


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Systems and Structures



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Pathways from and Crises after Communism

Part 2. The Case of Former USSR and China



For the first part of this paper see *Belvedere Meridionale* 2014. vol. 26. no. 4.

Abstract The transition from socialist redistributive economy to capitalist markets has proved to be a rockier road than anticipated. The degree and character of difficulties that the countries faced during the transition depended on the nature of the pathways taken.

In this paper I distinguish three major trajectories various countries followed: Central European neo-liberalism; post USSR neo-patrimonial regime and the East Asian (Chinese and Vietnamese) transformation from below. Rather than distinguishing the “right way” from the “wrong way” I explore what the different costs and benefits of the various pathways were at various stages of the transformation.

Keywords neo-patrimonial regimes, regimes, transformation, USSR, China

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Neo-patrimonial regimes

I call the second trajectory neo-patrimonial and – with the exception of the Baltic States which followed the prescriptions close to neo-liberalism – the countries of the former USSR can arguably be classified as such. The purest type of this pathway is the Russian one. (i) The emergent political system is “managed democracy” (typically referred to as “presidential Republic”). Political power is usually held by people who were closely associated with former communist rule. They were elected to office, but their electoral success was “managed”, the ancient regime was organically transformed rather than radically broken up in order to reduce the dangers of instability. (ii) The post-communist rulers and the rule itself are paternalistic. The privatization process was as fast (or even faster) as under the neo-liberal model, but it did not follow the “blind forces” of market, it was resistant to invasion by multinational capital and rewarded clients (often called “oligarchs”) who promise to be competent and loyal with property. (iii) The paternalistic logic applies to management-worker relationship as well: employers rather than laying workers off did not pay their wages, instead they offered them provisions in kind (barter – at least initially – was often extensive). How well or poorly neo-patrimonial regimes performed is contested. They might have absorbed the initial shock of transition better than neo-liberal regimes (especially as far as relatively moderate reduction of labour force participation is concerned), but the subsequent disintegration of the economy and social order was even deeper and lasted even longer. Nevertheless, those who were ready to deliver the verdict by 2000 would have arrived at a conclusion prematurely. The second decade of the transition turned out to be rather successful for the neo-patrimonial pathway, Russia and the Central Asian Republics took off. While in 2008-09 neo-patrimonial regimes also took a dive, they fast recovered and they seem to be less vulnerable by the euro crisis. It remains to be seen whether this is a sustainable growth trajectory or merely a one-time return on oil and mineral wealth. Some analyst suggested that Russia undertook at least a partial re-industrialization following the financial collapse of 1998 as a response of the sharp drops of domestic demand to import-products. In what follows I offer data from to so calls FSU-5, the five population-wise largest post-Soviet states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Turkmenistan)

The first phase of neo-patrimonial transition (1989–1998): deeper and prolonged recession

The USSR broke up in December 1991, but the writing was on the wall before: some countries declared independence and the economies were already declining by 1989-1990. The following decade was an unmitigated disaster. The GDP fell by some 50 %, life expectancy declined substantially (mortality of middle aged men skyrocketed). I could not find systematic data on poverty/living standards, but by all indication it went through the roof. In my 2000 survey (KLIĞMAN – SZELENYI 2002.) I asked randomly selected respondents on a large sample to report poverty in 2000 and recall whether they experienced the same level of poverty in 1988. In 2000, 17% of our Russian respondents were below \$2.15 PPP expenditure level (the same figure in Hungary was 1.8%; in Poland 1.7%). While Russia was a poorer country than its CEE satellites by the end of socialism (what in irony of Soviet imperialism), it became much-much poorer after ten years of transition. Since the trend of decline in GDP and life expectancy is similar in the other four neo-patrimonial countries, there is good reason to believe that their speed (and level) of impoverishment is comparable to Russia.

Furthermore, the recession was not only deeper in neo-patrimonial regimes (and they without doubt qualify for the D word: “depression”) but is also lasted longer. While neo-liberal

countries generally recovered by the year 2000 and were at or near the 1988 levels states on neo-patrimonial trajectory generally were still in free fall as late as 1998. Recovery had to wait until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century.

But in other indicators the neo-patrimonial regimes did not do that poorly. These countries managed sharp falls in GDP with relatively small unemployment and quite substantial labour force participation. Take the case of Russia. This country in 1992 was in decline for the third consecutive year and just in that single year the GDP fell by 15% – nevertheless unemployment stood only at 5% and labour force participation was still at a respectable 66%. Or Ukraine: by 1995 the Ukrainian GDP was down by some 50%, but unemployment did not reach 6% yet!

There is some debate about what caused the disaster of the first decade of the transition – and much research remains to be done to give a persuasive answer to this question. Some (SACHS 2005.; ASLUND 1995, 2007.; ASLUND – GURIEV – KUCHINS 2010.) blame initial conditions and lack of consistency in the reforms (and these authors tend to emphasize the relative success of the transition), others (STIGLITZ 2003.; KING 2003.) blame the reform strategy, “shock therapy”, especially mass or voucher privatization (and tend to see the Russian way to capitalism as a disaster).



The Russian (and Ukrainian) neo-patrimonial order seems to be related both to the rather dramatic decline in the economy and the relative moderation in unemployment and decline in labour force participation. Hence it had its “upside” and “downside” even during the first decade. The unique feature of privatization under neo-patrimonial order was the exceptionally fast transfer of public property into private hands of a new small elite almost “handpicked” by the patrimonial rulers. “We need millions of owners, rather than a handful of millionaires... The privatization voucher is a ticket for each of us to a free economy” – said President Boris Yeltsin,¹ but this had opposite effect. Given the speed the political leadership intended to transform property rights (to make capitalism “in 500 days”) it led to the emergence of an oligarchy. How and why? Arguably voucher privatization was intended to achieve sort of Proudhonian socialist aims. Indeed: who not make everyone an owner by distributing the common wealth to all citizens or at least to all workers of a given firm? Future vice premier, Chubais was responsible for privatization and under his watch privatization vouchers were mailed out to every Russian citizen. But most of them did not know what to do with them, but since their savings disappeared due to hyper-inflation, they offered their vouchers virtually at any price for sale in the emergent secondary market for vouchers. A small group of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurially minded managerial personnel bought up the vouchers and privatized state owned enterprises well below their value. Klebnikov for instance estimated that Gazprom which sold for \$250 million in 1994 by 1997 it was worth \$40 billion². Instantly a new class of a few dozen (or at best few hundred, certainly not millions) dollar billionaire oligarchs emerged.

The oligarchs of neo-patrimonial post-communism were similar in many ways to the robber barons in 19th-century America. And as Aslund among others pointed out there is nothing wrong about making such a class, if that solves the property problem (helps to create identifiable owners), what it certainly did. But there were some important differences between the oligarchs of neo-patrimonial order and the robber barons of the Wild-West US capitalism. For better or worse the robber barons were certainly not clients of the American political class, on the con-

¹ Cited by ASLUND 1995. 235.

² KLEBNIKOV 2000. 135.

trary, already during the late 19th century money called the shots. Under neo-patrimonial order the new rich were sort of “appointed” by the political rulers (and if they proved to be disloyal or unpredictable, like Berezovsky or Khodorkovsky from Putin’s point of view they were “fired” or jailed). Even more importantly, while almost all American robber barons made their millions by MAKING something (producing steel like Carnegie, drilling and refining oil like Rockefeller, building railways – no matter how useless some of those were – like Gould, who resembles most the Russian “oligarchs” who built railway line, even though some of those only bought markets along already existing lines – they created wealth. In sharp contrast the oligarchs at least under the first decade of market transition under neo-patrimonial regimes made billions from speculation (like Berezovsky purchasing cars from state owned firms at subsidized price promising hard currency revenues, but immediately re-exporting them in Russia for high profits on car markets where consumers normally had to wait for years for Russian cars, but could drive off from the saloons of Berezovsky immediately by paying higher than usual prices). So the US economy was booming with the raise of robber barons, the Russian economy was collapsing as the oligarchs were transferring their extra profits from privatization speculations to Swiss bank accounts (this is what Berezovsky also did, since he purchased cars from AVTOVAZ with promissory notes when inflation rate was 1000% in Russia, so “saved” his profit in stable Swiss Franks) and freezing them into mansions on the Riviera, Colorado Springs or you name it where.

Well, OK, the oligarchs made a big service by creating identifiable property rights, but it is hard not to see that at least for a while society had to pay a heavy price for it – lost half of its GDP (and million, probably as many as 3 million in Russia alone –as Lawrence King and co-authors agree – lost their life years before they were due to appear before their Creator).

Nothing can be further from me than to moralize about this and blame the oligarchs. Most of them are shrewd, young and smart entrepreneurs who used the opportunities which were inevitably created in a system which intended to turn within 500 days an economy wholly publicly owned into individual private ownership. And this all was managed under the gaze of the benevolent patrimonial ruler who was looking for the ablest young people (almost exclusively men) who will manage now the newly acquired property efficiently to serve the leadership of the ruler. If they ever lost sight of it they were severely punished (I already mentioned Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky). But at least for the early years the relationship of the new barons and their subjects was also patrimonial. The oligarchs were rich out of the grace of the ruler so the new barons also “took care” of their subjects. Workers may not have been paid, but they were less likely to be laid off than their comrades under a neo-liberal regime. Instead of receiving a wage they might have gotten a plot on which they could grow their food, the firm which employed them bartered food for them for the industrial products they produced; if they worked in agribusiness they received bartered clothing instead of a wage.



This was workable but of course unsustainable. By the second decade of the transition the capital accumulated from speculation is turned into drilling oil, mining copper etc. and the relationship between the political bosses and the new grand bourgeoisie, the employers and employees had to be renegotiated.

The second decade as we will see is a productive one, but it is more authoritarian rather than patrimonial.

But let me comment first on the cross-national differences among the FUS-5 countries.

BELARUS ¹									
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
GDP annual growth									
8	-3	-1	-10	-8	-12	-10	3	11	8
Unemployment rate									
Na	2	10	15	16	19	14	13	15	16
Labor force participation rate ²									
na	67	66	65	64	63	62	62	61	60
Public debt (% of GDP)									
Na	Na	Na	Ma	Na	Na	18	10	12	11
GINI ³									
22.8 ⁴	Na	Na	Na	21.6	Na	28.8	Na	Na	30.3
Life expectancy at birth ⁵									
71.6	70.8	70.4	70.0	69.0	68.8	68.5	68.6	68.5	68.4

KAZAKHSTAN ⁶									
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
GDP annual growth ⁷									
Na	Na	-11.0	-5.3	-9.2	-12.6	-8.2	.5	1.7	-1.9
Unemployment rate ⁸									
Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	7.5	11.0	13.0	13.0	13.1
Labor force participation rate ⁹									
na	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
Public debt (% of GDP)									
GINI ¹⁰									
25.7 ¹¹	Na	Na	Na	32.7	Na	Na	35.3	Na	Na
Life expectancy at birth ¹²									
68.9 ¹³	68.3	68.0	67.7	66.3	65.7	64.9	64.1	64.5	64.6

RUSSIA ¹⁴									
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998

¹ Data from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

² % of total population ages 15+, see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

³ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

⁴ 1988

⁵ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

⁶ Data from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

⁷ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

⁸ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

⁹ % of total population ages 15+, see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

¹⁰ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

¹¹ 1988

¹² Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

¹³ 1988

¹⁴ Data from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

GDP annual growth									
2	-3	-5	-15	-9	-13	-4	-4	1	-5
Unemployment rate									
Na	Na	Na	5	6	8	9	9	11	12
Labor force participation rate ¹⁵									
na	68	67	66	63	61	61	60	58	57
Public debt (% of GDP)									
Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	48	46	49	57	82
GINI ¹⁶									
23.8 ¹⁷	Na	Na	Na	48.4	Na	Na	46.1	Na	Na
Life expectancy at birth ¹⁸									
69.2	68.9	68.5	66.9	64.9	64.5	65.2	66.2	67.0	66.8

UKRAINE ¹⁹									
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
GDP annual growth ²⁰									
3.9	-6.4	-8.4	-9.7	-14.2	-22.9	-12.2	-10.0	-3.0	-1.9
Unemployment rate ²¹									
Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	5.6	7.6	8.9	11.3
Labor force participation rate ²²									
na	63	62	62	61	61	60	60	59	59
Public debt (% of GDP)									
Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	22	24	30	38
GINI ²³									
23.3 ²⁴	Na	Na	25.7	Na	Na	39.3	Na	Na	Na
Life expectancy at birth ²⁵									
70.5	70.1	68.9	68.9	67.9	67.9	67.1	67.3	67.3	68.0

TURKMENISTAN ²⁶									
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
GDP annual growth ²⁷									
-4.9	.7	-4.7	-5.3	-10.0	-17.3	-7.2	-6.7	-11.3	6.7
Unemployment rate ²⁸									
na	Na	Na	Na	na	Na	na	na	na	Na
Labor force participation rate ²⁹									
na	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
Public debt (% of GDP)									
na	Na	Na	Na	na	Na	na	na	na	Na
GINI ³¹									
26.4 ³²	Na	Na	Na	35.4	Na	Na	na	Na	40.8
Life expectancy at birth ³³									
62.6	62.7	62.7	62.7	62.7	62.9	63.0	65.2	63.4	63.6

¹⁵ % of total population ages 15+ years old, see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

¹⁶ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

The description of neo-patrimonial order offered before fits reasonable well Russia and the Ukraine, but it is at best a rough estimation of the actual socio-economic processes and structures in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

The Belarus comes close to something one could call a neo-Stalinist state. Belarus carried out some privatization, but the public sector is still the dominant one. Its post-Soviet recession (hard to call it transformational recession, since Belarus did not experience as of yet much of a transformation) was somewhat milder than in Russia or the Ukraine, though the unemployment rate in Belarus was substantially higher and the decline in life expectancy almost as bad as in Russia. Slow or little reform did not protect Belarus from the crisis, though its economic performance after 1997 was respectable. Its economy bottomed earlier (1996) while the other countries – each one of them, especially Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan better endowed in natural resources – were still in free fall. While Belarus followed a different trajectory in terms of privatization than Russia it has a similar socio-political system as the other neo-patrimonial countries (and it has very close economic and political ties with Russia). Each of the neo-patrimonial regimes were (and still are) ruled by older men who were high or at least middle ranking officials in the Soviet political, economic or military/intelligence establishment. Kazakhstan's Nazerbayev was already the chairman of the council of ministers during soviet times; Belarus's Lukashenko was an officer of the Soviet Army and a mid-level manager during the 1980s; Turkmenistan's eccentric first post-Soviet president ("president for life") Niyazov was the first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan; Ukraine's Yanukovich was promoted to managerial positions during the 1980s despite his earlier criminal (NOT political, criminal-criminal) convictions and of course Russia's Putin was an officer of KGB. The rulers operate with a sophisticated network of clients and while in Russia and the Ukraine there is a somewhat competitive multi-party system, their democracy is highly "managed", in Belarus and Kazakhstan and especially in Turkmenistan there is little semblance of any democracy. All five countries are "presidential republics" with a strong institution of presidents who are not tested in particularly competitive elections (some of the elections – especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – are not competitive at all – giving 80-95% of the votes to the "candidates" – resembling elections in Soviet times).

¹⁷ 1988

¹⁸ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

¹⁹ Data from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

²⁰ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

²¹ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

²² % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

²³ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

²⁴ 1988

²⁵ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

²⁶ Data from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

²⁷ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

²⁸ Statistical data are state secret in Turkmenistan. Official statistics report 0% unemployment, but it is believed to be 60%. That casts doubt on the labor force participation statistics as well. See CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov

²⁹ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

³⁰ Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

³¹ 1988

³² Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)

³³ Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Turkic states – used to be rather nomadic nations before incorporated into the USSR – with the majority of their population is Muslim and both regimes increasingly – though still cautiously play the Islamic card.

Despite these differences in economic policies and historical-cultural background, the collapse of the Soviet Union impacted the countries in similar ways to a similar extent, hence defining them as travelling on a similar trajectory, distinctly different from Central European neo-liberalism and East Asian “capitalism from below” seems to be justified.

The second phase of neo-patrimonial transition (1999–2010): economic explosion and fast recovery from the Global Financial Crisis

The great surprise of the post-communist transformation is the aggressive recovery of neo-patrimonial regimes. Social theory would predict that neo-patrimonial regime and economic modernizations are inconsistent hence the collapse of the 1990s impressed many of us as something anticipated. But starting the 1999 for ten uninterrupted years all countries I identified as neo-patrimonial were on a growth trajectory, some achieved double digit GDP growth and they outperformed the neo-liberal regimes and produced growth rates comparable to China.

The BIG puzzle of course is: are these countries so successful, because they are neo-patrimonial or to the contrary they are successful, because they are resource rich? Hard to tell, since both the crisis of the 1990s and the explosion of the first decade of the 21st century probably has as much to do with resource richness/dependency and the strategy of transition or the nature of the social-political regime.

There are really two schools of thought to explain the different dynamics of the 1990s and early 2000th. Among other commentators ASLUND (2010) and TREISMAN (2010) claim that the collapse of the 1990s is overestimated and the resource curse is way exaggerated (Rutland and others tend to agree). Russia (and arguably the region) is on the right track, neo-patrimonial or authoritarian order is transitory and eventually with economic growth and modernization Russia will also enter the democratic development (this is also consistent with Jeffrey Sachs, 2005).

Others attribute both the collapse and the recovery/and new downturn in the Russian economy to resource dependence. Russia fell so deeply in the 1990s, since oil prices plummeted – it recovered, since energy and mineral prices skyrocketed during the early years of the 21st century and it fell sharply in 2008 again because the shrinking demand for raw materials and oil/gas. SIDOSENKO (2011) claims than even in 2010, 98 % of Russia’s export came from natural resources and primary derivatives.



So was the impressive recovery simply the result of the increase of raw material and oil/gas prices or was there something else beyond it? Some argue after the 1998 financial crisis Russia (at least partially) re-industrialized. Given the collapse of the ruble import product became far too expensive hence a policy of import substitution led to some degree of re-industrialization. (KADOCHNIKOV 2006.) A complementary explanation is a rebuilding of state capacities under President Putin, as Peter Rutland put it a transition from Yeltsin’s Oligarchic capitalism to “state guided capitalism” (for this distinction see also BAUMOL–LITAN–SCHRA 2007.), what some may attribute to Putin. It is hard to tell how much of the success of the first two presidencies of Putin have to do with the “state guided” capitalist development (which in the spirit, if not in the words of Baumol and his co-authors may not be the best, but it is certainly not the worst either). An

alternative explanation is that it is not so much the reasonable or even smart industrial policies of the Russian state, which leads to the expansion of the early years of the 21st century, but the growth of oil, gas and mineral resource prices. The big question what only further careful research can answer: was Russia turning away from oligarchic capitalism to state led capitalism but – as Peter Rutland suggests – was it merely cash in the revenues of a rentier state.

The social science literature has begun to use the idea of rentier state (following to footsteps of Karl Marx idea of “rentier capitalism”) since the 1970s (the first usage of the term is attributed to Hussein Mahdavy, 1970) to describe those economies, which generate especially high revenues from exports of mineral resources, especially petroleum may suffer from the so called resource curse. The high revenues from natural resource creates disincentives to develop other branches of the domestic economy (if natural resources are discovered in already developed countries that can cause the so called Dutch Disease, the new resource may draw capital and labor from already developed sectors, increases their expenses, a decrease their competitiveness). Hazem BEHLAM and Giacomo LUCIANI (1987) applied it to the Gulf Countries and in general Arab states, Douglas Yates (1996) applied it to Africa (Gabon, but others used it for Nigeria as well). Ahmet KURU identified Turkmenistan as a rentier state (2002) to the best of my knowledge the first attempt to conceptualize neo-patrimonial post-communist regimes as “rentier” state. Turkmenistan with an estimated 40-60% unemployment rate, with then fourth largest oil and gas deposits in the world and with the highly authoritarian state qualifies perfectly for the label. Arguably Russia and Kazakhstan in the first decade of the 21st century demonstrated rentier state characteristics. Both of these states have large mineral and oil resources and they dramatic growth fluctuated in strong correlation with the oil prices. Being a resource rich rentier state tends to be a mixed blessing or indeed can straight be a curse. Economists usually emphasize the long term negative impact on economic development, but resource wealth and the rentier character of the state can be a barrier to democratization as well (Ross 1999. 312.), rentier states can buy peace and diffuse political mobilization by generous welfare payments and let us add by maintaining strong oppressive apparatuses to keep those inline who does not benefit from those welfare provisions (like the guest workers in the Gulf States).



It is difficult if not impossible to make a clear distinction between patrimonial regimes and the authoritarian/rentier state. I call regimes patrimonial, if there is a patron-client relationship. So the early post-Soviet Russian state was patrimonial, since the new rich received its wealth as “patrimony” from the good-will of the ruler and employers were also expected to take care of their employees rather than laying them of and leaving them at the mercy of the welfare state. Hence GDP fell, but unemployment remained low. The relationship between the ruled and ruler was one of loyalty and mutual obligations. The oligarchic stage of Russian development (from mid 1990s until the end of Yeltsin’s rule) was rather different, the oligarchs threatened the power of the rulers and they tended to act in a rather despotic manner towards their subordinates. The purest type of neo-patrimonial order were the early days of Yeltsin and especially the first years of Putin with his rather successful attempt to establish himself as the “good czar”, poverty was reduced, GINI was declining and the regime – far from democratic – had substantial popular support. But the “good old days” are clearly gone; Russia is more and more obviously an authoritarian system. Some of the rentier states treat at least some of their subjects well and combine strict authoritarian rule for the majority with generous provisions from rents to a privileged

minority. The clearest examples are the Gulf Monarchies, in particular Qatar and the United Arab Emirates where excessive exploitation of the “guest worker” majority (some 95 percent of the labor force in these countries are “guest workers”, who work there on three year renewable visa) with Scandinavian style welfare provisions for the 10 percent “natives” (Christopher Davidson, the best scholar of UAE hesitates to call it “tribal capitalism” (DAVIDSON 2009.) or “rentier state” (DAVIDSON 2005. 298.). Undoubtedly, tribal capitalism, or neo-patrimonial regime implies more the notions of loyalty, obedience, mutual obligations, while rentier state refers to oppressive and exploitative practices. The shift from neo-patrimonial to authoritarian/rentier state is discernible in the successor countries of the former USSR, Belarus being on one end of the scale Turkmenistan on the other end of the spectrum.

BELARUS ³⁴											
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP annual growth											
1.5	4	4.1	4.2	6.8	6.4	9.2	9.9	8.2	10	.2	7.6
Unemployment rate											
Na	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.0	Na
Labor force participation rate ³⁵											
59	58	58	58	57	57	56	56	56	55	55	56
Public debt (% of GDP) ³⁶											
13	17	13	11	10	10	9	8	9	Na	Na	Na
Population below poverty line											
Na	Na	Na	Na	27.1	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na
GINI											
Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	27.2	Na	Na
Life expectancy at birth											
Na	68.0	68.1	68.3	68.4	68.6	68.7	69.1	70.1	70.3	70.6	70.9

KAZAKHSTAN ³⁷											
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP annual growth											
1.7	10.5	12.2	9.5	9.2	9.1	9.5	10.6	8.5	2.4	1.2	7.0
Unemployment rate											
Na	Na	10.0	8.8	8.8	8.0	8.1	7.4	7.3	6.6	6.3	5.5
Public debt (% of GDP)											
Na	na	Na	Na	Na	13.7	10.5	11.0	7.7	8.9	14.2	16.2
Labor force participation rate ³⁸											
70	70	70	70	70	69	69	70	71	71	71	71
Population below poverty line											
35.0	Na	26.0	Na	Na	19.0	Na	Na	13.8	12.1	8.2	Na

³⁴ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

³⁵ Data 1999-2007 are from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

³⁶ Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book

³⁷ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

³⁸ Data from www.google.com/publicdata

GINI											
Na	Na	Na	Na	31.5	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	26.7	Ma
Life expectancy at birth											
65.5 ³⁹	63.2	63.3	63.4	63.5	66.1	66.6	66.9	67.2	67.6	67.9	68.2

RUSSIA ⁴⁰											
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP annual growth											
3.2	6.3	Na	4.2	7.3	6.7	6.4	6.7	8.1	5.6	-7.9	4.0
Unemployment rate											
12.4	10.5	8.0	Na	7.9	8.5	8.3	7.6	6.2	6.4	8.4	7.6
Labor force participation rate ⁴¹											
61	61	60	60	60	60	60	61	62	63	63	63
Public debt (% of GDP) ⁴²											
90	63	48	41	32	28.2	12.9	8.0	5.9	6.7	8.3	9.5
Population below poverty line											
40.0	Na	Na	25.0	25.0	17.8	Na	Na	15.8	Na	13.1	Na
GINI											
Na	Na	39.9	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	42.2	Na
Life expectancy at birth											
Na	67.2	67.3	67.5	67.7	66.4	67.1	67.1	65.9	66.0	66.0	66.2

UKRAINE ⁴³											
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP annual growth											
-4	6.0	9.0	4.1	9.4	12.0	2.6	7.1	7.7	2.7	-15.1	4.2
Unemployment rate											
Na	4.3	4.3	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.1	2.7	3.0	8.8	8.4
Labor force participation rate ⁴⁴											
58	58	57	57	57	57	58	58	58	59	59	59
Public debt (% of GDP) ⁴⁵											
51	46	37	34	29	24.7	17.0	12.7	11.7	10.3	30.0	38.4
Population below poverty line											
50.0	Na	29.0	Na	37.7	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	35.0	Na
GINI											
29.0	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	27.5	Na	Na

³⁹ Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book

⁴⁰ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

⁴¹ Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

⁴² Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book

⁴³ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

⁴⁴ Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicstatistics

⁴⁵ Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book

Life expectancy at birth											
Na	66.0	66.2	66.3	66.5	66.7	69.7	70.0	67.9	68.1	68.2	68.5

TURKMENISTAN ⁴⁶											
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP annual growth											
16.5	18.6	20.4	15.8	17.	17.2	13.0	11.4	11.8	14.7	6.1	9.2
Unemployment rate											
Na	na	na	Na	na	na	Na	Na	na	Na	na	na
Labor force participation rate ⁴⁷											
60	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Population below poverty line											
Na	na	Na	na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na
GINI											
Na	na	Na	na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na
Life expectancy at birth											
63.8	63.9	64.0	64.1	64.3	64.4	64.4	64.5	64.6	64.7	64.8	64.9

Belarus and the Ukraine are outliers. Belarus is poor in mineral resources and the Ukraine is also rather poor. It is more the political system what binds these countries together than the political economy. While the sharp drop of GDP during the first decade in Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan clearly is related to the moderation of oil prices and their explosive growth for the most part in the first decade of the 21st century was caused by the new oil boom, Belarus and Ukraine's economy cycle has more to do with their dependence on the Russian economy (and during the Global Financial Crisis the collapse of the Ukrainian economy also on its increasing dependence on the world markets and EU).

Despite the spectacular growth of neo-patrimonial regimes during the second decade of the transition, it is unlikely the success can be attributed to neo-patrimonial nature of the regime. These regimes were turning rentier states with highly and probably increasingly authoritarian systems. On balance neo-liberalism performed slightly better, but the only unqualified success story is Poland and it is hard to tell whether Poland was so successful, since it was pursuing the neo-liberal prescription more closely, or to the contrary, because it was somewhat less dependent of international capital. There is little doubt that both neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial regimes did better than they would have done would have stayed on the state socialist trajectory, but the road from socialism was and remained rocky. The nostalgia for the communist past which is still haunting the region is on the whole silly – people are freer and most of them live better than they or their parents used to live twenty years ago, so the nostalgia is either romanticizing the past when people were younger or a reasonable expression of anxiety in a new world where there is less security and more risk taking – nevertheless, the hopes of the late 80s or early 90s were hardly met and disappointment is widespread – often expressed by shift to the far right – is a major fact of post-communist social life in the former communist countries of Europe. Ivan T.

⁴⁶ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

⁴⁷ World Bank estimate, using \$1.08 per day per capita consumption with 1993 PPP, see China from Poor Areas to Poor People. Report No. 37349-CN, March 2009, Washington DC.: The world Bank

Berend formulated the problem even for the most successful neo-liberal trajectory so astutely: 1944-1993 was a “detour from the periphery to the periphery” (BEREND 1998).

During the early 1990s, I met David Stark several times at various conferences and he often recited an old Irish joke: two men meets somewhere in Ireland. The first one asks: “Which is the best road from here to Belfast?” The other responds: “Do not start it from here.” Good joke, but overstates the importance of the initial conditions and understates the policy errors made in selecting the pathways.

This leads us to the last section of this paper: the special trajectory China followed. We are often warned (SACHS 2005.) to be very careful in comparing the Chinese transformation with the post-Soviet and post-socialist European transition. Ironically, the argument is just the opposite of the Irish joke. The Irish joke implies: the problem is with the initial condition, you would easily get to Belfast, if you started from a better position. Now the Chinese initial conditions without doubt were the worst. So if China – unlike the former USSR or its European satellites – is a success story, it should not be attributed to the worst initial condition, it can be the outcome of the “advantages” of backwardness (to invoke GERSHENKRON 1962.), so either the inverse of the Irish joke is correct, or the Irish joke is incorrect, what matters is not the initial condition, but the selection of appropriate policies.

I am sitting tightly on the fence when I have to evaluate what matters more: initial conditions or policy choices. Both matter. The Czechs may have made some policy errors they still of all right, since their point of departure was so much better; the Hungarian initial conditions were pretty good and they may do poorly by now since they made some policy errors, the Poles were not in great shape during the 1980s, now they do better, probably because they made some good policy choices.

So the big question for the last section: can one claim that the Chinese did something right or they simply do fine because, they started from the very bottom (the benefit from the advantages of backwardness)?

“Capitalism from below”

There is a third pathway from redistribution to markets which can be identified with East Asian socialism, China (and Vietnam). In contrast with the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial trajectory which created capitalism by design, built the transition from above in East Asia, the drift from state socialist redistributive economy started from below. The nature of the Chinese formation and the driving forces behind its undisputable (though not necessarily sustainable) economic success is the subject of some controversy. According to the official ideology, China is “market socialism” (which is just a stage on the road to communism), while most Western commentators emphasize the capitalist features of China today. Some underline the “Chinese characteristics” (HUANG 2008.) of its capitalism, Victor Nee in his earlier work saw “hybrid” elements in the Chinese formation, but in his latest book, “Capitalism from Below” (NEE 2012.) he sees private entrepreneurship as force behind China’s growth. Philip HUANG (2012) in contrast objects to the binary opposition between public and private, capitalism and socialism but he emphasizes the central role of local (and central) government and the public sector in fermenting social and economic development. He is inspired by the work of Jean Oi and her theory of ‘local state corporatism’ (OI 1992, 1999.) who emphasized that the success of rural China cannot be merely attributed to raise of the private sector; the local state manages to use revenues from

Township and Village Enterprises (TVE's) to meet local social needs (fund education, healthcare etc.) when the central state cannot provide for such goals any longer. Is a "state centered" – change from above – (Oi) or "society centered" change from below – (Nee) centered explanation a better fit with the data?

Greatly influenced by Nee's early work (NEE 1989.), I introduced the idea of "capitalism from below" (EYAL and all, 1998. and KING – SZELENYI 2005.) to distinguish the Chinese way from the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial trajectory away from socialism. My proposal was not quite as radical as Nee's new theory is, but I made the following assumptions:

Unlike the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial shock therapeutic ways of making capitalism the drift away from redistribution to markets has been gradual in China (and after the mid 1980s in Vietnam). How gradual it was is disputed (Sachs for instance argues de-collectivization in China was sufficiently a 'shock', Sachs, 2005) , but "transformation from below" never experienced fast mass privatization; deregulation of state control over the economy was spread over years or decades, while it (convertibility of currency, elimination of tariff barriers etc) occurred in neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial regimes almost over-night;

(ii) In China the transformation started in the agrarian sector by shifting first production and next marketing/distribution of products from the agricultural collectives to individual peasant households. Another engine of early economic take-off for reform China was the success of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). The property rights of TVEs during the 1980s were the subject of heated debates. TVEs officially were collectives and operated under local government control. Hence many commentators regarded the success of TVEs as proof of the central role collective (rather than private) firms (see HUANG 2012.; Oi 1999 among others). Others (Yasheng Huang and others) claimed that the majority of TVEs were private businesses. According to Yasheng Huang, only 1.5 million out of the 12 million TVEs during the mid 1980s were publicly owned (HUANG 2008. 79.). Incidentally one unanticipated – by most Western observers on the political left and right – outcome of this "market transition" (Nee pointed this out in 1989) was the improvement in the living conditions of rural masses, the shrinking of inequality between rural and urban population, between cadres and the rest of the society, especially peasantry.

While I still believe this was a reasonably correct analysis of the Chinese reform of the 1980s, my earlier position needs to be reconsidered. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century there was some convergence with the neo-liberal/neo-patrimonial model. Yasheng Huang called this as the "great reversal" – the shift away from an entrepreneurial trajectory to a state directed one ((HUANG 2008. 109–174). Yasheng Huang is far from an advocate of socialism – to the contrary, he has been critical of the evolution in China during the 1990s since it drifted away from entrepreneurial capitalism a more statist mode (what Philip Huang – much more sympathetic to the causes of socialism – is inclined to call "state capitalism"). Nevertheless, it is hard to dispute that there was substantial re-centralization during the 1990s (the most important was arguably the change in the taxation system, Beijing regained a great deal of taxation authority and the balance of power shifted back from the province and localities which were quite well off during local state corporatism" the center, which suddenly was flooded with resources).

Let me illustrate this one anecdote. In 1995, I was in Beijing with my dear colleagues, Andrew Walder and Donald Treiman. One evening we were walking around – thirsty – in the Forbidden City. We saw light on in an ancient building and it turned out to be a "Bier Stube". So we had our Tsingtao Beer when it turned out Andy actually knew the manager who was making his tour

around the guests. That person turned out to be an employee of the National Archives where Andy did a great deal of research. We eventually learned that the “Bier Stube” is a side-branch of the National Archives. The funding was so much cut for the archive that in order to survive, they had to start some business venture to supplement their resources. We gathered around that time even the central Chinese intelligence agency had to run a hotel in downtown Beijing not so much to have easier access for the surveillance of foreign guests, but because they needed the funds from the business. These were times of the poor central state (with reasonably well to do local states). When I was back in Beijing in 2010, all seem to have changed. Beijing was flooded with resources. The Sociology department at Tsinghua University had better resources than Yale and Beijing was flooded with money (I also recall the rather inadequate facilities of the People’s University in Beijing during our visits during the early 1990s).

Well, one can object: but was it not 1997 that China started to privatize the corporate sector? Absolutely, but the question is: how did that “privatization” take place? But Yasheng Huang casts some doubts on the privatization of public sector. He suggests that IMF statistics which claims that only about 25% of the non-agrarian production comes from the public sector simply identifies “legal persons” when they are indicated as owners of a form as “private owners”. According to Yasheng Huang, these “legal persons” often stand for public entities, for instance for government owned banks or firms largely owned by government banks (Op cit, 15–16). Hence Chinese privatization maybe quasi-privatization and the contribution of the public sector to the non-agrarian GDP may be somewhere 50-75% (these figure are similar to the data provided by Philip Huang, who is of rather different political persuasion).

While it can (and IS) be contested how large the private vs. the public sector is, whether the state or the private sector leads Chinese economic growth all sides tend to agree that during the 1990s social inequalities increased substantially in China. During 1978 and 1985 GINI was moderated (much to the surprise of Western left-wingers GINI was actually quite high at the end of the Mao area and during market reform it was moderated) but after 1985, and especially during the 1990s inequalities (and most disturbingly the urban-rural inequalities) skyrocketed. While GINI in China today is not all that different from the USA most commentators agree (and in this respect by Yasheng Huang and Philip Huang are on the same side) it is untenably high and unlike the first decade of the reform the second two decades had some serious negative social consequences, which eventually needs to be addressed.

According to Yasheng Huang, China during the second half of the first decade of the 21st century, during the Hu-Wen regime China began to address these issues, paying more attention to rural development and social inequality. The dominant ideology of the first decade of the 21st century is “social harmony”, an idea borrowed more from Confucianism rather than Marxism. While in Marxism-Maoism the emphasis is on equality the idea of social harmony can live with inequality as long as it accommodates the idea of harmony – some can be more privileged than others but they also need to have responsibility for those beneath them. It involves more the idea of solidarity and responsibility rather than equality.

Hence China’s post reform (after 1978) development can be classified into three various stages, or epochs, “capitalism from below” (1978–1985 or possibly until the late 1980s, though following 1985 the Chinese leadership begins to respond to the dissatisfaction of the urban population to the “rural” bias of the early reform, but not sufficiently to prevent the 1989 revolutionary upheavals); the “great reversal” (or the Chinese equivalent of capitalism from above, 1992–2002, the Jiang Zhu era, with 1989–1991 as a temporary reversal to pre-reform policies,

with a strong pro-urban bias) and the post 2002 epoch (the Hu-Wen era) with an emphasis on “social harmony” and rural development.

What is constant in the Chinese case (and strikingly different from the former USSR and its European former satellites) is the fact that the CCP retained its power monopoly (though the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is losing credibility and Confucianism is gaining ground) – it appears that it is still true in China by the second decade of the 21st century that “politics is in command”. In political terms China is still a “communist country”.

The performance of Chinese way of drifting away from redistribution to market arguable had less social costs and more social and economic returns than the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial trajectory. During the first three decades of its transformation, China produced double digit (or close to double digit) annual economic growth, and while inequality increased substantially after the first decade of the reform the number of Chinese below the poverty line was reduced by hundreds of millions. China also was almost unscratched by the global financial crisis. The Chinese entered the global fiscal crisis not only without sovereign debts, but with gigantic reserves and applied a massive doze of classical Keynesian stimulation package in a timely manner (Keith Bradsher, 2009). The way the \$US600 billion Chinese “stimulus package” was spent is also indicative to what extent China is now driven “from above”, almost all the stimulus went to the public sector and local governments (while the main beneficiaries of the Bush-Obama stimulus packages were private enterprises, especially banks and other financial institutions)

Economic performance of “Capitalism from below”

*China, social and economic development*³

Entrepreneurial epoch (Capitalism from below)										
1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Annual GDP growth										
11.7	7.6	7.8	5.2	9.1	10.9	15.2	13.5	8.8	11.6	11.3
Population below poverty line, headcount ⁴⁸										
Na	Na	Na	65.2	Na	Na	47.7	Na	Na	30.2	No
GINI ⁴⁹										
Na	Na	Na	29.1	Na	Na	27.7	Na	Na	29.9	Na
Life expectancy at birth ⁵⁰										
66.5	66.7	67.0	67.2	67.5	67.8	68.0	68.3	68.6	68.8	69.0

The Great Reversal (Capitalism from above)												
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Annual GDP growth												
4.1	3.8	9.2	14.2	13.5	12.6	10.5	9.6	8.8	7.8	7.1	8.0	8.3
Labor force participation rate ⁵¹												
Na	72	73	73	73	73	73	72	72	72	71	71	71

³ National Bureau of Statistics, China statistical yearbooks (<http://www.cinability.com/GDP.htm>; CIA World Factbook gives slightly different figures from 1999

GINI												
Na	32.4	Na	Na	35.5	Na	Na	35.7	Na	Na	39.2		
Population below poverty line, headcount ⁵²												
Na	35.0	Na	Na	30.3	Na	Na	18.7	Na	Na	19.9	15.6	
Life expectancy at birth												
69.3	69.5	69.7	69.9	70.1	70.2	70.4	70.6	70.8	70.9	71.1	71.3	71.4

“Social harmony”										
2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
Annual GDP growth										
9.1	10.0	10.1	9.9	11.1	11.4	9.6	8.7	10.4	9.4	
Labor force participation rate ⁵³										
70	70	70	69	69	69	68	68	68	Na	
GINI										
42.6	Na	Na	42.5	Na	Na	Na	Na	47.0 ⁵⁴	Na	
Unemployment rate ⁵⁵										
Na	Na	10.1	9.8	9.0	4.2	4.0	4.3	Na	Na	
Public debt (% of GDP)										
Na	Na	31.4	24.4	22.1	18.4	16.2	16.9	17.5	Na	
Population below poverty line ⁵⁶										
Na	Na	10	Na	Na	Na	8	8	2.8	2.8	
Life expectancy at birth										
71.6	71.8	72.0	72.2	72.4	72.6	72.8	73.1	73.3	Na	

When tested against empirical data, Yasheng Huang’s theory fares well for the early 1980s, but it does not offer much support to his hypotheses concerning the “social harmony” epoch. Indeed, 1978–1985 produced impressive growth together with a moderation of social inequality. I take this is strong support for Victor Nee’s 1989 “market transition theory”. But as capitalism shifts from “below” to “above” Nee’s theory does not seem to stand any more, but Yasheng Huang’s optimistic expectations about a new policy of social harmony, or a social democratic phase of Chinese capitalism or market socialism (you name it the way you want to) does not get much support. Economic growth remains around the same level as it was in the 1990s, but there seem to be no evidence for anymore “social harmony”, social inequality reaches its highs at the end of the epoch.

