that fits into the Frankenstein category it is the issue of cloning. Man has always sought to usurp the rightful position of God, to control his environment, and to create a secular Godless utopia on earth. Adam wanted to be God and rule over his own life so because of his prideful disobedience we, his descendants, have inherited his tendency to want to be our own gods; not having to be accountable or having to answer to anyone but ourselves. (s1088, Anthony Gonzales.¹⁴⁶)

In cloning human beings, we play “God.” We are dealing with something that can change the human race in ways that will affect deeper than how we look, but more on how we are. The human ties of motherhood, fatherhood, brotherhood, blood relatives, and fellowship will be inevitably altered, in a way that only will serve to alienate humans from one other. How much respect do we give to God, the creator, when we go about destroying something so well designed as the human family? (s2100, faithleap.net¹⁴⁷)

The speaker appearing as a Catholic Professional voice warning humanity not to play God is, first of all, a prophet warning a disobedient people about a path they should not take. The prophet warns of dangers, most of all the danger of acting

144 Fr. Fisher is quoted in Kairos Melbourne Catholic journal.

145 For a definition of ‘conspiracy theory’ see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_theory. See also Dean 1998 for an account of the use of conspiracy theories in relation to the UFO phenomenon.

146 The site this quotation has been taken from is called “Roman Catholic Replies”. The site is identified as follows: “Roman Catholic Replies is dedicated to providing the Truth, the Whole Truth and nothing but the Truth concerning the Roman Catholic Faith.” The speaker is identified as follows: “Anthony Gonzales is the writer, editor and publisher of The Hammer. He has degrees in Philosophy and History from Loyola University in Los Angeles, California...”

147 The site is identified as follows: “In October 1996, we began Leap of Faith. We are committed to proclaim the Roman Catholic Faith and are totally faithful to Pope John Paul II. This webpage is full of information about our Catholic faith and traditions. Most of the articles are written and produced by us. There are testimonies of faith to encourage the reader to walk with the Lord.”

against the will of the Lord. This type of prophetic rhetoric has a long history in the Judeo-Christian tradition, dating back to the stories in the Old Testament. As previously discussed, in these stories people often rebel against the wishes or commands God has expressed, often with calamitous consequences. The voice of these Old-Testament prophets rings through the prophetic identifications of the Professional Catholic voices who protest against cloning by claiming that it is “playing God”.

As already discussed, religious bioethics sometimes strives for a “prophetic” expression. According to Driver (2000), it is widely thought in the study of religious rhetoric that religious language generally takes one of two basic forms: the rhetoric of the prophet or the rhetoric of the mystic. The prophet hears a word that is not his or her own, but a message strong enough to disrupts consciousness, actions and deliberations. The voice demands expression through the prophet. As Driver (2000) states “The prophet is not his own person; something else speaks here. Only on behalf of that Other may the prophet presume to speak her or his warnings, interruptive proclamations, predictions, and promises.” (Driver 2000, 88.)

The Professional Catholic voices, prophets of Catholic bioethics warning of the dangers of cloning, usually warn the rebellious pro-cloners of prideful disobedience of God. This includes some elements warning against actually “stealing” from the hands of God something that belongs to Him only. This thematic was already discussed in the Logos part of the theme of “Playing God”:

Some may call this a medical breakthrough; I believe it is a moral breakdown. The abuse of medical technology in the United States for reproducing human life, is creating an even greater medical crisis in our country. Human reproduction is now in the hands of man when it rightfully belongs in the hands of God. (s2018, Raymond Flynn, Chairman of CatholicVote.org, former Mayor of Boston and Ambassador to the Vatican.)

The other central warning that the prophetic voices proclaim is the danger that faces humanity as a race if scientists wade too deep into waters they should not have dipped into in the first place. The radical alteration of the pre-determined patterns of human existence and reproduction are seen as a rebellion against God who originated the rules and intended them to stay that way. By cloning and altering the “rules of God”, man has set himself against and even above God:

Cloning is a sin against our creatureliness and our need to wait upon the Lord. As most can understand, in cloning another human man has set himself above and against God his Creator. (s2080, Fr. Bryce Sibley.)

The prophets warning humanity “not to play God” are, first of all, persons who know what God meant for humanity and where the boundaries of the “creature” lie. The speakers claim authoritative knowledge of the rules God has devised for his creatures to follow, and thus claim the prophetic authority of the direct voice of God. The identification is slightly different from the authority of the Official voices. The Official speakers stand on the tradition of the Catholic Church, drawing authority from the sources of apostolic succession. As the Professional speakers need to set

themselves apart from the laity, but are not clearly a part of the succession, they must create authority in a different manner. One possible speaker presentation outside hierarchical succession but with theological backing is that of the prophet. Prophetic style is probably something that is used to some extent in the rhetorical traditions of the Pro-Life movement and other Catholic social institutions. As discussed in the section concerning the social institutions that contextualize the Catholic Internet discussion on cloning, the Pro-Life movement, for instance, seems to create a counter-cultural discourse community where the rhetorical means used by the speakers can easily take on a prophetic character. Counter-cultural identification, “going against the flow” as it were, is exactly the position the prophets of the Old Testament delivered in their message. The discourse communities that have strong opinions and a tradition of harsh rhetorical expression create elite audiences that the prophets who are against cloning seem to target with their arguments.

The softer position that speakers sometimes adopt is more of a questioning kind. This voice is not a booming voice of prophecy from the sky, but rather the voice of an equal that questions the ramifications and responsibilities the new means of technology open for humanity:

Is it an oversimplification to assert that we shall soon be compelled to decide not only how we shall live, but who shall live? Are we creatures in a factory farm? Or are we all members of a family, created in the image of a loving God, brothers and sisters who sojourn in time but whose true habitat is eternity? (s2117, Ian Hunter.)

Why is it that you and I at this moment can feel free while we talk? Because I have not chosen the color of your eyes, or hair, or your sex, just as your parents did not decide it for you. This is why cloning, with the possibility of determining the physical and psychic characteristics of the unborn, is absolutely incompatible with freedom. (s2153, Alex Kahn.¹⁴⁸)

The central question asked by the “peer-prophets” seems to be, would people really want to live in a world where humanity makes the decisions that rightfully belong to God. The ethos is built as a clear extension of the logos and pathos of “playing God”. In the logos of the argumentative structure it is established that cloning is a divine power in the wrong hands; in Pathos a negative emotional response to that state-of-things is enforced and finally in Ethos it is asked “what do you think about it?”

The voices of the peer-prophets do not focus on the problematic of creating persons by cloning or on the problems of the divine authority crisis that the stronger prophetic voices associate with “playing God”. Instead, the speakers focus on the huge responsibilities that advanced reproductive techniques bestow on humanity. The voice of the peer-prophet is a voice of a parent who seems to say “ok, you have a chance to play ball with grown-ups, but do you really think you can bear

¹⁴⁸The speaker is identified as follows: “Kahn is director of the Cochin Institute of Molecular Genetics in Paris, and secretary of the European Life Science High Level Group, headquartered in Brussels, Belgium. In this interview, Kahn confirms the warning given by the Holy See on the eve of the World Conference Against Racism, in the document “The Church in Face of Racism: For a More Fraternal Society.”

the consequences?” Entrusting the powers of procreation to humanity requires faith in humanity’s ability to use these powers correctly. In the Catechism it was established that science is good, in a way, but humans are likely to err because of their sinfulness. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 89-95.) Faith in humanity seems to be in short supply for both the authoritarian and peer-prophet voices:

Playing God: The process of cloning human beings fosters the idea that certain individuals can have authority over the existence of others, to the point of programming their biological identity. The impact of this possibility gives rise to whole new dimensions of racism and sexism. One idea, often explored in science fiction, is the cloning of genetically manipulated human beings for slave purposes. (s2166, Fr. Kleppner.¹⁴⁹)

The peer-prophet is a wise parent of the human race who wishes to remind people how unfit gods they would make given the powers of God. Underlining the gravity of responsibilities that result from increased power is a good rhetorical technique. People can identify themselves with the situations described by the peer-prophetic voices, both in the position of authority and of the governed. The ethical ramifications of cloning are great and the ethical questions it gives rise to are complex. A person imagining himself in the position of a decision-maker will almost certainly feel unease and frustration. These feelings are easily transferred to the representations of being a target of these decisions: decisions made by another imperfect human being. The biblical tradition of human error creates a wide audience base, a discourse community of sorts that the peer-prophets utilize. It might even be said that the two prophetic types in the examples vary according to the biblical example they follow: the more intense prophets speak against building a tower of Babel, and the softer-toned peer-prophets remind the audience of the consequences of the Fall.

The assumed audiences of the two types of prophetic voices warning humanity about playing God also vary. The audience of the louder prophets is a theologically orientated elite audience. This audience is well aware of the original sin of Adam and of the devastating results it wreaks among those who want good but end up doing evil. This audience is an audience experiencing contrition and fear of God, or at least a fear of crossing the boundaries God has set. It is this very fear that the prophetic voices draw on to make their claims persuasive. The elite audience is seen as manifesting a shared belief that cloning is self-evidently rebellious against the order of Creation and thus against God. At the same time, the audience is seen as manifesting a strong belief in that some persons can speak, in a prophetic sense, on behalf of God himself.

The audience of peer-prophets is much more universal in nature. It is feasible even outside the Catholic context that human beings are sometimes or even often prone to making bad decisions. As discussed above, the persuasiveness of their claims is not essentially based on theological beliefs but on structures of human feelings of responsibility that are considered as relevant for many people. The audience capable of and interested in questioning the ethical decision-making

¹⁴⁹The text this quotation has been taken from is from the homepage of The Saint Frances Cabrini Parish. The speaker is identified as “Rev. Joseph J. Kleppner, S.T.L., Ph.D. Pastor”.

capabilities of other people is potentially any and all of us. The speakers assume their audiences as being susceptible to worries that cloning would bring about a radical change in the structures of authority and power that people at present have over other people. The audience heeding the questions of the peer-prophets is not an audience afraid of God, but an audience afraid of other people and the possible misuse of power inherent in all human decision-making. For this audience the fear of cloning is made manifest through the natural human tendency to question the capabilities of others.

There is also a third type of speaker-audience identification in the voices warning of “playing God”:

The people who founded this country said all men “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,” the right to life being first among those. Don’t we believe as Americans that God not man is the author of life? (s2084, Catholic Exchange.¹⁵⁰)

The third voice is not as common as the two previously discussed, and is profoundly political in nature. This is no wonder, since the Pro-Life movements are very politically active. The speaker in these voices is a concerned citizen and politician who wants to remind people of human rights, spiced with some religious belief. The audience is comprised of citizens who feel that their rights are threatened by new technology.

Although different on the surface, the identification of speaker and audience in the “political prophecy” is very similar to the first class of prophetic voices discussed above. Theological fundamentalism is here exchanged with a sort of “political fundamentalism”, which serves as the mutually manifest base for the persuasive power of the argumentation. The audiences are seen as manifesting a belief in the connection between legislation and God. Although the voice is rather separate from other dominant Catholic voices, it gains some emphasis in the material studied because of the extensive legislative discussions on cloning.

5.1.4. Cognitive view of Playing God

Logos

The first line of argumentation in the theme of “Playing God” warns that human beings should not take for themselves that which belongs to God. Although, according to theology, Catholic speakers would probably be among the first to deny that humans could ever steal something from God, the amount of arguments built around the assumption makes it difficult to dismiss. To claim that human beings can actually take something from God when God does not want it to happen is theologically incorrect. The theologically unfit part of the argument is, of course, that it incorporates an assumption that it would be possible to wrest something

¹⁵⁰The site is identified as follows: “Catholic Exchange is a non-profit media organization that seeks to bring the Good News of Jesus Christ as proclaimed by the Catholic Church to the world through the modern tools of mass communication.”

out of the hand of an omnipotent being against the will of that being. This creates the inconsistency that in Christian belief-systems God is generally considered to be omnipotent and as such categorically above such things happening, yet on the particular argumentative structures within the theme we see people implying quite the opposite. The theologically incorrect assumption within the argumentative structure underlines the point that when addressing audiences on the Internet, even speakers with specialized theological knowledge resort to a rhetoric that incorporates theologically incorrect inferences.

As mentioned in the discussion concerning counter-intuitiveness, the tendency to draw contradictory conclusions about omnipotent or supernatural beings is a universal feature of religious thinking. (see sections 3.3. and 3.4.) The reason for this contradiction is quite simple: the “omnipotence” of a given entity is an empty concept in the sense that no conclusions whatsoever can be drawn from it. Or, in other words, in the context of the theme of “Playing God” only one conclusion is possible: if the omnipotent being wants to remain the sole creator, he will remain the sole creator. In this sense it is conceivable that cloning should be tested and if it succeeds, it must be God’s will. Since this cannot be allowed in the context of Catholic teaching, it becomes necessary to present God differently in certain argumentative contexts: more human-like and less omnipotent. This is necessary because the ‘anthropomorphism’ or human likeness introduced to the concept of God on these occasions allows for argumentative structures that have folk-theoretical inferential power.

Actually the substitution of theologically correct concepts with inferentially salient concepts is not uncommon when arguing about matters from a Christian point of view. The omnipotence attributed to God, for example, is a counter-intuitive idea that would not support arguments in the sphere of folk inference, no matter the subject. Consider this example: God is an omnipotent and omniscient being, the will of whom cannot be resisted. In this case it is unnecessary to argue that someone should refrain from doing something against the will of God, since it is impossible anyway. Then, consider this example: God is an omnipotent and omniscient being, but human beings can do things against his will, and he cannot stop them from acting against his will, but his followers (other human beings) must do this on his behalf. Now we are left to wonder, what do the qualities of omnipotence and omniscience contribute to argumentative structures if they do not appear anywhere? The omniscient and omnipotent qualities attributed to the Christian God are inferentially empty concepts that carry no force of argumentative inference. This is why it becomes necessary to imply a different type of God in argumentative structures that incorporate God as an agent¹⁵¹.

Furthermore, the idea of “omnipotence” is a counter-intuitive idea, which as such does not allow people to generate a self-persuasive force by utilizing their facilities of natural folk-psychological inference. An omnipotent and omniscient being has no motivations, no intentions, nothing he might want or desire. These are the qualities of a limited cognition, of the type of personal agency that the folk-psychological intuitions of humans are familiar with. What results is that it is difficult to imagine such a being, and impossible to say anything on his part. This would create a kind of rhetorical dead end. When God is represented as a being

151 For more information concerning God as an agent see, for example, Barrett, J. & Keil, F. 1996, Barrett 1998; 1999; 2004, Pyysiäinen 2005.




Figure G3: Humans: whimsical and capricious gods

with aims, perceptions, intentions and wants (e.g. like a human being), the audience's facilities of folk-psychological inference can be activated in order to support argumentative inference. "God wants everyone to be saved", "God sees your troubles" and "God wants to be the sole creator" are arguments that are not built on the assumption of an omniscient and omnipotent God. They are built on a conceptualization of God that incorporates humanlike personal agency and thus enables folk-psychological inference. Presenting God as a player in the context of natural folk-theoretical reasoning opens the door for the use of rhetoric and dissolves the inferential dead end.

Folk-psychological inferences are important for both of the main dual argumentative lines within the current theme. The more moderate and questioning voice in the Catholic theme of "Playing God" is not so concerned over God's rights, but rather over human capabilities of assessment and ethical evaluation. This is presented in Toulmin's schema in figure G3.

Through their intuitive psychological assumptions people can identify with the situations where "powers beyond human capability" are used with human intellectual and moral capacity. The scenario functions as the basis of, for example, many of the Greek myths, modern fiction and the general suspicion we feel towards our superiors. As discussed in the section concerning cognition, an important function of naive sociology is to assess the division of power within social groups. (see section 3.4.) If there was no possibility of evaluating the ability of others or no possibility of surrendering power into someone else when it is beneficial, human beings would not be able to function as groups. Being able to function as large social units has given a substantial evolutionary edge to humans, and it is quite natural that evaluating the division of power is an important function of social cognition.

In important situations, power is probably never surrendered without intuitive evaluation or without persuasion. It is possibly quite a natural psychological and social tendency to feel evaluative when it comes to great power someone else possesses that has potential consequences impacting the life of the individual doing the evaluation. To present authorities with power as wilted is a good tactic to inspire fear and to motivate individuals to do what they can to restrict the menacing powers from falling into the wrong hands. The persuasive tactic becomes especially effective in the context of Catholic doctrine, which explicitly states that an “evil” authority (meaning opposed to Catholic thought) must be resisted.

The two differing argumentative structures more or less follow the two prophetic attitudes discussed all along in the theme of “Playing God”. Setting them into Toulmin’s schema does not reveal anything decisively new, but certainly helps to outline the essential difference between the argumentative stances. It is interesting to note that although it is perfectly reasonable to include both lines of argumentation under the heading of “Playing God”, the things they actually say are completely different. The first is about including God in argumentative structures as an agent. The argumentative structures aim at bringing God into a position where argumentative inference becomes possible. The result is an argumentative structure that allows for folk-psychological inference, with a background of questionable theology. The other line of argumentation is about naive sociology and natural suspicion humans can feel towards each other. The argumentative structure aims at waking people up to make ethical evaluations and assuming a responsible stance towards important issues through utilizing their abilities of folk psychology.

Pathos

As discussed previously concerning the cognitive elements of emotional persuasion, emotive input can affect the way persuasive discourse is processed in two different ways. Emotional input can contribute to the change in the recipient’s cognitive structure, which happens through a relatively extensive cognitive elaboration or systematic processing of the information. On the other hand, emotive input can further a fairly superficial adaptation to a situation. When extensive elaboration occurs the main evaluative weight is set on the quality of the inferential assertions presented in the sense that the evaluation of the causal relations between the suggested facts gains emphasis. When superficial adaptation occurs, the perceptions of the audience are diverted from the actual matter by having it emotive to accept the suggested information as true through emotional appeal. As was suggested, strong fear or strong negative emotion would probably be the most effective way of achieving this. (see section 3.5.2.)

It seems that the main function of the emotive elements in the theme of “Playing God” is not to encourage a deep cognitive processing of the problematic of cloning but to facilitate quick evaluations through superficial elaboration. The attention of the listener is diverted from the actual inferential relations suggested in the argumentative structure by emotive mental imagery where human beings either succeed or fail in obtaining godlike powers. One way or another, emotionally distressing circumstances follow. The fear appeal is induced in two ways: either by activating the fear of the supernatural (or, rather, the counter-intuitive) or by activating the fear of another human being. In the case of inducing the fear of the

counter-intuitive, the emotive force is associated with ideas such as angering God, divine retribution and so on. This is an emotive strategy already discussed: counter-intuitive concepts seem to be good tools for generating fear appeal because of their attention-demanding quality. (see section 3.4.) Furthermore, if it is true that deep elaboration through examining the inferential relations of an argument and surface elaboration through emotive content are somewhat oppositional to one another, a further rhetorical benefit can be found in the usage of counter-intuitive concepts. As discussed previously, counter-intuitive concepts are inferentially incomplete, and as such are not very good material for deep elaboration that requires the examination and understanding of the inferential relations present in what is being argued. On the other hand, they are attention-demanding and interesting. Although it remains very hypothetical, it may be that in the context of rhetoric and persuasive discourse, counter-intuitive ideas are more easily associated with emotive persuasion than logical persuasion.

The emotive power induced by utilizing fear of other humans draws on the natural evaluative tendency that naive sociology bestows on human beings. Through folk-psychology people can (and probably often do) evaluate the abilities and competences of other people. (see section 3.4.) It is commonsensical that people often feel a certain fear linked to their intuitive evaluation of another person's ability to manage a given task that may affect the well-being of the person doing the evaluation. Think of a situation where you enter a taxi, and notice that the driver acts abnormally. You may smell the odour of alcohol, notice the driver is not sitting straight, is not communicating in a sound manner etc. Whichever of these symptoms that suggest the driver is not capable of handling the task he should is enough: you step out of the taxi, and, being a socially responsible person, call the police. Although the situation is much simpler, it is slightly similar with the Catholic voices that warn of the inability of those who would clone, to control the forces they acquire. The evaluation of the capabilities and risks involved in the process of cloning is not, however, based on reason and empirical evidence as it was in the case where one stepped out of the taxi. The evaluation is based on emotive strategies that emphasize the immensity of the force of cloning and the wilted nature of human beings as well as of the social institutions associated with cloning.

It appears that the more emotively demonizing a thematic discussion is, the more it aims at "deceptive" rhetoric. In this context, "deceptive" means that the rhetoric does not encourage systematic elaboration of the actual causally relevant matters under debate, but rather a superficial adaptation of the suggested states-of-things through fear-inspiring imagery and pejorative discourse. If deceptive rhetoric is defined this way, the Professional Catholic voices arguing that cloning and genetic technology are "playing God", are a prime example of deceptive rhetoric.

Ethos

In the theme "Playing God", the elements of pathos and ethos become very closely intertwined. This is chiefly because the argumentative structure that induces fear appeal through emphasizing the human ability to make errors focuses on an arguably universal social aspect of reality. When fear is induced through describing the psychological fallibility of humans in general, ethos and pathos

seem to inseparably intertwine. The ability and tendency to be wary of the mistakes others may make is a human cognitive universal, and the argumentative assertions that can be made based on that fallibility are universally manifest to all possible audiences.

There is, however, from the point of view of ethos, one interesting emphasis within the theme that is not so evident in other themes. In the different elements of fear appeal that have been discussed within the theme, universal tendencies of human cognition are used to generate fear appeal. Both fear appeals use universal cognitive tendencies to facilitate their fear effect, but the persuasion through supernatural (or counter-intuitive) fear is aimed at an elite audience and the sociological fear at a universal audience. Although the ability to feel counter-intuitive concepts as threatening, menacing or at least disquieting is universal, a culture-specific religious rhetoric seems to be necessary to utilize the fear as a persuasive element. As a blunt example: for the social fear appeal to be plausible one needs to believe that humans can make mistakes. This is in all likelihood a very common conceptualization of the states-of-things. But for the supernatural fear to be effectively activated, one needs to believe that God in the Christian sense is real. So, while the social fear appeal would probably be as effective for an atheist as for a Catholic, the supernatural fear appeal would probably not be as effective for an atheist, although both have similar intuitive cognitive tendencies. Therefore the supernatural fear appeal must be aimed at elite audiences, who manifest Catholic or Christian beliefs.

It is also worth noting that while all the themes discussed under the Official voices had some form of general or biological essentialism as their cognitive core element, the current theme is based more on the structures of folk psychology and naive sociology. For example, both “Human Dignity” and proper family circumstances were argued for through adhering to systems that correspond to intuitive biological reasoning. The emphasis of “Playing God” is different. The intuitive cognitive mechanisms called into play within the current theme are responsible for human capabilities of making social and psychological assumptions concerning other people’s behaviour and intentions. So the actual argumentative focus turns from the issue of cloning itself to those who do the cloning, and the emphasis on the relevant folk-theoretical principles also changes with the subject.

With our intuitive psychological assumptions we cannot only approximate the motivations and ideas of other people, we can also be suspicious of them. Within the current theme the peer-prophetic voices use a structure of social cognition that is present everywhere in social interaction: doubt of the benevolence and ability of other humans. As we (hopefully) are aware of our own limitations, we naturally tend to be even more aware of the limitations of others. Supplying a scenario where a human being would make decisions concerning other people on a scale typically attributed to God is enough to send shivers down most spines. So, it can be said that the whole theme of “Playing God” is essentially tied to social intuitions and thus to ethos. Most of the things that could be said of the cognitive aspects of ethos within the current theme have already been stated above and need not be repeated here. The rhetorical approach that suggests people are unable to bear the responsibilities their technologies bestow on them can be considered something of a persuasive master move. The argument should be persuasive to most audiences because the mechanism of the social cognition it appeals to is a human universal.

