


HOSTAGE AND BARRICADE INCIDENTS:
A PROFILING PERSPECTIVE

Richard A. Murphy




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
A THESIS

Submitted by Richard A. Murphy
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
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by

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ABSTRACT

The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) has initiated a research project that profiles the perpetrators of hostage and barricade incidents. This research is conducted using a questionnaire that is completed at incident conclusion. The questionnaire was provided by the FBI as part of a project called HOBAS (Hostage, Barricade, and Suicide). The HOBAS information is distributed electronically and in print to member law enforcement agencies. HOBAS information is used in this project as the main source of secondary data. The University of Louisville School of Medicine supplied an additional source of secondary data.

There are 24 questionnaires that make up the primary information. The HOBAS database covers 1,828 incidents, and 120 incidents are described in the information from Louisville. There is not enough primary data to constitute valid research from a statistical standpoint. However, for the purposes of future research, the three sources are listed and discussed in a preliminary manner. The premise that the perpetrators of these incidents and the incidents themselves have common factors is demonstrated. Unique aspects of the incidents that have occurred in Georgia are also discussed.

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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Regrettably, hostage and/or barricaded gunman incidents are not rare occurrences throughout the United States or in the state of Georgia, the latter of which is the main emphasis of this project. As taken from the questionnaire used in this project, a barricade incident involves a person who refuses to come out of a fortified position or release a victim where there is no substantive demand. A hostage incident occurs when a person (or persons) is held against his or her will and the captor has made substantive demands. As an example for definition, a common occurrence when both of these occur is when an individual 'barricades' himself inside his home and holds his family there against their wishes. More often than not, some type of standoff with law enforcement ensues. However, due to the independent nature of law enforcement organizations in America, exact details about the frequency and distribution of these incidents would be nearly impossible to research, let alone count. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), in research that will be particularly described later, provided information on 32 incidents during a four year period from June of 1995 through mid-June of 1999.

Shortly after the incident with the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, in 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched a substantial internal campaign to produce a system that collects, analyzes, and disseminates research obtained on hostage and barricade incidents. The violent end to the standoff between law enforcement and the Davidians opened some eyes, to say the very least. One of the tools of this campaign is the Hostage Barricade Database, otherwise known as HOBAS. As of the end of June 1999, the HOBAS had 1,828 incidents on record (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 13-14, 30).

There exist a number of law enforcement publications and organizations nationwide whose goals are to educate their brothers and sisters about a variety of issues. Only recently though has a central clearinghouse of information come into existence about hostage and/or barricade situations. That clearinghouse is the HOBAS, and part of its purpose is to allow law enforcement personnel to review statistics on similar incidents so that they may better prepare themselves to handle their own incidents. Specific to the GBI's response teams, information will be provided later about steps taken in the same direction.

The HOBAS project is in place to address all of the issues that have been mentioned. Part of its purpose is to count hostage and barricaded gunman incidents. Another purpose of the HOBAS is to make available information that law enforcement may use to improve incident responses. The HOBAS also serves in that capacity as a provider of statistical information that may be used to predetermine incident perpetrators. Finally, the HOBAS is a two-way information handler. Agencies across the country submit information to the database and may retrieve information at will. By proxy, the HOBAS is making dozens of agencies nationwide work together on the issue of response effectiveness to these types of incidents.

The problem in this project is the collection of appropriate HOBAS information from qualified incidents that the GBI's Special Response Team (SRT) has been involved with. How that information falls in line with the FBI's HOBAS statistics is another factor here. An attempt will be made to characterize the offenders of these incidents and the incidents themselves. Comparisons will be made to information provided by Dr.

Theodore Feldman of the University of Louisville. Project hypotheses are presented in their own section.

This project has implications for law enforcement leaders and managers across the country. The information provided herein can even be applied to the larger population of all law enforcement officers, in that the uniformed patrol officer is usually the first one on the scene of a hostage or barricaded gunman incident. The information and data found herein can also be cross-disciplinary. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and other medical personnel may be interested in some of the data as it pertains to mental illness and substance abuse issues. Criminal justice individuals, other than those active in police operations, may be interested in this information in general or in some of the categories specific to a given area of interest. Social workers and others in a counseling capacity may be interested in the causes and outcomes of these incidents as they relate to the offender(s) as well as the victim(s). The importance of this work to special response teams and/or hostage negotiators should be self-evident. Students and professionals in criminal justice stand to gain unique insight into this field from a variety of angles.

For clarity and variety of writing and reading, several liberties were taken with terms and wording herein. Dr. Feldman's research is also known as *the Louisville database*, and the primary data gathered from the GBI is often called *Georgia data*, *the Georgia factor*, and/or is simply referenced as coming from the GBI or primary data. *SRT* and *SWAT* are synonymous, although *SWAT* usually refers to the general association with special response teams while *SRT* primarily refers to the GBI's teams. The context in which each term is used will provide the necessary connotation(s). The acronym *HOBAS* is used in a variety of ways. Sometimes it will be referred to as *the HOBAS*, and

at other times the term will be used as if it is a proper name. The term *critical incident* or *incident* refers to qualifying hostage and barricade events, which are occasionally referred to as a *crisis*.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The problem of collecting critical incident information, and its distribution through the HOBAS database or any other means, is a limited field of study. In an early review of these matters that will be discussed shortly, the FBI has stated as much.

"Unfortunately, little comprehensive data exist concerning crisis negotiation activities in the United States" (Hammer, et al, 1994: 1). Another article that appeared in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in 1991 covers the subject in great detail, and is a valuable read to any interested party. However, nowhere therein is any type of database or central information location mentioned. Inadvertently though, this second article does make the point attempted throughout this document:

Before any decisions are made, the on-scene commander should evaluate the presence of high-risk factors, consider all other intelligence available, and combine this information with the assessments made by both the negotiation and tactical teams. This combined information will assist the commander in differentiating between a genuine hostage situation, a pseudo-hostage situation, and an intended homicide incident (Fuselier, et al, 1991: 10).

The key point to be remembered from the above selection is "...consider all other intelligence available...", in that intelligence is described as all knowledge of any given subject collected from any source.

Theodore Feldman, MD, of the University of Louisville, KY, has done a great deal of research into these exact matters. His interest on the subject from a medical point of view provides further credibility and a slightly different angle on this project. Without any delay in his study, he concurs with the absence of direct work: "While the law

enforcement literature contains many references on hostage negotiation strategies, relatively little scientific data exists on the characteristics of these incidents" (Feldman, 1996: 3).

Dr. Feldman describes from that point the database founded in 1996 by the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Louisville School of Medicine. Quite similar to the HOBAS, at least in information stored, Dr. Feldman's database will be compared to the HOBAS information in a side-by-side manner later in this paper.

In the meantime, an overview of critically relevant points of the Louisville database is presented in list form so that parallels will be readily apparent.

1. The Louisville database examined three types of incidents: hostage incidents, barricaded subjects without hostages, and barricaded subjects who held hostages.
2. The Louisville database evaluated the situational and behavioral factors which influenced hostage and barricade situations. (Psychological factors were also evaluated, but are out of the scope of this project.)
3. Two levels of data were used in situational and behavioral analysis: the characteristics of the *incident*, and the characteristics of the *perpetrator*.

Additionally, Dr. Feldman directly states that "[t]he objectives of the study were to identify the motivations for hostage-taking and barricades, develop a comprehensive psychological profile of offenders, explore the factors that influenced outcome of the incidents, and improve negotiation strategies and crisis management procedures used by law enforcement agencies" (Feldman, 1996: 5). His work goes hand-in-hand with this

work and the GBI's objectives, and similarly fits some of the categories of data found in the HOBAS.

Nonetheless, generally or specifically, some research about the subject and a small amount of material on the matter has been produced. What is perhaps even more prolific than the academic and professional investigations into critical incidents is the coverage that the printed media provides. For better or worse, the popular mediums that news travels on have brought the issue to light.

Most of the articles that follow were printed as news facts only, and are relatively succinct. However, as appropriate, investigative findings indicate that the interest in these matters has a broad scope.

The incidents described in the excerpts from Georgia newspapers were gathered completely at random. Those incidents were read and the articles collected in an infrequent manner based on opportunity, not on careful scrutiny of several newspapers on a daily basis. Citations are presented at the front of each excerpt, as listed by the parent paper as indicated.

Excerpts from the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Sunday, January 2, 2000:

Officers conclude 12-hour standoff. Assault of rural Clay County home ends authorities' standoff with armed former mental patient.

By Harry Franklin, State Editor

A 12-hour standoff between authorities and an armed former mental patient was brought to a close early New Year's Day. Law enforcement officers successfully subdued the subject after making a tactical assault on the house in rural Clay County. Melvin R. McCoy, 47...was taken into custody about 3 a.m. at his house...A five-member Special Response Team made up of Georgia Bureau of Investigation agents and Georgia State Patrol officers was brought in from across the state Friday evening to help sheriff's deputies...[The county sheriff] had negotiated with McCoy for hours without convincing him to surrender...During an assault on the house...incendiaries were used to try to isolate McCoy inside the

house...Officers recovered a 20-gauge shotgun and a .22-caliber pistol after McCoy was subdued...[h]e will face aggravated assault charges..."I saw some very exemplary police work during the last night," [the sheriff] said. "The state of Georgia, I'm satisfied, has some real professionals. Some came by chopper and some by car. We had probably 40 officers there at various times" (Franklin, 2000: B1, B4).

Excerpts from the LaGrange Daily News, Sunday, March 19, 2000:

Killing suspect stays holed up with hostages

DUNDALK, Md. (AP)-A heavily armed man suspected of killing four people remained holed up with at least three hostages in an apartment late Saturday, as relatives and friends pleaded for him to come out...Law officers converged on the building at about 9:30 p.m. Friday, and were negotiating with Palczynski by telephone... Palczynski was holding hostage [his ex-girlfriend's] mother, her brother and the mother's boyfriend, police said..."We have a philosophy of surround and talk," said Baltimore County Police spokesman Bill Toohey said [sic] Saturday...Palczynski has said that if he were faced with returning to jail, he would kill himself or make police shoot him...Palczynski has been in a similar position before. In 1992, he kept police in Idaho at bay for 16 hours following a domestic complaint by a girlfriend. He was finally forced out with tear gas (Associated Press, 2000: 1, 2).

Mr. Palczynski was later killed by law enforcement after two of the three

hostages escaped and an assault was conducted to rescue the third hostage.

Excerpts from the Athens Daily News, Tuesday, December 28, 1999:

Police reviewing standoff procedures. Athens man still at large after eluding officers on Christmas.

By Stephen Gurr, Staff Writer

Athens-Clarke police are reviewing procedures used during a 13-hour Christmas Day standoff in which a shooting suspect managed to slip past 20 law enforcement officers and escape...Marcus Lamont Easley was still at large Monday, wanted for aggravated assault on a police officer. Police say Easley, 19, barricaded himself and a girlfriend in [a] residence and later fired three shots from the home at officers...Assistant Police Chief Mark Wallace, who was in command of the scene Saturday, said..."Certainly, everyone is preparing reviews on what occurred" (Gurr, 1999: 1A, 7A).

Excerpts from the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Friday, March 24, 2000:

Man commits suicide after rooftop standoff

DIX HILLS, N.Y.-A man who fatally shot himself during a rooftop standoff committed suicide after killing his stepson... John Fenrich Jr., 36, began his siege [after involving the local media]. The station then called police, authorities said (contributor unknown, 2000: A4).