⁴⁸ Data from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook

⁴⁹ Data from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook

⁵⁰ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

⁵¹ World Bank estimate, using \$1.08 per day per capita consumption with 1993 PPP, see China from Poor Areas to Poor People. Report No. 37349-CN, March 2009, Washington DC.: The world Bank

⁵² % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

⁵³ CIA World Factbook, 2007. China ranked #33 among the countries of the world, the US #41 with a GINI of 45.0

⁵⁴ Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book

⁵⁵ People living below \$1.25 a day

⁵⁶ Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Factbook

Some now regard to Hu-Wen epoch as a “lost decade” and incoming president Xi is expected to open a fourth epoch, with further liberalization of the economy and Singapore like political reform of the party.

Let me offer a few concluding remarks on the case of Vietnam – the case I am the least familiar with and which is also the least covered in scholarly literature. Most commentators I read see Vietnam as following the Chinese strategy of transformation (GUO 2004. 393.; YAMAOKA 2007. 13).

The reform in Vietnam came though substantially later. After the Vietnam War the communist leadership imposed the most doctrinaire policies on the South, creating a major economic crisis and food shortages during the second half of the 1970s (YAMAOKA 2007. 12). The Vietnamese orthodox leadership resisted pressure from reform even when it came from their staunchest ally, the Soviet Union and from Gorbachev – the door to reform only opened up when the arch-conservative Le Duan in 1986 passed away and another conservative, though one with reformist inclinations, Truong took over the leadership (BUNCK 1996). The reforms introduced by Truong were called *Doi Moi* and they resembled in some ways “perestroika” though when the chips came down it was closer to the Chinese rather than the late Soviet and especially early post-soviet Russian model. Vietnam, much like China some seven years earlier, dismantled the agricultural cooperatives and gave agrarian production back to the peasants (this is something Russia never did and the Central European countries did not do either). So in one stroke Vietnam eliminated food shortages and as far as we can tell dramatically reduced poverty during transition (while as we saw poverty skyrocketed in the former USSR and its European satellites). Vietnam also followed China by NOT combining perestroika with glasnost, hence retaining the political monopoly of the Communist Party, what arguably was the precondition – but for a price what many would judge to be unaffordable – of a gradualist transformation (this again is something what distinguished Vietnam and China from the European post-communist regimes – see this point in YAMAOKA 2007. 9.)

Nevertheless, Vietnam’s reforms were not only later than the Chinese, they also had more of a shock element. While Vietnam did not rush to mass privatization, it moved more aggressively to market liberalization, shut down early state enterprises, opened faster rooms for the private sector and opened up its borders to FDI (BUNCK 1996. 236.). Hence I may argue Vietnamese “capitalism from below” came with a “neo-liberal” flavour. Nevertheless, Vietnam never experienced the transitional recession/depression mainly because in the first stages of reform the rapidly expanding household sector absorbed most of the costs (and labour freed from SOEs – see MCCARTY 2000.)

So far Vietnam is a “success story” – much like China is. They managed the transition without the frightening costs other post-communist transformation trajectories could not avoid.

VIETNAM ⁵⁷													
1986	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP annual growth													
2.8	5.1	9.5	5.5	4.7	6.0	7,2	7.7	8.5	8.2	8.5	6.2	5.3	6.8
Unemployment rate													
Na	Na	25.0	Na	Na	Na	6.1	1.9	Na	2.0	4.3	4.7	6.5	2.9
Labor force participation													
Na	76	75	74	74	74	74	74	74	73	73	73	73	73
Population below poverty line													
Na	Na	37.0 ⁵⁸	Na	Na	28.9	Na	19.5	Na	Na	14.3	Na	12.3	10.6
GINI													
Na	Na	36.1 ⁵⁹	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	37.6	Na	Na
Life expectancy at birth													
Na	Na	Na	69.3	69.6	69.9	70.1	70.4	70.6	70.9	71.1	71.3	71.6	71.9

But both for China and Vietnam the BIG question is – much like for the neo-patrimonial/rentier states, but for a different reason – sustainability. There are two major reasons why the East Asian transformation from below is vulnerable: (i) will they be able to retain their export led industrialization once the price of their labour will catch up with the rest of the world? (ii) can the political monopoly of the communist party maintained under market capitalist conditions and if it cannot is a “gradualist” transformation of the political system conceivable? If it is not and political systems either stay or fall, what would be the social and economic consequences of such a political disintegration?

Victor Nee in his *Capitalism from Below* (NEE 2012.) offers us the most optimistic scenario. The main meta-theoretical implication of this formidable book is that the natural or normal way capitalism evolves is “from below”. After all, capitalism came also “from below” in England, the United States or the Netherlands. Gershenkron’s 19th century cases of finance capital led capitalism in Germany or state-led capitalism in tsarist Russia were aberration just as capitalism by design either in neo-liberal or in neo-patrimonial way may be. Let me add: democracy did not come fast and free. Early capitalism operated sweat-shops, did not have universal suffrage, workers resistance was broken by force. Democracy is a late-comer and came only after strenuous fight for liberty and equality. Hence Jeffrey Sachs may be right (SACHS 2005.): democracy will come to China, but let me add: in due time. Let’s not put then wagon ahead of the horse.

But a final word of warning: comparing the various pathways out of state socialism is tricky however. One may just compare apples and oranges. East Asian socialist formation faced very different challenges when reforms began. China during the late 1970s was still an overwhelmingly agrarian society, while before the fall of communism the USSR and its European satellites completed industrialization. China could – and still can – extensively grow and flood the world market with inexpensive industrial goods. The domestic market in China has extraordinary potentials. It is estimated that only about 200 million Chinese from the population of 1.3 billion lives in a mass-consumption society. China in responded to the Global Financial Crisis and the

⁵⁷ % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS

⁵⁸ 1998

⁵⁹ 1998

shrinking of world markets for its products by expanding domestic consumption. On the other hand Russia and Central Europe did not have much of a choice. Their political regime melted down in 1989–1991, no room was left for “gradualism”, building capitalism “from below” – being integrated into the world system without much or any qualification was inevitable and the crises which followed were logical consequences of such integration.

So can we learn from each other or we only can learn from our own mistakes? I do not want to end this paper with a totally agnostic note. If there is a lesson to be learned it is certainly a complex one.

The road from socialism to capitalism certainly proved to be rockier, costlier (and lasted longer) than anticipated. Some of those costs should be discounted given the “initial conditions”, but other costs incurred due to policy choices governments made. Some of the benefits of arriving at the “destination” also might have been overestimated hence popular disillusionment – a common post-communist experience – can be attributed for less benefits than hoped for higher costs than society was prepared to pay.

Let’s return to the Irish joke. What could be our response to the stranger somewhere in Ireland lost his way and asks us: which is the best road to Belfast?

First I would ask: Are you sure you want to go to Belfast? There are many other possible destinations why don’t you compare at least some of them with Belfast? Would you consider London or Stockholm instead of Belfast? How much do you know about Belfast anyway? Is it possible that Belfast is actually not quite as nice as you think it is so, if you get there you may regret it.

The second point I would make: well, as you should know there are many roads which will get you to Belfast. Some roads may not be for you. Some needs a lot of climbing and given the conditions of your knees, I would not recommend you to take those. But do not allow anybody to fool you and claim: there is only one (or the “best”) way you can get to your destination (whatever that may be). So our first task is to eliminate some of the roads which are obviously not suitable for you and once that was done you evaluate carefully what are the costs and benefits of each of the roads open to you.

My final point: each destination offers various kinds of benefits and each road has various, multiple kind of costs. To decide which benefits you want and what costs you are willing to pay cannot be established in a scientific manner, these are political choices a well-informed public needs to make in a democratic process. Belfast is cosy and the beer is good, but the place is boring. London is exciting, but you might find it too big and you would feel lost in it. Stockholm may be of the right size with just enough excitement, but will you stand the long and cold winter nights? So it depends on your preferences what you want. The same goes with costs: if you take road A rather than road B, it may take you longer, but it may be shadier so you will suffer less from exposure to intense sunshine. So how much are you willing to pay from what kind of cost?

After all, with more or less costs, with more or less disillusionment all transitional societies are at some sort of “destination”, the “transition” by and large is over. But less illusion, more cool-headed rational calculation by a well-informed public in a democratic discourse may have made this transition less frustrating. And finally, let’s not forget: there are no final destinations in history. Market transition is over but there are other transitions (making a welfare state for some, transiting to democratic policy for others or all of the above...) ahead of you. So you are again – always – at cross-roads. Think about the advice we just gave to the lost stranger in Ireland. And do not forget: once you got to Belfast you may continue your journey to London, New York, or who knows, probably to Singapore? *

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Desecularisation in Postcommunist Romania



Abstract The paper gives an analysis of the process as a result of which postcommunist Romania has moved from being an officially atheist country to being one of the most religious countries in Europe. The process of desecularisation is analysed in three dimensions. On the macro-level, I outline the religious headway in the most important institutions of the Romanian society, on the meso-level I analyse the changes in the organizational structure of churches and in the denominational structure of the country, while on the individual level the changes occurring in individual religiosity. In the final part of the study I argue that within these dimensions desecularisation was realized to different extents, while “desecularisation from above” is not likely to achieve its goals in the long run.

Keywords religion, Romania, desecularization, secularization

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Presently, Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe (VOICU 2007, ТОМКА 2005). However, this situation is relatively new, as twenty three years ago Romania was officially an atheist country, in which religion – at least officially – was considered the anachronistic, tolerated relic of the past. And although in reality the population of the country was probably quite religious back then as well, the social importance of religion was significantly lower than today – thus this leading position of the country at the beginning of the 21st century is the result of developments of the past 20 years. In my paper I attempt to review these developments by analysing the events that led to the present-day situation.

The expansion of religion in Romania is not an isolated case, as from the 1990s onwards several comprehensive studies report a religious revival as well as the rise in the social significance of religion (CASANOVA 1994, BERGER 1998a). Based on Berger, the concept of desecularization is accepted to name the phenomenon, which should be understood as counter-secularisation, that is the expansion of religion in societies previously characterized by secularizing tendencies (BERGER 1998b). In his detailed explanation of the concept, KARPOV (2010) defines desecularisation as the opposite process of secularisation, and uses the same dimensions in outlining it as the ones applied by the theoreticians of secularization. Thus, one of the areas of desecularisation is represented by previously secularized institutions, in which religious norms gain new ground, both in the formal and informal sense. The process of desecularisation can be realised in the practice of religion and religious faith, leading to the revival and intensification of religious life, but also through the fact that religious practice moves from the private sphere to the public one in a more accentuated way. Desecularisation can also manifest itself in the character of cultural products (art, literature, philosophy, etc.), the contents of which have become more religious, and last but not least in the “substratum” of society, that is in its material culture (e.g., in the building of churches and parochial buildings, in the growth of the economic wealth of the churches, in the appearance of religious market products, etc.). These different areas of social life can become desecularised more or less independently from one another, and thus we can encounter very different cases of desecularisation in real life (KARPOV 2010. 250). The areas in which desecularisation processes take place are mostly determined by the social actors they are the result of: while the simple religious actors achieve outcomes mostly in the field of religious practice and faith (“desecularisation from below”), the activist groups with greater social influence are capable of de-secularising the system of institutions and culture in the above sense as well (“desecularisation from above”) (KARPOV 2010. 251–255).

While I agree completely with the above outlined concept of desecularisation, in my analysis – which is not based on my own empirical research, but aims to be a synthesis of available empirical analyses – its application is difficult as it includes many dimensions that have not yet been investigated in Romania. Thus, preserving the logic of Karpov’s conceptualisation, the desecularisation processes which have taken place in Romania are discussed below using the three dimensions of secularisation defined by Dobellaere. Dobellaere, in systematising the voluminous scholarly literature on secularisation, determines three “levels” of the phenomenon (DOBELLAERE 2002). According to him, secularisation means a diminishing commitment of the individuals towards the church, which he calls “individual secularisation”. This therefore covers the increasing difference between the actual religious knowledge, attitudes and everyday behaviour of the believers and the expectations of the church related to these. The second level of secularization is institutional secularisation, which means the internal, organisational restructuration of the

churches and denominations, including the changes in the message and in the values represented by the organizations. As a third level of secularisation he identifies societal secularisation. This is the result of the functional differentiation of modern societies, and covers the phenomenon in which, due to gradual professionalization, certain sectors (sub-systems) of modern societies gain more and more autonomy, becoming independent in this process from religion. As a result of this level of secularisation, religion becomes an independent social sub-system, which in addition is being gradually transferred from the public sphere to the private sphere (DOBELLAERE 2002. 29–40). The cause of the differentiation of the sub-systems is rationalisation, as a result of which the actors of the sub-systems are regulated by instrumental control rather than moral control.

In the light of Dobellaere's theory, in the following I consider the changes that have occurred in Romania in the relationship between religion and the main institutions of society, that is in the societal position of religion, as well as the processes on the level of religious organisations, and the way in which individual religiosity has been transformed.

Religious change at the societal level

One of the most common explanations of the change occurring in the societal status of religion in social modernisation is linked to the theory of social differentiation, according to which the sub-systems specialising in performing certain social tasks and "functions" become more and more self-reliant and more independent from other sub-systems, they start following their own instrumental rationality and take the more general moral considerations less into account (POKOL 1997). The independence of the individual sub-systems from religion can occur as an unexpected consequence of professionalization (latent societal secularisation), but also as the conscious effort for the laicisation of the given social sphere (manifest societal secularisation) (DOBELLAERE 2002). As it is known, in Eastern Europe the latter type of secularisation was dominant, and the reduction of the influence of the churches and religion over certain sub-systems occurred as the result of violent intervention on the behalf of the state. Such secularising intervention was for example the nationalisation of religious education, of the religious health and social institutions, or the banning of the economic activities of churches by confiscating their property. This aspect of the socialist transformation of society was not legitimate in the eyes of large groups of the population, thus the political motivation of societal secularisation between 1945 and 1989 was one of the reasons and prerequisites of the opposite, desecularisation processes after the regime change. As the result of the latter, religion and the churches have been re-gaining influence over the previously secularised institutions of society, and their influence seems to be growing steadily. The presence of the church in such institutions is often merely symbolic, which in itself is not a negligible phenomenon; however sometimes the intertwining of the religious and other sub-systems exceeds the symbolic level and religion comes to affect the functioning of the sub-system (MOISE 2004; ANDREESCU, G.–ANDREESCU, L. 2009).

The process of desecularisation in question is perhaps the most spectacular in the case of the political sub-system. From the point of view of this relationship it is crucial, that orthodox theology mutually defines the Romanian nation and the church by each other, and that – accordingly – any attempt to separate the church and the state is interpreted as an attack against the church (STĂNESCU 1996). Its relations with any kind of political power are viewed by the Romanian Orthodox Church in the light of the "Byzantine Symphony", according to which the

proper arrangement is the close co-operation between the two. Even in the communist decades, this co-operation worked better than in the majority of socialist countries, as a result of which the suppression of denominations in Romania was less powerful than in the other countries of the communist bloc. The desecularisation of the political system after the regime change is especially striking on the symbolic level, as the presence of the leaders of the Orthodox Church sanctifies almost every political event. In addition to this symbolic presence, the church and state structures are intertwined in their institutions as well, through the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs. This institution, although part of the state apparatus, is virtually the representative of the Orthodox Church in the state apparatus by the fact that the ones occupying office positions are almost without exception church people with a degree in theology, and who try to enforce the interests of the Church rather than those of the state in their office.

In addition to the symbolic and institutional intertwining, the Orthodox Church also influences the functioning of the political sub-system. This is achieved on the one hand through the close relationship between the Orthodox Church and ethnic identity, as in every political decision with an ethnic dimension the influence of the Orthodox Church as an ethnic church is obvious. In addition to their role in the formation of ethnic politics, in the last twenty years denominations have frequently played a role in shaping public opinion in political issues not related to ethnicity as well. In this respect the role which can be considered even more important than influencing the voters' choice options, which the Orthodox Church gained through the development of policies and influence, is that in the public debates it has become the most important social partner at the expense of the institutions of civil society.

The process of desecularisation is similarly spectacular in the case of educational institutions. The symbolic presence is strong in this case as well, as the events at the beginning and end of school years are rarely without ecclesiastic presence, religious symbols on the walls of educational institutions are often found – one of the public debates in the topic has been provoked exactly by the issue of icons (sacred images) in schools (BAKÓ–HORVÁTH 2009). Establishing school chapels and college churches is no longer of a merely symbolic significance, as there is real religious activity going on in them, and as such they are the bastions of church(es) in the educational system. The most important interlocking of religious and educational institutions however has not been achieved by these, but by the introduction of religious instruction in schools, as the result of which church representatives with a degree in theology have become a constant presence in public schools. This presence influences the specific rationality of education, regarding the pedagogical principles on the one hand, and the principles of cognition on the other. Pedagogy is an independent science, with particular notions regarding education and training, as well as particular methods developed for these, from which the principles and methods of the churches may be more or less different (MOISE 2004).¹ In addition to these particular pedagogical issues, the presence of the church influences the functioning of the school in the way that it spreads a world view and cognitive logic different from the scientific world view and the rational cognitive principles behind it that are propagated by education. This effort is well represented by the attempt to exclude the theory of evolution from the biology curriculum, as well as that of the philosophical concepts of God from the philosophy curriculum.² In these cases the autonomy

¹ The differences between the pedagogical principles are well presented in an educational story written by Moise: in the story from the Orthodox religion textbook the little boy tries to destroy a swallow's nest, but due to God's intervention the ladder falls, and the little boy lies in bed all summer as punishment (Moise 2004).

² A comprehensive overview of this attempt to influence the curriculum can be found in the open letter addressed to the Ministry of National Education by the Solidarity for the freedom of conscience organisation.

and independence of these scientific fields are damaged as a result of the intervention of the religious sub-system. Besides the attempts to influence the contents of the curriculum, there is a similar influence upon the actually taught material as – especially in rural schools – due to administrative reasons the teachers of religion with a theological qualification are forced to teach other subjects as well (MOISE 2004, STAN-TURCESCU 2005, ANDREESCU et.al. 2007).

In addition to politics and education, a strong presence of the church has been established in the social and health care sector. In these the situation is similar to the above, except for the fact that the impact on the functioning of these institutions is presumably weaker, than in the case of political or educational institutions. The influence of the church upon the economic sphere seems also to be minor.

In the above we have mainly discussed the transformations of the relations between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the institutions of the state, as the societal status of religion is determined first and foremost by the religion of the Romanian majority. The situation of the Hungarian minority denominations is also worth an analysis. Taking into account the not purely religious social engagements of the Hungarian historical churches, it becomes obvious that – unlike the Orthodox Church – these primarily take place within the framework of civil society. This is consistent with the Western European models, where the emergence of religion from the private sphere (de-privatisation) and the strengthening of its social presence (revitalisation) also happen within the frameworks of civil society. By its presence in civil society, the public appearance of religion is realised without influencing the systemic operation of these societies (CASANOVA 1994).

With regard to the societal expansion of religion and churches, the question of the social legitimacy of the phenomenon can also be raised. In a nationally representative survey conducted in 2008 we formulated questions about the public perception of the political influence of priests. The answers revealed that the majority of the population does not agree with the influence of the church upon politics: influencing the opinions of the voters was rejected by 80% of the respondents, while 73.5% does not agree with the influencing of political decisions. We have not found any significant differences in these opinions of the different ethnical groups.³

TABLE 1 ❖ *The opinion of Romania's population on priests' political engagement*

	Fully Agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Does not agree	Does not know, no answer
Priests should not influence the way people vote	50.1	28.9	9.3	5.4	6.2
Priests should not influence political decisions	48.9	24.6	12.1	7.7	6.7

<http://www.humanism.ro/articles.php?page=62&article=225>

³ The data are from the "Social cohesion and inter-ethnic climate in Romania 2008" research, which was carried out by the Interethnic Relationships Research Centre in October-November of 2008 for the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities.

Changes in the organisation of the church, modifications in the denominational structures and the nature of religiosity

I find particularly remarkable two aspects of the manifold processes of transformation in the mid-level of the Romanian religious context: the organisational growth of the large churches and the changes in the religious patterns within these.

From the point of view of organisational changes the large churches have gone through a process of obvious growth. The end of the bans formulated by the communist regime was first followed by an increase in the number of the clergy, and together with the introduction of religious instruction in public schools a new body of individuals with a theological degree appeared, that of the teachers of religion. Their number reaches in order of magnitude that of priests, as according to the 2011 statistics of the Orthodox Church, in addition to the latter group of 14,231, the group of around 7,700 of the teachers of religion is active in education.⁴ The growth of the clergy and that of the training of teachers of religion both have contributed to the growth of a third group of religious experts, that of teachers of theology. The expansion of the latter group was further strengthened by pairing theology with other university courses, as a result of which theological training became available in a much larger circle. The integration of theological education in state universities – which means that the financial burden of the cost of the training does not need to be borne by the churches – resulted in the facilitation of the rise in the number of both the students and the teachers. Thus the number of institutions providing theological education increased from three to fifteen in the first ten years after the regime change, and the number of the enrolled students exceeds ten thousand (ANDREESCU–KACSÓ 2009). And finally there is a significant rise in the number of groups of monks, whose massive presence mainly characterizes the Orthodox Church: according to the aforementioned statistics in 2011 there were 8476 monks living in the country. Overall the number of people with a theological qualification has multiplied in the last twenty years. This organisational and personnel growth mainly characterises the Orthodox Church; however similar processes took place in the case of the other churches as well. The smallest increase occurred in churches with less significant resources for growth: the ones, which – due to the fact that they have less members and to their geographical dispersion – were not entitled to start groups within the system of religious education in schools, and in which there are no religious orders functioning.

In addition to the institutional growth within the church, another organisational change is the institutionalisation of church movements. Two types of such movements should be distinguished, the ones organised around visions, and the reform movements created with the purpose of changing the churches from within. Movements built around visions mainly characterise the Orthodox Church,⁵ however we have knowledge of similar events in the Hungarian population of the country, the most important of them being the one organised around the Seuca visions

⁴ These data refer only to Orthodox priest and teachers of religion. The source of the Romanian Orthodox Church Staff statistics: http://www.patriarhia.ro/_layouts/images/File/ADM_2011.pdf (accessed: 2014.02.05) The numbers of teachers of religion is mentioned in the following: http://www.noutati-ortodoxe.ro/b-raspunsul-patriarhiei-romane-la-ultimele-dezinformari-asur-b_l24744_p0.html (accessed: 2014.12.15)

⁵ In his textbook “Misiologie și ecumensim” [‘Missiology and Ecumenism’] David Pestroiu presents several movements organized around visions: Noul Ierusalim, Petrache Lupu de la Maglavit, Miscarea de la Vladimiresti (Pestroiu, 2010)

(PETI 2009). The common characteristic of these movements is that they are popular among the members of lower classes, and institutionalised movements are rarely developed from them. Churches treat them with reservation; any type of institutionalisation usually leads to excommunication and exclusion. The reform or revival movements are created with the purpose to renew worship and moral order within the church. These movements therefore signal the need for internal change, while their constant presence in the church may trigger the transformation of the dominant forms of piety. They are more organised than the ones built around visions, and thus their exclusion is more difficult, especially when members of the clergy are involved in them. Table 2 lists the most important reform movements of the three largest historical churches, without being exhaustive.

TABLE 2 ❖ *The renewal movements of the three largest churches in Romania*

Romanian Orthodox Church	Roman Catholic Church	Reformed Church
Oastea Domnului ['Army of the Lord'] Miscarea Rugul Aprins ['The Burning Bush Movement'] Miscarea Ortodoxa de Reinviere Monahala ['Monastic Orthodox Re- vival Movement']	Cursillo Focolare Hit és fény ['Faith and Light'] Karizmatikus Megújulás ['Charismatic Movement'] Ferencs Világi Rend ['Secular Franciscan Order']	CE Szövetség ['CE Association'] Zimányi – mozgalom ['Zimányi – movement'] Miskolci Missziós Csoport ['Mis- kolc Missionary Group']

A part of these movements were established as far back as the beginning of the 20th century. Before communism, most of them were considered sects to be excluded by their churches, and the communist regime did not tolerate them because of their self-organised, civil nature. In order to eradicate them, secular power often used the help of priests working for the secret police as well, and as a result these movements survived until the regime change as underground movements, in conflict with their own churches. After the regime change the most important ones were reconciled with, and a more or less formal integration was achieved as well (KISS 2003; BLAGA 2009).

The analyses on the most popular reform movements of the three largest churches, the Oastea Domnului ['The Army of the Lord'], the Catholic Charismatic Movement and the CE Association, have pointed out several common characteristics within these. All three movements are organised as integrated systems of small groups, as multi-centre horizontal networks consisting of local small communities. Regarding their teaching – compared to their churches – they are characterised by a greater ethical rigour on the one hand, on the other the members play a more active role in the shaping of individual religious world views than what is usual in the large churches; nevertheless this happens with a frequent emphasizing of doctrinal unity with the church. From the point of view of religious practices the importance of personal repentance, the evangelization ambitions, the high emotional loads of community events, the high importance of music and song, as well as the relative laxity of physical discipline can be highlighted. As there is no common root of these movements, the similarities in the movements operating within the framework of the different churches probably indicate a more general shift in religious needs, regardless of denomination. Such common features are the practice of religion in small communities, the religious egalitarianism within these small communities, the high degree of individual freedom and spontaneity in the experiencing of religion, as well as the appreciation of emotions. The unusual success of the Pentecostal Church featuring many of the above also supports our interpretation, as the membership of this church has increased by 64 percent in the period following the regime change (from 220,000 to 362,000).

Apart from the spectacular growth of the Pentecostal Church, the denominational structure of the country after the regime change is characterised by a high degree of stability, the smaller changes are partly explained by the fact that many Hungarians have emigrated (the decrease in the percentage of Roman Catholics, Reformed and Unitarians) or by the aging membership (the decrease in the percentage of the Israelites). Concerning the changes in the membership of the different denominations, the slowing growth of evangelical churches is conspicuous, especially in the past ten years, as well as the minimal success of the newer “sects” and new religious movements: the category of “other denominations” increased from 0.4 percent to only 0.6 percent in twenty years. Knowing that half of this, 49,820 people belong to Jehovah’s Witnesses, 15,514 to the Romanian Lutheran Church, and 14,385 to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining “other denominations” make up only 0.2 percent of the denominational structure.⁶ Although the exact composition of this is not known, according to our knowledge it is largely made up of evangelical communities, while the presence of new religious movements that have made a great stir in the Western countries in the past 50 years seems insignificant. However, it is essential to mention in relation to the latter that most of them do not expect an exclusive membership from their followers, that is they do not expect them to give up their previous religious affiliations, and the options to connect offered are not the usual (for example they offer participation at courses rather than membership), so the number of followers is almost impossible to grasp from the statistical point of view.


TABLE 2 ❖ *Romania’s denominational structure according to census data, as well as the changes in the membership of the denominations between 1992 and 2011.*

	1992	2002	2011	Change between 1992 and 2011 (%)
Eastern Orthodox	86.8	86.8	86.5	-17.7
Roman Catholic	5.1	4.7	4.6	-25.1
Greek-Catholic	1.0	0.9	0.8	-32.6
Reformed	3.5	3.2	3.2	-25.1
Pentecostal	1.0	1.5	1.9	64.1
Baptist	0.5	0.6	0.6	3.1
Seventh-day Adventist	0.3	0.4	0.4	4.4
Unitarian	0.3	0.3	0.3	-24.8
Muslim	0.2	0.3	0.3	15.0
Evangelical Christian	0.2	0.2	0.2	-14.9
Old Believers or Old Rite Christians	0.1	0.2	0.2	15.7
Lutheran Synod Presbyterian	0.1	0.1	0.1	-5.0
Lutheran (Augsburg Confession)	0.2	0.1	0.0	-86.2
Israelite	0.0	0.0	0.0	-63.6
Other denomination	0.4	0.5	0.6	25.0
Non-religious and atheist	0.2	0.1	0.2	14.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	-

⁶ All the numerical data regarding the denominations are based on census data. Source: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/>


Changes in individual religiosity

Besides the changes outlined above regarding the social presence of churches and their systemic roles, there has been an increase in religiosity in the individual aspects as well. Despite all their shortcomings, the most frequently and periodically repeated surveys used to measure personal religiosity allow the tracking of the intensity of religiosity over time. To this end, they differentiate several dimensions of religiosity, for example the practical aspect of religion consisting of actions, the (cognitive) dimension of faiths and knowledge, the dimension of experience and the organisational dimension. In the period following the regime change an increase can be detected in all of these. The following figure shows several indicators of the cognitive, practical and organisational dimensions of religiosity in three different points in time: in 1993, 1999, and 2008. There has been an increase in every one of these indicators. The increase was more significant between 1993 and 1999, followed by stagnation: between 1999 and 2008 the values remain roughly the same.



The international comparative studies draw attention to several other additional explanatory factors of this high degree of religiosity. These show that in Europe the economic situation of the countries, the level of education, as well as religious pluralism determine the level of religiosity: the richer the country, the more it is characterized by religious plurality, the higher the level of education of the people, the less religious the population of that particular country is. In the case of Romania all three indicators determine a higher degree of religiosity (VOICU 2007).

Thus Romania, as the result of a complex process, has become one of the most religious countries in Europe, but the question is how long this religious flare is going to exist. On the different levels of the analysis regarding the expected changes in the societal significance of religion contradictory predictions can be made. On the level of individual religiosity the explanations



used by international comparative studies predict a temporary nature to the religious flare, as a possible economic boost and the expected growth in the education of the population will induce a decrease in religiosity in the light of these. A similar effect on personal religiosity is to be expected from the slow increase in religious plurality, which is also facilitated by international mass migration, which makes facing religious otherness inevitable even if the background of the migrants does not become pluralised from the religious point of view. Based on the systemic and organisational changes presented in the first part of our analysis however, in these scenes of religious revival the persistence of religion is more likely, as the increased systemic presence of the churches and their position of power can hardly be reduced. For the manifold multiplied group of religious experts it is also an existential necessity to preserve the current position of power, and knowing that we are talking about probably the most effective opinion-forming group, it is not likely that there will be any attempt on behalf of the political class to limit the political power and influence of these groups.

It is possible that in the future in Romania, besides a highly de-secularised system of institutions and the presence of an enlarged group of religious experts, the slow decline of personal religiosity can be expected. This can be inferred not only from the above described system of interconnections between welfare, education, religious plurality and religiosity, but also from the fact that the religiosity of the growing generation seems not to be greatly influenced by the now stronger religious socialization through religious instruction in schools. As shown in Figure 3 above, the religiosity of the successive generations presents a continuous decrease regarding most indicators, and this linear decrease is not broken by the fact that the generation born after 1981 received full religious instruction in schools. These data thus indicate that in spite of the systemic spread of churches, in the case of individual religiosity the continuation of the trend of secularisation is to be expected in the long run. *

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Communist-built Industrial Towns, the History of Newly Built Towns and Cities

*Distinctive Historical Development Paths of Hungarian 'Socialist'
and Western European Industrial Towns in the Second Half
of the Twentieth Century*



Abstract In my study, I intend to give a brief overview of the development of Hungarian communist built and Western-European industrial towns. What makes this topic worthwhile for exploration is that towns currently experience a number of core changes in their fabric. Naturally, these stem from their history, which in turn affects the current urban development schemes, the landscape of towns, and modifications in spatial arrangements. Another important aspect is that substantial variations are observable between the Western European and the Hungarian urban development models. On the one hand, past development policies reflected the economic and political realities of each country, which was further coupled with the east-west divide, thus impacting development priorities. As a consequence, there are still clear divergences among the countries surveyed despite the current trend toward more uniformity in urban development goals.. The article provides a detailed analysis of the various models, emphasizing peculiarities and specific features. It aims to establish viable forms for spontaneous and micro-managed paths of urban development.

Keywords urban development, industrial towns, Eastern and Western urban development models, spatial and urban development, communist industrial development

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The generally accepted theory of the stages of urban development was first elaborated by the so-called Dutch school (Klaassen, Paelinck, van den Berg) in 1981. According to this thesis, the development of urban regions can be broken down into a number of stages in which population does not evolve in a haphazard way but rather, especially in developed countries, follows a general pattern. The stages encompass *urbanisation* with rising core city populations, *suburbanisation* with the development of suburban regions surrounding the core city, *disurbanization* whereby rural areas experience higher population gains, and *reurbanization* with a significant rebound in the population of the core city.

György Enyedi, an economist and geographer, supplemented the general urban development theory on two points. He provides an alternative reading of the fourth stage by claiming that there are no actual population gains in the reurbanization stage, rather an alteration in the pattern of urban space takes place. (ENYEDI 2011.) Furthermore, he argues that the shift from one stage to the other is triggered by long-term economic cycles, the Kondratiev waves.

A brief survey of the development of Western European industrial towns

During history, even prior to the 20th century, there were numerous examples in Europe of the planning and subsequent foundations of entire towns or new sections of existing ones. It is not accidental that politics always played an integral part in the decisions related to urban development; however, it was during the historical developments of the 20th-century Europe which elevated political ideologies to a distinguished position in the foundation and life of newly established towns.

From the 1930s, but especially from the beginning of the 50s both in Western and Eastern Europe the wave of newly established towns in essence created new urban centres all across the continent and rearranged the settlement patterns of individual countries to some extent. Following World War II on both sides of the divided continent, new towns were founded, but generally speaking all of them in their spatial design, functional and structural makeup followed and adapted to their physical, spatial surroundings. In Western Europe, newly built towns primarily appeared in the outlying metropolitan areas of large urban centres and secondarily in well-established but resurging industrial areas. In Eastern, Central-Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe communist industrial development carved out a prominent role for the newly established towns in industrial regions, mining areas, and transport centres. Simultaneously, the planning of towns with commercial (industrial) and residential functions in the vicinity of large urban centres with already existing industrial capacities served the pre-determined goal of industrial development, so there were rarely spontaneous suburbanization. (UZZOLI 2013.)

Forced industrialization from the beginning of the 1950s had a tremendous impact on Central-Eastern European countries. The first phase in this process was the extensive development of heavy industry. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the industrial development of Central-Eastern Europe did not simply mean the slavish copying of the Soviet example; still analogous patterns prevailed as in the case of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 30s when the *developed capitalist countries* tried to strangle her economically (ENYEDI 1978.).

For the first phase of industrialization to be successful several factors had to be in place. The rapid pace of progress indicates that the entire economic potential of Central-Eastern Europe was allotted to this task. The resulting dominance of heavy industry, especially the energy sector and the steel industry in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was unmistakable, yet, in parallel, the traditional chemical industries also strengthened during this period.

The rapid growth of heavy industry required major development projects, which was accomplished at the expense of other industries. There was also an additional need for labour, mainly recruited from unskilled agricultural workers departing the country for the cities and for a new life. In the selection of the location of an industrial enterprise, accessibility for transportation was traditionally an important precondition. In the case of the resource-poor Central-Eastern European countries, this meant positioning the new industrial facilities near major transport arteries, e.g. the placement of the Romanian and Hungarian steel mills along the Danube. (ENYEDI 1978.) The heavily politicized nature of industrialization similarly led to industrial development projects in the backward agricultural areas and to an increase in the number of industrial workers.

The composition of the labour force underwent radical changes with employment in agriculture being increasingly supplanted by industry-related jobs. The migration of rural populations into urban areas accelerated, thus the proportion of urban populations on the planet doubled in half a century from 19.4% in 1920 to 38.4% in 1970. In Western Europe already 70% of the population lived in cities by this time. (PERÉNYI 1978.)

The chief characteristics of communist urban development consists of strong state intervention in spatial and urban development; forced development schemes and limited actual urbanization and slow pace of growth in the existing urban areas. The prime motive in the establishment of new towns was the industrialization of predominantly rural areas and for that end the new urban centres became the key beneficiaries of state funding allocations. The state economic policies guaranteed the privileges of the status of towns to the new settlements, which as showcases enjoyed extra funding and opportunities through regular economic planning and special development programmes. In most cases, medium-sized towns built around a single factory or industry were representative examples of communist development aims and spatial development programmes. (GERMUSKA 2002,2004.) The forced communist urbanization schemes generated this unique type of urban settlements, which continue to exist and function to this very day. (UZZOLI 2013.)

Naturally, each country exhibited its particular form of urban development. The results were diverse depending on economic conditions and opportunities, and the socio-political agendas set. Following World War I with the creation of the Soviet Union and after World War II with the emergence of communist satellite countries, the social achievements and the political maturity exhibited by the working class demanded greater attention from the governments in the west in affordable housing policies, utilities and infrastructure improvements, as well as in local public transport development.

The primary purpose of the construction of new towns was to neutralize the damage caused by the destruction of World War II. Some European countries, e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany and France, suffered considerable destruction. At the same time, reconstruction heavily impacted the theory and practice of urban planning and construction. Besides the elimination of war damage, the need to build adequate housing and the commencement of infrastructure development projects were also of high priority.

The construction of new towns began mainly in the form of residential or satellite towns of large urban centres. In the newly developed industrial regions, new industrial towns developed, while already existing industrial areas maintained their often unhealthy and cramped living environment. At this time, the concentration of industry and population created large urban agglomerations increasing challenges. Concomitantly, the expansion of road and transporta-

tion systems had its downside as well, since new road networks and hubs were created radically altering the existing relations among settlements. As a general rule, it can be stated that the faster the speed of urbanization was, the less advanced a country had previously been. Among Eastern European cities, fitting examples for rapid reconstruction and growth are Warsaw and Gdynia-Gdansk in Poland, Berlin, Dresden, and Rostock in East Germany; while in the west Birmingham and Coventry in the United Kingdom, and Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt-am-Main in West Germany can be named. The reconstruction of towns and the definition of the principles for building entirely new towns or sections can be approached from multiple angles; firstly from the concentration and strengthening cooperation among plants and factories scattered within city limits, secondly from the revitalization or demolition of obsolete living areas and the construction of modern multi-purpose residential zones, and thirdly from the building of new urban industrial and commercial zones. (UZZOLI 2013.)

In addition to reconstruction, the emergence of entirely new communist-built towns also played a significant role. Despite the common misconception, the new communist-built towns played a limited albeit significant role in the post 1945 urbanization of Central-Eastern Europe. (HAMILTON 1979.) In reality, very few genuinely newly founded towns were built during the communist era. Rather, the majority was constructed through hurried development or merger of already existing settlements, mainly villages, such as Tatabánya, Kazinbarcika, Tychy, and Nova Dubcina. Although the general assumption is that these towns owe their existence to heavy industrial functions, often their *raison d'être* was merely to alleviate the congestion of large cities by being constructed on their peripheries as purely residential settlements, e.g. Petrzalka next to Bratislava, Halle-Neustadt, Rostock-Lütten-Klein, and New Belgrade. (KOVÁCS 2008.) The advent of Soviet-style socialism offered new horizons in urban development, as it could become a consciously executed effort based on all encompassing objective analyses. Prior to World War II, urban development was simply the spontaneous fulfilment of a collection of ad hoc needs; during the communist era carefully executed regional planning schemes covering the entire country established the time, place, and budgetary requirements needed for the realization of every new project. Therefore, it became essential to prepare in every case a thorough economic, geographical, social, and technical feasibility survey. Essentially it was the conclusions thereby gained which delineated the directions of urban development schemes in the country. (RADOS 1975.)

