NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE STYLE

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The impressive progress of narrative theory in the past two decades has been, undoubtedly, connected with the elaboration of models of narrative structures, i.e. of invariant narrative systems defined on various levels of abstractness. Inspired by Propp's descovery of a common scheme underlying a variety of particular stories, French Structuralists have devised various "narrative grammars' for the description of narrative invariants. Quite recently, Lévi-Strauss has given a cogent summary of this approach: "Probably there is nothing more than that in the structuralist approach; it is the quest for the invariant elements among superficial differences." (Lévi-Strauss, 1978, 8; cf. already Piaget, 1972, 6). "Narrative grammars" have become a favourite and commonly used theoretical tool of folklorists, cultural anthropologists, text theoreticians and other specialists of narratology.

However, a literary scholar working in the domain of modern narrative theory has been faced with a painful dilemma: While recognizing that "narrative grammars" are a powerful explanation of the concept of "narrativity", he is forced to admit that these grammars generate structures which are aesthetically "barren", that is, lacking in aesthetic significance or effect. A sequence or a matrix of functions, motifemes, mythemes, etc. appears as an organizing principle of narratives, but it is aesthetically neutral, or, perhaps, irrelevant. It has not been observed too often that Propp was already aware of this limitation of "narrative grammars": If we are interested in those features which "provide the tale with its expressivity, its beauty and enchantment", we

have to go beyond the invariant structures and focus on the
"variable properties of the tale" (Propp, 1969[2], 79). Obvi-
ously, aesthetic effects are somehow associated with vari-
ability, singularity of texts, with properties which are by
definition outside the scope of models of invariant struc-
tures.

If our localization of aesthetic qualities is correct,
modern study of literature requires a narrative theory
which will achieve almost the impossible: It should de-
scribe how both the invariant and the variable properties of
narrative texts are organized and, moreover, it should es-
tablish explicit links between these two levels of organiza-
tion. In order to make some progress in this task, I propose
to revitalize the very old concept of style in terms which,
at first sight, might seem contradictory: *Style is the*
global regularity of idiosyncracy[2]. In a comprehensive nar-
rative theory, stylistics, describing the variability of nar-
rative texts, could become a useful partner of narrative
grammar, studying models of invariant narrative structures.
Needless to say, such a narrative theory should also provide
means for describing explicitly the links leading from struc-
tures to styles and vice versa.

In what follows, I intend to demonstrate briefly and
without any claims to exhaustiveness how such a comprehensive
narrative theory could be pursued. In keeping with the pre-
dominant trend in contemporary narratology, I will remain
within the framework of semantics. This focus is not fortui-
tous; in the domain of narrative texts, more than in any
other domain of text theory, semantics necessarily represents
the core of theoretical enquiry.

1. *Extensional and intensional semantics*. In view of the
fact that aesthetic effects seem to be carried by variable,
often "minute" textual properties, our search for an ade-

quate semantics of literature has to be guided by the prin-
ciple that any reductionism, i.e. any loss of meaning, is
inadmissible. Specifically, any semantic theory or model
which reduces complex meanings of literary texts to invar-
iant semantic representations is just a partial theory or
model for literary semantics.

Two semantic systems are worthy of note in our search
for an adequate literary semantics: Frege's semantics - pro-
posed in the domain of the philosophy of language (see espe-
cially Frege, 1892), and Prague school semantics - developed
for the specific purpose of poetics (see Mukarovsky, 1928).
There are, in my opinion, many similarities between Frege's
and the Prague school's ideas about language and literature,
although there was probably no connection or influence be-
tween the two sources of modern semantics.[3] Their union *post
festum* would be, in my opinion, beneficial to both: It would
place the Prague school system into a broader theoretical
development of 20th century semantics and, on the other hand,
would provide Fregean semantics with a necessary vital link
to empirical semantic problems in language and literature.

It is commonly known that Frege's semantics is based on
the differentiation between *Sinn* (sense) and *Bedeutung* (ref-
erence). In Mukarovsky's system, the corresponding components
of meaning are called *vyznamova struktura* (semantic struc-
ture) and *tematicka struktura* (thematic structure). In this
paper, I will follow the already well-established practice
of referring to *Sinn* as *intension* and to *Bedeutung* as *ex-
tension*.

Efforts to apply Fregean semantics as an adequate se-
mantics as an adequate semantics of literature are hampered
by the fact that the most developed accounts of intensions
have followed reductionist models, in translating intensions
into purely extensional languages. Such translating proce-
dures seem to be *typical of contemporary logical semantics*
and of linguistic semantics based on logico-semantic cate-

gories. At present, the most popular version of this proce-
dure derives its inspiration from possible-world semantics.
Intensions are defined as functions from possible worlds to
extensions. Such functions pick out from every possible
world exactly those elements of the world which represent
the extension of the given expression in that world. While
such attempts to express intensions in an extensional lan-
guage are understandable and even necessary in logical se-
mantics, - with its goal of formulating truth-conditions in
intensional contexts - they seem to be unproductive in lit-
erary semantics, precisely because intensions are reduced to
extensions. We have to repeat again that an adequate inten-
sional semantics of literature has to give a non-reductionist,
"autonomous" account of intensions. All experience, past and
present, indicates that a non-reductionist theory of inten-
sions is the most difficult (some would say, impossible) task
of semantical theory.

