On the Analysis of Public-Key Cryptologic Algorithms

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Alla mia famglia...

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Abstract

The RSA cryptosystem introduced in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman is the most commonly deployed public-key cryptosystem. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) introduced in the mid 80's by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller is becoming an increasingly popular alternative to RSA offering competitive performance due the use of smaller key sizes. Most recently hyperelliptic curve cryptography (HECC) has been demonstrated to have comparable and in some cases better performance than ECC. The security of RSA relies on the integer factorization problem whereas the security of (H)ECC is based on the (hyper)elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ((H)ECDLP). In this thesis the practical performance of the best methods to solve these problems is analyzed and a method to generate secure ephemeral ECC parameters is presented.

The best publicly known algorithm to solve the integer factorization problem is the number field sieve (NFS). Its most time consuming step is the relation collection step. We investigate the use of graphics processing units (GPUs) as accelerators for this step. In this context, methods to efficiently implement modular arithmetic and several factoring algorithms on GPUs are presented and their performance is analyzed in practice. In conclusion, it is shown that integrating state-of-the-art NFS software packages with our GPU software can lead to a speed-up of 50%.

In the case of elliptic and hyperelliptic curves for cryptographic use, the best published method to solve the (H)ECDLP is the Pollard rho algorithm. This method can be made faster using classes of equivalence induced by curve automorphisms like the negation map. We present a practical analysis of their use to speed up Pollard rho for elliptic curves and genus 2 hyperelliptic curves defined over prime fields. As a case study, 4 curves at the 128-bit theoretical security level are analyzed in our software framework for Pollard rho to estimate their practical security level.

In addition, we present a novel many-core architecture to solve the ECDLP using the Pollard rho algorithm with the negation map on FPGAs. This architecture is used to estimate the cost of solving the Certicom ECCp-131 challenge with a cluster of FPGAs. Our design achieves a speed-up factor of about 4 compared to the state-of-the-art.

Finally, we present an efficient method to generate unique, secure and unpredictable ephemeral ECC parameters to be shared by a pair of authenticated users for a single communication. It provides an alternative to the customary use of fixed ECC parameters obtained from publicly available standards designed by untrusted third parties. The effectiveness of our method is demonstrated with a portable implementation for regular PCs and Android smartphones. On a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone our implementation generates unique 128-bit secure ECC parameters in 50 milliseconds on average.

Key words: cryptology, cryptanalysis, public-key cryptography, integer factorization, elliptic curves, hyperelliptic curves, discrete logarithm problem, GPUs, FPGAs, complex multiplication method

Zusammenfassung

Das 1977 von Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir und Len Adleman entwickelte RSA Kryptosystem ist heutzutage das am häufigsten verwendete. Mitte der 80er Jahre wurde die Elliptische-Kurven-Kryptographie (ECC) entwickelt, die wegen ihrer vergleichsweise guten Leistung eine immer beliebtere Alternative zu RSA geworden ist. Vor kurzem wurde gezeigt, dass Hyperelliptische-Kurven-Kryptographie (HECC) vergleichbare und in einigen Fällen sogar bessere Leistung im Vergleich zu ECC bietet. Die Sicherheit von RSA basiert auf dem Faktorisierungsproblem, wohingegen die Sicherheit von (H)ECC auf dem Problem des diskreten Logarithmus für (hyper)elliptische Kurven ((H)ECDLP) beruht. In dieser Arbeit werden die besten Methoden zur Lösung solcher Probleme auf ihre praktische Verwendbarkeit hin untersucht. Ausserdem wird eine Methode zur Erzeugung von flüchtigen ECC Parametern vorgestellt.

Der beste bekannte Algorithmus zur Lösung des Faktorisierungsproblems für ganze Zahlen ist das Zahlkörpersieb (NFS), dessen zeitintensivster Schritt das Suchen von Relationen ist. Wir untersuchen, inwieweit Grafikprozessoren (GPUs) diesen Schritt beschleunigen können. Dafür werden Methoden zur effizienten GPU-Implementierung von modularer Arithmetik sowie von diversen Faktorisierungsalgorithmen vorgestellt, und ihre Leistung wird analysiert. Ausserdem wird gezeigt, dass die Integration unserer GPU-Software in ein aktuelles NFS-Softwarepaket einen Geschwindigkeitszuwachs von 50% ergeben kann.

Zur Lösung von (H)ECDLP ist die beste bekannte Methode Pollards rho Algorithmus. Durch die Verwendung von Äquivalenzklassen, die durch Automorphismen der Kurve induziert werden (wie beispielsweise die Negationsabbildung), lässt sich diese Methode beschleunigen. Obwohl die Verwendung der Negationsabbildung schon umfangreich untersucht wurde, ist den anderen Automorphismen bisher wenig Aufmerksamkeit zuteil geworden. Inwieweit sich Pollard rho mit diesen Automorphismen beschleunigen lässt, untersuchen wir sowohl für elliptische Kurven als auch für hyperelliptische Kurven vom Geschlecht 2. Als Fallbeispiel analysieren wir 4 Kurven des 128-Bit Sicherheitsniveaus, um ihr genaues Sicherheitsniveau zu bestimmen.

Zusätzlich stellen wir eine neuartige FPGA-Architektur zum Lösen von ECDLP durch Pollard rho mit Negationsabbildung vor. Damit können die Kosten eines FPGA-Verbundes zum Lösen von Certicoms ECCp-131 Herausforderung abgeschätzt werden. Sie sind um einen Faktor 4 niedriger als die der besten bekannten Implementierung.

Zum Schluss präsentieren wir eine effiziente Methode, um eindeutige, sichere und unvorhersagbare flüchtige ECC Parameter für eine einzige Kommunikation zwischen zwei authentifizierten Partnern zu erzeugen. Dies stellt eine Alternative zu der gebräuchlichen Praxis von festen ECC Parametern aus öffentlichen, von nicht vertrauenswürdigen Dritten erstellten Standards dar. Die Effektivität unserer Methode wird durch eine portable Implementierung für PCs und Android Smartphones demonstriert. Auf einem Samsung Galaxy S4 Smartphone erzeugt sie im Durchschnitt alle 50 Millisekunden einen Satz eindeutiger ECC Parameter im 128-Bit Sicherheitsniveau.

Stichwörter: Kryptologie, Kryptoanalyse, Kryptographie mit öffentlichen Schlüsseln, Faktorisierung ganzer Zahlen, elliptische Kurven, hyperelliptische Kurven, Problem des diskreten Logarithmus, GPUs,

Zusammenfassung

FPGAs, Methode der komplexen Multiplikation

Résumé

Le système de cryptage RSA introduit en 1977 par Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir et Len Adleman est le système cryptographique à clé publique le plus souvent déployé. La cryptographie sur les courbes elliptiques, ou ECC, introduite dans le milieu des années 80 par Neal Koblitz et Victor Miller devient une alternative de plus en plus populaire pour RSA grâce à ses performances compétitives en raison de l'utilisation de tailles de clés plus courtes. Plus récemment il a été démontré que la cryptographie sur les courbes hyperelliptiques ou HECC offre des performances comparables et, dans certains cas, meilleures que ECC. La sécurité de RSA repose sur le problème de factorisation d'entiers tandis que la sécurité de (H)ECC est basée sur le problème du logarithme discret dans le groupe correspondant à la courbe (hyper)elliptique, abrégé (H)ECDLP. Dans cette thèse les performances pratiques des meilleures méthodes pour résoudre ces problèmes sur différentes plates-formes sont analysées et une méthode pour générer des paramètres éphémères sécurisés pour ECC est étudié.

Le meilleur algorithme publiquement connu pour résoudre le problème de factorisation d'entiers est le crible sur les corps de nombres, ou NFS. L'étape de NFS qui prend le plus de temps est l'étape de collection de relations. Nous étudions l'utilisation de cartes graphiques ou GPU comme accélérateurs pour cette étape. Dans ce contexte, des méthodes pour implémenter efficacement l'arithmétique modulaire et plusieurs algorithmes de factorisation sur GPU sont présentées et les leurs performances pratiques sont analysées. En conclusion, il est démontré que l'intégration des implémentations à l'état de l'art de NFS pour CPU avec notre logiciel pour GPU peut conduire à une acc'el'eration de 50%.

Dans le case de courbes elliptiques et hyperelliptiques pour l'utilisation cryptographique la méthode la plus rapide connue pour résoudre l'(H)ECDLP est l'algorithme du Rho de Pollard. Cette méthode peut àtre accélérée en utilisant des classes d'équivalence induite par automorphismes d'une courbe comme la négation. Nous présentons une analyse pratique de leur utilisation pour accélérer l'algorithme du Rho de Pollard sur les courbes elliptiques et courbes hyperelliptiques de genre 2 et nous analysons 4 courbes au niveau de sécurité théorique de 128 bit dans notre cadre logiciel pour Pollard Rho pour estimer leur niveau de sécurité pratique.

En outre, nous présentons une nouvelle architecture multi-coeurs pour résoudre l'ECDLP en utilisant l'algorithme du Rho de Pollard avec la négation sur FPGA. Cette architecture est utilisée pour estimer le coût de résoudre le défi Certicom ECCp-131 avec un groupe de FPGA. Notre architecture permet d'atteindre un facteur d'accélération de approximativement 4 par rapport à l'état de l'art.

Enfin, nous présentons une méthode efficace pour générer des paramètres éphémères uniques, sécurisés et imprévisibles pour ECC destinés à être partagé par une paire d'utilisateurs authentifiés pour une seule communication. Il offre une alternative à l'utilisation coutumière de paramètres pour ECC fixés par des normes publiques conçues par des tiers non fiables. L'efficacité de notre méthode est démontrée avec une implémentation portable pour PC et pour smartphones avec Android. Sur un smartphone Samsung Galaxy S4 notre implémentation génère des paramètres uniques sécurisés à 128 bit de sécurité pour ECC en 50 millisecondes en moyenne.

Mots clefs : cryptologie, cryptanalyse, cryptographie à clé publique, factorisation d'entiers, courbes

Résumé

elliptiques, courbes hyperelliptiques, problème du logarithme discret, GPU, FPGA, méthode de la multiplication complexe

Sommario

L'algoritmo RSA introdotto nel 1977 da Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir et Len Adleman è il sistema di crittografia a chiave pubblica maggiormente utilizzato. La *crittografia basata su curve ellittiche*, o ECC, introdotta alla metà degli anni 80 da Neal Koblitz e Victor Miller sta diventando un'alternativa all'RSA sempre più popolare grazie alle sue prestazioni competitive dovute all'utilizzo di chiavi di dimensione minore. Recentemente è stato dimostrato che la *crittografia basata su curve iperellittiche*, o HECC, fornisce prestazioni simili e in alcuni casi superiori ad ECC. In questa tesi la sicurezza dell'RSA è basata sul problema della fattorizzazione di numeri interi mentre la sicurezza di (H)ECC è basata sul problema del *logaritmo discreto su curve (iper)ellittiche*, o abbreviato (H)ECDLP. In questa tesi sono analizzate le prestazioni dei migliori metodi per la risoluzione di questi problemi su diverse piattaforme ed è proposto un metodo per generare parametri sicuri "monouso" per ECC.

Il miglior algoritmo per risolvere il problema della fattorizzazione di numeri interi è il *crivello di campi numeri*, o NFS. La fase dell'NFS che richiede più tempo è la "collezione di relazioni". È presentata l'analisi dell'uso di schede grafiche o GPU come acceleratori per questa fase dell'algoritmo. In questo contesto sono descritti metodi per l'implementazione efficiente dell'aritmetica modulare e di diversi algoritmi di fattorizzazione di numeri interi su GPU e ne sono analizzate le prestazioni nella pratica. In conclusione, è dimostrato che l'integrazione del nostro software per GPU con implementazioni dell'NFS allo stato dell'arte risulta in uno speed-up fino al 50%.

Se si considerano curve ellittiche e iperellittiche per uso crittografico, Il miglior metodo per la risoluzione dell'(H)ECDLP è il metodo rho di Pollard. Questo metodo può essere accelerato utilizzando le classi di equivalenza indotte dagli automorfismi delle curve come la mappa di negazione. È presentata un'analisi pratica dell'uso di questi automorfismi per accelerare il metodo rho di Pollard sia nel caso delle curve ellittiche che in quello delle curve iperellittiche e quattro curve al livello teorico di sicurezza di 128 bit sono analizzate all'interno del nostro framework software per il metodo rho di Pollard al fine di stimare il loro livello di sicurezza pratico.

È inoltre presentata un'architettura many-core innovativa per la risoluzione dell'ECDLP su FPGA che implementa il metodo rho di Pollard con la mappa di negazione. Questa architettura è utilizzata per stimate il costo monetario necessario per risolvere la challenge ECCp-131 pubblicata da Certicom su un cluster di FPGA. Confrontata con lo stato dell'arte la nostra architettura ha prestazioni superiori di circa 4 volte.

Infine, è presentato un metodo per generare parametri ECC monouso unici, sicuri e non predicibili per l'utilizzo in un'unica sessione da parte di due utenti autenticati. Questo metodo fornisce un'alternativa all'uso classico di parametri ECC fissi forniti da standard pubblici prodotti da terze parti (non necessariamente affidabili). L'efficienza del nostro metodo è dimostrata con un'implementazione portabile per PC e smartphone equipaggiati con il sistema operativo Android. Su un Samsung Galaxy S4 il nostro software impiega in media 50 millisecondi per generare parametri ECC unici al livello di sicurezza di 128 bit.

Parole chiave: crittologia, crittanalisi, crittografia a chiave pubblica, fattorizzazione di numeri

Sommario

interi, curve ellittiche, curve iperellittiche, problema del logaritmo discreto, GPU, FPGA, metodo della moltiplicazione complessa

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1 Introduction

Cryptology is the scientific study of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

Classical cryptography is the scientific study of secret codes providing confidentiality for messages transmitted over an insecure communication channel (assurance that the information contained in the message cannot be accessed by unauthorized parties). However, modern cryptography has a wider connotation and includes other aspects of information protection like *integrity* (prevention of malicious alteration of the information contained in the message) and *authentication* (assurance that the identity of the communicating parties can be provably verified). In general the goal of modern cryptography is to provide methods to protect information from unwanted alteration or use by malicious unauthorized parties.

Confidentiality can be obtained using cryptographic tools like block ciphers or stream ciphers. Integrity can be obtained using hash functions. Authentication can be obtained using message authentication codes. Such tools belong to the domain of *symmetric-key* cryptography wherein it is assumed that a secret key is shared by the communicating parties. *Public-key* cryptography, instead, deals with secure communication when the communicating parties do not share a secret key. In this case each party possesses a pair of related public key and private key. The first is published in the open as public domain information, whereas the second is known only to the owning party. Public-key cryptography has two main applications. One is the secure exchange of secret keys between communicating parties for subsequent use in symmetric-key protocols. The second is authentication with the additional requirement of non-repudiation (i.e., digital signature). Non-repudiation provides an undeniable proof that a given party generated the message making it impossible for such party to claim otherwise.

Cryptanalysis is the science of security assessment of cryptographic methods and protocols by both theoretical and practical means. Usually the goal of cryptanalysis is to assess how hard it is to achieve a *break* of a given method, where a break is the violation of one or more of the security requirements (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, authentication or non-repudiation). For instance recovering the secret key from the public key is a severe break of a public-key method.

In this thesis problems in both public-key cryptanalysis and public-key cryptography are taken on. The first practical algorithm to implement public-key cryptography was introduced by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman in 1977 [178]. The algorithm they proposed, the RSA algorithm, has become since the most widely used standardized tool [105] to instantiate key exchange and digital signature protocols notwithstanding the advent of efficient alternatives in more recent years. In the case of RSA the secret key can be recovered from the public key by solving the *integer factorization problem* [126]: given a composite positive integer *n* find two positive integers *u*, *v* such that $n = u \cdot v$ and u, v > 1. Thus, the security of RSA is related to the hardness of this problem. Integer factorization is believed to be a computationally hard problem, although this has never been proven. There are no known polynomial time (in the size of the number to be factored) algorithms to solve the integer factorization problem

on regular (non-quantum) computers. However there exists a polynomial time algorithm to solve the integer factorization problem on quantum computers [188]. The fastest known algorithm for regular computers, the number field sieve (NFS) [128], has *subexponential* running time. After the advent of the NFS no major cryptanalytic result has affected the security of RSA [31].

The most popular alternative to RSA is *elliptic curve cryptography* (ECC). ECC was introduced independently by Koblitz and Miller in the mid 80's [141], [115] and today it is a standardized and deployed public-key method [200, 53]. As for RSA the main applications of ECC are key-exchange and digital signatures [63, 68, 200]. The security of ECC is related to the hardness of the *discrete logarithm problem* (DLP) in certain carefully selected finite groups [76, Definition 2.1.1]: let *G* be a finite group written in multiplicative notation, then given $g, h \in G$ find $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, if it exists, such that $g^a = h$.

As we will see in detail in this thesis, in the case of ECC, the finite group has a specific realization: a (large) prime order subgroup of the group of points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. If such a subgroup is carefully chosen then the best publicly known way to solve DLP is to use a *generic* attack whose complexity grows as the square root of the cardinality of the subgroup (however, as in the case of the integer factorization problem, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to solve the DLP on quantum computers [188]). For this reason ECC keys can be selected to have size significantly lower than RSA keys (for the same security level) [30] resulting in competitive performance in practice [61]. *Hyperelliptic curve cryptography* (HECC) [116] is an alternative to ECC having very similar security properties. HECC enables the use of even smaller keys, but at the price of additional arithmetic complexity. Recent works have demonstrated that its performance is comparable to and in some cases better than the performance of ECC [34, 21].

Both DLP and integer factorization can be solved in polynomial time on a quantum computer [188]. There are alternatives to RSA and (H)ECC as *coding* based [136] or *lattice* based [85, 100] cryptographic methods for which there is no known efficient attack for quantum computers.

The ability to solve the hard problems underlying public-key methods provides a direct mechanism to obtain the secret key from the public key. Therefore, the theoretical study of algorithms to solve such problems is key to evaluating the security of public-key methods. Estimating how difficult these problems are to solve in practice reconciling the algorithmic state of the art with the current computing technology is also a relevant research problem. Results in this field provide valuable insight to assess security and set the parameters of the affected methods in the real world. This type of experimental research requires studying the computational aspects of the algorithms and the details of the target computing architecture to obtain an efficient implementation and collect sensible experimental results.

Other types of attacks can obtain the secret key without solving the underlying hard problems. Usually they rely on flaws in the implementation of cryptographic methods. For instance side channel attacks exploit the information related to the secret key that is leaked through alternative channels (computation time, device power consumption and noise) or actively leverage the unsafe handling of exceptions and faults [117, 118, 32, 48, 69, 82]. Another perspective on attacks has become recently relevant to the research community after the revelations on the PRISM surveillance program of the national security agency (NSA), namely the possibility that cryptographic standards may have a backdoor [91, 189] or that implementations may have been crafted by malicious designers to have flaws they can exploit.

In this thesis, the difficulty of integer factoring in the case of RSA moduli and the difficulty of DLP in the case of elliptic and hyperelliptic curves, are studied in practice. An efficient alternative to the customary use of fixed ECC parameters is also studied. More precisely, the following four main problems are addressed.

The first is the study of the impact of new massively parallel computing devices like many-core graphics processing units (GPUs) [158, 159] on the hardness of integer factoring in practice. Our contribution sheds light on how these popular computing devices can impact the factorization of RSA

moduli using NFS and provides insight on the limitations of modern many-core GPUs as accelerators for parallel public-key cryptologic algorithms. Chapter 3 covers this work and is based on [137] (published in CHES 2014) and [138] (full version on IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive).

The second is the analysis of the practical speed-up that can be obtained in practice when solving the DLP in the case of different types of elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves. This contribution provides insight on the actual level of security of ECC or HECC when using these curves in all cases where constant factor speed-ups are relevant. Chapter 4 covers this work and is based on [36] (published in PKC 2014).

The third is the efficient design of Pollard's rho algorithm to solve the ECDLP for elliptic curves defined over prime fields using field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Our implementation is significantly more efficient than the state of the art and we use it to estimate the cost of solving the Certicom ECCp-131 DLP challenge [51]. Chapter 5 covers this work and is based on [101] (submitted to FPL 2015).

The fourth problem is the real-time generation of *ephemeral* ECC parameters as opposed to the customary use of fixed ECC (for instance defined by public standards designed by third parties) parameters. Building on a previous idea we propose a method to generate secure ECC parameters in real time on constrained devices. The ECC parameters are generated on demand, used once and then discarded. This contribution is a concrete attempt to provide an alternative to the use of fixed ECC parameters, drastically reducing the effects of a potential attack on a specific set of parameters. The performance of our method is demonstrated in practice with an implementation for x86 processors and Android smartphones. We believe that our contribution may pave the way for innovative research in this direction. Chapter 6 covers this work and is based on [139] (to appear at the NIST Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards 2015).

2 Background

In this chapter we introduce the theoretical and practical background relevant to this thesis. We denote by log the natural logarithm function and by & the bitwise *and* operation.

2.1 Large integer representation

We adopt the following notation for the representation of positive integers (we do not need notation for *signed* integers as we never treat them formally):

- The *bit-size* or simply *size* if not specified differently of $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ is defined as $\lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor + 1$ if n > 0 and 1 if n = 0.
- Given $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ we say that *n* is a *k*-bit integer with $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$, if $2^{k-1} \le n < 2^k$.
- Given $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ and $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 2}$ with $0 \le n < r^{\ell}$ for some $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$, a *radix-r representation* of *n* is a sequence $(t_i)_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$ such that $n = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} t_i r^i$ and $t_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$. If $0 \le t_i < r$ for $0 \le i < \ell$ then the representation is unique.

2.2 Smooth positive integers

In this thesis we deal several times with the concept of "smooth" positive integers. This is captured by the following two definitions:

- A positive integer is *B*-smooth with $B \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 2}$ if all its prime factors are at most *B*.
- A positive integer is *B*-powersmooth with $B \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 2}$ if all the prime powers dividing it are at most *B*.

2.3 L-notation

Denote by $L_x[r; \alpha]$ any function of *x* that equals

$$L_x[r;\alpha] = e^{(\alpha+o(1))(\log x)^r (\log\log x)^{1-r}}$$

where $\alpha, r \in \mathbf{R}$, $0 \le r \le 1$ and o(1) is for $x \to \infty$. This expression is useful to get a concise asymptotic notation ("L-notation") for any function whose order of growth is between *polynomial* ($L_x[0;\alpha]$) and *exponential* ($L_x[1;\alpha]$) in the length log x of the parameter x, namely *subexponential*.

2.4 Arithmetic

The fundamental building block of most public-key cryptologic algorithms is *modular* arithmetic. Modular arithmetic in practice hinges on integer arithmetic. Due the large size of the integers involved,

multi-precision integer arithmetic is used, namely arithmetic defined for large integers given in radix-*r* representation for a suitably chosen radix $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 2}$. Modular arithmetic can be informally thought of as integer arithmetic where the result of any operation is reduced modulo *M* using *least non-negative residues* modulo *M*. Formally this is the arithmetic in $\mathbb{Z}/M\mathbb{Z}$. The run time of most of the algorithms described in the following chapters is determined by the run time of the modular multiplication operation. Therefore, a fast implementation of the latter is crucial. In this section we describe the Montgomery multiplication algorithm to compute modular multiplication. We also describe an exact division algorithm and a divisibility test based on a similar idea, and a compositeness test. These algorithms are used in the subsequent chapters. More information on large integer (and modular) arithmetic can be found in [113], [46] and [60, Chapter 9]. In the following we denote the radix used to represent the large integers by *r* with $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 2}$.

2.4.1 Montgomery arithmetic

The Montgomery multiplication method [143], due to Peter Montgomery, allows to compute modular multiplication without divisions. This method is easy to implement and advantageous in all cases where long sequences of arithmetic operations modulo a fixed $M \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ need to be performed, e.g., modular exponentiation or elliptic curve arithmetic (see Section 2.5).

The classic modular multiplication Algorithm [192] interleaves the multiplication operation and the modular reduction operation. The original formulation of Montgomery multiplication also interleaves the multiplication operation with the reduction operation. We assume that $M \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ is such that gcd(M, r) = 1 (usually M is simply assumed to be odd as r is a power of 2 on computer systems). A constant R is chosen such $R = r^{\ell}$ and $r^{\ell-1} \le M < r^{\ell}$ for some $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$. Choosing R as a power of the system radix r is key to the efficiency of the algorithm as it ensures that all the divisions performed are just cheap divisions by the system radix (e.g., "shift" operations). The *Montgomery representation* of $X \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ge 0}$ is defined as $\tilde{X} = X \cdot R \mod M$. The Montgomery sum/difference of two transformed integers \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y} is the Montgomery representation \tilde{T} of $T = X \pm Y \mod M$, namely $\tilde{T} = (X \pm Y) \cdot R \mod M = (XR \pm YR) \mod M = \tilde{X} \pm \tilde{Y} \mod M$. The Montgomery addition/subtraction of \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y} denoted by $\tilde{X} \pm \tilde{Y}$ is thus equivalent to the modular addition/subtraction of \tilde{X} , \tilde{Y} . The Montgomery product of \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y} , is the Montgomery representation of the product $Z = XY \mod M$, namely $\tilde{Z} = (XY) \cdot R \mod M = X \cdot R \cdot Y \cdot R \cdot R^{-1} \mod M = \tilde{X} \cdot \tilde{Y} \cdot R^{-1} \mod M$. Therefore the Montgomery multiplication of \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y} denoted by $\tilde{X} \pm \tilde{Y}$ is equivalent to the two following steps:

- 1. *multiplication step*: compute the regular product of \tilde{X} and \tilde{Y}
- 2. reduction step: divide the product by R modulo M.

An operand $X \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ can be transformed into its Montgomery representation computing $\tilde{X} = X^{\tilde{c}}R^2$ and the inverse transformation can be obtained computing $X = \tilde{X}^{\tilde{c}}1$. Assume $R^2 = r^{2\ell} = 2^{2\ell h}$ for some $h \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ and $2^{\ell' h} < M < 2^{\ell h}$ for some $\ell' \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ with $\ell' < \ell$, then the value $R^2 \mod M$ can be computed as follows: set $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^{\ell' h}$ and then compute Z_j with $j = (2\ell - \ell')h$ where $Z_i = Z_{i-1} + Z_{i-1} \mod M$. As a result Montgomery arithmetic can be carried out without ever resorting to classic modular multiplication.

In general the inverse of a unit modulo n with $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ (e.g., modulo r as required below) can be computed with the Extended Euclidean algorithm in time $O(\log^2 n)$. In practice, computing an inverse modulo a power of 2 can be done in a simpler way as shown in Algorithm 1 [65].

Radix-*r* Montgomery multiplication is shown in Algorithm 2. This algorithm interleaves the multiplication step and the reduction step of Montgomery multiplication. This strategy minimizes the number of radix-*r* words utilized (only ℓ +1 radix-*r* words are needed). The main trick of the algorithm is the computation at line 4 where the value *q* is calculated such that $Z + qM \equiv z_0 - z_0 m_0 m_0^{-1} \equiv 0 \mod r$.

Algorithm 1 Inverse modulo 2^h with $h \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$.

Input: $h \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$, $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ odd such that $0 < a < 2^{h}$ **Output:** $z = a^{-1} \mod 2^{h}$ 1: $z \leftarrow 1$ 2: $p \leftarrow a$ 3: **for** i = 0 to h - 2 **do** 4: **if** $(p \otimes 2^{i+1}) = 1$ **then** 5: $z \leftarrow z + 2^{i+1} \mod 2^{h}$ 6: $p \leftarrow p + 2^{i} a \mod 2^{h}$ 7: **return** z

Algorithm 2 Radix-*r* Montgomery multiplication algorithm.

 $\overline{\operatorname{Input:} X = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} x_i r^i, Y = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} y_i r^i, \text{ the modulus } M = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} m_i r^i, \mu = -m_0^{-1} \mod r \text{ with } 0 \le x_i, y_i, m_i < r, \ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0} \text{ such that } r^{\ell-1} \le M < r^{\ell}, \gcd(r, M) = 1 \text{ and } 0 \le X, Y < M$ $\operatorname{Output:} Z = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} z_i r^i, Z = X \cdot Y \cdot r^{-\ell} \mod M$ $1: Z \leftarrow 0$ $2: \operatorname{for} k = 0 \text{ to } \ell - 1 \operatorname{do}$ $3: Z \leftarrow Z + y_k \cdot X$ $4: q \leftarrow z_0 \cdot \mu \mod r$ $5: Z \leftarrow \frac{Z + q \cdot M}{r}$ $6: \operatorname{if} Z \ge M \operatorname{then}$ $7: Z \leftarrow Z - M$ $8: \operatorname{return} Z = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} z_i r^i$

The value $\mu = -m_0^{-1} \mod r$ is precomputed with Algorithm 1. At the beginning of the first loop iteration (k = 0) in Algorithm 2 we have that Z = 0 (at line 1 Z is set equal to zero). If at the beginning of iteration k for k > 0 it holds that Z < 2M then at the beginning of iteration k + 1 we have that Z < (2M + (r - 1)(M - 1) + (r - 1)M)/r = (r(2M) - (r - 1))/r < 2M. By induction it follows that after the for loop we have that $0 \le Z < 2M$ and we may need to subtract M from Z so that $0 \le Z < M$ (the final conditional subtraction at lines 6 and 7).

Notice that at the end of the for loop (before the conditional subtraction) we have that $Z \leq \frac{XY+(R-1)M}{R}$. Assume $0 \leq X, Y < 2M$ then $Z \leq \frac{(2M-1)^2+(R-1)M}{R} < \frac{4M^2+(R-1)M}{R} < 2M$ if R > 4M. It follows that by choosing R > 4M, a sequence of Montgomery products can be performed without the conditional subtraction until the final result is computed [204].

Algorithm 2 requires $2l^2 + l$ multiplications of radix-*r* digits. It is possible to combine Montgomery multiplication with sub-quadratic integer multiplication algorithms like Karatsuba's method [108] whose complexity is $O(\ell^{\log_2 3})$ or methods based on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) like Schönhage-Strassen method [181] whose complexity is $O(\ell \log \ell \log \ell \log \ell)$ and Fürer's method [74] whose complexity is $O(\ell \log \ell) 2^{O(\log^* \ell)}$ (where $\log^* x$ denotes the iterated logarithm function of *x*, defined as 0 if $x \le 1$ and $1 + \log^* (\log x)$ if x > 1 for a real number *x*). For instance, this can be done by "de-interleaving" the multiplication part and the reduction part of Algorithm 2 as follows. Precompute $U = -M^{-1} \mod R$, compute $S = \tilde{X} \cdot \tilde{Y}$ as a full product, compute $Q = (T \mod R) \cdot U \mod R$ as "half" full product, compute $T = Q \cdot M$ as a full product, compute $Z = \frac{S+T}{R}$ and then perform the subtraction if necessary. The above full and half products can be computed using sub-quadratic algorithms. However, this is advantageous only when the size of the integers to multiply is relatively large. For the applications discussed in the

following chapters Algorithm 2 is the most efficient.

Algorithm 3 shows the *binary left-to-right modular exponentiation* method [113, 4.6.3] modified to use Montgomery arithmetic (and Algorithm 2 as a sub-routine), which requires $\Theta(k)$ Montgomery multiplications for a *k*-bit exponent $E \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$. There exist other modular exponentiation techniques. For instance the *sliding window method* [8, 9.1.3] reduces the number of modular multiplications performed at the price of some pre-computation and memory storage and the Montgomery ladder [144] provides resistance to some side-channel attacks [117].

Algorithm 3 Radix-*r* binary left-to-right "Montgomery" exponentiation. Input: $X = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} x_i r^i$, the modulus $M = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} m_i r^i$ and $E = \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} e_j 2^j$ with $e_j \in \{0,1\}$, $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$, $e_{k-1} = 1$, $0 \le x_i, m_i < r, \ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ such that $r^{\ell-1} \le M < r^\ell$, gcd(r, M) = 1, $R = r^\ell$ and $0 \le X < M$ Output: $Z = X^E \mod M$ 1: $\tilde{X} \leftarrow X^{\sim} R^2 \mod M$ 2: $Z \leftarrow \tilde{X}$ 3: for j = k - 2 downto 0 do 4: $Z \leftarrow Z^{\sim} Z$ 5: if $e_j = 1$ then 6: $Z \leftarrow Z^{\sim} \tilde{X}$ 7: $Z \leftarrow Z^{\sim} 1$ 8: return $Z = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} z_i r^i$

2.4.2 Exact division

Algorithm 4 shows the exact division method originally proposed in [104] to compute Y/X with $X \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$, $Y \in Z_{\ge 0}$ and X | Y. The method avoids division using the fact that X | Y. If Z = Y/X then $ZX \equiv z_0x_0 \equiv y_0 \mod r$ so z_0 can be computed as $z_0 = (x_0^{-1} \cdot y_0) \mod r$. The algorithm iteratively computes the other digits of the quotient using the facts that if $T_k = Y - \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} z_h X r^h$ and in radix-r representation $T_k = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} t_i$ with $0 \le k \le m-n$ then $t_k \equiv z_{k+1}x_0 \mod r \Rightarrow z_{k+1} \equiv t_k x_0^{-1} \mod r$ and that $T_k \equiv 0 \mod r^{k+1}$. Notice that computing $T_{m-n} = Y - ZX = 0$ is not needed so the computation of

that $T_k \equiv 0 \mod r^{n+1}$. Notice that computing $T_{m-n} = Y - ZX = 0$ is not needed so the computation of z_{m-n} is performed outside the for loop at line 5.

The similarity with the Montgomery multiplication algorithm (see Algorithm 2) is evident.

2.4.3 A divisibility test

Algorithm 5 illustrates a "division free" method to test the divisibility of a radix-*r* integer *X* by an integer 0 < d < r with gcd(d, r) = 1. This method can be thought of as a variant of the exact division method described in 2.4.2. The main observation in this case is that if r|X then d|X if and only if $d|\frac{X}{r}$. The idea of the algorithm is to use Montgomery multiplication's trick (see subsection 2.4.1 for the details) to iteratively add kd for some $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ to X (the result will still be equal to X modulo d) such that X + kd is divisible by r (or equivalently $X + kd \equiv 0 \mod r$) and replace X with $\frac{X+kd}{r}$ until X < r. At this point it is enough to check whether X = 0 or not to determine whether the input X is divisible by d.

Algorithm 4 Radix-*r* exact division [104].

Input:
$$X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i r^i, Y = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} y_i r^i \text{ with } 0 \le x_i, y_i < r, m \ge n > 0 \text{ such that } X \mid Y \text{ and } \gcd(x_0, r) = 1$$

Output:
$$Z = Y/X = \sum_{i=0}^{m-n} z_i r^i \text{ with } 0 \le z_i < r$$

1:
$$x' \leftarrow x_0^{-1} \mod r$$

2:
$$for k = 0 \text{ to } m - n - 1 \text{ do}$$

3:
$$z_k \leftarrow x' \cdot y_0 \mod r$$

4:
$$Y \leftarrow \frac{Y - z_k \cdot X}{r}$$

5:
$$z_{m-n} \leftarrow x' \cdot y_0 \mod r$$

6:
$$return \ Z = \sum_{i=0}^{m-n} z_i r^i$$

Algorithm 5 Radix-*r* divisibility test.

Input: $X = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} x_i r^i$ with $0 \le x_i < r$, an integer d < r with gcd(d, r) = 1 and $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ **Output:** Return *TRUE* if d|X and *FALSE* otherwise 1: $\mu \leftarrow -d^{-1} \mod r$ 2: $x' \leftarrow x_0$ 3: $x_l \leftarrow 0 //$ "Pad" X with an extra 0 digit 4: **for** *i* = 1 to *l* **do** $k \leftarrow (x' \cdot \mu) \mod r$ $Z \leftarrow \frac{(x'+k \cdot d)}{r} / |Z| < 2d$ 5: 6: if $Z \ge d$ then 7: $Z \leftarrow Z - d$ 8: $Z \leftarrow (Z + x_i) / / Z < r + d$ 9: if $Z \ge r$ then 10: 11: $Z \leftarrow Z - d$ $x' \leftarrow Z$ 12: 13: **if** x' = 0 **then** 14: return TRUE 15: else return FALSE 16:

2.4.4 A compositeness test: Miller-Rabin

Theorem 1 (Fermat's little theorem). *Given a*, $p \in \mathbf{Z}$ with p prime and $p \not| a$, we have that

 $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \mod p$

or equivalently that $a^{p-1} - 1$ is an integer multiple of p. If we do not impose p a, then we have that

 $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$

instead or equivalently that $a^p - a$ is an integer multiple of p.

Given positive integers *n* and *a* (base) such that gcd(a, n) = 1, compute $b = a^{n-1} \mod n$. If $b \neq 1 \mod n$ then *n* fails the "Fermat test" and so it is composite by Theorem 1 (*a* is said to be a "witness" to the compositeness of *n*). Otherwise we say that *n* is "pseudoprime" to the base *a*. From Fermat's little theorem we know that a prime *n* will be pseudoprime to all bases *a* (positive integers with gcd(a, n) = 1),

but unfortunately there exist also composite numbers pseudoprime to all bases *a*, the Carmichael numbers [50]. There exist infinitely many Carmichael numbers [1], although as *n* grows, they occur much less often than primes [172]. Abstractly, Theorem 1 states that if *n* is prime *then* a certain equality is satisfied. Fermat's test uses the contrapositive of this implication, namely if the equality is not satisfied by *n then n* is not a prime. As a consequence it is not a primality test, but a compositeness test.

