

**SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE DEPLOYS ITS FIRST
PEACEKEEPERS TO DARFUR, SUDAN: A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY
ON THE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATIONS AND THE
ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE PEACEKEEPERS IN
AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS).**

BY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis that is submitted for the degree “ Mphil in Conflict Transformation and Management” at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, is my own original work and has not previously been submitted to any other institution and that all that have been consulted or quoted are indicated and acknowledged by means of a comprehensive list of references.

Ntime Samson Mokhine

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CHAPTER 1.

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Conflict is a global phenomenon that can have negative outcomes if it is not properly managed. It can hamper the development of nations and lead to destruction and abject poverty especially if it takes place at national and international level. Several countries in Africa are known to have been in conflict for decades. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia are some of those countries that have experienced conflict at a large scale. The Sudan, a country on which this treatise is based, is one of the countries that have been in civil war for the past fifty years (Atta el-Battahani in Simmons and Dixon 2006:10). The Republic of South Africa has, since the first democratic elections in 1994, started to reintegrate into international politics. Some of the obligations that faced the Republic of South Africa are to assist in providing resources like troops, police, food, and other humanitarian aid to the conflict areas especially in the African continent. The South African Police Service (SAPS), has also joined other police agencies in providing peacekeepers to the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), to assist in peacekeeping. To that effect, the SAPS has, since 2005, started to contribute its peacekeepers to the former African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the current United Nations Hybrid Mission in Sudan (UNAMID).

1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The focus of this research will be on the question as to whether the South African Police Service adequately prepares its police officials for the functions they will be performing in Sudan: Darfur. This broad question leads to further questions that include the following:

- What are the peacekeeping recruitment and selection criteria for the South African Police Service members who need to be deployed in Sudan: Darfur?

- Is the South African Police Service peacekeeping training curriculum adequate enough to prepare its members for their deployment in Sudan: Darfur?
- Does the South African Police Service have any measures to evaluate the role played by its members in Sudan: Darfur?
- What measures have been introduced to utilise the new skills brought by members that have been deployed?
- Are there any properly posted members with mission experience, who are capable of presenting and further developing peacekeeping training in the South African Police Service?
- Does the South African Police Service senior management have knowledge of generic peacekeeping concepts?

The abovementioned questions necessitated the formulation of the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The recruitment and selection criteria for the South African Police Service are not clear and aligned with the activities that have to be conducted thereafter.

Hypothesis 2: The SAPS peacekeeping curriculum is not adequate enough to prepare its members in Sudan, Darfur.

Hypothesis 3: There are no measures in place to evaluate SAPS members' role in Sudan, Darfur.

Hypothesis 4: Lack of recognition of new skills and experiences learned from the peacekeeping mission frustrates members who have returned from Sudan, Darfur.

Hypothesis 5: Members with mission experience are not further developed and posted as trainers in peacekeeping to share their experiences with their colleagues who need to be deployed to peacekeeping missions.

Hypothesis 6: SAPS senior managers (at Provincial and Divisional levels) have limited knowledge of peacekeeping.

1.3. RESEARCH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The goal of this research is to determine whether the South African Police Service adequately prepares its members before they leave for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur and whether they get support from their employer upon arrival in the mission. The research goal is operationalised by the following objectives:

- Objective 1. To determine whether the South African Police Service has a set of internal policy guidelines on peacekeeping.
- Objective 2. To determine whether the South African Police Service adequately trains its peacekeepers before they are deployed.
- Objective 3. To recommend measures that can be put in place to align recruitment, selection, training and deployment of members.

1.4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework provides a clear understanding to the primary concepts that are intended to be used in this study. Clarification of the concepts will also assist the reader to understand the context within which the concepts are used in this study.

1.4.1. Peacekeeping

According to the International Peace Academy peacekeeping refers to the prevention, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace (Siekman 1991:6).

Marrack Goulding, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs defined peacekeeping as field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations Command and Control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary (Cilliers and Mills 1995:11).

1.4.2. Peace building

Peace building is generally defined as any actions undertaken by the UN in a conflict situation that are aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem, so as to prevent a re-occurrence of the conflict once the UN presence is scaled down or phased-out (De Coning and Henderson 2006:21).

1.4.3. Peace enforcement

According to Furley and May (1998:4) peace enforcement refers to the intervention of troops from an external state or states into a situation of conflict with the purpose of imposing peace.

1.4.4. Conflict resolution

According to Burton (1990:2) conflict resolution refers to the transformation of relationships in a particular case by the solution of the problems that led to the conflict behaviour in the first place.

1.4.5. Training

Training refers to a systematic and planned process to change the knowledge, skills and behaviour in such a way that organisational objectives are achieved (Erasmus and Van Dyk 1999:2)

1.4.6. Mediation

According to Moore (1996:14) mediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.

1.4.7. Culture

According to Edelstein, Ito and Kepplinger (1989:33) culture refers to understanding that has been generated among individuals and groups about the nature of human relationships, how those relationships were established and the social outcomes that are predicted for its members.

1.5. LAYOUT OF THE RESEARCH

This research comprises of seven chapters that entail specific background on each chapter. Chapter one entails an overview of the research. It provides the reader with a synopsis of the purpose of the research and the scope of the research. Chapter two focuses on the historical background of peacekeeping and its development since the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the growing complexities of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War in 1989 and also the background on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU). Chapter two also provides the problem statement, hypotheses, and the conceptual framework of this research. Chapter three focuses on research methodology and entails key steps in research design. These include choice of the target population, sampling, data collection and ethical considerations in scientific research.

The review of literature pertaining to peacekeeping and peace support operations is covered in chapter four of this research. This includes the nature of peacekeeping operations, legal framework of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and also the selection and training of peacekeepers. Chapter five focuses on the deployment of the South African Police Service members in Darfur, Sudan. This chapter covers the selection and training of the SAPS members before they leave for Sudan, their deployment in Darfur and their return and roles after completion of the mission. Chapter six focuses on presentation and interpretation of data. It entails data presentation tables and the interpretation of the data collected during this research. Research findings and recommendations are covered in chapter seven of this research.

1.6. CONCLUSION

The chapter provided the hypotheses that give clear scope within which this research is conducted, the goal and the objectives of this study. This chapter also provided a conceptual framework that will assist the reader to understand the context within which the concepts are used. Finally this chapter provided the layout of the chapters of the research and what they entail. Chapter two will provide a historical background to peacekeeping in the context of this research.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PEACEKEEPING

2.1. BACKGROUND

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the Republic of South Africa faced major obligations that were performed by most states in the international global arena. These obligations include, amongst others, rejoining the United Nations (UN) and the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the deployment of peacekeepers to various peacekeeping missions to assist in conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. International conflicts date back for centuries but the purpose of this treatise is not to give the history of such conflicts, but rather to present the realities that are of significance in peacekeeping including the conflict in Sudan: Darfur on which this treatise is focusing. In order to streamline these realities into their proper context it is sufficient to go back in time as far as the First World War. The First World War formally ended with the Treaty of Versailles concluded at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (de Rover 1998:69). This treaty created the League of Nations and the International Labour Office. The main aim of the League was “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security”. The League of Nations failed to achieve this aim due to the apathy and reluctance of the member States rather than the apparent inadequacies of the treaty provisions (de Rover 1998:70). The League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War and it was dissolved on the 18th of April 1946 after the establishment of the United Nations on the 24th of October 1945. In June 1945, fifty governments participated in the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter is the multilateral treaty that sets out the legal rights and duties of the UN member states. According to Article 1 of the UN Charter the purposes of the United Nations are: to maintain international peace and security, to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (de Rover 1998:73).

The prime concern of the United Nations is international peace and security. For the United Nations to succeed in that endeavour, it depended on effective cooperation among member States in contributing the necessary resources for the overall accomplishment of its aims and objectives. Such resources include soldiers, police officials, financial support, equipment and other resources that would be of relevance in a given mission. The UN Charter contains three critical chapters that have a serious impact on the nature of the mandates that are given to the peacekeeping missions. Interestingly, nowhere in the UN Charter does the name peacekeeping or peace enforcement appear. These words were used during the early traditional missions that were conducted by the United Nations in the first three decades after its existence. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are implied from the chapters of the UN Charter.

Chapter VI, on peacekeeping, deals with pacific measures that can be taken with the consent of the belligerents (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004:46). According to Article 33(1), these measures include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements. Under this chapter peacekeepers are given a limited mandate to perform their duties. They are restricted to observation, monitoring reporting and advising as required by the mandate as prescribed by the United Nations under this chapter. Chapter VII, peace enforcement, entails a broad variety of actions that can enforce peace which include the use of force. Under this mandate, no consent is required for the implementation of a mission. Under this chapter the police are armed and are given full responsibility of law enforcement. On the other hand the military is not only restricted to offer protection to civilians, they are authorized to use force in separating parties to the conflict and also assist in law enforcement. Collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in peacekeeping is envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Zacarias 1996:104). Under this chapter the UN Charter gives authority to regional organizations like the African Union (AU), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to independently carry out peace settlement initiatives in their regions.

This arrangement is conditional and this Chapter stipulates that it should only be used under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This implies that the region will have to seek authorization from the UNSC before it takes any action against the breach of peace. An exception can be taken if the threat is imminent and lives can be lost while waiting for authorization. According to Shimura in Thakur and Schnabel (2001:47) the first Peacekeeping Operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), had its origin in a cease-fire that was achieved in the first Middle East war in 1948. This operation consisted of contributions of officers from Belgium, France and the United States of America. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization was the birth of what is known as peacekeeping today. Traditional peacekeeping involved fighting between two or more countries and peacekeepers would be deployed to separate them either through drawing a ceasefire line or deploying in a buffer zone to keep the combatants at a healthy distance from each other. The job of peacekeepers was not difficult as such because they knew who the parties to the conflict were and their duties focused mainly on separating them. These classical conflicts were mainly interstate in nature. This implies that they involved conflict between two or more states for one reason or another. A practical example of this type of interstate conflict is a war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands in the early 1980's. Another similar example of two states caught up in warfare even today, are between Ethiopia and Eritrea over a piece of land that both countries claim belongs to them. In this type of conflict parties are clearly identifiable and the reasons for the conflict are clearly articulated.

Peacekeeping missions or peace support operations were minimal during their early evolution. Few missions were experienced due to the tension that existed between the east and the west during the cold war period. It was during this time that traditional peacekeeping missions of the kind mentioned above, were evident and the United Nations had no serious in-mission challenges of dealing with parties to the conflict until in 1989 when the cold war was officially ended. After the cold war the nature of peacekeeping changed due to the dynamics of conflicts. Conflicts were no longer taking place between states. They were, in fact, within states or they were intrastate conflicts.

