



## The Working Class and the Welfare State A Historical-Analytical Overview and a Little Swedish Monograph

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Göran Therborn

## THE WORKING CLASS AND THE WELFARE STATE

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### 1. The Working Class Perspective

The histories of the welfare state have hitherto, on the whole, been written from above. Their searching eye has been firmly fixed on governments and Civil servants, and mainly with a view to looking into what the latter have contributed to the development of what from today's perspective appears to be the main feature of the welfare state, social insurance and large-scale income maintenance programmes. The best of these works embody an impressive scholarship, combining meticulous with imagination and subtlety.<sup>1</sup> But their approach tends to preclude from the outset a full understanding of the emergent reality of the welfare state. After all, the latter arose as form of dealing with what was once called "the working and dangerous classes". Therefore, an understanding of the rise of the welfare state seems to require an understanding also of what the working class and its organizations and mouthpieces thought, demanded, and fought for with regard to welfare and State, and of what happened to all that.<sup>2</sup>

When a class perspective is brought to bear on the welfare state, this is usually done by social scientists, who have to substitute theoretical dissection, economic analysis or correlational causation for historical investigation.<sup>3</sup>

So, let us then begin by asking what the workers and the workers' movement themselves thought and did "workers question" and "workers' insurance". Short of historical research, we will largely have to confine ourselves to what the organized movement said, but as far as possible within the boundaries of a little essay, an attempt will be made to relate movement expressions to class experiences. Since class is a category not bound by state borders, we will make a brief overview of the centres of the European labour movement in order to catch a glimpse of what may be called a working class perspective in social policy and of the welfare state.

#### 1.1. Collective Autonomy, Work and Politics

What is most immediately striking from a look at labour history in relation to the conventional welfare state perspectives of the 1980s is the middle class perspective of the trajectory from poor-relief to the welfare state. The working class and the labour movement had different concerns.

Social security, to the extent it existed and/or was envisaged, was not an aspect of the state, but of autonomous class or popular institutions, friendly societies and trade unions in Britain, mutual aid societies and *compagnonnages* in France. "Combination" was a key word in early British working class parlance and practice, "association" that of the French working class from the 1830s. Herein were combined trade union struggle, mutual aid in case of need, and a socialist or cooperative reorganization of society. The weekly Trades Newspaper, founded in 1825 by the London "trades"/unions, had as its motto "They helped

everyone his neighbour".<sup>4</sup> The British friendly societies had about a million members by 1815, the trade unions - many of which also functioned as friendly societies - the same number in 1834.<sup>5</sup> In France 2438 mutual aid societies with about 250.000 members were identified in 1852.<sup>6</sup> These, legally recognized, collective bodies provided sick pay, health care, widows' pensions, funeral costs, etc. for their members and their families. The resources and the benefits of these societies were meagre and fragile, and their range of coverage limited, but they provide an important background to the positions taken by the labour movement with regard to social regulations by the state. Another reason why collective autonomy was an important part of a working class perspective on social security was the early importance of employer-provided or employer-controlled welfare benefits. A French researcher has called these employer provisions of the 19th century "the first drafts of our Social Security"<sup>7</sup>, and they were put up by vigilantly anti-union employers, such as Krupp and the British railway companies<sup>8</sup>, as well as by more progressive ones. This second kind of non-state welfare institution (of a non-charitable kind) could be quite extensive. Thus, in Prussia in 1876, 59% of 4850 "larger industrial enterprises" had an accident insurance, 42% ran a health insurance, 14 % provided health care or housing.<sup>9</sup>

The struggle for workers' management or co-management of enterprise institutions of social provision began very early. Among the French miners it dates back to 1850: A protracted struggle ensued, spearheaded by the miners and the railwaymen. Both groups of workers demanded and finally got state protection of their autonomy from the employers.<sup>10</sup> A similar struggle by German miners in the 1860's was the one single case of social policy, in today's sense of the word, which was dealt with by the First International.<sup>11</sup>

What the early working class movement positively demanded from the state was work and the regulation of working conditions and working time. Since the Napoleonic Wars English cotton spinners had their Short-time Committees agitating for working time regulation, and by 1847 a pace-setting Ten Hours bill for women and children in the textile industry was passed.<sup>12</sup> Under heavy pressure from working class associations, the Provisional Government coming out of the French February Revolution was forced to "commit... itself to guarantee the existence of the worker by labour... to guarantee labour to all citizens." To the workers, guaranteed work and free workers' associations were the main content of the revolution, and the government's closing of the National Workshops brought the Parisian proletariat and populace into rebellion and, finally, bloody defeat.<sup>13</sup>

A third aspect of the early working class perspective should also be emphasized from the outset. That is the predominance of political concerns over social ones, of political rights and the abolition of political privilege, the right to associate, the right to vote, over and above social rights. This is clear from the programmes of the labour international and parties, but it might be argued that such a properly political perspective was a contribution of socialist intellectuals from outside the working class. The historical record, however, shows an opposite relationship between political and social reform. The first nationwide working class mass movement in history, Chartism, was a movement exclusively demanding (male) parliamentary democracy.<sup>14</sup> True, it was preceded by a dispersed trade unionism, and trade unions are no doubt the most universal working class institution.

"But Chartism was different from earlier reform movements, and from protests like the poor law and factory movements. Whereas they were all campaigns in which workers participated alongside other classes and under middle class or aristocrat leadership,

Chartism was consciously and overwhelmingly a working-class campaign."<sup>15</sup> Of course, political and socio-economic issues and concerns were interwoven. The radical Chartist and anti-poor law campaigner J.R. Stephens put it thus in a speech in 1838: "... by universal suffrage I mean to say that every working man in the land has a right to a good coat on his back, a good hat on his head, a good roof for the shelter of his household, a good dinner upon his table."<sup>16</sup> Similarly, the Walloon workers, who between 1891 and 1912 went on a series of militant and violently repressed strikes for universal and equal suffrage, also fought for what they saw as the likely consequences or implications of the latter, a reduced working day, more job safety, pensions, etc. But the point is: "The politics in which the proletarians of Wallonia became interested - and how fast! - is nothing else than the fight for universal suffrage."<sup>17</sup>

A perspective on welfare state development which has an awareness of class and class conflict cannot stick to the bureau vistas of the state policy maker or the vision of the concerned middle class reformer and follow a post hoc constructed line evolution from poor relief to institutions of income maintenance. It will have to open itself to the class Society itself, to the collective strivings in the latter, to its struggles for power and autonomy, and to concerns other than those of the latterday social worker.

## 1.2. Social Policy in the Programmes of the International Labour Movement

The ten immediate post-revolutionary demands - after the conquest of democracy - of the programme of the Communist League, i.e., the Communist Manifesto include nothing about social security. They do include demands for strongly progressive taxation and for public and free education together with the abolition of child factory labour in its current form.

In his inaugural address to the First International, Marx hailed the British Ten Hours Act as a victory of "the political economy of the working class", and pointed, secondly, to the important example of the cooperative movement, for having shown that large-scale modern production is possible without a class master. No other social issue was raised, nor in the preamble the statutes of the International.<sup>18</sup> The most important concrete immediate demand put forward by the First International was the legal limitation of the working day. Its 1866 Congress in Geneva declared: "A preliminary condition, without which all further attempts at improvement and emancipation must prove abortive, is the legal limitation of the working day". Referring to demands raised by American workers, the Congress proposed an eight-hour day.<sup>19</sup> The Congress adopted a curious resolution on child labour. It demanded the restriction of the working hours of children aged 9 to 12 to two hours, and that juvenile labour should always be combined with education. But it also held forth that "in a rational state of society every child whatever, from the age of nine years, ought to become a protective labourer..."<sup>20</sup>

The two competing founding congresses of the Second International in Paris in 1889, the Marxist and the Possibilist, both put the eight-hour day first on the agenda. The Marxist one added a catalogue of demands for protective work legislation, from the interdiction of the work of children under 14 to that of "certain branches of industry and certain modes of manufacturing prejudicial to the health of the workers". The Congress also decided to follow the American Federation of Labor in calling for an international 8-hours demonstration on the first of May 1890, and an executive commission was charged with the task of transmitting to the international government congress on work legislation proposed

by Switzerland the demands of the Paris Congress.<sup>21</sup> The Parisian decisions were reaffirmed at the Second Congress in 1891, in a resolution vehemently denouncing the hostility of existing governments with respect to workers' protection. The stronger language of the resolution, put forward by the Belgian Vandervelde, was a concession to the SPD leader Bebel, who, supported by his Austrian colleague Adler, emphasized that the main task of Social Democracy was not to wring a piece of protective legislation, but to educate the workers about the character of the present Society with a view to letting it disappear as soon as possible. Bebel also underlined that the SPD had been against the protective legislation put forward by the German government.<sup>22</sup>

The Erfurt Programme of the SPD, adopted in 1891, was a sort of model programme of the Second International. For example, it provided the blueprint for the 1897 Swedish SAP programme. The programme ends with a list of specific, immediate demands. First there is a set of ten points, starting with the franchise and the electoral system, ending with education, jurisdiction, and health progressive income and wealth tax. Then follows a Special list of demands "for the protection of the working class": five work regulations, beginning with the 8-hour day, a demand for supervision and inspection of work conditions through special public bodies, equality of agricultural and domestic workers with industrial workers, security of the right of association, and, finally, "Takeover of the whole Workers' insurance by the State with decisive /massgebender/ cooperation of the workers in the administration."<sup>23</sup>

The Congresses of the Second International, after the first ones, devoted little time to discussions of social policy and worker protection. However, the Amsterdam Congress of 1904 passed a resolution introduced by SPD, on "Working-Class Insurance". This is the first time in the history of the international labour movement that social insurance is accorded a central position among immediate demands. Protection of the forces of labour, the resolution says, "cannot be better reached in a capitalist society than by laws establishing an effective system of insurance for the workers." Insurance should cover "the period when it is impossible for them to avail themselves of their labour-power in consequence of illness, accident, incapacity, old age, pregnancy, maternity or glut /of the labour market?GTh/. The workers ought to demand that their insurance establishments should be under the administration of the insured themselves, and that the same condition should be given to the workers of the country and to the strangers of all nations..<sup>24</sup> The Stuttgart Congress of 1907 dealt with workers' migration, but had no further topic of Social policy on its agenda.

The Eighth Congress in Copenhagen in 1910 adopted a resolution on "workers' legislation", repeating the demands of the Paris and Amsterdam Congress, especially singling out the non-protected condition of workers in agriculture and forestry. A novelty was a resolution on unemployment. There were demands, first of all, for "general obligatory insurance, the administration of which should be left to the workers' organizations and the costs of which should be borne by the holders of the means of protection." Further, public works, where unemployed are paid at the union rate, the creation and the subsidy of trade union or bipartite labour exchanges, a reduction of the hours of work, and, pending general insurance, financial subsidies of unemployment funds. "There subsidies have to leave the trade union organizations in full autonomy."<sup>25</sup>

In their reports to the Copenhagen Congress, some of the affiliated parties, notably the German, the Danish, and the Swedish, gave rather extensive presentations of activities in

the field of social policy, by themselves as well as by their respective governments. The SPD proposal with regard to social insurance, and most immediately health insurance, was for "a uniform organization under the self-government of the insured... including all these working for wages or salary, also all other persons with an income of not more than 5000 marks per year... and free medical attendance."<sup>26</sup>

Between the world wars, the main social policy preoccupations of the Socialist International were the (largely unsuccessful) fight for the governmental ratification of the Washington Convention on the 8-hour day and the question of unemployment, even before the onset of the Depression.<sup>27</sup> The abortive attempt, in Berlin in 1922, to unite the II, the 2 1/2, and the III International did produce a declaration of common action on two questions, for the 8-hour day and against unemployment.<sup>28</sup> Regulation of the working time and securing the 8-hour day was foremost also in the international of Social Democratic trade unions. At its Fifth Congress in Stockholm in 1930, its Belgian Vice-President Mertens presented a social policy programme. It contained a list of social insurances and a set of worker protection measures, with specified demands for union control or cooperation.<sup>29</sup> It was adopted by the ensuing Congress in Brussels, in the through of the Depression and with little effects.

As could be expected, the Comintern devoted little attention to questions of social policy. In the resolutions of its first four congresses the latter are only touched upon once, and then rather obliquely. The Agrarian Programme of the Fourth Congress includes a paragraph about the fight for an eight-hour day and for social insurance for agricultural workers.<sup>30</sup> This scant interest for ameliorations of the workers' lot within capitalism follows naturally from the early Comintern's perspective of immediate revolution.

More significant, perhaps, is the 1928 programme of the Comintern. Here, among the "main tasks of the proletarian dictatorship", is a point D about Worker Protection. It includes a shortened work week: the interdiction of nightwork and work in dangerous branches of industry by women; social insurance paid for by the state and self-managed by the insured; free, extended health care; societal care of children together with the recognition of motherhood as a social contribution, and social equality of men and women. Point E contains a programme of housing expropriation and construction.<sup>31</sup>

We will end this survey with the programme indicating the dissolution of a specific working class perspective. This dissolution is manifested in the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration of Social Democracy. There, the concepts of class struggle, working class, and classes have disappeared - replaced by man, citizens, people. The social policy part is expressed in terms of human rights: "3. Socialism stands not only for basic political rights but also for economic and social rights. Among these are: The right to work; The right to medical and maternity benefits; The right to leisure; The right to economic security for citizens unable to work because of old age, incapacity or unemployment; The right of children to welfare, and of the youth to education in accordance with their abilities; The right to adequate housing".<sup>32</sup>

### 1.3. The Social Policy Perspective of the Working Class

Guided by an analytical class perspective, controlled by an empirical overview of the practical and programmatic efforts of organized labour, we should be able to piece together a theoretical construct of a working class type of social policy as a tool for disentangling different contributions to the contemporary welfare state, and for gauging working class success or failure in different countries and different periods.

#### **A. The Guiding Principle**

Most immediately and most directly, what workers rose and organized to fight for were workers' rights to livelihood, to a decent human life. A conception of workers' rights seems to be the guiding principle running through working class perspectives on social policy, a principle opposed to insurance as well as to charity, an assertion overriding liberal arguments about the requirements of capital accumulation, dangers of competitiveness, and the necessity of incentives. The labour perspective is first of all an assertion of the rights of working persons, against the logics of charity objects, market commodities or of thrifty savers. It would be a bigot Marxism which denied that this working class principle may at times overlap with the compassion of humanitarian middle class reformers, an aristocratic paternalist sense of obligation, a Radical conception of citizens' rights or the enlightened self-interest of businessmen and statesmen, concerned with the reproduction of the labour force, of the soldier force, or of the existing social order. But there are also occasions and issues on which the working class tends to be left alone with its principle, in which other concerns take on an overriding importance to other groups and classes. Unemployment and the treatment of the unemployed is such a crucial issue. Shall the unemployed have the same rights and conditions as the workers, whom it is profitable to employ, in public works employment or as benefit receivers? Should the prevention of unemployment be a task of social policy overriding all others? Questions like these form touchstones of class perspectives.

#### **B. Task Priorities**

The first working class priority is undoubtedly protection of the class itself, Arbeiterschutz (worker Protection), as it is tellingly termed in German: leisure from work, safety at work, and union rights.

The labour movement has always been male dominated and, in spite of the explicit demands for the legal equality of women, this workers' protection orientation often includes a patriarchal Special protectionist attitude towards women and women's work, often assimilated with that of children.<sup>33</sup> Class also has a gender aspect. The second priority of the labour movement has been the right to work, the maintenance of employment under non-punitive conditions. Income maintenance and social insurance arranged by the state is not an original working class demand. Insurance by means of associations of mutual aid developed early in working class history, but State insurance comes from elsewhere. For instance, it does not figure in the Social Democratic Gotha Programme of 1875, in spite of the latter's half-Lassalleian pro-state perspective.<sup>34</sup> The founding congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Workers' Party in December-January 1888-89 dismissed the workers' Insurance organized by the state - just adopted in Germany and Austria. Both because of the lack of significance to the social problems of the "worker who is capable of working" and because of its directly negative effects in "the partial transfer of the costs of poor relief

from the municipalities to the working class and the restriction as much as possible, where feasible the shoving aside of the independent support organisations of the workers". Instead the Congress demanded a "worker protection legislation (Arbeiterschutz Gesetzgebung)".<sup>35</sup>

This does not mean, however, that the labour movement and the perceived threat from it did not play a significant part in the establishment of public social insurance. We have the word of Bismarck: "If Social Democracy did not exist, and if there were not masses of people intimidated by it, then the moderate advances which we have managed to push through in the area of social reform would not yet exist..."<sup>36</sup>

When the labour movement comes to demand extension of social insurance this is always seen in relation to incapacity to work, not in terms of breadwinner responsibilities and family size. Universal public education is an early demand, whereas public housing and housing hygiene appear somewhat later. Housing does not appear in the Erfurt Programme, for instance. It is brought to the Sixth Congress of the International in Amsterdam in 1904 by the British delegation.

