CONTENDING ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY: UNIVERSALISM *VERSUS* ECONOMIC NATIONAL INTEREST

THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS SALES TO 'PARIAH STATES' 1994-1999

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ABSTRACT

This study examines post-apartheid South African foreign policy under former President Nelson Mandela, and the apparent ambiguities that were its recurrent feature in the period from 1994 to 1999. Its focus is on the inherent irreconcilability of the economic national interests and the foreign policy principles which included the promotion of and respect for universalist principles and interests such as human rights, democracy, international peace and security.

In examining South African foreign policy during this period, it would appear that the country was trapped between two competing priorities: the need to promote universalist" principles and the need to satisfy its national economic interests. The main aim of the study is to explain how this "irreconcilability" between universalist principles and national economic interests would later create ambiguities and contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy, weaken respect for its foreign policy

principles, and ultimately lead to ideological failure among politicians who employed 'short-term gain' policy decision-making in dealing with 'pariah states'. The study further demonstrates that "realist" national interests are frequently short-term, realizable and vital for a country, while universalist interests are long-term, idealistic and usually not easily realizable. It will be argued, therefore, that a country faced with making decisions about its vital national interests, will not make efforts to pursue long-term universalist interests if that choice would in any way endanger its fundamental national interests.

In order to better assess this ambiguity, this thesis will provide a case study of Pretoria's arms sales to 'pariah states' during the period. The purpose of this study is not to attempt to explain all of the issues around post-apartheid foreign policy-making, or even to argue whether the sale of arms to 'pariah states' was 'politically incorrect', but to provide a 'piece of the puzzle' which might explain how the social and economic situation may have compelled Pretoria to sell arms when these actions disregarded universalist principles of foreign policy. The conclusion seems to confirm the realist view that universal values and principles can be regarded only when they are in harmony with a state's perceived self-interests.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	Armaments Acquisition Council
AACB	Armaments Acquisition Control Board
AAM	Air-to-air missiles
AASB	Armaments Acquisition Steering Board
AB or Bond	Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Brotherhood in short)
AEB	Atomic Energy Board
AECI	African Explosives and Chemical Industries
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AI	Amnesty International
AMD	Maritime and Defence Industry Association
AIS	Islamic Salvation Army
ANC	African National Congress
AP	Afrikaner Party
APC	Armoured personnel carrier
ARMSCOR	Armaments Development and Production Corporation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASM	Air-to-surface missiles
AT	Arms transfers
ATMs	Anti-tank missiles
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation

BC	Black Consciousness
BE	Barlow Electronics
BOSS	Bureau for State Security
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CDFs	Civilian Defence Forces
CEF	Central Energy Fund
CHRI	Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COIN	Counter-insurgency
CSIR	Council for Scientific Research
DFPC	Defence Foreign Policy Committee
DI	Defence industry
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DOI	Department of Information
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Commission for West African States
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union

EW	Electronic warfare
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
Fida	Islamic Front for Armed Jihad
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
FN	*Fabrique National*
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FLS	Frontline States (Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia).
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GEC	General Electric Corporation
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GNU	Government of National Unity
HOGs	Heads of government
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICI	Imperial Chemical Industries
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ILO	International Labour Organization
IRRC	Investor Responsibility Research Centre
LN	League of Nations
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

LEW	Lyttleton Engineering Works
MEI	Movement for and Islamic State
MK	*Umkhonto We Sizwe*
MPs	Members of Parliament
MPLA	Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola
MPV	Mine-protected vehicle
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NAC	National Accelerator Centre
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCACC	National Conventional Arms Control Committee
NEERI	National Electrical Engineering Research Institute
NEC	National Executive Council
NIAST	National Institute for Aeronautics and Systems Technology
NIDR	National Institute for Defence Research
NITR	National Institute for Telecommunications Research
NMERI	National Mechanical Engineering Research Institute
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRL	National Physical Research Lab
NRIMS	National Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences

NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NLE	Non-lethal equipment
NFS	Not-for-sale
NSAs	Non-state actors
NSE	Non-sensitive equipment
NP	Nationalist Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan-African Congress Party
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMP	Pretoria Metal Pressings
PTI	Protea Telecommunications Industries
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
R & D	Research and Development
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRI	Rocket Research Institute
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SA	South Africa
SAAF	South African Air Force

SACP	South African Communist Party
SADIA	South African Defence Industry Association
SADC	Southern African Development Conference
SAFM	South African Frequency Modulation
SAM	Surface-to-air
SAN	South African Navy
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Services
SAS	South African Ship
SIPRI	Swedish International Peace Research Institute
SMSE	Sensitive Major Significant Equipment
SS	Smith and Soregi
SSE	Sensitive Significant Equipment
SSM	Ship-to-ship missile
SOU	Special Operations Unit
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicles
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UP	United Party
US	The United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VHF	Very high frequency
WHO	World Health Organization
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to the memory of my late grandfather, *Japuonj Timotheo Adede Wuod Wanjawa.*

To him who is able to keep me from falling and
present me before his glorious presence without
fault and with great joy.
Adapted from Jude 24-25.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted, either in the same or in a different form, to this or any other university for a degree.

Nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high minded principle, and have competed more than they have cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age old mode of behaviour has changed or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead.

Henry Kissinger 1995, <u>Diplomacy</u>. New York: Touchstone.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the Research

The year 1994 marked the first democratic election in South African history, which, on a wave of national and international optimism, brought the African National Congress (ANC) into power. The ANC's decades-old struggle against the apartheid regime was instrumental in bringing the injustices, the violations of universal human rights and fundamental liberties to the attention of the international community. In addressing the past injustices of the apartheid legacy, the ANC could now finally influence the new South Africa's policy.

It therefore came as no surprise that the ANC-led Government of National Unity wanted to make a clean break with the previous militant and racist foreign policy of the apartheid regime. This determination to break with the past was demonstrated by the desire to base the foundations of the new South African foreign policy on the promotion and respect of universalist values.[1] These values consisted of human rights, promotion of democracy worldwide, pursuit of domestic and global peace and security and the respect for international law and international justice. Thus, in the course of negotiating the transition to democracy, ANC president Nelson Mandela put forward several foreign policy principles that included the promotion of such inclusive values. These principles would constitute the central core of

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[1] Universalism also termed as Kantianism/idealism emphasizes and relies on reason in human affairs, and puts confidence in the peace-building function of the international political system. This perspective holds that there is an international solidarity (natural harmony) of interests by men, which are morally bound. The core of the universalist perspective holds that international politics is about relations among individuals and groups that states are composed of. Accordingly, the highest interest of the individual coincides with that of the larger community.

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Mandela's foreign policy and guide the behaviour of South Africa in international politics.

Between 1994 and 1999, however, the ANC-led government proposed and approved a number of apparently controversial arms sales to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria, Uganda, Republic of Congo, Taiwan and Colombia, among other countries. The controversy aroused suspicion. On the one hand, the new South African foreign policy was committed to the respect for human rights and international peace, and on the other, the sale of arms was directed to countries characterized as 'authoritarian' or 'undemocratic', usually with poor human rights records or experiencing both internal and external conflicts. Clearly the government appeared to be departing from its core foreign policy principles. How then could one explain this 'about-turn' in policy principles?

Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the economic sphere. Immediately following the April 1994 elections, the Mandela administration was faced with the need to address the realities faced by the majority of South Africa's citizens – unfortunate realities such as poverty, social exclusion, unemployment, social unrest, crime, underdevelopment and low investment. The new administration was thus under political obligation to implement an economic programme/plan to address these key priorities.

This 'obligation' was reflected in South Africa's foreign policy content, especially in its preoccupation with foreign trade. The defence industry was among several crucial domestic industries that would play a big part in Pretoria's drive for foreign trade. As Pretoria geared itself towards creating employment and increasing foreign exchange earnings to further develop industries domestically, the defence industry would play an even larger role in dealing with the harsh economic realities that South African citizens faced.

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Even during the post-apartheid era, the defence industry continued to play an important part in stimulating the South African economy and providing significant strategic value. Despite a considerable decrease in the number of jobs, the defence industry provided employment for several tens of thousands of people and generated considerable foreign exchange earnings for the government. In order to sustain employment and bring in sufficient foreign exchange earnings, however, the defence industry had to gear itself for the export market. Accordingly, it was in Pretoria's national interest to ensure that the production and export of armaments and related equipment continued.

In pursuing its national interest on the global market, however, South Africa had to face competition from big producers like the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan and smaller producers like Spain, South Korea, Singapore, India, Switzerland, and so on. As noted by the prestigious Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2001) world military expenditure and arms trade in 1998 formed the largest spending in the world at over $780 billion. Of this amount high-income countries, which hold only 16 percent of world population, accounted for about 75 percent.[2] In 1998, South Africa was the 10th largest weapons producer in the world and the biggest in Africa, even though its sales accounted for only just over 1% of the global arms trade (Dispatch, 1998), and had managed to sell arms worth more than R 3.3 Billion (US$ 600 million) to 91 countries between April 1994 and August 1999 (Marais, 1999).

The available data therefore shows that South Africa is not one of the major players on the global arms market and that it occupies the middle range of the hierarchy of

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[2] The combined military spending of these countries was thus slightly higher than the aggregate foreign debt of all low-income countries and 10 times higher than their combined levels of official development assistance in 2001 (SIPRI, 2001).

arms producing countries together with Israel, Sweden, Brazil and Argentina (Buzan, 2002).[3] However, South Africa is still the biggest arms producer on the African continent, which helps it to maintain its regional power status.

The acquisition of power, influence and the allegiance of lesser powers in addition to other political interests, combined with economic push-factors mentioned above are strong enough reasons for a country to engage in the production and sale of arms.[4] However, the global arms trade is a result of "supply push from producers and demand pull from consumers" (Buzan, 2002).[5]

It can be argued that the global arms trade addresses the imbalances between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The dynamics of power politics, however, compels states to acquire more military power than their potential adversaries. The acquisition of military power is achieved, among other things, by the qualitative advance in weapon technology, which preserves the qualitative distinction between the countries. In other words, for the small group of technologically innovative states a qualitative edge remains a critical ingredient of their military power (Buzan, 2002).[6]

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[3] Among 100 world largest arms-producing companies (excluding China), South Africa's manufacturer Denel was ranked 90th in 2002 and 79th the previous year (SIPRI, 2003).

[4] Justifications for developing and maintaining a national defence industry are discussed more in detail in Chapter 4.

[5] According to Buzan (2002) the desire of producers to sell arms is complemented by the assertion of the right to receive arms by non-producers and part-producers of weapons. Thus, there is a shared interest between suppliers and recipients in maintaining the arms trade. Moreover, the right to buy and possess arms is closely related to the maintenance of the international society based on the sovereign equality of states.

[6] In the literature this drive for technological development is described as 'technological determinism' or 'technological imperative', which means that once technological developments are under way, they are unstoppable, inevitable, unavoidable and irreversible (Chandler, 2000). Regarding military technology Buzan and Herring (Kinsella, 2002: 218), however, distinguish between technological determinism and technological imperative, the latter representing unavoidable requirement to consider how to respond to the frequent technological advances of the contemporary world, but not determining what the response will be or even whether there will be a

Technological advancements, however, are not only boosted by state's drive for military power but also by the arms trade, since the increased access to the modern weaponry and the perceived increased insecurity as a result, generate incentives for the continued military technological innovations by the leading states (Kinsella, 2002: 212). Therefore, by selling arms South Africa is necessarily engaged in the arms dynamics described above, which means that this is an additional reason for the country to maintain its arms industry and supply countries, which seek arms that they cannot produce themselves.

On the demand side armaments are required and thus frequently acquired by regimes that engage in war, violence and repression. The South Africa case study was chosen because it can hopefully expose the problems regarding the pursuance of a foreign policy agenda that contradicts the very country's foreign policy aspirations. Through this case study we will attempt to demonstrate that South Africa created contradictions that violated the very underpinnings of its own 'moral' foreign policy - a situation which was the antithesis of the values that should have informed South Africa's foreign policy. The Mandela administration therefore, would appear to have faced a dilemma in pursuing universalist values and economic national interests *concurrently* when formulating its foreign policy.

1.2. The Literature Review

The controversy surrounding the arms deals - and foreign policy in general - has been the subject of discussion by South African and other scholars. A number of researchers have observed that the foreign policy orientation of the post-apartheid South African government has often fluctuated between 'realism' and 'moral

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response at all. That will be influenced to varying degrees by political, domestic structure, and action-reaction factors.

internationalism'. For example, Van Nieuwkerk, (1998) and Mills, (1997:4) assert that the foreign policy mood in South Africa under Mandela reflected this dual approach; and while there was a strong nationalist focus on the promotion of South Africa's own national interests, there was an international moral commitment to the promotion of human rights as well.

This 'fluctuation' between "the commitment to respect human rights and the practice of selling arms to so-called 'pariah states'[7] has led a considerable number of scholars to describe post-apartheid South African foreign policy under Mandela as 'ambiguous', 'incoherent' and 'inconsistent.' Batchelor (1999) observes that, because of the pressures to satisfy its economic objectives, Pretoria flouted its arms sales policy and foreign policy by extension, all of which appeared confused and non-coherent as a result. Tony Leon (cited in Van Wyk, 1999:297) similarly observes that South Africa's "...performance on the world stage has been characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies, backtracking... Our foreign policy appears to be schizophrenic..."

Leon's views are echoed by Chhabra, (1997) who contends that after 1994, Pretoria's foreign policy had been marked by several contradictions with regard to what policies and actions to adopt because of the pressures between stated policy and national interest. Other scholars, however, emphasize that Pretoria violated its foreign policy principles by selling arms to 'pariah states' and suggest that it should

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[7] The term 'pariah states' in this research denotes states that are non-democratic, conflict-ridden or conflict-prone, including those involved in arms races. Otherwise, the concept 'pariah states' is a Western term which came to be used to describe states that were/are at the centre of Western concern and consequently are labelled as such by Western governments, more specifically the US and its allies (Niblock, 2001: 10-15). The term has been used interchangeably with other terms such as 'rogue states' or 'states of concern'. Such states were/are seen to be playing an international role that was disruptive to American interests while also going contrary to norms and values of the international order. Subsequently, economic and diplomatic relations with these states had to be annulled since they could not be trusted to follow international commitments.

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have adhered to those principles and constitution regardless of its economic interests. Thus, Cock (1996:23), observes that although human rights and the promotion of democracy were pillars of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy, Pretoria's arms sales undoubtedly contributed to violent conflicts and the infringement of human rights in the states to which Pretoria sold arms.

Similarly other authors have questioned whether Pretoria's 'opportunistic' arms sales have served to further hamper both economic and human development on the continent. Edmunds (1997a and 1997b) analyses Pretoria's arms sales to Turkey and Rwanda and concludes that in the sales to both states, the government put short-term economic national interests before the country's foreign policy principles and constitution by extension, and in the process, the government violated the very principles it was supposed to uphold. Shelton's (1998) in-depth study of South Africa's arms sales to the Middle East questions whether Pretoria's sales have promoted peace or contributed to increased conflict in an already volatile region. He argues that there needs to be firmer adherence to the official policy guidelines, that decision-makers need to be highly informed about the states and regions to which they intend to sell arms, and concludes that in the case of arms sales to the Middle East, Pretoria did not comply with stated policy.

Supporting Shelton's views are other scholars who have tried to explain these ambiguities in terms of the in-built contradiction between Pretoria's perceived national interests and its role as a defender of universalism in the world. Thus, Le Pere *et al.* (1999:3) have acknowledged that,

> "...there was a palpable tension between prioritizing its perceived commercial, trade, and political interests and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of global human rights and democracy."

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Battersby (1999) similarly argues that although South Africa had regulations for the sale of arms that had to be adhered to, problems emerged at the onset of the Mandela regime because there were in-built contradictions between Pretoria's need to create jobs and boost exports on the one hand, and its need to promote human rights and moral values as reflected in its constitution on the other. Other scholars have attributed this flaw to the foreign policy-making process in post-apartheid South Africa. Top decision-makers are not always unified in their approaches. Could the ambiguity and confusion found in the new South African foreign policy document have been the result of compromises among novice parliamentarians? Or was it perhaps because the foreign policy document was so hastily put together (i.e., to satisfy national economic interests and the needs of the 'pariah states'), that radical changes to supposed key 'universalist' principles were announced without clarity? Thus, Fabricius, (2000) asserts that the executive seems to have usurped the role of being the sole foreign policy decision-maker. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, (1999) seem to concur by arguing that the reasons for Pretoria's ambiguous foreign policy lie in the fact that the executive appears to have appropriated excessive decision-making power.

Existing literature on the ambiguities and contradictions in Pretoria's foreign policy 1994 to 1999, generally, has tended to concentrate on its economic aspects, or on historical events connected to the transition to democracy. The result is that, while there is substantial information available on these issues, very little of it explains how and under which conditions South Africa 'needed' to act opportunistically and so, 'had' to ignore the economic and social needs of those who brought the ANC into power. Furthermore, the literature does not go beyond mere observations to explain the in-built tension between stated policy and action. More research is also needed on the "irreconcilability of 'universalist' and realist theories and on the explanations behind these contradictions. Thus, while scholars have identified the problem of Pretoria's inconsistent and ambiguous foreign policy, it would seem that

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rigorous theoretical expositions have been lacking. In other words, the question of pursuing national interests based on a set of 'moral' principles has not been posed and/or sufficiently dealt with. This question is not only relevant for South Africa, but also for any state implementing its foreign policy in the international arena.

1.3. Research Question and Hypothesis

This thesis will attempt to address the following question:

"Can the promotion of human rights, democracy and world peace as 'universalist values' be reconciled with the pursuance of national economic interests such as the export of arms when a state is engaged in relations with another state that disregards the exact 'universalist values' the first state is trying to promote?"

With this question in mind, the thesis proposes to critically examine the contradictions that emerged in South Africa's foreign policy as a result of the pursuance of both universalist principles and economic national interests in its foreign policy. In this regard, the attempt will be made to prove the following hypothesis:

'The ambiguities and contradictions observed in South Africa's foreign policy can be explained by the irreconcilability of South Africa's universalist foreign policy principles with its economic national interests when pursued in relation to 'pariah states'. The ambiguities were facilitated by the nature of foreign policy decision-making in South Africa.

In other words, the thesis proposes to argue that a foreign policy based on universalist principles is not viable in the context of harsh domestic economic conditions fuelled by poverty, migration, discrimination and powerlessness. In addition, the international environment compels states, which seek profits by selling arms, for example, to engage in competition for clients and overlook the atrocious actions of the client 'pariah states'.

It should be pointed out at the outset of this thesis, however, that there are some limitations to the research. The study of the tensions and 'irreconcilability' of realism and universalism in a country's foreign policy is a relatively new, untested area, and thus very little quantitative research is available on the subject. Furthermore, it is very difficult to prove the extent of the influence of individual factors on the government's decisions to sell arms to 'pariah states'. At the same time, the study's hypothesis does not imply that some other factors or a combination of factors cannot explain the ambiguities and contradictions seen in South Africa's foreign policy in relation to 'pariah states'.

1.3. Methodology

As mentioned earlier, the thesis aims to address a gap that has existed in the literature on South Africa's foreign policy during the five-year period following the regime change. The research will provide a theoretical explanation for certain foreign-policy decisions that were made in this period by Nelson Mandela and his close associates. To this end, the underlying theoretical foundations to both economic national interests and universalism will be interrogated.

This debate will hopefully provide answers with regard to the relation between foreign policy principles and national interests, a state's hierarchy of national interests and the variety of interests a state can have. The theoretical conclusions

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will be applied to the case study of South Africa's foreign policy between 1994 and 1999, and its arms sales in particular.

Historical sources, whether 'behind the scenes', or from public archives will attempt to supply explanations of the intent behind various policy decisions. The context in which shifts in foreign policy occurred will be documented using official government communiqués, media clippings, and the content of diplomatic letters. Using process-tracing the study will document how the new South African foreign policy shifted towards the national economy supporting policies – and seek to explain why the shift led to engagement with 'pariah states' and how it undermined 'universalist' principles by identifying and charting intervening causal processes.

Supplementing the analysis in the thesis, statistical data will be used to show the amount of arms sold to various 'pariah states' as well as the impact of those sales on the recipient states. In addition, there will be data on the economic benefits the arms sales had for Pretoria as well as statistics on the economic situation of South Africa prior to the arms sales which appeared to have been a motivating factor for the sales.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that some data relevant for this research was unavailable. This data pertains to arms sales during the apartheid era as well as arms sales during the Mandela administration. This is understandable since arms sales are often done in secrecy and consequently, the statistics regarding these sales are also secretive. In order to compensate for this omission, the data was obtained from overseas research institutions as well as local research institutes and think tanks.

Other information that was not readily available, related to identification of the key decision-makers during the Mandela administration. It is hoped, however, that these shortcomings do not significantly affect the quality of this research.

Why is this topic relevant to the study of international relations? Why should it matter whether a state adopts a realist or universalist approach to its foreign policy? Why should it matter if these two perspectives are "irreconcilable"? The South African case study can help answering these questions because it will show how the pursuit of universal values cannot be reconciled with the pursuit of economic interests when a state's trade partner disregards the same universal values on which that state's foreign policy is based. At the same time the case study will demonstrate that the irreconcilability of universalist principles with economic national interests gave rise to the ambiguities and contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy in relation to 'pariah states'.

Hopefully, the findings of this study will be applicable to the foreign policy of any state, that is trying to function and survive in international relations by engaging in trade relations that are vital for the survival and functioning of any state as well as for the well-being of citizens. The findings would have practical value for state foreign policy. If a state wants to have a coherent foreign policy, it would need to consider the 'irreconcilability' of the universalist and national economic interest when pursued in relation to 'pariah states'.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

Chapter one gives an overview and introduction to the thesis. It also looks at the methodology and structure of this study. Chapter two examines the three theoretical perspectives of realism, rationalism and universalism. It debates the different perspectives and looks at their many facets in terms of international politics, foreign policy and national interest. This theoretical debate also provides the background for an in-depth analysis of the two concepts — foreign policy and national interest — most relevant to this research.

The application of these two theoretical perspectives will be critical to the study's arguments because they can explain both the realism of economic national interests, and the universalism that appears to have been pursued concurrently in post-apartheid South African foreign policy. Prior to analysing both perspectives, substantial definitions are provided to ensure that all underlying theoretical foundations are fully understood.

The theoretical framework chapter provides the basis for the discussion about post-apartheid South Africa's universalist foreign policy. Subsequently, chapter three discusses South African foreign policy-in-the-making between 1990 and 1994 in order for one to understand how and *when* South Africa's universalist foreign policy was subjugated by "stronger competing national economic interests". Hence, a historical overview of the ANC's foreign policy is given which illustrates the ways in which it was, essentially, geared at addressing the domestic political, social and economic situation.

Managing the contradictions of South Africa's foreign policy, which arose between 1994 and 1999, is the subject of chapter four. The chapter attempts to show *how* the ambiguities that emerged in Pretoria's foreign policy, discrepancies in foreign policy decision making, fostering cordial relations with 'pariah states' - were managed. In this regard, the chapter looks at a few case studies where problems of implementation and subsequent ambiguities emerged under Mandela and further, how they were dealt with.

Chapter five focuses on the domestic, economic and social factors that influenced Pretoria's arms sales. In this regard, it analyses the South African defence industry as well as the domestic economic and social demands faced by the government. The chapter will attempt to demonstrate that the economic and social situation in South

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Africa did influence the foreign policy and national interest of the new government, at least with regards to its arms sales, from the onset of the Mandela presidency.

Chapter six discusses the creation a new South African arms sales policy under the Mandela administration. It argues that the arms sales policy was aimed at reconciling South African economic interests and universalist principles in its foreign policy as well as was enabling the country to have a transparent and legitimate arms sales policy. This new policy would then do away with suspect arms deals that were characteristic of the former apartheid regime.

The next chapter focuses on post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales to the so-called pariah states after April 1994, which ultimately compromised Pretoria's foreign policy principles, its arms sales policy, and the constitution by extension. The critical argument in this chapter will be that Pretoria's foreign policy principles were not adequately implemented - and hence the ambiguity between policy and action emerged.

The final chapter gives a summary of the main theoretical findings, as well as a summary of conclusions concerning the South African case study. The chapter also highlights the implications for future South African foreign policy and suggests some potential research areas.

2. THEORETICAL PERPECTIVES AROUND FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

2.1. Introduction

International relations is a relatively new discipline. It only developed as a separate discipline after the end of the Second World War when scholars, strategists and politicians tried to explain the causes of the two world wars and how they could go about avoiding future conflicts. The classical realist writing *Politics Among Nations* by Hans Morgenthau signifies the beginning of international relations/politics as a special discipline within the social sciences. Since then numerous approaches, schools and perspectives have developed within the discipline.

It is in this regard that scholars such as Bull, (1977), Hassner, (1994), Lieshout, (1995) and Wight, (1991) have observed that the ideas of various scholars can be roughly grouped into three theoretical perspectives on international relations, namely realism, rationalism and universalism.[8]

The chapter starts with an examination the debate around these three theoretical perspectives. It will attempt to outline the main characteristics of the realist, rationalist and universalist perspectives. A discussion of these perspectives will be followed by theoretical explanations relating to differences between the theoretical traditions, and how they view international politics, foreign policy and national

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[8] The purpose of this theoretical chapter is not to cover all the approaches in international relations, rather, it focuses on and discusses one possible division of the theoretical perspectives in international relations to address the main problem of the thesis. The application of the three perspectives (realism, rationalism and universalism), however, does not imply that other approaches, such as constructivism, would not be relevant for the analysis in the thesis.

interest. These explanations will help us understand Pretoria foreign policy between 1994 and 1999.

It is hoped that this debate will also provide the background for an in-depth analysis of two concepts relevant for this research, namely 'foreign policy' and 'national interest.' As this chapter attempts to show, these concepts are closely linked, since national interest ultimately leads to foreign policy action. In other words, foreign policy action is an extension and a product of a state's national interest. Therefore, the theoretical background in this chapter will give a necessary insight into the factors that influence a state's foreign policy behaviour and explain how this behaviour is linked to its national interests.

This chapter is based on two assumptions: one, that ideas and teachings about international relations fall into three major theoretical perspectives; namely realist (also termed as Machiavellian or Hobbesian), rationalist (Grotian), and universalist (Kantian/idealist or revolutionist) perspectives. These perspectives would appear to be representative of the major contending issues studied in international relations today. Each is valuable in its own respect and offers plausible perceptions on how people should view the relations between states and further, how international relations should be conducted.

The second assumption is that - even though each perspective has its own more or less elaborate explanation as regards the essence of international politics - the reality of international politics cannot be explained by one perspective only. It can also be argued that the truth about international politics lies in the debate amongst the three perspectives.

2.2. The Realist Perspective in International Politics

The realist teachings have been probably the most influential in the theory of international politics. Realism was originally the dominant school of medieval philosophy and it concerned itself with the doctrine that universals (general ideas and abstract concepts) have an objective existence, as opposed to nominalism, which asserted that universals were 'mere names'. In the eighteenth century, reality became 'matter', whereas in the twentieth century, realism meant a frank acceptance of the disagreeable aspects of life such as violence, sin, suffering and conflict (Bull, 1977; Hassner, 1994; Lieshout, 1995 and Wight, 1991).

Realist thinking was also influenced by scientific theory - biology in particular. For example, Charles Darwin (1899)'s book *The Origin of Species* was associated with realist philosophy and thereby expounded the hypothesis of natural selection in biological evolution. Consequently, the expression "survival of the fittest" came into being, and was subsequently turned into a sort of cliché for 'the struggle for existence', not only in science but also in international politics.

According to realists the relations between states in the international system reflect the relations between human beings. Realists have a somewhat gloomy view of human nature and they have written extensively on its negative aspects. This view has also been influenced by other social sciences such as psychology.[9]

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[9] For example, the ideas of Sigmund Freud, (1939:35, 77), who asserted that "the tendency to aggression is an inherent independent instinctual disposition in man... and that the greatest obstacle to civilization is the constitutional tendency in man to be aggressive against one another...".

Machiavelli, (1928:134,142), who is seen as the real 'inventor' of political realism as he was the first person since the Greeks to look at politics without ethical presuppositions, concluded that:

> "...human beings are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowards, covetous and as long as you succeed, they are obedient and will give you anything possible including their life, children when the need is far distant. But when the need approaches, they turn against you ... if human beings were entirely good, this precept would not hold, but because man is bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them (keep faith)."

Similarly, in his classic work, the *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes, (1946:81) noted that:

> "...one finds three principal causes of disagreements in human beings: competition, timidity and grandeur. The first makes man invade for triumph, the second for security and the third for status. The first uses aggression to make human beings masters of other human beings and their properties; the second to preserve them; the third for trifles — as a word, a smile, or any other sign of under value."

He goes on to note that during the time when human beings live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in a condition which is called war; and such a war is of every human against fellow humans (*bellum omnium contra omnes*).

Realists further contend that people are egotistic. It is in this regard that realist scholars such as Carr (1942), Waltz (1979) and other neo-realist scholars observe that humans display egoism or the will to assert themselves at the expense of others. And since humans who are egoistic rule states and are power-hungry, a state of war exists because all states seek power and seek to ensure their own safety in an international society where peace is fragile.

Thus, Waltz, (1979:103) sums up the realist perspective's view of human beings as follows: "…the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutal and short." Hence, it is this nature of human beings that is reflected in the relations among nation-states.

From this perspective, therefore, it is assumed that in international relations conflict is the rule rather than the exception. It is further assumed that the international society does not exist and that international law is somewhat vague and constantly violated. Consequently, the international society looks like a peacetime convenience of sovereign states. This interpretation of the international society was originally put forward by Hobbes who viewed international relations as an arena that resembles the state of nature. In other words, war and conflict are synonymous and are a part of the international system/society (Bull, 1977 and Cohen *et al.*, 1974).

For realists, the existing diplomatic system is a network, whose purpose is aggrandisement and defence. Further, they hold that there can be no world society without a world state. Their secondary premise is that the international system is constituted of nothing but great powers, which then go on to comprise and determine the nature of the international society.

Further, there is no international society integrated to the extent that it is able to define for national societies the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do for their individual members (Hegel, 1949: 340; Morgenthau, 1951:34; 1958:80-81). Hence, states seek passions, private interests, selfish ends, force, vices and wrongdoings in order to enhance their national power or strength.

Power is another concept frequently used by realists, especially also discussed in relation to morality, law and national interests. The fundamental premise of realism is that politics forms the basis of morality and law, and that power in all its features

is self-justifying. Morgenthau, (1951:34) agrees with Hobbes that the state crafts morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state.

To realists, the major rationale of the state is to maintain and increase power for survival in an anarchical international society, since a state's policy is determined by the pressure of conflict. Bull (1977: 40-51) and Cohen, (1974) concur with Morgenthau that the state's moral role is to achieve power since this power guarantees its survival in the international system. Consequently, it is in the national interest of a state to pursue this power, and achieve it by whatever means necessary. For this reason, all states have a moral obligation to achieve their national interest.

2.3. Rationalism

Rationalists believe in the value of international cooperation in a predominantly anarchic and hostile international society or system. They believe that though human beings are sinful and bloodthirsty creatures, they are also rational. Consequently, the word 'rationalist' emerges from this assumption.

Rationalists[10] such as Grotius, Locke, Burke and Bull argue that conflict exists at the same time that international cooperation among states takes place. Although states are not subject to a common superior, they form a society whose workings are evident in institutions such as diplomacy, international law, the balance of power and the concert of great powers. Proponents of this perspective argue that although states interact with one another, they are not free of moral and legal restrictions and are subsequently bound by the rules of the international society they comprise of and have a stake in.

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[10] Rationalists are divided into 'realists' and 'idealists'. The realists observe the actual state of the international society and they envisage how the society should be administered in recognition of the existing anarchical society. The idealists believe that the laws and regulations be enacted so that man can live in harmony and that the nature of man is good and they pursue ideals on earth

Rationalism therefore argues that reason is a source of knowledge in itself, superior to and independent of sense perceptions. In the seventeenth century, rationalism came to acquire an epistemological importance in describing, "How do we obtain knowledge?" It claimed that reason itself, aided by observation, could provide us with philosophical knowledge, which is true knowledge. This could be arrived at through deduction from necessary ideas (Wight, 1991:15-17).

Rationalism has also a spiritual conception of the universe, which in some way is illusory. This spiritual conception of the universe theory was developed by scholars such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz.

Rationalists hold natural law in high regard. Earlier writers of international law were divided into naturalists, positivists and Grotians.[11] Grotians place emphasis on treaties and customs underlining that both are essential to the law of nations. Rationalism is linked to reason within the concept of natural law and the belief in natural law is a belief in a huge, moral constitution to all created things, including human beings.

Rationalism is an understanding that enduring and permanent principles originate from a source that transcends earthly power. In addition, it is a belief that men and women have an inherent association with this law and some inherent response to it. This is because of their possession of a rational ability. Reason in this respect means the competence to know this natural law and the obligations it imposes. As a result, men and women are in essence rational creatures and reason consequently becomes

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[11] Grotians are taken to be rationalists. Writers on international law also came to be known as 'naturalists'. Naturalists uphold that the solitary law of nations is the law of nature. The foremost naturalist was Pufendorf who understood natural law as one entailing anarchic liberty and not as a principle of social cohesion. Positivists on the other hand sustain the reverse in that the only law of nations is what is found in custom and treaties, thus the law of nature is non-legal and non-existent.

a manifestation of the spiritual brilliance in humans - '*Ratio est radius divini luminis*'. This is the validation for using the word 'rationalist' in relation to international theory (Wight, 1991:14).

On the aspect of human nature, rationalists do not have a definitive position. As a result they are neither pessimistic nor optimistic about human nature. They describe human nature as a kind of 'tension'. In a way, rationalists are seen as towing the middle line as a 'compromise' between anarchy and a perfect harmonious world. For example Taylor (1952: 262) spells it out best when he observes that there is a third way between despair and utopianism; and that is to take the world as it is and improve it by having faith and hope in humankind. He concludes that the rational side of human beings in the end always proves stronger than the irrational one.

Rationalism in essence appeals to reason in both the Christian and secular forms. Scholars of this school view human beings as sinful, pugnacious and irrational. At the same time they perceive individuals as rational beings who have reason and are subsequently capable of succeeding at creating peace and harmony in society. Rationalists acknowledge the fact that society is in most parts a culmination of cooperation amongst rational people. In a way, one could term rationalists as reformers because though they admit the presence of an anarchical society, they reiterate that human beings are gifted with the ability to reason to strive and create harmony and peace in society (Wight, 1991: 19-20).

The rationalists possess firm conceptions of the underpinnings of the international society. There is a solidarity or potential solidarity of states that comprises the international society. Furthermore, the international society and its laws are binding on member states in their relations with one another. With respect to the use of force, rationalists assert that the legitimate use of force or violence is a monopoly of the entire community of states. Consequently, the international society's laws

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sanction certain kinds of wars, a service they render to the entire international society (Butterfield and Wight, 1966: 52-53).

Rationalists assert that the state of nature is still bound by the law of nature (pre-Hobessian moral law of nature). Hence the sovereignty of states is passed on to different states by social contracts and there is a law of nations acknowledged by sovereigns as social contracts and are legally binding and not only a moral imperative. The major assumption amongst rationalists is that law is the source of society and precedes society. Moreover, this law originates from some transcendent source such as God's will. Consequently, there is no absolute distinction between the state of nature and a human beings' soul condition (ibid).

Hugo Grotius' doctrine of sociability explains that it is the social contract that gave way to the condition of sociability, and of the capacity to be social. The law of nature determines sociable behaviour; hence, the state of nature is a condition of sociability that leads to conditions of peace and common interaction, but is at the same time unstable, formless, insecure and liable to collapse into war. The state of war is a state of enmity, malice and mutual destruction; the state of nature on the other hand is one of goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation. Ultimately, a rationalist views the international society as a customary society, one that uses customary law to guide relations though not perfect. It follows that at any given time, the greater part of the amalgam of international relations adopts custom rather than force. To rationalists, the role of force would be to remedy the insufficiencies of custom – force emerges when custom breaks down (Wight, 1991:17-25).

With regards to national power, scholars of this perspective do not put faith in certain conditions of which power (resultant from human beings aggregation in political society) is the most vital. To them, powers are not self-justifying but must be justified by reference to some source outside or beyond itself and are transformed

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into 'authority' (Lauterpach, 1946 and Wight, 1991: 99). Rationalists also hold the premise that human beings are logically and morally superior to the state and that political institutions are made for human beings.

This theoretical perspective embraces 'moral realism' – realism in the classical/philosophical sense, which means that goodness, value and moral norms are all grounded in nature, independent of human interest and opinion. In this sense, moral realism in politics implies the doctrine of natural law - "the law behind the law" (ibid). Natural law therefore assumes respectable philosophical grounds for believing that promises, treaties ought to be honoured and wars should not be waged with unnecessary cruelty to civilians. The sanction of natural law ultimately lies with the human conscience. The doctrine of natural law with its sanctity in human conscience means that the eventual reality of politics and the guarantee of political well-being lies in the individual, passing judgement on the false justice and lawless power of his judges and torturers (Lauterpach, 1946; Van Vollenhoven, 1919 and Wight, 1991:99-102).

Rationalists also have an established view about foreign policy and national interests. Their view of foreign policy is of the assumption of the desirability of co-operation and adopting the principle of concert (togetherness). This perspective seeks security in cooperation and defensive alliances, because in the international society at any given time there are more law-abiding powers that strive to ensure peace is maintained whereas there are aggressive powers that want to upset this peace. To rationalists, this is the key assumption, the chief political interest underlying the international society, which is to hold together all states in the presence of looming anarchy (Shaw, 1995: 21-28, 91-93 and Von Glahn, 1996: 25-30).

