



## The Japanese Sentence-Final Particle No and Mirativity

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In this sense, the study on mirativity in Japanese is in an early phase of development, and thus further investigations are required to fully understand the Japanese mirative system. Hoping to explore and develop this immature field, I will demonstrate that the sentence-final particle *no*, as in (2) and (3), falls under the category of mirativity.<sup>3</sup> *No* is grammatically a nominalizer. A clause nominalized by *no* is presented as unexpected information.

- (2) Koko-ni ita n da. (n is a phonological variant of *no*)  
 here-Dat be Mir Cop  
 ‘That is where you are.’
- (3) [The speaker came back to his house, and found the rooms ransacked.]  
 Doroboo-ga haitta n da.  
 theft-Nom enter.Past Mir Cop  
 ‘Someone must have broken into my house.’

The sentence in (2) can be uttered in a context in which the speaker found the hearer in an unexpected place, and hence implies his surprise. Without *no* (and the following copula verb *da*, which cannot immediately follow verbs), the sentence (i.e., *Koko-ni ita*.) merely expresses the speaker’s discovery of the hearer, and no longer indicates the speaker’s unexpectedness (cf. Inoue (2001:144-145)).<sup>4</sup> In (3),

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unexpectedness of the statement by a third person.

- (i) [The speaker and the hearer are talking about a woman.  
 “Watasi, kekkon suru wa” datte! (Sinji-rare-nai yo.)  
 I marriage do Feminine-marker Mir believe-be able to-not SFP  
 ‘[A woman said] “I am getting married.” (I can’t believe it.)’

*Datte* in (i) is used to quote the statement made by a woman, signaling that the speaker finds the woman’s marriage unexpected. It is, however, the accepted view that mirativity “makes no claims about the source of information, [and] can occur with first-hand observation, inference, or hearsay” (Watters (2002:300)). We must thus contemplate that *datte* is, by nature, a mirative expression. In fact, reported evidentials in some languages are used as a mirative strategy; they receive mirative interpretation in some context (cf. Aikhenvald (2004)). This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. I will leave it for future research.

<sup>3</sup> I found, through the internet, the paper entitled “Evidentiality and Mirativity on Sentence-Final Predicates in Japanese and Korean: A Particular Attention to ‘Kes-ita’ and ‘Noda’” (인문연구 66, pp. 27-48 (2012)) written by 김정민 (the original title is in Korean). The paper is written in Korean, with which I am not familiar. However, fortunately, English abstract is available on the website <http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE02076028>. According to the abstract, the paper assumes that the nominalizer *no* encodes an inferential evidential, and is extended to the mirativity; namely, *no* can be used as a mirative strategy. On the other hand, I propose that *no* is, by nature, a mirative marker, and should not be considered an evidential (see section 2); the inferential interpretation is not related to its meaning, because mirativity is ignorance of the source of information (see the discussion below).

<sup>4</sup> Following Inoue’s (2001) analysis, the sentence *Koko-ni ita* implies that the speaker has

the speaker infers from the situation he sees in front of him that someone broke into his house. The information inferred is readily associated with the notion unexpectedness because it implies that the speaker had not known it before the inference took place (cf. DeLancey (2001)); in other words, the information has not been integrated into the speaker's knowledge. The information in (3) can actually be interpreted as unexpected information to the speaker: he has not expected that someone broke into his house. Without *no*, the speaker merely makes an assertive, or exclamatory, statement about the relevant event.

“The concept of ‘mirativity’ is a relatively recent arrival on the typological scene” (Aikhenvald (2012:435)), and thus it has yet to be fully understood. In fact, there still remain controversial issues such as what semantic range mirativity covers, and whether it is an independent category from others like evidentiality (see Aikhenvald (2012) for detailed discussion). Discussions on the sentence-final particle *no* will contribute to deepening the understanding of this immature concept in several respects. For instance, mirativity is generally defined in terms of the speaker's unexpectedness (cf. DeLancey (1997), Aikhenvald (2004)). However, Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012) propose that mirativity is also related to unexpectedness to the hearer (see also Aikhenvald (2012)). The following sentence lends support to their proposal:

- (4) Kyoo-wa yasumi masu. Kaze-o hiita n desu.  
 today-Top be absent from Pol cold-Acc caught Mir Cop.Pol  
 ‘I will not go (to school). I’ve caught a cold.’

