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## Why Doesn't Worcester Vote?

Molly B. Kazin

Clark University, mollykazin@gmail.com

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## WHY DOESN'T WORCESTER VOTE?

MOLLY B. KAZIN

AUGUST 2016

## A MASTER'S RESEARCH PAPER

Submitted to the faculty of Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the department of International Development, Community, and Environment.

And accepted on the recommendation of

Kathryn Madden, Chief Instructor

## **ABSTRACT**

## WHY DOESN'T WORCESTER VOTE?

#### MOLLY B. KAZIN

This research presents findings from a study of voter turnout and registration in Worcester, Massachusetts and takes steps to examine possible reasons why turnout has been consistently low in municipal elections. Specifically, it assesses educational attainment, income, race and ethnicity, and types and function of municipal government as reasons for the minimal turnout. Drawing on literature, case studies throughout the United States, and census and city clerk data, this paper will discuss reasons for voters' lack of involvement, a comparison of seven municipalities throughout Massachusetts, and recommendations for creating a more civically engaged community in Worcester.

Kathryn Madden, MCP, SMArchS, AICP

Chief Instructor

Laurie Ross, Ph.D.

Second Reader

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## INTRODUCTION

Upon going to my own polling place in Worcester's ward 8 for the 2015 municipal election, I was disappointed to see that at nearly 5:00pm, I was only one of roughly 75 people who had voted. When the day was over, only 104 people voted at St. Peter's church that day, which seemed incredibly low to me. Voting in local elections has been shown to be an easier way "for citizens to acquire crucial democratic skills and become familiar with the public realm at the local level" to ultimately engage and empower citizens and have them learn to trust government (Hajnal & Lewis 2003, 646).

After looking into voter turnout for my precinct, I saw that this low turnout was no anomaly; voter turnout at that precinct was consistently lower than the majority of the city. Voter turnout has been extraordinarily low in Worcester's municipal elections, with only 21% of registered voters participating in the November 2015 municipal election, and 14% in the November 2013 election. In the second largest city in all of New England, only 76% of eligible voters are actually registered to vote (Mosakowski Institute 2016, 8). This is alarming because research has shown that local politics are a good way to give power to citizens and keep them engaged. According to Nabatchi and Amsler, because "local policy issues are likely to be more immediate and comprehensible to individuals than state and federal policy," and have a direct impact on their lives, voters should theoretically be most involved in local elections (2014, 2). This is where issues such as city budgets, crime

prevention, waste disposal and garbage collection, schools, parks and recreations, and zoning actually impact daily life for individuals and communities (Nabatchi & Amsler 2014, 2).

Robert Putnam wrote in his book "Bowling Alone" (1995) that Americans have disengaged with politics and government, as they have also disengaged in other civic memberships and organizations, and have even withdrawn from churches and community organizations. He also notes that while membership in organizations that require effort or active participation have dropped off steeply, organizations where people can be passively involved (from writing checks to receiving newsletters) have seen a great increase in membership (1995, 138). Putnam claims that there is a great lack of social trust and engagement, and points to the following as explanations: women joining the labor force, a decline in home ownership, and shifting demographics away from a nuclear family. According to Putnam, these are the major reasons why people are less engaged with civic and community organizations. While there may be some truth in each of these factors, there are bigger factors at play as to why eligible voters simply are not making it to the polls each election cycle.

There are many contributing factors as to why voters are not participating in Worcester elections, including the many systems of power that have prevented or oppressed these eligible voters from having any meaningful civic involvement.

According to James DeFilippis, "no place (a community, a region, or whatever) is solely a function of the internal attributes of the people living and working there. If communities are outcomes, they are not simply outcomes of the characteristics of

relationships—both internally, within the communities, and externally, between actors in the communities and the rest of the world" (2001, 790). Voter turnout may not be so low solely because Worcester residents in certain census tracts do not have any desire to influence their municipal government, but rather because of the various exogenous traits of the constituents all layer together, leading to less impetus to turn out to the polls. The socioeconomic status, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, and governmental structure have all led to a disengaged voting base. This paper will attempt to look at those power relationships and the features of communities that all add up to a very unengaged Worcester voting base in municipal elections, while also comparing Worcester to six other municipalities throughout the state: Boston, Cambridge, Lawrence, Lowell, New Bedford, and Springfield. Ultimately, low voter turnout in municipal elections is not a problem unique to Worcester. This problem affects municipalities throughout the state.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

This section will discuss the four most relevant factors that may influence voter turnout in Worcester and across the country, as they appear in the literature. Education and socioeconomic status oftentimes go hand in hand, so seeing how each of these impact voter turn out could explain why certain pockets of the city have such low or high turnout. As there are such diverse and vibrant ethnic communities throughout Worcester, it is important to see the effects of race and ethnicity on voter

turnout. Lastly is the role of governmental structure in influencing voter participation.

## **EDUCATION**

Research shows that there is a link between education and voter turnout, and that turnout rates rise with every additional year of formal education (Sondheimer and Green 2010; Burden 2009; Dee 2003; Hillygus 2005). According to Burden (2009), education is a "fundamentally nonpolitical individual characteristic," which is why it is such a robust and impressive motivator of voter turnout, especially since it is "acquired outside of the political sphere, yet has potential to affect political behavior in important ways" (541). Sondheimer and Green's multiple studies (in lower-income, minority-heavy communities in Michigan, Colorado, and Tennessee) tracked multiple groups of students throughout their primary education and then whether these students ultimately registered to vote or participated in various elections in the early 2000s. Ultimately, they discovered that some of the major reasons that educational attainment influences voter participation is that education increases one's understanding of and interest in politics, and that education gives potential voters the necessary skills to "negotiate bureaucratic hurdles associated with voting" (Sondheimer & Green 2010, 185). Education provides the critical thinking skills to deconstruct and understand the complex issues within politics (Burden 2009, 542; Hillygus 2005).

Additionally, "because education predicts an individual's social network position...education works as a social sorting mechanism" (Hillygus 2005, 28). Each

year that a potential voter remains involved in formal education increases the chances that they "are substantially more likely to be found closer to the center of politically important social networks, while those with less education are much more likely to be found at the periphery" (Hillygus 2005, 28). Within these political networks, those who are mobilized by the political elite tend to be at the center of social networks created by educational experiences (Hillygus 2005).

Chen, Ognyanova, Zhao, Liu, Gerson, Ball-Rokeach, and Parks (2013) also note that for immigrants or minority groups, educational attainment is "an indicator of the degree of socialization one has undergone to embrace the values of American democracy and civic participation." The more time that immigrants or members of minority groups spend in formal American institutions, the more American ideals and actions will become a part of their own lives.

