

Marko Juntunen

Institute for Asian and African Studies
University of Helsinki

BETWEEN MOROCCO AND SPAIN

Men, migrant smuggling and a dispersed Moroccan community

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

*To be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Arts
at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XIII,
Unioninkatu 33, on the 12th of October, 2002 at 10 o' clock*

Helsinki University Printing House,
Helsinki 2002

ISBN 952-91-5052-0 (printed)
ISBN 952-10-0666-8 (PDF)

CONTENTS

Note on transcription

Foreword

INTRODUCTION 9

Men on the move: presences and absences

The political space of migration

The setting: the leaking community of L'araish

Why study men as gendered subjects?

Gender in an unbounded setting

Gender through practical discourses

Is *rudzūla* masculinity?

Harrāga as persuasion

On the structure of the work

CHAPTER I 22

Cafés and quarters, telephone booths and satellite antennas

Reflections from the cafés

The quarter through facts and figures

Articulating connections

CHAPTER II 32

The "hidden migration"

The new migration

Harrāga: migrant smuggling

Gibraltar: from channel of connections to separating boundary

CHAPTER III 44

Street wise

Negotiating social relations

The politics of confronting class boundaries

CHAPTER IV 62

Between past and present, between Morocco and Spain

L'araishi – members of the idealised community

The true originals: place and belonging in L'araish

The moral community

Narratives of "betweenness"

Wrestling with bureaucracies

Muslims in between

The ambiguity of us: "betweenness" and joking

Conclusion: the multiple originals

CHAPTER V 86

The shifting conditions of manhood: work, person and prestige

Interpreting social order

Durūf: Enveloping the realities of life

Establishing connections

"*Durūf* teaches the jobs": social relations of work

Images of the "bosses"

Dabbar: social arrangements

Conflict and reciprocation

CHAPTER VI 111**Building futures with women****Tayyib and Malika****Images of women****Ambiguous providers: male self-images****Pre-marital relations****Capitalization of the marriage market****Mustafa****CHAPTER VII 128****Sociability and sentiment*****Dawra* – evening tour****Friendship and *ḍurūf*****Domestic provider, freewheeling bachelor****Repressed frustrations****CONCLUSIONS 141****Moral bodies****Acknowledgements****Bibliography**

Note on transcription

Northern Morocco is a multilingual cultural environment. Besides Moroccan colloquial Arabic, (which is spoken in a variety of versions) and literary Arabic, the official language of Morocco, many people are also familiar with Spanish and French. Among the subjects of this study it is not at all uncommon to mix all these four languages and dialects in everyday speech.

In the transcriptions I have tried to follow as closely as possible the actual pronunciation of the words. However, for the sake of readability I have chosen to write the names of places and persons in the standard English alphabet.

To indicate the pronunciation I have used the vowels e and o, [ē and ō for long vowels] in addition to a, i, and u [ā, ī, ū for long vowels] familiar from transcriptions of literary Arabic. For readers competent in literary Arabic I must note that the Moroccan vernacular pronunciation often differs from literary Arabic, and a considerable number of everyday words are borrowed from sources other than Arabic. For these reasons I needed to introduce consonants such as c, ch, g and p.

Standard Arabic transliteration


أ	a	ط	ṭ
ب	b	ظ	Z pronounced as ɟ in the vernacular, transcribed as ɟ when spoken
ت	t	ع	ʿ
ث	th pronounced as t in the vernacular, transcribed as t when spoken	غ	gh
ج	dz	ف	f
ح	ħ	ق	q
خ	kh	ك	k
د	d	ل	l
ذ	dh pronounced as ɟ in the vernacular, transcribed as ɟ when spoken	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	هـ	h
س	s	و	w
ش	sh	ي	y
ص	ṣ	ء	ʾ
ض	ḍ		

Foreword

Today in every part of the globe people are more mobile than ever, but also more than ever denied the right to cross national borders freely. Both global mobility and imposed restrictions on crossing national boundaries give structure to individual lives, offering considerable material and socio-symbolic gains for some and major tragedies for others. One of the busiest informal routes for entering Europe from Africa is paved in the rough waters of the Strait of Gibraltar. Every year several thousand Moroccan and other African youngsters cross the Strait of Gibraltar on small open boats and join the ranks of migrants without documents in Spain, Italy, France and elsewhere in Western Europe. A mere fraction of the actual attempts are successful – every year for several dozen Africans the journey over the Strait of Gibraltar becomes their last trip. For others arrest and quick deportation from Europe put a harsh end to their dreams for the future. A very significant number of Moroccan adolescents and young adults are linked to black market migration even if they never leave their home communities: they may offer different services to prospective migrants by arranging for documents, visas, work contracts, translation services or they may actually serve as middlemen for migrant smugglers.

My trip to the Northern Moroccan town of L'araish [Al 'Arā'ish in literary Arabic], which was to be the main "field" of this study in fact started almost seven years before I actually embarked on a fieldwork journey for Morocco in January 1998. Since the beginning of the decade I had been interested in how international leisure tourism launches forms of mobility from Africa to Europe. I gained my first impressions of Northern Morocco in 1991 while undertaking studies in Modern Standard Arabic at Muhammed V University in Rabat. In August 1991 I visited L'araish for the first time with some of my Moroccan friends from the neighbouring town of Ksar el Kebir. In the summer months of 1992 I again spent nearly two months in Ksar el Kebir and the coastal village of Moulay Bouselham engaged in fieldwork, which was to materialize in my master's thesis in 1994.

In 1997 I finally applied for a research permit to carry out more thorough fieldwork in Morocco. My initial purpose was to observe male sociability and performances of masculinity in a Moroccan location with marked migrant flows to Western Europe. After almost nine months, I was suddenly welcomed by the Moroccan authorities to carry out my project in the province of L'araish on the Northern Atlantic coast of Morocco. The answer to the question why I was directed to this particular place remains obscure, but it is likely that the official atmosphere in Morocco, given the growing attention paid by the media to questions of unrecorded migration and the human rights aspects of international mobility, contributed to the question. I was soon to understand that my field was situated in an area which had only experienced a rapid increase in cases of migrant smuggling into Spain since the mid-1990s. In fact the whole province was known according to popular Moroccan stereotypes as part of the *bilād ḥarrāga* [the land of migrant smuggling] – the coastal area stretching from the Northern Atlantic shores of Kenitra to the easternmost points on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco.



Northern Morocco.



From L'araish to Terrassa: the route of the ḥarrāga.

INTRODUCTION

Men on the move: presences and absences

Belpuig, Catalonia 13.5. 1990

I guess every migrant makes his attempt to reach his goal. When I was in my home country I heard rumours about immigration and its results. People leave their country to live abroad. One year they come with a new car and a lot of money. This is the case that pushed me to be myself an immigrant. So since I am one of them, I have to resist and be as solid as I can to reach my goal.

(Personal diary [original English] of Anwar,¹ undocumented migrant in Catalonia from 1990 to 1994.)

This study concerns the social construction of gender in a context characterised by movement across international borders. What follows can be classified as the ethnography of Moroccan *sha'bi*² young men whose lives are deeply touched by "*ḥarrāga*" migrant smuggling from Morocco to Spain.

Ethnography based on participant observation naturally has to take *place* within certain geographical co-ordinates. The place where I shared moments with these men, some of whom were constantly on the move, was L'araish, an urban locality of some 100,000 inhabitants on the Northern Atlantic coast of Morocco. However, something essential about this place would not have been grasped without extending one's gaze over the northern side of the Strait of Gibraltar, a natural boundary separating Morocco from Spain. Fieldwork in this setting meant not only focusing on people who were present "in the flesh" but also on those absent from L'araish. The town taught an important lesson for a novice ethnographer: without learning to listen to the stories, comments and gossip concerning absent people I would have grasped very little of what was going on in L'araish.

The main stage of this study is in Morocco but constant side-tracks opened by the subjects' social connections lead us to Spain, especially to industrial regions around Barcelona.³ The cultural

¹ The names of the subjects of this study are all pseudonyms. In order to protect their anonymity I have changed minor details of their lives (occupations, constitution of the family, etc.) and placed their homes in L'araish in other locations than the actual ones.

² The Arabic term *sha'b* is in Northern African contexts often attached to urban, in economic terms lower middle class strata of population (see e.g. Singerman 1995, 11). The practical usage of the category in Northern Moroccan settings indicates that its translation in terms of class or income group is not justified. In its adjectival form *sha'bi*, the term refers to a whole variety of cultural practices, notions of socio-economic conditions, including work, social relations, the quality of social networks and forms of behaviour. *Sha'bi* also refers to easy-going sociability and the genuine "down to earth", stereotypical Moroccan character. Furthermore, public figures such as singers or actors with a large popular following are said to have plenty of *sha'biya* – popularity.

The term *sha'bi* in Northern Moroccan colloquial Arabic is in its most general usage attached to people without official income [*dakhl rasmi*] or steady wage labour [*'amal rasmi*]. *Sha'bi* also refers to spatial divisions. The "popular quarter" [*ḥayy sha'bi*] is in Northern Morocco typically composed of unofficially constructed housing, unpaved roads, and lack of infrastructure, and it has a high prevalence of sheet-metal huts. However, in reality the *sha'bi* quarter is much more heterogeneous in its social composition than the cultural stereotype leads us to understand. Due to land and property speculation and the rising cost of living, the popular quarter also hosts skilled workers, artisans, lower-level professionals and civil servants.

context within which these men operate refuses to be bounded by geographical borders. In short: we are dealing with processes of constructing male gender in a cultural setting which resists labelling in geographical terms. These men, if not actually crossing borders themselves, would very much like to see themselves do so. They identify themselves in complex ways so that notions of 'belonging', 'loyalty' and 'home' are ambiguous and often contradictory. In many ways these men are between Morocco and Spain.

In respect to the men⁴ that form the subject of this study, the nature of their social connections and the centrality of migration in their lives as an actual practice or aspiration make it essential to think of Morocco and migrant concentrations in Spain as a single cultural space with its flows of influences which bear upon male identities.

My main interest lies in the following questions: how do these men orient in a social reality characterised by tensions between international mobility made possible by *harrāga* and the restrictions of mobility imposed by the European Union's (EU) migration policy? What does this, in many respects new political, economic and social space mean to these men and how do they conceptualise their place in it?⁵ What do their migration practices and discourses concerning migration tell about notions of male identity and masculinity? How should we understand the choices of thousands of Moroccans who pay fortunes to migrant smugglers, embark on small open boats [*pateras*] and risk their lives hoping to reach the northern shore of the Mediterranean?

The political space of migration

Migration policy in the EU countries constructs Northern Morocco as one of the core areas of concern: rapid population growth, a serious youth unemployment problem and stagnant national economy are seen to create tremendous pressures to migrate, especially for the young people. The gradually implemented "closing of the doors" policy in Western Europe (from the mid-1980s onwards) has naturally left an imprint on the Northern Moroccan communities, where for decades men have been on the move.⁶

As a result of attempts to freeze people's mobility towards Western Europe discourses concerning migration have begun to play a prominent role in the social interaction among the Moroccans on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar. Ways to acquire visas, information concerning job opportunities abroad, contacts with possible marriage partners who reside in the target countries, stories concerning personal experiences or those of friends as migrants form a great part of the social encounters among various categories of people in and outside Morocco.

³ International migration from this area has rapidly intensified only since the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s (Lopez García 1996b, 73). The majority of migrants today head towards Barcelona, Madrid, industrial areas in Catalonia and agricultural areas around Almería.

⁴ Primary focus on male gender does not mean that women are excluded from this study. Gender constructions are products of both women's and men's practical activities and discourses. The practical problems concerning a male researcher's access to the domain of women are well documented in the ethnography of the Middle East. The women in this work are to a great extent present through the discourses of *sha'bi* men. In view of this study the women are in many ways absent, as are some of the members of the community. Both absences are, however, critically important to the understanding of the lives of the men in this study.

⁵ I do not mean that social dispersion, migration, and frequent social connections across the Spanish-Moroccan border are entirely new phenomena. However, the present-day social, political and economic space where *harrāga* operates is qualitatively different from previous historical phases. *Harrāga* emerged in the region more or less simultaneously with Spain's entry to the EU in 1986 and it intensified after Spain introduced entrance visas for Moroccans in May 1991 (Al Qabab 1998).

⁶ The history of modern labour migration in Northern Morocco reaches far beyond the establishment of Spanish colonial administration in the area in 1912 (Seddon 1981, 176).

It would be a serious methodological shortcoming to observe the construction of gender in this kind of context solely within a single bounded community. Any claim that there exists a bounded "culture" which is distinctively local is, I believe, unfounded. In the case of these men, whether border crossers or not, it is clear that the nation-states are not bounded units for them. Seen from the *sha'bi* men's perspective, crossing borders is a strategy of survival. A great number of these men operate in a setting which involves several locations in Morocco, Spain and the rest of Western Europe while they mould their social networks to seek their futures. They interpret the situations in which they find themselves and the nature of the surrounding social, political and economic structures through contact with multiple social fields. The dynamics of a particular attempt to cross the border may involve complex social contracts within a network of family, friends or neighbours, which may sometimes extend over several different nation-states. In short, the subjects of this study create a space, which challenges the conception of a localised social world when they seek means for survival. The Moroccans living in Spain maintain contacts with L'araish through international telephone calls and frequent visits, they stay tuned to events in different areas through satellite TV, they balance their budgets by transporting consumer goods over international borders and they create various informal services that link households on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar.

Despite the frequency of international border crossing and the dispersed nature of personal networks L'araish as a point of identification and direction of loyalty is far from unimportant to the subjects of this study. The readiness to cross borders is in fact counterbalanced by discourses that constantly create attachments to home, which is seen as a culturally and ethnically distinct unity. While the men devise strategies to travel between Morocco and Spain they still seem to have the tendency to cluster around "remembered or imagined homelands".⁷

Nor have the nation-states guarding their international boundaries become unimportant to these men. In fact there are two sides to the coin. The households in L'araish are attached in complex ways to people sometimes dispersed over multiple nation-states but at the same time the "logic" of the movement, and the situations in which the novice migrant finds himself when crossing the border is centrally structured by the immigration policies of nation-states such as Spain. It is a well-documented issue that Moroccan migrants in Spain are in many ways segregated from the wider society – a fact which results in maintenance of various different attachments with the places of origin in Morocco. Nor do I wish to claim that the border, which separates Morocco from Spain is conceptualized in a similar manner by all Moroccans. The experiences of the subjects of this work indicate that the relation to *harrāga* varies from person to person. Not all individuals attached in one way or another to L'araish wish to migrate to Europe, however, it is important to note that they are all linked in different ways to the social reality characterized by international mobility. To cross the border in open boats is without a doubt the most frequent form of migration in L'araish among the *sha'bi* men. Yet it must be noted that there are in fact multiple simultaneous migrations the methods of which parallel the various social, economic and educational backgrounds of the individuals. For the wealthier and qualified professionals the options are naturally wider; studies, business and work relations, and tourist trips also make it possible for some to move.

The setting: the leaking community of L'araish

"There is not a single house in this street that doesn't have a migrant in Europe," said one of my first contacts in L'araish, describing the nature of family networks in the town. The fact that my "field" was here but seemed to leak in every direction, giving rise to many "over theres" beyond my reach, created numerous methodological problems as I made my first vacillating attempts to

⁷ See Gupta and Ferguson (1992).

engage in participant observation.⁸ Since observation of people in a single social setting did not seem to offer a key to understanding the nature of the social world of various categories of people (visiting migrants, returning migrants, potential migrants, long-term residents, rural-urban migrants) who called themselves *L'araishi* (natives of *L'araish*) then I would naturally have had to follow the routes and chains that link different locations. This means that the field, rather than being a geographical location, should be understood as consisting of social conjunctions and linkages (Marcus 1995). Dispersion was if anything a practical challenge: in order to understand the domestic economy of just one particular family that I was acquainted with, I would have had to follow the chains from Morocco to the Portobello Road in London, then make another trip to Rotterdam in Holland, then another detour to the United States and New Zealand and a further visit to the family member who settled in Japan after marrying a Japanese woman in London!⁹

As much as *L'araish* appeared to be a location characterized by global movement, it also hosted innumerable social phenomena which I understood as social implications of European attempts to freeze people's mobility across national borders. The everyday reality of both Moroccans who are "on the move" and the ones who feel "left behind" is given specific character by the processes that maintain inequality in relation to movement across national borders. In this reality informal social networks offer the only means to contact migrant smugglers or to acquire essential official or forged documents. Not only has migration shaped the social lives of people but also the "social lives" of material objects:¹⁰ even the most ordinary everyday commodities have been transformed into tokens that can grant the right to migrate. For example, it is known to everyone in *L'araish* that a young man married to a Moroccan in one of the EU countries is obliged to present – not only an endless stack of official documents in order to apply for a foreign visa – but also used telephone cards, letters, photographs, even his wife's bottles of facial cream, or descriptions of her underwear in order to convince the officials of a particular European embassy that there exists a genuine relationship between the respective parties.

Why study men as gendered subjects?

Until the 1970s ethnographical studies carried out in various Northern African and Middle Eastern contexts understood men and women as monolithic and opposite categories defined by culture-specific systems of rules (Eickelman 1989 [1981], 187). Gender sensitivity often meant that only the voices and practices of women were seen as gendered social constructs, whereas

⁸ When describing her fieldwork experience among members of a Caribbean migrant community Olwig mentions feeling that the studied culture "kept escaping me", for it always seemed to be in places where the researcher was not present (Olwig 1997, 19).

⁹ Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999) call social units, which link people to several places "transnational communities". Though this phenomenon has existed throughout human civilization the authors note that it is the mere mass of people living "dual lives", having two or more countries and the complexity of the phenomenon, which have attracted social scientists' attention. The authors list a number of primary criteria to establish the concept 'transnational': "high intensity of exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis" (ibid., 219.). Recent technological developments have facilitated new, rapid and easy links over long distances thus making present-day communities markedly different from earlier migration communities (ibid., 223.). Mintz (1998), among others, has argued that adopting transnationalism as a qualitatively different historical phenomenon is misleading. According to Mintz, transnational as a conceptual tool to comprehend the contemporary stage of world history has further led to premature and unnecessary rejection of key anthropological terms such as 'community', 'culture' and 'region'.

¹⁰ Appadurai (1986) introduced the term "social life of things".

men and masculinity were seldom named explicitly as topics of inquiry.¹¹ Writing about men is not new, but approaches to observing men and masculinity as gendered constructs are relatively new phenomena with a history dating back to the late 1970s.¹²

The beginning of the 1990s witnessed an increasing ethnographic interest in men and masculinity (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994; Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991; Loizos 1994; Hart 1994; Kandiyoti 1994; Gutmann 1996; Gilsonan 1996; Vale de Almeida 1996). These works, among others, took considerable steps away from monolithic conceptions of gender by understanding masculinity as a contextually acted, contested and verbalized category, underlining the fact that in each society there are various versions of masculinity and different dominant and subordinate versions are mutually constructed.

Recently the focus has shifted to the social and cultural processes by which men distinguish themselves and the contexts and criteria by which this is done.¹³ Such accounts have managed to point out several informal ritualistic domains which construct different understandings of masculinity.

Informal modes of stereotyped male social interaction are sometimes called "rituals of masculinity" (see e.g. Driessen 1983). Such symbolic practices have been scrutinized in the accounts of several ethnographers working in Mediterranean settings (e.g. Gilmore 1991; Driessen 1982; Bowman 1989; Papataxiarchis 1991; McDonogh 1992; Vale de Almeida 1996; Peteet 1994). The ritual of masculinity was a notion which made me realize that studying *ḥarrāga* required a gender sensitive perspective. First of all, *ḥarrāga* seemed to follow a very patterned ritualized plot, which was to a great degree organized around male bodies. Migrants boarding open boats are predominantly young, socially marginal and unmarried men [*shabāb*], not quite like complete men [*ridzāl*]. Upon reaching Spain they very often work as agricultural labourers, construction workers or street vendors. They are expected to return with signs of material success – in cars packed with gifts for family members and friends. Young men very often aspire to turn the wealth gained through migration into capital in the sexual arena. Over the summer holiday period a number of cafés in the centre of L'araish turn into central meeting-points between the migrant young men and the resident women of the town. For some migration and access to economic resources is followed by marriage, establishing a family and building a house – a landmark of the individual success story – in L'araish.

¹¹ In fact this applies not only to the Middle East but to the emergence of men in ethnography in general. Cornwall and Lindisfarne argue that contemporary anthropological analyses of masculinity and manhood resonate theoretical tones that have been introduced by feminist anthropologists over a decade earlier (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994, 27-29).

Despite the theoretical developments formulated by feminist anthropology and the anthropology of gender the recently emerged "men's studies" have in many cases ignored the critique, which has been directed against the natural givenness of gender categories and the views that see gender as a monolithic entity. For example, Gilmore (1993) perceives maleness as a unitary concept, which is everywhere based on evolution and psycho-biological factors. His approach takes gender categories as "total" opposites and assumes that in any location there is only one way to be a man. Similarly, Brod's work is indicative of the time it was written, in 1987, and seems to be unaware of the dangers of generalizations from Western positivist, dualistic and stereotypical gender dichotomies despite the fact that the pitfalls of such approaches were pointed out by MacCormack and Strathern in 1980 (MacCormack and Strathern 1980).

¹² According to Hearn, the study of masculinity only gained wider academic interest in the latter half of the 1980s (Hearn 1989, 202). The author lists a variety of forces which explain the emergence of the trend, including feminist writing, gay politics and men's responses to feminism.

¹³ This framework can be found, among others, in works by Gilsonan (1996), Peteet (1994), Zinovjeff (1994), Bowman (1989) Gutmann (1996) and Vale de Almeida (1996).

Help in the context of *ḥarrāga* involves the idea of the recipient's subordination to the helper, and it naturally materializes in various ways. The helper and the helped may enter into complex contracts where the forms of reciprocation may take various different forms of material and social arrangements. Often a particular migrant in Spain may provide the payment for the crossing and the candidate promises to pay it back by his labour, or sometimes the smuggler offers the candidate a free crossing which he will reimburse later.

Family, kin and neighbours with their social networks often facilitate migration by providing economic possibilities and the necessary social contacts to smugglers and their middlemen. Members of the family, kin and quarter [*ḥawma*] also often provide the first accommodation and opportunities for wage labour in Spain. Yet there is no fixed pattern in these forms of aid and assistance. Family and kin in the context of *ḥarrāga* are domains loaded with expectations, differing interests and competition for economic and symbolic capital. The international *L'araishi* community and its composite families are by no means free of tensions – on the contrary – it seems that lack of a common incentive often seems to be its most audible element, at least among the young men still waiting for their chance to cross over to Europe.

Often instrumental help is offered only to one's younger brothers, children and female family members. Dependants are helped to cross safely to Spain, whereas men very often have to endure the dangerous sea journey. Furthermore, despite the fact that nowadays many single women also migrate to Spain in open boats, possible material success does not grant women similar symbolic capital as in the case of men. Materially successful women are often publicly condemned for gaining wealth through less respected or even socially unacceptable ways: by being domestic servants or in some cases as prostitutes.

Gender in an unbounded setting

To study men in this context I faced a major theoretical problem. Where was I to situate gender? Numerous ethnographies based on fieldwork in Moroccan localities have situated gender identities within more or less bounded Moroccan society and focused on the educational and economic effects of modernization on a variety of levels of association (Kapchan 1996; Azrawil 1991; Mernissi 1975; Mir-Hosseini 1993, among others).¹⁴ The lists of challenges to gender relations is long and often includes phenomena such as the changing social and economic roles of women (Kapchan 1996), challenges to patriarchal forms of authority (Azrawil 1991; Mir-Hosseini 1994), rising marriage age, new persuasions promoting courtship based on love and the establishment of independent nuclear family-based households and the mystification of Western sexuality (Evers-Rosander 1991; Davis and Davis 1988).

However, the changes in gender relations cannot simply be attributed to the effects of modernization on the *localities*. In order to approach the dynamics as to how the present-day mobile context gives form and meaning to gender identities we need to scrutinize the boundaries of both localities and persons.

¹⁴ From the numerical perspective the changes in women's gender position and experience have in fact occurred extremely rapidly: the illiteracy rate of women born prior to 1955 is 78.5 % in the cities and 98.7% in the countryside (Talamoudi 1983). In the 1970s only about 7% of women between 14 and 19 were studying in secondary schools (Mernissi 1975, 92), whereas today the number of women enrolled in institutions of higher education roughly equal the number of men. The percentage of women employed as civil servants has also increased rapidly: from 16.6% in 1979 to 28.5 % by 1986 (Azrawil 1991, 62). In a similar vein, women's average marriage age had risen from 17 in the early 1960s to 24 years in 1985 (US Department of Commerce 1980, 2; Davis and Davis 1988, 103).

The need to rethink boundaries, I believe, is neatly presented by taking a closer look at the concept *ḥarrāga*. The word derives from the verb *ḥreg*, which in colloquial Northern Moroccan Arabic refers to the sea journey over the Strait of Gibraltar without official documents. From the same Arabic word root [*ḥrg* in Moroccan colloquial, *ḥrq* in modern standard Arabic] derives the active participle *ḥāreg*, which refers to the manner of crossing or the "role" of crosser. [e.g. *ana mshīt ḥāreg*, "I went over the border in the manner/role of *ḥāreg*"]. The meanings of the verbal root *ḥrg* in Northern Moroccan colloquial can only be translated with difficulty into English. The root *Ḥrg* points to piercing, going through, driving through a red light, penetrating, psychological stress stemming from yearning for something or the urge to commit a certain act, but also to burning "burning one's past" as one informant put it. Burning the past becomes very literal in the case of migrant men: for the fear of deportation they must carefully avoid carrying any official identification on them at all times. Furthermore, in pre-colonial Morocco the verb *ḥreg* referred to military activities of the central authority *Makhzan* with the intention of pacifying rebellious tribes.¹⁵ *Ḥreg* thus refers to a whole cluster of concepts that describe social situations by referring to bodily experiences. Because of the multiple meanings of *ḥreg* it is difficult to identify any single word in English that would bear the same connotations. For ethnography it is a challenge to come to grips with the concept *ḥreg* and its multiple layers of meaning.

Ḥreg is one of a whole array of concepts that grasp something very important concerning the social life of the men in this setting. From my perspective *ḥreg* is first and foremost a methodological challenge. The notion and its derivations manage to challenge in a single move physical, psychological, social, geographical and political boundaries. In short, *ḥreg* points to the limitations of anthropological observation bounded by locality.

It is precisely the ambiguity and openness of the notion which makes it a significant source of jokes and puns, thus providing young men with opportunities to create multiple and equally ambiguous self-understandings. Referring to both psychological yearnings and identity change the concept seems to offer an important starting-point for approaching the construction of male images in this particular setting. With notions such as *ḥreg* one is basically dealing with the difficulty of "translating culture". However, present-day Moroccans occupy an ever-widening space which challenges the quest of "cultural translation" as a process of unravelling "local knowledge".¹⁶ The complex ways in which the men construct and perceive the multiple cultural links between the different referents of the notion *ḥreg* and, on the other hand, the ways in which the men relate to nationally anchored identities will be major themes throughout this study.

Gender through practical discourses

It should be clear by now that this work aims first and foremost to abandon the idea of gender as a final result of underlying (whether e.g. "Islamic" or "local") single logic.¹⁷ Throughout the periods I spent in participant observation, it soon became clear that there were a whole variety of contextual ways both to talk about gender and to act in a gendered manner. "A man's got to do what a man's got to do" including the mobile *sha' bī* men, but it refers to a whole set of multiple, ambiguous and often contradictory issues. *Ḥreg* was far from being the only oblique, contextual

¹⁵ This idea was presented by Dr. Mukhtar el Harras (1999, oral communication).

¹⁶ See Geertz (1983).

¹⁷ Understanding male and female identities as constituted by "rules" was in fact an idea that can already be found in 19th-century Orientalist scholarship. The central characteristic of Orientalist ethnography was that all aspects of social life, including gender identities, were approached in relation to Islam, which in general was understood as an all-encompassing value system. Such an approach only paid secondary attention to local variations of social practices or understood them as corrupted forms of the "pure Islamic doctrine" (see Said 1978).

and multi-layered notion used by people in this setting. This fact made me realize at an early stage in this research that cultural translation of the social life of these *sha' bī* men would not result in a clear-cut and bounded analysis of the ways in which they make sense of their lives. The ways in which the men conceptualized the surrounding social reality and talked about themselves were malleable, ambiguous and, to my frustration resisted my first attempts to objectify them in analytical language. Cultural translation occurred in a truly trans linguistic space, which included Arabic, English, Spanish, French, my native Finnish and finally writing up this research in a non native language – English. Throughout the field experiences I had to be mobile like the subjects of my study, crossing borders, using several middlemen to contact people and to establish friendships, to obtain information, certificates and official documents – just like the subjects of this study in their everyday activities.¹⁸ I was manipulated in many social situations and I manipulated them myself on many occasions. Portraying men as rigid objects, examples of the "other", simply would not do justice to the conditions in which the different social contexts appeared to me.

Largely for these reasons I have adopted a *discursive*¹⁹ approach to the construction of gender and other social distinctions (whether based on ethnicity, religion or regionalism). First of all, I needed to acknowledge that understandings of identities are changing and contextual and I am a major participant in the construction of these contexts. Both men and women constantly revise and "update" their understandings through dialogue with each other. Through their practical involvement in everyday life they construct multiple associations between identities and surrounding reality.

To acknowledge that people create multiple and simultaneous gender identities does not, however, mean that there is nothing shared. On the contrary, it is clear that the subjects were able to utilize various different direct and indirect ways to talk about men and women. Different spheres of life create different discourses, each of which help in understanding the other. Conceptions of gender can never be fixed or static because every person stands in the intersection of multiple discourses throughout the gendered life cycle from childhood to adolescence and adulthood.

Why approach men and masculinities through discourses? The discursive approach pays respect to the complexity of identity and provides a perspective on the ways in which people provide both limitations and avenues for their own actions. Observation of the multiple direct and indirect ways in which people talk about gender also shows that there is no simple deterministic relation between society and an individual's practical decisions. In short, a discursive approach allows a dynamic view of culture shot through with changing power relations, struggles and inequalities.

Gender identities are not mere products of language and language use. Language is naturally not the only system of symbols by which the link between material bodies and abstract and conceptual identities can be established. The physical body can itself become a site of symbolic *representation* through practical bodily performances, dress styles, or physical modifications (Connell 1996, 159; Vale de Almeida 1996, 4). People perform meaningful actions within differing social relations in private homes, streets, workplaces, and leisure activities, and thus they continuously engage in constructing and modifying symbolic representations of gender.

¹⁸ Chapter III includes a more detailed discussion of the social relations I established in L'araish and the various positions I occupied in relation to the subjects of this study.

¹⁹ On the use of discourse oriented methods in ethnography, see Long (1992), Farnell and Graham (1998), Lincoln (1989). On discursive perspectives on gender in the Middle East, see Kapchan (1996), Caton (1987).

It is important to note that it is only through meaningful actions that people can make claims concerning specific gender identities (Peteet 1994, 34). Social recognition as a courageous man requires acts which are recognized as being courageous. Because of this practical aspect of gender it is important to keep the analysis attached to the real life-situations of real, living people and their social relations emerging through their everyday practices.²⁰

Symbolic representations, whether constructed through discourses or practical actions often have pragmatic consequences. Social interactions construct sentiments and feelings which relate to people's normative understandings as to what is proper, what is understood as social constraints, and what are the standards by which need, poverty or success are interpreted. People thus construct representations but are manipulated at the same time, at least partly by discourses and other representations. In short, representations reflect the ways in which people think but they also guide their thinking. It is through the discourses and practical representations that men internalize social expectations. This study attempts to provide an analysis of discourses and practical symbolic actions of real living men, to attach these to reified, practical life situations and further to construct a perspective where these life situations can be understood within a larger perspective of global power imbalances.

Is *rudzūla* masculinity?

Masculinity has proved to be a concept which has been used in various – and often imprecise – ways in academic writing. In some studies masculinity means the psychological characteristics of men, gendered experiences, gender identity, and sex role socialization; sometimes it refers to gendered behaviours, furthermore it has been used in frameworks such as psychoanalysis and power and institutional analysis (Hearn 1996, 203). Often masculinity works as an evaluative device to observe the behaviours and identities of men or as a primary cause behind men's practical social actions. Viewed in this light it often appears as "shorthand for social limitations on men" (ibid.).

The first precondition for studying masculinity in a particular social context is, of course, finding evidence that masculinity is a relevant category for social identification, social practice and performance. A researcher cannot simply assume that masculinity exists. There is no doubt that masculinity is a prevalent notion in the *sha'bi* men's discourses concerning identity but the men in this study obviously do not talk about 'masculinity' – they talk about *rudzūla*.

In Northern Moroccan contexts the concept of *rudzūla* refers to both manhood and masculinity. *Rudzūla* is closely associated with male bodies, whereas masculinity – at least in recent analytical usages – points to a whole complex domain of social practices which organize social and cultural discourses, and it may materialize in a variety of domains from institutions to individual bodies (Carrigan, Connell, Lee 1985; Connell 1996; Butler 1990). Masculinity may also be demonstrated by female bodies but not *rudzūla*.

A general lack of well-defined rites of passage from boyhood to adolescence and to adult manhood has been noted as characterizing many Middle Eastern and North African masculinities (Peteet 1994, 34-35). *Rudzūla* derives from the Arabic word *radzul*, 'man', which refers only to a married man and is thus distinguished from a 'young man', *shābb*, a category which refers to bachelorhood, *'uzūba*. *Rudzūla* is more than a series of biological transformations for there is no biological difference between a young man over thirty, a *shābb* and a *radzul*. The

²⁰ Precisely here lies a central problem of much recent literature on masculinity (see e.g. Connell 1995; Gilmore 1993; Brittan 1989; Brod 1987). Studies often base the analysis on institutional practices, state policies, or abstract "cultural processes" and thus shift the attention from the practical life situations of real men.

transformations from one category to another are thus social and "accompanied by performative deeds, such as braveness, readiness for risks, fearlessness, assertiveness, defence of honour, face, kin and community to convince the public approval" (Peteet 1994, 34.). However, *rudzūla* is meaningful only in relation to other cultural representations, practices and institutions. Scrutinizing *rudzūla* in "itself" only reduces to lists of characteristics such as the ones above, which hardly captures the culture specific nature of the concept. In the following account I wish to show how scrutinizing *rudzūla* requires sensitivity to notions concerning hierarchy, power and prestige. Attention is paid to the ways in which the *sha' bī* men perceive social hierarchy, the cultural construction of work and the social relations it involves. Secondly, we must acknowledge that any account concerning men has to pay attention to the fact that they are also gendered in relation to women. How *rudzūla* is constructed through men's perceptions concerning their relations with women is another point that receives attention in this work. Thirdly, men are not merely domestic bread-winners but also friends and acquaintances who share specific gendered time and space of gendered leisure. *Rudzūla* also needs to be observed in relation to culturally constructed situations of sharing male sentiment, laughter and leisure. All these three larger domains of observation construct a variety of representations of *rudzūla*.

The concept of *hegemonic* masculinity is a particularly applicable heuristic tool for observing how clusters of ideal representations, issues of hierarchy and power relate to the construction of male identities. Connell points out that what used to be called the male role is best understood as the culturally authoritative or *hegemonic* pattern of masculinity (Connell 1996, 164).

According to Vale de Almeida hegemonic masculinity (in Southern Portugal) is an ideal model which

"unattainable to practically any single man exerts over all men a controlling effect, through embodiment, ritualization of practices of everyday sociability and discursiveness that excludes a whole emotional field considered feminine" (Vale de Almeida 1996,5.).

Men largely support hegemony, or more accurately – a variety of contextual hegemonic representations – because they are persuaded to do so (Carrigan, Connell, Lee 1985, 592). Persuasion works through its promises of gendered power. Wealth, assertiveness, physical strength and courage are in many cultural settings in close kinship with political power and social influence, thus they often translate to hegemonic masculine representations. However, men are positioned in various ways towards hegemonies. By observing the main social relations and symbolic constructions, which constitute hegemonic masculinity, Vale de Almeida (1996) manages to point out how a whole variety of gender identities are constructed and how not only women's but also men's lives are controlled and constrained by images of male domination. Men both construct and change hegemonic representations but they are also persuaded to internalize aspects of the hegemony.

Hegemonic representations become particularly useful when tracing the interrelations between masculinity and international movement in my context of observation. How do the discourses and practices concerning the crossing of borders negotiate the hegemonic masculinity in the case of *sha' bī* men? How is a man's success and failure interpreted and on the basis of what criteria? How do the socially constructed expectations concerning manhood reflect on individual men's aspirations, future plans and perhaps personal tensions?

It is important to take into account the fact that individual men's relations to hegemonic representations are not independent of their position within the male life-cycle. Gender is also

differentiated according to age. Without recognizing this, hegemony hardly becomes an applicable analytical concept. Largely for these reasons I have decided to construct this study on the basis of the lives of young males struggling to acquire public recognition of their *rudzūla* in the different cultural domains of social interaction. Being young fathers, men approaching the socially expected marriage age, or unemployed university graduates, they obviously face hegemonic persuasions in a very concrete sense. The expectation to prove one's capability to act like a man, whatever it may mean in various situations, is particularly strong at this phase of the life-cycle.

***Ḥarrāga* as persuasion**

Why do we need the notion of *ḥarrāga* when talking about masculinity and manhood in this context? Simply because to my way of understanding *ḥarrāga* is a strongly gendered practice and it substantially modifies people's discourses on the subject of men and masculinity.

Ḥarrāga has several gendered, ritualistic features which work in a persuasive manner. However, it is clear that understanding *ḥarrāga* as a ritual of masculinity in the light of passage (Van Gennep 1960) from male status to another would be incorrect. It is obvious that many men are never able to participate in the migration rite and many men fail to enter Spain. Also many men never exceed the obviously liminal period while in Spain. They are stranded in Spain without official status, working in dangerous, underpaid occasional occupations and often living in extremely deficient and crowded dwellings. Many perhaps permanently lack the ability to "cash" the symbolic capital back in Morocco. Also, in the case of "successful" migrants there is very rarely any aggregation back to the social surroundings occupied prior to the rite. Often before migration, many find that they have lost their 'trust' in Morocco and are especially concerned, for fear of corruption and speculation, about investing in Morocco in any other field than land and property transactions and the immediate material needs of households.

For the vast majority of relatively successful *sha'abī* men *ḥarrāga* launches a life-style characterized by constant mobility between continents. Furthermore, as we shall see during the course of this study, it becomes clear that the migrants' heroic performance and display of success are often interpreted by people still residing in L'araish as mere theatre and boasting.

Rather than a rite of passage, I suggest, it is more interesting to view crossing the border in this context in the light of the idea of "rite of institution" suggested by Bourdieu (1991). According to Bourdieu, it is important to pay attention to the fact that societies distinguish between people to whom particular rites pertain and those who never participate in them (or "pass through them"). Rather than constituting passages from one status to another the major function of such rites is to create arbitrary conceptual boundaries. In this light, rather than constituting identity passage, migration emphasizes particular hegemonic representations and persuades men to meet particular gendered expectations which, to use the words of Vale de Almeida (1996, 5) create "controlling effects" upon young men's lives.

On the structure of the work

The work is divided into seven chapters. The first three chapters describe the main fieldwork site with a view from outside and provide the reader with essential numerical information concerning the context of the study. It also aims to introduce the reader to the tone of the first social relations that I formed at the beginning of the period of fieldwork in L'araish.

Chapter I – "Cafés and quarters, telephone booths and satellite antennas" – is an experiment, playing with the image of classical ethnographic entry to a particular location, the town of

L'araish. Images presented by cafés and quarters create an atmosphere of bounded sociability familiar from conventional ethnographic writing. However, as the implicit reader moves from the cafés to the outer borders of the town the entire approach to location of culture is brought into question. It becomes obvious that one of the social consequences of international mobility in L'araish is the fact that place, community and the feeling of togetherness simply refuse to be framed by the same co-ordinates. In the present-day reality the "community of L'araish" exists simultaneously in many places.

Chapter II – "The hidden migration" – surveys the wider political and economic context of the recent dispersion of social reality. It illuminates the way in which questions concerning migrant smuggling in the Strait of Gibraltar are dealt with in the Spanish and Moroccan media representations. Furthermore, the chapter introduces the reader to the instrumentality of migrant smuggling in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Chapter III – "Street wise" – focuses on the ways in which inequality and discrimination in relation to the freedom to cross international borders shape dialogical situations where ethnographical material is constructed. It also introduces the way in which complex processes concerning the directions of belonging and loyalty are constructed in a dispersed setting and how images of locality and fluidity of boundaries are manifested simultaneously in people's discourses.

Chapter IV – "Between past and present, between Morocco and Spain" – dwells in more detail on questions of loyalty and belonging and attempts to approach the multiple ways in which community is understood among the different categories of *sha'bi* people. It becomes clear that the various categories of people in L'araish (long-term residents, migrant candidates, returning or visiting migrants, recent rural urban migrants) do not have a simple and homogenous relation to a particular place of belonging. Communitarity is, on the one hand, created by idealized reading of the past where the family stories of arrival in the town from surrounding rural areas play a central role. Belonging to a social whole is on the other hand created through liminal images: through discourses concerning corrupted bureaucrats and official neglect of the social and physical surroundings. I will also indicate that the ideas of alienation and liminality are also important in *sha'bi* jokes and puns, which are the main topics of the latter part of the chapter.

Chapters V to VII approach representations of masculinity within the context outlined by chapters I to IV and they narrow the focus further towards persons. How migration practices of the young *sha'bi* men both shape and are shaped by cultural notions of *rudzūla*, person and prestige is the main theme of these chapters.

Chapter V – "The shifting conditions of manhood: work, person and prestige" – observes *sha'bi* men's narratives concerning work, social arrangements and the social relations involved. It studies how the images of work relate to the construction of different kinds of men and hierarchies between men. Initiation through different patron-client relations characterized by temporary submission and rebellion give a distinctive imprint to the social relations between various categories of working men including the context of migrant smuggling.

Rudzūla is, as noted, constructed through interaction in different social relations. Men are measured, not only by bosses and co-workers, but also by mothers, sisters, girlfriends, wives and other family members. How the *sha'bi* men talk about women as girl friends, objects of "chase" and future wives, and how they understand *rudzūla* as being constructed by the female view, compose the main interests of Chapter VI: "Building futures with women".

Ruzdūla is furthermore demonstrated in the context of all-male leisure activities, a theme which will be dealt with in Chapter VII "Sociability and sentiment". It approaches the construction of male style, leisure discourses and gender specific sentiments.

Ethnographic fieldwork in a cultural setting where mobile people construct complex social attachments across international borders posed several methodological challenges which further resulted in my adoption of particular textual strategies when writing this study. First of all, I decided that this study as a written text should contain a feeling of movement. First, the focus of this work "travels" from physical borders (towns, streets, nation-states) to social borders (the notion of belonging, social hierarchy), and finally to the more intimate spheres of social life, including sexuality and sentiments. Secondly the ethnographic focus shifts from the visually observed to language and thereafter from everyday dialogues (narratives on work, social relations, and gender relations) to more hidden meanings (sexuality, frustrations, suffering). Finally, I wanted to return an observing eye to the starting-point – the streets of L'araish.

The reader familiar with conventional ethnographic writing will soon notice that this work does not include a separate chapter on research methodology. I have chosen rather to comment on methodological issues throughout this work. There are various reasons for this. First of all, the social relations throughout the fieldwork were very complex and multi-dimensional. The fieldwork was not only concerned with establishing face-to-face relations but I needed to familiarize myself with several categories of absent people and to learn to understand the nature of linkages and conjunctures between persons separated by long distances. I had constantly to revise and rethink how the notions of community, togetherness and loyalty are constructed, negotiated and challenged in this setting. This idea is dealt with in chapters I, III, IV, and VII.

The researcher can only gain access to spaces that people are ready to share with him/her (Hastrup 1995, 155-158). I needed the *sha' bī* men's permission to spend time with them, but what led to gaining such permission, I felt, was itself a central element of this research. For these reasons the research methods and social relations – and ultimately analytical propositions – emerge as closely interlinked issues in the following pages.

The mutually constructed communicative spaces between myself and the *sha' bī* men were shaped by contradictory political and economic processes. Issues such as the right to global mobility, the complex attachments we had, the "colour of our passports", wealth and education had a bearing on these relations. These communicative spaces were far from fixed – our communication rested on constantly transforming social relationships, the future of which I was, of course, unable to predict. The methodological choices, the issues we discussed, the "secrets" we revealed to each other were results of accommodations to situational changes in these relations. These issues, among other things, are discussed in chapters III, IV and V.

CHAPTER I

Cafés and quarters, telephone booths and satellite antennas

Café Madrid, Café Rosas, Café Crimalis, Café Grand Prix, Café France... This place certainly has more than its fair share of cafés, was my first impression upon entering L'araish. I encountered cafés occupied by civil servants, dressed in neat club jackets and colourful ties, cafés with men from nearby villages dressed in heavy woollen gowns and cafés with unemployed bachelors in jeans and t-shirts slouching on the outdoor seats. I passed by cafés with high school students bent over their notebooks in far corner-tables, busily finishing their assignments, cafés with older men playing backgammon or cards and cafés with noisy crowds watching the Spanish football league match. I quickly noted that there is also a small group of cafés, or more exactly *Salons de thé*, with young couples engaged in intimate conversations at more remote upstairs tables. Furthermore, I noted that café etiquette creates an economic space for the informal service sector; a crowd of six to sixteen-year-old youngsters who supply customers with contraband cigarettes and shoe cleaning services.



Café Koutoubia.

Whether I proceeded around the central square or turned southbound towards the quarters built during the five decades of Spanish colonial occupation of Northern Morocco I encountered chains of cafés, terraces and more cafés. One of the first places I entered, Central, is the preferred "hangout" of occasional independent tourists, the vast majority of whom come from Spain and France. Only the most adventurous make the 77-kilometre trip south from Tangiers to L'araish, despite its calm atmosphere, numerous historic attractions and miles of spacious beaches.²¹ The

²¹ In 1993 4,256 foreign citizens visited L'araish. Local hotels recorded a totality of 5,663 nights spent there. Of these French and Spanish tourists numbered 2,840 (Risālat al Ghurfa 1994, 4).

fact that the Tangiers-Rabat highway – still under construction in 1998 – was going to pass by L'araish some five kilometres east of the centre was a clear statement about the position of the place in the international tourist industry. Many foreigners seemed to prefer to stop forty kilometres north, at Asila, the major tourist town in the area with polished *medina* [historic centre], craft shops, restaurants, bars and nightclubs. It was not at all difficult to picture L'araish, too, with its 3,000 years of urban history, slowly turning into a tourist attraction. Despite its potential to lure thousands of visitors, the nearby ruins of the ancient Roman port of Lixus had been left to rest in peace and the historic town centre was in a state that even the guidebooks of the toughest backpackers would label it "genuine". Also the local administration did not seem to worry about the slow erosion of the landmark of the town centre, a fortress dating back to the period of Portuguese dominance in the region in the 15th century. From my point of view the total absence of sightseeing tourism meant that there would be at least one obstacle less in L'araish: no negotiations with *fogid*, unofficial tourist guides offering their expertise to foreigners as in the historic centres of Tangiers, Tetuán or Asila.

Café Central shares a corner with Café España, the regulars of which, I noticed, included familiar faces from local banks, the provincial administrative centre, authoritative-looking elderly men, and obviously the more affluent locals. The latest newcomer in business, Ahlan, which was to become one of my favourites, attracted plenty of unemployed college graduates, young teachers and high school students.

The next one down towards the historic centre is Koutoubia with its large outdoor patio, often frequented by rural men, probably from many villages in the agricultural area southeast of the town, which produce peanuts, potatoes, sugar cane, strawberries and various other fruits. Then comes Café Lixus, which is also a restaurant serving fish from local fisheries. Attached to the wall of the historic town centre there is perhaps the densest concentration of hang-outs for residents of the historic centre, workers at the local harbour and crews of fishing boats. These places clearly reflect the deteriorating job situation of the harbour, once one of the most important industrial areas in the province. Since the 1980s the local fishing industry and canneries had begun to employ predominately seasonal workers, leaving large numbers of men plenty of leisure time.

On the way to my roof-top dwelling in a section of the town built by the Spanish I had to pass numerous cafés frequented by employees of the local prison, construction workers, refuse collectors, police, local "big-shots" and factory workers from the few textile and fruit-processing companies still operating in the area.

The places described are however a mere fraction of the cafés available. Of course there is Tansammre, 'Alame, Bou'arfa, Liamama, Gran Prix, Partis, Bretagne, Cafeshop, Rosas, Nakhil, Ghurub, Marqsina, Crimalis, Ibtisama, La Iskina...

Reflections from the cafés

If the mere number of cafés in a town with approximately 100,000 inhabitants is almost mind-boggling, another feature which caught the eye of a newcomer is that the majority of these places seemed to attract a regular crowd. Cafés not only served as the first introductory settings enabling me to observe the everyday sociability of the various categories of people in L'araish, but they also revealed a host of general ideas that inform people in their actions.²² A quick glance

²² On cafés and gendered forms of sociability, see Driessen (1983), Brandes (1980), Cowan (1991), McDonogh (1992), Papataxiarchis (1991).

indicated that cafés are gendered male spaces, where each place seemed to attract customers following somewhat similar dress codes. Moreover, L'araish's cafés also reflected features of the political sphere: space seems to be often differentiated according to the occupation and age of the customers. And finally, some cafés, with a large number of youngsters "squeezing the juice out of themselves" as the Moroccan idiom aptly captures the scene, clearly reflected the worsening unemployment problem, which had affected the youth in particular. Since 1990 L'araish had lost five middle-sized industrial enterprises and close to 2,700 work-places in the modern industrial sector, and there was not much hope of a better labour situation in the future (Al Harraq and Al 'Ali 1996, 64).²³ In 1998 L'araish was clearly not the most attractive place for investment, making it one of the bleakest areas in the country, with average youth unemployment of over 40%, and for university graduates almost 72% (Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki newspaper 11.3. 1998). Crowds of young men sitting on the concrete wall in Barco Atlántico – a scenic cliff overlooking the Atlantic Ocean, walking around the central square or playing football in the pine forest, were there simply because there was not much else to do. The late 1990s witnessed the opening of the first Internet clubs, billiard and game halls, a few new fast-food places and cafés with satellite television. Europe "there" – only 100 kilometres away, was present "here" in L'araish in the illusions and frustrations concerning opportunities and the future, which was understood as non-existent "here". Many men in their twenties felt that they represented the "forgotten generation". According to some, Morocco "rested on a volcano" because of the worsening unemployment problem.



Barco Atlántico.

²³ The statistics provided by the local employment office indicated a general loss of faith in the possibility of finding work through official routes rather than the actual unemployment situation. Between 1988 and 1992 4,838 town dwellers had searched for jobs through the office. A large proportion of the 1,581 applicants who managed to find work were women employed by the textile and leather factories in the area. Only 33 trained applicants found work through the office (Al Harraq and Al 'Ali 1996, 92-93).

Despite the proximity of Europe, the young men in L'araish in early February 1998 appeared to follow a rather unified dress code, at least when compared with men of the same age in any Spanish town. There was very little variation in the style language – no ear-rings, no hippy-looking men with shoulder-long hair, no hip-hoppers, no skateboards, no surfers – in short nothing that indicated the birth of youth sub- or counter-cultures with close affiliation with musical or pastime preferences. Nor would young men wear the traditional hooded gowns [*djellāba*] or leather sandals [*bilgha*] in public spaces. Furthermore a full beard, familiar from the Islamist students on the Rabat and Fes university campuses, were clearly out of style in L'araish. Colourful men's shirts or t-shirts and jeans or cotton trousers and always short, neatly-cut hair seemed to be the order of the day. Those who wanted to express their status as modern educated civil servants [sing. *muwaddaf*²⁴] did not hesitate to wear a complete men's suit and tie for their evening walks. However, the style of the young women was more versatile. Some would wear longer caftans and even on some rare occasions a veil but many young women from 15 to 20 years of age dressed roughly as the men of their age. Until the summer holiday return of the migrants in July - August there were no mini- skirts, or sleeveless tops visible on the streets. Adolescent girls occupied public spaces such as streets, beaches and modern cafés but contacts between the sexes seemed to occur always conscious of observing eyes. Young women, despite the fact that they freely visited some particular cafés or *salons de thé* at lunch hours hardly occupied them in the evenings. Many took their evening walks in groups of four or five friends or relatives, obviously not unaware that their brothers, cousins and other family members occupied the same spaces. Lovers sought privacy in the pine forest, on the beaches and at the more remote café tables but clearly avoided any physical contact within the sight of others.

