

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL PARTY
SYSTEM IN THE CISKEI

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METHODOLOGY

The data for this study were collected over a period of seven months of which six months were spent between Mdantsane and Zwelitsha and one month at Gabozana.

The primary technique used was that of the social anthropologist: that is, I lived among the people I was studying, participated in their public activities, visited with them and in other ways attempted to integrate myself into the community as far as was possible for an outside and a researcher. Being a Xhosa, myself, obviated some of the difficulties which a white field-worker might experience.

A good deal of the data was gathered, in all three areas, informally, during a course of casual conversation, observations, social gatherings. No attempt was made at randomly sampling the populations except for the Mdantsane survey. The method of selecting key people was preferred. While in Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, structured questionnaires were administered to several specific categories of people (members of the CLA; candidates for the township council elections at both Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, the part of the general electorate in Zwelitsha and Mdantsane and a general questionnaire in Mdantsane). All other interviews were focused but unstructured and were pursued in depth.

As the study was concerned with the development of political parties, I made a special point of attending meetings of the Inkundla and Imbizo at Goboza, election campaign meetings of township council candidates in the townships, observed the township council elections and attended sessions of the CLA.

The purpose of the informal interviews was, inter alia, to discover attitudes towards the system of competing political parties, toleration

of differing party affiliation within the same household and the effect of party politics on traditional institutions.

The formal questionnaires, as had been noted, were administered to select categories and members of the CLA. Their purpose was, inter alia, related to that of the informal interviews and were also helpful in collecting biographical data and information relating to a variety of political attitudes.

Finally, relevant historical material was collected from available sources. Informal interviews, observations and similar qualitative data was subjected to content analysis while quantifiable data were analysed with the aid of a computer.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: One

Page	3	Para	4	Line	3:	Substitute 'forms' for 'terms'
"	6	"	5	"	12:	Correct spelling: 'Orange Free State'
"	7	"	3	"	14:	'Differentiate on' should read 'differentiate in'
"	8	"	1	"	4:	'has been' should read 'have been'
"	11	"	3	"	2:	Substitute 'laid' for 'lain'
"	14	"	2	"	3:	Insert 'a' before 'common'

INTRODUCTION

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Ciskei homeland, which is a 'sub-state' of the Republic of South Africa, attained a semi-autonomous status as a result of the implementation of the Bantustan policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. This semi-autonomous status introduced a Westminster type of parliamentary system which in turn brought into being a political party system.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate, amongst other things, the roles played by these political parties:-

- i) What role would the political parties play in the struggle of the Ciskeians for equal political rights vis-a-vis white South Africa?
- ii) Whose interests would those political parties serve?
- iii) This semi-autonomous status has resulted in the juxtaposing of traditional and modern political institutions. The political institutions that have emerged, include inter alia, legislative assemblies and political parties. These modern political institutions have been superimposed on traditional political institutions. What effect(s) would the one have on the other?
- iv) Would the development of political parties lead to the establishment of a one, two or dominant party system?

In order that the above questions may be answered,

- i) An attempt will be made to define a political system, illustrating the concept with examples taken from the Republic of South Africa political scene and at the same time, attention will be directed to the relationship between the Republic of South Africa and the Ciskei.
- ii) When investigating the political party and the political party system, the role played by the political parties and the political party system in the relationship between the Republic of South Africa and the Ciskei will be defined.

2. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Political activities and processes take place in a milieu which is known as a political system. A political system is described as:-

"...consisting of inter-acting roles, structures and sub-systems, and of underlying psychological propensities which affect the inter-actions. . ."

(Almond and Powell: 1966: 28)

The system as an analytical concept has been adopted by political scientists (Easton, D. : 1965: 21) to facilitate the understanding of the functioning of the political process.

A system has a boundary which is responsive to its environment. The environment of a political system consists of both domestic and international factors. Domestic factors include, inter alia, the social systems such as the economic, religious or legal system. The political system is an integral part of this "over-all membership system formed by a society" (Young: 1968: 38). International factors of the environment include the neighbouring states.

Factors entering the system from the environment, in the form of demands and support, are called 'in-puts' (Almond and Powell: ibid: 25).

Demands include a variety of demands made by the citizen on the political system. There is the demand for the allocation of goods and services. An example of this would be demands for irrigation or educational services, housing or transport services that are made by the people on the Ciskei Government, or demands for more land and greater financial grants that are made by the Ciskei Government on the Republic of South Africa.

Supports are inputs made in order to facilitate the functioning of a political system, as for example, the payment of taxes, rents and levies. These inputs enter the system as 'raw' materials. Processes within the system convert the inputs into 'manufactured' material called the outputs. The processes that convert inputs into outputs are known as the conversion processes. Within the political system are political structures and roles that are responsible for the execution of these 'conversion processes'. These conversion processes may be classified as: rule-making, interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule application and rule adjudication (Almond and Powell: ibid: 29).

Outputs are sometimes referred to as the authoritative decisions; for example, the provision of irrigation and educational facilities or the provision of housing or transport services. These authoritative decisions leave the system and enter the environment or are distributed within the system itself. It does happen, at times, that an output activates an input. When this input re-enters the system, it is called a 'feedback'. Outputs may be classified and grouped

into categories. These categories are known as capabilities. A capability is defined as:

" . . . [showing] how the system is performing in its environment and how it is shaped by it . . . "
(Almond and Powell: ibid: 29)

The various capabilities are, for example, regulative, extractive, distributive and responsive. Capabilities throw light on the system as a unit in its "relations to other social systems and to the environment" (Almond and Powell: ibid: 28). Capabilities, individually or as combinations, are used for characterising the various political systems for comparative purposes. To ensure the continuation of a political system, recruitment and socialisation are employed. Socialisation and recruitment imply the adoption of new roles and personnel and the adaptation of these new roles and personnel into the system. While the various authorities differ in the definitions they offer of a political system, they agree that a political system is associated with the exclusive use of legitimate physical force (Almond and Powell: ibid: 17). In order that political authorities may extract obedience from their subjects, they have to use power in one of its various terms. Power may be defined as:-

"[the] . . . generalized capability to secure the performance of binding obligations . . . "
(Swartz et al: 1966: 14, quoting Parsons: 1963b, 237)

These authors argue that legitimacy provides one of the bases for power. In a chapter to follow on 'Political Party Activity in the Rural Areas of the Ciskei', the operation of the inkundla casts interesting light on the question of legitimacy. The inkundla does not rely on a police force for the implementation of its decisions but relies on tradition and the respect of the people of Gobozana.¹ Many factors induce this respect: the people of Gobozana expect the inkundla to protect their interests, they expect the inkundla to settle their disputes and the inkundla allows them to keep cattle and live happily. As a result of this, the people at Gobozana show respect

1. Gobozana and Tamacha are names of villages in the rural areas of the Ciskei to which reference is made in the chapter: "Political Party Activity in the Rural Areas of the Ciskei".

for the inkundla and obey the inkundla. This is because the inkundla is regarded as being legitimate. The power on which the inkundla relies, is consensual. When legitimacy is missing, as is the case, for example, with the relations between Gobozana and Tamacha, obedience is induced by means of force or coercion. Force or coercion relies on its 'intrinsic effectiveness' in order to bring about the desired results. When power depends on its intrinsic effectiveness, in order to bring about the desired results, it is called coercive power. Coercive power relies on 'sanctions' in order to exact obedience. In the relationship between Gobozana and Tamacha, as will be shown in a later chapter, sanctions take the form of fines.

Power is regarded as a political process (that is, within a political context) and as such should not be confined to certain specific political structures (Young: 1969: 66).

"The power process is not a distinct and separable part of the social process, but only the political aspect of an inter-active whole" (Young: ibid: 66).

Power and influence have almost the same meaning, except that these terms differ when the set of values on which each is based is taken into consideration. For instance, influence is necessary when making a tribal authority workable and acceptable. I shall illustrate influence by referring to an example from the chapter "Political Party Activity in the Rural Areas of the Ciskei" which demonstrates the influence the Gobozana headman has on the people of the village. I want to quote an example in which the influence of the Gobozana headman on the people of the village is demonstrated.

On this occasion, a delegation from a neighbouring village of Xhukwana which is inhabited by clans of the AmaRarabe, had arrived at Gobozana. This delegation requested permission to conduct a search for wood that was presumably cut from their forests. This request enraged the men at Gobozana. They maintained that this request was made because the Xhukwana people underestimated and looked down upon them because they were AmaMfengu. Violence nearly erupted but for the timely intervention of the headman of Gobozana who calmed his men and told the Xhukwana delegation to leave and not return to Gobozana. This incidence illustrates, amongst other things, the respect and influence the Gobozana headman

enjoys with his people. The headman had, by merely showing his men what the repercussions of taking the law into their own hands were, convinced and satisfied them that his advice was good. Power and influence are designated as 'techniques of gaining compliance' (Swartz, et al: ibid: 22).

"The first technique is force and coercion, and the basis of this technique is its intrinsic effectiveness. In other words, this system requires less in the way of complexity in shared values and expectations . . . it depends upon a limitation . . . of alternatives, so that in the last resort [force], the choice of those who are to comply is between suffering physical discomfort and acquiescence . . . consensual power depends on legitimacy . . . persuasion . . . rests upon convincing the compliers that the best course to follow is the course indicated . . . influence is one form of persuasion . . . "

(Swartz, et al: ibid: 22).

The fore-going is a description of a conceptualised political system. The following discussion will concentrate on an example of a political system such as we find in the Republic of South Africa.

The Republic of South Africa is a capitalist system that is said to be democratic. The population of the Republic of South Africa is not homogeneous. It is divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious and racial lines into the following:

- i) The Europeans, sometimes known as 'whites', are descendants of people who migrated from Europe (Hellman: 1949: 7). Europeans are divided into smaller groups such as the Germans, the English, the Jews, Afrikaners and Greeks. The common categorisation is based on language: hence English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites. Whites number about 3 726 540 or 17,4 per cent of the total population, according to the 1970 census (S. A. Yearbook: 1974: 1). The juxtaposition of certain facts, for example, that 17,4 per cent of the population occupies about three-quarters of the total land surface while about 80 per cent of the population (which comprises the non-white section) occupies about 13 per cent of the total land surface, is startling, without any further comment being necessary. The whites in the Republic of South Africa command and wield political and economic power. As a result, it is whites who are members of the country's legislatures; whites own, manage and are overseers in the mines, factories, farms and railways of the country.

- ii) The other section of the population is composed of blacks, sometimes known as 'non-whites' or 'non-Europeans'. This section is made up of the following population groups:-
- a) The Coloureds who number about 2 027 430 or 9,4 per cent (S. A. Yearbook: 1974).
 - b) The Asians, sometimes known as Indians, who number about 618 140 or 2,9 per cent (S. A. Yearbook: 1974).
 - c) Africans, sometimes known as Bantus who number about 15 036 360 or 70,0 per cent of the population. (S. A. Yearbook: 1974).

Coloureds are the result of miscegenation between Europeans and indigenous people (Hellman: ibid). There are Coloureds in most large cities of the Republic of South Africa but most Coloureds live in the Western Cape. As a result of the preferential treatment that Coloureds receive from whites, the Coloureds are regarded as being on a higher pedestal than Africans (Carter: 1958: 75). Asians are natives of India whose great-grandfathers came to South Africa as indentured labourers to work on the sugar plantations (Hellman (ed) ibid: 9). Asians form a strong commercial group. There are Asians in most big cities of the Republic of South Africa except in the Orange Free State where Asian settlement was prohibited as early as the colonial period (Wilson et al: 1971: 431). Most Asians live in Natal.

The population of the Republic of South Africa can be divided into the capitalist class which comprises those people who own or manage the means of production and a working class which comprises those people who do not own the means of production, but are employed by the capitalist class at a price for their labour. As a result of the intrusion of the ethnic element, this categorisation (of working class-capitalist class) has been complicated. Consequently, the now applicable categorisation, is based on colour and the position can be described as:-

"[whites and non-whites] . . . related together in a denominational system of racial differentiation, operated by the 'Whites' over the 'non-Whites'. The Whites comprise the employers and one group of workers, the politically free workers, and the rest of the workers, the politically unfree workers, were 'non-Whites' "
(Johnstone: 1976: 3).

While another author, echoing the same sentiments writes:-

"In the economic sphere, it is the relationship to the means of power which appreciably defines the relationship to the means of production . . . Inequalities in political rights, in economic participation, in education ramify throughout

the society. They combine with the ideologies of cultural differences, contemptuous stereo-types, segregation and other discriminatory devices to give rise to a many-faceted general status of ruling race and subject race (Kuper: 1974: 269-70).

Whites support their arguments for the domination of blacks by appealing to cultural differences; applying concepts of dehumanisation and depersonalisation in which the blacks are equated to animals, or objects, as is for example in the case of black labour when reference to it in such stock-phrases as 'canalising' or 'regulating' the 'flow' of black labour, is made, As if black labour was occupying the same status as market commodities. Blacks are also subjected to such measures as 'pass-laws' (Kuper: 1974: 13-17). The present insistence by the Government that Africans identify with their traditional culture is one such ideology of cultural difference being used as an instrument of domination (Kuper: ibid: 13-17).

As a result, segregation in social, economic and political spheres has been institutionalised. Legal, traditional and psychological instruments have been employed towards this goal. Consequently, not only are blacks separated from whites but blacks amongst themselves are divided. The constitution of the Republic of South Africa emphasises this differentiation in that it stipulates that only those of 'European descent', may become members of the legislatures. The Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951; the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act, 1959, to mention only a few, are segregatory measures that are aimed at providing separate political institutions for the various racial groups. Social discrimination is perpetrated by implementing such legislative enactments as the Land and Trust Acts of 1913 and 1936; the Group Areas Act; Provision of Separate Amenities Act and many others. Differentiation on the economic field had its foundation laid by the adoption and implementation of the 'Civilized Labour Policy' which discriminated against blacks by providing protection for the poor whites (Wilson, et al: 1971: 438). The Industrial Conciliation Act; the Wage Act; the Settlement of Disputes Act and many others enhanced this discrimination in economic affairs between white and black workers. The blacks were denied the right to form trade unions. These are only some of the legislative enact-

ments (this list is not complete!) that support the framework of 'apartheid'. As a result of these 'apartheid' measures, Africans have been confined to the reserves which have been demarcated under the provisions of the Land and Trust Acts of 1913 and 1936. The movements of Africans has been controlled by a system of influx and efflux laws.

These reserves and locations are labour reservoirs (C. Bundy in African Affairs: Vol. 71; No 282; January, 1972. Williams in Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists: 1974). The Ciskei stands in this relation (that of being a labour reservoir) to the Republic of South Africa. In response to such regulatory mechanisms as taxes, quit-rent, 'pass laws', influx control and many others, the Ciskeians 'flow' into the Republic of South Africa to work on the mines, factories and farms. We have observed that political power is in the hands of the white minority, while blacks, although in the majority, are allowed participation in political institutions that are subordinate and inferior to those of the whites. Political institutions for Africans are located in the homelands. Those Africans that live in urban areas are allowed participation in such subordinate institutions as the advisory board or urban councils. This has resulted in confrontation between whites and blacks. Blacks want direct participation on a basis of equality in the country's legislatures that are reserved for whites.

Consequently, protest organisations that were said to be engaged in the Liberatory Movement, emerged. This movement was spear-headed by such organisations as the African National Congress, the All-African Convention; the Non-European Unity Movement, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured Peoples Organisation, the Anti-Coloured Affairs Committee and the Pan-Africanist Congress. The list is by no means complete! The Government, in defence of the status quo, launched a severe counter-action against this liberatory movement by the implementation of such enactments as the Suppression of Communism Act, the Terrorism Act, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Sabotage Act, the State Security Act, to name only a few. These legislative enactments were used against associations and individuals, resulting in arrests, banishments, bannings and in some cases death. Many people, as a result, fled the country; the liberatory organisations went underground, leaving behind an organisational vacuum. There was no organisation that could give expression

to the interests and aspirations of the blacks.

As part of a scheme to fight black political consciousness, the Bantustan policy was introduced, bringing into existence the 'Homelands'. The creation of these 'homelands' must be viewed against this background:-

- i) To ensure that the mines, factories and farms of the whites would receive a regular supply of cheap migrant labour (Wolpe in Economy and Society: Vol. 1, No. 4, Nov. 1972) a network of labour bureaux was established in the homelands to facilitate the movement of this cheap labour. The possibility of establishing training centres in the homelands where labour would be trained for industry in white areas, was advocated (SAIRR: 1973: 135).
- ii) The influx of Africans into white urban areas was not only to be controlled but 'surplus' Africans had to be diverted into the homelands¹ by employing such measures as re-settlement; making the homelands more attractive by improving on certain things (for example introducing 'self-government' or independence; making available loans for business or building homes). This had the effect of creating a black middle class while the africanisation of the state departments that were created as part of the 'self-government' schemes, resulted in the rise of a black bureaucracy.
- iii) The creation of the homelands was aimed, amongst other things, at silencing world criticism of the Republic of South Africa's discriminatory policies.
- iv) By creating political opportunities in the homelands, and insisting that Africans in white urban areas could only enjoy political rights in the homelands, black demands for political equality, would be silenced while conflict arising from the demands for political equality would be transferred to the homelands (Wolpe in Economy and Society: Vol. 1: 1972).
- v) To ensure that the homelands would 'toe-the-line', economic interdependence between the Republic of South Africa and the homelands has been emphasised. This would be effected by encouraging the homelands to depend on 'hand-outs' from Pretoria.

Homelands were created for all African national units. These national units were defined in the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959. The provisions of this Act made it possible for a homeland or a particular

1. Rhodie (ed): 1973, p. 113 et seq.

nationality to be connected to members of its national unit that lived and worked in towns by means of urban representatives. Each homeland is linked to the Republic of South Africa through a commissioner-general.

The Ciskei is one of these homelands. These homelands lack economic viability and have to rely on the Republic of South Africa for economic assistance. A semi-autonomous political status has been granted to some of these homelands. This semi-autonomous status is enjoyed within the framework of the Republic of South Africa. This means that any legislative enactments that emanate from the legislative assemblies of these homelands can become law only after approval by the Republic of South Africa. This defines the subordinate status of these homelands to the Republic of South Africa.

In the following chapters, the Ciskei homeland will be described and placed in its correct perspective in relation to the Republic of South Africa. It will be shown that as a result of attaining semi-autonomous status, political parties emerged in the Ciskei. This semi-autonomous status will be described with a view to bringing out the relationship between the Ciskei and the Republic of South Africa. The Ciskei is therefore a sub-system of the Republic of South Africa, created by the Republican Government which exercises all intrinsic power: political, military, police, and economic. In an effort to legitimise this sub-system in the eyes of blacks, use has been made of both modern and traditional institutions. The political process in this sub-system cannot be appreciated in isolation, except in the context of the Republic of South Africa as a whole.

3. THE POLITICAL PARTY

Political parties appeared on the political scene of the Ciskei as a result of the attainment of a semi-autonomous political status by the Ciskei. It will be interesting to speculate whether these political parties were a product of deliberate planning or a result of a process of evolution.

In this section, attention will be directed to the nature and functions of political parties. Political parties in the Ciskei will be measured against this conceptual model.

Political parties are essentially associations for articulating and aggregating the interests of the people. They are the creation of a modern political system. They are essential to the modern political system (Jupp: 1970: 1; Lapolambara, et al: 1966: 3 and Duverger: 1957: Introduction).

Political parties have had varied origins, among which the following may be mentioned. Some political parties originated as factions within the legislature e. g. in Great Britain. In Africa, there are 'parties' that originated from adapting existing associations; others grew out of the 'congress' movements, while others developed from remnants of fragmented associations. They developed, mainly, in response to the introduction of legislative systems (Zolberg: ibid: 13 and Hodgkin: 1961: 48). There were also political parties that were created by the colonial authorities for the colonial people with the express purpose of diverting their attention from the 'nationalist' liberatory movements which were gaining popularity and strength among them (Zolberg: ibid: 60). Political parties in the Ciskei originated almost under similar conditions and circumstances. This is one reason why members of the Black Consciousness Movement refuse to recognise the leaders and institutions of the homelands. (Dr. Kotzé in Politikon: Vol. 1, No. 1, June, 1974: 44).

A political party may be defined in various ways. Definitions differ mainly in the emphasis that is laid on the various requirements for a political party. For instance, one definition may emphasise the electoral function of a political party to the exclusion of other requirements, while another definition may stress control of political power as a function of a political party. The political parties in the Ciskei emphasise the electoral and patronage functions and are based on traditional structures for support. An explanation will be offered in subsequent chapters as to why this is so. For the present, I suggest looking at a few definitions of political parties:-

" . . . any organisation which nominates candidates for election to the legislatures . . ." (Crotty (ed): 1968).

The main criticism of this definition is that it has omitted the competitive element which distinguishes a one-party from a multi-party regime (Dowse and Hughes: 1975: 340-1). As a result this definition includes under political parties, not only competitive parties, but also one-party states where the party, at least, "goes through the motions of legislative representation" (Dowse and Hughes: ibid). It also includes parties which ". . . for one reason or another, are not permitted to nominate candidates . . ." (Dowse and Hughes: ibid).

While Jupp (Jupp: 1968: 1) insists on classifying as political parties those associations that for one reason or another cannot nominate candidates for the legislature but which under other circumstances would do so. He focuses instead on the mere entertainment of the desire to gain control of the government. According to this definition, the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress and many others would have to be classified as political parties. These organisations entertained a desire to control the government but were prevented from putting up candidates for the legislatures! These are requirements for a political party, not all need be met. Let us examine a few:-

The first and foremost requirement for a political party is that it should seek control of or a share in political power. It is by virtue of this requirement that a political party is distinguished from a pressure group (Jupp: 1968: 1). A political party may succeed in controlling or sharing political power by ensuring that the people who will man the governmental institutions are from its ranks. This leads to the next function of a political party: the recruitment of personnel to the political institutions. Towards the realisation of this goal, the political party selects from its own ranks suitable and appropriate candidates whom it helps to campaign and win elections.

The political party must facilitate the articulation of interests which is a

" . . . process by which individuals and groups make demands upon the political decision-makers"

(Almond and Powell: ibid: 73)

This function may be performed in many different ways and by various structures (Almond and Powell: ibid). Pressure groups, trade unions, and many other associations may perform this function.

Interest aggregation which is the converting of demands into general policy must be performed by political parties (Almond and Powell: ibid: 98).

It is interesting to note that the political parties in the Ciskei (as will be shown in subsequent chapters) relied for a statement of policy on an adapted version of the white Nationalist Party policy of separate development. African political parties were not only concerned with political activities, but also included in the lists of their functions, the performance of 'welfare' work for their members (Hodgkin: ibid).

Another important function of a political party, is patronage. This is a process whereby the 'party' seeks to consolidate its position by handing out newly created posts or existing posts to its members (Jupp: ibid: 102-3). It is against this background that the political parties in the Ciskei will be observed and the role they play in the relationship between the Ciskei and the Republic of South Africa will be assessed.

4. THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

A political party system is the arrangement of the parties (Jupp: ibid: 5). Duverger describes a party system as:-

" . . . a certain stability in the number of parties, their internal structures, their ideologies even their respective sizes, alliances and types of opposition."

(Duverger: 1972: 12)

Jupp maintains that the 'numerical criteria' of political party systems, is not sufficient when classifying political party systems. He suggests that such factors as the 'style' of party aspirations and the effectiveness with which parties carry out their functions are essential (Jupp: ibid: 7). Another important criteria for classifying party systems, is the toleration of opposition. Multi-party systems tolerate opposition while dominant and

one-party regimes, tolerate either a 'token' opposition or opposition is completely discouraged.

Various reasons are advanced for either the watering down of opposition or the complete discouraging of opposition groups. In Africa where the emergence of dominant and one-party regimes has been common occurrence, the following reasons have been advanced-

- a) The opposition is viewed with suspicion, it is believed that the opposition is the instrument of the colonialists. It is being instigated to work against the freedom and unity of the people. (Apter in Markovitz (ed): 1970: 226 et seq; Zolberg: ibid: 51).
- b) During the emergence of African states the strongest party was identified with the state as was the case in Ghana. The opposition was accused of encouraging disunity (Zolberg: ibid: 56 et seq and Markovitz et al: 1970: 226, et seq).
- c) The institutionalised opposition of the Westminster type is believed to be foreign and redundant to the African. According to African tradition, opposition was ingrained in the system. People expressed their opposition during the discussion and agreement was reached as a result of consensus (Nyerere: 1967: 104 et seq).
- d) Opposition was discouraged because, it was believed, it would obstruct the reconstruction process of the nation (Mutiso et al: 1975: 458; Apter in Markovitz et al: ibid: 227).
- e) Nyerere believed that any difference of opinion which was not on fundamentals, could not be solved by the existence of an opposition; the existence of an opposition meant that division was on fundamentals and as such the state was in a state of 'civil war'. A difference of opinion, did not call for an opposition. The existence of opposition in this case encouraged factionalism (Mutiso et al: ibid: 479; Zolberg: ibid: 48-9).
- f) Protagonists of the one-party system submit that even before the independence period - that is, before the decolonisation period - there was no two-party system in Africa. The one-party system was common and therefore the two-party system was foreign (Mutiso et al: ibid: 458).
- g) Nyerere makes reference to the United Kingdom that the two-party system in the United Kingdom was the result of the existence of the class system of the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. In Africa, no various classes exist at the present moment, therefore one party may cater for the needs and aspirations of the people (Mutiso et al: ibid: 479).

Elimination of opposition groups was carried out in various ways, which included the following:-

Arrests, intimidation, banishments, bannings, victimisation of the supporters of opposition groups by dismissal, transfers and some other tactics aimed at discouraging supporters of opposition groups. Elections would be manipulated (Zolberg: 1966: 66 and 78 et seq).

D. Apter in "Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New States", in Markovitz (ed): 1970: 226 et seq, states that the general tendency of the rejection or weakening of opposition groups, derives from the need for security on the part of the political leaders. "For them to go out of office is, in effect to become unemployed" (Apter in Markovitz et al: ibid: 227).

By examining the activities of the political parties in the Ciskei against this background, the role these 'parties' play, may be assessed and at the same time the political parties will be placed in their correct perspective in terms of aims enunciated at the beginning of this 'Introduction'.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Two

Page	21	Para	1	Line	5:	Correct spelling 'Government'
"	24	"	3	"	3:	'Were described' should read 'was described'
"	27	"	3	"	5:	Substitute 'to' for 'for'
"	32	"	2	"	11:	Betterment Scheme in capital letters.
"	33	"	4	"	6:	'introuduction' should read 'introduction'
"	44	"	2	"	1:	Delete 'up'
					6:	'arrangement, sanitation' should read 'arrangements for sanitation'
"	45	"	5	"	2:	Substitute '86 of 1975' for '83 of 1973'
"	47	"	1	"	2:	'Seconded' in small letters
		"	4	"	1:	'television' in small letters
"	48	"	1			Substitute '15 elected members' for '20 elected members
"	49	"	1	"	5:	Insert 'and raise loans' after 'funds'
"	51	"	5	"	7:	Substitute 'fifteen' for 'twenty'
"	52	"	2	"	3:	'Administrator' with a capital 'A'
"	54	"	4	"	1:	'fragmanted' should read 'fragmented'
				"	3:	'might' should read 'should'
"	55	"	5	"	1:	Substitute 'socio-political' for 'socio-politico'
		"	6	"	3:	Substitute 'divert' for 'divest'
"	57	"	5	"	2:	'must in looks and everything' should read 'must be seen to'
"	56	"	3	"	5:	'black man' for 'blackman'
		"	4			'black man' for 'blackman'
		"	5			'black man' for 'blackman'

Page 44 b) ii) Insert 'There are also fifteen members elected by single and multiple member constituencies'.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CISKEI CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

1. POSITION AND BOUNDARIES

The Ciskei forms part of the province of the Cape of Good Hope. It lies between the Great Fish River in the west and the Great Kei River in the east in a part of the country that is commonly known as the 'Border'; this stretches from the Indian Ocean towards the south and inland northwards towards the Bamboe-Storm Mountains. (SAIRR: 1973: 17 and Benbo: 1975: 17).

The homeland extends over an area of 942 076 ha; it consists of five large units and was divided into nine magisterial districts, namely:-

Mdantsane; Zwelitsha; Middledrift; Keiskammahoek;
Victoria East; Peddie; Hewu; Glen Grey and Herschel.

The last two areas, Glen Grey and Herschel were ceded to the Transkei in November, 1975 (Benbo: Ibid: 16) The area of the two districts amounts to 420 000 ha. The Ciskei will get compensatory land amounting to 150 000 ha. Ciskeians who do not wish to become Transkei citizens will be settled on this land: the Ntabethemba for those who will be resettled from Herschel and Zweledinga for those who will be resettled from Glen Grey areas. (Records of CLA Debates: Special Session: 1975).

2. THE PEOPLE OF THE CISKEI

The Khoi-khoi and the San were reported to be the earliest inhabitants of the Ciskei. The Khoi-khoi were encountered as early as 1622 near the mouth of the Great Fish River (Wilson, et al: Vol. 1: 1969: 81). African tribes of the Cape Nguni group were met by survivors of the Stavenisse near the mouth of the Kei River (Wilson, et al: ibid: 84) Africans in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) may be divided into various cultural groups, for example:

- a) The Nguni.
- b) The Sotho.
- c) The Venda and
- d) The Herero-Ovambo.

The Nguni are in turn sub-divided into:

- i) The Natal Nguni or the Zulus.
- ii) The Swazi
- iii) The Cape Nguni and
- iv) The Ndebele.

The Cape Nguni are further sub-divided into:-

<u>Main Group</u>	<u>Sub-group</u>
Aba-Nguni or AmaXhosa.	AmaNgqika) AmaNdlambe) AmaRarabe AmaGcaleka Various smaller Groups
Aba-Thembu	AmaHlanga or AmaQiya AmaDlomo or AmaHala AmaDlavu AmaTshatshu
Aba-Mbo	AmaMpondo AmaMpondomise AmaXesibe AmaBomvana
Later groups of immigrants.	AmaBaca; AmaHlubi AmaQwathi; Imi-Tetwa AmaNgwana; and AmaMfengu

(Source: Raum & De Jager: 1972: 7)

The Cape Nguni speak IsiXhosa and are usually referred to as the AmaXhosa. The Nguni groups that eventually settled in the Ciskei included:-

AmaRarabe; AmaNtinde; ImiDange; AmaHleke;
AmaGwali; AmaMbalu; AmaGqunukwebe; ImiDushane;
ImiQhayi (Hammond Tooke: 1958:21) the AmaJingqi;
and ImiNgcengethelo.

Tribal groups of the AmaMfengu arrived later. Tradition maintains that the Nguni tribes migrated from the North and travelled southwards along the eastern coast (Cohen and Middleton: 1970:219). It is interesting to note that it was common practice for a Nguni chiefdom to adopt the name of its chief: the AmaNdlambe were named after Ndlambe; the AmaRarabe, after Rarabe. Chiefdoms were also named after a famous ox of the chief: for instance, the AmaJingqi were named after Maqoma's ox, Jingqi; while the ImiNgcengethelo adopted the name of

Tyali's ox, uNgcengethelo. The AmaMbalu, after Tiso's famous ox, uMbalu (Soga: 1930: 63)

Tribal groups of the AmaTola, AmaBhele, AmaZizi and AmaHlubi survived the iMfecane which was Tshaka's reign of terror about 1823 (Walker: 1964: 176). They arrived in Hintsa's Gcaleka-land "... destitute, famine-stricken and helpless" (Soga: ibid: 180 and Moyer R: 1971: "Some Current Manifestations of Early Mfengu History" unpublished paper). They called themselves the AmaMfengu¹⁾ from the word ukumfenguza - which means in search of food and shelter (Moyer: ibid) Hintsa received these people with peace and pleasure, allowing them to settle and rehabilitate themselves.

The missionaries, particularly Ayliff and Dr. Philip, drove a wedge between the AmaMfengu and the AmaGcaleka by making suggestions of 'slavery' - that the AmaMfengu were being treated as slaves by the AmaGcaleka. Offers of protection and 'emancipation' under the Colonial Government were made to these people.

The AmaMfengu, having been exposed to privation, insecurity and suffering, readily succumbed to this talk of 'slavery', 'emancipation' and 'protection' (Majeke: 1952: 36). This 'emancipation' was effected when about 17 000 men, women and children were removed from the land of the AmaGcaleka. They were re-settled at such places as Peddie, Victoria East and Keiskammahoek on land that was confiscated from tribes of the AmaRarabe.

On leaving the land of the AmaGcaleka, these people were encouraged to remove, not only cattle belonging to them, but also those belonging to the AmaGcaleka. (Moyer: 1971: unpublished paper).

Many authors, amongst them, Soga and Majeke, refute the argument that the AmaMfengu were ever enslaved by the AmaGcaleka. They

1. The present day Mfengu consciously rejects the term Mfengu. It is regarded as being derogatory; it is felt that this term was appropriate when the AmaMfengu arrived in Gcaleka, destitute. The term preferable is AbaMbo.

argue that the AmaGcaleka did not know anything about 'slavery'. This story is fabricated by the missionaries (Majeke: 1952: 36; Moyer: 1971; ibid and Soga: 1930: 179) This 'emancipation' of the AmaMfengu was effected in 1835.

The AmaMfengu, in recognition of the services rendered to them aligned themselves on the side of the Colonial troops and consequently played a definite and important role as military auxiliaries and decoys in the wars of dispossession against the tribes of the AmaRarabe. (Moyer: 1971: ibid).

The role of the AmaMfengu as military auxiliaries and their being settled on land confiscated from clans of the AmaRarabe, led to the development of a conflict between the AmaMfengu and the AmaRarabe. (This conflict will be described fully in the section on the Emergence of Political Parties in the Ciskei). This conflict becomes very important in Ciskei politics today: the formation of political parties is based on the Mfengu-Rarabe confrontation.

Whites entered the Ciskei, some as hunters, others as traders and farmers. They came as individuals over a long period of time except for the German immigrants who were encouraged by Sir George Grey to settle in the Ciskei. They were settled near King William's Town; and such towns as Berlin, Frankfort, Hamburg and Stutterheim, sprang up. This, Sir George Grey had hoped, would act as a civilizing influence on the African tribes; such settlers would help in the defence of the Colony. The policy of intermingling the nationalities resulted in the Ciskei looking like a chessboard of black and white (Fort Hare Paper: Ciskei A Bantu Homeland). This contributed towards the fragmentation of the Ciskei.

Coloureds also settled in the Ciskei as either servants of the white colonists or as military auxiliaries and interpreters. These population groups make up the composition of the Ciskei population. The inter-action between them, either as individuals or as groups, constitutes the history of the Ciskei.

3. THE PERIOD OF CONFLICT OVER THE FRONTIER

Perhaps, the most appropriate way of starting this section is to make use of this quotation:

"As colonists seeking hunting and grazing land, moved eastward across the Gamtoos, the Xhosa moved westward across the Fish, seeking exactly the same things..."
(Wilson, et al: 1969: 235)

This passage contains the most crucial facts that contributed towards the frontier conflict between white colonists and tribes of the AmaXhosa. The conflict erupted into the Frontier Wars which were fought over almost a hundred years (1778-1878). During this period of strife the boundaries of the Ciskei shifted eastwards and westwards several times during the nine so-called 'kaffir' Wars. These wars marked the resistance of the AmaXhosa to dispossession by the white colonists. These white colonists were backed and supported by such states as the Dutch, at first and later the British. These states were better and more effectively armed and equipped (Wilson, et al: ibid: 242).

As time progressed, the reasons for waging these wars were extended to include, not only hunting and pasturage needs, but also the labour needs for the farms and homesteads of the colonists. The AmaXhosa were eventually subdued and defeated. This defeat cannot be attributed to military performance only. There are other factors that facilitated the defeat of the AmaXhosa, such as:-

a) The Missionaries

Missionaries were bearers of civilisation: religion, new skills and values. The dissemination of this civilisation among tribes of the AmaXhosa, resulted in the emergence of a new group of 'converts' or amakholwa. The emergence of this group further divided the AmaXhosa into pagans and 'converts'. The 'converts' became attached to the mission stations and in due course renounced their tribal customs and ways of living. They turned against their chiefs, thus undermining tribal authority and solidarity. Dr. Phillip is quoted as saying:-

"Whenever the missionary places his standard among a savage tribe, their prejudices against the colonial Government give way, their dependence upon the Colony is increased by the creation of artificial wants" (Majeke: 1952: 8).

b) The Cattle-Killing Episode

A tragic event that broke the might of the AmaXhosa, was the Cattle-killing episode. This took place about 1856 or 1857 when Nongqawuse made prophecies that if the people killed all their cattle and burnt their crops, the dead would be resurrected and would combine forces with the living against the Colonial Government. People died in their thousands, those who survived, fled into the colony where they became available for employment on the farms of the colonists, on the construction of roads and bridges, erection of schools and hospitals (Majeke: 1952: 10) (Wilson et al: 1969: 258). Thus Africans were made available for the cheap labour market. Those who entered the white settlement, were subjected to labour-coercing devices such as the pass-law system, taxes and rents. This also meant, to a large extent, the destruction of the subsistence economy and the incorporation of the Africans into the market economy. The coming together of blacks and whites created problems not only of communications but also the so-called 'native problem'. Brookes defined this 'native problem' as the subjugation of black masses to colonial rule (Brookes: 1924: 12).

The differences in culture between the whites and blacks were given as reasons for the creation of institutions of a subordinate and advisory character for the articulation of the interests of the blacks. Colin Bundy had this to say about the conquest of the AmaXhosa and the cattle-killing episode:-

"[it]. . . accelerated the integration of the colonial and traditional societies on terms, largely, of the former's choosing . . ." (African Affairs: Vol. 71; No. 282: 1972).

The demand for cheap labour was intensified by the discovery of gold and diamonds. The cheap labour problem forms the underlying basis for white-black relations. The end of the military hostilities between the Africans and the white colonists, ushered in a period of struggle for political equality between the Africans and the whites.

c) The Tribal Conflict

The use of the AmaMfengu as military auxiliaries and the settling of the AmaMfengu on land that was confiscated from clans of the AmaRarabe, led to the development of hatred and animosity between the AmaMfengu

and the AmaRarabe. This has been expressed in the AmaMfengu-AmaRarabe conflict (Moyer: undated: "AmaMfengu, Self-defence, Expansion and Frontier Wars . . ."). This tribal feeling of hatred and animosity persists to the present day.

d) The Undermining of Traditional Authority

Sir George Grey applied a policy that was aimed at reducing the power of and influence of the chief. The chief was regarded as being the fulcrum of the power and solidarity of the AmaXhosa. By allowing the chief to receive a salary, his power was reduced. He had abandoned his traditional judicial rights (Wilson, *et al*: *ibid*: 264). The traditional political institutions were, consequently, destroyed, thus closing channels of communications between the people and the colonial government. The chief's being made a paid servant of the white government, brought in its wake his alienation from his subjects; the effect of this alienation was enhanced by the process of urbanisation which resulted from industrialisation. (Hammond-Tooke: 1975: 216 *et seq* also Hammond-Tooke in Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968) 455-477).

4. EARLY ADMINISTRATION

This section will focus attention on the various tactics and devices that were employed in the early administration of the Africans.

Early administration took the form of 'indirect rule' under which the chiefs were allowed to rule over their chiefdoms subject to colonial Government supervision. The Treaty System entailed entering into a 'pact' with the Xhosa chiefs. In the 'pact' the chief undertook to rule his chiefdom in peace. Gifts and presents were given to him to induce his 'co-operation'. A Government agent was placed with him. Direct rule was applied in such locations as the Tyume Valley where Africans were re-settled. A white Government official, a commissioner, was appointed. Individual plot allotments were made. Quit-rent was levied on the plot-holders. The quit-rent has been described as an incentive to industriousness. (Brookes: *ibid*: 118). However, quit-rent was also

a lever to force people to 'go out' and seek work.

Sir George Grey introduced such methods as the education of the Africans for which schools were established; hospitals and medical services were introduced in order to fight against superstition. Institutions of a 'civil character suited to their present conditions' were created (Brookes: ibid: 91). Sir George Grey aimed at breaking the 'worst part of the kaffir polity' which was based on the influence and power of the chiefs. (Brookes: ibid: 93).

Sir George Grey in order to achieve the complete subordination of the AmaXhosa, thus destroying the political structures of the Xhosa traditional society had hoped to replace these traditional political institutions with political institutions of an inferior and subordinate nature.

Problems of communication resulted when the 'Kaffir polity' was destroyed. Africans had been able to articulate their interests through the chiefs. As a result of this subordination, magistrates were placed among Africans with the hope that communication between the Africans and the colonial government would be facilitated.

As a result of the differences of culture, communication problems arose, not only between the magistrates and the Africans, but also between the Government and the Africans. The values held by Africans differed from those held by the white magistrates. The problem of communication between the Africans and the Government was not solved. As time progressed, the white magistrates were identified with the status quo: the pass laws and many other discriminatory devices that were used against blacks. The problem of communication was not improved.

4.1 The Vote

The franchise was made available to Africans under the Cape Constitution Ordinance of 1853. This legislation introduced a 'colour-blind', qualified vote with the following requirements:-

"Occupation of property valued at not less than £25 for 12 months; or earning power of not less than £50 per year; or £25 per annum with board and lodging . . ."
(Brookes: ibid: 276).

The 'Hofmeyr Act' of 1887 injected some encouragement to Africans to register as voters. This Act provided for exemption to Africans registered as voters from such discriminatory legislative enactments as the carrying of passes under the pass law system, and the restrictions on the procurement of liquor.

After 1880, enthusiasm to register as voters increased in the Glen Grey and Herschel areas. The registration of voters during the years 1887 and 1888 were described as of a 'scandalous' and indiscriminate nature in the Herschel and Glen Grey districts. Many discrepancies were uncovered in these areas (Brookes: ibid: 278).

In the Victoria East districts, the registration of voters was described as being 'short of a legion' (Brookes: ibid: 278). In the whole of the Cape, registered voters numbered 135 168, while the natives numbered about 8 117 and 'other' (most of whom were natives) were 10 162.

In the districts of Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, Somerset East, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Aliwal North and Tembuland, the native vote carried weight. It determined the outcome of an election (Brookes: 1924: 279 also Hammond-Tooke in Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968) pp 455-477).

The Franchise and Ballot Act, 1892, raised the requirements for the voter's qualifications: the property requirement was raised to £75 while the earning power requirement was raised to £50. In addition to these requirements, an applicant was expected to be able to read and write. The ownership or occupation of land under the quit-rent tenure provided in terms of the Glen Grey Act, 1894, was not acceptable as a qualification for registration as a voter (Brookes: ibid: 277). This Franchise and Ballot Act, 1892, was, as a result of the large numbers of 'Red-Blanketed' Africans that were disqualified from registering as voters, nick-named the 'Red Blanket Act'.

While Africans of the Ciskei showed great interest in the Cape vote, Transkeians, at first, did not show any interest. There was no demand for the Cape vote until after European canvassers in 1903 showed the Transkeians the advantages that were obtainable as a voter as a result of the Hofmeyr Act, 1887 (Brookes: ibid: 278).

Professor Brookes described the effects of the franchise on the African as having ameliorated the condition of the African; according to him the Cape African was 'better-off' than most other South African natives (Brookes: ibid: 280).

Jabavu was disillusioned when he heard 'anti-native' speeches in the Cape Parliament. These speeches came from members of Parliament who owed their seats to the African vote (Jabavu: 1922: 62).

Whilst I agree with the sentiments expressed by Professor Brookes about the Cape vote having made the Cape African 'better-off', I wish to make this clear. The Cape African was better-off, perhaps, culturally. Politically and economically, they are in the same situation as the other Africans. If the Cape franchise had any substantial effect, such laws as the Franchise and Ballot Act, 1892 and the Glen Grey Act, 1894 would never have been passed by the Cape Parliament.

Brookes remarked that the "wise administration and skilful employment of quasi-self-government" in the Transkei improved the position of the Transkeian. (Brookes: op cit).

The vote did not improve the problem of communication channels. Africans, as illustrated above, were not allowed into the organisations that formulated the policy and demands for the government. The communications passage operated in a 'one-way' fashion. Everything came from above. The proper functioning is 'two-way'.

The European political parties of the Cape, were only interested in the votes of the blacks. Their interest in the black man ended with the conclusion of an election (Jabavu: 1922: 63). The articulation of the interests of the blacks was not promoted. Instead Brookes complained that the manner in which white canvassers wooed black voters, threatened the morality, prestige and dignity of the whites (Brookes: op cit: 280).

Brookes, is worried about the 'morality' of these white politicians. What about the interests and aspirations of the blacks who were being given empty promises!

4.2 The Glen Grey Act, 1894

In this section attention will be paid to the provisions and implications of the Glen Grey Act, 1894. This Act was primarily meant for the people living in the Glen Grey district, but it was later felt that the provisions should be extended to include other areas and people in the Cape (Brookes: ibid: 362). The provisions of this Act introduced a measure of local government. Local and district councils were created. The composition of district councils was as follows:-

- i) Six members appointed by the Governor-General.
- ii) Six nominated by the location boards and approved by the Governor-General.
- iii) A district magistrate who also acted as chairman.

The term of office was three years; the district councils were empowered to levy taxes on all immovable property and also quit-rent on all residents of locations (Rogers: 1933: 41).

The location boards were established in surveyed locations; each had three members appointed by the Governor-General.

The functions and duties of the location boards included amongst other things:-

- i) The construction of and control of water-courses.
- ii) Regulation and supply of water for irrigation.
- iii) Control of grass burning; cutting of firewood, brushwood and thatching grass.

These location boards were subordinate to the District Councils and they served as a mouthpiece of the location residents and as training grounds for membership to District Councils. (Rogers: ibid).

C. J. Rhodes, aptly remarked during a discussion of the Bill that was to become the Glen Grey Act, 1894, that the colonial Government had destroyed the traditional political structures of the African society and not replaced them; therefore it was appropriate that institutions which would engage the attention of the African on local matters be introduced (Vindex: 1900: 373). The same type of argument was advanced when

the Bantu Authorities Bill was being passed through parliament. The message was clear and distinct that African attention should be diverted from the call for equal political opportunities with the whites; institutions to cater for the interests and aspirations of Africans would be created in African 'homelands'. When C. J. Rhodes pioneered this Glen Grey Bill through the Cape parliament, he was reacting to African demands for a share in power. This 'demand' was expressed by the eagerness of the Africans to register as voters in the non-discriminatory voters roll of the Cape Province.

The desire by Africans to register as voters in spite of the stringent requirements for qualification, was astonishing. Fears of Africans 'swamping' the whites were expressed (Brookes: ibid: 281). The Glen Grey Act, 1894 was therefore an attempt to divert African attention from the Cape Town Parliament to local issues.

The Glen Grey Act, 1894 was not aimed at only providing avenues for local government for Africans, it was also meant to facilitate the 'flow' of cheap African labour to the mines, farms and homesteads of South Africa. C. J. Rhodes' remarks that the provision of this legislation would also provide a 'stimulant' to Africans for work (Vindex: 1900: 381). This was effected by the 'quit-rent- which was levied on location residents.

4.3 The Extension of the Council System

In this section, attention will be focussed on the formation of the Union of South Africa which was introduced by the Act of Union of 1909 and the extension of the council system to other provinces in an attempt to create institutions that would cater for the communication of the interests and aspirations of the Africans.

The Act of Union, 1909 marks a further step in the constitutional development of the Ciskei. It will be remembered that the Ciskei had been administered as an integral part of the Eastern Cape.

Constitutional development of the RSA, affected the Ciskei: As a result of the provisions of the Act of Union, 1909, the Native Affairs Department was created. (Government Notice No. 1 of 1910). The effect of this was

to centralise the activities and policies of the various colonies. This resulted in the extension and enhancement of the Native Commissioner system. The Native Commissioner is an official of the Department of Bantu Affairs and is appointed in areas that are predominantly African. In areas that are predominantly white, magistrates are employed. In white urban areas, white magistrates perform the duties of Native Commissioners. Chief Native Commissioners were appointed in all African territories. The Ciskei was also provided with a network of Native Commissioners with the Chief Native Commissioner in King William's Town.

The Governor-General was declared the paramount chief of all the African tribes in the Union of South Africa and was endowed with powers to legislate by proclamation.

Africans had come to value the Cape liberal franchise as ideal and desirable. Hopes of its extension to the northern provinces were entertained. But instead, the South Africa Act, 1909 did not provide for the extension of the franchise to the northern provinces (Wilson, et al: Vol. 1: 1969: 439 et seq). Africans became frustrated at the various provisions of the South Africa Act, 1909. They regarded the provisions of this Act as signifying 'disenfranchisement' and the diminution of their political rights (Wilson, et al: ibid: 440). This led to protests (see chapter on the Fore-runners of the Political Parties). The associations for protest catered mainly for the educated elite. The channels of communication, that were created for Africans, such as the Native Commissioners, did not enjoy the support of the educated African. Frustration and disillusionment set in amongst the Africans. The council system had been looked upon as a training ground (Brookes: op cit). The 'sufficiently' educated African hoped to be admitted to the franchise enjoyed by whites. The reduced political rights, as a result of the Act of Union, 1909, brought frustration and disillusionment and this in its wake enhanced the problem of legitimacy and communication.

The Native Affairs Act, 1920 provided for the extension of the council system to the other parts of the Ciskei and the Union of South Africa. Location boards were established by proclamation in the following areas:-

Herschel; East London; Keiskammahoek; Hewu;
Tamacha; Middeldrift; Peddie and Victoria East.

The Glen Grey Act, 1894 and the Native Affairs Act, 1920 were meant to provide primarily for the creation and extension of the council system, respectively but the other purposes of these Acts were to encourage a cheap flow of regular black labour to the mines, factories and farms of South Africa. In order to facilitate the realisation of the latter aim, the Land Act, 1913 or Squatter's Act was promulgated.

It was revealed during a debate on the Land Bill that Africans were occupying 'white farms' as squatters or as 'share-ploughers'. The demand for agricultural produce had increased as a result of the discovery of gold and diamonds. Reports of increased activity were received from various places. Africans ...

"occupied, tilled and grazed nominally white lands in enormous numbers ..." (C. Bundy in African Affairs: Vol. 71: No. 282: 1972).

C. Bundy quoted a report in which the African was described as

"man to man, the Kaffir of these parts is a better farmer than the European, more careful of their stock, cultivating a larger area of land, and working themselves assiduously..."
(African Affairs: Vol. 71: No. 282: 1974)

This was in complete contrast to what Rhodes said during a debate on the Glen Grey Bill, that Africans were a 'lazy lot' (Vindex: 1900: 381 et seq) Thus the 1913 Land Act taken in conjunction with such legislative provisions as the pass-laws, permits, to name but a few, facilitated the creation and regulation of the flow of cheap labour to the mines, factories and farms of South Africa. The Land Act, 1913 provided for:-

- i) The demarcation of African reserves.
- ii) The abolition of squatting.
- iii) The prohibition of Africans buying land outside the reserves.

4.4 The Ciskei General Council (CGC)

In this section attention will be directed to the establishment of the Ciskei General Council (CGC) sometimes referred to as the Ciskeian 'Bunga'. Particular attention will be directed to the function of the CGC as an 'umbrella' organisation and its co-ordination of the activities of the various district councils and local boards.

