
Lettres de Byblos
Letters from Byblos

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VALERIE MØLLER AND THEODOR HANF

**South Africa's New Democrats:
A 2002 profile of democracy in the making**

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The authors

Introduction

South Africa's dramatic conversion to democracy has been heralded as a modern-day miracle. In former Nobel peace prize winner Archbishop Tutu's words, it was 'touch and go' whether all conflicting parties would participate in the first non-racial elections in April 1994. The 'rainbow nation', as the new South Africa liked to call itself in the first years of democracy, was heralded as a beacon of hope and enlightenment for Africa and the world.

Since 1994, South Africa has successfully conducted two further national elections that have been declared essentially free and fair. The country has emerged as a leading representative of the economic and political interests of developing countries and the South in the international arena. The question is whether living under democracy has influenced the manner in which South Africans see themselves, their country and the world around them.

This report seeks to document how South Africans think and feel some eight years into democracy about issues that are important in their own lives and have significance for the future of their society. The study covers personal experiences, attitudes and beliefs, and the aspirations and fears of ordinary people. It seeks to identify the sentiments and collective experiences that may contribute to or hinder the consolidation of democracy in years to come.

The report is based on an inquiry conducted in March 2002 among over two thousand South African adults over 16 years of age in a nationally representative MarkData survey that included all regions of the country.

The 2002 survey follows on a series of opinion polls conducted in South Africa that contribute to a larger project that has assessed the prospects of South Africa transforming into a democratic society. The project was launched by Theodor Hanf some thirty years ago. All attitude surveys conducted for the South African democracy project have been conducted by the same company, MarkData, using an identical survey design to aid comparability across space and time. Respondents are interviewed in their own homes in their language of choice by trained interviewers.

The South African democracy project is a longitudinal study. The initial attitude survey for the South African democracy project led by Theodor Hanf and his team was conducted in the late 1970s. Results were reported in a book with the prescient title of 'prospects of peaceful change'.¹ The euphoria that gripped the country in the month after the first democratic elections was captured in a survey conducted one month

¹ Hanf, Th., Weiland, H., & Vierdag, G. 1981. South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change. London: Rex Collings.

after April 1994 elections.² Reconciliation in the rainbow nation was assessed in further rounds of surveys carried out in the 1990s.³ The study reported here is based on the first survey conducted for the South African democracy project in the new millennium.

The South African democracy project is part of a much larger international programme of research on democracy led by Theodor Hanf. The international research programme covers over a dozen countries that have only recently experienced the change-over to democracy or are in transition to democracy. One of the aims of the international democracy study is to identify the factors that play a role in easing the transition to democracy in multicultural societies such as South Africa. Education is one such factor thought to play a leading role in promoting democracy.

The report that follows starts with an introduction to South African society as recorded in the composition of the sample drawn for the survey. Further chapters review attitudes relating to a wide range of domains, including the psychosocial, the economy, religion and personal identity, politics, democracy, and overall subjective well-being. The conclusions comment on recurring themes and the role of education as a force for promoting democracy in South Africa.

² Møller, V. & Hanf, Th. 1995. *Learning to Vote*. Indicator Press, University of Natal, Durban.

³ Møller, V., Dickow, H. & Harris, M. 1999. South Africa's 'rainbow nation', national pride and happiness. *Social Indicators Research* 47: 245-280; and Dickow, H. & Møller, V. 2002. South Africa's 'rainbow people', national pride and optimism: a trend study. *Social Indicators Research* 59(2): 175-202.

Social and Cultural Markers - Analysis of a Sample Survey

Attitudes and opinions are shaped by a variety of demographic, geographic and cultural factors. Survey analysts routinely check whether differences of opinion and outlook are determined by factors such as age, gender, urban and rural residence, and participation in the economy. Yet demographics may not suffice to explain all differences in social and political attitudes.

This is particularly true of a society such as South Africa which embraces a rich diversity of peoples and a history of division between these peoples. Thus, it will be equally important to take cultural markers such as race or ethnicity, language and religion into consideration in any discussion of factors shaping people's attitudes and beliefs.

The MarkData survey conducted in March 2002 shows where South Africa's socio-economic and cultural markers fit into the mosaic of South Africa's society and how they are distributed geographically. The socio-economic and cultural markers used in our study are introduced below in the first section of this chapter. Their interrelationships are reviewed in the second section which discusses how cultural markers reflect the equalisation of opportunity in a once deeply divided society under apartheid.

Social and economic variance

Of the 2164 respondents, 47 percent are men and 53 percent are women.

The *age* distribution, which is a favourable match with official statistics, is as follows (in percent⁴):

16-17 years	7
18-24 years	22
25-34 years	26
35-49 years	24
50 + years	22

⁴ Applies to all tables, unless otherwise indicated. Distributions add to 100% or nearest due to rounding.

The sample included persons 16 years of age and over. As South Africans are eligible to vote with 18 years, younger respondents are placed in a separate category for analysis purposes.

South Africa is a young population. Half of the respondents in the sample are 35 years or younger and only some 17 percent are over 55 years of age.

After the 1994 elections, the country was divided into nine provinces. The sample is distributed as follows over the new *provinces* created after the first democratic elections.

Western Cape	11
Northern Cape	2
Eastern Cape	14
Free State	7
KwaZuluNatal	20
Mpumalanga	7
Limpopo ⁵	10
Gauteng	21
North West	8

The three provinces with the largest populations are Gauteng, KwaZuluNatal and the Eastern Cape which is reflected in the subsample sizes. KwaZuluNatal incorporates the former homeland of the Zulus and the Eastern Cape encompasses the Ciskei and Transkei homelands divided by the mighty Kei River. The Northern Cape, which is mainly arid, has the lowest population density. Gauteng Province is the melting pot, where all languages and cultures mingle freely in a cosmopolitan atmosphere. The two richest provinces in terms of their contributions to the nation's Gross National Product are Gauteng and the Western Cape. Gauteng is South Africa's commercial centre which emerged from gold mining enterprises in the 19th century. The province includes Johannesburg, known locally as Egoli, or the city of gold, and Pretoria, South Africa's capital. Pretoria's main architectural landmarks are the houses of parliament and the University of South Africa, the largest distance-learning university in southern Africa. The Western Cape includes the mother city of Cape Town where parliament meets for half of the year. The first settlers from Europe landed on the shores of what was to become the Cape Colony in the 17th century. Table Mountain towers over Cape Town's major landmarks, the houses of parliament and the Anglican cathedral. It is on the cathedral steps that anti-apartheid protest movements clashed with the police during their demonstrations in the seventies.

⁵ Limpopo was still called the Northern Province at the time of the survey.

Under the past government, South Africa was divided into four provinces with a scattering of rural homelands assigned to blacks⁶ where land was held in trust for them. The homelands were excluded from official statistics which created a false picture of socio-economic indicators and cultural markers. Blacks living in the homelands typically survived on subsistence agriculture, remittances from wage earners working in the urban-industrial centres of the economy, and government transfers in the form of the near-universal non-contributory state old-age pension. Until the abolition of the notorious pass laws in 1986, blacks were expected to return to their respective rural homelands at the end of a working life. Only in urban areas such as Soweto, near Johannesburg in Gauteng Province, were they allowed to live out their lives in place. Soweto refers to the cluster of black townships near Johannesburg which served as dormitory suburbs for black workers in the open economy. As far back as the late seventies, the authorities reluctantly recognised that many Sowetans had no rural homeland to which they could return. Although townships like Soweto were considered an exception, they increasingly became the norm after the pass laws were removed.

The spatial distribution of the sample by *type of settlement* is as follows:

Tribal	23
Rural	15
Cities and small towns	5
Squatters, shack settlements	7
Hostels	4
Former black townships	24
Former coloured townships	8
Former Indian townships	3
Metropolitan areas	14

In the sample, slightly fewer than four in ten are urban-based. Rural respondents are divided into those who reside in the tribal areas of the former homelands and those in the rural common area. Squatters, hostel and township dwellers are resident in urban centres.

The sample is distributed across *occupational rank* as follows:

⁶ The term 'black' is used here as synonym for 'African'. Both terms are in official use although Statistics South Africa currently uses the designation 'African'. Some South Africans take exception to the exclusive use of the latter term arguing that all peoples living on the African continent are Africans.

Highest ranking occupations	2
Medium ranking occupations	6
Clerical and sales	6
Skilled manual and routine white collar	1
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	26
Economically inactive	60

The majority of the working population is employed in the lower occupational ranks and has limited work skills. The economically inactive constitute the single largest occupational category with the following composition:

Unemployed	27
Students and pupils	14
Retired persons and pensioners	14
Housewives, home makers	5
Total economically inactive	60

The proportion of the unemployed among the economically inactive exceeds that of housewives/homemakers and students and learners. A third of respondents between the ages of 18 and 49 years state they are unemployed. The official unemployment rate in February 2002 according to Statistics South Africa is 29.4% according to the official definition and 40.9% according to the expanded definition which includes discouraged workseekers (*Fast Facts*, November 2002, South African Institute of Race Relations, SAIRR, 2002:9)

The highest-ranking occupations are to be found in the metropolitan areas. Residents of metropolitan areas account for only 14 percent of the sample total but occupy about a third of the highest-ranking positions in society. About four-fifths of the respondents from the tribal areas are economically inactive. Under the former government, the tribal areas were considered labour reserves. Some 38 percent of respondents in tribal areas indicate they are unemployed and a further 21 percent state they are retired.

South Africa's economy has shifted from primary production in mining and agriculture to services as is evident in the distribution of *occupational sectors* in the sample.

Professional, semi- and technical	4
Managerial, executives and administrative	1
Clerical and sales	7
Transport, delivery and communication	3
Services	14
Farmers, fishermen, hunters and farm workers	6
Artisans and apprentices	2
Miners, quarrymen, production foremen and supervisors, operators, production workers and related	3
Economically inactive	60

Surprisingly, not a single respondent in the tribal areas state they are farmers, which suggests that subsistence farming is not a viable occupation there. In contrast, the dominant occupation of respondents in the rural areas outside the former homelands is agriculture, with 41 percent stating they are employed as farmers/farm workers,

The distribution of the sample by level of *education* is as follows:

Up to Grade 5	28
Grade 6-7	13
Grade 8-9	17
Grade 10-11	17
Grade 12	12
Grade 12 or more	12

Educational achievement is skewed toward the lower levels. Over one quarter of the sample has gained less than 5 years of formal education. Grade 12 is the year in which South Africans take a matriculation examination. A matriculation pass is considered the minimum requirement for most jobs beyond the most menial ones. Just under one quarter of the sample has completed secondary education. Only some 12 percent have gained some higher education in teacher or technical training institutions or at a university. An encouraging sign is that illiteracy is concentrated in the older generation. Some 55 percent of respondents 50 years and older have received no formal education. Among 18-24 year-olds, 38 percent have gained a Grade 12 level or higher education compared to 14 percent among persons over fifty.

Educational achievement and occupational rank are closely associated. The vast majority of respondents in professional and managerial occupations, some 78 percent, have higher educational qualifications. The majority of the persons with no education

are employed in the service sector. The unemployed have an educational profile similar to the sample average but half as many have obtained a higher education.

As with education, the distribution of the sample by monthly household and personal *income* is skewed towards lower earnings. A substantial proportion of respondents refused to disclose their income or was uncertain of the amount earned in the household. Approximately half of the respondents living in the former homelands, townships and squatter camps report no personal income. The chances of earning an income and escaping unemployment increases with age.

Monthly <i>household</i> income (gross)		Monthly <i>personal</i> income (gross)	
No income	4	No income	37
No information	20	No information	8
R1-579	24	R1-579	27
R580-1659	27	R580-1659	16
R1660+	24	R1660+	12

To give readers an idea of income levels cited above, the monthly average minimum wage excluding agricultural and domestic workers is R2691 in 2002 (*Fast Facts*, November 2002, SAIRR, 2002:9). According to a study published by Statistics South Africa in September 2000, some 29 percent of South African households were living in poverty based on a poverty line of R800 a month. Gauteng and the Western Cape provinces had the lowest levels of poverty (SAIRR, 2001:372). In the year of the survey, the non-contributory state old-age pension, a major source of income for poor households, was worth R620.

The highest earners in South African society occupy professional and managerial positions, followed by artisans, transport and communication workers, miners, and service workers. Agricultural workers tend to earn least; some 70 percent earn R579 or less per month.

Cultural variance

Under apartheid, South Africans were obsessed by *race*. Under democracy, race continues to be an important marker of social status and social change. The post-apartheid South African census asks the enumerated to state their race in terms of the population groups of Black/African, coloured, Indian or Asian, white and other. The

categorisation will have a familiar ring to most South Africans as it refers back to the race classification imposed on citizens according to the Population Registration Act passed in 1950. However, importantly, racial identity is a matter of choice in the new era. The census asks people to self-categorise with the cue: "How would the person describe him/herself in terms of population group?"

The sample distribution on *race* is as follows.

Black/African	78
Coloured	9
Indian	3
White	10

Blacks constitute over three quarters of the population and now enjoy majority rule. The African National Congress has successfully been elected to lead the country in the first open elections of 1994 and again in the second and third national elections of 1999 and 2004.

The respondents speak the following *languages* at home:

Home languages		
Nguni:	IsiZulu ¹	21
	IsiXhosa ¹	16
	Swazi	2
	Ndebele	2
Afrikaans		15
Afrikaans & English		3
English		11
Sotho:	Western Sotho/ Setswana ¹	10
	Northern Sotho / Sepedi ¹	8
	Southern Sotho / Sesotho ¹	8
XiTsonga ¹		4
Tshivenda ¹		2

¹ For ease of reference, the text and tables to follow may refer simply to Zulu; Xhosa; Western, Northern and Southern Sotho; Tswana, Pedi, Tsonga; and Venda.

In the democratic era, South Africa recognises eleven official languages: English and Afrikaans and nine African languages. Ethnic and language groupings overlap. The ten former homelands were home to specific tribes with their own language. The Nguni languages of Zulu, spoken mainly in KwaZuluNatal Province, and Xhosa, spoken mainly in the Eastern Cape, are the most common languages, followed by Afrikaans which was brought to South Africa by Dutch settlers in the 17th century. Although English is the lingua franca used in business and communication, it is the mother tongue of only a minority, mainly descendants of the 1820 settlers in the Eastern Cape Province and the settlers who arrived in the 19th century on the shores of the port later known as Durban in KwaZuluNatal Province. Only one in ten South Africans speak English as their first language.

The vast majority of blacks speak an African language; of which Zulu, Xhosa and the three Sotho languages are the most widely spoken. Less than 5 percent of blacks speak English or Afrikaans as a home language.

The coloured people in the Cape region are mainly descendants of Malay slaves brought to the Cape Colony in the 17th century. Some 71 percent of coloureds in the sample speak Afrikaans and a further 17 percent are bilingual and speak English and Afrikaans.

The vast majority of Indians speak English as their home language, some 93 percent. Less than 5 percent are fluent in the Indian languages spoken by their forebears when they immigrated to South Africa in the 19th century.

The white population is divided into Afrikaans and English speakers: approximately 55 percent speak Afrikaans, and 36 percent speak English. A further 7 percent are bilingual.

In advance of the detailed discussion on the interrelationships between cultural and socio-economic markers in the next section, it should be noted that, given South Africa's history of social exclusion, the English and Afrikaans languages are indications of distinct socio-economic advantage. English and Afrikaans speakers occupy some 60 percent of professional and managerial positions. The two language groups are over-represented among the higher income earners. Some 63 percent of English speakers and 46 percent of Afrikaans speakers report household incomes in the highest survey category.

South Africa's cultural diversity is evident in the religious makeup of its people. Respondents are members of the following *religious denominations*:

Mainline Christian churches	14
Dutch Reformed churches	12
Anglican Church	6
Roman Catholic	9
Baptist Church	2
Charismatic churches	20
Religious movements	5
African Independent Churches (AIC)	20
Islam	2
Hinduism	1
None	9

The older established churches of South Africa include the various Dutch Reformed Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Anglican Church as well as other mainline Christian protestant churches. The congregations of the well-established mainline protestant Christian churches, represented by Methodists, Lutherans, Congregationalists, and Episcopalians, among others, are outnumbered by those attracted to the newer Charismatic churches. Charismatic churches include the Apostolic Faith Mission, the Rhema Church, the Assembly of God, the Full Gospel Church and various other evangelical and revivalist denominations. The Baptist Church and religious movements such as the Salvation Army, the Seventh Day Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses, have a substantial following. Islam and Hinduism are minority religions. Just under one in ten in the sample did not indicate a religious denomination. It is possible that this category includes religious traditionalists as well as non-believers and persons who did not wish to disclose their religious persuasion.

The Charismatic group of churches and the African Independent Churches have the largest following. The African Independent Churches embrace a very wide assortment of separatist churches of the Zionist and Ethiopian persuasions. Many of these churches operate without church structures and their members assemble in private homes or in public open spaces. The most prominent of the African Independent Churches is the Zion Christian Church, which has its headquarters in the Limpopo Province. Over the long Easter weekend, over one million believers gather from around the country for their annual meeting which takes place in the open air.

Religious denomination reflects social status in line with the ethnic make-up of religionists. Members of the African Independent Churches, religious movements, and the Charismatic churches are more likely to have no income, while members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Hindus and Muslims tend to be among the higher income earners. Best educated are members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Hindus and Muslims. The highest percentages of poorly educated are found among members of the Charismatic and African Independent Churches, and among persons with no religious persuasion.

Anglicans, Dutch Reformed, Catholics, Muslims and Hindus in the survey are over-represented in the ranks of professionals and managers in the economy. The highest proportion of unemployed is found among Roman Catholics, members of Charismatic churches, African Independent Churches and religious movements. Although numbers are small, over one-quarter of Muslims are not economically active housewives, which might be taken as an indication of the stricter division of labour between men and women in Muslim households.

A higher proportion of men than women are members of the patriarchal Dutch Reformed churches, 56 percent compared to 44 percent. More men than women, 74 percent versus 26 percent, did not indicate a religious persuasion. Women are more likely than men to be members of religious movements (65%) and the African Independent Churches (59%).

Blacks are mainly affiliated to the African Independent Churches (25%) and the Charismatic churches (20%), and the established mainline Christian churches (16%). One in ten blacks in the survey said they did not belong to any religious denomination. It is possible that some religious traditionalists are included in this residual category. Coloured respondents are mainly members of charismatic churches (35%) and the Dutch Reformed churches (25%). Indians are predominantly Muslims (41%) or Hindu (35%). Whites are predominantly members of the Dutch Reformed churches (45%) and the mainline Christian churches (10%). An above-average proportion of blacks (83%) are Roman Catholic. Above-average proportions of coloureds (16%) and whites (15%) are Anglicans.

Given their numerical majority in the South African population, blacks make up the largest proportion of members of all religious denominations. Exceptions are Hinduism, Islam and the Dutch Reformed Churches. Hindus are exclusively Indian. Three quarters of Muslims are Indian, the remainder coloureds. The Dutch Reformed Church, established by the Afrikaners, has a following which is 43 percent black, 30 percent white and 19 percent coloured.

As the designation suggests, the African Independent Churches are exclusive to blacks. The Charismatic churches and the religious movements, which are newer to South Africa than the mainline Christian churches, have a following throughout South African society. However, it is the Anglican Church which has the most diverse membership in terms of race, home language and geographical location.

Noteworthy is that religious affiliation cuts across South Africa's language divides.

Dominant home languages spoken by religious followers:

Mainline Christian churches	Xhosa (36%) ¹ , Zulu (15), Western Sotho (14%)
Dutch Reformed churches	Afrikaans (54%), Western Sotho (19%)
Anglican Church	Xhosa (25%), English (24%), Zulu (15%)
Roman Catholic	Zulu (53%), English (11%)
Baptist Church	-
Charismatic churches	Afrikaans (19%), Zulu (16%), Xhosa (16%)
Religious movements	Xhosa (28%), Zulu (23%)
African Independent Churches (AIC)	Zulu (31%), Xhosa (19%)
Islam	English (58%), Afrikaans (14%), Other ² (6%)
Hinduism	English (100%)
None	Zulu (25%), Northern Sotho (21%)

¹ 36% of members of the mainline Christian churches speak Xhosa as their home language.

² Other languages include Indian languages.

Given South Africa's language mix, one would expect isiZulu and isiXhosa speakers to dominate in most religious denominations. Western Sotho and Setswana speakers are also well represented in the mainline Christian churches and the Dutch Reformed churches. The Anglican and Catholic churches have a large English-speaking following. The Dutch Reformed churches are home mainly to Afrikaans speakers. Islam has its following among Indians and coloureds who speak either English, Afrikaans or Indian languages.

The provinces differ markedly in terms of their cultural markers including racial composition, dominant languages spoken within their borders, and religion. Ethnicity and language markers overlap. The former homelands were set aside for different tribes which shared a common language (see map below). Thus, the dominant languages spoken in all the provinces including a former homeland are African ones. The Dutch Reformed churches have the largest following in the western part of the country in the Cape and North West. African Independent Churches are popular in the Eastern Cape, KwaZuluNatal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo, all provinces with vast tribal areas.

Dominant racial, language, and religious denominations in the nine provinces:

Province	Race groups	Home languages	Religions
Western Cape	Coloured 55%, black 26%, white 17%	Afrikaans ¹ 64%	Charismatic 27%, Dutch Reformed 25%
Northern Cape	Coloured 46%, black 43%, white 11%	Afrikaans ¹ 75%	Charismatic 28%, Dutch Reformed 28%
Eastern Cape	Black 84%, white 8%, coloured 7%	Xhosa 80%	Mainline Christian 27%, Charismatic 22%, AIC ³ 22%
Free State	Black 84%, white 14%	Southern Sotho 64%	Dutch Reformed 30%, Mainline Christian 26%
KwaZuluNatal	Black 81%, white 9%, Indian 8%	Zulu 78%, English 17%,	Roman Catholic 26%, AIC ³ 23%
Mpumalanga	Black 91%, white 7%	Zulu 35%, Swazi 31%,	AIC ³ 39%, Charismatic 15%
Limpopo ²	Black 95%	Northern Sotho 50%, Tsonga 24%, Venda 19%	AIC ³ 28, Charismatic 27%
Gauteng	Black 81%, white 14%	All languages are spoken	Charismatic 25%, AIC ³ 21%
North West	Black 92%, white 5%	Western Sotho 83%	Dutch Reformed 27%

¹ Includes bilingual Afrikaans- and English-speakers

² Known as Northern Province at the time of the survey


³ African Independent Churches

Blacks are the majority group in all provinces with exception of the Western and Northern Cape. The Cape was formerly a coloured labour preference area, which explains the high concentration of the coloured population in the Western and Northern Cape. The white population is mainly in the metropolitan areas of Cape Town in the Western Cape Province, in Port Elizabeth and East London in the Eastern Cape Province, in Durban in KwaZuluNatal Province, and in the vast urban agglomerations

around Johannesburg and Pretoria in Gauteng Province. The white population in the Free State Province is mostly rural. The highest concentration of blacks is in the provinces which include the former homelands: Limpopo, North West, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and KwaZuluNatal. Noteworthy is that the African Independent Churches have a strong presence in these same provinces as well as in Gauteng, the reception area for the socially mobile from all provinces.