The Miller-Selfridge-Rabin pseudoprimality test [6, 140, 176] is based on Theorem 2, which follows from Fermat's little theorem and the fact that if *n* is prime then the equation $x^2 = 1 \mod n$ has only two solutions in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$: x = 1 and x = -1.

Theorem 2. If *n* is an odd prime such that $n - 1 = 2^s t$ with *t* odd and *a* is a positive integer with gcd(a, n) = 1 then one of the two following conditions must hold:

 $\begin{cases} a^{t} = 1 \mod n \\ a^{2^{i}t} = -1 \mod n \text{ for some } i \text{ with } 0 \le i \le s - 1 \end{cases}$

If *n* fails the above test, i.e., none of the above conditions hold, then *n* is composite and *a* is a witness to the compositeness of *n*. Otherwise if *n* passes the test we say that *n* is a "strong pseudoprime" to the base *a*. Unlike Fermat's test, there does not exist a composite *n* being a strong pseudoprime to all bases *a* with gcd(a, n) = 1. It can be shown [142], [176] that for each composite integer *n* with n > 9 the number of integers *a* with 0 < a < n such that *n* is a "strong pseudoprime" to the base *a* is at most $\frac{\phi(n)}{4}$. It follows that the probability that a uniformly random base *a* with 0 < a < n is a witness to the compositeness of *n* is larger than $(n - \frac{\phi(n)}{4})/n > (n - \frac{n}{4})/n = 3/4$. This result gives rise to Algorithm 6. On input an odd composite integer n > 9 and a positive integer *k* Algorithm 6 returns *strong pseudoprime* with probability less than $(1 - \frac{3}{4})^k = \frac{1}{4^k}$. The choice a = 2 allows to replace some modular multiplications needed to computer the modular exponentiation on line 4 (e.g., Montgomery multiplications computed at line 6 of Algorithm 3) with cheaper modular additions and in practice one iteration (i.e., setting k = 1) suffices to recognize "most" composites quickly.

Algorithm 6 Miller-Selfridge-Rabin compositeness test

Input: An odd integer *n* to be tested such that n > 3 and a positive integer k **Output:** Either *composite* or *strong pseudoprime* 1: Write n-1 as $n-1=2^{s}t$ where t is odd 2: **for** *i* = 1 to *k* **do** Pick a random integer (base) *a* such that 1 < a < n - 13: $b \leftarrow a^t \mod n$ 4: if $b \not\equiv \pm 1 \mod n$ then 5: $j \leftarrow 1$ 6: while $(j < s) \land (b \not\equiv -1 \mod n)$ do 7: $b \leftarrow b^2 \mod n$ 8: if $b \equiv 1 \mod n$ then 9: return composite 10: 11: $j \leftarrow j+1$ if $b \not\equiv -1 \mod n$ then 12: return composite 13:

2.5 Elliptic curves and genus 2 hyperelliptic curves

In this section we introduce the basic facts about elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves that are needed in this thesis.

2.5.1 Weierstrass curves

We use an informal definition of elliptic curves for the sake of simplicity in line with [130] and we refer the reader to [190, Chapter III] for a general and more formal introduction. We denote by *K* a field with characteristic different from 2, 3. An *elliptic curve E* over *K* is then defined by a short affine Weierstrass equation (2.1)

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b (2.1)$$

with $a, b \in K$ and $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$. The set of points E(K) of the elliptic curve E over K is defined as

$$E(K) = \{(x, y) \in K^2 \text{ such that } y^2 = x^3 + ax + b\} \cup \{O(\text{point at infinity})\}.$$
(2.2)

Such a set of points has the structure of an abelian group with the point at infinity *O* being the identity element. The group law is defined as follows (in additive notation):

- *Identity element*: O + P = P + O = P for all $P \in E(K)$.
- *Negative element*: Given $P = (x_1, y_1) \neq O$ and $Q = (x_2, y_2) \neq O$ we have that P + Q = O if and only if $x_1 = x_2$ and $y_1 = -y_2$; thus -(x, y) = (x, -y).
- Addition and doubling: Given $\lambda \in K$ such that $\lambda = (y_1 y_2)/(x_1 x_2)$ if $P \neq Q$ (therefore $x_1 \neq x_2$) or $\lambda = (3x_1^2 + a)/(2y_1)$ if P = Q, we have that P + Q = R, where $R = (x_3, y_3)$ with $x_3 = \lambda^2 x_1 x_2$ and $y_3 = -\lambda x_3 y_1 + \lambda x_1$.

We note that adding two distinct points and adding a point with "itself" (doubling) are different operations and that the point at infinity has no concrete representation in this coordinate system. The system of coordinates used above is usually referred to as *affine Weierstrass coordinates*. We use the following abbreviations to express the cost of elliptic curve operations in terms of finite field operations: **a** for field addition (or subtraction), **m** for field multiplication, **s** for field squaring, **i** for field inversion and **c** for multiplication by a constant depending on the curve equation. The cost of addition in Weierstrass affine coordinates is then $2\mathbf{m} + 1\mathbf{s} + 6\mathbf{a} + 1\mathbf{i}$ and the cost of doubling is $2\mathbf{m} + 2\mathbf{s} + 7\mathbf{a} + 1\mathbf{i}$. It is possible to use different coordinate systems with faster addition and doubling formulae than affine coordinates. For example, addition and doubling in *Weierstrass projective coordinates* require more field operations but avoid the inversion [60, Chapter 7]. In software a field inversion is usually significantly slower than field multiplication. When using projective coordinates the *set of points* E(K) of *E* over *K* is defined by equation (2.3)

$$E(K) = \{(x: y: z) \in \mathbb{P}^2(K) : y^2 z = x^3 + axz^2 + bz^3\}$$
(2.3)

where $\mathbb{P}^2(K)$ denotes the projective plane over *K*, i.e., the set of equivalence classes of triples $(x, y, z) \in K^3$, $(x, y, z) \neq (0, 0, 0)$; two triples (x, y, z) and (x', y', z') are equivalent if there exists $c \in K^*$ such that cx = x', cy = y' and cz = z'. The equivalence class containing (x, y, z) is denoted by (x : y : z). Given an elliptic curve *E* over *K*, the point $(0:1:0) \in E(K)$ is the point at infinity and it is the only point for which z = 0. All the other points of *E* are of the form (x : y : 1), where $x, y \in K$ satisfy equation (2.1).

In several cases the operation to optimize is *scalar multiplication* of a point *P* by a scalar $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ defined as $\underbrace{P + P + \dots + P}_{k}$. The *double-and-add* method to perform scalar multiplication is shown in

Algorithm 7. This method performs $\Theta(k)$ elliptic curve operations for *k*-bit exponent $K \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$. It is analogous to Algorithm 3 for modular exponentiation and methods like sliding-window exponentiation or the Montgomery ladder mentioned in Section 2.4.1 can be easily adapted to scalar multiplication.

Algorithm 7 Double-and-add elliptic curve scalar multiplication.

Input: $P \in E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ and $K = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} e_j 2^j$ with $e_j \in \{0, 1\}$, $e_{\ell-1} = 1$, and $\ell \in \mathbf{Z}_{>0}$ **Output:** $Q = K \cdot P$ with $Q \in E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ 1: $Q \leftarrow P$ 2: **for** j = l - 2 downto 0 **do** 3: $Q \leftarrow 2Q$ 4: **if** $e_j = 1$ **then** 5: $Q \leftarrow Q + P$ 6: **return** Q

In addition to varying the coordinate system, one can also use curve models defined by different equations.

2.5.2 Montgomery curves

Equation (2.4) defines a *Montgomery curve*. This family of curves was introduced by Peter Montgomery [144].

$$By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x, (2.4)$$

with $A^2 \neq 4$ and $B \neq 0$. The set of points of a Montgomery curve over a field *K* and the notion of projective coordinates are defined analogously to the case of Weierstrass curves. Montgomery curves provide faster arithmetic than Weierstrass curves for all the applications in which the *y* coordinate of points can be dropped. This is means that points are identified up to their sign, but despite that, it is still possible to compute scalar multiplication.

For all nonzero $\lambda \in K$, the point $(X : Y : Z) = (\lambda X : \lambda Y : \lambda Z)$ corresponds to the affine point $(X/Z, Y/Z) \in E(K)$ with $Z \neq 0$, x = X/Z and y = Y/Z satisfying equation (2.4). Given two distinct points in projective coordinates $P = (X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1)$, $Q = (X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2)$, and their difference $P - Q = (X_4 : Y_4 : Z_4)$, it is possible to derive efficient formulae for computing the *X* and *Z* projective coordinates of their sum $R = P + Q = (X_S : Y_S : Z_S)$, that do not involve *Y* coordinates:

$$X_S = Z_4 \cdot [(X_1 - Z_1)(X_2 + Z_2) + (X_1 + Z_1)(X_2 - Z_2)]^2,$$

$$Z_S = X_4 \cdot [(X_1 - Z_1)(X_2 + Z_2) - (X_1 + Z_1)(X_2 - Z_2)]^2.$$

These addition formulae can be computed at the cost of $4\mathbf{m} + 2\mathbf{s} + 6\mathbf{a}$ by caching some intermediate values.

Similarly given $P = (X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1)$ and $2P = (X_D : Y_D : Z_D)$ we have:

$$4X_1Z_1 = (X_1 + Z_1)^2 - (X_1 - Z_1)^2, \quad X_D = (X_1 + Z_1)^2 (X_1 - Z_1)^2,$$

$$Z_D = (4X_1Z_1)[(X_1 - Z_1)^2 + ((A + 2)/4)(4X_1Z_1)],$$

These doubling formulae can be computed at the cost of $3\mathbf{m}+2\mathbf{s}+4\mathbf{a}+1\mathbf{c}$ by caching some intermediate values.

As the addition formulae require the difference of two input points, the scalar multiplication (Q = kP for a positive integer k) is performed using a special case of addition chains called *Lucas*

chains [145]. An addition chain for $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ is a sequence of positive integer values $v_0 = 1, v_1, \dots, v_m = n$ with $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$), where for each $0 < j \le m$, $v_j = v_h + v_l$ for some $0 \le h, l < j$.

2.5.3 Edwards curves

The curves providing the fastest scalar multiplication are, as of today, *Edwards curves* originally introduced by Edwards in 2007 as a normal form for elliptic curves [67]. A more general version of these curves was introduced by Bernstein and Lange together with the first algorithm to compute point addition in projective coordinates whose cost is $10\mathbf{m} + 1\mathbf{s} + 7\mathbf{a} + 2\mathbf{c}$ [23]. The latter curves are today known as Edwards curves. Bernstein and Lange introduced also *inverted* Edwards coordinates resulting in a point addition cost of $9\mathbf{m} + 1\mathbf{s} + 7\mathbf{a} + 3\mathbf{c}$ [24]. Later, Bernstein et al. introduced a generalization of Edwards curves, namely *twisted* Edwards curves [14] and finally the fastest group arithmetic for twisted Edwards was introduced by Hisil et al. [99] with the use of an additional coordinate, i.e., the *extended twisted* Edwards coordinate system.

Let *K* be a field of odd characteristic, Edwards curves are defined by equation (2.5)

$$x^{2} + y^{2} = c^{2}(1 + dx^{2}y^{2})$$
(2.5)

where $c, d \in K$ with $cd(1 - dc^4) \neq 0$. This form is a special case of the more general twisted Edwards curve form defined by equation (2.6)

$$ax^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2 y^2 \tag{2.6}$$

where $a, d \in K$ with $ad(a - d) \neq 0$ (Edwards curves represent the special case where *a* can be rescaled to 1). Group operation formulae for these curves can be found in [14]. The set of points of a twisted Edwards curve over a field *K* and the notion of projective coordinates are defined analogously to the case of Weierstrass curves. In projective coordinates the point at infinity is (0:1:1) and the negative of (X:Y:Z) is (-X:Y:Z). For all $\lambda \neq 0 \in K$, $(X:Y:Z) = (\lambda X : \lambda Y : \lambda Z)$. This projective coordinate system for twisted Edwards curves is denoted by \mathscr{E} .

In the extended coordinate system a new coordinate t = xy is introduced to represent a point (x, y) in E(K) where E is defined by equation (2.6) in extended affine coordinates as (x, y, t). The map $(x, y, t) \rightarrow (x : y : t : 1)$ allows to move to projective coordinates. For all nonzero $\lambda \in K$, the point $(X : Y : T : Z) = (\lambda X : \lambda Y : \lambda T : \lambda Z)$ corresponds to the extended affine point $(X/Z, Y/Z, T/Z) \in E(K)$ with $Z \neq 0$, x = X/Z and y = Y/Z satisfying equation (2.6). For the auxiliary coordinate T it holds that T = XY/Z. This system is called extended twisted Edwards coordinates and is denoted by \mathscr{E}^e . The point at infinity is (0:1:0:1). The negative of (X : Y : T : Z) is (-X : Y : -T : Z). Given (X, Y, Z) in \mathscr{E} , passing to \mathscr{E}^e costs $3\mathbf{m} + 1\mathbf{s}$ by computing (XZ, YZ, XY, Z^2) whereas given (X : Y : T : Z) in \mathscr{E}^e passing to \mathscr{E} is cost-free by simply dropping T. Given two distinct points $P = (X_1 : Y_1 : T_1 : Z_1), Q = (X_2 : Y_2 : T_2 : Z_2) \in E(K)$ with E defined by equation (2.6) represented in \mathscr{E}^e with $Z_1 \neq 0$ and $Z_2 \neq 0$ their sum $R = P + Q = (X_S : Y_S : T_S : Z_S)$ is computed as:

$$\begin{split} X_S &= (X_1 Y_2 - Y_1 X_2)(T_1 Z_2 + Z_1 T_2), \\ Y_S &= (Y_1 Y_2 + a X_1 X_2)(T_1 Z_2 - Z_1 T_2), \\ T_S &= (T_1 Z_2 + Z_1 T_2)(T_1 Z_2 - Z_1 T_2), \\ Z_S &= (Y_1 Y_2 + a X_1 X_2)(X_1 Y_2 - Y_1 X_2). \end{split}$$

These addition formulae are independent of the curve constant *d* and can be computed at the cost

of 9m + 7a + 1c. Whereas $2P = (X_D : Y_D : T_D : Z_D)$ with $P = (X_1 : Y_1 : T_1 : Z_1) \in E(K)$ is computed as:

$$\begin{split} X_D &= 2X_1Y_1(2Z_1^2 - Y_1^2 - aX_1^2), \\ Y_D &= (Y_1^2 + aX_1^2)(Y_1^2 - aX_1^2), \\ T_D &= 2X_1Y_1(Y_1^2 - aX_1^2), \\ Z_D &= (Y_1^2 + aX_1^2)(2Z_1^2 - Y_1^2 - aX_1^2) \end{split}$$

These doubling formulae are also independent of the curve constant *d* and can be computed at the cost of $4\mathbf{m} + 4\mathbf{s} + 8\mathbf{a} + 1\mathbf{c}$. Formulae for *mixed* addition, namely for adding a point in affine coordinate to a point in projective coordinates can be derived setting $Z_2 = 1$. If a = -1 then the multiplication by the curve constant *a* can be saved and one further multiplication can be saved if $Z_2 = 1$. The cost can be reduced by mixing \mathcal{E}^e with \mathcal{E} . Notice that the cost of these formulae is higher than the cost of the formulae presented in [14] (i.e., $3\mathbf{m} + 4\mathbf{s} + 8\mathbf{a} + 1\mathbf{c}$).

Twisted Edwards curves are endowed also with *unified* and *complete* addition formulae. Unified addition formulae compute R = P + Q correctly even if P = Q (i.e., they can be used for doubling). Complete addition formulae are defined for all inputs, i.e., without exceptions for doubling, the neutral element and negatives. This type of addition formulae are desirable in cryptography as they prevent some side-channel attacks [103].

We now sketch the mixed scalar multiplication method presented in [99]. This elliptic curve scalar multiplication method is to date the fastest known in literature. The basic idea is to mix \mathscr{E}^e and \mathscr{E} and use the fact that no consecutive additions are computed. As a result it is possible to replace slower doublings in \mathscr{E}^e with faster doublings in \mathscr{E} :

- 1. If a point doubling is followed by another point doubling, use $\mathscr{E} \leftarrow 2\mathscr{E}$.
- 2. If a point doubling is followed by a point addition, use
 - (a) $\mathscr{E}^{e} \leftarrow 2\mathscr{E}$ for the doubling step and then,
 - (b) $\mathscr{E} \leftarrow \mathscr{E}^e + \mathscr{E}^e$ for the point addition step.

 $\mathscr{E} \leftarrow 2\mathscr{E}$ is performed using the faster formulae $(3\mathbf{m} + 4\mathbf{s} + 8\mathbf{a} + 1\mathbf{c})$ presented in [14]. The operation $\mathscr{E}^e \leftarrow 2\mathscr{E}$ is obtained by simply using the doubling formulae in \mathscr{E}^e mentioned above as they do not require the input coordinate T_1 and result in a cost-free conversion to \mathscr{E}^e . The formulae for addition in \mathscr{E}^e shown above are used for $\mathscr{E} \leftarrow \mathscr{E}^e + \mathscr{E}^e$. The computation of T_S can be avoided. This offsets the extra field multiplication necessary to compute T_D in $\mathscr{E}^e \leftarrow 2\mathscr{E}$.

2.5.4 Genus 2 hyperelliptic curves

We give a brief overview of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves describing the basic concepts used in Chapter 4. A genus 2 hyperelliptic curve over a field of odd characteristic K is defined by an equation $C: y^2 = f(x)$ where f(x) is a polynomial of degree 5 or 6 with no double roots. We assume for the remainder of this thesis that a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve is defined by equation 2.7.

$$C: y^2 = x^5 + f_3 x^3 + f_2 x^2 + f_1 x + f_0.$$
(2.7)

The set of points C(K) of C over K (defined in the same way as for elliptic curves, cf. equation (2.2)) is not endowed with a group structure, however roughly speaking, a group structure can be constructed by considering "pairs" of points as group elements. Formally we need to use the Jacobian of C, Jac(C), consisting of degree zero divisors on C modulo principal divisors (see [8, Chapter 4] for more details). Points of the Jacobian group in this case are weight 2 divisors. Such divisors can be represented in *Mumford representation* [152] as $(u(x), v(x)) = (x^2 + u_1x + u_0, v_1x + v_0) \in K[x] \times K[x]$, such that $u(x_1) = u(x_2) = 0$, $v(x_1) = y_1$ and $v(x_2) = y_2$, where (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) are two (not necessarily distinct) points in the set C(K), and $y_1 \neq -y_2$. Formulae for both addition and doubling of points of Jac(C) for C over finite fields exist in different coordinate systems and are analogous to addition and doubling formulae for elliptic curves. Addition and doubling formulae in affine coordinates are shown in Table 2.1 where a point $P \in Jac(C)$ is represented in Mumford affine coordinates as $P = (u_1, u_0, v_1, v_0, U_1 = u_1^2, U_0 = u_1u_0)$. Algorithm 7 can be used to compute kP for $P \in Jac(C)$ and a positive integer k.

Mumford affine addition

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{Input: } P_1 = (u_1, u_0, v_1, v_0, U_1 = u_1^2, U_0 = u_1 u_0), P_2 = (u_1', u_0', v_1', v_0', U_1' = u_1'^2, U_0' = u_1' u_0'), P_1, P_2 \in Jac(C) \\ \hline \sigma_1 \leftarrow u_1 + u_1', \quad \Delta_0 \leftarrow v_0 - v_0', \quad \Delta_1 \leftarrow v_1 - v_1', \quad M_1 \leftarrow U_1 - u_0 - U_1' + u_0', \quad M_2 \leftarrow U_0' - U_0, \\ M_3 \leftarrow u_1 - u_1', \quad M_4 \leftarrow u_0' - u_0, \quad t_1 \leftarrow (M_2 - \Delta_0) \cdot (\Delta_1 - M_1), \quad t_2 \leftarrow (-\Delta_0 - M_2) \cdot (\Delta_1 + M_1), \\ t_3 \leftarrow (-\Delta_0 + M_4) \cdot (\Delta_1 - M_3), \quad t_4 \leftarrow (-\Delta_0 - M_4) \cdot (\Delta_1 + M_3), \\ \ell_2 \leftarrow t_1 - t_2 \quad \ell_3 \leftarrow t_3 - t_4, \quad d \leftarrow t_3 + t_4 - t_1 - t_2 - 2(M_2 - M_4) \cdot (M_1 + M_3), \\ A \leftarrow 1/(d \cdot \ell_3), \quad B \leftarrow d \cdot A, \quad C \leftarrow d \cdot B, \quad D \leftarrow \ell_2 \cdot B, \quad E \leftarrow \ell_3^2 \cdot A, \quad CC \leftarrow C^2, \\ u_1'' \leftarrow 2D - CC - \sigma_1, \quad u_0'' \leftarrow D^2 + C \cdot (v_1 + v_1') - ((u_1'' - CC) \cdot \sigma_1 + (U_1 + U_1'))/2, \\ U_1'' \leftarrow u_1''^2, \quad U_0'' \leftarrow u_1'' \cdot u_0'', v_1'' \leftarrow D \cdot (u_1 - u_1'') + U_1'' - u_0'' - U_1 + u_0, \\ v_0'' \leftarrow D \cdot (u_0 - u_0') + U_0'' - U_0, \quad v_1'' \leftarrow E \cdot v_1'' + v_1 \quad v_0'' \leftarrow E \cdot v_0'' + v_0. \end{array}$

Output: $R = P_1 + P_2 = (u_1'', u_0'', v_1'', v_0'', U_1'' = u_1''^2, U_0'' = u_1''u_0''), R \in Jac(C).$ Cost: $\mathbf{i} + 17\mathbf{m} + 4\mathbf{s} + 48\mathbf{a}$

Mumford affine doubling

Input: $P_1 = (u_1, u_0, v_1, v_0, U_1 = u_1^2, U_0 = u_1 u_0)$, with constants $f_2, f_3 \in K$ (see equation (2.7)), $P_1 \in Jac(C)$

 $\begin{aligned} vv \leftarrow v_1^2, \quad vu \leftarrow (v_1 + u_1)^2 - vv - U_1, \quad M_1 \leftarrow 2v_0 - 2vu, \quad M_2 \leftarrow 2v_1 \cdot (u_0 + 2U_1), \\ M_3 \leftarrow -2v_1, \quad M_4 \leftarrow vu + 2v_0, \quad z_1 \leftarrow f_2 + 2U_1 \cdot u_1 + 2U_0 - vv, \quad z_2 \leftarrow f_3 - 2u_0 + 3U_1, \\ t_1 \leftarrow (M_2 - z_1) \cdot (z_2 - M_1), \quad t_2 \leftarrow (-z_1 - M_2) \cdot (z_2 + M_1), \\ t_3 \leftarrow (M_4 - z_1) \cdot (z_2 - M_3), \quad t_4 \leftarrow (-z_1 - M_4) \cdot (z_2 + M_3), \\ \ell_2 \leftarrow t_1 - t_2, \quad \ell_3 \leftarrow t_3 - t_4, \quad d \leftarrow t_3 + t_4 - t_1 - t_2 - 2(M_2 - M_4) \cdot (M_1 + M_3), \\ A \leftarrow 1/(d \cdot \ell_3), \quad B \leftarrow d \cdot A, \quad C \leftarrow d \cdot B, \quad D \leftarrow \ell_2 \cdot B, \quad E \leftarrow \ell_3^2 \cdot A, \\ u_1'' \leftarrow 2D - C^2 - 2u_1, \quad u_0'' \leftarrow (D - u_1)^2 + 2C \cdot (v_1 + C \cdot u_1), \quad U_1'' \leftarrow u_1''^2, \quad U_0'' \leftarrow u_1'' \cdot u_0'', \\ v_1'' \leftarrow D \cdot (u_1 - u_1'') + U_1'' - U_1 - u_0'' + u_0, \quad v_0'' \leftarrow D \cdot (u_0 - u_0'') + U_0'' - U_0, \\ v_1'' \leftarrow E \cdot v_1'' + v_1, \quad v_0'' \leftarrow E \cdot v_0'' + v_0. \end{aligned}$ Output: $R = 2P_1 = (u_1'', u_0'', v_1'', v_0'', U_1'' = u_1''^2, U_0'' = u_1''u_0''), R \in Jac(C).$

Table 2.1 – Addition and doubling in the Jacobian group of a hyperelliptic curve *C* defined over an odd characteristic field *K* in Mumford affine coordinates.

2.6 Integer factorization algorithms

In this section we describe some of the integer factoring algorithms we use in the following chapters. In particular we give details about the factoring algorithms used in the post-sieving phase of the number

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field sieve (NFS) as they are used in Chapter 3. We also give a very high level overview of the structure of the NFS. This structure is common to several simpler factoring algorithm like the quadratic sieve (QS) and touch upon the aspects in which the NFS differs. For a comprehensive description of NFS we refer the reader to [128]. We denote by n the positive composite integer we want to factor and assume that n is not a prime power (this can be checked in polynomial time in $\log n$).

2.6.1 Trial division

The most naive trial division method consists in simply trying to divide *n* by all $d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 2}$ such that $d \leq \sqrt{n}$, or more in general $d \le B \le \sqrt{n}$ for a desired positive upper bound B (we might aim to detect factors only up to a certain size). To find a factor of *n* (or declare it as prime), the number of trial divisions required is about \sqrt{n} in the worst case. It is trivial to do better: if the number is odd or the 2's factors are first removed, then it drops to $\frac{\sqrt{n}}{2}$ by trial dividing for odd numbers only. This improvement can be regarded as a trivial example of "prime wheel". To use a prime wheel we first multiply together primes p_i not larger than a fixed positive integer bound $B_w \le B$, i.e., we compute $M = \prod_i p_i$ with p_i prime. $p_i{\leq}B_w$ Then we compute all $m_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ such that $gcd(M, m_i) = 1$ and $m_i \leq M$, where $0 \leq i < \phi(M)$ with $\phi(M)$ denoting the Euler's totient function of M. For each consecutive pair m_{i+1} , m_i with $0 \le i < \phi(M) - 1$ we store the difference $\delta_i = m_{i+1} - m_i$ and also $\delta_{\phi(M)-1} = m_0 - m_{\phi(M)-1} \mod M$ in a table. After we trial divide by the primes dividing *M* we set d = 1 and we iteratively trial divide by $d \leftarrow d + \delta_{(i) \mod \phi(M)}$ for $i = 0, 1, \dots$ until d > B. By doing so we only trial divide by values not divisible by the primes dividing M and avoid useless trial divisions. If we have enough memory we can do better by preparing a list of primes *p* such that $2 \le p \le B$ (or just the difference of each pair of consecutive primes in the interval) and then trial divide just by every prime in the list. If $B = \sqrt{n}$ this requires $\pi(\sqrt{n}) \approx \frac{\sqrt{n}}{\log \sqrt{n}}$ by the prime number theorem. Each trial division can be performed in different ways, for instance:

- 1. Use a division algorithm computing both quotient and remainder, and check whether the latter is 0 or not.
- 2. Take the gcd of *n* and the candidate divisor and if it is larger than 1 use an exact division algorithm.
- 3. Use a divisibility test and then use exact division algorithm if needed.

If we are interested in testing whether an integer *n* is prime or not, or which are the primes appearing in its factorization we can directly use one of the above variations. If we need to find the full prime factorization of *n* then every time we find a divisor *d* we have to repeatedly compute $n \leftarrow n/d$ until $d \not| n$ to find its multiplicity. Similarly we can check if the number *n* is *B*-smooth or *B*-powersmooth for a positive integer bound *B*.

2.6.2 Pollard p-1

Pollard's p-1 method for integer factorization [169] is an application of Fermat's little theorem (see Theorem 1). On input a composite integer n, the method works as follows. Select an arbitrary integer a such that $a \neq \pm 1$ and gcd(a, n) = 1 (otherwise, we can immediately factor n). Fix a positive integer bound B_1 and compute the value $R = \prod_{p_i \leq B_1} p_i^{\lfloor \log_{p_i} B_1 \rfloor}$ with p_i prime, namely R is the product of all prime powers less than B_1 . Calculate $b = a^R \mod n$ and then g = gcd(b-1, n). The method succeeds if 1 < g < n, in which case g is a proper divisor of n.

Notice that *R* does not have to be calculated explicitly and the computation of $b = a^R \mod n$ can be carried out in $O(\log R) = O(B_1)$ operations modulo *n* with classic modular exponentiation algorithms (see Section 2.4.1). Assume *p* is a prime divisor of *n*, by Fermat's little theorem it follows that if p - 1|R then $b \equiv 1 \mod p$ and so $p|\operatorname{gcd}(b-1, n)$. Therefore, if for some prime divisor *p* of *n* the value p - 1 (i.e.,

the order of the multiplicative group of residues modulo p, i.e., $(\mathbf{Z}/p\mathbf{Z})^*$) is B_1 -powersmooth then g will be larger than 1. As mentioned above, the method succeeds if 1 < g < n, whereas if g = n it is likely that B_1 is too large (for each prime factor p of n the value p - 1 is B_1 -powersmooth) and we can reduce it and retry with the resulting smaller R. If g = 1 then the method has failed and we can abandon it, or increase B_1 and retry, or perform the so called stage 2 [144]. In stage 2, we assume that for some prime factor p of n the value p - 1 is B_1 -powersmooth except for one prime s such that $B_1 < s < B_2$ where B_2 is a second integer bound larger than B_1 . In other words, we assume that p - 1 = Qs where Q|R and s is the outlying prime. Since (p - 1)|Rs it follows by Fermat's little theorem that if $c_s = b^s \equiv a^{Rs} \mod n$ then $p|(c_s - 1)$ and $p|\gcd(c_s - 1, n)$. In stage 2 we look for such prime s.

Let s_j denote the *j*-th prime. The standard stage 2 computes c_{s_j} for each $B_1 \le s_j \le B_2$ and checks if $gcd(c_{s_j}, n) > 1$ for each c_{s_j} . The sequence of gcd computations can be avoided by multiplying together the values c_{s_j} , i.e., calculating $W = \prod c_{s_j}$, and then checking if gcd(W, n) > 1. In practice the difference of consecutive primes is small and this can be used to compute each c_{s_j} as follows. For each pair of consecutive primes (s_j, s_{j+1}) in $[B_1, B_2]$ compute $b^{s_{j+1}-s_j} \mod n$ and store it in a table. If the largest difference is D, compute $b^{2j} \mod n$ for $1 \le j \le D/2$ (the difference of two primes is even) and store each value in a look-up table. This pre-computation requires D/2 multiplications and memory space for D/2 values.

Then compute $c_{s_1} = b^{s_1} \mod n$ where s_1 is the smallest prime in $[B_1, B_2]$, with $O(\log s_1)$ modular multiplications. Finally for each prime $B_1 \le s_j \le B_2$ compute $c_{s_j} = b^{s_j} \mod n$ as $c_{j-1} \cdot b^{s_j - s_{j-1}} \mod n$, namely as the product of the partial result corresponding to the current prime and the value in the look-up table corresponding to the difference between the next and the current prime, and then $W = \prod c_{s_j}$. For each prime, two multiplications are needed (one for the above computation and one for accumulating the result if the gcd with n is computed at the end). As a result $2(\pi(B_2) - \pi(B_1)) \approx 2\left(\frac{B_2}{\log B_2} - \frac{B_1}{\log B_1}\right) + D/2$ multiplications are performed in this last step.

We can do better using a different time-memory trade-off known as baby-step giant-step (BSGS). The idea is to write each prime *s* such that $B_1 \le s \le B_2$ in radix *w* as s = tw - u where $w \approx \sqrt{B_2}$, $t_1 \le t \le t_2$ with $t_1 = \left\lceil \frac{B_1}{w} \right\rceil$, $t_2 = \left\lceil \frac{B_2}{w} \right\rceil$. Now we precompute the values $b^u \mod n$, the "baby steps", for $0 \le u < w$ and store them into a table. Then we can compute the values $b^{tw} \mod n$ for $t_1 \le t \le t_2$, the "giant steps", and store them in a table or we can simply process primes in ascending order and compute the values as they are needed. Notice that if s = tw - u, $gcd(b^s - 1, n) = gcd(b^{tw} - b^u, n)$. Thus, for each prime s = tw - u in $[B_1, B_2]$ we compute the value $b^{tw} - b^u \mod n$ and we can accumulate it by multiplying with the previous ones as before and compute one gcd with *n* at the end. With this approach we need about $\sqrt{B_2}$ multiplications to compute the baby steps, and $O(\log w + \log t_1 + t_2 - t_1) = O\left(\log \sqrt{B_2} + \log \left\lceil \frac{B_1}{\sqrt{B_2}} \right\rceil + \left\lceil \sqrt{B_2} \right\rceil - \left\lceil \frac{B_1}{\sqrt{B_2}} \right\rceil\right) = O(\sqrt{B_2})$ multiplications to compute the giant steps. The number of multiplications needed for the final step is $\pi(B_2) - \pi(B_1) \approx \left(\frac{B_2}{\log B_2} - \frac{B_1}{\log B_1}\right)$. If B_2 and B_1 are large enough we can roughly halve the number of multiplications compared to the previous approach.

Advanced Pollard p-1 BSGS stage 2. We can offset some of the baby steps pre-computations (and consequently stored values) not corresponding to any prime, if we consider only values of u with gcd(u, w) = 1. It follows that choosing the radix w as the product of small primes close to $\sqrt{B_2}$ we can offset more values. Smaller values of w can also be tried and in general the optimal choice has to be found experimentally.

We can reduce the number of multiplications in the final step at the cost of some extra precomputations. Assume we can find values (t, u) as before with the additional property that we can represent pairs of primes $B_1 \le s_i, s_j \le B_2$ as $s_i = tw + u$ and $s_j = tw - u$. We can check two primes in one pair "at once" if we slightly modify the values computed in the final step. Namely, for each prime pair we compute $b^{(tw)^2} - b^{(u)^2} \mod n$ since if *s* is the outlying prime we are looking for and $s|tw \pm u|(tw)^2 - (u)^2$ then $p|b^s - 1|b^{(tw)^2} - b^{(u)^2}$. To compute efficiently the baby steps and the giant **Algorithm 8** Evaluate $b^{(x)^2} \mod n$ at x = k + ih for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., l with $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$.

Output: $C = \{c_i = b^{(k+ih)^2} \mod n \text{ for } i = 0, 1, 2, ..., l\}$ 1: $c_0 \leftarrow b^{(k)^2} \mod n, c_1 \leftarrow b^{(k+h)^2} \mod n, c_2 \leftarrow b^{(k+2h)^2} \mod n$ 2: $e_0 \leftarrow c_0$ 3: $e_1 \leftarrow c_1 \cdot (c_0)^{-1} \mod n = b^{(2kh+h^2)} \mod n$ 4: $e_2 \leftarrow c_2 \cdot (c_1)^{-1} \cdot (e_1)^{-1} \mod n = b^{(2h^2)} \mod n$ 5: $c \leftarrow e_0$ 6: $C \leftarrow \{e_0\}$ 7: **for** i = 0 to l **do** 8: $c \leftarrow c \cdot e_1 \mod n$ 9: $e_1 \leftarrow e_1 \cdot e_2 \mod n$ 10: $C \leftarrow C \cup \{c\}$ 11: **return** C

steps we observe that both the *u* values and the *tw* values are in an arithmetic progression. We can efficiently evaluate $b^{(k+ih)^2} \mod n$ for i = 0, 1, 2, ... where *k* is the first integer value of the arithmetic progression and *h* is the positive integer difference of consecutive values.

As shown in Algorithm 8, after some extra pre-computations we can calculate the baby step and the giant step values at the cost of only one additional multiplication per value with respect to the previous approach. As far as the bounds for the *u* values and *t* values are concerned we have that $t_1 \le t \le t_2$ with $t_1 = \left\lfloor \frac{B_1}{w} \right\rfloor$, $t_2 = \left\lceil \frac{B_2}{w} \right\rceil$ and $u \le u_{max}$ with $u_{max} \ge \frac{w}{2}$. The cost of the algorithm is proportional to the number of prime pairs to be checked. If $\pi(B_2) - \pi(B_1)$ is much larger than $t_2 - t_1$ and u_{max} , the overall cost is mainly determined by the number of prime pairs to be checked, which is lower bounded by $\frac{\pi(B_2) - \pi(B_1)}{2}$ in the ideal case in which every prime is paired with another prime. A larger value for u_{max} allows to pair a larger number of primes and consequently reduce the number of pairs to be checked, but the practical effect on the performance has to be verified because it may increase the number of memory accesses.

Other flavors of stage 2 and optimization tricks for relatively large bounds B_1 and B_2 can be found in [144, 148].

