

Law and Business Review of the Americas

Volume 18 | Number 4

Article 6

2012

The Politics of Human Development in India and China: It Pays to Invest in Women and Children

Devin K. Joshi

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra>

Recommended Citation

Devin K. Joshi, *The Politics of Human Development in India and China: It Pays to Invest in Women and Children*, 18 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 487 (2012)
<https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol18/iss4/6>

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit <http://digitalrepository.smu.edu>.

THE POLITICS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA AND CHINA: IT PAYS TO INVEST IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN

Devin K. Joshi¹

ABSTRACT

This article explores the attainments of China and India on measures of basic human development as ingredients of a long-term economic development strategy. It proposes that major differences in ideology and state capacity explain in part why India has fallen behind China. The analysis suggests that these relatively hidden political factors play an important role in transforming and advancing human development not only within India and China but also in other developing and emerging economies. The findings also support the notion that public investments in the capabilities of women and children have significant social and economic payoffs in both the short-term and in the long-run.

Keywords: China, Children, Democracy, Human Development, Ideology, India, Politics, State Capacity, Women.

IN recent years, the India-China comparison has drawn attention from the mass media and academic scholarship as both countries have experienced tremendous economic and population growth over the last two decades (Joshi 2011a). Together, China and India accounted for 37.5 percent of the world's population and 12.1 percent of the world's combined gross domestic product in 2010 (World Bank 2012). Between 1990 and 2010, based on exchange rate comparisons (using constant 2000 U.S. dollars), China's gross national income increased almost eight-fold from \$446 billion to \$3.26 trillion while India's economy grew more than three-fold from \$267 billion to \$955 billion (ibid). Both states are armed with nuclear weapons and have been rapidly climbing up the technological

-
1. Devin Joshi is an Assistant Professor in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He researches and teaches about the international and comparative politics of development with a focus on Asia. His work concentrates on understanding how to build effective governments and inclusive democracies with special attention to the impact of governance on human development and the Millennium Development Goals. Professor Joshi is the recipient of multiple competitive research fellowships and has served as a visiting scholar in China, Germany, India, South Korea, and Sweden. His regional focus has been primarily in East Asia and South Asia although his interests are global. Prior to joining the University of Denver, he taught at the University of Washington, University of Hawai'i and Ewha Womans University. He holds a B.A. degree from Stanford and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.

ladder. In 1996, China and India were ranked 28th and 31st in the world in the number of U.S. patents registered (USPTO 2010). By 2011, they were respectively ranked 9th and 16th (USPTO 2012). With their newly created wealth and uniquely large populations, India and China have improved their positions in international negotiations and diplomacy through the formation of blocs in cooperation with Brazil and Russia (BRIC) and together with Brazil and South Africa (BASIC). As their young populations enter the labor force and foreign investment increases, many expect China and India to sustain moderate to rapid economic growth over the coming decades and reap a “demographic dividend” as the younger population (labor force) outnumbers the elderly (dependents), especially in India (Mahtaney 2007; Wilson and Purushothama 2003). If these trends continue, India and China are slated to become major world powers by the middle of the twenty-first century (Drezner 2007; Mahtaney 2007).


While China and India are often seen as rising in tandem, a common perception still holds that on many economic performance measures, China has surpassed India and is likely to stay ahead of India for quite some time (Bardhan 2010; Dobson 2009; Engardio 2007; Winters and Yusuf 2007; Smith 2008). As Table 1 illustrates, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), over the past seven years China has moved up from a rank of 49th in 2005 to become the 26th most competitive economy in the world in 2011. By contrast, over the same period, India declined from a rank of 50th in the world to 56th. Reflecting this trend, global attitude surveys find that almost 90 percent of Chinese express satisfaction with the direction their country is heading compared to less than 50 percent of Indians, as displayed in Figure 1.

Table 1: Global Competitiveness Index Scores for India and China

Year	India Score (Rank)	China Score (Rank)
2011	4.30 (56)	4.90 (26)
2010	4.33 (51)	4.84 (27)
2009	4.30 (49)	4.70 (29)
2008	4.33 (50)	4.70 (30)
2007	4.33 (48)	4.57 (34)
2006	4.44 (43)	4.24 (54)
2005	4.04 (50)	4.07 (49)

Source: World Economic Forum reports, various years.

Figure 1: Satisfaction with the Country's Direction (2002-2012)



Data Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2012. Question #784: "Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?"

Although there are multiple possible causes of variation in economic performance between China and India, much attention has focused on the countries' differing attainments on basic human development (BHD) (Bhalla 1992; Acharya et al. 2001; Dreze and Sen 2002; Dummer and Cook 2008; Dobson 2009; Bloom et al. 2010), a key pillar of long-term economic growth performance (e.g., Sen 1999; Ranis et al. 2000; Suri et al. 2011). Examining BHD performance in China and India over the last half-century, this article proposes a partial explanation for why India has fallen behind China. Beginning with a brief discussion of "human development" as a currently influential approach to thinking about global development (Joshi 2012a; Joshi 2012b), the chapter focuses on two relatively hidden political variables that appear to have played a major role in the BHD divergence between China and India: ideology and state capacity. The analysis suggests that efforts to develop greater state capacity and promote a more egalitarian ideology are key ingredients to advance public investment in BHD, especially the capabilities of women and children, as a strategy to deliver significant social and economic payoffs in both the short and long-term.

I. THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

Since the end of the Cold War, the human development paradigm has become the dominant approach to international development among the United Nations system and has been highly influential in shaping global perceptions of what constitutes development (Jolly et al. 2004; Joshi 2012a; Thérien 2012). The concept of human development (HD) which stems from the Nobel-prize winning Indian economist Amartya Sen's "capabilities approach" can be defined as "a process of enlarging people's

choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living.” (UNDP 1990: 10) As Sen (1999: 291) argues, HD is a function of the capabilities people possess, which can be evaluated by “the extent to which people have the opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value.” HD can be seen as intrinsically valuable because capabilities directly enhance people’s substantive freedoms. HD is also instrumentally valuable because enhancing people’s capabilities advances economic development.

Sen argues that, in all modern societies, certain fundamental capabilities are crucial to determining people’s choices and the ability to lead enjoyable lives. As displayed in Table 2, four of these capabilities can be seen as more or less universal. First, *physical capabilities* that enrich the body enable one to be healthy and have a long life. Second, *intellectual capabilities* acquired through education allow us to advance our minds and gain knowledge, understanding, reason, and wisdom. Third, *financial capabilities*, as influenced by opportunities for employment, income levels, and savings, impact one’s living standards. Fourth, the opportunity for individuals to participate on equal terms in the life of their community reflects important *social capabilities* fostered by respect for human rights and a democratic, non-discriminatory social environment (Sen 1999; Joshi 2012a).