### **C. Administrative Control**

Who should administer social insurance and welfare benefit schemes has been a central theme in the class conflicts around social policy and social institutions. From the French and German miners in the 1850's and 60 's through the II International to the 1928 Comintern programme for the time after the revolution, autonomous self-management has been a persistent demand of the workers' movement, with bipartite or tripartite forms as second and third best. There have been several reasons for this concern: For instance to establish and guarantee entitlement to benefits independent of the employer's discretion and punishment; to ensure a humane non-bureaucratic consideration of claims and claimants; to prevent the use of the funds involved by the employers or by the State; to train administrative cadres of the working class organization; to boost the recruitment of members.

### **D. Coverage and Organizational Form**

A wide coverage and a uniform organization of social regulations and social institutions have been part of the strivings of labour from very early on. A regional organization encompassing all the mining companies was fought for by the French and the Saxon miners mentioned above. Later this was extended to demands for international or internationally congruent regulations of work and leisure and to uniform organization of national insurance. Coverage should be wide, all wage workers and salary employers, with particular attention paid to bring in agricultural, domestic, and foreign workers into the schemes. Somewhat later, but at least already in the first decade of this century - as we have seen above in the case of SPD - demands were raised for including low-income earners in general.

These are demands, which ought to be expected from a rational working class point of view, as maximizing autonomy from particular employers and the unity of the class and its potential allies. General schemes, covering the whole population, however, can be only at most a second best strategy, erosive of class unity and difficult to combine with working class forms of administration. And demands for such schemes seem not to be found in the



early and the classical periods of the labour movement, up to the Depression and the Social Democratic breakthroughs in Scandinavia and in New Zealand. As an international conception, schemes of income maintenance seem to be an effect of the national anti-Fascist war efforts, the context of the unexpectedly enthusiastic reception of the Beveridge report of 1942.<sup>37</sup> Demands for administrative control and aims for organizational recruitment may make working class organizations sometimes opt for less than full coverage. This holds particularly for the case when specific class organizations so far have been the only one in providing certain benefits. It would then be in the interest of the labour movement to restrict a public insurance for such benefits to those who are or will become members. The field where this has occurred in Europe has mainly been in unemployment insurance.<sup>38</sup>

## **E. Finance**

The very origin of the labour movement was a protest against, among other things, the existing distribution of income and life chances. When issues of public insurance and public social services were raised, the labour movement always insisted on a redistributive mode of finance, either by progressive taxation (or luxury taxation) or by employers' contributions. This redistributive principle is, of course, different from, in conflict with the insurance principle, though between the two different compromises may be struck.

Another kind of compromise may come out of the possible conflict between a redistributive non-contributory finance and a say in the administration. The latter may be difficult or impossible to get without financial contribution. Before World War I the French CGT, and the Guesdist wing of the Socialist party, waged a vehement resistance against workers' contributions to a public pensions insurance - and to the bill as a whole - which became law in 1910. The law was a failure, the CGT had expressed the sentiments of the French workers on this issue. (The critique also referred to the capitalization scheme and the high age of retirement). After the war, however, the CGT became a champion of Social insurance with principled acceptance of workers' contributions as the legitimate basis for trade union control of the administration. (And the belated health and old age insurance act of 1930 was also in practice accepted and supported by the workers).<sup>39</sup>

Part of the redistributive perspective is also an early demand for public services free of charge, of education, health care, later also a wide range of municipal services (not necessarily free of users' tariffs).<sup>40</sup>

## **2. Social Policy and the Agenda of the Swedish Labour Movement**

A year after the end of World War II, i.e., at what was then regarded as Social Democratic "harvest time", the Swedish General and Factory Workers' Union held a national conference Social policy and wage policy. The secretary of the union, Gunnar Mohlne, said in the debate: "It is probably quite right to say that the unionized workers are not as interested in the questions of Social policy as in those of wage policy." Other speakers agreed.<sup>41</sup> A perusal of the minutes of Social Democratic party congresses also indicates that till 1940 other questions clearly held a larger interest than those of social policy in the widest possible sense of the word: defence and disarmament was the major issue, and other of great concern we land reform and organizations matters.

Social policy had no natural top position on the agenda of Social Democracy, including the lists of electoral promises. Only from the mid-1920s did Social issues begin to rank very prominently on the latter. On the other hand, from very early on, the Social policy-making that there was in the SAP was in very distinguished hands. Till World War I, at least, the party's leading Social politician was "the Chieftain" himself, party leader Branting. In the second generation, one member of the compact and stable *gruppo dirigente* of the party, Gustav Möller, devoted the major part of his long and important career to Social policy.

The rise of the Swedish welfare state is a complex and multifaceted story. In this section we will try to begin disentangling it by looking at the story, also complex, of social policy in the history of the Swedish labour movement. Only a few broad strokes of the picture can be painted here. The paint comes mainly from congress minutes of the SAP (the Social Democratic Party) and of the LO (TUC), the minutes of the Part Executive till about 1950, the party theoretical journal *Tiden*, and electoral materials. Other sources have been searched out more selectively.

## 2.1. From Worker Protection to Social Insurance via Socialism and Agrarian Reform

When the Constituent Congress of Swedish Social Democracy met in 1889, workers' insurance had become a word but not a fact in Sweden. In 1884 the leftwing liberal Adolf Hedin had presented his motion in Parliament about workers' insurance, which led to a public investigation by a committee, which published its positive report in 1888.<sup>42</sup> A few motions formulated as questions - as was the custom of the time - about the immediate conditions of the workers had been tabled. The Congress adopted a general resolution on "The Question of Protective Legislation/Skyddslagstiftningsfrågan/", which seems to be a commented translation of a similar resolution, referred to above, by the Constituent Congress of the Austrian Party at Hainfel a good four months earlier. Workers' insurance was dismissed, and a set of demands of protective legislation was put forward, beginning with the 8-hour day.<sup>43</sup> The Fourth Congress, in 1897, decided upon a motion to send party leader Branting as a delegate to the conference on worker protection in Zürich. It also adopted a programme, modelled after the Erfurt Programme of the SPD. It included two points on worker protection and a clause not to be found in Germany (where Bismarckian insurance had set a new stage of social conflict):

"Obligation for Society humanely to take care of all its members in cases of illness, accident, and at the time of old age."<sup>44</sup>

The Sixth Congress, of 1905, upon a proposal from the Executive, decided to elaborate the clause of 1897 just mentioned in a noteworthy manner: "Obligation for Society through an executive people's insurance humanely to take care of all its members in the case of accident, sickness, disability unemployment, and in old age."<sup>45</sup>

This was the year after "working-class insurance" had been adopted by the Second International at its Amsterdam Congress, and also the year after the Austrian government, upon Social Democratic demand, had presented a bill of social insurance, i.e., an extension of the workers' insurances of the 1880's.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> For an overview, see K. Englund, *Arbetsförsäkringsfrågan i svensk 1884-1901*, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wicksell, 1976.

A motion from Malmö asking what could be done for abandoned mothers without means, aroused the only social policy discussion at the congress, which finally transferred the issue to the party executive and to the parliamentary fraction for consideration. The women intervening were mainly demanding a moral condemnation of the abandoning fathers, branding them like scabs.<sup>47</sup>

The programmatic vision of social security remained one of "protective legislation/skyddslagstiftning/", the rubric of the treatment of social issues at the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Congresses. The major discussion at the two last congresses, of 1908 and 1911, on the topic concerned special protection of women, with regard to nightwork or working time, which the women were against. Defeated in 1908, the principle of gender equality was explicitly expressed by the Eighth congress, over the skeptical indifference of the party and trade union leadership.<sup>48</sup> At the congresses of (the fall of) 1914 and 1917, the topic itself was virtually absent.

In his report to the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International on party activity, Branting dealt rather extensively with social legislation, emphasizing that "Sweden is still far behind". He mainly dealt with protective legislation and employers' liability for accidents. He also mentioned that the SAP had proposed, on the occasion of government the health insurance bill, that health insurance should be made compulsory.<sup>49</sup>

Social insurance was a question pushed, in this period, primarily by leftwing liberals. The first Parliament motions about unemployment insurance, in characteristic Swedish parliamentary fashion formally demanding an investigation, were tabled by the Liberal Edward Wavrinsky in 1908, 1909, and 1910, each time stopped by agrarian conservatives. On the other hand, the leader of the Metal workers' union, Ernst Blomberg, by far the most far-sighted and consistent reformist of the first generation of Swedish labour leaders, was involved in the earliest initiatives.<sup>50</sup> The Metal workers' union, Metall, had decided upon an unemployment fund in 1895.<sup>51</sup>

The LO/TUC/ leadership showed little enthusiasm for demands of unemployment policies by the state. At the 1917 LO congress the United Union, which organized various factory workers, demanded a "solution soon to the question of state support at the time of unemployment". The LO leadership /Landssekretariatet/ declared that alert unions had solved the problem by establishing their own unemployment funds. While recognizing that there might be areas where state intervention would be called for, the LO leadership recommended rejection of the motion referring to an ongoing - in fact latent and expiring - public investigation. The Congress finally adopted the motion.<sup>52</sup>

When the moderately conservative government in 1918 presented a bill of moderate public support of voluntary health insurance the Social Democrats were rather passive. The part of respected and respectful progressive opposition was played by a group of Liberals, including Wavrinsky, and headed by the progressive Gothenburg entrepreneur James Gibson, demanding a more comprehensive obligatory insurance. The responsible Minister, Count Hugo Hamilton, a socially concerned seigneur, recognized Sweden's social lag, but held that in the face of a divided friendly society opinion a more ambitious legislation was impossible.<sup>53</sup>

This picture has to be nuanced. The party journal *Tiden*, for example, contained more articles on social policy than ever before the second half of the 1940's, both covering developments

abroad - Branting on Austria in 1908, Anton Andersson on Old Age Insurance and on the Minority Report on Poor Law Reform in 1909, Fritjof Palme on "People's Insurance in France" in 1910 - and domestic issues and investigations. In the Old Age Insurance Committee, appointed in December 1907, and whose 1912 report formed the basis of the 1913 Pensions Act, Branting took an active part. In Parliament he was vice-Chairman, under Hamilton of the Special Committee handling the bill in 1913.<sup>54</sup> The party also tabled a motion to the 1913 Parliament, demanding certain specified adjustments of the government pensions bill, some of which were accepted, and also demanding an investigation into employers' obligation to contribute to the pensioning of their workers (not accepted).<sup>55</sup>

The new programme of SAP adopted at the 1920 Congress, reaffirmed the classical socialist working class perspective. - It is often forgotten that the Bolshevik split off did not mean that the main heirs of the Second International became non-Socialist Social Democrats in the post-World War II sense. - Socialism was the main solution to poverty, in the meantime protective legislation should be fought for. Thirdly, since it was on the public agenda anyway, social insurance should be bettered and extended.

Point IX of the new SAP programme dealt with social insurance, under utter brevity: "Accident insurance. Health insurance. Maternity insurance. Unemployment insurance. Pensioning of old people and invalids as well as child and widow pensioning." A modest proposal of putting "obligatory" in front of each was summarily dismissed by Per Albin Hansson as "unnecessary", and duly dismissed by the congress without debate.

Point X dealt with worker protection, thirteen detailed demands. Two led to brief debate and to roll-calls. Arvid Thorberg from LO demanded that the legal 8-hour day should be called "maximum day", but the proposal of the programme commission of "normal day", referring to the situation of non-industrial workers (for whom even a provisional 8-hour day was still beyond reach) carried the day. Another vote was taken about the Programme Commission's proposal "Freedom to emigrate and to immigrate", which the party executive wanted to delete. Again, the commission won the day.<sup>56</sup>

The question of poverty was dealt with by Gustav Möller - the future architect of Swedish social policy - in a speech to points VIII, XII, XIV and XVI of the programme, dealing with foreign trade, socialization, cooperation, and taxation. Möller stressed that "an effect of the abolition of exploitation must be the abolition of poverty. Care has to be taken not to abolish exploitation in such a way that poverty gets bigger than it is now. ... Investigations have shown that the workers with the best conditions have reached as big a part of the result of common production as an equal distribution of the fruits of production would yield. Thence it follows that something else and more is required than the abolition of capitalism for the abolition of poverty... What has to be done, above all, is to do away with the enormous waste of the productive forces, which takes place in capitalist society." This is part of an explicit anti-Bolshevik polemic, but the important point in the context here, particularly in view of Möller's later location in Swedish history, is the concrete socialist perspective. Right after the previous quotation Möller continued: "It has turned out that the enormous boom, which the world war brought to our country, has not brought any rise of the working class standard of living, which, on the contrary, is somewhat lower than before the war. Everything speaks to the necessity to begin now the work of socializing production and abolishing capitalism."<sup>57</sup> This speech is also a part of the history of Swedish socialpolitik.

When did it all change? Answer, 1925-26. That is a date little observed by conventional historians, the period of the third Social Democratic minority government, little known for any historical achievements. A clear amount of time has lapsed both since the first Liberal-Social Democratic coalition, of 1917, and the "democratic breakthrough", of the late fall of 1918 - when the imperial thrones were crumbling in Berlin and Vienna. A clear amount of time remains before the parliamentary breakthrough of Swedish Social Democracy in 1932-33, and the replacement of socialist programming with the Realpolitik of crisis management.

"The big obstacle to this reform work /of ours/, overshadowing everything, has been militarism", Branting exclaimed in his inaugural speech to the SAP Congress of 1924. Second to the reduction of military expenditure was the "so immensely important agrarian question, where Social Democracy holds the flag for the poor proletariat, who people our crofters' and land labourers' cottages."<sup>58</sup>

Branting pointed to the top priority item of the labour movement agenda after the achievement of parliamentary democracy disarmament - decided upon in 1925, by Liberals and Social Democrats. But his mentioning of the agrarian question should also be taken seriously, Sweden was still a preponderantly and agrarian country. Urbanization is invoked as one of the explanatory processes of the rise of the welfare state mainly functionalist, non-historical arguments. But its importance also be tapped by historical investigation.

We may learn of the central significance of agrarian reform not only from the intellectual leader of SAP, but also, and more tellingly, from the Swedish trade unions of the first half of the 1920's. "The /1922 trade union/ congress exhorts the unemployed to seek their outcome to the largest possible extent in agriculture, and requests that the government and the proper authorities and particular associations forcefully to support the striving of the unemployed to acquire agrarian property /jordbrukslägenheter/".<sup>59</sup> A similar, albeit slightly less starry-eyed resolution was passed by the LO Congress of 1926.<sup>60</sup>

Socialism and agrarian reform were thus alternatives to social policy in today's sense of the word. And the financial possibilities had to be created by the reduction of the classical expenditure of the state, i.e., for purposes of war.

As party secretary, Möller was in charge of the SAP elect campaigns. For the 1924 election he had written a brochure called 'What we want', emphasizing peace and disarmament, and secondly reduced tariffs. Other things Social Democrats wanted in 1924 were unemployment insurance, the preservation of the 8-hour day, protection of agrarian tenants, access to farms by crofters and landless labourers etc.<sup>61</sup>

As Minister for Social Affairs 1924-26, Möller tried to break with the policy of budget cuts and to open room for social expansion. "If we could achieve an ease in public finance through the proposal of disarmament, then it is possible that we could, together with a reasonable mitigation of taxation, get room for an embetterment of the pensions insurance and to take up the questions of health insurance and unemployment insurance...<sup>62</sup> Möller introduced a set of government bills (1926:113-17) dealing with health insurance, to no avail. A bill of unemployment insurance never materialized,

because the government fell on the issue of principle, whether the Unemployment Commission should have the right or not to direct unemployed workers to workplaces in partial conflict.<sup>63</sup>

Möller's 1926 election brochure centers on social insurance, and it carries the telling title Unemployment Insurance and Other Social Insurance /Arbetslöshetsförsäkringen jämte andra sociala försäkringar/. There a set of demands are put forward, which constitutes a novel departure of Social Democratic thought in Sweden.