Café customers carried a host of symbols concerning the social and political situation of the town. The names of these places referred to the political history of L'araish. I noticed at least four different categories of café names; some were derived from the pre-Islamic past (Café Lixus), others were named after Arabic/Islamic Morocco (Koutoubia, Bou'arfa, Salam) and many pointed to the French and Spanish colonial history in Morocco (España, France, Grand Prix, La Iskina, etc.). Finally, there was at least one café (Tansammre) which derived its name from the Berber-speaking Morocco, and thus pointed to the internal migrations of the Berber population from the Rif, starting at the beginning of the 1940s.

Though numerous cafés seemed to host considerable crowds from noon until two p.m. – the usual lunchtime of the households – the prime time for café-goers was clearly from six p.m. onwards. The waiters often set the outdoor seats in one long line, facing the street. These places usually filled up first. By seven p.m., as the cafés started to get very crowded, pedestrians took over the streets from motor vehicles. The central square, and three avenues leading southbound were practically packed with men and women of all ages. Particularly popular was the six- to seven-hundred-metre-long loop from central square to the indoor market [*qaysariya*], and then towards Avenue Hassan II and its numerous cafés, then back to central square. Especially adolescents and groups of young men and women extended their promenade towards Barco Atlántico.

The quarter through facts and figures

The crowd moves slowly. Someone attempts to pass through in a private car. A young man makes a quick comment to a group of high school girls passing by. The road is constantly blocked because people are engaging in something which appears to be a ritualistic display of

²⁴ muwaZZaf in Modern Standard Arabic.

their social connections. Youngsters make frequent stops to meet a friend or relative: two or three rounds of kisses on cheeks, holding hands and tapping on shoulders...

Around nine p.m. the flow of people takes a new turn. Many head up the hill to reach the more remote corners of the whitewashed section, built by the Spanish, yet the majority seem to go even further. They walk another two to four kilometres to the dozens of quarters, the oldest of which were set up by thousands of hunger-stricken rural migrants from regions on Morocco's Mediterranean coast who arrived after continuous droughts had hit the areas in the late 1930s and 1940s (Seddon 1981, 132-134).



The historic centre of L'araish.

Many of the wealthier ones tend to turn towards the villas along the road leading to the Rabat highway or perhaps the modern three story-flats in the Wafa quarter. Others follow along the numerous dirt roads which cut across the area called al Hayy al Jadid, the largest concentration of popular quarters. However, despite the apparent infrastructural differences between the quarters, it is in many ways problematic to categorize them in terms of social classes and levels of income. Many of the popular quarters house not only recent rural migrants and people who survive without official wage labour, but also small commodity merchants, teachers, factory and fishery workers and bureaucrats from local administrative offices. Some areas, originally targets of housing programmes for the poor, have been occupied later by wealthier families as a result of land speculation. This particular area, al Hayy al Jadid, experienced rapid expansion only after the general recession and rapid population growth of the early 1980s (Al Harraq and Al 'Ali 1996, 13-14).



Western side of the al Hayy al Jadid quarter.

Following Morocco's independence in 1956 the population had dropped considerably, from 42,000 to 31,000 as a result of the departure of a proportion of L'araish's Spanish residents (Abu Lughod L. 1980, 248). Both urban and demographic development remained very slow during the subsequent two decades until the massive expansion during the 1980s. The population exceeded 90,000 individuals in the first half of the 1990s (ibid., 43).

National authorities had realized a need for housing programmes to counter the building of shanty-towns in the 1970s, yet the period between 1971 and 1982 witnessed mass migration from the countryside to urban centres all over Morocco. Problems resulting from deficient housing conditions no longer touched only the rural urban migrants but also the petty bourgeoisie, civil servants and workers in the local food-processing and textile industries. Urban planning programmes had simply arrived too late to tackle the problem. The expansion of these quarters went on in two ways. The wealthier built brick and cement houses, which lacked water, electricity and a sewer system – and further – an official license. On the other hand, vast areas were covered by huts [sing. *barrāka*] built of sheet metal, bricks and wood.

The town administration had two main strategies for countering the housing problem. In the 1970s the emphasis was on the introduction of town plans in new areas and massive population transfers with demolition of whole shanty-towns. In the 1980s the emphasis shifted towards redistribution of plots to the poorer households upon favourable terms. However, the outcome of the programme was not intended. In many areas around al Hayy al Jadid people gave up their right to free or very affordably priced property, but instead sold it to wealthier people who sometimes managed to gain access to several neighbouring plots. Sometimes the timetables for establishing basic services failed, which raised construction costs, and those for whom the housing programmes were intended, the poor, had to sell their rights. On occasion the urban plan was totally overlooked. In many places it is noticeable that some huts have been built practically in the middle of roads. The urban plan was in many cases implemented outside the lands owned by the state and originally included in the general town formula. Often the authorities of the

municipal construction department, big landowners and owners of construction businesses managed to negotiate arrangements that turned out to be profitable for all of them (see Al Harraq and Al 'Ali 1996, 22-29, 38-39).

By nine p.m. there are still a few sheep and donkeys wandering around the few open spaces spotted with torn plastic bags, tin cans and half-burnt waste. Despite the lack of street lights the curvy skyline appears to be composed by one- to three-story concrete houses, adjoined by unfinished, unpaved brick walls and shaky huts which look as if they are glued on one side to the more solid houses. In some places the huts narrow the road down to a footpath. This is the predominant urban landscape of L'araish.

The housing conditions further deteriorated in many areas towards the beginning of the 1990s. Besides the local migrations from the rural areas of Khemis Sahel, Ar Rasana, Bani 'Arus and 'Awamira a new wave of migration from the more distant regions started in the early 1980s. The majority of these migrants came from the Northern provinces of Tangiers and Tetuán but considerable numbers of migrants also arrived from the vicinity of Casablanca, Settat in North-Central Morocco, the Rif on the Northern Mediterranean coast and the Errachidia region in Central Morocco (PAIDAR Med 1996, 143; Al Harraq and Al 'Ali 1996, 42).



The quarter of Klito.

After the southern boundary of al Hayy al Jadid, the atmosphere of the town changes strikingly. On the large treeless plain of Sha'ban stand literally hundreds of properties under construction, finished private villas, three-story houses and small apartments: there is no need to be told that the owners are absent.

Land speculation in the early 1980s had proven to be very profitable for the few wealthy landowners, many of whom had managed to acquire large possessions upon the turmoil and slump in property prices caused by the departure of the Spanish. By the mid-1980s speculation also mushroomed in state-owned lands. Simultaneously with this the capital gained through

international migration began to materialize in the construction sector (Al Harraq and Al 'Ali 1996, 43-47). Many families with international migrants saw the opportunities opened up by property speculation and thus the construction sector experienced a sudden revival from 1985 onwards. However, this by no means resolved the crisis of the housing sector but rather international migration seems to have deepened it because speculation increased property and land prices. Furthermore, there is a general fear of renting to strangers and so many empty properties stand side by side with overpopulated huts.

Sha'ban is a real "day after" sight. Large concrete houses stand quietly under loose chains of streetlights in a motionless, dead landscape. The few lights in the ground-floor garages suggest that there are, after all, a few night guards employed by the owners to protect the properties from unwanted visitors.

Though Sha'ban is where L'araish ends, it marks a boundary line for the community only in a geographical sense. The absence of house owners suggests that L'araish as a social community does not end here.



A view from the quarter of Sha'ban towards the shanty-town of Guadaloupe.

Articulating connections

Once I had taken my first evening promenades and caught the first glimpses of the community's sociability as it appeared in cafés I realized that the fluidity of the community boundaries is also present within the café scene. I quickly noted that virtually every corner hosting a café also hosts a public telephone booth called *téléboutique* all over Morocco. The frequent overseas interaction that occurred in the *téléboutiques*, if anything, was a sign that L'araish is not only "right here" it is also in many cases "over there". The intense face-to-face communication occurring in the

streets and cafés was not enough for the "locals" there was a whole form of interaction that demanded an international telephone line.

And again, as in the case of cafés the number of public telephones in L'araish was astonishing! I counted no less than fifty telephone booths within a radius of 200 metres from my dwelling near the main bus station in the town. The usual number of telephone booths in a typical *téléboutique* is from four to six but there are a few places that have up to eight telephones. Especially after nine o'clock the queues in the waiting space become longer and there is no way one can miss the loud voices competing with each other. The majority of people have come at this hour because of the reduced prices of international calls in the evenings. In many booths women are accompanied by their children, who help to feed the coins exchanged at the cashier desk by the entrance. Calls to Spain can easily swallow up to seventy dirhams (\$11US), if there is a large household to exchange greetings with. Many *téléboutiques* also provide a fax service and photocopying service.

Another omnipresent sign of the new boundaries in L'araish is the rapid spread of satellite TV antennas. There is hardly an official market for the satellite discs, but instead anyone wishing to purchase one needs to turn to shopkeepers engaged in contraband traffic operating between the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and northern urban localities in Morocco.

Upon my first visits to the region in 1991 and 1992 the appliances were available to a few wealthier households. In 1998 many sheet metal huts, officially without electricity had satellite discs attached to their rooftops, opening the homes to dozens of European and Arabic channels. Many households in the popular quarters had laid underground electric cables for a distance of some dozen metres and had electricity provided for their receivers by the neighbours. From the point of view of the community several contradictory processes were under way. New visual images transmitting ideas of alternative life-styles and possible futures had entered even the poorest households. The rapid introduction to new influences also meant a growing awareness of the new social and political conditions that the members of the community were facing outside L'araish. Migration was by no means understood in terms of push and pull. The reality encountered by members of the community was much more blurred and ambiguous.

This chapter aimed to problematize (and play with) the central disciplinary convention in ethnographical writing; the anthropological entry to the field location. The reflections from the cafés and streets at the beginning of the chapter create a strong feeling of arriving in a compact small-town community. However, as the implicit reader moves to the outskirts of the town it becomes clear that the community does not end where the quarters of the town do. There was no 'coming to' and 'going from' the social community of L'araish, simply because numerous members of that community were also constantly coming and going. It is only one limited aspect of the community that can be observed in the town of L'araish. What appears as a stable community has in fact an omnipresent undercurrent of human mobility. The *sha'bī* quarter becomes a manifestation of this idea; the quarters appear to be full of contradictions which arise from people's uneven relations to international mobility: here an empty villa constructed by a migrant from Spain, or perhaps Holland or Britain, set up like a statue celebrating an individual success story, over there across the street a shaky hut belonging to a rural migrant without electricity and running water.

The following chapter will demonstrate that the social dispersion in this context is closely linked to important macro-processes such as international politics, economics and a variety of highly

contested social processes giving rise to a particular form of migrant smuggling – *ḥarrāga*. Migration has become, since the official closing of the European borders, a reality and a practice that attracts, besides the inhabitants of Northern Morocco, thousands of people (mostly young men) from countries south of the Strait of Gibraltar.

CHAPTER II

The "hidden migration"

A local quarter such as Sha'ban, the final point of our promenade around L'araish, is perhaps the most drastic example of present ambiguities concerning communal boundaries in the town. However, such quarters are by no means the only urban areas affected by international migration. Regardless of the socio-economic composition of the quarter there is hardly a house, certainly not a block in L'araish that does not have a migrant in Europe.²⁵ However, unlike many other Northern Moroccan urban localities, L'araish never seems to have had major participation in labour migration to the traditional target countries of migrant workers such as France, Belgium, Holland and Germany.²⁶

The following pages investigate the nature of the larger political and economic context of recent social dispersion in L'araish. I shall review the way in which both the Moroccan and Spanish media relate to migrant smuggling and its social and political repercussions. The chapter furthermore reports in detail on the instrumental and organisational aspects of migrant smuggling between Morocco and Spain.

International migration from L'araish has rapidly intensified only since the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (López García 1996b, 73). Now migration in L'araish, as in the case of many areas around Morocco, has found new destinations.²⁷ Recent official statistics estimate the number of international migrants from L'araish as 11,000, 71% of whom have oriented towards Spain, especially towards areas around the cities of Barcelona (41%) and Madrid (33%) (PAIDAR Med 1996, 142, 152; López García 1996c, 98). Yet it should be noted that the frequency of unrecorded migration and the fact that many people move constantly between different locations in Europe and in Morocco make it very difficult to give actual figures and the exact locations of the migrants.

Terrassa

The industrial area around Barcelona in central Catalonia has been one of the most popular destinations of the recent waves of Moroccan migrants from the province of L'araish. Terrassa, with a population of 170,000 (in 1998), was in fact a site for considerable internal migration – from the mid-1950s onwards. The recession that had hit the mining and agricultural sectors, especially in Andalusia had forced thousands to search for work in the textile and metal industries in the area (Moyano 2000, 5). In Terrassa the quarters hosting the largest

²⁵ This fact is not exceptional in any of the 11 Northern provinces of Northern Morocco, which account for 35% of the some 1.5 million Moroccans with legal status residing in Western Europe (PAIDAR Med 1996, 119; Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki newspaper 15.8. 1998)

²⁶ Morocco had ratified agreements concerning labour migration with France (in 1963), Belgium and Western Germany (in 1964) and Holland (in 1969) (Salt and Clout 1976, 155). Labour migration to France increased rapidly until 1968 (Ogden 1991, 305. ref. INSEE 1985, 16-17.) Central "reserve areas" of migrants were Casablanca, the Rif on the Northern Mediterranean coast and South-Western Morocco (Salt and Clout 1976, 157.) It is estimated that by 1996 the northern provinces had sent a total of 512,000 international migrants, 50.4% of whom reside in France (PAIDAR Med 1996, 119, 121). The busiest years of labour migration in the northern provinces were 1969-1972. Close to 40,000 people left the area, the majority of whom were from the Nador and Al Hoceima regions (Bossard and Bonnet 1978, 14). Until 1970 France was by far the most popular target country for Moroccans. Close to 70% of all its international migrants set off to France (Findly *et al* 1979, 90-94).

²⁷ For example, in Bani Miskin in Central Northern Morocco and in Fqih Ben Salih in Central Morocco the recent wave of migration oriented almost entirely towards Italy (see: Tugi 1996; Salih 1996).

concentrations of Moroccan migrants had been built upon the arrival of the earlier wave of Andalusian migrants. The largest of these, Ca N' Anglada, hosted only four inhabitants in 1945 but had swollen to a home for 7,600 by 1960.

The first few Moroccan migrants had arrived in the area in the 1970s. They were usually unmarried men who often worked as refuse collectors or unskilled labourers in the local metal and textile factories. Today many live with their whole families in the quarter. The overall population of Moroccans in Terrassa is very young – local schools today teach 310 students of Moroccan origin (ibid., 11-15).

The rapidly constructed suburban areas around Terrassa with small, often insufficient cheap flats were transformed into migrant quarters by the 1990s. Ca N' Anglada, with a total population of 11,600 inhabitants hosted some five hundred officially registered migrants of Moroccan origin by 1998, yet the same year witnessed another considerable influx of entrants. These were predominantly unmarried young men from L'araish province with very different future prospects from the earlier migrants (ibid.). Nearly all upon arrival lacked the necessary legal status for residence in the country. They had to turn to friends and relatives with residence permits for accommodation and keep up hopes of finding temporary work in the construction sites or metal and textile industries which all were known to employ migrants without documents.

It is difficult to estimate the actual numbers of Moroccans in Terrassa because of the high prevalence of undocumented entries, however, the number in 1999 was likely to be somewhere around 2,000 (ibid., 12). Those who manage to find work usually earn between 80,000 - 120,000 pesetas (\$500-800 US) monthly, a fact which does not allow them to spend more than 40,000 - 50,000 pesetas monthly on housing. Flats at such prices are nearly non-existent outside the suburban quarters, which were the earlier targets of migrants from southern Spain (ibid., 15).

Some 250 individuals out of the total of 1,842 Moroccans (in 1998) residing permanently in the town had completed primary school, including the four individuals who had diplomas from secondary schools or institutions of higher education. Nearly a sixth of the documented migrants (71 individuals) were illiterate (ibid., 8). What further complicates the migrants' situation, and promotes their social seclusion is the fact that the long-term residents of their immediate social environment are usually Spanish-speakers, but the official institutions, including schools, operate in Catalan. Very few of the men I met in Terrassa had any previous knowledge of Spanish upon arrival. Even years after migration their knowledge of the Catalan language was fragmentary.

The new migration

Following Driessen (1998) I agree that the terminology used by ethnographers should reflect the present-day social and political conditions of international mobility. The ways in which migration is conceptualized by researchers should furthermore echo the fact that the methods of migration are clearly different from in the days of labour recruitment. The frequently used term "illegal migration" carries a strong political connotation, as it stigmatizes people *a priori* as criminals and thus justifies protectionist migration policy in Europe. For these reasons Driessen (ibid.) suggests the term "new migration".

In both "official" and "unofficial" contexts Moroccans use the Arabic term *hijra sirrīya*, "hidden" or "secret" migration, which, I believe, aptly captures the atmosphere of present-day border crossing from Morocco. Not only does the term refer to the various methods of entering Europe "hidden" from the official eye, but it also points to the fact that at present people have to use various unofficial routes, contacts with migrant smugglers, their middlemen, and sub-

middlemen to arrange their trip and acquire the necessary documents such as forged visas, work permits, birth or marriage certificates or any documents that could further the migrants' entry into Spain. Furthermore, many of the Moroccan border crossers remain hidden from "official society" in Spain. For the fear of arrest, and in the worst case, deportation and prohibition of re-entry in Spain the new migrants avoid carrying official travel documents on them.²⁸ When they are caught by Spanish security officers, they claim to be Algerians, Tunisians or other Maghrebis. Morocco does not recognize any migrant whose identity cannot be verified from official documents. Neither can these migrants return home by official routes if they wish to maintain the possibility of ever returning to Spain. They are practically trapped in Spain: without work contracts they cannot obtain residence permits, thus they fall outside the scope of medical and social services. For thousands the only means of gaining official status is to wait for the next regularization process.²⁹ While without official status they have to make their living on the unofficial labour market as agricultural workers, street vendors, window cleaners, construction workers and, in the case of migrant women, as housemaids, baby-sitters, cleaners and in some cases prostitutes.³⁰ The dynamics of regularization ensures that in most cases the voluntary (holiday) return to Morocco occurs only in the case that the migrant has already "made it", regularized his status and acquired employment and housing. On the other hand, unsuccessful migrants do their best not to make an appearance in front of their friends and family in Morocco.

The most important contemporary factor modifying Moroccan migration is undoubtedly the new directions in the immigration policies of the Western European countries. Legal procedures to restrict the numbers of incoming migrants had been introduced in various Western European countries in the mid-1970s and were followed by initiatives aiming at the voluntary or forced return of numbers of migrants to their countries of origin.³¹ The EU started to formulate its policy concerning border control and entrance requirements for foreign citizens at the 1985 Maastricht and 1991 Schengen summits. By the beginning of the 1990s all Western European countries restricted the terms for family reunion of migrants and paid closer attention to entry through marriage with a permanent resident (KMAN 1997, 18-28). Along with these developments the EU countries sought to co-ordinate their migration policies, gradually diminish internal border control and shift it to its outer borders instead. For Spain EU membership in 1986 meant that the 13-kilometre narrow Strait of Gibraltar gained in importance not only as a cultural boundary between Europe and Africa, but it also turned into a boundary dividing people into "northerners" to whom international mobility was granted and the "southerners" who were denied such a right. In addition to Moroccans and other Maghrebis, the strait had also become a busy channel for also migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, especially Senegal, Nigeria and Gabon, but also from more remote African countries.

²⁸ The aliens' law in Spain (implemented in February 2000), at least in theory, does not allow deportation of any unidentified migrant caught inland who has not engaged in any criminal activity. Rapid deportation of migrants caught on the waters between Spain and Morocco is, on the other hand the usual practice.

²⁹ Both Spain and Italy have sought to counter the social and economic problems resulting from new migration by recognizing large numbers of migrants without documents. The year 1991 alone Italy recognized the status of 89,000 Moroccans. By 1996 it was estimated that Italy hosted nearly 50,000 unrecorded Moroccans (Salih 1996, 46-49). These processes were implemented in Spain in 1985, 1986 and again in 1991. Another major campaign took place in the spring of 2000. As a result 137,000 new migrants were recognized. Nearly 30,000 Moroccans received a negative resolution (El País 17.2. 2001).

³⁰ On the economic strategies of Moroccans in Italy, see Salih (1996), and Moroccan prostitutes in Spain Al Budali (1998).

³¹ The French government initiated a programme in 1980 which aimed at the return of 35,000 Algerian labour migrants annually (Ogden 1991, 301). On the programmes to return Moroccan labour migrants from Holland, see KMAN (1997, 15-17).

Until 1980 Spain had paid slight attention to the incoming migrants without documents who were in most cases allowed to stay in the country, or more accurately to pass through, most likely to France, Germany and the Benelux countries. In fact Spain and Italy – unlike the "traditional" target countries of Moroccan migration – had quickly been transformed from a migrant-sending country to a migrant-receiving country.³² Spain only imposed the first legal initiatives to control the flows of migrants through its southern shores in 1984 (Driessen 1998, 100). In May 1991 Spain – among the last Western European countries to do so – introduced entrance visas for incoming Moroccans. The new situation created hours' long queues in front of embassies or consulates of the EU countries in all the major cities of Morocco. Moroccans had to adapt to the reality that a mere holiday visit to Spain at worst demands dozens of documents, from school certificates to bank account records. Spain had literally closed its gates to Moroccans: the Spanish enclave of Melilla initiated a new 35 million dollar project, mainly funded by the EU, to construct a four-metre high double fence around its borders to block the way of unwanted migrants seeking routes to mainland Spain.³³ The project was to be finished by October 1998 (Cordesman 1998, 34). The same year the Moroccan press reported that the Spanish officials had even closed a drain tube in its other enclave, Ceuta, to stop especially child migrants entering the town from the Moroccan side.³⁴

The stricter entry policy in Europe also created a rising demand for all kinds of forged documents which could help the migrant's cause. In Morocco the market for forged visas and passports, birth and marriage certificates and bank account records expanded.³⁵ In Spain work permits were transformed into marketable goods for which Moroccans without legal status had to pay up to 500,000 pesetas (\$3,000 US).³⁶ Some Spanish advocates had demanded up to 10,000 pesetas for advice concerning procedures to apply for a residence permit, which technically should be free.³⁷

³² In Italy the number of Moroccans rose from 15,705 in 1987 to 95,580 in 1992, in Spain from 11,152 to 63,939 in 1994 (Bacaría 1998, 61). Changes in migration policies in Western Europe cannot entirely explain the new flows of migration to Spain. The 1980s witnessed growing labour shortages, especially in areas where new forms of intensive agriculture were introduced. This development affected mainly Catalonia, Valencia and Andalusia, where family-based farming was diminishing and often replaced by greenhouses demanding plenty of manual labour (ibid., 62-63).

³³ The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have witnessed growing numbers of arrests of new migrants. Spanish officials reported 16,000 cases in 1997 (Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki 8.7. 1998).

³⁴ Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki 26.2. 1998.

³⁵ In Fqih Ben Salih in central Morocco official visas turned into a black market commodity. Between 1989 and 1991 the prices were from 10,000 to 40,000 dirhams (\$1,100-4,400) (Salih 1996, 26).

³⁶ El País 1.3. 2000.

³⁷ See El País 6.2. 2000. Upon the implementation of the aliens' law in Spain (1.2. 2000) the latest regularization process of migrants also came into effect. For Moroccans without a legally recognized status this meant that if they wanted to gain temporary residence they had to register at the local immigration offices and solicit a residence/work permit. However, only migrants who were able to prove that they had entered the country prior to 1.6. 1999 and had at least once gained or at least solicited either a residence or work permit were eligible to do this. The southern coastal town of Alicante witnessed the most severe tensions as thousands of migrants queued in front of the local immigration office attempting to obtain the required documents. The Spanish Ministry of the Interior soon decided to extend the regularization process until 31.6. 2000. The El País newspaper reported that to prove their entry into Spain within the assigned time-limit many Moroccans had slept in front of the local offices, and tried to indicate the time of their entrance by producing old bus tickets, and bank, medical and shop receipts (El País 6.2. 2000).

The visa question, together with the unofficial market it had created was a widely discussed matter in the Moroccan media in 1998.³⁸ Many reporters had laid great attention to the new economic strategies opened by black market migration, the creativity of which knew no limits. Casablanca and Tangiers were reported to host gangs which made quick profits by selling places in the crowded queues in front of European consulates. A reporter from the *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* newspaper had spent a whole night queuing in front of the Spanish consulate in Casablanca and had witnessed that the gangs controlling the black market demanded up to 300 dirhams (\$35 US) for front places in the queue. These conditions were reported to "insult the honour and reputation of Moroccans"³⁹ and create bases for different methods of migrant smuggling.⁴⁰

From the beginning of the summer, when the rough waters calm down, both the Moroccan and Spanish media report practically every day cases of migrant smuggling, arrests and tragic accidents. This news is broadcast in Spain with such breathtaking frequency that for example in late July 1998 one Spanish TV news reporter announced that "there is no need to edit each piece of news on every incident in the strait – it is enough to write one story and change the dates."⁴¹

Besides risky crossings on small open boats [sing. *patera*] some smugglers use larger fishing boats or passenger ferries. There have been several reports of cases where children have managed to cross the strait underneath tourist buses which transport day-trippers between the Spanish Costa Del Sol and Tetuán and Tangiers on the Moroccan side.

The Moroccan press finds faults with Spanish statistics on hidden migration, stating that the estimates concerning both successful crossings and the victims of accidents are highly underrated in order to give the impression that the situation is under control.⁴² According to Spanish sources, by 1998 official status was granted to 115,000 Moroccans who presently account for the largest proportion (15.5%) of all of its migrant groups (Cordesman 1998,30). Spanish sources estimated the number of Moroccans without documents in 1998 as roughly 100,000 persons.⁴³ Similar statistical problems apply to numbers of victims of accidents. There are rough estimates that over the past five years about 1,000 migrants have drowned in the Strait of Gibraltar⁴⁴ but these statistics include only the numbers of either bodies found or deaths that have been reported by rescued victims of the accidents. What further complicates the statistics is the fact that the Spanish customs and police officers have faced accusations of involvement in the business.

In the case of new migration the Strait of Gibraltar is by far the most frequently used route to Europe but not the only one. From many locations in northern and central Morocco there is also considerable migration towards Italy⁴⁵, mainly via the island of Lambadoza close to the Tunisian coast.

³⁸ See *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* (1998) 15.7., 18.7., 4.8., 5.8., 11.8., 15.8. and *Al 'Alam* newspaper (1998) 15.8., 16.8..

³⁹ *yaḥuḥḥtu min karāmat wa 'azzat l- muwāḥin l- maghribī.*

⁴⁰ *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* 15.7. 1998.

⁴¹ *Al 'Alam* 31.7. 1998.

⁴² *Al 'Alam* 5.7. 1998. Spanish official sources claim e.g. that in 1996 the number of crossers was between 5,200 and 7,700 (*Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* 8.4. 1998). By 31.7.1998 the Spanish naval civil guard had that year arrested 3,032 migrants (2,282 of whom were Moroccans), but in the same period the police forces had arrested 5,409 migrants in mainland Spain (*ibid.* 8.8 1998). It is not known how many of these had entered the country across the strait.

⁴³ *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* 16.8. 1998.

⁴⁴ *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* 8.4. 1998.

⁴⁵ Italy hosts presently some 130,000 Moroccans with legal status (*Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* 27.7. 1998).

Ḥarrāga: migrant smuggling

The number of *ḥarrāga* cases in the Strait of Gibraltar had increased considerably in the early 1980s.⁴⁶ Cargo ships operating especially between the Moroccan ports of Casablanca, Agadir, Asfi and various European ports were reported with growing frequency to transport migrants. Simultaneous with this development, owners of fishing boats along the southern coast of the Strait of Gibraltar (the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta together with coastal locations in Tangiers and Tetuán provinces) realized the economic possibilities opened by migrant smuggling (Al Qabab 1998, 7).

***L'araishi youngsters crossing the Loukkos river mouth.***

A long tradition of cannabis smuggling between the Northern provinces of Morocco and Southern Spain offered a ready "infrastructure" for migrant smuggling.⁴⁷ The new immigration policy transformed migrants into profitable goods, which in many cases were more advantageous than hashish for the smugglers: the profit was guaranteed even if the boats failed to reach the Spanish coast. The migrants were also often more easily fooled than professionals in the drug business. The Moroccan press has reported on cases where the smugglers have in fact returned to the Moroccan coast and claimed that they have arrived in Spain. Migrant smuggling affected not

⁴⁶ Salih (1996, 43) notes that the phenomenon dates back to the days of labour migration in France. In 1950 the number of Moroccans without documents in France was estimated as 12,000 individuals.

⁴⁷ According to Moroccan sources, cannabis consumption started in Morocco after the colonial powers introduced hemp cultivation for purposes of rope and textile production. The Treaty of Algeciras (1906) includes an agreement on the trade of hemp between Morocco and Spain. The narcotic use of the plant started soon afterwards. The cultivation concentrated predominantly in the Northern Territories due to liberal Spanish legislation. In the Franco-Moroccan territory cultivation of hemp was banned in 1922. By 1960 both cultivation of hemp and possession of cannabis were banned in the whole of Morocco, but with the growing foreign market the area under cultivation in Northern Morocco grew constantly. Until the 1970s the cultivated areas were mainly in the Rif mountains but today the areas extend to L'araish and Tetuán provinces (Al 'Alam 1.3. 1998)

only coastal areas but also several locations in central Morocco (Bani Mellal, Khouribka, Meknes and Fes-region, Settat, Casablanca, Kenitra and Sidi Qasem) (ibid.).

Since 1992 the pressures from Spain and the EU led King Hassan II to initiate action against migrant smuggling (Driessen 1998). The Moroccan coast guard and the newly established Spanish Naval Civil Guard concentrated their control on the Coastal Strip between Tangiers and Ceuta, a fact which opened new yet much riskier possibilities for smugglers operating from the coastal areas of the L'araish province.

Migrant smuggling in the L'araish province, as in many other locations in Morocco, works through more or less fluid networks of boat owners [*mūl*], middlemen [*semsār*], sub-middlemen [*mdabber*] and various categories of assistants. In many cases I have witnessed that it is impossible to distinguish the smuggler from the smuggled – for one person might be both at the same time. A particular individual might very well finance his own trip by serving as a sub-middleman for more "professional" middlemen. On the other hand, the Moroccan press has reported arrests of more organized mafias. The networks might, but not necessarily, have contact persons on the Spanish side, who can arrange transport, necessary documents, accommodation and jobs in the agricultural or construction sectors.

As mentioned above, there are numerous different methods of smuggling migrants: in cargo boats, or fishing boats, but there are also networks with contacts with the crew of passenger boats and customs officials who accept unrecorded passengers. In L'araish the cheapest and most popular method is to cross the strait in *pateras*, small 5-7-metre-long fishing boats.⁴⁸ In 1998 crossing to most popular destinations in Spain, the coastal areas around Cádiz, cost from 5,000 to 8,000 dirhams (\$700-1,000 US). The middlemen are easily contacted through certain cafés in the town centre, and others located along the southern side of the town. The middlemen are often served by sub-middlemen who help them to fill the boats with fifteen to thirty clients. Usually the clients pay from 1,000 to 1,500 dirhams down payment, perhaps an additional 1,000 dirhams which will be changed into pesetas by the middlemen and handed back to the clients. The remainder is usually paid just prior to set-off. The middlemen contact the boat owners who start arrangements concerning the actual place of the set-off, usually a quiet beach anywhere between the southern vicinity of L'araish and the small coastal village of Moulay Bouselham. Upon waiting for the right weather the middlemen usually offer lodging for migrants outside the area and arrange transportation between the place of actual set off and lodging. Everything has to be done secretly. The clients are not informed either about the exact place or the exact timing of the set-off, which usually occurs at the darkest hours. The chosen night the clients are transported to the beach in minibuses, vans or small trucks. To avoid the inland customs and police posts the drivers use minor roads. The rest of the price is paid just prior to departure.

Usually one or two assistants seat the people in the boats. The passengers are told not to move, to put their spare clothes in black plastic bags and to avoid smoking and wearing colourful clothes to remain obscured from the coastguards on either side. The boat owners in this particular area use motors with 15 to 20 horsepower. To silence the noise the motor is usually wrapped in heavy rags. Right after the departure the boats head towards international waters and often approach the Spanish coast in the early hours of the morning.

What happens after reaching the Spanish shore naturally varies according to the individual migrant's social connections in Spain. Often migrants who seek transportation to Catalonia

⁴⁸ The L'araish-based newspaper Al 'Arā'ish wrote extensively about the local smuggling business under the heading "*Harrāga*, the deadly business" [*Harrāga, tidzarat l- mawt*] in 24.2. 1998.

attempt to contact relatives and friends who own private cars, while some hitch-hike in trucks conveying agricultural products to urban centres. Others have no other option than taking the risk of using public transport or paying considerable sums of money to taxi drivers. It is also common to make the first stop in agricultural areas such as Almería province and search for low paid labour in greenhouses.

Many, such as 'Abderrahman, one of the first young men who talked to me about his experiences, were not successful in their attempts to settle in Spain.

In 1997 'Abderrahman's paternal uncle Haddu provided him with the opportunity to go to Spain for 7,000 dirhams. Haddu was well positioned to do this because he occasionally transported migrant candidates from L'araish in his van to the coastal village of Gla 10 km north of L'araish, a place of embarkation used by a particular migrant smuggler operating in 'Abderrahman's home quarter. One midnight in late May 1997 'Abderrahman, with a dozen other boys embarked onto a six and a half metre boat. He was accompanied by his paternal cousin 'Abdellatif and their close friend Sa'id, who also aspired to go to Spain. The trip towards the bay of Cádiz was successful, however the boat had hit some rocks just prior to its approach to a small deserted beach nearby the town of Cádiz. After hiding in bushes, during the first night he headed on foot towards Cádiz. Upon entering a small village outside the town he started to look for a taxi in order to join his paternal cousin 'Abdelhaqq and his family in Terrassa. By this time 'Abderrahman's companion Sa'id had also entered the village, thus the men decided to share the expenses of the trip to Barcelona. The other companion, 'Abdellatif, had disappeared, yet 'Abderrahman later heard that he had arrived in Almería. By 1998 he was still without residence in Almería.

While passing the city of Málaga, after several hours on the road, 'Abderrahman and Sa'id were stopped by a police patrol. After a brief inspection in Málaga they were brought to Algeciras and the following day to Ceuta. Upon reaching the Moroccan border, in Fnidaq, Moroccan police wrote a report on their case and submitted them to Tetuán for trial. The court had imposed an eleven-month probation period and a 500 dirham fine, which 'Abderrahman had not yet paid by 1998.

Migrant smuggling between Morocco and Spain is an extremely flexible and constantly transforming phenomenon, which reacts with extreme rapidity to social and political changes.⁴⁹ After the initiation of the latest regularization process of migrants in Spain in the spring of 2000, migrant smuggling to the Canary Islands increased considerably. It was obvious that many migrants, especially from sub-Saharan Africa, had been fooled into believing that any migrant entering Spain prior to the termination of the regularization period would be granted temporary residence.

"Official" Morocco appears to have an ambiguous stance towards the *ḥarrāga* business. On the one hand, involvement in *ḥarrāga* is legally sanctioned and is a politically sensitive question between Morocco and the EU but at the same time it is clearly a safety valve for official

⁴⁹ The Spanish police had reported in the spring of 2000 three unprecedented phenomena in the migrant smuggling. 1) The clients were forced to transport hashish to Spain and meet their budgets by selling it during the first few days. 2) Hundreds of Sub-Saharan Africans arrived in the Canary Islands with the help of smugglers operating between the towns of Nouadibu in Mauritania and al 'Aiun in Morocco. 3) Emergence of smugglers who transport sub-Saharan Africans seeking routes to enter Spain via Northern Morocco to Southern Morocco and further to the Canary Islands (El País 7.5. 2000).

Morocco given the youth unemployment problem and the economic importance of foreign remittances to domestic economies.⁵⁰

One man working in L'araish prison informed me that only people actually serving in the "inner circle" of smuggling – the middlemen, van drivers, boat owners or captains – are punished by imprisonment from six months to three years. Many of the unsuccessful young men such as 'Abderrahman were brought first to Ceuta and then returned to the Moroccan side. The court in Tetuán had sentenced them to a fine of around 500 dirhams and released them with a couple of months' probation period.⁵¹ On the other hand, many informants had witnessed that Moroccan

⁵⁰ Salih (1996), based on his extensive fieldwork in Fqih Ben Salih, notes that the local society is clearly divided into households with migrants abroad and households without any income earners abroad. The former entirely dominate the construction activities, land and property transactions and the second-hand market in cars and household appliances. Very similar observations concerning both the Bani Miskin region in the Rif and L'araish emerge from the works of Tugi (1996) and al Shantuf (1999). On the national scale the remittances sent by the Moroccans abroad come before the phosphate and tourist industries in the national balance of payments (Ben Ali 1991; Ben Cherifa *et al* 1992).

⁵¹ The following is an excerpt from police investigation file concerning an attempted border crossing in 'Awamira (in L'araish province), which took place on 20.5. 1996.

20.5. 1996 upon a visit to 'Awamira police station.

"A person who wished not to reveal his identity announced that a man called Muhammed is engaged in hidden migration. He currently works as a guard in the irrigation sector of the Agricultural Investment Bureau in 'Awamira. He offers lodging for people who wait for the departure of the boats from the Atlantic coast near the place of his residence. The particular place is known as a place of departure for hidden migration.

Upon gaining this information we proceeded secretly to the dwelling belonging to the suspected person. In the presence of the director of the Agricultural Investment Bureau we knocked on the door of the man in question. We were received by a person who was not from the area. We enquired about the owner of the house and the person answered in a very reserved manner that he was not at home. He was obviously both surprised and frightened. Accompanied by the director we entered the house, met a group of men and questioned them about the reason for their presence in the house. Without hesitation they informed us that they were waiting for the owner, Muhammed. After each person had paid 4,000-5,000 dirhams the owner had announced that he was leaving to make the necessary arrangements for the illegal crossing to Europe. We asked the men to gather their possessions and follow us to the station. When we arrived at the station we heard the following witnesses:

'Abdel 'Aziz bnu al Risani, Moroccan, born 1973 in Bayda, lives currently in Ksar el Kebir (27 km southeast of L'araish). Zenkat al Baqqali 8 No. 19. Mother Rahma the mother of whom is unknown. The accused is unmarried. He can read and write. No previous records, carries personal identification card No. 43299 BL. The accused made the following statement:

I am from a rather well-off family. I have three brothers and both parents. My father works in 'Awamira at the local Agricultural Investment Bureau. I have also worked for the same bureau for three years but not officially. I have a friend called Hasan, whom I visit frequently at his butchers' shop in al 'Arbi in Ksar el Kebir. He told me that a man named Muhammed smuggles youngsters who seek work in Spain. After our enquiries we contacted the man. He works in the same bureau as my father and I, yet I have no previous acquaintance with him.

On Wednesday 14.5. 1996 my friend Hasan and I went to the residence of this man, only to find a room full of young men, whom we did not know. We learned that they were there for the same reason as us. The owner, upon receiving us, asked us to give him 4,000 dirhams for the trip. First I hesitated and assured him that I had the money, yet I would hand it to him upon entry to Spain. He demanded that I pay, informing me that the trip would start the following day, which was Wednesday. Considering the fact that he was a married man and working in the same bureau as I, I gave him the whole sum and an additional 1,000 dirhams to be exchanged into Pesetas. From that moment on I did not leave the house but waited to embark on the journey. The man never came back but instead you entered the house and brought us to the station. I took this risk without informing my small family. My wages were

security had been present at the harbours used by *harrāga* and allowed the boats to set off in return for bribes. However, I witnessed several times how the coastguards were patrolling the local coast in small aeroplanes observing any suspicious activity.

Gibraltar: from channel of connections to separating boundary

As a result of the protectionist migration policies formulated by the EU the Strait of Gibraltar transformed into a clearer economic and social boundary between Europe and Africa. However, the leftist press and academic discourse on both sides of the strait adopt exactly opposite stances towards the migration question. The Strait of Gibraltar has, according to this view always been a channel between different areas, not a separating barrier.⁵² A commonly used argument is that Spain itself has just recently been transformed from a sending country to a receiving country for migrants and that the movement of people between Morocco and Spain has since the days of Muslim conquest been very active (see Elbaz 1996; Arenal 1996; Lourido 1996). Further weight to these arguments is given by the fact that the past century witnessed considerable Spanish migration to Morocco. During the latter years of the Spanish colonial presence 10% of the population in Northern Morocco came from Spain (Mishbal 1998, 3). The Moroccan side also claims to have participated in the economic growth of Spain, as the Moroccans served as a work force to establish the facilities of the Spanish tourist industry during General Franco's rule (*ibid.*, 4-5). The economic slump of the first half of the 1970s, together with Spanish-Moroccan conflict over the Western Sahara, led to friction which reflected upon the migrants' position in Spain and resulted in mass arrests and the deportation of thousands of guest workers (*ibid.*, 6). Similar exploitation of the Moroccan work force still continues: on the one hand, the Spanish population council estimates that given the present birth rate the country needs at least 240,000 new migrants annually to maintain its present labour force; on the other hand, Spain issues annually work permits for a mere 30,000 new migrants (El País 7.1. 2000).

Especially clear is the conscious exploitation and marginalisation of migrants in the modern intensive agricultural sector with high demand for low paid labour.⁵³ One of the major concentrations of Moroccan agricultural workers on the Mediterranean coast, west of the city of Almería, hosted in 1999 over 8,000 migrant workers, but the local farmers had official permits to hire only 3,300. For the farmers hiring migrants without papers means savings in medical insurance costs and wages and frees them from responsibilities to provide sufficient housing. The largest single locality of Moroccan agricultural workers in the area, El Ejido, hosts about 5,500 Moroccans. As a result of social unrest caused by the extremely poor housing conditions of the Moroccans, conscious discrimination and overt racism in the area El Ejido witnessed the most serious xenophobic violence in the history of modern Spain.⁵⁴ Only a quarter of El Ejido's

between 1,000-1,200 dirhams a month. I took this risk in order to find permanent work and to be able to help my family and to build my future. I humble myself in front of the court and ask for its mercy. At one point in that room there were 11 young men. Some came and some left, for what reason I do not know. No one received the money they had submitted. Muhammed left his residence on 15.5. around 8 p.m. and he never came back. I do not have anything else to add. (translation from the Arabic by the author).

⁵² This idea was clearly expressed by representatives of various Moroccan migrant organizations in the 1998 seminar on Migration and Human Rights organized by the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights in Tangiers in November 1998 and in recent articles in the socialist Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki newspaper (see e.g. 16.8.). Furthermore, this stance is also adopted by Spanish academic accounts of Moroccan migration (see e.g. López García *et al* 1996).

⁵³ An unskilled agricultural worker in the Almería region earns about 5,000 pesetas per day, a sum which is over three times more than the wages in similar jobs in L'araish.

⁵⁴ In 5.2. 2000 a Moroccan young man under psychiatric care stabbed a Spanish woman to death while trying to steal her purse. The three days following the woman's funeral witnessed continuous clashes between the Moroccans, Spaniards and the local security forces. Many areas occupied by the agricultural workers were burned. Over 200 Moroccans had to seek asylum at the local police station. Many fled to the mountains and had to be assisted by the

migrants live in urban quarters. The rest find shelter in single-room huts, semi-isolated from the community, without running water, toilets or kitchens. The housing conditions, not only further total social exclusion, but also hinder the possibilities of family reunion.⁵⁵

Another accusation of the Spanish migration policy in the Moroccan media is that considerable numbers of Spaniards, both civilians and officials, are directly involved in the hidden migration. Not only do the farmers and construction companies utilize cheap labour, but there have been accusations concerning Spaniards' role in the smuggling business. Furthermore the Moroccan press has claimed that police and customs officers have robbed incoming migrants (see e.g. *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* 16.8. 1998).

The discussion concerning migration in the Moroccan press, however, avoids addressing not only the wider social and political factors behind migration but also the political tensions that the migrants' political organization creates. As noted earlier, Morocco is highly dependent on the overseas remittances sent by the migrants, yet the central authorities do not look favourably upon the political potential of the migrant groups. In the 1990s the government attempted to ease the tensions by creating a special ministry for migrant questions, and set up several migrant organizations under its surveillance. To control the migrants' potential political organization under religious organizations the central authorities in Morocco have sent several religious authorities to host countries (KMAN 1997, 19-20).

Many migrant organizations present at the Migration and Human Rights conference in Tangiers in November 1998, which I also attended, declared that the lack of trust in the central authorities is one of the main issues hindering the permanent return of the elder generation of labour migrants. The practices of Moroccan customs and official financial institutions were criticized by many representatives because they make returning migrants feel like a "cow being milked". Due to this criticism one of the points of attention of the Moroccan government has been to facilitate the annual return of over 1.5 million migrants the majority of whom cross from Algeciras to Tangiers in July-August.

The new "hidden migration" across the Strait of Gibraltar has become a critically important political phenomenon creating constant negotiations between the nation states of the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. This chapter demonstrated that the origins of *ḥarrāga* are related to the changes in Western European immigration policies which turned the Strait of

local Red Cross. Some twenty vehicles, shops and bars owned by Moroccans were looted or destroyed. By 8.2. 49 people had been injured, and by 10.2. 55 people, 39 of whom were Moroccans, had been arrested (*El País* 11.2.). The Moroccan government issued an official statement of its concern over the matter. The first arrests by the local security forces occurred only after three days of violence (*El País* 8.2.). 600 members of the security forces, 150 locals and others from Málaga, Valencia and Murcia entered the area. Many political parties and civil associations accused the Ministry of the Interior for its passivity. The Minister of the Interior Jaime Mayor claimed that in such unorganized acts of violence arrests are difficult to carry out, yet the local police chief informed journalists that he had been ordered not to interfere.

⁵⁵ The Spanish anthropologist Ubaldo Martínez Veiga, based on his three-month period of fieldwork in El Ejido (quoted in *El País* 11.2. 2000) claimed that the discriminatory policy exercised by the local authorities in El Ejido can be compared to South African apartheid. Veiga proclaimed that the migrant slums in the area make the scene similar to South African "bantustans", yet in this case "it is not a product of structural effects but the result of a totally conscious act."

Gibraltar into a closely guarded boundary between Europe and Africa. The huge expansion of black-market migration in Northern Morocco and the economic activities associated with it were to a large extent a result of the European attempts to keep the unwanted new arrivals outside its borders. Towards the later 1990s *ḥarrāga* had created a highly contested socio-economic space which both connected and polarized Morocco and Spain in a variety of ways. New unofficial economic strategies, exploitation of the migrants by a variety of categories of middlemen, smugglers and employees in both Morocco and Spain, together with outbursts of xenophobic violence, state-generated threat perceptions in Spain, massive arrests of migrants, their court deaths and deportations, all give a specific character to the social reality of *ḥarrāga*. Official state policies reflect the polarizing effects of *ḥarrāga*: Spain (and other EU countries) claimed that it is flooded by waves of illegal immigrants who cause social unrest and bring in drugs and crime. At the same time, the Moroccan media blamed the double-talk and hypocrisy of the EU countries who benefit from the cheap labour and thus indirectly encourage young people to risk their lives while crossing the strait.

Later chapters of this work focus on the intricate cultural micro-processes in the social reality of migrant smuggling. Understanding the personal contexts, expectations and future prospects of the people requires a detailed ethnographic focus. It was clear that as a person from the "opposite camp" the North, I had carried along in my very person a specific burden to investigate this social reality. I was simply not able to gain access to information which contained painful personal experiences without making it clear where I stood on the issue of migrant smuggling, racism and the situation of the migrants without documents in Europe. This process – to become street wise in order to associate with the young men – was by no means without its problems. It involved extensive negotiations, misunderstandings, and occasional tensions, as the following chapter demonstrates.

CHAPTER III

Street wise

On the way down Boulevard Moulay Mohamed Ben Abdellah at the busy corner of Café Rosas someone stopped me.

- Sorry, but do you have a minute?
- I am just going to go down to the market to get my gas bottle changed. After that I have to go and meet someone at Café Central.
- I saw you yesterday with those three. That hefty one, Hamid, is all right, but those two, they sell drugs. In Klito they all sell drugs. You know, I just wanted to say that "you should get in touch with people from your social level [*mustawā*]." ⁵⁶

Around 1 p.m. I took a seat from one of the tables placed in front of Café Central. I was waiting for 'Umar and the other guy. As they appeared I handed five dirhams to the *camarero* [waiter] and proposed to the guys that we walk towards the Barco Atlántico on the sea front. I suggested that we could start by drawing a map of the town. 'Umar's companion seemed tense at my presence. He preferred that we walk towards the almost eight-kilometres-long pine forest planted during the Spanish colonial era, in the late twenties, which borders their quarter of Klito in the al Hayy al Jadid section of the town. He said that over there we could talk without being disturbed.

I understood that we were weighing up each other's trust [*tiqa*], a frequently used word which had become familiar to me during my two previous trips to Morocco, especially in the negative expression "there is no trust". ⁵⁷

A day before 'Umar had said that by talking with me they put their trust on trial – a fact which I would have to keep in mind.

'Umar's friend: That's what we call *rudzūla*, [manliness, masculinity]. (Making snakelike movement with his hand) It means that you must not "wriggle with us". ⁵⁸

I understood very well that if I ever wanted to enter into contact with men from *sha' bī* quarters certain masculine qualities were expected from me. 'Umar's friend's statement had made me quite uneasy that evening. I remember my thoughts that night as I leaned over the wall of my roof-top flat and watched the almost deserted bus station where the last groups of people were waiting for their grand taxis to fill up for Tangiers, Tetuán, Ksar el Kebir and neighbouring villages. I worried that by opening up and offering their help those two could very well lead me into a situation where it would be difficult to back out in case I needed to reconsider the idea of working together. I understood that 'Umar's friend had this in mind when he told me not to "wriggle". They both obviously had realized that I knew no one else from the town. Neither had

⁵⁶ *khessak tkhleṭ m'a n-nās min mustawā dyalek.*

⁵⁷ *ma kaynsh tiqa.*

⁵⁸ *khessak ma thwi.*

they ever befriended a *gauri*⁵⁹ before. They said that I was the first one they had talked to for any long period of time. Of course, they said, they had guided the occasional tourist or two who visited L'araish towards the Pension Málaga or Hotel España. I certainly must have aroused their suspicion by speaking Moroccan Arabic and indicating that I was interested in talking about migrant smuggling.



Street vendors in the historic centre.

I had learned to take things very carefully at first. My first day as an apprentice of becoming street wise did not end very smoothly. During the first hour I ever spent in Tangiers, in June 1991, I managed to get myself into a situation with a *fogid* [tourist hustler] where there was no backing out. With a tough-looking friend the hustler forced me into a cellar room in Suq Sghir, the heart of Tangiers's city centre. Only by sheer luck did I manage to extricate myself from the very unpleasant incident as an elderly man wearing white *djellāba* knocked on the metal door. I remember jumping over the orange box, which served as a table, pushing the *fogid* out of my way and screaming my heart out on the street "somebody help me". I only lost my watch and the money I had with me.

⁵⁹ Gauri (fem. gauria) a slang word derived from Spanish *giri* denoting a foreigner, especially from Western Europe or America. According to one young man, Oriental people cannot be called *gauri*, and he was ambiguous in his stance concerning the Spanish. Sometimes in male discourse (jokes about sex etc.) the female offspring of returning Moroccan migrants can be called *gauria*.

It was I who first suggested that we had to talk somewhere where people were not looking at us. 'Umar's friend had suggested the pine forest. I became a little nervous only after I had noticed that 'Umar, too, was quite tense.

Entering into first discussions with young *sha'bi* men and finding manners, spaces and times to converse about migrant smuggling taught me in very concrete terms that the meanings we created through our dialogues⁶⁰ were clearly not independent of the political positions that we occupied in relation to the right to mobility in the wider global context. However, I also acknowledged the fact that dialogical understanding of ethnographic knowledge should not reduce ethnography to a mere textual play with "conversing subjects" (see de Vries 1992; Grimshaw and Hart 1995) for this would logically only distance ethnography from the lived experiences of these men. There was clearly more than dialogues going on between us. It is clear that the "dialogical performances" we carried out were at least partly separate processes from the information composing their taken-for-granted world (ibid.). These dialogues occurred between subjects who spoke from predetermined positions. These positions were not independent of power relations and interests, which were shaped by the different experiences, histories and types of knowledge we had. From the point of view of these men, issues such as the European policies of inclusion and exclusion, the emergence of migrant smuggling into Spain, massive rural-urban migration, youth unemployment, corruption and rapid population growth were all very concretely "real" experiences. They were present there in their minds and memories and they structured individual and family histories long before I ever entered into dialogue with them. Without delving into questions of how these men were positioned in the global interplay between economic and political hegemonies and peripheries I would have grasped very little of their interests, aspirations and frustrations.