Table 2: Fundamental Capabilities in the Human Development Approach

Capabilities	Focus	Indicators
1) Physical	Body	Health, Longevity
2) Intellectual	Mind	Knowledge, Schooling, Education
3) Financial	Living Standards	Income, Employment, Savings
4) Social	Equal Opportunity	Rights, Participation, Non-Discrimination

Source: Derived from Sen 1999.

HD is thus a broader way of thinking about development than a shorter-term and narrower focus only on annual growth of per capita income. The latter approach has been criticized for undervaluing children, women, human health, and the environment (Waring 1999). It has also been criticized for not taking into consideration the distribution of wealth and problems of social inequality and discrimination (Streeten 2003). As Sen (1999: 291) points out, “income levels may often be inadequate guides to such important matters as the freedom to live long, or the ability to escape avoidable morbidity, or the opportunity to have worthwhile employment, or to live in peaceful and crime-free communities. These non-income variables point to opportunities that a person has excellent reasons to value and that are not strictly linked with economic prosperity.”

As shown in Table 3, the goal of advancing HD has formed the basis of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which guide the work of the United Nations (Jolly et al. 2004; Joshi 2011b). In particular, the MDGs concentrate on BHD, a term referring to the health and education levels of children (both female and male) with attention to the fundamentals of child survival, immunizations, nutrition, literacy, numeracy, and compulsory education. From an economic perspective, BHD is vital because it forms the base from which more comprehensive human capital formation is made possible. Social investment in children and mothers is at the heart of BHD, because it can have multiple dividends for society. Sen (1999: 284), for example, has drawn much attention to the fact that “a child who is denied the opportunity of elementary schooling is not only deprived as a youngster, but also handicapped all through life (as a person unable to do certain basic things that rely on reading, writing and arithmetic).”

Table 3: The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

#	Dimension	Goal	2015 Targets Include:
1	Income/Food	Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger	½ the 1990 proportion of people with hunger and incomes under \$1/day
2	Education	Achieve Universal Primary Education	Primary school completion for all boys and girls
3	Education/Women	Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women	Gender parity at all levels of education (primary, secondary, tertiary)
4	Health	Reduce Child Mortality	1/3 the 1990 under-five mortality rate
5	Health	Improve Maternal Health	¼ the 1990 maternal mortality rate
6	Health	Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases	Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, other major diseases
7	Environment	Ensure Environmental Sustainability	Reverse loss of environmental resources, ½ the 1990 level of people without safe drinking water and sanitation, etc.
8	Aid	Develop a Global Partnership for Development	Develop a non-discriminatory trading and financial system, reduce developing countries' debt, make ICT available, etc.

Source: Adapted from Joshi 2011b.

II. WHY INDIA LAGS CHINA

Though many factors are involved, two relatively “hidden” political factors can explain in part why India has thus far made less progress on BHD than China. They can be described as “hidden” because they are a) not always visible, b) difficult to measure, and c) typically excluded from

quantitative statistical analyses. My focus here is on the underlying functioning of the state in building a human capital base and providing public goods (Joshi 2011b). By steering resources, channeling social forces, and guiding public thinking, politics play a key role in determining whether BHD is prioritized, emphasized, supported, and guaranteed (Dreze and Sen 2002). Among the political forces that matter, two of the most important (but often least observable) are ideology and state capacity.

A. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology can be defined as a “comprehensive belief systems composed of patterned ideas and claims to truth. Codified by social elites, these beliefs are embraced by significant groups in society . . . [they] are not merely justifications of economic class interests, but fairly comprehensive programs designed to shape and direct human communities” (Steger 2008: 5). Because ideologies play a major role in what and how people think, they are pivotal to HD. As relatively cohesive narratives limiting and directing language and thought, they influence what development methods and goals are believed to be possible and desirable both at the elite and mass level.

While ideologies vary across multiple dimensions, a number of prominent studies have found that societies with a relatively inclusive and egalitarian ideology are more successful in advancing BHD (Esping-Andersen 1990; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2011). By contrast, divided and patriarchal societies reinforced by inegalitarian ideologies have notably fewer public goods, and therefore lower attainments overall on children’s health and education (*ibid*). On this point, Sen (1999: xii) has recognized the importance of collective action, stating, “[i]t is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom *and* to the force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom. To counter the problems that we face, *we have to see individual freedom as a social commitment*” (emphasis added).

Regarding ideological emphasis on egalitarianism, China and India differ significantly despite having similarly sized territories, nearly identical population numbers, and large agrarian populations. India as a multi-party democratic system with a relatively free press has more ideological contestation than in China. Nevertheless, within India, the powerful ideological force of the caste system, supported by the dominant Hindu religious tradition, legitimates a fragmentation and stratification of the population into groups viewed by many Indians as entitled to different degrees of human development based on the hereditary caste into which they are born (Weiner 1991).

Though caste-based inequality and patriarchy have long histories in most parts of the Indian subcontinent, the relative passivity of most Indian political leaders to these cultural norms since Independence in 1947 has facilitated their perpetuation. During the first three decades (1947-1977) after Independence, the ruling Indian National Congress (INC)

party paid lip service to the trio of “democracy,” “secularism,” and “socialism.” Regarding the latter, however, it advocated neither egalitarianism nor empowering the masses through radical land reforms, major literacy campaigns, gender equality, or extensive equalization efforts as took place in Maoist China (Acharya et al. 2001). During this period, India’s Socialist Party and Communist Party did support more egalitarian ideology and policies, but were marginal in influence, never gaining more than a quarter of the votes combined in national elections outside the state of Kerala (Hardgrave and Kochanek 2000: 236-37). The INC, a coalition of rural landowners and the educated urban middle-classes, generally condoned both the deep inequalities of India’s stratified caste system and the widespread ideology and practice of patriarchy (Guha 2007). Rather than pursuing caste, class, or gender equalization, the INC aimed for trickle-down growth through urban industrialization and state control of industry (Kohli 2004). Upper caste Hindus (UCH), comprising about one-fifth of the population, were dominant in political decision-making. They held on average 67 percent of Indian Cabinet positions from 1950 to 1980 and a strong majority of leadership positions in government and the private sector (Goyal 1989; Jayal 2006; Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009).

Although India’s 1950 Constitution introduced electoral and bureaucratic quotas for “scheduled castes” (SC) and “scheduled tribes” (ST), little else was done to provide greater equality of opportunity in practice (Guha 2007). Efforts to lift up the lower castes became more prominent after the INC was first defeated in national elections by the Janata party (1977-1980), and the government constituted the Mandal Commission to investigate caste inequality. Though the INC soon returned to power in 1980, it was defeated again in 1989, and the National Front government moved to implement the Mandal recommendation of adding 27 percent reservations in government jobs and educational institutions for “other backward castes” (OBCs) (Jayal 2006: 180). In response, the 1990s were “a period of intense caste-based political mobilization” (*ibid*: 156) as quotas for SCs, STs, and OBCs combined increased from 22.5 percent to 49.5 percent in central government jobs. Thus, it has only been, for the most part, in the 1990s and 2000s that the issue of cross-caste equalization has come to the fore. While this has coincided with some decrease in the ideology of caste stratification in urban areas, it has paradoxically reinforced caste consciousness, social fragmentation, and identity politics (*ibid*). As a result, India has yet to experience any major transformation towards a more egalitarian dominant ideology.