## **SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS**

While education is certainly a way for people to adopt American ideas and ideals about democracy, quality of education differs between socioeconomic statuses, especially when students are attending neighborhood-based public schools. Because community schools draw attendance from particular neighborhoods, it often occurs that the majority of a school's enrollment belongs to similar ethnic groups or has similar household income. Research done by Edgar Litt showed that students in three communities in the greater Boston area, one upper class, one middle class, and one working class, were being "trained to play different political roles, and to respond to political phenomena in different ways." For instance, in working class communities,

he found that schools teach the bare basics about democracy but do not stress the importance of voting or the importance of being actively engaged in the system rather than passive citizens. The middle class school Litt studied taught the basics of democratic government and what it means to be a responsible citizen, but not how decisions are actually made about policy. "Only in the affluent and politically vibrant community," he found, are students taught any "insights into political processes and functions of politics passed on to those who, judging from their socio-economic and political environment, will likely man those positions that involve them in influencing or making political decisions" (Litt 1963, 74).

The outcomes of municipal elections can determine new policies regarding public safety, infrastructure, and land use, and when few people actually participate in these local elections, elected officials are ultimately only serving a small portion of their constituents (Hajnal & Lewis 2003, 646). Wealthy voters are likely to be targeted by political campaigns and therefore more likely to vote because of important policy decisions regarding taxes. Generally, when there is a chance of taxes being increased on wealthier voters, or where wealth has the opportunity to be redistributed in any way, voters come out at even higher rates to voice their opinions (Kasara & Suryanarayan 2015). When campaigns strategically target voters with certain policy preferences, wealthier voters are incentivized to show up to the polls while poorer constituents' votes are suppressed (Kasara & Suryanarayan 2015, 617). These individuals with higher socioeconomic status are shown to reap the benefits of voting because they have a "higher stake in society" and they "already possess many

of the skills and financial resources necessary for participation" (Chen et al. 2013, 208).

Socioeconomic status also determines how politics are viewed in a community. Communities with lower socioeconomic status tend to view politics as a "formal, mechanistic set of governmental institutions with emphasis on its harmonious and legitimate nature, rather than as a vehicle for group struggle and change (Litt 1963, 73).

In a 2001 study, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade noted that those with lower socioeconomic status, especially the unemployed, are significantly less likely to vote or engage in any formal political process partially because of their lower incomes, but mainly "because they do not participate in social networks in the workplace that reward political participation" (874). Low socioeconomic status is also linked to residential instability. When people are less connected or invested in their communities because of transience, they are less likely to have a sable network to encourage political participation, and they are also less likely to have a stable address to register to vote in the first place (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade 2001, 874).

## RACIAL MINORITIES AND IMMIGRATION

The number of registered voters is even lower for minority groups or immigrants who are not well represented within the municipality. According to Chen et al., "individuals living in places with few co-ethnics have little motivation to participate civically because they do not have sufficient in-group members to make a difference" (2013, 209). Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that "while first

generation citizens may have deeper ties to their co-ethnic communities, such ties may not lead to greater participation in the United States because first generation ethnic organizations tend to orient themselves more towards homeland politics than U.S. politics" (878).

In addition to the perceived lack of ability to make a difference, politicians are considerably less likely to focus any of their campaign efforts on smaller minority groups, which only reinforces their reasons for said minority groups to be disengaged or disenfranchised in the first place (Chen et al. 2013). This disenfranchised attitude may stem from immigrants' past experiences with repressive or democratic regimes. Those who have experienced political repression are likely to mistrust the political system in the United States, leading to lower voter turnout (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade 2001, 877).

First generation immigrants, even those who are naturalized and therefore legally allowed to vote, tend to have lower English proficiency, which when coupled with a tendency to live with co-ethnics, limits "opportunities to interact with participation-inclined out-group members, thereby reducing pressures to socialize into American civic norms" (Chen et al. 2013, 210). These opportunities to be politically engaged are more available to immigrants who have been in the United States for a longer period of time, according to Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001). As their English fluency increases, "they also tend to have greater contact with, and stronger commitments to the mainstream political system" (2001, 877).

When looking at specific ethnic groups, whether they be born in the United States or naturalized citizens, Mark Hugo Lopez and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera of the Pew Research Center discovered interesting trends among Hispanics who were eligible to vote. Overall, the Hispanics they found least likely to participate in elections were likely to be under the age of 30, male, unmarried, and to have no more than a high school education. They also found that Hispanic nonvoters were likely to have family incomes of less than \$50,000 annually, often unemployed, and frequently of Mexican origin. The biggest reasons that Pew researchers found for the high rates of nonvoting within Hispanic communities is first, "the relative youth of Latino nonvoters. Among them, 40% were under the age of 30. By contrast, among all Latino voters, only 25% were ages 18 to 29" (Lopez & Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). Besides the youth of votingeligible Hispanic populations, Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera found that potential voters' Hispanic origin could be telling; "Among Hispanic nonvoters, two-thirds were of Mexican origin in 2012 [in the presidential election]," and those most likely to vote were both of Cuban origin and college educated. In fact, they found that "[seven]-inten (70.8%) Latinos with a college degree and 67.2% of Latinos of Cuban origin turned out to vote... both substantially higher than the 48% turnout rate among all Latinos" (2013).

When looking for more differences between Hispanic voters and nonvoters, the Pew Research Center also found that females were more likely to vote than males, and naturalized citizens were more likely to vote than American-born citizens. Not only did naturalized citizens vote at a higher rate than United States-born citizens—

53.6% compared to 46.1%--but also the year that they arrived in the United States had an impact on their likelihood to vote. Studying the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012 showed that "58.8% of those who arrived before 1990 voted, while voter turnout rates were lower among those who arrived between 1990 and 1999 and those who arrived after 2000—47.2% and 44.1% respectively" (Lopez & Gonzalez-Barrea 2013).

The tendency of minority groups and immigrant groups to live in places with people with similar backgrounds (Krysan, Couper, Farley & Forman 2009) creates concentrated populations, which theoretically makes it easier for politicians to aim their campaigns at motivating certain groups. However, campaigning can be expensive and "limited resources compel campaigns to target their mobilization efforts to segments of the population they perceive to be most receptive, often at the expense of Hispanics, who tend to have low propensities to vote" (Panagopoulos & Green 2010, 2). This could explain much of why wards with high-minority populations have such low voter registration, and even lower turnout. This low turnout among Hispanics and Latinos "remains a puzzle, given that many of the structural and institutional barriers— including onerous registration requirements, English language-only ballots, and literacy tests—that inhibited Hispanic participation historically have been dismantled" (Panagopoulos & Green 2010, 1).

