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# Literary Animal Agents

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Literary Animal  
Agents

SUSAN MCHUGH

LITERARY ANIMAL STUDIES STARTED FOR ME WHEN THE QUESTION OF ANIMAL AGENCY AROSE IN A SURVEY-COURSE DISCUSSION OF A SHORT, forgettable William Wordsworth poem titled “Nutting.” A shy undergraduate, I hesitantly volunteered an interpretation of the text as reflecting the squirrel’s thoughts on the subject of seasonal change.

“That’s insane,” said the truly venerable professor, as the class fell silent. “Animals don’t think, and they certainly don’t write poetry.”

Twenty years or so later, this moment of candor remains stunning, only for different reasons. My reading certainly failed to take into account the poem’s original context, attesting instead to sensibilities peculiar to late-twentieth-century America, where (unlike in Wordsworth’s England) squirrels abounded. But the professor’s rebuke says much more. Animals locate a paradox of disciplinary concern, one that threatens to render literary studies irrelevant to the species discourses permeating other areas of thought and rapidly evolving through forms like genes, genomes, and proteins.

Animals abound in literature across all ages and cultures, but only rarely have they been the focal point of systematic literary study. At once serving as a metaphor for the poetic imagination and voicing the limits of human experience, a figure like Wordsworth’s squirrel gains value as dissembling the human, as at best metaphorically speaking. What matter who’s speaking, someone squirrely says, what matter who’s speaking (to corrupt the Samuel Beckett line made famous by Michel Foucault).<sup>1</sup> These peculiar operations of agency, these ways of inhabiting literature without somehow being represented therein, present tremendous opportunities for recovering and interrogating the material and representational problems specific to animality. But this work also necessarily involves coming to terms with a discipline that appears organized by the studied avoidance of just such questioning.

The textual politics of literary animals thus suggests a thoroughgoing critique attuned to the traces of species, to markings of potentials for different orders of agency beyond the human subject that I

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once naively imagined as figured by Wordsworth's squirrel.<sup>2</sup> Serving as a flash point for the ways in which literature gives voice to all kinds of nonhuman becomings, textual animals locate biopolitical knowledges as following from acts of reading.<sup>3</sup> To elaborate this point, I sketch below a few of the ways in which literary animal studies begins empirically to develop terms, methods, and concepts of species relations in order to intervene productively in a looming crisis of disciplinary ways of knowing. This movement is possible only through the formation of animal studies, an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that coalesces around questions of representation and agency—that is, around the unnatural histories of species.<sup>4</sup>

Moving across disciplines, beyond the domain of science (within which “animal studies” initially signaled a limited, literal distinction from human medical case studies), animal studies researchers are united by a commitment not so much to common methods or politics as to the broader goal of bringing the intellectual histories and values of species under scrutiny.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, scholarship in this area proves especially helpful in highlighting the contact points of aesthetic and ethical systems, and it concerns more than problems with individuals' rights or groups' welfare. Animal knowledges, in the broadest sense, become the stakes of moving from any given perspective or project to animal studies as a discursive formation.<sup>6</sup> This is not to say that knowledges are ends in themselves or that concerns about their accumulation, endangerment, and other operations are exclusive to animals. Rather, species forms, approached as ways of knowing, indicate the limits of comparable human ways of being as well as insist on more open-ended potentials, including how species being works in literary texts as a function of what we think of as their literariness.

Literary history supports my professor's formal lesson: animals emerged as significant figures in English literature only in terms of

metaphor. “A Poet is a nightingale,” proclaims Percy Shelley in his famous 1821 defense of poetry (699), at once citing the most famous animal representation of the Romantic artist's transcendence of human society (John Keats's 1819 poem “Ode to a Nightingale”) and limiting the literary animal's value to a figure for expressing the artist's increasing political alienation.<sup>7</sup> Recent studies of this kind of literary animal challenge its operations but not its underlying value, venturing that among British Romantics metaphoric animals serve literary purposes even as they model ways of thinking outside literary forms—for instance, in medicine and law.<sup>8</sup> Animals, once serving as reference points for the poet-critic as gatekeeper of truth, gain further significance for scholars today interrogating how this kind of cultural work proceeds directly from earlier Enlightenment views that animals teach people (especially on the early modern British stage) how to become human.<sup>9</sup> Although this new consensus insists on the more complex dynamics of reading literary animals as substitutes for human subjects in the making, it also illustrates how the aesthetic structures of metaphor, though precariously supporting the human subject, seem unable to bear animal agency.<sup>10</sup>