As a result, over the last half-century, public health and education gains in India have been modest in most states. With the notable exceptions of Kerala and, to a lesser extent, Tamil Nadu, the political parties in power in the central and state governments have for the most part not promoted an egalitarian ideology (Joshi 2012b). Ideas supportive of patriarchy and caste inequality continue to be prominent in attitudes towards public services for the poor, not only in public health, but also in

public education, nutrition, and sanitation (Weiner 1991; Sinha 2006). Evidence of this widely-held inegalitarian ideology of caste stratification is most clear in the treatment of the Dalits (also known as “scheduled castes”), who, along with indigenous peoples known as “scheduled tribes,” make up the bottom of the social pyramid and number between 150 and 200 million. Formerly known as “untouchables,” the Dalits are themselves divided into hundreds of sub-castes and often locked hereditarily into occupations that are dangerous, difficult, dirty, and dehumanizing. A few examples of Dalit sub-castes include the Dom, who cremate dead bodies; the Pakhi, Bhangi, and Sikkaliar, who transport and clean human excrement; the Musahar, who hunt rodents; and the Chamar, who work with leather. Though conditions are typically better in urban areas, surveys conducted in Indian villages have found discrimination against Dalits to be widespread, even in recent years. Table 4 lists some of the most common prohibitions, including denied access to employment, food sharing, water facilities, health care facilities, places of worship, police stations, restaurants, hotels, residential housing, public transportation, and selling in markets.

As Human Rights Watch reports:

Caste-motivated killings, rapes, and other abuses are a daily occurrence in India. Between 2001 and 2002 close to 58,000 cases were registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act – legislation that criminalizes particularly egregious abuses against Dalits and tribal community members. A 2005 government report states that a crime is committed against a Dalit every 20 minutes. Though staggering, these figures represent only a fraction of actual incidents since many Dalits do not register cases for fear of retaliation by the police and upper-caste individuals. . . . Exploitation of labor is at the very heart of the caste system. Dalits are forced to perform tasks deemed too “polluting” or degrading for non-Dalits to carry out. According to unofficial estimates, more than 1.3 million Dalits – mostly women – are employed as manual scavengers to clear human waste from dry pit latrines. In several cities, Dalits are lowered into manholes without protection to clear sewage blockages, resulting in more than 100 deaths each year from inhalation of toxic gases or from drowning in excrement. (HRW 2007)

Compared to India, China has experienced less ideological fragmentation and less fragmentation of the population into separate and competing caste identities. Moreover, in China, the State and the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are the dominant sources of ideological influence. Though ideology has shifted over CCP generations, it has differed from India in the sense that it has continuously retained a certain degree of emphasis on collectivism and egalitarianism. Most notably, in the Maoist period from roughly 1949 to 1978, promotion of radical egalitarianism was coupled with serious efforts to raise the status of women and ensure child survival. The CCP’s Marxist-Leninist ideology heavily em-

Table 4: Common Forms of Discrimination Against Indian Dalits

Frequency (% of Villages)	Forms/Sites of Discrimination against Dalits
Over 50%	Denied entry into non-Dalit houses, Prohibitions against food sharing, Denied entry into places of worship, Ill-treatment of Dalit women by other women
45-50%	Denied access to water facilities, Ban on marriage processions, Not allowed to sell milk to cooperatives, Denied barber services, Denied laundry services, Ill-treatment of women by non-Dalit men
30-40%	Denied work as agricultural laborers, Cannot sell things in local markets, Denied visits by health workers, Separate seating in restaurants, Denied access to irrigation facilities, Separate utensils in restaurants, Discriminatory treatment in police stations, Separate seating in self-help groups
25-30%	Denied entry into police stations, Denied carpenter's services, Denied entry into Public Distribution System shops, Denied access to restaurants/hotels, Forced to stand before upper-caste men
20-25%	Paid lower wage rates for the same work, Ban on festival processions on roads, Denied home delivery of letters, Segregated seating in schools, Denied entry into private health clinics, No access to grazing/fishing grounds, Tailors refuse to take their measurements, Separate drinking water in schools
15-20%	Discriminatory treatment in post offices, Cannot wear new/bright clothes, No touching in transactions at shops, Denied access to public roads/passage, Denied entry into primary health centers, Not allowed to use umbrellas in public, Schools segregated so that Dalit students have a non-Dalit teacher and Dalit teachers have non-Dalit students
10-15%	Denied entry into village council office, Ban on wearing dark glasses, smoking, etc. No seating or must enter last on public transport, Separate lines at polling booth, Denied entry into polling booth, Cannot wear shoes/slippers on public roads, Discriminatory treatment in primary health centers
Under 10%	Denied access/entry to public transport, Separate times at polling booth, Discriminatory treatment in private clinics, Compulsion to seek blessing in marriages, Forced to seek upper caste's permission for marriages, Cannot use bicycles on public roads, Denied entry/seating in cinema halls

Source: Shah et al. 2006.

phasized both empowering the masses and persecuting the upper classes, as evident in the state's propaganda and policy efforts. Soon after coming to power in 1949, the CCP launched massive literacy campaigns (*sao wenmang*), gender equalization laws (*hunyin fa*), and land redistribution programs (*tudi gaige*) to promote its egalitarian goals. State investment in public health and education was part of this egalitarian program.

Compared to the INC and India's other major political party, the BJP, the CCP placed much higher prioritization on BHD in China's poor and rural populations out of a professed commitment to a communist ideology of egalitarianism as well as to keep the poor loyal to the CCP and capable of fighting a potential war of resistance against foreign invasion. Following Confucian tradition, Chinese leaders took the role of ideology very seriously. Whereas print media was relatively uncensored and per-

mitted the exchange of different viewpoints within India, the CCP controlled the mass media in China and, during its first three decades in power, used it to adamantly propagate a Marxist and Maoist ideology (Schurmann 1968).

Motivated by an ideology glorifying the elimination of material and status gaps between socio-economic classes, China experienced several revolutionary changes that would mark a fundamental difference between its development trajectory and that of India in the early post-war period. Land reforms (*tudi gaige*) and the Marriage Law of 1950 enabled hundreds of millions of farmers and women across the country to escape from landlordism and patriarchy. These reforms were significant in ensuring that rural Chinese could own their own land, grow their own food, and choose their own marriage partners. Subsequently, general consolidation of state power in the early 1950s through rural penetration and anti-corruption campaigns, like the “Three-Antis” (*sanfan yundong*) against corruption, waste, and bureaucratic mentality, and the “Five-Antis” (*wufan yundong*) against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and stealing of state economic secrets reduced corruption (Lu 2000). It also concentrated power in the ruling party by eliminating or taming potentially opposing forces including warlords, industrialists, the landed bourgeoisie, and criminal organizations (Gong 1994).

