

REASON AND EROS

BY

W. D. CHALMERS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

RHODES UNIVERSITY

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Reason and ErosForeword

This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosophy. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic rôle of a philosophy of philosophy.

PART I. THE GENESIS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF REASON

The aim of this part of our enquiry, is to reach an understanding of the concept of Reason. In so far as Reason inheres in man, it is commonly regarded as distinguishing him from the other forms of life on Earth, as if the continuity of evolution sustains a break. The reality of this break we call in question, and, accordingly, we shall attempt to examine Reason in the context of Life as a whole.

Since the beginning of philosophy, notable thinkers have regarded Reason as the supreme endowment of human nature. At times they have spoken of it as a kind of outpost within man of a higher order, even of the Divine. At all periods we may detect within philosophy a tendency to regard Reason as in itself valuable, independently of its uses. Non-Philosophical mankind exhibits something of the same tendency in the value it places on education and culture as the essence of improvement and the means of solving the problems of humanity.

Let us approach Reason from an historical point of view, historical in the sense in which an individual's development may be said to be history. This is, essentially an empirical approach. Here it can be seen that the dependence of Reason on Life is a high inductive probability. As far as we can verify, no reasoning is performed except by a living being. A chain of reasoning is only followed by the living.

Most men pass through several years of life before beginning to exercise what would commonly be called "Reason". The baby crying for his milk is said to act instinctively. Even the young child learning to speak would not commonly be said to use Reason. But he, at least, in using words, shows himself conversant with concepts, and concepts are the units in Reason's structures.

Reason might be said to begin when the child discovers the question, "Why?" This shows that he is trying to understand something, and understanding and Reason are closely akin.

The question "Why"?

Let us consider the genesis of the question, "Why?". On the basis of a period of sensory experience, the child notices certain resemblances between different situations. Certain conjunctions seem to be repeated in the environment. These conjunctions may be simultaneous or consecutive. The co-existence of glass and light is repeated whenever he sees a window. The sensation of heat follows whenever he touches a certain water pipe. It is the consecutive conjunction that first provides an occasion for the question "Why?"

The repeated experience of a consecutive conjunction produces a subjective assurance that the same conjunction will be

repeated in the future. If B has always been found to follow A, a stage will be reached when the experience of A gives rise to the expectation of B. This is a simple observation from human psychology, and indeed from animal psychology too.

If the child has on several occasions pressed a switch (A), and a light (B), has resulted, he will soon connect A with B. Then there will come a time when the connexion fails - he switches on and no light follows. His crude assumption that B will always follow A receives a shock. But the internal necessity which made him connect B with A will not disappear. Instead it will impel him to make a new and more reliable connexion. The expression of this instinctive search is the question he will ask, "Why?"¹ His faith in repeated conjunctions is not destroyed, only modified. When his father shows him that the small wires, which carry the light are broken, his confidence will be justified. Between his previous conjunction of switching on and light, he will now insert intermediate terms, such as the wholeness of the filament. He will still direct his actions to the future in the assurance that it will resemble the past; but he will be more aware of the complexities of environmental conjunctions. Whenever a previously regular conjunction fails, he will feel challenged to analyze the original conjunction into smaller terms. Instead of connecting switching on directly with light, he will insert intermediate links such as the soundness of the filament, the food rider of the power plant and so on. He may then be said to "understand" something of electricity. But what is the essential difference between his new state of mind and his old one? On examination, there appears to be very little. All he has actually done is to anatomize his original two terms into a multiplicity of smaller ones. He has pried deeper into the sequences of his environment, but he is still essentially observing sequences. The minuter his study, the greater will appear the complexity of associations involved in any one event. Even the scientist observing molecules under the electron-microscope can do no more than observe repeated sequences. Both he and the child are impelled, though in different degrees, by a need to find unbreakable and ultimate sequences. They have a faith that uniformity is accessible to those who search deeply enough.²

Understanding begins to appear as a persistent impulse to find smaller, intermediate, unbroken sequences or conjunctions to replace larger ones which have failed. The only possible refuge from a broken sequence is in smaller unbroken sequences, and when these in

/their.....p.3.

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1. Sartre would interpret the question "why", or any question, as the recognition of the possible non-being of that about which the question is asked. "What is the connexion?", he would say, is asked by someone who knows that the answer may be, "There is none." Against this, we urge that the cogency of the life-force does not recognize this possibility. It irresistibly assumes that there is a real connexion. (Being and Nothingness Ch. 1)
 2. Hume points out that the ideas which are filled in by association may be ideas of the imagination as well as of the memory (Treatise, Pt. III: § III). This is not likely to occur, however, in the use of the Reason to sustain organic life. No association that does not survive the repeated testing of experience will be allowed to survive, for the simple reason that life depends on it. It is true of course, that the primitive inserts demons and spirits into his chains of causation, but this is only in cases where the desired effect is beyond his power of achievement, e.g. the production of rain. The philosophical spirit manifests itself in questioning even the gods and demons, when there is no practical reason to do so.
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their turn prove fallible, in smaller sequences still. The ideal of the practical scientist is to find ultimate unbroken sequences and out of them to build a certain foreknowledge of events. But, at best, he can find unbroken sequences, never unbreakable ones, that is from the point of view of his knowledge. The "why" of the actual perpetually resolves into a "how". Man's primary experience is one of confrontation with the already existing.

The future

What is the nature of the impulse which drives the human mind to penetrate even deeper into the uniformity of nature? At first, it is no more nor less than the need to sustain organic life by acting for the future in a particular way. All action is necessarily directed towards the future. If the future is an unknown, action can be neither intelligent nor effective. The more complex an organism is, the more deeply and widely does it have to take the future into account, in order to preserve existence. The possibility of taking the future into account is provided by the uniformity of nature, that is the repeated conjunctions which our environment thrusts upon our notice. These repeated conjunctions occasion in all forms of conscious life the conviction, as a rule unconscious, that the future will resemble the past. It is necessary for us to take repetitions as an indication of the underlying nature of our environment; to assume that what has been conjoined on a number of occasions and without exception, is conjoined in reality.

The extent to which an organism attempts to gauge the future, will be relative to the complexity of development of the organism, and the range of action possible to it. The greater its complexity, the more complex will be its relation to the environment, and the more various the directions along which it must attempt to foresee the future. The dog has to anticipate the behaviour of relatively few objects, for example, meat, water, cats and his master; the human being of a great many more. But the need to interpret the environment in order to gauge the immediate future is constantly thrust upon them both by the will-to-live.³ The fundamental activity of observing repeated conjunctions is common to the psychic processes of both dog and man. No matter how minutely we investigate the environment, there is nothing to observe but conjunctions. In so far as the thought of man and dog is directed towards these conjunctions, there is no intrinsic distinction between them. Yet a dog would not commonly be said to understand. The distinction must therefore be a matter of degree, the degree of minuteness to which conjunctions are investigated, the degree, in other words, of analysis. For a working definition, let us say that Understanding is a progressive and deliberate search for repeated conjunctions, carried out under the impulse of the will-to-live.

Analysis

Minute inquiry into the causes of any actual event will soon confront the mind with a complexity too vast to be comprehended. Between any two events in a repeated sequence, analysis will reveal intermediate events. If a sequence, hitherto reliable, fails, the task of the understanding is to break down the first event, or cause, into smaller parts. Likewise the apparently similar event,

/which.....p.4.

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3. Compare Bergson's words: "The essential function of our intellect, as the evolution of life has fashioned it, is to be a light for our conduct ... to foresee, for a given situation, the events ... which may follow thereupon. Intellect therefore instinctively selects in a given situation whatever is like something already known." (Creative Evolution, Ch. 1; Biology, Physics and Chemistry.)

which has yet produced a dissimilar result, must be broken down. Then some hitherto unobserved part, present in the first cause, but not in the second, comes into view. This element then becomes included in the cause. If B has always followed A until today, when it has failed to do so, we must take an A that was followed by B and analyse it into $A_1 + A_2 + A_3$. Then, treating the second A similarly, we should perhaps find that it breaks down into $A_1 + A_2$. In this case, A_3 appears as a necessary part of the cause, which now becomes $A_1 + A_2$ (i.e. the original A) $+ A_3 = B$. The original A is no longer regarded as the sufficient cause of B. If the time comes when $A + A_3$ is not followed by B, then it will be necessary to isolate a new element necessary to the cause of B. It is by this method that technicians improve their machines.

Investigated to meet practical needs, the causes of an event will remain manageable in number, but pursued with a desire to understand for the sake of understanding, they soon develop into an intractable complexity. Indeed they will not be less than the totality of events prior to the effect in question.⁴ Thus the understanding is brought up short in its attempt to explain an actual event by a complete enumeration of causes. The factors contributing to any actual event are too numerous to trace. Yet the understanding desires not only to explain single events, but aspires to explain the whole universe. Here it enters the realm of philosophy, when, no longer stimulated by practical needs, but under some new impulse, it seeks understanding without limit. It seeks to know the principle of the universe, with a desire to harmonize itself with that principle. But how can a faculty which turns back in dismay from the explanation of a single event, reasonably attempt to explain the universe? It is impossible unless explanation takes a new turning.

The philosophical Understanding

If we were right in saying that our basic data in explanation are the repeated conjunctions of nature, how can these be put to new effect? In this way if a conjunction of events has recurred many times, the understanding assumes the events to be conjoined in reality, given the required conditions. In other words, it assigns to them a conditional conjunction. "Bodies heavier than air fall" is a truth only when considered in vacuo. In experience, the contrary frequently occurs. It is a conditional or hypothetical truth which really means that under certain limited conditions, bodies heavier than air will fall. The understanding selects conjunctions in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, to suit its own purposes, it tacitly assumes the conditions under which this conjunction will occur - in other words the infinite multiplicity of causes - and postulates an objective connexion. This objective connexion is placed in the natures of the objects. These so-called natures function as a gathering point for all the relationships in which the object is encountered. Frequently repeated relationships are regarded as essential to an object's nature, rare ones as

/accidental.p.5.

4. Compare here Leibniz's use of the Sufficient Reason. It is impossible to reduce the causes of an event to necessary demonstration. From the human point of view, truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. Leibniz attempts to save necessity by postulating the presence in God of a Sufficient Reason, which from God's omniscient point of view, determines the event. It is hard to see how this Sufficient Reason can be less than a total knowledge, which loses the character of a reason, because it is no longer a principle.

(Monadology, para. 29)

accidental. From the frequently repeated relationships, the outline of the nature is sketched in. The picture that emerges is not of any actually existing thing. It is an abstraction.

From the abstracted natures of physical objects, which are the business of science, inquiry sometimes proceeds to abstractions from these abstractions in an attempt to discover more fundamental unifying principles. But whether a process of discarding leaves anything worth while - or anything at all - at the end is a question that must be carefully examined.

Although repeated conjunctions of events give us the idea of an internal connexion subsisting between the events, that is, the relationship of cause and effect, we must remember that we can never intuit this connexion. It is beyond the scope of our possible experience. We can do no more than notice that B usually or always follows or accompanies A. Causes and effects are events prior and subsequent in the flow of time. When the cause is present to us, the effect does not yet exist. We can never, therefore, actually see them in juxtaposition. The necessity of the connexions cannot be demonstrated.⁵ All that can be said is that it seems the universal nature of man to make them, and that they display a practical efficaciousness in the preservation and sustaining of life. The will-to-live within us compels us to believe in causal connexions.⁶ Even the philosopher who calls them in question must live by them all the while that he questions.

If the visual appearance of fire were connected with a burning sensation today and a chilling sensation tomorrow, we should never begin to group fires together under one concept. This grouping into concepts, the foundation of thought, is the result of our encounter with a uniform environment. Uniformity appears as the universal characteristic of Existence - we might almost say condition of Existence, were it not that this might carry a priori associations which we reject. Existence without uniformity is, in fact, unimaginable. For does not that which exists persist for some minimum of time? And does not persistence imply a resemblance between two successive temporal phases of the object - a recurrence, in other words, of those conjunctions which, for us, constitute the object?

We have mentioned "concepts" in passing. The "formation of concepts" is a philosophical description for the mental grouping

/of.....p.6.

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5. Hume is unanswerable here. There is no observable connexion between cause and effect. We make the synthesis instinctively on the basis of repeated sequences. (Treatise, Pt. III: § VI) Kant's solution is to locate causality in one of those a priori concepts (categories) which confer objectivity on perceptions. (Prolegomena 298). Sartre combats the phenomenalist tendency by locating the esse of the object beyond its percipi. (Being and Nothingness IV) Our position combines those of Hume and Sartre. The independent world of objects with its independent relationships is an instinctive postulate of the will-to-live.
6. In causality we indicate the most fundamental postulate of the will-to-live. There are in fact many others. No philosopher can philosophise without making them, for the activity of philosophising depends on the continuation of life. In the midst of his universal doubt, Descartes still lived by certain conscious assumptions. (Discourse on Method III).

of objects which we carry out in the light of the uniformity of nature. What the concept is in itself, its ontological status, is one of the most important questions in philosophy, a rock at which the stream of thought divides into two great channels. Concepts are sometimes regarded as subjective psychological events in living minds; sometimes as self-subsistent objective existences; and sometimes as both of these together.⁷ The etymological derivation of the word is from the subjective side, and means the active grouping together of a plurality of objects. Recurring similarities are the ground of such grouping. In animal life and at least the more practical spheres of human life, objects will be grouped by their relevance to organic survival, that is for their practical functions. These objects are the commonly recognized ones, the practical objects of life. We may call them Life-Objects, such things as food, clothes, trees, stones. They are also called material objects. These objects are grouped together for their potentialities as much as for their co-existent sensual characteristics. That is because the type of conjunction most relevant to practical purposes is a sequence. After one or two painful disappointments the camel and the desert ranger will no longer group water and mirages together. Although the immediate co-existent data in each are similar, they do not occupy the same place in a sequence, for they have different potentialities. Similarly fire and its reflection will not be grouped together for long, since contact with one brings pain and with the other, a wetting. Once the difference of potentiality has been grasped, the mind will look more closely into the conjunctions which constitute the first event of the sequence, to discover a factor present in one and absent in the other. This will then be regarded as a necessary part of the first event, as we saw above.

Life-Objects

At a later and more refined stage of thought we shall encounter concepts which are not groupings of life objects but of their abstracted elements. If our argument is correct it will be necessary to show that, at that level too, conceptualizing is still a grouping of conjunctions. An important question will be whether it is ever really possible to abstract from Time. But it serves our present purpose to note that the beginnings of conceptualization are a mental grouping together of objects or events, based on the uniformity or nature.

When conceptual grouping is based on repeated sequences, once a concept has been formed and tested for a reasonable period, it is no longer necessary to experience the full sequence before including a new object in the group. This is the whole practical usefulness of concepts. On the basis of past sequences, they enable us to predict the second term of a sequence when we have encountered only the first. When a child has once or twice experienced the painful properties of fire, he will not experiment again with a third object looking like the two fires which burnt him. Instead his mind will produce a lively image, to use Hume's words, of the potential pain, that is of the second part of the sequence, and he will avoid the flame.

Imagination

This image⁸ is an important element in the psychological

/and p.7.

7. The unity of thinking and being is the central assumption of Hegelian thought.
8. By image we here denote whatever is a reproduction of past sensory experience of any kind. Images may thus be tactile, visual and so on. We do not, however, intend those images which transcend past experience in the form, if not the matter, of their content. These are images of the fantasy and not primarily reproductive in character.

and subjective side of conceptuality.⁹ It is something inserted by the mind in lieu of actual experience. Essentially, it is a way of presenting the future while it is still potential, and so of enabling the subject to make a significant choice of action. Action is essentially directed towards the future, and the future is unknown. Every action begun has the nature of an act of faith or belief. I cannot know that, by stretching out my hand, I shall not attract the lightning onto my head. But I am in fact acting in the faith that I shall grasp the hand of my friend. This assurance is in the form of an image of the immediate future. It appears that all significant intentions must be related to some such image. If the future were not presented to us in this way, significant action would be impossible. At best there would be mechanical action and we should react in certain ways to certain types of stimuli. A conceptual image of the future is essential to the possibility of free choice. It remains a possibility, and is asserted by many, that on a purely rational level, imageless thought is possible. This question will have to be investigated, but in the practical sphere, we may affirm that sensory images must precede deliberate action.

So far the concept has appeared as the image producing tendency () of the mind which is affective towards a plurality of sequences previously experienced, and towards objects in the present, on the strength of their resemblance to the first parts of previously experienced sequences. This disposition or tendency is an attribute of a subject, of a living mind, and it is important to notice that it produces effects through the whole being of the subject, physical as well as mental. It has emotional concomitants, and bodily ones such as the tensing of muscles in a readiness to act. This readiness to act will be strong or in abeyance to a degree determined by the ontological status of the first member of the sequence, that is of the object of present experience. If a real fire is seen, the concomitant image of pain, warmth or damage to property will dispose the subject to action. If only¹⁰ a picture of fire is seen, the image will merely evoke further images and a weakened form of the emotions aroused by a real fire. The physical nature will remain unaffected.

While the genesis of conceptual activity lies in the need to gauge the immediate future, the conceptual faculty, being essentially the ability to group, needs only similarities to make it operative. It can therefore function with the objects of past time alone. The Kings of Ancient Egypt constitute a class to which it is impossible to add an object of present experience. Such a concept lacks practical applications, unless, by devious ways, it is used as an ingredient in some present attempt to gauge the future. If the concept "Kings of Ancient Egypt" includes the idea of an empire ending at Heliopolis, we shall not seek their tombs in Uganda. But it would be possible to indulge an interest in the Kings of Ancient Egypt which is largely divorced from any future action - and yet it can never be entirely so. The concept cannot be completely divorced from the present or the future, because it is the product of an interest and mental impetus

/which.....p.8.

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9. Price points out correctly that the essence of symbolic thinking is cognition of the absent (Thinking and Experience VIII). But we would extend this definition to thinking in general. For what is the function of thought if not to orientate us to the reality that we do not immediately perceive?
10. Hume on living Images.

which is a present fact and is necessarily¹¹ trained upon the future. At some stage it will send us to a particular show case in the Museum. Anything deliberate we do, it may be repeated, is necessarily directed towards the future.

Abstract con-
ceptuality

Let us now imagine a form of conceptualizing apparently even farther divorced from deliberate action, when the objects grouped are no longer unpractical Life Objects, but abstractions, such as mathematical figures, and most abstract of all, the definitions and the symbols of logic. Here it seems that the grouping faculty operates without reference to practical life. Reason, as it were, runs free and, to some, appears at its best in this liberated state. The time factor is supposedly eliminated in the intuition of eternally subsistent relationships. Terms are grouped which are present in their entirety. With the eradication of time, naturally there falls away the image of the future. Past, present and future are irrelevant as phases of the object. All parts of the object are seen in juxtaposition and simultaneously. The element of uncertainty which characterizes all conceptualizing trained on the future seems to disappear. In the flush of this certainty we believe that a new mode of thought is discovered. It will later be the contention of this essay that such is not the case - that the cords binding reason to practical life may be camouflaged, but never cut.

The conceptual disposition, it has appeared, may be active about events which occur in succession over a stretch of time, or about events which are closed and complete, or which are constant. Where the conceptual activity surveys a period of temporal duration, the inclusion of a new object under a concept will produce an image of the future in the place of that part of the series of events which remains to be actualized. This part may be more or less according to the point of the series at which conceptualization occurs. When conceptualization is active about completed events, the practical will is largely in obedience and the image of the future either ceases to exist or to be of vital significance. Thus, in grouping together as a class the Kings of Ancient Egypt, one has no interest in probabilities of behaviour on the part of the next member of the class one meets, simply because they have ceased to behave. Moreover such a grouping is attended by a far greater certainty than the first type. All the members of the class are known and the conceptual activity is a mere grouping under a common name. The third kind of conceptualization where constant events are grouped, resembles the second. Such events do not, it is supposed, change with the passage of time. A straight line is always a straight line, always possessing the same properties. There is no element of unpredictability in its nature. It is more completely known than the Kings of Ancient Egypt, because its entire content is apparent to immediate intuition.¹² It is an exceedingly

/simple.....p.9.

