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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC  
CONSEQUENCES OF RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION ARISING  
OUT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGRICULTURAL  
DEVELOPMENT SCHEME IN A RURAL CISKEI VILLAGE

Dissertation

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by

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(ii)

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is all my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at any other university.

  
.....  
CHRISTOPHER JOHN DE WET



DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated, with my love and gratitude, to Elizabeth and Hannah (my wife and my daughter) and to Makhosana and Madlomo (my parents in the field).

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## PREFACE

This dissertation is concerned with the impact of the implementation of a particular kind of agricultural development project, viz. Betterment Planning, upon a rural Black village in the Keiskammahoek Magisterial District of the Ciskei, in South Africa. The project was implemented in the mid-1960s, and involved the re-organisation of the village environment into demarcated arable, grazing and residential areas, which necessitated the villagers moving from their old, scattered residential clusters to several new, concentrated residential areas. This dissertation seeks to trace the consequences of this development project, and particularly the socio-economic consequences of the residential relocation that it involved.

Inasmuch as this is a study of social change, particular problems are raised with regard to the anonymity of the village. From 1948 to 1950, a multi-disciplinary survey, involving the disciplines of anthropology, economics, geology and botany, was conducted in the Keiskammahoek area. This survey focused on six villages, and resulted in the publication of the four volumes of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey in 1952 (Mountain 1952; Houghton and Walton 1952; Wilson et al 1952; Mills and Wilson 1952). In the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, the six villages which were studied, are openly mentioned by name.

As the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey was conducted before the implementation of the development project with which I am concerned, it provides me with a fairly detailed base-line against which to assess the implications of the project, and particularly, of the residential relocation that it involved. This, however, means that I am unable to conceal the identity of the village concerned, as I have to keep referring to the state of affairs in that village as portrayed by the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. To have given the village another name would have served no real purpose, as I would still have had to quote the particular chapters and pages of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey which refer directly to it. Any person who wished to take the trouble could easily establish the identity of the village by simply looking up the relevant references.

In addition to the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, I have also made use

of archival material, in an attempt to trace certain aspects of the village's history. To have changed the name of the village, as well as of a number of its past headmen, would have involved a systematic distortion of the archival material. Once again, anybody who wished to, could look up the relevant references.

I am well known to a number of local officials in the Keiskammahoek District, as I have obtained their permission to go into the village on field trips, and as I have consulted records in the offices of various government departments at Keiskammahoek. They all know the village in which I work, and indeed, some of those officials are from that village.

I have therefore not attempted to hide the identity of the village of Chatha in the Magisterial District of Keiskammahoek (See Map on p.X). I have, however, changed the names of all the people in the village to whom I refer, who are still alive. There does not seem much point in changing the names of e.g. headmen or other people who have been dead for a number of years, and whose families can no longer be negatively affected. To change their names would again have amounted to a distortion of archival material. I have not changed the names of officials quoted, as they are either dead or have long since retired.

In one or two cases, it is more difficult to hide people's identity than in others. One or two families have been centrally involved in the history of the headmanship, and the present political situation in Chatha cannot be properly understood without regard to that fact. Although I have changed the name of a particular figure in the village, I have therefore not changed his surname. To do so would in any event serve no purpose, as he is well known in the Keiskammahoek District, both in his official and in his personal capacity.

I have attempted to overcome the problem of the lack of anonymity to some extent by arranging with the authorities at Rhodes University to present two versions of my dissertation: The first version, which is unabridged, will be sent to my examiners. The second version, of which three copies must be deposited in the Rhodes Library, is a potentially public document. In this version I have summarized sections of Chapter Eight where the identities of individuals cannot effectively be hidden, and I have not mentioned their names. In time,

as such individuals die, it may become possible to place unabridged versions of the dissertation in the Rhodes University Library.

A few comments may be made on the research methods I employed in obtaining the data on which this dissertation is based. From December 1979, to December 1984, I spent a total of 17 months in the village of Chatha, making use of University vacations and periods when I was free from teaching commitments at Rhodes University. For the first five field months, I stayed in a camper (a "Kombi") in the village, and thereafter moved in with a family in the village. I made use of several research assistants from the village. This had the advantage that they knew everybody (or almost everybody in the village) - something I could not have achieved in the space of 17 months of non-continuous fieldwork. These assistants were paid on a daily or weekly basis, as they preferred. The principal research methods I used in the field were: a) participant observation - simply attending anything that was going on, such as village meetings, funerals, ceremonials, informal gatherings, etc., and joining in as best I could where this was appropriate; b) interviews with people about specific topics, such as their family genealogies, village history, village politics, aspects of ceremonial activity, agricultural practices, etc.; c) structured surveys, in which I sought to obtain basic socio-economic data from a representative number of households; d) simply walking around the village with my assistant, or on my own, observing what was happening and chatting to people. Extensive use was made of a tape-recorder for the recording of interviews and events, such as village meetings and ceremonials. Tapes were later transcribed with the assistance of various bilingual Xhosa-speaking people in the field situation, and in Grahamstown. In addition to research in the village itself, I spent about five weeks in the State Archives in Cape Town, and consulted official documentation in the offices of various Ciskei government departments.

A few terminological conventions have been employed in this dissertation, which may usefully be clarified at this point. I have adopted the terminology officially used to refer to people of various population groups in South Africa, viz. "Black", "Coloured", "Indian" and "White". These terms go back a long way in South African history, and their meaning, while not necessarily acceptable to everybody, is



clearly understood by all South Africans, whatever their official designation. The use of such terms is therefore principally a matter of convenience.