Functionality and ideological consistency also manifested in the architecture and urban development planning of the new towns. The town centres with their public functions, the factories and production plants, and the residential districts consisting of prefabricated blocks of flats were designed to be separate units. (ALEKSANDROWICZ 1999.) In their design the examples of Soviet style architectural philosophy appeared, which originally derived its inspiration from Western European urban planning and development theories. Although residential districts were distinct from industrial zones; however, the green belts often separating the various functional units were either not planned at all or insufficient attention was paid to them. The level of infrastructure and public services, as well as the service sector usually took roughly ten years after the establishment of the new town to reach the degree of sophistication that is suitable for a genuine urban settlement. (UZZOLI 2013.)

When referring to urbanization in former communist countries, it is a question of open debate whether urban development in these countries had some uniquely peculiar features. Many experts believe that the distinctly communist-built towns are not more than industrial

complexes with residential units housing the necessary labour force and were devoid of any genuine features of urbanization. ENYEDI(1988) claims that no significant changes occurred in these towns during the decades of communist rule. The towns simply evolved into liveable living environments which functioned simultaneously as places of employment and residence, and for each, given its socio-economic status, as the venue for suitable leisure activities. Due to the lopsided development of the fifties in the following decade, complex social-economic challenges surfaced. This was partially because of the newly created towns and their lack of proper urbanization as seen in the quality and number of residences, in infrastructure development, in services, and shortage of consumer goods available for the public. By time it became obvious that the labour market was unevenly tilted toward heavy industry which affected the whole economy negatively. The first signs of the gradual devolution of the Hungarian rustbelt were appearing in the sixties; a decade later it became an obvious reality with the emergence of attendant unemployment in industrial regions. (SYKORA 2009.) To mitigate the negative impact of the latter, job creation in the public services sector, education, municipal administration, and commerce could have been a possible solution; however, in many affected localities either not at all or only after a considerable time lapse did such a shift take place, mainly because of a shortage of funds to finance such employment initiatives. Nevertheless, from the sixties onwards, especially in the chemical industry, a qualified modernization had occurred, which strengthened the industrial emphasis of the newly built towns as well.

During the decades of communism in the settlement hierarchies of Central-Eastern and South-eastern Europe, newly built towns with a specific industrial purpose existed in parallel, e.g. the East German Stalinstadt, from 1961 Eisenhüttenstadt, the Polish Nowa Huta, the Bulgarian Dimitrovgrad and Kremikovci, newly built towns with industrial and/or residential functions constructed in the vicinity of existing large or medium-sized industrial cities, e.g. the Polish Nowe Tychy, and the Slovakian Nova Dubnica, as well as heavy industrial centres built with the expansion of already existing smaller settlements with an industrial focus, e.g. the Czech Kunčice and Vitkovice. It should be emphasized that it is often difficult to differentiate the clearly greenfield investment from the urban development projects; therefore a number of overlaps are discernible in this part of Europe. (BARTA 2010).

Following World War II, similar to Central-Eastern Europe, in South-eastern Europe urbanization had also speeded up reaching its apex by the end of the fifties. Communist industrialization, the establishment of new factories with connected development projects all accelerated migration into urban areas. Population growth and the transformation of the nature and functions of localities lead to a modification in the designation of settlement types. In Serbia fifteen (Jesenice, Krani, Titovo Velenje, Borovo, Zenica, Valjevo, Majdanpek, Titovo Uzice, Priboj, Bor, Vranje, Niksic, Titov Vales, Stip, and Kocani) and in Albania four (Elbasan, Qytety Stalin, Ballsh, and Memaliaj) newly built communist towns were founded. The majority of these are mining towns or centres of steel industry. It must be noted that they were not entirely newly built towns, as they had already existed as small settlements from the Middle Ages, but with rapid industrialization they expanded to towns of tens of thousands of inhabitants and became major industrial centres. (FARAGÓ L. – RÁCZSZ. 2010. – quoted in UZZOLI 2013.)

The radical social and economic transformations caused by the regime change in Eastern Europe found the newly built towns unprepared, usually lacking any binding customs and traditions. Upon the collapse of the soviet style communist social and economic system, it became manifest that they were inferior in innovativeness and less suitable to react effectively,

flexibly, and successfully to global challenges and the ensuing severe competition. From the 1980s, it became increasingly obvious that the artificial communist built industrial towns faced a multitude of deteriorating social, socio-economic, and environmental issues. Adapting to the global challenges from the beginning of the 1990s brought forward a new set of inequalities, although signs of their emergence had become apparent from the seventies onwards. High rates of unemployment, superfluous but fragmented heavy industrial production capacities, obsolete technologies, underdeveloped infrastructure, and the enormous scale of environmental pollution even today adversely impact the post-communist newly built towns as spatially manifesting social problems. Partly the causes but also the consequences of the socio-economic problems are a number of demographic processes and phenomena. Subsequent to the regime change, both in a political and economic sense, in many of these towns the flight of active age populations, population aging, and the resulting population loss occurred on a dramatic scale, unfavourably affecting their mid- and long-term development prospects. (UZZOLI 2013.)

A brief history of industrial towns in Hungary from the 1950s until the regime change

In the communist era, the so-called socialist town was one of the last architectural utopias of the 20th century. Originally it was designed to be the ideal urban space for the workers and at the same time a potent symbol of the new society under construction. During the Stalinist period, the 'socialist' town became a rigid system of dogmatic planning formulas. With the gradual erosion of communist orthodoxy, the stiff architectural planning regulations also eased. By the 1970s-80s, the idea of the 'socialist' town became an empty shell and existed merely as a vague collection of preconceived solutions for urban planning. (GERMUSKA 2004.)

In the creation of the communist industrial towns a primary role was played by the post-World War II social-economic and political processes. In one respect, this generated a level of dependency, while on the other it generated new economic, social, and political venues which influenced the landscape in some parts of Hungary fundamentally.

The first generally accepted settlement hierarchy of this country was laid down in György Markos's book *Economic geography of Hungary*. The author emphasized that in the definition of the status of a settlement not only its current, but also its inherited functions must be taken into account, such as population size, the particular historical development traits, spatial characteristics, and the pace of former growth. Nevertheless, it was the contemporary functions which served as the principal basis of qualification of the various types of towns; these were classified as administrative centres, transportation hubs, industrial towns, and agricultural towns. (GERMUSKA 2004.)

In Markos's hierarchy, the new communist-built industrial towns appear as an independent subgroup and include the towns of Ajka, Dunaújváros, Komló, Kazincbarcika, Oroszlány, and Várpalota. He sees these settlements as the products of the planned economies of people's democracies. Barta believes (BARTA 2010) that the new towns built during the communist era do not deserve to be called even 'socialist.' Although they have no precursors and considerably diverge from previously existing towns in their social, economic, and architectural characteristics, they do not possess any attributes to be socialist in essence.

Weclawowitz in his work *The Socio-spatial structure of towns in Eastern Europe* (1992) states that there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a 'socialist' town. In his opinion, socialism in the classical sense had not existed in any of the Eastern European countries in the preceding decades of communist rule. All definitions of 'socialist' towns can be grouped

around two basic principles or preconceptions. The first analyzes the planning of these towns and the principles to be applied in the construction of a 'socialist' town. The second is based on a wide array of analytical analyses of post-war urban development. (WECLAWOWITZ 1992.)

One common aspect of the definitions is that the notions of socialist and industrial towns are intertwined in both. The already established and especially the large-sized settlements could not be easily adapted or moulded to fit the ideological needs of the communist regime; whereas the new industrial towns were viewed as the prototypes of the future, as truly 'socialist' towns. (WECLAWOWITZ 1992.)

Pierre Merlin in his *New towns and European Spatial Development* identifies three types of new towns. His thesis distinguishes the newly established capital cities such as Canberra, Brasilia, Islamabad, the new industrial towns, the majority of which were located in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European satellite countries, i.e. Poland, Hungary etc., and a few so-called company towns, set up by corporations in northern Canada and France. These latter settlements were created by industrial development in formerly rural regions and most often were centred on a single large industrial plant or complex. Additionally, he also distinguishes those planned newly built towns which were established most frequently in the vicinity of large urban centres to alleviate their overcrowding, and to transform existing structures. Pál Beluszky considers industrial towns as distinct settlement types. He also identifies three subgroups in his study. He recognizes 'socialist' industrial towns, e.g. Dunaújváros, Ajka, Kazincbarcika, Komló, Tiszaújváros, Várpalota, Oroszlány, and Martfű, classical industrial towns, e.g. Ózd, Paks, Nyergesújfalu, Simontornya, and Tégglás, as well as industrial towns with a residential function, e.g. Bonyhád, Mór, Dorog, Százhalombatta, Bányaterenyé, Tolna, Sajószentpéter, and Lőrinci. (BELUSZKY 1999.) In Györgyi Barta's study *The twofold interpretation of the 'socialist' town definition* the 'socialist' town registers as a complex socio-economic entity which poses an unsolvable divide among the various employment groups. From the *economic point of view* the large state-owned industrial enterprises were at the focus of communist development policies and as such often played a distinguished role in the life of a particular town or even region. The top management of such state corporations also became notable and influential figures in the town itself and they had an unofficial, but explicit authority in its administration. The peculiar economic system and town structure, but mainly the general social fabric of communist societies was what gave the specific character to the *populace* of the 'socialist' towns. In such towns, stratification and segregation among different segments of the public did not materialize; in the local communities the labour market was dominated by technical and engineering professions both in the white and blue collar jobs, whereas humanities were of marginal importance.

Finally, the last definition pertaining to industrial towns is focusing on their economic prowess by defining them as localities where the majority of the population is being employed in industrial enterprises established specifically there. (TÉRPORTFOGALOMTÁR 2011.)

In Hungary, industrialization and industrial development commenced with substantial delay compared to Western European countries, in reality it started only in the first half of the 19th century. From the 1830s and 40s, politics was an important factor in industrialization, as it served as a tool in the struggle for political and economic independence of the country. (KŐSZEGFALVY 1978.) By reviewing the progress of the pre-1945 industrial development in Hungary, it can be concluded that despite some remarkable successes, the country remained industrially underdeveloped. By 1950, the communist regime commanded the rapid industrialization of the country following preordained 5-year plans, which in theory aimed to eliminate the inherited backward-

ness of the country and instigate comprehensive economic development with a primary focus on industry. In the first decades of communism, the emphasis was placed on the development of heavy industry, especially on industries directly linked with the extraction and processing of natural resources available domestically, such as mining and steel manufacturing. (Kocsis – SCWEITZER 2011.) Forced economic development, especially industrialization with mining, energy, heavy, and armaments industries, were in the centre of the economic policy of the communist regime. With this unbalanced development, within the scope of the first 5-year plan, between 1951 and 1955 industrial production was raised by 130% and a rapid shift occurred in the employment structure. The majority of municipal development projects targeted the urban areas, during this period the level of public services had markedly increased in urban areas and large-sized villages. (Kocsis–SCWEITZER 2011.)

In Hungary, it became a prime task in the building of the new communist social system to bring to an end the unbalanced nature of productive capacities available in the country by utilizing the advantages offered by a planned economic model. New industrial plants were founded, new high capacity coal and oil powered power plants were built, and the productive use of the natural gas deposits began. *By 1968 industrial production more than quintupled and the national income more than tripled compared to the pre-World War II levels.* The employment structure of the population also underwent dramatic changes; with the rapid growth in the number of industrial workers, the country's obsolescence in productive capacities was ameliorated. In the first wave of communist industrialization, from 1947 to 1954, the industrialization of the thus far neglected parts of the country began. The forced industrialization increased manifold the energy needs of the economy, which also entailed the sometimes unsound expansion and exploration of poor quality coal and lignite mines, such mining towns are Oroszlány, Komló, Ajka, and Várpalota, and the construction of a new oil powered power plant and refinery at Százhalombatta based on the newly discovered oil deposits. Of key importance were the towns of Kazincbarcika and Dunaújváros, the latter in addition to the power plant built for the iron and steel smelters also gave home to building material manufacturers and light industries. The communist-built industrial towns in some fields showed marked differences in comparison with the traditional or other types of industrial towns. The historian Pál Gemuskain analysis of this phenomenon gathered five unique features of the 'socialist' industrial towns.

The **first** and perhaps foremost, which was inspired by the ideas Iván Szelényi, is that communist-built towns were favoured politically in general and by the state's economic policies in particular and as such were the preferred recipients of the state redistribution system. This preferential status can be deduced from the designation of such settlements without exception as towns and in the generous allocation of funds in med-term economic plans and in regional as well as urban development programmes.

The **second** characteristic is that the primary purpose in the foundation of communist-built towns was the industrial development of mainly rural areas. (GERMUSKA 2002a.) In most cases, this entailed the establishment of a new industry or large industrial enterprise, which functioned as the primary employer of the local labour force guaranteeing long-term employment.

The **third** main feature is that in the communist-built towns' industry was always the main source of employment or roughly of 60% of the active working population. (GERMUSKA 2002a.) In the various settlements extensive relocations occurred only where industrialization and industrial presence had no legacy. In the specific town under examination the employment structure visibly tilted towards industry, and in accordance by 1972 73.5% of the labour force

was employed in the industrial sector. However, the mere presence of industry is not sufficient to transform a settlement into a genuine town for which an essential role is delegated to the tertiary sector. In the view of Lajos Tímár (GERMUSKA 2002a.) firstly, it is necessary for a properly stratified urban community to possess an employment market fit for all the diverse functions of a town, and secondly, those working in services support the gradual appearance of urban functions. He claims that the communist-built towns were not genuine urban, since that segment was not present in the local community which could serve as its most formative element.

The **fourth** major attribute is that in the communist-built towns' urban traditions were either very weak or nonexistent. (BELUSZKY 1999.) The 'socialist' towns were rootless; they lacked the traditional urban citizenry and social stratification, while the existing infrastructure and institutional background were inadequate as well. The development of a more cosmopolitan set of values could not materialize due to the novelty of these towns. These communities absorbed migrants from varied, though mainly agricultural backgrounds which greatly impacted the developing local values and norms in its own peculiar manner.

The new housing estates were often unable to preserve and maintain the old communal structures or to create new lasting bonds among the new residents, thus promoting social integration. As a further aggravation, the inadequacy of the town centres and the lack of organic wholeness among the diverse parts of these towns jeopardized their successful urbanization.

The **fifth** trait which applied to the communist-built industrial towns was a sustained population growth for a long period of time. Between 1949 and 1990 the population of 'socialist' towns in Hungary increased on average sixfold, whereas all other towns excluding the capital only by 40%. (GERMUSKA 2003a.)

Summarizing the main features of the communist-built industrial towns, nevertheless, did not provide an adequate answer as to what qualifies them to be referred to as genuine towns. As we have seen in the chapter dealing with spatial development in Hungary during the communist era, urban development and the attainment of the status of a town depended on a recommendation by the Presidential Council of the state. The title of a town also carried special consideration and additional financing which clearly benefitted urbanization and the development various distinct sub-units within larger urban communities.

By the 1980s, this urban setting had changed and there appeared new income based spatial divisions reflecting the socio-economic status of their inhabitants because of the spatial development concepts and the transforming economic conditions.

The current study aimed to offer a brief survey on the development spans of European and Hungarian communist built industrial towns. The importance of this topic is further accentuated by the ongoing transformation of towns in which urban heritage may be a dominant factor in shaping of the urban landscape, development policies and spatial adjustments. The second important factor is that there is a considerable divergence between the domestic and European urban development models. Such a phenomenon can be attributed to the varied settlement planning and politico-economic systems during the cold war; yet also to the diverse western and eastern development models and to the types of development projects they supported. Conversely, this means that there are discernible deviations based on former cold war allegiances until today, despite contemporary development paths which seem to materialize uniformly in urban development schemes.

The present work comprises of the description of the various models with their distinctive traits and similarities focusing on the issue of how sustainable are the spontaneous, forced, and advised forms of urban development in our contemporary world. *

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The 1921 Agrarian Reform in Transylvania and its Reflection in the Considerations of the Members of the Bucharest School of Sociology



Abstract The 1921 agrarian reform aimed to be a significant step towards Romania's agricultural development. The main motive of this reform – at least on a declarative level – was a socially oriented one: to expropriate a part of the big landowners' estates, and to distribute in among the poverty-stricken people, with a special concern towards the First World War veterans, or their widows. At the same time, the agrarian reform recognised the differences in development between the different regions of the newly-formed Greater Romania, and as such there were two different laws regulating the reform processes in the Old Kingdom and in the newly annexed territories.

The members of the Bucharest School of Sociology, based on the scarce data available to them to the time, approached the economically questionable results of this reform in a critical manner. József Venczel, who had acquired the bases of his professional knowledge at the same school, also proves, with regard to the Transylvanian land reform, that this had a second, national policy oriented goal, and its implementation was also ethnically biased.

Keywords Venczel József, agrarian reform, 1921, Transylvania, Bucharest School of Sociology, economic history.

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The context of Venczel's orientation towards the analysis of the Romanian agrarian reform

The new geo-political context, as modified by the second dictate of Vienna from August 30. 1940, based on which Northern Transylvania became, once more, part of Hungary, brought on an abundance of institutional changes. These changes unavoidably touched the scientific institutions as well, together with the people who have been activating in this domain.

This period has also brought significant changes upon József Venczel's life, statute, and institutional affiliation. He became a professor at the *Erdélyi Tudományos Intézet* [Transylvanian Scientific Institute], and at the same time, he was appointed the chief of the *Statisztikai és Birtokpolitikai Ügyosztály* [Bureau for Statistics and Land Policy] within the *Erdélyi Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület* [Hungarian Economic Association from Transylvania] based in Kolozsvár.¹ This institution was responsible for the assessment of the economical and agrarian situation of post-1940 Transylvania, and the Bureau led by Venczel was directly responsible for collecting the data pertinent to the situation of the properties in Northern Transylvania. As a result, Venczel had direct access to all the data necessary to render an objective interpretation of the 1921 agrarian reform.

Concerning Venczel's scientific background and intellectual capacity to undertake this assignment, it can be stated that he had a twofold scientific formation, these complementing each other in carrying out the job. Firstly, he had a law degree at the *Universitatea „Regele Ferdinand I”* [“King Ferdinand I” University], where he studied in Romanian language and where, in 1939, also obtained the Doctor of Laws title. Therefore, he possessed the knowledge and skills necessary to construe a certain law. On the other hand, he also benefitted from a second professionalization due to his unyielding interest in village work, his years of writing on the subject, and also due to his subsequent connections with the *Școala Sociologică de la București* [Bucharest School of Sociology], materialized in a semester of “internship” at this school in Bucharest. During this internship, he attended professor Gusti's lectures, had access to the archives of the *Institutul Social Român* [Romanian Social Institute]; participated in the *Muzeului Satului* [Village Museum] inventory process and in the second monographic campaign of Șanț village. These experiences had a marked contribution to József Venczel's scientific orientation, where the focus of his professional interest was ensnared by the operationalization of the biological frame and the economic manifestation,² in the spirit of the positivist-quantitative paradigm, which analysis became a central theme of his research.

The Romanian agrarian reform in the perspective of the members of the Bucharest School of Sociology

Here I would like to present three works, belonging to members of the Bucharest School of Sociology which, both by their content and conclusions may have influenced Venczel's perspective in his critical analysis of the agrarian reform. The first is Mircea Vulcănescu's work published

¹ Nowadays Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

² According to the paradigm developed by Dimitrie Gusti, the social reality can be defined correctly along four frames (natural/cosmological, biological, historical and psychological) and four manifestations (economical, spiritual, legal and political) which, according to the principle of parallelism, have a cause-effect relationship with each other while none of them has the priority over the others. For more information regarding Gusti's paradigm, please refer to Rostás (Rostás 2000, 2001) and Pászka (Pászka 2008, 2009).

in *Sociologie Românească* [Romanian Sociology], entitled *Excedentul Populației Agricole și Perspectivele Gospodăriei Țărănești* [The excess of the agrarian population and the perspectives of the peasant smallholdings].

Vulcănescu's analysis is based on country-level aggregated data, both concerning the data related to the agrarian properties, and the demographical data, related to the population's birth rate. In his analysis, Vulcănescu perceives the Malthusian problem as being very much of actuality in the rural areas of Romania, where the increase of the population, unaccompanied by a significant development in the agricultural production would lead to a further fragmentation of the properties and inherently, to an even bigger decrease of the production levels. Therefore, Vulcănescu sustains – for the above-presented reasons – that the beneficial effects of the agrarian reform may disappear entirely without a major change in the agrarian production methods, where, under these conditions, the winners of this transition would be the middle land-owners, the so-called “kulaks” (VULCĂNESCU 1937. 96–97.). As such, M. Vulcănescu arrives to a first critical observation on the agrarian reform: “[t]hough, socially speaking, it made the Romanian peasant the master of his own exploitation, thus consolidating, at least for a generation, the social peace of the country, from the economic point of view, it is far from being an indisputable success” (VULCĂNESCU 1937. 97.).

Following this, Vulcănescu's study focuses on the economical facet of the analysis of the agrarian reform's effects, lining up, step by step, the arguments sustaining the presented hypothesis. His argumentation starts with the fact that Romania's agricultural production remained centred on cereals, which yield a significant output only when cultivated extensively (at least at that time), stating that the “productivity of the agrarian cultivation has decidedly decreased” (VULCĂNESCU 1937. 97.). This argument is sustained by the agrarian statistical data, which shows that the production level before World War I was higher before the war than in the after-war period. Hence, this decrease in production is the unintended effect of the agrarian reform, due to the fact that the land redistribution was carried out without adequate agricultural know-how. In addition, regarding the peasants' mentality, Vulcănescu quotes Cijaianov, according to whom “this never pursues the maximal profitability, as the capitalist entrepreneur, but always the optimum efficiency, this being the perfect balance between his effort and the gain obtained out of it” (VULCĂNESCU 1937. 99.).

Vulcănescu arrives to the final conclusion that, although the agrarian reform was beneficial – at least on short term – from the social standpoint, seems that – from the economic point of view – it was a major failure.

In the last part of his study, following the Gustist model of social intervention after the detection of the problems, Vulcănescu lays forward a few recommendations which would remedy, in his opinion, the described situation.



In the same spirit was written Nicolae Cornățeanu's study, who asserts, same as Vulcănescu, that the Romanian agrarian reforms have followed the logic of politics, instead of the economics, which led to big mistakes in the conception of the agrarian reforms between 1864 and 1918 (CORNĂȚEANU 1937. 100–101). Therefore, the author suggests a recommendation complementary to the ones forwarded by Vulcănescu, arguing that a law that would warrant the indivisibility of the properties of less than 3 hectares would put an end to the agrarian land fragmentation process, a phenomenon described by Vulcănescu as well (CORNĂȚEANU 1937. 101–102).

In the same issue, no. 2-3 from 1937 of the *Sociologie Românească* journal, there was another study, closely related to the agrarian life in Romania. This was signed by Roman Cresin, and entitled *Care Este Structura Proprietății Agrare din România?* [What is the structure of the agrarian property in Romania?].

The first critique formulated by Roman Cresin at the address of the involved state institutions is the acute lack of information, more exactly the lack of concrete data, which would make any research seem unfounded, based on assumptions only. This shortcoming is mainly due to the inexistence of a regular agrarian census (CRESIN 1937. 90–91.). In this context, any attempt to draw up an objective analysis is enormously hindered. Nevertheless, as an accomplished intellectual who does not perceive the lack of data as an obstacle due to which one should give up their research, and searches for alternative data to give an adequate answer to the problem, Cresin uses five other data sources to carry out his research, the first being related to the results of the agrarian reform. According to the presentation of the data published by the Ministerul Agriculturii și al Domeniilor [Ministry of Agriculture and Properties], it can be stated from the aggregated data – which clearly conceals significant differences between the different types of properties, based on their sizes – that this reform did not ensue as expected. This suspicion is Cresin’s first conclusion as well, who, presenting the established results, asserts that: “[t]herefore, it can be presumed that the situation of the small and medium-sized properties is even less favourable than the one presented in the A and B tables [the repartition of the properties before and after the agrarian reform]” (CRESIN 1937. 92.). Knowing Cresin’s scientific work, characterized by a statistical, quantitative and positivist methodological rigorousness, the figure of speech “it can be presumed” is very uncharacteristic, and can be construed as a critique of the institutions involved.

Analysing the data from other sources than the above-mentioned publication – such as the statistics of the direct taxes, or the preliminary results of the 1930 agricultural census – Cresin arrives to the conclusion that the differences between the results are significant, which does not contribute to a correct and adequate assessment of the agrarian reform.

At the same time, he advises that the agrarian policy should treat the small, medium-sized and large properties differently, as these follow different logics of operation. But, before all else – in the spirit of the Bucharest School of Sociology – he declares that a research, a detailed census is necessary in order to correctly assess the realities of the Romanian agriculture (CRESIN 1937. 95.).

The fact that both Roman Cresin, as well as the other members of the Bucharest School of Sociology, starting with professor Gusti, felt the need of compiling Romania’s Encyclopaedia, this being the declared end-goal of their intellectual efforts, suggests that the volume of the current scientific knowledge on Romania, at least of the knowledge considered as scientifically funded, from Gusti’s point of view, was scarce. This argument is sustained by professor Gusti himself in the foreword of the *60 sate românești* [60 Romanian villages], where he states: “[i]n this era, of the intense organization of our nation, the research of the Romanian realities is very much needed. Efficient actions demand a thorough documentation. Nowadays, the superficiality and the dilettantism are, more than ever before, a crime against the nation. I am sure that only the diagnoses based on the type of research like the one carried out by the [Royal] teams can insure the documentation necessary to draw up a complete plan of organizing the national life” (GUSTI 1941. 5.). From this perspective, we can state that Venczel was a consummate Gustist, as he had entirely attained the same firm attitude towards those who have tried to formulate quasi-scientific conclusions on untested bases or scientifically unverified premises.

There can be no doubt that József Venczel had knowledge of these works, for several reasons. Firstly, the ideas and critiques presented above can be detected in his own works, adopted to the analysis of the effects of the agrarian reform in Northern Transylvania. On the other hand, he had started his analysis by thoroughly researching the pertinent Romanian literature.

The primary analysis compiled by József Venczel of the documents regarding the Transylvanian situation in the Romanian speciality literature

As a first step of his analysis, József Venczel tried to identify all scientific works written by Romanian authors pertinent to the agrarian reform of 1921. Therefore, after reading this literature, the majority of which was published in the French language, Venczel arrived to the conclusion that, in order to form an advised scientific opinion on the matter at hand, he needed to clarify the premises, namely the database that would serve as a basis for comparing the assessment of the effects.

The conclusions of Venczel regarding the books, works and studies written by Romanian authors in this domain is that these can be divided into two categories. The first category is composed by those works that quote or refer to the data initially presented by Dr. Ioan Iacob at the 1921, 15 July debate on the law regarding the agrarian reform, and in his work entitled *Chestia agrară din Ardeal* [The Transylvanian Agrarian Issue] published in 1924. According to Venczel, an array of authors continued to use Iacob's work as an original data source, quoting and analysing it. The other category is represented by Dr. Ion L. Ciomac, who uses Iacob's data with a certain reserve (VENCZEL 1943. 4.).

In the next step, Venczel compares the data used by Iacob – these being the result of the 1919 collection of agrarian data, with the statistical data from the Hungarian archives. The results show a significant difference: according to the Romanian data, the territory annexed from Hungary to Romania was of 14.933.841 “cadastre acres”³, while according to the data based on the registries compiled in 1909 by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this territory was of 17.794.643 cadastre acres, Venczel concluding that “this difference of 2.860.802 cadastre acres⁴ doesn't show in a good light the exactness and the validity of the 1919 collection of agrarian data [mandated by the Directory Council of Transylvania]”

Following this conclusion, Venczel's analysis extends over each category of land – both owned by the natural and the legal persons – and presents the differences between the statistical registries of the two countries. Based on these comparisons, Venczel discovers that at the basis of the data used by I. Iacob is not the 1919 data collection, but the “statistical compilation” (VENCZEL 1943. 5.) drafted by Ion and Ioan Enescu. The data used by Enescu and Enescu are called compilations due to the fact that the recalculation of the surfaces of the different areas based on the original data (from 1895) shows significant differences, which can be traced back to the fact that the agrarian register, and the “statistical compilation” include different administrative territories. This conclusion of Venczel is based on the fact that while Enescu and Enescu consider the totality of the Austro-Hungarian counties annexed to Romania, they did not perform the

³ The most accomplished people listed by Venczel as belonging in this category are: Livius Lazăr, Constantinescu Mititza, Valeriu Bercaru, Constantin C. Damian, and David Mitrany (VENCZEL 1943:3).

⁴ Venczel uses the traditional Hungarian “katasztrális hold” unit, which is equal to 5755 m². In the text, for a better fluency, I use “cadastre acres” in reference to this unit.

necessary corrections. The after-Trianon border was not traced along the borders of the existing counties, and as such, the counties of Western Romania after 1919 are not identical with those from 1895 (VENCZEL 1943. 5–6).

Reverting to the comparison of the Transylvanian land structure from the properties size point of view, Venczel discovers that the major differences between Iacob's and the Hungarian authors' works is caused by the different operationalization of the categories: while at Iacob the medium-size exploitations are defined as the ones under 500 cadastre acres, and the big exploitations have over 500 cadastre acres, Venczel – in accordance with the Hungarian statistics – considers the limit between the medium and big exploitation as being at 1000 cadastre acres.



Here I have to mention that Roman Cresin, in his work on the 1941 agrarian census, published in 1945, also defines the biggest agricultural exploitation category as the properties that have over 500 hectares (meaning approximately 870 cadastre acres).

After analysing the exploitations, Venczel moves forward to the analysis of the Transylvanian ethnical statistics, and proves that, in this case as well, the results are mostly erroneous, as they are based either on assumptions, or on obsolete data.

In conclusion, it seems that the last sentence from Venczel's presented work has, scientifically speaking, a universal validity: "[t]he propaganda disguised as science didn't serve, because it couldn't serve the justice" (VENCZEL 1943. 19).

The reflexions of József Venczel on the 1921 Romanian agrarian reform

This process of studying the effects of the reform has started in 1940, and after publishing his results, Venczel also made suggestions with regard to the 1945 agrarian reform, so we can state that this scientific interest was consistent on this issue.

In his works concerning the 1921 agrarian reform from Romania, Venczel aimed to test the main argument called forth by the state authorities, namely that the agrarian reform had as purpose the reorganization of the properties in order to guarantee the people's livelihood.

Firstly, to present the importance of the issue, Venczel gathered all the Romanian bibliographical references dealing with the agrarian reform, arriving to the impressive number of 384 articles (VENCZEL 1942. 3.).

The problem of the 1921 Romanian agrarian reform starts with the fact that we cannot talk about it at singular, as there were two separate laws: one with number 82 from July 17, 1921, which regulated the expropriations from the Romanian Old Kingdom, including Oltenia, Muntenia, Moldavia and Dobruja, and a second law under number 93 from 30 July, 1921, regulating the agrarian reform from Transylvania, the Banat [Bánság], Crişana [Kőrösvidék], and Maramureş [Máramaros].

After the delimitation of the territories, materialized in the legislative framework as well, Venczel asserts that these approaches were legitimate, as the two territories were characterized by different histories and different evolutions of the agrarian life and economy. Given the geopolitical context in which Venczel analysed the effects of the agrarian reform, in his works he mostly focused on the effects of the second law, regarding Transylvania, the Banat, Crişana, and Maramureş. At the same time, the data that had been at Venczel's disposal granted only the

possibility to analyse the effects generated in those territories which, in 1918–1940, were parts of Romania, and as such felt under the Romanian legislation, and at the moment of the 1941 census were part of Hungary, namely Northern Transylvania.

The analysis of the Transylvanian agrarian reform starts with the comparison of the two laws, and identifies in the following ten points the differences between them, which concern both the circle of persons falling under the incidence of the law, as well as the differences in implementation:

1. The law regarding the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has a more narrow scope, it only aims to increase the surfaces of the peasant-owned farms, to create commonage pastures and to meet certain public needs, so, unlike the law regarding Transylvania, it does not have in its purview the expropriation of forests in order to modify certain aspects of the economical balance (such as helping the labourers, functionaries or other categories of people with small means by giving them forest shares). In this respect, the law regarding the Old Kingdom does not exceed the concept of “agrarian reform”.

2. The law regarding the Old Kingdom has certain limits set concerning the minimum surface (100 hectares) of the estates which are subject to expropriation, and to the maximum surface (2,000,000 hectares) that can be expropriated, while the Transylvanian law has no such limits. In Transylvania 2,655 estates having under 100 hectares of agricultural land were expropriated; 74.9 per cent of these were in Hungarian, 13.1 per cent in German, and only 4.7 per cent were in Romanian ownership.

3. There are significant differences between the expropriation of the Crown’s estates and the estates owned by public persons and corporations, institutions, foundations etc. These properties are subject to expropriation in the Old Kingdom only with regards to the cultivable land, and the law provides that the estates under twelve hectares belonging to churches and schools remain untouched, while the Transylvanian law granted fewer such exceptions and established a smaller maximum limit.

4. Venczel observes significant differences between the two laws regarding the maximum surface over which the excess is to be expropriated, in all categories of expropriations (plain, hillside or mountain estates). Venczel sums the differences in the below presented table:

in cadastre acres	Old Kingdom	Transylvania
in case of the estates given in tenure at a certain, specified moment	174	50-100
in case of undividable estates, per owner	174	50
in case of hillside and mountain estates	174	50-100
in case of estates situated in plains		
in case of big apportionment needs	261	200
in case of moderate apportionment needs	348	300
in case of satisfied apportionment needs	434	500

The limit of acreages over which the remained area can be expropriated⁵

5. The above presented limits also show differences in the construction of the two laws, regarding the properties considered as composing one estate. In the Transylvanian law, all the

⁵ Data source: VENCZEL 1942. 22.

properties, even if they were situated in different geographical locations, of the same owner are considered as one estate, so the surface above the mentioned limit is subject to expropriation. In the law regarding the Old Kingdom, only the properties held in the same village or in the nearby villages are considered to sum up an estate, and as such, the expropriation can be applied separately on the different estates held by the same owner.

6. There is also a difference regarding the descendants pursuing agricultural studies. The law concerning the Old Kingdom insures the possibility of withholding 50 hectares of land for each son who is enrolled in a school with agricultural profile. The Transylvanian law allows this option for only one son and also decreases the surface which can be withheld by specifying half of the fathers' non-expropriable property, which in most cases cannot be more than 50 cadastre acres.

7. The laws concerning the Old Kingdom and Transylvania also treat the middle-sided estates differently. The law regarding the Old Kingdom provides that the surfaces expropriated from the hillside and mountain estates, which were under tenure at the moment specified by the law, can be apportioned in parcels of at least twenty-five hectares or more and the surfaces expropriated from the mountain and hillside estates cultivated by the owner can be apportioned in parcels of minimum fifty hectares or more. In Transylvania, the law regarding these estates only provides that these can also be the subject of expropriation if needed. Only in Northern Transylvania, estates under fifty cadastre acres belonging to 1,322 Hungarians, 286 German ethnics and 315 others were subject to expropriation in a proportion of 51.4 per cent, and estates between 50 – 100 cadastre acres belonging to 140 Hungarians, 7 German ethnics and 66 others were subject to expropriation in a proportion of 53.3 per cent.

8. The Old Kingdom and Transylvanian law also differs in the amount and nature of the just compensation given in exchange for certain expropriated areas and also in the amount established as a maximum limit of the state reserve.

9. The agrarian reform laws concerning the Old Kingdom and Transylvania also differ in regard of the price established for the expropriations. While the price for the expropriations in the Old Kingdom is established based on the situation of 1917 and the following five years, in Transylvania this price is established based on the situation from 1913 and the preceding five years. The Transylvanian law also provided a leeway in the price for expropriations by establishing the prices in Romanian lei and the exchange rates with the Hungarian Korona.

10. Finally, Venczel points out the characteristic differences in the composition of the expropriation committees. While the expropriation committees in the Old Kingdom include one representative of the owners and one of the villagers, the Transylvanian law does not provide for the representation of any of these categories (VENCZEL 1942. 19–26.).

Based on the above presented points, Venczel concludes that: “[t]he Transylvanian law is much more radical from every point of view: the law of expropriation is extended of every branch of the agriculture, tampers incomparably more with the traditional property policy processes, mercilessly breaks the secular order of the commonage, constricts the private properties under the minimal level, broadens the sphere of the concept of absenteeism disregarding the international treaties, and doesn't refrain from using such means and methods that lead to an economical degradation, and, leaving the Transylvanian people aside, entrusts the implementation of the democratic reforms to the organs of the authority” (VENCZEL 1942. 27.).

In the third chapter of his analysis, after presenting the differences between the two laws, Venczel proceeds to the comparison of the agricultural and social situation between the two parts of Romania.

Concerning the situation of the Old Kingdom, Venczel appeals to Adolf Gustav Klein's work⁶, according to whom the division of the agricultural properties was the worst possible, as, on one hand there were the big estates, concentrated in the ownership of a handful of people, and then there were the peasant properties, so small that they could not even sustain their owners. There was no such thing as a middle peasantry, but actually, by our construal of the concept, we cannot talk about a peasantry at all – summarizes Klein. In parallel with this situation – continues Venczel, based in continuation on Klein's work, in Transylvania "the percentage of the land owned by the peasants, who also own livestock and tools, is up to seventy percent of the total land in usage even if the properties are not very big, (between 5-15 acres), and the land is not as fertile as in the Old Kingdom, the Transylvanian peasant manages to secure the livelihood of his family" (VENCZEL 1942. 28.).

Another aspect by which the land ownership system differs between Transylvania and the Old Kingdom is the ownership and the function of the medium and big estates. In this respect, those estates which also fulfilled a social function – such as the commonages, which were almost completely absent in the Old Kingdom – fell into the category that was expropriated by the law of the agrarian reform, and as such, the peasants who were dependent on the proceeds of these properties have lost an important source of income. From this point of view – summarizes Venczel – the Transylvanian agrarian reform was more an antisocial, then a social one.

Analysing the legitimacy of the law regulating the agrarian reform, Venczel shows that, if we remove the commonage estates over 100 acres or 50 hectares from the list, we see that in Transylvania the percentage of the estates bigger then this limit was of 15,5%, while in the Old Kingdom this proportion was of 30 % (VENCZEL 1942. 30.).

Another argument forwarded by Venczel in order to present the cardinal differences between the two territories is the fact that while Transylvania did not see any peasant uprising since 1849, in the Old Kingdom there were a string of uprisings and social movements, fuelled by the desperate situation of the peasantry who have been pushed to the brink of subsistence level.

But if these differences were so sharp, why was an agrarian reform needed in Transylvania? – asks Venczel. He attempts to answer this question once again with the help of A. G. Klein, according to whom there was a thesis in the Romanian policy which also constituted an internal propaganda: "This thesis, which had become the common conviction of both the Romanian people and their leaders, stated that »the expropriation in Transylvania, based on national policy is as much as legitimate as the expropriation abroad (in the Old Kingdom) based on social policy «" (VENCZEL 1942. 31.).

In the next chapter, Venczel proves, based on the data that, at least between 1910-1916, the situation that occurred in Transylvania could have been construed as an agrarian reform realized in a natural manner, in the benefit of the Romanian ethnics. (VENCZEL 1942. 46.).

After presenting the precursory situations, Venczel moves on to actual the analysis of the agrarian reform in Transylvania. Venczel bases his analysis on the data published by Mititza Constantinescu, Gheorghe Ionescu-Șișești and Emil Petrini, who describe the most accurately the effects of the agrarian reform between 1920 and 1940. Based on the data of the 1941 Hungarian census, which thus included Northern Transylvania, Venczel calculates the percentage of the expropriated amount of the estates, broken into categories:

⁶ Klein, Gustav Adolf (1927): Soziale und nationale Probleme der Agrarreform in Siebenbürger in Deutsche Politische Hefte, Sibiu.

micro and small estates under 50 cadastre acres	51.4
small estates between 50 – 100 cadastre acres	53.3
medium sized estates between 100 – 500 cadastre acres	44.3
big estates over 500 cadastre acres	62.6

The percentage of the expropriated areas out of the totality of the estates⁷

By these calculations Venczel disproves the declared anti-feudal character of the Transylvanian agrarian reform, given that the small estates were also subject of expropriation, and in a quite big percentage, especially when compared to the data regarding the big estates.