## **GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION**

Research has found that one reason so few people turn out to vote in municipal elections is because of the type of government in their city or town. The

city manager form of government, where an individual is appointed to run the affairs of the city and the elected mayor's function is largely ceremonial, does not give voters much incentive to vote. By "weakening the powers of the mayor and shifting more power into the hands of an unelected city manager, this structural change may have reduced the direct influence of voters and decreased the incentive for local residents to vote" (Hajnal & Lewis 2003, 647). People who feel separated or distant from their government do not typically feel as though their vote will make a difference. Similarly, citywide elections for at-large positions are likely to have lower turnouts simply because constituents are so distanced from leaders. Very rarely do city governments with at-large elections capture voters' attention with larger citywide concerns. Hajnal and Lewis (2003) found that people will come out to vote if they think the candidate they are voting for can make some tangible difference in government, and "if voter participation is a function of the importance of an office, then cities where the mayor has more expansive duties and authority... have higher voter turnout" (Hajnal & Lewis 2003, 649).

However, in cities without a city manager, and where councilors are elected by district rather than at-large, voter participation typically increases. Hajnal and Lewis found that cities whose councilors "have direct rather than indirect control over city services, elections in which voters can use direct democracy to decide issues themselves, and elections where the position of mayor has some measure of control over the daily operations of the city are all cases in which more is at stake, and they are all cases in which turnout rises measurably" (2003, 659).

Reinforcing all of Hajnal and Lewis's claims are Dye and MacManus (2014), who through multiple studies, have been able to identify traits of municipal government structure that can predict whether voter turnout will be high or low. Like in Hajnal and Lewis's study (2003), one of the characteristics that leads to lower voter turnout is a council-manager form of government. Time and time again, Dye and MacManus (2014) found that municipalities with a strong mayor form of government are likely to have the strongest voter turnout than those with a weak mayor. They also found that higher turnout is associated with elections that are held concurrently with federal or state elections (in even years), rather than in the odd years.

#### **SUMMARY**

Understanding how education, socioeconomic status, race and immigration status, and government structure play into voter participation rates allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the voter participation rates in Worcester. Knowing that formal education leads to higher socioeconomic status, and vice versa, voter participation rates can be contrasted with educational attainment rates and median income to understand why certain cities have higher or lower turnout. Lastly, looking at the racial and ethnic composition of Worcester, there are diverse populations of Asian and African immigrants, but an especially large Latino/Hispanic community, which directed the literature to look at Hispanic voting trends.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This study addresses the various possible reasons why voter turnout is as low as it is in Worcester. The goal of this research is to allow us to understand what barriers are in place that keep eligible voters from being civically engaged, and what avenues are available for us to increase civic participation, particularly in municipal elections.

I chose to examine Worcester's municipal elections because of my own experiences voting in this city, noticing how empty my polling place was election after election. In order to fully understand voting practices in Worcester, the study examines the demographics in each of the 10 wards to see if the population characteristics in each ward affect participation, or if the rates can be explained by some greater factor than demographics.

To fully understand Worcester's voting trends, demographics and voting data was gathered from six other municipalities throughout the Commonwealth: Boston, Cambridge, Lawrence, Lowell, New Bedford, and Springfield. These cities were chosen for a variety of reasons; some of these municipalities have the same governmental structure as Worcester, while others have similar racial or ethnic compositions, and some cities are similar to Worcester in terms of their median income and poverty rate. Comparing Worcester to Lowell, Lawrence, New Bedford, and Springfield because of their status as Gateway Cities provides insight as to whether low turnout is an anomaly or the norm. According to Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 23A Section 3A, a Gateway City has "a population that is above 35,000

and below 250,000. The income of residents of Gateway Cities is below the median for the state and the share of residents with a bachelor's degree or above is below the state average" (Mosakowski Institute 2016).

Cambridge and Lowell are the only cities in Massachusetts that, like

Worcester, have a type E government, meaning they all have city managers with their
city council or mayor. Boston has a mayor-council government, as do Lawrence, New
Bedford, and Springfield. These four cities have a strong mayor and large minority
populations, both of which could be factors which determine voter turnout there.

Additionally, examining race, income, and educational attainment in these six cities
gives insight as to whether those were factors in the turnout rates, or if the turnouts
were more dependent on whether the race for an elected official in a strong mayor
system had higher turnout.

Since nearly 21% of Worcester's population is foreign-born and nearly a quarter of the total population is a racial or ethnic minority (Mosakowski Institute 2016), the research closely examines minority populations within Worcester to establish whether there is a tie between voting wards with high minority percentages and the low rates of voter participation.

By overlaying maps of the ten voting wards in Worcester with maps of census tracts, I was able to find which census tracts are within which wards. While there are 50 precincts (five within each ward), there are not 50 census tracts in the city, only 42.

#### **LIMITATIONS**

This study remained as quantitative and theory-based, as it was not possible to do a qualitative survey of all of the factors that lead to low voter turnout in Worcester. It could have added another layer of insight if it had been possible to survey people and ask why they were not participating in municipal elections.

Another limitation to this study is the imprecise manner used to determine which of Worcester's dozens of census tracts were in which voting wards.

Unfortunately, the City of Worcester does not have any sort of list as to which census tracts comprise each of the 50 precincts. The City also does not keep track of demographics by voting precinct or ward. Because GIS was not used, the list of census tracts sorted by voting ward as listed in Appendix I may not be exact.

Lastly, the actual content of civics curricula in Worcester was unavailable for this research, and seemed to vary based on which teachers from which high school were asked. For a more thorough analysis, it would have been ideal to survey high school history teachers to see whether civics was included in their lesson plans and at what grade levels or in what context. The existence of civics curricula does not tell what aspects are being emphasized or how it is being taught, which would be worth researching in any future studies.

## **COMPARING WORCESTER TO OTHER CITIES**

By looking at basic demographics from the 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Profiles, Worcester has the second largest population of all the cities. The median household income in Worcester is greater than Springfield, Lawrence, and New Bedford, but still lower than Boston, Cambridge, and Lowell. Compared to the other six cities, Worcester has the same percentage of residents living in poverty as Boston, which is roughly similar to the poverty rate in NewBedford, at 24%. Still, Springfield and Lawrence have the highest poverty rates out of the seven cities compared here. In terms of educational attainment, Worcester is fairly similar to Boston, and has higher educational attainment than both Lawrence (69%), New Bedford (71%), Springfield 76%), and Lowell (78%), but much lower than Cambridge (94%) See Table 1 below for a breakdown of total population, median household income, poverty rate, educational attainment (percent high school graduate or higher), percent of residents who are native-born and naturalized citizens, and voter turnout for each of the cities profiled.