Except in Chapter Two, when for historical reasons, the term "reserves" has been used, the term "homelands" has been used to refer to those largely rural areas set aside by successive South African governments for occupation by Black people. Subsequent official terminology has included terms such as "national states", and in some cases, "independent national states". As I refer to several such areas in this dissertation, I have, in the interests of simplicity, stuck to what is probably the most widely known and used term, viz. "homelands". The adoption of terms such as "Black", "White", "Coloured", "Indian", "homeland" or "reserve" should not necessarily be taken to imply support for a political system which for many years has classified, and sought to separate, people on grounds of their skin colour and various other ethnic characteristics.

Terms which refer to an official, such as "Magistrate", or "Native Commissioner", have been used in the upper case, as in most cases in this dissertation, they refer to particular Magistrates or Native Commissioners, etc., rather than to a category of official, such as "magistrates".


In 1961, South Africa converted her currency from British Sterling to a decimalised currency (Rands and Cents, with One Rand equal to 100 Cents). At the time, the exchange rate was two South African Rands to One British Pound. This exchange rate has been taken to apply when converting British Pounds to South African Rands in Chapters Two, Five and Six in this dissertation, as this rate of exchange remained constant for a number of years after 1961.

I have used the "Harvard" system of referencing in this dissertation - e.g. "The people distinguish three types of migrants" (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 115) - and have also made use of footnotes when clarifying terminology in Chapter Two, or when quoting archival or government sources in Chapters Three and Five.

There appears to be relatively little detailed material on the social consequences of Betterment elsewhere in South Africa, or on similar instances of villagisation elsewhere in Africa. Where such material is comparable to my findings, I have discussed it in the

course of the dissertation. For the most part, however, I have focused on the situation in the village of Chatha itself, trying to give as detailed an account as possible of various changes that have taken place in the village. Apart from discussing the practical implementation of the development scheme and the relocation that it involved, I have focused on three main areas of change, viz. agriculture, village politics, and ritual and ceremonial activities. I have not paid attention to kinship as a specific category for study in its own right, as it appears to be most usefully studied through the way in which it manifests itself as a principle of organisation in other activities, such as those mentioned above.

MAP OF THE CISKEI, SHOWING THE LOCATION OF CHATHA VILLAGE



Source: Daily Dispatch, 30th October 1981



LIST OF GENEALOGIES AND DIAGRAMS

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation sets out to trace the socio-economic consequences of the implementation of an agricultural development scheme (known as Betterment Planning) in a village in the Ciskei homeland of South Africa, in the mid-1960s. This development scheme involved the re-organisation of land use patterns in the village of Chatha, which resulted in the villagers having to move from their old scattered residential clusters to several new, more concentrated residential areas. The consequences of this residential relocation constitute the central focus of this dissertation.

The argument is advanced that relocation involves a transformation of people's physical and social environment, and that the social and economic consequences of relocation are best understood in terms of the way in which it transforms people's environment. Over time, people develop patterns of relationships which are both appropriate and effective in achieving their particular social, moral and economic goals within the context of their day-to-day environment. Relocation may change that environment in such a way that some of those patterns of relationships may no longer be either appropriate or effective in the new residential context, which may present people with changed economic conditions and new and more convenient or appropriate bases of association. For example, old patterns of political association, based on pre-relocation territorial groupings, may no longer be appropriate in a post-relocation situation with new territorial groupings. On the other hand, if the conditions of relocation have not seriously disrupted the ability of kinsmen to keep in frequent contact with each other, patterns of association based on kinship may show little or no change in the post-relocation situation.

While Betterment Planning has modified the people of Chatha's immediate environment, changes have also been taking place in the wider political and economic environment of which Chatha is a part. A new system of local government, officially intended to re-instate chiefly rule, has been introduced in the homelands of South Africa, as part of the general South African policy of "apartheid" or "separate development". Political parties have also been established in the homelands, resulting in the emergence of the Ciskei homeland as a de

facto one-party state. In addition to these political and administrative changes, the real value of cash incomes in the village of Chatha has risen by 169 per cent over the last thirty years, as the result of developments in the wider South African economy. These changes, together with the impact of Betterment Planning, have combined to modify the day-to-day environment and experience of the people of Chatha.

This dissertation seeks to trace the impact of this environmental transformation upon three aspects of life in the village, viz. agricultural activity, political competition, and patterns of ritual and ceremonial association.

Most households in Chatha are agriculturally worse-off as a result of Betterment Planning, as it cancelled a lot of arable land, which planners regarded as unsuitable for cultivation. A small group of people are agriculturally better off, as they have been able to move onto an irrigation scheme which was established as a result of Betterment Planning. The fact that the majority of households now have less land than before, is, however, offset by the dramatic rise in the value of cash incomes discussed above. Although agriculturally worse-off than before, the villagers of Chatha are better-off in an overall sense, although for reasons which have nothing to do with Betterment Planning.

Patterns of agricultural co-operation show few signs of change as a result of Betterment Planning. Before the implementation of Betterment, co-operation was territorially based, as people cultivated mainly with kinsmen and associates from their residential neighbourhood and its associated political sub-unit within the village. Today, many people still cultivate predominantly with their old associates, rather than with their new neighbours. Betterment has brought people into concentrated residential areas, where people are within relatively easy walking distance of their old pre-Betterment agricultural partners. In the circumstances, there is no reason why people should not continue to cultivate with their old kinsmen, friends and partners.