The majority of Indians live in and around the Durban metropolitan area in KwaZuluNatal. Between 1860 and 1911, Indians were brought from India as indentured labourers to work on the sugar estates of Natal. On completion of their contracts, some stayed on and found work as fishermen or market gardeners. Other Indians, mainly Muslim, came independently to South Africa to engage in trade. Restrictions were placed on the entry of Indians into some provinces including the Free State.

As far as religions are concerned, the Charismatic churches have a following countrywide. The Dutch Reformed churches are concentrated in the western provinces of the Western and Northern Cape, the North West, and the Free State. Roman Catholics have a strong presence in KwaZuluNatal Province.



Stratification and cultural difference

How does South African reality match the ambitious goals of a new nation committed to offering equal opportunities for all?

South Africa's first democratic elections held in April 1994 were hailed as a miracle.

The notion of a 'rainbow nation', adopted as South Africa's guiding symbol at the birth of democracy, epitomised the ideal of unity in diversity and a nation at peace with itself living in harmony. However, there is a tacit understanding among South Africans in the new political era that harmony presupposes a more equitable distribution of material resources in society to underpin the fledgling democracy. As mentioned earlier, the racial marker is one of the key indicators of progress used by South Africans to measure how far they have come to achieve the ideal of an equal opportunity society.

With the new constitution of 1996, considered to be among the most progressive in the world, the new South Africa has set itself the goal of achieving a non-racial society while enshrining the rights of minorities. This section examines how economic and cultural differences are interrelated some eight years into democracy.

Age and equal opportunities

Important to note at the outset is that there is a wide gap in the age distributions of the races as shown in the table below.

	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
- 34 years	56	50	52	43	54
35 - 49 years	24	27	22	21	24
50+ years	20	24	26	36	22

While the white population has passed the demographic transition with an age distribution comparable to those of Western developed countries, the black population is still a young one. Over half of the black subsample is under 35 years of age while over a third of the white subsample is over 50 years of age. As described earlier, the chances of securing a job and earning a higher income increase progressively with age. Equally important for a study of democracy is that older people worldwide tend to be more conservative than their younger counterparts. It is obvious that age differences will be reflected in the outlook on life and expectations for the future.

Social transformation for equal opportunities

Social transformation is the new buzzword in South Africa. Equal opportunities⁷ legislation introduced since 1994 has introduced affirmative action measures to accelerate the pace of transformation. Paradoxically, as mentioned earlier, South Africa still uses race as its key marker of progress in achieving its aim of transforming into a non-racial society. Racial quotas are defined to match the demographic profile of the population. Blacks, and to a lesser extent coloureds and Indians, as well as women and the disabled are considered previously disadvantaged groups who deserve advancement on potential rather than proven achievement. Initially, the question whether promotion according to affirmative action or merit would better serve South African society was hotly debated. In time, affirmative action measures were accepted as self-evident.

Currently, official statistics at the national, provincial and local level, as well as in government departments, educational institutions, and private sector organisations record the race of current and prospective employees. It is perfectly legitimate, in fact essential, to ask job applicants to state their race and gender for purposes of addressing past inequalities in society. In contrast, the new labour legislation rules out questions to prospective job applicants referring to age, marital status, health status and other personal circumstances which might affect performance on the job. Affirmative action policies seek to address the proportion of women in all positions in society. Tenders for state-funded projects usually include a clause stipulating the provision of jobs for quotas of women as well as youth and the physically disabled. In terms of employment equity quotas, the prize goes to organisations that employ black women.

Transformation is not an exclusive public-sector goal. All organisations in society are morally obliged to integrate larger numbers of previously disadvantaged sectors of society into their ranks. In order to comply with the new guidelines, private sector organisations are also obliged to submit their plans which set out their transformation strategies. Thus, private schools offer scholarships for pupils from the townships. There is pressure on sports clubs to run outreach programmes to develop previously less popular sports such as cricket and rugby among township youth. There is also pressure to replace good players on the South African teams with less experienced black sportsmen and women to represent South Africa. However, winning on the sports field is more important to many South Africans than political correctness. Therefore transformation in sports, which was fostered to promote national unity in the first years of democracy, has become a contentious issue.

⁷ The clause on equality in the constitution rules out discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

In short, South Africans are acutely conscious of the colour profile of all the groups and organisations to which they belong. Social comparisons along demographic lines are a by-product of the application of racial markers to chart progress in achieving an equal society.

Gender and equal opportunities

How do South African women, one of the major beneficiaries of affirmative action policies, fare in the new era? Our sample survey results show that black women have multiple disadvantages in that they tend to occupy the lowest occupational ranks, earn the lowest wages and swell the ranks of the unemployed. A significantly larger proportion of women than men in South African society have had no formal education, some 68 percent versus 32 percent. This translates into poor job opportunities. The majority of women remain outside the labour force: They account for 60 percent of the unemployed and 61 percent of pensioners and retired persons. Men dominate in the top managerial and executive positions, in the transport and communication sector, in agriculture, and as artisans, and miners and labourers. Although South Africa prides itself in the relatively high number of women who serve as members of parliament and ministers or their deputies in government departments, women are outnumbered by men in high positions outside of government and politics. The survey results show that women are employed mainly in the lower-ranking positions in clerical, sales and services. However, South African women have started to make their mark as professionals where they slightly outnumber men with 52 percent.

Twice as many women than men reside in the tribal areas (65% versus 35%) where people live mainly from subsistence farming, remittances from household members working away from home, and from government transfers which provide a safety net to the old and the poor. Women also outnumber men in the poorer provinces of the Eastern Cape (61%) and Limpopo (63%). Female-headed households tend to be among the poorest, in part because households tend to form around female state pensioners. Hostel dwellers and workers on commercial farms are predominantly men (71% and 63%, respectively). The commercial farms employ seasonal workers as well as farm workers who live with their families. Formerly, the single-sex hostels catered to male migrant workers in town and on the mines who left their families behind to look after their interests in the rural homelands. Since 1994, a large number of hostels have been upgraded and transformed into family housing units.

Spatial distribution of economic opportunities

Since the 1980s, South Africa is fast becoming an urban society. Over half of blacks are now residing in the urban and metropolitan areas. Black migrant workers, who formerly returned to the rural homelands after a working life, remain in town. In an open society, people vote with their feet and gravitate to urban centres and metropolitan areas in search of employment opportunities or at least better access to services, conveniences and government safety nets. A new phenomenon in the nineties has been the mushrooming of vast housing developments in small towns and squatter settlements in metropolitan areas that feature electricity and telephone wires strung overhead. A higher proportion of blacks currently live in squatter settlements than in migrant worker hostels. The black share of all small town and city dwellers in the sample is 32 percent, while the black share of metropolitan dwellers is 47 percent. Nevertheless, some 46 percent of blacks are still rural-based either in tribal areas in the former homelands (29%) or in other rural areas (17%) which include commercial farming areas.

Some eight years into democracy, urban residential areas still tend to be colour-coded. The majority of blacks in urban areas are concentrated in the areas formerly designated for blacks. Nevertheless, the survey results suggest that some racial mingling is taking place in the former common area. While some 26 percent of blacks in the sample still reside in the former black townships, a further 3 percent now live in townships formerly designated as coloured and Indian residential areas. Black respondents in the survey account for some 19 percent of residents in former coloured townships and some 23 percent of residents in former Indian townships. However, the movement is not reciprocal. There is little evidence that black townships are accommodating people from the other race groups.

Opportunities to earn a livelihood differ markedly from one province to another. The provinces with the former homelands - as indicated by the survey category of 'tribal area' - have large pockets of unemployment and low-income households. The richer provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape, which include South Africa's two major metropolitan areas, have the largest proportion of richer households in the sample. Similarly, personal incomes are highest in Gauteng and the Western Cape, where between 17 and 19 percent earn the highest monthly incomes, and lowest in the predominantly rural Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces, where between 44 and 46 percent report no income. KwaZuluNatal Province straddles the education and income divides in that it includes both one of the largest metropolitan centres as well as the deep rural areas of the former KwaZulu homeland. KwaZuluNatal evidences high levels of unemployment and illiteracy, presumably in the vast former rural homeland, as well as the higher education levels and better employment opportunities afforded by the metropolitan port city of Durban.

Women outnumber men with a ratio of over 60 to 40 percent in the poorer provinces of the Eastern Cape and Limpopo, which include former homelands. The dominance of women can be attributed to the outmigration of men in search of work from the tribal areas in these two provinces. The peripheral provinces of Limpopo and the North West have the highest rates of illiteracy as indicated by no education or less than 5 years of education.

Closing the gap between rich and poor

Closing the gap between rich and poor is seen as an important goal in the new South Africa. Efforts are underway to promote black empowerment in the economic sector. There is widespread consensus that a just society should strive towards alleviating poverty and creating a better life for all.

The table below shows that black economic empowerment still has a long way to go. The distribution of personal incomes earned by the black and white sectors of the population still follows the hierarchical pattern so characteristic of all South Africa's social indicators under apartheid. On average, whites command the highest monthly incomes, blacks the lowest, with others in between. Similarly, some eight years into democracy, virtually all indicators of living conditions and quality of life show that blacks are worst off, whites best off, with coloured and Indians falling somewhere in between.

	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
R1-579	30.8	26.5	18.5	3.2	27.3
R580-1659	17.5	13.8	14.8	5.0	15.8
R1660+	7.2	22.8	29.6	37.4	12.2

Income differentials are partly due to educational differences. A third of blacks have no education or are barely literate (indicated by up to five years of formal education). Only 17 percent of blacks have a Grade 12 or higher education compared to 72 percent of whites, 46 percent of Indians and 25 percent of coloureds. The legacy of Bantu education under apartheid which had neglected the education of the black population, meant that there were insufficient people of colour who had the necessary educational qualifications and experience to meet the demands of commerce and industry. In the first years of democracy, educational institutions lost many of their promising young black staff to key positions in government and the public service that paid more. Given the shortage of educated black candidates, South Africa has experienced a skills shortage in virtually every sector of the economy.

Equally worrying for the new democracy is jobless growth. Although the African National Congress government's macro-economic policy has created a stable economy, it has failed to attract the foreign investment needed to create jobs for a growing workforce. It is estimated that half a million jobs have been lost since the birth of democracy (*The Economist*, February 24, 2001, p 11). The macro-economic policy, Gear (Growth, Employment and Reconstruction) is a bone of contention between the ruling African National Congress and its trade union alliance partners. The latter are more in favour of populist policies to achieve equal opportunities and see the Gear policy as the cause of job shedding. On the other hand, in the global era, the new labour legislation which aims to promote employment equity, is regarded in some quarters as a disincentive to attract foreign investment and to create jobs in small business.

The lowest wage earners in the sample are to be found in the sectors where wages and working conditions are not regulated, in agriculture and domestic service. At the time of writing, minimum wages and basic conditions of employment were being introduced for domestic and farm workers. Workers in both of these sectors are also to be covered by unemployment insurance in the near future. Even these low-paying jobs are under threat. With rising costs of living many families can no longer afford live-in or full-time domestic help and share domestic services with other households. Increasing production costs, new legislation on the rights of tenants, and anticipation of minimum wage legislation in agriculture have prompted many commercial farmers to mechanise and reduce the size of their labour force.

Education and equal opportunities

Education appears to hold the key to economic success in South African society. In our sample, the limited jobs available go to the better educated. Occupational status is linked to educational achievement at both the individual and household level. At the household level, some 66 percent of respondents from households earning the lowest incomes have 7 years of education or less. In contrast, 52 percent of respondents from the more affluent households have at least 12 years of education. At the individual level, some 70 percent of the lowest income earners have 7 years of education or less, while 69 percent of the highest earners have at least 12 years of education. Rural dwellers are disadvantaged when it comes to access to education. Above-average proportions of persons living in the former homelands (16%), and in other rural areas (19%) have had no formal education. It is precisely these two categories that report the lowest household incomes: 37 percent of former homeland residents and just over half of residents of other rural areas report household incomes of less than R579 per month.

The racial distribution across occupational rank and earnings matches educational levels. Although blacks appear to have made significant inroads into the ranks of professionals, managers, and clerical and sales workers, the vast majority are still

employed in low-skill positions or have joined the ranks of the unemployed. The legacy of Bantu education, which prepared black school leavers only for the most menial of jobs, mainly as domestic and agricultural workers, remains to be undone.

	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
High & medium ranking professionals & managers	5	7	9	20	7
Semi-, unskilled workers	29	25	9	7	26
Unemployed	30	22	13	4	26

Equal opportunities and language

The new South Africa recognises eleven official languages with English as the common one.

Whereas, previously, official documents were published in Afrikaans and English, they are now in English. By printing their notices, business cards, letterheads and pamphlets in an African language, private-sector organisations communicate their support of the new political dispensation and country's new language policy. In 2003, the government's new language policy mandates government offices to print communications in at least three of the languages used in their area of jurisdiction to promote cultural diversity.

On the hills overlooking the Western Cape town of Paarl is the monument erected to celebrate the Afrikaans language. Afrikaans emerged from a dialect brought to the country by the Dutch in the 17th century. The definite losers in the new language policy are Afrikaans speakers whose mother tongue served as the official language for forty years under the previous government. A command of Afrikaans was formerly a requisite when applying for a public sector job. Afrikaans was the dominant language of bureaucracy and the language's ability to assimilate loan words also allowed it to serve as the language of technology and higher learning. In the new era, the formerly Afrikaans-medium universities are expected to teach in English to accommodate the rapidly growing intake of black students. Afrikaans now shares television and radio time with the other nine minority languages.

The Afrikaans language still retains some of its connotation as the language of oppression under apartheid rule. The Soweto uprising of 1976 was in protest that black students were taught in Afrikaans. At the time of writing, education policy makers are reconsidering their stance on Afrikaans as the dominant medium of instruction in

some of the country's leading universities. Education policy makers are seriously considering promoting select African languages as medium of instruction alongside English in higher education. This would give black students the advantage of being taught in their home language right up to the tertiary level. The development of Afrikaans in the former era might be used as a model when seeking to elevate an African language as medium of instruction in higher education.

The language issue, with its symbolism, remains a divisive issue in the new era. Afrikaans is a source of pride and identity for many white South Africans. The main concern of white Afrikaans-speakers is that their cultural heritage will be lost or diluted under the new dispensation. However, it is now the coloured community that represents the largest group of Afrikaans speakers. In the negotiations leading to South Africa's peaceful settlement, coloured leaders sought to allay white fears that the Afrikaans language might become extinct if there were a change of government. They vouched to safeguard the country's language heritage in the transition.

Religion and equal opportunities

The established Christian churches have always played an important role in South African politics. Under apartheid many of them opposed the ruling party of the day. In the 1980s breakaway groups from the Dutch Reformed churches took a strong stand against apartheid and paved the way for negotiations between the ruling National Party and the African National Congress in exile. Former Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu was a strong advocate of economic sanctions which forced the National Party to change its political course in the late 1980s. In the democratic era, he was to become the chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee to hear human rights violations.

In the 1990s and the millennium, the archbishops of the Catholic and Anglican churches continue to provide strong leadership. In the political arena, they compete as outspoken critics and watchdogs of the new government and have created an ecumenical forum to review the major issues in society including poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Anglican Archbishop Tutu's successor, Njongonkulu Ndungane, has become the champion of the poor and has lobbied for debt relief to African countries to raise the standard of living for the poor. Although the Zion Christian Church - included in the African Independent Church category in the survey - has chosen to stay out of politics, it did allow leaders from across the political spectrum to address its members in the run-up to the first national elections in 1994. As mentioned earlier, members of the African Independent Churches rank lowest on many socio-economic markers. Given their position in society, members of the African Independent Churches have the most to gain from equal opportunities to enhance their life chances in the democratic era.

Psychosocial Attitudes

Most social surveys assume that social factors such as gender, age, residence, occupation, education and income, mother tongue and ethnic and religious affiliation will influence people's thinking in matters of society and politics. However, subjective feelings will also shape people's views of society and politics. In this chapter, we review South Africans' trust in other people, fear or confidence, openness or resistance to change and belief in the ability to deal with others. These are all factors that may influence political attitudes. All items have been applied in previous cross-cultural studies.

People trust and feel close to some people and not to others. For each of the following types of people, tell us whether you feel close to and trust them.

In order of frequency, the respondents expressed their trust in:

Family	90
People of my religion	65
Friends	62
Neighbours	56
People of my ethnic group	51
People with the same working and living conditions	46
People from my village, town, home district	43
People from my province	32
All South African citizens	28
Nobody	10

Trust is multi-layered. It operates in concentric spheres. Trust is greatest in the intimate family circle and least pronounced at the more distant provincial and national level. The ordering of the layers between these poles is worth noting. Trust in fellow religionists falls somewhere between family and friends. Trust in members of one's own ethnic group features between neighbours and people sharing the same living and working conditions. One in ten respondents state they trust nobody.

There are a number of variations in the general pattern of trust relationships.

Indians tend to be more trusting than the other ethnic groups identified in the survey. It is only when it comes to the outermost layer of trust in fellow South Africans that Indian and black South Africans score the same 30 to 31 percent.

It is apparent that in the urban areas the hostel situation breeds caution in social interactions. Hostel dwellers tend to be less trusting than other urban dwellers. Hostel dwellers are more likely than others to say they distrust people in closest proximity including friends, neighbours, co-religionists, people who share the same ethnic origins and the same living conditions, as well as all South Africans.

Levels of trust also tend to vary according to cultural markers such as home language and religion. The small subgroups of Ndebele and Venda speakers tend to express greater trust in other people, an exception being trust in friends. It seems that bilinguals who consider both English and Afrikaans to be their home languages, are torn in their loyalties. They express below-average levels of trust in all South Africans as well as in people who share similar living conditions, in fellow members of their ethnic and religious groups, and in fellow citizens of their province. The small groups of Hindus and Muslims in the survey expressed high levels of trust in most instances.

Almost everyone trusts *family*. The lowest level of trust in family, between 82 and 85 percent, is found among Western Sotho speakers who are concentrated in the North West province.

Trust in *co-religionists* is most pronounced among Hindus, to a slightly lesser degree among Muslims, and among Indians generally. Between 80 and 90 percent in these categories say they trust people of their own religion. Between 72 and 76 percent of Anglicans, members of the Dutch Reformed and Baptist churches and religious movements trust their co-religionists. As might be expected, the level of trust is lowest among persons stating no religious affiliation. Possibly in reflection of religious participation, more women than men and more respondents over fifty years of age place their trust in co-religionists.

Friendship is by definition based on trust. The majority of South Africans, some 62 percent, state they trust their friends. Trust in friends appears to be above average, mainly over 70 percent, in cities and the metropolitan areas, and among professionals, higher income earners and the better educated. Least trusting of their friends, between 39 and 54 percent, are Swazis, residents of Mpumalanga Province and members of religious movements and African Independent Churches.

The pattern is inverted for trust in *neighbours*. Lower education and personal income are systematically related to higher levels of trust in neighbours. It is likely that low-income groups are more dependent on neighbours when in need in terms of norms of mutual solidarity. The lowest occupational levels and lowest income earners place greater trust in their neighbours than do professionals and high-ranking occupations and the higher earners. However, trust in neighbours is lowest among hostel dwellers possibly due to the fact that they share confined living space with neighbours.

Hindus and Muslims and to a lesser degree respondents from KwaZuluNatal and the Northern Cape express above-average levels of trust in their neighbours.

Ethnicity is an important cultural marker in South Africa. Approximately half of all respondents state they trust people of their own *ethnic group*. Hostel and township dwellers as well as residents of metropolitan areas tend to be less trusting than others. While 69 percent of isiNdebele and Tshivenda speakers trust members of their ethnic group, only 37 percent of bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers do so. Levels of trust in one's own ethnic group are lowest among Roman Catholics and members of African Independent Churches and highest among Hindus and Muslims.

Feelings of solidarity with people sharing the same *working and living conditions* is greatest in the farming and service sectors which are among the largest employers. Rural dwellers tend to express significantly higher levels of trust in fellow workers than people living in the metropolitan areas. Residents of former Indian suburbs feel closer to colleagues than residents of former black suburbs. The Eastern Cape, the Northern Cape and KwaZuluNatal, all provinces with large rural populations, are associated with trust in colleagues.

It is apparent that trust in people from the *same village* or hometown is associated with restricted geographical mobility. Older and rural South Africans still have roots in their home districts of origin. Trust in people from one's own village, town or home district increases systematically with age. Residents of tribal and other rural areas express much higher levels of trust than metropolitan and urban dwellers. The Eastern and Northern Cape provinces, which have large rural populations, are associated with higher levels of trust in people of one's own village. The lowest levels of trust are found among Southern Sotho, Siswati and Afrikaans and English speakers. It is possible that some whites and English speakers trace their origins to places beyond South Africa which might account for the low levels of trust, between 34 and 39 percent, among these two survey categories.

White and coloured respondents, and residents of metropolitan and the former coloured areas report significantly below-average levels of trust in people from their *own province*. Retired persons and people in managerial positions indicate high trust while professionals, artisans and miners are among the occupations indicating low trust. As is the case with the trust relationships discussed so far, Tshivenda and isiNdebele speakers indicate the highest levels of trust. People of the Western Cape express lowest trust while people from the Northern Cape, Limpopo and Gauteng feel closest to the people of their province.