**Table 1: Select Gateway Characteristics** 

	Population	Educational	Median	Individuals	Native-	Naturalized	Voter
		Attainment	Household	Below	Born	Citizens	Turnout
			Income	Poverty	Citizens		in 2015
				Line			Municipal
							Election
Boston	667,137	85%	\$54,485	22%	73%	13%	14%
Cambridge	106,844	94%	\$50,422	15%	72%	11%	29%
Lawrence	80,231	69%	\$34,496	29%	62%	18%	56%
Lowell	110,699	78%	\$49,164	19%	75%	14%	18%
New Bedford	95,072	71%	\$36,447	24%	80%	11%	23%
Springfield	153,060	76%	\$33,326	30%	89%	5%	17%
Worcester	184,815	84%	\$46,105	22%	79%	10%	21%

Data from 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5 Year Profiles

Looking at the racial breakdown by city shows that New Bedford has the largest proportion of white residents (Table 1), followed by Cambridge. Over 70% of Worcester residents identified as white in the 2014 American Community Survey. Springfield and Lawrence have the largest proportion of non-white residents. In these two cities, a large percentage of residents identify as "Other." This category encompasses anyone who does not self-identify as Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Black, or White. Those who identify as Hispanic or Latino are within this "other" category.




Figure 1: Gateway Cities' Racial Breakdown

Data from 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5 Year Profiles

Looking at factors suggested by the literature to have the most impact on voter turnout, such as race, median household income, and educational attainment, would point towards Worcester having a higher rate of participation than it does. Worcester has over two thirds of its population registered to vote, yet turnout is abysmal as seen in Table 2. It is important to note the high turnout in Lawrence's 2015 municipal election is likely due to the tumultuous political atmosphere there as a result of the corruption under the administration of Mayor William Lantigua and the movement to oust current Mayor Dan Rivera (Rosenfield 2013). Both of these candidates were Latino, which also was a factor in the 56% participation rate, as Lawrence's population is largely comprised of racial and ethnic minorities.

**Table 2: Enrollment Breakdown** 

City	Type of Government	Total Eligible	Total Enrolled	Percent Enrolled	Voter Turnout in 2015	
			Voters		Municipal	
Dooton	Mayorand	FF7 F70	202.700	C00/	Election	
Boston	Mayor and Council	557,578	383,768	69%	14%	
Cambridge	Mayor, Manager, and Council	84,171	60,740	72%	29%	
Lawrence	Mayor and Council	55,034	39,670	72%	56%	
Lowell	Mayor, Manager, and Council	86,745	57,487	66%	18%	
New Bedford	Mayor and Council	80,815	54,726	68%	23%	
Springfield	Mayor and Council	134,675	95,328	71%	17%	
Worcester	Mayor, Manager, and Council	159,299	108,428	68%	21%	

Data from "Enrollment Breakdown," published by The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

## CIVICS CURRICULUM IN MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The Massachusetts Board of Higher Education found "declining rates of voter participation, a lack of awareness about American history and political processes, and a superficial understanding of public issues, both domestic and international, among young people" in their 2014 report entitled "Preparing Citizens Report on Civic Learning and Engagement" (p. 6). The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Education's History and Social Science Curriculum Framework was approved in 2002 and published in 2003, and lists the following frameworks:

• In 3<sup>rd</sup> grade, students should:

- Give examples of why it is necessary for communities to have governments (e.g., governments provide order and protect rights)
- Give examples of the different ways people in a community can influence their local government (e.g., by voting, running for office, or participating in meetings)
- In 5<sup>th</sup> grade, students should:
  - Define and use correctly words related to government: citizen, suffrage, rights, representation, federal, state, county, and municipal.
  - Give examples of the responsibilities and powers associated with major federal and state officials (e.g., the President, chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, governor, state senators, and state representatives)
  - o Explain the structure of the student's city or town government.
- In 12<sup>th</sup> grade, students in an American Government elective course should:
  - Define the terms citizenship, politics, and government, and give examples of how political solutions to public policy problems are generated through interactions of citizens and civil associations with their government.
  - Describe the purposes and functions of government.
  - Define and provide examples of different forms of government, including direct democracy, representative democracy, republic, monarchy, oligarchy, and autocracy.
  - Explain how the rule of law, embodied in a constitution, limits government to protect the rights of individuals.
  - Explain how a constitutional democracy provides majority rule with equal protection for the rights of individuals, including those in the minority, through limited government and the rule of law. (Driscoll 2003).

Because of the way the frameworks are written, there is no way of knowing exactly what lessons on civic participation and engagement are being taught.

Furthermore, 12<sup>th</sup> grade American Government is an elective course, so not all students are learning the civics frameworks laid out for that course.

Massachusetts State Senator Harriette Chandler has tried three times to push legislation through that would require civics education in Massachusetts public schools, as she has said she is "tired of hearing about the cynicism of our youth...

Clearly, we need to get them more involved. I'm enthusiastic about it, and I'm dogged about it, because I want to see it happen" (O'Connell 2015). This bill, Bill S.249, states "Each public school district shall offer a unit of civic education, which can include a course, a weekend program, a model United Nations, or other such program promoting civic engagement. Regardless of the format, the unit must conclude with a voter registration drive that affords all students the opportunity to register to vote."

As of the end of July 2016, the bill in its final form, S.2454, has been passed to be engrossed by the Massachusetts Senate, and has been sent to the committee on House Ways and Means (The 189th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).

## **WORCESTER AS A CASE STUDY**

This section of the paper will first explain the government in Worcester, from the structure to the election process. It will review results from the past three municipal elections, in November 2011, 2013, and 2015. Finally, this portion of the paper will detail the demographics of the city of Worcester, with a focus on the portions of Worcester's residents who are minorities, whether they be native- or foreign-born, and naturalized citizens.

#### WORCESTER'S GOVERNMENTAL AND ELECTION STRUCTURE

Since 1947, Worcester has adopted a modified type E government, meaning that there is a city manager appointed by City Council, who "oversees the daily administration of the city, makes all appointments to city offices, and can be removed at any time by a majority vote of the Council." From 1947 to 1983, Worcester had 9 city councilors, all of whom were elected at-large. In 1983, there was an update to the city charter, which upped the number of councilors on City Council. Since this went into effect in 1985, City Council now has 11 members, six of whom are at-large councilors, and five that each represent a district. The mayor must run for office as a city council at large and win the popular vote to be elected, where (s)he acts as chair of the school committee and city council ("City Government" 2016).