Political groupings in Chatha have not changed in their nature, remaining territorially based. Groupings are, however, no longer formed along the lines of the old, pre-Betterment territorial

groupings, but along the lines of the two new large residential areas. This seems a predictable enough reaction to the new situation. The nature of the political prizes for which competition is conducted, has also changed. Groups no longer compete for the headmanship, and through the headmanship, for access to arable and grazing land. Betterment has effectively taken the control of land out of the hands of the villagers, and this has to an extent devalued the status of the headmanship. Groups now compete for privileged access to government-sponsored resources coming into the village, such as a clinic and a school, with the two new residential areas attempting to get these resources located as favourably as possible for themselves. The availability of these resources is in large measure a result of the South African government policy of separate development, which has made funding available for the infrastructural development of the homelands.

In the ritual and ceremonial sphere, change has been least in areas which were not based directly on territorial groupings before Betterment, and greatest in those areas which were based directly on such territorial groupings. Kinship-based and church-based activity thus shows less change in their organisation than do ceremonial groupings and youth groups, which were based on the old territorial divisions within the village. The re-organisation of the environment has thus had greater impact on those groups recruited along territorial lines, and they are re-aligning themselves along the lines of the new residential areas.

Today there are three broadly distinguishable kinds of income groups in Chatha, viz. a) entrepreneurs (who have benefitted from the concentrated residential settlements and the rise in the value of cash incomes), b) irrigation farmers and c) the rest of the village. This ranking does not, however, appear to correspond to any clear patterns of social stratification within the village. People are still bound to each other by a number of cross-cutting ties of kinship, territory (both pre- and post-Betterment) and friendship, and these ties operate in daily patterns of association in the village. In terms of the present balance of relationships, the residential relocation resulting from Betterment seems to have had the effect of opening out groups, and of making them more flexible. Whether the passing of the older

generation, with its pre-Betterment memories, loyalties and patterns of association, will result in the formation of a new set of groupings, based on the new territorial and economic order, remains to be seen.



## CHAPTER ONE

### LITERATURE SURVEY AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

#### INTRODUCTION

Communities throughout the world have been relocated, whether voluntarily, or by force. They have moved from their area of origin to a new area, or areas. Communities may have remained together during relocation, or they may have become dispersed. They may have been relocated for any of a number of reasons, such as: the threat or consequences of natural disaster; the attempt of various governments to control their subjects more effectively, or to separate them along lines such as race, language or religion; the attempt to improve the agricultural and ecological potential of an area through the rationalisation of land-use patterns; the construction of a large dam; or flight from political upheaval.

Such community relocation should be distinguished from migration, which more typically involves the movement of families or individuals, rather than whole communities. Migration may involve the permanent movement of people from their area of origin to a new place, e.g. a city, or it may involve people oscillating between two places, e.g. between a rural home area and a city, where they work for the best part of the year.

The study of relocation should be distinguished from the study of social change per se. Community relocation undoubtedly does give rise to social change, but so do migration, education, industrialisation and a host of other social phenomena - each in their own way. What needs to be examined and accounted for, are the particular kinds of social change that relocation, as a particular kind of social phenomenon, brings about in the lives of members of relocated communities.

This chapter sets out to provide a framework for the analysis of the case-study of community relocation to be considered in this dissertation. The theoretical literature relevant to the understanding of the social consequences of relocation will be

reviewed. The degree to which the theoretical generalisations made are usefully applicable to specific case-studies, such as that to be analysed in this dissertation, will be assessed. As the focus of this dissertation is on the social consequences of community relocation, rather than on the psychological impact of relocation on individuals, the work of analysts such as Pfister-Ammende (1973a; 1973b; 1980) and Zwingmann (1973) has not been considered. These authors are concerned with psychological disturbances in uprooted individuals such as refugees, rather than with the social consequences of community relocation.

The ethnography of relocation in Africa excluding South Africa will then be considered. It will be suggested that existing typologies of relocation in Africa are effectively unable to take account of the social consequences of relocation, as they do not concern themselves sufficiently with the environmental aspects of relocation, e.g. the distance people move, the environmental changes of terrain involved, the size and organisation of resettled communities. Suggestions will be made as to how an environmentally-oriented classification of relocation schemes in Africa might be made, and as to how this could help us to account in greater detail for their social consequences. Relocation in South Africa will be considered in the same light, again arguing for the usefulness of an environmentally-oriented analysis. An approach will then be suggested for analysing the case-study to be considered in this dissertation. It will be argued that the social consequences of the particular kind of relocation involved, can usefully be understood in terms of the way in which it modifies the physical and social environment of relocatees, and thus presents them with a modified set of opportunities and constraints in their new situation.

#### THEORETICAL ANALYSES OF RELOCATION

Existing theoretical analyses of relocation tend to concentrate on the element of stress involved in the process of relocation, seeking to explain relocatees' behaviour as a response to the stresses confronting them. Relocatees experience different kinds and intensities of stress during the various stages of the relocation



process (before relocation, during relocation, during the period of adjustment after relocation and after they have effectively established themselves in their new environment), and these differences find expression in different ways during the various phases of the relocation process.