"To this aim /of giving protection to honest citizens and of providing security on the occasion of unprovoked adversities of all kinds/ the Social Democrats demand:

- a reformed health insurance
- a reformed accident insurance
- a reformed pensions insurance
- the introduction of maternity benefits and maternity insurance,
- the introduction of support to or insurance of widows with minor children,
- the introduction of insurance against occupational diseases,
- the introduction of unemployment insurance.

Only when these demands have been carried through will Sweden be able to claim to be a civilized country."<sup>64</sup>

A similar view was expressed by Möller in one of his two election pamphlets in 1928. "From a Social Democratic point of view, no task can be more urgent, after the conquest of universal suffrage and the introduction of the 8-hour day, than the creation of a social insurance system, which gives a real feeling of security and safety to the citizens of the land."<sup>65</sup>

As it turned out, however, Swedish citizens at that time were more aroused by other feelings. The 1928 elections were a clear setback for SAP - although its absolute vote rose with a higher turnout - and the main victor was the Right, after an anti-socialist campaign of a vehemence thitherto unknown in Sweden.<sup>66</sup> And the social policy perspective as well as agenda of the Swedish labour movement was to change again too

## 2.2. Beyond Social Insurance - But Short of Socializing Consumption

### *The 'People's Home' and 'the Population Question'*

The oncoming Depression changed the orientation of Möller's electoral pamphlets. For the elections of 1930 he wrote Swedish Unemployment Policy - Social Democratic and Bourgeois, and for the 1932 election the topic was, The Crisis of Capitalism. indicated by Möller's subsequent publications, for the elections of 1934 and 1936, The Whole People at Work, and Better Pensions, respectively.

In the perspective of Swedish Social Democracy, (un)employment policy was a central part of social policy, and its organization sorted under the ministry of Social Affairs, headed by Möller after the victorious Social Democratic election of September 1932. In this context, however, we will have to leave out a treatment of the Social Democratic crisis policy.<sup>67</sup> One thing is noteworthy, though, neither SAP nor LO launched the idea of an expansion of social expenditure with a view to boosting purchasing power in the crisis.<sup>68</sup> Unemployment insurance was given priority - second to a public works programme - against the objections of Finance Minister Wigforss, who regarded the former as irrelevant to the current crisis. LO Chairman Forslund, conceded that, but urged nevertheless at the meeting of the Party Executive after the 1932 elections that unemployment insurance be given top priority.<sup>69</sup>

For our purposes here, it is significant to take notice of a radical change in the Social Democratic conception of social policy in the course of the 1930's. Let us first register how differently Möller looked at it by the time of the Party Congress of 1940, as compared to his views at the end of the twenties, mentioned above.

"If I now should give a picture of today's situation, perhaps I ought to, first of all, to remind you, that 'social policy' is a common designation of a series of utterly varying interventions and legislative measures. ... I think one can divide our social policy into ten different branches ... First, we have general workers protection. Further the various work time regulations. Number three is a bunch of social insurances. Number four maternity support and child care. Number five social housing construction, and number six invalidity support, which, true, is linked into social insurance but which by its nature is separate from it. Further there are various possibilities for education, scholarships, interest-free study loans, unemployment schools, vocational schools etc. Then there come measures for a more general bettering of the possibilities of support for those who have a hard time in society ...

Finally we have unemployment policy, and a group which will have to be called diverse and which consists of single laws and measures which do not fit in under the other titles."<sup>70</sup>

Are-emphasis on worker protection and worktime regulation together with a relative demoting of the "bunch /knippe/ of social insurances", is perhaps most striking in a comparison with Möller's perspective on the late 1920's. But some of the other items on the list indicate, albeit somewhat discretely, a new departure in the 1930's. We shall approach it via a détour of imagery and philology.

The term "welfare state" has never put on much political or cultural weight in Sweden. It has more to do with conceptual world of social scientists and historians, popular rights or political polemics. This is apparently in contrast to Britain or, say, the Netherlands, where the welfare state or the "verzorgingsstaat" is common currency in public debate. That is remarkable, primarily in view admittedly somewhat esoteric, interests of political in which my distinguished colleague Arnold Heidenheimer is blazing the trail. The welfare state became a catchword during the anti-Hitler war, coined by the Anglican Archbishop Temple in 1941 and given post hoc incarnation by the Beveridge plan a year later. Before that, the term had occasionally been used in Germany abusively.<sup>71</sup>

Gustav Möller has a good claim to an early location in the genealogical chain. In above, Möller titled the section where he introduced his and the party's idea of a comprehensive system of state would not be only a nightwatchman's state but also a welfare state".<sup>72</sup>

But the term did not stick. The Social Democrats' own designation of their achievements in the 1930's was " policy /välfärdspolitik/".<sup>73</sup> In the Swedish of the period, it had a connotation of a "policy for the common good". In retrospect, the policy and the Social Democratic ideology are generally known as folkhemspolitik and folkhemsidéologi, the policy and the ideology of the "People's Home". To readers with any knowledge of Sweden of the 1930's, no footnoting would be necessary to sustain that assertion. Its origin is clear. In the Social Democratic sense of it, the word goes back a speech by SAP leader Hansson in 1928.<sup>74</sup> Neither Hansson himself, nor the party used the word "folkhem" very often in the 1930's, and a grounded guess is that only from the early war years Hansson, as Prime Minister of a country threatened by invasion and occupation, became the father of the country.<sup>75</sup> - It is only in non-Swedish that a writer with the slightest concern for a living language can talk of Hansson as 'Hansson'. In Swedish, even a writer who, like the present one, can claim no particular affinity with the late and great leader of Swedish Social Democracy, would either, occasionally use his full name, or more generally, use only his first name, Per Albin. No other Swedish politician neither before nor after, has reached such a rapport with the people, that the use of his surname only would express a particular *Verfremdung*, ceremoniousness, or hostility.

By 1936, at least, the "People's Home" had nevertheless acquired a certain standing. Thus, for instance, Sweden's leading literary critic, Fredrik Böök, a maverick, pro-German Conservative, opens his traveller's book through Sweden in 1936 by a reference to "the Swedish People's Home, which his former Excellency /this was during a brief summer government by the Farmers' League/ Hansson, Per Albin, loves to speak about".<sup>76</sup>

The People's Home had an explicit connotation of 'family' - rather than 'house' -, of family community and equality with "no favourites or stepchildren". It connoted common concern and caring for each other and had its focus on society rather than on the State and particular institutions. It is noteworthy, and testifies to the tactical skill and success of the SAP, that the notion turned out quite compatible with a reaffirmation of classical working class demands in the fields of social policy. Paradoxically, the notion's relationship to the most innovative Social Democratic policy of the 1930's was more problematic, in spite of an apparent parallelism.

Much more radical and considerably more original than the economic crisis policy and the economic theory of the so-called Stockholm School was a proposal of social reform put forward in 1934 by Alva och Gunnar Myrdal, *Crisis in the Population Question*. By a remarkable, and politically successful, tour de force, the Myrdals turned the question of population decline into a basis of radical social reform - instead of the soil for a nationalist and familiaristic breeding policy as in Nazi Germany or in France. In one sense the most striking achievement of the Myrdals was that this question was turned into a platform of feminist demands - for women's rights to decide over their own body, to a job even if married, to societal provisions for children etc. - what was generally a bag of arguments for pushing back women into a category of breeders and



feeders. But here we will have to pass by most of what happened and to return to the Social Democratic vision of social policy.<sup>77</sup>

The radicalism of the Myrdals argued along the lines of the materially precarious existence of poor families and the discriminated position of women. But it drew its pathos from a technocratic rationalism, akin to Functionalist architecture the Soviet Five-Year Plan.<sup>78</sup> In the perspective of the Myrdals, social policy became a route and a means to social transformation. "The most important task of social policy, its immediate aim /syftemål/ is to organize and guide /styra/ national consumption along other lines than those which the so-called free consumption choice within the - technically often too small - household consumption units otherwise follow under the pressure of suggestion and of mass advertising... In the future it will not appear socially indifferent what people do with their money: what standard of housing they keep, what food and clothing they buy, and, above all, to what extent children's consumption will be satisfied. The tendency will anyway run towards a social policy organization and control, not only of the distribution of income in society, but also of the orientation of consumption within the families. And it is only by strengthening that trend and by guiding it in a certain direction, that also the orientations determining the fertility rates towards family making and breeding, which determine fertility rates, can be changed".<sup>79</sup>

The Social Democratic Old Guard kept a certain distance to the ideas of the Myrdals. In spite of its general popularity, the "population question" seems never to have been clearly linked to the "People's Home" notion, and Möller took a basically opportunistic interest in the former. At the 1936 SAP Congress, and in response to a lone neo-Malthusian motion, Möller said: "I must say that I don't hesitate for a moment to frighten as many Conservatives and as many Farmers' Leaguers and Liberals as possible /helst/ with the threat that our people otherwise would die out, if I by that threat could make them vote for the social proposals, which I put forward.

That is my simple view of the population question, and that is enough for me.<sup>80</sup> In the brochure about social legislation in Sweden during the Social Democratic reign, put out by the Party Executive in 1938, no special rubric is given to "population policy".<sup>81</sup>

However, this did not mean that the new perspective of guiding and socializing consumption had no resonance within Social Democracy. The Social Democratic youth organization, SSU, was more receptive than the party to the "population question". For the 1936 election SSU put out two pamphlets, one of which by G. Myrdal on 'What is the Conflict in the Population Question about', and the 1937 SSU programme inserted a paragraph on Sex and family clearly inspired by the Myrdals.<sup>82</sup>

More important, the new perspective tied in with some central strands of Social Democratic policy in the 1930's, most notably housing policy. Here the vision of the Myrdals met and got nourished by, both an employment programme and a workers' movement's classical concern with the living conditions of the working class, in this case particularly those of the agricultural workers.<sup>83</sup>

A partly new orientation is also visible in the two leading social politicians of the SAP after Möller, the nestor Bernhard Eriksson, a first rank public committee investigator of social

policy for three decades, from the 1920's to the 1940's, and Tage Erlander, during the war Deputy Minister for Social Affairs, and post-war party leader and Prime Minister.

What is new may be operationalized as an interest in benefits in kind, but as a general consumption policy, not as a doling out of food stamps or second-hand clothes to the poor. Bernhard Eriksson, in a 1944 overview of social reforms, added to compulsory social insurance a combination of benefits in cash and in kind for children, with an explicit priority to the latter, geared to housing, food, and clothes subsidies etc.<sup>84</sup>

Erlander, head of the 1941 Population Investigation, said for his part in 1944: "Still the main task of social policy is to make secure the livelihood /försörjning/ of the citizens. Several years ahead the point of gravity will have to lay on employment policy, social insurance and social care. To the extent that resources allow, however, increased attention ought to be devoted to the possibilities of structural transformation /omdaning/, which offer themselves if social policy purposefully engages itself in building up institutions of different kinds with the task of providing the citizens with utilities free of charge or to strongly reduced prices." "The main field of activity for measures of the kind hinted at is ... housing policy."<sup>85</sup>

An interesting, though perhaps only partially representative, expression of this line is Alva Myrdal's 1944 critique of the social policy of the ILO, which Myrdal had followed very closely.

It is also interesting, because the interwar ILO was not just an inter-governmental effect of faded Wilsonian idealism. The ILO at that time was regarded as, more than anything else, a Social Democratic achievement. Its director for 1919-1932 was the distinguished French Social Democrat Albert Thomas, and the Brussels Congress of the Social Democratic Trade Union International declared that the work of the ILO was of "great importance".<sup>86</sup> Consciously or not, Myrdal attacked the orientations of Continental Social Democracy. Myrdal argued along two main lines. First, against the ILO concentration on workers' insurance, instead of general social insurance; secondly, and more broadly, against the whole idea of centering social policy on social insurance: "The whole thought of social policy as a productive social policy - a common investment by the nation in its future welfare - with its accentuation /betonande/ of family policy and of preventive measures, has been completely neglected by the international discussion under the egid of ILO."<sup>87</sup>

Swedish Social Democracy was not going to surrender completely its vision of guiding consumption - and the existing norms of the internal equipment and layout of Swedish housing bear witness to that - but by the end of World War II it was clear that the "cash line" had won the day. In *Tiden* no. 2 1946 Möller presented "The Planned Social Reforms", emphasizing four pillars of a "reformed Social legislation":

1. People's Pensions
2. Obligatory Health Insurance
3. Children's Allowances
4. The extended /utbyggda public housing policy."<sup>88</sup>

The crucial issue here, symbolizing victory or, not defeat but, accommodation, was children's allowances. The fact that Möller presented them as one of the pillars of postwar Social policy meant that the radical Social Democrats had lost. The idea of a children's allowance in cash - which represented a major departure from the Myrdal conception of guiding consumption - had originally been launched, toward the end of 1942, by the Farmers' League intellectual Professor Wahlund, who rapidly got the support of the Conservative party leader and social politician Gösta Bagge. Erlander was rather negative.<sup>89</sup> Postwar Swedish Social Democracy basically accommodated to the "free consumer's choice".

However, a lasting and important result of the socialized consumption conception of social policy was the postwar ideology and policy that the State had an overriding responsibility for standard of the provision of housing and for an at limited costs to the tenants.<sup>90</sup>

### 2.3. From Subsistence Minimum to Income Maintenance

In this essay the treatment of post-World War II developments will be more summary than earlier history. Nevertheless, while going little into details, the claim is made - and then accepted as a valid criterion of criticism - that what is pictured below captures the main trend and its turns.

Another matter of principle was decided in the social reforms after the war, the question of flatrate minimum standard benefits or differentiated income maintenance. In contrast to the cash or kind issue in population policy - where a fundamental settlement was made, formally in the form of a compromise<sup>91</sup> but, given the background of the controversy, meaning above all a stop for further grandiose plans of consumption patterns - only a temporary, pyrrhic victory was gained by the flatrate subsistence principle.

The battlefield in this case was health insurance. Health insurance in Sweden was handled by friendly societies, which received public subsidies. The benefits paid out were differentiated after income, more directly according to premia paid in. In 1944, Socialvårdskommitten, the Public Committee investigating and planning most of the postwar Social reforms, presented a proposal for compulsory health insurance, covering the whole population, and providing income-graded benefits.<sup>92</sup>

Möller went against it, and carried with him, first the SAP Parliamentary Group, and then with the latter Parliament itself. Instead a uniform benefit was adopted, which then could be, and was explicitly expected to be, supplemented by voluntary insurance.<sup>93</sup>

Möller invoked several reasons, pragmatic as well as principled ones. He found the committee proposal too administratively complicated, and therefore also implying expensive overhead costs.<sup>94</sup> But also: "I find it of principle most correct that - when the State with its coercive power /tvångsmakt/ and at great cost introduces a general health insurance - it shall only see to it that everybody is guaranteed

a certain minimum standard on the occasion of illness, but that it should be left to the individual to take care about what more is needed."<sup>95</sup> As Möller pointed out in an article in *Tiden* somewhat later, the increased pensions reform and the health insurance were both based on "the principle of subsistence minimum".<sup>96</sup>

This was, of course, in line with the Beveridge plan and British Labour Party policy, with which Möller made detailed comparisons.<sup>97</sup> But what causal role, if any, the Beveridge plan had in Sweden is difficult to say.