All extensional accounts of intensions disregard the
essential link between intensional meaning and its corre-
sponding verbal expression. With respect to the theory of
intensions using the framework of possible-world semantics,
this deficiency has been pointed out: "This analysis of in-
tension has made the concept essentially language-independ-
ent. An intension has extralinguistic entities both as its
domain (possible worlds) and as its range (objects and truth
values)." (Allwood-Andersson-Dahl, 1977, 129). This disregard
of linguistic expression is, in my opinion, in clear contrast
with Frege's original notion. For Frege, *Sinn* was "the mode
of presentation" of the reference (op. cit., 119) and this
mode is necessarily given by the form in which the language
expresses the reference[4]. In accordance with Frege's original
notion, intensions should be defined as those components of
meaning which are necessarily and fully determined by the
form of their expression. Obviously, intensions are generated
only in languages which are not governed by a simple, one-to-

-one correspondence between expressions and referents.

While such an account of intension should satisfy a
student of literature, it will make the task of intensional
semantics even more difficult. If intensions are bound to
the corresponding forms of expression, then they are altered
or destroyed by any, even the slightest, change of expression.
This means that there is no possibility of describing inten-
sions in any kind of paraphrase (rewording) of the original
expression. The basic method of capturing meaning, the meth-
od of "interpretants", seems to be closed. It is impossible
to represent the intension of an expression (sign) by another
(synonymous) expression (sign).

The insistence on a necessary and unalterable correla-
tion between intensions and forms of expression seems to be
driving us into the same dead-end, where those afraid of the
"heresy of paraphrase" have been resting[5]. However, reject-
ing paraphrase as a tool for describing intensions does not
prevent us from seeking other, theoretically more satisfac-
tory, versions of intensional semantics. If intensions cannot
be described directly, procedures of *indirect* description
have to be formulated.

In this respect, the necessary bond between intension
and form of expression becomes a blessing. If intensions are
determined and structured by the form of their expression,
then they can be described indirectly through the structure
or organization of verbal expression. Such a direction has
been, in fact, pursued for some time in structural linguis-
tics and poetics, although the concept of intension has not
been generally used.

In spite of this opening, intensional semantics remains
a formidable task. In the domain of narrative texts, it
should be developed on two levels: 1. *Intensional micro-
semantics* will investigate the intensions of linguistic units,
such as words, phrases, sentences, in terms of the "inner
form" of their expression. Intension of a higher unit will

be interpreted as an integration of intensions of its com-
ponential expressions.[6] In this approach, verbal context
appears as a form of expression and, as such, has been re-
ferred to in many accounts of intensional meanings (see, for
example, contextual theories of metaphor). 2. *Intensional
macrosemantics* will investigate theories and methods for de-
scribing intensional meaning of whole texts, or, at least,
of some aspects of this intensional totality. Again, it will
approach this task through the study of the organization of
the text's expression (its texture). The unity of the con-
cept of intension on the micro- and the macro-level of or-
ganization is ensured: the global regularities of texture
correspond to the "inner form" of the micro-expressions,
while the intensional structuring of the narrative world
corresponds to the structuring of the micro-intension given
by the integration of its componential parts.

In this paper, intensional microsemantics will be left
aside. I will concentrate on proposing and demonstrating one
possibility of investigating intensional macro-organization
in narrative texts.

2. *The concept of intensional function*. The fundamental
concept of narrative macrosemantics is the concept of *narra-
tive world*. Narrative world is a set of individuals, objects,
properties, events and actions, which is constructed by the
narrative text.[7] Narrative worlds are not formless entities.
They are shaped in many different ways. The macro-restric-
tions operating on the set of elements forming the world are
either extensional, or intensional. Extensional restrictions
specify those conditions of admissibility in the world which
are totally independent of the designations, names and de-
scriptions of the elements. A purely quantitative restriction,
for example the number of narrative agents, is the simplest
example of an extensional restriction, generating one-agent,
two-agent and multi-agent worlds. A narrative world formed

by extensional restrictions has a shape, a structure, but
- as has already been mentioned - this structure is totally
independent of any possible expressions which will be used
to verbalize the world. Of course, we have to talk about the
extensional world, its elements and its structuring, for
this purpose, we have to construct a purely extensional lan-
guage, i.e. an artificial system of signs governed by the
principles of one-to-one correspondence between elements of
the world and elements of the sign system. The construction
of such a language has been an urgent task of semantics at
least since Frege. At present, I believe, the most promising
development in this direction is the elaboration of a system
of semantic representations. However, for our present purpose,
we do not have to go into details.