On the issue of national interests, rationalists observe that states pursue national interests with varying degrees of consideration for the interests of other states. They also assume a tension of interests between states, which at times can lead to conflict. They do however acknowledge that there is a possibility of mutually adjusting these interests. In other words, there is a partially resoluble tension of interests that is open to reconciliation. It is this belief in the resolution of tension of interests that makes them advocates and theorists of international law and organization (Barker, 200:4-6 and Wight, 1991: 125-135).

2.4. Universalism

The third theoretical perspective in international politics is universalism,[12] also termed Kantianism or idealism. This perspective emphasizes and relies on reason in human affairs, and puts confidence in the peace-building function of the international political system.

Universalism holds that international politics is about relations among the individuals and groups that states are composed of. Accordingly, the highest interest of the individual coincides with that of the larger community (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997:6-11). Moreover, universalists appeal to international morality, in that revolutionary consequences require all individuals to work for global harmony amongst people.

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[12] The teachings of this perspective are further divided into two 'sub-perspectives' depending on their revolutionary or religious nature. Revolutionary teachings emphasize changing the world through revolutions whereas religious teachings focus on changing the world over a period of time by way of religion (also called evolutionary).

Scholars of this perspective also believe in the moral unity of the society of states or international society and those who identify themselves with it. Hence, they advocate this unity as the foremost aim of their international policies.

For universalists, international theory and policy have a missionary disposition. According to Dawson (1950: 12), the historical basis underlying the foundation of the society of states was firstly, the purpose of considering universalism as a means and way of life and secondly, that it was in a way representative of Western civilization. In other words, Western civilization identified itself with universalism. In this regard, the distinguishing factor between Western customs and other world civilizations was its missionary culture — the desire to transmit a continuous series of spiritual and ideological movements. Some examples of international universalists would include the religious universalists[13] of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the French universalists,[14] and the totalitarian universalists of the twentieth century.

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[13] The religious universalists were both Protestant and Catholic. The Catholics asserted that the existing international society of Christendom Europe was being subverted by rebellion and as a result it needed to be reinstated. The Protestant form of universalism found its classic expression in the Calvinists, especially the French Huguenots, and the Catholic form in the Jesuits. The political philosophy of the Calvinists and the Jesuits was influenced by developed along their theories of power based upon popular consent, and of the right to oppose royal governments and despotism (Wight, 1991: 8).

International universalists such as Calvin, came up with a doctrine that stressed the supremacy and sovereignty of God. According to them Calvinists, authority bestowed upon kings and magistrates came from God. For this reason, in the eyes of God, all men were equal and if a king commanded anything immoral or non-religious, the natural duty of obedience changed into the special duty of disobedience. This was the source of the Calvinist doctrine of the duty of resistance to tyrants and the right to depose kings. Though kings had authority from God, the people judged if the king had forfeited that authority. What God was for Calvin, the general will (the social God), was for Rousseau.

[14] A similar view of French universalist international theory is made through their perception of the rights and duties related to the intervention in other states to liberate the adherents of one's own faction, as well as in the doctrine about the nature of the international society.

Although universalists tend to be optimistic and perfectionist about human nature (individuals are naturally good and are destined for salvation), they are at the same time sceptical of the character of human beings. This uncertainty about humans amongst universalists results in different arguments about the nature of individuals. For example, on the one hand, there is an ideological homogeneity among individuals that makes them strive for goals that are of common good to all people (Bull, 1977: 238). On the other hand, there is a pessimistic assumption about human nature. This is because universalists believe that, though people are born free, they are in actuality still in chains — this is the Rousseauite paradox.[15] The paradox comes from the fact that the humans who manage to be exceptions to the rule that all people are naturally good and free, are the very same people who have put other humans in chains.

With regard to international society, universalists would like to revive the underground medieval idea of a simple republic, and solidify the international society into a world state, in order to rebuild it into a super-state. In this way, universalist theory assimilates international relations with a condition of domestic politics. The more the international society is conceived of as a great society/super-state, where individual states are 'citizens' and exercise authority over them (*civitas maxima*), the more international relations can be thought of as representing the domestic politics of the universal '*civitas*'.

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[15] This paradox emerges, for example, in the works of Marx where the world is divided into two spheres: one inhabited by the majority peace-loving people of the world, and the other which is ridden with and controlled by secret enemies (imperialists) and vestiges in the presence of peace loving people. Consequently, it is the duty of the elect, the party — who at times speak of themselves as the majority of the human race — to coerce the remainder of the human race into goodness, into freedom. In universalist perspective, the duty of coercing the human race is often accompanied by extermination. This is an extreme form of optimism of the belief that by decimating the human race, one creates a virtuous world (Wight, 1991: 26-29) or international society.

Universalists therefore, desire to assimilate international politics to domestic politics; they are concerned with aspiration rather than fact. Their major problem is the gap between universalist prescription and the actual state of international relations.

With regard to the concept of national power, proponents of universalism do not find power self-justifying but rather see power as being something beyond itself. Universalists condemn the existing system of power from the political perspective that prescribes human goals, the right to moral judgement and duty of action.

'Force rather than power' is a term used by scholars in this perspective to connote something liberating, in that it destroys established power and bogus authority, and liberates new social elements and impulses. Force is a universalist concept, which has the capacity to overthrow power, to destroy existing political organizations in the name of universalist doctrine, and to facilitate the necessary reconstruction (Carr, 1939: 35-76).

Not all universalists, however, subscribe to force as a means of achieving the *civitas maxima*. Universalists can be divided into hard and soft camps. Hard universalists like Lenin believe in creating a brotherhood of living beings (*i.e. civitas maxima*), in which international politics is assimilated into the condition of domestic politics by violence. On the other hand, soft universalists such as Kant, Nehru, Woodrow Wilson, prefer yearning and talking to achieve their goals (Bull, 1977:252-278 and Wight, 1991: 40-48)

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On the basis of the above overview of the main characteristics of the three theoretical perspectives in international politics, it can be shown that the conceptions

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of human nature, international society, national power and the essence of international politics, differs substantially.

While realists believe that human nature is gloomy and negative and that human being's egoism and hunger for power is the root of all problems, rationalists argue that they possesses a rational ability to reason. It is this reasoning ability that makes men and women rational creatures in essence. Consequently, reason becomes a manifestation of the spiritual brilliance in humans and this makes one have faith and hope in human beings. Universalists tend to be optimistic and perfectionist about human nature (individuals are naturally good and is destined for salvation).

With regard to international society, realists argue that the existing diplomatic system is a network, whose purpose is aggrandisement and defence. In addition, conflict in the international society is the rule rather than the exception. Rationalists however, argue that the solidarity of states is what comprises the international society. Universalists view the international society as a simple republic to solidify the international society into a world state, in order to define it and constitute it as a super-state.

Realists view national power as primary to the existence of states and believe that it is this state power, which forms the basis of morality and law. By extension, this power in all its features is self-justifying. They argue that the major rationale of the state is to maintain and increase power for survival in an anarchical international society, since the 'pressure of conflict' determines a state's policy. Rationalists take a different view in that power is not self-justifying but must be justified by reference to some source outside or beyond itself. Universalists place human goals within the existing system of power. In other words, *human values and power* determine national power. Similarly, the three theoretical perspectives differ in their

understanding of national interests and foreign policy, the two concepts relevant for the analysis in this thesis, which will be examined in the following sections.

The assessment of the three theoretical perspectives has laid the foundation for the analysis of the concepts of 'foreign policy' and 'national interest' in the context of international relations. This framework will consequently help the reader to better understand the determining factors in the foreign policies and national interest of states. In fact, both foreign policy and national interest can be analysed within the context of the three theoretical perspectives. Ultimately, one can determine which type of foreign policy and national interest was pursed by a particular state depending on the prevailing characteristics of its foreign policy

2.5. Foreign Policy and National Interest

2.5.1. The Definition of Foreign Policy

The term 'foreign policy', like most commonly used terms in international relations theory, does not have a generally accepted definition.[16] Scholars differ on foreign policy's definitions, aspects, content, and functions.[17] However, it can be argued that there is a consensus about the *general* meaning of the term and what functions it entails.

There is agreement among a number of scholars (Frankel, 1968: 1 and Coulter, 1991: 272) that foreign policy consists of decisions and actions that involve, to some

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[16] For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the concept of foreign policy see Hudson, (1995: 209-238) and Hermann, (1987).

[17] Said *et al.*, (1995:30-31) note that the definition of foreign policy is problematic. This is because the term refers, on the one hand, to the general principles by which a state governs its relationship with the international political environment. On the other hand, however, the term can be defined as a course of action oriented towards a single objective, and therefore a state can have many policies as its objectives.

extent, relations between one state and others, and at a different level, the choice of directions that one takes towards one's national goals.

Similarly, Holsti, (1972:21) defines foreign policy as the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which those actions are formulated. It is also seen as the pattern of behaviour that one state adopts while pursuing its interests in relation to other states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 478; and Rodee *et al.*, 1983: 458-9).

Foreign policy can also be explained as something 'lesser than' the sum of all policies that have an effect upon national governments relations with other national governments (Millar, 1969:57). This explanation concurs with the argument that foreign policy refers by implication to the actions and purposes of personalised national governments with respect to areas and objects lying beyond their territory (Meehan, 1971: 266).

It has been observed that there are two basic approaches to foreign policy. The first is the ideological approach, whereby the policies of states *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world are merely expressions of prevailing political, social and religious beliefs. Foreign policies that fall under this approach are classified as democratic or totalitarian, libertarian or socialist, and peace-loving or aggressive.

The second approach to foreign policy is analytical. The main idea behind this approach is that foreign policy is based on multiple determinants including a state's historic tradition, geographical location, national interest, purposes and security needs. In order to understand foreign policy, an observer needs to take into account and analyse a host of factors (Macridis, 1962: 1-2). Consequently, whatever definition of foreign policy one uses, that definition can fall under the ideological approach, analytical approach, or can be a combination of both approaches.

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For the purpose of this thesis, however, foreign policy is defined as a policy formulated by a state in relation to other states and external environment. Such a policy includes general orientations and principles on which specific actions for the attainment of objectives/goals of a state are based. These general orientations and specific actions are influenced not only by ideology, but also by a host of other factors, such as geographical location, historical experience, security concerns, size of a state's population, to name but a few.

Nevertheless, it is important to single out one particular factor namely ideology,[18] defined as a system of beliefs, ideas and values characteristic of a group of people or a community. This system forms a lens through which the world is viewed and consequently, ideology influences policy-making and foreign policy-making in particular.[19] The extent of this influence, however, is determined by other factors that also influence foreign policy-making.

As mentioned, there are numerous differences in understanding amongst scholars as to what foreign policy is. For example, in some cases, foreign policy is equated with, or derived from official pronouncements of national governments; in others,

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[18] Macridis (1962:2) has defined ideology as "...a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group of people or community." Evans (1998:236-237) notes that the term means a "...set of assumptions and ideas about social behaviour and social systems, consequently, ideology becomes a lens through which policy-makers perceive their various environments and react accordingly." Similarly, Hague *et al.* (1992:91) view ideology as an organised set/system of beliefs and values about human society. In practice, ideology is identified by the intense desire of its adherents to transform the world in accordance with their key values. For more on ideology and foreign policy, see Carlsnaes (1986).

[19] The importance of ideology to foreign policy-making can be illustrated by numerous historical examples. Nazism and fascism as state ideologies fed the foreign policies of Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy. Similarly, the system of apartheid was based on racist, nationalistic ideology that was reflected in South Africa's foreign policy. Today, the leadership of the new South Africa bases its foreign policy on democratic and liberal ideas, including respect for human rights.

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foreign policy is equated with the actions of states *vis-à-vis* with other governments. More significant differences are visible, however, when one takes a closer look at how foreign policy is viewed by the individual perspectives discussed above.

2.5.2. Realist Conception of Foreign Policy

From a realist perspective, states are the basic units of analysis, which co-exist and collide with each other in the absence of any political superior. And these states are in a constant state of mutual insecurity; thus self-preservation is their foremost concern attainable by self-sufficiency mostly in defence and weapons.

Some scholars argue that states are unable to satisfy their desire for power within the national community and consequently, they project those unsatisfied aspirations onto the international scene where they come into conflict with other states having the same ambitions (Morgenthau, 1966: 97-99). In such an international system, states use their foreign policy to *enhance* their power so they can survive in the system and prevail upon other entities. More power also means more security, both domestic and international. In this system, war is just a pursuance of foreign policy by other means.

The realist perspective, however, is by no means uniform when it comes to an understanding of foreign policy. For example, Rose (1998) distinguishes four approaches within the realist perspective, namely, offensive realism, defensive realism, neo-classical realism and the *innenpolitik* approach (Rose, 1998:144-154). These four approaches to foreign policy take the behaviour of individual states rather than the pattern of outcomes of state relations as their independent variable. They seek to explain what states try to achieve in their external environment and why.

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2.5.2.1. Offensive Realism

Offensive realism or aggressive realism underscores the dominant role of systemic factors. It assumes that international anarchy is generally Hobbesian, apart from situations of bipolarity or nuclear deterrence. Security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximising their relative advantage. In an international society where offensive realism dominates, rational states pursuing security are prone to take actions that can lead to conflict with other states. Domestic differences between countries are considered to be relatively unimportant because pressures from the international system are assumed to be strong, consequently making states behave alike regardless of domestic characteristics. To offensive realists, relative capabilities and the external environment determine a state's foreign policy.

2.5.2.2. Defensive Realists

Defensive realists argue that systemic factors drive some kinds of state behaviour and not others. They assume that international anarchy is often more benign, in that security is in abundance (rather than scarce), and that states learn this over time. In defensive realism, all rational states pursuing security respond to threats that rarely occur. This deters the aggressor and alleviates the need for actual conflict. The exception to this rule exists when certain conditions ensure that states seeking security to fear each other for example when the modes of war favour the offensive state. Foreign policy is therefore an indication that rational states react positively to clear systemic factors. In this regard, states only come into war with each other when security dilemma is heightened. Hence rogue states that misread the security incentives offered by their environment only interrupt this period of lull.

2.5.2.3. Neo-Classical Realism

The third approach, neo-classical realism, explicitly incorporates both the external and internal variables. It also challenges the main elements of the other three realist approaches. Neo-classical realism claims that *innenpolitik* arguments are misguided

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because the single factor dominating a country's foreign policy is their relative material power *vis-à-vis* the rest of the international system. It also attacks both defensive and offensive realism by saying that they are erroneous because their emphasis on state responses to threats overlooks the fact that one's perceptions of threat is partly shaped by one's relative material power.

The unique aspect of neo-classical realism lies in its claim that the impact of material power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex. This is because of the different pressures exerted indirectly by the international system on the powers of states as well as intervening variables at the state/domestic level. To scholars who adopt this view, relative material power constitutes the core of a state's foreign policy. Further, actual political leaders and elites make foreign policy decisions; consequently, it is the perception of the decision-makers (with regards to power) that matters.

2.5.2.4. *Innenpolitik* Conception of Foreign Policy

The most relevant approach for this study is the *innenpolitik* approach, which stresses the dominant influence of domestic factors on foreign policy as opposed to external factors. It is argued that the most common approach to foreign policy analysis has been to assume that foreign policy has its roots in domestic politics (Holsti, 1967 and Rose, 1998).

Authors who adopt this approach claim that internal factors, both political and economic, influence how countries behave towards the world beyond their borders. These factors would include political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or socio-economic structures. In other words, a country's domestic political and economic environment (decision-making, economic situation, policies and the like) determines a country's foreign policy.

There are many variants of the *innenpolitik* approach, based on different domestic independent variables, but they all share a common assumption that foreign policy is the product of a state's internal dynamics.

To explain further the *innenpolitik* approach we can say that the domestic environment[20] forms the background against which policy is made domestically as well as in the international environment (Evans, 1998: 179 and Frankel, 1970: 87). In this regard, foreign policy objectives, decisions and actions are formulated or taken on behalf of the state by individuals and groups of individuals, among other things, to fulfil the general social needs of a state, to improve the economic situation, to achieve lower unemployment, better standards of living and higher *per capita* income, because these can be fulfilled mostly through transactions with other states (Holsti, 1967: 375-387). Furthermore, social and economic needs can be linked to policy outputs; and since economic welfare is considered a prime national value, it can be predicted that a resource-poor country will engage in foreign trade. Consequently, the foreign policy of a country would necessarily reflect its domestic concerns.

Moreover, a policy contributing modestly and consistently to prosperity and the raising of standards of living is viable and essential for any state's foreign policy. Since economic strength has always been an instrument for political power, every government is compelled to pursue a policy designed to further the acquisition of wealth. Ultimately, the acquisition of wealth becomes a way for a nation to become powerful. Stimulating industrial production at home thus becomes a normal function of the state.

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[20] This includes, among other things, the people in power, political parties, public opinion, pressure groups and decision-makers, the international system and relations between states.

It must be noted that even though the *innenpolitik* approach has considerable explanatory value, it fails to explain why states with similar domestic systems often act differently in the international arena and why unlike states in similar situations often act alike. Furthermore, scholars have emphasized that this foreign policy approach disregards the influence of external factors.

The operational definition of foreign policy used in this research allows for both systemic and internal factors, which can influence a state's foreign policy. This study is predominantly underpinned by the *innenpolitik* approach, however, despite its drawbacks; it is useful when one tries to explain how the domestic concerns of a government influence the actions of the government taken in the international environment.

2.5.3. Rationalism and Foreign Policy

The rationalist view of foreign policy includes the desirability of co-operation and adoption of the principle of concert (togetherness). This perspective seeks security in co-operation and defensive alliances, because in the international society at any given time there are more law-abiding powers that strive to ensure the maintenance of peace than there are aggressive powers that want to upset this peace. To rationalists, this is the key assumption and the chief political interest underlying the international society, which is to hold together all states in the presence of looming anarchy. In this regard, Butterfield and Wight (1966: 51-73) argue that co-operation under this perspective is based on economic, commercial interdependence, cultural links and the acceptance of humanitarian duties.

The basic principle of rationalists is to unite and influence states. Rationalists believe that it is easier to deal with a united satisfied state than with a multitude of small frustrated ones. The principles of unity and influence rest on two assumptions: that goodwill can evoke friendship and reciprocal goodwill, and that common

interests can be found through this co-operation. This is the principle of concert as it was experienced in the nineteenth century, the aim of which was to "neutralise and bind up all the selfish aims of the powers and establish a system of [checks and balances]" (Jones, 1924: 372; Cecil, 1921:331). Apart from being the most elaborate theoretical formulation of the principle of concert in the nineteenth century, it is also the foundation of the doctrine of collective security (Wight, 1991: 153).

This view of foreign policy is based on the assumptions that all states, if not most, abide by the rule of law and they strive to maintain peace. In addition states under this view are not aggressive but rather they cooperate with one another for the greater good. Likewise, unity and influence is important so that goodwill can evoke friendship and reciprocal goodwill, and that common interests can be found through this co-operation. Evidence of this trend can be observed in regional integration.

If one were to apply the rationalist view of foreign policy in this study, then it can be observed that some states do espouse such foreign policy. For example, there are states that view the world as abiding by the rule of law and strive to maintain global peace. In addition, governments promote cooperation at the economic, commercial levels as they endure to ensure interdependence as part of their 'humane' responsibilities. This level of cooperation further ensures cultural links and the acceptance of humanitarian duties and values across borders.

2.5.4. The Universalist View of Foreign Policy

The views of the universalists differ from the realists and rationalists in the sense that universalists wish to abolish the individual state's foreign policy altogether and this can lead to a global foreign policy (isolation of national interests). Universalists focus on the harmonization of state interests; hence this would require a 'universal foreign policy', a sort of global policy that would place the interests of the world above state interests, which would ultimately support state national interests, already

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harmonized in the past. Universalists do not believe in the international society but rather in *human life*. As a result, they would prefer to do away with the entire traditional diplomatic system and rely solely on beliefs and ideology. The consequence of the universalist dislike for diplomacy is the devaluation of diplomatic activity and decreasing autonomy of formal diplomats.

Since universalists favour a moral isolationist stand, the interest of the universal state is therefore seen as an amalgam of righteousness and reason; and subsequently, universalism appeals to world public opinion and does away with diplomacy and divide and rule tactics.[21]

Universalists believe that if one has the right kind of state, one will also have the right kind of policy. Hence, scholars such as Laski (1941: 181), Dutt (1936: 238) and Wight (1991: 107) see the foreign policy of a given state as a function of its inner system of class relations. In this regard, the nation state will and does act towards other nation-states as it acts towards its own citizens.

Under this view of foreign policy, the research would conclude that individual foreign policies tend to be subordinated to the harmonization of global interests that would ultimately lead to a global foreign policy. Although difficult to achieve, one may observe symptoms of such a global policy within international organisations

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[21] The principle of divide and rule is an application of realist foreign policy in international relations. For example, in the early nineteenth century Latin American states accused the United States (US) of pursuing this policy in the western hemisphere. The Americans boycotted the first inter-American congress in Panama in 1826 to create a common policy in foreign affairs because they said they had their own system. Furthermore, the Latin Americans believed that the US played off Brazil against Argentina, dictatorships against democracies and revolutionaries against liberals. This policy was aimed to keep European powers out of Latin America (by proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine), while at the same time wielding supremacy through the same unscrupulous methods that the US condemned other powers for.

such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, Green Peace and so on – the focus being the harmonization of interests for the greater good of the world (world interests).

Likewise, states also pursue harmonization policies in their relations with other states by placing emphasis on the interests of individuals and not the state(s) since ultimately the interests of humans are the interests of the world. This attitude would then be the 'norm' across the world. Examples of these prescriptions for behaviour would be the promotion of human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms and so on.

In sum, a country can apply one or more or all of the above views in its foreign policy. It is worth noting that these views are not static and can be applied in isolation or in combination with one another. Hence a country exhibiting one view today can espouse a different one tomorrow depending on the issue at hand. In this study, we shall observe some of these views individually or in combination with other perspectives.

2.6. The Concept of National Interest

A concept closely linked to the concept of foreign policy is that of national interest. National interest is a vague, confusing and ambiguous concept because it assumes a variety of meanings in the different contexts in which it is used, and often these meanings (contexts) cannot be reconciled. For example, national interests have been referred to simply as matters of importance to a state (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 482). Other scholars have defined national interest as a general, long-term and continuing purpose that the state, the nation, and the regime would ideally see themselves as serving at any given time (Said *et al.*, 1995: 27), whereas others still

have termed national interests as a collection of goods and values that a state seeks in the world (Coulter, 1991: 271).

Ultimately, because of the various definitions of the concept, the concept becomes somewhat vague and loses much of its analytical usefulness. The definition of the concept becomes even more complicated, since, in practice, each state determines its own national interest. National interest depends largely on the power of the state, on its system of government, social structure, degree of dependence on other states, and so on. In this regard, Frankel (1968:130) defines the concept as the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts, the total sum of all national and state values.

The problems incurred at arriving at a definition of 'national interest' are numerous. Firstly, the term 'national' refers to both the nation (social group) and to the state (political organisation). Some authors such as Rosenau (1968: 34) have distinguished between the use of the concept for political analysis and political action. National interest as an analytical tool is used to describe, explain or evaluate the sources/adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As a tool for political action on the other hand, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. The use of the concept for both analysis and action, however, refers to what is best for a national society. This analytical distinction still does not offer the means for further analysis or for empirical investigation, however. When the term national interest is discussed, it is sometimes difficult to assess in which of the two senses the concept is used.

Secondly, within each distinction, and depending on who makes the argument, there is no clear-cut difference between the use of the concept, which can have two meanings: for analytical purposes or for empirical investigation. For example, when it is argued that it is in the national interest of a member of the Southern African

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Development Conference (SADC) to maintain the organization, it involves either the discussion of SADC as an instrument of national strategy or as a prescription to maintain or reduce defences *vis-à-vis* non-member states.

Thirdly, the various authors adopt two fundamentally different approaches to the analysis of the national interest. On one hand, there are the objectivists who assume that national interests can be objectively defined and examined with the help of some objective criteria. Subjectivists, on the other hand, interpret the concept as a constantly changing pluralistic set of subjective preferences that can be observed through the study of decision-making.

Fourthly, the definition of the concept further depends upon the position a person takes within the spectrum of several pairs of extremes such as altruistic-egotistic (ideals *versus* self-interests, idealists *versus* realists), short and long term concerns, active-reactive, radical-conservative, hard and liberal minded, traditional-innovating, collectivist-individualist, and so on. In these cases, the attitudes of individuals can be ranked after some empirical indicators have measured them. In addition, the blurred lines between the domestic and international activities of the state add to the confusion since values pursued within these two areas of activity are not necessarily identical and receive different priorities (Frankel, 1970:15-17; Barber and Smith, 1974: 24-29).

Though confusing and at times ambiguous in their interpretation, national interests are often expected to be permanent or extremely durable. Accordingly, the national interests of great powers and the methods by which they are to be secured are also impervious to ideological and institutional changes (Morgenthau, 1962: 199). The permanence of national interests, however, is relative, and is subject to re-interpretation in relation to changes in power relations.

This ambiguity in the meaning of 'national interest' can be partly explained by the evolution of the concept. Natural interest's origins can be traced to the early stages of the modern state-formation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, first in Italy and later in England (Beard, 1934). Before the emergence of nationalism, other terms were used to describe national interests such as: 'will of the leader', 'dynastic interests', or *'raison d'état'*. These were gradually replaced by reference to the nation. American statesmen have also extensively used this term since the inception of the American constitution. Likewise, other terms such as 'national honour', 'public interest', 'general will' were used (Frankel, 1970: 20).

In practice, these interests remain vague and obscure because nations act in order to satisfy their best interests, and with time and circumstance these interests change. Furthermore, the national interest is what the power holders in a state seek to maintain and enhance – what the decision-makers suppose that interest to be. Additionally, what is vital for a state in foreign affairs is never self-evident because people are bound to differ over what constitutes the vital goals for a state; hence, the national interest is not a single goal. Moreover, statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and since power is an elusive and ambiguous concept, this circumstance further increases the vagueness and obscurity of the concept (Rosenau, 1974: 186-191; Morgenthau, 1966: 7-10).

Despite all these problems of the definition of national interest, some authors have attempted to make a useful classification of the concept. In order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the concept of national interest, it is useful to consider the following classification of the national interest in its various forms.

2.6.1. The Classification of National Interest

A number of scholars such as Frankel (1970:31-38), Kirk (1952:110-115) and Rosenau (1969) have proposed a functional classification of the term 'national interest'. In this regard, they identify three levels of classification:

A. aspirational;

B. operational; and

C. explanatory and polemical.

The third category overlaps with the first two; hence, this classification is not quite precise.

At the aspirational level, national interest refers to some ideal set of goals that a state would like to pursue or realize if it were possible. If national interest is professed at this level alone, then it is not actively pursued but it is relevant nevertheless. It does, however, indicate the general direction desired, and given the opportunity by means of favourable changes in the environment or in capabilities, it may become operational. Some characteristics of aspirational interests are:

- they are normally long-term interests;
- they are generally rooted in history and/or ideology;
- they command more attention from an opposition free of the restraints of and pre-occupation with the tasks of governing, than from the government itself;
- they provide purpose or direction and even a sense of hope (Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism);
- they need not be fully articulated and co-ordinated and can be contradictory;
- they do not require a 'feasibility study' and are rarely priced; and
- they are determined by political will rather than by capabilities, ideology being a strong determinant in this case, while the influence of power is ambivalent.

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At the operational level, national interests refer to the total sum of interests and policies actually pursued, and possess the following characteristics:

- they are usually short-term interests capable of achievement within the foreseeable future;
- they often originate from considerations of expediency and necessity;
- they are the major concerns of the government/party in power;
- they are used in a descriptive form rather than a normative form;
- because of the practical problems of implementation, contradictions among them are less easily tolerated than among aspirations;
- they are generally translated into policies based upon the assessment of their prospects of success and policies which can be approximately aggregated; and
- the crucial variable in their determination is found in capabilities rather than in political will. Hence, in this case, the classification of states by power is more relevant than by ideology.

On the explanatory and polemical level, the concept of national interest is used to explain, evaluate, rationalise or criticise foreign policy. In political argument, this explanatory and polemical level sets out to 'prove' itself right and others wrong, and the arguments are thus used for this purpose rather than for description or prescription. Examples of these are official documents published and statements by heads of government or foreign ministries made in parliament, parliamentary debates and discussions in the media.

Subsequently, each of the three theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter can be analysed in the context of the three functional levels of analysis namely, aspirational, operational, and explanatory/polemical.

2.7. 'The Debate' on the Concept of National Interest between the Three Perspectives

Realists define interests in terms of power, which means that in international relations the struggle for the acquisition and use of power by whatever means is the primary interest of a state. The basic national interest is to maintain freedom of action. Subsequently, a state that is able to preserve its freedom of action and consulting its own interests implies that it has the exclusive right to decide what its interests are, hence, no outside power can or may define its interests or duties.

In the pursuance of its national interests, however, a state is confronted with other states wishing to exert their wills and secure their interests. In all international systems the wills clash and interests conflict, periodically leading to wars and the disappearance of some states.

Within the realist perspective, however, there are differences as regards the definition and explanation of the concept of national interest. For example, Niebuhr (McKeogh, 1997: 126-135) asserts that every nation acts on the basis of and is guided by its self-interests. He correctly observes that nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principles, and have competed more than they have cooperated. Kissinger suggests that this type of state behaviour has not changed from the inception of the state nor is it likely to change in the decades ahead.

Morgenthau, (1951: 117-118) defines interests in terms of power.[22] He describes national interests as a list of essential national goals. Morgenthau (Robinson, 1969: 183-185) also defines the concept in many ways to cover a wide variety of meanings

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[22] Bringing the desires of a nation into line with the power available for the pursuit of those desires, and the designation of those interests that are to be pursued at all costs (Robinson, 1969:185).

such as: common interests and conflicting interests, primary and secondary interests, inchoate interests, community of interests, vital interests, identical and complementary interests, legitimate interests, specific and limited interests, material interests, hardcore interests, necessary and viable interests.[23] These terms can be divided into two general categories: the national interests of a single nation and the degree of commonality of interests between two or more nations. In sum, the acquisition and use of power by whatever means is the primary interest of a state; and the idea of national interest defined in terms of power is the core of state behaviour.

In this regard, it has been noted that in foreign policy the objectives should be and are defined in terms of the national interest; consequently, the type of interest determining political action at a particular time depends on the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is made (Morgenthau, 1966: 525-530). National interest, therefore, is *relative* because nations do what they do in order to satisfy

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[23] a. Primary interests include protection of the nation's physical, political and cultural identity and survival against encroachment. These interests can never be compromised and states will defend them at any cost.

b. Secondary interests include protecting citizens abroad and maintaining immunities for the nation's diplomats.

c. Permanent interests are relatively constant over long periods of time, and vary with time, for example Britain's interest over many centuries in navigating the seas.

d. Variable interests are those interests that a nation at any given time chooses to regard as its national interests.

e. General interests are those which the nation can apply in a positive manner to a large geographic area, to a large number of nations, or in several specific fields such as economics, trade, diplomatic relations and so on.

f. Specific interests are those positive interests not included in (e). These interests are usually closely defined in time and / or space and are often the logical outgrowth of general interests.

g. Identical interests between nations are those that nations hold in common for example the United Kingdom and the US have had an interest in assuring that the European continent is not dominated by a single power.

h. Complementary interests between nations are those that, though not identical, are capable of forming the basis of agreement on specific issues.

i. Conflicting interests are those not included in (g) and (h).

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their best interests depending on the time and circumstance. This is done with the goal of increasing a state's power relative to that of other states.

When it comes to the issue of national interests and morality, these two are distinct and combined at the same time. It is worthwhile observing that the state has no moral right to make sacrifices of the nation for the sake of certain moral principles, but rather the highest moral principle must be survival (Morgenthau, 1951: 985), since the state is entrusted with the very lives of its citizens. Hence, the state must ensure their well-being.

On the other hand, some scholars observe that national interests *are* a country's interests if they serve as a means to creating a moral or ideological objective for the country (Bull, 1977:52-53; 66-67). In other words, if the state's interests were in harmony with the common interests of the world, such a situation would consequently create global stability. The assumption here is the harmonization of all interests that are not concrete but general.

Rationalists take a rather different view of national interest. They argue that states pursue national interests with varying degrees of consideration for the interests of other states, but they also acknowledge that there is a tension of interests between states,[24] which at times can lead to conflicts. Although rationalists (Wight, 1991: 128; Butterfield and Wight, 1966: 51-73) recognize that the reactions of other states are part of the complexity of the situation within which national self-interest must be pursued, they also believe that mutual adjustment or regulation of these interests is possible by reaching a compromise between a state's interests and those of other states. Thus the ultimate aim of rationalist foreign policy is to strike a balance

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[24] In rationalist theory, there is a resolvable tension between different interests of states, and a balance between the interests of the international society as a whole. Individual power is possible to achieve.

between the national interest and the wider interest of the other states.[25] The belief in the resolution of tension of interests makes rationalists advocates and theorists of international law and organization (Barker, 2000: 4-6 and Von Vollenhoven, 1919).

While rationalists recognize that national interests have an important place in a state's foreign policy, universalists believe there is a natural harmony of interests that people are morally bound by. These, however, are not state-determined but are human-based interests. Rationalists also emphasize that the interest of a unified world is definable and achievable by the inevitable progress of history. According to universalists, the general idea behind the inevitable merger of various interests into generally-agreed global interests is what is known as the 'harmony of interests', 'union of interests' or 'solidarity of interests' (Wight, 1991: 114-119).

Taking account of their views regarding the harmony of interests, universalists can be seen as naive or idealistic since conflicting interests seem to predominate in today's world. However, the universalist perspective stresses that above all these conflicting interests, there are overriding concerns which ultimately require a universal foreign policy with the interest of the world's population in mind, a sort of world policy. Ultimately, all states would pursue these so-called 'overriding world interests' together in support of national interests.

The final stage of this process would be the emergence of a universal state, which would determine and express the real interest and will of the international community. Subsequently, such a state would be able to define its interests in relation to those of other states. It follows that the universal state would tend to

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[25] Though it is important to define another state's national interests and duties, it is possible to identify common international interests, which include particular national interests, through constitutional machinery and organizations of the international society.

inform other states of their business and pose as their protector at the same time (Wight, 1991: 117).

Therefore, as opposed to the realist perspective, which argues that states have to (selfishly) promote their own national interests in the absence of common interests, universalists take their belief in the 'commonality of interests'. They go even further than the rationalists by arguing that the highest interest of every individual coincides with that of the larger community. Individual states are merely a stage in the process of creation of a universal state; thus their interests are important as far as they promote universal ones.

2.8. Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine the debate around three theoretical perspectives; namely realism, rationalism and universalism. According to some scholars these three perspectives make up the major contending issues in international relations and offer explanations on how people should view the relations between states and further, how international relations should be conducted. Consequently, this chapter has also shown that each perspective has its own more or less elaborate explanation as regards the essence of international politics.

It has been shown that realists have a rather gloomy view of human nature where conflict and power are the rule rather than the exception and are inevitable. Rationalism, on the other hand, is premised on the assumption that reason is a source of knowledge and that the rational side of human beings always proves stronger than the irrational one in making decisions. Universalists appeal to international morality, in that revolutionary consequences require all individuals to work for global harmony amongst people. They believe in the moral unity of the

international society. This unity has a missionary character as the foremost aim of their international policies.

One can ultimately conclude that these theoretical perspectives are useful 'analytic tools' that help us to describe and explain situations and sometimes even predict future developments. Therefore, it is important to understand the main premises of each perspective and the differences between them in order to apply them to the realities of international relations. This is important within the dynamic, shifting context of the international relations arena, especially since depending on the issue that needs to be analysed - one or more theoretical perspectives can be applied.

This chapter has also attempted to show that the concepts of foreign policy and national interest are closely linked, since national interest ultimately leads to foreign policy action. In other words, foreign policy action is an extension and a product of a state's national interest. The theoretical background in this chapter has given the necessary insight into the factors that influence a state's foreign policy behaviour and explain how this behaviour is linked to its national interests.

Clearly what emerges from the foregoing analysis is that international relations (as well as a state's foreign policy) cannot be explained by one perspective only. For example, international relations are not purely about a struggle for power and supremacy. States do not engage in constant wars against each other, but these phenomena are present nevertheless.

Moreover, it can be argued that the analysis in this chapter will help explain Pretoria's foreign policy between 1994 and 1999, since each perspective described in this chapter has some explanatory value concerning the foreign policy of South Africa and states in general. The foreign policy of a modern state, therefore, is a mixture of realist, rationalist and universalist 'orientations'. As a result, we can

describe a foreign policy as realist, rationalist or universalist, depending on which 'elements' dominate a country's foreign policy in a particular period. Every foreign policy, however, whether realist, rationalist or universalist, is aimed at attaining national interests.

It has been observed in this chapter that the concept of national interest is an elusive one. This is because the term 'national interest' does not refer or confine itself to one particular objective or goal, since states pursue a multiplicity of goals. When all these goals are put together, they form the national interest of that state; and since these goals change over time, so does the national interest of that state.

The function of a state's foreign policy is to determine the hierarchy of these national interests, and to examine the national interests and principles of other states' foreign policies revealed in practice.

In the following chapters the conclusions of this theoretical chapter will be applied. More importantly, the chapters will attempt to show how the friction between universalism and realism in foreign policy can arise when universalist national interests are pursued in relation to 'pariah states', and when economic national interests are at stake.

The next chapter begins with the analysis of post-apartheid South African foreign policy in the making between 1990 and 1994. A historical overview of post-apartheid South African foreign policy will be necessary for a better understanding of the foreign policy principles that began to be developed before the elections of 1994. These principles can be described as universalist and they were influenced by the ANC's struggle for equality and liberation as well as the ideology that informed that struggle.

3. THE ORIGINS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONCEPTION OF ITS PRINCIPLES BETWEEN 1990 AND 1994

3.1. Introduction

In 1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections, which symbolically ended the apartheid era. As expected, the ANC convincingly won the elections and soon established control of the government. The new government was going to make a clean break with the undemocratic practices of the former apartheid regime, install democracy and advocate the respect of fundamental human rights and liberties.