Trust in *fellow South Africans* might be considered a matter of patriotism in the democratic era. It may be telling that trust in all South Africans is the only dimension on which black South Africans score higher than Indians who generally express the highest levels of trust. Approximately 30 to 31 percent of Indian and black South Africans state they feel close to their compatriots. The highest levels of trust are found in the tribal and rural areas, the lowest levels in towns, hostels and the metropolitan

areas. There are wide discrepancies between the provinces ranging from 13 percent in the Western Cape to 34 to 38 percent in the Northern Cape and Limpopo. Muslims, members of religious movements, the Dutch Reformed churches and Anglicans score between 19 and 23 percent trust in all South Africans, while members of mainline Christian churches score 34 percent and Hindus 42 percent, respectively.

Language may be among the most important cultural markers of feelings of solidarity with fellow South Africans. Speakers of languages of European origin exhibit the lowest levels of trust while speakers of the minority African languages, isiNdebele and Tsivenda, exhibit the highest levels of trust. Within the three most dominant African language groups, Western Sotho speakers feel closer to fellow South Africans than Xhosa or Zulu speakers.

The degree of trust by home language is as follows:

Trust in all people of South Africa (average: 28 percent)

Home language	%
Afrikaans and English	14
Afrikaans	16
Other languages	18
English	22
Zulu	26
Xhosa	30
Northern Sotho	31
Tsonga	31
Swazi	31
Southern Sotho	34
Western Sotho	37
Venda	60
Ndebele	64

An index was created to measure levels of trust ranging from trust in family to trust in fellow South Africans. A reliable index was produced that included all nine trust relationships. Scores ranged from 0, in the case of trust in no one, up to 9, in the case of trust in all nine reference groups under study. Scores are distributed as follows:

Trust Index Scores

None (0-1)	17
Low (2-3)	23
Medium (4-5)	19
Trusting (6-7)	17
High trust (8-9)	23

Overall levels of trust tend to be highest among Indians and older and retired persons. Generally it appears to be easier for members of close-knit minority groups and smaller-scale rural communities to be trusting. High trust scores are characteristic of the agricultural sector, the tribal and commercial rural areas, and of Limpopo, a predominantly rural province. The minority language groups of the Ndebele and Venda score above average on the index. By religion, it is the minority religions of Islam and Hinduism that are the most trusting. Muslims are the highest scorers overall. Good scores on trust are achieved by virtually all of the more established Christian denominations including the mainline Christian protestant churches, the Dutch Reformed churches, Roman Catholics and Baptists.

Low trust scores appear to be concentrated among groups that are more exposed to potentially harmful social contacts through their work or living circumstances. Groups that are more guarded in their relations with others include hostel dwellers, transport workers and miners. Low trust is also observed among residents of the Free State, Swazis and members of the African Independent Churches and religious movements.

I feel uncertain and fearful about my future.

Just under two thirds (62%) agree with this statement, black and Indian respondents more often than coloured and white respondents. Fear and uncertainty decreases with higher levels of education and household and personal incomes. Respondents in the lower skills, lower-paid occupations which require few educational qualifications, particularly in the agricultural and service sectors, are among the most cautious and fearful. No doubt fears are related to unemployment and poverty. Fear is highest in the poor province of the Eastern Cape and lowest in the more affluent Western Cape. Afrikaans and English speakers, who tend to be better-educated and command higher incomes than average, are less likely to endorse feelings of uncertainty and fearfulness than speakers of African languages. Over 70 percent of members of the African Independent Churches say they feel fearful about their future. It seems that feelings of security inspired by religious beliefs and fellowship are overshadowed by economic insecurities in this category. With fifty percent endorsing the statement, Baptists and Roman Catholics, who come from a range of social backgrounds, are least fearful about the future.

One should be very cautious with people. You cannot trust the people who live and work around you.

Slightly over two thirds (68%) agree with the statement. Semi- and unskilled workers tend to be more cautious in their interpersonal relations, in particular transport workers.

People from the Northern Cape are among the most cautious while Tshivenda and isiZulu speakers and residents of KwaZuluNatal are less circumspect in their dealings with other people.

The following two statements are often used as indicators of social conservatism:

One should be sure that something really works before taking chances.

If you try to change things you usually make them worse.

While three-quarters agree with the first statement, which expresses caution with the unknown, only just over a third are fundamentally sceptical about change.

Higher education, income and occupational status are strongly associated with more positive attitudes to change. Fundamental scepticism eases progressively with level of education and personal and household income. Managers, administrators, and clerical workers are less averse to taking risks than transport workers, farmers, and miners. Fear of change is greatest in South Africa's tribal and rural areas and among unskilled and agricultural workers.

Given their educational and income advantages, Indian and white South Africans tend to be less averse to change than their black and coloured compatriots. However, conservative pockets of South African society are found in the farming regions, in the mainly agricultural Free State Province, among Afrikaans speakers and members of the Dutch Reformed and Charismatic churches.

Among provinces, KwaZuluNatal - which has a high concentration of Indians and whites, English speakers and Roman Catholics - emerges as the least conservative.

There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country.

Just over six in ten (61%) responded in the affirmative, indicating that they did not feel they could assist in improving the well-being of compatriots. Feelings of disempowerment are clearly related to lower education and socio-economic status. People who lack the resources to manage their own lives obviously feel ill equipped to build their society. Agency increases progressively with income and personal and household income. Housewives and farm workers feel least capable of effecting improvements while professionals and managers feel most capable. Urban residents in towns and metropolitan areas are better placed or feel more confident to make improvements than rural dwellers.

Given the socio-economic disparities in South African society, the racial marker is a good indicator of feelings of empowerment. Indians feel most capable of effecting

change with 43 percent endorsing the statement, followed by whites (50%), and at a distance, by blacks (63%) and lastly coloureds (67%). Analogously, residents of the former Indian suburbs feel most empowered while residents of the former coloured residential suburbs least empowered. Other cultural markers follow suit. Among the provinces, KwaZuluNatal, with the largest concentration of Indians and English speakers, scores highest on empowerment, North West province lowest. By language, English and Xitsonga speakers score highest on agency; isiNdebele and Western Sotho speakers lowest. Membership of the Dutch Reformed Church, which has a strong coloured following, is associated with above-average sense of disempowerment. At the other pole, Hindus, Muslims, Baptists and Roman Catholics are among those who feel the strongest sense of agency. It is possible that the latter are influenced by the example of strong church leadership.

While the majority of South Africans feel they do not have the resources to uplift their society, they believe solidarity will nevertheless make a difference.

Even ordinary people can make progress if they help each other.

Nine in ten endorse the statement. This time round, coloured people score slightly above the average along with Indians and Whites - between 97 and 98 percent. The idea of solidarity appeals more to the better off in society. People living in towns, the metropolitan areas and in the richer provinces of the Western Cape and Gauteng score above average. Residents of black townships, squatter and tribal areas are less likely to support the notion of solidarity although it is commonly regarded as the backbone of African society. Support for the idea that solidarity will accelerate progress increases systematically with personal and household income. However, a similarly high proportion of households who claim no income and ones in the highest income bracket endorse solidarity as a catalyst for social development. Almost all English speakers are supportive of solidarity. In line with their strong feelings of interpersonal trust, the minority groups of Venda and Ndebele are among the best supporters of social solidarity.

To *sum up*, South Africans are still cautious about placing their trust in fellow South Africans some eight years after a negotiated settlement. Ethnic and religious ties appear to be closer. The majority in society are cautious about grasping new opportunities for development. Lack of a sense of efficacy prevails although almost all South Africans pay lip service to the notion of group solidarity to achieve progress. All these attitudes are personal. Nevertheless, they appear to be influenced by the economic power that respondents wield in South African society which still reflects the divides of the former era. Thus, the gulf between rich and poor, and black and white, is as remarkable in psychological attitudes as it is in the layers of social class. People at the centre who belong to the economically powerful groups are generally more trusting, open to new ideas, and more confident in their personal capabilities. The

black population lags behind in its levels of trust, and self-confidence. Interestingly, Indians, a small but economically powerful group, express the highest levels of trust and agency, yet are fearful of the future. As we shall see later, their concern about the future is a recurrent theme in their survey responses.

Perceptions of the Economy and Society

South Africa achieved a political miracle with the April 1994 elections when all South Africans, black and white, went to the polls to cast their vote for the first democratically elected government. Many of the new voters hoped that the democratic era would bring greater prosperity. Indeed the election promises were for a 'better life for all'.

How do South Africans see their economic opportunities some eight years into democracy?

Economic advisors point out that foreign investment is attracted to a country where people are themselves prepared to invest in their own future. An item in the survey probed willingness to save rather than spend.

Imagine that you are lucky and win a lot of money in the lottery. On which one of the following would you spend more than others?

Starting a business	29
Investing in a bank with good profit	26
Enjoying to spend the money on myself or my family	24
Improving my house and my furniture	19
Other	2

All options presented to the respondents appear to be attractive. Approximately equal proportions of respondents would become entrepreneurs or invest their money for the future. Slightly lower proportions, less than one-fourth, would spend the money on themselves or on home improvements.

Economic choices differ according to social background. However, differences in choices are subtle rather than clear-cut.

The business option is more attractive to blacks, Zulus in particular, to men rather than women, and to the 18 to 24 year age cohort. It is mainly better-educated professional people and sales and clerical workers earning above-average salaries who state they might become entrepreneurs if they had a windfall. Zulus and residents from KwaZuluNatal are likely to be attracted to the business option. This result is somewhat surprising in that Zulus are better known as descendents of warriors and their commercial prowess in KwaZuluNatal is overshadowed by that of Indians who are in part descendents of traders. However, there are also signs that entrepreneurship

might be seen as a way out of poverty: Unemployed persons and respondents from households with no income and those based in tribal areas also see themselves as entrepreneurs.

Potential investors are found mainly among the Indians and whites in the survey. The persons who would bank their windfall are for the most part urban-based in cities and metropolitan areas, working in higher-ranking managerial positions or as artisans. The majority are English speakers or bilingual in English or Afrikaans. Gauteng Province, at the centre of South Africa's economy, would supply the largest proportion of investors.

The highest proportion of consumers is to be found among black and coloured respondents. While coloured respondents focus on spending on themselves and family, the black consumers wish to invest in improving their homes. Age appears to play a difference in consumption patterns: younger individuals would prefer to spend the money on themselves and family while older persons would rather improve their homes. It is mainly lower income households and individuals, including agricultural and service workers, that would consume a windfall. Xhosas and people from the Eastern Cape are well represented among the potential home improvers. Sotho speakers generally and persons from the peripheral northern provinces, are over-represented among potential consumers. The consumption option may be an expression of the need to catch up rather than personal indulgence. No doubt many of the oppressed under the former political dispensation wish to make good their backlog in consumption. Furthermore, the former government did not promote an ethos of entrepreneurship among the politically marginalised.

A further dimension of the economic ethos is the perception of the ingredients of success in life.

In your opinion, which one of the following is the most important for achieving success in life?

Responses in approximate order of frequency are as follows:

Working hard for myself	39
Education	26
Working with others and standing together as a group	10
Experience	8
What your parents taught you	4
Religious beliefs	3
Connections	3
Other	7

South Africans believe that hard work and education will open up the doors to success. To a lesser extent, group efforts are also perceived as a means of getting ahead.

The social profile of persons who believe in *hard work* as the principal ingredient in success is dominated by whites and coloureds, men, individuals earning higher personal incomes and the higher-ranking occupations including managers, professionals, artisans, and skilled manual workers. Afrikaans, English and isiZulu speakers believe in hard work as do members of the Dutch Reformed churches and Baptists. Among the provinces, the highest proportion of votes comes from Limpopo, Gauteng and KwaZuluNatal.

Education is seen as the means of social mobility mainly among younger South Africans and particularly among students and learners. The peripheral city dwellers including shack and hostel dwellers, and residents of former coloured and black townships are more likely than others to place their bets on education. The highest proportion of votes for education comes from coloured respondents and from the Western Cape Province which has a large coloured population. Muslims, Anglicans, Roman Catholics and the mainline Christian churches place their faith in education to achieve in life.

Communal efforts to guarantee success are supported by whites and metropolitan dwellers and by managers and clerical workers as well as farm workers. Sotho speakers (Southern and Western) and Tshivenda speakers advocate solidarity. Among religious groups, the highest proportion of votes come from members of mainline Christian churches.

The *experience* option has a weak social profile which features transport workers and miners as well as students and learners.

As might be expected, *respect for parental teachings* is more widespread in the more conservative tribal areas. Concerning home language and religious markers, isiXhosa and isiNdebele speakers, and members of the Charismatic churches and Hindus vote for parental teachings.

Religious beliefs and *connections* as a means to move up the social ladder tend to be endorsed by Indians and women. Connections are particularly important to the unemployed. Above-average proportions of Muslims, Dutch Reformed and Hindus endorse religious beliefs as the key to success.

Job aspirations represent a strong indicator of the economic ethos. Under the former political dispensation, job options were severely curtailed for the majority of the population. In the new era, government support for individual entrepreneurship has increased, and employment equity legislation and black empowerment strategies seek to address past disadvantages for black entrepreneurs.

The following item was put to respondents to probe their willingness to take financial risks.

What kind of job would you prefer?

A job in a factory or in an office with a good salary you can rely on

Or

Your own business where you can win a lot or lose a lot?

The majority of black and coloured respondents opted for the financial security of a wage job, Indian and white respondents for their own business.

Job Preference	Race Group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Salaried job	57	70	49	46	57
Own business	43	30	51	54	43

Willingness to take financial risks increases progressively with age. While only 38 percent of 18-24 year olds would risk starting their own business, up to 57 percent in the over-fifty age cohort would accept the challenge. The unemployed, persons with no income of their own, and students would predominantly opt for securer wage work. The same applies to people currently working in high-risk, stressful jobs among the lower-income earners, such as miners and transport workers.

The association with education is inverted up to the tertiary level. With each year of education up to the level of matriculation in Grade 12, the aspiration to secure salaried employment increases. Approximately 48 percent of respondents with no education up to 63 percent with Grade 12 education would opt for a salaried job. Beyond Grade 12, people feel more confident about financial risk-taking; an above-average 48 percent would risk starting their own business.

The entrepreneurial spirit is more pronounced among Western Sotho speakers and members of the Dutch Reformed churches who are concentrated in the North West province. Coloured people of the Western Cape are least inclined to opt for entrepreneurship. Roman Catholics and persons with no religion tend to favour salaried jobs while Baptists and members of religious movements are more inclined to opt for starting their own business.

If I could, I would change to another kind of job.

Only half of the sample responded to the statement. Given the fact that approximately one quarter of the sample are unemployed and 60 percent are economically inactive, it is hardly surprising that aspirations to change jobs are not an issue for so many South Africans.

Among those who responded to the statement, a majority of 63 percent agreed. The proportion wishing to switch jobs reflects the racial hierarchy of economic power. Blacks are least contented with their present jobs; whites most contented with others somewhere in between.

Men and younger people are more anxious to change jobs, as are the economically weak. The association with age is linear: some 67 percent among 18 to 24 year olds wish to change jobs but only 52 percent in the fifty-plus age cohort. Hostel dwellers, squatters and rural dwellers are discontented with their present occupations. Similarly, transport workers, miners, and service workers would change jobs if they could.

Job satisfaction increases systematically with household and personal income. Almost three-quarters of persons with a Grade 1 to 5 education and persons earning less than R579 a month would like to change their jobs. Only about one in two at the upper end of the education and income scale wish to do so.

Dissatisfaction with one's job is highest in the northern peripheral provinces of Mpumalanga and the North West, lowest in the Free State, Northern Cape and the Western Cape where Afrikaans speakers dominate. Home language and religious markers overlap. The highest job satisfaction is found among Afrikaans and English speakers, members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Muslims, and Hindus. Above-average dissatisfaction with one's job is found among members of the African Independent Churches.

In a second item on perceptions of economic opportunities, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement.

Of course people always like to earn more, but I consider my income to be reasonable.

Response patterns suggest that perceptions of economic opportunities are linked to both job and income aspirations. Just on a third did not respond to the item, presumably because they are not earning at the moment. Approximately half of those who responded to the statement, 49 percent, indicated that they are earning a reasonable income.

People in higher-ranking positions in the economy are more satisfied with their income situation than others. Marginal urban people living in hostels and shacks feel they are entitled to higher earnings as are those working in unskilled jobs. Satisfaction with income is positively associated with both household and personal income. Less than four in ten among the lowest earners felt they were earning a reasonable income. Residents of the richest provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape, as well as the Free State, are most satisfied with their incomes while residents of the remoter and poorer provinces of the North West and Limpopo are most dissatisfied. English and Southern Sotho speakers are among the satisfied earners; isiZulu, Western Sotho, and the minority isiNdebele speakers among the most dissatisfied. The religious categories of Muslims, Anglicans, Dutch Reformed and mainline Christian churches are associated with higher satisfaction with earnings, African Independent Churches with the highest dissatisfaction.

Eight years into democracy the disparities in perceived economic opportunities are still by and large racially defined. In the table below, black respondents are most dissatisfied with their jobs and incomes, whites most satisfied, with others somewhere in between.

	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Would like to change jobs ¹	68	53	50	39	63
Not earning reasonable income ²	54	57	47	30	51

¹ n1107, ² n1454

What are the prospects of improving one's economic situation? A third item inquired into perceptions of opportunities for personal advancement.

Whatever my personal efforts, I will not get the education and jobs I am entitled to.

The majority, some 55 percent, express pessimistic views. The racial marker is significant here. However, this time round the hierarchy is flatter and only whites are confident of achieving their place in the economy to any significant degree. Only respondents in the highest household and personal income categories are positive about their economic opportunities.

The response pattern suggests that young people's optimism fades progressively as they grow older and accept reality in society. Some 60 percent in the age cohort 25-34 years are concerned that their efforts to advance economically will be thwarted.

However, confidence does increase systematically with level of education. Students, along with professionals, managers and to a lesser extent, clerical workers, are more inclined to think they will achieve the economic position they deserve. It is mainly the older and rural generation that does not see any economic opportunities on the horizon. Agricultural and transport workers and miners are among the most disillusioned.

By home language, English speakers are most confident of achieving their economic rights followed by isiXhosa and Afrikaans speakers. By province, KwaZulu Natal, the Eastern and Western Cape are above average in confidence. By religion, over half of Baptists, Roman Catholics and members of mainline Christian churches and the religious movements believe that their economic potential will be fulfilled.

Younger men and women of a family like mine have a reasonably good chance of reaching their goals in life.

South Africans are more optimistic about the next generation achieving their economic ambitions than for themselves. Two thirds of total respondents agree with the above statement.

Indians are most optimistic about the future for their children followed by whites. The latter result contradicts the popular perception that many white parents see no future for their children in South Africa. The percentage of optimists among coloureds is about average, with blacks slightly less positive at 64 percent.

Positive outlook on the future for one's children increases progressively with education and personal income but is systematically tempered with increasing age. Rural dwellers and hostel dwellers, who are for the most part migrant workers from rural areas, are least positive about future life chances. Interestingly, squatters are as optimistic as other urban dwellers about economic chances for themselves and their children. Higher-ranking occupations, including managers, professionals and clerical workers, are significantly more positive than semi- and unskilled workers.

The outlook on the future for the next generation is above-average among English and isiXhosa speakers; by province in the Western and Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga, and by religion among Muslims, Hindus, Anglicans and mainline Christian churches.

While respondents see a brighter future for their children generally, this does not necessarily translate into confidence that the next generation will enjoy a higher standard of living.

I am afraid that our children might not enjoy as high a standard of living as I have.

Some 57 percent agree. Indians who were among the most confident that their children would reach their goals in life, are most concerned about future prosperity with

72 percent agreement. Black respondents are most optimistic about future standards of living with below-average agreement of 55 percent. Whites and coloured people fall in between with 63 percent agreement. Above-average optimism regarding future levels of living for the next generation are expressed by hostel dwellers, isiXhosa speakers and Roman Catholics.

The table gives an overview of optimism about current and future life chances expressed by the different racial groups in response to the three items reviewed above.

	Race Group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Optimistic about life chances					
For self (will get education and job entitled to)	42	46	48	67	45
For children (will reach goals in life)	64	68	93	80	67
Optimistic about children's standard of living	45	38	28	37	43

Noteworthy in the above table is that blacks are least optimistic of all that they and their children will develop their potential in life. Nevertheless they are more confident than others that the next generation will enjoy a better standard of living.

When evaluating their life circumstances, whom do South Africans project as their reference for comparison?

When you think about what you have achieved in life, with whom do you compare yourself most often?

In order of frequency, the answers are the following:

<i>Nobody</i>	45
<i>People like myself ten years ago</i>	14
<i>My neighbours</i>	12
<i>My school mates</i>	11
<i>People of other population groups in my country</i>	7
<i>People in other African countries</i>	6
<i>Rich people</i>	3
<i>Westerners</i>	2

In a country which sought to enforce narrow social comparisons within ethnic groups the results are somewhat unexpected. How should one interpret the finding that the single largest group of South Africans do not compare their situation with anyone? Is it a sign of maturity and self-confidence in a newfound identity that causes South Africans to reject social comparisons? Or do South Africans wish to isolate themselves from the rest of the world as a special case. According to this type of interpretation, comparison with 'nobody' might also be equated with comparison with the contemporary self or a sense of superiority.

The opposite interpretation also lies close at hand. If South Africans consider themselves to be underachievers, they might shy away from making self-assessments relative to others to protect their ego-integrity.

Whichever interpretation holds, the interesting finding is that respondents who do make reference comparisons cite 'neutral' standards relating to the earlier self and categories close to the self such as neighbours and schoolmates. Only a minority choose reference comparisons with people better off than themselves, such as rich people or Westerners⁸ with access to higher material benefits that might incite feelings of resentment and relative deprivation. This in itself is remarkable in a society that is supposedly obsessed with racial reference comparisons which have been engrained over decades.

The social profiles of the various choices of reference standards provide some clues to the right interpretation of the above survey results.

The reference to 'nobody' is somewhat more common among city dwellers, in particular Indians, Muslims and Hindus. The tendency to avoid making social comparisons increases systematically with age and personal income which supports the maturity hypothesis. By province, the highest proportion of references to 'nobody' is in Limpopo. Although moving from a very low base, rural Limpopo is the province that has the highest rate of growth.

Reference to the earlier self is understandably more frequent among middle-aged and older groups in the survey. References to the self ten years ago increases systematically with household and personal income. Self-comparison is above average among people in higher-ranking occupational groups. However, shack and hostel dwellers are also inclined to make self-comparisons. By language and province, self-comparison is most pronounced among the isiXhosa speakers of the Eastern Cape, the province that has experienced the second-highest rate of growth in recent years.