The following excerpts from the Atlanta Constitution (February 10, 2000) detail some facts and findings surrounding an incident that occurred in Austell, GA, in July of 1999. Two Cobb County police officers lost their lives upon a tactical assault into a residence where the suspect barricaded himself inside his home with his 73 year old mother. This incident received a fair amount of attention - and criticism - in the media in and around the Atlanta area. The presentation of this case, and the others, is *not* presented for the purposes of pointing out individual or professional errors or wrongdoing. As documented, this case and others are offered for illustrative and learning purposes.

Cobb SWAT chief haunted by deaths

By Steve Visser

Lt. Steve Merrifield has spent 13 years bursting into homes to arrest gunmen. Until July, none of the good guys had died trying... Merrifield, who has commanded Cobb's SWAT team for two years, was in charge of the July 23 raid on a gunman holed up in his home near Austell. As they entered, Sgt. Steve Reeves, 35, and Officer Stephen Gilner, 32, were fatally wounded by Greg Smith. A report issued this week by the National Tactical Officers Association [NTOA] of Pennsylvania said faulty strategy by Merrifield contributed to the deaths. Specifically, the independent investigators said the 12-man SWAT team was undermanned, and the rescue of the gunman's mother inside the house shouldn't have been attempted without reinforcements... The association's report faulted the entire SWAT plan that night... The core finding of the investigation is that Merrifield should have known he didn't have enough men, and he should have called in help from outside agencies before attempting a rescue... Merrifield said that the critical problem of that night was poor information about the layout of the house, which put his men in the gunsights of an expert marksman who insisted on fighting and dying. (Visser, 2000: A1, A10).

Amid the ongoing controversy following the release of the investigation's findings

about this incident, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution came out with a follow-up article on February 20, 2000.

SWAT teams need unity, chief says

July tragedy: Lack of manpower seen as contributor to two deaths.

By Steve Visser [with contributions by staff writer Jack Warner]

Marietta police Chief Bobby Moody learned a hard lesson from the deaths of two Cobb County officers. Even when they're facing a single armed man, metro Atlanta SWAT teams need more strength in numbers. "What everybody in a command position is saying is that we need to get these SWAT teams together," said Moody, a former president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Last year, the SWAT team from one of Atlanta's best-trained law agencies - the 500-officer Cobb County police - found it couldn't overcome a mentally ill gunman who was also a crack shot. The five-man entry team found itself trapped in a kitchen facing a hail of buckshot coming down a narrow hallway. Two officers died. . . . It is unclear how many SWAT teams operate in the state - sheriffs and police departments form and disband them at will. But most likely have fewer than 20 officers, and few could afford in terms of either money or manpower to expand. Upon reading the [above] report's criticism of the Cobb SWAT team, Moody ordered his own 140[sic]-officer department's team expanded to 20. But he suspects that number - plenty to contain a house - could still leave him short-handed if his department faced a hostage situation. So he and Cobb Chief Lee New and Sheriff Bill Huston are discussing having their teams train together occasionally so they'll be comfortable working together on major operations. That would raise the total SWAT force in Cobb to 70 officers - a big-league number comparable to Los Angeles or Dallas, except the officers in Cobb will be part-time SWAT team members, training 18 hours a month instead of full-time training 40 hours. It's unclear, however, how well the organization will work. Moody would like to see metro Atlanta SWAT teams cooperate - at the very least meet regularly and share information - across county lines. . . . "Mutual aid is not a new concept," said Steve Smith, an expert on forming multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams. Smith is a captain with the SWAT team for the Lenexa, Kan., Police Department, which has 16 officers. he also heads the Kansas City Metro SWAT Association, which he said can swell his 16-member SWAT team to 102. The real strength of the teams isn't as much their mutual support during hostage rescues as their ability to relieve one another during days-long confrontations with barricaded gunmen. Smith said what can keep multi-jurisdictional teams from working is interdepartment rivalries. "Everybody clashes and butts heads," he said. "The reason we created our organization in 1989 was to share knowledge and experience. Tactical people have to take care of themselves because that's usually one of the first places the budget axe falls."

Building trust is critical for multi-jurisdictional teams to work...David Klinger, a criminologist with the University of Missouri in St. Louis who works with SWAT teams on tactics, said having a skilled SWAT team is a public safety question. The NTOA report said Cobb has had 24 hostage incidents since 1994 - what is termed a "significant number." "Every community should have a tactical response capability to manage a hostage rescue," Klinger said. "They need to understand, in my opinion, that they have limitations. How many places around the country can afford to have a full-time team that trains for these things? Not that many. You can't expect a smaller department to perform like a major-league team." Merrifield, who is being relieved as the SWAT commander next week, disputed the report's conclusion that his plan for taking the gunman was flawed. He said he had used similar plans successfully and never considered asking another agency for support because they hadn't trained together. The plan's weakness was flawed information, Merrifield said...Merrifield also acknowledged Sgt. Steve Reeves and Officer Stephen Gilner died because they faced what experts call a rarity: a barricaded gunman with both the skill and will to shoot down highly trained officers (Visser and Warner, 2000: D1, D6).

Many things should be gathered from the sampling of newspaper articles provided that detail or summarize hostage and/or barricaded gunman incidents. First and foremost, the frequency and distribution of these incidents across the United States should warrant some concern. Second, it should be evident that law enforcement is in and of itself reviewing these incidents whenever possible or necessitated. When appropriate, changes in policies and procedures are recommended. Third, the observant reader should see some common factors among the perpetrators of these incidents. Fourth, as stated and implied, an exchange of information among law enforcement agencies and SWAT teams is overdue. Such exchanges of information in the law enforcement community will require increased cooperation beyond the geographical and political boundaries of jurisdictions. Each of these main points, except for incident frequency, is covered to some degree in the paragraphs that follow, as they relate to this paper.

As far as the review and exchange of information by law enforcement is concerned, it is stated in the last article that there is a clear and obvious reluctance among

law enforcement agencies to share information. The reasons for that are many and varied. For those in law enforcement who will attempt to share information for the benefit of those who will listen, the HOBAS is a great vehicle for this information to travel on. As clearly indicated by the incident in Cobb County where two officers lost their lives, these incidents are not without review by law enforcement. Nonetheless, the trick of the matter is to apply what has been learned to future situations, regardless of where they may occur.

There are a great deal of common factors in a number of hostage and barricaded gunman incidents. The commonalties cover a variety of specific areas, which will be listed later. However, as mentioned, even a cursory collection of information on the incidents from the printed media can result in a number of similar facts. All of the offenders in the articles presented were male. All of those incidents involved weapons use (or access to weapons) by the offender. Each of the incidents involved standoffs with law enforcement officers that lasted at least several hours. Eight deaths were associated with the incidents. All five incidents occurred in a residence that was either the offender's or the residence of someone known by the offender. Three tactical assaults occurred. It is this type of information - the common factors - which make the collection of incident information interesting and necessary. It is also relevant to note that the common information can be analyzed in an effort to profile critical incident offenders *before* they commit the types of acts as discussed. If that cannot be accomplished, at least the incidents themselves will be somewhat predictable based on common factors.

The secondary data in this project make up the largest quantity of actual research numbers used. Some notes about the distributor of some of this data – the Internet – are mentioned to further document one of the foundations on which this project is based.

Information technology and telecommunications have, as in all other arenas, greatly influenced the way criminal justice operates. Along with the many obvious advantages that new and improved communications provide, the Internet is perhaps the fastest growing and most popular electronic communications tool available to the public today. The FBI has capitalized on this tool and created Law Enforcement OnLine, commonly known as LEO. LEO was developed and is operated by the FBI and is for the exclusive use of the law enforcement community. The LEO provides the following:

- A national focal point for law enforcement electronic communication, education, and information sharing.
 - Easy access through user-friendly interface.
 - Interactive computer communications linking all levels of U.S. law enforcement.
- (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 1)

Furthermore, the FBI continues to describe the LEO system as "...supporting broad, immediate dissemination of information. LEO is also used as a vehicle to educate officers on the best technologies and practices in all areas of law enforcement" (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3).

According to information about LEO provided to the GBI from the FBI in 1999, the first prototype operation of the system had 20 users in September of 1995. The LEO pilot program had 250 users a year later, and as of July 1, 1999, there were over 16,000 users. Federal law enforcement agencies comprised 27.8% of the users, State and Local agencies made up 71.2% of the users, and Canadian and Other agencies made up almost one percent of the LEO users (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 10). This information about

the LEO is worthy of note because the LEO houses the HOBAS database. Additionally, the growth of LEO users is indicative of how rapidly the word is spreading that the LEO is indeed the clearinghouse of information that the prudent law enforcement manager wants his or her agency to be a part of.

The HOBAS database can be used to gather a wealth of information on barricaded gunman and hostage incidents, as stated in the introduction. The FBI states that the HOBAS "...is a post-incident data collection tool with the capability of providing empirical and statistical data" (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3). The information stored therein is gathered from law enforcement agencies that participate in the LEO and submit data to HOBAS. Specific information can be requested, and negotiators and other law enforcement members of the system have access to that information 24 hours a day, from anywhere on the planet, via the Internet (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3). Particular details about the HOBAS database, and the questionnaire that is its major means of data collection, are discussed in the Research Design and Methodology section of this document.

More generally speaking, and still in relation to the FBI's background and literature on the matter, the following information is offered to indicate the origins of the ideas that may have led to the creation of the HOBAS database:

Over 600 crisis/hostage negotiators and members of special operations teams gathered in February 1992 to share ideas and exchange information and experiences. During this seminar, conducted jointly by the Baltimore County, Maryland, Police Department and the FBI, attendees from Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States reviewed five hostage incidents...the authors [of this article] requested that hostage negotiation unit team leaders attending the February seminar complete a crisis negotiation survey (CNS). The survey was designed to identify the needs of crisis negotiation teams (Hammer, et al, 1994: 1).

While discussing the survey, the authors address these issues: team selection and training, incident responses, the use of mental health professionals, information and training needs, and the feasibility of establishing a national clearing house for crisis negotiation

(Hammer, et al, 1994: 1). The points relative to this project should be clear.

Some of the findings from this survey, which was completed by 100 team leaders, are listed below:

Overall, little or no joint training was undertaken with SWAT teams.

Types of crisis situations where negotiation was needed, in sequence of the most occurring:

- Barricade incidents
- Domestic situations
- Suicides
- Hostage takings
- Criminal/high-risk arrest situations
- Kidnappings

Top five information and training needs of the respondents, in priority order:

- Assessing hostage-takers emotional stability
- Resolution strategies
- Negotiator communication skills and strategies
- Suicide indicators
- When to employ tactical strategies

(Hammer, et al, 1994: 4)

The similarities of the information asked for and taken from the survey are so similar to the HOBAS database and questionnaire that it is easy to believe that this seminar - and the concepts behind it - quite possibly led to the formation of the HOBAS.

Although this presumption is not confirmed, please bear in mind the following information presented near the close of this reference:

The overwhelming majority (92%) of the respondents cited a need for a national clearinghouse to collect, analyze, and disseminate the information regarding crisis negotiation. Further, 94% of the team leaders indicated a willingness to use such a clearinghouse, and 93% of the team leaders indicated willingness to assist the clearinghouse by providing both information and audiovisual materials on their crisis negotiation experiences (Hammer, et al, 1994: 4).

A better jumping off point was not found in any literature pertaining to this project. Their entire article conclusion is offered here to further document the origins of a central clearinghouse and/or database.