Intensional macro-restrictions affecting the shape of
the narrative world will be defined - in accordance with our
overall conception of intensional meaning - as such regular-
ities which operate through the forms of expression of the
world. Since the possibilities of expressing a world are ex-
tremely varied, we have, necessarily, a rich variety of in-
tensional world structures. Obviously, one and the same ex-
tensional world can be transformed by various forms of ex-
pression into many different intensional world structures[8].
The study of the possible intensional world structures and
of their relationship to the possible extensional world
structures, is, in my opinion, the most important task of
contemporary narrative semantics[9].

In a relatively short contribution, it is impossible to
discuss all the important problems connected with intensional
world structuring. I will concentrate on the possibility of
making the concept of intensional restrictions more specific
and explicit. In order to give a sharp focus to the discus-
sion, I shall deal only with the so-called *domain* of the
world, i.e. with the set of its individuals, "inhabitants".
In the case of narrative worlds, the domain is given by the

set of agents acting in the world. Narrative agents (tradi-
tionally called characters or *dramatis personae*) are dis-
tinguished from other objects in the world precisely by
their ability to perform actions.

As extensional entities, the individuals-agents will
be designated and referred to by a conventional set of sym-
bols, for example by the lower-case letters of the alpha-
bet: a, b, c... In order to ensure the extensional character
of this sign system, we will require that it follows the
principle of one-to-one correspondence: each individual will
be designated by one and only one letter. The domain of the
narrative world will then be represented as set
D = {a, b, c...}.

In particular narrative texts, agents will be "named"
by the various expressions of natural language, serving in
the function of singular terms. It is commonly known that
two distinct categories of expressions are available for
this purpose: *proper names* and *definite descriptions*. With-
out going into the controversy concerning the relationship
of these categories of singular terms, I will state my a-
greement with those semanticians who claim that proper names
and definite descriptions differ fundamentally in inten-
sional meanings. Such a view can be defended expecially with-
in the framework of the well-known theory of proper names as
"rigid designators"[10]. In the framework of our intensional
semantics, "rigid" designation can be interpreted as inten-
sion because a proper name thus provides a special mode of
presenting the individual. There is no doubt that every de-
finite description carries an intensional meaning given by
its form of expression. In other words, we claim that the
proper name *Odysseus* carries an intension different from the
intension of the definite description *the king of Ithaca*
and the latter, in turn, differs in intension from *the hero
of Homer's poem "The Odyssey"*.

If we accept this idea, then we can say that natural

language provides at least two intensionally different al-
ternative forms of expressing singular reference; any given
individual of the narrative world (that is any member of
set D) can be assigned in every act of "naming" either a
proper name or a definite description. In certain narrative
texts, the selection of these alternatives can be governed
by regular preferences, i.e. by stylistic regularities[11].
Formally speaking, in such texts the assignment of singular
terms to narrative agents is governed by a two-value func-
tion which assigns either a proper name or a definite de-
scription to each individual in the domain D. Any function
which provides a mapping of extensional symbols into inten-
sional expressions will be called *intensional function.* Our
function which will replace extensional symbols a, b, c...
by either proper names or definite descriptions shall be
called *intensional function of naming.* The operation of
this function can be observed in Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe.*
The regularity of naming in this novel is given by the fact
that only three agents of its world, *Robinson, Xury* and
Friday, are assigned proper names, while all other agents
are consistently expressed by definite descriptions; *my
father, the Portuguese captain, the English captain's widow,
Friday's father,* etc.

The concept of intensional function, as defined, could
become, in my opinion, a very important theoretical tool
for describing the organization of intensional meaning in
literary texts. Every intensional function generates a sty-
listic regularity of texture by controlling the selection
of alternative expressions or categories of expressions. In
fact, a stylistic regularity is *empirical evidence* of the
operation of an intensional function in a text. On the other
hand, intensional function is responsible for the inten-
sional structuring of the narrative world, by splitting the
extensional world into a set of intensionally defined "sub-
worlds". In such a way, the concept of intensional function

provides the vital linkage between *regularities of texture* (i.e. the form of the text's expression) and *macrostructuring of intensional meaning*.

In the case of the intensional function of naming, which has been used as our concrete example, the domain of the narrative world (D) is split into two subsets: the set of agents named by a proper name and the set of agents named by a definite description. The extensional macrostructure (domain) is transformed into an intensional macrostructure (picture of the domain). The resulting macrostructure is intensional in character, precisely because its existence and shape are dependent on and fully determined by the regularity in the form of expression, in texture. If such a regularity did not exist, if, for example, all agents of D were expressed by proper names only, this particular intensional structuring would not come into existence. This statement should not be construed in such a way as to imply that with-.out the intensional function of naming, *no* intensional structuring of the narrative world would be possible. Our theory assumes that there are many different intensional functions, and, consequently, many different ways of structuring narrative worlds intensionally. Narrative macrosemantics should specify the particular intensional functions and describe their contribution to the overall intensional structuring of narrative worlds.