The sentence-final particle *no* has been traditionally regarded as an explanation marker (cf. Alfonso (1966), Kuno (1973)). Here, the sentence with *no* provides an explanation for why he will be absent (from, say, school). Notice that the information conveyed has already been established to the speaker and thus it is not unexpected to him; rather, the speaker intends to convey unexpected information to the hearer. The observation in (4) leads us to conclude that, as Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012) point out, mirativity can be concerned with the hearer's perspective (I will discuss sentences like in (4) in more detail later). Other aspects of *no* which I will make clear in the following sections will also make it possible to promote better understanding of mirativity.

The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews Aoki's (1986) proposal that the sentence-final particle *no* is an evidential marker and argues that in describing its semantic aspect, mirativity is preferable to evidentiality.

Section 3 provides supporting evidence for the proposal that *no* is a mirative marker. Section 4 deals with examples which, at first sight, are counter-examples to the proposal in this paper. However, I will show that they, on the contrary, reflect a certain property of mirativity. Section 5 shows that *no* expresses unexpectedness to the hearer as well as the speaker. Section 6 concludes this paper.

## 2. Previous Studies: Is the Sentence-Final Particle *No* an Evidential Marker?

Before giving supporting evidence for the claim that the sentence-final particle *no* is a mirative marker, I will touch on previous studies which regard it as an evidential one. Evidentiality and mirativity are similar in that they “essentially delineate the speaker’s relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states” (Dickinson (2000:381)). In fact, a number of studies have constantly discussed the conceptual relationship between them (cf. DeLancey (1997, 2001), Lazard (1999), Aikhenvald (2004, 2012)). Although they have conceptual similarities, this section argues that mirativity provides a more reasonable basis for analyzing *no* than evidentiality.

Aoki (1986) claims that *no* is an evidential marker; “[a]n evidential *no*, or more informal *n*, may be used to state that the speaker is convinced that for some reason what is ordinarily directly unknowable is nevertheless true” (Aoki (1986:228); see also Simpson (2003)). For example:<sup>5</sup>

- (5) Kare-wa atui no da.  
 he-Top hot Evid Cop  
 ‘I know that he is hot. It is a fact that he is hot.’ (Aoki (1986:228))

Here, the sentence describes the sensation of a third-party, which is not directly accessible to the speaker. *No* indicates that the speaker judges this inaccessible, or unknowable, information to be true.

Aoki’s proposal, however, is highly controversial because of the vagueness of the notion evidentiality. Evidentiality can be conceptually divided into at least two types: the evidentiality in the broad sense and that in the narrow sense (Willett (1988)). The former is concerned with the speaker’s epistemological attitude toward his knowledge of a situation as well as the source of information, and the latter with only the source of information. If we define evidentiality in the narrow sense, *no* cannot be considered to be an evidential because “[t]his morpheme can be interpreted as referring to validation of information rather than the way it was obtained” (Aikhenvald (2004:81)). We thus should be careful in analyzing *no* in

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<sup>5</sup> Here, I use Evid as a gloss of *no* instead of Mir.

terms of evidentiality.

In addition, it should be noted that Aoki considers the information conveyed by the sentence with *no* to be “ordinarily directly unknowable” (see also Kamio (1997:65)). His description implies the possibility that *no* falls under the class of mirativity rather than that of evidentiality because “unknowable” is conceptually similar to “unexpected” in that they imply that the information in question has not been integrated into the speaker’s (or the hearer’s) knowledge. So, I assume that in order to deepen the understanding of *no*, mirativity is more conceptually suitable than evidentiality.