According to Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:130) civilians are the targets in these wars, not accidental victims. They further indicate that in the First World War, over 80 per cent of battlefield deaths were combatants; by the 1990s over 90 per cent of war-related deaths are civilians, killed in their own homes and communities, which have become the battlefields of international-social wars. It was no longer easy to keep the peace like during the traditional peacekeeping days where it was clear who the enemy was and exactly where the borders of each state were situated. Miall *et al* (1999:128), further indicate that these wars often persists for years, causing untold human suffering, but only sporadically catching the attention of the international community at large. The real victims of these conflicts are women, children and other vulnerable groups that have no means of protecting themselves against the parties to the conflict. Traditional peacekeeping or first generation peacekeeping as it is known, was no longer relevant to this type of conflict.

The ‘second generation’ was distinct from the first generation of traditional peacekeeping because such operations tended to take place within states, rather than between them, and in an environment where the interposition of the blue helmets (United Nations peacekeepers) between organized belligerents was either not possible or ineffective (Bellamy *et al* 2004:129). Peacekeeping operations started to be wider and involved parties to the conflict introduced a new component of civilians who had a specific role to play in the peacebuilding processes. In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict (Chayes and Chayes 1996:484). On the other hand, third generation peacekeeping is characterized by peace-enforcement. This entails enforcement of ceasefire agreements and the protection of humanitarian actors in the mission environment. The increasing complexity of peacekeeping continued until the advent of the current multidimensional and multidisciplinary peace support operations that are referred to as the sixth generation of peacekeeping. Currently the UN, together with other regional organizations, deals with complex peacekeeping or peace support operations that are multidimensional, and that require well trained peacekeepers who understand the nature of today’s conflicts as compared to the traditional peacekeepers.

Figure 1.1 below illustrates the peacekeeping missions since the first mission in 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Aboagye and Kent 2005:05). It also depicts the rapid increase in the number of such missions after the end of the cold war to indicate the change from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts that changed the face of peacekeeping from traditional buffering or separating roles, to complex and multidimensional peace support operations.




Figure 1: UN peacekeeping missions since 1948.

In addition to the synopsis of the establishment of the United Nations and its shortened version of its peacekeeping missions, a regional organisation from the African continent the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on the 25th May 1963 (Aboagye *et al* 2005:22). They identified the following purposes of the OAU:

- To promote unity and solidarity of the African states,

- To coordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to better life for the peoples of Africa,
- To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member States.
- To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and
- To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

After the first democratic elections of the Republic of South Africa in 1994 and the severe conflict that surfaced on the African continent, the OAU was not particularly successful in achieving its goals. According to Aboagye *et al* (2005:22), some of the reasons for this lack of success included principle of non-interference in the affairs of other member states, absence of a substantive security mechanism, lack of capacity and institutional expertise and the perceived and real reluctance of the UN and the international community to fully commit themselves to the resolution of destabilising conflicts. The end of the cold war and economic changes that coincided with that era, led to the African Heads of state to underscore the need to act quickly and determinedly to forestall devastating African conflicts. Thus, after thirty years of existence of the OAU, its leadership recognized the need to transform the organization and to ensure that the newly established entity would be able to address the newly identified challenges. These challenges, together with the Rwandan genocide in 1994, led to the establishment of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Togo and the subsequent launch of the African Union in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa.

In the area of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations continued in increase (Aboagye *et al* 2005:30). The establishment of the United Nations Liaison Offices in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, in 2002, constitutes a significant part of the framework for the cooperation and collaboration; especially in conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations. The United Nations has mandated several peacekeeping operations that were conducted by the African Union under chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which makes provision for regional arrangements.

These include, amongst others, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2003, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in 2003 and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. The cooperation and collaboration of these two bodies assisted in expediting the deployment of peacekeepers in some of the operations on the African Continent that were later handed over to the United Nations. These arrangements are carried out through various legal instruments that have to be signed and finalised for the authorisation of an operation in any part of the world. Thus it is not possible for a country to enter into the territory of another country without due authorisation of such entry by the United Nations. The invasion of Iraq by the United States of America falls under the category of such unauthorised entries by one country into the territory of another for the purpose of what was perceived by the United States of America to be justified and legal.

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is one of the peacekeeping missions that are conducted under the auspices of the African Union. According to Kindiki (2007:3) Darfur is Sudan's largest region, situated on its western border with Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. It comprises of an area of approximately 250 000 square kilometres (size of France) with a population of approximately 6 million people. African farmers, such as the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes predominate in Darfur. The rest of the population consists of nomadic Arab tribes (Kindiki 2007:3). Two main issues have driven the conflict in Darfur. The first is the ethnic division between the Government of Sudan and the non-Arab African communities in Darfur, which has led the Government of Sudan to support the Arab groups in the region. The second is an age-old economic competition between the nomadic Arab herdsmen and the farmers of the African tribes over land use and water. For the conflict to reach the magnitude it reached in 2003, it was fuelled by the incidents that took place some years before. Lack of trust between the government-favoured Arabs and the African communities in Darfur was exacerbated when the former government of Sadiq El Mahdi (1986 – 1989) adopted a policy of arming the Arab militias known as the *muraheleen*, also known as *Janjaweed*, and using them as a counterinsurgency force against the southern Sudan-based rebels.

After a coup that took place in 1989, the new government incorporated the *muraheleen* into the Popular Defence Forces and paramilitaries, who have been involved in the attacks against African communities in Darfur. The sharpest escalation of the violence in the decade from 1997 to 2007 took place in 2003. The government of Sudan is believed to have backed the *Janjaweed* (as a government underground force), similar militias and related predecessors in vicious attacks on the local villagers. These attacks led the local militants to organize their own armed rebel groups, notably Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLA and JEM groups accused the Government of Sudan of decades of neglecting and oppressing blacks in favour of the Arabs. They also demanded that the Government of Sudan address the perceived political marginalization, socio-economic neglect and discrimination against African Darfurians. In response to the rebellion the Government of Sudan allegedly sponsored the *Janjaweed* aggression (Kindiki 2007:4).

With active government support the *Janjaweed* attacked villages, systematically targeting civilian communities that share the same ethnicity with the rebel groups, killing, looting, displacing and polluting water supplies. Marong (2007:1) also confirms the activities of the *Janjaweed* as exacerbating the conflict in Darfur. He indicates that the conflict in Darfur is further complicated by the existence of and active involvement of a government-sponsored Arab militia called the *Janjaweed* which fights alongside the government troops. There is overwhelming evidence that the Government of Sudan is responsible for recruiting, arming and participating in joint attacks with the militia forces that have become the main instrument for attacks on, and the displacement of the civilian population (Kindiki 2007:4). The current estimates of the number of deaths during the two years range from 200 000 to 500 000. The international response so far has failed to stop the killings, protect the civilians or ensure accountability. Despite a ceasefire agreement and other agreement brokered and monitored by the African Union between the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, the Government of Sudan-backed militia continue in their offensive bombing of civilians and rebel targets especially in South Darfur.

After lengthy negotiations, the Government of Sudan consented to the deployment of 1 200 African Union troops in 2004 with the mandate to observe the ceasefire, report on violations and protect civilians. This was done under the African Union Mission in Sudan as it is known today. Although the number of peacekeepers has risen to 7 000 over time, logistics and their inability to implement their mandate have been major problems associated with the African Union peacekeepers with an approximate 1500 police officers on the ground in Darfur. In the face of overwhelming evidence, the Government of Sudan is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens (Kindiki 2007:5). The Darfur conflict is further exacerbated by attacks on African Union peacekeepers that are killed by faceless “gunmen” in the region. It was an open secret that the African Union Mission in Sudan was unable to protect its own peacekeepers due to the restrictive Chapter VI mandate of the UN Charter and the limited arms and ammunition of the peacekeepers.

Furthermore chronic lack of expertise, inadequate equipment and insufficient funds to pay for its air wing were some of the internal challenges of the AMIS. These challenges and the reluctance of the Sudanese Government to allow the deployment of the United Nations Peacekeepers in Darfur, elongated the period of suffering and killing of innocent civilians in this region. Ultimately, after long negotiations with the Sudanese President, Omar El Bashir, the Government of Sudan agreed to the deployment of the United Nations / African Union Hybrid Mission in Dafur (UNAMID). UNAMID was established under Resolution 1769 of the United Nations Security Council that spells out the new mandate of the mission. UNAMID officially took the reigns from AMIS on the 1st of January 2008 in what was seen as an uncertain start of the mission. The mandate has been elevated to a robust Chapter VII of the UN Charter that authorizes peacekeepers to use force if necessary during the tour of their duties. This includes police officers being authorised to do normal policing functions like crime prevention, investigation and also arresting of suspects. However the challenges of logistics and force generation are still unresolved due to lack of support from the UN / AU member States. This also led to slow deployment of additional peacekeepers that were pledged by the member states in support of peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur.

The Sudanese Government also complicated the scenario by specifying the types of weapons peacekeepers had to carry. Peacekeepers were only allowed to carry light weapons like assault rifles and hand guns even if there are rebels are still driving through Darfur carrying light machine guns, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft machine guns. This is a scene where the South African Police Service members are deployed alongside other military and police forces with an endeavour to bring peace in the war torn Darfur.

2.2. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided historical background on the evolution of peacekeeping. It provided the history of peacekeeping from the beginning of the League of Nations until the current period of multidimensional peacekeeping. This chapter also provided a background to the former Organisation of African Unity and the African Union. Furthermore the chapter provided the brief background of the conflict in Sudan, Darfur and the attempts made by the African Union Mission in Sudan to resolve the conflict. The next chapter focuses on research methodology and it will entail the discussion on research design, target population, sampling, data collection and research ethics.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The research methodology that a researcher follows is very important because it provides guidelines on how data is supposed to be collected. According to Babbie and Mouton (1998:49) the selection of methods and their application, are always dependent on the aims and objectives of the study, the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and the underlying theory or expectations of the investigator. Three broad methodological paradigms have dominated the scene in recent social research: the qualitative, quantitative and participatory action paradigms. For the purpose of this study, a quantitative approach will be used because of the nature of the data and the methods that are going to be used in collecting it. According to Mouton and Marais (1990:150) the quantitative approach is more highly formalized as well as more explicitly controlled, with a range that is more exactly defined and which, in terms of the methods used, is relatively close to that of the physical sciences. This is because historically, the quantitative approach has its origin and influences from the positivistic metatheory of social sciences.

According to Mouton and Marais (1991:42) the following are the three types of studies in scientific research.

- Exploratory studies.

The goal of exploratory studies is to explore something that is new or unknown to the researcher or the researcher has little or no knowledge about. This might be a new invention or a new topic in a particular field of study.

- Descriptive studies.