After analysing the expropriation of the agricultural lands, Venczel continues with the analysis of the wooded properties which were expropriated only in Transylvania, as this regulation was not present in the law pertaining to the Old Kingdom. As a final conclusion, he asserts that only one quarter of this type of land was awarded as apportionment of property, the rest was either given to different institutions, or retained as a state reserve, which does not coincide with the logic of the declared social policy.

Analysing the expropriations and the apportionments of property from the ethnic perspective, also on the basis on the census data, Venczel shows that, among those persons who did not own any property before the agrarian reform were more Hungarians, than Romanians, but the apportionments of property intently favoured the latter category.



Arriving to the analysis of the effects of the agrarian reform in Transylvania, Venczel proves both by analysing the text of the law and by the statistical results that, from the economic standpoint, this was, at least in Transylvania, very unsuccessful. An eloquent example is that one of the most populous categories – consisting of 67.288 people – was apportioned only with 1 cadastre acre parcels (0.58 hectare).

As Venczel presents the dates published by Petrini,⁸ from 1928, it shows the following situation:

receives 1 cadastre acre	67,228	people entitled by the law
receives 2 cadastre acres	83,987	people entitled by the law
receives 3 cadastre acres	68,557	people entitled by the law
receives 4 cadastre acres	43,980	people entitled by the law
receives 5 cadastre acres	14,745	people entitled by the law
receives 6 cadastre acres	999	people entitled by the law
receives 7 cadastre acres	1,183	people entitled by the law

The real effect of the Romanian land reform⁹

Venczel, analysing the volume of the land available through expropriations in Northern Transylvania, and accepting the arguments of Nicolae Cornățeanu, according to whom the minimal amount of land which is worth cultivating in order to insure a limited standard of living for a family is 3 hectares (= 5,2 cadastre acres), reaches the conclusion that, even if the

⁷ Data source: VENCZEL 1942. 54.

⁸ PETRINI, EMIL: *Reforma agrară*. Transilvania, Banatul, Crișana și Maramureșul 1918–1928. p.310

⁹ Data source: VENCZEL 1942. 67.

total available land was to be expropriated (regardless if this was farmland or pasture), it still would not be sufficient for everyone entitled. Convergent to this reasoning, Venczel reminds of Vasile C. Osvada's protest regarding the project of the law concerning Transylvania, and for the economic analysis he mentions Paul Nițescu's work, who characterizes the agrarian reform as a pulverization of the wealth, as the arithmetical mean of the parcels appropriated to the entitled persons was of 2.06 cadastre acres. It is understandable that at this point Venczel quotes a phrase of N. Cornățeanu, who characterized the situation of the time by the idea of "peasants made equal in misery".



After analysing the local data, Venczel – as expected from a researcher socialized at the Bucharest School of Sociology – switches to the international level and compares the data regarding Transylvania and the Old Kingdom with several European countries. From this comparison, he determines that, compared to the 1904–13 period, in the 1930–38 period the agricultural output of the Old Kingdom and of Transylvania has suffered a significant decrease – the only exception being the rye in the Old Kingdom – trend that cannot be detected in most of the European countries. These data also support the conclusion that the Romanian agricultural situation was better before the implementation of the agricultural reform than afterwards. In this respect, Venczel also quotes A. Frunzănescu's study, who qualifies the period after the First World War as the "regressive period of the Romanian agriculture" (VENCZEL 1942. 81.). Even if, quoting G. Ionescu-Șișești's work from the Romanian Encyclopaedia, Venczel concedes that these negative results are not entirely due to the agrarian reform, he still asserts very strongly that this reform has been carried out in a most unprofessional and – in the case of Transylvania – ethnically biased manner. At the end, he also states that "[t]his isn't only a national or political problem, but we are talking about the science of building a nation" (VENCZEL 1942. 81.).

This last remark can be interpreted as a critique towards the former political leadership of Romania who seem to have neglected – at least in the case of the Transylvanian agricultural reform – the social and economic realities of this area, making its decisions based exclusively on political arguments. Even more, this argument can be conceived as a nod to Dimitrie Gusti and the Bucharest School of Sociology (at a time of them being citizens of different countries, holding several opposite interests) who, by his "science of nation" established the scientific groundwork of constructing a nation based on the social and economic realities.

Following the changes underwent after 1940, materialized in a territorial adjustment of several countries, the censuses became an effective tool of procuring information regarding the demographic and economic realities of the newly-formed countries. As such, in parallel with Hungary, an agricultural census also took place in the 1941's Romania – that is, without the territories annexed to other countries from the Greater Romania: Northern Transylvania, Bessarabia and Southern Dobruja. The technical leadership of Romania's General Census was entrusted to Dr. D. C. Georgescu and the works of the Agrarian census to Mr. Roman Cresin.

This pair of Gustist disciples, engaged in key positions of the census, guaranteed its correct and professional execution. This census also had the aim – which it successfully completed – to provide data about (quoting I. Butoi's title) "The interwar Romanian village, a »Terra Incognita«". (BUTOI 2011.).

Although the publication of this data was only a compilation of provisory data, it managed to provide a detailed image concerning the situation of 1941 Romanian agriculture. In this respect,

it is an informative work, and as such it lacks the remarks, interpretations and explanations.

The late publishing of this work – in 1945 – did not take away much of its value and actuality, as in 1945 a new agrarian reform was about to be implemented, by the new pro-communist government which took over the power in Romania.

From the works presented above, it can be seen that the authors belonging to the Bucharest School of Sociology have unanimously criticised this reform as being an unprepared, scarcely documented and unprofessionally carried out endeavour. They all agree on the fact that the small size of the appropriations caused a significant hindrance in the agricultural production. The one significant difference is that, while the Romanian authors recognize the social legitimacy of this reform, on the Hungarian part, namely in József Venczel's opinion, it was perceived as a socially unjust and ethnically biased enterprise. *

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Social network based approaches in the research on religion in Central-Eastern Europe¹



Abstract The network science, based on network theory is a fairly new and innovative field and its approaches are groundbreaking in many aspects. The social scientific applications of the network analysis methods and concepts have been built on the results of network science. Thus, the social network analysis of religious networks is grounded on the methodological principles and assumptions of network analysis, especially social network analysis as it has developed in recent years. In this study the author gives a review of the application of social network theory and social network analysis in the sociology of religion in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach of sociological study of religious faith and religious groups is usually based on empirical research and interpretation of the research results. The sociology of religion has a broader perspective in studying religious life, but the religious social networks usually mirror other characteristics of the studied religious entities and phenomena to make it an interesting subject of research.

Keywords social network analysis, religious social network, religions research, congregational social network, Central and Eastern Europe

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In this study I plan to review the application of social network theory and social network analysis in the sociology of religion in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach of sociological study of religious faith and religious groups is usually based on empirical research and interpretation of the research results. The sociology of religion has a broader perspective in studying religious life, but the religious social networks usually mirror other characteristics of the studied religious entities and phenomena to make it an interesting subject of research. The network science, based on network theory is a fairly new and innovative field, and its approaches are groundbreaking in many aspects. The social scientific applications of the network analysis methods and concepts have been built on the results of network science. Thus, the social network analysis of religious networks is grounded on the methodological principles and assumptions of network analysis, especially social network analysis as it has developed in recent years. The subjects of research can be the members of religious communities or the communities themselves in this approach.

In the social network analysis method, the selected units of analysis, the cases are represented by nodes, and the connections between them are represented with lines. There can be many forms of connections among different nodes, so there might be different lines used to represent them. The mapping of a religious social network is supposed to be done on an empirical basis, and the results of the mapping shall be interpreted in an objective way. The graphical outcome of social network analysis – in other terms the graph – represents the place of the different actors in the network by points or nodes, and the connections between the different nodes with lines. The interpretation of the graphs is done by the researchers with the help of the graphics and statistical measures. Conclusions can be drawn based on the examination and statistical analyses about the characteristics of the social network. If the researcher wants to go into further detail, there are specific measures developed by network scientists to test their different hypotheses empirically about the network. This new method offers a whole range of new possibilities to do more detailed research on religious networks, but its diffusion among researchers of religion is very slow.

The first instance of using social network analysis in a religious setting can be traced back to the work of Sampson who performed the network analysis of eighteen trainee monks in a monastery (SAMPSON 1969; cited by HERMAN 1984). There were other sociologists applying the traditional sociometric approach to religious groups in the sixties and seventies, for example for clique detection and clustering of individuals. The patterns of the social networks were not examined in the works of this era. (HERMAN 1984).

Another very important boost was given to the SNA method when social scientists realized that the social network parameters of local congregations can be crucial in group development. The social relations developed in the local religious group – congregation settings were vital for the longevity of the group itself. HOGÉ and ROOZEN (1979) realized in their research that social factors, such as relationships in a religious group can be well more important in normal cases than the theological disposition. Such result contributed to the widespread diffusion of the social network approach and the SNA method in the American sociology of religion.

I follow the concept of FREEMAN (2004) to identify works that can be categorized based on the usage of SNA methods. He states that the works can be distributed into four categories based on the depth and methodological instances of SNA's application. The four categories are: the scientific work either or fully "(1) involves the intuition where the links among social actors are important. (2) It is based on the collection and analysis of data that record social relations

that link actors. (3) It draws heavily on graphic imagery to reveal and display the patterning of those links. And (4) it develops mathematical and computational models to describe and explain those patterns” (FREEMAN 2004). The four categories are usually combined in contemporary SNA articles.

I have selected Central and Eastern European articles dealing with religion and social capital which have at least references to social networks. I present my findings based on Freeman’s category system.

The social network approach in Central Eastern Europe: the transition era researches

The historical differences in the development of the societies of the region are very significant compared to the societies of other world regions, but among the countries of the CEE region we can easily identify many parallel processes. Based on the theories of key thinkers such as Paul Zulehner, Miklós Tomka and András Máté-Tóth (MÁTÉ-TÓTH – MIKLUŠČÁK – ZULEHNER – TOMKA – TOŠ 2000; Miklos TOMKA – ZULEHNER, 1999; Miklós TOMKA – ZULEHNER 2000), we can state with a high degree of confidence that Central and Eastern Europe has its special regional characteristics in the field of religious faith and belonging, historical and social issues and common value and identity elements determined by the common socialist past.

The most important factor of the CEE region serving as the base of cohesion is the common past that the countries share, and the common experience with the political transition of 1989–1991. The countries used to belong to a block dominated by the Soviet Union which was an absolute power that determined all aspects of social and religious life, and acted like an empire. Its political interests and social value system were forced on all countries in its zone of influence. The Soviet “empire” was not new to the inhabitants of the CEE region, as they had already known historically other empires, such as the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire which had formerly governed them. The phenomenon of being controlled from a distant political centre with limited degree of autonomy in different matters is a common experience in these countries. The political transition was a major breakthrough in gaining freedom and autonomy in this region which largely contributed to the emergence of nationalism region-wide in all the societies in question (MÁTÉ-TÓTH, 2010). The political transition was a major event that seemed to be promising for the entire population of the CEE region, and there were many illusions attributed to it; it was followed by a general expectation of swift social and economic rise in the respective countries. The civil societies of the countries of the region were lacking the real communities “healthy” societies usually have. The “negative modernization” theory of Elemér Hankiss even claimed a general decrease in the communitarian attitudes – a widespread atomization in the societies and infantilisation of the general public.

Most of the communitarian activities were controlled by the state itself before the regime change in these countries. After the significant political event, societies alone had no basis to organize a healthy civil society, whilst the churches already had significant independent social activities in process. For example, in Hungary the Catholic Church had the youth small-groups movement working underground and in addition to the official Church structure, the small neo-protestant churches had the “Council of Free Churches” – (“Szabadegyházak Tanácsa”, researched by SZIGETI and RAJKI (2012), and there were many other known religion-related activities of that time. It is fair to say that the transition was preceded and followed by a religious “revival” or by a higher average level of activities of religion-based communities in most societies, which shaped

the characteristics of the entire event and time period. Social networks based on religious commitment and belonging had a huge role in overcoming the communist past, firstly by actively helping to eradicate the state socialist system, and secondly by helping to build the democratic powers to take over after the regime change. These instances of religious social networking were the first phenomena widely studied by theologians, scholars of religious studies and sociologists of religion. This religious communitarianism decreased to a great extent in the late nineties, and lost its significance of providing a solid basis of social integration and cohesion.

The religious movements of the CEE transition era: Movimenti and others

The social integration and the new social cohesion were largely determined by religious communitarianism in the era of political transitions in the Central and Eastern European societies. There are many religious movements – most of them acting as social movements themselves – researched in Hungary and in other CEE countries. The general theory of “Movimenti” was elaborated by the example of the Roman Catholic Church in the nineties, but it may refer to the communitarian achievements of the Second Vatican Council as well. The theory had the aim to distinguish between movements and communities, and it refers to lay people living some form of community life. The “Movimenti” members of the different countries started to meet regularly in 1984 on the World Youth Day.

If attempt to review the basic Hungarian bibliography related to Movimenti, we have to mention the work of István KAMARÁS (1994) with the title: “Inwardly oriented bases – Bensőséges Bázisok” about the small Catholic communities existing in the era of the political transition. János Dobszay wrote an important book about the history of the Catholic social movement in Hungary “Regnum Marianum” (DOBSZAY 1991.). András Máté-Tóth compiled a book about another influential social movement of the time called “Bokor – Bush” led by a Catholic monk-priest called György Bulányi (MÁTÉ-TÓTH 1996). These works usually contain details about the social structure and networks of these groups, this aspect was inevitably a part of the different analyses, but it was not obviously the most important part.

In a review of the era, MÁTÉ-TÓTH (2011) writes about forty years of persecution of the underground Catholic movements after the Second World War. According to his opinion, the movements served the renewal and passing on of Christian beliefs, and the members of the small groups were priests, members of different congregations and lay people as well. Máté-Tóth calls these people heroes of faith in his writing, based on their deeds. Obviously, these community leaders had a major role in shaping the groups’ norms and values, as well as the important characteristics of the social network in these small religious groups.

The research of small Catholic communities

István Kamarás writes about small Catholic communities in Hungary after 1945 in his book entitled “Intimate Bases” (1994). These small communities represent simultaneously the unchanged original ideas, the belonging to the Church and the continuous renewal of religious groups. There are major spiritual movements inside the church, and the driving forces of these movements are usually the small communities. Kamarás estimated the number of such communities to 2-3000, their total membership around 30-40 000 and the average groups size to 8 to 15 members. The majority of the members were Catholics.

Kamarás researched different aspects of these groups: he examined the religious practice in different groups, the different activities inside the groups and the different types of these small groups. He highlighted four different movements: the more than 80 year-old Regnum Marianum movement, which was mainly active in raising preadolescent boys but had its organizational profile broadly extended over the time; the Bokor (Bush) movement established by the Schola Piaie monk-priest Györy Bulányi, which proclaimed non-violence, poverty and the strict following of the role model of Jesus; the international movement Fokoláré became popular in Hungary, teaching the importance of living the love of Christ in the everyday life, established by Chiara Lubich; and the Charismatic movement, which have taught the direct involvement of the Holy Spirit in people's everyday lives.

Kamarás examined different network characteristics of small communities, partly belonging to the four introduced major groups. The research questions were about the groups' leadership models, integration and legitimacy of group membership and leadership, the openness and closeness of different groups, and the characteristics of the members of different groups'.

Kamarás's important conclusion about social networks is that small group setting in the Catholic are usually formed around a priest or a charismatic layperson. Kamarás realized that the small groups have different life-cycles, based on group characteristics. He examined in-group dynamics and in-group conflicts, and their effects on the operation of the group. When he wrote about the small groups' out-group connections, he mentioned, that such connections "are low in number even in the early nineties". (KAMARÁS 1994. 108.) The communities rarely had connection to the leadership of their own Church; their leaders were usually harassed by the state police and the communist secret agents. Half of the small groups had no connection to any kind of religious organization at all. This is partly caused by intentional self-separation (e.g. Bokor). Kamarás also examined the individual members and their sociological characteristic. In conclusion, we can say that he did a social network analysis without making a sociometrical analysis or drawing a social network map. His research is invaluable to the sociology of religion, as most of the small groups have disappeared, and the facts that Kamarás had recorded can serve as important factors in understanding the religiosity of the transition era Hungary. The research is significant in the social network researches of religion topic as well. Kamarás applied the concepts and some methods of social network analysis because of the nature of his research topic.

The research of Regnum Marianum

The Regnum Marianum is a Catholic spiritual movement of Hungarian origins. It was established by Hungarian priests on the verge of currents of Catholic spiritual movements worldwide. Its organization dates back to 1896, but it was legally established in 1903. It was founded by nine Catholic priests working independently in parishes. Its original idea was to organize a worldly priest community without the members taking oaths. Its original goal was to help young boys who spent their leisure time on the streets without meaningful activities (DOBSZAY 1991). The organization was forcefully disbanded under state socialism in 1951, and its leaders were imprisoned. The movement became an underground movement, and struggled heavily against communist oppression by performing and maintaining its activities, establishing small groups and spreading its spirituality. The network approach is seldom present in the work of Dobszay, as his review is mostly historical, but we can conclude that a strong social network of Regnum Marianum groups were active in the 70s, 80s and early 90s. These groups were forced into hid-

ing and secretive operation, but served as a religious social network for the maintenance of the movement's ideas.

The Bokor movement

The "Bokor" movement operated in a special way: it was organized the way how Jesus organized his network in Biblical times (Mate-Toth, 1996; Zsummera, 1998). The organization operated with intense and effective relationships among members who were organized into small groups with approximately 12-15 active members. These small communities were organized into a large religiously based social network, with solid personal ties giving the cement of trust this social movement had – and which enabled it to resist the efforts of the communist secret police to invade the groups. The main idea was about network growth: it was envisaged that the members joining the "Bokor" would develop spiritually in the communities, and would eventually reach adulthood, and establish new small groups with their leadership. In this manner, the social network was supposed to grow like a bush – which did not happen because of the lack of personal skills and motivation. The communities were held together by organizers who were responsible for organizing the meetings and to oversee them. The communities were organized into branches, and branch leaders were elected to enhance horizontal communication inside the community. The communities and the branches were independent, and had regular meetings with different topics. The members were men and women coming from different backgrounds, coming together every two-three weeks and in the summer in a larger event to talk about important questions of faith, life and society. The "Bokor" movement is an excellent example of social networking applied, and its scientific analyses are the first to apply this network approach to the analysis of religious communities in CEE.

The leader of Bokor had a lot of influence on the organization, and Máté-Tóth (MÁTÉ-TÓTH 2011.) introduces his concept of everyday life heroes through the life and work of Father György Bulányi, the leader of the Bokor Movement. According to him, these heroes, including Bulányi were symbolic figures in the religious field and society as well. Máté-Tóth divided the communist era into two phases, the first between 1945 and 1974, and the second between 1975 and 1990. In this paper, I mainly focus on the second phase called analogically the "Babylonian Captivity" by Máté-Tóth. This second phase was a much less violent era than the first, with less obstacles to religious organizations, but the harassments of the state police and secret agents did not stopped (MÁTÉ-TÓTH 2011).

Religious social networks in Hungary before the political transition

We can conclude, based on the works of Kamarás, Dobszay and Máté-Tóth that the social network analysis concept was widely used in the research of Movimenti groups in pre-transitional Hungary. These groups could not operate freely inside the Hungarian society; they were closely monitored by the police and the secret service. There were obvious violent attempts to regulate or even restrict the operations of these groups. This outside pressure forced these groups to organize themselves in a special and protective way to prevent the infiltration of secret agents and other possible invaders.

Post-transition era examples of social network approach in the CEE sociology of religion

Gabriella Pusztai applied the social capital and social network aspects in her work about denominational schools in Hungary (2004). She applied and tested the concepts of Pierre Bourdieu and James Samuel Coleman about cultural capital and the strength of religious social networks with a survey research among high school students attending denominational schools in Hungary. She notes that denominational schools in Hungary are founded on the grounds of tight social networks of believer parents. The schools have also very strong and connected social networks in the grades which makes the students perform better compared to other schools in the academic field. This advantage is not present in public schools or non-religious private schools, because they lack the strong social network surrounding them. The students of denominational schools who come from families with religious background perform better than the children who come from a non-religious background, according to the findings of the research. The concept of Coleman about the better performance of students coming from closed social networks governed by norms was justified in Hungary (PUSZTAI 2004).

BAHOVEC, POTOČNIK and ZRINŠČAK (2007) wrote about social capital and religion. Their article is one of the first reviews in Central Eastern Europe about the problem. They put the theory of social capital in the centre of their research, and did secondary analysis of available EVS survey data to look at the situation in different European countries. They speak about social networks, but they do not apply any direct form of network analysis.

In their research about New Religious Movements in Hungary, MÁTÉ-TÓTH, TÖRÖK and NAGY (2008) applied the concepts of social embeddedness in the surveyed religious groups, and the social network concept to see the operation of different NRM networks. They discovered that higher level of social embeddedness and inwardly oriented social network were in strong connection with the high level of religiosity and religious attendance in the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The Witnesses had a very strong inwardly oriented social network, most of the individuals' friends were coming from the group, there were only some work colleagues in the social network. Weaker social ties linked members to colleagues who were not Witnesses. Marriage connections were formed almost exclusively among the members. The inwardly oriented, closed social network was based on an exclusivist view on salvation as the utmost religious good, and was paired with a perception of hostility of the general society towards the members of the group (MÁTÉ-TÓTH et al. 2008).

The same research investigated Hungarian Scientologists as well. The findings suggest a more heterogeneous social network compared to the Jehovah's Witnesses. The Scientologists had strong connections outside the religious group, and marriages were not exclusively formed inside the group. The Scientologists tried to establish good connections with the outside World, but still perceived the society's disapproval of their group. (MÁTÉ-TÓTH et al. 2008)

The research among Scientologists was extended and continued by MÁTÉ-TÓTH and NAGY (2011). A survey research was performed among more than 400 Hungarian Scientologists with a questionnaire putting a special emphasis on social network and social capital aspects. The findings suggested strong in-group solidarity, governed by a special set of network norms, built on a strong social network of religious group members. The social network acted as a safety net for Scientologists, it also provided business and employment opportunities for group members. The social network of the religious group was diverse and homogeneous, and it seemed to be able to help the individual members, as a high percentage of respondents said that they have received

help from / given help to other Scientologists. The most important form of support was friendly advice, but there was a high proportion of people lending money to other group members, and group members were using their social network to help other members find a job or contracts by having a say in favour of them (MÁTÉ-TÓTH – NAGY 2011).

NAGY (2010) published an article about the connections of social capital and religion, and the role of religious social networks in social capital formation. The article presented the main concepts of social capital, and did a review on the Central and Eastern European researches. It can be said that the social capital concept was pretty influential, with obvious application in the religious field, but social networks were not studied directly. The social networks were regarded as only one dimension of religious social capital by most researchers.

Sinziana PREDA (2011) studied the social network and identities of Romanian and Czech Baptists. The case of the Romanian immigrant Baptists in the Czech Republic was explained with the social network concept. Romanian Baptist immigrants moved to the Czech lands, escaping from economic hardships. Their religious social network provided protection for them, while they were able to find a job. They were also able to secure their place in Czech society. Their main social network was created from religious belonging, and the Baptist church had an important part in the integration of immigrants in their new social settings. The social and economic part of the process of immigration was made easier, and the trauma was significantly decreased by the religious social network.

The Central Eastern European Articles

The article's review results are shown in table 2. We should realize that a lot of articles in the field of sociology of religion researched and theorized the importance of connections between the different social actors. There was a lot of emphasis put on the network aspect study of different religious groups, but most of the researches did not collect specific data about the links among social actors. If we compare the results of Table 2 (CEE) with Table 1 (North America), we can realize that the applications of social network analysis methods and theories are more frequent and used to a greater extent in the North American setting. The theories about social networks are very important in Central Eastern European researches, but the methods were not widely.

It is especially interesting that no graphical imagery was used in any of the Central Eastern European researches to depict religious social networks. The application of these methods is the next step to be taken in the adaptation of the social network analysis. The demand for more elaborate methods of network analysis seems to be realistic, as a lot of works applied the social network theories.

TABLE 1 ❖ *Central Eastern European Social Network and Religion Articles Categorized*

<i>Author(s) and year</i>	<i>Category 1 (realize that links between social actors are important)</i>	<i>Category 2 (collects data about links among social actors)</i>	<i>Category 3 (uses graphic imagery to find patterns)</i>	<i>Category 4 (uses heavy statistics to analyze patterns)</i>
DOBSZAY 1991.	X			
KAMARÁS 1994.	X	X		
MÁTÉ-TÓTH 1996.	X	X		
ZSUMBERA 1998.	X			

PUSZTAI 2004.	X	X		
BAHOVEC – POTOCNIK – ZRINCAK 2007.	X			
MÁTÉ-TÓTH – TÖRÖK – NAGY 2008.	X	X		
NAGY 2010	X			
MÁTÉ-TÓTH – NAGY 2011.	X	X		
PREDA 2011.	X	X		
MÁTÉ-TÓTH 2011.	X			

SOURCE ❖ *Own editing based on FREEMAN 2004*

Conclusions

This paper analyzed the situation of social network and religion related researches in Central Eastern Europe. The review was conducted on the already published articles. The aim was to find examples of the applications of theory and methods related to social network analysis on behalf of researchers of religion. The articles found were presented in Table 1, and the concept elaborated by FREEMAN (2004) was used to categorize the reviewed works.

The works were selected based on their usage of the social network method, social network theory and the research of different aspects of the religious field. We tried to exclude the topic of social capital and religion, and concentrate on those articles which had a clear social network related topic. We tried to clarify the connections between social capital and social networks to justify the selection of reviewed articles from the overlapping pool. The findings based on the review have shown that the links between social actors are being theorized in the articles, and there are measures introduced to map these links. Most reviewed articles applied empirical methods, and different survey researches concerning different characteristics of the social networks.

There are still many possibilities in the application of the SNA method and theories in the Central Eastern European region setting. The social network mapping of different religious groups could offer a better understanding of many questions asked by the presently reviewed researches. For example, the answer about the specificities of religious networks compared to other social network could be found, if actual SNA researches were performed on the group level. It would be necessary to draw the multi-dimensional social network maps of different communities in a graphical way for further analysis, and for the possibility to use social network statistics. The advantages of the method could be used to answer the research questions which are otherwise hard to overcome, and to pave the ways for new findings and new possible ways of understanding of religious networks.

The possibilities the SNA method are promising for the sociology of religion; it is highly probable that a lot of social network researches will be conducted in religious settings in the coming years to create accurate and meaningful analyses about the operation of the different religious group networks. Connections between different social networks could be also examined, and to get a better understanding of the workings of the contemporary social structure. The possibility of doing such researches is enhanced by new research methods offered by the new technologies, such as smartphones, cheap tablets and extensive social network sites. *

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Homeless People's Transition from the Hidden World of Socialism to the Quasi-Welfare Social Safety of Contemporary Hungary: Evidence from Szeged



Abstract In Hungary, homelessness has reappeared in the 1990s as a kind of social problem and also as a phenomenon. The intention of this study is to show how homelessness has become visible to society and why the problem was perceived so late, despite the fact that homeless people were part of the socialist society, even if in a latent way. Fieldwork was carried out in Szeged, a city in southern Hungary after 2002. During the research, I have participated in the everyday lives of homeless groups as an observer; I have conducted interviews and examined the social networks, problems and possibilities of the homeless. In this study, I show that the Hungarian circumstances, politics and structural changes were different from their Western counterparts, since Hungary took a different path. This trajectory influences the fate of those who become homeless. Even so, twenty years after the end of socialism, a number of parallels with the West, and with the United States in particular, can be discerned.

Keywords homelessness, post-socialism, poverty, social exclusion, network

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Introduction

During the socialist era, homelessness was a marginal, hidden and understudied phenomenon essentially denied by officials, affecting primarily people who deliberately resisted socialist society, who could not function in it because of its debilitating problems, or who had criminal tendencies. The dramatic economic and social changes during the post-socialist period, however, fundamentally transformed the face of homelessness by adding a growing pool of marginalized people without apparent pathologies who simply could not adjust to the new neoliberal economic climate. The rise of this new type of homelessness and the persistence of old homelessness is aggravated by inadequate shelter provision and homeless service which forces homeless people to live in public places from where they are frequently displaced, and criminalization as a result. So while the proliferation and diversification of homelessness and its causes are primarily based on unique Hungarian circumstances and the dramatic shift from socialism to capitalism, the responses to the problems follow the American pattern with adverse effects on homeless people, their daily survival, and long-term life chances.

To substantiate this claim, I analyse both national and local data focusing primarily on ethnographic research I conducted in Szeged. Szeged is the third largest city in Hungary, though in general terms it might not seem as large (the current population is about 170,000). Historically, Szeged was an agricultural and commercial town until the building of the university in the first third of the twentieth century. In the socialist era, industrial institutions were built by the municipality; these were closed down after the end of the socialist era. However, the city, still plays an important role in the region both from an economic and a cultural point of view. As regards the homelessness, impoverished individuals from nearby settlements apparently believe that they can find a solution to their problems by moving to Szeged. Lacking resources, many become homeless and take up residence in the public places of the city. Research on homelessness is particularly important at this time because little attention has been paid to homelessness in Hungary in the past. One of the intentions of this paper is to show how the 'hidden poverty' of state socialism continues to manifest itself in the post-socialist era while the phenomenon of 'new poverty' is simultaneously created. One part of this new poverty is homelessness, a topic which did not officially exist during the socialist period and was considered taboo. Social scientists started to study poverty during the mid and late 1980s, i. e. during the years that are often referred to as 'soft communism' (BOKOR 1987; FERGE 1982; GÖNCZÖL 1982 and 1991; KEMÉNY 1979; EBERSTADT 1988; HÖJDESTRAND 2003). As we will see, increasing poverty have become obvious when many forms of unemployment, homelessness and permanent social deprivation were perceived. Since 1990, scholars have often concentrated on specific aspects of post-socialist economic and social changes, but poverty has received little attention from an anthropological or geographical point of view. To be precise, some aspects of poverty – such as rural poverty, the plight of the Roma, or the youth in urban housing – have been examined, but there have been only a few in-depth researches on the wider spectrum of poverty caused by capitalist development.

Neither the new poor, nor the winners of the post-socialist transformation have gained the attention of Hungarian social scientists, since native ethnographers have conducted almost no fieldwork in urban areas (for a few exceptions, see KÓBÁNYAI 1980 and 1982; KÜRTI 2002; SIMONYI 1995). Foreign anthropologists, meanwhile, have dealt predominantly with the concerns of post-socialist economy, such as market transition and the dismantling agricultural cooperatives. Therefore, being both Hungarian citizens and working as native observers, scholars working in Hungary may bring some unique perspectives to the study of homelessness. I am going to

apply this insider–outsider perspective in this paper in order to introduce the phenomenon of new poverty through the changes in Hungarian history and economy. These are changes that give new features to the culture of homelessness which becomes different in this way from that of those countries where this aspect of poverty developed gradually (see COSTA NUNEZ 1996; HAZRA 2005).

In this paper, I examine first the history of hidden poverty and criminalized homelessness in socialism in order to set the stage for homelessness’s manifestation in post-socialist Hungary. An examination of the rise of new homelessness” after 1989 shows the particular nature of homelessness in a country that “bypassed” Keynesian welfarism on the way to neoliberalism. While this history has assured marked differences with “American-style” homelessness, I will show that there are significant similarities as well.

The taboo: poverty in socialism

The Image of Poverty towards the End of State Socialism

Under socialism, poverty was rarely, if ever, discussed and the concept of impoverishment basically meant departure from the average income and lifestyle (SZALAI 1997. 1403). Impoverishment implied deprivation of power and personal rights, as well as departure from what was considered to be a respectable manner of life (BOKOR 1987). Alcohol consumption, misuse of income, poor health, careless hygiene and low levels of education were all noticeable aspects of the society of poverty in Hungary under socialism. Education had low prestige for the poor, while establishing a family and getting a job had more importance. At the same time, for some, alcohol consumption had greater significance than maintaining a certain standard of living; a trap which often led to crime or domestic abuse directed at the consorts (men or women) or children.

Though the deterioration of homes due to the inability of residents to maintain or renovate was indeed observed by town councils, citizens and researchers (see TIMÁR–NAGY 2007), especially in suburban districts, such evidence of poverty did not generate much public discussion, because most of these poor people had jobs, and relatively respectable lives. Consumption of alcohol was generally accepted by family members (as well as by researchers), while violence or mounting debts were often ignored. During the last decade of the socialist rule, poverty as such was still considered a shameful and invisible aspect of social life (BOKOR 1987). Thus, marked deprivation was often considered solely to be a phenomenon occurring amongst marginal groups who were often described as hobos, tramps and ‘dangerous’ idlers. Others successfully concealed their deprived status by seclusion or withdrawal from society, such as those who managed to keep their jobs, but lived in workers’ hostels, a very common type of accommodation in Hungary which provided temporary shelter for unaccompanied workers for a nominal fee. In retrospect, some scholars in the post-socialist period have started to see hostel dwellers and the “concealed homeless” of the socialist era.

Street Life during Socialism: Dossers, Tramps, and Criminal Idlers

Although homelessness as such was known during the socialist regime, it was not defined as such. In the scholarly literature, one can find negative labels used to describe homeless

people, such as hobos, tramps¹ and criminal idlers² (see UTASI 1987). A tramp is a person who wanders between settlements and roams the countryside occasionally accepting menial work, but basically preferring easier ways of earning money. Some of them – mainly younger ones – armed themselves with a specific ideology as they left home, saying that they were escaping from obligations and authority figures, such as parents, the workplace as well as schools. The sweet taste of freedom appealed to them, particularly in the summertime when many of them moved out temporarily to sleep under the stars. Many of these former hobos now have respectable homes and employment. Dossers³ have also changed their lifestyle, although they appeared predominantly in the squares and parks of larger towns and were visible at rock concerts. Their Hungarian name (*csöves*) may derive from the large pipes at construction sites in which they frequently slept in (UTASI 1987. 181.). A few youngsters were recruited to live in grounds from criminals and school drop-outs who had chosen to escape from parental authority, but they live outside periodically when they wanted. Finally, there were those who were brought to the same fate by having a disability which prevented them from being integrated into homeless society; therefore they lived alone.

Youngsters – an overlapping category – managed to get by through a number of means, doing odd jobs, pickpocketing, stealing, begging, forging prescriptions, pimping and prostitution. Older homeless people lived on collecting litter or even cheating by selling counterfeit gold. Naturally, these activities were regarded as illegal by both the homeless and the state. Indeed, government policy regarded unemployment as a dangerous menace to society and those youngsters who did not start work immediately after finishing school – putting off becoming employed for a while so that they could live a vagrant life, or just living without working – were seen as parasites, maniacs or criminally idle (FERGE 1982). The status of the homeless did not only draw social disapproval; *thepolice* could intervene and send them to work (interview with M.R., a former criminal idler 1998/2⁴).

Almost no homeless in the socialist era slept in the streets; perhaps they slept mostly on park benches in the summer. They preferred to live in summer cottages which were temporarily vacant, condemned buildings, cabins built without authorization, or bed-shares.⁵ Some of

¹ Tramps (*csavargó*). Like dossers, tramps lived on the streets, but unlike dossers, they had no homes to return to. Tramps often finished school, became unemployed, begged and lived by casual labour. Some dossers and tramps tried to live 'outside' society, drawing on an ideology against the established order.

² Criminally idle, criminal idler (*közveszélyes munkakerülő*). During the socialist era, a person's status was dependent on their employment. Those who did not seek employment, or did not find a job in a short time, were considered penal idlers. According to the public opinion of the time, they were a threat to the existing order and the building of socialism, as they would not participate in it. This label was noted on their identity papers, and policemen checking their identities could march them away, or from time to time the local government offered them work.

³ Dossier (*csöves*). In the socialist era, youngsters living on the streets were called dossers. Many of them escaped from parental supervision to the streets, while some of them began living in public spaces as truants. Their name originates from the drainage tubes (*csövek*), found on building sites, in which they took shelter. Most of them lived only temporarily on the streets. Their characteristic clothing also separated them from other youth subcultures: 'tube-like' trousers, long pullovers, studded leather jackets, gas mask shoulder bags.

⁴ The numbers after the citation of interview means the year and the serial number of interview with a certain person.

⁵ Bed share (*ágybérlet*). The severe housing shortage made it impossible for all workers to find places in hostels or to rent a room in a flat. People desperate for some kind of shelter could rent a bed in a room holding 10 to 15 beds, with no access to cooking or other facilities.

them intended to spend the winter in labour hostels, hospitals or mental hospitals, while others considered prisons as a possible solution to their seasonal accommodation needs (for all these, see KÓBÁNYAI 1980; UTASI 1987; interview with MALAC 2002/5).

Redundant Workers in Work Places and Workers' Hostels

Workplaces and workers' hostels⁶ both produced hidden unemployment and homelessness (SPÉDER 2002. 45), especially at the end of the socialist era when many workplaces and almost all workers' hostels ceased to function. Workplaces had a surplus of labour, a phenomenon well-known from the era of state socialism which created problems for both employers and employees. These were not obvious at first, because no one in the workplace seemed idle. Everyone worked – socialist ideal was the full employment – but surplus workers produced an unused surplus of goods that piled up in warehouses (FERGE 1982).

For labourers, cheap workers' hostels provided temporary accommodation, but these were the permanent or only homes for many⁷ in reality (LÁNG–NYILAS 1987. 33.; VERES 1979; OROSS 2001). As Mátyus (1978) pointed out, hostels helped temporarily, but they did not provide a future. Hostel dwellers worked long hours in order to earn more money, but they did not save and instead spent considerable sums on leisure, and often got into disastrous personal relationships that produced an even greater cultural gap between them and the mainstream society (MÁTYUS 1978). The majority of hostel residents were from peasant backgrounds; consequently their former community could not protect them in the city, as Kürti describes for the workers in Csepel (2002). Becoming an urban factory worker meant that most of the time these formerly rural dwellers abandoned social ties with their home communities. Despite the fact that alienation and helplessness was a characteristic feature of this world it still left an empty space when hostels were closed. Those who had hostel accommodation provided by the state, or who had neglected their relationships with the communities from which they came, had no place to go (LÁNG – NYILAS 1987). If they had a job or savings they could rent accommodation. Those who did not have, or lost their jobs, had no other choice but to live on the streets. However, the argument that hostels concealed homelessness is not entirely true. They were rather institutions that helped migration towards urban centres, especially for those who originally came from the countryside. However, emerging social, cultural or generational conflicts inside the family led to a situation where rural youth could not return and became powerless urban dwellers. The workers' hostels started disappearing in the first few years of capitalism, and ultimately made homelessness more visible, but in order to understand how, it is crucial to understand the specific social and economic transformations of post-socialism.

⁶ Workers' hostels (munkásszállás). In order to satisfy the labour demands of rapidly developing industrial production, companies established hostels which provided accommodation for workers 'enticed' from the countryside. There were separate hostels for men and women. People living in these considered them a temporary solution, but sometimes a temporary solution became a long-term one. On workers' hostels in Budapest, see KÜRTI (2002).

⁷ OROSS (2001) says that 92 thousand people lived in workers' hostels in the 1980s and approximately 30 thousand of them lived effectively as homeless.

The challenges of postsocialism

From Socialism to Capitalism – Overall Trends

With the collapse of socialism, the pseudo-system of security offered by the state vanished. Poorer people had to contend with serious changes in the early post-communist years. Meanwhile, they saw a change in those values that had seemed to be evident before: self-identity, ideology and faith in their own ability (ŠIKLOVÁ 1996. 537–539.; cf. LAKI 2003. 129.). As full employment ended, a need for highly trained and educated professionals emerged due to the closing of large factories, mines and state enterprises during the transformation to a market economy. Thus, there was much less need for manual labourers; so blue-collar workers could expect job security or find new jobs no longer, and the threat of unemployment suddenly became a much-discussed topic in public discourse (LAKI 2003). In socialism, because of the complete employment concept, the criminal idlers' number was around 2.000, but after the transition, the unemployment rate had grown up to 16.1% (see NAGY 1994).