These reforms also set the stage for major expansions of rural education and national health insurance over the next several decades during the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” On the one hand, these campaigns contributed to major advances in the health, education, and nutrition of children. On the other hand, these campaigns regularly involved harassment, torture, and brutal punishment of political dissidents and opponents. By contrast, the Indian government did not attempt to carry out major reforms in any of these areas.

The sharp divergence in political ideology between India and China in the mid-twentieth century was clearly reflected in patterns of government expenditure. In the early 1950s, Chinese public education expenditure (PEE), at 2.0 percent of GDP, was three times higher than in India, where it was only 0.6 percent of GDP. While spending increased in India, by 1960 China still spent double the proportion of national income (3.0 percent) on public education as India (1.5 percent) (MoE 2006; Tilak 2006). China also invested heavily in public elementary and secondary schools because its revolutionary ideology insisted that education was a right and a duty for all citizens. This trend partially reversed itself during the Cultural Revolution, a period of drastic cuts in Chinese higher education budgets. But even during the Cultural Revolution, China directed a larger share of its education budget towards elementary education than India (Pepper 1996; Tilak 2006). While this was a highly detrimental time for China’s urban schools and universities, there was a significant shift in resources to expand primary education in the countryside where most of

the population lived and where the unit cost of providing schooling was significantly lower (Han 2000; Andreas 2009).

In the health sector, there was also a clear cut divergence with China spending over twice as much on public health as a percentage of national income than India in 1960 (1.3 percent versus 0.5 percent), and between one and a half to two times as much as India in 1980 (3.0 percent versus 1.4 to 2.0 percent) (Bhalla 1992; Acharya et al. 2001). China's public health budget also focused more on children and rural areas, whereas most of Indian health spending was in the private sector and not directed primarily towards the poor and rural majority of the population (WHO 1983).

Notably, in China, the dominant ideology promoted by the state shifted after Mao's death. Ideological emphasis in the opening and reform (*gaige kaifang*) period had gradually turned away from communism and towards capitalism (1979-2003), until more recently, emphasizing the more ambiguous goal of developing a "socialist harmonious society" (*shehuizhuyi hexie shehui*) since 2004 (Joshi 2012a). During this period, the CCP has not only tolerated but also promoted increasing wealth and income inequality within China. Despite this major turnaround, its ideological slogans and public policies have nevertheless consistently emphasized setting a basic minimum floor for children, particularly when it comes to the implementation of maternal and child health programs and the expansion of compulsory education (Joshi 2012a). Ideologically, much propaganda has been directed towards the promotion of improving the "quality" (*suzhi*) of China's population by encouraging smaller families with healthy, nourished, and well-educated children (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). Since 1979, this has been coupled with a national population policy restricting most families to having only two children in rural areas and one child in urban areas (*ibid*).

As shown in Table 5, much of the BHD gap between China and India can be traced to the earlier 1950-1980 period when ideological differences between the two countries were strongest. In 1950, the infant mortality rate (IMR) of China (175) was higher than in India (146), but by 1979, India's IMR (125) and child mortality rate (CMR) (153), were roughly two and a half times higher than in China where, even by the highest estimates, the IMR (56) and CMR (62) had dropped significantly (Nanda and Ali 2006; Swamy 2003; World Bank 2012). Likewise, school expansion was much more rapid in China. Whereas in both countries roughly one out of six people were literate in 1950, by 1980 two out of three Chinese were literate, compared to only about one out of three Indians.

Table 5: Human Development Indicators in India and China
(1950-1979)

Human Development Indicators	China-1950	China-1979	India-1950	India-1979
Infant Mortality Rate	175	56	146	125
Literacy Rate	14	66	17	36
Primary School Enrollment		93		79
Secondary School Enrollment		51		28
Per Capita Income (2000 US\$ PPP)		\$762		\$1179
Human Development Index Score	0.132	0.550	0.119	0.407

Data sources: Nanda and Ali 2006; Swamy 1989, 2003; World Bank 1981, 2012. Note: the Human Development Index for 1950 was calculated by the author using data from Swamy (2003) for per capita income in US dollars (purchasing power parity), adult literacy rates, and life expectancy at birth, using the scaling norms of the 2005 UNDP methodology: (Income: Log \$100 to Log \$40,000; Life Expectancy: "Rate" refers to the share of the population that is literate; "Primary and secondary school enrollment rates" refer to the percent of the age-specific population enrolled in school.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE CAPACITY

Though a good portion of the gap between China and India can be traced to ideological differences in the pre-1980 period, variation in state capacity has also been a crucial factor in determining BHD achievements. Joel Migdal (1988: 8) has defined "state capacity" as the state's ability to penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources, and appropriate resources in a determined way. It can also be understood as the state's "ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently, and sustainably" (Hildebrand and Grindle 1997: 34). State capacity is partly constitutional and partly a matter of whether public administration functions in a "Weberian" manner (Evans and Rauch 1999). State capacity is strong when the central government has enough power and efficiency to implement policies (Wang and Hu 1998). Strong states, for example, are able to conscript their populations to meet military or civil needs (Joshi 2011a). They are able to control their territories and prevent armed conflicts so that the government holds a legitimate monopoly over violence. This usually requires high levels of tax compliance and the elimination of untaxed and unregulated "informal sector" economic activities (Wang and Hu 1998). It also requires skilled, trained civil servants and uncorrupt administrative management to effectively staff, promote, and supervise policy implementation and enforcement (Joshi 2011a). A state with strong capacity maximizes the impact of allocated resources to achieve programmatic goals, whereas corrupt, inefficient, and ineffective states waste resources and are less capable of accomplishing stated goals.

Though India and China both have various capacity deficits, India has generally been weaker than China in dimensions of state capacity relevant to fostering BHD. For instance, India has faced greater problems of public personnel deficits. Doctor, teacher, and nurse absenteeism have

been major problems in India (Chaudhury et al. 2006). A sizable portion of public health and education expenditures are wasted when salaries are paid to employees on Indian state government payrolls without services being delivered (*ibid*). Studies conducted over the past decade have found Indian health worker absenteeism rates to be the highest in the world at about 40 percent (*ibid*; World Bank 2008). Teacher absenteeism in India has also been high, averaging 25 percent across the country with rates as high as over 40 percent in the state of Bihar (Rogers and Vegas 2009).