Two-value functions are the simplest form of intensional functions. Higher-value intensional functions are obviously possible, since natural language quite often offers more than two alternative forms of expression for one and the same extensional meaning. In fact, such is even the case with singular terms, if we inspect them more closely. While logical semantics has been satisfied with distinguishing proper names and definite descriptions, linguistic semantics has to take account of the fact that within both categories, there exist subcategories with substantial differences in inten-

sional meaning[12]. We can say, for example, that there exists
a significant intensional difference between calling some-
body by his surname and calling him by his first name.

Without going into a systematic theory of singular
terms in natural language, I propose to use the following
preliminary categories in our study of the intensional struc-
turing of the domain of narrative worlds:

I. Proper name: 1) surname: a) without "inner form":

Nixon;

b) with "inner form":

Baker,

Black;

2) given names: *John, Petrovic;*

3) nicknames: *Caddy;*

4) abbreviations: *X.Y.*

II. Definite descriptions: 1. fixed (i.e. stable through-
out the whole text): *my
father* (in *Robinson
Crusoe*);

2. contextual/unstable (i.e.
changing according to con-
text): *the last customer in
the store.*

In different narrative texts, the intensional function
of naming can operate over any set of these alternatives,
that is the author may select the expressions for naming his
agents from any one of these categories or any one of their
combinations. In other words, intensional function of naming,
if present in the text production, will operate as a two-,
three-...n-value function, depending on the number of cate-
gories which enter the selection process. In order to demon-
strate the operation of intensional function of naming and
its contribution to the intensional structuring of the nar-
rative world, I want to examine a text which certainly rep-
resents a challenge to semantic analysis, *The Trial* by

Franz Kafka.

3. *Intensional structuring in The Trial*. A modern narrative
text, examplified by Kafka's novels and short stories, has
often been characterized as semantically multivalent, i.e.
open to a multitude of semantic interpretations. This unde-
niable property of modern literature has often been taken as
an excuse for interpretative anarchy: Since a modern text
can mean anything, every reader or critic is allowed to con-
struct his own "meaning". Instead of undertaking the diffi-
cult and laborious analysis of the semantic structure of
modern texts, literary criticism has taken the easy route:
bypassing the text and formulating "meanings" which are
nothing more than slightly adjusted versions of the critic's
preconceived ideology. This characterization of contemporary
"interpretative" criticism might seem too harsh and too gen-
eral. However, it certainly applies to the many critical
"readings" of Kafka. They express the religious, political,
social, psychological, etc. position of the critic, rather
than Kafka's own semantics.

Narrative semantics, which, at present, is the most ac-
tive part of structural poetics, operates in a direct con-
trast to this kind of "interpretative" criticism. In a me-
ticulous analysis, based on a comprehensive semantic theory,
the text inherent regularities of the organization of mean-
ing are revealed. There is no denying the fact that the fi-
nal recovery of meaning from a literary text is accomplished
in the act of reading, i.e. in the interplay of the text and
(a) reader. However, the acts of reading and interpretation
are to be controlled by the semantic structuring of the text;
if this control is disregarded, the "readings" and "inter-
pretations" offer subjective guesses, in the best case, and
misrepresentations, in the worst case.

In spite of an abundance of critical literature on
Kafka[13], little has been done to understand his work in the

light of narrative semantics. My modest excursion into Kaf-
ka criticism serves no other purpose than to demonstrate
that: a) even the most "mysterious" texts generate meaning
.by regular processes and devices of meaning production;
b) consequently, the structuring of meaning in these texts
is no less susceptible to theoretical analysis than it is in
the "simple" and "non-ambiguous" texts of classical litera-
ture.

One of the interesting factors of semantic structuring
in Kafka's *The Trial*[14] is the operation of the intensional
function of naming (as defined in part 2). This function as-
signs terms of singular reference to all the agents of the
novel in a surprisingly regular and consistent way. Rare
"exceptions" can be accounted for as manifestations of com-
peting regularities. The scope of the intensional function
extends to both the narrator's texts and the characters'
speeches; as a rule, agents are "called" by the same des-
ignation in both textual planes. For example, *Fräulein Bürst-
ner* is the regular designation of this agent used both by
the narrator and by Frälein Bürstner's co-agents. Excep-
tions arise in such cases when an "intimate" way of desig-
nation, usually first name, is used in conversations be-
tween the agents: *Josef K.* is called *Josef* by his uncle and
by Leni.

The intensional function of naming in *The Trial* operates
over the following set of categories:

  I. Proper name; 1. surname: *Block*,

  2. given (first) name: *Leni*;

  3. abbreviation: *K.*

 II. Definite description: 1. fixed: *der Prügler* (the
                                    whipper);

                          2. contextual (unstable): *ein
                             junger Bursche* (a young
                             boy) - *der Bursche* (the
                             boy) - *der Sohn des Haus-*

meisters (the son of the
housekeeper).

It seems to me that the distinction of surnames with or
without "inner form" is irrelevant for this novel; nicknames
do not occur.