Descriptive studies are very specific in their aim and are intended to observe and report a particular phenomenon.

- Explanatory studies.

According to Mouton and Marais (1991:45) the aim of explanatory studies is to explain a given phenomenon in terms of specific causes. This study is descriptive because it aims to describe the process that the South African Police Service takes in recruiting its incumbent peacekeepers until they are deployed and finish their mission period and come back home.

3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to arrive at a particular conclusion, research has to be planned in order to have a clear direction. Research design consists of a blueprint of the process that the researcher will undergo from the beginning to the end of the research. The following were identified as key steps in this study: choice of the target population, sampling, data collection and ethical considerations in this study.

3.2.1. Target population

According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1981:294) a population is the aggregate of all cases that conform to some designated set of specifications. For the purposes of this study the target population refers to all members of the South African Police Service who are already in a database of members who have already served in the African Union Mission in Sudan. The South African Police Service has already had four hundred and twenty seven members that have already completed their mission period in Sudan. These are the SAPS members that serve as a target group for this study.

3.2.2. Sampling

According to Leary (1991:82) sampling refers to the process by which a researcher selects a sample of subjects from the population of interest. The target population is heterogeneous and consists of males and females from various divisions and components of the South African Police Service. They come from various parts of the country and are of various ranks ranging from Constable to Senior Superintendent. They are of various ages and races.

The sampling method that is used in this research is non-probability sampling. According to Huysamen (1994:43) the probability that a given element of the population will be included in the non-probability sample cannot be specified.

In this research purposive sample is used to obtain the relevant sample. In this type of sampling researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity and / or previous research findings to deliberately obtain participants in such a manner that the sample obtained may be regarded as representative of the relevant population (Huysamen 1994:44). In this instance the researcher has been employed as a police officer for the past seventeen years and has worked on peacekeeping since 1999, long before the South African Police Service started deploying its members to Darfur, in Sudan. Based on the understanding of the researcher purposive sampling is relevant in this regard.

The sample that is used in this research is going to be the SAPS members who are in the mission in Dafur, Sudan on the 26th of September 2007. A total number of forty-two (42) officers will be coming back from the mission on the 26th of September and an additional number of thirty (30) officers will be remaining in Darfur and coming back to South Africa in November 2007. The researcher has access to all these officers and they will be used to provide valuable inputs to this research project. The SAPS has a total number of four hundred and twenty-seven members who have been to the mission thus far. This number is not inclusive of those that will be returning at the end of November 2007.

3.2.3. Data collection

Since the nature of this study is quantitative, a comprehensive questionnaire (See Annexure A) was developed, tested and thereafter distributed amongst the South African Police Service members at the African Union Mission in Sudan Headquarters in El Fashir, Dafur. The questionnaire covers biographical information of the respondents, aspects of training prior deployment, their functions during the deployment and also placement of SAPS members after completion of the mission. Furthermore close ended questions were used in the questionnaire due to the quantitative nature of this research.

The variables contained in the questionnaire are the following:

Table 1: Questionnaire variables.

Variable	Name
A1	Gender
A2	Race
A3	Age
A4	Rank
A5	Years of service
A6	Educational qualifications
B1	Voluntary deployment to the African Union Mission in Sudan
B2	Voluntary medical tests before deployment
B3	Clarity of the course on the functioning of the UN and the AU
B4	Clarity of the course in dealing with human rights issues in the mission
B5	4 x 4 skills development during the Generic Peacekeeping Course
B6	Clarity of lectures in dealing with vulnerable groups in the mission
B7	Humane treatment of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) by the Sudanese police.
B8	The extent of the observation of practices by the Sudanese police
B9	The extent of monitoring the activities of the Sudanese police
B10	The extent of advising the Sudanese police
B11	The extent of reporting misconducts, criminal activities or good practices of the Sudanese police.
B12	Logistical support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur.
B13	Social support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur.
B14	Level of preparedness from South Africa on peacekeeping functions performed in Darfur.
B15	Assessment during the Generic Peacekeeping course before deployment.
B16	Medical testing before deployment.
B17	Awareness on South African Police Service policy on peacekeeping deployments.
B18	Waiting period before redeployment.
B19	Awareness on senior management's attendance of any peacekeeping training in South Africa or elsewhere.
B20	Willingness to share peacekeeping experiences and managerial support in implementing such experiences.
B21	Willingness to be redeployed if given another chance.
B22	Value of presence in Darfur to the lives of the victims of armed conflict.

The information reflected on the questionnaire should be read with the attached questionnaire in order to be clear on what each variable relates to.

3.2.4. Research ethics

According to Babbie *et al* (1998:520) ethical issues arise out of our interaction with other people, other beings (such as animals), and the environment, especially where there is a conflict of interest. Ethics play a critical role in ensuring a proper balance between the need to do research and the rights and entitlements that other people have. These ethical considerations include, amongst others, the following: anonymity and confidentiality, voluntary participation and no harm to participants.

3.2.4.1. Voluntary participation and privacy.

According to Huysamen (1990:178) to compel subjects to participate in a research is probably ethically more unacceptable than to let them participate without their knowledge. The respondents in this research were requested to voluntarily participate and no one was under undue pressure to participate.

3.2.4.2. No physical or psychological harm to participants

The researcher should ensure that under no circumstances may the participants in a research project be exposed to pain or discomfort. Social research should never injure the people being studied, regardless of whether they volunteer for the study or not (Babbie *et al* 1998:522). The questionnaires that were distributed were developed and tested for any sensitive questions that could upset the respondents.

3.2.4.3. Anonymity and confidentiality

Anonymity and confidentiality are critical ethical considerations especially if the protection of the subjects' interests and well-being is the protection of their identity. According to Vermeulen (1998:17) all participants in a research project have the right to remain anonymous therefore the identities of individuals should not be revealed.

In this study the participants did not have to provide any information that could link with their identities. The notes on the questionnaire indicated that participants were not supposed to provide their names to ensure their anonymity. Confidentiality of the data provided does not necessarily come into the picture because of the anonymity of the respondents.

3.3. CONCLUSION

Research methodology is a pillar of scientific research. This chapter outlined the research methodology in this study as quantitative in nature. The research design was also discussed as a blueprint or a plan on which the research is conducted. The target population, sampling and data collection techniques were discussed and the variables of the questionnaire were also outlined. Ethical considerations were also taken into consideration during the entire research process to ensure the integrity of the study. Specific considerations were made in relation to the rights to confidentiality and anonymity, voluntary participation and exposure to physical and psychological harm on the subjects of the study.

The next chapter will orientate the reader on peacekeeping literature with a specific focus on the history of the United Nations peacekeeping and peace support operations since the inception of the current multidimensional and complex peace support operations.

CHAPTER 4

RELEVANT LITERATURE RELATING TO PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Conflict is a global phenomenon that forms an intricate part of human existence. It is a critical element of development and change in all parts of the world. It is a driving force that ensures continuous metamorphosis of critical aspects of human existence such as social, political and economic aspects. At the international level, unresolved conflicts have serious negative outcomes that impact badly on the lives of other human beings. Sometimes these unresolved conflicts leave a trail of death, poverty, suffering, human insecurity and even a lack of respect for human dignity and life. Large-scale conflicts like the conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq and the recent and ongoing conflict in Somalia bear testimony to the devastating nature of conflict. Most of these conflicts, unlike the early conflicts that took place between the 1960's and late 1980's, are conflicts that take place within the borders of a particular country. According to Rankhumise (2006:1) intra-state wars and conflicts in Africa have created unprecedented humanitarian crises within the continent. This creates a challenge to the world community to quickly respond in resolving and preventing these conflicts due to their complexity and bureaucratic processes that have to be followed in resolving conflicts of this nature.

The following discussion is going to focus on the legal framework of peacekeeping operations with specific reference to peacekeeping mandates, Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA), Rules of Engagement (ROE), the roles of the civilian police and human rights issues. The discussion will further focus on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping, cultural and gender issues, the concept of Disarmourment, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the personal safety of peacekeepers in the mission environment. The discussion will also focus on selection and training of peacekeepers and logistical support for the peacekeepers. The discussion will end with a comprehensive conclusion.

4.2. NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping has been evolving since its inception in 1948. During the Cold War era, conflicts were interstate in nature and the parties to the conflict were clearly identifiable. According to Thakur (2005:3) the goal of traditional peacekeeping missions was to promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of great power rivalry. The principle of consent of the parties to the conflict to allow an international force to intervene in bringing peace to the warring parties has since been in place during classical peacekeeping. However since the end of the Cold War conflicts started to become intrastate in nature and this implied the need for a serious change in the approaches that were used by the United Nations and other regional organizations in addressing the conflicts that took place during the Cold War period. The number of United Nations operations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the UN was placed center-stage in the efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts (Thakur 2005:4). The evolution of peacekeeping can be summarized in the following table that reflects the generation, activities and the missions that took place.

Table 2. Evolution of peacekeeping.

Generation of peacekeeping	Purpose of peacekeeping operations	Examples of Specific Missions where the operation was deployed
First generation	Separation of combatants (states) by the United Nations mission.	United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) between Egypt and Israel
Second generation	Additional range of functions rather only military interposition. (Conducted outside the UN system).	Zimbabwe, Beirut and Sri Lanka.

Third generation	Tasks like military disengagements, demobilization and cantonment, policing human rights monitoring and enforcement, observation, organization and conduct of elections, rehabilitation and repatriation and contemporary administration.	Namibia and Cambodia
Fourth generation	Peace enforcement and protection of the civilians (Mission failed dismally during the Srebrenica killings in 1995)	United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia
Fifth generation	Multinational peace enforcement operations that are later taken over by the United Nations after they stabilize. (Traditional third generation functions mark this generation of peacekeeping operations)	Bosnia and Haiti
Sixth generation	A United Nations multinational force with a robust mandate. UN organized elections, state building, humanitarian aid and rule of law.	East Timor

After the increase in the number of peace support operations at the end of the Cold War (after 1989), there was no policy developed that served as a guide for the new and complex United Nations missions. This compelled the United Nations to do some introspection on its peacekeeping operations to ensure that there would be improvements in future operations. According to Thakur (2005:5) the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a high-level international panel, chaired by former Algerian foreign minister (and subsequently special UN envoy to Afghanistan and the Iraq) Lakhdar Brahimi, to make recommendations for the changes in UN peacekeeping. The report came to the conclusion that “when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. Some of the changes that were brought about by the Brahimi report were:

- An increment of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to support field missions,
- Bolstering of the offices of the military and the police advisers,
- A lessons learnt unit was restructured into the best practices unit and the DPKO’s logistics component situated in Brindisi (Italy) received funding to acquire strategic deployment stocks.
- The police commissioner was no longer supposed to report to the military force commander, but to be at the same level as the force commander and both had to report to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General.