Furthermore, the following sentences lead us to consider *no* a mirative marker:

- (6) Koko-ni ita n da. *direct perception*  
 here-Dat be Mir Cop  
 ‘That is where you are.’ (= (2))
- (7) [The speaker came back to his house, and found the rooms ransacked.]  
 Doroboo-ga haitta n da. *inference*  
 theft-Nom enter.Past Mir Cop  
 ‘Someone must have broken into my house.’ (= (3))
- (8) A: Watasi, kekkon simasu.  
 I marriage do.Pol  
 ‘I’m getting married.’  
 B: E!? Kekkō suru no? *hearsay*  
 what marriage do Mir  
 ‘What!? Are you getting married?’

Generally speaking, unlike evidentiality, mirativity “makes no claims about the source of information, [and] can occur with first-hand observation, inference, or hearsay” (Watters (2002:300)). The sentence-final particle *no* follows this general tendency of mirativity. In (6), the sentence conveys that the information is acquired through the visual sense. In (7), the speaker infers from the situation he sees in front of him that someone broke into his house. In (8), speaker B expresses his surprise at what speaker A has just said. These examples suggest that as with mirative markers found in other languages, *no* is not subject to the source of information. It is thus reasonable to consider that *no* is subsumed under the mirative category, rather than the evidential one.

### 3. Proposal

As mentioned in section 1, I would like to propose that the sentence-final particle *no* is a mirative marker. In what follows, I will provide supporting evidence for this claim.

#### 3.1. Incompatibility with Adverbs Denoting Expectation

The oddity of the following examples suggests that the speaker's sense of unexpectedness must be involved in *no*:<sup>6</sup>

- (9) \*Omottatoori, ippai iru n da.  
 as is expected many be Mir Cop  
 'As is expected, there are many people here.'  
 (Noda (1997:87), with modifications)
- (10) \*Sasuga, kyaputen na n da.  
 as is to be expected captain Cop Mir Cop  
 'As is to be expected, you are a captain (of our team).'

The adverb *omottatoori* indicates that the event in question is expected to happen; in (9), the speaker expects that a number of people are in the place in question. *Sasuga* introduces information which has been expected to be true (cf. Morita (1989)); in (10), the speaker re-realizes that, as he has expected, the person in question deserves the captain of, say, a baseball team due to his outstanding play. As shown in (9) and (10), these adverbs are incompatible with *no*. In fact, the sentences become acceptable if they are omitted, as in the following examples:

- (11) Omottatoori, ippai iru. (cf. (9))  
 (12) Sasuga, kyaputen da. (cf. (10))

The incompatibility of *no* with *omottatoori* and *sasuga* suggests the association with unexpectedness.

#### 3.2. Information Known to the Speaker

Tanomura (1990) points out that the following sentence containing *no* sounds unnatural:

- (13) [The speaker failed to make a contract. She speculates on the reason for this failure.]

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<sup>6</sup> Example (10) was pointed out to me by Masatoshi Honda (p.c.).

\*Kitto watasi-ga miseenen na n da.  
 surely I-Nom under age Cop Mir Cop  
 ‘I must be under age.’ (Tanomura (1990:39))

Here, the speaker concludes that she could not make a contract because she is under age. Notice that the information that the speaker is under age is assumed to be evident to the speaker; this information is not unexpected to her. In this case, the sentence containing *no* sounds unnatural. In (13), we must not choose *no*, but must choose the sentence-final particle *kara* ‘because,’ which is not associated with mirativity, as shown in (14).

(14) [The speaker failed to make a contract. She speculates on the reason for this failure.]  
 Kitto watasi-ga miseenen da kara da.  
 surely I-Nom under age Cop because Cop  
 ‘It is because I am under age.’ (Tanomura (1990:39))

Even in the same context as in (13), however, the sentence is acceptable if the information inferred has not been established to the speaker prior to speech time. Let us consider the following example:

(15) [The speaker failed to make a contract. She speculates on the reason for this failure.]  
 Kitto watasi-ga sutureina koto-o itta n da.  
 surly I-Nom rude thing-Acc say.Past Mir Cop  
 ‘I must have said something rude.’