Comparisons with neighbours tend to be concentrated among the less educated and rural peoples of South Africa working in the lower occupational ranks. By cultural and geographical markers of language and province, above-average comparison with

⁸ The South African Rand had lost approximately a third of its value against the US dollar in the six months leading up to the survey, hence comparison with Westerners might be seen as an economic as well as a cultural reference standard.

neighbours is found among Western and Southern Sothos, Ndebeles and residents of Mpumalanga.

Comparison with schoolmates is mainly the prerogative of the younger set still at school or pursuing their studies at tertiary level.

Interestingly, the reference to other race groups has no striking social profile. It is claimed by people from a wide range of socio-economic circumstances ranging from hostel dwellers and farm workers to persons occupying middle management positions.

Comparisons with other African countries is popular mainly with younger blacks, including students, and the less economically powerful categories, such as the unemployed and economically inactive. Members of the African Independent Churches and residents of Gauteng and the North West score somewhat above average.

It is predominantly the young black upwardly mobiles, the 'buppies', as they are sometimes called, that compare themselves with rich people. 'Buppies' include professionals and people in middle-management positions in the economy. However, select survey categories associated with less economic power, such as rural dwellers and residents of Mpumalanga, also compare themselves to the rich people of South Africa

Categories associated with Western social comparisons focus on city dwellers, persons in higher-ranking occupations, and whites and coloured people based in the Western Cape. The Western Cape and its capital city of Cape Town are considered less African and more European in character than other regions of South Africa.

The responses elicited by the item on social comparisons suggest that South Africans feel fairly self-confident and comfortable with their place in society and the world. They refrain from making invidious comparisons that generate self-pity and resentment.

Some people say that there are different levels in society which others call classes. Here we are thinking of economic levels and not of groups with different languages or ethnic groups. To what level in society would you be closest?

<i>Upper level</i>	2
<i>Upper middle level</i>	6
<i>Middle level</i>	35
<i>Lower middle level</i>	22
<i>Lower level</i>	35

The majority of South Africans regard themselves as lower rather than middle class. People in Western industrialised countries tend to see themselves as middle class.

The self-assessed social class structure is clear-cut and consistent. It matches objective levels of income as far as these were reported as in the table below.

Self-assessment	Household income in Rands		
	1-579	580-1659	1660+
Upper level	1	2	5
Upper middle level	2	3	11
Middle level	18	24	53
Lower middle level	21	25	18
Lower level	58	45	14

n1625

The higher occupational ranks of top and middle management, clerical and sales, and skilled manual tend to see themselves as middle class. The semi-skilled and unskilled regard themselves as members of the lower classes. Occupational sectors follow suit. In order of frequency, the sectors managerial and executive, professional, clerical and sales, and students regard themselves as more middle class. Thereafter, the percentages regarding themselves as lower class increase from mining, to artisans, to transport and communications, to services, and finally to the farming sector, which regards itself as mainly lower class.

The apartheid hierarchy is clearly evident in social identity. In the table below, blacks tend to see themselves as lower to lower-middle class, whites as middle to upper class, with coloured and Indians in between.

Self-assessment	Race Group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Upper level	2	3	4	6	2
Upper middle level	3	10	13	23	6
Middle level	29	41	67	61	35
Lower middle level	24	21	11	8	22
Lower level	41	27	6	1	35

The geography of apartheid which made a distinction between the peripheral homelands and the open urban centre is still engrained in the minds of South Africans and seems also to match economic reality. In order of frequency of attributions to middle class status, the metropolitan areas and cities rank highest, followed by former Indian residential areas, coloured townships, black townships, hostels and shack areas. People living in rural and tribal areas see themselves as predominantly lower class.

The other cultural markers can easily be ranked according to popular perceptions of socio-economic levels. Regarding home language, English and Afrikaans are predominantly middle class. The Tsonga, a minority ethnic group, and Sothos range from the middle to lower levels in the order Southern, Western and Northern Sotho. Tshivenda speakers place themselves in the lower-middle and lower levels. All the Nguni languages rank in the lower level: the dominant languages of Zulu and Xhosa as well as the minority tongues of Swazi and Ndebele.

Religions also follow a fairly well defined class structure. Islam, Hinduism, the Dutch Reformed churches, and the Baptist church are solidly middle class. At the lower-middle to middle level are the Anglican, Roman Catholic and the mainline Christian churches. Charismatics rank slightly lower at the lower-middle to lower levels. Predominantly lower class are religious movements, and the African Independent Churches as well as the category of people lacking a religious denomination.

By geographical distribution, Gauteng, Western Cape and the Free State are regarded as the most middle-class provinces. The lower-level provinces include the former homelands: Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. The sparsely populated Northern Cape is also ranked mainly in the lower level. In between lie Kwa-Zulu-Natal and the North West, which encompass a wider spectrum of rankings between the lower middle and lower levels.

The majority of South Africans place themselves on the lowest rung of the social ladder. Do workers see themselves as powerless in the workplace?

It doesn't matter what workers or employees do, they can never win against the bosses.

One in two agree with the statement. The better-educated higher earners occupying higher-ranking positions in the economy are more likely to think that workers can score in the workplace. Rural and hostel dwellers and residents of tribal areas feel least capable of confronting their bosses. A sense of newfound empowerment is evident among township blacks; almost 60 percent disagree with the statement. Southern Sotho speakers are more confident than their isiZulu and isiXhosa-speaking cousins. Interestingly, Indians, given their business interests, might be expected to side with

management. However, Indians are prominent among those who think workers are disempowered.

Poor people have only themselves to blame for their situation.

Few South Africans fall into the trap of self-blaming. Less than one in five agree with the statement. Workers in the agricultural sector, which ranked lowest in terms of socio-economic status above, are least likely to shoulder the responsibility for living in poverty.

When I see what rich people have, I feel that I should have the same.

Black and coloured people, with 61 and 45 percent, express greater envy of the rich in society. By comparison only 21 percent of the on average relatively better-off Indians and whites do so.

Feelings of relative deprivation ease significantly with increasing levels of education and income. The socio-economically peripheral categories of rural and tribal dwellers, squatters and hostel dwellers are all more likely to feel envious of the privileged in society. The highest levels of envy are among farm workers and the unemployed. Six in ten members of the African Independent Churches believe they are entitled to a larger share of wealth in society. Up to 70 percent of Western Sotho speakers and residents of mainly Western-Sotho speaking North West Province harbour resentment against the rich.

A further item probed South African views of social stratification.

Here are two descriptions of the social differences in this country. With which one do you agree?

A small minority has most of the wealth at the expense of the majority of the poor people.

Or:

A majority of people are at a middle level, with fewer people who are rich or poor.

Views are split down the middle. On average, 51 percent describe South Africa as an unequal society. The racial vote is hierarchical with 53 percent blacks pronouncing society to be unequal, as do 49 percent of coloureds, 30 percent of Indians, and 39

percent of whites. It is mainly the groups in society who rank themselves on the lowest stratum that are candid about the glaring inequality. By economic categories, the respondents declaring South Africa to be an unequal society include squatters, households with no income, the mining sector, and the unemployed. By religion, people not indicating a religious denomination and members of the African Independent Churches regard society as hugely unequal.

In contrast, English speakers, Hindus and Muslims and residents of the Free State are among those most inclined to describe South Africa as predominantly middle class. In line with their self-assessed rank in society, above-average percentages of Southern Sotho speakers and residents of the North West see society as egalitarian.

What progress has been made in closing the gap between rich and poor since the advent of democracy? The following item probed respondents' views:

In the last ten years, has the difference between rich and poor in this country increased, decreased or remained the same?

A majority of 60 percent think wealth differentials have increased. A further 22 percent think the difference between rich and poor has remained the same. Only 18 percent perceive a closing of the gap.

The highest proportions, between 70 percent and three-quarters of residents in former Indian townships, Southern Sotho speakers and residents of the Eastern Cape perceive that inequalities are increasing. At the other extreme, about one in two Zulus and rural dwellers living outside the tribal areas think that inequalities have remained the same or even decreased.

As regards your conditions of life, are you better or worse off today than 10 years ago?

Comparing your present situation to your conditions of life one year ago, how well are you off today?

The following picture emerges from the responses to the two questions:

	Living conditions		
	better	the same	worse
Compared to ten years ago	34	35	31
Compared to one year ago	26	47	28

The majority of South Africans feel they have progressed or at least not slipped back in the past ten years. However, short-term gains are less frequent than long-term gains over the past decade. In both the case of longer and shorter-term material gains, it is people who have moved up the social ladder who are reaping the rewards. The proportion of those who perceive gains in living conditions increases fairly systematically with education, household and personal income, and occupational rank. Students and younger people are also more likely than others to see progress in their lives.

Over the past ten years, Indians are most satisfied with improvements in living conditions with 47 percent reporting gains, followed by 36 percent gains for whites, 34 percent for blacks and 28 percent for coloureds. Coloureds are the only group to report a net loss, with a higher proportion of 43 reporting a loss rather than a gain.

English, Northern Sotho and Tshivenda speakers report 'net gains', that is a higher proportion reports better than worse conditions, over the ten-year as well as the one-year period.

Afrikaans speakers, and Western Sothos are among the few who over the past ten years have scored net losses. Between 39 and 40 percent think their living conditions have got worse. Net losses over the past year as well as the past ten years are highest among the residents of the North West, the home of Western Sotho speakers.

What is the outlook on the future?

How do you think things will be for people like yourself in five years' time? Taking all things together, will things be better, worse, or about the same as today?

South Africans are mainly optimistic about the future. The single highest percentage, 41 percent in the total sample, holds hopes for a better future. Slightly over one quarter fear things will get worse.

All race groups, except Indians, are more optimistic than pessimistic about the future. Net optimism, that is, the percentage of 'better' less the percentage of 'worse' responses, is highest among blacks. Whites are cautiously optimistic; their optimism and pessimism is fairly balanced.

	Life in five years' time		
	Better	Same	Worse
Black	41	34	25
Coloured	41	32	27
Indian	34	23	43
White	37	29	34
∅	41	33	26

The outlook on the future is somewhat different in 2002 than in earlier studies. Formerly, the pattern was for groups who were by and large satisfied at present to express pessimism for the future. Conversely, groups still dissatisfied with life at present projected a rosier future. In the present study, only Indians follow the pattern of current satisfaction combined with projected dissatisfaction in the future.

A positive sign is that the younger generations of South Africans are far more positive than negative about their life chances. The proportion of positive responses outweighs the negative ones by 3:1 and 2:1 in the 16-17 and 18-24 age categories, respectively. The proportion decreases successively by each age category and reaches 1.4 : 1 for the 35-49 year olds. It is only among persons 50 years and over that pessimism slightly overtakes optimism: only 28 percent among over fifties are optimists compared to 33 percent pessimists.

Students and persons with a tertiary level education are among the most optimistic of South Africans. Other mainly optimistic sectors of the economy include workers in the service sector as well as those in professional, managerial and clerical positions. Equal proportions of rural-based individuals and agricultural workers are optimists and pessimists. Miners are more often negative than positive. The progression from pessimism to optimism increases steadily from unskilled workers right through to the highest ranks of captains of industry and commerce.

Among the provinces, the Eastern and Western Cape emerge as most optimistic, followed by Limpopo, Gauteng, and Mpumalanga. The Free State is the only province in which negative votes outweigh positive votes. Among the Bantu languages, the isiXhosa and minority isiVenda speakers are among the most optimistic. Only among the minority of Xitsonga speakers are there more pessimists than optimists. Among the larger language groups, Xhosas are more optimistic than Zulus. Persons speaking Afrikaans or bilingual English and Afrikaans speakers are more likely to be pessimistic than English speakers. By religion, optimists are prominent among the religious movements, Baptists and persons with no religious denomination. High proportions of optimists are also found in the Anglican Church, African Independent Churches, and the Charismatic churches.

To *sum up*, eight years into democracy, aspirations are still by and large racially defined. South Africa is described as an unequal society in which the gap between rich and poor are increasing. Social identities are still haunted by the past. The weaker socio-economic groups express dissatisfaction with their jobs if they are lucky enough to have employment. The majority of South Africans define themselves as lower rather than middle class. Ambitions to do better in life are tempered by worries that personal efforts will be thwarted. However, there is optimism for the next generation especially among the formerly marginalised groups. The most disillusioned in the new era are Afrikaans speakers who fear their culture will be lost in future.

Religion and Identity

One of the major national projects in the democratic era has been the forging of a new common identity for South Africans. The apartheid era entrenched racial identities as a person's passport to opportunities. Forced racial identity put a person in his or her place in the South Africa pecking order. Power and prestige was afforded according to a person's position in the apartheid racial hierarchy. South Africa's new constitution guarantees equal opportunities to all. Under the new political dispensation, South Africans are encouraged to take pride in their racial identity and the country's diversity. Since 1994, cultural diversity is officially declared one of the country's strengths. The question is whether emergent identities in the new South Africa reflect a better understanding of one's identity in a multicultural society that espouses harmony between people from different social, ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds? Do South Africans cherish their roots and present multiple identities or do they see themselves as South Africans first and foremost?

Until recently, South Africa presented itself as a Christian country oblivious of the fact that all world religions are represented within the country's borders. Under apartheid, the 'Christian' label was attached to the country's education system. At the height of apartheid the Dutch Reformed church was referred to as 'the National Party at prayer'. Under democracy, religious diversity is respected and efforts are taken to present South Africa as a country that embraces a multitude of faiths. Religious observance at official functions tends to be of an ecumenical nature. For example, representatives from several religious persuasions were invited to officiate at the installation of Nelson Mandela as president in 1994 and Thabo Mbeki in 1999 and 2004. In the past South Africans opened many of their meetings with a prayer. In the new era a chairperson mindful of the diverse composition of the meeting may call for a moment of silence instead. Noteworthy is that the official census records the religious affiliations of South Africans although respondents volunteer this information.

What then are the religious beliefs in a society in which Christianity as the official religion of the former government sidelined other beliefs for some forty years in the past century?

Two statements in the survey explored respondents' attitudes towards a meta-material world; the first statement asked about hypothetical meta-material influences on life, the second about life after death.

Whatever people say, there are hidden forces of good and evil that may help or harm me.

I believe in some form of existence after death.

Some two thirds agree with both statements: the first statement is accepted by 65 percent; the second statement by 68 percent.

The first statement that affirms hidden forces appears to be attuned to traditional African belief systems. Above average percentages of Xhosas and people in the Eastern Cape agree with the first statement while speakers of other African languages, including isiZulu and Sotho speakers tend to disagree. English speakers mainly agree with the first statement. Although numbers are small, belief in forces of good and evil are very strong among Indian South Africans regardless whether they are Muslims and Hindus. Roman Catholics and the unaffiliated are least likely to have animistic beliefs.

The statement affirming life after death is endorsed by close on four in five coloured, Indian and white South Africans. The belief in an afterlife is far less pronounced among blacks, particularly among township residents and squatters. Blacks living in the former homelands are more likely to believe in the after life than those living in townships or shack settlements. Unsurprisingly, older persons are more likely to profess belief in life after death. Belief in the afterlife is significantly lower among the unemployed and in the lower income groups. By province, agreement with the second statement is highest in the Eastern Cape and lowest in Gauteng. Southern Sothos and Vendas are less likely than other ethnic groups to be among believers. Belief in the after life cuts across religious divides in South Africa. Anglicans, Muslims, and Hindus are equally and very likely to profess belief in an afterlife. In contrast, only approximately one in two persons without a religious affiliation do so. About one in two members of religious movements state they believe in life after death.

I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished.

If the notion of existence after death is related to the idea of compensatory justice, agreement increases from 68 to 73 percent. An above average 89 percent of coloured and Indian South Africans believe in justice after death. Approximately three in four whites and seven in ten blacks do. Once again, persons without a religious persuasion are least likely to affirm the statement in contrast to eight or nine in ten Muslims and Hindus. Afrikaans speakers are most likely to believe in justice after death; Northern Sotho or Sepedi speakers least likely. By province, belief is strongest in the Eastern and Western Cape and weakest in Gauteng and Limpopo.

I am convinced that my own religion is the only true religion.

South Africans appear to be free of religious bigotry. Less than half, 49 percent, agree with the statement. Coloured and Indian South Africans and Afrikaans speakers, with

just over 60 percent agreement, are more likely to believe they have the true faith. Older people are more convinced than younger people. The belief is particularly strong among economically better-off households, in metropolitan areas and in Gauteng. Muslims are most likely to think their religion is superior to others followed by members of Dutch Reformed churches and Charismatic churches. Persons without a religious affiliation are least likely to endorse the statement.

No matter to which group people belong, the most important thing is that everybody leads an honest life and is a good human being.

The vast majority, 89 percent, believe that personal integrity is more important than religious or any other group affiliation. With 96 percent agreement, this belief is more pronounced among coloured, Indian and white than among black respondents. The idea that a person should be judged according to character increases somewhat with income and education. Members of Dutch Reformed and mainline Christian churches are most likely to endorse the statement; persons without a religious affiliation and members of African Independent Churches least likely. Only three quarters in Limpopo Province agree.

I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.

One fifth agree. Between 21 and 23 percent of Anglicans, Protestants, Roman Catholics and members of the African Independent Churches state they can be happy without believing in God. Blacks and whites with 23 and 13 percent agreement are more likely to dispense with believing in God than are coloureds and Indians with only 4 and 6 percent agreement, respectively. Unsurprisingly, over half of those without religion agree. Up to one third of Northern and Southern Sothos and people living in Limpopo Province believe they can enjoy life without believing in God.

To what extent do respondents practise their religious beliefs?

How often do you pray?

<i>Regularly</i>	57
<i>Often</i>	16
<i>Sometimes</i>	20
<i>Hardly ever</i>	4
<i>Never</i>	4

Religion is part of everyday life for many South Africans. Almost three quarters pray regularly or often. Less than 10 percent in any race group state that they do not or hardly ever pray. Indians pray more often than whites and coloureds. Blacks pray least often. Praying is more common among women than men, among older than younger respondents, and among higher income earners including professionals and managers. Afrikaans speakers and residents of small towns engage in prayer regularly. Members of the Dutch Reformed church, Muslims, Hindus and Baptists state they pray regularly.

Do you go to religious services?

<i>Yes, once a week or more often</i>	55
<i>Yes, sometimes</i>	30
<i>Hardly ever</i>	8
<i>Never</i>	7

Presumably, many respondents engage in prayer in their religious community. Over half attend religious services on a weekly basis and a further 30 percent less regularly. A similar response pattern emerges as for regular prayer. Regular churchgoers are found in the partly overlapping survey categories of Afrikaners, small town residents of the Free State, and members of the Dutch Reformed churches. Above average percentages of Muslims, Hindus, and Baptists participate in weekly religious services.

Lower than average attendance at religious services is observed for the survey categories of squatters, hostel dwellers, persons with Grade 1 to 5 education, and the Northern Sotho, Swazi, Ndebele and Zulu language groups. Surprisingly, approximately one in five persons without a religious affiliation pray regularly and attend a weekly religious service.

Faith and religious values should determine all aspects of state and society.

A majority of 69 percent agree the above statement. The desire to subordinate state and society to the dictates of faith and religion is characteristic of fundamentalists of all religions. However, in the case of South African believers, the endorsement of the statement may stem less from fundamentalist fervour than from the conviction that society should uphold the moral values of their faith community.

The respondent groups that have stronger religious beliefs and practice their religion in everyday life are more likely to endorse the statement. Over three quarters of coloured and Indian respondents think that religious values are all important for state and society. Slightly fewer whites than blacks agree, 62 percent versus 69 percent. Tswana and Afrikaans speakers, and members of the Dutch Reformed churches and Muslims think faith and religious values should determine all aspects of public life.

One detects a conservative element in the response pattern: housewives, agricultural workers, and residents of small towns are among those slightly more in agreement with the statement while residents of metropolitan areas are less likely to agree. The provinces, in which coloureds and Afrikaans speakers dominate, the Western and Northern Cape, score above average agreement. Below average agreement comes from Northern Sothos and Zulus and the provinces that include their former homelands Limpopo and KwaZuluNatal. The lowest percentage endorsement comes from persons with no religion.

I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion.

Some 78 percent agree. Over nine in ten Indian and whites, and eight in ten coloured persons state they try to observe the teachings of their religion in daily life. At 75 percent, agreement with the statement is slightly below average among blacks. The response pattern is similar to that for prayer and attendance at religious services. By religion, above average agreement is found among Muslims, Hindus, members of the Dutch Reformed churches, and Baptists. Roman Catholics score slightly below average. By race group, Indians try hardest to live an exemplary life according to their religion. Agreement with the statement is higher among women than men, highest in the top income bracket, and increases with age and education. A conservative element is observed: above average agreement is found among residents of small towns and housewives. Above average percentages agreement with the statement come from both Afrikaans and English speakers. Xhosa speakers who are mainly resident in the Eastern Cape also try to apply religious teachings in everyday life. Below average agreement with the statement is found among squatters, hostel dwellers, and transport workers.

Religion is one of the markers shaping people's self-understanding; nationality, measured in terms of language and ethnicity, is the other. How comfortable do South Africans feel about mixing with people from other cultural groups?

*I feel very close to people of my own **religion**, whatever their education, wealth or political views.*

*I feel very close to people of my own **group**, whatever their education, wealth or political views.*

*I prefer to be with people who speak my own **language**.*

Seventy-three percent agree with the first and second, and 63 percent agree with the third statement. Religious and ethnic affiliations appear to be stronger than affiliation by language. There is quite some overlap between feelings of belonging in terms of

religious and ethnic affiliation. However, language affiliation is weaker possibly because language cuts across other divides in society.

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Close to co-religionists	71	86	87	75	73
Close to people of own ethnic group	72	84	82	73	73
Prefer to be with people who speak own language	61	70	59	67	62

The survey categories that express strong religious beliefs and observe religious practices more strictly than others tend to feel very close to co-religionists. By religion these are mainly the Dutch Reformed churches, Islam and Hinduism and religious movements. By ethnicity and socio-economic groups it is Indians and coloureds, women - in particular housewives, managers, artisans, small town residents, and blacks living in the former homelands that have strong religious ties. By language, Afrikaans and bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers are particularly close to co-religionists. IsiXhosa speakers and residents of the Eastern Cape tend to be closer to co-religionists than isiZulu speakers and residents of KwaZuluNatal.