⁶⁰ Ethnography has traditionally adopted culture as a system of rules, or deeper logic directing individuals' practical and mental activities (see Asad 1986; Watson 1991, 88-89). However, understanding ethnographic information as a dialogically constructed product (Dwyer K. 1982; Tedlock 1987) overcomes major paradigmatic weakness (but also a cornerstone) of much earlier ethnographic writing: the *a priori* exotic cultural otherness, waiting to be unravelled or translated by an external observer. In fact, the concern for cultural translation has been particularly vivid among a group of American anthropologists working in Morocco in the 1960s and 1970s. Moroccan society has been a focus of studies by a number of "interpretative anthropologists" (Geertz C., Geertz H., Rabinow P., Rosen L.) who have aimed to understand the cultural common-sense assumptions whereby people make sense of their social surroundings. Despite the different theoretical tunings between the individual researchers, the interpretationists have shown overall interest in underlying cultural continuities and stable social forms. The object of the studies was not primarily the Moroccan social person or his/her situated speech but the implicit meanings behind people's words and behaviours. By formulating cultural models they have sought to explain the logic of social organization in Moroccan society, and further, aimed to analyse how the models relate to social stratification and social exchange (see Chapter V).

Dialogical ethnography, in contrast to the interpretationists, adopts a radically different understanding of culture, dismantling the idea of cultural otherness, independent of the observer's eye. Rather than an objective rule system "out there", dialogical understanding takes culture as a fluid and malleable accomplishment resulting from social interaction between individuals. The function of ethnography is therefore to lay emphasis on the performance of the researcher and the subjects of research and the ways in which they both actively constitute knowledge. The dialogical approaches have furthermore sought to advocate alternative writing strategies whereby ethnographical objects could be incorporated into ethnography as active subjects composing accounts where multiple voices interact (Grimshaw and Hart 1995, 46).

Hamid, a 31-year-old mechanic, had first opened the conversation with me. He said that he had seen me reading the *Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki* newspaper at Barco Atlántico. He had thought that "he cannot be a tourist". After all, in early February there were extremely few foreign faces in the town. We bumped into each other at the post office half an hour later and soon decided to have a word at a nearby café. We headed for Café Spaboc, which was packed with men watching the Africa Cup football match between Morocco and Egypt on the TV. The air was bluish grey from heavy cigarette smoke. We found a small round table in the far corner. I sat down with Hamid, 'Umar and Radwan, who had joined us on the way. After hearing that I was in town to write a book about migration Hamid announced that he had spent five years in Spain.

Marko: Did you go by *patera* [open boat]?

Hamid: Yes.

Marko: How many were you?

Hamid: There were 29 of us. I went first to Córdoba, then after three months to Madrid.

Marko: You'll have to tell me your whole story some time.

Hamid. (Leaning towards 'Umar). We will show you everything. You will even see the places where the boats leave.

Marko: And what do you want for that? A girl from Finland?

(Hamid laughs and slaps his hand against mine).

I opened my newspaper and showed an item of news about a Moroccan migrants' convention in Spain. I said that this is the image we get in Europe; where is the life of individual migrants? As if I was showing off, I hit my hand on my chest and said, "Where is the taste of life in this?" 'Umar interrupted my attempt to talk like a man. He said that we should watch the game and talk later. He nodded his head towards a man at a neighbouring table, letting me understand that he had been observing us carefully. Continuing my tough guy act I said quietly that I am used to being listened to. Sometimes people think that foreigners are here to buy cheap hashish. Hamid said that I would have to be careful. I explained that that was why I had applied for a research permit, so that talking with me should cause no problems.

It was clear that to Hamid, Radwan, 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar my person was not independent of the symbols and structures that serve in the process of restricting migration. I never ceased to be a potential means for helping people to migrate, and this fact naturally had its effect on the tone of my communication with various categories of people. I constantly faced situations where I simply was not able to meet the needs of the people who never failed to provide me with the most highly valued resource for any researcher in anthropology: their time. Though they shared with me their life experiences I was not willing to help them with obtaining a visa to visit my country. I had explained my point of view on both legal and moral terms. I had and still have denied the men I met in L'araish any favor that might prove to be either legally or ethically difficult for them or me.

As I followed 'Umar and his companion towards the forest we first passed the cathedral-like roofed market-place built by the Spaniards, then walked by the old cemetery on the sea front, known to some Europeans because of the grave of Jean Genet, the French author and playwright, and headed along a narrow dirt road packed with people. Many were likely to be recent rural migrants from the neighbouring countryside, some from Rif and Jbala and some from even more distant places. The ground was covered with second-hand kitchen utensils and used clothes.

I decided to reveal what I had just heard that morning from the passer-by at the corner of Café Rosas:

-*Marko*: I have to think constantly what people are after when they start talking with me. Just this morning one guy warned me that you deal hashish, but quite quickly you learn to sense if someone is after something.

-*'Umar*: You know it by their face. In 90% of the cases you can tell it by their face.

I felt that the best way to ease the atmosphere of mutual testing is to open up. I said that I was here in such an awkward situation – without any acquaintances. If someone wanted something from me it would be very easy to "talk me dizzy".⁶¹ I also explained that I understand that migrant smuggling is a business comparable to international drug trafficking and of course there are people who are ready to go to any measure to protect their interests. If I followed someone to take a look at the migrant smugglers' business, as Hamid had suggested, there might always be someone who did not welcome my presence.

'Umar: As long as you are with Moroccans there is no problem. You can always say that your father is Moroccan and your mother is *barrānīya* [foreigner]. You speak our language.

We sat down by the remains of a burnt out car at the edge of the forest. In February it was still very quiet; no groups of youngsters playing football, no high school students preparing for their examinations. Occasionally a jogger passed by in the distance. Some adolescents had obviously come for a date, away from unwanted gazes.

'Umar's friend started by drawing a circle in my notebook in order to describe to me the different sections of the old centre and its surroundings. After I inquired about their section, al Hayy al Jadid, he continued:

-Here on the eastern side of the forest you have the *sha'bī* quarters, that's where the majority of migrants originate. This whole area we call al Hayy al Jadid but it's got many sections which all have their names, like Klito, Jnan al Bidawa, Jnan al Basha, Mhashas – there's so many of them. Many people over there live in sheet metal [*zanq*] houses

At three p.m., after a long discussion concerning their quarter we decided to head towards the town. I said that I felt tired of listening and writing down what they had said. I noticed that I still could not remember the name of 'Umar's friend. "'Abdel 'Ali," he said.

After my enquiry he explained that they had been friends for about twelve years. 'Umar said that they were closer to each other than to Hamid or Radwan, the other two whom I had met at Café Spaboc.

'Abdel 'Ali: Friends have to have similar conditions [*ḍurūf*]. (Continues)

-Radwan doesn't live in al Hayy al Jadid, he lives in the Spanish *medīna*, they are "in a more affluent situation".⁶² Hamid used to live opposite our house. They are both "offspring of the town".⁶³

⁶¹ *duwwekh-ni*. The verb *duwwekh*, (*dawwakha* in literary Arabic) refers among other things to conquering, subjugating, making submissive, humbling, and humiliating.

⁶² *la-bās 'la-hom*.

We said goodbye at my front door and decided to meet the following day at eleven o'clock.

The misunderstandings that occurred were not only about meanings of words and idioms that people shared with me (and with each other) but it was even more difficult to figure out the motives behind their particular narratives and self-presentations.⁶⁴ I had the feeling that over the first few days the things had proceeded curiously easily. Certainly I had not expected anyone from *sha'bi* quarters to sit down with me and talk in this manner during my first weeks in L'araish. Yet I was very far from being relaxed with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali and found myself wishing that also Radwan and Hamid had been present, too. They seemed to be much more trustworthy and easy-going. Especially 'Abdel 'Ali's reaction towards me was on occasion very tense and reserved. He had suggested that we enter the forest, making me feel that something secret was going on. I pondered his reasons for joining 'Umar to meet me. After all, he had not been present when I met 'Umar, Radwan and Hamid for the first time. 'Umar had perhaps planned to "reserve" me for himself and 'Abdel 'Ali for reasons which I naturally could only guess at. I felt that I could not make any sense of what was going on or what was said to me if the motives behind the actual words remained almost a total guess to me. However, I had no other way to proceed than to try to evaluate people's words on the basis of their circumstances but how was I to build a picture of their "real" life situations?

Negotiating social relations

Over the following days it became obvious that both 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali had personal interest in talking about migration with me. Only much later did I find out that on occasion 'Umar arranged passports for uneducated people without necessary connections and know-how to deal with the local bureaucrats. In fact, much later, in 1999, he was imprisoned for four months for counterfeiting a passport. The "toughness" of their circumstances, the bleak image of life that they gave concerning their future prospects in L'araish were at least partly means to test me. I felt that the testing was about my reactions in case they asked me to help them migrate. They were tough guys who had grown up in a quarter where anyone claiming to possess *rudzūla* had to be extremely capable of protecting his interests. This was a serious matter, they clearly wanted to say.

As we sat by the military barracks that were left deserted by the Spanish decades ago 'Umar said, facing the sea.

Everyone's destiny is *maktūb* [written; i.e. in the hands of God], if you are to drown in the sea you cannot do anything about it. [...]

You have seen us a few times walking in the streets, we wake up, we eat breakfast then we go to the streets but this same thing goes on for 15 to 20 years. You "get bored"⁶⁵, you feel

⁶³ *wlād l-blād*: 'Abdel 'Ali used the category to distinguish Hamid and Radwan from the rural migrants and to emphasize that they were born in the town.

⁶⁴ Moroccan Colloquial Arabic, *daridza*, which every student of Literary Arabic, *fusha*, knows, is in many ways a problematic language for a non-native speaker. It is nearly entirely a spoken language, and it differs considerably morphologically, syntactically, lexically and phonetically from literary Arabic, the usual "first language" of non-native students of Arabic. From the student's point of view the scarcity of advanced, appropriate and up-to-date learning material is a considerable problem. There is hardly any other possibility than learning the language in practice. Furthermore, the L'araishi dialect has adopted plenty of vocabulary from Spanish, which required at least a basic knowledge of also this language.

⁶⁵ *ka-tqent*

weak. Then your mother sees you like that – bored and "lost".⁶⁶ You're weak, not a man. Write this one down: "The one without money has bitter words and from this shit they'll get even more bitter."⁶⁷ When you leave us you go to your flat, you write, you go to sleep, but when I sleep I constantly wake up because of distress. I've got no schedule.

'Abdel 'Ali (interrupting): Without money you do not have a schedule.

'Umar: In the end you are in a situation where you do not care whether you die at sea. You see others who have gone over [to Spain]; of course it is an example.

'Abdel 'Ali: And you've got *parabol* (satellite TV) in every place.

'Umar: (grinning) I can't watch it. I'll start to cry.

'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali were both approaching thirty. I understood that 'Umar wanted to share that day some of the reasons for his frustrations – how the surrounding social reality constantly fed young men like himself and 'Abdel 'Ali with expectations which they were not *allowed* to fulfil, because of structural constraints. On the other hand, dozens – like themselves – had taken the risk to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and returned with signs of success. The courage to perform like such men 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar certainly had. There was no doubt about it, they indicated.

'Umar

'Umar was born in 1972. He is second youngest of six siblings. His father, a peasant from Twadzna, a small village west of L'araish, migrated to the town in the early 1950s. 'Umar's mother was also born outside L'araish in Grafta, a rural area north-west of the town. 'Umar's eldest sister Sa'diya is married to an unskilled construction worker who on occasions also sells fish in the street descending to the central harbour of L'araish. The couple and their five children now occupy a hut close to the central market in al Hayy al Jadid. 'Umar's sister Fatna used to work in the local bakery, and prior to her marriage she was employed by a corner milk bar in the centre of the town. Fatna married a sharecropper from the village of Hshaysha south of L'araish. In the mid-1990s the couple moved to L'araish and settled in the latest of L'araish's many shanty-towns, Guadaloupe, which gained its name after a Mexican soap opera, popular on Moroccan TV in the mid-90s. The youngest of the sisters, Rahma, also lives in L'araish; she is married to 'Abdelila, who is employed by the agricultural co-operative Loukkos. 'Umar's brother Muhammed (born in 1968) is a childhood friend and classmate of 'Abdel 'Ali's and in fact it is through him that 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar became friends. Muhammed migrated to Spain in 1991 and settled in Barcelona.

After dropping out from secondary school at the age of fifteen 'Umar started to learn car body repair and painting in three different small garages; all these opportunities were opened up by his father's and elder brother Muhammed's connections. After becoming a master [*mu'allim*] he was given a chance to take charge of a garage with a childhood friend, Khalid.

Undoubtedly 'Umar was doing very well between 1991 and 1994. Besides ordinary repair work, he said, a good source of income was to change the serial number of quality cars registered in Europe but brought back to Morocco for sale by returning migrants. In order to avoid paying import tax on the vehicles the returning migrants hired professionals like 'Umar to substitute a part taken from a Moroccan car involved in a crash for the whole piece of a car body with its serial number. The whole enterprise came to a sad end when 'Umar's and Khalid's attempt to cover the budget imbalances by counterfeit receipts failed. The owner fired both men and sought

⁶⁶ *maḍlūl*

⁶⁷ *Lli ma 'indu flūs, klāmu messūs, u min gūs ghīr yīsūs.*

a new manager who established a mechanic's garage in the premises. Until 1998 'Umar had worked only occasionally a few day's temporary assignments at various different garages. While without work 'Umar also engaged in arranging passports and other documents for potential migrants.

'Umar helped his elder brother Muhammed to obtain his passport just prior to the spring of 1991, when Spain introduced visas for incoming Moroccans. Muhammed was taken to Spain by a man named 'Annani who was from the family of his classmate and the son of another garage owner, 'Adil, with whom 'Umar had worked earlier. 'Annani had permanent residence in Great Britain. He agreed to stand bail for Muhammed upon entry to Spain if he in return promised to marry a girl from 'Adil's family, and thus ensure her later entry into Spain. Muhammed, however, never kept his word. Instead, after obtaining temporary residence and working in Barcelona in construction sites, for a bus company and gas company he had moved in with a Moroccan woman from Kenitra who lived in Spain. The couple are now officially married. Muhammed had severed relations between his family and 'Adil's, which further reduced 'Umar's chances of obtaining temporary jobs at the garage owned by 'Adil's father. Another problem had emerged: during the first years Muhammed had sent money to his father for him to finish the second-floor construction of the family home. Yet when he came for a visit he found that nothing had been done. Muhammed never found out where his father had spent the money, and returned to Spain. Later his father rented a downstairs storage room to a shopkeeper. This allowed him to finish the second floor where the family had now moved. Muhammed, for his part, had bought a piece of land from al Maghreb al Jadid – the quarter where he wanted to build his own house. Muhammed claimed that now, since the rent arrangements, his father had sufficient income and was no longer dependent on his remittances from Spain. He had also promised to arrange a Spanish work contract for 'Umar by October 1997 but 'Umar had not heard from his brother for several months and was worried that perhaps Muhammed had run into problems in Barcelona. Later, in 1998, 'Umar heard rumours that his brother had had an accident at the construction site and broken his arm.

When without work 'Umar spent much time around the town away from his quarter. He had never been abroad and his travels inside Morocco consisted only of few trips to the neighbouring towns in the north. On occasion he seemed very frustrated about his situation and often talked about his need to migrate to Europe. During the first months of my fieldwork I would often come across 'Umar in Café Lacoste, a place also frequented by 'Abdel 'Ali and his paternal relatives Habib and 'Abderrahman.

'Abdel 'Ali

'Abdel 'Ali was born in 1969. He is the youngest of three brothers and two sisters. Together with his wife Fatna (1974) and son Zakariya (1995) he now shares a sheet-metal hut built on top of a single floor concrete house occupied by his elderly parents Ahmed (born in 1933) and Rahma (born in 1939) and his elder brother Muhammed (b. 1953) with his family, wife and six children.

'Abdel 'Ali's grandfather Huwari (1898-1990) together with his four brothers dwelled in the "family village" Risana south - west of L'araish. Besides subsistence farming, as a young man Huwari had engaged in trade in honey, beans and seeds, often extending his trips to L'araish in the north and over the Spanish-French territorial border south of Risana. His brother Mustafa was employed by a Spanish agricultural company, and Slimane considerably younger brother, the only completely literate of the brothers was a *fqih*, a Koran school teacher, a leader of prayers and also known as a particularly gifted healer with godly charisma [*baraka*]. Huwari's eleven

children from his two marriages were born between 1930 and 1971. Only one of Huwari's and his four brothers' 19 children who were born prior to 1960 received any modern schooling. In fact, until the mid-seventies, when the first primary school was opened in 'Awamira, the only option to gain modern education was to attend school in L'araish – a possibility which a mere fraction of 'Abdel 'Ali's family born prior to 1970 had enjoyed. Huwari married for a second time after the death of his first wife in the early 1950s and it is exactly at this period that his elder sons Muhammed and Ahmed, 'Abdel 'Ali's father, establish their separate households. Ahmed's arrival in L'araish appears to have occurred sometime between 1952 and 1955. A few years later the elder brother Muhammed arrived in L'araish and opened a small grocery store in Jnan al Bidawa quarter. The youngest of Huwari's sons, and the only one with a modern education, 'Abderrazzaq (b.1948) stayed in Ahmed's household in L'araish during his studies, later entered teachers' college, worked for a while in Nador and settled with his nuclear family in al Hayy al Jadid in 1978. These three households also hosted several mostly male children from the larger family who entered primary school in L'araish.

Prior to Moroccan independence 'Abdel 'Ali's father Ahmed worked with a German constructor, then as an assistant in a local hospital. Some years later he started to work with a Spanish constructor. After independence in 1956 the constructor returned to Spain. Ahmed started to transport agricultural products from Risana to L'araish, assisted by his father and his brothers Bouselham and Qaddur. In the early 1980s he returned to construction work. Ahmed's eldest sons Muhammed (born in 1953) and Mustafa (b.1959) completed primary school and started to help their father at the construction sites. 'Abdel 'Ali is the only one of Ahmed's children with a high school certificate, which he gained in 1991 at the age of 22, after failing several classes. 'Abdel 'Ali had started working full time at constructions specializing in concrete reinforcement, a skill which he learned from working with his father and two brothers. The introduction of housing programmes and the first investments of the new wave of international migrants revived construction activities in the quarter throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The construction sector in the area, however, underwent a gradual downslide after 1994 (in fact there were no longer any empty plots of land in the immediate vicinity).

'Abdel 'Ali's father is the only one of the six full brothers and sisters who in 1998 did not have any offspring earning income abroad. The migration practices in the family were centrally channelled through three key persons. The first international migrant was 'Abdel 'Ali's father's paternal cousin Muhammed, who had been recruited to work in Germany in the early sixties. After several years working in a meat-processing factory in Germany he settled in Terrassa in Catalonia in the early 1970s. The second batch took place just prior to the introduction of entrance visas in Spain nearly two decades later. 'Abdel 'Ali's uncle Muhammed's son 'Abdelhaqq (b. 1963) together with his second cousin 'Abdel 'Aziz entered Terrassa in 1987 and 1989. Over the following decade it is these three persons who became key figures in arranging the crossing of over a dozen new migrants in the family, establishing a connection between Terrassa and L'araish – this, however, would not have been possible without the help of 'Abdelhaqq's elder brother Hmed, who thanks to his connections with the town administration played a central role in nearly a dozen individual crossings.

It is more than likely that the examples set by the "key figures" providing links between Terrassa and L'araish had a profound impact upon the lives of young men such as 'Abdel 'Ali. However, kinship did not seem to provide clearly defined channels for assistance between Spain and L'araish. On the contrary, migration provided new expectations, demands, disagreements and disputes within the larger family. The patterns of help facilitating actual migration between Terrassa and L'araish seem to "flow" centrally from elder brother to younger brother (or half

brother) or sister (who are in all cases within the family, either unmarried or divorced upon their migration), from husband to his wife and children⁶⁸ to his sister's husband and to a man's own parents. In the case of more distant relations the favours usually require money. 'Abdel 'Ali had several times asked for financial help from both his paternal and maternal uncles and cousins residing in Spain and Italy to finance his trip but they had continuously refused their help. 'Abdel 'Ali assumed that they were afraid that a newcomer would prove to be a more successful worker than the older migrants. They, he explained, "always have to stay above you".⁶⁹ He assumed that if he just managed to arrive in Spain the family members simply could not refuse their help.

The fact that 'Abdel 'Ali and his brothers did not have close links with Terrassa severely diminished their possibilities of crossing to Spain. On the other hand, a dispute between the brothers reduced the family's options for financing the first crossing. The marriage of 'Abdel 'Ali's brother Mustafa to a neighbouring girl in 1989 was not welcomed by his parents. Mustafa and his wife had to leave the family home, whereas the elder brother Muhammed and his family were allowed to stay. The couple had occupied a small flat belonging to the family of Mustafa's mother-in-law. The dispute worsened to a point where Mustafa and 'Abdel 'Ali refused to work with their brother Muhammed, who was seen by both as their parents' favourite. 'Abdel 'Ali also claimed that Muhammed had hid money from their joint projects and passed it on to his wife's father, who is also his paternal uncle. Due to these disputes the family lost most of their connections with the local constructors and the father Ahmed gave up working in the construction business. Mustafa, together with his wife, sold the flat and attempted to enter Spain via Ceuta in 1993. Without trustworthy connections he was fooled by the middlemen, spent nearly 30 days trapped in Ceuta and lost his money.⁷⁰ In 1998 he lived with his wife and five children in one of the shanty-towns of Tangiers and economically was going through a very difficult period. Occasionally he provided a middleman, also from the family but operating in the 'Awamira region with youngsters wishing to take a *harrāga* trip, until the man was caught and arrested for trial in June 1998. In fact on one occasion I came across adolescents from Fes who were offered lodging by 'Abdel 'Ali while they were still waiting for Mustafa to make preparations for their crossing. However, 'Abdel 'Ali never revealed to me whether he played any role in Mustafa's activities.

'Abdel 'Ali's father had entirely given up construction work and in 1998 was selling vegetables three times a week in the central market of the quarter. He spent plenty of time, often whole nights, on the nearby rocky beaches on his fishing trips. The eldest of the brothers, Muhammed took on occasional construction assignments in the villages of 'Awamira, but the tensions between the brothers had developed to a degree that 'Abdel 'Ali was still very reluctant to work with his brother.

⁶⁸ In most cases the migrant men in the family were single upon migration but married within one to five years after entering Spain. All the single migrant men married women who upon marriage still resided in Morocco. Among the rural households the men were more likely to leave their wives in Morocco for several years than within the urban households. This tendency was also associated with the social closeness between the spouses: especially wives who were closely related to migrant men were left in Morocco. Among the rural households the marriages of migrant men were to a father's brother's daughter (one case), a mother's sister's daughter (one case), a father's father's brother's son's daughter (one case) and to daughters of neighbouring families. None of the marriages of the men who resided in L'araish prior to migration were based on kinship, but rather took place with friends' or work partners' sisters or daughters (three cases). Especially the more educated urban men were likely to facilitate their wife's and children's migration after three to four years from marriage.

⁶⁹ *kness-hum ibqaw l-fūq.*

⁷⁰ See more about Mustafa's attempt to migrate in Chapter VI.

'Abdel 'Ali had married Fatna (b.1974), a younger sister of his long-time friend Tayyib (b.1965) in 1995, when there were still occasional work opportunities for construction workers in the quarter. After the birth of their only child Zakariya one year later job opportunities in the quarter worsened drastically and 'Abdel 'Ali worked for a short period in a large construction site in Tangiers. Due to tensions between the brothers 'Abdel 'Ali's wife, too, was clearly avoiding close contact with the family members living downstairs. 'Abdel 'Ali's and Fatna's everyday life was very much oriented towards Fatna's parents' household. Nearly every day prior to lunch at least one of his sisters Amina (b.1971), Sa'diya (b. 1960) Zahra (b. 1959) and Hafida (b. 1975) would stop by for a short visit, often accompanied by their children. From 8 p.m. onwards Fatna and Zakariya usually spent their time at her parents' sheet-metal hut, some hundred metres away. Very often, after our evening promenades around the town I would join 'Abdel 'Ali and spend the night at Fatna's parents' house. This large household became my "family" in L'araish.

Fatna's father was born in L'araish in 1927. He spent his early childhood in the town. As a teenager he worked for a German constructor and drove a truck between L'araish and Tangiers. From the 1950s onwards until his retirement he had worked on several fishing boats in L'araish. He is now officially retired but works as a night-watch-man at the fishing harbour. His wife was born in the neighbouring town of Asila but worked for several years at two restaurants owned by a Spaniard who over the years had become a close friend of the family.

Fatna has five brothers and four sisters. Her eldest brother lives in Asila and works at the prison administration in Tetuán; the others still resided in L'araish in 1998. Sister Zahra together with her family lives in the historic centre. She is married to 'Abdessamed, a fisherman and a boat owner who on occasion works with migrant smugglers. Daughters Sa'diya and Amina and son Anwar (b. 1960) together with their spouses and children, occupied their own sheet-metal huts on the same property but with separate entrances. Son Tayyib (b. 1968), works as a civil servant at the administration office in the provincial prison. Together with his wife and two children he lived at his parents' house together with his two younger brothers Hisham (b. 1976) and Khalid (b. 1982) and divorcee sister Amina (b. 1971).

After the first weeks I was far from convinced that I would be able to overcome the tensions that I felt while I was with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali. I had tried to look for Radwan and Hamid but they were both busy at work – Radwan on the fishing boats and Hamid in a garage. The few times when we made an appointment in Café Central they did not show up. However, I felt assured that the only way I could have at least a chance to enter young men's networks in the Klito quarter was that I had no outside assistants directing me to particular people. I did not want to be associated with anyone, especially people from a more bourgeois background, whose reputation and social connections in the quarter I did not know. Being introduced by the wrong person could have easily made me an object of suspicion, which would have been difficult to overcome. The multiplicity of my positions became especially clear when I realized that the politics of migration not only affected my relations with various categories of informants but also with members of the academic world. I had been offered invaluable help, useful requests and comments by several Moroccan researchers. Often I have felt that my somewhat odd nationality for studying these issues opened many doors and made me less suspect. However, exactly the opposite had also happened. On two occasions discussions with researchers ended up in a heated debate: projects such as mine, I was accused, were utilized by European migration policy-makers to control Moroccans. Students like myself were only promoting their future careers in official institutions, which formulate the future of migration policy in Europe, I was accused. Politics were also present when dealing with "home". The chargé d'affaires at the Finnish Consulate in

Rabat expressed interest in my study and proposed the idea that I apply for a position in the Finnish Foreign Ministry to monitor the developments concerning migration and Islamic movements in North Africa. Quickly I found myself cruising from shanty-town to the consulate's garden party, bombarded by expectations to call the personal secretary of the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights to talk about my research. This was the lesson *par excellence* that doing fieldwork never occurs in a political vacuum.

I wondered how I could ease the reciprocal feelings of testing between myself, 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar. Especially with 'Abdel 'Ali I felt very awkward when saying anything, asking questions or commenting on his words. How to react to someone's narrations concerning the toughness of his circumstances, frustrations concerning unemployment and urges to migrate following the example of others and at the same time feel that these words are indirect ways to say "Why don't you help me?" The setting made me feel that there was something deeply immoral about my whole presence. I could not clearly explain myself why I felt like that. I knew very well that there would not be any feeling of easiness between us if we did not talk directly about our reasons for working together. The only thing that prevented me from saying this was the fact that I was far from convinced that I would have the strength to keep on meeting with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali.

Without knowing whether I was doing the right thing I suggested to 'Abdel 'Ali that we could reach an agreement. As 'Abdel 'Ali had been several weeks without work, I expressed to him that I needed someone to assist me with the language and acquaint me with the *sha'bī* quarters. Despite my considerable fluency in Moroccan Arabic I had to admit that over the previous years I had associated primarily with university students and thus there were several aspects of the local dialect of the *sha'bī* men which were far from familiar to me. I considered seriously whether this "agreement" would only create additional ethical problems concerning my research. Far from having reached any final solution, I thought, I could not do anything about our differing and in many ways unequal situations. I had the right to come and go from country to country; 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar did not. I had to take it as a fact that it is considered not only a crime to assist in migration without documents but, more importantly, it is dangerous. Was I to pay for information from 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali now? I felt that at least the conditions under which information appeared and was recorded in my notes was something I could control. I did not want our working together to create situations where I would dominate the course of our relations or give the impression that because I paid 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali they would be assistants and I the boss. I hoped that perhaps I could help them understand that they were the experts and I the one who is an apprentice concerning this social world. I wanted to show them that I was grateful for their help. On the other hand, I felt that only by making a "deal" I could show that I could be trusted and that I would stand behind my words.

Finally, after considerable negotiation, we agreed that 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar would help me first for a month; we would meet three times a week and I would pay both of them roughly the sum that a construction worker such as 'Abdel 'Ali earned in similar hours of work on a construction site.

Relations between 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar quickly worsened towards a conflict that cooled their relationship and made it impossible for me to see 'Umar, or his friends, such as Hamid and Radwan without severing my contacts with 'Abdel 'Ali. I believe that my presence was at least partly responsible for the disagreement between the two. After about three weeks of working together 'Umar obtained a temporary assignment through Khalid, a friend with whom he had run a garage owned by a migrant in Holland a few years back. The job took place in a small garage

on the slope of the L'araish-Tangiers road. As the *l-'īd l-kbīr* feast⁷¹ was approaching 'Abdel 'Ali, for his part, was growing more concerned as to how to buy a sacrificial lamb for the feast. Despite the fact that 'Umar was now working and thus unable to join us he demanded that 'Abdel 'Ali share the money that I paid for his work with me. "'Umar claims that it is he who found you," 'Abdel 'Ali explained. 'Abdel 'Ali felt that he was being treated unjustly but explained that he wanted to preserve his friendship with 'Umar and thus had to be flexible with him. Conscious of our recent negotiations over the definition of our "deal" he had started to treat me with a certain wariness. As he opened his explanations with the words "You should not get nervous", I knew what to expect. We would enter into another negotiation concerning the definition of our relationship. For the following weeks it appeared to me that 'Abdel 'Ali put great effort into assuring me that I should choose him as a working partner instead of 'Umar. He started to provide me with "confidential" information, dramatic news with surprising turns, often starting his sentences with the words "make sure that 'Umar doesn't hear about this", or "remember that this is just between us". However, the friction between 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali deepened the understanding between us two. At least 'Abdel 'Ali was now able to observe to whom I showed my loyalty, or if my opinions concerning 'Abdel 'Ali could be changed by a third party.

As the misunderstanding between 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar worsened another problem emerged. 'Umar had run into trouble while arranging a passport for a man in his quarter and turned to 'Abdel 'Ali for help. Unable to solve the problem, 'Abdel 'Ali felt that 'Umar had put pressure on him. The people in question had been led to understand that somehow 'Abdel 'Ali was responsible for the problems. Due to this frictions 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali started to avoid each other's company.

My friendship with 'Abdel 'Ali took a long time to mature. We proceeded through disagreements, negotiations and occasional tensions but at least we started to see that we were not intending to harm each other. The first step was that over the first month 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali internalized their roles as experts. "There is no need to talk to anyone else, of course you can do as you wish but you will regret it," they told me.

After the first month in L'araish I made the acquaintance of many other young men from the quarters closer to the centre of the town. These contacts were opened through 'Aziz, a 28-year-old unemployed university graduate who had written a study concerning urban planning in the town. These young men were usually high school graduates and from more affluent families. Because of their more secure material backgrounds it was easier for me to explain to 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar why I had found other acquaintances. Despite the fact that these men, too, were often unemployed and eager to migrate, their future prospects were in many respects far brighter than 'Umar's and 'Abdel 'Ali's. I expressed to them that these others were by no means familiar with *sha'bī* life as they were; however their different perspectives were also important if I was ever to understand this social world. Only later did I realize that by compensating 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali financially for their help I had unconsciously allocated them a specific status. It never even occurred to me to find other assistants or directly compensate any other person for their help. Especially during the first months my meetings with 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar involved detailed discussion concerning their families and kin, their professional histories and the social composition of various urban quarters. The meetings with all my other companions were much more open and spontaneous in nature. Throughout the period I spent in L'araish I kept these two

⁷¹ The Feast of Immolation.

sets of social relations separate from each other. I learned that in fact very few young men such as 'Aziz ever paid visits to the poorest quarters.

Through 'Aziz I got to know L'arbi (b.1968), who in 1998 was finishing his master's degree dissertation in geography at the University Mohammed V in Rabat concerning the effects of international migration on regional development in his hometown of L'araish. After our first meetings L'arbi invited me to join a research trip to nearby villages, where he was assisting his professor's survey concerning patterns of migration in the rural areas. We visited several rural households in the 'Awamira region, which had witnessed rapid increase in migrant smuggling only since the mid-1990s .

After a few meetings, exchanging ideas concerning our studies, L'arbi – being an easy-going and sociable character – started to integrate me into his very large circle of friends. The majority of these men, all in their twenties and early thirties, were from more well off families than my companions from the al Hayy al Jadid quarter. Though many of them came from *sha'bi* quarters, they like L'arbi, lived in concrete houses surrounded by sheet-metal huts. L'arbi's father, a high school principal, had migrated to L'araish from the Jbala region north of L'araish. Four of his brothers had migrated to London in 1961 but still visited L'araish annually.

Rachid, L'arbi's 26-year-old younger brother, became one of my closest friends. He had majored in geology and graduated from the University of Tetuán in 1994 but had not found work suitable for his qualifications. He had also sent several applications to universities in Britain, Belgium and Spain to continue his studies, but without success. In 1991 as the rumours concerning the introduction of entrance visas by the Spanish authorities started to circulate among students in Tetuán, Rachid told that several of his friends had left for Spain. At that time the residents of Tetuán were able to cross over to Ceuta without a passport and then they arranged contacts with migrant smugglers who took them over to Spain.

Since his graduation Rachid had worked as a substitute teacher and taken a temporary job in the sugar mill in the nearby 'Awamira region. In 1998 he offered printing and editing services to other L'araish-based university students thanks to his computer at home – in 1998 still a rare currency in the town. An incident in 1998 changed Rachid's future drastically. A distant relative, 23-year-old Halima (from the family of his paternal uncle's wife), came to spend the summer holiday in L'araish after eight years in London. The respective families approved of the idea that Rachid should become engaged to Halima and join the other family members in London. I attended the couple's party following the signing of the marriage contract and through letters kept up with how things were going. Finally, in February 1999, after nearly six months of paperwork Rachid obtained a visa for London.

Also, L'arbi himself had made preparations for migration to London. He planned to apply for a visa to visit his relatives in London after graduation, taking his future wife with him. He had agreed on the conditions of marriage with Ilham, his student friend from Rabat but originally from al Hoceima. However, the couple split up. While L'arbi was still carrying out his survey in L'araish Ilham had agreed to marry a 42-year-old civil servant from her native town. L'arbi finally gained his degree in the spring of 1999. Since that day he had joined the hundreds of unemployed university graduates who had set up camp in the centre of Rabat and carried out demonstrations several months in the latter half of 1999. While the demonstrations were still going on he managed to obtain a position in the Ministry of Housing and Constructions. Today he lives in Rabat.

The politics of confronting class boundaries

As I had no previous contacts with L'araish, the realization of the whole project would not have been possible without the help offered by my long-time friend Mbarek. I had met him, then a law student, in 1991 at Muhammed V University campus in Rabat while I was undertaking studies at the university's summer programme in Arabic. I had visited his hometown Ksar el Kebir, neighbouring on L'araish 27 km. to the southeast, several times. We spent a large part of August 1992 camping together with a number of Mbarek's friends in Moulay Bouselham, a beautiful beach village further south down the coastline from L'araish. Thanks to Mbarek and his friends my linguistic and social capabilities developed to a degree that it was relevant to think of doing research in Morocco.

Mbarek is the youngest son from a successful chain of nine siblings. Unlike many of his age group, he had not faced an extended period of unemployment and economic dependence from his household since graduation from the university. After the death of his father in 1984, his elder brothers, (medical doctor and airline pilot), took care of the family budget. Mbarek had managed to negotiate himself personal liberties that were unheard of to others in the family when at the similar age. He was the first to smoke inside the house or to have a girlfriend visiting his home prior to the signing of the marriage contract. I had observed at close quarters how he cleverly adjusted his words and behaviours as he moved between different social contexts – from leisure to the domestic, from a drinking session with friends to meetings within his large and respected family that traced its genealogy back to Andalusia with plenty of "cultural capital", as I heard one of my friends from Rabat characterizing the family. By 1998 he had established his own and obviously very successful office as a lawyer in the neighbouring town. Mbarek had taken the responsibility to stay permanently at the old family house to look after his mother. He had also engaged a daughter of wealthy medical doctor from Mohammedia who studied business administration in Rabat. The signing of the marriage contract was to take place before August 1998 so that the couple could spend the summer holiday together.

Prior to my arrival in L'araish Mbarek managed to arrange me two rooms from a very basic rooftop flat in the heart of the section of the town that dates back to the Spanish colony. My landlord Rachid was Mbarek's neighbour in Ksar el Kebir, a 32-year-old law graduate from a wealthy merchant family. We agreed upon a very reasonable price "for Mbarek's face"⁷² as Rachid said, on the condition that Rachid could use the smallest room. Especially over the summer months Rachid visited me frequently, often with a female companion and practically lived a few days almost weekly in the smaller of the rooms.

It took a few days before I understood that while Mbarek and his fiancée Sa'ida assisted me in cleaning and painting the rooms and bringing in some basic furniture we had engaged in construction of the subjects of my study. We were speaking of the people of the southern quarters of the town as "them", "the ones who go with *ḥarrāga*".⁷³ I later noticed that some of the cafés I had started to frequent were interpreted by Sa'ida as "*sha'bi*" places. In their language *sha'b* appeared not only as a term connoting poverty and being socially and economically marginal⁷⁴ but also being dirty,⁷⁵ backward,⁷⁶ "lacking general awareness",⁷⁷ over-crowdedness⁷⁸

⁷² *la wudzh Mbarek.*

⁷³ *lli ka- ḥarrgu.*

⁷⁴ *hāmishī*

⁷⁵ *mwessekh*

⁷⁶ *mutakhallif*

⁷⁷ *ghir wā'ī*

⁷⁸ *zhām*

and "cunningness"⁷⁹. Yet Sa'ida and Mbarek like many other wealthier youngsters saw the *sha'b* also as representatives of traditional "real" Morocco.

Mbarek and Sa'ida were quite surprised at the selection of people I had chosen to share my time with. It was somehow distressing to understand how different a domain of Morocco I was to enter through 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar. I started to try to situate Mbarek and the people I knew through him within the stereotypes concerning social strata. Many of my acquaintances in the neighbouring Ksar el Kebir, who had been unemployed in the summer of 1992 were now doing extremely well. The social networks based on kin, neighbourliness and extended closeness of families had ensured them entrance to the labour market as higher civil servants or runners of family enterprises. Sa'id from Ksar el Kebir who was in 1992 called by his friends "the guy who has a Europe fever", back then unemployed university drop out, now took charge of his father's textile businesses, wore fancy club jackets and on occasions coasted around the streets of L'araish with his red sports-car. Muhammed, also my long-time friend from Ksar el Kebir was soon to be appointed judge in one of the smaller towns in the Tetuán province. I realized that the experiences I had shared with these people would be very different from what was to come. I understood very well that it would not be wise to use their social connections if I ever wanted to associate in a casual way with people from *sha'bi* quarters.

Mbarek himself considered even the possibility of engaging in "their" lives with great suspicion. Mbarek's and my landlord's Rachid's perception of my odd interest in the life of the *sha'b* also materialized in many goodhearted jokes that were directed at me. As we ran out of white paint and had to leave the ceiling untouched, Mbarek said that my room "is suitable for an anthropologist". After completing the preparation of my room we went to the nearby beach and I was asked to pose for a scenic photo, which was to be on the cover of my book. We spent a very pleasant day on the deserted beach. Time and after again I was asked to photograph the seemingly infatuated couple posing inside a heart drawn on the sand with their initials inside it, jumping up and down in the air, hand in hand, and running around barefoot in the cool February breeze. The whole day we would return to making jokes about what was to be the title of my book: we ended up with either "The City of Violent Love" or "The Town of Pigeon Droppings".

During the first months of my stay Mbarek passed by at my flat nearly every week. Occasionally we visited his sister's family's huge three-story villa on the outskirts of L'araish or another married sister in Tangiers. Our conversations offered me a possibility to express my anxieties about the progress of my research. Mbarek, by his opinions represented a kind of mirror reflection of what I had experienced. It was very interesting to hear Mbarek's warnings and interpretations concerning the situations that I had run into with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali. After all they had, Mbarek said, in mind the idea how to utilize me for their own good. From his warnings I got the impression that the whole social sphere is full of potential dangers. I should not go to the forest nor the beach for runs by myself because kids from Klito "go there to take *pastillas* ["pills" i.e. drugs] and they may be carrying knives", he warned me. Upon my first visit to one family in Klito my landlord Rachid said: "You must know that Klito is the crime centre of L'araish". Sa'ida had commented that same situation saying "aren't you afraid?" One of Mbarek's friends was seemingly surprised that even the sheet-metal huts had satellite TVs. These comments were not only a result of my lack of familiarity with L'araish. I learned to understand that mistrust of strangers, avoidance of strange quarters and unoccupied spaces around the town were salient features of the whole social exchange.

⁷⁹ *tkharwīd*

After about a month of my arrival Mbarek said that he wanted to meet 'Abdel 'Ali. I refused, not only in order to protect his anonymity, but I was also worried that suggestions to meet with a lawyer would only raise the suspicion of 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali.

It was only after approximately four weeks since my arrival that I fully understood the position of my dwelling within the social landscape. I lived on the rooftop of the *wakīl l-malik* ["king's delegate"] of the town who, among other duties, served as the public prosecutor at the municipal law court. Had I known to whom Rachid's family was renting the flat downstairs I would have considered carefully whether the house was a wise choice. My friends from the southern parts of the town never explicitly asked about my relations to my neighbour but from the beginning – I had understood that my neighbour is just an ordinary lawyer – I attempted to be very quiet and somewhat restrained in my behaviour towards my neighbours. It took me nearly four months before I asked 'Abdel 'Ali for the first visit to my flat. This resulted partly from the fact that I did not want to raise the suspicion of my neighbours and also my landlord Rachid, who had the habit of frequenting my lodgings without a prior notice.

At first our meetings with Mbarek were very therapeutic situations for me. I felt that I could express the anxieties from our first meetings with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali. I also had someone to talk to concerning the ethical problems arising from my research. I sensed that Mbarek's reaction towards me changed after hearing that I had started to help 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar economically. He seemed to suggest that by doing that I was only furthering the gap between us. He hinted that I had created an unbalanced power situation where 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali were "paying back by offering information", as he said. I refused to see our relation in this light. I thought that there is nothing that I can do about the inequalities present in our meetings due to my being a citizen of an EU country. I failed to see how could I diminish these inequalities. Refusing to compensate their help at all would certainly not offer a solution. I noticed that my relation with Mbarek received a political undercurrent after these discussions. I am afraid that Mbarek started to see my relation with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali very much in the light of encounter between the colonialist and colonized: my relation towards 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali was a Western employer - African employed situation where the side possessing the money set the tone of the interaction. I was able to do with them "whatever I wanted", as he once said. I fear that Mbarek started to also look at my relation towards him through the same lens. I tried to restore our relations by saying that, of course, our perceptions concerning my relation with 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar is partly shaped by the social surroundings that we have lived in. Mbarek rejected my points of view very strongly. He suggested that true friendship overcomes cultural differences and by talking about human personalities as subjects to cultural and social processes I only interpret our personas as representatives of political entities and in that situation I raise obstacles between us. After about four months Mbarek stopped visiting me completely. The situation was worsened also by the fact that I felt that Sa'ida had started to perceive me as a competitor occupying too much Mbarek's attention. I had tried calling him without success. After receiving news from my landlord about Mbarek's engagement party with Sa'ida, I was surprised by the fact that I was not invited.

I am nowhere near finding the solution to the ethical problems present in the politics of representation of my experiences in L'araish. I wish to avoid the marginalizing narratives prevalent in many writings concerning the urban poor but instead present the discourses and the practices of the subjects of this study in a manner that places their lives in the interface between individual agency and oppressive practices. Some young men, whether I encountered them in the *sha'bī* quarters of L'araish, on the streets of Barcelona or in migrant cafés in Terrassa, faced extreme distress in their lives. I cannot deny the fact that sometimes the reality was extremely

demanding to meet. I have sometimes reacted with anger, sometimes with depression to what I have seen and heard concerning the obstacles they have met in their lives. This reality includes dead bodies of youngsters washed upon the Spanish shores of Almería, Cádiz and Tarifa, fears of deportation and racist attacks, drug dealing, bribery and violence.

I am aware that the ways in which some of the people in this study exhibit agency over their lives may sometimes counter the moral values of middle-class Western readers or perhaps aggravate the Middle Eastern reader. Perhaps some might think that I am giving the Moroccans a "bad name". I worry that parts of the material that I gained from the people who decided to share their time with me and talked about their lives can be seen as negative stereotypes and utilized as fuel for the "yellow press" or construction of anti-migrant sentiments in Europe. Yet I do not believe that ethical problems of representation could be simply wiped away by refusing to name the actual ways in which people struggle against the (national or international) discriminatory practices and on the other hand how I struggled to meet with such reality. I believe, that if anything, this kind of editing would be a serious ethical problem in itself. I must say this even if I understand that sometimes the line between "participant observation" and "revealing politically sensitive information" becomes very thin. I can only ease the ethical "load" of these questions by having made clear to myself where my own judgment stands. If I have to name one single underlying motive of writing this study it is to show that the inequality in relation to people's movement across national borders has far-reaching and often tragic social effects. The attempts to freeze peoples' mobility can never be complete, but instead, in the present situation they created a market for migrant smuggling, exploitation and overt discrimination, which sets the scene for tremendous sacrifices in human terms in both Morocco and Spain. I believe it is my responsibility to not to scandalize or to sanitize the information that I heard and saw. The final responsibility, what to emphasize, how to interpret, what to select and quote is in the minds of the reader.

This chapter returned us to the streets through the medium of participant observation ethnography. I have examined how inequality and discrimination in migration shapes the contradictory nature of everyday discourses and actions, including the conduct and construction of the ethnographic material itself.

Chapter IV addresses in more detail the complex and multiple ways in which belonging and loyalty are constructed in the *sha'bi* setting. It interrogates "narratives of betweenness", including the relevance of engagement with bureaucrats and bureaucracies, and the exemplification of "betweennesses" through men's practices of joking.

CHAPTER IV

Between past and present, between Morocco and Spain

The following pages result from questions which constantly came to mind throughout the project. What is the meaning of home and belonging to these men in between Morocco and Spain? What are the processes for the creation of unbounded community which transcends the sociability of the coffee-houses, the streets and the quarters of L'araish, and what are its constituents? It became clear that people, still residents in L'araish at the time of the fieldwork, candidates for migration, returning or visiting migrants from Terrassa or other places and recent rural-urban migrants constructed a whole variety of contradictory and ambiguous ways to talk about home, identity and community. Answers to the question who belongs to home, who can be considered one of "us", received an equal variety of interpretations. The social boundaries in this respect seemed no less ambiguous and contradictory than the geopolitical border separating Morocco from Spain.

In order to turn the very confused and confusing relation of the *sha'bi* men to the notions of home and belonging into an ethnographical text I had to turn to multiple sources. Besides containing discussions with informants on personal and family histories, their spontaneous comments and narratives attached to different social features of the community, this chapter makes use of various other sources, such as popular Moroccan literature, comedy tapes, and popular jokes. Multiple sources required multiple styles of writing. In the following I constantly move between ethnographic eyewitness report, abstract analytical language and a variety of quotations drawn from different sources.

Terrassa 24.4. 2000

Over the first week of the three-month period that I spent with migrants from L'araish province in Catalonia in the spring of 2000, I met the NGO activist 'Uthman, originally from Ksar el Kebir, L'araish's neighbouring town. He had studied sociology at the University of Tetuán but had been expelled because of his political activities in the leftist student organisation. In 1991 he migrated to Spain and commenced his studies at the University of Granada. However, shortly afterwards he dropped out from the university because of financial problems. After several shorter periods spent in greenhouses in the Almería region, 'Uthman arrived in Terrassa in 1994. As a series of racial clashes broke out between Moroccan migrants and long-term residents in Terrassa, in July 1999, 'Uthman soon became one of the most visible members of the Moroccan community. Being active in human rights, anti-racism and migrant organisations he had been interviewed several times for the national and international media.

The violence started in Ca N' Anglada, a quarter located a few kilometres away from 'Uthman's flat. The area in question hosts over 25% of the some 2,000 Moroccan migrants in Terrassa. Since the mid-1990s Ca N' Anglada had witnessed continuous social friction, and it soon became a target of criticism and frustration on the part of the long-term residents. According to the letters to the editor in local newspapers, drug dealing and sexual harassment of the local women by Moroccans had repeatedly annoyed the residents of the quarter (Moyano 2000, 17-18). The racial clashes had flamed from a fist-fight between Moroccan and local youngsters at a public folk festival on 11.7. 1999 and soon attracted several national media to the area. The first three days of continuous unrest received no public recognition from the town's administration. The situation became considerably more critical as groups of skinheads arrived from neighbouring Sabadel and Barcelona, extending their attacks towards reporters of the national news agencies. Finally,

the town mayor had called for additional help from a special body of the security forces, the *Unidad de Intervención Policial*. One hundred and fifty policemen established themselves in the quarter. By 18.7. eight persons suspected of involvement in the incidents had been arrested.

On the day of our meeting 'Uthman came to pick me up from Terrassa railway station with his friend Abdessamed, who had moved from Ksar el Kebir to Düsseldorf, Germany a few years earlier and was on his way to visit several of his Moroccan friends now living in different locations around Spain.

On the way to 'Uthman's flat we passed several huge construction sites with anarchist A signs, swastikas and anti-government graffiti daubed on the concrete walls. 'Uthman had told me earlier that a number of large textile factories had recently been demolished in the heart of the town. Since the clashes in July 1999 he told me, these large construction sites no longer sought cheap labour in the ranks of the Moroccans in the town. The job situation had worsened considerably.

'Uthman rented a large ground-floor flat in a small and neat-looking, relatively new apartment house – much nicer than I had expected. Spacious couches covered nearly a quarter of the living room. A television, satellite receiver, and VCR were all placed on a solid bookshelf. I exchanged greetings with 'Uthman's elder brother 'Abdu, who had lived in the country without a residence permit since 1997, and his Polish girlfriend Claudia, also without documents, who had joined the others only some six months earlier.

I had told 'Uthman earlier that I would like to see some of his video recordings from Spanish television concerning racial clashes in both Terrassa and El Ejido. In the El Ejido reportage the camera wandered through worn-out flats, deserted industrial halls and shaky huts – all occupied by Moroccan youth working in the greenhouses of the area. One young man told the interviewer that he constantly informed his family in Morocco that everything was OK – "why make them worry, they have their own problems there". On two occasions 'Uthman pointed to the interviewed youngster saying, "I know him, he is from Ksar el Kebir". A Spanish reporter asked a Moroccan teenager whether he was afraid – after all this violence. The boy answered, "When you have risked your life to cross the sea, how can you be afraid of anything?" The camera also followed a man who had just welcomed his wife and children to El Ejido. His dwelling had neither water nor electricity; the interview was carried out in candlelight. "Nobody is willing to give a room for rent," the man commented. 'Uthman added that if the man speaks the truth – that he had been there twenty years, he must have "plenty of money hidden in Morocco".⁸⁰

Why do they only live for their future? I asked 'Uthman. "Because others evaluate you according to what you have,"⁸¹ he answered. Then he started to relate how migrants lack "trust" in Morocco. Very few invest their money in Morocco for "security reasons".⁸² "They just build a house and leave it empty." "Many people make the mistake that they do not settle here properly," he added. I then asked what was the secret of his success. "I was first in Granada, I had this much money (stretching out his arms) and it kept on running out. I did not profit anything from it."⁸³ When all is gone I think I will just die."

⁸⁰ *flūs bezzāf mkhebbi' f l-maghreb.*

⁸¹ *N-nās qaddru shnu lli 'indek.*

⁸² *masāil amnīya.*

⁸³ *ma rbeht wālu.*

On occasion 'Uthman said, he had worked in El Ejido's greenhouses, some weeks at a time, but the wages, he said, did not allow him to save anything. "I had two chances – to move to Terrassa or to go back home. When I came here I lived in exactly the same conditions as those you just saw [on the television]."

He explained that the secret of his success was that after two years in Terrassa he was able to rent a flat of his own. He also said that living with other Moroccans only "brings trouble".⁸⁴ He mentioned constant competition over jobs, self-centredness, and the friction caused by the fact that everyone wants to borrow money from those successful enough to find work.