In (15), the speaker is assumed to realize at speech time that she was rude when talking about a contract, and to conclude that her rudeness resulted in the failure of the contract. Thus, the information that the speaker was rude can be regarded as unexpected. In this case, the use of *no* is fully acceptable. The examples given above show that *no* introduces unexpected information.

### 3.3. *The Speaker’s Uncertainty*

As discussed above, the mirative marker *no* is not licensed when the sentence in question describes the event expected by the speaker. Let us first consider the sentence in (16), which we assume has been uttered in the situation where the speaker just put on a heater.



- (16) \*Korede atatakaku naru n daroo.  
 that warm become Mir Mod  
 ‘The room will warm up.’

The speaker put on the heater with the intention of warming up the room; thus, he has expected that the event described in (16) will happen after he puts on the heater. In this situation, the use of *no* degrades the acceptability of the sentence. We should omit *no* from the sentence, as follows:

- (17) Korede atatakaku naru daroo. (cf. (16))

Notice that the sentence in (16) becomes acceptable if the sentence-final particle *ka* is attached at the end of the sentence:

- (18) Korede atatakaku naru n daroo ka.  
 that warm become Mir Mod SFP(uncertainty)  
 ‘I wonder whether the room will warm up.’

*Ka* signals the speaker’s uncertainty (cf. Moriyama (1989), Hirose (1995), Takiura (2008)). Thus in (18), the speaker is uncertain about whether the room will warm up or not; in other words, the speaker does not expect that the heater will warm up the room. Hence the acceptability of the sentence with *no*.

### 3.4. Yes-No Questions

The sentence-final particle *no* can appear in yes-no questions, as exemplified in the following example:

- (19) A: Kyoo-wa yasumimasu.  
 today-Top absent from.Pol  
 ‘I will be absent (from school) today.’  
 B: Karada-no guai demo warui n desu ka?  
 body-Gen feel or something bad Mir Cop.Pol SFP  
 ‘Are you sick or something?’ (Tanomura (1990:63))

Here, speaker B infers that speaker A is sick. Speaker B is assumed not to know speaker A’s illness, so he is using *no* to express unexpectedness. As with declarative sentences with *no* like (13) and (16), yes-no questions with *no* sound unnatural if the information conveyed has already been established to the speaker, as

shown in the following example:

- (20) A: Kyoo-wa yasumimasu.  
 today-Top absent from.Pol  
 ‘I will be absent (from school) today.’  
 B: \*Tenki-ga warui n desu ka?  
 weather-Nom bad Mir Cop.Pol SFP  
 ‘Is the weather bad?’ (Tanomura (1990:63))

Suppose that speakers A and B live in the same town and both know the weather there. In this case, the information on the weather is not unexpected to speaker B, which makes the use of *no* unacceptable.

Furthermore, we can capture the difference between questions with and without *no*. Let us compare the following sentences:

- (21) a. Kinoo eega-e ikimasita ka?  
 yesterday movie-to went.Pol SFP  
 ‘Did you go to a movie yesterday?’  
 b. Kinoo eega-e itta n desu ka?  
 yesterday movie-to went Mir Cop.Pol SFP  
 i. ‘Is it that you went to a movie yesterday?’ [inference]  
 ii. ‘You went to a movie yesterday?’ [echo-question]<sup>7</sup>  
 (McGloin (1980:123), with modifications)

According to McGloin (1980:123), the sentence in (21a) “is a simple, information-seeking question”; the speaker is just seeking the truth value of the proposition. In (21b), on the other hand, “the speaker indicates that he assumes that the listener went to a movie and questions whether his assumption is correct” (McGloin (1980:123)); the speaker infers the propositional content from some contextual hints (e.g., he found a ticket of the movie). In addition, sentence (21b) can also be interpreted as an echo-question (see English translation (ii)) if it is uttered as a reply to utterances like:

- (22) Kinoo eega-e itta yo.  
 yesterday movie-to went SFP(I tell you)  
 ‘I went to a movie yesterday.’