These steps constituted the United Nations internal transformation activities that were intended to bring the peacekeeping missions into line with the nature of the new conflicts, in order to better respond to them after the cold war. These developments within the United Nations system had a serious influence on the way peacekeeping should be performed by the regional organizations. According to De Coning (2006:6) over the past half decade, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations.

The African Union, in particular, has played a leading role by deploying its first two peace operations in Burundi; the African Union Missions in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan (African Union Mission in Sudan). A natural sequence that has evolved, and has already been seen to be working is that the regional organizations and the African Union would first deploy in a conflict area and later the United Nations would take over the complex operations and ensure that they are properly managed and supported. According to De Coning (2006:6) this pattern was established in Burundi, where the African Union deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) (United Nations Operation in Burundi) in 2004; and repeated in Liberia where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) in 2003, followed by a UN operation (United Nations Mission in Liberia) later in the same year; and it is also the case with Darfur where the African Union Mission in Sudan was first established in 2004 and has since been replaced by the United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

4.3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping and peace support operations, by their nature, operate within a strict legal framework that is derived from various components of international law. The legal framework covers the United Nations Charter that serves as a basis for the United Nations functioning. The United Nations Charter has three chapters that provide guidelines on the mandates of particular peace operations. These are chapter VI, VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter and they will be explained below. The legal framework also includes various Conventions, Covenants, Memoranda of Understanding, Status of the Forces Agreements, national legislation, human rights law and Codes of conduct that require compliance by parties to the conflict and also by the peacekeepers.

4.3.1. Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Peacekeeping or pacific settlement of disputes).

Chapter VI deals with pacific measures that can be taken with the consent of the belligerents for the purposes of peaceful settlement of disputes (Bellamy *et al* 2004:46).

According to Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, these measures include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements. Under this chapter peacekeepers are given a limited mandate to perform their duties. They are restricted to what is required of them by the mandate as prescribed by the United Nations under this chapter. The use of force by the peacekeepers is restricted. The only time when force can be used is when peacekeepers have to defend themselves. The nature of force to be used is prescribed under the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of each mission. The South African Police Service members formally started their first deployment in the African Union Missions in Sudan (AMIS) in March 2005 under a Chapter VI mandate. There were only eighteen members of the SAPS that were deployed during that period. The functions that peacekeepers had to perform from the beginning of the mission in 2004 until the 31st of December 2007 were restricted to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These activities include advising the Government of Sudanese (GOS) Police on how they should carry out their duties, especially with due regard to human rights. They assist in training, monitoring and reporting of any or unlawful or illegal practices by the GOS Police. They are not carrying any side arms and they are protected by the military while they carry out their daily functions.

The duties of the military under this Chapter are to offer protection to both the civilians (police included) and Military Observers (MILOBS). According to Appiah-Mensah (2005:12 –13) the enhanced mandate of AMIS was established by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 20 October 2004. This mandate was carved out with the assumption that the Government of Sudan will provide primary first-line protection to the people of Darfur and lead on compliance with the Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement signed in Ndjamena, Chad on the 8th of April 2004. This was not the case and the African Union did not change its mandate in this regard. Thus AMIS operated as an observer mission with a restricted mandate and limited personnel and equipment. This created serious challenges for the AMIS mission to provide adequate protection to the civilians over and above what the mandate had provided.

4.3.2. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Peace enforcement).

Peace enforcement missions entail a broad variety of actions that can enforce peace. These actions include the use of force both by the military and the police in carrying out their functions. Under this mandate police do their normal policing functions and have powers to arrest, detain, do community policing, investigate, manage crowds and also prevent crime as opposed to the limited functions under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Under this chapter the police are armed and are given full responsibility of law enforcement. On the other hand the military is not only restricted to offering protection to civilians, they are authorized to use force in separating parties to the conflict and also assist in law enforcement. This mandate is currently implemented in UNAMID and it is seen to be robust enough to protect the civilians in Darfur and also for the mission to implement its objectives as expected by the international community. The mandate was put in place on the 1st of January 2008 under Resolution 1769 of the Security Council of the United Nations.

4.3.3. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (Regional arrangements).

Collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in peacekeeping is envisaged in UN Charter Chapter VIII (Zacarias 1996:104). The United Nations Charter gives authority to regional organizations like the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to independently carry out peace settlement initiatives in their regions. This arrangement is conditional and Chapter VIII stipulates that it should only be used under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This implies that the region will have to seek authorization from the UNSC before it takes any action against any breach to peace with any state. An exception can be made if the threat is imminent and lives can be lost while waiting for authorization. A classical example of such situation is the response of ECOWAS in Liberia that was later taken over by the United Nations to become the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was also a Chapter VIII type of an operation that functions as a Chapter VI mission (peacekeeping mission).

The United Nations gave the African Union a Security Council Resolution to carry out a mission in Sudan: Darfur. The Government of Sudan did not want peacekeepers from outside African countries to participate in the mission in Darfur, which is why the mission could not be a United Nations mission from the outset. However the United Nations took control of the mission in Darfur with effect from January 2008 with a Chapter VII mandate that authorises the peacekeepers to use force in performing their functions.

4.3.4. United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement cannot take place unless under the authority of the United Nations in a form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). To launch complex operations, pre-operation fact-finding missions to the area where the mission is going to be held are essential to gather information to determine the nature of the mission to be established. However this has been seen as time wasting and escalating the conflict that has already started, and invites criticism of the UN's late response to the missions such as it happened in Cambodia. It is true that when conflict has erupted and there is a need for peacekeepers, time is of the essence to ensure that lives are not lost and the conflict does not escalate while United Nations is still doing a feasibility study on the type of the operation to be established. Eventually, the Council almost always accepts the Secretary-General's report and its recommendations which is compiled after fact-finding missions. And it normally proceeds to adopt a resolution that officially establishes the anticipated operation along those lines (Shimura in Thakur *et al* 2001:50). The resolution will specify the type of peace initiative (either peacekeeping or peace enforcement) that is authorised and entails all the parties that are going to be deployed and sets out their specific roles during the mission. The resolution will indicate the end state of that mission as prescribed by the UN Security Council. In case of a Chapter VIII the UNSCR will further specify the region that it is aimed to authorize to conduct a mission, the activities and role players in that particular mission. The current UNAMID mission has been authorised under Resolution 1969 of the United Nations and stipulates precisely what the end state of the operation should be.

4.3.5. Status of the Forces / Mission Agreement (SOFA)

According to Mlotha in Aboagye and Kent (2005:21) the Status of the Forces / Mission Agreement (SOFA / SOMA) is concluded between the United Nations and the territory in which the mission is going to be deployed.

The two concepts are usually used interchangeably but it should be noted that the SOMA applies to peacekeeping and the SOFA applies to Peace enforcement. In these agreements the United Nations will undertake to ensure that the peacekeepers will conduct their duties in full respect of the legal framework of the United Nations. Furthermore the SOFA / SOMA indicates that each peacekeeper is subjected to the national laws of his or her country during the mission period. This implies that if a peacekeeper commits an act that is an offence in his or her country, such peacekeeper should be repatriated from the mission and prosecuted for such act in his or her home country. According to Cilliers in Cilliers and Mills (1995:72-73), the legality of a peace support mission in any country's territory should be guaranteed by a Status of Forces Agreement signed between the host country and the UN, regulating the following in detail:

- Privileges and immunities of the force, officers, officials and members of the force.
- Matters concerning the application of taxation, customs and fiscal regulations.
- Communication and postal services.
- Availability of the local currency for the use by the force.
- Use of water, electricity and other public utilities.
- Freedom of movement.
- Use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields.
- Settlement of disputes or claims.
- Civil and criminal jurisdiction and identification and status.

The SOFA will stipulate the jurisdiction of the mission, facilities to be used by peacekeepers, the rights to carry firearms and wear uniforms in a foreign country and also enjoy the protection and privileges such as exemption from paying tax. All peacekeepers enjoy their protection and privileges that are specified in the SOFA but such privileges could be waived if the peacekeeper commits an offence in the mission.

Practically the SOMA of AMIS was violated because the Sudanese authorities used to close the airport in El Fashir and this created serious challenges to the mission especially in cases of medical evacuations. AMIS would complain to the Sudanese authorities and the airport would be temporarily opened and closed at a later stage.

4.3.6. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

The MOU is an agreement between the United Nations or the African Union and the police or troop contributing country. According to Mlotha in Aboagye and Kent (2005:22) the MOU provides guidelines to the troop or police contributing country in terms of the number of peacekeepers to be contributed, the authority under which they are going to be deployed and the duties of the United Nations or African Union regarding the payment of salaries and allowances to the peacekeepers. In the case of AMIS the SAPS contributed one hundred and twenty five (125) peacekeepers and are under the command and control of the Special Representative of the Chair of the Commission (SRCC) of the African Union, Baba Ghana Kingibe. The duties of the African Union are to provide them with shelter, food, daily allowance and logistical support like vehicles, information technological support and to offer them protection while on duty. Be it as it may, the African Union had its challenges in achieving these duties. Peacekeepers would sometimes work for months without being paid and this dropped their morale given that they were performing their functions in the harshest mission in the world.

4.3.7. Rules of Engagement (ROE)

According to Cilliers in Cilliers *et al* (1995:75), Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide political direction, within legal parameters, and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. They provide guidelines and conditions in which force should be used in the peacekeeping operations. Some of the instances under which force can be used are in self-defence or defence against direct attack or threats to the lives of members of the peace support operation. Force can be used in resisting attempts to disarm peace support forces and also in resisting attempts to arrest or abduct peace support forces. Furthermore force can be used to resist the attempts by forceful means to prevent peace support forces from discharging their mandated duties.

Rules of engagement further prescribe specific weapon systems that the mission should use and the conditions under which these weapons should be used. Under any circumstances, if force has to be used it should be preceded by a clear warning. However use of force must not be delayed if there is immediate threat to lives, if casualties have already occurred or a warning will increase the risk of death or injury. If force has to be used, it has to be minimum use of force to achieve the aim of using it. Furthermore collateral damage to civilians' property should be calculated and the use of such force should cease as soon as circumstances permit. Rules of Engagement are very strict and peacekeepers must adhere to them to avoid unnecessary use of force with possibilities of injuries, deaths or damage to properties of innocent people.