"How do others see you," I asked. "They see me as a politician, but they respect me. There is envy because I succeeded." "Don't you think that you would have the chance of being hired by the municipality to work as a go-between between the administration and the migrants," I then asked him. He said that he does not want to be "bought silent". "How do the officials in the town administration see your activities?" I continued. "They are afraid of me. They fear for their jobs," he answered.

L'araish 1.7. 1998

Sitting on the patio of Café Ahlan with Rachid and his cousins who had just come over from London: heavily-built Muhammed, his ten-year-old brother, their cousin Hisham, his younger brother and their cousin Nabil. Rachid explains that their fathers, all brothers, had left L'araish for Britain twenty-seven years ago.

They all live in Kilburn in London, except Hisham and his brother, whose house is not far from Portobello Road. They all speak English to each other but Rachid says that their fathers do not allow them to speak it at home.

Ghailan, the café owner's son also joins us. He jokes with the sleepy-looking Nabil, saying that his café should serve him an English breakfast.

I have a word with Hisham in English. The family comes here every year, this time for seven weeks. They had taken a direct flight from London to Tangiers. He says that he has studied seven years of written Arabic, but that it is beginning to get weaker. Some people do notice the foreign accent in his Moroccan colloquial, he says.

A large black Peugeot with British licence plates coasts slowly by the café and the heavy sounds of a deep bass drum echo from the open windows.

"Moroccans," Rachid says (in a sarcastic tone), shaking his head. - "They are from the 'Klito of London'," ⁸⁵ Muhammed says, and continues, "I know them, they are from our block. All the kids from London know each other here."

It should be obvious from the above dialogues that 'Uthman, Rachid, Hisham and Muhammed constructed multiple notions of belonging, home and community, which emerged simultaneously. The nature of these young men's relations to these notions emerged as

⁸⁴ *ka- ikhlaq mashākil.*

⁸⁵ Muhammed parallels Kilburn – given its high concentration of Moroccans – with the *sha'bi* quarter of Klito in L'araish.

contextually shifting and they combined various discursive elements. The dialogue with 'Uthman conveyed several different images of "us" – the Moroccan migrants in Spain. 'Uthman is, on the one hand, an active spokesman for Moroccan migrants' human rights and he assists several organisations working against racism and discrimination. Yet on the other hand, he also suggested that there are several internal causes of friction among the migrants. According to his words, he in fact "succeeded" because he was able to distance himself from the competition between the Moroccans. He saw that the migrants were facing an ambiguous and contradictory reality on both sides of the Mediterranean. On the one hand, 'Uthman maintained that the others (fellow Moroccans) established a close link between material possessions and personal prestige. Yet he also held that the competition over material and social capital had no fixed objectives. The direction of one's loyalty and belonging, and finally the location of one's home – no matter how successful one is – remains ambiguous: the migrants lack "trust" in official Morocco and refuse to participate in establishing new enterprises there. But neither does Spain appear as a direction of loyalty and trust for the Moroccans – even a poor-looking Moroccan migrant, as 'Uthman stated, may have a lot of money "hidden in Morocco". 'Uthman suggested that for many people migration constructs a social space which lies somewhere between Morocco and Spain.

What further complicated the issue of belonging was the fact that these men, in one sense between Morocco and Spain, were still strongly attached to their places of origin in Morocco. Nearly every migrant at least intended to build a house in the quarter they once left behind or in its near vicinity. On the other hand, these same men refused to settle in L'araish after acquiring material gains. According to 'Uthman, the migrants also "make the mistake of not settling in Spain".

The second excerpt conveys another image of the construction of "us". Regardless of three decades spent in London, Rachid's relatives still returned annually to L'araish for several weeks each time. The fact that his cousins, who were all born in Britain, were not allowed to speak English at home and were taught literary Arabic was a clear indication of their parents' identity policy. According to the residents of L'araish, the migrant youth were in many ways similar to the residents, yet different. On the one hand, they often maintained close ties with familial and friendship networks which extend to L'araish, but according to the residents of L'araish they sounded different and behaved differently. Many recognized Hisham as a foreigner because of his accent when speaking Arabic. Some of his friends in L'araish commented that he walked differently and that even his features had changed because of extended periods spent in Europe. The migrants from Britain coasting by the café in their fancy Peugeot conveyed an image of individual success accomplished through migration. It was a clear indication of attachment to L'araish to display one's material gains in front of "familiar eyes", but it was precisely this fact that often caused friction, envy and conflict even within families, not to mention friendship circles. The migrants "boast" – or literally – "make themselves look bigger",⁸⁶ many held, as the sarcastic tone of Rachid's comment "Moroccans", indicated. Many migrant men, like the Peugeot owners from London, took the trouble to drive through the whole continent of Europe to arrive "home" in their own car. Note that Rachid, still resident in L'araish, called the hot shots "Moroccans", yet Muhammed added that they were in fact from London, from the district of Kilburn. Community was both here in L'araish and there in London or Spain but not self-evidently located anywhere. How is one to approach it then?

⁸⁶ *tkabbbru* or equally *biyynu ras-hom kbīr*.

Discursive genres have been observed to play a distinctive role in creating and mediating ideas of community, home and belonging (Kapchan 1996, 4). Where to focus and what to emphasise when observing these discourses is naturally a question of selection in accordance with the researcher's interests and methods of enquiry. As I aimed to understand how men with attachments to *sha'bi* quarters constructed these notions through their everyday discourses, I came to realize that they were in fact organised around two larger bonds. I chose to call them "narratives of the idealised community" and "narratives of betweenness". I shall briefly explain what I mean by these terms and dwell on them in more detail in the following pages.

Narratives of the idealised community

Despite the recent social dispersion, the idea of a geographically located home-town with its community of native members was not without relevance to the *sha'b*. The community of natives was centrally constructed through an idealised reading of the town's past. For the *sha'bi* men, whether recent migrants or still resident in L'araish at the time of the fieldwork, the family stories of arrival in the town from the surrounding rural areas, together with past images of social harmony and tolerance towards the once large Spanish population of the town played a central role in this process. On the other hand, in the case of the older generation of migrants, such as Rachid's relatives in London, there was clear nostalgia for the town as it was in the past, when it was first left behind. These ideal images of the past were clearly projections from the present. While the past image of the town conveyed ideas of harmony, morals and tolerance, the town in the present popular view was a site for growing social dispersion, decadence [*fasād*] and negligence [*ihmāl*]. The *sha'b* widely supported the idea that many of the original natives no longer lived in L'araish, but rather had migrated years earlier.

Narratives of "betweenness"

Identification of the self with a bounded entity, whether – depending on the context – it was Morocco, the North (the former Spanish territory) or the town of L'araish, was only one of the rhetorical forms to construct community used by the *sha'b*. Along with the notion of a geographically located community, there existed another central process to construct collective group identity among the *sha'b*. What did men like 'Uthman in fact mean when they described migrants' unwillingness to invest their money in Morocco in terms of "lack of trust"? What did they mean by saying "people make the mistake of not settling in Spain"? The young men understood L'araish, on the one hand as the ideal, moral community of the past but at present it did not offer satisfactory social membership. These men understood that migration offered a personal opportunity for the future but it was known to every one that acquiring social membership in Europe was an extremely difficult process. By "narratives of betweenness" these young men sought to make these ambiguities comprehensible. Through this process they simultaneously engaged in constructing the collective "us", the "us" which was not obviously located anywhere. The idea of liminality in young men's discourse was conceptualised with the notion of *ghurba*. The notion literally means "place of exile" but in *sha'bi* men's practical usage it also pointed to a state of "alienation" or "being a stranger to one's concrete social surrounding", which was emerging anywhere – in Morocco or in a foreign country. Association between self and *ghurba* was established through experiences with corrupt bureaucrats in Morocco, interpretations of official negligence towards the social and physical environment in L'araish and stories concerning racism and discrimination towards Moroccans in Europe.

L'araishi – members of the idealised community

Let us return in more detail to the narratives of the ideal community. It should be clear by now that in L'araish as in various other localities in Morocco international migration and political processes aiming at controlling mobility, structured the lives of various categories of people –

not only migrants and returning migrants but also the people still residing in the town. As the circumstances of the individuals in this study indicate, mobility which extends national borders and engagement in life far beyond the geographical borders of L'araish was for many in the setting at least a potential course for the future. Rachid is an apt illustration of this: he was still resident in L'araish at the time when the above excerpt was written but moved to London in 1999. In July 2000 he returned to L'araish for the first time, for his wedding. Equally, one of the young men I interviewed in a café in Terrassa in the spring of 2000 remembered having seen me in Café Ahlan in L'araish in July 1998. The man had since then succeeded in entering Spain with a migrant smuggler.

However blurred the social boundaries become, the *sha'bi* men still managed to talk about the people of L'araish, [*L'araishi*] or synonymously "offspring of the town" [*wlād l-blād*] as social categories. The *sha'bi* men distinguished between overlapping categories of *L'araishi*, members of the international migrant community [*dzāliya*], rural migrants [*n-nās min bediya*], "members" of neighbouring towns [*min barra*] and foreigners.⁸⁷ Furthermore, they often conceptualised wider society in terms (e.g. characterisations concerning people from neighbouring towns or provinces) which further essentialised the features of "us", the *L'araishi* / *wlād l-blād*. This at first seemed to create an epistemological problem: I – following the present-day anthropological dogma – approached social identities as contextually changing flexible constructions and questioned the relation between culture-identity-location, yet the objects of the study engaged in constructing highly localised, imaginary communities (Lovell 1998, 15). This naturally led to the question how to make both ends meet?

The true originals: place and belonging in L'araish

Who had the right to be called *L'araishi* was a critical question among the various categories of people. Nearly all the subjects of this study had attachments to the *sha'bi* quarters of L'araish and nearly all of them had either experienced rural-urban migration or they belonged to the first generation of urban dwellers. The men were well aware of their own and others' stories of arrival in the town. For the town dwellers urban life was often portrayed as a sign of progress, culture and awareness of the urban social connections but it also represented growing isolation from the extended family. Town life was juxtaposed against the backwardness, social intimacy of the family, security but ignorance of the rural life-style.

Origins were understood as a central element of social identity and to a great extent a principle, which organised many spheres of social interaction. For example, rural migrants from Rif were said to dominate the taxi-driving business in L'araish and the *Swāsa* from southern Morocco were known for establishing small corner stores selling pans, pots and cutlery. The recent rural migrants from surrounding agricultural areas were said to be the only ones engaged in the most humble economic activities generally understood as "dishonouring"⁸⁸ for the *wlād l-blād*. By references to origins people also made claims about others' physical, social and mental qualities in extremely particular detail. *Qaşrawa* [the originals of the neighbouring town of Ksar el Kebir] were, for example, said to be more "active"⁸⁹ in business, and religiously more conservative than the *L'araishi*. Furthermore, the *L'araishi* young men emphasized the international, tolerant and "Spanish" atmosphere of the town and juxtaposed it with the conservative atmosphere of Ksar el Kebir.

⁸⁷ A foreigner is usually called by terms "Westerner" [*gauri*], Christian [*naşrānī*] or European, [*ūrubbi*].

⁸⁸ *ghīr muhtarma*.

⁸⁹ *nashī*

Answers to questions concerning social origins were by no means clear. Usually a young man who called himself *L'araishi* claimed membership in the category by the fact that he was born in the town, regardless of his present whereabouts. Others making the same claim could easily be categorized as outsiders because the family did not have, for example, well-established social networks in the area or the family was generally perceived as socially marginal [*hāmishi*] or weak [*d'if*].

A group of youngsters spending time in the cafés in the town centre might very well present themselves as *L'araishi* upon first meeting with an outsider, but after a while identify themselves by the fact that their forefathers come from the same region outside of the town. The idea of physical closeness through kinship, neighbourliness and *qarāba* [social "closeness resulting from frequent interaction between different households"] also composed an aspect of people's social identities. As the life situations of men show (see Chapter III) kinship and neighbourhood relations were domains for multiple voices and interests. Any "sensible" [*ma'qūl*] young man took wider kin into account when balancing his actions and aspirations. It should be noted, however, that kinship relations composed a highly charged domain for both co-operation and friction, competition over material resources and social prestige, which only seemed to have worsened with the recent social dispersion through migration. Kin was understood ideally – as 'Abdel 'Ali once stated – "the moral ideal"⁹⁰ pointing to co-operation, mutual trust, togetherness and help, but the practical reality was much more versatile. Considerable differences in the economic capacities of closely-related households, e.g. between first cousins, were in fact very common in al Hayy al Jadid in the late 1990s. It was not at all surprising that the head of the family residing in a sheet-metal hut was first cousin to a migrant in Barcelona who had erected a three-storey concrete building in the original quarter.

The moral community

Wlād l-blād as a social category was centrally constructed by claims to membership in an idealised community understood to have existed in the town in the past. One could claim to be *weld l-blād* (sing.) regardless of one's actual whereabouts. In fact one of the features of the category – I have heard similar comments about Tangiers – was that the "true natives"⁹¹ had long since migrated from the town, and now even the historical centres of the towns were occupied by outsiders [*barrāniyīn*].

The idealised community appeared as a metaphor for the moral character of the *wlād l-blād*. They were portrayed as bearers of the tradition of the community of harmony, morals and tolerance towards each other but also towards the once considerable Spanish population in the town. The moral character of the *wlād l-blād* was then juxtaposed with the decadence of the new social groups: the rural urban migrants, the modern bureaucrats and the modern educated élites.

Especially the men with a longer distance from the rural background viewed recent rural migrants as sources of *fasād*, a notion referring to conduct generally understood as "un-Islamic" such as consumption of alcohol and drugs, loose sexual morals, dissolving family ties, self-interest and lying, bad language and street aggression. Upon my comments concerning children selling cigarettes or six or seven-year-old children carrying shoe-cleaning boxes or sniffing dissolvents, I was always reminded that these are not *wlād l - blād* but recent rural migrants.

⁹⁰ *matal l-ikhlāq*.

⁹¹ *l-aşliyīn l-haqīqiyīn*.

Whether the people claiming to be *L'araishi* were residents at the time of the fieldwork or visiting or returning migrants they described the shanty-towns, which in fact cover nearly two-thirds of the urban area, as an uncharacteristic town scene and declared that the "real" *L'araish* was very different. 'Abdel 'Ali as with many other long-term residents of al Hayy al Jadid quarter, emphasised in our dialogue concerning his family's arrival in the town that the house where he was born was one of the first in the area.

-When did your father arrive here (in Klito)?

-I tell you...it was about 1967. The most remote house here was our house (...) behind us there were only bushes. There was noooo-one (stretching the word) around here. That whole quarter did not exist back then, just those spiky bushes.

A typical arrival story listed the means of income of the families, which often meant small subsistence agriculture, raising sheep, goats and cows, and very often the families had engaged in trade or provided services for the town's Spanish population.

'Abdel 'Ali's father had worked for both German and Spanish constructors in the area prior to Morocco's independence in 1956. 'Umar's father had supplied Spanish constructors with sand, which he transported with his donkeys from the nearby beaches. 'Abdel 'Ali's father-in-law had worked for a Spanish agricultural company as truck driver before entering a Spanish fishing enterprise.

The *L'araish* of the past appeared time after time in peoples' narratives as a small cosmopolitan community, distinctively tolerant towards its foreign population. In fact, many young men characterized it as "the most Spanish of Moroccan towns". The Spanish colonial authority appeared in spontaneous discussions as totally different from the men's image of the French authorities – void of racist policy towards the Moroccans. The French colonial authority was seen as much more organised than the Spanish one, and overtly discriminatory in nature. "Back then nobody knew of racism," 'Abdel 'Ali's father-in-law, Muhammed, a 71-year-old retired fisherman told me after describing in detail how both populations had lived side by side in the areas which now host the al Hayy al Jadid quarter. The people belonging to the generation with experience of the colonial period described how many Moroccans had learned Spanish at an early age. Some Spaniards spoke at least rudimentary Arabic and many remember them as co-workers in agricultural co-operatives and small fishing industries. I understood Muhammed's comment, "we often stopped over in Cádiz to unload our fishing boats", as an indication of the openness and tolerance of the times – even the international frontiers were more flexible back then. The Spanish were, he added, "just as poor as us", yet everything was in general "cheap and available". The elder generation of the Spanish were ascribed with features which in many ways made them look more "Moroccan" than the Moroccans themselves. Muhammed's wife Rahma described to me at length how the Spanish cooked their food in Moroccan coal grills [*midzmār*], wore hooded *dzellāba*, married Moroccans, and when they left for Spain were called *Moros*⁹² in their country.

Often a particular Spanish figure plays a central part in the whole family's economic history. After working for nearly three decades on Spanish fishing-boats 'Abdel 'Ali's father-in-law, Muhammed, had established firm contacts with a Spanish fishing-boat owner who also ran two small restaurants and a café in the town. Rahma, his wife, had worked for nearly ten years as the chief cook in one of the restaurants and managed to gain employment for one of her four

⁹² In the present-day context in Spain, 'Moro' is a strongly derogatory term.

daughters in the same restaurant after her retirement. The same Spaniard had also offered work in his enterprises for two of the six sons of the family.

The Spanish did not leave at once. Many stayed years after Moroccan independence. The departure was described to me rather as a process where one generation raised its children and left the country after witnessing the deteriorating economic situation and the growing tensions between Spain and Morocco, culminating in the Western Sahara conflict (1975). In contrast with the present difficulties in crossing the border and growing xenophobia in Spain, many members of the older generation told me how they had their chance to migrate with the return of their Spanish friends. Rahma, for example, was asked to join a particular Spanish friend's family in Spain in 1963 but commented in a sarcastic tone, pointing at her husband, "but this one was against the idea". 'Abdel 'Ali's father, for his part, had worked for two foreign constructors and was asked to migrate to Germany in the late 1950s but his wife did not like the idea.

Despite the fact that there is no "objective" history against which popular versions of the past can be verified, the popular narratives of the town's past told surprisingly little about social friction between the Spanish and the Moroccans. Western historical sources do state that the Moroccan nationalist resistance in the North was centrally organised around the urban bourgeois of Tetuán and Tangiers, who were very limited in number in L'araish (Seddon 1981, 168-173). The nationalist ideology was a late import in the area. However, L'araish had witnessed outbursts of violence in 1956 as the masses raided the palace of the local Pasha (known for his sympathy towards the colonial regime) and slaughtered one of his servants and a number of other people (Choukri 1994, 14-22). However, Choukri's reports portray the violence as targeted entirely against Moroccans suspected of being supporters of the foreign administration and only the Spaniards who were directly involved with the occupation.

Narratives of "betweenness"

L'araish served as a reference to both bonds which organised discourse concerning home and belonging. It was at the same time a metaphor for the community sharing the idealised past, but in the present it emerged as a site of social inequality and corruption, giving rise to collective identifications constructed around sentiments of alienation and "betweenness".

Place and betweenness

The essentialised, ideal community existing in the past was something very different from the present popular image of the town. Social injustice and moral deterioration in L'araish were both themes which popular memory located only in post-independence Morocco.⁹³

The way the category "they" – representing the Moroccan central administration and local bureaucrats – is presented in the following narration by 'Abdel 'Ali concerning his father's arrival in L'araish agrees very well with the present-day *sha'bi* image of the recent local history of independent Morocco. During the colonial period 'Abdel 'Ali's father had purchased a property from Spanish settlers prior to buying the first family hut in the al Hayy al Jadid quarter. According to him, this occurred in the early 1950s.

-He bought it from the Christians [*nṣāra*, sing. *naṣrānī* i.e. Spaniards] when they were going away (to Europe). He bought it from them for 360 dirhams. Then they built a road there. 360 dirhams, and how many rooms did it have there? It had 20 rooms. And when

⁹³ The second part of Choukri's autobiography *Al Shuṭṭār* describes the years immediately after Moroccan independence in Tangiers as a period when the overall social atmosphere faced a deep depression (see Choukri 1994, 135-141).

independence came they said, "We are going to build a road there." Then they demolished it and built the road.

-And your father did not get any compensation?

-Nothing, and think about it: 20... rooms (...)

At the moment of this narration we stood some hundred metres away from the southernmost corner of the quarter consisting of 80 square metre properties. A twenty-room house would easily have been the highest in the whole quarter. By the curiously low price of the property, 'Abdel 'Ali obviously wished to indicate that his father had very good relations with the Spanish owner of the property. His comment also clarified how close relations with the departing Spaniards could have offered considerable material advantages.

The administration of independent Morocco was centrally constructed from the bourgeoisie of the major cities of the former French territory, especially Fes. The former Spanish territory was slowly integrated into the area colonised by the French.

They (the central authorities) "hate the North"⁹⁴ was a common idiom used by the *sha'bi* men in discussions concerning regional development.⁹⁵ It also emerged frequently in recent migrant's explanations concerning the present economic deterioration of the town.

Ihmāl, "negligence", was a frequently used concept whereby the young men characterized the local under development. They also applied the term when describing the attitude of the official institutions towards the urban poor. It seems that men in their twenties, often the first generation of the beneficiaries of modern education, tended to construct understandings of this negligence with references to larger structures, such as post-colonialism, the national economy and unequal development between different regions in Morocco. The older generation and younger men with less education tended to verbalise these ideas in a more personal manner and blamed the local politicians and the few renowned "big men" in the area for the present economic crisis.

The concept of *ihmāl* framed a vast *sha'bi* discourse which provided innumerable details in the town scene with stories about people's unequal abilities to negotiate with wealthier bureaucrats of the official institutions in order to further their interests. These discourses provide the less advantageous social groups with means to make the immediate reality understandable: why sheet-metal huts were built in particular areas without official licences, why some streets had narrowed down to footpaths, why some areas were without street lights. The town's most visible public areas were filled with popular stories of hidden pacts, rumours of dirty deeds and bureaucratic cunning. The central square, I was told by many café-goers, once hosted a Spanish theatre, the second largest in the whole of Morocco but was demolished as the result of a shady construction deal between a local big man and the town administration in the late 1980s. The square also had a beautifully decorated fountain which was covered with quotations from the works of Cervantes but had long since been demolished and was now covered with concrete plates produced by a factory in Kenitra belonging to the former Minister of the Interior. These interpretations were not only the property of people attached to L'araish. They tallied very well with other Moroccans' stereotypical interpretations concerning the "North" [*shamāl*], referring to provinces once under Spanish rule. Many Moroccans outside the area attached to the area the

⁹⁴ *ka- ikerhu sh- shamāliyyīn*.

⁹⁵ See similar observations from Tangiers in Munson 1984.

words "the land of migrant smugglers" [*bilād ḥarrāga*] or "cunning with local bureaucrats" [*tkharwid*⁹⁶].

More than once I heard that a large proportion of the "true natives" [*l-aṣliyīn l-haqīqiyīn*] who had migrated to Europe decades previously preferred to stay away from the town because they could not stand seeing its present state.

Wrestling with bureaucracies

The young *sha'bī* men were constantly obliged to interact with several spheres of the local administrative offices. To apply for a job within the state bureaucracies, to obtain a visa to visit Spain or to renew one's passport required dozens of documents, certified copies, tax stamps and numerous encounters with different persons in several official institutions. To speed up the bureaucratic red tape the *sha'b* constantly sought to utilise their personal social connections [*ma'ārif*], linking them to these institutions. The *sha'bī* men's discourses concerning their attitude towards official bureaucracies constitute another vital part of the "narratives of betweenness".

Nearly all young men perceived that the times were bad. Any discussion concerning local administration, bureaucratic procedures, local politics or development projects conveyed an image that the material [*mādda*] had taken over the moral [*ikhlaq*]. "In these times money is everything" or "who thinks about morals anymore? – everyone is just after their own interests" were ideas which I heard repeated dozens of times in different versions. Often the idea was interpreted in terms of bribery [*rishwa*]. "How do you think the civil servants [*muwaddafīn*] can afford to buy cars? It is all *rishwa*." On one occasion while I was passing a block of flats inhabited by the lower-ranking bureaucrats working in the customs office 'Aziz told me that the apartments were furnished with goods confiscated by the National Customs [*l-dzumruk l-malakī*] from Moroccans returning to their country from Spain.

Such rumours and stories were attached to every level of the official bureaucratic and economic hierarchy. If you really wanted to "make it big", then turn to drug and migrant smuggling or land speculation – this was a fact well-known to all. A local businessman was known to have gained his wealth by exporting hashish in his fishing boats. Some even claimed that the same man had engaged in printing counterfeit money. Another well-known businessman was said to have entered regional and finally national politics only in order to advance his private real estate and commercial enterprises. Upon discussing the economic situation in L'araish many held that nowadays there simply is no "trust" [*tiqa*] in anyone. If there was something common to all Moroccans it was the fact that everyone was aware of "their own interests" [*'ārefrasu*].

Given the deteriorating economic situation, continuous rural urban migration and rapid population growth, competition concerning the posts in the official labour market had worsened considerably during the latter years of the 1990s. The employment situation of high-school and university graduates was in fact alarming in 1998. In a national competition for 420 positions of tax inspector, there were no fewer than 35,000 applicants nationwide. 'Aziz, a 28-year-old unemployed law graduate, had participated in the written part of the test. 'Aziz had waited for the results for six months, only to hear that none of the five applicants from the L'araish province had been accepted. He also added that many young university graduates in L'araish were in a

⁹⁶ The term *tkharwid* refers to the ability to manipulate and influence the decision-making of the personnel of the bureaucratic institutions.

very disadvantaged position because the news concerning entrance tests in larger cities often reached L'araish too late.

From the *sha'bi* men's point of view the whole official labour market in Morocco appeared to be a domain organized through social networks. The only means of gaining access to secure employment required *ma'arif* – prestigious people who had the authority to "enter" [*dakhkhal*] others in jobs. Some people whose trustworthiness was far from established were known for their abilities to "manipulate the local bureaucrats" [*tkharwad m'a l-makhzan*] in return for financial compensations. For members of families without sufficient connections with bureaucrats or ones without opportunities to bribe them, many of the massive national competition for public-sector posts had become simply rituals with very little practical relevance.

Applying for a public-sector job required numerous official certificates, certified copies and tax stamps. Critical institutions in this respect were the quarter foremen [sing. *muqaddim*], the municipal administrative office [*baladiya*], the district administrative office [*'amala*], and the main police station [*da'ira*]. Obtaining the normally required documents such as a birth certificate, proof of a clean criminal record, a civil status certificate, officially certified copies of school diplomas and the national identity card, often required strenuous and endless rounds from one bureaucrat to another. The men constantly turned to their personal contacts who were able to make these encounters smoother, faster and often considerably cheaper.

The strenuous and often exhausting meetings to obtain the required documents were, however, only a part of the process. Personal relations with people who could influence high-ranking officials within the particular bureaucratic institution were necessary if one ever wished to enter these jobs.

The linguistic idioms used by the young men describing their experiences reflected the fact that *rishwa* was taken for granted in entrance procedures: jobs are gained "by the route of bribery"⁹⁷, money "has entered"⁹⁸ the entrance tests. A commonly heard question stated literally: "By how much are you going to reach a mutual understanding with him?"⁹⁹ – in other words, "How large a bribe are you ready to pay?" This usually required personal relations with people who were well positioned to pass on the bribes to their professional superiors. Preferably the contact person was an employee within the same institution.

'Abdel 'Ali had taken the entrance test for the positions in the National Prison Administration [*idarat s-sudzun*] four times, in 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1997, but without success. In August 1998 he travelled together with his paternal cousin, 'Abderrahman, this time to Kenitra for the same purpose. It was his last chance to participate in the test since the applicants were required to be less than 30 years of age. Obtaining a counterfeit birth certificate, a method which was widely used, was out of the question because it required both money and especially close contacts with the quarter foreman [*muqaddim*] and the administrative offices. 'Abdel 'Ali's attraction to this particular field obviously resulted from the fact that his eldest brother-in-law had worked for several years in the same institution and was well connected to a high-ranked official in Tetuan. Through this contact he had managed to help his younger brother Tayyib pass the entrance test in the early 1990s. Since the brother-in-law had direct personal connections only with the administration of the Tangiers district 'Abdel 'Ali estimated that he would have to pay him at least 5,000 dirhams (\$ 500 US) to pass on to his superior so that he would forward 'Abdel 'Ali's

⁹⁷ *'an tariq rishwa.*

⁹⁸ *dakhhal fi-ha flus.*

⁹⁹ *B-shal 'a tetfahem m'ah?*

cause in the test taking place in Kenitra. However, these transactions always had their risks. Despite the bribes, the applicants often did not succeed but ended up losing considerable sums of money. In fact, this had happened to 'Abdel 'Ali's cousin 'Abderrahman, whose father had paid 35,000 dirhams to an official in Kenitra to enter his son in the national railway company a few years earlier. Finally he was given a negative answer, yet only a proportion of the money was returned.

For the men without contacts and the ability to offer bribes the odds in favour of succeeding in these tests were nearly non-existent. Especially in the case of competitions for lower-level bureaucratic posts the test practices hardly even sought to rank the applicants in any relevant way. 'Abdel 'Ali described his experiences in the tests taking place in Tangiers in 1996. He estimated that on that particular day there were nearly 4,000 applicants.

"There were 25 boys in my hall. The supervisors did not check our pockets but made sure that no one talked with others. Then they handed out small pieces of paper and asked us to write a three-digit number which cannot be divided by two. On the second paper they asked us to write a slogan other than "God, King and Nation". I wrote the number 313 and the sentence: " He who sows will harvest". Another year I wrote; "If you seek you will find".

Then they handed out envelopes into which you had to seal the papers and sign it with your own name. Then they told us the subject of our essay. You had to analyse one holy tradition [*ḥadīth*], which began with "I condemn injustice...". They gave us two hours for that. I wrote some twenty lines. I started "in the name of God the merciful" and then told about a poem by al Mutanabbi where he talks about the wrongdoers and the rich who oppress the poor and then about 'Umar ibn al Khattab who was always against injustice. Then I said that the state takes care of the rights of the poor.

Everyone was also asked why they decided to choose this field (...) last year none of the participants from the North succeeded. It was the Ministry of Interior which had decided so. It is all politics."

Though people often publicly condemned the bureaucratic red tape, overt general corruption, and they joked about such issues, there was hardly a *sha' bī* family which would not have liked to see one of its offspring gaining professions in local government offices or security institutions. From the *sha' bī* men's point of view particularly attractive jobs were in border control, and in several different security institutions. It is also precisely these positions which granted the possibility of making considerable unofficial income through distribution of favours, which were compensated by money. A lower-level administrative bureaucrat in security institutions such as prisons could easily double his official income (usually around 1,500-2,000 dirhams – \$250-300 US) by providing goods and services such as cigarettes, alcohol and foodstuffs to prisoners.

On the one hand, gaining positions in these institutions can be understood as personal "victories" over the system – every bureaucratic position in fact opens "avenues of participation"¹⁰⁰ for members of family and kin. On the other hand, often the attraction of these positions lies not only in the job itself. People aspired rather to utilise such positions in order to improve their chances of obtaining a Spanish visa. It was much easier for civil servants and personnel in the lower levels of security institutions to gain foreign tourist visas than for people without such positions. Among other documents, professionals within bureaucracies were usually required to present official certificates from the employer concerning their right to an annual holiday

¹⁰⁰ The term is borrowed from a monograph by Singerman (1995) concerning methods employed by *sha' bī* families to achieve communal objectives in Cairo.

[*shahādat l-ʿuṭla s-sanawīya*] and another official certificate from the employer which permitted the departure. For the same reason – to improve the possibilities of obtaining foreign visas – jobless young men did their best not to become designated as officially unemployed in their national identity cards. It was generally known that tourist visas were not granted to the officially unemployed.

Muslims in between

The idea of liminality constructed through "narratives of betweenness" helps us to understand the ways in which the social significance of Islam was perceived by the young *shaʿbī* men.

Men unanimously shared the view that everyday social reality marked by socio-economic and moral decadence and "rotteness" [*fasād*] had very little to do with the normative ideals of Islam.

What constituted these normative ideals for these men was not a simple question. The young men were surrounded by multiple different understandings of Islam. Islam was interpreted to the *Lʿaraishi* youth through the Koranic school [*msīd*], the official school system – which echoed the official national religious authorities – elder men of traditional religious learning [*fuqahāʾ*], family elders, resurgent Islamic movements in both Europe and Arab countries, their student organizations and finally through the activities of international Islamic popular preachers and their publications in satellite channels, video and audio cassettes and popular booklets.

Different understandings of Islam agreed to a great extent with indicators such as age, wealth, gender and education and corresponded with the ways the people – to use the Arabic term – *ṭabbaq* [applied] Islam in their lives. Visits to saints' tombs, the use of talismans, belief in active interventions of evil spirits [*dznūn*. sing. *dzinn*], mystical powers of certain *fuqahāʾ*, and practices of sorcery [*shaʿwada* or *shūr*] were much more vivid among illiterate members of the older generation than with people with contact with modern education. These same practices were easily condemned as superstition [*khurafāt*] by the younger and more educated. Such beliefs and practices furthermore prevailed more likely among people with experience of rural life.

On the one hand, there were the often wealthier and more educated men who said that they had a "European mind" [*ras urubbī*] and that they were not religiously observant. The other end was constituted of men well read in both religious traditions and the modern popular religious literature. For them Islam associated with a thorough social, political and moral reform programme that was to purify social life from *fasād*. However, the unwritten echoes of past practices, modernist Islamist ideas and modern more secular notions did not manifest as clear and separate domains in people's understandings and practices. The boundaries were fuzzy and new associations and relations were constantly being created; the traditional and the modern were in a constant state of redefinition. Socio-moral everyday practices of people and the more dogmatic Islamic ideas were in a blurred relation with each other (Schade-Poulsen 2000, 151).

Very few men, for example, observed their daily prayers but yet all my companions fasted during the month of Ramadan. Nearly every young man drank alcohol but kept the practice strictly hidden from the members of the household. Sometimes the drinking sessions in *Lʿaraish*'s pine forest took place even during the religious holidays. On the other hand, people said that drinking was not fitting during the month of Ramadan. Religious idioms mixed easily with practices which in fact were understood to be "against Islam". Receiving a piece of hashish [*dzwāna*] from a dealer could very well be thanked by saying "God's grace upon you".¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ *bārak l-lāhu fik*.

Application [*taṭbiq*] of Islam was understood to be relative to a person's age. Young men held that it was simply too difficult to "apply Islam a hundred percent" [*tabbaq mīya bi l-mīya*] in their lives, to avoid drink, sexual relations prior to marriage, lying, jealousy and self-centredness. Such things, the unmarried men understood, could always be left behind once one marries and starts to take growing responsibility [*mas'ūliya*] for the members of one's household.

Though almost every Moroccan is born Muslim there were very few "true Muslims" [*muslimīn bezzāf*], I was often told. Religiously observant persons were demarcated from all natural born Muslims by the term "devoted" [*multazim*], which I heard was in fact a very recent new social category associated with the emergence of new Islamic movements, popular in the major university cities in Morocco from the 1970s onwards. But this did not mean that my companions would support the new Islamic associations without criticism. These movements were understood within similar framework as political parties – usually interpreted as personality-centred organizations. These movements were rallying for political goals under the guise of Islam, which many held was incorrectly and irrationally interpreted in many respects. They wanted to "turn to what was behind, but we are heading forward". This is how one man commented on how some *sunnīyīn* – supporters of popular Islamic organizations – wanted to copy blindly the first community of Muslims in every aspect of life. They, for example, no longer chanted "there is no God but God" in their funeral processions. According to their interpretation, the very first funeral processions in the time of the Prophet were silent – only later did Muslims adopt the practice of chanting this particular verse. The same man also criticized the way in which during Friday prayers a particular Imam in a mosque in Tangiers, known for his close association with *sunnīyīn*, had paused for a long time to say the invocation prayer [*du'ā*] in the middle of the official prayer ritual [*ṣalāt*] – a practice which according to him was totally against the proper order of ritual practices.

Regardless of the different understandings as to what constituted normative Islam, some aspects were supported by nearly all men, even those who did not claim to be observant Muslims at all. Islam's ideal role in social reality was often expressed in terms of Islam's ability to purify social reality of *fasād*. However, for the vast majority of men this purification meant first and foremost a practical individual moral programme. The line of the young *sha'bi* men's argument was very closely associated with practical reality – if people including bureaucrats and politicians were more devout there would not be the problems of corruption, unemployment and violations of morality, many held.

From the young men's perspective, Islam as a component of social identities seemed to create another contradiction of belonging. Morocco represented to people not only *waṭan*, a political entity and a nation-state, but also *bilād*, home country and the site of cultural origins. According to some, practising Muslims could identify with *bilād* but not with *waṭan*.

Morocco as a nation-state was understood to control Islamic expression and interpret Islam in a manner which was criticized by many. These ambiguities were often dressed in the idiom "but they do not apply Islam here".¹⁰²

Many felt that migration results solely from the fact that it is a necessary practice to obtain daily bread [*qūt*], and thus giving up one's Moroccan nationality would resemble betraying [*khiyāna*] common cultural origins, one's *bilād*, and ultimately one's identity as a Muslim. However,

¹⁰² *walākin ma ka-iṭabbqūsh l-islām hinaya.*

Morocco as *waṭan* was understood as a source of their "alienation" and the need to migrate in the first place.

By pointing out that many had left for Europe for material reasons the men indirectly expressed a negative stance towards enculturation to European life-styles and the internalization of new moral values or behaviours.

Some migrants said that many "try" the Western life-style, but find out that after all it does not "fit" or "suit" [*nsab*] Moroccans. This idea echoed an understanding of the West in terms of juxtapositions translated into Islamic idioms. Among the *L'araishi* men, as in many parts of the Muslim world, consumption of alcohol and sexual immodesty together with self-centred materialism constitute the cornerstones of the "Islamic" image of the West (Malti-Douglas and Douglas 1994, 201). Claiming that the migrants' problems in Western Europe result from the fact that many are uneducated and from a rural background, the men suggested that contact with Western societies demands constant self-control and intellectual awareness of the moral dangers understood to be lurking everywhere in the West. Among the migrants Islam emerged as a countering value system to the European cultural "threat", often dressed in alcohol consumption, abandoning fasting, lax sexual morals and growing self-centredness. Islam was understood to be something authentic and natural for a Moroccan. Yet at the same time migrant communities in the West were understood to be freer to create Islamic associations than in Morocco but as Muslims they constitute a minority in the West, a fact which created moral, political and social contradictions.

The complex relation with the West was described both as a threat to Muslim identities but also as a process of trial and error which could strengthen Muslim devotion [*iltizām*]. On many occasions in *L'araish* I heard people commenting that in fact "Islam comes from the West" – its social influence echoes back to *L'araish* with the example of the devout returning migrants. This idea had multiple manifestations in *L'araish*. Halima, a young woman who had returned to *L'araish* from London for the first time in eight years explained that in Morocco she dressed more liberally than in her familiar surrounding in London where "everyone prayed". Six months after my friend Rachid's migration to London I heard from his brother *L'arbi* that he had started to attend prayers on a regular basis. "What kind of Muslim states are these here [in North Africa]?" asked one migrant man from *L'araish*, presently living in Holland.

The ambiguity of us: "betweenness" and joking

-Why did they impose that visa (in the Western European countries)? So that we could go abroad? But in fact we are abroad here (in Morocco) [*w- ḥna fi l-khāridz hinaya*].

Ahmed Sanussi - a popular Moroccan stand up comedian.

Contradictions concerning notions of home, belonging and loyalty left plenty of room for negotiation, multiple interpretations and absurd juxtapositions. It perhaps comes as no surprise that the *sha'bi* men's verbal play and joking referred to the ambiguous aspects of socially constructed "us" and the tensions between the spatial community – belonging to a place – and identification with "betweenness" on multiple levels of association.

In order to understand the *sha'bi* men's humour it has been essential to take a detailed look into narratives of the "idealised community" and "narratives of betweenness". The fact that narration "hits" (*dreb*) the target indicates that it has managed to condense aspects of the wider social political and economic context in a manner which relates to the practical reality of the audience. Humour and laughter can be understood as relief-providing vehicles for social groups with

limited access to central spheres of political and economic interaction. Besides providing relief, joking among the *sha'bi* men also had central collective solidarity-building functions. Joking was also an important identity process.

Both in the spontaneous humorous narrations and more fixed jokes the collective *sha'bi*-self appeared as a victim of both the national and international "system". The common man represented a kind of victim of injustice, unequal distribution, and corruption but he was also capable of countering the system, thanks to his cunning. The ideology inherent in the *sha'bi* men's jokes, however, does not directly oppose the state in political language, nor were people themselves openly engaged in their activities to further a public policy. Ridicule and joking arises rather from the fact that the *sha'bi* men realised their limited resources to change patterns of authority shot through by patron-client relations. After all, one had to participate in order to further one's interests, no matter how critically one related to the justness of the ways things were.

Men's gatherings in cafés and evening strolls through the streets provided the context for the narratives analysed here. Only some of the following narrations are jokes, which were repeated time after time in more or less fixed form. Especially the young men's leisure-time gatherings provided the setting for constant invention of spontaneous situational jokes which implicitly defined the collective and its position within the wider society. A young man sitting in silence with his friends in a café might, for example, become the object of comment: "Join in, it is only the police who listen!" Once a group of men discussed whether they should head north or south on a fishing trip. The majority wanted to go south but one man preferred to go north. He said: "but we here always go against the will of the people".

Both forms of the narrations, the more or less fixed jokes and the spontaneous narrations or comments often come very close to the content and structure of the rhetoric of the very popular Moroccan stand up comedian Ahmed Sanussi. Sanussi's popularity among urban youth lies in the fact that he manages to condense the "master narratives" of the *sha'bi*, which concern the contemporary social and political reality. Sanussi's products are distributed in C-cassette form, widely accessible to large audiences. His language shares several central features with Egyptian political humour, such as hostility towards international businesses and Western imperialism (see Malti-Douglas and Douglas 1994, 62). Many officially unemployed university graduates in L'araish informed me that Sanussi is from time to time banned from live performances on university campuses but recordings are widely distributed all over Northern Morocco.

The popular narratives and jokes that dwell on the themes of hierarchy and social inequality can roughly be divided into three overlapping categories. First, many of the jokes convey an image of "them", an unexplicated, double-faced, post-colonial bureaucratic élite, whose position rests on the support of the West. The élite becomes nearly synonymous with the West: it is thoroughly "Westernised" but it utilises the critique of the West to acquire popular legitimacy. Secondly, many jokes concentrate on a critique of the political, social and economic decadence of Morocco – the loss of indigenous identity and overt foreign political, cultural and economic intervention. Thirdly, the jokes create the "us", the oppressed, the unemployed, the uneducated, the poor, those aspiring to migrate, those who are stripped of personal dignity.

The first type of joke constructs a category of "them", the unexplicated élite, which sometimes manifests itself in the form of a "big-bellied man"¹⁰³ or a local bureaucrat. Sometimes a representative of "them" can be as abstract as *makhzan* – a concept which literally refers to the principal authorities of the state, but it is used by the *sha'b* to represent any official authority or any aspect of official Morocco. The true nature of the authorities is often analysed in the form of a homonymic pun. The jokes usually take the form of a monologue composed of questions and answers.

"What does the word Morocco [*Maghreb*] consist of?" one young man said and answered, "*Ma ghrīb*", which roughly translates as "that which is strange". By this the man echoed a very common Moroccan new proverb: "When in Morocco do not wonder at anything,"¹⁰⁴ indicating that patron-client relations, social inequality and social and economic management are manifested in such a wide variety of forms that one should be prepared to face almost anything when in Morocco. Strangeness also relates to the *sha'bī* sentiment that the present political climate is in a situation where reality and illusion, and ultimately truth and falsehood, become intertwined. Once I asked Muhammed, one of the dealers in second-hand goods in the central market of L'araish, whether he wanted me to bring him anything from Rabat. "Bring us the truth," he replied.

Another time 'Umar asked me whether I knew the origin of the colloquial word for police [*bulisi*]. He then continued; "From the words *būl* - to "piss" and from the French *ici* - "here". Uttering the word 'police', turning towards authority becomes in this pun synonymous with calling for someone to litter himself. 'Umar continued that the word 'gendarmierie' [*dzendarmiya*] consists of the words "he came, went for a round and took a hundred dirham note".¹⁰⁵ The security institutions are characterized by an endless hunger for bribe money, 'Umar clearly wished to say. The security forces do not go on rounds to protect "us" but to collect one hundred dirham notes from "us". In a similar vein, he went on, the colloquial word for 'customs' [*diwāna*¹⁰⁶] - consists of the words "*ddi nta w ana*", which roughly translates as "you take (some) and give me the rest". This aptly clarifies popular sentiment towards customs officials, whether at international borders or at inland stations. The mixing of foreign languages in all of the terms (*bulisi*, *dzendarmiya* and *diwāna*) not only serves as an illustration of the unboundedness of the context of the language users but also makes a statement about the identity of the Moroccan administration: they are by nature foreign to "us".

This type of joke seems to be very popular, and in fact many of the puns I heard were borrowings from the aforementioned stand-up comedian Ahmed Sanussi. In Sanussi's language, for example, political election [*iqtirā*] turns into "suggestion" [*iqtirāh*], the former Minister of the Interior Idriss al Basri turns into "*Mercidriiss*" because of his commonly-known fondness for Mercedes cars.

Sanussi's humour rests on the perception that the élite are selfish and thoroughly corrupt. The members of the élite lack "feelings and compassion and love for Morocco",¹⁰⁷ as Sanussi puts it on his tape *Visa wa baliza* (Visa and Suitcase, 1996).

¹⁰³ *Ili 'indu kersh kbīr.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ila kunti fī l-maghreb w-la tastaghrib.*

¹⁰⁵ *dzā dār ḥeṭṭ miya.*

¹⁰⁶ '*Diwāna*' is a colloquial term derived from Spanish *aduana*, [customs]. In literary Arabic term '*diwān*' (in administrative context) means 'treasury' or 'administrative office'.

¹⁰⁷ *faqar fī 'awāṭif, faqar fī ḥanān, faqar fī ḥubb l-maghreb.*

One of Sanussi's dialogues deals with the privatization of former state institutions. Two prominent men discuss:

- "I will buy an electric company. If someone does not like me I will cut off the water and electricity."

His companion adds:

- "Oh boy, imagine this privatisation occurred in Parliament (meaning that one could buy the parliament seats), there really would be money there."

Sanussi's élite are ready to go to any lengths to present a favourable image to Western supporters.

Before the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] meeting in Marrakech the city centre experienced a thorough face-lift operation: public areas were cleaned, beggars, street vendors and storytellers and other performers were removed from most visible areas. Sanussi commented: "Our face is there", i.e. the image of Morocco rests upon them, the West. Hundreds of lemon trees were planted in the city centre but "they are not ready to do it for the sake of us".¹⁰⁸ In order to give a good impression of Morocco to the foreigner, the élite tell the common man:

- If a wealthy *naṣrānī* [Christian i.e. European/American] happens to tumble and fall down, throw yourselves next to him, so that it doesn't look like he fell. Roll in the sand!

Often "them" refers not only to the representatives of the Moroccan French-speaking élite, but also to the representatives of Western international capitalism. Both are seen as equally threatening to the indigenous, "true" Moroccan identity. "Everything here is in their language".¹⁰⁹ When a Frenchman comes to Morocco he enters the Hôtel de France, drinks his coffee in Café Paris, "as if he had never left his country".¹¹⁰

However, the élite strive to maintain their popular support by utilising the critique of colonialism for nationalist causes. One central component in Sanussi's jokes is making the double-faced nature of this enterprise visible. The nationalist struggle for independence [*mukāfaḥa*] against colonialists turns, through a pun, into "squatting on knees" [*mkeffeh*].

The "us" represented in the jokes is synonymous with the common man who struggles in the everyday reality framed by corrupt bureaucratic red tape, poverty and social marginalisation. Jokes which describe interaction between the decision-maker and the common man are very typical among the *sha'bī* men.

A man entered a bar, which was full of drunkards. When he told them to stand up they stood up, and when he told them to line up they lined up. He pointed his finger to the left and to the right and said, "Mules to the left and donkeys to the right". One man spoke up and said, "I am not a donkey." "OK, go with the mules," the man said.

¹⁰⁸ *ma-shi 'la qibalna.*

¹⁰⁹ *kull shi bi lughat-hum.*

¹¹⁰ *bḥal ma sāfersh min blādu..*

In one of Sanussi's jokes the common man discusses with a civil servant from a government office:

-What is your profession?

-I clap hands.

-What kind of job is that?

-Well, there is this company...every now and then they send us to clap hands. We are seated and...as we have nothing to do with our hands...you know these days there are a lot of elections and speeches...people get together. They (the company) tell us to give them a big hand.

-Who else works in the family?

-My poor wife used to ululate from rejoicing [*tzaghrat*] but her tongue swelled up.

-But how do you survive? You clap and she ululates?

-From water and ululations.

The common man, in the guise of a backward trickster and dupe who, thanks to his ignorance, ends up being always one step ahead of the representative of official society is also a common butt of jokes. The following joke, concerning the interaction between the common man and the official from the Ministry of Agriculture, clearly illustrates how the backwardness of the peasant turns into passive resistance.

A man from the Ministry of Agriculture went on a tour of inspection in the countryside. He came across a peasant with a flock of sheep and asked him:

-Where do the sheep get their water?

-The black ones or the white ones?

-The black ones.

-There is that well over there.

-And the white ones then?

-The white ones as well.

-And where do they graze?

-The black ones or the white ones?

-The black ones.

-Up over there.

-And the white ones?

-The white ones as well.

-And how much do they pay for the wool here?

-Of the black ones or the white ones?

-The black ones.

-20 dirhams a kilo.

-And the white ones?

-The white ones as well.

The man had kept on writing everything in his official file but now he had started to lose his temper. He asked sharply:

-Why do you keep on asking "black ones or white ones"?

-Because the black ones are mine.

-And the white ones?

-The white ones as well.

Inherent in all these narrations is the ambivalent attitude of the common Moroccan towards official society. One is, on the one hand, *sha' bī*, part of the Moroccan soil, a representative of the

true, authentic character but, on the other hand, "they" have made "our" country foreign to "us". The common man "lives like a stranger in his *own* country"¹¹¹ – this is in fact a very common saying among young men. The sentiment of being alien or a stranger to one's immediate surrounding is conceptualised by the notion of *ghurba*. In literary Arabic the term means "place of exile" but in the *sha'bi* men's idiom it refers to both the sentiments felt by Moroccan migrants in foreign countries (they are also said to "live in *ghurba*") but also in general to the feeling of homesickness and alienation. In Morocco it is the Sanussi's "them", the unexplicated élite, that are responsible for "our" *ghurba*;¹¹² in Europe it is unfair legislation, xenophobia, discrimination and often racism. The ambiguous sentiment of "betweenness" conveyed by *ghurba* is another very popular source of jokes in L'araish. Perhaps the most multi-layered expression of this ambiguity that I heard came from Ghailan, a 28-year-old university graduate who had studied for two years in Madrid but had returned to Morocco.

-Who was the first one to go with the migrant smugglers?¹¹³ he said, and soon answered his own question:

-Tariq Ibn Ziyad.

In this joke the heroic historical figure, the military leader Tariq Ibn Ziyad, who led the Muslim army towards Gibraltar (*dzabal ṭāriq* in Arabic – literally "Tariq's mountain") and thus opened Spain to Muslim conquest in the year 711, is transformed into something very different from the military hero and representative of Arab hegemony. He is equalled in the joke to thousands of *sha'bi* migrant men who cross the strait in *pateras*. The heroic conquest of Ibn Ziyad becomes parallel to an act of escape on the part of the young present-day migrants – escape from Morocco. Inherent in the story is also – although perhaps with a touch of sarcasm – the idea that Europe is undergoing a new Islamic conquest via international migration. It is thus clear that the joke plays with the multiple referents of the notion *ḥreg*, presented in the introductory chapter. Though in the joke *ḥreg* primarily refers to penetration of borders, in the pre-colonial period it referred to military interventions to pacify rebellious tribes under the Islamic authority of the Sultanate. A similar idea, a pun on the referents of *ḥreg* in the context of migration is manifested in the following joke. Again migration is seen as escape from Morocco. This time the pun centres around the idea that *ḥreg* also refers to burning – burning one's past.

During the Gulf War Saddam Hussein realised that America is beyond the range of his missiles. He pondered whether he would have better odds if he launched them from Morocco. After everything was set and ready he pressed the starting button but nothing happened. He tried again but with the same result. He ordered some of his technicians to check the missiles. Everything appeared to be in perfect condition. Finally the technicians checked the rocket engines and noticed a number of Moroccan youngsters hanging from the exhaust pipes. One of the technicians asked what on earth they were doing.

-We want to burn/migrate, they said [*ḥna bāghīn nḥārgu*].

A similar idea – migration as an act of escape – also materialises in several of Sanussi's jokes:

¹¹¹ *ka- i'ish fi ghurba fi blādu*.