The city's five districts are each comprised of two voting wards, and each ward is further divided into five precincts, for a total of 50 precincts throughout the city. The precincts are drawn roughly along census tract lines. Some of the precincts are large in area while others span only a few blocks wide because of the more dense populations there. Each precinct has its own polling place, which can be found online at <a href="http://www.worcesterma.gov/e-services/where-do-i-vote">http://www.worcesterma.gov/e-services/where-do-i-vote</a>. Each polling place is open for 12 hours on Election Day, from 8:00am to 8:00pm. City Council District 1 includes wards 1 and 2, District 2 includes wards 3 and 4, District 3 includes wards 5 and 6, District 4 includes wards 8 and 10, and finally, District 5 includes wards 7 and 9 (Figure 2). The different shades of grey in Figure 2: City Council District, Ward, and Precinct Boundaries demarcate voting precincts, within which are polling places.




Figure 2: City of Worcester District, Ward and Precinct Map

Worcester municipal elections occur in odd-numbered years, so as not to occur at the same time as state and federal elections. This is typical for municipal elections, and both of the other Gateway Cities compared in this research (Lowell and Lawrence)

also have their elections scheduled in odd-numbered years (The City of Lowell Election Results; City of Lawrence, Massachusetts: Election Results).

Through the Election Commission, voters can arrange to vote with an absentee ballot in advance if they will be unable to make it to the polls on Election Day.

According to Worcester City Clerk David J. Rushford, voters may request an absentee ballot if they will not be in Worcester on Election Day, if their religious beliefs prevent them from voting at the polls, or if a physical disability prevents them from voting at their precinct's polling location. Absentee ballots are available for those incarcerated for crimes that are not felonies, as well as for voters in the armed forces whose most recent permanent address were within city limits. It is possible to apply for absentee ballots by mail or on the City's website so that an absentee ballot can either be mailed to the voter's address or so that the voter may arrange to vote in the Worcester Election Office. Voters can apply for an absentee ballot up until the noon before Election Day in Worcester, and absentee ballots must be submitted before 8:00pm on Election Day, either by hand or by mail, but not electronically.

A report done by the Worcester Regional Research Bureau (WRRB) in 2015 found that while rates of voter registration do not fluctuate much, voter turnout has been consistently low in the past decade and a half. The report monitors turnouts between 2001 and 2013; during that time the average voter turnout for municipal elections was 21%. This rate is much different than Worcester's participation rates in state and federal elections, where 36% voted in the 2014 state election, and 59% voted in the 2012 state and federal elections. Still, this rate for state and federal

elections is considerably lower than the United States as a whole, where "the average voter turnout for elections for State offices was 40%, while the average turnout for State and Federal elections combined was 44%" (2015, 3).

So what is it that has Worcester's turnout rates so low? According to the WRRB report, entitled "Don't Boo. Just Remember to Vote," (2015) (referencing a quote by President Obama from his June 2014 graduation speech at Worcester Technical High School), the following reasons why Worcester residents self-report as being unengaged with public process and voting are as follows:

- Public apathy and/or ambivalence (69%);
- Lack of media attention or unfair/unbalanced coverage (39%);
- Difficulty of reaching youth and other segments of the community (36%)

These are the top reasons the Worcester Regional Research Bureau found for voters to be disengaged, but Worcester's demographics in each voting ward also suggest education, race, income, and form of representation to be reasons for the low turnout.

## WORCESTER DEMOGRAPHICS

According to the American Community Survey conducted in 2014, the City of Worcester has a total population of 182,511. While Worcester's residents mostly identify as White, it has a vibrant Hispanic and Latino population, as well as Black and Asian communities.

Overall, 22% of Worcester residents are living in poverty, according to the United States Census Bureau's American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates from 2010-2014. This rate is nearly double the state of Massachusetts's 11.6% poverty rate. While the average for all Worcester residents living in poverty is roughly 22%,

educational attainment plays a major factor in whether someone is likely to live below the poverty line. The poverty rate for those who have less than a high school diploma is almost 37%, and the median they are earning \$20,611. A high school graduate can slash their chances of living in poverty almost in half, with average earnings of \$29,409 and only a 19% poverty rate. See Table 3 below for the statistics on Worcester's individual median income and poverty rate, based on educational attainment. Figures 3 and 4 show maps of Worcester's educational attainment and median income, where the darker areas represent a higher concentration of residents with high school diplomas or higher, or a higher median income.

Table 3: Worcester Median Earnings and Poverty Rate By Educational Attainment

Educational Attainment	Median Earnings	Poverty Rate
Less than high school graduate	\$20,611	36.5%
High school graduate (includes equivalency)	\$29,409	19.0%
Some college or associate's degree	\$34,115	14.0%
Bachelor's degree	\$47,389	8.3%
Graduate or professional degree	\$64,662	

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates




Figure 3: Percent of Worcester Residents with High School Diploma or Higher

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates




Figure 4: Worcester Median Earnings in 2014

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

The poverty threshold in the year 2014, when the United States Census Bureau compiled this data, was \$12,316 for a single person household. The poverty threshold for a two-person household with no children was \$15,853 in 2014, and a three-person household with two adults and one child was \$19,055. The chart below shows what percent of the population fell into various income brackets. The median household income in Worcester is approximately \$46,105, but the majority of individuals in Worcester have an income between \$25,00 and \$49,999. Almost 20% of the population earns between \$25,000 and \$34,999 and another almost 22% of Worcester residents earn between \$35,000 and \$49,999 annually. Figure 5, below, shows a breakdown of earnings within Worcester's population.




Figure 5: Worcester's Earnings by Percent of Population

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Of the total city population, 142,508 Worcester residents are over age 18, representing 78% of the population. However, not all of these 142,508 residents are eligible to vote, as some are not citizens. In the state of Massachusetts, United Statesborn citizens as well as naturalized citizens have the right to vote. This includes those born in Puerto Rico who now live in Massachusetts. A report commissioned by Worcester's Seven Hills Foundation has explained that, "naturalized citizens are immigrants who earned their citizenship after entering the country and they represent approximately half (49 percent) of Worcester's foreign-born population (and 10 percent of Worcester's total population overall)" (Goodman et al. 2015, 12). According to the same report, an overwhelming amount of these naturalized citizens (56%) gained their citizenship between 2000 and 2010 (2015, 12). This means that the number of eligible voters have only recently become eligible to vote. While language could be considered a barrier to voting, Worcester has Spanish language ballots available.