4.3.8. Other elements of the legal framework

The legal framework for a peacekeeping operation will not be complete if it does not include international human rights law and humanitarian law. According to de Rover (1998:60) human rights and humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) form an integral part of international law with both types of law designed to protect individuals and collectives and their fundamental rights and freedoms. Human rights are covered in the International Bill of Human Rights, which include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On the other hand de Rover (1998:61) states that humanitarian law provides the applicable standards for protection of victims of war and the conduct of hostilities. Human rights law and humanitarian law are the basis for peacekeeping missions. According to Bah in Aboagye and Bah (2005:40) Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that “no government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its people”. Human rights and humanitarian law or law of armed conflict are the most frequently used international instruments that are intended to protect breaches of human rights and also to protect the civilians during the war. The code of conduct for the peacekeepers is also an element of the legal framework. Peacekeepers are bound to act within the ambit of the code of conduct to maintain the integrity and professionalism of the blue helmets and the African Union peacekeepers.

Any infringement of the code of conduct can have dire consequences to the peacekeepers with a possibility of being repatriated back to their countries. National legislation of the troop or police contributing country also forms part of the legal framework.

In the case of South African Police Service members in Darfur, any SAPS member who commits an act that is an offence under the South African legislation should be arrested and made to appear in front of a South African court to answer for such an offence. This is also the case with peacekeepers that contravene the local legislation of the host country.

4.4. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

According to Rankhumise (2006:6), as in many conflict scenarios, women, children, the disabled, and the elderly have invariably been among the victims of the military confrontations between the Government of Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Army. The warring factions seriously affected the socio-economic fabric of society during the destruction of villages and the looting of property and livestock during raids. Common to this type of scenario, people flee their homes and become displaced. Some even flee their countries of abode to other neighbouring countries to be refugees. The Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) report indicates that since early 2003, the people of Darfur have endured a vicious campaign of violence, which has forced almost 2 million people to flee from their destroyed villages in search of safety. Rape against women and children has been a constant factor in this violence throughout this campaign terror. More tragically it continues to this day even long after people fled from their villages. The stories of rape survivors give a horrific illustration of the daily reality of people in Darfur and especially of women and young girls, the primary victims of this form of violence (Rankhumise 2006:6).

The deplorable impact of complex emergencies within Africa is underscored in the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees' state of the world's displaced and other populations as depicted in Aboagye (2007:2) in the following table 3:

Table 3: Total population of concern to UNHCR by region of asylum and category (1 January 2005)

Others of concern								Total population of concern
Region	Refugees	Asylum seekers	Returned refugees	IDPs of concern to UNHCR	Returned IDPs	Stateless	Others	
Africa	3 023 000	207 000	330 000	1 200 000	33 000	120	67 000	4 860 120
Asia	3 471 000	56 000	1 146 000	1 328 000	62 000	724 000	113 000	6 900 000
Europe	2 068 000	270 000	19 000	900 000	51 000	731 000	391 000	4 430 000
Latin America and the Caribbean	36 000	8 000	90	2 000 000	-		26 000	2 070 090
Northern America	562 000	291 000	-	-	-	140	-	853 000
Oceania	76 000	6 000	-	-	-	-	-	82 140
Total	9 236 000	838 000	1 495 090	5 428 000	146 000	1 455 260	597 000	19 195 350

The devastation that is left by most of the conflicts cannot be overlooked. The table above indicates gruesome statistics of people who were affected by the conflicts through the world by January 2005. These numbers are huge and imply that people are constantly on the move searching for safety, security and a place where they can be housed and live peacefully.

4.5. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR).

The devastating conflicts that catch international attention such as Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cotê d'Ivoire and others were and are still fueled by easy access to small arms and assault rifles within the conflict environment. Opposing parties will ensure that they arm themselves to protect their interests in times of attacks by their rivals. The skirmishes that take place during the climax of each conflict leave carnage and loss of lives. De-escalation of conflict occurs when parties agree to settle their differences. The signing of peace agreements and voluntary surrendering of arms by the parties typically characterizes this time.

This is the time when the peacekeeping mission, together with other role players prepares the environment in which the DDR process is going to take place. Most of the components play a critical role in this costly and delicate process. The three phases of DDR are interconnected and the successful completion of each phase is essential to the success of the others (Fusato, 2003:1). The goals of DDR are both short and long term. In the short term, DDR aims to restore security and stability through the disarmament of warring parties. On the other hand, demobilization of armed groups is another fundamental step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of the conflict. The long term goal of DDR is to establish a sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful society.

4.5.1. Disarmament

Disarmament entails the actual handing over of the firearms and other elements of the artillery or arsenals of all parties to the conflict with the purpose of creating a weapon free and peaceful environment. The activities that take place during disarmament include, amongst others, pointing out and de-mining of areas where mines have been buried, destruction of weapons, management of weapon collection sites and also registration of soldiers and their weapons. Potential target groups for the DDR process are usually government forces, opposition forces, irregular armed groups, armed civilians, militias and other foreign forces that might have been in the conflict area.

The main reason for disarmament is to restore order and to give the authority and power to the state to protect its own citizens. It also reduces a chance of relapse into armed conflict due to reduction or complete disarmament of the civilians and other armed groups in the mission environment. Various methods are used to destroy firearms. These include burning them, and cutting or shredding them. It is the duty of the experts from the military to utilize the most effective and efficient method of destruction in this regard. In the Darfur situation, disarmament is not ready to be suggested because the AMIS did not prove itself as having the capability of protecting the civilians in Darfur especially under the previous Chapter VII mandate. Furthermore the Sudanese authorities on the other hand did not show any intentions of protecting the civilians in Darfur.

There is therefore still no trust among the parties to the conflict, and armed groups will not voluntarily hand over their firearms because they believe that they need them to protect themselves against their enemies. There is a very substantial role for the mission during the disarmament process because it has the responsibility of establishing the DDR center that has the entire basic infrastructure for both management of the process and temporary residence for the ex-combatants. The cost implications for this process are very high and it needs to be conducted by experts to ensure that it does not fail. It is obvious that the peace process can fail for reasons that are independent of whatever part of the DDR programs. However the failed or misused DDR processes not only threaten the success of the peace process, they also risk aggravating the conflict should a relapse occur (Sundh and Schjørlein 2006:13).

4.5.2. Demobilization

Demobilization is a process of either downsizing, or completely disbanding potential targets of disarmament as mentioned above. According to Aboagye and Kent (2005:97), demobilization involves the assembling, quartering, administration and discharge of former combatants who may receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life. The demobilization process takes place in a secured camp where various activities can be carried out to ensure smooth transition and re-insertion of the ex-combatants into normal community life. The camps should have the capacity for assessing vocational skills, interpersonal relations and provide referrals to employment and social services if needed (Aboagye *et al* 2005:98). Some of the activities that should be carried out in the demobilization camps include, amongst others, the following:

- Sports and recreation
- Literacy training
- Skills training
- Health education
- Peace accord orientation
- Vocational counseling and
- Pre-discharge orientation

It is the duty of all the components of the peace support operation to ensure that all areas that need to be attended by various expertises are covered. Thus the focus of the humanitarian organizations will be on the welfare of the ex-combatants and their families and the police and military will focus on safety and security related aspects whereas the political component of the peace support orientation will focus on the processes of the peace accord and the peace process.

4.5.3. Reintegration

The reintegration process entails measures provided to the former combatants with the intention to increase the potential for them and their families' economic and social means to survive after being reinserted into normal civilian life (Aboagye *et al* 2005:98). The reintegration programs can include various forms of assistance to the former combatants. Former combatants are given various types of assistance that are either financial, material assistance, or assistance in kind. Assistance might also be in a form of skills training or entitlements that can assist the former combatants to start a sustainable life after the conflict.

4.6. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PEACEKEEPERS

Peacekeeping is a function that is not similar to the normal functions that are performed by the police and military while they are in their countries of origin. It entails performing a new function, out of the normal national environment and also being expected to perform that function with other peacekeepers from various parts of the world and together working in a new environment that is characterized by conflict. Therefore peacekeepers need to be properly selected and capacitated for the new function and new challenges that they are going to face in the peace support operation. The kind of training conducted should be able to prepare the peacekeepers to cope with the realities of some of the harshest conditions in the world. According to Fetherston (1994: 164) the crucial significance of training in the process of developing effective peacekeeping is two-fold:

First training provides the means for dissemination of the meta-goals guiding peaceful intervention and implementation of third party activities designed to accomplish those goals, and secondly, training provides an important link in the testing of the conceptual base of peacekeeping. Selection of and training of peacekeepers is a critical task that should be carried out with great circumspection. Selection includes recruiting volunteers and putting them through series of medical tests that include a mandatory Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV) test. The other tests that are recommended by peacekeeping countries like the Republic of South Africa are cholesterol testing, blood alcohol volume testing and psychometric tests. It is a prerequisite that all peacekeepers to be deployed have to be in possession of valid drivers' licenses, they must be able to drive a 4x4 type of vehicle under difficult conditions. They must be able to pass their English test and should be able to shoot with their pistols.

After passing these initial tests, the incumbent peacekeeper is recommended to attend training on peacekeeping. According to Aboagye *et al* (2005:50) the United Nations recommends three types of training in the process of deploying peacekeepers to peace support operations. The first is a generic peacekeeping course that is presented to the incumbent peacekeepers that have passed their medical and psychometric tests as part of their selection process. This generic course lasts for two weeks and its purpose is to introduce peacekeeping concepts to the participants and to ensure that they have the necessary skills and theoretical knowledge and also the practical requirements of going on the mission.

The United Nations' Selection and Training Team carry out quality control on all the peacekeepers that are deployed to its missions to ensure that they comply with all the criteria and standards set for peacekeeping deployments. If a participant fails the selection criteria he or she will be repatriated to his or her country at the expense of that country. The second type of training is three days pre-mission training. The purpose of this training is to give the participants a clear background of the conflict and to discuss mission specific information.

The last type of training is the induction training that participants receive upon arrival in the mission. Its purpose is to orientate the peacekeepers and to do assessments of their driving skills, language skills and shooting skills. Training assists peacekeepers to have a mental picture of what is going to happen upon arrival in the peace support operation.

4.7. CONCLUSION

Peacekeeping has evolved dramatically since the deployment of the first missions in 1948. Most of the developments were influenced by the lessons that were learned by the United Nations and the regions that were involved in peacekeeping missions. It is clear that traditional peacekeeping had to change due to the challenges that were brought by the end of the cold war. Multidimensional peacekeeping and new peace support operations were more complex and included role players who were not in the peacekeeping arena before the end of the cold war. The recommendations from the Brahimi report also added momentum towards continuation of an evolutionary process of United Nations peace support operations. Humanitarian assistance and the DDR process play a significant role in making a difference between conflict and peace. Strict selection and rigorous training assists in improving the standards of peacekeeping operations that make a difference to those that receive the services of the peacekeepers. The next chapter will focus on the South African Police Service officers in both the AMIS mission, and the current UNAMID mission in Darfur: Sudan.