By suggesting a different story, or rather by shifting the focus of attention to the ways in which animality permeates literature, my reading of “Nutting,” however inadvertently, brought to class questions that have come to plague not just literary studies but the whole of disciplinary thought. The constitution of the subject, in the broadest sense, was at stake in this discussion, as my professor well knew. An American immigrant, Jewish veteran of the Second World War, and pioneering feminist scholar, my professor had fought on many lines for more rigorous and inclusive responses to the query coming to crisis in the twentieth century: what is the human? From this perspective, metaphor provides a strong defense for poetics in the service of anthropocentrism, for communicating (even becom-

ing a means whereby people can learn how to read) messages about our essential humanity.

“Like fish seen through the plate glass of an aquarium,” says the novelist and cultural critic John Berger in an infamous argument about animals in modernity, animals in this approach to representational mechanisms appear to be eternally “disappearing” or distanced in relation to the human (16, 14).<sup>11</sup> That is, the point of metaphoric and other aesthetics beholden to substitutive logics may be to support human subject forms, but their ongoing reliance on caesura or erasures invokes other potentials as perpetually deferred. Positing this inhuman-human division as a productive and never absolute intervention, some philosophers have begun to call attention to how species divide only through fluctuating convergences of representational forms.<sup>12</sup> More to the point of this essay, the perforation of species boundaries—proliferating today, for instance, through genetically modified organisms in agrifood flows—casts literary aesthetics in a pivotal moment in which it has become both difficult to critique anthropocentric models and imperative to elaborate creative new forms of agency.

The problem of animals as written into the metaphysics of speech and subjectivity emerges most clearly through poststructuralist analysis of human animality, and more precisely through the ways in which animal studies gains legitimacy in literary circles with Jacques Derrida’s movement toward questions about the subject’s inscription in the erasure of animal traces. Derrida rejects “the distinction between animal and human language” as obfuscating: “The treatment of animality, as of everything that finds itself in submission by virtue of a hierarchical opposition, has always, in the history of (humanist and phallogocentric) metaphysics, revealed obscurantist resistance” (*Post Card* 474n). In his final series of lectures on the subject, he locates the potential for countering this resistance in companion animal bodies—specifically, in his

pet cat’s possession of a “point of view regarding me” (*Animal* 11). So often applied now to examples in the existing canon, this formulation of nonhuman traces as deconstructing human attempts at self-representation elaborates the logic of substitution through which the animal’s sacrifice (i.e., its real and representational consumption) supports the human. But it creates more problems than it resolves for literary animal agents.

Intriguing in hindsight as a striking absence in the identity debates, animality gains intellectual appeal for some literary critics as a repressed deconstructive element, a marker of difference internalized in human species being.<sup>13</sup> This implies that animal subjectivity remains significant only as an essentially negative force against which the human is asserted—hence the appeal of metaphoric animals. But the formal implications of Darwin’s theory of the mutability of species for human animality trace a more specific historical trajectory in Margot Norris’s account of why modernist writers and artists explicitly rejected metaphor in favor of the more plastic structures of narrative and visual media in their experiments with antirepresentational forms that critique anthropocentric aesthetics more coherently than they express human animality.<sup>14</sup> While an important area of critique, and one that clarifies how these internal breakdowns of the humanist subject render animal subjectivity all the more impossible,<sup>15</sup> Derridean deconstruction remains circumscribed by the disciplinary structures of the human subject, illustrative of yet unable to account for the textual significance of animality.<sup>16</sup>

Even by the time of my fateful class, researchers had begun this theoretical work around at least three interrelated imperatives for animal studies, with direct implications for literary critique. First, conceptualize agency as more than simply a property of the human subject form. Second, recover the spectrum of agency forms represented in a variety of cultural traditions albeit subordinated in

Western humanism, perhaps most obviously in the literary history of canon formation. The third impulse complemented this historical work: connect the representational forms and material conditions of species life, which entails learning from these failures to explain the agency of literary animals, respecting that they cannot finally be enlisted in the tasks set for them by literary representation.