2.6.3 ECM

The elliptic curve method (ECM) for integer factorization was proposed by Hendrik Lenstra in 1985 [130]. ECM can be derived from Pollard's (p-1)-method (see Section 2.6.2) conceptually "replacing" the multiplicative group of residues modulo $p((\mathbf{Z}/p\mathbf{Z})^*)$ with the group of points on a random elliptic curve E defined over $\mathbf{Z}/p\mathbf{Z}$. We recall that p is an unknown prime divisor of the composite integer n we want to factor. Fix a positive integer bound B_1 and compute the value $k = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i^{\lfloor \log_{p_i} B_1 \rfloor}$ with p_i prime

as in Pollard p - 1. Select the coordinates of a point P at random (in Z/nZ) and then an elliptic curve E defined over Z/nZ such that $P \in E(Z/nZ)$, where n is the integer to factor. Next, compute the multiple $k \cdot P$ of P with a scalar multiplication. Notice that the algorithm works with elliptic curves defined over the finite ring Z/nZ. The set of points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite ring is still endowed with a group structure, but the addition law is different from the finite field case and requires special addition and doubling formulae. ECM simply uses the formulae for the prime field case (see Section 2.5) although they may fail in some cases. Such a failure is actually a success in ECM as it is very likely to unveil a factor of n. In fact if for some prime divisor p of n, the point $k \cdot P$ and the point at infinity O of the curve become the same modulo p (but not modulo n) the algorithm succeeds. If affine coordinates are used the group law failure is due to an attempt to compute the inverse modulo n of a value not

coprime to *n* and thus not invertible. This means that taking the greatest common divisor of this value and *n* will yield a factor. If projective coordinates are used to avoid inversions with O = (0:1:0), one must explicitly check for the above "failure" condition. This condition is equivalent to *p* dividing the *z* (or *x*) coordinate of the result, calculating the greatest common divisor g = gcd(z, n) (or g = gcd(x, n)). The conditions under which 1 < g < n or g = 1, *n* are the same as for Pollard p - 1-method with the only difference that order p - 1 of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ is replaced by the order of $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$. Equation (2.3) with $K = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ defines the set of points ECM works on in projective coordinates. The difference with the prime field case is that besides "affine" points of the form (x : y : 1), where $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ and the point at infinity (0:1:0), there are also other projective points not corresponding to any affine point. If the order of *P* in $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ is B_1 -powersmooth for *all* prime factors *p* of *n*, then kP will equal the point at infinity (0:1:0) and the gcd of x(z) and *n* will be *n*. Whereas if there exists at least one factor *p* of *n* such that the order of *P* in $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ is B_1 -powersmooth, then kP will equal one of the other projective points we mentioned above and the gcd of x(z) and *n* will be a non trivial-factor of *n*.

Hasse's theorem (1934) [190, Chapter V, Theorem 1.1] states that the order of $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ is of the form $p + 1 - t_p$, where t_p is an integer depending on *E* and *p* for which $|t_p| \le 2\sqrt{p}$ (more details on this are given in Chapter 6). If there exists a prime factor *p* of *n* such that the number $p + 1 - t_p$ is B_1 -smooth (and so *k* is a multiple thereof), then ECM is likely to find a non-trivial divisor of *n*.

In [130] it is proven that if an elliptic curve over \mathbf{F}_p , where p > 3 is prime, is chosen at random, then its order is approximately¹ uniformly distributed in the interval $(p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p}, p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p})$. It follows that, if the algorithm fails, one can perform another *run* selecting a different elliptic curve. This will likely yield a new t_p value and so the number $p + 1 - t_p$ will have a a fresh chance to be B_1 -smooth.

The heuristic expected running time of ECM to factor a composite positive integer *n* depends on *p*, the smallest prime divisor of *n* and is based on a conjecture on the smoothness of $#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ in the interval $(p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p}, p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p})$. Its expression in L-notation is:

$$L_p\left[\frac{1}{2};\sqrt{2}\right]O(M(\log n)),$$

where $O(M(\log n))$ is the running time of a multiplication modulo *n*. The worst case occurs if n = pq with p, q primes $\approx \sqrt{n}$ and the running time becomes $L_n[\frac{1}{2};1]$. There are other algorithms whose running time is given by the latter expression but independent of the size of the prime factors of *n*. For example, the expected running time of the quadratic sieve (QS) [173] is the same as ECM in the worst case. The advantage of ECM is that it is expected to be faster in presence of small prime factors.

In the event that one run of ECM fails it is possible to perform a stage 2 analogous to the stage 2 we described for Pollard p - 1. Let Q (i.e., Q = kP) be the point computed by ECM algorithm as described at the beginning of the current section. We refer to this algorithm as stage 1. If stage 1 fails, the point Q is output. The number of curve operations required to compute Q is $O(\log k) = O(B_1)$ using Algorithm 7. Assume that sQ = O in $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ for some prime factor p of n (but not for all of them), where s is a prime between B_1 and a larger value B_2 . In other words assume that the order of Q in $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ is s (i.e., the order of P in $E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ is B_1 -powersmooth except for the prime s). Stage 2 of ECM looks for this prime s the same way as for Pollard p - 1. All the variants and improvements we discussed for Pollard p - 1 in Section 2.6.2 like BSGS apply to ECM (see also [146] and [44]) as well and some of them are seen "in action" and more detail in Chapter 3.

ECM can be implemented with different types of curves like the ones we have described in Section 2.5. In particular it is convenient to choose curves providing fast scalar multiplication like Edwards curves (see [16, 39] and Chapter 3 for more details on their use in ECM) and having some known small

¹This is in fact proven for the interval $(p+1-\sqrt{p}, p+1+\sqrt{p})$ only.

factor in their group order to increase the probability of it being smooth. Recently there has been renewed active research on finding families of curves having "good" group orders for ECM [15, 10].

In this thesis we see ECM at work in the context of "cofactorization" [111], [110], a step of the NFS (see 2.6.4) to factor relatively small auxiliary positive integers. Several works have explored this application of the algorithm [62, 75, 191, 89, 133, 166, 214, 39]. However, ECM has also two applications in the context of large integer factorization. One is the factorization of integers whose size is out of reach for the NFS, and so one can only hope that these integers have a small prime factor that can be discovered by ECM (see [41] for a practical application). The second one is the factorization of moduli used in the RSA *multiprime* [178] or *unbalanced* [186] variants in which the modulus is the product of more than two primes of about the same size and the product of a small and large prime respectively.

2.6.4 The number field sieve (NFS)

The general number field sieve (GNFS) [128] is the asymptotically fastest publicly known algorithm to factor RSA moduli [178]. An RSA modulus is the product of two large primes of roughly the same size. The special number field sieve (SNFS) was developed by generalizing some prior ideas [58], [167]. The SNFS [128] is tailored to factor numbers having a special form. The GNFS was developed later on as generalization of the SNFS and is nowadays the best method to factor RSA moduli. The current RSA factoring record was set in 2010 with the GNFS for a 768-bit RSA modulus [111], [112]. In the remainder of this thesis we denote the GNFS simply by NFS.

The idea of the NFS is to find integer solutions x, y to $x^2 \equiv y^2 \mod n$. If such integers are found, then with probability at least 1/2 either gcd(x - y, n) or gcd(x + y, n) will yield a non-trivial factor of n [64]. Other algorithms like the quadratic sieve (QS) [173] or the continued fraction method [124] are based on the same idea (see also [64] and [150]). These algorithms have running time $L_n[\frac{1}{2};1]$ whereas the NFS has running time $L_n[\frac{1}{3}; \sqrt[3]{\frac{69}{9}}]$. See [57] for a variant of the NFS to factor multiple integers.

Several algorithms searching for a congruence of squares consists of two steps. A *relation collection* step in which many auxiliary small integers of a particular form are generated and then checked for smoothness with respect to some positive bound *B* (see Section 2.2). The smooth values are collected. The relation collection is followed by a *linear algebra* phase in which a linear system is solved to find subsets of the collected smooth integers whose products will yield a pair of integer squares x^2 , y^2 modulo *n*. The bound *B* defines the *factor base*, namely the set of all primes less than or equal to *B*.

In both the QS and the NFS the candidate integer values are generated evaluating polynomials with integer coefficients at integer values within a given range. The great advantage of generating values in this fashion is that to determine which of these values are *B*-smooth one can use a *sieving* procedure that processes all the values at once using a time-memory trade off. Sieving is significantly faster than checking one value at the time with factoring algorithms.

Sieving. Assume we are given a polynomial with integer coefficients f(X), an integer range $[X_1, X_2]$ and we want to find all the values X in this range such that f(X) is B-smooth. We observe that for a prime p we have that if p | f(X) then $p | f(X + kp) \forall k \in \mathbb{Z}$. It follows that if we find the roots of f(X) modulo p then for each of such roots X_p we have that $p | f(X_p + kp) \forall k \in \mathbb{Z}$. Now, the values X_k in $[X_1, X_2]$ such that p | f(X) are obtained as follows

$$X_0 = (X_p - (X_1 \mod p)) \mod p$$
(2.8)

$$X_k = X_1 + X_0 + kp, \forall k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ge 0} \text{ such that } X_k \le X_2, \tag{2.9}$$

for each root X_p . The same reasoning is true if we look for polynomial values divisible by prime powers, with the only difference that now we need to find polynomial roots modulo p^{α} for a prime p and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$. Methods to find polynomial roots modulo primes and prime powers can be found in [60, 2.3.3].

Assume that the number of integers in the interval $[X_1, X_2]$ is M > 0. If we initialize an array of M integers with 1's and then for each prime power $p^{\alpha} < B$ with $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ and for each value X in $[X_1, X_2]$ found as above we multiply the corresponding element in the array by p we have that the elements X in $[X_1, X_2]$ such that f(X) is B-smooth are those whose corresponding value in the array at the end of this procedure is exactly f(X). We can replace multiplications with cheaper additions if in the above procedure we initialize the array with 0's instead of 1's and replace each multiplication by p with the addition of the value $[\log p]$. In the end the values X for which f(X) is B-smooth are those whose corresponding value in the array is close to $\log f(X)$. By using logarithms we may erroneously declare some non B-smooth values as B-smooth, however this can be obviated to by performing some post-sieving factoring to discard them. If M > B then after finding the polynomial roots the running time of sieving is proportional to $M \log \log B + \pi(B) + O(M)$ [60, 3.2.1]. Sieving can also be used to find prime values within an interval or to find the complete factorizations of the integer values within an interval or to find prime values and practical optimizations thereof are presented in Chapter 6.

QS and NFS. In the QS one looks (using sieving) for *B*-smooth values of the form $Y_i = f(X_i) = X_i^2 - n$ where $X_i = \sqrt{n} + i$ for i = 1, 2, ... where *B* determines the factor base. We assume that we sieve for values $X_i \leq \lfloor \sqrt{2n} \rfloor$ so that $X_i^2 - n = X_i^2 \mod n$. For each *B*-smooth Y_i we have that $Y_i = \prod_{j=1}^{\pi(B)} p_j^{\alpha_j}$ where $p_j \leq B$ is a prime and $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$, and we can define the exponent vector $\bar{v}_i = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{\pi(B)})$. The vector \bar{v}_i establishes a *relation* between Y_i and the primes p_i in the factor base and relations can be used to construct the congruence of squares modulo *n* as follows. If we find a subset *S* of the *B*-smooth Y_i values such that the components of the exponent vector of the product $Y = \prod Y_i$ are all even, then *Y* is a square and we obtain the congruence of squares $Y \equiv X^2 \mod n$ where $X = \prod X_i$ and we can attempt to factor *n* computing $gcd(\sqrt{Y} \pm X, n)$. The problem of finding a subset *S* as above can be reduced to a linear algebra problem if we reduce the relation vectors \bar{v}_i modulo 2 component-wise as it becomes equivalent to finding a subset of relation vectors whose sum is 0 modulo 2, or in other words a subset of linearly dependent vectors. Then if we collect at least $\pi(B) + 1$ relations (more if we want increase the chance of finding a subset leading to a non-trivial congruence of squares) we can use linear algebra tools like Gaussian elimination to find these subsets (as the resulting systems are sparse, more efficient parallelizable algorithms for sparse systems like block Lanczos [147] or block Wiedemann [203] are used in practice).

The NFS differs from the QS in the relation collection phase. The NFS relation collection produces asymptotically smaller values than the QS relation collection (and therefore more likely to be smooth) and this results in a significantly better running time. We provide an operational description of the relation collection in the NFS in Chapter 3 and refer the reader to the literature [128], [174] for more information.

We finally point out that in practice, in the relation collection, smooth values with respect to the factor base except for one or more (e.g., 3 or 4) primes larger than the smoothness bound *B* are also collected. Such values can be multiplied together so that in the factorization of their product the large primes have even exponent, thus yielding useful extra relations [60, 6.1.4], [127]. The use of large primes allows to choose a smaller smoothness bound B' < B (namely a smaller factor base) therefore reducing the time spent on sieving. As the large primes lie outside the factor base, sieving is modified to report B'-smooth or B'-smooth values except for a co-factor of reasonable size, so that there is a good chance that it will be the product of one or more of the allowed large primes. This variation together with the use of logarithms for sieving as described above, makes it necessary to add a post-sieving phase (sometimes referred to as cofactorization if it involves only factoring the outlying co-factor) in

which a combination of the factoring algorithms described in the remainder of this section is used to factor the reported values and discard false positives (practical details about cofactorization can be found in [110], [119]). In Chapter 3 we describe the post-sieving phase and its full implementation on GPUs.

2.7 The Pollard rho algorithm for discrete logarithms

Let $\langle g \rangle$ be the finite cyclic group generated by the element g with group law written additively. If h is an element of $\langle g \rangle$ the *discrete logarithm problem* is the problem of finding an integer $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ such that h = kg. The Pollard rho algorithm [170] was originally proposed as a factoring method and subsequently a variant to solve the discrete logarithm problem in finite cyclic groups was derived [171]. In the following we focus on prime order subgroups of the group of points $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ of an elliptic curve E defined over the prime field \mathbb{F}_p but the description is also valid for prime order subgroups of the groups of points of the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve defined over \mathbb{F}_p . We denote such a subgroup having prime order q and generator $P = (x, y) \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ by $\langle P \rangle$. Given some $Q \in \langle P \rangle$, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ECDLP is to find $k \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ such that Q = kP. If the elliptic curve does not have special properties, generic (namely, designed to work in a generic finite group without exploiting properties of a specific finite group representation) algorithms like Pollard rho are believed to be the asymptotically fastest algorithms for solving the ECDLP.

2.7.1 The Pollard rho algorithm for ECDLP

The Pollard rho algorithm is based on the result known as the *birthday paradox*, i.e., if elements are drawn uniformly at random with replacement from a finite set *S* the expected number of draws before hitting the same element twice is $\sqrt{\frac{\pi|S|}{2}}$ [113, Exercise 3.1.12]. Given $Q \in \langle P \rangle$ as above, the idea of the algorithm is to find a collision (two distinct elements mapped to the same image) in the function $M : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \to \langle P \rangle$ defined as M(a, b) = aP + bQ with $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$. If such a collision is found, i.e., four integers $a, b, a', b' \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that aP + bQ = a'P + b'Q and $b' - b \neq 0 \mod q$ (if the latter condition is not satisfied we would have an unlikely "fruitless" collision) then the value $(a - a')/(b' - b) \mod q$ is a solution of the ECDLP.

An idealized version of the algorithm would use a truly random walk. At step 0 an initial point $P_0 \in G$ is selected as $P_0 = a_0 P$ where a_0 is a positive integer chosen uniformly at random. At step *i* with $i \ge 1$ the walk selects a random point $P_i \in \langle P \rangle$: as $P_i = a_i P + b_i Q$ for uniformly random $a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{Z}$. The expected number of steps before finding a collision between P_i and P_j with j < i by looking up in a hash table is $\sqrt{\frac{\pi q}{2}}$.

The version of the algorithm described above needs storage for a number of points which is exponential in the group size. To obviate this problem the actual Pollard rho algorithm uses an approximation of a truly random walk. Two types of walk have been proposed and analyzed in literature: *mixed walks* and *additive walks*. A mixed walk is defined as follows. Given two small non negative integers *r* and *s* define a partition function $\ell : \langle P \rangle \rightarrow [0, r + s - 1]$ such that $\langle P \rangle_j = \{R : R \in \langle P \rangle$ and $\ell(R) = j\}$ where the sets $\langle P \rangle_j$ have approximately the same cardinality. Pre-compute the points $F_j = c_j P + d_j Q$ for random integers $c_j, d_j \in [1, q - 1]$ for all $j \in [0, r - 1]$ and store them in a lookup table. The first point in the walk is selected as $P_0 = a_0 P$ for a random (but known) integer $a_0 \in [1, q - 1]$ and at step $i \ge 0$ the next point is computed as $P_{i+1} = f(P_i)$ using the following iteration function:

$$f(P_i) = \begin{cases} P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)} \text{ if } 0 \le \ell(P_i) < r, \\ 2P_i, \text{ if } r \le \ell(P_i) < r + s. \end{cases}$$
(2.10)

An additive walk is simply a mixed walk where s = 0 and consequently the iteration function involves point additions only. The walk defined by Pollard in the original version of the algorithm is a *mixed walk* with r = 2 and s = 1 (see [171]). One can imagine a walk pictorially as having an initial "tail" part followed by a "loop" part that closes on itself exactly at the first collision point as depicted in Figure 2.1. A collision in the walk can be detected using Floyd's cycle finding method [113, Exercise 3.1.6] that consists in computing at each step the point P_{2i} in addition to P_i for i = 0, 1, ... and check whether $P_{2i} = P_i$. Assume $i = \mu$ (see Figure 2.1) then $P_i = P_{\mu}$ and $P_{2i} = P_{2\mu}$. The distance between the two points is $\delta = 2i - i = 2\mu - \mu \equiv \mu \mod \lambda$ and if $\delta = 0$ we find a collision. Otherwise after step i + 1 we have that $\delta = 2(i + 1) - (i + 1) = 2(\mu + 1) - (\mu + 1) \equiv \mu + 1 \mod \lambda$. So the distance δ increases by 1 modulo λ after each step. It follows that starting from $i = \mu$, after at most $\lambda - 1$ steps, δ becomes equal to 0 and a collision is detected. Alternatively one can use a collision detection method that converges faster in practice but requires a stack data structure whose size is logarithmic in the number of steps [157].




Figure 2.1 - Pictorial view of a Pollard rho walk.

Both parts have expected length $\sqrt{\frac{\pi q}{8}}$ [70]. At each iteration one elliptic curve addition is required to compute the next point and two integer additions are needed to keep track of the integer multipliers *a* and *b* such that $P_i = aP + bQ$, so that once a collision is found the value that solves the discrete logarithm can be computed (if the collision is not fruitless cf. below).

Both mixed and additive walks do not behave as truly random walks. As shown in [45] and [9] the average number of steps in an additive walk before a collision is larger than the expected number given by the birthday paradox. A collision in the original mixed walk is expected with high probability after $\Theta(\sqrt{q})$ steps, if the partitions are generated uniformly at random [109]. Teske showed experimentally that additive walks with $r \ge 16$ and mixed walks with $r \ge 16$ and $1/4 \le s/r \le 1/2$ reach closely the performance of a truly random walk and mixed walks do not perform significantly better than additive walks unless r = 3 [198]. More recently Teske's results have been supported by experiments that suggested an optimal ratio s/r close to zero [38] and it has been proven that a collision in an additive walk occurs in $O(\sqrt{q \log q})$ steps with probability larger than 1/2 [37].

Another method that has the same asymptotic run time as Pollard rho is Shanks' baby steps giant steps (BSGS) [114, Exercise 5.25] (of which we have described a variant in section 2.6.2). The idea of this method is to write the unknown integer solving the discrete logarithm in radix $\lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil$ so that $Q = kP = (k_1 \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil + k_0)P$ with $0 \le k_1, k_2 \le \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil$. It works as follows. Pre-compute the values $i \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil P$ for $i = 0, 1, ..., \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil$ and store them in a hash table. Compute Q - jP for j = 0, 1, ... until $Q - jP = i \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil P$ for some integer *i*, then the value $j + i \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil$ solves the discrete logarithm problem. The method succeeds in $O(\lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil)$ steps and requires $O(\lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil)$ memory for the hash table. It is possible to modify the algorithm to reduce both previous bounds to $O(\sqrt{k})$. However, the Pollard rho algorithm requires only $O(\log q)$ memory and when parallelized (see next paragraph) it requires significantly less memory than Shanks's method [76, Theorem 14.3.2].

2.7.2 Parallel Pollard rho

The Pollard rho algorithm can be naively parallelized by launching *m* instances on *m* processors each running an independent walk and this would result in a speed-up factor of \sqrt{m} . It is possible to obtain a factor of *m* speed-up by introducing *distinguished points*, namely points having a common property that is easy to verify. For instance one can define the distinguished points as the points having the least significant *d* bits of a given coordinate all equal to zero for a small positive integer *d*. In this case the probability that a point chosen uniformly at random is distinguished is roughly $1/(2^d)$. The algorithm needs to be modified as follows. Each processor starts a walk from a different random point but all of them use the same precomputed points F_i and the same index function ℓ . This choice implies that once two independent walks reach the same point then they will be hitting the same points in every subsequent step, namely the walks are deterministic. Therefore they will eventually hit the same distinguished point as depicted in Figure 2.2 where 2^d is the expected number of steps before a walk hits a distinguished point.

If at step $i \ge 0$ the walk running on a given processor hits a distinguished point P_i , the processor reports P_i together with the integers a and b such that $P_i = aP + bQ$ to a central processor. Alternatively, if a and b are too large to be sent and stored efficiently, only the distinguished point P_i and some compact information that enables the central processor to regenerate the walk (and compute a and b) are reported [25]. The latter solution in practice requires the walks to be short, namely each processor needs to start a fresh walk relatively often.

Once the central processor has received the same distinguished point twice it can compute the solution to the discrete logarithm (if the collision is not fruitless). The approximate expected running time of this parallel version of Pollard rho is $\sqrt{\frac{\pi q}{2}} + 2^{d-1}$ if $1/(2^d)$ is the probability that one out of 2^d points generated by a walk is distinguished. The choice of the distinguished point property gives rise to a memory-time trade-off [201], [183]. In practice the property is tuned so that the number of expected distinguished points to be collected before finding a collision is compatible with the communication and memory constraints of the utilized system.

2.7. The Pollard rho algorithm for discrete logarithms




Figure 2.2 – A distinguished point collision in parallel Pollard rho.

2.7.3 Using automorphisms to speed up Pollard rho

Pollard rho can be modified to search for a collision of equivalence classes of points (rather than single points) in $\langle P \rangle$ induced by the group of curve automorphism Aut [190, III.10] (notice that this is not the group of automorphisms of $\langle P \rangle$). With this modification the search space is reduced from *q* to *q*/#Aut, where #Aut is the size of the group of automorphisms on the curve, resulting in a speed-up factor of $\sqrt{#Aut}$ [206, 66]. Denote by ψ the generator of Aut and by *m* its order. For all $R, R' \in \langle P \rangle$, define an equivalence relation ~ on $\langle P \rangle$ by $R \sim R'$ if and only if $R = \psi^i(R')$ for some $0 \le i < m$. Note that there are around *q*/*m* such equivalence classes in $\langle P \rangle$, and that $m \ge 2$ since Aut contains (at least) the identity map and the negation/involution map "–". In practice the algorithm has to be modified to select a representative of the equivalence class at each iteration in a well defined manner [66] so that parallel walks are still deterministic (see Section 2.7.2), i.e., the iteration function is a function of the equivalence class containing R, i.e. $\tilde{R_1} = \tilde{R_2}$ if and only if $R_1 \sim R_2$. An efficient way of choosing such representatives is imperative to an optimized implementation of the Pollard rho algorithm, as described in fine-grained details for several curves considered in Chapter 4. The important point is that each time the iteration function

Chapter 2. Background

computes a new group element P_{i+1} via an addition, it now immediately computes *the* representative element \tilde{P}_{i+1} , thereby accounting for *m* elements at a time. This effectively reduces the size of the set on which we walk by a factor of *m*, which theoretically reduces the expected time to a collision by a constant factor \sqrt{m} . In practice however, computing these representatives incurs an overhead which reduces the actual speedup obtained. This problem has been extensively studied in practice for elliptic curves with #Aut = 2 and the main contribution of Chapter 4 is to optimize parameter selection in a variety of scenarios (in the case of both elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves) to see how close we can get to this theoretical \sqrt{m} improvement.

Fruitless Cycles

It is well known that certain practical issues are encountered when exploiting the automorphism optimization [206, 79, 66, 40, 25]. Walks will end up in *fruitless cycles* – endless small loops where many fruitless collisions are found over-and-over again (the collisions are fruitless because they have the same a_i and b_i). At a high level, these collisions occur because the automorphism ψ , which generates Aut, has a minimal polynomial of small degree; for all scenarios in this thesis, ψ satisfies $\sum_{i=0}^{d} e_i \psi^i = 0$ for $e_i \in \mathbf{Z}$ and where $d \leq 5$. Since each step in a walk involves the addition of an element from a relatively small fixed table, it is possible that the same table element (or a very small subset of it) is added multiple times in succession, and that these contributions to the walk are annihilated by unfortunate linear combinations of powers of ψ (which sum to zero). The simplest and most frequently occurring example is when the negation map sends the walk into a fruitless 2-cycle (denoting the negation map by ψ_n we have that $\sum_{i=0}^{1} \psi_n^i = 0$): the partition function will choose the same table element twice in a row (i.e., $\ell(P_i) = \ell(P_{i+1}) = \ell(P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)})$) with probability 1/*r*, and the representative \tilde{P}_{i+1} of the equivalence class $\{P_{i+1}, -P_{i+1}\}$ will be $\tilde{P}_{i+1} = -P_{i+1} = -(P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)})$ with probability 1/2, meaning that $\tilde{P}_{i+2} = \tilde{P}_i$ with probability 1/(2*r*). This is analyzed in more detail for different cycle lengths and values of m = #Aut in [66].

Cycle Reduction

In [206], a "look-ahead" technique is described to reduce the event of 2-cycles. This method starts by computing a candidate point \hat{P} for P_{i+1} as usual, i.e. computing $\hat{P} = P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)}$; if $\ell(\hat{P}) \neq \ell(P_i)$, then we set $P_{i+1} = \hat{P}$ and continue, otherwise we discard the point \hat{P} and compute another candidate point by adding the next lookup table element $F_{\ell(P_i)+1 \mod r}$ to P_i . Note that the probability that rlookup elements result in invalid candidates is extremely low, i.e. r^{-r} . As analyzed in [40], using this look-ahead technique lowers the probability to enter a 2-cycle from $\frac{1}{2r}$ to $\frac{1}{2r^3} + O(\frac{1}{r^4})$. This technique can be generalized to longer cycles as well [206, 40]. Note that if a point gets discarded, it means that we have computed the group operation but did not take a step forward in our pseudo-random walk. We refer to this event as a *fruitless step due to cycle reduction*. In Chapters 4 and 5 we use a 2-cycle reduction technique that slightly modifies the above approach.

2.7.4 Detecting and escaping Fruitless Cycles

Even if the probability of a fruitless cycle is lowered using the look-ahead strategy described in subsection 2.7.3, the walks will still eventually enter a fruitless cycle, which clearly must be dealt with. The first step towards a remedy is to detect that a walk is trapped; the next step is to then escape the fruitless cycle in a deterministic way, such that if any other walk encounters the same cycle, they both end up exiting using the exact same point. The idea described in [79] is to occasionally store a sequence of points and to check for repetitions by comparing new points to these stored points (more details on cycle detection are given in Chapter 4). If a cycle has been detected, then one can escape by applying a modified iteration function to a representative of the cycle; in [79], the point with smallest *x*- or *y*-coordinate is proposed to be the representative. In [40] it is observed that different iteration functions used to escape the cycle are insufficient, and can result in the walk recurring to the same fruitless cycle soon after it "escapes". As observed in [66, 40], one example of how to properly escape cycles is to *double* the representative of the fruitless cycle. Escape by doubling is effective as it is heuristically shown to "break" the cycle structure. This approach is used in Chapter 4.

2.7.5 Handling automorphisms in practice

The optimal combination of cycle reduction and detection/escape strategies and the optimal values for the parameters thereof depend on the characteristics of the target computing platform (e.g., cache sizes or programming model). For instance in [25] the Playstation 3 SIMD architecture is targeted and it is shown that the best approach is to avoid cycle reduction and only perform detection of cycles of different lengths with frequency inversely proportional to their length. In the implementation described in Chapter 4, x64 processors are targeted (without exploiting SIMD instructions) and both cycle reduction and cycle detection are performed (the latter is performed seldom). The FPGA implementation presented in Chapter 5 uses a very large value for r, performs cycle reduction and delegates cycle detection and escape to the host system.

2.8 Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA)

CUDA [161] is a computing platform, consisting in both a hardware and a software architecture, that enables NVIDIA GPUs to support general purpose computing.

Programming model

At the programming level CUDA consists of extensions to the C/C++ or Fortran languages, a set of libraries and some specific data types that enable the programmer to compute on the GPU. CUDA programs are very similar to C/C++ programs, for instance both normal and recursive functions can be defined (a call mechanism exists) and several C++ constructs are supported. CUDA allows programmers to define special functions that run on the GPU called *kernels* (very similar to C functions). A kernel is executed in the form of multiple parallel instances corresponding to a set of parallel *threads*. Threads are grouped in *blocks* and blocks are grouped in *grids*:

- **thread:** A thread executes one instance of the kernel, and it is uniquely identified inside its block by a thread identifier. Each thread has its program counter, registers, per-thread private memory, input, and output results.
- **block:** A block is a set of concurrently executing threads that can cooperate among themselves through synchronization and shared memory. Each thread block has a private per-block shared memory space used for communication between threads within the same block, data sharing, and result sharing in parallel algorithms.
- grid: A grid is an array of thread blocks that execute the same kernel, read inputs from global memory, write results to global memory, and synchronize between dependent kernel calls. The GPU executes a kernel as a grid of parallel thread blocks.

This hierarchal grouping scheme allows CUDA applications to scale across different device models.

GPU architecture

CUDA GPUs are throughput oriented computing devices featuring up to thousands of cores. A CUDA core can execute a floating point or an integer instruction per clock cycle. CUDA cores are clustered in streaming multiprocessors (SMs) that contain several resources shared by the cores inside them. For




Figure 2.3 - High-level overview of a CUDA GPU architecture.

example, each SM has its own register file, L1 cache, shared memory, load/store units and other special functional units. All SMs share the GPU's global memory (RAM), an L2 cache memory and a *constant* memory (the latter has optimal performance when all cores access the same address). Figure 2.3 shows a high-level overview of a CUDA GPU architecture and Table 2.2 shows the main features of high end Fermi [158], Kepler and Kepler Titan [159] GPUs. The CUDA thread grouping hierarchy described in

Table 2.2 – NVIDIA GPU comparison: Fermi, Kepler and Kepler Titan.

Model	GTX 580	GTX 680	Titan Black
# cores	512	1536	2880
SMs	16	8	15
Cores per SM	32	192	192
Frequency	1544 Mhz	1110 Mhz	980 Mhz
RAM	1.5 or 3 GB	2 or 4 GB	6 GB
RAM bandwidth	192 GB/s	192 GB/s	336 GB/s
TDP	244 W	195 W	250 W

the previous subsection is mapped to hardware elements as follows. One GPU executes a kernel as a grid of concurrent thread blocks. A global scheduler assigns each block to a given SM on which the block is executed for its whole lifecycle. One SM schedules and issues batches of 32 threads, of the

blocks assigned to it, to its cores or other units. These batches are called *warps*. The concept of warp is transparent to the programmer, although the performance is significantly better when threads in a warp execute the same code paths and access memory locations that have adjacent addresses. The practice of having threads in the same warp access adjacent global memory locations is usually referred to as *memory coalescing* and is crucial to obtain good performance. As memory transactions have a certain burst size (namely there is a minimum number of adjacent words that have to be transferred in one transaction), if coalescing is enforced, the number of memory transactions to serve all threads in a warp will be minimized (see Figure 2.4). Otherwise more memory transactions will be necessary as




Figure 2.4 - Memory coalescing in CUDA.

some words transferred in one transaction will be discarded wasting bandwidth. More information on CUDA optimization techniques can be found in [160].

2.9 FPGAs

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits that can be programmed after manufacturing to implement hardware functions (either combinational or sequential). The desired hardware

function is specified by the user through a hardware description language (VHDL or Verilog).

Nowadays FPGAs are not only used for application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) prototyping as in the past, but also to implement hardware designs for final production in several application fields. Due to their flexibility and low non-recurrent engineering costs, FPGAs are often preferred to custom ASICs when the desired production volume is relatively small. Typical FPGA applications span from packet processing in data-centers [43] to hardware acceleration in high-performance computing [97, 131]. The large capacity of their programmable parallel logic makes FPGAs suitable for implementing highly parallel applications especially when such applications can benefit from a fine-grained tuning of the computing resources. Figure 2.5 shows the architecture of an FPGA device [175].




Figure 2.5 – Generic FPGA architecture [175].




Figure 2.6 - Configurable logic block architecture. [207].

FPGAs are composed of a two-dimensional array of configurable logic blocks (see Figure 2.6 [207]), also referred to as *slices*. Usually, each logic block contains one or more Look-Up Tables (LUTs), several

Flip-Flops (FFs), multiplexers, and dedicated connections to create carry-chains. These resources can be configured to implement combinational or sequential functions. The dedicated carry-chain connections between adjacent logic blocks are used to implement efficient large integer adders, exploiting the carry-lookahead technique [209]. A programmable interconnection matrix connects all the logic blocks. Moreover, input/output signals are managed by dedicated I/O slices, usually supporting multi-standard voltage levels.

Modern FPGAs include also embedded SRAM memory blocks (BRAMs) and dedicated Digital-Signal-Processing (DSP) slices. The memory blocks provide a total storage space up to several tens of MegaBytes on high-end devices [210] and are used to implement fast access large data structures. The DSP slices usually include dedicated and configurable binary signed or unsigned multiply-and-accumulate (MAC) units. The latter are used to implement arithmetic functions like parallel multipliers [2]. As shown in Figure 2.5, embedded memory blocks and DSP slices are typically arranged in columns and can be combined through dedicated interconnects to form larger components.

The FPGA design flow consists in three main steps:

- Implementation of the system in a high-level hardware description language (HDL) like VHDL or Verilog.
- Synthesis of the HDL code into a *netlist*, namely a list of nets connecting the logic gates and FFs implementing the HDL design. This step is performed by a synthesis tool [208]. The performance of the system can be estimated through simulation of the netlist.
- *Place and route*: the process mapping the netlist to physical resources on the FPGA and producing the final bitstream to program the device. This step is carried out by a place and route tool. A common good practice is to use at most 90% of the available slices for the design. This is sufficient to make sure that the place and route tool will be able to fit the design on the FPGA and that the performance estimate obtained through simulation of the netlist will be met.

Typical FPGA design environments include several other tools like simulators or power analyzers.

3 Cofactorization on GPUs

Today, the asymptotically fastest publicly known integer factorization method is the number field sieve (NFS) [168, 128]. Several integer factorization records have been set using the NFS, including a 768-bit RSA modulus recently as described in [111]. As explained in Section 2.6.4 in the first of its two main steps, pairs of integers called *relations* are collected. This is done by iterating a two-stage approach: *sieving* to collect a large batch of promising pairs, followed by the identification of the relatively few relations among them. Sieving requires a lot of memory and is commonly done on CPUs. The follow-up stage requires little memory and can be parallelized in multiple ways. It may therefore be cost-effective to offload this follow-up stage to a coprocessor. Most previous work in this direction focussed on offloading the elliptic curve integer factoring (ECM, [130]), which is only part of this follow-up stage. For graphics processing units (GPUs) this is considered in [19, 17, 39] and for reconfigurable hardware such as field-programmable gate arrays in [191, 166, 75, 62, 89, 133, 214].

In this chapter we explore the possibility to offload the *entire* follow-up stage to GPUs to allow the CPUs to keep sieving, thus optimally using their memory. We describe our approach, with a focus on modular and elliptic curve arithmetic, to do so on the many-core, memory-constrained GPU platform. Our results demonstrate that GPUs can be used as an efficient *high-throughput co-processor* for this application.

Our design strategy exploits the inherent task parallelism of the stage that follows the actual sieving, namely the fact that collected pairs can be processed independently in parallel. Because the integers involved are relatively small (at most 384 bits for our target number), we have chosen not to parallelize the integer arithmetic, thereby avoiding performance penalties due to inter-thread synchronization while maximizing the compute-to-memory-access ratio [17]. We use a single thread to process a single pair from the input batch, aiming to maximize the number of pairs processed per second. Because this requires a large number of registers per thread and potentially reduces the GPU utilization, we use integer arithmetic algorithms that minimize register usage and apply native multiply-and-add instructions wherever possible.

For each pair the follow-up stage consists of checking if two integer values, obtained by evaluating two bivariate integer polynomials at the point determined by the pair, are both smooth, i.e., divisible by primes up to certain bounds. This is done sequentially: a first kernel filters the pairs for which the first polynomial value is smooth, once enough pairs have been collected a second kernel does the same for the second polynomial value, and pairs that pass both filters correspond to relations. Each kernel first computes the relevant polynomial value and then subjects it to a sequence of occasional compositeness tests and factorization attempts aimed at finding small factors.

We have determined good parameters for two different approaches: to find as many relations as possible (\approx 99% in a batch) and a faster one to find most relations (\approx 95% in a batch). The effective-ness of these approaches is demonstrated by integrating the GPU software with state-of-the-art NFS

software [72] tuned for the factorization of the 768-bit modulus from [111]. A single GTX 580 GPU can serve between 3 and 10 Intel i7-3770K *quad-core* CPUs.