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11. Compare Sartre's description of human reality as a constant self-surpassing towards its possibilities. (Being and Nothingness 1 : V). How are these possibilities presented if not conceptually and in the form of images?
12. By intuition we denote the immediate perception which is the basis for all conceptual attitudes. With the development of Reason, we hold, intuition itself does not change. All that changes is the conceptual network of associated ideas which intuition is able to arouse in the psyche. This, naturally, develops and clarifies with the progress of experience. We do not, like Kant, believe that Reason (understanding) contributes anything to the content of intuition. For him it will be remembered, even the most primitive perception implies the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. (Transcendental Analytic : para. 107)

simple event. No new member of the class could conceivably disappoint expectations, unless the entrance examination had been slipshod in the extreme, for past, present and future are all the same for a straight line. Such, at least, is the prevailing notion of these constant events, and their concepts are attended by a certainty equal to that attending completed events. They gain, moreover, a new quality, independence of the empirical. This is because it seems that we know all straight lines without actually having seen them all. The concept contains the essential nature of all straight lines. We could not feel this in the same way about the members of the class of Ancient Egyptian Kings. There the concept affects only one aspect of some extremely complex beings. In knowing that Chosroes was a King of Ancient Egypt, we hardly know the essence of the man. The only way to approach it would be by exhaustive empirical research. But the concept of a constant event imparts knowledge of essence independently of experience, which apparently gives it a radical and intrinsic superiority, the superiority of a priority. It seems to combine the prophetic quality of the practical concept with the certainty of the closed concept. Whether these claims can survive scrutiny remains to be seen.

Summary

At this stage it will be helpful to review the conceptual disposition¹³ and distinguish its essential nature. Essentially it is a grouping activity, conducted on the basis of the similarities encountered in Nature. All the members of a conceptual class must be similar in all of certain respects. The sum of these respects is, as it were, a passport into the group. Sometimes grouping is made on intuition of a partial similarity in the assumption of a total similarity. The partial similarity is known and present, the total similarity is unknown and future. This is practical conceptualization, the most common form, which is demanded by Life of all conscious beings. It is obviously concerned with the Time process. Otherwise conceptualization is conducted on the basis of a total similarity already known. Similarity thus appears as the relationship fundamental to the formation of concepts. Therefore it becomes necessary to consider what constitutes resemblances; and we shall ask particularly to what extent they are objective and to what subjective.

Similarity

Explanation appeared above as the progressive substitution for larger conjunctions, not universally occurring, of smaller conjunctions universally occurring. Similarity is the relationship between recurring conjunctions, in the light of which they are said to recur. Concepts are, in one aspect at least, mental attitudes adopted towards conspicuously repetitive conjunctions.

What precisely does it mean, to say that a conjunction recurs? The language we employ seems to indicate an identity between two events, as if each were a manifestation of the same unity, of the same one thing. Conceivably, the same conjunction might appear and disappear and reappear in a variety of circumstances. But then, a conjunction may exist in different places simultaneously, just as in this room there are three examples of that particular conjunction of events known as a table. But can a single entity exist in three, or a million, different places at one time? Moreover, objects are easily imaginable which would be said by some to exhibit tabularity, and by others, to be more like stools. Nor could there be any final settlement of the difference. Is the conjunction both present and not present in such objects? It appears that similarity cannot be reduced to the conjunction, for while similarity is a unity, the

/conjunctions.....p.10.

13. The word "disposition" is used advisedly to indicate that the ground of concepts is a fluid psychic tendency. The concept is nothing apart from the functioning of this tendency. It has no independent reality. This dispositional interpretation is also recommended by Price. (Thinking and Experience; Chapter XI)

conjunctions resolve into a plurality of conjunctions. (Moreover its apparent dependence on the judgment of the observer seems to destroy a conjunction as an objective entity). It is inseparable from the object in which it inheres and distinct from other conjunctions in as far as the object in which it inheres is distinct. It is plain that the objects themselves are distinct and mutually exclusive. At no point do they impinge on one another and they are different in all their parts. Even supposing two tables to be made exactly similarly to the limits of skill, they could never occupy the same position simultaneously, which suffices to distinguish them in every part.

Similarity is a relationship. Every relationship involves at least two related objects. If the relationship is known, a third entity is involved, the point of view from which it is known, or in other words, the knowing mind. In certain relationships, being in love for example, the observer is unessential, even undesirable. In others, such as similarity, the relationship is significant more for the observer than for the related objects. The similarity of two trees is without effect on the trees themselves, but it will "strike", as we say, the observer. Both trees will evoke in him the same concept. He will group them together. Let us make a working distinction, then, between affective relationships and observed relationships, remembering, of course, that many, all, in fact, to which reference can be made, are both.

Similarity is essentially an observed relationship. The relationship is nothing apart from the related objects which in this case are three, two objects each with its distinct thus, and the subject which unifies them in a single mental attitude. The "relationship of similarity" is no more than a name expressive of this situation. Its unity is the unity of the subject's attitude.

What of the objective side? Is the mere power of evoking the same concept sufficient evidence of similarity? This is repugnant to common sense, or to any belief in the reality of the objective. It is obvious that, almost universally, some objects and not others evoke the same concept in minds. Where similarity strikes one man and not another, moreover, it is usually possible to explain what in the objects themselves gives rise to the same concept in the observer. The nature of the objects has a strong influence on the mind of the observer. The observer on the other hand appears to exercise a selective faculty with regard to which aspects of the objects he will group together. But the needs of life ensure that, for the most part, the same objects will evoke a single concept in different observers.

The objective side of Similarity may perhaps be further elucidated as an approximation to identity. Identity is not possible between a plurality of objects, but in their approach to it, Similarity essentially consists. Each tends to become replaceable by the other. We may also note that Identity is a somewhat dubious predicate, even of a single object in relation to itself. It seems to achieve a more satisfactory meaning when it describes the tendency of objects towards mutual replaceability, as a name for the lack of relationship that would exist if perfect coincidence were achieved.

Let us make the additional observation that the persistence of a concept, so that we regard the same concept as operating at different times and upon different objects, is not an absolute identity. The concept has a relative persistence grounded in the psychic continuity, but it is susceptible to Time and Change, as are, indeed, the psychic ground itself, and the similar objects which evoke the concept.

Similarity has no ultimate objective criterion. It is a relationship relative to the point of view of an observer, who

selects aspects of objects to include them in a single concept. Thus the layman may say that this bird is like that one solely because both are green; the ornithologist, from a different viewpoint, may say that the sparrow resembles the ostrich. The only criterion of similarity is the consensus of human opinion, which for the most parts is determined by practical considerations. That is why most men agree in recognizing the main classes of life-objects, trees, grass, animals, stones and so on. The practical relevance of objects, on the other hand, springs from the nature of the objects themselves, and so we may believe that the unities of our practical concepts do not usually cut across the unities of Nature. Conceptual unity may of course be from a point of view determined at will, and it is quite possible to will the unpractical. Because of the demands of life, however, and the universal will-to-live, which meets them, unpractical groupings, are rare and commonly considered absurd. We do not try to live in accordance with the colour of things, slaughtering all red things, eating all blue things, sitting on all green things. Experience shows us groupings that are more significant. Life bids us waste no time on idle concepts.

Purpose in Conceptuality

The natural world and man's concepts of it constitute parallel unities. Firstly, on nature's part, there is an actual, emphatic and repeated conjunction of events which almost compels the mind to accept the unity of the elements conjoined. The subjective conceptual unities will thus correspond to the unities of nature, because they are formed at the dictates of a strong volition, the will-to-live. However, it should be observed that on the subjective side, the determining factor is volition, or purpose. This purpose has no effect on the matter of a practical concept, which is the contribution of objective nature. It can, however, decide what portion of the material of nature it will demarcate for a particular concept. The more practical concepts correspond more closely to the behaviour of nature; they are less likely to be destroyed by the phenomena.

The priority of Volition over Conceptuality, and so, over Reason

We saw the genesis of the concept as the instrument of volition, a method of presenting the unknown future to which significant action must be related. If concepts are the units of which Reason's structures are composed, volition must be prior, ontologically and historically, to Reason. On this view, when Reason is accorded primary ontological status, an attempt is made to put effect before cause. How does this occur? Apparently because of the independent vitality that Thought, once generated, seems to display.

Conceptuality is first called into play by physical events which resemble the earlier term in a conceptual sequence. The remainder of the sequence is evoked in image form. It is subsequently possible for the evocation of images to function in a backward direction as well, provided that the evocative event corresponds to a point in advance of the beginning of the conceptual sequence. Thus if I see a duck, I not only expect a quack in the future, but also visualize emergence from an egg in the past.

In as far as conceptual thought is a means of substituting for actual experience, it partakes of the continuity of actual experience. When a duck evokes my concept, my thought passes smoothly to images of all the relationships in which I have encountered ducks in the past. If no practical stimulus presses me, thought ranges at will over the antecedent, the contemporaneous and the future associations of the duck, all presented in image form. I imagine its hatching, its first trip to the pond, its nest and mate, and its possible end on the dinner table. But thought is not suddenly arrested at the conceptual boundary. Any of the images which my concept of duck evokes can itself serve as a centre for farther conceptual divagation. From the dinner table, for instance, I could easily pass to the falling of trees, and from thence to the

equatorial jungles, and so on without end. The conceptual attitudes of the mind project as it were, a moving and unbroken image of experience. It is not, therefore, a possibility, that the attitudes themselves are not in reality separate entities, but form a continuum, from which they are abstracted only with partial accuracy? Are there, in reality, no concepts, but merely conceptuality, the tendency of the mind to represent experience at the stimulation of similarity? If concepts are not distinct entities on the subjective side, the doctrine of the self-subsistent objective concept becomes harder to defend, for its sharp frontiers are neither in the mind nor in the world.

We have noticed the great freedom with which conceptual thought travels in any temporal direction from an immediate stimulus. In a situation where the practical will is active, it will confine thought to a limited range of associations, particularly to the probable future. When the practical will is in abeyance, thought passes freely from concept to concept under the stimulus of some prevailing emotion. The images are produced by pure association undirected by practical considerations, even to the point where the mind, to please the emotions, images an environment distinct from the sphere of practical purpose. This is the sphere of Fantastic Imagination, the interpretation of which we shall consider later.

Conceptuality is set in motion by a variety of objective stimuli. It draws vitality from some objective stimulus because the objective present is the focal point of Life, and Life is the fundamental category of our existence. The farther it ranges from objective stimulus, the farther removed it is from the energy of Life, and the weaker and less vital it becomes. Its genesis was from the practical life and its foundation in the practical life can never be dispensed with. Existentially, it depends on the practical life.

The distinct-
ness of con-
cepts

If the matter of conceptuality is continuous, not discrete, how does it occur that we think of concepts as discrete entities, and emphasise their distinctness by attempts to define them? The cause seems to be reflection about the method by which conceptual thought communicates itself. The variety of stimuli which can evoke conceptual thought has been mentioned. One kind of stimulus is the token, of which the most ubiquitous example is the spoken word. The word is a sound attached by voluntary convention to the members of a conceptual class, so that it may serve to represent the actuality, or the image of any member of the class. Once such a convention has been made, the word may pass as a counter¹⁴ between those who have agreed to it. In each mind it will evoke a corresponding concept,

/correspondingp.31.

14. Thus, for Price, words are "cashable" in terms of experience. (Thinking and Experience; Ch. II)

corresponding but not identical, for each man will have his own ¹⁵ images. In the practical sphere, the purpose of communication is achieved if concepts are evoked which are not destroyed by the environment. If I am told to "look out for snakes", and images associated with my concept prompt me to watch my path and not the sky, the purpose is achieved. Communication is originally a transmission of the grounds of deliberate action.

The word

A word of language is in fact a great multiplicity of entities, which allowing for differences of pronunciation, exhibit a relatively common form. Because the differences between pronunciations of the same word are practically insignificant, it is easy to suppose that in the word we have a single overriding and metaphysical entity. Once "the word" is accorded this ontological status, it becomes itself the focus of inquiry as if it possessed a specific content. On this error are built all the complexities of the problem of Meaning. "The word dog" is a convenient phrase which in fact means "all the words which resemble my word 'dog'." Against the view that postulates "the word dog" as a single entity, the challenge is, "produce it." And if the postulant resorts to obscure methods of perception, intuitions and such-like, the challenge must be still "produce them," until he is driven to the uncommunicable. Then, in fairness, he should retire from the argument, for argument presupposes communicability.

The sole content of a word is its power, derived from convention, of evoking corresponding concepts in different individuals. The power is, in fact, the convention, which itself resolves into volition. The word must be stripped to a bare sound and content located firmly in the consciousnesses between which it passes.

/Arguments.....p.14.

15. Of course the hearer need not have mental images. Provided that the words he hears correspond to conceptual dispositions in him, which can, if activated, produce images, the meaning is conveyed. The imaging faculty may lie dormant, but on its possible operation the meaningfulness of a word for the hearer depends. If I hear a word which cannot, as distinct from does not, arouse an image for me, I do not understand that word. The power of the word to evoke an image depends, as Price points out, in the last resort upon extensive definition. But verbal communication normally presupposes the absence of the estensible. Communicative meaning, therefore, depends on the image.

Arguments about the meaning of a word are in reality arguments about which objects or events it is generally agreed to attach the sound to.¹⁶ To qualify as a horse, an animal will, for most men, have to exhibit certain characteristics. Consensus is achieved not because of a general apprehension of the content of the objective word, but because the similarities of objective nature are emphatic and strike similarly on different minds. Doubtful cases which divide opinion are always imaginable. At such times the final word is usually pronounced by practical volition which, though always present, speaks louder when nature is less emphatic. Have we not often heard this sort of talk: "for present purposes, this courts as a so-and-so?" This argues that the basic category in meaning is volition, which forms conventions for the use of tokens, and where practically directed, is receptive of the emphatic similarities of nature.

Volition is the essence of conscious life, and in pursuing problems to this source, we must acknowledge that we leave them at the door of Mystery. At present it will be sufficient to draw thought to this common centre.

The schemes
of communication

The spoken word, when regarded, objectively speaking, as more than a sound, is also the source of the idea of objective concepts. This, incidentally, explains the recent emphasis on linguistics, when the dependence of the objective concept upon the use of words began to be suspected. We have to decide between two schemes of communication. The first consists of two or more conscious individuals, the external world and visible or audible tokens by which the individuals arouse in each other images of parts of the external world which are outside their present experience. The possibility of this arousing of images rests on the nature of the mind itself, which we have not yet investigated in detail. For the present it is sufficient to note that thought passes from object to image, or from image to image by association.

The alternative scheme consists of two or more minds, the objective concept, and the token which is attached to it. Here a whole new sphere of reality is postulated, the sphere of concepts regarded as independent entities, the sphere of the entia rationis.

It may be observed that all the components of the first scheme are empirically verifiable. Although the nature of the mind has not been explained, there is at least no reasonable doubt of the existence of minds, if thereby is meant the range of psychic phenomena. In the second scheme, however, the objective concept is not an empirically verifiable entity, and does not exist in the ordinary manner in Time and Space. In the common meaning of the word "exist", it does not exist at all.

A Turning
Point

We have now come to a turning point. We have encountered the suggestion of a reality outside Space and Time, that is outside Existence, which would be radically different from everything that has so far entered into our account of Reason. We have offered an empirical account of Reason as engendered within the sphere of Existence by the interaction of the living psyche with its environment.

/We.....p.15.

16. But what, it may be asked, of abstract nouns such as love, multiplication and so on? Can these be words attached to objects or events? We answer that such words denote nothing but men loving, or men multiplying, for which they are convenient symbols. In this we agree with the ancient Romans who, instead of "the building of ships," preferred to speak of "ships to-be-built". Behind the abstract term we must always seek the concrete reality.

We have observed Reason operating only upon the events and objects of existence. We have seen no reason to suppose that it operates about any other type of reality. But now within philosophy we encounter terms that are assumed to refer to a new type of Reality. We cannot escape the conclusion that philosophy, at least in some of its forms, claims the power to use referring terms about the non-existent; in other words, that it claims that the frontiers of Reason transcend the frontiers of Existence. (Let us call this the Rationalistic assumption).

This is a startling claim of crucial importance. Whether it can be justified we must now inquire.

Philosophy as
Communication

Let us be clear on one point. Our present proceedings are a communication¹⁷, and anything that partakes of the nature of communication is lodged firmly within Existence. If we dispense with Existence, we dispense with human relationships in general, and the relationship of communication in particular. The whole edifice of philosophy is an edifice of communication. Therefore the attempt to speak meaningfully of a reality beyond Existence rests on the assumption that such a reality can be communicated through Existence. It is the admission of a relationship between Existence and what lies beyond it. It is an acceptance of the challenge to produce, in terms of Existence, a supra-existential reality.

The postulation of a connexion between the sphere of Being¹⁸ (as the supra-existential sphere is often called) and the sphere of

/Existence.....p.16.

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17. Similarly, for Jaspers, Truth is communicability. There is no single and absolute Truth accessible to man. Truth becomes rather than is. (Reason and Existing : 3).
18. The positing of Being as a rule produces an ens rationis, for, as a rule, it involves the sacrifice of phenomenal qualities. The Substance of Spinoza, which might be supposed to have overcome the difficulty, is in fact both immanent and transcendent, and qua transcendent, non-phenomenal. The Monads of Leibniz are non-phenomenal because they are non-spatial. The being of Sartre, although, in intention, non metaphysical, (since it is being-for-revelation, rather than revealed being) falls ultimately into the same trap. For it transcends the phenomenon's temporal determinations, and just is. A different approach is, however, adopted by Heidegger who holds that the passage from phenomenon to being is from homogeneous to homogeneous, and by Bradley, for whom appearances, while not the whole of reality are nevertheless "in" reality. With these last views we are substantially in sympathy. It certainly seems that the phenomena point beyond themselves as not being the whole of reality. But why should they be assumed to point to that which is ontologically different? Are they not best understood as parts of the whole? Then, if someone asks us what is the whole, we shall frankly admit that we can never know it, not because it is by nature unknowable, but simply because there are an infinite number of possible points of view, and one consciousness could never hope to occupy them all. (This insight was fundamental in the construction of the system of Monads). Moreover, the will-to-live forces precisely this view upon us. It postulates the appearances as real aspects of a real whole. The perception of aspects is no more than the axiomatic correlate of a positional consciousness.

Existence, brings with it the obligation to exhibit that connexion. Precisely how, it must be asked, can Being be connected to Existence? To answer this question, it is necessary to know Being, for the connexion is, in itself, nothing, consisting merely in the juxtaposition of the connected. The question then is, how or as what, is Being Known?

The Knowing
of Being

Let us begin by paraphrasing the question just asked as follows: What do we know of something that is not in Space and Time? Plainly, we must answer, it can have no sensory qualities, not even the so-called primary qualities of Extension and Duration. We can say ad infinitum that it is not this and not that, but we can never say that it is this or that. There is, indeed, a certain range of terms used to refer to Being which are either negative or else carry a disguised spatio-temporal connotation. We must discount the negative terms at the outset. For to say of a thing that "it is not this and not that" will never prove that it is anything at all.¹⁹ There is no proof that the "it" is a referring term. We must not think that simply by virtue of being used, it is a meaningful word. Therefore let us, at least for the present, refuse to accept such words as "infinite" as referring terms. This is a negative word meaning no more than "not finite". It is not necessarily the description of anything real. It is even doubtful whether it is a valid description at all; for description must surely be the assigning of positive content to what was previously a mere token. Then there are other terms used of the supra-existential which have a meaning borrowed from the existential.²⁰ Such a word is "eternal". This term supposedly has two meanings. By the first, it is the equivalent of "non-temporal", which brings it under the unacceptable class of negative terms. By the second, which now concerns us, it is a compound of quantity and duration. Its meaningfulness depends on our imagining, in as far as we can, a stretch of time that never stops. Our images, it is true, must stop, but we stop them with a reservation that there is always more. The content of the term is purely positive and existential. Another term used of the supra-existential, and sometimes regarded as expressive of its essence, is "logical". Much will depend on the meaning that

/can.....p.17.