#### **WORCESTER 2011 MUNICIPAL ELECTION**

## **Candidates**

The following candidates ran for councilor at large positions in the 2011 municipal election: Joseph M. Petty, Kate Toomey, Joseph C. O'Brien, Konstantina B. Lukes, Rick C. Rushton, Michael J. Germain, Stephen S. Buchalter, Michael J. Monfredo, Bill Coleman, James A. Kersten, Carmen L. Carmona, and Devin T. Coleman. Joseph Petty ultimately won in the race for mayor, but by less than one percentage point, or a

mere 635 votes. Kate Toomey was the runner up, earning a seat as a councilor at large, along with Joseph C. O'Brien, Konstantina B. Lukes, Michael J. Germain, and Rick C. Rushton.

The race for city council districts saw two battles between newcomers in districts 1 and 3, no challenge in district 2, and an incumbent ousted from the district 4 seat. The table below, Table 4, shows the election results.

**Table 4: 2011 Worcester City Council District Election Results** 

District	Incumbent	Challenger	Winner	Ward	Turnout
1	[None]	Tony J. Economou,	Tony J.	1	29%
		Virginia W. Ryan	Economou (51%)	2	21%
2	Philip P. Palmieri	[None]	Philip P. Palmieri	3	13%
			(100%)	4	15%
3	[None]	George J. Russell,	George J. Russell	5	23%
		Arthur G. Ellis	(53%)	6	15%
4	Barbara G. Haller	Sarai Rivera	Sarai Rivera	8	14%
			(60%)	10	16%
5	William J. Eddy James Kalogeropoulos William J. Eddy	7	19%		
			(59%)	9	29%
	•	•	·	Total	20%

From City of Worcester Election Results

## **Turnout**

Just under 20% of Worcester voters made it to the polls for this election. The wards with the highest turnout were 1 and 9, which each saw 29% of registered voters come to the polls. The lowest turnout of all 10 wards was ward 3 with only 13% of voters participating, and ward 8 had only 14% participation. Table 5, below, details voter turnout by district and by ward.

#### WORCESTER 2013 MUNICIPAL ELECTION

## **Candidates**

In the 2013 municipal elections, the following individuals ran for an at-large position: Joseph Petty, Kate Toomey, Morris Bergman, Konstantina Lukes, Rick Rushton, Michael Gaffney, Michael Germain, Bill Coleman, Peter Kush, Carmen Carmona, Mesfin Beshir, and William Feegbeh. Petty was reelected mayor of the City of Worcester, with Toomey, Bergman, Lukes, Rushton, and Gaffney elected as Councilors at Large.

Table 5, below, details the candidates running for district seats in city council, as well as whether the candidates were newcomers or incumbents. As councilors in districts 4 and 5 ran uncontested, the challenger was left blank in the chart.

**Table 5: 2013 Worcester City Council District Election Results** 

District	Incumbent	Challenger	Winner	Ward	Turnout
1	Tony J. Economou	Christopher M. Rich	Tony J.	1	23%
			Economou (52%)	2	15%
2	Philip P. Palmieri	Jennithan Cortes	Philip P.	3	10%
			Palmieri (51%)	4	12%
3	George J. Russell	[None]	George J.	5	13%
			Russell (64%)	6	8%
4	Sarai Rivera	[None]	Sarai Rivera	8	8%
			(73%)	10	9%
5	William J. Eddy	Gary Rosen	Gary Rosen	7	16%
			(51%)	9	24%
				Total	14%

From City of Worcester Election Results

#### **Turnout**

As shown in the table below, a small fraction of the registered voters in Worcester actually cast a ballot in the November 2013 municipal election. The highest turnout in the city was in wards 9 and 1, with 24% and 23% participation, respectively. Ward 9 is part of City Council district 5, which saw a very close race between incumbent William J. Eddy and challenger Gary Rosen, who ultimately ousted Eddy with his 51% majority of the vote. Ward 1 is part of District 1, where there was an equally close race between Tony J. Economou and Christopher M. Rich, where Economou ultimately kept his seat in the Council with 52% of the vote. The wards with the lowest voter turnout were wards 6 with 8% of registered voters making it to the polls, ward 8 with only 8% participation, and ward 10 with 9% participation. Wards 8 and 10 make City Council District 4, where incumbent Sarai Rivera ran unopposed.

Are voter turnout rates higher in some wards and lower in others because of the candidates for city council, or could it be because of the characteristics of the communities within each ward? It must be acknowledged that there is perhaps less urgency for voters in wards 8 and 10 to participate because there was no challenger for Sarai Rivera.

The Worcester Regional Research Bureau has compiled data to show voter turnout by precinct and by ward in the 2013 municipal election, as seen in Figure 6 below.

Registered Voter Turnout in Worcester, MA Municipal Election, 2013 Ward Boundries Percent of Registered Voters in Precinct 5.0 - 8.6% ô Celebrating Voting Data: City of Worcester, MA GIS Data: City of Worcester GIS, 2012

Figure 6: 2013 Voter Turnout by Voting Precinct and Ward

From Worcester Regional Research Bureau, "Don't Boo, Just Vote"

## **WORCESTER 2015 MUNICIPAL ELECTION**

## **Candidates**

The following individuals ran for a Councilor at Large position in the 2015 municipal election: Joseph M. Petty, Michael T. Gaffney, Kate Toomey, Konstantina

Likes, Morris A. Bergman, Khrystian E. King, Juan A. Gomez, Matthew E. Wally, Robert J. Sargent, Christina L. Zlody, William S. Coleman III, and Linda F. Parham. Petty received the most votes, earning him his third term as mayor of Worcester. The other elected at-large councilors were Gaffney, Toomey, Lukes, Bergman, and King.

Table 6, below, details the candidates running for district seats in city council, as well as whether the candidates were newcomers or incumbents. As George J.

Russell ran unopposed in district 3, and Gary Rosen had no competitor in district 5, the challenger was left blank in the chart.

**Table 6: 2015 Worcester City Council District Election Results** 

Distric	Incumbent	Challenger	Winner	Ward	Turnou
1	Tony J. Economou	Cindy T. Nguyen	Tony J.	1	33%
			Economou (60%)	2	24%
2	[None]	Candy Mero-Carlson, Jennithan Cortes	Candy Mero- Carlson (55%)	3	16%
				4	18%
3	George J. Russell	[None]	George J. Russell	5	20%
			(100%)	6	13%
4	Sarai Rivera	Jacqueline Kostas	Sarai Rivera	8	11%
			(68%)	10	14%
5	Gary Rosen	[None]	Gary Rosen	7	22%
			(100%)	9	32%
			,	Total	21%

### **Turnout**

Voter turnout in some wards was particularly high in the 2015 municipal election, compared to the previous two election cycles. This election saw the highest voter turnout in ward 1 out of all three elections compared in this paper, at roughly one third of all registered voters coming to the polls. The next highest turnout was 32% of voters from the ninth ward, which shows a pattern similar to the previous election. Wards 1 and 9 consistently have the highest turnout, though this election's turnout was overall higher than the 2013 election, and roughly on par with the 2011 election. Figure 7 below shows turnout rates for every ward, and that throughout these three elections, ward 8 is consistently the ward with the lowest or second-lowest voter participation rate.