The most systematic attempt to construct a theoretical framework by means of which to analyse the impact of relocation, is surely that of Scudder and Colson. Their framework will therefore be examined in some detail, and other stress-based analyses more briefly considered in evaluating the usefulness of a stress-based approach to relocation.

a) Scudder and Colson's Analysis of Relocation

These two authors publish both jointly and separately, have worked closely together for the last thirty years, and freely share their field notes and ideas (personal communication from Scudder, 1984). They will thus be jointly referred to, although the work of either author may be quoted separately. Their major research has been concerned with the long-term consequences of the relocation of some 55 000 people, as a result of the construction of the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River between what are now Zambia and Zimbabwe, during the late 1950s (notably Colson 1960; 1971; Scudder 1962; 1968 and Scudder and Colson 1980). Wider theoretical formulations about the nature and social consequences of relocation have flowed from this research. (notably Scudder 1973a; 1973b; 1975; 1981; 1984 and Scudder and Colson 1982).

Scudder and Colson argue that "people who undergo resettlement, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, respond to the process in predictable ways. This is true across cultures partly because the stress of relocation limits the range of coping responses of those involved" (Scudder 1984, p 5 - 6).

While one might think that whether resettlement was undergone voluntarily or compulsorily would make a major difference to the way in which people reacted, they argue that the difference is one of degree, rather than of kind. Collective relocation involving "families or whole communities with established behaviour patterns" (ibid., p 6) is a stressful experience, and the problems and stresses

accompanying forced relocation also characterise other types of relocation, although to a lesser extent (ibid., p 10).

Within the broad range of predictable responses, there is however room for differences. Within a community, rich and poor will react differently, inasmuch as they will have access to different options and resources in terms of which to adapt to relocation (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 268). Similarly "the minority of potential relocatees who support removal...or who decide to relocate themselves without government assistance" will react differently to the rest of their community which is forcibly relocated, usually with government assistance (ibid., p 274). Those more favourably situated in regard to relocation react differently because the range of their coping responses, both economically and psychologically, is not as limited as is that of other relocatees.

The stress to which relocatees are subjected is of a three-fold nature: physiological, psychological and sociocultural. Physiological stress may express itself in increased mortality and morbidity rates (ibid., p 269) while psychological stress may take the form of trauma, feelings of guilt at having survived the relocation process while others died or were left behind, grieving for the abandoned home area, and anxiety about the future (ibid., p 270). Sociocultural stress may relate to a loss of material assets during the move, arrival at a new site which has not been adequately developed to enable relocatees to regain economic mobility, a weakening or loss of leadership within the relocated community, and a simplification and reduction of the "cultural inventory" of the community due to a disruption or loss of pre-relocation behavioural and symbolic patterns (ibid., p 270 - 271). These three levels of stress are interrelated and may complement and aggravate each other.

Scudder and Colson attempt to systematise the response of relocatees by dividing the relocation process into four successive stages.

The four stages of their model of the relocation process are

- 1) the recruitment stage
- 2) the transition stage
- 3) the stage of potential development
- 4) the handing over/incorporation stage.

A resettled community must pass through all four stages if it is to be successful, in the sense of realising its "development potential", through achieving economic viability and administrative autonomy (Scudder 1981, p 88). All resettled communities do not necessarily pass through all four stages. For a number of reasons, a community may not realise its "potential" and may never achieve either economic viability (stage three) or political and administrative autonomy (stage four) (Scudder 1984, p 18). It may instead remain dependent upon the agencies or government associated with its original relocation.

It may not always be clear whether a community or a section of a community is coming to the end of a particular stage. The four stages of the relocation process should not be regarded as watertight compartments. There will necessarily be some overlap between the stages, which should be seen as "tools for coming to grips with a complicated and dynamic process" (ibid., p 17), rather than as actual states.

Each of these stages will be discussed in turn, and their interrelationship assessed.

1) The Recruitment Stage. At this stage, the community itself is not yet directly involved. The recruitment stage relates rather to activity on the part of the government and agencies that are initiating the relocation. Decisions are made by these outside bodies as to whether a community should be moved and if so, where to. Initial feasibility studies are undertaken and plans drawn up. Construction of necessary infrastructure such as roads and irrigation schemes may be started. If the area to be settled is unoccupied, or sparsely populated, potential settlers will need to be recruited. The recruitment stage is thus a preparatory stage, in which the initiative is taken by outside bodies and in which the people who are ultimately to be relocated, may not be involved at all. It is related to the succeeding stages inasmuch as the decisions taken and the plans formulated will affect the length and stressfulness of the transition stage, as well as the possibility of potential development (Scudder and Colson 1982 p 274; Scudder 1984 p 18).

2) The Transition Stage. This stage commences when the communities to be moved discover that they are to be moved, and involves the move itself and the period immediately after it. This stage is a period of major stress, during which people adopt a "conservative" stance (Scudder and Colson 1982 p 271) in an effort to reduce stress, and as a coping device whereby they fall back on the range of adaptive strategies with which they are familiar. People "turn inward and behave as if their sociocultural system were a closed system" (ibid., p 274). Before relocation, people may attempt to cope with their stress by denying the move, and by carrying on as usual, as if it were not going to happen. People cling to the familiar, changing no more than is necessary in the new situation. They try to move together with kinsmen, neighbours or co-ethnics (where various ethnic groups are involved), in order to create a familiar and secure environment in the new area. Economically and socially people are initially risk-avoiding, sticking to known practices and social ties. Behaviour in the new settled areas is strongly kin- and neighbour-oriented, and geared to the meeting of subsistence needs. This close family and neighbourhood focus makes for a decreased emphasis on, and participation in, community activities, and for a corresponding simplification of certain aspects of the community's culture.