The crisis negotiation survey provides preliminary insights into selected demographic and functional characteristics of a sample of crisis/hostage negotiation teams within the United States. It represents the first attempt at collecting and disseminating information on hostage negotiation team characteristics and crisis incidents.

The information obtained through the CNS can provide an initial benchmark by which to assess the needs and functions of individual crisis/hostage negotiation teams. Further, this information can be used to create effective training and information dissemination programs. Most important, however, the research can be used to identify and address the most critical needs of crisis teams throughout the country (Hammer, et al, 1994: 4,5).

The application of the HOBAS to the GBI is a work in progress, but most of the initial steps have been taken. There is one particular angle that the GBI has been interested in from the inception of their own project. That angle is the one of the criminal profile. The definition of a profile, or profiling, for these purposes, is taken from *Criminal Behavior: A Psychosocial Approach*, written by Curt R. Bartol. In the first chapter of the book, Bartol, in a discussion of Psychological Criminology, has this to say about profiling:

Criminal profiling (also called psychological profiling or criminal personality profiling) refers to the process of identifying personality traits, behavioral tendencies, and demographic variables of an offender based on characteristics of the crime. To a large extent, the profiling process is dictated by a database collected on previous offenders who have committed similar offenses (Bartol, 1995: 15).

Please keep in mind the last part of the above citation; "...the profiling process is dictated by a database collected on previous offenders who have committed similar offenses." It is this idea of a database that this whole paper is based.

Every project has a beginning, and the work within the GBI that is represented here started with an idea that was quickly put on paper as the work began. The internal GBI memorandum that follows represents their interest in the profile as well as the beginning of what has turned into this document, which is part of their larger goals.

To: Inspector Bob Ingram

From: SAC Fran B. Wiley
 Crime Analysis Unit

Date: June 19, 1998

Ref: Criminal Analysis/ Profiling of SRT Incidents

Within the past year the GBI - SRT unit has responded to a number of critical incidents regarding barricaded gunman/hostage situations in Georgia.

In the majority if not all of the situations the perpetrator was a white male, age range from 35-45 years old. The question comes to mind: "Why is this?"

This unit will be examining all of the SRT incidents and interviewing Special Agents to capture and analyze the data and information about the perpetrator in each of the incidents.

The purpose of this is to anatomize the physiological and psychological traits and characteristics of each offender in an effort to provide a common profile.

This information would be of great benefit to both the GBI and other law enforcement agencies throughout the country.

This research would be conducted by the Crime Analysis Unit (SAC Fran B. Wiley and S/A Keith Howard) in an effort to train our own agents and other law enforcement agencies.

This project, when completed, will provide supervisors and officers with a better understanding of the personality causing the often-deadly situations, and it will assist in their response.

And so it began. The idea that offenders of hostage and barricade incidents in Georgia could be profiled - prior to the commission of future incidents - was born. By sheer coincidence, the FBI and GBI were developing this train of thought at

approximately the same time. The FBI did have a bit of a head start, but that turned out to be extremely advantageous to the GBI. This new aspect of criminal profiling would be based in large part on a concept covered earlier: a central clearinghouse of information. As a bonus, the information gathered at either clearinghouse, at the federal level or in Georgia, would provide details about these incidents to any organization that wanted to be a part of the LEO program.

The project as it applies to the GBI and their Special Response Teams (SRT singularly) was formally introduced to supervisory GBI agents on January 25, 1999. While present for 'in-service' training at Georgia's Public Safety Training Center, all agents present were briefed on the GBI's project by Special Agent Ralph Stone, the Director of the GBI's Training and D.A.R.E. unit. The purposes and intent of the project were discussed during this briefing, and a booklet on the matter was passed out to all agents present. Excerpts from the booklet follow:

In June 1998, during a meeting of the Behavioral Science Section, Inspector Robert "Bob" Ingram questioned why the majority of Special Response Team critical incidents had involved white males over 35 years of age...[He] expressed that understanding the psychological traits and characteristics of these offenders would benefit law enforcement. Inspector Ingram requested that a research project be conducted...The research project attempts to assist critical incident managers and hostage negotiators in making decisions regarding incidents that involve barricaded gunmen, hostage situation, and/or armed subjects who attempt or commit suicide. It was decided that a system would be developed to collect data from each Special Response Team mission, which would then be combined with the data from other missions (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 1).

It was no stroke of luck that the GBI happened upon the HOBAS project. It was a matter of diligent research, which is what they are good at. In the initial phases of project organization, the GBI learned about the HOBAS project and requested more information. Upon receipt and review of that documentation, the GBI determined that the data - and

the questionnaire - from the HOBAS project were indeed well suited to what the GBI planned to initiate and execute. The GBI joined LEO, and the research project was underway (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 1).

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

Research Objectives

The objectives of this research come from the collective goals of the GBI and the researcher. The goal of the GBI is professionally operational in nature. They intend to apply what is learned from the HOBAS to critical incidents that they respond to in Georgia. The basic research performed from an academic standpoint is just that. Nonetheless, for policy requirements or degree requirements, the objectives of the research are mutually beneficial.

Generally speaking, the idea is to analyze critical incident data collected from across the United States and apply it to future incidents. The genesis of these ideas, as previously covered, presumes that all of these incidents share certain traits and characteristics that will allow for categorization of the perpetrators and/or the incidents themselves. Ultimately, such information will assist incident response commanders to make informed decisions. All of this can be broken down into the categories of perpetrator and incident analysis along with the arbitrarily assigned area of the Georgia factor. This term indicates that these incidents and/or the people who commit them in the state of Georgia have some type of unique characteristic that sets them apart from the national aspects.

Hypotheses

The objectives are condensed and listed as testable hypotheses:

1. Critical incidents share common traits.
2. Perpetrators of critical incidents share common traits.
3. In Georgia, either by event or individual, the traits of critical incidents differ from the national commonalities.

Operationalized and Independent and Dependent Variables

Due to the descriptive nature of the research, a cause and effect relationship that would entail the use and description of a conditional proposition (Fitzgerald and Cox, 1994: 51) is not applicable to the hypotheses.

However, in the larger scheme of profiling these events, it can be said that the common characteristics of these critical incidents, and those who commit them, may lead to a better understanding of the subject that can be applied to future situations. That being the case, and more directly speaking, the HOBAS database can be said to be part of the cause that leads to the effect of better crisis management. That is big picture thinking, and the point is offered for the purpose of tying the hypotheses together with the higher objective. That is the extent of variable operationalization as applicable to this project, although more details about the data are available as design and methodology are discussed later.

Hypothesis Linkage to the Literature

The first hypothesis states that critical incidents share some common traits across the country. The second hypothesis is more concerned with who actually committed these

offenses. Commonalties by definition do not apply. The obvious fact that a barricaded gunman incident actually involved a barricaded gunman is not a qualifier.

Some of the common factors of more concern are the ones found in the newspaper articles presented earlier. Some of those factors include the same gender of all of the perpetrators, the presence of violence and weapons, the duration of the standoffs with law enforcement, the presence or holding of relatives as hostages, and the like.

Those factors, and others, all fall into the categories of these incidents as studied by Dr. Feldman: hostage incidents, barricaded subjects without hostages, and barricaded subjects who held hostages. Furthermore, additional relationships are established among the first two hypotheses and the common factors described later in Dr. Feldman's study when he lists, in table form, the Sex and Race of Hostage/Barricade Subjects, Total Weapons, Primary Weapons Used, Age Range, Location of Hostage/Barricade Incidents, and so on (Feldman, 1996: tables).

Furthermore, with the idea of the HOBAS database kept in mind, it is clear that it also lists information provided about these incidents. As with most research, a certain amount of demographic information is collected. The Louisville database and the HOBAS cover some of the same territory in that regard, and thus relate to the first two hypotheses in that manner. Remember that the HOBAS, as part of the LLO, "...is a post-incident data collection tool with the capability of providing empirical and statistical data" (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3).

Hypothesis number three states that as critical incidents occur in Georgia, review of them will show that there is something different about them that warrants the label of the Georgia factor. More succinctly, critical incidents in Georgia are different in some

way than those that are measured across the United States. An example of this might be how it is described near the end of the Literature Review that Inspector Ingram of the GBI stated that the critical incidents in Georgia are perpetrated by white males age 35 or over.

That is an interesting proposition, in any case, but is it true? As compared to the national incidents, are the ones in Georgia committed by older white males than the national average? Perhaps. In a broader sense, are the events of this nature in Georgia different than their national counterparts? It was upon the asking of that question that the third hypothesis was constructed. Obviously, the GBI has a particular interest in the Georgia factor.

Overall, the literature, either of the popular media or of professional or academic research, indicates that all of these incidents are in some way(s) common.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Prior to describing the details in the subsections that follow, the general research design is worthy of a few notes. The original intent of this project was to gather data, using the HOBAS questionnaire, on all GBI SRT missions. While this was completed per Inspector Ingram's early guidance, the number of questionnaires returned falls just short of a quantity acceptable for genuine research and analysis. That is good, generally speaking, because the larger argument is made that the less the SRT works, the better. That means that fewer of these incidents are occurring.

This situation has created the dilemma, however, of deciding what to research. The decision was made to use HOBAS statistics in comparison with the GBI returns, so that some validity may be attached to the project. For additional purposes, the Louisville

database will also be cited to satisfy basic research and exploratory needs. Therefore, the project centers on secondary data and the first phases of primary data from the GBI SRT returns.

Research Method

Secondary data makes up most of the information analyzed in this project. The FBI, during the early stages of the communication with the GBI about LEO and HOBAS, provided various statistical reports from the HOBAS database. These reports are made up of information from the questionnaires that were submitted to HOBAS from a variety of law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada. Remember that submissions to HOBAS from 'Canada and Other' make up less than 1% of the total incidents in the HOBAS database (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 9). Therefore, due to the negligible amount those incidents, no attempt was made to separate those from the ones that occurred throughout the United States.

The reports are presented as brief and clear documents that are easy to understand and retrieve information from. The categories are listed in the sequence of the questions on the questionnaire, therefore making the data retrieval process very efficient; especially once familiarity with both documents was gained. Additionally, the HOBAS reports come in sets of twos. One set has the actual breakdown of questionnaire responses in actual numbers, and the other in percentages. Having both at ready disposal is advantageous when specific data is desired.

The Louisville database is also a secondary data vehicle that provides insight into these matters. The primary method used in Dr. Feldman's original research is offered for reference purposes:

[Dr. Feldman] has served as a consultant to the hostage negotiation teams of the Louisville Police Department, the Jefferson County (KY) Police Department, and the Kentucky State Police. The former two departments serve a metropolitan area of approximately 750,000 people, while the latter agency has jurisdiction state-wide but responds to incidents in rural counties. Data were obtained from review of police case files of hostage and barricade incidents occurring in the three jurisdictions and from notes compiled during on-scene consultation at hostage/barricade situations. Standardized case history forms were developed for each incident (Feldman, 1996: 7).

The HOBAS questionnaire was used on incidents that the GBI's SRT responded to. The questionnaire was not altered in any way as it was distributed to and/or electronically delivered to GBI Special Agents who were familiar with specific SRT missions. This distribution occurred on January 25, 1999. It coincided with the briefing and training for the SAC's (Special Agent[s] in Charge) mentioned in the review of the literature.