The new government headed by Nelson Mandela, however, faced many challenges. Among the challenges was the problem that democratic South Africa had to convince its neighbouring states that it would pursue a different foreign policy to that of the apartheid regime. Thus in 1994, the ANC published a comprehensive foreign policy document, which included principles of South Africa's future foreign policy. Since the ANC's history revolved around the struggle for liberation and human rights, it was not surprising that these principles included the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and international law.

This chapter will investigate the origins of the new South Africa's foreign policy by examining the history of the ruling party and its foreign policy. It will attempt to show that while the ANC's foreign policy was concretized in the four-year period from 1990 to 1994, the making of that foreign policy began in the mid-1980s. Since this process was based on its ideology of a liberation movement, the foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa also reflected that ideology.

3.2. The African National Congress' Foreign Policy in the Making

The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 as the voice of black South Africans. Even though between 1950 and 1959 the ANC focused its resources mainly on the domestic political struggle, and paid little attention to issues of foreign policy at this time, the foreign policy[26] of this movement can be traced back to the Freedom Charter of 1955.

In this regard, the ANC did include some elements of its future foreign policy in the Freedom Charter of 1955. According to the Charter, South Africa was committed to respecting the rights and sovereignty of all nations and to strive to maintain world peace and settlement of all international disputes by negotiation not war. In addition, it recognized the right of the people of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which were protectorates at the time, to decide their own future and the right of all African peoples to independence and self-government, which were to represent the basis of close co-operation (Meli, 1988: 210-213).

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[26] The use of the term foreign policy to explain the ANC's international activities indicates the unique position of liberation movements as non-state actors (NSAs) in the international system, which seeks to encompass the state itself. Taylor (1984:3, 17-20) argues that although the primary actors in world politics are nation-states, NSAs are also entities in the international political system. These NSAs possess the following characteristics: they are transnational (they consist of individuals and/or groups residing in two or more states) and are formally organized; they seek to settle disputes and "speak with one voice" to more powerful non-member states or within international organizations. Furthermore, NSAs can be classified into four categories: economic, security, political and cultural/ideological functional groups. Consequently, NSAs are considered multipurpose organizations with their political functions being the most salient. They are also known as international non-governmental organizations.

NSAs formally declare the purposes of their organization in a charter that legally binds the members of the organization in a set of principles. Alternatively, if the intended functions are not stated in a public document then these can be gathered from public statements of the group's leaders or by examining the long-term behaviour of the organization or group (Taylor, 1984:21-29).

As a result of its anti-apartheid activities, the ANC was banned by law on 30 March 1960, nine days after the Sharpeville massacre. The ANC was to remain banned together with other organizations such as the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) until the historic lifting of the ban by President De Klerk on 2 February 1990.

However, two days before the banning of the ANC, Oliver Tambo (National Executive member and Secretary General) was instructed to leave the country and set up an External Mission to lobby for outside support.[27] The ANC External Mission together with *Umkhonto We Sizwe* (MK) or 'Spear of the Nation' training camps was set up in Tanzania (Benson, 1966: 256 and Gibson, 1972). On 28 March 1960, Oliver Tambo slipped out of South Africa and went on to establish the ANC's first overseas office in London.[28]

As a consequence of the ban the ANC was forced to go into exile and its members were left to continue the struggle by the only other means left to them — the use of force and other illegal means. The result was the formation of MK as the military wing of the ANC.

Meanwhile, the government was putting more pressure on the ANC in the early 1960's with the arrests, detentions or killings of senior ANC members to the point that the movement was almost eliminated both politically and militarily. As the South African government's actions began having an effect on the ANC leadership

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[27] Tambo's initial task was to raise funds after setting up the External Mission and represent the ANC at international organizations (Tambo, 1987: 39-41). Thomas, (1996: 109) observes that the ANC created the External Mission for a more permanent diplomatic presence and to mobilize international solidarity against apartheid while at the same time giving it a more direct and permanent access to the UN.

[28] The ANC's main offices were in Dar-Es-Salaam and London. In early 1962, the ANC set up offices in Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Dar es Salaam and London (Thomas, 1996:32, 42).

domestically, the party met in the former Bechuanaland in October 1962 to try and rectify the organization. It was here that party delegates set out the framework of ANC foreign policy in exile by endorsing the military campaign and the policy of seeking foreign assistance through diplomacy and fund-raising activities conducted by the External Mission (Alden, 1993: 64). It can be observed, however, that Alden's position did not represent the ANC's actions across the board. This is because the meeting in Bechuanaland was to take stock of the party's performance and map the way forward. Amongst other issues discussed were strategies that would be adopted in order to realise their goals.

On the military front, the ANC faced problems within the first decade of its struggle from exile. In 1966, there was a lot of restlessness in the MK camps and the ANC encountered the problem of incipient mutiny within MK. This situation continued, leading up to the Wankie campaign of 1967[29] where the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the ANC forces engaged Rhodesian forces, resulting in heavy casualties on the side of both the ANC and ZAPU. The consequence of this defeat and subsequent demoralization led to the calling of a conference at Morogoro, Tanzania in 1969.

The main concern of the conference was to take stock of military strategy after the Wankie incident, to restore the confidence of ANC members in the National Executive and to re-design its political strategy (ANC, 1985: 8 and Sechaba, 1970: 2-3). It is more probable, however, that the conference was not necessarily convened to restore confidence of the party members, but rather to chart a way forward for the party, since the lack of confidence was not really an issue as it could easily be raised especially after the Wankie incident.

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[29] Thomas, (1996: 80) has observed that the ANC's alliance with ZAPU underscored its commitment to liberation struggle across Africa as well as its commitment to African unity.

The conference was also an opportunity for the members to convince the ANC to open up its membership to non-black members. This subsequently strengthened the commitment outlined in the 1955 Freedom Charter to a class rather than racial analysis of South Africa's condition. The result of the conference was that the ANC admitted new members, adopted a document entitled *Strategy and Tactics*, which was a scaled down version of the ANC's programme, and that new officers were elected and non-blacks became members of the party.

As part of the new strategy, the ANC recruited thousands of young South Africans leaving the country to take up the armed struggle abroad. Although most of them were Black Consciousness (BC) radicals, the ANC had the task of recruiting them and converting them into loyal ANC soldiers/members (Ellis, 1991: 445 and McKinley, 1997). These authors viewed the BC's position as 'radical' since it was a move away from the 'norm' at the time. It can also be argued that the BC was geared to use 'practical means' to ensure their voice was heard. Consequently, BC members found that they could get 'a voice' by joining the ANC.

These new recruits enabled MK to re-launch the armed struggle for the first time since the Rivonia raid in 1963, when South African police arrested the leadership of the ANC.[30] The ANC strategy was to a build a programme of armed machinery especially through the Special Operations Unit (SOU), which carried out the attacks on the oil from coal plant at Sasolberg and on the military headquarters at Voortrekkerhoogte in 1963 (Ellis, 1991: 447 and Sechaba, 1971:14). In addition, the External Mission was now going to play a vital role in the military aspect of the struggle and not concentrating solely on diplomacy. However, it is worth noting that this approach by the ANC was not 'militaristic' in nature as the above authors would

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[30] Nelson Mandela was arrested in 1962. Prior to the Rivonia arrests, the ANC was active within South Africa by having its own underground structures for the pursuance of the armed struggle (Thomas, 1996: 35). These arrests symbolized the transition of ANC strategy from selective sabotage to armed struggle (ANC, 1970: 24).

have us believe but rather that it was strategic, since it needed military precision to effect the ANC's plan of action.

The apartheid regime's response to these attacks was the destabilization, murder, cross-border raids and abductions that began after 1981 with the aim of defeating MK's guerrilla war. The consequences of this response were the destabilization and disruption of MK's logistics network, which led to the frustration of MK soldiers culminating in mutinies in the camps in Angola in early 1984 (for example the MK camp in Pango).[31]

Meanwhile, the ANC exploited the events occurring inside South Africa by 1984, which were ushered in by the Vaal Triangle uprising that soon spread throughout South Africa, and later resulted in a state of emergency proclaimed by Pretoria in 1986. As the unrest continued within South Africa, the ANC convened the Kabwe Consultative Conference in 1985, where a successful proposal by the party removed all the remaining racial barriers to membership of the ANC's governing body (NEC) and the organization was set to become racially all-inclusive as it sent out its forceful anti-apartheid message to the world.

On the diplomatic front, the foreign policy of the ANC had undergone considerable changes from the time it was a liberation movement to the period when it became the ruling party in South Africa. The ANC had to modify the policies it started out with because of the changed domestic and international environment.

As mentioned earlier, the ANC changed its view of South African society by placing emphasis on the democratization of the country, which consequently opened up its membership to non-blacks. Furthermore, the ANC's foreign policy was influenced

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[31] The ringleaders of the mutiny were publicly executed after the loyalists took back control of the camps (Ellis, 1991: 446).

by its resentment of the lack of assistance from the West and general imperialist ideals on account of two factors: firstly, the failure of its diplomacy and endeavours to get world public opinion on its side in the 1960s, especially in convincing Western states to impose economic sanctions on Pretoria through the UN; and secondly, the OAU's unreliable support for the armed struggle, which became evident in 1967, when the Liberation Committee failed to provide adequate support for the ANC-ZAPU offensive in Rhodesia (Chakaodza, 1990 and Thomas, 1996: 150).

It is important to note that one of the reasons the ANC failed to garner world public opinion was because most Western states continued to trade with Pretoria despite the South African government's apartheid laws and treatment of the majority of its citizens. In addition, the OAU's inability to support the Wankie offensive in Rhodesia was a result of the inadequate financial capacity of the OAU as well as lack of unity within the organization itself regarding the question of how to deal with Pretoria, since some African states had cordial informal relations with Pretoria.

Despite these setbacks, the ANC's diplomacy was successful in many ways. The ANC's External Mission grew in size and importance as the ANC's ability to operate within South Africa became restricted. For example, in addition to the London offices, the ANC opened offices in New York as well as in other European countries.[32] ANC diplomacy at this point was geared at publicizing the injustices brought about by apartheid, and at the same time effecting the isolation of South

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[32] Between 1960 and 1990, when the ANC was in exile, it acted as a government-in-exile and as such was accorded diplomatic status by a number of countries around the world. By 1988, the ANC had 33 offices around the world (Norval, 1990:183) and an even larger number of states and organizations recognized its legitimacy. The organizations mentioned above included the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN (which included the UN Special Committee on Apartheid). This list of countries that were members of the NAM included Algeria, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Kuwait, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Republic of Congo, Oman, Cameroon, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Africa. For this reason, the establishment of the Special Committee on Apartheid by the UN in 1962, which acted on behalf of the ANC's interests, supplemented ANC's endeavours. Consequently, the UN regularly drafted resolutions condemning apartheid. These resolutions included a voluntary ban on arms sales passed by the Security Council in 1963 (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 79-80; Mandela, 1994b).[33]

Most of the ANC's UN activities were confined to the Special Committee on Apartheid's Sub-Committee on Petitions until 1974,[34] when it was given observer status in the Special Committee.[35] The ANC's communications and petitions to the Sub-Committee revolved around four issues: the implementation of apartheid, the political situation in South Africa, the need for economic sanctions, and the release of political prisoners (Thomas, 1996:112).

Moreover, the ANC's activities and roles in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) played an important part in the liberation struggle. The ANC supported socialist and nationalist movements that emphasized their anti-imperialist commitment (Thomas, 1996: 98). In addition to the support by socialist and nationalist movements, the ANC received the support of Islamic states such as Iran, which resulted in the suspension of oil shipments to South Africa (Kimche, 1973: 101). This would be understandable since Pretoria had

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[33] Although it took the UN longer to endorse the armed struggle than the OAU and NAM, by the end of the 1960s the General Assembly began to support armed struggle in South Africa because the Western permanent members on the Security Council refused to implement mandatory economic sanctions on South Africa (Thomas, 1996: 117).

[34] The ANC first came before the Security Council (together with other liberation movements in Africa) during the Council's special session in Addis Ababa in 1972 (Bailey, 1988: 132-138).

[35] The ANC and PAC were granted permanent observer status at the request of the Special Committee against Apartheid. In 1975 the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo addressed the General Assembly for the first time (UN Yearbook 1975:138). He did so again in 1982 and the ANC's Permanent UN observer Johnny Makatini addressed the Assembly in 1983 (Sechaba, February 1984:7-11).

good relations with Israel, a country that had enemies throughout the Middle East, and which continued to support the apartheid regime.

Other tangible benefits that the ANC received were the NAM and OAU's influence on the development of anti-apartheid diplomacy at the UN in the following ways: firstly, the non-aligned states formed a caucusing group at the UN to influence the General Assembly's agenda (Mandela, 1994 and Peterson, 1986: 40);[36] secondly, the non-aligned conferences developed positions on South African issues that were adopted and later introduced as resolutions within the UN (Singham, 1977: 246); thirdly, the non-aligned summits called for greater co-operation with the UN's anti-apartheid activities; and finally, the non-aligned conferences included topics that were directed to Pretoria's isolation and thus relevant to ANC diplomacy. For example, at the 1972 NAM foreign ministers meeting in Guyana, the discussions revolved around working papers on better NAM co-ordination at the UN and a paper on decolonization (Jankowitsch and Sauvant, 1978:698).

In its struggle against the apartheid regime, the ANC's affiliated itself with the SACP, which brought some changes to the ANC's foreign policy. Firstly, there was the formalization of the Revolutionary Council — the joint ANC-SACP executive body for administering the armed struggle — and the adoption of democratic centralism, which sharpened the decision-making powers of the movement. Secondly, the resources of the Soviet Union and its allies were at the disposal of the ANC, giving it unlimited access to training and material.[37] Thirdly, the association between the ANC and the SACP meant that there was greater ideological cohesion between the ANC and the Soviet Union from the late 1960s (Thomas, 1996: 158-159).

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[36] In 1975 the General Assembly asserted for the first time that South African liberation movements contributed to the "purposes of the UN" (UN Resolution 3411 B (XXX) 1975).

[37] After Stalin's death, Soviet foreign policy began to support bourgeois nationalist leaders in the Third World, ignoring the fact that they were not communist (Thomas, 1996: 59).

The 1960s and 1970s saw more African nations gain independence, especially in Southern Africa. This meant that the ANC could gain support from 'friendly' African states in its fight against apartheid. For example, the collapse of the Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola led to Marxist-Leninist regimes in Luanda and Maputo. For the ANC, this was an opportunity to operate from bases established on a territory contiguous with South Africa for the first time since the early 1960s.[38]

Earlier in the decade, during the Morogoro Conference in 1969, the External Mission established a plan for the revolutionary overthrow of the South African state in accordance with the "four pillars of the revolution". These included first, all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures; second, the united mass action of the people; third, the armed offensive, spearheaded by *Umkhonto-we-Sizwe*; and fourth, the international drive to isolate the apartheid regime and win world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle.[39]

The first three tenets of this programme were politico-military in nature while the latter focused specifically on diplomacy. Hence, the propaganda and political mobilization led to the renewal of civil disobedience and boycotts, where protest marches and fiery funerals dominated the domestic arena. As a consequence, the ANC and the international anti-apartheid movement gained strength in their efforts to isolate Pretoria globally.[40] In addition, the ANC's leader in exile, Oliver Tambo,

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[38] The ANC had support from its allies the MPLA and FRELIMO in Angola and Mozambique respectively. After their respective independence, they supported the ANC at the OAU, NAM and Frontline States by establishing formal relations with the organization (ANC, 1985: 22).

[39] Sechaba May 1970, p.5; Sechaba, March 1984, p.4

[40] Evidence of this was seen in the following events:
   A. a campaign on American university campuses;
   B. the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by the United States Congress in 1986;

was accorded ministerial status in his visits around the world. By the late 1980s, the ANC had more than thirty official diplomatic missions all around the world,[41] which was more than the South African government had. As a consequence of the ANC's emerging strength, position and image on the international arena in its fight against Pretoria, the heads of white South African business met with the ANC outside the country in defiance of the government.

Furthermore, the changes taking place in the arena of international politics had a significant effect on the ANC's activities. For example, the signing of the New York Accords on Angola and Namibia in December 1988 signified the closure of the MK camps and the removal of guerrillas from Angola (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:191). While the signing of the Accords did not prevent the ANC from playing a formal active role in South Africa's internal affairs, the ANC still made incursions into South Africa. However, these actions became less intense with the reduction and closure of the MK camps in the neighbouring countries. With the ANC's shift from pursuing a military solution to a more peaceful settlement in the struggle in South Africa, the foundation was laid for a negotiated settlement with South Africa. This was a necessary action and route to pursue as part of the ANC's new strategy.

Following P.W. Botha's resignation, the new leader of the National Party F.W de Klerk responded to the need for attaining a possible negotiated settlement with the ANC by releasing several well-known ANC members from prison and easing restrictions on demonstrations. All these steps were pre-conditions for engaging in

C. the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) mission shuttling between South Africa government officials, the ANC and Commonwealth officials.

It can be argued that the above events placed the ANC on the same diplomatic level as Pretoria.

[41] Norval, (1990:82) mentions 33 states/locations where the ANC had diplomatic missions during apartheid. These were: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Benelux countries, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, West and East Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Greece, India, Japan, Canada, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Sweden, Tanzania, United Nations, USSR, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

direct negotiations that the ANC had asked for. The pre-conditions set forth by the ANC were referred to as the Harare Declaration.[42] On 2 February 1990, De Klerk announced 'the unbanning' of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC and the forthcoming release of Nelson Mandela.[43]

The first official meeting between the ANC and Pretoria took place in May 1990, where they jointly issued the Groote Schuur Minute laying the foundations for establishment of a favourable climate for negotiations. Subsequently, on 6 August 1990 the ANC agreed to a unilateral suspension of the armed struggle, thus creating a period of *détente*, during which the peaceful resolution of existing disputes would be possible.

3.3. Foundations of Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy: Principles and Objectives

In 1992, the ANC published its policy guidelines entitled *Ready to Govern*. These guidelines outlined the ANC's future foreign policy that in theory and practice heralded the end of the ANC's liberation struggle and the introduction of a future foreign policy for South Africa (ANC, 1992: 28-31). Since the ANC was perceived by many to be a terrorist organization, these policy guidelines were an attempt of the ANC to change these perceptions and adopt a universalist stance — a move from its previous armed policy against Pretoria.

As a consequence of this changed strategy, the ANC outlined its position on international relations in the post-apartheid era and declared that its foreign policy

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[42] The Harare Declaration (August 1989) included the following pre-conditions: the release of political prisoners; the removal of restrictions on political organizations; the repeal of security legislation and removal of troops from the townships; and an end to political trials and executions.

[43] Concrete discussions between Mandela and the government began as early as 1988.

would be shaped by the nature of South Africa's domestic policies and objectives, directed at addressing the needs and interests of its citizens. Further, this foreign policy would be non-aligned, and South Africa would continue with its membership in financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as honour all relevant international treaties.[44]

At this stage the ANC took a new approach with regard to its official position. For example, in February 1993 the ANC sought to redefine its mission in the international solidarity movement beyond that of its anti-apartheid activities and transform itself into "an active and positive force for the construct of... a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa" (Pahad, 1991: 9).

This new position taken by the ANC, genuine as it was, was partly aimed at attaining some level of credibility with the international community and indicating a changed position focusing on reconciliation, domestic development and democracy. This democratic stance discarded the internationalist orientation that was once central to the ANC's foreign policy. Some authors argue that this was evidence of flexibility and realism of the movement in the face of changing circumstances (Alden, 1993: 77 and McGowan, 1993:35-61), but it might be more probable that the ANC had little choice but to adapt to the changing circumstances within and outside South Africa, which finally led it to adopt some of those values the apartheid government opposed.

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[44] Cautious co-operation with the international financial institutions was advised, as was regional economic co-operation on a mutually beneficial basis.

3.3.1. The Universalist Orientation in South Africa's Foreign Policy

In 1994, ANC won the first democratic elections in South Africa and, on a wave of optimism, assumed control of the government headed by Nelson Mandela. Among other things, the new government set out its foreign policy principles, which were influenced on the one hand by the history of South Africa as a pariah state and its long record of human rights abuses, racism, political oppression, and on the other hand, by the ANC's struggle for equality, democracy, human rights and against apartheid.

For example, Bischoff and Southall (1999) and Mbeki (1994:200-206) observe that the international role post-apartheid South Africa adopted was derived from the anti-apartheid and pre-democratic struggles of the past. Selebi (1999:209) concurs by saying that the challenges faced by post-apartheid foreign policy stemmed from South Africa's history and values that Pretoria would have to deal with. Southall (1999) similarly argues that the ANC's foreign policy agenda in post-apartheid South Africa was governed and shaped by the past legacy — the search for peace and human rights. In this way, the historical experience was an important factor in shaping the early post-apartheid foreign policy.

Even though the ANC's struggle against apartheid was criticized for its military efforts, which resulted in the infringement of human rights through killing and death, restrictions around its membership and the insensitivity for liberal tendencies within the organization, its struggle was nevertheless informed by ethics and idealism.

For example, one of the purposes of the ANC's activities in exile was to inform the world of the violations of universal human rights and fundamental liberties committed by the apartheid regime. In this regard, Alden (1993:64-65) and Ellis (1991:439) observe that the ANC's foreign policy during apartheid was

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characterized by general pronouncements against Pretoria whilst their diplomacy was concentrated on publicizing the injustices brought about by Pretoria. Evans (1996:249-251) concurs by observing that the ANC sought an international audience to highlight its struggle for civil and political liberties by mobilizing the pan-African and anti-apartheid movements. Likewise, Mandela (1990) spoke of the ANC's role in ensuring the peaceful abolition of the apartheid system.

It therefore came as no surprise that the ANC-led government of national unity based the foundations of post-apartheid South African foreign policy on the promotion and respect of universal values such as human rights, democracy, domestic and global peace and security, international justice, most of them also enshrined in South Africa's new constitution.[45]

In 1993, Nelson Mandela put forward several principles that would form the basis of South Africa's future foreign policy (Mandela, 1993: 87, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002: 175). These principles were further elaborated in March 1994, when the ANC published a comprehensive foreign policy document entitled *Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa* (ANC, 1994; Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:198; Nel, 1999). Both documents advanced seven principles that were intended to guide the behaviour of South Africa in international politics:[46]

- a belief in and preoccupation with human rights which extends beyond the political, and embracing economic, social and environmental dimensions;
- a belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of human life can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;

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[45] See for example: Chapter 1/1 (Founding provisions), Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights), Chapter 14/ 232-233(General Provision in International Law - on Customary international law and application of international law) (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 3,5-17,103).

[46] Foreign policy principles can be described as a set of rules or standards guiding the behaviour of a state in relation to other states when pursuing its national interests (essential national goals or objectives).

- a belief that justice and international law should guide relations between nations;
- a belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations should strive;
- a belief that South Africa's foreign policy should reflect the interests of Africa (Schoeman, 2000 and Vale, 1990:13-14);
- a belief that South Africa's economic development depends on growing regional and international economic co-operation (Mills, 1995); and
- a belief that South Africa's foreign relations must mirror a deep commitment to the consolidation of its democracy.

From the above principles, one can observe that South Africa's foreign policy principles under president Mandela were mainly universalist in nature. For example, it can be argued that at present, the international community considers the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, maintenance of international peace and security as 'universal interests/values' of human beings.[47] Thus, by placing emphasis on these universal values by transforming them into its foreign policy principles South Africa would necessarily pursue a universalist foreign policy.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to trace the evolution of the new South Africa's foreign policy from the times when the ANC was mainly operating abroad/in exile to 1994. It has also examined the history of the ANC and its foreign policy, which was highly influenced by the domestic situation in South Africa during the apartheid era.

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[47] This position is controversial from the point of view of certain cultures/states/societies. However, this is the position advocated by developed and non-developed states as well as international organizations.

In the process of attempting to analyse the above issues, the chapter underscored that, while the ANC's foreign policy was concretized in the four-year period from 1990 to 1994, the making of that foreign policy actually began in the mid-1980s. The principles on which the foreign policy of the ANC and later the South African foreign policy were based can be traced to the Freedom Charter of 1955. This is because the ANC included some elements of its future foreign policy in the Charter. According to the Charter, South Africa was committed to respecting the rights and sovereignty of all nations and to striving to maintain world peace and settlement of all international disputes by negotiation. Since then the ANC has based its ideology on being a liberation movement and later, the foreign policy of the new South Africa on those very elements in the Freedom Charter.

Consequently, the ANC seems to have been consistent in advocating its universalist policy from the early days of apartheid. This consistency in advocating its universalist policy emerged with the adoption of the 1955 Freedom Charter and later, opening up the ANC's membership to all races. Furthermore, the ANC's persistent struggle for freedom and equality within international organizations (the UN, OAU and NAM) and on the diplomatic front was arguably a universalist stance.

The struggle against apartheid and the promotion of universalist values by the ANC finally bore fruits in the late 1980s, when the apartheid regime was ready to negotiate. The changing circumstances finally enabled ANC to redefine its mission of the international solidarity movement by transforming itself into a political party working for a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa in February 1993. In the same year, Nelson Mandela put forward the principles that would form the basis of South Africa's future foreign policy.

Post-apartheid South Africa, as mentioned previously, based its foreign policy on the preservation of the very values the apartheid regime disrespected. It can therefore be concluded that the principles of the new South African foreign policy were largely informed and influenced by ANC's history as a liberation movement, which fought for equality and non-racial society. At the same time they were influenced by the ideology of liberal democracy, since the ANC's struggle was also the struggle for democracy and respect for human rights. These values were universalistic in nature; hence, by committing itself to the respect of such principles South Africa would necessarily pursue a 'universalist' foreign policy.

However, as it will be shown in the next chapter, this was not the case. In implementing its foreign policy South Africa deviated from the adopted universalist principles to pursue the national interests instead, which resulted in ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy. The ambiguities were also facilitated by the foreign-policy decision-making process, in which Mandela played a key role.

4. MANAGING THE CONTRADICTIONS: SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1994-1999

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter provided a broad overview of the origins of the ANC's foreign policy principles. The research has concluded that, due to the specificity of the ANC's history, its policy was based on the universalist values of democracy, respect of human rights and peaceful coexistence among states. If one looks at South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to 1999, however, one can observe that these principles were compromised on numerous occasions, especially in South Africa's relations with so called 'pariah states'. The result of going against adopted foreign policy principles rendered Pretoria's foreign policy contradictory and ambiguous.

This chapter will attempt to show that these ambiguities ranged from discrepancies in foreign policy decision making to having cordial relations with 'pariah states' and supporting regimes in those states. The common feature of all the cases in which ambiguities arose was that Pretoria found itself compromising its foreign policy (universalist foreign policy principles) and the constitution by extension. This chapter will attempt to assess how these ambiguities were managed within South Africa's foreign relations with different states.

4.2. Managing the Contradictions

Right from the onset of the Mandela administration, there were symptoms that South Africa's foreign relations would undergo tremendous testing. On one side the post-apartheid government wanted to change the image of South Africa as a rogue state by basing its foreign policy on universalism, which has a missionary orientation. At

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the same time universalism subscribes to moral ideals and places a high premium on human affairs. Some of these 'moral ideals' are democracy, fundamental human rights and freedoms, and so on.

On the other hand, as it will be shown below, Pretoria's foreign policy did not reflect the universalist principles that were to guide the new government in relations with other states. It seemed that it was carrying out quite a pragmatic and realist foreign policy that followed South Africa's national interests. Hence, it can be argued that there was 'a tension' between the official foreign policy principles and the foreign policy actually pursued, which compelled the Mandela government to eliminate that tension by managing the contradictions in its foreign policy.

One way of dealing with the contradictions in Pretoria's foreign policy was through the decision-making process, which could either help reconciling the official and actual foreign policy or turn the scale in favour of either the universalist or realist option. As it will be argued in the next section, due to the nature of foreign policy decision-making and the special role of President Mandela, the decision-making process did not help eliminating the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy; it rather facilitated and perpetuated them throughout the Mandela administration.

Even though the foreign policy decision-making process in democratic South Africa was meant to be more transparent than it was during the apartheid era and although this was the case at the beginning of the Mandela administration, there were numerous cases where the proper channels were not followed when it came to foreign policy decision-making.

In view of these preliminary points, this chapter will also examine the decisions made during the Mandela administration in order to establish how the decision-making process contributed to the inconsistencies in South African foreign policy

between 1994 and 1999. Since it appears that Mandela and his close circle of associates dominated the decision-making process between 1994 and 1999, it can be argued that this 'familiarity' consequently enabled certain decisions to be taken independently of the formal rules and procedures. Lacking administrative experience, and perhaps, 'flying by the seat of one's pants', the standards for many policies were most likely relaxed. In this way, the stated policy was not followed and the Mandela government was able to pursue the national interest in a way that disrespected Pretoria's universalist foreign policy principles. Thus, it can be argued that the ambiguities were not only poorly managed through the decision-making process under Mandela but they were also facilitated by this process.

4.3. Managing Foreign Policy Decision-Making under Mandela

Once the ANC assumed power in April 1994, it had to deal with two major issues: first, there was the need to change ideologically and readjust politically from being a liberation movement to becoming the governing political party. Secondly, there was the obligation to understand the inherent modifications in the world order, following the collapse of the bipolar world and the end of the Cold War. This meant shaping a foreign policy that would reflect recognition of the changes in international relations as well as adopting a 'pragmatic internationalist stance' in dealing with the world in general.

The liberal principles in South Africa's foreign policy formed a more or less rational system of principles. However, when it came to the implementation of the foreign policy there seemed to be less consensus among the key decision-makers about the substance of policy and its goals, as some authors have observed (Fabricius, 2000:217-223; Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999; Van Wyk, 1997:190-197; 1999:291-303; 2000:225-234). What has proved to be even more problematic was the process by which policy was made. For example, the government officially

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endorsed a policy that was to be implemented in practice, but the same government later made decisions that were not in line with the stated policy.

PICTURE 1: SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING ENVIRONMENTS

Source: LE PERE, Garth, and Anthoni VAN NIEUWKERK (1999) "Making Foreign Policy In South Africa" [On-line] http://www.igd.org.za/programmes/sa_fpa/direction.html

A range of factors influences every government's decision-making process. Besides ideological, organizational and systemic considerations, the domestic and external environments substantially influence and determine this process. While domestic factors and the domestic environment are crucial elements for foreign policy making, a country's foreign policy has to be communicated, explained and executed in its external environment. Thus it is worthwhile illustrating the different environments, in which post-apartheid South African foreign policy was made (see Picture 1) (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002: 181-185).

This picture also illustrates that in post-apartheid South Africa, foreign policy principles and priorities have been formulated and planned by actors within the executive. As several authors who studied the decision-making process in South Africa have observed, the primary locus of expertise in and implementation of foreign policy was the executive office — more specifically the President and the Deputy President. Hence, the executive office often found itself in competition, if not at odds, with a range of other actors within the executive who also shaped government's policy, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (Diescho, 1996 and Muller, 1997:70).[48]

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[48] The participation of various actors is understandable in view of the widening scope of international relations and the blurring of the customary differentiation lines between domestic and foreign affairs, what Keohane and Nye, (1977) have called "complex interdependence." Indeed, the world can no longer be understood in the simplistic scheme of the Cold War since it is infinitely more complex, driven by impulses that require a range of new and overlapping policy instruments and resources.

Foreign policy agendas now include issues as diverse as investment, migration, energy, inflation, food security, human rights, labour standards, environment, and so on. Governments thus "find it increasingly difficult to set priorities, avoid contradictory targets, and maintain a sense of national interest and direction. Since the alternatives are more numerous and less clear-cut, the task of choosing becomes more complex" (Karvonen and Sundelius, 1987:7). In an era that stresses the importance of global financial markets, international trade linkages and information technology, the management of the foreign policy agenda becomes a task for multiple bureaucratic players.

Post-apartheid South African foreign policy decision-making during the Mandela administration was more transparent than in the apartheid era. The decision-making process was slightly decentralized, and there was a level of openness with regard to the processes of foreign policy decision-making. There were, however, similarities: P.W. Botha depended on three close associates (his Press Secretary, Head of the Office of the State President and a personal friend), and the post-apartheid government also prepared its foreign policy largely through a combination of close associates such as President Mandela, Deputy President Mbeki,[49] Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, Mandela's and Mbeki's Directors-General — Prof. Jakes Gerwel and Dr. Frank Chikane respectively (Fabricius, 2000: 217-218; Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002: 190).[50]

Foreign policy decision-making was not the sole reserve of President Mandela and his close associates, however. It also included the involvement of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), which co-ordinated its operations internally. A top management committee constituted of all chief directors, namely Deputy Director-General, the Director-General, Deputy Foreign Minister and Foreign Minister, met once a week, whereas the same group (with the exception of the chief directors) met daily. The Minister of Foreign Affairs sat on the Ministers' Security Council with the Minister of Safety and Security, Minister of Intelligence and Minister of Defence to co-ordinate security matters and on the Cabinet Committee on Security and

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[49] The former Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki, a very skilled diplomat and international statesman was, while in exile, the ANC's chief diplomat with a distinctly international outlook. Like President Mandela, he had a hand in fashioning the contours of South Africa's foreign relations. He had, for example, been the prime architect of re-configuring South Africa's relations with the US and Africa (Corrigan, 1999).

[50] Also included in this group was Blade Nzimande — the ANC National Executive Committee Chairperson of the sub-committee on International Affairs (Mayibuye, June/July 1997). This group did not include, however, the Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo who focused more on domestic matters arising from his experience as ANC Secretary-General (Fabricius, 2000: 218).

Intelligence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials sat on the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee that focused on the broader security agenda.

Nevertheless, the Cabinet was the primary coordinating body for foreign policy — bringing together the ministers of all the departments that played a part in foreign policy (foreign affairs, finance, trade, defence, the President and Deputy President). Thus the Cabinet coordinated and integrated foreign policy.

Nelson Mandela had a special role in the decision-making process, not only on account of his position as President, but also because of his personality and international stature. Consequently, he seemed to dominate a number of major foreign policy decisions and he almost overshadowed the role of various government departments as well as Parliament.

This special role of the President and his Office, as well as the lack of coordination within the government that was evident at times, influenced the making of foreign policy decisions and sometimes even led to embarrassing political and diplomatic moments for South Africa. For example, Mandela announced that Pretoria was to continue to sell arms to Rwanda on the very day that the DFA was about to announce the termination of that policy in 1996-1997. Another example was Mandela's premature announcement of peace negotiations between Zairian president Mobutu and the rebels in 1997, which almost shattered the entire peace process.

In certain cases, it appeared that South Africa's foreign policy reflected the interests of the ruling party, which were at odds with the universalist foreign policy principles. For some reason, the ruling party maintained close relations with states that did not respect the same values South Africa was supposedly trying to promote. These contentious relations form the 'logic' (or perhaps lack of logic) that might explain how and under which conditions the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign

policy became more and more evident. The next section deals with many examples in South Africa's foreign policy history, where decisions were not in line with foreign policy principles. This, as it will be argued, indicates that the Mandela government had problems with the implementation of its stated foreign policy.

4.4. Managing the Problems of Implementation

From the beginning of the Mandela presidency his administration faced a problem of pursuing a foreign policy that was based on universalist principles. South Africa's commercial, political and defence interests competed with the idealistic principles of its foreign policy, which consequently led to numerous cases where the principles were compromised by the decisions the Mandela government took. Pretoria compromised its foreign policy principles in its relations with states in Africa (Nigeria, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Lesotho), Asia (Indonesia, Burma and China), Cuba and the Arab World (Libya, Iran, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), to mention but a few.

4.4.1. African Continent

South Africa's relations with African states between 1994 and 1999 provided yet more examples of how Pretoria compromised its foreign policy principles. The Nigerian crisis of 1993 (where the Nigerian government was responsible for several violations of democratic freedom) was a test, which South African foreign policy failed to pass.

The ANC had a long history of relations with Nigeria, since close links had been forged between their military and political elites while the ANC was in exile. In June 1993, General Ibrahim Babangida annulled Nigeria's presidential elections that had supposedly been won by Chief Moshood Abiola. Babangida's successor,

General Sani Abacha, later jailed Abiola for treason in June 1994. Although Pretoria was under international pressure to lead a political condemnation campaign against the Abacha regime, South Africa did not take a pro-active position, but instead chose a cautious and quiet approach. Pretoria did not wish to get heavily involved in the domestic affairs of other states – perhaps signalling a new foreign policy approach entitled, 'quiet diplomacy'.

Another example of unprincipled foreign policy was South Africa's attempt to broker a peace deal between the two sides in the Zairian civil war in April 1997. The anarchy and kleptocracy, which had been perpetuated by the Mobutu regime, eventually culminated in a civil war. Mandela led the peace talks between Mobutu and Laurent Kabila as the rebels' leader on the *SAS Outeniqu*a, a South African naval vessel.

The motives for Mandela's efforts became suspect and open to different interpretations. Questions were raised as to whether the talks were to smoothen the departure of Mobutu (an American ally), or whether they were aimed at easing Laurent Kabila into power (Vale and Maseko, 1998:8). Moreover, Pretoria seemed to have been caught unawares by the extent of the conflict when SADC member states (Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia) joined in the civil war. Eventually, Pretoria sanctioned intervention in these countries to protect regional security, even though it was itself initially opposed to foreign military intervention.

The case of Lesotho is also illustrative of how South Africa's written policies were compromised by its economic interests. On 22 September 1998 South African and Botswana armed forces intervened in Lesotho under the auspices of the SADC to restore law and order in the aftermath of a looming constitutional crisis. *Operation Boleas* was intended to create a level of stability in the country as well as to return Lesotho soldiers to their barracks. In the process of attempting to create order in the

country, a number of people lost their lives (mainly soldiers) and human rights organizations reported on abuses committed by South African soldiers.