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19. Take for instance, Spinoza's Substance. In that it is infinite, we understand that it is nothing to which we may point, for all that we perceive is finite; in that it is one, that it is not many; in that it is in itself, that we may analyze it into nothing else; In that it has infinite attributes, that it has aspects both inconceivable in number and qualitatively unlike all phenomenal qualities, even those that bear the same name. In short, in everything that may be said of substance, we discover a nothingness, a negation of something else. Therefore we have no option but to conclude that Spinoza's definition does not convey a positive content. This, in turn, invalidates it as the starting point of a system.
20. Of course the example of this par excellence is the Monadology, but it is hardly a general case. The Monads are constituted as entia rationis by what they lack, namely extension and causal relationship. (Monadology; paras. 3 and 7). But in everything positive that is said of them they appear to constitute simply a new sensory world. For they enter into compounds, they are qualitatively differentiated, each occupies a unique viewpoint and so on. Their whole positive content is illegitimately borrowed from Existence. Nor does it help to say that all this is metaphor, when, if the metaphor is abstracted, nothing else is left.

can be assigned to this word, and on whether we can or cannot bring it under the second class of words, whose content is really existential.

The assign-
ment of mean-
ing to words

Let us consider briefly how meaning is assigned to words. It is necessary that meaning be assigned in some manner, for a word, qua audible or visible token, does not ipsa natura, refer. There is no necessary connexion between a word and its connotation. For the word "concept" we might perfectly well substitute "hyopp", and use it equally effectively, provided the convention were generally recognized. Of course, the most obvious proof of the conventional nature of words is the²¹ existence of different languages with dissimilar words for the same objects. The connexion between token and connotation is completely synthetic and conventional.

How then is content to be supplied? No word tells us its own meaning, - we discount compound words which might fictitiously appear to do so - no sound is necessarily connected with any object. Whence does meaning come? In Existence, the answer is "by empirical demonstration". Can the case be otherwise with words denoting the supra-existential? Their meaning is no more implicit than that of other words. Again we must ask for a demonstration of meaning, and failing demonstration, must deny their claim to significance. It will not satisfy us to hear a supra-existential term resolved into other supra-existential terms unless the process ends eventually with confrontation. He who claims to know the supra-existential but declines to produce it should in honesty take his place among the mystics. He must cease to pose as a philosopher. For the essence of philosophy is a reasoned progress from Known to Unknown, not an inspired but unsubstantiated leap into the unknown. When such a leap is taken, it must be frankly recognized that Reason has been abandoned. No attempt must be made to produce a pseudo-logic of the unknown.

The essence of the conceptual world is logicality. Here reason is seen pure and unimpeded by existence. Here the traces of reason which run like golden threads through Time and Space lead us to their source in a more real world. Such, at least, is the picture painted first by Plato and subsequently by a band of successors over many centuries until, with Hegel, the claims of Reason reach their zenith. All such systems agree in making logical entailment

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21. Should someone object that by "word" in this context we really mean "the sound for a word", we shall answer as follows. What is the word besides the token or the concept? Must we now allow for a new entity? The onus probandi is on him who posits it. We, however, can discern no further element in communication over and above these two, and of the two, the word is surely the token rather than the concept. And if someone should further object that without a common underlying word, it would be impossible to translate from the sounds of one language to the sounds of another, we answer that translation may equally well be based on a similarity of concepts - and, as a translator will know, even this is sometimes lacking, so that what is abstract in one language must be concretely phrased in another, and so on.

or necessity the sole relationship in the Rational world.²² To Hegel, logic is not only the relationship, but also the matter of reality.

Examination of
the Logical
or Pure Reason

What are the essential characteristics of the logical? The most obvious is the quality of certainty which inheres in its relationships. Then there is the fact of its universal applicability, so that a logical truth seems to obtain for all time and in all places. It has an apparent independence of Time and Change.

Is there any doubt of the principle that in seeking the world of Reason, we must start from the world of Experience? We have already seen that the practice of philosophy is firmly attached to Existence - that is, to Experience. All public philosophy, at least, is an attempt to communicate on the existential level. Although the proof can be no more than inductive and empirical, it seems certain that no one arrives at Reason before Experience. Otherwise we should have to suppose the child in the womb, at some stage before the senses wake to life, capable of understanding pure reason. It is also contrary to human experience that Reason enters the consciousness as something alien and unrelated to Experience. It is essentially in Experience that we first feel the need of Reason. We encounter it first as a comment and an explication emerging from Experience. Historically and subjectively, Reason is the product of Existence. Is there any sense in which Reason can be prior to Experience, and thus exhibit an independent objective existence? Can it ever break free from its dependent origins and rise above Existence? Is it, perhaps, possible that Reason has a logical priority to Experience? If it has, then what we have called the genesis of Reason from Experience, is more truly the instantiation of Reason in Experience. The apparent temporal development of Reason is, in reality, only the development of the consciousness in its apprehension of Reason. Before accepting such a doctrine of Reason, we must ask certain questions.

Firstly, remembering that, even though Reason may be prior to Experience, our approach to it is through Experience, we must ask if it can be produced. We wish to be confronted by self-subsistent Reason, for otherwise we have no proof that the term refers. And if we are told that the self-subsistent is too great to depend on our proofs, we shall persist unabashed that our weakness demands proof; that we cannot blindly accept the reality of the unknown, and remain philosophical. Even granting that there is this self-subsistent Reason, until we know it, it is nothing to us; and he who would speak to us about it must be prepared to say, "By this term, I refer to this." In talking or writing, audible and visible tokens are used; they are used in the assumption that through them it is possible to impart new knowledge. But the tokens, per se, have no connexion with their meaning whatever. The only method of assigning meaning to these tokens is demonstration, that is, the

/production.....p.19.

22. Although, for Hegel, Reason is regarded as distinct from, and superseding the Understanding with its death-dealing sharpness of concepts, there is no doubt that it is still a process of Thought, and that Hegel would have regarded his dialectical transitions as necessary. It is interesting to see how the life and movement of the world-flow make an illicit re-entry in the dialectic. Hegel's system illustrates the collapse of the logical as the structure of reality, not, as he supposed, under pressure of the supra-logical, but by the disguised re-affirmation of the pre-logical. His contradictions, as Findlay remarks, are really opposing tendencies, or forces, in the world.

production of the object signified.²³ Therefore until the nature of pure Reason is shown to us, we shall withhold assent from it.

It is fallacious to suppose that pure Reason is only partly communicable. For the part must be like the whole. If the uncommunicable part is intrinsically different, communicable and uncommunicable are not related as parts of the same whole, for they have nothing in common.²⁴ The uncommunicable is not the valid matter of philosophy in general or of rationalistic philosophy in particular, which consists in imparting or discovering entailed truth by means of communication. The communicable is ultimately the demonstrable. Public philosophy, being concerned with the communicable, i.e. the demonstrable, denies its own nature when it speaks in a way that presupposes knowledge of the undemonstrable. (Let us note in passing that we may accept as demonstration the analysis of a term into demonstrable parts. But we must insist that, since terms have, per se, no connexion with their meaning, meaningfulness is ultimately grounded in the possibility of demonstration.)

Rationalism would wish to proceed by entailment, that is by a necessary and unbroken chain of reasoning. From the starting point of communication, which is lodged in Existence, it would wish to proceed by entailment to supra-existential reality, to show, in other words, that Existence implies Supra-Existence. Failing, perhaps, in this, it would wish to show at least that Supra-Existence implies Existence, thereby saving the logical character of Reality. But in this case, it should be noted clearly, the initial passage beyond existence is achieved not by necessity of reasoning, but by a leap whether of induction or of inspiration. Such a leap Plato appears

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23. All meaning rests ultimately on what Price calls "ostensive" definition (Thinking and Experience; ch. VII). There were no words with which to explain the meaning of the first word ever used. It acquired meaning simply from constant association with a certain object, or type of objects. The process is repeated every time a child learns to speak. If this is the way in which meaning is generated, nothing is meaningful which cannot, if necessary, be reduced to this form of definition. This is a criterion of the greatest usefulness in clearing away the accumulation of vague intellectual entities which so easily confuse the mind of the philosopher.

24. Compare Spincza's use of this principle. (Ethics: Axiom V)

to suggest in the Republic.²⁵ Moreover it will no longer be possible to exhibit Reality in Existence, but only to exhibit Existence in Reality. The communication of truth to those who do not already know it becomes impossible. At best, it may be possible to indicate a path along which they may hope to encounter it.

Mysticism

We have just adumbrated or described an interesting and important phenomenon. This is the assumption, without logical cogency, of a Reality beyond Existence, in other words, the unnecessary assumption of supra-existential reality. This assumption we shall name Mysticism.²⁶ (The²⁷ assumption, let us note, may or may not be made after a process of inductive reasoning, but in either case it is something new. For inductive reasoning does not supply a reality. At most, it disposes us to belief in a reality. The actual postulation of a reality proceeds from an independent source.)

Let us return to the nature of the Logical. The task is to show that a sphere of logical reality is implied in Existence, for we are compelled to make Existence our starting point if we wish to communicate. In what sense, therefore, can Existence imply anything? This is the problem that may prove the stumbling block rationalistic thought. Thought, desiring to move above Existence, is yet compelled to plant clay feet upon Existence. The nature of the spatio-temporal is in general intractable to indubitable implication. The so-called implications of practical life have,

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25. To reach the Idea of the Good, we must stand upon hypotheses (sc. definitions of the Ideas), and reach out towards the idea that unites these hypotheses. The hypotheses are abstractions from Existence, and the Idea of the Good is likewise an abstraction from the hypotheses. The process of discovery is experimental and principles must be constantly tested. Once the ultimate principle is apprehended, it will be possible to return from it deductively to all the lower principles (though not, we should notice to phenomena, for deduction ends with ideas). There is a radical hiatus here. Reason has settled itself in the real world and can find no return to the world of Existence, because it insists on deductive procedure. It is forgotten that the possibility of the deductive process rests on an initial inductive process from Existence. Or if this is remembered, it is construed as the inferiority of Existence, which is well left behind. This, in turn, is possible, because the nature of the Ideas as mere abstractions from Existence is forgotten. They become imbued with a substance of their own. On this illogicality rests the idea that it is possible to deduce from them, or rather from the supreme Idea. Deduction must always be from greater content to lesser content. Thus the Idea of the Good must at the same time be ultimate abstraction and supreme content, both nothing and plenitude of being, than which no greater contradiction is imaginable. Why a conceptual and psychic unity (for such are all abstractions) should be objectified as supreme content we shall later come to understand. (Republic VI and VII)
26. The view that this is an assumption receives support from Kierkegaard for whom Faith is a miracle, the gift of God (The Absolute Paradox). Additionally, in describing historical knowledge as a deliberate act of belief, he lends confirmation to the view that Reason does not yield certitude outside immediate Existence. (Interlude)
27. Note: Kierkegaard on Belief.

for the most part, a very small degree of certainty. No-one, for instance, would suppose that the verdicts of our law courts are supported by anything so cogent as logical demonstration. Indeed, in the temporal flow, there can be no demonstration from one moment to the next. I cannot prove that when this pen next touches the paper, it will leave an ink mark and not strike sparks.

There are however, certain areas of Existence where implication seems to become possible, that is in the theoretical disciplines, particularly mathematics and logic. These disciplines depend on an existential means of conveying their content. There is no recognizable mathematics without figures or numbers, which are, at least in one aspect, physical entities, or logic without symbols, which again are physical. The man who would be a mathematician or a logician without these means, must be content to be one in secret. There may be some who are. Humanity has nothing to say to them, nor they to humanity. They are as if they were not. But those who would communicate their meaning are bound to Existence. If they claim that they use existence to symbolise the supra-existential, they are bound to demonstrate the supra-existential, or else abandon their symbols, that is, abandon communication. In any case, would a symbolic relationship, that is, an arbitrary one, satisfy the rationalistic need for the implication of supra-existence by existence? Surely not, for it is not the nature of a symbol to convey per se the nature of its signification. Nor is a symbol a representation, related to its object by similarity.

It appears that the rationalistic position demands that the nature of the physical entities employed in mathematics and logic should itself imply the supra-existential. If these objects are not symbols, nor yet representations of the supra-existential, no other alternative remains. We must therefore examine these objects, minutely if necessary, to see whether, unlike other physical objects, they contain the seeds of pure Reason. If we conclude that they are not essentially different from other physical objects, it will be necessary to explain their certainty and logicity in spatio-temporal terms. But if an intrinsic difference does emerge, we shall have the problem of relating these objects to the remainder of Existence.

An Examination
of Physical
Objects exhibiting
Necessity

Let us look first at mathematical objects which Plato regarded as the most striking approximation of the seen to the unseen. The simplest mathematical object is undoubtedly the straight line, which, by Euclidean theory has no width but only length and direction. This description however, does not fit any actual straight line that we have seen. That which truly had no width would be, as truly, invisible. All the straight lines that we have seen have had some minimal width. The minimum requisite width is what is sufficient to render the line visible. The straight line without width is at once transported to the supra-existential and stands in need of verification by implication from the existential straight line, which has width. Therefore let us accept that we are examining an object which has length and breadth. If it is to be visually apprehensible, it must also have colour; if tactually, it must have texture. We are dealing with an object that is thoroughly physical in nature. It must also therefore, have duration. This, experience will confirm. We have seen no straight line that might claim to be timeless. Archimedes' straight lines in the sand were erased by the sea, the silver metre will perish one day. A straight line is as durable as the physical matter of which it is made. If there is no intrinsic difference between a straight line and other existent objects, what is the difference in virtue of which certainty attends the relationships of straight lines?

The ordinary physical object is infinitely complex.

Infinite causes contribute to its existence and its content is so diversified as to defy exhaustive description. The straight line is, by comparison exceedingly simple.²⁸ Both ordinary physical objects and simplified ones are arranged in conceptual groups. In the case of the ordinary objects, the characteristics required for admission to any one conceptual group are obviously an abstraction from the natures of the individuals, so that "homo sapiens" quite clearly leaves a great deal unsaid about Jones or Brown. Therefore Jones or Brown might be said to be conceptually intractable. It is impossible to reduce them to one concept, hard to describe them in many. The gap between the reality and the description is inescapable. But in the case of the straight line, the concept is not so obviously an abstraction. The apparent nature of any particular straight line seems to be completely contained in the conceptual specifications, so that in describing any particular straight line in terms of the mere definition, we seem to describe it exhaustively. But we only seem to do so. The essential particularity and individuality of straight lines has been illustrated above. Because the same description fits all individuals so well, it becomes very easy to transfer emphasis to the conceptual description and to regard the individuals as mere manifestations of rectilinearity. This is essentially a psychological, and not at all a logical transition.

Because of their extreme simplicity, geometrical figures are not able to change to the same extent as ordinary physical objects. Their nature is so limited that any change involves conceptual rejection. When the remainder of particularity makes itself felt in some way, for instance when the paper the line is drawn on is crumpled, the straight line is no longer a straight line and is rejected from the conceptual group. The line has changed in respect of those parts always present, but ignored before, which were not included in the abstraction. When this occurs, it is felt that this physical object which has lapsed from its previous conceptual status, was never in fact a real straight line, but simply a symbol of the reality which is non-physical. A man can change extensively and remain a man; a straight line can only change in length, and remain a straight line. Being an extensive physical nature, man can suffer considerable physical change and remain recognizable; being a limited physical nature, a straight line is rendered unrecognizable by a minimal physical change. Because there has been so close an approximation of concept to object, engendering a belief in the self-subsistent and formative nature of the concept, the lapse of the object is disassociated from the state of the concept, to the detriment of the object. The object is regarded as at most an approximation in physical matter to a non-physical reality. We, however, have undertaken to find this non-physical reality implied in the physical, or else to surrender belief in it. Therefore we must return to the line drawn on paper, or to something equally physical.

Whence is the certainty in geometrical relationships derived? Is not this quality an indication of the presence of something transcendent? It is plain that there can be no deductive relationships between objects existing at different points in the time flow. Geometry cannot prove that any actual line will be straight in the future, or that any two straight lines will be brought into conjunction in the future. It can merely state that if two straight lines touch in the future, the relationship will be such and such.

/Nor.....p.23.

28. Compare Descartes' ascription of the certitude of Arithmetic and Geometry to the fact that they "alone deal with an object so pure and uncomplicated, that they need make no assumptions at all which experience renders uncertain." (Rules for the Direction of the Mind : II)

Nor does it attempt to state relationships between a line existing in the present and a line that will exist in the future. All its propositions involve the contemporaneity of the objects related. Geometry mitigates the effect of the time flow by regarding the related objects simultaneously. It never relates a present object to an absent object. The first element in geometrical certainty, therefore, is contemporaneity.

It is noticeable, in the second place, that the objects related in geometry are always directly or indirectly contiguous. If an object is to be related to another which it does not touch, the relationship will be achieved by the insertion of objects, e.g. tangents, bisecting lines and so on, which link the two objects to be related. The mind may pass from one relationship to the next and at each point the related objects will be contemporaneous and contiguous.²⁹ If geometrical objects are essentially the same as other physical objects, we might expect to find that contemporaneity and contiguity make for certainty in other objects as well. Certain facts are facts which we know. Might we be said to know anything in terms of ordinary physical objects as certainly as we know that two straight lines, on touching, form angles equal to one straight line? It does appear that there are physical spatio-temporal facts about which we do feel a certainty that approximates in degree to mathematical certainty.³⁰ I cannot doubt that my pen is in my hand; or that my hand is on the paper; or that the part of the paper overhanging the desk plus the part on the desk together equal the whole sheet. All these facts consist of the relationships of contemporaneous and contiguous objects. Granted the reality of spatio-temporal objects, these are indubitable facts. The third dimension, however, is for some philosophers, a dubious interpretation of two dimensional data. For them, it would be possible to restate the intuitive certainties of experience in terms of two-dimensional existences, regarding all phenomena as occurring on a single flat plane. Such philosophers would presumably not deny the reality of the observation point, that is to say of their own consciousness, which cannot be on the same plane as the phenomena. Its separate existence involves the third dimension, a fact which makes it seem unreasonable to deny it within the phenomena. Be that as it may, the simple relations of co-existent and contiguous objects are certain at the moment of their intuition, to a degree that is indistinguishable from the certainty of geometry. If it be doubted that the relationships of geometrical objects derive their certainty from primitive intuition, it is only necessary to consider the proofs of some elementary propositions. The congruency of equal-sided triangles, for instance, is proved by placing a side upon an equal side.

It is true that geometrical proofs may be conducted with inaccurate diagrams; that a line drawn by an unaided hand will do as well as a straight line. Is this not proof that the physical

/object.....p.24.

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29. Compare Descartes on the nature of a chain of reasoning. Each link must be separately intuited so that there may be no break in the necessary connexion (Rules : VII) There is envisaged no deductive passage to a new object, but rather the intuition a posteriori of the relationship between two objects already co-existing.
30. To the objection that the contradictory of a spatio-temporal fact will not be self-contradictory, as is the case with the contradictory of a logical truth, we make this provisional reply. There are such spatio-temporal truths. e.g. This table (which I see now) is this table (which I see now), cannot be contradicted without self-contradiction. If it can be shown that logical truths depend on this form of identity, will not the point be made? But this we shall discuss later.

object is not the reality? A town planner may move model motor cars up and down model streets, but this is no sign that real cars and real streets are not the reality. The models are symbols of actual cars, and the free-hand lines are symbols of actual straight lines. But if this is so, how is it possible to construct cogent proof in terms of these geometrical symbols; it is not possible to have a real traffic jam with model cars. This is a muddled objection based on an inaccurate analogy. The model traffic can assist us to imagine real traffic. In the same way, the inaccurate lines can assist us to imagine accurate lines. The geometrical relationships do not in fact subsist between the inaccurate lines. They would subsist between lines such as the inaccurate ones symbolize. The necessity subsists in the relationships of the accurate lines which are merely represented by the inaccurate lines. But it may be wondered if any imagined lines can have a nature so precisely determined that they can participate in geometrical relationships. Are they not mere symbols just as much as the free-hand lines? This seems a fair objection. It would be very hard to isolate and stabilize the mental image of a geometrical object.