The questionnaire is a lengthy one, due in part to the details required by an investigation into these matters. The questionnaire has 59 questions that cover four pages. A fifth page is available for a summary of the incident so that the respondent may write or type in additional information. It is also stated on page five that a copy of the incident report or case file may be attached. Fixed-alternative answers are available for most of the questions. However, the number of alternatives ranges from a few to 16. As a result, actual completion of the questionnaire by the respondents was undoubtedly quite time consuming. This length of time was compounded by answers that required specification depending on the fixed alternative selected. There are also several questions that have a "Other" option available when a particular answer was not listed among the fixed alternatives. Those other responses were written in accordingly.

Census

It is customary in research document formats for this section to be titled Sampling. However, if a definition or type of sampling can be attached to the primary data, the fact that *all* GBI SRT critical incidents were subjects of the research constitutes a census (Fitzgerald and Cox, 1994: 71). The primary data was finite, and small in number, and therefore studying every element involved in the research was accomplished with ease.

It is theoretically possible that all future incidents could be studied in a similar manner. The narrow scope of the project would provide for further analysis of every event that qualifies as a critical incident that the GBI SRT responds to. Recall that since the inception of the general research idea, the goal has been to analyze exactly these types of events. As an addendum to the larger project, one of the goals of the research is to evaluate attempted or committed suicides by perpetrators of the hostage and/or barricaded gunmen incidents, with or without firearms. However, since the suicide angle is part of the larger directive, it fell into place within the questionnaire and did not warrant special attention herein. It is mentioned as an inclusion to this section so that it would be clear that what was researched was, in no vague terms, predetermined. Hence the small amount of primary data and the ability to conduct the research in the census form.

Additionally, a few notes about the secondary data are presented for review. Dr. Feldman stated that his "[d]ata was obtained from review of police case files of hostage and barricade incidents occurring in the three jurisdictions and from notes compiled during on-scene consultation..." (Feldman, 1996: 7). It would appear that Dr. Feldman also conducted a census. The FBI's HOBAS database can said to be a collection point of

information gathered from a census as well. The database comes from the submission of their own completed questionnaires, which are limited in subject matter to the incidents as defined.

Data Collection

Again, even though the total of the primary data did not prove to meet fundamental research standards, the collection of it is detailed. Specific instructions were provided with actual copies of the questionnaire that were distributed to the SACs in January of 1999. A deadline of the end of February was provided for returns. For those GBI field offices that did not receive questionnaires, copies were provided via fax one week after original distribution. All offices were contacted during that week to see if there were any problems with the questionnaire. Part of the intent of the briefing and the distribution of the GBI's research literature was to set the stage for questionnaire completion. As a result, data collection was quite simple. In effect, some training on the questionnaire was provided to the respondents before the questionnaire was distributed. The questionnaires were to be returned to the GBI Training and DARE Unit by fax, or, preferably, by US Mail.

Questionnaires were returned in the mail almost immediately. They were initially scanned by GBI Special Agent Keith Howard to see if they were complete. If not, they were collected in a designated location in the office of the GBI Training unit in Forsyth, Georgia. There were some questionnaires that were not complete, and these were separated and flagged for follow-up at a later date.

At least once weekly during March of 1999, the author personally read and reviewed each returned questionnaire for completion and accuracy. Most questionnaires

were returned within the designated time frame, but others came in sporadically throughout the spring of 1999.

There were some open-ended options to some questions, and these required clarification. Upon the realization of this, phone calls were made to each of the respondents in order to clarify blank or unclear responses. The questionnaire does provide the respondents with the opportunity to list their name and contact information. In instances where this information was omitted, phone calls were made to the GBI office in the region where the questionnaire was completed, based on where the original incident occurred. Reminding office SACs or assistant SACs of the questionnaire always led to rapid discovery of the actual respondent.

It is important to factor in the aspect of memory to questionnaire completion. The HOBAS questionnaire asks for very specific information on a variety of categories and subcategories that an SRT member may not readily recall, if they were ever familiar with those details to start with. This affected questionnaire completion and accuracy. Case files, either the GBI's or the local (the jurisdiction where the original incident occurred) agency's, were attached to some of the questionnaires when available. It can be argued that a case file or report on the incident can jog one's memory, but it can also be argued that a report may not include information that HOBAS is looking for.

Tabulation and Analysis

Upon completion of all questionnaires by the respondents in the summer of 1999, data collection was obtained through the simple method of counting responses to the individual questions. Bear in mind the small number of returns. The only difficulty with

this process was the determination of what type of incident each completed questionnaire qualified as.

As described in the previous section, the questionnaires were briefly scanned for accuracy immediately upon receipt. They were examined in deeper detail upon complete study of the questionnaires during the summer and fall of 1999. Accuracy was checked again during these readings.

No coding of answers was required during the manual tabulation phases of data analysis. The small amount of primary data did not require electronic tabulation or tracking in any way, shape, or form. At best, during table and graph construction, a calculator was used on occasion to double check math that was done mentally or with pencil and paper.

The secondary data has been previously collected, by nature of definition. Both Dr. Feldman's and the HOBAS statistical reports included raw numbers and percentages. Toward the end of this paper, simple comparisons are made with all three sources of data.

RESULTS

The heart of any research endeavor is results. For ease of understanding, the results of the primary data will be presented along with the larger results as provided by the HOBAS statistical reports. While this is occurring, the results will be shown in actual numbers most of the time. Percentages will be used only during occasions where the expression of data in that matter is of critical importance.

Additionally, the primary data as it is listed in the following sections is often not totaled. In an effort to reduce the discussion of the results, the often unanswered questions from the primary data were omitted. The continuous notations of what was

answered and what was not would be self-defeating and repetitive. “Unknown”s and “Other”s *are* included in the discussion of the results only as they are pertinent to the question at hand.

Bear in mind that the primary data is listed and carefully described as a precept for others who embark on similar research. The main recipient and user of the primary data is the GBI. As of April 2000, guidance was provided to the author that the GBI fully intends to continue the research initiated by this project. Part of the design of this approach is to also leave this project open for further work and enhancements, either by the GBI or the author.

The Louisville database will be discussed last, but in a comparative manner. This tactic is employed because the Louisville database has some of the same information as the HOBAS and some information that is different than the HOBAS. Not all of the secondary information from the Louisville database will be used. Although worthy of standing alone, only relevant information from Dr. Feldman's project will be related to the HOBAS and GBI data.

The reader will note in the following sections that some text is in a different font and size. This was done so that it will be perfectly clear as to the exact wording of the questionnaire without the need to check it.

From the primary data, 24 of the 32 questionnaires returned were determined to be usable. That is to say that those questionnaires met the basic incident qualifications as defined shortly. There were 1,828 incidents on record according to the HOBAS statistical reports issued in late June of 1999. Dr. Feldman studied 120 hostage and barricade incidents.

The results as described in text form make up the largest amount of material in this document. Some questions were not factored into the data pertinent to this study, and these omissions are explained.

Questionnaire

Without further adieu, the results, by question and in sequence, are presented after a copy of the actual questionnaire. Due to the cluttered arrangement of questions and answer options on the questionnaire, an annotated copy is not provided. In the interest of maintaining authenticity, the questionnaire pages are not numbered.

Return to:

FBI Academy
Crisis Negotiation Unit, Bldg 9

Quantico, VA 22135
Phone: (703)632-1496
FAX: (703)632-1474

FBI INCIDENT # _____

M = MANDATORY ENTRY
FD-522 (Rev 00-00-00)
(03/03/99)

Agency Name: _____	Phone: _____
Address: _____	
City: _____	
State/Province: _____	Zip: _____ Country: _____
Prepared by: _____	
(Pnnt) Last	First MI
Date of report: ___/___/___ (mm/dd/yyyy)	
Law Enforcement Serial # _____	



SECTION A: INCIDENT

1. Type: (Select one) M
 Attempted Suicide Barricade¹
 Suicide Hostage²
 Combination
2. Was the incident:
 Planned
 Unplanned
3. Date/Time: M
 (mm/dd/yyyy) - Time (24-hour clock)
 Start: _____ Time _____
 (mm/dd/yyyy) _____
 End: _____ Time _____
 (mm/dd/yyyy) _____
4. Location: (Select one) M
 Apartment/Condominium Mobile Home Public Transportation
 Automobile Office/Workplace Government/Public Building
 Barn/Out Building Hotel/Motel Other: (Specify) _____
 Prison/Jail Private Resident/Farmhouse
5. Violence occurred. (Select all that apply)
 Onset
 During
 Demand/Deadline
 Surrender/Conclusion
6. Violence occurred against whom:
 Against Law Enforcement Officer
 Against Random Hostage/Victim
 Against Selected Hostage/Victim
7. Was religion a factor in this incident?
 Yes
 No

SECTION B: NATURE OF CONTACTS

8. Communication with subject initiated by: (Select all that apply)
 Employee Crisis Hot Line
 Family Member Neighbor
 Law Enforcement Social Worker
 First Responder Victim
 Negotiator Witness/Passer By
 Spouse/Ex-Spouse Friend
 Significant Other Other: (Specify) _____
 Health Care Professional
9. Method of communication: (Select all that apply) M
 Bullhorn/PA Written
 Existing Phone Service Robot
 Exposed Face-to-Face No Communication
 Hostage Phone Other: (Specify) _____
 Cell Phone
 Voice Contact from Cover
 Radio/Internal Intercom
 Internet (i.e. chat room)
10. Were Third Party Intermediaries (TPI) used? M
 Yes
 No
11. Type of TPI used: (Select all that apply)
 Clergy: (Specify type of Religion) _____
 Family Member: (Specify relationship) _____
 Friend: (Specify type) _____
 Mental Health Consultant: (Specify) _____
 Public Official: (Specify) _____
 Attorney: (Specify type) _____
 Media: (Specify) _____
 Other: (Specify) _____
12. The TPI: (Select one)
 Helped
 Did not help
13. Was a mental health consultant used during incident? M
 Yes No

¹ Barricade Incident: A person(s) refusing to come out from a fortified position or release a victim where there is no substantive demand. Emotional venting predominates over achieving a clearly identified goal. ² Hostage Incident: A person(s) held against their will and the captor has made a substantive demand. It is a goal-oriented incident.

SECTION C: RESOLUTION

- | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| <p>14. Resolution based on. M</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Negotiation/Surrender (Go to Question 18)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Combination negotiation/tactical</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Tactical/Intervention</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Suicide/Attempted Suicide</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Escape</p> | <p>15. Type of tactical action:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deliberate assault</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Assault</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other: (Specify) _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by Hostage/Victim(s)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Sniper Shot</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> "Suicide by Cop"</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Less than lethal means (Select all that apply)</p> <table border="0" style="width:100%"> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Rubber Bullets</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Net</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Pressure Hose</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Bean Bags</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Chemical Agent</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Canine</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Stun Gun</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No Assault</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____</td> </tr> </table> | <input type="checkbox"/> Rubber Bullets | <input type="checkbox"/> Net | <input type="checkbox"/> Pressure Hose | <input type="checkbox"/> Bean Bags | <input type="checkbox"/> Chemical Agent | <input type="checkbox"/> Canine | <input type="checkbox"/> Stun Gun | <input type="checkbox"/> No Assault | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ | | <p>16. Date/time assault initiated</p> <p>Start: _____</p> <p align="center">mm/dd/yyyy Time</p> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rubber Bullets | <input type="checkbox"/> Net | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Pressure Hose | <input type="checkbox"/> Bean Bags | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chemical Agent | <input type="checkbox"/> Canine | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Stun Gun | <input type="checkbox"/> No Assault | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
17. Negotiating team role in tactical action:
(Select all that apply)
- Diversion
- False Concessions/Bogus Delivery
- Stalled for time for tactical preparation
- Set-Up Subject for Resolution
- Not Used

If the Subject committed suicide also capture this data in your answer to question 44 - Status of Subject.