In South Africa, public opinion was divided as to whether the motives for the intervention were altruistic. Even within the South African government and military there were complaints that the intervention was a failure and inappropriate (Africa Confidential, 1998). The intervention did not adhere to the criteria for government defence policy on peacekeeping. Instead, the intervention was seen as having little to do with democracy. In fact, South Africa's intervention helped to keep in power a regime not favoured by the majority of Lesotho citizens. The 'altruistic motive' had more to do with security concerns around the Lesotho Highlands Water Project – a development project that South Africa was heavily dependent on. Once again, issues of economic national interest seemed to have eclipsed fundamental concerns in South Africa's foreign policy - human rights, democracy, international peace and security. Once again Pretoria defended this intervention in the name of restoring democracy and civil order.

4.4.2. Far East Asia

Pretoria's relation with Indonesia has raised many questions concerning its use of 'principled' foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making. Jakarta's human rights record has often been questioned, particularly concerning the East Timor problem. The ongoing conflict in East Timor revolved around the aspirations of East Timor citizens in gaining their independence from Jakarta.

In July 1997 Mandela made a visit to Indonesia, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Mandela clearly stated that Pretoria would supply Jakarta with weapons for its defence and when South Africa sold arms to Jakarta, the West accused South Africa of unethical practices. When the sale was made public, Indonesia was still occupying East Timor, and its forces had been committing gross human rights

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abuses against the local population for many years. Mandela's decision disregarded South Africa's foreign policy principles and his verdict was made without any consultation with Parliament or the Foreign Ministry.

South Africa also refrained from voting on resolutions criticizing the Indonesian government's human rights violations at the UN Commission on Human Rights. It also chose not to criticize Jakarta when Indonesian security forces used excessive force during pro-independence protests in East Timor. In addition, President Mandela admitted in 1995 that Jakarta had financed the ANC after 1994, raising serious questions about the extent to which Pretoria's policy was driven by the party's financial interests (Brummer, 1995). Interestingly, in November 1997, President Suharto was awarded South Africa's highest honour for non-citizens — the Order of Good Hope — during his official visit to South Africa (Horta, 1998). This act symbolized the good relations between South Africa and Indonesia.

During his term in office, Mandela continued to maintain ties with other Asian states that had poor human rights records. During his tour of the Asian region in 1997, he did not use the opportunity to criticize the decision by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to admit Burma as a member. Neither did Mandela openly support the detained pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace laureate, Aung San Su Kyi (SAPA, 9 March 1997). The head of intelligence in the Burmese military regime was later invited to attend Thabo Mbeki's inauguration in June 1999. Burma has played a vital role in the anti-apartheid struggle, and this was the reason that has been given to justify Pretoria's continued relations with Burma.

In late 1996, Mandela announced that South Africa would accord full diplomatic recognition to the Peoples' Republic of China and downgrade the relations with

Taiwan, which had been established in 1976,[51] even though earlier that year (August 1996), President Mandela had stated that South Africa had no intention of severing its ties with Taiwan (Chhabra, 1997: 177-182).

Pretoria explained this change of heart by pointing out that the decision created an opportunity to discuss human rights issues with Beijing. However, the South African government has repeatedly failed to raise human rights issues in meetings with Chinese officials.[52] This official statement was not particularly credible because firstly, Pretoria's earlier position was that it did not want to get involved in China's internal affairs, and secondly, this decision meant the end for Pretoria-Taipei relations that had been cordial for over three decades.

Taiwan had supported the ANC in the run-up to the election of 1994, made contributions to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and substantial investments in South Africa[53] (Havenga, 1995: 32-43). When compared to China, Taiwan's human rights record was much better, but this point was not strong enough to prevent Pretoria choosing China over Taiwan as a 'trading partner' in view of the potentially big market.

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[51] According to Singh, (1997:52-59), three factors encouraged South Africa to make this move. Firstly, mainland China's refusal to maintain full diplomatic ties with South Africa while Pretoria maintained its relations with Taiwan. Secondly, the impending transfer of Hong Kong to China in July 1997, and thirdly, the huge Chinese market represented a significant potential for South African exports.

[52] Both Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela refrained from bringing up human rights during their visits to Beijing in April 1998, and May 1999, respectively. South Africa did take a stand for human rights in China when, in 1997 and 1999, it voted against China's successful effort to avoid any discussion of its human rights record at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.

[53] There are about 350 Taiwanese companies in South Africa employing 45 000 people. Taiwan also contributed 35 million rands to the ANC's election campaign in 1994 (Bischoff and Southall, 1999: 165-166).

4.4.3. Cuba

Post-apartheid South Africa's relations with Cuba were also characterised by compromise of declared foreign policy principles. Once again, this 'moral void' would leave room for opportunities influenced by economic, historical, symbolic and political factors.

Cuba supported the ANC during the liberation struggle and played an important role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The ANC government, therefore, continued to nurture the relations created during the ANC's liberation struggle, and to demonstrate its solidarity with the NAM. During Mandela's inauguration in 1994 at the lawns of the Union Buildings, the warmest and most rapturous welcome was reserved for Fidel Castro. The following day, Cuba became the first country to establish formal diplomatic relations with the new government.

Pretoria's cordial relations with Havana were frequently criticized, since they did not follow 'official' foreign policy. Cuba's human rights record was mentioned in this regard, as well as its lack of attempt to democratize the political system. As it was observed by Chhabra (1997:223), Cuba "clings to repressive state socialism… and makes a mockery of the ANC's proclaimed commitment to human rights."

In June 1996, South Africa and Cuba signed two bilateral agreements — an investment protection agreement and a health cooperation agreement. One of the areas for cooperation was the mining of nickel in Cuba and the other was the importation of Cuban doctors to alleviate the short supply of doctors in rural South Africa (*op. cit.*: 225). One can argue that these interests (i.e. 'needs'), in turn, led Pretoria to continued good relations with Havana despite its undemocratic practices. The South African government's response to dealing with Havana, has been that Pretoria would not abandon its anti-apartheid allies in their time of need.

4.4.4. The Arab World

Pretoria's relations with states in the Arab world have withstood international pressures throughout the years. South Africa's relations with Libya can be explained by applying the same argument as in the Cuban case. Mandela had strongly supported initiatives of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) to lift UN-imposed sanctions on Libya, and transfer the two Libyans accused in the Lockerbie air disaster to a neutral country (Henwood, 1997). In other words, it supported its own supporters.

South Africa even broke ranks with Western states in its efforts to respect relations with one of the "most dangerous supporters of terrorism in the world" (Chhabra, 1997: 227). To the West, this was all the more alarming because Libya had been accused of having a chemical weapons programme, repressing human rights at home, and developing weapons that have a capability of major destruction.

In his official statements Mandela made it clear that South Africa's relations with Libya would not be determined by the US and its allies (Chhabra, 1997: 227). Mandela's arguments for the maintenance of relations with Tripoli were the same as for Cuba – based on their past support for the anti-apartheid movement. Despite all the accusations levelled against Libya, Pretoria continued to have cordial relations with a state that violated the very principles post-apartheid South Africa was premised upon. In June 1996, Pretoria announced that steps were being taken to accredit a non-resident South African ambassador to Libya and in September of the same year, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo attended Libya's National Day celebrations in Pretoria.

Post-apartheid South Africa also maintained good relations with Iran. Tehran supported the ANC during its struggle against apartheid. Pretoria also had economic interests in maintaining good relations, since Iran supplied almost 70 percent of

South Africa's oil needs (Henwood, 1997). Moreover, there had been talks between both countries about the possibility of South Africa storing 15 million barrels of Iranian oil at the Central Energy Fund's (CEF) Saldanha Bay storage facility (Chhabra, 1997: 236).

Like Libya, Iran has been condemned by Western states for its alleged support of Hezbollah fighters in Southern Lebanon and the radical Muslim organization — People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) — who are funded through Hezbollah. This has fuelled speculation about the extent of Islamic fundamentalism and Iran's possible role in South Africa's domestic politics (Chhabra, 1997: 237).

According to US intelligence, Iran is alleged to be one of the countries that support terrorism. In addition, Amnesty International observed in 1996 that seventy people had been executed in Iran (Chhabra, 1997: 234). Despite these allegations President Mandela stated that "we must look at relations with a country from the perspective of our own national interest", when Iranian President Rafsanjani visited South Africa in September 1996 (Chhabra, 1997: 233). Foreign Minister Nzo further reiterated Mandela's position on Iran by stating, "South Africa follows its own independent policies..." (Chhabra, 1997: 234).

Pretoria's policy towards the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic — SADR (Western Sahara),[54] a former Spanish colony and a full member of the OAU, was also criticized by South African domestic and foreign observers. In its foreign policy document of 1994, the ANC stated that it would support Western Sahara through the

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[54] In 1973, after years of resistance to Spanish rule, the national liberation movement, the POLISARIO Front was formed and embarked on an armed struggle. In 1975, Spain announced its withdrawal from the territory and in the process signed a secret agreement with Morocco and Mauritania giving both states control over the territory. In 1979, Mauritania withdrew from the territory. By 1976 the POLISARIO Front had declared the SADR that signalled the beginning of the liberation struggle of the territory.

OAU and call for the recognition of its independence (Chhabra, 1997: 212). In June 1995, President Mandela wrote to President Abdel Aziz promising to establish diplomatic relations between Pretoria and the Sahrawi Republic (Chhabra, 1997: 216).

Later, Pretoria stated that it would delay formal recognition since it was awaiting the advice of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali. This was an uninformed decision, because, according to the UN Charter, it is the prerogative of any country to choose with whom it wants to establish any relations. It is not for the UN to interfere in such decisions.[55] Ultimately, the ANC government failed to recognize the SADR, and in this way gave its support to Morocco, which is still occupying Western Sahara.

In February 1996, Foreign Minister Nzo and the Moroccan Prime Minister Abdellatif Filali signed an agreement establishing a Joint Commission to strengthen cooperation between both countries in all fields. It is worth noting that in March 1994, Thabo Mbeki made a visit to Morocco, which gave rise to speculations about whether Mbeki was fund-raising for the ANC's election campaign, and under which conditions Rabat agreed to fund the ANC.

The above case studies have hopefully provided sufficient evidence of how South African foreign policy was compromised by decisions that reflected either economic interests, or the interests of the ruling party. It would appear that in each case Pretoria resolved to emphasise national interests over its foreign policy principles. Greg Mills, Director of the South African Institute for International Affairs (1997b: 19-34), contends that "South Africa's foreign relations illustrated contradictory strains between formulated policy and implemented policy...South Africa follows a

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[55] Article 2(7) of the UN Charter restricts the UN from intervening: 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.

'twin-track' foreign policy...where it pursues the national interest above human rights while on the other hand it displays concerns over human rights and democratization".[56]

Other scholars who concur with Mills are Nkuhlu (1995:53,56) who observes that "...The danger of South Africa's principled foreign policy arises when pragmatic considerations become the embodiment of the conduct of foreign policy...which points to an unresolved identity crisis upon which considerations of national interest have to be based," and Suttner (1997:300-303) who also notes that "... the promotion of human rights in foreign policy is easy to state as an aspiration...but difficult to implement...[because of this] South Africa's [national interests] can never be a means to promote human rights."

Pragmatic considerations definitely influenced many important foreign policy decisions of the Mandela government. Furthermore, as many observers of South African foreign policy have noted, Mandela often took decisions into his own hands to the extent that policy often followed his public statements, rather than the other way around (Mills, 1997:24). This meant that South Africa's image (and its foreign policy) tended largely to be equated with the President's profile. Even though the decision-making process during the Mandela administration has not been sufficiently researched to provide enough comparative information, one can, nevertheless, make a tentative conclusion on the basis of the existing literature that the circumstances in which Mandela frequently used his own judgement to make important decisions were more conducive to pragmatism and unprincipled foreign policy. It should be no surprise that this also led to the inconsistencies in South

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[56] Mills, (1999:4-6) further talks about South Africa following a 'four track' foreign policy namely, pursuing national interest, focus with human rights and democratization, observing a global role in world affairs and redressing the foreign policy imbalances of the past especially its relations with the Middle East, Libya and Cuba to mention but a few.

Africa's foreign policy, which left many observers wondering about what really drives that policy.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that South Africa's foreign policy between 1994 and 1999 was based on 'pragmatic', national-interest-seeking decisions that replaced 'universal' principles in foreign policy. Regrettably, this dynamics was also characteristic of decision-making processes used in determining foreign relations with so called 'pariah states'. The chapter has also assessed how these ambiguities were *managed* from a decision-making point of view in South Africa's foreign relations with 'pariah states'.

In the sphere of decision-making, there were a few members of the executive who influenced Mandela's decisions, since the final decision apparently lay with the President. These individuals included Deputy-President Mbeki, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and his deputy Aziz Pahad, the previous and current Trade and Industry Minister Trevor Manuel and Alec Erwin, National Executive Committee's members of the ANC, and senior civil servants in the DFA, DTI and other departments within the executive. Despite the changes in post-apartheid foreign policy decision-making, one can still observe that from 1994 to 1999, the locus of foreign policy decision-making remained in the President's Office.

The cases described in this chapter provide an indication that there were many factors influencing foreign policy decisions, and that some of these factors were strong enough to induce the decision-maker(s) to deviate from the official or stated foreign policy. It should be noted that it was a prerogative of South Africa as a sovereign state to engage in relations with any state it wanted. The conundrum is that, by exercising its freedom to choose to engage in relations with these states,

Pretoria went contrary to its own foreign policy principles. The international community saw these states as 'problematic' because of their long history of human rights abuses, non-democratic practices or because they were seen as posing a threat to international peace and security. By maintaining close or even cordial relations with such states, the Mandela government compromised its universalist principles, creating a sense of ambiguity in Pretoria's foreign policy. However, the government attempted to deal with the criticisms that emerged as a result of the interaction with the 'pariah states' by justifying its actions and decisions.

Such poor management of the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy, however, was the most visible when it came to the arms sales policy. Here, the tension between the universalistic principles of South African foreign policy and South Africa's national interests was especially evident. The next chapter will try to analyse the underlying reasons for unprincipled arms sales made by the Mandela government between 1994 and 1999. In addition, the chapter will attempt to show the economic and strategic importance of the South African defence industry for the economic and social developments of the country, which were among the pressing concerns of the Mandela government.

5. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS SALES

5.1. Introduction

One of the issues that the Mandela government had to deal with when it came to power was the question of the defence industry, which had a significant role during apartheid, not only in strategic but also in economic terms. As this chapter will show, defence industry remained important also for the democratic government in terms of jobs, exports and foreign exchange earnings. Yet as the research has shown, the ANC was soon compelled to change some of these aspects. Why? In order to answer some of these questions, this chapter focuses on the domestic economic and social factors that influenced Pretoria's foreign policy and national interests with regard to the issue of arms sales to the so called 'pariah states'.

As one of the most prominent realist scholars, Hans Morgenthau, (1951:33-34), has noted, "…a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions, without consideration of the national interest, is bound to fail." Since states have a moral objective to gain power by pursuing their interests in order to survive, states can support universal values and principles only when they are in harmony with its perceived self-interests. In other words, the universal values have to support or be in line with the state's national interest for a universalist foreign policy to be feasible.

On the basis of the theoretical exposition in chapter two, it can be argued that South Africa could only pursue a universalist foreign policy when such a policy was in conformity with the pursuance of its more immediate political, economic or other concerns.

In line with the above-mentioned theoretical conclusions, the chapter will attempt to show that the economic and social situation in South Africa did in fact influence the foreign policy and national interest of the new government from the onset of the Mandela presidency. The government had to deal with many vital concerns apart from political ones, such as underdevelopment, high rates of unemployment and poverty, inadequate housing and crime. Hence, the changes in Mandela's foreign policy can at best be understood as arising from domestic pressures on the government. This situation, which was also a consequence of past apartheid policies, apparently influenced the implementation of new South Africa's foreign policy.

The economic and social realities the Mandela government faced at the time compelled it to support industries that were viable and had also the potential for growth and development. As this chapter aims to demonstrate, the defence industry had such potential despite the problems it encountered in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This chapter will ultimately attempt to show that the defence industry was an asset for the South African economy and furthermore, that the sales and export of arms constituted South Africa's national interest, whose pursuance ultimately compromised foreign policy principles.

5.2. The Economic Realities behind South Africa's National Interests

When Mandela assumed power in April 1994, the economic and social situation in South Africa was in need of improvement. The economy was performing dismally because of years of trade and economic embargos that had taken their toll on the country. There were scarce foreign exchange reserves that Pretoria could use for international trade.

For example, Lewis, (1990: 114, 147) estimates that the trade sanctions and embargos, especially the oil embargo imposed on South Africa, cost the country two billion US dollars a year, primarily in terms-of-trade effects.[57] As a result, South Africa's real GDP grew a total of 4.7 percent between 1981 and 1987, which led to a 10 percent drop in per capita income (Lewis, 1990: 27-28). Other scholars (Chettle, 1982: 82; Spandau, 1979: 153-55; Lewis, 1990: 60, 103; Lipton, 1988: 86-87) estimate that the total costs of the oil embargo, including price premium on imports, costs of stockpiling, construction and operation of oil plants such as the SASOL increased considerably and probably ranged from one billion to two billion US dollars.

Van Bergejik (1995: 343-344) has thus observed that the direct costs of the oil embargo more than doubled South Africa's oil import bill and furthermore, that the direct costs of the oil embargo in the 1980s equalled South Africa's gross foreign debt, which by the end of the decade was estimated at 15 to 20 billion US dollars. He added that economic activity in South Africa had also been hampered by the fact that fewer new technologies became available to the country during sanctions.

Pretoria's problems were not limited only to oil imports. When it attempted to make up for the shortfall in foreign exchange on account of the oil embargo by selling its coal and other raw materials on the international market, this attempt was not fully successful, since the embargos imposed by Denmark, France, and other Western states reluctant to buy South African coal cut the expected exports by 17 percent in 1986, putting 40 000 jobs in the mining industry in danger. To maintain exports, South Africa had to sell its coal at 10 percent below the world price of 25 to 26 US dollars per metric ton for that grade of coal (*Washington Post*, 25 July 1986, A27; Lipton, 1988: 46).

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[57] See Annex 8 for a presentation and data on the economic impact of sanctions on the apartheid South African economy.

In the financial sector, apartheid South Africa suffered severely with the divesting of foreign investment. As a result, the South African Finance Minister Barend du Plessis estimated that the shortfall in foreign investment capital for 1985 had reduced the annual foreign investment growth rate from a possible 5.5 percent to 3.5 percent (*Washington Post,* 1 September 1985, A30).[58]

To make matters worse, the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) estimated that of the approximately 350-400 US companies with direct investments in South Africa in January 1984, seven withdrew in 1984 and 39 in 1985. During 1986 the numbers increased; 40 companies left and 13 announced their intention of leaving, including some of the biggest (Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola, Exxon, General Motors and IBM). By June 1987, a further 39 companies had left or had announced their intention of leaving, including Ford Motor Co., Citicorp and ITT. By mid-1988, only 136 US companies remained in South Africa (Lipton, 1988: 64; Baker, 1989:59).

Moreover, American banks reportedly withdrew one billion US dollars in the first half of 1985. They refused to extend new credit, primarily on political grounds, which was the catalyst for the short-term debt crisis in August that same year. British banks, to which Pretoria owed more than a quarter of the 12 billion US

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[58] For example, the American states of Wisconsin, Nebraska and Connecticut adopted legislation in 1978, 1980 and 1980 respectively calling for divestment of shares held by public institutions in US companies with investments in South Africa. In the mid-1980s, other states such as Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, as well as the cities of Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, New York passed laws forbidding investment of municipal or state funds in companies operating in South Africa. In 1986, California announced that it would gradually divest itself of holdings in companies with ties to South Africa; this decision affected about 10 billion US dollars in investments. By end of 1988, 23 states, 19 counties, 79 cities in US had adopted various economic measures to distance themselves from South Africa (Chettle 106-08; *New York Times,* 28 October 1984, A18; *Los Angeles Times,* 25 December 1984, A1; Lipton, 1988: 23-24; Baker, 1989: 61).

dollars debt falling due in the next 12 months, were also unwilling to make new loans to Pretoria (*Washington Post*, 1 September 1985, A1).

This had an immense effect on the South African currency resulting in its collapse. At end of August 1985, the value of the South African rand fell from 54 cents per US dollar to 34 cents. The collapse of the rand that year was linked to the threat of additional economic sanctions by the international community, which further precipitated the currency crisis (*Financial Times-SA*, 29 August 1985, 10; 30 August 1985, 10). Faced with all these economic difficulties, Pretoria was forced to develop numerous domestic industries in order to become self-sufficient by producing its own goods and providing services that it would not ordinarily produce and provide, such as civilian and military machinery and hardware, civilian and military automobiles, and so on. In this regard, it is generally conceded that this comparative advantage is the key in the military complex.

Thus in 1994, the Mandela government inherited an economy that was worn out by sanctions. Furthermore, there were other pertinent issues afflicting the majority of South African citizens that the new government had to address. These issues were poverty, unemployment, social unrest, crime, underdevelopment and low investment.

Poverty was a particularly disturbing issue since over 60 percent of South Africans lived below the poverty line in 1994. Hence, it was the role of the new government to alleviate poverty and in the process, a number of programmes and strategies were set up to help deal with the issue.

Another issue closely related to the problem of poverty was that of unemployment. It stood at about 40 percent in 1994 and a further 500 000 jobs were lost between 1994 and 1996 alone. As a result of the high levels of unemployment and poverty,

levels of crime rose steeply, to the extent that in 1994, South Africa had one of the highest murder rates in the world with Johannesburg being one of the world's most violent cities.[59]

The post-apartheid state was therefore compelled to confront these issues. The Mandela administration was obliged to put in place economic strategies that would help alleviate poverty, increase investment, accelerate development and create employment.

The initial response was establishment of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994 to address the injustices of the past regime while maintaining the economy on a path of sustained growth (RDP White Paper, 1994). Essentially the RDP sought to mobilise South African's and the country's resources to completely eradicate the effects of apartheid and to build a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future. The RDP was later succeeded by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, also initiated by the ANC government, in response to the country's macro-economic challenges, which translated into an active search for increasing direct investment, new markets for exports, development aid for infrastructure and human resources development (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:197).

The establishment of GEAR was seen as a response to the inadequate performance of the RDP to address certain pertinent issues focusing on the human aspects of

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[59] In 1996, 57 percent of South Africans were living in poverty. The number of crimes, especially rape, carjacking, serious assault, housebreaking and common robbery has been increasing since 1996 and the trend has been sharply upwards since 1998. South Africa has the second highest murder rate in the world after Colombia at 65 murders per 100 000 persons. Johannesburg is the most violent city in the world with 110 murders per 100 000 persons. In addition, unemployment in South Africa is 36 percent and 500 000 jobs have been lost since 1994 (The Economist, 24th February 2001: 4, 7 and 11; Schonteich, 2000).

development. As part of the ANC administration's GEAR policy, the role of the new government was to increase employment levels, boost economic growth and adopt a redistribution of wealth programme that would economically empower more black South Africans and raise their standards of living (Grimond, 2001; Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999).

In this regard, Pretoria made concerted efforts after 1994 to raise the standards of living of South African citizens by ensuring the availability of affordable housing, health care, access to clean water, education, free access to all governmental and social services, economically empowering black South Africans in various industries, creating employment, investing heavily in infrastructure in areas that were formerly disadvantaged, and so on.

The government had to ensure people got decent housing. Concerns included building new houses for the citizens around the country while at the same time, providing access to health care in the areas where these houses were built. The government also had to make a commitment to make services such as health care accessible to South Africans, especially in the remote areas of the country, and to provide clean water by establishing water projects around the country. [60]

The government was also compelled to play an important role in making education accessible to all South Africans. In this regard, hundreds of schools had to be built after Mandela took over in 1994 and the existing schools had to be improved, especially in the former disadvantaged areas. Education was to be one of the ways

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[60] Grimond, (2001:2) observes that since 1994, black household incomes had risen by nine percent in real terms. In addition, nine million people have had access to clean water since 1994, 1.5 million households have had access to electricity and over one million new housing structures were built for people who had no formal shelter before. The government also introduced basic pensions for the poor elderly. Moreover, the government provides a free sandwich a day for every child at primary school – ensuring a minimum nutritional diet.

the post-apartheid government would attempt to empower the majority of its citizens who were formerly disadvantaged.

Going hand-in-hand with education would be the economic empowerment programme for the formerly disadvantaged. This programme would be aimed at 'levelling the playing field' as well as making the economic sector accessible to formerly disadvantaged people.

Therefore, from the above overview it is clear that the economic and social situation of the country would be and was an important pre-occupation of the Mandela government. The economic development and well-being of South African citizens was of the utmost importance to the new government.

In order to implement the programmes and achieve the goals mentioned above, it was crucial for the government to have the economic/financial capability to support its projects. This capability could come, among other things, from profitable domestic industries. One such industry was the defence industry, which had been in existence for over seventy years. It grew in importance during the last twenty years of apartheid since the country needed to become self-sufficient in the production of armaments as a result of the economic embargos imposed during apartheid. In this way, the defence industry had long played an important part in South Africa's economy.

In fact, the defence industry was such an important part of the economy, that the Mandela government had a vital interest in preserving it. It provided jobs to several thousands of people, contributed a noticeable percentage to the country's GDP and represented a significant percentage of government's foreign exchange earnings. For example, between 1982 and 1993 the arms exports as a percentage of total exports ranged from 0.1 percent to 1.2 percent. Within the same period Pretoria's arms

exports increased by 300 percent. This amounted to roughly 4 percent of South Africa's GDP (Batchelor, 1996: 103-105). In addition, between 1982 and the early 1990s, Pretoria's arms exports rose from 20 million to 270 million US dollars (Batchelor, 1998) (see 5.4 for a more detailed analysis). In the following sections, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate the centrality of the defence industry in the period prior to and during the democratic struggle.

5.3. The Development of the Defence Industry in South Africa

South Africa's military industrial complex was established during the 1960's. During the Cold War, apartheid South Africa fought a battle on two fronts: domestic and regional. The military battle was literally to place restrictions on the non-white population in view of the potential civil unrest (within South Africa), and also to lend support to Rhodesia and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. To this end, the drive to acquire modern weaponry received greater input from the government. On the international front, the regime tried to win the understanding and support for its domestic policy and from 1975, to destabilize neighbouring African countries to lessen the perceived security threats arising from regimes that were installed after decolonization.

Needless to say, a solution to domestic and regional strategies required a regular influx of military equipment, including arms. However, this was not easy in the face of international criticism and the outcry against the racist regime, accompanied by a voluntary arms embargo called for by the UN Security Council in 1963. Hence, South Africa could not count on procuring arms through international trade and it became necessary that the country ensured a constant supply of arms through its own production. As a result, a sophisticated military and defence industry developed and became an important part of Pretoria's economy.

5.3.1. Background of the Defence Industry

The development of defence technology and the production of armaments have been part of South Africa's tradition for a long time. It can be argued that the foundation was set with the revolutionary design of the short stabbing spear by the Zulu king Shaka, followed by the work of the Cape gunsmiths in the late 18th century and the early 19th century. The first artillery pieces designed and produced in South Africa were two cannons manufactured by a Boer farmer and used in the First Anglo-Boer war. Further cannons were locally manufactured during the Second Anglo-Boer war, the 'Long Cecil' being an example (Hatty, 1996).

The period between 1912 and 1939 saw both a beginning and a great advancement in South Africa's military industry. The Union Defence Force was established in 1912 and was modelled on the British tradition and depended almost entirely on British equipment. Although the last British forces were withdrawn from South Africa in 1921, Pretoria's defence remained closely linked to that of Britain (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998).[61] In the 1930s, naval services were temporarily put on hold because of military spending cuts. Although no indigenous armament production took place at this time, there was one exception in 1930, when South Africa began domestic production of certain types of military aircraft though this effort was curtailed by lack of funds, too.

Between 1939 and 1945, there was a major drive to produce certain types of military aircraft and armaments for South African troops who fought on the side of the Allies. This was especially true in East and North Africa, and for the protection of the Cape sea route. In 1940, an advisory committee on defence force requirements was set up to handle all matters concerning the acquisition of armaments. This led to

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[61] The Royal Navy retained its bases at Simonstown and Walvis Bay.

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the establishment of six armament factories during the war years. Shells, cartridge cases and bombs were manufactured and infantry arms and British designed tanks were assembled.

Other armaments produced during this period were armoured vehicles, howitzers, mortars and ammunition, and some electronic equipment such as radar components.[62] During this period, part of the African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI), owned by the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) of Britain, was engaged in military production. However, after 1945 all wartime factories were closed except two: the Defence and Ordnance Workshop (later became Lyttleton Engineering Works) and the South African Mint .303 Ammunition factory. Both these factories operated as state factories.

Further developments took place between 1945 and 1961. In 1948, a Board of Defence Resources was created as a permanent body to direct national armament policy. This organization was superseded by the Munitions Production Office (a branch of the Department of Defence) in 1951. This establishment led to the creation of South Africa's first rifle factory in 1953. In 1954, military research and development was separated as a special field through the creation of the National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) — under the umbrella of the Council for Scientific Research (CSIR).

By the time South Africa underwent its first arms embargo in 1963, it already had some basic conditions for arms production (Landgren, 1989). Hence, when it became necessary to produce armaments, Pretoria already possessed capable steel and explosives industries. Abundant power from accessible coal, and large numbers of skilled engineers and scientists further strengthened these pre-conditions for arms

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[62] During the Second World War, 5 770 armoured cars, 600 guns of various calibre and more than 30 000 military vehicles of eighty different types were produced by South Africa (Hatty, 1996).

production. Subsequently, South Africa established the first defence research organization that combined general industrial research with military industrialization.

Between 1962 and 1990, the South African arms industry was characterized by the development of an armaments industry designed to support domestic and regional policies in the wake of international isolation. The embargos of 1963 and later 1977 meant that Pretoria had to become self-sufficient in armament production. Batchelor and Dunne (1998) observe that these conditions severely hampered South Africa's access to international sources of arms and laid the basis for the establishment of a self-sufficient defence industry. Pretoria was further isolated in 1967 when the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling on all states to cease supplying South Africa with arms. South Africa faced new obstacles in 1977 when the UN imposed a mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria.

In addition to producing its own weapons to counteract international embargos, Pretoria's increasing involvement in a number of conflicts in the region (for example with Angola and Namibia in the 1980s) contributed to considerable expansion of the domestic defence industry. Indeed, both of these involvements required a guaranteed supply of improved weapons (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). Consequently, by the end of the 1980s, Pretoria had a well-developed defence industry that was able to meet the needs of the South African military.[63]

The industry's sectors included the production of aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles, warships, infantry weapons and small arms, military electronics and communications equipment, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear technology. Modernization developed mainly on the basis of access to Western

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[63] For a detailed account of the organization and structure of South Africa's defence industry, see chapter 4.

technology (Guimaraes, 2000:153-190).[64] For example, aircraft production began with Italian and British technology in the 1960s, and was later augmented by more sophisticated projects on the basis of French technology in the 1970s and 1980s. Production in other sectors was based on French and German technology and that of other advanced Western states, and in addition, South Africa acquired production licences from Belgium, France, Israel and Britain (Landgren, 1989: 37 and Miller, 1980). Accompanying the growing production in the defence industry was development of military research and development (R&D).

5.3.2. Organization and Structure of South Africa's Defence Industry

South Africa's military industrial complex was established during the 1960's. The government's response to the prospect of more open civil unrest and external threats was to acquire and produce even more modern weaponry. In 1961, for example, more than 127 licences for the local manufacture of military equipment were negotiated with overseas arms industries (Barber, 1973: 192).

After 1961 - with the declaration of South Africa as a republic and withdrawal from the Commonwealth – there was at the same time fear of a potential arms embargo, and military technology was transferred in anticipation of the uncertain future. Hence, there was urgent need not only to restructure the military industry but also to militarize South African society. In this regard, the Armaments Production Board was established in 1964 with the adoption of the Armaments Act. In 1968, its name changed to the Armaments Board, and the Development and Production Act No. 17 of 1968 created a specialized production unit called the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (Armscor) (Hatty, 1996).[65]

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[64] For a detailed account of South Africa's weapons industry dependence on foreign military technology, see Annex 3.

[65] Armscor's duties were listed as: to take over all manufacturing facilities so far handled by the Armaments Board; to expand those facilities and set up new industries; to handle all arms exports

In 1976, a major re-organization of Armscor was undertaken because of mounting international pressure for an arms embargo on South Africa. The Armaments Board was incorporated into Armscor that then took full control of imports and exports of arms. In 1978, the bulk of the military research that was done by the National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) was transferred to Armscor. In addition, the Defence White Paper of 1979 emphasized that Armscor had to become technologically self-sufficient in the presence of the arms embargo. After 1982, arms export promotion became the task of Armscor, and a special export department called Nimrod was also set up the same year.

It has been argued that following the UN Security Council Resolution 418 of November 1977, which imposed a total arms embargo on South Africa and annulled all existing licences and agreements with South Africa, that South Africa was compelled to take up foreign licence-supplied technology as its 'innovations'. Examples included the production of the French Eland armoured car, the development of the Skerpion and Kukri missiles (Landgren, 1989: 45; Shelton, 1999).

5.3.3. Military Research and Development

Military research and development (R&D) began in South Africa in 1961 and was undertaken mainly by nine organizations.[66] In addition to these organizations

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and imports. Paragraph 4 of the Act stipulates that the organization shall review all matters relating to raw materials necessary for the production of armaments. Consequently, Armscor played an important role in Pretoria's defence planning.

[66] The Council for Scientific Research (CSIR) remained the central organization overseeing military R & D. But there were other organizations working in this field. They included:

- The National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) was the CSIR's most important branch, directing defence research at universities in South Africa.

forming the core of military R&D, Armscor had a number of subsidiaries attached to it. Most of these subsidiaries (see Annex 1 for details) were gradually incorporated into Armscor. For example, Telcast was later incorporated into Atlas and Eloptro (incorporated into Kentron). Kentron, formed in 1978, was to bring together V3A air-to-air missile production. In addition, this team developed the V3B and undertook its export (for more details see Annex 2).

5.3.4. Sectors of the South African Defence Industry

The sectors of South Africa's defence industry include aircraft, armoured vehicle, missile, warship, infantry weapons and small arms, military electronics and communications equipment, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear technology industries.

- The National Institute for Aeronautics and Systems Technology (NIAST) performed strategic R&D in the field of aeronautics for South Africa's aviation industry, which almost exclusively produced military aircraft for the air force.
- The National Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences (NRIMS) provided consulting services to government agencies and performed contract research as well.
- The National Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (NMERI) developed new designs for explosive shells as well as new glass fibre helicopter blades to replace imports. They also undertook aerodynamic testing.
- The National Chemical Research Laboratory.
- The National Electrical Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) performed R&D for the electronics industry.
- The National Institute for Telecommunications Research (NITR) performed long term R&D in radio communications.
- The National Physical Research Lab (NPRL) operated a radar facility with NITR and applied research in optical sciences, high-pressure physics and acoustics.

Three institutes that carried out nuclear research were National Accelerator Centre (NAC), the Pretoria Cyclotron Group and the Independent Atomic Energy Board (AEB). The AEB was set up in 1957 to oversee nuclear research.

5.3.4.1. The Aircraft Industry

French, Italian and Israeli participation and technology created the South African aircraft industry.[67] Products of this industry sector were:

A. the counter-insurgency fighter Impala. This fighter plane was of Italian origin possessing a British engine;

B. the Kudu and Bosbok light planes. These were of American and Italian origin;

C. the assembly of the 48 Mirage F-1 fighters from France;

D. the incorporation of the Mirage-3 fighter Israeli technology into the Cheetah;

E. the development of the Alpha XH-1 prototype helicopter gunship that was considered a genuine South African design.[68]

All these were projects undertaken by the Atlas Aircraft Corporation.[69]

5.3.4.2. The Armoured Vehicle Industry

This industry had been producing and developing a variety of vehicles for army needs, making maximum use of foreign motor industry technology. Vehicles were imported from Europe as 'civilian' goods and engines, and electronic components continued to be imported after the 1963 and 1977 embargos. By 1980, before the embargos began having an effect, South Africa's auto industry consisted of seven major companies namely:

Ford and General Motors from the US supplying the South African Police (SAP) and SADF, Chrysler also from the US, Toyota and Datsun-Nissan from Japan, British Leyland from Britain, Volkswagen from West Germany and Alfa Romeo from Italy.

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[67] American technology was acquired through Italy.

[68] Landgren (1989:63) notes that this was a re-designed Aloutte-3 Helicopter of French design.

[69] In 1964 the South African government contributed in the formation of an aircraft industry based on private initiative. Hence the government transferred 40% of its peacetime maintenance service to private companies. The Bonuskor Group was asked to form the companies for this undertaking. One of the registered companies that year was Atlas Aircraft Corporation of South Africa with an initial capital of 25.5 million British Pounds Sterling in November 1964 (Landgren, 1989: 65).

The list of military projects included the Eland armoured car that had been produced under French licence since 1966; the Ratel armoured car of 1976 was developed with German technology; the Oliphant upgraded tank of 1982 was a new version of the old British Centurion tank; the G-5 and G-6 self-propelled howitzer of 1982 and 1985 were developed with technology from the US, Canada, Belgium and Sweden; and the mobile Valkiri 127mm artillery rocket of 1980. Other high-wheeled vehicles also built were the Hippo, Buffel and Casspir armoured transport cars. The Hippo was designed and from 1976 jointly produced with the Rhodesian arms industry. The Zebra transporter succeeded the Hippo. The Casspir armoured transport car led to the development of the Gemsbok Mountain armoured car, the Bosbok transporter and the Duiker water tanker.

5.3.4.3. The Missile Industry

This was the most secretive branch of the defence industry. The development history of the South African-produced air-to-air missiles took place between the test shooting in 1968 and the presentation of the V3B Kukri at the arms exhibition in Piraeus, Greece in 1982. Ship-to-ship missile (SSM) technology was acquired with the licensed production of the Israeli fast attack boats from 1978 onwards. The only successful missile project of the 1960s was the Cactus surface-to-air (SAM) system that was produced jointly by the French and South Africans. The foreign technology needed for the missile industry was thus acquired from West Germany, France, Israel and the US.