What, then, is this certainty which we find in geometrical relationships, even independently, so it seems, of accurate diagrams? Could it, perhaps, be found without the aid of any diagram at all? Are we at last arriving at the supra-existential? But we have already seen that there can be no public geometry without spatio-temporal geometrical existences, and also that there is a certainty of intuition inherent in the relationships of these existences. How can this certainty be the same certainty as that which inheres in a proof with inaccurate figures? Precisely what do the inaccurate figures symbolize? Do they represent any specific figures? It appears not, because the truths apply to all straight lines, or all triangles. But "all triangles" has an undemonstrable reference. We can never see all present triangles, let alone all past and future ones. The problem becomes soluble when we remember that tokens or symbols are the conventional and arbitrary signs of conceptual attitudes. To talk of "all triangles" with an objective intention is illusory. It is common experience that people may so talk when at that moment they perceive no triangles whatsoever. For all that they know, not a single triangle exists in the world, or will ever exist. Common sense undoubtedly assures them that their words do refer, and that "all triangles" is a real group of objects; but this does not alter the fact that the objective reference is possibly non-existent. The reference is essentially subjective and this is what gives it an apparent universality of application. It would be possible for me to create by definition the concept "gloob", and talk with a priori certainty of the characteristics of all gloobs. But the certainty has a purely subjective foundation. Paraphrased, it runs as follows: If I encounter any creature acceptable to my concept "gloob", it will be such and such a creature. Now "such and such" is equivalent to "acceptable to my concept". By making this substitution, we can see that we are not talking about actual creatures, but about a concept, in other words about a private attitude of the ego. Because this attitude may be maintained towards imaginary objects, it has independence of experience. This is the essential nature of the a priori, that it predicates the definition of the concept of indubitable members of the concept; it conceptualizes on a basis of total subjective similarity, never, like practical conceptualization, on a basis of partial objective similarity. It has, in itself, no reference to the actual future, which is an unknown. It is not evoked by the emphatic conjunctions of nature so much as arbitrarily created. The appearance of practical applicability is due to the ease with which new members of the class can be manufactured. This ease is due to the extreme simplicity of the arbitrary objects.

The word
"All"

A priori knowledge derives its claim to universal applicability from the verbal form in which it is expressed,

/particularly.....p.25.

particularly from the use of the word "all". It is useful to examine the reference of this term "all" as used in a priori statements. When we say that all triangles are such and such, to what objects do we refer? Presumably to all triangles that have existed and do exist, and all that will exist. But it is possible that no triangles will exist in the future - certainly future triangles do not exist now at the moment of reference. This part of the reference is actually nothing and may be discounted. An a priori statement has no necessary reference to the future. Does it, then, satisfy our meaning to equate "all triangles" with "all triangles that have existed (or do exist)"? No, for we mean more; we mean all possible triangles. But possible triangles are an undemonstrable reference. They are nothing. The realm of the possible is another form of the realm of the supra-existential, the reality of which is in question. We have made demonstrability the criterion of significance, and the possible, i.e. the supra-existential has so far proved undemonstrable. But is it not so that a statement of the form, "all triangles, are such and such", might be true even if no triangles had ever existed? The truly a priori should not depend for its truth upon instantiation in Existence. The statement, in this case, proves to be about no existent triangles at all, but about triangularity. Triangularity is a concept. The subjective and psychic aspect of a concept is demonstrable. The objective aspect, if it is real, has so far proved undemonstrable.

At this stage it will be helpful to examine the subjective geometrical concept more minutely. To ease the task, let us take the simplest of such concepts, Rectilinearity. Of what elements, therefore, is my concept of a straight line compounded?

A priority
Subjective or
Objective?

What, we ask, is the truly "a priori" which is independent of instantiation in Existence? Is there really such a thing? What is rectilinearity independently of straight lines - so that from the nature of rectilinearity we may make logical deductions? Historically speaking, no one thought of rectilinearity before he saw a straight line. There is no historical priority. But is rectilinearity then logically prior to straight lines? No - for a straight line is not deduced, it is drawn.³¹ Its existence is independent of deduction. We may, therefore, experience³² straight lines without prior experience of rectilinearity. But of the converse, there is no proof, nor even evidence.

Plato, while perhaps he would have granted this, would yet have maintained that the logical attitude which geometrical figures evoke is not acquired but remembered.³³ Actual straight lines or actual equals, he would say, put us in memory of an already

/possessed.....p.26.

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31. If it should be objected that this does not confute the logical priority of rectilinearity, we ask what, precisely, does the objector mean by priority? Does his idea not involve that the prior is on the same ontological plane as the subsequent, that it partakes of the same mode of being? (We invoke Spinoza's principle that things which have nothing in common cannot be related). Therefore, either rectilinearity is a sensorily apprehended object, or, a straight line is an invisible ens rationis. We know that a straight line is a sensory object, therefore so is rectilinearity, which is absurd by definition. Therefore rectilinearity and straight lines are not related as prior and subsequent.
32. The fact that we call them straight lines does not imply a pre-knowledge of rectilinearity any more than the fact that we call cats cats implies a pre-knowledge of felinity.
33. So in Theaetetus.

possessed but subconscious knowledge of rectilinearity or equality. Two considerations militate against this view. Firstly, why should it be universally necessary to experience straight lines or equals before remembering rectilinearity or equality? Somewhere or other, we might expect, the memory would have remained in consciousness. Unless, of course, humanity as a whole has passed through some vale of oblivion. Secondly, and more cogently, rectilinearity, remains undemonstrated as a reality. It has not been made objective. As subjective, however, an account may be given of it. It is the subjective unity, the attitude of acceptance operative towards some objects that resemble other objects which we have agreed to call straight lines, to such a degree that there is no perceptible or relevant dissimilarity. But the question remains, how can such a concept enable us to make deductions independently of the presence of actual straight lines? We answer, by producing images of straight lines juxtaposed in given ways. But how can such images have the accuracy or the persistence that is necessary to make the relationships obtain? All that is necessary is that they should obtain to the limits of our perception.³⁴ This after all, is the limit that must be set to all our empirical assertions, however scientific. Every statement is made from a certain point of view, and is true if it accurately reflects the position from that point of view, provided it be received as a statement from that point of view. Even the most finely drawn straight lines will reveal mountains and chasms under the microscope. A straight line is straight for the manner of perception employed by the immediate purpose.

Measurement

It is, moreover, an illusion to suppose that because geometrical proofs do not employ actual measurement, they are non-empirical. Measurement is essentially the juxtaposition of objects in order to find points of coincidence accurately to the limit of perception. In geometrical proof, such juxtaposition, while not actually carried out, is constantly assumed. If it is accepted as obvious that two straight lines which are equal to a third straight line, are also equal to each other, it is solely because it is obvious that if they were juxtaposed, they would coincide. We simply imagine the three lines together, and if we imagine them according to their descriptions, it is beyond argument that they will coincide. If they did not, they would not be the lines described. Thus geometry is based on measure, and measure is juxtaposition of actual objects.

It may be objected here again that proofs can be conducted with inaccurate figures, the schoolmaster's rough diagram on the board for instance. This is true, simply because, by deliberate convention, these figures are tokens evocative of accurate images, or of the conceptual associations formed from experience of accurate figures.

Number

The universal applicability of number and the complete exactitude possible in this medium, are likewise traceable to the arbitrary nature of the terms employed. Numbers are arbitrarily established tokens. There is no intrinsic connexion between either the word "three" or the symbol "3" and what they denote. "Three" might just as easily be "two" and "3", "2". Then, the relationships between these tokens are a direct consequence of the connotation which we arbitrarily assign to them. "Three" is half of "six" because men decided that "three" should denote so many units and "six" so many. The unities denoted are partly subjective, relative to concepts. A conceptual attitude is a unifying attitude - not that it in any sense welds matter into one - but consciousness, for a given purpose, posites a certain stretch of existence as one.

/The.....p.27.

34. Or, alternatively, evoke a conceptual attitude based on the experience of perfect figures.

The unity, therefore, is half in the subject, a unity of attitude. Nature often supports such unities, but she is independent of them. They place no limitation upon her. Our unities are not constitutive of things. We talk of the house; nature shatters it by an earthquake. We decide in accordance with our purposes that such and such a portion of existence shall be regarded as one. Fields, mountains, books and bridges are unities from a deliberately adopted point of view, or rather from a point of view dictated by a purpose. But, for other purposes, they could all be analyzed into an infinity of smaller unities, or grouped into larger unities, if circumstances required. Then what, we must ask, is the significance of denoting an object as one - for significance there must be. Why do we think in terms of ones at all?

Unity and Differentiation

Nature provides an occasion by presenting us with emphatic conjunctions. These conjunctions are relative unities against the environment. Thus we see that this area of experience moves as one, and that area as another. This gives us the essence of unity as solidity or indivisibility. Indivisibility in turn, can only be observed in the divisibility of a larger whole. Thus the pieces of the puzzle become ones in the disintegration of the puzzle. The puzzle itself becomes one when we distinguish or divide it from the table surface whereon it rests. Unity thus appears as the corollary of differentiation. Differentiation however, is the corollary of change and movement, for these are discernible only by the observation of difference in succession. More basically, differentiation is the corollary of existence in the world, of objectivity. For no object, even one wherein we can observe no change, can exist, without differences. Let us imagine an unbroken plane of homogeneous colour. It must end somewhere, or it ceases to be imaginable, and where it ends, there is differentiation. Even to perceive its internal extension, we must perceive some minimal difference, even if it be only in relationship to the observer's position. Differentiation, and thus unity, are fundamental to existence. The unities we observe depend upon the purpose with which we observe, but their objective reality is independent of our observing.

Once unity has been traced to differentiation, the problem of its subjective aspect is clarified. The fact that the mind can posit unities which nature destroys, simply witnesses to the mind's power of selection. The differentiations it observes are real in nature, but they are not differentiations to which Nature gives emphatic support. There is no need to posit the unifying function of consciousness as in fact formative of the world, - or to regard it as an a priori condition of existence. It is simply a more sophisticated power of selection corresponding to purposes that transcend the elementary preservation of organic life. The catalyst of unity in the matter of experience is not perception, which is confronted with differentiation as already existing, but rather purpose, which affirms³⁵ some differentiations and neglects others.

/It.....p.28.

35. Here we join issue firstly with Kant who thinks that all unity in perception is the work of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. It is, we believe, objectively present in Nature. And secondly with Sartre, who seems to believe that consciousness nihilates, i.e. causes to be non-existent, those aspects of perception which are irrelevant. The café slips away into indeterminateness as I look for Pierre. It becomes simply the not-Pierre. But we believe that our purpose, as distinct from consciousness, by selecting certain aspects of Nature's differentiation, in no way affects the reality of the differentiations which it disregards. (Being and Nothingness : Part I : II)

It is tempting but misleading to say that purpose "negates" other differentiations. It cannot cause them to cease. It can merely disregard them.

Plurality

When plurality is introduced, number gains in content. It now denotes similarity as well as indivisibility, both still relative to purpose. When, for example, we are told that there are three men at the gate, we understand that each object is coherent, and that each resembles the others to a certain minimal extent determined by our conceptual attitude. If one of the men turns out to have no head, our concept may reject him as man. We should then deny that there were three men and assert that there were only two. Number is demonstrated as susceptible to similarity, or the lack of it.

Pure Number

So far we have examined number applied to objects, but what of number when it is pure and unapplied? Here much the same may be said as of pure geometry. If symbols and everything sensory are removed, nothing demonstrable remains. To explain the meaning of "three" we resort, not to the supra-existential, but to some sensory example, for instance three strokes drawn on a page. It is from the more concrete that the symbolic figures or words derive their meaning, not from the more abstract. (They are really, of course, completely concrete themselves). As soon as the meaning of the symbols is assimilated, we are able to make calculations with the symbols alone. Unless we are aware how this comes about, it is easy to fall into the assumption that the symbols are effective by virtue, not of a concrete but of an abstract and supra-existential connotation. In reality the symbols are concrete objects employed to represent other concrete objects. Their power lies in their representative ability, but this is wholly derived from human consent. The symbol, or token, is an object, which, not of its own nature, but by convention is evocative of conceptual attitudes. These attitudes, as we have observed, provide a substitute for actual experience. Thus the symbol 4 evokes in me an attitude which, if necessary, can project an image of four units. It is, of course, true, that I can, and usually do, calculate by means of figures, without the help of images to instantiate their meaning. This is due to a deftness acquired by practice. I have become accustomed to, have formed concepts of, the relationships of figures, and can now pass conceptually along the lines of those relationships. From the symbols $6 + 3$, I can pass instantaneously to 9. Asked to prove the connexion, however, I must take nine concrete units and divide them into a group of six and a group of three. This Hume has pointed out.

Pure Logic

To the symbols of pure logic, similar considerations apply. The concrete symbols are necessary to communication. Unlike the objects of geometry, they are not related by their own natures. Their relationships are conventional, grounded on the consent of logicians to use them in particular ways. The necessity inherent in this discipline depends upon the decision of its practitioners to attach a certain function to certain symbols.

The symbols however, are not regarded as referring beyond the logical discipline. Relationship and necessity are taken to be purely internal. Yet it is plain that this cannot be so, for, as we saw, the symbols do not provide their own relationships. They are the tokens of something else from which their cogency is derived, namely their conventional significance. In what, we must then enquire, does this conventional significance precisely consist?

Firstly, we may eliminate a reference to the objects of the world. The symbols do not stand for particular existent objects, or even for classes of objects. They may function without

being made to stand for these things. We do not have to say: "Let x represent an apple" before we can proceed. (This is not to say that x cannot represent an apple). The connotation would appear to lack the characteristics of objects, or at least to be independent of these characteristics.

Secondly we must eliminate supra-existential connotation, for the supra-existential is the demonstrandum which we are trying to deduce from sense. To assume a connexion between our symbols and the supra-existential is to beg the question.

The only remaining road to take is into the processes of the mind, into the observed ways of the living intelligence. The mind, by practice, can form a conceptual web around each symbol, of its allowable relationships with other symbols. This amounts to little more than memorizing the rules of a game. Just as we learn in chess that a knight may move two squares forward and one to the side, so in logic we may learn that symbols on either side of the sign of identity are interchangeable. We are simply learning a way of doing things, a skill without significance. Significance is destroyed.

If our account seems to deprive formal logic of depth and importance, is this not because there is commonly attached to it a lurking memory of the world of objects, giving it illusory depth?

A logical truth, we hear, is one the opposite of which is self-contradictory. The only propositions of which this is true, are propositions reducible to the form of identity.

$$Z = Z \text{ (Z is Z).}$$

We wish to determine the significance of this proposition. There are two alternative possibilities. Either the sign of identity signifies the bare and mechanical interchangeability of the Z symbols on either side of it - a view which deprives it of meaningfulness. Or the sign of identity refers to some situation beyond the symbols. (But it cannot refer to the relationship of the symbols qua physical objects, because qua physical objects, they are obviously not identical). If there is reference beyond the symbols, we must take identity in its usual sense, implying unity. But the concept of unity is meaningless except as grounded in Existence, where it characterizes the fundamental experience of the world as differentiated. Only by this reference to Existence can the statement of identity become significant.

In allowing the formula of identity this reference to objectivity, we do, however, destroy it as a statement. Permitted to intuit behind Z and Z one single object, we see the meaninglessness of the apparent relationship suggested by the statement form. A statement is, basically, information; that is, a passage from the immediate (i.e. the subject) to the non-immediate (i.e. the predicate) which is rendered conceptually immediate. In the formula of identity, however, there is no passage to the non-immediate. Therefore the use of the statement form is not valid. We are in the presence of the pre-conceptual, which is prior to meaning and prior to truth. The statement form, the vehicle of mediation, collapses into primitive intuition.

It is perhaps the retention of the form of a statement despite the necessity of this collapse which appears to give to the statement of identity the absolute indubitability of the primitive intuition. In reality however, this indubitability does not belong to the propositional form. It belongs to the world.

It appears, then, that formal logic is either without significance, or else retains a self destructive allusion to objectivity. In either case, the road beyond existence remains barred.

Summary

At this stage it will be useful to gather up the main points of the argument.

Philosophy sets out to find a path beyond the experience of the senses. Being a discipline of Reason, it seeks to pass beyond the senses by deduction, that is, to find within the world of sense conclusive proof of the ultra-sensory world. It is thus drawn to those regions of the world of sense where our reasoning takes on the character of necessity. Necessity is assumed to characterize the highest exercise of Reason.

Philosophy is also communication. It is not only the attempt to achieve truth, but is also committed to the rendering of truth accessible to others, and, if possible, cogent for others. Communication takes place only through the medium of the senses; i.e. it is grounded in Existence. The task is therefore to present a logically necessary ascent from sensory communication to non-sensory reality.³⁶ Existence is the given. Supra-sensory reality is the demonstrandum.

Logical necessity inheres in only a very small segment of the objects of the world, that is in the objects of certain specialized disciplines. These objects, on examination, prove to be entirely sensory, though of a highly simplified kind. Their necessary relationships depend either, as in geometry, on their extreme simplicity as objects, or, as in number and logic, on a conventional method of use.

In geometry the apparent coincidence of concept and object gives the appearance of a new kind of knowing. The conceptual aspect is enhanced to the detriment of the objects. The concept "man", for example, leaves a great deal unknown about the individual to whom it is applied. But the concept "straight line" seems to give an exhaustive description of any actual straight line. This prompts a thought process which may be reduced as follows: Here is an object which contains nothing that was not in my definition. I possessed the definition before I saw the object. Therefore I knew the object before I saw it. Therefore my knowing is prior to the object, and possibly produced the object. The object, at all events, is posterior to the knowing of it. Therefore, when the object lapses from rectilinearity, I still possess the reality, that is, my knowledge. Then why should I not discard the object and adhere only to the reality, that is, to my knowledge? Then I shall have risen above sense, above Existence. My knowledge will be pure.

/The.....p.31.

36. We may pause here to note the double fallacy which disables all ontological proofs of God. In the first place, such proofs do not start from the sphere of Existence, but from the supra-sensory sphere where we must locate the Idea of God (if there is such a thing). Thus the question is begged at the start. Secondly, there is illegitimacy in the customary passage from Essence to Existence. Essence is idea. From Essence, therefore, only the idea of Existence, not the actuality, can be extracted. This Kierkegaard has pointed out. Wolfson (Spinoza; The Ontological Proof) argues plausibly that under the form of proof there lies a direct intuition of God. We prefer to find the pre-rational affirmation of the Eros, for an intuition of God, we believe, is impossible.

The basic flaw in the above is, of course, that the knowledge was never exhaustive at all. The physical object changed by virtue of a disregarded residue. The prior knowledge, in fact, was knowledge of a subjective conceptual attitude, not of any external actuality.

In the symbolic disciplines, the same illusion of the presence of the supra-sensory arises from the fact that the relationships of necessity are not sustained by the symbols per se. The cogency is therefore assumed to emanate from a more real order. This assumption begs the question; there is, moreover, no inductive need to make it. For the cogency inherent in the relations of the symbols can be satisfactorily explained in terms of conceptual association, that is of psychic behaviour. To locate the cogency in the psyche is not, of course, to have explained the psyche. But it is sufficient at present simply to indicate this as an empirically verifiable series of phenomena, exhibiting, in common with other forms of psychic life, the tendency to form conceptual associations.