SECTION D: POST INCIDENT

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <p>18. Injuries to: (Select all that apply) M</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Bystanders</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Law Enforcement</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> None</p> | <p>19. Death: (Select all that apply) M</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Bystanders</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Law Enforcement</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> None</p> | <p>20. Was there significant property damage?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No</p> |
|--|--|--|

Explain in narrative
Subject/Victim status recorded later

Explain in narrative
Subject/Victim status recorded later

21. Negotiations conducted in:
- English
- Spanish
- Other Language _____
- Interpreter Used: Yes No
22. Number of negotiators on scene. _____

SECTION E: ANCILLARY INFORMATION (OPTIONAL)

- | | | |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 23. Does the agency have a trained negotiation team? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 24. Does the agency have a mental health professional assigned? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 25. Does the agency have a dedicated tactical team? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 26. Does the negotiation team/negotiator(s) regularly train with SWAT? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 27. Does incident commander participate regularly in negotiation/SWAT training? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |

HOSTAGE/BARRICADE REPORT
SECTION F: SUBJECT DATA

Subject Number _____

28 Subject: **M** _____
(Letter Reference)

29. Age: _____
(Whole years)

30. Sex: Female Male

31 Marital Status: Single Married Separated Divorced Widow/Widower Cohabitation

32. Race: **M**
 Black White
 Asian/Pacific Islander Hispanic
 Native American Other: (Specify) _____

33. English language fluency:
(Select one)
 Fluent in English
 Other: (Specify) _____

34. Employment: Yes No
(Select all that apply)
 Education Management
 Government Retired
 Homemaker Student
 Law Enforcement Laborer
 Professional/Technical
 Self Employed/Business Owner
 Tradesman/Machine Operator
 Other: (Specify) _____

35 Education Level: (Select highest level) **M**
 Dropout
 High School Graduate
 Some College
 College Graduate
 Trade School

36. Military Experience:
(Select one) **M**
 Prior
 Present
 None
 Unknown

37 Criminal History: **M**
(Select all that apply)
 None
 Unknown
 Prior Charges:
 Hostage/Barricade
 Other Crime (Specify) _____
 Violent

38. Prior suicide attempts:
(Select one)
 Unknown
 None
 One or more
(Select all that apply)
 Firearm
 Overdose
 Jumper
 Cutting Instrument

39 Mental health problems: **M**
(Select all that apply)
 Committed in Past to State Mental Health Facility: (Select all that apply)
 Inpatient Outpatient
 No Known Current Problems
 No Known Prior(s)
 Other: (Specify) _____
 Receiving Counseling/Therapy
 Resident Treatment Facility

40. Substance abuse history:
(Select all that apply)
 Alcohol
 Controlled Dangerous Substance:
(Specify) _____
 List Non-Prescription:
(Specify) _____
 List Prescription:
(Specify) _____
 Unknown
 None

41. Substance used in this incident: (Select all that apply)
 Alcohol
 Controlled Dangerous Substance:
(Specify) _____
 List Non-Prescription:
(Specify) _____
 List Prescription:
(Specify) _____
 Unknown
 None

42. Explosives used in this incident: **M**
 Yes
(Describe Device and Type of Explosive) _____
 No

43. Weapons used in this incident: **M**
(Select all that apply)
 Yes
 Blunt Object
 Chemical
 Handgun
 Knife
 Shoulder Weapon
 Other: (Specify) _____
 No

44. Restraining order on this subject:
(Select one)
 Existing
 Prior
 None

45. Status of Subject: (Select one) **M**
 Suicide
 Injured
 Killed (Select if applies)
 Suicide by Cop
 No Injury

NOTES: If there were multiple subjects involved in the incident, copy this page and fill in the data for each subject. Be sure that each subject has an assigned sequential letter, e.g. A, B, C, etc. On each additional page include:
Agency name: _____ Date of the report: ___/___/___

HOSTAGE/BARRICADE REPORT

SECTION G: HOSTAGE/VICTIM DATA

If no hostage taken or victim held - explain in narrative

Hostage Number _____

46. Hostage/Victim: M _____
(Letter Reference)

47. Age: _____
(Whole years)

48. Sex: Female Male

49. Race: M
 Black
 Asian/Pacific Islander
 Native American

White
 Hispanic
 Other: (Specify) _____

50. English language fluency:
(Select one)
 Fluent in English
 Other: (Specify) _____

51. Hostage/Victim treatment M
(Select all that apply)
 Verbally Abused
 Physically Abused
 Sexually Abused
 Ignored
 Not Mistreated
 Talked Freely with Subject(s)
 Other: (Specify) _____

52. Hostage/Victim mobility: M
(Select all that apply)
 Allowed Free Movement
 Movement Restricted
 Restrained Physically
 Isolated

53. Did the victim's mobility
improve during the incident? M
 Yes
 No

54. Hostage/Victim survival information: M
(Select all that apply)
Stockholm Syndrome
 Negative Feelings Toward Law Enforcement
 Positive Feelings Toward Subject
 Subject has Returned Positive feelings
Toward Hostage/Victim
 Not a factor

55. Was subject positively influenced
by hostage/victim(s)? M
 Yes
 No

56. Relationship to Subject: M
(Select all that apply)
 Employer
 Family Member
 Friend/Co-worker
 Law Enforcement
 None
 Other
(Specify) _____
 Spouse/Ex-Spouse
 Significant Other

57. Hostage/Victim release: (Select one)
 Released at Time of Negotiated Surrender
 Released Prior to Resolution of Incident: (Select one)
 Negotiated Release
 Non-Negotiated Release
 Due to Health Factors
 Rescued by Tactical Team

58. Status of hostage/victim at end of incident (Select one) M
 No Injury
 Injured
 Deceased (Select one)
 Killed by subject
 Died: (Specify) _____

59. Did subject allow this hostage/victim to talk to law enforcement? M

Yes No

60. Did subject talk to law enforcement through this hostage/victim?

Yes No

NOTES: If there were multiple victims involved in the incident, copy this page and fill in the data for each hostage/victim. Be sure that each victim has an assigned sequential letter, e.g. A, B, C, etc. On each additional page include:
Agency name: _____ Date of the report: ___/___/___

For clarity, the first question on the questionnaire was Type under Section A: Incident.

The answer options were, in order, Attempted Suicide, Barricade*, Hostage*, and Suicide. The asterisks refer to a brief explanation of the terms found at the bottom of the first page of the questionnaire, as follows:

Barricade incident: A person(s) refusing to come out from a fortified position or release a victim where there is no substantive demand.


Emotional venting predominates over achieving a clearly identified goal.

Hostage incident: A person(s) held against their will and the captor has made a substantive demand. It is goal oriented.

It was the responses to the choices that determined if all reported incidents were

applicable to the project. As far as the primary data was concerned, some respondents claimed that a particular incident involved more than one of the available options, which was determined to be quite adequate; in that any given situation may be a combination of any of the answers. Refer to the chart on the following page titled “Types of Incidents.”

Types of Incidents



Obviously, Barricade incidents were the ones most reported by the GBI. On the Statistical Report of Incidents provided from the FBI, the numbers are somewhat larger.

Their data for Incident Type is as follows:

Hostage:	222
Barricade:	1,082
Suicide:	196
<u>Att. [Attempted] Suicide</u>	<u>328</u>
Number of Incidents	1,828

Two things are important to note here. First, the number of incidents (1,828) in the FBI's reports is shown in this table so that it is clear that the numbers of individual

incidents add up to the number of total incidents. There will be occasions within this text when the total of the individual raw numbers does not add up to the total number of incidents. Relevant notations are made. Otherwise, the absence of either total indicates that the individual factors add up to the total number of incidents, regardless of how expressed.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the actual questionnaires submitted to the federal HOBAS are not available for review. Therefore, according to the smaller number of incident types from the Georgia statistics, multiple responses submitted to the FBI are not known. However, the FBI does state that "...data collected for the HOBAS database is processed to eliminate ambiguous information before being entered" (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 4). Their judgement and procedures were not called into question.

Now back to the point at hand: incident type. In Georgia, most of the incidents were of the barricade and hostage nature. At the federal level, most of the incidents were also of the barricade (59.2%) and hostage (12.1%) nature. It is this type of correlation that we will be looking for from now on.

Question two asks if the incident was planned or not. There were two omissions to this question from the GBI, and 94 'unknowns' according to the HOBAS statistics. In Georgia, 13 were unplanned, eight were planned, and three were unknown. Those compare to 1,287 unplanned and 447 planned according to the HOBAS.

Question three refers to the dates and times of the incidents. Blanks are offered on the questionnaire for starting and ending times. A brief review of the dates and times was conducted on the primary data during careful examination of the questionnaires in the fall of 1999. No correlations or relationships could be established, therefore this question is

considered moot. Additionally, the Time of Day on the HOBAS report shows a fairly even distribution of start and end times. No noteworthy relationship involving time and its influence on the incidents or perpetrators exists.

Question four has four answers for location. The jurisdiction, city, or county where the incident occurred is not the issue. The nearly exact type of location is. The question is presented, as well as the primary and HOBAS answers, in that order.

4. Location: (Select one)	
Apartment/Condominium	1/382
Automobile	0/45
Barn/Out Building	0/9
Prison/Jail	0/0
Mobile Home	9/79
Office/Workplace	0/58
Private Residence/Farmhouse	10/965
Public Transportation	0/1
Government/Public Building	0/0
Other (Specify)	4/289

Again, a correlation jumps out at the reader and the researcher. Most of the critical incidents that occur nationwide and in Georgia take place at private residences, which include farmhouses. So far, so good. The primary data is consistent with the national statistics. Maintaining those consistencies and pointing out any discrepancies are part of the research objectives.

Continuing on, question five requests answers to Violence occurred: (Select all that apply). This is a question worthy of close inspection. The answers and their frequency, in the same way as above, are presented.

Onset	13/853
During	11/418
Demand/Deadline	3/185
Surrender/Conclusion	10/207

These critical incidents are violent, which is the main point. However, there was more violence per incident (determined by simple math) reported in Georgia than there was at the federal level. Regrettably, this cannot be statistically proven due to the large difference between the primary numbers and the secondary numbers.

Question six is a follow-up to question five. The concern is with to whom the violence occurred. One answer was not given in the primary data. The answer option and results are similarly shown:

Against Law Enforcement Officer	13/501
Against Random Hostage/Victim	1/122
Against Selected Hostage/Victim	9/556

Question seven pertains to religion as a factor in the incidents. Twenty-two "No" answers were reported in the primary data. The HiOBAS statistical reports list this data, in several subcategories, but relevancy is not seen.

The next section on the questionnaire is titled *Nature of Contacts*. Individuals who may be interested in this section more than others might include hostage negotiators and those who train, assist, or work with them.

Question number eight pertains to communication initiation with the subject, by a number of choices. Overwhelmingly, law enforcement officers were the first to communicate with the perpetrators of these incidents. Similar correlations are seen between the primary data and the secondary data again. At the federal level, 1,314 law enforcement officers reportedly made the first contact with the subject(s). The next closest group was family members, and there were 271 of those. In Georgia, the respondents reported that 22 law enforcement officers made the first contact, with five family members making the first contact. There were several multiple answers to this question in the primary data.