¹¹² It should be noted that from the Arabic verbal root (*gh-r-b*) are also derived the concepts *gharb* [the West] and *istaghrab* [to be surprised, to wonder].

¹¹³ *Shkun l- uwwel lli ḥreg?*

-Imagine they issued visas for everyone. I sure wouldn't mind that. Let's leave them here alone. I wonder who they would play their dirty tricks on!

However, migration is no solution to the feeling of *ghurba* in Morocco, because Europeans appear in many of Sanussi's stories as manifestations of even greater injustice.

-The French were here [in North Africa] for 140 years without a visa.

Given the current political culture in Morocco and migration policies in Europe the common Moroccan identifies with places in complex ways. In the following story, as with thousands of young migrant men, the protagonist decided to "run around the world" in search of a place where individual initiative and entrepreneurial spirit would count, where there would be room for heroic success. In the story Morocco stands for a society that kills all individual initiatives.

There was once an ant that decided to run around the world. When it reached America people noticed that "this must be the famous ant". They squatted down and began to spur it on. It kept on going and finally reached Morocco.

Someone shouted:

- Look! That's the famous ant.

Another said, pressing his finger down and crushing the ant:

-You mean this one?

However, migration is no simple solution to the problems of alienation from one's country. As indicated by the opening of this chapter, the social tensions in migrant concentrations of *L'araishi* often lead to violent incidents, as in Terrassa in 1999. In the stories I heard from *sha'bi* men, both in L'araish and in Terrassa, migration frames a domain of a qualitatively different kind of alienation. Though migration, at best, can offer the chance of a better life through self-fulfilment and greater economic opportunities, it is also a scene for racism and social marginalisation. The backwardness of Moroccans entering a foreign country becomes evident, but it should be noted that backwardness and marginality in relation to Westerners also conveys the image of Moroccans as individuals more capable of feeling compassion and sympathy towards others. The "European" is the more "advanced" but at the same time more self-centred.

Two Moroccans met in a bar in France. One of the men had stayed there for a long time, the other had arrived only recently and was terribly homesick for his wife. The first one said:

-But hey, listen, they have here a thing called a telephone.

-Oh really, where?

-Just walk down the corridor and turn right.

The man did as was suggested but inadvertently turned left and entered the toilet. It was the first time he had ever seen a toilet basin so he thought: "that must be it".

He opened the lid, squatted down, leaned forward and started shouting:

-Fatima, Fatima, can you hear me! This is Muhammed!

He continued for a while, and when he returned he said to his companion:

-The sound was not too good, but it sure smelled like Morocco.

In this joke the protagonist is portrayed as an ignorant new arrival, unaware of the features of the "more progressed" society. Despite the fact that he had lived in France long enough to miss his wife terribly he had not familiarized himself with the toilet or telephone, which also serves as a comment on the living conditions of many of the present-day migrants in Europe. The

protagonist and his wife are called by the most common traditional Muslim proper names in the Islamic world, Muhammed and Fatima. The compassion towards the closest ones at home, though society is portrayed as smelling like a toilet basin, is genuine. In the story the toilet basin serves as a provocative device: it is not only a channel of communication between the two societies but also conveys the idea that everything impure and dirty originates in the West.

Conclusion: the multiple originals

The previous pages focused on the underlying ambiguities concerning directions of belonging among people who associate themselves with the *sha'bi* quarters of L'araish. The various categories of people – whether migrants or residents – engaged in negotiation concerning what it means to have one's origins in the town. The idealised home situated in the past served as a central framework for the construction of *sha'bi* moral selves. However, there were several contemporary processes which made "home" feel "foreign". Such a sentiment was to a great extent verbalised by the term *ghurba*, which constructed another bond of collective association. The nature of all collective identifications was, however, ambiguous and contained internal friction: the *sha'bi* residents of L'araish held that migrants could launch considerable developments with their financial investments in L'araish and lessen the feeling of *ghurba* at home, yet the migrants claimed that there was no confidence in financial and official institutions in Morocco. Investments were almost entirely directed towards fulfilling personal and family objectives. Many migrants refused to return "home" permanently and instead chose to live in *ghurba* in a foreign country, making frequent visits back "home" to display their individual material accomplishments. Yet Morocco also represented the shared cultural origins and Islamic aspect of individual identities.

Among the "locals" in L'araish there was a widely shared perception that the central authorities and financial institutions endeavour to "create closeness"¹¹⁴ with the migrants. In fact, during the holiday season, when the migrants return to L'araish, many banks set up banners to welcome possible clients. The greater financial potential of the migrants, and their reluctance to invest in the local economy, together with worsening inequality in the housing sector, were the most commonly listed reasons for social distance between the long-term residents and visiting migrants. All these ambiguities are demonstrated in the following quotation which I wrote down after attending a seminar organised by a particular L'araish-based NGO. The objective of the seminar was study the possible role of migrants in regional development in Northern Morocco.

The setting of the open discussion which concluded the seminar took place in "The centre of reception of the Moroccan community abroad"¹¹⁵ situated at the junction leading to the *Autoroute*, the newly built highway connecting L'araish to Rabat. The place served as a resting-point for migrants passing through L'araish to other parts of the country. It was established on municipal property, but was administrated by private companies, which in the summer of 1998 had set up a fair to advertise household appliances. Numerous gendarmes patrolled the area and allowed only vehicles registered abroad to enter its premises. Several ferry companies operating in the Strait of Gibraltar, a particular national bank and a telephone company had set up their offices in the area. After a considerable delay the discussion commenced with the opening words of the chairman of the host NGO, Mr. Husayni. He addressed the audience in literary Arabic but soon apologised and asked whether it would be possible to continue in French. As the ground was opened for a discussion a long-haired man (who introduced himself as a L'araishi and long-time migrant in Holland, and dressed in a tight leopardskin-coloured T-shirt with a thick golden

¹¹⁴ *yitqarrab*

¹¹⁵ *markaz istiqbāl l-dzālīya l-maghribīya fi l-khāridz.*

chain) asked whether the organising NGO in L'araish had an office which could co-ordinate possible investment projects in the town. Many migrants I talked with over the summer months had in fact expressed similar ideas: there was a widely-shared desire to do something for the benefit of the hometown, especially for the most visible sign of its present recession, unemployed youth, but no one knew how to contribute. Among some of my friends there had been discussion whether the organising NGO was any "cleaner" than the official administrative offices because both chairmen were civil servants in the construction department of the *baladiya*, the town council.

Another speaker took the floor and said that he knew several second-generation migrants who could not find anything to do in L'araish during the holiday season, but preferred to rush to areas with more developed tourist infrastructure, such as Asila, Rabat or Casablanca and spend their holiday (and money) there. He called for a discussion concerning the ways in which the *L'araishi* migrants could participate in the development of the region. The same man continued by saying that many younger people have a "psychological hindrance" to entering the town; they do not feel at home there anymore. Very similar ideas were in fact provided by the "local" youth. Many said that they simply had to leave their favourite cafés in the centre of the town and spend their evenings in less popular places because they could not stand the pompous behaviour of the migrant youth with more money.

A third speaker, the chair of a Moroccan NGO in Holland, asked for the floor. He mentioned that there were two issues which the members of the migrant community [*dzāliya*] wanted to discuss time after time. First, what to do about the open boats [*pateras*] transporting migrants? TV stations, both in Holland and Spain, constantly poured out images of dead bodies washed up on the beaches and presented voices of youngsters who had gone abroad without their parents. "What is the role of the media in creating stereotypical images of Moroccans?" The man's words echoed another major tension within the *L'araishi* community with direct bearing on the people residing abroad. The more educated, more "settled" migrants with official status often blamed the recent arrivals, who were often uneducated young men, for the growth of xenophobia in Europe and the negative stereotypes attached to Moroccans by some Westerners.

The same speaker finally commented that the second critical issue among the *dzāliya* was the situation of the youngsters who return to Morocco from France, Britain and Holland. "They have nothing to do with the local youth. How to create mutual contacts [*tawāṣul*] between them? They stop in Tangiers or Asila rather than stay here. And on the other hand, any ideas concerning common enterprises always run into the same problems: there is no trust [*tiqa*]." Finally the man dressed in a leopardskin T-shirt said:

"The highway passes right by - L'araish is about to die. We have to find out what the people want. For example, there is a plan to develop the northern coastal areas but what can be done with the migrant money?"

CHAPTER V

The shifting conditions of manhood: work, person and prestige

This study began by observing the significance of the international boundaries between Africa and Europe and then shifted the focus to the construction of social boundaries among the various categories of the *L'araishi*. In the remaining three chapters our attention is further narrowed down to gender and gendered practices.

How the migration practices of young *sha'bi* men both shape and are shaped by cultural notions of *rudzūla* [masculinity/manhood], person and prestige is the main theme of the following pages. Chapter V observes the construction of the *sha'bi* version of *rudzūla* within the context of male work. Chapter VI concentrates on male perceptions concerning relations with women, and finally Chapter VII addresses the subject of how *rudzūla*, sexuality and male sentiment are expressed within the context of male leisure. These three domains – work, gender relations and male sociability – construct overlapping versions of *rudzūla*. There is no single unambiguous hegemonic model of being masculine, but rather a plurality of contextually emerging versions, which all both empower and constrain *sha'bi* men's lives. Hegemonies never emerge without challenges. A whole variety of dominant and subordinate masculinities are defined and redefined in different domains of social interaction. However, all these versions help us to understand the ways in which these *sha'bi* men make their way within the reality of widening spheres of influences.

Interpreting social order

A group of American anthropologists (Geertz H., Geertz C., Rosen L., Rabinow P.) working in Morocco in the 1960s and 1970s were particularly interested in the interpretation of cultural processes by which people ascribe meaning to their social reality. A brief discussion of the basic assumptions of the works of these "interpretationists"¹¹⁶ helps to illuminate my perspective towards cultural construction of masculinity and indicate why I have appropriated particular cultural notions as keys to approach gender and person in this context.

The common denominator of the aforementioned ethnographers' works on Morocco is that they adopted an individual social person as the basic unit of society. This analytical choice resulted from empirical problems in locating any general systems of stratification (whether based on kin, wealth, or education) within Moroccan society. Society, according to the interpretationists, was rather understood as composed of intricate webs of individually created constantly shifting social ties. Social bonds of domination and subordination were then seen to permeate the whole of society. From the point of view of social hierarchy a crucial matter is a person's relative position within the overlapping networks. The stability of the social system arises – not from the outcome of the creation of social ties – since they are in constant flux – but from the means, the social common-sense assumptions by which people negotiate (or "bargain") their social relations. In other words, order comes from the means of tying bonds – not from the process of patterning relations. All bargain in the same way. The only relative difference – and thus the basis of social hierarchy – is the skill and capacity to bargain. The ways in which people construct social ties in Morocco, regardless of age, gender, and social status are homogenous, and guided by a single cultural logic. The logic of bargaining has such a degree of homogeneity everywhere in Morocco that it has been said to characterize the whole of Moroccan society.

¹¹⁶ Here I primarily refer to works by Geertz C., Geertz H., Rosen L. (1979), Rosen (1984), and Rabinow (1975), (1977).

One central paradox in the works of these interpretationists is the fact that the exact period of their fieldwork – the 1960s and 1970s – witnessed major transformations within Moroccan society, but very little attention was paid to them in the final analysis. First, rural - urban migration greatly intensified during this period. Together with rapid population growth the urban areas expanded very rapidly all over Morocco. The emergence of new shanty-towns had one major social effect: urban spaces were strongly stratified according to the wealth and social connectedness of the inhabitants, which was often associated with the length of residence in the urban setting. In L'araish in this exact period the size of the population grew with extreme rapidity. Vast areas, today characterized as *sha'bi* quarters [*hayy sha'bi*] sprung up around the old colonial quarters. Secondly, over the same period the personnel of the Moroccan administration in public sector bureaucratic institutions multiplied manifoldly (Abu Lughod J. 1980, 250-259). A new group of modern educated civil servants [*muwaddafin*] appeared on the labour market. Together with these developments Morocco ratified agreements with several European countries on the terms of labour migration, the peak of which was reached in the early 1970s. The remittances sent from Europe further diversified the stratification of urban spaces. In North-Western Morocco the position of new administrative élites (i.e. customs officials, gendarmes, highway patrol police, bureaucrats in the construction sector) relied to a great degree on intensifying connections across the international borders.

These general trends are, of course, crude simplifications of the processes underway but relevant in at least one respect. It is paradoxical that while the interpretationists aimed to understand the underlying logic of practical action (creation of social networks) their analyses were heavily based on language use rather than practical action (i.e. on negotiation of social relations in practice). The central assumption that positions within society rest entirely upon the capacity to negotiate bonds of obligation does not stand closer scrutiny in the present-day *sha'bi* context. In the modern, stratified urban spaces people also use several evaluative idioms which classify an unknown person *a priori* into certain social groupings (e.g. *sha'b*, *muwaddaf*), and these evaluations guide the ways in which people interact with each other. These assumptions are not only read from language use but as everywhere else from embodied practices (clothing, glances, interpretations concerning "the nature of a person's eyes", cleanliness, assumed social connectedness, respectability of the person and so forth). The *sha'b* very often express the idea of social stratification with the notion *ḍurūf* [conditions or circumstances]. The notion refers among other things to a person's social connections but also to wealth, reputation, and gendered social virtue. Those with less advantaged *ḍurūf* resort to "social arrangement" [expressed by the verb *dabbar*] when negotiating social connections. *Dabbar* involves clever manipulation of social relations through concealing and revealing knowledge and playing with one's public image. *Dabbar* is a particularly important resource of social bargaining especially for those on lower levels in the social hierarchy. It is a resource of the weak.

These two central notions frequently employed by the *sha'b* suggest that social relations in present-day urban contexts are not only bargained, untouched by *a priori* ideas of social stratification. In both L'araish and Terrassa I encountered very little overlapping of social networks, or attempts to bargain social relations with men from very different educational and economic backgrounds. A very similar observation was made by the Moroccan sociologist Bushanfati (1988, 164-166) in two shanty-towns in Meknes in central Morocco. He argued that the urban poor created social networks which were of extreme importance, given the difficult material conditions in these quarters. However, the creation of social relations was guided by several underlying factors. In poor urban quarters constituted from residents from various social and geographical backgrounds the forms of co-operation were largely based on regionalism, common rural origins, work relations, religious affiliations and blood relations. Also of central importance was the predominance of relations based on close physical proximity. Bushanfati also found considerable differences in the intensity of social relations, which agreed with the age and gender of the person in focus.

The interpretationists furthermore paid little attention to gender and the cultural patterning of the gendered life cycles. Shared understandings, the prime interest of the interpretationists cannot be analyzed independently of the situations and the wider culturally-patterned contexts in which they are used. Both these issues are of extreme importance when we look at the construction of gender, person and social networks among the *sha'bi* men in the present-day context. The young men hold an understanding of the male life-cycle which they usually call simply "the future" [*mustaqbal*]. To have "the future" implies, among other things a gradual accumulation of "respect" [*ihtirām*] within the overlapping social networks. Its antithesis implies that one is "stuck" in relationships (with bosses, fathers, teachers or other social superiors), which grant no social mobility.

Gaining respect at this stage of the life-cycle thus entails that young men create relations of voluntary deference to their social superiors. Such relations form a vital part of a young man's *mustaqbal*. Young men understand that one aspect of *rudzūla* results from male initiations i.e. accumulation of respect acquired through relationships, some of which require submission to the patron. The young men realize very well that *rudzūla* requires the ability to withstand suffering in one's body [*tkarfas*], patience [*sabr*] and cleverness [*dakā*, sometimes also *'aql*] to "profit behind the patron's back" [*rbeḥ murāh*], and gain respect through closeness to the patron. Hammoudi (1997) perceives that (male) personhood in Morocco is marked with a high degree of ambivalence – because every person is simultaneously in both a submissive and dominant position *vis-à-vis* others. Manhood thus implies a waiting period when the submissive party

...must also painfully give up for a while the identity he wants to have: being the chief, the father, a virile and dominating man (in contrast to women) the master (in contrast with the disciple) (ibid., 4.).

According to Hammoudi, a rather homogenous system can be found in domains of political action, in political parties and trade unions and in public and private bureaucracies. Ascending in status in all domains of social life is preceded by a period where the submissive party tries to gain benefits from proximity to the patron. This requires, according to Hammoudi, social sacrifices, such as auto-repression of signs of agency. Central to this "system" is that people are guided by the patron-client model while they may at the same time oppose it.

Following the interpretationists, my interest lies in the processes whereby the men in this study ascribe meaning to surrounding social reality through language and other symbolic representations. However, rather than constructing all encompassing social logic in the manner of the interpretationists I find the *sha'bi* men's meaning making to be contextual, malleable, changing and often contradictory. I also acknowledge the fact that the subjects of this study are bound to speak very differently at different phases of their life cycle, after maturing, establishing families and fathering children. I also acknowledge that not all men become fathers or patrons. For some men patron-client relations never grant opportunities to profit from closeness to the patron.

For these young men some masculine representations weigh differently than for older males. The three different domains I approach in the following – relations of work and social arrangement, gender relations and finally male friendship – construct different masculine representations. Some of these are contradictory and ambiguous. They overlap and their boundaries are blurred. Men play with these ambiguities, joke about them, and create associations with different aspects of masculinity in novel ways.

A reader familiar with the works of the interpretationists will notice that in the following very little attention is paid to cultural notions such as 'attribution' / 'relationship' [*nisba*] 'origins' [*aṣl*], 'obligation' [*ḥaqq*], and 'rationality' [*'aql*] which the interpretationists adopted as keys to the construction of social identity, personhood and establishing social relations in Morocco.¹¹⁷ I understand that the centrality of notions such as *ḍurūf* and *dabbar*, *ḥreg* and *ghurba* (see previous chapter) in the lives of these men indicates that social reality, including the tools of ascribing meaning constantly changes. Furthermore, as people's objectives change the nature of the social networks is bound to be transformed (Singerman 1995, 166).

The notions whereby people make sense of their social world are revised as the social world changes but they also participate in changing the world. New understandings of the social reality are linked to the changing circumstances of the subjects, and they reflect the new challenges to the community's borders.

***Ḍurūf*: Enveloping the realities of life**

From the first weeks of my fieldwork, I heard young men making frequent comments concerning life "conditions", or "circumstances" [*ḍurūf*]. Often men in their early twenties explained to me that their *ḍurūf* does not "allow"¹¹⁸ them to think about marriage. On other occasions, when exposing their urges to migrate, some stated that their *ḍurūf* was "nerve-racking"¹¹⁹, "still bad"¹²⁰, "harsh"¹²¹, or simply "difficult".¹²² Upon my questioning, young men frequently provided a whole understanding of the *sha' b* self-image by recourse to *ḍurūf*. It is characteristic of the *sha' b*, they told me, to live in *ḍurūf* which is always "unsettled",¹²³ which sometimes "ascends and sometimes collapses".¹²⁴ When we talked about returning migrants, or bourgeois families their *ḍurūf*, in contrast was often characterized by attributes such as "settled"¹²⁵ or "preferable/open to multiple options"¹²⁶ or perhaps "good",¹²⁷ "improved"¹²⁸ or "relaxed".¹²⁹ In short, *ḍurūf* appeared to be a notion which was used as the reason and cause of particular choices, but it also referred to the quality of social relations and their influence on individual persons. The ways in which young men talked about their *ḍurūf* offered a perspective for approaching notions of hierarchy, social worth and gendered hegemonies. *Ḍurūf* appeared as a key to the conceptions which these still in many ways "incomplete" adult men held about *rudzūla*. As these men often verbalized their urges to migrate by references to *ḍurūf*, it also seemed to open a way to approach the linkages between *ḥarrāga* migration and gendered meanings.

¹¹⁷ For discussion on the Moroccan notions of *nisba* and *aṣl*, see Geertz C. (1979, 140-50), Rosen (1984, 19-30). Rosen (1984, 60-70) and Eickelman (1976, 123-54) provide a detailed analysis of the notion of *ḥaqq*. *'Aql* [rationality] is scrutinized in Rosen (1984, 31-34), in Eickelman (1989, 242-243) and in Eickelman (1976, 128-133).

¹¹⁸ *tmaḥ*

¹¹⁹ *m'aṣṣba*

¹²⁰ *baqi qabiḥa*.

¹²¹ *qāṣḥa*; in literary Arabic *qāsiya*.

¹²² *ṣa'ba*

¹²³ *ghīr mustaqirra*.

¹²⁴ *marra ka-ḥīla' marra ka-ḥīḥ*.

¹²⁵ *mustaqirra*

¹²⁶ *mḥayyira*

¹²⁷ *meziyāna*

¹²⁸ *mḥassna*

¹²⁹ *mrtāḥa*

Ḍurūf - the term

In modern standard Arabic dictionaries¹³⁰ the concept of *ḍurūf* is usually translated as "conditions" or "circumstances" (Wehr 1994 [1979], 679; Al Mawrid 1994, 79). It derives from a verbal root which, among other things, refers to ideas of "containment", "enveloping" and "covering". The variety of ways in which *sha'bi* men used the concept indicated that its meanings should be detected from practical usages, which seemed to be much wider and contextual than the dictionary definitions suggest. The concept seemed to "envelope" construction of a gendered social person and his/her relation to the social, economic and moral hierarchy. When people talked about their pasts, presents and futures in terms of their *ḍurūf*, I understood, the frames of discussion involved the individual's reciprocal relations to household and family, patterns of friendship and social connections with neighbours and the wider society. Matters such as material wealth, work, means of arranging income, and individual and family reputation within its social networks were also clearly at issue when people referred to their *ḍurūf*.

Another major problem that I encountered when trying to explain to myself what young men meant by the term, was that it appeared to be closely linked to the idea of management of social relations through public performance, concealing and revealing of knowledge, and "gossip" [*hadra*], which all feed notions of 'trust' [*tiqa*], public 'face' [*wudzh*], 'respect', [*ihtirām*] and 'envy' or 'jealousy' [*ghīra*]. What is important for the sake of one's *ḍurūf* is how people *perform* in front of the socially constructed vision and how people *talk* about others and become the subjects of others' talk.

ʿAbdel ʿAli once explained to me:

"Sometimes you have to bring things home at night time, so that people do not see you. For example, if you bring something new to your house you have to do it at night-time so that people do not see it. If they see it, they have something to say about it. One time one problem happened to me. At that time I worked in Tangiers. I had bought two pieces of *seddari* [long wall-to-wall sofa]. Since then I have not been able to buy anything new for my house. Why? Because I have not been careful. I really realized that these things have their importance. I have tried to get one more so that there would be three of them but the *ḍurūf* just do not help me.¹³¹ But the day God wants to help me, he helps me."

Some aspects of *ḍurūf* can be expressed as something one is short of in relation to others. Men may state for example: "there is still a lot that I need concerning my *ḍurūf*".¹³²

Since the beginning of the 1990s, L'araish has witnessed tremendous social and economic changes, largely resulting from migration. New economic opportunities were opened up for *sha'bi* youngsters thanks to the growing social influence of *harrāga* in the region. Numerous men began to serve as middlemen for smugglers, to arrange official or forged documents for prospective migrants, to offer translation services, to provide links to bureaucrats and the security forces and to serve as vehicles of information concerning opportunities to migrate. Migration also launched vast changes in the housing sector, construction, real estate and land market in Morocco, and catalyzed growing frictions, xenophobia and discrimination in Spain. As migration became ever more difficult to realize and required more courage, physical stamina and determination, it created new competition for material wealth and social prestige. Finally, in the

¹³⁰ In literary Arabic the word is written *Zurūf*.

¹³¹ *ma bghatsh d-ḍurūf tsā'adni*.

¹³² *bezzāf de d-ḍurūf lli khess-ni ana*.

case of young men it opened new negotiations concerning standards by which they experience poverty and need, and success, too. In order to understand what the young men mean when talking about *ḍurūf*, respect has to be paid to all the afore-mentioned social, cultural and economic processes launched by *ḥarrāga*.

How do people construct understandings concerning *ḍurūf*? In April 1998 I made the acquaintance of Anwar¹³³, 'Abdel 'Ali's brother-in-law, who had spent nearly four years (1990-1994) in Spain without official status. During this period Anwar had written several diaries relating his personal experiences as a migrant. He also recounted childhood memories and described social life in L'araish. In one of the entries Anwar describes his neighbours' situation in L'araish.

"My neighbours' family consists of (widowed) mother, nearly 55, Ahmed 29, Omnia 15, who died in December 1989, Hakima 34 and finally mentally disabled (son) Hafid. This family came to settle in this quarter seven years ago, because they did not find peace in other quarters, because of the way they led their life, so they came and settled (here) in order not to be hurt or insulted.

Ahmed was an intelligent student with a literary inclination. He gained his *baccalauréat* in 1983 but he did not go on (with his studies) because of the obstacles he found in his life. Besides, he is a heavy smoker of drugs. As a result of this he is jobless and his whole life depends on his sister's money that she brings in from the illegal work she does. So what does she do? And where does she get the money? Every day she uses cosmetics to appear beautiful in the eyes of others, then she goes out to the house of the *qawwāda* [female pimp] where the *baghiyāt* [prostitutes] gather. She was accustomed to make the best of her life and her family's life. She prefers to be a *baghiya* rather than to ask for help from others. She loses her temper easily if anyone touches her brother Hafid.

¹³³ Anwar (born in 1965), the elder brother of 'Abdel 'Ali's wife Fatma is the only one of eleven brothers and sisters with university experience. He started studying English in Tetuán in 1985 but dropped out after his third year in 1988. In L'araish he had made the acquaintance of a French tourist, Didier, a teacher from Rennes, to whom he had offered lodging for several weeks at his parents' house. Didier, for his part, offered to help Anwar if he ever decided to visit him in France. Anwar had obtained a temporary work permit in late 1989 and worked for a short while in Lerida in Catalonia but decided to return to Morocco.

In the spring of 1990 he left Morocco, this time for France. His friend Didier's attempts to find him work proved to be unsuccessful, so Anwar travelled once more to Catalonia. In late April 1990 he headed for Barcelona. Without residence and work permit he finally settled in Belpuig in central Catalonia. During the first three months he worked for five different employers: in bars, small industrial enterprises, as a refuse collector and cleaning sewage wells. After 1991, Anwar spent nearly 18 months without permanent work in Spain, dwelling in deserted houses or without shelter in various different locations in Spain. He finally returned to L'araish in May 1994 for his younger brother's wedding. After his return Anwar managed to find work in the local administrative office but was later laid off. He then worked periodically on the local fishing-boats. In 1995 Anwar married a divorcee from Risana (with whom contacts were provided by 'Abdel 'Ali) and set up his sheet-metal hut adjacent to his parents' house. Anwar had managed to regain his job at the local administration but during my period of fieldwork payment of his wages had been delayed for several months. He was very willing to share his experiences of Spain with me and, for example, let me read the two diaries from which the quotations are taken. Most of his experiences of Spain were written in English – in order to keep his ideas out of reach of his Moroccan room-mates – he explained. The original text in English includes sentences which are not intelligible if the reader has no understanding of Moroccan Arabic sentence structure and expressions. On occasion Anwar uses Arabic terms when he cannot find a suitable word in English. For the sake of readability and correct understanding I have made a few modifications to the original text.

Her mother is a short, tiny woman who makes great efforts to make her living by her special methods. For example, she helps people who are celebrating their newborn babies. And more than that, I guess that she uses her version of medicine against illness. She sometimes travels to the countryside where people believe in these things more than in the town.

But though these people are marked by their manners they are generous and lend their smiles to everyone. For instance, they take responsibility for their neighbour's wife and two children. The mother usually gives my small brother some coins to buy something for himself. And next to her there might be a well-dressed man with a pocket full of money, but he does not offer a penny to the blind woman standing there.

Hakima's father died five years ago. He was a man with a sense of rhythm and he was good at playing the *tambūr* [flat drum]. He suffered from a heart disease which weakened him rapidly. Maybe he was weakened by the social view of him.

I had just got to know Ahmed when his poor father died, leaving the poor family renting a small room to hide from the big fat animal (the landlord). When it rains it means trouble for their lives, and when it is hot it is very hard to stay in or sleep there.

Hakima was once married (she later divorced) to a gentle young man who accepted her as a faithful wife. He was a silent and polite man. He seldom speaks but laughs from time to time. Yes – the outsider's view of her changed for the better. People never saw her walking on the strait path but at least she was married. Her husband had everything to satisfy his wife. But the further away Hakima goes from her home the worse the situation gets. There is no one else who can support the family. Some people repeat that she can work. Yes, she could be a slave in the house of a big fat man. And in that case any moment the lady is absent the big fat man would make her have sex just for the pleasure or change. So she would be able to take care of her family and surely would appreciate the monthly pennies. She could take up a tough job in a factory, but not permanently. Or she could be a cleaner in some establishment, controlled by pythons. Unfortunately she could not afford to pay bribe money to get into other places [...]

This all hurts her brother Ahmed, who will not be able to hide the truth. To save her daughter the mother knows how to kill the fetus before it grows. She is to blame? Everybody says, "Yes" without analyzing their case. She (Hakima) will be a bad example for everyone, and a subject of insults. But suppose we stop Hakima and advise her to study at home? Yes, it is good from the external point of view. Let us take a look, what do these people eat? Are they satisfied? Do they even have something to eat? Do people throw rocks at her?

They are the most generous – even if they haven't much. They are the most polite and best educated. These people keep themselves to themselves. That is all. They used to have a salary from the army, for their father had worked there. Once he died, I guess it was 1985, the son died too¹³⁴ and they were left without any income. Ahmed tried many times to reclaim his father's pay but nothing happened. Hakima, then, was the only choice to save them from starvation and hunger.

¹³⁴ Anwar perhaps refers to Ahmed's "social death".

A central theme carries through Anwar's account: the relationship between wealth, hierarchy and gendered public image, and the way in which these become subjects of social control. First Anwar draws the image of a family with weak male figures, the mentally handicapped Hafid and the unemployed drug addict Ahmed. The women of the family, the divorcee Hakima and her widowed mother, resort to professions which are occupied by women without a male protector (see Jansen 1987). The mother, Anwar suggests, is a traditional healer and sorceress [*musha'wida*], and the daughter, Hakima, is engaged in prostitution. Since the *males* of the household are not able to provide for the family, Hakima is described as the *ultimate* choice to save them from hunger. Hakima's "illegal" activities have a bearing on the family's prestige and reputation, but first and foremost they pose a challenge to Ahmed's *rudzūla*. He, as the eldest male in the family, should ideally be its main breadwinner. Anwar makes the following statement: the economically less advantaged are constantly forced to place their public respect [*iḥtirām*] at risk, because of economic weakness. This moreover has an emasculating effect on the men of the household.

In the *sha'bi* context both men and women speak of "my *ḍurūf*".¹³⁵ A woman's *ḍurūf* always emerges directly linked to a man's capability to provide. It is man's responsibility to provide and maintain a woman's *ḍurūf* and to ensure that the women are protected. In the present-day *sha'bi* context women's wage work outside the home does not itself compose a threat to a woman's reputation. However, both men and women perceive that certain jobs by definition indicate that a woman's *ḍurūf* does not protect her from possible physical interventions by her male superiors. Working as a cleaner, housemaid, or agricultural labourer not only makes a woman vulnerable – it in fact indicates that her *ḍurūf* is in such a state (exactly as in the case of Hakima in Anwar's writings) that she has had to take such a job in the first place. In short the less respected are so because they have to arrange their living by methods which are considered to create a stigma. In some jobs, the young *sha'bi* men hold, it is impossible for a woman to preserve her "honour" [*sharaf*].¹³⁶ For these reasons single women migrants are very often perceived as morally lax. Their economic success is perceived in a very different manner from that of successful young men. For a young man wealth gained through migration is proof of his masculine capabilities to provide; in a similar situation young women are usually assumed to have engaged in prostitution. In fact, single women migrants are usually widows, divorcees and orphans (Ramírez 1998).

Anwar suggests that sometimes people have to risk their public reputation but should not give up their independence, even in the most extreme situations. Hakima prefers to preserve the family's autonomy and not "ask for help from others". Throughout Anwar's writing, receiving help is understood to create a bond of obligation between the helper and the helped (see Eickelman 1989, 244). Anwar seems to suggest that one should always strive to preserve one's independence and ability to influence social relations, even at the cost of one's public reputation. Any *sha'bi* person naturally, by necessity, enters into client relations with others, but in order to preserve one's public face there has to be at least a promise of "profit behind his (the master's) back" [*rbeḥ murah*]. It is particularly humiliating to become merely the servant of others.

Anwar seems to understand Hakima's choice to become a prostitute – at least she is not a "slave" to anyone. Her brother Ahmed risks his reputation by giving up his obligation to protect his sister rather than maintain this duty by becoming a servant of others himself. Male virtue is ultimately related in the present-day *sha'bi* context to independence and respect. In some cases men seem to value personal autonomy more highly than sexual control over the women in the family. This is

¹³⁵ *ḍurūf dyalī*.

¹³⁶ *Sharaf* is often also used as a synonym of hymen.

certainly an unorthodox claim, at least when compared with accounts from various Middle Eastern and North African contexts in harmony with the long tradition of "Honour / Shame" anthropology (Peristiany 1965; Pitt-Rivers 1963; Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers 1992), at least in one sense. It is worth noting that male honour is in many accounts ultimately associated with (sexual) control of women (see e.g. Dwyer D. 1978a; Dwyer D. 1978b; Abu Lughod L. 1985; Abu Lughod L. 1986; Delaney 1991; Caton 1987; Tapper 1991).

According to Anwar's view the wealthy males (the big fat man, the factory foremen) exploit the poor, but because of their social influence they can keep their "illegitimate" activities (sexual relations with women such as Hakima) out of the public domain and thus preserve their reputation. If faults do not become public they are not faults. Only men like Ahmed, declares Anwar, are unable to hide their incapacity to protect the female members of their households from public scrutiny. Despite their public stigma, Anwar regards the members of the family in question as the most polite and most generous in the whole quarter. They are simply forced to live as they live because of their *ḍurūf*.

The family's true morality lies in the fact that its members aspire to maintain their independence by not asking for help from others. Rather than becoming servants of others they constantly offer their generosity to others, such as children and beggars who are not expected to reciprocate. It is the economically resourceful "well-dressed man" who finally appears as the true object of Anwar's condemnation. The moral quality of the rich is in fact so profoundly questioned that Anwar constantly proclaims their inhumanity, by calling them animals and pythons.

Like Anwar in his writings, *sha'bi* men very often construct understandings concerning social hierarchy by reference to a person's *ḍurūf*. There are simply those who have better *ḍurūf* – those who have wide social networks, who are often also materially wealthy, more autonomous, with more social influence, and those with "unsettled" *ḍurūf*, who lack social connections with important political and economic domains. The economically affluent (the boss, the employer, the owner) and the less advantaged (the client, the worker, the one asking for help) appear in the patron-client relation, where the patron maintains control over the less affluent party. The rich simply "own", the poor work; they only have their manual labour to trade for wages.

In a world characterized by tension between asking and offering, submission and dominance, morality relates primarily to equality of distribution, fairness of exchanges and generosity. The rich are self-centred, "corrupt, made rotten" [*mafsūd*] because they do not perform a duty assigned to all Muslims – distribution of proportion of their wealth to the poor. This, by contrast, means that being poor implies honour and piety. Popular men of religion are praised for their simplicity and justness and the plainness of their life-style. Rich and poor appear in many ways as moral opposites. Poor men often state that they have "nothing but God".

Here emerges a major contradiction: the wealthy are condemned because of their lack of compassion for the poor and their unwillingness to distribute their wealth out of a mere sense of solidarity and equality with fellow-Muslims. However, the poor should never ask for help in order not to enter into a dependency situation. Yet the *sha'bi* men also praise the capacity to maintain one's independence, the accumulation of wealth and the gaining of social influence through individual astuteness.

In another extract Anwar talks about his room-mates in Spain:

If you want to buy people, buy them with money so that they are not your enemies. And if you buy them, they will never react against you. That is the nature of human beings. Give them something whenever they ask but never ask them to give you anything. Yesterday I bought them all a piece of drug [hashish]. They all respect me now and changed their behaviour, so I'll buy them (to be my clients) forever.

In short, a whole ideology, relating to the management of social relations, the construction of gendered hegemony and the social meaning of wealth seem to be conveyed by the single notion of *ḍurūf*. It constructs male virtue through ideas of autonomy, independence and wealth converted into social influence and respect through distribution of bonds of obligation. *Ḍurūf* is a prime example of the way in which ideologies of social influence and power include complex overlapping notions. It simply resists translation to any single category.

Establishing connections

Sha' bī men "build" [*bnā*] *ḍurūf* through capable performance in the various domains of social interaction where a man's endurance, stamina and hardness is constantly compared with other men's performances. *Ḍurūf* appears in social practice in terms of respect [*iḥtirām*]. A person has as much *ḍurūf* and *iḥtirām* as he deserves. Should his *ḍurūf* "collapse", [*tāḥ*] it implies that his public respectability is also stained and he cannot face the challenges in competitive situations. Signs of poverty and misery are particularly humiliating since they are direct symptoms of a man's incapacity to participate in the performances of masculinity. In situations of challenge men can very well be called 'non-men' [*ma-shi radzul*]. *Rudzūla* requires constant social approval of its existence –it is by no means a fixed quality of men's physical bodies.

The challenges of *rudzūla* often involve the idea that a man gains respect through his words; thus the soundness of his verbal testimonies, and the rationality of his judgment are critical issues. Heated arguments over respect are very common in public interaction between men. Calling another person's words exaggerations, lies or fabrications usually leads to equal challenges. *Sha' bī* men seem to respect the autonomy of others for exactly these reasons. Lies and fabrications which are not direct challenges to a person's respectability often go unnoticed because men realize that public questioning of another's words would only lead to further arguments. It is always a powerful method for backing up one's own fabrication by asking the other party, "Are you calling me a liar?"

Wealth is a major resource associated with *ḍurūf*, but it does not *per se* compose *ḍurūf*. To be respected one must know how to use one's wealth. Wasting money in an unproductive manner on pleasures of the night is mere stupidity. For a real man wealth is a vehicle of influence, connections and material symbols of prestige. Respect among men is the result of practical actions, often involving a long route of establishing and managing social contacts and slowly utilizing one's subordinate relations with particular masters as spring-boards for the accumulation of wealth and for gaining more advanced positions in order to establish new social relations and then to turn them to growing social and political influence. From the *sha' bī* men's perspective, social relations with migrants, border control and various categories of middlemen working in the context of migration have important economic and socio-symbolic value. In 'Abdel 'Ali's extended family there is one particularly influential man called 'Abdelhaqq who managed to transform his business relations in L'araish into a more advanced position in relation to mobility across the international border. Marriage to the sister of a border guard allowed him to start import activities and further turn his financial wealth into political influence. This furthermore allowed him to enter into very profitable property transactions in L'araish and granted several members of his family the opportunity to migrate.

'Abdelhaqq

'Abdel 'Ali's paternal cousin 'Abdelhaqq arrived in L'araish from the family village of Risana, together with his parents and five siblings, in the early 1970s. His father Muhammed opened one of the first grocery stalls in the rapidly expanding neighbourhood in the Jnan al Bidawa quarter. 'Abdelhaqq's first job was in a local bean cannery and on occasion he helped run the family store. With the profits gained from the shop his father, Muhammed, bought a second-hand truck and entered into a client relationship with the local bean cannery. 'Abdelhaqq's responsibility was to provide the factory with products from the agricultural areas surrounding their original village, Risana.

In the early 1980s 'Abdelhaqq's mother inherited a small property in Risana. A modern irrigation system was introduced in the area in the early 1980s, and during the first years the crops proved to be very profitable. 'Abdelhaqq's father rented more irrigated land, while 'Abdelhaqq terminated the contract with the bean cannery. Instead, with his elder brother Hmed, he started to take care of the accounts of the agricultural business. By the time Hmed had gained a high school diploma, the father, Muhammed, decided to close the grocery stall in the quarter. He started up a new business, this time a women's clothing and perfume shop, which was opened in another rapidly growing quarter, Jnan al Basha. He assigned the responsibilities to his son Hmed. Meanwhile 'Abdelhaqq crashed his truck in a traffic accident near the town of Sidi Kachem.

Through his business activities Hmed had made the acquaintance of a Spanish man, a long-term resident in L'araish. The man had offered his help for now jobless 'Abdelhaqq, promising to provide him with connections if he wanted to go to Spain. In fact, 'Abdelhaqq entered Spain at the end of 1987 and settled in Terrassa. As in the case of many other new migrants, he started working on local construction sites. In 1990, one year before the introduction of entrance visas in Spain, 'Abdelhaqq's younger sister Zahra joined him in Terrassa and was soon working in a local café-bar.

By 1990 the housing improvement programme had been implemented in the Jnan Bidawa quarter. The hut occupied by the family had by now been demolished, but with the financial assistance sent by 'Abdelhaqq and Zahra the family managed to build a concrete house in the quarter of Wafa. 'Azizi, a friend of 'Abdelhaqq's brother Hmed, a former migrant and now a local politician had housed the family until the construction was completed.

Upon his frequent visits to Morocco, 'Abdelhaqq had started to import – among other things – second-hand refrigerators and freezers. Through these activities he made the acquaintance of *Comadar Gendarme* working in the Moroccan border control on the border of the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. In 1993 'Abdelhaqq married the *gendarme's* sister Maimuna. The marriage undoubtedly opened more favourable opportunities for 'Abdelhaqq in his import business.

Meanwhile 'Abdelhaqq's brother Hmed – while running the lingerie and perfume shop – rented another property where he set up a small dressmaker's shop. Hmed, for his part, established contacts with the owner of a large textile shop in the centre of L'araish, whose sister Rachida he married. With the help of his business associate 'Azizi, Hmed had joined a political party and managed to have himself elected to the town council. During this period 'Abdelhaqq returned to L'araish from Spain for a few months. Through his contacts with the municipal administration Hmed managed to acquire two 80 square metre plots at very reasonable prices, which were to be sites for both 'Abdelhaqq's and his sister Zahra's houses. During this period Hmed provided numerous family members with contacts which secured their migration to Spain. Back in Terrassa, 'Abdelhaqq had arranged a Spanish work contract for his sister Baida's husband

Hussein, who crossed over to Spain with a migrant smuggler in 1995. After about a year in Spain Hussein, too, started building a house for his nuclear family in L'araish. By mid-1995 both of 'Abdelhaqq's parents had moved to Terrassa. 'Abdelhaqq had arranged a visa for his father, who was in need of an eye operation, and managed to obtain a visa for his now elderly mother, too. By 1998 only Hmed and his wife and children remained in L'araish, but 'Abdelhaqq, I heard, was making preparations for them to come to Spain.

"*Durūf* teaches the jobs":¹³⁷ social relations of work

One day during the first month of my fieldwork I sat in the pine forest on the southern edge of L'araish with 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali. I asked them to explain to me what kinds of work people do in their quarter. 'Umar replied:

Very few people there hold a regular job. Let us look, for example, at construction work. Someone, for example, goes to Spain, comes back and wants to build a house. He asks someone to arrange the land for him and then you've got many middlemen¹³⁸ who find you the masters¹³⁹ and they have their ways of getting the workers.¹⁴⁰ You can have up to 30-40 men working on one site. The one who wants his house built doesn't necessarily know the workers, he only deals with the middleman. He arranges for the workers and they have to come "for his face".¹⁴¹ Because he "has the word"¹⁴² in the quarter. They just have to come because "they are always dependent on him".¹⁴³

'Abdel 'Ali: He is a person who's got "power over the *sha'b*".¹⁴⁴ You've got many kinds of middlemen – they have their specialities. Someone deals with construction, someone with cars, someone arranges places for rent, someone is only involved in buying and selling.

Marko: And how do they get in contact with people?

'Umar: Everything works through cafés. Everyone knows where the important men in their quarter sit. Your money is never enough, even for the necessities. It is best just to do your job and be quiet. In this world "there's no rights".¹⁴⁵ Your *durūf* teaches the jobs. You have to "arrange"¹⁴⁶ everything, because "there is no set route to do things".¹⁴⁷ If you have someone's autograph in your papers it doesn't mean anything. It is all up to how you can "arrange your things".¹⁴⁸ That's why we say, "Grease them a bit so things work out"¹⁴⁹ or "either a wrinkled ten dirham note or your budget is lost".¹⁵⁰

'Abdel 'Ali: In these things "there is no humanity".¹⁵¹ If "your hand is crushed"¹⁵² you say, "Your eye has vision but your hand is short."¹⁵³

¹³⁷ *D-duruf 'allamak l-hurūf* – literally: "The circumstances teach you the letters". Both words, *hurfa* [profession] and *harf* [letter, pl. *hurūf*], are derived from the same cluster of meanings.

¹³⁸ *samāsir*

¹³⁹ *mu'allimīn*

¹⁴⁰ *'ummāl*

¹⁴¹ *'la wudzhu.*

¹⁴² *'indu klām bezzāf.*

¹⁴³ *daiman mu'tamidīn 'alēh.*

¹⁴⁴ *quwwa 'la sh-sha'b.*

¹⁴⁵ *huqūq ma kaynsh.*

¹⁴⁶ *dabbar.*

¹⁴⁷ *ṭriqa rasmīya ma kaynsh.*

¹⁴⁸ *dabbar rask.*

¹⁴⁹ *dhen s-sir, isīr.*

¹⁵⁰ *Mila mkemmsha wella mizān msha* – meaning that it is best to offer a bribe.

¹⁵¹ *dzānib insānī ma kaynsh.*

¹⁵² *yeddak mherrsa* – referring to poverty.

'Umar: So you know why these people take the risk of going [to Spain] by *patera*. In everything "you either win or are butchered".¹⁵⁴

Work appears as a hierarchical sets of relations where people with poor *durūf* have very little influence on the ways in which agreements concerning the social and material exchanges are made. The workers trade their manual labour in exchange for wages to their bosses – and on the bosses' terms. Positions are based on *durūf*, which in this context is the publicly recognized capability to mobilize people through a "word" [*klām*] and social influence [*quwwa*]. The less advantaged can manipulate the exchange relations by social arrangement, as 'Umar stated: "You have to arrange [*dabbar*] everything because "there is no set route for doing things". Let us take a closer look at these themes.

Work, in the *sha'bī* men's idiom, is constituted of *shghul* or '*amal* [wage work], *wadīfa*¹⁵⁵ [a steady position in the civil service], *khidma* [work – often in the sense of temporary service] and various unofficial methods to *dabbar*, to "arrange income", which may be connected with other categories.

It should be noted that for the overwhelming majority of *sha'bī* men in Terrassa migration implies very few changes in the opportunities for wage work and its social constitution. Men with similar backgrounds to 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar very often took occasional jobs in garages and on construction sites and engaged in periodical street commerce. Upon entry to Spain they most likely find employment in the greenhouses of Almería or in factories and on construction sites in Catalonia. Men who prior to their first migration managed their household budgets by "arranging" services, contacts or documents, or were engaged in contraband trafficking of various household goods, continue these strategies across the national borders after establishing legal status in Spain. Shirts, sports shoes, small electronic appliances, freezers, refrigerators and used cars are very popular articles of trade for migrant men. However, migration signifies one marked difference. In L'araish men with higher education such as recent university graduates, hardly engaged in manual labour, yet upon entry to Spain nearly all *sha'bī* migrants engage in very similar jobs, regardless of their educational background.

The professional records of the men in 'Abdel 'Ali's extended family are by no means exceptional when compared with other *sha'bī* men in L'araish or Terrassa. Among 'Abdel 'Ali's relatives, including his in-laws' household, only three out of 44 men of his generation had completed 12 years of high school. Most of them had started their professional careers as apprentices but had also gone through extended periods without wage labour.

A large number of 'Abdel 'Ali's relatives had worked in workshops, small industries, agricultural co-operatives, garages and constructions. Other options included working as night-watch-men, street vending or retail selling of agricultural products. One man, Anwar, had worked occasionally on a L'araish-based fishing-boat. Only three men born since 1964 occupied *wadīfa*. Of these, two were 'Abdel 'Ali's brothers-in-law: Tayyib, who until the year 2000 worked in the local prison administration, and Anwar,¹⁵⁶ who since his return from Spain in 1994 worked in a rural administrative office in the 'Awamira region. Regardless of the men's professional background in Morocco, all men with permanent residence in Spain worked either on building sites or road constructions, in the agricultural sector (in greenhouses) or alternatively in small

¹⁵³ *L-'ayn baṣīra, l-yedd qaṣīra* – meaning that one sees many desirable things but cannot obtain them.

¹⁵⁴ *ya imma rabḥa wella dabḥa*.

¹⁵⁵ *waZīfa* in Modern Standard Arabic.

¹⁵⁶ See note 133.

commerce and the textile industry (in textile factories in Terrassa). Work in greenhouses is for many the first introduction to wage labour in Spain. Many leave the greenhouses in the Almería region after a few initial months and search for construction work paying better wages, in Catalonia.

The majority of the men had taken up employment through the apprentice system of learning. I often heard men saying, "*ḍurūf* teaches the jobs". The proverb plays with the double meaning which characterizes the *sha' bī* perception of work and its social organization. First, it is the family's standing in social and material relations which primarily direct male children to particular economic spheres. Secondly, the proverb also conveys the idea that extreme material need forces people to strategize and manage their lives.

If a male child has to abandon his studies for economic reasons or proves to make unsatisfactory progress parents prefer their sons to enter an apprenticeship rather than become street vendors, selling contraband cigarettes or shining shoes. These activities are the domain of the extremely poor. Streets and market-places are generally considered "bad" [*qbīh*] spaces characterized by bad language and the morally reprehensible behaviour of the *ṣlageṭ*¹⁵⁷ ["ill-mannered no-goods"]. Parents often speak of their fears that in the streets the children would learn lies, and disrespect towards their elders. The child would grow up rotten / corrupted [*mafsūd*¹⁵⁸].

Male children, usually between the ages of ten and sixteen, enter workshops through their parents' or elder relatives' direct contacts or else through well-recognized people possessing the authority and personal relations to "enter" [*dakhkhal*] people in jobs. In garages the younger boys usually serve as assistants to the skilled labourers; they hand their superiors the required instruments and keep them in order or take the simplest jobs, such as changing car tyres or running errands for the older workers. Usually they clean the facilities after the working day and on occasion supervise the premises when the older workers are not present.

The apprenticeship model of work includes the following categories of professionals: *patron* [the owner], *semsār* [the middleman], *mu'allim* [skilled labourer/master], *'āmil* [worker] and *weld / derri* [boy i.e. apprentice]. All these positions are recognized unofficially without any formal documents and they do not constitute clear-cut social divisions. Qualification in each category of worker results from collective testing and recognition of a person's practical skills.¹⁵⁹ It is practical experience which composes skill and professionalism in this context. Ascending in status in the context of apprenticeship-based jobs is not marked by any formal rituals. Nor is promotion documented in any formal manner. For example, should a construction worker in L'araish wish to renew his Professional Certificate he needs to contact the Artesanal Office [*ghurfat ṣ-ṣina'a t-taqlīdīya*] and provide a document from his home-quarter's foreman [*muqaddim*] concerning the work he does. The *muqaddim* simply contacts the constructor with whom the particular applicant has worked and asks what kinds of responsibilities he has had.

The *patrons* [also sometimes called *mwālīn* sing. *mūl*], are only "responsible"¹⁶⁰ for the proper running of things; they do not work but manage, "supervise"¹⁶¹ and own the facilities, and

¹⁵⁷ 'Abdel 'Ali described the term *ṣalgōṭ* pl. *ṣlageṭ*: "They are outside society [*khāridz l-mudztama*], they do not know how to talk properly [*ma ka-i'arfush l-klām*]. They deal with any kinds of people, they are always fighting and wanting to show that they are tough."

¹⁵⁸ *mafsūd* – passive participle derived from the term *fasād*; see pages 61-63.

¹⁵⁹ Compare observations concerning Portuguese quarry workers: Vale de Almeida (1996, 65).

¹⁶⁰ *mas'ūl*

maintain contacts with middlemen who arrange both the assignments and the workers. For example, in L'araish's garages it is essential that the owners have contacts with the local police or gendarmes in order to gain access to news concerning accidents on the roads and possible repair jobs. Similarly in the construction sector, the constructor [*bannāi*] usually has several middlemen who provide news concerning applications for construction licences from the public administration. It should be noted that very similar forms of organization of social relations prevail in various other economic domains, in commerce or contraband smuggling, likewise in *harrāga* migration. The bosses simply own the boats and they are surrounded by numerous categories of middlemen who supply the prospective migrants for the boat drivers [*rais t-trīq*].

Sometimes the *patron* of the particular enterprise might be absent altogether (on occasion because of migration) but instead he has assigned someone to look after the facilities. Skilled labourers usually have at least five to seven years' professional record. The apprentice's learning depends on copying and observing rather than any kind of formal teaching. Little by little the masters assign more difficult tasks; they "add the weight"¹⁶² on the child, as the idiom goes. Initiation to higher status is constituted by the ability to snatch knowledge from the older men by copying and observing but also through the personal capacity for *tkarfas* – withstanding discipline, physical punishment and harsh conditions. 'Abdel 'Ali, for example, once stated that a child should not be too old when entering a garage since older children would not learn to "endure"¹⁶³ the discipline of the superiors. Withstanding bodily discipline and pain is taken for granted aspect of the apprenticeship model of learning.