As a result of the application of the intensional func-
tion of naming, the set of agents of *The Trial* is split into
the following, intensionally defined subsets:

1. The protagonist forms a one-member subset, singled
out from the set of agents by his exclusive proper name
abbreviation. The standard form of the name is *Josef K.* with
the variant *K.* and with contextual variants (used only in
allocutions) *Herr K.* (in Mrs. Grubach's speech) and *Josef*
(used by his "intimates", the uncle and Leni). It is note-
worthy that the priest (in chapter IX) addresses the pro-
tagonist *Josef K.* (152), a quite unusual form of address in
German, even if full family name was used[15]. While all the
above given forms are variants of the abbreviation, there
is an alternative mode of naming the protagonist, namely by
fixed definite descriptions. This aspect of the protagonist's
naming will be dealt with later.

2. There is a group of agents whose standard name is a
surname, in two different forms: a) The surname alone is as-
signed, as in the case of *Huld, Tittorelli, Block.* Three
minor characters are named in the same way: *Rabendsteiner,
Kullich, Kaminer*; in this case, the mode of naming is excep-
tional, as will become clear later. b) The second variant
of the surname, its polite form, is restricted to three
agents: *Fräulein Bürstner, Frau Gruber* and *Fräulein Montag.*
In the case of *Frälein Bürstner*, an occasional variant *das
Fräulein* can be found in characters' speech, indicating her
exceptional position in this set; the other two female char-
acters are episodic. An interesting detail should be men-
tioned here: In their most intimate moment (end of chapter
I), Joseph K. wants to call Fräulein Bürstner by her first

name, but he realizes that he does not know it (27). This
lack of first name is no less significant for the expres-
sion of the intensional meaning than the polite surname
under which this female agent is known.

3. The agents assigned first names only are, at first
sight, a rather mixed set: *Elsa, Leni* (K's mistresses), *An-
na* (the cook) and *Franz* and *Willem* (the wardens). What is
significant in the case of this set is that it can be de-
fined by an extensional property: all characters in this
group are of "low status" socially or professionally (Franz
and Willem are described as "niedrige Angestellte" (10),
low clerks). We have here a case where intensional split-
ting of the domain coincides with its extensional subdivi-
sion, reinforcing its significance for the semantic struc-
ture of the novel.

4. The possibility of naming agents by the assignment
of contextual, unstable, changing definite description will
concern us here from a purely formal aspect only. Unstable
definite description is a transitory stage in the process
of naming. It leads either to the assignment of a proper
name, or to the selection of a permanent, fixed definite de-
scription. The introduction of one of the wardens in Chap-
ter I can be used as an example of both outcomes; the chain
of naming proceeds as follows: *ein Mann* (a man) → *der Mann*
(the man) → *der fremde Mann* (the strange man) → *der Fremde*
(the stranger) → *Franz* (in Willem's allocution) / *der
Wächter* (the warden) (in narrator's text). The agent will be
known thereafter under the proper name or the fixed definite
description. This process does not apply to a group of minor
or episodic characters who do not rise above the level of
anonymity signified by the unstable definite description.
Their role in the semantic structure of the novel will not
be discussed, with the exception of one specific case (see
below).

5. A very prominent specific feature of the naming of
agents in *The Trial* is the assignment of fixed definite de-
scriptions to a large set of individuals. Both the negative
and the positive aspect of this mode of naming is sig.ifi-
cant: On the negative side, these agents are - similarly as
Josef K. - deprived of a standard proper name; their proper
names are never given. On the positive side, the *type* of the
fixed definite description is most important: the agent is
designated by his function or position in the two social
institutions represented in *The Trial* - the Bank and the
Court. All the employees of the Bank, with the exception al-
ready mentioned, are named in this way: *der Diener* (the
servant), *der Direktor* (the director), *der Direktor-Stell-
vertreter* (the vice-director). The group of the representa-
tives of the Court, designated by fixed definite descrip-
tions, is rather large: *der Aufseher* (the supervisor), *der
Untersuchungsrichter* (the examining magistrate), *der Stu-
dent* (the (law) student), *der Gerichtsdiener* (the Court at-
tendant), *der Auskunftgeber* (the informant), *der Prügler*
(the whipper), *der Kanzleidirektor* (the director of the
bureau), *der Richter* (the judge), *der Dritte Richter* (the
Third judge), *der Gefängnisskaplan* (the prison chaplain),
etc. We should add that the designation *der Angeklagte* (the
defendant) could be characterized as a fixed definite de-
scription expressing a "position" at the Court. It is as-
signed to minor (anonymous) characters, but in two cases,
in the case of Josef K. and Block, it serves as a secondary
designation of a major character[16].

One exception to the exclusive use of the fixed defi-
nite description has already been mentioned: Josef K. 's
wardens are given proper (first) names (*Franz*, *Willem*). an-
other interesting case is the girl in chapter IV, whom Jo-
sef K. meets during his visit to the attic offices; she is
not assigned a fixed definite description and, therefore,
her function at the Court remains unclear. Much more impor-

tant is the case of the two gentlemen in chapter X who arrive
to execute Josef K. They are not given a fixed definite de-
scription. This exceptional case seems to me so significant
that I will return to it in more detail in the conclusion of
this paper.