People seek to "move the shortest distance...in terms of the psychological and socio-cultural context of their lives" (ibid., p 273), and they may usefully be seen as attempting to achieve a condition of equilibrium, by accommodating the new situation in terms of their pre-relocation frame of reference. The transition stage is "Rarely...shorter than two years, and often it will be much longer". (ibid, p 275). As mentioned earlier, those people who are economically and psychologically better equipped to adjust to relocation are less conservative and risk-avoiding in their reactions to relocation. They are more likely to be innovative, particularly if they see the chance of gaining in some way from the relocation process (ibid., p 271 - 277; Scudder 1973a, p 51 - 53; Scudder 1984, p 21 - 24; Scudder 1981, p 113).

3) The Stage of Potential Development. This stage is characterised by "the shift from a conservative, security-oriented stance to a more



open-ended one in which an increasing proportion of relocatees begin to participate actively in risk taking" (Scudder and Colson 1982 p 281). This usually occurs when the majority of relocatees have regained the degree of economic self-sufficiency they enjoyed before relocation, and as they feel more at home in their new environment. People respond to opportunities presented by their new environment, and diversify their activities and investments. Production may be diversified and non-agricultural sources of income pursued, such as petty trading, or home-based enterprises. Income is invested in items such as the education of children, the improvement of housing, recreation and consumer goods. Patterns of social stratification may emerge, based on differences of income and corresponding life-style.

This developing well-being and initiative is reflected in a more outward-looking focus. Effective local leadership emerges that is able to negotiate with the outside world, and a growing community awareness is expressed in the revival of community-oriented ritual and ceremonial activity.

The stage of potential development should not be seen in terms of a regained condition of equilibrium after the disruptions of relocation. People's behaviour is dynamic and innovative, approximating the idea of an open-ended system, rather than that of a self-contained equilibrium. In this regard, the stage of potential development is qualitatively different from the preceding transitional stage (ibid., p 280 - 283; Scudder 1984, p 24 - 27).

4) The Handing Over/Incorporation Stage. This stage, which may be taken to signify the successful relocation of a community, is reached when control of local production and project activities (such as an irrigation scheme), as well as of its own affairs, is handed over to that community. It then becomes an autonomous unit, both economically and administratively, able to take its place within the wider society. The relocated community's activity becomes incorporated into the regional economy, and development (or government) agencies responsible for implementing the relocation process, hand over administration of the relocatees and their area to "departmental, local government and settler agencies" (Scudder 1984, p 27). The unwillingness of relocation agencies to let go of the economic and/or administrative

reins, impede a community's ability to move out of the transition stage into the stages of potential growth and of handing over and incorporation. This fourth stage is usually only reached when a second generation has grown up in the new area and assumed command (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 275; Scudder 1981, p 122-125; Scudder 1984, p 27 - 28).

As stated earlier, Scudder and Colson argue that this four-stage model should be seen as an attempt to introduce some analytical order into the mass of data relating to the relocation process, and it is not the case that all relocated communities can be judged to have passed through all four stages. Nor is it the case that scholars have necessarily followed resettled communities through all four stages, and accordingly it is the last two stages (potential development and handing over) which have not been adequately studied, and "about which we know the least" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 281).

The role of stress in the relocation process seems central to Scudder and Colson's analysis. It is because the stress of relocation limits the coping mechanisms available to relocatees that they react in a predictable fashion, in spite of cultural diversity.

In this light, the assertion that this predictability holds, whether a community is voluntarily or compulsorily relocated, appears problematic. In the context of a forcibly relocated community, "that minority of potential relocatees who support removal or...those kinship units, households and individuals who decide to relocate themselves without government assistance (do not) behave during the transition period as if a sociocultural system were a closed system" (ibid., p 274). If sections of a community that relocate voluntarily, or at their own cost, and under less stress, behave differently during the transition stage, then it is not clear why entire communities that relocate on the same terms should also not react differently to communities that are relocated forcibly and with government assistance. If communities that have such different experiences of the relocation process can be understood as reacting to relocation in basically the same way, then this requires a level of generalisation which must overlook considerable difference in detail, and which must accordingly detract from the explanatory power of the theoretical

model which considers them together. Greater clarification of the differences between forced and voluntary relocation would enhance the value of Scudder and Colson's model as it would allow for a more precise consideration of the role of stress in the relocation process.

Partridge, Brown and Nugent, while broadly supporting Scudder and Colson's approach, argue that communities with different cultural traditions and social structures will react differently during the transition stage. "Closed community systems...respond differently to forced resettlement than more open communities" (Partridge et al, 1982, p 260). They argue that Scudder and Colson's model (taken for their purposes from Scudder 1968; 1969 and 1973a), whereby a community becomes more closed and inward-turning during the transition stage and then again more open during the stage of potential development, has limited applicability. It may well be applicable to a more open system like that of the Gwembe Tonga people of the Kariba area, whose society was characterised by a tradition of fission before relocation. Their data (ie. Partridge et al) was gathered among Mexican communities which each formed "a small, closed, hierarchically organised world", in which the tendency towards fission was not present (Partridge et al 1982, p 260). They argue that a more closed community tends to become more open during the transition stage, and then once again to become closed once it has passed through transition (ibid., p 261).

The distinction between "open" and "closed" communities is one of degree rather than kind, and may be made rather arbitrarily. However, Partridge and his colleagues' comments with regard to the open/closed distinction suggest that Scudder and Colson's model is formulated at too high a level of generality to take effective account of different types of reaction to relocation by communities which, because of differences in social structure, may well experience and react to the stresses of relocation in different ways.