Images of the "bosses"

The image of a supervisor [*murāqib*], "boss" [*patron*] or master [*mu'allim*] and often also school teacher [*ustād*] who employs strict discipline towards apprentices and students and expects continuous reaffirmation of the signs of submission from inferiors, is a theme often represented not only in the discourses of the men of L'araish but also in Moroccan *sha'bī* literature. Two very popular Moroccan autobiographies, *Al Rahīl* by L'arbi Batma (1995) and *Al khubz al ḥāft* by Muhammed Choukri (1993), describe the hierarchy of work in the 1950s in a very similar manner to *L'araishi* men.

L'arbi Batma describes his teenage years in Casablanca in the 1950s.

That man (the owner of a workshop) was one of the worst exploiters of the workers I had ever met in my life. He would look for people who knew the job, but suffered from mental illness, and he hired them (Batma 1995, 82-83; my translation).

In his autobiography, Batma characterizes the bosses as people who heartlessly exploit [*yastaghillu*] the *ḍurūf* of the poor. Their hierarchical position is often decorated with signs of their wealth – the bosses, according to Batma, are fat or big.

The [factory] owner was a Fascist with a hard heart and huge body, a cigarette in his mouth, dressed in a blue suit and a shirt which was stretched to its utmost limits by his full-blown belly (ibid., 85; my translation).

Anwar's writings about his professional experiences in Catalonia echo a similar ethos. After moving from Barcelona to Belbuig in Central Catalonia Anwar managed to find housing with

¹⁶¹ *rāqab*

¹⁶² *yitaqqel 'alēh*.

¹⁶³ *yithammel*

three other migrants and obtained a temporary job with a company specializing in cleaning sewage wells. Anwar writes in his diary:

15.5. 1991

The second day with the chief. He is a materialistic man whose soul is money. At three p.m. he took me and Ramon to work for him. First we had to open the wells. I opened three, but with difficulty. Then he asked me to open five because he wanted me to. Later he spoke his language, which I do not understand. Then he pointed down the sewage well. So I understood that I had to go down to clean the machine. He told me that I had to take off my shoes because of water. He told me that he would offer me a shower at his son's house saying, "If you know the soap". It hurt me to hear that, because he considered any African an animal. But the truth is that he is himself an animal.

The idea that bosses dehumanize the workers by discipline and expected submission and are thus guilty of being inhumane is expressed in almost identical terms, whether the context of work described by Anwar is Spain or Morocco. The fact that Spanish employers make the *sha'bi* men do the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs and totally ignore the labour laws, was a recurrent theme that I heard from migrant men in Terrassa. Though the boss in Spain is often described as a racist he is in many ways no different from the Moroccan bosses. In Anwar's descriptions concerning his father's work on the fishing-boats of L'araish the foreman's materialistic interests can go as far as risking the lives of the workers:

He (Anwar's father) was a devoted worker like a horse, who performed his duties faithfully. Muhammed is his name, he is 63 years of age. He had worked more than half of his life and now he is retired and does not earn enough for just himself. [...] All the materialist owners of fishing-boats benefit from his strength and give him insufficient wages to make him a slave of the manager [...] He was once in a shipwreck between Asila and Tangiers, in 1975 in a ship called Richard. But God saved them all because they are poor and have families who wait for them. The owner was in his car in Tangiers waiting for his cargo to reach the harbour and not the human beings who were in danger.

Bosses are expected to exercise discipline and make their subordinates work but what really makes them worthy of respect is that they have a word [*kelma*] which can be counted on, they have a strong personality [*shakhṣīya qawīya*] and are known for their fairness towards the workers.

The man [the chief smuggler] pulled out a packet of cigarettes from his pocket and handed one to each of us: he seemed a fair kind of guy. Only an idiot would try to fool a man like that. Qabil was like a small child compared to this man. Maybe he is also a good man but certainly he is without strength of character. This man, on the other hand had already won my trust (Choukri 1993, 88; my translation).

Dabbar: social arrangements

What do the *sha'bi* men mean when they speak about "arranging" [*dabbar*]? Work in the apprentice system of production is based on open "contracts" where the owner holds the ultimate word of authority [*kelma*] concerning the content of the work. Owners simply "own", workers work; "face", reputation and publicly recognized "arm for work"¹⁶⁴ are the criteria by which workers are evaluated.

¹⁶⁴ *dirā' f-sh-shughl*.

A number of themes are constantly repeated in the men's narrations concerning work: the bosses are self-centred, and utilize the open contracts of work for their own gain, while the workers have to endure hard conditions and have very little to say concerning the content of the work. The bosses "exploit" [*staghall*] the *ḍurūf* of workers. The nature of the relation is captured very well with a common sentence used by people in L'araish. The worker either accepts the terms set by the bosses or has to leave and "arrange his life in whatever way".¹⁶⁵

However, during the course of the fieldwork I noticed that such a bleak image – the harshness of the *ḍurūf*, and the greed of the wealthy – was only the first surface level of the men's narrations concerning work. Only later did other aspects become clear: it is important that the ability to endure the harsh working conditions, to take punches honourably and to gain recognition through one's toughness and thus ascend towards a more respected male image are vital and constantly repeated tests of *rudzūla*. The ability to withstand the harshness of the *ḍurūf* is translated into a source of personal integrity and honour – this also at least partly explains why the working conditions are described as "inhumane". Taking punches honourably becomes a source of prestige. Anwar writes:

Belpuig, Catalonia 13.5. 1990

I guess every migrant makes his attempt to reach his goal. When I was in my home country I heard rumours about immigration and its results. People leave their country to live abroad. One year they come with a new car and a lot of money. This is the case that pushed me to be an immigrant myself. So since I am one of them, I have to resist and be as solid as I can to reach my goal.

However, the process of translating endurance and the capability to take punches into a source of face and respect has a central aspect to which Hammoudi (1997) seems to have paid no attention in his analysis of the nature of authoritarian relations in Morocco. In exactly the same way as the Finnish factory workers observed by Kortteinen (1992), the *sha'bi* men create secret mechanisms of control to counter the unfair exchange between the bosses and the workers (or any master-subordinate relation). Among the *sha'bi* men the social cost of all this is that people's words, deeds and intentions are subject to systematic scrutiny. This is why *sha'bi* men maintain that there is no "trust" [*ma kaynsh tiqa*] in others.¹⁶⁶

The idea of clever manipulation of social encounters for personal gain is expressed in Northern Moroccan Arabic by means of a variety of concepts. As these concepts are constantly used in practical everyday life and are manifested in people's behaviour, they are complex in form. The concept *tkharwīd* [cunning, mixing with, manipulating] usually refers to the use of social networks and rhetoric skills in order to gain better access to spheres of bureaucratic decision-making. Similarly, the verb *dabbar*, to which I have referred several times, relates to arranging, manipulating and managing social relations and the ability to discover new informal economic spheres.

Social rationality [*'aql*] or cleverness, [*dakā*] usually refer to social management and the ability to read the true intentions behind the actions of others rather than purely theoretical analytical

¹⁶⁵ *dabbar rasu b-ayy ṭrīqa*.

¹⁶⁶ This aspect seemed to be nearly non-existent in Kortteinen's material. Whereas the secret mechanisms of manipulation constructed a lively domain for cunning, trickery and play with person's public image among the *sha'b*, they constituted a domain of silence among Finnish factory workers. Finnish workers were extremely reluctant to talk to an outsider about their personal methods for manipulating work contracts.

skills (Rosen 1984, 31-34; Eickelman 1989, 242-243; Eickelman 1976, 128-133). The problem in translating all these concepts lies in the fact that their evaluation along the positive-negative line is extremely difficult. Depending on the context they can be both. For example, *sha'bi* men attach three different sets of contextual meanings to the notion *dabbar*. First, it refers to finding methods (often occasional) for making money outside of the formal economy. In this sense the notion is morally neutral. For example, on many occasions when we talked about youngsters dealing in drugs or occasionally transporting contraband goods from the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, or helping others to obtain official documents, or about occasional wandering street vendors and tourist hustlers, my companions would explain that these people "have no option, they have to arrange "themselves" [*dabbar ras-hum*] because of their *ḍurūf*. Secondly, the notion refers to providing connections, goods and capital, services and contacts for others. One can, for example, arrange work for a friend [*dabbar-lu khedma*] but just as well female company [*dabbar-lu bint*]. Thirdly, *dabbar* can refer – in a clearly negative sense – to utilizing publicly condemned methods to gain material benefits (e.g. tricking, stealing, lying). Due to the openness of the concept, *dabbar* appears as an object of constant contextual negotiation. One's own conduct is very unlikely to be translated as a third type of *dabbar*. *Dabbar* is also a central means for playing with one's public image.

There is something that unifies all three different sets of meanings. They are all based on rhetoric skills, imposing one's interpretation of reality on the other party. Cunning and trickery are often expressed by people associated with L'araish's *sha'bi* quarters as part of the national character of Moroccans.¹⁶⁷ On one occasion 'Umar declared that the Moroccans have "cleverness"¹⁶⁸ that no other nationality can challenge. Similarly, Muhammed, a forty-year-old second-hand dealer told me one day that "there is work everywhere, even in Mozambique. A Moroccan can *dabbar* work anywhere he wishes".

It is important to note that the negative self-reflections expressed in the idiom of cunning towards people considered as "outsiders" can also serve as bases for solidarity because they draw boundaries by regulating access of "outsiders" to such potentially damaging insights (Herzfeld 1995, 130). Yet there is another perspective regarding such self-reflections. Condemning others is also a comment on the personal, positive qualities of the narrator. Others may steal, lie, or employ shady methods for personal gain, and naming such potentially dangerous social spheres also defines also spheres where such dangers do not exist. For example, more than once I was warned not to leave my personal possessions in other Moroccans' houses as I had done in the house of the person who warned me.

Anwar writes:

I understand that he (Anwar's father) is right not to mix with selfish people. He cannot say that he is unsociable, no, he has friends but they hurt him and caused him obstacles in his life – so as a result he chose loneliness and that is his happiness. In my childhood he taught me not to trust friends. I wonder why. [...] He always advises my mother not to trust people but she is social and cannot accept his ideas. But as for me, after learning many lessons from his life I agree with him.

The contextual openness of *dabbar* also explains why the *sha'bi* men appeared willing to talk about their work experiences to an outsider like myself. "Honourable deeds translated into verbal

¹⁶⁷ For comparison with the Greek context, see Herzfeld (1995).

¹⁶⁸ *dakā*

form" through the practice of *dabbar* (see Caton 1987). I heard numerous stories from men where others were described as cunning, tricky and not worthy of trust but at the same time the narration served as a means for composing a positive self-image and building my trust in them. In the following I shall take a detailed look at a particular *dabbar* narration. Not only does it indicate how 'Abdel 'Ali presented himself and made judgments regarding 'Umar's behaviour but it also serves as an illustration of how processes to regulate international migration have opened whole economic niches where *sha'bi* youth can find economic strategies through *dabbar*.

Arranging papers

Dabbar clearly appears as a form of both agency and resistance for the *sha'bi* men but also as a method for manipulating the personal public image. As noted earlier (see Chapter IV), the *sha'bi* men's access to many material goods, administrative offices, or wage work, is mediated through informal service networks, which are shifting in nature. This fact provides *sha'bi* youth with economic opportunities to arrange income.

In order to apply for a passport the applicant must provide the Licence Office [*maktabat ad-dzawāzāt*] situated in the Municipal Administration Office [*baladīya*] with a file containing a number of required documents and numerous tax stamps. Each step in obtaining the documents may demand several hundred dirhams in bribe money. The file for a passport must include a birth certificate from the *baladīya* in duplicate, six copies of the National Identity Card, which have to be certified by the *baladīya*. The quarter foreman [*muqaddim*] is responsible for issuing the residence certificate and proof of the applicant's profession. Following all these procedures, the licence office in *baladīya* issues a passport application, which is stamped by the office representative. Students also need to provide a guarantee from their legal guardian in order to assure that official costs will be covered. The *muqaddim* is also responsible for providing official proof of the applicant's civil status. All these documents have to be collected in an official file. A further 100-dirham tax stamp is needed and then the file can be handed into the Licence Office in the *baladīya*. The officials cut off one corner of the file, containing the number of the file and the name of the person in question. The next step is to obtain a certificate from the local police stating that the applicant has no criminal record. Young men have an idiom that problems with the police can easily "litter their file"¹⁶⁹ and thus seriously complicate their chances of obtaining a passport. After roughly two or three weeks the passport can be collected from the provincial administration office. Since nearly every dealing with officials demands a bribe [*rishwa*], the costs of obtaining a passport can easily rise to several thousand dirhams, especially if one is without personal contacts with the institutions or *muqaddim* of one's quarter (see Salih 1996, 26). Especially uneducated people and rural migrants often have to turn to middlemen in order to "get out" [*kharradz*] their papers. On occasion both 'Abdel 'Ali and 'Umar engaged in this activity. During the first months of my fieldwork 'Umar and 'Abdel 'Ali ran into a serious conflict which occurred as 'Umar was arranging papers for a particular family in al Hayy al Jadid.

'Abdel 'Ali: "'Umar had offered to arrange a passport for some people. These people were really poor and weak. In the beginning they said, "How much do you want for it?" He said, "I'll do it for you for 3,000 dirhams. They said, "OK" [*wakhkha*] and gave him (first) 2,000 dirhams.

How much did he need in order to obtain the documents? He spent 600 dirhams. And the rest he spent himself. So he went back to the people and said, "I didn't complete your file. I need more money."

¹⁶⁹ *wessekh l-milaff*.

And how much did they give him? They gave him 2,000 dirhams. What did he do with it? He spent it all. I don't know what he did with it – 4,000 dirhams!

Then one day he came to me and said, "Abdel 'Ali, what should I do?" and so on and so on. I said that I knew this man who knows how to "mix with the bureaucrats" [*tkharwad m'a l- makhzan*]. I told him to give me money. I went to that man and asked him, "How much?" He said, "Give me 3,000 dirhams". I said, "OK", and then told 'Umar: "He said 3,000 dirhams".

'Umar went to those people and said there was a man who could do it for 3,000 dirhams. How much did they give him? They gave him 2,000. And how much did he bring me? He gave me 1,000 dirhams. I gave it to the man, but 'Umar spent the rest of the money.

At the same time 'Umar agreed with a man from Casablanca to arrange his passport, too. This man's papers had been in the office for days and nothing worked out. So what did 'Umar do? He found another man and asked him to sell his passport. Because he ('Umar) was going to throw away the picture and then intended to replace it with another. Do you understand? It was like he counterfeited it.

The man gave his passport but 'Umar did not pay anything to that poor man. He just "got him dizzy with his words" [*duwwkhu*], "the officials heard about it" and so on and so on. I mean he confused the man. Do you understand? That man from Casablanca had given 'Umar 2,000 dirhams. Do you see how much money he ate [*kla*]? And what did he do with it? He bought a pair of boots, jeans and a jacket. Well anyway, he spent the money. And when the man (from Casablanca) came he gave him the passport but he turned it down. He knew right away it was forged. He said, "This is not my passport", "give me my 2,000 dirhams". He ('Umar) said, "Give me one month and your passport will be ready."

So the money was gone and he did not know what to do. He came to me because the file (of the first person in question) was in my house. The man, who is also a *ḥādzdz*¹⁷⁰ (who had offered his help for the first case) told me to complete the 3,000 dirhams. Then 'Umar said to me, "How are we going to arrange all that money now?" So then he told me to go to those people (of the first case) and say that I had given the *ḥādzdz* all the money. But I refused.

So then finally the file (of the first case) needed only one 300-dirham stamp. 'Umar went and stole the money from his father's pocket. You see! Would you steal from your father? He got the stamp and attached it to the file. He went back to the people and they gave him some money. I don't know how much, maybe some 600 dirhams. Then 'Umar came back to me. This official at the Provincial Administration was supposed to hand the passport to him but they said there, "He is not here". And 'Umar said to the man "How much do you want for the passport?" The man said, "1,600 dirhams". 'Umar said, "OK". The man said, "OK".

Then he went back to these people and told them, "The man asks for 1,600 dirhams."

"All this money for one passport!" they said. "I have nothing to do with it," 'Umar said. They said, "OK, we'll give you 2,000 dirhams." See how much money he ate.

Finally, 'Umar told that the missing money was in 'Abdel 'Ali's possession. 'Umar had suggested again that they should blame the *ḥādzdz* for the problem. Now 'Abdel 'Ali felt that 'Umar had put pressure on him. He was afraid that the people in need of the missing money would harm him.

The structure of the confusingly complex narration can be seen to involve numerous social relations whereby 'Umar attempted to reach his objective. First, he offered to do a service for the poor and weak people in need of a passport, seemingly certain that he could exploit people for

¹⁷⁰ Honorific title of a person who has performed the pilgrimage to Mecca.

his own gain and "talk them dizzy" [*duwwekh*] in order to profit more. In order to seek ways to solve the problem he used his social contacts and involved 'Abdel 'Ali in the business, who for his part turned to the *ḥādzdz* to resolve the situation. 'Umar now had two other people involved and he went back to the first family to explain the situation and play for more time.

To cover the debts to the first party 'Umar turned to the man from Casablanca and involved him in the business. Then he attempted to use the uneducated man, whose passport he managed to take, to provide a passport for the man from Casablanca. Finally, 'Umar's attempt to use the counterfeit passport appears to have been unsuccessful.

To solve the problem 'Umar suggests to 'Abdel 'Ali that they put the blame on the *ḥādzdz*. This fact aggravated 'Abdel 'Ali.

In a social context where respect and publicly recognized prestige are associated with the "level" [*mustawā*] of one's *ḍurūf*, the resource of the less advantaged is to manipulate their self-presentation by controlling what aspects of their *ḍurūf* to reveal and what to hide. But exactly here lies a central ambiguity in the lives of these *sha' bī* men. Trustworthy relations are the vehicles to accomplish ends but there is "no trust in man" because one has to manipulate one's own self-presentation in order to build trust in the first place, exactly as in the case above. "People do not reveal their *ḍurūf* to a stranger, whether Moroccans or not", "they do not necessarily speak the truth", were both stereotypes I heard throughout the periods I spent with the young men.

Each individual is naturally unique in the way he or she is connected with others at a given moment. To maintain old relations and establish new ones, one has to manipulate one's public image in several different directions at the same time. In the above case 'Umar simultaneously manipulated seven different parties, each of whom was connected with other interested parties with their own interpretation of the situation.

This all at least partly explains the reason why, right from the beginning of my fieldwork, I never faced silence when talking with other young men. On the contrary, I often pondered why a person would reveal to me issues about his life and what might be the reason for revealing such information. Practices of *dabbar* clearly seemed to transcend the domain of wage work. I was right from the beginning part of the culture of *dabbar* – a stranger from abroad, who knew no one in the town, who knew nothing of people's *ḍurūf*.

Conflict and reciprocation

Among *sha' bī* men there is a high reliance on individual rather than group effort for countering the economic realities of everyday life. This idea is linked with the network-centred social world and the understanding of respect as the result of individual action. Young *sha' bī* men tend to avoid establishing enterprises, economic alliances and joint investments because economic co-operation in general is considered to be precarious, and when it occurs, alliances among young men are shifting in nature. Willingness to enter into economic relations with other men requires "mutual understanding" [*tfāhum*]. Conflict is very often versed in the idiomatic expression "we did not understand each other" [*ma tfāhamnāsh*].

Men usually avoid entering into a business partnership with friends. Equality of friendship¹⁷¹ and, on the other hand, competition, interested reciprocity, and hierarchy of work relations

¹⁷¹ Friendship and male leisure are observed in detail in Chapter VII.

compose separate genres for these men. This idea manifests itself in several domains of male social exchange. For example, young men working in contraband trafficking,¹⁷² or drug dealing¹⁷³ hardly ever enter into partnership with others, regardless of the fact that they may use shared vehicles for transporting the goods. I never heard of young prospective migrants setting up co-operatives, e.g. to buy a motor boat to go to Spain – yet it would have required only four to five men's co-operation to make the trip cheaper than with migrant smugglers. These forms of co-operation are nearly non-existent and upon my enquiries I always faced the same answer: "there is no trust".

Lack of trust creates severe friction between men in the following narrative. The narrator, 'Abdel 'Ali, related me about his friend, 'Umar, and his relation to another young man, Khalid. The both men had worked in L'araish in a garage owned by a Moroccan migrant in Holland:

It all started because a man named 'Alami who lived in Holland knew 'Umar's father. When 'Alami first moved here he did not have anything. 'Umar's father has told me about this. He then bought the man a sack of flour and this is how their friendship started.

Then later 'Alami got a job in the harbour – he used to carry boxes of fish and later he sold his share. Then later, after the war, the delegations came here and started to recruit migrant workers. He got himself a contract with a number of people whom he knew from the harbour. Because he had nothing, he left Morocco for Holland. He first worked for some months, returned and then took his family with him. After some five years he built two houses here in the Lkhero quarter. Then he went back to Holland for another five or six years, came back and bought a house with a storage room. At this point he got to know a man who complained to him about his *durūf*. 'Alami promised to open a grocery shop in the storage room and hired this man, Habib, as his shopkeeper. Then he oversaw that the construction of his houses was completed and left for Holland. This Habib used to know 'Umar's father, too.

Marko: Before you talk about that, tell me how you got to know 'Umar. Was it because of his brother Muhammed?

¹⁷² Many young men in the region were engaged in occasional contraband trafficking of textiles, small electronics and household appliances. In L'araish the goods were usually purchased from middlemen with connections with people who thanks to their contacts managed to smuggle the goods across the Spanish-Moroccan border in Ceuta. Several locations in the close vicinity of the frontier, such as Madyaq, Ksar as Sghir and Tetuán, are particularly busy centres for these activities. Because of growing security control on long-distance taxi-drivers working in contraband traffic young men brought their goods to L'araish in public long-distance buses. On each trip the price of transportation of the goods had to be negotiated with the bus crew, who placed the goods in the luggage-receptacle. The men themselves usually covered the distance to L'araish in long-distance taxis. If stopped, the bus personnel then took the responsibility for bribing the gendarmes occupying the six highway checkpoints between Madyaq and L'araish. Upon reaching L'araish the men usually sold the products directly in the street or passed them to the dozens of black-market retailers in an indoor market in the centre of L'araish where sweets, canned foodstuffs, cheese, cosmetics and plastic toys were available.

¹⁷³ Hashish sold in L'araish very often comes from a rural area called Grafta, fifty kilometres inland from L'araish. It is transported to the town by young *sha'bi* men. A group of youngsters usually share the travel costs to the area, and buy several one-hundred-gram sheets [*blāka*] from producers with whom they have established contacts. A kilo in L'araish sold for around 3,000 dirhams (\$500 US) in 1998. The product is then carried to L'araish on foot to avoid public attention. Upon reaching L'araish *blaka* is cut into ten-by-one-centimetre sticks [*tranch*] for street vending. Often the transporters, like one of my café companions, 26-year-old Muhammed, hire other young men to take care of the actual selling. Usually the retailers cut small pieces [*dzwāna*] from the *tranch*, which is sold for around five to seven dirhams. In 1998 hashish dealing in L'araish was almost entirely operating through *sha'bi* boys from the Klito quarter, all with specific market areas.

'Abdel 'Ali: Muhammed studied with me in secondary school. But around 1988 I started to spend a lot of time with 'Umar. We were really close, we used to lend each other clothes, and offer each other treats in cafés and so on.

So, this Habib also knew 'Umar's father, who used to have a *carro* [carriage for transporting goods] at that time, and so he started to work with Habib. Once 'Alami's car broke down in the middle of the road and 'Umar's friend Khalid happened to pass by. He asked what the problem was and promised to fix the car. He had seen that the car had Dutch licence plates and so he thought that he could make a "good profit".¹⁷⁴ He had a friend who is a mechanic who could fix the car and so Khalid could take his share. 'Alami also said that there was a dent in the car, which he wanted repaired. He informed Khalid that he had a garage in al Hayy al Jadid and in fact needed someone to take care of it. I was with 'Umar that day in the centre [of the town] and we saw Khalid coming to us saying that someone from Holland had asked him to take care of his garage. Now Khalid also wanted 'Umar to join him. We went to see the garage: everything was brought from Holland. 'Alami had invested at least 20,000 - 30,000 dirhams for the equipment only.

'Umar told his father what had happened and all of a sudden it became clear that 'Umar's father knew the man. "A real coincidence!"¹⁷⁵ The place had everything except a ditch and so I helped 'Umar dig it and we also laid the concrete topping on it. Either one had to be responsible towards the authorities. 'Umar's father advised that 'Umar should only enter the business as a worker [*'āmil*], so Khalid was made responsible [*mas'ūl*] and this Habib became the supervisor [*murāqib*]. They agreed that the accounts would be checked monthly and then Habib would pass the news on to 'Alami. 'Umar and Khalid had agreed on splitting the wages in half. On top of this 'Alami took 800 dirhams monthly rent for the facilities and Habib was to take care of that too.

Then they started the work. And who arranged [*dabbar*] the jobs for them? It was 'Adil ('Umar's friend, who had earlier worked at his father's garage). Right from the beginning they had customers. After a week 'Adil arranged a car for them, which was a roughly 500-dirham deal. After two weeks there came another. Then the bottle ran out of gas and that caused the first fight. They needed 700 for it. Khalid demanded that 'Umar pay his share of it but 'Umar claimed that they had agreed that he would only come to work there. I went to talk to 'Umar and said that it was best not to "make a big noise about it".¹⁷⁶ So 'Umar paid 200 and Khalid the rest.

Then just within one week they brought in three cars. Only Khalid was present at the time. He set the prices, but did not inform 'Umar of the real nature of the deal. The owners of the cars paid little by little and Khalid started to run around with the money he had received, yet 'Umar did most of the work. When it was time to share the profit 'Umar said, "It was I who did the work." So I went there again and told them to "agree with each other".¹⁷⁷ At the same time Habib, too, came and asked to see the accounts. Khalid had wasted quite a large sum of money and came to me complaining that Habib wanted to settle the accounts. Khalid suggested that we forge all the receipts from that month. I agreed because I wanted to help 'Umar. So we took the receipt book and added a little onto all the expenses and took off a little from all the assignments. Finally they were only 500 dirhams short .

¹⁷⁴ *rbeh bezzāf*.

¹⁷⁵ *ṣudfa meziyāna*.

¹⁷⁶ *nūwwed ṣda'*.

¹⁷⁷ *tfāhmu*

Khalid's mother was ill at that time. He explained to Habib that he had taken the money for his mother's medicine. Habib said that we could call 'Alami – he would surely lend the money for the medicine. So Khalid got 2,000, gave his mother half of it and spent the rest.

'Umar also started to hide money from Khalid. Next month a new car came in. It belonged to a man who owned a bar in the harbour. 'Adil had arranged that job. Only 'Umar was present at the garage. 'Umar had agreed to do the job for 1,500 dirhams. He wanted to hide one thousand from the sum. A week later the car owner came and gave 'Umar 1,000. At that time there were also two apprentices at the garage who got 20 dirhams a week. Khalid wanted 500 dirhams for himself. 'Umar paid him and both of them gave the apprentices their share. On the following Sunday 'Umar went to the man asking for an extra 500 dirhams. So he had gained in total 1,000 dirhams. He gave his father 500 and kept the rest for himself. The car had been in the garage for some 3-4 weeks, so in the evenings 'Umar used to take it and go for rides with me or his girlfriend.

Next week 'Adil again arranged for a new car. Only we three, 'Adil, 'Umar and I, knew about it. But right then Khalid was in the garage fixing a car, which belonged to a migrant from Spain and he claimed that it was only a minor job. 'Umar went to talk to the man, only to hear that the bill was to be 500 dirhams. 'Umar asked me what he should do about it. 'Umar would have liked to "trick"¹⁷⁸ Khalid again but I tried to talk sense to him. 'Adil also said, "Leave it, the man is going back to Spain, forget about it." So 'Umar cooled down, but soon there was a new problem with a Reno. It was to be a thousand-dirham job. However, in that month all of a sudden 'Alami came to Morocco and demanded to see the accounts. I was present when this happened. Also, the owner of the Reno came to ask for his car. 'Alami said that the garage would stay closed until the accounts had been checked. 'Alami had in fact said to Khalid that if he didn't settle the accounts he'd go to prison. At that point 'Umar's father also interfered.

Then exactly at that time Khalid's mother died. 'Alami gave Khalid 800 dirhams and demanded 3,800 dirhams from Khalid to balance the accounts. 'Alami gave him a month for that. 'Umar said that he had had enough and quit the job but 'Alami asked him to stay for one more month. He said that he would be paid on a daily basis. Khalid had fled to Rabat at that time. They said that the police were looking for him. Then 'Umar went to ask 'Adil to join him – they would share the wages. 'Adil had refused but instead asked 'Umar to start work in a new garage. So 'Adil did not want to join in and 'Umar had to finish the job on the Reno. After that was over 'Umar gave the money to 'Alami and the garage was closed.

The ethnographic approach to social communities such as the L'araishi requires conceptual tools that can account for the ways in which social dispersion and the global policing of international mobility triggers cultural change in such settings.

This chapter was structured around discussion of two key concepts, constantly used by the *sha'b*, namely *ḍurūf* ["socio-economic conditions"] and *dabbar* ["arranging social relations"]. The first notion conveys a complex ideology which refers to the quality of a person's social relations (both 'here' and 'there'), the social meaning of wealth, poverty and need, and gendered virtue. The ways in which the men talked about *ḍurūf* in everyday contexts provided a perspective for observing the intricacies of social life which help us to understand the gendered readiness (or even

¹⁷⁸ *khda'*

compulsion) to participate in *ḥarrāga* migration that the young men display in the *sha' bī* setting. Manhood ideally results from "building *ḍurūf*", which in the context of work refers to a long process as men are gradually transformed from "apprentices" into "masters". This process calls for constant proof of one's masculine potentials – enduring discipline and pain, and displaying the ability to withstand suffering for the sake of others.

The second multi-layered notion, *dabbar* [arrangement of social relations], served as a key concept for observing the organisational aspects of social relations of work and business and the moral management of such relations. We came to notice that in this highly hierarchical and honour-conscious social world *dabbar* refers to social cleverness (in both the positive and negative sense) and skills to negotiate social relations. The ability to *dabbar* is a social 'resource' for the *sha' bī* men to make a living but it is also a means to appear honourable in this highly codified masculine context. The cultural "logic" of *dabbar* has a major effect which helps us to understand the *sha' bī* economic activities, including the context of migrant smuggling: trust has a fragile nature. The *sha' bī* men clearly seem to avoid joint economic activities but rather strive to maximize their relative independence in economic relations.

The following chapter will shift the focus from work to women and to the construction of manhood in relations between men and women. Gender relations in and outside the domestic sphere have not been immune to the social transformations launched by *ḥarrāga* migration. Socially constructed persuasions to migrate and to improve one's circumstances stand in interrelation with the ways in which domestic organization of gender and male sexuality is constructed in this setting.

CHAPTER VI

Building futures with women

To be a man in a particular social setting is not only a matter for men. Among the *sha'b* as everywhere, multiple representations of male identities become meaningful only in relation to different categories of women. Furthermore, any study of masculinity should acknowledge that gender constructions emerge through social relations and embodied practices, which include both men and women.

The *sha'bī* men's discourses reflected the fact that a man's *ḍurūf* and his social worth were negotiated not only in garages, on construction sites, in streets and cafés but also in relation to the domestic organization of gender and gendered responsibilities. Moreover, marriage, fatherhood and sexuality were central themes when men talked about socially constructed persuasions and expectations (or often more accurately compulsions) to participate in *ḥarrāga*.



This chapter seeks to observe the processes underway within relations between men and women. It directs attention to questions as to how the discourses on migration intertwined with understandings of gender relations, domestic organization and marriage. It further observes how varieties of womanhood was constructed in men's discourses and how the *sha'bi* men's self-images appear through the discourses on gender relations.

Tayyib and Malika

Tayyib (born in 1968) is 'Abdel 'Ali's brother-in-law and friend from early childhood. Unlike 'Abdel 'Ali, Tayyib did not complete secondary school but dropped out in order to study in the local vocational school [*takwīn mihānī*] to become an agricultural mechanic. While still continuing his studies he also worked on various construction sites in L'araish and as a waiter in two different cafés, both owned by a long-time Spanish family friend. After dropping out from school Tayyib took part in the national entrance test for positions in prison administration. Finally, in 1992, he was placed in the provincial prison in L'araish, not least because of his elder brother, who had worked for several years in another large prison in Tetuán. First Tayyib worked as a night guard and later he was promoted to office work in the administration bureau. Tayyib married Malika, his mother's sister's daughter from neighbouring Ksar el Kebir in 1994. Malika's father owns a bakery and there are altogether eight children in the family, one of whom has migrated to Belgium. The couple established itself in Tayyib's parents' house in central al Hayy al Jadid, where Tayyib's two younger brothers and divorced sister also lived in 1998. Under the same roof but with separate entrances also dwelled Tayyib's two married sisters and his married elder brother Anwar, all with their spouses and children. Tayyib and Malika settled in a three-by-four-metre corner-room, which was directly behind a large room furnished with long couches, two large round wooden tables, separate spaces for prayer for male and female family members and a metal stand for the television. Tayyib earned 1,500 dirhams monthly from his official work but considerable additional income by arranging small services for prisoners – such as cigarettes and foodstuffs.

Towards the end of the summer of 1998 Tayyib and Malika had run to obvious friction caused by the practical inconveniences in their living arrangements. Tayyib spent most of the day-time hours away in the prison some four kilometres away – a distance which he travelled on foot. Often while visiting the household in the daytime, I noticed that the couple's door was closed with a small lock. Malika, accompanied by her only child, a one-year-old daughter, very often spent the daytime hours 27 kilometres away at her parents' house in Ksar el Kebir. On other occasions Malika was inside the small room accompanied by her daughter. Tayyib still had considerable debts to cover from the wedding costs. He was also helping his parents since the elder brother, Anwar, had not received his first pay from the rural administrative office in 'Awamira, regardless of the fact that he had worked there for several months. Often at dinner times Tayyib and Malika took their meals separately from the rest of the family. Tayyib rested comfortably in the corner couch opposite the TV, VCR - player and satellite receiver – all bought out of Tayyib's wages – and clearly made the decisions what were proper programmes to watch for the younger members of the household.

In July 1998 Malika became pregnant for the second time. 'Abdel 'Ali and his wife Fatna provided an interpretation that now Malika had started to put more pressure on Tayyib to leave his paternal home and find a house for rent for the couple. 'Abdel 'Ali interpreted Tayyib's situation, saying that as a civil servant [*muwaddaf*] it was not proper for him to stay with his parents, but he also held that Tayyib was reluctant to move out because of his debts. On the other

hand, 'Abdel 'Ali claimed that Tayyib did not "show his *rudzūla* in front of his wife".¹⁷⁹ Malika was hardly participating in the household chores, which were nearly entirely taken care of by Tayyib's mother and his divorced sister, now living under the same roof with her five year old son. Yet Malika pushed Tayyib to make the decision to move out.

Finally, in August 1998, with the help of his friend from work, Tayyib had found a flat for rent in the western part of al Hayy al Jadid and decided to move away with his wife and daughter. This fact caused severe disagreements within the larger family. Tayyib's income had covered a large part of the shared water, electricity and telephone costs of the four joint households. Tayyib's father's pension from the local fishing harbour and 500 dirham wages from work as a night guard in the harbour did not meet the family expenses.

Over the following year and a half (1998-2000) I returned to L'araish for three shorter visits. Tayyib's younger brother had found temporary work on construction sites in L'araish, which had offered at least a temporary improvement in the financial situation. After moving out from the parental home Tayyib had been held as a suspect in a case of hashish dealing on behalf of particular prisoners and was laid off from work until the inspection was completed. Due to the incident Tayyib, Malika and their two children had to leave the flat they had rented and they moved to Malika's parents' house in Ksar el Kebir. In March 2000, when I visited L'araish I heard that Tayyib was searching for contacts with migrant smugglers through a relative. In June 2001 he made his first attempt to cross the Strait of Gibraltar but was caught by the Spanish Civil Guard and brought back to Morocco.

Any man, like Tayyib, who was struggling to establish his own household had witnessed other young men – neighbours, relatives and friends – taking the risk of crossing the Strait of Gibraltar. In the case of the most successful candidates, the men built a new house in the original quarter or in its near vicinity, married and established a nuclear family, the members of which often moved to Spain over the following few years. Any *sha' bī* man also knew enough stories of accidents at sea and failures to enter Spain. It was common knowledge that making a heroic homecoming one day required patience and stamina to withstand physical suffering.

From the point of view of these men, migration was nearly a compulsory practice in the process of becoming fathers of families, husbands and providers for members of families and wider kin. For men finding themselves in situations like Tayyib, lack of determination to participate in *harrāga* soon resulted in public questioning of a person's *rudzūla*. A man like 'Abdel 'Ali's father's half-brother Abdessalam was certainly not the only one disparaged by other young men because of his lack of courage to cross over to Spain. He had had the chance, in fact, he had once embarked on a boat but he was afraid to leave Morocco; this was reason enough for some to characterize him as a failure [*fāshil*] and weak personality [*shakṣīya ḍa'īfa*].

However, the men's jokes, rumours and spontaneous discussions indicated that they realized very well that the material advantages gained through migration were at least partly illusionary showing-off. The men still in L'araish were aware of the extremely difficult conditions of greenhouse workers in Almería or construction workers in Catalonia and the social and political marginalization of Moroccans in Spain. Yet from the point of view of these men the success of a particular migrant was something very concrete if it included cars, houses, wedding processions, wives and children. After all, this was very reified evidence that one was "man enough" to

¹⁷⁹ *biyyen r-rudzūla dyalu quddām l-mara dyalu.*

improve one's *durūf*, gain greater social standing [*mustawā*], and the more suffering the victory involved the greater the glory was. By translating the successes of migrants to individual masculinized victories and evidence of a man's *rudzūla*, migrant men themselves became the central symbols who persuaded others to migrate.

Images of women

What did young women look like through the eyes of *sha'bi* men? Men unanimously shared the idea that marriage was taken for granted as a future prospect. For the majority of my friends, still bachelors, marriage was an essential part of the future, [*mustaqbal*], a notion which meant much more than mere expectations, aspirations and perhaps dreams relating to social and material conditions placed somewhere ahead in the temporal continuum. The course of *mustaqbal* was something a capable man could keep in his hands.¹⁸⁰ The notion was synonymous with a gendered duty and responsibility: in short, *mustaqbal* was an image of the ideal male life cycle where domestic responsibilities to provide for wives and children and gradually accumulating male social rationality [*'aql*] completed the constitution of a male person. It was precisely this notion of an ideal life cycle which overlapped with the ways in which men verbalized their "reasons" for migrating.¹⁸¹ A man was to "build" [*bnā*] his *mustaqbal* with his own hands. This gendered future was also something which could cease to exist. Very often men described their "lack of future" [*ma kaynsh mustaqbal*] by referring to a stalemate situation which they faced in their lives framed by economic dependency on the parental household and a position within patron-client networks which did not allow accumulation of respect or wealth.

However, the vast majority of men between 20 and 33 years of age that I knew in both L'araish and Terrassa were unmarried, largely due to the fear of finding themselves in situations like that of Tayyib above. In fact, particularly bleak were the descriptions concerning their *durūf* from the few married men like 'Abdel 'Ali, his brother Mustafa, his brother-in-law Tayyib and his brother Anwar, all men whose ability to provide for their nuclear family had severely deteriorated since the early years of marriage.

The civil status of the *sha'bi* men around 30 years of age was directly linked to their degree of economic self-sufficiency. Many men who were unemployed and still in L'araish said that in these confusing times, which offered room for heroic victories to some but frustrations to others, marriage was simply unthinkable given their situations. According to similar logic, the men who accomplished a degree of economic independence – usually through gaining a permanent civil servant profession [*wadīfa*] or secure status as migrants in Spain married very soon afterwards.¹⁸²

These realities were constantly lurking in the background when men constructed images of women. The discourses of young fathers or still unmarried men fell into two interdependent and overlapping genres. First, woman as an unpersonified, general category was easily characterized by her "natural" qualities. The fact that economic independence composed a great part of a man's acceptability as a husband made women look as if they were by nature allured by wealth. Women's natural characteristics including, her sexuality, were subject to irrational emotion and

¹⁸⁰ *Mustaqbal* in this sense was clearly different from the meaning of the term in the religious context, where it rather points to a person's divinely ordained due to which it was duty to adapt as well as possible.

¹⁸¹ The notion of "building a future" is centrally present in Baqqash (1998). The work, a collection of short stories "*Al hidzra s-sirriya*" [The Hidden Migration] portrays several protagonists, young employed and frustrated men seeking opportunities to cross to Spain.

¹⁸² On actual marriage practices in Morocco, see Maher (1974), Geertz H. (1979, 364-368), Dwyer D. (1978a), Kapchan (1996, 153-180), Combs-Schilling (1989). The legal context of Moroccan marriages and divorces are scrutinized in Mir-Hosseini (1993).

uncontrolled drives. Men made a close association between women's material and sexual desires. Women's emotional faithfulness, modesty and honour were issues which were "for sale". Second, women were also, of course, discussed through real persons, girlfriends or wives, sisters, mothers and relatives and the neighbourhood. The closer to the domestic sphere of the male speaker the women in question were, the more clearly they were presented as exceptions to these "general qualities" of women. The "nature" of these domestic women was clearly a comment about the speaker's ascription to a particular gendered power relation between men and women: women's movement in social space required male control. This is briefly what "proper" gender order meant to men. The men by no means claimed that in reality every woman was, in fact, controlled by a man or that the social reality functioned according to ideals of propriety – they simply stated that this is the way things should be. Similarly, women who talked in a negative sense about women who spent their time in the streets and cafés claimed indirectly that women should ideally avoid such places and that a woman's association with domestic space was something harmonious with the norms of propriety (see Jansen 1987, 187). In order to be meaningful, the idea of what is proper needs to be defined in contrast with the "improper". Through providing images of women, men's discourses thus negotiated ideals of domesticity and legitimate sexual relations but also threats to these ideals. In these discourses women were clearly from either party: respected [*muḥtarma*], devoted [*multazma*], permitted in a religious sense [*ḥalāl*], girls of the home [*banāt l-manzil*], good [*meziyāna*], or in contrast "taken over by lusts and emotions" [*gharīza*], "rotten or spoiled" [*mafsūda*], fallen [*ṭayyiḥa*] or simply bad, [*qbīḥa*].

How were the norms of propriety negotiated in young men's narratives? There were clearly two types of stories. First, there were varieties of moral stories presenting real incidents from familiar shared social reality yet they contained several stereotypical character types and linguistic patterns.¹⁸³ Secondly, there were narratives concerning women and sorcery [*sha'wada*]. The following moral story was typical of the first category of narratives.

There was a police officer in L'araish who found out from a grocer [*mūl l-ḥanut*] that his wife received male visitors while he himself was absent at work. To convince the officer the shopkeeper suggested that he could hide behind the counter and see with his own eyes what was bound to happen. Soon he saw a man entering his house. The police officer waited an additional half an hour and entered his home only to find the man on top of his wife. He said to the man, "Just finish the job, I will wait". Then he asked the man, "How much do you pay her?" The man said, "Five *dirhams*". The policeman said, "Pay her the money." The man paid and left the house. The officer then tossed the coin in his hand (indicating that she had "given up her husband" for five dirhams).

The man then left the house. One day while at work he received a phone call from the hospital. The wife had committed suicide. On the day he found his wife in bed the man had not wanted to commit a crime of honour [*djarīmat sh-sharaf*] and end up in prison.

The story directs attention to the woman's "illegitimate" actions – a woman's sexual desire is associated with her desire for wealth (owned by a man) and she finally has to pay for her behaviour. The man, the lover, remains in the background. Despite his engagement in sexual relations outside the legitimate context of marriage he does not receive any punishment, as does the woman. Unlike the woman, the man (the husband) is able to control his emotional self [*nafs*], despite the fact that he finds his wife with another man. The husband acted on the spot

¹⁸³ These moral stories are in fact a vivid part of the Moroccan popular press. A considerable part of the tabloid *Al Muwatin al Siyasi* is devoted to reinforcing such popular moral attitudes.

with cool determination, which saved him from committing a crime of honour. A similar framework is also present in the following story, also interpreted to me as a real incident in L'araish.

A man who worked as a judge [*qāḍī*] found out from his neighbours that his wife received male visitors. One day he left for work but hid and waited for a while to see what was going to happen. Soon somebody entered the house. He waited for a while and then entered himself, only to find his wife lying naked in bed with the visitor. The *qāḍī* asked his wife's lover "Do you want to take this woman?" The man nodded. Then he asked the same question of his wife. She also answered in the affirmative. The *qāḍī* then called the authorities and informed them that he wanted to divorce his wife. The woman then left the house with the lover.

One day at the law court the *qāḍī* received a file. He took a look at the file and saw a picture of his former wife's lover attached to it. The man had killed the former wife, after finding her in bed with another man. After the case had been settled in court the *qāḍī* said to the man, "I did not kill you then but I gave you my judgement – 15 years of prison. When the man entered the prison the *qāḍī* visited him with a basket of food and said, "I treated you justly. You treated me badly. Therefore you pay to God."

Stories of sha'wada

A second popular story framework portrayed the nature of women by means of narrations concerning sorcery [*sha'wada*].¹⁸⁴ It is difficult to state the actual popularity of *sha'wada* practices among young men and women. However, references to *sha'wada* appeared from time to time in spontaneous leisure discourses among men. *Sha'wada* is a flexible framework of practices based on the assumption that human emotions and agency can be manipulated through recourse to supernatural powers. *Sha'wada* is, in fact, practised by both men and women, but usually men talk about it as almost entirely the domain of women. Women try to "possess" [*tmlek*], or "capture" [*tshubbar*] men by *sha'wada*. It is worth noting that *sha'wada* implies an unbalanced, countered power relation between men and women. It is not about making the man falling in love with a woman but rather it implies gaining the opportunity to manipulate a man's will (see Jansen 1987). *Sha'wada* is very often practised by sorceresses,¹⁸⁵ professionals from poorer, socially marginal backgrounds who may use written talismans, potions, foodstuffs, and special rituals for a variety of purposes. However, *sha'wada* also falls within the domain of some men. These men are called *fuqahā'* [sing. *fqiḥ*], a term which usually refers to men of traditional religious learning, who often serve as leaders of Friday prayers, mosque school teachers, and consultants on legal and religious issues, and are often understood to possess godly charisma, *baraka*, to heal the sick and persons possessed by spirits [*dznūn*]. The *fuqahā'* provide also different kinds of charms and talismans. Some *fuqahā'*, however, are said to be "bad" [*qbīḥ*], and are known to engage in occasional practices of sorcery. In men's narratives it is nearly always women who turn to either male or female professionals to cause harm to men. Men, for their part, often emerge in these discourses as victims who consult *fuqahā'* to cast counter-magic [*'aks*] initiated by women or to find out the causes of obstacles in their lives. Many modern educated men condemn such practices as superstitions [*khurafāt*] and claim that they are forbidden in the religious sense [*ḥarām*], but in practice things are far from clear-cut.

¹⁸⁴ The term *shur* is often used synonymously with *sha'wada*.

¹⁸⁵ Unlike in Algeria (Jansen 1987), these women are not usually called "*musha'wida*" [sorceress] but usually addressed as "bad" [*qbīḥa*] women who "practise *sha'wada*" [*ka-ddīr sha' wada*]. Sometimes also the term *shuwwafa* is used.

The forms of *sha'wada* that the men talked about can be crudely divided into four categories, all with specific methods. First, the term referred to capturing the rational part of the victim's mind [*'aql*], including his will and social judgment. The methods ranged from feeding the victim special potions, using talismans which were often made from the person's photograph. Secondly, it meant entirely destroying the victim's mental capabilities or causing death. The first category included e.g. a method where a frog with magic writing on its skin was burnt on an open coal grill. One example of the second category was a method whereby, it was said, a woman could control the man with "a dead person's hand" [*ka-thekkem b-yedd l-mayyit*]. In this method the woman wipes a dish of *couscous* with a dead person's hand and feeds the food to the man. Third, *sha'wada* refers to taking away a man's sexual potency by methods which often includes the use of locks, knives and scissors with magic inscriptions.

In the following narrative 'Abdel 'Ali explained how he diagnosed his friend 'Umar as having become the victim of *sha'wada* practised by his "girlfriend" [*ṣadīqa*] Zahra.

'Abdel 'Ali: We could, for example, just sit around in the town centre. Imagine we met each other (somewhere) around the town and he said, "Sorry, I have to go." I said, "All right, come back soon." But he left and never came back. He knew that the incident remained in my memory. So I said, "Leave it, let's not make a problem out of this." But this would go on from day to day for about two years. I realized that 'Umar was not acting normally. We could sit in my house and he would say, "I need to see that *bint* [unmarried woman] today." So I asked him, "What is the matter with you?" He said, "I don't know, 'Abdel 'Ali." Then I married Fatna and we had a son, but 'Umar was still with that *bint*.

Marko: And there is no solution. He cannot marry her?

'Abdel 'Ali: According to Islamic law? No, he cannot. Why? Because when she walks with him all the way to 'Umar's house and his parents see her they say, "'Umar, if you are going to take that *bint* you have to leave the house for good."

Marko: What can you tell about her extended family [*'aila*]?

'Abdel 'Ali: What could I say? In fact the boys say that it is no good [*ma tselḥu-shi fi l-ḥaqīqa*].

Marko: Where are their origins [*aṣl*]?

'Abdel 'Ali: I do not know, but she's got one sister, who is also corrupted/rotten [*mafsūda*]. She goes to Ceuta and Melilla¹⁸⁶ to work, to "arrange for herself" [*dabbar 'la ras-ha*]. Her father has passed away and the mother does not work anymore. Who took her there? It was the brother of the wife of my cousin 'Abdelhaqq. She lived with him over there for over a year. Imagine where her honour [*sharaf*] is? She says "I have my *sharaf*," but then another day she told 'Umar, "I haven't had my period for over two months." 'Umar said, "Go and see a doctor." The *bint* said, "Come with me." And imagine, 'Umar had to do almost impossible things to get the money together, 2,000 dirhams. She is ready to empty his house. The money she asks for she gets.

I started to think that she had practised *sha'wada* against him. She had told him, "When I want to bring you to me I'll make you come" [*fuqāsh ma bghit ndzībek ndzībek*] and had sworn it by God.

¹⁸⁶ 'Abdel 'Ali establishes a link between the woman's notorious reputation and the fact that she had been alone in the two Spanish enclaves, known to host numbers of Moroccan housemaids and prostitutes.

And this all happened the day he had given her the photograph. Then 'Umar had met another (woman) but the photograph broke the whole thing, because 'Umar cannot stay away from that *bint*.

There are many features in the narrative which portray 'Umar's relation with the woman as anomalous. 'Umar had lost some of his ability to act rationally [*ma'qūl*], the woman managed to satisfy her demands of 'Umar but was portrayed in the narrative as far from being a proper spouse. 'Umar was providing for the woman but did not even think of marrying her, yet he could not rid himself of her. The woman clearly had the word of authority [*kelma*] over him, and she in fact had even declared this by saying that she could bring him to her whenever she wanted.

It is worth noting that in many narratives, including the above, the woman, the agent of *sha'wada*, appears as the sole person behind the harmful actions directed at men. The woman is stereotypically uncontrolled by her father, brother or husband.

In another story a boy named 'Abdelila became the victim of *sha'wada*, which was a result of his stepmother's activities. The boy's father was a wealthy fish merchant and the owner of two large properties in the old centre of L'araish. 'Abdelila's mother died and soon afterwards the father married a woman from Ksar el Kebir who later gave birth to two children. She went to a bad *fqih* in Ksar el Kebir and asked him to make her dominate over her husband [*sayṭar 'lēh*]. Back in L'araish the woman made the husband drink a potion and the man became "like a donkey". The woman asked him to "write" him all the inheritance and the man agreed to everything. Finally, the man started to feel his health deteriorating until, after some 40 days, he died. 'Abdelila and his full siblings then told the woman that they wanted their share of the inheritance, but the woman said, "If you do not leave me alone I will kill you one by one." So the woman went back to the *fqih* and they practised *sha'wada* with a frog and photographs. Then one of 'Abdelila's full siblings died. The others were terrified and stopped demanding the inheritance from the woman. 'Abdelila now works on one of the fishing-boats in the centre of L'araish.