The establishment of the Rocket Research Institute (RRI) in 1964, which undertook research and development in this industry, was indicative of Pretoria's realization that it needed missile systems. The RRI worked under the CSIR and was established under the auspices of the University of Pretoria with additional expertise from the Max Planck Institute of Aeronomy for Stratospheric Physics in Lindau/Harz, West

Germany. Two West German organizations were responsible for early rocket construction in South Africa — the Herman Oberth Gesellshaft of Bremen and the Waffen Uhel Luftrustung. The latter was an umbrella organization for about thirty German firms involved in the rocket industry.

The first major duty of the RRI was to organize the Cactus/Crotale SAM programme with the French. According to Professor Le Roux (Landgren, 1989: 103), Vice-President of the CSIR at the time, Pretoria wanted a place in space and weather research. Moreover, South Africa had been forced by events in Africa to enter the missile field at the same time. The German company of Bolkaw AG was tasked with the first test-firing of missiles at the St. Lucia test range in Natal. The French company Sodetag that built the St. Lucia test range was involved in building satellite tracking stations in Paardfontein near Pretoria as well as funding the French Crotale/Cactus SAM programme in 1964. It has been observed that French participation was necessary for South Africa's missile technology.

Other projects that South African scientists were involved in and that were financed by Pretoria, were the Milan anti-tank missiles, the Matra R-530 and R-550 Magic air-to-air (AAM) and the Exocet SAM (Schissel, 1977). Additionally, the French developed the AS-20 and AS-30 air-to-surface missiles (ASM) and exported them to South Africa, where they were made to local specifications and requirements (Jane's, 1983: 513).

Research & Development in missile technology was also undertaken at the Kentron Missiles (part of Armscor) that was formed in 1978 to handle Kukri and Valkiri projects. In 1973, a new missile research institute was established under NIDR — the propulsion division with the task of conducting development up to the production stage of missiles, their warheads, propellants and propulsion systems. Landgren (1989:104) has observed that the Tsumeb research centre was linked to

nuclear research, the RRI concentrated on space research, whereas the NIDR division focused on conventional missile technology.

Apart from the above developments, South Africa also imported a large number of missiles that included the French Matra R-530 and R-550 Magic AAM for the Mirage fleet; the AS-20 and AS-30 ASM for the Buccaneer bombers; the SS-11 anti-tank missiles, the Franco-German Milan and Entac anti-tank missiles (ATMs) for Eland armoured car, the Gabriel SSM from Israel for the Skerpion fighters and the AIM-9 Sidewinder ASM from the US to arm the Sabre fighters.

5.3.4.4. The Warship Industry

The Dutch East India Company built the first berthing facilities in Simons Bay in 1768. The British naval base in Simonstown was created in 1808, which later became known as the most modern naval dockyard in the southern hemisphere. Repair, maintenance and manufacturing support for the South African Navy (SAN) were undertaken at the naval dockyard in Simonstown. The consequent expansion of the Simonstown dockyard became important after the 1977 embargo especially for the purpose of upgrading and refitting existent ships. For example, one of the programmes for upgrading and modernizing the fleet that existed before the 1977 embargo was the modernization programme of four British president-class frigates. By 1986, only one of these remained in service.

The second state-owned dockyard managed by the navy was the Naval Dockyard Durban on Salisbury Islands. Since 1980, it has been expanded to provide maintenance for the new strike craft flotilla.

The first expansion of the Simonstown Naval Dockyard occurred with the purchase of three Daphne-class submarines from France in 1971. By 1990, they remained the only submarines of the SAN. The idea of a South African submarine dates back to

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1961 whereas the planning of 'Project Daphne' began in 1964. Although it was clear that no submarines would be coming from the British, in 1964, the first Daphne submarine was commissioned in France and in 1967, contracts were completed with the French Navy as well as the training and education of the first South African submariners. In 1970, trials began on the first vessel — the SAS Maria Van Riebeeck.

The Simonstown yard, a new submarine base complex was completed by 1971 and was built by a Danish company (approved by the Danish government in 1969). According to the 1969 South African Defence White Paper, this base cost 20.3 million US dollars. The submarine headquarters were completed in 1971 and the flotilla was commissioned as SAS Drommedaris and renamed SAS Hugo Biermann in 1974.

In 1980, the P.W. Botha Tidal Basin with berths for fifty ships was opened. In 1982, a new building project began in Simonstown, which concentrated on electronic, mechanical and structural maintenance facilities in two buildings close to the refitting berth; this greatly enhanced Pretoria's capacity to support the new sophisticated electronic and mechanical equipment of the 1980s. However, the warship building in South Africa began in 1978, when the Israeli Reshef-class missile boats began being built.

5.3.4.5. The Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Industry

This was one of the most secretive industries in South Africa during apartheid, because one of the methods of establishing the existence of production facilities is by observing their actual use in warfare. Such use has reportedly occurred in several regional wars since 1945. For example, the Angolan government had accused Pretoria of using chemical gases during its invasions into the country (Landgren, 1989:149).

In the chemical weapons industry, the African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI) (owned by Britain's ICI and De Beers of South Africa) dominated the market. Other firms were Sentrachem and Hoechst (both South African). AECI was connected with the chemical products used by the military and police. It produced tear gas, nerve gas and defoliants. Between 1912 and 1962 Britain supplied tear gas to South Africa until the 1963 embargo; by that time, however, Pretoria was already producing its own tear gas at AECI factories in Modderfontein. In 1963, the CSIR disclosed that work was being carried out on developing tabun, somen and sarin gases (all poisonous).

It has been noted that the SADF used chemical agents in 1978 against 600 Namibian refugees at Kasinga camp in Angola. Furthermore, in 1981, SWAPO president Sam Nujoma accused Pretoria of using napalm and chemical warfare in Angola (The Star, 3 April 1981).

The use of defoliants by South Africa on the Angolan/Namibian border at Kavango in 1983 was confirmed by the South African government (Rand Daily Mail, 19 October 1983). During 1983, an international journal confirmed that South Africa was doing research on improving nerve gases that could have the effect of an atom bomb (Kosova, 1983: 157).

Concerning South Africa's bacteriological weapons, it has been alleged (although never proven) that prior to 1990, the SADF had began testing special types of viruses and bacteria, harmless to whites but lethal to non-whites. The testing was allegedly conducted on political prisoners in South Africa. The centre for bacteriological weapons research was allegedly the secret biological lab at the SAAF base at Louis Trichardt in Transvaal. According to reports, active research had been carried out by the SANs school for chemical, biological and radiological

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defence near the Simonstown Naval Base. Although there were numerous allegations about Pretoria's CBW programmes during apartheid, none of them were ever proven or verified. There was also a lack of corroboration from other independent sources.

5.3.4.6. Infantry Weapons and Small Arms

During the apartheid era, when most of southern Africa was under colonization, the South African government supported white regimes in Southern Africa by making incursions into Angola and Mozambique. This was done in the form of an infantry war that required infantry weapons such as rifles, machine guns, grenades and mines. The small arms industry is the oldest branch of South African military production, the most comprehensive and well developed. Of the 127 foreign licences acquired in 1961, nearly all were for the local production of ammunition, small arms and bombs. For example, the Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun was licensed from Belgium to South Africa and the FN 7.62mm standard NATO gun supplied by Belgium (Landgren, 1989: 125). Both licences were revoked in 1963 but their production in South Africa continued since it was possible for Pretoria to use freely licence-supplied technology after formal cancellation of such licences. In other words, once technology had been supplied there was no way for the supplier reclaiming the know-how, or force the buyer to forget the knowledge.

The main companies involved in this industry were the Lyttleton Engineering Works (machine gun, rapid-fire ammunition and rifle manufacture), Pretoria Metal Pressings and Naschem (manufacture of high calibre ammunition and grenades); and Somchem, originally part of the AECI.

5.3.4.7. Military Electronics and Communications Equipment

The electronic industry was crucial to the development of sophisticated weaponry and was established by the South African branches of multinationals. Hence,

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Pretoria's access to the US, UK, German and Israeli technology laid the foundation for local industries. For example, companies involved in production for Armscor were Britain's Plessey and Racal Electronics, General Electric Corporation (GEC), Marconi, Decca and EMI Electronics. Sectors of military electronics included:

A. military semi-conductor and integrated circuits industry;

B. C3 I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence); and

C. microwave industry.

The products of these industries included electronic warfare (EW) systems such as avionics, radar and telecom, lasers and navigated optronics or electro-optics, and systems for training and simulation. EW equipment was integrated into every existing or planned weapon system whereas passive EW techniques were used to obtain intelligence communication links. Radars, infrared detectors, lasers, TV cameras and sighting devices all used some portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum for their respective operations. Active EW techniques were used to prevent enemy use of this spectrum for example, by noise or deception jamming that disrupted enemy C3 networks and radar systems. Some examples of military electronic applications were the helmet-guided Kukri ATA missile and the G-5 howitzer and its A580 fire-control system based on a 16-bit computer with a 64kb memory.

The following companies produced military electronics and communication equipment:

1. ALTECH was the first electronic company created and its full name was Allied Technologies. It was based on British and French technology.[70]

2. GRINEL was the name of Grinaker Electronics that was formed after the takeover of British owned Racal (South Africa) in 1978.[71]

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[70] In order to avoid the mandatory arms embargo, ITT – the British division of the US giant (Electronic and Communication Corporation) sold its 33% share in Altech to Altron (Altech's holding company) in 1977. In order to compete globally, Altech also bought the South African subsidiary of the French STC Company.

3. TACTEL was one of the major South African communications companies that came about as a result of mergers.[72]

4. BARLOW ELECTRONICS/REUNERT (Belgium) was owned by Barlow Rand Corporation that gained access to foreign technology by acquiring foreign companies.[73]

5. ELOPTRO was established in 1974 as the Armscor subsidiary to undertake the manufacture of optical components for various weapon systems, including involvement in optronics.[74]

6. TRIVETTS/VEC — The company drew on French technology and expertise in servicing Daphne submarines.[75]

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[71] At the time, Racal Electronics (UK) was the leading supplier of radio packs and tank radios. Over half of Racal's South African production went directly to the armed forces. Grinel was based partly on British and French technology and it specialized in the design and manufacture of advanced military communications and electronic equipment (Paratus, November 1979: 53). Grinel's development engineers worked closely with the SADF, in the process gearing production to the needs brought by actual combat.

[72] It re-equipped the South African army with locally manufactured Thomson-CSFTRC-3000 radios (based on French technology) and produced the Danish designed Very High Frequency (VHF) equipment for the army (Janes Defence Review Vol 4(9) 1983: 830). It also produced high frequency hopping radios, which became one of Pretoria's main exports by 1982.

[73] In 1977, it acquired 50% of Marconi (South Africa) and French owned Fuchs Electronics. In 1983, Barlow Rand set up an electronic and power engineering group by restructuring its subsidiary – Reunert Electronics. It then focused more on electronics rather than engineering.

[74] Its task was also to reduce Pretoria's dependence on importation of optical and electro-optical devices. In 1979, Eloptro became an independent unit of Kentron and all its work was done for the SADF involving R&D, manufacturing, maintenance, re-building and modification of existing equipment and consulting. Production of optical devices began in 1976, including work on the vision for the 155mm G-5 howitzer. In 1977, the licenced production of night-vision equipment began using ITT technology or Israeli licences. In 1981, Eloptro developed the mini-night sight-Gogga, including a compact laser range finder. The Gogga was applied to the 7.62mm R1 and the 5.56mm R4 rifles, but could also be mounted on the AK-47, M16, G-3 rifles and the Bren and Vickers machine guns. Eloptro provided all optical devices for Ratel and the Eland armoured cars, and contributed to the helmet-sight system in the Kukri missile. Although between 1974-1977 Eloptro's production was nearly exclusively based on foreign licences, by 1986, 99% of its production originated from its own designs (Timmerman, 1986: 47).

7. PROTEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES (PTI) was a major supplier of electronics to Armscor. It supplied field telephones to the SADF and by 1975, it was supplying transformers and power supplies to the armed forces. In 1977, PTI introduced new field switchboards in the SADF.[76]

5.4. The Centrality of the Defence Industry to the South African Economy

The relevance of the defence industry for a country can be both political/strategic and economic. When it comes to the strategic and political relevance, the defence industry can provide security and self-reliance for a country. This is because no country wants to be dependent on weapons from abroad. Furthermore, a domestic defence industrial base can be used as a tool in foreign policy since it supports the pursuit of power and influence, and provides means for acquiring allies and friends (Buzan, 2002; Andersson, 2001).

Regarding the relevance and role of a defence industry for the economic development of a country, various views can be observed. For example, a number of scholars argue that the development of the defence industry and the economy in general are intertwined, at least with regards to the complex relationship between economics and militarization.[77] This complex relationship can be placed into two schools of thought: those who claim that militarization has a negative impact in the

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[75] It updated the sonar electronics for the submarines included in the addition of computer-aided target motion analysis. Apart from sonar electronics, Trivetts-VEC was engaged in areas such as semi-automatic analysis of low frequency noise, transducer and array design, and anti-torpedo counter-measures. It specialized in electronic and electronic engineering.

[76] For a detailed account of the electronic products the above seven organizations produced see Annex 2.

[77] Militarization refers to a growing armaments capacity and allocations of societal resources for military ends (Wolpin, 1986: 2).

economy and those who assert that it has a positive influence on the development of a country.

On one side there are authors who claim that defence production diverts critically scarce inputs, such as capital, technical skills, labour, raw materials, and foreign exchange from the economy to produce arms. The defence industry is seen as being unproductive, yielding few spin-offs to the civilian sector, absorbing limited resources. In this way, it is perceived as a drain on the economy and an obstruction to social and economic development (Mushkat, 1982: 104, 181; Neuman, 1994: 102).

On the other side there are those who believe that the defence industry brings anticipated beneficial socio-economic spin-offs to the economy. In this regard, infrastructure built for military purposes is used by the civilian population and the economic viability of the arms trade makes it a beneficial and stable macroeconomic enterprise for the state and the government (Batchelor, 1996: 102-106).[78] In addition, transfers of technology from military to civilian industries are considered a spur to industrialization.[79] A country can also benefit through import substitution since there are more foreign exchange savings earned as a result (Mushkat, 1982: 183; Neuman, 1994: 104). Thus, the military industry can create employment opportunities and assist in human capital formation through training and skills development (Batchelor, 1996:113). All these factors are seen as significant preconditions for development.

The aim of this section, however, is not to discuss the above opposing views relating to the benefits of defence industry for the economy, but to show the importance of South Africa's defence industry for its economy to the extent that the available data

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[78] For a detailed study of the economic benefits of militarization, see Smith, (1983).

[79] For the examples of the technology developed and produced by the defence industry see Annex 5.

allows us. It is assumed, nevertheless, that the defence industry does have at least some spin-off effects for other industries in the economy, especially manufacturing.

We have already established the security and political rationale for the development of the defence industry during apartheid, now we will focus on the economic benefits of this industry. During apartheid the defence industry was a major contributor to the South African economy. It is important to observe that since there had always been considerable input by the state and private sector in this industry, by the late 1980s the defence industry was one of the most significant sectors of South Africa's industrial base (in terms of resources) (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998).

Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the defence industry was a major creator of jobs, and by 1989 it employed directly and indirectly around 160 000 people in domestic arms production, which constituted about 10 percent of total jobs in the South Africa's manufacturing industry (Batchelor, 1996:99 and Shelton, 1999). The arms exports sector supported 21% of jobs in the defence industry in 1994 of whom a similar percentage were technically highly trained workers (Batchelor, 1996:103, 114).

The defence industry has also had its share of highly capitalized and skill-intensive jobs in South Africa. For example, in 1989 there were more than 2 000 scientists and engineers employed by Armscor, which represented 11 percent of the total R&D personnel in the South African economy (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998).

Furthermore, the available figures show that in 1993 the domestic defence industry was contributing 4.4 percent of the manufacturing output in South Africa, which represented 1.1 percent of the country's GDP (Batchelor, 1996a: 104).

TABLE 1: South Africa's arms exports as percentages of manufactured exports and total exports 1982-1993

YEAR	ARMS EXPORTS CURRENT PRICES (in million rands)	ARMS EXPORTS/ MANUFACTURED EXPORTS (%)	ARMS EXPORTS/TOTAL EXPORTS (%)
1982	22	0.2	0.1
1983	27	0.3	0.1
1984	48	0.4	0.2
1985	282	1.8	0.7
1986	331	1.7	0.7
1987	454	2.1	0.9
1988	269	1.1	0.5
1989	205	0.7	0.3
1990	163	0.5	0.2
1991	794	2.4	1.2
1982	488	1.9	0.7
1993	886	3.1	1.1

Source: Batchelor, Peter, (1996) "The Economics of South Africa's Arms Trade". J. Harker, Aurora Papers 28, Collaborative Security in South Africa. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, p.104

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the defence industry was also a major contributor of foreign exchange earnings for the government. Between 1982 and 1993 the arms exports as a percentage of total exports ranged from 0.1 percent to 1.2 percent (see Table 1). Within the same period Pretoria's arms exports increased by 300 percent. This amounted to roughly 4 percent of South Africa's GDP (Batchelor, 1996: 103-105). Between 1982 and the early 1990s, Pretoria's arms exports rose from 20 million to 270 million US dollars (Batchelor, 1998) (see Table 2).

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According to the data provided by Singh and Wezeman, (1995), Pretoria exported arms worth 640 million US dollars in 1993 and was ranked 59th in the world in terms of arms exporting countries. In addition, in 1995 defence exports represented 21 percent of all exports or 1,25 billion rands in foreign exchange earnings (Hatty, 1996).

TABLE 2: South Africa's arms exports in relation to current prices in US dollars and values in 1990 rand terms.

YEAR	ARMS EXPORTS CURRENT PRICES (in million rands)	ARMS EXPORTS/ CURRENT PRICES (in million US dollars)	ARMS EXPORTS (in million rands) (1990)
1982	22	20	61
1983	27	24	68
1984	48	32	112
1985	282	126	561
1986	331	144	551
1987	454	223	663
1988	269	118	347
1989	205	78	230
1990	163	62	163
1991	794	288	713
1982	488	171	405
1993	886	271	689

Sources: Batchelor, Peter, (1996) "The Economics of South Africa's Arms Trade". J. Harker, Aurora Papers 28, Collaborative Security in South Africa. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, p.100;

Armscor; South African Reserve Bank — Quarterly Bulletin.

Hatty, (1996) further observes that in 1992, 90 percent of all exports were defence industry equipment, however, by 1995 defence exports had gone down to 84 percent because of the increase in civilian exports as well as defence budget cuts.

In post-apartheid South Africa, the influence of the defence industry has continued although the magnitude of the industry has been reduced considerably. There have been further cuts in the defence budget (see Table 3), which has resulted in loss of jobs and a brain drain.

TABLE 3: Defence Budget Trends, 1989 — 1996

Figures are in million rands in constant 1990 prices.
* Defence spending as a share of total government expenditure.

YEAR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Defence budget	11,435	1 071	8 094	7 605	6 589	7 153	6 249	5 9895
Change	5,5%	-11,9%	-19,6%	-6,0%	-13,4%	8,6%	-12,6%	-5,7%
Defence/GDP	4,1%	3,6%	3,0%	2,8%	2,4%	2,6%	2,2%	1,9%
Defence/government Expenditure*	13,0%	12,4%	9,8%	8,4%	6,8%	8,1%	6,8%	5,0%*

Sources: Batchelor and Dunne, 1998;
DoD, Budget review 1998, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1998.

This, however, does not mean that the impact of the defence industry has been non-existent. On the contrary, according to Batchelor (1996:99) and Shelton (1999), the defence industry's contribution to the South African economy at the time was still impressive in the sense that 40 000[80] people were employed by this industry in 1998 and that jobs were still being created, whilst there were some 800 companies involved in the arms industry, and the technical potential of the industry was still remarkable.

TABLE 4: Defence Industry Employment, 1989 — 1996

YEAR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Armscor/Denel	26 348	23 630	21 387	16 580	14 914	14 847	15 209	15 218
Total defence industry	131 750	118 750	106 935	82 900	74 570	74 235	76 045	76 090
Defence industry/manufacturing employment (%)	8,6	7,7	7,2	5,8	5,3	5,3	5,4	5,3
Arms industry/total Employment (%)	2,3	2,1	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,3

Sources: Armscor;

South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin (1989-1997).

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[80] According to Hatty, (1996) there were 50 000 people employed in the defence industry in 1996.

According to the data of the South African Defence Industry Association (SADIA) the defence industry employed over 70 000 people in 1994, of which an average of over 17 000 worked directly on defence products (Hatty, 1996).

Other data, such as those in Table 5, indicate that employment in the defence industry as a percentage of total manufacturing employment was much higher than previously thought. For example, average employment figures in post-apartheid South Africa for industry are around 75 000. This is arguably evidence of the considerable employment capacity of the defence industry in present-day South Africa.

TABLE 5: Defence Industry Employment as a Percentage of Manufacturing Employment and Total Employment, 1989 — 1997

YEAR	DEFENCE INDUSTRY*	DEFENCE / MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT (%)	DEFENCE / TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (%)
1989	131 750	8.3	2.3
1990	118 150	7.5	2.1
1991	106 935	6.8	1.9
1992	82 900	5.4	1.5
1993	74 570	5.0	1.4
1994	74 235	4.9	1.4
1995	76 270	5.0	1.4
1996	76 700	5.3	1.5
1997	73 995	5.3	1.4
AVERAGE	90 612	6.0	1.7

* Estimate, includes Armscor, Denel and private sector defence industry

Sources: Armscor Annual Report (various years), Denel Annual Report; South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin.

Table 6 below indicates that the production of arms engaged considerable levels of direct employment in 1996, numbering around 20 000.[81]

TABLE 6: Statistics on the value of output and the number of people employed in arms production in South Africa 1994 — 1999.

*Data are in million rands at current prices, unless otherwise stated.

| YEAR | DIRECT EMPLOYMENT | VALUE OF MILITARY SALES / PRODUCTION / CONTRACTS | | | TOTAL |
| | | DOMESTIC | EXPORT | | |
	DEFENCE RELATED EMPLOYMENT (A)	(B) CONSTANT 1990 PRICES	ARMS EXPORTS (A) CONSTANT 1990 PRICES	(C) CONSTANT 1990 PRICES	ARMS SALES (A) CONSTANT 1990 PRICES
1996	20 234	1 707	559		3 742
1995		1 808	843	721	6 638
1994		2 093	789		3 390

A. South African Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industry Association (AMD), *Defence Industry Statistics*[On-line] www.amd.org.za,

B. Domestic Acquisition Spending; National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), *White Paper on the South African Defence Related industries,* December 1999 [On-line] www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/defence/defenceprocure1.html (Table 2.2)

C. National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), *White Paper on the South African Defence Related industries,*

[On-line] www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/defence/defenceprocure1.html

D. National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), *South African Export Statistics for Conventional arms 2000-2001* [On-line] www.pmg.org.za/bills/020731ncaac.htm

Source: [On-line] http://projects.sipri.se/milex/aprod/nationaldata/southafrica.pdf

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[81] This figure includes employees from Armscor, Denel and other companies directly involved in the armaments manufacturing industry.

TABLE 7: Defence Industry Sales 1992-1995

1 — in million rands
2 — % of total exports

YEAR	1992		1993		1994		1995	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Defence Sales	3 452	76	3 422	70	3 390	67	3 638	60
Civilian Sales	621	14	833	17	1 051	21	1 117	19
Non-related Sales	480	11	630	13	604	12	1 297	21
TOTAL SALES	4 554		4 885		6 046		6 050	

Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview — Today and the Future" In African Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/5.3/Defence%20industry.html

As the Table 8 shows, the value of arms exports grew at an average of 40 percent per year between 1989 and 1998 and averaged over half a billion rands between 1989 and 1998. However, when compared with merchandise exports, arms exports grew at a lower rate in comparison, and formed a small percentage of the exported merchandise, one percent on average.

TABLE 8: South African Arms Exports, 1989 — 1998

YEAR	ARMS EXPORTS*	% CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR	MERCHANDISE EXPORTS*	% CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR	ARMS EXPORTS as a % of MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
1989	236		44 170		0.5
1990	163	-30.9	42 735	-3.2	0.4

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YEAR	ARMS EXPORTS*	% CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR	MERCHANDISE EXPORTS*	% CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR	ARMS EXPORTS as a % of MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
1991	686	320.7	46 147	8.0	1.7
1992	411	-40.0	42 516	-7.9	1.0
1993	712	-73.2	46 974	10.5	1.5
1994	659	-7.6	53 873	14.7	1.2
1995	721	9.5	60 419	12.2	1.2
1996	1330	-54.2	66 401	9.9	0.5
1997	802	142.8	71 487	7.7	1.1
1998	380	-52.6	80 005	11.9	0.5
AVERAGE	510	40.1	55 472.1	7.1	1.0

* (in million rands, constant 1995 prices)

Sources: Armscor Annual Report (1989-1998);

National Conventional Arms Control Committee, 1999;

South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin.

Defence exports as percentage of total exports increased steadily from 18 percent in 1992 (614 million rands) to 29 percent (1,05 billion rands) in 1995 (see Table 9). Hence, it can be argued that the export of defence products still played an important part in Pretoria's exports. With regards to defence industry exports, in 1994 and 1995, around 85 percent of total exports were defence equipment while civilian exports made up only around fifteen percent.

TABLE 9: Defence Industry Exports 1992-1995

1 — in million rands
2 — % of total SA sales

YEAR	1992		1993		1994		1995	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Defence exports	614	18	755	22	789	23	1049	29
Civilian exports	35	6	77	9	133	13	187	17
Non-related Exports	35	7	89	14	13	2	18	1
TOTAL EXPORTS	684	15	921	19	936	19	1254	21

Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview — Today and the Future" In African Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/5.3/Defence%20industry.html

In 1994, the value of arms exports was 918 million rands and by 1997, this value had increased by 30 percent to 1166 million rands. Between April 1994 and August 1999, Pretoria sold arms worth more than 3.3 billion rands (600 million US dollars) to 91 countries (Batchelor, 1999).

In 1997, weapons had become South Africa's second largest manufactured export worth 370 million US dollars (SIPRI, 2001). These sales accounted for five percent of total manufactured output, 1.2 percent of South Africa's GDP and one percent of all manufacturing jobs (Shelton, 1998). In 1995, South Africa was placed twelfth on the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's list of top twenty international arms exporters (South Africa, 1997: 20).

TABLE 10: South Africa's Arms Exports and Sales of Surplus Arms, 1992 — 1998

YEAR	TOTAL EXPORTS*	CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS YEAR (%)	SURPLUS SALES*	CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS YEAR (%)	SURPLUS / TOTAL EXPORTS (%)
1992	645		101		15.7
1993	1 054	63.5	87	-13.4	8.3
1994	928	-12.0	72	-17.9	7.7
1995	1 033	11.3	64	-10.5	6.2
1996	502	-51.4	83	29.7	16.6
1997	1 135	126.3	71	-14.4	6.3
1997	512	-54.9	49	-32.0	9.5
AVERAGE	829.8	13.8	75.2	-9.7	10.0

* In million rands, constant 1995 prices.

Sources:

Armscor Annual Report (1992-1998);

National Conventional Arms Control Committee, 1999.

As Table 10 demonstrates, between 1992 and 1998 the value of South Africa's total exports fluctuated quite widely with an increase of almost 14 percent per year over the period. In addition, South Africa's arms exports averaged over 800 million rands per year in sales. These arms sales represented a considerable source of foreign exchange for the South African government.

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In addition to acquiring foreign exchange earnings, the South African economy has indeed benefited considerably from having a domestic defence industry.[82] The research refers to foreign exchange savings, which were made as a result of domestic production of armaments. Table 11 below shows the data on savings for the years 1994 and 1995.

TABLE 11: Foreign Exchange Savings Due to Local Defence Industry

1994 / 1995	MILLION RANDS
Local Purchases	2 919
Less Imported Content of Local Purchases	802
Counter trade Credits against Imports	380
Exports	982
Foreign Exchange Savings	**3 479**

Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview — Today and the Future" In African Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/5.3/Defence%20industry.html

In addition to foreign exchange earnings and savings the government benefited from all companies involved in the sale of armaments since they had to pay a certain percentage to the government out of every sale they made. South Africa's arms exports are dominated by Denel (a state owned corporation), which controlled 80 percent of total arms exports in the period 1992-1998 (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). Denel together with the three major private sector companies (Reunert, Grintek and Altech) is also the dominant player in the domestic defence market, accounting for over 80 percent of the defence industry sales on domestic market.

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[82] See Annex 4 for data on the companies that constitute the South African Defence Industry Association.

Defence companies pay 18 cents out of every rand in sales to the government. In 1995, for example, the government received 225 million rands in revenue from defence firms. Moreover, Denel's financial contributions in 1994/1995 amounted to 590 million rands (Hatty, 1996).[83]

TABLE 12: Composition of Turnover, Denel, 1992-1998

| YEAR | TURNOVER (in million Rand at constant prices) | Defence change from previous year (%) | DEFENCE | | CIVILIAN | | DEFENCE TOTAL (%) |
			Domestic (in %)	Exports (in %)	Domestic (in %)	Exports (in %)	
1992	3660		63	16	20	1	79
1993	3382	-7.6	53	20	24	3	73
1994	3274	-3.2	48	23	25	4	71
1995	3401	3.9	45	24	25	6	69
1996	2805	-17.5	50	14	30	6	64
1997	2725	-2.9	41	20	30	9	61
AVERAGE	3207.8	-5.5	50	20	26	5	70

Source: Denel Annual Reports.

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[83] Singh and Wezeman, (1995:576) observe that in 1995, Denel had 14 000 employees. Denel is a public company with all its equity owned by the state, employing about 13 800 people (down from 28 000 persons in 1992). A Board of Directors, responsible to the Minister for Public Enterprises, manages the company. Denel receives no government subsidy, unlike many of its foreign competitors, such as French state-owned defence industrial companies that receive government support. It is presently structured as a single company with divisions and subsidiary companies. These companies include Atlas (aircraft), Eloptro (optronics), Kentron (anti-aircraft systems, missiles, RPVs, avionics), LIW (artillery, turrets, infantry weapons), Mechem (mine-protected vehicles, special equipment) and four ammunition producers - Naschem, PMP, Somchem and Swartklip. Denel also controls several research and development facilities and test ranges.

The defence industry's contribution to South Africa's industrial sector is also important, since it has always played a strategic role in the development of Pretoria's industrial structure, especially in the manufacturing sector. It is widely recognized that countries experiencing sustainable growth and improving their standards of living have achieved that mainly through growth and development in the manufacturing sectors.

In South Africa, the manufacturing sector contributes 25 percent of the GDP, which is more than any other sector. Military production represents an important part of this sector, since it is essential for economic spin-offs as well as for the transfer of technology from military to civilian industries, a trend that is crucial to industrialization. Table 13 below provides a list of examples of commercial application of defence industry technology.

TABLE 13: Examples of Commercial Application of Defence Industry Technology

1	Environmental control systems for mining applications
2	Sporting rifles and ammunition
3	Cricket bats
4	Civilian aircraft engine gearboxes
5	Composite material filament wound pipes
6	Mobile hydraulic test bench
7	Walk through metal detectors
8	Electronic encryption for commercial facsimile transmission
9	Wide format monochrome inkjet plotter
10	Electronic head turnstile
11	Liquid flow metering systems

12	Industrial microwave ovens
13	Protected 4 x 4 vehicle
14	Light commercial tractor
15	Baggage handling and check-in facilities
16	Marine distress flares
17	Intensive care monitors
18	Rural telephone system
19	Composite racing bicycles
20	Composite aircraft seats for Concorde

Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview — Today and the Future" In African Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/5.3/Defence%20industry.html

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show that the defence industry was central to the South African economy. By the time apartheid was effectively implemented, Pretoria had a fully operational defence industry that involved innovation, assembly and modifications of defence products. South Africa managed to obtain a considerable amount of assistance from Western countries in the form of direct funding, importation of spare parts, and acquisition of production licences, all of which facilitated the development of its defence industry. This kind of assistance helped Pretoria becoming a major arms producer in the world.[84] Prior to the 1990s, South Africa not only produced weapons, it also exported a substantial volume of arms to countries in Africa, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

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[84] In Africa, Pretoria was one of the largest weapons producers and subsequently also the largest arms exporter.

After the UN embargo had been put into place, Pretoria's arms industry had to become more self-sufficient than before to be able to supply the military and in cases where Pretoria did not have the technology to build or develop equipment, it modified or improved current models to give them a longer shelf life.

This chapter has also shown that by the time apartheid came to an end in the early 1990s, Pretoria had established a huge defence industry that became quite central to the South African economy. Despite the embargoes and budget cuts, the defence industry was still an economic asset to the apartheid regime and remains so today.

After the early 1990s, the defence budget was considerably reduced, as the internal and external security situations of the new government were significantly different from those of the previous government. In other words, *with the democratization of South African society, many reasons for spending on defence equipment disappeared*. As a result, with the decreased defence budget, the defence industry saw a considerable loss of jobs in a country that was already dealing with high levels of unemployment.

However, even with this reduced number of employed people, the defence industry still provides jobs for tens of thousands of people in a country that faces high levels of unemployment. In addition, the approximately 800 companies involved in the arms industry are still creating jobs.

With the decreased domestic demand for defence industry's products, the government was forced to look for foreign buyers. In a shrinking post-Cold War arms global market the competition was harsh, but if we look at the available data, we can observe that arms exports increased during the Mandela administration.

It is understandable that the government had a great interest in exporting arms since Denel, the large state-owned defence conglomerate, controls 80 percent of all defence exports and together with three other local firms, controls 80 percent of the domestic defence industry. At the same time it employs on average 15 000 people and has an annual turnover of over three billion rands every year.

The data in this chapter has shown that in the 1990s the defence industry still formed an important part of South Africa's economy, especially since any crisis in this industry and its effects could spill over to those (civil) sectors of economy that depended on the defence industry, such as other manufacturing sectors. However, the Mandela government could not afford to have a crisis in a major sector of its economy in the face of many economic and social problems such as underdevelopment, inadequate housing, high rates of unemployment, crime and poverty. Therefore, the preservation of the defence industry as well as the selling of the defence industry's products to interested clients was in South Africa's national interest — economically speaking.

If one applies the *innenpolitik* approach to foreign policy analysis, one can argue that South Africa's foreign policy under Mandela was mainly influenced by its domestic factors. In this regard we can argue that a country's domestic political and economic environment can greatly influence a country's foreign policy.

The sale and export of arms constituted post-apartheid South Africa's national interest, whose pursuance ultimately compromised its foreign policy principles. In exporting arms, however, the government faced a problem of its foreign policy implementation. The states that were in need of arms and other defence equipment violated the very laws Pretoria sought to preserve. Since the government had a great interest in selling arms in order to sustain the South African defence industry and solve domestic economic and social problems, it had to create an arms sales policy

that would promote South Africa's economic/commercial national interests and be in line with its foreign policy principles at the same time. The next chapter will therefore discuss the arms sales policy that was adopted to guide the government when selling weapons to ensure that it would behave as a responsible arms dealer.

6. CRAFTING AN ARMS SALES POLICY

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapter attempted to show that the defence industry was central to the South Africa economy. By the time apartheid was effectively implemented, the defence industry came to secure a central position in the economy of South Africa. The chapter also demonstrated that by the early 1990s, Pretoria had established a huge defence industry whose exportation of arms contributed significantly to the GDP and ultimately continues to play a major part in the creation of foreign exchange for the economy. Despite the embargoes and budget cuts, the defence industry was still an economic asset to the apartheid regime and remains so today. This was evident from the fact that even after the demise of apartheid and with the emergence of the new South Africa, the defence industry still provides jobs for tens of thousands of people in the country as well as brings in the much-needed foreign exchange.

Thus it would seem that the democratic regime was not about to abandon the defence sector because of its centrality to the economy. The Mandela government would continue to rely on the proceeds of the defence industry in order to solve or deal with domestic pressures. In this regard, it would have to introduce a viable arms sales policy. This policy would have to be enacted in order to make arms trafficking more transparent and legitimate with the demise of apartheid.

This chapter therefore proposes to look at South Africa's arms sales policy. It begins with an analysis of the two major markets where the arms trade takes place and which Pretoria took part in, during and after the apartheid era. A review of the apartheid arms sales policy will be undertaken with a view to show the development of South Africa's arms sales policies. The chapter will then proceed to discuss how

post-apartheid arms sales policy came in to being by discussing some of the recommendations and submissions that were made to a committee entrusted with the creation of a new arms sales policy. The chapter will then proceed to analyse post-apartheid arms sales policy in detail before concluding the debate on South African arms sales policy. The major purpose of the new post-apartheid arms sales policy was to enable the country to have a transparent and legitimate arms sales policy that was a move from the secrecy that shrouded past policies.

Given the sensitive and, in most cases, the political nature of the arms trade and its importance for the promotion of national interests, including the preservation of a state's security, the arms trade or arms transfers are frequently clouded with secrecy where deals are brokered in concealment. The covert nature of these transactions, however, means that they are frequently done in 'grey' and 'black markets.' South Africa in this regard has been actively involved in both types of markets both during and after the apartheid period. Hence it is important for us to discuss both markets to get an idea of the arena in which the arms trade takes place.

6.2. Black and Grey Markets

Since the mid-1980s, the black and grey arms markets have emerged as major factors in the arms trade. The illegal black market arises as a reaction to embargos as states try to acquire weapons in spite of them. The state-sponsored grey market, though receiving less attention, is much larger and more destabilizing. One can say that the grey market is evidence of a government's alignment as states experiment with new and risky relationships.