Part of the problem seems to relate to the elusive nature of the concept of stress itself. How are we to measure accurately the stress people encounter during the relocation process? And even if we succeed in establishing an acceptable measure of the physical presence of stress, how are we to cater for people's interpretations of what is happening and how this relates to the stress that they are

experiencing? Unless we are able to gain a clearer measure and interpretation of the stresses involved among relocatees in different sorts of relocation situations, and among different individuals in the same community, the value of a stress-based explanation of different responses that they may show, is limited.

Nor is it clear how we are to relate stress to the behaviour of relocatees. During the transition stage, people adopt a "conservative stance to reduce the possibility that further stress will occur...(they) turn inward and behave as if their sociocultural system were a closed system" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 274). Yet the "reduction of the relocatees' cultural inventory" and the "simplification of their sociocultural system" (Scudder 1975, p 467) that seems to result from this conservatism as well as from the contingencies of their new situation, is itself a source of stress, creating a sense of uncertainty and deprivation (ibid, p 468; Scudder and Colson, 1982, p 271). Reduction of cultural inventory thus seems to be both a stress-avoiding response, as well as a source of stress. The relationship between stress and behaviour requires greater clarification if we are usefully to explain relocatees' behaviour in stress-based terms.

Inasmuch as Scudder and Colson's model derives its explanatory force from the impact and consequences of stress, its usefulness seems limited largely to the first two stages which it outlines, viz. the recruitment and the transition stages. The recruitment stage is related to stress inasmuch as "Decisions taken at this stage...influence the length and severity of the stressful transition stage and they may prevent the stage of potential development taking place" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 274). The transition stage is related to stress inasmuch as it is in this stage that people react in predictable ways in attempting to come to terms with the stress resulting from relocation.

Once the stage of potential development has been reached, the model appears to lose a good deal of its explanatory power. People are now behaving in innovating and open-ended ways, interacting actively with their new environment. They have now passed through the period of stress, and the potential paths they may follow are now related to factors other than stress. Such factors may include new patterns of



leadership and wealth in the new community, the presence or absence of other resettled communities, new economic opportunities and limitations. This diversity of possible factors reduces the ability to make predictions about people's behaviour during this stage, to a high level of generality, which again is unable to take effective account of specific cases.

Scudder makes a comment which suggests that their model operates most usefully at the recruitment and transition phases of the relocation process. Writing about Kariba relocatees who had emerged from the transition stage, and now felt at home in their new environment he states "Indeed, from that time on, our methodology no longer could detect the direct effects of the resettlement experience. As with the hosts, the relocatees were being influenced by events that pertained, not so much to relocation, but to the modernisation of Zambia. Throughout the transition period, their ecological frame of reference was dominated by the lake basin and the down-river resettlement areas. Thereafter, they were increasingly incorporated within an extended ecosystem which included not just the lake basin, but also the line of rail and the major urban centres on the Zambian Plateau" (Scudder 1975, p 468-469).

While there is a clear logical connection between stages one and two inasmuch as recruitment influences the severity of transition, the link between the first two and the last two stages of the model seems more tenuous. While the nature of decisions taken during the recruitment stage may prevent the occurrence of the stage of potential development, or while the intensity of stress during the transition stage may delay its onset, it is not clear how the nature of the recruitment and transition stages will affect patterns of behaviour during the stage of potential development when it does take place. The way in which people behave in the stage of potential development must be understood in terms of a wide range of factors (as discussed above), of which the previous relocation experience is only one.

In a recent formulation, Scudder (personal communication 1985) suggests that "While it is true that more variables come into play at the end of stage two, the contrast between stage two and stage three is related...to the resettlement context, with stage three influenced by the nature of the preceding settlement resettlement. Furthermore,

recent return visits to Zambia (Kariba) suggest that resettlement experiences during stage two continue to influence local responses to opportunities/constraints some 25 years plus after resettlement...I think that the uprooting process, while being stressful in the transition period, also tends to reduce the restraining influence of other behavioural patterns, institutions and values once stage three begins (if it begins)". However, until the relationship between transition and stage three (potential development) is clearly demonstrated (in stress-based terms, or otherwise), it appears to remain problematical.

In the same way there are no clear links between the stages of recruitment and transition, and the final stage of handing over. There seems to be a connection between the nature of the third stage and that of handing over. The nature and feasibility of the transition stage seems likely to be influenced by factors such as whether a community does achieve economic viability, what leadership patterns it develops and whether it is able to keep its second generation from emigrating. The fact that the order in which the third and fourth stages occur may be reversed (Scudder 1984, p 17) indicates that there is however no logical or necessary connection between them either.

The explanatory force of Scudder and Colson's model of the relocation process then seems to relate primarily to its first two stages, and particularly to the transitional stage. It provides a useful framework with which to analyse people's responses to relocation, in terms of the ways in which the stresses of relocation restrict the range of coping mechanisms available to relocatees, and in terms of the ways in which people seek to overcome these stresses. However, it suffers from a high level of generality which limits its ability to account for different types of response to relocation, as was shown by considering the distinction between voluntary and compulsory relocation, as well as that between more open and more closed communities. This generality is probably related to the elusive nature of the concept of stress, which is central to Scudder and Colson's analysis.

Scudder and Colson's model is derived mainly from experience on large-scale relocation undertakings, arising out of e.g. dam construction or large-scale agricultural development projects,

involving settlement in areas which in some cases were unsettled or sparsely populated before ("new lands settlement"). In such undertakings, large numbers of people are relocated, often across large distances. The case-study to be considered in this dissertation involves relocation of a community of about 2 000 people across a very short distance (of up to two miles) within the area they previously occupied. Scudder and Colson's model appears less readily applicable to smaller-scale instances of community relocation.