5.2. Monsters and Horror Scenarios

5.2.1. The logos of Monsters and Horror Scenarios

Indeed, it is not just the horrific applications but cloning itself that are abominations. For human beings are unavoidably defined by our biological, embodied natures. How we come into being is not trivial: it is central to who we are. This is one of the reasons why incest, even consensual incest --which like cloning, has no “victims” -- offends us to our core. It blurs the lines of kinship: the begotten couples with her begetter. (s2125, E.V. Kontorovich.¹⁵²)

If we cannot prevent human cloning, on which there is wide-scale public agreement and understanding, our hope of reining in the biotech industry in its development of an endless stream of alluring and complex consumer products will begin to fade. This is the tipping point for the industry and the common good. Humankind must prevail. (s2122, Nigel M. De S. Cameron.¹⁵³)

The nature of the argumentative structure in “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is somewhat different compared to the previous themes analyzed. The previous themes were unified by a clear core argument, or a couple of central assertions that made up the cores of the argumentative structures. The theme “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is unified mostly by its fear-inspiring imagery and is actually comprised of several argumentative lines with somewhat different emphasis. If arguments were movies, the previous themes would be groups of movies with similar storylines, and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” would be a group of movies unified only by similar special effects. One important feature of the current theme is that it is like a collection of extreme examples from all of the other themes. The theme is necessary because the extremity of the voices quoted under this theme makes them sufficiently removed from the actual themes to which they would belong if the rhetorical imagery they utilize was more moderate in nature.

Laying all these different argumentative structures open using Toulmin’s schema would not be very reasonable for several reasons. First of all, many argumentative structures present within this theme are based on inferential assertions already discussed under other themes. In essence, going through all the different core structures would be repeating this whole study on a minuscule scale. Secondly, there would be too many different structures to make a reasonable claim for the

¹⁵²The web search strings used to find Catholic voices on cloning returned E. V. Kontorovich’s article on National Review, issue of March 9, 1998. The writer is only identified as “a writer living in New York”. However, within the text the writer clearly demonstrates knowledge concerning the cloning debate, and has consequently been categorised as a “Professional” voice.

¹⁵³Nigel M. de S. Cameron’s article “Cloning at the Crossroads of Humankind.” was published on Wilberforce Forum (June 25, 2001). The text this quotation was taken from was found on catholiceducation.org. The speaker was identified as follows: “Nigel Cameron is Dean of The Wilberforce Forum and Founding Editor of the journal Ethics & Medicine. (<http://ethicsandmedicine.com/>)”.




Figure M1: Fear and moral orientation

integrity of the current theme as a real “theme” in the same sense as other themes analyzed within this study.

It might at first seem that since the Professional voices studied here lack a clear cohesive core of argumentative assertions, bundling them up as a theme is far-fetched to begin with. However, from very early on in the preliminary close reading of the material under study, it became apparent that the use of horror concepts, frightening imagery and doomsday scenarios was exceedingly common particularly among the Professional voices on the Internet. Often the horror imagery and appeal to some elements of popular fiction were so dominant that they seemed to be both the tools for argumentation as well as ends in themselves. Still, no matter how pronounced a given use of mental imagery was, it would not qualify a group of arguments as a theme within the present analysis.

There is, however, one important dual structure that emerges from the fear-inspiring mesh of arguments within the current theme. There is a method to the madness, or as it might be expressed here, there is a reason why fear-causing means are used as well as a reason why they are used in a particular way. In “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” the Catholic anthropology, or the Catholic idea of man, becomes the backing enabling the rhetorical stances within the theme. It is this structure below the surface layer of the arguments that makes “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” a true theme:

In crucial cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it. Popular abhorrence at incest, bestiality, cannibalism, the desecration of corpses—and here I would include cloning, crossing human and animal species, and non-therapeutic

genetic engineering—may well be based on rather more than a fear of the new, whether in science or morality. It may derive from the fact that ‘we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightly hold dear.’ (s2103, Very Rev. Prof. Anthony Fisher.)

In the above argument it is stated that what human beings fear and loathe by nature is actually truly evil. The argument is built on the assumption taken from Catholic moral theology that the inherent ‘natural moral law’ guides human beings through their capabilities of moral reasoning. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC527-529.) Thus natural feelings of fear and loathing felt when something is perceived as “unnatural” act in accordance to God’s will. This argument can be placed in Toulmin’s schema as presented in figure M1.

The speaker quoted in the above example makes the point that the ideas of cloning and of the creation of hybrid life forms are something that seems to violate what humans tend to hold as “natural”. In the Catholic context, violations of the natural order are perceived as violations of the rules originally set by God. The Natural Moral Law, an inherent goodness in the soul of a human being, strives to follow the rules of God. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC527-529.) Therefore the argumentative strength of the current structure derives much from the fact that feelings of unnaturalness are a typical cause of fear and suspicion.

In the context of the doctrine of Natural Moral Law it seems quite understandable that the Catholic speakers commonly share a belief that the fear and abhorrence people feel towards cloning is a sign of deeper wisdom. In the context of the Catechism it might be said that the natural goodness inherent in man makes him resist cloning. In this sense it is both godly and rhetorically reasonable to use fear-causing imagery to magnify the type of “wise fear” that keeps humans on a narrow path and helps them temper the prideful attitudes that cause them to stray outside the boundaries God has set.

One substantial argument that the voices speaking of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” make in their visions concerning the future is about the social status of the would-be clone. This questioning is somewhat similar to what was expressed in the theme “Human Dignity”, but usually with more extreme emotive elements attached:

If experimentation in human cloning produces misfits or freaks (as happened with cattle cloning), how will they be treated? If they are considered commercial products, as “things,” will they be tossed into a shredding machine if they are less than perfect? Will they be recognized as persons entitled to rights, or will they be treated as animals or slaves or robots without any legal protections? (s2149, George J. Marlin.¹⁵⁴)

¹⁵⁴Originally the text this quotation has been taken from is from “The Politician’s Guide” (© 1998 published by Morley Books). The title of the passages found on EWTN.com (Eternal Word Television Network, which is a global Catholic TV network) is “THE POLITICIAN’S GUIDE to Assisted Suicide, Cloning, and Other Current Controversies .

The argumentative structure above follows a line of thought much utilized in “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”: if cloning and genetic technology in general is to become accepted, they will inevitably give rise to inhuman societal phenomena. On one hand society will have its hands full wrestling with the ethical questions raised by the emergence of a new class of people. On the other, according to the Catholic voices, the defining factors of what makes one human worthy of living will change. The postulated future horror scenarios are attempts to persuade people to join in the belief that the outcome of cloning cannot be anything but negative.

The argumentation is somewhat similar to the previous examples by the Official voices that focused on the sufferings of the would-be clone and on the degeneration of society brought about by cloning. What is emphasized in the current theme is the depiction of a world where cloning is accepted and which has become a horrible place for everyone, not just for the clone. The core of the argumentative structure is built around the assumption that increasing the human abilities of control and choice will inevitably end in terrible chaos. The backing behind the Catholic voices that aim to magnify this type of fear and abhorrence is a basic disbelief concerning human ethical capabilities, in a manner slightly similar to that observed in the theme of “Playing God”:

Is that the business we’re going to be into, breeding these perfect people by these pretty trivial cultural standards? Of course, part of the deal is that what starts to count as a defect or what starts to count as an undesirable trait gets more and more particular and trivial, but becomes sufficiently problematic in the eyes of many folks that it becomes the grounds for abortion, for example. We know that babies get aborted now because it’s the wrong sex—they want a girl or they want a boy—or because of little minor things like [a] cleft palate. (s2036, Jean Bethke Elshtain, an ethics professor at the University of Chicago Divinity School.¹⁵⁵)

In Toulmin’s schema the argumentative structure justifying the frightening imagery that Catholic speakers are eager to employ appears as in figure M2. In the first example the fear-causing potential and the natural feeling of strangeness that human beings associate with the concept of cloning was taken as an indicator that cloning must be wrong since people naturally fear that which is wrong. It seems that the argumentative structure above is justified on exactly the opposite grounds to how the natural fear people experience towards cloning was justified in the previous argumentative line. Now, if the human ability to discern what is good and what is evil comes naturally, why fear human invention and the increasing abilities of choice? And if human nature is so deeply degenerate and drawn to wrong choices, why is the natural fear people experience towards cloning a sign of good? Catholic speakers have used both lines of argumentation in a contradictory manner to back up the agenda of making cloning seem undesirable. As discussed earlier, religious concepts seem to offer the chance to draw different kinds of conclusions from the same positions, because of the ephemeral nature of the concepts themselves. Here in this theme the flexibility the “mystical triple-axis of morality” discussed before (see chapter 2.5.) becomes apparent.

155 The text the quotation was taken from was found on the Web site of catholicnewworld.com.




Figure F2: The natural tendency of human ethical choices

As was mentioned when discussing Catholic doctrine, the Catholic Catechism teaches that the human nature as well as all human action is naturally divided into two different parts, one that retains the natural goodness and will to act according to the will of God, and the other that is the exact opposite, prideful and evil. Most importantly, there is no clear-cut line between the two, but both are inherent qualities of a human being. In this context it is possible to view these natural human tendencies as orientated in opposite directions at the same time. With an omnipotent God as the third moral actor in the field, ethical evaluations can easily go this way or that, or even in opposite directions simultaneously, as within the current theme. The very same fallen human nature that is tarnished by original sin and is the cause of moral corruption also expresses “deep wisdom” within the theme. Whereas their natural tendencies were seen as leading people astray in other themes, here the natural fears and tendencies to draw conclusions from them are seen in two different, even opposing ways. Human nature is seen as orientated towards good by nature when it perceives cloning as unnatural, and as orientated towards evil by nature when considering cloning as a possibility.

5.2.2. The pathos of Monsters and Horror Scenarios

Of the handful of clones that make it to term, most will have grossly enlarged placentas and fatty livers, the article said. And of the three or four fetuses that may survive their birth, most will be monstrously big, perhaps 15 pounds, and will likely die in the first week or two from heart and blood vessel problems, underdeveloped lungs, diabetes or immune system deficiencies. With access

to an intensive care unit, perhaps one of those 100 clones will survive, scientists said. It will bear the hallmark of most animal clones: a huge navel, a remnant of the oversized umbilical cord that inexplicably develops during most pregnancies involving clones. (s1086, ZENIT Editorial Address.¹⁵⁶)

Governments must make the cloning of humans to be a criminal offense in order to safeguard family life. From the viewpoint of the child, the cloner is a rapist: he lusts for self-satisfaction and spurns parental care for the child. Like other criminals, cloners deserve to be put safely behind bars to protect the rest of society. (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD.)

One does not have to look for long to find emotionally charged persuasive elements within the current theme. As mentioned, the theme of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” has the strongest emotive weight of all the themes analyzed within this study. It can safely be said that the emotive elements have the main role within the theme, and that they are almost without exception aimed at one thing only: to magnify the fear and abhorrence of cloning. The current theme can be considered a prime example of fear appeal in the context of this study. The would-be clones are described as malformed and with multiple health problems, while the persons responsible for cloning are likened to rapists and other misfits of civilized society. The sole purpose of describing the cloned children as suffering from multiple abnormalities is to demonize the technology and the process that made them that way. Describing scientists as “rapists lusting for self-satisfaction” is not a case of a reasonable enquiry into medical ethics, but a fiercely emotive example of the use of pathos. The purpose of identifying a genetic scientist with a rapist is to create a powerful emotive cue – to make people experience the same anger and repugnance towards cloning as they would towards rape.

The emotive effect is achieved in three ways that were already somewhat apparent in the previous chapter. The first of the emotive tactics is to depict the clone itself as something disquietingly other than a normal baby:

One report hinted that Dolly Two has cells as old as those of the mother clone, Dolly One. This I cannot verify, but if true, then human clones might be born with gray hair. Premature aging is not a desirable genetic endowment for children. Children should be children, not tiny old people. (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD.)

The unnatural scenario described above is most likely to cause disturbing feelings in most readers. The second emotive technique frequently used by the voices of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is to emphasize the monstrous nature of the cloning technology itself or of a society that would allow cloning:

¹⁵⁶The Web magazine Zenit identifies itself as follows: “Our objective is to inform about the “world seen from Rome,” with professionalism and faithfulness to the truth. We aim to view the modern world through the messages of the Pope and the Holy See; tell about the happenings of the Church; and inform about the topics, debates and events that are especially interesting to Christians worldwide.”

This isn't a ban on cloning. It allows cloning, then creates a government mandate to kill all the clones. For the first time in history, Congress would define a class of developing human it is a crime not to destroy. To call these bills pro-abortion is to say too little. Current abortion laws allow the destruction of human embryos, as if they had a tenuous claim on human dignity. These proposals would require their destruction, as if they were rabid dogs. (s2083, Richard Doerflinger.¹⁵⁷)

The "cloning industry" and the "mad scientists" behind the idea of cloning are the cause of fear in these arguments. The first two emotive techniques usually overlap to some extent. The notion of the monstrous nature of the technology used, of those using it, and of the products, is essentially created by underlining the same feeling of biological unnaturalness and by using emotionally charged examples.

The third way of emoting fear of cloning is the recurring claim that once it begins, it inevitably takes the place of the more traditional means of procreation and becomes the rule, not the exception:

A mad scientist, perhaps from offshore, will implant an embryo into a woman desiring to go down in history as the first birth mother of a human clone. Since no one will urge that she be forced to have an abortion, the birth of the child will be unstoppable. The event will produce spectacular headlines and no legal consequences. (Would society actually allow the parents of a cute baby to be jailed, much less the scientist who had helped the infant come into being?) The birth of the next such child will produce page three stories. The birth of the twentieth or thirtieth such child will be unremarkable and the ban will soon become functionally irrelevant, regardless of the actual state of the law. (s2087, Wesley J. Smith.¹⁵⁸)

Underlining the inevitability of cloning development and connecting it to the nightmarish visions of a Huxleyan society enforce the emotive persuasion to act against these developments. The emotive tactic is effective in the sense that the developments are portrayed as grave, yet not unstoppable. This is a strong appeal to primary emotions, certain to provoke anxiety and even action against the developments that would turn the world the listeners know into a hell.

157 The original text, found on catholicexchange.com, does not identify Richard Doerflinger with any Church hierarchies or positions in associations. However, the site is identified as follows: "Catholic Exchange is a non-profit media organization that seeks to bring the Good News of Jesus Christ as proclaimed by the Catholic Church to the world through the modern tools of mass communication." Also, Richard Doerflinger appears on many forums as the Director of the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.

158 The original text, found on catholicexchange.com, does not identify Wesley J. Smith with any Church hierarchies or positions in associations (see the previous note for information concerning the website). A web link identifies him as follows: "Award-winning author and lawyer Wesley J. Smith is a Senior Fellow at the Discovery Institute, an attorney for the International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, and a special consultant for the Center for Bioethics and Culture."

Emotive structures that emphasize fear and abhorrence of clones, the cloning industry, cloning technology, a society that would allow cloning and so forth are present throughout the whole Catholic argumentation concerning cloning. In a sense it can be said that the tip of the emotive iceberg is summarized in the pathos of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”. As discussed before, strong emotional persuasion often occurs at the expense of facts or at the expense of “good rhetoric” that focuses the attention to the implied facts of the argumentative structure. In this sense, although hardly surprising considering the heuristic starting point for the formation of the theme, “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is something of an example of deceptive rhetoric.

5.3.3. The ethos of Monsters and Horror Scenarios

The brave, and anxious, new world is upon us. We have the capacity to design various life forms according to our desires. The race is on to make the next generation of human beings in our own image. We want to engineer those who come after us according to what we find desirable. If technology allows us to produce a better automobile, why not a “better” human being? Why indeed, for there are a number of powerful arguments which favor cloning. (s2035, Father William Maestri, Clarion Herald.)

Decisions about the morality of human embryo research and human cloning are not for a few scientific elitists to make. This is about the future of humanity as we know it. This is about our children being used as research subjects. This is about our human progeny being used as guinea pigs in someone’s big summer science project. (s2123, C. Ben Mitchell.¹⁵⁹)

Of all the Catholic voices on cloning the theme of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is arguably the weakest in the sense of logos. As mentioned earlier, the theme is included in the analysis because of the relative quantitative significance of Catholic argumentation extensively built on mental imagery of horror movies and end-of-the-world scenarios. As noted on several occasions, the general trend seems to be that as the emotive “volume” of the Catholic voices increases, the actual factual content of the argumentation tends to get weaker. As discussed in the text outlining the theory, when the factual content of an argumentative structure gets weaker, the authority of the speaker presentation and the importance of emotive elements tend to get stronger.

In the logos part of the current theme it was established that what people naturally perceive as abnormal and what they strive for by nature are things to be avoided. In pathos, both of these argumentative structures were strengthened by emotionally charged negative imagery, and both are directed at a wide audience.

¹⁵⁹The text, found on catholiceducation.org, identifies the author as follows: “C. Ben Mitchell is senior fellow of the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity in Bannockburn, Ill., associate professor of bioethics and contemporary culture at Trinity International University, and editor of the journal *Ethics & Medicine*.”

The argumentation in “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” focuses on describing the imaginary worst possible scenarios of human cloning and the results it would have on the rest of society. Possible audiences include all members of societies that are depicted as facing a danger. The visions of cloning emphasize the status of the clones as monsters, as something nonhuman that would seriously affect the lives of other people. The horror scenarios describe the destructive effects that cloning human beings would have on the rest of the world, usually in line with the Catholic vision of a good society based on religious values outlined in the Catechism.

The Catholic speakers who focus their attention and imagination on the possible outcomes of human cloning are directing their words at “society” or “humanity” in general. Usually the speakers speak of “us” when talking about the destruction of humanity or when describing the monstrous nature of cloning techniques. This is a clever rhetorical tool: by describing unacceptable conditions and associating everyone with them, the emotive force of the argumentation can be used to drive people to action. If the “we” or “us” who are monsters, it becomes necessary for the listener to explicitly differentiate himself from those described. This differentiation is probably best done by acting against that which is described as evil. It seems the central idea of the whole theme of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is aimed at producing an idea of a fallen humanity that is not equally fallen – some are still aware enough to be driven into action towards good.

In cataclysmic scenarios that describe the inevitability of mass cloning if the first case were allowed to happen, the Catholic voices are presenting themselves as visionaries who have knowledge of the future. Most Catholic voices within the current theme display a strong belief in the speaker’s own capacity of knowing what the future holds. Furthermore, the speakers express themselves as having the knowledge of what awaits humankind as a whole if these terrible technologies are allowed to flourish. Thus the speakers in this theme can be named the “foretellers of doom”.

Men become hired hands, women become incubators, children are products made to order. Parents become trainers, children become troops, technicians drive out love as bad money drives out legal currency. If technical problems are overcome, if mass-cloning develops into a viable business, cloning might smother natural child-bearing. The cloning of humans is not God’s plan for our race. Every child has a right to have a father and a mother, and that is basically why cloning falls afoul of nature’s way and God’s way. (s2045, Fr. Anthony Zimmerman STD.)

A foreteller of doom is a prophet like the voice encountered in the previous theme (see section 5.1.), resembling the worried father-figure, but with some additional gifts of foresight. The foreteller of doom steps further from a doctrinal emphasis, and closer to a self-presentation as a seer. In terms of Catholic speaker presentation, it might be said that the prophetic voices within the theme are of a more obscure succession than the ones in the previous theme. This is at least partially due to the nature of the assumed audience. The argumentation is not directed at an elite audience having theological knowledge but rather at an audience familiar with the apocalyptic material in popular fiction.

So, it is conceivable that the foretellers of doom aim at awakening “normal people” who do not share the Catholic belief-system of the apocalyptic events signalling the approach of the end of the world. The audience is, nevertheless, still perceived as possible supporters of those attempting to prevent the end of the world. Where a predominantly Catholic vision of apocalypse is not brought into play, visions from popular culture takes centre stage. While Huxley’s ingenious novel “Brave New World” has had its share of attention in the previous themes, it seems that especially within the current theme the Catholic speakers are eager to utilize Huxley’s ready-made recipe of a twisted society and human oppression. Furthermore, other scenarios from popular fiction are used to a great extent:

Like many Star Wars fans, I have been eagerly awaiting George Lucas’s upcoming “prequel” to his saga of the young Luke Skywalker. The new movie will show how Luke’s father and his mentor, Obi-Wan Kenobi, became involved in “the Clone Wars.” Little did I know that the clone wars would actually start this year. (s2027, Mr. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.)

A century ago the prescient English author, Mary Shelley, warned of runaway science during the industrial revolution without morals. In her novel “Frankenstein.” This book foretells man’s manipulation of nature (Dr Victor Frankenstein attempted to produce his “monster”, by “un-natural law,” without God’s plan); the human lust for power (doing unnatural things just because they are possible), and the divorcing of science from morals (the doctor worked on his own without others and religious values). Studying this novel’s warnings-along with Pope John Paul and others-will help us avoid moral and medical chaos. Catholics embrace genuine, holistic scientific progress. We promote science with spiritual saneness. (s2112, Father John J. Lombardi.)

It is becoming increasingly clear that the bio-anarchists leading the charge to Brave New World want a virtually unlimited license to engage in human cloning. The proof is in the legislation they keep trying to pass. (s2095, Wesley J. Smith.¹⁶⁰)

Cloning might produce large armies, such as those bred for war by the evil Saruman in “The Lord of the Rings.” Clone wars might remove any sense of morality or immorality about war since those who are killing, or being killed, would be the fruits of soulless technology and of no greater value (but less expense) than an airplane or tank. (s2091, Cal Thomas.¹⁶¹)

160The text this quotation has been taken from, found on catholicexchange.com, identifies Wesley J. Smith as follows: “Wesley J. Smith is a senior fellow for the Discovery Institute. He is the author of Culture of Death: The Assault on Medical Ethics in America.”

161The text this quotation has been taken from, found on catholicexchange.com, identifies the speaker as follows: “Cal Thomas is a nationally syndicated pro-life columnist”.

Human cloning is a neuralgic issue -- whether it's issues of 1984 or issues of Frankenstein. There's clearly an extraordinary reaction that comes from people when this topic is brought up. (s2129, Jesuit Fr. Kevin Wilde.)

The bleak future where cloning has been allowed is likened to several nasty scenarios in popular fiction such as *Brave New World*, *Frankenstein* and even *Star Wars*. As discussed, the general focus of the speakers in this theme is to create a believable claim that "one way or another, if cloning is allowed, the world will become hell". Thus it becomes exceedingly important that they find familiar examples of such possibilities. Huxley's novel is, of course, ideal for such purposes. Other than *Brave New World*, the imagery from modern popular fiction seems to be the most reliable source for creating future horror-scenarios. Drawing terrifying imagery from popular fiction is a good rhetorical move because by utilizing it the speakers can be fairly sure they reach a wide audience. Most of the fiction used within the theme has been purposefully created to contain frightening elements. Since the Catholic agenda within the theme appears to be to utilize strong fear appeal to make people accept their claims, such fiction becomes a handy rhetorical tool. Furthermore, fictional stories like *Frankenstein* and *Star Wars* have a wide audience base, and the themes therein are known to many people. From this it is possible to conclude that the speakers within the theme conceive their primary audience to be those who are more familiar with popular fiction than with the Bible. The primary audience for the strongest fear appeal is the universal "fallen humanity", who are not part of the Catholic discourse community.