During the Cold War, the black and grey markets were trivial in comparison to the post-Cold War era. They did not have a big impact on the international system since in the bipolar world states aligned themselves to one of two powers and in the

process got the necessary assistance from their powerful ally. Since the end of the Cold War, as the international system has become more chaotic, and ethnic conflict has replaced inter-state wars as the most immediate danger to international peace and security, the black and grey markets have grown and cannot be overlooked (Karp, 1994: 175-176).

The effects of black and grey transactions can be felt much more quickly and with greater certainty than with ordinary open transactions. Both types of markets contribute to the degree to which weapons will be used to threaten or kill. Their greatest effect is felt at the extremes of international conflict, in small-scale arming of sub-state actors, and in the drive by 'pariah states' to acquire weapons that can cause significant damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure (Karp, 1994: 180-186).

In comparison to the black market, the grey market is more obscure and resembles the covert nature of the black market. In reality, however, it is much different. Unlike the black market, grey transactions are usually neither entirely legal nor illegal. Some of the characteristics of the grey market include, among other things, the transfer of non-standard weapons, and the reliance on intermediary suppliers to further disassociate suppliers and recipient governments. By using covert channels, officials on the supplier's and recipient's side can take greater risks while minimizing potential embarrassment or danger (Karp, 1994: 177-178). Therefore, this way of selling arms would appeal to both sides making the transaction.

The grey market on the supply side is the domain of those who use arms exports as the tools of their foreign policy. If the black market is seen as the violation of national or international law, then any action counter to stated policy and customary rules indicates operations on the grey market. And while the black market is illegal, the grey market can be considered illegitimate. The reason for selling weapons on

the grey market is to avoid political problems at home and abroad after engaging in open transfers (Catrina, 1994: 197).

The market in which a country will trade in arms depends largely on the international as well as domestic, political, and economic contexts. Analysis of apartheid South Africa's arms trade policy can shed some light on how the illegitimate or even illegal arms transfers work in practice.

6.3. Apartheid South Africa's Arms Sales Policy

During apartheid, South Africa's arms sales policy was ambiguous, unpredictable and lacked adherence to international norms and regulations (National Assembly, 1997:3019). Arms exports were determined by the Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 1968 (Armscor Act). The major problem with this act was that it was both unclear and misleading at the same time. Armscor was responsible for the manufacture, sale and acquisition of arms. Although it was originally intended to operate under a ministry, it was constituted as a separate and autonomous entity that functioned as a company. However, the Minister of Defence could, on the basis of the Act, approve corporate loans and appoint and dismiss directors.

Since Pretoria was determined to enter into the international arms export market, it adopted certain rules, regulations and classifications, which formed its arms sales policy, to guide Pretoria in the arms trade in the face of international embargos.[85] Since 1983, potential buyers were classified according to recommendations made by the Defence Foreign Policy Committee (DFPC)[86] and these categories were:

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[85] South Africa first showcased its weapons at an arms exhibition in Piraeus, Greece in 1982. This event signalled Pretoria's entrance into the export market.

[86] The DFPC comprised members of Armscor and the former South African Defence Force. It was chaired alternately by the SADF's Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Armscor's General Manager

Group 1: no restriction on the marketing and/or export of armaments which had been released for marketing;

Group 2: only non-sensitive armaments could be exported to such countries;

Group 3: no armaments could be exported to these countries.

In addition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment were divided into three broad categories (Cameron Commission, 1995):

Category A: all armaments released for marketing;

Category B: all non-sensitive items such as vehicles, radios, anti-riot equipment and weapons and ammunition not exceeding 12.7mm;

Category C: all products not released for marketing.

There were always inconsistencies and a disregard for principled policy in Pretoria's arms sales, which were exposed in the Smith Report of 26 September 1983 (Cited in Cameron Commission, 1995).[87] Moreover, considerations about the lethal nature of the armaments, ethics, human rights and international norms were evidently lacking in South Africa's sales policy at the time.

Before 1982, South Africa's arms export industry was a protected territory because the government did not make information readily available for public knowledge. After 1982 with Armscor's entrance into the export market, this situation changed, with better access to information regarding this industry because Pretoria needed to sell individual weapons on the international market. Still, the data on its customers and orders was a well-kept secret.

(import and export Control). In 1991, the DFPC was joined by the Department of Foreign Affairs and National Intelligence Service, and Department of Trade and Industry from 1994.

[87] For example, the South African government classified the Lebanese government as belonging to Group 1, and the main opposition group, Christian Militia, as Group 2. In 1987, the Lebanese government became a Group 2 market, while the Christian Militia was upgraded to Group 1 status.

Since the 1960s, Pretoria had exported certain types of military equipment through middlemen/intermediaries in order to go around the UN arms embargo and the boycott of South African goods. At the same time Britain, France, West Germany and Israel provided Pretoria with opportunities to export South African equipment. For example, a subsidiary of a foreign company in South Africa would export diesel engines to West Germany and from there they were re-exported to other foreign countries.[88]

In all these cases, the buyers remained anonymous and furthermore, they were kept in the dark about the origin of the goods. In some instances, countries such as France literally sold missiles on behalf of South Africa, for example, the sale of the Crotale missile through France, and the importation of South African-made equipment by the US (Landgren, 1989: 174).

Amongst other weapons and ammunition that Armscor offered for export were:

  a. pyrotechnics for the army, navy and air force. These included thunder flashes, smoke canisters, rocket flares, trip-wire flares and coloured signals, anti-missile decoys and 81mm smoke generators for combat vehicles;

  b. a comprehensive range of hand grenades including offensive, defensive smokers and riot control;

  c. 5.56mm and 7.62mm rifle grenades of high explosive red phosphorous smoke types;

  d. non-metallic, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines;

  e. demolition equipment (International Defence Review, 12, 1984: 1809).

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[88] Most of the military technology Pretoria used during apartheid was received through Western countries. See Annex 3 for data on the use of foreign military technology in the aircraft, missile, armoured vehicle, warship and other military industries.

Ultimately, the volume of South African arms exports prior to 1982 cannot be established. The same could be said for South Africa's export of small arms, ammunition and other military equipment, which was possible to conceal. With regards to major weapons the question as to who the buyer was and the origin of the goods remain the main area of contention.

It can be argued, therefore, that during this period Pretoria undertook to sell arms through the black or grey markets in order to circumvent the arms embargo imposed by the UN. At the same time, after the embargo was imposed South Africa could only use the black market to sell and procure armaments and earn much-needed hard currency for its economy. However, after 1982 and with Armscor's entrance into the regular export market, Pretoria openly engaged in export and trade despite the embargos placed on it.

The Mandela government did not have the same problems as the apartheid regime when it came to the export of arms. The embargos were lifted in 1994 and the products of the defence industry were eligible to be sold on the international market. However, the new government faced other issues in relation to the arms sales right from the beginning. To avoid future problems and embarrassments an elaborate arms sales policy was formed, which is discussed in the next section.

6.4. Post Apartheid South Africa's Arms Sales Policy

In September 1994, the discovery that a consignment of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) weapons supposedly destined for Lebanon had apparently been sold to Yemen, soon led to the appointment of a commission of inquiry by President Mandela on 14 October 1994 (Government Notice R 1801 of 1994). The Cameron Commission of Inquiry into alleged arms transactions between Armscor

and Eli Wazan and other related matters was to investigate illegal arms dealings and particularly the sale of weapons to Yemen, a country to which South Africa was not allowed to sell arms under government policy (this event became known as the Yemen debacle.) The Commission was headed by Judge Edwin Cameron and became known as the Cameron Commission. The specific task of the commission was to:

> "Comment in the context of South Africa's national and international obligations and responsibilities on the appropriateness of South Africa's current trade policy with regard to weapons and components with reference to weapons and related materials, and decision-making processes with regard to such trade".

The Commission published the first of its two reports (Cameron Reports) on the Yemen transaction in June 1995. The Commission also invited interested parties and members of the public to submit written presentations on adequate policies that may be used in the future. Among the presentations that were submitted concerning adequate policies that may be used in the future were the South African Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Practice and recommendations for the improvement of those measures (Cilliers, 1994, 1995).

Among the recommendations made were those initiated by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) (Cilliers, 1994 and 1995). It was their argument and recommendation that in creating an arms policy South Africa should take into consideration the issue of global arms control among other things. According to IDPs recommendations, it was vital that Pretoria ensures that its arms export policy is in line with the wider security concept (human and economic security) as well as the UN Charter.

As a result Pretoria needed to commit itself to a policy of transparency in non-proliferation and arms control that covered weapons with major destructive capabilities and the general proliferation of conventional weapons.

Cilliers (1994) further argues that Pretoria's primary goal would be to establish and reinforce South Africa's reputation as a responsible arms producer, possessor and trader of defence-related products and advanced technologies. In its endeavours, South Africa should attempt to balance the interests of the domestic defence industry with trade in defence-related products to provide for future defence needs. It should also contribute to socio-economic development through export earnings; and at the same time such trade should be in accordance with international conventions and other control regimes of which South Africa is a signatory.

In this regard, the IDP (Cilliers, 1994) proposed a draft conventional arms transfer policy that would be debated. The conventional arms transfer policy of the South African Government would serve the security interests of the country in two important ways:

- Pretoria would support arms transfers that met its own continuing security needs, and those of its friends and allies.
- The Government would not participate in arms transfers that may destabilise or threaten regional peace, or undermine global and regional security.

In addition to the new conventional policy serving South Africa's security interests, this new policy would also set out certain goals that it would strive to achieve. The goals of this conventional arms sales policy would serve:

- to ensure that South African military forces can continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;

- to help allies and friends in the region deter or defend themselves against aggression, while promoting interoperability with South African forces when combined operations are required;

- to promote regional stability, while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems;

- to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, democratisation, and other foreign policy objectives; and

- to enhance the ability of South Africa to develop its industrial base to meet South African defence requirements and maintain a long term military technological capacity at lower costs (Cilliers, 1994).

IDP (*ibid*), however, noted that a vital element of South African policy on arms sales should be the promotion of control, restraint, and transparency of arms transfers. The core of Pretoria's efforts should be to promote multilateral restraint, to put in place a successful regime of effective international controls on arms sales and the transfer of sensitive technologies, particularly to regions of tension and to states that pose a threat to international peace and security. In line with pursuing multilateral restraint through this and other mechanisms, the Government should exercise unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security and foreign policy interests require it to do so.

The South African Government should also:

- support regional initiatives to enhance transparency in conventional arms trade, such as those being examined by the OAU, SADC/ASAS and possibly soon the ISDSC;

- support efforts to establish an international export control regime to increase transparency of transfers of conventional arms and related technology, to establish effective international controls of these transfers, and to promote restraint - particularly to regions of tension and to states that are likely to pose a threat to international peace and security;

- support current arms control and confidence building efforts to constrain the demand for destabilising weapons and related technology;

- act unilaterally to restrain the flow of arms in cases where unilateral action is effective or necessitated by overriding national interests. Such restraint should be considered on a case-by-case basis in instances where South Africa has a substantial lead on weapons technology, where South Africa has no fielded countermeasures, and where the transfer raises human rights issues or indiscriminate casualties, already the case with landmines; and

- assist and support other suppliers to develop effective export control mechanisms to support responsible export policies.

Consequently, the IDP proposed that once a transfer was approved, the Government had to provide support for the proposed export. This would include: tasking overseas mission personnel to support overseas marketing efforts of South African companies bidding on defence contracts, actively involving senior Government officials in promoting sales of particular importance to South Africa, and supporting official Department of Defence participation in international defence and trade exhibitions. All these measures also add credibility, transparency and government control and would depend heavily on the effectiveness of the decision-making process.

A critical area in the field of arms transfers is arms transfer decision-making. Because the transfer of arms is usually of a complex nature, Pretoria's decisions should, in future, be guided by a set of general criteria that draw the appropriate balance between legitimate arms sales to support the national security of friends and

allies, and the need for multilateral restraint in the transfer of arms that would enhance the military capabilities of hostile states or that would undermine the stability of certain regions of the world (Cilliers, 1994).

According to Cilliers (1995), arms transfer decisions should therefore be guided by the following general criteria:

- consistency with international agreements and arms control initiatives;
- appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate security needs in South Africa and the recipient country;
- consistency with South African regional stability interests, especially when considering transfers involving power projection capability or the introduction of a system that may foster increased tension or contribute to an arms race in the region;
- the degree to which the transfer supports South African strategic and foreign policy interests through increased access and influence, burden sharing, and interoperability;
- The impact of the proposed transfer on South African capabilities and technological advances particularly in protecting sensitive software and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration knowledge;
- the impact on the South African industry and the defence industry base whether the sale is approved or not;
- the degree of protection afforded to sensitive technology and the potential for unauthorised third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion to unauthorised users;
- the risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely impacting upon South African operational capabilities in the event of a compromise;
- the risk of adverse economic, political or social impact within the recipient nation and the degree to which that country's security needs can be addressed by other means;

- the human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question;
- the availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers;
- the ability of the recipient to effectively field, support, and appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its intended end use (Cilliers, 1994, 1995).

Additionally, South African arms export policy should also adhere to the following specific requirements:

- armaments are sold only to internationally recognised governments, i.e. not to guerrilla or other movements;
- armaments offered for sale must be released for export by the South African National Defence Force;
- the sale or transfer of weapons of mass destruction (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons and associated delivery systems) or the technology associated with them, is prohibited in terms of the Non-Proliferation Act of 1993;
- specified (supplier, product and recipient country) Armaments Marketing Permits must be issued by the Minister of Defence or a person/organisation authorised by him in terms of the Armaments Development and Production Act regulations (Act no. 57 of 1968);
- end-user certificates must be required in all cases and the validity of these certificates confirmed (Cilliers, 1994, 1995).

All the above recommendations made up part of the submissions to the Cameron Commission that was entrusted to search for a new and transparent arms sales policy after the Yemen case.

The Yemen case, therefore, demonstrated the need for a new arms sales policy, accountable to the government, and the Cabinet in particular, which would regulate the entire arm sales process to avoid future irregularities. Consequently, the Commission proposed a new arms sales policy and regulation system. A Cabinet memorandum of August 1995 set up a new four-level arms control system consisting of:

- a processing unit (Directorate for Conventional Arms Control) based at the Defence Secretariat;

- a review of any proposed arms sales by various government departments (defence, foreign affairs, trade and industry, safety and security, transport, intelligence);

- a scrutiny committee consisting of the Secretary for Defence and the Directors-General of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry; and

- a cabinet committee (the National Conventional Arms Control Committee — NCACC) chaired by Kader Asmal, the Minister for Water Affairs and Forestry.[89]

This structure is reproduced in Picture 2 below.

Accompanying the new arms control system was a new acquisition management structure that would ensure proper acquisition of arms and materials used in the manufacture of armaments. This structure was a three-tier system that was to ensure transparency and accountability in the acquisition of armaments. Once a user-requirement was identified, the Armaments Acquisition Control Board (AACB) screened all the projects and programmes. After the AACB's approval, the next step in the monitoring hierarchy was the Armaments Acquisition Steering Board (AASB)

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[89] Other members of the NCACC include the ministers of defence (and deputy), trade and industry; arts, culture, science and technology, constitutional affairs, public enterprises, intelligence services (and deputy), foreign affairs (and deputy), and safety and security (and deputy).

that screened and approved cardinal projects. At the top end of the management acquisition structure was the Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC), whose sole responsibility was the final approval of defence and armament projects. This structure is reproduced in Picture 3 below.

In terms of this arms control system, any arms export application had to pass all four stages successfully and be assessed on a case-by-case basis, thereby eliminating the pre-1994 'Yes List and No List' approach (countries to which weapons could be sold and those that no weapons were to be sold). In the *White Paper on Defence*, adopted by government in May 1996, all potential sales had to be channelled through the NCACC. According to official policy as laid out in the *Guide to the Terms of Reference of Conventional Arms Control in South Africa,* decision-makers are required to consider the following criteria for each arms export application (Secretary for Defence, 1996):

    a. the recipient country's record on human rights and fundamental freedoms;
    b. existing tensions or armed conflicts and the internal and regional security situation of the recipient country;
    c. the recipient's record of compliance with regard to international arms control agreements and treaties;
    d. the nature and cost of the arms to be transferred in relation to the circumstances of the recipient country, including its legitimate security and defence needs and the objective of least diversion of human and economic resources for arms procurement; and
    e. the degree to which arms sales are supportive to South Africa's national and foreign interests.

PICTURE 2: ARMS SALES DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Source: http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Frame/Frame.htm

PICTURE 3: ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC)

approves cardinal projects

⬆

Armaments Acquisition Steering Board (AASB)

approves on cardinal projects
screens cardinal projects

⬆

Armaments Acquisition Control Board (AACB)

screens all projects and routine programmes

⬆

User Requirement Identified

Source: http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Frame/Frame.htm

When considering applications for arms export permits, the guidelines suggest the avoidance of arms sales that are likely to:

- violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- contravene South Africa's obligations;
- endanger regional and international peace by introducing destabilizing military capabilities;
- be diverted by the recipient country or re-exported to third countries;

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- negatively impact on South Africa's diplomatic and trade relations with other states;
- contribute to the escalation of regional conflict.

The approval procedure is further complicated by the classification of armaments in five separate categories:

Category A: Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE) — any weapon system that can cause high casualties, or major damage;

Category B: Sensitive Significant Equipment (SSE) — hand carried assault weapons;

Category C: Non-Sensitive Equipment (NSE) — equipment used in support of combat operations with no inherent lethal capacity;

Category D: Non-Lethal Equipment (NLE) — protective equipment, or defensive equipment such as de-mining systems;

Category E: Not-for-Sale (NFS) — defence related items, which cannot be sold, such as anti-personnel land mines.

In July 1995, the *Mail & Guardian* published country categories with respect to the above regulations (The Economist 1995:31-32). These categories were as follows:

> Category 1 (no arms restrictions): Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, **Zimbabwe**, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Benin, Cape Verde, Senegal, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Eritrea, Bahrain, Egypt, **Israel**, Jordan, **Kuwait**, Mauritania, **Morocco** and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (but all sales on hold pending peace referendum in Western Sahara), **Oman**, Qatar, **Saudi Arabia**, Tunisia, **United Arab Emirates**, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, **People's Republic of China**, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia (since put on hold), Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Macao, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pacific Ocean Islands, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka (since put

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on hold), **Republic of China**, Thailand, Vietnam, United States of America, Canada, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, French Guyana, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, **Colombia**, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Bahamas, Bermuda, Belize, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Grenada, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Vatican, San Marino, Malta, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, **Cyprus**, Greece, Andorra, Albania, Hungary, Turkey (since changed to IV), Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russian Federation, Belarus.

Category ll (some arms restrictions): Comoros, Madagascar, Mali, **Cameroon**, **Congo,** Sao Tome and Principe, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, **Uganda**, Palestinian National Authority, **India, Pakistan**, Bulgaria, Romania.

Category lll (non-lethal equipment): **Angola**, Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Zaire, Djibouti, **Algeria**, Lebanon, Moldavia.

Category lV (no arms sales): Lesotho, Liberia, **Nigeria**, **Sierra Leone**, Gambia, Burundi, **Rwanda**, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Christian Militia, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, Tadjikistan, Kirghistan, Uzbekistan, Croatia, Slovenia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan.[90]

All the regulations that were a part of official policy on arms sales provided assurance that universalist foreign policy principles were put into practice at the very time when South Africa would pursue its economic interests by exporting arms to

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[90] The National Conventional Arms Committee first provided this information on 26 August 1996 in Pretoria.

various countries. Furthermore, the Cameron Commission specifically suggested that such arms transfers be compatible with the values of South Africa's interim (and now also, the new) constitution respecting human rights:

> "The new criteria [for determining which categories of weapons may be exported, and to which countries], should be based above all, on South Africa's commitment to democracy, human rights and international peace and security. More specifically, the criteria should seek to avoid the export of arms to repressive and authoritarian regimes and to illegitimate rebel movements. Attention should also be paid to the political and economic stability of the prospective recipient state and the surrounding region..."[8]

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyse how post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy was crafted. A review of the apartheid arms sales policy has shown that the development of South Africa's arms sales policy, ultimately led to the creation of a post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy. It would appear that this development occurred in order to address the demands of a particular period during that very busy post-apartheid phase. But the arms sales policy would have to take into account the different arenas where the arms trade took place, namely the black and grey markets.

This chapter has demonstrated that the black and grey markets are important in the arms trade and that states such as South Africa took part in such markets during and after the apartheid era. On account of the sensitive nature of defence industry products, sale and export of these products would also be considered sensitive - or even controversial. Thus states frequently use grey or black markets to avoid

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[8] Commission of Inquiry into alleged arms transactions between Armscor and one Eli Wazan and other related matters. First Report. Johannesburg. 15 June 1995, p. 4.

potential controversy and public censure. In this way, the apartheid regime was able to sell its defence industry's products in spite of a UN arms embargo. The transactions were done in secrecy and often conducted through middlemen and/or third-party countries at least until 1982, when Armscor entered the global market. Hence, a viable and more transparent arms sales policy was needed for accountability purposes.

Unlike the apartheid regime, the South African government under Mandela was able to trade weapons produced by the South African defence industry quite openly. However, the Yemen debacle, which involved illegal arms dealings, demonstrated that South Africa needed a more transparent arms sales policy as well as formal procedures for approving individual arms deals. This led to the appointment of the Cameron Commission, which investigated the Yemen incident and made recommendations concerning post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy.

This chapter also demonstrated that the purpose of Pretoria initiating a new viable arms sales policy was of utmost importance since it determined how transparent its arms trade would be. The result was a policy based on consideration for human rights, international/regional peace and security, South African interests, recipient country defence needs, and so on. In addition, a four-level arms control system was put in place to ensure the observance of the adopted rules or guidelines on a case-by-case basis to avoid irregularities. It should be noted that this arms sales policy was completely in conformity with universalist foreign policy principles.

Based on the government's arms sales policy, this thesis can argue that the Mandela government had honest intentions of respecting its foreign policy principles, and understood that any initial ambiguities would need to be addressed through introduction of procedures that needed to be followed when selling sensitive products of the defence industry. In this way, the government would prevent future

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deals with states that disregarded the upright principles that the foreign policy of the new South Africa was based upon. It can be argued that this statement is true because the Mandela administration was aware of the effect that the sale of arms would have on its foreign policy and constitution by extension.

This point is connected to the observation that production and selling of arms products differs in a number of important ways from the sale of other commodities of the manufacturing industry. Firstly, the products of the defence industry are 'sensitive' in that they are used for taking human lives in great numbers. Secondly, military equipment provides political, security and strategic significance for a state since it can be used for deterring an internal or external threat or eventually for the legitimate defence of a country and illegitimate attack on or intervention into another country. Knowing that arms products have the power to cause much damage, the Mandela administration needed to introduce 'moral' standards – in the form of new procedures - when selling arms products to other states.

The numerous case studies in the next chapter will, however, attempt to demonstrate that the government did not take those guidelines into consideration as a rule, but rather as an exception. In this way, the government's arms sales practice earned much criticism at home as well as abroad.

7. SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS SALES 1994 - 1999

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the post-apartheid South African arms sales policy that emerged as a result of the Yemen affair. The chapter also presented the different markets in which the arms trade takes place, such as the black and grey markets. The chapter showed that the apartheid arms sales policies could no longer be applied by the democratic government, hence, a new policy had to be enacted that would reflect the ideals and vision of the new government. This new policy had to be in conformity with the official universalist foreign policy of the Mandela government and constitution by extension.

As demonstrated in chapter 4, the Mandela government ran into problems when trying to implement its official foreign policy. The same was true for the arms sales policy since the actions of the government were continuously in breach of its foreign policy principles. Arms were sold to countries that were on Pretoria's list of censured states, which meant that the arms exports to those countries should not have taken place. In addition, arms that were sold fell into the restricted categories of arms that could not be sold at all.[91] This chapter thus analyses South Africa's

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[91] In this regard, South African government's classification of armaments falls into five separate categories: Category A comprises Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE), which include conventional weapon systems such as artillery, bombs, and grenades and armoured fighting vehicles. Category B comprises Sensitive Significant Equipment (SSE); all assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and other related small arms and ammunition would fall in this category. Category C comprises Non-Sensitive Equipment (NSE), which is used in support of combat operations. These include meteorological stations, radio equipment, support vehicles, radars and recovery equipment. Category D comprises Non-Lethal Equipment (NLE) that is limited to mine-detecting equipment, and all non-lethal pyrotechnical and riot control products. The last Category E comprises the Not-for-Sale (NFS) defence related items, such as anti-personnel land mines. The SMSE, SSE and NFS

arms sales in practice with a view to examining the extent to which they conformed to the stated policy of the government.

7.2 Post Apartheid South Africa's Arms Sales

After the Yemen debacle, which brought about a new South African arms sales policy, South Africa refused to sell weaponry on human rights grounds on several occasions. For example, it imposed an arms embargo on Nigeria with effect from the 2 November 1995, following embargos put in place by the European Union (EU) and United States.[92]

In line with its own policy but provoking protests from the Kenyan government, South Africa refused to supply riot equipment to the Kenyan police (Onyango, 1997). South Africa's position was in line with its foreign policy of promoting democracy and transparency in Africa – a major issue at the time in Kenya. Pretoria also claimed to have resisted pressure from Sudan to provide maintenance for South African helicopters previously supplied to that country's abusive government by the apartheid regime.[93] Sudan at the time was known to be a perennial abuser of human rights and non-democratic performer, and Pretoria's acceptance to sell arms to Khartoum would be seen as supporting the Sudanese regime.

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types of armaments thus possess lethal capabilities because of their ability to destroy human life while the rest are non-lethal armaments.

[92] According to NCACC chair Kader Asmal, interviewed on SAFM 15 November 1995, as reported by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 November 1995. The EU and US had already imposed restrictions on arms sales to Nigeria, following the November 1993 coup that put General Abacha in power; these restrictions were strengthened following the 30 October 1995, sentencing and 10 November 1995 execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).

[93] Human Rights Watch interview with Ronnie Kasrils, Pretoria, January 31, 1999.

In addition, following the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan, and the country's subsequent suspension from the Commonwealth, South Africa announced that it would suspend arms sales in order to put pressure on the military regime in Pakistan to democratise and uphold fundamental human rights. Despite these efforts, South Africa later allowed delivery of arms sold under previously-negotiated contracts. Zimbabwe complained in mid-2000 that it had not been able to purchase tear-gas from South Africa earlier that year, and South African officials reportedly attributed the denial for export to civil unrest in Zimbabwe at the time (SAPA, 2000). This position was rightly taken by Pretoria in defending its policy of promoting and defending democracy.

Despite these instances in which human rights in arms sales policy were observed, there have been numerous controversial decisions to allow the official export of South African arms to governments engaging in repression against their own people, or to countries involved in civil wars. In December 1999, the non-governmental Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) reported that five of the top ten destinations for South African arms exports between 1996 and 1998 included Algeria, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, India and Pakistan, countries that had experienced some form of conflict (both inter-state and intra-state), undemocratic and authoritarian regimes, and poor human rights records (Stoppard, 1999). Some analysts have observed that such controversial arms deals made Pretoria an irresponsible arms trader (Batchelor, 1999 and Economists for Arms Reduction).

For example, Pretoria's plan to sell arms to Syria in 1997 (The Economist, 1997: 44) was in contravention of its arms sales policy. Firstly, this contravened South Africa's arms sales policy to states not upholding human rights; secondly, selling arms to Damascus meant escalating the arms race and contributing to the already potent instability in the Middle East. As one analyst has noted, "Syria is the country most likely to go to war with Israel" (Battersby, 1999:253). Furthermore, the regime

in Syria is a dictatorship that has operated under a state of emergency since 1963 (Nathan, 1997). Even though it can be argued that Pretoria was creating a type of balance of power in the region, counteracting Israel's enormous arms supplies from the United States, this sale was nevertheless illegitimate. In order to understand why South Africa went ahead with the sale and violated its foreign and arms sales policy in the process, one has to observe the ANC's past relationship with Damascus. Syria had supported the ANC during the apartheid era and this South Africa's decision to sell arms can be viewed as returning a favour to a friend in need. In addition, the threat faced by Syria in relation to Israel compelled Pretoria to sell arms to Damascus.

South Africa's arms deals with abusive governments and countries in conflict have fed the perception, domestically and internationally, that the ANC government's foreign policy is haphazard and that South Africa has failed to become a restrained and responsible arms trader. In addition, it appears that the Mandela administration decided that maintaining jobs in the arms industry and other economic considerations were more important than the government's stated commitment to human rights principles (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

To illustrate to what extent South Africa violated its arms sales policy, foreign policy and constitution by extension, several case studies are presented below.

7.2.1. Algeria

In December 1991 the Armed Forces annulled the democratic elections in this country and took control of the government. As a result, political violence soared. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the winners of the elections, resorted to an armed struggle to pursue their grievances. Consequently, this low intensity civil war escalated with the mass killings of civilians. Thus, all opposition groups, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) — armed wing of the FIS, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA),

the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (Fida) and the Movement for an Islamic State (MEI) have been accused of attacking civilian populations. The government has also been accused of employing small militia groups to carry out attacks on civilians in order to discredit the Islamist opposition.

There have been suggestions that the Algerian armed forces allowed atrocities to take place in order to turn the population against the Islamist opposition (Shelton, 1998). Observers estimate that roughly 100 000 people were killed between 1992 and 1998 (Lambrechts, 1998:7). In other words the Algerian armed forces did not take into consideration or care about the lives and wellbeing of Algerian citizens but were more concerned about getting domestic support over the Islamist opposition who enjoyed the popularity of the masses and had seemingly won the elections that had been nullified by the army.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI (2001), South Africa supplied Algeria with 10 Seeker Unmanned Air Vehicle systems in 1997. The 1997 deal reportedly concerned 'Seeker remote-piloted vehicles,'[94] a pilotless plane with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment, and possibly Rooivalk attack helicopters (Kirby, 1998).[95] Minister Asmal stated in Parliament that the weapons included sensitive, major-significant equipment and non-sensitive equipment, and that Cabinet had stipulated that the weapons should be used only for external self-defence and not for internal repression. The Algerian government declared that the Seekers would be used only to patrol its borders and oil pipeline network.

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[94] According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Africa sold 10 Seeker vehicles to Algeria in 1998 (SIPRI, 2001).

[95] Denel was invited to demonstrate the Rooivalk helicopter to the Algerian government in October 1997 (Denel (Pty) Ltd media statement, October 17, 1997).

- The total weapons sold to Algeria by Pretoria in 1998 alone were worth 84.9 million rands (15.2 million US dollars).
- A further 173 million rand arms package followed in 1999.
- By 1999, Algeria had purchased 1 584 000 rands (288 000 US dollars) worth of non-sensitive equipment from South Africa (included upgrade packages for Mi-17 military helicopters and Mi-24 attack helicopters in Algeria's arsenals) (Batchelor, 1999 and Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, 1999).

It is important to note that the above sales went ahead despite the international outcry and inquiry about human rights abuses in Algeria. (Human Rights Watch, 2000). The announcement of the 1999 sale came on the day the Algerian government rejected calls from several human rights organizations for an international inquiry on the human rights abuses in Algeria. The South African government's endorsement of the NCACC decision was on condition that the weapons would be used only for self-defence from external influences and not for internal law enforcement (The Star, March 18, 1998:5). However, the weapons package sold to Algeria included Seeker Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems, which were ideal for domestic surveillance and policing and unsuited for external reconnaissance because their use across borders would violate the sovereignty of neighbouring countries.

7.2.2. Rwanda

The conflict in Rwanda in the 1990s originates partly in the violence and destruction that occurred from 1959 to 1966, when the Hutu overthrew the Tutsi monarchy, which had ruled for centuries. At the time, between 20 000 and 100 000 Tutsi were killed. This violence drove about 150 000 Tutsi (*Banyarwanda*) to Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire. Similarly, in Uganda, the *Banyarwanda* and their descendants

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suffered under Milton Obote and Idi Amin. In the early 1980s around 2 000 of them joined a guerrilla movement led by a former Defence Minister, Yoweri Museveni.[96]

Rwanda's tremendous turmoil over the last decade - the most memorable being the genocide in 1994 - was preceded by a war launched in October 1990 by Tutsi guerrillas of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the Hutu-led government. Although both the government and guerrillas had few resources to purchase weapons, their combined 45 000 combatants represented a potential market and arms suppliers saw an opportunity in Rwanda (Goose and Smyth, 1994:88).[97]

The proliferation of weapons in Rwanda evidently extended the war, displacing over one million people. At the same time the flow of arms facilitated the violations of international law (where both the army and the RPF were engaged in direct attacks on civilians and civilian areas) and human rights abuses. Relief organizations estimated that 500 000 people perished in the genocide carnage that began in April 1994.

Following a storm of protest over a decision to approve arms sales to Rwanda in September 1996 (Block and Swart, 1996),[98] the South African government suspended the sale of weapons to that country in November 1996 over fears that Rwandan forces committing abuses might use South African arms (Williams,

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[96] In 1986, Museveni and his men took over the Ugandan government and in 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from its northern border with Uganda, more than half of its forces and most of its officers were drawn from the Ugandan army.

[97] By this time an arms race was under way, where more than a dozen states helped fuel the war. At the same time, both sides seem to have purchased a colossal volume of weapons, to the extent that the Rwandan government admitted to having been bankrupted in striving to pay for these weapons (Goose and Smyth, 1994: 89).

[98] According to SIPRI (2001), South Africa sold to Rwanda 20 RG-31 Nyala anti-personnel carriers in 1996 in a deal that was worth 18 million US dollars and included small arms.

1996)[99] both within Rwanda and in cross-border raids into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (formerly Zaire). In July 1997, the NCACC did a *volte-face* and gave the go-ahead for arms transfers despite eruption of fighting in western Rwanda and the involvement of Rwandan troops in a series of atrocities within Rwanda and in the former Zaire, in which Rwanda intervened in late 1996 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

In response to the increased attacks by armed opposition groups believed to have been allied to the former Rwandan army and the *interahamwe* militia, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) mounted large-scale military operations, especially in the north-west part of the country, where many unarmed civilians lost their lives. Many of the victims were refugees who had returned to Rwanda at the end of 1996 after fleeing attacks on refugee camps in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo.[100]

Despite Rwanda being involved in both intra-state and inter-state conflict, Pretoria went ahead with the sale of arms to Rwanda. Amnesty International has asserted that South Africa was Rwanda's largest arms supplier (Edmunds, 1997). And since the Rwandan army had been reportedly involved in 6 000 deaths in 1997 alone (Amnesty International, 1998),[101] the Human Rights Watch in its October 2000 report (IRIN, 2000) suggested that:

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[99] The Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad had declared that South Africa would refrain from selling arms to Rwanda until peace and stability returned to the region. At that time this deal worth 18.5 million US dollars was suspended, a number of armoured vehicles had already been provided to the Rwandan government. The UN arms embargo against Rwanda had been lifted on 1 September 1996.

[100] See Amnesty International Report of, 1997 for more details.

[101] Kader Asmal, head of the NCACC, described the equipment to be exported as "non-lethal" and "non-sensitive," but added that, "in the future, South Africa will be prepared to consider supplies which fall in the higher, lethal categories subject to the observance of assurances such as those publicly given by the Vice-President of Rwanda that "... South African-supplied weapons would not be used outside Rwandan territory" (Zavis, 1997).

"...South Africa's choice of some of its arms customers has revealed a gap between the principles professed by the NCACC and the practice which appears to be based more on considerations of *realpolitik* and economics..."

The report added that in 1998, South Africa again furnished arms to Rwanda and Uganda, this time worth over 21 million rands (3.8 million US dollars).[102]

Huge protests from national and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, accompanied this reversal of policy. Faced with mounting criticism, the government justified the sale by declaring that a void would have been more dangerous to security in the region, that Rwanda was a legitimate and internationally recognized government, and that South Africa's ultimate goal in the Great Lakes region was complete demilitarization.[103]

However, it remains to be explained why South Africa decided to provide weapons not only to Rwanda, but also to Uganda and the Republic of Congo in 1997 in the face of compelling evidence of grave human rights abuses and persistent instability. In 1997, the value of sales to all three countries totalled over 56 million rands (12.2 million US dollars).[104]

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[102] Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999." In 1998 South Africa sold weapons worth nearly 19.6 million rands (3.6 million US dollars) to Rwanda and worth 1.5 million rands (273,000 US dollars) to Uganda.

[103] Human Rights Watch interviews with Kader Asmal, Pretoria, October 28, 1996, and Cape Town, February 3, 1999.

[104] Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999." Asmal stated in April 1997 that South Africa had a guarantee from Uganda that the weapons sold would not be channelled across the border to rebels in Zaire (SAPA, April 24, 1997).

7.2.3. Kuwait

Human rights abuses in Kuwait, especially in the post-liberation period have been rampant and mostly perpetuated by the Kuwaiti regime. For example, Kuwait has laws that discriminate against women both in public and private life. This is evident in the so-called 'honour crimes' where men kill female relatives for infidelity or indecency and get a three year jail sentence. In addition, women are banned from voting or standing for elections and they cannot contract their own marriage or get a divorce. To make matters more serious, in November 1999, the National Assembly voted against women's suffrage.

Following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, the drive to avenge the horrors of the Iraqi occupation ushered in a new wave of human rights abuses by the Kuwaiti regime. Despite calls to defend human rights in rallying support for the war against Iraq, the reinstated Kuwaiti government did not change its position on the question of human rights and continued to use violence.