Similarly, the socialist housing system went through some basic changes. City council houses⁸ were no longer built, and consequently prices jumped sky-high (see KORNAI 1980. and 2007). Mortgage repayments became difficult for many, so was the acquisition of first flats for young family members. Workers' hostels and workplaces closed down at the same time. Those people who were not able to go home found themselves suddenly in a very uncertain situation. Contractors in the 'second economy'⁹ adjusted to the unstable market conditions by employing workers illegally whose futures remained uncertain (BORBOLY et al. 2003. 195.; SIMONYI 1995. 65–66.; see also JANCUS 2002. 63–66) because they could anytime lose their jobs and livelihood; at the same time they had problems associated with their illegal work status, such as the lack of benefits and social security pensions. After the socialist era, alcohol abuse increased during working hours, and this became the reason for possible dismissal. Those who could not adopt to the new employment standards obviously faced unemployment.

During the socialist period, workers' incomes were not high, but one could still live off them. People of lower social classes could utilize more of their earnings, because the state subsidized some consumer goods. Moreover, payday could be celebrated with small events such as dining at a restaurant, going for a drink, or celebrating name days¹⁰ and anniversaries. Holidays and travel, meanwhile, were supported by trade union holiday vouchers which could be used at the union's own holiday resort for labourers. It was a particular feature of Hungary at the time that income was untaxed and contributions to trade unions were set at a low amount. To balance the losses of badly run state enterprises, the government taxed profitable companies. Thus there were neither enough funds in the state budget for the recreation of labourers at trade union resorts, nor financial aid for travelling. All this state support – subsidized consumer goods, trade union

⁸ The proportion of the houses owned by the city councils – especially blocks of flats – was 60% in new built quarters in the socialist era, but some years after the transition it decreased to 8% by the privatization and the annulations of systematic building. Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

⁹ Second economy (második gazdaság). The second economy was based on work outside working hours. Lots of workers used to run a farm or take small jobs at home to supplement their family's income. They saved their strength during work time for the second economy. It was not illegal, because there were no income tax or laws about market production at the time; but these activities reduced the productivity of the first economy.

¹⁰ Every single day in calendar is attached to a name (previously a name of a saint) and whoever wears that name, celebrates the day on the certain date by inviting separately colleagues and family members to drink and eat.

benefits and so on – ceased immediately after the fall of socialism. At the same time, incomes remained at the same level (LAKI 2003. 128–29.), prospects became uncertain, and spending on recreation and leisure decreased.

Formerly, moonlighting for secondary incomes¹¹ provided a reliable supplement to salaries, as numerous companies closed in the new economic climate, so this sort of money became the sole means of support for many people. They had to use all their knowledge and experience to adapt to the market economy. Formerly, raw materials, tools, and warehouse stock “wandered” to the second economy or to agricultural cooperatives’ household plots. Moonlighting employees could use both their knowledge and their ‘borrowings’ to their benefit. Although there was a period of transition when a person’s knowledge of this sort could help them get a foothold in the new system, with the institutionalisation of market economy such “moonlighting” and “borrowing” became more difficult. By 1995, those who could not adapt found themselves unemployed or at risk of unemployment, while those who had gained practical experience from moonlighting were much more successful in the new economy.

Post-socialism and Neoliberal Poverty in Hungary

After the transition, the government put the emphasis on resolving economic problems, while social issues were ignored. The responsibility of individuals grew as the state cut back its social provisions. The causes of this shift were, as TÓTH (1994. 313.) points out, “partly the conscious reform politics and partly the outcome of economic transition, which changed the institutional structure [of welfare].” With the end of socialism, and without the step of an intermediary Keynesian welfare state, Hungarian society suddenly had to confront a new world of individual independence *and* individual liability. Welfare expenditure rapidly decreased, access to subsistence allowances became more difficult, and citizens’ administrative loads and burdens grew. Subsidies were gradually removed from energy producers leading to an increase in consumer prices and to increased expenditures on basic necessities. Previously, essential goods were not subjected to VAT, but a tax on such goods was soon introduced. Taxes also increased on luxury goods, such as alcohol and tobacco, of which homeless people are disproportionate consumers.

Anyway, in the early 1990s, it was already clear that welfare expenditures *increased* as a percentage of GDP compared to the 1980s (TÓTH 1994), even the real value of welfare services decreased. During the recent years, welfare expenditures have continuously decreased (especially spending on health and public education), and so have remaining price supports. Under socialism, and during the first years of the transition, for example, health care was free to all and paid from the taxes; now it is available only to medical insurance policy holders.

As a result of these shifts, post-socialist poverty primarily affects two groups. The first is comprised of the poor and deprived from the socialist era who carried this status into the post-socialist period. The second group is made up of those who fell into poverty from relatively good, lower-middle-class positions. Unemployment and loss of social status impacted these groups heavily during the 1990s (see NAGY 1994; SPÉDER 2000 and 2002). The main reasons for this fall were either retirement (as pension programs were destroyed) or failure as an entrepreneur in the new market economy (cf. SPÉDER 2002. 103.; see also SPÉDER 2000). Wherever they had come

¹¹ Secondary incomes (mellékes or mellékes jövedelem) derived from work undertaken as a part of the second economy.

from, the main concerns for the new poor were loss of savings, and thus the compulsion to live day to day, with the resultant problems ranging from the need to find casual or illegal work to the lack of medicines, to the precariousness of housing, as making mortgage or rent payments became more difficult (LAKI 2003; SIMONYI 1995). Under the pressure of such processes, family networks have frayed and social isolation of the poor has become common.

The sudden threat of unemployment (with the end of lifetime work guarantees) impacted people both materially and emotionally. The mass dismissals which peaked between 1992 and 1995 (LAKI 2003) combined with the formerly “hidden” unemployment problem of the socialist era culminated in a crisis. The problem was so widespread that mutual assistance became almost impossible; people could not spare money, possessions, or other resources (LAKI 2003). “Self-exploitation” among those who were still employed increased as they worked hard to preserve their jobs and support their families. Those who could, undertook casual work and for many this was the only option. Some worked illegally (*feketemunka, svarc*) to earn a living, which was better than doing nothing. Even so, the chances of obtaining and maintaining a flat for both the new and the old poor continued to worsen. Those who had bought flats with loans could not be sure that they could meet payments. Coupled with the rising energy costs, increasing numbers of poor and lower-middle class residents found themselves in a bind, unable to afford both housing payments and energy bills. Some who fell behind on mortgages or rent moved in with other family members. Others went to homes for the elderly, if they could. The rest had to live on the streets.

A new phenomenon: homelessness

Notwithstanding the existence “dossers”, “tramps”, and “idlers”, homelessness *of this sort* was unknown in the socialist era. People who were integrated into the society had jobs (FERGE 1982. 91.) and those who had jobs had a place to live. People who “chose” homelessness – the dossers, tramps, and idlers – were despised by society. Now, however, those who lost their jobs often lost their place in hostels as well. And still others with physical or other limitations could not find work at all and as a consequence they could not afford to live in society. Many of those thrown onto the streets in these ways lost all their possessions in the process, compounding their poverty.¹² The increasing numbers of such people – their presence in the streets of Hungarian cities – first brought widespread notice, and social concern, in the winter of 1992 (IVÁNYI 1997). The first civil initiatives – shelters for the homeless, temporary and daytime homes, food distribution – began at this time. But it has also become clear that state intervention in the growing crisis was unlikely.

The Scale of the Problem

According to best estimates, 11 percent of the population was deprived of essential goods (a proxy for the people in poverty) and 20 percent was at risk of becoming poor in the last decade of socialism (BOKOR 1987). (These estimates are inexact. Bokor [1987] emphasizes that under socialism “poverty” could not be truly examined: in addition to its “forbidden” political status, there was a lack of “poverty identity,” or means of readily identifying the poor¹³.) However, after

¹² Of course, those few who voluntarily choose homelessness out of an ideological or other commitment or a sense that the freedom of the street is better than the confines of the house also choose to live with minimal possessions (cf. MAY 2000. 745–748).

¹³ Researchers therefore had to construct creative ways to probe the depths of poverty in socialist Hungary, especially since many individuals would not answer direct questions out of a sense of shame, distrust of au-

the demise of socialism, researchers have developed new metrics of poverty more amenable to statistical description (SPÉDER 2002). Using such techniques, poverty was shown to be 13 percent in 1997,¹⁴ but some 30 percent more of the population was at risk of poverty because of financial difficulties (SPÉDER 2002. 57.). By this time, a generally accepted social idea of poverty – a “poverty identity” – emerged and surveys could be made among those who identified themselves as “poor”. Some 25 percent of the Hungarian population defines itself as poor. Given the differing metrics used in surveys, it is hard to know whether the 13 percent or 25 percent figure is the more accurate one. What is clear, however, is that the number of people at risk of homelessness in the new Hungary is not insignificant.

Obtaining an accurate number of how many people actually *are* homeless is difficult. The first census of homelessness, conducted in 2005, recorded approximately 10,000 homeless people. Yet, many scholars dispute this figure, because there were no fixed criteria on which fieldworkers could base their estimates. For instance, in my hometown, Szeged, census-takers reported only thirteen homeless people, because they only counted them with a “homeless lifestyle” – those who actually lived on the street and received no government support. Consequently, more than 560 people were left out by the census-takers, because they had contacts with social institutions (in addition, other homeless people simply refused to take part in the census). Expert estimates of the number of homeless people in Szeged are that in 2005 there were between 800 and 1200 people who lived on the streets or in the surrounding city (interview with K.J., executive director of a shelter). Neither the number of homeless persons in other communities in the region, nor the ratio of counted people to uncounted is known. Across the country, while shelters and soup kitchens have not reached full capacity yet, turnover in daytime homes surpasses their capacity.

The Beginnings of a Response

Over the course of the past decade, the number of shelters (hostels) for the homeless, daytime support services, and street social workers has been slowly increasing. A commissioner of homeless affairs has also been appointed. At the same time, however, the neoliberal central government has stressed homelessness as an individual’s rather than a direct social problem. Cities and towns have been granted extended powers to regulate activities – ranging from smoking to begging – in public spaces. As gentrification has advanced, homeless people are more and more pushed out of view (TIMÁR – NAGY 2007), and candidates for public office have begun to promise to make the homeless disappear if elected. Decision makers have turned to western “best practices” for creating cities that cater to tourists and wealthy city-dwellers, stressing the importance of a clean city for public health, aesthetic, and tourism purposes (see also AMMAN 2000; MITCHELL 1997).

With the withdrawal of state aid for the poor, and despite the availability of some European Union money for addressing homelessness, charity-based aid (often religiously oriented) has arisen to fill the holes of the tattered social safety net (providing hostels, daytime facilities, food aid, etc.). Human rights-centered activism about homelessness has also begun to function. Yet, in common with private charity and activist-based interventions elsewhere in Europe and the United States, charities in Hungary perpetually struggle with a lack of resources. This problem is

thority, or a fear that is they complained they might be punished. Usually they developed data from indirect questions about informants’ lives. Typically researchers asked about material goods that informants had or did not have (such as access to cooking facilities or sufficient food) and from that determined general minimum stands of living. On the basis of that general standard, researchers could ask, “what do people lack in relation to that minimum standard” and thereby derive estimates of poverty.

¹⁴ This is roughly equivalent to the U.S poverty rate at the same time (BURT et al 2001).

compounded by a general scepticism, perhaps inherited from the socialist era stating that charity is little more than a way to earn money. Support for charity-based aid is thus highly unstable.

Such facts structure the everyday lives of homeless people in Hungarian cities.

Homelessness in Szeged

Becoming and Being Homeless

Through in-depth life-history (PÁSZKA 2007) interviews, my homeless informants recounted their past experiences; the reasons for their becoming homeless and their past and current experiences of being homeless. Several recurring motifs became obvious: homeless people saw their homelessness as a reflection of society's morals, for example, while also wanting to sensationalize their own histories. Nevertheless, the main trajectories towards homelessness can be revealed from their stories. When asked to describe how and why they became homeless, most of my informants in Szeged referred both to the transition to the post-socialist society and economy, and to the role of conflicts and conflict-resolution mechanisms in their pre-homeless lives. They referred to the uncertainty that dominated their lives as industrial and agricultural workers and how their adjustment to the new conditions of the transition had failed. In addition, most of them referred, with a kind of detachment, to the inconsistency of their present life lead almost entirely by chance with the one they had hoped to have.

1. Structural and Individual Factors

Becoming homeless is partly a structural, partly an individual process (cf. BURT *et al.* 2001). Homeless respondents in Szeged pointed to the structural causes of their homelessness by mentioning the changes in the structure of the economy after socialism. But they also named other structural causes emanating from changes in social policy. They talked of permanent unemployment and the instability of illegal (black) employment, and the redundancy of the semi-skilled labour force, as well as the closure of workers' hostels, and deteriorating conditions of housing as significant causes of their homelessness. They also pointed to the lack of rehabilitative services for those who are released from prisons and orphanages. And, as the economy has hardened, they talked about how owners of tiny amounts of capital – micro-entrepreneurs – have been squeezed out. The inability to pay bills or meet the rent or mortgage payments were also discussed. But homeless people also spoke of psychiatric problems,¹⁵ and alcohol abuse,¹⁶ as the main individual reasons for becoming homeless, but informants also linked their homelessness to stays in prison, difficult family situations, divorce, and “bad decisions”. It is apparent that the combination of these structural and personal factors – and an individual's capacity to cope with them – matters on the path to homelessness in a city like Szeged.

2. Characteristics of Homeless People in Szeged

In Szeged, most homeless people are male; rarely women or children are rarely found amongst the homeless.¹⁷ If a woman does become homeless, it is caused by similar reasons as in

¹⁵ Sullivan *et al.* (2000) note that those homeless people, who suffer from mental illness, also typically suffer from other serious health and social problems. Many of the homeless in Szeged have mental disorders such as schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, and others. Such homeless people are particularly at risk of social isolation and disintegration.

¹⁶ Some 10 percent of the Hungarian population suffers from alcoholism (ELEKES 2000).

¹⁷ One cause of this situation, according to many homeless men, is that when they divorced, their wives took

the case of men. Alcohol and drug abuse, unemployment and the lack of education are common factors contributing to homelessness among both men and women. Unlike in the United States where racial groups are over-represented homeless people are mostly white in Szeged – from the majority – with only a few professing themselves to be Gypsies (Roma). This might be the case, because the ties in Gypsy families are strong, especially as far as the sharing of resources among extended family members is concerned. Even so, the proportion of homeless Gypsies seems to be greater in other Hungarian cities. This is probably caused by the functioning of great cities like Budapest as a magnet for unattached, disaffiliated people of all sorts, and by the fact that in other more industrial cities, where the breakdown of the hostel system coincided with Gypsy overrepresentation. Furthermore, Gypsies make up a disproportionate number of beggars (who are not always homeless) in Szeged. White homeless people often resort to illegal or casual labour before begging. In addition, “entrepreneurs” import Gypsies from Romania to work on the streets of Hungarian cities (interviews with Dóm homeless group). Finally, the number of immigrants is growing; they come mainly from Africa and move in and out the homeless hostels.

Interviews make it clear that the homeless world is a world defined by men. While women live and work in it, they have very little control over the social framework of which they are part. Men determine the hierarchies that define everyday life, sometimes using physical or psychic violence as a mean of consolidating their authority. Homeless life is territorial as well, with a homeless man serving almost as “owner” of the territory, for whom women (and the few homeless children) act as kind of “employees.” Homeless worlds are in this way *more* patriarchal than the large, ambient world; women are less equal than in general society.

Power and prestige in homeless networks are determined primarily by the ability to secure income and arrange accommodation (educational attainment, for example, has little part in gaining prestige among the homeless in Szeged). On the top of the hierarchy of prestige are the ones with semi-permanent employment; daily workers follow, “illegal” workers (excluding beggars), market traders, beggars, freeloaders, and recyclers of used materials are in line (cf. UTASI 1987). Those who gain resources through assault, robbery, or prostitution (among other proscribed behaviours) are largely considered outcasts in the homeless society. Among city-dwelling homeless people, those who live independently look down on those who resort to the hostels; but both the hostel-residents and those living independently on the street look down on independent homeless living in the forests on the outskirts of town. The ability to survive a winter outdoors bestows a prestige almost as great as having a regular income (through pension, disability relief, or welfare payments), because it shows great survival skills.

3. *Connections, Social Exclusion and Inclusion: How the Homeless Remain Homeless*

Through my research, it is apparent that so-called strong relations among homeless people (and their housed family, friends, and colleagues) tend to erode and become increasingly conflict-ridden over the time. As older (pre-homeless) relationships deteriorate, homeless peoples’ connections to those outside the homeless world tend to be structured around the ability and willingness of non-homeless persons to contribute to the raising of the status of homeless individuals. These relationships tend to be quite instrumental in nature. Increasingly,

possession of their homes, though there is no doubt that the chains of causality are much more complex than that.

homeless people form relationships only among themselves. But these relationships are often weak expressed through friendliness and collegiality which is informal and transitory, waning as quickly as they waxed.¹⁸ At the same time, many homeless people argue that possibilities for escaping homelessness are hindered by their fellows. Together with the already described hierarchal relationship between many homeless people – a relationship that replicates a patron-client form – it is obvious that the narrow band of relationships that homeless people maintain can be one of the major factors of keeping them homeless.

Necessity and mutuality go hand in hand, because homeless people depend on each other for survival: needs require mutuality, and mutuality helps to fulfil needs. These require and result in a constant presence in each others' lives, so homeless people share food, drink, tobacco and dwelling place; they also protect each other. Among the lifestyle and the in-group direction of their connections, a common loss of faith in the future, and physical and mental deterioration, all perpetuate the state of homelessness for homeless people in Szeged. As time passes, these factors become more and more serious: the more time they spent on the street, the less chance they have of escaping and starting a new life. This mutual dependency leads to inescapable homelessness, which cannot be interpreted without understanding the context of being excluded from the main structures of post-socialist society (NAGY 2004). Being homeless means not only a physical exclusion from society, but also exclusion from regular social processes. Homeless people are considered to be outside the mainstream society and culture, members of which leave the homeless on their own both symbolically and literally (CALDEIRA 1999. 102–105; FRANKFURT 1997; JORDAN 1996. 81.). Living on the street and some phenomena associated with it, such as alcohol abuse, results in social disapproval; moreover even the social institutions charged with helping the homeless become stigmatized.

Houses and homes – so taken-for-granted by the housed majority – symbolize a world of order by providing security and a feeling of importance. Without these, a person is considered to be insecure, insignificant, defenceless and deprived. The homeless are deprived of their security and the means for fulfilling their own desires. In addition, they are deprived of their civil rights (cf. LYNCH 2002). Although homeless people can theoretically vote, they often cannot exercise this right as they have no registered permanent address or they have sold their ID cards. As a result, the homeless lack essential civil rights which adds one more dimension to the structures that keep them homeless.

4. Use of Public Space and the Criminalization of the Homeless

In the recent years, a few places in Szeged have been “monopolized” by the homeless, and as a result there has been an effort to “reclaim space” by both the local government and other city dwellers. From the early 1990s, Hungarian homeless people have become more visible as occupiers of public space and many other residents complained that they have no access to these places. Public areas are technically open to everyone, but as individual homeless people began to mark them as their own domestic spaces, housed residents turn away. The meaning and nature of space changed: public space was no longer the impersonal space of the city, now it was the intimate space of someone's home. From the perspective of the homeless people, their occupation of public space becomes a kind of legitimate homesteading, marked by territorial control. Many

¹⁸ Burt et al (2001) reveal the distinctions between well-connected and isolated homeless people, but their analysis needs to be complemented with an examination of the quality of the relationships that homeless people establish.

public places, the niches between buildings, park benches, cemetery crypts, sections of forest land, and so on, have gone through a process of colonization.

There is a social and geographical order in this colonization. As a 43-year old homeless man explains: “This place is ours, mine and my brother’s. If another tramp turns up, we tell him to leave this place as this place is ours. All who help us, come back here, for they know that they find us here. It’s been ours since last year. Formerly no one was here, only a beggar, no one else. The promenade belongs to the Csibaks, and Tibor is there, too. Sometimes we come around, but we never work [i.e. beg] in their place” (Interview Ocskó F., 2002, Dóm square). Even so, territorial challenges often lead to skirmishes or even violent fights.

Cities have responded in numerous ways. Szeged was the first Hungarian city to pass an anti-panhandling law to outlaw begging. Now it is illegal not only to beg, but also to clean car windows. The city has installed arm rests across benches to make it impossible to lie down;¹⁹ and it has criminalized squatting in abandoned houses or on unused building sites.²⁰ In this way, places both for “work” – begging – and sleep have been squeezed shut. The city also tightened the control on the use of streets and sidewalks in the busiest parts of the town which have long been central locations for homeless people to beg, hang out (cf. BRIDGE – WATSON 2001; SASSEN 1999), or scavenge (cf. MITCHELL – HEYNEN, 2009). Civil social organizations argue that these restrictions on begging and hanging out violate homeless people’s rights of free action, association, and movement (cf. MITCHELL 1997).

There has been simultaneous pressure in Szeged to move homeless hostels out of the centre, but the geography of social service provision, with services scattered around the city, require homeless people to traverse the centre on their daily paths: they have not been excluded entirely. Namely the ways between the five service points cross the centre and the primary places of visible homeless is downtown (NAGY 2004 and 2009). Thus it is not uncommon to still see shop guards shoeing homeless people away on behalf of owners who see them as disrupting their trade.

In all these aspects, homelessness in Szeged and Hungary, looks more and more like its American counterpart, even if the pathway to this kind of homelessness and its regulation has been different.

Conclusion

In Hungary, homelessness has been produced through special historical-economic-political processes to which policy has responded in piecemeal ways. As the situation continues to change, so does the response – from an initial sympathy for the plight of the homeless in post-socialism to their increasing criminalization. The structural and individual causes of homelessness in Szeged and in Hungary share similarities– the role of alcohol abuse or illness in compounding the structural effects of the economy, but they diverge as well, for example in the the historical role that workers’ hostels played in housing the poor and providing some social stability (at least as long as work lasted), even if they hid poverty in the socialist era. As the local and national Hungarian states adopt neoliberal “best practices” – ranging from reduced welfare spending to anti-panhandling laws – the relationship between social subsidy and individual liability has been reformulated and as a result the plight of the homeless has become even more precarious.

¹⁹ Dome homeless people have responded by tearing the arms off.

²⁰ On the pretext that illegal use causes a fall in property value and is thus a form of stealing.

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Development Trap? Unequal Territorial Patterns of EU-funds Allocation in Hungary



Abstract In this paper we introduce some results about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the Hungarian regional development policy: our main goal is to examine empirically its regional inequalities. After a brief outline of the theoretical frame based on (new) economic sociology, we analyse several databases on more territorial levels and explore some opinions about the issue from personal interviews.

According to the results of the empirical analysis, the question of preferred status seems to be counter-final due to the complex combination of the lack of resources. The respecting relationships imply a kind of development trap, as it is worth becoming beneficiary on the project level, because it means higher support rate and higher amount of support, but being in the preferred status has a negative effect aggregated on the micro-regional level, i.e. it is disadvantageous.

Keywords Regional inequalities, development policy, EU-funds

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0. Introduction

In this paper we introduce some results of our research concerning the relation between social inequalities and social policy. The general question whether social intervention can reach its goal – such as to reduce or eliminate some aspects of social inequalities – is widely examined in both national and international research projects.

In our PhD-research we investigated the appropriateness and effectiveness of Hungarian regional development policy. Our main goal was to answer empirically whether some mechanisms result in counter-final effect, and to demonstrate the regional inequalities of regional development policy.

In this paper we shortly outline the theoretical frame which can be successfully applied to interpret the connection of regional development policy and (territorial) inequalities on the basis of (new) economic sociology, and to demonstrate some results of our quantitative and qualitative empirical work.

Our research may be interesting as in the course of the quantitative secondary data analysis the problem is examined from an institutionalized point of view: we study whether the institutional regulations and classifications generated and applied by the regional policy itself reach their aim. According to our assumption, they do not, so we expect the institutional regulation of regional development policy to cause unintended consequences.

To examine empirically the counterproductivity of development policy projects, we created complex databases on the project-, settlement- and micro-regional levels, and employ models that are capable to exclude the alternative explanations to gain high internal validity. We expect the empirical investigation of the mechanisms underlying the counterfinal effects of regional development policy to be fruitful for scholars and also policy-makers.

1. Short Theoretical Introduction

In our research, we focus our attention on the patterns and territorial inequalities in the distribution of EU development funds (CRESCENZI (2009), LÓRÁND (2011)). The paper presents some of the results of our empirical examinations of this issue. The relevance of this topic comes from the fact that from 2004 there are possibilities in Hungary too gain financial supports offered by EU development programmes, thus it is reasonable to expect unintentional consequences in respect of these resources' distribution. During the exploration of this problem, building on the theory of the new economic sociology in the background, we interpret the system of development policy as something that intends to help common goods to come into existence (OLSON 1997) – or rather to prevent the situation of common bad (see HIRSCHMAN 1995) to come into existence – when it employs institutional devices (ELSTER 1997) in order to enforce territorial equalization principle in the central regulation of the resources' allocation (STIGLER 1989). Our preliminary assumption is that the state fails (TULLOCK 2005) which causes counterproductive effects (SZÁNTÓ 2006, MERTON 2002). In the research, we considerably build on previous studies which discuss (KONRÁD – SZELÉNYI 2000) and empirically show (VÁGI 1991, 1982) reproduction of inequalities in examination of domestic territorial development policy.

We can interpret the framework of the institutional system examined in general by Benedek (2006), on the level of the EU by FORMAN (2000), KENGYEL (2008), HORVÁTH (2001), SZIGETI (2007) putting an emphasis on its special characteristics in Hungary. We argue that changes caused by joining the EU can be considered a strong institutional rearrangement (Csíte–KOVÁCH (2002), KOVÁCH–KUČEROVÁ (2006), KOVÁCH (2008)) but the main characteristics and patterns

of competing for development resources have not changed considerably; therefore questions raised by previous studies still remain (see Voszka 2006).

The novelty in setting these problems may be that *institutional classifications* are involved in the research that are fixed as principles to be applied by the actual development policy. The main goal of our work was to examine the effect of these factors that is, to examine the fulfilment of aims which are set by the regulator itself. We do not intend to examine what effect the development funds have on certain economic-social problems. It would be difficult to specify, as the change of settlement structure is considered to be a slow process, it cannot be interpreted by human standards (FEKETE 2010. 35.). Therefore we intend only to shed some empirical light on the distribution of development funds. In this way, the research may contribute to reveal some factors and mechanisms which determine the distribution of development policy resources on the one hand, and to helping future planning processes on the other.

2. Research Question

The actual question of the research to be presented below is whether the *institutional regulation of the distribution* of the European Union development funds in Hungary is successful – taking into consideration its aim; i.e. to enable the less developed territories (settlements, micro-regions) of the country to absorb development funds. In order to reach this objective the government explores – using statistical data – the development level of every micro-region and according to these differences defines for every EU planning period the least developed micro-regions and settlements of the country listed in a *decree*. The importance of the content of this decree comes from the principle of the EU-funds allocation mechanisms, namely that (only) the underdeveloped areas listed by the decree (*preferred* or *favoured* micro-regions and settlements) can apply for development projects with smaller ratio of own sources, i.e. with higher support rate.

3. Methodological Description

In the analysis, we investigate empirically whether the *regulation* described above *facilitates the absorption of development funds*. To carry out the analysis, we have built – and aggregated on several different territorial levels¹ – complex statistical databases² containing all the information needed to fill the variables in this general model below:

$$\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 \times X_R + b_{2...n} \times X_{Cl...n}$$

¹ While data-processing and interpretation of the results special attention should be paid to the fact that territorial analysis has its own methodology and system which is in connection with the use of statistical data in territorial analysis (see Dusek 2004., T.E. 2005.). This is because in the statistical analysis of territorial inequalities the indicators have different values – that is they show minor or major inequalities – depending on what territorial unit we have as the basis of analysis. This mechanism coming from the choice of the given territorial unit is named scales effect (Dusek 2004. 115.). The direction of distortion is systematic and tendentious – in the case of simple statistical methods and correlation. Using the same statistical method we can see that the higher aggregation level we investigate, the less territorial inequalities can be shown (Dusek 2004. 117., 119.). The changeability of territorial units results in another problem, the zoning effect. It derives from the fact that a given territorial unit can be divided into subparts of the same number in alternative ways. Statistical analysis on alternative divisions results in different degree of territorial inequality (Dusek 2004. 118–119). Thus it is needed to take into account these factors even if it is not referred or mentioned constantly during the analysis.

² In the course of quantitative data analysis we do not present and refer to the p-values or significance levels of the test results as we employ statistical data and there is not necessary to further generalize to the 'whole' population, i.e. we examine the real situation.

In the equation³ the dependent variable (Y) measured the amount of EU development funds allocated (source: downloaded from the webpage of National Development Agency, Hungary), the main explaining variable (regulation, X_R) contained the information – coded in a dummy format – if the micro-region or settlement is a preferred micro-region or not (source: recoded from and according to the decree list). We applied a specified impact analysis design (*regression discontinuity design*) in the course of data analysis to ensure statistical control (see Moksony 2005). Furthermore, we introduced more relevant statistical data⁴ (as control variables; $X_{Cl...n}$) on the actual regional level (source: downloaded and merged from the webpage of the Hungarian Statistical Office) in order to reach higher level of internal validity (Moksony 1985), i. e. to control the estimation for as many alternative and potentially distorting explaining factors as possible and to measure the net effect of the regulation (Moksony 2006).

4. Results of Data Analysis

4.1 Selected Quantitative Results

Considering the results of the secondary statistical data analysis, the effect of being preferred seems to be frequently controversial, counter-final in the light of the intended objectives.

Analysing the development fund indicators of the micro-regions of the Great Hungarian Plain – taking it as an example – the before mentioned experience can be seen well-marked in the case of the development-fund absorption rates of the preferred rural development micro-regions. The main question here is whether being classified as preferred, favoured rural development micro-region provides better options to gain development funds (AVOP; Agrár- és Vidékfejlesztési Operatív Program; ARDOP; Agrarian and Rural Development Operative Programme) which were directly designed to support rural- and agrarian investments. The results of Table 1. do not confirm this presumption. The difference between the preferred and not preferred rural development micro-regions can be most easily seen, if we examine the last column of the table, the so-called ‘rural-development multiplier’, which we calculated as a ratio: the value belonging to the favoured rural-development micro-regions was divided by the value belonging to the not preferred micro-regions. So this simple indicator reflects in one single number how the preferred micro-regions were more likely to acquire development funds. After surveying these numbers, it can be seen that the highest difference between the micro-regions is in the case of the total amounts of the OPARD-funds: the preferred rural development micro-regions applied for only 68 percent of the total amount of OPARD-fund applied by the non favoured micro-regions. That is, the micro-regions preferred because of their agrarian and rural profile applied for a *smaller* share of agrarian- and rural development funds. However, the value of the rural development multiplier in the case of all the variables is under 1, so it can be concluded that the *preferred rural development micro-regions perform regularly worse* compared to the not preferred micro-regions in the case of rural development funds.

³ To investigate the relations between the variables we mostly use comparison of means, logistic and linear regression method. The latter ones makes us capable to show the relation between variables with the help of a single indicator (MOKSONY 2006. 54.).

⁴ We should take into consideration the role of this kind of statistical control as for causality analysis real experiment is the most suitable method regarding internal validity due to randomization. When we control alternative explanations statistically – that is, in the case of quasi-experiment tests – we get weaker internal validity. However ‘*regression discontinuity design*’ enables us to get a level of internal validity similar to the experimental methods but without the need of randomization (MOKSONY 2005. 99.).

TABLE 1 ❖ *Differences of project absorption*

Dependent variable		Mean	Standard deviation	R.D.M.
All AVOP projects (p.)	0	88,80	50,10	0,89
	1	79,20	33,79	
AVOP projects won (p.)	0	51,70	24,34	0,97
	1	50,00	24,18	
Total amount of AVOP funds (HUF)	0	2 017 305 663,30	1 335 799 644,64	0,68
	1	1 377 044 974,13	775 492 996,75	
Total amount of AVOP funds won (HUF)	0	1 178 452 305,30	559 099 678,77	0,72
	1	852 042 399,33	590 956 391,67	

Abbreviations: 0 = not preferred rural development micro-regions, 1 = preferred rural development micro-regions; R.D.M. = Rural Development Multiplier: the quotient of the values of preferred rural development micro-regions and not favoured micro-regions.

Source: Own calculation on a complex data-base containing the micro-regional level data of the National Development Agency.

In order to refine the previous results, we step down to micro-level data and examine directly the Regional Development Operative Program (RDOP) projects of the Hungarian Development Plan (HDP I.). Though the effect of the decree-level institutional regulation of being preferred or favoured seems to be also problematic: in Table 2. we presented the results of linear regression models estimating the effects of being preferred micro-region and preferred settlement respectively on different absorption indicators. Except for the variable of support rate, all of the 'b'-coefficients are negative, i.e. the preferred micro-regions and preferred settlements perform worse than their more developed partners. For example, a project-application coming from a favoured micro-region has nearly 37 millions HUF *smaller* contacted total sum of the investment on average – only to take the highest difference –, and if a project comes from a favoured settlement, it has 46 million HUF drawback on average taking the same – and in this case also the highest – indicator. Only the support rate is influenced in the expected, i.e. the officially aimed positive direction: the projects of the favoured micro-regions have on average 2,2 percentage higher support rate, and the projects of preferred settlement have on average a 4,1 percentage advantage:

TABLE 2 ❖ *Effects of different levels of regulation*

Explaining variables. Dependent variable (millions HUF/%)	Coefficients	Preferred micro-region or not	Preferred settlement or not
Total sum of funds won	Constant	215,601	213,060
	'b'	-19,492	-25,025
Granted total sum of the investment	Constant	267,343	262,766
	'b'	-35,548	-45,816
Total sum of funds contracted	Constant	218,201	214,418
	'b'	-22,814	-26,827
Contacted total sum of the investment	Constant	268,234	263,140
	'b'	-36,891	-46,497
Amount of funds paid	Constant	210,937	206,883
	'b'	-24,857	-29,433
Support rate	Constant	84,398	84,280
	'b'	2,208	4,074

Source: Own calculation on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

We can unfold the connections above, if we analyse further the effects of the regulations separately. For this we use the variable ‘amount of funds paid’ as this is an indicator representing a realized and already absorbed fund, and first take the preferred micro-regional status. The initial effect is again replicated by the results of the first model (Table 3: M1): a project from a favoured micro-region has on average 25 million HUF smaller amount of fund compared to a project from a not disadvantaged micro-region. At the first step, we calculated and included a new variable in the linear regression procedure (Table 3: M2) so as to control the impact of the factor arising from the obvious differences of the circumstances (for this we constructed a principal component containing several aspects of information – number of population, rate of unemployment, number of enterprises per capita – about the actual micro-region all at once. The results of this calculation show that after controlling for the features of the micro-region the effect of favoured status decreases to -8,6 million HUF, i.e. the disadvantage of the preferred – less developed – micro-regions may be explained *partly* by their disadvantaged circumstances itself. But it can not be said that the drawback is fully due to these factors, as there is still a remarkable negative impact related to the preferred micro-regional status. In the next model, we applied another dimension of the development level of the micro-regions investigated: the rate of favoured settlement was treated as a new explaining factor. According to the results of this model estimation (Table 3: M3), the amount of funds paid is smaller (i.e. the effect of this variable is negative; -0,18 on average with every 1 percent) with a higher level of preferred – underdeveloped – settlements in the micro-regions. But the more important outcome is that in this model also – now controlled for the share of underdeveloped settlements – the self-employed impact of being preferred micro-region is still negative: a project coming from a favoured micro-region – no matter how high or low the ratio of preferred settlements is – has smaller ($b^2 = -16,067$) amount of fund paid on average. Finally, we included in the estimation both of the former control variables beside our main explaining factor, and there seem to be again an unfavourable effect (Table 3: M4). Separated from the – in this final model positive – effects of the features of micro-regions and the rate of underdeveloped settlements, the impact from the institutional regulation of being preferred micro-region is negative: a project from a favoured micro-region has an average nearly 11 million HUF less amount of funds paid compared to the more developed territorial units.

TABLE 3 ❖ *The net effect of preferred micro-regional status on the amount of funds paid (HUF)*

Constant, explaining variables	Models (M1–M4) constant and ‘b’ coefficients (million HUF)			
	M1	M2	M3	M4
Constant	210,937	201,977	214,300	200,983
$X_{\text{preferred_micro-reg.}}$	-24,857	-8,605	-16,067	-10,733
$X_{\text{dev.level of micro-reg.}}$	–	24,108	–	24,393
$X_{\text{rate of preferred settl.}}$	–	–	-0,183	0,048

Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

The other control regulation concerning a lower territorial level (preferred status of settlements lagged behind) shows similar disparities. In this case we also need to start the exploration of the effects from the basic two-variable model (Table 4: M5): it says that – as it can be seen

in the relevant part of table 2. – the projects handed in from a preferred / underdeveloped settlement have on average almost 30 million HUF less total amount of funds paid. Controlling for the previously introduced micro-regional development-level factor (principal component), the extent of the drawback of the favoured settlements decreases (Table 4: M6) from the initial -29,4 value to -18,6 million HUF. The next model takes into consideration the other alternative explaining variable; the overall rate of settlements in a disadvantaged position (Table 4: M7). The results show that if we control for the relative frequency of favoured settlements in the micro-region, a project coming from a preferred settlement has on average 22,8 million HUF less total amount of funds paid. And this dimension of disadvantage also seems to consist according to the results of the final model (Table 4: M8) containing all the two alternative factors examined separately previously and the main explaining variable. In this case the average lack of funds paid for a project handed in from a lagging behind settlement – aside from the (positive) effects coming from the development features of the micro-regions and the level of underdeveloped settlement – is close to 27 million HUF.

TABLE 4 ❖ *The net effect of preferred settlement status on the amount of funds paid (HUF)*

Constant, explaining variables	Models (M5–M8) constant and 'b' coefficients (million HUF)			
	M5	M6	M7	M8
Constant	206,883	203,335	210,945	196,981
$X_{\text{preferred_settlement}}$	-29,443	-18,612	-22,773	-27,733
$X_{\text{devlevel of micro-reg.}}$	–	23,667	–	25,509
$X_{\text{rate of preferred settl.}}$	–	–	-0,139	0,208

Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

Staying at the project level and using the same database of the Regional Development Operative Program (RDOP) we also calculated the so-called effect of interaction between the preferred settlement variable and support rate variable constructed by multiplying their values with each other as explicated below:

$$\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 * X_{\text{preferred_settlement}} + b_2 * X_{\text{support_rate}} + b_3 * X_{\text{INTER}} \quad , \text{ that is}$$


$$\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 * X_{\text{preferred_settlement}} + b_2 * X_{\text{support_rate}} + b_3 * X_{\text{preferred_settlement}} * X_{\text{support_rate}}$$

This special kind of indicator measures the effect of one variable from the interaction in the function of the value of the other variable from the interaction. Thus the – symmetric – indicator quantified this way can inform us about the effect of one variable depending on the value of the other variable. In our analysis, the main focus is on the effect of the favoured status of settlements, so we rearranged the regression equation in order to estimate the impact of being a preferred settlement in the light of the value of the support rate – as presented below:

$$\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_2 * X_{\text{support_rate}} + (b_1 + b_3 * X_{\text{support_rate}}) * X_{\text{preferred_settlement}}$$

Using this ($b_1 + b_3 * X_{tam.arany.}$) formula we can calculate the actual value of the examined effect from the preferred status at every possible value of the support rate. The interaction effect itself is positive ($b^3=0,387$), which means that with higher support rate a higher positive effect of the preferred status can be expected (this is illustrated in Figure 1. using a green line with positive slope). This relationship itself could be regarded as a fortunate result, as it would imply that if the support rate is high enough, then the disadvantaged settlements can benefit more from the institutional regulation. However, if we calculate not just the interaction effect but the actual effects separately for the not preferred and the preferred settlements we can conclude that the positive effect is only a quasi positive effect. Actually the level of fund absorption is initially higher in the case of the more developed, i.e. not favoured settlements, and these applicants preserve their better position: although in the case of the preferred settlements the line representing the level of fund absorption is more steeped – due to the original positive value of the interaction effect –, this steepness is not high enough for the settlements lagging behind with preferred status to catch up the more developed ones – at least in the range of realistic values of the support rate with a natural maximum of 100 percent. So it can be stated that although the effect of the interaction is positive at higher value of support rate, we witness a higher effect of the favoured status, it is still insufficient to eliminate the drawbacks of the underdeveloped settlements – not to mention to enable the latter ones to overtake the settlements in better positions.