Cryptologic applications of GPUs have been considered before: symmetric cryptography in [135, 94, 212, 95, 165, 42, 84], asymmetric cryptography in [151, 197, 96] for RSA and in [197, 3, 33] for ECC, and enhancing symmetric [27] and asymmetric [19, 17, 18, 39] cryptanalysis.

The source code of this project is freely available.

This chapter is based on [137] (published at CHES 2014) and [138] (full version on IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive).

3.1 Preliminaries

The Number Field Sieve. For details on how NFS works, see [128, 174] and Section 2.6.4. Its major steps are polynomial selection, relation collection, and the matrix step. For this chapter, an operational description of relation collection for numbers in the current range of interest suffices. For those numbers relation collection is responsible for about 90% of the computational effort.

Relation collection uses smoothness bounds B_r , $B_a \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ and polynomials $f_r(X)$, $f_a(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ such that f_r is of degree one, f_a is irreducible of (small) degree d > 1, and f_r and f_a have a common root modulo the number to be factored. The polynomials f_r and f_a are commonly referred to as the *rational* and the *algebraic* polynomial, respectively. A relation is a pair of coprime integers (a, b) with b > 0 such that $bf_r(a/b)$ is B_r -smooth and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ is B_a -smooth.

Relations are determined by successively processing relatively large *special primes* until sufficiently many relations have been found. A special prime q defines an index-q sublattice in \mathbb{Z}^2 of pairs (a, b)such that q divides $bf_r(a/b)b^d f_a(a/b)$. Sieving in the sublattice results in a collection of pairs for which $bf_r(a/b)$ and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ have relatively many small factors. To identify the relations, for all collected pairs the values $bf_r(a/b)$ and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ are further inspected. This can be done by first simultaneously *resieving* the $bf_r(a/b)$ -values to remove their small factors, then doing the same for the $b^d f_a(a/b)$ values, after which any cofactors are dealt with on a pair-by-pair basis. Alternatively, cofactoring can be preceded by a pair-by-pair search for the small factors in $bf_r(a/b)$ and $b^d f_a(a/b)$, thus simplifying the sieving step. The latter approach is adopted here, to offload as much as possible from the regular CPU cores, including the calculation of the relevant $bf_r(a/b)$ - and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ -values. The steps involved in this extended (and thus somewhat misnomered) cofactoring are described in Section 3.2.

3.2 Cofactoring Steps

This section lists the steps used to identify the relations among a collection of pairs of integers (a, b) that results from NFS sieving for one or more special primes. See [110] for related previous work. The notation is as in Section 3.1.

For all collected pairs (a, b) the values $bf_r(a/b)$ and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ can be calculated by observing that $b^k f(a/b) = \sum_{i=0}^k f_i a^i b^{k-i}$ for $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^k f_i X^i \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$. The value $z = b^k f(a/b)$ is trivially calculated in k(k-1) multiplications by initializing z as 0, and by replacing, for i = 0, 1, ..., k in succession, z by $z + f_i a^i b^{k-i}$, or, at the cost of an additional memory location, in 3k - 1 multiplications by initializing $z = f_0$ and t = a and by replacing, for i = 1, 2, ..., k in succession, z by $zb + f_i t$ and, if i < k, t by ta. Even with the most naive approach (as opposed to asymptotically faster methods), this is a negligible part of the overall calculation. The resulting values need to be tested for smoothness, with bound B_r for the $bf_r(a/b)$ -values and bound B_a for the $b^d f_a(a/b)$ -values.

For all pairs (a, b) both $bf_r(a/b)$ and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ have relatively many small factors (because the pairs are collected during NFS sieving). After shifting out all factors of two, other very small factors may be found using trial division, somewhat larger ones by Pollard p - 1 [169], and the largest ones using

ECM [130]. The use of these three methods is further described below. In our experiment (cf. 3.4.2) it turned out to be best to skip trial division for $bf_r(a/b)$ and let Pollard p-1 and ECM take care of the very small factors as well. Based on the findings reported in [119] or their GPU-incompatibility, other integer factorization methods like Pollard rho [170] or quadratic sieve [173] are not considered. It is occasionally useful to make sure that remaining cofactors are composite. An appropriate compositeness test is therefore described first.

Compositeness test. We use the compositeness test described in Section 2.4.4. The test is used as follows, to process an *m*-value that is found as an as yet unfactored part of a polynomial value $bf_r(a/b)$ or $b^d f_a(a/b)$. If 2 is a witness to *m*'s compositeness, then *m* is subjected to further factoring attempts; if not, the polynomial value is declared fully factored and the corresponding pair (a, b) is cast aside if $m > B_r$ for $m | bf_r(a/b)$ or $m > B_a$ for $m | b^d f_a(a/b)$. This carries the risk that a non-prime factor may appear in a supposedly fully factored polynomial value, or that a pair (a, b) is wrongly discarded. With a small probability to occur, either type of failure is of no concern in our cryptanalytic context.

Trial division. Given an odd integer *n*, all its prime factors up to some small trial division bound are removed using trial division (see Section 2.6.1 for more details on trial division). For each small odd prime *p* (possibly tabulated, if memory is available) we use the divisibility test described in Section 2.4.3 to check for the divisibility of *n* by *p*. If *n* results divisible by *p*, the divisibility test is repeated with *n* replaced by $\frac{n}{n}$ (computed using the exact division algorithm described in Section 2.4.2).

Pollard p - 1. We use Pollard p - 1 stage 1 and the advanced BSGS stage 2 with the optimizations described in 2.6.2. We improve the latter by preparing, for each giant step, a list of indices to another list containing the baby steps such that each pair of giant step, indexed baby step actually corresponds to a prime or prime pair. Using this two lists, only useful baby step values are fetched from the table, saving useless memory accesses in the final step of the method.

Elliptic Curve Method. We describe ECM in detail in Section 2.6.3. The current best approach to implement ECM, as used here, is "a = -1" twisted Edwards curves (based on [67, 16, 99, 15]) with extended twisted Edwards coordinates (improving on *Montgomery curves* [144] and methods from [213]). The arithmetic of extended twisted Edwards coordinates is described in subsection 2.5.3. Applying the additively written "group operation" requires a total of eight multiplications and squarings in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$. With initial point *P* the point kP can thus be calculated in $O(B_1)$ multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$, after which the gcd of *n* and the *x*-coordinate of kP is computed. Because the same *k* is often used, good addition-subtraction chains can be prepared (cf. [39]): for $B_1 = 256$, the point kP can be computed in 1400 multiplications and 1444 squarings modulo *n*. Due to the significant memory reduction this approach is particularly efficient for memory constrained devices like GPUs. We also select curves for which 16 divides the group order, further enhancing the success probability of ECM (cf. [10, Thm. 3.4 and 3.6] and [15]). More specifically we use "a = -1" twisted Edwards curve ($E : -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2$) over \mathbb{Q} with $d = -((g - 1/g)/2)^4$ such that $d(d + 1) \neq 0$ and $g \in \mathbb{Q} \setminus \{\pm 1, 0\}$.

Related work on stage 1 of ECM for cofactoring on constrained devices can be found in [191, 166, 75, 62, 89, 133, 214, 19, 17, 39]. Unlike these publications, the GPU-implementation presented here includes stage 2 of ECM, as it significantly improves the performance of ECM.

ECM Stage 2 on GPUs. The fastest known methods to implement stage 2 of ECM are FFT-based [44, 144, 146] and rather memory-hungry, which may explain why earlier constrained device ECM-cofactoring work did not consider stage 2. These methods are also incompatible with the memory restrictions of current GPUs. Below a baby-step giant-step approach [187] to stage 2 is described that is suitable for GPUs. Let Q = kP be as above. Similar to the naive approach to stage 2 of Pollard's p - 1 method, the points ℓQ for the primes ℓ in (B_1, B_2) can be computed and be compared to the zero point modulo a prime p dividing n but not modulo n by computing the gcd of n and the product of the x-coordinates of the points ℓQ . With N primes ℓ , computing all points requires about 8N multiplications in $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$,

assuming a few precomputed small even multiples of *Q*. Balancing the computational efforts of the two stages with $B_1 = 256$ as above, leads to $B_2 = 2803$ (and N = 354).

The baby-step giant step approach from [144] speeds up the calculation at the cost of more memory, while also exploiting that for Edwards curves and any point *P* it is the case that

$$\frac{Y(P)}{Z(P)} = \frac{Y(-P)}{Z(-P)},$$
(3.1)

with Y(P) and Z(P) the Y- and Z-coordinate, respectively, of P.

For a giant-step value $w < B_1$, any ℓ as above can be written as $vw \pm u$ where $u \in U = \{u \in \mathbb{Z} : 1 \le u \le \frac{w}{2}, \gcd(u, w) = 1\}$, and $v \in V = \{v \in \mathbb{Z} : \left\lfloor \frac{B_1}{w} - \frac{1}{2} \right\rfloor \le v \le \left\lfloor \frac{B_2}{w} + \frac{1}{2} \right\rfloor \}$. Comparing (vw - u)Q to the zero point modulo p but not modulo n amounts to checking if $\gcd(Z(uQ)Y(vwQ) - Z(vwQ)Y(uQ), n) \neq 1$. Because of (3.1), this compares (vw + u)Q to the zero point as well. Hence, computation of $\gcd(m, n)$ for $m = \prod_{v \in V} \prod_{u \in U} (Z(uQ)Y(vwQ) - Z(vwQ)Y(uQ))$ suffices to check if Q has prime order in $(B_1, B_2]$. Optimal parameters balance the costs of the preparation of the $\frac{\varphi(w)}{2}$ tabulated baby-step values Y(uQ) and Z(uQ) (where φ is Euler's totient function) and on the fly computation of the giant-step values Y(vwQ) and Z(vwQ). Suboptimal, smaller w-values may be used to reduce storage requirements. For instance, the choice $w = 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7$ and $B_2 = 7770$ leads to 24 tabulated values and a total of 2904 multiplications and squarings modulo n, which matches the computational effort of stage 1 with $B_1 = 256$. Although $\gcd(u, w) = 1$ already avoids easy composites, the product can be restricted to those u, v for which one of $vw \pm u$ is prime if storage for about $\frac{B_2 - B_1}{w} \times \frac{\varphi(w)}{2}$ bits is available. With w and tabulated baby-step values as above, this increases B_2 to 8925 for a similar computational effort, but requires about 125 bytes of storage. A more substantial improvement is to define

$$Y_{v} = \Big(\prod_{\tilde{v} \in V - \{v\}} Z(\tilde{v}wQ)\Big)\Big(\prod_{\tilde{u} \in U} Z(\tilde{u}Q)\Big)Y(vwQ) \text{ and } Y_{u} = \Big(\prod_{\tilde{u} \in U - \{u\}} Z(\tilde{u}Q)\Big)\Big(\prod_{\tilde{v} \in V} Z(\tilde{v}wQ)\Big)Y(uQ),$$

and to replace *m* by $\prod_{v \in V} \prod_{u \in U} (Y_v - Y_u)$. This saves 2|V||U| of the 3|V||U| multiplications in the calculation of *m* at a cost that is linear in |U| + |V| to tabulate the Y_v and Y_u values. For instance, it allows usage of $B_2 = 16384$ at an effort of 3368 modular multiplications.

3.3 GPU Implementation Details

In this section we outline our approach to implement the algorithms from Section 3.2 with a focus on the many-core GPU architecture. We used a quad-core Intel i7-3770K CPU running at 3.5 GHz with 16 GB of memory and an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 580 GPU, with 512 CUDA cores running at 1544 MHz and 1.5 GB of global memory, as further described below.

3.3.1 Compute unified device architecture

We focus on the GeForce *x*-series families for $x \in \{8, 9, 100, 200, 400, 500, 600, 700\}$, of the NVIDIA GPU architecture with the compute unified device architecture (CUDA) [161]. Our NVIDIA GeForce GTX 580 GPU belongs to the GeForce 400- and 500-series ([158]) of the Fermi architecture family. These GPUs support $32 \times 32 \rightarrow 32$ -bit multiplication instructions, for both the least and most significant 32 bits of the result. See Section 2.8 for a detailed description of CUDA.

3.3.2 Modular arithmetic on GPUs

We used the parallel thread execution (PTX) instruction set and inline assembly wherever possible to simplify (cf. carry-handling) and speed-up (cf. multiply-and-add) our code; Table 3.1 lists the arithmetic assembly routines used. "Warp divergent" code was reduced to a minimum by converting

most branches into *straight line code* to avoid different execution paths within a warp: branch-free code that executes both branches and uses a bit-mask to select the correct value was often found to be more efficient than "if-else" statements. In the remainder of this chapter we will assume that the system radix is $r = 2^{32}$.

Table 3.1 – Pseudo-code notation for CUDA PTX assembly instructions [162] used in our implementation. Function parameters are 32-bit unsigned integers and the suffixes are analogous to the actual CUDA PTX suffixes. We denote by f the single-bit carry flag set by instructions with suffix ".cc".

Pseudo-code notation	Operation	Carry flag effect
addc(<i>c</i> , <i>a</i> , <i>b</i>)	$c \leftarrow a + b + f \mod r$	
addc.cc(<i>c</i> , <i>a</i> , <i>b</i>)	$c \leftarrow a + b + f \mod r$	$f \leftarrow \lfloor (a+b+f)/r \rfloor$
subc(<i>c</i> , <i>a</i> , <i>b</i>)	$c \leftarrow a - b - f \mod r$	
subc.cc(<i>c</i> , <i>a</i> , <i>b</i>)	$c \leftarrow a - b - f \mod r$	$f \leftarrow \lfloor (a - b - f)/r \rfloor$
mul.lo(<i>c</i> , <i>a</i> , <i>b</i>)	$c \leftarrow a \cdot b \mod r$	
mul.hi(<i>c</i> , <i>a</i> , <i>b</i>)	$c \leftarrow \lfloor (a \cdot b) / r \rfloor$	
mad.lo.cc(d, a, b, c)	$d \leftarrow a \cdot b + c \mod r$	$f \leftarrow \lfloor ((a \cdot b) \mod r + c)/r \rfloor$
madc.lo.cc(d, a, b, c)	$d \leftarrow a \cdot b + c + f \mod r$	$f \leftarrow \lfloor ((a \cdot b) \mod r + c + f)/r \rfloor$
mad.hi.cc(d, a, b, c)	$d \leftarrow (\lfloor (a \cdot b) / r \rfloor + c) \bmod r$	$f \leftarrow \lfloor (\lfloor (a \cdot b)/r \rfloor + c)/r \rfloor$
madc.hi.cc(d, a, b, c)	$d \leftarrow (\lfloor (a \cdot b)/r \rfloor + c + f) \mod r$	$f \leftarrow \lfloor (\lfloor (a \cdot b)/r \rfloor + c + f)/r \rfloor$

Algorithm 9 Mul(Z, x, Y)

Input: Integers *x* and $Y = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} Y_i r^i$ such that $0 \le x, Y_i < r$ for $0 \le i < n$ with n > 0. **Output:** $Z = x \cdot Y = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$. mul.lo(Z_0, x, Y_0) mul.hi(Z_1, x, Y_0) mad.lo.cc(Z_1, x, Y_1, Z_1) mul.hi(Z_2, x, Y_1) **for** i = 2 to n - 2 **do** madc.lo.cc(Z_i, x, Y_i, Z_i) mul.hi(Z_{i+1}, x, Y_i) madc.lo.cc($Z_{n-1}, x, Y_{n-1}, Z_{n-1}$) madc.hi($Z_n, x, Y_{n-1}, 0$) **return** Z ($= \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$)

Algorithm 10 Sub(Z, Y)

Input: Integers $Z = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$ and $Y = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} Y_j r^j$ such that $0 \le Z_i, Y_j < r$ for $0 \le i \le n, 0 \le j < n$, and $0 \le Z < 2Y$. **Output:** If $Z \ge Y$ then $Z = Z - Y = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$ with $Z_n = 0$. Otherwise $Z = r^{n+1} - (Y - Z) \mod r^{n+1} = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$ with $Z_n = r - 1$. sub.cc(Z_0, Z_0, Y_0) **for** i = 1 to n - 1 **do** subc.cc(Z_i, Z_i, Y_i) subc($Z_n, Z_n, 0$) **return** $Z \quad (= \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i)$

Practical performance. Our decision not to use parallel integer arithmetic dictates the use of algorithms with minimal register usage. For Montgomery multiplication, the most critical operation, we

Algorithm 11 PredicateAdd(Z, Y, p) (where $a \land b$ computes the bitwise logical AND operation on each pair of corresponding bits in a and b)

Input: Integers $Z = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} Z_i r^i$, $Y = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} Y_i r^i$, and $p \in \{0, r-1\}$ such that $0 \le Z_i$, $Y_i < r$ for $0 \le i < n$, and $0 \le Z < r^n$. **Output:** Z = Z + 0 if p = 0 and Z = Z + Y if p = r - 1. add.cc($Z_0, Z_0, Y_0 \land p$) **for** i = 1 to n - 2 **do** addc.cc($Z_i, Z_i, Y_i \land p$) addc($Z_{n-1}, Z_{n-1}, Y_{n-1} \land p$) **return** $Z = (\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} Z_i r^i)$

Algorithm 12 MulAddShift(Z, x, Y, c)

Input: Integers $Z = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$, $Y = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} Y_j r^j$, *x* and *c* such that $0 \le x, Z_i, Y_j < r$ for $0 \le i \le n, 0 \le j < n$ and $c \in \{0, 1\}$. **Output:** $Z = \lfloor (Z + x \cdot Y + cr^{n+1})/r \rfloor = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$ mad.lo.cc(Z_0, x, Y_0, Z_0) **for** i = 1 to n - 1 **do** madc.lo.cc(Z_i, x, Y_i, Z_i) addc($Z_n, Z_n, 0$) mad.hi.cc(Z_0, x, Y_0, Z_1) **for** i = 2 to n **do** madc.hi.cc(Z_{i-1}, x, Y_{i-1}, Z_i) addc($Z_n, c, 0$) **return** Z ($= \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$)

Algorithm 13 MulAdd(Z, c, x, Y)

Input: Integers $Z = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$, $Y = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} Y_j r^j$, and x such that $0 \le x, Z_i, Y_j < r$ for $0 \le i \le n, 0 \le j < n$, and $0 \le Z < 2r^n$. **Output:** $Z = (Z + x \cdot Y) \mod r^{n+1} = \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i$, $c = \lfloor (Z + x \cdot Y) / r^{n+1} \rfloor$ ($c \in \{0, 1\}$). mad.lo.cc(Z_0, x, Y_0, Z_0) **for** i = 1 to n - 1 **do** madc.lo.cc(Z_i, x, Y_i, Z_i) addc($Z_n, Z_n, 0$) mad.hi.cc(Z_1, x, Y_0, Z_1) **for** i = 2 to n - 1 **do** madc.hi.cc(Z_i, x, Y_{i-1}, Z_i) $c \leftarrow Z_n$ madc.hi.cc(Z_n, x, Y_{n-1}, Z_n) $c \leftarrow (c > Z_n) // c \in \{0, 1\}$ **return** Z $(= \sum_{i=0}^{n} Z_i r^i)$

therefore preferred the plain interleaved schoolbook method to Karatsuba [108] (in addition the schoolbook method makes a better use of multiply-and-add instructions [17]); Algorithm 14 gives the CUDA pseudo-code for moduli of at least 96 bits.

Table 3.2 compares our results both with the state-of-the-art implementation from [123] benchmarked on an NVIDIA GTX 480 card (480 cores, 1401Mhz) and with the ideal peak throughput attainable on our GTX 580 GPU. Compared to [123] our throughput is up to twice better, especially for smaller (128-bit) moduli, even after the figures from [123] are scaled by a factor of $\frac{512}{480} \cdot \frac{1544}{1401}$ to account for our

Algorithm 14 Radix- 2^{32} interleaved Montgomery multiplication (we assume n > 2).

Input: Integers A, B, M, μ such that $A = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} A_i r^i$ with $0 \le A_i < r, 0 \le B < M < r^n$, and $\mu = (-M^{-1}) \mod r$. **Output:** Integer $C = \frac{A \cdot B}{r}^n \mod M = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} C_i r^i$ with $0 \le C_i < r$ and $0 \le C < M$. 1: Mul (C, A_0, B) 2: mul.lo (q, C_0, μ) 3: MulAddShift(C, q, M)4: **for** i = 1 to n - 1 **do** 5: MulAdd $(C, c, A_i, B) // c$ is a temporary unsigned integer variable 6: mul.lo (q, C_0, μ) 7: MulAddShift(C, q, M, c)8: Sub(C, M)

9: PredicateAdd(C, M, C_n) // $C_n \in \{0, r-1\}$

Table 3.2 – Benchmark results for the NVIDIA GTX 580 GPU for number of Montgomery multiplications per second and ECM trials per second for various modulus sizes. The Montgomery multiplication throughput reported in [123] was scaled as explained in the text. The estimated peak throughput based on an instruction count is also included together with the total number of dispatched threads. ECM used bounds $B_1 = 256$ and $B_2 = 16384$ (for a total of 2844 + 3368 = 6212 Montgomery multiplications per trial).

	Leboeuf [123]			th	is work			
	Montgomery	ns		ECM (8192 threads for all sizes)				
moduli	measured	measured peak		measured measured peak		#threads	trials	Montgomery muls
bitsize	(scaled, millions)	(millions)			(thousands)	measured (millions)		
96		10119	10135	16384	1078	6697		
128	2799	5805	5813	16384	674	4187		
160	2261	3760	3764	16384	453	2814		
192	1837	2631	2635	16384	309	1920		
224	1507	1943	1947	15360	243	1510		
256	1212	1493	1497	10240	180	1118		
320	828	962	964	10240	107	665		
384	600	671	672	9216	86	534		

larger number of cores (512) and higher frequency (1544 MHz). For 32 ℓ -bit moduli, with $\ell \in [3, 12]$ (i.e. moduli ranging from 96 to 384 bits), we counted the total number of multiplication and multiplyand-add instructions required by Algorithm 14 (including all calls to the auxiliary algorithms). The throughput of those instructions on our GPU is 0.5 per clock cycle per core, whereas the throughput of the addition instructions is 1 per clock cycle per core. Since we use fewer addition than multiplication instructions, our throughput count considers only the latter. Thus, our estimate for the Montgomery multiplication peak throughput is obtained as $\frac{1544 \cdot 10^6 \cdot 16 \cdot 32}{2m(\ell)}$ where $m(\ell) = \ell(4\ell + 1)$ is the number of multiplication instructions performed by Algorithm 14. In our benchmarks we transfer to the GPU two (distinct) operands and a modulus for each thread, and then compute one million modular multiplications using Algorithm 14 (using each output as one of the next inputs) before transferring the results back to the CPU. Our throughput turns out to be very close to the peak value.

3.3.3 Elliptic curve arithmetic on GPUs

When running stage 1 of ECM on memory constrained devices like GPUs, the large number of precomputed points required for windowing methods cannot be stored in fast memory. Thus, one is forced to settle for a (much) smaller window size, thereby reducing the advantage of using twisted Edwards curves. For example, in [19] windowing is not used at all because, citing [19], "Besides the base point, we cannot cache any other points". Memory is also a problem in [17], where the faster curve arithmetic from Hisil et al. [99] is not used since this requires storing a fourth coordinate per point. These concerns were the motivation behind [39], the approach we adopted for stage 1 of ECM (as indicated in Section 3.2). For stage 2 we use the baby-step giant-step approach, optimized as described at the end of Section 3.2 for $B_2 \leq 32768$. Using bounds that balance the number of stage 1 and 2 multiplications does not necessarily balance the GPU running time of the two stages (this varies with the modulus size), but it is a good starting point for further optimization.

Table 3.2 lists the resulting performance figures, in terms of thousands of trials per second for various modulus sizes. Two jobs each consisting of 8192 threads were launched simultaneously, with each job per thread doing an ECM trial with the bounds as indicated, and with at the start a unique modulus per thread transferred to the GPU. The relatively high register usage of ECM reduces the number of threads that can be launched per SM before running out of registers. Nevertheless, and despite its large number of modular additions and subtractions, ECM manages to sustain a high Montgomery multiplication throughput. Except for the comparison to the work reported in [123], we have not been able to put our results in further perspective because we did not have access to other multiplication or ECM results or implementations in a comparable context.

3.4 Cofactorization on GPUs

This section describes our GPU approach to cofactoring, i.e., recognizing among the pairs (a, b) resulting from NFS sieving those pairs for which $bf_r(a/b)$ is B_r -smooth and $b^d f_a(a/b)$ is B_a -smooth. Approaches common on regular cores (resieving followed by sequential processing of the remaining candidates) allow pair-by-pair optimization with respect to the highest overall yield or yield per second while exploiting the available memory, but are incompatible with the memory and SIMT restrictions of current GPUs.

3.4.1 Cofactorization overview

Given our application, where throughput is important but latency almost irrelevant, it is a natural choice to process each pair in a single thread, eliminating the need for inter-thread communication, minimizing synchronization overhead, and allowing the scheduler to maximize pipelining by interleaving instructions from different warps. On the negative side, the large memory footprint per thread reduces the number of simultaneously active threads per SM.

The cofactorization stage is split into two GPU kernel functions that receive pairs (*a*, *b*) as input: the rational kernel outputs pairs for which $bf_r(a/b)$ is B_r -smooth to the algebraic kernel that outputs those pairs for which $b^d f_a(a/b)$ is B_a -smooth as well. The two kernels have the same code structure: all that distinguishes them is that the algebraic one usually has to handle larger values and a higher degree polynomial. To make our implementation flexible with respect to the polynomial selection, the maximum size of the polynomial values is a kernel parameter that is fixed at compile time and that can easily be changed together with the polynomial degree and coefficient size and the size of the inputs.

Kernel structure. Given a pair (a, b), a kernel-thread first evaluates the relevant polynomial, storing the odd part *n* of the resulting value along with identifying information *i* as a pair (i, n); if applicable the special prime is removed from *n*. The value *n* is then updated in the following sequence of steps, with all parameters set at run-time using a configuration file. First trial division may be applied up to a small bound. The resulting pairs (i, n) are regrouped depending on their radix-2³² sizes. The cost of the resulting inter-thread communication and synchronization is outweighed by the advantage of being able to run size-specific versions of the other steps. All threads in a warp then grab a pair (i, n) of the




Figure 3.1 – An example of kernel execution flow where the values are assumed to be at most 160 bits. The height of the dashed rectangles is proportional to the number of values that are processed at a given step.

same size and each thread attempts to factor its *n*-value using Pollard's p - 1 method or ECM. If the resulting *n* is at most the smoothness bound, the kernel outputs the *i*th pair (a, b). If *n*'s compositeness cannot be established or if *n* is larger than some user-defined threshold, the *i*th pair (a, b) is discarded. Pairs (i, n) with small enough composite *n* are regrouped and reprocessed. Figure 3.1 shows a pictorial example of a kernel execution flow. This approach treats every pair (i, n) in the same group in the same way, which makes it attractive for GPUs. However, unnecessary computations may be performed: for instance, if a factoring attempt fails, compositeness does not need to be reascertained. Avoiding this requires divergent code which, as it turned out, degrades the performance. Also, factoring attempts may chance upon a factor larger than the smoothness bound, an event that goes by unnoticed as only the unfactored part is reported back. We have verified that the CPU easily discards such mishaps at negligible overhead.

Interaction between CPU and GPU. The CPU uses two programs to interact with the GPU. The first one adds batches of (*a*, *b*) pairs produced by the siever (which may be running on the CPU too) to a FIFO buffer and keeps track of special primes. The second program controls the GPU by iterating the following steps (where the roles of the kernels may be reversed and the batch sizes depend on the GPU memory constraints and the kernel):

- 1. copy a batch from the FIFO buffer to the GPU;
- 2. launch the rational kernel on the GPU;
- 3. store the pairs output by the rational kernel in an intermediate buffer;
- 4. if the intermediate buffer does not contain enough pairs, return to Step 1;
- 5. copy a batch from the intermediate buffer to the GPU;
- 6. launch the algebraic kernel on the GPU (providing it with the proper special primes);

Table 3.3 – Time in seconds to process a single special prime on all cores of a quad-core Intel i7-3770K CPU.

large primes	number of pairs after sieving	relations found	Ŭ	cofactoring time		% of time spent on cofactoring	
3 4	$\approx 5 \cdot 10^5$ $\approx 10^6$	125 137	25.6 25.9	4.0 6.1	29.6 32.0	13.5 19.1	4.22 4.28

Table 3.4 – Parameters choices for cofactoring. Later ECM attempts use larger bounds in the specified ranges.

desired	algorithm		rational kernel			algebraic kernel			
yield algorithm		attempts	B_1	B_2	attempts	B_1	B_2		
0.5.07	Pollard <i>p</i> – 1	1	[256,2048]	[8192, 16384]	1	[256, 4096]	[16384, 32768]		
95%	ECM	[5,10]	256	[4096,8192]	10	[256, 512]	[4096, 32768]		
99%	Pollard <i>p</i> – 1	1	[1024,4096]	[8192, 32768]	1	[256,2048]	[8192, 16384]		
	ECM	[10, 12]	[256,512]	[4096, 32768]	[10,20]	[256, 512]	[4096, 32768]		

7. store the pairs output by the algebraic kernel in a file and return to Step 1.

Exploiting the GPU memory hierarchy. GPU performance strongly depends on where intermediate values are stored. We use constant memory for fixed data precomputed by the CPU and accessed by *all threads at the same time*: primes for trial division, polynomial coefficients, and baby-step giant-step table-indices for the second stages of factoring attempts. To lower register pressure, the fast shared memory per SM acts as a "user-defined cache" for the values most frequently accessed, such as the moduli *n* to be factored and the values $-n^{-1} \mod 2^{32}$. The slower but much larger global memory stores the batch of (*a, b*) pairs along with their current *n*-values. To reduce memory overhead, the *n*-values are moved back and forth to shared memory after regrouping.

3.4.2 Parameter selection

For our experiments we applied the CPU NFS siever from [72] (obviously, with multi-threading enabled) to produce relations for the 768-bit number from [111]. Except for the special prime, three so-called *large primes* (i.e., primes not used for sieving but bounded by the applicable smoothness bound) are allowed in the rational polynomial value, whereas on the algebraic side the number of large primes is limited to three or four. Table 3.3 lists typical figures obtained when processing a single special prime in either setting; the percentages are indicative for NFS factorizations in general. The relatively small amount of time spent by the CPU on cofactoring suggests various ways to select optimal GPU parameters. One approach is aiming for as many relations per second as possible. Another approach is to aim for a certain fixed percentage of the relations among the pairs produced by NFS sieving, and then to select parameters that minimize the GPU time (thus maximizing the number of CPUs that can be served by a GPU). Although in general a fixed percentage cannot be ascertained, it can be done for experimental runs covering a fixed set of special prime ranges, and the resulting parameters can be used for production runs covering all special primes. Here we report on this latter approach in two settings: aiming for all (denoted by "99%") or for 95% of all relations.

Experiments. For a fixed set of special prime ranges and both large prime settings we determined all (a, b) pairs generated by NFS sieving and counted all relations resulting from those (a, b) pairs. Next, we processed the (a, b) pairs for either setting using our GPU cofactoring program, while widely varying all possible choices and aiming for 95% or 99% of all relations. This led to the observations below.




Figure 3.2 – Rational kernel cofactoring run times as a function of the Pollard p-1 bounds with desired yield 95%.

Table 3.5 – Approximate timings in seconds of cofactoring steps to process approximately 50 million (a, b) pairs, measured using the CUDA clock64 instruction. The wall clock time (measured with the unix time utility) includes the kernel launch overhead the CPU/GPU memory transfer and all CPU book-keeping operations.

large primes	desired yield	kernel	poly eval	trial division	Pollard p – 1	ECM	regrouping	total	wall clock
	95%	rational	0.05	-	56.42	149.49	5.97	211.94	263
3	3370	algebraic	0.10	0.36	6.21	39.05	0.44	46.16	203
5	99%	rational	0.05	-	79.19	213.15	7.75	300.16	367
		algebraic	0.10	0.36	10.84	48.93	0.68	60.91	
	95%	rational	0.06	-	57.50	122.66	7.22	187.45	324
4	9370	algebraic	0.18	0.88	15.75	110.75	1.11	128.68	324
4	99%	rational	0.06	-	57.48	158.49	8.53	224.57	470
		algebraic	0.18	0.89	27.47	212.47	1.79	242.80	479

Although other input numbers (than our 768-bit modulus) may lead to other choices our results are indicative for generic large composites.

We found that the rational kernel should be executed first, that it is best to skip trial division in the rational kernel, and that a small trial division bound (say, 200) in the algebraic kernel leads to a slight speed-up compared to not using algebraic trial division. For all other steps the two kernels behave similarly, though with somewhat different parameters that also depend on the desired yield (but not on the large prime setting). The details are listed in Table 3.4. Not shown there are the discarding thresholds that slightly decrease with the number of ECM attempts. Actual run times of the cofactoring steps are given in Table 3.5. Rational batches contain 3.5 times more pairs than algebraic ones (because the algebraic kernel has to handle larger values). For 3 large primes the rational kernel is called 5 times more often than the algebraic one, for 4 large primes 2.2 times more often.

Varying the bounds of the Pollard p-1 factoring attempt on the rational side within reasonable ranges does not noticeably affect the yield because almost all missed prime factors are found by the subsequent ECM attempts. However, early removal of small primes may reduce the sizes, thus reducing the ECM run time and, if not too much time is spent on Pollard p-1, also the overall run time. This

is depicted in Figure 3.2. Note that in record breaking ECM work the number of trials is much larger; however, according to [211] the empirically determined numbers reported in Table 3.4 are in the theoretically optimal range.

3.4.3 Performance results

Table 3.6 summarizes the results when the same special prime as in Table 3.3 is processed, but now with GPU-assistance. The figures clearly show that farming out cofactoring to a GPU is advantageous from an overall run time point of view and that, depending on the yield desired, a single GPU can keep up with multiple quad-core CPUs. Remarkably, more relations may be found given the same collection of (a, b) pairs: with an adequate number of GPUs each special prime can be processed faster and produces more relations. Based on more extensive experiments the overall performance gain measured in "relations per second" found with and without GPU assistance is 27% in the 3 large primes case and 50% in the 4 large primes case (cf. Table 3.7).

Including equipment and power expenses in the analysis is much harder, as illustrated by (unrelated) experiments in [163]. Relative power and purchase costs vary constantly, and the power consumption of a GPU running CUDA applications depends on the configuration and the operations performed [56]. For instance, global memory accesses account for a large fraction of the power consumption and the effect on the power consumption of arithmetic instructions depends more on their throughput than on their type. We have not carried out actual power consumption measurements comparing the settings from Table 3.7.

Preliminary experiments on NVIDIA Kepler GPUs. As shown in Table 2.2 the latest family of NVIDIA Kepler GPUs features a larger number of computing cores, larger memory bandwidth, and twice as many registers available per thread. However, each core works at a lower frequency and in addition the per-core throughput of 32-bit multiplication and multiply-and-add instructions is lower on Kepler GPUs than on Fermi GPUs (0.17 vs. 0.5 [161]). As a result our implementation is not expected to perform better on this family unless it is modified to take advantage of the higher number of cores and registers to the detriment of the frequency and the computing power of each core.

Preliminary experiments showed that the performance of our implementation on a high-end Kepler GTX Titan Black is roughly the same as the performance on a Fermi GTX 580. The per-core throughput of 32-bit floating point multiplication is relatively high on Kepler (namely 1 [161]) but at first glance the use of floating point instructions to implement multi-precision integer arithmetic is not promising and waiting for the next generation of CUDA GPUs (Maxwell) seems the best alternative.

3.5 Conclusion

It was shown that modern GPUs can be used to accelerate a compute-intensive part of the relation collection step of the number field sieve integer factorization method. Strategies were outlined to perform the entire cofactorization stage on a GPU. Integration with state-of-the-art lattice siever

Table 3.6 – GPU cofactoring for a single special prime. The number of quad-core CPUs that can be served by a single GPU is given in the second to last column.

	large primes	number of pairs after sieving	desired yield	seconds	CPU/GPU ratio	relations found
	2	$\approx 5 \cdot 10^5$	95%	2.6	9.8	132
3	$\approx 5 \cdot 10^{-10}$	99%	3.7	6.9	136	
4	$\approx 10^6$	95%	6.5	4.0	159	
		99%	9.6	2.7	165	

large prime	1	number of pairs after sieving	setting	total seconds	relations found	relations per second
3	3 100	$\approx 5 \cdot 10^7$	CPU only	2961	12523	4.23
U	100		CPU and GPU	2564	13761	5.37
4	50 ≈	$\approx 5 \cdot 10^7$	CPU only	1602	6855	4.28
	50	$\approx 5 \cdot 10^{\circ}$	CPU and GPU	1300	8302	6.39

Table 3.7 – Processing multiple special primes with desired yield 99%.

software indicates that a performance gain of up to 50% can be expected for the relation collection step of factorization of numbers in the current range of interest, if a single GPU can assist a regular multi-core CPU. Because relation collection for such numbers is responsible for about 90% of the total factoring effort the overall gain may be close to 45%; we have no experience with other sizes yet.

It is a subject of further research if a speed-up can be obtained using other types of graphic cards (to which we did not have access). In particular it would be interesting to explore if and how lower-end CUDA enabled GPUs can still be used for the present application and if the larger memory of more recent cards such as the GeForce GTX 780 Ti or GeForce GTX Titan can be exploited. Given our results we consider it unlikely that it would be advantageous to combine multiple GPUs using NVIDIA's scalable link interface.