The second interesting use of ethos within the current theme is the division of the possible audiences into two different sediments of fallen humanity. The elite audience is reached for by using a rhetoric that incorporates those having the right values into the mass of fallen humanity, but excludes them from this mass in the sense that they have the right knowledge and the possibility to do the right thing. Those who heed the prophets are the chosen ones amid a humanity that has lost its vision of the great plan God has set for the world. The prophets and the elite audiences who hear their voices are called upon to make sure that the divine plan is allowed to continue.

What also stands out within the current theme as compared to previous Catholic voices is the rhetoric where the cloned person himself is depicted as a monster. In the previous themes the clone was generally considered a victim of circumstances, a person as worthy and valuable as anyone, whose fundamental value is violated by technological interventions. Within "Monsters and Horror Scenarios", the would-be clones are presented in a new light: as immoral killing-machines or as Frankenstein's monsters of sorts. This is an interesting rhetorical turn, but since the conceptualization of clones as monsters is most common in the rhetoric of Lay Catholic voices, the thematic will be discussed more closely under the next theme, "Ensoulment".

5.2.4. Cognitive view of Monsters and Horror Scenarios

Logos

The current theme does not offer anything significantly new from the point of view of cognitive analysis. At the most it offers some new versions of the cognitive mechanisms discussed under previous themes. Similarly to these previous themes, within the current theme many different situations of cloning and the results of cloning are depicted as unnatural and frightening. One of the reasons the described situations easily arouse feelings of unease is, as discussed before, that they violate the intuitive folk-theoretical assumptions people naturally have of the living kinds they encounter in their environment. (see chapter 3.4.) The inferential ontologies of biological and also of social and psychological reasoning are utilized in building the arguments within the theme.

As discussed in the theme “Playing God”, it is quite commonsensical that human beings are able to and frequently do evaluate the motivations, intentions and agendas of other people (see section 5.1.). This is the everyday use of the faculties of folk psychology and naive sociology. It is equally commonsensical that the choices people make can be either beneficial and benevolent or harmful and malicious. In the context of Catholic theology these tendencies have been named the “Natural Moral Law” and “the sinfulness of man”. (see section 2.5.) In the case of cloning, people are not understood as being guided by Natural Moral Law, because based on Catholic doctrine it is impossible to justify the technological interventions into procreation that cloning introduces. Therefore it must be concluded that the pursuit of cloning techniques is the province of the “dark side” of human nature, and thus a result of the sinfulness of man. The argumentation in “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” boils down to the application of these natural evaluative skills. In Toulmin’s geometrical schema this appears as in figure M3.

The above schema demonstrates that the argumentative structure is not wholly sound, neither on the basis of folk-theoretical principles nor on the basis of Catholic anthropology. Both accounts make it possible to conceptualize human intent as directed to good as well as to evil. In other words, the argumentation that capabilities in human hands inevitably lead to a catastrophe finds some support from the backing of Catholic anthropology and folk-theoretical thought, but the argumentative structure can be challenged using the very same inferential assertions that it stands on.

The Catholic voices also make another claim, which is that because there is a human tendency to observe that cloning involves something unnatural, cloning must be evil. The Catholic speakers have noticed the feelings of unnaturalness that can be associated with the technological aspects of reproduction and have turned the situation into a rhetorical tool. Here the intuitive predisposition that folk-theoretical thought produces appears to work in favour of the Catholic conceptualization of Natural Moral Law: technological intervention violates folk-theoretical conceptualization of procreation and so violates Catholic doctrine. This is probably at least partially because (as already mentioned) Catholic doctrine can be seen as formed based on the same folk-theoretical principles that cloning violates in this case. If this is the case, the situation creates a chance to create an




Figure M3: The ontological principles of evaluating human behaviour

argumentative bridge that combines the natural predispositions with Catholic anthropology. This is presented in Toulmin’s schema in figure M4 (see the next page).

It is a subject open for debate whether the natural feelings folk-theoretical cognitive systems produce should be used as a basis for ethical definitions of policies. From a scientific point of view the intuitive biological assumptions responsible for the feelings of strangeness associated with cloning are not good or evil, they are more like mental reflexes. Chaim Perelman suggested that “The Kantian Conviction” of a universal audience that possesses high enough evaluative skills should be used as a basis for defining ethically sound argumentation. As discussed, defining those “intelligent enough” remained a problem in the theory. In a slightly similar vein, the current example seems to suggest that natural, folk-theoretical predispositions should be used as a moral guideline. As the folk-theoretical intuitive inferences are, in a manner of speaking, reflexes as much as one’s knee reflex, it seems problematic to use them as a basis for ethical evaluations.

Another interesting point that the “detached dual morality” presented in this argumentative structure brings up is the relation between the concepts of idealized essence and sortal essence attributed to human beings. (see section 3.4.) It was earlier established here that the Catholic idea of a human being incorporates an important element of ideal essence: a human being is a being created by God, a being with a soul, and this gives a human being a special essence relevant to value-attribution. As far as the essential core goes, humans are considered extremely valuable in Catholic thought. However, the essential core has no direct effect on the sortal essence of a human being: a human being’s sortal essence can be anything from saintly to utterly wicked. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 89-95.) If the ideal-




Figure M4: Catholic doctrine and folk-theoretical thought united

essential core of a human being can be viewed as an inferentially empty concept, the sortal-essential quality of man leaves the argumentative field open for the utilization of folk-theoretical inference. In other words, as men can be inherently good or evil, it is left for an external value-attribution to evaluate their sortal essence. The sortal essences are evaluated based on the situation. Consequently, evaluations of sortal essences are based on values attributed to the things the people in question do in a given situation. If they do things that are good in the eyes of the speakers making the value-attributions, the persons are following the good sides of their nature. If the things the persons do go against the value-attributions of the speakers, the persons are depicted as monsters following their evil nature.

Intuitive ontology does not offer much direct help in analysing the interesting dual interpretation of human morality present within the theme. The most that theories of folk-psychology and naïve sociology allow is that since people are able to make positive or negative evaluations concerning each other, it is pivotal for the effective use of *inventio* that any context of interpretation permits both to exist. In other words, when there is little in the way of evidence or in the way of an inferentially coherent argument, it is important to be able to twist that which remains in any way that makes folk-theoretical intuitions work in the favour of one's argument. Thus Catholic theology where humans are seen as both good and evil at the same time is by no means an exception – it seems to be just a theological example of the twists and turns of intuitive social cognition. Within the boundaries of social cognition both of the argumentative settings, the first where humans naturally want good, and the second, where humans naturally err, seem believable. Both of these natural qualities of social cognition are used within the argumentation to further the Catholic agenda.

Pathos

As it was with logos, the emotive elements of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” do not offer anything radically new to the cognitive analysis previously carried out in this study. This is to be expected, since the whole theme is, as mentioned previously, something of a collection of the most aggravated forms of emotional appeal already seen in the previous themes. The current theme utilizes the already familiar technique of fear appeal through emphasizing the counter-intuitive elements inherent in the process of cloning. While the feelings of unnaturalness inherent in the alteration of reproductive rules cannot be used as a sound basis for making ethical evaluations, it seems that they can be used quite effectively in manipulating the negative primary emotions. Depicting a cloned child as something unnatural probably creates feelings of fear and disgust in most audiences. The intuitive folk biological assumptions give the negative imagery utilized a universality and emotive power. Children truly should be children and not tiny old people, nor should they grow up to be Frankenstein monsters or soldiers without conscience. Creating imagery where cloning produces unnatural children is a very powerful rhetorical tool for underlining the fearsome aspects of the changing rules of reproduction. The negative impulses that the outlined horror scenarios produce facilitate a quick surface elaboration of the suggested states-of-things: anything that produces unfeeling monsters or unnatural children should most definitely be avoided at all costs. The emotive effect directs the audiences to a sidetrack: the suggested states-of-things are quite far removed from the factual matters that should and could be argued concerning cloning.

In addition to the imagery of monster-children, two styles of fear appeal that play on social cognition are prevalent in “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”. A society that is depicted as indifferent to human life or to human suffering is a powerful image that most audiences endowed with typical capabilities of social cognition would probably want to avoid. To make the point stronger, the Professional voices emphasize the comprehensiveness and inevitability of the unwanted social development if it is allowed to start. These elements are not totally new either, as similar suggestions were present in the themes of “Sacred Family”, “Exploitation/Dehumanization” and “Playing God”. What is novel, however, is the extent to which the Catholic voices stretch the imagery within the current theme.

The thematic of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” can be seen as a prime example of the rhetorical technique where factual arguments are mainly dodged with the help of emphasized emotive content. It can be argued that argumentative structures which emphasise this type of “emotive dodging” can be included within the category of “deceptive rhetoric”. At least this is the case if deceptive rhetoric is understood as a rhetoric not meant to argue facts but as a way of directing the audience’s attention away from the inferential assertions made within an argument.

Ethos

The audiences constructed in “Monsters and Horror scenarios” are divided into a Christian elite audience and an audience of a much more universal nature, much like in the previous themes. The unique aspect in the ethos of the current theme

is the dominance of the universal audience, which is approached through using the imagery from popular fiction. It appears that the speakers attempt to awaken an audience unfamiliar to them and their beliefs, so they turn from theology and biblical stories to an extensive use of popular fiction as the basis of a mutually manifest apocalyptic representation. As a result, both audiences are seen as sharing a mutually manifest collection of apocalyptic representations. The elite audience is seen as receptive to apocalyptic material drawn from the Catholic tradition and the universal audience to imagery from horror and science fiction prose and movies. Mutually manifest imagery of a terrible future is seen as a good rhetorical tool for making cloning seem unacceptable.

The emphasis given to fear appeal through the imagery that contains counter-intuitive material gives a special quality to the speaker presentation within the theme. This quality is not a new one; a similar construction has been apparent in previous themes where the speakers have adopted a “prophetic” style of expression. Within the current theme, however, as the prophetic language gains emphasis, the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the process of authority attribution become clearer. As mentioned when discussing cognitive theories, persons of divine authority (priests, shamans etc.) are often attributed a special ideal-essential core. That is, there is something different in the priest compared to the average person, but it is impossible to pinpoint exactly what that difference is. (see chapter 3.4.) As discussed earlier, the process of ideal-essential value-attribution contains inferential gaps, and thus no clear inferences can be drawn from ideal-essential understandings to the sortal-essential nature the given agents possess.

The ideal-essential quality that the Official, ordained, Catholic speakers expressed was constructed by appealing to the doctrine of apostolic succession. As discussed in the text concerning Catholic theology, apostolic succession is the special quality originally granted to Peter by Jesus himself, and is expressed most clearly by the Pope, who is considered the substitute of Jesus on earth, and who is infallible when speaking *ex cathedra*. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 29-35.) The ideal-essential difference between those within the apostolic succession and normal people is quite clear. Now, it is impossible to pinpoint exactly what is so different in a Catholic Bishop, but many believe that the succession has altered him in some essential manner. This perception gives the bearers of the apostolic succession a special authority in the eyes of the elite audiences that share the belief in the Catholic principle of apostolic succession.

The Professional voices don’t always share the privilege of the ideal-essential special quality through the authority of the Catholic Church and apostolic succession. Therefore it becomes necessary to establish a sortal-essential speciality by demonstrating special qualities. This is probably one of the reasons why the rhetoric of the speakers tends to emphasize counter-intuitive, emotive elements and a significant reason why the Professional voices take on the distinct note of a prophet. The essential difference of a prophet can only be concluded from his self-presentation, and only the audience can interpret as prophetic the self-presentation of a given voice. Although sortal qualities cannot be inferred from ideal-essential attribution, ideal-essential attributions can thus be done from observing certain sortal qualities.

In other words, if we say that a given person is the substitute of a spiritual being on earth, the things we can directly conclude from this ideal-essential attribution are few. However, if someone speaks like a prophet, implying that he knows the will

of a spiritual being and presents himself as a champion of this entity, it is possible that some people will make an ideal-essential attribution and start considering him as possessing a special ideal-essential core. This probably happens when charismatic leaders gain a following in religious movements, for example. Within the bounds of this study, however, suffice it to say that it is clear that mechanisms of social cognition combined with the “mental reflexes” concerning counter-intuitive ideas can be seen as playing a great role in the generation of authority on the part of Professional Catholic voices. The theme of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” is a compound theme, tied together by strong fear appeal and prophetic speaker presentation.

6. The dominant Lay Catholic voices

6.1. Ensoulment

6.1.1. The logos of Ensoulment

James 2:26 says that the body without spirit is dead. Therefore, it would seem that as soon as you had a living being, you would have a soul. Assuming the being is human, it would have a human soul. (Animals have animal souls, but not immortal human souls.) If a clone is able to make rational choices -- if it has an independent will -- it has a soul. (s3022, "William Quinnan".¹⁶²)

I don't see how anyone can think that clones don't have souls but that babies conceived by in vitro would. There is little difference, save for the fact that they are using a different cell for the female instead of the egg. Is anyone going to argue that in vitro babies don't have souls? If anything is given life, it has a soul. The end. (s3108, "puma_rumor".¹⁶⁵)

i believe that it is impossible for a clone to have a soul. how can somethin man made acquire a soul? that is just a rediculous thought. (s3123, "cfpuppydog".)

The Internet is, as mentioned previously, a perfect place for the laity to voice its religious views. The Net offers easy access to many, and the discussion forums offer speakers an automatic audience; people interested in the given topics flock to the same locations to on the WWW to view the opinions of others. The Internet is extensively a place for the commonsensical expression of religion, or as previously discussed, the Little Tradition (e.g. a conceptualization of religion without theological expert knowledge). (see section 2.2.) As became obvious in the previous themes, even the Official and Professional Catholic voices tend to take on the style of Little Tradition when appearing on the Internet, and the expert environments

¹⁶² Although the search strings containing the term 'Catholic' returned all the discussion threads quoted here, it is extremely unlikely all the speakers are Catholic by affiliation. If someone mentions the term 'Catholic' in one reply to a discussion thread, the search engines utilised in this study pick the whole thread. However, to ensure that the quotations presented here are in line with Catholic lay opinions, two follow-ups were made. I started two discussion threads on different forums with a question "What do you, as Catholics, think about cloning?". Both threads received many answers, the total number of posts clearly exceeding a hundred replies, and the discussion escalating between those of a different opinion. The material from the follow-up has not been used here, because the persons did not know they were partaking a study and some chose to reply by their (probably real) RL identities. As it is almost impossible to get consent from all the speakers, the material was omitted from this study. However, the follow-ups clearly demonstrate that whether or not all the given speakers quoted here are Catholic by affiliation, the argumentation is in line with Lay Catholic view concerning the ensoulment of would-be-clones.

¹⁶⁵ It is extremely common for people to identify themselves by pseudonyms on the discussion forums.

where the special knowledge is communicated are closed to the normal users. This dominance of Little Tradition, easy accessibility and freedom of expression make the Net a veritable goldmine of lay religious expression and argumentation. In the context of the cloning discussion, the most common theme of argumentation is the “ensoulment” of the clone, meaning argumentation on whether or not a cloned person possesses a soul.¹⁶⁴

The basic setting for arguments in the matter of ensoulment is simple: either the clone is perceived as possessing a soul, or not. The first voice does its best to include the would-be clones into the fold of humanity. The second voice argues that a clone cannot be human, it cannot have a soul and thus is not a part of humanity. However, there are several argumentative structures on both sides of the fence. This is particularly interesting because the Official voices were unanimous in asserting that a cloned person would have a God-given soul and be as much a child of God as any other person. The Professional speakers also consider a cloned person as possessing a soul in most cases.

Many of the Lay voices also defend the idea of a clone possessing a human soul: the most basic argument on behalf of the would-be clone’s ensoulment is that anything that seems alive must have a soul, since the observance of symptoms of life is considered to be a consequence of a creature possessing a soul. This is elaborated further into argumentative structures comprised of different mixes of personal, emotional and social “symptoms” of the presence of a human soul. In other words, there are different sets of criteria the would-be clone must fulfil in order to qualify as possessing a soul, but the underlying principle is the same in all of the structures found: if the clone expresses symptoms of life, mind and personality, it has a soul:

If the cloning process does become advanced enough for one to make a perfect clone without any genetic splicing or defromities then a living breathing thinking moving clone would have a soul. God gives the soul at the point of conception. If you are conceived in a tube or in a womb you are still conceived and God is the author of it. (s3123, “thedefender”.)

The soul must be present in order for there to be life. Life consists of birth, growth, maturation, dwindling and demise. In order for there to be any sensitivity to light, heat and pressure the soul must be present. A cloned form can be accepted by a soul and therefore give life to it. If it does not then the clone is useless dead matter, which is basically what our body amounts to when the soul leaves. (s3123, “oooooom”.)

Therefore, whether a clone has a soul depends entirely on whether the experiment “works”. If scientists make a perfect human body, but it just lays

¹⁶⁴The only Lay theme discussed in this work is “Ensoulment”. There were several other Lay themes discernible within the material, but they were not nearly as prominent. Some of the other themes were named “Animal / Organ Cloning”, which was about the pros and cons of cloning animals and spare organs for medical purposes, “Playing God”, which was essentially the same as the Professional theme by the same name and “Cloning Jesus” where the Lay voices pondered, in addition to many other interesting theological problems, should a cloned Jesus be considered a Son of God like the original.




Figure S1: If it is alive, it has a soul

there, and never acts "alive", then that would mean that no spirit came along to "pick up" that body. But if the clone acts alive, gets up, walks around, talks, or whatever, then there is a soul. (s3123, "bompu1".)

In these argumentative structures the observable features of a typical human being are taken as indicators of the presence of an invisible quality, the soul. Put simply, the argumentative structure focuses on the relationship between the normally observed behavioural qualities of humans and the presence of a soul. In Toulmin's schema this appears as in figure S1.

The second most common argumentative structure defending the ensoulment of the cloned persons focuses on the relationship between the method of procreation and the presence of a soul:

I don't see why clones should be any less likely to have souls than people conceived in more conventional ways... Not that I think cloning is a good thing, but then I think in vitro fertilisation is generally a bad thing as well, and rape is of course a terrible thing, but both can and do result in conception, and I wouldn't say that the person conceived doesn't have a soul, or is somehow less human than anyone else. (s3051, "Rachel Haynes".)

The same could be said for test tube babies. god didn't decide to create them man did, by artificially injecting the sperm into teh egg. Cloning is the EXACT same thing as in vitro, granted it;s wrong. i'm not arguing it;s ok. But if in




Figure S2: Ensoulment separated from the mechanisms of procreation

vitro kids have soul, there is NO reason to think clones won't... There is NOTHING to indicate that clones won't have completely independent personalities form the "ortoginal" (talk about stereotypes). (s3085, "SonofAslan".)

A body is a body, whether made the usual way, or artificially inseminated, or cloned. A spirit is a spirit, whether in a body or out of one. So, what is the confusion? It seems logical to assume that a spirit could inhabit a cloned body just as easily as a "born" body. (s3123, "Thetabop".)

The voices that undermine the meaning of the actual mechanisms used in the process of procreation are an interesting deviation from the norm of the cloning discussion. This is presented in Toulmin's schema in figure S2.

In the previously analyzed Catholic voices the actual technological procreation used in the process of cloning was seen almost without exception as a problem. The Official voices claimed that artificial reproduction damages the inherent essential dignity of a human being, and the Professional speakers emphasized the monstrous nature of both the artificial techniques used in cloning and the products it conveys. In this sense the current voice is an exception. While the idea of cloning is not necessarily appreciated by the speakers, the technological dimension of cloning is in some cases seen as irrelevant to the ensoulment of the cloned person.




Figure S3: Made by man

The technological aspect of cloning is not irrelevant to everyone. Rather, the voices that argue that technological elements are irrelevant considering the ensoulment of a clone are exceptions to the rule. The most prominent argumentative structure against the ensoulment of clones is built on a core assumption that anything man-made is an artefact rather than a human being:

A cloned being is created by man - not by God. Therefore there's no way God would place a perfect soul in an imperfect body. Plus, there's NO WAY man could reproduce a soul. That's witchcraft and sorcery to think one could. (s3123, "k4_3_16".)

No, clones do not have souls, as they are not true beings, they are man made. (s3123, "Prince_James".)

I don't think that anything artificially made would have a soul. Man does not have the power to create something with a soul. Only God has the power to create souls. A cloned child is not the same as a twin. I'm sorry, but they are just not! (s3123, "lkarountzos".)

I don't think clones would have souls due to the fact that they would be man made, not a gift from God. (s3123, "onethatloves".)

As discussed previously in “Human Dignity” and “Playing God”, both the general Christian interpretation of the Bible and the Catholic Catechism teach that God creates an individual soul for each human being. The Catholic tradition clearly identifies the process of human creation with a sexual act, repeatedly emphasizing the biblical passage “and they shall become one flesh”. (see section 2.5.; see also CCC 587-601.) It is interesting that the Official Catholic voices are unanimous in asserting that a clone would be ensouled, and it appears that in some sense the Lay voices opposing the idea of a being created through technological intervention are more logical in their religious reasoning than the Official Voices. In the Catholic context it is quite understandable that if the biological process of procreation is separated from engaging in sex, the mystery of ensoulment is also separated from the outcome. Thus one possible conclusion in the context of Catholic doctrine seems to be that if there is no biological contact through the sexual act, then a soul cannot be present in the progeny. This is, of course, religious thinking in the context of Little Tradition that excludes specialized theological knowledge. The argumentative structure is presented in Toulmins’ schema in figure S3.

Man-made things are not ensouled, only humans who are born in the manner God designed for human procreation. These argumentative structures form the core of the Catholic lay discussion on ensoulment, but the discussion has multiple variations built around several core structures. These include, for example, arguments concerning the manner of God’s involvement in the process and arguments concerning the quality of the spirits that settle in cloned humans. One important line of argumentation, for example, suggests that cloned humans would not be persons but empty shells ready to be possessed by demonic spirits. This line of argumentation will be more closely examined in the following section.

6.1.2. The pathos of Ensoulment

No matter how many different ways you try to consider it, a “clone” is still a human being; the only difference is how he/she was generated. In the end, you have to recognize that a “clone” is a different human being from all others, and I don’t care how many dna traits or genes are the same as another, even the source of the tissue... Thus, a soul can exist in that “clone” individual as sure as it does in any of us. (s3123, “ct5topaz”.)

People keep posing the question of whether or not a human clone could have a soul. I have another question to pose. How could a bastard plagiarism of God’s Holy work have a soul? What man would be doing is creating an empty humanoid vessel ripe for demonic possession. If there is no human soul inhabiting the heretic creation, there won’t be any opposition to Satan’s demons infesting it. (s3085, “Digges”.)

In the theme “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” the exclusion of clones outside from humanity was built on a hypothesis that the clone would be more or less radically different from people conceived by conventional means. The clone was most often excluded on the basis of easily observable physical differences, deformity or

early aging etc. It is not surprising that the same basic setting can be found in the emotional persuasion concerning the ensoulment of would-be clones.

The first interesting feature prominent in the pathos of ensoulment is the apparent lack of pathos in several cases – or at least the lack of pathos in the form generally easily perceived as emotional persuasion. Consider the two examples above. The second represents a prime example of the emotional persuasion generally used to persuade an audience to think that clones would be devoid of souls. It has many elements apparently intended to cause fear and to signal aggression, which, as is conceivable in the light of the previous themes discussed, are quite common elements in Catholic cloning argumentation. Instead of an emphasis on the known facts or reasoning, a horrid picture of satanic vessels possessed by demons is painted before the eyes of the audience.