The CGC was created under the provisions of the Native Affairs Act, 1920, the Native Administration Act, 1927 and under Proclamation 34 of 1934. According to this proclamation, the local boards and district councils from the following areas constituted the CGC.

Middledrift; Tamacha; Peddie; Victoria East; Keiskammahoek; Herschel and East London. All these were local boards. The district councils came from Glen Grey. (It must be noted that Hewu joined later).

The Chief Native Commissioner of the Ciskei was chairman of the CGC. The Native Commissioners from the constituent areas were ex officio members. These white officials participated in the debates but had no vote. Each district council or local board was represented by two nominated delegates. The powers and functions of the CGC included, inter alia, some of the following:-

- a) The initiation and consideration of any matter relating to the economic, industrial or social conditions of the African population within the area of jurisdiction of the CGC.
- b) The consideration of any proposed legislation or existing law which especially affected the Ciskeians.
- c) The consideration of anything which may be submitted to it by the Governor-General or the Minister for Native Affairs.
- d) Generally, such other powers and functions as may be regarded as proper to the administration of the CGC and may be committed to it by the direction of the Governor-General (Proclamation: 34 of 1934)

King William's Town was the headquarters of the CGC. Any resolutions that the CGC adopted had to be submitted to the Minister for Native Affairs for approval and only after such approval had been granted, could the resolutions be implemented.

The CGC had a Secretary/Treasurer who was responsible to the Chief Native Commissioner and not to the CGC. The white magistrates dominated the discussions of the CGC to such an extent that the African delegates did not feel free to participate. This attitude could have been the result of a genuine desire to help. In their sincere motives, the magistrates would be using their 'advanced' knowledge to assist the African who was 'new' and 'ignorant' about most things. But by so doing they dominated the discussions and consequently denied the African

an opportunity for self expression. The best the magistrates could do was to 'sit back' and allow the Africans to participate and then only to provide guidance.

By 1943, the CGC was experiencing difficulties stemming from its inadequate powers. The difficulties included:-

- a) The effect of the dominance of the white officials.
- b) The federal structure of the CGC allowed the district councils and local boards to exercise greater powers than the CGC itself. The Transkeian Bunga had a unitary structure which enabled it to enjoy greater powers than its constituents. The Transkeian Bunga enjoyed the power of appropriating and allocating funds. The CGC on the other hand, did not enjoy such powers. They were the prerogative of the district councils and local boards (Carter, et al: 1958: 94)
- c) Another stultifying factor was that the CGC could not implement its resolutions. The resolution had first to receive the approval of the Minister for Native Affairs. But the Transkeian Bunga on the other hand, classified its resolutions into:-
 - i) those resolutions that had a bearing on the Transkei, these were implemented immediately.
 - ii) The second category of resolutions was that which had a bearing on general matters. These had to receive the approval of the Minister for Native Affairs before being implemented. (Carter, et al: 1958: 94 et seq)
- d) Another limiting factor on the powers of the CGC was the meagre financial contributions that were made by the district councils and local boards to the CGC. The constituents of the CGC were required to contribute 10-12½% of the revenues of the District and Local Councils. (Proclamation 34 of 1934).

Contribution by District and Local Councils

to the CGC for 1934 and 1935.

<u>Contributor</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>
Glen Grey District Council.	£702. 5. 4	£1375. 1. 1
Tamacha Local Council	245. 3. 6	508.12. 6
Herschel " "	187. 6. 7	279. 5. 9
Middledrift " "	217. 5. 3	343.14. 10
Peddie " "	129.12. 9	204. 7. 3
Keiskammahoek L/Council	146. 18. 4	185. 6. 8
East London " "	115. 4. 2	196. 13. 0
Victoria East " "	108. 15. 7	135. 16. 7

(Source: CGC Records of Debates: 1935-44).

A Recess Committee was appointed to investigate and report on the possibilities of reconstructing the CGC on the same lines as the Transkeian 'Bunga'. It was hoped to encourage the constituents of the CGC to surrender some of their powers to the CGC. When the Recess Committee tabled its recommendations, it was revealed that such a scheme was not acceptable to some of the constituents. (Records of CGC Debates: 1945-1954).

The people outside the CGC had by this time become critical of the CGC and other similar institutions such as the advisory boards, the Transkeian 'Bunga' and the Native Representative Council that was founded under the provisions of the Representation of Natives Act, 1936. Because these institutions exercised advisory and local powers, they were described as toy 'telephones' and 'dummy' institutions (Tabata: 1950: 106 et seq) There was a general political awakening of the people. The ineffectiveness and failure of these institutions attracted the attention of the people. The people resented the fact that these institutions facilitated the acceptance of the Rehabilitation Scheme (Tabata: ibid: 90-91) The Rehabilitation Scheme, sometimes known as the betterment scheme was applied through the provisions of Proclamation 116 of 1949. An appropriate Government Notice applied the provisions of this proclamation in each area. This scheme entailed the resettlement of Ciskeians into close-settlement villages (as against the traditional scattered settlement pattern); grazing camps were provided; the fields and residential areas were also set aside; the number of stock was cut down to the carrying capacity of the land and the quality of the stock was improved.

The removal of Africans from the common voter's roll met with opposition. When the Representation of Natives Act, 1936 was promulgated, it met with opposition. It provided for the removal of Africans from the Cape Common Voters roll and the creation of a separate voters roll for Africans. Separate representation of Africans in the Parliament of the Union of S. A. and the Cape Provincial Council would be arranged as follows:-

- i) Three whites to represent Cape Africans in parliament.
- ii) Four white senators to represent the: Cape, Transkei, Natal, O. F. S. and the Transvaal.
- iii) Two seats in the Cape Provincial Council to represent Africans in the Cape.

A national advisory council, the Native Representative Council (NRC) was established. (M. Ballinger: 1969: 21 et seq).

It was against this background that the CGC became unpopular and lost its support and legitimacy. In the wake of these events, the white Government lost faith and became impatient with the CGC as a result of the fact that the CGC had become the subject of complaint.

It had become ineffective as a channel of communication. Its members realised that as a result of its lack of power, it could not serve the interests and aspirations of the Ciskeians. On the other hand, the Government realised that it could no longer engage the interests of the people. Therefore, an institution that would hold the attention of the people was necessary. This could be achieved by the introduction of an organisation that was based on the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951.

4.5 The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951.

This section will focus attention on the application of the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 to the Ciskei.

As introduction to this section, I wish to reiterate some of the criticisms that were advanced against the Council System of which the CGC was an example:-

- i) It was said, amongst other things, that the Council provided limited rights of self-government (Brookes: ibid: 254).
- ii) The Council System had been imposed from above; it had "never really functionally and logically integrated" with indigenous decision-making. It was firmly in the hands of the bureaucratic officers..." (Hammond-Tooke: 1975: 222)
- iii) The European officials had a stronger say while Africans were not given a chance. The Council System was based on Western methods and consequently neglected tribal administration, Bantu Law and custom. The council system did not lend itself to large-scale developments. (Pearce: undated: 3)

It was however, generally conceded that the Council System had an educative effect on the African; it acted as a training ground in administrative activities and other responsibilities in which the African got involved (Brookes: ibid: and Pearce: ibid:).

Dr. Eiselen, in an address to the CGC emphasised the fact that the CGC had retrogressed instead of progressed; it lacked financial competence in that, during the twenty years of its existence it had made the following financial distributions:-

Hospitals and Clinics	£25,000
Bursaries	- 19,000
Various donations	6,000
Afforestation	3,000
Agricultural shows	5,000
Irrigation works	2,000
Stock Improvements	300
Stationery	600

(Source: Records of Debate of the CGC: 1954).

These arguments presaged the 'exit' of the Council System and the introduction of a new system based on the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951. The arguments against the Council System, overlooked the fact that the limitations of the CGC were inherent in its constitution which provided a definite framework which was set and controlled in Pretoria.

The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 was being presented as ideal and the only medium to remedy the faults of the CGC. It provided for Bantu law and custom (Pearce: *ibid*) and was meant to resuscitate and re-establish the chieftainship which would be the fulcrum of the system (Carter: 1958: 92). The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 also provided for:-

- i) The abolition of the NRC. By the time of its abolition the NRC had imposed a ban on itself as a result of a protest against being ignored by the Government (Ballinger: *ibid*: 203).
- ii) A hierarchical system of authorities was introduced: at the base were the tribal and community authorities. The tribal authorities were applicable in areas where people lived more or less in tribal units. The community authorities were created for areas where detribalisation was common. Chiefs would be chairmen of tribal authorities. Chairmen of community authorities were elected from among the members. Regional authorities co-ordinated the activities of tribal and community authorities. A chief would be a chairman of a Regional authority. At the apex of this arrangement would be a territorial authority.

- iii) The emphasis was on allowing the Africans to operate this machinery. The functions and powers of these authorities were subordinate and advisory - concerned with local affairs such as, inter alia, dipping tanks, construction and maintenance of roads and bridges and agriculture. These authorities were granted greater financial powers than those that were enjoyed by the district councils.

Chiefs and headmen were granted quasi-judicial powers.

The 1954 session of the CGC resolved itself out of existence in favour of the Bantu authorities dispensation by requesting the Government of the RSA to apply the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 in the area under the jurisdiction of the CGC. (Records of Debates of the CGC: 1954). Consequently, the CGC was reconstructed and reconstituted in terms of this Act.

Tribal, community and regional authorities were established. In order to achieve this, some of the defunct chiefdoms were revived and granted recognition; new chiefs were installed, headmen were promoted to the chieftainships. According to information, the application of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 was met with strong criticism. This Act was criticised, for being . . .". . . a reactionary effort to resuscitate a divisive tribalism" (Carter: 1967: 50).

Also where there was no chieftainship, the Act provided for the creation of a chieftainship by the promoting of a headman. Professor Hammond-Tooke was assigned the task of finding the appropriate people to fill such offices (Carter: op cit). The criticism of this practice was that a chief could never be made but was born.

The following regional authorities constituted the territorial authority of the Ciskei (CTA):-

The Hewu Regional Authority
 The Ndlambe Regional Authority
 The Keiskammahoe Regional Authority
 The Victoria East Regional Authority
 The Middeldrift Regional Authority
 The King William's Town Regional Authority
 The Herschel-Bandla le Sizwe Regional Authority
 The Ngqushwa Regional Authority.

The regional authorities from Glen Grey joined the CTA later. The Glen Grey Regional Authority identified itself with the CTA in 1966 (Record of CTA Debates: 1966).

The paramount chief of the AmaRarabe was made the chairman of the CTA; chairmen from the various regional authorities were ex officio members of the CTA; each regional authority appointed two delegates from among its members to represent it on the CTA (Proclamation R496 of 1961).

The final number of the members of the CTA was twenty-two and yet, not all the chiefs in the Ciskei were included as members of the CTA. Criticism, by members of the CTA was that the CTA was not sufficiently representative.

The CTA had an Executive Committee which was appointed, by vote, from among the members of the CTA. This Executive Committee attended to the business of the CTA during the period when the CTA was not in session.

White officials could attend in an advisory capacity while other white officials such as the Director of Education could attend the CTA meetings and give reports (Records of Debates of the CTA: 1963).

It was not long before the CTA was frustrated by the nature of its position. Members began demanding more powers; speeches of members of the CTA included, inter alia, a desire for amalgamation with the Transkei (Record of CTA Debates: 1967). As a result of this dissatisfaction, the CTA appointed a Recess Committee in 1966 to look into the powers and structure of the CTA. The findings and recommendations of this Recess Committee were expected in the 1967 session of the CTA.

In 1967, a special session of the CTA was convened; the report of the 1966 Recess Committee was expected at this special session but instead, proposals for a new organisation were tabled for consideration by members of the CTA.

It became apparent that the members of the CTA were taken by surprise: they had expected a report-back by the 1966 Recess Committee but instead proposals for a new organisation were tabled.

The Government had failed to take the members of the CTA into its confidence; consequently, the feelings of these people were not considered. This illustrated the Government's contempt for the feelings of and opinions of these people. This action was deeply rooted in the history of South Africa: When the Glen Grey Act, 1894 was promulgated the people were not consulted; the Act of Union, 1909, the Land and Trust Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Representation of Natives Act, 1936, the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, the Bantu Education Act, to name but a few, were all promulgated, without the consultation of Africans. This was once more an illustration of the lack of communication between the Government and the people. The communication system operated in a one-direction fashion: from top (that is the Government) to the people. This was one reason why the people created their own platforms in the form of organisations which could act as their 'voice'.

The envisaged re-organisation proposals were the direct result of the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 - taken a step further in conjunction with such Acts as the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government, 1959; and the influence of the Transkei, which had attained 'self-government' status cannot be under-estimated.

The Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act, 1959 provided for, inter alia, the abolition of African representation in the white parliament and the Cape Provincial Council. It recognised various Bantu nationalities; it provided for the representation of the various homeland governments in white areas; tribal representatives in white urban areas could also be appointed; the various Bantu nationalities were linked to the Government of the Republic of South Africa by Commissioners-General.

4.6 The 'New Deal'

The then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development had this to say about the 'New Deal':

"[It was] ... a system of administration decentralising the

Department of Bantu Administration and Development and conferring more administrative functions on Territorial Authorities..." (Record of Special CTA Session Debates: 1967).

The same views were expressed by the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development when he said:-

"[The New Deal was]... 'n verdere fase op die pad na selfbestuur... Hierdie fase sal bestaan uit die be-oefening van groter bestuurs- en administratiewe bevoegdheid deur die Bantoe-owerhede..." (Record of Special Session of the CTA: 1967).

As a result of these 'administrational functions' that were being ceded to the Ciskei Territorial Authority the following was envisaged:-

- a) The tribal and community authorities would receive direct representation on the CTA. The CTA numbers would, consequently, be augmented.
- b) A reconstruction and re-organisation of regional and tribal authorities was therefore necessary and this could be effected under Proclamations 142 and 143 of 1968.
- c) All chiefs in the Ciskei would become ex officio members of the CTA. Chairmen of community authorities would also be ex officio members of the CTA.
- d) The paramount chief would appoint a personal representative who would be allowed to participate in the discussions but could not accept any official post in the CTA.
- e) Ordinary chiefs could also appoint deputies who could participate in the discussions but could not vote.
- f) Voting in the CTA was on a tribal basis. No individual had a vote. The tribal delegation voted en block. This had the effect of submerging the individual in the tribe. The reason lies in the emphasis that the system had on the traditional institutions.
- g) The chairman and vice-chairman were elected from amongst its members. Official records do not supply the reason for the replacement of the paramount chief as chairman; but I shall venture to make a suggestion: according to the law and custom of the Africans, a chief must pretend to some dignity and charisma. This cannot be maintained or protected in a 'hot' debating chamber. If this charisma has to be maintained, then participation in the debates would suffer. On the other hand, if the people participating in the discussions are to be allowed

to feel free, the charisma and dignity must go.

In other words, we cannot have both the charisma and free discussions. This applies to all chiefs. At the village of Tamacha, the chairman of the Authority is, officially, the chief (Hammond-Tooke: 1959: 77) but in actual practice, a chairman is elected. The chief becomes a ceremonial head. The conduct of the meetings is the duty and responsibility of the amaphakathi (Councillors).

- h) An Executive Council would be elected from the members of the CTA. Amongst these members of the Executive Council, there was a chief Executive Councillor who co-ordinated the activities of the Executive Council.

The distribution of seats in the Executive Council was based on ethnic lines: the AmaRarabe and AmaMfengu were each awarded two seats while the AbeSuthu and the AbaThembu were each awarded one seat.

The distribution of seats in the Executive Committee, not only emphasised the recognition of the importance of these traditional institutions, but also institutionalised them, consequently, immortalising the tribal differences; posterity will always be reminded of these petty tribal differences that made unity amongst Africans difficult.

The effect was to encourage fratricidal strife which ensured that Ciskeians would devote most of their time and energy to tribal fights. The full impact of this is that even the formation of political parties in the Ciskei involves tribal strife. The AmaMfengu-AmaRarabe conflict which is part of history, was revived. Political opportunists allowed themselves to be used as tools in dividing the Ciskeians into faction camps. The lesson of the union between Briton and Boer, in order to effect the oppression of the African, did not make an impression on them.

- i) Six state departments were created; each department was placed under an Executive Councillor. The departments that were created included:
- i) The Department of Authority Affairs and Finance
 - ii) " " " Community Affairs
 - iii) " " " Works.
 - iv) " " " Education and Culture
 - v) " " " Agriculture and Forestry
 - vi) " " " Justice

- j) A CTA civil service was established. White officers from the RSA civil service were seconded to the nascent Ciskeian civil service. The retention of these seconded officers raised such questions: Were these officials responsible for the guidance of the application of the policy of separate development or were they genuinely available for the guidance of this nascent black bureaucracy?

Later these seconded officials would be replaced by Ciskeians in an attempt to Africanise the Ciskei Civil Service.

At the inception of the 'New Deal' the white Republican officials occupied 25% of all posts on the fixed establishment. In 1972 this number came down to 16% while in 1973 it was 13,4% and in 1974 it was 5,2%. (Source: Annual Reports of the Ciskeian Public Service Commission: 1972, 1973 and 1974).

A chart showing the Ciskeian Public Service for 1974 is shown on the next page:-

CISKEIAN PUBLIC SERVICE FOR 1974

DEPARTMENT	Permanent Ciskei incumbents	Ciskeian officers out of adjustment (1)	Republican officers held against Posts (2)	Temporary Ciskeian employees (3)	Vacancies (4)	Total (5)	Percentage seconded incumbency
Chief Minister and Finance	46	8	17	0	10	81	21%
Justice	116	33	29	2	13	193	15%
Education	104	13	9	146	30	302	3%
Interior	319	23	25	144	130	641	3,9%
Agriculture and Forestry	219	4	4	432	297	997	4,5%
Works	273	87	65	917	38	1 380	4,7%
TOTAL	1 077	168	190	1 641	518	3 594	(6) 5,2%

Notes:

- 1) Held out of adjustment against posts of higher or lower grading for various unavoidable reasons.
- 2) No qualified Ciskeian replacement available.
- 3) These figures include temporary workmen.
- 4) No incumbents; Ciskeian or Republican, permanent or temporary available.
- 5) 1 647 temporary workmen included.
- 6) If the temporary workmen are excluded, this percentage will be 9,75% in comparison with the percentage of 11,35% as at 31st December 1973.

(Extracted from: 1974 Annual Report of the Ciskeian Public Service Commission)

- k) A Treasury was established. The treasury would be responsible for the allocation and appropriation of funds for the services of the CTA; it would also be responsible for levying and collecting taxes.

The 'New Deal' introduced wider powers to the CTA within the framework of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959. As a result of the application of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, thirty-three tribal authorities, four community authorities and nine regional authorities were established in the Ciskei (Benbo: 1975: 16). The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 which formed the basis for the Bantustan policy was criticised by one author for being . . .

" . . . the fragmentation of Africans by policies designed to strengthen tribal organisation and solidarity. . ."
(Wilson, et al: Vol. 2: 1971: 459).

Another writer expressed the belief that the Bantustan policy was a response by the RSA government to internal and external pressures and was aimed at transferring the points of conflict from the white urban areas to the 'homelands' (Wolpe: in Economy and Society: Vol. 1; No. 4 Nov., 1972). As a result of the emphasis of political activity being transferred to the homelands, Africans living in white urban areas were denied political rights in these areas. They were expected to identify themselves with the homelands where they would be able to enjoy their political rights. The external and internal pressures to which the writer referred were, world opinion and the political awakening of the people of South Africa. These were some of the reasons why the Government was determined to push ahead with the Bantustan policy. The realisation of this policy depended on the willingness and co-operation of the Africans.

5. THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS STATUS

In this section, attention will be focussed on the attainment of a semi-autonomous status by the Ciskei; the implications of this stage and the results of the attainment of such a status.

The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, 1971 provided the framework within which the homelands attained 'self-government'. This Act is a

'blanket' Act whose provisions are made applicable to the various 'homelands' by means of a proclamation (SAIRR: 1973: 50) Self-government was achieved in two stages:-

- i) The first stage entailed the integration of the CTA with the CLA and consequently the Legislative Assembly was created. The provisions of Proclamation 118 of 1971 made this possible. To allow for a smooth transition, the structure and functionaries of the CTA were retained.
- ii) A Recess Committee was appointed and instructed to draw up a suitable constitution for a semi-autonomous Ciskei Legislative Assembly (CLA). When the Recess Committee tabled its recommendations, Proclamation R187 of 1972 which is the Constitution Proclamation came into being. This proclamation ushered in the second phase. The Ciskei Constitution Proclamation provided for:-

a) Area of Jurisdiction

The area of the semi-autonomous CLA included the following:-

Mdantsane; Zwelitsha; Hewu; Victoria East; Keiskammahoek; Middledrift; Peddie; Herschel; Glen Grey and the Zibula Tribal Authority in Stutterheim.

The consolidation proposals for 1975 resulted in:-

- i) The Ciskei may gain the Kat River Valley which includes the Kat River Irrigation Dam. (Benbo: 1975: 12)
- ii) Herschel and Glen Grey have been ceded to the Transkei. Herschel and Glen Grey cover an area of 420 000 ha while the compensatory area, Ntabethemba and Zweledinga, cover an area of 150 000 ha (Record of Debates: Special Session of CLA: 1975).

The excision of Glen Grey from the Ciskei and incorporation into the Transkei (Benbo: 1975: 16) happened after the residents of Glen Grey had indicated by a referendum in 1970 that they favoured remaining with the Ciskei by an overwhelming majority (Records of CLA Debates: 1975).

As a result of the excision of these areas from the Ciskei, confusion and misery have resulted. People were fleeing their homes and properties to settle in resettlement camps near Queenstown. A squatter settlement has resulted and in its wake disease and malnutrition are common (Daily Dispatch: 7. 1. 77).

This resettlement of people from these areas, was carried out with the connivance and knowledge of the Ciskeian Government. Ciskei official vehicles were used for transporting these people and their belongings. But no proper settlement arrangement, sanitation, water, school and clinics were made.

In order to cope up with the present crisis, a fund had been established by the ruling party (the CNIP). This is referred to in the chapter on Political Party activity in Rural Areas.

Note: A Map of the Ciskei is attached - see annexure D.

b) Membership of the CLA¹

The membership of the CLA is composed of the following:

- i) The Paramount Chief of the AmaRarabe.
- ii) The Constitution stipulates that there will be 29 chiefs of established tribal authorities. This section of the Constitution can always be amended to accommodate the newly established chieftancies. The Committee drafting the Constitution had decided on 52 chiefs but this was later amended to 30 chiefs. (Records of the CLA Debates: 1972).
- iii) The paramount chief could appoint a representative to act on his behalf. Such personal representative of the paramount chief could participate in the debates of the CLA but could not accept any official position. He had no vote.

c) The Powers and functions of the CLA

The CLA was granted power to legislate on any subject affecting the Ciskei except - defence; foreign affairs, preservation of peace and security; postal and telephone services, immigration; of non-citizens; currency; banking; excise and customs (SAIRR: 1973: 71).

The CLA enjoys extra-territorial powers which enable it to 'reach' out to Ciskeians who work or stay in white urban areas. These powers enable it to collect taxes from Ciskeians in towns. It has been estimated that the number of males temporarily absent from the Ciskei is 39 187 and that 19,4% of the population of the Ciskei is urbanised (Benbo: ibid: 24-5). These powers also enable the Ciskeians living or working

1. After the excision of Glen Grey and Herschel from the Ciskei, the CLA membership had been reduced as follows: 29 chiefs and 15 elected. The membership is expected to increase as a result of the addition of Zwelethemba and Ntabethemba electoral divisions to the Ciskei.

in white urban areas to participate in elections and political party activity of the Ciskei (SAIRR: *ibid*: 1973: 51). The CLA can allocate and appropriate funds.

- d) A cabinet consisting of six ministers and a chief minister was established. There are now seven state departments as a result of the inclusion of the Department of Health in 1976.

These are the departments:-

- 1) The Department of the Chief Minister and Finance.
- 2) The Department of the Interior.
- 3) The Department of Justice.
- 4) The Department of Education and culture.
- 5) The Department of Agriculture and Forestry.
- 6) The Department of Roads and Works.
- 7) The Department of Health.

Proclamation 187 of 1972 provided for the members of the cabinet to be elected from among the members of the CLA but with the introduction of Proclamation 86 of 1975 the chief minister is empowered to appoint his men. This has been the result of the influence of the political party system.

The removal from office of cabinet ministers is placed in the hands of the Chief Minister. Proclamation 83 of 1973 contains the procedure for the removal of a cabinet minister.

In the Westminster-type of government institution, the prime minister is granted the power to appoint and dismiss a cabinet. This principle is being grafted onto the CLA as a step towards the development of the Westminster-type of parliamentary system.

Any legislative enactment by the CLA must receive the approval of the RSA before it becomes a legal instrument. Amendments to the existing laws and the Constitution Proclamation had to receive the approval of the RSA.

A link between the RSA and the Ciskei is the Commissioner-General whose services were shared between the Ciskei and Transkei but with the Transkei's advancement into independence, a separate Commissioner-General for the Ciskei had been appointed. The Ciskei is empowered, under the Promotion of Bantu-Self-government Act, 1959 to establish

representatives in white urban areas. This facilitates communication between the 'homeland' government and workers from the 'homeland' who live in towns.

It must be noted that the creation of these semi-autonomous governmental structures has to be accompanied by an appreciable amount of freedom of speech on the part of these homeland leaders. These leaders criticise the policy on which they are founded! This of course, is not by accident. It is a deliberate scheme to show the outside world and the Africans themselves that the Bantustan policy allows for 'freedom'.

Proclamation 187 of 1972 announces that the CLA is 'declared self-governing' within the framework of the RSA. This immediately establishes the relationship between the RSA and the Ciskei.

The RSA employs measures to ensure that the 'homeland' would behave according to plan. These are some of the measures:-

a) Financial Control

A Revenue Fund was established for the CLA. Monies and grants that accrue to the CLA from the South African Consolidated Revenue Fund, are paid into this fund. The income and expenditure estimates of the CLA are scrutinized by the RSA Minister of Finance. All the accounts of the CLA are submitted to the Controller and Auditor-General for auditing (SAIRR: 1973: 51). (See appendix for figures).

b) Legislative Control

- i) Before any legislation from the CLA becomes law, it must receive the approval of the State President of the RSA.
- ii) The CLA cannot legislate on the following:-
defence; foreign affairs; the preservation of peace and security; postal and telephone services; immigration of non-citizen; currency and banking customs and excise. The State President would legislate for the CLA on these matters, by proclamation. (SAIRR: ibid)

c) Judicial Control

On attaining the semi-autonomous status, the CLA took over control of all Native Commissioners courts. For Supreme and appeal court services, the CLA depends on the RSA.

d) The Administrative Control

- i) The physical presence of the South African Police (SAP) in the Ciskei, the Seconded white officials; the postal and telephone services; all these facilities ensure the control over the Ciskei by the RSA.
- ii) The appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers must receive the approval of the RSA.
- iii) While the CLA enjoys the power to be able to arrange for her own public holidays, it still observes the public holidays prescribed by the RSA.
- iv) The Ciskei depends on the RSA for radio and Television services.
- v) The South African Railways - road and rail services operate in the Ciskei.

e) Educational and Cultural Control

- i) The CLA receives financial assistance from the RSA so that it may provide educational services to the Ciskei. The following amounts have been contributed:-
 - 1970/71 - R3 010 385
 - 1971/72 - R4 225 074
 - 1972/73 - R4 678 000
- ii) The CLA uses the syllabi, certificates, diplomas and examinations that are approved by the RSA.

6. COMPARISON OF THE CGC, CTA AND CLA

In this section differences between the CGC, CTA and CLA are tabulated in an attempt to illustrate the stages of development of the Ciskei:- (Table on next page)

COMPARISON OF THE CGC, CTA AND CLA

CGC	CTA	CLA
<p>1. <u>Membership</u> Members appointed to the CGC from the District Councils. Included amongst its members are white magistrates. Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner was Chairman.</p>	<p>Members appointed to CTA; emphasis was on chiefs who were chairmen of various authorities. Number too small and as a result some chiefs were excluded. At first Paramount was Chairman, later chairman elected from members.</p>	<p>Chiefs fulcrum of the system; all chiefs in Ciskei were <u>ex officio</u> members; 20 elected members; there was representative of the paramount chief.</p>
<p>2. <u>Voting</u> Voted as individuals</p>	<p>Voting as tribal unit, no individual vote.</p>	<p>Voting according to party affiliation.</p>
<p>3. <u>Constituents</u> Based on district councils and local boards which cut across tribal boundaries.</p>	<p>Based on tribal/community and regional authorities. Two delegates appointed from each authority. After the 'New Deal' tribal and community authorities were represented directly on the CTA.</p>	<p>Based on tribal authorities. Each chief from a recognised tribal authority is a CLA member. Twenty elected members. Has electoral Divisions.</p>
<p>4. <u>Powers</u> Powers basically local; Resolutions adopted.</p>	<p>Powers local, resolutions submitted to RSA.</p>	<p>Enjoys legislative powers subject to approval of RSA - enjoys extra-territorial powers.</p>

CGC

CTA

CLA

5. Financial Competence

Minimal financial powers; appropriation and allocation of funds done by district Council. Received 10-12½% financial support from 1934 to 1954 the CGC distributed only £60 900.

Minimal at first but increased after 'New Deal' to include powers to allocate and appropriate funds. Relies heavily on grants from Consolidated Revenue Fund. Accounts are audited by the Controller Auditor-General.

Enjoys greater financial powers than predecessors. Has power to levy and collect taxes; enjoys the power to allocate and appropriate funds; Relies on grants from Consolidated Revenue Fund. Accounts are audited by the Controller Auditor-General

(See appendix for figures)

6.

(See appendix for figures)

6. Franchise

6.

6.

(a) None for CGC

(a) None

Exclusively Ciskeian and extended to men and women from 18 years of age.

(b) Limited franchise for those on special roll to elect representatives in the S. A. Parliament.

7. Political Parties

Nil

Nil

Parties emerged in response to the election of the 20 CLA members.

8. Bureaucracy

Nil

None at first but after 'New Deal' a Ciskei Public service was started. RSA white officials seconded to Ciskei.

Had greatly expanded public service.

<u>CGC</u>	<u>CTA</u>	<u>CLA</u>
9. <u>State Departments</u>		
Nil	None at first but was awarded six after 'New Deal'	Has SEVEN departments. Headed by cabinet ministers.
10. <u>Executive Council</u>		
Nil. Relied on the chief Bantu Commissioner and a paid secretary/treasurer.	At first had an Executive Committee; later replaced by an Executive Council of six. A chief Executive Councillor co-ordinated the services of the various Executive councillors; distribution of seats in the Executive Council based on ethnic lines: Two seats each for AmaRarabe and AmaMfengu; One seat each for the AbaThembu and AbeSuthu. Each executive Councillor headed a state department.	Has a Cabinet of Seven ministers each heads a State Department. There is a chief Minister who is responsible to the CLA and who appoints and dismisses his Ministers subject to approval of the State President.
11. <u>Officials</u>		
The Chief Native Commissioner was chairman and there was a Secretary/Treasurer.	Paramount Chief was chairman but after new deal chairman was elected from members.	Secretary a paid official Chairman elected from members.

(Source: Records of Debates: CGC; CTA and CLA from 1934-1975).

7. COMPARISON OF CLA WITH PROVINCIAL COUNCILS

The recently acquired semi-autonomous status of the CLA must of necessity be compared to other sub-systems in the RSA, namely the Provincial Councils.

- a) The Ciskei had been administered as an integral part of the Cape since the annexation of the Ciskei to the Province of the Cape of Good Hope - from as early as 1847.

b) Legislative Powers

Both the CLA and the Provincial Council are subordinate legislatures. Whatever legislative enactments issue from these bodies have first to receive approval of the RSA before becoming effective as a legal enactment.

Legal enactments from the Provincial Council are applicable to the area under its jurisdiction. The CLA enjoys extra-territorial powers which enable it to collect taxes from Ciskeians living and/or working in white urban areas; they also ensure the participation of Ciskeians who live permanently in white areas, in Ciskei elections.

c) Composition of these institutions

A provincial council is composed of elected members; from these elected members an Executive Committee is elected and the chairman of the Executive Committee is an administrator who is a Government appointed official. In the CLA, there are ex officio members who gain admission to the CLA by virtue of their positions as chiefs; in addition to this, there are twenty elected members. From the ranks of these nominated and elected members, a Chief Minister is elected who then appoints a Cabinet of six.

- d) Both the CLA and the Provincial Council receive financial assistance from the Central Government. The CLA and the Provincial Council are both subject to the financial control measures of the Government.
- e) A Provincial Council does not enjoy separate judicial powers. It depends on the Central Government for judicial services while the CLA enjoys control over the Bantu Commissioners Offices.
- f) While a Provincial Council does not enjoy the privilege of having its own flag and anthem, the CLA has a flag and anthem as national symbols. This alone illustrates that



the CLA is destined eventually to become independent.

- g) A Commissioner-General is a link between the RSA and the CLA while the link between the Provincial Council and the RSA is the administrator.

The fore-going comparison illustrates the legal position of the provinces relative to the homelands. It is significant to note that the creation of the homelands brought with it an uneasy feeling of mistrust on the part of whites as well as blacks; it was felt that the homeland policy would result in the fragmentation of the RSA and this would be South Africa's 'frankenstein' (Rhodie: 1975: 165).

Professor Khan, writing on the relationship of the Transkei Legislative Assembly's sovereignty to that of the RSA makes the following comment:-

"[the TLA was]... a new type of legislative body of a more advanced character than a local authority... [it had]... wider powers than those of provincial councils... its advanced constitutional structure, with a cabinet and most attributes of responsible government..." (SALJ: Vol- LXXX: 1968: 478 et seq).

Professor Khan's remarks are appropriate in the case of the CLA as well. The implication is that the homeland constitutional status is a prelude to 'independence' while that of the province is merely that of a subordinate local body.

8. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT¹⁾

It has been said that proper political advancement must be accompanied by proper economic advancement. This section will focus attention on the economic development of the Ciskei.

The economic development of the Ciskei takes place through the agencies of the South African Bantu Trust and the Xhosa Development Corporation. These are both statutory bodies. The RSA has contributed, towards the economic development of the Ciskei enormous funds, through these organisations. Figures to illustrate this will be given in the appendix.

1. See appendix for figures illustrating economic activity.

The Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC) in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture of the Ciskei has initiated and established agricultural projects which have laid emphasis on the involvement of Ciskeians in the various positions...

"[from]...partial involvement and later to partial or complete take over..." (Benbo: ibid: 40-1).

The following results have been obtained from major agricultural projects:-

"Gross sales have increased from R53 455 in 1973/74 to R329 073 in 1974/75. In the same period employment on the scheme increased from 395 to 803. (Benbo: ibid: 41).

Nine irrigation schemes have been developed of which Lante/Mbinzane and Occupation Post projects were ceded to the Transkei as a result of the excision of the Glen Grey area (Benbo: ibid: 41).

The Ciskei has no mineral resources. (Benbo: ibid: 43). The industrial and commercial projects that have been established, are established on an 'agency' basis. No recognised growth points have been developed, but industrial projects have been established with the aid of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in white areas which border the Ciskei such as East London-King William's Town complex. As a result commuting has arisen. The employment capacity of this project is 10 824 (Benbo: ibid: 46-7).

The commercial sector provided work opportunities for about 1 300 workers in 1973 (Benbo: ibid: 49).

A tremendous leakage of income has been noted. This is caused by the fact that most Ciskeians in Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, buy from the RSA, as a result of the competitive prices of commodities in white urban areas. This renders the multiplier effect within the Ciskei negligible. (Benbo: ibid: 51).

An extensive network of labour bureaux has been established throughout the length and breadth of the Ciskei to ensure that labour will be directed and regulated to where it is needed in the RSA (Benbo: ibid: 70).

A close study of the population figures reveals the following:-

- i) As a result of migrancy, the male : female ratio indicates that a large proportion of the economically active males were absent from the Ciskei. These were involved in migrant labour. Of the males that were in the Ciskei, about 24,4% were economically active in the Ciskei; 74% were not economically active; while 5,5% did not state their occupations. (Benbo: ibid: 29).
- ii) As a result of migrancy, there was a very high rate of male dependency. For every 100 male adults there were 270 females and children (Benbo: ibid: 25).

The Ciskei, as a result of migrancy, is left with a population that is composed mainly of women and children and old and infirm men. The formation and maintenance of associations depends on the active participation of the community. Usually the leadership is drawn from young men but what happens when these are not available? African custom and tradition requires that women should take a 'back' seat. For these and other reasons, the formation of political parties in the Ciskei rural areas would be badly affected.

Pressure on land is considerable; the population density is about 56 persons to a square kilometre. Consequently, many peasant families do not own land (Bantu Investment Corporation: Bantu Homelands: 37). The creation of homeland townships may act as a magnet to attract the surplus population and concentrate it on one spot. This would leave those with interest in farming, actively occupied with farming. The success of this scheme depends on the availability of work opportunities in or around these homeland townships such as:

Sada; Mdantsane, Ilitha and Dimbaza (SAIRR: 1973: 136).

One writer emphasised the fragmented nature of the Ciskei as a drawback to economic development (Schonefield 4: 1973: Unpublished paper) This writer maintained that at least the homeland might have one integral block which could act as locality for growth points that could result in a developed infra-structure.

Maasdorp in a paper: "Economic Development Strategy in the African Homeland: The role of Agriculture and Industry" writes:-

"It will be a long time, therefore, before agriculture in the homelands can be revolutionalised...labour - intensive agriculture will not end the dependence of the homelands on the white areas or the need of white areas for African labour... for the fore-seeable future, labour-intensive agriculture will not provide the solution to the homeland employment problem..."

The same author emphasises the lack of skilled labour as a drawback to envisaged industrialisation of the homelands and the lack of suitable localities for these industries (Maasdorp: ibid:).

Professor Lombard writes:

"The homelands are therefore still to be considered as economically dependent systems although with fairly advanced social infra-structures... Like many other African territories and economies in the underdeveloped world, it will take a very long time before the homeland economies will be able to provide employment opportunities of sufficient growth elasticities from within" (Rhodie (ed): 1973: 177).

The socio-politico and economic development of the homelands can be understood only when viewed against the general pattern of the socio-economic and political development of the RSA. It will be observed that these Bantu homelands serve a definite purpose in the socio-economic and political picture of the RSA.

Wolpe writes:-

"[The] Bantustan policy of separate development was the response to these combined internal and external political pressures and was (and is) designed both to divest opposition and to transfer conflict out of the white urban areas to the African homelands... In the economic sphere, apartheid 'modernises' the system of cheap migrant labour and perfects the instruments of labour coercion..."
(Wolpe in Economy and Society: Vol- 1; No 4: Nov. 1974).

Wolpe comments further that the facilities that are made available in the homelands for employment opportunities are only meant to make extra money with which to supplement the earnings of migrants. It is also suggested that even the attempts at creating a 'middle class' in the homelands has a definite purpose.

9. CONCLUSION

Returning to the question of political development of the Ciskei, I wish to emphasize some of the arguments that have been made. I shall do this at the risk of being repetitive.

It must be noted that political action in the Ciskei must be viewed against the background provided by the general political scene of the RSA. There are always the two sides: there is the point of view of the architect of these 'devices' and on the other, the point of view of those for whom these 'devices' have been introduced. Each of these sides has its own aims and desires. Until these aims and desires have been placed in their correct perspective, we cannot give a correct interpretation and assessment of the situation.

The political development in the Ciskei, from the council system to the Bantu authorities has been responsive to forces inside and outside the country. The forces inside have been characterised by a clamour for equal political opportunities between blacks and whites. The reason for this call was that there is a problem of communication. The blackman feels that his aspirations and interests are not articulated through the institutions specially prepared for him. Not only that, but also that he is denied the right to take part in the central decision-making processes. The blackman questions the institutions that have been specially made for him.

As a result of this call for equal opportunities between black and white the attention of the outside world has been directed towards South Africa. Therefore the constitutional development of the Ciskei, must be seen against this background. It must be seen as an attempt to silence outside criticism of the policy of the Government of the RSA and not only that but also as an attempt to divert the attention of the blackman from the clamour for more and equal political rights.

By the creation of such things as the legislative assemblies with decision-making power, the political parties, the introduction of homeland citizenship and the other trappings of 'self-government', it was hoped that the blackman would take full advantage of this homeland 'freedom'.

But as long as the Ciskei is subordinate, in one way or another, to the Republic of South Africa, the demand for more power (which power is represented by the 'whites only' parliament in Cape Town) will never cease. The CLA derives its advisory and subordinate powers from the parliament in Cape Town. It must be expected, therefore, that, at one stage or another, the limited powers of the CLA will be exposed. This will enhance the demand for more political power.

Before this section is concluded, an attempt must be made at answering the question: Why were the political parties developed? At this stage, I shall confine myself to the outlines of this question. It will be answered in detail in the section dealing with the 'Emergence of Political Parties'.

The struggle for liberation had been spearheaded by organisations that were eventually banned and which fled the country resulting in the creation of an organisational vacuum; resulting in the 'stifling' of the voice of the struggle for liberation.

The Government would not 'accept' the people's silence but it preferred the people to speak through organisations of its own creation. These political parties were also created with the purpose of facilitating the acceptance of the Bantustan policy.

It must be noted that these homeland 'parliaments' in order to be able to engage the attention of the people, must in looks and everything emulate the 'white' parliament in Cape Town. The white parliament is based on a political party system. For the same reason the homeland political parties have been created - as an essential part of the scheme.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Three

Page 58	Para 2	Line 2:	Biblical quotation from Old Testament: Joshua: 9 verse 21.
" 61	" 1	" 15:	'establishement' should read 'establishment'
" 62	" 1	" 2:	'allegience' should read 'allegiance'
" 63	" 2	" 3:	Substitute 'work' for 'works'
" 64	" 4	" 6:	'Much had' should read 'much has'
" 65	" 4	" 5:	a 'Westenised' African should read 'Westernised' African
" 68	" 3	" 4:	Substitute 'them' for 'you'
" 70	" 2	" 1:	'position' should read 'position'
" 71	" 1	" 7:	Substitute 'supposition' for 'supposition'
" 73	" 1	" 3:	Substitute 'for' for 'to'
" 78	" 9	" 1:	Delete reference to Walker
" 84	" 2	" 1:	'Union' in small letters
" 88	" 1	" 10:	Substitute 'interrogation' for 'interogation'
" 90	" 7	" 2:	Insert and close brackets: (Article in p. 54)
" 95	" 4	" 2:	'Politics was' should read 'politics is'

CHAPTER THREETHE FORE-RUNNERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The South African situation is such that the majority of the population, the blacks, occupy a 'pariah' status (Mayer: 1972: 3) while the minority, the whites, enjoy a position of privilege. Consequently, blacks are denied and deprived of many of their political and economic rights. These are the preserves of the white minority whose members man the legislatures, are involved in the administration and decision-making of the country. They also own, manage or are over-seers on the mines, farms and in the factories.

The socio-political and economic structure of the country is such that the blacks are the "hewers of wood and drawers of water" (Joshua: 9: 21) They are made to operate political institutions of a subordinate and advisory nature. Consequently, problems of communication and legitimacy have arisen. Communication channels between the ruler and the blacks are impaired. Successive institutions that have been created by the Government for the Africans have proved unacceptable to the Africans.

As a result of this, a protest movement, sometimes known as the liberation movement was started. In this section attention will be focussed on the formation, activities and leadership of the organisations in the liberation movement and while doing so emphasis will be laid on the significance and relationship of these organisations of the liberation movement to:-

- 1) The organisations that emerge in the Ciskei as a result of the attainment by the Ciskei of a semi-autonomous status.
- 2) The role these organisations played in facilitating the struggle of the Ciskeian for equality.
- 3) Whether these organisations facilitated the articulation and aggregation of the interests and aspirations of the Ciskeian.
- 4) Ciskeians lacked institutions that could be used as platforms for their demands, would these organisations under discussion perform this function?

For the sake of convenience, our discussion will be divided into the following:-

- 1) The period of the moderates, from 1910, up to and including the two World Wars.
- 2) After the two World Wars, a 'crop' of militant leaders emerges. This covers the post-Second World War period including the sixties.
- 3) After 'Sharpeville' and the counter-action period of the RSA ruling regime, disintegration sets in and the liberation movement is not only 'silenced' but attempts are made by the ruling white regime to provide organisations to replace those of the liberation movement. It is at this stage that a movement that re-organises the fragmented forces of the liberation movement, appears. This is the black consciousness movement which emerged from about 1969. All events from this time, up to the present moment, will be included under this period.

1. The Moderates

The early beginnings of the 'protest' movement, including the period of the two World Wars, will be covered under this head. A common characteristic of this period was the appearance on the political scene of a leadership that was moderate in outlook, opportunistic, individualistic and whose actions and participation in the protest movement, was motivated by reaction to particular discriminatory legislative measures. Consequently, the organisations that emerged were the direct results of particular discriminatory measures. Many factors contributed towards the making of this leadership. In this section light will be shed on the activities, significance and role this leadership played in the development of a protest movement which was contributory, directly or indirectly, to the emergence of political parties in the Ciskei.

1.1 The Period before 1910

The end of the frontier hostilities, marked the beginning of a political struggle between the black majorities and the white ruling minorities. The flow of black labour into the white settlements as labourers on the mines, farms and homesteads of the colonists, brought in its wake a ...

"growing interdependence and co-operation of the various population groups within one economy and political order ... " (Walshe: 1970 : 15).

A black elite which was imbued with 'non-racial ideals' which were based on Christian doctrines (Walshe: ibid: 1) was emerging. The gradual process of economic integration facilitated the formation of these attitudes (Walshe: op. cit). The development of political consciousness was motivated by various factors, amongst which the following may be mentioned:-

- a) The Cape liberal franchise had a politicising effect on the Africans. It encouraged the formation of an African elite (Wilson; et al: 1971: Vol-II: 427). It also attracted the attention of Africans in other colonies (Walshe: ibid).
- b) Missionary teachings had an effect on the formation of political attitudes and ideas. Christianity encouraged the idea of the 'brotherhood' of man. Christianity was not only a religion, but it also imbued the people with cultural, political and economic values. (Walshe: ibid: 11).
- c) The influence of the struggles of such American Negroes as B. T. Washington, Du Bois and others had a tremendous effect on such African leaders as the Rev. Dube who claimed to be emulating the example set by B. T. Washington. Rev. Dube, founded the Ohlange Institute in Natal. His idea of a 'permanent organisation' to defend the interests of Africans was inspired by Du Bois. (Walshe: ibid: 13 also Wilson: et al: Vol-II: ibid: 435).
- d) The launching of a Xhosa press: Isigidimi Sama Xhosa (The Messenger of the AmaXhosa) in 1884 and the Imvo Zabantsundu (the opinion of blacks) facilitated the development of political consciousness (Walshe: ibid: 3-4).
- e) The emergence of seperatist Churches: the Ethiopian and African Methodist and Episcopal (AME) Churches encouraged the formation of these protest organisations. An American Negro influence was operative in these Churches(Wilson; et al: Vol-II: 1971: p. 435).
- f) The early African leaders had always looked up to Britain for salvation, but when it became apparent that Britain would not defend the Cape liberal franchise against the advancing Afrikaner influence of the northern colonies, they became disillusioned with British liberalism. This encouraged the formation of organisations on which they could rely.
- g) Another important factor that contributed to the political consciousness of the Africans and which ultimately

led to the formation of protest organisations, was the fact that the Eastern Cape had the longest history of contact between Africans and Whites. In 1850, more than 9000 African children attended mission schools most of which were in the Eastern Cape. This number rose to 100 000 and then to 170 000 in 1900 (Walshe: ibid: 7). Educational institutions, such as Lovedale, Healdtown, St. Matthews and many others, produced an African elite that 'gave expression to the new political consciousness' of the African. (Walshe: ibid:) Fort Hare, though established later, became a seed-bed of African political consciousness. Before the establishment of Fort Hare, many Africans obtained their university education over-seas, from where they returned motivated to the establishment of a common and open society.

The early protest activities were expressed in the form of deputations and petitions to either the British Government or the Colonial Government. The African leadership of this era showed characteristics of being greatly influenced by the Christian religion. Apart from this, they were also individualistic and moderate. The existence of tribal loyalties and language differences obstructed the early formation of a national organisation.

It was only after the rise of industrialisation which resulted, inter alia, in urbanisation, that an increased contact between the various peoples resulted in the reduction of the effects of tribalism. Urbanisation encouraged opportunities for pursuing common interests as communities developed (Wilson; et al: Vol-II: ibid: 435). As the effects of tribalism diminished and the problems of language were overcome, the formation of a 'nation-wide' protest organisation became possible.

The early protest movement included such organisations as African Peoples Organisation (APO) which was founded in 1902. It had a Coloured membership. It was started in the Western Cape (Wilson; et al: Vol-II: ibid: 428).

An association which was described as a 'seed' of the African National Congress (ANC) was started in the Eastern Cape in 1884. It was known as Imbumba Yama-Africa (African Union) (Wilson: et al: ibid: 428) At the same time a Vigilance Association was formed in the Transkei (Wilson, et al: ibid: 432). In 1908, Jabavu formed the Cape Native Convention with a special purpose of excluding the chiefs from the village

boards and district councils because of their 'reactionary influence' (Walshe: ibid: 17 et seq).

The chiefs were noted for being 'reactionary' because they 'remained true to their allegiance' to the Colonial Government and perhaps the British Crown. They did not entertain 'rebellious' ideas. This attitude made them ready 'yes men', consequently, unconscious opponents of the 'protest movement'.

The same attitude persists with the chiefs today. It is for the same reason that the Government can rely heavily on the co-operation of the chiefs for the implementation of the Bantu Authorities System.

In the Orange River Colony, a number of individuals from various tribal groups, met to found the Orange River Congress which had as its primary aims the following:

- a) To protest against the carrying of passes by women.
- b) The extension of the Cape liberal franchise to the other provinces (Wilson; et al; ibid: 433 also Walshe: ibid: 17).

In Natal, protest was expressed through the formation of the Natal Native Congress which accepted representation by Whites and was founded in 1901 (Walshe: ibid: 16 also Wilson, et al; ibid: 433). The Natal Indian Congress was founded in 1894. It was modelled on the Indian National Congress. Discriminatory laws and a system of taxation that was exploitative against the Natal Indians was introduced by the Natal Colonial Government. This aroused dissatisfaction and protest among the Natal Indians resulting in a civil disobedience campaign which it initiated in Natal in 1908 and 1913 while in the Transvaal, civil disobedience was initiated in 1906. (Wilson: et al; ibid: 430)

An 'umbrella' organisation which took under its wing the following protest organisations, was established in the Transvaal:

- i) A BaSotho Committee
- ii) The Native Congress of the Transvaal
- iii) The Transvaal Vigilance Association.

The parent body was called the Native United Political Association of the

Transvaal (Wilson: et al: ibid: 432). It was aimed at protesting against discriminatory legislation. The first activity it carried out was to submit a petition to England on discriminatory legislation.