4 Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curves: a **Practical Security Analysis**

In the last couple of decades, the use of elliptic curves or genus 1 curves for public key cryptography has become increasingly popular [115, 141]. The security of these cryptographic schemes relies on the difficulty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Currently, the best known algorithms to solve this problem are the so-called "generic" attacks, such as the parallelized version [201] of the Pollard rho algorithm [171], which has been used to solve large instances of the ECDLP (cf. [93, 52, 38, 9]). The Pollard rho algorithm is described in detail in Section 2.7. It is well-known that this algorithm can be optimized by a constant factor when the target curve comes equipped with an efficiently computable group automorphism [206, 66]. For example, on elliptic curves computing the negative of a point is very cheap and this *negation map* can be used to speed up the run-time by at most a factor $\sqrt{2}$. When the cardinality of the automorphism group is larger, such as for the elliptic curves proposed in [79], a higher speedup is expected when solving the ECDLP.

Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 have also been considered for cryptographic applications [116] (also see [13, 122]). Just as with their elliptic curve counterpart, the best known algorithms to solve the discrete logarithm in such groups are the generic ones. The practical potential of genus 2 curves in public-key cryptography has recently been highlighted by the fast performance numbers presented in [34]. For cryptographically interesting curves over large prime fields, it is possible to achieve larger automorphism groups in genus 2 (see [66]). This not only aids the cryptographer (e.g. [77, 34]), but also the cryptanalyst: one can expect a larger speed-up when computing the (H)ECDLP on curves from these families [66].

In this chapter we investigate the *practical* speed-up of Pollard rho when exploiting the automorphism group. We use the methods presented in [40, 25] for situations where only the negation map is available, and extend these techniques to curves with a larger group automorphism. As examples in the elliptic case, we use two curves that target the 128-bit security level: the NIST Curve P-256 [200] and a BN-curve [11] – the automorphism groups on these two curves are of size two and six respectively, which are the minimum and maximum possible sizes for genus 1 curves over large prime fields. To mimic these choices in the hyperelliptic case¹, we use two curves from [34], where the automorphism groups are of size two and ten - these are the minimum and maximum possible sizes for cryptographically interesting genus 2 curves over large prime fields. We implemented efficient field and curve arithmetic that was optimized for each of these four curves, and derived the best parameters to make use of the automorphism optimization.

We obtain security estimates for these four curves using parameters and implementations that were devised to minimize the practical inconveniences arising from the group automorphism optimization.

¹The fact that the BN curve is *pairing-friendly*, while our chosen genus 2 "analogue" is not, does not make a difference in the context of our ECDLP Pollard rho analysis. We wanted curves with large automorphism groups, and we choose the BN curve as one interesting example.

When taking the standardized NIST Curve P-256 as a baseline for the 128-bit security level, we show that curves with a larger automorphism group (of cardinality m > 2) indeed sacrifice some security. The constant-factor speedup, however, is lower in practice than the often cited \sqrt{m} . Nevertheless, using both theoretical and experimental analysis, we provide parameters which push the performance of the Pollard rho algorithm close to what can be achieved in practice.

This chapter is based on [36] (published at PKC 2014).

4.1 Preliminaries

General group elements. We use *Jac*(*C*) to denote the Jacobian group of a curve *C* over a finite field \mathbf{F}_q , where q > 3 is prime. For our purposes, *C* and Jac(C) can be identified when *C* is an elliptic curve, where our group elements are all points $(x, y) \in \mathbf{F}_q \times \mathbf{F}_q$ satisfying $C: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ over \mathbf{F}_q , together with the identity element \mathcal{O} . In genus 2, our curves are assumed to be of the form $C: y^2 =$ $x^5 + f_3 x^3 + f_2 x^2 + f_1 x + f_0$ over \mathbf{F}_q . In this case we write general elements of the Jacobian group (i.e. weight 2 divisors) in their Mumford representation as $(u(x), v(x)) = (x^2 + u_1x + u_0, v_1x + v_0) \in \mathbf{F}_q[x] \times \mathbf{F}_q[x]$, such that $u(x_1) = u(x_2) = 0$, $v(x_1) = y_1$ and $v(x_2) = y_2$, where (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) are two (not necessarily distinct) points in the set $C(\mathbf{\overline{F}}_a)$, and where $y_1 \neq -y_2$ (see Section 2.5.4). The canonical embedding of *C* into Jac(C) maps $(x_1, y_1) \in C(\mathbf{F}_q)$ to the divisor with Mumford representation $(x - x_1, y_1)$ – we call such divisors *degenerate*. Since $\#C \approx p$ and $\#Jac(C) \approx p^2$, the probability of encountering a degenerate divisor randomly from Jac(C) is $O(\frac{1}{n})$; this is also the probability that the sum of two random elements in Jac(C) is a degenerate divisor [153, Lemma 1]. Combining these probabilities with standard Pollard rho heuristics allows us to ignore the existence of degenerate divisors in practice - in all of the cases considered in this work, it is straightforward to see that an optimized random walk is more likely to solve the discrete logarithm problem than it is to walk into a degenerate divisor. Note that in the unlikely event one encounters a degenerate divisor, such that our general-case formulas compute divisors which are not on the Jacobian, this can be dealt with at almost no additional cost by performing a sanity check on all active walks, once in a while. Another solution is to perform such a sanity check on the distinguished elements only (see the description of the parallel Pollard rho algorithm in Section 2.7.2) and to discard such incorrect elements.

Affine additions with amortized inversions. As mentioned in Section 2.7, each step of a random walk requires the addition of two distinct Jacobian group elements. In the context of scalar multiplications, additions on the Jacobian are usually performed in projective space, where all inversions are avoided until the very end, at which point the result is normalized via a single inversion. In the context of Pollard rho however, it is preferred to work in affine space for two main reasons. Firstly, we need a way to suitably define and efficiently check a distinguished point criterion on *every* group element that is computed; since there are many distinct tuples of projective coordinates corresponding to a unique affine point, there is currently no known method to do this efficiently when working in projective space without converting points to affine coordinates by using inversions.

The optimized versions of Pollard rho run many concurrent random walks. An effective way to reduce the cost of inversions in affine coordinates is to take advantage of Montgomery's simultaneous inversion method [144]. If enough concurrent walks are used, then the amortized cost of each individual field inversion becomes roughly 3 field multiplications – this makes affine Weierstrass coordinates the fastest known coordinate system to work with for cryptanalysis. On elliptic curves, such amortized point additions require 5 \mathbf{F}_q multiplications, 1 \mathbf{F}_q squaring and 6 \mathbf{F}_q additions; on genus 2 curves, these additions cost 20 \mathbf{F}_q multiplications, 4 \mathbf{F}_q squarings and 48 \mathbf{F}_q additions [59] – see Table 4.1 in Section 4.2.

4.1.1 Handling Fruitless Cycles in Practice

The problem of fruitless cycles due to use of automorphisms is detailed in Section 2.7.3. In this subsection we compute a lower-bound on the number of fruitless steps we expect to perform in order to state an upper-bound on the (theoretical) speedup. For this analysis, we measure the cost of the additional (fruitless) computations we have to perform in order to deal with cycles. To analyze this cost, we use a function *c* which expresses the cost of certain operations in terms of the number of modular multiplications. We summarize which strategy we use in our implementation and outline how we select the various parameters, based on our analysis, to perform cycle reduction and cycle escaping.

In [40], different scenarios and varied parameters for both cycle reduction and cycle escaping techniques are implemented and compared. The recommendations are to use medium sized values of *r* (since larger values might decrease the performance by introducing cache-misses), to reduce the event of 2-cycles only (not any higher cycles), and to escape cycles by doubling the cycle's representative. This combination of choices was able to achieve a 1.29 times speedup over not using the negation map on architectures supporting the x64 instruction set, while from a theoretical perspective a speedup of 1.38 should be possible (both speedups are slightly below $\sqrt{2}$). A follow-up paper [25] takes a different approach on the single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) Cell processor. Since multiple walks are processed by the same instructions, all of which must follow identical computational steps, the cycle reduction technique is completely omitted. Instead, the walk is modified to occasionally check for fruitless cycles – different cycle lengths are detected at different points in time, but if a cycle is detected, this is resolved by escaping from it by again doubling the cycle's representative.

We now analyze the maximum expected speedup in more detail. Assume we perform w > 0 steps, and that at every step we can enter a cycle with probability p, if we are not in a cycle already. Once we enter a cycle at step $0 < i \le w$, all subsequent w - i steps are fruitless. Hence, after w steps we expect to have computed W(w, p) fruitless steps where

$$W(w,p) = \sum_{i=0}^{w-1} p(1-p)^{i}(w-i) = \frac{(1-p)^{w+1} + p(w+1) - 1}{p}.$$
(4.1)

Using this simple analysis (which is similar to the analysis from [25]), one can compute the ratio between the number of fruitful steps and the number of total steps. For example, the implementation described in [25] uses r = 2048, checks for 2-cycles every 48 iterations, and checks for larger cycles much less frequently. Since 2-cycles occur with probability $\frac{1}{2r}$, the expected number of multiplications due to fruitful steps (per 48 iterations) is $c(f) \cdot (48 - W(48, \frac{1}{2 \cdot 2048}))$, where c(f) is the cost to compute the iteration function expressed in multiplications, which in this setting is c(f) = 6. The total number of multiplications computed is then $48 \cdot c(f) + c(D)$, where the latter is the cost for point doubling in order to escape the 2-cycle, which is c(D) = 7 in the elliptic curve case. Ignoring the various implementation overheads, this analysis shows that a speedup of at most $0.97\sqrt{2}$ is expected when taking only 2-cycles into account.

In our implementations, we choose to follow an approach closer to that which is described in [40] as we target generic x64 processors with large caches and do not consider the use of SIMD instructions. The reason is that we *do* want to use the cycle reduction technique to lower the probability for walks to enter 2-cycles (at the price of occasionally computing fruitless cycles due to cycle reduction). We remark that in a SIMD setting, such as that considered in [25], an approach without cycle reduction might be more efficient in practice. We note that using the 2-cycle reduction technique also reduces the event of 3-cycles, which can only occur if $3 \mid #Aut(C)$, for which the BN curve is the only scenario in this chapter. As shown in [66], 3-cycles occur only if we add representatives from the same partition three times in a row – this repetition is exactly what we aim to avoid using the 2-cycle reduction technique.

We check for cycles every α steps by recording the β points { $\alpha, \alpha + 1, ..., \alpha + \beta - 1$ } (or an appropriate

subset of these points), and checking if the $(\alpha + \beta)$ th point occurs in the list of recorded points. If it does, then we select a fruitless cycle representative and use this point to double out of this fruitless cycle: this heuristically eliminates recurring cycles [40].

We modify the cycle reduction technique from [206, 40], as mentioned in Section 2.7.3. In order to avoid, with probability r^{-r} , the scenario where all of the *r* lookup table elements (denoted by F_j for $0 \le j < r$ as in Section 2.7.1) give rise to an invalid next point, we simply add a point from another precomputed lookup table, containing points $F'_j = c'_j P + d'_j Q$ for random integers $c'_j, d'_j \in [1, q - 1]$ for all $j \in [0, r - 1]$, as follows:

$$P_{i+1} = \begin{cases} P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)} & \text{if } \ell(P_i) \neq \ell(P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)}), \\ P_i + F'_{\ell(P_i)} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Following the analysis from [40], this reduces the probability to enter a 2-cycle from $(mr)^{-1}$ to approximately $\frac{1}{mr^3}$. For practical values of r, this makes 4-cycles the most likely event to occur, with probability $\frac{r-1}{m^2r^3} \approx (mr)^{-2}$ (assuming independence of the precomputed points F_j). Due to this cycle reduction technique, we expect that one out of r steps is fruitless (since the probability that $\ell(P_i) = \ell(P_i + F_{\ell(P_i)})$ is $\frac{1}{r}$). Hence, the fraction of all steps that are fruitful is $\frac{r-1}{r}$.

4.2 Target Curves and their Automorphism Groups

In this section we discuss our chosen target curves and the associated parameter choices and optimizations in the context of Pollard rho. The computational costs for divisor addition, computing the equivalence class representative, and updating the a_i and b_i values are summarized in the worst and average case in Table 4.1 and explained below for each target curve. The average case costs are used in our analysis (we allow branch instructions in our code), but we include the worst case costs for settings (like parallel architectures) where all the walks must always perform the same (worst-case) computational steps.

We choose to target two curves in genus 1 and two curves in genus 2. All four of these curves have a prime order between 254 and 256 bits. The two elliptic curves have m = 2 and m = 6, which are the respective minimum and maximum values of m = #Aut(C) for cryptographically interesting genus 1 curves over prime fields; likewise, the two hyperelliptic curves have m = 2 and m = 10, which are the respective minimum and maximum values of m = #Aut(C) for genus 2 curves of cryptographic interest over prime fields.

In each case we also outline our parameter choices for handling fruitless cycles. We follow the analysis and notation as outlined in Section 5.1, with a primary goal that less than one percent of the steps we compute are fruitless. We assume that the cost of a modular multiplication and modular squaring are equivalent: if required, the analysis can be trivially adjusted to reflect any other cost ratio. In order to sufficiently reduce the probability of cycles to occur, we always take $r \ge 1024$ (we did not use the idea from [25] to reduce the storage of the *r* precomputed points). Furthermore, in order to detect much longer (and much less likely) cycles, we take $\beta = 32$, so that we can detect and deal with cycles up to length 32. More precisely, given a probability *p* to enter a cycle at every step, and a value for *a* (we check for cycles every *a* steps), we estimate the fraction of all computation that is *fruitful* using Eq. (4.1), as

$$\frac{c(f)\cdot(\alpha-W(\alpha,p))}{\alpha\cdot c(f)+c(D)}\cdot\frac{r-1}{r},$$
(4.2)

where the first fraction is due to the cycle detection and escaping (we assume that we always compute a doubling to escape), and the second fraction incorporates the fruitless steps due to the cycle reduction

technique. Although we give the costs of updating the a_i and b_i , we omit these from our analysis – the correct a_i and b_i can be recovered when needed, when each path starts at a random point derived from a random seed, as described in [9].

4.2.1 Target Curves in Genus 1

NIST CurveP-256. Let $q = 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$, and define $E: y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b$ over \mathbf{F}_q with

b = 0x5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B.

This curve has a 256-bit prime order

n = 0xFFFFFF60000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFECE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551,

and is defined in NIST's Digital Signature Standard [200]. In this case Aut(E) = {id, -}, meaning that $(x, y) \sim (x, -y)$, so we take the representative of each class to be the point with the odd *y*-coordinate (when $0 \le y < q$). In the worst case, the cost of computing this representative is a negation in \mathbf{F}_q , and updating the corresponding (a_i, b_i) pair costs two negations in $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$. On average though, these costs are halved, since we have already computed (and detected) the representative half of the time.

In order to derive parameters for the cycle detection, we use $p = (2r)^{-2}$ as the probability to enter a 4-cycle, which (due to the cycle-reduction technique) is higher than the probability to enter a 2-cycle – see Section 5.1. The elliptic curve group operation costs are taken as c(f) = c(A) = 6 and c(D) = 7. Using the parameters r = 1024, $\alpha = 7 \cdot 10^4$ and $\beta = 32$, we expect that around one percent of the computed steps are fruitless: Eq.(4.2) evaluates to 0.9907.

BN254. Let *q* be the 254-bit prime obtained when $u = -(2^{62} + 2^{55} + 1)$ is plugged into $q(u) = 36u^4 + 36u^3 + 24u^2 + 6u + 1$. The Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve [11] *E*: $y^2 = x^3 + 2$ over \mathbf{F}_q has a 254-bit prime order

n = 0xFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFE02DDCE61B2C8A36986F2326A05727043,

and has been used in several of the "speed-record" papers for pairing computations that target the 128-bit security level (e.g. [5, 83]). Since $q \equiv 1 \mod 3$, there exists $\zeta \neq 1 \in \mathbf{F}_q$ such that $\zeta^3 = 1$, meaning that $E(\mathbf{F}_q)$ has additional automorphisms, e.g. $\phi: E \to E, (x, y) \mapsto (\zeta x, y)$. In fact, Aut(E) = $\{id, -, \phi, -\phi, \phi^2, -\phi^2\}$, so that the points (x, y), (x, -y), $(\zeta x, y)$, $(\zeta x, -y)$, $(\zeta^2 x, y)$ and $(\zeta^2 x, -y)$ are all equivalent under \sim . We take the representative of each equivalence class to be the point whose xcoordinate has least absolute value and whose y-coordinate is odd. In the worst case, computing this representative costs one multiplication, two negations and one addition in \mathbf{F}_{d} (we need to always compute the x-coordinate of all possible representatives as shown below to select the one having least absolute value, the worst case happens when y is even and so we need to compute -y), and updating the corresponding (a_i, b_i) pair costs two multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ by either ζ' or ζ'^2 with ζ' such that $\zeta'^3 - 1 \equiv 0 \mod n$; we exploit $\zeta^2 x = -(\zeta + 1)x$ to compute the *x*-coordinate of $\phi^2(P)$ from the x-coordinates of $\phi(P)$ and P without any further multiplications. On average however, we only need the negation to get the odd y-coordinate half of the time; to update the (a_i, b_i) , we compute two $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$ multiplications in 4 out of 6 cases (by ζ' in 2 out of the 4 cases and ζ'^2 in the other 2 out of 4 cases), namely two thirds of the time, while in the remaining 2 out of 6 cases, namely one third of the time, we need a single $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$ addition.

In order to derive parameters for the cycle detection, we use $p = (6r)^{-2}$ as the adjusted probability to enter a 4-cycle (taking the group automorphism into account). In this case the elliptic curve group operation costs are taken as c(f) = c(A) = 7 and c(D) = 8, where both costs incorporate the

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additional multiplication to compute the representative. Using r = 1024 and $\beta = 32$, we find that a corresponding α value (for which we expect that around one percent of the computed steps is fruitless) as $\alpha = 6 \cdot 10^5$, which is almost an order of magnitude larger than in the NIST CurveP-256 setting: in this case, evaluating Eq. (4.2) gives 0.9911.

4.2.2 Target Curves in Genus 2

Generic1271. Let $q = 2^{127} - 1$ and $C: y^2 = x^5 + a_3x^2 + a_2x^2 + a_1x + a_0$ over \mathbf{F}_q with

 $a_1 = 0x44642D7B9E492BE2E3C4F8A36F0C4236, a_0 = 0x504351F67810EFACF06E3A6E5C532F0.$

This curve was recently used in [34] as a "generic" instance of a (degree 5) genus 2 curve, since it has no special structure and the order of its Jacobian is a 254-bit prime

Here Aut(*C*) = {*id*, -}, which extends to *Jac*(*C*) to give that the divisors $(x^2 + u_1x + u_0, v_1x + v_0)$ and $(x^2 + u_1x + u_0, -v_1x - v_0)$ are equivalent under ~. Thus, we take the representative of each class to be the divisor whose v_0 -coordinate is odd. In the worst case, the cost of computing this representative is two negations in \mathbf{F}_q , and updating the corresponding (a_i, b_i) pair costs two negations in $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$. On average these costs are again halved since we already have the correct representative half of the time.

In order to derive parameters for the cycle detection, we use exactly the same parameters as in the NIST CurveP-256 setting, since the automorphism groups are the same, and only the costs of the group operations differ: c(f) = c(A) = 24 and c(D) = 28 in this case: Eq.(4.2) evaluates to 0.9907 (when $\alpha = 7 \cdot 10^4$, $\beta = 32$ and r = 1024).

4GLV127-BK. Let $q = 2^{64} \cdot (2^{63} - 27443) + 1$. The Buhler-Koblitz [49] curve *C*: $y^2 = x^5 + 17$ over \mathbf{F}_q gives rise to a Jacobian whose group order is a 254-bit prime

n = 0 x 3 FFFFFFFFFFF94 CD4661 A0 E5 A59 CB9080 D244 E988 D519 BA2A4239 C9A8 B868 DEF.

Since $q \equiv 1 \mod 5$, there exists $\zeta \neq 1$ in \mathbf{F}_q such that $\zeta^5 = 1$, which gives rise to additional automorphisms on C, e.g. $\phi: C \to C, (x, y) \mapsto (\zeta x, y)$. The map ϕ extends to weight-2 divisors as $\phi: Jac(C) \to C$ $Jac(C), (x^2+u_1x+u_0, v_1x+v_0) \mapsto (x^2+\zeta u_1x+\zeta^2 u_0, \zeta^4 v_1x+v_0).$ Here Aut $(C) = \{id, -, \phi, -\phi, \dots, \phi^4, -\phi^4\}, (id)$ so we take the representative of each class to be the divisor whose u_1 -coordinate has least absolute value and whose v_0 -coordinate is odd. It takes three multiplications, three additions and a negation (this time we use $\zeta^4 = -(\zeta^3 + \zeta^2 + \zeta + 1)$ to save a multiplication) to first determine the minimum value in { $\zeta^{i} u_{1}$ } for $0 \le i \le 4$, another two multiplications to compute the corresponding $\zeta^{2i} u_{0}$ and $\pm \zeta^{4i} v_{1}$, and finally one negation for the v_0 -coordinate. To comply with the formulas in [59], we must also recompute the two extended coordinates $u_1 u_0$ and u_1^2 , which additionally incurs a multiplication and a squaring. In the worst case, the cost of finding this representative is six multiplications, one squaring, three additions and two negations in \mathbf{F}_q ; the worst case happens when we select $\{\zeta^i u_1\}$ with i > 0 (so we need to compute $\zeta^{2i} u_0$ and $\pm \zeta^{4i} v_1$) and when v_0 is even (we need to compute $-v_0$). Updating the (a_i, b_i) pair costs two multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ as a_i and b_i are multiplied by a power of ζ' (at most a fourth power) with ζ' such that $\zeta'^4 + \zeta'^3 + \zeta'^2 + \zeta' + 1 \equiv 0 \mod n$ similarly to case of the BN254 curve. On average though, we only need the three \mathbf{F}_{a} multiplications and one \mathbf{F}_{a} squaring for u_{0} , v_{1} , $u_{1}u_{0}$ and u_1^2 in eight of the ten cases (one of the ten needs only one \mathbf{F}_q negation, the other case needs no computation), and we only need to negate v_0 in five of the ten cases. For updating (a_i, b_i) on average, we need two $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$ multiplications in eight of the ten cases (by $\zeta', \zeta'^2, \zeta'^3$ or ζ'^4), two $\mathbf{Z}/n\mathbf{Z}$ negations in

Table 4.1 – Cost of the Pollard rho iteration for the selected genus g curves, where m = #Aut and q is the prime field characteristic. We denote modular multiplications, modular squarings and modular additions/subtractions with **m**, **s** and **a** respectively. When updating the a_i and b_i values, we compute modulo the appropriate n instead of modulo q.

			cost of one step				
curve	g	$\mid m$	divisor	compute re	compute representative worst average		ate a_i , b_i
			addition	worst			average
CurveP-256	1	2	$5\mathbf{m} + \mathbf{s} + 6\mathbf{a}$	1 a	$\frac{1}{2}\mathbf{a}$	2 a _n	$1\mathbf{a}_n$
BN254	1	6	5m + s + 6a	1 m +3 a	$1m + \frac{5}{2}a$	$2\mathbf{m}_n$	$\frac{4}{3}$ m _n + $\frac{1}{3}$ a _n
Generic1271	2	2	20 m +4 s +48 a	2 a	1 a	2 a _n	$1\mathbf{a}_n$
4GLV127-BK	2	10	20 m +4 s +48 a	6 m +1 s +5 a	$\frac{27}{5}$ m + $\frac{4}{5}$ s + $\frac{3}{5}$ a	$2\mathbf{m}_n$	$\frac{8}{5}\mathbf{m}_n + \frac{1}{5}\mathbf{a}_n$

one of them, while the remaining case leaves (a_i, b_i) unchanged.

Taking the size of the automorphism group into account gives $p = (10r)^{-2}$ as the adjusted probability to enter a 4-cycle. Including the average number of additional multiplications to compute the representative of the equivalence class in the iteration function, the costs become c(f) = 30.2 and c(D) = 34.2. An α value for which we expect that around one percent of the computed steps is fruitless is $\alpha = 10^6$: this is over an order of magnitude larger compared to the Generic1271 setting: evaluating Eq.(4.2) gives 0.9943 in this case (when $\beta = 32$ and r = 1024).

4.2.3 Other Curves of Interest

In this subsection we briefly mention the application of the Pollard rho algorithm to other popular curves that have appeared in the literature and that target the 128-bit security level.

Other genus 1 curves. Bernstein's Curve25519 [12] and Hisil's ecfp256e [98] both facilitate fast timings for scalar multiplications without the existence of additional morphisms, so besides the faster modular arithmetic that is possible over these pseudo-Mersenne primes, the application of Pollard rho to these two curves is identical to the case of CurveP-256. There are other *j*-invariant zero curves (that are not pairing-friendly) which have been put forward for fast ECC using the Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) technique [79]: the prime order curve $E: y^2 = x^3 + 2$ over \mathbf{F}_q with $q = 2^{256} - 11733$ was used by Longa and Sica [134], while the prime order curve $E: y^2 = x^3 + 7$ over \mathbf{F}_q with $q = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977$ is proposed in the SEC standard [54] and is subsequently used in Bitcoin [154]. In both of these cases, the automorphism group is the same as that for BN254, so Pollard rho is optimized identically.

There exist numerous families of curves that come equipped with non-trivial morphisms which are useful in the context of scalar multiplications, but which are not useful in the context of Pollard rho. This is often the case for curves that contain efficiently computable endomorphisms which are not automorphisms, like the families of **Q**-curves recently proposed by Smith [194]. On the other hand, Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) curves [77] do facilitate a constant-factor speedup in Pollard rho, since the GLS endomorphism gives rise to small orbits and is typically much faster than a group operation (it usually involves one multiplication by a fixed constant).

Other genus 2 curves. The authors of [34] recently used the Kummer surface found by Gaudry and Schost [81] to achieve fast scalar multiplications in genus 2. Interestingly, there is no known way to exploit the fast arithmetic on the Kummer surface in Pollard rho, since only pseudo-additions exist there. Discrete logarithm instances must therefore be mapped back to the full Jacobian group, where, besides the smaller prime subgroup resulting from the imposed cofactor of 16 on Kummer1271, the optimal application of Pollard rho is identical to the case of Generic1271.

In addition to Buhler-Koblitz curves of the form $y^2 = x^5 + b$, the performance of 4-dimensional scalar decompositions on curves of the form *C*: $y^2 = x^5 + ax$ over \mathbf{F}_q was also recently investigated [34].

Similar to the BK curves, the endomorphisms on these curves are very efficient in comparison to a group addition, so they facilitate significant speedups in Pollard rho. Here we have m = 8, so it would be interesting to see how close we can get to a $\sqrt{8}$ speedup in this case.

As is the case in the elliptic curve setting, there are several genus 2 families that possess maps which are useful to the cryptographer, but which offer no known benefit to the cryptanalyst – see [80] for some examples of endomorphisms which are not automorphisms. Thus, the application of Pollard rho to these families is identical to the case of Generic1271.

4.3 Performance Results

In order to systematically compare the security of the genus 1 and genus 2 curves from the previous section, we designed and implemented a software framework for 64-bit platforms supporting the x64 instruction set. This modular design is capable of switching various features on or off: for example, using the automorphism optimization, employing different techniques for handling fruitless cycles, using different finite fields, or using different curve arithmetic. We implemented dedicated modular arithmetic for the special prime fields considered in this work (see Section 4.2); for each curve, we optimized the modular multiplication by hand in assembly, which resulted in a significant performance speedup compared to compiling our native C-code. All of the experimental results presented in this section have been obtained using an Intel Core i7-3520M (Ivy Bridge), running at 2893.484 MHz, and with the so-called *turbo boost* and *hyper-threading* features disabled.

We do not claim that the performance numbers reported in this section are the best possible. In a real attack, which focuses on a single curve target, the curve arithmetic and the arithmetic in the finite field should be optimized even further in assembly – we spent a moderate amount of time per curve to achieve good performance.

4.3.1 Correctness

In order to make sure that our software framework works correctly and behaves as expected, we searched for curves defined over the same base fields as our target curves (as outlined in Section 4.2), but with smaller (around 45-bit) prime-order subgroups (we note that ψ stabilizes these prime-order subgroups in all cases). We ran our implementations and enabled all the "statistic-gathering" options: this slows down the cost of a single step, but does not alter the behavior of the algorithm. We computed 10 batches of 10^3 Pollard rho computations for solving discrete logarithm instances in these subgroups, both with and without the use of the automorphism optimization.

Pollard rho without the group automorphism optimization. Assume we use an *r*-adding walk without the automorphism optimization (we take m = 1, where *m* is the cardinality of the group automorphism that is used). Experimental results from [198] suggest that using a larger *r*-value, such as $r \ge 16$, results in practical behavior that is closer to a truly random walk and gives a run-time that is close to the expected $\sqrt{\frac{\pi n}{2}}$. This is in agreement with the heuristic analysis from [9, Appendix B], which refines the arguments from [45], where it is shown that the average number of pseudo-random group elements required to find a collision (and solve the DLP) using an *r*-adding walk is

$$\sqrt{\frac{\pi n}{2m(1-\frac{1}{r})}},\tag{4.3}$$

where *n* is the size of the prime order subgroup. We use the parallel (i.e. distinguished point) version of Pollard rho, such that approximately one out of every 2^d points is distinguished. When computing *w*

Table 4.2 – Summary of the number of steps required when solving the DLP in a prime order subgroup $n (2^{N-1} < n < 2^N)$ on the four (modified) curves we consider in this work. We computed 10 batches of 10^3 discrete logarithms and we display the minimum and maximum number of average steps out of these 10 batches, as well as the overall average. We used a 32-adding walk and a distinguished point property with d = 8, which we expect to occur once every 2^8 steps. The expected estimate is derived using Eq. (4.4).

curve	N	min	avg	max	expected
NIST CurveP-256	45	6528891	6 703 125	6959881	6702814
BN254	47	12766948	13130659	13353056	13114481
Generic1271	45	6936215	7087854	7311815	7137587
4GLV127-BK	45	5339249	5489583	5668256	5489249

walks concurrently, Eq. (4.3) can be adjusted to

$$\sqrt{\frac{\pi n}{2m(1-\frac{1}{r})}} + w \cdot 2^{d-1}.$$
(4.4)

This is because after two walks collide we need to perform an additional $w \cdot 2^{d-1}$ steps after the two walks arrive at the same point: on average, 2^{d-1} steps are required to reach the next distinguished point, after which each of the two colliding walks will send the (same) distinguished point to the central database and the collision will be detected. For each scenario, Table 4.2 summarizes the average minimum, average and maximum steps of these 10 batches together with the theoretical number of steps we expect to take to solve the DLP. In all four cases, the average number of steps observed in practice matches the expected number of steps almost exactly: the difference is below one percent.

Pollard rho with the group automorphism optimization. When using the group automorphism with $m = #\operatorname{Aut}(C)$, we can encounter two types of fruitless steps: those due to the 2-cycle reduction technique and those which are performed when a walk is trapped in fruitless cycles. Due to the cycle reduction technique we use (see Section 5.1), the probability of 2-cycles and 3-cycles (if the latter can occur) have been reduced significantly. In fact, the probability to enter a 4-cycle becomes the most likely event by far, so we use the approximation $p = 1/(mr)^2$ (see Section 5.1) for the probability of entering any cycle. We check for cycles every α steps, where α depends on the curve (see Section 4.2), and we escape these cycles if necessary. If *s* is the expected number of steps required to solve the DLP, then the expected number of fruitless steps spent in fruitless cycles is

$$\frac{s}{\alpha} \cdot W(\alpha, (mr)^{-2}), \tag{4.5}$$

where W is as in Eq. (4.1).

Table 4.3 summarizes the results of running Pollard rho with the group automorphism optimization, where it is clear that the number of fruitful steps observed is very close to what we expect. Hence, we can expect to achieve a speedup if the practical cost of the iteration function is not increased too much. We note that the number of fruitless steps due to the 2-cycle reduction technique is also consistent with the prediction.

Interestingly, for the two curves with a larger automorphism group (i.e. with m > 2), the number of trapped fruitless cycles is lower than the expected value, which can be explained as follows. Since we expect fruitless cycles to occur much less frequently, the α parameter has been chosen significantly larger than for the curves with m = 2. In our benchmark runs, we solve the smaller DLP instances that are outlined in Table 4.2; if one of the walks gets trapped in a fruitless cycle, then, with overwhelming

Table 4.3 – A comparison of the expected (exp.) and real number of fruitless steps (**FS**) and fruitful steps when computing 10 batches of 10^3 discrete logarithms (as in Table 4.2) but using the group automorphism optimization. The genus-*g* curves have m = #Aut(C) and we check for cycles up to length β every α steps.

	NIST P-256	BN254	Generic1271	4GLV127-BK
(<i>g</i> , <i>m</i>)	(1,2)	(1,6)	(2,2)	(2,10)
(α,β)	$(7 \cdot 10^4, 32)$	$(6 \cdot 10^5, 32)$	$(7 \cdot 10^4, 32)$	(10 ⁶ , 32)
exp. # of fruitful steps (Eq.(4.4))	4 668 485	5 274 669	4 971 221	1 712 170
real # of fruitful steps (s)	4643787	5271219	5 010 354	1723756
exp. # of trapped FS (Eq. (4.5))	38 537	41 671	41 538	8185
real # of trapped FS	33 349	28 526	42 122	4835
exp. # of cycle reduction FS	4535	5148	4893	1683
real # of cycle reduction FS	4582	5173	4911	1687

probability, one of the other concurrent walks will solve the DLP before this trapped walk has computed all of the fruitless $\alpha + \beta$ steps that are required to escape from this fruitless cycle. This behavior is not incorporated in our estimate for the total number of trapped fruitless steps. We ran larger instances of the DLP and, as expected, the total number of trapped fruitless steps increased.

4.3.2 Implementation Results

In order to optimize performance, we conducted several experiments to find the best parameters for instantiating the Pollard rho algorithm in practice: we varied the number of partitions in the adding walks and the number of concurrent walks. For all four curves, we found that 2048 concurrent walks resulted in low costs for amortized inversions and gave the best performance. Using 2048 concurrent walks contradicts the advice from [40], which might be explained by the fact that our platform has a large cache so that "cache-misses" will only occur for a much larger number of concurrent walks. In regards to the optimal size of the lookup table, our benchmark runs showed that using 32-adding walks are best when the automorphism optimization is not used, and that 1024-adding walks are best when it is.

In Table 6.4 we state the performance numbers using the parameters above. We save computation by exploiting the fact that one does not need to update the a_i and b_i values [9]: this is especially significant for the curves with m > 2. Note that the number of computer cycles per step, when not using the group automorphism optimization, is lower for the BN254 curve compared to CurveP-256. This is surprising since the BN254 curve does not use a special prime. A partial explanation is that the CurveP-256 arithmetic is relatively slow, especially compared to the other NIST curves, and the addition of two residues might result in a carry occupying an additional word, which slows down the computation. On the other hand, the BN254 curve is defined over a 254-bit prime field, such that subtraction-less Montgomery multiplication [204] can be used to save a conditional subtraction in every modular multiplication. Furthermore, the addition of two residues does not result in a carry occupying another word, which saves instructions. We suspect, however, that a hand-tweaked assembly implementation of NIST's CurveP-256 can be made slightly more efficient than the subtraction-less Montgomery arithmetic using the x64 instruction set.

Table 6.4 states the expected speedup of Pollard rho using the automorphism (which takes into account the additional cost of choosing representatives), as well as the speedup we observed. This experimental speedup is consistently five to seven percent lower than the expected one, except for the 4GLV127-BK curve – such differences can be expected, as our analysis did not take extra modular additions, subtractions and negations into account, nor did we consider various overheads due to the

Table 4.4 – The performance of our implementations expressed in the number of cycles per step without (32-adding walk) and with (1024-adding walk) the usage of the group automorphism running 2048 walks concurrently. For each curve, the expected speedup (which takes into account the additional cost of computing the equivalence class representative) and the speedup found in practice are stated together with the expected number of single-core years to solve a discrete logarithm. The security of each curve is given when taking NIST CurveP-256 as the baseline for the 128-bit security level.

CUIRIO	performance		speedup	core	sec	
curve	without	with	exp.	real	years	
NIST CurveP-256	1129	1185	$\sqrt{2}$		$3.946 \cdot 10^{24}$	
BN254	1030	1296	$\frac{6}{7} \cdot \sqrt{6} \approx 0.857\sqrt{6}$	$0.790\sqrt{6}$	$9.486 \cdot 10^{23}$	125.9
Generic1271	986	1043	$\sqrt{2}$	$0.940\sqrt{2}$	$1.736 \cdot 10^{24}$	126.8
4GLV127-BK	1398	1765	$\left \frac{120}{151} \cdot \sqrt{10} \approx 0.795 \sqrt{10} \right $	$0.784\sqrt{10}$	$1.309 \cdot 10^{24}$	126.4

usage of additional memory latencies. In the case of the BK curve, these additional factors constitute a much smaller fraction of the factors that were included in the analysis, which is why our experiment's results match the expected numbers even closer. For each curve, Table 6.4 also reports the expected number of single Intel Core i7-3520M core years required to solve a discrete logarithm instance. This estimate assumes that we use the group automorphism optimization and takes into account that we have to perform slightly more steps, increasing the estimate from Eq. (4.3) such that we take fruitless cycles into account, in line with the analysis from Section 4.2. Based on this estimate, we also give the security level for each curve using the NIST CurveP-256 as the baseline for 128-bit security. Hence, this security estimate takes into account the different available optimizations for each curve, as well as the varying performance for the base field arithmetic.