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<sup>7</sup> The interpretation in (ii) is mine.

The difference in interpretation between (21a) and (21b) can be attributed to the mirative meaning of *no*. Because of the use of *no*, the sentence in (21b) receives the interpretation that the information conveyed has not resided in the speaker's knowledge before speech time. So this sentence can be seen as a conclusion of inference or as a repetition of what the hearer has just said (both interpretations imply that the information is obtained at speech time and has not been integrated into the speaker's knowledge). In (21a), on the other hand, the sentence does not linguistically indicate that the information has been absent from the speaker's knowledge, because, unlike in (21b), the mirative marker *no* is not used here. So sentence (21a) is not related to the inferential and echo-question interpretations, merely asking the hearer to specify the truth value of the proposition.

### 3.5. Wh-Questions

The sentence-final particle *no* can also be used in *wh*-questions. Again, McGloin (1980) observes the difference between *wh*-questions with and without *no*. For example:

- (23) a. Kyoo(-wa) doko-e iku?  
 today(-Top) where-to go  
 'Where shall we go today?'  
 b. Kyoo(-wa) doko-e iku no?  
 today(-Top) where-to go Mir  
 'Where are we going today?'

(McGloin (1980:128))

Suppose that the speaker and the hearer are ready to go out for lunch together. According to McGloin (1980), the *wh*-question in (23a) indicates that the speaker tries to decide where they are going by discussing with the hearer, while that in (23b) indicates that the speaker is not involved in the decision as to where they are going and merely asks the hearer to provide the answer. The difference between (23a) and (23b) observed by McGloin (1980) naturally comes from the mirative meaning of *no*. In *wh*-questions, the information conveyed by elements other than the *wh*-word is normally presupposed. In (23), for instance, the speaker has already known that he and the hearer will go somewhere. Thus, when *no* appears in *wh*-questions, the unexpected information is the value of the *wh*-word; the speaker uses *no* to express his inability to specify this value. That is why *wh*-questions with *no* like (23b) indicate that the speaker cannot specify the value of the *wh*-word because of his inability to expect it and thus totally depends on the

hearer for the specification of the value; on the other hand, *wh*-questions without *no* like (23a) signal that the speaker can expect and specify the value of the *wh*-word and thus is involved in its specification.

The analysis here can account for the omissibility of *no* observed by Yoshida (2012). I would first like to introduce the notion *D(iscourse)-linked*. According to Pesetsky (1987:108), the *wh*-phrase in a question like *Which book did you read?* is D-linked in that “the range of felicitous answers is limited by a set of books both speaker and hearer have in mind”; on the other hand, the *wh*-phrase *how many angels* in *How many angels fit on the head of a pin?* is non-D-linked in that “there is no presumption that either speaker or hearer has a particular set or quantity of angels in mind.” Yoshida (2012) points out that D-linked *wh*-phrases allow *no* to be absent in *wh*-questions. For example:

- (24) *Dono hon-o yondeiru (no)?*  
 which book-Acc reading Mir  
 ‘Which book are you reading?’ (Yoshida (2012:1606))

Suppose that the speaker and the hearer have been assigned homework which requires them to choose a book from a list of readings and to read it, and the speaker is asking the hearer which book he is reading (I have slightly changed the context Yoshida gives). The *wh*-phrase in this context is interpreted to be D-linked, which, according to Yoshida, makes the omission of *no* possible. On the other hand, the following *wh*-question does not allow us to drop *no*:

- (25) *Nani-o yondeiru #(no)?*  
 what-Acc reading Mir  
 ‘What are you reading?’ (Yoshida (2012:1606))