## **DISCUSSION**

Figure 7: Multi-year Comparison of Voter Turnout by Voting Ward 2011 Municipal Election 

■2013 Municipal Election 

2015 Municipal Election 

2015 Municipal Election 

2016 Municipal Election 

2017 Municipal Election 

2018 Municipal Election 

2019 Municipal E 33% 32% 29% 24% 23% 23% 22% 19% 16% 14% 15% 13% 13% 9% 8% 8% Ward 10

35

Table 7: Ward-Based Percentage of Worcester Residents Living Below 100% Poverty

Ward	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>Poverty Rate</b>	10%	10%	15%	26%	10%	25%	13%	36%	11%	42%

Looking at the voter turnout in the three elections studied, some of the wards have consistently high or low turnout while others fluctuate from year to year. Some wards with lower turnouts could likely be attributed to uncontested racesl, as some wards with high turnout may be due to engaged social networks and successful campaign strategies. Upon further inspection of ward 3's voter turnout, the 2011 and 2015 races both featured unopposed candidates, while the 2013 election did have one challenger to the incumbent. Looking at the 6% difference in voter turnout between the 2011 and 2015 elections, the fact that the incumbent faced no challengers could not have been the only factor for the low turnout. Some of the higher turnouts, for example ward 9, could be due in part to the highly contested election. Gary Rosen just barely won that election with 51% of the votes. Perhaps because of the divide between him and incumbent William J. Eddy, more voters turned out to polling places that year. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the data alone, so comparing the data to the literature provides more insight.

#### Education

Starting on the Worcester-only small scale, the educational attainment data gleaned from the 2014 American Community Survey supports the literature on voter turnout as understood by education. Based on the voting wards with the highest

percentage of residents who have less than a high school diploma, the least educated wards in the city of Worcester are wards 4, 8, and 10. These wards all have between 20-26% of residents who have less than a high school diploma. On the other end of the spectrum, wards 1, 2, and 9 have the highest percentages of residents with graduate or professional degrees—over 17% in these three wards. Judging by the educational attainment of each voting ward, it is apparent that the most educated wards have the highest voter turnout, while the least educated wards have the lowest turnout. Based on reports by Sondheimer and Green (2010), this is likely because education increases understanding of and interest in politics. These higher rates of educational attainment also point towards citizens having politically conscious social networks (Hillygus 2005), which would lead them to the polls.

On a broader scale, however, the cities with the highest educational attainment--Cambridge (94%), Boston (85%), and Worcester (84%)—all have less than one third of their registered voters actually participating in municipal elections. The city in this comparison with the highest turnout is also the city with the lowest percentage of residents with high school diplomas: Lawrence. Lawrence will continue to break the rules and contradict the literature throughout this study.

#### **Socioeconomic Status**

In Worcester, the data supports the literature, and the wards with wealthier people do in fact vote at higher rates than wards whose residents are poorer (Kasara & Suryanarayan 2015). The highest rates of poverty exist in ward 4 (26%), ward 6 (25%), ward 8 (36%), and ward 10 (42%), and these wards also have consistently

lower voter turnout. The voter participation rates were highest in wards 1, 5, and 9, where poverty rates hover around 10%.

Outside of Worcester, voting trend data does not align with the literature at all.

Of the cities profiled, Boston and Cambridge both have median household incomes over \$50,000 yet their voter turnout in municipal elections was not as high as the literature may have suggested. Higher median income and lower poverty rates should theoretically lead to higher voter turnout, according to Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001), and Litt (1963) reinforces the notion that more affluent communities know more about civic engagement and governmental institutions, thereby leading to higher participation. The data from these seven cities shows that the literature simply does not apply to Massachusetts.

### **Racial Minorities and Immigration**

Looking specifically at the 2015 Worcester election results, the voting wards with the highest voter turnout are wards 1, 2, 5, 7, and 9. When looking closely at the breakdown of native-born citizens versus naturalized citizens in each ward, these five wards all have over 50% native-born citizens. This supports the theory, as stated by Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001), Chen et al. (2013), and Panagopoulos and Green (2010), that native-born voters are more likely to make it to the polls than naturalized citizens. The voting wards with less than 50% native-born citizens have lower turnout, as seen in ward 4 (46%), ward 8 (40%), and ward 10 (44%).

However, outside of Worcester, the cities with lower voter turnout did not in fact always have higher proportions of native-born citizens. In fact, the highest voter

turnout came from Lawrence, where only 62% of the population is comprised of native-born citizens. With the logic from Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) and Panagopoulos and Green (2010) that native-born citizens vote in higher numbers, then Springfield, Worcester, and New Bedford should all have higher voting participation rates than they do. Of the seven cities profiled, Springfield (89%), New Bedford (80%), and Worcester (79%), all contest the literature.


#### **Government Structure and Function**

Looking at the seven cities compared in this study, it is important to remember that three of these cities (Cambridge, Lowell, and Worcester) have a type E government with a mayor, city council, and city manager. The remaining four cities, Boston, Lawrence, New Bedford, and Springfield all have a strong mayor. This could account for voter turnouts where all other factors are similar to Worcester, but voter turnout is higher (i.e., Lawrence), and in places with similar voter turnout rates, factors such as educational attainment and median income can explain the higher turnouts (i.e., Cambridge).

It is likely because of the strong mayor system in Lawrence that led to the abnormally high turnout of 56%. This election was highly anticipated after years of corruption had wracked the city, so over half the city came out to voice their opinion as to who should control the Lawrence municipal government.

Figure 8 and Table 8 below show election results and poverty rates by city, respectively.





**Table 8: Poverty Rate by City** 

City	Boston	Cambridge	Lawrence	Lowell	New	Springfield	Worcester
					Bedford		
Poverty	22%	15%	29%	19%	24%	30%	22%
Rate							

Ultimately, the findings of this study are inconclusive. While education, socioeconomic status, racial identity and immigration, and government structure and function all are factors in determining voter turnout, there may be other systems or factors at play. The literature pointed to cities such as Boston, Cambridge, and Worcester having the highest voter participation rates, yet data shows that they did not. Lawrence, the poorest of the cities, had the highest participation, which directly contradicts the literature. In some areas the data seems to support the literature, and in others, no simple conclusions can be drawn without further research.