CHAPTER 5

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE DEPLOYMENT IN DARFUR

5.1. INTRODUCTION

The birth of new democracy in the Republic of South Africa in 1994 after long years of apartheid rule came with reacceptance of the country into the global political arena. During the long years of oppressive government, high levels of violence that were caused by racial conflicts and demonstrations against the government characterized the country in this regard. Due to the political change in the country, South Africa had to fulfill its obligations of being in the international political environment. According to Bradshaw (2007:10) South Africa has a troubled history of deep-rooted social conflict. Upon its re-entry into the full international community, the country had, in addition to its internal crime combating challenges, to ensure that it met its commitments in respect of peace operations. However South Africa preferred to deploy its peacekeepers to the peace support operations in the African continent due to the serious lack of support for these operations. Guided by the White Paper on Peacekeeping operations of 1999 (currently under review), South Africa deployed its peacekeepers to various missions in the African continent. Amongst these peacekeepers are the members of the South African Police Service who were deployed for the first time in March 2005 as a team of police officers to the African Union Mission in Sudan. The following discussion is going to focus on the process that is followed by the South African Police Service in deploying its members to African Union Mission in Sudan. The process includes selection, training, deployment, in-mission support and return of peacekeepers to their respective stations.

5.2. SELECTION AND TRAINING

Selection and training are done with members who volunteered and agreed to be deployed. Members submitted names at their respective stations and were called by their provincial offices to undergo various medical tests that are carried out by practitioners from 1 Military Hospital in Thaba-Tshwana, Pretoria.

The tests that were conducted are similar to those of the South African National Defense Force members who are deployed to various peacekeeping missions. The tests included HIV testing, cholesterol, nicotine and alcohol presence in the blood. The South African Police Service Psychological Services and Social Work Service would conduct psychometric tests and family visits respectively. Family visits are carried out, the aim of which is to assess whether the member's family circumstances can cope with the challenges while he / she is away on to the mission for six months. Social Work Services would then provide recommendations on whether the member should be deployed or not. After such tests and visits are completed, the member is called to attend training for two weeks in Pretoria.

The training intervention that they undergo was developed as a regional course under the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) that is an organization of thirteen (13) southern African police agencies in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The course was developed from the combination of Standard Generic Training Manuals (SGTM) of the United Nations, and the background, role and activities of the African Union in general, and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in particular. The training covered the following modules:

Table 4. SAPS peacekeeping training modules.

	MODULES	FOCUS
1	Background to the United Nations and African peacekeeping.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN peacekeeping history. ▪ Structure of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) ▪ Legal framework ▪ The African Union (AU) system
2	United Nations Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN Police Division ▪ UN police and AU current deployments ▪ UN Police selection and training criteria ▪ Roles of the peacekeepers. ▪ UN reporting system ▪ Best practices in peacekeeping.

3	The United Nations Peacekeeper.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN and SARPCCO police codes of conduct ▪ Cultural awareness ▪ Stress management ▪ Gender issues and peacekeeping
4	United Nations issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Negotiation and mediation ▪ DDR ▪ Media relations ▪ Humanitarian assistance ▪ Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC)
5	Safety awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Personal safety ▪ Mine awareness ▪ Health precautions and HIV AIDS ▪ Basic life support ▪ UN vehicle operations ▪ Terrorism
6	Human Rights and law enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Introduction to human rights ▪ Code of conduct for law enforcement officials ▪ Arrest, detention and imprisonment ▪ Vulnerable groups ▪ Use of force and firearms ▪ Criminal investigations and victims rights
7	United Nations Police operating techniques	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Radio communication ▪ Report writing ▪ Map reading
8	Practical field exercise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Practical application on all theoretical aspects of the course.

The peacekeeping course as outlined in table 3 also includes practical aspects that are completed outside the ambit of the theoretical presentations (models 1 to 7) that are indicated above. Additional practical aspects include, for instance shooting exercises, light physical training, 4 x 4 lecture and practical driving exercises in difficult terrain and report writing. This training was authorized and appreciated by the United Nations for positive regional initiatives by the regional organization (SARPCCO).

After the training members go back to their respective stations to be called again later to attend the pre-mission induction training for three days and are deployed immediately thereafter. The pre-mission training focuses on mission specific information that has been presented during the course where SAPS members who have returned from the mission brief their colleagues on what to expect upon arrival in the mission. It is also during the induction training that SAPS incumbent peacekeepers get inoculated and receive their logistical packages they will use in the mission.

5.3. SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE MEMBERS IN DARFUR

After the recruitment, selection and training that took place in South Africa and after an 8-hour flight to Darfur, the SAPS peacekeepers start to see the reality of peacekeeping. Upon arrival they start with induction training for the first seven days in El Fashir, AMIS Head Quarters. The initial deployment strength of the SAPS was eighteen in March 2005 but the number has been increased to one hundred and twenty-six (126) to date. The first challenge that the SAPS members face is accommodation. From their comfortable homes in South African they have to face a period of six months in tents. Harsh desert climatic conditions with temperatures that range between forty-five (45) and fifty (50) degrees Celsius during a good summer day dropping to minus five (5) at night, tends to be a nightmare to the SAPS members. Different smells and food tend to force these peacekeepers to remember their staple food in South Africa. Interaction with various cultural settings of the local people, local police, military and the international civilians and humanitarian agencies workers is another challenge to the SAPS peacekeepers. They have to acclimatize to all these new environments. During the first month of deployment some of them get mild malaria and lie in military hospital for a while.

5.3.1. Concept of operation (CONOP)

According to the Concept of Operation (CONOP) issued by the African Union in 2004, Darfur was divided in the following eight sectors:

- Sector 1: El Fashir also Head Quarters of the mission
- Sector 2: Nyala
- Sector 3: Junaynah
- Sector 4: Kabkabiya
- Sector 5: Tine
- Sector 6: Kutum
- Sector 7: Zalingei
- Sector 8: Al Daein

In addition to the SAPS members in the mission, there were another twenty-nine peacekeeping police agencies in the mission who were working together with the SAPS members. Other role players who worked in close proximity with the peacekeepers were representatives of the parties to the conflict, i.e. Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM/A), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Government of Sudan police and army. According to AMIS Force Head Quarters Daily Situation report No. 060/06 of 1st March 2006 the police strength was one thousand two hundred and twenty two (1 222) police peacekeepers in Darfur. The number increased to one thousand three hundred and thirty- nine (1 339) at the beginning of 2007. AMIS was a Chapter VI mission. This implied that the SAPS members were unarmed and faced with the danger of being threatened or killed at the whim of the marauding rebels. The functions of the peacekeepers were only limited to observing, monitoring, advising and reporting on any activities that were contrary to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

4.3.2. Logistical and financial support of AMIS

Logistical support of the mission plays a critical role in assisting the mission to realize its goals. The AMIS was faced with serious logistical challenges that frustrated most of the peacekeepers. The mission had twenty (20) MI-8 helicopters that were donated by the Canadian and the Netherlands governments. These helicopters were utilized for transportation between the sectors and to Khartoum. However due to a lack of proper logistical planning, most of these helicopters have been grounded due to a lack of fuel and servicing. Radio communications were also a serious challenge and the only means of communication was through the Thuraya satellite cell phones.

This mode of communication was expensive but had to be paid for due to the necessity of communication in Darfur. AMIS had a total strength of six hundred and forty-seven (647) vehicles that were used in the mission, of which the AU purchased five hundred and two. Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE), a multinational corporation that comes from the United States of America, provided accommodation and contracted Medical Support Solutions for AMIS. Vega aviation was a contracted fixed wing air service that was used but tended to cut their services due to lack of funds from the AMIS.

It is against this background on logistical and financial support that it became clear that most of the services rendered by AMIS to the peacekeepers were largely donations and contributions from other countries. It was not difficult to conclude that the mission was going to struggle to meet its objectives. This was a further frustrating factor to most of the SAPS peacekeepers who knew that they could not do anything to save the situation except to accept that they were part of the mission, and that they would assist where they could assist. Sometimes peacekeepers would go for a period of three to four months without receiving their Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). This was frustrating because peacekeepers needed money to sustain themselves in their harsh six months stay in Darfur.

5.3.3. Command and control of AMIS

The Mission was under the control of AMIS and authorized by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare. The Head of the mission, on the other hand was Baba Ghana Kingibe and the police commissioner was a senior officer from the South African Police Service, Director Tsiloane. All the sectors in Darfur reported to the mission headquarters in El Fashir. A further division existed at sector level where sectors were further divided into team sides and police stations. Given this long chain of command and lack of effective communication, critical information took some time before it reached its destination.

5.3.4. Support from the South African Police service

Support from home was not as easy to render as some SAPS peacekeepers expected. The promises made by Social Work Services sometimes could not materialize due to various reasons. A delegation would leave South Africa aiming to visit all the SAPS peacekeepers but would hardly visit two sectors due to the lack of helicopters to take them through. Another challenge was that the social workers were also shocked when they realized what the situation in the mission was and this created further fears for the incumbent peacekeepers with whom they met. Logistical support was also a serious challenge due to the banning of the South African National Defense Force's bigger aircraft from landing in El Fashir. This exacerbated the challenges even more because families were used to sending some items to their loved ones via the SANDF flights. The only time when the peacekeepers could get a chance to see their families was during their fourteen days Compensatory Time Off (CTO). However sometimes they would wait for air transport to lift them from the sector to El Fashir for two to three days of their CTO.

While in the mission, peacekeepers are confronted with stressful conditions that include, amongst others, humanitarian challenges that they do not have any powers to stop, serious crimes like murder, rape, robberies and also attacks that are aimed at them as peacekeepers. The Haskanita killings that took the lives of eleven (11) peacekeepers bear testimony to the reality that unarmed peacekeepers are sometimes killed in Darfur. This unfortunate incident took place on the 29th of September 2007 at a place called Haskanita that was relatively peaceful and stable. A convoy of AMIS peacekeepers that was on patrol was ambushed by a group of disgruntled militia who wanted to be recognized as one of the bigger parties to the conflict. The casualties were from various countries that include Senegal, Egypt, Rwanda, Nigeria and Botswana. Considering that these incidents take place in front of peacekeepers that might not have been paid for a period of three months, it was not amazing to hear that some of the peacekeepers returned to their countries sighting various reasons.