4.4 Conclusion

We analyzed the practical security of elliptic curves and genus 2 hyperelliptic curves over prime fields using the Pollard rho algorithm. We developed a software framework implementing the state-of-theart techniques to make use of the group automorphism optimization, which is targeted at 64-bit architectures that support the x64 instruction set. We detailed optimized parameter selection when dealing with practical issues, such as reducing, detecting and escaping fruitless cycles; in particular, we analyzed these choices for curves with large automorphism groups, which have not yet received a detailed analysis in the literature.

We studied the performance of the Pollard rho algorithm on two elliptic curves and two genus 2 curves of cryptographic interest, all of which are estimated to provide around 128 bits of security. Curves having group automorphism of cardinality *m* cannot achieve a speedup of \sqrt{m} : one has to pay a penalty for finding the representative of the equivalence class. Nevertheless, a constant-factor improvement is possible when dealing with fruitless cycles, and our analysis shows how to optimize this improvement in practice.

5 An Efficient Many-Core Architecture for ECC security assessment

Large instances of the ECDLP have been solved using the parallel version of Pollard rho [93, 52, 38, 9]. Analyzing the performance of Pollard rho in practice and solving large instances of the ECDLP is useful to estimate the security of ECC and choose the parameters of deployed crypto-systems appropriately. The Certicom challenges [51] have been published with the aim of providing a public litmus test for assessing the performance of ECDLP attacks.

In this chapter we explore the use of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) (see Section 2.9) as accelerators for the parallel version of Pollard rho. We focus on elliptic curves defined over "generic" prime fields \mathbf{F}_p where the prime p is assumed to have no special form.

Both hardware [90, 106] and software [38, 25] implementations of Pollard rho for the ECDLP on prime fields have been proposed in the literature. The architecture proposed in [90] has been implemented on Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGAs and elliptic curve prime group sizes ranging from 64 to 160 bits have been considered to assess its performance. The implementation proposed in [106] targets the secp112r1 curve from Certicom defined over a prime field of a special form. The architecture is based on a modular multiplication unit optimized to be efficiently mapped on embedded DSP resources of a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. These works have demonstrated that FPGAs are suitable accelerators for Pollard rho.

We present a novel pipelined many-core architecture implementing the parallel version of Pollard rho for elliptic curves over generic prime fields using the negation map speed-up and fruitless cycle handling [201]. The size of the prime field is configurable at synthesis time and the implementation does not rely on a specific target device architecture. We analyze the performance of our architecture when implemented on different FPGA families. Compared to the state of the art we obtain a speed-up of a factor of about 4. We also provide cost estimates for solving the Certicom challenge ECCp-131 using FPGA clusters. The VHDL code of this project will be made freely available.

This chapter is based on [101] (to be submitted to FPL 2015).

5.1 Parallel Pollard rho for the ECDLP on FPGAs

Elliptic curves and the Pollard rho algorithm are introduced in Section 2.5 and Section 2.7 respectively. We focus on prime order subgroups of $E(F_p)$ denoted by $\langle P \rangle$. We use the parallel version of Pollard rho with *r*-adding walks (where *r* is assumed to be a power of 2), distinguished points and the negation map [201, 206, 66]. A distinguished point, is a point in $\langle P \rangle$ having the least significant *d* bits of the *x* coordinate all equal to zero for a small positive integer *d*.

We use the negation map and the 2-cycle reduction technique adopted in Chapter 4, which requires a *second lookup table* containing *r* points $F'_j = c'_j P + d'_j Q = (x'_j, y'_j)$ for random non-zero $c'_j, d'_j \in [1, q-1]$ for all $j \in [0, r-1]$. This technique reduces the probability of entering a 2-cycle from 1/(2r) to $1/(2r^3)$ and this makes 4-cycles the most likely to occur with probability $(r-1)/(4r^3)$ (i.e., a 4-cycle appears

on average every $4r^3/(r-1)$ steps) as explained in subsection . We do not implement cycle detection and escape in our FPGA architecture as it would add significant architectural complexity. Instead we assume that cycle detection and escape is performed periodically on the host system (for instance the processor embedded in most FPGAs) every w iterations (see Section 5.3 for an explanation how the value w is selected following the approach from [36]), after which the current point of each walk is updated accordingly (see subsection 5.2.2 for the practical details). To avoid stalling the FPGAs until the host system completes cycle detection/escape and updates the current point of each walk, we alternate the execution of two sets of concurrent walks by using a buffer to store updated points. The host is responsible for loading the buffer. Every w iterations we send the points of the current (set of) walks to the host and we immediately re-start the other set of walks using the points stored in the buffer. It follows that the host has a time frame of w iterations to perform cycle detection/escape and store points from which the "suspended" set of walks will re-start.

The Pollard rho iteration we implement follows from the above description. Each walk repeats the iteration composed of the following steps, until a collision is found:

- 1. Given $P_i = (x_i, y_i)$ and $\ell = x_i \mod r$, set the point $S = (x_s, y_s)$ equal to $F_\ell = (x_\ell, y_\ell)$. Or set the point *S* equal to $F'_\ell = (x'_\ell, y'_\ell)$ if the second table was enabled at the previous iteration. Set the values a_s and b_s equal to c_ℓ and d_ℓ or c'_ℓ and d'_ℓ accordingly. Compute $P_{i+1} = P_i + S = (x_{i+1}, y_{i+1})$ (addition formula in Section 2.5). Given the two integer multipliers a, b such that $P_i = aP + bQ$, compute $a \leftarrow a + a_s \mod q$ and $b \leftarrow b + b_s \mod q$ so that $P_{i+1} = aP + bQ$ (recall that $P_0 = a_0P + b_0Q$).
- 2. (negation map) if y_{i+1} is even set $P_{i+1} \leftarrow -P_{i+1} = (x_{i+1}, p y_{i+1})$ and set $a \leftarrow -a \mod q$ and $b \leftarrow -b \mod q$.
- 3. (reduction) If the second table is not enabled then if $\ell(P_i) = \ell(P_{i+1})$ set $P_{i+1} \leftarrow P_i$ and enable the second table for the next iteration. Otherwise if the second table is enabled the current step is skipped.
- 4. If $x_{i+1} \mod 2^d = 0$ report the (distinguished) point P_{i+1} to the central processor.

If *w* iterations have been performed report current point to central processor for cycle detection and escape (starting from this point the central processor can perform the cycle detection and escape technique described in subsection 5.1).

5.2 **Proposed architecture**

The proposed many-core architecture relies on a pipelined core implementing the parallel version of Pollard rho. In this section we discuss design and implementation of a single core and of the final many-core architecture. We refer the reader to [121] for the basics of modern digital design, the description of standard combinational components such as multiplexers, comparators, adders and subtractors, sequential elements like Flip-Flop's, registers and shift registers and basic graphical notation for register transfer level (RTL) design.

5.2.1 Prime field operations

To implement the finite field operations required to build Weierstrass elliptic curve arithmetic (see Section 2.5) we use Montgomery arithmetic (see Section 2.4). In this subsection we denote the k-bit prime modulus by M. Montgomery addition and subtraction are implemented with a single simple hardware module using two k-bit binary adders. The latency of the addition/subtraction module is 1 clock cycle.

Montgomery multiplication. We use the Montgomery multiplication algorithm described in Algorithm 15 which follows from Algorithm 2 in a straightforward way by setting the radix r equal to 2. Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of the Montgomery multiplication module.

Algorithm 15 Binary Montgomery multiplication algorithm.

Input: $X = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} x_i 2^i$, $Y = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} y_i 2^i$, the modulus $M = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} m_i 2^i$ $(-m_0^{-1} \mod 2 = 1)$ with $0 \le x_i$, y_i , $m_i < 2$, $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ such that $2^{k-1} < M < 2^k$, gcd(2, M) = 1 and $0 \le X, Y < M$ **Output:** $Z = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} z_i 2^i$ with $0 \le z_i < 2$, $Z = X \cdot Y \cdot 2^{-k} \mod M$ 1: $P_t \leftarrow 0$ 2: **for** i = 0 to k - 1 **do** $P_t \leftarrow P_t + ((-x_i \mod 2^k) \& Y)$ 3: **if** $P_t \& 1 = 0$ **then** 4: $P_t \leftarrow P_t >> 1$ 5: else 6: $P_t \leftarrow (P_t + M) >> 1$ 7: 8: if $P_t \ge M$ then $P \leftarrow P_t - M$ 9: 10: else $P \leftarrow P_t$ 11: 12: return P

As shown in Figure 5.1 the input *Y* is stored in a *k*-bit register, while *X* is stored in a *k*-bit shift register (i.e., the value stored in the register undergoes a logical shift by one at each clock cycle). The accumulation operation is performed using two k + 2-bit binary adders and the k + 2-bit register *ACC* (as shown in Figure 5.1). The *k*-bit output *P* is available *k* clock cycles after *X* and *Y* are loaded in the input registers.

Inversion. For modular inversion we implement a modified version of the Kaliski algorithm [88] as illustrated in Algorithm 16. If the input *a* equals the Montgomery representation of the positive integer *X*, i.e., $a = \tilde{X} = X2^k \mod M$, Algorithm 16 computes $r = a^{-1}2^{2k} \mod M = X^{-1}2^{-k}2^{2k} = X^{-1}2^k \mod M$.

The algorithm can be split in two main phases. The first phase (i.e., Algorithm 16 lines 1 to 23) computes the *almost* Montgomery inverse [107, 88]. The while loop is executed *z* times with $k \le z \le 2k$ [107, Theorem 2]. At each iteration either the value of *u* or the value of *v* is reduced by a factor of at least 2 so the number of iterations *z* is at most twice the bit-size of *M*, namely 2*k*. Similarly, in the best case, *k* iterations are performed. Moreover the following invariants are maintained [107]:

- $0 \le r, s, u, v \le 2M 1$.
- gcd(a, M) = gcd(u, v), $as \equiv v2^z \mod M$ and $ar \equiv -u2^z \mod M$. It follows that after the while loop v = 0, gcd(a, M) = gcd(u, v) = u = 1 and $r = -a^{-1}2^z \mod M$.

The second phase corrects the result to obtain a valid Montgomery representation, iterating logical shifts and reductions modulo M (lines 24-27). The total number of iterations required to compute the result equals 2k. Figure 5.2 shows the architecture of the inversion module implementing Algorithm 16. The architecture is composed of 4k-bit registers, 3k-bit 4-to-1 and one 3-to-1 multiplexers, a combinational logic block and a finite-state machine (FSM) coordinating the operations [88]. The input a is loaded in register v. On input the values stored in registers u, v, r and s, the combinational logic block computes all values needed to update the four registers at the next clock cycle. The FSM determines which values computed by the combinational logic are used to updated registers u, v, r and




Figure 5.1 – Montgomery multiplication module.

s depending on the values of *u*, *v*, *r* and *s* in the current clock cycle. More precisely the FSM implements all the "if-then-else" blocks inside the while loop and the final for loop. Two states distinguish the first phase (lines 1-23) of the algorithm from the second phase (lines 24-27).

The result of the inversion operation is available in register r in 2k clock cycles after the input is loaded in register v.

5.2.2 Single pipeline multi walk core

The architecture of a *single pipeline multi walk* (SPMW) core is depicted in Figure 5.3. Although each walk exhibits an iterative behavior, the parallel version of Pollard's rho algorithm runs independent walks. We exploit this behavior by interleaving the execution of several independent walks in the same hardware pipeline. As mentioned in subsection 5.1, cycle detection and escape are performed after *w* iterations on the host system by sending the current points of each walk to the host system. As soon as the points are sent the SPMW core switches the execution to the second set of walks by simply loading updated points from a FIFO. In this way there is no performance loss due to the communication with the host for cycle section and escape. After cycle detection and escape the host will load the appropriate points into the FIFO to allow the suspended set of walks to re-start.

An SPMW core contains an arithmetic pipeline performing step 1 and the arithmetic operations for

Algorithm 16 Modified Kaliski inversion algorithm [88].

```
Input: a \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0} where M is the k-bit modulus, gcd(a, M) = 1 and a < M
Output: r = a^{-1}2^{2k} \mod M
 1: z \leftarrow 0
 2: u \leftarrow M
 3: v ← a
 4: r \leftarrow 0
 5: s \leftarrow 1
 6: while v > 0 do
       if u&1 = 0 then
 7:
           u \leftarrow u >> 1
 8:
           s \leftarrow s << 1
 9.
        else if v \& 1 = 0 then
10:
           v \leftarrow v >> 1
11:
12:
           r \leftarrow r << 1
13:
        else if u > v then
14:
           u \leftarrow (u - v) >> 1
           r \leftarrow r + s
15:
           s \leftarrow s << 1
16:
        else
17:
           v \leftarrow (v - u) >> 1
18:
19:
           s \leftarrow r + s
            r \leftarrow r << 1
20:
        z \leftarrow z + 1
21:
22: if r \ge M then
23:
        r \leftarrow r - M
24: for i = z to 2k do
       r \leftarrow r << 1
25:
        if r \ge M then
26:
           r \leftarrow r - M
27:
28: return r
```

step 2 from Section 5.1, an *initial point FIFO* (IP-FIFO) to hold the initial point $P_0 = (x_0, y_0)$ (2*k* bits) and the multipliers a_0, b_0 (2*k* bits) for each walk, two lookup tables (4*r k* bits each), i.e., T-WALK defining the *r*-adding walk and T-RED for the reduction technique, three 2-to-1 multiplexers and a comparator implementing negation map (step 2) and reduction (step 3), and an *output point dispatcher* (ODP) for step 4. The The arithmetic pipeline is composed of addition/subtraction modules, Montgomery multiplication modules [143] and an inversion module implementing a modified Kaliski inversion algorithm as in [90].

At the start-up the host loads the initial random points $P_0 = (x_0, y_0)$ and the multipliers a_0, b_0 for each walk in the active set into the IP-FIFO. As mentioned above, we iteratively run two sets of walks, with only one set active at a time. Before the execution of the current set of walks is suspended because of cycle detection and escape, the host loads a fresh set of updated initial points P_0 into the IP-FIFO. A counter inside the OPD asserts the *init* signal in Figure 5.3 controlling the multiplexer that allows one set of walks to start and also triggers the OPD itself to send the current point of each walk in the active set to the host for cycle detection and escape. The pipeline can be fully filled by interleaving the execution of multiple walks as shown in Figure 5.2.2, where we denote by *walk*_{*i*,*j*} the operation performed by the *i*-th walk at the *j*-th iteration.

At the beginning, $walk_{1,0}$ enters the pipeline. When the first stage completes, the output of $walk_{1,0}$




Figure 5.2 – Inversion module.





Figure 5.3 - High-level view of the SPMW core.

is passed to the second stage. At the same time, a new walk (i.e., $walk_{2,0}$) is started, filling the first stage. New walks can be launched until all pipeline stages are filled (Figure 5.4c). Once a walk completes an iteration, it re-enters the first stage to start the following iteration (e.g., $walk_{1,1}$ in Figure 5.4d).

5.2. Proposed architecture



(d) Start of the second iteration of the first walk.

Figure 5.4 - Single-Pipe Multi-Walks approach.

The performance, i.e., the throughput measured for instance in terms of points generated per second, is limited by the different latencies of pipeline stages. A walk can move forward only when the stage having the highest latency finished its computation. Table 5.1 shows the latency in terms of clock cycles of each module composing the pipeline as a function of *k*. We denote the highest latency in the pipeline by t_{max} , the throughput by $TP = \frac{1}{t_{\text{max}}+1}$ (an additional clock cycle is required

Chapter 5. An Efficient Many-Core Architecture for ECC security assessment

Table 5.1 – Latencies of the modules composing the pipeline.

Add/Sub	Montgomery multiplication	Inversion
1	k	2k

to pass the result to the next stage) and the number of stages composing the pipeline by N_s . In our case N_s equals the number of active walks in one SPMW core, namely walks that can be interleaved in a single pipeline. As shown in Table 5.1 the inversion module has the highest latency, i.e., $t_{max} = 2k$. Therefore, TP = 1/(2k + 1), whereas $N_s = 7$ as there are 7 stages as shown in Figure . The throughput can be increased by splitting the computation of the most costly operations, namely inversion and Montgomery multiplication, across multiple pipeline stages (*pipeline unrolling*).

5.2.3 Pipeline unrolling

Pipeline unrolling consists in splitting the computation performed by the stages having the highest latency across multiple stages having lower latency. In our case we focus on the Montgomery multiplication module and the inversion module, with latencies equal to *k* and 2*k* respectively. We modify inversion and Montgomery multiplication modules so their internal state (i.e., content of their registers) can be pre-loaded (e.g., the state reached by another instance of the same module can be used as the pre-loaded value). With this modification a module can perform just a subset of the steps required by the entire operation and its state can be transferred to another instance of the same modulus. Several identical modules can be combined (in a "cascade fashion") to compute a full operation. Even though this approach implies area penalty, each module "replica" in the chain can be assigned to a new pipeline stage having lower latency with the result of increasing the number of walks concurrently running in the pipeline.

As a first step we replicate the inversion unit to split inversion stage into two pipeline stages, each one characterized by a latency of *k* clock-cycles, as shown in Figure 5.6. The throughput becomes TP = 1/(k+1), however the hardware resources required to implement the inversion operation have doubled.

To further increase the throughput of the pipeline, the aforementioned approach can be recursively applied to all stages currently having maximum latency $t_{max} = k$, namely all Montgomery multiplication and inversion stages based on equations (5.1) and (5.2):

$$TP = \frac{1}{\left\lceil k/u \right\rceil + 1},\tag{5.1}$$

 $N_s = 3 + 5 \cdot u. \tag{5.2}$

Equation (5.1) models the SPMW core throughput with respect to k and the *unrolling factor u*. The unrolling factor denotes how many times inversion and multiplication modules are replicated, assuming as starting condition that the initial inversion stage has been already replicated as in Figure 5.6. Equation (5.2) computes the number of stages composing the pipeline after unrolling. The 3 addition/subtraction stages are not replicated because of their low latency, whereas the other 5 stages (i.e., 2 inversion stages and 3 multiplication stages) are replicated *u* times. As the value N_s equals the number of walks that can be interleaved and executed in parallel in a single pipeline, it also represents the number of points to be stored in the IP-FIFO and thus determines its size. Figure 5.7 shows the pipeline after applying further unrolling to Montgomery multiplication and inversion stages (u = 2) to obtain $t_{\text{max}} = \lceil k/2 \rceil$ and $TP = 1/(\lceil k/2 \rceil) + 1$).

The unrolling factor is limited by the availability of hardware resources to accommodate the module

replicas. We combine two approaches to maximize the throughput under hardware resource (area and memory) constraints:

- 1. Increase the unrolling factor until the area constraint is violated; this approach alone leads to a single SPMW core that, in some cases, does not utilize the hardware resources in the most efficient way. Incrementing the unrolling factor by one causes a δ_{area} increase of the area (for instance in our case 2 inversion units and 3 multipliers must be added). This may leave hardware resources unused when the overall area is not a multiple of δ_{area} .
- 2. Replicate SPMW cores to build a many-core architecture, as in Figure 5.9.

The total device area is denoted by A_{max} and the total device memory to accommodate look-up tables and the IP-FIFO is denoted by M_{max} . Incrementing the unrolling factor by one causes a δ_{area} increase of the area. We denote by A_0 the area required to implement an SPMW core with u = 1. The values A_0 and δ_{area} depend both on the device technology and k. The area occupied by one SPMW core A_{SPMW} is defined by equation (5.3). The number of cores we can instantiate N_{SPMW} is defined by equation (5.4). The minimum number N_{tables} of pairs of look-up tables T-WALK and T-RED necessary to sustain the bandwidth needed by N_{SPMW} (see subsection for the details) is defined by equation (5.6). The amount of memory needed by the IP-FIFO M_{FIFO} is defined by equation (5.5). The maximum number NMAX_{tables} of pairs of T-WALK and T-RED look-up tables that can be fit on the device is defined by equation (5.7).

The optimal values for the unrolling factor u and the number of SPMW cores N_{SPMW} , given k, A_{max} , M_{max} and the current t_{max} , are found by maximizing the many-core throughput TP_{MC} defined by equation (5.8) under the constraints defined by equation (5.9). The first constraint is imposed to make sure we can accommodate enough look-up table pairs to serve all cores (see subsection 5.2.4 for details on how the look-up tables can be shared by multiple cores).

$$A_{\text{SPMW}} = A_0 + (u-1) \cdot \delta_{\text{area}}.$$
(5.3)

$$N_{\rm SPMW} = \left\lfloor \frac{A_{\rm max}}{A_{\rm SPMW}} \right\rfloor.$$
(5.4)

 $M_{\rm FIFO} = N_{\rm SPMW} 4k N_s. \tag{5.5}$

 $N_{\text{tables}} = \lceil N_{\text{SPMW}} / (t_{\text{max}} + 1) \rceil.$ (5.6)

$$NMAX_{tables} = \lfloor (M_{max} - M_{IPFIFO}) / (8kr) \rfloor.$$
(5.7)

$$TP_{\rm MC} = N_{\rm SPMW} \cdot \frac{1}{\left[t_{\rm max}/u\right] + 1}.$$
(5.8)

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$$N_{\text{SPMW}} \le \text{NMAX}_{\text{tables}} \cdot (t_{\text{max}} + 1),$$

$$N_{\text{SPMW}} \cdot A_{\text{SPMW}} < A_{\text{max}}.$$
(5.9)

In the following we describe the architectural details of the inversion and Montgomery multiplication modules with state pre-loading.

Inversion module with state pre-loading

The architecture of the inversion module with state pre-loading is depicted in Figure 5.5.




Figure 5.5 – Inversion module with state pre-loading.

We extend the input/output interface of the basic module with additional input signals (i.e., u_{in} , v_{in} , r_{in} , s_{in} and f_{in}) and output signals (i.e., u_{out} , v_{out} , r_{out} , s_{out} and f_{out}). We add 5 multiplexers (controlled by the signal sel_{in}) to allow the internal state of the module (registers u, v, r, s and the FSM in Figure 5.5) to be pre-loaded from an external source through the additional input signals. The additional output signals propagate the state of the module.

Several inversion modules with state pre-loading can be connected sequentially by mapping the additional output signals of one module to the additional input signals of the following one to perform a full operation. For instance, Figure 5.6 shows how our pipeline changes by adding one replica of the inversion module to reduce t_{max} from 2*k* to *k*.

The output signal r_{out} of the last module will hold the final result. Notice that several input/output signals are unused by some modules in the sequence, for instance the primary input signal a is used only by the first module. This is not an issue as all the unused signals are automatically removed by synthesis tools (see Section 2.9).

Montgomery multiplier with state pre-loading

The architecture of the Montgomery multiplication module with state pre-loading is depicted in Figure 5.8.




Figure 5.6 – Replicated inversion module.




Figure 5.7 – Unrolled pipeline with $TP = 1/(\lceil k/2 \rceil + 1)$.

We follow the same strategy used above. We add output and input signals (*ACC*_{in} and *ACC*_{out}) to allow pre-loading and propagation of the state (i.e., the register *ACC*). Additional input and output




Figure 5.8 - Montgomery multiplier with state pre-loading.

signals (X_{in} , Y_{in} and X_{out} , Y_{out}) are needed to pre-load and propagate the content of the registers X and Y. We finally add a multiplexer (controlled by the signal sel_{in}) to allow the internal state of the module (register *ACC*) to be pre-loaded from an external source through the additional input signals *ACC*_{in}.

As for the inversion module several Montgomery multiplication modules with state pre-loading can be connected sequentially to perform a full operation. The output signal *P* of the last module will contain the final result $P = XY2^{-k} \mod M$. The right part of the module produces the final result *P* (reducing *P_t* modulo *M*). As it is used only by the last module, it can be removed from the other replicas.

5.2.4 System level architecture

Figure 5.9 shows the system level architecture, where the *host* communicates with an FPGA on which several instances of the SPMW core are implemented.

Each SPMW core has its IP-FIFO, whereas the lookup tables T-WALK and T-RED can be shared by




Figure 5.9 – System level architecture.

several cores as long as this is compatible with the bandwidth required by each core (as mentioned at the end of Section 5.2.3). More precisely, an SPMW core accesses T-WALK (or T-RED) for one cycle every $t_{max} + 1$ cycles. Therefore, the lookup tables can be shared among $t_{max} + 1$ SPMW cores by making the execution of each core shifted by one clock cycle.

The architecture, denoted by multi-SPMW (MSPMW) in Figure 5.9, can be replicated if the total bandwidth needed by all cores exceeds the maximum bandwidth sustainable by the lookup tables. The hardware resources needed to implement the simple communication interface for data transfer between the host and the FPGA are negligible and the overall required bandwidth is very limited. We analyze bandwidth requirements and other implementation details in the next section where we describe the implementation of our architecture on different FPGAs.

5.3 Experimental results

In this section we analyze the parameter choice for our implementation and show the experimental results.

We have selected the Certicom ECCp-131 challenge as the case study. It defines an ECDLP instance on a prime order elliptic curve over a 131-bit generic prime field and it is the smallest unsolved Certicom challenge over prime fields [51]. We denote the prime order of the group of points by *q*.

We optimized our architecture for a *Virtex 7-xc7v2000t* FPGA [210] using the parameters reported in Table 5.2 and obtained N_s = 78 (number of stages), N_{tables} = 2, N_{SPMW} = 11 and t_{max} = 9 (see Section 5.2.3). We have performed synthesis and place-and-route with *Xilinx ISE Design Suite* 14.7. The resulting operating frequency is *F* = 192 Mhz. As mentioned in Section 5.1 a walk is expected to

Table 5.2 - Optimization parameters for Virtex-7-xc7v2000t FPGAs. Area figures are in number of slices.

k	A ₀	$\delta_{ m area}$	Amax	M _{max}	r	d
121	2121	1561	287076	40.9Mbit	a 14	30
131 3121	$3121 1561 (\approx 90\%) $	1188 BRAMs (≈ 90%)	2	30		

get into a fruitless 4-cycle after roughly $\alpha = 4r^3/(r-1) \approx 10.7 \cdot 10^8$ iterations. We run one set of walks for *w* iterations before sending the current points to the host system for cycle detection/escape and

switching the execution to the second (suspended) set of walks (by reading updated points from the IP-FIFO). Denote by $w' \le w$ the number of fruitless iterations a walk performs due to fruitless cycles. As in [36] we want w'/w < 0.1 and this results in $w = \alpha/50$ (using equation (1) in [36]).

We set d = 30, thus a walk is expected to hit a distinguished point every 2^{30} iterations. To apply Equation (5.8), we consider 90% of the available hardware resources to make sure the design will fit on the FPGA after *place and route* (see Section 2.9).

We have run *post* place-and-route simulations using *Modelsim SE 10.0c* and used *Xilinx XPower Analyzer* to estimate the power consumption, namely 26.9W.

The system generates $D = 211.2 \cdot 10^6 \cdot 2^{-30} \approx 0.2$ distinguished points per second. Each distinguished point consists of *x* and *y* coordinates and the two multipliers *a* and *b*, plus one bit to differentiate distinguished points and points sent to the host for cycle detection and escape. In total each distinguished point is represented by an *h*-bit string with h = 4k + 1 = 525. The current set of walks is suspended after $c = (wN_s(t_{max} + 1))/F \approx 87s$ (the current points are sent to the host for cycle detection/escape and the second set of walks is re-started by reading points from the IP-FIFO) and the host has a time frame of 87 seconds to generate and store the updated points for the suspended set of walks into the IP-FIFO. A time frame of 87s is large enough to allow a regular CPU based host to serve several FPGAs. The number of IP-FIFOs equals N_{SPMW} (see Section 5.2.4). Each IP-FIFO contains N_s 4*k*-bit points. Then the total required bandwidth is $hD + (4kN_sN_{\text{SPMW}})/c = 5.26$ Kbits/s.

Look-up tables T-WALK and T-RED and IP-FIFOs are built from 36 Kbit BRAMs configured as 512x72-bit memory blocks. To read one point (four 131-bit values) from T-WALK or T-RED in one clock cycle, each point is stored across 8 BRAMs connected in parallel, for a total of 1024 BRAMs ($N_{tables} = 2$) out of the 1292 available. The IP-FIFOs are implemented with 88 BRAMs (8 BRAMs per IP-FIFO).

The correctness of the proposed architecture has been verified through simulations comparing its output against the output produced by a software implementation first and then solving the ECDLP in a 42-bit subgroup of an elliptic curve defined over a 131-bit prime.

Table 5.3 reports the overall equipment cost in dollars (the energy cost is relatively negligible) to solve the ECCp-131 Certicom challenge in one year on various FPGAs. The equipment cost for the Virtex UltraScale FPGA is not available yet. The Rivyera V7 is a computer hosting up to 40 Virtex-7 v2000t FPGAs [184].

We have estimated that the size of the hash table to store the distinguished points on the host should be roughly $\sqrt{\frac{2^{131}\pi}{4}} \frac{525}{2^{30}\cdot 8\cdot 2^{40}} \approx 2.6$ TB. It can be further reduced by increasing the value of *d*.

Table 5.3 – Solving ECCp-131 in one year on (a cluster of) different FPGAs. Number of points to compute: $\approx \sqrt{q\pi/4}$.

Tech	Device	FPGA price	Points/s	Cost
65 nm	Virtex-5 vlx330t	8.4 K\$	20.5M	453 M\$
40 nm	Virtex-6 vlx760	12.6 K\$	67.3M	207 M\$
28 nm	Virtex-7 v2000t	17.4 K\$	211.2M	91 M\$
28 nm	RIVYERA V7	500 K\$	8448M	65 M\$
20 nm	Virtex UltraScale 440	-	738M	-

Using the estimated power consumption of 26.9W for our implementation on a Virtex-7 v2000t FPGA we can estimate the overall electricity cost in the case of the third row of Table 5.3, where the use of 5238 devices is needed. Assuming that the electricity cost is 0.21\$ per KWh we obtain 252K\$ as the overall cost for one year. We conclude that the latter is currently negligible compared to the equipment cost. It is arguably unfeasible to solve the ECCp-131 challenge on FPGAs in reasonable time as shown in Table 5.3, however the rapid technology scaling could make it possible in the near future.

We have implemented our solution on a Xilinx Virtex-5 (k = 112) and a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGAs (k = 160) to compare with the current state of the art [106] (Table 5.4), [90] (Table 5.5). We have

implemented our solution using both the basic SPMW core with no unrolling and the SPMW core optimized with pipeline unrolling (SPMWopt in Tables 5.4 and 5.5).

	[106]	SPMW	SPMWopt
Frequency	100 Mhz	125 Mhz	125 Mhz
Points/cycle	1/114	1/225	1/14
Slices/core	5,229 (14.0%)	3,070 (8.2%)	16,386 (43.8%)
DSPs/core	130 (12.3%)	-	-
BRAMs/core	8 (1.5%)	8 (1.5%)	8 (1.5%)
BRAMs for		$256 (r = 2^{13})$	256 $(r = 2^{13})$
T-WALK, T-RED	-	(49.6%)	(49.6%)
#Cores/device	6	$11 (N_s = 7)$	$2(N_s = 48)$
Prime type	special form	Any	Any
negation map	No	Yes	Yes
Years to solve	50.4	30.7	10.5
secp112r1 (112-bit)	50.4	(1.64x)	(4.80x)

Table 5.4 - Comparison with [106] on a single Xilinx Virtex-5 vsx240t.

Table 5.5 - Comparison with [90] on a single Xilinx Spartan-3 xc3s5000.

	[90]	SPMW	SPMWopt
Frequency	40 Mhz	51 Mhz	48 Mhz
Points/cycle	1/855	1/321	1/41
Slices/core	3,230 (9.7%)	9,380 (28.2%)	29,390 (88.3%)
DSPs/core	-	-	-
BRAMs/core	15 (14.4%)	18 (17.3%)	18 (17.3%)
BRAMs for		$36 (r = 2^9)$	$72 (r = 2^{10})$
T-WALK, T-RED	-	(34.6%)	(69.2%)
#Cores/device	9	$2(N_s = 7)$	$1 (N_s = 23)$
Prime type	Any	Any	Any
negation map	No	Yes	Yes
Years to solve	$3.6 \cdot 10^{18}$	$3.6 \cdot 10^{18}$	$9.1 \cdot 10^{17}$
ECDLP (160-bit)	5.0110	(1.01x)	(3.93x)

Our solution requires more slices with respect to the one proposed in [106]. However unlike the latter, it does not rely on DSP blocks and we achieve a speed-up of factor of 4.8. This is a pessimistic comparison due to fact that the prime used in [106] has a special form allowing fast reduction.

With respect to the architecture from [90], which targets generic prime fields, we achieve a speed-up factor of 3.93.

5.4 Conclusion and future work

We presented a many-core hardware architecture implementing the parallel version of Pollard's rho algorithm with the negation map for the ECDLP on elliptic curves defined over generic prime fields. On FPGAs our architecture outperforms the state of the art by a factor of about 4. The optimization methodology we presented can be applied to similar hardware designs implementing embarrassingly parallel algorithms. As a case study we estimated the monetary cost to solve the Certicom ECCp-131. In the near future we plan to compare our FPGA implementation with a software implementation of Pollard rho for Intel Haswell processors and to explore the implementation of our architecture as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). In addition we plan to study strategies to improve its efficiency and optimize it for low-cost FPGAs.

6 Efficient ephemeral elliptic curve cryptographic keys

Deployment of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [115, 141] is becoming more common. A variety of ECC parameters has been proposed or standardized [200, 53, 54, 12, 4, 132, 35, 26], with or without all kinds of properties that are felt to be desirable or undesirable, as further reviewed in this chapter. All these proposals and standards contain a fixed number of possible ECC parameter choices. This implies that many different users will have to share their choice, where either choice implies trust in the party responsible for its construction. Notwithstanding a variety of design methods intended to avoid trust issues (cf. [20]) and despite the fact that parameter sharing is generally accepted for discrete logarithm cryptosystems, recent allegations [189, 91] raise questions. Relying on choices made by others, parameter sharing, and long term usage of any type of cryptographic key material, may have to be reconsidered.

In this chapter we suggest an approach that is diametrically different from current common practice, namely *personalized*, *short-lived* ECC parameter selection. By personalized we mean that no party but the party or parties owning or directly involved in the usage of parameters should be responsible for their generation:

- for a certified public key, **only** the owner of the corresponding private key should be responsible for the selection of **all** underlying parameters;
- in the Diffie-Hellman protocol, as there is no a priori reason for the parties to trust each others' public key material other than for mutual authentication, **both** parties, and no other party, should be equally responsible for the construction of the group to be used in the key agreement phase.

Personalization excludes parameter choice interference by third parties with unknown and possibly contrary incentives. It also avoids the threats inherent in parameter sharing.

By short-lived, or *ephemeral*, we mean that parameters are refreshed (and possibly recertified) as often as feasible and permitted by their application; for the Diffie-Hellman protocol it means that a group is generated and used for just a single protocol execution and discarded after completion of the key agreement phase. Ephemeral parameters minimize the attack-window before the parameters are discarded. Attacks after use cannot be avoided for any type of public key system. But the least we can do is to avoid using parameters that may have been exposed to cryptanalysis for an unknown and possibly extended period of time before their usage.

In this chapter we discuss existing methods for personalized, short-lived ECC parameter generation. Even with current technology, each end-user can in principle refresh and recertify his or her ECC parameters on a daily basis (cf. Section 6.1): "in principle" because user-friendly interfaces to the required software are not easily available to regular users. But it allows arbitrary, personalized choices – within the restrictions of ECC of course – in such a way that no other party can control or predict any of the newly selected parameters (including a curve parameterization and a finite field that together

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define an elliptic curve group, cf. below). Personalization isolates each user from attacks against other users, and using keys for a period of time that is as short as possible reduces the potential attack pay-off. Once personalized, short-lived ECC (public, private) key pairs are adopted at the end-user level, certifying parties may also rethink their sometimes decades-long key validities.

To satisfy the run time requirements of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, it should take at most a fraction of a second (jointly on two consumer-devices) to construct a personalized elliptic curve group suitable for the key agreement phase, that will be used for just that key agreement phase, and that will be discarded right after its usage – never to be used or even met again. In full generality this is not yet possible, as far as we know, and a subject of current research. However, for the moment the method from [125] can be used if one is willing to settle for partially personalized parameters: the finite field and thus the elliptic curve group cardinality are still fully personalized and unpredictable to any third party, but not more than eight choices are available for the Weierstrass equation used for the curve parameterization. Although the resulting parameters are not in compliance with the security criteria adopted by [26] and implied by [132], we point out that there is no indication whatsoever that either of these eight choices offers inadequate security: citing [26] "there is no evidence of serious problems". The choice is between being vulnerable to as yet unknown attacks – as virtually all cryptographic systems are – or being vulnerable to attacks aimed at others by sharing parameters, on top of trusting choices made by others. Given where the uncertainties lie these days, we opt for the former choice.