State capacity today differs between China and India, but the gap was even wider in the past. Whereas federalism and administrative weakness often undermined India's central government, the Chinese central government generally had more capacity to penetrate remote and rural areas. While this has enhanced China's ability to implement BHD policies, it has also functioned as a double-edged sword. China has been more effective than India in mobilizing its population for sanitation campaigns, literacy drives, and rural development projects, but the Chinese government has also used this capacity to supervise, torture, and punish those out of favor with the regime during intensely politicized campaigns like the Anti-Rightist Campaign (*fanyoupai*) (1957), Four Cleanups Movement (*siqing yundong*) (1962-1965), and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

The strength of the Chinese state has stemmed in part from the personnel system of the CCP and its single-party control over the state. In the early years after coming to power, the CCP controlled personnel in a brute manner through constant, relentless, and dramatic anti-corruption and rectification campaigns like the "Three-Antis" and "Five-Antis," aimed at reducing bribery, embezzlement, and other forms of malfeasance. While these campaigns could not wipe out all forms of public abuse, they were successful in reducing corruption to the point that China under Mao had less corruption than in the post-Mao period (Lu 2000; Manion 2004).

In India, however, there was not even a single large-scale anti-corruption campaign launched after its independence. This left corruption almost completely unchecked (Vittal 2003). Where the CCP had stronger organizational capacity to monitor administrative personnel, the INC lacked such capacity. In India, the bureaucratic backbone, or "steel frame," of the administration was the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), a carry-over from the Indian Civil Service that served the British during the colonial period. It was structured for the purpose of colonial extraction and to efficiently maintain order with a small number of officials. Rather than reforming the civil service, India kept the IAS, which many have seen as more of a "steal frame" for embezzling state resources (Quah 2008). This practice was most notable under the rule of Indira Gandhi, and has led to the corruption and politicization of the civil service into the twenty-first century (Godbole 2003).

China has had its share of politicized government officials, and faced problems of embezzlement, but the costs to officials of being in the CCP's disfavor (*i.e.*, imprisonment, struggle sessions, expulsion from the party, execution, etc.) have meant that, compared to India, there have generally been more substantial incentives for Chinese officials to comply with their superiors. Another tool used by the CCP has been to require cadres to demonstrate loyalty to the party's ideology. By contrast, the Indian state has not engaged in comparable repertoires of detention and ideological motivation to control or deter corruption among civil servants. Within India, known incompetent and corrupt officials have typically been allowed to keep their posts in all sectors of public employment, including those impacting BHD. As one Indian school principal put it, "[t]he teachers in the government schools are indifferent Once teachers enter the school system they cannot be terminated. *No one is ever terminated.*" (Weiner 1991: 56) (emphasis added).

Turning to the state's ability to accrue financial resources, Chinese revenue collection was close to one-third of its national income during the crucial 1950-1980 period, a very high level for a country with low per-capita income. The accumulation of such financial resources enabled the Chinese government to fund and carry out a much wider array of programs than if it had fewer resources available to it. As shown over five-year intervals in Table 6, state revenue in China was significantly higher than in India for most of this period. Moreover, in India, the state could only extract limited taxation from the rural areas, in part due to a constitutional prohibition against central government taxation of agriculture. While this may have benefited some of the rural poor, it enabled large absentee landowners to be free of tax obligations, thereby reducing the public revenue available for public goods.

Table 6: Combined Revenue Collection in India and China as a Percentage of GDP

Year	India Revenue	China Revenue
1950-1	8.6	NA
1955-6	10.4	27.4
1960-1	12.3	29.2
1965-6	16.5	27.6
1970-1	16.0	30.7
1975-6	20.0	27.2
1980-1	24.2	25.7
Average	15.4	28.0

Data source: Joshi 2007.

India's actual revenue-to-GDP ratios were probably somewhat lower than these official figures due to the large size of the "informal" sector, or uncounted portion of the economy, which still today encompasses over 90

percent of the country's labor force. Tax reforms and improved revenue collection in the late 1960s and 1970s did have positive payoffs for India in the post-1980 period, but, from a comparative perspective, it is likely that China's higher revenue raising capacity and taxation levels in the initial years were an important force for laying down more extensive physical and social infrastructures to help spread public health and education throughout the country.

Similarly, where the three-tiered Indian rural governance system of village councils (*gram panchayat*), block councils (*taluka parishad*), and district councils (*zilla parishad*) was weak and inactive in most places between the 1960s and 1980s, the three-tiered Chinese system of communes (*renmin gongshe*), production brigades (*shengchan dadui*), and production teams (*shengchan dui*) actively carried out basic administration and support for national campaigns (Unger 2002). The Chinese state was also more capable of mobilizing manpower through mass conscription campaigns, including compulsory rural service for doctors and teachers through "sent-down" programs (*xiexiang*). By contrast, various laws for public service conscription of youth and professionals were never implemented in India (Jeffery 1987). The inability of the Indian state to implement and enforce policies, both in the early years and later on, was prominently reflected in Jawaharlal Nehru's own dislike of compulsion. Whereas most countries claiming to be socialist laid down imperative and compulsory conditions, Nehru "was unwilling even to use a measure of compulsion" (Dutt 1981: 251).

Based on 2010 standardized governance measures produced by the World Bank (2011), China (-0.77) and India (-1.31) continue to diverge on political stability and the absence of violence. China (0.12) also scores higher than India (-0.01) on government effectiveness (World Bank 2011). Although comparable data for China are not available, India has been plagued for a long time by major problems of police, judiciary, and administrative corruption (*ibid*). As shown in Table 7, in a major survey conducted by Transparency International, over 85 percent of Indians view the police as corrupt (CMS 2005). Similarly, over 75 percent view the judiciary as corrupt. While India has been commended for its efforts toward enacting the rule of law, rampant judiciary corruption, deficits in judicial appointments, court cases delayed for years, and people imprisoned for years awaiting trial reveal state capacity deficits in need of attention. For example, at the end of 2009, in Indian state high courts alone, over four million cases were pending (SWI 2010).

The impact of administrative corruption, however, is probably the most detrimental to BHD. As shown in Table 7, the public distribution system (PDS), which provides food grains to the rural poor in India to combat hunger and malnutrition, has failed in most states. Most designated households do not receive grains in large part because they are stolen by intermediaries. As displayed in Table 7, large scale corruption also plagues Indian parliaments and state legislative assemblies and many

members face criminal charges for murder, rape, and other serious crimes.