The first example is very different. In fact, one might be tempted to question in what way such an example represents emotional persuasion in the first place? The question is well justified, because the violent, eruptive and offensive emotive elements are usually more easily associated with pathos. It is, of course, understandable why these emphasized displays of emotive persuasion easily become the focal point of the analysis of pathos. Pathos can, however, also be used in the opposite manner. Arguing by establishing an emotional atmosphere that creates a peaceful, calm and considerate mood is also emotional persuasion. One of the essential problems in using pathos seems to be that what can easily be recognized as emotional persuasion tends to be explosive, strong and expressive rhetoric, which is often not very focused on facts. The argumentative structures that chiefly promote calm and rational assessment seem to find their way under the heading of ‘logos’ all too often – within this particular study at least. The pathos of “Ensoulment” is a good place to balance this one-sidedness, because there are very good examples of both uses of pathos within the theme.

Further within the theme of “Ensoulment” there are emotive argumentative structures that both defend and deny the ensoulment of the would-be clones. One of the most typical commonsensical ways people create emotional judgements about the behaviours of other people is by evaluating the role their intentions play in a given situation. Therefore if someone intentionally took the life of another person, for instance, it is generally considered worse than if someone committed the same deed by accident. The mechanism of giving emotive evaluation based on the proponent’s intention is also partially a function of the intuitive assumptions discussed throughout the study. Because of this common way of passing judgement, one effective rhetorical means of defending the ensoulment of a cloned person is to demonstrate his irresponsibility concerning his condition as an artificially produced person:

Cloning is another illegitimate means of bringing a person into existence. They are identical twins of the donors of the DNA. Just as in any other illegitimate creation of a human being, e.g., fornication, in vitro, yes, the child is created in the image and likeness of God, has a soul, and Jesus died to save him. (s3108, “jschlosser”.)

Have to admit I think some of the replies here have been scary. Do test tube babies have souls? Of course they do. Just because an egg has been fertilized(forgive the spelling) outside of the womb doesn’t mean that the

result of that fertilization will lack a soul. Cloning is the same thing. (s3123, “bearblue”.)

A person is a person. Disabled or a genius. Product of sex or of cloning. I don’t approve of cloning. I don’t approve of rape, either, but the Church and society (should) treat people created as a product of rape with the respect due all human beings. (s3087, “gmoonster”.)

The mental structure that makes us think that the innocent should not be punished is really quite common and that makes it a good tool for emotional appeal. If the clones had no choice in their creation, why should they be the objects of hate and contempt? In this line of emotive persuasion the clone is seen as the victim of an “illegitimate” means of bringing a baby into existence. Similar victims include babies born as the result of a rape or simply outside marriage. Comparing would-be clones with babies born in other circumstances outside the Christian ideal gives the argument great emotive strength. To deny a clone ensoulment would entail denying ensoulment to any baby born outside the marital bond which is seen as “Godly” in Christianity.

The other way of seeing clones as victims is to liken cloned babies to those with serious handicaps. Here also the cloned baby is seen as a victim of circumstances, and not to be denied a soul because of his predicament but instead to be cared for:

...does God put a human soul in a test-tube baby, knowing she wasn’t created in a “normal” way? I think so. Would God put a soul into a cloned human being? Of course... Does an anencephalic baby have a soul? Of course. (s3041, “Jw Russell”.)

...if these human clones do manage to make it yes I believe they will have a soul along with so many genetic problems as to be astounding ... so we must love and care for them for whatever time that they will have on earth. Yes, they will have a mind as well. (s3085, “lmleesa”.)

The single most prominent emotive structure that defends the ensoulment of cloned persons is built upon the same natural tendency for making emotional evaluations, but it adds one very important agent to the equation: God. The most common argumentative structure that defends the ensoulment of would-be clones in an emotionally emphasized way looks into the functions of God’s psyche for grounds:

It still sounds like blaming the victim. if the chromosomes are lined up, it’s a human. that god would refuse it a soul is a monstrous suggestion, as if it’s up to us to decide who gets souled. (s3085, “newyawka”.)

Do such clones have a soul? I like the answer that only God decides that but I see a loving kind God who would love that baby and care for it no matter what the origin. After all, God took Adam’s rib and made Eve did he not? (s3123, “nlgt”.)

I believe that God would not deny a soul to a human being because he/she was cloned, because He is a loving God. But I do not believe for one second that He is happy about cloning being done. He used a flood once to cleanse a sinful world. What might he use this time? (s3123, “Mamawhappy”.)

Would a clone have a spirit; the eternal part of the person? I would think so, simply by understanding the character of God. The clone had no choice in existence any more than we had a choice to be born. How could God not ‘give’ a spirit to a person simply because he was created in a different manner. (s3123, “theremnant2”.)

As discussed earlier, religious counter-intuitive concepts are “empty” in the sense that no conclusions can be drawn from them. The example previously used was about God’s omnipotence in relation to scientists “playing God”. (see chapter 5.1.) In this example God’s psyche is anthropomorphized in order to draw ethical conclusions based on “what God must think is right”. On theological grounds the argumentation is flawed, because an all-knowing, all-good entity is of course not bound by human standards of morality. However, the only possible way human beings can make any assumptions concerning God, or what it is that God might want people to do, is to present God as a person like human beings. In a nutshell, to be able to argue about what God wants, God must be made into a good person with human morality. It is then possible to make inferences and to build arguments.

The argumentation that aims to have audiences emote towards the conclusion that would-be clones are without souls is much more similar to the emotional persuasion discussed within previous themes. Where the Professional voices had a distinct appetite for indulging in horrific mental imagery concerning the nature of the clones, the lay Christian voices take their own part in the rough handling of the would-be clones. There are three main rhetorical avenues within this emotive voice, the first of which returns to a familiar theme: clones are portrayed as unfeeling and inhuman creatures. The most commonly used point of reference in this voice is the Monster of Frankenstein or zombies from B-rated horror movies:

A clone is like a frankenstein, which they haven’t done yet. If you believe you have a soul, then there’s only one person who gave you it and it’s god, in the future if they do clone humans, it would only have a heart, no soul. (s3108, “supermommy02”.)

God knows you (your soul) before your born. God creates life in the womb. He gives you a soul. So, NO, clones will not have souls as they aren’t from God. Clones are the freak work of mankind. Does Frankenstein have a soul.... NO> (s3123, “jimbob10”.)

WE WERE CREATED BY GOD, AND ONLY GOD CAN MAKE A SOUL. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CLONE A BODY, WHICH IS JUST A SHELL OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT BUT IT WILL ONLY BE JUST THAT.... A SHELL. AS IN THE WALKING DEAD. OUR SOUL IS WHAT IS ALIVE. (s3123, “decr8tor”.)

The voices that depict the would-be clones as Frankenstein's monsters or zombies are similar to the "Horror Scenarios" discussed previously. (see chapter 5.2.) The main difference compared to the Professional voices is that the Lay voices further elaborate the theory of the inhumanity of a clone. The clone would not have a soul and would, as a result, be clearly different and unhuman. The emotive content in the zombie scenario is not, however, the strongest scenario suggested. The strongest emotional persuasion is achieved in the second rhetorical strategy opposing the idea of the ensoulment of clones. In this scenario a cloned person is depicted as having a soul, but not a good one:

OUR souls are coming from God, for sure. Of course, the clones have their own soul, but being not created by God, where from are coming their souls? Satan can appear as angel of light, doing his work... Be carefull, clones are not God's creatures!!! (s3123, "flavius_ct".)

I could not say that a clone would be born with a soul, but I would imagine that if that was not the case it would soon change. There are many discarnate spirits that would jump at the chance to have a fresh body. (s3123, "Meijin".)

I don't know if you consider the bible but if yyou will remember that Jesus cast out 200 devils from one man. Each one of those devils had a soul. the soul is part of the spirit being. Each spirit cast out was a spirit entity. Who is to say what spirits will enter the clone. There are good ones and bad ones. (s3123, "thesparrowfdt".)

A clone with a soul and no Spirit might be totataly demonic. Satan conterfits what God does, the Anti-Christ is supposededly resurrected, could it be he does die and replaced by a clone. After this ressurection the Anti-Christ is completly under the control of Satan and is no longer his own man. (s3123, "ussmalik".)

The idea of demonic possession is very common both in Christian mythology and in the horror entertainment of our time. The Bible contains numerous stories of possession, for example a story where Jesus banishes several thousand demons¹⁶⁵ from a single possessed man. (see Mark 5: 2-15.) Since these persuasive tactics incorporate interesting features from the cognitive point of view, they will be discussed in more detail under the cognitive aspects of "Ensoulment".

The third dominant strategy for emotionally persuading audiences to think that the ensoulment of cloned persons is impossible moves to the far edge of the theme of "Ensoulment". The disturbing problematic of the ensoulment of cloned people is associated to the Last Days and Apocalypse. The third strategy is built on Biblical imagery and especially apocalyptic visions to inspire dread:

...if/WHEN it happens, will these clones have souls? How are we to treat them? And finally, how can God let this happen? Does this mean the last days are upon us? What are we do do? (s3079, "hengruh".)

¹⁶⁵The Bible tells there was a "legion" of demons possessing the man. In the Roman army, the size of a legion was around 8000 men.

I am so much disgusted about having human clones. I oppose the idea cuz God does not make like that. I am waiting for the Judgement Day comes one of these days. To me, making the human clones makes no senses to me at all. If the human clones are made, there are such no souls at all. (s3123, “m3b”.)

I cannot express my personal revulsion at the thought of man finally openly claiming the province of God Almighty. We are most assuredly in the “very last of the last days” when we undertake this task. (s3123, “bekkasu”).

In this recurring Christian voice the process of creating cloned persons is seen as one of the final steps towards Judgement Day. It is strongly tied to the discussion surrounding the question of ensoulment, so it has to be mentioned although it is quite different from the most dominant elements within the emotive persuasion on this matter. The theme of the “last days” is built almost solely on the mythological content of Christianity, and is especially emphasized in the Lay argumentation. Although the Professional Catholic voices also utilize Biblical imagery of the Apocalypse, there is a difference in how the concept is used. The Professional voices seem inclined to warn people through apocalyptic imagery in order to stop the developments under argumentation. In contrast, the Lay voices only observe “the signs of the times” and seem to be preparing for the inevitable.

No matter how the apocalyptic imagery is utilized, by connecting the discussion on ensoulment to the Christian apocalyptic beliefs, the speakers underline the importance of their arguments and add emotional weight to their persuasion. Considering emotive effect and use of pathos, “Ensoulment” can be seen as the lay equivalent of the official discussion on “Human Dignity”. Both themes build their emotive power from the value-attribution of the very core element of what it is to be human. In other words, both of the concepts, ‘human dignity’ and ‘soul’, are very abstract but essentially important in the value-attribution of certain discourse communities. As discussed before, what value they are considered to have is emotionally important for human beings.

6.1.3. The ethos of Ensoulment

What I think everyone who is against this is missing is this: Do you honestly believe that God, knowing what we’re up to, (we are His children, after all), is going to put a soul into a human body that was not created in “normal” way? I don’t think God is that silly. (s3041, “Stacey”).

Human cloning is NOT OK with Catholics. However, such a human clone would be a fully human person, with a unique soul, in no way different from a person conceived the old-fashioned way. (s3064, “TemplarS”).

I am against cloning of humans. I believe that at the moment of conception that a soul becomes a part of the conceived individual. I believe that the soul is instrumental in the spiritual development of the individual. Because it is not possible for a physical human to create a spiritual entity, a human clone is not considered to be a human being. (s3118, “southgatemember”).

SOULS are something which GOD gave us, though i am not so learned enough to say when and where is it, but i am sure that's something clones don't, because they aren't created by GOD and we human beings aren't GOD! (s3123, "july_snow_01".)

The greatest difference between the Lay voices and the previously discussed Official and Professional voices is the relative equality the discussion forums grant to each voice. Although the Internet as a context of discussion in general tends to erode authority (see chapter 2.2.), in Official and Professional themes the creation of speaker presentations is done with an effort to establish authority. As discussed, although the Official and Professional voices utilize argumentative structures built according to lay theological expertise, they still tend to perform authoritatively in their self-presentation. The most usual way the voices present themselves as figures of authority is by associating with a real-life context that supports the idea that the speaker is a theological expert. In discussion forums the speakers have no benefit of authority by their context. The forums are quite democratic and very confrontational in nature; everyone is allowed to (and expected to) comment and argue their views equally with anyone else. As one might surmise, this design creates distinctive nuances in the rhetorical techniques of ethos applied in support of the argumentative structures.

The greatest embodiment of this "democracy" in the speaker presentations is apparent in the voices who choose not to argue anything by clear argumentative assertions, but to ask questions instead. Within the current theme, the method of questioning is more often found in association with voices that are at least partially sympathetic to the idea that clones would have souls. This is probably due to the tendency that the speakers defending the concept of the ensoulment of clones often present themselves in a more temperate manner:

Does a clone have a soul? Does God allow any being to be conceived (regardless of the "manner" of conception) without a soul. Or is this just bypassing God and playing deity for a day? (s3087, "BudlongBrown".)

If someone clones me, will my clones have a soul? Will it be my soul they have? Does this possibly suggest that according to religious dogma, I could, perhaps, be represented in Heaven (or Hell) more than once? (s3101, "Ronna Bunker".)

Now, the BIG question is, does GOD give a Spirit to a cloned being. If he does not, then that being is not Human. Of course the being has a human body, but a body does not define a human. Spirit does...a human Spirit. Now that being may have intelligence, emotions, etc but will be void of a Spirit...the essential ingredient of a human. (s3119, "zoe4me".)

It was posted that clones cannot have souls because they are made by man and not by god.....not by god? Do we will matter to grow? Do we CREATE life? No we may manipulate things a bit, but then we sit back and watch the miracle based on the rules of nature that are still mysterious in their essence. (s3123, "Ja-nine".)

Does a non-cloned human have a soul? And isn't natural reproduction just a form of cloning? Do eggs fertilized outside the womb have souls? What really is the difference between a cloned human and a naturally created human that would cause one to have a soul and the other not too? (s3123, "djhuty77".)

While the voices arguing on behalf of the would-be clones often take on the note of a questioner, sometimes the speaker presents himself as someone who is not certain about what the spiritual ramifications of cloning really are. This method of self-presentation can be found on both sides of the argument, not just with those defending clones but also with the opponents:

Just how human will the clone be? Will the clone have a soul? What are the genetic ramifications of cloning? Is it ethical to clone any living creature, let alone a human being? (s3080, "Michael Cook".)

No-one knows the answer to the question of whether these clones will have a soul. obviously they will be alive and have a mind, But the question is, will there be something missing? Is it the soul? The Essence of God? or The love that we feel? We don't know. But I would rather not try to find out! as I am against cloning. We are messing with Gods creation. (s3085, "davisluv".)

In addition to the speakers who present themselves through questions, some voices avoid the argument by directly appealing to supreme authority, which is either God or the Church:

I don't think there is a man on earth who can answer that question. Only God will know. Imagine that you could teach a clone how to pray and give it a knowledge of God. Would God abandon it? I like science fiction and the ideas of clones have been in it for years. So who is to say if God would give a clone a soul? Only God. (s3091, "dancny".)

Everybody is dancing around the real question. How would the church look upon the clone? How would the church look upon the donor? Regardless of the ethical consequences of cloning, someone is going to do it. What will the church do? (s3087, "spider521".)

Now, whether these clones have a soul, I'll leave that to the Church. (s3048, "Mark Curley".)

It is interesting to notice that in the voices that pose questions and appeal to authority the self-presentation of the speaker becomes almost transparent. There are almost no traces of the often strong (apostolic) and even magnanimous (prophetic) ways of presenting oneself found in the previous themes. The speakers do not assume positions of authority, but rather blend themselves into the area beyond the separate structures of authority. This is probably due to two things. First, the democratic

nature of the discussion forums may make a relatively mild identification atypically successful in a rhetorical sense. It is clear to the speakers that the majority of the readers and other voices appearing within the context share the understanding of the relative equality the forums grant to everyone. As such, the equality of the speakers can be seen as an idea shared by all the users of the forums. In such a context, a transparent presentation of oneself (versus a presentation emphasizing the speaker) can work better than in most other rhetorical situations.

The second factor, which most likely makes a mild identification more successful in the discussion forums, is the way they orientate the audience. In the forums it can be automatically assumed that anyone skimming the discussion threads is already interested in the subject under debate. Anyone posting arguments in discussion forums can be fairly certain that any possible reader is a person already interested in obtaining peer opinions concerning cloning. Thus there is less need to evoke his/her interest in the subject. The questioning stance and anonymity might also suggest that the speakers are unsure of their audience and rely more on the external structure offered by the discussion forums than on their assumptions about possible readers. In other words, they are unsure of what particular discourse communities they are addressing.

The curious lack of the elements of ethos in some discussion forum entries extends to the audience constructs as well – there are many instances where the speaker seems to make no assumptions at all about the nature of his possible audience. It is safe to say that some discourses on the discussion forums almost completely lack the elements of ethos. It may be that the new kind of contextual structure the discussion forums offer causes new kinds of communicative structures to be born. It seems the discussion forums give birth to an “incomplete” form of ethos where the normal assumptions that speakers entertain about their audiences and the presentation of themselves are replaced by the structures of the Internet environment. On the Net in general and in the forums in particular, every member of the audience can be a voice in the argumentation, and every voice is a part of the audience. The ethos of discussion forums on the Internet is an interesting question well worth further study.

While the above examples, the “incomplete Internet ethos”, represents a good part of the lay discussion concerning the ensoulment of clones, the majority of speakers have clear opinions on the matter, creating a more typical *inventio*. The weaker speaker presentations and opinions with less emphasized persuasive elements are more common in the democratically orientated discussion forums than in other Internet contexts, but they are still far from a majority. Where clear stances of opinion are adopted, the typical elements of ethos surface almost as strongly as in any other persuasive discourse analyzed within this study. The voices that have a clear opinion that would-be clones would have souls ring strong in Christian discussion forums:

I believe a clone would have a soul. Every living human being, no matter how they got their start in life would have God’s work of instilling a soul. If not, then you are talking about an automation of a human, not a human being. (s3123, “barbaraellen1946”.)

It would seem to me that a clone would have a soul. Just as we are a part and Parcel of god so to would a clone be. I say this with the belief that we all share

in gods' divinity being gods children in all. There fore any thing created by a piece of god would be gods defacto creation. (s3123, "lizardshaman".)

To ask the question whether a clone has a soul is akin to asking a living thing if it has life. Of course it does. If there were a human clone it would be a human being, a human organism, and like all the rest of us non-clones. the clone also would "have" what we "have" i.e., human life since it would be constituted chromosomally the same way we are. (s3123, "raphm".)

The speaker supporting the view that clones would have souls strongly emphasizes the similarity or sameness that clones would share with "us". Thus the voice arguing on behalf of the ensoulment of clones can be called "the speaker of unity". In this view, a clone is a person just like normally conceived individuals. The clone has the same chromosomes that we share, has a personality and a mind and thus shares the same essential qualities with all humans. By emphasizing the inclusion of the would-be clones into the fold of humanity the speaker creates himself as a peacemaker or a diplomat, who aims at dispersing the clouds of unnecessary prejudice that surround the cloning issue.

A most interesting discovery in this rhetorical construct is the manner in which the sameness of the cloned person is established. First of all, the sameness is emphasized through the use of common denominators that intimately connect all human beings: a clone would breath, move around and generally "act alive". When the first obstacle has been cleared and the voices arguing to include clones into humanity continue, they utilize assumptions about the human psyche. A clone would have experiences, feelings and a personality, just like any reader in the audience:

Clones most certainly have souls. They are human beings after all and would still be a living breathing person with the same feelings as any other person. I believe your soul is not what you are but who you are. My daughter is an invetro fertilized baby. She is a wonderful miracle of sience with a beautiful soul! I thank God for her every day! (s3123, "suemluiz".)

Therefore, whether a clone has a soul depends entirely on whether the experiment "works". If scientists make a perfect human body, but it just lays there, and never acts "alive", then that would mean that no spirit came along to "pick up" that body. But if the clone acts alive, gets up, walks around, talks, or whatever, then there is a soul. (s3123, "bompu1".)

Of course clones would have souls! Physically, a clone would be an exact copy of another human being. But mentally and emotionally, because they would possess their own brain, they would be a totally separate being. They would be capable of experiancing and forming opinions about their own life. They would have emotions. (s3123, "roseblossom1".)

It seems that the potential audience for the voices defending the humanity and the personal uniqueness of a would-be clone is truly a universal one. Clearly

the characteristics of human existence mentioned above are human universals, not culturally constructed and certainly something of an everyday truism. Any individual in any human society who is not able to grasp the basics of the idea that other people are intentional agents with their own thoughts, feelings and motivations will not be able to function in the social world as a normal human being.

The voices that exclude clones from the ranks of humanity ring equally strong in the discussion forums. The voices that deny the possibility of the ensoulment of clones share the same basic assumption but vary on their opinions as to what are the consequences the soulless state of the clone has:

I don't think a clone would have a soul. Even it would be a perfect clone, the essence (or soul) of the original would be missing. I also think that when we start to mess with the Lord's creations then we are letting ourselves into a realm where we shouldn't be going. (s3123, "statom5".)

The ability to clone a human, under no circumstances, should that give yet another reason to question the existence of God!!! Cloning is just the ability to make a "counterfeit" person. There is no soul in a clone. And the fact that there is no soul in a man made human is what will keep man from reaching the level of God. (s3062, "imconfused".)

The voices that see it as impossible that a clone could have a soul share many nuances with the prophetic Official and Professional Catholic voices discussed previously. They warn people not to rebel against God or not to take the steps that would bring humanity to the realm that belongs solely to God. The voices denying the possibility that a man-made clone could have a soul can be named "prophets of division", because they aim at emphasizing fundamental differences between persons conceived through cloning and persons conceived in the conventional manner. The central claim these voices make is that a clone, being a human creation, cannot be a "real" person. The "essence", the soul, is missing. The cloned being is not real human, but a "counterfeit" person.

The defenders of the ensoulment of clones established their position by creating a unified ethos encompassing the speakers themselves, their audiences and the clones. The voices claiming clones would not have souls are doing the opposite, drawing lines inside humanity, between themselves and "the world" and most definitely between would-be clones and the rest of the humanity:

Are you a Christian? Do you believe that a human being has a soul? If so, than you know what is wrong with cloning. Only God can create a soul. (s3107, "glendiphora".)

Scientist are trying to build human beings or temples with there own hands. There for I do not belive that cloned beings would have a sole or spirit because it is not GOD givin. (s3123, "HighMount".)

If the world wants to create clones let them. GOD dosen't issue out souls as though they were some kind of prize. HE creates each and everyone, HE knows

them all by name. What GOD creates belongs to HIM, what man creates belongs to man. A clone would have no soul, it would be an abomination in the eyes of the LORD. Just remember, render unto Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to GOD what is GODS'. (s3123, "tp3050".)

The speakers are situating themselves inside the realm of Christianity as opposed to "the world". The world of science and "the world", which in Christian rhetoric roughly means everything non-Christian, are presented as the opposites of good. The creation of a clone in these views is a godless act, and therefore those responsible and their creations belong outside of the boundary of the presumed audience. The prophets of division are speaking with the assumption that their audience manifests many features of a Christian belief-system, and it seems their arguments are directed at an elite audience. The first division built in this thread of argumentation is between the religious world and the "world" outside it.

Further exclusion of the would-be clone is achieved by portraying it as something not quite human. The first emphasis is on the manner of its creation, which the speakers see as radically different from normal conception:

No I do not believe that clones have souls. Only God gives us souls and clones would be made by mankind. I think the whole concept of cloning is going way over the line. People need to stop playing God. (s3123, "Beaspirit1".)

Cloning humans is absolutely NOT ok. How do you KNOW that a soul would find it's way to the cloned vessel? Many believe that a clone would not have a soul since it would not be a creation of God but instead a creation of man. When we create other things do you believe that they have souls as well? (s3126, "sansom".)