We introduce a new method for partially personalized ECC parameter generation that substantially improves the one from [125] and that also allows generation of *Montgomery friendly* primes and, at non-trivial overhead, of *twist-secure* curves. After surveying standard methods for elliptic curve selection for ECC and complex multiplication we provide an explanation (in Section 6.2.2) how the "class number one" Weierstrass equations proposed in [125] were derived and how that same method generalizes to slightly larger class numbers. As a result we expand the table from [125] with eleven more Weierstrass equations, thereby more than doubling the number of equations available. We also show how our method can be further generalized, and why practical application of these ideas may not be worthwhile. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach with an implementation on an Android Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone. It generates a unique 128-bit secure elliptic curve group in 50 milliseconds on average and thus allows efficient generation and ephemeral usage of such groups during Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Finally we analyze the security issues of our method and briefly discuss extension of our method to genus 2.

This chapter is based on [139] (to appear at the NIST Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards 2015).

6.1 Preliminaries

Elliptic curves. We recall some facts about elliptic curves that are relevant for this chapter and refer the reader to Section 2.5 for more details.

As explained in Section 2.7, for properly chosen *E*, the fastest published methods to solve the ECDLP require on the order of \sqrt{q} operations in the group E(K) (and thus in *K*), where *q* is the largest prime dividing the order of the group. If $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ is such that $2^{k-1} \le \sqrt{q} < 2^k$, the discrete logarithm problem in E(K) is said to offer *k*-bit security.

With $K = \mathbf{F}_p$ the finite field of cardinality p for a prime p > 3, and a randomly chosen elliptic curve E over \mathbf{F}_p , the order $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ behaves as a random integer close to p+1 (see [130] for the precise statement) with $|\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) - p - 1| \le 2\sqrt{p}$. For ECC at k-bit security level it therefore suffices to select a 2k-bit prime p and an elliptic curve E for which $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ is prime (or *almost prime*, i.e., up to an ℓ -bit factor, at an $\frac{\ell}{2}$ -bit security loss, for a small ℓ), and to rely on the alleged hardness of the discrete logarithm with respect to a generator (of a large prime order subgroup) of $E(\mathbf{F}_p)$. How suitable p and E should be

Table 6.1 – Timings of random cryptographic parameter generation using MAGMA on a single 2.7GHz Intel Core i7-3820QM, averaged over 100 parameter sets, for prime elliptic curve group orders and 80-bit, 112-bit, and 128-bit security. For RSA these security levels correspond, roughly but close enough, to 1024-bit, 2048-bit, and 3072-bit composite moduli, for DSA to 1024-bit, 2048-bit, and 3072-bit prime fields with 160-bit, 224-bit, and 256-bit prime order subgroups of the multiplicative group, respectively.

	80-bit security	112-bit security	128-bit security
ECC	12 seconds	47 seconds	120 seconds
twist-secure ECC	6 minutes	37 minutes	83 minutes
RSA	80 milliseconds	0.8 seconds	2.5 seconds
DSA	0.2 seconds	1.8 seconds	8 seconds

constructed is the subject of this chapter. For reasons adequately argued elsewhere (cf. [22, Section 4.2]), for cryptographic purposes we explicitly exclude from consideration elliptic curves over extension fields.

Depending on the application, *twist-security* may have to be enforced as well: not just $#E_{a,b}(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - t$ must be (almost) prime (where $|t| \le 2\sqrt{p}$), but also p + 1 + t must be (almost) prime. This number p + 1 + t is the cardinality of the group of points of a *(quadratic) twist* $\tilde{E} = E_{r^2a,r^3b}$ of $E = E_{a,b}$, where r is any non-square in \mathbf{F}_p .

Generating elliptic curves for ECC. The direct approach is to first select, for *k*-bit security, a random 2k-bit prime p and then to randomly select elliptic curves E over \mathbf{F}_p until $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ is (almost) prime. Because of the random behavior of $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$, the expected number of elliptic curves to be selected is linear in k and can be halved by considering $\#\tilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p)$ as well (and replacing E by \tilde{E} if a prime $\#\tilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p)$ is found first). Because $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ can be computed in time polynomial in k using the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm (SEA) [182], the overall expected effort is polynomial in k. Generating twist-secure curves in this way is slower by a factor linear in k.

Table 6.1 lists actual ECC parameter generation times, for $k \in \{80, 112, 128\}$. Using primes p with special properties (such as being *Montgomery friendly*, i.e., $p \equiv \pm 1 \mod 2^{32}$ or 2^{64}) has little or no influence on the timings. For comparison, key generation times are included for traditional non-ECC asymmetric cryptosystems at approximately the same security levels. The ECC parameter generation timings – in particular the twist-secure ones – may explain why the direct approach to ECC parameter generation is not considered to be a method that is suitable for the general public. Although this may have to be reconsidered and end-users could in principle – given appropriate software – (re)generate their ECC parameters and key material on a daily basis, the current state-of-the-art of the direct approach does not allow fast enough on-the-fly ECC parameter generation in the course of the Diffie-Hellman protocol.

Pre-selected elliptic curves. We briefly discuss some of the elliptic curves that have been proposed or standardized for ECC. As mentioned above, we do not consider any of the proposals that involve extension fields (most commonly of characteristic two).

With two notable exceptions that focus on ≈ 125 -bit security, most proposals offer a range of security levels. Although 90-bit security [29] is still adequate, it is unclear why parameters that offer less than 112-bit security (the minimal security level recommended by NIST [155]) should currently still be considered, given that the ≈ 125 -bit security proposals offer excellent performance. With 128-bit security more than sufficient for the foreseeable future, it is not clear either what purpose is served by higher security levels, other than catering to "TOP SECRET" 192-bit security from [156]. In this context it is interesting to note that 256-bit AES, also prescribed by [156] for "TOP SECRET", was introduced only to still have a 128-bit secure symmetric cipher in the post-quantum world (cf. [195]), and that 192-bit security was merely a side-effect that resulted from the calculation $\frac{128+256}{2}$ (cf. [195]). In that

world ECC is obsolete anyhow.

In [53] eleven different primes are given, all of a special form that makes modular arithmetic somewhat easier than for generic primes of the same size, and ranging from 112 to 521 bits. They are used to define fifteen elliptic curves of eight security levels from 56-bit to 260-bit, four with a = 0and *b* small positive ("Koblitz curves"), the other eleven "verifiably at random" but nine of which with a = p - 3, and all except two with prime group order (two with cofactor 4 at security levels 56 and 64). Verifiability means that a standard pseudo random number generator when seeded with a value that is provided, results in the parameters a (if $a \neq p-3$) and b. The arbitrary and non-uniform choice for the seeds, however, does not exclude the possibility that parameters were aimed for that have properties that are unknown to the users. This could easily have been avoided, but maybe this was not a concern at the time when these curves were generated (i.e., before the fall of the year 2000). Neither was twist-security a design criterion back then; indeed some curves have poor twist security (particularly so the 96-bit secure curve), whereas the single 192-bit secure curve is perfectly twist-secure. If one is willing to use pre-selected curves, there does not seem to be a valid argument, at this point in time, to settle for anything less than optimal twist-security (if not that one selects curves from a smaller subset): for general applications they are arguably preferable and their only disadvantage is that they are relatively hard to find, but this is done just once and thus no concern. It is therefore remarkable that more than a decade later the five curves of security level 96 or higher and with a = p - 3are "recommended elliptic curves for federal government use" in [200], the latest (2013) update of the federal information processing standards ("FIPS") for digital signatures, with just two of the five twisted curves within the wide group-cardinality margins allowed by [200].

The use of special primes was understandable back in 2000, because at that time ECC was relatively slow and any method to boost its performance was welcome, if not crucial, for the survival of ECC. The trend to use special primes persists to the present day, in a seemingly unending competition for the fastest ECC system. However, these days also regular primes without any special form offer more than adequate ECC performance. This is reflected in the Brainpool proposal.

The seven Brainpool curves [132] at seven security levels from 80-bit to 256-bit revert to the verifiably pseudo random approach from [53], while improving it and thereby making it harder to target specific curve properties (but see [20]). The primes p have no special form (except that they are 3 mod 4) and are deterministically determined as a function of a seed that is chosen in a uniform manner based on the binary expansion of $\pi = 3.14159...$ The curves use a = p - 3 and a quadratic non-residue $b \in \mathbf{F}_p$ (deterministically determined as a function of a different seed, similarly generated based on e = 2.71828...) for which the orders of the groups of the curve and its twist are both prime. As an additional precaution, curves are required to satisfy $\#E_{a,b}(\mathbf{F}_p) < p$.

The proposals [12] and [22] each contain a single twist-secure curve of (approximately) 125-bit security, possibly based on the sensible argument that there is no need to settle for less if the performance is adequate, and no need to require more (cf. above). All choices are deterministic given the design criteria, easily verifiable, and have indeed been verified. For instance, the finite field in [12] is defined by the largest 255-bit prime, where the choice 255 is arguably optimal given the clever field arithmetic. The curve equation is the "first" one given the computationally advantageous curve parameterization and various requirements on the group orders. Another, but similarly rigidly observed, design criterion (beyond the scope of the this chapter) underlies the proposal in [22].

The curves from [12] and [22] are perfectly adequate from a security-level and design point of view. If the issue of sharing pre-selected curves is disregarded they should suffice to cater to all conceivable cryptographic applications (with the exception of pairing-based cryptography, cf. below). Nevertheless, their design approach triggered two follow-up papers by others. In [4] they are complemented with their counterparts at approximate security levels 112, 192, and 256. In [35] the scope of [22] is broadened by allowing more curve parameterizations and more types of special primes, while handling exceptions

more strictly. This leads to eight new twist-secure curves of (approximately) 128-bit security, in addition to eight and ten twist-secure curves at approximate security levels 192 and 256, respectively.

The SafeCurves project [26] specifies a set of criteria to analyze elliptic curve parameters aiming to ensure the security of ECC and not just the security (i.e., the difficulty) of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, and analyzes many proposed parameter choices, including many of those presented above, with respect to those criteria. This effort represents a step forward towards better security for ECC. For this chapter it is relevant to mention that the SafeCurves security criteria include the requirement that the complex-multiplication field discriminant (cf. below) must be larger than 2^{100} in absolute value. Aside from the lack of argumentation for the bound, this requirement seems to be unnecessarily severe (and considerably larger than the rough 2^{40} requirement implied by [132]), not just because it is not supported by theoretical evidence, but also because the requirement cannot be met by pairing-based cryptography, considered by many as a legitimate and secure application of elliptic curves. On the other hand, [26] does not express concerns about the trust problem inherent in the usage of (shared) parameters pre-selected by third parties.

Attacking multiple keys. We conclude this section with a brief summary of results concerning the security of multiple instances of the "same" asymmetric cryptographic system. Early successes cannot be expected, or are sufficiently unlikely (third case).

- 1. *Multiple RSA moduli of the same size.* It is shown in [57, Section 4] that after a costly size-specific precomputation (far exceeding the computation and storage cost of an individual factoring effort), any RSA modulus of the proper size can be factored at cost substantially less than its individual factoring effort. This is not a consequence of key-sharing (as RSA moduli should not be shared), it is a consequence of the number field sieve method for integer factorization [128].
- 2. *Multiple discrete logarithms all in the same multiplicative group of a prime field.* Finding a single discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of a finite field is about as hard as finding any number of discrete logarithms in the same multiplicative group. Sharing a group is common (cf. DSA), but once a single discrete logarithm has been solved, subsequent ones in the same group are relatively easy.
- 3. Multiple discrete logarithms all in the same elliptic curve group. Solving a single discrete logarithm problem takes on the order of \sqrt{q} operations, if the group has prime order q, and solving k discrete logarithm problems takes effort \sqrt{kq} [120]. Thus, the average effort is reduced for each subsequent key that uses the same group.
- 4. *Multiple discrete logarithms in as many distinct, independent groups.* Solving *k* distinct discrete logarithm problems in *k* groups that have no relation to each other requires in general solving *k* independent problems. With the proper choice of groups, no savings can be obtained.

The final two cases most concern us in this chapter. In the third case, with *k* users, an overall attack effort \sqrt{kq} leads to an average attack effort per user of "just" $\sqrt{q/k}$. This may look disconcerting, but if *q* is properly chosen in such a way that effort \sqrt{q} is infeasible to begin with, there is arguably nothing to be concerned about. Compared to the rather common second case (i.e., shared DSA parameters), the situation is actually quite a bit better. Nevertheless, existing users cannot prevent that new users may considerably affect the attack incentives. In the final case such considerations are of no concern. However, given the figures from Table 6.1, realizing the final case for ECC with randomly chosen parameters is not feasible yet for all applications. The next best approach that we are aware of is further explored below.

6.2 Special cases of the complex multiplication method

Our approach is based on and extends [125]. It may be regarded as a special case, or a short-cut, of the well known *complex multiplication* (CM) method. As no explanation is provided in [125], we first sketch the CM method and describe how it leads to the method from [125]. We then use this description to get a more general method, and indicate how further generalizations can be obtained.

6.2.1 The CM method

We refer to [8, Chapter 18], [179], and the references therein for all details of the method sketched here. In the curve selection based on SEA point counting described in Section 6.1 one selects a prime field \mathbf{F}_p and then keeps selecting elliptic curves over \mathbf{F}_p until the order of the elliptic curve group has a desirable property. Checking the order is relatively cumbersome, making this type of ECC parameter selection a slow process. Roughly speaking, the CM method switches around the order of some of the above steps, making the process much faster at the expense of a much smaller variety of resulting elliptic curves: first primes *p* are selected until a trivial to compute function of *p* satisfies a desirable property, and only then an elliptic curve over \mathbf{F}_p is determined that satisfies one's needs.

The CM method arises from the theory of elliptic curves having complex multiplication. An elliptic curve *E* over the complex numbers **C** is isomorphic to C/Λ_E for some lattice Λ_E . If *E* has complex multiplication then the lattice Λ_E corresponds to an ideal I of an order \mathcal{O} of an imaginary quadratic field K. The curve E is said to have complex multiplication by \mathcal{O} . The *j*-invariant of E is an algebraic integer which is the root of a monic polynomial with integer coefficients and it is determined uniquely by the ideal class of I in the *ideal class group* of \mathcal{O} . In the case that \mathcal{O} is the ring of integers \mathcal{O}_K of an imaginary quadratic field $K = Q(\sqrt{-d})$ of discriminant -d where d > 0 is a square-free integer, then the minimal polynomial of the *j*-invariant of *E* is the Hilbert class polynomial $H_d(X) = \prod_{i=1}^{h_d} (X - j_i)$ where the values j_i for $1 \le i \le h_d$ are the *j*-invariant's of elliptic curves corresponding to each of the ideal classes in the ideal class group of \mathcal{O}_K , whose order is the *class number* h_d . If we choose a prime p properly, we can compute the *j*-invariant's of elliptic curves defined over F_p , that are reductions of a curve *E* defined over the Hilbert class field H of K having complex multiplication by \mathcal{O}_K . Such *j*-invariant's are the roots of $H_d(X)$ modulo p. In addition, given an element $\pi \in \mathcal{O}_K$ with norm $\pi \bar{\pi} = p$, we can easily compute the order of such a curve *E* over F_p as $p + 1 \pm (\pi + \bar{\pi})$ where π and $\bar{\pi}$ are the eigenvalues of the Frobenius endomorphism on the curve, namely the endomorphism sending $(x, y) \in E(F_p)$ to $(x^p, y^p) \in E(F_p)$. An elliptic curve over F_p with *j*-invariant determined by a given element $j \neq 0, 12^3$ is isomorphic to

$$E_j: y^2 = x^3 - \frac{27j}{4(j-12^3)}x + \frac{27j}{4(j-12^3)}$$
(6.1)

or to a quadratic twist \widetilde{E}_i of E_i whose equation can be computed as

$$\widetilde{E}_{i}: y = x^{3} + d^{2}ax + d^{3}b \text{ if } E_{i} = x^{3} + ax + b$$
(6.2)

where $d \in F_p$ is a quadratic non-residue. Given an imaginary quadratic number field $K = Q(\sqrt{-d})$, a prime p such that $\exists \pi \in \mathcal{O}_K$ with $\pi \bar{\pi} = p$ must satisfy

$$\begin{cases} 4p = u^2 + dv^2 & \text{if } d \equiv 3 \mod 4 \\ p = u^2 + dv^2 & \text{if } d \equiv 1,2 \mod 4. \end{cases}$$
(6.3)

Moreover, given an elliptic curve *E* defined over F_p for a prime *p* having form (6.3) and $\eta \in \{1, -1\}$ we

have that:

$$\begin{cases} \#E(F_p) = p + 1 + \eta u, \#\widetilde{E}(F_p) = p + 1 - \eta u & \text{if } d \equiv 3 \mod 4 \\ \#E(F_p) = p + 1 + \eta 2u, \#\widetilde{E}(F_p) = p + 1 - \eta 2u & \text{if } d \equiv 1, 2 \mod 4. \end{cases}$$
(6.4)

The standard CM method works as follows. Let $d \neq 1,3$ be a square-free positive integer and let $H_d(X)$ be the Hilbert class polynomial of the imaginary quadratic field $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{-d})$. If $d \equiv 3 \mod 4$ let m = 4 and s = 1, else let m = 1 and s = 2. Find integers u, v such that $u^2 + dv^2$ equals mp for a suitably large prime p and such that $p + 1 \pm su$ satisfies the desired property (such as one of $p + 1 \pm su$ prime, or both prime for perfect twist security). Compute a root j of $H_d(X)$ modulo p, then the pair $\left(\frac{-27j}{4(j-12^3)}, \frac{27j}{4(j-12^3)}\right) \in \mathbf{F}_p^2$ defines an elliptic curve *E* over \mathbf{F}_p such that $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 \pm su$ (and $\#\widetilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 \mp su$). Finally, use scalar multiplications with a random element of $E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ to resolve the ambiguity. For $d \equiv 3 \mod 4$ the case u = 1 should be excluded because it leads to anomalous curves, namely elliptic curves with $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p$ for which the ECDLP can be transferred to the additive group of \mathbf{F}_p and solved in linear time [180, 185, 193]. The method requires access to a table of Hilbert class polynomials or their on-the-fly computation. Either way, this implies that only relatively small d-values can be used, thereby limiting the resulting elliptic curves to those for which the "complexmultiplication field discriminant" (namely, d) is small. The degree of $H_d(X)$ is the class number h_{-d} of $Q(\sqrt{-d})$. Because $h_{-d} = 1$ precisely for $d \in \{1, 2, 3, 7, 11, 19, 43, 67, 163\}$ (assuming square-freeness), for those d-values the root computation and derivation of the elliptic curve become a straightforward onetime precomputation that is independent of the *p*-values that may be used. This is what is exploited in [125], as further explained, and extended to other d-values for which h_{-d} is small, in the remainder of this section.

6.2.2 The CM method for class numbers at most three

In [125] a further simplification was used to avoid the ambiguity in $p + 1 \pm u$. Here we follow the description from [196, Theorem 1], restricting ourselves to d > 1 with gcd(d, 6) = 1, and leaving $d \in \{3, 8\}$ from [125] as special cases. We assume that $d \equiv 3 \mod 4$ and aim for primes $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$ to facilitate square root computation in \mathbf{F}_p . It follows that $(\frac{-1}{p}) = -1$.

Let $H_d(X)$ be as in Section 6.2.1. If $d \equiv 3 \mod 8$ let s = 1, else let s = -1. As above, find integers u > 1, v such that $u^2 + dv^2$ equals 4p for a (large) prime $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$ for which the numbers $p + 1 \pm u$ are (almost) prime, and for which

$$a = 27d\sqrt[3]{j}$$
 and $b = 54sd\sqrt{d(12^3 - j)}$

are well-defined in \mathbf{F}_p , where *j* is a root of $H_d(X)$ modulo *p*. Then for any non-zero $c \in \mathbf{F}_p$, the pair $(c^4a, c^6b) \in \mathbf{F}_p^2$ defines an elliptic curve *E* over \mathbf{F}_p such that $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - (\frac{2u}{d})u$ (and $\#\widetilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 + (\frac{2u}{d})u$).

As an example, let d = 7, so s = -1. The Hilbert class polynomial $H_7(X)$ of $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{-7})$ equals $X + 15^3$, which leads to $j = -15^3$, $a = -3^4 \cdot 5 \cdot 7$, and $b = -54 \cdot 7\sqrt{7(12^3 + 15^3)} = -2 \cdot 3^6 \cdot 7^2$. With $c = \frac{1}{3}$ we find that the pair (a, b) = (-35, -98) defines an elliptic curve *E* over any prime field \mathbf{F}_p with $4p = u^2 + 7v^2$ and that $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - (\frac{2u}{7})u$.

Similarly, $H_{11}(X) = X + 2^{15}$ for d = 11. With s = 1 this leads to $j = -2^{15}$, $a = -2^5 \cdot 2^3 \cdot 11 = -9504$, and $b = 2 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 11 \sqrt{11(12^3 + 2^{15})} = 365904$. For any $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$ the pair (-9504, 365904) defines an elliptic curve *E* over \mathbf{F}_p for which $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - (\frac{2u}{11})u$, where $4p = u^2 + 11v^2$. This is the twist of the curve for d = 11 in [125].

The elliptic curves corresponding to the four *d*-values with $h_{-d} = 1$ and d > 11 are derived in a similar way, and are listed in Table 6.2. The two remaining cases with $h_{-d} = 1$ listed in Table 6.2 are

dealt with as described in [7, Theorem 8.2] for d = 3 and [177] for d = 8.

For d = 91, the class number h_{-91} of $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{-91})$ equals two and $H_{91}(X) = X^2 + 2^{17} \cdot 3^3 \cdot 5 \cdot 227 \cdot 2579X - 2^{30} \cdot 3^6 \cdot 17^3$ has root $j = (-2^4 \cdot 3(227 + 3^2 \cdot 7\sqrt{13}))^3$. It follows that $a = -2^4 \cdot 3^4 \cdot 7 \cdot 13(227 + 3^2 \cdot 7\sqrt{13})$ and $b = 2^4 \cdot 3^6 \cdot 7^2 \cdot 11 \cdot 13(13 \cdot 71 + 2^8\sqrt{13})$ so that with $c = \frac{1}{3}$ we find that the pair $(-330512 - 91728\sqrt{13}, 103479376 + 28700672\sqrt{13})$ defines an elliptic curve *E* over any prime field \mathbf{F}_p with $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$ and $(\frac{13}{p}) = 1$, and that $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - (\frac{2u}{91})u$ where $4p = u^2 + 91v^2$.

Table 6.2 lists nine more *d*-values for which $h_{-d} = 2$, all with $d \equiv 3 \mod 4$: for those with gcd(d, 6) = 1 the construction of the elliptic curve goes as above for d = 91, the other three (all with gcd(d, 6) = 3) are handled as shown in [102]. The other *d*-values for which $h_{-d} = 2$ also have $gcd(d, 6) \neq 1$ and were not considered (but see [102]). The example for $h_{-d} = 3$ in the last row of Table 6.2 was taken from [102].

6.2.3 The CM method for larger class numbers

In this section we give three examples to illustrate how larger class numbers may be dealt with, still using the approach from Section 6.2.2. For each applicable *d* with $h_{-d} < 5$ a straightforward (but possibly cumbersome) one-time precomputation suffices to express one of the roots of $H_d(X)$ in radicals as a function of the coefficients of $H_d(X)$, and to restrict to primes *p* for which the root exists in \mathbf{F}_p . This first approach is limited to $h_{-d} < 5$; for larger h_{-d} there are in principle two obvious approaches (other possibilities exist, but we do not explore them here). One approach would be to exploit the solvability by radicals of the Hilbert class polynomial [92] for any *d*, to carry out the corresponding one-time root calculation, and to restrict, as usual, to primes modulo which a root exists. The other approach is to look up $H_d(X)$ for some appropriate *d*, to search for a prime *p* such that $H_d(X)$ has a root modulo *p*, and to determine it. In our application, the first two approaches lead to relatively lightweight online calculations, but for the last approach the online calculation quickly becomes more involved. We give examples for all three approaches, with run times obtained on a 2.7GHz Intel Core i7-3820QM.

For d = 203 we have $h_{-203} = 4$ and $H_{203}(X) = X^4 + 2^{18} \cdot 3 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 739 \cdot 378577789X^3 - 2^{30} \cdot 5^6 \cdot 17 \cdot 1499 \cdot 194261303X^2 + 2^{54} \cdot 5^9 \cdot 11^6 \cdot 4021X + 2^{66} \cdot 5^{12} \cdot 11^6$ with root $-2^{14} \cdot 5^3 j'$ where

 $j' = 3357227832852 + 623421557759\sqrt{29} + 3367\sqrt{29}(68565775894279681 + 12732344942060216\sqrt{29}).$

This precomputation takes an insignificant amount of time for any polynomial of degree at most four. With $c = 2^4 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 203$ it follows that the pair $\left(-5c\sqrt[3]{4j'}, c\sqrt{203(3^3 + 2^8 \cdot 5^3j')}\right)$ defines an elliptic curve *E* over any prime field \mathbf{F}_p that contains the various roots, and that $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - \left(\frac{2u}{203}\right)u$ where $4p = u^2 + 203v^2$. The online calculation can be done very quickly if the choice of *p* is restricted to primes for which square and cube roots can be computed using exponentiations modulo *p*.

As an example of the second approach, for d = 47 the polynomial $H_{47}(X)$ has degree five and root 25j', with the following expression by radicals for j':

 $-13 \big(5364746311921861372 - 856800988085 \sqrt{5} - A (29162309591B - 135009745365087109801596264 \sqrt{5}) \big) (2C^2)^{1/5} \big) \big(2C^2)^{1/5} \big$

 $+(3861085845907-1237935\sqrt{5})/(2\cdot13^3C^{1/5})-18062673+13C^{1/5}/2^{2/5},$

where

$$A = \frac{67206667}{827296299281}, \quad B = \sqrt{47(119957963395745 + 21781710063898\sqrt{5})}$$

and

 $C = -20713746281284251563127089881529 + 16655517449486339268909175\sqrt{5} - \frac{D}{R}$

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Table 6.2 – Elliptic curves for fast ECC parameter selection. Each row contains a value *d*, the class number h_{-d} of the imaginary quadratic field $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{-d})$ with discriminant -d, the root used (commonly referred to as the *j*-invariant), the elliptic curve $E = E_{a,b}$, the constraints on the prime *p* and the values *u* and *v*, the value *s* such that $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1 - su$, and with γ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ denoting fixed factors of $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ and $\#\tilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p)$, respectively.

h_{-d}	d	<i>j</i> -invariant	<i>a</i> , <i>b</i>	$p, u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$	S	$\{\gamma\} \cup \{\tilde{\gamma}\}$
	3	0	0,16	$u^{2} + 3v^{2} = 4p,$ $p \equiv 1 \mod 3,$ $u \equiv 1 \mod 3,$ $v \equiv 0 \mod 3$	-1	{1,9}
	8	20 ³	-270, -1512	$u^{2} + 2v^{2} = p,$ $u \equiv 1 \mod 4$ if $p \equiv 3 \mod 16,$ $u \equiv 3 \mod 4$ if $p \equiv 11 \mod 16$	2	{2}
	7	-15^{3}	-35, -98			{8}
1	11	-32^{3}	-9504,365904			{1,9}
	19	-96 ³	-608,5776			
	43	-960^{3}	-13760,621264		$\left(\frac{2u}{d}\right)$	{1}
	67	-5280^{3}	-117920, 15585808	-		
	163	-640320^{3}	-34790720,78984748304	-		
	91	$-48^3(227+63\sqrt{13})^3$	$-330512 - 91728\sqrt{13},$ $103479376 + 28700672\sqrt{13}$	-		
	115	$-48^3(785+351\sqrt{5})^3$	$-1444400 - 645840\sqrt{5}, \\ 944794000 + 422522880\sqrt{5}$			
	187	$-240^3(3451+837\sqrt{17})^3$	$-51626960 - 12521520\sqrt{17},$ +201921077072 + 48973056000 $\sqrt{17}$			
	235	$-528^3(8875+3969\sqrt{5})^3$	$-367070000 - 164157840\sqrt{5}$, $3828113058000 + 1711984189440\sqrt{5}$	$u^2 + dv^2 = 4p,$ u > 1		
	403	$-240^3(2809615+779247\sqrt{13})^3$	$-90581987600 - 25122923280\sqrt{13},$ 1399216(10605743499 + 2941504000 $\sqrt{13}$)			
2	427	$-5280^3 (236674 + 30303 \sqrt{61})^3$	$-177865244480 - 22773310560\sqrt{61},$ 1099951(37121542375 + 4752926464 $\sqrt{61}$)			
	51	$-48^3(4+\sqrt{17})^2(5+\sqrt{17})^3$	-245616 - 59568 \ 17, 66257296 + 16069760 \ 17	-		
	123	$-480^3 (32 + 5\sqrt{41})^2 (8 + \sqrt{41})^3$	-580796160 - 90705120 \dd 1, 7619012947280 + 1189889913856 \dd 1	-		{1,3}
	267	$-240^3 (500 + 53 \sqrt{89})^2 (625 + 53 \sqrt{89})^3$	−12015034710000 − 1273591132080√ 89 ,			
	35	$-16^3(15+7\sqrt{5})^3$	$\begin{array}{c} 9968(2274273163768531+241072473215000\sqrt{89}) \\ \\ -226800-105840\sqrt{5}, \\ 60858000+27095040\sqrt{5} \end{array}$	_		
3	243	$-160^{3}(151022371885959)$ +104713064226304 $\sqrt[3]{3}$ -72603983653110 $\sqrt[3]{9}$	-1560 + 720 $\sqrt[3]{9}$, 32258 - 11124 $\sqrt[3]{3}$ - 7704 $\sqrt[3]{9}$	-	$\frac{\left(\frac{-2\alpha}{p}\right)\left(\frac{2u}{243}\right)}{\alpha = 2 - \sqrt[3]{9}}$	{1,9}
L	1	-12003030303110 V 3)				

for

 $D = 5^2 \cdot 11^2 \cdot 19 \cdot 23 \cdot 29 \cdot 31 \cdot 41 \cdot 47 (206968333412491708847 - 46149532702509158373845\sqrt{5}).$

This one-time precomputation took 0.005 seconds (using Maple 18). Elliptic curves and group orders follow easily, for properly chosen primes. In principle such root-expressions can be tabulated for any list of *d*-values one sees fit, but obtaining them, in general and for higher degrees, may be challenging. As an example of the final approach mentioned above, for d = 5923 the polynomial $H_{5923}(X)$ has degree seven and equals

$$\begin{split} -2^{30} \cdot 3^7 \cdot 5^6 \cdot 7 \cdot 62983 \cdot 1112240226499 \cdot 19292428007338985647320491911265071 \cdot 171556657076224699685934416851052653070777X^5 \\ +2^{45} \cdot 3^9 \cdot 5^9 \cdot 7 \cdot 53 \cdot 97 \cdot 769 \cdot 259381 \cdot 4437462560116423 \cdot 97604219520630586719251956183 \cdot 27147567165140472264577022190878351X^4 \\ -2^{60} \cdot 3^{12} \cdot 5^1 \cdot 2 \cdot 7 \cdot 31 \cdot 99208777 \cdot 34069172420656302782993334479869 \cdot 2115819005901949373115573163942760496221424793X^3 \\ +2^{75} \cdot 3^{16} \cdot 5^{15} \cdot 7 \cdot 11^3 \cdot 10477 \cdot 47581 \cdot 240853 \cdot 104531840353 \cdot 10353927562807 \cdot 35530273517694879272275348898856662128831X^2 \\ -2^{90} \cdot 3^{18} \cdot 5^{18} \cdot 7 \cdot 11^6 \cdot 47^3 \cdot 727 \cdot 7603931 \cdot 88452227997949 \cdot 1749307074347088305263628366419199311589957X \\ &+ (2^{35} \cdot 3^7 \cdot 5^7 \cdot 11^3 \cdot 17 \cdot 23 \cdot 41 \cdot 47^2 \cdot 71 \cdot 593 \cdot 659 \cdot 1103 \cdot 1109)^3. \end{split}$$

Given $H_{5923}(X)$ and 128-bit security, we look for 123-bit integers u and v such that $4p = u^2 + 5923v^2$ for a prime p for which $H_{5923}(X)$ has a root j modulo p and such that $\sqrt[3]{j}$ and \sqrt{j} exist in \mathbf{F}_p and can easily be calculated. For the present case it took 0.11 seconds (using Mathematica 9) to find

u = 9798954896523297426122257220379636584,

v = 6794158457021689958168162443422271774

which leads to the 256-bit prime

p = 68376297247017003283970261221870401697343820120616991149309517708508634100051

and

j = 5424365599110950567709761214027360693147818342174987232449996549675868443312.

Because $p \equiv 2 \mod 3$ all elements of \mathbf{F}_p have a cube root (in particular $\sqrt[3]{j} = j^{\frac{2p-1}{3}} \mod p$), $(\frac{j}{p}) = 1$ and $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$. The elliptic curve and group order follow in the customary fashion.

From our results and run times it is clear that none of these approaches (one-time root precomputations, or online root calculation) is compatible with the requirements on the class number (at least 10^6 in [132]) or the discriminant (at least 2^{100} in [26]). In the remainder of this chapter we focus on the approach from Section 6.2.2. Our approach thus does not comply with the class number or discriminant requirements from [26, 132], security requirements that are, as far as we know, not supported by published evidence.

6.3 Ephemeral ECC parameter generation

We describe how to use Table 6.2 to online generate ephemeral ECC parameters, improving the speed of the search for a prime p and curve E over \mathbf{F}_p compared to the method from [125, Section 3.2], and while allowing an additional security requirement to the ones from [125] (without explicitly mentioning the ones already in place in [125]; refer to Section 6.4 for details). In the first place, on top of the trivial modifications to handle the extended table and determination of a base point as mentioned in [125, Section 3.6], we introduce the following additional search criteria:

1. Efficiency considerations.

- (a) *Montgomery friendly modulus*. The prime p may be chosen as -1 modulo 2^{64} or modulo 2^{32} to allow somewhat faster modular arithmetic.
- (b) *Conversion friendly curve*. A small positive factor f may be prescribed that must divide $#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ (such as for instance f = 4 to allow conversion to a Montgomery curve).
- 2. *Twist security*. Writing $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = f cq$ and $\#\widetilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p) = \widetilde{c}\widetilde{q}$, with $f \in \mathbf{Z}_{>0}$ as above, cofactors $c, \widetilde{c} \in \mathbf{Z}_{>0}$, and primes q and \widetilde{q} , independent upper bounds ℓ and $\widetilde{\ell}$ on the total security loss may be specified such that $fc < 2^{\ell}$ and $\widetilde{c} < 2^{\widetilde{\ell}}$. The roles of E and \widetilde{E} may be reversed to meet these requirements faster (with f always a factor of the "new" $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$, which is automatically the case if $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$ and f = 4).

These new requirements still allow a search as in [125, Section 3.2] where, based on external parameters and a random value (see Section 6.4), an initial pair (u_0, v_0) is chosen and the pairs $(u, v) \in \{(u_0, v_0 + i) : i \in [0, 255]\}$ are inspected on a one-by-one basis for each of the eight rows of [125, Table 1] until a pair is found that corresponds to a satisfactory p and E. If the search is unsuccessful (after trying 256 * 8 possibilities), the process is repeated with a fresh random value and new initial pair (u_0, v_0) . With m = 1, c = 32, and no restrictions on $\#\tilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p)$, it required on average less than ten seconds on a 133MHz Pentium processor to generate a satisfactory ECC parameter set at the 90-bit security level. Though this performance was apparently acceptable at the time [125] was published, it does not bode well for higher security levels and, in particular, when twist security is required as well. This is confirmed by experiments (cf. runtimes reported in Table 6.4 below).

Sieving-based search. Secondly, we show how the performance of the search can be considerably improved compared to [125]. Because, for a fixed *d*, the prime *p* and both group orders are quadratic polynomials in *u* and *v*, sieving with a set *P* of small primes can be used to quickly identify (u, v) pairs that do not correspond to a satisfactory *p* or *E*. The remaining pairs, for which the candidates for the prime and for the group order(s) do not have factors in *P*, can then be subjected to more precise inspection, similar to the search from [125]. We sketch our sieving-based search for ECC parameters as in Table 6.2 where we assume that $\min(2^{\ell} - 1, 2^{\overline{\ell}} - 1) = f$ and $\max(2^{\ell} - 1, 2^{\overline{\ell}} - 1) \in \{f, \infty\}$, i.e., we settle for perfect twist security (except for the factor *f*) or no twist security at all.

Let (u_0, v_0) be chosen as above. If if the prime p must be Montgomery friendly we need to impose that $v_0 = \left(\frac{-4-u_0^2}{d}\right)^{1/2} \mod 2^{r+2}$ with r = 64 or r = 32. To enable conversion to Montgomery curves we impose the conditions specified in [149, Theorem 20] which make the curve order divisible by 4. We found it most convenient to fix u_0 and to sieve over regularly spaced $(v_0 + i)$ -values, again restricted to certain residue classes for the same reasons (including divisibility of $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ by f in case f > 1), but using a much larger range of i-values than in [125]. Fixing u_0 , the first at most sixteen compatible d-values from Table 6.2 are selected; only ten d-values may remain and depending on the parity of u_0 the value d = 7 may or may not occur. Let $d_0, d_1, \ldots, d_{k-1}$ be the selected d-values, with $10 \le k \le 16$. With I the set of distinct i-values to be considered, we initialize for all $i \in I$ the sieve-location s_i as $2^k - 1$ (i.e., all "one"-bits in the k bit-positions indexed from 0 to k - 1), while leaving the constant difference between consecutive i-values unspecified for the present description. We mostly used difference 16, using difference 4 only for d = 8, and using 2^{r+2} with r = 64 or r = 32 if the prime p must be Montgomery friendly (so that $v = (\frac{-4-u^2}{d})^{1/2} \mod 2^{r+2}$).