Table 7: State Capacity Deficits in Major States of India (2005)

State	Residents who Believe the Police are Corrupt (%)	Residents who Believe the Judiciary is Corrupt (%)	Lok Sabha MPs Charged with Criminal Cases (%)	Proportion of Rural Population Receiving PDS Food Grains (%)
Andhra Pradesh	86	40	7	63
Bihar	96	94	33	4
Gujarat	88	81	27	42
Haryana	88	80	20	5
Karnataka	87	75	21	56
Kerala	70	48	42	80
Madhya Pradesh	94	88	24	11
Maharashtra	83	77	42	38
Orissa	85	80	14	5
Punjab	90	86	31	2
Rajasthan	91	85	16	16
Tamil Nadu	68	78	21	69
Uttar Pradesh	90	78	28	4
West Bengal	93	79	12	10

Data source: CMS 2005. Note: state acronyms are for Andhra Pradesh (AP), Bihar (BI), Gujarat (GJ), Haryana (HR), Karnataka (KN), Kerala (KR), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Orissa (OR), Punjab (PJ), Rajasthan (RJ), Tamil Nadu (TN), Uttar Pradesh (UP), and West Bengal (WB). Dreze and Sen 2002; SWI 2006.

Over the last three decades, Indian state capacity has also been weaker than China in preventing armed conflicts and urban massacres. Based on its 2005 National Human Security Index score of 30 out of a possible 100, India ranked seventh lowest in the world and slightly lower than China (35 out of 100) (Joshi 2009). As shown in Table 8, among recorded incidents of mass urban violence claiming at least one hundred lives during the post-1980 period, eight occurred in India and four in China. Though a problem for both countries, with the notable exception of Tiananmen in 1989, urban massacres in China have been primarily limited to the border provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang, whereas in India, mass killings have taken place in the major metropolises of Ahmedabad, Delhi, Mumbai, and Varanasi in addition to rural insurgencies and armed conflicts in disputed border areas. A border war with Vietnam resulting in 220 officially recorded fatalities was China's only standing armed conflict in the post-1980 period. By contrast, as detailed in Table 9, India had at least thirteen major armed conflicts resulting in an estimated 37,048 deaths between 1980 and 2010 (UCDP 2012). Comparably, the Indian state's inability (or unwillingness) to guarantee the absence of violent conflict in its territory has obstructed its ability to provide health care and education

in conflict regions. Not only have these conflicts channeled general public spending away from HD and toward warfare, but lasting conflict has been a deterrent to foreign and domestic investment in conflicted areas.

Table 8: Mass Violence (over 100 deaths) in Urban Centers of India and China (1980-2010)

Year	Location/Incident	Country	Estimated Deaths
1984	Amritsar Massacre	India	Over 500
1984	Delhi Massacre	India	4,000 to 12,000
1989	Tiananmen Massacre (Multi-city)	China	1,000 to 4,000
1990	Srinagar Massacres	India	100
1992	Ayodhya/Bombay Riots	India	1,000 to 2,500
1993	Bombay Bombings	India	250
2001	Shijiazhuang Bombings	China	100
2002	Gujarat Genocide	India	1,000 to 2,000
2006	Mumbai Train Bombings	India	200
2008	Tibetan Protests/Crackdown	China	50 to 150
2008	Mumbai Attacks	India	150 to 200
2009	Ürümqi Riots	China	200

Data Sources: Varshney 2002; Yagnik and Sheth 2005; Kaur and Crossette 2006; Shani 2007; UCDP 2012. Alternative estimates may also be available on Wikipedia. Note: In the aftermath of the Amritsar Massacre it is estimated that 20,000 to 30,000 Sikhs died during conflict in the Indian state of Punjab between 1984 and 1992 (Shani 2007).

Table 9: Armed Conflicts (Over 100 Deaths) in China and India (1980-2010)

Country	Armed Conflict	Years	Estimated Deaths
China	China-Vietnam	1980-1988	220
India	Assam	1990-2010	1158
India	Bodoland	1989-2010	681
India	Bodo-Santhal	1996-1998	292
India	India-Pakistan	1984-2003	2119
India	Kuki-Naga	1993-1998	432
India	Kuki-Paite	1997	136
India	Maoist Insurgencies	1990-2010	4264
India	Kashmir	1989-2010	19006
India	Manipur	1982-2009	682
India	Nagaland	1992-2007	598
India	NSCN-IM - NSCN-K	2005-2010	260
India	Punjab/Khalistan	1983-1993	6899
India	Tripura	1980-2006	521

Data Source: UCDP 2012. Notes: Numbers of deaths are based on the cumulative "best estimate" or only estimate of fatalities from UCDP. NSCN-IM stands for National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac-Muivah faction. NSCN-K is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang faction.

III. COMPARING DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES

Measuring BHD in terms of Human Development Index and MDG criteria, China has made considerable strides over India, as shown in Table 10. In 2010, infant mortality was three times lower in China (1.6%) than India (4.8%) while child mortality in China (1.8%) was about one-fourth the rate of India (6.3%). Literacy in China (94%) was much higher than in India (63%), and child malnutrition in India (44-48%) was very high compared to China (5-12%). Overall the poverty rate in India (69%), based on the two-dollar-per-day poverty threshold, was more than double the level in China (30%). China was also ahead in primary education. In 2009, only 4 percent of Chinese children had not reached the fifth grade of primary school compared to 30 percent in India (UNESCO 2012). Similarly, where child labor between ages five and fourteen was less common in China outside Tibet and its Western provinces, it was still common throughout India, estimated at about 28 percent (Jayaraj and Subramanian 2005).

Table 10: Comparing Basic Human Development in China and India (2006-2010)

Human Development Indicators	Year	China	India
Infant Mortality	2010	1.6%	4.8%
Child Mortality	2010	1.8%	6.3%
Youth Illiteracy	2009	1%	19%
Adult Illiteracy	2009	6%	37%
Female Illiteracy	2009	9%	49%
Child Malnutrition (under-weight)	2006	5%	44%
Child Malnutrition (under-height)	2006	12%	48%
Poverty Rate (< \$2/day)	2010	30%	69%

Data Source: World Bank 2012.

During the late 1990s, China also had twice the number of doctors per capita and triple the number of hospital beds per capita as India, with two out of every three child births in China taking place in hospitals, compared to only one in three in India (Dummer and Cook 2008). Although there were significant regional disparities in both countries, about 90 percent or more of China's villages had functioning health care stations during this period with low rates of doctor and health worker absenteeism compared to India (West 1997).

In conclusion, India has been slower than China at improving BHD. Encouragingly, India's infant mortality rate dropped by more than half, from 12.5 percent in 1980 to 4.8 percent in 2010, but Indian child malnutrition was still very high at 46 percent. When we tabulate the cumulative impacts over time the results are staggering. Table 11 depicts the number of child deaths under age five from 1970 to 2009, which was approximately 122 million in India compared to about 46 million in China. Thus, while India was able to escape a famine like that which occurred in China between 1958 and 1961 during its Great Leap Forward campaign, high rates of everyday mortality in India have claimed a considerable number of lives.

Table 11: Child Deaths in India and China (1970 to 2009)

Decade	India	China
1970-1979	38.61 Million	19.99 Million
1980-1989	34.17 Million	11.87 Million
1990-1999	28.16 Million	9.46 Million
2000-2009	20.73 Million	4.19 Million
Total	121.67 Million	45.51 Million


Data Source: Calculated from World Bank 2012 data.