The Essence

The essence of the argument is that from Existence there is no necessary passage to Supra-existence. And therefore Reason cannot claim to cognize Supra-existence without first executing an irrational leap. Any reasoning which speaks in supra-existential terms can do so only because it has in fact assumed the reality of the Supra-existential. Such reasoning rests on a premise that cannot be communicated either in proof or demonstration. Moreover, we have witnessed the genesis of Reason in the sphere of Existence, where it functions in an a posteriori manner upon the data of experience. What was claimed as a priori proved to be not absolutely, but only relatively a priori. A fortiori, therefore, an a priori knowledge of the undemonstrable comes under question.

When we call the Supra-existential in question, no one can demonstrate it for us, nor can Reason deduce it for us. Because of this, we must deny Reason the right to speak as if it cognized the Supra-existential. It can only earn this right by providing a deductive passage to the Supra-existential, which it does not do.

So far as is empirically verifiable, Reason is post-experiential; that is, it is called into being by experience. Experience is prior to Reason. But there is no verifiable experience of the Supra-existential. Therefore, when Reason claims to cognize the Supra-existential, there are two possible interpretations. Either Reason must claim an unverifiable experience. Or it must inexplicably change its character from a posteriori to a priori, so that it no longer needs the basis of experience. The first alternative we reject because reasoning that rests on the unverifiable is itself unverifiable, which destroys its character as reasoning. The second alternative we also reject, because if Reason is prior to Supra-existence, it must be the ground of Supra-existence, and, a fortiori, supra-existential itself. But we know it as Existential. If it becomes supra-existential, it is no longer what we have meant by "Reason".

On the strength of these considerations in general, and principally on the consideration that the Supra-existential is unverifiable, we shall withhold consent from all forms of philosophizing that imply cognition of the Supra-existential. Yet we recognize at the same time an undeniable fact, namely, that there is a large body of philosophical thought, it may be the bulk of philosophical thought, that makes precisely the assumption we have outlined, that is, cognition of the Supra-existential. Such an assumption does indeed seem to lie at the roots of philosophizing. The second part of this essay, therefore, will consist in the main of an investigation of the cause of this assumption in philosophy, and of the conclusions that may be drawn concerning it.

The Rationalistic Assumption

At the end of the preceding we outlined the nature of the Rationalistic Assumption, as we once before called it. This assumption that Supra-existence is known enters philosophy in the main by one device, the objectification of the concept.

The Objectification of the Concept

When the concept is assumed to have objective reality, to be, in other words, an independent entity, a foundation is laid on which it becomes possible to build the world of the entia rationis, which includes among its contents the famous systems of philosophy. All entia rationis, however, are rendered unverifiable by the fact that in philosophizing we must start from Existence, if for no other reason, because we communicate through Existence. He, therefore, who claims to know the entia rationis, has made an irrational leap. In leaping he abandons Reason. Why, therefore, should he reassert Reason after he has leapt, in postulating a supra-existential and rational world? We claim, in effect, that such a leap is not possible to Reason; that in making it, Reason denies its own nature. Why, therefore, do we see the leap attempted time after time? It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the central theme of philosophizing is the difference between Appearance and Reality. If Reality is claimed for cognition, as it frequently is, then the leap is being attempted. Therefore we ask, what can be the impetus of the attempt?

What is the impetus?

If our earlier analysis of Reason as consisting essentially in the psychic tendency to form conceptual associations was correct, then Reason is not in itself an impetus. Moreover, is it not absurd to suppose that Reason is a self-destroying impetus - as it must be if it attempts the leap?³⁷ In our analysis of Reason within Existence,

/we.....p.33.

37. Compare this leap with Kierkegaard's (The Paradox and the Offended Consciousness.) There is something in common, and also a vital difference. For Kierkegaard the Incarnation is the Absolute Paradox in which absolutely unlike, i.e. God, is absolutely like, i.e. a man among men - in a nutshell, the swaddling clothes of the eternal. Kierkegaard sees this as a contradiction that offends Reason. Paradox and Reason can co-exist only on condition of Reason's self-abnegation in Faith, which is the leap. The Rationalistic Assumption is also a leap to supra-existence, but - and here lies the vital difference - an unconscious one. Hence Reason is supposed to pass in unbroken passage to supra-existence, and moreover, to cognize it. It is not, as with Kierkegaard, left behind. Kierkegaard is paralleled by Jaspers (Reason and Existence IV) who believes that circularity, i.e. contradiction, is necessary to philosophy as a cryptogram of Transcendence. Thus a formula which is objectively self-destructive becomes the symbol of supra-existence (e.g. causa sui). This must happen when we try to think the unthinkable. While our argument disagrees with the Rationalistic Assumption, we nevertheless find it hard to concur entirely with Kierkegaard and Jaspers. Let us consider Kierkegaard's Paradox.

The absolutely unlike is the absolutely like. What meaning shall we assign to "absolutely unlike". Plainly, no positive content is conveyed (as distinct from intended.) The absolutely unlike is not known in itself. It is a limit of thought. In fact, it is the unknowable. (The force of the "absolutely" we hold to be conveyed by the suffix "-able". Cf. unknowable/unknown.) Correspondingly, the absolutely like is the knowable. Thus, by substitution we come to:

The unknowable is the knowable.

Let us not be offended yet; for Kierkegaard has told us it is a paradox. Let us substitute further. For "knowable" let us say the Christ, this man, and, precisely qua knowable, this flesh. Then we have:

The unknowable is this flesh.

The unknowable, however is necessarily an unknown. Kierkegaard's statement, we are certain, originated from a known, Christ the man. This then is the real subject, Christ the man, this flesh.

(Footnote 37 continued overleaf)

we did in fact discover that it was grounded on a vital force which we called the Will-to-live. But the Will-to-live does not exhaust the psychic need of man. When the requirements of organic life have been met, is it deniable that in many, perhaps most, men, there remains a felt need? This need appears to proceed out of the psychic depths, and in as far as both have a psychic centrality, to be continuous with the Will-to-live. The Will-to-live, once satisfied seems to pass imperceptibly into the new desire. This³⁸ merging receives corroboration from the dual meaning of the word "life" which denotes first organic life, and then a developed or "spiritual" life. Life refers in either case to the central psychic force, and the second stage is inseparable from the first. The first, however, does not always develop into the second.

³⁹The above is offered simply as the fruits of an empirical venture into psychology. We believe that the presence of a desire that transcends the needs of physical life is widespread and empirically verifiable. We further assert, also on empirical grounds, that this desire is not satisfied by anything within Existence, that in one form, at least, it cannot discover an objective in Space and Time; accordingly that this desire postulates the Supra-Existential by its own internal cogency.

The Eros defined.

In as far as the desire towards Supra-existence is common to mankind in general⁴⁰, let us call it the Eros. It gives rise to a variety of forms of the postulation of supra-existential reality. One of these forms is Religion. Another, we suggest, is Philosophy, in so far as Philosophy seeks the supra-existential. Religion and Philosophy

/appear.....p.34.

37. (Continued)

(Alternatively we may arrive at the same result by noting that "is" must signify identity if there is to be a paradox. Accordingly, we may substitute subject and predicate for each other.) The Paradox, then, becomes this:

This flesh is the unknowable, i.e. unknown.

Can Reason abnegate itself before this? Can this be the true meaning of "Christ is God?" We suggest not. Is it not possible, however, that we do not need to think the unthinkable? Is this not a mistaken attempt? Normally a statement uses concepts. But of God, qua unthinkable, there can be no concept, and hence, no thought. The statement about God, therefore, is not a normal statement. It is the verbal expression of something that is prior to thought, and inaccessible to thought. In extracting from it a paradox, thought merely demonstrates its own secondary nature, and its powerlessness to step beyond its limits. To the thought that does not make the attempt, the Paradox is not necessary. To the thought that does assault its limits, the Paradox may be necessary, not logically, but as a psychological jolt. (Compare Price's comment to the effect that when thought finds contradiction in a fact, there is something wrong with the thought.)

38. Compare Jaspers on the Encompassing. (Reason and Existenz II and III esp. IIA). The three modes of our being, empirical existence, consciousness as such, and spirit are interdependent. In particular, the higher cannot stand without the lower. Similarly, in our view, the Eros grows out of the will-to-live, which is directed to empirical existence.
39. For a justification of this procedure, see Bradley (Appearance and Reality IX). Metaphysics that spurns psychology begets a monster.
40. The existence of a general Eros implies that the philosophical path is only one approach to supra-existence among many. Cf. Bradley. (Appearance and Reality: Intro.) "there is no calling or pursuit which is a private road to the Deity."



appear in this way as two branches of the same basic Eros, which, in them becomes differentiated into the Religious and the Philosophical Eros. It is not, however, essential to our argument that the basic identity of the Religious and the Philosophical Eros be recognized. All that is essential is the granting of the Philosophical Eros. It is here that we strive most of all to bring conviction. The arguments that we offer are two.

In the first place, Reason, regarded as bare conceptuality, does not provide its own motive force. Reason, as we have said, is grounded in vital impetus. This at least we believe we have observed in the sphere of Existence, where Reason is motivated by the will-to-live. There is, therefore, an inductive presumption that Reason, still considered as bare conceptuality, requires a motive force when it attempts to cognize Supra-existence. Such a force appears to be present in the Eros towards Supra-existence. Secondly, what philosopher is there who does not experience the desire to philosophize? Who does not philosophize under the urgency of an inner need? (Here, naturally, we rule out the Sophists and their successors who philosophize in a superficial way for pecuniary gain.) This need is precisely what we mean by the Philosophical Eros.

We have presented a number of arguments to the effect that Reason does not transcend Existence. As a consequence of these arguments we maintain that when Philosophy attempts to cognize Supra-existence, it is not impelled to do so by Reason (which in any case is not a force), but by the Philosophical Eros which postulates Supra-existential reality independently of Reason, that is to say, mysteriously.

The Dual Nature of Philosophy

Philosophy now appears as consisting of two elements. Firstly an impetus, (the Eros) and secondly Reason. Where it postulates the supra-existential, it does so under the impetus and not by any cogency of Reason. On the contrary, Reason cannot attempt to cognize the supra-existential without destroying itself. Therefore, in philosophies where this leap is attempted, we hold that there is a mistaken view of the function of Reason. But we do not on that account advocate the separation of Reason and the Philosophical Eros, so that a large area of Philosophy collapses completely. Rather, we believe, the task is to establish the proper interplay of Reason and the Eros. To the clarification of this interplay the remainder of this essay will be largely devoted.

Mysticism

Before approaching this task, let us make a final observation concerning the Eros. In so far as it is an impetus to something beyond Existence, it may be called Mysterious, because its objective is not cognized. This objective, if it is real, is the Mystery, (). The postulation of the Mystery is the essence of Mysticism. The existence of the Eros is in no way offered as a proof of the reality of the Mystery. It would no longer be a mystery if it could be proved. The Eros postulates the Mystery but does not prove it. If we, under the Eros, postulate the Mystery it is because the Eros compels us, not by any logical cogency, but as a force. We shall now turn to consider the movement of the Eros within Philosophy.

Philosophy as the search for the One

Will anyone dispute that the dominant and uniting theme of Philosophy in all ages has been the search for Reality as opposed to Appearance? And may this not equally well be expressed as the

search for the One⁴¹? For philosophizing always takes the form of finding a unity in plurality, the one in the many. We maintain, and in due course hope to show, that this One is supra-existential. In which case, the supra-existential is centrally and not merely incidentally posited in Philosophy. By our argument, it must be posited by the Eros which we may thus call the Eros to the One. In other words, the mystical element is central in Philosophy. It thus becomes possible to define Philosophy as Reason impelled by Eros, or as Eros proceeding by Reason.

In concrete terms, the sense of the above is that the philosophical man is impelled by an inner cogency to seek, by means of Reason, a reality beyond the phenomena of Existence. He is possessed by a restlessness in the face of Existence which is not assuaged by the conceptualization of Existence that suffices to meet the needs of organic life or The beginning of Philosophy is thus evinced in the attempt to pursue farther than the needs of require; the uniformities of Nature which are first grasped under the will-to-live. In this way man arrives at the Scientific attitude. This is why the first philosophers were also the first scientists. Let us consider this phase.

Science

Science is the attempt to understand Nature, to apprehend the causes of phenomena and dispel the mystery of the physical world. It soon discovers that Nature is too complex to be known in detail. A minute examination of the causes of a single event produces immediately an intractable multiplicity; that is, if the enquiry is directed to discovering all the factors without which this event could not have happened. There is, however, an alternative view of causation.

It is possible to pursue a chain of what might be called commensurate causes, causes that is, on the same scale as the end event. This is done with reference to a particular and limited purpose. Thus, if a man is in prison, we may say it is because he committed a crime, which was because he was badly brought up, which was because his father died young, which was because he contracted phthisis, which was because he was a miner, which was because his father was a miner before him, which was because he lived in Wales, which was because the Romans chased his ancestors there - and reasonably soon to the beginning of the world. But this is a highly simplified and abstracted view of causation which will not suit the purposes of science. The scientific spirit wishes to know the totality of causation contributing to a single event.

In an interconnected universe, this totality of causation soon appears to be the totality of the universe, which is so interrelated that if a single grain of sand were annihilated, the whole future would be changed. Therefore there is no past event, however minute, whose effect is not felt in this present event.

/Nor.....p.36.

41. Only in the discursive analysis of the Enlightenment when Reason devoted itself to the understanding and organization of the various fields of human endeavour, all assumed to be valid and valuable, does the Eros to the One seem to be dissipated and lost. As Schweitzer remarks (*Civilization and Ethics I*), what this optimism lacked in depth, it made up for in the fact that its hands were blistered. Nevertheless, in the abeyance of the Eros, true philosophy that seeks ultimate bases seemed to die. But in the following century, with the appearance of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and the Existentialist thinkers the Eros came to a strong rebirth and philosophy once again ran in its true course.

Nor is this all. The whole of the coexistent present, supplying as it were collateral support to an event, must also be reckoned as cause.

The scientific spirit then, seeks law in nature, the knowledge that certain things had to be, and that other things will have to be. It aims to apprehend nature as a single coherent whole proceeding predictably and without mystery. Law is the answer to the impossibility of actually experiencing the whole universe. If that cannot be, the next best, perhaps a better thing, is to know that, given this, then that must be. In taking this turning, science retreats into the conceptual (for a Law is a conceptual unity) before the baffling multiplicity of nature. Knowledge, starting from some present experience, radiates out conceptually to the unknown past, present and future. In such knowledge there is no logical necessity, simply the assumption that Nature will continue to behave as it has always behaved.⁴²

Law, however, is an abstraction. The wider its scope, the less it has to say, and the scientist, whose knowledge is that of experiment and intuition, could never be satisfied with a vague generalization about the material universe.

Practical science, it is true, accepts the obvious physical natures as stops and proceeds to make laws for the behaviour of a variety of substances. It is content with a number of practical unities because it presses little farther than physical life demands. The philosophical spirit, however, the eros towards the One, drives down another scientific path, that of research.

In research, the attempt to embrace the whole is abandoned for an ever minute examination of the past. The faith of research is that, in the smallest division, matter will reveal a unity. Even here, however, the One of matter cannot itself be matter. For supposing that the smallest parts of matter revealed a perfect similarity, they would still be a multiplicity. There would be no objective unity. The only unity possible would be one of principle, that is, a subjective and conceptual unity.

The fundamental
diversity of
matter

But if we pursue these thoughts a little further, we shall see that basic matter cannot exhibit even a unity of principle. Composite matter presents us with the infinite diversity of the world around us. Such diversity in the composite state cannot arise from a perfect similarity in the discrete state. Between the smallest parts of matter, there must be a difference, either structural or kinetic. If they are perfectly similar structures, then they must move in dissimilar paths. If they move in ⁴³similar paths, they must be dissimilar structures.

Moreover, neither the structural, that is the three-dimensional, nor the kinetic aspect of matter can be discarded.

/Modern.....p.37.

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42. So Bergson: "Science carries this faculty (the prevision of the future by common sense) to the highest possible degree of exactitude ... but does not alter its essential character".) The essential law of all intellect is that "like produces like". (Creative Evolution. Ch. I : Biology Physics and Chemistry).
43. A unity of principle might embrace either the structural aspect, if it exhibited similarity, or the kinetic, if it did. But a single principle could not embrace both structural and kinetic. Moreover, to produce composite diversity, either structural or kinetic must be internally diverse. This is an additional reason for the impossibility of a single principle.
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Modern research seems to attempt to reduce volume to movement, that is to say, to Energy. But it is obvious that there can be no movement without that which moves. Structure and motion are equally fundamental in matter, unless, indeed, the Prime Mover suddenly introduced motion into a motionless cosmos. But that is disproved by the evidence for evolution.

In the last analysis, we have seen, matter yields no unity, not even of principle.⁴⁴ Having travelled to the end of the scientific road, the philosophical Eros must take a new turning. Gradually it begins to turn away from the natural world, and to seek the One elsewhere.

The self-affirmation of consciousness

When the Eros finds no satisfaction in the material world, there takes place the self-affirmation of the Eros as valuable independently of nature. At the same time, the importance of consciousness is enhanced. The evidence of this new spirit is that the mind becomes selective with regard to Nature; no longer feeling bound to investigate matter to the uttermost, it starts to select certain aspects of nature as more important than others, because they seem to approximate more closely to the One that is sought. Thus the good, the just, the beautiful and so on receive more attention than the rest of things.⁴⁵ In a word, Value is born.

Value

The various values evinced by Nature are grouped into unities by the conceptual faculty. These groupings are made on the basis of similarity between certain acts, for example, just acts, or certain objects, for example, beautiful objects. In some philosophies, however, a real unity such as Justice or Beauty, is postulated behind the multiplicity of just acts or beautiful objects. Let us now consider how this may arise.

The Eros to the One, we must remember, is, in Philosophy, proceeding by means of Reason. Reason is not itself the impulse, but it ranges over experience at the urge of the impulse. Reason is essentially post-intuitional, secondary to experience. It has, we must remember, only two functions, induction and deduction. Induction is the forging of conceptual links among the events of experience. Deduction is the passage by imagination along those conceptual links. Of itself, deduction possesses only correctness. Truth is the property of induction when it makes a true grouping. A deduction may be true as well as correct, only by being drawn from a true concept. In induction, Reason is a unifying function. We have seen cause to believe that the unities of Reason are psychological, but this is not apparent in the early stages of the withdrawal of the Eros from Nature. In the unities of Value with which Reason seems to render Nature tractable, the Eros senses an approximation to the One. But the Eros is, unknowingly, seeking a substantial unity. Therefore it imbues the unities of Reason with substance, and posits Truth, Beauty and so on as objective realities.

The Deceived Reason

Here there arises a condition of illusion, which, variously regarded, may be caused by the Eros, insufficiently weaned from nature, or by the *Ubris* of Reason which attempts to satisfy the deepest demands of Life. Reason, being secondary to experience, can never engender experience of a new order, yet here it is held to have done so. A new reality is supposed to have entered experience. Then a circularity of thought occurs. Reason is required to be

/operative.....p.38.

44. Thus from the material One of Thales we pass to the fundamental diversity of the Atomists. Their insight, in as much as it has abandoned belief in the One, is the epilogue of the scientific phase of philosophy.

45. i.e. good men, just acts, beautiful objects etc.

operative in terms of this new experience, both inductively to reach a higher reality, and deductively down to the world which instantiates the objective values. Because there is a void of true experience, Reason lacks nourishment and turns for substance to itself.⁴⁶ Pure Reason, however, is as transparent and lacking in substance as objectified value. Consequently, Reason fastens on those exercises where it is exhibited in its purest form, that is where its process is clear and necessary. The sensory content, which is in fact the whole matter of these exercises, is regarded as unessential, a residue, useful only as an illustration of the nature of Pure Reason. Finally there occurs what may be called the apotheosis of necessity.