For financial and other reasons, the putting into effect of the health insurance act was postponed. In the new round of plans and preparations, in 1952-53, the subsistence principle was dropped in favour of the notion of income maintenance. The Parliamentary debate of 1946 had demonstrated little enthusiasm for the flatrate subsistence, the friendly societies, for instance, were critical, as were conservative and liberal social politicians. But what decided the issue was that, with a committee proposal for reforming the occupational accident insurance coming up, the idea concretized of linking the health and occupational accident insurances, and the latter was already based on income maintenance principles. Möller's successor as Minister for Social Affairs, Gunnar Sträng, seized upon the idea. In 1952 a committee headed by Deputy Minister Eckerberg proposed the abandonment of the subsistence principle, a new government bill was adopted by Parliament in 1953, to take effect from January 1st 1955.<sup>98</sup>

It is interesting, in the light of the following, to notice that this first breakthrough of the income maintenance principle had a connection to working class experiences - through the link to occupational accidents and diseases in the insurance scheme, and because the Minister of Social Affairs, former leader of the Farm Workers' Union, was at the time the most direct personal bond between the government and the unions.

The full-scale breakthrough came in 1957-58 with the adoption of the superannuation scheme, ATP. About that there is already an extensive literature.<sup>99</sup> Here, only two points need to be underlined. First, that the income maintenance principle field of pensions was a working class and trade union demand, in particular from the better paid Metal workers. Secondly, that the demand was explicitly part of a drive for equality, i.e. for equality between manual workers and white collar employees - who had supplementary pensions by collective agreements. The fight for a superannuation scheme was a struggle for advancing the positions of the working class.<sup>100</sup>

#### 2.4. Beyond Income Maintenance - the Level of Living and the Resurgence of Worker Protection

On February 6th 1958 Tage Erlander wrote in his diary: "There are strong reasons to consider the great reform period as concluded if we get the pension settled /i hamn/. Then there is needed a renewal, which I am not capable of. We will have to tackle the structural change of the economy, which the welfare /väståndssamhället/ requires. I remain the prisoner of the reformist ways of thought of an old age. The Möller epoch is over. Then his disciple Erlander should also disappear from the political arena."<sup>101</sup> And what could Social policy and the welfare state possibly be more than extensive income maintenance programmes, particularly since a transition to socialism was never a concrete perspective for Swedish Social Democrats.<sup>102</sup> Hugh Heclo tellingly subtitled his excellent comparative study of Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, referred to above, "From Poor Relief to Income Maintenance". But he also pointed out that no "final answers" had been found, and he ended his book, published in 1974, with an epilogue: "The Rediscovery of Inequality".

The inequality and the often very low level of incomes amidst booming welfare capitalism became an issue in Sweden in the late 1960's. In 1965 the government, upon parliamentary initiative, appointed a Low Income Investigation Committee /låginkomstutredningen. The SAP Congress of 1968 set up a Study Group on Questions of Equality, jointly with LO and headed by Alva Myrdal. "Increased Equality" became a major party slogan. In the 1970 elections it was put on every electoral poster by the SAP.

The equality programme of the Myrdal group was little specific in its proposals, but extensive and radical in range and coverage. Social policy had a rather modest place in the document. Most space was devoted to education, secondly to economic and workplace democracy.<sup>103</sup> But the general egalitarian thrust petered out fairly soon, and Social Democracy came on the defensive, with new issues entering the forefront, such as environment, nuclear energy, decentralization.<sup>104</sup>

A remarkable offspring of the Low Income Committee was a set of "level of living" studies, pushed by the sociologist Sten Johansson and associates. Though the level of living concept is a product of academic sociology wedded to Social Democratic reformism, it is important also in this context, looking at the labour movement and the welfare state. Because the concept has become an important frame of reference, within which the Swedish trade unions view distributive patterns and problems.<sup>105</sup>

The level of living refers to "the individual's disposal of resources with which he/she can pursue his or her own life." "Welfare" denotes the individuals' level of living "in the areas which citizens try to affect through common decisions and through commitments in institutional forms, i.e., through politics.

Welfare, then, is the individual's disposal of resources in terms of

1. Health and access to care
2. Employment and working conditions
3. Economic resources and consumer's protection
4. Knowledge and possibilities for education
5. Family and social relations
6. Housing and neighborhood service
7. Recreation and culture
8. Security of life and property
9. Political resources."<sup>106</sup>

But the concerns and policies of the Swedish labour movement also took another, more specific turn around 1970 beyond the maintenance of existing incomes. In a sense it was a return to classical working class concerns, to what was then called *arbetarskydd*, worker protection, now renamed work environment.

In the recommendations of the report to the 1966 LO Congress, "The Trade Union Movement and Technical Development", there was still little concern with work environment.<sup>107</sup> But a couple of years later the strains of the unprecedented economic boom began to be noticed in the trade union movement, and a new concern with workplace democracy and work environment emerged. Metal Local 1 in Stockholm provided a kind of vanguard.<sup>108</sup> After an earlier initiative by Metall LO was building up a medical unit, which

was gathering an impressive empirical material, showing the various physical hardships and risks which the LO-members had to put up with in their work.<sup>109</sup> In December 1969, LO and SAP, as part of the preparing of the 1970 elections, presented a joint programme for "Better Work Environment", followed up by a report of the LO executive to the 1971 Congress<sup>110</sup>, and, on the government side, by official committees and a series of government bills, leading up to the Work Environment Act of 1978.<sup>111</sup>

## 2.5. Facing the Economic Crisis: ?

The proper ending of this survey has to be a question mark. The international economic crisis is beginning to bite in Sweden too, and what that will mean to social policy, the welfare state, and Social Democracy's conception of them is an open question. So far, the international debate about "crisis" and "the limits" of the welfare state has had relatively little resonance in Sweden. In the electoral campaign of 1982 SAP made four promises of welfare state defence: to restore pensions indexation; to restore status quo ante with regard to no waiting days in the health insurance; acceptance of the proposal of unemployment benefits made by the unemployment insurance funds; and, finally, restoration of the level of state support for municipal construction of daycare centers.<sup>112</sup> Those promises have been kept, with the qualification that the existing pensions indexation will be modified. And then?

## 3. Social Democracy and the Formation of the Swedish Welfare State

How much has Social Democracy contributed to the formation of the Swedish welfare State? Answering that question is either trivial, a trivial answer to a rhetorical question, or something much more difficult and complicated than is usually thought, in Sweden. The trivial answer of a modern court chronicler or of the respectful *Festschrift* contributor would be: everything (more or less).

And in one sense, at least, it would not be untrue. The period of decisive welfare state development – wherever one would locate that period in time more precisely - was presided over by Social Democratic governments, from 1932 to 1976, having a majority or an overwhelmingly dominant plurality in Parliament. The successful policy initiatives and decisions were naturally taken by those in office and power.

The matter becomes more complicated, however, as soon as we reformulate the question: Would there have been no developed welfare state in Sweden without a parliamentary dominant Social Democracy? To the true believer, to utter such a question may look like spitting in church. But, of course, only a quick glance South of the Baltic - countries amply mapped by the OECD, the ILO, and by the Social statisticians of EC - brings the necessary conclusion: Yes, there would have been an advanced welfare State even without a dominant Social Democracy, because such a state can be found in the Netherlands, in France, West Germany, Belgium.

Thus, we seem to have a sort of unity of opposites here. The question, what has been the contribution of Social Democracy to the development of an advanced welfare State in Sweden could be answered with some truth in each utterance: Everything (more or less); Nothing (at bottom). This dialectical situation should be a fascinating challenge to Marxists.

Now, a full-scale Marxist analysis would have to include a penetrating study of the development of Swedish capitalism, something which our project has not got the resources to undertake. And in this essay we will have to confine ourselves to a few observations of pertinence.

### 3.1. Social Democratic Priorities of Ability and Power

Firstly, we will look at how much effort the Swedish Social Democrats have put into social policy, what relative priority they have given to it. Here there can be no doubt that the social questions have been given top priority.

This priority could be seen as part of a cautious reformist perspective. Opening the discussion, in the Party Executive, of postwar party and government policy, Per Albin Hansson emphasized: "We must make clear to the public that we do not have such a socialization programme as the opponents are asserting. In the foreground of our work for the nearest period are the social questions. Later on we will have to occupy ourselves with the question on industrial democracy, with school questions etc."<sup>113</sup>

However, the most telling indicator of how the SAP has regarded social policy is the political rank of its leading social politicians. Here a striking pattern emerges, which had best be appreciated against an international background. The difference was noticed by the SAP journal *Tiden*, on the occasion of Aneurin Bevan's resignation from the Labour Government, in protest against Finance Minister Gaitskell's inroads into free health care. (The conflict had some similarities with one which in Sweden put Möller against Finance Minister Sköld and a part of the SAP parliamentary fraction.) Bevan had then also come out against the fact that the postwar Labour Governments included no Minister of Social Affairs among those of Cabinet rank.<sup>114</sup>

In other countries the Minister for Social Affairs is often recruited from within or around the trade union movement. Such is the tradition of the Dutch and the German confessional parties, for example, and of Postwar Austria.<sup>115</sup> This should probably be interpreted as a concession to certain important sectional interests, particularly in the case of the confessional parties, in which other interests tend to have a well-established upper hand.<sup>116</sup>

In Swedish Social Democracy Gustav Möller established a different pattern.<sup>117</sup> He was party secretary, i.e., head of the party's organizational apparatus - a position he kept for long even as a Minister - and one of the three or four top leaders of the party. He was first succeeded, in 1951, by a former trade unionist, Gunnar Sträng, by then already six years a Minister, however. Sträng was followed by a parliamentary politician of the inner circles of the party leadership, John Ericsson, soon replaced by two former party secretaries in a row, Torsten Nilsson and Sven Aspling. After the 1982 election the then party secretary Sten Andersson entered the government and chose to become, Minister for Social Affairs.

When SAP had to choose its leader and Prime Minister in 1946, after the death of Per Albin Hansson, the two main candidates were Möller and his former deputy Minister, Erlander, recently made Minister of Education. The choice of Erlander was highly significant, as he was then primarily noticed as an investigator and administrator of social policy, little known outside the party leadership - Palme made his political career as Erlander's personal secretary and trouble-shooter in a number of fields. But in preparation

for higher office he was given as Ministerial responsibility another sector of the welfare state, education. However one would like to assess the achievements, it is clear that SAP has contributed to the Swedish welfare state to the best of its ability.

### 3.2. Slow Growth - The State Constraints of Effort

In quantitative terms, the achievement of the SAP effort is quite modest, when looked at in an international mirror. It is only in the 1970's that Sweden, together with the Netherlands, has come to occupy front rank in the commitment of the nation's economic resources to social security.

Table 1. Social Security Expenditure As Per Cent of GDP

	1965	1970	1973
Austria	17,8	18,8	18,0
Belgium	16,1	18,1	20,0
Denmark	12,2	16,6	20,9
Finland	10,6	13,1	15,0
France	15,8	15,3	20,8
Germany	16,6	17,0	18,9
Italy	14,8	16,3	19,0
Netherlands	15,7	20,0	22,8
Norway	10,9	15,5	18,0
Sweden	13,6	18,8	21,5
Switzerland	8,1	10,1	12,5
United Kingdom	11,7	13,8	14,6

Source: P. Flora et al., *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1915-1975*, Frankfurt, Campus, 1983 p. 456.

Only by the latter half of the 1960's did the Swedish state, simultaneously with the Dutch one, become a welfare state in the sense of devoting more than half of all public expenditure to welfare state activities and concerns, i.e., social insurance, social care, social assistance, and education.<sup>118</sup>

Broad international comparisons of this sort have a sensitizing task in view of national conceit – or self-flagellation. But their generality also render them rather abstract. We should, then add some flesh to the table above.

When Möller in 1947 presented his overview of the postwar social reforms decided upon, he made some detailed comparisons with Britain. Both in the case of pensions - because of the Swedish regionally varying cost-of-living supplements, once originally imported from Denmark - and of health insurance, Möller proudly announced that Swedish benefits were higher.<sup>119</sup> The nag was, however, that the Swedish health insurance, although the bill was passed in 1946, was to take effect only in 1950. In 1948 a further postponement till 1951 was decided by Parliament, and on April 20 1950 Prime Minister Erlander announced in the Second Chamber that the financial situation required that the health insurance - including the abolition of the, rather low, in-patient fees at public hospitals - had to be put off again, for an indefinite time. At the time of the final passing of the Health Insurance Act, in May 1953 - with a view to taking effect from 1955 - Social Minister Sträng uttered: "By international comparison we have stood rather badly", referring to Belgian, British and



French postwar health insurance reforms, as well as to several prewar schemes of public health insurance, from the era of Bismarck and on.<sup>120</sup>

The 1953 Health Insurance Act entailed a deterioration in the occupational insurance, now partly included into the new health insurance, by the introduction of three waiting days. For this and some other reasons the reform was far from a popular success, as its technical architect, Deputy Social Minister Per Eckerberg, bitterly complained.<sup>121</sup>

Another example. The superannuation scheme, ATP, adopted in 1959 is generally regarded as the great pride of postwar Swedish Social Democracy in the field of social policy. This is the time British Labour was clearly outdistanced, still kept in opposition by the Tories. In Swedish postwar politics ATP came to constitute a political watershed, drastically reducing the main opposition party, the liberal People's Party and giving a new vigour and self-confidence to Social Democracy. The bill was passed, with the decisive help of one defecting Liberal MP, after one referendum and one extraordinary Second Chamber election.

The outcome was, no doubt, a major reform, which gave manual workers a legal right to a superannuation equal to that which white collar employees had gained by collective bargaining. In international terms, however, the benefits granted by ATP were hardly outstandingly unique. Together with the universal basic pension the Swedish ATP system was to give from the age of 67 about 60-80% of the previous income of the fifteen best years - up to a certain income limit. Two years earlier, in 1957, West Germany, upon Christian Democratic initiative - with a very active part played by Adenauer himself - adopted a new pensions system, which would provide workers and employees (with a full work career) from the age of 65 about 60-80% of the current income of all insured (i.e. economically active).<sup>122</sup>

It seems undeniable that, for all its prioritisation and for all its efforts, Swedish Social Democracy has not any particularly striking record in its welfare state performance. But why? To my knowledge, that question has hardly been seriously tackled so far. Dedicated Social Democratic scholars tend to avoid it, proposing instead another topic, such as structural forms<sup>123</sup> - an important issue, to which we will turn below.

The Social Democratic social policy efforts were fighting against what they themselves regarded as strict financial constraints. This was also hammered in by the bourgeois Opposition.<sup>124</sup> The latter is hardly a far-reaching explanation, however. Why should Swedish bourgeois parties be more adamant against increased taxes than their comrades in other countries?

The basic reason seems to be the following. In public commitments to social security we can distinguish two main roads. One is the legal institution of compulsory social insurance, pioneered by Wilhelmine Germany, an institution kept separate from the State proper - the territorial government or the *Gebietskörperschaften* - with its own finance and its own administration. The other road, first explored on a large scale

by Denmark (but combined with social insurances), involves that the state apparatus proper - central and local - undertakes to finance, organize and administer social benefits and social care. In their developed forms, the former might be called a welfare polity, the latter a welfare state.<sup>125</sup> The leading countries in 1965 are all of the welfare polity

type, Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Sweden was clearly in the second category. The main Swedish institution of social policy before the post-World War II reforms, the "people's pension" system was administered by the state was never financed by contributions to more than half, from 1927 only to a quarter. The rest came from taxes and interest on funds.<sup>126</sup>

Sweden before World War II was a laggard in social security commitments. At the 1932 SAP Congress, the party's second social policy specialist, Bernhard Eriksson, with a mixture of awe and admiration, pointed to the high social security contributions taken out in other countries. Whereas a Swedish worker paid 0.5 to 0.8 % of his income to pensions insurance (the only one he had to contribute to), a labourer in Copenhagen would pay 7 %, a French worker 4 %, and a German one 8.5 % to social insurances.<sup>127</sup> To that came employers' contributions of about the same per cent of the wage bill.