Some of the methods used in this retaliation were murder, torture, arbitrary detention, and unlawful deportation. The ploy was a government-inspired pursuit to root out those who had collaborated with the Iraqi occupiers and to restructure Kuwaiti society in a fashion that was deemed more reliable politically. The victims, almost uniformly long-term residents of Kuwait, were principally Palestinians, Iraqis, and the stateless Arabs known as 'Bedoons', who have been victims of human rights abuses as a result of their statelessness (Human Rights Watch, 1995).[105]

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[105] Kuwait also practises institutionalized discrimination against its residents known as 'Bedoons', forming about one third of Kuwait's population. Even though they have been long-time inhabitants of Kuwait, they have been denied Kuwaiti citizenship and are now being rendered stateless. Barred from employment, denied education for their children, restricted in their movements, and living

In addition to the human rights question in Kuwait, there is a tension between Kuwait and Iran, which is based on Kuwait's nervousness about Iran's naval defence build-up in the region. In this way, Iran perceives Kuwait's co-operation with the West as a way of interfering with the objectives of Islam in the Middle East.[106]

Despite these many internal and external problems facing Kuwait, South Africa sold arms to the Kuwaiti government that contributed to the escalation of regional conflict. In 1997, South Africa sold armaments to Kuwait worth 5.9 million rands of which 95 percent were weapons having major destructive capabilities (weapon systems that can cause high casualties or major damage). This was clearly a violation of Pretoria's arms sales policy. The resultant sale would arguably tend to heighten the tension and hostility already existing in the Middle East. In this case, South Africa did not take Kuwait's poor record of human rights and regional relations into consideration when agreeing to the sale.

7.2.4. Colombia

On 8 November 1992, Colombian President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo adopted a string of emergency decrees limiting civil liberties, granting additional powers to the military, and punishing any contact or dialogue with insurgent groups. The declaration marked a reversion to authoritarian rule supposedly left behind with the

under the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and deportation, Bedoons are a community of have-nots in one of the wealthiest countries of the world. At the same time, tens of thousands of Bedoons, who fled Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation, have been barred from returning to their country (HRW, 1995).

[106] Tension has been an exacerbated, especially since 1994, when Kuwait signed an agreement with the US to build an American army base 40 km south of Kuwait City, which included the positioning of military equipment in northern Kuwait. Under this agreement, the US would defend Kuwait from external aggression as well as provide military and technical assistance in the event of an attack.

passage of the 1991 Constitution. And despite the adoption of emergency measures, the government failed to win a decisive upper hand in the thirty-year war against Colombia's 7 000 guerrillas.

Colombia is Latin America's leading recipient of US military aid, and in the past has appeared to provide counter-narcotics measures. However, the armed forces' priorities still remain centred around counter-insurgency tactics. Here, the focus of the military has been on the establishment of three Mobile Brigades, and deployment of elite units of trained soldiers who operate in areas of great insurgent activity. In the process of instilling peace and stability, however, these units have reportedly been implicated in a shocking number of abuses, including extra-judicial executions, disappearances, rapes, torture, the wanton burning of houses, crops, and food, arbitrary bombings, beatings and death threats.

For their part, guerrilla forces have engaged in an alarming number of violations of international humanitarian law, including the killing and torture of captured security force officers, attacks on civilian targets, and the destruction of the environment by repeated bombings of oil pipelines, which have put the civilian population in grave danger. The determination of the guerrillas to demonstrate their strength and the government's equal determination to incapacitate the insurgents is believed to prolong the stalemate characterizing Latin America's longest-running war and increase the suffering of those civilians caught in the cross-fire (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

According to the NCACC, Colombia has no arms restrictions. In other words, South Africa can sell arms to Columbia, but doing so brings serious implications. Colombia's history of intra-state conflict over the past few decades both with rebel

groups in the highland forests of Colombia as well as the drug cartels[107] would call for an opposite stand.

In 1997, South Africa sold 71.2 million rands worth of armaments to Colombia, 90 percent of which were from Category A: Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE). Further, between 1996 and 1998 Pretoria sold arms to Colombia worth 144.6 million rands (Khanyile, 2000:28-30 and Mills, 1997).[108] South Africa's agreement to sell arms to Colombia — a country undergoing intra-state conflict and committing human rights abuses — was a clear violation of Pretoria's arms sales policy.

7.2.5. Israel

Israel is a country situated in an extremely complex and hostile region. Currently, Israel is undergoing a ten year defence modernization programme, which includes new fighter aircraft, attack and transport helicopters, the upgrading of naval forces and the provision of a variety of US armaments and high tech sub-systems. The modernization plan called *Israel Defence Forces Beyond 2000* is based on an annual US aid grant of 1.8 billion US dollars.[109]

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[107] Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine. The Medellin and Cali cartels are the biggest and most powerful and pose an enormous threat to peace in Colombia.

[108] According to SIPRI, South Africa sold to Colombia 4 Anti-Personnel Carriers in 1996. These were the RG-31 Nyala type (SIPRI, 2001). South Africa's arms sales to Colombia in 1997 included approximately 60 million rands (13 million US dollars) in sensitive major significant equipment, 10 million rands (2.2 million US dollars) in sensitive significant equipment, and 2 million rands (434,000 US dollars) in non-lethal equipment. In 1998, these categories represented 21 million rands (3.8 million US dollars), 14 million rands (2.6 million US dollars), and 10 million rands (1.8 million US dollars) in sales respectively, in addition to 14,000 rands (2550 US dollars) in non-sensitive equipment. The year 1999 saw South Africa sell Colombia nearly 22 million rands (3.6 million US dollars) in sensitive major significant equipment, 7 million rands (1.1 million US dollars) in sensitive significant equipment, and 160,000 rands (26,000 US dollars) in non-lethal equipment. Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999."

[109] This figure has been constant since 1979, when Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt.

It is known that the Middle East is an extremely volatile region, prone to conflicts and instability. Since Israel is a non-Muslim state with very close ties with the West, there is surrounding tension between Israel and its Muslim neighbours. For example, from 1998 the US, Israel and Turkey have held joint exercises in the eastern Mediterranean. Iran and Syria subsequently became very uncomfortable with this alliance and believed that this partnership was an attempt by the US to encircle them (Shelton, 1998). Egypt also warned that the growing co-operation between Turkey and Israel would promote the establishment of a counter-alliance.

Furthermore, following the 1996 election of a right-wing government under Benjamin Netanyahu and its rejection of the land-for-peace principle (the foundation of the Middle East peace process), tension in the region increased significantly. The continued regional diplomatic stalemate and tension in Arab-Israeli relations has led some observers to predict the emergence of a new regional war (Shelton, 1998). In addition Israel-Syrian relations have suffered severely to the extent that Syria may be planning to go into a 'limited war' for changes to occur in the Golan Heights and Lebanon (Shelton, 1998).

Accordingly, national security remains at the top of Israel's political agenda. Protection of Israeli citizens from suicide bombers and attacks by extremists continue to be observed keenly by the Israeli government, whereas the long-term threat is perceived to emanate from Iran, Iraq and possibly Algeria. In response, Israel has sought ways to neutralize Iran, which is believed to be attempting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic weapons. Israel has threatened pre-emptive strikes if Iran or Syria deploys missiles capable of attacking

targets in Israel. According to Israeli intelligence, in 1998, Iran was less than two years away from developing a ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel.[110]

According to NCACC regulations, Israel has no arms restrictions (category I). With these problems and complex arrangements in the Middle East, and in view of the 'arms race' in the region, Israel is not a country that should be receiving any kind of weapons from South Africa. This is because Jerusalem is in a state of war with its neighbours and domestically with Palestinians who want an autonomous homeland within Israel's territory. In 1997, however, Pretoria violated its arms sales policy by selling arms worth 30 million rands to Israel (consisting of category B equipment worth 26.1 million rands)[111] (Battersby, 1999: 253).

7.2.6. India/Pakistan

The case of arms sales to India[112] is another example showing how Pretoria violated its own laws in the search for profit. In 1997, India was South Africa's largest recipient of major conventional weapons worth 600 million rands of which 572 million rands were weapons that could cause significant damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure. (Khanyile, 2000: 29). Shelton (1998) has observed that the equipment sent to India consisted of G6 artillery systems. India has been involved in an inter-state conflict with Pakistan for over half a century over the disputed Kashmir region.

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[110] According to Shelton, (1998), Syria has deployed a significant missile capability, which poses a major threat to Israel. These missiles have ranges that easily reach Israeli territory.

[111] South Africa's sale of arms to this country clearly contradicted government arms sales policy and the undertaking to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country, since it ignores Israel's oppression of the Palestinian people (http://www.igd.org.za/Programmemes/sa_fpa/armstrade.html).

[112] According to SIPRI, in 1998 and 1999, South Africa sold 90 Casspir anti-personnel carriers to India. This deal was worth 12 million US dollars and the equipment was destined for army and police units in Kashmir (SIPRI, 2001).

Pakistan also purchased conventional arms worth 33.7 million rands from South Africa in 1997, of which 26.7 million rands were weapons that cause significant damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure (Battersby, 1999:252). Apart from the war and ongoing tension with India, Pakistan is not considered a democracy because of its failure to undertake democratic reform in spite of international pressure.

Until 2002, before the crisis in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, General Musharaff was considered a political outcast in the eyes of the international community because he ran the country dictatorially. For a number of years after he had come into power, he refused to call for new elections. Despite Islamabad's horrendous human rights and democracy record, between 1996 and 1998 South Africa sold 95.2 million rands worth of armaments to Pakistan (Battersby, 1999:252).

India and Pakistan were involved in an arms race, which led both states to defy international norms and conduct nuclear tests in May 1998, hence raising the spectre of a new nuclear arms race. Both states purchased weapons from South Africa that the NCACC categorized as consisting of conventional implements of war that cause heavy personnel casualties, major damage and destruction to material, structures, objects and facilities. These include artillery, bombs and grenades, and armoured fighting vehicles (Secretary for Defence, 1996:1-12).

7.2.7. Saudi Arabia

In 1997, Saudi Arabia undertook a five-year development plan to modernize its armed forces and purchase new weapon systems. In the same year the total Saudi defence budget was 40 billion US dollars (33% of the government budget). Analysts had predicted that Saudi Arabia's acquisition of a modernized missile system would

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set off a new arms race in the Middle East and intensify Iran's resolve to match or exceed Saudi capabilities (Shelton, 1998). Saudi officials reiterated in 1998 that the missile modernization was intended to deter Iran, which possessed missiles as well as chemical and biological weapons.

In its domestic affairs, the government has been accused of being authoritarian and oppressive on numerous occasions. For example, women were especially discriminated against, and may not expose any parts of their bodies in public. Likewise, women are not permitted to drive cars and punishments carried out on them for adultery or breaches of the laws are particularly severe. At the same time, the government and royal family do not allow dissent or opposing views from the citizens and therefore, democracy does not exist.

In 1997, Pretoria, in full knowledge of the above, went ahead with the sale to Riyadh of 140,000 rands worth of weaponry classified as Non-Lethal Equipment (NLE). These included riot control products, baton rounds and tear gas among other equipment. This equipment was to be used within the country — most likely to quell dissent and keep a tighter control on Saudi Arabia's citizens.

In addition, it has been observed that in July of the same year, South Africa was planning to sell R7 billion worth of G6 artillery cannons to Saudi Arabia (Battersby, 1999:254). This deal was astonishing in light of the fact that Riyadh had an appalling human rights record and existed in a highly volatile region that did not require further impetus to escalate the existing tensions.

7.2.8. Republic of Congo

An Amnesty International Report of 1998 condemned the deliberate and arbitrary killing of unarmed civilians and cited other abuses, including indiscriminate shelling

of civilian targets, which were perpetrated by government forces and armed opposition groups in and around the Congo's capital Brazzaville.

The organization also received reports that government forces, including President Denis Sassou Nguesso's own militia known as *Cobras*, were deliberately killing unarmed civilians suspected of supporting the armed opposition group known as *Ninjas* loyal to former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas.

Government forces were also reported to have been using heavy weapons such as multiple rocket launchers to shell heavily populated areas believed to be strongholds of the *Ninjas*. There were also reports that the *Ninjas* targeted unarmed civilians suspected to be government supporters. In addition, combatants on both sides were allegedly raping women and deliberately wounding civilians.

Since late August 1998 hundreds of defenceless civilians have been killed in the context of fighting between the *Ninjas* and government forces in the Pool region of southern Congo, as well as in Brazzaville. Thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes into forests in the Pool region and as many as 15 000 are reported to have fled to neighbouring DRC.

It has been observed that Congo was one of the countries that purchased arms from South Africa in the past years since the crisis both within the Congo and the Great Lakes began (Batchelor, 1999).

- Between 1996 and 1997 when the crisis in Congo grew, South Africa sold more than 93 million rands worth of weapons to Congo (Batchelor, 1999).[113]

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[113] In 1996, Congo took delivery of 18 Mamba MK-2 Anti-Personnel Carriers from South Africa (SIPRI).

- In 1997, Pretoria sold 31.9 million rands worth of armaments to Congo, of which 24.5 million rands were weapons Category A as described to by the NCACC.

- The above figures do not include the 107mm multiple rocket launchers sold to Congo Brazzaville (worth 61 million rands) shortly before the outbreak of hostilities in that country (The Star, 1998: 9).

- The supply of weapons by Pretoria to Congo continued even after the civil war broke out in 1997 (Pech, 1997).[114]

7.2.9. Oman

Oman is an autocratic state where the Sultan retains the ultimate authority on all important foreign and domestic issues. The law prohibits criticism of the Sultan in any form through the media. The country has no formal democratic political institutions, and its citizens do not have freedom to ensure the peaceful change of their leaders or their political system.

Oman has had a poor record with regards to human rights. Human rights abuses have included mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without charge, and the denial of due process of law. The government restricts freedom of expression and association and does not ensure full rights for women and workers. Oman is one of the countries that still have not ratified the International

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[114] In 1996, South Africa approved the sale of 60 million rands (14 million US dollars) in weapons to Congo-Brazzaville. In 1997, after civil war had broken out, it sold a further 32 million rands (7 million US dollars) of arms, including sensitive major significant equipment valued at 25 million rands (5.4 million US dollars). Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999."

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that includes Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[115]

Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector of the economy, or even inform themselves of their rights. Government officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative. Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country. Prior to 1999, women in Oman could not stand for election and women did not participate in public affairs.

In addition to the above, citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. Marriages in foreign countries, concluded without permission, can lead to denial of entry into Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate child from claiming citizenship rights (Arabic News Com, 2001).

In addition to all of the above violations of human rights by the Omani regime, appropriate government authorities, such as the Sultan Qaboos University, the police, or the relevant ministry, must approve public cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars. Academic freedom is restricted, particularly regarding controversial matters, and politics.

Despite this situation, Denel concluded a major contract to supply Oman with G6 artillery systems (Brummer and Morrise, 1995) worth 10.4 million rands in 1995.

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[115] Article 19 states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

This was clearly a contravention of Pretoria's laws as regards the sale of armaments and its foreign policy principles.

7.2.10. Cameroon/Nigeria

Cameroon has had an ongoing conflict with Nigeria over the oil fields at their borders. Tensions have risen and many have lost lives in this area. Both Cameroon and Nigeria have laid claims to the Bakassi Peninsula — a 1000 square kilometre (400 sq miles) area located in the Gulf of Guinea that is believed to contain significant oil reserves.[116]

This dispute was subsequently taken before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. In February 1994, Cameroon took up this issue with the ICJ and formal hearings began in March 1998. Even though the matter was presented before the ICJ, there were several armed confrontations and clashes between Nigerian and Cameroonian forces between 1994 and 1996. Each country also maintained a significant army force in the area leading to increased tensions and unnecessary deaths.

According to Khanyile (2000:28), South Africa sold 13.7 million rands worth of lethal weapons to Cameroon and a further five million US dollars worth of armaments in 1998 (SIPRI, 2001). At about the same time, Cameroon received delivery of two MB-326 Impala ground attack fighter planes and one Impala jet trainer aircraft (SIPRI, 2001), which means that Pretoria again dishonoured its arms sales policy and by extension its foreign policy.

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[116] Proven oil reserves are about 400 million barrels
[www.aberdeenchamber.co.uk/international/page.cfm?pageid=335].

7.2.11. Sierra Leone

Since 1990 Sierra Leone has undergone a major civil war, which has resulted in thousands of deaths. In early February 1999, troops of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ousted the government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Freetown. This ended their nine-month rule, which was characterized by widespread human rights abuses and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. For the past several years a vicious civil war has engulfed Sierra Leone, characterized by atrocities against civilians, often committed by the RUF, a rebel group formed in 1991 with support from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Upon taking power on 25 May 1997, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties and public meetings, and announced rule by military decree. The ARFC, created by a group of senior military officers, soon joined forces with the RUF. During their joint rule, many judges, lawyers, and police fled the country, causing a total collapse of the judicial system. The AFRC/RUF government arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics, including students, journalists and human rights advocates, causing thousands to seek asylum abroad.

On 10 March 1998, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG reinstated President Tejan Kabbah - initially elected in March of 1996 - who subsequently declared a state of emergency. After losing political power, the AFRC/RUF alliance engaged in a war of terror against civilians, committing widespread and egregious atrocities in an attempt to regain power. Between February and June 1998 alone, its members raped, deliberately mutilated, or killed thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians. The AFRC/RUF abducted men, women and children, probably numbering the thousands, for use as combatants, forced labourers, or sexual slaves. In addition to the various

forms of physical abuse, innumerable civilians suffered psychological trauma from the rebels' choice of tactics and extreme cruelty like the severing of limbs to compound the horror of their attacks.

Furthermore, the Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who supported the Kabbah government, also committed numerous abuses, including indiscriminate killings and torture, but on a significantly smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, were responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors also obstructed humanitarian assistance and extorted money or other payment at roadblocks (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Despite these and other crimes against humanity taking place in Sierra Leone, South Africa sold to Sierra Leone 6 million US dollars worth of lethal weapons at a time when the conflict in this country was at its peak in 1995. This sale included the delivery of two Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters during the same year (SIPRI, 2001).

7.2.12. Other Recipients

After 1994, South African arms were also sold to a number of countries, amongst them Indonesia, China, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Uganda. None of these countries met the requirements to be legitimate recipients of South Africa's weapons (Khanyile, 2000).

In July 1997, Nelson Mandela visited **Indonesia,** a fellow-member of the Non-Aligned Movement. We have already described the situation in Indonesia in chapter 4 and the good relations that Mandela government had with this country. Therefore,

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it is not surprising that during the visit, the South African president declared that: "If it becomes necessary for us to supply arms for external defence to Indonesia, we will do so without hesitation" (SAPA, 1997). Responding to questions about the human rights record of Indonesia in East Timor, Mandela added that South Africa would not take advantage of the two countries' friendship "to say what should be done" (Mail & Guardian, 1997; Horta, 1998; Brummer, 1995 and Davis, 1996). Subsequently, in 1998 South Africa provided Indonesia with military support equipment worth 2,597,000 rands (473,000 US dollars).

Pretoria also sold arms to the **People's Republic of China** during the Mandela presidency. For example, in 1996 and 1997, South Africa sold 284,000 rands (66,500 US dollars) and 8,629,000 rands (1.9 million US dollars) worth of non-sensitive military equipment to China, a country still under a European Union arms embargo imposed after the bloody 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy activists. [117]

These controversial arms sales have not been isolated cases. On the contrary, South Africa repeatedly opted to approve arms deals that might have been rejected on human rights grounds. **Angola's** long and brutal war, for example, has been fed in part by South African arms purchases by the Angolan government,[118] whose forces have been responsible for gross and persistent human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.

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[117] In 1997, it was reported that South Africa was negotiating to sell advanced military technology to China in a deal worth about one billion rand (220 million US dollars) (ANC, 1997).

[118] According to SIPRI, South Africa sold three Casspir Anti-Personnel Carriers to Angola in 1995 (SIPRI, 2001). Angola was the recipient of South African non-lethal support for 43,000 rands (10,000 US dollars) in 1996; sensitive major significant, and sensitive significant equipment 3,151,000 rands (573,000 US dollars), and 5,794,000 rands (1.1 million US dollars) respectively in 1998. As noted above, a 1999 sale of sensitive significant equipment worth one million rands (163,500 US dollars) comprised armoured vehicles sold to a private mining company. Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1996-1998," and "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999."

Angola is a country that has been embroiled in civil war since it attained independence in 1975. The government under the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has been at war with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels since 1975, vying for control of Angola. Consequently, millions of Angolans have been killed over the past 28 years and millions more displaced or maimed.

In 1995, South Africa delivered 3 Casspir armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to Luanda, and between 1997 and 1998 Pretoria exported seven million US dollars worth of weapons to Angola according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2001). By selling this equipment to Angola, Pretoria once again was in direct breach of its arms sales policy — selling weapons to a country involved in intra-state conflict and with a history of human rights abuse.

Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), all partners of South Africa in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), were involved in the DRC war, as was Burundi. South Africa armed several of the participants in the war: Namibia and Zimbabwe, for example, bought South African weapons between 1996 and 1998; and Zimbabwe continued to receive 'non-lethal' military equipment in 1999.[119] **The DRC** itself also received South African military support equipment weaponry in 1998 worth 1,778,000 rands (324,000 US dollars). The deal with the DRC allegedly included five Casspir armoured personnel carriers sold in September 1998.[120] The DRC government has been responsible for gross and

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[119] Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999."

[120] Human Rights Watch interview with an arms trade analyst, Johannesburg, January 30, 1999.

widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law resulting in numerous civilian deaths.[121]

The **Republic of China (Taiwan)** has been in a state of war with Mainland China from 1948, when the communists under Mao Tse Tsung drove away the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek. China considers Taiwan a rebel province that should rejoin the mainland. Provocation in the guise of military exercises by both sides as well as weapon purchases has only heightened tensions. Taiwan on the other hand considers itself an independent sovereign state recognized by almost two dozen states around the world. In 1997, South Africa sold Taiwan 38.6 million rands worth of arms, of which the majority were weapons systems capable of major damage to infrastructure and human life.

The **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** is situated in the heart of the Middle East, which means that, like other states in the region, it has also experienced tense relations with its neighbours. The UAE has accused Iran of threatening Arab states in the Gulf through its rearmament programme (Blanch, 1997:1-2). In 1997, the UAE's foreign minister Rashid Abdullah suggested that Iran was stockpiling weapons on its land bordering UAE, and in the occupied islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs that form part of UAE's territory. The ownership of these islands has been under dispute by Iran and the UAE. The UAE foreign minister added that these weapons were not 'defensive' but 'offensive' directed against the Emirates and other countries in the region (UAE Interact, 2002).

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[121] While the total number of civilians killed will never be known, the total for Kinshasa alone was probably several hundred. This estimate is based on multiple interviews and reports from local and international organizations based in Kinshasa. No comprehensive report or breakdowns of the number of combatants and civilians killed were available from these organizations (Human Rights Watch, "Casualties of War," p. 11).

Following the 1991 Gulf War, the UAE launched an extensive defence modernization programme. According to the central bank in Abu Dhabi, the UAE spends nearly half of total government expenditure on defence. Between 1993 and 1996, defence spending accounted for 48 percent of Abu Dhabi's total spending (8.7 billion US dollars on defence preparedness and military system upgrading). As a result, Pretoria also sold arms to the UAE in 1997, and in the process, violated its own arms sales policy. The arms, worth 16.5 million rands, contained military hardware that could cause major significant damage to both human life as well as to physical infrastructure (Khanyile, 2000:28). In total, from 1996 to 1998 South Africa sold more than 62 million rands worth of weaponry to the UAE (Batchelor, 1999).

Uganda has been involved in an ongoing civil war with rebels in the northern part of Uganda. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony has been trying to destabilize the Museveni administration for over a decade. The LRA have located their bases located mainly in southern Sudan (a strategic position which has also led to numerous breaks in relations with Khartoum). They will often conduct cross-border raids into Uganda and later retreat. This conflict has resulted in mass slaughter by both the government and the rebels. For example, the rebels have taken to kidnappings, raping women, planned destruction of whole villages as well as uncontrolled, rampant killings. The government on the other hand has been accused of being heavy-handed when attempting to keep the peace in the northern region, and this has led to indiscriminate deaths.

Furthermore, Uganda was involved in the conflict in the DRC and in Rwanda, when its own political house was not in order. Domestically, Uganda does not allow party plurality to exist[122] yet it calls itself a democracy. Political parties are in fact illegal,

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[122] The ruling National Revolutionary Party, the government and leadership assert it is not a party but rather a 'movement'.

although individuals may run for a post if he or she desires. Notwithstanding Uganda's lack of political integrity, in 1995, Uganda bought two million US dollars worth of arms from Pretoria and purchased nine million rands worth of weapons categorized as 'Significant Major Sensitive Equipment' in 1997. In 1998, Pretoria sold an additional one million US dollars worth of weapons to Kampala.

7.3. Analysis of the Arms Sales Data

So what can one make of the above evidence? It appears – quite clearly - that South Africa sold arms to states that were not supposed to be recipients of the armaments. The recipients of Pretoria's arms were states that were non-democratic, conflict-ridden or conflict-prone, including those involved in arms races. Yet again, these sales suggest, that in the process of approving them, the South African government violated its arms sales policy, foreign policy and its constitution by extension.

To further prove the argument one must examine the issue of weapons sold to Algeria. These weapons were classified as sensitive, major-significant equipment, however, the arms sales policy criterion stipulates that only non-lethal equipment may be sold to Algeria. In addition, Algeria has undergone severe domestic upheavals in the last decade. It would seem logical that the sale of such weapons would likely heighten the conflict that existed in this already volatile state.

Still ignoring its policy criterion, South Africa sold arms to Rwanda, Uganda and the Republic of Congo between 1997 and 1998 worth over 20 million US dollars. In total, Uganda bought nearly four million US dollars worth of arms from Pretoria - all categorized as 'Significant Major Sensitive Equipment'. These sales were made despite compelling evidence of grave human rights abuses and persistent instability in the entire Great Lakes region. The war in the region included other states such as

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Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as they fought over the riches of the DRC.

In West Africa, Pretoria proceeded to sell over 30 million rands worth of lethal weapons to Cameroon that included MB-326 Impala ground attack fighter planes and Impala jet trainer aircraft. Similarly, Pretoria sold Sierra Leone 6 million US dollars worth of lethal weapons at a time when the conflict in this country was at its peak in 1995. This sale included the delivery of two Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters during the same year. Both Cameroon and Sierra Leone are in very volatile and unstable region that have undergone severe conflicts or are involved in tensions with other states.

In Latin America one can again witness the flawed thinking when forming Pretoria's arms sales policy since a country like Colombia had no arms restrictions. Between 1996 and 1998 South Africa sold 217 million rands worth of armaments to Colombia, 90 percent of which were Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE). These sales went ahead despite the civil war and abolition of civil rights in Colombia.

In the Middle East, the Israeli case further underscores the extent to which South Africa's arms sales policy was flawed. Moreover, despite the tension, conflict and competitive behaviour of the arms race that Israel is involved in, Pretoria violated its arms sales policy by selling arms worth 30 million rands to Israel in 1997 even though, according to NCACC regulations, Israel was to have no arms restrictions.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Oman – states that have terrible human rights records and are oppressive to their citizens – are classified as having no arms restrictions. For example it was observed in the press that, in July 1997, South Africa was planning to sell R7 billion worth of G6 artillery cannons to Saudi Arabia and nearly

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a quarter of that amount to Oman (Battersby, 1999: 251-256; Khanyile, 2000: 24-31 and Nathan, 1997).

In that same year, South Africa sold armaments to Kuwait worth 5.9 million rands of which 95 percent had major destructive capabilities. Yet the governments rendered it fit to have no restrictions placed on Kuwait – all this despite its domestic oppression, atrocious human rights record, curbing of information and freedoms of associations and existence in a highly unstable region.

Between 1996 and 1998, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) received arms worth 62 million rands. These were weapons that could cause major significant damage to both human life and physical infrastructure. News of this announcement was startling because the UAE has a territorial dispute with Iran and moreover, the Middle East is still a very volatile region. The last thing to do would be to escalate the existing tensions.

In Asia, although India and Pakistan were restricted to certain arms, in 1997 India was South Africa's largest recipient of major conventional weapons worth 600 million rands of which 572 million rands were weapons that could cause significant damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure. Pakistan also purchased conventional arms worth 33.7 million rands from South Africa in 1997, of which 26.7 million rands were weapons that cause significant damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure.

South Africa provided Indonesia with military support equipment worth 2.6 million rands in 1998 despite the fact that Suharto's oppressive regime was in power. Likewise, the People's Republic of China took delivery of 2.1 million US dollars worth of non-sensitive military equipment between 1997 and 1998. However it is important to note that South Africa sold Taiwan 38.6 million rands worth of arms,

and the majority were weapons systems capable of major damage to infrastructure and human life. Taiwan is in a state of war with Mainland China.

One of the problems encountered with conducting this 'questionable' business with the above-mentioned states was that Pretoria did not take into account the changing dynamics in the respective countries. Hence, the government did not modify its policies accordingly to suit situations of conflict.

As the examples of arms sales in this chapter have shown, weapons were sold to countries censured by the international community – even though they engaged in undemocratic practices, that included massive violations of human rights and liberties, killing or persecuting certain parts of the population, involvement in or contribution to armed conflicts, and otherwise bringing much suffering to the nationals of their countries. It is strange that South African government officials, who had been at the receiving end of undemocratic practices for decades, did not choose to join the international community in censuring these human-rights abusers.

Sales to states that are unstable or otherwise involved in armed conflict, obviously contravene the very principles featured in South Africa's foreign policy documents, which permit sales of weapons for legitimate defence and security purposes - not to exacerbate tensions and expand conflict. The case studies clearly document that a number of South Africa's arms sales - including those to Algeria, Colombia and Congo-Brazzaville - were made to countries with very poor human rights records. It must be repeated that this set of arms deals stands in sharp contrast to the clearly stated pledge that South Africa would not transfer arms to countries that systematically violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Why then did South Africa sell arms to these states and violated its arms sale policy, foreign policy and constitution by extension? We have already discussed the South

Africa's economic motivation for the export of arms in chapter 5, but it should be noted that in several cases the decisions of the Mandela government could be attributed to the historical relationship between these states and the ANC as a liberation movement during the apartheid era.

During that time they have provided political and financial support to the ANC, hosted ANC offices and military bases within their territories or supported the ANC within multilateral institutions such as the NAM. Moreover, these countries constitute some of Pretoria's ardent supporters in the post-apartheid era by providing moral and/or financial support. These countries include Algeria, Kuwait, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Uganda.

It is obvious, however, that profit-making was the main motivation for the post-apartheid government since the Mandela government made the arms sales to the countries, which did not necessarily have a good historical relationship with the ANC during the apartheid era. The Mandela government, despite of its official agenda of supporting democratic elected governments, sold arms to these countries, most of whom were afflicted by internal strife and bordered by hostile neighbours. Amongst the countries that fall within this category are Colombia, Rwanda, Israel, Republic of Congo, Oman, Cameroon, People's Republic of China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter provided a series of short case studies, which illustrated the discrepancy between South Africa's official policy and actual decisions made in

relation to arms sales. These decisions (to sell arms to 'pariah states') were seen as controversial abroad as well as at home since they were made to countries with poor human rights records, involved in regional wars or arms races, contributing to international instability and endangering world peace and security. It can be argued that in the search for new markets to sell its arms, Pretoria contributed to increased international insecurity and warfare.

Thus, the same government that was aligning itself with the promotion of democracy, human rights and international peace and security made decisions on a case-by-case basis that would indicate an opposite stance. As this chapter has shown such decisions were the rule rather than exception.

In addition to the problems of implementation of South Africa's arms sales policy, there is the argument that the policy itself was flawed. At the time the policy list was published, some of the countries to which South Africa could sell armaments without restriction were the same countries that engaged in human rights violations, non-democratic practices, and arms races. These countries included Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Colombia and Cyprus. Hence, one can argue that the arms sales policy itself contained inherent ambiguities.

South Africa's new arms sales policy was meant to prevent sales to specific countries involved in wars, engaged in human rights abuses, states not complying with international arms control agreements and treaties, and contravening South Africa's foreign policy objectives as well as endangering regional and international peace by increasing their military capabilities, amongst other things. In line with this policy, the government also instituted a cabinet committee — the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) — that was to regulate the sale of arms. This placed considerable constraints on Armscor (initially the sole merchant

of weapons), in determining to whom arms could be sold. As already noted in the thesis, this new arms sales policy was generally in line with South Africa's new foreign policy principles.

Despite these regulations, South Africa exported armaments to countries restricted under NCAAC regulations. For example, it was clear that Pretoria's sale of arms to Algeria, Colombia, People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Indonesia, Israel, India, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, (to mention just a few countries), contravened South Africa's arms sales policy. The result of this 'decision' was most unfortunate: it has been noted that 57 of the 83 South African arms recipients between 1996 and 1999 did not satisfy NCACC criteria (Ceasefire Campaign, 2000).

Had the South African government fully complied with its arms sales policy, its decision would probably have created considerable negative impact on the South African economy, for example, losses in revenue, increased unemployment, shutting down of companies, non-development of technology, not to mention the decrease in foreign exchange earnings derived from the export of armaments. In looking at these very large cost-benefits, the ANC government perhaps saw an opportunity. Such rationalization might, therefore, explain post-apartheid Pretoria's drive to export weapons even though that meant the contravention of its arms sales policy of 1995.

In reviewing the available figures on the volume of arms sold to 'non-pariah states' between 1994 and 1999 (see Annex 6), one can see that arms were also sold to 'good' states and that altogether the sales brought in a considerable amount of revenue to Pretoria (62 million US dollars). However, this revenue was much less compared to the sales made to 'pariah states'. Statistical evidence on both types of arms sales thus shows the viability and importance of the defence industry to the South African economy.

From the exposition in this chapter it becomes obvious that the Mandela government was not implementing its foreign policy when it made decisions on the export of South African defence industry's products. However, the Mandela government attempted to resolve the tension between its foreign policy principles and national interests and manage the apparent ambiguities in its foreign policy in a number of ways. For example, Pretoria ceased selling arms to particular states that did not fit the bill to be recipients of arms or cancelled contracts to supply weapons. This was the case with Turkey after damning reports that Ankara was raiding Kurdish villages and killing civilians at random.

In other cases, the government attempted to convince the public that the sales were justified. For example, Rwanda, Congo, India, and Taiwan were described as states that needed to defend their territories and sovereignty. This was obviously not true since these countries were experiencing severe tensions with their neighbours or were already at war.

In all cases of arms sales to 'pariah states', however, the South African government learnt that when it was 'forced' to choose between its national interests and universalist principles, it was not possible for the government to uphold these universal principles because altruistic, moral behaviour is incompatible with following one's national economic interests when selling arms to 'pariah states', as the analysis in this thesis has shown. It can be concluded, therefore, that the findings in South Africa's case study of arms sales to 'pariah states' supports the argument that economic interests are more crucial for a country than interests rooted in ideology and history.

8. CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to discuss the apparent contradiction between universalism and realism in South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to 1999. The basic problem appeared to be that a foreign policy based on universalist principles was not viable when domestic concerns and the reality of international relations compelled states to put their national interests ahead of any other policies that may exist. In this regard, the study proposed to argue that the irreconcilability of universalist principles with economic national interests gave rise to the ambiguities and contradictions seen in South Africa's foreign policy in relation to 'pariah states'.

In attempting to address the above argument, the study sought to explain the 'logic' behind these contradictions. In this regard, the research has attempted to address the limitations of prior research by providing rigorous theoretical expositions that had been lacking in the literature – with special focus on the issue of pursuing universalist principles and economic national interests concurrently in post-apartheid South African foreign policy.

In order to provide 'a piece of the puzzle', chapter two looked at possible theoretical background, which might explain why these contradictions emerged. The chapter examined debates around the three classical theoretical perspectives in international relations - realism, rationalism and universalism. The debate showed that realism provides a gloomy view of human nature where conflict and power are the rule rather than the exception and are inevitable. Rationalism, on the other hand, is premised on the assumption that 'reason' is a source of knowledge in itself and that the rational side of man always proves stronger than the irrational one in making decisions. Universalists, on the other hand, appeal to international morality, in that revolutionary consequences require all individuals to work for global harmony *with* other people. They believe in the moral *unity* of the international society. This unity

has a missionary character, which also describes a universalist's desire or duty to assimilate international politics into domestic politics.

The chapter further concluded that even though each perspective has its own more or less elaborate explanation as to the essence of international politics, the reality of international politics could never be explained by one perspective only. It can also be argued that the truth about international politics lies in the debate amongst the three perspectives.

The second chapter also provided an in-depth analysis of the two concepts: 'foreign policy' and 'national interest'. The purpose of this analysis was to show how these two concepts were closely linked, especially since national interest ultimately leads to foreign policy action. In other words, foreign policy action is described as an extension and a product of a state's national interest.

The conclusion of the second chapter was that 'international relations' and 'state foreign policy' cannot be explained by one perspective only and that the concept of national interest was an elusive one. This reasoning is that the term 'national interest' does not refer or confine itself to one particular objective or goal, since states pursue a multiplicity of goals. Hence, the chapter laid a firm foundation for the analysis of the origins of post-apartheid South African foreign policy.

Chapter three's investigation of the origins of the new South Africa's foreign policy began with a background on the history of the ruling party and its foreign policy. The chapter attempted to show that, while the ANC's foreign policy was concretized in the four-year period from 1990 to 1994, the creation of that foreign policy began as early as the mid-1980s. Since this process was based on universalist ideology of a liberation movement, the foreign policy of the new South Africa also reflected that ideology. The chapter then proceeded to capture the evolution of the new South

Africa's foreign policy from the period when the ANC was mainly operating abroad/in exile to 1994. It also examined the history of the ANC and its foreign policy, which, as the research pointed out, was highly influenced by the domestic situation in South Africa during the apartheid era.

Chapter three concluded that the principles of the new South African foreign policy - which was largely based on universalism – was also largely informed and influenced by ANC's history as the liberation movement, which fought for equality and non-racial society. At the same time, however, the ANC government was influenced by the ideology of liberal democracy - especially since the ANC's struggle for legitimacy was also the struggle for democracy and respect for human rights.

Chapter four attempted to show that the Mandela government faced problems in implementing its foreign policy based on universalist principles with apparent ambiguities emerging in its foreign policy, which encompassed discrepancies in foreign policy decision making, having cordial relations with 'pariah states' as well as supporting regimes in those states. The government tried to manage these ambiguities not by resolving the tension between the official universalist foreign policy and national interest (e.g. by the realignment of its foreign policy actions) but by defending its 'illegitimate' actions.