Persons who feel closer to their own ethnic group include women, coloureds and Indians, persons living in the former homelands, the unskilled and economically inactive, residents of the Northern Cape and Limpopo, members of the Dutch Reformed church, Hindus and Muslims. Below average percentages of Afrikaans and English speakers agree with the statement on close group ties. The ethnic marker among black South Africans corresponds to languages spoken in the former homelands reserved for different ethnic groups (see map above). It is mainly the language groups spoken in the north and the east of the country, the large group of Sesotho speakers and the smaller language groupings of the Vendas, Tsongas, Ndebeles and Swazis, that have the strongest feelings of proximity with their own ethnic group. The two largest language groups in the south of the country, the isiXhosa and isiZulu speakers, feel less close to their kin people.

Afrikaans speakers, coloureds and residents of the Western Cape are over-represented among those who prefer to be with people who speak their own language. IsiXhosa and isiNdebele speakers also prefer their own company. Setswana speakers and people living in the North West are among those most comfortable to mix with people speaking other languages. Although language coincides with the ethnic marker, preference for being with people who speak one's own language follows a completely

different pattern than that observed for feelings of proximity to one's religious or ethnic group. The preference to be with one's own people tends to cut across economic status divisions. This suggests that South Africans who are forced to mix with others in terms of their occupation or residential situation, feel comfortable mixing with people from different cultural backgrounds although they do not necessarily feel close to them. Residents of the most cosmopolitan province, Gauteng, are among those who feel comfortable in the company of people who speak a language other than their own.

Religious and ethnic communities tend to preserve their cohesion by preventing intermarriage with outsiders. How do respondents feel about mixed marriages?

I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they loved each other.

I would be quite happy if a child of mine married someone from a different ethnic group if they loved each other.

Seventy-two percent agree with the first and 68 percent agree with the second statement. Respondents are somewhat less concerned about religious than ethnically mixed marriages. Blacks are most tolerant of mixed marriages, whites least tolerant, with the other groups in between. Whites are particularly opposed to mixed marriages across the colour line.

Noteworthy is that mixed marriages are approved by marginal socio-economic categories such as former homeland residents, hostel dwellers and squatters. Professionals and executives as well as persons with no or low incomes are equally tolerant of mixed marriages.

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Agree to religious mixed marriage	75	71	62	53	72
Agree to ethnically mixed marriage	73	68	59	36	68

Members of the Dutch Reformed churches and Muslims are most likely to condemn religious mixed marriages; respondents belonging to evangelical, African Independent

and Baptist churches are least concerned. Afrikaans speakers are among the most conservative.

Both Afrikaans and English speakers and to a lesser degree Southern Sotho speakers oppose ethnically mixed marriages. Zulus, with 68 percent agreement, are on average. All other language groups tend to be less concerned about mixed marriages across the colour divide. Members of the Dutch Reformed church and Muslims are strongly opposed to both religious and ethnically mixed marriages.

A good friend is a good friend whether s/he is black or white.

Eighty-six percent agree. Ninety percent of whites and over 90 percent of coloured and Indian respondents are colour-blind when it comes to friendship. Blacks with 84 percent agreement on average, tend to have greater reservations, particularly hostel dwellers. The better educated and urban dwellers are more likely than others to agree with the statement. Xhosas and Zulus value friendship across the colour line more than Sothos. Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Muslims, Hindus and Baptists are more prepared to overlook pigmentation than members of African Independent Churches and religious movements.

In sum, for the majority of respondents interreligious and interethnic marriages are no longer taboo as they were under the former political dispensation. Pockets of conservatism regarding intermarriage are found among Christians and Muslims with strong religious convictions. Possibly owing to the legacy of forty years of 'separate development', there are still greater reservations about taking a marriage partner from a different ethnic group than from another religion. However, friendships across the colour line seem to be taken for granted.

Self-perceptions tend to be complex in a multicultural society. A statement probed the mix of markers used by South Africans to identify themselves.

People in a country can be in different social groups at the same time. You can have a job, a religion, a language, a nationality, you live in a homestead, village or a town, you may belong to a political party - and all these things may be of different importance to you. If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself.

Descriptions of self varied considerably. Responses were grouped into categories as follows:

	1 st response	3 responses
<i>Positive characteristic</i>	34	58
<i>Personality trait</i>	22	46
<i>Ethnicity</i>	9	19
<i>Religion</i>	8	23
<i>Gender</i>	8	18
<i>Race group</i>	3	6
<i>Language</i>	2	8
<i>Geographical region</i>	2	6
<i>Other</i>	10	31

The majority of new South Africans prefer to present themselves as individuals rather than persons affiliated to a particular grouping in society. Just over a third of respondents described themselves in terms of a positive personal or universal characteristic and a further fifth in terms of a personality trait. Worth noting is that personal descriptions tend to be mainly positive. There were few mentions of belonging to a socially excluded group in society. This response pattern suggests that self-descriptions affirm a positive self-image.

Respondents were allowed up to three self-descriptions. If all three options are summed, almost six in ten respondents identify themselves by a positive characteristic and almost half by a personality trait. Religious, ethnic and racial identities emerge as stronger second and third options. Religion and ethnicity/race compete with each other as identities and gender is more important than geographical region.

Ethnicity as first descriptor is more common among residents of former homelands and hostel dwellers, and lower socio-economic groups as defined in terms of income and education. Persons with no religious affiliation are more likely than others to identify themselves by their ethnic group.

Gender identities are more common among women than men. Religious identity is above average among women, higher income groups, Afrikaans speakers and among members of Dutch Reformed and charismatic churches and among Muslims.

The pattern of first, second and third self-descriptions are striking. Respondents who identify themselves as individuals with certain positive characteristics and personality traits tend also to emphasise their individual characteristics and personality in their second and third responses. Respondents who identify themselves along gender lines tend to add personal/positive descriptors or religion as further self-descriptors.

If religion is the first descriptor, personal positive descriptors or ethnicity are most likely to be second and third choices. Similarly, if ethnicity is the first descriptor, religion, language and gender dominate as further descriptors.

Race, a minority first option, is followed by a wider range of options.

Identity by geographical region is most likely to succeed language as first self-description.

In sum, it would appear that self-description divides into two major groupings, individual versus group characteristics. The majority of South Africans opt to emphasise their individual rather than their collective identity. This is a remarkable finding in a formerly colour-coded society and suggests that democracy has empowered many South Africans to revise their feelings of self worth.

Unfortunately, people of my group live in less favourable conditions than others.

Agreement with this statement is indicative of a sense of relative deprivation, generally a fertile ground for ethnic tensions. Sixty-nine percent express this sentiment. There are significant differences by race.

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Less favourable conditions for my group	71	78	52	46	69

Whites followed by Indians feel less disadvantaged which is an accurate reflection of living conditions. Surprisingly, a higher percentage of coloured than black respondents agree with the statement suggesting that coloured South Africans feel they are short changed under the new political dispensation. An apt description of coloured feelings of resentment is that under apartheid coloured people were not white enough, but now under democracy they are not black enough to benefit from equity redress measures. Respondents who express feelings of deprivation include persons in the intermediate income categories as well as the rural poor. Perceptions of disadvantage are keen among hostel dwellers, squatters, isiXhosa and isiNdebele speakers, and people living in the poorest provinces of the Eastern Cape and Limpopo. The more affluent Western Cape is associated with feelings of deprivation owing to the large concentration of resentful coloured people in that province. Above average agreement with the statement on deprivation is found among those without a religious affiliation, the African Independent Churches and Charismatics. There are fewer feelings of deprivation among township blacks and skilled workers. English speakers and Hindus are among those who feel least deprived. Underrepresented among the resentful are Roman Catholics, members of the Dutch Reformed and other mainline Christian churches, and Baptists.

How do respondents see the cleavages in their society?

Which of the following differences would you consider to be the biggest one in South Africa?

In order of frequency, the responses are as follows:

<i>Difference between rich and poor</i>	53
<i>Difference between black and white</i>	31
<i>Difference between Christians and Muslims</i>	9
<i>Difference between big cities and the rest of the country</i>	8

In a society obsessed with race it is remarkable that the difference between rich and poor is perceived to be greater than racial difference. Under democracy the previously disadvantaged expect to catch up on the material advantages previously denied to them. On the other hand, income and race are still inextricably intertwined and rising unemployment in the new era may easily overshadow race issues. It is therefore interesting to observe which emphasis is placed on one or the other cleavage by the different interest groupings in society.

	Race group				
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Difference between . . .					
Rich and poor	53	64	56	40	53
Black and white	30	19	33	42	31
Christian and Muslim	8	13	9	12	9
Big cities and the rest of the country	9	5	2	6	8

Coloureds, who are most inclined to feel that their group suffers deprivation in the new order, emphasise the difference between rich and poor over the colour divide. Coloureds give equal but lesser weights to the black-white and Christian-Muslim divides in society. Blacks follow suit in emphasising first the rich-poor and then the black-white divides but also draw attention to the gap between the big cities and the underdeveloped rural areas. Whites split their vote more equally between the black-white and the rich-poor divide. A sizeable minority among white respondents voice concern about the Christian-Muslim divide. To some extent this concern may have been prompted by the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the year before the survey.

Apart from the massive coloured vote, the respondents who are most concerned about the rich-poor divide in South African society tend to be the lower socio-economic categories including respondents in the rural homelands and on the urban periphery,

farm workers, members of the African Independent Churches, and the intermediate income categories. Above average number of 'rich and poor' votes come from Limpopo, one of the poorest provinces where people live in abject poverty, and from the Western Cape, the province with one of the largest concentrations of coloureds where rich and poor live cheek by jowl.

The black-white divide is perceived to be greatest among urban dwellers including hostel dwellers, people living in the former Indian residential areas, small towns and metropolitan areas. Above average numbers of votes come from Gauteng, the Eastern Cape and the Free State. Anglicans, members of mainline Christian churches and Hindus perceive black-white differences to be the greatest.

As might be expected the Christian-Muslim divide is seen to dominate in the eyes of the protagonists and those caught in the crossfire. Votes come from the bottom and top end of the socio-economic ladder, from the unemployed, housewives, and the highest occupational ranks; from the provinces that are home to Indian and coloured Muslims, KwaZuluNatal and the Western Cape; from Afrikaans speakers, coloureds, and residents of former black townships. Among the religious groupings, Roman Catholics are particularly concerned about the Christian-Muslim divide, along with Muslims, Baptists, members of religious movements and Hindus.

It is mainly black groupings that cite the rural-urban divide. People living in the commercial heartland of Gauteng and the poorer cousin provinces of the north, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the North West, perceive the gap between urban and rural living to be greatest. It is mainly residents in small towns and the metropolitan areas, hostel dwellers, persons working in the communications and transport sector, and students who see the gap between city and country as the biggest one. Above-average mention of the rural-urban divide is made by respondents belonging to religious movements and those with no religious affiliation.

South Africa's progressive Constitution guarantees racial equality. However, equity measures to redress past disadvantage such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment charters may reintroduce racial tensions in the rainbow nation. The following question probes views on race politics.

Obviously there are differences between groups in this country, but they should be kept out of politics.

Seventy-one percent agree. Coloureds and whites are more likely than others to think that race and politics should not be mixed. By race, percentage agreement is 88 percent among coloureds, 80 percent among whites, 68 percent among blacks and 65 among Indians. The notion that racial differences should be kept out of politics is particularly strong among higher income groups, among farmers and managers, in coloured residential areas and small towns in the Western and Eastern Cape, among

Afrikaans and Xhosa speakers, and members of the Dutch Reformed churches and Muslims.

The rainbow symbol epitomises the nation-building project of the first years of democracy. The symbol championed by former Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and South Africa's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, caught the imagination of the newly united nation in a superb feat of social engineering. The heyday of the rainbow was South Africa's return to the international sports arena and the winning of the World Rugby Cup in 1995. The appeal of the rainbow symbol has faded during the Mbeki era. During his first term as president, Thabo Mbeki revived the notion of the gap between black and white and rich and poor over the rainbow symbol of unity in diversity. However, the ideal of the rainbow is still used to jolt the national conscience whenever an event occurs that calls into question harmonious racial co-existence. Similarly, moments of triumph are celebrated in the name of the 'rainbow nation'.

How do respondents understand the rainbow symbol in 2002?

A lot has been said by religious and political leaders about the rainbow, symbol of peace, and about a new covenant with God as a sign for the future of South Africa. People differ in what they think about this. Which of the following options is closest to yours?

Respondents answered as follows:

<i>For me, it has no meaning at all.</i>	28
<i>For me, the covenant is a religious matter only and should not be used in politics.</i>	25
<i>I believe that God has offered to all South Africans, black and white, a new covenant for a peaceful life in a common nation.</i>	47

Almost half believe in the rainbow symbol as a political tool for nation building. The other half is fairly equally divided into those for whom the symbol has no meaning or a purely religious one.

There are major differences of opinion among the race groups. Over two thirds of Indians and over half of coloured and whites but only 45 percent of blacks see the rainbow as a nation-building political symbol.

	Race group				
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
The rainbow . . .					
No meaning	30	16	17	19	28
Religious symbol	25	30	15	29	25
New covenant for peace in a common nation	45	54	68	52	47

Believers in the rainbow as political symbol tend to be Indians, men, urban dwellers and higher income earners including skilled manual and clerical workers. English speakers are somewhat more likely than Afrikaans speakers to believe in the covenant for a peaceful co-existence between the races. Members of the Dutch Reformed and evangelical churches, Muslims, Hindus and Baptists are more likely to believe in the rainbow than Roman Catholics and members of the African Independent Churches. Interestingly, given the rainbow symbol's origin, Anglicans and members of the main-line Christian churches conform to the average.

Coloured people, small town dwellers and women are among those who are more likely to attach a purely religious meaning to the rainbow symbol. Generally, whites and coloureds, the two groups that felt race and politics should not be mixed, also condemned the mixing of religion and politics.

Sceptics are more commonplace among lower income blacks, including hostel dwellers, shack dwellers and rural people in the former homelands. For Xhosa speakers, residents in the Eastern Cape, and persons without a religious affiliation the rainbow symbol tends to be devoid of meaning.

The rainbow was one of the fledgling democracy's first nation building projects championed by its first president. Nelson Mandela's successor as president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki initiated the even more ambitious panAfrican project of African renewal often referred to as the African Renaissance. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), the brainchild of Mbeki, was established early in 2002 to promote democracy, and economic and social development in Africa. Respondents were invited to put forward their views on the ingredients of success for this project.

There is much talk of African Renewal, African Renaissance and Ubuntu these days. What is the most important precondition for African Renewal to become reality? South Africa must . . .

Respondents chose the given options in the following order:

<i>Reform its economy</i>	25
<i>Reduce social inequality</i>	23
<i>Develop skills to compete globally</i>	15
<i>Be proud of its culture and revitalise it</i>	15
<i>Improve relations with the rest of Africa</i>	7
<i>Never heard of African Renewal, a vague concept, don't know</i>	16

The option on reforming the economy is attractive across the racial spectrum but particularly to whites. Urban residents, higher income earners, people in top occupational positions, English and Afrikaans speakers all recommend economic measures to put Nepad on track.

The recommendation to reduce social inequalities is the highest priority option among coloured respondents who voiced their feelings on poverty issues in response to other survey items. Unsurprisingly, reducing the gap between rich and poor is the option most favoured by the economically weaker in society, low-income householders and blacks living in the underdeveloped rural areas, shack settlements and hostels. Above average percentages of votes come from Zulus and Tswanas and their provinces of origin, KwaZuluNatal and the North West. Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, members of religious movements and Muslims urge that steps be taken to reduce the gap between rich and poor.

The skills development option appears to be most favoured by the upwardly mobile who wish to improve their career prospects. Votes for this option increase by level of education. The option is popular among young people, students, residents in hostels and the former black townships, skilled manual workers and members of religious movements.

A diverse group recommend taking pride in and revitalising South Africa's cultural heritage. The culture option is attractive to people in the 25 - 34 age group, shack and small towns dwellers, agricultural workers and farmers, and by Xhosas and Zulus. By religion, Baptists, members of the mainline Christian churches and the African Independent Churches see the need for a cultural revival.

Some 16 percent stated they had not heard of the concept or it was too vague. Black South Africans appeared to be better informed and more interested in the question of African renewal. Indians, Afrikaans speakers and members of the Dutch Reformed church appeared to be least interested or informed. Older and less educated respondents were among the least informed.

The racial vote on the preconditions for the success of African renewal provides insight into political priorities.

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
The rainbow . . .					
Economic reform	22	28	28	40	25
Social equality	24	30	26	8	23
Skills development	16	5	8	17	15
Cultural revival	16	11	9	11	15
Relations with Africa	8	3	2	4	7
Disinterest, no knowledge	14	24	26	21	16

Blacks are torn between the need to strengthen their cultural identity and economic interests through economic reforms and skills development. Blacks stand most to benefit directly from skills development programmes to redress unequal opportunities for the formerly disadvantaged in South African society. Coloured and Indians concentrate on the twin concerns of economic reform to achieve greater equality in society. To a certain extent, white and black opinions converge. The white vote focuses on economic reform, most likely with a view to competing in a global economy. According to this interpretation, skills development is regarded as essential to produce a sufficiently qualified workforce to remain competitive in future.

An index of religiosity was developed based on nine items discussed in this chapter. Items covered the importance assigned to religion⁹, articles of faith¹⁰, proximity to co-religionists¹¹, and religious observance in everyday life¹². Results are shown below.

⁹ Disagrees: *I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.* Agrees: *Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of society and state.*

¹⁰ Agrees: *I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one.* Agrees: *I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished.* Agrees: *I believe in some form of existence after death.*

¹¹ Agrees: *I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth or political views.*

¹² Agrees: *I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion.* - Prays often or regularly. - Goes to religious services once a week or more often.

Religiosity Index Scores

Not religious	3
A little religious	11
Fairly religious	20
Religious	35
Very religious	32

According to index scores, the majority of South Africans (67%) are religious or very religious. Religiosity increases with age. Women tend to be more religious than men. Coloured and Indian respondents are more religious than whites. On average, blacks are least religious. By race, the percentages scoring 'very religious' include 53 percent of coloureds, 52 percent of Indians, 44 percent of whites, and 27 percent of blacks. Strong believers are found in Indian and coloured neighbourhoods, in small towns, and among farmers, housewives and pensioners. The very religious are overrepresented in the Western and Eastern Cape and in the Free State. Over one in two Afrikaans speakers are very religious, as are just over one third of English and isiXhosa speakers. Muslims and members of the Dutch Reformed Church feel strongly about religion. As might be expected, persons who have no affiliation are not religious.

The lowest scorers on the religiosity index include Zulus, hostel dwellers, shack dwellers and residents of KwaZuluNatal and Limpopo.

Religiosity, as measured by our index, and trust, as measured by the trust index introduced earlier, tend to be strongly positively associated. Respondents who are more religious also express higher levels of trust in their compatriots.

In *conclusion*, South Africans are seeking a common identity that is inclusive of cultural diversity. Religion plays an important role in the lives of most South Africans and strengthens trust across socio-cultural divides. The rainbow as symbol of strength in unity still appeals to South Africans from all walks of life. Less than a decade into democracy, conservative views on group affiliations are softening and there appears to be greater willingness to interact with people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. The taboos of the past are being shed and marriage across language, ethnic and religious lines is no longer unthinkable. Nonetheless, there are still reservations about intermarriage across the colour line. There are signs that economic inequalities threaten the new sense of common purpose. Economic tensions tend to eclipse those of racial distancing of the past. New resentments are growing among groups in society whose aspirations are overlooked under the new political dispensation. Coloured people are of the opinion that their economic aspirations are not being addressed while Afrikaans speakers feel the need to hold fast to their particularistic cultural values. Of all groups in the survey the Afrikaners are least likely to embrace the rainbow nation ideal and most likely to express the wish to remain true to their linguistic and religious origins.

Political Orientation

A legacy of a turbulent past, South Africans take a keen interest in local and national politics. What are their views on the political situation in their country in the new era?

What in your opinion is the most serious political problem facing our country today?

Respondents were allowed one response only. The individual replies were grouped in the following categories:

Unemployment and poverty	40
Crime	18
Health including HIV/AIDS	11
Housing and infrastructure	10
Other socio-economic problems	7
Political issues	5
Discrimination, racism	3
Corruption and greed	2
Education	2
Other	2

Unemployment and poverty top the list of South African woes eight years into democracy. Economic issues overshadow other tensions in society caused by crime and corruption, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the backlog in housing and infrastructure. Since 1994 the country's macroeconomic policy has introduced economic stability and modest growth but has not translated into jobs.

However, perspectives on problems are seen through different prisms.

	Race group				
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Most serious problem					
Unemployment and poverty	44	39	26	14	40
Crime	14	31	44	32	18
Health	12	4	8	5	11
Housing	12	4	1	2	10
Other socio-economic	6	8	5	9	7
Political issues	3	5	7	16	5
Discrimination	2	4	3	9	3
Corruption	1	2	2	5	2
Education	2	1	2	2	2

Concern about lack of income and jobs is highest among blacks with 44 percent and drops to 14 percent among whites. It is predominantly the victims of jobless growth who express concern about poverty: people living in the tribal areas, particularly in Limpopo and Mpumalanga, low income earners, the jobless, and members of the African Independent Churches and Charismatics. Health and housing are also of greater concern to blacks than any other group.

Crime and security issues override economic concerns among Indians and whites. Poverty and unemployment and crime carry almost equal weight among coloureds. Concern with safety is above average among whites, English and Afrikaans speakers and in the Western Cape.

Women as nurturers tend to emphasise health and housing issues to a greater extent than men. Residents of KwaZuluNatal, the province hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, are more likely than residents of other provinces to identify health as society's most serious problem. Taking several survey categories together, young white male students appear to be most concerned about reverse discrimination. Above-average percentages of whites list political issues, discrimination, and corruption as serious problems in society.

How do interviewees rate the social elites that can address their problems?

Which of the following influential groups of people do you consider as very important or as not very important in South Africa?

	Very important
<i>Church leaders</i>	89
<i>Members of parliament</i>	85
<i>Ministers in national government</i>	84
<i>Bankers</i>	79
<i>People in big business</i>	79
<i>Managers of big enterprises</i>	79
<i>Leaders of political parties</i>	78
<i>Military leaders</i>	74
<i>Gang leaders</i>	5

Respondents regard church leaders among the most influential in society followed closely by the political and the economic elite. Parliamentarians and ministers are considered more influential than the leaders of political parties. In the case of the ruling African National Congress, the role of president and political party leader overlap. The military are assigned lesser importance by the respondents. Although gang leaders may hold entire communities to ransom in some urban areas, they are considered by far the least important.