With special attention to some overlooked leaders in these areas, I conclude here by tracing these developments in order to illustrate not just the magnitude of the work that remains but also its postdisciplinary future in the twenty-first century.

Although no one to date seriously argues that squirrels write poetry, animals are being reconceptualized as active participants in all sorts of cultural production, and that participation has material and methodological consequences for literary scholarship. Analysis of the varied involvements of animals in the production of disciplinary and other knowledges, often inspired by Donna Haraway's account of animals as significant others in science studies,<sup>17</sup> sparks all sorts of claims about nonhuman markings in and ruminations of texts. Authors' household pet-keeping histories, agricultural employment, blood-sport hobbies, and other participations in cultural traditions centered on animals subsequently gain new interest and bolster speculation about the relation of biographical details to creative responsibility in representing animals.<sup>18</sup> Historically remote and poorly documented accounts make it difficult to determine particular animals' influences on literary representation. Particularly controversial animal practices, or the systematic integration of animals in cultural productions of and against human subjects,<sup>19</sup> arguably present an even greater challenge as sources of affect in the politics of knowledge.

Messy entanglements of human and animal agents become sedimented even in cultural practices without immediate ties to animals (e.g., the French colonial usage

of *animalicide* to mean killing a "native"), compromising the claims of scholars charged with proanimal sympathies that literary representations distort or oppress animal subjectivity.<sup>20</sup> Positing animals as mechanisms of transcendence, whether through foundational human knowledges<sup>21</sup> or prediscursive fellow feeling for other species,<sup>22</sup> only exacerbates this problem. Whatever the motive, such approaches to species risk a dangerous endgame for animal agency, one that brings animals into conversation only by emptying out the textual operations of species being and species becoming—the problems of which, again, work in literary texts as a function of their literariness—not to mention the embodiments in space and time that animal studies scholarship seeks to pinpoint.

In this way, the operations of human/animal relations localized through textual production lead along a second track to interrogation of the convergences of agency forms and values. Now that chimeric pet clones are being produced on demand, the plasticity of certain species forms can be taken for granted, and their production is further mystified. Reading such domesticates historically, as members of species adapted to flourish alongside humans, reinscribes them together with us in collaborative cross-species productions that in turn command representational transformations as well. Published a few years before my "Nutting" lesson, Harriet Ritvo's history of animals in Victorian England provides an early example of how to analyze animals as bearers of meaning and catalysts of social change. As metaphors, Ritvo argues, animals like the show dog stand for their nonelite owners' aristocratic pretensions, and breeding such an animal furthers social mobility.<sup>23</sup> Ranged alongside metonymic possibilities, the prizing of metaphoric relations in literature begins to make sense as part of a representational continuum that becomes more compelling and confusing as it strikes closer to home.

Poststructuralist aesthetic accounts of contemporary animal representation highlight the ways in which the mechanisms of representation confront the singularity or closure of meaning with forms that build in gaps, fissures, or ruptures. Contrived metaphoric breakdowns and other ostentatiously mismanaged animal representations invite critique as unequivocal formal failures, only to prompt queries about (and make efforts to respond to) the inadequacies or shortcomings built into representational processes concerning animals.<sup>24</sup> Viewed thus, early post-Darwinian experiments with voicing human animality might be said to continue through literary animal narratives that break signifying chains in ways that foreground—even at times redress<sup>25</sup>—the historic paradox of the animal agent as subsumed by literary forms.

Particularly when framed in film and new media, animal acts signal ruptures to identity forms, in relation to anthropomorphizing traditions that empty out the animal content and to other patterns against which writers have struggled to represent animals as nonhuman social agents.<sup>26</sup> Informed by Haraway's and others' theories of human and nonhuman agency as coconstitutive, studies that take a longer historical view akin to Ritvo's further illuminate the unsettling ways in which animal representations pry apart forms of agency and the human subject.<sup>27</sup> The focus on embodiment, surfaces, and exteriority in filmed and other representations of live animals perhaps most clearly distinguishes animals as agents of an order different from that of human subjectivity—more precisely, as actors operating in accordance with a logic different from that of intentionality or psychological interiority.<sup>28</sup> That these concerns about animal agency appear to arise most comprehensively in response to modern urban conditions clarifies further that animal agency can never simply oppose human identity, that animal agents are never separable from human presences.