It is evident from the fore-going that, though confined and constrained by local difficulties, a beginning had been made with the organisational works for the protest movement. The formation of protest organisations was motivated, inter alia, by:-

- a) Britains failure to encourage the extension of the Cape liberal franchise to the other colonies. The Afrikaner in the northern colonies was determined that there could be no equality between white and black in Church or State (Wilson: et al: Vol-I: 1969: 228 also Manseregh: 1962: 61)
- b) Judging from the number of political organisations that were found in the Cape, during this time, it was evident that the African in the Cape had attained a higher standard of political consciousness than those in the other colonies.
- c) Organisations that were formed during this period failed to fulfill the requirements of modern political organisations. They could be described as 'groupings' of people who were attracted to particular individuals (Tabata: 1950: 8). However, these 'groupings' originated from the people's need for a platform and a proper channel of communication for their interests and demands, unlike the political institutions that emerged in the Ciskei for the express purpose of legitimising institutions created as a result of the Bantustan policy.

In concluding this section, I wish to reiterate the following:-

It was evident that political consciousness amongst Africans was delayed in its growth by lack of proper organisations. The leadership of these organisations was concerned about its being recognised and rewarded as a group that was 'civilized' or had acquired western culture. The very system of the Cape liberal franchise, encouraged the creation of an educated African elite ...

"[the] Cape policy provided clear goals for the educated Africans and the important symbol of a new citizenship ... the vote" (Walshe: 1971: 6).

The very same system had many Africans disqualified: those who

desired to be registered as voters but could not as a result of the provisions of the Voters Registration Act, 1887 (Walshe: ibid: 5) and later as a result of the provisions of the 'Red Blanket Act' of 1892. The tendency was therefore, one of forming organisations that catered for the interests and aspirations of the 'educated' elite. Whilst, the interests and aspirations of the Africans 'educated' or 'uneducated', 'civilized' or uncivilized', were neither being articulated nor aggregated through the channels that were created with the connivance of the Government, the organisations that the 'educated' formed for themselves, failed also to articulate and aggregate the interests of the Africans.

White political parties failed to accommodate the Africans as members. The only time these parties ever became aware of the existence of black voters was when they canvassed for votes. Even then, white candidates, both English and Afrikaner, 'wooed' African voters with candy and tobacco (Jabavu : 1922 : pp. 62-3; also Hammond-Tooke in the Journal of African History: Vol-IX: No. 3: 1968: 459).

The formation of a country-wide protest organisation was delayed because of the prevalence of tribal loyalties, the lack of a common language and the existence of diverse interests.

The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was the first organisation to cater for the interests and aspirations of the ordinary man-in-the-street, on a mass basis. The ICU could not be regarded as a political party. It was meant to be a trade union. The ICU reached epic proportions in size but as a result of misunderstanding within the leadership, the ICU floundered. The leadership became, not only individualistic, but also opportunistic. Much had been said about the opportunism of the leadership of the era. Involvement in organisational work, entailed sacrifice of one's time and energy. A desire for compensation for one's sacrifice resulted in the development of opportunistic tendencies that resulted in the misuse and mal-appropriation of funds.

African leadership, during this era, fought for recognition and acceptance into the white society and institutions, as a reward for having assimilated 'Western' culture, but, unfortunately, the South African system did not differentiate between 'educated' and 'uneducated'. The only distinction

that was made was between black and white. As a result, the African elite became frustrated.

The problem of communications remained unsolved. The interests of the blacks remained unarticulated. The council system, which was introduced under the provisions of the Glen Grey Act, 1894, did not provide a solution; the liberal Cape franchise also failed to solve the question of communication. White political parties that existed, during this time, did not accept blacks as members. Thus the interests and aspirations of the blacks were not channelled through to the central decision-making bodies of the country.

The ad hoc organisations that had been formed, sought to direct attention, only, to particular discriminatory measures as 'protest', laying emphasis on particular discriminatory measures and not giving expression to the interests and aspirations of the masses of blacks. Only the interests and aspirations of the educated elite mattered! Even then this did not mean that the interests and aspirations of the educated elite were being articulated. Lack of proper channels of communication persists to this day.

1.2 The formation of the African National Congress (ANC)

We have discussed in the previous section, the formation of ad hoc associations that were the result of reaction by the 'educated' elite to particular discriminatory measures. By launching these organisations, the African educated elite, had hoped to protest thereby directing attention to themselves as a 'westernised' African. In this section, attention will be directed to the formation of organisations that, at first catered for the interests and aspirations of the elite but later broadened out to accommodate the masses.

When studying the activities of the ANC, it will be necessary for us to assess the significance of this organisation in relation to the aims enunciated earlier.

The period preceding the formation of the ANC had been characterised by an African leadership that had developed confidence and trust in the British Crown. During the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) Africans fought on the side of the British. They had hoped that victory for the

English signified the 'dominance of the Cape liberal franchise' (Walshe: ibid: 15) and the extension of the liberal franchise to the other colonies. England, on the other hand, had her attention focussed on the realisation of the unification of the four colonies. England could not risk the recurrence of a civil war of the proportions of the American Civil War on South African soil, on the question of the African franchise. (Thompson: 1900: 118). Consequently, a compromise was arrived at: the Cape liberal franchise would not be extended to the other colonies, instead, it would be safeguarded in the South African Constitution by entrenchment. The unification of the four colonies was made a reality only on the conclusion of this compromise.

No Africans were invited either to the Treaty Conference at Vereeniging or to the National Convention at Bloemfontein in 1909. In other words, no African opinion was consulted about either the treaty terms or the terms of Union (Mansergh : ibid: 65 et seq). Failure to consult African opinion was not unique to these historical events. When the Representation of Natives Act was passed by parliament, no African opinion was consulted. African opinion was consulted after the Bill had been introduced in Parliament. Again when the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, the Bantu Education Act and many others were introduced into Parliament, no African opinion was consulted.

It was not surprising that the Africans realised that the Act of Union, 1909 had come to provide a basis and framework for racial discrimination. But as a result of the lingering 'trust in the benevolent intentions of the Whites' (Wilson: et al: Vol-II: ibid: 437) the Africans were still prepared to acquire 'constitutional rights within the economic life and political institutions' of South Africa (Walshe: ibid: 34). It was argued that 'half a loaf is better than no bread at all', thus the Cape liberal franchise would be better than nothing. (Walshe: ibid: 34).

Guided by these principles and attitudes, the Africans, under the auspices of the South African Native Convention met in 1909 and despatched a delegation with a petition to England. This was not the first and only petition to Britain and it would not be the last. These petitions had all been a fruitless and futile exercise. The formation of an ad hoc convention was significant in that it transcended local and tribal differences. It brought together into one organisation people from the various colonies. The convention was fore-runner to the 'Congress'. The formation of

'Congress' was influenced by the following factors:-

- i) Enthusiasts such as I ka Seme had taken the initiative and were keen on this Union-wide organisation (Walshe: ibid: 33).
- ii) The prospect of facing legislation from a 'unified' parliament, might have had some influence on the formation of this 'union-wide' organisation, not only as a protest organisation but also as a consolidatory measure. The new parliament had issued a spate of discriminatory legislation including such legislation as the Native Labour Act, 1911; the Mines and Works Act; the Dutch Reformed Church Act, 1911, to name but a few (Walshe: ibid: 31). These legislative enactments, provided the African with sufficient cause for alarm.
- iii) Urbanisation resulted in the breaking down of tribal and regional boundaries. Conditions of common interests and experience were created (Wilson: et al: ibid: 437).
- iv) The Act of Union, 1909 made the Africans political outcasts (Tabata: ibid: 8).

It is against this perspective that the South African National Native Congress was established at Bloemfontein in 1912. SANNC was formed, not only as a protest against discriminatory legislation, but also as an instrument to fight tribalism and to promote parliamentary representation. It was also hoped that SANNC would educate African opinion (Walshe: ibid: 37). Prudence, restraint and a dutiful respect for the rulers God placed over the Africans, would be exercised (Walshe: ibid: 37).

This declaration was appropriate to the attitude of African leaders during this era: they were mission-school educated. Those who were present at the first conference, were described as:-

"[gentlemen with] ... personalities, formally dressed in suits, frock coats, top-hats and carrying umbrellas ..."
(Walshe: ibid: 33)

Apart from adopting resolutions, SANNC, despatched petitions to the British Crown and the Union Government. It also assisted with the 'no-pass' campaign at Johannesburg in 1919, and co-operated with workers in their struggles (Wilson: et al: ibid: 444-7).

After several drafts of the SANNC constitution, it was finally decided to change the name: South African National Native Congress to South African National Congress (ANC); in 1923.

Notwithstanding the fact that the early leadership of the ANC was elitist and sought to feather its own nest, the ANC as an organisation was destined to play an important rôle in the struggle of the African for equal political and economic rights. In other words, the ANC had the potential of an ideal organisation that would serve the interests and aspirations of the Africans. It was to become a platform for black demands for equal political and economic opportunities.

Through its activities, the ANC was able to mobilise the black masses in the struggle for equal political, economic and social opportunities. It directed its energies to securing for blacks the franchise and the right to be elected, to elect people to represent you in the administrative and decision-making bodies of the country. It aimed at creating an open society that would be non-racial, where each person would be judged according to his abilities and would not be prejudiced by either his colour or his religion.

This meant that the ANC would reject the inferior and subordinate institutions that were being created for a 'child' race.

An organisation may be good, but it is what its leadership does with it that is important. This applied in the case of the ANC. Its leadership did not reject these 'half-measures' such as the provisions of the Representation of Natives Act, 1936. These 'sops' were meant to isolate the leadership from the majority of Africans.

The Land Act, 1913 provided, inter alia, for:-

- i) The demarcation of the 'Native' territories.
- ii) The abolition of African squatters: consequently transforming an African peasantry into a landless and exploitable proletariat (Wilson, et al: ibid: 435 also Bundy in African Affairs: Vol-71; No. 282; 1972).
- iii) The prevention of Africans from buying land outside the 'native' reserves.

Hertzog had remarked during the debate on this bill, that the 'Swart gevaar' threatened to squeeze the white farmers off their land (Walshe: ibid: 30). This was not only an attempt to win support for this Bill but also an illustration that whites (English- and Afrikaans-speaking) could stand together when faced with a 'Swart gevaar'.

When in 1914, the Secretary for Native Affairs attended an ANC conference, which was held in Kimberley, the visit signified for members of the ANC that the ANC would be recognised as an 'official liaison' between African opinion and the Government. This was not to be. It was decided at the conference to send a delegation to England and petition the British Crown about the Land Act, 1913 (Walshe: ibid: 49). This was once again a futile exercise.

When the First World War (1914-1918) started, the Africans showed keenness to help but were rebuffed by a reply from the Cabinet that:

- a) There was no desire to make use of the services of Africans in a 'combat capacity'.
- b) The conflict originated amongst the white people of Europe.
- c) The Government was anxious to avoid the employment of its native citizens in warfare against whites (Walshe: ibid: 53).

Nevertheless, Africans were eventually allowed to join the war as a 'labour contingent' (Walshe: op. cit.).

This refusal to accept the African as an equal and partner, clearly illustrated the racialistic attitude of the Government. The failure of the 1919 delegation to the Treaty Conference at Versailles, was described by Walshe as a 'major watershed' in the history of the ANC (Walshe: op. cit.). As a result of this failure, the ANC lost much of its "coherence and initiative". The support of the chiefs declined; membership stagnated and was later depleted and Congress began a long struggle of . . .

"Political frustration and organisational weakness"
(Walshe: op. cit.).

Kuper believes that African political organisations derive, to a large extent, from situations of crises and from the denial of an effective political rôle for Africans (Kuper: 1965: 316). The ANC was no exception to this. The ANC was founded as a movement for democratic rights and as a reaction to the denial of these rights in the Union Act, 1909 (Kuper: op. cit.). The inference from this is that the South African political system's denial to Africans of political

and economic rights which is based on discrimination, resulted in a series of crises. The author, R. Kuper illustrates his point by naming the formation of such organisations as the ANC, the All-African Convention (AAC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) as deriving their existence from crisis situations. The type of 'crisis situation' which he describes for each case is as follows: the ANC founded, partly, as a reaction to the discrimination and denial of democratic rights in the Union Act, 1909 while the AAC was founded as a result of a re-action to the 'contraction' of political rights under the provisions of the Representation of Natives Bill and the provisions of the Land and Trust Bill. The PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) was formed as a result of a crisis within the ANC (Kuper: op cit). I cannot accept the Act of Union, 1909, the Representation of Natives Act, 1936, the Native Land and Trust Act, 1936 and any other, as any more of a crisis than, for instance, the Industrial Conciliation Act or any other enactment. These Acts are the unfolding of the discriminatory and racial policies of the South African ruling regime, and not points of a crisis! Pin-pointing areas of crisis in the legislative enactments that cover the socio-political and economic relations in South Africa, flows directly from a fallacious attitude of regarding each legislative enactment as an isolated aspect that had no bearing on or relation to the rest of the picture. Each legislative enactment must be regarded as an integral part of the general pattern of oppression.

As a result of the position of the African's lack of political rights, the ANC served the interests of a subordinate people. This gave the existence of the ANC, though not illegal, a 'clandestine' appearance. This was born of the 'official' attitude towards the ANC.

The ANC was generally labelled as a 'communist' organisation; it encouraged the development of 'ungrateful' and 'cheeky' Africans.

Jupp comments as follows:-

"The distinguishing characteristic of the political party is that it has been brought together to influence or to control the political institutions of a society. A political party may have no chance of controlling the government of a country but, if it has such control as a specific aspiration, then it is entitled to be classed with parties, which do exercise control.

(my underlining - Jupp: 1968: 1).

This statement justifies the classification of the ANC as a political party. If Jupp's contention that the mere entertainment of an 'aspiration to control' is sufficient for classification as a political party, then the ANC does qualify for classification. But on the other hand, the fact that the ANC served people who were excluded from the franchise, doomed it to the position of a perpetual pressure group. Jupp's contention must be accepted with the pre-supposition that such political party was not excluded from participation in the elections. Take, for instance, the position of the B. N. C. P. in the Ciskei. Its inability to win at the polls, does not imply exclusion from the franchise.

This idea to entertain aspirations to control was never exercised by the ANC even in relation to elections for members of the NRC, the Advisory Board or Bungas. The ANC failed to nominate candidates for election into these institutions. Not because of non-collaboration, because individual members of the ANC served on these bodies.

The statement that the destiny of any political party is shaped by its environment. (Jupp: op. cit) has been proved to be true with the ANC. In its attempts to express the interests and demands of the Africans, it involved itself in petitions and campaigns of various nature and dimension, such as the 'one-day strike'; 'no-pass campaign' culminating in the 'defiance campaign'. Official reaction to these activities, led to various repressive measures that culminated in the banning of the ANC.

As a result of the lack of control over the government and the administrative institutions of the country, and consequently, the lack of resources, the ANC could not take advantage of patronage. Jupp describes patronage as an essential element in maintaining party loyalty (Jupp: op. cit: 26). The political institutions that emerged in the Ciskei as a result of the attainment of the semi-autonomous status, enjoyed the advantages of patronage: they rewarded their supporters, and in so doing increased legitimacy for the system. On the other hand, the ANC owed its origin to the people's need for a mouth-piece and platform. Consequently, the ANC did not have to 'buy' the support of the people. The people's faith and conviction that the ANC would secure for them equal political and economic rights, was sufficient to hold the loyalty of the people.

We have noted earlier that the ANC aggregated and articulated the interests and aspirations of the Africans. Jupp describes an interest as a 'claim on society by a group of people, however, constituted' (Jupp: op. cit: 33). The 'claims on society' that the ANC made on behalf of the Africans, included, inter alia, equality of all people in all spheres including political and economic spheres.

It is of academic interest, whether the political institutions that have emerged in the Ciskei as a result of the attainment of the semi-autonomous status, will be able to aggregate the interests of the Africans. These institutions have been created for the express purpose of promoting and facilitating the acceptance of the policy of separate development and not the realisation of African demands for equality of political and economic opportunities.

In the homeland policy "equality" is applicable and confined to certain areas and regions; it is defined by territory and nationality. This does not result in the creation of an open and colourless society in which only merit of citizens is considered.

As an organisation the ANC had a potential: it was an ideal organisation but its leadership lacked vision and was self-centred. It attempted to attract the attention of the ruling regime to recognise its being acculturated and consequently expected to be rewarded for that. This meant being treated differently from the mass of 'uneducated' and 'uncivilized' Africans.

These African leaders failed to see the ANC as an organisation for the masses. They failed to see it as providing a channel of communication and a platform for the interests and demands of the Africans.

It is noteworthy that some of the leaders in the ANC came from the Eastern Cape.

On the whole the fault with the African leadership of this era, was that they regarded their position as stemming from cultural aspects, such as lack of civilisation in relation to the white society, and not as being a result of the imperialist-capitalist system thriving on the poverty and underdevelopment of the masses. It is only after the reconstruction and re-orientation of the ANC and its leadership that the struggle changes from a plea for recognition as a civilized people to a militant demand for equal political and economic rights for all.

1.3 The Formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU)

The establishment, activities and significance of the ICU will be explored in this section with particular reference to the significance of the ICU to the protest movement and in the fight for equality.

The 'new' white parliament continued to produce discriminatory and oppressive legislation; such laws as the Native Urban Areas Act, the Native Administration Act, 1927, the Native Service Contract Act, the Native Labour Regulation Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924, to name but a few, conferred on the Government extensive powers to regulate and control the residence and employment of Africans. (Wilson; et al: ibid: 438).

Kuper writes ...

"A trade union role for Africans was never fully institutionalised, and the definition of "employee" under the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924, as amended in 1937, effectively excluded the vast majority of African workers from participation in registered trade unions or in collective bargaining within the statutory machinery..." (Kuper: 1965: 316).

The intents and effects of this legislation was to expose the Africans to economic exploitation without any organisational protection. Africans suffered misery under the migrant labour system and the civilized labour policy. The civilized labour policy protected white unskilled and semi-skilled labourers from African competition.

By 1919, the ICU emerged as a pioneer in the African trade union movement. Its emergence signified the realisation by Africans that they were economically exploited. It also, as a result of their position as political outcasts, emphasised their position of being politically oppressed. This latter factor, placed African trade unionism in a peculiar position.

When the ICU was formed, it thrived on the defects of the ANC. The ANC had failed to attract the mass membership from the ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. It had also failed to articulate the demands of the workers. The ICU provided a home for these frustrated workers (Walshe: ibid: 83).

During the 1920 Miners' Strike, ANC support was marginal ...

"perhaps by reason of class differences between the leaders of Congress and the workers, or by reason of the conception that trade union organisation was not appropriate action for a political association..." (Wilson; et al: ibid: 447).

Kuper seems to supply an answer to this when he writes ...

"Inevitably it [that is African trade union movement] takes on an explicitly political character, since Africans are a proletariat in the classic Marxist sense and constitutional forms of economic and political redress are lacking..." (Kuper: op cit: 317).

The ICU was formed in 1919 by Kadalie in Cape Town. (Wilson; et al: ibid: 447; Tabata: ibid: 11 also Walshe: ibid: 83). It was involved in a dock-workers' strike in Cape Town in 1919. It organised workers strikes throughout the country. The first conference of the ICU was held in Bloemfontein in 1920. Delegates to this conference included, the following:-

- i) The Native Labour Union of Port Elizabeth
 - ii) Delegates from the Free State
 - iii) A representative of the Women's League of the Congress
- (Source: Wilson; et al: ibid: 447)

At the height of its glory, about 1928, the ICU had mobilised a large following...

"It rapidly assumed the character of a political mass party of national emancipation..." (Kuper: op cit: 316/7).

It had grown into a powerful political movement but rivalries between its leaders resulted in the movement fragmenting into several groups of leaders with personal followers, as tensions between the communist-inclined and the conservative leaders intensified and government repressive action accelerated the decline of the movement (Walshe: ibid: 193 also Wilson; et al: ibid: 447). The meteoric rise of the ICU had just as rapid a decline. (Kuper: op cit).

Tabata makes some interesting observations when he points out that the ICU fought on two fronts: the economic and the political. (Tabata: op cit: 13).

The ICU fought as a trade union, struggling for the improvement of wages, conditions of work and the right to be organised in a workers' association for protection and collective bargaining. It was inevitable that the ICU should take cognisance of the other ailments from which the worker or an African suffered. These were facts of his political oppression.

The author (Tabata) views this as being contributory to the 'undoing' of the ICU. Consequently, according to him, the ICU was neither 'flesh nor fowl' (Tabata: ibid). As a result of this ambivalence, the ICU could do justice to neither the political issues nor the economic exploitation of the workers.

Another criticism that is raised by this author against the ICU is that, it made lavish promises which it was unable to fulfill. An interesting result of these promises is related by Tabata: An enthusiastic farm labourer decided to move, lock, stock and barrel, from where he was employed and followed Kadalie with all the promises of land and stock. (Tabata: op cit).

Both the ANC and ICU, emerged as organisations that championed the cause of the Africans. They acted as vehicles and platforms for the aspirations and demands of the Africans for an equal share in economic and political rights in an open and non-racial society.

It must be noted that these organisations originated from the people's need for proper channels of communication and also for the purpose of articulating and aggregating the interests and aspirations of the Africans. In this sense, these organisations may be seen as being committed to the facilitation of the efforts to attain 'freedom' and equality for the Ciskeian, 'freedom' that may be defined in terms of the abolition of discriminatory and repressive legislation, a 'freedom' that would ensure that all people, irrespective of the colour and complexion of their skins, or their religious beliefs, would serve on the administrative and decision-making councils of the country.

The ICU fought for these ideals, and, except for its opportunistic

leadership, had aimed at creating conditions of equal economic and political opportunities. As a pioneer in African trade union movement, it did not divorce the economic exploitation of the African from his political oppression. These are two sides of the same coin. Any attempt to separate them, carries the seeds of its own destruction. The ICU is the only, organisation that ever enlisted the membership of farm labourers. But unfortunately, its leadership was a group of careerists (Tabata: op cit).

1.4 The All-African Convention (AAC).

We shall, once again discuss in this section, the formation, activities and significance of yet another organisation in the liberation movement. The formation of the AAC will be discussed in relation to its significance for the ideals of the liberation movement. While doing this, we shall attempt to show the relation between the organisation and the parties that emerged after the application of the Bantustan policy in the Ciskei.

The 'Hertzog Bills' marked the culminating point in the series of discriminatory legislation that had been produced by the Union Parliament in Cape Town. These following bills were included:-

- i) The Representation of Natives Bill
- ii) The Land and Trust Bill
- iii) The Native Laws Amendment Bill

Apart from these 'Hertzog Bills', the pass-law system was gradually effectively and uniformly being applied (Horrell: 1971: 9). 'No-pass' agitational campaigns had started in the O. F. S. and Transvaal with disastrous effects (Wilson, et al: ibid: Vol. 2: 1971: 445). These repressive legislative enactments had detrimental effects on the cause and progress of African protest movement.

The ANC and ICU had both lost the initiative of championing the cause of the black man. Apart from the failure of the deputations that were sent to England, the British Crown would not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Union of South Africa because of the provisions of the Statute of Westminster, 1931. This statute granted to the Union of

South Africa dominion status (Wilson; et al: Vol-2: ibid: 439). This 'dominion status' implied that the Union was virtually independent of Britain. Another important factor was that the African leaders had complete faith in white liberals. (Walshe: ibid: 115 et seq also Tabata: ibid: 30 et seq). These factors taken together weakened the African leadership. It was against this background that these 'Hertzog Bills' were launched.

These bills presented the Africans with a challenge and amidst protests and criticism, the bills became law. (Horrel: ibid: 10; Wilson; et al: Vol-2: ibid: 451 also Tabata: ibid: 17) for the sake of brevity, I shall concentrate on the bill that became the Representation of Native Act, 1936. It provided for:-

- 1) Separate representation of Africans in the S. A. Parliament and Cape Provincial Council. Three whites were to represent the Cape Africans in the House of Assembly. Four white Senators would be elected from the following areas to represent Africans in the Senate:-

The Cape Proper; The Transkei; Natal; OFS and the Transvaal.

There would be two White representatives in the Cape Provincial Council.

- 2) A separate voters list for Africans would be compiled.
- 3) A nation-wide advisory council with subordinate powers would be established. Its members would be drawn from the ranks of Africans. There would be nominated and elected members. This was the Native Representative Council (NRC). Its functions included, inter alia, considering proposed legislation affecting Africans and any matter referred to it by the Minister for Native Affairs.
(Sources: Tabata: ibid: 21 et seq; Wilson; et al: Vol. II ibid: 450 also Horrel: ibid: 10 et seq).

This Act also provided for the abolition of the Cape Common Voters Roll.

As protest against these bills, a conference was called at Bloemfontein in 1935. The specific purpose of this conference was to demonstrate to the Government that the bills were being rejected. The organisation that was formed at this conference was acclaimed as being 'ideal'. It had a federal structure, consequently, providing an organisational 'umbrella' for all associations of the blacks. It acted as a co-ordinating

body. (Tabata: ibid: 23; Wilson; et al: ibid: 450 et seq).

Some of the leading officials of the AAC belonged to the ANC but for the following reasons, the ANC refused to identify itself (as a body) with the other organisations of the blacks in the AAC:-

- i) The ANC claimed that the AAC was not purely an African organisation because it brought under its 'wing' organisations for the Coloured people. (Horrel: ibid: 14).
- ii) The AAC advocated a boycott of the Hertzog Bills, but the ANC, on the other hand, maintained that the boycott was inapplicable... (Horrel: ibid: 15 also Tabata: ibid: 41).

The refusal by the ANC to work with the other organisations under the AAC, was not only tragic, but introduced a schism within the liberation movement which was characterised by antagonism between the AAC and the ANC. Disunity has resulted from such antagonisms.

The 'Hertzog Bills' were accepted. It was being said that the acceptance was done 'under protest'. The acceptance was rationalized by saying that ...

"half a loaf is better than no bread ... the Act must be given a trial..." (Tabata: ibid: 40).

It was evident that the educated elite saw opportunities offered by the Act which ought not to be thrown away even at the risk of betraying the uneducated masses. Members of that elite would almost exclusively benefit from the provisions of the 'Hertzog Acts' (Tabata: ibid: 42); they would be members of the Native Representative Council which was a national advisory council that would be elected from amongst Africans from the four provinces. It was provided with all the democratic trappings such as elections and secret ballot (Tabata: ibid: 89). The elite had hoped that membership of the NRC would eventually lead to membership of the white's only parliament. But after some years of working the NRC, bitter experience showed the Africans that ...

"The Council in its present form provided no effective machinery for consultation between the Government and the African population" (Ballinger: 1969: 206).

and that it had become a 'toy telephone' (Walker: 1930: 147).

The AAC, like the other protest organisations before it, declined in popularity because, though it had represented a genuine consensus of African opinion ...

"... it had no organisational basis save fragmented and emaciated factions ... it had the pretensions of a central body without well-founded organisations in the provinces..." (Walshe: ibid: 123/4).

The demise of the AAC, in the late thirties marked the end of an era, during which organisations were led by moderate Africans. To round-off this section, I wish to reiterate the following:-

- i) We set out to investigate whether the formation of the protest organisations facilitated the attainment of political and economic equality by the African and whether such organisations provided proper channels of communication.
- ii) After more than 25 years of existence, the protest movement produced organisations that had the potential for an ideal organisation but it had not succeeded in achieving the aims set out above; the African leadership that was produced during this period, was individualistic, opportunistic and imbued with Christian religious ideas. They were men who wanted recognition for their being 'westernised'.
- iii) Despite all that, these men were an intermediate link between the spirit of resistance that characterised the frontier wars and the resistance to domination in this present era. Their pioneer efforts at starting organisations made the present generation accustomed to organisational discipline. This facilitated the growth of the liberation movement.
- iv) The leadership of this era did not relate what was happening to them to socio-economic and political factors. As a result, it took them a long time to realise that their position was not a product of isolated discriminatory measures. It took them a long time to realise that the lack of proper channels of communication was part of a general pattern which was aimed at keeping the African subordinate so that his economic exploitation could be facilitated. For them, for example, such things as the pass-laws were meant to be applied to the 'uncivilized' and 'un educated' sections, hence the 'educated' preferred to carry exemptions from these pass-laws, which exemptions, were in truth and in fact 'passes'.
- v) The Eastern Cape played a definite role in the development of the liberation movement: the presence of missionaries, the existence of educational institutions such as Lovedale, Healdtown, Fort Hare, the earlier and longer contact between white and black, the role of the African press and the Cape liberal franchise, to name but a few of the factors

contributed towards the creation of an African elite that regarded participation in the white parliament as being of cardinal importance, and ideal; while participation in subordinate political institution was regarded as being a 'stepping-stone' and training ground for the eventual enjoyment of full political and citizenship rights.

2. The Period of Militants

In this section attention will be devoted to the investigation of:-

- i) The emergence and activities of a militant African leadership.
- ii) The development of a political struggle based on a programme of principles. This brought to an end the tendency to base the protest struggle on ad hoc organisational arrangements which were sparked off by particular and isolated discriminatory measures.
- iii) The development of a mass movement to cater, not only for the educated elite but also for the African majority. The pattern of a mass-membership organisation was set by the ICU but during this era, mass-membership did not occur accidentally, it became the aim and object of protest organisations. to organise large mass followings.
- iv) This will be related to the struggle of the African people for equal opportunities in political and economic spheres in South Africa.

An assessment will be made as to whether the political organisations that were developed during this period provided a channel for the articulation and aggregation of the interests and aspirations of the Africans.

2.1 The Effects of the Second World War on the Oppressed People.

Before a discussion on the period of militants is started, it is advisable that the effects of the two world wars on the oppressed, first be discussed.

The First World War had encouraged Africans to entertain hopes that it would bring relief from discriminatory laws. When this did not occur, Africans sent a deputation to Versailles which became a futile exercise (Walshe: ibid: 71). The Second World War held even more promise

for, and influence over the colonial people because:

"[it was] ... far more global in its direct impact and in its implications than its predecessor ..." (Emerson: 1962: 4).

Emerson also states that as a result of the growing political consciousness of the colonial peoples, the imperialists were occupying very precarious positions in the colonial world. (Emerson: 1962: 4).

The Africans strongly believed that the war effort was to liberate the many oppressed Africans, (Wilson; et al: ibid: 439; Tabata: ibid: 62 also Walshe: ibid: 262).

Part of the war had been fought in North East and North Africa; this alone was sufficient ground for African involvement. Consequently, thousands and thousands of African able-bodied men were attracted and recruited into the war. Such slogans as 'fight for freedom'; 'equality' and 'defeat nazism' were used for luring recruits. When in the army, Africans fought side by side with soldiers from other countries.

When victory was achieved, a new organisation that promised to be non-racial, non-discriminatory and anti-oppression, appeared on the scene. This was the United Nations Organisations with its Charter. It promised to champion the cause of the underdeveloped and under-privileged. Its charter forming a basis for future civil rights demands. (Carter: 1967: 99).

The Atlantic Charter and the Bill of Rights of the United Nations Organisation inspired Africans with ideas of freedom. They desired the application of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter to South Africa. (Walshe: ibid: 274 et seg). The struggle for liberation was encouraged by the decolonisation process that subsequently took place in Africa and the East. (Emerson: ibid: 4; Walshe: ibid: 336). The same author, Emerson, maintains that more than the Charter, it was the determination of the 'freed peoples' to liquidate colonialism, that gave inspiration. (Emerson: ibid: 5). The war had encouraged a 'new boldness' of thought. (Walshe: ibid: 328).

2.2 Beginnings of a Militant and Principled Struggle

Frustration and disappointment at the increasingly discriminatory

legislation brought with it the realisation that nothing could be achieved through "reasoned argument and conciliatory methods" (Horrel: ibid: 15) and that consultation within the parliamentary framework had failed, therefore extra-parliamentary channels were the only available means for continuing the fight. (Wilson et al: ibid: 456). A resolution by the ANC in 1943 led to the formation of the Youth League in 1944. (Horrel: ibid: 15). The emergence of this group led to the introduction of a militant spirit in the activities of the ANC. The Youth League, though loyal to the ANC, espoused principles of exclusive African nationalism. (Wilson et al: ibid: 458). The Youth League introduced into ANC activities new ideas, such as the 'Programme of Action'. (Wilson et al: ibid: 461 and Walshe: ibid: 328). The formation of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) in 1943 by the coming together of the All-African Convention and the Anti-Coloured Affairs Committee (a federal coloured organisation that was established for the sole purpose of fighting the Coloured Affairs Council and Department) resulted in drawing up of a Ten-Point Programme and the adoption of the Non-Collaboration policy. (Wilson et al: ibid: 456/7; Horrel: ibid: 16; Tabata: ibid: 77). The Ten-Point Programme contained demands which when applied to the South African society would result in the creation of democratic conditions, while the policy of non-collaboration implied the refusal by Africans to operate the institutions of their oppression. (Tabata: ibid: 82). This meant that the Non-White oppressed should boycott such institutions as the NRC, Bungas and advisory boards. The ANC leadership at the same time prepared an African Charter based on the Atlantic Charter (Walshe: ibid: 274 et seq.).

The introduction of the Ten-Point Programme and the African Charter (which was later replaced by the Freedom Charter) meant that Africans had come to realise that their oppression was not a matter of a particular discriminatory act but that they were politically, economically and socially oppressed. It also meant that they had realised that the Cape liberal franchise was not sufficient.

The adoption of the policy of non-collaboration which is applicable through a boycott not only renders the 'dummy' institution ineffective but also prepares the people for a disciplined dedication to the struggle for freedom. But unfortunately, not all African organisations adopted and applied this policy (Tabata: ibid: 55).

Bitter rivalry arose between the ANC and the AAC over which organisation should be the mouth-piece of the African people, and over the application and adoption of the policy of non-collaboration through the boycott of the 'dummy' institutions (Tabata: ibid: 111 et seq). This rivalry was reminiscent of the brother fighting brother in Africa in such places as Zaire, Angola and now encroaching upon Rhodesian soil where the African ranks have been fragmented into not less than four rival camps, all differing not on fundamental grounds but on tribal formations. It is interesting to note that this type of attitude slows down the tempo and pace of the advance of freedom.

2.3 Inter-racial Co-operation

The emergence of this concept of 'inter-racial co-operation' brought in its wake the realisation that oppression may differ in intensity but it remains the same. Differences in oppression as applied to the various racial groups had one aim: that of divide and rule.

Thus, this section will be devoted to the exploration of the occurrence and significance of this concept of 'inter-racial co-operation'. This investigation will be done with a view to ascertaining whether this co-operation adversely affected or facilitated the African struggle for equality and freedom and whether the provision of proper channels of communication was affected detrimentally or promoted by this co-operation.

The repressive and discriminatory legislation received a boost with the coming into power of the Nationalist Party in 1948. (Horrel: ibid: 18). Laws were aimed at discriminating, not only between white and black but between Coloured, Indian and African as well. Racial discrimination was applied through such measures as the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act; the Immorality Act; the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, to name but a few (Horrel: ibid: 18-19).

The intensification of racial discrimination tended to encourage 'inter-racial co-operation'. African, Indian and Coloured 'protest' organisations drifted towards each other and inter-racial alliances were formed.

Adverse conditions that militated against the formation of these inter-racial alliances existed within the ANC. The Youth League espoused an exclusive type of African nationalism; consequently, the Youth League

believed, inter alia, that through their numerical strength the Africans could achieve anything; as a result there was no need for Africans to seek co-operation with other racial groups (Walshe: ibid: 352; also Walshe: 1973: 31). The problem of co-operation with other racial groups led to fission within the ANC ranks and the break-away of the Pan-Africanist Congress.

Inter-racial co-operation occurred in the trade Union movement of the 1919's, in the ICU and in 1943 in the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM). The NEUM was a federal organisation that took under its 'organisational umbrella' all organisations of the blacks (Coloured, Indians and Africans) of a cultural, political, educational or economic nature. Some of the organisations that were affiliated to the NEUM included, inter alia,

"the Anti-Cad; the AAC, the TLSA (Teachers League of South Africa) CATA (Cape African Teachers Association) and many others" (Tabata: ibid: 77).

Inter-racial co-operation within the ANC was described as being 'multi-racialism' (Wilson; et al: ibid: 458). In this context it implied that each racial group co-operated with the others as a unit; with its own organisation. Consequently when a Joint-Planning Council (JPC) was formed, each co-operating racial group had to come as a group. This JPC consisted of the following:-

the ANC; the South African Indian Congress (SAIC); and the Franchise Action Council (FAC) of the Coloured community. (Wilson; et al: ibid: 461).

On the other hand the racial co-operation of the NEUM was based on an individual basis (Wilson; et al: ibid: 458).

The inter-racial co-operation between the ANC-SAIC-FAC was characterised by mistrust and suspicion; however, relations between them persisted until a White organisation, the Congress of Democrats, identified itself with them. When the Congress of the People was formed, the following organisations had also joined:-

The South African Coloured Peoples Organisation (SACPO)
The Congress of Trade Unions (Wilson; et al: ibid: 463).

The significance of these inter-racial alliances was to demonstrate that the black oppressed realised:-

- i) That their salvation lay in unity against the oppressor.
- ii) That the oppressor created artificial differences in an attempt to keep the members of the various racial groups divided. Oppression may differ in degrees but fundamentally, it is the same.
- iii) By uniting together, the various racial groups have attempted to found a new and free South African nation. The racial barriers that keep the one racial group aloof and apart from the others would be rejected.

2.4 Mass-Membership Organisations

In this section attention will be devoted to the significance of the 'mass-membership' form of the organisations of the liberation movement; with special reference to whether this form of organisation facilitated the struggle for equality.

Various factors influenced the development of this mass-membership form of organisation. The influence of the Communist Party on the ANC cannot be under-estimated.

The Congress Youth League exerted much influence on this tendency. The Youth League was established in 1943. Its ideology emphasised the exclusive basis of African solidarity as a race and a nation (Wilson; et al: ibid: 458). It believed that Africans were oppressed as a nation and not as a social class. The oppression of the African differed in various ways from that which applied to the other racial groups (the Coloured and Indians). Inter-racial co-operation was acceptable only as a 'self-conscious unit' (Wilson; et al: ibid: 459).

When the Youth League worked within the ANC, it 'activated' the ANC into the adoption of a Programme of Action. This Programme of Action was designed to secure freedom from White domination and to gain direct representation on all administration and decision-making bodies; it advocated a boycott of all institutions designed for an inferior race.

It advocated strikes, civil disobedience and non-co-operation (Wilson; et al: ibid: 461). It organised such events as the Freedom of Speech Convention, Freedom Day Demonstrating against discriminatory legislation, the National Day of Protest, to name but a few. (Wilson; et al: op cit). These activities culminated in the 1952 Defiance Campaign which was organised and launched under the auspices of the Joint Planning Council (Wilson; et al: ibid: 461). Civil disobedience in the form of defiance of all unjust laws, was launched. This campaign created the impression that there were 'just' laws in South Africa.

Of the 8557 volunteers that were involved in campaign against the unjust laws, two-thirds came from the Eastern Cape. Kuper, writing about the Defiance Campaign in the Eastern Cape believes that the factors that contributed to its success included, inter alia, :-

- i) The Eastern Cape had had a longer contact with Europeans and Christianity.
- ii) The trade union movement was well established in the Eastern Cape.
- iii) The Africans in the Eastern Cape were used, relatively, to more liberal policies, consequently, the sharp reaction to apartheid.
- iv) There was greater stability of family life and a more homogeneous African population. (Kuper: 1957: 124 also Wilson; et al: ibid: 462).

The core of the resistance movement was in the large and small towns of the Eastern Cape. (Kuper: op cit). Action was taken against the stock rehabilitation and limitation schemes. Mr. Smit, the then Secretary for Native Affairs described the rehabilitation scheme before a meeting of the Ciskei General Council as:

"[being] ... wider in scope than anything conceived before... which aims at correcting mistakes of the past and ensuring a better life for the inhabitants in future..."
(quoted by Tabata: ibid: 89-90).

Resistance to this scheme was launched in the rural areas under the guidance of organisations affiliated to the All-African Convention. Tabata gives an account of a report that was tabled by a delegate in the 1948 conference of the NEUM (Tabata: ibid: 91). The campaigns

we have discussed brought frustration and disillusionment in their wake. The African leadership was liquidated. They were banned, banished, or restricted to their homes; arrested or killed. Some fled the country. Organisations were banned and forced to go underground. This left an organisational vacuum (Walshe: 1973: 40; Wilson; et al: ibid: 468 also Horrel: ibid: 24).

- . Kuper, in Wilson; et al: Vol. 2: 1971: op cit), credits the defiance campaign with having brought the position and plight of the blacks in South Africa to the attention of international opinion. I do not agree. The plight and position of the blacks was a well-known matter to the international world. When we have to take into consideration the many petitions that were sent to international conferences, we cannot but accept the fact that the international world was well-informed about the plight and position of the blacks in South Africa but the only thing about the defiance campaign was that it threatened to make South Africa another conflagratory spot. It troubled their consciences because much was invested in South Africa.

The movement towards mass-membership involvement, had, besides establishing the liberation movement on a broad base, increased political consciousness. This meant that a larger and larger group of Africans had become aware of the disadvantages under which they lived: namely, the lack of proper channels of communication, the lack of institutions for the articulation and aggregation of African interests and aspirations and the lack of a platform for their demands for freedom.

When the people's organisations were 'silenced' an apparent 'death' and 'silence' was revealed, consequently leaving a 'vacuum' that was to be filled by organisations that were the product of the application of the Bantustan policy. These organisations were designed to fill the vacuum.

It must be noted that the political institutions of the Bantustan policy, have been provided with all the trappings of democracy such as the vote, elections, parliamentary form of government, freedom of speech and political parties. The language they use is that of 'freedom' and 'equality'. This is no accident!

3. Government Counter-action

The South African ruling regime, faced with increasing civil disobedience, from the supporters of the Defiance Campaign, and its aftermath were thrown into a panic. Counter-action measures in the form of the Suppression of Communism Act, the Public Safety Act, Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Prohibition of Interdicts Acts, to name but a few, were employed against the 'campaigners' or any other person that dared to oppose the Government. The definition of Communism was so wide and all embracing that any action could be brought under it. The Security Branch of the police was granted wide and extensive powers of search, arrest and interrogation (Horrel: ibid: 24-30 also Walshe: 1973:30).

As a result of state reaction, many black leaders were charged with treason, while others were served with banning and banishment orders. Some organisations of the liberation movement had to disband and go underground. Some of these organisations re-established themselves outside the borders of the RSA. (Horrel: ibid: 31).

Other organisations, re-appeared, though temporarily, on South African soil in different form and guise: the ANC and PAC re-appeared as Umkhonto weSizwe (the Spear of the Nation) and Poqo, respectively. These were military wings of these organisations that were nipped in the bud before they could do anything effectively. The NEUM re-appeared in a unitary form as the African Peoples' Democratic Union of South Africa. (Horrel: ibid: 54-57). The elements in the NEUM have also re-assembled into the APDUSA outside the borders of the RSA.

In response to the sporadic sabotage activities that were perpetrated by members of the Umkhonto weSizwe, the Government brought onto the statute book such legislative enactments as:-

the Criminal law Amendment Act and the Explosives Amendment Act (Horrel: ibid: 6).

The period between 1943 and 1969 was characterised by the appearance on the South African political scene of a militant and determined African leadership. In their attempt to high-light the plight of the blacks, these leaders adopted agitational methods that led to 'cul-de-sac' types of

activities. This resulted in frustration and disillusionment as they came up against a 'wall' of resistance from the ruling regime. The goals of 'freedom' had not yet been attained. Freedom entails equality of political and economic opportunities. This means that the franchise will be extended to all irrespective of colour; blacks will also gain admittance to the governmental and decision-making bodies of the country. Economically no restrictions will be placed on anyone who wishes to take up employment and earn a living.

The position of the African at this stage became most unenviable. Whilst the interests and aspirations of the African remained unarticulated and unaggregated, the liberation movement organisations were either banned or were forced to go underground. There was no organisation that protected and defended the interests of the African. Any attempt to start such an organisation, met with strong police surveillance. Consequently, an atmosphere of 'towing' the Government line prevailed and suspicion and fear were rife.

The only alternative open seemed to be the acceptance of the channels provided by the Bantu Authorities System. This system introduced a three-tier tribal authorities system that was based on the chief. There were the tribal and community authorities at the base; the regional authorities co-ordinated the activities of the tribal and community authorities. At the apex of this arrangement was the territorial authority.

When the Territorial Authority was transformed into a Legislative Assembly, it was invested with democratic trappings that were enshrined in a semi-autonomous constitution, the vote, the ballot box, elections, political parties and a parliamentary system.

The language of the political institutions of the Bantustan is characterised by the use of such concepts as 'freedom' and 'equality'. This naturally, attracted to them many Africans who were hungry for 'freedom' and 'equality'. By thus accepting one aspect of these institutions, they have accepted the whole system of separate development.

Finally, let me conclude this section by commenting on the Defiance Campaign, sometimes referred to as the Passive Resistance Campaign. This, in itself was a contradiction in terms because, how could resistance be passive? But, however, this was expected to be peaceful. This campaign seemed to be carrying terms with contradictory meanings: 'resistance', 'defiance' and 'peaceful'. The campaign was designed to enlist 'volunteers' who would continuously and constantly be exposed to confrontation with the police. These 'volunteers' were told that their sacrifice and agony would result in the repeal of the 'unjust' laws; a sense of frustration and disillusion filled the 'volunteers'. This erupted into violence. Thus the defiance campaign dealt the liberation movement a blow from which it could not easily recover.

On the other hand, the defiance campaign helped to politicize the masses of the Africans and also made South African and international opinion, aware, not of the plight and position of the Africans but of the fact that Africans would no longer tolerate the subordinate position which was forced upon them by the South African ruling regime.

4. Black Consciousness Movement

In this section, attention will be focused on the origins, development, ideology and significance of the Black Consciousness Movement with particular reference to:-

- i) The struggle of the African for equality.
- ii) The relationship between the organisations of the liberation movement and the political institutions that develop as a result of the Bantustan policy.
- iii) The role of the Black Consciousness Movement in the improvement of communication channels between the ruling regime and the Africans.

4.1 Origins of the Black Consciousness Movement

Prof. Kotzé traces the origins of Black Consciousness to the beginnings of the ANC and AAC in 1912 and 1935 respectively. Article on 'Black Consciousness' by Prof. Kotzé in Politikon: Vol. 1; No. 1; June 1974: p. 54. Black Consciousness became a strong movement between 1967

and 1969 (Walshe: 1971: 38; Horrel: ibid: 140 also Politikon: ibid: 55).

What is Black Consciousness?

Black Consciousness was described as:-

- i) An attitude and a way of life.
- ii) A rejection of all the value systems that seek to make the black man a foreigner in the country of his birth and reduce his basic human rights.
- iii) An attempt to encourage the black man to build up his own value system and see himself as self-defined and not as defined by others.
- iv) A concept which implies awareness by black people of the power they wield as a group, both economically and politically and hence group cohesion and solidarity are important facets of black consciousness.

Manganyi in an attempt to define Black Consciousness, starts by giving a dictionary meaning of 'consciousness': which is 'mutual knowledge as to which one has the testimony within oneself'; 'the totality of impressions, thoughts and feelings which make up a person's conscious being'. In this definition of Black Consciousness, there is an implicit recognition of 'mutual knowledge'. This recognition leads further to that of Black solidarity ... Black Consciousness should be understood to mean that there is mutuality of knowledge, with respect to the totality of impressions, thoughts and feelings of all black people (Manganyi: 1973: 18).

Black Consciousness is being criticised for being racialistic. Manganyi's reaction to this has been that, this is of necessity in response to White Consciousness and solidarity (Manganyi: ibid: 20).

According to protagonists of this movement, the term 'black' embraces all those who...

by law or tradition, politically, economically and socially are discriminated against as a group in South African society and identifying themselves as a unit with the struggle towards the realisation of their aspirations ..." (Black Review: 1973: 42-3).

Such terms as 'non-whites', 'non-Europeans' are regarded as being derogatory and as such are rejected (Politikon: ibid: 55: 1972-Black Review: 1973: 42 and also Manganyi: ibid: 18). These terms are said

to be describing one man by the negative of another (Majeke: 1952: op cit).

In a critical appraisal of the Black Consciousness Movement, Professor Kotzé states:-

"The existential nature of Black Consciousness is a dominant feature, and what cohesion the movement has, can be attributed to the common experiences of its adherents in white-ruled South Africa, and not to a common agreement on the nature and function of Black culture." (Politikon: ibid: 46).

While Manganyi does not refute the existential nature of the Black Consciousness Movement, he does dismiss the argument as ...

"not judicious interpretation" (Manganyi: op cit)

that the Black Consciousness refers primarily to the...

"awareness of the skin..." (Manganyi: op cit)

He argues that the colour of the skin is itself significant. It becomes significant in relation to the body and therefore

Black Consciousness has no choice but to start from the existential fact of the black body... (Manganyi: op cit)

As an ideology, black consciousness, found a home in such organisations as:-

the South African Students Organisation (SASO); the Inter-denominational African Ministers Associations (IDAMASA); the Association for the Education and Cultural Advancement of African People of South Africa (ASSECA); the African Independent Churches Association (AICA); the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) and the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) (Walshe: 1973: 38-39).

Other associations that were listed included the:-

Natal Youth Organisation; the Transvaal Youth Organisation; the South African Student Movement; Black Youth Cultural Association; the League of African Youth; Pretoria Student Movement; Junior African Students Congress; Society for African Development; Springs Students Association; and the Sharpeville Black People's Convention (Politikon: ibid: 57- Professor Kotzé's article).

From a cursory view of the organisations that embrace the Black consciousness ideology, there is much to support Dr. Kotzé's idea that this movement is elitist. (Politikon: ibid: 47 et seq). But this does not invalidate the argument that this movement is an attempt to remobilise the African ranks after the heavy beating they took from the forces of the ruling regime. It is also an attempt to continue the liberation movement struggle by organisations that have been created by the people.

Another important aspect of this movement is its involvement of youth in the struggle for equal political and economic rights. A close study of the organisations that embrace the policies and principles of this movement, reveals the many student organisations that are in this movement.

4.2 The Black Consciousness Movement and Government-Created Institutions

In this section attention will be directed to an investigation of the black consciousness movement and Government-created institutions with particular reference to how such relationship affects the following:-

- i) The struggle of the African for equal political and economic rights.
- ii) The improvement of the channels of communication between the RSA and the African.
- iii) The provision of a platform and a medium for the articulation and aggregation of the interests and aspirations of the African.
- iv) And the role such relationship will play in facilitating or obstructing the link between the RSA and the Ciskei.

Before we proceed, it is advisable to draw a distinction between homeland institutions and Government-created institutions. Homeland institutions include all Government-created institutions that are based and centred in the homelands while Government-created institutions, on the other hand, include those Government-created institutions that are found in white urban areas where Africans live. These terms are applied to denote and distinguish political institutions that are created for blacks.