The radically different manner of conception means that the cloned creature is not a human being, but rather a "thing". This in turn has several severe consequences for the created being:

i don't think were CREATING humans in the cloning or another human. We're growing another body and mind. a sentient being has a "soul" (IMHO), so the clone cannot be sentient and not have a "soul." (s3123, "ToZo".)

A human being is only a human being when the spirit and soul enter the body. When did man ask GoD for a spirit and soul to put into that clone. What is a human body without a spirit and soul? Animal, that is what. What does a animal with the capability of a human "do"? (s3121, "thesparrowfdt".)

...how can something that God didn't create have a soul or a spirit. That is something which man can't make. Clones will be just empty vessels and most likely won't know right from wrong. Therefore most will probably be sociopaths. I also don't believe God will allow for cloning to take place. (s3108, "princessleeyah".)

Within the multiple voices arguing that clones do not have souls there are three frequent variations on the opinions of what is the status of the created being is. First, and in a way the most radical one, is that a clone, being a human creation and thus a “thing” rather than a person, would not be sentient at all. In this view a clone would be just a biological automaton with no mind, inactive, something like a brain-dead human being. The core of the argument is that a cloned being would lack both the essential humanity bestowed by God in the process of creation and as a result would also lack many visible features that are typically associated with a human being. So the exclusion of the clone from “real” humanity would be strikingly clear.

The second common variation is that the cloned beings would have human capabilities and would be alive and active, but still not even close to human. Rather, the soulless clones would be something akin to an animal. The third variation is that the cloned humans would be human beings, indeed persons in their own right, but with some aspects of their cognitive functions severely impaired. The soulless beings would be sociopaths, psychopaths, they would not be able to tell right from wrong, etc. Here the exclusion of cloned people from the rest of humanity is not as categorical. The would-be clones are perceived as people, they would only be twisted or hideously evil.

Within the confines of this particular study it suffices to say that the two-fold (double helix, if you will) ethos apparent within this theme is by no means rare in the rhetorical analysis of different matters. It is an extremely typical method of rhetorical persuasion to build structures of inclusion and exclusion and to draw argumentative front lines through these structures. It is by far more common to find an inclusion/exclusion pair in any issue under debate than to find a unanimous ethos of exclusion, which has until this theme been the norm of the Catholic voices analyzed.

6.1.4. Cognitive view of Ensoulment

Logos

Several lines of argumentation within the theme of “Ensoulment” either defend or doubt the idea that a clone would have an essential core like other persons. The central concept used within the argumentative structures, ‘the soul’, is a typical ideal-essential concept, something understood by the speakers as the core that makes a human being a human being. (see chapter 3.4.) Interestingly, the theme shares much with the first theme of this study, “Human Dignity”. Both “Human Dignity” and “Ensoulment” are built on strong ideal-essential assumptions concerning something that is considered as fundamentally important for a human being to really be human, but of which no inferences can be made. While the cognitive mechanisms in Official “Human Dignity” and Lay “Ensoulment” are very similar, a notable difference comes about in terms of theological correctness. Since the lay speakers are mostly anonymous and unhindered by the demand to be doctrinally correct, the mechanisms of essentialist thought become much more apparent in their argumentation.

Although the official speakers were of one mind that a clone would be ensouled, there was little argumentation for the defence of that position. The Official voices took the idea as self-evident and did not need to defend their stance, but the Lay voices do not get off the hook so easily: they need to defend the idea in peer discussion that cloned persons might have souls. As mentioned before within several themes, reasoning derived from ideal-essential concepts is impossible without incorporating additional inferential principles from other categories of folk-theoretical thinking. The concept of the ‘soul’ is inferentially empty in the sense that its presence can only be determined by sortal- or causal-essential qualities. There are inferential gaps in the reasoning processes that try to connect observable qualities (intentional movement, communication abilities, etc.) that indicate the presence of life and mind with the ideal-essential element of the ‘soul’. This is, as discussed, can be considered a typical feature of religious reasoning concerning essential categories. (see chapter 3.4.)

One of the inferential folk-theoretical ways to observe that a being has a soul is possible through folk-biological inference. If species members are conceptualized as sharing similar essential cores that are transmitted in biological procreation, then a child begotten by an ensouled human being will be observed as having a God-given soul. There are many additional criteria for a “proper” or “dignified” way of begetting progeny in Catholic teaching; these were discussed under “Human Dignity” and “Sacred Family”. Consequently there are many possible situations where the circumstances of procreation do not fulfil the ideal criteria that Catholics believe are meant by God. However, even though these additional criteria are not fulfilled, the causal-essential transmission of the essential human core is achieved if the biological chain of procreation remains unbroken.

There may also be many situations where a person conceived after the normal manner does not fulfil the sortal-essential criteria typically required for being categorized as a person. For example, it may be that a person conceived observing all the rules of procreation does not have a brain. As the child is anencephalic, it cannot have intentions, cannot communicate, has no mind and so on. So many of the criteria typically associated with an ensouled person are not met by the person without a brain: the child lacks many of the features typically associated with a human being. However, it is extremely unlikely that in Catholic thought the child would be deemed as ‘having no soul’. This is at least partially because it was born after the intuitively salient causal rules of biological procreation. It still fulfils the criteria for folk-biological causality, by which it is intuitively inferred that the ideal-essential core elements have been passed, although the sortal-essential qualities of the child are radically different from an average person. The criteria for determining ensoulment becomes, in a manner of speaking, “stricter” in the case of cloning than in the case of, for example, a baby born without a brain. This is because the manner of procreation where clones are born violates the folk-theoretical biological inferences. While an anencephalic baby also lacks many features normally associated with the concept of a ‘person’, it is still easily understood as essentially human, because it fulfils the biological causal rules cognitively imposed on the mediation of an essential core element. So it can be concluded that at least on the issue of cloning, causal-essential inferences have more weight than sortal-essential observations when determining the ideal-essential status of a human being.

Since a cloned person does not fulfil the rules for the mediation of the essential element of being human, the Lay Catholic voices conclude in many cases that the




Figure S4: If it expresses observable personality, it has a soul

clone must also lack the other crucial features associated with the concept of an ensouled person (consciousness, intentional movement, etc.). In Toulmin's schema the argumentative structure appears as in figure S4.

The primary defence of the ensoulment of clones is a typical example of reasoning that is made about an ideal-essential category that is not directly connected to observable reality or to principles of natural causal thought. Where the actual inferential steps to be drawn directly from the essential idea falter and become impossible, intuitive folk-biological assumptions are brought into play to fill the gaps in the structure. By comparison, sortal-essential inference can go only one way: from observable sortal qualities to a postulated essential core element. In this case, if the observable sortal qualities of a cloned person are similar to those of a person conceived in a normal manner, it is concluded by the speakers that the essential cores bringing the sortal qualities about must also be similar. The above argumentative structure is utilized both by those who oppose the idea of clones having souls and by those who think clones have souls. Those who oppose use the structure by arguing that a clone would be an empty husk, with no intentional qualities or persona. Those who consider that clones would be ensouled seem to think that it is very easy to solve the question: just clone, and if the cloned person acts like a normal person, it has a soul.

The second argumentative structure that defends the idea that cloned persons might have souls focuses on the assertion that the method of procreation is irrelevant regarding the ensoulment of the baby. Interestingly, these claims go against the grain of intuitive biological assumptions, somewhat contradicting folk-biological assumptions or at least extending them into unfamiliar territory. The way of reasoning about the presence of a soul is still built upon assumptions of biological causality




Figure S5: Ensouled despite the conditions of procreation

(e.g. if something is to be considered human, it should be considered as possessing a human essence), but the essentialistic idea is separated from the actual mechanisms and conditions of procreation. The argumentative structures that defend the ensoulment of would-be clones often agree that cloning is not an ideal way of being conceived, but not so far removed from the natural way as to merit the loss of a soul.

The argumentative structure is made stronger by giving examples of other situations where the typical or, from a Christian point of view, ideal circumstances of human procreation are violated. The argumentative structure suggests that if the ideal circumstances of procreation are the determining factor for ensoulment, a very many people should be denied the possession of a God-given soul. This presents the voices arguing against the ensoulment of the would-be clones in a rather thankless light as trying to put a significant part of humanity outside the category of “real humans”. In Toulmin’s geometric schema the argumentative structure looks like in figure S5.

The argumentative structure disassociates the ideal-essential concept of the ‘soul’ from folk-biological inference. Or to be more precise, it extends the biological intuitions to include a technological element. In ontological categories of thought, “being built or made” is a quality of artefacts, whereas “being born” is the quality of living kinds. Technological intervention, or “building clones”, mixes the ontological inferential principles of two separate categories of intuitive thought. The above example suggests that it is possible for people to have ideal-essential conceptualizations even if the inferential rules of ontological categories are mixed.

The Official Catholic voices were unanimous in their view that a cloned person would be severely deprived in terms of dignity, physical and psychological well-

being and social environment. However, in the Official view, God would not deny the clone a soul. As mentioned, when theorizing about the mind of God, people regularly utilize the same intuitive psychological assumptions they use to interpret the actions of other people. The will or opinion of God is not typically understood through theological, “correct” schemas (e.g. God is omniscient and incomprehensible to the human intellect) but instead through intuitive folk-psychological and naïve sociological assumptions used to make sense of the actions and thoughts of other human beings. This mode of speculation about the mind of God is seen in action within this persuasive discourse: if we, mere humans with distorted and meagre moral understandings can see that the cloned baby is not the culprit but the innocent victim of the cloning industry, surely a loving, omniscient God thinks in the same manner. It would seem incomprehensible in view of typical intuitive assumptions that any sane and benevolent psyche would choose to punish an innocent victim in a most extreme manner. So the argument gains persuasive impetus by connecting the intuitive assumptions people have to a postulated divine psyche.

All in all, while the Lay voices that defend the ensoulment of cloned persons are quite exceptional in the field of the Christian cloning discussion, their arguments are built on the same elements of ontological reasoning. They use the same intuitive assumptions as the previous voices examined but turn the tables as to the conclusion: the same mechanisms are used to reach the opposite outcome. The most concurrent argumentative structure within these voices is the direct opposite of the above example. In Toulmin’s schema this appears as in figure S6 (see the next page).

The argumentative structure is directly built on the idea that the violation of ontological categories of thought that happens in cloning has consequences. Humans are conceived, not made, thus things that are made are not human and cannot have an essential human core. The voices that oppose the idea that clones have souls see it as impossible that God might give a soul to the product of technological intervention. The idea would violate ontological essentialist categorization, folk-biological inferential reasoning and Catholic doctrine as understood in the Lay sense.

In the first argumentative structure discussed in this chapter the Lay Catholic voices argued about the sortal qualities that indicate the presence of a soul. It was argued that a clone cannot be ensouled and as a result has no personality or intentional movement, for example. On the other hand, it was argued that if cloning produces people who share the sortal qualities of people born in the conventional manner, this must mean that they also share the same ideal-essential core qualities. This is, in a manner of speaking, a dangerous course of argumentation for those who oppose cloning. Consider a case in which human cloning was successfully attempted and the person born seemed quite normal. Now the voices that claimed a clone would not have a mind or personality but be an empty husk would apparently be wrong. However, one argumentative strategy opposing the ensoulment of clones remains. The argumentative structure has many variations, but the core assumption is that technological intervention causes the clone to have a different essential core: not a God-given soul but something evil. This is presented in figure S7.

Claiming that would-be clones indeed have capabilities similar to the observable sortal qualities of “real” human beings but extremely different essential core qualities is a masterful rhetorical move. Since the observation of the sortal qualities





Figure S6: Made things have no souls

of a cloned person does not necessarily reveal a demonic essence (as demons can be devious and deceptive) the only remaining way of ensuring that a person has a God-given soul is to ensure he is born according to folk-biological intuitions. It can never be known for sure at which point the possessed clone will reveal his demonic essential nature. This idea is very compelling both emotionally and audience-wise, because it is a typical counter-intuitive idea. As discussed, counter-intuitive ideas tend to be interesting, attention-demanding and easy to remember, which makes them effective rhetorical tools. Because of the powerful emotional content inherent in the idea of “possessed clones”, the concept will be discussed further below.

Pathos

The idea of a creature that appears human on the surface but is in essence something else – a demonic, totally evil creature – is a very frightening concept, which seems to come quite easily for many religious people. The appeal inherent in this type of idea is connected to many elements of essentialistic reasoning and folk inference. As discussed previously, humans are naturally inclined to think that living kinds have species-specific essential cores, but nobody knows what this actually means in the sense of drawing inferences or making conclusions from the idea. This “inferential void” creates fertile ground for exciting scenarios where the essence of the person in question has been altered or changed in some mysterious manner. Since the essence cannot be seen or measured in any way, it is left for other people to determine the situation by the surface symptoms the person exhibits. Since the relation of the essence to the visible features of a person is not causally clear, but



Picture S7: Clones will be demonic

subject to gaps in the reasoning process, people get to exercise their faculties of folk-psychology and naive sociology. This is, at least partially, what happens in stories about possession and generally in horror stories where people are not what they seem to be on the surface.

It might be tempting to hypothesize that the popularity of the idea of demonic possession has been transferred to the culture of horror movies from its origin in Christian culture. It can be argued, however, that both the transmission and scariness of the concept are directly tied to the intuitive biological and psychological assumptions that human beings entertain about other human beings. This would entail that both the Christian mythological accounts and the modern movie industry's obsession with demonic possession are symptomatic of certain domain-specific conceptual violations. The same hypothesis would also explain the effectiveness of argumentative tools that evoke primary emotions and facilitate quick surface elaboration of argumentative structures through implementing counter-intuitive ideas.

In a manner that is somewhat uncommon in counter-intuitive ideas concerning agents, in the representation of a cloned person the intuitive ontological assumptions of both the biological properties of living kinds and the psychological properties of persons are violated many times. As already discussed, the counter-intuitiveness in a given idea has a certain 'optimum'; if the relevant folk-theoretical mechanisms are violated too many times within a single idea, it is no longer appealing. (see chapter 3.4.) The idea of possessed clones contains multiple violations, but in such a way that they seemingly strengthen each other's credibility. First of all, as mentioned before, the clone is at the same time a manufactured thing and a living kind sharing human biological properties. This contradiction in biological causality

that people normally perceive in living kinds impeaches the essential nature of the clone. In normal circumstances a lamb gives birth to a baby lamb and we intuitively assume that the baby lamb has the same essence as the mother – even if the baby was missing a leg, or fur, etc. If a human mother gives birth to a baby, we make the same intuitive assumption about the baby’s essence. In the case of a clone the intuitive postulation of human biological essence is compromised.

Demons and stray spirits, e.g. personal agents without physical bodies, are a textbook example of counter-intuitive beings. For the sake of recall, a counter-intuitive being is a being that has some qualities that correspond to our intuitive assumptions about agents and other qualities that are totally strange. (see chapter 3.4.) Consider, for example, the demons Jesus drove out from the possessed man in the biblical example. (see Mark 5: 2-15.) The demons had minds, that is, they were intentional agents who had some evil and cruel motivations and that is why they had possessed the unfortunate man Jesus helped. The demons also had communicative capabilities. This corresponds to the intuitive assumptions we entertain about agency: they (the demons) have motivations and intentions, and understanding these gives us a possibility to decipher their sometimes bizarre behaviour. What is really strange about the demons is that they had no bodies of their own and as many as 8001 individual minds had populated the single body of the man in the story. As Jesus drove the 8000 extra spirits away, the original mind of the possessed man remained and the situation reverted to normal. The ‘intentional psyche – no body’ representation of the demons makes them somewhat prototypical counter-intuitive beings.

So it seems that when it is asserted that a cloned person is possessed by a demon, two representations that violate cognitive assumptions in different ways are connected. The cloned body is a human body, seemingly deprived of the biological causality that makes it possible for it to have a human essence, or a soul in the cloning discourse. The demons are representations that connect intuitive psychological assumptions of agency with a peculiar state of disembodiment. It seems that the two concepts (where each lack some aspects of intuitive assumptions normally used to make sense of persons) come together to form a strong rhetorical tool. After all, if both in the Scriptures and in horror movies an ensouled person can be possessed, why not then a soulless container with human biological properties. If there is nobody home, it is easier to break in. Furthermore, the two incomplete (or counter-intuitive) creatures described by the Lay Catholic voices can be combined to create a complete creature: a body without a soul and a spirit without a body seem to make an intuitively plausible combination. Although impossible to ascertain within this study, it would be interesting to study whether these ideas share a mutual attraction outside the cloning discussion. (E.g., is it an intuitively plausible idea in general that human shells without essential cores attract stray spirits without bodies?)

Be that as it may, in the sense of pathos the representation of a creature with a human outlook and demonic essence is a very unsettling idea. It is unsettling because the relevant intuitive assumptions are activated and violated in a way as to produce a representation that is provoking yet easy to grasp and remember. The representation that causes fear through cognitive mechanisms is used in this context to provoke action and the surface elaboration that since clones are not ensouled, creating them is an evil thing, which should be prevented.

It seems clear that most of the emotive attempts to persuade people to believe that would-be clones are soulless creatures aim to produce fear or other negative primary emotions. This suggests that they all facilitate quick surface elaboration of the ideas presented and do not encourage audiences into deep elaboration concerning cloning. However, as mentioned, substitutive deep elaboration seems to take place within the argumentative process. As the audiences think about demonic possession and the relevant theological context, they can create a deep elaboration of sorts. The substitutive deep elaboration connects folk-theoretical intuitions and a religious context to form a deep-elaborative persuasive effect. When the audience conceptualizes cloning in religious context, a religious deep elaboration can be achieved. This would have the same persuasive effect as deep elaboration of the negative facts of cloning, but in this case religious imagery is substituted in place of inferential assertions (logos). This allows for a very effective special use of pathos in the context of those elite audiences that believe in possession.

On the other hand, however, the emotive content defending the ensoulment of clones tends to aim at soothing emotive elements, thus creating a suitable atmosphere for deep elaboration and the assessment of facts. Although the same axis of emotive content is present in all the major themes of the Christian discussion about cloning, it is most apparent when emotively persuading within the issue of ensoulment.

Ethos

As discussed before, the rhetorical ethos of ensoulment is built on a dual axis of inclusion and exclusion of the would-be clones in relation to the human population born in the “normal” way. The method of inclusion was to underline the similarity of the physical and cognitive existence that the cloned persons would share with the rest of humanity. The method of exclusion, likewise, was to utilize biological and folk-psychological reasoning, but to the opposite end. In both argumentative accounts the biological and mental features of the would-be clone are seen as a proof of the invisible human essence, a soul.

It is easy to notice that the argumentative structures within the theme are not primarily constrained by theological principles. Although this has mostly been the case in all of the themes because of the dominance of Little Tradition on the Internet, it is emphasized when the Lay voices take to the stage. Rather than utilizing theologically correct ideas, the speakers’ arguments are based explicitly on the principles of intuitive folk-theoretical assumptions. If it breathes, it must be alive, because things in the mental category of objects and artefacts do not breathe; living kinds do. The first step the “diplomats of inclusion” must take is to establish that a clone is alive even if it shares with artefacts the important feature that it is manufactured by humans. The cognitive categorization that is relevant for the argumentative structure establishes it as directed at a universal audience. As discussed earlier, the argumentative strength of claims based on intuitive understandings rises, at least partially, from the fact that they are easily manifest for any member of any audience endowed with typical human cognitive capabilities. The diplomatic voices try their best to utilize the cognitive reflexes of categorization to enfold both themselves and their readers into the same sea of humanity, along with the cloned persons. As the things the argument is built on

are human universals, the potential audience that listens and is persuaded by the arguments is extremely wide. This audience includes all those who have a mutually manifest understanding which states that sortal qualities of personal agency are the defining factors of being human.

The “speakers of division” use the same mechanisms of cognitive categorization to establish the otherness of clones. Below the surface layer of religious rhetoric (e.g. the “world” versus “us”, meaning non-Christians versus Christian believers) the speakers are utilizing the same intuitive assumptions for denying the humanity of would-be clones that the defenders of ensoulment use to establish the humanity of the clones. First the speakers of division establish the place of the clone in the cognitive category of artefacts rather than in the category of living kinds by emphasizing that clones are man-made in contrast to normal human beings who are “divinely conceived”. The proof of being divinely conceived is, in most cases, being conceived in the conventional biological manner. The division between the assumed audience and the clone is deepened by an appeal to the intuitive psychological assumptions of the audience. The most radical claim previously made against the ensoulment of would-be clones was that a cloned human being would be completely devoid of all psychological functions. The argument establishes the human soul as the essence, which is ultimately the reason for emergent cognitive functions. In other words, no soul, no human essence – and no mind. The argument makes a strong claim but becomes very vulnerable at the same time: if human clones were to be created and proved to be as functional as any of us, the argument would fall completely. The other two argumentative structures used for creating division are better in this sense, because they portray a human who acts like a human and has human capabilities, but nevertheless has no soul but a demonic essence instead. In this sense it can be said that the arguments concerning the “state of the clone’s soul” are primarily appealing to those discourse communities that manifest stories and beliefs of possession and spiritual agents. However, since the appeal of the counter-intuitive elements is universal, the arguments most probably command attention even beyond these elite audiences.

The way explicitly religious argumentative structures about a soul are built using the means supplied by intuitive cognitive capabilities instead of theological material is not a new discovery. However, in the context of the cloning discussion it is a profoundly interesting phenomenon, and certainly worthy of further study. Indeed, it may be that the inferential structures that intuitive cognitive capabilities produce are the means human beings routinely utilize when arguing about essentialistic categories like the soul, dignity or divine entities. This may also be the reason why the Official voices of the Catholic Church have decided to speak about human dignity and not to question the ensoulment of clones. Arguing about the soul in a folk-theoretical manner in the concrete technological context of cloning easily reveals the inferential incompleteness of the concept of ‘the soul’. The concept of ‘human dignity’, while essentialistic, is abstract enough to ensure that the argumentation stays within the bounds of doctrinally correct theological assertions. At the same time, the concept of ‘dignity’ opens a rhetorical bridge to general humanistic discussion, as it is not a term solely used by religious discourse communities. The Lay voices, not restricted by the shackles of theological correctness, have argued the matter of ensoulment with the best possible arsenal they have at their disposal. That arsenal seems to include human universals that are brought about by intuitive cognitive assumptions.

What has become apparent in the course of all the themes analyzed is that the relevant cognitive mechanisms have started to overlap more and more. Although all the themes discussed here have had their special emphasis and the combinations of essentialism, folk-theoretical inference and counter-intuitive thought have been utilized in different ways within different themes, analysing further themes would make the cognitive analysis too repetitive. This is a good indicator that it is time to start summing up the results of this analysis. The next chapter will compare the rhetorical and cognitive elements discovered in the analyzed themes and offer some conclusions for the objectives that were set at the beginning of the study.



Part III:

Conclusions and comparisons

”It is a good morning exercise for a research scientist to discard a pet hypothesis every day before breakfast. It keeps him young.”

- Konrad Zacharias Lorenz

7. Conclusions concerning Catholic argumentative strategies

Here in part 3 the research tasks set at the beginning of the paper will be discussed and reflected upon. The first task set at the beginning of this study was ethnographic: to find out how Catholic argumentation concerning cloning on the Internet appears from the point of view of an average Internet user. This thematic forms the outline for the whole study. The material analyzed in this study is a corpus an average Internet user would find if he/she browsed the Internet at random to some length. The ethnographic questions that are relevant for this study have already been discussed in the sections concerning the contextualization of the material, and there is no further need to return to virtual-ethnographic questions in these concluding sections. This is mainly because the virtual-ethnographic survey is not the main point of interest but rather the starting point in the study. The following sections will focus on the analysis that has been done after the ethnographic gathering of the material. The answer to the ethnographic task will emerge as the analysis of the rhetorical and cognitive elements of the persuasive discourse of Catholic voices draws to a close. In other words, by understanding the persuasive rhetoric and the cognitive mechanisms relevant to the Catholic cloning argumentation, we will come to understand how the argumentative whole appears in the eyes of an average Internet user.