For each d_j and each sieving-prime $\varsigma \in P$ up to six roots $r_{j\varsigma}$ modulo ς of up to three quadratic polynomials are determined (computing square roots using $\frac{\varsigma+1}{4}$ -th powering for $\varsigma \equiv 3 \mod 4$ and using the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm [60, 2.3.8] otherwise); the polynomials, shown in Table 6.3, follow in a straightforward fashion from Table 6.2. To sieve for d_j the following is done for all $\varsigma \in P$ and for all roots $r_{j\varsigma}$: all sieve-locations s_i with $i \in (r_{j\varsigma} + \varsigma \mathbb{Z}) \cap I$ are replaced by $s_i \wedge 2^k - 2^j - 1$ (thus setting a possible Table 6.3 – Polynomial representation of p = p(X), $#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = \operatorname{ord}(X)$ and $#\tilde{E}(\mathbf{F}_p) = \operatorname{ord}(X)$ for the discriminants in Table 6.2.

-d	p(X)	$\operatorname{ord}(X)$	$\widetilde{\operatorname{ord}}(X)$
3	$(3X^2+u^2)/4$	$(3X^2 + (u^2 + 4u + 4))/4$	$(3X^2 + (u^2 - 4u + 4))/4$
8	$2X^2 + u^2$	$2X^2 + (u^2 - 2u + 1)$	$2X^2 + (u^2 + 2u + 1)$
<i>d</i> ≠ 3,8	$(dX^2+u^2)/4$	$(dX^2+(u^2+4\left(\tfrac{2u}{d}\right)u+4))/4$	$(dX^2+(u^2-4\left(\tfrac{2u}{d}\right)u+4))/4$

"one"-bit at bit-position j in s_i to a "zero"-bit, while not changing the bits at the other k-1 bit-positions in s_i).

A "one"-bit at bit-position j in s_i that is still "one" after the sieving (for all indices, all sieving primes, and all roots) indicates that discriminant $-d_j$ and pair $(u_0, v_0 + i)$ warrants closer inspection because all relevant related values are free of factors in P. If the search is unsuccessful (after considering k|I| possibilities), the process is repeated with a new sieve. If for all indices j and all $\varsigma \in P$ all last visited sieve locations are kept (at most 6k|P| values), recomputation of the roots can be avoided if the same (u_0, v_0) is re-used with the "next" interval of i-values.

Some savings may be obtained, in particular for small ς values, by combining the sieving for identical roots modulo ς for distinct indices j. Or, one could make just a single sieving pass per ς -value but simultaneously for all indices j and all roots $r_{j\varsigma}$ modulo ς , by gathering (using " \land "), for that ς , all sieving information (for all indices and all roots) for a block of ς consecutive sieve locations, and using that block for the sieving.

Parameter reconstruction. A successful search results in an index j and value i such that d_j and the prime corresponding to the (u, v)-pair $(u_0, v_0 + i)$ leads to ECC parameters that satisfy the aimed for criteria. Any party that has the information required to construct (u_0, v_0) can use the pair (j, i) to instantaneously reconstruct (using Table 6.2) those same ECC parameters, without redoing the search [125]. It is straightforward to arrange for an additional value that allows easy (re)construction of a base point as described in [125]. For key exchange, the two parties can both perform the generation process to produce the same parameters after agreeing on a common seed as explained in Section 6.4 when *rigidity* is discussed.

Implementation results. We implemented the basic search as used in [125] and the sieving based approach sketched above for generic x86 processors and for ARM/Android devices. To make the code easily portable to other platforms as well we used the GMP 6.0 library [73] for multi-precision integer arithmetic after having verified that modular exponentiation (crucial for an efficient search) offers good performance on ARM processors. Making the code substantially faster would require specific ARM processor dependent optimization. We used the Java native interface [164] and the Android native development kit [86] to allow the part of the application written in Java to call the GMP-based C-routines that underlie the compute intensive core. To avoid making the user interface non-responsive and avoid interruption by the Android run-time environment, a background service (*IntentService* class) [87] is instantiated to run this core independently of the thread that handles the user interface.

Table 6.4 lists detailed results for the 128-bit security level, using empirically determined (and close to optimal, given the platform) sieving bounds, lengths, etc. Table 6.5 shows average timings in milliseconds for different security levels in two cases: prime order non twist-secure generation and perfect twist security. The x86 platform is an Intel Core i7-3820QM, running at 2.7GHz under OS X 10.9.2 and with 16GB RAM. The ARM device is a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone with a Snapdragon 600 (ARM v7) running at 1.9GHz under Android 4.4 with 2GB RAM. It is evident the the running time is

significantly higher when the twist security option is enabled, as well as the advantage of using sieving. The other options have little impact on the running time. Key reconstruction (see [125] for the details) takes around 0.3 (x86) and 1.7 (ARM) milliseconds.

					x86, over 10000 runs					ARM, over 3000 runs						
					bas	sic				basic		sieving				
l	$\tilde{\ell}$	$\{\ell\} \cup \{\tilde{\ell}\}$	f	MF	μ	σ	μ	σ	P	I	μ	σ	μ	σ	P	I
not twist secure:																
		$\{6,\infty\}$			8.2	4.8	7.8	3.6	100	2^{10}	64	47	50	30	150	2 ¹²
6					9.6	6.2	8.6	3.8	200	2^{10}	72	58	59	35	250	2 ¹²
		$\{6,\infty\}$		\checkmark	8.3	5.0	7.8	3.7	100	2^{10}	64	44	49	29	200	2 ¹²
6				\checkmark	9.7	6.4	8.7	3.8	200	2^{10}	71	55	60	33	250	2 ¹²
		$\{6,\infty\}$	4		8.4	5.2	7.9	4.0	100	2^{10}	64	49	54	35	200	2 ¹²
6			4		9.7	6.4	8.8	4.7	200	2^{10}	71	57	61	36	250	2 ¹²
		$\{6,\infty\}$	4	\checkmark	8.6	5.2	7.9	3.8	100	2^{10}	62	48	50	29	200	2 ¹²
6			4	\checkmark	9.7	6.4	8.6	3.7	200	2^{10}	72	58	56	35	250	2 ¹²
		$\{1,\infty\}$			8.8	5.4	8.0	4.0	100	2^{10}	65	47	53	32	200	2 ¹²
1					10.4	7.1	8.9	4.0	200	2^{10}	77	61	58	36	250	2 ¹²
		$\{1,\infty\}$		\checkmark	8.8	5.5	8.0	3.9	100	2^{10}	65	50	50	31	200	2 ¹²
1				\checkmark	10.4	7.0	8.8	3.9	200	2^{10}	76	62	57	35	250	2^{12}
							tw	ist sec	ure:							
		{6}			148	143	46	33	700	2^{14}	1280	1271	357	304	750	2^{15}
1	6				167	162	55	44	800	2^{14}	1432	1392	410	335	750	2^{15}
		{1,6}			160	151	49	34	800	2^{14}	1350	1341	392	326	750	2^{15}
		{1}			180	177	49	40	800	2^{14}	1433	1372	390	325	750	2^{15}
		{6}		\checkmark	143	139	50	36	700	2^{14}	1301	1270	390	311	750	2^{15}
1	6			\checkmark	165	161	51	38	800	2^{14}	1428	1321	409	315	750	2^{15}
		{1,6}		\checkmark	154	148	49	35	800	2^{14}	1327	1300	380	316	750	2^{15}
		{1}		\checkmark	172	168	48	36	800	2^{14}	1491	1428	378	326	750	2 ¹⁵
		{6}	4		162	158	49	34	700	2^{14}	1307	1245	390	319	750	2 ¹⁵
		{6}	4	\checkmark	165	159	50	38	700	2^{14}	1287	1253	385	318	750	2^{15}

Table 6.4 – Performance results in milliseconds for parameter generation at the 128-bit security level, with ℓ , $\tilde{\ell}$, f, P, and I as above, the "MF"-column to indicate Montgomery friendliness, and μ the average and σ the standard deviation.

6.4 Security criteria

In this section we review security requirements that are relevant in the context of ECC. Most are taken from [26], the order and keywords of which we roughly follow for ease of reference, and some are from [69]. We discuss to what extent these requirements are met by the parameters generated by our method. Generally speaking our approach is to focus on existing threats, as dealing with non-existing ones only limits the parameter choice while not serving a published purpose.

Table 6.5 – Summary of performance results in milliseconds for parameter generation at different security levels: 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 160-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit, with ℓ , $\tilde{\ell}$, f, P, and I as above, the "MF"-column to indicate Montgomery friendliness, and μ the average.

						x86			ARM					
	~	~			basic	0			basic	sieving				
ℓ	$\tilde{\ell}$	$\{\ell\} \cup \{\tilde{\ell}\}$	f	MF	μ	μ	P	I	μ	μ	P	I		
80-bi	it sec	urity:			(10000 runs)				(100 runs)					
$\{1,\infty\}$					3	3	50	2 ⁹	22	19	100	2 ¹¹		
					(1000 runs)				(100 runs)					
		{1}			31	10	200	2^{12}	197	61	450	2 ¹²		
112-bit security:						(10000 ו	runs)		(100 runs)					
$\{1,\infty\}$				6	6	100	2 ⁹	47	38	200	2 ¹⁰			
					(1000 runs)				(100 runs)					
		{1}			114	30	800	2^{14}	981	214	650	2 ¹⁴		
128-b	oit se	curity:				(10000 1	runs)		(3000 runs)					
		$\{1,\infty\}$			9	8	100	2^{10}	65	53	250	2 ¹²		
						(10000 1	runs)		(3000 runs)					
		{1}			180	49	800	2^{14}	1433	390	750	2^{15}		
160-b	oit se	curity:				(1000 r	uns)		(100 runs)					
$\{1,\infty\}$				19	16	300	2^{11}	143	87	200	2 ¹⁰			
					(1000 runs)				(50 runs)					
		{1}			474	85	800	2^{14}	5425	808	750	2^{15}		
192-b	oit se	curity:			(1000 runs)				(100 runs)					
		$\{1,\infty\}$			36	25	400	2^{12}	265	169	20	2 ¹⁰		
	(1000 runs)							(20 runs)						
		{1}			1144	222	1200	2^{16}	10785	2231	900	2^{17}		
256-b	oit se	curity:			(1000 runs)				(100 runs)					
$\{1,\infty\}$				105	70	400	2^{13}	14543	575	450	2 ¹¹			
						(1000 r	uns)		(10 runs)					
		{1}			4635	994	1200	2^{16}	50 sec	10 sec	1200	2 ¹⁷		

ECDLP security. For the security of ECC, the discrete logarithm problem in the group of points of the elliptic curve must be hard. In this first category of security requirements one attempts to make sure that elliptic curve groups are chosen in such a way that this requirement is met.

- **Pollard rho attack** becomes ineffective if the group is chosen in such a way that a sufficiently large prime factor divides its order. This is a straightforward "key-length" issue (cf. [129]). Using a 128-bit prime field cardinality with $\ell \leq 5$, as suggested by Table 6.4, is more than sufficient.
- **Transfers** refer to the possibility to embed the group into a group where the discrete logarithm problem is easy, as would be the case for "anomalous curves" and for curves with a low "embedding degree". For the former, the elliptic curve group over the finite field \mathbf{F}_p has cardinality p and can be effectively embedded in the additive group \mathbf{F}_p , allowing trivial solution of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (cf. [180, 185, 193]). By construction our method avoids these curves.

For the latter, the group can be embedded in the multiplicative group $\mathbf{F}_{p^k}^{\times}$ of \mathbf{F}_{p^k} for a low embedding degree *k*. To avoid those curves, we follow the approach from [125] which ties the smallest permissible value for *k* to the published difficulty of finding discrete logarithms in $\mathbf{F}_{p^k}^{\times}$. It would be trivial, and would have negligible effect on our performance results, to adopt the "overkill" approach favored by [26, 132, 35], but we see no good reason to do so.

• **Complex-multiplication field discriminants** refers to the concern that for small values of the discriminant (-d in our case) there are endomorphism-based speedups for the Pollard rho attack [206, 78]. For instance, the first row of Table 6.2 leads to groups with the same *automorphism group* [190, Chapter III.10] as the *pairing-friendly* groups proposed in [11] and thereby to an additional speedup of the Pollard rho attack by a factor of $\sqrt{3}$. We refer to [66, 36] for a discussion of the practical implications and note that such speedups are of no concern for 128-bit prime field cardinalities with $\ell \leq 5$.

Despite the fact that the authors of [26] agree with this observation (cf. their quotation cited in the introduction), and as already mentioned in Section 6.1, [26] chooses a lower bound of 2^{100} for the absolute value of the complex-multiplication field discriminant while [132] settles for roughly 2^{40} . Neither bound can be satisfied by out method, as amply illustrated in Section 6.2.3. Until a valid concern is published, we see no reason to abandon our approach.

• **Rigidity** is the security requirement that the entire parameter generation process must be transparent and exclude the possibility that malicious choices are targeted. Assuming a transparent process to generate the initial pair (u_0, v_0) (for instance by following the approach described in [125]) the process proposed here is fully deterministic, fully explained, and leaves no room for trickery. If a single party needs to generate its parameters, that party can select its seed in any way it sees fit; with two parties both simultaneously generating the same parameters, they may both independently select a seed, exchange hash-commitments of their choices, after which they exchange their seeds as well, and proceed (assuming the committed values are correct) with the "exclusive-or" of the two seed values as final seed. Note also that a third party is excluded and that the affected parties (the public key owner or the two communicating parties engaging in the Diffie-Hellman protocol) are the only ones involved in the parameter generation process.

ECC security. Properly chosen groups can still be used in insecure ways. Here we discuss a number of precautions that may be taken to avoid some attacks that are aimed at exploiting the way ECC may be used.

- **Constant-time single-coordinate scalar multiplication** ("Ladders" in [26]) makes it harder to exploit timing differences during the most important operation in ECC, the multiplication of a group element by a scalar that usually needs to be kept secret, as such differences may reveal information about the scalar (where it should be noted that the "single-coordinate" part is just for efficiency and ease of implementation). For all Weierstrass curve parameterizations used here constant-time single-coordinate scalar multiplication can be achieved using the method from [47]. If efficiency is a bigger concern than freedom of choice, one may impose the requirement that the group order is divisible by four ("f = 4" in Table 6.4) as it allows conversion to Montgomery form [149] and thereby a more efficient constant-time single-coordinate scalar multiplication [144].
- **Invalid-point attacks** ("Twists" in [26]) refer to attempts to exploit a user's omission to verify properties of alleged group elements received. They are of no concern if the proper tests are consistently performed (at the cost of some performance loss) or if a closed software environment can be relied upon. Some are also thwarted if the curve's twist satisfies the same ECDLP security requirements as the curve itself, an approach that thus avoids implementation assumptions while replacing recurring verification costs by one-time but more costly parameter generation: for one-time parameter usage one-time verification is less costly (than relatively expensive generation of twist secure parameters), for possibly repeated usage (as in certified keys) twist secure parameters may be preferred. Our parameter selection method includes the twist security option and thus caters to either scenario. Below we elaborate on the various attack possibilities.
 - *Small-subgroup attacks.* If the group order is not prime but has a relatively small factor h, an attacker may send a group element of order h (as opposed to large prime order), learn the residue class modulo h of the victim's secret key, and thus obtain a speedup of the Pollard rho attack by a factor of \sqrt{h} . It suffices to ascertain that group elements received do not have order dividing h, or to generate the parameters such that the group order is prime (one of our options).
 - *Invalid-curve attacks.* An attacker may send elements of different small prime orders belonging to different appropriately selected elliptic curve groups, all distinct from the proper group. Each time the targeted victim fails to check proper group membership of elements received the attacker learns the residue class modulo a new small prime of the victim's secret key, ultimately enabling the attacker to use the Chinese remainder theorem to recover the key [28]. This attack cannot be avoided at the parameter selection level, but is avoided by checking that each element received belongs to the right group (at negligible cost). Also, using parameters just once renders the attack ineffective.
 - *Twist attacks against single-coordinate scalar multiplication.* Usage of single coordinates goes a long way to counter the above invalid-curve attacks, because each element that does not belong to the group of the curve automatically belongs to the group of the twist of the curve. Effective attacks can thus be avoided either by checking membership of the proper group (i.e., not of the group of the twist) or by making sure that the group of the twist of the curve satisfies the same security requirements as the group of the curve itself (at a one-time twist secure parameter generation cost, avoiding the possibly recurring membership test). As mentioned above, it depends on the usage scenario which method is preferred; for each scenario our method offers a compatible option.
- Exceptions in scalar multiplication ("Completeness" in [26]). Depending on the curve parameterization, the implementation of the group law may distinguish between adding two distinct points and doubling a point. Using addition where doubling should have been used may be

leveraged by an attacker to learn information about the secret key [103]. Either a check must be included (while maintaining constant-time execution, as in [35]) or a "complete" addition formula must be used, i.e., one that works even if the two points are not distinct. This leads to a somewhat slower group law for our Weierstrass curve parameterizations, but if they are used along with f = 4 in Table 6.4 the parameterization can be converted to Edwards or Montgomery form, which are both endowed with fast complete formulae for the group law [23], [12].

- **Indistinguishability** of group elements and uniform random strings is important for ECC applications such as censorship-circumvention protocols [26], but we are not aware of its importance for the applications targeted in this chapter. We refer to [22, 71] for ways to achieve indistinguishability using families of curves in Montgomery, Edwards or Hessian form and to [199] for a solution that applies to the Weierstrass curve parameterization (which, however, doubles the lengths of the strings involved). Either way, our methods can be made to deal with this issue as well.
- Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (not mentioned in [26]). In [55] it is shown that for protocols relying on the ECC version of the strong Diffie-Hellman problem the large prime q dividing the group order must be chosen such that q 1 and q + 1 both have a large prime factor. Although several arguments are presented in [54, Section B.1] why this attack is "unlikely to be feasible", [54] nevertheless continues with "as a precautionary measure, one may want to choose elliptic curve domain parameters that resist Cheon's attack by arranging that q 1 and q + 1 have very large prime factors". Taking this precaution, however, would add considerable overhead to the parameter generation process. Our methods can in principle be adapted to take this additional requirement into account, but doing so will cause the parameter generation timings to skyrocket. The attack is not considered in [26], and none of the standardized parameter choices that we inspected take the precaution recommended in [54].

Side-channel attacks are physical attacks on the device executing the parameter generation process or the cryptographic protocols. Most of these attacks require multiple runs of the ECC protocol with the same private key (cf. [69, Table 1]) and are thus of no concern in an ephemeral key agreement application. There are three attacks for which a single protocol execution suffices:

- *Simple power analysis (SPA) attacks* are avoided when using a scalar multiplication algorithm ensuring that the sequence of operations performed is independent of the scalar.
- *Fault induced invalid curve attacks* can be expected to require several trials before a weak parameter choice is hit, and can be prevented by enforcing more sanity checks in the scalar multiplication [69].
- *Template attacks* may recover a small number of bits of the secret key and can be avoided using one of the randomization techniques mentioned in [69].

6.5 Conclusion and future work

We showed how communicating parties can efficiently generate fresh ECC parameters every time they need to agree on a session key, generalizing and improving the method from [125]. Our major modifications consist of the use of sieving to speed up the generation process, a greater variety of security and efficiency options, and the inclusion of eleven more curve equations. Furthermore, we explained how to further generalize our method and showed that doing so may have limited practical value. We demonstrated the practical potential of our method on constrained devices, presented

performance figures of an implementation on an ARM/Android platform, and discussed relevant security issues.

Future work could include further efficiency enhancements by targeting specific ARM processors, direct inclusion of Montgomery and Edwards forms, extension to genus 2 hyperelliptic curves and, much more challenging and important, improving elliptic curve point counting methods to allow on-the-fly generation of ephemeral random elliptic curves over prime fields. Unfortunately, we do not know yet how to approach the latter problem, but genus 2 extension of our methods seems to be quite within reach. We conclude with a few remarks on this issue.

Extension to genus 2 hyperelliptic curves. Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 allow cryptographic applications similar to elliptic curves [116] and, as recently shown in [34], offer comparable or even better performance. Genus 2 hyperelliptic curves may thus be a worthwhile alternative to elliptic curves and, in particular given the lack of a reasonable variety of standardized genus 2 curves, generalization of our methods to the genus 2 case may have practical appeal. In [205] it is described how this could work. The imaginary quadratic fields are replaced by *quartic* CM fields and the *j*-invariant (a root of the Hilbert class polynomial) is replaced by three *j*-invariants which are usually referred to as Igusa's invariants. In [202] a table is given listing equations with integer coefficients of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves having complex multiplication by class number one quartic CM fields and class number two quartic CM fields. The three algorithms presented at the beginning of [205, Section 8] can then be used to easily compute the orders of the Jacobians of these curves over suitably chosen prime fields. The main remaining problem seems to be to resolve the ambiguity between the order of the Jacobian of the hyperelliptic curve and of its quadratic twist other than by using scalar multiplication. We leave the solution of this problem – and implementation of the resulting genus 2 parameter selection method – as future work.

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EXPERIENCE

Intern, Crypto group, Microsoft Research, Redmond WA, USA June 2013, September 2013 Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curves: a Practical Security Analysis.

Intern, LSI EPFL, Lausanne. Switzerland May 2010, July 2010 Implementation of a LEON3 processor interface for the OpenOCD debugger.

PhD student, TestGroup, Polytechnic University of Turin, Italy January 2010, August 2010 Design of dependable reconfigurable systems on FPGAs.

Research assistant, TestGroup, Polytechnic University of Turin, Italy September 2009, December 2009

Exploring partial reconfiguration capabilities of FPGAs for SoC dependability.

Software engineer, DITRON Software Group, Pozzuoli (Naples), Italy April 2009, July 2009 Design of a distributed system for fault tolerant data synchronization. Implementation of a prototype in C#.

PROJECTS

LACAL, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

PhD projects

Efficient update of encrypted files stored in the cloud February 2015, ongoing

Goal: devise efficient methods to allow the update of encrypted files stored in the cloud Description: exploration of trade-offs between security, time and memory efficiency of methods to encrypt files so that partial updates are possible without requiring full decryption/re-encryption. Design of prototypes in Java, performance and security analysis.

Efficient ephemeral hyperelliptic curve cryptographic keys February 2015, ongoing

Goal: implement real time generation of hyperelliptic curve cryptography parameters and keys. Description: extension of the method devised for elliptic curves (see below) to hyperelliptic curves. Implementation of a portable prototype in C using the GMP library.

Implementing Pollard rho for ECDLP on Intel Haswell processors February 2015, ongoing Goal: estimate the cost of breaking the ECCp-131 ECDLP challenge using a cluster of Intel Haswell processors.

Description: implementation of parallel Pollard rho attack for elliptic curves over prime fields on Intel Haswell processors and performance analysis to estimate the cost of solving the Certicom ECCp-131 challenge with a cluster thereof. Use of C, assembly and possibly AVX2 vector instructions.

Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in CUDA July 2014, October 2014

Goal: study of the exploitability of buffer overflow vulnerabilities in CUDA. Description: experimental study of buffer overflow vulnerabilities in CUDA software to understand how malicious users could exploit them to modify the execution flow or run arbitrary code. Use of CUDA-gdb and CUDA binary tools to debug and disassemble CUDA binaries.

Efficient ephemeral elliptic curve cryptographic keys October 2013, February 2015 Goal: implement real time generation of elliptic curve cryptography parameters and keys on smartphones.

Description: study of the Complex Multiplication method to generate elliptic curve parameters for cryptographic use with focus on a variant suitable for real-time generation. Extension and improvement of this variant with sieving techniques, extra security requirements and additional curve models (also extension to hyperelliptic curves). Implementation of the devised algorithm on x64 CPUs in C and Android smartphones in Java/C and NDK/Java JNI using the GMP library.

In collaboration with TestGroup, Polytechnic University of Turin, Italy:

Implementing Pollard rho for ECDLP on FPGAs, January 2014, October 2014 Goal: estimate the cost of breaking the ECCp-131 ECDLP challenge using FPGAs or ASICS. Description: implementation of parallel Pollard rho attack for elliptic curves over prime fields on FPGAs in VHDL and performance analysis to estimate the cost of solving the Certicom ECCp-131 challenge with a cluster of FPGAs or ASICS. Use of pipelining and hardware multithreading to exploit the parallelism of random walks and achieve high throughput.

As a research intern at Microsoft Research, Crypto group, Redmond, WA, USA:

Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curves: A Practical Security Analysis June 2013, September 2013 Goal: analyze the security level of certain types of elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves studying the performance of the parallelized Pollard rho attack with the use of automorphisms. Description: development of a software framework (in C) implementing the parallel version of Pollard rho attack for both elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves over prime fields with software moduli implementing automorphism acceleration, simultaneous inversion, several fruitless cycles handling techniques and performance counters. Analysis of two elliptic curves and two hyperelliptic curves having different automorphism groups using this framework to get a practical estimate of their security level.

Accelerating the number field sieve with GPUs March 2012, December 2013

Goal: implement the post sieving phase of the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm on CUDA GPUs and evaluate a heterogenous CPU-GPU computing platform for RSA security assessment. Description: parallel implementation of the whole post-sieving step of the NFS relation collection phase on GPUs using CUDA C and PTX assembly. Implementation of a multi-threaded (POSIX) wrapper application to integrate the GPU software with pre-existing state-of-the-art NFS software packages for regular CPUs. Evaluation the effectiveness of the new heterogenous solution experimenting with the NFS software used to set the current RSA factoring record (768 bits).

Elliptic curve method for factorization (ECM) on GPUs February 2011, July 2011

Goal: implement elliptic curve operations and scalar multiplication on CUDA GPUs for the acceleration of ECM.

Description: implementation of elliptic curve operations and scalar multiplication on CUDA GPUs in CUDA C and PTX assembly. Exploration of strategies to integrate the produced code with the GMP-ECM software package and performance evaluation of GPU accelerated parallel ECM.

High-throughput RSA on GPUs September 2010, January 2011

Goal: implement batch RSA decryption on CUDA GPUs and analyze the performance. Description: implementation of multi-precision Montgomery modular arithmetic and RSA CRT decryption on CUDA GPUs in CUDA C and PTX assembly. Analysis of latency and throughput.

As supervisor of student/intern projects

Jelliptic, elliptic curve cryptanalysis with browsers September 2014, January 2015 Goal: evaluate the use of browsers of volunteers as a distributed platform for cryptanalysis. Description: implement the parallel version of Pollard rho attack for elliptic curves over prime fields in JavaScript and a prototype server infrastructure to evaluate the use of browsers as client applications for distributed cryptologic computations.

In collaboration with Prof. Paolo Ienne, LAP, EPFL:

CUDA GPUs arithmetic micro-benchmarking September 2014, January 2015 Goal: Understanding limitations of CUDA GPUs as accelerators for cryptologic algorithms. Description: Study of modern GPUs and integer arithmetic using both GPGPU-Sim and micro benchmarking on actual devices.

Modular arithmetic with floating point instructions on GPUs August 2014, September 2014 Goal: implement and evaluate Montgomery modular arithmetic on Kepler GPUs using floating point instructions.

Description: motivated by the significant drop in performance (throughput) of integer arithmetic instructions on the latest NVIDIA GPUs.

Implementation of multi-precision Montgomery modular arithmetic using single and double precision floating point CUDA PTX assembly instructions on Kepler GTX Titan Black cards. Performance evaluation.

Fast elliptic curve key exchange on ARM February 2014, July 2014

Goal: implement and evaluate elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange on ARM to get an estimate of the relative speeds of key exchange and parameter generation.

Description: in the context of the **Efficient ephemeral elliptic curve cryptographic key** project. Implementation of side-channel resistant elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange over large prime fields with no special form in C on ARM processors using the GMP library.

Celliptic: elliptic curve distributed cryptanalysis on cellphones September 2013, October 2014

Goal: build a client/server infrastructure to solve an instance of ECDLP using cellphones. Description: implementation of three main components. A Java NDK/Java JNI client application for Android smartphones acting as wrapper around the pre-existing native C code implementing the parallel version of Pollard Rho to solve ECDLP. A server collecting distinguished points from the clients and storing them in a database. A website displaying statistics about the users' contribution to the overall computation.

Implementing multi-precision modular arithmetic on CUDA GPUs February 2013, June 2013

Goal: implement a library for multi-precision modular arithmetic on CUDA GPUs. Description: efficient implementation of modular arithmetic in CUDA and PTX assembly as a multiprecision library.

Fast arithmetic for elliptic curve Pollard rho with ARM NEONSeptember 2012, January 2013Goal: implement fast elliptic curve arithmetic for Pollard rho algorithm using NEON SIMDinstructions on ARM (BeagleBoard).

Description: implementation in C and ARM assembly of Montgomery modular arithmetic and elliptic curve arithmetic using NEON SIMD instructions on a BeagleBoard. Evaluation of ARM development boards as an energy efficient cryptanalytic platform.

Integrating a CUDA RSA implementation with OpenSSL February 2012, July 2012

Goal: investigate the use of a high-throughput RSA implementation for CUDA GPUs to accelerate OpenSSL.

Description: analysis of OpenSSL code (or other cryptographic softwares like OpenDNSSEC) and

study of strategies to offload RSA decryption/signature operations to CUDA GPUs.

As a research intern at LSI, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland:

Implementation of a LEON3 processor interface for the OpenOCD debugger May 2010, June 2010

Goal: implement a software module to allow the OpenOCD debugger to interface with a LEON3 processor through JTAG.

Description: development of an extension (in C) of OpenOCD to interface the software with a LEON3 processor through a JTAG port. Testing with a USB to JTAG interface and a LEON3 evaluation board.

As a research assistant and PhD student at TestGroup, Polytechnic University of Turin, Italy:

FPGA systems fault-tolerance using partial reconfiguration September 2009, August 2010 Goal: investigate the use of partial reconfiguration capabilities of FPGAs for fault tolerance. Description: development of a LEON3 based SoC prototype on Xilinx FPGAs (VHDL) with the capability of dynamically replacing a non-critical component with the bit-stream of a critical component in case the original critical component fails.

As a software engineer at DITRON Software Group, Pozzuoli (Naples), Italy:

Design and implementation of a distributed system for fault tolerant data synchronization April 2009, July 2009

Goal: design of a distributed system for data sharing between network nodes with resiliency to node crashes.

Description: design of distributed system allowing network nodes to locally update a shared database and propagate the updates to the other remote nodes. Use of a leader election algorithm and keepalive mechanism for database synchronization and recovery after node crashes.

Implementation of a multi-threaded prototype in C# with connection to a Microsoft Access database.

EDUCATION

PhD, LACAL, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland September 2010, May 2015
EDIC "Fellowship" student 2010
Courses:
Fall 2010 - Advanced algorithms, Algorithms in public key cryptography
Spring 2011 - Advanced computer architecture, Programming massive parallel graphics processors
Semester projects at LACAL:

Fall 2010 - High-throughput RSA on GPUs

Spring 2011 - Elliptic curve method for factorization on GPUs

Engineer, Polytechnic University of Turin, Italy February 2010 "Esame di stato per l'abilitazione alla professione di ingegnere" (Engineer professional qualification exam).

M.S. degree in computer engineering, Federico II University of Napoli October 2006, June 2009 Thesis: "Design of dependable NoC (Network on chip) switches" Level: 110/110 "magna cum laude"

B.S. degree in computer engineering, Federico II University of Napoli September 2003, October 2006

Level: 110/110

LANGUAGES

Italian: Mother tongue

English:

Reading - Excellent Writing - Excellent Speaking - Excellent

French:

Reading - Intermediate Writing - Basic Speaking - Basic

Certificates:

FCE (FIRST CERTIFICATE IN ENGLISH), University of Cambridge, Local Examinations Syndicate June 2002

FRENCH A1 Intensive course, certificate of accomplishment, EPFL Lausanne July 2010

SKILLS

Programming Languages: CUDA C, assembly (Intel x86, CUDA PTX), VHDL, JAVA, C#, C++, Python (SAGE), Perl, Scala, HTML, Magma, Matlab, Mathematica Middleware: Past experience in CORBA Operating Systems: Linux,Windows, Mac OS X Networking: TCP/IP Stack, past experience in programming Berkeley sockets Tools: Vim, Menthor Graphics ModelSim, Xilinx ISE and PlanAhead, Altera Quartus, Eclipse, OllyDbg, WebScarab, WireShark, Matlab, Excel, Powerpoint, Word, Visual Studio,GDB Competences:

GPU parallel programming, cryptography, computer arithmetic, computer architecture, computer security, digital hardware design (RTL)

Background competences:

Software engineering, computer system dependability, computer networks, operating systems

Certificates and training:

PUMPS 2014 (NVIDIA) UPC Barcelona, Spain, July 2014 Microsoft Azure for Research Training ETH Zurich, Switzerland, November 2013 Practical Computer Security, EPFL January 2013 ECDL, European computer driving license May 2001

Online courses:

Software Security (Coursera, Michael Hicks, University of Maryland) - December 2014 Analyzing the Universe (Coursera, Terry A. Matilsky, Rutgers University) - December 2014 Automata (Coursera, Jeff Ullman, Stanford) - October 2014 Functional Programming Principles in Scala (Coursera, Martin Oderski, EPFL) - September 2013 Cryptography I (Coursera, Dan Boneh, Stanford) - March 2012 Algorithms: Design and Analysis, Part 1 (Coursera, Tim Roughgarden Stanford) - March 2012

PUBLICATIONS

"Exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities in CUDA" Andrea Miele TO BE SUBMITTED TO USENIX's WOOT 2015

"Efficient ephemeral elliptic curve cryptographic keys" Andrea Miele, Arjen Lenstra TO APPEAR AT the NIST Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards 2015

"An Efficient Many-Core Architecture for Elliptic Curve Cryptography Security Assessment" Andrea Miele, Marco Indaco, Fabio Lauri, Pascal Trotta TO BE SUBMITTED TO FPL 2015

"Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curves: A Practical Security Analysis" Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, Andrea Miele, Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 2014 Year: 2014, On pages(s): 203-220, Location: Buenos Aires, Argentina

"Automated synthesis of EDACs for FLASH Memories with User-Selectable Correction Capability"

Maurizio Caramia, Michele Fabiano, Andrea Miele, Roberto Piazza, Paolo Prinetto High Level Design Validation and Test Workshop (HLDVT), IEEE International 2010

"A software framework for dynamic self-repair in embedded SoCs exploiting reconfigurable devices" Andrea Miele Automation Quality and Testing Robotics (AQTR), IEEE International Conference on 2010

"Microprocessor fault-tolerance via on-the-fly partial reconfiguration" Stefano Di Carlo, Andrea Miele, Paolo Prinetto, Antonio Trapanese Test Symposium (ETS), 15th IEEE European 2010

TALKS

"Post-sieving on GPUs" INRIA, Nancy, France 10.23.2014

"Cofactorization on GPUs" CHES 2014, Busan, South Korea 9.25.2014

"Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curves: A Practical Security Analysis" PKC 2014, Buenos Aires, Argentina 3.26.2014

"Cofactorization on GPUs" Microsoft Research Crypto group lunch seminars, Redmond, USA 6.20.2013

"Elliptic Curve Method for Integer Factorization on Parallel Architectures" EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland 12.15.2011

TEACHING

Teaching assistant , EPFL, "Information, Computation and Communication" Fall semester 2014 Teaching assistant , EPFL, "Global issues" Spring semester 2014 Teaching assistant , EPFL, "Information, Computation and Communication" Fall semester 2013 Teaching assistant , EPFL, "Discrete structures" Spring semester 2013 Teaching assistant, EPFL, "Algorithms in public key cryptography" Fall semester 2012 Teaching assistant , EPFL, "Discrete structures" Spring semester 2013

AWARDS

Best poster award: "Cofactorization on graphics processing units" PUMPS 2014, Barcelona, Spain Outstanding teaching assistant award, EPFL Switzerland 2013 Award for exemplary work as teaching assistant, EPFL, Switzerland 2012

REVIEWING

IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS) 2015 Design Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 2015 Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 2014 CRYPTO 2014 EUROCRYPT 2013 ASIACRYPT 2012 ASIACRYPT 2011

HOBBIES

Sports: Basketball, played at competitive level for over 10 years. Fitness, soccer, boxing. Cinema Reading History Astronomy Electric guitar playing

DRIVING LICENSE(S)

A(motorbike), B(car)

REFERENCES

Prof. Arjen Lenstra EPFL Lausanne arjen.lenstra@epfl.ch

Prof. Dimitar Jetchev EPFL Lausanne <u>dimitar.jetchev@epfl.ch</u>

Prof. Paolo Prinetto Politecnico di Torino paolo.prinetto@polito.it

Prof. Alfredo Testa SUN Napoli <u>alfredo.testa@unina2.it</u>

Prof. Elvira Russo Federico II University of Napoli <u>elvira.russo@unina.it</u>