In at least one sense a woman who practises *sha'wada* embodies similar threats to the idea of propriety as a woman whose sexuality is uncontrolled. Women who acted independently without any male decision-makers were constantly represented as possible threats to the organization of domestic gender roles and also to proper sexual relations.

Ambiguous providers: male self-images

The images of women created by popular narratives indicated that the cultural stereotype which constructed male-female relations in terms of provider-provided for, was of great relevance in the *sha'bī* context. It applied in a very similar way to both migrant men and the men still in L'araish: men were said to "build the futures" and women to "ascend" [*tla'*] through men in both the material and social senses. These socially shared perceptions were no novelty among the *sha'b* but were embedded in the historical consciousness, being widely present in indigenous representations concerning gender relations (see e.g. Munson 1984; Westermarck 1914; Choukri 1993; 1994 Batma 1995; Dwyer D. 1978a).

The material and social symbols that the men aspired to acquire through migration were linked to gender relations in complex (and often contradictory) ways. Wealth was a symbol of both male prestige and masculine heroism but as it easily translated to male sexual capital it also constituted a threat to public morality and proper sexual order. "Who still thinks of *sharaf*? – it is

all money!" "How many women had sold their *sharaf*?" were both frequently stated idioms of the men still in L'araish, but who were eager to display their masculine capabilities by migrating.

On the one hand, a man was expected to marry and start a family but to marry without being able to provide for a wife was considered particularly emasculating. Unmarried men on the verge of the culturally acceptable marriage age played with these very ambiguities.

"There was a Moroccan migrant guy in Britain who came to L'araish for a holiday visit accompanied by his British girlfriend," twenty-eight-year-old 'Aziz told me once. He continued, "While they were crossing the street in Barco Atlántico the girl stumbled and fell down on the ground. A local man screamed from across the street to the migrant man in Arabic, "Hey, you dropped your papers!"

'Aziz assumed that his joke portrayed a real occurrence in L'araish in the late 1990s. The situation is in many ways stereotypical in the way it portrays a variety of very common incidents in L'araish, especially over the summer months. A migrant man is accompanied by a foreign girlfriend on his holiday trip to Morocco. She is in fact very rarely a Spaniard, because the Spanish girls "are afraid of Moroccans", as many say, but more often blonde – German, British or Scandinavian. The joke condenses the socially constructed visions of the young men still "stuck" in L'araish. The location where the observer witnesses the scene is in fact a popular place for pastime gatherings of poorer unmarried men without the financial resources to spend their time in nearby cafés with views over the Atlantic Ocean. The young men, such as the observer in the story, interpret the Moroccan man in such mixed couples by establishing an isomorphic relation between migration, wealth and male sexual capital. The men like the spectator are blocked from establishing lasting relationships with women, not to mention marriage, yet the migrant man is able to win the heart of a Western woman. The spectator's ironic comment – "Hey, you dropped your papers!" – is an attempt to "pay back" the frustration of such unemployed and immobile men to the migrants displaying their masculine sexual successes. The comment challenged the migrant youngster's *rudzūla*, even humiliated his person by assuming that the migrant had secured his stay in Britain (gained his "papers") by becoming financially dependent on the Western woman. The fact that the woman became associated with the man's papers referred not only to a countered economic dependency relation between the man and woman, but a more serious anomaly. The migrant man's whole presence in the West – even his official identity, was portrayed as something dependent on the woman.

A very similar perception, where *rudzūla* and male sexual attractiveness translates to a man's ability to provide for a woman was also central in the story 'Umar once told me:

This guy, Mbarek, who works as a refuse collector had lured some *bint* from "outside" [of L'araish] to the pine forest. He had presented himself as Nouredine, a lecturer from the University of Fes. Then some woman whom he knew walked past and yelled, "Hello Mbarek." She took off immediately.

The protagonist in the story had posed as an educated, self-reliant man. However, a passer-by reveals the embarrassing reality. The woman immediately realizes that if the man lied about his name then all the things he had told her would also be mere fabrications.

Pre-marital relations

What did men's actual relations with women look like among unmarried *sha'bī* men in their twenties and early thirties? In theory, sexual relations outside of marriage are illegitimate in

popular moral discourse, and also in Moroccan juridical and religious discourses. These relations, men told me, were both *mamnū'* [forbidden in practical everyday morality] but also *ḥarām* [reprehensible in the religious sense]. The fact that young men and women broke these principles prior to their first marriage, however, did not make irrelevant the widely-held idea that these practices should not have occurred. Strong support for this idea lay in the fact that premarital sexual relations were very often hidden by both young men and women from their social superiors: members of the domestic sphere, mothers, fathers and elder siblings but also from respected elders.

Young men paid respect to the contextual code of propriety [*ḥshūma*] which in practical terms meant that particular practices, words and behaviour had to be kept out of reach of the eyes and ears of their social superiors. From the young men's point of view, observation of codes of *ḥshūma* required contextual management of social situations, verbal cleverness and rhetorical skills.

Actual practices and codes of *ḥshūma* often stood in an ambiguous relation. The code of *ḥshūma* was not usually considered broken unless the violation became a reliably witnessed scandal [*faḍīha*] and thus public knowledge. Very often it was not the practice itself which violated the code but the fact that it happened in the sight of respected social superiors or official authorities.¹⁸⁷ Some young men told me that for example their parents knew that they smoked cigarettes and hashish or drank alcohol, but that they would never engage in such activities "in front of" [*quddām*] their parents or elder relatives. On the one hand, there was the context of the hierarchical network of people which constructed the domain of *ḥshūma*, while on the other hand, there was the context of male age mates, friendship and leisure with different codes of conduct. The ways in which the young men moved between the different contexts could not be captured by simple clear-cut logic of analytical dualities such as private and public. The spaces were constantly contested and transformed their quality in accordance with the people present in a given situation. What seemed to be critical for the young men was that they employed sensitive contextual awareness as to who witnessed their actions and practices. Café talk – loud laughter, joking and swear-words – sometimes came to an extremely rapid end when the father of one of the participants stepped in. The fact that sons and fathers avoided each other in contexts of male leisure was not, however, a mere reflection of the contextual code of *ḥshūma*. It also meant that in the presence of their fathers young men were not able to act according to the ways in which male leisure constructed masculine codes of conduct (male leisure is discussed in more detail in the following chapter).

Men usually extinguished their cigarettes before meeting respected elder males, bosses or older working colleagues, but shortly afterwards their behaviour changed to the code of the domain of leisure among friends. Similarly, men avoided vulgar talk [*klām mḡawwad*] and swear-words when a married woman was in their presence but their language would change very soon afterwards. Pacts not to inform members of the households, or silencing them by cover-up stories were very often agreed between brothers at late-night sessions when they would share a hashish joint or drinks in private cars, in the parks or forests.

¹⁸⁷ A similar attitude applies to official tolerance of prostitution. A woman's engagement in sexual relations outside of marriage is judicially equivalent to prostitution, which may lead to imprisonment (Dwyer D. 1978a, 20). In practice official society shows considerable tolerance towards even organized prostitution (see observations in Algeria: Jansen 1987, 162). On the other hand, the Moroccan press reports from time to time on break ups and imprisonment of members of more organized networks of prostitution, yet usually they result from other dramatic events (deaths, drug dealing) connected with the actual activities of prostitution.

The contextual observance of *hshūma* gave a specific character to sexual relations outside the culturally legitimate context of marriage. They were arranged, managed and maintained in an atmosphere which required that a whole sphere of information and actions had to be kept hidden [*mkhebbi*] from several categories of people. This very often meant that a number of issues concerning the background conditions of the meetings between a man and woman were kept hidden from the partner. Especially men with fewer financial capabilities realized that to appear attractive in the eyes of young women required that they hide aspects of their *durūf*. One young man, Moundzi, explained to me his feelings as follows:

"A marginalized [*mhammash*] boy knows that the girl thinks of her future through him. She wants a *parabol* [satellite disc], a TV, and she sees that he is "materially weak" [*d'īf māddīyan*]. The boy can't do anything but satisfy his passions [*yakhud min shahwatu*], there is no future for the relationship. In these times material possessions [*l-mādda*] are the most important thing [*kull shi*]."

A central paradox structuring these relations was that both young men and young women knew that the relationship would have no future unless the male partner had practical opportunities to build *durūf* for the couple. This made both sexual and emotional faithfulness suspect. Often men remarked that there were very few girls who were not *mafsūda* [rotten or corrupted], yet, as the term itself indicates, the notoriety of women required *fāsīd* or *fsaydi* – the masculine term referring to the person who "corrupts" or "causes rottenness".

Cars and full suits [*comple*] were not only masculine signs of wealth but also capital in the sexual market. If the university graduates L'arbi, Mbarek, Ghailan and Muhammed happened to be on the streets dressed in a casual way, they often stated that it was in fact much easier to pick up young women when dressed "clean" [*nqi*], which usually meant wearing a full suit and a tie. Some wealthier men's relations with the opposite sex were nearly entirely directed to women categorized as *qhāb* [sing. *qahba*], who engaged in occasional independent prostitution, especially in larger towns.¹⁸⁸ The search for such contacts was rapidly moving to the domain of mobile telephones in the later 1990s. Some wealthier young men who spent a great deal of time away from L'araish because of studies or work had established lasting relationships with such young women. One young man, Muhammed, told me how some of these young women had begun to contact him and his friends, thanks to frequent extended meetings. Together with three of his flat mates he had even bought a large double bed with heart-shaped red satin sheets, which was placed in the quiet corner room of the flat. On one occasion, to the dismay of Muhammed he had forgotten his mobile telephone at his parents' house in L'araish and was afraid that one such woman might contact him but find his mother on the telephone. Leisure stories and laughter about such embarrassing moments were plentiful: on one occasion Ghailan told me how he had brought his *sadīqa* [girlfriend] into his house while his widowed mother was away visiting another relative. All of a sudden the man's elder brother entered the house. The young man had no other option than to order the girlfriend inside his wardrobe where she had squatted for several minutes. On another occasion Ghailan's family had rented a house in a nearby coastal

¹⁸⁸ Schade-Poulsen describes in a very similar manner the relations of young men and women in Algeria (in Oran) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Night-life in Oran included both married and unmarried men and several categories of courtesans and free women. Men often maintained lasting love affairs with courtesans and sometimes took care of them financially. The nature of these relations was clearly different from normative domestic sexual relations between men and women. Unlike in domestic relations, in cabarets, men and women fondled and kissed each other, consumed alcohol and smoked together. However, such night culture was non-existent in L'araish and the majority of my friends lacked the financial possibilities to enter cabarets charging entrance fees of up to 150 dirhams in larger towns such as Tangiers.

village for the summer months and the man had spent over a week with his girlfriend in the tent placed in the backyard. None of the family members knew that she was in the village.

Some younger men in their early twenties told me that as the six-digit telephone numbers in a given location always started with a particular two-digit local code, it was easy to get in touch with women by making random telephone calls. The men would simply dial numbers until a young woman answered the phone. Some men told me that they had established hidden telephone relationships in this manner. Some others, professionals with more money and mobility, had taken great trouble facilitating opportunities to meet regularly in privacy with their girlfriends. One of my friends from Ksar el Kebir spent practically every weekend in a shared flat with his girlfriend in Rabat, yet the fact that he shared a flat with her was unknown to both his and her family and also to the landlord.

The following narrative by 'Abdel 'Ali condenses a number of characteristics of pre-marital relations between *sha'bi* men and women. Again the story portrays real places and characters in L'araish, yet exactly as in the above narratives the story involves several stereotypical incidents, linguistic patterns but also character types which were present in dozens of narrations and jokes concerning gender relations. Mutual affection is portrayed as a suspect and complex affair, which both sides keep hidden [*mkhebbi*] from their households. The narrator's acceptability as a bridegroom is directly linked to his economic capabilities. She, the girlfriend, is portrayed as a woman with standards, educated and attractive, but is finally taken by an older man displaying signs of material wealth. In this case, the man appears to be a wealthy foreigner.

That *bint* (Amina) is one of my brother Mustafa's in-laws. She used to study at the music institute (in L'araish). She "entered my heart"¹⁸⁹ and I did not have anything against the idea that we would have had a good relationship until we built a future and then got married. She had the same idea. I was in my fourth year in the secondary school. We used to have sex but with precautions because I have experience...(pauses) and I know (pauses)...

I used to go and visit her and she would visit me but neither of our families knew about it. I even wanted to "ask for her hand".¹⁹⁰ I had bought a ring worth 400 dirhams and told her that this is like a symbol of our agreement on the marriage terms [*khutba*], but the thing remained like that. Then they heard about it at my home. They did not like the idea. Then I also found out that her mother was more reluctant about the idea...her daughter would not have a "good future".¹⁹¹ The mother had the idea of getting her employed in the shoe factory. So I helped her, and her sister too, to get in there. Back then they would only hire the relatives of the workers, so I went to one of my acquaintances and asked her to get papers from the boss, and this is how we managed to get the women in.

So now Amina had her pay and I was without work – so I started to think that "now I am the smaller one".¹⁹² I mean, "she was bringing in the money".¹⁹³ Her brother then explained to me how they had started to talk about me in their house. They were still friendly and showed the "virtue of generosity"¹⁹⁴ towards me but I saw from their eyes what was going

¹⁸⁹ *dkhalt f-qalbī.*

¹⁹⁰ *nkhebb-ha*

¹⁹¹ *mustaqbal meziyān.*

¹⁹² *ana ṣghīr deba.*

¹⁹³ *dakhhalt l- flūs.*

¹⁹⁴ *ḥuṣnu ḍ-diyāfa.*

on. At that time my brother Mustafa arranged a job for me in a *malbana* [small shop selling sweets, soft drinks and dairy products] because I wanted to show that I was able to build my future in order to "tie myself to her mother".¹⁹⁵

Then an older man came to the factory and started to "chat around"¹⁹⁶ with her and finally he asked her to marry him. And now she is in Spain. They (her relatives) told me that "the one from Spain has come" – but not because of Amina but because of her sister Fatima. I then bought a bottle of whisky and drank until the morning. "I mean I made myself really suffer thoroughly."¹⁹⁷

The man then became a Muslim. He was some 60-65 years old. The girl doesn't want children with him. She sent me some letters and said, "I have to bring you a gift," but I said, "I don't need any gifts or letters." I mean if a person has any personality [*shakhṣīya*] she has to preserve her esteem [*karāma*] from the start. I can tell you that one day she will ruin herself.

The fact that the woman, Amina, obtains a job in the shoe factory makes the unemployed 'Abdel 'Ali understand that he is beginning to appear an unacceptable bridegroom in the eyes of Amina's household. Finally, an older man with more financial capacities and mobility marries the woman and takes her abroad. 'Abdel 'Ali's narrative expressed very little emotion or sorrow resulting from the loss of the object of attraction. Instead he consciously made himself *tkarfas* [withstand suffering] by getting drunk. Enduring suffering, mastering pain and emotion¹⁹⁸ becomes once more, (exactly as in the context of apprenticeship) an indication of *rudzūla*. A similar idea – muting sentiments of loss – was often present when I discussed with a number of young men the subject of relationships between men and women. The cultural context, which emphasizes male self-sufficiency and self-control, also feeds the ways in which men talk about sentiments and emotions. Love was often explained to me as something which takes away strength of character. Mbarek, for example, went to such an extent that he perceived love as composing the "problem of the Eastern man" [*mushkilat r-radzul sh-sharqī*]. Love according to him associates with softness and uncontrollability and a man after all "should never show that he is weaker than a woman". Stories like the above, portraying break-ups for economic reasons, were in fact very common. L'arbi had been making preparations to migrate to London since the mid-90s. He planned to apply for a visa to visit his relatives in London after graduating from the University of Rabat and to take his future wife with him. He had agreed on the conditions of marriage with Ilham, his girlfriend since university days in Rabat. However, since graduation L'arbi had been unable to find work and thus decided to continue his post-graduate studies. Between 1996 and 1998 he had to spend lengthy periods of time in his native L'araish, because of his extensive research. In 1998 Ilham had agreed to marry a 42-year-old civil servant from her native town of al Hoceima. L'arbi's flat-mate in Rabat took such stories for granted and did not even want to explain his own story, saying that "we all have similar stories". This attitude was very similar to that of Muhammed, a 24-year-old *L'araishi* and a drop-out from the American Institute in Tangiers. He said that "futures" or girlfriends are equally sore points for young men like him, and I should not ask about them.

We return to 'Abdel 'Ali's story. Despite the fact that the man who was to become Amina's husband was described as a non-Muslim, he was acceptable to her parents. The woman, and

¹⁹⁵ *bash nḥezzem b-l- umm dyalha.*

¹⁹⁶ *tkharbaq m'a-ha.*

¹⁹⁷ *tkarfast rasī meziyān.*

¹⁹⁸ Male emotions will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapter.

indirectly also the members of her household who approved of the marriage, finally appeared as objects of 'Abdel 'Ali's moral condemnation. The fact that Amina did not want any children with the husband indicated that she had married, primarily for instrumental reasons, a wealthier man who offered her the possibility of migration.

Capitalization of the marriage market

The poorer *sha'bi* men's comments constructed an understanding that *ḥarrāga* had intensified the capitalization of the marriage market. Furthermore, they had plenty of evidence of the fact that financial independence brought the young men more liberties not only to establish a separate household from their parents but also more say concerning who was to be the marriage partner. In the present-day context men widely held that the odds of marrying irrespective of the will of their parents and kin was possible only through wealth.

Marriages based on extended partnership between young men and young women and entered into independently of the social connections of parents, kin or neighbours were clearly novelties among the *L'araiishi*. I recorded information from 'Abdel 'Ali's patri-kin concerning 24 family members' marriages (a total of 29 marriages), which were contracted before 1987.¹⁹⁹ Of these 24 individuals, nine had married a close patrilineally or matrilineally related person (cousin or second cousin). 14 individuals had married a person from the "family village" of Risana or neighbouring villages in the 'Awamira region and only one person married a spouse from outside of the immediate area. Only four persons had married more than once due to divorce.

The pattern seemed to change gradually in marriages contracted between 1987 and 1998. Of the 33 patri-kin members born between 1954 and 1978 a total of sixteen persons were married (a total of 17 marriages), and of these, eight persons married a close relative, three close neighbours and six persons "outsiders".

Was there a new logic in these marriages? In the majority of the marriages contracted before 1987 it was clear that the respective households had common interests built around agricultural or trade interests. Mutual affection and extended pre-marital contact between the spouses was a secondary (if not irrelevant) element in the marital choices. However, in the latter marriages it seemed that they were contracted more often with persons who had met each other independently of their respective household arrangements. Men sought spouses with education and good looks, and with whom they could share affection. Often the wife was the sister of a school- or workmate or a girlfriend from student days. Despite the tendency to establish more independent neo-local households, the marriages often promoted common interests between the families. The common interest was more clearly defined by individual persons, not by the social superiors of the spouses. If a man had migrated to Spain and was engaged in import activities the marriage often secured a better position in these activities; a similar situation also applied to commercial activities inside Morocco.

It was also clear in these marriages that individual decision-making required a secure economy. The more physical distance there was between the households of the spouses the more likely it was that the husband was educated and had a relatively secure economy. This tendency echoed

¹⁹⁹ Prior to the 1980s rural marriages in the province were very seldom officially documented with formal marriage certificates [*'aqd z-zawādz*]. The marriage involved reading *fātiḥa*, opening sura of the Koran, in the presence of witnesses from both families. Often the bride price [*ṣdāq*] was set but not paid at the time of the marriage; instead the payment was made if the marriage terminated. Very often children from unregistered marriages were not entered in the official records. Many people arranged official documents for their marriages and children only several years later.

men's discourse – wealth could purchase nearly limitless liberties in relation to parental authorities when it came to marital choices. Even transgressions of codes of *ḥshūma* were possible because of wealth – once more wealth emerged in an ambiguous relation to legitimate gender order. Some families even allowed their daughters to marry wealthy non-Muslim men. Such comments were often made as "what could they (parents) say? – they are only after money".

Men in Terrassa with secure status revealed similar attitudes: migration had greatly increased the men's desirability as husbands. Some, such as 'Uthman, 34, even complained that it was much easier to get in touch with women while at home in Morocco than in Terrassa. However, the problem was that during the one-month summer vacation there was too little time to choose one's spouse from all the women available. Men generally preferred to choose a spouse from their place of origin because "westernized" Moroccan women tended to be "difficult to handle" [*ṣa'ba*]. However, the men often claimed they felt especially strong pressure to provide for their wife, because women who had recently migrated wanted to gain quick access to material symbols of wealth. They wanted to "ascend quickly", [*tla' b-sur'a*] – to possess homes, cars, furniture and household appliances which agreed with Spanish standards – and display their economic success in full view of other Moroccans.

Despite the changing patterns of actual marriages, and the more openly promoted tendency towards establishment of separate conjugal units based on love and shared affection, the young men perceived marriage as being a complex and difficult matter. Getting married was understood as a problematic process including multiple voices and interests. Often, as in the following case, the pressures to meet the socially constructed measures of the husband as provider resulted in severe crises within the households.

Mustafa²⁰⁰

Soon after his marriage in 1989 'Abdel 'Ali's elder brother Mustafa moved into a one-room flat inherited by his wife and mother-in-law. Mustafa's marriage was anything but welcomed by his father and his elder brother Muhammed, because they claimed that the woman was "noisy" [*ka-tnuwwed ṣda'*] and from a disrespected family. Thus Mustafa also lost his chances of obtaining construction work through his father and brother, with whom he had worked for several years. In 1992 and 1993 Mustafa was going through an extremely difficult period financially. At the same time *ḥarrāga* migration had begun to accelerate in the region. Finally, Mustafa and his pregnant wife decided to sell the flat. The money was shared between Mustafa's wife and her mother. Soon after this a distant relative from Mustafa's father's family, 'Aisha, came from Spain for a visit. She offered to put Mustafa in contact with a particular smuggler who could provide a safe crossing in one of the large passenger boats operating between the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and Algeciras on the northern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar. Two of Mustafa's paternal cousins who also planned to leave for Spain expressed their doubts concerning the relative's suggestions and instead wanted to arrange a joint crossing with a smuggler working in the region. Mustafa lived off the money gained from the sale of the flat and decided to wait for a safer solution while the cousins crossed with a local migrant smuggler and arrived safely in Spain.

Several weeks afterwards 'Aisha excused herself from helping him, claiming that control on the Moroccan-Spanish border in Ceuta had grown stricter, thus getting there (without a Spanish visa)

²⁰⁰ Mustafa's story is put together from two discussions with Mustafa and 'Abdel 'Ali. On one occasion 'Abdel 'Ali himself provided additions to the story.

would cause a problem. She asked him to hand over the 10,000 dirhams that was still left from the money and promised to facilitate his crossing to Ceuta, yet she returned a few days later and handed back the money, saying that the plans would not work out. Mustafa said that he had begun to doubt whether she had in fact done anything to further his cause.

Mustafa and 'Abdel 'Ali begun to look for a local smuggler but found no one they could trust. They continued their search for connections from Tetuán, as they had heard of a particular woman, a friend of Mustafa's wife, who had informed them that she had heard of a man with connections who could secure their entry to Ceuta and on to Spain for 15,000 dirhams. Upon meeting with the man, Mustafa clinched a deal that 'Abdel 'Ali would bring the 10,000 from L'araish and provide an additional 5,000 by selling Mustafa's refrigerator and video-tape recorder that he had purchased some time before. Mustafa stayed in a modest hostel in Tetuán while 'Abdel 'Ali went back to L'araish to arrange for the money. They met at the Tetuán bus station the next day.

A few days later the middleman appeared at the hotel door and the brothers said farewell to each other. The man managed to smuggle Mustafa into Ceuta and left him waiting in a deserted house with other prospective migrants. The man never showed up again. Mustafa was trapped in Ceuta for over a month, embarrassed to inform his family about his situation. Crossing the border back to Morocco would have meant trouble because he had stayed in Spain without official documents.

'Abdel 'Ali had not heard from his brother for over a month. Finally, after considerable trouble 'Abdel 'Ali had managed to find a person, a contraband dealer operating between Ceuta and Tetuán who smuggled Mustafa out of Ceuta.

Now, all his savings gone, Mustafa returned to L'araish, where his pregnant wife had been staying in her paternal house. Mustafa's father refused to host the couple and so Mustafa had to turn to rural relatives in 'Awamira who owned a sheet-metal hut in L'araish. A few weeks later Mustafa managed to find a temporary job, which allowed him to pay back the rest of the money back to the man who had helped him out of Ceuta. A year later the couple was told to leave the house. Mustafa's father finally allowed the couple – now with their first child – to move in, but the tensions soon broke out again. In 1998 Mustafa and his by now four children had lived for several years in one of Tangiers' shanty-towns. Mustafa worked occasionally on construction sites in Tangiers but also in the 'Awamira region, which still hosts several of his relatives. On occasion I met him in L'araish while he was arranging contacts for adolescents who were trying to get in touch with local migrant smugglers.

The ways in which the men in this study talk about their relations with women provided a perspective for observing how the changes in the community's boundaries among the *L'araishi* stand in interrelation to notions of gender. This chapter has demonstrated that both *sha'bī* men and women underline the idea of complementarity of men's and women's social lives when expressing ideas concerning relations between the sexes. In the *sha'bī* context the notion of complementarity means that men are perceived as socially responsible for providing "socio-economic conditions", *ḍurūf* for others, and women as responsible (under the control of men) for the upkeep of the households. Construction of male-female relations in terms of provider-provided for is a powerful (yet contextually revised) presupposition which is closely related to notions of male and female virtue and social worth.

This chapter furthermore focused on the ways in which the gendered norms of propriety were constructed through a variety of men's popular narratives. In *sha'bi* men's terms, woman's self emerges time after time as something which demands capable male performance to be satisfied and controlled. Uncontrolled women were always represented in men's narratives as a possible social threat.

For many young *sha'bi* men it has become increasingly difficult to marry and establish independent households. Many young men approaching marriageable age had faced situations where objects of their affections married older in economic terms more affluent men, who were often migrants. A central paradox structuring these young men's pre-marital sexual relations with women is that enduring close emotional contact with a woman without any intention to marry her stigmatizes woman's reputation.

The symbolic significance of migration stands in close association with the male duty to provide and control. The socially constructed expectations to migrate and to "build a future" for women is clearly a central cause of distress and frustration in the lives of young *sha'bi* men. Despite the dangers attached to migration men often acknowledge the fact that their wives and mothers support their decisions to engage in *harrāga* migration. These decisions often result in extreme strategies to finance the trip, such as selling necessary household appliances, sometimes houses, plots of land or properties.

CHAPTER VII

Sociability and sentiment

A research trip across national borders, between personal pasts, presents and futures revealed that complex social processes were underway in a dispersed *L'araishi* community. The journey had convinced me that much of the social life of the *sha'bi* men on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar concerned gendered meanings, persuasions, struggles, frustrations and tragedies but also heroic performances, all closely related to international political mechanisms for controlling travel across international borders.

The social relations acted out in the streets of L'araish were not only the accomplishment of the people present at a given moment, but their form and content were also shaped by categories of absent people. In fact it was often the absent ones who directed men to contact so-and-so, to ask someone to contact so-and-so in Spain, to enquire about another's *durūf*, to verify a persistent rumour and so forth – in endless variety of versions. What was going on in the streets of L'araish simply did not make sense unless attention was paid to the questions of how and on what conditions migrants lived their lives and what was the nature of their links, tensions, and struggles with people still in L'araish. The nature of male sociability, including social representations such as friendship, alliance and relations of enmity, simply required paying attention to relations across borders, otherwise something very significant about the interaction between men would have been omitted. Some young men had the right to cross the international border while many others were desperately looking for opportunity to migrate. This was a fundamental fact for the understanding of the manner in which men participated in night-time leisure – the focus of this final chapter.

Dawra - evening tour

The streets provided the settings for the performances, the plot was about acting out masculine social selves by moving – on foot or in migrants' cars – around public spaces in specific gendered time, the night. The men, migrants or "locals", "hit rounds" [*ḍreb dawrāt*] on the streets and "walked with each other" [*tsarau*]. To stay outside of these contexts of male sociability indicated that one did not "go out" [*khredz*], did not "move" [*tharrak*], was not "active" [*nashīl*], or did not "get together" [*dzma*] – all idiomatic expressions which translated to non-participation in what was understood as a central aspect of *rudzūla*.

The migrants offered other men (and on occasions women) rides in their cars – symbols of masculine accomplishment carrying Spanish, Dutch or British licence plates as signs of personal success, but also notorious for their capability to transform themselves into private spaces hosting late night enjoyments, such as drinking, smoking hashish and having sex. While the young men participated in the different contexts of male leisure, in the streets, cars or the cafés the object of selective gazes was not only the individual and his actions, but the quality of the relations between individuals. In a social reality where a great deal of man's value was synonymous with his personal social relations men paid attention to the persons whom others stopped to greet, whether they were "clean" [*nqi*] (i.e. well dressed and displaying signs of material wealth), with social standing [*f-mustawā*], whether someone who left for Barcelona a year ago had returned in a car, whether someone appeared "relaxed with himself" [*murtāh ma'a rasu*] or perhaps "disturbed and tense" [*mqallaq*]. The nature of a man's connections with other men (as noted in Chapter V), both reflected and constituted a part of his *durūf*. Its antithesis – unpopularity in the company of other men, inability to connect with others indicated that a man was "lacking" [*nāqis*], a notion which, among other things, also referred to "being lowered",

"imperfect" or "short of supplies" i.e. being of lesser social value than others. The symptoms of being *nāqis* were solitude and avoidance of the company of other men – simply because such a man was understood to be too weak to defend his integrity in the company of others.

‘Abdel ‘Ali explained:

"For example, someone goes out to the streets. He finds his friends – someone is dressed nicely,²⁰¹ elegant in his attire,²⁰² and he talks nicely²⁰³ or with manners.²⁰⁴ He has good *ḍurūf*, goes to his house and finds his peace.²⁰⁵ He goes to a café and can relax.²⁰⁶ But the person (the observer) who has problems with himself,²⁰⁷ he sees that he is always *nāqis*."

Evaluation of others' social worth and the nature of a person's social connections were relevant matters for men, and this at least partly explained why the streets were patrolled by constant criss-crossing gazes. The practice of looking at others was conceptualized in multiple notions which referred to power and prestige relations but also to their challenges. A man could "look in" [*shūf fi*] someone – a notion which referred to a malevolent gaze often resulting from envy – envy of other men's assumed *ḍurūf*. On the other hand, a man with better *ḍurūf* could convey a look of disdain [*hugrāniyya*]²⁰⁸ towards the other party.

Men paid attention to others' words and talked about the manner in which men talked. They remarked as to whether a person's words [*klām*] made sense: was the person merely jumping from one subject to another like a female gossipier [*tartāra*], or perhaps his words were just mere "showing off" [*tkabbur*]?²⁰⁹ Men often held that the actual course of affairs was not embedded in other men's words but only detectable by using one's social rationality [*‘aql*]: "If someone shows off [*ka- itkabbar*], you know about it. I mean he could tell you, 'I wake up in the morning and hit a round and I'll bring back two-three hundred dirhams...I mean any round'. But where does he get that kind of money? From underground? This kind of person just shows off."

The occasions when other men's actions were justified as mere theatre were many. "See that one, in that red car, my brother knows that he shares a flat with eleven others in Terrassa." One young migrant man from Terrassa, called Koudri, whom I met over the summer months in L'araish, cruised around the streets in a car bought by his brother in Holland. The car still had Dutch licence plates so Koudri related to me that he in fact lived in Holland. A mere show-off according to others, a simple attempt to present himself as one of the wealthier second-generation international migrants to distance himself from the recent migrants in Spain.

L'arbi for his part, related to me many times that in fact it has now become considerably more difficult for a migrant youth to "present himself big" [*biyyen rasu kbīr*] while in L'araish. Before the introduction of satellite receivers and the Internet the "local" youth had no idea what were the expensive and "hot" quality clothing brands in Europe. "Earlier some (migrants) could wear

²⁰¹ *lābes meziyān*.

²⁰² *‘anīq f l-libās dyalu*.

²⁰³ *hḍar meziyān*.

²⁰⁴ *muaddab*

²⁰⁵ *ka ilqa rāḥa*.

²⁰⁶ *ka ilqa dīk l-masā'il mrtāḥa*.

²⁰⁷ *nafs*

²⁰⁸ A colloquial word derived from the Arabic root *ḥqr* - to despise, to scorn, to look down, to be humiliated.

²⁰⁹ Literally "making oneself appear big, old, prestigious [*kbīr*]".

Benetton and Naf Naf, and bring second-hand clothes to their family. Now it is harder to distinguish the migrants from the locals."

Men's talk and their social value were closely linked. Words demanded respect. Contesting a person's practices and self-presentations, narratives and judgments as "showing off" [*tkabbur*] led to counter-arguments from the other party. Much of male leisure was verbal performance – putting on a show. In one corner Ghailan would attract a crowd of boys while explaining to 'Aziz, Muhammed and Nouredine how he had demanded the "racist son of a bitch" [*dak l-unṣuri, hijo de puta*] official in the Madrid metro pay his fare because of senseless security check-up, which made him miss his train. Around the corner Tayyib would complain to Habib that he "stops more often than a bus" – to greet the dozens of friends also circling in the streets. Men observed who laughed, how and with whom, who shared a table with whom and who had the right to offer refreshments in the cafés and to whom. "Wasn't the cousin who had left sometime ago for Terrassa acting in a grandiose, pompous way [*mḍakhkham*]?" "Did he not appear as if he did not want to stop for a chat? Did you see how he was showing off?"

Verbal cleverness and playful challenges of others' "face" were often closely linked. Male leisure was to a great extent concerned with "humorous empty words" [*klām khāwiya*], mock fights, pinching each other's nipples or mocking an oddly placed word, high-pitched laughter or a feminine gesture. The purpose of these actions was to see how far the other party could take a joke. In fact, at times popular pastime fun was to search for the limit how far a particular person could take being "laughed at" [*ḍhak 'la*],²¹⁰ and how well he could respond to jokes. If the person lost his temper, if his "blood rose" [*tla' d-damm*], his companions immediately did their best to cool his head but losing one's temper also caused plenty of fun for the participants. At times this kind of joking might start from picking on someone because of his plump body, or sometimes it started by mocking someone's laughter, weak head for liquor, similar looks to some comic figure etc. "We need a gay bar here [in L'araish] so that Nabil could also go out." In such situations of challenge, weakness was synonymous to quiet reception of others' words or losing one's temper. It was best to do as Nabil did and quickly think of an appropriate way to strike back: "Who here is one of them [gays]? It is you who constantly talk about them."

I was certainly not the only one engaged in participant observation while in the streets. I realized that I, the "foreigner", [*gauri*], the "Christian" [*naṣrānī*], was also a central point of selective gazes. As my fragmented and partial knowledge of the social relations between men, evaluations of those relations and the meanings of different gazes deepened I also learned about the shared assumptions held by the men concerning my social relations. I received plenty of advice and warnings as to whether it was worth staying with a particular person, questions concerning what I wanted from that person and comments as to whether his "face" [*wudzh*] was "worth anything" [*sawā*], whether he had a "hidden interest" [*maṣlaḥa*] in mind for keeping me company.

I was constantly advised how to act if I happened to come across someone considered to have a *maṣlaḥa* in his mind, and it was frequently suggested that perhaps I should find more suitable company for myself. "Watch out for Khalid, when I left you I saw him waiting in front of the grocery store to see if you came out alone."

A white, worn-out-looking Honda 626 stopped a few metres in front of 'Abdel 'Ali and me in Barco Atlántico. We had just crossed the street and were heading towards a crowd of youngsters

²¹⁰ The term also refers to fooling and tricking.

blocking the junction at a spot where the police had just terminated a fist-fight between two youngsters. A white *Al 'Amn al waṭanī*, [National Security] van was still parked in the middle of the road. 'Abdel 'Ali pointed towards the Honda, saying that it belonged to Hamid, a distant relative from his mother's side of the family. Some three years earlier Hamid had crossed over to Italy via Tunisia and then continued his journey to Spain. Hamid now lives in Barcelona and works on occasion on construction sites. Several times a year he takes the nearly two-day drive from Terrassa to Algeciras and crosses over to Ceuta or Tangiers on the Moroccan side before reaching L'araish. He is now married and the father of a two-year-old son. His wife and child are still in L'araish.

Noticing me with 'Abdel 'Ali, Hamid opened the car window and started with a bundle of familiar questions, which I had heard dozens of times when meeting a new person. "You speak Moroccan Arabic?" "You mean you are not even half-Moroccan?" "Are you a Muslim?" "Do you attend prayers?" "Why don't you come with us, we'll teach you how?"...

Then he slapped his fist against the palm of his left hand and asked whether I have tried Moroccan *ṭabbūn* [female sex]. He continued enquiring how long I intended to stay in Morocco and said, "What! Are you going to be *makkūt* ["repressed"] for several months more!" He obviously noticed that 'Abdel 'Ali was already somewhat uncomfortable because of his direct words. Unlike many others, 'Abdel 'Ali never talked with me about women in such a manner. He preferred to present himself to me as *multazim* – a devout person, a term which also points to responsibility [*mas'ūliya*] towards God but also to the male obligation to provide for others. And what is more, unlike many other men of his age, I had never seen 'Abdel 'Ali drink or smoke. His reserved irritation seemed to spur Hamid on. "You should try them (the women); Moroccan *ṭabbūn* is really sweet [*ḥalw*]. We have to go and look for some."

'Abdel 'Ali shook his head, laughed and turned towards me, saying "Don't get heated up" [*ma ṭṭla'sh d-damm*]. I replied that it certainly was not the first time I had heard young men talk like that.

Hamid asked if we had any plans for the night and offered us a ride to Café Atlas – a popular meeting-place between youngsters over the summer months, but also known as one of the places where the local *ḥarrāga* could be found. In Avenue Hassan II we bumped into 'Abdel 'Ali's paternal cousin 'Abderrahman and his friend Habib. Hamid parked the car to greet the men. After exchanging rounds of kisses Hamid continued his show – now he had moved to the subject of cheating in sexual relations [*khiyāna*]. "Everyone here runs after other women. I mean now I am talking about the married men." "He is just laughing with you," 'Abderrahman commented [*ghir ka-idḥak ma'ak*] – he seemed to relate to Hamid's talk in my presence exactly as 'Abdel 'Ali did. "He is the bad mouth of the town", he added, pointing to Hamid. I said to Hamid that he seemed to be the teacher [*ustād*] in those things here. "Yes, really a teacher, they threw him out of the school after seven days," 'Abderahman said laughingly. 'Abdel 'Ali laughed, too, and added fuel to his words: "Yes, he beat up the teacher."

Later Hamid told me that he had driven his car from Barcelona a few days before and if I wanted to visit him there I would be welcome. Then he announced that he wanted to go for a round in his car to look for women. Habib and 'Abderrahman continued westbound towards the cafés, while 'Abdel 'Ali and I decided to head towards the centre.

Friendship and *ḍurūf*

In the context of friendship, the notion *ḍurūf* – once again – made significant appearances. The notion negotiated meanings of men's leisure relations from a variety of angles. A man's *ḍurūf* was also largely about the quality of his friendship, his popularity among other men and the ability to generate shared enjoyment. Friendship between two men was perceived to require "equal" [*nafs*] *ḍurūf*. Men with different social, material and educational backgrounds could not become close [*qrib*] friends, many maintained. If a youngster from a well-off family spent time with another from poor conditions it was a question of hidden interests [*maṣlaḥa*], patron-client relation or perhaps homosexual relation, the other men claimed. Echoing this idea, men who had managed to gain a permanent position in the civil service or equally migrants who established themselves in Spain complained that it was difficult to maintain the relations with friends from adolescence and student years. Men preferred to share their leisure and drink their coffee with others of their own social standing [*mustawā*].

Close emotional friendship with "trust" [*tiqa*] was not common currency. "If three get together it is inevitable that one of them has a *maṣlaḥa*." Given the present times and the difficult *ḍurūf* many men witnessed in their lives that friendship was simply "good for nothing" [*ma ka infa'sh wālu*]. There was no *tiqa* – because everyone just "had to think about himself" [*'āref rasu*] – all justifications familiar from the context of the social relations of work. Many only appeared to be friends, and addressed others accordingly as "brothers" or "friends" in order to establish close contacts with useful people. There was no self-evident and clear-cut division between relations of work, social arrangement [*dabbar*] and relations of male leisure. However, men seemed to be cautious of entering into working relationships or joint businesses with "true friends" [*l-aṣḍiqa l-haqīqiyyīn*]. In fact, the frequent justification of people as self-centred, understanding the bond of friendship as a fragile, precarious and risky business was only furthered by the fact that many had expected help from people of their own age who had managed to secure their stay in Spain but were constantly denied assistance.

The two faces of male sociability were centrally present in the practices of male leisure: on the one hand, men wanted to be popular, attract other men to share laughter and generate high spirits in the company of others, but there was something risky about the idea of friendship. Very often men associated with several dozen people, roughly of their own age, but stated that they had only one or two true friends. So many were out there to "talk others dizzy" [*duwwekh*]²¹¹ in order to shift alliances and friendships between men because of their personal interests. In fact, most of the stories I heard concerning break-ups between two friends conveyed an image where disagreements were not so much a result of direct disagreement between two friends, but included at least a third party who wanted to cause the break-up. Often men's narratives included the idea that true and close friendship was an object of envy and thus the target of people's malevolence. These shared assumptions, however, did not deny the existence of close and emotionally committed friendship between men. On the contrary, often men seemed to have invested much time and determination in friends with whom they felt "similar" [*bḥal bḥal*] and "close" [*qrib*] and with whom they had established a relationship of trust and loyalty. However, it was simply impossible to have many true friends [*ṣadīq bezzāf*]. 'Aziz and Karim were such close friends, and so were Sa'id and L'arbi, Muhammed and Tayyib as well. These "couples" spent several hours every day in each other's company. Such close relations only seemed to have intensified because of the general belief in men's self-interest and the fragility of trust.

²¹¹ See footnote 61.

The composition of the groups of men circling in the streets tended to change throughout the night, thus the evening rounds also served to define the changing patterns of friendship and alliance but also enmity and disagreement between men. Men sometimes died in the social sense from the perspective of a particular group. Idriss, who had come to a disagreement with L'arbi over the running of the soft-drink kiosk, which they had rented for the holiday season, simply disappeared from cafés where L'arbi and his friends spent time. He no longer stopped to meet men with a close association with L'arbi. Friends showed their loyalty by avoiding men with whom one or more associates had created enmities.

If male leisure relations were to be characterized by a single idea it was definitely "shifting networks of loyalty". Not realising this, I often ran into awkward situations. Muhammed and Mbarek were friends in 1991 but the break-up, the reasons for which neither wanted to explain, occurred in early 1992. While visiting Ksar el Kebir between 1992 and 2000 I received invitations to both Muhammed's and Mbarek's homes and I soon realised that in such situations it was impossible to maintain close contacts with both parties. Being invited to a particular home meant that I was expected by my host to be loyal to his leisure circles throughout my stay, otherwise my actions would have seemed very impolite to him. The fact that I lived alone in L'araish gave me some more liberties but I was constantly trying to avoid places and times where different groups could come together, in order not to be pushed into choosing either one of the core groups. I was certainly acting oddly in associating with groups of men with such a wide variety of educational and material backgrounds. One night in 1998, towards the end of the summer, 'Aziz and Karim, both came to say to me in a slightly irritated tone that "they were my first *L'araishis*" and I should get together with them more often. Invitations posed a similar problem. At one point I simply had to refuse new invitations because they would have led to even more problems concerning my loyalties.

Besides being a site for the display of loyalty, friendship, alliance and avoidance, evening tours were also sites for male disputes and sometimes aggression. While some were out to have a laugh with friends, some were there to bully and challenge other men to fights. Aggression could erupt from an attempt to approach another man's sister, a quickly uttered "*kif ash*" [how about it?] from an open car window addressed to a woman accompanied by a male family member standing a few steps away, or perhaps from imitation of a man's words or laughter in a manner which made him look effeminate. However, in the context of friendship I never observed disagreements going beyond the point of a few heated words.

To defend one's integrity in more serious situations of a direct invitation to aggression was not stigmatizing – on the contrary, an expected aspect of *rudzūla*. Only men who were known as badmouths, drunkards or drug addicts, and who started these challenges, were referred to in the negative terms *maskhūṭ* ["loathsome"], *ṣalgōṭ* ["malicious"] or *shemta* ["trickster"]. Male leisure in many ways provided the context for the performance and definition of masculinity and the male expression of sexuality but it also provided the context for negotiating the normative structures defining the cultural codes of propriety and what was considered its transgression.

Domestic provider, freewheeling bachelor

A typical night usually started with a gathering in one of the dozens of cafés in the centre of L'araish frequented by a particular group of men – usually social equals and of roughly the same age. This group was usually called simply "the boys" [*drāri*].

Men's leisure networks were often very large (up to 30-40 individuals) and the composition of groups circling in the streets changed throughout the night. Some relationships were described

with idioms such as "we only greet each other, no more" [*ghīr ka-nsellmu w sāfi*], some men – often considerably older than *drāri* – were addressed "as café friends" [*aṣḍiqā dyal qahwa*], connected through occasional interaction over the tables.

One of such groups of *drāri* consisted of L'arbi, 28, his younger brother Rachid, 26, his friend from his student days in Tetuán, Ghailan, 26, 32-year-old-teacher Driss, twenty-year-old Ilyas and Muhammed, 28, who was L'arbi's and Rachid's paternal cousin but also L'arbi's part-time flat-mate during the university years. These men formed the core of the group but a number of other, more or less occasional associates, such as 'Aziz, who worked in Rabat, and Moheddine, who worked in Tangiers, and many others, joined the group from time to time. In 1998 several individuals, all at one time closely integrated members, were not present because of migration. On top of all this a number of men present in 1998 had been absent because of migration for lengthy periods. Ghailan had spent nearly two years in Spain but returned in 1996. Rachid for his part left the group for London in 1998. Furthermore, there were several migrants who belonged to the families of the more settled members and they became closely associated with the group during their summer holiday in L'araish.

Café Nakhil was chosen as a meeting-place by accident. As the older men had moved during their student years to different locations around Morocco they had agreed to meet over the weekends in a particular newly-opened place to save the trouble of making numerous telephone calls to arrange the meetings. However, as Ghailan's father had opened a new café two blocks down towards the centre the group moved to this new location. The nights usually started around seven or eight p.m. with a period of chatting, joking and watching sports on the television in the café. Upon entering, the men greeted everyone who happened to be present, shook hands with each member sharing the same table and in case there had been a longer time-lapse since the last meeting the greetings included two to three rounds of kisses on both cheeks. Men usually ordered coffee, soft drinks and Moroccan mint tea from the male waiters who served at the tables. Men hardly ever paid for their own drinks but upon leaving the cafés considerable negotiation started over the right (not the turn) to treat someone present. The night usually continued with a walk around the streets with occasional stops to greet other acquaintances, to play a round of pool or to run an errand for someone. If one of the members left the group at this point for one reason or another he usually faced plenty of light-hearted joking, mocking and questions as to whether he had a girl waiting somewhere. During a *dawra* men usually took up a wide space of the streets as people constantly stopped to greet other friends and relatives, or made a quick joke or comment to groups of young women, if there still happened to be any on the streets. The pace of walking was very slow and included plenty of waiting periods, the purpose of which was to gather the group together. Some men who had started their nights with this group, but were looking for their closer friends, would leave the group and join another. Often one or more of the members of the group left the other to run an errand or do a favour for another friend and make an agreement to join the others in a particular place.

Summer nights witnessed sharing a couple of bottles of red wine or some hashish joints in more private places and singing both Western and Arabic music. Ghailan was the only one in this particular group with access to a private car. At around midnight, when the group included only four to five men, he would park his father's BMW somewhere closer to the seafront for a smoking or drinking session. On occasion Ghailan brought along a couple of young migrant women with more personal liberties than the resident women. Drinks were always consumed in the "Moroccan way" [*tarīqa maghribīya*], where one glass circulated from hand to hand. Each drinker in turn was to down in one big gulp the wine or brandy blended with a soft drink. The objective was to get drunk quickly, but clearly those who could not take the drinks or got drunk

faster than others caused plenty of fun for others: "Have you ever emptied a whole litre of gin all by yourselves. Me and 'Aziz once started drinking and as 'Aziz started to sleep I went on with another "guy" [*khiyyi*]. I told him, 'Keep pouring' [*kobb, kobb*]. He tapped on my shoulder but I said, 'Just pour'. The others passed out but I walked to the beach and threw myself in the sea. I felt like the bottom hit my face. I laid down for a while and then walked home."

The late nights included plenty of laughter, joking, narratives concerning past drinking parties – how much a particular person had been able to drink – encounters with women and embarrassing, funny moments. Once the parties reached their full swing Mbarek was in the habit of grabbing his worn-out guitar with a Bob Marley sticker glued on it and singing his verses; "You the young one, love is a difficult affair, and the days of jealousy finish you up".²¹² Despite the fact that he had never practised the guitar, Muhammed would start making up songs about "Capone", the local big man known to every one. L'arbi, the joke reserve of his circle of friends, would often pour out one joke after another, only pausing when he was unable to contest the loud roars of laughter: "A Scandinavian, a Turk and a Moroccan discussed what is the most highly valued thing in their countries. 'Our women', said the Scandinavian. 'Our carpets' said the Turk. 'Our dicks which fuck the Scandinavian woman on a Turkish carpet,' said the Moroccan."

The atmosphere was always very pleasant, cheerful and warm. On the way home the group very often stopped for a late snack. Some with more conservative fathers like L'arbi would ask the others if their eyes were still reddish, or if their breath still smelled of brandy. The group often said farewell to each other when there were only a few hours left till dawn.

The leisure relations between men reflected a version of *rudzūla* which was in many respects different from the representations in the context of work and social arrangement but also from *rudzūla*, which prevailed in men's discourses concerning marriage, domestic relations and courtship. Both these latter contexts conveyed a strong sense of hierarchy and avoidance of social superiors. Men's friendship in the context of leisure was, however, as noted above, centrally organized around ideas of equality.

Leisure was a domain for laughter and "empty words" [*kalām khāwīya*]; work and the household were domains where the critical question was who possessed the masculine word of authority [*kelma*]. Another boundary marking the specific quality of leisure-time masculinity arose from its relation to family, patterns of authority and the domestic male roles. Hamid's and Abdel 'Ali's words and practices in the above excerpt in many ways conveyed this idea. The first question Hamid asked me was whether I was a Muslim, and he offered to teach me the principles of Muslim conduct. However, neither he himself nor 'Abdel 'Ali perceived hardly anything odd in the way Hamid asked me in subsequent sentences whether I pray and whether I have had sexual intercourse with Moroccan women. Roughly speaking, the nature and tone of leisure relations, but also the individual self-presentations were constantly negotiated within these intersecting frameworks – man the member of the hierarchical set of relations of work and domesticity and man the participant within the context of male leisure. This fact naturally provided plenty of room for contextually emerging versions of masculinity. In fact, young men engaged in leisure talk often presented ambiguity/contradiction [*tanāquḍ*] as something important in defining young men [*shabāb*]. "We want our wives to wear veils, but not our lovers," one single man once said, making the other men sharing the café table laugh. Wives and veils pointed to domesticity, Islam and proper conduct towards the family and hierarchical domestic relations. Lovers, for their part,

²¹² *Ntiyya ṣghīra w l-hubb ṣa'b*
n- nhar l-ghīra yaqdī 'alēk, yaqdī 'alēk.

pointed to expressions of sexuality in the context of male leisure. In a similar vein, the different genres for expressing *rudzūla* emerged in 24-year-old Moundzi's words as he answered my question whether he ever intended to perform the holy pilgrimage to Mecca. "I am too young for that. When you become a pilgrim [*ḥādzdz*] it means that you can't drink or smoke or look at women. You must attend the prayers."

Many features of young men's leisure humour were based on juxtaposition between the different representations of *rudzūla*. Young men, for example, called large hashish joints, which were passed from hand to hand in a circle of friends, *'ailīya* – the "domestic" or "family ones". However, hashish smoking was in reality carefully kept separate from the domestic domain.

The following joke, which I heard from L'arbi could be interpreted in a similar manner:

The vagina and anus discussed for hours which one of them the area between them belongs to. The heated argument had gone on for hours until at night the penis came around. "We have been arguing about which one of us the area between us belongs to," the vagina said to the penis. Finally the penis said, "It belongs to neither of you, I leave my shoes there before I enter."

The joke associates male sexuality, on the one hand, with domestic, legitimate and religiously sanctioned relations between men and women: shoes are taken off before entering a house – similarly shoes are taken off before entering a mosque. Secondly, the penis leaves open the question where it enters – this points to the two different directions of male sexuality – the vagina representing proper and domestic sexual relations, the anus representing the improper / leisure / morally questionable.