Scudder (personal communication, 1985) states "I would say that the greatest applicability of Scudder/Colson, including the various processes forecast during stages three and four, is where relocation involves the greatest spatial alteration...Where changes in the spatial dimension are considerably less, as in your Chatha case, (and) East African villagisation...applicability will depend on a number of situational factors that have not been properly analysed - factors which might make relocation theory highly relevant, and on the other hand, of little relevance". The extent to which the Scudder/Colson approach is useful in making sense of relocation in the case I am analysing, will be considered in the course of the dissertation.

#### b) Other Stress-Based Analyses of Relocation

Other stress-based analyses of relocation include those by Fried (1963; 1980) Marris (1974; 1980) Lumsden (1975a) Sutton (1978) and Trimble (1980). These analyses are less developed than that of Scudder and Colson, and will be briefly outlined before proceeding to some general comments on stress-based analyses of relocation.

Fried's 1963 article was about the relocation of slum-dwellers in Boston, and he wrote about their reaction to relocation as one of grief. The title of his article, "Grieving for a Lost Home", has become a celebrated phrase in the relocation literature, and Scudder and Colson (Colson 1971, p 53; Scudder and Colson 1982, p 270) and Marris (1974, p 43ff) acknowledge the value of his analysis to their work. People attempted to cope with their sense of loss by "clinging to the familiar" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 272), trying to remain as close as possible to their old residential areas and to keep up pre-relocation relationships (Fried 1963, p 160).

In a later article (1980), Fried considers relocation in terms of role adaptation, arguing that the stress people experience is largely the result of the extent to which people's range of roles and role behaviours have been disrupted by relocation (ibid, p 88-89). Relocates adapt their range of roles and role behaviours in response to stress experienced.

Marris (1961; 1974; 1980) writes about relocation in the context of slum clearance in Lagos, in Nigeria. He argues that people display a tendency towards conservatism in the face of a threat to the "structure of meaning by which each of us sustains the relationships to people, work, and the physical and social circumstances on which our lives depend" (Marris 1980, p 101). Events such as bereavement, sudden social change, or relocation constitute such a threat. Relocates seek to find alternative means to transform their sense of meaning associated with their old residential areas, to accommodate and to make sense of their new situation (Marris 1974, p 57).

Sutton (1978) argues that relocation is a traumatic experience. He then appeals to Marris' argument (1974) that people may react to a sudden "crisis of discontinuity" (p 21), such as relocation, in one of two ways, viz. either through despair and apathy, or through innovative, adaptive, creative behaviour. Sutton (1978, p 64) suggests that we would benefit by developing a "model of resettlement which includes the dichotomous reaction to trauma displayed by a traditional society" (i.e. despair, and innovation).

Lumsden's (1975a) analysis is derived from his study of relocation in the case of the Volta River Project in Ghana. He places his analysis within the context of systems theory. He argues that the Volta River Project could be seen as an exogenous stimulus or "stressor", entering a system of "somewhat interdependent parts" (ibid, p 193) consisting of Nchumuru society - the society which Lumsden studied. This stimulus evoked various adjusting or coping responses, which in turn made for changes within the social system (ibid, p 193-195).

Trimble (1980) briefly considers the impact of forced relocation in four communities, arguing that the suddenness and the extent of the social change effected by relocation puts relocates under a great deal of stress as they have to adapt to a new environment and a new



life-style (ibid, p 457). Particularly stressful is the "group's lack of decision-making power" (ibid, p 455). Relocates attempt to adapt to these disruptive processes in such a way as to minimise the stress they are experiencing.

Even within the context of the analysis of relocation, all of the models discussed above have been formulated at a high level of generality. The approaches of Fried (1980), Marris and Lumsden amount to models of social change, of which relocation - even in its stressful stages - is an example, rather than a special phenomenon for analysis in its own right, having specific characteristics of its own. A number of social changes other than relocation can cause stress, and bring about role disruption, a threat to people's structure of meaning, or stress within a social system. These three approaches accordingly seem to have little to contribute to the understanding of relocation as a specific phenomenon. The approaches of Fried (1963) Sutton (1978) and Trimble (1980), while focussed specifically on relocation, are also too undeveloped to be of much use, consisting essentially of a few generalisations rather than a theoretical framework.

c) An Evaluation of Stress-Based Analyses of Relocation.

All of the above frameworks for analysing the impact of community relocation or resettlement have concentrated on the aspect of stress. This has led them all to focus on the most stressful period of the relocation process viz. the period immediately before the move, the move itself, and the period of adjustment afterwards. Inasmuch as the severity of the stress of relocation may be seen to lead to predictable responses, the explanatory value of any of these frameworks must effectively be limited to the most stressful aspects of relocation. In Scudder and Colson's terms, this would relate to the stages of recruitment and transition.

When people start to regain their psychological, social and economic momentum, i.e. when they have effectively passed through the period of stress, the explanatory value of such stress-based frameworks is largely diminished. The relocation experience is now but one of a number of social political and economic factors which

will influence people's behaviour patterns. If relocation is to be understood primarily in terms of its stressful nature, then it would seem arguable that, once the period of stressful adaptation is over, the relocation process may effectively be said to be over. In the stage of potential development (in Scudder and Colson's terms) people are becoming risk-takers, outward-looking, innovative. This would suggest that their behaviour would best be understood in terms of approaches other than that of resettlement analysis.