In the overview table below political leaders include members of the government and parliament and party leaders. Bankers, business people and managers are grouped together as economic leaders.

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Very important					
Church leaders	88	92	100	87	88
Political elite	78	81	77	76	82
Economic elite	80	71	82	78	79
Military	76	66	80	61	74
Gang leaders	6	2	2	5	5

There is relative consensus on who are South Africa's elite. Church leaders rank ahead of political role players. Political and economic leaders vie for second place with the military. Gang leaders fall far behind all others.

Respondents are unanimous about religious clout. Church leaders have been outspoken and impartial critics of society before and after the coming of democracy. There is great respect for the role they play as champions of the poor and the down-trodden. In the survey, there is widespread agreement on the moral guidance provided by church leaders especially among women, Indian and coloured South Africans. Members of all the diverse religious groupings state that church leaders are very influential. Respondents without a religious affiliation are least likely to consider the influence of religious leaders as significant.

Political and economic leaders vie for second place in importance. Blacks, coloureds and whites place the economic elite slightly ahead of the political elite. Ministers in national government are considered more influential than members of parliament by coloureds and whites while the reverse is the case among blacks and Indians. Indians, who are influential in the commercial sector, assign a more important role to economic than political leaders.

In many respects, parliament and government are dependent on each other. Since 1994 politicians have introduced equity policies aimed at transforming the way in which business is conducted in South Africa. On the other hand, government openly admits that it relies heavily on big business to grow the economy so that it can carry out its social programmes. The rural constituencies, women, and the lower socio-economic groups appear to have a somewhat greater regard for the influence and the prestige of parliamentarians and leaders of political parties than for the importance of government ministers. English speakers and residents of South Africa's commercial centre in Gauteng consider big business particularly important.

The military plays a minor role in internal politics. It is increasingly playing a greater role in foreign affairs, in particular in providing peacekeeping forces to oversee treaties brokered by the African Union. However, not all of its missions since 1994 have been successful. In the survey, Indians and rural respondents assign above average influence to the military.

Gang leaders are not considered at all influential. It is possible that the lack of endorsement of importance might reflect disapproval of the power gang leaders wield over some neighbourhoods, particularly in Cape Town's coloured residential areas.

Things being as they are at present, in which one of the following situations do people have the best chance of fair and just treatment?

<i>In court</i>	56
<i>In a police investigation</i>	23
<i>When applying for a job</i>	17
<i>None</i>	4

Confidence in the impartiality of the courts is highest, followed at a distance by the belief that one will be treated fairly by the police and future employers. The rank order of confidence is similar among all race groupings. However, emphases vary strongly as shown in the table below:

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Fair treatment in					
Court	52	70	78	74	56
Police investigation	26	16	7	5	23
Job application	18	12	6	12	17
None	4	2	9	9	4

Blacks spread their confidence votes more evenly to include the police and potential employers. There is above-average trust in the police in the former homeland areas and among Sesotho speakers. Coloured, Indians and Whites trust the courts above other state institutions. Trust in the courts increases with higher socio-economic status in terms of education, income and occupation. There is less trust in the courts in the former rural homelands and among speakers of African languages. Interestingly, in spite of affirmative action, a substantial proportion of whites still feel they will receive fair treatment when applying for a job.

Cynics, who state they do not stand a chance of fair and just treatment, tend to be older respondents, those based in metropolitan areas, and English speakers.

If you keep out of politics you have peace and a clean conscience.

Sixty-one percent agree. Agreement varies significantly by race: 61 percent among blacks, 76 percent among coloureds, 54 percent among Indians and 52 percent among whites. The preference to stay out of politics is strongest among coloureds and might be a reflection of their political alienation expressed as relative deprivation in other survey responses reported earlier. Voter apathy is notorious in the coloured community. Other survey categories that are associated with political abstinence partially overlap with coloured identity and include the commercial farming areas, agricultural and communication and transport workers, and housewives. Political abstinence increases systematically with a decrease in income. English speakers are particularly

keen to be involved in politics while Southern Sothos, Xhosas and Afrikaans speakers are more eager to stay out of politics.

Even if some South Africans have little interest in political activism, they have strong opinions about political leaders.

Think of political leaders in our country. Which leaders do you admire most?

Favourites among political leaders are as follows:

	1 st choice	2 nd choice
Nelson Mandela	55	18
Thabo Mbeki	13	18
Ruling ANC leaders ¹³	6	25
Black opposition leaders ¹⁴	8	12
White opposition leaders ¹⁵	6	12
Former homeland leaders ¹⁶	1	2
Religious and cultural leaders ¹⁷	.5	2
Black historical icons ¹⁸	.5	1
Apartheid leaders & icons ¹⁹	.5	1
None	12	

¹³ Includes provincial and national leaders of the ANC and its alliance partners. Prominent mentions include deputy president Jacob Zuma; leader of the women's league and Nelson Mandela's former wife, Winnie Mandela; Cyril Ramaphosa, former trade union leader turned black-economic-empowerment businessman; and former trade unionist now Gauteng premier Mbazima Sam Shilowa.

¹⁴ Prominent mentions include Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mangosutho Buthelezi, United Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa, and Pan-Africanist Congress leaders Patricia de Lille and Stanley Mokgoba.

¹⁵ Most votes go to Nobel Peace prize winner and leader of the New National Party, FW de Klerk, and to the leader of the Democratic Party/Democratic Alliance, Tony Leon. The NNP and the DP formed the DA to fight the 2000 municipal elections. They broke up the alliance in October 2001 and the NNP formed a new alliance with the ANC in advance of the 2004 national elections.

¹⁶ Most prominent mention goes to former Bophuthatswana president Lucas Mangope.

¹⁷ Includes Nobel peace prize winner, emeritus Archbishop Tutu, and popular sports people, television presenters, etc.

¹⁸ Prominent mention goes to ANC hero, Chris Hani, assassinated in April 1993, among other political activists in the struggle against apartheid.

¹⁹ Mainly mention of former National Party leaders of the apartheid era including former president PW Botha and Pik Botha. One vote goes to the architect of apartheid, Dr H F Verwoerd.

Nelson Mandela, who served as South Africa's first democratically elected president for one term from 1994 to 1999 is the first choice of over half. If second votes are counted, almost two thirds declare Mandela as their hero. Thabo Mbeki, the country's second president in the democratic era, follows at a distance with some 13 percent of votes in the first round rising to 18 percent in the second round.

Overall, the ruling African National Congress leaders take the largest share of all votes starting with Mandela and Mbeki. By comparison black and white opposition leaders attract a minority of votes.

Noteworthy is that respondents remember leaders of the past on both sides of the political divide. Historical icons include ANC leaders who died in the struggle against apartheid such as Steve Biko as well as Dr H F Verwoerd, the architect of the grand plan of separate development. Homeland leaders, who were supported by the apartheid government, are still admired mainly by respondents in the tribal areas of the former homelands. Tribute is paid to stalwarts in the liberal opposition under National Party rule such as Helen Suzman whose voice is still heard.

The choice of Mandela as South Africa's icon of freedom and democracy is unsurprising as he is recognised as a wise elder statesman not only in South Africa but worldwide. In this survey he is unanimously voted as most respected leader. He attracted some 62 percent of Indian votes, 55 percent of black votes and 45 percent of white and coloured votes in the first round, and between 63 and 75 percent in all groups in both rounds.

If a comparison is made between first and second votes, the support for Mandela is overwhelming as is the general support for the ruling African National Congress, the party that attracted an over two thirds majority in the 2004 national elections. In the majority of cases, Mandela, Mbeki and ruling ANC leaders featured either in the first or second vote. Generally, if respondents did not choose Mandela in the first round of voting, they did so the second time around. Conversely, some 41 percent of respondents who voted for Mandela in the first round, voted for Mbeki in the second round. Those who cast their first vote for Mbeki or an ANC leader, gave Mandela or another ruling ANC leader as their second choice. The only exceptions are respondents who opted for other historical icons as first choice. They were as likely to use their second vote to support a white opposition leader or to pay their respects to a white historical icon.

Mandela, affectionately known by his clan name of Madiba, is the revered favourite of all South Africans. There is no distinct profile for his supporters. There are stark contrasts between the profiles of the other political supporters. Mbeki, who is a Xhosa from the Eastern Cape, has a strong following among blacks, and in the former homelands. He is much admired by his own people in the Eastern Cape. Respect for Mbeki increases with decreasing age. Support for ANC leaders is concentrated in the lower socio-economic groups and among rural residents of the northern provinces of the North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga that include many of the former home-

lands. Recognition of black opposition leaders is found mainly among the Zulu of KwaZuluNatal, the home of Mangosutho Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party. White opposition supporters include the overlapping survey categories of Afrikaans and English speakers, coloureds and whites, and residents of the Western Cape and KwaZuluNatal provinces. Homeland leaders are still remembered mainly by Setswana speakers in the North West and to a lesser degree by isiZulu speakers in KwaZuluNatal. Whites and residents of KwaZuluNatal are overrepresented among those who could not name a respected leader.

In Mandela, South Africans have found a common cause. His leadership has smoothed over many of the tensions in a once deeply divided society. In contrast, there are multiple groups that strongly reject Mbeki in response to a further probe.

Which political leader in our country do you most dislike?

Thabo Mbeki	24
Black opposition leaders	17
White opposition leaders	13
ANC leaders	6
Former homeland leaders	2
Apartheid leaders & icons	1
Religious and cultural leaders	.5
None	37

Rejection of Mbeki increases with income. It is concentrated in urban areas, particularly in metropolitan Gauteng and among English and Afrikaans speakers. Members of all race groups express dislike of Mbeki, particularly Indians. Among blacks, antipathy is particularly intense among Zulus in KwaZuluNatal.

	Race group				
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Most disliked leader					
Mbeki	20	35	50	38	24
Black opposition	19	11	6	4	17
White opposition	15	10	10	5	13
ANC leaders	4	6	2	16	6
Homeland	2	1	-	-	2
Mandela	1	2	2	2	1
None	38	36	28	33	37

Political tensions come to the fore in response to the probe on disliked leaders. Whites tend to oppose mainly black leaders in the ruling and opposition parties. Blacks tend to reject all leaders not in the ANC fold. Coloured people seem to be caught in the middle; substantial percentages reject both white and black opposition leaders. Indian voters are most likely to reject Mbeki.

Antipathy to black opposition leaders is strongest in the tribal areas and shack settlements. By ethnicity, isiZulu and isiXhosa speakers and to a lesser degree Western and Northern Sotho speakers state they dislike leaders not in the ANC fold. Dislike of white opposition leaders is strong in the commercial farming areas and among Zulu speakers. Coloured voters have little respect for both white opposition leaders and Mbeki. Residents in the North West province have a love-hate relationship with homeland leaders; they both admire and reject their traditional leaders.

As might be expected, respondents in the Western Cape and KwaZuluNatal, the two provinces that have resisted ANC rule since 1994, are overrepresented among those who express an aversion to some political leaders. A quarter of KwaZuluNatal respondents reject Mbeki and some 16 percent of Western Cape respondents reject other ANC leaders. IsiZulu speakers are prominent among those who loathe Mbeki, black and white opposition leaders.

Thinking of political leaders whom you support, would you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Agree	Disagree
<i>Most people like myself support these leaders.</i>	71	29
<i>Even if these leaders act in a way I do not understand, I would still support him/her in an election.</i>	38	62
<i>Given the situation in the country, these leaders cannot do very much to improve our lives.</i>	51	49

The majority are convinced that members of their own group share their opinions of political leaders. Rural people are overrepresented. Blacks (74%) are surer of their views, followed closely by coloureds (69%), and then Indians (56%) and whites (57%).

Only 38 percent are prepared to support their preferred politician unconditionally. The majority openly disagree. Disagreement is particularly strong among Indians, English speakers, and urban dwellers. Rural constituencies are more prepared to support political leaders without question; Xhosas more so than Zulus. By race, 41 percent of blacks, 35 percent of coloureds, 19 percent of Indians and 26 percent of whites would support leaders without reservation.

There is widespread scepticism about what political leaders can achieve to improve the quality of life of ordinary people. Again cynicism is stronger among Indians. Households in the lower income brackets are also more doubtful.

These opinions indicate a considerable degree of realism and political common sense among respondents - at least in principle. Voting patterns show that the majority of South Africans continue to support the African National Congress although the ruling party has by its own admission fallen short on achievements to improve the living standards of the poor.

Respondents were asked for whom they would vote in the next elections. The distribution of votes is shown in the table below. Percentages are based on the respondents that replied to the probe. Some 82 percent gave a first choice and 74 percent a second choice. The table groups together the Africanist parties, the PanAfrican Party and the Azanian People's Party, and the small Indian party of the Minority Front led by Amichand Rajbansi. The African Christian Democratic Party and the United Christian Democratic Front provide a forum for Christian values. The parties on the conservative right include the more moderate Freedom Front and the conservative hardliners: the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Hersichtige Nasionale Partei.

If national elections were held tomorrow, for which party would you vote? What would be your second choice?

	1 st choice	2 nd choice
African National Congress ANC	64	28
Democratic Party/Alliance DP/DA	8	10
New National Party NNP	5	9
Inkatha Freedom Party IFP	5	6
United Democratic Movement UDM	3	6
Africanist parties & Minority Front AZAPO, PAC, MF ²⁰	2	9
Christian parties ADCP,UCDF ²¹	2	3
Conservative white parties FF,CP,AWB,HNP ²²	.5	1
South African Communist Party SACP	-	2
Non-voters	13	27

²⁰ Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Minority Front (MF)

²¹ African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP).

²² Freedom Front (FF), Conservative Party (CP), Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Herstigte Nasionale Partei (HNP)

The African National Congress is the winner by far. Its alliance partners include the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The two mainly white opposition parties, the liberal Democratic Alliance led by Tony Leon and the New National Party, launched in 1998 as successor to the former ruling National Party, claim less than 10 percent in the first and second round of voting. The Inkatha Freedom Party that is still party to South Africa's power-sharing arrangement in 2002, only musters some 5 percent of votes. Some 3 percent of votes go to the United Democratic Movement, founded in 1997 by Eastern Cape leader Bantu Holomisa in partnership with Roelf Meyer, former National Party cabinet minister and key negotiator of South Africa's negotiated settlement in the early 1990s. Parties that appeal to particular interest groups, Christians and Africanists, have followings of only some 2 percent of votes in the first round.

If responses are broken down by race, party preferences reveal that voting is still a racial census.

	Race group			
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White
First and (second) choices				
ANC	72(31)	41(22)	43(14)	6(5)
DP/DA	3(6)	22(23)	12(19)	51(39)
NNP	2(6)	21(23)	21(23)	20(20)
IFP	6(6)	1(2)	2(7)	2(7)
UDM	3(6)	4(7)	5(2)	1(1)
Africanist & MF	2(11)	-(4)	2(14)	-()
Christian	1(3)	4(4)	-()	4(3)
Conservative right	-(0)	-()	-(2)	4(4)
SACP	-(2)	-(1)	-()	-()
Non-voters	13(29)	8(16)	14(19)	14(22)

Over 70 percent of blacks vote for the ANC. One in two whites support the DA. Coloureds and Indians fall somewhere in between; they split their votes between the three largest parties of the ANC, the DA and the NNP. Although the ANC has gained a multiracial following by 2002, blacks dominate in terms of sheer numbers. Transformed into the New National Party, the former exclusively white NP has found some support among Indians and coloureds but not among blacks.

The party profiles are as follows:

The *African National Congress* is the party of choice for black respondents. The ANC is attractive to all age groups and to both rural and urban dwellers. It has a following among income earners as well as the unemployed. It is a first choice for large numbers of isiXhosa speakers and a second choice for isiZulu and Western Sotho speakers.

The *Democratic Alliance* is supported by the better-educated, economically stronger, mainly white Afrikaans and English speakers in the most affluent provinces of the Western Cape and Gauteng.

The *New National Party's* constituency is also in Gauteng and the Western Cape. It has twice as many Afrikaans than English speakers. The formerly white party has gained a substantial following among coloured and Indian voters. Average income and educational levels are below that of the DA. The service sector is well represented in the NNP.

The *Inkatha Freedom Party* is the male-dominated party of the Zulus. It has a large following among older voters with little income and education. Over four fifths who make the IFP their first choice are Zulus based in KwaZuluNatal. A substantial proportion of those who make the IFP their second choice are likely to be economically somewhat better off and resident in Gauteng.

The *United Democratic Movement* has the strongest following in the tribal areas of the Eastern Cape. Although numbers are small, it is attractive to women, low-income earners and the unemployed.

The *Africanist* parties and the *Minority Front* are attractive to blacks, Indians and coloureds. Their constituencies tend to be young. True to their ideological foundations, the Africanist parties have a following among a wide range of African ethnic groups.

The *Christian* parties have a strong following among the older age cohorts, among women and among Setswana speakers of the North West.

The *conservative* parties are dominated by white Afrikaans speakers from the stronger socio-economic classes. The conservative parties are well represented in the Free State, Gauteng, the North West.

Non-voters include respondents in a wide range of age and socio-economic categories. Zulus make up the single largest group of non-voters.

It is instructive to compare first and second choices to assess the distance and affinities between political parties.

ANC supporters tend to vote for the ANC the second time round. Alternatively, a few vote for an Africanist party or else they abstain.

Since 1994, the *Democratic Party* and the *New National Party* have variously competed with each other to attract voters away from their rivals or have joined forces to pool votes. The two parties formed the Democratic Alliance to fight the 2001

municipal elections only to part company again in 2002. The affinity between the DA and the NNP is fairly close judging by respondents' voting patterns. DA and NNP supporters give their second vote to their own or the other party. A few also consider voting for the ANC and the IFP, or else they abstain.

UDM supporters opt for a wide range of second choices including the ANC, an Africanist party and the DA. They are more likely to give their second vote to the ANC than their own party.

IFP supporters split their second vote between the ANC and their own party.

When voting the second time round, the *Christian* party supporters are more likely to repeat their first choice but also consider the ANC.

Africanists include the ANC and the NNP as well as their own party in their second choices.

The members of the various *conservative* parties exchange votes. Only one in five cast their second vote in favour of the more liberal DA.

Earlier on, the divide between rich and poor and economic inequalities were identified as the critical issues in society. The resolution of these issues has high conflict potential, as the response to the following statements shows:

Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society in recent times. Which one of the following descriptions do you agree with most?

	Agree
<i>Unfortunately, co-operation between different groups continues to be difficult.</i>	53
<i>In spite of everything, co-operation between different groups works reasonably well.</i>	47

Slightly over half think that intergroup co-operation leaves to be desired. Above average percentages hold this viewpoint among urban blacks, residents of metropolitan areas, intermediate income groups and occupational ranks, and Setswana, Afrikaans and English speakers.

How do respondents appraise government performance?

By and large, I think that our present government is leading the country in the right direction.

Overall over half agree. However, opinions vary significantly by race.

	Race group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
<i>By and large, I think that our present government is leading the country in the right direction.</i>	57	38	36	29	52

The black constituency that overwhelmingly supports the African National Congress gives a much higher approval rating than others. Approval ratings are highest in the lower socio-economic groups according to education and income, in the former rural homelands, and among hostel dwellers. Xhosas tend to be more positive than Sothos who in turn are more positive than Zulus. By religion, agreement with the statement is highest among members of the mainline Christian churches and the African Independent Churches.

What type of social, economic and political order would respondents like to live in? The following question explores this.

In your mind, which country comes closest to being an ideal country, the country that other countries should attempt to be like?

Answers were grouped as follows:

South Africa	37
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other African countries	10
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	26
United Kingdom	6
Europe	5
Russia, Middle East and Asia	4
Don't know	8
None	5

Over one third projects its own country as ideal. A similarly large group name prosperous western democratic countries and trading partners. Respondents are split into

two fairly equal sized clusters. South Africa and African countries compete with the mainly more prosperous countries of the West as ideal countries in the respondents' views. The single largest vote goes to South Africa. Feelings of patriotism, national pride and new found self-esteem may play a role among those who say South Africa lives up to their image of an ideal country.

South Africa fits the image of ideal country across the racial divide. South Africa attracts the single largest percentage of votes among members of all races.

	Race Group				
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Ideal country					
South Africa	37	50	30	32	37
Other SADC and Africa	12	1	4	1	10
US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	24	28	26	32	26
United Kingdom	5	6	2	11	6
Europe	4	6	4	12	5
Russia, Middle East, Asia	3	3	20	1	4
Don't know, no response	9	5	9	6	8
None	5	2	6	5	5

The South African response is more attractive to older than younger respondents; whereas Western immigration destinations such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are more attractive to younger people than older respondents. Metropolitan residents particularly favour the United Kingdom.

As might be expected, the perceptions of the ideal country are biased in favour of respondents' historical and ethnic roots. White South Africans are more likely than others to idealise the countries where their ancestors were born in the United Kingdom and Europe. In the case of Indians and residents of KwaZuluNatal, India is more likely to be considered the ideal country.

The African vote is concentrated among black South Africans who have their roots on the continent, in particular among rural-based respondents, lower income earners and among those who have greater contact with the rest of Africa. Not unsurprisingly, votes for other African countries are more commonplace among respondents living in the provinces bordering on SADC countries such as Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the North West; and among transport and communication workers. Ethnic groups located

inland and in the south such as Sesotho and Xhosa speakers are least likely to vote for another African country.

To *sum up*, political orientations indicate that the new democracy still has a long way to go to meet even the most basic needs of its people. There are divergent views on the political priorities of the country and which leaders and political parties are best equipped to address the challenges. Co-operation between groups is still lukewarm and there is little confidence in the performance of leaders. Given the country's long history of division, it is not surprising that political party support is still broadly along racial lines. However, there are signs of a softening of such divisions. Earlier chapters noted the emergent sense of personal pride among South Africans. Political orientations also hint at an emergent sense of common purpose and confidence in the fledgling democracy. South Africans from different social and cultural backgrounds choose their former president, a symbol of freedom and reconciliation, as their most favoured political leader and their own country as their ideal. Although the overwhelming majority back the ruling party, a slight majority would also reconsider supporting a party that fails to lead. South Africans value the moral influence of their religious leaders who are not afraid to speak out on political issues of the day and to criticise political leaders. These are subtle indications of a growing democratic maturity.