5.4. RETURN OF PEACEKEEPERS TO SAPS

After the gruesome period of facing one's death on a daily basis, the SAPS peacekeepers come back to South Africa with high expectations that they will be used in better posts like training other peacekeepers due to lack of capacity in that field or in other fields where members have learned that they can improve and have an impact on the local crime situation. Unfortunately the SAPS do not use these expectations and experiences. The qualified peacekeepers with mission experience tend to become frustrated once back at their original posts and some even think of getting back to the mission to earn more money rather than to be continually frustrated by the non-supportive working environment. In addition to this lack of recognition of their skills and the experiences, the SAPS indicate that peacekeepers should not be redeployed immediately after a mission. The rule is that such a member should stay for a period of two years before being deployed again. Another worrying factor is that peacekeepers are not properly reintegrated with their families. During the recruitment and selection process, the SAPS goes to great lengths in testing its members through expensive tests but when they come back from the mission the perception is that they are no longer cared for by the organization because the peacekeepers have accomplished what was originally intended for them. At the end of 2007 it was clear that UNAMID, under the command of a South African Police Service Assistant Commissioner Mike Fryer, was going to take over the command of AMIS under UN authority with a revised mandate and better logistical support.

5.5. CONCLUSION

The South African Police Service peacekeepers go through a rigorous process of recruitment and training before they are deployed to AMIS. Their medical and psychometric testing ensures that the SAPS deploy peacekeepers that will cope with the challenges of the mission. SAPS peacekeepers are faced with harsh climatic challenges and unforgiving working conditions when compared to those at home.

Inadequate logistical and financial support by AMIS created serious morale challenges but peacekeepers had to do their work for the welfare of the people of Darfur. Lack of recognition after returning from the mission created frustration in most of the SAPS peacekeepers that needed to make a difference after they arrived home. This created a perception that their experiences and new expertise were of no value because they were not incorporated into the bigger picture of the SAPS as an organization. The next chapter is going to focus on the presentation of our data, and its interpretation with a view of giving a proper perspective on the analysis and results of the study. This will be done through the presentation of data tables of variables derived from the questionnaire used in this research.

CHAPTER 6.

DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to present the data collected through frequency tables with various variables from the research questionnaire. The major limitation of this research is that only the SAPS peacekeepers that were in the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan, were used as the subjects of this research. Their results might not be as good as those who had finished their operation, and were waiting to be redeployed. Forty-two (42) questionnaires were distributed amongst all the members of the SAPS who were completing their mission and all the questionnaires were returned without any one being spoiled or missing.

6.2. DATA PRESENTATION TABLES AND INTEPRETATION

Table 5.

Gender

Category	Count	Percent
Male	29	69.0476
Female	13	30.9523
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 69.0% were male and 30.95% were female.

Table 6

Race

Category	Count	Percent
African	24	57.1428
White	11	26.1904
Coloured	5	11.9047
Asian	1	2.3809
Missing	1	2.3809

Of all the respondents 57.14% were African, 26.19% were White, 11.90% were Coloured and 2.38% were Asian

Table 7

Age

Category	Count	Percent
Younger than 25	0	0.0000
25 to 35	13	30.9523
35 to 45	23	54.7619
45 to 50	5	11.9047
50 to 60	1	2.3809
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 30.95% were between the age of 25 to 35 years, 54.76 were between the age of 35 and 45 years, 11.90% were between 45 and 50 years whereas 2.38% were above 50 years.

Table 8

Rank

Category	Count	Percent
Constable	4	9.5238
Sergeant	7	16.6666
Inspector	25	59.5238
Captain	6	14.2857
Superintendent	0	0.0000
Senior Superintendent	0	0.0000
Missing	0	0.0000

From the table 9.5% of the respondents were Constables, 16.66 % were Sergeants, 59.52% were Inspectors and 14.28% were Captains.

Table 9

Years of service

Category	Count	Percent
0 to 5 years	4	9.5238
5 to 10	4	9.5238
10 to 15	13	30.9523
15 to 20	12	28.5714
20 years and more	9	21.4285
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 9.52% were having 0 to 5 years of service, another 9.52% was between 5 and 10 years of service, 30.95% had between 10 and 15 years of service, 28.57% had between 15 and 20 years of service and 21.42% had more than 20 years of service.

Table 10

Educational qualification

Category	Count	Percent
Below Grade 12	4	9.5238
Grade 12	24	57.1428
Degree / Diploma	12	28.5714
Honours / B-Tech	2	4.7619
Masters degree and more	0	0.0000
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 9.52 had qualifications below Grade 12, 57.14% had Grade 12, 28.57% had Diplomas and 4.76% had Honours degrees or B / Tech Degrees.

Table 11

Voluntary deployment to AMIS

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	42	100.000
No	0	0.000
Missing	0	0.000

All the respondents volunteered to be deployed.

Table 12

Voluntary medical tests before deployment

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	41	97.6190
No	1	2.3809
Missing	0	0.0000

A majority of the respondents have undergone voluntary medical testing before deployment.

Table 13

Clarity of the course on the functioning of the UN and the AU

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	28	66.6666
Somewhat	12	28.5714
A little	1	2.3809
Not at all	1	2.3809
Missing	0	0.0000

A majority of the respondents indicated that the course was clear on the functioning of the AU and the UN.

Table 14

Clarity of the course in dealing with human rights issues in the mission

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	28	66.6666
Somewhat	11	26.1904
A little	2	4.7619
Not at all	1	2.3809
Missing	0	0.0000

A majority of the respondents indicate that the course was clear on human rights issues.

Table 15

4 x 4 skills development during the Generic Peacekeeping Course

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	26	61.9047
Somewhat	10	23.8095
A little	2	4.7619
Not at all	4	9.5238
Missing	0	0.0000

A majority of the respondents indicated that the course developed their 4 x 4 driving skills.

Table 16

Clarity of lectures in dealing with vulnerable groups in the mission

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	27	64.2857
Somewhat	11	26.1904
A little	2	4.7619
Not at all	2	4.7619
Missing	0	0.0000

A majority of the respondents indicated that the lectures were clear.

Table 17

Treatment of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) by the Sudanese police.

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	2	4.7619
Somewhat	11	26.1904
A little	13	30.9523
Not at all	16	38.0952
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 4.76% indicate that the refugees and IDPs were treated fairly by the Sudanese police, 26.19 indicate that they were treated somewhat fairly, 30.95% indicate that they were treated a little unfair and 38.09 % indicated that they were not treated fairly at all.

Table 18

The extent of the observation of practices by the Sudanese police

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	4	9.5238
Somewhat	19	45.2380
A little	15	35.7142
Not at all	4	9.5238
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 9.52% were able to observe the practices of the Sudanese police to a larger extent, 45.23% were reasonably able to observe the Sudanese police, 35.71% were able to observe the Sudanese police to a small extent and the 9.52% were unable to observe the Sudanese police.

Table 19

The extent of monitoring the activities of the Sudanese police

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	7	16.6666
Somewhat	15	35.7142
A little	14	33.3333
Not at all	6	14.2857
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 16.66% were able to monitor the activities of the Sudanese police to a great deal, 35.71% could reasonably monitor the activities of the Sudanese police, 33.33% could monitor the activities of the Sudanese police to a little extent and 14.28% could not monitor the Sudanese police at all.

Table 20

The extent of advising the Sudanese police

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	5	11.9047
Somewhat	13	30.9523
A little	14	33.3333
Not at all	10	23.8095
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 11.90% were able to advise the Sudanese police to a great deal, 30.95% to a reasonable extent, 33.33% a little extent and 23.80% were unable to advise the Sudanese police.

Table 21

The extent of reporting misconducts, criminal activities or good practices of the Sudanese police.

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	1	2.3809
Somewhat	11	26.1904
A little	9	21.4285
Not at all	19	45.2380
Missing	2	4.7619

Of all the respondents only 2.38 % indicated a great deal of reporting misconducts, criminal activities or good practices of the Sudanese police, 26.19% found reporting somewhat reasonable, 21.42% found reporting a little difficult and 45.23 found reporting of such incidents totally difficult.

Table 22

The logistical support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur.

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	24	57.1428
No	18	42.8571
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all the respondents 57.14% indicated to have received logistical support from the SAPS and 42.85% indicated the contrary.

Table 23

The social support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur.

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	10	23.8095
Somewhat	5	11.9047
A little	6	14.2857
Not at all	20	47.6190
Missing	1	2.3809

Of all the respondents 23.80% indicated that they received social support from the SAPS, 11.90% indicated that the support was somewhat reasonable, 14.28% indicated that social support was only a little and 47.61% indicated that they had never received any social support from the SAPS.

Table 24

A level of preparedness from South Africa on peacekeeping functions performed in Darfur.

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	28	66.6666
Somewhat	7	16.6666
A little	6	14.2857
Not at all	1	2.3809
Missing	0	0.0000

The majority of the SAPS peacekeepers indicated that they were highly prepared for their functions in Darfur.

Table 25

An assessment during the Generic Peacekeeping course before deployment.

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	34	80.9523
No	8	19.0476
Missing	0	0.0000

A majority of the respondents indicated that they were assessed during the Generic Peacekeeping course before they were deployed.

Table 26

Medical testing before or after deployment.

Category	Count	Percent
Before	41	97.6190
After	0	0.0000
Missing	1	2.3809

A majority of the respondents indicated that they had medical testing before they were deployed.

Table 27

Awareness on South African Police Service policy on peacekeeping deployments.

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	28	66.6666
No	13	30.9523
Missing	1	2.3809

A majority of the respondents indicated that they were aware of the SAPS policy on peacekeeping.

Table 28

Waiting period before redeployment.

Category	Count	Percent
1 Year	36	85.7142
2 Years	1	2.3809
3 Years	1	2.3809
4 Years	0	0.0000
5 Years	0	0.0000
Missing	4	9.5238

Majority of the respondents indicated that the waiting period before redeployment is 1year.

Table 29

An awareness on senior management's attendance of any peacekeeping training in South Africa or elsewhere.

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	15	35.7142
No	26	61.9047
Missing	1	2.3809

Of all the respondents 35.71% indicated that they are aware of senior managers who attended peacekeeping training and 61.90% indicated that they were not aware of any attendance of senior managers.

Table 30

The willingness to share peacekeeping experiences and managerial support in implementing such experiences.

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	20	47.6190
Somewhat	14	33.3333
A little	6	14.2857
Not at all	2	4.7619
Missing	0	0.0000

Of all respondents 47.61% indicated that they were willing to share and implement their peacekeeping experiences, 33.33% indicated reasonable willingness, 14.28% a little willingness and only 4.76% indicated unwillingness in sharing their experiences and in implementing them.

Table 31

The willingness to be redeployed if given another chance.

Category	Count	Percent
Yes	34	80.9523
No	8	19.0476
Missing	0	0.0000

Majority of the respondents indicated that they were willing to be redeployed if they are given another chance.

Table 32

Value of presence in Darfur on the lives of the victims of armed conflict.