The second task was theoretical: to find out in what way Aristotelian idea of *inventio* can be enriched with the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought. This problematic will be discussed through a theoretical reflection. The main focus of this reflection will be to evaluate the theoretical merit and applicability of the theory.

The third task of this study was to test the theory combining Aristotelian *inventio* and the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought. This was to be tested by trying to analyse the virtual-ethnographic material of the Catholic Internet discussion concerning cloning. The central question that will determine whether or not the suggested theoretical approach is plausible can be stated as follows: did the combination of rhetorical and cognitive theories provide an informative point of view for analysing the Catholic argumentation concerning cloning? The discussion concerning the merits and weaknesses of the analysis made utilizing this theoretical combination will be one of the purposes of these concluding sections.

7.1. The Official voices

The first Catholic Official theme examined in this study was the theme of “Human Dignity”. Of all the Catholic argumentative material analyzed, the essentialistic theme of “Human Dignity” appears to be the most comprehensive in nature. The comprehensiveness of the theme comes about in two different ways. First of all, the idea of ‘dignity’ that encompasses all human existence seems to hover in the background of all the Catholic argumentative structures observed. In the end, no matter the actual point of the argumentation in question, the same basic idea can be found at the background of all of the themes. In a nutshell, the basic idea of “Human Dignity” is that the way God intended things to be, must be preserved, because if it is forsaken, human dignity will be compromised one way or another. The dignified state of human beings is rooted in their essential quality as beings created by God, as individual, unique and ensouled persons. All Catholic argumentation concerning cloning appears to stem from core beliefs of “creatureliness”, from beliefs concerning what makes humans dignified and godly. This idea is tied to all arguments analyzed in this study, one way or another. The second factor that can be seen contributing to the comprehensive nature of the idea of ‘human dignity’ is the abstract ideal-essential nature of the concept of ‘dignity’. The ideal-essential nature of the concept of ‘human dignity’ can be viewed as giving Catholic argumentative discourse persuasive flexibility and folk-theoretical plausibility. In other words, since from a cognitive point of view ‘human dignity’ can be viewed as an inferentially empty concept, many things can be argued based on it, and because of inferential emptiness folk-theoretical inference must be used in order to draw conclusions concerning ‘human dignity’.

On the basis of ‘human dignity’ the Catholic speakers argue that human beings have the right to be born in the conventional manner that follows the rules of procreation God has set. Sexual expression is seen as a fundamental part of God’s plan, and the dignity of persons cannot be properly achieved through the mystery of procreation if the sexual aspect of procreation is substituted by a technological process. The idea of normative family relationships is also connected to the idea of dignity: a properly dignified marriage includes having children and a dignified way to be born is to be born in a family setting that again fulfils the normative ideals of a good family. In the Catholic theological context the process of cloning is seen as violating human dignity in two quite different ways. Firstly, the rebellion against the rules God has set violates the dignity human beings have as creatures who should obey God. This is a violation of dignity that those who would clone bring upon themselves. Secondly, the actual biological and social interventions done in cloning are seen as violating the dignity of the person who is cloned.

Cloning technologies that aim to produce live offspring are seen as degrading to human dignity because they violate the above-mentioned sacred circumstances of procreation. Therapeutic cloning is, on the other hand, seen as degrading to human dignity because, in the opinion of Catholic speakers, it violates the sanctity of human life. The Catholic Church postulates all human beings an equal right to live, and destroying blastocysts in the process of stem cell harvesting is viewed as mass abortion, and consequently as mass murder. The problematic of stem cell

harvesting connects the problematic of “Human Dignity” with the Lay theme of “Ensoulement”. The destruction of blastocysts is seen as mass murder because the Official Catholic voices see it as self-evident that ova fertilized by cloning are as ensouled as ova fertilized through the conventional means (as opposed to many Lay voices). Since the Church teaches that human beings are ensouled by God at the moment of conception, the destruction of blastocysts has to be deemed a murder of thousands of ensouled human individuals. In this sense the argumentative strategies in the theme “Human Dignity” also come very close to the strategies used in “Exploitation / Dehumanization”.

Emotive strategies in the defence of human dignity include arousing feelings of sympathy towards blastocysts in two different ways, depending on what type of cloning is under debate. In the case of life-birth cloning pathos is induced through a mental simulation of the situation a cloned person might face in life. The audience is led to imagine the anxiety a clone might experience by describing the emotionally burdensome social situation he would face. The other emotive strategy used in the case of cloning for medical purposes is simply to emphasize the ideal-essential and causal-essential humanity inherent in blastocysts. In this case the rhetorical means are used, at least partially, as a way of activating folk-psychological value-attributions in a situation where they would not arise spontaneously. The argumentative strategy that ties the different threads together in “Human Dignity” is built on a general assumption of “human rights” that belong to every human being because of the mystery of Creation.

As for the audience of the argumentation on “Human Dignity”, it is noteworthy that the language of the theme is civilized in terms of the general discussion of human social rights, etc. The theological concepts employed in the discussion are divided into two distinct forms of expression, and while the theological grounds are sound, they appear to be concealed behind the language of human rights discussion. The Catholic concept of “Human Dignity” is, however, an essentialistic, mystical term, that can actually be understood as a thing quite similar to the concept of a “ensoulement” in the Lay discussion concerning cloning. The ideal-essential cognitive conceptualization of a human essence can be seen as functioning in a similar manner in both themes. However, the essentialistic conceptualization is expressed in a correct theological and social form under the theme of “Human Dignity”. This socially and theologically correct essentialism is directed as a warning to the scientific community and to those who might support the idea of cloning. It is also directed as an officially formulated strengthening of faith to those who already manifest the Catholic belief system.

On the cognitive side the ideal-essential quality of the most fundamental tenets of Catholic argumentation is of great importance. The considerable prevalence of the structures of folk-theoretical inference in Catholic argumentation stems from the essentialistic marrow of Catholic anthropology and from the inferential gaps it produces. The inferential gaps in the doctrines of Creation and ensoulement can be understood as among the biggest reasons why the general principles of biological reproduction are seen as fundamentally important to human dignity in Catholic thought. As the theological concepts are inferentially empty, intuitive biological causality is a possible cognitive tool for creating inferences. In other words, in Catholic argumentation of “Human Dignity”, circumstances derived by folk-biological reasoning are typically seen as the factors that define ‘dignity’. As no conclusions can easily be drawn from ideal-essential concepts, the bridge

from the concept of dignity to the practice of procreation has to be built by folk-theoretical inference. So, it can be argued that at least a partial explanation for the view that cloning damages human dignity is that cloning violates dignity because it violates folk-biological intuitions. Consequently, in “Human Dignity” the inferential principles of folk-biological reasoning are utilized in a persuasive sense to deepen the gap between the ideas of technological and conventional reproduction.

The same cognitive principles can be seen as working in favour of the voices that speak about the equality of blastocysts and adult human beings. Those voices build on the folk-theoretical conceptualizations that make people intuitively assume that essential cores are present in human beings, no matter how small they are. The argumentative structures that oppose the destruction of blastocysts gain plausibility from essentialistic reasoning, whether or not the audience shares the Catholic understanding of a “soul”. This happens because the Catholic conception of a “soul” can be viewed as one theological definition given to the universal human tendency to postulate species-essential core qualities for living kinds.

In addition to activating folk-biological inferences the Catholic speakers underline the humanity and personal nature of blastocysts. Although a blastocystic embryo does not have a brain or any features resembling an adult human being (i.e. its sortal-essential qualities are completely different), blastocysts are discussed in terms suitable for describing adult humans. This can be understood as important in terms of persuasion, because it probably activates folk-psychological inference for most audiences. By depicting blastocysts as fully human in the argumentation, the Catholic voices may activate the cognitive functions the audience typically uses when reasoning about other adult persons. By creating this cognitive effect, the argument gains persuasive force. It is arguably a very different thing to make ethical evaluations about a person than it is to make them about a cell cluster with a limited number of cells. In other words, the range of potential value-attributions given to a kidney is very different than the range of potential value-attributions given to a person. This is, at least partially, because kidneys belong to a different ontological category of folk inference than persons. However, if the blastocyst is understood as a cell cluster, it may be intuitively more similar to a kidney than to an adult person. To make their argumentation convincing, the Catholic voices must ensure that the blastocyst is categorized in a way that folk-psychological value-attribution can take place. This opens interesting questions of ethical thought in general: how far are systems of ethical thought and everyday ethical evaluation determined by inferential cognitive dynamics? The more general relationship between category membership, folk psychology and systems of ethical value-attribution is an interesting problematic well worthy of further study.

In the rhetorical sense the theme of “Human Dignity” appears to be designed to meet the requirements of modern ethical and social discussion. Considering the thematic it utilizes and the language used to express the assertions, the theme appears to be aimed at an universal audience. As opposed to the universal appeal of “Human Dignity”, the second main official theme, “Sacred Family”, incorporates ideals that have an uneasy relation to the dominant values of the surrounding secular societies, at least more so than the ideas presented in “Human Dignity”. The Catholic Church does not endorse divorce and remarrying and hence the ideals of proper sexual expression are in Catholic teaching normatively tied to marriage. Catholic teaching prohibits sexual expression outside marriage. In a similar vein, Catholic teaching prohibits the sexual expression and marriage of sexual

minorities. These topics are understood in many different ways by the different potential audiences that the Catholic speakers try to reach, and as such they create a somewhat problematic sphere for finding the right persuasive tactics.

The first argumentative strategy used in “Sacred Family” states that everyone should have the right to be born in an ideal family. The argumentative strategy is related to “Human Dignity” as mentioned earlier, as well as to the Catholic understanding of a godly and decent society that treats people in a benevolent manner. Sexual reproduction is God’s plan for man and woman, and marriage is God’s rule for the proper context of the fulfilment of that plan. As sexual reproduction was seen as a fundamental factor where human dignity was concerned, within the current theme it is regarded as an important element of marital dignity. If a couple is unable to reproduce, this is understood as God’s message that His plan for the couple is different, and that they are not meant to reproduce. Reacting to this by cloning a biological offspring is seen as undignified for all concerned, as well as damaging to the institution of marriage itself. According to Catholic teaching, the institution of marriage is a cornerstone of the family, and the family is a cornerstone of a good society. Consequently, the possible negative effects of meddling with the rules of marital institution and procreation are seen as very far-reaching.

What becomes plausible in the cognitive analysis of the Catholic argumentation concerning family is that the concept of ‘family’ is apparently given an ideal-essential status by the Official voices. The Catholic idea of family is more than a social category: it is a central part of the divine plan, a co-operative mystery that God has devised for his creatures. As in “Human Dignity”, this type of ideal-essential concept can be viewed as inferentially empty, and consequently it can be argued that folk-theoretical reasoning is again substituted to enable inference. What is decisively different from the idea of “Human Dignity” is that the context of the concept of sacred family union is much more tied to Catholic theology. What is decisively similar, however, is the persuasive support folk-theoretical inference can offer the argumentative assertions that Catholic voices utilize.

In the first argumentative strategy the concept of ‘family’ is tied to Catholic teaching and a connection to naive social intuitions can also be observed. It is probably safe to say that by their naive sociological reasoning people are aware that the society they function in is kept together by some invisible forces. In other words, people intuitively realize that there are innumerable social and institutional ties that hold together the complex web of society; however, these ties are not completely self-evident from a folk-theoretical sociological perspective. In this type of naive sociological context it is probably an effective argumentative strategy to postulate an ideal-essential core complex that is asserted as being the reason for the intuitively observed orderliness of society. In the argumentative strategy that claims family union (in the ideal-essential sense of divine mystery) and begetting children in the traditional manner are the cornerstones of a functional society, Catholic teaching and folk-theoretical inference can be seen forming a rhetorically powerful combination.

The second argumentative strategy used in “Sacred Family” warns of the confusion that reproducing by cloning would cause in family relationships and through that in the whole of society. This “confusion” is usually described through a demonstration of a break-up in the biological order of procreation, e.g. “a mother is the twin sister of her daughter” and so on. It is conceivable that this type of argumentative strategy activates folk-biological inferences to emphasize the

unnaturalness of cloning. The strategy in the argumentative structure aims to make cloning seem more threatening for the family union by underlining the unnatural biological relations it causes. This is a good argumentative strategy: folk-biological intuitions offer a certain natural backing for the Catholic claims in this sense. The doctrinal context concerning the rules of procreation and folk-biological intuitions concerning descent appear to go hand in hand in this type of argumentation.

Within the family theme the normative Catholic ideal of family life is presented as warm and natural in an emotive strategy to underline the unnatural and cold nature of technological reproduction. Cloning is depicted as a severe threat to the normative structure of the family, and to the ideal of parenthood. The violation of the natural biological procreative chains in cloning is emphasized in order to underline the “unnaturalness” of the process. The emphasizing of the unnaturalness of cloning gives plausibility to the Catholic vision of reproductive cloning as a kind of “reproductive violence”. Cloning is likened to rape and sexual violence in an emotive strategy to differentiate it as far as possible from the ideal concept of normative family life and procreation according to God’s plan.

The speakers of “Sacred Family” present themselves as concerned parents, who rise to oppose a society that has begun to chip away at its own cornerstones and has abandoned normative family values. All people who manifest the ideal of a traditional, heterosexual core family emerge as the primary audience. The second speaker presentation that emerges within the theme is a defender of the mystery of family union and marriage that permeates the Catholic understanding of family life. The audience of the “Marital Mystic” is a Catholic elite audience who manifest the beliefs of Catholic theology concerning family.

In the sense of cognitive systems, the essentialistic ideas of the sacredness of the family union appear slightly more opaque and complex than the essentialistic thought and folk-biological inference characteristic of “Human Dignity”. As was mentioned when discussing natural human groupishness, a biological family tie can be considered something of a natural microsociological unit of life, reproduction and emotional attachments. In this sense a social unit defined by biological descent is the most basic unit of naive sociology and arguably of natural inferential reasoning concerning social units. The Catholic claims concerning “Sacred Family” can be seen as built, at least partially, in line with intuitive understandings of biological family attachments and natural systems of naive sociological cognition. In Catholic argumentative structures a family is regarded as the basic and indispensable unit of biological reproduction. The voices regard the conservation of clear biological descent (“order in family relationships”) as a fundamentally important factor in retaining orderly families and thus an orderly society. The family as a basic, biologically defined unit of emotional attachments creates a good cognitive ground for emotive strategies of persuasion. It seems that this intuitive sociological “ethos” creates a unifying force between Catholic theology and intuitive folk-theoretical inference concerning reproduction and the sociological units related to it.

In this sense it is understandable how disassociating reproduction from the conventional biological context can be seen as confusing family relationships. Naive sociological reasoning gives Catholic argumentation credibility in this sense – the microsociological units of biological reproduction are a natural category for naive social reasoning. Cloning indeed causes confusion from the point of view of folk-theoretical intuitions concerning biological and social causality, and is in this sense a counter-intuitive idea. From this point of view the Catholic ideas pertaining

to biological reproduction and the family union can be viewed as theologically formulated expressions of natural reasoning, and in the issue of cloning these religious stances gain credibility from ontological structures of folk-theoretical thought. The Catholic theme of “Sacred Family” is in a rhetorical sense the most harmonic of all the themes analyzed: it combines the cognitive elements of naive sociology and folk biology to create a unified inventio.

The theme of “Exploitation / Dehumanization” chiefly focuses on issues of cloning for medical purposes. The theme incorporates many of the same ideas as the argumentative structures opposing stem cell research in the theme “Human Dignity”. The centrality of the stem cell question within the theme also gives it some similarity with the emotionally charged Professional voices and with the problematic of ensoulment. However, the theme also has interesting special characteristics imbedded in the argumentative strategies used.

The similarity of the theme to the argumentation concerning “Human Dignity” is at its clearest when the Professional voices argue that stem cell research constitutes a utilitarian view of human life. As human dignity was seen as compromised by the destruction of blastocysts, within this theme therapeutic cloning is seen as the exploitation and instrumentalization of human life, indeed as the mass murder of unborn children. Similarly to the style employed in “Human Dignity”, a discussion that brings to mind issues of human rights is extremely dominant within the theme “Exploitation / Dehumanization”. While the outlook of humanitarian language is quite common for all Catholic official themes, the connection to theological principles is clearer in the theme emphasizing human dignity and especially in the “Sacred Family”. This is most likely due to the extremely extensive audience base that opposes the idea of stem cell research. In arguing against stem cell technologies involving human blastocysts the Catholic speakers are not alone in their quest for the right values, but can join the chorus of many social movements that oppose therapeutic cloning. This is unusual, since normally the stances Catholic speakers adopt in issues concerning procreation are somewhat counter-cultural, e.g. Catholic speakers often have to argue against mainstream trends in secular societies. This untypical position moves the Catholic argumentative style and strategy towards the direction of the discussion that other social instances arguing the same thing utilize.

Due to the argumentative opportunity that the thematic of therapeutic cloning offers, a special characteristic found only within this theme in Catholic discussion is the assertion that cloning exploits women. As discussed, due to the values they uphold, the Catholic voices rarely have the possibility to appear as the benefactors of women’s rights. Usually Catholic speakers are in the position where the values of the surrounding society seemingly pay more regard to the rights of women, for example in matters of reproductive choice and family planning. In “Exploitation / Dehumanization” Catholic speakers capitalize on the position where they can defend the rights of women and protect them from exploitation at the hands of the cloning industry. This defence relates to a larger idea, which is very prominent within the theme: acceptance of cloning is seen as a step towards a twisted and inhumane society. The same dreadful vision of a society declining into a eugenic nightmare acts as a driving force of many of the Professional voices.

The emotive strategies utilized in “Exploitation / Dehumanization” generally focus on the above-mentioned idea of malignant social development. Emotional appeal is created by asserting that if people accept cloning now, they and especially

their descendants will be brutally exploited by a twisted, totalitarian society in the future. The ethos of the speakers sounds atypically humanistic, which is due to the atypical argumentative position within the field of social issues that the problematic of therapeutic cloning bestows on the voices. The audience is assumed to be all members of “free” societies who would hate to see their progeny controlled by the rules of a technological theocracy of sorts. The speaker characteristic of the theme is the defender of the rights of women, and the assumed audience includes, of course, women and also all those interested in the issues of women’s rights. In a way the Catholic rhetoric of women in relation to stem cell technologies establishes an ethos to reach out to a generally problematic audience.

The cognitive mechanisms used in the persuasive strategies of “Exploitation / Dehumanization” appear to be largely the same as in the arguments concerning stem cell harvesting in the theme of “Human Dignity”. Capitalizing on the ideal-essentialistic understanding of the concept of humanity and underlining the folk-biological understanding of the humanity of blastocysts seem to be the most important cognitive strategies used within the theme. The postulation of a human essential core can be and probably usually is associated with the general belief that human individuals have an indisputable right to exist. This leads, as mentioned already, to the interesting question of the general relation between ethical systems of thought and inferential cognitive ontologies. Another interesting assumption can be drawn from the emphasized trend of postulating humanity and a human likeness to blastocysts, which is very prominent within the theme. It may be that postulating a human essence allows for more effective inference than postulating an animal essence. This seems plausible because human beings can be reasoned about as persons, while animals are intuitively categorized as less personal agents. In other words, in the case of personal-agent postulation the inferential structures of folk psychology can be activated to support the folk-biological essentialistic assumptions. This is what seems to happen in the Catholic argumentation. However, this remains only a hypothesis, which should be tested in further study.

The emotive strategies in the theme are comprehensively built around the activation of folk-psychological assumptions in relation to the blastocysts. By postulating personality and mind to blastocysts, the Catholic voices call forth feelings of sympathy towards them. At the same time, depicting blastocysts as humans helps to demonize the cloning industry, which, according to the argumentative structure, engages in mass murder by therapeutic cloning. The strategy to liken blastocysts with adult human beings by using folk-psychological assumptions is stronger in the current theme than it was in “Human Dignity”, which was built mostly on folk-biological inferences.

Folk-psychological assumptions can also be seen working in the creation of the ethos in “Exploitation / Dehumanization”. The most relevant mutually manifest idea the speakers capitalize on is the vision of an oppressive society, which makes victims out of the audience. The speakers describe the social factors of exploitative cloning and ask the audience “Wouldn’t you hate to live in an oppressive, exploitative society? Wouldn’t any?” As folk psychology and naive sociological intuitions go, the question is likely to get an affirmative answer. The argumentative strategy gains persuasive power by this in the sense that it generates universal appeal.

The contextual factors that embody Official Catholic voices in general arise from the official commitments of the speakers. First of all, the requirements of theological correctness make the voices somewhat more careful in their rhetorical expression

than the Professional voices. There are no simple ways to make inferences based on inferentially incomplete religious concepts, and yet religious principles form the normative rules that the Official Catholic voices must be able to connect to the biological and ethical problematic of cloning. The basic mechanism for giving argumentative assertions inferential plausibility appears to be quite similar in all of the themes: the essentialist concepts were given persuasive force by utilizing folk-theoretical inferential structures.

The causal gaps in argumentative structures patched over by the abductive use of intuitive inferential reasoning are not as plainly visible in Official argumentation as they are in Professional and especially Lay argumentation. This is at least partially due to the demand of theological correctness and partially to the Official voices' aim of social credibility. Although the rhetoric of Little Tradition dominates the field of the Internet discussion, the Official voices remain the most theologically correct of the voices analyzed. The requirement of theological correctness masks the processes of intuitive reasoning to some extent by dressing the argumentation in theological language. On the other hand, the search for common ground with other social actors opposing human cloning gives the Catholic official argumentation the look of human rights activism, which further clouds the inferences drawn from religious beliefs through to argumentative conclusions.

However, despite this "dual nebulosity" of the outlook of Official Catholic voices, the cognitive rules of essentialistic categorization and folk-biological reasoning can be seen as comprehensively utilized in inferences of all the argumentative structures analyzed. The contextual factors and matters of orthodoxy affect the argumentation, which is to say that they affect the outlook of ethos and pathos of the rhetoric used. However, the cognitive mechanisms behind the persuasive force of both the factual and emotive claims of the Official voices remain similar to those also used by the other Catholic voices.

7.2. The Professional voices

The argumentative strategies of the Professional voices analyzed in this study have a rhetorical style that is notably different in outlook compared to the Official voices. The style is generally much harsher, with more elements that appeal to emotions, and with different factual points of focus. The differences between the Official and Professional argumentative strategies firstly stem from the differences in the use of theological grounds utilized for establishing the relevance of the arguments. In a nutshell, it might be said that the Professional voices build less on doctrinal correctness and more on prophetic expressiveness. Secondly, there are differences concerning both the self-presentation and authority of the speakers and the general social field of the discussion that the Professional themes pertain to. The Professional voices are partly defined by a social stance that seems to place them in a field of biological and social discussion where Catholic speakers are traditionally counter-cultural. This tradition of oppositional discourse communities has clearly visible effects on the style of the Professional argumentation. Most importantly, there also appear to be differences in the cognitive elements that gain precedence in the formation of the most common argumentative structures of Official and Professional speakers.