The Apotheosis of Necessity

How does this come about? Reason, pushing beyond sense, finds only itself, the self awareness of the mind, a vague and ill-defined experience. It cannot directly intuit its own content. It therefore postulates as its content the quality of necessity which inhered in the clearest, though not necessarily the most profound, of its sensory exercises. Here it supposes that it has approached closest to itself; although, as we have seen, necessity is a property only of some extremely limited objects. Then, having found only itself beyond the senses, Reason postulates itself as the One, the supra-sensory reality, and Necessity as the essence of the One.

The fallacy is plain if we remember the only two possibilities of Reason, viz. Induction and Deduction. Apart from these two functions, Reason has no power. Induction forges subjective unities. Deduction makes explicit the unities of induction. Necessity inheres only in the secondary function, deduction. Neither faculty can produce experience of a new kind, although induction can possibly⁴⁷ orientate us towards it. But deduction, being secondary to induction, cannot even do this. Yet it is proposed to ascend to new reality by necessary steps, that is by deduction. When the attempt fails, as it is bound to, supra-sensory reality is nevertheless posited by the Eros. Then necessity is projected into the One. How illogical that the power which failed to make the ascent should be posited as the inner energy of the higher world!

The root cause of the delusion is the objectification of the conceptual unities of Reason. This happens when a conceptual structure is built across the flood of the Eros. If the barrier holds, the stream solidifies and dies. Concepts become invested with the gravity of the lifeless Eros. Life is extinguished. Philosophy is choked in the stranglehold of Necessity.

The Way of Escape

There is, however a way of escape. This is to accept the reality of the psyche, the living and mysterious conceptualizing subject. The Eros must withdraw into the phenomena of the soul, taking with it the light of Reason, of a Reason freed from Necessity. For wherever there is experience, there Reason may range. The reality of psychic experience is well enough attested to merit its attention.

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46. The *véηēis véηēews* of Aristotle, for all its far-reaching influence on Western thought, principally felt in the Thomist identification of this intellectual essence with God, is, of all concepts, the emptiest; an early and extreme manifestation of the Rationalistic Assumption.
47. Thus Einstein's formula stands like x for an unknown coefficient of sensory occurrences. It is made up through the lack of observable conjunctions. It is efficacious, and so it is assumed to stand for a reality. But should it cease to save the phenomena, it would fall. Thus it is not an intuition of reality.

In passing beyond Necessity, we do not pass beyond Reason. It is still possible to be philosophical, that is, to seek the One by the aid of Reason; but we shall no longer seek a necessary knowledge of the One. We shall understand that Reason has varying degrees of cogency and clarity according to the sphere of Reality over which it ranges.

Consciousness

In directing our thought towards the psyche, we are first confronted by the phenomenon of consciousness. Consciousness is the quality of awareness inherent in the living organism. It is only by our ability of consciousness that we can know the other data of the psyche, or for that matter, anything at all. Therefore it is necessary to investigate consciousness first. In doing so, however, we encounter an immediate difficulty.

Difficulty

The difficulty is that it is only by consciousness that we can investigate consciousness. The question, therefore, is whether the consciousness of consciousness is possible. Can consciousness be conscious of itself?

Our criterion for the valid matter of reasoning has become the possibility of experience. We have broken free from the limitations of necessary thought and are now able to let Reason range over all that is experienced. Provided only that there can be consciousness of consciousness, we shall be able to reason about consciousness. But is consciousness of consciousness a fact of experience?

The Objective

It will be helpful here to consider in general the nature of that which can be experienced, that is, the knowable, or the objective.

In the first place, it seems that the knowable is, in some sense, substantial. It has content. It has opacity. The reality of this content is not affected by any ontological construction which may later be put upon it. It is a primitive and pre-conceptual certainty. It is a thisness prior to conceptual formulation. No statement about the objective can carry the reality of actually experiencing it. It is, therefore, impossible to explain. All we can do is indicate an experience which every man must have for himself.

In the second place, it seems that the knowable must have some minimal duration. It must last for some period of time if it is to be known at all.

Thirdly, the objective is particular. It is a unity in diversity. It is itself and not something else. Its thisness is exclusive of all other thisness. And it is also exclusive of nothingness. The objective is that which truly cannot both be and not be the same thing.⁴⁸ If we describe it as not being what it is, it passes at once beyond the possibility of experience.

/Thisness.....p.40.

48. In this aspect, the objective is exhibited as the basis of logic. Despite Platonic and Hegelian discoveries of contradictories in the same object, we maintain that the objective is never anything but what it is. This view is also held by Sartre in his analysis of Being in-itself. The so-called discovery of contradictories is really a failure to distinguish the part from the whole, or to realize that meaning depends on context. The house that is red and white is red-in-part and white-in-part. The stone that is heavy and light is heavy-for-the-child and light-for-me. But the house is not red and white in the same part; the stone is not heavy and light for me. Thus the law of logic is no more than the way of things.

This-ness is obliterated. On this aspect of the knowable, we base our argument.

Let us return to the question, "can there be consciousness of consciousness?" This could be re-phrased as, "can consciousness be objective?" The objective is that which is known. Consciousness is that which knows. The two are mutually exclusive. To be that which knows is not to be that which is known. For consciousness to be objective, it must be that which is known. But it must also be that which knows. Therefore, since the objective cannot both be and not be the same thing, consciousness cannot be objective. It is an unknowable, and so irrelevant to Reason. Its apparent reality must be due to the false objectification of a concept.

Query

Here a query arises. Have we not gone astray by using the general term, consciousness, when real consciousnesses are distinct and individual? We may have shown that a particular consciousness cannot know itself; but have we shown that one consciousness cannot be known by another consciousness?

In replying to this, we must first establish what it is that constitutes a consciousness as particular. Consciousness is knowing. Knowing is distinguished from knowing firstly by that which is known. This cannot be identical, except from the same point at the same time. But knowing from one point at one time cannot be the knowing of two consciousnesses, only of one, for there is no distinction. Therefore it must be impossible for two consciousnesses to be at the same point at the same time. Therefore it must be impossible for one consciousness to know the knowing of another.

Thus we return to the conclusion that consciousness cannot be an object of experience. There is, thus, no reason to regard it as an independent reality.

But if consciousness is not an independent reality, from what does the concept of consciousness originate? Surely from the relationship of the knower and the known. The knower and the known are the realities behind the term "consciousness," just as people and sounds are the realities behind the term "speech".

The question then arises, "what is the knower?", to which we reply, the living human organism. Consciousness is the interplay of the living organism with its environment.⁴⁹ The inherence of

/knowing.....p.41.

49. This position somewhat resembles that of Leibniz for whom perception is a basic property of all Monads, in that each reflects the determinations of all. We, similarly, do not see consciousness as a sudden interpolation into matter, but rather as a fundamental potentiality which is realized as matter becomes organized, much as a house is realized out of bricks. This is essentially the position of Teilhard de Chardin (*The Future of Man*; Ch. VI). Of the degree of passivity or activity inherent in living matter, to what extent life is original and to what it merely suffers, we have not attempted to speak, because we do not see this as of fundamental importance. Bergson dwelt on this point because, for him, matter is like a mould encasing the vital impetus. (*Creative Evolution I: Vital Impetus*). In this way he seems to re-admit the Platonic-Aristotelian hiatus between form and matter (for even Aristotelian form fails to inhere completely). We, by contrast, do not distinguish between matter and the impetus, making matter mechanical and impetus the mystery. For the whole of matter is ultimately mysterious in the manner of its issuing from Transcendence. The whole cosmic process is grounded in the Unknowable.

knowing, whenever found, in a living organism furnishes overwhelming inductive proof of the dependence of knowing on organic life, of the existence of knowing only as a function of organic life.

Self-consciousness

But in making this apparently a priori decision on the impossibility of experiencing consciousness as object, have we done justice to the mass of human experience, both lay and philosophical, which has produced the term self-consciousness? This well attested experience must surely be the foundation of the view that consciousness can intuit itself. How, then, are we to construe the term self-consciousness? Let us attempt an analysis of the phenomena.

Analysis of Experience

We are now attempting to answer the question, "50 is consciousness experienced?" as distinct from, "can consciousness be experienced?" We are doing so in order to have a check on the apparently a priori conclusion which we reached, based on the nature of the knowable is such.

In the first place, consciousness is of something, of this chair, that book and so on. But when I attempt to examine my consciousness of an object, the experience becomes clouded and vague.

/Anything.....p.42.

50. Let us consider the positions of Descartes, Kant and Sartre. Cogito ergo sum has the form of a deduction, but in Med. II, Descartes describes the ego as what "properly speaking ... is in me called feeling." Then in Med. III, he says, "I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind, yet always ... I add something else to the idea which I have of that thing." Thus we have the ego once deduced, and twice directly apprehended. The emphasis on direct apprehension is strengthened by the fact that the ego is already present in the mere "cogito". We conclude that the deductive form is an unsuccessful attempt to introduce logical process into a primitive intuition. We also attach importance to Descartes' diagnosis of the content of this intuition as feeling.

Kant, in the Transcendental Aesthetic states that "inner sense gives no direct perception of the soul as object, but it nevertheless is the one single form in which our state comes before us as a definite object of perception." There is thus no perception of the self for Kant. It is merely implied as the source of unity or connectedness in the perception. Why this unity cannot be ascribed to objective nature, we fail to see. Notice that Kant, unlike Descartes, refuses to identify self with feeling.

Sartre (Being and Nothingness Intro. III) posits a pre-reflective cogito, an awareness of the self in all perception. This reminds us of Descartes, but Sartre does not describe the awareness as a feeling. It is a non-positional awareness of self which necessarily accompanies awareness of the object. It is an awareness that does not constitute the self as object. It cannot be deliberately achieved, only incidentally to objective perception. This is either an extremely difficult or else a somewhat muddle-headed view. Our analysis of remembered perception leads us to suspect the latter. Sartre seems to be trapped among the fleeting ghosts of internal sense. At best, he stands on a direct contradiction. Awareness of the non-objective is simply not awareness.

We maintain that there is awareness of the self in the Cartesian sense of feeling, but that this self is not strictly the percipiens, but rather another part of the psyche. The percipiens is merely a faculty of this deeper self, which is however, not yet the true self. Bradley finds no absolute self in consciousness and we agree with him (Appearance and Reality IX). No phenomenal self is absolute. But we shall later indicate a possible explanation of the absolute self.

Anything that might be termed my consciousness eludes me, and the perception of the object itself seems to fade and become unclear. This appears to be because the intention of thought towards the object is withdrawn. It appears that I cannot deliberately be conscious of consciousness.⁵¹

Is there, then, any way of examining our ordinary experience, with a view to analysing its content? A way does suggest itself. If immediate experience is radically altered by our scrutiny, can we not instead, examine past experience by means of Memory?

The examination
of remembered
experience

This method bears fruit. I find that I have a clear memory of the dog walking across the carpet a minute ago. It seems to me plain that I was conscious only of the dog, without any concomitant consciousness of my consciousness. Ordinary experience, it seems, does not contain consciousness as a datum.

We have now failed to find consciousness by deliberate intuition, and it has not appeared as a datum of primary experience. What, then, can self-consciousness be? For we can no longer construe it as consciousness-consciousness. We must discover another connotation for "self".

The Self as
Will

The psyche contains several elements: sensation, emotion, imagination, conceptuality and will. Does "self" refer to any or to all of these? The self is that by which a man is what he is, by which he is the sort of man that he is. The most fundamental aspect of the character is will or intention. It is by this that other men primarily judge him. When I am aware of myself, I am aware of a feeling of direction or intention towards Existence in general. This appears to me as what I fundamentally am. By extension I am also my emotions and all else that is in the psyche, but most fundamentally I am my will. This central node of will is undoubtedly present as a feeling, not unlike the feelings of the outer senses. The emotions too are possessed of physical locations.

The persistence
of the self

Moreover, I am aware of my basic self as something that persists - not indeed as changeless, but as a recognizable continuum. It transcends consciousness because it does not cease with consciousness. This is illustrated by the phenomenon of sleep. I awake the same person as I was before. My self has not been obliterated by the cessation of consciousness. It is as if the light in a room has been switched off for a time, and is then switched on again. The room is revealed as still there. Of course it cannot be proved that the room did not cease to exist when the light was out, but common sense and inductive reasoning made it in the highest degree improbable. Indeed, the persistence of the self is an assumption necessary to the practical life. It makes nonsense of experience to assume that other men cease to be when consciousness temporarily ceases. The murderer who made the plea that he had killed no one because the victim was asleep would meet with little sympathy from the jury. Such expressions as, "he regained consciousness" reinforce the same point. Thus the self appears to be more than consciousness, to be founded outside consciousness. We conclude that the experience of self-consciousness does not contain consciousness as a datum. Thus the conclusion drawn from the nature of the knowable is substantiated by the analysis of experience.

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51. By intention of thought is signified not some determination of thought itself, but the deeper determination of will which directs the thought as well as many other functions of the organism. This intention is apprehended as feeling by the reflective consciousness.

A fuller consideration of the organism

The living organism was identified above as the reality of which consciousness is a function. Before moving on, let us consider the implications of this fact. It implies firstly that consciousness is a purely material function; that there is nothing in consciousness beyond the nature of highly organized matter. In other words, matter, at a sufficiently complex stage of organization, becomes conscious. The universe is thus a continuum and consciousness has always been its possibility, the possibility of matter. No longer may we regard it as miraculously introduced into matter.

But it is hard to surrender belief in consciousness as the non-material, the antithesis of matter. Yet this belief must be surrendered in the light of certain radical objections.⁵²

In the first place, it is necessary that consciousness and the conscious being at some point coincide. Consciousness either is the organism, or else it is by means of the organism. (The universal presence of the organism suffices to establish it as the condition of consciousness). If consciousness is by means of the organism, then consciousness is beyond the organism, and should be aware of the organism. But consciousness sees with the seeing of the eyes; it does not see the eyes. It is aware with the awareness of the brain; but it is not aware of the brain. Moreover, if the organism is in some sense an intermediary between consciousness and the object, such intermediaries become necessary ad infinitum. There must be an organism to relate consciousness to the organism and so on, which is absurd. Therefore consciousness must coincide with the organism.⁵³

This coincidence, does not, however, mean the debasement of consciousness. For matter is pre-rational, ultimately inexplicable; and mysterious. By this discovery of matter's potentiality, consciousness is not debased; rather, is matter enhanced.

Once consciousness is recognized as a function of the organism, the phenomenon of self-consciousness becomes explicable. Consciousness is one function among many. Just as the lights of the car are not the whole machine, so consciousness is not the whole psyche. It is the awareness that is prerequisite to the functioning of will, just as the light is necessary before the car can move in the dark. Thus consciousness can illuminate a part of the psyche which is not identical with itself - yet neither can it be separate from itself, for the psyche is a continuous unity. Its interconnexion is the interconnexion of the organism itself.

The organism, qua psyche, is aware with a part of itself. It is aware firstly of objects, and secondly of that part of itself which is not aware. (The body, by analogy, sees with the eye, the eye sees the body, but the eye does not see the eye. The self, i.e. the part of the psyche which is not aware, acts in accordance with awareness; it behaves as if it knows the world. Therefore there is overwhelming reason to assume that the self is continuous with the part of the psyche that is aware. This assumption, so irresistibly forced upon us by Nature, is in fact the origin of all such statements

52. Spinoza attempts to overcome this hiatus (in reality a new form of the old Platonic one) by making Thought and Extension two attributes of the one Substance. This effects a junction, as it were behind the scenes, unverifiable and founded on a mere definition. As such it does not carry conviction.

53. It is hard to agree with Bergson that a pre-existent power of sight merely shapes matter accidentally to form the intricate structure of the eye. In this way the dependence of sight on the organism becomes a kind of unnecessary courtesy. (See the analogy of the iron filings, Creative Evolution I : The Vital Impetus).

as "I perceive," "I know," and so on. Such statements, therefore, should not be taken as proof that knowing intuitively itself. Once knowing is apprehended as a function of the concrete, the situation of self knowledge becomes understandable in terms of the concrete, in terms of the part and the whole. We are no longer obliged to posit a reflexivity which we know ought to be objectively self-destructive.

The alternative views of consciousness are severely opposed. On the first alternative, we have consciousness that is conscious of itself. On the second alternative, we have something concrete which is conscious with part of itself of another part of itself.

By the first alternative, the concrete is an irrelevancy. Consciousness becomes absolute from the world and completely empty, for it is not itself content. It is beyond experience and beyond reason. It is nothing.

By the second alternative the phenomena, i.e. the universal presence of the organism, are saved, and we are not compelled to reason about the unknowable.

More than
consciousness
is given in
consciousness

It may be that the account we have given of self-consciousness will be unacceptable to many, although convincing to ourselves. But even if that is so, the one point in it that is pivotal to our argument remains simple and very difficult to doubt, namely that in self-consciousness there is given that which is more than consciousness. Consciousness is aware of that within the psyche which has substance and opacity, and dominant in this body of internal phenomena is Will.

As the Eros to the One withdraws from external Nature into the psyche, it can find no satisfaction in absolutized consciousness. Even were such consciousness the object of experience, it would be utterly devoid of content and could never satisfy the desire of the Eros for substance.⁵⁴ The will on the other hand exhibits substance of feeling, and unity, and a kind of primacy within the psyche due in part to its power to influence and control the other aspects, and in part to its traditional designation as free. To the exploration of Will, therefore, Reason will turn.

The Will

Human will or intention has already emerged in this argument as lying at the base of Reason. Exactly which unities the conceptual attitude selects from Nature is dictated by an underlying purpose. Truth and falsehood are relative to purpose. If a thing is so, it is so for a purpose. The present purpose is the criterion of meaningfulness in all statements. Thus the will emerges as the unity underlying Reason and Truth. It also underlies Consciousness, for what we shall be conscious of can be determined and changed by will. Will directs consciousness by directing the organism. It could even direct the destruction of consciousness in suicide. In the Will we appear to be approaching the central node of human reality.

Will as
choice

Will is choice, the selection of one possibility out of two or more. Before it can choose, there must be consciousness of possibilities, and, in this sense, consciousness is necessary to will. The self must be aware of the world before it can choose in terms of the world. This is not, however, the same as saying that the will depends for existence on consciousness. Consciousness provides

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54. The One of Philosophy is conceived as reality, that is, as substance. That is why the unities of Reason, though merely psychic become, when substituted for the One, artificially substantialized.

it with an occasion but not with existence. There is no reason to suppose that consciousness creates what it illuminates.

Responsibility

The use of will is accompanied by feelings of responsibility, rectitude and guilt which commonly lead us to the conclusion that the will is free⁵⁵, that the origin of its choices is in itself; that it is what it is by its own doing. This responsibility is relative to a standard which is conceived as external to and greater than the will. Will intuitively itself as standing under an Imperative. These ideas are a commonplace of everyday morality, (which is no indication that they are or are not true). Nevertheless, the idea of freedom as commonly regarded is beset by certain grave difficulties, to which we must now give attention.

Freedom

The Emotions

To begin with, let us observe the existence of a secondary, but nevertheless important, aspect of the self, that is, the emotions. These form a pattern of impulses which is frequently in conflict with the volitional element, or will. They seem, nevertheless, to be capable of modification by volition, which plays upon them like a sculptor's chisel on a block of stone. They form a kind of reservoir of all past acts of volition, as well as other things besides, and their pull is felt in all acts of present volition. They present, sometimes in support of, sometimes in opposition to will, a combined impulse of repulsion from or attraction to a possible course of action. It is the governing of this impulse of emotion that is the major problem of practical morality. For it is a common experience that the choice of the will is resisted by impulse, often with success.