I wish to distinguish categories of persons that participate or will not participate in homeland politics. An enthusiast writing in the Daily Dispatch, distinguished four categories of persons who either participated, or rejected homeland politics. These are the following categories:-

- a) Those who accepted the homeland, implicitly, as their legitimate share in South African politics. They have completely surrendered to the idea of the balkanisation of South Africa and that each 'nationality' must develop along separate lines to full self-realisation (Daily Dispatch; 2-10-75).
- b) Another group is that which asserts that it accepts homeland politics as a stepping stone and as a platform from which to negotiate with the RSA for a share in the political and economic spheres. (Daily Dispatch: 2/10/75). This group hopes to use the Bantustans as a stepping stone. History has shown that this stand is futile: the NRC would have been used as a stepping stone but the limitations imposed by the constitution of such an institution, made it impossible for the institution to lend itself to being used for any purpose outside the framework of its constitution. The same thing may be expected of the homelands. Their constitutions will not lend themselves to manipulations other than those provided for in their constitutions. The result with the NRC was disillusionment and dissatisfaction. People who claim to be in this category are as guilty of collaboration as those in the first category.
- c) Those people who feel that homeland politics are infra dig, that is, below their dignity, belong to this group. Usually educated people fall under this category. Their education is a liability to the African nation (Daily Dispatch: 2/10/75). People in this category, live in a dream world. They still entertain thoughts of having been members of organisations that were in the liberation movement (ANC, PAC and AAC) which are now banned. These people know it for a fact that belonging to these organisations is punishable by law. They therefore have an excuse for folding their arms. The truth and fact is that these people are victims of fear. They are not only afraid of police intimidation but also they fear the truth that they are 'shirking' their duty towards the oppressed.
- d) The fourth group is that which is actively engaged in anti-homeland politics. (Daily Dispatch: 2/10/77) Members and supporters of the Black Consciousness Movement belong to this group.

In order to bring out the full meaning and significance of the relationship between these institutions and the black consciousness movement, one has to trace the very existence of these institutions. They were created specially for a subject race and endowed with advisory and subordinate powers. These institutions operate mostly on local or regional basis.

In 1972, the following was decided about these institutions by the black consciousness movement:-

- i) Those are institutions of oppression designed to cheat the people into believing that they have communication links with Pretoria.
- ii) That whites have no right to balkanise the country and allocate any percentage of it to blacks.
- iii) That the artificial division of blacks into ethnic groups is aimed at cheating the outside world into believing that there is validity in the multinational policy of the white nationalists.
- iv) That the whole philosophy of separate development is a solution mooted by the same people who have created the problem. (1972 Black Review: 1973: 77).

In the same publication, participation in homeland politics is likened to a man who prepares to challenge another man with unloaded guns he received from his enemy (1972 Black Review: op cit: p. 77).

There are some black consciousness movement supporters who feel that participation in homeland politics was 'selling-out' on the struggle of the black people (1972 Black Review: op cit: p. 78).

It is reported that in 1972, the supporters and members of SASO, though unsuccessful, wrote letters to several Chief Ministers of Bantu Homelands and called upon them to resign (Politikon: op cit).

The rejection of these institutions is liable to be misconstrued by some people. Some of the people who reject these institutions may be living in the homelands. These institutions are supposed to be giving expression to the political life of the homelands, therefore, if one lives in the homelands, one inevitably comes under the ambit of these institutions.

Rejection of these institutions, implies refusal to take part in their political activities and refusal to vote in the elections that are arranged

under these institutions.

As a result of the 'non-collaboration' of the black consciousness movement, with homeland leaders, an antagonistic attitude has arisen between it and the homeland leaders. A smear campaign was started by the homeland leaders in which the black consciousness movement was labelled as a terrorist and communist inspired movement. When Mr. Sebe made these allegations, he accused the opposition of associating with a subversive organisation (Records of CLA Debates: 1975).

Paramount Chief K. D. Matanzima expelled from the Transkei the Federal Theological Seminary because he believed that they were associated with the black consciousness movement.

The black consciousness movement rejects the White value-system, not without cause. Homeland leaders who are described by the movement as being 'tools'; 'quislings' and 'sell-outs' are described by white writers as 'pragmatists'. They earn that description for being willing to operate their own enslavement. People who refuse to operate these homeland institutions, are called theorists. (Dr. Kotzé in Politikon: op cit).

This is reminiscent of the AAC-ANC times when members of the AAC were labelled as 'theorists' because they refused to collaborate in the working of their own enslavement. The ANC on the other hand was applauded for being practical.

The present rivalry between the movement and the leaders of the homelands is also reminiscent of the rivalry between the AAC and the ANC. Then the rivalry was between organisations of the people that differed only in their 'modus operandi'.

But this cannot be said of the rivalry between the movement and leaders of the homelands. The movement is composed of organisations that stem from the people's need for a platform and channels of communications while the leaders of the homelands are misguided, either willingly or unwillingly, into an opportunistic position of leadership of institutions that are products of a carefully designed policy of separate development.

5. Conclusion

In summarising this section, the following points need to be emphasised:-

- 1) The position of the African, gave rise to a liberation movement which was spearheaded by organisations that were later banned. Bantustan political institutions emerged to fill the organisational vacuum created by the disappearance of these liberation movements. But it must be noted that there is no continuity between the organisations of the liberation movement and the organisations that were a product of the Bantustan policy. The political parties that were a product of the Bantustan policy were not created with the purpose of facilitating the struggle of the African for political and economic equality but were meant to facilitate the acceptance of the Bantustan policy and institutions by Africans.
- 2) The problem of the articulation and aggregation of interests and aspirations was not solved. The organisations in the liberation movement sought to fulfill this function. The interests and aspirations of the Africans they expressed in the Freedom Charter and Ten-Point Programme of the ANC and the NEUM respectively. But the institutions that were the product of the Bantustan policy cannot express the interests and aspirations of the Africans as did the organisations that were in the liberation movement. These institutions will fulfill some of the demands of the people within the present status quo but not as demanded by the organisations in the liberation movement. The reason for fulfilling some of these demands is to gain legitimacy for the institutions of the Bantustan policy - not as an achievement of 'equality'.
- 3) The institutions of the Bantustan policy enjoy the ability to indulge in patronage. This also facilitates the acceptability of these institutions with the people while on the other hand, those organisations in the liberation movement lacked the means and resources for patronage. But because these organisations originated from the people's genuine needs, they were acceptable to the people without the assistance of patronage.
- 4) The organisations in the liberation movement served as platforms from which the people made their demands known to the ruler. But this cannot be said of the institutions that resulted from the Bantustan policy. Take for instance the attitude of the Ciskei Government and Ciskei Nationalist Independence Party during the bus boycott at East London and Mdantsane. Instead of assisting the commuters in the fight against increased prices, the Ciskei Government and its supporters, forced the people to use the buses! The earlier organisations, those in the liberation movement, had supported strikes by workers. The struggle of the workers was theirs.

- 5) This brings one to consider whether the institutions of the Bantustan policy are a continuation of the liberation movement. The answer is NO. There is no continuity between the two : the one is created by the architects of the apartheid policy as a sweet coating to a bitter pill, while the others on the other hand developed from the people's genuine needs.
- 6) Finally, the organisations in the liberation movement were diametrically opposed to separate development. Thus unlike the institutions of the Bantustan policy which facilitated the acceptance of this policy, they would oppose the acceptance of this policy.

The final conclusion would be that the institutions of the Bantustan policy were created for the purpose of facilitating the acceptance of the policy of separate development. They are not linked to the organisations of the liberation movement that were banned whose positions have been taken by black consciousness movement organisations.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Four

- Page 101 Para 2 Line 1: Substitute 'incident' for 'incidence'
'nomination' for 'nominations'
- " 104 " 2 " use upper case for Ikhonco whenever it appears
- " 1 Last sentence : should read: 'An organisation would have a legal
personality and be able to bear responsibility
for the case'.
- " 133 " 2 " 10: 'exhonorate' should read 'exonerate'
- " 134 from foot: 'brances' should read 'branches'
- " 134 " 5 " 6: Substitute 'directly' for 'direct'
- " " 2 " 7: Insert one
- " 141 " 5 " 1: Substitute 'in' for 'at'
- " 143 " 1 " 1: Insert sub-heading: Nomination of candidate.
- " 144 " 7 " 1: Substitute 'founded' for 'found'
- " 148 " 1 " 1: delete 'it'
- " 148 Correct increase for Sam: 10758
- " 151 " 1 " 2: :for the Sebe's and the' should read 'for Sebe and ...'
- " 153 " 3 " 3: Substitute 'the fulfilment' for 'to fulfilment'
- " 155 from the foot: delete 'where'
- " 157 " 5 " 2: 'and not' should read 'and do not'
- " " " 8: 'the readily' should read 'the more readily'
- " 158 " 8 " 2: Insert 'a constant threat'

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

1. Introduction

We have followed the constitutional development of the Ciskei from a non-elective body to an elective institution that enjoyed a 'semi-autonomous' status within the RSA. This status brought to being a parliamentary system which in turn gave rise to a political party system.

In this section attention will be devoted to investigating the emergence of these political parties. We shall not be content to explore the emergence of these political parties only; we shall also investigate their significance and their effect on inter-personal, inter-associational relations and especially their effect on the traditional institutions.

It will be interesting to note whether political parties facilitated the provision of proper channels of communication, and the struggle of the Ciskeians for equal political and economic opportunities. It is also of interest to decide whether these parties form a continuous link with the organisations of the fifties or not. If not, what role are these parties destined to play?

2. The Ciskei's First General Election.

The first general election in the Ciskei took place in February, 1973. It provided an opportunity for the electorate to exercise their newly acquired franchise.

2.1 The Franchise

The right to vote or elect a representative to the legislature of the Ciskei was extended to all Ciskeians above the age of eighteen years ...

"... every citizen of the age of eighteen years or over who is not subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 7 ... [who is] ... in possession of a reference book and whose reference book indicates that he has been registered as a voter, shall be entitled to vote ..."
(Proclamation 187 of 1972).

The registration of voters was done under the provisions of the Election

Proclamation R194 of 1972 which stipulated, amongst other things, that, in order to qualify for registration one had to be ...

"... domiciled in the Ciskei, may be born in the homeland but not necessarily resident in the homeland; may be born and domiciled outside the homeland, but, upon a claim that they are Ciskeians, are entitled to registration because of tribal affiliation with residents of the Ciskei ..."
(Election Proclamation: R194 of 1972).

If we view the provisions of Proclamation 194 of 1972 as an integral part of the 'mosaic' picture of the Bantustan policy, the acceptance of an application for registration by a voter, of a person who neither was 'born' nor 'domiciled' in the Ciskei homeland, but who supported his application for registration with claims of 'tribal ties' or 'tribal affiliation', must be viewed as an attempt to encourage the acceptance of the ideal of multi-nationalism by which blacks in urban areas have to identify themselves with the homelands.

Bantu Affairs Commissioners assisted by registration teams and agents, carried out the registration of voters. At one stage, the response was described as being 'poor'. There was a complaint that on the Reef, only about two-thirds of the Ciskeian voters were registered (Daily Dispatch: 24. 10. 72). Response in the Glen Grey area was reported to be a 'tremendous' success. The reason for this was attributed to the experience gained by the voters at Glen Grey during the referendum that was held in the area during 1971. One week before the closing of registrations, Glen Grey had notched the highest total of voters, 57 347 (Daily Dispatch: 25. 10. 72).

2.2 The Distribution of Seats

The twenty CLA seats were distributed amongst nine electoral divisions on the basis of the number of registered voters per constituency. Eventually there were 480 801 Ciskeian voters registered. The final registered voters for Glen Grey was received with misgivings by the chiefs at Glen Grey. They had expected Glen Grey to lead because of her high total registered voters only a week before! As a result of this, the Glen Grey chiefs alleged that some irregularities were committed when the final count was compiled. A letter of complaint was sent to the Minister of Bantu Administration and

Development in which this complaint was stated. (Daily Dispatch: 13. 12. 72). This illustrates the keenness of the Glen Grey chiefs to have more elected representatives for their area.

Apart from that incidence, the nominations and the distribution of CLA seats was accomplished without any incidence. The following chart will indicate the position of CLA seats distribution, contesting candidates and registered voters per constituency:-

TABLE SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF CLA SEATS, REGISTERED VOTERS AND CONTESTING CANDIDATES.

<u>Electoral Division</u>	<u>Registered Voters</u>	<u>CLA seats of Representatives</u>	<u>Contesting Candidates</u>
Zwelitsha	92 411	4	10
Victoria East	90 097	4	10
Glen Grey	86 052	3	16
Mdantsane	77 023	3	8
Herschel	48 949	2	7
Peddie	28 292	1	2
Middledrift	24 703	1	2
Hewu	20 169	1	5
Keiskammahoek	13 105	1	3

(Sources: Daily Dispatch: 11. 11. 72 also Le Roux in the Bulletin of the Africa Institute: Vol. XI: No. 3: 1973 p. 122).

2.3 Political Parties in Outline

In this section we shall attempt to explore the conditions and circumstances in which political parties emerged. We shall also highlight the role these political parties were destined to play.

Participants in the Ciskei general election arranged themselves in groups that eventually coalesced into the present party structures. The groups formed by the candidates were:-

- i) The one and only established political party, the Bantu Nationalist Conservative Party (BNCP), was founded and led by the late Mr. Bokwe.

- ii) A group that was led by Mr Sebe: the Ikhonco was initially known as the 'Broederbond' but with increased membership became known as the 'Big 17' (Ikhonco = Link).
- iii) Chief Mabandla led a group called the Imbokotho emnyama. (Imbokotho means a stone used for grinding or as a missile).
- iv) Odd candidates who did not fit into any of these groups, self-styled themselves, the 'Independents'. In actual fact only one independent candidate ever differed ideologically from others. They were independents only because they were not accommodated in the various electoral slates; their independence was not based on ideological differences.

We mentioned earlier that all these groups accepted and embraced the policy of separate development. Candidates in the various electoral divisions had decided to form electoral slates on the basis of 'friendship'. The formation of these electoral slates was meant to facilitate the voting process. A particular list of names would be associated together as a combination and the voter would be encouraged to remember them in that order. This was particularly intended to assist voters who could neither read nor write. Literate voters would be allowed to make their own combinations but invariably the slates were elected as units. The combining of these candidates into these electoral slates was also meant to:-

- i) Lower the campaign costs
- ii) Promote interchange of platforms between candidates.

Thus, when candidates had grouped around Mr Sebe and Chief Mabandla, the interchange of platforms was enhanced to a greater extent.

It was mentioned earlier that there was only one political party engaged in the election campaign. This was the BNCP. The formation of groups around certain individuals, was the beginnings of the 'outline' of discernible political parties. The actual formation of political parties, at that stage was allegedly discouraged by some senior government officials. The candidates who coalesced around Sebe and Mabandla, at that stage, were to remain their supporters when political party definition became clear. It is necessary to give a short outline of the groups.

a) The Ikhonco

The nucleus of the Ikhonco was drawn from candidates who came from:

Zwelitsha, Mdantsane and Victoria East.

The group had nick-named itself the 'Broederbond'. Apart from an attempt to promote their candidature in the election, they were also motivated by the following:-

- i) At the time of the Ciskei general election, most people in the Eastern Cape, particularly in the Victoria East area, and in the big cities and farms of the RSA, engaged in reviving the tribe of the AmaJingqi. Members of the 'Broederbond' used this in their campaign efforts; telling the people that voting for them would ensure that the AmaJingqi would be rewarded with land where they could settle.
- ii) Members of the 'Broederbond' claimed that they were candidates selected by chiefs of the AmaRarabe. In the Glen Grey area there were candidates who made a similar claim that they were the favourites of chiefs in the Glen Grey area; this claim was refuted by the chiefs in the Glen Grey area in a press statement (Daily Dispatch: 13. 12. 71). As a result of this claim an ethnic conflict of the AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu resulted. This ethnic dimension gave a boost to the recruiting efforts of the parties when they appeared.
- iii) The 'Broederbond' also aimed at enhancing Sebe's chances of being elected to the political leadership of the AmaRarabe. He was elected to the leadership at a meeting in Grasberg near King William's Town.

Members of the 'Broederbond' included businessmen from Port Elizabeth, some chiefs of the AmaRarabe, also businessmen from Zwelitsha and Mdantsane. The first meeting of this body was held at Fort Beaufort in 1972. Included in the decisions that were adopted at this meeting were the following:-

- i) There was a dire and growing need to open the membership of the 'Broederbond'.
- ii) As a result of this expansion, it was felt necessary to re-name this body. It became known as Ikhonco. The Ikhonco means a link. The idea being that this body would 'link' together into one organisation all the people of the Ciskei. Another name for this group that became popular was the 'Big 17' (after the 'Big three' of World War II fame).

The 'seventeen' denoted the number of candidates who formed the group. These candidates came from the following areas:-

Zwelitsha, Mdantsane, Victoria East, Glen Grey, Herschel, Hewu and Middledrift.

Many people were lured into supporting the Ikhonco by promises. It is alleged that Chief Njokweni of the AmaZizi, a Mfengu clan in Peddie, was promised the Mfengu paramountcy when created. Today, Chief Njokweni has been promoted from the position of deputy-chairman of the CLA to the post of Cabinet Minister in the Sebe Government.

Njokweni's collaboration with the Ikhonco resulted in the development of enmity between him and the other chiefs of the AmaMfengu.

b) The Imbokotho

This is Mabandla's group. The term Imbokotho means a grinding stone, the stone could also be used as a missile. This group prefer the former interpretation. They claim that grinding is a task that is familiar and associated with black homesteads.

Members of this group claimed that they followed the example set by members of the Ikhonco: when members of the Ikhonco grouped around Sebe to form the ikhonco. Members of the Imbokotho grouped around Mabandla. This implied that some of the things that the Imbokotho did, during the campaign, it did as a reaction to and in response to what the Ikhonco had done. Take for instance, such statements as; (I was informed);

"no Mfengu must be allowed to rule over Ciskeians"

The reaction to this was:

"Why should you allow yourselves to be led by people who had little education".

The Imbokotho was associated with AmaMfengu. Members of this group acknowledged the fact that the political party, the CNP was formed before the existence of parties was announced in the CLA. The formation of the CNP was expedited by the fact that:-

- a) The members of the Imbokotho had instituted litigation against the Ikhonco as a result of alleged electoral infringements. An organisation that would have a legal personality; to bear the responsibility for the case.

- b) Funds would be needed to cover litigation costs. These had to be collected and deposited in a commercial bank in the name of the organisation.
- c) It was therefore easier to cope with the intricacies and demands of the case as an association than it would have been for individuals.

These reasons influenced the decision that resulted in the formation of a political party, the Imbokotho, even before the results of the Ciskei general election were announced. According to information, this group was not influenced by the actual outcome of the elections to institute litigation, but by the manner in which the elections were conducted.

2.4 Policies and Principles advocated by Candidates

In this section attention will be given to an investigation of the principles and policies that were advocated by the election candidates.

a) The Bantu Nationalist Conservative Party (BNCP)

In an undated statement issued during the election campaign by the leader and founder of this party, the following points were raised:-

"The party further recognises the existence of certain races of European origin, who, having established themselves and contributed to the development of the country for over 300 years, have come to regard the country as their only home. The party will uphold their rights to the territory and regarding them as separate entities will accord recognition to their traditions, customs and practices and in so far as these will not infringe on the rights of the Bantu".
(Mimeographed statement: Issued by the leader of the BNCP).

In the same statement, the BNCP recognised the existence of the various African tribal units. These would be allowed separate identities. A government would be formed from a federation of these 'separate entities'.

"Bantu cultural patterns can be extended by introducing such items of foreign culture as are adaptable to the Bantu cultural framework"
(Mimeographed undated statement: op cit).

On the establishment of a Ciskei Parliament, the BNCP envisaged a bicameral parliament : the one house for the elected members while the

other was for the nominated members. Each tribal unit would be encouraged to debate in its own mother tongue. Xhosas would use isixhosa, Sothos would use isisotho and so on. (Undated Manifesto on the establishment of a Ciskeian Parliament. Issued by BNCP in Xhosa).

In its manifesto the BNCP claims to represent a democratic element and they pledge themselves to safeguard democratic rights, however, their claims to being champions of democracy are negated by the repressive measures that they propose to institute, for example, that each tribal unit should debate in its mother tongue! This restriction is against the democratic right that a man must be allowed to use the language of his choice.

b) The Mabandla Group

During the Ciskei general election Chief Mabandla, the then Chief Minister of the Ciskei submitted a statement to his Cabinet which he hoped it would accept. The same statement was offered to the candidates who endorsed his policy and would pass the statement to the electorate. In the statement he expressed the hope that the policy and principles enunciated would be the basis on which the Ciskei Government would be founded. (Mimeographed Statement: Issued by Mabandla: 21. 2. 72).

N.B. For a full text of the Statement see Annexure E.

c) The Sebe Group

This group was led by Mr. L. L. Sebe and a full text of its statement of policy appears as Annexure F.

It must be noted that a manifesto is a mere vote-catching device which successful candidates seldom regard as being bound to fulfill. A further analysis of these manifestos reveals the following:-

Except for the one independent candidate campaigning on a non-racialism ticket, all the remaining candidates fought the election on a separate development ticket (Daily Dispatch: 9. 12. 72). Those candidates who campaigned as 'independents', did not differ ideologically from the other candidates. Their independence was determined by their non-relationship to the electoral slates.

Members of a slate might combine because one had influence in the rural areas, while another might have influence in the urban setting. They would campaign together, then, for mutual advantage. Another determining factor was the number of candidates per constituency. The number of members forming a slate corresponded with that for the number of CLA seats for that electoral division. It is worth noting that the groups espoused the same policy of separate development. The alternative of non-racialism was advocated by one candidate who was soon squeezed out. The candidates that mattered then, favoured, all of them separate development. This left the voter no ideological choice between the candidates.

Instead the choice of candidates could be based on personalities, education, background and other personal qualifications. This was the case at Keiskammahoek and Peddie. In these two electoral divisions the ethnic dimension entered the scene long after the general election. Consequently, Peteni won the Keiskammahoek constituency because of his educational and family status. In Peddie, a graduate and an inspector of schools won the election.

In the other constituencies, the ethnic dimension reduced the election campaign into an AmaMfengu-AmaRarabe contest. Before we discuss the ethnic dimension, I wish to focus attention on the key figures in the election drama.

2.5 The Sebe-Mabandla Leadership

The emergence of Sebe and Mabandla as leaders of the AmaRarabe and AmaMfengu groups, respectively, was no accident. In order that competition and opposition might be keen, leadership had to be built on controversial issues. A brief discussion of the roles played by both Mr. Sebe and Chief Mabandla may illustrate this point.

a) Sebe

Mr. Sebe is presently the Chief Minister of the Ciskei. He is the first elected Chief Minister. He is a Tshawe, a royal family clan of the AmaRarabe, but not of the reigning house. It is interesting to note that as a result of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, Mr. Sebe successfully applied

for recognition as a chief. He was made a chief of a section of the AmaGqunukwebe.

Mr. Sebe trained as a teacher at Lovedale. According to information received, he is a religious man who is involved in various religious associations. One of them being the Moral Re-Armament. After teaching for some time, he was promoted to the position of assistant inspector. He also holds a diploma in Agriculture.

In 1968, he was appointed to the CTA as a representative of the AmaNtinde. When the 'New Deal' was introduced, he and Mr. Mtoba served on the CTA Executive Council as representatives of the AmaRarabe under Chief J. T. Mabandla.

When the CTA was transformed into the Ciskei Legislative Assembly with a Cabinet, Mr. Sebe served on the Cabinet as Minister of Education until a Cabinet reshuffle. In the newly constructed Cabinet he was in charge of the Department of Agriculture and Forstry. The education 'portfolio' was entrusted to the care of Mr. Mtoba. Mr. Sebe regarded this reshuffle as a demotion. As a result enmity developed between Mr. Sebe on the one hand and Mr. Mtoba and Chief Mabandla on the other hand.

In 1972, Mr. Sebe visited the USA. A big reception was arranged for him on his return. This was an attempt to boost Mr. Sebe as a political leader of the AmaRarabe. Amongst the guests that were present at the reception, there were the following:-

Paramount Chiefs K. D. Matanzima and Sigcau.

The other dignitaries that were expected to attend, such as Chief G. Buthelezi, Chief Mabandla and the Paramount Chief of the AmaRarabe, did not attend. Chief Mabandla explained that he and his Cabinet did not attend because they were not invited (Daily Dispatch: 24. 10. 72).

While Mr. Sebe was in the United States of America, it was rumoured that Chief Mabandla would dismiss him from the Cabinet as a result of things Mr. Sebe had said in a meeting of AmaRarabe which were a criticism of the Cabinet. This rumour aggravated the situation between Mr. Sebe and Chief Mabandla. Mabandla denied the authenticity of the rumour (Daily

Dispatch: 23 and 24. 10. 72).

According to informed sources, the preference of Mr. Sebe as a political leader of the AmaRarabe, was based on his being the most experienced Rarabe to have served on a Cabinet. It would appear that Sebe's leadership was acceptable to the Rarabe Tribunal which is a committee representing the various clans of the AmaRarabe. It advises the Paramount Chief.

b) Chief J. T. Mabandla

He was the first Chief Minister of the transition CLA. He is now the leader of the Opposition party in the CLA. He is chief of the AmaBhele, a Mfengu clan in the Tyume Valley.

He was trained as a teacher and he also attended the school of Sons of Chiefs and headmen at Tsolo in the Transkei.

Chief Mabandla is a great champion of the spirit and pride of the AmaMfengu which is symbolised by the Celebrations of the AmaMfengu. He is president of the committee responsible for the organisation of these celebrations. In the 1960's, at the installation of the late paramount chief Velile of the AmaRarabe, Chief Mabandla refused to accept a 'staff' of authority, paramount chief Velile gave to him. He argued that his acceptance of the staff would signify allegiance to the Rarabe paramountcy. He further added that his refusal to accept the staff was motivated by the realisation that he was an Mfengu and consequently owed allegiance to an Mfengu paramountcy. The Rarabe paramountcy did not represent the interests and aspirations of the AmaMfengu as could be evidenced by the failure of the paramount chief to intervene when a high-ranking official of the Rarabe Tribunal had insulted the AmaMfengu.

Informed sources maintained that Mabandla had instigated the submission of an application for the recognition and establishment of a paramountcy for the AmaMfengu. It was alleged that Mabandla entertained hopes of occupying this position.

Chief Mabandla was for several years a member of the CTA as a representative of the AmaBhele Tribal Authority of Krwakrwa in the Tyume Valley. When the 'New Deal' was introduced, Chief Mabandla served on the 'New Deal'

Executive Committee as Chief Executive Officer. He held this post until the CTA was transformed to the CLA when he became the first Chief Minister of the CLA.

These then were the key figures in the Ciskei general election campaign. These leaders issued manifestos in which separate development was accepted as a framework within which to work. This meant that there was very little by which the candidates could be distinguished. The ethnic dimension introduced the only really clear basis for differentiating the one candidate from the other. It had been introduced into Ciskeian politics when the distribution of seats in the CTA Executive was based on ethnic lines.

2.6 Ethnicity in the Ciskei

This section will be devoted to the exploration of the origins, nature and significance of ethnicity with particular reference to its effect on personal and associational relations.

a) Definition

In an attempt to find a definition for the terms "ethnic" and "ethnicity", I shall turn to Mitchell who uses what he calls a 'common-sense level' of the term ethnicity ...

"... simply the significance that is attributed to perceptible cultural distinctions in so far as public action is concerned ..." (in Cohen: 1974: 84).

Cultural differences between the AmaRarabe and AmaMfengu are not obvious. Emphasis has been on the difference in the process of acculturation. The AmaMfengu were known to have been the first to acquire 'western culture'.

Professor Wilson believed that the Mfengu and the Xhosa ...

"... are now culturally scarcely distinguishable but about a hundred years ago, language and custom differences were distinguishable (Wilson; et al: Vol. III: 1952: 1).

Professor Pauw insists that the AmaMfengu, despite a long period of mixing with the AmaXhosa, had managed to retain some political identity (Pauw: 1975: 3).

Professor Wilson further added that ...

"... politically, they [the AmaMfengu and AmaXhosa] are united in opposition to Europeans. Today, the real cleavage in the district is between White and Black ... that which formerly existed between Mfengu and Xhosa, has virtually disappeared ..." (Wilson; et al: Vol. III: 1952: 1).

This view is not surprising when one takes into consideration the events of the period during which Professor Wilson undertook her research work. This was at the height of the defiance campaign. The ideas of African unity and protest had travelled far and wide and the European was, rightly or wrongly, being identified as the oppressor of the black man.

Cohen, operationally, defines an ethnic group as a collectivity of people who...

"share same patterns of normative behaviour ... form a part of a larger population, interacting with people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system ..."

Our concern in this section is the manifestation of ethnicity as "the strife between ethnic groups in the course of which the members emphasise their identity and exclusiveness" (Cohen: op. cit).

b) The Historical background: AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu Conflict.

This section will deal with the historical background of the AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict in the Ciskei.

Among the various tribal groups that make up the population of the Ciskei, are clans of the AmaRarabe and those of the AmaMfengu. Clans of the AmaRarabe were among the first to arrive in the Ciskei. Those of the AmaMfengu arrived later. They consisted of several tribes that survived the Mfecane, Tshaka's reign of terror (Moyer: 1971: Some Current Manifestations of Early Mfengu History: p. 1).

These Mfengu clans arrived in the land of the Gcaleka, destitute, desolate and without shelter (Moyer: op. cit). Chief Hintsa settled them amongst the Gcaleka. He gave them food, shelter and allowed them to rehabilitate themselves.

The missionaries, among them Dr. Philip and Rev. Ayliff, built up a

story of 'ill-treatment and bondage' of the AmaMfengu by the AmaGcaleka. Soga and Majeke, amongst many, refute the story of the existence of 'slavery' amongst the AmaGcaleka. They argue that the institution of slavery was unknown to the AmaGcaleka, then. (Soga: 1930: 180 et seq also Majeke: 1952: 36 et seq). The missionaries offered the AmaMfengu 'freedom' and 'protection' under the Colonial Government.

Consequently, the AmaMfengu were settled at such places as Peddie, the Tyumie Valley and Keiskammahoek area. The land on which the AmaMfengu were settled, was confiscated from the AmaRarabe. (Moyer: op cit: p. 2). On leaving the land of the Gcaleka, the AmaMfengu were encouraged to take with them cattle belonging to the AmaGcaleka (Moyer: op cit: p. 2).

The AmaMfengu were used as decoys and military auxiliaries against the AmaRarabe. (Moyer: op cit: p. 2). The AmaMfengu soon adjusted themselves to the new economy and culture, consequently earning the designation of collaborators (Moyer: The Mfengu Self-defence, Expansion and the Frontier Wars: Undated, Unpublished Mimeographed Article: p. 5), because they made the new system workable and acceptable.

It has been explained elsewhere in this section that when the AmaMfengu arrived in the land of the AmaGcaleka, they consisted of several tribes. They adopted the name Mfengu as a description of what they believed was ukumfenguza, meaning begging for food and shelter -(Moyer: 1971: 2).

c) Devices used to keep ethnicity alive

Many devices are used to 'keep alive' in the memories of Ciskeians what took place about a hundred years ago. In this section attention will be devoted to exploring the events and facts that have been used to keep ethnicity a living concept to Ciskeians. Before we consider some of the following examples, I wish to direct attention to a current move by some of the educated Mfengu elite.

There has been a conscious attempt by this group to reject the use of the term Mfengu. This is replaced by the term AbaMbo. Writers such as Soga and Kawa, refuse to classify the Mfengu as AbaMbo (Kawa: 1929: 9

also Soga: 1930: 59). Kawa further concedes that he would agree to the application and use of this term on condition that it was the express wish and intent of the AmaMfengu to have the term applied to them.

These people argued that the term Mfengu was not only a misnomer but it also had a derogatory meaning. Its derogatory meaning was taken from historical circumstances when the Mfengu were regarded as collaborators (Moyer: op cit: p. 5). It was a misnomer because there was no Mfengu who still performed ukumfenguza.

This leads to the derogatory meaning of the term Mxhosa. It is accepted amongst African circles that when this term is used in a despising tone, it carries a derogatory implication that arouses associations of dishonesty and theft from the colonists!

i) The Celebrations of the AmaMfengu

The Committee for the Celebrations of the AmaMfengu was started in 1907. This is elected from amongst the elite of the AmaMfengu. Its responsibilities include, inter alia the following:-

- i) The organisation and arrangement of activities connected with these celebrations.
- ii) It acts as a guardian of the cultural interests of the AmaMfengu.

These celebrations are held once each year on the 14th of May or any date that may be indicated by the organisers. The venue for the celebrations is at a place called EMQWASHWINI (at the Milkwood tree). The purpose of these celebrations is to commemorate the 'emancipation' of the AmaMfengu from 'slavery' under the AmaGcaleka. A monument has been erected at this celebration venue : a milkwood tree was planted in about 1835. Next to the tree is a monument on which a plaque with the 'covenant' had been inscribed. The covenant comprises promises which the AmaMfengu made on being 'emancipated'. They promised to pray to God, to be loyal to the authorities and to educate their children.

Apart from feasting, speeches and singing, the AmaMfengu present at the celebrations are made to repeat the covenant. Since the emergence of political parties in the Ciskei, attendance at the celebrations has been poor.

People have been told that the aims of the Celebrations were opposed to those of the Government. Consequently, many people who would not have liked to be thought opposed to the Government, have stayed away from them. As a result, the Celebrations have been reduced to a position where it was attended by CNP supporters only. The AmaMfengu who supported the Government stayed away.

ii) The Ntsikana Celebrations

The Ntsikana Celebrations were started in 1912 as a counter to the Celebrations of the AmaMfengu. They were aimed at regrouping the clans of the AmaRarabe around a national symbol and also as a channel for Rarabe nationalism. Thus behind their religious facade, were political overtones.

Many committees have been organised for the purpose of arranging and preparing for these celebrations. There is a committee for each town or district. The Ntsikana Celebrations are less centralised than the Celebrations of the AmaMfengu.

Ntsikana was a Cira, a Rarabe clan. He was a Christian convert (Bokwe JK: 1914: 12 also Holt: 1954: 107). The story of Ntsikana's conversion is interesting. He had met and heard Dr. Van der Kemp preach, at an early age, when he was still a herd-boy. The message of the Gospel he received then, remained with him until he was a man. He met the Reverends Read and Williams whom he wanted to accompany to Bethelsdorp, but Colonial laws forbade him to travel to Bethelsdorp (Holt: op cit: 106).

He moved to Gqora in the Kat River area in the Mankazana hills where he met Rev. J. Williams (Bokwe: op cit: 5 also Holt: op cit: 106). It was as a follower of Rev. Williams that Ntsikana had a vision of light around his famous ox, Hulushe (Bokwe: op cit: 8 also Holt: 1954: 107). After this vision, Ntsikana decided to "wash off" the red ochre from his body. He created a precedent by this. All converts after him 'washed off' the imbola (red ochre) as a sign of being converted. Amongst the Xhosas he was the first to be buried in a coffin. (Holt: op cit: 126). Ntsikana was the first Xhosa to introduce Xhosa hymns. He was a composer and a poet (Holt: op cit: 112-4).

There is a strong belief that Ntsikana was a prophet. This contention was

refuted by Holt (1954).

There seems to be some relationship between the CNIP and the members of the Ntsikana committees. Leading members of these committees are invariably members of the CNIP.

iii) The Use of Clan-names

The use of clan-names is very common amongst Africans. Clan-names, especially in rural areas where people still live in more or less tribal units, enhance tribal awareness. But, in cities where urbanisation has resulted in settlements that disregard tribal affiliation, though clan names are in common use, tribal awareness is not aroused (Pauw: 1975: 3). In the cities, the use of clan names facilitates introduction into a circle of friends. The ethnic conflict had always been latent; it has been inflamed by the introduction of party politics. To illustrate the nature and depth of the ethnic division, I shall relate the following stories.

I was informed that, one day, in a village in the district of King William's Town, a young black man, driving a furniture removal truck, once gave a lift to an elderly man. When the elderly man reached his destination, he alighted. He requested to know the young man's clan. When he learnt that he was an IMfengu, (IZizi) the elderly man expressed disappointment at having accepted a favour from an IMfengu.

Another story from the same district of King William's Town, was told by a young Mtshakazi (a young woman). She was a Xhosa and had married an IMfengu. Her parents did not approve of her marriage to an IMfengu. She was, consequently disinherited and deprived of all contact with the family.

Examples of how deep these tribal feelings run can be quoted ad nauseum and the prevalence of this enmity in the rural areas can adequately be illustrated.

iv) The Installation of the Rarabe Paramount Chief

The introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 brought in its wake many events that had a direct bearing on the problem of ethnicity. We shall explore in this section such events as the installation of the late Paramount

Chief Velile Sandile as the Paramount Chief of the AmaRarabe, Mabandla's refusal to swear allegiance to the Rarabe paramount chief, and the activities of the then secretary of the Rarabe Tribunal, as contributing to the problem of ethnicity. These events are so closely related that we shall treat them as one.

In an article in the Imvo Zabantsundu of the 23. 12. 60, the then Secretary of the Rarabe Tribunal issued a statement in which he mentioned, inter alia, that there could be no inter-marriage between the AmaMfengu and AmaRarabe clans.

This statement had repercussions when the Paramount Chief Velile was installed. By custom and tradition chiefs under him had to swear allegiance. This was done in the following manner:-

- i) The Paramount Chief issued to the Chiefs present 'sticks' as a symbol of power.
- ii) All the other chiefs accepted the 'sticks' except Mabandla who pointed out that his acceptance of the 'stick' signified acknowledging allegiance.
- iii) Mabandla based his refusal on the fact that the Paramount Chief remained silent when his Secretary insulted the AmaMfengu. By thus remaining silent he condoned the action of the Secretary.
- iv) Mabandla emphasised the fact that Sandile represented a Rarabe paramountcy and not an Mfengu one.

It must be noted that Mabandla had envisaged instigating an Mfengu paramountcy which he had hoped to fill himself.

v) Governmental Symbols

When the 'New Deal' was introduced in the CTA, the seats in the Executive Council were distributed on tribal basis as follows:-

The AmaRarabe clans had	-2
The AmaMfengu " "	-2
The AbaThembu " "	-1
The AbeSuthu " "	-1

The coat of arms of the Ciskei has the following symbols:-

- i) A milkwood tree (Umqwashu) which is associated with the AmaMfengu.

- ii) A blue-crane carries a sprig with nine leaves. This denotes the nine regional authorities that comprise the CLA.
- iii) A head of an ox said to be that of an ox which belonged to Ntsikana. This is associated with clans of AmaRarabe.
- iv) Four ivory rings that symbolise the four chieftainships found in the Ciskei : the AmaRarabe, AmaMfengu, AbaThembu and AbeSuthu.

vi) Other Statements and activities contributing to Ethnicity

Ethnicity has been encouraged by certain statements and activities. We shall devote this section to an investigation of these statements and activities and their effect on ethnicity.

Before the general elections in the Ciskei, Chief Mabandla is reported to have denounced the activities of a certain group of people as being conducive to a revival of the AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict. This group of people went to the urban areas in the Ciskei creating the impression that they were the true representatives of the AmaRarabe; that they enjoyed the blessings of the chiefs of the AmaRarabe.

Chief Mabandla warned that only merit should decide the outcome of the elections and not tribal affiliation (Daily Dispatch: 6. 10. 72). In a different press statement, Chief Mabandla remarked that ...

Various tribal groups ... do not seem to take the elections as a nation but as different entities, each working for the glorification of its racial image ... " (Daily Dispatch: 17. 10. 72).

In the same issue of the Daily Dispatch, it was alleged that secret meetings were held by certain groups in which plans were being drawn up. Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile of the AmaRarabe issued a statement in which he warned all those who were alleged to have been campaigning under the guise that they were the true representatives of the AmaRarabe (Daily Dispatch: 17. 10. 72).

In drawing this section to a close, I wish to emphasise the fact that the revival of the AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict led to an estrangement of

inter-personal and inter-associational relations in the Ciskei. The emergence of political parties in the Ciskei, used this latent ethnic conflict to build support and to facilitate membership recruitment.

2.7 The Election Results

In this section, attention will be devoted to a study of the election results, paying particular attention to the following questions:-

- i) What effect did the election results have on the emergence of political parties?
- ii) Did the results indicate whether the absence of political parties during the election campaign was a serious defect or not?

We mentioned earlier that sixty-three candidates competed for the twenty CLA seats. When the results were made known, the Ikhonco had won fifteen of these seats. In addition to the Peddie seat, the Mbokotho gained additional seats from Glen Grey, Keiskammahoek and Herschel. The BNCP did not win a seat and none of the 'independents' won a seat! For detailed comment, I shall use the results of the Victoria East and Zwelitsha electoral divisions.

In the Victoria East area, four CLA seats were contested. The possible number of registered voters was 90,097. Ten candidates registered to compete for these four seats. The candidates arranged themselves into two slates of four candidates each and two 'independents'.

The one electoral slate was composed of members from the Ikhonco while the other slate consisted of members from the Imbokotho. During the voting, each voter had to vote four times. This meant that the possible number of votes was $90,087 \times 4 = 360,388$. Of these votes the Ikhonco polled as a group a total of 206,758 while the Imbokotho group polled a total of 54,437 votes. The Ikhonco led the Imbokotho by 152,321 votes.

The only candidate during the campaign who was supported by a political party, the Bantu National Conservative Party, was Mr. Bokwe and he polled 2,478 votes. This meant that the BNCP with its policies was rejected by the electorate.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Four

A. 1973 Ciskei General Election Results.

Insert the following percentages for: (p. 119)

Zantsi L.M.	3143	1.17
Bokwe S.T. (BNCP)	2478	.92
Sub-Total	5621	

Insert the following percentages for (p. 120):-

Guzana Dr	8989	3.31
Putu M.M.	4438	1.63
Sub-Total	13427	

Substitute the following for Keiskammahoek:-

Peteni R.L.	6309	62,06
Ntshiywa D.G.	1769	17,35
Qalaza H.	1444	14,20

In the Zwelitsha electoral division, 92 411 voters were registered. Four CLA seats were to be competed for. This meant that the possible number of votes would be obtained by multiplying 92 411 by 4. The result was 369 644. Of these the Ikhonco group polled 154 757 votes while the Imbokotho group polled 101 544. The Ikhonco led the Imbokotho by 53 213 votes.

Ten candidates had participated in the contest in the Zwelitsha constituency. Two slates were formed and two candidates contested as independents. The candidate who campaigned on a non-racialism ticket polled about 3, 4% of the total votes cast.

While members of the Ikhonco group from the Victoria East and the Zwelitsha constituencies, won the election, members of the Imbokotho from both constituencies alleged that the successful candidates in both constituencies had perpetrated electoral infringements which had resulted in them (the Imbokotho) being prejudiced in the elections. They instituted litigation against the successful candidates. Full results of the elections:-

A. 1973 Ciskei General Election Results.

1. Victoria East

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>% votes polled</u>
Maqoma, L. M.	52 632	19, 61
Lamani, A. Z.	52 486	19, 56
Burns-Ncamashe	51 313	19, 12
Ximiya, W. F.	50 327	18, 75
	<u>206 758</u>	
Mabandla, M. M.	16 029	5, 97
Matakane, R. S.	13 803	5, 14
Mbatani, M.	13 450	5, 07
Zantsi, W. M.	11 155	4, 16
	<u>54 437</u>	
Zantsi, L. M.	3 143	
Bokwe, S. T. (BNCP)	2 478	
Spoilt ballot papers	<u>1 558</u>	
	7 179	Grand Total

2. Zwelitsha

Sebe, L. L.	42 095	16, 3
Ngezo, V. V.	38 821	15, 0
Nkontso, D. E.	37 963	14, 7
Sam, M.	<u>35 878</u>	13, 8
	154 757	

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>% votes polled</u>
Mtoba, S. L.	30 531	11, 8
Guzana, P. F.	25 457	9, 8
Sangotsha, I. L.	23 230	8, 9
Ntshela, M. J.	22 326	8, 6
	<u>101 544</u>	
Guzana, D. R.	8 989	
Putu, M. M.	4 438	
Spoilt Ballot Papers	2 154	
	<u>15 581</u>	
3. <u>Mdantsane</u>		
Siyo, L. F.	25 327	13, 3
Kewuti, Q. J.	24 164	12, 7
Bashe	23 752	12, 4
	<u>73 243</u>	
Mzamo, A. N.	21 310	11, 2
Rula, D.	20 220	10, 6
Voyi, M. A.	20 099	10, 5
	<u>61 629</u>	
Billie, H. K.	2 814	1, 4
Mangala, J. K.	1 676	0, 8
Spoilt Papers	667	
	<u>5 157</u>	
4. <u>Middledrift</u>		
Hoyana, A.	12 159	62, 7
Mjoji, N. W.	6 996	36, 1
Spoilt Papers	221	
	<u>19 376</u>	
5. <u>Peddie</u>		
Stamper, P. G.	15 449	70, 7
Msuthwana, P. E. E.	6 125	28, 0
Spoilt Papers	264	
	<u>21 838</u>	
6. <u>Keiskammahoek</u>		
Peteni, R. L.	6 309	35, 1
Ntshingwa, D. G.	1 764	9, 8
Qalaza, H.	1 444	6, 3
Spoilt Papers	649	
	<u>10 166</u>	

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>% votes polled</u>
7. <u>Hewu</u>		
Myataza, B. D. R.	6 464	46,8
Bandla, P.	4 657	33,7
Ntlabathi, V.	1 118	8,0
Ngoma, N. T.	851	6,1
Sishuba, T. A.	492	3,5
Spoilt Papers	<u>254</u>	
	13 836	
8. <u>Herschel</u>		
Mokhesi, S. J.	13 973	22,2
Mkrola, N. J.	13 284	21,1
Burhali, S.	12 133	19,3
Mei, M.	8 942	14,2
Kumalo, M. A.	7 209	11,4
Kambula, D. W.	5 187	8,2
Mfaxes, M. J.	1 310	2,0
Spoilt Papers	<u>659</u>	
	62 697	
9. <u>Glen Grey</u>		
Saliwa, J. H.	20 522	11,8
Jaxa, W. T.	18 453	10,6
Booi, Z. E.	17 846	10,3
Gantsho, S.	17 733	10,2
Noholoza, M. J.	17 571	10,1
Mzazi, N. E.	16 859	9,7
Sondlo, T. N.	16 144	9,3
Dumezweni, M. E.	16 142	9,3
Mhlom, W.	15 556	8,9
Noji, W.	4 722	2,7
Vanqa, E. T.	4 099	2,3
Ngese, A. S.	2 762	1,5
Mbalo, M. J.	2 256	1,3
Joka, M. E.	774	,44
Zote, S.	662	,38
Mdyosi, G. J.	480	,27
Spoilt Papers	<u>601</u>	
	173 182	

- N. B. i) Zote, Mdyosi and Joka must have lost their deposits.
 ii) Only three seats were competed for but the number of entries was 16!

(Source: Ciskei Official Gazette: No. 6: 23.3.73).

B. Observations

- 1) Heavy polling was noticeable in constituencies where the Ikhonco and Imbokotho groups operated. This emphasised the usefulness of a combined effort when campaigning. Candidates that were independents suffered heavy losses.
- 2) Where no combined effort at campaigning was employed, other factors such as, inter alia, education, position, family ties, family status, and being known in the area, assisted the candidate in influencing voters in his favour.
- 3) The presence of embryo political parties controlled and limited the number of candidates taking part in the election. Take for instance the Glen Grey electoral division which had three seats in the CLA: sixteen candidates registered! This number would have been limited to two or three if there had been parties.
- 4) Election figures revealed that the Imbokotho performance was better in the urban areas than in the rural areas.
- 5) It looks as if multi-member constituencies promoted the presentation of electoral slates and this in turn facilitated the emergence of political parties.

We have followed the participants in the Ciskei general election campaign, up to the point where the election results were announced. Only one political party, and that not well organised, took part in the election campaign. Individuals grouped around Sebe and Mabandla also took part in the election campaign. The following points flow from this:-

- i) The absence of properly organised political parties deprived the election campaign of a vital dynamic.
- ii) The people's eagerness to participate in political party activity was demonstrated by the fact that after being discouraged from forming political parties at one stage, they eagerly rallied around the leadership of Sebe and Mabandla in an attempt to form groups that substituted for political parties.
- iii) The great number of candidates (sixty-three in all) that competed for the twenty CLA seats, was eloquent evidence of the absence of political parties. Political parties would not only have restricted the number of candidates but also the quantity of candidates would have improved.

- iv) The adoption of the AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict not only high-lighted the lack of a political ideology but also the lack of an organisational framework, such as a political party would have provided. Candidates used traditional institutions to recruit votes as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. This could only promote tribalism.
- v) The election campaign emphasised the existence of groups that were ready to be transformed into political parties. The leading personnel in these groups also became leaders in the political parties.

2.8 The Emergence of Political Parties.

We have discussed and seen how candidates campaigned for election to the CLA. Most of them had arranged themselves into groups from which the outlines of the future parties were discernible. What was then a mere 'outline' now crystalised into definite political party formations. In this section I wish to see what function political parties play in the struggle of the Ciskeians to achieve political and economic equality. Will they facilitate the provision of proper channels of communications? Will they help with the articulation and aggregation of the interests of the Ciskeian? What relations will these parties promote between individuals on the one hand and between the various associations and groups on the other?

The announcement of the election results did not signify the end of intensive organising and canvassing. Canvassing and organising had to be employed in order to win support for the Ikhonco on the one hand and Imbokotho on the other to decide who would lead the CLA. Before the start of the first CLA session in 1973, the Ikhonco and the Imbokotho were actively engaged in organising chiefs to support them. The chiefs were in the majority in the CLA and anyone who could turn this majority to his advantage, was assured of a win in the contest for the position of the Chief Minister.

The strength of the competing groups was not known. All that was known was that the Ikhonco had captured fifteen elected seats and its strength among the chiefs depended on the success of its 'canvassing and organisation' while the Imbokotho was reputed to have a good chiefly following.

It was difficult to predict the outcome of the voting for the position of the

Chief Minister; many people would not be frank about their group line-up, but canvassing had been going on. Each group making promises to its prospective supporters.

Chief Mabandla who had been Chief Minister was the Imbokotho candidate for the position of Chief Minister while Mr. Sebe who had served in Mabandla's Cabinet, was the candidate for the Ikhonco.

When the results were announced, Sebe had emerged victorious with 26 to 24 votes over Mabandla (Records of CLA Debates: 1973).

The Ikhonco proved to have planned its strategy because when nominations for the cabinet positions were called for, it made en bloc nominations and voted as a unit thus out-manoevering the Imbokotho. This resulted in the Imbokotho withdrawing from contesting any positions in the CLA.

The formality of dividing the House into a Government side and an Opposition side, brought with it the announcement of the existence of two political parties : the Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) on the Government side and the Ciskei National Party (CNP) on the Opposition side. The ruling party (CNIP) was under the leadership of Mr. L. L. Sebe and the Opposition, was led by Chief J. T. Mabandla (Records of CLA Debates: 1973).

Thus the CLA composed of both the traditional elites, such as chiefs and the modern political elected elites gave rise to a two-party system. This CLA was endowed with all the democratic trappings including the right to legislate on certain subjects, but it was denied the 'final say' in many important areas. The White Government retained the 'final say'. This meant that the CLA was not sovereign in its own territory. This lack of sovereignty circumscribed the franchise extended to its subjects. The CLA stood naked without effective power (in the eyes of the discerning!). It is a subordinate legislature. Real power lay in the white parliament. These then were the political rights the CLA's semi-autonomous status had introduced in the CLA. The Ciskeian has not yet obtained equal political and economic opportunities with the white man in the RSA. The political rights of the Ciskeian must be viewed in relation to the sovereignty

of the Ciskei. Ciskeians in urban white areas were expected to exercise their political rights in their homeland. For this reason the Constitution of the Ciskei has been endowed with extra-territorial powers. This was in line with the implementation of the policy of separate development.