Leisure marks a specific gendered time, as noted earlier. Regardless of a man's age, leisure constructs a kind of nostalgia for bachelorhood. The boundaries between leisure and work and, on the other hand, domestic male relations are established clearly in café sociability. Bosses and workers, just as fathers and sons, avoid entering the same cafés (or sharing sociability) and some cafés ban activities associated with work, such as reading books or studying.

Men gathered to share specific male enjoyment, not to justify each other's actions. Often the enjoyment itself seemed to be closely connected with the lack of domestic and moral responsibilities of men [*mas'ūliya*] and was often expressed by laughter and shared spontaneous joy associated with drinking or smoking hashish. The times I was invited to drinking sessions it was clear that participating in the consumption of alcohol and willingness to share a particular male sentiment were interpreted as a sign of trust and genuine affection towards the particular circle of friends. I was on occasion asked to join these drinking sessions with the idiom "leave yourself to us" [*khellik ma'anā*]. Equally, a common expression concerning having coffee in fact created a strong sense of association not only between the drink and the subject but with a whole atmosphere or specific ritualistic time associated with leisure. The idiom "*Yalla ntqahwaw*" [let's have coffee] could actually be translated into English as "Let's become coffee-like".²¹³

Repressed frustrations

Sitting with 'Aziz in a café. A rugged-looking man, around 25 years of age appears with a small drum, then comes another man with a violin. The men play a ten-second piece. *Llah yirḥam l-wālidīn* [God have mercy on your parents], the first man utters – a common

²¹³ This idea was suggested by Dr. Mukhtar el Harras, in an oral communication.

formula for beggars. 'Aziz shakes his head and says that we are students – no money. The man responds in search of our sympathy and a few coins: "'Arfti lli kayna"; you [must] know how it is".

What about emotions? How did the men talk about what they felt as they oriented in their everyday reality? At first sight it seemed that cultural contexts where men interacted allowed very little room for narrative expressions of a person's own feelings of frustration and weakness. However, as the life situations of many of these men indicate, there was plenty of envy and unmet future expectations, which made the shared leisure enjoyment often appear an escape from the bleakness of everyday realities.

True, the men I spent my time with had a wide repertoire of notions that pointed to predominantly (negative) male emotions such as "lacking" [*nāqış*], "political and sexual repression" [*kabt*], and "burning" [*harq*], all of which referred to urges, feelings of repression and worries. However, more elaborate expressions as to how one experienced such feelings seemed to be themselves repressed. When it came to emotions, you just "knew how it is". This was the first problem that makes writing about male emotions a difficult matter. I understood that attempting to explain or understand emotions is by necessity a battle against windmills. How is one to write about emotions? I would certainly miss the point if I wrote about them based on observations of how people talked about them. But how is one to comprehend how they *felt* them? And finally, how to write about the ways I felt them feeling what they felt? It seems that cultural translation stops where feelings start. A question too large to be tackled in this study.

I can attempt to say at least something about the notions used by *sha'bī* men to verbalize gendered feelings. I came across very little ritual poetry like the *decimas* of southern Portugal, which conveyed in culturally acceptable terms notions of male sorrow and loss, no indigenous *L'araishi* music genres or established musicians expressing what was going on in the minds of young men, as in Oran in Algeria in the 1980s (see Vale De Almeida 1996; Schade-Poulsen 2000). The social reality of *sha'bī* men, which placed such an amount of gendered symbolic significance on migration, clearly gave rise to specific gendered frustrations but the same world offered men very little room for expression of these feelings. Men were not to *ishki* [complain] or *ibki* [cry]. Migration by no means meant that such frustrations would be overcome in a single blow. Rather, the fact that some acquired social prestige through migration underlined and emphasized certain heroic representations of *rudzūla*, amplifying the frustration of the less heroic.

Sentiments and feelings are not things, but processes referring to socially constructed contexts, interpretations, ambiguities and contradictions. They are not private but embedded in practical social relations and struggles. Without any inner essence they rise and pass while being closely related to socially constructed reality. The cultural terms – expressions and enactments of emotions – are reflections of particular social relations but also shape people's understanding of the nature of the shared social reality.²¹⁴

The ways in which sentiments are expressed are not immune to the ways in which social interaction is gendered. Distinctive among the *sha'bī* men was that expression of emotions which arose from unmet social expectations to "build *durūf*" and inability to display signs of masculine heroism appeared not to have a culturally acceptable social context. Emotions surfaced – when

²¹⁴ See Rosaldo (1984), Vendler (1984), Vale de Almeida (1996).

men talked about them – in an impersonalized, unexplicated way, yet they were shared, constantly emerging in jokes and spontaneous puns.²¹⁵ These emotions belonged to a silent domain familiar to all men, but which no one talked about as personal experiences in the company of other men.

Upon discussions concerning frustrations and unmet social expectations the protagonist in the narratives was always in the second person passive or the third person.

What does it mean that emotive notions referred to different aspects of *rudzūla*? It is best to illustrate this with a concrete example. We have explored the complex and overlapping meanings of the notion of *ḍurūf*. I have indicated throughout the previous chapters that the single notion condensed ideas of gendered social hierarchy in a network-centred social world, prestige and social meaning of wealth. It is worth noting that many of the central notions with which men talked about male frustrations were equally complex and overlapping. The term *nāqīṣ*, as noted, could be described as the antithesis of *ḍurūf* – being short of both social connections and material wealth, and the social repercussions this has. One central notion which is closely associated with the state of "being *nāqīṣ*" is *makbūt* [being repressed], a passive participle derived from the notion of *kabt* (in literary Arabic the word refers to putting down, crushing, restraining, repressing, suppressing, a desire or feeling and excluding from consciousness, but also to throttling, strangling or killing). In the *sha'bi* men's idiom *makbūt* referred to sentiments of being in a stalemate situation, being dependent on one's household, frustrated because of the social expectations that one build one's future *mustaqbal*, marry and establish one's family, but it also referred to a person's inability to "ascend" [*tlā' l-fūq*] towards a more prestigious political position within the overlapping male networks. *Makbūt* also referred to wider political structures. The young men could, for example, state that they were repressed in terms of democracy, [*makbūt bi n-nisba d-dimukratia*]. The term also meant feelings of male sexual repression, reflecting the close cultural association between wealth and male sexual capital in the *sha'bi* context. In this sense the term did not apply to women. Although sexuality is understood as a natural part of the constitution of a human being (and sex for mere pleasure is an acknowledged part of legitimate sexual relations in marriage), there was no popular term referring to unmarried women's sexual frustration or unmet desires. Men's sexuality itself never appeared as a social threat like women's – rather it seemed that popular discourses perceived social problems arising from the situations where men's sexual needs were not met in a legitimate manner. The "problem" that popular (male) discourses underlined arose from the fact that in present-day contexts young unmarried women were participating more freely in public social life but men had no opportunity to marry because of economic realities. Sexual harassment, touching, attempts to make body contact in crowds, making direct comments to unaccompanied young women, were always explained to me as symptoms of young men's *kabt*. The notion both explained and naturalized young men's open machismo and assertiveness towards young women but it was also used in discourses explaining sexual frustration and the inability to forge balanced and emotionally committed relationships with women.

Mbarek once explained to me:

"*Kabt* is a feeling that you know that it is impossible to find a woman, you cannot meet women. *Kabt* ascends to their [young men's] heads [*kabt ka-imshi fi ras-hom*]. They don't know anything about women. If a man feels weak [*d'if*] in front of a woman he will not

²¹⁵ See Chapter IV pages 81-84.

be able to do anything with her. He feels that she is better than him [*hsen minnu*, i.e. in this context more self-assured]. This leads to problems of the self [*mashākil nafsīyya*]."

What did the multiple notions referring to male sentiments have to do with migration and social dispersion? How were they associated with *ḥarrāga*?

In their everyday speech the *sha'bī* men used a whole variety of notions which referred to sentiments rising from inability to meet gendered social expectations. These sentiments were associated with clusters of symptoms which were usually expressed in reference to a person's *nafs* – the carnal or desiring self.²¹⁶ The well-being of a person's *nafs* was understood to be associated with the state of his *ḍurūf*. Young men expressed the view that the problems of *nafs* [*mashākil nafsīyya*] result from "weakness in society" [*du'f f-l-mudztama'*]. One man explained that it means that one is not "worth anything" in society [*ma ka-isāwī-shī*²¹⁷]. Similarly, another man said that "one has an internal struggle in one's *nafs*" [*ṣirā' dakhil n-nafs*] and that one has a constant feeling "that one has to accomplish more" [*kheṣṣu daiman iwṣel*]. Some symptoms were bound to male roles as providers for households. One was going through the feeling "that one had to fulfil one's responsibilities but was not able to do so [*kheṣṣu ithammal l-mas'ūliya walākin ma iqdersh*]."

In more concrete terms, these sentiments were said to "chop" [*ka-tqaṭṭa*], or to "create a knot" [*tkhlaq l-'uqda*] in one's *nafs*. One central symptom of these frustrations was "burning" [*ḥarq*] in the chest [*ṣadr*]. It is interesting to note how both notions, *ḥarrāga*, [migrant smuggling] and *ḥarq*, derive from the same cluster of meanings.²¹⁸ The cultural associations and links between *ḥarq* and *ḥarrāga* are natural, taken for granted features of the social worlds of these young men, who have been the focal point of this study. However, as I have aimed to indicate throughout this study, understanding and interpretation of these linkages required a detailed look at multiple aspects of social exchange and negotiations concerning social identities and boundaries in this dispersed social setting.

As the reader will notice, this study ends where it first began – in the multiple levels of meaning of *ḥarrāga*. In the masculine emotion of burning [*ḥarq*] all the multilayered meanings of *ḥarrāga*, crossing borders, identity change and the desire to accomplish gendered symbols of success are embodied. They make sense in the minds of these young men and they are felt in their bodies – it is my wish that throughout these pages I have managed to persuade the reader to reach the same conclusion.

²¹⁶ The multi-layered notion *nafs* refers to universal God-given human desires and drives, such as the appetite for nutrition, the needs for rest and comfort, envy and jealousy, but also lusts and cravings. *Nafs* is in many respects a complementary notion to "reason / rationality" [*'aql*]. It is the rational *'aql* capacities of humans which make them unique among all living things in the way they can control their desires and thus stay within the confines of the age- and gender-relative notion of proper conduct, *ḥshūma*. In general women are believed to have more *nafs*, men more *'aql*. For a more thorough discussion of the Moroccan versions of *nafs* and *'aql*, see e.g. Rosen (1984, 148), Kapchan (1996 104-105).

²¹⁷ *ka-isāwī* [*yusāwī* in literary Arabic] means "being on a level", in this context it could be translated as "being on a level with others".

²¹⁸ Both are derivations from the verbal root *ḥrq*. The pronunciation of the notions, one with *q* and one with *g*, is a feature of the L'araishi dialect. However, native speakers clearly recognize the close association between the notions.

In February 2002 immediately after finishing the manuscript version of this work, I visited L'araish once more. Many of the men I had got to know in 1998 had left for Spain. 'Abderrahman, 'Abdel 'Ali's paternal cousin, finally received a work contract from his relatives in Terrassa which allowed him to obtain a visa for Spain. In May 2001 'Abdel 'Ali's brother, Muhammed, had sold his plot next to his father's house. Muhammed later financed his eldest son's crossing to Spain. He contacted a smuggler who managed to enter the son in one of the large passenger boats operating between Tangiers and Algeciras.

In June 2001 'Abdel 'Ali, together with his brother-in-law Tayyib, made his first attempt to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. Earlier that year a relative of 'Abdel 'Ali's wife had started to organise *ḥarrāga*-trips and offered 'Abdel 'Ali a considerable loan for which he was supposed to pay back after reaching Terrassa. 'Abdel 'Ali and Tayyib, together with 27 men and one woman, arrived at the uninhabited coastal strip near Barbate, some 50 kilometres south of Cádiz. After hiding in bushes for five days, the men were caught by the Spanish Civil Guard and brought back to Morocco after spending three days at the police station in Cadiz. Both men were eager to make a second attempt during the summer of 2002.

And the mother gives you that "look" [naḍra]. Not because she feels hatred but because she wants to see you being a man and helping your father. What does she say? She says, "Other people's sons have all migrated and arranged for themselves [dabbu 'ala rashom] but you are still here with us. So you feel "pressed" [m'aṣṣar] and "bothered" [mqallaq] because your mother said these words. You say (to the mother), "Arrange the money for me so that I can go ḥāreg." But you do not find enough money to go ḥāreg. And this fact creates the knot in your self [naḥsiya] and these words remain recorded in your memory like on a cassette. Whenever your mother sees you she says, "Go dabbar for your self [...] and help me and your father and siblings with the problems of the house." And what do you say? You say, "I will help but I want my own independent house with its own chores, and when I am with my household I need to have support – I mean a wife and children." I mean it is these problems that men always think of. The mother says, "Go dabbar for yourself and help us". Most [people] here think that they need their independence. These problems...the ḍurūf of the family... there is shortage [naqṣ] of food and there is no means of relaxation [rāḥa] at home and this is what creates the knot ['uqda] in your self [nafs].

Abdel 'Ali (17.5. 1998)

Conclusions

Since the beginning of the 1990s Western Europe, the USA and Australia have witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of cases of migrant smuggling. At present, migration without official documents is a phenomenon that attracts thousands of people (mostly young men) from countries of the South, be they those of the old Eastern Bloc countries or the Middle and Central East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia or China. The international mobility of the people is guarded most carefully where political and economic hegemonies share borders with less significant areas of the global economy: on the Turkish-Greek border, the Southern Italy-Tunisian coast, the Spanish-Moroccan frontier, the Finnish-Russian border the US-Mexican Border, to name just a few of these critical frontiers.

In Europe thousands of new arrivals have become the subject of a polarized political debate which includes populist politicians, right-wing extremists, the media, employers in need of a cheap labour force, social workers and human rights activists. Despite the magnitude of the media representations which deal with migrant smuggling and the new arrivals, what is lacking is attention to the cultural micro-processes involved as the global-level social, political and economic forces shape the everyday realities of the people in the critical areas and cultural spaces of migrant smuggling. The phenomenon of migrant smuggling involves extremely intricate issues, patterns and social processes which have a tremendous effect on the societies on both sides of the critical borders.

The broad argument of this study is that EU migration policies have gradually transformed the Strait of Gibraltar into one of these critical boundaries. For Africans opportunities to cross the European frontier have constantly become more difficult since the mid-1980s. The gates of Western Europe were practically closed to Moroccans as Spain adopted (in May 1991) a strict entrance visa policy for visitors from the South. During the early 1990s migrant smuggling on small open boats, a phenomenon called *ḥarrāga*, emerged in the area, and its socio-cultural and economic effects soon became visible all over Northern and North Central Morocco in Andalusia, Murcia and Catalonia in Spain. The black market and underground economy connected with migrant smuggling expanded rapidly and constructed a new social and economic linkage between the two countries.

This study sought to demonstrate that through these developments a distinctive "transnational cultural space" emerged between Morocco and Spain. The preceding pages have identified and dissected some of the major cultural traits in this in many respects unbounded, dispersed and complex social setting in terms of notions of identity, community and gender while focusing on the lives of the major participants in *ḥarrāga*: the young lower-class [*sha'bi*] men.

The opening chapters bring into focus the practical realities of life of the urban young men within the cultural space which is, as is demonstrated, thoroughly transformed by migration and the informal market operating around *ḥarrāga*. These transformations have large-scale social, economic and infrastructural manifestations: the urban landscape in Northern Morocco is undergoing rapid changes resulting from construction projects financed by migrants. A large number of lower-class households are entirely dependent on remittances sent by the international migrants. For the young Moroccan men on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar methods of arranging income are to a great deal connected with the economy of migrant smuggling; unofficial cross-border trade or arranging services and documents for prospective or actual migrants.

Chapters I to III familiarize the reader with the nature of the fieldwork location: the town of L'araish in Northern Morocco, constructing visual images of its cafés and quarters and the social effects of the recent migration flows. After this the focus is shifted to the methodology of enquiry (participant observation, taped interviews, a variety of "soft data" supplemented by documentary analysis) and the conditions in which the ethnographic material was collected and recorded. In Chapter IV the study examines the contradictions involved in such borderland culture in terms of construction belonging and identity. The identities of these men appear as both locally anchored and located but also liminal and subject to liminal definitions through transnational and migratory challenges to that localism.

The later chapters of this work focus on the themes of cultural and gendered identities. *Harrāga*, it is argued, is to a large degree a gendered and culturally patterned phenomenon. In this social setting *ḥarrāga* constructs a promise or illusionary promise of a better life. It has a ritualised and patterned plot, which is organized to a great extent around male bodies. Migrants boarding the open boats are predominantly young, socially marginal and unmarried men [*shabāb*], not quite like complete (married) men [*ridzāl*]. They are expected to return with visual signs of material success – in private cars packed with gifts for family members and friends. In chapters V to VII *Harrāga* is then interpreted at length from a variety of perspectives in terms of its masculine genderedness.

A single thread runs through these chapters. Migrant smuggling has multiple organisational and symbolic links to male social exchange and in fact, participation in it and the patterned cultural practices associated with it (display of courage and stamina, suffering in one's body for the sake of others, heroic homecoming, investments made in the housing and domestic sector) become in many ways synonymous with the practice of masculinity in this context of observation. By providing opportunities to display real or imagined symbolic capital associated with different male discourses, *ḥarrāga* frames a persuasive masculine contest concerning male virtue and respect.

The outcome of the symbolic contest is not clearly defined. Rather than providing male status passages, *ḥarrāga* underlines social boundaries between men; it emphasises certain heroic representations which both modify and are modified by discourses concerning social relations of work (Chapter V), domesticity and marriage (Chapter VI) and male leisure sociability (Chapter VII). A detailed look into both the social/symbolic and instrumental aspects of *ḥarrāga* brought forward numerous other notions concerning social expectations, pressures and sentiments attached to male bodies. All these notions – *ghurba* [alienation, homesickness, exile] in Chapter IV, *ḍurūf* [conditions, circumstances], *dabbar* [arrangement of social relations] in Chapter V, *mustaqbal* [the future, ideal male lifecycle] in Chapter VI, *nāqiṣ* [to be lacking], *makbūt* [politically or sexually repressed] and *ḥarq* [burning] in Chapter VII – reflect the multiple struggles, accommodations and aspirations of men who orient in a social reality of widening spheres of influence.

The lives of the men in this study reflect the contradictory cultural processes underway in the context framed by *ḥarrāga*. These men play out the ambiguities of the newly emerging social roles in this setting as they attempt to cross and expand social boundaries. Those successful enough to gain access to material benefits thanks to migration invest their capital nearly entirely in the domestic and reproductive sphere in the "hometown" of L'araish. However, the same migrant men refuse to settle in either Spain or Morocco; they rather construct a life-style characterized by constant mobility between Morocco and Spain.

New population movements such as *ḥarrāga* become understandable by paying attention to the actual ways in which the subordinated social groups relate in their everyday practices to different forms of authority. From these men's point of view authority involves multiple sources and hegemonic representations. It is exercised by larger economic and international political systems controlling international mobility, national development policies, administrative institutions and patterns of leadership in person centred social networks. Listening to these men revealed aspects of the complex dynamics of how people both construct and reflect intellectual and moral hegemonies in various domains of social relations (work, the domestic realm, gender relations and male leisure). The life-situations and practical choices of these men demonstrate how marginal groups display their agency in a transnational social context characterized by discriminatory policies, which distribute holders of certain nationalities limitless rights to move across international borders and refuse them to others.

Textualising this kind of social world required adoption of a variety of perspectives. This study explored narratives of men, their spontaneous discourses and practices, joking, diaries, and popular Moroccan literature in order to illuminate the everyday realities of *sha'bi* men.

This study has constantly focused on the discursive and practical aspects of the lives of these men. I contextualised their voices by offering information about their complex life situations, while at the same time I attempted to illuminate the conditions under which the information I gained appeared to me. Language (narratives, jokes, spontaneous discourses) and practical actions, performances and bodily styles were in this study taken as keys to following the social construction of masculinities (and femininities) in this setting. Gender is throughout the preceding pages understood as one of the bases of social identities, among others, but it is given precedence in this study because the symbolic world of *ḥarrāga* is centrally organised through male bodies and particular symbolic meanings which are strongly masculine. Gender is understood as a fluid and contextual form of symbolic representation, which becomes meaningful in relation to other symbolic representations. Manhood / masculinity (and its associations with *ḥarrāga*) were thus dissected by focusing on three different cultural domains, namely work and the social relations it involves, the domestic sphere, marriage and the relations between men and women, and men's leisure sociability. *Rudzūla* [manhood/masculinity] in this social setting has many faces without any self-evident core. That this social world is highly codified in terms of masculinity means that different spheres of social life emphasize particular masculine representations and thus end up constructing complex persuasive constraints on the lives of men. These persuasions are centrally conceptualised in the single notion of *ḍurūf*, which in the context of work translates to social prestige, face, assertiveness, respect, and rhetoric skills for arranging social relations. In the context of domestic gender relations, *ḍurūf* refers to the male duty to provide material and social conditions and protection for women, and in the context of male sociability it means assertiveness, popularity among men, the ability to generate particular male enjoyment, sexual "Don Juanism", a particular "clean" [*nqi*] and "cultured" [*muaddab*] male style which is detected from dress, hairstyle and rhetoric skills and the display of one's material accomplishments.

Not all men acquire recognized, "settled" [*mustaqirra*] *ḍurūf*. They are placed within this social setting very differently in terms of their *ḍurūf*. This fact constructs a variety of categories of men. *Ḍurūf* appears in social practice in terms of respect [*ihtirām*]. One has as much *ḍurūf* and *ihtirām* as one deserves. Signs of poverty and misery are particularly humiliating since they are taken as direct symptoms of a man's inability to participate in the codified world of masculinity. In the

situations of challenge, men can very well be called "non-men" [*mashi radzel*]. *Rudzūla* requires constant social approval of its existence - it is by no means a fixed quality of male bodies.

Moral bodies

Writing an ethnographical study of the social world of *harrāga* raised a variety of moral dilemmas. The social spaces in which the ethnographical "data" were constructed was highly unequal in terms of the fundamental right of mobility across borders. To many young unemployed men living in conditions of extreme poverty and frustration I represented a chance to migrate, a middleman who could actualise migration, assist in finding work or housing in Europe. This kind of inequality tended to politicise our persons. Issues such as racism, racial violence and nationalized personal "qualities" were issues which I was constantly asked about. "Why doesn't *your* country allow others to travel freely like *we* do?" Studying identities in this setting required constant reflection on where the researcher stands on the issues of racism, migrant smuggling, the court deaths of the migrants and the tragedies involved.

In this sense migrant smuggling and the unofficial market associated with it construct an extremely complex (and in many ways new) ethnographic space. What I mean by this has much to do with the ways in which the inscription of power on young migrants' bodies by security institutions, migration policies and entry restrictions function. First, it should be underlined that transnational reality from the perspective of the participants in *harrāga* has very little to do with the cosmopolitan life-styles of the business élites or the members of generations-old diasporic families who mix languages, styles and traditions according to contextual preference. The social world of undocumented migrants is characterized by fear of being caught by the security forces and deported and by exploitation practised by a variety of categories of middlemen who work in the business of migrant smuggling. These conditions construct specific kinds of Moroccan moral selves. A familiar figure in the Spanish evening news – a Moroccan youngster showing a V for victory sign with his fingers while swearing to return after being caught in the sea by the Spanish coastguards indicates how *harrāga* has turned into a ritual where control of mobility constructs a social dichotomy separating Moroccan young men from others, those free to move in the global context, for whom social inclusion in Western Europe is a natural right. Young Moroccan men with great expectations of gaining social recognition through the display of heroism, the ability to withstand suffering in one's body, and willingness to take up any job to build a future often end up being treated as *a priori* criminals, clandestine or "illegal" migrants, often stamped with a popular stereotype, making them appear in Spain as locusts in search of easy money and a more liberal social environment. There is no doubt that the political processes aimed at excluding a large part of the population from Western European societies because they have no documents, or more accurately because they have no right to become documented, has far-reaching social, political and disciplinary consequences. People absent in the administrative sense have a problem making their voices heard – this seems to apply also to the context of academic works. Migrant smuggling and migration without documents are extremely sensitive issues for ethnographers because the subjects' methods of survival in overtly discriminatory contexts do not always look neat. A researcher willing to reflect on this reality is constantly forced to employ self-censorship because undocumented migration constantly creates new forms of exploitation, organised crime, violence and xenophobia based on rigid politicization of identities and culturalization of such phenomena. To be ethically and politically correct means all too often remaining entirely silent about these issues.

Despite the emergence of a new moral body, the structure of the market of migrant smuggling often seems to hinder the political mobilisation of the moral self. One often repeated administrative slogan in Western European countries states that migrant groups need to auto-

organize themselves to improve their situation but the statement does not take into account the structural limitations and the social frictions created by migrant smuggling within the migrant communities. The social world of *ḥarrāga* includes various mutually competing categories of people, both Moroccans and Spaniards. Every step from organising the undocumented crossing to gaining housing, work and the necessary documents includes various categories of people who have turned the emergence of undocumented, unrecognised and *a priori* criminalized people into a market commodity. What further complicates the matter is the fact that the smugglers and the smuggled, the victim and the exploiter are not entirely separate categories. The tensions and conflicts between the migrants are amplified by the fact that the subjects are at the same time dependent on each other's help, social connections and know-how, but every individual is at least a potential rival in competition for jobs, housing and ultimately, symbols of success. While undocumented in Spain, the competitors occupy a reality characterised by exercise of authority by a variety of categories of middlemen who control vital resources: housing and work but also security enabling them to stay out of sight of the administrative institutions. These tensions are only furthered by the fact that Spain, like other Western European countries, hardly recognises the educational backgrounds of the undocumented migrants. Young workshop apprentices and university students end up, at least during the first years in Spain, working in very similar professions. When large-scale social unrest breaks out, as in el Ejido in the summer of 2000, or in Terrassa in 1999, it is the most marginalized of the migrants who are held responsible for the violence and the negative popular stereotyping of Moroccans in Spain. These popular stereotypes are not constructed solely by the long-time Spanish residents of these localities but at least partly shared by the more settled, more educated and more well-off Moroccans. Official Spain furthermore stratifies migrants in accordance with their residential status, into several categories of people, a fact which clearly seems to reflect the patterns of their organisation. The migrant groups are multiple and often structured along person-centred networks. The levels of participation among the young undocumented men are very low.

This study has aimed to illustrate the importance of the gender-sensitive perspective for observing the practices and accommodations of people on the southern borderlands of Europe. In ethnographic writing masculine gender has often been taken as the "neutral" point of view when analysing socio-cultural phenomena. By the time this study went to press in September 2002, in the Moroccan context the phenomenon of *ḥarrāga* has attracted the attention of several novelists, hundreds of newspaper articles and several NGO programs but by 2002 there was still no serious published academic works on the subject, yet the specific site of this study – L'araish and its surrounding coastal areas – is a necessary passage for potential migrants.

When Spanish news agencies tell of massive arrests of new Moroccan arrivals on the Andalusian coast or of clashes between greenhouse workers and the local population in Murcia, when the returning migrants queue in the harbour of Algeciras on their way to spend their holiday in Morocco and the young heroes circle around the streets of L'araish in their newly-bought car carrying Barcelona licence plates a whole variety of gendered meanings, struggles and negotiations are involved, as we have seen throughout this study.

The ways in which these men live through times of rapid change, the appearance of migrant smuggling and its social and material manifestations are to be understood as ongoing battles between socially marginal groups and the afore-mentioned multiple power structures. This study aims to indicate that the nature of the struggle could hardly be grasped in any other way than observing the ways in which people themselves act out and verbalise what they are struggling for.

I believe it is of utmost importance to emphasize the transnational and migratory perspective on the study of gender and gendered practices in contemporary Morocco. Recent global developments suggest that migrant smuggling is an increasing phenomenon, and many fundamental questions concerning lives of the men and women in this study have, I believe, equal relevance to many other areas rapidly transformed by migrant smuggling.

Acknowledgements

At last, I thought, I have reached the pleasant moment to write down my thanks for the people who helped me to put this book together. However, to my surprise writing this page appeared to be extremely time consuming and difficult. I simply found myself writing and erasing line after line, as I tried to condense the nature of numerous, very different personal relations, and present my gratitude to the following people in an ordered manner. Because of this unexpected difficulty, the acknowledgements appear in the end of this book – I have a tendency to postpone difficult tasks until the last hour.

The authorship of this work partially belongs to the dozens of *L'araishi* men and women whom we learned to know throughout the preceding pages. Nearly five years has passed from our first meeting to now, and our relations have endured changing circumstances. I wish to express warmest thanks to 'Abdel 'Ali and Fatna, Muhammed and Rahma, Anwar and Tayyib, and 'Umar for opening their homes, families and friendship circles to me. Aziz and L'arbi, both young researchers gave me invaluable insights into the history of urban planning and migration patterns in L'araish, and made my days in their home town an unforgettable period.

In Morocco, I have received plenty of assistance and advice from three researchers. Mukhtar el Harras, thoroughly read parts of my work and offered invaluable support. Thanks to his help, my access to several important literary sources in Rabat became possible. Assistant Professor Jamila Bargach read the manuscript version of this book. I am deeply indebted to her for comments and suggestions. Professor 'Abdessamed Dialmy commented on my research plan before the fieldwork period in L'araish, and gave me valuable insights into the recent sociology of gender and sexuality of Morocco.

In Terrassa, Mohamed Outmani took the role of adviser and friend, and provided me with plenty of sources and connections which greatly increased my understanding of the situation of Moroccans in Spain. In Madrid, Angeles Ramírez read parts of my work and introduced me to the recent debates on migration in Spain.

During my graduate student years in Finland, I have been extremely fortunate to work under the kind and detailed supervision provided by Academy Professor Ulla Vuorela. I am grateful to her for having had the chance to become integrated in a group of graduate students interested in the Middle East, gender and transnational communities (Petri Hautaniemi, Susanne Dahlgren, Riina Isotalo). Without the support and counsel provided by Prof. Vuorela and these fellow students, this work would not have materialized.

Many other people have participated in giving this book its shape. Professor Heikki Palva has encouraged me and supported my work throughout my graduate student years. Professor Jeff Hearn read the finished manuscript version and suggested several important additions. Eeva Peltola, Professor Mhammed Sabour, Willy Jansen, Sossie Andezian and Kirsti Westphalen, all have kindly offered their help and comments in different parts of the research process.

I would also like to thank Nordic Africa Institute, the Sasakawa Foundation and the Niilo Helander Foundation for financial support at various stages of the research. Finally, my thanks belong to the researchers and fellow students at the Institute for Asian and African Studies, University of Helsinki.

Throughout the years I spent in studying the international *L'araishi* community I shared my ups and downs with my Heini. I hope you understand that for me this is not the right context to describe how much I appreciate your support.

Bibliography

Sources in Arabic

Al Budali N. 1998: Waḍ'iyat n-nisā' l-maghribiyāt fi l-mudztama' l-Isbānī min khilāl ba'd l-shahādāt. [The position of Moroccan women in Spain through some legal testimonies] Unpublished presentation at the International Seminar on Human Rights and the Moroccan Migrant Community Abroad [Al Munāzara d-duwalīya ḥawla: Al dzālīya l-Maghribīya bi l-khāridz wa ḥuqūq l-insān] Tangiers, Morocco 23-26. 11 1998. Organised by the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights.

Al Harraq M., Al 'Ali H. 1996: Dināmikīyat t-tatawwur l-ḥaḍārī li madīnat l- 'Arā'ish min 1985 ilā 1995. Baḥth li nayli l-idzāza fi l-ḥuqūq. Dzāmi'a Sidi Muhammad Bnu 'Abd Allāh, Kullīyat l-'ulūm l-qānūniya wa l-iqtisādīya wa l-idztimā'īya, Fās. [The dynamics of urban development in L'araish, from 1985 to 1995. Unpublished Bachelor's degree thesis, Sidi Muhammed 'Abd Allāh University, department of law and economics, Fes.

Al Maghrib fi al arqam 1989: Mudīriyat t-tanmīya li l-bank al Maghribī li t-tidzāra l-khāridzīya. n:o 29, Dar al Bayda'. [The annual statistics of the developmental administration bureau of the Moroccan bank, Casablanca]

Al Qabab M. 1998: Al hidzra s-sirrīya. [The hidden migration]. Unpublished presentation at the International Seminar on Human Rights and the Moroccan Migrant Community Abroad [Al Munāzara d-duwalīya ḥawla: Al dzālīya l-Maghribīya bi l-khāridz wa ḥuqūq l-insān] Tangiers, Morocco 23-26. 11 1998. Organised by the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights.

Al Shantuf 'A. 1998: Al hidzra d-duwalīya wa athāruha 'ala l-wasaṭ l-ḥaḍārī bi l-'Arā'ish. Baḥth li nayli diblūmu d-dirāsāt l-'uliyā, dzāmi'at Muhammed V, Kullīyat l-adab wa l-'ulūm l-insāniya, Ar-Ribāt. [International migration and its effects on the urban sphere in L'araish. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Muhammed V University, Faculty of Humanities. Rabat.

Azrawil F. 1991: Al mar'a wa r-radzul – t-taghyīr ṣ-ṣa'b. [The woman and the man - the difficult change] Dār l-Fanak, Dār l-Baydā'.

Baqqash M. 1998: Al hidzra s-sirrīya [The hidden migration, collection of short stories] Tangiers.

Batma A. 1995: Al Raḥīl. [Departure] Sharīkat r-Rābiṭa. Dār l-Baydā'.

Bossard R. Bonnet J. 1978: Al hidzra l-maghribīya naḥwa Ūrubba. [Moroccan migration towards Europe] Al madzalla dziugrāfiyyat l-maghrib 23.

Bushanfati B. 1988: Fī t-taḥaḍḍur wa t-thaqāfa l-ḥaḍārīya bi l-maghrib: dirāsa fi l-binā' l-idztimā'ī li mudun ṣ-ṣafiḥ. [Urbanisation and urban culture in Morocco: a study of social structure in shanty-towns.] Manshūrāt Al-ḥiwār, Dār l-baydā'.

Choukri M. 1993: Al Khubz l-ḥāfi. [The plain bread] Dār ṣ-ṣāqī, London and Beirut.

-1994: Al Shuṭṭār [Street wise]. Dār ṣ-ṣāqī, London and Beirut.

KMAN 1997: Komitee Marokkanse Arbeiders Nederland, Dzam'ayya al 'ummāl al Maghariba bi Hulanda 96/97, Amsterdam.

Mishbal J. 1998: Al hidzra d-duwalīya wa ḥuqūq l-insān bi Isbāniya. [International migration and human rights in Spain] Unpublished presentation at the International Seminar on Human Rights and the Moroccan Migrant Community Abroad [Al Munāzara d-duwalīya ḥawla: Al dzālīya l-Maghribīya bi l-khāridz wa ḥuqūq l-insān] Tangiers, Morocco 23-26. 11 1998. Organised by the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights.

Risalat al Ghurfa 1994: Milaff sh-shahr 4. Risālat ghurfat t-tidzāra wa ṣ-ṣinā'a. [Monthly files no. 4. Chamber of Trade and Industry, Tetuán.]

Salih M. 1996: Min Faqīh Ben Sāliḥ ilā Milano: Al hidzra d-duwalīya al maghribīya ilā Itāliya wa ta'thīruha 'alā manātiq l-inṭilāq. Baḥth li nayl diblūm dirāsāt l-'uliyā'. Dzāmi'at Muhammad V, kullīyat l-adab wa 'ulūm l-insāniya. Ar-Ribāt [From Faqīh Ben Salih to Milano: Moroccan

migration to Italy and its effects on the sending areas. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Muhammed V University, Faculty of Humanities. Rabat.]

Tugi M. 1996: Al hidzra d-duwalīyya wa athāruha 'alā t-tanmīya l-maḥallīya bi minṭaqa Bani Miskīn – iqlīm Sattāt. Risala li nawl dīblūm d-dirāsāt l-'uliyā. dzāmi'at Muhammad V, kullīyat l-adab wa l-'ulūm l-insānīya, Ar-Ribāt [International migration and its effects on local development in the Bani Miskin region, province of Settat. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Muhammed V University, Faculty of Humanities. Rabat.]

Sources in English, Spanish, French and Finnish

Abu Lughod J. 1980: Rabat: Urban apartheid in Morocco. Princeton University, Princeton.

Abu Lughod L. 1986: Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. California University, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

-1985: Honour and Sentiments of Loss in a Bedouin Society. *American Ethnologist* 12/2.

Ahmed A. 1995 *The Future of Anthropology : its relevance to the contemporary world.* Athlone, London.

Al Amin A. 1968: L' Évolution de la femme et le problème du mariage au Maroc. *Présence Africaine* 68.

Al Mawrid 1994, Arabic-English dictionary. Dar el ilm lil malayēn.

Appadurai A. 1998: Fieldwork in the Era of Globalization. *Anthropology and Humanism* 22/1 1998.

-1995: The Production of Locality. in Fardon R. ed. 1995.

-1991: Global Ethnoscapes: notes and queries for a transnational anthropology in Fox R. 1991

-1986: *The Social Life of Things : commodities in cultural perspective.* Cambridge University, Cambridge.

Arenal M. 1996: La diáspora morisca. in López García B. dir. 1996.

Asad T. 1986: The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology. in Clifford J., Marcus G. eds. 1986.

Bacaría J. ed. 1998: *Migración y cooperación mediterráneas: transferencias de los emigrantes residentes en España e Italia.* Icaria Antrazyt, Barcelona.

Ben Ali D. 1991: 'Ajustement Structurel et Retrait de l'Etat' in *Economie et Socialisme. Revue Marocaine de Reflexion et de Débat*, 10.

Bencherifa et al. 1992: Études des mouvement migratoires du Maroc vers la communauté européenne. GERA (groupe d'études et de recherches appliquées) Université de Rabat.

Bernard H. ed. 1998: *Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology:* Altamira.

Bond G., C. Gilliam A. eds. 1994: *Social Construction of the Past: representation as power:* Routledge, London and New York.

Boudjedra R. 1969: *La répudiation.* Paris, Denoel.

Bourdieu P. 1991: *Language and Symbolic Power:* Polity Press, Cambridge.

Bourgois P. 1995: *In Search of Respect: selling crack in el Barrio.* Cambridge University, Cambridge and New York.

Bowman G. 1989: *Fucking Tourists: sexual relations and tourism in Jerusalem Old City.* *Critique of Anthropology*, 9/2.

Brandes, S. 1980: *Metaphors of Masculinity: sex and status in Andalusian folklore.* University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

Brittan A. 1989: *Masculinity and Power.* Blackwell, Oxford.

Brod H. 1987: *The Making of Masculinities: the new men's studies.* Allen & Unwin, Boston.

Butler J. 1990: *Gender Trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity.* Routledge, New York.

Carrigan T., Connell R., Lee J. 1985: *Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity.* *Theory and Society*, 14/5.

- Caton S.** 1987: Power, Persuasion and Language. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19/1.
- Clifford J.** 1994: Diasporas. in *Cultural Anthropology* 9/3, 1994.
- Clifford J., Marcus G.** eds. 1986: *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* University of California, London.
- Combs-Schilling M.** 1989: *Sacred Performances: Islam, sexuality and sacrifice.* Columbia University, New York.
- Connell R.** 1996: *New Directions in Gender Theory, Masculinity Research and Gender Politics.* *Ethnos* 61/3-4.
- 1995 *Masculinities.* Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Cornwall A., Lindisfarne N.** eds. 1994: *Dislocating Masculinity.* Routledge, London.
- Cowan J.** 1991: *Going Out for Coffee?: contesting the grounds of gendered pleasures in everyday sociability.* In Loizos P., Papataxiarchis E. eds. 1991.
- Davis S., Davis D.** 1988: *Adolescence in a Moroccan Town: making social sense.* Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.
- Delaney C.** 1991: *The Seed and Soil.* California University, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- de Vries P.** 1992: *A Research Journey.* in Long N., Long A. eds. 1992.
- Díaz de Rada A., Cruces F.** 1994: *The Mysteries of Incarnation: some problems to do with the analytic language of practice in* Hastrup K., Hervik P. eds. 1994.
- Dwyer D.** 1978a *Images and Self-Images: male and female in Morocco.* Columbia University, New York.
- 1978b *Ideologies of Sexual Inequality and Strategies for Change.* *American Ethnologist* 5/2 1978.
- Dwyer K.** 1982: *Moroccan Dialogues: anthropology in question.* Waveland, Prospect Heights.
- Driessen H.** 1998: *The New Immigration and the Transformation of the European - African frontiers.* in Wilson T., Donnan H. eds. (1998). Cambridge University, Cambridge and New York.
- 1983: *Male Sociability and Rituals of Masculinity in Rural Andalusia.* *Anthropological Quarterly* 56/3 1983.
- Eickelman D.** 1989 [1981]: *The Middle East: an anthropological perspective.* Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs.
- 1976: *Moroccan Islam.* University of Texas, Austin.
- EIU** 1992: *Country Report 1/1992, Morocco.* The Economist Intelligence Unit, London.
- Elbaz M.** 1996: *La diáspora sefardí a través del Mediterráneo y el Magreb tras la expulsión de España en 1942.* in López García B. dir. 1996.
- Evers-Rosander E.** 1991: *Women in a Borderland: managing Muslim identity where Morocco meets Spain* *Stockholm studies in social anthropology* 26. Stockholm University, Stockholm.
- Fardon R.** ed. 1995: *Counterworks: managing the diversity of knowledge.* Routledge, London and New York.
- Farnell B., Graham L.** 1998: *Discourse Centred Methods.* in Bernard H. ed. 1998.
- Featherstone M.** ed 1990: *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity.* Sage, London.
- Findly A. et al.** 1979: *Crisis in Maghrebi Emigration: policy alternatives.* *Maghreb Review* 4/3 1979.
- Fox R.** ed. 1991: *Recapturing Anthropology: Working In the Present.* School of American Research press, Santa Fe.
- Friedman J.** 1992: *Cultural Identity & Global Process.* Sage, London.
- Geertz C., Geertz H., Rosen L.** 1979: *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society.* Cambridge University, Cambridge.

- Geertz C.** 1983: *Local Knowledge: further essays in interpretive anthropology*. Basic Books, New York.
- Gilmore D.** 1993: *Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity*. Yale University, New Haven.
- Gilsenan M.** 1996: *Lords of the Lebanese Marches: violence and narrative in an Arab society*. University of California, Berkeley.
- 1976: *Lying, Honour and Contradiction*. in Kapferer B ed. 1976.
- Grimshaw A., Hart K.** 1995: *The Rise and Fall of Scientific Ethnography*. in Ahmed A. 1995.
- Gupta A., Ferguson J.** 1997 *Anthropological Locations: boundaries and grounds of a field science*. Berkeley University of California, Berkeley.
- 1992: *Beyond Culture: space, identity and the politics of difference*. *Cultural Anthropology* 7:1 1992.
- Gutmann M.** 1996: *The Meaning of Macho: being a man in Mexico City*. University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Hastrup K.** 1995: *A Passage to Anthropology: between experience and theory*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Hastrup K., Hervik P.** eds. 1994: *Social Experience and Anthropological Knowledge*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Hammoudi A.** 1997: *Master and Disciple: the cultural foundations of Moroccan authoritarianism*. University of Chicago, Chicago and London.
- Hart A.** 1994: *Missing Masculinity?: prostitutes clients in Alicante, Spain*. in Cornwall A., Lindisfarne N. 1994.
- Hearn J.** 1996: *Is Masculinity Dead?: A critique of the concept of masculinity/masculinities*. In *Understanding masculinities: social relations and cultural arenas* ed. Mac an Ghail M. Open University Press, Buckingham.
- 1989: *Reviewing men and masculinities - or mostly boys' own papers*. *Theory, Culture and Society* no. 6/1989.
- Herzfeld M.** 1995: *It Takes one to Know One: collective resentment and mutual recognition among Greeks in local and global contexts* in Fardon R. 1995.
- INSEE 1985: *Recensement Général de la Population de 1982, Les Etrangers*. Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Paris.
- Jansen W.** 1987: *Women Without Men*. Brill, Leiden.
- Kandiyoti D.** 1994: *The Paradoxes of Masculinity*. in Cornwall A., Lindisfarne N. 1994.
- Kapchan D.** 1996: *Gender On the Market: Moroccan women and the re-voicing of tradition*. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
- Kapferer B.** ed. 1976: *Transaction and Meaning: directions in the anthropology of exchange and symbolic behavior*. Institute for the Study of Human Issues cop. ASA essays in social anthropology; vol. 1.
- Kortteinen M.** 1992: *Kunnian kenttä: suomalainen palkkatyö kulttuurisena muotona*. [The fields of honour. Finnish wage work as a cultural form] Hanki ja Jää, Helsinki.
- Lincoln B.** 1989: *Discourse and the Construction of Society: comparative studies of myth, ritual and classification*. Oxford University, New York.
- Loizos P., Papataxiarchis E.** eds. 1991: *Contested Identities: Gender and Kinship in Modern Greece*. Princeton University, Princeton.
- Loizos P.** 1994: *A Broken Mirror: masculine ethnography in Greece*. in Cornwall A., Lindisfarne N. 1994.
- Long A.** 1992: *Gods, Knowledge and Beer: the methodological significance of situational analysis and discourse*. in Long N., Long A. 1992.
- Long N., Long A.** eds. 1992: *Battlefields of Knowledge: the interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development*. Routledge.

- López García B.** (dir.) 1996: Atlas de la Inmigración Magrebí en España. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid y Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales, Dirección General de Migraciones, Madrid.
- 1996 b: La evolución del origen de los inmigrantes Marroquíes en España. in López García B. dir. 1996.
- 1996 c: Geografía de los Marroquíes en España: el mapa de la regularización. in López García B. (dir.) 1996.
- Lourido R.** 1996: Españoles en el Norte de Africa en la Edad moderna. in López García B. (dir.) 1996.
- Lovell N.** ed. 1998: *Locality and Belonging*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Mac an Ghail M.** ed. 1996: *Understanding Masculinities: social relations and cultural arenas*. Open University Press, Buckingham.
- MacCormack C., Strathern M.** eds. 1980: *Nature, Culture and Gender*. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
- McDonogh G.** 1992: Bars, Gender, and Virtue: myth and practice in Barcelona's Barrio Chino. *Anthropological Quarterly* 65/1 1992.
- MacLeod A.** 1991: *Accommodating Protest. Working Women, the New Veiling and Change in Cairo*, Colombia University, New York.
- Malti-Douglas F., Douglas A.** 1994: *Arab Comic Strips: Politics of an emerging mass culture*. Indiana University, Bloomington.
- Maher V.** 1974: *Women and property in Morocco : their changing relation to the process of social stratification in the Middle Atlas*. Cambridge University, London and New York.
- Marcus G.** 1995: *Ethnography in/of the World System: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography*. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24.
- Mernissi F.** 1975: *Beyond the Veil: Male-female dynamics in a modern Muslim society*. Schenkman, Cambridge.
- Mintz S.** 1998: *The Localization of Anthropological Practice*. in *Current Anthropology* 18/2 1998.
- Mir-Hosseini Z.** 1993: *Marriage on Trial : a study of Islamic family law*. Tauris, London.
- Munson H.** 1984: *The House of Si Abd Allah: the oral history of a Moroccan family*. Yale University, New Haven and London.
- Moyano J.** 2000: *Els Conflictes Interculturals: el cas de Ca N' Anglada*. Catedra Unesco sobre Pau i Drets Humans. Barcelona.
- Ogden P.** 1991: *Immigration to France Since 1945: Myth and Reality*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14/3.
- Olwig K.** 1997: *Cultural sites: sustaining a home in a de-territorialized world*. in Olwig K. Hastrup K. 1997.
- Olwig K., Hastrup K.** eds. 1997: *Siting Culture: the shifting anthropological object*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Ortner S.** 1998: *Fieldwork in the Postcommunity*. *Anthropology and Humanism* 22/1.
- Paerregaard K.** 1997: *Imagining a place in the Andes: In the borderland of lived, invented, and analysed culture*. Olwig K. Hastrup K. eds. 1997.
- PAIDAR-Med** 1996: *Programme d' Action Intègre pour le Développement et l'Aménagement de la Région Méditerranéenne Marocaine*. Diagnostic, Vol 1. Moroccan Ministry of Interior, Spanish Foreign Ministry.
- Papataxiarchis E.** 1991: *Friends of the Heart: male commensal solidarity, gender and kinship in Aegean Greece*. in Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991.
- Peristiany J.** ed. 1965: *Honour and Shame: the values of Mediterranean society*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.
- Peristiany J., Pitt-Rivers J.** eds. 1992: *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*. Cambridge University, Cambridge.

- Peteet J.** 1994: Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance: intifada, cultural politics of violence. *American Ethnologist* 21, 1994.
- Pitt-Rivers J.** ed. 1963: *Mediterranean Countrymen: essays in the social anthropology of the Mediterranean*. Mouton, Paris.
- Portes A., Guarnizo L., Landolt P.** 1999: The Study of Transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. *Ethnic and racial Studies*: 22/ 2 1999.
- Rabinov P.** 1977: *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco*. University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- 1975 *Symbolic Dominance: cultural form and historical change in Morocco*. University of Chicago, Chicago and London.
- Ramírez A.** 1998: *Migraciones Género e Islam: mujeres Marroquíes en España*. Agencia española de cooperación internacional. Madrid.
- Robbins J., Bamford S.** eds. 1997: Introduction. *Anthropology and Humanism*: 22 / 1, 1997 Special Issue: Fieldwork Revisited: changing contexts of ethnographic practice in the era of globalization.
- Robertson R.** 1992: *Globalization: social theory and global culture*. Sage, London.
- Rosaldo M.** 1984: Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling, in Shweder R. and Levine R. eds. 1984.
- Rosen L.** 1984: *Bargaining for Reality: construction of social relations in a Muslim community*. University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Said E.** 1978: *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, New York.
- Salt J., Clout H.** 1976: *International Labour Migration: Sources of Supply*. in Salt J., Clout H. eds. 1976.
- Salt J., Clout H.** eds. 1976: *Migration in Post War Europe*. Oxford University, London.
- Schade-Poulsen M.** 1999: *Men and Popular Music in Algeria*. University of Texas, Austin.
- Seddon D.** 1981: *Moroccan Peasants: a century of change in the Eastern Rif 1870-1970*. Dawson, Folkestone.
- Shweder R., LeVine R.** eds. 1984: *Culture Theory: essays in mind, self and emotion*. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
- Singerman D.** 1995: *Avenues of Participation: family, politics, and networks in urban quarters of Cairo*. Princeton University. Princeton.
- Strathern M.** 1998: *The Gender of the Gift: Problems With Women and Problems With Society in Melanesia*. Berkley University. Berkley.
- Tapper N.** 1991: *Bartered Brides*. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
- Talamoudi F.** 1983: *The Diaglossic Situation in North Africa*. *Orientalia Gothenburgiensa* 8. Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis 1983, Gothenburg.
- Tedlock D.** 1995: *The Dialogic Emergence of Culture*. University of Illinois, Urbana.
- US Department of Commerce** 1980: *Country Demographic Profiles, Morocco*. Bureau of the Census, Washington DC.
- Wagner U., Yamba B.** 1986: Going North and Getting Attached. *Ethnos* 1986, 3:4.
- Vale de Almeida M.** 1996: *The Hegemonic Male: masculinity in a Portuguese town*. Bergham Books, Oxford.
- Van Gennep A.** 1960: *The Rites of Passage*. Chicago University, Chicago.
- Watson G.** 1991: *Rewriting Culture*. in Fox R. ed. 1991.
- Vinogradov A.** 1974: French Colonialism as Reflected in the Male-Female Interaction in Morocco. *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, series 2/ 36.
- Wehr H.** 1994 [1979]: *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Hans Wehr. Ed. By Milton Cowan. Spoken Language Services, Inc., Ithaca.
- Vendler Z.** 1984: *Understanding People*. in Shweder R. and Levine R. eds. 1984.
- Westermarck E.** 1914: *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*. Macmillan, London.

Wilson T., Donnan H. eds. 1998: *Border Identities: nation-state and international frontiers*. Cambridge University, Cambridge and New York.
Zinovjeff S. 1991: *Hunters and the Hunted*. in Loizos and Papataxiarchis eds. 1991

Other sources

articles in Moroccan press

Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki 1998: issues from following dates
 26.2. 8.4. 15.7. 18.7. 27.7. 31.7. 4.8. 5.8. 8.8. 11.8. 15.8. 16.8.

Al 'Alam 1998: issues from following dates
 1.3. 5.7. 31.7. 15.8.

L'araish 1998 (al 'Arā'ish) issue 24.2. 1998

Articles in the Spanish press

El País 2000: issues from following dates
 6.2. 8.2. 11.2. 1.3. 7.5.

The Internet

Cordesman A. 1998: *Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc? Threats to the West: Middle East Studies Programme: transnational threats from the Middle East. The Internet: <http://usis.org/mideast/reports/ME>*