All cases described in this chapter have a common feature - Pretoria found itself compromising its foreign policy (universalist foreign policy principles) and the constitution by extension. These cases also give us some indication of the many factors that influence foreign policy decisions, some of them strong enough to induce the decision-maker(s) to deviate from the official or stated foreign policy.

Chapter five sought to explain some of the reasons for the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy. After it came to power, the ANC was compelled to review some of the aspects of its universalist foreign policy in order to address South Africa's pressing domestic, economic and social concerns. In this regard, the government had to focus on some of its vital industries that could create the necessary foreign exchange and employment among other things. One such industry was the defence industry, which was a crucial part of Pretoria's national interest that further influenced South Africa's foreign policy with regards to the issue of arms sales to the so called 'pariah states'.

Therefore, the aim of chapter five was to show that the defence industry was central to the South African economy. By the time apartheid was effectively implemented, Pretoria had a fully operational defence industry that involved innovation, assembly and modifications of defence products. This was possible due to the fact that South Africa managed to get a considerable amount of assistance from Western countries in the form of direct funding, importation of spare parts, and acquisition of production licences, all of which facilitated the development of its defence industry. The chapter also demonstrated that by the early 1990s, Pretoria had established a huge defence industry whose exportation of arms contributed significantly to the GDP and ultimately continues to play a major part in the creation of foreign exchange for the economy

However, despite the embargoes and budget cuts during the apartheid period and after 1994 respectively, the defence industry was still an economic asset and remains so today – both in terms of the creation of foreign exchange for the economy and for creating employment. For example, the defence industry employed 70 000 people in 1994, 15 000 of whom depended on exports, and this number was reduced to 50 000 by 1996. Despite the slight drop in the number of employees, the importance of the defence industry for the South African economy remained high. Moreover, there are

some 700-800 companies involved in the defence industry, which still employ a considerable number of people. In addition, the data on defence industry sales and exports shows that from 1992 to 1998 sales increased. By 1997, weapons had become South Africa's second largest manufactured export.

A country that, in 1996, had 57% of its population living in poverty and a 36% rate of unemployment could only benefit from a developing and well-functioning industry that showed constant growth in production, sales and exports.

Thus, the chapter was able to conclude that, in considering the economic and social concerns faced by the government, concern for domestic factors constituted at least some of the basic tenets that would determine the new South Africa's foreign policy. Accordingly, one can argue that South Africa's foreign policy under Mandela was mainly influenced by its domestic factors; and further, that a country's domestic political and economic environment can greatly influence a country's foreign policy.

It would seem, therefore, that the democratic regime was not about to abandon the defence sector because of its centrality to the economy. And since the Mandela government would continue to rely on the proceeds of the defence industry in order to solve or deal with domestic pressures. In this way, the government would have to introduce a viable arms sales policy. Such a policy would have to be enacted in order to make arms trafficking more transparent and legitimate with the demise of apartheid.

In view of the above, chapter six looked at South Africa's arms sales policy. It began with an analysis of the two major markets where arms trading took place, during and after the apartheid era. In addition, a review of the apartheid arms sales policy was conducted in order to show the development of South Africa's arms sales policies. The chapter then proceeded to discuss how post-apartheid arms sales policy

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came into being, by sharing some of the recommendations and submissions that were made to a committee entrusted with the creation of a new arms sales policy in post-apartheid South Africa.

This chapter demonstrated that the black and grey markets played a crucial role in the procurement of arms - which states such as South Africa took part in, both during and after the apartheid era. Because of the sensitive nature of the defence industry's line of work, the sale and export of defence industry products are often secretive – and in many cases, even controversial. Thus states frequently use grey or black markets to avoid potential controversy or public censure. In this way, the apartheid regime was able to sell its defence industry's products in the face of a prominent UN arms embargo. The transactions were done in secrecy and often conducted through middlemen and/or third-party countries at least until 1982, when Armscor entered the global market. Hence, a viable and more transparent arms sales policy was needed for accountability purposes.

Chapter six also attempted to discuss how post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy was to be crafted. A review of the apartheid arms sales policy showed that the development of South Africa's arms sales policy ultimately led to the creation of post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy. The major purpose of the new post-apartheid arms sales policy was to enable the country to have a transparent and legitimate arms sales policy. This was quite a move from the secrecy that enshrouded past policies. The need for transparency was especially acute following the case of the Yemeni debacle, which raised questions about 'good' governance, and the effectiveness of Pretoria's past arms sales policies. Hence the conclusion of this chapter was that the purpose of Pretoria – in initiating a new viable arms sales policy – was to create a transparent arms sales policy based on consideration for human rights, international/regional peace and security, South Africa's interests, a recipient country's legitimate defence needs, and so on.

After 1994, the past arms sales policies (of the apartheid regime) could no longer be applied, hence, a policy had to be enacted especially after the Yemen affair that would reflect the ideals and vision of the new government. This new policy had to be one that would be in conformity with the official universalist foreign policy of the Mandela government and constitution by extension.

The policy actions of the government, however, appeared to suggest that the decisions taken to sell weapons to countries that had earned Pretoria's censure, were not in conformity with the universalist foreign policy of the Mandela government. Chapter seven thus looked at practical issues around the arms sales in order to examine the extent to which the sales conformed to the stated policy of the government. This chapter provided a series of short case studies, which consistently illustrated the discrepancy between South Africa's official policy and actual decisions made in relation to arms sales. These decisions (i.e., to sell arms to 'pariah states') were seen as controversial abroad as well as at home since they were made to countries with poor human rights records, involved in regional wars or arms races, contributing to international instability and endangering world peace and security. It can be argued that, in the search for new markets to sell its arms, Pretoria contributed to increased international insecurity and warfare.

Thus, while Pretoria was aligning itself with the promotion of democracy, human rights and international peace and security, it made decisions on a case-by-case basis that would indicate an opposite stance. This chapter showed that such decisions were the rule rather than exception. In addition to the problems of implementation of South Africa's arms sales policy, it was observed that the new arms sales policy itself was flawed. Some of the countries to which South Africa could sell armaments with no restrictions, were the very countries that engaged in human rights violations,

non-democratic practices, and competitive arms race behaviour at the time the policy list was published.

The country case study research on sales to so-called 'pariah states' included Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Colombia and Cyprus. It was found that 57 out of 83 South Africa's arms recipients between 1996 and 1999 did not meet the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) criteria. For this reason, this thesis argues that the arms sales policy itself contained inherent ambiguities that created a type of 'permission' or space to bend rules. From the exposition in this chapter it became quite clear that the Mandela government was not implementing its foreign policy when it made decisions on the export of South African defence industry's products to 'pariah states'. These actions as a consequence led to the contradictions in post-apartheid South African foreign policy.

Pretoria's position is explainable in that short-term interests come about as a result of necessity or expediency and take priority over long-term interests (aspirations). In other words, since the economic concerns of Mandela's government compelled it to maintain the defence industry production and exports in the shrinking post-Cold War global arms market, this economic interest overrode its universalist interests that originated in the new government's ideology and past anti-apartheid struggle. In this way 'aspirations' were put on hold to address the more immediate needs of the new government.

If one analyses this apparent contradiction between the official arms sales policy and the deals made in practice, one can come to the same conclusion as Human Rights Watch did in 2000 — that South Africa's arms sales were not based on NCACC principles but on considerations of *realpolitik* and economics.

The research subsequently establishes that the Mandela government found itself compromising its own foreign policy principles when it concluded dealings with 'pariah states' - weaponry that was needed to keep those regimes in power. Whether ambiguous foreign policy principles caused this outcome, or disrespect for foreign policy principle caused the ambiguity - is difficult to surmise. The study nonetheless argues that the result of going against set foreign policy principles and arms sales policy criterion rendered Pretoria's foreign policy ambiguous in both instances. An analysis of South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to 1999 therefore displays these ambiguities especially in the implementation of foreign policy, which was the result of the government's 'faulty 'decision making process that facilitated the sale of arms to the so called 'pariah states' to take place.

> This study has therefore provided strong evidence in support of the main argument that South Africa's problems with the implementation of a principled foreign policy based on universalist values, came from its own moral conflict - pursuing its economic and national interests by engaging into relations with states that did not share South Africa's values. In the process, it was 'forced' to choose between its national interests and universalist principles since it was not possible to uphold these principles in state relations with other states when it came to pursuing its economic interests, and – as the case studies show - the selling of arms to 'pariah states'.

It can be concluded that, even though South Africa's foreign policy between 1994 and 1999 appeared full of contradictions, inconsistencies and ambiguities to its critics, it was more or less consistent in pursuing its economic national interests through the arms sales. Each country case study of arms sales therefore highlights how the pursuit of universal values cannot be reconciled with the pursuance of economic interests when a state's trade partner disregards the exact universal values on which a state's foreign policy is based.

In terms of its foreign policy and the principles on which it is based, one can conclude that South Africa has basically two options. Firstly, future ambiguities can be avoided by redefining the foreign policy principles in such a way that they reflect more immediate and 'realist' national interests. Secondly, if Pretoria wants to regain its credibility as a defender of human rights and peaceful co-existence among nations as well as being a responsible arms seller in the international community, then it needs to follow its set foreign policy principles as well as its official arms sales policy.

A distinction should be made, however, between the promotion of human rights and *ensuring* respect for such rights. Promotion of human rights is a broad commitment, manifested for example in South Africa's efforts to facilitate a democratic transition in some of the countries mentioned in this thesis. A less significant objective might be to assist in ensuring observance of basic human rights. Even though the sale of or refusal to sell arms is difficult to justify as a means to promote human rights, any sale can be guided by whether or not there is respect for human rights in the states wishing to purchase arms (Suttner, 1997: 300-301).

Ultimately, one comes to the question of whether South Africa can afford to be a responsible arms dealer and what consequence this would have for the defence industry. This is a question that would require further research and analysis. Also related to this issue is the question of the economics of arms production, its spin-off effects to the rest of the economy. Since many scholars cannot agree on whether a defence industry represents an asset or liability for an economy, this issue would benefit from further research.

Another area that requires further research involves the development of arms production in the Third World. Since Third World countries are sensitive to trends

on global markets, it would be relevant to establish whether the development of an arms industry would be beneficial for their industrialization and development of manufacturing sectors. Given that Third World states are recipients of arms, the issue of arms transfers is a relevant study area as regards the costs and benefits for the suppliers and recipients. Here, one must not only think of economic, but also strategic and political benefits.

In addition, the issue of arms transfers is also related to the problem of accountability. As the Yemen case has demonstrated, arms can be resold or relocated to third parties by either the supplier or recipient. As a result, the problem of re-transfers emerges, and the question of the adherence to and enforcement of end-user commitments emerges. This is a research area that should be explored further, but raises an additional problem: data on arms re-transfers is difficult to obtain, since these are often conducted on black and grey markets.

Finally, the study of South African foreign policy would also benefit from further research on the decision-making processes in the Mandela government, as well as the present administration. In this way, identification of those responsible for decision-making would be possible, which could eventually bring more accountability into the decision-making process.

ANNEX 1: DIVISIONS AND PRODUCTS OF ARMSCOR DURING APARTHEID

1. Divisions

SOMCHEM was an Armscor subsidiary and the oldest South African ammunition and mining explosives industry, dating back to 1896 when the first dynamite factory was established in the Transvaal. In 1924, Ernest Oppenheimer and Lord McGowan of Nobel Industries created the African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI) owned by Britain's Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and De Beers of South Africa. During the Second World War, AECI supplied munitions and propellants to Allied forces. In 1962, AECI sold its munitions sector. Consequently, munitions, propellants and other military explosives were handed over to Somchem, which was created in 1962 as a sub-section of AECI. In 1971, Somchem was incorporated into Armscor as a full subsidiary. By the end of the 1980s, Somchem was manufacturing a wide range of rockets, propellants and explosives for the SADF (Rand Daily Mail, 16 October 1981).

NASCHEM was also an Armscor subsidiary and one of the largest ammunition manufacturers in the southern hemisphere. Naschem's Lunz plant, which began operating in the late nineteenth century, shared its manufacturing work with the Boskop plant (established in 1979) that specialized in base-bleed 155mm ammunition for the G-5 howitzer. New technology ammunition was developed here, including bunker-breaking munitions and armour-breaking sub-munitions, of which some was exported.

PRETORIA METAL PRESSINGS (PMP) produced 7.7 mm .303 ammunition for British Vickers, 7.62 mm ammunition for the Belgian FN rifle, the 5.56mm ammunition for the R4 rifle from Israel, 20mm and 30mm ammunition for DEFA

552/553 guns from France and the 35mm ammunitions for the Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns from Switzerland. The PMP opened a new plant in 1981, which was able to manufacture the most sophisticated types of rapid-fire ammunition.

2. Products of Armscor

Ammunition and Explosives

After the 1977 arms embargo, South Africa's official suppliers stopped trading with it, and consequently Pretoria's goal was to become self-sufficient in ammunition production. By 1981, Armscor was able to supply the entire ammunition requirements of the SADF, of which 141 types of ammunition were produced including naval ammunition (The Star, 18 September 1981; The Times, 7 March 1970). In 1983, local ammunition was tested for the first time for the 76/62 mm Italian-supplied Oto-Melara compact guns arming minister-class missile aircraft. By 1985, the 76 mm naval ammunition was among those items that Armscor exported.

Grenades

Grenades were used in the operational area by the SADF infantry units. Only two types of explosive grenades were used — a South African and Portuguese type/origin. All types of hand-grenades were manufactured locally with technology under foreign licence and developed further according to war-fighting requirements. The standard hand grenade in South Africa was similar to the US M26 and British L2AI. A new South African designed grenade was unveiled in 1983, which was capable of killing and injuring with a blast of needle-sharp white-hot fragments.

Other, older types of anti-personnel rifle grenades were produced in two models — the South African combination of the US M26 design and the old Mecar design that could be fired from 7.62 mm and 5.56 mm rifles. Other South African productions

included the US designed 40 mm fragmentation grenade developed for the M-79, designed to fill the gap between the maximum range of a hand-thrown grenade and minimum range of a platoon mortar.

In 1985, Armscor launched a 6-shot semi-automatic 40 mm launcher for counter-insurgency (COIN) and conventional combat, while other developments were the single-shot stopper 37 mm grenade launcher and the 75 mm rifle grenade designed by Naschem.

Bombs

Since 1964, ammunition for all types of mortars and mortar bombs has been produced in South Africa. Though original designs were French-licenced, significant modifications were introduced to adapt to climatic conditions, for example, the South African smoke bombs that use titanium tetrachloride instead of white phosphorous.

Other developments were Pretoria's re-design of the old limpet bomb that could be stuck to any surface, like magnet-operated bombs. In addition, in 1983, a locally produced fuse was introduced — the Menlin proximity/impact fuse that could be used with any calibre of mortar bomb.

In 1986, Armscor unveiled details of three new types of bombs developed in South Africa. The first one was a 450kg cluster bomb — CB 470 or Alpha MK-2 — that was first tested in May and October 1985 on the Mirage F-1 fighter. It was designed according to the needs that came about in the Angolan war to produce high-density uniform fragmentation patterns over a large ground area. The second bomb was a 120kg shrapnel bomb and the third was a 250kg practice bomb for aircraft use. By 1985, all these bombs were available for export (Flight International, 15 April 1986: 10-11).

SMALL ARMS

Rifles

1. R1/7.62mm — In 1961, Pretoria obtained the licence from the Belgian Fabrique National (FN) for the NATO standard weapon. Lyttleton Engineering Works (LEW) produced over 300 000 units. In South Africa, the rifle was designated R1 and replaced the old British Bren and Vickers .303 type. The South African licence was revoked after 1963 as a result of voluntary arms embargo but production continued.

2. R4/5.56mm — This rifle was a replacement for the R1 but the Israeli Galil rifle sufficed eventually since the R1 was not as effective as the AK-47 used in Angola and Namibia. Furthermore, the Galil resembled the AK-47. In South Africa, the licence produced Galil was designated R4 and offered for export in 1979. Between 1985 and 1986, the R4 completely replaced the R1 in the SADF (Janes Defence Weekly, 25 February 1984). However, a commercial counterpart — the LM4 was produced and sold on the civilian market by Armscor subsidiary Musgrave Manufacturers and Distributors.

3. R5/5.56mm — From 1983, LEW began work on a shorter version of the R4 to meet SADF standards. This version was called the R5 that was used exclusively with the Ratel armoured personnel carrier (APC). It was developed to counter the Russian small version of the AK-74.

Machine Guns

1. FN 7.62mm and MG4 — The Belgian FN MAG 7.62mm and British Browning M1919 A4 were licenced and produced in South Africa from 1960. The South African Browning was designated M-G4 and was mainly a vehicle mounted machine gun arming the Eland and Ratel armoured vehicles. After

extensive modifications, the South African version was rebuilt to fit the 7.62mm NATO calibre (Defence and Armament No 24, November 1983). Consequently, the MG-4 was available in two versions namely the MG-4CA co-axial machine gun and the MG-4AA for infantry support.

2. UZI — Pretoria obtained the licence from Belgium to produce the Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun. The Belgian Fabrique National had acquired the licence for the Uzi from Israel in 1955. The Uzi was the standard weapon of the SADF and although production stopped after the SS-77 was developed, it was still in use with the South African Railways Police Task Force until 1985 (Paratus, December 1985).

3. SS-77, which was first presented in 1985, was conceived in 1977 and the designers were Smith and Soregi (hence 'SS'). Modifications on the SS-77 were undertaken to meet SADF specifications. It used the NATO 7.62mm cartridge and was designed by Armscor and the Army. New equipment related to the machine gun was locally produced in 1985 with a new mounting design called the Rattler which could be used for the SS-77, FN 7.62mm and the MG-4 Browning. The mounting could also be on all armoured vehicles, naval vessels and was primarily designed for anti-aircraft use.

4. GI-2/20mm (Wick-Fire Cannon), which was purchased under licence in 1974 to equip the first Ratel armoured cars, was extensively upgraded by Armscor and is based on the French F2. After the SADF became dissatisfied with it, LEW re-designed certain features of the F2 and in 1985, it was renamed the G12 gun and offered for export.

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5. GA-1/20mm was a multi-purpose automatic cannon unveiled by Armscor in 1986. It was based on the Messerschmidt MG-751 of the Second World War that included a hydraulic sight. It was mounted on armoured vehicles and new generation attack helicopters.

6. BXP-9 was a parabellum sub-machine gun presented by Armscor in 1984.

Pistols and Shot Guns

1. The 9mm MAMBA was an indigenous production while the rest were of foreign origin. This specific type of gun was not widely distributed.

2. STRIKER — In 1985, a company by the name Armsel announced that its striker semi-automatic 12-bore shotgun was to be produced for military and police use. It was locally designed and produced from 1980 and was mostly used as an anti-riot weapon.

Mortars

These include the 60mm, 81mm and 120mm mortars of French Hotchkiss and Brandt design. They were used in the SADF and produced under French licences locally. After the first batches were imported from France in 1960 and licence-produced under a 1964 agreement, local manufacture continued even after the licences expired. The 60mm mortars from the 1980s were replaced by a locally developed version — the M4 series. The M4 60 mm mortar was developed in South Africa according to infantry specifications and based on the French M1.

ANNEX 2: ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE INDUSTRY

1. COMPUTERS — Amongst South Africa's products was the AS-80 computer controlled artillery fire-control system that was offered for export by Armscor. The system was produced by ESD and consisted of a 16 bit digital mini computer, a terminal unit with a keyboard, printer and visual display facilities.

2. RADAR — The Plessey Electronics Corporation (UK) was the first supplier of radios and radar technology to South Africa. Plessey (South Africa) was set up in 1963, which in conjunction with CSIR developed a distance-measuring instrument, the MRA5, for military purposes. This device was exported from South Africa to Third World Countries. Plessey also developed (through Armscor) the EMVA MK-10B muzzle velocity radar analyser that was produced by Global Chemicals in Capetown (Janes Weapon Systems, 1986: 20).

3. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT — During the apartheid era, military communications was an industry in which Pretoria had developed considerable know-how. These included:
   a. frequency-hopping radios,
   b. man-pack and vehicle radio set transmitters,
   c. receivers and transceivers for base station and strategic applications,
   d. airborne, ground-to-air, air/sea and maritime communication systems,
   e. walkie-talkies, line-of-sight equipment, telegraph converters,
   f. antenna systems and field telephones (Armscor, 1984: 1811).

In the 1960s, Pretoria began operating its first modern military communication network — the Advocaat Telecommunication System — that was contained at the Silvermine Control Centre at Simonstown Naval Base. This sophisticated C3 centre was designed under the Simonstown Agreement with Britain to protect Western shipping in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The West German company Telefunken supplied this hardware. General Electric Corporation (GEC) equipped the South African national communication and telecommunication network, and the military Troposcatter C3 Network.

ANNEX 3: THE USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ON SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS

THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Type	Foreign military technology	Stage of know-how	Method of disimplementation
Impala series 1-3 COIN fighter/armed trainer	Italy/UK (MB 326)	Stage 5: From assembly to manufacture (400 units) Programme completed in 1986	Licence - 1965 Sold as 'unarmed trainer'
Bosbok transport/liaison	Italy/USA (AM-3C)	Stage 2: Assembly of 40 units from imported components Programme completed in 1975	Licence - 1971 Sold as 'light plane'
C-4m Kudu transport/liaison	Italy/USA (AM-3C, AL-60)	Stage 2: Local modification in 1973 (25 units) Programme completed in 1976	Sold as 'light plane'
Mirage F-1C/A jet fighter	France (Mirage F-1C/A)	Stage 2: Assembly of 48 units Programme completed in 1977	Sold for 'external defence' Licence - 1971 Planned local production of 100; stopped by embargo
Cheetah jet fighter	France/Israel (Mirage-3)	Stage 5: Local redesign Prototype - 1986	Unofficial technical co-operation for modification of 47 Mirage-3 still in service
Alpha XH-1 gunship helicopter	France (Alouette-3)	Stage 5: Local redesign Prototype - 1986	Unofficial technical co-operation

SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.261

THE MISSILE INDUSTRY

Type	Foreign military technology	Stage of know-how	Method of disimplementation
Cactus surface-to-air	France (Crotale)	Stage 2: Assembly	Licence - 1964 Developed in France with South African financing and South African specifications Sold for 'external defence'
Scorpion ship-to-ship	Israel (Gabriel 2)	Stage 2: Assembly	Licence - 1974, to arm 12 Reshef patrol boats
Kukri air-to-air	France/USA/Israel (Magic, Sidewinder)	Stage 5: Local RDT&E from 1964. Previous V3 and Whiplash cancelled. Kukri redesign - 1980 In production from 1984	Unofficial technical co-operation with Israel
Exocet ship-to-ship	France (Exocet)	Stage 5: Local redesign 1982 Under development Project unconfirmed	Unofficial technical co-operation
ATM anti-tank	France/Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (Entac, Milan, SS-11)	Stage 5: Local redesign - 1984 Under development Project unconfirmed	Believed to be based on types in use with Army

SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.262

ARMOURED VEHICLES

Type	Foreign military technology	Stage of know-how	Method of disimplementation
Eland series 1-7 armoured car	France (Panhard AML-60/90)	Stage 5: From assembly to manufacture of 1600 units 1966-84	Licence - 1963 Not defined as 'COIN' weapon Clandestine acquisition
Ratel series armoured car	Belgium/FRG (Sibmas)	Stage 5: Local redesign late 1960s	Continued use of imported technology
AC-100 armoured car	Belgium/FRG (Sibmas)	1500 units produced Programme continued	
AC-200 armoured car	Belgium/FRG (Sibmas)	Under development in 1986, based on Ratel	
Olifant main battle tank	UK/Israel (Centurion)	Local redesign - 1982	Unofficial technical co-operation Modification of 250 Centurions originally imported from UK
Valkiri multiple rocket launcher	Israel	Stage 5: Local redesign of Israeli copy of 'Stalin organ' - 1980 In production	Unofficial technical co-operation
G-5/G-6 self-prop, long-range howitzer	Canada/USA/Belgium/Sweden	Stage 5: Local adaptation of foreign-designed concepts Production start in 1977	Developed by Space Research Corp. in USA/Canada and Belgium according to South African specification Clandestine acquisition in 1976

SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.263

MILITARY TRUCKS/TRANSPORTERS

Type	Foreign technology	Stage of know-how	Method of disimplementation
Landrover, jeep	UK	Stage 5: From assembly to manufacture (1962-1980) (?)	Licence 1961; not defined as 'COIN weapon'
Trax, jeep	France/UK/USA	Stage 5: Local design In production from 1976 (?)	Licenced engines from Chrysler, Leyland and Peugeot; to replace Landrover UK radio communication system
Samil series, trucks Over 70 variants including: Buffel APC Bulldog APC Rhino troop carrier	FRG/Israel	Stage 5: From assembly to manufacture Redesign based on Samil-20, Samil-50 and Samil-100	Licence - 1964 Magirus-Deutz/Unimog Reported Isreali-designed armour plate Continued use of imported technology
Magnis series, trucks	FRG/Japan	Stage 5: In production from 1984	Merger of Magirus/Nissan technology; to replace Samil
Sakom series, light trucks Sakom-50	FRG	Stage 5: Redesign base on Samil-50 - 1982	Continued use imported technology
Casspir series transporter	Unknown	Stage 5: 1972	Reportedly developed in co-operation with Rhodesia
Hippo/Ribbok transporter	Unknown	Stage 5: 1976	Reportedly developed in co-operation with Rhodesia

SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) <u>Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry</u>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.264

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THE WARSHIP INDUSTRY

Type	Foreign technology	Stage of know-how	Method of disimplementaiton
P 1558 large patrol boat	Unknown	Stage 5: One unit produced (1974-76)	Armed with Bofors guns
Flexible torpedo recovery ship	UK	Stage 2: One unit produced in 1969	Built by foreign subsidiary Dorman Long (Africa); probably licence
De Mist tug	UK	Stage 5: One unit produced in 1978	Built by foreign subsidiary Dorman Long (Africa); probably licence
De Neys and De Noorde tugs	UK	Stage 5: Two units produced in 1961 and 1969	Built by Globe Engineering Works
Navigator training ship	Unknown	Stage 5: One unit produced in 1964	Built by Fred Nicholls
87-tonne rescue launchers	FRG	Stage 2: Produced in 1961 and 1962	Probably licence 1961 FL9AR type built by Krogerwerft
'Namacurra'-class 5-tonner harbour patrol boat	Unknown	Stage 5: Reported as local design; 30 units produced in 1979	
'Minister of Defence' — class missile-armed FAC	Israel/Italy	Stage 2: 12 units in production from 1978	Licence - 1974 Armed with Oto Melara guns
Voortrekker-II ocean racing yacht	Unknown	Stage 5: Produced in 1983	In Navy service
Shirley-T helicopter carrier			

Type	Foreign technology	Stage of know-how	Method of disimplementaiton
Tafelberg armed helicopter carrier	Unknown	Stage 5: Prototype 1982	Reportedly produced for Israel: Unconfirmed
	Denmark/Israel/ Switzerland	Stage 1: Conversion of aged tanker (1983-84) Purchased from Denmark in 1965	Modification of imported civilian vessel Armed with Scorpion missiles and Oerlikon guns
Drakensberg fleet replenishment vessel	FRG	Stage 5: One unit produced (1984-86)	Announced as the first naval vessel designed and built in South Africa
Submarine Type-209	FRG	First unit planned in 1992	Clandestine acquisition of blueprints in 1985 Reported technical aid also from Chile and Turkey

SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.26

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ANNEX 4: COMPANIES CONSTITUTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

1. The Denel and its subsidiaries

The Denel group is divided into three major sectors namely, Aerospace, Ordnance and Commercial sectors.

AEROSPACE

	Denel Aviation *Denel Aviation Military Aircraft* Maintenance, repair, overhaul and production of fixed and rotary wing military aircraft.
	DPS Denel Personnel Solutions (Pty) Limited provides, in addition to labour brokerage, labour-related services, including among others, payroll bureau, security services and training in numerous fields.
	Eloptro Eloptro commands a wide spectrum of capabilities in the development, manufacture, integration and support of a select range of high-tech products in the electro-optical field.
	Kentron Kentron is the division of Denel Aerospace responsible for the development, production and support of leading-edge technology products in the areas of guided missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV Systems) and sighting systems.
	OTB OTB is a versatile missile and aircraft test range specialising in in-flight systems performance measurements for the local and international aerospace industries.

ORDNANCE

	LIW Design, development, assembly and support of a whole spectrum of turrets for artillery, armour, infantry and naval applications.
	La Forge Supplier of forged, heat-treated and machined ammunition components made from aluminium alloys and steel for artillery and naval gun systems as well as forgings for the automotive industry.
	Mechem Supply of mine-clearing equipment and mine-protected vehicle (MPV) platforms as well as execution of mine clearing contracts.
	Naschem Design and supply of medium to heavy calibre ammunition systems, ammunition, detonics and related products for all types of armed forces.
	PMP Manufacture of small and medium calibre military and commercial ammunition as well as brass strips and cups for use in ammunition component manufacture for own use and exports.
	Somchem Development, industrialization and manufacture of propulsion systems for artillery, tactical rockets and missiles, warhead subsystems, propellants for small calibre ammunition and power cartridges and also civilian and military applications of energetic material.
	Swartklip Products Supplier of pyrotechnics and related products which include 155 mm pyrotechnic carrier rounds and industrial cartridges.
	Vektor Design, develop and manufacture of machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, mortars and hunting rifles and rifle actions.

COMMERCIAL

Densecure (Pty) Limited — This is the captive insurance company of the Denel Group.

Source: www.denel.co.za

2. Other companies

1. ATE
2. AMS
3. Aerosud
4. ADS
5. African Gabions
6. Alpine
7. A•M•D
8. ANSYS
9. Avex Air
10. Avitronics
11. Avitronics Maritime
12. Bureau Veritas
13. Cabris
14. Canvas&Tent
15. CCII Systems
16. Century Avionics
17. Cochrane Steel
18. Comenius
19. Contactserve
20. Crayford ATV's
21. Cybersim
22. Delkon
23. Diel
24. Divetek
25. Epsilon
26. Eurocopter
27. EADS
28. Execujet
29. Fuchs Electronics
30. Futuristic BS
31. Gennan Systems
32. Grintek Ltd.
33. Grintek Comm.
34. Grintek Ewation
35. HSI / Plexsa
36. ILC
37. Isis Inf. Systems
38. IST Dynamics
39. ITC Services
40. Kal-Gard
41. Kimberley EW
42. Krone (Africa)
43. Laingsdale Eng.
44. Lasibon Video
45. Lechabile QS
46. Log-Tek
47. MGL Milkor
48. MOH-9
49. PISA
50. Pertec
51. Proton Marine
52. PTS
53. Racal
54. Red-i-Laser
55. Rescomp
56. RDL
57. RDI
58. RRS
59. RSD
60. SA Bullet R. Glass
61. Samil Motor Corp.
62. Stingray Marine
63. TEC
64. Techno Arms
65. Tellumat
66. Thales Adv. Eng.
67. Three Spears Int.
68. Tools for Decision
69. Truvelo Manufact.
70. Turbomeca Africa
71. Unistel Tech.
72. Vaportec

ANNEX 5: WORLD-CLASS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED AND PRODUCED BY THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

1	Ultramobility heavy wheeled vehicles
2	Light wheeled armoured vehicles
3	Security vehicles
4	Transponders
5	Low cost simulators
6	Combat helicopters
7	Composite rotor blades for helicopters
8	Composite materials
9	Radar
10	Fibre-optics and applications
11	Sonar
12	Light weapon systems
13	Lasers
14	Ordnance
15	Fuse technology
16	Electronic warfare
17	Flat screen technology
18	Optics
19	Secure communications
20	Avionics
21	Single crystal turbine blades for aircraft engines
22	Counter mine technology in protection, detection and clearing
23	Refurbishing and upgrading dated equipment

SOURCE: HATTY, Paul (1996) "Defence Industry Overview — Today and the Future" In African Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/5.3/Defence%20industry.html

ANNEX 6: 'NON-PARIAH' RECIPIENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS 1994-1999

Recipient/ Supplier (S) or Licencer (L)	No. Ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Order/ Licence	Year(s) of Deliveries	No. Delivered/ Produced	Comments
Canada S: South Africa	2	RG-31 Nyala	APC	1999	1999	2	For use in Kosovo
France S: South Africa	5	Chubby-Husky	AMV	1996	1996-97	(5)	Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system for use in Bosnia
	5	Chubby-Meerkat	AMV	1996	1996-97	(5)	Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system for use in Bosnia
Ghana S: South Africa	(2)	SA-316B Alouette-3	Helicopter	(1995)	1996	(2)	
Malawi S: South Africa	(13)	AML-90/Eland-90	Armoured car	(1994)	1994	(13)	Ex-South African army; may incl AML-60 version
Namibia S: South Africa	24	5.5in Gun Mk-3	Towed gun	1998	1998	24	Ex-South African army; gift; South African designation G-2
Peru S: South Africa	4	RO-107 107mm	MRL	(1997)	1998	4	
Sweden S: South Africa	(6)	Mamba Mk-2	APC	1998	1998	6	For use by Swedish UN forces in West-Sahara

Recipient/ Supplier (S) or Licencer (L)	No. Ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Order/ Licence	Year(s) of Deliveries	No. Delivered/ Produced	Comments
UK S: South Africa	3	Chubby-Husky	AMV	1996	1996	3	Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system for use with IFOR in Bosnia; ex-South African Army; refurbished before delivery
USA S: South Africa	3	Chubby-Meerkat	AMV	1996	1996	3	Part of "Chubby" mine-clearing system for use with IFOR in Bosnia; ex-South African Army; refurbished before delivery
	6	Mamba Mk-2	APC	1996	1997	(6)	For use with UK forces in Bosnia; UK designation Alvis-4 and Alvis-8
	(10)	Chubby-Husky	AMV	(1997)	1998	(10)	Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system; deal worth 14 million US dollars
	(10)	Chubby-Meerkat	AMV	(1997)	1998	(10)	Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system; deal worth 14 million US dollars
	(5)	RG-31 Nyala	APC	1996	1996	5	For use in peacekeeping operations; option on 5 more

Recipient/ Supplier (S) or Licencer (L)	No. Ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Order/ Licence	Year(s) of Deliveries	No. Delivered/ Produced	Comments
	17	Mamba Mk-2	APC	(1994)	1995	17	Ordered via UK company; for use with UN forces in Bosnia (UNPROFOR)
	30	RG-31 Nyala	APC	1995	1995	(30)	
United Nations S: South Africa	27	RG-32 Scout	APC	1998	1998-99	(27)	For UN peacekeeping, monitoring and humanitarian operations
	23	RG-32 Scout	APC	1998	1999	(23)	For UN peacekeeping, monitoring and humanitarian operations
	75	RG-32 Scout	APC	1999	1999	(35)	Deal worth $9 m; for use with UN in Kosovo

*The above data refers to actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. All figures are trend-indicator values expressed in million US dollars at constant (1990) prices.

Source: STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) DATABASE, 2001.

ANNEX 7: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY DURING APARTHEID

Calculated Economic Impact (annual cost to target country in US dollars)

UN-led Sanctions

Phase I, 1963-1978:

Increased cost of arms imports resulting from diversion of purchases from US, UK suppliers; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of average annual imports, 1963-78.	7 million
Economic security cost of holding large oil stockpiles 1974-78; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of estimated value of stockpile.	100 million
Reduction in Eximbank loans to South Africa; welfare loss estimated at 70 percent of reduced transfers.	9 million
Total, 1963-78	**116 million**

Phase II, 1979-85:

Mandatory UN arms embargo; welfare loss estimated at 30 percent of average annual recorded imports, 1979-85.	3 million
Economic cost of holding large oil stockpile, 1979-85; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of estimated value of stockpile.	300 million
Price premium on imports of oil after Iranian revolution in 1979; welfare loss estimated as 10 percent of average annual value of crude oil imports, 1979-85.	220 million
Total, 1979-85	**523 million**

UN and US-led sanctions, 1985-94

Mandatory UN arms embargo; welfare loss estimated at 30 percent of average annual recorded imports, 1986-94.	74 million
Economic cost of holding large oil stockpile, 1986-94; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of estimated value of stockpile.	200 million
Price premium on imports of oil after Iranian revolution in 1979; welfare loss estimated as 10 percent of average annual value of crude oil imports, 1986-94.	120 million
Impact of US trade sanctions (excluding coal, see below); welfare loss estimated at 30 percent of reduction in trade from average annual value in 1982-85.	210 million
Impact of US, French, Nordic, Commonwealth ban on South African coal imports; welfare loss estimated at 40 percent (because of significant discounting) of reduction in trade from average annual value in 1982-85.	103 million
Impact of krugerrand ban; welfare loss estimated at 3 percent of value of gold used in coins (calculated as 100 metric tons of 1982-84 average annual price of 386 US dollars per ounce).	41 million
Reduction in access to international capital due to federal, state, local government measures; welfare loss calculated at 10 percent of average annual change in net flows, 1986-90 compared to 1980-84.	260 million
Total	**1008 million**

NB: The estimated costs of the oil embargo are based on the $1b-$4b range for the cost of stockpiling in Lewis (p. 103) and Lewis' estimate (p. 60) of imports for daily consumption of 70m barrels annually and annual average prices of $31/bbl in 1979-85 and $18/bbl in 1986-94.

Relative Magnitudes

Gross indicators of South African economy

South African GNP (1964)	$9.8 billion
South African population (1964)	18.1 million
South African GNP (1979)	$43.8 billion
South African population (1979)	27 million
South African GNP (1985)	$52.6 billion
South African population (1985)	33 million

Annual effect of sanctions related to gross indicators

Percentage of GNP (1964-base)	1.2
Per capita (1964-base)	$6.40
Percentage of GNP (1979-base)	1.2
Per capita (1979-base)	$19.37
Percentage of GNP (1985-base)	1.9
Per capita (1985-base)	$30.55

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1998; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues.

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