FIGURE 1 ❖ Differences of fund absorption



Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

So far we can conclude that both on micro-regional level and project level the effect of the institutional regulation officially planned and expected to enable the areas in disadvantageous position to catch up for the less underdeveloped ones in the field of the absorption of European

Union development funds proved to be unsuccessful. These empirical results imply that the less developed applicants – no matter micro-regions or directly projects – are at a disadvantage during the competition to gain development funds.



Now, we turn to a special group of projects in the Hungarian development policy and analyze the so-called *priority projects*. Everyone may admit that the priority projects are rather a special kind of development intervention considering the fact that the decision about the refusal or acceptance of a particular priority project is taken by the government itself. So in this case there is not that kind of competition to acquire the fund as we may suppose it in the previously analyzed instances, rather there is some kind of administrative decision – even if we take into consideration the evaluation process itself during which two separate professional reviews are included with recommendation about being supported or not. There is another angle why the priority projects can be regarded as extremely important policy instruments: *“a priority project is in priority because it contains such important development – either on a national or on a regional level – that can not be managed in other project budget due to its monetary dimension and uniqueness”* (K.D. 2007).

The data of the priority projects can be achieved from a given part of the webpage of the National Development Agency in a single Microsoft Excel table, which was supplemented during our work with further factors; additional variables from other sources. We assume that this information is important to be shared, as the tables shared on the internet include only the status of an actual priority project: the result of the governmental decision whether the project is supported, must be improved further, or rejected. From this divide we created a dummy variable – with a value 0 indicating that the priority project was refused and with a value 1 indicating that the priority project was supported or it needs still some elaboration –, so in this analysis the main question and our dependent variable can only be the decision, more properly the probability of being supported. Accordingly, we will apply likelihood-ratio calculations and logistic regression models in the course of data analysis.

The first numbers show the regional disparities of the possibilities of having a supported priority project: we assembled a simple cross-tabulation of the regional affiliation and the status of support; furthermore we calculated and included in the last column the odds to be supported separately in every region. The values imply that there are great differences in the probability of winning a priority project (see Table 5.): in most cases of the regions the numbers are under the value 1 – the notable value which means that the likelihood of having a supported project and a rejected project is the same; values over 1 indicate bigger possibility to be successful at having priority projects accepted, and values under 1 signifying worse performance in this field. So in the regions of Dél-Alföld, Dél-Dunántúl, Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország and Közép-Dunántúl, the priority projects do not tend to be as fruitful as they are in the traditionally and well-known more developed regions – Közép-Magyarország and Nyugat-Dunántúl (in the latter cases the numbers are already twice as high; 1,8 odds to have a supported priority project) . Thus, it is obvious that it is more difficult to have a granted priority project in the less developed regions, but the inequality becomes even more significant, if we consider the difference between the odds of the group of regional priority projects and the national level priority projects: the national ones have more than 6 times higher odds to be supported.

TABLE 5 ❖ Regional differences of the odds of priority projects to be granted

In the cells shown: frequencies		Status (government decision)		Total	Odds of a priority project to be granted in the region
		Not granted	Granted		
Regions	‘Dél-Alföld’	100	37	137	0,37
	‘Dél-Dunántúl’	41	16	57	0,39
	‘Észak-Alföld’	85	56	141	0,66
	‘Észak-Magyarország’	50	44	94	0,88
	‘Közép-Dunántúl’	55	48	103	0,87
	‘Közép-Magyarország’	51	96	147	1,88
	‘Nyugat-Dunántúl’	40	73	113	1,83
	National projects	17	105	122	6,18
Total		439	475	914	(1,08)

Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

Besides the regional dimension of differences, we also analyzed the effect of territorial development on the odds of having an accepted priority project. The first explaining variable in the related models was the proportion of the preferred micro-regions in the county from which the priority project was invited in the evaluation and decision-making process. According to the results of the logistic regression model (Table 6: M9), the effect caused by this so-called rate of underdevelopment is negative ($b' = -1,7$), but perhaps it is more effective for us to investigate the antilogarithm of the ‘b’ estimates, which transforms the raw ‘b’ values into the more easily interpretable odds ratio. Thus, it can be stated that there is – in this case as well – a remarkable inequality: with a higher proportion of preferred – i.e. less developed – micro-regions at the county level there is a lower odds ratio (b' antilog.=0,18) to have a supported priority project. However, in the group of the counties where there are not any favoured micro-regions, there is a higher possibility of the priority projects to be accepted: numerically – as it can be seen from the value of the constant in the same logistic regression model – nearly twice as high odds ratio (b' antilog.=1,95) can be measured; in other words it is much more likely to have a successful priority project in the more developed counties.

The other aspect of this territorial dimension is investigated from a less gradual point of view: we divided the units of analysis into two different groups depending on the mean value of the variable: proportion of the preferred micro-regions in the county. For the projects above the cut point values were coded with 1 (signifying a higher rate of underdevelopment), and the other ones were coded with 0 (signifying the counties with less – under the average – lagging behind micro-regions) as described below:

If $x \leq 50\%$, then the value of the new variable = 0 ($N = 402$),
 If $x > 50\%$, then the value of the new variable = 1 ($N = 407$).

So this dummy version of the original variable may reveal more visible and more distinct differences. Applying the logistic regression model in this case fulfills this expectation (Table 6: M10): although the raw ‘b’ estimate of the explaining variable is smaller than at the previous model, the antilogarithm of the indicator proves to be higher (b' antilog.=0,32) and marks more

notable disparity. It means that if a priority project proposal is given in from a county where the maximum share of the favoured (underdeveloped) micro-regions is fifty percent, then it is one and a half times more possible to be supported – see the antilogarithm value of the ‘b’ in the case of the constant(=1,53) –, while in the case of the counties with higher rate of underdeveloped micro-regions, the odds ratio is only 0,3 – i.e. it has only one-third likelihood to have a successfully accepted priority projects proposal.

TABLE 6 ❖ *The effect of the rate of underdeveloped micro-regions on the odds to be granted*

(N = 809)		b	antilogarithm of b coefficients
M9	X _{proportion of underdeveloped micro-regions}	-1,699	0,183
	Constant	0,667	1,948
M10	X _{rate of underdeveloped micro-regions_dummy}	-1,149	0,317
	Constant	0,425	1,529

Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

As demonstrated by the empirical results above, it cannot be stated that the decision-making processes of development policy would be more egalitarian on a higher level; i.e. on the governmental level: the priority projects also seem to lack any kind of spatially harmonizing impact. Rather, we had to face the fact that these particularly important and outstandingly expansive investments are more easily realized – or realized at all – by (co)financing with European Union development funds in the more developed regions and areas of the country.


4.2. Results of the Qualitative Research: Responses from the Interviews I.

Based on the results of the personal interviews conducted with different types of actors and stakeholders in the EU-funded project application system – self-government leaders and representatives of municipalities, project managers of micro-regional development associations, proposal-writers and project managers of project firms; i.e. members of the project class – we can shed some light on the factors behind the relations explored above, or the mechanisms laying in the background of the quantitative data.

According to the opinions of the respondents (see Figure 2.), the success of the application and project management can be traced back – on the one hand – generally to the *scarcity of resources*. This scarcity of resources means in the field of proposal writing and project generation itself the lack of own funds. As in the process of competition for development funds some of the participants – no matter if they are municipalities, enterprises or non-governmental organizations – do not possess privately the necessary financial resources to complete their project budget. This shortage of resources is even aggravated by the fact that these actors – just because of their disadvantaged circumstances – can obtain bank loans only limited or with restricted conditions – if they can at all – to complement their development projects and provide the own contribution. Thus, the results from the qualitative data highlight an objective impediment which is originated in the lack of resources. There is even an opinion that the acquisition of the European Union development funds depends solely on the own financial resources. Another dimension relating to this shortage of resources is the method of *subsequent financing*, which – beyond the very existence (or lack) of the necessary private resources – demands the availability of further free

monetary frame to start and to finalize the first phases; accounting periods of the projects. This problem emerges as an extremely important factor, as it does not concern the applicants of the excessively underdeveloped areas alone, rather it proves to be a complicating factor of the project funding system as a whole, impeding all the financially less strong stakeholders.

FIGURE 2 ❖ Results from the interviews



Source: Own categorisation and edition from the opinions in the interviews by ATLAS.ti

4.2.1. Related Quantitative Results

In order to investigate whether the disadvantage described above and directly caused by the monetary conditions generally pervade the project proposal system, it may be fruitful to analyze deeply the quantitative data. If the applicants struggling with the shortage of financial resources are really lagging behind, it may confirm the phenomenon explored in the interviews.

We use the data of the projects from the period of the National Development Plan (NDP I.; 2004-2006), as these can already been treated as closed, i.e. the trends appearing in the data may not change yet. In this case as well, we analyze all the supported projects without sampling (N=11720), but we excluded the ones which were funded without competition (the priority projects and the central projects). The complex multi-level calculations (see Table 7) provide a rather remarkable result about the question raised: the first part (Table 7: M9) of the outcomes shows the effect of the preferred status of the micro-region on the support rate regarding the project level, and aggregated on the scope of the institutional regulation, i.e. micro-regional level. The values of the regression coefficients imply that on project level both the applicants from preferred; i.e. underdeveloped micro-regions are at advantage – because their projects are realized with 5,5 percentage higher support rate on average –, and aggregated on the micro-regional level the average level of support rate is higher ($b=8,4$), as well. These results confirm that it is worth being favoured in the European Union funds based Hungarian project allocation system, because the preferred applicants can implement their projects with smaller own financial resources – due to the higher support rate.

TABLE 7 ❖ *The effect of preferred status on project and micro-regional level*

MODEL	VARIABLES OF THE MODEL	PROJECT LEVEL	MICRO-REGIONAL LEVEL
M9	Constant	58,485	57,087
	DEPENDENT V: Support rate	5,519	8,377
M10	Constant	27,340	3541,649
	DEPENDENT V: Amount of funds paid (million HUF)	18,767	-2430,598
M10.c1	Constant	-27,445	1186,649
	DEPENDENT V: Amount of funds paid (million HUF)	13,687	-2776,071
	CONTROL V: Support rate	0,936	41,243
M10.c2	Constant	-26,178	661,304
	DEPENDENT V: Amount of funds paid (million HUF)	4,031	-357,584
	CONTROL V: Support rate	0,946	49,033
	Development level	-9,229	4122,595

Source: Own calculation edition and aggregation on micro-regional level on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.

The further part of table 7. also reveals the positive impact of the favoured status where we estimated the effects on the total amount of funds paid (Table 7: M10-M10.c2). The latter is higher in the case of the projects coming from preferred micro-regions in the case of the two-variable model and also in the models containing additional control variables. The estimation of the simple two-variable model (Table 7: M10) quantifies the difference of the dependent variable – total amount of funds paid – when we shift from the group of not preferred micro-regions to the group of the preferred ones. The extended model (Table 7: M10-M10.c1) – containing the first additional variable; support rate – makes the same estimation simultaneously controlled by the aforementioned alternative explaining factor (support rate). In the final model (Table 7: M10.c2), we included another control variable – development level of the micro-region; a principal component constructed from 5 indicators as described earlier –, thus the coefficients of this model present the net effect of being preferred micro-region – aside from the impacts of the value of the support rate and the micro-regional development level.

The results of the first basic model (Table 7: M10) indicate that – on the project level – the effect of belonging to a preferred micro-region is positive: a nearly 19 million HUF higher amount of funds can be observed on average. After controlling – the initially likewise positive – the effect of support rate (Table 7: M10.c1), the independent impact of the favoured micro-regional status decreases a little, but remains positive ($b^1=13,7$). And in the final model (Table 7: M10.c2)– which estimates the effect of our main explaining variable, the values of the support rate and the development level of the micro-regions considered to be constant – there is still a positive effect: if a project is given in from a preferred micro-region, then the sum of funds paid is 4 million HUF higher on average.

In so far, as all of the models investigated above are examined aggregated on the micro-regional level, we obtain respectively the opposite results – that is, the effect is negative: only to mention the results of the final model (Table 7: M10.c2) illustratively – aside from the positive

effects of the support rate and the context of the micro-regions – in the group of the favoured micro-regions the amount of funds paid is 357,6 million HUF smaller. This casts doubt on the advantageous impact of the institutional regulation of favoured micro-regional status because it means that when we move from the group of not preferred micro-regions to the group of the preferred ones, the average level of fund absorption is lower.

To sum up briefly, the advantageous impact of being preferred micro-region can be detected only on project level; on territorial level it seems to be rather a disadvantage. Thus, we may conclude that the results of the empirical research above reveal an essential problem of the project fund allocation system: it is worth being involved in the institutional regulation of being preferred on the *project level, as an applicant* – because this brings both higher rate of support and higher amount of funds paid in the projects. However, generally speaking, the micro-regions considered to be the accumulation units of drawbacks and inequalities can not reach any kind of advantages – thus generating a kind of *trap* in development policy. So to say the favoured status as an institutional regulation is advantageous and reaches its objective initially intended, but on territorial level its effect is not advantageous so it is in this respect counterproductive.

4.3. Results of the qualitative research: responses from the interviews II.

However, among the causes of lagging behind or being successful in the processes of project generation and fund absorption the factors – related to the financial shortages and strengths – described above based on the interviews and also analyzed with quantitative methods can be regarded as only one of a more differently interdependent group of factors. In the opinions of the respondents, more elements could be discovered – connected to a different aspect of the scarcity of the resources, too (see Figure 2). One of these elements is the *lack of activities* – organizationally separated – assisting and relieving the course of assembling project proposals, on which the investor or applicant can rely. Since the success of proposal writing and the phase of planning of projects needs and supposes – according to the respondents' opinions – the availability of *knowledge and skills* which do not always exist in the case of all potential applicants. Those employees or staff members who have already been handling such tasks for a long time are far more experienced with proposal documents and in this respect they have the know-how and expertise that is required to prepare these materials precisely and accurate.

It seems to be actually irrelevant whether this complexity of particular skills and knowledge is accessible *within the organization itself* – even as a separate proposal writing department, or just as a few staff members specialized directly for this purpose –, or this knowledge is achieved as a service sold by the market in the form of tender or proposal writing companies. These two options are equivalent from the perspective that both supposes the existence of – eventually financial – resources. In this way – another – source or aspect of inequalities is created for those applicants being in less advantageous conditions. The proposal writing companies and their employees incorporated obviously wider, deeper and more extensive knowledge. And this can be taken into consideration as a cause for the respondents' opinion which declared that it is not even rewarding for a smaller organization – for example a self-government of a small settlement or the small- and medium-sized enterprises – to employ or train colleagues who have expertise of every given area in depth, because on the one hand their education may be fairly expansive, and on the other hand it is likely that during their work it will be necessary for them to rely on their specific knowledge only rarely (project proposals with specific themes or areas are created only occasionally). Unlike the proposal writing companies – it can be much more promising for

them to invest into the training or employing of a person with experience and knowledge in a particular field as this member of the staff may carry out for different clients the same kind of works and duties that require the specific knowledge.

4.4. Summary of the results

According to the secondary data analysis, counterfactual patterns of the institutional regulation of the European Union funds absorption could be explored: on micro-regional level (1) the preferred rural development micro-regions have a smaller rate of both projects and funds compared to the developed, i.e. not beneficiary territorial units. Project level data of regional development projects implied that (2) the support rate is influenced positively by the governmental regulation: in the preferred settlements and micro-regions the average level of support rate is higher, however (3) in both cases of micro-regional and settlement level, the effect of preferred status proved to be disadvantageous: even in the control-variable models, the projects from preferred territorial units have on average smaller amount of funds paid than their developed counterparts. The (4) positive value of the interaction effect can be regarded as favourable outcome, although a higher value would be more desirable, as the overall tendencies show that this advantage of the underdeveloped, i.e. preferred settlements is not high enough to help the less developed ones to catch up. In the case of the especially remarkable priority projects (5), a clear regional dimension of inequality could be measured concerning the odds to have a granted projects and the (6) distribution of the underdeveloped micro-regions seemed to be a significant factor in this case as well: the higher presence of preferred micro-regions decreased the odds of the priority projects to be granted. The results of the qualitative research (7) revealed three main factors influencing the success of development project absorption: besides the indispensable economic capital a kind of cultural or human capital, furthermore social resources or personal relations prove to be necessary elements. In the light of the qualitative research results (8) the institutional regulation seemed to work as a kind of development trap: some more detailed analysis on different levels revealed a controversial role of the preferred status.

5. Conclusions

Above we introduced some results about the appropriateness and success of the Hungarian regional development policy – our main goal was to answer empirically whether mechanisms resulting in counter-factual effects can be explored, i.e. to demonstrate the regional inequalities of regional development policy. After shortly outlining the theoretical frame by interpreting the connection of regional development policy and (territorial) inequalities on the basis of (new) economic sociology, we carried out analysis on several databases on more territorial levels and explored some opinions about the issue from personal interviews.

According to the results of the empirical analysis, we can conclude that both on micro-regional level and project level the *effect of the institutional regulation* of the absorption of European Union development funds – officially planned and expected to enable the areas in disadvantageous position to catch up with the less underdeveloped ones – *proved to be unsuccessful*. These empirical results imply – in accordance with the related EU-level results (BRADLEY 2006, CRESCENZI 2009, ESPOSTI – BUSELOTTI 2008, MARTIN-TYLER 2006) – that *during the competition to gain development funds the less developed applicants are at a disadvantage*. More precisely, the quantitative (secondary statistical analysis) and qualitative (interviews) outcomes show that preferred status seems to be counter-factual due to the complex combination of the lack

of resources. Moreover, the respecting relationships imply a kind of *development trap*, inasmuch it is worth becoming beneficiary on the project level, because higher support rate and sum of support can be achieved, but on micro-regional level the impact of being preferred is negative, i.e. disadvantageous.

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Segregation in Minds

*Analysis on the Statistical and Mental-based Socio-spatial
Segregation in a Hungarian City*



Abstract In this paper, I explore socio-spatial segregation from a particular perspective, which may probably be considered a novelty in the investigation of spatial social patterns, as it focuses on questions such as: What kind of distinction occurs between socio-spatial patterns designated by statistical data and the cognitive representations of those patterns in people's minds? and What explains these differences, and what kind of impact can they generate?

Keywords mental map, cognitive representations, segregation, social-spatial segregation

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Research background

This study summarizes a 10-year-long investigation on the socio-spatial pattern of a Hungarian city, Szeged and its alterations represented on the mental map of the Szegeders involving qualitative and quantitative types of research methods and statistical data.

The main motivation to study the socio-spatial segregation within the city of Szeged was presented by the theoretical and methodological criticism of Gábor Csanádi, Ferenc Ekler, József Hegedűs, János Ladányi and Iván Tosics (EKLER – HEGEDŰS – TOSICS 1980; CSANÁDI – LADÁNYI 1988; LADÁNYI 2008), and their results gained from investigations on the diverse segregation patterns of different social classes.

The research has undergone several changes with respect to its methodology in the past 10 years. Initially, we based our works exclusively on quantitative methods, particularly on sampling, and investigated relevancies of social-spatial differentiation models set up by classical urban sociology theories in the case of Szeged. Rightful and constructive professional criticism of our research's initial direction induced us to extend the theoretical framework of the research problem, and investigate it from different methodological aspects as well. Besides the sociological approach of socio-spatial segregation, we also extended our attention to theories of socio-geography and urban economics. In addition to the interdisciplinary expansion of conceptual framework, the methodological perspective of the research problem we studied was likewise enriched which built on the theory of combining more research methods together.

We grasped the issue of socio-spatial segregation from a peculiar perspective, which may be probably considered a novelty in the investigation of territorial-spatial social patterns, as it focuses on questions like 'what kind of distinction occurs between socio-spatial patterns designated by statistical data and the cognitive representations of those existing in people's minds?', and 'what explains these alterations, and what kind of impact can it generate?'

By analysing the results of qualitative and quantitative surveys, we justified that significant changes in the urban structure are still decisive forces on boundaries of cognitive structures appearing on mental maps, whereas former borderlines between historical districts are tend to exist only in minds – cognitive maps –, and solely those urban areas present distinctions in this sense that used to be independent settlements earlier.

Our scientific attention was turned to the problem of real and cognitive socio-spatial segregations during the investigation on the correlations between cognitive structures and historical districts. For the study of this problem, we performed an experiment in which we scrutinized primarily the areal position of two social groups (low or high-status, poor or rich population, as it was defined during our surveys) that could be well determined and distinguished by using the latest census data in delimitations of different areal units, subsequently we compared these with their later positions on mental maps occupied seven, eight, and nine years afterwards.

The analysis accomplished on the 2001-census data also verified in the case of Szeged what had already been articulated by others earlier (LADÁNYI 2008), namely that indexes marking the spatial segregation – in case of the usually applicable, relatively extensive territorial delimitations – of the people occupying the bottom of social hierarchy are lower than those on the top. This theory proved to be peculiarly true in case we determine segregation index by means of its projection on greater areal units. Thus, segregation, which exists anyway and is concentrated in smaller territorial units, became invisible as a consequence of greater social heterogeneity in the area.

To carry out an experiment, we investigated whether segregated areas with certain social at-

tributes exist on the Szegeders' cognitive maps, or not; and if so, to what extent are these identical to our results of the analysis on socio-spatial segregation retrieved from the 2001 census data? Ranking by the territorial ratio of those residents of Szeged who were classified as low-status group according to census data (educational attainment, and employment status) exhibited identity to the results of none of the years in which mental mapping was conducted; however, the population belonging to the high-status group bore strong resemblance to the ranking of residential areas of the wealthy in the mental mapping surveys.

Results of the mental mappings indicated similar cognitive structure in the case of segregation between rich and poor in all three years of surveying. Conclusively, we introduced and defined the notion of 'mental segregate', as being territorial units where determinant adjectives corresponding to mental spheres displayed on mental maps, or the frequency of the mentioning of stereotypes bearing identical content were extraordinary.

We proposed three possible explanations for the accuracy or inaccuracy of mental maps: as for the 'static explanation', and the 'dynamic explanation', we explained the diversity of patterns of the society's spatial arrangement in minds in the first case with the particularities of the group-specific territorial location of the real distribution (static), and in the second case with the difference occurring in the frequency of the measures of urban rehabilitation by target areas (dynamic).

The third, 'stereotypical explanation' implies that distinctions between real and cognitive spatial patterns in different social groups' notions are generated by stereotypes relating to mental maps. With respect to the stereotypical explanation of the distinction between real and cognitive socio-spatial patterns, the scientific question arose whether exaggerating stereotypical explanations that are related to areas comprising different segregates have any kind of impact. We adopted the urban economic theoretical approach on external impacts (LENGYEL – MOZSÁR 2002, KANEMOTO 1996) relating to the judgement of areas comprising segregates of different quality. We expressed degrees of the external impact characterising individual districts in the value distinction between areal results of the dissimilation and mental dissimilation indexes, and we ranked urban areas subsequently upon the indicators of the 2001 base year and three survey years, then we tested/challenged the coherence on the grounds of the correlations among ranking lists. On the basis of the results, we concluded that external impacts deriving from stereotypes prevail most intensively in areas consisting of segregates.

During the course of this research, we apply the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in the analysis of the 'real' and mental socio-spatial patterns of Szeged, so as to highlight the methodological problems of territory-based socio-scientific analyses through the examples of results that we obtained from a variety of analysis procedures. The thesis can be regarded as interdisciplinary from a methodological point of view, since the various survey methods and research issues that provide the empirical basis of the study represent the subject and methodology of several other disciplines (sociology, economy, socio-geography, social psychology, cultural anthropology, urban studies).

The main direction of my study is represented by the empirical analyses of the following hypotheses:

Dominant segregate hypothesis: Segregates appear on maps regardless of their type.

Mental segregate hypothesis: boundaries that appear on mental maps do not correspond to the segregate boundaries measured and delimited upon quantitative datasets; boundaries of mental segregates are more extensive.

Stereotypical externality hypothesis: Stereotypes related to segregates cover greater units of the urban structure comprising these – districts in the case of Szeged –, and have positive or negative external effects on them.

All three of our hypotheses have been proved to be true during our investigation.

Applied methods

In our opinion, the typology delineated by Peter Blau, which is used most frequently in urban sociology, can be perfectly applied for the determination of the complex of parameters deciding spatial segregation on the grounds of social status (BLAU 1976, ANGELUSZ 1999. 359–382.), therefore we employed the structural parameters included in this typology for the determination of the social position of individual units of analysis in the quantitative phase of our research, the operationalisation and the analysis.

On one hand, the extension of territorial units represents one of the major methodological problems in researches dealing with the correlation between social stratification and spatial segregation, and on the other hand, the strongly correlating sample size does another. We would be able to obtain the most accurate data possible from similar analyses, if we were aware of those parameters of the total population that determine social stratification; however, we are unable to fulfil the latter in most of the cases. Such opportunity to detect individual parameters of the total population in Szeged is the ten-yearly population census. Nonetheless, the nominal and gradual parameters determined by Blau are not recorded even in this data collection affecting the entire population, only a few of them, involving gender, age, educational attainment, domicile, occupation, marital status, workplace, nationality and religion.

Results of Hungarian urban sociological investigations indicate that in the case of spatial segregation by social strata – within the list of parameters by Blau – those parameters can be well defined by which spatial segregation can be distinguished most apparently (LADÁNYI 2008). On the basis of his investigation conducted in Budapest, János Ladányi classifies the parameters including age, educational attainment, workplace and occupation into those ones by means of which spatial segregation by social strata can be detected most precisely.

I intend to give an overview of the changes occurred in the spatial pattern of Szeged city's society between 2001 and 2010 on the basis of objective data and those retrieved from mental maps, employing five different research methods:

- Source analysis
- Observation
- Mental mapping
- Survey by questionnaire
- Secondary analysis

The techniques of investigation we employed are based on the incorporation of quantitative and qualitative methods, which provide high levels in both reliability and validity. Our method of investigation ranges on a qualitative-quantitative scale whose endpoints are represented by 'field-near' (qualitative) and 'field-distant' (quantitative) techniques for achieving higher degree of reliability and validity (LETENYEI 2004. 56–66).

Our point of view is that only and exclusively valid research results are worth considering, although one has to endeavour to achieve adequate level of reliability. The greatest advantage of combining these two methods of data collection is that it ensures data of higher validity and reliability for analysis by the fact that the definition of research question and its relevance become

more established as a result of qualitative collections in the field, thus providing higher level of validity in terms of questions to be articulated by the quantitative research phase.

During our data collection in the quantitative phase of the research, we could work with such questions by incorporating more methods – completed on a sample of a large number of items and therefore providing high reliability – because of the already processed qualitative results whose validity is greater as well. We ensured higher validity in the case of the survey, which is anyway highly reliable but less valid as a consequence of inappropriately articulated questions, by formulating questions for the quantitative measurement device on the basis of the high validity data yielded by the fieldwork prior to developing the device itself. There is a recommended sequence of different methods during a research that involves the abovementioned combination of data collection techniques that is advancing from qualitative data collection techniques toward quantitative procedures. Any variation from this sequence or swapping of the two techniques of data collection would occur in one case, namely in the cases of fieldwork and secondary analysis, when the secondary analysis of data obtained from previous results in the research topic can overtake fieldwork phase (LETENYEI 2004).

We begin our research in the thesis topic with the examination of the documents introducing the society of Szeged, then with a jump to the ‘field-near’ end of the axis/scale we continue with data collection that ensures high validity regarding the built-up environments of different urban areas and distinctions among social composition of the various districts by applying observation technique. Conclusions of this research phase generate the articulation of the study’s research problem, and the decision to set up hypotheses in further phases of the study about socio-spatial segregation in Szeged, and to employ methods for its measurement at a higher scale of reliability.

Secondary analysis represents one of the higher measurement methods, in which we analysed the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s (HCSO) population census data on the total population of Szeged involving variables of the completed level of education and age. We recognise socio-spatial distinctions by census districts on the grounds of these parameters taken from 2001.

In the phase of secondary analysis the following two reasons induced us to take into account exclusively the number of years of school completed and age:

Researches focusing on segregation in Hungary indicated that these variables (and particularly the completed level of education) are the most dominant factors in the social composition of segregates. (LADÁNYI 2004) The other reason is that on the level of evolvable variables census data were restricted to these parameters both being applicable on two higher measurement levels, and as determinants of social status.¹

Data collection necessitated by the mental mapping was conducted in the quantitative research phase, specifically focusing on the stereotypical notions of individual areas, and expressly on the cognitive perception and localization of areas resided by low class (poor) and higher-class (wealthy) people.

In this section of the thesis, we analyse the spatial segregation of Szeged’s society on the basis of two determinant structural parameters of social stratification, and its extension, as well as the mental representation concerning spatial locations of the various social groups in the mind of Szegeders.

¹ Census data consist even of economic activity and employment status, which belong to the gradual parameters of social stratification; furthermore, gender/sex and ethnic identity, which are to be classified as nominal parameters (BLAU 1976, ANGELUSZ 1999). Nonetheless, we did not consider these variables practical to involve in the analysis due to the low level of their measurement and previous results obtained from segregation researches.

We make an attempt to introduce how the research on spatial segregation of the urban society can be interpreted with the help of qualitative and quantitative approaches, the secondary analyses of the 2001 census data, as well as of observation and three survey questionnaires. We determine objective and subjective (mental dissimilation) index values assigned to individual areas of the city from larger territorial units to the smallest delimitations possible (functional residential area – district – census tract – census block, and interpret the internal differentiation of Szeged upon these. The main questions of our analysis is partly of methodological nature and partly concerns Szeged's internal divisions. The methodological issue is to what extent the results obtained through mental mapping diverge from or are in accordance with results retrieved from quantitative data. A further methodological question is how much mental mapping, as a method, is eligible to assess the spatial movement processes of the urban society, and the effects of urban planning interventions.

During our analysis we strive to better understand what kind of alterations or similarities of the separation, segregation of high and low-status population of Szeged by residential areas can be indicated by which analytical technique, in other words, how much the objective and subjective interpretations of the population's segregation are in correspondence to each other.

We considered the application of source and document analyses – as a method of data collection – concerning the socio-spatial analysis of Szeged effective, because documents, descriptions and social scientific and sociological studies emerging on the occasion of the 1879 Great Flood, which was a determinant event in the city's life, refer unequivocally to the fact that it had a significant impact on the history of the development and society of Szeged (LECHNER 2000, BÁLINT 1959, ERDEI 1971, BÁLINT 1976, KOVÁCS 2003).

Results of document analyses completed on the socio-spatial pattern of Szeged generated further research questions in the qualitative phase, namely that:

What does the current spatial structure of Szeged look like?

How much do individual parts separate from each other by the function and physical characteristics of residential buildings?

Can one sense some kind of heterogeneity concerning the composition of local society?

In what spatial and social categories do the people of Szeged think about their city?

To put it otherwise and correlate with a specific research method: how are the city and its population represented on the mental map of Szegeders, and what parts, areas, groups and social categories build them up?

For testing the relevancy of research questions articulated in the first research phase, we simultaneously applied two data collection techniques subsequently: besides observations taken during the city's visit, we made unstructured interviews with residents of the given districts. For selecting the study subjects, we applied the technique of convenient sampling (Babbie 2003:205-206), as we did not aim to perform representative sampling at that research phase, however, we sought to select respondents who possibly bore different demographical attributes. During the course of our observations conducted in the period between 2002 and 2007, we conducted some 150-200 short discussions.

Conclusions of the qualitative research section

As a conclusion to data collection accomplished through observation, we ascertained that the building stock of Szeged has more or less preserved its traditional arrangement by districts even today with respect to physical and functional attributes. It can also be perceived that tradi-

tional distinctions among urban areas are gradually vanishing in terms of both the appearance of new buildings and the social characteristics of their residents. The onetime historical districts are steadily losing their particular faces with respect to their characteristics – in case of both the build-up environment and the social homogeneity –, and thus their borders are slowly blurring. Former boundaries of the historical districts tend to exist only in minds – on cognitive maps. Some difference is presented by those neighbourhoods that used to be independent settlements. Borderlines between these once independent areas and Szeged were and still are sharper (dyke, railway, main road), and can rather be interpreted as fault line, whose influence can be detected on cognitive maps as well.

Conclusions of the quantitative research section

During the secondary analyses of the 2001 census datasets of the HCSO, we analysed segregation and dissimilarity indexes² of Szeged's inhabitants, which can be classified into categories of unemployed people in active working age with low educational attainment, and those in active working age (low-status), and white-collar workers with high level of education (high-status)/unemployed people in active working age with low educational attainment (low-status), and those white-collar workers with high level of education in active working age (high-status) in four territorial distributions / divisions.³

Segregation indexes exhibited different results regarding the extension of different status groups and delimited territorial units. The larger an individual unit is, the smaller the segregation indexes of studied groups are. The difference between segregation indexes are striking between low and high-status groups in the largest areal unit, namely functional residential areas. It can be detected in this territorial delimitation that high-status people are prone to segregate more intensely, whereas low-status people are not. But at the same time, if we compare the ranges of the segregation indexes by territorial units group by group, significant differences are produced. The extension of territorial delimitation has a great impact on the values of the low-status groups' segregation indexes. In the case of the territorial delimitations of Szeged, the delimitation on census tract level is the unit, in which segregation index values of either status groups converge. Hence, the segregation curve represents J shape in case of great territorial delimitation, while as a consequence of decreasing areal units in Szeged, it nearly followed U shape. Such a significant J-shaped curve cannot be experienced by means of decreasing the level of territorial analyses either, as in Budapest or other bigger European cities (LADÁNYI 2005. 147.) which can be interpreted by different social composition.

We created two groups for high-status people during the analysis, as a risk of error emerged, namely that we could have specified group boundaries for people in the highest social status too loosely – since we classified occupations falling under the determination demanding high and medium level education into this group.

This could have led to the conclusion that we compared the segregation indexes of middle class strata characterised by low territorial segregation with indexes of the low-status inhabitants. In order to make sure how much this category classified into the high-status group influence our

² We determined active working age between 18 and 60; low level of educational attainment at 8 or less completed classes. Categories of white-collar workers were the following: legislator, leaders of the administration and trade unions, occupations involving independent application of university degrees, other occupations demanding high or medium level education.

³ Grouping variables of the database enabled these four different territorial distributions.

results, we created another high-status group from which we extracted occupations requiring other high or medium educational level, and likewise calculated its segregation and dissimilarity indexes. Results did not alter remarkably.

Consequently, results assessed on census data support those declarations in Szeged's case as well according to which indexes of those occupying the bottom of the hierarchy indicating spatial segregation – in case of the generally used, relatively extensive territorial delimitations (functional residential zone, district) – are lower than those being on the top. Our investigation apparently verifies that this theorem is definitely valid in the case when we determine segregation indexes on the basis of larger territorial units, which as a consequence of social heterogeneity within the area overlap, and conceal segregation, otherwise existing and concentrating in smaller territorial units. The reason for this is that high-status people can concentrate according to their own volition; they can afford, and they are able to choose the residential area they prefer, whereas the poor cannot afford this from their own resources, therefore they are compelled into micro-segregates, where they concentrate occupying smaller areal units (LADÁNYI 2007. 199–215).

As a conclusion of the thesis we articulated three interpretations concerning distinctions in the socio-spatial patterns retrieved from statistical data and mental maps:

Dynamic explanation

By means of our dynamic interpretation concluded by the research, we can detect distinctions between statistical data and cognitive socio-spatial segregation patterns in that urban renewal measures dominantly affect residential areas of the low-status population; greater degree of transformations and various urban ecological processes emerge in these areas frequently due to interventions. Habitats of the high-status inhabitants indicate greater permanency, large-scale changes do not occur in these areas. Spatial distribution of the low-status population could have changed as a consequence of rehabilitation interventions taken place in Szeged after 2001, which was projected on mental maps as well; while location of the high-status people, which had already been fixed in minds, remained unchanged.

Static explanation

In accordance with the research results produced by Ladányi and his associates, as well as our analyses concerning Szeged low-status population's areal concentration indicates territorial homogeneity only in the case of smaller territorial units, in other words, areas populated by the poor, the so-called micro-segregates are strongly dispersed within the city. Consequently, cognitive maps of urban districts constructed through individual experience indicate intense dispersion in minds due to the same characteristics of poor residential blocks/areas, and thus subjectivity is more prevalent concerning location. On one hand, people can encounter poor micro-segregates scattered in various portions of the city; on the other hand they meet those smaller units resided by poor people frequently that concern their day-to-day visits, thus their cognitive territorial judgement tend toward those areas. Urban areas that are believed to be resided by the poor are, on one hand, characterised by greater degree of dispersion in minds on the basis of location, and on the other hand, categorisation concerns more areas as a consequence of this tendency. In contrast to the latter, one can encounter areas populated by high-status people that overlap greater territorial unit only in well separated and defined districts, thus distinctions in the subjective daily experience do not induce distortive effects on cognitive maps; these bear stronger resemblance to real spatial social arrangement. During our research we defined the

term of mental segregation, which stands for those territorial units that exhibit definite alteration from other mental spheres with respect to determinant adjectives marking mental areas on mental maps, or the frequency of mention of stereotypes carrying identical content.

We supplemented the theory of easily learnable, 'readable' city (LYNCH 1960; cited by CSÉFALVAY 1990), which throws light on that relatively accurate cognitive map can be created easily and quickly about clearly sectioned cities that are characterised by particular architectural environment, with the statement that relatively precise cognitive map can be created about cities that can be described by more homogeneous socio-spatial segregation.

Based on our research results, in our opinion we can make the general statement by means of our two abovementioned explanations that the accuracy of mental maps are heavily influenced by two factors, as for the analysis on the cognitive representation of either physical or social spheres:

- dynamic factor: frequency of the spatial change of the analytical units (fault lines, borderlines, landmarks, mental spheres, stereotypes),
- static factor: spatial extension of analytical units

Stereotypical explanation

We created an index, called mental dissimilation index to measure territorial disparities on the basis of the frequency of mention of areas populated by the poor or the rich.

Mental dissimilation index measures the spatial distribution of the mental representation of two cognitive categories. This indicator is basically symmetric, i.e. functions and sequence of the two compared distributions are exchangeable. The calculation is, in substance, performed upon the formula in which one totals absolute values of the distinctions among territorial units of the percentage of the two cognitive categories relating to given mental territorial units, and divides them by two.

Values can range between 0 and 100 in the case of mental dissimilation index as well. If a certain stereotype is not associated with a mental spheres in minds, its value converges to the low limit value, while in case of the connection of a certain stereotype to a certain area it moves toward the upper limit. The value of mental dissimilation index calculated for each district of Szeged relying on the 2007, 2009 and 2010 datasets we study the mental spatial distribution of the low and high-status population.

With reflection to the results, we articulated a third explanation, namely stereotypical explanation. This explanation virtually involves – in case of the distinction among real and mental spatial patterns of various social groups' – categorisation, and the frequency and extension of exaggerating attitudes accompanying categories, which characterise stereotypes associated with mental spheres.

Concerning the stereotypical interpretation on the distinctions between real and cognitive socio-spatial patterns we raised the question in connection with further investigations whether exaggerating stereotypical explanations have some sort of impact, or one can detect such external impact that is a possible consequence of the distortion of cognitive spatial pattern, or not.

The main direction of the research is right in compliance with the analysis of stereotypes relating to territories, during which we shed light on the fact that negative stereotypes associated with districts of Szeged correlate unequivocally with the presence of ethnic segregates in those areas. Our results reinforce that suchlike areas represent only relatively small portions of districts, nonetheless, negative stereotypes concern whole districts, in other words, they have negative external impact on districts. *

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Digital Gaps in School? Exploring the Digital Native Debate



Abstract The students of today have mostly grown up surrounded by numerous digital technologies, like cell-phones, computers and the internet; therefore they are called digital natives by some scholars. These information and communication technologies are indispensable parts of their lives. The digital gaps which are caused by the (different) use of digital technologies are socially relevant primarily in school, as they influence the inequalities in education. In our article, we present the possible approaches of digital inequalities in school, the gap between teachers and students and the differences among students. We introduce the concepts and theories about the digital natives then sum up the main criticism about this thesis. Recent empirical studies and their results are presented to argue in favour of the heterogeneity of the digital native's generation.