To present the will as that which can be resisted brings it down inevitably to the sphere of the forces, where it struggles for mastery, a power among other powers. Sometimes it is strong enough to conquer, sometimes it is overpowered by a stronger. But can this be reconciled with the notion of a free choice? If the will is a force immersed in conflict, how can it be free? A force is pulled this way and that by other forces, constantly modified and influenced. If it fails, it fails by weakness, not by freedom.

Should we, then, surrender the idea of freedom as illusory and rest content with the relative and comparative freedom that the human being possesses when compared with lower forms of life? For it certainly seems that man has more power of originality than the dog, and far more than the ant. He does not travel along rails like the engine, but the path he takes appears to issue from his own thought. But this relative freedom turns out, when we analyse it, to be no freedom at all. It is simply the consequence of man's greater awareness that more possibilities should appear to him. Here he differs from the animals only in degree. Freedom, however, appears to exist in the face of the possibilities - as that by which a man goes one way rather than another. And if at this point the pull of emotion makes itself felt, whether it is emotion of one's own desires, or emotion, for example fear or love, caused by another, that which chooses cannot be truly free. Shall we, then, be content with this illusory freedom? Or need we posit freedom at all? If

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55. Compare Hegel (Positivity of Christian Religion : § 9)
"Morality .. is independent, spurns any foundation outside itself, and insists on being self-sufficient and self-grounded." What really does the insisting? Can it be abstract morality? No. It is the insistence of a mysterious force within the psyche.

we do not, we must be content to see in man no more than the sum of his causes, a consequence in all respects.

The Demand of
the Eros for
Freedom

When this suggestion is made, at once a voice is raised in protest. It is the voice of the Eros, which, arising itself beyond ordinary causation⁵⁶, constitutes that in man which drives beyond determinism. To see man as a product in all respects is to negate that in him which drives towards the One. For the One is conceived as ultimate, original and uncaused, and we strive towards it by virtue of a kinship. If we are mere mechanisms that affinity is destroyed - how could a machine investigate the origins of its being? - and so the Eros rebels. And as we are following the quest of the Eros, whether to failure or attainment, we must go farther in the search for freedom. For in this notion which the Eros cannot abandon, we seem to have found the road inside the psyche which continues that external path which Reason travelled in the search for the One.

If what is commonly called will cannot be free, where must we look for freedom? Must we not draw a distinction between will and will-power? In this way we may lift free will to a higher level and see it no longer as involved, but as that which directs the force of will which bears on the world of things. Will becomes an authority which mobilizes the force of will-power, and which cannot, therefore be held responsible when will-power proves too weak. Will is like a general sitting on a hill above the battle, sending commands to his embattled soldier, the will-power. Thus will becomes exempt from the responsibility for concrete results. Its responsibility seems to consist in whether it mobilizes the will power or not.

Excuse

This way of thinking, outlandish though it may appear, is nevertheless, by implication, a commonplace of our moral judgment. When we excuse a man on the grounds of certain disadvantages of environment or upbringing, it is as much as to say, "He did the best he could. He chose well but was saddled with a vicious propensity that was too strong for him". Thus we blame the man who, in spite of a moral upbringing, became an alcoholic, and excuse the man, who, raised in a slum, drank gin with his mother's milk.

Sufficiency
of Grace

To the uncompromising elevation of free will above the interplay of forces, the New Testament offers the alternative theory of grace. "Ye are not," we are told, "tempted above that ye are able." There is in all our choices a sufficiency of power to restore equilibrium, so that the will in the middle of battle, may still be poised and free. In this way excuse is excluded and responsibility for concrete results is retained.

Excuse is the preservation of freedom by the diremption of choice and its result. Sufficiency of grace is the preservation of freedom by denying the imbalance of forces. The essential effect of both views is to present will as that which is self-determined and immune to outside influences. This amounts to postulating will as an absolute. It is beyond the influence of anything outside itself and totally free. Whether this notion of will is a tenable one we must now inquire both from logic and from experience.

The possibility
of Absolute
Will

An absolute will cannot qua choice exist apart from possibility. That is to say it must be related to that which transcends it. It is absolute in that it creates itself, but not absolute in that it creates its possibilities. At one pole of the act of

/will.....p.47.

56. That is to say, no cause can be discovered within Existence for the positing of Supra-existence. The Eros arises within Existence by an apparent originality.

will there must be the this or that. The possibilities, by their transcendent reality imply that will is not ultimate power. The possibilities are given to will as its situation.

If this is not so, will must constitute the world. The world must flow inevitably out of will, which means that it cannot be present to will as possibility. Will without possibility ceases to be choice. It is prior to freedom. It ceases to be the will of man and could only be the will of God.

It is our experience that through the will power of man the world may be changed, but certainly not that it is constituted by the will of man. The world is a given susceptible of modification, but a given nevertheless. We must, however, remove free will beyond the possibility of any modification of the world by its own power. For if free will modifies the world only partly, this implies that it encounters resistance, and so, that it is open to influence and no longer free. Alternatively if it modifies the world completely, that is the same as constituting the world. In other words the world ceases to exist as the transcendent alternatives, which means that will ceases to exist as choice. Will becomes prior to choice and prior to freedom. That is, it ceases to be the will of man. We must, therefore, insist on the complete powerlessness of free will. It can be no more than an effortless affirmation or negation. A significant corollary of this is that if free will is effective in the world, it must be so by the power of Another.

We have now arrived at the concept of a will that floats free of the world, relative, indeed, to the world, but at the same time uninfluenced by the world. It has no power of itself but seems to command a certain power. This power, however, has an independent origin.

We have arrived at this concept by an analysis of the popular notion of will as both Free and Effective. If choice is both free and effective, then it must move the world by a power not its own.

The restlessness of Freedom

The will has been driven into an absolute state. It is in flight from the causal flux. This flight has been caused by the notion of Freedom which casts off all restraints. The only possible relationship of will to the world is that of a spectator by means of consciousness. Even here, however, freedom finds no resting place. Once posited it is like a fiery globe that burns its way through any container in which we attempt to keep it. A closer examination of freedom will show that this is true.

The Notion of Freedom

Let it be made clear that in examining the notion of Freedom, we are not positing Freedom as a reality in itself. That would be to fall back, into the error of objectifying the concept. By "Freedom," let us understand really, "that which is free," or "the free," that is, so far as we can see at present, the will qua the centre of human reality. Reason can deal only with the knowable, and, as we have seen, only the particular and concrete is knowable. We do not at this stage assert that there is or is not an experience of concrete freedom, but we are reasoning with an intention towards such an experience.

Freedom and the Psyche

It may be observed, to begin with, that Freedom, or "the free", must be determined neither from without the psyche, nor from within the psyche by some trait of character.⁵⁷ To be truly

57. Compare Spinoza (Ethics : Ref. VII): "That thing is called free which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature ... On the other hand that is necessary which is determined by something external to itself." In this sense of the word "free", which we adopt, the will that is determined by a psychic propensity is not free.

free, will must be uninfluenced by psychic character. Therefore, either choice and character must be independent of each other, or if there is dependence, character must depend on choice. This implies the temporal priority of choice over character. When choice occurs, it must be uninfluenced. Therefore it cannot be directly connected with the psyche, for this would involve the possibility of its being influenced by the psyche. Qua free, choice must, as we have seen, be powerless. Its influence on the psyche must be by an independent source of power; either this, or else it has no influence on the psyche. On either alternative, freedom, if it inheres in will, separates will from the rest of the psyche so that it floats in undisturbed equipoise.

The Originality
of Choice

If, as the sense of responsibility seems to indicate, psychic character is the result of choice, there must be some point at which will exists and character does not yet exist. There must have been one original choice which produced character. In this case the function of subsequent choices becomes somewhat enigmatic. If they are to produce character, it must be in the sense of producing additions to character, so that character is analogous to an aggregate of all acts of choice. In this way, choice may be regarded as constantly prior to character.

If choice is to be free, it cannot be allowed that character, once established, has an effect on future choices, unless on one condition. This is that in the history of each individual psyche, there can be only one occurrence of free choice, that is, prior to the existence of character. Difficult though this idea seems,

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58. Sartre identifies freedom, i.e. choice, with consciousness, which constantly rises in Nothingness above the self. Consciousness cannot coincide with self, which it constantly nihilates to face the possibilities in anguish. Anguish is the realization that the future of consciousness depends entirely on the decision of the present moment and not on any already existing selfhood. It is the sense of absolute responsibility. Sartre's view rests on the premise that consciousness really nihilates the existing self, just as the premise that human reality is essentially nihilation is the foundation of his philosophy. It is interesting to compare with this the Bergsonian concept of Duration. Duration is concrete; past, present and future are indivisible. Nevertheless, the future always contains an element of originality unforeseeable until it is actualized. But the past is not left behind. We drag it after us for ever. Sartre's nihilation breaks with the past in a radical manner. Bergson's Duration does not break at all. Experience seems to support Bergson rather than Sartre, whose idea of Anguish is too hectic to be humanly supportable for any length of time. Such a break with the past belongs rather to the rare moment of crisis than to the normal course of existence. Moreover, Sartre in effect postulates consciousness as a dynamic of change - nihilation is a very considerable power. But how can such power reside in a mere awareness? Awareness may be the condition of the use of power, but it is not itself power. It is noteworthy that radical breaks with the past, e.g. the conversion of Saul, are commonly attributed to the power of another. This accords with our view of human freedom as powerless. If Nothingness is a valid description of consciousness, it is not, we suggest, as a nihilating power, but as Nothingness before power.

it is not to be rejected out of hand.⁵⁹

But it is quite possible, we should notice, for character to influence the alternatives of future choice, for this is not to influence the choice itself. For instance, my character, once established, may render me unsuitable for certain types of employment. If I have robbed the till, I shall not be offered a post in the bank.

A principle

Similar considerations apply to the external results of previous choices. These results have a limiting effect on the alternatives of future choices. For instance, because I chose to live in South Africa rather than Scotland, I am now faced with the possibility of climbing the Drakensberg, whereas otherwise I would have been able to climb Ben Nevis. We may widen the issue into a general principle, that earlier choices can affect the alternatives of later choices, but cannot effect later choices in themselves - that is, if the will is to be free.

The alternative views of free will

Two alternative views of freedom have emerged, based on two different views of the connexion of choice and character. If character, once established, influences future choices in themselves, then freedom can inhere only in one original and historical choice. But if character, once established, influences only the alternatives of future choices, choice may be constantly free. It is plain that the second alternative of a constantly free choice is more in accord with the common notion of free will as a continuous reality. The will, we believe, is not free once only and never thereafter, but is something constantly exercised and constantly free. Therefore, let us first consider the implications of this view.

Freedom can have no past

It seems clear that that which is free can have no past. To have a past is to be determined by that past. The free must therefore be constantly new. As the centre of human reality, the will must be incessantly original. It must, as it were, be a continuous new creation, centred indeed on a particular human psyche but in no sense determined by that psyche. Each new act of choice must be completely severed from previous choices. Yet the common notion of will is as a continuum. How does this arise? We must reply that, if will is free, it can only arise from the continuity of the locality of will, the continuity of the psyche in which the will inheres. But we must not evade the final implication, which is that the free destroys itself as existence, that is, as the knowable.

The nothingness of Freedom

That which can have no past can have no present either. For the present is a minimal duration. If something can have no past, it cannot endure. All existence is duration, however minute, and that which cannot endure, cannot exist. It is beyond Time, beyond the Knowable, outside consciousness. Thus we see how the notion of freedom always breaks from comprehension, how it cannot be arrested in the confines of existence. It leads inevitably to the unknowable. We have already identified the unknowable as beyond the reach of Reason. To be consistent, we must confess that Freedom passes beyond Reason. We shall never be able to observe it and

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59. This is what Plato seems to suggest in the Myth of Er, where the souls choose their characters before birth. It is the view, substantially of Aristotle, who assigns primary significance to an original choice: "We can only control our dispositions at their beginning - the additions to them stage by stage are imperceptible, like the growth of bodily infirmities." (Nicomachean Ethics, III, V) Kierkegaard describes an original and irrevocable choice (A Project of Thought), and the idea is of course in accord with the doctrine of Original Sin.

chart its ways. Moreover, the crucial question must be faced, as to whether Freedom is a reality at all, and if so, can it hold significance for us. Can we speak meaningfully of that which is not a thing, of that which is nothing?

Let us leave these problems for a while and return to the alternative view of freedom as a single and unique occurrence in the individual's life. Is it possible that here the difficulties will be dispelled? It soon appears that nothing is changed, except that we are not obliged to show that Freedom has no past. For here, it has not been posited as possessing a past. All that we can do is draw the same implication, that Freedom is beyond existence.

The free will, we have established, if it is a reality, is a reality outside consciousness. It cannot know itself. We were led to this conclusion by our notion of freedom, by our sense of the uncaused at the centre of the psyche. The Eros drove us to pursue this notion as that within us which links the psyche to the One. In pursuing the uncaused we pass beyond consciousness.

The path of Negation

Our path to the uncaused is, from one point of view, a path of negation. It is the progressive rejection of all that is apprehensible, first in the external world and then within the psyche, where we passed from the apprehensible power of will, to free will and so to the unknowable. If the psyche is related to the uncaused, it is related to something that stands on the boundary of Existence, something that we can never perceive. Doubtless we were led to it by perceptible indications, the feelings of responsibility, of guilt and of originality. But these feelings were not themselves the free. The path of negation led us away from them in their turn to the point where the knowable psyche ends.

The Role of Reason

Reason applied to the problem of the will and its freedom has led us beyond the knowable world. The concept of the free emerges as something unique, not a concept in the ordinary sense, for it is not formed on the basis of experience. It is a pointer which directs thought to the limits of Existence where Reason must collapse. We saw that the idea of freedom is not posited by Reason, but by the Eros. Like the Eros, therefore, it is ultra-rational. But this realization, the passage of thought to the end of consciousness, to Nothingness, does not satisfy the Eros. We have, indeed, an indication that the goal of the Eros is beyond Existence and unknowable, but the Eros demands a passage not only in thought, but in reality. Before we inquire how the Eros may pass to the unknowable, let us consider what meaning we may assign to this word. We seek a passage to the beyond, but are we seeking that which is meaningful for us?

The meaningfulness of the un- knowable

It is plain, immediately, that we cannot know the unknowable. In a sense, therefore, it can have no meaning for us. We shall never be able to explain it, never say what it is in itself. Whether it is a reality or not we shall never know.

On the other hand, the search for the One is not occasioned by a knowledge of its reality. It is set in motion solely by the Eros, a prerational cogency continuous with the will-to-live. The Eros postulates a reality as its goal. Since the Eros itself arises independently of knowledge, it is not surprising that its objective is also beyond knowledge.⁶⁰ When Reason, by

60. How shall we interpret Nietzsche's poem to the Unknown God?
"O thou Unknown God that grips deep in my soul ..."
Nietzsche address the unknown not on the basis of any cognition of it - for then it would not be unknown, but purely and solely under an internal constraint which impels him to an unknown objective - that is to say, under the Eros.

reflecting on the freedom of will, arrives at Nothingness, the Eros is not satisfied, for this Nothingness is merely a project of thought and does not yield substance. The Eros seeks the reality of Nothingness which must be the real Nothingness of Will as opposed to the thought of will's nothingness. Here at last it may find its objective. This, then is the significance of the unknowable. It is the reality which we shall never consciously apprehend, but which is posited by the Eros as lying at the Nothingness of Will. It is behind the veil at the end of a particular path through Existence.

The Ravine

We seem to have come close to the goal of the Eros. We have arrived at a signpost which says that our destination is near. The reality of will is beyond Existence. All that is left is to restore it to its reality. It seems a simple matter to direct will away from Existence to the unknowable. Then suddenly we discover that the signpost points across a ravine. For thought, which flies like the crow, the way was short indeed. But we must arrive in the body. What is it that bars our way? What is this ravine? It is the fact, which we noted before, that will stands under an Imperative. But we have already travelled a difficult path. Before grappling with a new obstacle, let us pause to review the argument's latest phase, from the point where will appeared to us to be the dominant psychic phenomenon.

The Review

Will appeared as that in consciousness which is more than consciousness. It is not created by consciousness, although consciousness furnishes it with its sphere. It is that by which a man's character is constituted, that by which he is what he is. Associated with will we discovered feelings of guilt and rectitude which referred us to Responsibility. Responsibility in turn referred us to Freedom. Responsibility, guilt and rectitude are definite feelings which we account for on the basis of Freedom. But Freedom, once posited presents grave difficulties. When we analyze experience, it becomes clear that there is nothing within experience which can be free. Experience is an interlocking whole where each existent feels the pull of all other existence. But if this is not considered conclusive, an examination of the phenomenon commonly called "will" reveals it as susceptible to influence, and so not free.

Thus it appears that we do not know Freedom, indeed, that we cannot know it. Freedom cannot, therefore, be a true concept, for a concept is formed on the basis of what is experienced. Nevertheless Freedom is a term corresponding to an attitude of the psyche, an attitude akin to conceptual attitudes. This attitude, moreover, is not resolved when we discover that the free cannot be within Existence. If anything, it gains in strength, with a cogency of mysterious origin.

Concepts and Notion

It becomes necessary, in this way, to introduce a distinction between the psychic attitude that refers to a known, i.e. the concept, and the psychic attitude that posits an unknown reality. This latter let us call a "notion". By "notion" therefore, is indicated an attitude of mysterious origin within the psyche which directs the psyche towards an unknowable reality.⁶¹ A notion is

61. This is, surely, the real significance of the disguised negativity of many of the terms that attempt to convey the nature of God, as well as of the via negativa of the mystics. Notions find no instantiation in Existence. They issue really in the Nothingness of Thought, the admission that thought has failed to cognize their content. This is a bitter pill for Reason, which, as a last resort, produces the negative epithets. By them the unwary are deluded into believing that God is cognized, caught in the conceptual net. But concepts are post-experiential, and there can be no conscious experience of God to provide the basis for a concept of Him.

the counterpart within experience of a reality that lies outside experience. Naturally, the validity of the notion, the reality of its reference, is incapable of conclusive proof. The notion stands or falls by experience. It stands firstly by the degree of its mysterious cogency and, secondly, by the results within experience that it produces. A notion that is dynamic within experience, may, on these grounds, be believed to abut on unknowable reality.⁶²

There exists within the psyche a strong notion of being uncaused, that is of Freedom. Only on such a basis can the categories of guilt, rectitude and responsibility be made meaningful. The psyche sees itself as being what it is by its own doing, as being, in a sense, its own origin. It posits itself as issuing in some way from beyond causation, as standing above experience. This position necessarily makes its origin unknowable, in the realm of unseen reality. In this way we pass in thought from the insistence of the notion of Freedom, to Transcendence.

We may here note in passing that the Idea of the One is a notion.⁶³ It is not a concept from experience, but a haunting idea of mysterious origin. Correspondingly, the Eros, or the impetus to the One, is a drive of mysterious origin.

The Eros, when it arises in consciousness is the deepest drive within the psyche. It is the desire for the one objective which gives all other objectives their meaning. It is the central thirst, the great hunger. Thus it is that a mere passage in thought to the unseen reality can never satisfy the Eros. The analysis of the notion of Freedom, or rather, the inductive discovery that it has no reference to experience, is sufficient to direct thought to the supra-sensory. But thought, as we saw, can at best, render the absent present in the form of an image. It is thus a grave mistake to suppose that it can achieve a satisfying transition to transcendent reality, of which it cannot give us even an image. The passage of thought to Freedom skirts the inner depths of the psyche; it skirts the substance of will. Thought alone cannot conduct the gravity of the Eros. At this point again, within the very psyche, we must be on guard against the of Reason. Somehow we must retrace our steps and find the category which can engage the full weight of the mystic Eros.