Question nine is another question that allows for multiple answers and has a very specific area of interest. The concern is the method of communication, based on the type of equipment or style used to conduct the communication. The equipment or style is

listed in sequence in the following columns, with the item at the top of each list being the most used.

Georgia

Exposed face to face
Cellular phone
Existing phone service
Bullhorn
Voice contact from cover

HOBAS

Existing phone service
Voice contact from cover
Bullhorn
Exposed face to face
Hostage Phone

This was another multiple answer question. The differences are clear, but only summations should be made. There are a number of possible explanations for the differences, but more research is needed prior to analysis of this phenomenon at that level.

Question ten concerns the use of TPIs (Third-Party Intermediaries). The term is self explanatory, and they are largely not used in critical incidents according to both the primary and secondary data (16 "no's" in primary, 1,510 "no's" in the secondary). When they are used, they are largely ineffective and are family members more often than not (questions 11 and 12, inversely). Of the types of TPIs reported, five out of eight were family members in Georgia and there were five "did not help" answers to the question. At the federal level, there were 157 family members out of 347 TPIs, and more responses that the TPI did not change the situation, or made it worse, than positive responses such as surrender, lowered emotions, etc. These details about the effectiveness of TPIs are not meant to construe that family members of perpetrators had no positive effect during these incidents. The lack of actual questionnaires submitted to the HOBAS prevents a detailed analysis of this subject.

Mental health consultation (question 13) is another area where the primary and secondary information agree. The answer "no" occurred 23 times in Georgia, and was reported 1,473 times on the HOBAS.

Page two of the questionnaire begins with Section C, which is titled *Resolution*. The FBI HOBAS reports do not provide numbers and percentages for every question. Rather, they provide data on categories of questions, which explains the differences in the tables below. The similarities should be apparent though.

The first question in this section, number 14, pertains to resolution. The primary data is as follows:

Negotiation/Surrender	6
Tactical/Intervention	7
Combination negotiation/tactical	6
Suicide/Attempted Suicide	3

Three answers to this question were written in. Those consisted of two responses of "escaped" and one "fell asleep." One questionnaire had two responses to this question.

The HOBAS database shows the following about resolution, represented as it appears in the Statistical Report of Incidents:

Resolution By

Negotiations Only	1,035
Comb. Negot/Tact. Act.	578
Tactical Action Only	155
Negotiation after Tactical Act.	7
Resolution Unknown	53

There may be a variety of reasons why there are 53 occurrences of Resolution Unknown. Details about multiple answers or unknowns are not provided with the HOBAS statistics.

Question 15 refers to tactical action, although the HOBAS statistics have Negotiations Only as an answer in this category, even though it is not a choice on the

questionnaire. Fortunately, it is the answer with the most responses (1,035). A clear breakdown of the primary and secondary answers is offered:


Deliberate Assault	8/326
Emergency Assault	3/83
Other (specify)	3/220
Overtaken by Hostage/Victim(s)	0/3
Sniper Shot	0/7
"Suicide by Cop"	1/4
Less than lethal means	8/150

Question 16 asks what date and time the tactical action was initiated. This is another moot point in this project.

Question 17 is another one that may be of special interest to hostage negotiators and personnel in similar roles. The role of the negotiation team in the tactical action is the point here, and multiple answers were allowed. According to the primary data, the negotiators provided one diversion, four set-ups of the subject for resolution, and stalled for time for tactical preparation on six occasions. At the federal level, the occurrences of negotiator participation in each of these areas were almost evenly distributed. In the same sequence as above, the numbers from the HOBAS are 137, 96, and 101. Furthermore, false concessions were communicated to the subject 14 times, and there were 124 'other' uses of the negotiators in tactical interventions. The HOBAS also states that there were 121 non-answers to this question.

The next section of the questionnaire is titled *POST INCIDENT*. The first two questions, 18 and 19, cover injuries and death, in that order. However, the HOBAS presents a table that has been translated to chart form for simplicity of data review. The table in the HOBAS (and the chart below) covers the above questions as well as numbers 44 and 57 on the questionnaire. The primary data and secondary data are indicated by (P) and (S), as appropriate.

Injuries and Deaths



Property damage is the subject of question 20. Primary property damage was reported six times out of 24, and HOBAS answers were 1,473 in the negative, 178 in the positive, and 177 "Unknown"s.

English is the primary language used in these incidents (question 21), making up most of the federal answers and all of the answers in Georgia. HOBAS answers and distribution were English, 1,288, Spanish, 25, Other, 23, and Unknown at 492.

The number of negotiators on scene (question 22) is a neglected question. Only 13 answers were received in the primary data, and the answer is not even offered in the

HOBAS statistics with the exception of Total Used Tactically (379), which is found under the Tactical Use of Negotiators subcategory. Nonetheless, according to the primary data respondents' answers, there was only one negotiator on the scene most of the time (seven answers). Two negotiators were on the scene of the incident twice, three three times, and five negotiators worked one incident.

Section E on the questionnaire is optional. It is titled ANCILLARY INFORMATION. A brief digression from results is warranted here. In the Literature Review, an article from the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is cited in a discussion about the history (or lack thereof) of a "central clearinghouse" of information about critical incidents and the professionals involved in responding to them. In the article, there are sections titled "Negotiation Team Selection and Training" and "Use of Mental Health Professionals." Within the first section is the quote "Overall, little or no joint training was undertaken with SWAT teams" (Hammer, et al, 1994: 2). This is brought up here because of the following questions, listed verbatim from the questionnaire:

23. Does the agency have a trained negotiation team?	Yes	No
24. Does the agency have a mental health professional assigned?	Yes	No
25. Does the agency have a dedicated tactical team?	Yes	No
26. Does the negotiation team/negotiator(s) regularly train with SWAT?	Yes	No

Due to the similarities between these questions and the quotes, and the points illustrated in the literature review, further credibility is given to the theory that the HOBAS dates back to the early research as indicated. Additionally, these questions are presented as options, and do not have their own listing on the HOBA^c statistical reports. The use of these questions as part of a long-term study into these matters could not be confirmed. It is reassuring though to believe that this is the case. The primary data is supplied.

23. Yes 21 No 1
24. Yes 2 No 9

25. Yes 21 No 19
26. Yes 15 No 7

Section F of the questionnaire consists of information about the perpetrators of these incidents. The total numbers in this section on the HOBAS have increased by 64. Apparently, there were a few more perpetrators than there were incidents.


Question 27 is omitted here due to privacy reasons. The names of the individuals involved have no bearing on this study.

Question 28 pertains to the ages of the perpetrators. The age brackets below were chosen because they are listed that way in the HOBAS report. The table below is provided for the purpose of reviewing the actual numbers.

<u>Georgia</u>		<u>HOBAS</u>	
Under 18	0	Under 18	64
18-29	5	18-29	554
30-45	10	30-45	848
46-65	7	46-65	247
Over 65	0	Over 65	30
Unknown	2	Unknown	149

One of the larger research objectives, which is applicable to interested parties within the GBI, is to compare the Georgia statistics with the HOBAS in a side-by-side manner (remember hypothesis number three). Thus, the chart below. The data values represent percentages, and the chart is actually two charts in one. The Georgia age categories are on the left, while the federal age categories are on the right. In taking some liberty with the results, it is interesting to note that the 46-65 years old age category in Georgia is over twice its federal counterpart. Until additional primary research is conducted, however, the supposition that perpetrators in Georgia are older than the national mode is not valid.

Subject Age Groups (% of total subjects)



Under 18 18-29 30-45 46-65 Over 65 Unk. Under 18 18-29 30-45 46-65 Over 65 Unk
Georgia Bureau of Investigation Federal Bureau of Investigation

Questions 29, 30, and 31 are similarly demographic in nature. In order, these questions cover gender, marital status, and race. The distribution of primary answers and HOBAS statistics is presented.

	<u>Georgia</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
<u>Gender</u>		
Male	all	1,672
Female		174
Unknown		46
<u>Marital Status</u>		
Married	10	463
Divorced	2	185
Separated	0	143
Single	8	722
Unknown	4	<u>388</u>
		(1901 this category, see below)
<u>Race</u>		
Native American	0	55
African American	4	369

Asian/Pacific Island	0	41
White/Hispanic	19	1,204
Other	0	192
Unknown	1	31

It is not known why the total under the category of Marital Status on the HOBAS side is different than the total number of subjects (1,892). The initial train of thought on this matter, after much exposure to the primary questionnaires, is that multiple answers were given upon initial questionnaire completion. This would be applicable to the Marital Status category, especially since some of the choices could be considered one situation. An example of this would be if a subject was legally married but separated from his or her spouse. At tabulation, these separate answers would be counted as such. The issue of diminishing returns may come to mind at this point, especially if one is only studying the HOBAS statistics on a percentage basis. That is a valid matter, but would not apply if studies of this matter were conducted over time.

In any event, like other categories, these demographics offer a snapshot of the subjects who are perpetrators of critical incidents. A quick scan of the tables above indicates that most of the critical incident offenders are single, white males. Seasoned professionals in law enforcement and/or hostage negotiators could probably indicate as much when asked the question of "Who?", but now those answers can be backed up with some credibility. Moreover, the Georgia numbers match the HOBAS as far as this classification of perpetrators is concerned.

Continuing on with offender characteristics, English language fluency (question 32) is worth mentioning, albeit briefly. All of the offenders in Georgia spoke and understood English. An overwhelming majority of the HOBAS offenders were fluent in English. This tells people involved in these incidents that they probably will not need an

interpreter. Only 50 of the offenders within the HOBAS numbers did not understand English fully. Unknown responses therein numbered 230.

Employment, number 33 on the questionnaire, was not addressed by the HOBAS database. In Georgia, there were nine positive responses, ten negative responses, and five unknowns.

Another surprising omission on the HOBAS database is the absence of question 34 on the questionnaire, which deals with the education level of the subjects. The primary data revealed that there were seven high school graduates, one college graduate, and two high school dropouts. It is not known what the education levels of the remaining fourteen subjects were.

Military background (number 35) was not listed in the HOBAS report. Less than half (eight) of the perpetrators in Georgia had current or prior service. It was reported that eight had no experience, which leaves eight unknowns.

In law enforcement circles, the issue of whether not an individual has a prior history of criminal activity is nearly paramount in investigations from the street level to the international level. This is question 36. Percentages from the HOBAS database are used here to rapidly indicate that slightly over half of the perpetrators (50.1%) have a criminal background. The HOBAS states that 34% of the subjects had an unknown criminal history, 18% had none, 26.1% had a history including violent crime, and an alarming 3.9% of the subjects had a history of previous hostage and/or barricade activities! "Other Crimes" constituted 20.1%. The total percentage is 102.1%. This question was one of many in the HOBAS database where multiple answers were accepted. As far as the primary data is concerned, there were 17 responses that indicated

that the subjects had some type of past criminal involvement. Of those, there was one report of previous hostage and/or barricade involvement. There were nine instances where the criminal history was unknown, and there were two negative responses. Again, multiple responses occurred.

Some of the subjects who committed these incidents had previous experience pursuing suicide. However, the answers to question 37 in the primary data included 17 "Unknown"s. Within the HOBAS, there were over 1,600 unknown or no known prior suicide attempt answers. The lack of knowledge one way or the other negates the question.