Having established the intensional structure of the do-
main of the narrative world, that is the subsets of agents
defined by the intensional function of naming, we shall pro-
ceed to investigate how this structuring generates, or, bet-
ter to say, contributes to generating the intensional mean-
ing of the novel. Let us recall our claim, according to which
an investigation into the intensional structuring of the
narrative world by means of intensional functions will give
us indirect access to the intensional macro-meaning of the
literary text. Specifically, in the case of the intensional
function of naming, we hope to have gained an access which
will lead us far beyond the traditional intensional seman-
tics of proper names derived from their "inner form" (cf.
Eis, 1970)[17].

In spite of the fact that we have been investigating
only one intensional function operating in *The Trial*, we
should hope to uncover significant traces of the total in-
tensional macrostructuring of the text. In this first, and,
necessarily, partial approach, I want to suggest that three
aspects of the intensional macrostructure of *The Trial* are
generated, or, at least, indicated by the intensional func-
tion of naming:

1. *Hierarchy of agents and their relationships.* Intensional
structuring resulting from the application of the function
of naming generates associations of agents in addition, and,
sometimes, in contrast to those which are established by ex-
tensional criteria. The most obvious feature of this aspect
of intensional macrostructure in *The Trial* is the isolation
of the hero-protagonist in a one-member class, resulting

from the exclusive use of abbreviation as his name[18].

As a result, Josef K. is differentiated from all other defendants, expecially from Block. The intension of exceptionality, uniqueness which becomes obvious in a systematic study of naming, outweighs the intension of anonymity or loss of identity which the abbreviation evokes in isolation. Kafka's hero is certainly an ordinary man because his fate is the possible fate of anybody. He is, however, unique among the ordinary men because of his insistence on human dignity in the face of an inhuman, inaccessible force.

The hero-protagonist forms the centre of the intensional system and the other agents are grouped around this centre according to their particular relationships to the protagonist. The intensionally generated split in the set of female characters is especially striking. I have in mind the intensional contrast between *Elsa* and *Leni*, on the one hand, and *Fräulein Bürstner*, on the other hand. K.'s mistresses, being named by the first name only (their family name is never given), are linked to other low-status characters. In this case, the intensional feature (name) brings the extensional property of the class (low status) into a sharper focus. The low status of K.'s mistresses[19] is especially significant in contrast to the inaccessible Fräulein Bürstner, named consistently by the polite form of surname. The special position of this female character vis-a-vis Josef K. is reinforced by the intensional contrast to the male group of characters around K. who act as his "helpers" or "informers"; these latter agents form a separate intensional class because they are consistently named by surname only (*Huld, Tittorelli, Block*).

In general, all agents of *The Trial* assigned a proper name (first name, surname, Frau/Fräulein + surname) can be said to form the "private" group of the hero. They enter into clearly specified relations and interactions with the hero, while their association with the institutions of the

world of *The Trial* is vague, indefinite, sometimes mysteri-
ous. The case of the minor representatives of the institu-
tions (the three bank employees and the wardens) is typical;
they are attracted into the "private" group by their closer
association with Josef K.

2. *The intension of the institutions*. Two social institu-
tions, the Court and the Bank, play a fundamental role in the
semantic structure of *The Trial*. On the extensional level,
these institutions are clearly in contrast: The Bank is a ra-
tional, highly-efficient and well-defined form of social or-
ganization with clearly determined procedures and goals of
operation. The Court's mode of activity is desperately mud-
dled, irrational and chaotic, with no rules of procedure and
with absolutely unpredictable results. This extensional con-
trast, however, is counteracted by a similarity on the inten-
sional level, indicating a deeper connection of these two
institutionalized modes of social activity. The intensional
similarity is given by the fact that the Bank's and the
Court's representatives form one class on the criterion of
naming: as we know already, they are named by fixed definite
descriptions expressing their function or position in the
strict hierarchy of both institutions: *the director* (in the
Bank) - *the Bureau director* (in the Court). The semantic sig-
nificance of this mode of naming is reinforced by a lack of
proper names with respect to this set of agents. They are
"professionals", not "individuals". It seems to me, however,
that at a deeper level, there is a special motivation for
withholding the proper name in the case of the Court's offi-
cials. The reason is suggested by Titorelli, a very important
"informer" about the workings of the Court. When Josef K.
asks Titorelli about the name of the judge who is being por-
trayed by the painter, Titorelli replies: "Das darf ich nicht
sagen." (108) ("I am not allowed to tell you"). This answer
indicates that the proper names of the Court's officials are
tabu. This tabu-like prohibition of proper names is consist-

ent with the overall intensional character of the Court in
The Trial: The Court is an alien, separate, unknown and in-
accessible *invisible* world[20].