What is more, this dovetailing of aesthetic materiality and social viability follows

from the reframing of community in terms of mixed species. The foremost model of such reframing remains Mary Midgley's philosophical account of human sociality as premised not on domestication (conceived as absolute domination) but rather on people's interactions with members of other species who also happen to be social.<sup>29</sup> Literary narrative can broker these transactions between forms of species and social agency, as is illustrated by Vicki Hearne's attempts, in both poetry (*In the Absence*) and prose (*Adam's Task*), to represent the responsiveness required of such relations as experienced through her training relationships with dogs and horses. At every turn emphasizing "the sketchiness of the tokens of English" and more generally the instructive inadequacies of linguistic representation (*Animal Happiness* 71), these early efforts in animal studies underscore the difference that makes a difference in what Haraway more recently terms companion-species relationships.<sup>30</sup> A poet-critic in the tradition of Shelley, Hearne also implicates literature as an ambivalent humanistic endeavor employed in the brutal management strategies of "animalcultures,"<sup>31</sup> a charge to which literary critics have only begun to respond.

Returning to my literary animal education, I suggest that the more important lesson for future research lies in a growing responsibility to relate critical practice to the (inter-)disciplinary consequences of taking literary animals seriously. As literature becomes one of many locations for negotiating the representational problems of animals, forcing new questions about how literary histories bind animals that have linguistic forms (like metaphoric chains of substitution) to the terms of human individuals, literary studies has a greater opportunity to intervene in the problems of species' mutating through xenotransplantation, genetic modification, and cloning, which appear to be changing the terms of life itself. By furthering the investigation into new and old means of representing animals, literary

animal studies can contribute to a broader understanding of porous species forms and can help model knowledges and responsibilities attendant to life in the twenty-first century. But this work will happen only if scholars forgo the politics and privileges of knowledges conceived in exclusively disciplinary terms.

It is well worth questioning what we humans can ever know about other species. But my sketch of the history of literary animal agents shows how such self-questioning all too often comes at the expense of moving from studying animals with any established methodology or preset value system to imagining ourselves working in (or even against) a newly formulated discursive field that brings together complex and different constructions of and methods for studying animals and studying with them. To varying degrees, the analyses of animals in literary form, whether metaphoric, sentimental, or antirepresentational, that have emerged in recent years undermine commitment to disciplinary ways of knowing even as they offer the best argument for the relevance of literature and its institutions to the impending posthumanistic conditions of species.

## NOTES

My deepest gratitude goes to Richard Dienst and Catherine Frank for their help with this essay.

1. Beckett's text reads, "What matter who's speaking, someone said, what matter who's speaking" (85), and Foucault uses it to open out structuralist questions of the self-referentiality of writing, which "has freed itself from the necessity of 'expression'" to become what in today's terms seems the autopoiesis of language itself ("What" 1623).

2. I borrow these terms from Jacques Derrida's theory "of the trace, of iterability, of *différance*" as "possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no language" and which "*are themselves not only human*" ("Eating" 116).

3. Clarifying how the formation of individual human subjects is not natural or incidental but purposeful, Foucault analyzes the (human) subject as produced as social agent (through "anatomy-politics" or disciplinary regimes of the individual) not in a vacuum but in relation to a dy-

namic of biopower, in which alternative forms of human and other species relations take shape through the "biopolitics" of irreducible populations (*Introduction* 147).

4. Nigel Rothfels makes the point that the identification of animals with natural history (situating them in their "native haunts") overshadows study of their roles in cultural histories—their positioning in "such human environments as museums, books, circuses, and zoos" (6).

5. The Animal Studies Group's volume *Killing Animals* provides an exemplary and compelling case that this commitment is a necessary condition for the development of animal studies "as an autonomous and substantive field" (Preface viii).

6. Although "discursive formation" is Foucault's term, here I more directly borrow Stuart Hall's argument about the formation of cultural studies to elaborate what I have witnessed in the rise of animal studies—namely, that its conflicted origins, histories, materializations, and discourses converge decisively if unstably in "a common disposition of energy and direction" (Raymond Williams, qtd. in Hall 1899), which for Hall stays relevant only through a productive tension between "simply pluralist" (anything-goes) and singular (dogmatic) politics.