Some of the subjects also had mental health problems. A table for the responses to question 38 is presented for clarity and quick review. Obviously, the HOBAS numbers are the larger ones. From the primary data, a total of 23 responses were provided for this question. Even though that total is almost 24, multiple answers were provided on some of the questionnaires. One answer of "paranoid-schizophrenic" was written in on one of the GBI questionnaires. The breakdown of respondent reported Mental health problems is:

38. Mental health problems: M	
(Select all that apply)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Committed in past to state mental health facility
<input type="checkbox"/>	No known current problems
<input type="checkbox"/>	No prior
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other: (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Receiving counseling/therapy
<input type="checkbox"/>	Resident treatment facility

Committed in past to state mental health facility	6/172
No known current problems	7/733
No prior	2/418
Other: (Specify)	3/333
Receiving counseling/therapy	4/275
Resident treatment facility	1/275

Multiple answers were also allowed for this question. The HOBAS total of the responses is 1,983.

Substance abuse history is another matter entirely. The secondary data will be discussed momentarily. In the primary data, there were 39 positive responses to questions

39 and 40, which address the history of subject substance use and the use of substances *during* the incident, if any.

For illustrative purposes, the substance abuse and use as addressed on the questionnaires is presented, with numerical representations included for the reported users/abusers from the primary data.

<p>39. Substance abuse history: (Select all that apply)</p> <p><u>13</u> Alcohol</p> <p><u>7</u> Controlled dangerous substance: (Specify) _____</p> <p><u>0</u> List non-prescription: (Specify) _____</p> <p><u>2</u> List prescription: (Specify) _____</p> <p><u>9</u> Unknown</p> <p><u>1</u> None</p>	<p>40. Substance used in this incident: (Select all that apply)</p> <p><u>10</u> Alcohol</p> <p><u>4</u> Controlled dangerous substance: (Specify) _____</p> <p><u>1</u> List non-prescription: (Specify) _____</p> <p><u>2</u> List prescription: (Specify) _____</p> <p><u>9</u> Unknown</p> <p><u>2</u> None</p>
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What is interesting to note about questions 39 and 40 is that there were only three responses to the *None* option, which indicates that it was *not* known for certain in most of the incidents if the perpetrator was “clean” and/or sober. Therefore, the accuracy of the *Unknown* responses should be questioned, and it may be postulated that some of the answers about substance use/abuse are skewed because real information is frequently not readily accessible or available to the respondents.

In addition to alcohol, the following substances were written in to both questions when respondents were asked to be specific about substance type: marijuana (two times), Prozac, Tylenol, “crack” cocaine (two times), methamphetamines (two times), and “Unknown”. Prozac and Soma were written in as prescribed medications being used prior to and during an incident, respectively.

This is another occasion when percentages from the HOBAS database are more appropriate than raw numbers. Refer to the table below.

	<u>History of Use</u>	<u>Use during Incident</u>
None	5.7%	5.0%
Controlled dangerous substance	12.3	8.5
Prescription	2.3	4.3
Non-prescription	2.9	1.8
Alcohol	24.4	32.9
Other	1.9	1.0
Unknown	59.5	53.2

Again, multiple answers were accepted. Note the high percentage of "Unknown"s.


Question 41 is of particular interest to law enforcement first responders, SWAT teams, and others that may be on the scene during these incidents. Explosive use during critical incidents, according to the HOBAS, numbered 88. There were three reports of explosive use from the primary data, and the exact explosives used were reported as one grenade, one instance of ignited gasoline, and one incident involved the use of gasoline and dynamite.

Question number 42 is also critical to the same audience of question 41. Multiple answers were permitted. Weapons - of some type or another - were used in the majority of all of the incidents. Fully 1,746 positive responses were given according to HOBAS, and 22 out of 24 incidents in the primary data included weapon use. Among the weapons in the "Other" category, chemicals were used on at least one occasion and a baseball bat on another.

42. Weapons used in this incident: M (Select all that apply) <u>23/1,746</u> Yes <u>2/262</u> Knife <u>7/740</u> Handgun <u>15/511</u> Shoulder Weapon <u>4/233</u> Other <u>1/390</u> No

The last question in the SUBJECT DATA portion of the questionnaire is about the presence of restraining orders on the subject. The high number of negative and "Unknown" responses to the question (1,781 collectively) dictates that the issue be dropped from further discussion and research in this project.

Section G on the questionnaire is titled HOSTAGE/VICTIM DATA. According to the HOBAS, there were 555 victims. In Georgia, there were 15. Once more, the first question in this section is omitted for privacy reasons. The next few questions are demographic in nature, much like the beginning of the previous section, and are summarized in the chart below and the tables on the next page.



	<u>Georgia</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
<u>Gender</u>		
Male	7	175
Female	8	374
Unknown	0	6
<u>Marital Status</u>		
Married	N/A	127
Divorced	"	28
Separated	"	23
Single	"	235
Unknown	"	142
<u>Race</u>		
Native American	1	22
African American	1	118
Asian/Pacific Island	0	27
White/Hispanic	13	337
Other	0	43
Unknown	0	8

In keeping with the pursuit of analysis of critical incidents based on the statistics, the above charts and tables may lead to a generalization that single, white females of early and middle adulthood are most often victimized by the perpetrators.

The rest of the results from the questionnaire are reported on a question-by-question basis. After all, this project is primarily concerned with the characteristics of the perpetrators and the incidents, not the victims and the incidents. The term "victims" is inclusive of those who were held hostage and/or were somehow victimized during the course of the crisis. Also, due to the smaller number of victims, in both sets of data, a detailed presentation of the results is not warranted.

So far, in the above tables and graphs, demographics have been covered. That information entails the responses from questions 46, 47, and 48. English fluency is the

subject of question 49, and involves no investigation because non-English fluency is not a factor.

Question 50 asks for the respondents to list Health factors. There were three physical injuries during the incident reported in the primary data, and 34 in the secondary data. The other optional answers, none of which were answered in Georgia, are listed as follows (with distribution): Coronary (13), Diabetic (two), Mental Condition (7), Other (37), Unknown (55), and No Known Problems (423). The total for these health factors in the secondary data, including the injuries that were sustained during the incident, is 605. Apparently, some of the factors as reported occurred during the same incident.

Question 51, and its distribution of answers (primary/secondary), is shown. As indicated in the box, there were 83 "Other"s reported in the secondary data. Both sets of numbers, when added together, exceed the total number of victims reported.

51. Hostage/Victim treatment: M
<u>1/20</u> Ignored
<u>2/171</u> Not mistreated
<u>4/83</u> Other: (Specify) _____
<u>4/125</u> Physically abused
<u>1/26</u> Sexually abused
<u>1/66</u> Talked freely with subject(s)
<u>4/114</u> Verbally abused

Victim mobility, question 52, has three choices. They are Allowed free movement, Guarded by: [respondent reports who], and Restrained. In the primary data, no freedom of movement was reported. There were seven answers to Guarded by:, with the subject written in as the guardian. Four of the respondents marked Restrained, and three respondents wrote in "Escaped". In the secondary data, in order, the numbers were 247, 196, and 136. It is not known if any escaped in the secondary data, and no knowledge of who did the guarding or restraining is available either. The reason for this absence of knowledge falls once more on the lack of the original questionnaires submitted to the HOBAS.

A subsection of information on the HOBAS Statistical Report on Victims is titled Stockholm Syndrome. The Stockholm Syndrome, as widely accepted, is a term used to describe a hostage situation during which the hostage taker gains support, sympathy, or similar feelings from the hostages. These feelings can include adverse attitudes toward law enforcement. Fortunately, the Stockholm condition is usually temporary. Regardless, the table as presented in the HOBAS is offered. It answers questions 53 and 54 and includes primary data answers as before.

Stockholm Syndrome

No	6/494
Yes - Negative feelings toward law enforcement	1/22
Yes - Positive feelings toward subject	6/48
Yes - Subject returned positive feelings to victim	0/20

Subject manipulated by victim?

Yes	3/49
No	10/506

According to the primary data, most of the victims were related to the subject in one capacity or another. Five were family members, three were friends or co-workers, five were former significant others or children of the subject (according to written comments), and two were spouses or ex-spouses. The HOBAS states that no relationships, other relationships, and unknown relationships constituted 235 of the responses to question 55. That number was the largest in the series, with family coming in next at 185. Significant others were 96, police officers were 8, employers 3, and friends and co-workers number 88.

Question 56 describes the release of the victim(s). In addition to what is shown,

56. Hostage/Victim release: (Select one)	
<u>1/90</u>	Released at time of negotiated surrender
<u>6/116</u>	Released prior to resolution of incident
<u>0/86</u>	Negotiated release
<u>4/107</u>	Non-negotiated release
<u>1/98</u>	Rescued by tactical team

there were two instances of "Fled while subject was sleeping" written in on the questionnaires. That makes the total for the primary series 14, which is due to the fact that two victims were released by different means during the course of one incident.

Question 57, the status of the victim at the end of the incident, has been covered previously in this document. Refer to the chart titled Injuries and Death on page 38.

The last two questions on the questionnaire are "Yes" or "No" in format. Did the subject allow the victim to talk to law enforcement? In the primary data, there were five negatives and five positives. In the HOBAS, there were 332 and 214, in order. Did the subject talk to law enforcement through the victim? In the same order, eight and four and 434 and 82, with 39 "Unknown"s in the HOBAS.

Remember that Dr. Feldman from the University of Louisville School of Medicine has conducted similar research. Dr. Feldman's work is geared more toward a medical and negotiation interest, as opposed to that of law enforcement first responders, special response teams, and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. However, the Louisville database has some very appropriate data that applies directly to the research. In the sequence and titles found in the original document, the near mirror image data from Louisville pertains to Age Range, Sex and Race of Hostage/Barricade Subjects, Criminal History, Location of Hostage/Barricade Incidents, and Total Weapons. Each table as listed will receive special consideration and comparison to this project's research in individual sections over the course of the next few pages. Only the HOBAS statistics will be compared with the Louisville database. Both sets of information are expressed in percentages.

Dr. Feldman's Age Range table (of subjects) is broken down into four-year increments beginning at the age of 10 and ending at the age of 69. These increments have been grouped together as closely as possible to the similar HOBAS breakdown. Refer to the table.

	<u>Louisville</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
Under 19/18	20.28	3.4
20/18 - 29	34.97	29.3
30 - 44/45	34.26	44.8
45/46-64/65	9.80	13.1
65-69/Over 65	0.70	1.6

Considering the error of a slight variation among brackets, the two data sets are relatively parallel, with the exception of the first age group. This is due to a skew between the sets resulting from Dr. Feldman's report that indicates that 19.58% of the subjects he studied were between 15 and 19 years of age. When the unknown number - 7.9% - of the HOBAS database is factored in, possible accountability for the large difference in the early age brackets becomes apparent. By the way, there are no 'Unknowns' in Dr. Feldman's research, with the exception that age was not determined for one subject.

In the areas of Sex and Race of Hostage/Barricade Subjects, charts from earlier are revisited and edited to incorporate the Louisville data.

	<u>Louisville</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
<u>Gender</u>		
Male	97.92	88.4
Female	2.08	9.2
Unknown		2.4
<u>Race</u>		
Native American	N/A	2.9
African American	33.33	19.5

Asian/Pacific Island	2.08	2.2
White	56.94	57.5
Hispanic	7.64	6.1
Other		10.1
Unknown		1.6

The differences are not so different this time. Notice the White category: barely half of a percentage point apart. The same applies to the Asian/Pacific Island category. The African/American category, however, is substantially different.