IV. CONCLUSION

Today it is common to ask why India as a democracy has fallen behind China on measures of BHD. The partial answer offered here is that, among other factors, India has not yet succeeded in replacing the pervasive ideology of caste and social stratification with an ideology supportive of equal opportunity and guaranteed basic human rights. India is a country that continues to struggle with massive social inequality and disempowerment, whereas China, a country with significant regional and economic inequality, has neither a caste system nor the degree of gender discrimination present in India. Moreover, in many sectors crucial to BHD, corruption in India has been rampant, and state capacity is generally weaker than in China.

As shown in Figure 2, China has sustained economic growth rates after 1980 rapidly outpacing India. This is in part because of early investments in women and children starting in the 1950s. Both countries' development strategies involved major tradeoffs. During the earlier period the Chinese government demonstrated outright cruelty to the rich and "capitalist roaders" through sins of commission; while the Indian government displayed pervasive cruelty to the poor through sins of omission. Over the longer term, however, China's BHD foundations have resulted in a labor force that is more skilled, literate, and mobile than India's. This is especially true of young women, who are a major source of China's manufacturing labor force (Dobson 2009). Many women in India are, by contrast, uneducated or under-educated and face other significant workplace obstacles, such as corrupt police who do not prevent rape and sexual harassment and social taboos prohibiting people of different caste origins from living, working, and eating together.

Figure 2: Per Capita Income Growth in China and India (1980-2010)



Data Source: World Bank 2012. Note: Per capita income refers to per capita GDP based on purchasing power in constant 2005 US Dollars.

In conclusion, the processes uncovered in this article challenge two commonly held assumptions about improving BHD. First, it is often assumed that economic growth primarily drives BHD (Swamy 2005). But, as demonstrated here, in the pre-1980 period, China experienced major BHD progress while still experiencing a lower level of per-capita income than India. Hence, although the relationship between economic growth and BHD may be mutually causal, this comparison supports the findings of several influential studies that BHD may contribute more to growth than growth contributes to BHD (Ranis et al. 2000; Suri et al. 2011).

Another assumption is that democracies have higher BHD than non-democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000; Haggard and Kaufmann 2008), but empirical studies have found that this is not always the case (Joshi 2009). A more nuanced understanding may show that the type of democracy is also important in determining how much the state invests in BHD, particularly when it comes to women and children (Lijphart 1999; Heller 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Joshi 2009; Joshi 2012c; Joshi 2012d). Thus, while economic growth and democratization may be valuable in their own rights, analysis suggests that human and economic development in both China and India would benefit from moving toward more inclusiveness in ideology and practice and developing a more effective system of state administration to implement and enforce quality programs that benefit public health, education, and nutrition for all sections of the population.

REFERENCES

- Acharya, Alka, Rama V. Baru and Geetha B. Nambissan. 2001. "The State and Human Development: Health and Education." in G.P. Deshpande & Alka Acharya (eds.) *50 Years of India-China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams*. New Delhi: Tulika.
- Alesina, Alberto and Edward Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andreas, Joel. 2009. *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bardhan, Pranab. 2010. *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of India and China*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bhalla, A.S. 1992. *Uneven Development in the Third World: A Study of China and India*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bloom, David E., David Canning, Linlin Hu, Yuanli Liu, Ajay Mahal, and Winnie Yip. 2010. "The Contribution of Population Health and Demographic Change to Economic Growth in China and India." *Journal of Comparative Politics* 38: 17-33.
- Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey S. Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers. 2006. "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20(1): 91-116.

CMS (Centre for Media Studies). 2005. *India Corruption Study to Improve Governance*. New Delhi: Transparency International India.

Dobson, Wendy. 2009. *Gravity Shift: How Asia's New Economic Powerhouses will Shape the 21st Century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Dreze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 2002. *India: Development and Participation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Drezner, Daniel. 2007. "The New New World Order. (India and China are the Emerging Countries)" *Foreign Affairs* 86(2): 34-46.

Dummer, Trevor and Ian Cook. 2008. "Health in China and India: A Cross-Country Comparison in a Context of Rapid Globalisation." *Social Science and Medicine* 67(4): 590-605.

Dutt, Rabindra Chandra. 1981. *Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.

Engardio, Pete. 2007. *Chindia: How China and India are Revolutionizing Global Business*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Evans, Peter and James Rauch. 1999. "Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of 'Weberian' State Structures on Economic Growth." *American Sociological Review* 64(5):748-765.

Godbole, Madhav. 2003. "Bureaucracy at Crossroads." In Bidyut Chakrabarty and Mohit Bhattacharya (eds.) *Public Administration: A Reader*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Gong, Ting. 1994. *The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes*. Westport: Praeger.

Goyal, Santosh. 1992. "Social Background of Top Corporate Officials in the Private and Public Sectors" in Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (eds.). *Dominance and Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Greenhalgh, Susan and Edwin A. Winckler. 2005. *Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Guha, Ramachandra. 2007. *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*. New York: Ecco.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. 2008. *Development, Democracy and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Han, Dongping. 2000. *The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Educational Reforms and their Impact on China's Rural Development*. New York: Garland Press.

Hardgrave, Robert L. and Stanley Kochanek. *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*. Boston: Thomson Wadsworth.

Heller, Patrick. 2000. "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India." *World Politics* 52 (4): 484-519.

Hildebrand, Mary and Merilee Grindle. 1997. "Building Sustainable Capacity in the Public Sector: What Can be Done?" in Merilee Grindle (ed.) *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries*. Boston: Harvard University Press.

HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2007. "India: 'Hidden Apartheid' of Discrimination Against Dalits." Accessed 13 February 2007. <<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/02/12/india-hidden-apartheid-discrimination-against-dalits>>.

Jaffrelot, Christophe and Sanjay Kumar (eds). 2009. *Rise of the Plebians? The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies*. New Delhi: Routledge.

Jayal, Niraja Gopal. 2006. *Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Jayaraj, D. and S. Subramanian. 2005. "Out of School and (Probably) in Work: Child Labour and Capability Deprivation in India." UN-WIDER Research Paper No. 2005/55.

Jeffery, Roger. 1988. *The Politics of Health in India*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Jolly, Richard, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai and Frédéric Lapeyre. 2004. *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Joshi, Devin. 2007. "Government Performance, Economic Growth and Human Development in China and India." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington.

Joshi, Devin. 2009. "Do We Have a Winner? What the China-India Paradox May Reveal about Regime Type and Human Security." *International Studies Review* 10(1): 73-98.

Joshi, Devin. 2011a. "Multi-Party Democracies and Rapid Economic Growth: A Twenty-First Century Breakthrough?" *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 7(1): 25-46.