The political parties in their activities would have to make the system of Bantustans acceptable to Africans. Africans in the urban areas would have to decide whether to expose themselves to police surveillance by remaining aloof from homeland politics or whether to join in. Their motives for joining homeland politics can serve to silence their consciences and provide some outlet for the need to make their unhappy position acceptable.

The traditional system had been undermined for very many decades but now after alienation between the chief and the subject had been brought about by the Western culture and urbanisation, tribal units are being revived and promises of land are made. Chiefs are being made, in the sense that where no hereditary chief could be found, a headman was promoted. All these factors would occupy the minds of those who would be members of the CLA. Consequently, they would forget that the primary need of the Africans was equality in all spheres between white and black and not separation!

The Ciskei-RSA relations and the denial to thousands of Africans of political rights did not improve the channels of communication.

The emergence of political parties must be viewed as a significant event. When performing their role of socialization, they will facilitate the acceptance of Bantustan institutions. They will thereby be promoting good relations between the RSA and the Ciskei.

2.9 The Ciskei Legislative Assembly Litigation

The first general election of the Ciskei attracted the interest and attention of over sixty candidates. All competed for the twenty CLA seats. These elections brought in their wake litigation. It was alleged that irregularities had been committed. The groups that were involved in the litigation were:-

- i) The Mtoba group in the Zwelitsha constituency

complained that the Sebe group perpetrated some electoral infringements which prejudiced their chances in the election.

- ii) In the Victoria East constituency, the Zantsi group alleged that the Lamani group committed some electoral irregularities which prejudiced their chances in the elections.

When it became known that such an electoral petition was pending, people were quick to remark that the Mtoba and Zantsi groups should accept defeat and not expect the courts to fight their cases. These people rushed to conclusions without giving thought to what was involved : that is, free elections and the freedom to vote for the candidate of one's choice. Whether the Election Proclamation R194 of 1972 provided for elections that were confined to a particular territory, and for a particular language group, did not matter, but it provided for free elections and it facilitated the choice of the best candidate without fear of being intimidated.

In this section, attention will be given to the reasons for and significance of the CLA election petition. While making these investigations, emphasis will be laid on the effect these cases had on:-

- i) The right of the Ciskeian to participate in elections free from fear of being intimidated and coerced.
- ii) The role played by officials, whether black or white at elections, must be well defined. They must be disinterested. They must facilitate the smooth-running of the events without themselves showing interest or favour to any side.
- iii) The advisability of adopting multi-candidate constituencies when the majority of voters are illiterate, must be considered.

a) Zwelitsha Electoral Petition

An election petition that arose in the Zwelitsha electoral division gave rise to the Mtoba and Others v. Sebe and Others (SALR: 1975 (4) p. 413) case. This was brought about as a result of the contravention of the provisions of the Election Proclamation R194 of 1972. It was alleged that the following irregularities were committed by the Sebe group with the white officials collaborating:-

- i) The supply of ballot papers was exhausted at some polling stations, resulting in the voting stopping before the scheduled closing time.
- ii) During the counting and sorting of ballot papers, ballot papers were cut, resulting in some portions of the ballot papers which contained valid votes, being discarded.
- iii) The activities (including alleged threats and intimidation) by one, Mahaiya and his relationship (if any) to Sebe and his group.
- iv) The question of costs.

(Source: SALR: 1975 (4) p. 417).

This is not a re-trial of the case. The task facing us is that of investigating the principles involved in this case in terms of what has been mentioned earlier. It may be necessary for us to re-identify the groups that were involved in this drama.

Ten candidates in the Zwelitsha constituency had been contesting the election for the four CLA seats. These candidates had arranged themselves into two electoral slates and two independents. The one group consisted of Sebe, Nkontso, Sam and Nqezo while the other group was represented by Mtoba, Guzana, Sangotsha and Ntshela.

We have discussed in an earlier section the ideology and alliances that these groups formed and their activities. Of relevance to us now is that the Sebe group won the election while the Mtoba group lost. The Mtoba group alleged that the Sebe group assisted by the white officials committed some irregularities (as mentioned in this section). According to this group, the effect of these irregularities was that its chances of winning the election were prejudiced.

Threats and intimidatory activities were aimed at inducing voters to accept candidates who were not of their choice. In the trial, the court discharged the respondents on the charges of intimidation and threats; however their membership of the CLA was invalidated on the following grounds:-

- i) The officials had failed to provide sufficient ballot papers to enable the voters to cast their votes.

- ii) The cutting up of ballot papers constituted an offence against the provisions of the Election Proclamation R194 of 1972. The cutting up of ballot papers resulted in valid ballot papers being discarded. Some of the discarded ballot papers that were retrieved carried names of candidates from both the Sebe and Mtoba groups.

The setting aside of the election of the members of the Sebe group, resulted in the creation of four vacancies in the Zwelitsha constituency. A bye-election in the constituency was indicated. By the time the election of members of the Sebe group had been declared invalid as a result of the judgement in the election petition, Sebe had been elected Chief Minister of the Ciskei. In terms of the judgement, he had to vacate this position, but instead, he was appointed to the post of economic advisor to the Ciskei Cabinet! This meant that Sebe would virtually remain attached to the Cabinet. As a matter of fact, he enjoyed all the privileges and advantages attached to the Chief Minister's post. He was only deprived of the use of the title.

b) Victoria East Electoral Petition

In the Victoria East area, a case similar to the Zwelitsha one was brought by the Zantsi group against the Lamani group. It was alleged that the latter group had contravened the provisions of the Election Proclamation R194 of 1972, in almost the same circumstances. In this case also, a group of white officials was charged together with the group of candidates. The following infringements were cited:-

- a) Corrupt practices such as, inter alia, changing of voters cards and replacing them with those that belonged to the Lamani group; forging ballot papers so that the Lamani group would be favoured. It was alleged that these irregularities were committed by agents and supporters of the Lamani group.
- b) The agents and supporters of the Lamani group were alleged to have tried to influence and/or coerce voters to vote for the Lamani group by allegedly threatening, intimidating and singing songs that had the effect of influencing voters and by performing other activities.

- c) The returning officers and/or polling officers were said to have failed to maintain the requisite secrecy at polling booths. Consequently, members of the Lamani group entered a polling booth ...

"bombarded with chanting voices and given white cards bearing the names of the Lamani group ... who formed queues and columns on either side of the waiting voters to inspect, scrutinize and see the marks made by him on the said ballot paper ..."

(Extracted from a statement by W. M. Zantsi to his Attorneys: 14. 3. 73).

- d) At some stage during the voting the supply of ballot papers was exhausted. This supply was replenished by a supply from another polling station, but, no proper care was taken to note the correct number of ballot paper books that made up the consignment. This resulted in a number of books being delivered long after the first delivery was made. This delivery was not authorised. It appeared as if these books were part of the first consignment.
- e) One of the most serious allegations was that the white officials had failed to seal properly ballot boxes and cardboard boxes that were used to improvise for ballot boxes. (Statement signed by members of both the Zantsi and Lamani groups before the chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner: 1. 3. 73).

By the time the results of the litigation were announced, two members of the Lamani group, Chiefs Maqoma and Burns-Ncamashe, had been promoted to the chieftainships of the AmaJingqi and AmaGwali, respectively. Consequently, their membership of the CLA as elected representatives, was terminated, resulting in the creation of two vacancies in the Victoria East area. They were now, ex officio members of the CLA by virtue of their being chiefs but this did not affect the course and results of the case.

The election petition was decided outside court basing it on the Mtoba and Others v. Sebe and Others case. It was decided, inter alia, that:-

- i) The Lamani group should vacate their seats in the CLA, thus allowing for a bye-election to take place.
- ii) The litigation costs were shared between the parties concerned (that is each group paid its own litigation costs).

c. Observations

The court findings in this case upheld a democratic right, first of all, of defending the right and secondly emphasising the right to elect the candidate of one's choice, without fear of being intimidated or coerced.

From the evidence adduced, officials acted wrongly. This emphasised the inadvisability and unsuitability of the practice of use of multi-candidate constituencies where there was a majority of illiterate voters.

The Election Proclamation R194 of 1972 provides for voting by secret ballot, allowing each voter to vote for as many as there are candidates to be elected. Voters who are unable to vote because of either illiteracy or some physical incapacity, have their ballot papers completed by the polling officer on their behalf in the presence of two witnesses. The voter indicates his choice by word of mouth. (Richings: 1977: Mimeographed paper on 'The Ciskei Constitution'). This is what the Proclamation prescribes, but it may not coincide with what occurs in actual practice.

Some stricter application of the letter of the law could be resorted to so that the illiterate person is protected. In some countries, candidates are associated with certain symbols which facilitates voting by those who can not read.

It became clear from the attitude and actions of the white officials involved in these cases that they favoured the success of the Sebe group. This indicated that the Mabandla group had fallen into disfavour.

Bundy warned that it was the aim of the RSA Government to transfer trouble from the white urban areas to the homelands (C. Bundy in African Affairs: Vol. 71: No. 282: January 1972). The switch-over from Mabandla to Sebe must be viewed in this light, more so, when the Government does not allow the electorate to make a free choice. One reason for Mabandla's downfall may have lain in the fact that many of his associates did not accept the policy of separate development and also that he (Mabandla) talked in terms of the Ciskei-Transkei amalgamation. (Daily Dispatch: 23. 11. 72). Sebe on the other hand was docile in his acceptance of separate development.

When Sebe was unseated, as a result of the Court judgement, the RSA

Government approved of his being appointed Economic Advisor to the Ciskei Cabinet (Daily Dispatch: 18. 10. 75). As a result of this newly created post, Sebe became an "appendage" to the Ciskei Cabinet. He enjoyed all the benefits and allowances attached to the position of Chief Minister except the use of the title of Chief Minister. It is claimed that some members of the CNP entertained the opinion that Mr. Sebe had consequently, been afforded tremendous influence. This contributed to his success in the subsequent bye-election. Another significant event that was cited as a support for the Sebe group, was that though Mr. Sebe was respondent number one in the election petition, he was never called to appear in court to give evidence. Was this in deference to his Chief Minister's charisma?

3. Party Structure, Ideology and Leadership

The party 'outlines' of the election groups developed into clear political parties whose recruitment efforts reinforced the ethnic conflict in the Ciskei. In this section we shall study the structures, ideologies and leadership of the various political parties. The informal structure of the parties will also receive attention. We shall also by reference show the role these parties will fulfill.

a) The Bantu Nationalist Conservative Party (BNCP)

The BNCP was the oldest established political party in the Ciskei. Its founder and leader was defeated as an election candidate in the Victoria East electoral division. This virtually meant the rejection of the party by the electorate. The structure of the Party was never clearly elucidated. Unfortunately, the leader and founder of this party died. During the election campaign, the BNCP issued a statement of policy in which it accepted the principles of working within the framework of separate development. In an explanation, it was declared that the racial groups in South Africa would be recognised and kept as racial entities. Bantu nationalism would be developed based on the traditions, law and custom of the Bantus. Chiefs would be recognised as the traditional leaders of the people. However, no explanation or detail was given as to how the various tribes and racial groups would be kept separated. It must be noted that industrialisation has brought in its wake, urbanisation which makes separation of races difficult.

b) The Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP)

This party developed from the election campaign group the 'Big 17' alias Ikhonco. The name Ikhonco had been retained with its symbolism of a link or chain binding into one Ciskei nationality people of different walks of life : rich and poor; educated and uneducated; rural folk and urban dwellers and people from the various tribes in the Ciskei.

It was an elitist party which as time progressed, broadened its base to allow for a mass membership. The bye-elections assisted in achieving mass-membership.

The nucleus organisation of the CNIP was nick-named the 'Broederbond'. This was made up of some chiefs of the AmaRarabe and candidates from the following constituencies:-

Victoria East, Mdantsane and Zwelitsha.

The 'Broederbond' met for the first time in Fort Beaufort, in 1972. The nucleus membership of the 'Broederbond' consisted of representatives of the Rarabe clans. In order not to offend prospective members, the composition of the 'Broederbond' membership had to be concealed. The purpose of the first meeting included, inter alia, the following:-

- i) To canvass for more support among the election candidates.
- ii) To boost Sebe's claim to the leadership.

The reason for the desire to conceal the true nature of the first meeting of the 'Broederbond' was that the organisers feared that prospective members would be scared away by the claim that members of the 'Broederbond' claimed to be enjoying the blessings of chiefs of the AmaRarabe.

After the meeting at Fort Beaufort, membership of the 'Broederbond' grew to include candidates from Hewu and Middeldrift. At the same time, it underwent a change of name : it became known as the 'Big 17' alias Ikhonco or "link".

Members of the Ikhonco helped each other with, inter alia, drawing up of

campaign programmes, interchange of platforms and the pooling of resources. The Ikhonco was organised around Mr. Sebe and when at the 1973 CLA session the existence of parties was announced, Sebe was proclaimed the National leader of the Ikhonco or CNIP (Records of CLA Debates: 1973). The first conference of the party was held at Zwelitsha in 1974.

i) The Policy

The parent organisation of the CNIP or the 'Big 17' sometimes called the Ikhonco, accepted separate development as a policy framework within which to work. (Mimeographed undated Policy Statement issued by L. L. Sebe). Ever since, this group has tenaciously stuck by the policy of separate development. Members of this group equate the Ciskei's attainment of a 'semi-autonomous' status with the attainment of equality and freedom. The fact that Bantustan 'freedom' and 'equality' was confined to particular territories and was for enjoyment by particular language and skin-colour groups, was accepted by them. They did not view the homeland 'freedom' and 'equality' as an attempt to exonerate white South Africa from the charge of depriving blacks of a share in the country's political and economic power. It is as a result of the co-operation and collaboration of such people that the SA ruling regime talks of 'plural democracies'.

A founder member of the CNIP once remarked that their participation in Bantustan politics would ensure that the right man and not a 'yesman' got into the position. By this, he was justifying his participation in these subordinate institutions. He continued his argument by adding that if the right man got into the position, these Government-created institutions could be used to the benefit of the black man.

ii) The branch

This is a local organisational unit. It may be formed whenever ten or more people who embrace the principles and policy of this party come together.

A membership fee is payable upon which a membership card is issued.

A branch executive consists of the following: a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary, assistant secretary and a treasurer. All these officials are elected from amongst members of the party.

In places where no branches exist and where there are people who desire to identify themselves with the party, but they are less than the number required to start a branch, such person(s) may affiliate directly to the National Conference. Branches may be established in towns, cities, farms, factories and compounds. For purposes of administration, a branch may be subdivided into iinqila or 'cells'. Since the inception of the party, no fewer than hundred branches have been established. The branch is the basic unit or cradle of the party structure.

iii) The Regional Committee

The Regional Committee co-ordinates the activities of branches. The Executive of a Regional Committee is elected by branches. Since the inception of the party, only two Regional Committees have been established at Victoria East. Regional Committees are supposed to arrange regional conferences to which branches would be invited; it is unfortunate, however, that Regional Committees have failed to function as planned.

Consequently, it has been found advantageous to organise rallies on a regional level while conferences are associated with the National Conference. A National Conference is held once a year. National Executive members are invited to rallies.

iv) The National Executive

At the apex of the party hierarchy is a National Executive. The governing body of the party is the National Conference which is composed of the following:-

- 1) The National Executive
- 2) The officials and delegates of Regional Committees.
- 3) Two delegates each from branches affiliated direct to the National Conference.

The duties of the National Conference include, inter alia, the following:-

"The making of and reviewing of national policy; the performance of such duties as may befit a 'supreme administrative and controlling body'. Officials are elected at a National Conference; Disciplinary decisions by the branches and regions are rectified at the National Conference".

Since the inception of the party, three national conferences have been held: the first one was at Zwelitsha; the next one was in Cape Town in 1975 and in 1976, there was one held at Mdantsane.

National Conferences are usually held prior to the start of the CLA sessions.

Apart from the registration of delegates, the collection of registration fees, dealing with matters affecting the Constitution and catering for public addresses, the National Conference adopts resolutions. At the 1974 conference, the following resolutions, amongst others, were adopted:-

"There were too few police stations at Mdantsane; The 3rd Class pass in Std. VI had to be abolished; More clinics and ambulance services had to be established. 'Indentured' migratory labour had to be abolished. More land was requested and more bridges had to be constructed".

A system of processing these resolutions was in use. Resolutions from the various regions and branches were condensed into one list and then tabled before the National Conference for consideration.

The National Executive consists of the following who are elected from amongst the delegates at the National Conference:-

The National leader; The National Chairman and Deputy Chairman; The General Secretary and Organising Secretary; The party Information Officer and the Treasurer.

v) The Leadership

The National Leader is endowed with extensive powers such as

"Making decisions about the party policy and to publicise them".

There is no indication in the Constitution that the National Leader should act in accordance with the advice and wishes of the other officials. In other words the concept of collective leadership is not catered for.

The leadership of the CNIP is presently experiencing difficult times : a rift threatens to appear between the Mdantsane group led by Siyo, the Minister of Health in the Ciskei Government on the one hand, and Sebe and the other members of the leadership on the other (Daily Dispatch: 4. 3. 77). The leadership of Sebe has been blamed for the crisis (Daily Dispatch: 11. 3. 77).

According to information received, the following events are alleged to be at the bottom of the crisis:-

- i) It is alleged that some members of the CNIP leadership (Siyo and others in Mdantsane) accepted an offer of a bribe from outside (this is presumed to be the Transkei). These gentlemen were set the task of removing Sebe at the No- confidence debate in the 1977 session of the CLA. If Sebe was defeated, a new Cabinet would have to be established and such a government would be led by Chief Burns-Ncamashe. (Daily Dispatch: 25. 3. 77). This new Cabinet would work towards the realisation of the Ciskei-Transkei amalgamation.
- ii) It was alleged that Mr. Siyo, the Minister of Health had lost the confidence of the people in Mdantsane, not only as a result of the part he was alleged to have played in the plot, but also as a result of his role in the distribution of licences (trade) in Mdantsane. Corrupt practices have also been allegedly committed by the Mdantsane township council.
- iii) Siyo and Lamani, the CNIP Chief Whip in the CLA who also featured prominently in the bribe story, had a vote of no-confidence passed in them during the National Conference held at Uitenhage (Daily Dispatch: 22. 4. 77). For strategic purposes, Sebe avoided stern and direct action against Siyo and company. Sebe has also refrained from taking any action against these men, because the Siyo group refused to hand over the books and financial records of the party and also threatened to institute litigation against the Sebe group for conducting unconstitutional party elections (Imvo Zabantsundu: 2. 5. 77).
- iv) Before the CLA session started, it was openly speculated that Siyo would be dismissed from the Cabinet. But Sebe did not act according to these

speculations, though the breach between him and Siyo had not healed. But immediately after the CLA session, Siyo was 'demoted' in a Cabinet reshuffle to the less important post of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. (Daily Dispatch: 24. 5. 77). The demotion must be viewed as part of Sebe's limiting of Siyo's power.

The latest development in the Sebe-Siyo conflict, was the dismissal of Siyo from the Cabinet (Daily Dispatch: 24. 6. 77). This has virtually brought the rift between Sebe and Siyo into the open. The CNIP has now been divided into two groups.

vi) Activities of the party

Apart from political recruitment and the control of the government, the party has taken part in such activities as the rally. The rally is a cross between a prayer meeting and a conventional party meeting. During a rally, prayers are said, hymns are sung and speeches made. The speeches are interrupted by shouts of the party salute 'bopha' meaning tie or bind together and raised hands with linked fingers indicating a chain.

Usually, the words of a hymn are changed and names of present leaders of the party and current events are substituted. This was reminiscent of the fifties when the Defiance Campaign of the ANC was at its height. The message of the songs then was directed at the white ruling regime, but the songs in the homeland elections conveyed messages that were directed at the other Africans. During the fifties, people would sing, for example, a song with the following message:-

"Verwoerd, Malan or Strydom set Africa free".

but today the songs carry such messages as:-

'Mtoba or Mabandla leave Sebe alone'

During the fifties the Congress had a salute: 'Mayibuyi Afrika' (Africa must be returned) at the same time the right hand fist with the thumb pointing backwards would be raised. The present day homeland based CNIP's salute is 'bopha' at the same time the fingers are linked indicating a chain.

The rally is usually preceded by a motorcade. Women are expected to appear in 'traditional' dress.

The party policy is explained and new members are recruited. The rally is usually accompanied by much pomp and grandeur, feasting and singing.

Apart from participating in rallies, members of the party have also to take part in a National Conference which takes place once a year.

vii) Membership

Membership of the party is open to all Ciskeians from the age of eighteen years. The term 'Ciskeian' is borrowed from the Homeland Citizenship Act, 1970.

The party does not have any youth wing. It would appear that the youth reject the homeland politics. They are inclined to follow the black consciousness movement.

It was once alleged that the recruiting efforts of the CNIP were tribalistic. This was because of it being associated with the AmaMfengu-AmaRarabe conflict.

viii) The Party's Salute

The party's salute is a linking of the fingers, denoting a chain and the party's rallying cry is 'Bopha'. Recently, members of the ruling party have been wearing party colours in their button-holes. These colours are blue and white. These colours coincide with the official colours of the Ciskei Government. One would interpret this as an expression of a wish by the CNIP to be identified with the Government.

c. The Ciskei National Party (CNP)

This party developed from the imbokotho group of the election campaign. The imbokotho in this context means a grinding stone. The name Ciskei National Party was finally decided upon after a suggestion that the party be known as the Ciskei National Convention, was turned down.

There was the fear that such names which were associated with the organisations of the liberation movement would arouse suspicion. In a statement dated the 24. 4. 73, Chief Mabandla gave the following reasons for the formation of the party:-

- 1) The experience gained during the election campaign necessitated the formation of a political party. The experience referred to was the possibility of being faced with the activities of an organised group which aimed at winning at all costs. As a result of irregularities against the Election Proclamation R194 of 1972, litigation was instituted against this group.
- 2) The next reason flows from the first one. Being faced with a court case, the collection of funds and other legal requirements, they had to form a political party which could be used as a 'legal personality', for collecting funds and instituting legal proceedings.
- 3) The development of the Ciskei from a territorial authority to a Legislative Assembly necessitated the formation of the political party.
- 4) The formation of political parties, signified the rejection of individuals as an embodiment of proper leadership. Proper leadership was expressed in principles and ideals that were embodied in constitutions.

(Source: Mimeographed Statement by Chief Mabandla: 24. 4. 73).

1) The Policy

In this statement, Chief Mabandla also expressed the hope that the formation of the CNP would:-

"represent the aspirations of the people of the Ciskei, a party that will endeavour to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests and aspirations of the traditional leaders ... in the circumstances, we have decided to accept chieftainship as the corner-stone of our party structure ..." (Mimeographed Statement: 24. 4. 73).

The author of this statement had, unfortunately, omitted to explain what he meant by:-

- i) the conflicting interests and aspirations of the traditional leaders.
- or
- ii) in what manner the chieftainship would be made a cornerstone of the party structure.

In a subsequent, undated statement, on the 'Problems of Homeland Transition',

Chief Mabandla remarked that ...

"separate development was the only acceptable platform of expression for the blackman ..."
(Mimeographed undated statement by Chief Mabandla).

Without doubt, Chief Mabandla accepted separate development as a policy framework, unreservedly. Chief Mabandla should have made it clear that not all black people accepted these Government-created platforms.

ii) Change of Policy

The embracing of the policy of separate development by the CNP, meant that both the ruling party and the Opposition CNP espoused the same policy. As a result, there could be very little ideological difference between them.

But after the annual National Conference of the CNP which was held in May, 1974, the CNP announced the adoption of non-racialism as a policy. It was argued in support of this 'switch-over', that:-

"... the White politician's policy of separate development is unacceptable to the CNP ... if there were no job reservations, no influx control, no Immorality Act, no forceful removal of people from one place to another, the CNP would accept differentiation of people according to their races or tribes ..." (Mimeographed CNP Statement: 26. 5. 74).

Whilst this marked a change in policy on the part of the CNP, it also revealed a certain amount of inconsistency which could be interpreted as confusion in the thinking of the CNP leaders. Differentiation of any kind was wrong and unacceptable even if job reservation, the Immorality Act, influx control or the forced resettlement of blacks were removed and abolished. Fundamentally, democracy implies, inter alia, the existence of freedom of association. By this we must understand that no state must decree a man's associates, he must be free to associate with anybody with whom he wishes. Therefore for a party to claim to be non-racial and at the same time to accept racialism under different conditions is inconsistent.

The CNP embraced non-racialism which was diametrically opposed to the

policy of separate development. But the CNP owed its existence to the policy of separate development and not only that, it is also actively co-operating in legitimizing the institutions created by this policy. How can the CNP hope to implement the policy of non-racialism within a context of separate development?

In a discussion with members of the party leadership, they expressed the view that if they could seize power, they would make the homeland machinery unworkable, like the Labour Party did to the Coloured Representative Council.

The adoption of the policy of non-racialism, however, would enable the CNP to offer an alternative policy to separate development and as such be able to function as a real opposition.

iii) The Structure

The formal organisation of the CNP is as follows:-

a) Branch

A branch may be established anywhere where there are twenty or more people who desire to identify themselves with the party. In rural areas, the branch coincides with the area of jurisdiction under a chief or headman. In places where there are less than twenty people who wish to form a branch, provision is made for these people to either join a neighbouring branch or affiliate directly to the National Executive. For purposes of administration, the RSA and Ciskei are divided into regions. At each of these regions, a branch or branches of the CNP are formed. Two delegates per branch go to a regional meeting.

There are branches at the following areas:-

Zwelitsha (two); Alice (three); Mdantsane (two); Glen Grey (two) and two in the Western Cape (no particular town is mentioned where these branches are located).

Each branch has its own officials.

b) The Regional Committee

Where two or more branches exist, side by side, a Regional Committee may be formed to co-ordinate the activities of the branches.

My informant insisted on the fact that, constitutionally there was a distinction between a branch and a Regional Committee; but in practice, there was no difference between these two.

A Regional Committee has its own Executive Committee.

c) The National Executive

The National Executive is entrusted with the administrative and decision-making of the party when the national conference is not in session. The following make up the National Executive who are elected at the National Conference:-

- i) The National Leader.
- ii) The Deputy-National Leader.
- iii) The National Secretary and the Assistant Secretary.
- iv) The Treasurer.
- v) The members of the CLA who are members of the party but do not hold any official positions in the party.

d) The National Conference

This is the supreme governing body of the party. It is responsible for the making of party policy. It is composed of the following:-

- 1) The National Executive Committee.
- 2) Representatives from each region: the Chairman Secretary, and two delegates.
- 3) Party members who are CLA members, but do not hold office in the party.

Since the inception of the party, only two National Conferences have been held. Amongst the items that were discussed in the first National Conference, may be mentioned the following:-

Affirmation of the policy of non-racialism, amalgamation with the Transkei. Other resolutions included policy on sport and African Trade Unions.

iv) Activities of the Party

The party takes part in the following activities:-

i) The Rally

The rally has been discussed in detail in a preceding section. The party holds rallies more often than conferences. The host region usually invites other regions and branches including members of the National Executive.

ii)

The CNP like the other party, is involved in the nomination and assistance of candidates in fighting elections.

iii) Membership

Membership is open to all Ciskeians above the age of eighteen years. A membership card is issued upon payment of a membership fee. A membership declaration is signed on making the application. The declaration includes the taking of an oath that one will abide by the rules and Constitution of the party.

iv) Emblem and Salute

The emblem of the party is a black woman kneeling by a grinding stone. The grinding stone is associated with the task of grinding that is commonly performed in a black home. The symbolism is that the party will pulverise racialism, thus rendering it useless. The party salute is a raised fist emulating the grinding movement accompanied by the cry of 'Khulula' (make free).

v) Miscellaneous

An informant made the following observations:-

- a) In order that homeland leaders avoid alienating the black people, they should refrain from finding fault with the black consciousness movement. The black consciousness movement originated from the liberation movement of the fifties.
- b) The basic difference between the CNP and the organisations in the black consciousness movement, was that those who belonged to the latter movement, refused to have anything to do with Bantustan politics, while the CNP made use of these Government-created platforms.
- c) He was convinced that if the Opposition CNP gained control of the CLA, it would make it unworkable, as did the Coloured Labour Party in the Coloured Persons' Representative Council (CRC).
- d) It is difficult to calculate the Mdantsane-East London branch membership. Although there are 1 100 members on paper, the actual figure could be far higher or much lower, as many members failed to renew their membership and also to re-subscribe.

- e) Party organisation was far from being ideal, because:-
- i) In rural areas, for instance, nobody ever cared to renew membership. A rural branch never maintained the momentum that was present at its inception.
 - ii) In most areas the party structure shrinks as a result of apathy. Resort has been had, consequently, to committees. This means reducing the branch structure to a committee composed of those who are active. Members became motivated and activated into action when there was an election.

The following comments emerge from the preceding:-

- a) The political parties have a hierarchical structure, which emphasises the power structure of most political institutions in this country.
- b) The membership of these parties reveals interesting features: the CNP initially appeared to be a party of chiefs while the CNIP had mostly an elected membership. (Charton: 1977: ibid). Party tactics and manoeuvring have so changed the composition of the CNIP that it is now not only dependent on chiefs for survival in the CLA (Charton: 1977:ibid;) but is also led by a chief!
- c) The Constitutions of the CNIP and CNP reveal many similarities. For instance, both provide for regional committees but in both parties regional committees do not exist except in Victoria East.
- d) Both parties do not give consideration to the organisation of youth branches in their constitutions. The CNP does claim to have had a youth branch that went defunct at Glen Grey. Youth apathy towards homeland politics can be attributed to the influence of the black consciousness movement.

c. The Ciskei National Union Party

This is a newly found party. Its founder and leader is Chief Burns-Ncamashe.

This party came into being after Chief Ncamashe, the then Minister of Education in the Ciskei Government was expelled from the CNIP

caucus and then dismissed as a member of the Cabinet.

It would appear that the breach did not arise, as a result of ideological differences, because the CNUP embraces the policy of separate development.

The first signs of the rift appeared when there were to be bye-elections in the Victoria East constituency. A misunderstanding developed over the nomination of candidates and Chief Sebe as National Leader upheld a decision recognising a set of candidates not belonging to the Ncamashe camp. The breach widened and Chief Ncamashe was dismissed from the Cabinet.

This party's performance at the recent bye-elections was not of the best; it has not held many public functions except for a symposium that was held at Zwelitsha on the Ciskei-Transkei amalgamation. It is difficult to assess the membership of the party. It is possible that Chief Ncamashe, like Chief Maqoma of the AmaJingqi relies on and expects his tribe to follow him into the party (Maqoma's Installation Speech at Gontsana: 1974).

4. The Bye-Elections

As a result of the outcome of the election cases, vacancies in the CLA were created in the following constituencies:-

i) Zwelitsha

Four vacancies occurred as a result of the unseating of the following CLA members:-

Sebe, Nkontso, Sam and Nqezo.

ii) Victoria East

Four vacancies in the CLA occurred as a result of the unseating of the following:-

Maqomo, Ncamashe, Lamani and Ximiya.

a) Nominations

When the verdicts of the cases were announced, people who supported the Sebe group consoled themselves with such moral boosters as: 'the voter will decide'; and that the 'final decision will be taken at the polls'. The ruling party had by then consolidated its position as a result of, inter alia,

defeating the opposition at the Keiskammahoek bye-election: it repeated its success over the opposition at a bye-election in the Herschel area. Both CLA seats were formerly in the hands of the opposition.

The opposition was convincingly defeated at the polls in the municipal elections in the townships of Mdantsane and Zwelitsha. The CNIP had increased its majority in the CLA. Therefore when these bye-elections were held, the ruling party was enjoying a position of strength and confidence.

The nominations were as follows:-

i) Zwelitsha

The CNIP nominated Sebe, Nkontso, Sam and Nqezo while the CNP put forward Mtoba, Guzana, Rutu and Simandla.

ii) Victoria East

In the Victoria East area, nominations were as follows:-

As a result of the promotion of Maqoma and Ncamashe to the chieftainship of the AmaJingqi and AmaGwali, respectively, bye-elections had to be conducted twice: first to fill in the two vacancies caused by the promotions and secondly, to fill the vacancies caused by the unseating of Lamani and Ximiya as a result of the election.

At the time the bye-elections were to take place in the Victoria East area, a crack in the CNIP ranks had appeared. A misunderstanding between the Lamani-Maqoma group on the one hand and Burns-Ncamashe on the other hand, had developed. This came to a head when nominations for the bye-elections were made.

In the nominations for the first bye-election, Chief Ncamashe presented a set of candidates from his followers. One of these candidates was his wife but he withdrew her name on the final nomination day. His set of candidates included the following:-

Dikana and Mabele.

The CNP nominated Matakane and Makuleni while the Lamani-Maqoma group of the CNIP nominated Qupe and Fani.

The normal procedure for nomination in the CNIP is that candidates are sorted out at branch level and when finality has been reached, the names are sent to the Regional Committee (where this exists). The Regional Committee forwards the names to the National Executive, which rejects or confirms the nominations.

In the present misunderstanding, the nominations could be regarded as the culminating point in a situation which was characterised by misunderstanding between Ncamashe on the one hand and Lamani-Maqoma on the other hand. Ncamashe had become unpopular, not only with the Victoria East group but also with the whole CNIP leadership. He was being criticized for being unable to work in harmony with the others.

On the other hand, the Ncamashe group had had enough of the Lamani's, Maqoma's and the Ximiya's who would never attend a single meeting unless it was held in Port Elizabeth. Consequently, the nomination dispute was referred to the National Executive for a decision. Sebe, the National Leader favoured the Maqoma-Lamani group by upholding their nomination. This action did not deter Ncamashe from putting forward his own candidates.

The nominations for the second bye-election in the Victoria East area, were as follows:-

<u>CNIP (Lamani Group)</u>	<u>CNIP (Ncamashe)</u>	<u>CNP</u>
Lamani	Ndindwa	Swartbooi
Ximiya	Gamanda	Linda
		Ngaka

b) Results of the Bye-election

As the voters prepared to go to the polls to decide who would win the seats in the Zwelitsha and Victoria East areas, interest and speculation was keen. It was clear that the CNIP would win but the growing question was, was the result of the polls going to vindicate the cause of the CNIP?

As we had described earlier, the Government had successfully entrenched itself while the Opposition party was taking steps backwards. The conditions were not the same as at the time of the general election. In its self-

entrenching campaign, the Ciskei Government, it is alleged to have insisted that ...

Voters should vote for the Government that would bring freedom and progress; this was our Government; Our Government will provide more amenities; it will increase pensions; provide more land; increase the salaries of civil servants; more houses would be built; vote for the man your Government gives you. (I observed the campaigns).

The impact on the electorate was tremendous; the dividing line between the Government and the CNIP had become blurred, and on the other hand, the CNP had been painted as jealous and as people desiring the downfall of a Government that would bring freedom and progress. The Opposition had no effective answer to these tactics. Moreover, during the election campaign, the CNIP candidates received assistance from the Government in the form of personnel and vehicles. (Records of CLA Debates: 1975). The results were as follows:-

BYE-ELECTION RESULTS: ZWELITSHA

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Bye-Election Results</u>	<u>General Election</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Sebe	47 591	42 095	+ 5 496
Nqezo	47 011	38 821	+ 8 190
Nkontso	46 655	37 963	+ 8 690
Sam	46 636	35 878	1 758 *
Mtoba	5 188	30 533	-25 345
Guzana	5 478	25 457	-19 979
Putu	4 630	-----	
Simandla	4 259		

In the 1973 general election, the Sebe group beat the Mtoba group by a lead of 53 215 votes. This lead was increased in 1975 to 168 338. Some of the following factors might have contributed towards this state of affairs:-

- i) Political party influence.
- ii) Being associated with the Government party.
- iii) The effect of the electoral petition.
- iv) Association with Sebe as Chief Minister.

Figures indicated that both on the individual and group level, the Mtoba group received a drubbing.

In the general election, for instance, Mtoba had polled 30 533 votes but in 1975 he polled a mere 5 188 votes. Guzana likewise, polled 25 457 votes in 1973 but in 1975, he polled only 5 478!

BYE-ELECTION RESULTS: VICTORIA EAST

i) First bye-election

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Results</u>
<u>CNIP (Lamani Group)</u>	
Qupe	22 057
Fani	21 884
<u>CNP</u>	
Matakane	7 994
Makuleni	7 508
<u>Ncamashe Group</u>	
Dikana	3 922
Mabele	3 425

(Source: Ciskei Official Gazette: No. 85: 12.9.75).

ii) Second bye-election

<u>CNIP (Lamani Group)</u>	
Lamani	34 503
Ximiya	34 362
<u>CNP</u>	
Swartbooi	5 708
Linda	4 027
Ngaka	2 446
<u>Ncamashe Group</u>	
Ndindwa	2 430
Gamanda	1 946

(Source: Ciskei Official Gazette: No. 89: 24.10.75).

The results of the bye-election revealed, inter alia, that

- i) The CNIP had maintained its majorities in the

two electoral divisions. In the Zwelitsha area the majority had increased while in Victoria East there was a discernible decrease in the majority. Various reasons contributed to this apparent decrease. The rank and file of the CNIP was faced with a possible split as a result of a misunderstanding between the CNIP leadership in the Victoria East area. This resulted in the two sets of candidates: the Lamani group on the one hand and the Ncamashe group on the other hand, splitting the vote. The fighting and misunderstandings within the party might have scared prospective voters away.

Despite all that, Lamani and Ximiya, together polled 68 865 votes while their opponents (the CNP and the Ncamashe group) together polled 16 557 votes. That was about 24% of the total votes polled by Lamani and Ximiya together. On the other hand, the other CNIP candidates in this area namely: Qupe and Fani (Lamani group) polled a total of 43 941 votes while the CNP and the Ncamashe group together polled 22 849. The lead was 20 052 votes! Matakane, a veteran CNP candidate who campaigned in the 1973 general election and polled 13 803 votes, could not repeat that performance in the 1975 bye-election. He had to be satisfied with only 7 994!

- ii) It is sometimes said that no one wishes to associate with a losing side. This has been true of the opposition. This party started on the losing path when at first it lost at the Keiskammahoek bye-election: this was followed by a defeat at the township elections at Zwelitsha and Mdantsane. The CNP lost again at the Herschel bye-election and then the bye-elections at Zwelitsha and Victoria East. The Opposition party had been losing support in the Assembly as well!

When voting for the position of Chief Minister took place, Chief Sebe was re-elected by 29-13 votes over the late Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile of the AmaRarabe.

Before nominations for this position took place, it was openly speculated that Chief Burns-Ncamashe would stand for election. Information was that members of the Opposition party had offered to support his candidature. Unfortunately, Chief Ncamashe preferred to 'wait for his death' rather than adopt a fighting stand. Consequently, he refused to contest the position and add fuel to the fire!

Informed sources maintained that if Chief Ncamashe had contested the

position of Chief Minister, he would have 'died' a more honourable political death than by having to wait, meekly, for the Sebe's and the Siyo to chop his head off.

What prompted Chief Mabandla to stand down as candidate for the position of Chief Minister and allow the late paramount chief to stand, is still a subject for speculation. Did he hope that the person and status of the paramount chief would attract the loyalty of the other chiefs and induce them to vote for a 'brother chief' against a commoner?

The actual results disproved his calculations, but also proved that party loyalties were stronger than loyalties to traditional statuses.

This once again demonstrated how the chieftainship could be used as a political pawn!

5. (a) Comparison of the CNIP and the CNP

We have seen how political parties have emerged from ad hoc groups formed to facilitate and promote the campaigning of candidates during the Ciskei general and bye-elections. These parties have taken shape to such an extent as to have contributed to the division of the CLA into the ruling party and the opposition parties.

In this section I wish to draw attention to a comparison of these parties in relation to their manifestos. Their manifestoes were the basis on which they had to face the electorate.

Both manifestoes show great consideration and promise to bring about educational reforms. While the Mabandla group directs its appeal to the Ciskeians generally, on educational matters, the Sebe group, on the other hand, not only directs their appeal to all Ciskeians but woos the teachers and inspectors by promising promotion on merit and not on racial lines. This is interesting because, I was informed that just before the Ciskei General Elections, the Ciskei Government was accused of making inspectorial promotions on ethnic lines. At the time of the elections, there was a general complaint among teachers about a lack of a teachers' association which would enjoy official recognition. That is why Mr. Sebe promised to encourage the formation of such an association that would

be consulted by the Education Department on educational matters.

About chieftainship, the Mabandla group promised that:

"... we shall always dedicate ourselves to preserve the office of chieftainship, and to promote the traditional system of authority, whilst observing democratic norms as the most equitable form of modern government..."
(Mimeographed statement of Policy and principles issued by Mabandla in 1973, February).

Whereas, on the other hand, the Sebe group promised, not only a protection of the chieftaincy but also improved salaries and conditions of service.

On the question of agriculture, the Mabandla group makes vague and general references to 'scientific agricultural methods'. Sebe on the other hand makes concrete promises of state assistance to hardworking and distressed farmers.

Where Mabandla talks of providing 'suitable sports facilities' and 'suitable centres of entertainment', Sebe crystallizes his point by promising to employ "more social workers" ... to 'encourage such sporting activities as boxing, dancing etc' to reduce the crime rate.

Mabandla promises to abolish the "means test" applied to people seeking pensions. The main criticism about this is that the concept of a 'means test' may not be understood by everybody. Sebe on the other hand, realises that pensioners would be interested in the betterment of their grants. For that reason, he promises to increase pension and disability grants.

About townships, Mabandla was once more too abstract. He promised to improve conditions in 'already existing townships'. Sebe's concrete approach mentions cinemas and parks; swimming pools; improvement of street lighting and the construction of better roads.

Mabandla's stand on African political rights, the rights of Africans in white urban areas, the right of African medical doctors and lawyers to set up practices in white urban areas and the establishment of workers associations, is not clearly defined.

Some of this has to be inferred from his talk about independence. Sebe on

the other hand, promises to fight for equal political rights; the protection of the right of Africans to remain in white urban areas; to fight for the right of African medical doctors and lawyers to put up practices in white urban areas and the right of the African.

b. Success Attained in Implementing Points raised in Election Manifesto

An investigation to show the extent to which Sebe had been successful in implementing the items of his election manifesto, is fraught with many problems.

The Ciskei as a homeland, has been created to fulfill a definite purpose. The RSA Government allocates to homeland governments, in this case, the Ciskei large sums of money to facilitate to fulfilment of the purpose for which the homeland was established. Look, for example, at the following figures:-

For the financial year 1975/6:

Own Resources amounted to R7, 131, 000 or 20, 7%
 RSA Govt Subsidy " " R27, 352, 000 or 79, 3%.

(Source: Benbo: 1975: p. 64).

The availability of these funds makes it possible for the Ciskei Government to carry out its programmes. These programmes must however enjoy the approval of the RSA Government. We find the following comment appropriate:-

"He undertook to improve the status and emoluments of chiefs and headmen, public servants, medical personnel, farmers and workers. Whenever it was possible for them to take the initiative, the Ciskei Government has honoured these promises ..." (Charton: 1977: Address: "The Problems of New Legislatures with special reference to the Ciskei Legislative Assembly").

A detailed discussion of this manifesto will throw more light on what Sebe has or has not achieved.

2. Political rights and privileges

The promise of 'equal political rights, privileges and treatment' has not

been realised beyond what the semi-autonomous status allows. The activities of police surveillance have not spared or respected any human dignity. The banning, banishment and actual arrest of Ciskeians has continued unabated.

The Ciskei Government has very little, if any sympathy towards members of the black consciousness movement (CLA Debates: 1975). Personal freedom has been further eroded by the banishment of a Mdantsane lawyer (Daily Dispatch: 31. 12. 74). Further examples of the Ciskei Government's sensitivity to criticism, is the attitude of the Government towards the Opposition party, civil servants and teachers who sympathise with the Opposition get transferred or demoted.

The working conditions and salaries of chiefs and headmen have been improved. (Charton: op cit). But full authority for township councils was never granted. Instead the Government interfered in civic matters by openly sponsoring pro-ruling party sympathisers to stand as candidates in the local elections for the township councils (see Chapter on the Party Activity in urban Areas).

The struggle for more land in the Ciskei was lost when the Ciskei lost the Glen Grey and Herschel areas to the Transkei as a result of the consolidation proposals. The area excised and ceded to the Transkei was larger than the compensatory area gained by the Ciskei (Record of CLA Debates: Special Session: 1975). The promises to the civil servants were met in the form of improvement to salaries and conditions of employment and facilities for study leave.

Education

Salaries and working conditions for teachers have been improved. Facilities for studying have also been made available. A system of in-service training has been introduced and the Ciskei Government tried to establish as many schools as possible. Compulsory education has been introduced.

Health Services

A very big hospital had been opened at Mdantsane. This hospital was

built even before the Sebe Government came into power. The Ciskei Government has recently taken over the Department of Health. There are still many rural villages that are desperately in need of health services. The expansion of the services could also be hampered by the shortage of medical doctors.

Social Services

One cinema had been erected at Mdantsane, swimming pools have also been constructed at Mdantsane and Zwelitsha. The townships in which improvements have been concentrated are Zwelitsha and Mdantsane. Even in these townships, there are roads that are impassable when wet; street lighting is inadequate. Gangsterism has not been reduced, let alone prevented.

7. Agriculture and Forestry

Co-operative farming has not been defined but on the other hand there has been development of co-operatives which are establishments which are owned and run by Ciskeians with Government assistance. Ciskeian farmers are assisted in buying on credit and at lower prices, such things as seeds, implements, fertilizers and insecticides only in the Keiskammahoek area.

A scheme had been started at Keiskammahoek where farmers are subsidised. Whether this scheme will be successful or not, remains to be seen.

8. Stimulation of the Economy

Mining activities do not exist. Industrial development inside the Ciskei has been very slow. It takes place on an agency basis. Development has been facilitated by the XDC. About R109,005 worth of industrial buildings and housing for white personnel has been invested by the XDC in undertakings at Sada and Dimbaza. (Benbo: 1975: 43). Most industries are founded outside the Ciskei at such places as the East London-Berlin-King William's Town industrial complex (Benbo: op. cit.: p. 45).

The Ciskei Government has been caught on the horns of a dilemma where concerning the creation of employment opportunities ...

"In order to create employment opportunities, the Ciskei Government must attract industry, and in this they compete with the other homelands. Low wages are an incentive to industries. The Government is therefore caught in a bind. If they use what influence they have to push for higher wages, they may discourage more industry from coming to the Ciskei..." (Charton: 1977: ibid).

For the same reason, the formation of trade unions had been discouraged as being evil. Instead the formation of liaison committees has been encouraged.

In several strikes that broke out in the Border area, the Ciskei Government acted as 'peace-makers' (Daily Dispatch: 1. 8. 74 also Die Oosterlig: 30. 7. 74).

9. Relations with other Governments

Good relations between the RSA and the Ciskei exist. But, there has been a misunderstanding between the Transkei and the Ciskei Governments. This had developed over the question of amalgamation between these two homelands.

Pensions and disability grants have been improved.

Internal Relations

These are far from being cordial. Party politics introduced hostile camps. As a result of the introduction into politics of the ethnic dimension, interpersonal as well as inter-associational relations have been affected. In a survey of voluntary associations in Zwelitsha, it was revealed that the party political influence effect on the one teacher's association had a bad effect on the attendance. Members failed to attend the meetings and other activities of the association because a CNIP-CNP conflict had developed within the members. At Mdantsane, a man who had been an official of a sports body had to resign after he discovered that the other members had become hostile towards him because he belonged to the CNP while they were members of the CNIP.

Another aspect of interest in this dichotomy is lack of tolerance one for the other. In a survey of attitudes at Mdantsane, we probed into whether

a person would accept a friend or a relative or a member of the family to belong in a political party not his, in other words, an opposition. The majority of replies would not tolerate opposition in politics. Only a very small number would tolerate such. This they regarded as freedom of choice and thought.

The effect of political parties on traditional institutions has been dealt with in the chapter on The Political Party Activity in Rural Areas. This was inevitable because the traditional institutions represent an out-going and out-moded tribal life and do not deserve to be maintained at all costs.

Because what the Bantu Authorities system sought was to build on the traditional institution, it sought to entrench them even against the modernising effects of urbanisation. Political parties enhance the modernising trend consequently, the political parties and the traditional institutions are not complementary but contradictory.

Finally, I wish to make this clear that those voters who see their promises fulfilled may readily relate to the Ciskei Government and accordingly accept it as legitimate. This may be true with those groups such as the farmers (at the Keiskammahoek scheme and perhaps Mpekweni) and perhaps the middle class. But those voters who felt that the Government had failed to carry out its promises may not readily relate to the Government. This group may be ready to attribute anything that happens as the fault of the Ciskei Government. They may not see the RSA Government behind such schemes as the excision of Glen Grey and Herschel.

Both these versions are common to people who have accepted the Bantustan policy and not relate it to the general pattern of oppression of blacks by whites. If the Bantustan policy is viewed as part and parcel of the general plan of oppression, the Ciskei Government may be seen for what it is - an instrument in the hands of oppressors. It has no decisions of its own. It is merely carrying out the oppressors' plan. If there are groups whose interests and aspirations get satisfied, that suits the oppressors plan because the more satisfaction he can create in the groups, the readily his plans will be accepted! Take for instance the Africanisation of the bureaucracy in the Ciskei. This is the application of separate development. Employment must be according to merit. Colour should not influence employment!

6. Conclusion

The foregoing is a graphic description of the political parties that emerged in the Ciskei. These political parties were a product of legislative enactments. They have, therefore, a definite purpose to fulfill; this means that we cannot view these parties in isolation, they must be viewed against the background of the general oppression pattern. With this in mind, we must proceed to outline the functions which these parties have to fulfill:-

- i) They supplied the personnel other than those that were there ex officio, to serve on the CLA. The CLA is aimed at providing a channel of communication for the interests and aspirations of the Ciskeians.
- ii) These parties not only mobilise public opinion in the Ciskei, but also facilitate the articulation and aggregation of the interests and aspirations of the Ciskeians.
- iii) They also facilitate the creation of platforms from which the Ciskeians can voice their demands. These parties operate within the Ciskei. This means that their function is only in relation to institutions in the Ciskei.
- iv) Flowing from that point, it becomes essential to note that the main function of these parties is to legitimize Bantustan institutions. (Charton: 1977: Unpublished address on "The Problems of New Legislatures ...").
- v) Consequently these parties promote good relations between the RSA and the Ciskei.