The Criminal History portion of the Louisville database includes types of actual crimes, as opposed to the primarily violent or not nature of the HOBAS. Therefore, only the existence of a criminal history is compared here. In any event, this category is almost evenly split, in any way that it is viewed. At least some consistency is being maintained.

	<u>Louisville</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
History: Yes/No	52.08/47.92	50.1/52 (with "Unknown"s)

Location of Hostage/Barricade Incidents is difficult to categorize. The HOBAS has fewer listings for incident location than Dr. Feldman does. In the table below, the HOBAS locations are listed first, at the far left. As appropriate, locations from the Louisville database are indented and under the HOBAS locations, so that the difference in categories will be noted. Otherwise, the Louisville categories fall under those of the HOBAS. This reassignment is arbitrary and is meant to include all of information from Louisville about location.

	<u>Louisville</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
<u>Location</u>		
Apartment/Condo	N/A	20.9
Mobile Home	"	4.3
Private Home/Farm	42.50	52.8
Automobile	N/A	2.5
Barn/Out-Building	"	0.5

Office/Workplace	10.00	3.2
Public Transit	N/A	0.1
Other	see below	15.8
Restaurant/Bar	10.83	N/A
Convenience Store	7.50	"
School	6.67	"
Gov't Facility	10.83	"
Medical Facility	5.00	"
Hotel/Motel	3.33	"
Retail Store	2.50	"
Media Facility	0.83	"

These numbers are obviously difficult to compare. The one location that jumps out is the private home, regardless of type of structure. The student or professional of these matters would also keep in mind that virtually no location is exempt from these incidents, as carefully detailed by Dr. Feldman.

Total Weapons appeals to a very specific audience, the members of which should be obvious. Dr. Feldman's multiple elements in his Total Weapons table fall nicely into the categories of the HOBAS.

	<u>Louisville</u>	<u>HOBAS</u>
<u>Weapon types</u>		
Knife	10.44	13.8
Handgun	61.54	39.1
Shoulder Weapon	10.99	27.0
Other	8.79	12.3
None	8.24	20.6

The last element listed is inclusive of the category of "Physical Assault" in Dr. Feldman's research. It is not debated that a physical assault includes a weapon. Category and definition matching to the HOBAS are the purposes of such a liberty, and apologies are made to Dr. Feldman. There are some notable differences in the weapons table. The

inverse relationship among the types of guns used may require special attention in the future. That may also be a local or regional issue, which could be of obvious interest.

Findings Keyed to Each Hypothesis

Now that the results have been sufficiently reviewed, the testing phase of this project begins. The hypotheses are listed again as a refresher:

1. Critical incidents share common traits.
2. Perpetrators of critical incidents share common traits.
3. In Georgia, either by event or individual, the traits of critical incidents differ from the national commonalities.

The initial inclination should be that hypotheses one and two are true, based on the numbers and comments provided in the section above. Closer review is necessary though.

According to all sets of data, or combinations of them as compared, critical incidents share a number of common traits. The common traits that are listed below include all of those in which a comparison revealed that there were remarkable and large similarities among the data sets. A cut-off score - such as a certain percentile - was not established. There are too many unknowns and too little primary data to justify such strict measuring of similarities or differences in this project.

Other than similarities by definition - hostages, barricade, and barricade with weapons - there exist a substantial number of common traits to most of the incidents studied. Those common traits are as follows:

The incidents are not planned.

Most incidents occur in private residences.

Weapons are used more often than not, especially firearms.

Violence occurs most of the time.

When violence occurs, law enforcement officers are the largest number of victims, followed by selected victims/hostages, then random victims.

Law enforcement initiates contact with the subject almost always. When tactical actions occur, they are usually deliberate in nature.

This list describes several of the fundamental aspects of these incidents that occur as they unfold. Based on the research, interested parties may conclude that critical incidents will contain some, if not all, of the above basics. The first hypothesis is supported.

The second hypothesis is similar to the first, but deals strictly with the subject or perpetrator of the incidents. This area should spark some interest across the board, because the second hypothesis was supported quite well.

Subject demographics match each other quite well. Inspector Ingram of the GBI had it right when he coined the term "angry white male syndrome". The commission of these events by females is nearly nonexistent. Most of the males were white, and they most frequently fell into an age bracket starting at 30 and ending at 45. Furthermore, about half of the perpetrators had a criminal history. All three sources of data reflect these results.

The Georgia factor is a term from the last hypothesis. The term reflects the curious question of whether or not these incidents as they occur in Georgia are somehow unique or different than the national indications. This is where the lack of primary data hurts this project the most. This hypothesis is not supported.

Two categories come to mind, however, when drawing early conclusions about the Georgia factor. The first is the injuries/deaths category that was charted earlier. More officers were injured and/or killed in Georgia than other officers across the states (liberties with percentages taken). That is a rough assessment, but may be indicative of a trend. The conclusion is brought to bear to further drive home the need for additional

research into these matters. The types of weapons used also warrant some attention in Georgia. It may come as no surprise to Georgia law enforcement officers that the subjects use long guns (shotguns and rifles) more often than short guns (pistols and revolvers).

Some additional areas under the Georgia umbrella that appear different than the national and/or Louisville statistics are listed. Further elaboration is mere conjecture at this point, so the list concludes the investigation into this matter for the time being. The difference in age of the Georgia offenders and those subjects across the country has been discussed in the previous section.

Communications with subjects in Georgia usually involve face-to-face discussions, as opposed to electronic means.
More tactical interventions occur in Georgia than elsewhere.
More of the subjects are married.

The first two hypotheses are supported by the research/data. The third is not. There are plenty of law enforcement officers across the country that could describe some of the items that have been validated herein. However, now they can say those things with more credibility than before, if the research is reviewed.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The individual reader will largely determine the conclusions drawn from this project. The fact that older, white males commit most of these incidents is obvious just by review of the statistics. Since hypotheses one and two were supported by the data, these incidents, no matter where they occur, receive exclusive membership into a very unique club.

More importantly though, the issue that the HOBAS - despite its faults - is a useful tool for the purpose of profiling these incidents is not to be missed. For those individuals who are interested in the areas of hostage and barricaded gunmen situations,

the HOBAS and what it reveals is a valuable new tool. The trick is to understand the HOBAS and implement it as necessary. This is particularly important to law enforcement first responders and special response team commanders.

Specifically speaking, the GBI has initiated a project that will ultimately benefit their SRT in a variety of ways. The HOBAS information will be of use to them, and the GBI's information will be of use to the HOBAS and all other agencies that reap similar rewards from it. Furthermore, in Georgia, the bureau is on the leading edge of information technology that is available to law enforcement. Once the word gets out that the GBI is using such a database, and that use has had some positive impact on critical incident responses and resolution, other agencies across the state will want to come on board. Perhaps, in the future, the GBI will have it's own database of information that will be exclusive to the state.

It is recommended that the GBI continue to move forward with this project. For others, it is advised that longitudinal research be conducted, even if the HOBAS is the only source of data. The burning question about the study of the HOBAS over time is whether or not some of the answers will change or shift. If so, what are those changes attributed to?

In any event, if primary data is available through the use of the questionnaire, obtain that data by any reasonable means. The applications of the use of the data, from any agency, can be critical to how an agency responds to - and resolves - these situations. If such a measure is approved or supported, in any organization, it is further advised that at least one individual be dedicated to the project on a full-time basis. There are simply too many details, too much data collection, and too much analysis to be taken on by a

professional or student who cannot devote all of their efforts to the same. Furthermore, a briefing of some type or another may be necessary prior to the distribution of the questionnaires.

Plenty of time should be allotted for academic or professional pursuit of everything that the HOBAS has to offer. This is especially important if information is desired on past incidents, which was the case with the GBI. An endeavor such as this cannot be completed in a project type of timeframe of a few days or a few months. The reasons for this point, and the others, will become clear in the following section.

LIMITATIONS

Regrettably, the limitations to this project are quite numerous. The primary limitations involve the HOBAS database and the information-gathering tool, that being the questionnaire. Other limitations include time and resource restraints. The small quantity of primary data has been adequately covered.

The questionnaire is of very poor design. While the information gained is quite useful, the means of getting it are too objective. There are too many questions that are open-ended in nature, including the ones where several answer options are provided. As should have been observed throughout the course of the results and questionnaire review, the biggest indicator of this problem are the blanks for specification on many of the questions. There are no less than 22 opportunities on the questionnaire for the respondent to write in specific answers, 'other' answers, and the like. An initial thought on how to resolve this situation is to limit the number of write-in options and/or dictate that fixed-alternative answers should be marked as close as possible to what the actual answer is. Along the same lines, write-in answers also occurred when no write-in was necessary.

This scenario should be similarly addressed. Furthermore, if the questions on the questionnaire cannot be designed in a 'yes' or 'no' format, then there needs to be more fixed-alternatives and/or closed answers. Wading through the write-ins is quite time consuming. The hand written answers may be valid and relevant to the question, but the collection, tabulation, and analysis of the data becomes skewed.

Another factor related to poor questionnaire design is length. Including the narrative, the whole document is five pages long. There are 59 questions, and well over 200 choices of answers. (Coding the answers would be a requirement if large amounts of questionnaires were used to obtain primary data.) The large quantities of choices do not include any answers that require additional clarification as described above. The number of questions and answers for subjects and victims increases by 100% if there are more than one of each. Poor respondent cooperation becomes a big factor - and shortcoming - quite rapidly. Should case files have to be reviewed for details, or should a narrative be written, then the time required for completion of the questionnaire can jump exponentially.

The HOBAS database, as good as it is, is not perfect either. As discussed numerous times already, there is information requested on the questionnaire that is not even covered in the database. Regardless of assigned importance, the omission of these particular subject areas is indicative of poor data dissemination. The database is wonderful, but is hard to work with. The physical layout of the categories requires much attention to detail. Some of the alternatives within the categories are out of sequence with the ones as found on the questionnaire. Therefore, it is quite possible that when comparing a number of questionnaires with a database document, as in this project, the

assignment of the number of answers can be different than the actual results. Parsimony is a key to this research, based primarily on the volume of individual datum. It would be nice if the database mirrored the questionnaire in these respects.

Time constraints were a factor in completion of the research in this project. For example, the answer frequencies discussed in the results section were just that - counts of answers. The conclusions and comments did not include how many white males used weapons, for example. There was no tabulation or analysis of what the raw totals indicated within themselves. To determine how many white males used long guns in a mobile home hostage situation, or any other combination of what the numbers categorize, would be an enormous task yielding astronomical results. The possible scenarios that could be analyzed under the larger umbrella of research must number in the hundreds, at least.

Work was done on this project over the course of almost two years. The primary researcher worked part-time on the information frequently, as did several individuals within the GBI, namely Special Agent Keith Howard. None of the parties involved could fully dedicate themselves to the project, and all had primary professional or academic duties that required most of their attention. The point here is that, as described, this type of work is quite time consuming. For future reference, the time issue will require serious consideration before any more work on similar matters is launched.

Researcher bias is a factor in this project, but a small one. Exposure to two barricaded gunmen situations did not slant the work at all. Conversely, those experiences better armed the author to conduct the research, talk with the respondents, review case files, develop rapport with various parties, and so on. There is some concern about the

continued work that the GBI will pursue relative to the HOBAS project, primarily because of the investment made. The academic interest in this project is limited to the elected choice of completing a project of this nature. Subject matter is irrelevant.

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APPENDIX

Completed primary data questionnaires (24).

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