Suppose that the speaker finds the hearer reading a book but he has no idea what book the hearer is reading. Because the speaker does not know possible candidates for the book the hearer is reading, the *wh*-phrase in this context is non-D-linked. In this case, *no* is not allowed to be dropped from the sentence.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Yoshida (2012) gives an explanation to the facts shown in (24) and (25) by assuming that *no* is a question marker. However, it is syntactically a nominalizer, not a question marker (cf. Kuno (1980)). For one thing, it can be used in declarative sentences:

- (i) A: *Nani-o yondeiru no?* (= (25))  
 B: *Rebinson-no puragumatikkusu-o yondeiru no.*  
 Levinson-Gen Pragmatics-Acc reading Mir  
 ‘I’m reading Pragmatics written by Levinson.’

These facts can be accounted for by assuming that *no* in *wh*-questions signals that the speaker cannot expect the value of the *wh*-words. When *wh*-words are non-D-linked as in (25), the speaker cannot specify the value of the *wh*-words because he does not know a set of possible values; in other words, he is incapable of expecting the value. That is why *no* is obligatorily used when *wh*-words are non-D-linked. On the other hand, when *wh*-words are D-linked as in (24), the speaker can select the most plausible value from candidates. So he relatively easily expects which value is the most plausible one. That is why *no* is allowed to be omitted from the *wh*-questions. It should be noticed here that D-linked *wh*-words does not necessarily imply that the speaker can always expect the value of the *wh*-words. Even if he knows the member of a set of possible values, he, in some cases, cannot expect which value is the correct one. In such cases, we must use *no* to indicate our inability to expect the value. For example:

- (26) A: Kono prezento-wa dare-ga kureta to omou? Hanako,  
 this present-Top who-Nom gave that think Hanako  
 Yooko soretomo Zyunko?  
 Yoko or Zyunko  
 ‘Which girl do you think gave me this present, Hanako, Yoko, or  
 Zyunko?’
- B: Zenzen wakaranai yo. Dono ko-kara moratta ??(no)?  
 at all know-not SFP which girl-from received Mir  
 ‘I have no idea. From which girl did you receive it?’

Here, speaker A is enumerating candidates who gave him the present. So the *wh*-word *Dono-ko* ‘which girl’ in speaker B’s utterance is D-linked. As is clear from speaker B’s first utterance, he expresses his inability to select one girl among the three. In other words, he cannot expect the correct answer to speaker A’s question, which makes the use of *no* obligatory.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4. Mirativity and *Handanbun/Gensyoobun*

This section deals with examples which might appear to be counterexamples to the analysis developed so far. Let us consider the following example (cf.

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Here, speaker B replies to speaker A’s question with *no*, which means that it is not specialized in marking sentences as questions.

<sup>9</sup> Kuno (1980) claims that *no* serves to widen the scope of the interrogative particle *ka*, whose scope is, according to Kuno, confined to the element next to it; to put it simply, it is used for the grammatical purpose in interrogative sentences (for details, see Kuno (1980); see also Takubo (1987) and Kuwabara (2013)). The discussion in this section, however, suggests that the use of *no* is triggered by pragmatic, not syntactic, motivation.

Tanomura (1990):

(27) [The speaker hangs the laundry outside at night before going to bed. The next morning, he realizes that it is raining.]

\*Ame na n da!  
rain Cop Mir Cop  
'It's raining!'

In (27), the speaker suddenly realizes that it is raining. Judging from the context, the speaker does not expect that it is raining in the morning. We can thus predict that *no* can be used in this context, but the sentence in (27) in fact sounds unnatural; here, *no* (and *da*) must be omitted, i.e., *Ame da!* (the copula *na* in (27) becomes *da* here).