7. Anticipating how this image troubles the representational narrative of literary history itself once the poet as Romantic animal comes under scrutiny, Raymond Williams relates its historical significance for poets inhabiting the margins ("darkness" and "solitude") of the culture, to which Shelley argues that they are central. For Williams, Shelley thus voices the "felt helplessness of a generation" in which "the free play of genius found it increasingly difficult to consort with the free play of the market" and whose "difficulty was not solved, but cushioned, by an idealization" (47).

8. Christine Kenyon-Jones makes this argument explicitly about Wordsworth's contemporary Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "metaphorical self-identifications . . . with . . . especially birds" (66).

9. Demonstrating that this point becomes more complex in the multilayered contexts of animal performance on the early modern English stage, Erica Fudge shows how for theatergoers (who were also likely baiting fans) "watching confirms the status of humans as animals" when the theatergoers identify with a character like Ben Jonson's Volpone. But when they read him correctly as a symbol, they are "made truly human by humanism" (*Perceiving* 87). Fudge's more recent, extensive contextualization of humanist ideologies arising in this period demonstrates how modern criticism oversimplifies them "by ignoring the presence of animals or by ceasing to interpret the animals as animals" (*Brutal Reasoning* 176).

10. Indicating how narrative structures further destabilize these processes, Ivan Kreilkamp aligns animals' emergence "as semi-humans in the realm of culture and as semi-characters in the realm of literature" to explain how Victorians in fiction voice an increasing awareness of

their own precariousness as subjects through often horrified (even horrifying) identifications with animals (82).

11. I am paraphrasing Berger's argument about how perceptions of the animal who has "disappeared" or who is otherwise "rendered marginal" in modern industrial conditions reify dynamic processes whereby animals continue "becoming synonymous" with the human, "fading away" (22) in an indefinitely eroding or receding process.

12. Giorgio Agamben reframes the "intimate caesura" of the inhuman-human, from which "man" emerges as both place and product of place-holding operations (15). For Agamben, "concentration and extermination camps" emerge not in the conventional terms of man's dehumanization of others but rather as "an extreme and monstrous experiment" proceeding from the divisions "between the human and the inhuman, which has ended up dragging the very possibility of the distinction to its ruin" (22).

13. Cary Wolfe, for instance, argues that critical practices that fail to uncouple the discourse of species from speciesism—a systematic discrimination against others based on characteristics said to be nonhuman, which fuel a fundamental repression of concerns about human species identity—perpetuate even as they purport to break with humanist epistemologies. His argument is informed, he says, by Derrida's later discussion of "the asymmetrical material effects of these [species] discourses on particular social groups" (6).

14. Norris argues that the "biocentric" tradition of representing human animality ended in failure, but points to the exceptional case of Franz Kafka's animal narratives, which cast this dynamic in terms of a narration or tentative narrative logic of animal being that "retracts itself" (65)—elsewhere "a negative side of narration . . . a phantom narration, a trace" (133)—that hangs in the balance of the "tale-spinning" of narratives of species life, including human animality (131).

15. Arguing that animals are literally reduced to shadow forms in cinematic images, Akira Mizuta Lippit sees a history of this dynamic in "the simultaneous culmination and beginning of an evolutionary cycle: the narrative of the disappearance of animals and that of the rise of the technical media intersect[ing] in the cinema" (197).

16. In Lippit's reading of Derrida, "the sacrificial cut that implements subjectivity" positions animality as a tool "lacerat[ing]," not neatly edging, "the discourse of the subject" (16). The significance of multiplicity to this model emerges only through his discussion of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's taking "the logic of becoming from Darwinian and Bergsonian evolution" as a force complementary, and to them superior, to being (131). Lippit thus tacitly affirms the Deleuzian assumption guiding my own analysis here that animality permeates language, literature, and everything as a line of flight or potential for becomings.

17. Haraway's assertion that "animals are active participants in the constitution of what may count as scientific knowledge" (*Primate Visions* 310) is most often cited as a more precise and relevant argument that follows from

Bruno Latour's critique of the contexts in which modern scientists lay singular claim to scientific agency. Haraway's animal model anticipates the importance, underscored in her later work, of the slippage between "the apparatus of bodily [and] . . . literary production" (418n8).