Category	Count	Percent
Great deal	25	59.5238
Somewhat	11	26.1904
A little	4	9.5238
Not at all	1	2.3809
Missing	1	2.3809

Of all the respondents 59.52% indicated that their presence in Darfur added value to the lives of the victims of armed conflict 26.19% indicated somewhat reasonable value, 9.52% indicated little value and only 2.38% indicated that it had no value at all.

6.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided data and its interpretation. It indicated the limitations of data collection and the influence it might have on this study. The data indicates that the SAPS deployments to peacekeeping or peace support operations need improvement to ensure that they are abreast with the realities that are experienced by the peacekeepers in the mission. It is against this background that the next chapter will provide the recommendations that should be implemented to ensure that corrective steps are taken to improve SAPS peacekeeping deployments.

CHAPTER 7

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. INTRODUCTION

The outcomes of data interpretation reveal a clear picture of a high level of commitment and willingness of the SAPS members to serve in the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The focus of the study was to provide a description of the processes that are followed by the SAPS in deploying its members to Darfur. The study had to identify shortcomings in the processes and provide recommendations on how to remedy such weaknesses. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with the findings of the research and how they relate with the hypothesis and the objectives of this study as identified at the beginning of the research. This chapter will also provide comprehensive recommendations to improve the processes followed by the SAPS in peacekeeping deployments.

7.2. FINDINGS

7.2.1. Findings relating to the hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: From data analysis, it is very clear that this hypothesis is not valid. It is clear that from the beginning of recruitment and selection processes all SAPS members who participate in the process of deployment do that voluntarily including medical testing and attending the Generic Peacekeeping Course. Analyzed data indicated that 100% of the respondents were not compelled to participate in peacekeeping deployments whereas 97.61 volunteered to undergo medical tests.

Hypothesis 2: This hypothesis is also not valid. From data analysis 66.66% of the respondents indicated that the course has assisted them in understanding the AU and the UN systems and also human rights issues.

Furthermore 61.90% indicated that they developed their skills in 4 x 4 driving and 64.28% indicated that the lectures were helpful in dealing with women and children in the mission.

Hypothesis 3: This hypothesis is valid. Neither the SAPS nor the AMIS had performance measurement tools to evaluate the performance of the SAPS members in the mission. The only formal assessment conducted to the members was during the training on Generic Peacekeeping Course where 80.95% of respondents indicated that they were assessed.

Hypothesis 4: This hypothesis is valid. Of all the respondents 80.74% indicated that they had plans to implement what they had learned. However unwillingness of their offices to shift from their old ways of doing things frustrated them and created a perception of negativity causing these police officials who have been on the mission to remain silent in different matters of policing.

Hypothesis 5: This hypothesis is valid. Of all respondents 47.61% indicated that they were willing to share and implement their peacekeeping experiences, 33.33% indicated reasonable willingness. However there is no management support to ensure that these experienced peacekeepers can be further developed and even posted in areas where they can use their new knowledge and skills.

Hypothesis 6. This hypothesis is valid. The SAPS has started peacekeeping deployments in 2005 and so far only four (4) Directors and one (1) Assistant Commissioner have been trained in peacekeeping nationally. The limitation of knowledge and a good understanding of peacekeeping by SAPS senior managers is an outcome of the period that the SAPS has started working in this environment. Of the entire respondents 61.90% indicated that they are not aware of any senior manager who had undergone any training in peacekeeping.

7.2.2. Findings relating to the objectives

Objective 1. To determine whether the SAPS has internal policy guidelines on peacekeeping.

This objective was achieved through the data that was presented in section 5.2 above. Of all the respondents 66.66% have indicated that they are aware of the SAPS internal policy on peacekeeping.

Objective 2. To determine whether the SAPS adequately trains its peacekeepers before they are deployed.

This objective was achieved. 66.66% of respondents indicated that they were adequately trained for the functions that they were performing in Darfur.

Objective 3. To recommend measures that can be put in place to align recruitment, selection, training and deployment of members.

This objective is going to be achieved in the following discussion (7.3 below) that is going to specifically focus on the potential recommendations that are suggested from this research.

7.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the objectives of this study is to recommend possible measures that can be put in place to improve processes that the SAPS should follow in recruitment, selection, training and deployment of its members to avoid any deterioration of its internal arrangements.

7.3.1. Peacekeeping capacity building in the SAPS

Capacity building in the peacekeeping environment within the SAPS entails recruitment, selection, training and the opportunity to present courses by SAPS members with mission experience. This will lead to a sense of recognition and reward to those members who want to share their experiences with their fellow colleagues who will be going for deployment in Sudan or elsewhere. A training facility and permanent posts have to be created to ensure that this function is not done on ad hoc basis, using trainers from other institutions. Peacekeeping should have a specific training facility where peacekeeping courses can be presented. This can ease the frustration of peacekeeping trainers who are moving from one training facility to another after every course. A peacekeeping training facility can also assist in hosting peacekeeping course participants from other African countries in this regard.

7.3.2. Peacekeeping policy development

The process of peacekeeping policy development, especially in a specialized function like peacekeeping, should involve inputs from members who have already got practical experience in this field. Several drafts of peacekeeping police guidelines have already been circulated within the SAPS and have not yet been finalized for implementation. To this end it is recommended that Division Visible Policing (Head Office) and Division Legal Services (Head Office) should work in consultation with the Provinces to request inputs, comments and suggestions on peacekeeping policy. Members from the peacekeeping mission should be given an opportunity to read the policy and provide comments on whether or not the policy is addressing all issues relevant to peacekeeping.

7.3.3. Attendance of seminars, conferences, exhibitions and courses in peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping is a global phenomenon and most police officers in the world know their role in peacekeeping. Attendance of seminars and conferences does not only create opportunities for sharing information, but provides an in-depth knowledge base with the institution and that this will further assist in institutional capacity building.

Hosting of these of conferences and seminars will also provide an added benefit to the SAPS through interacting with a network of countries that already have experience and skills in the field of peacekeeping.

7.3.4. Partnerships with all role players in peacekeeping

Sustainable partnerships should be created between the SAPS and various specialized role players like Non-Governmental Organizations, universities and other bodies that deal with peacekeeping. This can be advantageous to the SAPS because some of the NGO's provide their services free of charge. These institutions can be used as a knowledge base for the SAPS, the SAPRCCO region and the African continent at large.

7.4. FUTURE RESEARCH

This research was conducted with the purpose of providing a description of the processes that the SAPS follows in its peacekeeping deployments. The scope of this research was very narrow because it focused much on the recruitment, selection, training and deployment of the SAPS members in Darfur. Further research can be conducted on issues like Security Sector Reform (SSR), peace-building interventions, vulnerable groups with in the peacekeeping environment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) during and after the conflict and the role of regional organizations in conflict prevention within the African context.

7.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined the hypotheses and confirmed whether they were valid or not. The objectives of this study were also tested against the data provided by this study. As one of the objectives of the research, recommendations were also suggested and the opportunity for further research was also explored in this regard. This study has factually proved and disproved some of the perceptions that people had of SAPS peacekeeping deployment processes.

Furthermore, internal capacity building and external partnerships seemed to be at the core of SAPS sustainable capacity building in peacekeeping. Education, Training and Development (ETD) of the SAPS members in peacekeeping interventions will continue to be the bedrock of quality members that have been deployed since 2005.

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ANNEXURE “A”

Take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire. Mark the answer you choose with an X. You do not have to write your name on the questionnaire. The researcher guarantees anonymity of respondents and confidentiality of the responses given in this regard. All the information gathered will be used to assist the South African Police Service to assess its contribution to peacekeeping in general.

Use black or blue ink if you are not filling the form electronically.

Please leave the small boxes next to the right margin open for research purposes.

E.g.

Are you a member of the South African Police Service?

Yes	Ω	1	No	2
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SECTION A

A1. Gender

Male	1	Female	2
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A2. Race

African	1	White	2	Coloured	3	Asian	4
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A3. Age

Younger than 25	1	
25 to 35	2	
35 to 45	3	
45 to 50	4	
50 to 60	5	

A4. Current rank

Constable	
Sergeant	
Inspector	
Captain	
Superintendent	
Senior Superintendent	

A5. Number of years of service

0 to 5 years	1	
5 to 10	2	
10 to 15	3	
15 to 20	4	
20 years and more	5	

A6. Educational qualifications

Below Grade 12	1	
Grade 12	2	
Degree / Diploma	3	
Honours / B-Tech	4	
Masters degree and more	5	

SECTION B

B1. Did you volunteer to serve in the African Union Mission in Sudan: Darfur?

Yes	1	No	2
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B2. Were you compelled to undergo any medical tests before leaving for the mission in Sudan: Darfur.

Yes	1	No	2
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B3. Did the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course you attended assist you in understanding the functioning of the African Union and the United Nations?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B4. Did the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course you attended assist you in dealing with Human Rights issues in the mission?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B5. Did the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course you attended assist you in developing your 4 x 4 driving skills?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B6. Were the lectures on vulnerable groups helpful in dealing with women and children in the mission?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B7. Were the refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons treated fairly with due regard to their human rights by the local Sudanese Police?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B8. To what extent were you able to observe the practices of the local Sudanese Police?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B9. To what extent were you able to monitor the activities of the local Sudanese Police?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B10. To what extent were you able to advise the local Sudanese Police on policing issues?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B11. To what extent were you able to report any misconduct, criminal activity or good practices by the local Sudanese Police?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B12. Did you get any logistical support from the South African Police Service while you were in Sudan: Darfur?

Yes	1	No	2
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B13. Did you get any social support from the South African Police Service while in the Sudan: Darfur?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B14. Was the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course and the Pre-mission briefing adequate enough to prepare you for your functions in the Sudan: Darfur?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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B15. Were you formally assessed on the course contents during the Generic Peacekeeping course?

Yes	1	No	2
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B16. Did you undergo medical tests before or after the Generic Peacekeeping Course?

Before	1	After	2
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B17. Are you aware of any South African Police Service policy on peacekeeping deployments?

Yes	1	No	2
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B18. How long should you wait before you can be redeployed to another peacekeeping mission?

1 Year	1	
2 Years	2	
3 Years	3	
4 Years	4	
5 Years	5	

B19. Are you aware of senior managers (Assistant Commissioners and above), who have undergone any peacekeeping training in South Africa or elsewhere?

Yes	1	No	2
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B20. Do you have any plans of using your experiences from the mission when come back to South Africa and to what extend would you get management support on implementing such plans?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
------------	---	----------	---	----------	---	------------	---

B21. If you were given another chance, would you still volunteer to go back to Sudan: Darfur?

Yes	1	No	2
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B22. Do you think that your presence in Sudan: Darfur has added value to the lives of the victims of armed conflict?

Great deal	1	Somewhat	2	A little	3	Not at all	4
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Thanks for taking time to complete this questionnaire. Your contribution to this end is highly appreciated.