Democracy and Harmonious Co-existence

The majority of South Africans have spent only a few years living in a democracy. Therefore, it will be important to know how people deal with underlying tensions inherited from an earlier era. How are members of a formerly deeply divided society coming to terms with a new, progressive constitution that regards all citizens as equal? Are South Africans prepared to settle political differences amicably according to democratic rules? Will they make the effort to try to live on good terms with compatriots? Do they really believe in the basic tenets of democracy or do they feel the need to develop home grown alternatives that better reflect deep-seated cultural values? Are people with different religious and ethnic affiliations prepared to live together in harmony in the newly unified state, to respect others that are different, and to regard cultural differences as a source of enrichment? Finally, there is the question of the relationship between democracy and solidarity: are democratic beliefs conducive to or associated with greater respect for fellow citizens and harmonious co-existence?

These questions are explored in this chapter. In a fledgling democracy it might be useful to start with a question on the most important priorities for government action in the new democracy.

What is the most important thing the government should achieve in the present situation?

<i>Total honesty of government</i>	30
<i>Efficiency in managing the economic development of the country</i>	24
<i>Enforcement of the law</i>	24
<i>Improving public health services</i>	15
<i>African renewal; renaissance; ubuntu</i>	7

Priorities in approximate order of importance are an honest government, economic development, rule of law, and efficient health services. African renewal, still a fairly new concept at the time of the survey, is considered a much lesser priority. Importantly, an honest government, an essential prerequisite for democracy, is considered the top priority. It appears that respondents value transparency and openness above all and assume that a government accountable to the people will serve their interests best. Coloured respondents and members of the Dutch Reformed churches are most likely to stress the need for a government beyond reproach. Economic development is a particularly strong priority for top-level managers and its perceived importance

increases with education. Concern with law enforcement increases with age and is somewhat stronger among men and metropolitan dwellers. Public health is an above average priority among groups who are most dependent on the service including blacks and women generally, as well as respondents from lower income households and Limpopo, the second poorest province. Black respondents are most likely to place African Renaissance on the political agenda. Of all South Africa's ethnic groupings, Xhosas and Zulus are most likely to see African goals as important.

It is often argued that citizens in new democracies are predisposed to judge the performance of democracy primarily in terms of improving living standards rather than abstracts such as regular elections, competing political parties, and freedom to criticise government. Ordinary citizens expect democracy to deliver at least the basic necessities of life such as food, water, shelter and education. What are the attitudes of respondents to statements about the basic tenets of democratic rule - a multiparty system, free elections, accountable government, freedom of the press and an independent judiciary? The results are given in descending order of support.

A president whose power is balanced by parliament.

Or:

A president who can act without interference by members of parliament.

First option: 71

It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the better candidate for the country to win.

Disagree: 70

Control of newspapers by government in order to prevent disunity.

Or:

Newspapers free to criticise government and enjoy freedom of expression.

Second option: 66

One political party only, with a single plan for the country's future.

Or:

More than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future.

Second option: 56

Judges who follow instructions given by the government.

Or:

Judges who apply the law whatever the government says.

Second option: 53

Substantial majorities are convinced that the executive should be answerable to the legislature, that elections should not only be free but also fair and the press should be

free. Smaller majorities favour a multiparty system and want an independent judiciary. Women tend to be more scrupulous than men when it comes to condemning the falsification of election outcomes.

Seasoned voters are more attuned to democratic ideals than new voters. Between three quarters up to over 80 percent among whites agree compared to between half up to 70 percent among blacks. Coloured and Indian voters fall somewhere in between.

There are two exceptions. The result on the role of the judiciary comes as a surprise as South African courts have a long history of upholding justice in spite of restrictive laws. In the new era the constitutional court has overturned several government decisions that did not meet the principles underlying South Africa's new constitution. Our survey results suggest that an independent judiciary is more important in urban areas and among the higher socio-economic groups in terms of education, occupation and income. Unusually, Indians are least likely to agree with the statement that judges should be independent when applying the laws of the land.

All race groups have reservations regarding a multiparty system. Recent debates have showed up the fundamentally different understandings of the role of the opposition in a multiparty system. Critique of government is considered a threat to the new democracy that will undermine unity of purpose in meeting societal goals. In successive rounds of national, provincial and local government elections, the African National Congress has taken control of all the provinces and the majority of the municipalities to achieve its goals.

What do respondents think about the free expressions of ideas, opinions and interests - prerequisites of democracy?

	Agree	Disagree
<i>It is harmful for society if individuals or groups have different opinions and pursue different interests.</i>	55	45
<i>It is normal that people have different opinions and pursue different interests as long as they respect the rules.</i>	86	14
And:		
	Agree	
<i>A state authority that controls particular interests and preserves social harmony.</i>		29
Or:		
<i>Freedom for people to pursue different interests provided they respect the rules.</i>		71

There is a split vote on the first item where the risk of harming society is evoked. However, when options are offered in the second and third items that allow for individual freedom without harming the social order ("provided people respect the rules"), substantial majorities agree. Veteran voters are more supportive of individual freedoms than beneficiaries of the universal franchise since 1994. Collectivist values which place group interests and social harmony ahead of individual self-centred interests may also play an important role here. Up to 70 percent of Indian voters agree that differences in opinions and interests might harm society.

The liberal options tend to find the greatest favour among the better educated and in urban and metropolitan areas. Interestingly, and possibly a sign of the promotion of the empowerment of women under democracy, female respondents appear to be more eager than their male counterparts to pursue personal development. There is a regular progression from conservatism to liberalism in line with the old social order of the former political era on the third item. For example, blacks are among the most conservative and favour state control over individual freedoms, coloureds are somewhat less conservative, while over eight in ten Indians and whites vote for individual freedoms.

Further questions probed respondents' views on the best recipe to achieve peaceful co-existence and to manage cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in the country.

There are many countries like ours - that is, a country with different religious, language and ethnic groups. There are different forms of government in these countries and different opinions about what is the best way of ruling such a country. We will give you some of these opinions.

Please tell us whether you find each of the following opinions acceptable or not.

	Acceptable
<i>The country is divided up and groups form their own states.</i>	29
<i>The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is decided.</i>	26
<i>One group rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave.</i>	22
<i>A single party open to everyone rules without opposition.</i>	34
<i>A joint government rules in which all major groups share power.</i>	80
<i>All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party (parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition.</i>	85

The most extreme solution to keeping the peace in a multi-ethnic society is partition. Some 29 percent agree with this solution to keeping the peace. This option is acceptable to an above-average 40 percent of whites, in particular to Afrikaners, who still

hanker for self-determination in an Afrikaner homeland. The Freedom Party was originally formed to put the idea of a volksstaat to the new government of national unity in 1994. Partition is also considered a reasonable solution among minority African ethnic groups such as the Ndebele and the Tsonga.

Some 28 percent of blacks find it acceptable that the largest group should rule. A quarter of whites and 23 percent of coloureds support the second option but only 9 percent of Indians do so. Above-average percentages of township blacks, the unemployed, and rural agricultural workers find it acceptable that the largest group should rule.

The third option - might is right - finds somewhat less support than the second option. Some 23 percent of blacks, 18 percent of whites, 15 percent of coloureds and 6 percent of Indians favour the third option. Mainly black respondents in the lower socio-economic sectors of society are in favour of a dominant group excluding all others.

Over a third would be prepared to accept a one-party state. Blacks with 38 percent and Indians with 34 percent are more in favour of the fourth option than coloureds with 22 percent and whites with 19 percent. Mainly lower socio-economic groups in the rural areas approve of a one-party state. Interestingly, this option also finds favour with younger respondents. Whites are least in favour of an ethnic majority rule or a one-party state. Indians would prefer a one-party state to ethnically based majority rule.

A power-sharing arrangement enjoys strong support from all race groups with 85 percent of total votes. Power-sharing is approved by 89 percent of Indians, 82 percent of blacks, 73 percent of whites and 71 percent of coloureds.

Simple majority rule - the winner takes all - is the most acceptable solution. It pleases people in urban and rural areas and Afrikaans and English speakers. It receives somewhat greater support from Southern Sothos and Xhosas than Zulus.

Acceptance of different forms of political regulation is revealing. However, preference for one form over the others is a more important consideration.

Which one of the above options do you feel is the best solution for our country?

<i>All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party (parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition.</i>	45
<i>A joint government in which all major groups share power.</i>	34
<i>A single party open to everyone rules without opposition.</i>	8
<i>The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is decided.</i>	5
<i>One group rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave.</i>	5
<i>The country is divided up and groups form their own states.</i>	4

According to results the real contest is between only two options: a multiparty system and a power-sharing solution.

	Race Group				Ø
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	
Majority rule	45	42	23	52	45
Joint government	33	39	68	28	34
Single party	9	8	4	4	8
Largest group rules	5	4	2	3	5
One group rules	6	3	2	1	5
Partition	3	5	2	12	4

The largest percentage among whites, blacks and coloureds favour a ruling winning party with the non-winning parties in the opposition. By and large the most favoured option conforms to the political dispensation at the time of the survey.

Although numbers are small, almost seven in ten Indians favour the power-sharing solution over the winner-takes-all solution. In 1994, the government of national unity (GNU) with the African National Congress, the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party was formed as a power-sharing solution. The National Party then broke away from the GNU in 1996 to become an opposition party.

Some 12 percent of whites would prefer partition, the most radical solution to preserving peace in a multicultural society. This is the solution that has been rejected by continuous oversight on the part of the ruling ANC government.

All other options of political regulation attract less than 10 percent of votes.

The South African miracle refers to the country's transition to democracy that avoided bloodshed. Political violence was rife before the settlement. How do respondents view violence in the new era?

Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle.

Just over two thirds (67%) agree that violence and killing is indefensible. Some 85 percent of Indians, 78 percent of whites, 71 percent of coloureds and 65 percent of blacks condemn political violence. There is a tendency among the better educated to distance oneself from violence. Over 90 percent of Hindus, and four in five Anglicans condemn violence as well as above-average percentages among members of the mainline Christian churches and Muslims. Over 80 percent of Xhosa speakers and residents of the Eastern Cape dissociate themselves from political violence.

Respondents who are prepared to support political violence are found mainly in the rural areas and among unskilled workers and low-income households. Support for violence appears to be concentrated in the northeast of the country, in the provinces of Mpumalanga and Limpopo and among the Pedi and some of the minority ethnic groups living in the region including the Tsonga, Venda and the Swazi.

Are there any situations where breaking the law might be condoned? The following statement intimated there might be exceptions:

It is permissible to break the law if it is in the interest of my family.

Exactly two thirds disagree. Those who rule out exceptions and excuses for breaking the law tend to be respondents living in towns and metropolitan areas, in the highest income bracket, and English speakers. By ethnicity and religion, Sesotho and Zulu speakers, and Hindus are least inclined to consider breaking the law.

However, above-average percentages of students and younger respondents think it is permissible to break the law if one's family would benefit. Support for bending the law in the interest of the family increases progressively with decreasing age. Other categories that indicate they would consider breaking the law for their families include residents of former coloured areas, hostels and tribal authority areas. Noteworthy is that above-average percentages among persons reporting no income are prepared to risk breaking the law for their families. This result suggests that some respondents might consider theft a legitimate solution to poverty alleviation in an unequal society.

What policies do respondents believe are best for their country?

The following set of statements was put to respondents:

	Agree
<i>A government that allows one state language only.</i>	18
Or:	
<i>A government that gives everybody the right to use his/her own language in public, in offices, courts and parliament.</i>	82
<i>A government that tries to make all people as equal as possible in wages, housing and education, even if incomes are heavily taxed.</i>	70
Or:	
<i>A government that allows people who are clever and work hard to become wealthier than others, even if some remain permanently poor.</i>	30

<i>continued</i>	Agree
<i>Local authorities that are elected by the people of the respective regions, towns or villages.</i>	69
Or: Local authorities that are appointed by central government.	31
<i>Shops and factories owned by private business people who will work hard to make the businesses grow.</i>	66
Or: Shops and factories owned by a government elected by the people.	34

Respondents have the strongest feelings about language rights and equity. Majorities believe in private business ownership and elected regional authorities.

Some 82 percent of respondents believe that everyone should be allowed to speak their own language in public - a belief that is entrenched in the country's new constitution. The strongest supporters of a multiple language policy are found among respondents whose home languages are Afrikaans, isiZulu, isiXhosa and Setswana.

In practice, it is near impossible to give equal weight to the eleven languages that were made official in 1994. Most official documentation is in English although directives have been issued to promote an additional regional language alongside English. One fifth of blacks support one official state language followed by 12 percent of whites, 11 percent of Indians and 9 percent of coloureds. Supporters of a single language policy are concentrated in metropolitan Gauteng, as well as in tribal authority areas, mainly those in the northeast including Limpopo and Mpumalanga.

Earlier on respondents identified equity issues as the most pressing ones for the country. In response to the second set of statements, 70 percent would support a more socialist welfare policy in preference to the capitalist option. Groupings that stand most to gain from socialist state interventions are the strongest supporters of a government that seeks to equalise access to wages, housing and education. These include mainly the rural and urban poor, the unemployed and housewives. Support for opportunities for entrepreneurs to advance ahead of others come mainly from residents in metropolitan areas, people with higher education, the professional and service sectors, and the richest provinces of Gauteng and the Western Cape. Endorsement of the statement on a capitalist policy increases progressively with rising personal income.

Over two thirds are of the opinion that local authorities should be elected rather than appointed by central government. The regional power option is supported by 69 percent of all respondents, and 84 percent of whites, 74 percent of coloureds, 68 percent of Indians, and 67 percent of blacks. Residents in urban and metropolitan

areas favour elected leaders. Preference for elected local authorities increases progressively with household and personal income.

Respondents in rural areas and marginal urban categories such as squatters and hostel dwellers favour local authorities appointed by central government. Zulus and the minority Ndebele are most in favour of government-appointed local authorities.

Two thirds approve of private rather than state control of businesses. Support for private ownership increases progressively with 61 percent of blacks in favour, 75 percent of coloureds, 83 percent of Indians, and 90 percent of whites. Endorsement of a private ownership policy is above average in the Western Cape, among professionals and managers, artisans and skilled manual workers, and among persons with higher education. Approval for private control of business increases systematically with rising household and personal income. By language, English speakers are for private ownership; by religion Anglicans, Muslims and Hindus vote in favour.

What roles do respondents see for civil society and trade unions in a democracy? Two statements explored respondents' views:

Here are statements that describe different ways in which a society can be governed. Which could you agree with?

	Agree
<i>A government that is influenced by all sorts of organisations and movements and associations of ordinary private people.</i>	70
Or:	
<i>A government that listens only to organisations that support it.</i>	30
<i>Trade unions that are guided by government so that their demands meet the public interest.</i>	50
Or:	
<i>Trade unions that are free to negotiate whatever they think to be in their members' interests.</i>	50

Seven in ten opt for a government that is willing to entertain the views of a strong civil society. In favour of an influential civil society are mainly respondents living in metropolitan areas and persons with a higher education. Support for the option of a strong civil society increases with rising income. Women tend to feel stronger than men about civil society having a voice.

Only 30 percent opt for a government that is deaf to dissenting voices. Above average support for a government that has selective hearing comes from rural respondents, Tswanas and respondents living in the northwest in the provinces of the Northern Cape and the North West, and persons with no religious affiliation.

Opinions are divided equally when it comes to the independence of trade unions. What might play an important role in shaping responses to trade union issues is the fact that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) is one of the ruling African National Congress alliance partners. Above average support for trade unions independent of government comes from respondents in the metropolitan areas, particularly respondents living in the former Indian suburbs, and English speakers. Residents in the central west regions of the country in the provinces of the Free State and the North West tend to support the independence of trade unions. In contrast, Tsongas and Pedis in the adjoining provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga in the north east and in KwaZuluNatal in the south are more likely to think trade unions should tow the government line.

Do respondents believe that some groups in society should receive preferential treatment to make up for iniquities and discrimination in the past?

Thinking of the policies of different groups of people in South Africa, how should important positions be filled? With . . .

	<i>People I know and trust</i>	<i>People mainly from my own group</i>	<i>Fair representation of all groups</i>	<i>The best, most capable people</i>
<i>Senior jobs in government services</i>	16	7	27	50
<i>Senior jobs in business, the private sector</i>	10	8	27	55
<i>The cabinet of the country</i>	10	7	27	56

Over half state that appointments in senior government service, in the private sector and in cabinet should be made on merit. Just over a quarter believe in quotas to achieve fairer representation of groups in society. Less than one in five state they would prefer trusted people or people from their own group to be selected for important positions.

The pattern of responses is fairly similar for positions in the public and private arena. However, a substantial proportion, 16 percent, would like to see known and trusted persons appointed to civil servant positions.

All race groups agree on the rank order of preference for filling important positions. Preference for appointment on merit is followed at a distance by appointment in terms

of equity, trust and group membership. The following table averages the percentages voting for each of the four principles of appointment over the three types of positions by race. The vote for appointments on merit progresses steadily from 45 percent among blacks up to 82 percent among whites.

Appointment	Race Group				
	Blacks	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Merit	45-53	57-58	62-68	76-82	50-56
Fair representation	28-29	29-34	23-28	10-14	27
Known and trusted	11-19	5-10	4-9	5-7	10-16
Member of own group	8-9	2-6	2	3-4	7-8

Appointment on merit appeals to metropolitan dwellers, and increases with age, education and income. It finds least favour among the unemployed and economically inactive. Whites tend to be the staunchest supporters of merit appointments, blacks the weakest supporters, with Indians and coloureds falling in between.

Equity principles of fair representation of all groups in important jobs is considered important in rural areas. Above-average percentages of Pedi and Mpumalanga residents consistently vote for a representative allocation of important jobs. It is also apparent that a substantial proportion of coloured people favour quotas to protect minority access to positions of influence.

Blacks are over-represented among those who recommend that members of their own group and known and trusted persons, such as friends and relatives, be appointed to important positions. In the case of civil service positions, filling staff vacancies with known and trusted candidates is particularly important to blacks in urban and tribal areas and also to Roman Catholics and Sesotho speakers.

How do respondents feel about living in a country with diverse cultures, religions and ethnic groups?

In the present conflicts of our country all sides concerned should seek compromises and try to find agreement.

Over nine in ten (92%) agree that compromise is the best way to manage conflict situations. Virtually all whites, Indians and coloureds support the compromise route

while 91 percent of blacks do so. Poverty might suppress the willingness to compromise in conflict situations. Support for the statement increases systematically with personal income while below-average support is found among respondents from households with no or very low incomes. Sepedi speakers and respondents from Limpopo, one of the poorest provinces, are less likely to endorse the compromise solution.

Whether one likes it or not, when groups with different languages, religions, colours or other differences live in one country, one group will either control others or be controlled.

Just over two thirds (68%) agree. An above-average 83 percent of Indians and three quarters of whites agree. Respondents living in metropolitan areas, in the former Indian suburbs, and in rural areas are more likely than others to believe that a dominant group will inevitably take control in multicultural societies. Over four in five Tswanas and residents of North West Province believe that the strongest group will take control compared to only slightly over half in Mpumalanga.

Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's rights.

On average, 81 percent agree. Over 90 percent of Indians and coloureds agree, followed by 81 percent of blacks and 77 percent of whites. Acceptance and respect for difference increases progressively with household income. Sceptics are found mainly in the rural and tribal areas and in the provinces of Limpopo, the Free State and KwaZuluNatal. Over one fifth of Pedi, Zulu, Tsongas, and Vendas disagree with the statement, as do persons without a religious affiliation.

Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting.

A majority of 70 percent consider ethnic diversity to be advantageous for a country. Opinions differ by race. Ethnic diversity enriches according to 83 percent of whites, 82 percent of Indians, 69 percent of coloureds and 68 percent of blacks. Acceptance of ethnic diversity increases systematically with household and personal income and is above average in urban and metropolitan areas. Residents of Mpumalanga, a province that has experienced social tensions since 1994, are among those least likely to hold positive views of ethnic diversity.

How firmly have democratic values taken root after eight years of democratic rule?

A scale of democracy was constructed by totalling scores on select items discussed in this chapter. The items in the scale included support for a multiparty democracy²³ rather than dominant²⁴ or unopposed single party rule²⁵, and support for a free press²⁶, group rights²⁷ and ethnic diversity²⁸.

Scores were assigned from 0 to 10 with the top scores going to individuals who espoused the largest number of democratic values.

Democracy Index Scores

Not democratic (0-2)	6
A little democratic (3-4)	13
Almost a democrat (5-6)	25
Democratic (7-8)	29
Very democratic (9-10)	27

Over half achieve high marks on the democracy test; 56 percent score at least 7 out of 10 and can be regarded as good democrats.

Response patterns suggest that education and exposure to democratic practice play an important role in shaping political attitudes. Scores on the democracy index increase systematically with higher socio-economic status as indicated by occupational rank, education and personal income. Older persons tend to be more democratically inclined than younger persons. Survey categories that characterise veteran voters attract higher scores. Above average percentages of English, Afrikaans and bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers rank as 'democratic' and 'very democratic' as do respondents living in the Free State and the Western Cape. Among speakers of African languages, Southern and Western Sothos rank highest on the democracy index. Zulus are overrepresented among the low scorers who express no or only a few democratic ideals.

Newly enfranchised blacks generally score lowest on the democracy index; veteran white voters score highest, and coloureds and Indians score in between.

²³ Agrees: *More than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future.*

²⁴ Disagrees: *One group rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave.*

²⁵ Disagrees: *A single party open to everyone rules without opposition.*

²⁶ Agrees: *Newspapers free to criticise government and enjoy freedom of expression.*

²⁷ Agrees: *Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights.*

²⁸ Agrees: *Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting.*

	Race Group				
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Ø
Not democratic	7	4	2	1	6
A little democratic	15	7	10	7	13
Almost a democrat	27	18	21	18	25
Democratic	26	44	40	32	29
Very democratic	25	27	28	42	27

How do sociocultural values relate to democratic ones? Which attitudes and beliefs underpin democratic values?

Trust is considered the hallmark of a functioning democracy. Therefore one might expect trust and democracy to go hand in hand. Survey results do not support this notion. The association between the trust index, introduced earlier, and the democracy index is tenuous. If anything, the group of respondents least inclined to support democratic ideals are more trusting than others.