Since Sweden had been neutral in World War I, her state had neither experienced the growth by war mobilization, which, for instance Britain had. Between 1913 and 1918 Swedish general public expenditure as a per cent of GDP, increased from 10,4 % to 14.3, in Britain from 12.7 to 48.4.<sup>128</sup>

Because of previous thrift with the public purse, the SAP reformers had much to catch up with, and because the countries welfare state road mainly based on general taxation, an expansion was more politically sensitive and met more resistance. The last thing mentioned is a hypothesis, but the way the door to expansion was opened seems to suggest that it is correct. The solution finally found was twofold, employers' insurance contributions and new indirect taxation. The original 1946 Health Insurance Act, which was later abandoned, had envisaged no employers' contributions. 79 % was to be paid for by the State out of general taxation, of which the direct income tax provided for about two thirds<sup>129</sup>, and the rest by insureds' contributions.<sup>130</sup> According to the 1953 Act, which took effect, only 26% was financed by the state, 51 by contributions from the insured, and 26 % by employers' contributions.<sup>131</sup> According to Eckerberg, who formulated the proposal, the introduction of employers' contributions was crucial for breaking out of the financial straitjacket.<sup>132</sup> In Parliament, the Conservatives were against, because of the increased public expenditure involved. But the Leader of the Opposition, Liberal party leader Ohlin, and his party supported the bill, Ohlin explicitly hailing with satisfaction the new financial construction, though he would have preferred an even greater reduction of the states's contribution.<sup>133</sup>

The ATP system was to be based on employers' contributions. This meant that constraints of public finance did not appear in the heated controversies about it. Instead, opposition centered on its character of legal obligation.<sup>134</sup> The introduction, in 1959, of a sales tax met with bourgeois opposition, but was carried with passive Communist support.<sup>135</sup>

The 1960 election was the most polarized in Swedish postwar history, in terms of the positions of the main parties. The bourgeois parties demanded, more strongly than ever, tax reduction and more room for individualism, while SAP was committed to a strong public sector, leaving the defensive posture of 1956. The Social Democrats won (modestly) and for two decades even the Conservatives refrained from proposing any concrete tax reductions.<sup>136</sup> While taxes and social contributions rose rapidly.

Post World War II Social Democracy has taken Sweden to a front rank of welfare state development by the 1970's. That remains an impressive achievement, even though it took about fifteen years for it to pick up speed. We have seen already that this rank is shared by another country, little dominated by Social Democracy, the Netherlands. But perhaps the catch-up is unique?

In quantitative terms, that is not true. In 1930 total social security expenditure in Sweden amounted to 3.4 % of GDP, in the Netherlands to 2.1 %.<sup>137</sup> The increase till the onset of the current crisis, i.e., till 1973, is 20.7 points in the Netherlands and 18.1 in Sweden.

### 3.3. Structural Conflicts and the Impact of Class

“We shall in our propaganda, of course, push forward the pensions, the housing policy, and the child allowances. About these reforms there is really no discussion. In this case we cannot, unfortunately, count with the same conflicts as we had about the reforms of the 1930's.”<sup>138</sup> Thus, SAP party secretary Sven Andersson during the internal deliberations of postwar SAP policy, in December 1945. The committees, which formed the basis of the government bills were unanimous in their proposals of social expansions, including consent from Conservative politicians and representatives of the Employers' Confederation. The rapid expansion of the 1960's and early 70 's was also consensual. On top of the improved public benefits of various kinds, the employers agreed furthermore to a series of extras in collective agreements, collective life insurance from 1963, severance pay /avgångsbidrag/ insurance from 1965, special supplementary pension from 1973, and extra occupational accident insurance from 1974.<sup>139</sup> The SAF, and the organization of small industry and handicrafts, SHIO, as well, also took a positive stance, in 1969, to the so-called Seven Crowns Reform, by which out-patient fees to private doctors would be reduced to the symbolic amount of seven crowns.<sup>140</sup> Also the work environment reforms were basically consensual, and the Work Environment Act was soon followed up by a more specified LO-SAF agreement.<sup>141</sup> It is also remarkable that the work environment offensive of the Swedish labour movement hardly predates a new concern with the same issue by the American (Democratic-controlled) Congress, which in 1970 set up the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.<sup>142</sup>

The Swedish case certainly gives some support to the idea that rich and growing societies tend to provide more and better social security to its citizens. Whether this is so in capitalist societies because it is positively functional to capital accumulation or simply because it is compatible with the latter is of little importance here. Whichever the case, the effects on the beneficiaries is the same.

In one sense, the strong Swedish Social Democracy was little more than the canal in which the high waters of post-World War II advanced capitalism was transported to the land of the Swedes. However, to continue the metaphor for a second, it is not unimportant where and how a canal is dug. In democratic countries, and even in non-democratic ones with a certain amount of legitimacy accorded to popular aspirations, there has always been a fairly broad and heterogenous attention to popular distress and misery, for a wide number of reasons. There have certainly been moments of history when pitched battles have been fought for or against taking any measure, but in the type of societies of which Sweden is a part, controversies seem more often to have centered around different assessments of urgency and around what kind of measures.

Before World War II the crucial conflicts about unemployment policy did not center around whether something or nothing should be done about the situation of the unemployed, but what? In the 1920 conflicts centered around how the Unemployment Commission should act. On the "conflict directives" two Social Democratic governments found themselves forced to resign, in 1923 and in 1926.<sup>143</sup> In the crisis policy negotiations of 1933 the Progressives /frisinnade/ finally came up with a proposal almost exactly to the same amount as the SAP, but with a different wage structure on the public works.<sup>144</sup> The unemployment insurance passed in 1934 by the SAP and the Progressive was throughout the 1930's, till its revision in 1941, received with general skepticism and often outright hostility by the unions, because of its restrictive conditions for the recognition of union unemployment funds.<sup>145</sup> Similarly, the defeats in the 1920's, of various government bills proposing extended public support of the voluntary health insurance stranded on organizational rocks.<sup>146</sup>

There is, then, something wrong, or rather biased, with the grandiose project on social insurance in Western Europe directed by Peter Flora in its focus on dates of legislation, extent of coverage, and costs.<sup>147</sup> The causes people fought for or against are largely neglected. (This remark should not be interpreted as a dismissal of an oeuvre epochal in its quantitative grandeur, to which all scholars of the field have to pay grateful attention.)

In the postwar period, the size of Social policy was hardly a controversial issue, save in the 1960 election. On the contrary, it often happened that a bourgeois party, usually the liberal People's Party, proposed higher expenditure than the Social Democratic government. In the period of 1948 to 1958 this was a constant theme with regard to pensions.<sup>148</sup> The postwar social policy conflict, about superannuation, was not primarily about superannuation and employers' payment of that - upon which there was a broad agreement.<sup>149</sup> An important part of the SAF was also positive - several major firms had workers' pensions already - though it turned out difficult to unite the employers around a positive agreement.<sup>150</sup> The controversy centered around whether it should be a legal obligation or not, and, later, how the system should be financially organized. No doubt, considerations of parliamentary power were also part of the maneuvering.

The Great Social Democratic Celebration view of the development of the Swedish welfare state has to be repudiated and relegated to where it belongs, the lush vegetations outside the open veld of scholarship.

On the latter field we should change gear. From asking reform or no reform, expanding or containing welfare commitments we should move to raise questions about, what kind of reforms and commitments We began this blitz overview with a glance at working class strivings and perspectives. Can anything thereof be detected in the current welfare State, and can we therein find anything which testifies to the particular significance of a strong labour movement?

### **A. The Principle of Workers' Rights**

The Social Democratic government, of the 1920's paid an impressive respect to working class principles of right and wrong. In 1926 the SAP government decided to go rather than allow the Unemployment Commission to send unemployed workers to the Stripa mines, where 12 syndicalist workers had gone on strike. But that was a peak of principled class

politics. In the 1930's even after having received a sufficient parliamentary base in 1936, the SAP government decided to accommodate and circumvent rather than abolish, the hated Unemployment Commission and its low wage labour camps.<sup>151</sup> This in spite of the act that the completely Social Democratically dominated LO Congress of 1936 had demanded that the activity of the Unemployed Commission should be wound up at the soonest".<sup>152</sup> In the postwar period, no overriding workers' rights were ever asserted by Social Democracy, and in the face of rank-and-file working class opposition and leftwing activity, the government in 1974 officialty sanctioned employers' legal right to fire workers who struck outside the institutionalized bargaining framework. The practice of the corporatistically organized Labour Court also changed in the same period, towards a more repressive posture against unofficial strikes. In class where they did not explicitly celebrate it, the trade union leaderships refused to voice any objections.<sup>153</sup>

It would be biased, however, to give this as the only example. (As well as to neglect it.) On the whole, postwar Social Democracy, and particularly from the late 1950's and on, have had much of its social policy shaped by the trade unions. This is a striking difference to the rather marginal and unimaginative LO position before World War II. Most original was the trade union concept of stabilization policy in a full employment economy, which started, not from the perspective of the state but from the independence of the trade unions, and which put a public labour market policy - fostering mobility and retraining - rather than a wage restraint incomes policy into focus.<sup>154</sup> - To some extent this was window-dressing, hiding the continuous, top secret informal contacts and deals between the Prime Minister and the LO leader, of which Erlander discretely gives many examples in his memoirs.<sup>155</sup> But it was more than that. It was also an expression of the fact that LO after World War II had the resources to develop policies from its own perspective, and it was also connected with the dependence of the SAP government upon LO. Erlander asked in his diary of September 22 1949 whether a government Ohlin (Liberal party leader) or Wigforss (Social Democratic Finance Minister and First Older Statesman) would succeed him, if LO refused to accept his government's stabilization policy.<sup>156</sup> At least if one is to believe Erlander himself, to take an open fight with the LO leadership was out of the question.

The above-mentioned central social policy conflict in Sweden was pushed by the LO, demanding, without delay, a superannuation for manual workers.

### **B. Priorities of Tasks: Worker Protection and the Right to Work**

The SAP built its majoritarian political base by its employment policy in the 1930's, and whatever the econometrical effects of its policy then, the latter has remained a fundamental political capital. Full employment has been a top priority of Swedish postwar Social Democracy, expressed in ambiguous labour market policies as well as in electoral programmes. Together with Norway and Switzerland, Sweden has been very successful in this respect, but only the idealist ideologue would attribute this only to government policy, without taking into account the strength of the capitalist economy. However, the centrality of labour market policy and the great powers given to the Labour Market Board - organize along the lines of Socialist cadre administration, in spite of its corporatist board,<sup>157</sup> - is an expression of a vindication of classical working class priorities. Via the tentacles of the OECD, Swedish labour market policy has also become an export article, a true tribute to the imaginativeness of postwar Swedish trade unionist Social Democracy.<sup>158</sup>

The important part played by worker protection in Social Democratic reform policy, as noticed above, both in the 1930's and the 1970's is also a follow-up of early working class demands. In the latter period this was not unique per se, as we have seen - and simultaneous West German and Austrian concerns could also be cited. However, the degree of priority, expressed in both trade union and in public resources allocated, seems to have few international rivals, Norway perhaps.<sup>159</sup>

### **C. Administrative Control: Self-Management**

Since 1962, and increasingly, the major part of Swedish social security - municipal social assistance apart - is handled by a uniform network of public bodies, försäkringskassor, with a slightly ambiguous legal status, public authorities without corporatist elements but not quite part of the state apparatus proper. These insurance funds administer health insurance, pensions, and children allowances. The local boards are appointed by the counties, and a minority by two central state agencies.<sup>160</sup> Hospital care is in the hands of county governments, since 1862.

Originally, the friendly societies organizing health insurance in Sweden had been a motley collection. The 1931 act of recognized health insurance funds made all of them territorial and non-competitive, with a few accepted exceptions. Thus, the big private concern Asea had one, the state Tobacco Monopoly another, and the printers' and the woodworkers' unions also had their own funds. There was traditionally a strong progressive liberal element in it, from the old Liberal workers' movement, and the Temperance movement. The leader of the Progressives in the 1920's and the Prime Minister of the 1931 Act, C.G. Ekman, for instance, was an important health insurance treasurer. The "movement" of health insurance, as it was called, never had a distinctive class or class-divided character. But gradually, some liberal notables apart, it seems to have been pretty much a movement run by Social Democratic trade union men.<sup>161</sup>

The late supplementary social insurances by collective agreement, mentioned above, have a bipartite administration. In two important respects, the principle of workers' self-management is maintained in the current Swedish welfare State, however. Both are clear expressions of trade union power. One is unemployment insurance which is still non-obligatory and is administered by funds of each national union.

Trade union opinion had been divided on the issue. At the LO Congress in 1922 the radical minority was against trade union unemployment funds. Unemployment insurance was a duty of the state - or of "society", as public power is often called in the Swedish labour movement. The unions had to be combat organizations. The majority, however, rallied to the demand of a legal insurance based on public contributions to the trade union funds.<sup>162</sup> A joint SAP-LO conclave in 1930 found views divided about obligatory unemployment insurance or not, how it should be organized etc. Finally, it was deemed most tactical publicly to demand obligatory unemployment insurance.<sup>163</sup> The bill of non-obligatory Ghent system, which was presented and passed in 1934, was meant as a temporary provisorium.<sup>164</sup>

A proposal of an obligatory unemployment insurance was put forward in 1948, by the classical committee on postwar social reforms, Socialvårdskommitten. The majority view held that existing trade union unemployment funds would remain, but that everybody had a right to unemployment insurance through a new social security agency. The Social Democrats, included chairman Bernhard Eriksson, wanted, in a reservation, that the

existing health insurance funds should be kept, and that they should handle unemployment insurance for people non-unionized. The representative of the Conservatives, on the other hand, wanted a wholly state administered scheme. All were for obligatory unemployment insurance.<sup>165</sup>

LO gave an ambiguous remiss comment, declaring its adherence to the principle of an obligatory unemployment insurance, but finding neither committee alternative acceptable for various reasons.<sup>166</sup> An obligatory unemployment insurance was taken from the agenda. In 1951 Deputy Social Minister Eckerberg wrote in a Festschrift to Erlander: "It is likely that we will keep our voluntary unemployment insurance for a long time."<sup>167</sup>

The second major example is constituted by the funds built up for the superannuation scheme, with the most immediate view to maintaining a high level of saving. In the final round of negotiations between the Social Democrats and the liberal People's Party, in the attempts to find a compromise in the given parliamentary situation, these funds were a central bone of contention. Liberal leader Ohlin wanted the funding to be organized by private insurance companies, so as to avoid State direction of the capital market. The SAP leadership apparently had no such intentions, but were skeptical of Ohlin's proposal for various reasons. On the other items of Ohlin's agenda for a compromise, including certain possibilities of contracting out, an agreement seemed possible. The idea of workers' superannuation was clearly accepted by the Liberals.<sup>168</sup> In the end, nothing came out of these negotiations, however.

There would then be large public funds, but who were to run them? The party leadership did not regard this a very important issue, and the original proposal was a set of tripartite boards. It was the trade union leaders, also SAP MP's, who asserted the right of the unions to have a majority of the boards administering "the wage-earners' money". After some hesitation the government finally gave in, reducing government representation.<sup>169</sup>

In the control of the work environment Swedish trade unions also have an important role, besides that of the state inspectors and of municipal health authorities. Two structural features, in particular, may be underlined. The safety steward is basically a trade union representative, not someone with a certain function in the enterprise. This means that local unions have the right - upon permission by the state inspectorate - to appoint "regional safety stewards", for a number of small enterprises and for new workplaces which have no employees yet. These regional stewards need not to be employed by any of the enterprises, in which they have the right to intervene. Secondly, safety stewards have the right to order all work to be stopped, if they consider immediate danger to bodily harm exists.<sup>170</sup> The French "Auroux Laws", passed in 1982 by the French Left government do not give such rights,<sup>171</sup> which Swedish unions got in 1974.

#### **D. Coverage and Form of Organization: Wide and Uniform**

The mean and meagre pension system adopted in Sweden in 1913 bequeathed one very important structural legacy to later generations of social reforms: It was universal in its coverage. That was a bit of an accident. Neither the committee proposal nor the government bill included universal coverage.<sup>172</sup> Nor did the SAP motion on the subject.<sup>173</sup> But what was hardly an accident, but rather an expression of the class relations in Sweden at that time, was the principle of a wide coverage. The committee and the government had suggested that persons with wealth 'above a certain level should be excluded, and the Social

Democrats with an income above 2,000 crowns a year, which then corresponded to about 150 % of the average wage of an industrial worker.<sup>174</sup>

The principle of a wide coverage of public social security commitments goes back to 1884. Then the urban left liberal Adolf Hedin tabled a motion asking for a public investigation into workers' insurance. The motion was clearly inspired by Bismarck's example. But before it was taken, the second Chamber made an addition to it, upon the proposal of six farmers of the majoritarian Yeoman Party. The addition was "/workers/ and with them comparable small farmers and artisans".<sup>175</sup> In the ensuing committee the progressive farmers' leader A.P. Danielsson followed this up.