The effectiveness of these parties depend, inter alia, on the following:-

- a) Over a short term their effectiveness will be devoted to gaining legitimacy for the Bantustan institutions. If, over a long term, the demands of the Ciskeians have not been met, such as, for instance, for more land, equal political and economic opportunities, freedom of movement, frustration will set in.
- b) The existence of such movements as black consciousness presents constant threat to the legitimacy of homeland parties. It is interesting to note that headquarters of the Ciskei Government are Zwelitsha. This movement has,

either by accident or purposely made Zwelitsha its headquarters for the Eastern Cape. I should not be surprised if the failure of these political parties to attract the youth was a result of the influence this movement had on the youth.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Five

Page 160	Para 1	Line 9:	'or is their visit to' should read 'or was their penetration of'
" 170	" 1	" 3:	'Complied' should read 'comply'
" 171	" 1	" 2:	'On the' should read 'in the '
	" 4	" 7-7:	'Native, about Imfengu and that about Umxhosa' should read 'native, about ImFengu and uMxhosa'
" 176	" 2	" 9:	'has either' should read 'had either'
" 178	" 2	" 2:	'and as' should read 'that as'
" 180	" 4	" 3:	'Amongst' should read 'amongst'
" 183	" 3	" 5:	'inside and/or inside' should read 'inside and/or outside'
" 185	" 2	" 12:	'promised with increases' should read 'promised increases'

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITY IN THE RURAL AREAS

In this chapter the intrusion of political parties in the Ciskei rural areas will be considered in relation to the following:

- i) Party politics and their effect on the relationship between the existing political structures and personal relations (the headman, chiefs, tribal authorities and the inkundla).
- ii) Would the political party intrusion in the rural areas affect the existing personal relationships within associations?
- iii) Would the political parties establish their presence in the rural areas or is their visit to the rural areas for specific purposes only?

1. THE SITUATION OF GOBOZANA

Gobozana lies in a north-westerly direction, about 15 km from the Grahamstown-King William's Town road. The village lies on the ridge of a hill below which run the following streams: the Gobozana stream runs in an easterly direction; the Cacadu in a northerly direction and the Mdiza in a westerly direction. These streams mark the boundaries of the village as well (Government Notice No. 1085 of the 19th July, 1957). According to official correspondence, Gobozana is village No. 47 in the list of locations in the magisterial district of King William's Town.

1.1 Socio-economic Conditions

Gobozana is divided into a residential area, the fields and four grazing camps. Water is very scarce. There are no dams for conserving water; there are two windmills but only one is in working order. The one that is in working order is situated at the extreme end of the village. The villagers depend on water from open stagnant pools. Some homesteads have devised a way of conserving their own water by excavating holes near their homes and lead water into these 'dams' and have them covered.

There are 299 homesteads in the residential area. Each homestead has a vegetable plot, a cattle kraal and two or more huts or a western-type

of dwelling house (there are very few of these). Grass roofing has been replaced by iron roofing.

The fields consist of the following:-

- i) Two $7\frac{1}{2}$ morgen plots: one is owned by the young prince (inkosana) and the other belongs to the headman. The nkosana maintains that holding a $7\frac{1}{2}$ morgen plot is a privilege that is enjoyed by chiefs and headmen only; this then is proof that he is chief.
- ii) The other plots vary from $3\frac{3}{4}$ to 1 morgen in size.

The proportion of plots to the number of homesteads tells a story of a landless peasantry. Overcrowding is common and consequently the off-spring of villagers are encouraged to seek sites elsewhere. The population statistics for the village are:-

- i) In 1951, there were about 758 people of whom 325 were males while 433 were females. (Hammond-Tooke, 1958, p. 53).
- ii) The 1970 census showed that there were 1 080 people at Gobozana - no male/female breakdown is available. (Ethnological Publications: No. 53 of 1975, p. 3).

Over a period of nineteen years, the total population increase at the village has been 322 persons or 18 per cent, approximately, one per cent increase per annum. This is a clear indication of the effects of migrant labour on the rural areas. The males as heads of families are absent: a survey has revealed that the rural population is mainly composed of aged and infirm men and there are a great number of females and children (Benbo, 1975, p. 25). Gobozana as part of this rural area, suffers from the consequences of this male deficient population. Interest and enthusiasm are important determinants for the establishment and maintenance of associations in a community. In a community composed mainly of aged and infirm males, women and children, can we expect to find sufficient interest and enthusiasm to support the associational life of a community? This raises a pertinent problem for the political parties because it is they that will require an active leadership from the community to support any permanent structure the political parties may decide to establish in the rural area. The rural areas have been deprived of the opportunities of being influenced by the mass-membership organisations of the 50's and 60's, which have operated mostly in urban areas. Old men who, perhaps in their migrancy, might have come into

contact with these organisations, are now unable to take up any leading positions because of age. For the sake of survival, would the political parties relegate the leadership to women? This would be out of step in a rural village where women occupy a back seat.

Gobozana depends, to a large extent, on agricultural produce. Maize, pumpkins, beans, peas and squash are grown during the summer season when there are rains. During winter, when the rains are scarce, crop-growing is at its lowest. The greatest handicap to progress in agriculture is, perhaps, lack of water and the fact that there is no Agricultural Extension Officer at Gobozana. As a result of this state of affairs, people at Gobozana rely very heavily on migrant earnings. Some informal trading takes place, but this is negligible because only a few can afford to put things out for sale.

1.2 External Relations

Gobozana is predominantly AmaMfengu of the AmaZizi clan. It lies in a tribal territory that belongs to ImiDushane, a tribal unit that belongs to the AmaRarabe clans. Gobozana is one of 19 villages that constitute the Tribal Authority of the ImiDushane (see Proclamation 313 of 1. 3. 57 issued under the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951).

Being a member of the Tribal Authority of the ImiDushane makes Gobozana a subject of the ImiDushane, and as such owes allegiance to the ImiDushane chief at Tamacha. But the people of Gobozana refuse to acknowledge this allegiance. They maintain that they owe allegiance to their chief at Gobozana, although this chief is not recognised by the law of the country.

The people at Gobozana were placed in the position in which they are by historical reasons: Gobozana was founded by a man called Xengxe who, though not appearing in the ruling line of the chiefs of the AmaZizi, is shown in geneological charts as being of royal descent (Soga: 1930: 424; Kawa: 1929: 72-3). This man is said to have executed some duties for the chief of the ImiDushane and as a reward for his services, was allowed to settle on the present site of Gobozana. Xengxe, on finding sufficient pasturage and land, encouraged a relative of his, Ngqwele, to start a settlement at a place which was named after him. The people

living at Ngqwele belong to the AmaZizi clan and, according to information, paid allegiance to Xengxe. Old residents of Ngqwele still regard Gobozana as their Komkhulu (Great Place). They refuse to accept Tamacha as the legitimate Komkhulu. To them this was as a result of the nefarious manoeuvres of the ImiDushane, just as the ImiDushane chiefs had been the first to accept the Rehabilitation Scheme recommendations.

The unfortunate part is that when the boundaries of the ImiDushane tribal territory were defined, nothing was mentioned of this transaction and consequently, Gobozana and Ngqwele were included within the boundaries and jurisdiction of the ImiDushane. When asked about this the chief of the ImiDushane, Chief P. Z. Siwani, maintained that Xengxe was allowed to settle on the said land as a headman subordinate to the ImiDushane.

Informants from the village of Gobozana, maintain that the Chief of the ImiDushane had promised to mention the existence of the Gobozana chieftainship to the authorities during the period of the application of the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 in the Ciskei when chieftainships were being resuscitated. Despite all this, Gobozana still claims that their chief is at Gobozana. According to them, men who have been headmen cum chiefs have been in the Xengxe family until after the death of Blaai.

A geneological tree of the Xengxe family will reveal the following descent line. (See over)

According to information, the line of descent in the Xengxe family is as follows:

Xengxe had two wives. The issue of the first wife was MAGWXALISA who left for the Transkei. The issue of the second wife was SINA who succeeded his father in the throne.


Sina had one wife who bore him three sons: BLAAI, MPUKU and DYASI. The elder, Blaai succeeded his father.

Blaai had two wives. One of his wives bore him a son, DODO. The sex of the other children is not known. But it is agreed that Dodo was the rightful heir.

Dodo had three wives. MPUMELELI was the issue of the great house and he became heir.

Mpumeleli had one wife. Five children were born of this house. ZIBANE is the eldest and heir.

Genealogical Tree of the Xengxe



1) Information collected during interview

The situation has resulted in dissatisfaction and resentment between Gobozana and Tamacha. The people at Gobozana had decided to take up the matter on their own. They have brought the matter to the attention of the Committee of the AmaMfengu Celebrations. This Committee includes such 'dignitaries' of the AmaMfengu as Chief Mabandla. A fund was established at Gobozana to enable men from the village to travel to Cape Town in search of documents entitling them to the site of Gobozana.

The people at Gobozana believe that the Tamacha chief deliberately omitted to mention the Gobozana chiefdom to the authorities because the

Tamacha chief stands to benefit from their subordinate position: Gobozana has to pay tribal dues (Amahlamvu) to Tamacha. Another disadvantage emanating from this position of subordination is that work-seekers from Gobozana who are registered under the Tribal Labour Bureau at Tamacha, are said to receive attention only after the interests and needs of the work-seekers at Tamacha have been satisfied.

A story of an incident at the Great Place of the ImiDushane, is related. There was a feast in honour of the ImiDushane chief's promotion to the post of a Cabinet Minister in the Ciskei Government. All villages under the ImiDushane were to contribute amahlamvu towards the catering for the feast. Gobozana made her contribution. On the day of the feast, people from Gobozana were overlooked and not accorded their 'share' of the festivities. No explanation was given and consequently, Gobozana felt offended. To them, this was a deliberate snub because they were 'amaMfengu'.

It is against this background that we have to view the relationship between Gobozana and Tamacha. The following conclusion can be drawn from the foregoing:-

- a) Relationships between Gobozana and Tamacha have become strained.
- b) As a result of this strained and tense relationship, communication between Gobozana and Tamacha has been impaired, rendering the passage of input/output difficult.
- c) The fact that Gobozana is Mfengu within a Rarabe enclave, arouses ethnic sympathies which were revived in the present AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict.

This tribal conflict, as has been explained earlier, is rooted in the early history of the Ciskei (Moyer, 1971) but has been used by political parties as political 'stickers' by means of which the people are divided into two camps: one for the IMBOKOTHO the CNP and the other for the IKHONCO the CNIP (Breytenbach, 1974, p. 45). This tense and strained relationship between Gobozana and Tamacha has motivated Gobozana to desire the recognition of her chieftainship.

1.3 Internal Structure of the Village

A. The Headman

The headman is a Government paid official whose appointment must enjoy the confidence and approval of the community. Since the intrusion of party politics into the politics of the Ciskei, the appointment of headmen has been affected by party politics. The ruling party in the Ciskei uses the appointment of headmen to reward its supporters. At one village in the Ciskei, a serving headman was dismissed from his position on the allegation that the headman had behaved rudely and disrespectfully towards his Chief.¹ The chief belongs to the CNIP while the headman belongs to the CNP. When the case was investigated, no proof was found to support the accusation that the headman had been disrespectful and rude. The accusation was a pretext for dismissing him - and a pro-CNIP man was appointed to the position. Where a headman had been installed against the wishes of the community, the people invariably 'swallow' the appointment against their wishes. They accept that the choice is legal since it is the Government's choice which may not be opposed. The people believe implicitly that the Government has the power to force an appointment on the village.

While no special qualifications are necessary for the position of a headman, the ability to read and write is seen as being essential because the headman is expected not only to be able to read with understanding official correspondence, but must also be able to communicate such information to the people of the village. The position of the headman carries much responsibility with it but the remuneration for headmen is not commensurate. The headman at Gobozana supplements his headman's salary with pension benefits he obtained from his retirement as a constable. This allows him to live comfortably.

The headman at Gobozana was educated as far as Std IV. He was employed as police constable by the SAP and SAR until he retired on pension. The knowledge the headman gained as 'policeman' has become useful to him now that he is a headman.

We have mentioned earlier that the first headman of Gobozana belonged to

1. Information obtained during an interview.

the royal clan of Gobozana. The headmanship remained in this royal clan until after the death of headman Blaai. The people at Gobozana regarded headman Blaai, not as a headman, but as a Chief: he enjoyed the respect and dignity due to a chief. This did not please the Tamacha administration which maintained that there could not be two chiefs within the tribal territory of the ImiDushane. Hence headman Blaai was summoned to appear before the Tribal Authority at the ImiDushane where he was told to desist from maintaining a chief's court at Gobozana. After the death of headman Blaai, the headmanship was awarded outside the Xengxe royal clan. The present headman is a distant relative of the nkosana. This relationship has inspired the headman to want to work hard for the restoration of the chieftainship. As, of course, the restoration of the chieftainship would ensure village autonomy and the end of the Tamacha control.

Informants maintain that the appointment of the present headman enjoyed the approval of the community at Gobozana. This contributed greatly to the respect and trust the headman enjoys in the community.

A successful headman is one who has the interests of his people at heart. This is indeed true of the present headman at Gobozana. The headman's greatest ambitions include, inter alia, some of the following:-

- i) To achieve the liberation of Gobozana from Tamacha domination;
- ii) The recognition of the Gobozana chieftainship; and
- iii) To secure for Gobozana better educational and health services.

On first assuming office, the headman found the school at Gobozana housed in only two classrooms. Today the school, through his initiative is accommodated in eight classrooms and not only that, but also the school had been promoted to the status of a combined lower and higher primary school. Towards the recognition of the local chieftainship, the headman has brought the presence of the young nkosana (prince) to the notice of the Tamacha administration. The headman applied for permission for the young nkosana to attend the celebrations of the AmaMfengu as a chief. The young nkosana is the great grandson of headman Blaai who was a descendant of the founder of Gobozana. The celebrations of the AmaMfengu take place annually under the auspices of the Committee Organising the Celebrations of AmaMfengu. The purpose of these celebrations is the commemoration

of the 'emancipation' of the AmaMfengu from bondage under the AmaRarabe. The Tamacha chief granted permission on the understanding that such a request would not backlash in that the nkosana's appearance at the Celebrations should not be construed as consisting official recognition of his status as chief at Gobozana. The headman has been instrumental in the establishment of a fund to finance the delegation to Cape Town where it would find out the whereabouts of the title deeds to the site on which Gobozana stands. Unlikely though, the success of their attempt may be the belief and commitment of the people to their mission, underline the strength of their desire for autonomy.

Previous headmen of the village were notorious for embezzlement of funds belonging to the public. When the present headman assumed office he instituted the practice of issuing receipts for monies received and each of the sub-headmen kept a record of monies collected in the area under his jurisdiction.

The duties of a headman include, inter alia, being a 'link' and a 'go-between' between the village and the Government, the Government being represented by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner at Zwelitsha. The headman is also a 'link' between the Tribal Authority and the village. He is also a link between his village and other villages. As 'go-between' and 'link' between the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, the headman is expected to bring to the notice of his village instructions and regulations issued by the Government. The headman has to channel complaints and grievances of the people through either the Bantu Affairs Commissioner or the Tribal Authority to the Government. As a link between his village and the other villages, the headman receives and disseminates through the village council announcements of funeral services, wedding feasts, to name only a few, from other villages. He is expected to be well-informed so that he is able to assist the community with advice and guidance.

The headman is also expected to assist with the collection of taxes; he has to maintain law and order in his village. This is a difficult task since there is no law enforcing body such as a police force. For the maintenance of law and order in the village, the headman relies, to a great extent, on the community's respect for the traditional law and custom of the community. Gobozana is one village in which the communal spirit based on the respect for the traditional structures in the village, is intact and unviolated by

influences of modernity. Examples of this respect for the traditional law and order will be found in the following sections when we focus attention on some of the structures in the village. This analysis has focused attention on the headman as leader of a village. According to this analysis, the headman appears to be an important figure in a village and the position he occupies has great responsibility. It is perhaps in recognition of these qualities that when party politics entered the rural areas, the organisers of these political parties were to concentrate on the headman and they enlisted the services of headmen to facilitate the contact between the 'party' and the rural communities. Firstly, the services of the headman were enlisted for the organisation and arrangement of meetings for the election campaign. It was afterwards decided to use the services of headmen in selling membership cards, and in collecting contributions towards a Herschel-Glen Grey Refugee Fund. In the light of what I have mentioned about Gobozana and the Tamacha administration and the desire to have the chieftainship of Gobozana recognised, the carrying out of tasks imposed by the political parties necessitated careful thought and judgement on the part of the headman at Gobozana.

The position of the headman was unenviable. He had to look after the interests and needs of the people at Gobozana. Failure to do so would deny him the legitimacy he was accorded by the people. 'Party' loyalties and the CNP's pressure on the headman were also making their demands; from yet another direction came the difficulties of being subordinate to Tamacha. He could not afford to ignore all these. If he ignored or defied Tamacha or the ruling 'party', the results would most certainly be disastrous for Gobozana and for the headman personally. The input-output passage between Gobozana and the 'party', which is the Government and Tamacha, would be impaired. For instance, mere suspicion based on the assumption that because Gobozana was Mfengu, she had to sympathise with the Imbokotho, is said to have resulted in a junior secondary school that would have been awarded to Gobozana being awarded to a neighbouring village that was friendly towards the Ikhonco. Gobozana is lacking in essential services such as health and water. Would open alignment with the opposition not jeopardise the chances of Gobozana's securing these services? The headman is quite aware of the state of affairs, and therefore, when he brings to the inkundla, CNIP membership cards for them to buy, they co-operate, in the interests of the village. Again when the headman is

summoned to a meeting called by the Chief Minister at Zwelitsha, and he returns with the news that each village has to contribute R20 towards a relief fund for the Glen Grey-Herschel refugees, they complied.

The following section will focus attention on the other associations in the village without which the functions and duties of the headman would not be completely successful.

B. The Village Committee

This is a statutory body: the names of those who have to serve on this Committee must be submitted to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner for approval. There are six members of the Committee who are elected by the community. There is no cash remuneration for serving on the Committee except for the enjoyment of the prestige and respect that accompanies these posts. One material enjoyment that one gets as a member of this Committee is the enjoyment of iswazi¹ or imvula mlomo which is a fee in kind or cash that is paid to the headman for services rendered or in anticipation of services to be rendered.

Members of the Village Committee serve for a definite period. The Committee has a chairman. This position is held by the headman. There is a secretary. The duties of the village committee include, inter alia, assisting the headman with the maintenance of law and order. The committee prepares and arranges the agenda for the inkundla. Disputes between members of the village are channelled through the headman or Secretary and the committee. These will decide which of these should come before the inkundla (village court) and which will be disposed of, with only a report to be submitted to the inkundla. It also disposes of minor cases and then submits a report. The committee acts on behalf of the inkundla while it is not in session. To illustrate this point, I will relate events that occurred, one day, when horsemen from a neighbouring village arrived.

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1. Iswazi (literally a twig from a tree) can be used in different contexts to reveal some of the following meanings:-
- i) Iswazi or Imvula-mlomo is a fee in kind or cash that you 'pay' at a chief's or headman's place in expectation of some services in return.
 - ii) Lobola is accompanied by iswazi.
 - iii) Somebody returning from work in the mines or towns must produce iswazi.

The horsemen came from Xhukwana which lies to the north of Gobozana on the Debe Nek area. Xhukwana is occupied mostly by clans of the AmaRarabe. Relations between Gobozana and Xhukwana are, normally, cordial except when such acts as trespassing create discord. Trespassers for firewood and pasturage caused misunderstanding between the villages and this is to be viewed against the background of the conflict between AmaMfengu and AmaRarabe.

The delegation from Xhukwana was led by the village headman and included a forest ranger who was responsible for patrolling the forests in the Debe Nek area, and two other men. The delegation came to ask for permission to search the homesteads at Gobozana for wood they believed was being cut from their forest by women from Gobozana.

The members of the Gobozana committee became incensed. This request was proof that members of this delegation 'looked down' upon them; they despised them because they were AmaMfengu. The correct and proper thing to do was to arrest the people responsible for the cutting of these trees on the spot. Each speaker from Gobozana emphasized the fact that the request was outrageous. The atmosphere became tense. Had any of the Xhukwana men become adamant and if the Gobozana headman had not calmed his men, violence would have erupted. The men from Xhukwana left with their heads 'hanging', being less bold than when they came. This incident was reported at the next session of the inkundla.

This incident illustrates some of the following issues:-

- i) The headman is not only respected but also influential among the members of the village. The fact that he was able to calm the enraged Gobozana men, illustrates that he is respected and that people are prepared to listen to him.
- ii) The eruption of these tribal men into angry shouts of this nature, about IMfengu and that about UmXhosa is clear evidence that tribal divisions are very common among people in the rural areas and it only takes one false step and the whole facade of 'we are all Africans' erupts into an ethnic conflagration.
The political parties have 'fanned' these tribal feelings for their own selfish gains and now the Ciskei is divided into hostile camps of AmaXhosa and AmaMfengu.
- iii) The inkundla is closely associated with the person of the headman because, amongst other things, the headman is leader of the inkundla and physically, the inkundla is part of the headman's property. Therefore, whatever attitude the men have

the headman, is automatically reflected on the inkundla; it is natural that if one respects you, he will also show respect for your place (inkundla) as well. The inkundla derives its dignity from the tradition and custom as well.

C. Izibonda Zomsenge¹

These are unofficial posts that are created by the community. Their creation was aimed at facilitating the functions of maintaining law and order. The entire village is divided into six sections, each of these sections is placed under an isibonda somsenge or sub-headman. Each sub-headman has a sub-court which operates under and in co-operation with the village court. The powers of a sub-court are limited but very effective. Defiance of these powers is treated with contempt.

To illustrate that the powers of sub-courts should not be defied, I shall relate a story of a case that was brought before the village court for defying a sub-court. In this case a man was brought before a sub-court for being insolent and disrespectful to his parents. The sub-court found him guilty and fined him a goat. The man refused to pay the fine. The case was brought before the village court. The village court confirmed the findings of the sub-court and ordered the man to pay not only a goat but a goat and six rand. The man decided to submit to the findings of the court. He pleaded for pardon, producing R8,00 as the only money he could afford.

The example illustrates how the village courts and sub-courts co-operate in the interests of law and order.

All these structures operate within and in relation to the INKUNDLA. What then is the inkundla?

D. The Inkundla²

The inkundla is a term that generally applies to:

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1. Izibonda is plural of isibonda - a headman. But the literal translation of isibonda is a post or standard or pole planted into the ground. Umsenge is a tree from which no poles can be made because when dry the tree becomes brittle. Therefore an isibonda somsenge is a pseudo-headman.
 2. Open space between the cattle kraal and the huts (Hammond-Tooke, 1975, p. 15).

i) A general council of the village that is constituted by the adult initiated males of a village meeting at a particular place and time. Usually the village council meets at the place of the headman (Hammond-Tooke, 1975, p. 141). This is the village moot which has decision-making and administrative powers. It is known as imbizo from the verb ukubiza. Un-initiated boys and women do not attend the imbizo.

The headman presides over the imbizo. There is a secretary who records the decisions of the imbizo; and keeps minutes. A prayer is said before and after the proceedings of the imbizo. Leading the inkundla in prayer is a favour. The selection of the person to lead the prayer, rests with the headman among members of the inkundla.

ii) When the village petty court meets, it is known as the inkundla (Hammond-Tooke, 1975, p. 141; Wilson et al: Vol. III: 1952:30). The village court is endowed with limited quasi-judicial powers based on the tribal laws and custom. The inkundla is constituted by the same people that constitute an imbizo. Un-initiated boys and women attend only on business. At Gobozana the sessions of the imbizo and inkundla take place on the same day - and even the same system of recording is used for both, consequently, when minutes of the imbizo are being read, records of the inkundla proceedings are also read as part of the minutes. The inkundla uses the same officials the imbizo uses (the chairman and secretary); in addition the inkundla has a prosecutor while a messenger of the court is appointed whenever the need arises.

Anybody who defies the powers of the inkundla is referred to the Tribal Authority at Tamacha. Defiance of this court is subject to the sanctions of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's court. A serious view is taken of cases of defiance against the tribal courts and no mercy is shown to the defiant person.

But although the inkundla may draw on the official sanctions of the Tribal Authority to back up its own decisions, there are important considerations that would prompt the headman to refrain from referring a case of defiance to the Tribal Authority court at Tamacha.

In line with the strained relations between Gobozana and Tamacha, as complicated by the ethnic element, the headman and inkundla may regard the referring of a defiant case to Tamacha as a betrayal of their community;

as exposing one of their own to the enemy. Even the fines, it is argued, would be forfeit to the unwelcome outside administration. And there may be less political factors to take into account too: the headman might well exercise distinction in handing someone over to Tamacha in view of, say, mitigating circumstances he has to take into consideration.

In one case where mitigating circumstances were taken into consideration, the inkundla decided to ostracise the particular individual instead of referring the case to Tamacha. When a person is ostracised, he is regarded as an outcast and isolated. At wedding feasts and public gatherings, he is ignored. If there is a 'feast' at a private homestead, the head of the homestead is expected to ignore a person placed under ostracism.

In this case, two men were brought before a sub-court for insulting and obstructing an injoli (master of ceremonies) in the performance of his duties. The sub-court found these two men guilty and fined each of them a goat. One of these men left for the mines and the man remaining behind was brought before the village inkundla. On the day of the trial, this man showed gross insubordination and defiance, leaving the inkundla no option but to find him guilty. The inkundla discovered that the man was in poor health, was unemployed and was being supported by his widowed mother. Consequently, the inkundla decided that the man must be ostracised.

The inkundla does not conduct its trials as a magistrate's court does.

There is no preparation of a case by the prosecutor. In the inkundla the prosecutor puts the allegations to the accused and after one or two questions, those present are allowed to participate in the trial. The trial takes the form of a discussion at the end of which a decision is reached by consensus. This practice may lead to the inkundla being swayed by an eloquent section. An attempt of this sort was made in the following case. A truck owner who was also a resident of Gobozana appeared before the inkundla. In the case the truck owner preferred a charge against the inkundla for failure to meet its obligations. The inkundla through its officials had hired the services of the truck belonging to this man for carting soil at R30,00 per day. The inkundla had to bring its own labour. The truck owner submitted a claim to the inkundla for seven days' work. The inkundla refused to pay saying that only four days of work had been done.

On the day of the trial, the same officials of the inkundla officiated, and after a lengthy discussion, it was decided that the truck owner was claiming an amount in excess of what he was being owed. The truck owner was dissatisfied with the verdict of the inkundla and resolved to have it rescinded.

The truck owner went around to the people who were present at the first hearing and solicited their assistance; he also incorporated the services of men who were not present at the first hearing when the original decision was arrived at. This manoeuvre came to the notice of the headman and his committee.

During the next session of the inkundla after the reading of the minutes, the matter was raised as a point arising from the minutes, and the case came up for review. After a lengthy and lively discussion, the inkundla upheld its original decision: that the truck owner was guilty of demanding money in excess of what was due to him. What was noteworthy was that many people who had favoured the original decision or had supported the original finding had now turned against it. What had made these people turn against their original decision? Whilst I acknowledge the fact that the efforts of the truck owner to have the inkundla swayed were blunted by the stubbornness of the headman and his committee, I want to emphasise the fact that the attempt to manipulate the opinion of the inkundla cannot be denied. The possibility that one day such advances may be made against the headman, is there.

The inkundla is not only a guardian of tribal customs and traditions, it is also an important medium for communication. We have mentioned earlier that the headman is a link between the village and the outside world. The outside world being the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, the Government and many other things that do not emanate from within the village. Whatever comes to the notice of the headman from these outside sources, the headman must bring to the attention of the inkundla which in turn will disseminate the information to the village. The village has complete trust in the reliability of the inkundla as a source of information. A survey conducted at Gobozana to explore, inter alia, the reliability of certain news media showed that out of 53 households approached, 44 of these had complete faith in the reliability of the inkundla as a source of information.

The inkundla performs an important function of allocating sites, licences and many other things. This function is executed, in most cases, by the headman and his committee and then a report is submitted to the inkundla. Applications for sites or licences are usually accompanied by uswazi which is then enjoyed by the headman and his committee. Any licences or sites that the inkundla issues, must also be submitted to the Tribal Authority for approval. This is perhaps done with a view to keeping a check on the licensing system.

The inkundla is the most important body in a rural community. The inkundla has social, judicial and political importance. Even the advent of political parties in the rural areas must be seen against the background of the inkundla. The political organisers had to apply to the headman for permission to hold election campaign meetings and as a result of the consent and consensus of the inkundla, they were able to enter the rural areas. The significance of the role played by the headman in the activities of a village must be viewed in the context of the inkundla. This made the inkundla an important body which the political party has either to befriend or alienate in order to make or lose contact with the rural communities.

E. Ad hoc Treasurers

These positions are informal. Their creation is based on the decisions of the community. For every project that the inkundla desires to undertake, a fund is established by appointing somebody from the inkundla to look after such a fund. When the urgency for the fund has declined, any balance from the fund is deposited with a commercial bank. There are as many treasurers as there are projects.

The system of keeping public funds with individuals, is open to malpractices especially when people are exposed to poverty. The headman before the present one was caught up in malpractices involving the misappropriation of village funds. The secretary was included as an accomplice in the crime. As a result of being involved in misappropriation of funds, the secretary lost the confidence of the community.

F. The Betterment Scheme Committee

This is a statutory body. It is composed of six men who are elected by the

inkundla for a fixed period of time. The duties of this committee include, inter alia, keeping an eye on the grazing and ploughing methods. Any incorrect methods must be reported with the headman. This committee is not very popular and one rarely hears mention of its existence.

In bringing this section on the administrative structures of the village to an end, the following points are emphasised:-

- i) The role played by the headman is such an important one that even the political parties must take cognisance of it.
- ii) The role played by the headman becomes significant within the context of the inkundla which is the body that acts as a filtering bed for all things that enter the village. The political parties in entering the villages, have also to come through the headman and his inkundla.
- iii) Tribal animosity is latent in the rural areas, and was readily revived; therefore, when the political parties entered the rural areas, armed with the AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict, it was easy to herd the rural electorate into tribal camps of Imbokotho and Ikhonco.

In order to appreciate and understand the significance of the roles of the various political structures within a village community, we must study these political structures against the background of the socio-economic conditions prevalent in that village. It will then be possible for us to assess whether the political parties used the traditional political structures:-

- i) Merely as a means of collecting votes, or
- ii) with the intent and purpose of creating a permanent structure for the articulation of the interests of the peasantry such as a local-level branch of a political party.

G. The Church

i) The Bantu Presbyterian Church

This is one of the early missionary outposts that was built by Dr J. Ross after he founded the Mission station at Pirie. The church, a stone building, stands on a site about 2-3 km outside

the village. There is no resident minister or evangelist, as a result the congregation experiences difficulty with the performance of baptisms and communion. The fact that the church stands a distance away from the residential area may have contributed to lack of interest in church activities.

The Mothers Union is made up of such a small number of interested members and as a result their meetings are no longer held in the church, instead they conduct revival services in private homesteads. The church lacks people to conduct Sunday School services. The headman is an elder in this church. Organisationally, the church falls under the Zwelitsha circuit of the BPC (Bantu Presbyterian Church). Members from the local church attend church meetings such as the Deacon's Court or the Session at Pirie.

ii) The Bantu Church of Christ

This is a separatist church with headquarters in Port Elizabeth. Male members of the church do not shave their beards. Members of this sect do not eat pork. Sabbath day is on a Saturday when no work must be done - even meals are served cold. The sect is very recent in the village and was started by a migrant labourer in the 1950's. This sect has no resident minister and has no building of its own. Members of this church are keen to establish links with the mother church at Port Elizabeth. They attend all church functions held in either Port Elizabeth or Zwelitsha (it could be possible that their travelling is made easier by the fact that one of their members owns a transportation business). Recruitment of members is difficult in this church because of the many restrictions that it places on its members.

Between these two churches, there are no more than 50 active Christians. The belief in ancestral worship is still very common among both 'red' and 'school' people. Ancestral worship is expressed through the performance of amasiko (rituals). Goats and cattle are the most suitable sacrificial animals and the fact that these animals are kept in large numbers endorses the belief that ancestral worship is very common in this village.

The lack of enlightened leadership for the churches - a leadership that would make the church a dynamic organisation within the community, taken together with the adherence to ancestral worship, reduces the possibility of the church becoming a dynamic force for change within the community.

H. The School

The school was started in the village as early as 1895. The school was housed in the stone church building (ELITYENI). It started as a one teacher school under the management of the church. It is interesting to note that though the local school was the oldest in the neighbourhood, it had taken a long time for it to progress to the present status of higher primary school. It had progressed from a one teacher to a six teacher school.

The school roll comprises about 350 pupils, of whom more than 50 per cent are boys. The drop-out rate is especially high among girls, for when the girls reach a certain age, their parents encourage them to leave school and get married.

I. The School Committee

There is a school committee of seven - five men and two women - elected from amongst the local parents. The headman is chairman of the school committee and the secretary of the inkundla is also secretary of the school committee. The school committee works hand-in-hand with the principal and staff of the school towards the maintenance of progress in the school. The school committee works with the co-operation of the inkundla. To illustrate this point, I shall relate a story of events that showed that there is co-operation between the school, the school committee and the inkundla in the interests of the school.

In order to reduce the drop-out rate at the school, the principal prepared a list of names of children who were no longer attending school. The list was taken to the inkundla for discussion and the recommendation of a line of action. The inkundla decided to summon all the parents and guardians of the children whose names were listed. The charge laid against the parents and guardians was that they had, by neglecting their duty of sending

the children to school, endangered the very existence of the school.

All these parents and guardians were found guilty and each fined R2 and asked to send the children back to school.

J. The Nompilo Committee

This is a version of the South African Anti-Tuberculosis Association. There are nine members of this committee. The headman is chairman of the committee. The duties of this committee include, inter alia, encouraging TB patients to take their treatment regularly, and to arrange for known TB cases to go for X-rays. The Nompilo Committee had direct connection with offices of the Health Department in King William's Town.

K. The Zenzele Women's Association

The Zenzele teaches the women economic ways of running a home. The Zenzele has its own set of officials and the membership to this association is on an individual basis. Amongst its many activities in the village, Zenzele built a house to accommodate a nurse's clinic. Each household was required to contribute R1,00 towards a fund for building this house. Initially, Zenzele attracted a large number of women but now the membership has declined.

The local branch of Zenzele was affiliated to the Zwelitsha branch of Zenzele. The Zwelitsha branch used to invite members of the local branch to varied activities, such as a 'Day Course'. This ensured that the members of the local branch had connections outside and this connection would have acted as a modernising force within the community. The Zenzele is now defunct not only as a result of the frustration brought about by failure to realise some of their objectives such as for instance, having spent their funds building a 'clinic' for a nurse, only to find no nurse was available, but also as a result of a general apathy.

L. Vukani Farmers Association

The aim of this association was to improve agriculture and to introduce facilities for credit extension to the village. This association was started by an Extension Officer.

This farmers' association worked through the inkundla in that it had no separate set of officials. Membership was on an individual basis. The association collected funds from the community which were used for buying goat rams. These rams died on arrival. As a result of this, the farmers became frustrated and lost interest in the association.

M. Miscellaneous and ad hoc bodies

The associations that will be considered under this sub-heading are those that are of temporary duration. Such associations neither have officials nor constitutions but their existence fulfils a necessary and important function in the community. These associations have leaders who guide the activities of the association from knowledge gathered from traditions and customs or as a result of practice.

i) The Space

This is an entertainment and recreational association. It is called the 'space' after the musical instrument used - the 'spacegram'. Recorded music is played to which young people dance and jive.

The 'space' is foreign to the village culture. It comes from the towns. It replaces the traditional umtshotsho which was a gathering where the youth sang and performed traditional dancing.

ii) The Concert

This is sometimes called a 'tea-meeting'. The concert is used for raising funds, especially by the school. The preparation for a concert includes extending invitations to school choirs from neighbouring villages. It is held in the school hall, usually on a Friday night to Saturday morning. A concert has a master of ceremonies who is commonly known as a 'chairman'; the admission fees that are being collected at the door are received by a 'door-keeper'.

School choirs take turns in rendering musical items which are 'bought' at the chairman's table or 'vetoed' - this 'buying' and 'veto-ing' of musical items is the chief source of funds. Cakes, chickens and other foodstuffs are also displayed for sale on the same lines as for the musical items. In one such a concert at

Gobozana, the local school raised more than R100,00.

iii) Work-parties

Work-parties are divided into:-

- a) Work-parties that concern domestic work, are called, Iboxo.
- b) Work-parties that concern work on the fields, are known as Ilima.

The organisation and arrangement of work-parties includes extending invitations for assistance to friends and relatives, the preparation of food and beer. Participation in a work-party is reciprocal in that for people to participate in one's work, one must have supported a work-party in the village, arranged and organised by others. It must also be mentioned that, as a result of, among other things, the common use of money, people who take part in work-parties, tend of late to expect money in return for their services in a work-party.

iv) Health Services

There are no health services at Gobozana. People from Gobozana have to travel to Tamacha or Noncampa for health services. An eagerness to have health services at the village was illustrated by the people's willingness to shoulder the expense of transporting a nurse once a week from Tamacha - for a clinic at the village. The eagerness of the Gobozana people for the services of a nurse was expressed by the way they made sacrifice to contribute towards a fund for building a house which they hoped would one day accommodate a nurse. This venture was initiated by Zenzele.

Not having health services in the village has resulted in people dying along the road to or from the villages with clinics, and babies being born along the road.

Lack of these health services has encouraged the belief in traditional medicine with the result that there is a great number of amaxhwele (herbalists) and at least about seven oosiyazi (diviners).

A study of voluntary associations in Gobozana reveals that people at Gobozana readily lose interest and enthusiasm in some voluntary associations. This apathy could be a result of a combination of factors, such as for instance:-

- a) The general composition of the population at Gobozana can be cited as a factor. The effects of migrant labour are that young and able-bodied men and women are forced to leave their homes, leaving behind aged and infirm men, women and children (Benbo: Economic Review of the Ciskei: 1975). African tradition and custom emphasize that the leading role be played by males in activities of the village, leaving women to play a secondary role.
- b) Most of the voluntary associations such as the church and the cultural associations such as Zenzele and Farmers associations, have displayed a grave lack of enlightened leadership. This factor further compounds the existing frustration.

These factors taken together with the homogeneity of the population prevented the penetration of party politics into the associational activities of Gobozana - unlike what happened at Zwelitsha where a survey of voluntary associations revealed that party politics detrimentally affected some of the associations.

2. POLITICAL PARTIES AT GOBOZANA

This section will focus attention on the actual intrusion of political parties in the rural areas and Gobozana in particular. Light will be shed on the activities of the political parties and their effect on

- i) The administrative structures at Gobozana
- ii) Associations and personal relations, inside and/or inside Gobozana
- iii) Whether the political parties would establish a permanent structure, such as a branch, which would be useful to the villagers as an organisation for articulation and aggregation of interests.

2.1 The General Election Campaign at Gobozana

In preceding chapters the election campaign was explained but the following facts from the preceding chapters will shed some light on our study:-

- a) Of the twenty CLA members to be elected, the electoral division of which Gobozana was an integral part, was to elect only FOUR.

- b) Ten candidates stood for election in this electoral division. These candidates were divided and arranged into electoral slates of two (each slate consisting of four members) and two independent candidates.
- c) It must be borne in mind that the manifestoes of the sixty-two of sixty-three candidates that had offered themselves for election to the CLA accepted separate development (S. A. Journal for African Affairs: Vol. 4: No. 1: 1974-75). The significance of this statement is illustrated by the fact that these candidates did not differ substantially on their manifestoes. The ethnic factor was adopted as a major point of difference.

This worked out in the following manner: one group of candidates which included in their midst a Mr Sangotsha who was very popular in the area of ImiDushane, visited Gobozana. This group, which I shall call group 'A' was fighting the election campaign on the side of Chief Mabandla. Groups that sympathised with Chief Mabandla were known to be sympathetic towards the cause of the AmaMfengu. This fact connected group 'A' with the AmaMfengu.

The other group of candidates, which we shall call group 'B' was sympathetic towards the AmaRarabe. This group included a Mr Nkontso. Mr Nkontso was said in the ImiDushane area to be 'hater' of AmaMfengu. Thus when these groups visited Gobozana, they depended on the following issues for success:-

- i) The ethnic issue (AmaRarabe-AmaMfengu conflict).
- ii) The influence and acceptability of either Mr Nkontso or Mr Sangotsha.

Group 'A' was first to visit the village and group 'B' came after. Members of the village claim that group 'A' was a favourite because:-

- i) Of ethnic sympathies.
- ii) The hope that if Chief Mabandla came into power, the possibility of the recognition of the local chieftainship was increased.
- iii) The inclusion of Mr Sangotsha in group 'A' paid off good dividends while on the other hand, the inclusion of Mr Nkontso in group 'B' limited its chances of success.
- iv) It was argued that the recognition of the local chieftaincy would result in the village being freed of subordination to the Tamacha administration.

Despite the popularity and success of group 'A' in villages such as Gobozana, group 'B' fought and won the over-all elections in the Zwelitsha

constitutency. But the results of the elections in the Zwelitsha electoral division were challenged by group 'A', who alleged that group 'B' had perpetrated some electoral irregularities which had prejudiced group 'A's' chances for success in the election. The Supreme Court upheld the plea made by group 'A' that the electoral irregularities that were committed prejudiced their chances. Consequently the election results were declared nul and void. (SALR: 1975 (4) 413) the case is Mtoba and others v Sebe and others).

As a result of this verdict, the electoral division of Zwelitsha was declared vacant pending a bye-election in the constituency. The declaration of a bye-election in the electoral division of Zwelitsha had come after a year during which the ruling party of which group 'B' was an integral part had entrenched itself. The ruling party had adopted and applied various measures in the course of entrenching itself, including some of the following:-

- a) The ruling party was the authoritative body that allocated scarce goods and services. The Government was said to reward its supporters by placing them in key positions while supporters of the opposition were transferred or dismissed (Daily Dispatch: 24. 8. 73).
- b) It was alleged that pensioners were promised with increases to their pensions provided they supported the Government. Threats to have these pension grants withdrawn as punishment for supporting the opposition were alleged to have been made.¹
- c) It was alleged that people in the rural areas were promised more facilities (tractors, dams, clinics) as long as they supported the ruling party. Threats of eviction were made to those who supported the opposition.
- d) It was alleged that wherever the ruling party held meetings, official vehicles and the government servants were used in assisting ruling party candidates in fighting election campaigns (Record of CLA Debates: 1975, p. 43).
- e) Announcements by speakers of the ruling party emphasised the fact that the opposition was a group of people that were jealous of the Government and did not want to see the Ciskei advancing to 'Freedom'.
- f) The ruling party had to its advantage the services of the media of communication - especially the radio which sang the praises of the Government.
- g) The CNIP had won the chief ministership of the Ciskei by a mere two votes but by the time the bye-elections were declared, the CNIP commanded a comfortable majority in the CLA.

1. Information collected during interviews.

- h) The enthusiasm of Ciskeians for Ciskei politics had 'dampened' as a result of party politics which divided the Ciskei into CNIP-CNP camps of intolerance and animosity. Party politics affected not only associations but also personal relations.

These events and facts provide a general background against which events in the Ciskei are to be viewed. In addition to these, there are factors that affected Gobošana by the time the bye-elections were declared.

2.2 The Bye-elections at Gobošana

When the bye-election campaigns started the people of Gobošana had, like people in most villages, become disillusioned and consequently enthusiasm for Ciskei politics had decreased. In the wake of political parties, labelling of people as Imbokotho - CNP or Ikhonco - CNIP became common practice. Gobošana was identified with Imbokotho and this was said to be disastrous to Gobošana. To be identified with the Imbokotho meant to be denied certain benefits - Gobošana was said to be denied the privilege of being awarded a Junior Secondary School (1975). On this account the secondary school was awarded to a village that was friendly disposed towards the ruling party. Gobošana had hoped for the recognition of its chieftaincy but how could Gobošana support the opposition and not jeopardise the chances of the recognition of that chieftaincy? Gobošana also expected the Government to provide her with such amenities as health services and water but support of the opposition might well compromise their chance of getting these amenities. Since Gobošana was predominantly Mfengu, it would always be regarded with suspicion by the ruling party.

It was for these sort of reasons that the people at Gobošana would readily agree to support of the Government. Any probing questions from me, as an outsider, soon had me labelled as a 'government spy'. The bye-elections 'trapped' Gobošana in this position.

Group 'B', with its composition unchanged but having gained much strength from the background and association with the Government, was first to visit Gobošana. Group 'A' had changed its personnel: Mr Sangotsha was dropped. For strategic reasons, it was felt in opposition circles that, since Mr Sangotsha entered the CLA as a representative of the paramount chief, he could be left out in the bye-election in favour of someone from the opposition ranks.

Once more, group 'B' won the election. From the discussion above, it is difficult to state in clear terms, the nature of Gobošana's participation in the by-election but we may of course assume,

The following section will illustrate, using election figures, the effect of the propaganda that was unleashed by the Government on assuming office. This had been disastrous to the opposition. The people 'feared' the Government.

3. POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE KEISKAMMAHOEK ELECTORAL DIVISION

Electoral division Keiskammahoek is made up of various villages that are predominantly Mfengu. Only one CLA elected member had to be chosen from amongst three candidates that stood for election.

The leading candidate in this area was a Mr Peteni. Mr Peteni was born and brought up in the Keiskammahoek area. He was well educated and was a lecturer at the University of Fort Hare. He was from a well-known and important family of educated people. The ethnic factor did not gain much popularity in the election campaign in this area. Members belonged to the same ethnic group: that of the AmaMfengu - and with the manifestoes not differing much, the election was fought on a personal level. Mr Peteni's campaign was successful because of his status and education. The election results were as follows:-

Mr Peteni	6 309 or 68,4%
Mr Ntshingwa	1 764
Mr Qalaza	1 144

(Results extracted from the Official Gazette, No. 6 dated 23. 3. 73)

Not only on ethnic sympathies but also on other considerations, Mr Peteni had aligned himself with the opposition group. He was elected as the chief whip of the opposition party (Records of Debates of the CLA: 1973).

Unfortunately, Mr Peteni was not satisfied with the course of events. He had hoped to gain a ministerial post which would offer him a lucrative salary but because of his association with the opposition, he was doomed to earn about R100-150 per month as an ordinary CLA member. Mr Peteni could not live on this. He resigned his position as CLA member and returned to his former position as lecturer at the University of Fort Hare.

(Daily Dispatch: 3. 8. 73). The electoral division of Keiskammahoek was, consequently, declared vacant pending a bye-election. This was the first bye-election to be fought on party political lines.

The general remarks on the post-general election period and events, are applicable to Keiskammahoek as well. It is perhaps essential that I should reiterate the fact that electoral division Keiskammahoek was pro-CNP in leanings. When the ruling party switched on its propaganda machine, it was able to convert a majority that was pro-CNP in its favour; the ruling party was represented by an 'unknown' man in the bye-election. He was unknown because he did not stay in the Keiskammahoek area. The results were:-

Mr Guzana (for CNIP)	4 817 or 67%
Mr Guzana (for CNP)	2 369

(Extracted from the Official Gazette: No. 34 of 15. 3. 74)

It is interesting to note that:-

- i) The CNP polled less than 50 per cent of the votes that were polled by the CNIP. This signifies the gradual 'slipping-off' tendency of the opposition.
- ii) The votes cast during the bye-election were less than the total votes that were cast during the general election. This signifies the apparent loss of enthusiasm and the disillusionment of most Ciskeians.

An assessment of the facts and events surrounding the intrusion of political parties into the rural areas of the Ciskei will show, amongst other things that:-

- a) The political parties only used the political structures in the rural villages for electoral purposes
- b) The political parties failed to establish a permanent political structure in the rural areas, such as a 'party' branch which could be useful by the peasantry in the articulation and aggregation of interests. Perhaps, this was a designed failure because the effect and influence of political parties would negate the aims of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, namely to make the chieftainship the fulcrum of the authorities system.

4. THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES

In this section we shall examine the results of the 'contact' between the political parties and the traditional political structures. We shall illustrate this by making reference to the activities of the political parties:-

4.1 The Chief

As well as being a Government appointed official, the chief is also a traditional head of a tribe. The chief is respected and influential amongst his subjects but the advent of party politics in the rural areas affected the relationship between the chief and his subjects.

- a) In the tribe of the ImiDushane the chief has an inner circle of advisers called 'Amaphakathi' (Hammond-Tooke, 1958, p.77). Included among the members of this inner circle council, are two men who are prominent in party political affairs: Mr Sangotsha and Mr Nkontso, both of whom have been mentioned in connection with CNP and CNIP, respectively. With these two leading councillors of the chief supporting the opposing and antagonistic parties, it became difficult for the chief to convene the inner circle.

The advisory functions have been taken over by Mr Nkontso who belongs to the same political party as the chief. The effect of party politics on this inner circle of councillors was to 'kill' it.

- b) Tribal affiliation is sometimes equated with 'party' membership - to illustrate this statement, I shall refer to events and facts that concern the tribal unit of the AmaJingqi.

The AmaJingqi is a tribal unit under chief Maqoma. The AmaJingqi were detribalised after the Frontier Wars. With the coming into force of the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, the chieftainship of the AmaJingqi was revived and granted recognition under Chief Maqoma. The remnants of the tribe were re-organised into small groups in the various towns and farms. Each tribal association had its officials.

On the occasion of the celebrations of the recognition of the AmaJingqi, chief Maqoma announced that those who were AmaJingqi are to become CNIP members as a sign of gratitude to Mr Sebe for having granted recognition to the tribal unit of the AmaJingqi. The influence of party politics has resulted in the membership of the AmaJingqi being transformed into CNIP membership. This act does not take into consideration the fact that party political membership is a free democratic choice.

- c) Tribal membership can also be used as a political 'ball' in the struggle for supremacy between the political parties. To illustrate

this point, I wish to refer to events and facts in the life of the AmaGwali tribe.

The AmaGwali is a tribal unit that has been revived under Chief Burns-Ncamashe who was erstwhile Minister of Education in the Ciskei Government. The AmaGwali are mainly detribalised and live in towns and farms of the whites. When Chief Burns-Ncamashe fell into disfavour with the CNIP, members of the cabinet and ruling party went round visiting members of the AmaGwali, discrediting Chief Burns-Ncamashe. Chief Ncamashe was being painted as an opponent to the Government and as such opposed to progress in the Ciskei. Members of the AmaGwali were being wooed into changing tribal affiliation. Like members of the AmaJingqi who support the ruling party, members of the AmaGwali were promised land allotments. Tribal loyalties to their chief are being misconstrued as implying loyalty to the political affiliations of the chief. In other words the political party uses the chief as a tool for collecting membership.

- d) When political party loyalties of the chief and his tribal members are contrasting, problems arise. When the late Paramount chief of the AmaRarabe decided to identify himself with the opposition party, there was a furore (Daily Dispatch: 10. 8. 73). Those who were pro-CNIP were opposed to the paramount chief's involvement in party politics. Pro-CNP opinion was that the paramount chief was exercising a democratic right. The result of this 'tug-of-war' was that the Ciskei Government ignored the existence of the Paramount Chief (Records of CLA Debate: 1975).

In the case of the AmaZibula tribal unit, the chief was pro-CNP while the tribe (which belonged to AmaRarabe) was pro-CNIP. This controversy arising over loyalties, resulted in the tribe's loyalty to the chief being undermined. The Tribal Council of the AmaRarabe, acting under the acting-paramount chief of the AmaRarabe (who is also pro-CNIP) decided to relieve the chief of the AmaZibula of the chieftainship (Imvo: 2. 10. 76).

- e) The position of chiefs can be used for political purposes: the ruling party was being accused of using the position of chiefs for party political purposes. This allegation arises from the fact that the ruling party has been granting recognition to chiefs of the AmaRarabe clan while applications of chiefs of the AmaMfengu were ignored (Record of CLA Debates: 1975). The final result is that the chieftainship is being reduced to the level of political pawns.