However, the unacceptability in (27) reflects a certain property of mirativity. As Dickinson (2000:381) puts it, mirativity “essentially delineate[s] the speaker’s relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states”; more specifically, “a mirative marker indicates the relationship the information coded in the proposition has to the speaker’s overall expectations and assumptions.” The speaker thus must evaluate, in the light of his overall knowledge, whether or not the information in question is unexpected (cf. Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012)): the speaker first recognizes an event, an object, etc., and then makes a judgment on whether this recognized event, object, etc. is unexpected information (see Guentchéva (1994) for related discussion).<sup>10</sup> So we can predict that mirative sentences are incompatible with what Japanese linguists have traditionally called *genshoobun* (lit. ‘phenomenon-sentences’), which is paired with *handanbun* (lit. ‘judgement-sentences’). *Genshoobun* is sentences which merely describe events and states, while *Handanbun* is sentences in which the speaker’s subjective judgement is involved. Generally speaking, *handanbun* contains the topic marker *wa*, whereas *genshoobun* does not. Consider the following examples:

(28) a. Kodomo-wa naite iru.  
dog-Top cry being  
'The child is crying.'

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<sup>10</sup> In fact, Kuroda (1973:380) notes that the sentence-final particle *no* “serves as a marker to indicate that some ‘second order’ assertion, so to speak, is made with respect to the proposition expressed by the sentence to which [*no*] is attached.” That is to say, *no* indicates that the speaker first recognizes an event, an object, etc., and then makes a certain judgment on that recognized event, object, etc. (see also Hayashi (1964)).

- b. Kodomo-ga naite iru.  
 dog-Nom cry being  
 ‘A child is crying.’

In (28a), which contains the topic marker *wa*, the speaker is making a judgment on the child in question; that is, he first recognizes the existence of a child and then judges that he is crying. In (28b), on the other hand, *wa* does not appear and thus the sentence is interpreted to be a statement merely describing the situation where a child is crying. *No* reflects the speaker’s subjective judgement in the sense that it indicates that he evaluates the information in question as unexpected. It is thus assumed not to occur in genshoobun.

Let us now turn back to example (27). In this example, the speaker is assumed to be merely expressing what he has just recognized. That is to say, the sentence is interpreted to be a genshoobun. In fact, it is impossible to supply the sentence in (27), with or without *no*, with the topic phrase *X-wa*, such as *Kyoo-wa* ‘today-Top,’ which is a sign of handanbun (i.e., *\*Kyoo-wa ame da!! \*Kyoo-wa ame na n da!*). The unacceptability in (27) can thus be attributed to the incompatibility between *no* and genshoobun (see also Noda (1997) for related discussion). We can here predict that the sentence in (27) becomes acceptable if it is put in a context where a certain topic phrase can be linguistically manifested. This prediction is borne out by the following example:

- (29) [The speaker looks out of a window and realizes that it is raining.]  
 (Kyoo-wa) ame na n da.

In (27), the speaker has a sense of urgency because the laundry gets wet, but in (29), the speaker does not have such a sense. In this case, we can supply the topic phrase *kyoo-wa* ‘today,’ as shown in the parentheses, which means that the sentence is a manifestation of the speaker’s subjective judgement. Hence, the sentence in (29) is potentially compatible with mirative judgement, which is expressed by *no*.

## 5. Unexpectedness to the Hearer

So far, I have argued that the sentence-final particle *no* expresses unexpected information to the speaker. This semantic property of *no* is in conformity with a typological tendency of mirative markers; a number of mirative markers found in other languages are associated with unexpectedness to the speaker. In fact, when it comes to definitions of mirativity, the word *speaker* often appears in such definitions. According to DeLancey (1997:33), for example, “the function of [mirativity] is to

mark sentences which report information which is new or surprising to the speaker,” or Aikhenvald (2004:209) says that mirativity is a linguistic category “whose primary meaning is speaker’s unprepared mind, unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise” (the underlines are mine). Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012:488), however, point out that mirativity “will often be used in circumstances in which the proposition is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the speaker, but may also be used when it is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the addressee” (see also Aikhenvald (2012)). Let us consider the following Kalasha example:

- (30) Amerika’ bo hu’tala dur kai ši’-an hu’la.  
 America very high house make Past.Pf.3Pl become.Past.Infer.3  
 ‘In America there are very tall buildings.’ (DeLancey (1997:47))

The example in (30) “could be said by someone who is returning from the wide world with stories for his fellow villagers” (Delancey (1997:47)). So, “in this context the proposition is not one for which the speaker does not have a psychological preparation, but rather one that is new for the addressee” (Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012:488)). They conclude from examples like (30) that “mirativity could simply be defined as ‘a linguistic category that characterizes a proposition as newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising’” (Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012:488)); the notion *speaker* should be excluded from the definition of mirativity.

The sentence-final particle *no* is noteworthy in typological terms because it expresses unexpectedness to not only the speaker but also the hearer, supporting Hengeveld and Olbertz’s (2012) proposal. Let us consider the following example:

- (31) Boku ne, konban deeto na n desu.  
 I you know this evening date Cop Mir Cop.Pol  
 ‘I’m going on a date this evening.’  
 (Kikuchi (2000:37), with slight modifications)

Here, the speaker is revealing to the hearer that he is going on a date. The information conveyed is assumed to have already been established to the speaker and thus it is not unexpected information to him. Rather, in (31), the speaker is conveying unexpected information to the hearer.

The following conversation will make this point clearer:



- (32) A: Kimi-wa Akiko-to kon'yaku sita sooda ne.  
 you-Top Akiko-to engagement got Evid(hearsay) SFP(you know)  
 'I hear you got engaged to Akiko.'
- B: Iya tigau. Boku-wa Hanako-to kon'yaku sita n da.  
 no wrong I-Top Hanako-to engagement got Mir Cop  
 'No, that's wrong. I got engaged to Hanako.'
- (Inoue (1974:288))

Here, speaker A first believes that speaker B got engaged to Akiko. Speaker B then denies it and gives the correct information that the woman to whom he got engaged is Hanako. It is obvious that the sentence with *no* brings unexpected information to speaker A. In this situation, *no* (and the following copula *da*) cannot be omitted (i.e., \**Boku-wa Hanako-to kon'yaku sita.*). This is because the sentence without *no* does not signal that the information is unexpected to speaker A, and thus is incompatible with the context.

The following example also lends support to the analysis here:

- (33) A: Ano mise-ni hai-re-nakatta.  
 that shop-Dat enter-be able to-not.Past  
 'I was turned away from that shop.'
- B:(\*)Kimi-wa miseenen na n da yo.  
 you-Top under age Cop Mir Cop SFP  
 'You are under age.'

Speaker B's utterance can be interpreted to be either acceptable or unacceptable depending on the context. Let us first consider the context where this sentence is unacceptable. The information that speaker A is under age is assumed to be evident to him because age is part of one's personal information. In other words, this information is not unexpected to speaker A. *No* in (33) thus introduces expected information, yielding an unnatural sentence. Speaker B's utterance, however, becomes natural in a context where he tries to make speaker A remember his age. Because of the fact that speaker A tried to enter a shop for adults, speaker B treats speaker A as if speaker A forgot his own age. In this case, the information that speaker A is under age is interpreted as if it were unexpected information to him, which makes the use of *no* fully acceptable.

The fact that *no* expresses unexpectedness to the hearer as well as the speaker shows the importance of Hengeveld and Olbertz's (2012) work. Mirativity should be defined without recourse to the notion *speaker*; it is neutral in that the definition

does not specify to whom the information in question is unexpected.

## 6. Conclusion

Typological studies have recently paid attention to the semantic category *mirativity* since the seminal work of DeLancey (1997). There are, however, very few studies which investigate Japanese grammatical mirative markers. Hoping to promote the study of mirativity in Japanese, I attempted to clarify that the sentence-final particle *no* is a grammatical mirative marker. I also argued that the mirative marker *no* has a noteworthy function in typological terms; it expresses unexpectedness to not only the speaker but also the hearer.

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