Religiosity is a different matter. There is a fairly strong positive association between the religiosity index, introduced earlier, and the democracy index. Some 30 percent of respondents who are classified as 'not' or only 'a little' religious on the religiosity index also score low on the democracy index, that is, are classified as 'not' or only a 'little' democratic. Conversely, some 34 percent of the 'very religious' are also 'very democratic' and a further 32 percent are 'democratic'.

To *sum up*, majorities endorse basic democratic principles such as freedom of expression, an independent judiciary and an accountable government. There is majority support for an open society that supports cultural diversity and free enterprise. Respondents' top priorities for a functioning democracy include an honest government and a strong civil society. Respondents are well versed in conflict regulation to achieve harmony in a multicultural society. Cultural diversity is viewed as a blessing rather than a burden. However, respondents vacillate when it comes to choosing between a power-sharing arrangement and majority rule. They also harbour serious doubts about the role of an opposition in a multiparty democracy and the merits of allowing too many individual freedoms that might harm solidarity. The spectre of inequality and poverty appears to shape views on state regulation: dependence on state welfare may be preferable to exploitation by the private sector.

An earlier chapter found that religiosity promotes trust in society. In this chapter we learn that religiosity may also foster democratic ideals. One in two respondents achieve good marks on a 'democracy test'. Ironically, veteran voters from a less democratic era emerge as those most likely to espouse democratic values under the new political order. Obviously there is room for democracy education and further debate on political issues to strengthen the new democracy.

Happiness in Democracy

Has the coming of democracy to South African improved the quality of life of ordinary citizens and created happiness? This final chapter reviews several items designed to probe how South Africans assess their lives and their expectations for quality of life in future.

Respondents in the survey were asked to consider their lives now and in ten years' time as follows:

*Thinking about life in South Africa for people like yourself, how do you feel: . . . ?
How do you think you will feel in 10 years' time: . . . ?*

Responses were distributed as follows:

	Satisfaction at present	Projected satisfaction in ten year's time
<i>Very satisfied with life as it is</i>	9	16
<i>Just satisfied but not very satisfied with life as it is</i>	30	30
<i>Not satisfied but also not dissatisfied - in the middle</i>	24	26
<i>Dissatisfied with life as it is</i>	28	19
<i>Angry and impatient with life as it is</i>	9	9

Thinking about life in South Africa for people like yourself, how do you feel?

There is a near perfect correspondence of *current satisfaction with life* and South Africa's racial hierarchy. There is a systematic increase in satisfaction from 36 percent 'very satisfied and satisfied' among blacks, to 43 percent among coloureds, 47 percent among Indians and 54 percent among whites. Conversely, some 40 percent of blacks

are 'dissatisfied, angry and impatient', compared to 38 percent among coloureds, 20 percent among Indians, and 18 percent among whites.

Current satisfaction is highest in towns, cities and metropolitan areas while 'dissatisfaction, anger and impatience' is highest in the rural areas. Squatters and hostel dwellers are also more dissatisfied than others. Generally, unskilled workers, and in particular miners, transport workers, and the unemployed are disenchanting with life in South Africa.

Material circumstances are linked to perceptions of a better life in the present. A positive assessment of quality of life increases systematically with both household and personal income. Persons from households that have access to conveniences such as piped water, electricity, and a flush toilet, indicate higher current satisfaction with life than others. A more comprehensive measure of living standards produces similar results. The Living Standards Measure²⁹ is widely regarded as a fair and racially unbiased measure of levels of living in the new South Africa. The LSM index, whose contents are regularly updated, is based on a list of items which are thought to make up the good life in the material sense. In our survey, current satisfaction with life rises systematically with living standard as measured by the LSM. The proportion of satisfied is only between 28 and 34 percent at the bottom end of the LSM scale (scores 1 through 5) and rises to between 54 and 59 percent satisfied at the top of the scale (scores from 8 to 10). While only between 12 and 18 percent are dissatisfied at the top of the scale, the proportion dissatisfied increases to between 42 and 47 percent at the lowest standard of living.

By province the currently most satisfied provinces are the Western and Eastern Cape, the most 'dissatisfied, angry and impatient' are Mpumalanga and the North West. Satisfaction with life is above average among English, Afrikaans and Xhosa speakers. 'Net' satisfaction³⁰ is highest among English speakers. 'Net' dissatisfaction³¹ is highest among Zulu speakers followed by Western Sotho and the minority Tsonga speakers.

²⁹ The Living Standards Measure (LSM), compiled by the South African Advertising Research Foundation, measures the socio-economic status of an individual or group. A cluster of some 20 or more variables are used to measure the respondents' lifestyles, including items such as car ownership, ownership of household appliances including refrigerator and washing machine, ownership of radios and a television set, amenities in the home such as hot running water and flush toilet, a telephone in the home or a cellular phone. Based on results, respondents are usually divided into eight LSM categories. The version of LSM used in this study distinguishes between 10 LSM categories with LSM 1 being the lowest (or poorest) standard of living category and LSM10 the highest (or most prosperous).

³⁰ Calculated by subtracting the percentages indicating dissatisfaction from the percentages indicating satisfaction.

³¹ Calculated by subtracting the percentages indicating satisfaction from the percentages indicating dissatisfaction.

Members of the Dutch Reformed churches, Muslims and Hindus state they are mainly satisfied at present. 'Net' dissatisfaction is highest among Roman Catholics with 43 percent dissatisfied and only 31 percent satisfied. Members of African Independent Churches, religious movements and persons with no religious denomination also report above-average dissatisfaction.

How do you think you will feel in 10 years' time: . . . ?

Regarding projections for *life satisfaction in future*, optimism outweighs pessimism. There are twice as many optimistic whites and coloureds than pessimists: 52 and 51 percent optimists to 20 percent pessimists. Among blacks, 45 percent are optimistic compared to 30 pessimistic. Among Indians the comparative percentages are 40 to 25.

Optimism rises systematically with increasing household and personal income. 'Net' optimism³² is most widespread in the urban areas and among the highest-ranking occupations. Young people are more likely than older people to project satisfaction on the future. Three times as many students and schoolgoers are confident rather than pessimistic about the future.

By province, the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape and to a slightly lesser degree, the Northern Cape are most confident in a better life in future. Only Mpumalanga is sceptical. Optimism is most pronounced among Xhosa and Venda speakers. Between 40 and 45 percent of the minority Swazi and Tsonga speakers think they will be dissatisfied or angry in ten years' time.

By religion, Anglicans, Dutch Reformed, Muslims and Baptists - all religious denominations with better-off members, project mainly satisfaction onto the future. The verdict is split among members of religious movements. Approximately a third expects to be satisfied in future while another third anticipates future dissatisfaction.

Two further indicators inquired how respondents rate their life at present. Both items are ones that have been put to South Africans in intervals over the past twenty years:

Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Generally speaking, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Taking all things together in your life, how would you say things are these days? Would you say you are very happy, fairly happy, fairly unhappy or very unhappy?

³² Calculated by subtracting the percentages projecting future dissatisfaction from the percentages projecting future satisfaction.

The evaluation of *overall life satisfaction* was put to respondents right at the beginning of the interview, the item on *global happiness* at the very end. The distribution over the response categories and an ambivalent mid-point is as follows:

	Satisfied with life	Happy
Very satisfied/happy	8	7
Satisfied/happy	35	36
Neither, nor	16	23
Dissatisfied/happy	25	21
Very dissatisfied/happy	16	13

The proportions satisfied and happy with their lives are very similar. Satisfaction is thought to be the more cognitive, rational assessment while happiness is considered to be the more affective or emotional one. As might be expected, the more emotional evaluation in terms of happiness is, on average, slightly more positive.

Current satisfaction with life-as-a-whole and global happiness increase systematically along the racial hierarchy imposed prior to democracy. A consistent pattern of satisfaction and happiness emerges if the two categories on either side of the ambivalent mid-point are grouped together.

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Happy	Unhappy
Black	37	46	38	39
Coloured	58	28	56	24
Indian	65	22	54	19
White	68	18	69	12
Ø	43	41	43	35

Highest 'net' satisfaction and happiness occurs in towns, cities and metropolitan areas and in the former Indian suburbs. 'Net' happiness is also very high among the residents of the former coloured townships. Hostel dwellers, squatters and rural dwellers are among the most dissatisfied and unhappy with their situation.

Individuals who are faring better than others in terms of formal education, occupation and income are more satisfied and happier. In most cases life satisfaction and happiness increase systematically with occupational rank, years of education and household and personal earnings.

The provinces ranking highest on life satisfaction and happiness are the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape. Mpumalanga has by far the highest proportion of dissatisfied and unhappy citizens as well as the lowest proportion of satisfied and happy ones. Limpopo scores only somewhat better.

The language groups associated with above-average life satisfaction and happiness are English speakers and bilingual Afrikaans and English speakers. Afrikaans, Venda and Xhosa speakers are also predominantly satisfied and happy. Mainly dissatisfied are the minorities who speak Tsonga and Swazi as their home language. 'Net' dissatisfaction and 'net' unhappiness is remarkably high among the large group of Zulu speakers.

By religion, satisfaction and happiness is above average among Muslims, Hindus, and the Dutch Reformed. Members of the Baptist and the mainline Christian churches are predominantly satisfied with life. Anglicans are mostly satisfied and happy. In contrast, members of religious movements, African Independent Churches, Roman Catholics and persons with no religious denomination are predominantly dissatisfied.

The three indicators of current satisfaction and happiness produce similar results. Obviously, the combination of 'anger and impatience' is the strongest reaction to a political system that does not meet citizen needs and wants, followed by dissatisfaction. Unhappiness is more likely to be caused by difficult personal life circumstances rather than by public interventions in individual lives. However, all three indicators point to the importance of position in society for enhancing well-being. The projection of satisfaction on the future is the prerogative of those who have been treated well by society. The currently satisfied and happy continue to project satisfaction and happiness into the future. Importantly, the young are well represented among the optimists. Students, in particular, seem to gain confidence that they are on the right track to achieving a 'brighter future'

The importance of the material underpinnings of life satisfaction is reflected in the strong association of levels of living with current and future well-being. This positive association cuts across the racial and cultural divides in the sense that the Living Standards Measure is a neutral one. On each of the four indicators of happiness and satisfaction in the table below, better-off South Africans express a more positive outlook and contentment.

Average percentages satisfied/happy and dissatisfied, unhappy, angry or impatient with life now or in ten years time								
LSM	Life now		Life satisfaction		Happiness		Life in ten years' time	
	Satisfied	Dissatis/ angry	Satisfied	Dissatis	Happy	Unhappy	Satisfied	Dissatis/ angry
1-5	33	44	35	50	35	42	43	33
6-7	45	30	49	30	52	27	50	22
8-10	56	14	67	18	66	13	53	18

Living Standards Measure: 1 = lowest, 10 = highest standard of living

Worth noting is that current inequalities of living standards appear to be of less importance for projections of future satisfaction and discontent. In the far right column in the table above, the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' in terms of percentages satisfied and 'dissatisfied or angry' in future is much narrower than for the other three indicators of current quality of life.

In *conclusion*, some eight years into democracy, the formerly disadvantaged groups in South African society are still searching for happiness and satisfaction in their lives. It is abundantly clear, that material conditions play an important role in citizens' evaluation of their quality of life. Freedom to vote was only the first step. Ordinary South Africans now want a taste of the good life to fulfil their vision of the ideal democracy.

All the cultural markers characteristic of current happiness and life satisfaction are ones that constitute better life chances or are associated with a higher living standard. The previously advantaged white South Africans still emerge as the most satisfied and happy, with Indians close behind. Black South Africans are still experiencing a happiness deficit. Rising unemployment and economic deprivation have taken their toll.

Encouraging, however, are signs that where the new government has managed to raise standards of living it has also planted the seeds of contentment, not only for the present but also for the future. Even more encouraging is that large proportions of South Africans expect to be more satisfied with life in future. A healthy sign is that young South Africans appear to be particularly optimistic. In earlier quality-of-life studies conducted during the eighties and nineties, it was mainly blacks that expected life to get better from a position of abject poverty and oppression, while whites, who had everything to lose, tended to be pessimists. Now whites share their black compatriots' optimism and Indians and coloureds are not far behind. Material living standards boost confidence in the future among all South Africans. Those who have reaped the material rewards under democracy face the future with confidence.

Concluding Comments

South Africa's democracy project must succeed. Its success is imperative if only to prove to the world that peaceful co-existence is possible in spite of the odds. Africa needs a strong democracy to lead by example.

The survey findings reviewed in the preceding chapters suggest that the seeds of democracy have indeed taken root among ordinary South Africans. However, much still needs to be done judging by the scores achieved on the democracy index. Only every second South African scored as either 'democratic' or 'very democratic' on an index that measures endorsement of principles such as a multiparty system of democracy, freedom of expression, tolerance of difference, and appreciation of cultural diversity. Trust in fellow citizens and the institutions that make democracy work leave much to be desired. Nonetheless, the prospects of South Africans becoming better democrats in time appear to be good. Encouraging are the signs in the survey response of unity of purpose, growing self-respect and respect for difference in society. Religion plays an important role in the lives of South Africans and appears to strengthen trust across social and cultural divides. Many of the indicators reviewed in this report suggest that the election euphoria of 1994 and the 1995 victory in the World Rugby Cup have given birth to a spirit of unity and reconciliation that has been remarkably robust even if South Africa's identity as 'rainbow nation' has faded. The rainbow symbol that signifies a united and reconciled nation is still regarded as the ideal if not the reality. South Africans still refer to Nelson Mandela, South Africa's first democratically elected president who has become an international symbol of freedom and reconciliation, as their leader. An honest government is a priority for the new South Africans. They recognise as moral authorities their church leaders many of whom have not shied away from criticising political injustice and corruption in society. Perhaps the most astonishing finding is how self confident South Africans have become in themselves and their country as evidenced in response to survey items on identity and reference comparisons. A strong sense of personal and national identity should provide a solid base from which to promote democratic ideals such as tolerance and mutual respect.

Happy and discontented citizens

Democracy is commonly associated with health, wealth and prosperity. Perhaps the greatest challenge to promoting democratic ideals is the expectation of a higher standard of living that have been raised during the transition to democracy. Western countries have projected the notion the democracy produces affluence and equality. However, South Africa remains an unequal society and economic prosperity has remained illusive for South Africans in the lower ranks of society. Survey respondents are of the opinion that the divide between rich and poor has increased rather than

decreased under democracy. They identify poverty and unemployment as the most serious problems facing their country. Worrying is that the youth, who are generally optimistic about their future in the new South Africa, appear to have fewer scruples than others about resorting to illegitimate means as a way of securing a fair share of the economy for their families. Although attitudes do not necessarily translate into action, such misplaced entrepreneurial ambitions are not unimportant in a society that is suffering from jobless growth, high youth unemployment, and unacceptably high levels of crime.

A contented citizenry is considered to be the hallmark of democracy. The new South Africans expected a better life under democracy. Therefore, it is disappointing that more recently enfranchised citizens are *dissatisfied* with life than are satisfied. It is true that the government of the African National Congress has built millions of houses and brought electricity and clean water to millions of South Africans in fulfilment of its election promises. Nonetheless, the infrastructure backlog inherited from the previous government is enormous. The growing pockets of discontent among citizens who feel they have been overlooked or short-changed is a threat to democracy.

In spatial terms, the 2002 survey identified the discontented as rural residents living in the former homelands and farm workers on commercial farms whose economic situation has not changed much in the new era, as well as the hostel and shack dwellers in the urban areas; by religion, the economically weak members of the Zion Christian Church; and by ethnicity, the Zulus whose sense of personal pride has been dented under African National Congress rule. Survey responses attest to these groups' disillusionment with leaders who are seen to be unwilling to listen to the voice of the people. The discontented are among those least likely to think their leaders have the capacity to effect positive change in society. They are currently dissatisfied with their lot and their future economic prospects. Nonetheless, the very fact that survey respondents have no reservations in voicing their grievances may be taken as a sign that South African democracy is working. In a democratic society that espouses freedom of expression and association, citizens should feel free to express their dissatisfaction through legitimate channels that include opinion polls and the ballot box.

Education for democracy

Citizens in most of the established democracies enjoy relatively high levels of education. The idea is close at hand that education may be a prerequisite for democratic ideas to flourish. Indeed, a leading idea that launched the international study of democracy was that education should make for better democrats. South Africa's democracy study provides some tentative answers to the question whether education of the masses plays a significant role in the acceptance of a democratic system of governance.

At the time of 2002 survey, only about one in eight South Africans have received twelve years of education and a further one in eight have benefited from some higher

education. However, levels of education levels have risen significantly with each generation.

In support of the supposition that education and democracy go hand in hand, the better educated in the 2002 survey do indeed score higher on the democracy index. Throughout the survey, the better educated present themselves as leaders who are more critically aware, open-minded and tolerant. Increasing levels of education tend to be associated with less conservative attitudes. The better educated are less likely to express fear of social change and uncertainty. They try to live their lives according to their religious principles. They are more likely than others to be confident of their personal capabilities, more willing to take financial risks, and to embrace new ideas and entrepreneurship. They are supportive of personal freedoms and are more likely to place their trust in friends rather than kin. They support appointments to key positions in society on merit rather than on the basis of trust or kinship. They have faith in democratic institutions such as the law courts that play an important role in making democracy work. They consider an independent judiciary to be an important priority for South Africa and believe they have the right to hold their government accountable. Importantly, in a multicultural society, they value friendships that cut across ethnic and religious lines and believe ethnic diversity is beneficial for society. Equally important given South Africa's history of strife in the past, the better educated categorically reject the use of violence to settle any kind of dispute.

Education is regarded as a passport to success in South African society. The better educated respondents in the 2002 survey enjoy higher living standards. They express greater job and income satisfaction and are confident of a positive future for their children. The youth, who tend to have received more formal education than their parents and grandparents are generally optimistic about the future which augurs well for South Africa's democracy project.

In contrast, the poorly educated tend to score low on the democracy index. Concentration of the poorly educated who are less democratic are found among low income earners, in the rural areas, and among members of African Independent Churches, precisely among the groupings that express the highest levels of disillusionment with political leaders and discontent with their life chances in the democratic era. Particularly striking is the disaffection of Zulus, the largest ethnic group in South Africa, which has been politically sidelined since 1994. Of significance for the analysis here is that Zulus are among those who score lowest on the democracy index. Noteworthy also is that some of the disaffected groups - Zulus, and hostel and shack dwellers - score very low on the religiosity index which is associated with higher levels of trust in fellow South Africans.

Informal education and democracy

Perhaps it is short-sighted to focus merely on formal school education as a crucial factor in promoting democracy. In the run-up to the first open elections in 1994,

numerous organisations provided education in civics to new voters. Since 1994 South Africans have been exposed to a wide range of public awareness and education campaigns at all levels of society. Radio and television, which reach most of the population even in remote areas, devote many hours in the day to 'infotainment' that combines information and education with entertainment. Talk shows with panels of experts educate the general public on civics, health, finance, the law, and all manner of topical and development issues until late at night. Many South Africans, including individuals whose schooling was neglected in the era of Bantu education, are now receiving informal as well as formal adult education on a daily basis. It appears that this continuing adult education programme may have promoted some of the ideals of co-existence that are now taken for granted. The next generation growing up in South Africa may never question that a person should be judged according to character rather than skin colour.

Metropolitan dwellers, who are more likely to be better educated, often act as trend-setters in accepting novel ideas and fashions. It is therefore likely that urbanisation may rival education in promoting democratic ideals. In the 2002 survey, residents of South Africa's metropolitan areas are among the most politically aware and tend to be more enterprising, more open to progressive ideas and supportive of democratic principles. The fact that South Africa, whose wealth was established in agriculture and mining, is fast becoming an urban society may assist in advancing the country's democracy project.

At the same time, proximity to wealth and opportunities in urban areas may also become a breeding ground for the discontent and cynicism which may hinder progress with the democracy project. The marginal urbanites, the hostel and shack dwellers, are a case in point. They are more likely than others to indulge in envious social comparisons to fuel their discontent.

The new democrats?

As is evident from our survey findings, wealth, education and happiness are intertwined in the case of the emergent black middle class. The question is whether education or income is the driving force behind the promotion of democratic ideals. It is commonly assumed that it is easier to be magnanimous and peace loving when living in affluence than in poverty. The 2002 survey evidence shows that higher education is associated with greater openness and tolerance. At the same time, higher levels of education and income are both associated with higher scores on the democracy index. As it is near impossible to disentangle education and income as markers of social status in the 2002 survey, it is uncertain whether income or education does the most work in shaping progressive and democratic ideals.

A separate analysis of the 2002 survey results reported in an earlier bulletin³³ found that the new black economic elite, which is better educated than most South Africans, shares some but not all views with veteran voters who scored highest on the democracy index. Consider that members of the upwardly mobile black middle class are smugly satisfied with their social standing in the democratic era. They are brashly self confident and mix with ease with all South Africans. In contrast to the disillusionment and discontent found among the economically and politically marginalised, members of the new black middle class are optimists who expect to continue to reap the rewards of democracy in future. It does not seem implausible to project that the better-educated emergent black middle class is cut out to become the new breed of democrats in South Africa.

Outlook

The fourth national elections may be the proving ground for South Africa's new democracy. It is predicted that the next national elections to be held in 2009 will be hotly contested not only by the opposition parties but also by the alliance partners of the ruling African National Congress. The acid test will be whether all parties contesting the elections will stick to the rules of the game, or bend them to suit their own interests, or possibly even resort to illegal and violent means to retain or gain power.

In 2002, the socio-economic divides are still overlaid by racial ones. Judging by the hypothetical election results produced by our survey, political polls remain a racial census. Equally worrying for the future of democracy in South Africa is unconditional loyalty to political leaders that does not mix well with a multiparty system of democracy. In the 2002 survey, approximately four in ten South Africans are prepared to give their vote to an ineffective leader rather than to vote for the opposition. Equally problematic would be the scenario in which disillusioned citizens abstain from exercising their right to vote. In the 2002 survey, Zulus count among the most disenfranchised voters who said they would not go to the polls.

Future rounds of surveys for the South African democracy project will tell whether such misgivings are misplaced. At present, one in two South Africans is a good democrat. The 2002 survey suggests that it would not be imprudent to place our bets on the new generation of better educated and contented South Africans to swell the ranks of good democrats. Whether this scenario will become reality is a question for future research.

³³ Møller, V. 2004. Peaceful co-existence in South Africa in the millennium: A review of social indicators in the 2002 democracy study. *Lettres de Byblos* No. 4, International Centre for Human Sciences, Byblos.