Keywords digital gap, digital inequalities, digital natives, net generation, ICT use patterns

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1. Introduction

The problem of digital gaps or digital inequalities in education can be approached in two different ways. First, there are generational differences in ICT knowledge and usage between students and teachers. This is what the sociological literature describes with the popular terms “digital natives” and “digital immigrants” (Prensky 2001a). The main question that emerges in regard of this type of inequality is whether teachers are able to prepare students for their later life in an ICT based society? The other approach of digital inequalities in education focuses on the differences of ICT usage and knowledge among the digital native generation, the students. Many empirical researches inspired by the digital native–digital immigrant concept point out that the present generation of students cannot be considered as a homogenous group as far as their technology use is concerned. There are differences between them in terms of access, mode of use and ICT competence. These divergences among students imply the question how they influence the students’ chances in education, or in other words, what impact ICT use has on school performance. How does ICT use contribute to a better or a worse school performance?

This paper aims to give a detailed overview of the two approaches of digital inequalities outlined in the introduction in order to offer a better understanding of the implications of ICT in education. We will first introduce the concepts of digital gap and digital inequalities in social sciences to familiarize the reader with some basic notions of the topic in focus. In the second chapter we give a summary of the concepts and theories of the emergence of a new, digitally well-equipped and technology-savvy generation. Then improvements of the concept and criticism are presented in the next section, as many scholars questioned the adequacy of these thoughts on the digital gap between students and teachers. To support the critics, the latest empirical findings of both quantitative and qualitative studies are introduced. These empirical works also refer to the second approach of digital inequalities in education, namely to the differences of the use among students. We intend to highlight the arguments that emphasize the heterogeneity of the digital natives.

2. The Digital Gap and the Digital Inequality Concepts

The interest of social sciences in technologies and their social implications has been a rather marginalized territory of research for a long time. However, first the appearance and spread of the television, then of other information and communication technologies – like cell-phones, computers and the internet – has directed the attention of social scientists gradually on these technologies and their effects on social life. Sociologists have caught up on these phenomena because of their characteristic of creating some kind of inequalities among groups and individuals in society (BOGNÁR – GALÁCZ 2004). When ICT began to spread, two common views emerged concerning the effects of them on social stratification. People and scientists had great expectations in connection with these technologies. They presumed that by giving access to information, knowledge and opportunities, the information and communication technologies would diminish social inequalities. The other – more pessimistic – view did not expect the ICT to decrease but to increase social inequalities as access of and competencies for these technologies are not evenly distributed in society (PINTÉR 2007, DIMAGGIO et al. 2001). Although both views can be theoretically supported, the latter assumption turned out to be realistic, since empirical studies have revealed huge differences both between regions or countries, and inside the societies, between individuals or groups of individuals.

The empirical studies applied distinct approaches to the digital differences according to the

level of penetration. At the beginning – when penetration was low - emphasis was put on the access, and dichotomous distinctions were made between the ones who have access to ICT and who do not, or later between those who use these applications and who do not. This is the concept of the *digital gap* or *digital divide* (DiMAGGIO – HARGITTAI 2001). Analyses with the focus on the digital divide have tried to reveal the socio-economic characteristics of the users and non-users. In a huge empirical study NORRIS (2001) unfolded the variables that influence the digital gap. It is not surprising that these factors are identical with the traditional socio-economic and demographic variables: gender, age, ethnicity, educational attainment, income, occupation and type of residence (rural or urban) are the main predictors of ICT access and use. According to Norris's findings, the variable that has the most significant impact on the digital divide is age. Young generations are ten times more likely to use the new information and communication technologies than older people. Thus generational differences, which will be discussed later in this paper, seem to beconstitute a significant dimension of the digital inequalities in terms of access and use.

When penetration reached a higher level, the focus of research has shifted from the dichotomous distinctions between users and non-users to the differences among the users. It has simply lost relevance to investigate the characteristics of the ones who have and who have no access to ICT, as access and use were available for the majority of the society¹. This new approach directed the attention of researchers from the digital divide to digital inequalities. Thus, the term of digital inequalities refers to the differences among the users concerning the quality of use. These differences can be investigated in many dimensions. DiMAGGIO and HARGITTAI (2001) – who introduced the term of digital inequalities – suggest five dimensions of the digital inequalities. The first one is that of the (1) technical apparatus including hardware and software. The quality of the computer or other device that one uses to access the World Wide Web generates inequalities in use as the bad status of the hardware or the lack of special software limits the use. Technical apparatus also includes the type of connection. The dial-up connections make many applications difficult or unreachable; while a broadband connection does not limit the usage. Researches reveal the huge importance of the broadband connection in the ways of use. This type of connection leads to quantitative and qualitative changes in use. Broadband access may enhance the period of time spent with surfing the Internet. In a panel survey, HITT and TAMBE (2010) found an increase of 1300 minutes in the use in a month when the connection was changed to broadband access. They also revealed changes in the quality of use as people visited more entertaining and news sites after shifting to broadband connection. KOLKO (2010) witnessed in his research a shift to “socially undesirable” uses e.g. downloading music as an outcome of the broadband access. Another dimension of the digital inequalities is (2) the autonomy of use according to DiMaggio and Hargittai. This category includes the place of use, the control of use and other aspects of autonomy. The use at home or at a public place can differ a lot. For example, the time of use may be limited in a library or school, and filters may be applied which hamper the usage. An important dimension of inequalities lies in the (3) ICT competencies, skills and knowledge. These cognitive factors vary among users leading to differences in the use of the internet. (4) Social support may also generate inequalities, as the use is facilitated for those who receive support from their family, friends. The last dimension

¹ Of course, the digital divide is still significant in many societies, primarily in developing countries, and the investigation of groups excluded from access and the use of ICT can be relevant in developed societies as well, but the digital inequalities among users is more in focus.

on the authors' list is (5) the purpose of use which can be very diverse. They make a distinction whether the use increases economic productivity, political or social capital, or the one serves mainly for entertainment. It is foreseeable that the two categories of use have a great impact on the inequalities among users.

Both the digital divide and the digital inequality conception are applied in studies dedicated to the differences between the digital immigrants and natives, and the generation of the digital natives itself. Before moving on to the empirical results, we describe the concepts and theories of the digital natives in detail.

2. The Teacher–Student Digital Gap

Concepts of the Digital Natives and Digital Immigrants

The concepts of an emerging new generation which differs in many ways from the previous one has begun to appear in the late 1990s. Many terms were used to describe this generation of which the most popular ones are the *Net Generation* (TAPSCOTT 1998), the *Digital Natives* (PRENSKY 2001a), the *Millennials* (OBLINGER 2003) and the *Screenagers* (RUSHKOF 2006). These descriptions refer to the rise of a new generation that was born at the time when the different information and communication technologies began to spread rapidly. Some authors specify the period of time when this new generation was born. According to Tapscott, the Net Generation consists of those who were born between 1977 and 1997. Oblinger defines a shorter period of time for the Millennials: they are the group of people born between 1982 and 1991. Prensky does not give the exact dates for the birth of the digital natives, but his followers estimate the rise of the digital natives from the 1980s (PALFREY–GASSER 2008).

Although there are differences in defining the roots of the emergence of the new generation, all concepts share the view that one of the main characteristics of these children (and adults by now) is that they got to know ICT as a natural part of life. They have not known the world without cell phones, computers and internet and could not imagine how things would work without these devices. The socialisation among ICT has influenced the net generation's skills and the way they think and learn. That is why most of the theories concerning the digital natives are tightly connected to discussions about the education system in the 21st century.

The most popular concept belongs to Marc PRENSKY (2001a, 2001b) who makes a distinction between the so-called *digital natives* and the *digital immigrants*. He assumes that all the changes we see in the generation of the students nowadays – their clothes, slang, styles etc. – are due to the fact that they are the first generation who grew up with the new information and communication technologies. The name the author gives this generation – the digital natives – refers to their ability to speak the digital language as a “native speakers” (PRENSKY 2001a. 1.). They have learnt all the skills and knowledge about ICT naturally as a “mother language”. In contrast, those who met the new digital technologies later in their lives could not fully acquire the digital language they retained an “accent”. This is what happens to a migrant when settling in a new country getting to know a new culture. Most immigrants retain an accent, although they learn the language, the traditions and the norms of a new culture. This is why Prensky uses the term *digital immigrants* for the generation preceding the digital natives. The accent of the digital immigrants appears in many of their actions. For instance when they print out a document to edit it rather than doing it on the computer. These differences between the generations challenge the education system. Education is facing the problem that the *digital natives are taught by the*

digital immigrants. This situation results in complaining teachers about their students who do not pay attention and complaining students about their teachers, because they find their teaching methods boring and out of date. This mutual dissatisfaction leads to inefficient education. Prensky emphasizes that the teaching staff has to adapt to the changed skills, abilities and way of thinking of the students. He deduces the change of digital natives' thinking patterns from social psychology and neuroplasticity. The social psychological argument includes the presumption that the thinking patterns change depending on one's experiences (PRENSKY 2001b: 2). Studies revealed that the environment and culture in which people are raised affect and determine their thinking patterns (PRENSKY 2001b: 3). The students of today were raised in an ICT "culture" that's why we can assume that their way of thinking has changed. Neuroplasticity is a discipline in neurobiology which studies the physical changes of the brain that occur due to its persistent stimulation. Prensky considers the exposure to videogames, the computer and the internet such a stimulation which causes physical changes in the brains of the children. What are the different attitudes and characteristics of the digital natives and the digital immigrants? In their paper for educators JUKES and DOSAJ (2006) collected these differences (Table 1).

1. TABLE ❖ *Characteristics of the digital natives and the digital immigrants. Source: JUKES – DOSAJ 2006. 37.*

DIGITAL NATIVES	DIGITAL IMMIGRANTS
prefer receiving information quickly from multiple multimedia sources	prefer slow and controlled release of information from limited sources
prefer parallel processing and multi-tasking	prefer singular processing and single/limited-tasking
prefer processing pictures, sounds and video before text	prefer to provide text before pictures, sounds and video
prefer random access to hyperlinked, interactive, multimedia information	prefer to provide information linearly, logically and sequentially
prefer to interact/ network simultaneously with many others	prefer students to work independently rather than network and interact
move seamlessly between real and virtual spaces instantaneously	prefer to operate in real spaces
prefer to learn "just-in-time"	prefer to teach "just-in-case"
want instant access to friends, services and responses to questions, instant gratification and instant rewards	prefer deferred gratification and deferred rewards
prefer learning that is relevant, instantly useful and fun	prefer to teach to the curriculum guide and standardized tests

The differences between the characteristics of digital natives – the students – and the digital immigrants – the teachers – generate a tension between these groups which is disadvantageous for the efficiency of education. For these reasons Prensky suggests that the education methods should be adapted to the students' way of thinking and learning: translated into the digital native's "language". He encourages education staff to use computer games as pedagogical tools for education. Digital natives are familiar with computer games and with a game designed appropriately for educational purposes students would learn geography, maths and other subjects

easily and in an entertaining way. Some teachers might doubt the efficacy of computer games for providing the required knowledge, however, Prensky shows through examples that games can be very useful. He claims that the content of the curriculum doesn't have to be changed just the mean of teaching it. In all subjects new methods can be invented which adapt more to the digital natives' language. Besides the new methods, new contents should be included in education like digital and technological knowledge and also disciplines like ethics, politics, sociology etc. (PRENSKY 2001a. 4.).

Many thinkers caught up on Prensky's concept and developed the idea of a new digital generation. The students who OBLINGER (2003) calls the Millennials are more or less identical with the digital natives. She identifies three generations of "new learners". These are the "Baby Boomers" who already graduated from college, the "Generation X" who are currently doing their college studies and the "Millenials" who are just entering higher education. They need to be paid a special attention at as higher education has to take into account the expectations and characteristics of the new students to retain their competitiveness (OBLINGER 2003. 42.). The Millennials apply distinct learning styles from the previous generations; they prefer teamwork, experiential activities and the use of technology (OBLINGER 2003. 38.). For them – like for the digital natives –, technology is a natural part of life. According to Oblinger's research those students who incorporated technology use within their socialization differ in their attitudes and aptitudes towards learning.

3. Critics of the Digital Native Concept

The concept of a new generation of students, especially the thoughts of Prensky, have been modified and criticized since their appearance. The critiques addressing the digital native-digital immigrant concept are of two kinds. One group of critical arguments is more theoretical and concerns the dichotomous distinction between the two generations and the implications of the concept for a radical change of the education system. Other critiques emphasize the lack of empirical support of the concept and claim that empirical research leads to results that undermine the digital native discourse.

Even some of the writers who actually agree with Prensky's concept refine some parts of it. In their huge work on the digital natives, PALFREY and GASSER (2008) declare that they do not consider the digital natives to be a new generation, but a population. They doubt the rise of an entire generation, as children of the same age in developing countries do not even have access to or lack the cognitive skills to use the new technologies as digital natives in wealthy countries do. For this reason, one cannot expand the digital native label to all people who were born in a defined period, as the place of birth in terms of developed or developing country also matters. The authors suppose that even in a developed country there might be groups of people who do not belong to the digital native population, although they were born at the same time, because they are an underprivileged class in society (PALFREY – GASSER 2008. 14.). Besides the limitation of the digital native attribute, the authors also introduce a third group in the digital era, these are the *digital settlers*. The digital settlers are a transitive category between the digital natives and immigrants. They got to know the new technologies from the beginning, but they grew up mostly in an "analogue-only" world. They are familiar with ICT and use these technologies often in a sophisticated way, but they continue to rely on analogue forms of interaction (PALFREY – GASSER 2008. 4.). Another category that was introduced by TOLEDO (2007) is the *digital tourists* who cannot avoid entering the digital world from time to time, but they do not do it with pleasure.

Most of the critics of the digital native concept mention the lack of empirical analysis on this population. They consider Prensky's view on a radical change of the education system as a moral panic (Z. KARVALICS 2001). Critical approaches on the digital native-digital immigrant concept rely on the results of empirical fieldwork on this generation (SELWYN 2009, BENNETT-MATON 2010). The findings of quantitative and qualitative research on the one hand confirm that there are differences between students and their teachers in their use of ICT and their competences, but on the other hand they question the strict distinction of generations and reveal the digital natives to be a homogenous group regarding their ICT use. We will present some of the recent empirical findings in the next section.

4. The Student- Student Digital Gap

Empirical Findings on the Digital Natives' ICT Use and Attitudes

Researches inspired by the digital native debate have been conducted in many regions mostly in developed countries – like the US (HARGITAI 2010), the UK (JONES et al 2010, MARGARYAN et al. 2011), Canada (SALAJAN et al. 2010) – but also in some developing regions like South-Africa (BROWN – CZERNIEWICZ 2008). There have been investigations regarding the students' use of computers and the internet in every level of education in elementary school and high school (EYNON – MALMBERG 2011, JACKSON et al. 2010) and mostly in higher education (SALAJAN et al. 2010). The researches dominantly use quantitative methods, but some investigations combined these with qualitative methods (e.g. MARGARYAN et al. 2011) and we find studies with an emphasis on the qualitative approach (BEN-DAVID KOLIKANT 2010). What are the main findings concerning the digital natives' ICT use patterns and attitudes?

Jones et al. (2010) conducted a quantitative research among first year university students – born after 1983 – at five universities in the United Kingdom to explore their usage patterns of ICT and to investigate whether this population can be considered as a homogenous group of digital natives. The survey consisted of four sections: demographic characteristics of the respondents, access to technology, use of technology in university study and course-specific uses of technology. The results are partly confirmed the concept of the digital natives, as the researchers found an extensive access to and use of ICT. On the other hand, the concept of the generational homogeneity was not supported by the results, because minorities were revealed who use technology differently. Some reported a low use of e-mail, others often download or upload materials from/to the internet and there is another minority that contributes to blogs and wikis. This research found a complex picture of minorities in the same age group which contradicts the notion of a homogenous digital native generation.

The study of MARGARYAN et al. (2011) addressed not only the technology use patterns of university students, but their use of technologies for learning as well. They used a mixed method of a questionnaire and an interview. Not only students, but also educational staff were asked in the survey to compare the two generations' technology use and attitudes. Besides the age dimension, the researchers added a discipline dimension as their sample consisted of students and teachers from Engineering and Social Work. The quantitative results show that students from a technical discipline and digital natives use more technology tools than students from a non-technical discipline and digital immigrants. However, considering the learning styles of the digital natives the “... study found no evidence to support previous claims suggesting that current generation of students adopt radically learning styles, exhibit new forms of literacy, use digital technologies in sophisticated ways, or have novel expectations from higher education.” (MARGARYAN

et al. 2011. 438.). The interviews revealed that students prefer rather traditional, conventional, passive learning and teaching methods. The authors conclude that although education has to change somehow to adapt to the new challenges the claims for these changes cannot be based on the argument of the shifting learning patterns of the students.

The digital native-digital immigrant dichotomy was put more in the focus of the research of SALAJAN et al (2010). They investigated the inter-generational differences in technology use and the attitudes towards adopting digital technologies in teaching and learning. The research was conducted among students and staff of the Faculty of Dentistry in Toronto. The samples were asked the same questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the academic year to conceive the changes after exposure to technology use in the courses. Their findings show that there are age-related differences in technology use between students and faculty members, but these differences are minimal and with no universal applicability. According to their results, the authors claim that the digital native-digital immigrant divide is “... *an overly simplified, narrow and potentially riftng perspective...*”(SALAJAN et al. 2010. 1402.).

The mostly quantitative analysis presented above point out that a more sophisticated understanding of the revealed intra-generational differences and the implications of ICT use for learning should be outlined by qualitative research. A mainly qualitative study was conducted by BEN-DAVID KOLIKANT (2010) among high school students in Israel. Her research question was how the digital natives themselves perceive the impact of ICT on learning and school performance in comparison to the digital immigrant generation. The answers of the students revealed an ambivalent judgement of ICT – mainly the internet – regarding its role in learning and school performance. Although the majority of the students who all were intensive users of the internet claimed that the internet was a helpful and useful tool for learning, they considered their knowledge and skills in learning worse than of the generation grown up before the internet. The reasons for this view are related partly to the school being “old-fashioned”, as many interviewees expressed. They told that the school does not adapt to the changed ways of thinking and abilities of the students who are digitally-savvy. The children considered their knowledge worse, because they assumed that the generation before the internet read more books and was more diligent as they were not “tempted” by the digital technologies.

6. Conclusion

Digital inequalities in education have to be perceived, as they are challenging the efficacy of education in many aspects. As one dimension of digital inequalities, we introduced the concepts of the digital native-digital immigrant divide which concerns the differences between teachers and their students. These thoughts on the radical change of the education system somehow generated a moral panic after their appearance. However, we underlined the necessity of empirical support of this thesis and questioned the concept of a radical change by presenting the critical approaches of this concept. There is no evidence that the students of today would be in any aspects different to their ancestors due to their exposure to information and communication technologies. The education system has to consider these new skills and communication forms of the students, but teachers should not be discouraged by getting categorized as digital immigrants. They have huge responsibility to guide the students in the digital world and to show them how they can use the new opportunities of the internet and other ICT to gain advantage in learning. The other dimension of the digital inequalities in education concerns the differences between the students which were revealed by many empirical studies inspired by the digital native debate.

The empirical findings – some of which recently published works we presented– challenge the digital native concept by pointing out that this generation cannot be handled as a homogenous group. There are differences in connection with the access and the use of ICT. We share the view of Palfrey and Gasser on the digital natives who are rather a population than a generation, as aspects of the digital divide, the socio-economic factors and the dimensions of the digital inequalities still play an important role among students. Teachers should take into account these differences when applying teaching methods that require digital skills and knowledge. A better understanding of both approaches of the digital inequalities in education needs more empirical analyses for being able to suggest changes for education. *

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The Term ‘Sense’ in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory



Abstract The paper is about a key term of Niklas Luhmann’s System Theory: the term ‘Sense’. According to System Theory, ‘Sense’ can be defined as the medium of social reality: a universal medium of the systems of consciousness and communication that enables the reduction of the world’s complexity (the environment of the systems). The world is made up of senseful operations, and as such it is bound to the systems also formed by these operations. The world as environment (the ‘outside’) and the identity of the observer (the system; the ‘inside’) are both effects of senseful operations. Sense is not a substance, but a relation. It is not essential but processual. The paper places the term ‘Sense’ in the context of some other important terms of System Theory, like ‘medium’, ‘form’, ‘system’ ‘environment’, and also gives a brief summary of the theoretical frame, inasmuch it presents the tradition of ‘second order cybernetics’ developed by Heinz von Foerster.

Keywords sense, cybernetics, system theory, social constructivism, form, medium, Luhmann

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Introduction

The theory of Niklas Luhmann is usually called ‘system theory’, even though he himself said this term would be only a ‘brand’ and nothing else (LUHMANN 2009 [1984]. 7–15). Based on the brand ‘system theory’, superficial interpretations declare Luhmann’s work to be a kind of structuralism, a maze of rigid system-categories. However, a deeper study of Luhmann’s theory quickly makes it apparent that the Luhmannian systems are structures not defined by principles outside of them, but by momentarily existing operations of ‘sense’. This paper is about this key term of the Luhmannian theory.

Heinz von Foerster’s second order cybernetics and the Luhmannian systems

The Luhmannian term ‘Sense’ has two main roots. One is Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology: the Husserlian impacts on Luhmann’s work and the relations between the authors in general are very nicely presented in Jakob Arnoldis’s paper ‘Sense making as communication’ and they are also expressed by Luhmann himself in his book on Husserl. That is why this paper starts with the other root, which is less known, even though it is as important as the Husserlian one.

This other root of the term ‘Sense’ (and Luhmann’s theory in general) can be found in Heinz von Foerster’s ‘second order cybernetics’. The Austrian author Heinz von Foerster worked out a complex epistemology on the basis of classical cybernetics (FOERSTER 2003.). He tried to develop a point of view that replaces the linear and rigid structure of the object-subject (observer-observed) distinction. According to Foerster, the observer is really constructed by the observed and vice versa: ‘observation’ is nothing else but the circular relation between them. Observation as a relation defines the observer and the observed, so

the observer refers not only to the observed, but also to himself by the act of observation. This crucial self-reference of the observer can be taken as another main point of the circular way of thinking or – as Foerster named it – the “cybernetics of cybernetics”. Humberto Maturana’s famous definition sums this all up: “everything said is said by an observer” (MATURANA 1987. 65–82.) So the relation of observer and observed (subject and object) is defined more as co-ordination than subordination.

Foerster sees the main difference not between subject and object (observer and observed), but between the *orders* of observation. His favourite illustration for this is the case of the blind spot. Using Foerster’s terms, the first order of observation (our eye’s direct observation) is unable to get a coherent and complete image about the world out there. What we can see is something we learnt to see: the image we “see” is a result of computing processes. Actually, it is our brain that “sees”: it observes the observation of the eyes transmitted to the visual cortex. The blind spot can be seen only by conscious observation of the observation of our brain. This is self-reference (one of Foerster’s a key terms): when we are looking for the blind spot, we are actually observing our own observation; we are observing ourselves as we are observing. In Foerster’s blind spot experiment, we glimpse our own blindness. A paradoxical situation arises: we can see that we cannot see, so we see (that we cannot see). With the help of the introduction of a new (second) order of observation, the observation of the first order of observation will be possible. The second order of observation in that case is self-observation: we can observe *how* the first order of our observation works.

Cybernetics, says Foerster (or rather, “the first order of cybernetics”, as he named the traditional form of cybernetics), uses feedback only on the level of the elements (objects) of the observed system. In spite of that, Foer-

ster's "second order of cybernetics" is circular insofar as the cybernetician takes himself as part of the observed system. The description of reality depends more on the describing system (subject) than on the "reality out there" (object). Foerster's "undifferentiated encoding principle" says that we only have data of quantitative kind. Our neural system "knows" only the place and intensity of any stimulus. All qualities of any impression are made by the observing system itself: that is the basis of the famous idea of "operational closure" developed by Humberto Maturana.

Niklas Luhmann's oeuvre can be interpreted as a combination of the second order of cybernetics and the theory of autopoietic systems, applied in the field of social sciences (LUHMANN 1995.). Concepts like the distinction between 'closed' and 'open' systems and the self-regulation of these systems were key problems of general system theory from the 1950s on. Closed systems do not take any material (possible element of the system) from their environment in their functioning. The elements of open systems are, on the other hand, in the condition of permanent streaming: they can transgress on the borders of the system. They are tending towards a more complex and differentiated state. Open systems are not only characterized by the production of entropy (like closed systems), but also by the transmission of entropy. The relation between system and environment is a specific problem of the theory of open systems.

One of the most important questions of cybernetics was how the states of systems can be stabilized under continually changing environmental conditions. The feedback models (developed for answering that question) seemed universal for classical cybernetics; that is why cybernetics could be considered to be able to describe technical, social and psychic systems.

After this brief summary of cybernetics and system theory the main questions of the

Luhmannian way of system theory and cybernetics can be asked: 1. how can we define a system? 2. how is the distinction between the system and its environment produced and reproduced? 3. what is the exact operation that produces the distinction, and how is it able to decide (inside the system) what belongs to the system? According to Luhmann, these problems had been considered in two different ways in earlier system theory: some arguments took systems as substantial, some others as analytical categories. Luhmann rejects both, because both of them constitute observing positions outside the systems, so they consider system theory itself an observer outside the world it observes. They say – according to Luhmann's argumentation – that system theory as a scientific position of observation is not a part of the "world" it observes. Based on Foerster's theories of observation (summarized above), Luhmann can easily reject this position. His (and Foerster's) starting point is the negation of objective observation. The observer must enter into the observation. The distinction between observer and observed is made by the observer's act of observing himself as he observes. Observed (self)observation produces the observed (the result and matter of observation).

In connection with this, Luhmann claims we can see that systems cannot be defined by their borders because the borders are constantly changing, and there is no (objective) position of observation. His answer (and innovation) is the dynamic concept of the system. He says: "The system is nothing else actually but the difference of the system and the environment." (LUHMANN 2004. 66.) A differentiated system does not equal the sum and connections of its elements, but it is built by system/environment *differences* – even as the differences between observer and observed construct the process of observation and the process of observation makes the difference between observer and observed in Foerster's theory.

The *medium* (in this case: tool, territory

and matter) is the sense. It is in this medium that the systems of communication and the systems of consciousness operate: both are characterized by specific ways of operation, and neither can be derived from the other. The basic operation in the case of the system of consciousness is *thinking*; in the case of the system of communication (the social system, says Luhmann) it is *communication*. They can appear for each other only as environment (it is not possible to derive communication from consciousness). We have to understand the forms of sense appearing in communication systems (the structures of sociality or “social reality”) in a “*sui generis*” way.

Towards the right question about sense: “How does it function?” instead of “What is it?”

We can thus draw the following conclusions: 1. only autopoietic systems are able to observe. 2. the way of observation necessarily contains the element of self-reference. 3. the operations called ‘observation’ can be performed only in the medium of sense: the systems of consciousness and communication are sense-producing and sense-processing systems. (They operate in the sense and thereby (re)produce sense.)

The ‘world’ as an endlessly complex and as such unobservable environment must be reduced to forms delivered by the medium of sense. Systems are created in the sense: this medium enables the distinction between self- and other-references, which is the distinction of system and environment. Sense also enables the temporal continuity of this distinction (LUHMANN 1997. 51., 54.). The complexity of the ‘world’ stays unspecified: any kind of order can be based only on the forms of sense which are done by distinction-drawings of systems. (LUHMANN 1987. 44–46.)

The context of sense can be created by transgressing on the borders of the system: the

system itself is able to interpret its environment as the ‘other’ side of the distinction between self- and other-reference (remember: when a system observes, it always observes itself and the environment, because observation is always drawing a distinction between self- and other-reference, between, so to speak, “Me” and the “World”). The main characteristic of the forms of sense is that they are able to mean themselves (as actual) and something else (as potential) at the same time (LUHMANN 1997. 48.). Consequently, the world can be observed in the medium of sense, but it cannot be taken as something already given (which means that it only comes into existence in the process of observation). No kind of substantial world-concepts can be acceptable for the Luhmannian theory. For the systems of sense, the world cannot be anything else but information-potential from which meaningful identities (objects, symbols, signs) can be formed by the process of observation (LUHMANN 1997. 46–47.).

I will discuss the correspondence between sense and information later; now I would only like to emphasize that information is closely connected to the observing systems. Luhmann’s concept of information is deontological: information can be produced only by the operation of observation of observing systems and does not have any ontological character.

The Places of Sense

If we want to ask the question “what is sense?”, we can hardly find a right answer within the Luhmannian theoretical context and terminology. The question in fact is an ontological one. According to the Luhmannian point of view, sense is not ‘something’ we could define. We cannot observe sense as a whole, because it is impossible to take an observing position that enables that. It is impossible to observe sense, because there is no observing position outside of it. Sense contains (makes

possible) all potential observations and observing positions. So we cannot observe sense, because we are inside of it when we observe. We cannot see it; we cannot define it as ‘something’ (KARÁCSONY 2003.).

Thus, the right question should rather be “How does sense function?” For answering that question, first of all it is worth examining *where* sense functions. In other words: what is the vehicle of sense? In the Luhmannian theory these vehicles are the autopoietic systems of consciousness and communication. We have to keep in mind that these are coequal kinds of systems. That is why it is impossible to say that consciousness is the primary vehicle of sense, and why Luhmann argues in many texts for a concept of sense which is not bound to any form of “subject” (LUHMANN 1987, 1997, 2008.). He rejects the identity between sense and subjective intentions. (He says in that case the next question would stay unanswered: “What is then the sense of the subject?” – If we accept the term “subject”, we already presuppose sense.)

There is no ontological basis or vehicle that would bear sense (subject or consciousness for example), so we have to understand it independently of all these (LUHMANN 2006.). Sense is neither the advent of the spirit in the world (Hegel), nor vice versa (Husserl) (LUHMANN 2008. 15.). Luhmann describes sense neither as substance nor as phenomenon, but as relation or context (LUHMANN 1987. 19.). Sense is not a content of consciousness but a rule of selection. It is a distinction; in fact it is a basic medium / form-difference (LUHMANN 2006. 217.) in the form of potential/actual. The self-referential side of the difference is the actual, which is always connected to the other-referential side, the potential. The medium of the sense is a horizon of (potentially referable) possibilities, and the forms of sense are actualizing some of them: these are the “contents” of sense. Sense reduces the complexity of the environment (world) in that way, and also keeps the complexity as the horizon of potential:

sense is nothing else but a selectively working relation between the system and the “world” (LUHMANN 1987. 23.).

The answer for the question about the place of the sense can be formulated: sense is *between* the system and the world. In other words: it is *in the relation* of the system and the world. More precisely: it is *the relation itself*. Sense appears always in certain forms but it always transgresses these forms, because it makes other possibilities imaginable. The relation of the systems and sense is a constitutive and contingent one. (Contingent because potential options are always there; any order, any form of a system is only a possible one among others.) (LUHMANN 1987. 20–21. and LUHMANN 2006. 223–224.).

The functioning of sense is characterized by the urge of selection. It must keep the complexity on the external side (outside the system), and it must reduce it on the internal side (inside the system). Systems come into existence by selective reduction of the horizon of potentialities (which is the medium of sense). Systems are the forms of sense. The system is actual, the world is potential. The borders of the systems are borders of sense drawn moment by moment. They are contingent, and they can change in every moment.

Sense as medium and form

The term ‘form’ can be defined as the unity of a certain distinction and marking which always takes place in a certain medium. The form is the actualization of the medium: it makes actual some potentialities of the medium by distinction (selection). Sentences, for example, are forms of the medium ‘language’ (LUHMANN 2006. 214–217.). So the form selects a certain terrain of the medium, and signs it as field of further operations. Luhmann names this terrain ‘marked space’. This is the inner side of the form: then, further distinctions can be drawn. These further operations in the

marked space are called ‘re-entries’ (BRUNCZEL 2010. 28–46.).

If we take a closer look at the medium of sense, it becomes obvious that we have to specify what we said about its potential character. For being able to offer potential options for form-creating operations, the horizon of sense cannot be infinite. Its potentialities cannot be applied to anything. The world cannot be “whatever”. The infinite character of possibilities, the reference to “anything” is narrowed down by the process of repression which limits the possible options (LUHMANN 2008. 25.). The process of repression marks a set of options as ‘possible’ (this is the marked space), set apart from the ‘impossible’. (‘Possible’ is anything what can exist or happen.) The marked space of the possible is open for the re-entry: that is, further operations can be done which make further distinctions between actual and potential (both must be possible!) – and this is how the ‘real’ comes into existence (LUHMANN 2008. 15–16.).

Repression operates with negation. The possibility of negation separates the possible from the impossible. ‘Possible’ is anything (and only that is possible) that can be negated: this is the marked space open for re-entry of further (in that case dividing ‘right’ from ‘false’) operations. So the possibility of negation is the operation of repression. (Sense itself cannot be negated, because it contains negation as such. Even the sides of distinction meaningless/meaningful are meaningful.)

Following repression, the next step is making concrete forms. One principal tool of that is time, which enables the continuity of form-making (in the order of before/after). At this point, it is important to keep in mind that operations are happening instantaneously, they do not have extension in time. To keep up a continuous existence, systems must reproduce their operations and exactly that helps time in the form (distinction) of before/after which marks the present of the operation and divides

it from the past (not actual any more) and from the future (not actual yet) (LUHMANN 2008. 13.; LUHMANN 1997. 52–53.).

In addition to time, there are two other dimensions in which sense comes into existence (makes negations possible): the material and the social ones (LUHMANN 2006. 225.; KARÁCSONYI 2003.; LUHMANN 1987. 31–32.). The social dimension of sense includes the experiences of *Me* and *Others* referring to each other (in Luhmann’s words: ego and alter). Different concepts of the world are applied to each other in forms of communication: consenses and dissenses. Communicable forms of sense come into existence in this dimension. (This aspect of the Luhmannian concept of sense is very close to the Husserlian term ‘intersubjectivity’.) Sense creates a kind of normative and technical aspect in this dimension in order to make possible processes of communication (between systems of consciousnesses which are operationally closed for each other).

The material dimension reduces the world to the schema of thingness. It emphasizes that the aspect of communication according to it is always about something: it marks something in the world and the marked object becomes actual by the marking (divided from the not-marked rest of the world which stays potential). The material dimension is closely connected to the social and temporal ones: these give context to the material sense (LUHMANN 1987. 32.).

Systems operating in the medium of sense are able to assign causality to the continuity. This way they can transgress the borders of themselves by assigning causality to their environment.

By the interplay of the dimensions the form of information in the use of sense comes into existence. The function of sense (as we have seen above) is a selective relation of the system and the world. As we have also seen, sense is not a content of consciousness but a set of rules of selections. Contents enter into the experience (in the case of systems of con-

sciousness) and communication (in the case of systems of communication) as information. Information is actually also an operation; the application of form, selection. It is a conscious selection led by sense and as such it is always contingent (LUHMANN 1987. 26.).

Regarding systems of communication we have to draw the conclusion that we cannot conceptualize communication as a transfer of information or sense, but only as mutual sense-actualization on the basis of common structure of sense delivered by the social dimension of sense.

Regarding the systems of consciousness, the most important term is 'experience'. This is nothing but surprising information: informative modification of the expected; an overwriting of former premises. Experience is the continuous reconstruction of the senseful constructed reality (LUHMANN 1987. 27.). Information is the selection (and marking) of something. The structures of sense (its applied forms) make the preconditions of being able to gain information value. Events are not pieces of information on their own: they only become information in the medium of sense. Information can be marked only by selections that are interpretable for the system (that are contained by the sense-context of the system). As novelty (information) cannot appear only that has been given formerly as possible (LUHMANN 2008. 38.).

The novelty and connective potential of information mean that during a certain operation of sense it narrows the terrain of potentiality in which later operations can be done. In other words: information makes a re-entry, divides new marked / unmarked spaces and by that it reduces complexity (entropy). (LUHMANN 1997. 46.).

Summary

Sense is the universal medium for the systems of consciousness and communication that enables the reduction of the complexity of the world. It makes possible the observation of the world by forms that transgress on themselves (transgress the 'actual' in the direction of 'potential'). The forms of sense mark the world as a horizon of potentiality. In the forms of sense, systems are able to observe the world and themselves. (Keep in mind: system-borders are always drawn in sense. They are sense-borders.) The world is formed by senseful operations and as such it is bounded to the systems formed also by these operations. The world as environment (the 'outside') and the identity of the observer (the system; the 'inside') are both effects of senseful operations. Sense is not a substance but a relation. It is not essential, but processual. *


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A Hungarian Village in the English Regional Survey Movement

Dorothea Farquharson's field diary in Dudar, 1937



Abstract An unpublished field diary with original photos from 1937, written during a field research in Dudar, Hungary by Dorothea Farquharson, member of the Institute of Sociology / Le Play House, London.

Keywords Le Play House London, Sándor Veress, Hungarian folk music, peasant life, Dorothea Farquharson, Regional Survey Movement, Dudar

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Introduction

In September 1937, a sociological-ethnographic field work was conducted in Dudar, a small village in Hungary, with participants from England and Germany. The event was organized by a Hungarian staff, the members of the College of Arts of the Szeged Youth.

The English part of the research group consisted of and was partly recruited by the members of the Institute of Sociology / Le Play House, London.¹ In the 1920s and 1930s Le Play House regularly made research trips to different, mainly rural regions of Europe, including Eastern Europe.² The team arrived in Hungary in 1937. Their program was a part of the English Regional Survey Movement which was very popular at that time. The English group visiting Hungary was led by Alexander Farquharson, the general secretary of the Institute of Sociology. The administrative work and the preparations for this trip were made by his wife, Dorothea Farquharson, herself an active member of the Institute as well.

The history of this event is well documented in the Hungarian literature of social history,³ but almost nothing has been published from the results of the research. They were supposed to be lost or, at best, to be lurking somewhere. It was discovered only in 2013 that a great amount of research documentation can be found in the Archives of Keele University,⁴ where the papers of Le Play House and the Institute of Sociology are stored.

Simultaneously with the field work conducted by the English researchers, Sándor Veress, a Hungarian composer and folk music scholar, a former pupil, and at that time a colleague of Béla Bartók, collected folk songs in the village⁵. Dorothea Farquharson accompanied him, and made extensive notes on these occasions.⁶ Here, for the first time, we publish her diary in an edited form.

We learnt about the production of the manuscript in a letter of Dorothea Farquharson to Sándor Veress, dated 22nd October 1937,⁷ only a few weeks after the Dudar meeting.

I have just finished the file of Folk Music in Dudar. I am sending it out to you now so that you may insert the tunes that you heard there. I am not sure if I have left enough pages in every case for all the tunes that you would like to insert, therefore I have now included some spare sheets in case you need to use them. We have had a type-script made of this file, and I am putting copies of all the photographs in it so that you may have it for yourself to keep. I shall send it out to you when you return my file, because we need to have one here for reference and in case the other were lost in the post.

Unfortunately, due to his actual personal circumstances, Veress could not complete this manuscript, therefore it remained a little fragmentary.

The manuscript was typed up on a typewriter. Occasionally Hungarian texts of folk songs were inserted, each cut out from the 1938 issue (released at the end of 1937) of “Szegei Kis Kalendárium” [Little Calendar of Szeged], which published a part of Veress’s Dudar collection. In a few cases the texts have hand-written English translations. There are also references to the musical form of the tunes. And, as we can read in Dorothea Farquharson’s letter, there are

¹ Actually this organization founded the famous periodical, *The Sociological Review* in 1920.

² For a detailed history of Le Play House, Institute of Sociology and the Regional Survey Movement see EVANS 1986.

³ See LENGYEL 1997.

⁴ Foundations of British Sociology Archive, Keele University Library

⁵ He collected 37 folk songs there. See BERLÁSZ 1982. 140.