A minor point should bring us back to the protagonist.
His central position in the "private" group has been em-
phasized. However, Josef K. is exclusive in yet another re-
spect: in the accumulation of names which are assigned to
him. Josef K. is an individual who faces his tragic fate a-
lone. At the same time, however, he is a part of the social
machinery represented by the institutions. Correspondingly,
he is assigned "institutionalized" names in the form of
fixed descriptions, being *"Herr Prokurist"* (Herr Assessor)
in the system of the Bank and *"der Angeklagte"* (the defend-
ant) in the domain of the Court. In such a way, the one-mem-
ber set represented by *Josef K.* is the intersection of all
three fundamental sets of agents who comprise the domain of
The Trial: the "private" group, the Bank and the Court. The
pivotal position of the tragic hero could not be highlighted
in a more emphatic way.

3.   While the features of the intensional structure of *The
Trial*, just discussed, seem to me quite clearly established,
the third feature is controversial. I want to propose it as
an hypothesis arising from a thorough examination of the
texture of Kafka's novel. In order to become more convincing,
the hypothesis requires further evidence.

It is striking that the two men who appear in the last
chapter of *The Trial* in order to kill Josef K. are not named
in accordance with the intensional function controlling the
assignment of names in this novel. If the intensional func-
tion were applied in this case, the men, as representatives
of the Court, would be assigned (perhaps after a stage of
instability) a fixed definite description corresponding to
their professional function. If the Court has its *judges,*
magistrates, whippers, etc., it could be expected to have its
well-appointed and appropriately named *executioners*. However,

the naming of the two gentlemen remains in the vague mode of
the unstable definite descriptions: in the narrator's text,
they are called *zwei Herren* (two gentlemen), *die Herren* (the
gentlemen) and *seine Begleiter* (his companions); in K.'s in-
ner monologue, they are *"alte untergeordnete Schauspieler"*
(old, minor actors) and *vielleicht...Tenöre* (maybe...tenors).
(K. even asks one of them in which theater they perform).

   This absence of the expected mode of naming would not be
striking, if it was clearly established in the text that the
gentlemen are representatives of the Court. However, unlike
the wardens of chapter I, they do not claim to act according
to a commission (*Auftrag*); they make a silent sign in answer
to K.'s rather indefinite question (162). In other words, the
association of these agents with the Court is expressed nei-
ther explicitly, nor by the intensional mark of the name. It
is obvious that the identity of K.'s executioners is uncer-
tain. Should we assume then that they are not at all connected
with the Court? Should we interpret K.'s execution as an event
which was not "ordered" by the Court? A positive answer to
these questions would bring a new dimension into the semantic
interpretation of *The Trial*. If K.'s execution cannot be
traced to the Court, then it is an absolutely random event
coming from a different, unknown realm. Such a twist in the
semantic structure of the story would indicate that Kafka
wrote not only *The Trial*, but also, in the last chapter, a
parody of his own novel, specifically, a parody of the rules
governing its semantic structure. We know that the Court's
proceedings and activities are purely random and arbitrary;
consequently, any random and arbitrary event, if its origin
is not specified, can be interpreted as originating from the
authority of the Court. Because the Court initiates random
and arbitrary events, any random and arbitrary event of un-
certain origin can be "blamed" on the Court, can be inte-
grated into the chain of the Court's proceedings. With re-
spect to the final act of *The Trial*, such an integration has

been, as a rule, performed by readers and critics. Our minute
analysis of modes of naming in the novel suggests that this
interpretation is far from self-evident.   .

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     Contemporary literary criticism looks more and more like
an isolated island of dilettantism in the ocean of theoreti-
cally and methodologically advanced anthropological and so-
cial sciences. The most obvious consequence of the human-
istic preference for speculation, which prevails in literary
studies, is the contemptuous attitude towards the literary
text. Unable to develop reliable methods for the study of
text structuring, literary criticism has abandoned its prop-
er subject and has resorted to guesses about authorial inten-
tions and readers' concretizations[21]. Although these escape
manoeuvres are often masked by complicated "theories", they
are nothing else than symptoms of the persistent theoretical
and methodological feebleness of literary criticism.

     Literary texts are complex semiotic objects and, as such,
require the development of ingenious methods of investigation.
Among the difficult tasks facing literary theory, the prob-
lem of intensional meaning is probably the most difficult. In
view of our claim that intensions are crucial components of
literary meanings, the progress of literary semantics de-
pends on the development of reliable methods for the study of
intensions. Our suggestion to link intensional semantics with
the traditional concerns of stylistics might be a step on the
long road towards a theoretically sound and empirically
fruitful intensional semantics of literature.

Notes

[1] The concept of style has not been accepted as a central
concept of literary theory. Most students of literature
have treated style as a peripheral, almost accidental
property of literary works. In the realm of linguistics,
stylistics has not fared much better than in the empire
of literary criticism. While many fundamental aspects of
language, such as suprasyntactic structures, "deviant"
syntax and semantics, pragmatic aspects, etc., have been
discussed under the label of (linguo-)stylistics, the
discipline has not been recognized as a necessary compo-
nent of a linguistic theory. Rather, it has been the play-
ground of linguistists who, dissatisfied with the rigidity
and inflexibility of popular linguistic models, have been
trying to cope with the irregular, idiosyncratic, "messy"
aspects of verbal communication. When, finally, the emerg-
ing text theory pushed some of the traditional concerns of
stylistics into the center of theoretical attention, it
failed to acknowledge the merits and results of its prede-
cessor. The study of style has not been recognized as one
of the most fundamental tasks of text theory.