The above illustrates the tensions that occur as a result of party political interference in the chief-subject relationship and the effect of party politics on chieftainship.

4.2 The Headman

After our study of activities in a rural village, the role played by a headman in the life of a rural village was observed as being very important. The

headman occupies a leading position and also wields much influence.

The ruling party in the Ciskei insists on placing their supporters in positions of headman whenever these occur. It is essential for the ruling party to have, in such key positions as that of headman and the chief, men who support the ruling party. This will ensure for example that requests for the sale of CNIP membership cards and requests for contributions by each village towards a Herschel-Glen Grey Refugee Fund (as was made to the Gobošana headman), will be executed.

From the foregoing the role of the political parties in the rural areas had been observed to be aimed at using the existing (political) structures and not to establish a permanent political party framework, such as a branch for the articulation and aggregation of the interests of the peasantry.

This cannot be regarded as an accident, because evidence stemming from the architects of separate development shows an insistence by these gentlemen on the preservation of the traditional structures; the traditional political structures are accepted as the pivot on which the Bantustan policy is to be based. Even the Tomlinson Commission was expected to submit recommendations on plans to improve the reserves but such recommendations were not to subvert the traditional framework of the reserves (African Affairs: Vol. 71 No. 282, Jan. 1972: Article by D. Welsh - The Cultural Dimension of Apartheid).

This insistence on the traditional political structures, seems to ignore the fact that, as a result of urbanisation, a great deal of alienation has taken place, in consequence of which the chief as traditional leader lost legitimacy with urban Africans.

When the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, were being applied, tribal/community, and regional authorities were established.

Because these authorities were based on chiefs, and because chiefs owed their existence to the existence of tribal units, the Government encouraged the resuscitation of defunct chiefdoms and promoted headmen to vacant chieftaincies. It is as a result of this action by the Government that the people at Gobošana were motivated to desire the recognition of their chieftaincy. The application of the provisions of this Act met with criticism (Carter: 1958: 92).

It is also important that we note that ever since the chiefs became the 'paid' servants of the Government, alienation between them and their subjects occurred (Hammond-Tooke, 1975: 104-5). This process of alienation has been accelerated by the process of urbanisation which tended to draw the people away from the place of influence of the chief to places where tribal divisions were less apparent and as such ties with chiefs and the tribe were more readily forgotten.

A survey was conducted in Mdantsane which revealed that of the 110 people interviewed, only 35 were willing to identify themselves with chiefs. The majority maintained that they had no chiefs. This clearly indicated the general rejection by urban blacks of the traditional political structures.

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Six

- Page 194 para 3, Line 4: Delete 'such'
- " 197 " 1 " 1: Insert after 'owned, when the research was undertaken'.
- " 207 under iv 2: Monopositic should read 'monopolistic'
- " 211 under c 6: 'ones' should read 'one's'
- " 214 para 5 Line 1: Typing error: 'within'
- " 216 " 1 " 1: Correct spelling 'Zwelitsha'
- " 217 under ii Education: Substitute 'Three' for 'four'
- " 218 Renumber p. 218 should be 220.
- " 220 Renumber p. 220 should be 218
- " 220 under iv Occupation: Insert: 'four self-employed'
- " 223 heading: Correct spelling: 'Party'.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITY IN URBAN AREAS

1. Two Local Elections Described.

Up to now, we have observed how political parties have emerged from election campaign groups; we have also witnessed how their development was facilitated by the utilization of the ethnic conflict. In the present section attention will be devoted to the investigation of political party activity in two urban areas in the Ciskei: firstly party involvement in the local and civic matters of the township council in Mdantsane and, secondly party involvement in elections and civic matters of the township council of Zwelitsha. When consideration is given to this involvement, particular reference to the following will be made.

- i) What effect did political party involvement have on civic and local affairs? Was such involvement for good or for ill?
- ii) Did such involvement facilitate the provision of proper channels of communication and also provide a platform for the demands of the Ciskeian?
- iii) Was this involvement able to facilitate the articulation and aggregation of the interests and aspirations of Ciskeians?
- iv) Did such involvement promote or obstruct good relations between persons and also within associations?

To facilitate a lucid exposition of facts and events, the material in this chapter will be presented in two sections: Section A will deal with Mdantsane while 'B' will deal with Zwelitsha and Section C will be the conclusions.

SECTION A1. MDANTSANE

Before discussing the political party intrusion into the civic matters of Mdantsane, attention will be focussed on the socio-economic conditions at Mdantsane.

1.1 Position and Situation

Mdantsane lies about twenty-one kilometres north of East London. It is situated along valleys and hillsides. It was started in 1963 on Bantu Trust land to provide accommodation, not only for East London's resettled families but also for families uprooted and resettled from white farming areas and cities of the RSA. Consequently, it was a reservoir for labour needed in the factories and commercial undertakings in and around East London.

1.2 The Population

The population figures for the township are as follows:-

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
66380	68750	71804	82180	86225	98289

(Benbo: 1975: 32/3).

The population figures that are supplied reflect the total numbers of registered dwellers. These do not include, however, those people who enter the township 'unofficially'. This 'unofficial' population avoids such restrictive measures such as permits and influx control regulations. Population increase has not only been the result of natural growth but also of resettlement from other areas.

1.3 Housing

In 1970, there were about 9565 houses at Mdantsane. By 1975, this number had increased to 15414. This meant that an increase of about fifty percent had taken place (Benbo: op cit: 32/3).

1.4 Amenities.

Each unit is so planned that there is a shopping centre, but not all shopping centres in the various units have been developed. Some units lack shops such as general dealers and cafés. This has given rise to a proliferation of informal traders who charge exorbitant prices. The general trend is for entrepreneurs to go in for 'bottle-stores'. These have more profits than general dealers.

At Zone 9, where in 1974 there was neither a shop nor a café, the first enterprise to be established in 1976 was a bottle-store. The residents of Zone 9 boycotted this bottle-store, claiming that they preferred to have shops and cafés first!

In 1974 there were about eighteen general dealers, two commercial banks, one funeral parlour, one beer-brewing undertaking, three beer outlets, two bottle-stores, one bookshop, one boarding house, one drapery shop, one hotel, one wood and coal merchant, three restaurants and one garage. These do not seem to satisfy the needs of the people of this township. The majority of residents in the township, shop in East London. This could be fashionable, but there are other reasons that contributed to this tendency. These may naturally, vary from individual to individual, but I suggest the following:-

- a) The prices, quality and quantity of goods in East London have more attraction than those in the township which are prohibitively expensive.
- b) The fact that shopping facilities do not exist in all zones, encourages shopping in East London.
- c) One may also take into consideration the fact that most people work in East London, so they buy as soon as they get their wages.

1.5 Transport Services

The SAR's main line between East London and King Williams Town touches the township at two points: at the Mdantsane township and at Mount Ruth. From these points commuters are conveyed into the township by bus and taxi services.

The bus service was privately owned. It was owned by a white company. The bus service operates in two stages:-

- a) A feeder bus service operates between the units and the main bus terminus. Commuters are collected from the units to the main bus terminus and back.
- b) A main bus service operates between the main bus terminus in the township and the town.

A taxi service that consists of registered and 'pirate' taxis complements this service.

1.6 The Health Services.

The following health services are available in the township:-

- i) There is a 1699 bed hospital with 12 operating theatres and a nurses residence that has been completed.
- ii) Twenty-four clinics are housed in temporary accommodation. Seven of these are medical consultant clinics.
- iii) The clinics and hospital at Mdantsane work in co-operation with the Frere Hospital in East London.
- iv) The Cripple Care Society is housed in eight houses.
- v) There is the Woodbrook Chest hospital for infectious diseases. This is under the control of the East London Municipality and is situated in East London.
- vi) Apart from these, black medical practitioners (about eight) have established practices in the township.

1.7 Old-age and Child Welfare

Ninety-three two-roomed houses were set aside for use by the old and infirm people, rent free.

There is only one crèche, three play grounds, a park and a swimming bath. These are not sufficient.

1.8 Schools

The information on schools was supplied by the Inspector's office in Mdantsane and covers the period including 5th February, 1975:-

<u>Grade of School</u>	<u>No. of schools</u>	<u>No. of Pupils</u>	<u>No. of Teachers</u>
Lower Primaries	20	12302	204
Higher Primaries	11	6636	120
Secondary Schools	2	1090	28
High Schools	2	1476	44
Industrial and Textile	1)	up to the time of writing, no information about attendances and staffing was received from these schools.	
Technical and Commercial	1)		
Vocational School	1)		

It must be noted that four schools: two higher and two lower primaries, operated on the double-shift system. An In-service Training Centre for teachers and a teacher training school were to be started in 1976.

Despite the existence of these schools, the drop-out rate is very high.

1.9 Sport facilities

The following are included:-

- 1 Rugby stadium
- 2 Rugby fields that are not enclosed.
- 3 Soccer fields (Only one is enclosed)
- 11 Tennis courts (situated at Zones 1 and 2)
- 1 Cricket field.

It must be noted that these sports facilities are concentrated around units 1 and 2. As a result the other units are lacking in sports facilities. Thus these sports facilities are not only inadequate but also badly distributed.

1. 10 Law and Order

According to information received, the South African Police at Mdantsane was manned by the following white and black officers:-

<u>Position</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lieutenant	2	-	2
Warrant Officers	1	1	2
Senior Sergeants	-	2	2
Sergeants	4	20	24
Temporary Warrant Officers	2	-	2
Constables	-	68	68
Women Clerks	-	3	3

It was reported that a black warrant officer would be promoted to the position of lieutenant. This police force was assisted in the task of maintaining law and order by a squad of black reservists commonly known as 'Oolindikhaya' (those who watch over the home).

The crime statistics for the period (January and February 1975) were as follows:-

<u>Nature of Crime</u>	<u>Jan: 1975</u>	<u>Feb: 1975</u>
Robbery	-	-
Rape	12	19
Serious Assault	72	83
Common Assault	205	210
Murder	4	6

These figures represent cases that were reported to the police. For various reasons an unknown quantity of unreported cases existed. For this reason, the reported cases may not be regarded as being conclusive.

The Bantu Affairs Commissioner's Offices

Black and white officers man these offices. The emphasis has been on a gradual africanisation of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's Offices.

1. 11 The Postal Services

These are poorly provided. The one and only post office in the township is situated in unit 2. It is equipped with a telephone exchange system. The Postmaster and staff are black. All the other units are served by pillar boxes. In some units, even these pillar box facilities were lacking. Consequently, people had to go to the main post office for even such small transactions as buying postage stamps.

The service of the telephone exchange and even the post office itself leaves much to be desired.

The police and postal services were under the control of the RSA Government. It was strongly speculated, though, that by 1977 the police would be handed over to the Ciskei Government.

1. 12 The Township Council

Before 1971, Mdantsane was administered by a Board of Management which was composed of a Township Manager and men appointed from the superintendencies. The size of this body depended on the number of superintendencies. In 1971 the provisions of Chapter 8 of Proclamation 293 of 1962 were applied to the township through proclamation 419 of 1971. Proclamation 293 of 1962 governs the establishment of townships in homelands. Chapter 8 of this proclamation deals with the establishment and control of township councils. The provisions of this proclamation are made applicable to each township by means of a proclamation.

The first township council was established in 1971. It was made up of elected and non-elected members. The elected members exceed the nominated members by two. The Chairman and deputy chairman of the council are elected from among the members of the council. The secretary

is a paid official. Members serve a two-year term during which the chairman who is commonly referred to as Mayor, is elected every twelve months. The council is responsible for the administration of the township and is required to:-

- a) Give such orders or directions not inconsistent with these regulations.
- b) Make bye-laws for general observance in the township
- c) In addition to other fees payable, levy a rate not exceeding R1-00 per annum for the benefit of the treasury of such township council.
- d) Allocate accommodation to township residents.
- e) Remove unlawful residents and prevent unlawful occupation of land.
- f) Allocate building sites to schools, churches and businesses.
- g) Control the issuing of trading licences.
- h) Institute quasi-judicial enquiries into rent defaults.

(Source: Proclamation 293 of 1962)

a) The First Township Elections: 1971

The first township council election was held in 1971. The inauguration of the councillors was performed by the then Commissioner-General of the AmaXhosa in September of 1971. This council was established during the reign of the Mabandla regime. There were seven elected members. Each member represented a ward or superintendency.

The Mabandla Government nominated members to the council. The council election results were as follows:-

<u>Ward 1</u>		<u>Ward 2</u>		<u>Ward 3</u>	
Mazaule	- 599	Saule	- 810	Qumza	- 568
Mfaxes	- 176	Nontloko	- 172	Salman	- 410
Manqala	- 113	Joka	- 160	Bunzi	- 131
Mayaba	- 85	Hoyi	- 14		
Ngabaza	- 17				

<u>Ward 4</u>	<u>Ward 5</u>	<u>Ward 6</u>	<u>Ward 7</u>
Toyana - 889	Mbana - 667	Billie - 623	Jiba (unopposed)
Bungana - 126	Siyo - 532	Mahlangeni - 387	
Makotyana - 71			
Dyani - 43			

(Source: Daily Dispatch: 17. 9. 71)

The first council elections were fought on a non-party basis. When the Mabandla regime was deposed, after the Ciskei General Elections, the Sebe Government came into power leading a newly formed party. The CNIP was interested in consolidating its position; it was prepared to face any task in pursuance of this aim. The dichotomy of CNIP-CNP was to spread its tentacles even as far as the affairs of the township council. Evidence of this could be seen in the following:-

- a) The then chairman of the council claimed to be non-aligned. According to him, he belonged to neither the CNIP nor the CNP. But members of the Council claimed that he had pro-CNP sympathies. These said that if any issue came up for discussion, and during the course of the debate it became apparent that the loyalties of both the CNIP and CNP supporters were affected, the Chairman would fail to resolve the matter. Where the interests of the CNP were involved, it was alleged that the Mayor showed favouritism.
- b) One nominated member of the Council (Dr. Kakaza) was dismissed from the Council for pro-CNP sympathies (Daily Dispatch: 7. 9. 73).

This meant that party politics had made inroads into the civic affairs of the township even before the 1974 township elections. In several ways the activities of the council suffered. Take for instance the loss to the council of the services of a man of Dr. Kakaza's calibre, as a result of being dismissed for espousing pro-CNP sympathies. There was also the question of the many cases that were unresolved as a result of the Chairman's predicament.

When in 1974 the Council elections took place under the sponsorship of political parties, the only thing that was 'new' was the actual involvement of the Ciskei Government in the civic matters of the township. The Ciskei

Government was severely criticized for this involvement. Mr. Sebe, replying to this criticism stated that it was the duty of all governments to ensure that they enjoyed support and co-operation at all levels. The success of any government depended on the co-operation that existed between it and local government. One way of ensuring that this co-operation would be forthcoming was by placing one's men in the key positions such as the township councils (Daily Dispatch: 18. 10. 74). The Chief Minister supported his statements by citing examples from American and English political and administrative authorities.

b) Nominations for the 1974 Elections.

Before the nomination court for the candidates to contest the township election was convened, it became clear that the then Minister of Interior in the Ciskei Government, Mr. L.F. Siyo, was heading for a confrontation with Mr. Mtshizana, a lawyer in Mdantsane over the issue of the participation of Mdantsane residents of Transkeian origin in the election campaign. This confrontation developed into a 'smear campaign' (Daily Dispatch: 31. 5. 74).

The 'smear campaign' was primarily aimed at character assassination, by revealing in public facts and events in the private lives of people. Many people disapproved of this as a weapon for fighting an election. But its adoption emphasised the lack of depth in homeland politics.

When it became known that political parties would sponsor their own candidates, the CNP decided to announce a new set of candidates (Daily Dispatch: 9. 6. 74 and 4. 7. 74). The CNIP announced that it would regard the township elections as a testing ground for its strength.

Mdantsane was the largest black 'city' in the Ciskei. It was therefore, necessary that the ruling party should be in command of public opinion in Mdantsane to facilitate smooth functioning between the Ciskei Government and the township Council.

The Ciskei Cabinet made the CNIP nominations without consulting CNIP

supporters in Mdantsane. This was fraught with problems because:-

- i) There were candidates who were overlooked and not considered for nominations. These candidates were keen to contest as independents.
- ii) The CNIP nominations revealed an emphasis on young candidates and a disregard and rejection of the older and more experienced men.

The Ciskei Cabinet was, however, successful in dissuading the disgruntled candidates from contesting as independents. Some of them were awarded seats in the council as nominated councillors.

There arose another crop of 'independents'. These candidates wished to escape direct alignment with either the CNIP or the CNP. Their stand of non-alignment never actually materialised because from the point of view of CNIP supporters, these independents were grouped along with CNP, while the CNP on the other hand made use of the services of these 'independents' on its platforms. The final outcome of the nomination court was as follows:-

Zone 1

Mfaha, a CNP candidate was returned unopposed. In the 1971 Council elections, he had polled 176 votes against the winning 599.

Zone 2

Two candidates contested this seat: Dukashe, a local business man who had been a Government nominee in the 1971 Council was now sponsored by the CNIP. Sauli, also a local businessman, who had won the seat in 1971 by 810 votes, was sponsored by the CNP.

Zone 3

Mpepo was a CNIP candidate. He contested against Qumza, the first Mayor of the township who had won his 1971 election by 568 votes. Qumza himself described himself as an 'independent' but the public and the CNIP grouped him with the CNP.

Zone 4

A. Toyana contested against Dr. Kakaza. Toyana, a CNIP candidate had won this seat in 1971 by more than 800 votes. Dr. Kakaza was a Mabandla nominee on the 1971 Council and was dismissed from the Council by the Sebe regime for pro-CNP sympathies.

Zone 5

Siyo was CNIP candidate while Siphunzi represented the CNP. In the 1971 election, Siyo had lost to Mbana who polled 532 votes.

Zone 6

Mzamo, the only female on the list professed to be 'independent' but was regarded as a CNP hanger-on. Her husband was a staunch CNP supporter. She was returned unopposed.

Zone 7

Sonjica was returned unopposed. He was an 'independent' but was regarded as a CNP supporter.

Zone 8

Sicatsha was unopposed. He was a CNIP man. This was a new zone.

Zone 9

Mzongwana was a CNIP man. He contested against Mtshizana a lawyer in Mdantsane. Mtshizana was a CNP man. Zone 9 was a new zone.

The CNP emerged from the nominations with three unopposed candidates. One of these candidates would have preferred to be considered as an 'independent' candidate but people insisted on grouping her with the CNP. The CNIP on the other hand had only one candidate who was returned unopposed. There was to be a keen contest in five of the nine zones.

A survey of the candidates was conducted and the following was the outcome:-

CORRECTIONS

CLARIFYING TABLE ON P. 206.

1. The table focuses attention on two questions:-
 - a) The campaign methods used
 - b) Who used which method.

2. It must be assumed that each candidate will use all available opportunities to explain his manifesto and win for himself supporters. These campaign methods were amongst the tools used by the candidates to realise the said purpose. These campaign methods differed in one or more instances, for example:-
 - i) The press was used for clarifying the candidates stand-point and manifesto. It was also useful for announcing the candidate's programme: meetings and other things. It reached far and wide and even beyond the borders of the affected area.
 - ii) The Radio Worked on the same principle as did the press but both media were not in the control of the candidate. They could either be in favour or disfavour of the candidate. In the Mdautsane 1974 township council elections, most candidates did not favour the press and radio.
 - iii) House Party may have two essential aims: one the opportunity to clarify a candidate's point of view and win support and the other raising fund. It is usually held in a limit to the number of people to be invited. The candidate explains his manifesto over a cup of tea and at the same time is afforded an opportunity to get a closer and friendlier look at his supporters. Very informal.
 - iv) Public meetings are held either in public Buildings or open air. They are formal and adhere to a set procedure and have a chairman.
 - v) House visits may be undertaken by the candidate. He visits private houses and talk to families. He may be assisted in this by his supporters.
 - vi) House meetings are more or less the same as house parties. The difference lies in that in a house meeting, the purpose is not to raise funds and there is a chairman who has a procedure to follow.

1. Methods of campaigning:

Party	Press	Radio	House Parties	Public Meetings	House Visits	House Meetings	None
CNIP	-	-	4	3	4	-	
CNP	1	-	3	4	2	-	1
IND.	-	-	1	-	3	1	

- i) House parties, public meetings and house-to-house visits seemed to be the most commonly used.
- ii) Only one candidate made use of the press. The CNIP supported candidates claimed that the press, especially the Daily Dispatch gave them bad publicity.
- iii) The public meetings referred to included open air meetings which were commonly used by both sides. At these meetings, candidates shared platforms. Each meeting was preceded by a motorcade through the township. Loud hailers were used to praise one set of candidates and to criticize the other, songs were sung. At the venue of the meeting, speeches were interspersed with the singing of hymns whose wording had been changed to convey messages in praise of the one set of candidates, on the one hand and disparaging messages about the other candidates on the other hand. Shouts of 'Bopha' in the case of CNIP supporters, would be heard while CNP supporters cried 'Khulula'. At times a praise-singer would be used. This was common in CNIP meetings.

The 'smear campaign' dominated the agenda of such meetings.

2. When asked about the difficulties these candidates encountered during the campaign, the following replies were received:-

- i) Six candidates (3 CNIP; 2 Independents and 1 CNP) did not experience any difficulties.
- ii) Three CNIP candidates, four CNP and one Independent experienced some difficulties. These difficulties included some of the following:-

'The Smear-campaign which was generated by the campaign acted as a deterrent to potential supporters. People were reluctant to attend meetings as a result of the crime rate'

3. What issues did the candidates raise during the campaign?

To facilitate an understanding of this point, it must be understood that candidates from the CNIP camp did not use any handbills or manifestos. They argued that the use of handbills or manifestos did not guarantee that what was contained in them would be honoured by successful candidates. Candidates from the CNP, on the other hand, made use of handbills and manifestoes. This group was made up of highly educated people; they appealed to the educated and moreover realised that the handbills or manifestos could reach those who were not able to attend meetings.

The following issues were raised by the candidates:-

i) Lighting

Street lighting at some points in the township was inadequate. Some streets were impassable during wet weather. Improvements should be made.

ii) Housing

Housing was inadequate. This should be improved.

iii) Welfare and Sport facilities

Welfare services were not satisfactory. These were inadequate. Sport facilities were also not satisfactory. The control of grounds left much to be desired.

iv) Funeral Services

These were inadequate. They were being provided on a monopolistic basis by Mr. Siyo. This led to exploitative prices and low standards of service. 'Non-Bantu' undertakers were not allowed into the township.

v) Schools

Schools were inadequate and those that existed needed improvement. It was suggested that lower primary schools should be provided with wooden floors. There should be a lower primary school in each unit to enable young children to attend without problems.

vi) Post Office Services

These services should be extended to all units. At present there is only one post office. This was situated in unit two.

vii) Autonomy in local affairs

This meant that the township council should be allowed the control of its own treasury and not rely on decisions from Zwelitsha.

viii) Shopping facilities

These were inadequate. This encouraged the flourishing of 'pirate' traders who charged exorbitant prices.

ix) Transport

A white-owned bus company operated in the township. It provided a two-staged service: there was a feeder system which operated between the units and the main bus terminus in the township and a main service that operated between the main bus terminus in the township and the main terminus in town. (East London).

Dissatisfaction over the bus service had been great. Bus commuters complained about, inter alia:

- a) Increase in bus fares
- b) Discourteous behaviour of bus road staff
- c) The inadequacy of the feeder system.

Apart from complaint (a) the other complaints formed part of a long standing list of complaints. The decision to increase bus fares with effect from the 1st December, 1974 was the last straw that broke the camel's back. A bus boycott started and continued for two months. I am merely adding this to illustrate the importance of transport in Mdantsane. The elections were held in September, 1974 but the bus boycott started in December. It is not surprising then that all candidates included the question of transport in their manifestos.

4. A probe into the ages of the candidates revealed the following:-

Age	CNIP	CNP	IND
30-40	1	2	2
41-50	-	2	1
51-60	5	1	-
Total	6	5	3

- i) The CNIP candidates were older
- ii) The CNP candidates were younger

Place of birth:-

Party	East London		Outside: E. L.	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
CNIP	2	-	1	3
CNP	-	-	1	4
IND.	-	1	-	2

- i) Only the CNIP had candidates who were born in town.
- ii) Most of the candidates came from outside the urban area, emphasising a characteristic element in the composition of the township population: its population included many resettled families.

5. Occupation and Education.

5.1 Education

Party	Primary	J. C.	Matric	Degree	Professional
CNIP	4	1	1	-	Primary School plus Diploma in Agriculture
CNP	1	-	2	2	1 MB ChB FCP 2 Attorneys Adm.
IND.	-	1	2	-	NP 4 plus J. C.

The CNP candidates were, on the whole, more highly educated.

5.2 Occupation

Party	Lawyer	Medico	Own business	Journalist	Salesman	Pensioner	Clerk	Factory Worker	Other*
CNIP			3			1			2
CNP	1	1	1		2				
IND.			1	1			1		

* Other includes storeman and Painter

The CNIP had mainly self-employed (business) men

The CNP had a monopoly of professional men

6. In an attempt to ascertain the attitudes of the candidates towards tribalism as manifest through the use of the isiduko and allegiance to tribe and chief, the following questions were asked:-

- a) What was your isiduko?
- b) To which tribe did you belong?
- c) Who was your chief?

The following response was recorded:-

Party	Isiduko	Tribe	Chief	None
CNIP	6	5	5	2
CNP	5	3	2	5
IND.	3	3	2	1

For an explanation of an isiduko (clan name) reference will be made to (Soga: 1930: 20) who regards the isiduko as being different from a surname. The isiduko is applicable to a wider relationship circle than is a surname. The isiduko was commonly used for tribal identification purposes. For instance, the isiduko distinguishes an imFengu from an umXhosa. Africans, especially those that are Xhosa-speaking, whether urban or rural dwellers, use the isiduko to a great extent. (Pauw: 1975: 3).

All candidates more readily remembered their iziduko than they did their chiefs or tribes.

7. When candidates were asked about the reasons why they identified with the parties of their choice, they replied as follows:-

- i) Nine were attracted by the policies of the various parties.
- ii) Three independents did not join any party.
- iii) Two followed the example and influence of relatives.

8. What were the policies of the parties they supported?

- a) The three independents had no party to support.
- b) Four CNP candidates supported the official policy of the CNP: namely, non-racialism.
- c) One CNP supporter, while espousing the policy of Non-racialism, also added that apartheid was imposed from above; Africans were never consulted about it. He believed that rights and responsibilities must be determined, not by one's isiduko or tribal affiliation or the colour of one's skin and texture of the hair, it should be by merit.
- d) Six candidates embraced the policy of separate development.

9. Political Background.

Party	ANC, PAC AAC etc.	Advisory Boards	Homeland* Politics	None
CNIP	3	1	2	-
CNP	4	-	1	-
IND.	1	-	1	1

* Homeland Politics indicates that the township elections were the candidate's first experience.

The majority of candidates claimed association with the organisations of the liberation movement of the fifties.

10. Reasons for standing included the following:-

- 1) Two candidates advanced the status and constitution of the council as a reason for standing. They argued that there was a need for change in the structure of the council and that the relationship between the Ciskei and the township council had to be overhauled to allow for more powers to be given to the council.
- 2) Five candidates stood because of the Community's grievances. The grievances of the people were not receiving proper and fair attention.
- 3) There were candidates who stood because they were requested to do so by:-
 - a) Residents of the unit (Three candidates)
 - b) Political parties (Two candidates)

After campaigning, polling day came and the results of the elections were as follows:-

Zone 4

Toyana (CNIP)	-	807
Dr. Kakaza (CNP)	-	135

Toyana (CNIP) won the seat.

Zone 2

Dukashe (CNIP)	-	603
Sauli (CNP)	-	313

Dukashe (CNIP) won the seat.

Zone 3

Mpepo (CNIP)	-	766
Qumza (Ind.)	-	100

Mpepo (CNIP) won the seat.

Zone 5

Siyo (CNIP)	-	698
Siphunzi (CNP)	-	199

Siyo (CNIP) won the seat.

Zone 9

Mzongwana (CNIP) - 550
 Mtshizana (CNP) - 218
 Mzongwana (CNIP) won the seat.

(Source: Daily Dispatch: 4. 10. 74)

11. Post-Election Events

Not only was the Ciskei Government satisfied with the outcome of the township elections, the Chief Minister emphasised the necessity for the Ciskei Government to establish co-operation between it and the local government. This was one way in which that co-operation could be achieved (Daily Dispatch: 18. 10. 74)

The Ciskei Government 'packed' the council with members nominated from its ranks. Seven members were nominated (Daily Dispatch: 18. 10. 74). The new council was inducted into office by Chief P. Z. Siwani, the then chairman of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly. (Daily Dispatch 18. 10. 74) At the first meeting of the new council when officers and standing committees were being elected, the three pro-CNP cum independent councillors were overlooked for election to the standing committees. Thus, when it was announced later that these three councillors had been dismissed from the council for failure to pay rent (Daily Dispatch: 25. 10. 74) it did not come as a surprise.

The vacancies that were created as a result of the dismissal of these councillors, were filled by pro-CNIP candidates after a bye-election was held. (Daily Dispatch: 14. 2. 75).

SECTION B2. ZWELITSHA

Zwelitsha lies on the banks of the Buffalo River, about four kilometres from King William's Town. The name Zwelitsha is derived from two words: ilizwe elitsha. The fusion of these words Zwe plus litsha gives us Zwelitsha which means a 'new country'. This name has been appropriate

because to many landless Africans and resettled families, this town has provided a home.

It was started in 1949 as an experimental village (Hammond-Tooke: 1958: p. 37-8). The establishment of Zwelitsha was meant to provide a home for workers from the over-populated Ciskei as well as families resettled from white urban and farm areas. These were to be settled in Zwelitsha under fully urbanized conditions.

2. Socio-Economic Conditions

It is the oldest homeland township with the result that:-

"... there had been time for amenities to be provided such as electricity, sewerage, tarred main roads, a community hall and a teacher-training college. There is a hotel, several restaurants and a variety of shops ..."
(Horrell: 1973: p. 146).

The Goodhope Textile Corporation which was started as a joint undertaking by the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa and the Calico Printers Association of Great Britain offers employment to residents of Zwelitsha (Hammond-Tooke: op cit). There is also the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, shops, and factories in the King William's Town-Berlin-East London industrial development area. The township also relies on the Ciskei Government which provides the most employment.

In 1974 there were within the township sixteen general dealers; one garage; one funeral parlour; a block of offices and some private individuals provided employment to domestic servants.

2. Population

The population statistics for the township are as follows:-

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
21027	21125	22180	26495	29650	29816

(Source: Benbo: 1975: p. 32-3).

Between 1970 and 1975 the increase in population was 8789. When taking these population figures into consideration it must be borne in mind that the official figures represent population figures of those who were officially registered. Fear of being repatriated or punished under the pass laws, results in some people avoiding officially registering. Consequently, the 'unofficial' population escapes enumeration.

2.2 Houses

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
2356	2397	2369	2417	2419	2419

(Source: Benbo: 1975: 32/3).

Only sixty-three houses were built between 1970 and 1975. This was at an average of five houses per year. In 1972, about twenty-eight houses were, for one reason or another, demolished. (Benbo: op cit)

2.3 Administrative and Political

Zwelitsha was earlier administered by a Board of Control under the supervision of a white manager. Members of the Board of Control were appointed from among the residents. The township was divided into wards; each ward was represented by one member on the Board of Control. The township council was established under Chapter 8 of Proclamation 293 of 1962. The first township council was established in 1971. Its elections were carried out on a non-political party basis but with the emergence of the political parties in the Ciskei, councillors were viewed with suspicion that they might support the CNP. Hence when the present Ciskei Government assumed power, it dismissed councillors nominated to the Council by the previous (Mabandla) Government. It accused these councillors of pro-CNP sympathies (Daily Dispatch: 17. 8. 74).

The functions and powers of the Zwelitsha council are the same as those for the Mdantsane council which have been adequately discussed in the section on Mdantsane. Just as much as the Ciskei Government desired to extend its control and influence over the Mdantsane township council, so did it entertain the same hope and desire with regard to the Zwelitsha township council.

Moreover, it was argued, inter alia, that Zwelithsa was the headquarters of the Ciskei Government; it was correct and appropriate therefore that Zwelithsa should become the stronghold of the ruling party. This could be achieved by gaining control of the key positions in the township.

2.4 Nominations

Before the nomination court was convened, the SABC warned its employees against taking an active part in the township council affairs. (Daily Dispatch: 23. 8. 74). The effect of this announcement was to deny employees of the SABC any opportunity to seek nomination as candidates for the township council election. Consequently, if the CNP had hoped to use any of the SABC employees as candidates, it was prevented.

The CNIP announced the names of the candidates it had nominated to contest the council seats. (Daily Dispatch: 26. 7. 74) The final results of the nomination court were as follows:-

Ward 1

Makopo (CNIP) unopposed.

Ward 2

Nokele (CNIP)

Qunta (CNP)

Ward 3

Sigwabe (CNIP) unopposed.

Ward 4

Bobo (CNIP) unopposed

Ward 5

Qeqe (CNIP) unopposed

Ward 6

Dyonase (CNIP)

Ngaba (CNP)

Elections would be held at only two wards, namely 2 and 6.

2.5 Campaign and Elections

The campaign at Zwelitsha was less aggressive than the one at Mdantsane. But the ruling party had warned its members and supporters not to attend meetings convened by CNP candidates. (Daily Dispatch: 19. 7. 74). In a pre-election survey of the candidates, the following became clear:-

i) All candidates were males. The CNIP had six, while only two were sponsored by the CNP. Four of these had been returned unopposed. Voting would take place at wards 2 and 6 only.

ii) Place of birth

Only two of these candidates were born in urban areas. The other six were born in rural areas. This emphasised the position of Zwelitsha as a township surrounded by Ciskei Villages.

iii) Education

One had no education at all. Three had primary school education. Four had the Junior Certificate. One had a University degree.

iv) Occupation

One was a clerk. Two were employed as machine minders at the Textile factory. One was a salesman in a furniture shop.

v) Tribal Affiliation

All of them could and readily remembered their clan names (iziduko) but only three were willing to be associated with either a chief or any particular tribe. This emphasised the effect of urbanisation which tended to minimise the effects of tribalism.

vi) When asked about who supported their nominations, the following replies were given:-

- a) One candidate was supported by the Church
- b) Six were supported by their political parties
- c) One was supported by residents in his ward.

vii) Asked why they identified themselves with political parties, they answered as follows:-

- a) One joined a political party as a result of the example set by his friends.
- b) Six were attracted by the principles and policies of the parties.
- c) One joined because it was the party in power.

- xv) Issues raised by candidates in their manifestos included the following:-
- a) Improvements to schools and the water supply.
 - b) Improvement to the standard of working conditions, wages and a reduction in unemployment.
 - c) Rentals were too high and an abolition of the practice of 'locking out' residents because of arrears in rents.
 - d) Improvement to and additions to sport facilities.
 - e) A review of the present system of issuing trade licences.
 - f) The stricter application of the Bantu Law and Custom in relation to 'unmarried' mothers.
 - g) The acceleration of the provision of houses in order to fight congestion.
 - h) The provision of more street lights and an improvement to the township roads.

The 30th day of September, 1974 was the day preceding the polling day. On that day, the CNIP held a big rally in support of its candidates. Delegates to this rally came from Mdantsane as well as other small places, nearby. Members of the Ciskei Cabinet who were present included the Chief Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Agriculture. The cabinet ministers had come in their official cars. This added dignity and officialdom to the motorcade that drove to the Community Centre. The motorcade met the Mdantsane delegation near the SABC building. Singing of hymns and cries of 'Bopha' filled the air as a public hailer system increased the velocity of the sounds.

Speakers at the rally reiterated the need for Zwelitsha to become a CNIP stronghold. Zwelitsha was the headquarters of the Ciskei Government, therefore the ruling party had to control public opinion.

Small children recited verses that praised the Government and detrimental things were said about the opposition. A praise-singer repeated praises about the Government. All this was interspersed with cries of 'Bopha'. If you were in the audience and you failed to shout 'Bopha', a strange feeling of loneliness (the loneliness you would feel in a strange foreign environment) overcame you. The genuine and

- b) The two CNP candidates preferred a CNP majority because it would always seek to promote co-operation and harmony.
- xi) Asked about how they viewed the functions of the Council, they answered as follows:-
- a) It served as a forum.
 - b) Things were improving. (these were not explained)
 - c) The regulations governing the Council should be applied honestly and intelligently. (This was not explained).
 - d) One candidate explained that the Council did more for the community, but failed to explain what he meant.
 - e) One felt that the intrusion of party politics into civic matters, would eventually stifle the council.
- xii) When asked why the Council was preferred to other organisations, the replies were as follows:-
- a) The council was the only organisation the respondent was acquainted with.
 - b) The council had more power than the Board of Control.
- xiii) Why did you stand?
- The following answers were given:-
- a) I wanted to be of service to the community.
 - b) Things do not work out well without me.
 - c) I was requested by the residents of my ward.
 - d) I wanted to protect the interests of the community
 - e) I have an interest in public affairs.
 - f) I was requested to stand by my party.
- xiv) A probe into the political background of the candidates revealed, inter alia, that:-
- a) One had taken part in the activities of the organisations of the liberation movement of the fifties.
 - b) Six started their political careers with the beginning of homeland politics.
 - c) One had none.

viii) When we probed into their methods of campaigning, the following replies were given:-

All claimed to be using meetings. People were invited to these meetings.

ix) Asked whether they experienced any difficulties during and in connection with their campaigns, they replied as follows:-

a) None of the six CNIP supported candidates experienced any difficulty. The two that were facing an election, did not experience any difficulties.

b) The two CNP candidates met with varied difficulties. It was alleged that people who voted or supported these CNP candidates or attended meetings convened by these candidates, would, inter alia, be evicted from their houses; their pension grants would be discontinued.

c) One CNP candidate claimed that he experienced difficulties with the venue for his campaign meetings. If, per chance, he got a venue for a meeting, the CNIP supporters would come to disrupt his meeting or organise a counter meeting in the same vicinity.

d) It was alleged that the CNP was against the Government. Even if a council would have a CNP majority, that council would not enjoy the co-operation and confidence of the Government.

e) One CNP candidate complained that it had become difficult for him to walk about the streets. Children confronted him singing songs with messages that defiled him. Cries of 'Bopha' accompanied these songs. He contemplated withdrawing from the campaign.

x) When asked about which majority would be effective in the council, they answered as follows:-

a) The six CNIP candidates preferred a CNIP majority because it would enjoy the support of the Government. Consequently, there would be less confrontation between the Government and the Council.

spontaneous feeling of the people compelled you to identify yourself with them. You felt that the people around you believed in the 'freedom' and 'equality' these homeland leaders alluded to.

2.6 The Elections and Aftermath

The 1. 10. 1974 was polling day at Zwelitsha. Polling stations were established at the Community Centre for the residents of Zone two and at a Lower Primary School for those living at Zone six.

When I interviewed the CNP candidate at Zone two, I found him to be very unhappy. He had discovered that the Zone two voters list contained names of persons who did not qualify for inclusion. (Daily Dispatch: 1. 10. 74). CNIP camp followers had entered the immediate vicinity of the polling station wearing buttonholes bearing the name of the CNIP candidate. The buttonholes carried messages such as Votela uNokele (vote for Nokele). Banners carrying the same message were displayed in the immediate vicinity.

After a long discussion between a polling officer and the two candidates, it was decided that the banners and buttonhole cards should be removed from the immediate vicinity of the polling station. These could be displayed outside the fence. Voting eventually started after these banners had been removed. On the question of a voters list, no finality was reached. The CNP candidate registered his dissatisfaction, though he made it clear that he would abide by the outcome.

At the Zone six polling station, only one candidate had turned up. The CNP candidate withdrew from the campaign when things started to 'hot up': he could not succeed in organising meetings and the tactics of the CNIP had become personal. For instance, children would mock, at times insult him in the streets. Voting proceeded as normal at this 'station' just as if there were two candidates.

The Ciskei Cabinet paid brief visits to the polling stations. The school where the voting took place at Zone six was 'closed' for the day and the children were sent home. These children helped to swell the numbers of those who were singing outside these polling stations. The singing

and shouting outside the polling stations, was reinforced when CNIP supporters from Mdantsane arrived in bus-loads. Fights broke out between the groups of supporters. Cries of 'bopha' filled the air. Queues of voters had been formed: one for the CNIP candidate and the other for the CNP candidate. At Zone two the queue for the CNIP candidate became ever longer while that for the CNP candidate became ever shorter. At the Zone six polling station, there was only one queue and that was for the CNIP candidate. The over-all effect of the queues would be to influence even prospective CNP voters to join the CNIP supporters.

The overwhelming presence of CNIP supporters may be presumed to have affected voting patterns. I myself observed the queues of CNIP supporters growing longer while those of the CNP became reduced.

The election results were as follows:-

Ward 2

Nokele (CNIP) - 411

Qunta (CNP) - 100

Nokele won.

Ward 6

Dyonase (CNIP) - 467

Ngaba (CNP) - Nil

Dyonase won.

(Source: Daily Dispatch: 11. 10. 74).

After the announcement of the results, the Ciskei Government announced the names of the four nominated candidates. These included men from the CNIP ranks, thus giving the council a completely CNIP complexion.

SECTION C

3. CONCLUSION

For purposes of clarity, this section will be divided into two: one part will deal with party activity and its effects upon individuals while the other will be devoted to a summary on the intrusion of party politics on civic

matters with the resultant effects on the Government and other inter-associational relations.

3.1 Effect of Party Intrusion on Individuals and Inter-personal Relations

For the purpose of this comment, the political party activity in both Mdantsane and Zwelitsha will be treated as one.

The total votes cast at Mdantsane and Zwelitsha was 5358. Of these the CNIP candidates, from Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, polled 4293 votes or 80, 12% while the combined effort of the Mdantsane and Zwelitsha CNIP candidates amounted to only 1065 or 19, 88%. This was a very low poll and a poor performance by the CNIP candidates.

Now, let us consider the election results from a point of view of individual achievement. The CNIP candidates were, in both townships, highly qualified, being university graduates. This in itself should have added to their dignity and charisma. CNIP candidates on the whole were business men and factory workers. But as a result of the effect of the party influence the individual outcome was as follows:-

In 1971 Sauli won the ward 2 seat with 810 votes but in 1974, he managed to get only 313 votes.

In 1971, Qumza won the ward 3 seat with 500 votes; in 1974 he polled a mere 100 votes.

A well-known Mdantsane Lawyer contested ward 9 against an unknown CNIP candidate. This lawyer polled 218 against the 'unknown' person's total of 550 votes.

Ward 4 where a well-known medical practitioner polled 135 votes, was won by Toyana with 807 votes.

At Zwelitsha a well-known university graduate and secretary of the CNIP polled 100 votes against Nokele's 411 votes.

I have been trying to show how personal dignity and charisma have been undermined. (Educational achievement is regarded with respect and awe amongst Africans). Therefore the defeat of 'well educated' people by ordinary business men suggests the existence and presence of another dimension.

It must be assumed that both parties (and candidates) were allowed equal opportunities for appealing to the electorate. But the issues become weighted against the opposition when we consider the type of an electorate they had to deal with.

The Ciskei electorate is mostly illiterate and uninformed; it cannot see the difference between the ruling party and the Government; it will also not see the need for the existence of an opposition party. Thus, the ruling party presented its candidates as people who were approved by the Government. People were asked to vote for the candidate approved by the Government. Voting for these Government 'approved' candidates, ensured that such amenities as pensions, houses, sport facilities and schools are made available, but on the contrary to vote otherwise would result in a denial of these amenities. Therefore to support the CNP was at the risk of having these amenities discontinued. People, as a result feared going against the Government. This was where the success of the CNIP lay. In its being associated with the Government.

What effect did political party intrusion in civic matters have upon personal relations? Personal enmity and hostility against the opposition was manifest. Hostile camps of CNIP-CNP formed within the ranks of local government.

We have discussed the adoption and application of a 'smear campaign' during the township elections. The nature of the 'smear campaign' resulted in character assassination. This bred enmity and hostility. The banishment of the Mdantsane lawyer was one such bad fruit resulting from this 'smear campaign'.

3. 2 Effect of Intrusion on Government.

Government involvement in local affairs was bound to have bad results. When the Government became directly involved in civic matters, it was easily affected by anything that happened at local level. Take for instance, the recent conflict in the Mdantsane township council. The council was consequently divided into two groups: there was the Siyo group of councillors and there was on the other hand, the group of councillors that supported Sebe.

The Siyo group was accused of perpetrating such malpractices as accepting bribes, displaying favouritism in the allocation of houses and many others (Daily Dispatch: 3. 6. 77).

This conflict within the Mdantsane township council has affected relations between members of the Ciskei Cabinet. There has arisen a rift between Sebe and Siyo.

It is possible that if the Ciskei Government had not involved itself in local matters in Mdantsane or Zwelitsha, it would not have been readily affected by such conflicts.

It is difficult for the Government to stand aloof now. Instead, it is entangling itself even more. Its latest move has been to remove the nominated councillors in the Mdantsane council because of allegedly pro-Siyo sympathies. A set of nominated members has to be selected from the pro-Sebe camp. The aim was to 'pack' the council with pro-Sebe councillors; a vote of no-confidence was then to be passed in the Mayor. If this succeeded, a new council would be elected, preferably from the pro-Sebe ranks. (Daily Dispatch: 3. 6. 77).

This has not by any means promoted the articulation and aggregation of interests. The ordinary man in the street is left without a channel of communication as a result of party politics.

Take also the example of the 1971 council in Mdantsane. Many things could not be resolved as a result of a deadlock between the CNIP and the CNP. In 1977, the Sebe-Siyo rift has been reflected at council level and is impairing the efficacy of the council.

Again the intrusion of party politics into civic matters makes the Government responsible, to a degree, for possible civic mismanagement.

The argument that the Government need have control over the township council is unfounded. For one thing the council operates within a framework set by the Government. The council is structurally controlled by the Government. This control is exercised through the allocation of funds.

3.3 The Government and legitimacy.

Another important aspect of the control of townships by the Government, is the question of legitimacy. The Government must strive to increase its legitimacy amongst its citizens. This it may achieve by providing more amenities for the community and by encouraging the people, through their organisations, to communicate with the Government.

In a survey of voluntary associations in Zwelitsha, we probed into the people's awareness about the relationships between the Government and the various voluntary associations. We tried to find out whether the people were aware of the Government's obligations towards them.

The organisations that were interviewed were thirty-one. The following were included:-

'two educational organisations; five sporting bodies; four entrepreneurial, five religious, one social, five workers' associations, and one politico-cultural.'

In response to a question whether these associations ever experienced any interference from the Government, they replied as follows:

- a) A cricket club and Saso (South African Students Organisation) did experience interference from the Government. With the cricket club it was refusal of a permit for a Coloured player to enter the township, whilst Saso activities are forever receiving police attention.
- b) The other associations had never experienced any difficulties with the Government.

Asked whether party politics affected their activities, the following response was obtained:-

- a) Only one organisation, a teachers association, experienced interference from the CNIP-CNP dichotomy. As a result of this, the membership dwindled and consequently the organisation became defunct.

- b) The other organisations did not experience CNIP-CNP interference with their activities.

Asked if they ever approached the Government for assistance, the replies were:-

- a) Only eleven organisations ever approached the Government for assistance such as, for example, tennis courts; improvement to a holiday resort and applications for registration.
- b) The other twenty organisations had not made any contact with the Government.

These organisations proved to be unaware of the 'input' function they could perform. By so doing, they would not only be catering to the interests of their members but would also be supporting the Government and building its legitimacy.

Finally, we must view the township council as a local level organisation that should be within the reach of every one, regardless of their political affiliation. When this council is tainted by party politics, it becomes unapproachable to those who do not share the same political views as the councillors. The tasks which it was supposed to do, namely, to provide the channelling of communications and to provide a platform for the interests and aspirations of the people, are not carried out properly.

When the ruling party controls "... all the patronage and all the avenues of opportunity" political cynicism spreads and the public becomes adept at producing "spontaneous support" Prof. Apter calls this the most harmful type of corruption. It is even more corrupt than the mal-appropriation of funds because society is then based on delusion and deception. (Apter in Markovitz: 1970: 232).

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Seven

Page	231	para	6	Line	3: 'community' in small letters
"	231	"	2	"	17: Correct spelling 'themselves'
"	233	"	5	"	3: Correct spelling 'Maqoma'
"	235	"	4	"	3: Small letters: 'lawyer'
"	240	"	3	"	2: 'is affected' should read 'was affected'
					3: 'is quick' should read 'was quick'
					5: 'will' should read 'can'
"	241	"	2	"	9: 'condition' whould read 'conditions'
		"	1	"	2: Insert 'homelands' after RSA
		"	2	"	8: Small letters' 'world'

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PARTY SYSTEM

1. Introduction

Up to the present, we have traced the political development of the Ciskei. It had developed from a non-elective institution that was based on the council system. With the introduction of the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 in the area of the Ciskei, the Ciskei General Council ceased to exist; it gave way to an institution based on the 'authorities' system. In 1968, this institution received extensive powers under the 'New Deal'. When the Council System was being abolished, it was described as being "foreign to African development" (Charton: 1977: ibid) the council system was said to encourage development from top to bottom unlike the 'authorities' system which encouraged systematic development from bottom to top; it was being said that the 'authorities' system took into consideration the customs and traditions of the Africans. The 'authorities' system was based on the chief. The 'New Deal' in its wake brought new governmental symbols into existence. An Executive Council which was the precursor of the present Cabinet system, was introduced. The members of the Executive Council were placed at the head of state departments. The 'New Deal' was described by one official of the Department of Bantu Affairs as an attempt to decentralise the department of Bantu Administration and Development.

When the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, 1971 was promulgated, its provisions were applied to the Ciskei by means of proclamations in two different stages. The whole process culminating in the attainment of a semi-autonomous status by the Ciskei within the RSA. It was as a result of the attainment of this status that a legislature with a political party system developed.

This section seeks to investigate the political party system that emerged as a result of the attainment of this semi-autonomous status. Particular reference to the following will be made:-

- i) What type of a party system actually developed?
Was it a one-, two or dominant party system?

- ii) Does the party system allow for free elections or is it non-competitive?
- iii) Does the party system allow for an opposition? What type of an opposition?

2. The Party System

After the first general election for the twenty CLA members, political parties emerged from election campaign groups. The only political party that contested the election in the Victoria East constituency, was rejected by the electorate. Only the two groups led, one by Mr Sebe and the other by Chief Mabandla, remained. These groups had during the election campaign made use of the AmaMfengu-AmaRarabe tribal conflict in their drive for support. This resulted in their being associated with the respective tribal groups: the Mabandla group was associated with the AmaMfengu while the Sebe group was associated with the AmaRarabe.

The structure and membership of political parties were discernible in the outline in these groups; consequently, when the existence of parties was announced, the leading personnel were those that led the election groups. The Ciskei National Party was led by Chief Mabandla while the Ciskei National Independence Party was led by Mr Sebe (CLA Debates: 1973).