In “Playing God”, the Professional voices argue that the issue of human cloning is an instance of human pride that opposes the design of the Creator. Cloning is seen as a modern-day tower of Babel, which will, one way or another, collapse on the heads of those who have been consumed with the negative side of human nature. This is argued through two main strategies. The first argumentative strategy is to emphasize the effects that original sin has on human aspirations, and to view as natural the human tendency to rebel against the design God has created. In this case it is seen as fundamentally important by the Professional voices to awaken audiences to notice that there are people in the world who are trying to take what belongs to God, to usurp God or, in essence, to become gods.

The second strategy is to emphasize the results of the rebellion against God through referring to the biblical stories of human arrogance or to modern fiction where human endeavour ends up badly. In these stories human pride can lead to destruction in two different ways: either the increase in human powers will lead to destruction because the divine power achieved is not accompanied by divine wisdom, or God himself will intervene to the ruin of the rebels who threatened the divine plan. In essence, both argumentative structures say that the power to make decisions that control procreation, or taken one step further, gaining control over some previously random factors of procreation, are powers best left to God. Either way, the wrong aspirations of those wishing to clone will lead to catastrophic consequences, and such persons should be stopped.

The emotive strategies used within the theme are threefold. As the first and most important strategy, a structure similar to the one seen in “Exploitation / Dehumanization” emerges. This first emotive strategy emphasizes the extent of the power cloning would bestow to evil people or organizations. To be able to induce emotionally charged responses to the idea that certain human beings are in the process of obtaining divine power, the speakers must rely on the human tendency to be interested in and suspicious of the power other people have. The case of being

worried that someone gains divine power can basically be viewed as an instance of everyday social reasoning, in which each and every human being can be suspicious of the motivations and intentions of other people. As concluded before, humans have a natural ability to be suspicious of the evaluative competence of other people, and the greater the power the others possess, the greater the reason to be suspicious. It can be argued that this fundamental tenet of the naive sociological theorizing that human beings express everywhere is used in this theme to assert that the power to clone does not belong to the hands of individual human beings or institutions controlled by human beings.

The second emotive strategy in “Playing God” has the distinct flavour of a conspiracy theory, which in other words means that the natural human facility discussed above is mainly applied to the evaluation of institutions. The Professional voices depict the cloning industry as a harbinger of the wrath of God, or as the standard bearer of the human sinful tendency towards prideful rebellion. The natural tendency to make evaluations concerning the abilities of others is utilized in argumentation to give persuasive force and to inspire dread by expressing the idea that the mistakes of a few power-hungry people may prove costly for the whole of humanity.

The third strategy of emotive persuasion within “Playing God” is to demonise the scientific community and to suggest that it wants – either through not understanding the rules set by God or through deliberate malice – to ruin God’s design. The emotive strategies all revolve around the Catholic teaching of human pride and its inevitable consequences: sinful pride is the reason why people act as they do and inevitable destruction is the result unless people wake up and stop playing God. In these argumentative structures the divine power of cloning would fall into the hands of institutions that are malevolent or at least have poor grounds for making value judgements.

The speaker present in the argumentative structures is a prophet with two different faces. The first prophet is a classical awakener who speaks to those audiences who manifest a Catholic “the faithful versus the world” idea. The voice of this classical prophet is directed to an elite audience that must be activated to do God’s work in a world that has rebelled in relation to God’s plan. The elite audience are those who already understand that the things happening in cloning are contrary to God’s plan, and the voices generally aim at strengthening the audience’s resolve to act on the matter. The extreme emotive weight apparent in some arguments is partially explained by the elite audience: since the facts have already been agreed upon on the basis of a mutually manifest system of belief, the argumentative strategies can be focused on encouraging action.

The second prophetic voice, the peer-prophet, addresses the ranks of those who are uncertain as to what to think about cloning. The universal audience peer-prophets reach for consists of those who slumber in the sleep of heedlessness and must be awakened to act before it is too late. The theological emphasis of the argumentation is stronger in the classical prophetic approach, which is perfectly understandable: the elite audience already manifests the relevant beliefs, and all the prophet must do is create a connection between the manifest belief-environment and the topical interpretation of cloning. The peer-prophets, while still expressing their arguments by manifesting many facets of religious belief, are much more diplomatic in the sense that their message appears to be primarily directed to anyone who is concerned about the possible social and ethical implications of

human cloning. And because of the cognitive counter-intuitiveness of the idea of cloning, the audience constructed within the argumentation probably gains a universal character.

As for the cognitive mechanisms relevant to the argumentative structures, a notable difference can be found in relation to the three previous themes discussed. While all the Official voices appeared to have folk-biological intuitions or ideal-essentialistic conceptualizations as the constitutive cognitive factors of their argumentative strategies, "Playing God" can be viewed as gaining persuasive force from folk-psychological assumptions and naive sociological reasoning. Firstly, understanding God as an actor in the field of divine interaction that cloning creates (stealing from God, stepping over the boundaries God has set etc.) demands intuitive accounts of God's mind, of evaluating God and His plan with the same rules the human actors in everyday ethical settings are evaluated with. While theologically incorrect, some arguments indicate a conceptualization that it is possible to do wrong by stealing from God. While not exactly correct in the sense of abstract theology concerning the nature of God, biblical stories show that God can be angered by human rebellion and pride, and He may choose to intervene in a destructive and retributive manner. So, although it may be possible to steal from someone powerful, it is not wise, because at some point the theft can be noticed and that someone may use his powers for revenge.

To be more exact, the essentialist concept of "God" doesn't appear much different from the other ideal-essential concepts used in the argumentative strategies of the Official voices. As previously argued, the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient God is inferentially empty. The inferential emptiness of the concept can be demonstrated by the cloning issue: if an omnipotent being wants to reserve himself the sole right to do something, there is not much to discuss. In a way, the strategy that an anonymous Lay voice suggested sounds reasonable: test cloning, and if it works, it must be God's will. This is a functionalist response to the inferential impasse the idea of stealing from an omnipotent being creates. Another way around the impasse is, of course, in a manner similar to that which seems to be used in Official themes: to fill in the inferential gaps with folk-theoretical thought. This substitution makes it possible to argue that someone can steal from God, God can be angered, etc. What remains different, however, is the style of folk-theoretical substitution utilized in the theme "Playing God". Within the current theme, the substitution is done through folk-psychological and naive sociological inferences.

The second manner in which intuitive reasoning is used within the theme resembles "Exploitation / Dehumanization". Intuitive accounts of human psychology and sociology are necessary in order to create evaluations and assumptions concerning the mandates granted to other human beings. In "Human Dignity" and "Exploitation / Dehumanization" the audience's facilities of folk psychology were mostly activated in the side role of generating feelings of sympathy for the underprivileged clones. In the current theme the same intuitive mechanisms of inferential thought seem to take the chief role and appear to be used to generate suspicion towards those who think differently.

In contrast, the role of folk-biological inference is lessened: the only connection to intuitive biological reasoning is used in the background of the emotive strategies of the current theme. The violations of the intuitive understandings of biological procreation can be seen as the dynamo of emotive power in this theme as in many previous cases. The power and right to decide the moment of conception and the

genetic (essential) nature of humans is attributed to God, or, in other words, to the divine mystery. Obtaining technological control over the mentioned processes violates intuitive assumptions, which in this particular case are in line with religious views of the procreative mystery.

This connection between intuitive assumptions and religious teaching leads to an emotive rhetoric that is deceptive in two slightly different ways. For the sake of recall, “deceptive emotive rhetoric” meant that the speaker attempts to create a substitutive elaboration, which in a cognitive sense resembles deep elaboration but replaces the factual assertions of the argument (logos) with emotively charged material from a given source. The substitutive material in the current theme appears to be a combination of biblical stories and folk-theoretical principles. On the one hand, the emotive strategy suggests that cloning should be stopped in fear of divine retribution. On the other, cloning should be stopped because divine power in human hands is a retribution in itself. Both accounts aim at diverting the attention of the audience from factual assertions to assumptions concerning the consequences of cloning. In this manner the emotive strategies create a substitutive elaboration that strengthens the feelings of suspicion that the counter-intuitive nature of cloning probably produces in the first place. It is most likely that for many audiences the original fear that the idea of cloning produces is not based on facts or expert knowledge but on intuitive folk-biological inferences. It is important for the deceptive emotive strategy to further the disassociation of core data concerning cloning and to capitalize on building bridges between the intuitive fear of cloning and elements of fear appeal from the theological context. The intuitive mental structures used in this way most probably create a powerful and persuasive emotive rhetoric.

The ethos of “Playing God” uses strong elements of intuitive social suspicion. Human individuals who want the power of cloning are not to be trusted, and neither are the political or industrial authorities who possess the power to allow cloning. The aspirations of the would-be cloners are not to be trusted, because if they fail, the consequences will be horrible, and if they succeed, the consequences will probably be even more disastrous. The mutually manifest cognitive environment activated by the theme is a powerful tool of distrust, and since it can be argued that it is in the social nature of human beings to be suspicious, the argumentative structures gain universality and persuasive power. The speakers are those who reveal evil hidden agendas to the audience, prophets who warn the majority of humanity that they may have to suffer because of the folly of a few.

The second professional theme, “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”, is actually for the most part built out of the same components as “Playing God”, only with additional emotive volume. The many different central assertions within the theme revolve around one particular structure, which can be summarized as follows: clones, cloners and those who support the idea of cloning become monsters because they take part in or support a monstrous technological process. If this is allowed to continue, the claim continues, the world as we know it will become a totalitarian hell, where eugenic tyranny will take the place of conventional procreation.

As for the explicit argumentative strategies and content, the analysis of the theme offers little if anything new. The only interesting and novel discovery within the theme that stands out compared to other argumentative structures analyzed in this study is the dual essentialism apparent in Catholic anthropology. The ideas of original sin and human pride and the idea of Natural Moral Law are both used to

justify an argumentative position in a contradictory manner. The idea that cloning is evil is backed with an assertion that because human beings feel a natural unease concerning cloning, it must be wrong. This means that basic human nature is orientated towards good, and works along the lines of Natural Moral Law. On the other hand, the fact that human beings want to have cloning technology is justified through arguing that human beings have a natural tendency to want evil things, because of original sin and pride, much as discussed under “Playing God”. Similarly, it is argued that human beings should not be allowed to have cloning technology because they could not possibly make good decisions and the technology, in human hands, would lead to a disaster. In the cognitive sense this dual structure can be viewed as another instance of ideal-essential conceptual flexibility: many different things can and will be inferred from inferentially empty concepts.

The emotive strategies within the theme are very similar to those in “Playing God”, although the imagery used is much more aggressive. As such, the emotive strategy of “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” makes it an exemplary case of deceptive rhetoric in the sense discussed before. The utterly demonizing and pejorative picture of cloning is served to the audiences in two different frameworks, by two different speaker presentations. The speakers apparent in the theme are hardcore versions of the “Playing God” prophets. The first foreteller of doom utilizes apocalyptic imagery from the Bible and addresses the elite audience that manifests the Catholic vision of the end of the world. The second foreteller of doom, using the imagery of popular fiction, warns those of the more universal audience, consisting of those who have the potential to become worried about cloning and the possible consequences it brings, but manifest the imagery of popular fiction more readily than the Catholic imagery of the Christian apocalypse.

On the cognitive side the emotive elements within the theme offer no big surprises. The main idea of the theme is to induce fear, and the cognitive unnaturalness of cloning as compared to biological and social intuitions is utilized as a means to amplify the emotive force of the claims presented. The psychological and sociological mental reflexes are also activated in the descriptions of the terrifying, oppressive society that is to come.

What the theme yields are some hypotheses that might be useful in future research. It might be interesting to test whether the more religious people are more sensitive with respect to activating their folk-theoretical inferential mechanisms in substitution of inferentially empty conceptual structures. This might be true, since religious reasoning often seems to be abductive in nature. Where the causally empty religious notions give no chance for drawing the commonsensical conclusions people must make in their everyday lives, intuitive inferences might be routinely applied in an abductive manner. This might be tested in cases where religious concepts must be used as a basis for making ethical evaluations that concern biological and sociological situations. If the current hypothesis is right, utilizing the intuitive systems would be quite common in reasoning for both more and less religious people, but more so for the religious. However, at the moment, this is only a hypothesis, which cannot be tested with the material analyzed in this study.

In general the Professional voices have a very different outlook than the Official voices. First of all, the argumentative strategies of the Professional voices are notably less theologically correct than those of the Official speakers. The concepts used in building the arguments are religious in nature, but they are less abstract and more “concrete”. As such, the religious language within the themes is not

that of a theological expert, but of a religious leader, and the level of theological concreteness of the utilized religious concepts makes it possible for the speakers to discuss the themes of cloning in a manner that appears more direct and concrete. The lessened requirement for theological correctness also makes it possible for the speakers to use a much more aggressive and confrontational rhetoric.

Both the internal theological incorrectness and the contextual aggressiveness of the Professional voices make the cognitive mechanisms utilized in the argumentative strategies more readily visible than they were in the Official themes. While the same mechanisms seem to be used by both the Official and Professional speakers, one notable shift in emphasis occurs: while in the Official voices the general species-essentialistic thought and folk-biological reasoning were the main cognitive mechanisms, the Professional voices mainly use structures of folk psychology and naive sociology. One reason for this is the comprehensively deceptive nature of the Professional rhetoric; essentialistic categorization and folk-biological systems of thought can be viewed as being one step closer to the actual facts of the matter of cloning. Averting the attention of the audiences as far as possible from factual content by utilizing psychological and sociological intuitions in a manipulative manner seems to be one of the main functions of this shift in emphasis.

7.3. The Lay voices

The Lay voices arguing over the ensoulment of cloned persons constitute the single largest complex of Catholic cloning argumentation available on the Net. Here are voices both defending and denying the status of clones as human beings that share the ideal-essential human core, a soul. The voices are not evenly matched, as the voices denying the ensoulment of the clones are somewhat more numerous, but still, the defending voices represent a good part of the discussion. This is exceptional, as Official and Professional voices have been all but unanimous in their completely negative stance towards anything that has to do with cloning.

The argumentative strategies defending the ensoulment of clones represent an anomaly in the Catholic cloning-discussion both for their content and agenda. The central difference in the content of Lay argumentative strategies that defend the ensoulment of clones revolves around the balance between logos and pathos used in the argumentative structures. The difference of agenda mainly has to do with the way the idea of a clone is conceptualized; while the voices are not necessarily supportive of cloning in general, they nevertheless are not categorically against it. The main argumentative strategies in the defence of the ensoulment of a would-be clone are twofold. The first strategy associates the presence of a soul with the presence of a life and personality. Therefore, if the would-be clone is alive and has a mind and personality, it means that it is ensouled. The speakers hold that the presence of human life or at least human personality is impossible without the presence of a soul. From a cognitive point of view, the Lay voices hold that if a cloned person expresses the sortal-essential qualities that cause him to be categorized as human, he also possesses an ideal-essential human core.

The second strategy in the defence of a would-be clone's ensoulment is an extension of the first. The Lay voices undermine the significance of the relationship between the method and circumstances of procreation and ensoulment. The speakers present examples where people are conceived in ways apparently outside of the ideal Catholic norm, and proceed to conclude that all people born as the result of, for example, rape or in vitro fertilization, are ensouled. The conclusion stems partially from the fact that these people express the same symptoms of life and the sortal-essential qualities of being a person as do others. The argument where people born as a result of technological intervention have souls is remarkable in the sense that it goes against the grain of folk-biological inferential rules. Some people infer that "being born not made" is not a defining factor in the acquisition of a species-essential core element. On the other hand, the conclusion appears to partially stem from a folk-theoretical interpretation of divine ethics: God would not punish a cloned child by not giving him a soul even if cloning in itself would be against His will – that would be punishing the victim.

In some part the Lay voices that defend the ensoulment of clones sound very similar to the Official voices that defend the 'human dignity' of cloned persons. As in the theme of "Human Dignity", the position where the ensoulment of a would-be clone is taken for granted does not in any way suggest that the speaker endorses cloning, quite the contrary. The Lay voices that see it plausible that a would-be clone is ensouled are often critical of the technology, and hold that humans deserve to be born normally. Similarly, the Official voices claim that human cloning should be

banned because cloned people have ideal-essential human dignity, and they deserve to be born in the conventional manner. The processes of technological procreation are in these examples regarded as something that does not fulfil the requirements of the dignity that human beings are entitled to through their essential quality. The processes, however, are not seen as something that would deprive the people of the essence that makes them dignified beings, or ensouled humans.

The voices that deny the possibility that a clone might have a soul sound more like the Professional voices of horror and apocalypse. They claim that only God can create a human soul, and that the process of ensoulment happens only in procreation that takes place according to the rules God has set. This means biological reproduction through sexual intercourse, preferably within a Christian marriage. The voices that hold it impossible for a clone to have a soul draw a radical line between natural and technological reproduction, claiming that clones are made by man, not created by God. Consequently, they claim that anything man-made cannot have a soul, because only God creates souls. In these argumentative strategies the human ideal-essential core is regarded as conditional to the concrete conventional processes of procreation. In other words, it can be argued that those who claim that a technological process makes it impossible for a clone to acquire a human essential core follow folk-biological inference. According to folk-biological intuitions essential cores are biologically transmitted through the procreative process and consequently a violation of the biological process violates the acquisition of a human essential core.

The emotive strategies used by the opposite sides differ radically. The defenders of ensoulment encourage thinking and reflection through presenting examples and questions. The emotive content of the defence of ensoulment is rather exceptional in the context of the discussion analyzed in this study, as the emotive strategies of the Catholic cloning argumentation in general seem to rely on inducing fear and activating other negative primary emotions. This is probably due to three things. Firstly, an emotive strategy that relies on influencing strong, negative primary emotions is probably more effective as a persuasive strategy built on emotion instead of fact. Negative primary emotions such as fear and disgust are intense and related to survival, so they are extremely important and attention demanding. Most of the theories of emotion previously discussed mentioned more primary emotions that have to do with aggression, disgust and anxiety than emotions that have to do with peaceful or tranquil states of mind. So, as emotional persuasion goes, it is conceivable that whenever there is a chance to manipulate negative primary emotions to the benefit of one's cause, it is worthwhile. In other words, at least in the context of cloning discussion, it seems to be a rhetorically plausible method to create substitutive elaboration by using fear appeal.

The second reason that arguably affects the commonness of the emotive strategies of fear and disgust in the Catholic cloning argumentation is the cognitive snare that can be easily associated with representations of clones. As discussed, because clones and the method of procreation used to conceive them violates natural human intuitions about biology and personal agency, feelings of suspicion may naturally surface for many possible audiences. Where a certain amount of fear comes to people naturally, it is in all likelihood an effective persuasive strategy to capitalize on that fear. It is exactly this natural fear that the speakers of unity must overcome in their defence of the ensoulment of clones. Therefore it is quite comprehensible that they must utilize emotive tactics that oppose the rhetorical

effects utilised for arousal of fear and suspicion. The defenders must undermine the feelings of strangeness and suspicion brought about by the violation of intuitive folk-biological principles, and they also need to soothe the aggressive emotive elements associated with the rhetoric that utilizes the persuasive strength that the folk-theoretical violations in cloning produce.

The third probable reason for the uncommon pathos in the defence of the ensoulment of clones involves the position of the voices in the context of the Catholic cloning argumentation in general. In defending the ensoulment of clones the Lay voices are in a difficult position in the sense that they can easily be interpreted as favourable to cloning. As in any dispute, a position that can easily be exploited by those who oppose it must be defended with care and with as much backing as one is able to muster. Since in general the Catholic cloning argumentation appears as a churning sea of negative emotive manipulation, the speakers of unity attempt to capitalize on facts and on calming down the pejorative rhetoric of their opponents. When countering strong emotive rhetoric from a tricky position, fighting fire with fire is probably never a good rhetorical option.

The defenders of ensoulment find their factual backing in other examples where people are born outside the apparent ideal circumstances planned by God. They claim that if *in vitro* fertilized people or the children of rape victims appear to be ensouled, why would cloned people not have souls. Consequently, if God denied souls to those people, He would be punishing the victims, which is not coherent with His benevolence. These are elements for deep cognitive elaboration that make up the central defence of the ensoulment of clones. As in other cases discussed, within the current theme the essentialistic concept of 'God' seems to be reasoned about through substituting theologically correct conceptualization of God with folk-psychological inference.

While the emotive minority strategy of the speakers of unity is sound, the speakers of division prove no less ingenious in their emotive appeal. In the argumentative strategies of the "divisionists" it is suggested that if clones have souls, which would be apparent if they express symptoms of life and personality, there is still no telling what kind of souls there are. If clones really are alive, they may be either sociopaths or possessed by demons. Interestingly, in some instances the speakers seem to attribute the common adult-competent abilities of folk-psychological and naive sociological reasoning to the presence of a God-created soul. In the view of the voices that oppose the idea that clones could be ensouled, if no God-created soul is present, the clone will lack the typical human social capabilities, and become a sociopath or, in the worst case, a psychopath. This emotive strategy is probably quite effective for many possible audiences, because it makes multiple additional frightening scenarios possible. If the clone who lacks a soul was like a zombie or a brain-dead human, there would not be much to fear from it. But if the cloned person is depicted as a soulless psychopathic time bomb in the midst of normal people, the emotive strategy most likely gains huge persuasive momentum.

The most frightening concept presented by the speakers of division is the idea of the demonic possession of clones. In many variations of the Christian worldview the presence of personal, supernatural evil is a concrete fact, and the idea of possession fits to the context of the discussion easily. Instead of being presented as mentally deprived people and lacking normal social and emotional capabilities, clones are depicted as the vessels of intentional and intelligent evil. This allows for lasting fear and suspicion since even the sociopath and psychopath inevitably

reveal themselves, but an intelligent demonic agent can continue in the midst of people unnoticed, working its evil will. Pathos is a persuasive force to induce action, and this persuasive strategy seems to suggest that it is up to those who know the secret truth about clones to stop them. The idea of demonic possession connected to cloning is an incredibly vivid example of fear appeal utilizing counter-intuitive concepts.

Another interesting feature in the idea that connects cloning and demonic possession is the way it seems to combine several ideas that violate the systems of intuitive thought. As discussed many times before, the idea of a cloned person mixes cognitive categories of thought (artefact, living kind) and folk-biological reasoning: the clone is a person but is constructed by man something like an artefact. The idea of a demon is counter-intuitive in the sense that a demon has features compatible with folk-psychological reasoning (e.g. it is a personal agent) but it has no body. Because of the cognitive optimum (e.g. only one counter-intuitive element per concept), several counter-intuitive ideas are seldom combined, as the following representation becomes too complex: zombies are zombies, living bodies without minds, and spirits are spirits, living minds without bodies, but the two do not mix. Zombies never suffer from demonic possession, normal people do.

The analyzed material suggests that the idea of a clone as a biological organism not born normally, but constructed in the way an artefact might be, can be intuitively combined with the idea of demonic possession much more readily than the idea of a zombie. It may be that counter-intuitive ideas that combine violations from different areas of folk-theoretical reasoning (biological causality and psychological causality in this case) can include more than one violation of intuitive systems. The particular cognitive process responsible for this anomalous “dual counter-intuitiveness” should be tested and analyzed in future study. What remains apparent within the bounds of this study is that ideas of counter-intuitive beings can function as powerful rhetorical tools in argumentation.

In addition to the dual counter-intuitiveness of religious ideas concerning a possessed clone, another interesting case for further study is created by the incomplete ethos of the discussion forums. It is an interesting problematic how the democratic and anonymous forums affect the way speakers express themselves and how audiences are constructed. Within this study it became clear that speakers in the forums can dissolve their self-presentations and audience constructs almost entirely, although it is by no means the norm. In other argumentative situations on the Internet the speakers utilized structures of ethos that correspond very well to the general theory of ethos. The difference is probably at least partially due to the fact that much of the material present on the Internet is a variant of argumentation already presented in conventional forums like newspapers, sermons, public speeches and so on. The materials in the discussion forums are created for and used only within the forums. In conventional persuasive interactions the structures of ethos are used as methods for creating a framework for the interaction. It is clear that in the discussion forums the creating of these frameworks can be omitted because the forums create a supporting framework of their own. However, the precise mechanisms involved in this process are a matter for further study.