# CONCLUSION

Even though the data has shown to be inconclusive, one possible step to take to increase voter turnout would be to have a Get Out the Vote campaign. By focusing more energy on strategizing for more voter education, mobilization, and voter registration in cities with low voter turnout, Gateway Cities could see an increase in participation.

One part of a Get Out the Vote campaign could happen within the school setting, as the literature suggests that our schools could greatly shape the ways our communities view politics. The way that politics are framed within each learning environment, be it as a tool, a necessary evil (Sondheimer & Green 2010, 185) or something in between, translates into higher or lower voter turnout. One of the biggest things we can do to encourage a higher voter turnout is to change the way we speak to youth about politics. At the very least, it is imperative that schools frame politics and government as a tool. Instead of making governance seem so far away, it is crucial that children learn how politics work at the local and national level. That way, students can understand who gets to make certain decisions, and how things can be changed. If we can add civics education to public school curriculum, we can inform children about the political process and teach them that the political system is something to work with.

Another reason why a Get Out the Vote campaign is so crucial is because of the large foreign-born population in Worcester. In a city with such a rich and diverse immigrant community, it makes sense that many children's parents are not able to

vote, which may mean that the younger generations are not hearing about the political process, even if they themselves will be eligible to vote in the future. If these native-born children of immigrants do not hear about voting and the importance of voting from their parents, there is a chance that they will be unaware that they have the right to vote.

A Get Out the Vote campaign in any of these gateway cities may need to reach out to the community at nonconventional venues in order to be effective in raising voter participation rates. For instance, it might make sense to do a miniature civics lesson at churches, mosques, synagogues, community centers, etc., to appeal to a different crowd who may otherwise be disengaged. To reach as many people as possible, having voter registration drives at school open houses could target the parents, guardians, and older siblings of the thousands of school-aged children in Worcester. The library, grocery stores, and parks are also good places to expand the voting pool. These are efforts that could be spearheaded by the Election Commission, by volunteers from the community, or by political science classes at any of the area consortium colleges or universities. Many people are simply unaware of how to become politically engaged, or why it matters. Instead of asking people to come to the polls, it might be more effective to meet them where they already are.

In Gateway Cities where people do not have access to transportation or cannot easily make it to polling places, another Get Out the Vote tactic could be providing rides to polling places. For voters who are unable to make it to the polls even with

additional transportation options, absentee ballots are available. Get Out the Vote could teach people how to request an absentee ballot.

Additionally, in wards where voter turnout is especially low, it might be beneficial for city councilors and candidates spend some extra time campaigning and targeting these wards. As the literature points out, city governments with a weak mayor and strong city manager often yield lower voter turnout than elections to select a strong mayor. While it is unlikely that Worcester will change its charter anytime soon to change the government's structure, it would make sense for city councilors to make themselves more accessible to their constituents during campaign season, and throughout the year. That way, voters will realize that their vote actually matters and they will be able to go into the polls more confident about who they are voting for. Additionally, voters are more likely to come to the polls in an election for a strong mayor rather than a weak mayor with an appointed city manager. It is a long shot to convince the city to revise its charter, but it has been revised in the 1980s, and as Worcester's population changes, it may be worthwhile for its electorate to change alongside it. At the very least, it would be beneficial to reevaluate the set up of city council, and whether the at-large and district councilors are an effective way of representing the city.

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# Appendix I: Database of Worcester Characteristics by Census Tract, Council District, and Voting Ward

The color of the	Census Tract	District	Ward	Total Population	Total Eligible Voters	Native Born	Native Born Percent	Naturalized	Naturalized Percent	Raw Data White	White	Raw Data Minority	Minority Race	Raw Data Less than High School	Less than High School	Raw Data High School	High School	Raw Data Some College	Some College	Raw Data Bachelors	Bachelors	Raw Data Graduate or Professional Degree	Graduate or Professional Degree	Median Income	Raw Data Poverty		2015 Voting Turnout
Proposed 1         1         9,556         6783         6465         6891         318         318         318         513         8121         779         206         238         1402         238         2402         238         2402         228         3276         178         1970         10           7300         1         2         5,433         3660         3464         638         324         46         4781         888         652         12%         325.58         66         112         248         34.02         75         562         12%         235.58         66         112         24         113         1284         11.71         256         750         66         429         48         5608         250         560         250	7301	_1	_	5,981	3308	3160	53%	148	2%	4127	69%	1854	31%	598.1	10%	1555	26%	1734	29%	1,615	27%	478	8%	\$38,798	538	9%	$\overline{}$
Percent   1   1   19,15   11,179   11,184   59%   515   38   1671   776   4466   23%   1640   20%   499   23%   3460   28%   236   232   24   34   478   348   3																		_									$\vdash$
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Appendix II: 2011 Voter Turnout in Worcester Municipal Election

District	Ward	Registered Voters	Voter Turnout	Percent
1	1	11,836	3,393	29%
	2	10,493	2,161	21%
2	3	9,143	1,208	13%
	4	8,869	1,275	15%
3	5	10,372	2,354	23%
	6	8,224	1,212	15%
4	8	8,661	1,207	14%
	10	7,981	1,307	16%
5	7	10,185	1,943	19%
	9	11,038	3,178	29%
	Total	96,642	19,244	20%

Appendix III: 2013 Voter Turnout in Worcester Municipal Election

District	Ward	Registered Voters	Voter Turnout	Percent
1	1	12,418	2,908	23%
1	2	11,858	1,816	15%
2	3	9,416	945	10%
2	4	10,222	1,258	12%
3	5	11,319	1,523	13%
3	6	9,420	784	8%
4	8	9,244	719	8%
4	10	9,208	802	9%
Г	7	10,891	1,704	16%
5	9	11,776	2,813	24%
	Total	105,792	15,272	14%

Appendix IV: 2015 Voter Turnout in Worcester Municipal Election

District	Ward	Registered Voters	Voter Turnout	Percent
1	1	11,546	3,781	33%
	2	10,558	2,529	24%
2	3	8,150	1,301	16%
	4	8,842	1,613	18%
3	5	10,322	2,082	20%
	6	8,154	1,081	13%
4	8	7,777	912	11%
	10	7,496	1,050	14%
5	7	9,851	2,181	22%
	9	19,764	3,424	32%
	Total	93,460	19,954	21%