The CNP had originally decided on the Ciskei National Convention for a name. This name was rejected because it aroused associations with the organisations of the liberation movement of the fifties. It was feared that people would be reluctant to identify themselves with such organisations as the African National Congress or the All-African Convention. The name Ciskei National Independence Party was an import from the Transkei, with only the 'Ciskei' being substituted for the Transkei. These parties were born in an Assembly that was composed of thirty ex officio members and twenty elected. (Proclamation R187 of 1972). The section dealing with the ex officio membership can readily be amended whenever there is a need, as was the case in 1974 with Proclamation R38 which made provision for additional chieftaincies (Charton: 1977: 1).

The CNP in 1973 was the party of the chiefs, as well as the party of the 'Fingo'. The only elected representatives in this party were messrs P. G. Stamper (Peddie) L. R. Peteni (Keiskammahoek) S. J. Mokhesi Herschel) J. Saliwa and W. Jaxa (Glen Grey). In 1976 there was only one elected representative left ..."

The Ciskei National Independence Party in contrast could claim the allegiance of only 11 chiefs out of the 30 in 1973. The remaining 15 elected representatives were their men and they elected an all commoner cabinet ... (Charton: 1977: 6)

This gave the CNIP a slender majority of two over the CNP to win the Chief Ministership. But today, not only does the CNIP command a strong majority in the CLA, but its leader is a recognised chief, leading a cabinet with five chiefs and only one commoner! This illustrates the importance of chieftainship in the balance of power.

2.1 The Policies of the Parties

The CNIP inherited from the 'Big 17' the policy of separate development. CNP speakers teased the ruling party for adopting its masters' policy (CLA Debates: 1975).

During the election campaign and for some time after that, the CNP adopted the policy of separate development. The similarity in the policies between the CNP and the CNIP was emphasised by a statement in which the then Minister of Justice in the Ciskei Government once claimed that there was no opposition in the CLA (Records of CLA Debates: 1973: 113) It was only after a conference in 1974 that the CNP changed its policy to that of non-racialism. Though the CNIP found it necessary to ridicule the CNP for this change of policy; as a result of this change the CNP was turned into an opposition with an ideological alternative to the policy of separate development.

It had been argued in some circles that, the policy of non-racialism within a framework of separate development was not practicable.

2.2 The Struggle for Supremacy

Before we discuss the form and nature of the struggle of these parties for supremacy, I wish to refute a statement by one of the CLA members:-

"... the CLA was divided into two the day the Opposition announced its establishment as a party..." (Records of the CLA Debates: 1973)

This statement does not take into consideration the existence of election groups which had divided the Ciskei into camps of Imbokotho and Ikhonco. When the parties emerged the dichotomy of Imbokotho and Ikhonco was already in full swing. Thus the struggle for supremacy in the Ciskei had begun during the general election campaign. When the CNIP won the Chief Ministership by a narrow margin of two, this was a continuation of the struggle. The fortunes of the ruling party continued to rise while those of the Opposition, declined.

The ruling party also registered convincing victories over the Opposition at the polls at Keiskammahoeck, Herschel and the township council elections at Mdantsane and Zwelitsha. This established the ruling party as the leader of public opinion both in the rural and urban areas of the Ciskei. The ruling party further consolidated its position by employing the following tactics:-

- a) It installed its supporters in key positions, both as a method of control and as a means of legitimizing itself.
- b) New chieftainships were created that would support the ruling party, assuring it of an official majority in the CLA (Charton: 1977: op cit).
- c) It tried to drive a wedge between the Opposition and the chiefs by accusing the Opposition of associating with organisations that had subversive objectives. They maintained that the conditions of service of the chiefs, did not allow them to identify themselves (Records of CLA Debates: 1975).
- d) The Opposition on the other hand accused the Government of promoting sectional interests in the Community and also of denying supporters of the Opposition the same resources that it made available to its supporters. For instance it was alleged that civil servants and teachers who had pro-CNP sympathies were transferred and denied promotion (Records of the CLA Debates: 1974).
- e) As a result of dealing with an 'uninformed' electorate, no distinction was made between the ruling party and the Government. Thus the association of the ruling party with the Government resulted in it being accepted by the uncritical electorate as the Government. This led to the opposition not being accepted as legitimate. It was not regarded as an essential part of Government but as a jealous and treacherous people who fought against the efforts of progress and freedom for Ciskeians.

The defeat of the CNP at the polls and the unleashing of propaganda against it, accelerated the deterioration in strength and popularity of the imbokotho. The numerical strength of the two parties in the CLA was as follows:-

a) Chiefs: Party Membership: 1973-76.¹⁾

<u>Date</u>	<u>CNIP</u>	<u>CNP</u>	<u>CNUP</u>	<u>Total</u>
1973	11	19	-	30
1974 ²⁾	16	17	-	33
1975 ³⁾	18	18	-	36
1976 ⁴⁾	20	18	1	39

Explanation

- 1) Table quoted from (Charton: 1977: 7).
- 2) Three new chiefs on Government side and two transferred from CNP.
- 3) Three new chiefs on Government side and one transferred back to CNP.
- 4) Two new chiefs on Government side. One dismissed from CNIP caucus and formed the CNUP.

b) CLA: General Membership¹⁾

<u>Date</u>	<u>CNIP</u>	<u>CNP</u>	<u>CNUP</u>	<u>Total</u>
1973	26	24	-	50
1974	32	21	-	53
1975	32	21	-	53
1976 ²⁾	30	13	1	44

- 1) Figures extracted from CLA Records: 1973-76.
- 2) Drop in total membership is the result of the excision of Herschel and Glen Grey from the Ciskei and of their being transferred to the Transkei as a result of consolidation proposals.

The position of the parties in the CLA has resulted in the creation of a strong ruling party with a weak opposition. Duverger would refer to this as a dominant party system. (Duverger: 1972: 36).

2.3 The Role and Function of the Opposition.

Up to now we have shown how the ruling party entrenched itself. The increase in support for the ruling party has conversely meant the decline of the Opposition. In Western countries, an opposition is regarded as an essential part of a government and its performance is regarded as a 'public duty' (Dahl: 1964: 4). But the position in Africa is different.

Professor Apter describes the role of an opposition in Africa ...

"The role of a political opposition has proved ambiguous in most newly independent nations. New governments rarely see the necessity for a regular opposition party, nor do they always accept the idea of opposition as a normal feature of government..."

(Apter in Markowitz: 1970: 226).

Nyerere points out that an institutionalised opposition is foreign to African culture. According to him, opposition is integrated into the fabric of discussion among Africans consequently, decisions are arrived at through consensus (Nyerere: 1967: 195). According to Nyerere, opposition encourages the formation of factions; opposition was necessary only when there were differences on fundamental issues (Nyerere: op cit). Because the emergent African states are primarily concerned with the development of the nation, differences on 'fundamental' issues do not exist.

Chief Mabandla in 1972 echoed the same idea about the opposition when he said that there was no institutionalized opposition in traditional African courts (Record of CLA Debates: 1972).¹⁾

Professor Apter advises that opposition should ...

"Oppose but not obstruct" (Apter in Markowitz: op cit).

When in 1972 the CTA was preparing to give way to the CLA, Chief Mabandla went on record optimistically wondering whether the opposition would be destructive or constructive (Records of CTA Debates: 1972). After a heated debate in 1973, Chief Mabandla expressed the opinion that the opposition which he led was not spiteful, it was constructive (Records of CLA Debates: 1973). His vision of the role of an opposition was expressed when he compared the opposition to a person who applies brakes to a run-away car. At another stage he saw it as the spurs which are applied to put into 'action' an 'inactive' horse which was the Government (Records of CLA Debates: 1973).

The Government opinion of the opposition was expressed by the Chief Minister when he said that the opposition should be co-operative. Chief Magoma adds to this that the ruling party would tolerate an opposition that is not only co-operative but also not involved in subversive activities...

1. Reference to CTA and CLA debates in this section is quoted from work compiled by Mrs. N. C. J. Charton.

"I now say the Ruling Side is prepared to allow an opposition side which is up to a required standard, but that must follow the direction of the present Government and must follow the general trend of democracy as practised in modern times..."
(Records of CLA Debates: 1975: 25).

The attitude of the Government is further illustrated by the accusations it makes against the opposition for associating with organisations that have subversive objectives (Records of CLA Debates: 1975).

In a survey of the members of the CLA which was conducted in 1975, one of the questions aimed at finding out about the views of members of the CLA with regard to the functions of an opposition.

The majority of respondents could only remember that an opposition had a 'watch-dog' function. It had to watch over the activities of the Government. Intolerance underlined the answers that ascribed to the opposition a 'watch-dog' function. The association which the 'dog' image suggested has a derogatory meaning.

Some of the replies that were given included the following:-

"the opposition had to overthrow the Government; some did not even know the functions of an opposition; others openly declared that opposition had to be tolerated only. There were still those who claimed that opposition had no positive function..."

2.4 Lack of Tolerance for an Opposition

Perhaps the most appropriate way of starting a discussion on this is by referring to Professor Apter's remark that...

"Political leaders easily accept the view that a political opposition is troublesome..."
(Apter in Markowitz: op cit).

This is true with people who not only resent criticism but also do not tolerate opposition. The attitude displayed by the Ciskei Government when it said it could tolerate an opposition that conformed to their standards, was evidence that those people found opposition to be 'troublesome'.

In a survey of socio-political attitudes in the township of Mdantsane in 1975, about three hundred households were included in a sample. One of the

questions that was asked probed the people's tolerance of opposition. People were asked if they approved their relatives or friends supporting an opposite party. The replies that were given revealed an astonishing amount of intolerance of opposition. The various answers given included:-

Opposition could not be tolerated in the same household;
people of the same household must belong to one party;
Opposition encouraged an exchange of words and
eventually misunderstanding developed.

The Ciskei Government's intolerance of an opposition, and of criticism is illustrated by two incidents:-

- a) There is confrontation between members of the black consciousness movement and the Ciskei Government. This movement aims at liberating the black man, first from his slave mentality and secondly from the physical oppression resulting from his position as a black in South Africa (Wolfson: 1976: 49). Thus, this movement declared itself opposed to the operation of Government-created platforms, such as the homelands. Because of this, leaders and members of the CLA saw themselves threatened by the existence of this movement.
- b) Sensitivity to criticism on the part of the members of the Government was evidenced when a Mdantsane Lawyer was banished from his home and practice to Herschel (Daily Dispatch: 31. 12. 74). The lawyer had been vociferous in criticizing the Government's involvement in local and civic matters of the Mdantsane township council. (For details of this see Chapter six).

Apter believes that insecurity on the part of the members of the Government, creates this sensitivity to criticism and intolerance of opposition (Apter in Markowitz: op cit).

2. 5. The Opposition in the CLA and Future

In this section I suggest that we should investigate the performances of the Opposition in the CLA and there after looking at its future.

To facilitate this investigation, an analysis of the debates of the CLA is suggested, especially a no-confidence debate.

In the first place we find the opposition confronted by problems of acclimatization. The CLA is a relatively new institution and consequently, the rules and regulations governing the procedure in the CLA are comparatively unknown to the members. Hence the opposition was time and again caught up in its ignorance of the Rules of Procedure.

Take for instance, the problem of time that was to be allocated to each speaker, during the no-confidence debate in the 1975 session. The procedure to be followed was that, the Leader of the Opposition was expected to make a request for the suspension of regulation 67 of the Rules of Procedure. This regulation governs the allocation of time to each speaker during a no-confidence debate. The Leader of the Opposition failed to make this request. He had assumed that the suspension of this particular regulation would be automatic because it had been automatic during the 1974 session (Records of CLA Debates: 1975).

During the debate, the question of time inhibits the performance of the Opposition speakers. They run out of time and the chairman (who is in actual fact a party man) refuses to consider time extensions or a belated request for the suspension of regulation 67 of the Rules of Procedure.

Another example of the problems which acclimatization brought onto the Opposition may be found on page 136 of 1975 Verbatim CLA Debates Report. The feeling of disgust and despair is unmistakable when Chief Mabandla says ...

Mr Chairman, as we are a developing country,
new things are cropping up now and again.
Whether it is according to the procedure or not...
(Records of CLA Debates: 1975).

As a result of the problem of time, the opposition found itself confronted with a case of having allowed information for publication by the press which had not been discussed in the Assembly (Records of CLA Debates: 1975: 124-239). During the discussion it had become apparent that the Leader of the Opposition had failed to raise certain issues in the no-confidence debate in the Assembly; he had prepared a list of all the issues he intended bringing forward but because of a clamp down on time,

he could not submit all the points he had prepared. He had submitted the list of issues to the press for publication.

Members of the ruling party objected to finding points that were not discussed in the Assembly, in the press (Daily Dispatch). This brought the bona fides of the Leader of the Opposition under scrutiny. Why was the Opposition keen on by-passing the Assembly? Had it lost confidence in the Assembly?

Many and various explanations could be given for this. The Leader of the Opposition claimed that the fault was with him. He did not envisage that the time limitation would make it impossible for him to submit all the issues he had prepared in the Assembly.

But looking at this as an outsider, one is compelled to reason as follows:-

The opposition had become suspicious of the Government: in its anxiety to expose the Government, the Opposition, most probably, regarded the CLA and its officials as not only hostile to it but also in cahoots with the Government in trying to 'cover-up' the Government's activities. The Chairman's refusal to grant the suspension of regulation 67 of the Rules of Procedure was viewed against this background.

For these reasons the Opposition decided to hand over to the press for publication what it had prepared for the no-confidence debate. This is not an attempt to condone the action of the Opposition but an attempt to explain why it 'by-passed' the Assembly.

To illustrate my contention that the Opposition might have viewed the Chairman as part of the Government side, let us refer to page 16 of the 1975 Records of the CLA Debates. A clash between the Chairman of Assembly and Chief Mabandla occurs over how Chief Mabandla should present his thoughts. This, Chief Mabandla resents. If you observed the 1975 CLA session, you cannot but come to the conclusion that the attitude of the Chairman discourages Opposition enthusiasm.

Between Chief Mabandla, Sangotsha, Stamper, Mavuso and Chief Mpangele, the Opposition raised the following issues during the no-confidence debate:-

- a) The respect shown by the ruling party towards chiefs and the Paramount chief. It had ignored the existence of the paramount chief by not inviting him to the installation of new chieftainships; the Cabinet Ministers entered villages and ignored the chief or headmen at such villages.
- b) The new chieftainships that this Government had granted recognition had been mostly from the clans of the AmaRarabe.
- c) The policy of separate development was 'borrowed' from the White Nationalist Party. It was unchristian.
- d) The removal of a certain tribe of Imingcangathelo from under the jurisdiction of a Mfengu chief and being placed under their own chief (who was recently recognised) was described as encouraging tribalism.
- e) The insecurity of civil servants and teachers was also raised.
- f) The Consolidation proposals for the Ciskei had resulted in the excision of Herschel and Glen Grey from the Ciskei and their being transferred to the Transkei. This was also criticised. It was also revealed that the land transferred to the Transkei was larger than the compensatory land.
- g) The attempts at detente between the Prime Minister of the RSA and the Chief Ministers of the Homelands had been a mockery and a show of bullying by the Prime Minister.
- h) The representative of the RSA at the UNO had claimed that change would be introduced in the RSA within six months.

Chief Mabandla ended without having accomplished his aim. He had aimed at raising more points than the time could allow. He concluded by saying that the Opposition aimed at bringing change, not to the Ciskei, but to the RSA as a whole (Records of CLA Debates: 1975).

When making his reply to the no-confidence debate, Chief Mabandla wanted to introduce new issues which were not included earlier, this

was ruled out of order.

The other speakers from the Opposition indulged in repetition but succeeded in raising the following additional points:-

- i) The loss of the irrigation scheme at Lantel / Mbinzane as a result of the excision of Herschel and Glen Grey. The Kat River irrigation scheme which was promised as compensatory had not yet been obtained.
- ii) The Government's failure to negotiate for the transfer of East London and King William's Town, indicated that the present Government failed to put up claims for anything substantial from White South Africa.
- iii) The results of the Herschel bye-election were raised but because of a point of objection from the Government, were dropped.
- iv) The Government was criticised for remaining silent on the Committees Drift issue: Why had the Government not made land claims?
- v) The Government was criticised for failing to carry out some of its promises to the people. It had promised to construct bridges and drinking wells but it failed to do this.
- vi) The Government's complaisance over the question of land was criticised. Africans though in the majority occupied only 13 per cent of the land surface while the whites, the minority occupied 87 per cent of the land surface.
- vii) The use of Government vehicles during election campaigns in support of candidates sponsored by the ruling party, was also criticised.
- viii) The expulsion of the Federal Theological Seminary from Alice was raised. The Ciskei Government was criticised for failing to protest against this expulsion.

Apart from these points, the Opposition indicated where the Government deserved praise.

From an observer's point of view, the Opposition side would have raised all the issues they had wished to, if only they had shared the work equally

among themselves. Failure to do this resulted in that speakers after Chief Mabandla indulged in repetition. If they had compiled a list of the issues they desired to raise and then apportioned the work equally among the speakers, they would have avoided repetition and would not have run out of time.

Nevertheless, the quality of issues raised was such that the Government would always be on the alert. It would realise that, though the numbers of the opposition restricted its success, its ability to expose and criticise Government activity was tremendous. It played the part of a 'conscience' to the Government.

It must be noted that as long as the composition of the Opposition was mostly chiefs, the Opposition's effectiveness is affected because the Government is quick to remind the chiefs in the Opposition about their being Government servants. Only those chiefs that are clear about their roles as chiefs and members of the Legislative Assembly, will cope. The effectiveness of the opposition would be improved by a membership that was derived mostly from the elected members.

3. The Usefulness of the Party System

Political parties have been brought into existence for a variety of reasons. Problems of development, such as national integration, political participation, legitimacy and the management of conflict have been some of the problems for which political parties have been thought relevant (La Palombara: 1966: 399).

A closer look at the socio-political and economic conditions of the RSA, taken together with the Ciskei, will facilitate a better understanding of the usefulness of a political party system in the Ciskei. Before attempting this, let us focus attention on the following points of interest.

The process of decolonisation has been characterised, in Africa and elsewhere, by the removal of the colonial powers from the scene. But in the RSA this process has been that of replacing the white oppressor by a black elite through the policy of the Bantustans.

In the emerging, newly independent countries of Africa and the East, political parties developed from 'national movements' but in the RSA, political parties have emerged as a result of the creation of subordinate legislatures. These political parties have been encouraged to develop so that they may facilitate the legitimisation of the Bantustan institutions. They are also expected to protect the existence of these Bantustan institutions. For instance, a dominant party system emerged with the result that the Bantustan institutions may not be 'overthrown' by a 'revolutionary' party. Chiefs alone cannot succeed in 'safeguarding' these institutions against such moves. An example of an 'overthrow' is what happened to the Coloured People's Representative Council when the Labour Party under Leon 'captured' all the elected seats!

The Bantustan system is such that only a pro-separate development party may get into power and retain power. This party entrenches itself by adopting some of the methods we have discussed earlier. Thus a dominant party system emerges. We had said earlier that the creation of the Bantustans was a reaction to:-

- i) The increased demand by Africans for equal political and economic rights in South Africa.
- ii) The RSA government reaction to World opinion about condition in the RSA.

The ruling white minority, by creating these Bantustans hoped to use them as an excuse for denying the black majority equal political and economic opportunities in white South Africa. Hence, blacks in white urban areas are told to identify themselves with some homeland where they can enjoy political and economic opportunities; the sharing of political power in white areas is remote.

3.1 The Party System and the Traditional Leaders.

In earlier sections we have indicated how traditional leaders were affected by the political parties and have consequently been used as political pawns in the struggle for control and supremacy in the CLA. In her article, Mrs Charton (1977) "The Chieftainship in the CLA: A Political Asset or Political Liability" shows how the chief was caught in a dilemma between his loyalty to his administrative duties ,

traditional status and the party political membership. Consequently, the author further points out...

"However, an analysis of the election results in 1973 and 1975 must at least raise as a working hypothesis the fact that the Chiefly group lacked election appeal, even in some rural areas. And this being so, must also throw doubt on their legitimacy as modern style legislators..." (Charton: 1977: op cit)

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This reminds me of an interview I had with a leading CNIP supporter. He complained that one chief who is now a Minister in the Ciskei Cabinet, refused to accept party members as colleagues, even if they were members of the CLA. He regarded them as councillors. At one time the same chief had converted members of his tribe into members and supporters of a political party! A conflict developed as a result of his attitude towards his party colleagues cum councillors. This was taking on the shape of the elected members of the CLA versus the nominated members. The misunderstanding between Siyo (a commoner) and Sebe (now a chief) has brought the conflict to a head.

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It is interesting to note that the elected CLA members claim amongst other things that they are the direct representatives of the people unlike the chiefs who have been nominated. Numerically, the chiefs outnumber the elected members by about 3:2 but in the Assembly itself no precedence is indicated. All members of the Assembly are entitled to the same and equal treatment. The Constitution Proclamation announced that at ceremonies, the chief would take precedence over Cabinet members and other members of the CLA but in practice, Cabinet Ministers enjoy precedence over both chiefs and the other members of the CLA.

The struggle for power in the Assembly, as can be judged from Sebe's promotion to chieftainship, is going to emphasise the chief or nominated member versus the elected member approach.

Sebe's Cabinet started off as a commoner-dominated cabinet but today, the same cabinet is dominated by chiefs. There is only one commoner Cabinet member. An overseas study tour was arranged for the Ministers of Agriculture and Interior (Daily Dispatch: 9. 6. 77). The Minister of Agriculture is a commoner and was at loggerheads with Sebe. Hence

Sebe allowed Siwani (Justice) and the Minister of Interior to go on tour. Both are chiefs. The following could be deduced from this:-

- 2
like Sebe
in 1972
vs Mabandla
- a) The overseas trip would act as an attraction and bait to other chiefs.
 - b) Sebe's refusal that Siyo should go might be influenced by, inter alia, the fear that Siyo might return with an improved image from overseas.

Whether Sebe would succeed in enticing the chiefs to support him would depend on various reasons such as:-

- 1978 -
1980
1980
1980
- i) Chiefs may feel compelled to support Sebe by the provisions of the proclamation under which they are employed. They may take it that it is obligatory that they should support Sebe.
 - ii) It is possible that other chiefs may feel obliged to support Sebe only because they are of the same clan.

It is interesting to note that Sebe claims the support of fifteen chiefs; two are said to have crossed from the Opposition side (Imvo Zabantsundu: 18. 6. 77).

Dominant

What the outcome will be is difficult to say until after the elections. Sebe's intentions are defined: to organise a majority of chiefs on his side. His plan will not deviate from the dominant party system but his aim is to organise a ruling side that is composed mostly of chiefs. This will create problems for him. In the first place such a party will not have a mandate from the electorate, especially those Ciskeians who live in white urban areas. There is also the possibility that some chiefs may refuse to work with Sebe.

3 horns & Amalgam

And yet, on the other hand, there is a strong possibility that Siyo's faction may amalgamate with the other opposition groups, the CNP and CNUP.

Whatever the outcome, of the power struggle in the Ciskei, the party system is decidedly being manipulated by those in power to remain a dominant party system. It is, however, partly competitive and does allow

a numerically weak opposition.

The development of a black "bureaucratic elite which will tend to rule in its own interests" (Charton: 1977: 11) will receive the encouragement and co-operation of the Government of the RSA. This black elite will ensure that the party system and the channels of communication serve mainly its interests. This will result in polarisation between the masses or the workers and the elite (Charton: op cit).

CORRECTIONS

Chapter: Eight

Page 249 para 2 Line 15: 'such electorate' should read 'such an electorate'
" 250 " 1 " 6: Substitute 'for' for 'to'

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The RSA is a country whose heterogeneous population is divided into blacks and whites. The blacks constitute a majority while the whites are a minority. Political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of the white minority while the blacks are denied these rights. About eighty percent of the land surface is owned and occupied by the white minority while only about thirteen percent of the land surface belongs to the blacks. This division of land, facilitates, inter alia, a regular 'flow' of black labour to the mines, factories and farms of the white man. This 'set-up' of the socio-political and economic conditions of the RSA has given rise to the stratification of the population into oppressor and oppressed. The whites are regarded as the oppressors and the blacks as the oppressed. Consequently, a struggle for an equitable and judicious redistribution of political power and economic opportunities developed. Forces and elements that favour an equitable and judicious redistribution of political and economic power have been grouped into organisations of the liberation movement. The struggles and activities of this liberation movement have directed the attention of the outside world to conditions in the RSA. The Government of the RSA has been called upon to defend the status quo and also bring to a halt the advancement of the aims and ideas of the liberation movement. The application of the policy of separate development is one such attempt. This policy envisages, inter alia, the fragmentation of the RSA into various socio-economic units called the homelands where the various Black 'nationalities' will be settled. This affects only the thirteen percent of the land surface that has been set aside for occupation by blacks. Blacks will be allowed to exercise and enjoy 'full' political rights and develop economic 'sufficiency' in these homelands. Those blacks living in the urban areas who have, as a result of urbanisation, become detribalised, will be expected to identify themselves with the homelands. They will not be allowed to share equal political rights with whites in urban areas. Their political rights and aspirations are to be expressed in the homelands. They are 'temporary sojourners' in the urban areas. This policy faces many problems: blacks living in urban areas either have lived in these areas for many generations, or have been born in these areas.

Their outlook and political consciousness have been orientated by conditions in these areas. They have lost contact with the homelands.

Apart from that, the homelands suffer from pressure of population on land and because they are not economically viable, cannot provide sufficient employment opportunities to support their populations adequately.

The Government of the RSA has devised and employed various techniques to attempt to make the homelands attractive and acceptable. They have tried to accelerate the rate of political "decolonization" of these homelands. As a result of this, the homelands have undergone various stages of constitutional development. One such stage has been the attainment of a 'semi-autonomous status'. When this stage was reached, a parliamentary system emerged. A political party system accompanies the emergence of this stage. Though the homeland has been declared 'self-ruling' within the framework of the RSA, it does not enjoy any autonomy. Legislation from its Legislative Assembly has to be approved by the RSA and there have been fields which were beyond its legislative powers. This was virtually a position of political subordination.

Hence, it has been essential that when taking stock of the development of the political party system in these homelands, it has had to be viewed as an integral part of the Bantustan institutions. They are not to be viewed in isolation but must be viewed against the background of the general pattern of the socio-political and economic structure of the RSA. The significance and role of these political parties will then be emphasized. When we investigated the significance of the roles of these political parties, the following questions were considered crucial:-

- (a) What role did these parties play in the struggle of the Ciskeian for equal political power and economic opportunities?
- (b) Whose interests did these parties serve?
- (c) The party system that developed in the Ciskei, was it a multi-party or a one-party system. Did it allow for an opposition?

Our investigations revealed, inter alia, that the parties that emerged in the Ciskei facilitated the acceptance of Bantustan Institutions by creating, in both rural and urban Blacks "a new sense of identity and new loyalties" about the homeland institutions (Mayer: 1972). They also provided personnel that would serve on these institutions. In the short term, these parties may achieve the acceptance of these institutions because some people seem to believe the message of homeland 'freedom', 'equality' and 'independence'. These parties may succeed in articulating the interests of a 'middleclass' who stand to benefit from the new employment opportunities and trading facilities that were created by the new homeland institutions.

In the long run, however, the people's frustration may lead to the rejection of the homeland politics because the system may have failed to articulate the interests of the important sectors of the Ciskeian population such as peasants and the workers. Their clamour for more land, assistance in agriculture, equal pay for equal opportunities, the right to form workers' organisations, the end to the migrant labour system, to name but a few may not have been met. This may result in the Ciskeians identifying themselves with those struggling for the equal sharing of political power and economic opportunities by all the sections of the population of the RSA. This may signify a rejection of the subordinate political institutions of the homelands. E.C.

The existence of the organisations in the Black consciousness movement which is an integral part of the liberation movement, may focus attention on the role and significance of the Bantustan institutions. Revealing in so doing the fact that the homeland system was created with the express purpose of maintaining and perpetuating the discriminatory socio-political and economic conditions of the RSA. This has been achieved by introducing political parties whose effectiveness was confined to the homeland institutions; the myth of 'developing' the homelands by introducing cosmetic improvements to agriculture and creating trading facilities was not an effort to create an economically viable Ciskei but was aimed at creating a 'middle-class' that would act as a 'buffer' between the working class and the rulers. In order to maintain a regular flow of black labour to the White-controlled mines, factories and farms, it may be necessary to keep the Ciskei under-developed.

By facilitating the acceptance of the Bantustan Institutions, these parties may succeed in serving the interest of the RSA. But as the awareness in the Ciskeians grows, as a result of "revolution of the mind" (Kanza: 1971:8) in the Ciskeians, they may reject all inferior institutions. It is only then that they will be able to reject the Bantustan policy. They may become aware that their participation in the inferior institutions of the homelands, may defeat the aims of their struggle for equal political and economic power.

The Bantustan policy, in its wake, brought about a system that was fraught with contradictions. There are the modern political institutions which were grafted onto the traditional political institutions. The modern set of political institutions was aimed at promoting the acceptance of the traditional set of institutions and vice versa. The contradictions in this system are unlimited. It must be remembered, for example, that the traditional institutions are associated with a stage of development in the socio-political and economic growth of a people. While on the other hand, there are the modern political institutions. These are the outcome of modern development. The interaction between these sets of institutions, produces an effect that is different from that which the architects of separate development had envisaged. Consider the following examples:- *See Kanza 1987*

- (i) The 'Inner' council of the Amaphakathi (councillors) of the chief of the ImiDushane, became defunct as a result of party politics (see chapter five) Party politics had a deleterious effect on traditional institutions.
- (ii) The Ciskei Government promoted the recognition of defunct chieftainships. The chieftainships that were granted recognition were those that would support the ruling party. The chieftainships were being used as political pawns. This undermined the chieftainships.
- (iii) Party politics exerted a strain on the chief-subject relationship. In some cases, where members of a tribe belonged to a party different from that of the chief, a rift resulted between the chief and his subjects. In others, a whole tribal membership would be converted to party membership. We find in these two instances, tribal membership being used for party political gains. *See Kanza 1987*
- (iv) Political parties used the tribal structures and feelings to facilitate their membership recruitment. As a result of this a conflict between the AmaRarabe and AmaMfengu was fanned. The CNIP was commonly associated with AmaRarabe while the CNP was connected with AmaMfengu. *See Kanza 1986-1987*

Legitimacy

Party System
SIX

It is probably because of this that political parties never succeeded in establishing their branches in the rural areas. This would have exposed the tribal structures to the strain and stress of party politics. The 'ascribed' legitimacy of the chiefs may, under these conditions, be challenged by the 'achieved' legitimacy of the modern political institutions (Charton: 1977). Such an act would not have been in the interests of the Bantustan policy. An inevitable clash between the elected CLA members and the nominated members, the chiefs, revolves around the important question of legitimacy. The Bantustan policy seeks to reintroduce and perpetuate these tribal institutions so that they may be held as a cultural excuse for denying the Ciskeians full and equal participation in the modern political institutions of the country.

Dominant System

Stability (Kotze)

Apart from promoting the facilitation of the Bantustan system and providing personnel to serve in these Bantustan institutions, the political parties in the homelands promote stability to the homeland system. This is achieved by the development of a dominant party system that allows for a token opposition. Many factors encouraged the development of a dominant party system in the homelands. In the Ciskei when the parties first emerged, the ruling party had a two-member lead over the opposition. But, by a systematic insistence on describing the opposition as 'treacherous' and 'jealous' of the progress towards 'freedom' (thus creating a sense of guilt for being a member of the opposition) and assisted by the fact that chiefs who are in the majority in the Legislative Assembly were made to 'suffer' for being members of the opposition, the ruling party succeeded in whittling down the supporters of the opposition and winning over to them members of the opposition. The success of these tactics was facilitated by the existence of an illiterate and uninformed electorate. Such electorate would fail to distinguish between the government and ruling party.

The government and parties involved themselves in civic and local affairs of townships. The Government had hoped to increase its legitimacy by this involvement. It would achieve this by gaining control of the chief positions in the townships; by placing its members and supporters in important positions in the townships; gaining control of public opinion and out-manoeuvring the opposition. But this involvement neither improved the articulation of interests nor did it gain the Ciskeian improved channels of communication.

Township
Govt
K.D. Sand et al
involvement

*had results
Mfengu AmaRarabe feud*

On the contrary, Ciskeians were subjected to increased corruption in the distribution and allocation of houses; favouritism and corruption surrounded the issuing of trade licences; the possession of political party membership cards became the foremost requirement for qualification to any service in the township and the AmaRarabe - AmaMfengu dichotomy received added impetus. Consequently, the Ciskei Government was increasingly associated with malpractices that were perpetrated by some members of the councils. It was also blamed for the revival of the AmaMfengu - AmaRarabe conflict. Township dwellers had been divided into two camps. The smooth-running of the townships was affected by the introduction of party politics.

Therefore, in the light of these investigations, I conclude that the RSA, by encouraging the emergence of political parties which developed into a dominant party system, intended to achieve, inter alia, the following:-

- (a) In the short term the Ciskei political parties may promote the acceptance of the Bantustan Institutions which were introduced for the sole purpose of preserving and perpetuating the status quo in the RSA. They thus succeeded in servicing the interests of the RSA. Only the interests and aspirations of the 'middle-class' and elite in the Ciskei may be served.
- (b) The position of the traditional institutions as being the fulcrum of the authorities system and their existence side by side with the modern political institutions may prevent the development of effective political parties. The emergence of an ineffective party system may result in the development of an equally ineffective political system that can only flourish in its position as a subordinate system to the RSA.
- (c) Therefore, the long term effect may be the development of frustration and disillusionment of Ciskeians in the Bantustan institutions because of an awareness that may be brought about by the teachings of the liberation movement. As a result of these teachings, the institutions of the Bantustan system, including the parties, may be seen for what they are.

*TKee
Venda
Bop
Ciskei*

*Political parties
or democracy*

Dr. J. M. ...

Population statistics

These figures are supplied in order to facilitate the understanding of some points that arise in the foregoing pages.

1. De facto Population Figures: 1970

<u>Total</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Coloureds</u>	<u>Africans</u>
529 390	1220	2210	525 960

(Source: South African Yearbook: 1975: 1)

The de facto population includes those Ciskeians that were in the Ciskei on the day of the census. The 'absent' Ciskeian, includes those engaged as migrant labourers.

While the de jure population includes all Ciskeians. In 1970, this number was 934 580 of whom 50,7% or 474 260 were males. (Source: Benbo: 1975: 20-21).

2. Population Ratio's

Temporarily absent men from Ciskei	39 187
Absenteeism co-efficient for black men	14,4%
Percentage urbanised	19,4%
Adult male dependence burden	270,3
Male : Female ratio	75,55

(Source: Benbo: 1975: 24).

3. Tribal Statistics

Tribal authorities	38
Community authorities	4
Regional Authorities	9

(Source: Benbo: ibid:).

4. No. of Tribal units

AmaRarabe	8
AmaMfengu ¹	14
AbaThembu	5
AbeSuthu	2

1) (Source: Dept. of Information: King William's Town: 1974).

ANNEXURE B

Financial Statistics

Financial statistics showing progression in amounts received and distributed by
by Ciskei General Council;)
Ciskei Territorial Authority and) :-
Ciskei Legislative Assembly)

Ciskei General Council - 1944, 1945 and 1951

Income

	£. s. d.
Balance: 1944; 1945; 1951	45644. 7. 1d.
Contributions from District and local councils	12464. 17. 11d.
Miscellaneous Revenue	<u>1561. 18. 4d.</u>
Total	59671. 3. 4d.

Expenditure

	£. s. d.
Establishment	38. 3. 1d.
Educational Facilities	3802. 16. 8d.
Afforestation	423. 16. 11d.
Hospitals	4008. 15. 0d.
Agriculture	882. 12. 0d.
Sanitation/Health	2051. 7. 0d.
Miscellaneous Expenditure	2253. 6. 10d.
Balance	46189. 13. 9d.
Loss on sale of Investments	<u>20. 2. 6d.</u>
Total	59671. 3. 4d.

(Source: Records of CGC Debates: 1944, 1945 and 1951).

Ciskei Territorial Authority: 1961; 1964 and 1965

<u>Income</u>	R	<u>Expenditure:</u>	R
Contributions from Tribal Authorities 12½%	26 895, 51	Salary (Secr/Treas).	2 245, 72
Resale of books	6, 46	Subsistence allowances	6 345, 71
Sale of blue book	1, 55	Travelling allowances	16, 80
Sale of Stationery	54, 93	Interpreter	5 587, 91
Interest on Investments	437, 24	Miscellaneous	1 600, 08
Contributions: BAD	1 600, 08	Allowances to Chairman	3 244, 14
Refunds	1, 00	Health	37, 60
Clinic Fees	121, 90	Stationery & Printing	192, 00
Disallowances Recovered	93, 90	Bursaries	1, 42
	<hr/>	Bank Charges	21, 00
		Audit Fees	9 857, 23
		Excess Revenue over Expenditure	<hr/>
Total	<u>29 149, 61</u>	Total	<u>29 149, 61</u>

Ciskei Legislative Assembly:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>
1971/72	11 257 144, 07	11 239 625, 92
1972/73	12 139 029, 09	12 175 601, 13
1973/74	<u>17 038 175, 37</u>	<u>16 880 798, 44</u>
	<u>40 434 348, 53</u>	<u>40 296 025, 49</u>

(Source: Records of Debates: CTA: 1961, 1964 and 1965; CLA Financial Reports: 1971/72; 1972/73 and 1973/74).

ANNEXURE CEconomic Development6. XDC Contribution towards the Economic Development of the Ciskei

The XDC is a statutory body which was established to facilitate industrial development in the Ciskei.

(a) Agricultural projects

Tyumie Citrus Irrigation
Occupation Post: Milk and Irrigation
Lante/Mbinzane Irrigation project

The XDC rents land for development from a tribe; employment opportunities are created; in-service training takes place. The farms will gradually be transferred to Ciskeians. (It must be noted that the project at Keiskammahoek is not cited in this summary).

The Lante/Mbinzane and Occupation Post projects have, as a result of the Consolidation proposals, been ceded to the Transkei. (Benbo: ibid: 41).

(b) Industrial Development

Industrial development within the Ciskei has been undertaken in Dimbaza and Sada:


	<u>Dimbaza</u>	<u>Sada</u>	<u>Total</u>
Land set aside for Industrial Development	22 ha.	5 ha.	27 ha.
Land already developed	3,63ha.	2 ha.	5,63ha.
Industrial Buildings by (XDC)	R63 005	-	R63 005

(c) Forestry

Yield from forestry relatively low. (Benbo: ibid: 43).

(Source: Benbo: ibid: 43 et seq).

MAP OF THE CISKEI



ANNEXURE EPOLICY STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF MINISTEROF THE CISKEI: CHIEF J. MABANDLA ✓CISKEIAN GENERAL ELECTION 21 FEBRUARY 1973.

I have submitted the following policy statement to my Cabinet. It has been adopted unanimously by members of the Cabinet. I therefore proceed to offer it to the electorate of the Ciskei and wish to call on all candidates who offer themselves for election and who endorse the policy which I hereby announce to contact me without delay. This policy will be the principle on which the future Government of the Ciskei will be based and for which the electorate will be requested to vote:

It has been no mean achievement to develop from a rather obscure system of government, administered mainly from Pretoria, to a self-governing status. We are very proud to have been responsible for the piloting of this development, and for the fact that we consulted the leaders of our people at every phase thereof.

✓ All these beneficial developments have taken place under the guiding principle of Separate Development, which was adopted by the leaders of our people, and which we adopted as the mandate of our day to day responsibilities, and which has been the foundation stone on which constitutional development was based. We still subscribe to this policy of Separate Development, and we wish, in broad terms, to outline future policy as follows:

1. We pledge ourselves to observe the Ciskeian Constitution as the Charter of our future development on constitutional matters. It is in terms of this constitution that we shall always dedicate ourselves to preserve the office of Chieftainship, and to promote the traditional system of authority, whilst observing democratic norms as the most equitable form of modern government. We shall always regard this Constitution not as a finality, but as a prelude to complete independence for the Ciskei. For a meaningful independence we shall strive for a clear definition of the boundaries of the Ciskeian territory and for a fair and just programme of consolidation. ✕
2. We recognise the fact that the citizens of the Ciskei belong to the Xhosa National Unit, and that there is a very close affinity between ourselves in the Ciskei and our "brothers" in the Transkei. History has so fated it that we were and still are divided, but there is every indication that this division will, and must be terminated at some time in the future. We unequivocally declare that amalgamation will not be effected except by an expressed desire and mandate of the leaders and citizens of the Ciskei through the Legislative Assembly.

amalgamation

2/...

3. We do not subscribe to any policy aimed at integrating the Ciskei into:

- (a) A multi- racially integrated state and society;
- X (b) A federal or confederate system of government, embracing a number of Bantu national units. ANC

But, for sound economy, for security and for diplomacy, we shall endeavour to sustain friendly ties with the Republic of South Africa, and any other neighbouring independent state, provided that such friendly ties will be reciprocated on the basis of equality. Further, we shall promote treaties, when necessary, between the Ciskei and the Republic of South Africa and/or any other friendly independent state for mutual benefit on such matters as defence, state security, trade and infrastructure for industry, major health projects or schemes, etc.

We shall maintain cordial relations with any non-Ciskeians residing within the borders of the Ciskei.

4. By way of consultation and dialogue, we shall observe a close liason with the Republican Government, who has thus far been our guardian, and will move towards more and greater responsibilities in close co-operation with the Republican Government.
5. At home we shall strive to improve agriculture by the introduction of more scientific agricultural methods for maximum land yield and remuneration from stock. We acknowledge the fact that agriculture is the backbone of economy in the Ciskei, and that no nation can afford to ignore the vast importance of agriculture in the national household.
6. We shall endeavour to get the best possible labour conditions for our migratory labourers, who annually go to work in the Republic. We shall exert ourselves to the utmost to remove legal, technical and administrative discrepancies and impediments, affecting our labourers in the Republic.
7. It is our firm belief that the trend of education in the Ciskei will determine every facet of our national development. We also believe that until the bulk of our citizens are educated, and until the quality of their education is indisputable, self-government of independence for the Ciskei will be meaningless. We shall endeavour to improve on the tremendous advances we have made so far. Specifically our future education policy is aimed at:
- (a) The reduction of teacher-pupil ratio.
- (b) A diversification of avenues of study to meet all the demands of a self-sufficient nation.
- (c) Elimination of double session and the "platoon system".
- (d) Compulsory primary and secondary education up to the age of 16.
- (e) Extension of facilities for adult education.
- (f) Providing more and better classrooms at both primary and post-primary levels.

- (g) Better conditions of service and salaries for teachers.
- (h) Provision of free books for all, and bursaries for post-primary education.
- (i) Negotiations to extend university and medical school facilities for many.

We aim at producing an educated Ciskeian who can be servicable anywhere in the world, when his academic qualifications are needed.

8. We appreciate that industrial development for the Ciskei merits a very high priority. We have taken note of the Republican Government's policy of decentralisation of secondary industry, towards border areas. We have already reaped great benefits from this policy of decentralisation. Bearing this in mind, we shall continuously prevail on the Republican Government to apply this policy meticulously, thus channelising considerable industries to the Ciskei, which is admirably situated for border industry in many respects. We shall unceasingly petition the Xhosa Development Corporation to:

- (a) establish commercial and industrial concerns within the boundaries of the Ciskei under the agency system, to enhance economic stability in our country;
- (b) accelerate the process of training Bantu personnel in such industries, so that eventually such industries will be manned by Bantu;
- (c) accelerate taking over of business concerns from non-Bantu within the Ciskei for an eventual take-over by Bantu businessmen.

In order to improve our economy in the Ciskei it is our firm belief that the earning power of all our employees must be improved. We firmly believe in the principle of equal pay for equal work. We shall continue to negotiate with the Republican Government, and to exert pressure on employers of our citizens for the fulfilment of this principle. We shall continue our efforts to improve the earnings of our chiefs and headmen to a standard commensurate with their status and responsibilities.

9. (a) We are committed to improve the present conditions in the already existing townships and settlements;
- (b) We shall strive to abolish the means test when one applies for Old Age Pension;
- (c) We shall continue to see to it that our people are not resettled until essential facilities and services are provided such as lighting, water, post office facilities, schools, clinics, etc., and that they are resettled within reach of possible employment. We shall endeavour to improve the quality of dwelling houses provided for our people in townships. In view of the fact that Bantu sport is beginning to attract world attention, we shall strive to provide enough and suitable sport facilities. We shall also see to the provision of suitable centres of entertainment.

10. We believe that South Africa is a permanent home for many nations, and that the people within must live in freedom from internal strife and tension, and from external invasion.
 - (a) We shall also associate ourselves with all the efforts of the Republican Government to maintain law and order, and to defend South Africa against subversive intrusions.
 - (b) We shall do all in our power to promote good relations within the different tribes making up the national unit of the Ciskei. For unity and strength tribalism must not come into the national affairs of the Ciskei. We shall play our part to make the Ciskei, and South Africa, a happy home for all its inhabitants.....

ANNEXURE FMANIFESTO OF L. L. SEBECISKEI GENERAL ELECTION 19731. INTRODUCTION

- (a) I stand for the aspirations and wishes of the Ciskeians. That these should be achieved within the framework of the policy of Separate Development.
- (b) For this goal I have sacrificed a career in the Department of Education so that you should not be found leaderless during this stage of constitutional development. I, therefore, stand as a symbol of sacrifice for your interests.

2. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

- (a) Promise of equal rights, privileges and treatment for all Ciskeians in the Ciskei and in the Urban Areas.
- (b) To struggle for the recognition of all hereditary chiefs irrespective of ethnic group.
- (c) To negotiate areas/land for resettling of the recognised chiefs and their people.
- (d) To protect the existing rights and privileges of all chiefs.
- (e) To raise salaries of chiefs and headmen.
- (f) To grant full authority to township councils to run civic matters without any interference.
- (g) To maintain law and order in the Ciskei.
- (h) To struggle for more land for the Ciskei.
- (i) To see to it that the consolidation of the Ciskei is not prejudicial to the interests and welfare of the Ciskeians.

3. FAIR DEAL FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS

- (a) Ciskeian Public Servants to enjoy similar privileges as those enjoyed by their counterparts in the Republic by:
 - (i) Seeing that they get the same subsistence and travel allowances.
 - (ii) Providing more transport vehicles so that there should be more progress and more efficiency in the various departments.

- (b) To see to it that all promotions are based strictly on ability and merit.
- (c) That no civil servant will have his chances of promotion prejudiced on account of his ethnic extraction.
- (d) To see to it that public servants are granted more scholarships to further their studies with full pay.
- (e) To champion higher salaries and leave bonus for public servants, viz., clerks, magistrates and prosecutors etc.
- (f) To grant public servants to buy a house anywhere in the Ciskei.

4. EDUCATION

- (a) Promotions to the inspectorate will depend on experience, qualifications and merit and creation of more posts.
- (b) To narrow the gap in salaries between Ciskeian teachers and those of other racial groups.
- (c) To employ married female teachers permanently.
- (d) To offer scholarships to teachers who wish to further their studies.
- (e) To grant study leave with full pay to all employees of the department.
- (f) To encourage in-service training courses for teachers.
- (g) To encourage inspectors to hold conferences where members of the inspectorate will read papers on various subjects.
- (h) To grant autonomy to professional organisations and consult their views on all educational matters viz., conditions of service, syllabuses and examinations.
- (i) To introduce compulsory free education for Ciskeian children of school going age.
- (j) To supply free books in all Ciskeian schools.
- (k) To establish special schools for the deaf and blind in the Ciskei, with improved conditions of employment.

5. HEALTH SERVICES

- (a) To build modern clinics.
- (b) To provide more transport for medical officers and nurses.

(c)/.... 3.

- (c) To grant study leave with full pay to nurses so that they should further their studies in:
- (i) Intensive nursing care
 - (ii) Hospital administration
 - (iii) Radiography
 - (iv) Ward administration
 - (v) Public Health
- (d) To encourage employment of more health officers and nurses in the clinics in the remote areas, and creation of more higher and responsible posts especially in hospitals.
- (e) Build more hospitals.

6. SOCIAL SERVICES

- (a) To erect playgrounds and build recreational halls.
- (b) To build cinemas and parks.
- (c) To build swimming pools.
- (d) To improve Townships' roads and to construct better roads to rural locations.
- (e) To see to it that street lighting is provided in all townships.
- (f) To prevent gangsterism and tsotsism. Social workers will be employed to work among the young to encourage sport like boxing, dancing, etc., and improving working conditions of social workers and thus stop high rate of resignations. More scholarships for them.

7. AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

- (a) To promote co-operative farming.
- (b) To train Ciskeian youth in Veterinary Surgery.
- (c) To encourage meat industry in the Ciskei.
- (d) To build big breeding stations for stock, viz., cattle, sheep, fowls, pigs and to sell the stock to the Ciskeians at reduced prices.
- (e) To train Ciskeians as foresters by establishing a Forestry school with better facilities.
- (f) To subsidise hardworking farmers with loans/grants on same basis as the Land Bank.
- (g) To give seeds and fertilizers to successful farmers at half price.
- (h) To create a scheme for Ciskeian farmers to buy insecticides at low prices.

8. STIMULATION OF THE ECONOMY OF THE CISKEI

- (a) To encourage industries on an agency basis to create avenues of employment for the Ciskeians.
- (b) To encourage industrialists to pay high wages to workers.
- (c) To encourage healthy working conditions in factories.
- (d) To encourage industrialists to recognise workers' associations as mouth-pieces of fellow workers.
- (e) To encourage labour inspectors to visit factories to investigate working conditions.
- (f) To encourage Ciskeians to own businesses in the Ciskei by granting trading rights to aspiring businessmen.
- (g) To encourage friendly countries to the Republic to establish industries in the Ciskei.
- (h) To accelerate the industrial development of the Ciskei. Foreign aid will be solicited from countries like the U. S. A. through the required channels.

9. RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS

- (a) To maintain healthy diplomatic relations with the Republican Government and other Homeland Governments.
- (b) To see to the protection of the Ciskeians in the cities.
- (c) To see to it that Ciskeians who have been working in the cities for a long time are allowed to remain there with their families.
- (d) That widows and the aged are not ejected from the cities after they have spent the rest of their lives in the cities.
- (e) To petition the Republican Government to regard doctors, lawyers and businessmen as people doing essential services in the urban areas and that there should be no restrictions on their remaining there.
- (f) To petition the Republican Government to grant higher pension benefits to the old, aged and sick.

10. INTERNAL RELATIONS

- (a) To create mutual trust among all people in the Ciskei.
- (b) To establish healthy relations amongst all people by organising occasions which will bring all Ciskeians together.

(c)/... 5.

- (c) To promote institutions which will bring and unite the people of the Ciskei.
- (d) To honour and respect those institutions which have played an important role in the lives of the people in the Ciskei.

11. CONCLUSION

I wish to remind the voters of the Ciskei about my achievements as head of Education and as head of Agriculture and Forestry.

CORRECTIONS

Bibliography:

Correct spelling: ~~La Palombara~~ ^{La Palombara} J. (p. 268)
Mansergh N. (p. 268)
Morgenthau R. (p. 268)
Rhodie N. (p. 269)
Runciman W.G. (p. 269)
~~Hellmann~~ ^{Hellmann} E. (p. 267)

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