Sweden was in many ways a poor and undeveloped country in late 19th century. But in one sense it was a much more popular state than those south of the Baltic. Sweden had a strong propertied peasantry with their own political leaders and representatives. The undeveloped character of capitalism and bourgeois politics also meant that the main line of class conflict was drawn between farmers and gentlemen /herrar/.<sup>176</sup>

Among its many detailed investigations, the Workers' Insurance Committee even made a remarkable class analysis of Sweden. Thereby it found that only 6 % (5.5) of the population could not be counted among "workers and with them comparable persons". Excluded were tradesmen, employees, officials, landowners, and businessmen.<sup>177</sup>

The Social Democratic reformers of the 1940's continued the line of wide but non-universal coverage. It was the bourgeois parties, in particular the Conservatives, who then stood for universalism. In the committee proposing a new pensions system, a universal flatrate pension was proposed by the two Conservative members, whereas the Social Democratic majority wanted a means-tested scheme. Möller was vacillating, but came finally down on the side of universalism. Prime Minister Hansson argued, in the 'SAP parliamentary group, for means-tested pensions on principled grounds, supported by Erlander and Finance Minister Wigforss, the latter for budgetary reasons. But the MPs rebelled and took the universal scheme.<sup>178</sup>

Tactical considerations, with regard to an otherwise rather awkward situation for a party, which proudly regarded itself as the reform party, probably played a good part in the rebellion. Erlander told the Party Executive in December 1945 that his committee was going to propose free meals for all school children. "Those whom it will be most difficult to persuade /about this/ are our own people. It is, as a matter of fact, not popular to drop the principle of means test."<sup>179</sup>

This may sound like the world turned upside down to Anglo-Saxon ears. But wide non-universal coverage is, as was noted above, an old working class principle. The differences to Anglo-Saxon experience follows from where the line of means test is drawn. In Sweden, and in Denmark, that line was always drawn high up, excluding only the wealthy minority. And since the systems were tax-financed, it was not unnatural for the wealthy and their representatives to say, more or less: if we are going to pay for it, we want some benefits too. The Swedish Employers' Confederation, SAF, supported the more generous universal pensions proposal in 1945-46.<sup>180</sup> And in the interwar ILO the Danish employers' representative Örsted argued for a universal pensions insurance, to deaf ears.<sup>181</sup> On the other hand, the wide coverage principle and the one of organizational uniformity precludes different schemes for workers and for the broad mass of white collar employees. That was a



controversy in 1953 between SAP and the People's Party with regard to the health insurance. The latter wanted the right to contract out for groups which had their health insurance organized by private insurance, such as bank and insurance employees. The former won the day, but the government bill also included a special subsidy for voluntary extra insurance, mainly aimed at farmers and small entrepreneurs. Obligatory universal health insurance still kept certain non-universalistic elements.<sup>182</sup>

The superannuation Act did give the possibility for collective contracting out, a tactical concession to an uncertain white collar opinion. Here other factors contributed to making Swedish social security what it looks today. After investigations and negotiations, both SAF and the white collar unions found it practically impossible to arrange a pensions system outside ATP. The SAP was lucky too. In replacement for earlier collective agreement pensions, the SAF conceded in 1960 to a generous salary increase, of 15 % on the average.<sup>183</sup> The dire warnings of the wage and salary consequences of the Social Democratic pensions proposal were manifestly proved wrong, and SAP made a lasting inroad among the middle strata.

As was mentioned earlier, since 1962 a General Insurance Act has given a uniform organization to Swedish income maintenance schemes, trade union administered unemployment insurance being the major exception. However, as we also took notice of in the context of unemployment insurance, such a uniformity was long resisted by leading social politicians of the SAP; still in 1948. One of the few Communist social policy proposals, to which leading Social Democrats ever paid any attention, was a motion of 1946 about a uniform administration of all social security. But in the end it was not accepted.<sup>184</sup>

### **E. Finance: Redistribution and Free Public Services**

The strict insurance principle of equivalence between payments in and benefits out never got firmly anchored in Swedish social security. True, the 1913 pensions system was meant to have no redistributive effects<sup>185</sup>, but soon municipal supplements could be added, without having any poor relief character and ditto effects. (That was the Danish pension system since 1891.) In 1935 the insurance part was reduced - but not completely replaced by taxation as the Social Democrats had originally demanded - and the funding was discontinued. This change was passed almost unanimously, and the system lost its official name of "pensions insurance", to become just "people's pensioning".<sup>186</sup>

However, insurance was not being phased out, neither in principle nor in practice. Bernhard Eriksson, the important Social Democratic wartime social planner - chairman of the crucial Socialvårdskommitten wrote in 1944 a glowing defence of the insurance principle, for "psychological" reasons. "In a social insurance system even the poor will feel satisfaction in having himself contributed to the costs of his future security and in having, in the way society requires it, done his self-support duty."<sup>187</sup> Above we have already taken notice of the fact that the breakthrough, in the 1950's, of large-scale income maintenance programmes was characterized by an increase of the insurance element. But also, in the case of health insurance, that the bourgeois opposition had demanded a higher rate of insurance contributions.

Even after the turn of the 1950's, Sweden has been second among Western European countries in financing social security out of general taxation, after outstanding Denmark.<sup>188</sup>

"Population policy" was a major aspect of Swedish social policy in the 1930's and 1940's. But the French and Belgian system of a family wage insurance was rejected outright, mainly for egalitarian reasons.

In a comment on family wage and children's allowance system, Erlander wrote in 1944: "one should strive for a vertical transfer of incomes in society", noting that the French and the (Nazi) German systems only equalized families with children with those without within the same "income class".<sup>189</sup> Conservative Party leader Bagge had the opposite concern, looking for a possibility of equalization within classes without transfers from one Social group to another.<sup>190</sup> The notion touched upon earlier of wide coverage plus a meals test rather high up had, of course, also a redistributive intention and effect.

As a provider of public welfare services - including public education - Sweden is outstanding among the OECD countries for which data are available. In 1980 government final consumption for welfare services amounted to 17.8 % of GDP in Sweden, as compared to 11.6 in West Germany (in 1979) and Finland 11.2, occupying second and third rank, respectively.<sup>191</sup> The reasons for that top position are many and complex, and the configuration of the explanatory factors cannot be laid out here, only some of its components. Directly, Social Democracy has contributed an idea of socially planned and provided consumption, first laid out by the Myrdals, later modified and the only spoken silently about, but nevertheless with some significance. Erlander stated in 1944: "It is ... not indifferent how the increased income /of families with children/ is used ... it may be in the interest of the families and of society to try to educate /upplysa/ and guide the families to use their income in a particular way."<sup>192</sup> He then went on to point to maternity clinics, meals for school children, daycare centers, the public production of subsidized children's clothes and shoes, etc. The two last ideas never materialized, but the others did, though it was going to take decades for Erlander's, for that time quite advanced appreciation of daycare facilities to free women from being bound to the home, to gather political force.

Probably much more came from Social Democracy only indirectly, through Social Democratic mutations of structures handed down from ancient history. Local territorial governments - as opposed to transfer funds - are of old very strong in Sweden, an effect of ancient peasant independence. It is noteworthy that the administration of the pensions system of 1913 was not given to any corporatist organ nor to any agency of the central state apparatus. Its basic unit of administration were municipal pensions committees.<sup>193</sup> Hospital care had since 1862 been put under the responsibility of elected county councils.

In a profound sense, modern Swedish Social Democracy is the legitimate heir of the old propertied Swedish peasantry: cautious, moderate, steadfast, honest, and popular. (Of course, this does not necessarily pertain to the sleek academic administrators with their party card as a letter of recommendation, but to Social Democracy as a broad 20th century social movement.)

Another legacy which could be, and was, turned to advantage was urban and professional underdevelopment. For instance, a development of "socialized medicine" had a relatively well-located baseline, if it could start from a situation of Sweden in 1940: of 3436 legitimate physicians in the whole country, 620 were public county /provinsialläkare/ or city doctors, 170 were employed by the armed forces, 979 by physical hospitals (almost all public), and 160 by mental hospitals (most of them public).<sup>194</sup> That is, at most 44 % were private practitioners only. But it is also true that Möller was lucky, after a couple of

other probings, to find a radical and colourful figure to organize a progressive health care policy, Axel Höjer, head of the Medical Board 1935-1952, and the latter did not escape vicious resistance.<sup>195</sup>

Finally, there are some special structural continuities, across profound changes - continuities of which we cannot yet say whether they are just a striking coincidence or whether there are some never-outspoken undercurrents of influence. The most important such link is between the pre-World War II Unemployment Commission and the postwar Labour Market Board. The first was the institution of the realm most hated by the working class, the latter the pride of the trade union economists. The former was, in the 20's, a bastion of deflationary gold currency orthodoxy and a center of bourgeois policy-making<sup>196</sup>, the latter the center of imaginative Social Democratic economic policy, the so-called Rehn-Meidner model, tellingly named after two leading postwar trade union economists. In spite of all differences, both have in common, a hostility to cash payments, a commitment to public works programmes, to vocational training, and to encouraging labour mobility.<sup>197</sup> The opposite class appreciations of the two authorities hinges on the difference between one geared to a pre-Keynesian low-wage economy, the other to an expensive and mobile high-wage economy.

With its camps of rural colonization, using as little cash as possible, and its stern work ethic, the Unemployment Commission was very much an epitaph of kulak social policy.

That Sweden became a welfare state is neither the merit nor the fault of Swedish Social Democracy. Even if the SAP had been defeated, in 1932, in 1948 or in 1956-60, some sort of welfare state is most likely to have emerged anyway. But the kind of welfare state Sweden became is to a large extent an outcome of Social Democratic policies. There are parts of these policies, which seem to have been shaped long ago, when the Swedish state was cast in its mould, but there are others and more, which tap their roots from other sources. Swedish Social Democracy claims to be the labour movement of the country. Without agreeing to any allocation of patent rights in this field, it seems clear that the welfare state, which the Swedes have got through the strivings of Social Democracy, corresponds to a large extent to the classical demands of the labour movement within capitalism. But that welfare state is also the legitimate heir of a propertied peasant society superficially governed by a crust of officials and landowners. Post-World War II Swedish Social Democracy has drawn upon both the labour movement and the structural heritage bequeathed to it, when the propertied farmers had to give in to other classes. International and domestic class history, both unite in the edifice, which we now see in front of us.

Class relations, state structures, and the meanderings of politics give us the picture we see. Social Democracy is not just *deus ex machina*, but nor is it a function of capital. It is a historical movement of a working class character.

To what extent its welfare policy has affected the capitalism, which the classical labour movement set out to abolish, and to what extent the same policy has in fact made people equal, secure, and happy are other stories. Perhaps we will find some or the other on another occasion.

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<sup>1</sup> Two recent collective works may be said to sum up the state of the field, by and large, circa 1980: P. Flora and A. Heidenheimer (eds.), *The Development of Welfare States of Welfare States in Europe and North America*, New Brunswick and London, Transaction Books, 1981; P. Köhler and H. Zachner (eds.), *Ein Jahrhundert Sozialversicherung*, West Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1981. The latest large-scale comparative work is that by J. Alber, *Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat*, Frankfurt, Campus, 1982.

<sup>2</sup> A notable exception to the one-sided perspective is the study of French social security up to the World War II by H. Hatzfeld, *Du pauperisme a la securite sociale*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1971.

<sup>3</sup> Such is the best Marxist or Marxist contribution so far, e.g. G. Lehnhardt and C. Offe, "Staat und Sozialpolitik", *Kölner Zeitschrift f. Soziologie u. Sozialpolitik Sonderheft Welfare State*, London, Macmillan, 1979; W. Korpi, *Social Policy and Distributional Conflict in the Capitalist Democracies*, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for Social Research, 1980; S. Marklund, *Klass, stat och socialpolitik*, Lund, Arkiv, 1982; G. Esping-Andersen and W. Korpi, *From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States: The Development of Scandinavian Social Policy*; paper so far unpublished presented at the ECPR Joint Workshops in Freiburg, March 20-25 1983. From the point of view of class analysis, the work by Marklund is the most penetrating. G. Esping-Andersen's *Social Class, Social Democracy and State Policy*, Copenhagen, *Nyt fra Samfundsvidekaberne*, 1980, is a perceptive work of contemporary history, but with a focus on Social Democratic government policy.

<sup>4</sup> W. Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*, Cambridge, University Press, 1980; E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English working Class*, New York, Vintage, 1966, quotation from p. 775.

<sup>5</sup> E.H. Hunt, *British Labour History 1815-1914*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981, pp. 193 and 206.

<sup>6</sup> Hatzfeld op.cit. p. 199.

<sup>7</sup> Idem p. 104.

<sup>8</sup> Hunt op.cit. pp. 8 and 331.

<sup>9</sup> W. Fischer, "Die Pionierrolle der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik im. 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert", *Zeitschrift f. Unternehmensgeschichte Beiheft 12*, 1978, p. 41

<sup>10</sup> Hatzfeld, pp. 215 ff.

<sup>11</sup> The issue was brought forward the General Council of the First International by an organization of Saxon coal-miners who wanted to affiliate, and who were involved in a struggle for control over their local Knappschaftskassen. At Marx's road to working class autonomy would be to recognize the insurance without employers' contributions and to fight for the legal liability of capitalists for accidents in their employment. The General Council of the First International 1868-1870. Minutes, Moscow n.d. pp. 71 f, 302-9.

<sup>12</sup> Hunt, 1981, p. 213. The "normal workday" campaign and its legislation was also the only piece of social policy treated by Marx in *Capital*.

<sup>13</sup> Sewell, op. cit. pp. 245 ff.

<sup>14</sup> The six points of the People's Charter were manhood suffrage, annual parliaments, a secret ballot, equal electoral constituencies, payment of MPs, and the abolition of their property qualifications. Hunt, 1981, p. 219.

<sup>15</sup> Hunt, 1981, p. 220.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted from Hunt, p. 219.

<sup>17</sup> M. Liebman, *Les Socialistes belges 1885-1914*, Bruxelles, vie ouvriere, 1979, pp. 8 ff, Citation from p. 80.

<sup>18</sup> Marx-Engels Werke, Berlin, vol. 16, pp. 5-17.

<sup>19</sup> The General Council of the First International op. cit. p. 286. The same demand was repeated in two resolutions of the 1868, *ibid.* pp. 294, 296.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* p. 287. That was Marx's view, of his view of child labour in his *Critique of the Gotha programme*, Marx-Engels Werke vol. 19 p. 32.

<sup>21</sup> *Les Congres internationaux ouvriers de 1889*, Geneve, Minhoff Reprint, 1976.

<sup>22</sup> *Le deuxieme Congress International ouvrier socialiste*, Bruxelles 1891, Geneve, Minhoff Reprint, 1977, pp. 289 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Programm der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*. Berlin 1891.

<sup>24</sup> *The International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam 1904. Projets de resolutions adoptes*. Bruxelles 1904 p. 53.

<sup>25</sup> *Huitieme Congres Socialiste International. Compte rendu analytique*, Gand 1911, pp. 479-81, 461-2. Quotations, from pp. 461 f, have been translated from French to English by the author.

<sup>26</sup> From 1907 to 1910. Reports ... of affiliated parties to the International Socialist Congress of Copenhagen August 28th – September 3rd 1910, Copenhagen 1910, p. 17

<sup>27</sup> A brief overview of the social policies of the congress of the Socialist International between the wars may be gained from P. de Laubier, *l'age de la politique sociale*. Paris, Ed. Techniques et Economiques 1978, pp. 134 ff.

<sup>28</sup> de Laubier, p. 134 n.