18. Documenting these sorts of connections in canonical nineteenth-century fiction, Jennifer Mason cites Haraway to argue for the significance of "actual, animate nonhuman bodies that circulate in and co-create this thing we call culture" (22).

19. Glen Elder, Jennifer Wolch, and Jody Emel elaborate, "Norms of legitimate animal practices are neither consistent nor universal." This lack, along with the potential of these norms for inspiring volatile, emotional responses, makes them powerful "tools of a cultural imperialism designed to delegitimize [the] subjectivity" of subaltern peoples (73) and, I would add, of animals.

20. Georges Bensoussan clarifies that around 1903 the "murder of an indigenous [in this case, African] person was called animalicide" (112). I thank Anouar Majid for this reference and translation. Julie Smith describes more polemically her own "'pro-animal view' that maintain[s] that animals are knowable as opposed to a 'pro-use' view that [holds] that animals can never be more than what we construct them to be" to clarify her distress that the empirical emphasis on representation in animal studies defers political commitment (295).

21. Distinguishing her literary and cultural analysis of dog texts from what she sees as more conventional animal studies approaches, Alice Kuzniar claims her interest is not in "an expansion of an academic, historical approach to the social function of the pet but [rather in] . . . the affective, immediate ties between man and the four-footed," especially the "sadness" of the "repressed" pet that in her analysis appears fundamentally unaltered, at least since the Renaissance (3).

22. Crafting an explicitly animal-rights-based model, John Simons rejects poststructuralist theory in favor of "feeling" (or "an emotional response to texts") that he acknowledges "has not been at the center of the critical enterprise for a very long time" (70).

23. Ritvo writes, "If keeping a well-bred dog metonymically allied its owner with the upper ranges of society, then the elaborate structure of pedigree registration and show judging metaphorically equated owner with elite pet" (93).

24. Steve Baker elaborates this aesthetic in terms of "botched taxidermy," in which the "botchedness or gone-wrongedness" in contemporary fine-art images of animals does not signal artistic failure so much as a more complicated set of engagements with animal form, each of which is "deliberate, and has its own integrity" (156).

25. Regarding the deliberate incoherence of contemporary experimental narrative, Robert McKay explores how the expectation that these representations bear meaning becomes problematized in an experimental literary intertext that casts the fictional domesticated



animal as a site of neither consumption nor projection but the production of “new corrupted meanings” (167).

26. Philip Armstrong clarifies the latter in terms of authors’ attempts “to find ways of describing agency at work through the interactions of a complex and widely-dispersed network of actants, both human and other-than-human” (196).

27. As the geographers Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert characterize them, “the practices that are folded into the making of representations” inscribe more options for non-human participation in representational processes than just serving as empty vessels to fill with human meanings, including the possibility that animals actively “destabilize, transgress or even resist our human orderings” (5).

28. Noting the abundance of “rhetorical animals on screen,” Jonathan Burt argues that “much of the power of the film animal” stems from the formal interplay of agency underpinning human/animal relations in these contexts, “regardless of the nature of animal interiority, subjectivity, or communication” (31).

29. As Midgley puts it, animals became tame “not only because the people taming them were social beings, but because they themselves were so as well” (112).

30. In *The Companion Species Manifesto*, Haraway claims that *companion species* signifies first and foremost multiplicity, a “bestiary of agencies, kinds of relations, and scores of time”: “There cannot be just one companion species; there have to be at least two to make one” (6, 10). More precisely contrasting this “less shapely and more rambunctious” phrase with *companion animal* in *When Species Meet* (16), she explains further that the Latin derivation of *companion* from *cum panis*, or “with bread,” figuratively converges with *species*, which biologically designates “the dance linking kin and kind,” to figure humans and animals together as “messmates” and “comrades” (17).

31. Noting that human/animal contacts today overwhelmingly involve farmed animals, Una Chaudhuri qualifies the “self-identification as animal lovers that we perform every day” as “part of a paper-thin but rock-hard veneer on an animalculture [a neologism derived from Haraway’s *natureculture*, in turn a derivation of *technoculture*] of staggering violence and exploitation” (10).

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