⁶ Ref. no: LP/4/1/3/7/10/3 ii

⁷ Ref. no: LP/4/1/3/7/10/1 i

empty places for the rest of the texts and translations, almost on every page of the manuscript. Empty places were left for the photographs too, with hand-written comments. Although the manuscript itself does not include the photos, we managed to find photographs in other folders of the Dudar research material.⁸ Based on Dorothea Farquharson's comments we could identify, and consequently insert some of them in this edited version of the text. While editing the notes we omitted the references for the missing texts, music notes and photos in order to have a flowing and readable text containing as much information as possible. The omissions are marked with (...) in the following text. Our additions are in square brackets [...]. Obvious typing errors were corrected.

Dorothea Farquharson's notes can be regarded as a field diary, offering an interesting insight into her English point of view, with observations about the host families, their everyday life, customs, personal connections, clothes, houses and surroundings, as well as about the occasions when these people sang songs. At the same time, all of her notes reflect the information she got from Sándor Veress, her guide and interpreter on these occasions.

Acknowledgements

Dorothea Farquharson's writings and the survey images are published with the kind permission of the Foundations of British Sociology Archive, Keele University Library.

We owe special thanks to Ms. Helen Burton, librarian of the Archive, for making the research material ready to be photographed, and for all of her creative help to make all the necessary information available.

⁸ Ref. nos: LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i and LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix

Dudar, Hungary. Peasant Life Studies. Folk Song.

[Dorothea Farquharson's notes on collecting folk songs in Dudar with Sándor Veress]

Notes made in September 1937 when visiting peasant houses in Dudar to hear songs sung by the peasant men and women.

Professor Veress organized this work, took down the tunes and acted as interpreter. It is due to his kind help that these notes have been compiled. In each case two visits were made to the house and peasant family. At the first visit we heard the songs and Professor Veress chose some that would later be repeated for the purpose of record-making. One evening was set aside to make some of these records, the peasants coming to Professor Veress for this purpose. At the second visit to the house, details of the family history and of the house plan and furniture were noted and photographs of the family, and of those who sang, and of the house were made. Szendi István, one of the

peasants of Dudar, told us where we could find the peasants who knew most of the songs. The "little boy with the nuts" offered to carry the portfolio and gramophone for Professor Veress and managed to plead this as excuse for absence from school.

He made the acquaintance of Professor Veress by offering him some nuts. This led to a talk that ended in devoted service.

Song sung by Szendi István: Love ballad of the daughter of the Baron of Szedri & the shepherd boy.⁹ (...)

Szendi István took us to the home of his mother, Szendi Sándorné whose portrait is here

⁹ Hungarian text: „Arra alá, a szedresi határba,/ Kivirágzott egy nagy hársfa magába...” English translation is not included in the manuscript.



PHOTO 1 ❖ *Professor Veress, Szendi István and the little boy with the nuts¹⁰*

given.¹¹ She was born in Dudar and has lived here all of her life. She is now aged 64. Szendi Sándorné lives with her widowed daughter, and grandson and grand-daughter. She is herself a widow.

We were anxious to hear her sing because she is one of the older peasants and we thought she might give us some of the older traditional melodies. She learnt her songs from her mother and grandmother and has passed them on to her children.

The daughter with whom Szendi Sándorné lives married the son of the owner of her house, who lives next door. This son was killed in an accident when he was only 23 years of age. The little property of the two peasant houses that stand on broken ground at the S.W. end of Dudar village, and are adjoining, is therefore in the hand of the family. But in the house of Szendi Sándorné one living room is let off to a woman with three children who is not a relative.

The widowed daughter of Szendi Sán-

¹⁰ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i

¹¹ We could not identify this photo so far.

dorné is now away at Szombathely for a course of training in midwifery. The midwife of Dudar is old and about to retire and Szendi Sándorné's daughter will return to take her place. Dudar peasants welcome the ideas of having a younger midwife, trained in up-to-date methods, as though there have been few deaths of mothers in child-bed, and the rate of infantile mortality is high. Szendi Sándorné's other daughter lives in Csetény, and her two sons are in Dudar.

[Comment for a picture¹².] Vines hang from the roof of the gador. The owner of the

PHOTO 2 ❖ *[A Dudar house]¹³*



¹² Not inserted in the manuscript. Probably this could be the photo above.

¹³ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i



PHOTO 3 ❖ [A peasant house in Dudar.] Maize cobs hang to dry in the sun and beans are in heaps on the earthen floor.¹⁴

property outside the door of her house, and standing on the gador. The ground slopes rather steeply away from the gador level.

The gador is a narrow passage along the side of the house, open on three sides, but protected by the slope of the house roof. The gador is a characteristic feature of the peasant house in Hungary and dates back to very early types of building. It is not in any sense a form of the modern verandah. It is narrower than a verandah and is essentially part of the actual structure of the house and not a mere adjunct. The gador usually has an earthen floor and wooden or dried brick posts to support the roof. (...)

[Comment for a picture:] Picture of Szen-di Sándorné's house showing the gador, about 2 or 3 feet wide and raised a step above the slope on which the two houses stand. (...)

The rooms are on one floor, but there is in each house an inside ladder in a closed passage, rather like a high cupboard, which leads to the hay-loft. The two grand-children were playing on the ladder when we arrived. The baby cried aloud at [the] sight of someone strange and had to be picked up and stowed away indoors in the cradle.

In the picture on the first page Professor Veress is standing in front of the door of the ladder-way into the left. (...)

The main entrance led into the central kitchen, clear of all furniture except the 4 feet square stove of whitewashed brick. On the wall at the back of the stove were pretty plates of peasant pottery, probably made at the pottery not far from Dudar. These are mainly for decorative purposes. In some cases they are never used except for decoration: but Szendi Sándorné told us that she used them very occasionally for special feast days. This central kitchen gave a very pleasing impression of lightness and colour. The walls were white-

¹⁴ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix

washed and the earthen floor was smooth and clean-swept. The earth itself was of yellowish clay that helped to give a bright effect. The stove was placed in a chimney that formed a kind of apse against the wall opposite the entrance.

On each side were smaller arches in the walls with flue holes for pipes from the stoves in the living-room. A chimney-corner seat was here which would be warm in winter from the stove on the other side of the wall. The lower step was hollowed out to make a warm and dry shelter for chickens. On the second step was a small fire-place with a metal top where pot could be set to boil. The stove in the central kitchen is always used for making bread.

Spoons and plates in daily use were arranged on the stove at the back. A wood fire is made in the stove and when the inside is thoroughly hot the ashes are swept out and the leaves are inserted.

The woman who rents a living-room in Szendi Sándorné's house has the room on the left of the entrance but shares the central kitchen. In the living room is a tiled stove with the same arrangement of chimney corner steps as in the central kitchen. Her stove is not used in summer as she can cook on the second step and bake in the central kitchen. In her room were two wooden beds against the wall opposite the door, a table, 2 chairs, some shelves covered with a curtain (for wardrobe), and some shelves for pots and pans.

There was a hanging lamp in the centre of the room and two windows looking onto the gador. (...)

Szendi Sándorné's living-room is to the right of the entrance on the other side of the central kitchen. We were invited to come in and sit down, but first the chickens had to be chased out and the chairs dusted. The room was of fair size – about 12 to 14 feet square, with a raftered roof, earth floor and two windows looking on to the gador. In every respect it was the same as the other living-room, though furnished differently. We also noticed that there was an

electric bulb hanging from the ceiling in this room, whereas the lodger had a hanging lamp. The central kitchen had no lighting; portable lamps are used there.

In this room were two large wooden beds covered with a woollen red and green coverlet, two chairs, an old wooden cradle, a small table against the window with two wooden forms and the stove in the corner. This stove was not tiled, but was of whitewashed brick and stone. A pair of Russian boots hung from a roof-beam. There was a wardrobe, a cupboard, trunk and sewing machine. Some pegs for hanging clothes were fixed into the wall near the door. (...)

Szendi Sándorné was joined by another old woman. They sat side by side on the two chairs, with folded hands and serious faces, the little grand-daughter of 5 squatting on the floor between them. The small grandson of 8 stood listening by the table where we were sitting. Neighbours came in and out at intervals. Szendi Sándorné was dressed in a dark blue linen frock, a black shawl on her head. She was wearing black felt boot. She sang quite naturally and without any fuss, just as the tunes came into her head or were suggested by her son or the neighbours. Her voice was sweet and clear.

Professor Veress took down the melodies and explained their character to me so that notes could be made.

[a] The first song was a well-known tune, its chief characteristic being the change from 2 time to 3 time.

Little long-tailed swallow

Little brown haired lassie

How did you manage to come to this place?

*I didn't come that way! I was taken by coach,
it was my beloved who brought me here.¹⁵*

¹⁵ Hungarian text: Hosszi farku föcske/Szép barna menyecske, /Hej, hogyan tudtál jönni / Ez idegen földre. // Nem úgy gyűttem ide, / Kocsin hoztak ide, / Hej, heles kis angyalom, / Csalogatott ide.



PHOTO 4 ❖ [A woman from Dudar]¹⁶

Sung by Szendi Istvánné aged 64. Born Suzanne Kis, widow of Stephen Szendi.(...)

[b] One song popular in the Great War took as its theme the death of Prince Rudolf of Hapsburg . There stands the white cross above his grave and one asks “*Why did you kill yourself and leave your wife alone*”. The answer is; “*It was all for love*”. (...) All the songs so far have been love lyrics.

[c] Another tells how “*the church bell sounds; my love goes to church; my heart breaks because I cannot go there with her.*”

[d] Song in a **a b a** melodic form.

Within the three boundaries of Dudar

I am a Highwayman.

I am so called for so I am &

My Rose, my love, loves me.

¹⁶ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix

*In the cemetery of Dudar
Three maidens are walking alone
They walk in the cemetery
Because their lover lies there.¹⁷*

[e] Song in a **a⁵ a⁵ a** melodic form¹⁸. Here the 2nd and 3d lines repeat the melody of the first line but a 5th higher. (...)

Mazalin Pálné – aged 51. A widow with children. She has aged prematurely, but is a striking personality. She sings well and is much in demand for the house-to-house gatherings during the winter when the women and girls of the village strip the maize kernels from the cob. Later on there are similar gatherings to make feather beds with goose-down. Every woman brings such beds to her home after marriage. They are the pride of each peasant household. They can be seen, on sunny mornings, hung out on the gador to air; it might even be supposed that they are shown somewhat ostentatiously when airing is not quite necessary. Some beds that we saw were piled high with such down-filled mattresses. Another occasion for communal singing is when the maize has to be husked and braided. We went to one such gathering in a peasant house on evening (September). Notes of this are recorded farther on.

Mazalin Pálné sings while they work, but she also teaches hers songs to the other women so that they can carry on the tradition. (...)

We found Mazalin Pálné on her knees on the floor of the central kitchen, washing the grandchild’s frock in a little wooden trough. The child (of 3 years) sat by her on the earthen floor. The stove was prepared for bread-baking.

We were taken to the living-room to the right of the kitchen. The chairs were dusted for us and clean had-woven linen coverlets were placed on the beds. The small grand-child

¹⁷ Hungarian text: *A dudari hármás határ/Magam vagyok benne betyár./Viselem a betyár nevet, nevemet/Mer a rózsám engem szeret./A dudari temetőbe./Három kislány sétál benne./Az is azért sétál benne, de benne./Szeretije fekszik benne.*

¹⁸ This song is missing from the manuscript.

stood between her grandmother's knees until she become sleepy. Then she fetched a wooden stool, climbed up into the bed and lay quietly under the coverlet. Two little girls, of perhaps 10 and 12 years of age, came into the house with large pumpkins and could be seen through the doorway cutting them up and putting the pieces into a cooking pot on the kitchen stove. The self-reliance of these young children and their complete lack of affectation of any kind, was really remarkable.

Mazalin Pálné's songs were all love lyrics. The most common metre was **a b b a**. One song began „*My love is in Dudar*”, and others introduced allusions to Dudar. In one song the rhythm changed two or three times, as if to adapt itself to some occupation which it is accompanied. One song referred to the heavy taxation of Hungary when the three Kaisers met in conference in Vienna. One asked, „*What is going on in Hungary?*” and got for the answer „*Taxation*”.

*Francis Joseph while travelling to Vienna
chanced to meet two fine Hungarian hussars.*

*He asked them: well my fine fellows,
what news?*

*The taxes are heavy, poor Hungary
cannot bear it.*

Francis Joseph loves a soldier:

He makes recruits parade in double file.

*In the middle of them a candle burns before a
crucifix,*

*Oh what a beautiful way of swearing alle-
giance to him.¹⁹*

There were songs for Name-Day celebrations when parties are held and a special cake is made.

¹⁹ Hungarian text: *Ferenc József mikor Bécsbe utazott./Két szép magyar huszárral találkozott./Kér-di tőlük, szép magyarok, mi ujság?/Nagy az adó, nem bírja Magyarország./Ferenc József szereti a katonát/Két sorjával állítja a rekrutát./Közepibe ég a gyertya, feszület./Ferenc József jaj de szépen esküdte.*

A Christmas Eve carol and a New Year's greeting were also sung.

Some songs were of the forest bandits who had gained popular sympathy. They had been imprisoned for some small offence and were later outlawed. Their only means of subsistence was by robbery of the rich travellers on the forest roads. But these bandits (c.f. our own Robin Hood stories) only kept from their loot what they needed for themselves; the surplus they distributed to the poor of the neighbouring villages. (...)

Another such song tells of a man who was born a horse-thief; when he was born he had stolen a filly. Later he stole 6 horses belonging to the County. Now everyone is searching for him; he is, in fact, the most wanted man in Hungary.

[Another] songs sung by özv. Mazalin Pálné:

[a] „*When I was 18 I wanted to marry and I asked several girls but each found something amiss with me. I was too short, or too fair, or my eyes were blue, or that I squinted, my fortune was too small, my money too little, I had no horse, my smoke did not smell nice, I had no boots. I had not a big moustache, my mother was disagreeable and I did not come out enough.*”

(Other peasants in the room added further versions; one wanted a man with curly hair, and finally one didn't want to marry at all.)

„*And so I live my life in disgrace because no girl will have me. I shall become a soldier. My mother always said I was to be a soldier although I am not specially fit for this.*”

[b] Harvest Song²⁰ (...)

[c] „*Dressing for Christmas*”. sung by an old man. „*Oh my boot! I can't put enough rags round my feet to make it fit. My aunt Juliet is snatching at the „strudel” on the table and my uncle is roasting the chicken on the stove.*”

This song is not sung in the house but as a carol outside the window.

²⁰ Hungarian text: *Arra alá learatták a buzát...* English translation is not given in the manuscript.

Farkas József lives on the outskirts of Dudar on the road to Csetény. He was a prisoner of war in Russia, at Kazan on the Caspian. He has a good voice and sings well. All his songs were plaintive and he sang them dreamily.

The house in which Farkas József lives is of the usual type of peasant house. It has a large yard in front, with outhouses. There is the gador, the central kitchen with three stoves, and a broad oven below the main chimney.



PHOTO 5 ❖ *Farkas József aged 42*²¹

We were invited in the living-room. This was large and airy, with three windows with bright geraniums and fuchsias in pots on the sills. Bottles of paprika, cucumber with vinegar from grape were on top of the wardrobe. Rows of apples could be seen on one window-sill. There was a hand-woven linen table-cloth on the table and a pot of asters. (...)

Songs sung by Farkas József:

[a] A well-known song to a sweet melody about a girl who is an angel and loved above all else. The second verse brings in the inn at Dudar – newly painted and full of folk and ends with the injunction; „*Go home, go home young man; it is already time. The morning star is already in the sky.*” The village inn is evidently intimately connected with love and life in the village. (...)

[b] Farkas József sang a ballad. It was an old theme but set to another theme as usual. The story of a man who had 600 guilders, [and] who was murdered for his money. The body was thrown into the river; but the river did not bear him away. A fisherman saw the body afloat on the water and brought it to the bank in his boat. The father of the man came and spoke to his son. The murdered man looked as in life with his black hair on his shoulders but he gave no sign. His wife came and tried to make him walk, but he was still lifeless. Then came his girl lover who took him home with her saying she would live with him for 3 or 4 days. (...)

One other song [by Csoó Sándor aged 38] had the rhythm of cradle-rocking but was not a lullaby. The usual Hungarian beat is lengthened for the second note to give this effect. (...)

One evening we went to a peasant house to see the husking and braiding of the maize. In the central kitchen young girls were sitting on the floor or leaning against the wall, stripping the long yellow husks from the maize cob. They sang as they worked. In the lamp-light the gold of the maize glinted giving a beautiful glow. Professor Veress was there taking down some of the melodies they sang. (...)

In the living-room with its 4 beds piled high with bedding, two or three old men sat on the floor as they plaited the stalks of the maize cobs into a long chain. These would now be hung up to dry. Later in the autumn further parties would be held to strip the maize fruit from the cob. The men did not sing on their own but sometimes joined in with what the girls were singing.



PHOTO 6 ❖ *Farkas József and his wife*²²



PHOTO 7 ❖ *Kovács Pál, his wife, son, two grandsons, daughter, son*²³

Songs heard in the house of Kovács Pál.

This was the most interesting household yet seen in Dudar. Kovács Pál is now 69 years of age. He is of stout build, square head, long moustache – the shepherd type of Hungary. He wore a white shirt and white linen trousers, long and fringed, with a dark coat and apron. He smoked his long briar pipe and kept his hat on all the time.

²² Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i

²³ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix

Kovács Pál has had ten children, five girls and five boys. Two sons were killed in the war, one died in infancy. The two surviving sons are seen in this picture and the two little grandsons. Of the five daughters four are now married. The only unmarried daughter is shown in the picture. Her name is Kovács Kató. Kovács Kató is a very attractive girl, now aged 20. It was Kató, who took the role of bride in the peasant wedding scenes that the villagers staged for us at their Sunday festival. On that occasion her dress was very elaborate; but when we visited her

home she was in her usual workday clothes – white blouse, red apron, brown kerchief on her hand and blue and white patterned skirt.

A coloured print on the wall showed a prosperous farmer's house where great preparations were being made for the wedding of the daughter of the house whose name was Kató. A feast is prepared; there is to be dancing and singing, a great jubilation.

*Sürgés forgás készülődés
Ma lesz a nagy leánykérés
Férjhez megy a kis Kató
lesz mulatság dáridó.*²⁴

One wondered whether this Kató was also making preparations for her wedding, especially because the chief activity in the living-room was spinning and weaving of brown linen, perhaps for her trousseau.

On the right hand side on entering the living-room was first a spinning-wheel, and behind that a weaving loom. The weaver was Nagy Imre, aged 79. He learnt spinning and

²⁴ This text can be found only in Hungarian in the original manuscript. Here is a rough translation: *There's hustling and bustling around./Since today is proposal day./Little Kató will soon get married./ There'll be fun and gaiety galore.*

weaving from his father and has been doing it all his life. The custom is for the family to supply the yarn while he comes to the house to make it up into linen cloth. Nagy Imre is not related to the family of Kovács Pál. He is simply employed there to make the linen required for family use and specially for what must be made and set aside for the daughters when they marry.

The spinning-wheel and loom are placed in the windows in good light. It can be seen




PHOTO 8. Nagy Imre at the spinning wheel²⁵

that the wheel is worked by both foot and hand. When enough bobbins have been filled with spun wool for the shuttle of loom Nagy Imre left the spinning-wheel and began to work the

loom. He used a foot pedal to change warp and woof, and ran the shuttle back and across by hand. The stuff he was making was a rather coarse brown linen. When about a yard was ready he took his feet off the pedal, and rolled the stretch of material to make it quite flat, cutting off any loose ends. Then he asked Kató for a mug of water. He filled his mouth with water and the most skilfully squirted it up and down the selvedge edges of the linen. The edges had then to be rolled once more. Again he filled his mouth with water and this time sprayed the whole surface of the linen by tiny jets of water from his mouth. Long practice has made this process perfect. The rolling-pin was again used quickly back and forth and the whole piece of linen thus treated was turned over on the big roller and stretched while it was still damp.

While the weaving was going on it was not possible to hear songs, as the noise of the loom was too great. No doubt if several voices were used there would be no difficulty in hearing the melodies. Professor Veress said that songs associated with occupations did not derive from industry. They were songs already known and sung to make work easier. The variation in certain phrases of these songs is accounted for by the fact that they are sung by different people in different occupations. The same song adapted by the folk to suit their purposes, and thus holding a living tradition in folk music.

The furniture in this house was obviously handed down from past generations. There was an old oak table with a drawer for bread; a stove; 2 beds; 1 bench with back; 2 chairs; and shelves. The walls were whitewashed, the floor was earthen. There was a hanging lamp in the centre of the room. Pottery, photographs and unframed coloured prints were on the walls. A red and white cotton bed-cover, with deep frills was also noted.

Kovács Pál sat on the bed by the door, smoking his pipe of content. Kovács Kató came in and out with what was required for the loom – and then sat on one of the chairs to sing to us.

²⁵ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i

Her brothers and the two grandchildren and the mother all came in to listen. It suggested a very happy family circle. One felt, too, that the parents were greatly respected by their grown-up sons and daughter.

When we passed through the central kitchen (with its large stove, the bread browning in the oven and the pans cooling the mid-day meal on the top) into the other living-room we were shown the family's household goods. This was indeed the "first" room. Here were three beds piled high with down mattresses; a solid chest of drawers; a book-case and cupboard. There were three windows to this room and it was much lighter than the room with the loom. A heavy oak beam that ran across the centre of the roof bore the inscription **K P 1865**, the date when the Kovács family built the house. Portraits of the father, Kovács Pál, in his army uniform of the 1914-18 war, with ribbons and medals, and of the two sons who were killed in the war, also decorated with military awards, were evidently the cherished possessions here. There was also the portrait of a local bishop and in the drawer of the chest we were shown several big volumes of church history – all Calvinistic and solid reading. We noticed one volume with the title: "*History of the Protestant Church*". Certainly these books had been well read and were much cared for.

Kovács Kató sang:

[a]
*Didn't I tell you mother dear that you should
let me get married?*

*For now they'll make me join the army &
others will take my lover.*

*Love her comrade, I don't care
Have you time with her. I don't mind.*

*But don't kiss her in front of me
as sorrow would then break my heart.²⁶*

[b]

*The gate of cemetery is wide open
That's the place for me beauties of Dudar
Come to pluck the flowers for me.*

*Pluck the flowers, pluck the flowers –
But not that lonely white lily –*

*If you do pick her, don't let her droop,
Plant her in the top of my grave
Deep in the black earth on it.²⁷*

[c]

*How I wish I were an oak in the forest
Then perhaps someone would light a fire with
me.*

*I should like to light up & burn the whole
round world –
since they won't let me love my darling in
peace.²⁸*

²⁶ Hungarian text: *Mondtam anyám, házasíts meg,/ Mert elvisznek katonának, / Ha elvisznek katonának,/Elszeretik a babámat. // Szeresd pajtás nem bánom, / Éljed véle ja világod. / Csak előttem meg ne csókold, / Szívemet megöli ja bubánat.*

²⁷ Hungarian text: *Temetőkapuja/Sarkig ki van nyitva,/Odajárnak a szép dudari lányok,/Rólam szedik a virágot.//Szedjétek, szedjétek,/Rólam a virágot,/Csak azt az egy fehér liliomot,/Rólam le ne szakítsátok.//Ha leszakítjátok,/El ne hervasszátok,/Ültessétek a sirom tetejére,/Mélyen a fekete földbe.*

²⁸ Hungarian text: *De szeretnék tölgyfa lenni az erdőbe,/Ha valaki tüzet rakna belőlem,/Eltüzném ezt a kerek világot,/Mert nem hagyják szeretni a babámat.*



PHOTO 9 ❖ Children returning from school²⁹

The children of Dudar are as fond of music as are their parents. Professor Veress was able to take down some of the pretty tunes that the school-children sang. *

²⁹ Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i

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Europe in German

Review of “A német Európa” by
 Ulrich Beck’s

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What to anticipate when a German sociologist, a resolute Europe-supporter publishes a book entitled “The German Europe”? Support for Europe from a German point of view, or support for Europe from a European citizen who happens to be German? The latter one and there is no contradiction. It is possible to debate the leftist perspective and conclusions, but it would be irrational to ignore the opinion of Ulrich Beck, the author of *Cosmopolitan Europe* and *World Risk Society* (published in Hungary by the Belvedere Publisher in 2007 and 2008). The title

alone is provocative and Beck knows it. As Europe experienced earlier how Germany opposed fiercely its neighbours in the Bismarckian era and had a major part in the outbreak of WWI under the leadership of emperor William II (not to mention *Das Dritte Reich* of Hitler), citizens and politicians of the continent might be overrun by worries and visceral fear when they learn that some kind of ‘German Europe’ is emerging. However, according to Beck it has already emerged: “Everybody knows, yet we break a taboo by declaring that Europe has become German.” Nobody planned, but the economically strong Germany has become a great power amongst the decision-makers of European policy under the shadow of Euro collapse (p. 13.) After the decades spent with public confessing of historical guilt, the Germans themselves could not handle this situation at first, but this has changed as well. “Suddenly, everybody in Europe speaks German. Not the language, but the approval of those solutions for which Angela Merkel has fought a long, but successful fight.” – said Volker Kauder, the fraction leader of the CDU in the Bundestag on an event organised by the party in 2011. Even the number of participants at German courses has remarkably increased in European cities; many of them would like to work in “German-speaking countries” or for a German company. While most European countries still suffer the consequences of the economic crisis, with an unemployment rate hardly manageable in some places, the economic indexes of Germany and other “German-speaking countries” (Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg or Holland) are excellent, the unemployment rate is not only low, but there is also a lack of labour force in some



regions, so there the applicants from European crisis zones are really welcomed.¹

But what reasons have led to “German Europe” and what are the consequences for Germany, and especially for Europe? These are the questions that the author intends to answer. In Europe and mainly in East-Central Europe, it is often forgotten that the European Union despite its deficiencies and problems is indeed a success story. It was not rare that the European countries earlier tried to overcome their internal problems and interstate conflicts with weapons, or with the introduction of duties and embargos. Between the countries that were integrated there is no war any more, and the means of managing economic conflicts have been remarkably improved, even if it is not evident at first glance in all cases. As the author puts it: the great development represented by the European Union – in opposition to the continental history of colonial empires and nation states – can be grasped at the fact that Europe and democracy are synonyms (p. 41.). Moreover, the European Union, despite being considered infirm by many, has achieved a leading position in world economy: with its 18,6% share of the global GDP, the EU precedes the avowedly emerging giant, China (14,9) and the United States (17,1) as well. It is true, though, that the GDP per capita still has to improve, since the average of the EU28 falls behind the values of the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan.² Nevertheless, there are a lot of problems in the EU, unlike in Germany. The engine of Europe is German economy: it gives more than one fifth of the 28 member states’ GDP, and it is only preceded by the

more populous USA, China and Japan in the world ranking. However, as Beck points out, these indexes are no satisfying references for the usual European citizen: the German saving policy divides Europe; it does not matter that the member states’ governments support it either out of conviction or under pressure, if the majority of citizens reject it. One major source of tension are the enduringly high rates of unemployment which are still increasing in some regions despite the austerity measures, and afflict primarily the young entrants leaving them with an image of a hopeless future. In certain Southern countries, the unemployment rate of the youth even exceeds 50%. Moreover, the conflict between public opinions of the crisis-stricken and creditor countries is sharpening, as the former one refuses the deadly pills of crisis-healing, while the latter cannot understand why they should financially support the indebted ‘lazy’ countries. In Beck’s opinion, this obviously shows that there would be various Europes in Europe in the future. As he writes: at least three dimensions of new inequalities in Europe exist; firstly, the inequality between the Euro- and non-Euro countries; secondly, the division within the Euro-zone (creditors and debtors), and thirdly, the inequality of the two speeds in one Europe (pp. 21. and 53.). The author believes that all these processes contribute to the strengthening of Germany’s leading role in the European Union.

The economy prospers, the unemployment is not really high and keeps decreasing; the Germans as the teachers of the EU set an example to the member countries. Beck however, as a sociologist, is not surprised by the fact that people in Greece and Spain fume at the system where they think the weakest have to pay the costs of the crisis and where they see disparity and injustice. The banks that had formerly declared the omnipotence of free market and condemned every form of state regulations had asked now the greatest state help possible and they got it. According

¹ Péter Tectet: Európa németül fog beszélni (Europe is going to speak German). *Válasz.hu*, 2011. november 20., <http://valasz.hu/vilag/a-targyalasok-soran-mindig-europai-szellemen-beszeltunk-43306> (Access: 2014. december 14.)

² Cited by: *Portfólió.hu*, 05-05-2014. http://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/na_melyik_a_vilag_legnagyobb_gazdasaga.198535.html (Access: 2014. november 30.)

to Beck, the financial system is off the hinges. But he proves with clear argumentation that interdependency in the common Europe is factual, Greece's secession or exclusion from the Eurozone would cause more damage than "saving". This concrete example, the assistance to Greece reveals the dilemma of the EU leaders as well. The actual government of Greece has to pretend for its voters that it is opposed to the forceful intervention in their politics, but the chancellor of Germany cannot boast at home either with the unsecure fruits of the financial support for Greece. The author concludes, not without bitterness: European internal policy nowadays is not oriented towards the European commonwealth, but it is influenced by national elections, the media and economic interests. All this serves the survival at home. And everybody thinks that they would be more successful, if they displayed doubt, and they did not stand up for the common future of the EU, but they prized national interests. Most politicians do not even consider taking risks in internal affairs for the sake of Europe (p. 31.) Anyway, we learn that every cloud has a silver lining: Beck says that the crisis not only chopped Europe figuratively into pieces, but paradoxically, it brought its citizens closer to each other, as some discussed in the last months the Greek economy more intensively than the issues of the labour market in their own regions. Never has Europe be spoken about with such intensity by the front pages of newspapers, the economic and cultural columns, by the local news, in the village and at the dinner table (p. 50.) which would hopefully result in the emergence of a common European consciousness. European problems are European problems in Portugal, Germany, Greece and Hungary: if one domino falls, no one knows how many more it would knock off and where the process would lead. Furthermore, the phenomenon called globalisation happens parallel to the European integration, in other words, Chernobyl, Fukushima, 9/11 or

the crash of the American credit markets have indeed influenced the European region and the European decisions.

According to Beck, the primary leader of the EU is neither the Committee, nor the President of the Council; it is in fact the crownless queen of (German) Europe: Angela Merkel. The German Beck believes that the source of the German chancellor's power is her "tendency" for not acting, or temporizing. Whenever she has to take a definite position in important question, she does it; but if the actual power relations require, she is ready to take a 180 degree turn at anytime without feeling guilty, as a true Machiavellist. Considering other components (German culture of stability, connection to the orthodoxy of nation state, etc.) attributed to the Merckelian policy, Beck creates the term of Merkievellism (combining the essential elements of *The Prince* by the Florentine political thinker, Machiavelli and the everyday political practice of chancellor Merkel). Beck might be a bit too strict with the German leader, and at the same time, he might overestimate the significance of her personal policy, or her possibilities in the European governance. Being uninterruptedly in power for such a long time (since 2005) is indeed an important political advantage, but the German diligence, thrift and economic achievements give the real background for Merkel's nation state policy. The real merits of the "Mutti" are that she has become the reader of German souls, her Protestant Puritanism, work moral and diligence has met the similar attitude of the Germans. And it is indeed her accomplishment that unemployment has been significantly reduced and her Christian democrat government was able to boost German economy.

Beck is right when he states that Merkel temporizes on the European level, the real question is whether she does it out of wise consideration as Beck supposes and as it seems afterwards.

Temporising or decision making, Merkel

demands austerity, tax moral and discipline in state finances as the requirements of Germans, surrounded by 'careless peoples' adds Beck mockingly. Although Beck criticises the German government, especially because of its European policy, he declares: compared to its historical antecedents, the present Germany is the best that we have ever seen (p. 72.).

As far as the future is concerned, the author hesitates, but he is optimistic in connection with the outcomes. The (latent) world risk society is a revolutionary one where normal and extraordinary situations cannot be separated. The danger that casts doubt on the existence of the Euro and the EU is implicitly an extraordinary situation which is not restricted to the nation states. This an extraordinary situation of transnational characteristic that is used by different participants (politicians of nation states, the non-voter representatives of the European institutions [e. g. the European Central Bank], social movements and managers of powerful financial concerns) in various ways (with technocratic or democratic legitimacy).

Beck asks: can the citizens of Europe be convinced to find a solution for the common crisis in cooperation? The author suggests that Europe can develop in two directions. In the fortunate case, the history overloaded with wars of nation states would be defeated and the crisis would be curbed through democratic cooperation. In the second case, the technocratic reactions for the crisis would bring the dusk of democracy, as the threatening catastrophe would legitimize every allegedly necessary measure; annul every kind of opposition and in this sense lead to an absolutistic rule (p. 41.). All in all, the 'German Europe' that has come to life Beck finds inappropriate. The alleged necessity of German austerity policy has pushed the principle of equal participation in the

background and it is more and more frequently substituted by forms of hierarchic dependency (p. 73.). Ulrich Beck concludes at the end of his essay volume that a social contract inspired by Rousseauian philosophy would be essential at the beginning of the 21st century which would exceed the nation state situation and offer more freedom, more democracy and greater social security for the citizens through its elevated Europeanism. And how can it be realised? Beck indicates: through the coalition of the indebted countries and Germany that gains profit from the crisis. The Merkiavellistic governance has to be modified; (full?) political-economic union should take the place of neoliberal reforms. Or it might be achieved by the protesting masses of citizens who would fight from beneath for a union that is political and committed for social democratic principles, since only such a union would be able to vanquish the reasons of the misery (p. 90.). Is this really the recipe? Many argue against this statement, but its core concept, namely that the 'German Europe' has emerged, cannot be disputed.

The translation of Beck's work edited by Csaba Jancsák and published by the Belvedere Meridionale is fluent and easy to understand. First and last, the publisher did a fine job: not long after the publication of the original German version, the Beck volume became available in Hungarian which is a praiseworthy accomplishment.

(ULRICH BECK: *A német Európa: Új hatalmi térségek a válság jegyében*³. Ed. by Csaba Jancsák, trans. by Ildikó G. Klement. Belvedere Meridionale, Szeged, 2013. 91 pp.) *

³ The original title: *Das deutsche Europa: Neue Machtlandschaften im Zeichen der Krise* published in Berlin in 2012.

ULRICH BECK (1944–2015)

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
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Ulrich Beck who deceased on the 1st January 2015 at the age of 70 was one of the greatest sociologists of his generation. The questions of globalisation and social changes were at the centre of his work. In his view, we live in a new world whose boundaries and foundations have become insecure and plastic. We cannot perceive and effectively form the new social reality, the second modernity, because our institutional systems and the history of their foundations have their roots in the era of the first modernity. In an era whose leading ideas were characterised by full employment, the dominance of national state policy in connection with national economy, functioning boundaries and clear-cut territorial identities. Beck thought that these ideas cannot answer the key questions of our age. His basic notion was that the institutions of national states are challenged by the global threats that do not respect any boundaries. In the chaotic world fear becomes a constant feeling and the longing for the lost security increases. Another of his significant conclusions was that (world)risk and risk-consciousness do not only dominate the great institutions of our society, but they penetrate into the everyday life of individuals transforming it to be more reflexive, as the reference frame of individuals is life-world itself. As a consequence, alienation from customs and traditions is a typical tendency of our age, the second modernity.



As a resolute supporter of transnational Europe, Beck believed that a European social contract is necessary that would guarantee more freedom, social security and democracy all over the continent, because Europe in its present form would not be able to resist the storms of risk world. The European Union must be something more than a ‘bitter marriage’ kept together by the fear of collapse; it has to be based on something else: on the creation from beneath, in other words, on the vision of citizens’ Europe. There is no better way to revitalize Europe than encouraging Europeans to act in their own rights and find each other again.

In Hungary, Ulrich Beck’s *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* was published by Századvég in 2003. In 2001, we started to work on the Hungarian edition of Ulrich Beck’s *Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus – Antworten auf Globalisierung* (originally published in 1997) at the suggestion of the youth researcher Kálmán Gábor. This volume was translated by Ildikó G. Klement and published with Kálmán Gábor’s epilogue in Szeged by the Belvedere Publisher in 2005 (under the title *Mi a globalizáció? A globalizmus tévedései – válaszok a globalizációra*). Since the

first volume we have published one of Beck's further works almost every year (all of them were translated by Ildikó G. Klement and the covers were designed by Andrea Majzik): *A választás tétje* in 2006, *A kozmopolita Európa* in 2007 (originally *Cosmopolitan Europe* which he wrote with Edgar Grande), *Világkockázattársadalom. Az elveszett biztonság nyomában*. In 2008 (*World Risk Society*), *A munka szép új világa* in 2009 (*The Brave New Work of World*) and *A német Európa. Új hatalmi térségek a válság jegyében*. in 2013 (*Das deutsche Europa*). The forewords/epilogues were written first by Kálmán Gábor, and in the case of the last two volumes by Csaba Jancsák. Kálmán Gábor, the greatest populizer of Beck's work in Hungary passed away in 2009, and now we lost Ulrich Beck.

Ulrich Beck was born in Stolp, Pomerania (today Słupsk, Poland). From the middle of the 1960s he studied sociology, philosophy, physiology and political science at the University of München. He earned his doctoral degree in arts in 1927; seven years later he habilitated in sociology. He was a lecturer of the University of Münster between 1979 and 1981 and of the University of Bamberg between 1981 and 1992. Later, until his death he worked as a professor at the Ludwig Maximilian University in München and London School of Economics. During his very active research career he earned international acclaim and many prestigious awards. His research interests were modernisation/modernity, globality/globalisa-

tion, individualisation, cosmopolitanism and the issues of the European Union. He re-examined social and economic correlations with an innovative approach and enriched social sciences with the introduction of new terms, such as "risk society", "second modernity" and "reflexive modernity".

On 17 November 2014, the Sociological Workshop of Szeged organised a book debate as a part of the Festival of Hungarian Science (an event of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) with the title *From world risk society to German Europe* where sociologists, philosophers and ecologists participated. As the host of this event, I had to realise how Ulrich Beck's work inspired generations, and how versatile, popular and influential his theories are.

Farewell, dear Professor!

CSABA JANCSAK

THE EDITOR OF THE HUNGARIAN EDITIONS OF
ULRICH BECK'S VOLUMES

"Ulrich Beck was a dedicated and conscientious scholar, with an encyclopaedic knowledge of the social sciences. For such a distinguished figure he was refreshingly down to earth and approachable, highly popular with his students everywhere. I used to tease him quite often, since he never mastered the British sense of humour, with its mixture of self-deprecation and smug superiority. More often than not though I was the one who ended up looking foolish. He had a good line in put-downs when he needed to."
(Anthony Giddens)



A SZERKESZTŐSÉG POSTALÁDÁJÁBÓL:

Tisztelt Főszerkesztő Ur!

Ezúton szeretnék helyreigazítást kérni a Belvedere újság jövőre tervezett számában. Tevékenyen jelent meg lapszámunk 2005/ XII. 7-8. számában a Holokauszt Kiskunfelegyházán cikk szerzője Kun Zsuzsanna. Kérem szíves helyreigazításukat.

Tisztelettel:
Mak Kornel

2014. november 29.

KISS GÁBOR FERENC

*„Lovon, gyalog, autón,
biciklin, vasúton...”*



A MAGYAR KIRÁLYI HONVÉDSÉG GYORSCSAPATAI

Kiss Gábor Ferenc monográfiája a magyar királyi Honvédség történetének egy izgalmas korszakába vezeti el az olvasót. A tudományos igényvel megírt mű az akkor egyik legkorszerűbbnek számító fegyvernem, a gyorscsapatok (páncélosok, gépkocsizó lövészek, huszárok, kerékpárosok) megalakulását, fejlődését mutatja be annak gyakorlati alkalmazásán keresztül. A kötet

lapjain nem csak egy modern fegyvernem története bontakozik ki, hanem az 1938–1941 közötti területegyesítések hadtörténetének az utókor számára is tanúságos oldala. A tárgyalt korszak eseményeinek ismerete ugyanakkor segít megérteni a Honvédség második világháborús szereplésének hátterét is.

MEGREDELHETŐ A KIADÓNÁL.