The Imperative

We do not have to look far. In identifying the will as the centre of the psyche, we should also realize that this centre cannot be by-passed. The possibility of a merely theoretic attitude to will must be discarded. For the will, with the feelings of responsibility that haunt it, presents us with an Imperative. Here we encounter Law, a law which stands guard over the gateway to the self, so that if we would enter the self, we must submit.⁶⁴ In the heart of the self we encounter this law, nor can we avoid it without sacrificing the centre of the psyche. This is the ravine we must negotiate.

/We.....p.53.

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62. We have, incidentally, stumbled on the significance of the One. As thought approaches Nothingness and the limit of consciousness, plurality disappears. Thus the One, may be understood as the reality outside plurality. It is outside plurality simply because it is outside Existence.
63. In their almost universal occurrence, the notions bear a marked resemblance to the archetypal ideas of the psychologist Jung.
64. Thus the Existentialist philosophy insists upon engagement as the condition of attaining selfhood. On the same foundation rests that corner-stone of Western ethics, the significance of the Moment.

We are moving, of course, outside the possibility of proof. The ultimate verification of these claims lies in experience. What we ask, in effect, is this; "Is there any feeling rooted more deeply in the phenomenal psyche than the feeling of responsibility? Is there any other notion which engages to the same degree the volitional centre of feeling which we call the self?"

The path of the Eros is now seen to lie through the centre of the soul, that is the will. Desire must identify itself with will, and submit to the Imperative before which will stands. The Eros thus becomes morally responsible. The way to the One becomes the way of the fulfilment of the Law.

While the Eros seeks ultimate content, the imperative is not a source of content. It is rather a sense which dictates the attitude of the will in the face of content, or the desire for content. The Imperative regulates our approach to content, whether as present in experience, or as sought, in the One. The Imperative thus bears upon the various phases of the will-to-live, which manifests itself first in self preservation and finally in the Eros. Without the will-to-live we can bring nothing to the Imperative. But without the Imperative, the will-to-live becomes lost. Emphasis on the Imperative to the neglect of the will-to-live produces sterile morality. Emphasis on the will-to-live which disregards the Imperative results in a formless licentiousness. The perfect balance must be maintained. Out of the two, however, priority must surely be assigned to the will-to-live. For the will-to-live is continuous with the whole cosmic process which supports the possibility of our access to Transcendence. The Imperative is essentially relative to life. Thus its demands have been different for different men in different ages. If one must have one or the other, it is better to have the will-to-live. Thus it happens that the harlot and the publican enter heaven before the pharisee.

Moralists have attempted a variety of explanations of the genesis of the Imperative. The utilitarian view may seem to explain away its mystery until we realise that this scheme makes no allowance for the Eros. Utilitarianism can account for the Imperative as a rational form of the will-to-organic life, as a contract to do no harm and be unharmed in return.⁶⁵ But once the mysterious generation of the Eros takes place within the psyche, and it is found that the Imperative exercises authority over this as well, the Imperative takes on all the mystery of the Eros. Utilitarianism may explain the Imperative as regulative of organic living, but it can never explain it as governing the will to the One. Therefore we affirm that the Imperative, that is, the sense of obligation which haunts the will, is of mysterious origin.

Morality

We have stumbled, it may be noticed, almost inadvertently on the origin of Morality. It appears as the fusion of the will-to-live with the Imperative. It is engendered by their interplay. The way of the Eros to fulfilment is now seen as the moral way.

The Unconditional Imperative

The Imperative is experienced as a feeling haunting the phenomenal will, that is the will-power, on which it appears to lay its injunctions. The phenomenal will is bound to fulfil them and the sense of responsibility assures it that any failure to do so must originate in its own freedom. The Imperative that engages the psychic depths invariably relates the psyche to the world-flow. Thus the phenomenal will proceeds to involve itself in its situation, the situation that it has by virtue of belonging to a particular organism in the flow of existence. Even when the Imperative presents an ethic of world-rejection, it may be seen that the phenomenal will is involved in its situation. Involvement in this case takes the form of a struggle for detachment rather than

for effective participation. But it remains involvement. In one way or the other the Imperative directs will power upon the world. The will must immerse itself in its situation. Moreover, the Imperative does not present itself to will as conditional upon will's freedom. It does not say to will, "If you are free, do this." It says simply, "Do this, or you will stand guilty." It is from the guilt that we proceed in thought to the notion of Freedom. Therefore it is an evasion of the Imperative to deny its claims by taking a stand upon the notion of Freedom as outside existence. The Imperative is unconditional, or, as Kant described it, categorical.

The notion of Freedom is only generated as a commentary on the Imperative. The Imperative does not stand or fall by Freedom. It is an illegitimate abstraction to regard Freedom in isolation from the Imperative. Nevertheless, while it cannot exempt us from obedience to the Imperative, the notion of Freedom may cast light on the manner of the obedience. The Imperative directs the phenomenal will to involvement in experience. It is possible that the time may come when the notion of Freedom will serve as the key to the understanding of experience.

The progress
of involve-
ment

The injunction of the Imperative bears upon the phenomenal will, upon the feeling within us that we identify as will. With this force, we accordingly try to fulfil the demands of the imperative. Thus, if I am prone to outbursts of temper, I try to reinforce my will against the violence of my emotions. Perhaps I achieve some degree of success, but it is never complete. The phenomenal will, that is the will power, is perpetually unable to satisfy the Imperative completely. Moreover, even when we appear to have made progress, the Imperative becomes correspondingly more exacting. There is always a gap between performance and perfection. This situation might come to be accepted as inevitable were it not for the notion of Freedom which stands behind the Imperative and points the finger of accusation at the will. "Your failure," it seems to say, "originates with you and no other. You are responsible for your shortcomings". It is, of course, possible to ignore the notion of Freedom, but this, in the end, is the same as to ignore the Imperative itself, since the Imperative points to Freedom. And to ignore the Imperative, is, as we saw, to by-pass the centre of the psyche through which the Eros must pass. Thus the Eros demands that the will redouble its effort, which it does, perhaps again and again, until eventually it collapses with an exhaustion which is akin to, possibly the same as, the exhaustion of the organism. And so eventually comes the realization that the will is not free. Yet in that moment, the Imperative does not abate its insistence. The will-power, or phenomenal will, has reached the moment of maximum involvement. It is so thoroughly engaged in experience that it has no further resources of strength. It is immersed and held locked in the world-flow. The idea that it is in some way free has become quite untenable, and yet the Imperative bears on it as if it were free. Under this pressure, at last, the true will disassociates itself from the phenomenal will and from experience. It forsakes the illusion of its own power and turns in purity and nakedness to face the source of the Imperative. In that moment experience and the self, which is the phenomenal will, become as nothing to the true will. Thus, in experience, we reach again the point of Nothingness, where the will passes out of consciousness to be free before the face of Transcendent Reality. The Nothingness of Thought finds its counterpart in the real Nothingness of Will.⁶⁶

66. Both Nothingnesses are founded on the Eros, that of Thought because the Eros alone sustains the notions, that of Will because only the Eros turns the will from Existence to Transcendence. In no sense do we posit Nothingness as an independent reality, such as it becomes with Sartre. The term stands merely for the stage or point where conscious experience ends, and where Transcendence may be thought

(Footnote 66 continued overleaf)

In this final moment of conversion the notion of Freedom can play a part. It may, by showing that Freedom lies outside experience, direct will the sooner to its transcendental destiny. But if it be asked why the notion of Freedom might not have accomplished the emancipation of will before the moment of maximum involvement, we answer that while the Imperative is experienced, it has to be obeyed. It is unconditional and cannot be evaded. The disengagement of the true will from the phenomenal will is impossible without the maximum involvement of the phenomenal will.⁶⁷ For the phenomenal will is a force which cannot be held still except by complete engagement. It is, indeed, in the nature of a passion to which we are bound until it is exhausted. It is the Imperative that drives it to exhaustion, not by illusory demands but by confronting it with a standard, which, in assuming the central position in the psyche, it has unwittingly committed itself to fulfil. At the point of Nothingness the self that has failed disappears, and with it, the Imperative itself vanishes. The phenomenal will has to learn in strife that it is not the possessor of authenticity. The authentic will is beyond consciousness before Transcendence.

The change in
the notion
of Freedom

It will be seen that, in the course of our argument, the notion of Freedom has undergone a subtle change and development. We started from the common notion of Freedom as the property of the phenomenal will in the face of existential alternatives. The fact that on this plane there can be no absolute freedom forced us to postulate the free will as standing outside consciousness. Here it at once becomes unknowable and the only proof we can offer, inside existence, of its reality is the evidence of its effectiveness. If there are events within consciousness that are explicable only on the assumption of a reality called Free Will, then that assumption is justified, although not proven. Such realities are, in themselves for ever unknowable. All that we actually know is a coefficient which thought substitutes for the supposed reality that coordinates the phenomena. Thought cannot touch the reality itself. Only

66. (Continued)

to begin. Of course, this must not be taken to imply that conscious experience actually ceases - the eyes still see, the ears still hear. In the Nothingness of Thought, the Eros pushes Reason to its collapse; in the Nothingness of Will, will seems to turn out of consciousness to face Transcendent Reality. Thus it disappears as apparent or phenomenal will, that is as will-power. Nothingness, is, as it were, the opening of a door in the psyche to the unknowable. The old self disappears. Here, moreover, we come upon a possible meaning for the Absolute self. The psyche that opens to Transcendence opens in a particularized way. Will not the unique and irreplaceable nature of each psyche's approach to Transcendence suffice to constitute the individual self - is the self, in other words, the particular Absolute? We are reminded of Hegel's concrete universal, but "universal" is a term of psychic and conceptual significance. It cannot convey the supreme content of Transcendence.

67. This scheme corresponds to a widespread, almost archetypal experience. Compare the story of the conversion of Saul, who in his greatest effort discovered his complete weakness, or that of Christian in the Pilgrim's Progress, who could remove his burden by no expedient. Both found their release in the power of another. In the work of the Eros which brings us to the point of Nothingness, and in the presence at Nothingness of a restoring power, we are aware of a process which can be called Redemptive.

will can do this, and before it does so, the of free will
from phenomenal will must be accomplished.

It may legitimately be asked whether, since the Realities are unknowable, such notional terms as Free Will and Freedom are in fact significant; do they really refer? We answer that they may refer, not to the unknowable in itself, but to the unknowable as it lies at the end of a particular avenue of experience. Freedom is so named because it lies at the limit of the search for knowable freedom. The One is so named because it lies at the end of the search for knowable unity. These paths through experience are followed under the attraction of notions, mysterious ideas which draw thought to the limits of consciousness.

Freedom, we have seen, cannot exist within experience. As applied to experience, the notion destroys itself. Yet the psychic source of the notion is not destroyed by the impossibility of experiencing Freedom. Instead the attitude directs itself beyond consciousness to the unknowable.

The notion of Freedom arises secondarily to the experience of the Imperative. The common error is to locate its reality in the phenomenal will. The Imperative bears unconditionally on the phenomenal will, and, only in explanation points to Freedom. The phenomenal will arrogates this freedom to itself. In consequence, the Imperative bears harder upon it until its complete engagement and utter exhaustion are plain to see. Thus the ground is prepared for the withdrawal of the true will from the phenomenal will. This in fact is the withdrawal from self. The phenomenal will must be driven to its death. This the bare notion of Freedom cannot accomplish. But it can, in the midst of strife, provide an explanation of the inexorability of the Imperative. No understanding of the notion of Freedom can ever take the place of the conversion of the will. It can be of use only as the will consents to embrace it. As long as the phenomenal will still arrogates to itself the centre of the psyche, so long will it be under the death sentence of the Imperative.

Freedom as it emerges is indeed somewhat remote from the common notion. The common notion, as we have seen, errs in locating freedom in the phenomenal will. But it contains an indestructible element which persists even when it is shown that Freedom cannot lie within experience. This is the sense of authenticity. Freedom, or free will, we may then say, is the unknowable reality which corresponds to the sense of authenticity.

Let us always guard against the illusion that we know the unknown reality. It is utterly unknown. All that we do know is that this or that path through the world leads us to an end which may in fact be a beginning. It is as if we touch Transcendence at various points like rivers running into the sea. If on returning to experience we find ourselves mysteriously enriched, we may rationally believe that we have been in the presence of God.

The end of the
Self

We have witnessed the destruction of the phenomenal will. This phenomenal will we earlier identified as what is commonly called the self. With the disappearance of the phenomenal will at the point of Nothingness, and the assumed emergence of the free-will, all self-consciousness is destroyed. The self has become nothing to consciousness, and if it is a reality, it is real before Transcendence, in the unknowable world. As phenomenal will dies, it is as if an open passage is formed in the psyche from Transcendence to Transcendence. The channel begins in the unknowable with the mysterious rise of the Eros and issues in the unknowable with the destruction of will-power. That is the moment of the final liberation of the Eros. Its bondage to the phenomenal will has

been worked out and it passes invisibly to Transcendence. The stress of its struggle to Freedom departs from the soul. Instead of the self, there is a passage through the psyche from Transcendence to Transcendence. Transcendence, the unseen reality, the One, has replaced the self.

The origin of self

The self has emerged as an obstruction in the current that flows from Transcendence to Transcendence. As such, it is destined to disappear. It seems, indeed, to be the antithesis of Freedom and the foundation of human bondage. The question thus arises as to how it came to existence in the first place. We remember that as the Imperative bore upon the self, the self became conscious of guilt, or responsibility, which in turn referred to Freedom outside existence. So it appears that the origin of self lies in Freedom, and that, on that plane, there is or has been a choice of surrender to Transcendence or the projection of will as power in opposition to Transcendence. But we run the risk here of a circularity of thought. We seem to be projecting into the unknown the nature of choice, which is a phenomenon of existence. It is indeed true that all the categories of the knowable fail when we come to the unknowable. The idea of a choosing prior to existence is beyond our conception. Does it help to say that, on this plane, choosing is the same as existing? Hardly, for such an existing and such a choosing are not knowables.

We must, however, remember that Freedom is Authenticity as postulated in the phenomenal will. Freedom is the result of the arrogation of authenticity to itself by the phenomenal will. Authenticity is not possible within Existence. Freedom is the result of the assumption that it is. It is the contradictory combination of Authenticity with the existent. The phenomenal will is engaged in choice and so choice comes to be regarded as the essence of Freedom. But with the separation of Freedom as Authenticity from the phenomenal will, it is no longer essential to project the nature of choice into Authenticity. Authenticity, as we encounter it in experience, is the notion which negates causation. This negation of causation is the knowable phase of a passage to what lies beyond causation where the reality of Authenticity must be, if indeed it is a reality. In the grip of the notion, however, we cannot help moving towards Authenticity as towards what is real. To prove that it is real is impossible.

It now becomes feasible to locate the origin of self, not necessarily in free choice, but in the Authentic or the Uncaused. While the positive content of this is for ever uncommunicable, there is particularity in the method by which thought approaches it, that is by the negation of Causation, and not of something else. The manner of being of the Authentic is perpetually under a veil. We detect its echo in the psyche. The Eros moves towards it. But Authenticity itself is with Transcendence.

Authenticity refers to will as it is before Transcendence. Phenomenal will is will with an intention away from Transcendence towards Existence. Authentic will cannot appear in consciousness for its intention is towards Transcendence. It is, therefore, unknowable and we posit it only on inductive grounds as the unknown coefficient of certain phenomenal effects inexplicable in terms of Existence. The interpretation of these effects has no public cogency, for they are private to the individual psyche. Such interpretation, moreover, is not the cause of the positing of Transcendent reality. This is done originally and solely by the Eros.

Conclusion

As we approach the end of the argument, let us briefly survey the main landmarks of the road we have travelled, in order to see the whole in perspective.

Since Philosophy is essentially reasoning, we examined the nature and the sphere of Reason. We discovered that Reason is secondary to Experience ontologically, and also that it has no logical priority to Experience. Where reasoning exhibits Necessity, it is because of the extreme simplicity of the objects about which it reasons, or because those objects are used in a pre-determined way. Necessity, therefore, should not be sought in reasoning in general. We saw, finally, that the world of self-subsistent Reason, of the entia rationis in any form, must be rejected because it can neither be proved, nor is it inductively indicated, and moreover, because a satisfactory explanation of the unities of Reason is available in terms of psychic behaviour.

It then appeared that despite its limitation to Existence, Reason, as employed in Philosophy, constantly attempts to leap beyond Existence to a transcendent sphere, usually conceived as rational. Having seen that such a leap is not demanded by Reason itself, that it is moreover, the destruction of the Reason that attempts it, we enquired outside Reason for the cause of Reason's self-destroying attempt. By empirical investigation we discovered a universal human Eros to Transcendence, which postulates Transcendence independently of all rational grounds. In as far as this Eros seeks Transcendence by means of Reason, we identified it as the vital impetus of Philosophy.

Reason is an indispensable necessity to the philosophical Eros. The Eros by itself is blind and can proceed only by the classification of Reason. The task of Reason thus appears as the analysis of Experience in such a way that the path of the Eros to Transcendence is made clear. An important aspect of this work is the analysis of the notional content of Thought which will invariably be revealed as having a reference beyond Existence. In as far as the Eros postulates a real reference for this thought, it will be directed beyond Existence.

Thought under the Eros ranges first over objective or external Existence, and finding no satisfaction there, turns finally to subjective or psychic Existence. Within the psyche it discovers the unconditional Imperative as supreme. Associated with the Imperative is the notion of Freedom which refers to Supra-existence. By this notion thought may pass to Transcendence, but the Eros must submit to the Imperative as the condition of its own passage to Transcendence. The injunctions of the Imperative are relative to the historical situation of the psyche as dependent on the organism. (Thus the philosopher who sees an injured man may not pass by on the other side in the interests of his thought. In doing so he may indeed retain the thought of a passage to Transcendence, but he will forfeit the reality.)

As the peculiar danger in philosophising, we indicated a characteristic situation and named it the of Reason. This is in essence a cul de sac, situated on the path from external to internal Existence. The unities of Reason are not recognized as psychic, but are postulated as self-subsistent reality. This is always the result of the leap, where Reason is projected into what is really the sphere of Transcendence. Thus the Eros is not allowed to pass beyond Reason. Accordingly it invests Reason with the substantial nature of the One which it seeks. This impasse may result in the destruction of both Reason and Eros.

The universal dependence of consciousness on the organism, and the connexion of the organism with the process of cosmic evolution, demand a world-view in which the material universe is recognized as essential. Matter we have observed to be an original and mysterious datum. Equally mysterious is the process by which it gradually organizes itself into conscious life, and finally human life, in which the Eros first appears, as the culmination of the vital impulse. Accordingly we suggest that the Eros arises in mystery from Transcendence and passes through the material universe as its essential conatus, back to Transcendence. The universe, in other words is the condition of the return of Transcendence to itself.

The phenomenal will appears as that which opposes the passage of Transcendence in the Eros. In other words, it is the evil, or the contradiction, in the cosmic process. At the Nothingness of Will, it is destroyed; and the passage of the Eros beyond Existence is made possible.

In restricting the sphere of Reason, we in no sense suggested that it was unnecessary or unimportant. Even with the passage of the Eros to Transcendence, we believe that its task is not yet complete. For though, in one way, we have reached an ending the end, that is, of Philosophy as the search for the One, in another way we are at a beginning. We shall conclude with a brief sketch of what this may be.

We mentioned certain psychic effects of the passage of the Eros to Transcendence. Principal among these, we suggest, is the presence in the psyche, as feeling, of a new depth of content. This appears as a mysterious upwelling from Transcendence into Existence. Being psychically central, it appears to be the true content of the self, replacing phenomenal will. But it is a dark and unformed presence which calls for the clarifying work of Reason. Thus reason appears as the mediator of selfhood. As we see it set to work under a new impulse, we are aware of the possibility of a second phase of Philosophy.

THE END

68. Here we may establish a link with Jaspers. In his philosophy, Existenz is the true selfhood that must be won by Reason, which is therefore defined as potential Existenz. We differ from him on two main points - firstly that he seems to regard Reason as a power in itself, and secondly that he does not recognize the part played by the Imperative.

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