<sup>29</sup> Here I have used a Swedish trade union source, *Berättelse Över Landsorganisationens I Sverige verksamhet 1930*, Stockholm 1931, pp. 231 ff.

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<sup>30</sup> Manifestes, Theses et Resolutions de Quatre Premiers Congres de l'Internationale Communiste 1919-1923. Paris, Reimpression en facsimile Francois Maspero, 1969, p. 180-

<sup>31</sup> Kommunistiska Internationalens Program, Lund, Arkivs Klassikerserie, 1980, pp. 45-6

<sup>32</sup> Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism. Adopted by the Socialist International at Frankfurt 1951. New York, Socialist Party, USA, n.d.

<sup>33</sup> The Social Democratic women demanded no prohibition of nightwork for women, for instance. (Nor did they demand family or child allowances, but this was in agreement with the male perspective, see further below) Huitieme Congres Socialiste International, op. cit. pp. 492-5.

<sup>34</sup> Of its six specific demands, one deals with education and five with worker protection, in the German-Scandinavian sense. From K. Marx! "Kritik des Gothaer Programms, Marx-Engels Werke vol. 19, pp. 30 ff.

<sup>35</sup> Beschlüsse de Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs am Parteitag zu Hainfeld... ergänzt am Parteitag zu Wien... here quoted from reprint in Kleine Bibliothek des Wissens und des Fortschritts, Frankfurt a. M., Zweitausendeins, n.d. (ca. 1982), pp. 2401-2.

<sup>36</sup> Tenstedt, F., Sozialgeschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981, p. 222. For some elaboration of this argument, cf. G. Therborn, When, How and Why Does A State Become A Welfare State? Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Workshops in Freiburg March 20-25 1983, part I. Therborn 1983a.

<sup>37</sup> For the reception of Beveridge's plan, see J. Harris, William Beveridge, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, ch. 17. In 1941 Ernest Bevin had managed to get a clause on social security inserted into the Atlantic charter issued by Churchill and Roosevelt, A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. II, London, Heineman, 1967, p. 69.

<sup>38</sup> Thus, at the time of introduction of unemployment insurance in Britain, by the Liberal Lloyd George government, the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC proposed that the insurance should be restricted to unionists. The Government refused this naturally enough for such a government. J. Harris, Unemployment and Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972, pp. 317-8

<sup>39</sup> Hatzfeld, op. cit. pp. 229 ff.

<sup>40</sup> At the Paris congress of the II International, in 1960, the Belgians got a resolution passed on "municipal socialism", about the promotion of municipal services as "embryos of the collectivist society". Cinquieme Congres socialiste International, Geneve, Minhoff Reprint, 1980, pp. 112 ff. The most important development of municipal socialism came after World War I, headed by the Socialists of Vienna

<sup>41</sup> Grov- och Fabriksarbetarförbundet, Föredrag och diskussion om socialpolitik, Stockholm 1946, p. 35, expressions of agreement pp. 40 ff.

<sup>43</sup> Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarspartis konstituerande kongress... 1889, Stockholm 1890, pp. 23-24; relevant motions on pp. 13-14.

<sup>44</sup> The programme and its German background is treated in H. Tingsten, Den svenska socialdemokratin ideutveckling, Stockholm 1941

<sup>45</sup> Förhandlingarna vid Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarspartis Sjätte kongress... 1905, Stockholm 1905, p. 133

<sup>46</sup> On the Amsterdam resolution see above. The Austrian development is treated by Branting in an enthusiastic article of few years later, Hj. Branting, "Ett moderns socialförsäkringsförslag", Tiden no. 1 1908. The 1904 and 1908 bills of the Austrian government were delayed in Parliament till the summer of 1914, and then the war broke out, cf. H. Hofmeister, "Landesbericht Österreich", in Köhler-Zacher op. cit., pp. 621 ff. Hofmeister does not present the position of Austrian Social Democracy quite correctly. They were for the extension of public insurance to categories of self-employed, but they insisted on workers' management of the workers insurance.

<sup>47</sup> Förhandlingarna... Sjätte kongress... 1905, op. cit. pp., 133 ff.

<sup>48</sup> Förhandlingarna vid Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarspartis Sjunde Ordinarie Kongress, Stockholm 1908, pp. 239 ff; Förhandlingarna vid Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarspartis Åttonde Ordinarie Kongress. Stockholm 1911 pp. 82 ff. In 1911 the women, headed by Anna Sterky, had the support of Carl Lindhagen, burghomaster of Stockholm, MP, former left liberal and a Feminist. In 1908 the women had favourably contrasted his stand in Parliament on women's nightwork/ against prohibition, together with the conservative majority/ with that of the SAP MPs.

<sup>49</sup> "Report to the Congress in Copenhagen in 1910 from the Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Part, in From 1907 to 1910...

<sup>50</sup> P. G. Edebalk, Arbetarlöshetsförsäkringsdebatten, Lund, Ekonomisk-Historiska Föreningen, 1975, pp. 72 ff.

<sup>51</sup> Idem p. 14.

<sup>52</sup> Landsorganisationens kongress 1917, Stockholm 1917, motion no. 60, minutes of the debate, pp. 177 ff. This puts into some perspective, of limitation, a Social Democratic Parliament motion of 1912 demanding a better

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planning of public works with a view to fighting unemployment, a motion which – in an interesting study somewhat obsessed with finding historical antecedents – has been presented as the origin of the crisis policy of the 1930's. O. Steiger, *Studien zur Entstehung der neuen Wirtschaftslehre in Schweden*, West Berlin, Duncker & Humnlot, 1971, pp. 106 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Andra Kammarens protokoll 1910 56:7, Motioner 306 (Gibson et al.), 315 (Tengdahl and other Social Democrats)

<sup>54</sup> A. Elmer, *Folkpensioneringen i Sverige*, Lund 1960, pp. 27 f., 49 f. The leftwing of the party found the proposal too meagre to be accepted, *ibid.* pp. 31 f.

<sup>55</sup> Andra Kammarens Protokoll 1913, Motion 304, by Värner Ryden et. Al.

<sup>56</sup> Protokoll från Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis elfte kongress ... 1920, Stockholm 1920, pp. 56 f.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* p. 83

<sup>58</sup> Protokoll från Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis elfte kongress...1924, Stockholm 1924, pp. 5-6.

<sup>59</sup> Protokoll från Landsorganisationens...kongress 1922, Stockholm 1922, p. 335.

<sup>60</sup> Protokoll från Landsorganisationens...kongress 1926 p. 351

<sup>61</sup> G. Möller, *Vad vi vilja*, Stockholm 1924.

<sup>62</sup> Socialdemokratiska Partistyrelsens Protokoll 19.4. 1925. After the 1921 elections Möller said in the Party Executive that an employment insurance should be the most important task of a possible Social democratic government. Further below on his list, after the proposals of the trust committee, industrial democracy and other items Möller mentioned a bettering of the pensions insurance, whereas "the question of health insurance should not be forced forward". F.V. Thorson, the would-be Finance Minister, said that pensions would have to wait. Partistyrelsens Protokoll 6.-8.10. 1921.

<sup>63</sup> The SAP government adopted an intransigently principled issue on this question and fell. Möller was apparently prepared to some juridical advocacy in order to make to a compromise possible. T. Erlander "Samarbete eller strid. Gustav Möllers ställningstagande vid Stripakonflikten", *Tiden* 1981, pp. 42-45.

<sup>64</sup> G. Möller, *Arbetslöshetsförsökningen jämte andra sociala försäkringar*, Stockholm 1926, p. 4.

<sup>65</sup> G. Möller, *Trygghet och säkerhet åt Sveriges folk!*, Stockholm 1928, p. 5. Emphasis in the original. Möller also wrote a second brochure for the 1928 election, dealing with unemployment policy, *Humanitet och arbetslöshet*.

<sup>66</sup> On the electoral campaign, see J.-O. Nilsson, *Klassideologier i Valen 1928, 1932 and 1936*, a study made within the project "Sweden under Social Democracy", Sociologiska institutionen, Lunds Universitet, spring 1981, mimeographed.

<sup>67</sup> It has been treated in an essay written parallel to this, "The Coming of Swedish Social Democracy", in the multilingual 1983/ 1984 *Annali of the Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in Milan*: E. Colotti (ed.) *L'Internazionale operaia e socialista fra le due guerre*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1985. A Swedish translation appeared in Arkiv no. 27-28 (1984),

<sup>68</sup> The Party Executive, supported by the Congress, rejected motions to the 1932 SAP Congress, which put pensions reform in a crisis context. The importance as such of better pensions was underlined, but for the rest the matter had better be left to the Parliament fraction, pending ongoing investigation of a technical kind. Protokoll från Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis ... kongress ... 1932, Stockholm 1932, pp. 159 ff. Protokoll från Landsorganisationens ... kongres ... 1931, Stockholm, 1931, p. 251 (resolution on crisis policy). Cf. also, the SAP crisis programme, *Socialdemokratis förslag till krishjälp åt arbetare och bonder*. Stockholm 1932, and Möller's electoral pamphlet. *Kapitalimens kris*, Stockholm 1932.

<sup>69</sup> Partistyrelsens Protokoll 21.9. 1932. A very little popular unemployment insurance, after the Ghent model of state support to trade union unemployment funds, which satisfied certain conditions, was introduced in 1934.

<sup>70</sup> Protokoll från Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis ... kongress 1940, Stockholm 1940, pp. 194-5.

<sup>71</sup> On the development of the welfare state concept, see Flora and Heidenheimer *op. cit.* pp. 18-19.

<sup>72</sup> G. Möller, *Trygghet och säkerhet åt Sveriges folk!*, *op. cit.* p. 5. But Möller was then explicitly quoting Lassalle, which takes us another sixty years or so back. The Dutch "verzoringstaat" is coined after the French "Etat providence", P. Thoenes, "The Welfare State, Realization of a concept?", in *The Welfare State, realization of a concept?*, in *The Welfare State in Europe*, Keynotes for the IDPAD seminar The Hague 13. – 15.6. 1983, mimeographed, p. 5.

<sup>73</sup> "The policy, which has been carried out in the last years, we have, on various occasions allowed ourselves to name a welfare policy", Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson said the parliamentary "remiss debate" in 1935, P. A. Hansson, *Demokrati*, Stockholm 1935, p. 179. In the 1936 electoral campaign, the SAP had a poster with a picture of Hansson and the text "Vote the welfare policy", S. Bodin et al. (eds.), *Affischernas kamp*, Stockholm, SAP, 1979, p. 87.

<sup>74</sup> Hansson's speech is reprinted in the recent selection of his speeches and his journalism edited by A. L. Berling, *Från Fram till folkhemmet*, Stockholm, Metodica Press, 1982, pp. 227-34.

<sup>75</sup> This seems also to be indicated by Gunnar Fredriksson in his essay "Per Albin och folkhemmet" in G. Fredriksson et al., *Per Albin-linjen*, Stockholm, Pan, 1970, p. 53. Fredriksson

<sup>76</sup> F. Böök, *Det rika och det fattiga Sverige*, Stockholm 1936, p. 3.

<sup>77</sup> On the topic proper, see A. and G. Myrdal, *Kris i befolkningsfrågan*, Stockholm 1934; *Sveriges Offentliga Utredningar* 1938-57; A.-K. Hatje, *Befolkningsfrågan och välfärden*, Stockholm 1975; A.-S. Kälveborn, *More Children or Children of A Better Quality?* Uppsala-Stockholm, Almquist & Wicksell, 1980; A. Myrdal, *Nation and Family*, New York, 1941; G. Myrdal, *Hur styres landet?*, Stockholm, Raben & Sjögren, 1982, pp. 186 ff.

<sup>78</sup> The Myrdals were, and have remained, Anglo-Saxon radicals fed by a Swedish populism. They were politically radicalized during a stay in the United States during the academic year of 1929-30, i.e., the period the Great Crash, and they joined SAP in 1932, L.G. Lindskog, *Samtal med Alva Myrdal*, Stockholm, Sveriges Radios Förlag, 1981, p. 20. Without going into the patent rights of the different members of the Stockholm School, Erik Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, and others, there seems to be little doubt that already by the early 1930's, Gunnar Myrdal had already established himself as the School's most brilliantly and flamboyantly creative representative. Apart from his constructive contributions to economic theory proper, Myrdal had then published a devastating critique of ideologizing in economics, *Vetenskap och politik i nationalekonomien*, Stockholm 1930. In 1932 G. Myrdal had also published two noticed articles on social policy, 'Socialpolitikens dilemma', *Spektrum* nos. 3 and 4 1932, pleading for planning and a prophylactic social policy. - Architectural Functionalism had a great breakthrough in Sweden subsequent to the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930. Cf. P. Råberg, *Funktionalistiskt genombrott*, Stockholm, Norstedts, 1972. The Myrdals were personally befriended with several of the new architects, Lindskog op.cit.

<sup>79</sup> A. and G. Myrdal, *Kris i befolkningsfrågan*, Stockholm 1934, p. 203.

<sup>80</sup> *Protokoll från Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis kongress ... 1936*, Stockholm 1936, p. 189.

<sup>81</sup> *Socialdemokratiska Partistyrelse, Sociallagstiftning, arbetslöshets- och bostadspolitik i Sverige 1933-1937*, Stockholm 1938.

<sup>82</sup> *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbunds ... kongress 1937*, Stockholm 1937, p. 114.

<sup>83</sup> See H. Thylin, 'Den statliga bostadspolitiken' and A. Johansson, 'Staten och bostadsfrågan', in *Ett genombrott Stockholm 1944*, Festschrift to Gustav Möller at his 60th birthday, pp. 167-204 and 224 ff, respectively.

<sup>84</sup> B. Eriksson, 'Socialförsäkring och social omvårdnad', in *supra* p. 153.

<sup>85</sup> T. Erlander, 'Aktuella problem inom befolkningspolitiken *supra* pp. 438 and 440, respectively.

<sup>86</sup> Hatzfeld op.cit. p. 133; *Landsorganisationens i Sverige Berättelse 1936* op.cit. p. 301.

<sup>87</sup> A. Myrdal, "internationell och svensk socialpolitik", *ibid.* pp. 443-458, quotation from. P. 456

<sup>88</sup> G. Möller, "De planerade socialreformerna", *Tiden* no. 2, p. 72.

<sup>89</sup> T. Erlander, 1940-1949, Stockholm, *Tiden*, 1973, p. 192f Erlander is quoting his diary.

<sup>90</sup> The postwar programme was out in G. Möller, 'Kan trygghet skapas?' III, *Tiden* 1947, pp. 325-43.

<sup>91</sup> Möller presented the outcome as a compromise between the cash and kind "lines", which it was in the short run, G. Möller, 'De planerade socialreformerna', *Tiden* no. 2 1946, pp. 80-81.

<sup>92</sup> *SOU* 1944:15.

<sup>93</sup> The Government Bill was numbered Proposition 1946: 312. About the debate in Parliament, see *Andra Kammarans Protokoll* 1946:42.

<sup>94</sup> *Partistyrelsens protokoll* 9.2. 1945.

<sup>95</sup> Proposition 1946: 312 p. 136.

<sup>96</sup> G. Möller, "Kan trygghet skapas?", *Tiden* 1947, I p. 147.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 133 f, 149. Beveridge was an important figure al for the chairman of Socialvårdskommitten, Bernhard Eriksson, and to other Social Democratic social politicians See, B.Eriksson, 'Socialförsäkring och social omvårdnad', *Ett genombrott*, the 1944 Festschrift to Möller, op.cit.pp. 128-31, 136-39. That did not prevent Eriksson from taking another position in the construction of health insurance, however.

<sup>98</sup> *SOU* 1952: 39, *Andra Kammarans Prptokoll* 1953:23.

<sup>99</sup> The standard study is B. Molin, *Tjänstepensionsfrågan*, Göteborg, Scandinavian University Books, 1965. There are also valuable non-Swedish works, such as B. Nedelmann, *Rentenpolitik in Schweden*, Frankfurt/New York, Campus Verlag, 1982, and H. Heclö, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*, New Haven/London, Yale University Pr 1974 pp. 232 ff.