[2] For Students of style, this definition will be neither too
striking, nor very original. Havranek has already defined
style as "the singularized organization of a discourse in
its totality" (Havranek, 1963, 64; the quoted paper was
originally published in 1942).

[3] These similarities will be explored in more detail in
Dolezel, forthcoming.

[4] Only in view of this interpretation can we understand why
the two sentences of geometry, quoted by Frege, have dif-

ferent intensional meanings. In the rich literature of
Frege's interpreters,Walker has come closest to formulat-
ing this character of intensional meaning: "Nothing pre-
vents one and the same object from being signified by sev-
eral different signs. Although the use of different signs
is sometimes arbitrary and therefore superfluous, it is
sometimes the case that the difference between the signs
goes with a difference between the ways each sign presents
the object in question, the *Darstellungsweise"* (Walker,
1965, 75).

[5] The classical formulation of the "heresy of paraphrase" is
to be found in Brooks, 1947.

[6] A study of intensions in terms of "inner form" of expres-
sions will connect intensional semantics with another major
representative of the Prague school, V. Mathesius (see,
Mathesius, 1947).

[7] The assumption that literary texts *construct* their own
worlds of reference is one of the axioms of structural po-
etics; both theoretically, and methodologically it is much
more stimulating than the traditional axiom of "mimesis".
For a preliminary demonstration of certain procedures of
world construction, see Doleẑel, 1980.

[8] In a less technical discourse, we could simply say that one
and the same world can be rendered or verbalized in a varie-
ty of world "pictures".

[9] The most comprehensive account of the present state of nar-
rative semantics can be found in Woods-Pavel, eds.,1979;
cf. also Csuri, ed., 1980.

[10] The theory was proposed and developed in Kripke, 1972 and
1980. Kripke's thesis that proper names lack Fregean sense

(intension) is a necessary corollary of his assumption
that intensions should be described in terms of possible-
-world semantics. I share Linsky's view that this thesis
is "incorrect" (Linsky, 1977, 69 ff.). However, even the
acceptance of Kripke's view on this matter would not in-
validate our main thesis: proper names having "zero" sense
would still differ from definite descriptions which carry
sense.

[11] The concept of style as a regulated selection of alterna-
tives has deep roots in stylistics. cf. Dolezel, 1969.

[12] In the framework of logical semantics, the idea that "every
singular term is either a personal proper name or a defi-
nite description" has been criticized by Linsky (op. cit.,
69). Linsky assumes that "there are many kinds of singular
terms which fit neither of these two categories", without
proposing any kind of categorization. I prefer deriving
the "many kinds of singular terms" by subcategorizing the
two basic kinds.

[13] For a thorough and relatively recent survey of Kafka crit-
icism, see Beicken, 1974.

[14] I am using the Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag edition of *Der
Prozess* (Frankfurt/M., 1960). The English translation by
Willa and Edwin Muir (Penguin Books, 1976) has been con-
sulted, but not necessarily followed.

[15] It is a minor point that the abbreviation is applied also
to Josef K.'s uncle. The usage is clearly motivated by the
need to protect the hero's mode of naming.

[16] It is important to note that the fixed definite descrip-
tion is used in all respects as a proper name. Most sig-
nificantly, the agent is identified by it in the ritual of
introduction (55, 78).

[17] The abbreviation has been treated as a sort of "inner form" and, as such, has been discussed in Kafka criticism. The question whether it does or does not stand for the name of the author has received most of the attention (cf. Jaffe, 1967, 13, 16 f.).

[18] This isolating semantic effect would become even more obvious if Kafka's intensional system was compared with other systems using abbreviations as names for agents. Zamjatin's novel *My* (We) represents a clear contrast to Kafka's system: While in *The Trial* the abbreviation serves as an intensional mark of the exceptionality of the hero, in Zamjatin's science-fiction novel, the names-abbreviations (given in the form of a combination of letters and numbers) mark the agents as belonging to a "faceless" mass; all the agents of the novel (with the exception of the Benefactor) bear this name, thus forming a large intensionally defined class. Deprived of proper names, they are deprived of their individual identity. The Benefactor stands out in a one-member class, singled out by the fixed definite description. What we have here is a clear reversal of Kafka's intensional structuring with the preservation of its basic components.

[19] The fact that Josef K. (as well as K. from *The Castle*) has sexual relations with women of low status has been commonly known in Kafka criticism (cf. Jaffe, op. cit., 94).

[20] For a definition of the concept "invisible world" see Dolezel, 1979.

[21] While these problems connot be resolved by abstract speculation, they are legitimate topics of empirical enquiry in the psychology and sociology of literary communication.

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