The incompleteness of ethos in the discussion forums was apparent in many examples, but not in all of them. Where the ethos of ensoulment takes a more conventional outlook, two speaker presentations can be identified. As mentioned before, the main voices present in the argumentation concerning the ensoulment

of the clones are “the speaker of unity” and “the speaker of division”. While these speaker presentations can be identified, no clear outline whatsoever emerges of the particular audiences the speakers construct. The effect of the discussion forums on ethos is even more distinct when speaking of audience constructs than it is when analysing speaker presentations.

As a whole, on the cognitive side the analysis of the discussion on ensoulment represents the single most informative analysis within this study. While all the cognitive mechanisms utilized within the Lay argumentation have already been discussed under other themes, and as such the analysis of the theme does not reveal anything radically new, the mechanisms gain a greater visibility within the theme of “En soulment”. The essentialistic understandings concerning humanity and the mechanisms of folk-theoretical reasoning on biology, psychology and sociology are at their most visible within this theme. This is due to the fact that the lay speakers are not encumbered by demands of theological or social correctness, but are free, so to speak, to speak their minds. The argumentation by the Official voices is tied by demands of theological correctness and social credibility. This leads to adopting a socially correct form of expression, typically easy to associate with the general language of, for example, the discussion on human rights. The demand of theological correctness tempers the expression of intuitive assumptions by injecting some highly abstract, learned theological principles into the expressions used. While the theological principles function, for the most part, under the same cognitive reflexes as the Lay inference, the specialized language and expression make them more difficult to perceive.

8. Summary and reflections

8.1. Comparisons: strategies and mechanisms

To facilitate a comparison of the different ideas presented in this study, the central ideas of the logos, pathos and ethos of the Catholic cloning argumentation are presented here as a summary. The first table deals with the structures of logos. It contains the two most prominent argumentative strategies of every theme analyzed and the relevant inferential mechanisms utilized within the structures to create persuasive force (see table L1 on the next page).

It turned out in the analysis of logos that all the themes included at least two main argumentative strategies. The rhetorical structures in “Human Dignity”, “Exploitation / Dehumanization” and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” share similarities: they are different sides of an argumentative strategy that can be called a “Human Rights strategy”. “Dignity” represents why humans have rights that are violated by cloning, “Exploitation” addresses the exploitative nature of cloning in a concrete manner and “Monsters” adds an emotive front to the discussion.

“Sacred Family”, “Playing God” and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” are also connected to form a similar “plotline”. The strategies are built on a similar view of society and on the fundamental rules humans must follow in order for their society to maintain itself. The theme of family discusses in a concrete manner the rules concerning procreation that have been set by God. “Playing God” represents ‘why’ humans want to rebel against these rules, and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” describes what happens if this is done.

In the sense of logos and argumentative strategies the theme “Ensoulement” stands alone. This is not because of the uniqueness of the elements used in the argumentation, but because it does not fall in line with any specific “plotline” or agenda apparent in other themes. The question of the ensoulement of would-be clones represents theological incorrectness in the sense that it discusses abstract theological issues in a concrete manner. In other words, the folk-theoretical mechanisms of inference are most visible in the Lay discussion. “Ensoulement” is also different in its relation to social questions, which are not seen as relevant within the theme. In this sense the theme of “Sacred Family” also stands out. It represents a Catholic social position concerning cloning and other procreative issues not entirely shared by secular mainstream society.

On the level of cognitive systems the groupings of major similarities form differently than on the level of rhetorical outlook. The main systems of folk-theoretical inferential thought relevant to each theme are, of course, not the only cognitive ontologies at work within the argumentative structures. However, clear differences in the emphasis of the cognitive systems can be discerned between the themes. It appears that the themes of “Human Dignity”, “Exploitation / Dehumanization” and “Ensoulement” use the idea of ideal-essential core species that members share as the basis of their argumentative structures. Folk-biological inference is used to the greatest extent in establishing the concept of ‘human dignity’ and by the Lay voices that oppose the idea that clones could have souls. Folk-biological inference also

THEME	Argumentative strategy 1	Argumentative strategy 2	Mechanism of causal reasoning
Human Dignity	Every human being has the right to be born in a dignified manner. A dignified manner of birth means sexual reproduction in a normative family setting.	Every human being has equal rights of existence from the moment of conception. The moment of conception includes a mysterious creative act of God.	Species have essential cores that are transmitted through biological reproduction. Essences are not determined by external features but define them instead.
Sacred Family	Dignity of marital life is related to sexual reproduction through God's plan.	Cloning confuses family relationships and consequently damages the order of the society in general.	Folk biology: Family is the natural basic unit for biological reproduction, emotional attachment and "human groupishness".
Exploitation / Dehumanisation	Therapeutic cloning exhibits an utilitarian understanding of human life and constitutes mass murder.	Cloning exploits women, who have to sell their ova to satisfy malignant cloning industry.	Species members sharing an essential core have same rights of existence, because they are alike despite surface differences.
Playing God	Cloning is an instance of the Tower of Babel. Humans try to usurp God, become gods or to rebel against God's rules by cloning.	Acquiring technological control over procreation will lead to catastrophic consequences.	Folk psychology: God's involvement and evaluation of the mental capabilities of other people.
Monsters and Horror Scenarios	Clones, cloners and supporters of human cloning are monsters because of the nature of the cloning technology.	If cloning is allowed, the world will turn into a place of nightmares described in horror fiction.	Folk biology: unnaturalness of cloning. Folk psychology and naïve sociology: facility for suspicion.
Ensoulment	There is no life without a soul. If the clone exhibits symptoms of life, it has a soul. The method of procreation is irrelevant.	Only God creates souls through the rules He has set. Anything man-made can't have a soul.	Species-essentia: a living human has human essentia. Folk psychology: essentia causes mind and personality.

Table L1: Catholic argumentative strategies summarized

seems to be important in the themes of “Sacred Family” and “Monsters and Horror Scenarios”. The use of folk biology is, however, somewhat different in these two themes. In “Sacred Family” the natural biological bonds of procreation are given an ideal-essential character: the Catholic doctrine concerning the family union is given a folk-biological backing. In “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” folk-biological inference appears to be utilized in a manner opposite to that seen in “Human Dignity”: to highlight the unnaturalness and disgusting character of clones. In “Exploitation / Dehumanization” folk-biological inference also appears to be used to underline the humanity of the clones. Folk-psychological inference can also be viewed as playing an important part within this theme.

There are reasonable grounds to suggest that folk-psychological systems of thought are used to some extent to generate persuasive force in “Playing God”, “Exploitation / Dehumanization”, “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” and “Ensoulement”. The theme of “Playing God” seems to utilise folk-psychological inference in two different ways: to make it possible to infer the motivations of God and to remind the audience of the imperfection inherent in human beings. “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” emphasizes the latter. In the theme of “Ensoulement” both folk-biological and folk-psychological inference appear to be used to stress the counter-intuitive nature of would-be clones. In “Ensoulement”, clones are depicted as something not ideal-essentially human. The same combination of folk-biological and psychological inference is used in the exact opposite manner in “Exploitation / Dehumanization”, where the humanity of the clones is emphasized. Table P1 (see the next page) summarizes the emotive strategies, aims and cognitive mechanisms used in the pathos of Catholic argumentation.

Two main styles of emotive appeal can be identified within the material. This is partially due to the theoretical approach: the tools utilized tend to categorize emotional persuasion into two major groups. Emotive elements in persuasion aim either at diverting the attention of the audience away from the actual facts of the matter under discussion, or at establishing an emotionally stable context for reflection. These were named surface elaboration and deep elaboration in the theory, but during the analysis the idea of a ‘surface elaboration’ as the only divertive use of emotional persuasion began to seem inadequate. The term ‘substitutive elaboration’ was coined to describe occasions of argumentation where the attention of the audience is averted from the actual facts of the matter under discussion, and where substitute material that having a deep elaborative nature and strong emotive value is introduced instead. Such occasions include, for example, situations where Catholic voices that oppose cloning utilize biblical stories to establish that the cloning industry is a rebellion against God. In this case the audience deeply elaborates on the religious context of the argumentation and as a side note accepts that cloning is evil, without deeply elaborating on the actual facts concerning the cloning industry.

Major similarities in the emotive strategies first form between the Official voice of “Human Dignity” and the Lay voices that defend the idea that a clone might have a soul. Both emotive structures mainly aim to call forth sympathy and a calm evaluation of what is essential in a human being, what rights these essential qualities entitle, what brings the value attribution about, etc. As such, it appears that they attempt to bring about a deep elaboration of issues relevant to cloning and represent, within the scope of this study, “good” emotive rhetoric. In other words, the emotive strategy in these themes is generally not aimed at diverting attention

THEME	Emotive strategy	Emotive aim	Cognitive effect
Human Dignity	Induce sympathy towards the hardships of cloned persons and towards blastocysts destroyed in therapeutic cloning.	Make people think about the situations cloning gives rise to and to take a compassionate stand against it.	Deep elaboration through evaluating the situation of a cloned person and assessing therapeutic cloning.
Sacred Family	"Family" is a fundamentally warm, natural and good idea. Cloning is unnatural and threatens the ideas of family and parenthood.	Cause fear of cloning by depicting it as "reproductive violence". Cause fear by depicting cloning as a threat to family institution.	Surface elaboration of the threat cloning poses for the idea of family. Quick adaptation of folk biology to the cloning issue.
Exploitation / Dehumanisation	If you tolerate cloning, you tolerate rape, exploitation and your children will suffer in the society to come.	Induce fear and disgust towards cloning by depicting bleak consequences and identifying it with disgusting things.	An increase in fear and prejudice towards cloning. A quick surface elaboration of the suggested consequences of cloning.
Playing God	People are not benevolent controllers of power. Ungodly institutions and people want to take God's power and use it malevolently.	Induce fear of those who support cloning on individual and institutional level. Whether they succeed or not, you will come to grief.	An increase in fear and prejudice towards those who support cloning. A surface elaboration that they are misled or evil.
Monsters and Horror Scenarios	Clones belong to horror movies. A society that allows cloning is twisted. Once cloning begins, the end is inevitable.	Cause fear and anxiety towards all aspects of the idea of cloning.	A surface elaboration of the catastrophic nature of cloning.
Ensoulment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reconciliation: clones are fully human and deserve sympathy. 2. Prosecution: clones are not human and deserve hate. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Include clones into the fold of ensouled humanity. 2. Exclude clones from the fold of ensouled humanity. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deep elaboration through examples of diverse instances of being conceived. 2. Surface elaboration through intuitive mechanisms of causal reasoning.

Table P1: a summary of emotive strategies

or substituting the actual facts under discussion with material from a different context.

All the other themes seem to represent deceptive rhetoric in the sense that they aim at affecting primary emotions in such a manner as to either induce a quick surface elaboration of the suggested things or to substitute different contextual materials for facts. Two groups can be further discerned from this side of deceptive rhetoric. In “Sacred Family”, “Exploitation / Dehumanization” and “Playing God” feelings of dread are mainly induced through depicting the effects that human imperfection may have. In these cases emotive effects are arguably largely tied to folk-psychological and naive sociological intuitions. In “Monsters and Horror Scenarios” and the side of “Ensoulement” denying the possibility of ensoulement for a clone, dread is inspired by creating scenarios akin to modern horror fiction. In these cases the unnaturalness of the biological, social and psychological elements of cloning is emphasized. Counter-intuitiveness postulated with respect to the would-be clone and the cloning process can be viewed as playing a great part in the generation of fear appeal in these themes. Table E1 summarizes the speaker presentations and supposed audience constructs apparent within the themes (see the next page).

As for the similarities and differences in the structures of ethos, the table looks somewhat self-evident. Ethos as an element of a given argumentative strategy is used for creating the framework of persuasive interactions, and therefore it is primarily tied to social contexts. The categories of argumentation (Official, Professional and Lay voices) were from the beginning formed on the basis of the social frameworks (that were apparent in the virtual-ethnographic reading of the materials) within which the speakers chose to present themselves, and it is hardly surprising that the same grouping outlines the similarities and differences in ethos.

The Official voices share a similar speaker presentation, which is expressed as theologically learned and being diplomatic towards the rest of the society. Authoritarian style is very common for both the Official and the Professional voices.¹⁶⁶ The Professional voices are prophetic and controversial with respect to the society they perceive as secular and somewhat hard-of-hearing. The Lay voices can go either way depending on the agenda they forward. A similarity in Official and Professional assumptions concerning audiences is that the two include structures aimed at both elite and universal audiences. The Lay voices differ in this sense, partly because of their place on the ladder of Catholic hierarchy, partly because of the incompleteness of the structures of ethos in the discussion forums.

¹⁶⁶As was discussed, authoritarian style can be considered a typical feature of all religious rhetoric. See, for example O'Rourke Boyle 2001, 662-672.

THEME	Elite Speaker manifestation	Elite audience manifestation	Universal speaker manifestation	Universal audience manifestation
Human Dignity	Moral Shepherd standing on apostolic succession.	Catholics who manifest belief in apostolic succession.	A general humanist.	All interested in human rights.
Sacred Family	Defender of Creator's design.	Catholics who manifest belief in normative Catholic family values.	A concerned parent.	All who associate "good of a child" to a form of family union.
Exploitation / Dehumanisation	Defender of the rights of women.	Women and those specially interested in the rights of women.	A benevolent humanitarian who defends the defenseless.	All who manifest abilities of typical human social thinking.
Playing God	A classical prophet warning the chosen of dangers.	Catholics who manifest a Christian "us versus the world" - dichotomy.	A peer-prophet aiming to awaken people to see a looming danger.	All people whose lives might potentially be damaged by cloning culture.
Monsters and horror scenarios	Foreteller of biblical, apocalyptic doom.	Catholics who manifest a belief in biblical stories of the end of the world.	Foreteller of doom utilizing imagery from popular fiction.	People who manifest visions of doom exhibited in popular fiction.
Ensoulement	1. Speaker of unity. 2. Speaker of division.	Incomplete ethos; all who ponder the issue of a clone's ensoulement.	A questioner, either positively or negatively positioned.	All who ponder the issue of a clone's ensoulement.

Table E1: a summary of ethos

8.2. General reflections on the theory

The theoretical setting in this work incorporated challenging elements: first, a new way to connect Aristotelian *inventio* with cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought. This can also be viewed as an attempt to supply cognitive content to rhetorical methodology, and building connections between different scientific approaches is by definition challenging. Further challenge was brought about by the selection of the Internet as the source of the subject matter, and by adopting a huge field of topical discussion as the subject matter of the study. Innovation is the bread and butter of scientific work, but it also contains risks; in a new theoretical setting one can never be sure beforehand just how well the theory performs. And the greater the attempt to do something innovative is, the greater the risk of creating a dysfunctional tool. This section offers some reflection and theoretical critique on what was done in this study.

The first question to reflect on is how successful the general interplay between the virtual-ethnographic material under study and the theoretical approach was. Despite the special ethnographic problems that Internet materials have in relation to some research settings, in purely content-based argumentation analysis it is difficult to imagine better material. The virtual-ethnographic question this study discusses is significant in itself: too few studies map out what kind of information normal Internet users get from the information superhighway. However, although significant, the ethnographic question is not, as already mentioned, the main issue in the study. The main issue was to test whether it is possible to build a theoretical combination of Aristotelian *inventio* and the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought and use this combination as an informative tool for argumentation analysis. In answering this question, the Internet materials provided a perfect corpus of material. First of all, the material was unedited in the sense that it did not represent the editorial lines of any given newspaper, for instance. The argumentative structures in the material were original in the sense that they were not answers given to questions asked by a researcher, but the actual arguments the speakers chose as freely presenting their point of view. In addition, the argumentation originated from many different levels of official control; it is extremely unlikely this kind of extensiveness in the scope of the speakers could have been found anywhere else than on the Internet. These factors made the Internet materials ideal for the testing of the theory.

Considering the risks involved, the analysis combining the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought and Aristotelian *inventio* worked quite well. Considering the whole of the analysis, it seems very plausible that the mechanisms of folk-theoretical inferential reasoning are in some part responsible not only for the form of the Catholic rhetoric, but for the actual opinions that Catholic speakers have adopted concerning cloning. The hypothesis presented at the beginning of this study was that the intuitive folk-theoretical mechanisms of representing the states-of-things in the world effect how people think about cloning and how they form argumentative structures concerning it. As it turns out, the effects of the folk-theoretical inferential machinery were quite easily discernable in all argumentative strategies used by the Catholic voices. In most cases the argumentative structures

could be viewed from the point of view of folk-theoretical thought without huge problems and arguably in an informative manner.

In a sense, this remarkable “fit” that the theoretical approach had with the analyzed materials is also a function of the subject matter under analysis. It is not necessarily clear that the theoretical approach suggested here would function as well in all possible instances of argumentation analysis. The material under study is quite ideal for this type of approach in the sense that, first of all, the matter being debated unites biological, social, psychological and, ultimately, essential questions concerning humanity. Secondly, the scrutinized voices come from a religious context, which means that their conceptualization of humanity is most probably based on essentialistic thought. This type of setting is certain to contain rhetorical and cognitive elements that will stick to the type of theoretical web woven here.

The most informative combination between the rhetorical and cognitive approaches was achieved in the analysis of *logos*. It was suggested in the theoretical part of the study that the analysis of *logos* is not, as has been frequently understood in rhetorical approaches, the study of the factual content of an argument. To say that a method of analysis is interested in the factual content of an argument is actually saying nothing at all. It was suggested, along the lines theorized by Stephen Toulmin, that the study of *logos* is the study of the inferential structures established within a given argumentative structure. Thus, the plausibility of an argumentative structure can be viewed as a function of the inferential credibility between the different elements that an argument is made of. Understood like this, the study of *logos* proved to be quite well suited to incorporating a cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thinking. It can be quite reasonably argued that Catholic argumentative structures and assertions concerning cloning are to a significant extent built on ideal-essential conceptualizations and folk-theoretical inference. In fact, it can be suggested that the persuasive force of most of the argumentative structures that Catholic voices utilize depends on folk-theoretical inference to a great extent.

Compared to the analysis of *logos*, the analysis of *pathos* proved to be much more problematic. In part this is due to the extreme one-sidedness of the emotive strategies employed by the Catholic voices. Although Kenneth Burke’s idea of ‘demonization’ which was briefly mentioned at the beginning of this study, was not incorporated into the theoretical approach taken here, it seems that almost the whole emotive persuasion in the Catholic cloning argumentation is demonizing in the Burkean sense. If the chief emotive strategy is to make a thing seem alien and “something to be avoided”, it is rather self-evident that both negative emotive persuasion and fear appeal gain emphasis. Although the one-sidedness of the emotive elements within the material made the analysis more difficult, the theoretical approach also seems to leave something to hope for. The conclusions that the included theoretical ideas of emotion and persuasion allow might have been better if the social side of emotional expression and group dynamics could have been better represented. The apparatus used makes it possible to theorize whether the emotive strategy in a given argumentative structure creates “good” or “deceptive” rhetoric, and it is interesting in the context of a rhetorical study that a given emotive strategy can cause cognitive changes in the brain to occur in different ways. In other words, it can be quite safely assumed that different types of emotive persuasion can bring about different types of cognitive elaboration. Deeper understanding of the emotive elaboration as a brain process can help to understand the persuasive force of the emotional content in argumentation. However, including a social-psychological

analysis of emotional expression might have deepened the cognitive analysis of emotional appeal even further.

So, there remains a feeling that emotive rhetoric could be analyzed in more depth. This feeling of a certain lack of explanatory depth may partly be due to the large gap between the heuristic layers of emotional persuasion and cognitive functions. To be more interesting as a rhetorical theory of emotional persuasion, a cognitive-rhetorical approach should be able to establish richer theoretical connections between emotional, motivational, memory and attention systems at the level of the brain as well as at the level of social interactions. This can, of course, be done by combining brain research, social psychology and rhetoric, but the relative complexity of the required theories makes it a challenge to incorporate the whole apparatus that would be required in an analysis that connects these levels of explanation. And even in this particular study, regrettably, the cost of the heuristic scope is a certain lack of explanatory depth in the case of emotional persuasion.

In the end, the analysis of pathos as done in this study allows one to reflect on what types of emotive elements are used in a given argumentative strategy. This in turn allows one to theorize what kinds of emotional responses the speakers are aiming to arouse in their audiences. And as the third step, one is able to suggest whether the emotive strategy aims at inducing deep elaboration, which in the light of the theorists of rhetoric can be seen as “good” rhetoric, or at inducing surface elaboration, which can be seen as “deceptive” rhetoric based on the same accounts of the theory of rhetoric. These are interesting points of analysis and certainly help to shed some light on the process of persuasion, but ultimately the division of emotive strategies to two broad categories of “good” and “deceptive” rhetoric is not as informative as might be hoped for. This lack of explanatory depth is exemplified by the limited informative value that incorporating the elaboration likelihood model and heuristic-systematic model had in the context of this analysis. Some important questions concerning motivation, group and peer pressure and religious affiliation, for example, that certainly affect emotive interactions, seem to receive too little attention in the analysis. Incorporating these elements into a cognitive-rhetorical analysis of emotional persuasion might be an interesting challenge for further study.

The rhetorical concept of ethos proved to be rather difficult to combine with the cognitive approach productively and in a sense the incorporation of the cognitive approach with the idea of ethos remains the most unfruitful of the three categories of *inventio*. This is mostly due to the nature of the concept of ‘ethos’. In and by itself, ethos means virtually all that has to do with persuasion. When speaking about the self-presentation of a speaker and the audience constructs present in argumentative interactions, one is actually speaking of quite many things. Consequently, the cognitive side of ethos is very complicated. In the issue of the self-presentation of the speaker some relevance can be attributed to the mechanisms of folk psychology and naive sociology that the speaker utilises to “know” his audience without necessarily personally knowing any of them. The audience can be viewed as using the same cognitive mechanisms to analyse both itself and the positioning of the speaker within the mutually manifest understandings. At the same time, ethos includes the spheres of social roles and social schemas, both at an individual as well as wider sociological level.

Ethos is difficult to incorporate as an element of complex analysis, because by definition it already incorporates many levels and positions a theory of

argumentation and persuasion must take into account. Logos compared to ethos can be seen as the microscopic examination of inferential relations perceived as plausible, and pathos can be viewed as just one function of the same cognitive systems that are in large-scale use in ethos. The concept of ethos might be utilized as a meta-setting for a study incorporating cognitive theory in argumentative analysis, but for that it would be necessary to understand ethos as a complex social-psychological framework for the actual analysis of the argumentative structures and persuasion in a given issue.

In addition to the bewildering complexity of the concept of 'ethos' itself, the feeling of a certain arbitrariness and the lack of explanatory depth in the analysis of ethos within this study boils down to the exclusion of social psychology. Social psychology as a discipline interconnects many of the levels of analysis aimed at in the study. In this sense it might have enriched the analysis presented here if a social-psychological layer of analysis had been incorporated into the theoretical apparatus. This would probably have made the presentation of the actual analysis slightly different. The analysis of logos and the analysis of folk-theoretical reasoning would have remained the same, but the analysis of pathos and ethos would have merged into one social-psychological and cognitive evaluation of the given persuasive strategies. This is an interesting possibility for a theoretical avenue of further study.

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