Joshi, Devin. 2011b. "Good Governance, State Capacity, and the Millennium Development Goals." *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 10(2): 339-360.

Joshi, Devin. 2012a. "Does China's Recent 'Harmonious Society' Discourse Reflect a Shift towards Human Development?" *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17(2): 169-187.

Joshi, Devin. 2012b. "The Impact of India's Regional Parties on Voter Turnout and Human Development." *Journal of South Asian Development* 7(2): 139-160.

Joshi, Devin. 2012c. "The Developmental and Protective Varieties of Liberal Democracy: A Difference in Kind or Degree?" *Democratization*, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2011.634581.

Joshi, Devin. 2012d. "The Social and Adversarial Varieties of Democracy: Which Produces Fewer Criminals?" *Development and Society* 41(2): 229-252.

Kaur, Jaskaran and Barbara Crossette. 2006. *Twenty Years of Impunity: The November 1984 Pogroms of Sikhs in India*. Portland, OR: Ensaaf.

Kohli, Atul. 2004. *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, John. 1966. *Leadership in Communist China*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lu, Xiaobo. 2000. *Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involvement of the Chinese Communist Party*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mahtaney, Piya. 2007. *India, China and Globalization: the Emerging Superpowers and the Future of Economic Development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Manion, Melanie. 2004. *Corruption By Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

MoE: Ministry of Education (China) Development & Planning Division. 2006. *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Tongji Nianjian*. (China Education Statistics Yearbook) Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

Nanda, A.R. and Almas Ali. 2006. "Health Sector: Issues and Challenges" in *India: Social Development Report*, ed. Council for Social Development. 18-32. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Pepper, Suzanne. 1996. *Radicalism and Education Reform in Twentieth-Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2012. Pew Global Attitudes Project Question Database. Accessed on 13 December 2012. <<http://www.pew-global.org/question-search/?qid=784&cntIDs=@10-@10.50-@20-@20.50-stdIDs=>>>.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Quah, Jon S.T. 2008. "Curbing Corruption in India: An Impossible Dream?" *Asian Journal of Political Science* 16(3): 240-259.

Rajaretnam, T. 1990. "Family Planning Programme versus Maternal and Child Health Services: The Emerging Trend in India." In *Health and*

Family Welfare Services in India, ed. J. Basantibala and R.N. Pati. 79-93. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House.

Ranis, Gustav, Frances Stewart and Alejandro Ramirez. 2000. "Economic Growth and Human Development," *World Development* 28(2): 197-219.

Rogers, F. Halsey and Emiliana Vegas. 2009. "No more cutting class? Reducing Teacher Absence and Providing Incentives for Performance," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 4847. Washington DC: World Bank.

Schurmann, Franz. 1968. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor.

Shah, Ghanshyam, Harsh Mander, Sukhadeo Thorat, Satish Deshpande and Amita Baviskar. 2006. *Untouchability in Rural India*. New Delhi: Sage.

Shani, Giorgio. 2007. *Sikh Nationalism and Identity in a Global Age*. London: Routledge.

Sinha, Dipa. 2006. "Rethinking ICDS: A Rights Based Perspective." *Economic and Political Weekly* 41(34): 3689-3694.

Smith, David. 2008. *The Dragon and the Elephant: China, India and the New World Order*. London: Profile.

Steger, Manfred B. 2008. *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Streeten, Paul. 2003. "Shifting Fashions in Development Dialogue" in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A.V. Shiva Kumar (ed.) *Readings in Human Development*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Suri, Tavneet, Michael Boozer, Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart. 2011. "Paths to Success: The Relationship between Human Development and Economic Growth," *World Development* 39(4): 506-522.

Swamy, Subramanian. 1989. *Economic Growth in China and India*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers.

Swamy, Subramanian. 2003. *Economic Reforms and Performance: China and India in Comparative Perspective*. New Delhi: Konark Publishers.

Swamy, Subramanian. 2005. "Chasing China: Can India Bridge the Gap," pp. 77-96 (Chapter 5) in Edward Friedman and Bruce Gilley (eds.) *Asia's Giants: Comparing China and India*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

SWI (Social Watch India). 2006. *Citizens Report on Governance and Development 2006*. New Delhi: Pearson Longman.

SWI. 2010. "Executive Summary" in *Citizens Report on Governance and Development 2010*. <<http://socialwatchindia.net/publications/citizens-report/citizens-report-on-governance-and-development-2010-executive-summary/view>>.

Thérien, Jean-Philippe. 2012. "The UN and Human Development: From Ideology to Global Policies," *Global Policy* 3(1): 1-12.

Tilak, Jandhyala B.G., 2006. "Education: A Saga of Spectacular Achievements and Conspicuous Failures" in Amitabh Kundu (ed.) 2006. *India: Social Development Report*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). 2012. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database. (Date of retrieval: 2012/07/04).

UNDP (United Nations Development Program). 1990. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.

UNDP. 1999. *Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face*. New York: Oxford University Press.

UNESCO (United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). (2012) UIS Data Centre. Accessed on 13 September 2012. <<http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/tableviewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143>>.

Unger, Jonathan. 2002. *The Transformation of Rural China*. London: M.E. Sharpe.

USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office). 2010. Patents by Country, State, and Year – All Patent Types (December 2009). <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_all.htm>.

USPTO. 2012. Patents by Country, State, and Year – All Patent Types (December 2011). <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_all.htm>.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. 2nd Ed.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Vittal, N. 2003. *Corruption in India: The Roadblock to National Prosperity*. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.

Wang, Shaoguang and Hu Angang. 1998. *The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Waring, Marilyn. 1999. *Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth, 2nd Edition*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

WEF (World Economic Forum). Various Years. The Global Competitiveness Report. <<http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness/index.html>>.

Weiner, Myron. 1991. *The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

West, Loraine A. 1997. "Provision of Public Services in Rural PRC." In *Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China*, ed. Christine Wong. 213-282. New York: Oxford University Press.

WHO (World Health Organization). 1983. *Primary Health Care - The Chinese Experience*. Geneva: WHO.

WHO. 2006. *World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health*. Geneva: WHO.

Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. 2010. *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*. London: Penguin.

Wilson, Dominic and Roopa Purushothaman. 2003. "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050." Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 99.

Winters, L. Alan and Shahid Yusuf. 2007. *Dancing with Giants: China, India, and the Global Economy*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 1981. *World Development Report 1981: National and International Adjustment*. New York: Oxford University Press.

World Bank. 2008. *Global Monitoring Report 2008 - MDGs and the Environment: Agenda for Inclusive and Sustainable Development*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2011. Worldwide Governance Indicators. Accessed on 4 July 2012. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp>.

World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators On-Line Database. Washington DC: World Bank.

Yagnik, Achyut and Suchitra Sheth. 2005. *The Shaping of Modern Gujarat: Plurality, Hindutva and Beyond*. New Delhi: Penguin Books.