<sup>100</sup> To the 1953 congress of the Metal Workers Union, the Executive presented an extensive report comparing the social benefits of employees and manual workers, with a particular attention to pensions rights. For an overview of the ATP conflict from the point of view of the union, see K. Beckholmen, *Två årtionden 1956-1976*, Stockholm, Svenska tillindustriarbetareförbundet, 1978, pp. 161 ff. How it worked from inside the government - with trade union pressure from one side, uncertain parliamentary astellations and considerations from another, and difficult legal-actuarial technicalities from a third angle is conveyed by Erlander's memoirs, T. Erlander, 1955-1960, Stockholm, *Tiden*, 1979, pp. 127 ff.

<sup>101</sup> Erlander 1979 p. 199

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<sup>102</sup> True, retired Finance Minister Wigforss tried to revive a socialist perspective in a series of writings and utterances in the 1950's. At the Social Democratic Youth Congress in 1955, for instance, Wigforss made a speech, later published as a pamphlet with the title "The Welfare State - Station Towards Socialism", Vålfärdsstaten - anhalt till socialismen. But Wigforss was then a venerated elder statesman without any influence on party policy.

<sup>103</sup> For an analysis of Swedish electoral campaigns 1948-1979, see G. Therborn, 'Electoral Campaigns As Indicators of Political Power', in S. Hänninen and L. Paldån (eds.), *Rethinking Ideology*, Berlin and New York, Argument/ International General, 1983. This published version is abridged from a longer study. 1983b.

<sup>104</sup> A. Myrdal m. fl., *Jämlikhet*, Stockholm, Prisma, 1969. The report has also been published in German, W. Menningen (ed.), *Ungleichheit im Wohlfahrtsstaat*, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1971. In the German edition 14 pages are devoted to education at all levels, almost 11 to economic and workplace democracy, 8 pages to family policy including male-female equality, about seven and a half pages came under the rubric of 'equality through social policy'.

<sup>105</sup> The distribution, particularly between manual workers and white collar employees, along the components of the level of living is, for instance, a recurrent theme in *LO-Tidningen*, the weekly organ of LO (TUC).

<sup>106</sup> S. Johansson, *Mot en teori för Social rapportering*, Stockholm, Institute for Social Research, 1979 p. 138. In earlier reports the components and the definitions were sometimes worded slightly differently.

<sup>107</sup> *Fackföreningsrörelsen och den tekniska utvecklingen*, Stockholm, Prisma, 1966, pp. 219 ff.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. A. Kjellberg, 'Från industriell demokrati till medbestämmande', *Arkiv för Studier i Arbetarrörelsens historia* no. 21-22 (1981) pp. 69 ff.

<sup>109</sup> E. Bolinder et al., *Risker i jobbet: LO-enkäten*, Stockholm, Prisma/LO, 1970.

<sup>110</sup> *Bättre arbetsmiljö, Ett handlingsprogram*. Stockholm, Socialdemokraterna/LO, 1969; *Fackföreningsrörelsen och arbetsmiljön*, Stockholm, LO/Prisma, 1971.

<sup>111</sup> The Swedish work environment legislation and policies have been the object of several very interesting studies, e.g., S. Kelman, *Regulating America, Regulating Sweden*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1981; T. Björkman and K. Lundquist, *Från MAX till PIA*, Lund, Arkiv, 1981; L. Lundberg, *Från lag till arbetsmiljö*, Malmö, Liber, 1982. Trade union assessments may be found in *Krav på arbetsmiljön*, Stockholm, LO 1981; B. Viklund, "Arbetsmiljön – skilj på rådgivning och inspektion", in *1970-talets reformer I arbetslivet*, Stockholm, Tiden, 1982.

<sup>112</sup> *Detta vill socialdemokraterna*, Stockholm. SAP, 1982 pp. 55 ff.

<sup>113</sup> SAP, *Partistyrelsens protokoll* 9.12. 1945.

<sup>114</sup> K. Björk, "Bevan och Möller", *Tiden* 1951 pp. 321-6. Later Labour governments however, have accorded Cabinet rank to Ministers responsible for social policy matters, the most colourful of whom was late Richard Crossman.

<sup>115</sup> On Austria, see E. Talos, *Staatliches Sozialpolitik in Österreich*, Wien, Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1981, p. 326

<sup>116</sup> Cf. the presentation of the current Christian Democratic Social Minister in the West Germany and of his career in *Der Spiegel* no 2. 1983. The SPD-dominated governments Brandt and Schmidt, for their part, seem to have accorded no first rank to their Social Ministers.

<sup>117</sup> Social Minister of Sweden's first Social Democratic government, in 1921-23, was the former trade union leader Herman Lindkvist, though.

<sup>118</sup> For references and calculations, see Therborn 1983 a op.cit. pp. 22-3.

<sup>119</sup> Möller 1947 op. cit. pp. 134, 139

<sup>120</sup> *Andra Kammarans Protokoll* 1953:23 p. 148

<sup>121</sup> P. Eckerberg, "Medborgarens behov av trygghet" in F. Nilsson (ed.) *En bok om och till Gunnar Sträng*, Stockholm, Tiden, 1981, pp. 24 ff.

<sup>122</sup> See the excellent monograph by H.G. Hockert, *Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland*, Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1980, p. 325 n.

<sup>123</sup> For instance, W. Korpi et al., *Några huvuddrag in den svenska socialpolitikens utveckling*, Stockholm, Institute for Social Research, 1982, and Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1983 op. cit.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. N. Elvander, *Svensk skattepolitik 1945-1970*, Stockholm, Raben& Sjögren, 1972.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Therborn 1983 a p. 35

<sup>126</sup> Å. Elmer, *Folkpensioneringen i Sverige*, Lund, 1960, p. 349. Little known to others than specialists on Swedish social policy, this is a highwater mark in social policy historiography.

<sup>127</sup> *Protokoll från Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis ... kongress ... 1932* op.cit. pp. 166-7.

<sup>128</sup> *Flora* 1983 op.cit. pp. 426 and 442.



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<sup>129</sup> Idem p. 329.

<sup>130</sup> Möller 1947 p. 145

<sup>131</sup> Å. Elmer, *Svensk socialpolitik*, Sixth ed. Lund 1958, p. 335.

<sup>132</sup> Eckerberg 1981 op. cit. p. 24.

<sup>133</sup> Andra Kammarrens Protokoll 1953: 23 pp. 162 ff, and 172 ff.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Mohlin 1965 op. cit.

<sup>135</sup> About the background and the context, see T. Erlander 1955-1960, Stockholm, *Tiden*, 1976, pp. 265 ff.

<sup>136</sup> This assertion about the 1960 election runs counter to conventional Swedish opinion, which would regard the one of 1948 holding the prize of polarization. An examination of electoral programs, electoral posters, and verbatim transcriptions of broadcast party leaders' debates shows, however, that conventional opinion is wrong with regard to official party positions. General feeling might have been more hostile in 1948, perhaps. Therborn 1983b.

<sup>137</sup> The total amount of social expenditure has been calculated from ILO, *International Survey of Social Services*, Geneva 1933; GDP has been calculated from the proportions of GDP combined with absolute figures (for public expenditure and taxation) given by Flora 1983 op.cit. The Dutch figure for social expenditure conforms with the national statistics published by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Tachtig jaren statistiek in tijdsreeksen*, The Hague, Staatsuitgeverij, 1979 p. 186. The Swedish figure reported to the ILO is, however, not insignificantly higher than the one given by Sweden's specialist scholar on social security, 338 million crowns as compared to Elmer's 276. Elmer 1958 op.cit. p. 329.

<sup>138</sup> SAP, *Partistyrrelses Protokoll 9.2.1945*. Sven Andersson.

<sup>139</sup> *Landssekreterariats berättelse för 1980*, Stockholm, LO, 1981, p. 102.

<sup>140</sup> M. Carder and B. Klingeberg, 'Towards A Salaried Medical Profession: How 'Swedish' was the Seven Crowns Reform?' in A. Heidenheimer and N. Elvander (eds.), *The Shaping of the Swedish Health System*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, p. 163.

<sup>141</sup> LO, *Krav på arbetsmiljön* op. cit. p. 18; cf. also Björkman-Lundquist 1981 op. cit.

<sup>142</sup> Kelman 1981 op. cit. pp 1 ff.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. H. Nordström, *Svensk arbetslöshetspolitik*, Stockholm 1949, pp. 99 ff, 126 ff.

<sup>144</sup> B. Ohlin, *Ung man blir politiker*, Stockholm, Bonniers, 1972, p. 215.

<sup>145</sup> P.G. Edebalk, *Arbetslöshetsförsäkringsdebatten*, Lund, Ekonomisk-Historiska Föreningens, 1975, pp. 187 ff. At the LO Congress in 1936 the LO Executive was instructed to bring about a revision of the 1934 Act, *Protokoll* p. 425.

<sup>146</sup> For a cool overview, see SOU 1944:15 pp. 56 ff.

<sup>147</sup> The final report, and the best one, is Alber 1982 op.cit.

<sup>148</sup> Elmer 1960 p. 134.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Mohlin 1965 op.cit. A schema of the different proposab is to be found on p. 183.

<sup>150</sup> Söderpalm *Arbetsgivarna och saltsjöbadspolitiken*, Stockholm, SAF, 1980, pp. 85 ff.

<sup>151</sup> . An excellent study of SAP government policy towards the Unemployment Commission is done by B. Rothstein, "Fanns det en arbetsmarknadspolitik före AMS?", *Arkiv* no. 23-24 (1982).

<sup>152</sup> LO, *Kongressprotokoll 1936* op.cit. p. 434.

<sup>153</sup> T. Bresky et al., *Medbestämmande mera dröm än verklighet*, Stockholm, Liber, 1978, pp. 62 ff.

<sup>154</sup> The protagonist's view is given by G. Rehn, *Finansministrarna, LO-ekonomerna och arbetsmarknadspolitiken*, Stockholm, Institute for Social Research, n.d. (Originally delivered speech in 1977).

<sup>155</sup> B. v. Sydow, who has had access to Erlander's papers, is somewhat less discreet, *Kan vi lita på politikerna?*, Stockholm, *Tiden*, 1978, e.g., p. 368.

<sup>156</sup> T. Erlander, 1949-1954, Stockholm, *Tiden*, 1974, p.47.

<sup>157</sup> B. Rothstein, "AMS som Socialdemokratisk reformbyråkrati" *Arkiv* no. 18 (1980).

<sup>158</sup> B. Rothstein, 'The Success and Export of Swedish Labour Market Policy', paper presented to the ECPR Joint Workshops in Freiburg 1983. Rothstein's work also comes out of the "Sweden under Social Democracy" Project.

<sup>159</sup> C. Hogstedt, Professor of Occupational Medicine in Stockholm, has given me valuable information about occupational medicine and work environment in friendly conversations. Conclusions from them are my sole responsibility.

<sup>160</sup> An insider's view is given by R. Broberg, *Så formades tryggheten*, Stockholm, *Försäkringskassaförbundet*, 1973 p. 94 ff; a penetrating critical study of current social security

administration is T. Fürth "'maskaledrift eller storskaledrift?'," Stockholm, Historiska institution, Stockholms Universitet, 1979, mimeograph.

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- <sup>161</sup> G. Lindeberg, *Den svenska sjukförsäkringshistoria*, Lund 1949, gives a broad official account of the early history. The different recognized funds and their recruitment are presented on p. 402. The funds were rather evenly distributed across the country, with higher figures in middle-sized industrial towns, like Norrköping, Trelleborg, and Eskilstuna. A more lively picture is provided by a series of interviews with pioneer organizers in Broberg 1973 p. 254 ff.
- <sup>162</sup> LO, Kongressprotokoll 1922, p. 197 ff.
- <sup>163</sup> SAP, Verkställande Utskottets Protokoll 25-27.11.1930.
- <sup>164</sup> SAP, Partistyrelsens Protokoll 21.9.1932, Hansson and Forslund.
- <sup>165</sup> SOU 1948:39, p. 457 ff.
- <sup>166</sup> Landssekreterariatet, Verksamhetsberättelse 1949. LO 1950, 168.
- <sup>167</sup> P. Eckerberg, "Samordningen inom socialförsäkringen", in *Människan och samhället*, Stockholm, SAP/Tiden, 1951, p. 83.
- <sup>168</sup> Erlander 1976, p. 246 ff. The negotiations were secret and unknown to Mohlin when he wrote his study, Mohlin 1965.
- <sup>169</sup> B. v. Sydow, *Kan vi lita på politikerna?*, Stockholm, Tiden, 1978, pp. 329-30.
- <sup>170</sup> H. Gullberg et al., *Arbetsmiljölagstiftningen*, Stockholm, Allmänna förlaget, 1974, p. 38 ff. Kelman op.cit. bypasses the union part of the administration and regulation of work environment, which, for all the author's many acute observations about the functioning of the Swedish state, gives a profoundly misleading picture. An interesting down-to-earth description of two cases of work environment regulation is given by M. Käppi et al., *Arbetsmiljöbestämning och yrkesinspektion*, Gothenburg, Dept. of Projekteringsmetodik at Chalmers, 1983, mimeograph.
- <sup>171</sup> Le Monde Dossiers et documents no. 102 (juin 1983) p. 8.
- <sup>172</sup> Elmer 1960, p. 30 n.
- <sup>173</sup> Andra Kammaren motion 1913: 304 by V. Ryden et al.
- <sup>174</sup> The wage level, of 1914, is taken from Elmer 1960, p. 256. Elmer himself pays no attention to the SAP motion, nor to Branting's important article on Austria in *Tiden* 1908, cited above.
- <sup>175</sup> K. Englund, *Arbetsförsäkringsfrågan i svensk politik 1884-1901*, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976 p. 31.
- <sup>176</sup> Cf. G. Therborn, "The Formation of a Bourgeois-Bureaucratic State in Sweden and Its Political Effects", paper presented to the SSRC Conference on "States and Social Structures", Mt. Kisco New York, February 1982, so far unpublished
- <sup>177</sup> *Arbetsförsäkringskommitténs betänkande 1.1.*, Stockholm 1888 p. 45 ff.
- <sup>178</sup> Elmer 1960, pp. 81-90
- <sup>179</sup> SAP, Partistyrelsens Protokoll 9.12.45.
- <sup>180</sup> Elmer 1960 p. 87
- <sup>181</sup> A. Myrdal 1944 op. cit. p. 452
- <sup>182</sup> Andra Kammarens Protokoll 1953: 23, the interventions of Sträng and Nihlfors.
- <sup>183</sup> G. Malmström, *Samverkan, slagkraft*, Stockholm, SIF, 1970, p. 220 ff.
- <sup>184</sup> Möller 1946 p. 84. The major communist Party social policy document was put out before the 1948 elections, G. Adolfsson, *Fattigvård eller social styggheit?* Stockholm 1948. In the parliamentary record communist interventions on social policy are regular, and usually very concrete and specific in demands and criticisms, but they have been permitted no influence.
- <sup>185</sup> Elmer 1960 pp. 30-31.
- <sup>186</sup> Idem p. 64 ff.
- <sup>187</sup> Eriksson 1944 op.cit. p. 130.
- <sup>188</sup> ILO, *The cost of Social Security*, Geneva, various years.
- <sup>189</sup> T. Erlander, 1944 op. cit. p. 424.
- <sup>190</sup> Erlander 1973 p. 193. Erlander is quoting his diary of the day his conversation with Bagge took place, December 22 1942.
- <sup>191</sup> OECD, *National Accounts 1963-1980 vol. II*, Paris 1982, tables 2a and 3a.
- <sup>192</sup> Erlander 1944 p. 431
- <sup>193</sup> Elmer 1960 p. 51.
- <sup>194</sup> H. Berglund, "Läkarkåren och provinsialläkarväsendet" in W. Kock (ed.), *Medicinalväsendet i Sverige 1813-1962*, Stockholm 1963 p. 154.
- <sup>195</sup> Cf. A. Höjer, *En läkares väg*, Stockholm, Bonniers, 1975. Höjer was a leftwing Social Democrat, who became radicalized as a volunteer in the Finnish Civil War, on the White side.
- <sup>196</sup> Cf. I. Andersson, *Otto Järte*, Stockholm 1965, p. 187 ff.
- <sup>197</sup> The parallel has been drawn and elaborated by B. Rothstein 1982.