However, even within the context of the recruitment and transition stages, stress-based analysis seems to develop problems in regard to the generality of the analysis, as well as the issues of measuring and interpreting stress, and of relating it to behaviour (these problems have been discussed in relation to Scudder and Colson's analysis).

Using the broad generalisations of stress-based analyses where they may prove useful, we need to develop a more detailed typology of different kinds and circumstances of relocation which will enable us to give a more detailed account of responses to relocation. This will now be attempted with reference to the ethnography of relocation in Africa.

#### THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF RELOCATION IN AFRICA

##### a) An Argument for an Environmentally-Oriented Typology of Relocation in Africa

The spatial aspect of relocation seems central to the understanding of its consequences, as it involves the movement of communities from one place, and environment, to another. Relocation thus involves the modification or change of the physical and social environment in which people find themselves, and may present them with different agricultural, economic and infrastructural conditions to those they experienced before relocation.

The kind and degree of environmental modification that relocatees undergo will, it seems, be a major factor in influencing their response to relocation, as it largely determines the circumstances in which relocatees find themselves, and to which they will have to adapt. The kind of environmental modification undergone also seems to

hold the key to a greater understanding of the stress undergone by relocatees, as some moves will involve greater modification, and greater stress than others. The environmental aspect of relocation may conveniently be divided into a physical and a social component, although they are interrelated.

Scudder and Colson argue that "In clinging to the familiar, relocatees attempt to move the shortest distance, not only in space, to remain in contact with a familiar habitat, but also in terms of the psychological and sociocultural context of their lives" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 273). Fahim expresses the same idea slightly differently, when he says that "relocatees change as much as is necessary to continue behaving in accordance with pre-location goals and values" (Fahim 1983, p 164). People attempt to adapt to their new environment in such a way as to preserve as much of their pre-relocation style of life as is possible and useful in their new environment.

The degree to which people will be able to achieve this preservation will be largely circumscribed by the physical aspect of the move. The way in which people will seek to organise themselves in their new situation, will be influenced by factors such as whether they are close enough to their old home area to be able to keep up contact, whether they are too far ever to pay a return visit, or if the old area has been transformed, whether they are in an area which is topographically, agriculturally and climatically similar or different, whether they will have to adopt new means of making a livelihood.

In the Aswan Dam case, the Sudanese Nubians were moved about 500 miles to Khashm-el-Girba and away from the banks of the Nile River whereas in many Ujamaa villages in Tanzania, several neighbouring villages moved together to form a single unit. In the case-study to be considered in this dissertation, in some ways like Ujamaa, villagers moved inside the boundaries of the village.

The social component of the environmental aspect of relocation relates to matters such as demography, organisation of the new residential areas, lay-out of the resettlement area as a whole, and the administrative structure under which the relocated community

falls. Changes in the demographic composition of the pre- and post-relocation areas are relevant to post-relocation social organisation. In the cases of the Aswan Dam and the Volta River Project relocations, people found themselves in settlements ten to thirty times larger than they had been accustomed to (Fahim 1981, p 55 - 57; Butcher 1970, p 89). Not only were they in much larger communities, but they were also in much more diverse communities, consisting of members of various ethnic groups. In the Zande Scheme in the Sudan, by contrast, households were located on separate plots, up to 40 acres in extent, and keenly felt the lack of neighbourhood (Reining 1966, p 109).

People's feeling of either continuity or disruption of community life in their new context will also be strongly influenced by the lay-out of their new residential areas. People may have been able to move as communities or neighbourhoods to their new homes, or they may have been allocated houses on some other criterion, such as family size (as in the case of the Egyptian Nubians relocated to Kom Ombo (Fahim 1983, p 59). The amount of freedom which people have to choose their neighbours and immediate community will have a direct influence on the size and sort of groups that develop in the post-relocation context.

Closely related to the way in which the residential areas are situated and internally organised, is the general lay-out of the resettlement area itself. Proximity to facilities such as wood and water, gardens and fields, schools, clinics and shops will influence patterns of interaction and co-operation within the new community. If each section of a large community is self-contained in terms of services, these sections may become more inward-turning than if they have to share facilities, travelling daily through each other's social territories. The lay-out of an area may also favour some relocatees at the expense of others, providing them with better facilities, or larger arable allotments, etc. Where this differential allocation coincides with the residential separation of the relatively more favoured relocatees, as in the case of the Sudanese Nubians at the expense of the local nomads at Khashm-el-Girba (Agouba 1979), this may lead to polarisation within a resettlement scheme.

Relocatees often find themselves part of a different, and usually more centralised political and administrative structure. Ujamaa relocatees became incorporated into the structure of the Tanzanian



National Independence Party and its bureaucracy, divided into Party cell units, each consisting of ten homesteads (Abrahams 1981, p 34). On a large agricultural scheme such as Mwea in Kenya, people find themselves under a comprehensive scheme administration which exercises close supervision over their agricultural activities (Singleton 1974, p 128). The kind of administrative structure, and the comprehensiveness of its control, will influence the kind of leadership structures and groupings that emerge among relocatees.

These few remarks about the environmental aspect of the relocation process should be sufficient to suggest its importance to the understanding of the social patterns emerging in a resettlement community. The stress relocatees experience, both during Scudder and Colson's transitional stage and afterwards, seems to be closely related to the kind of environmental modification they undergo. It could thus be argued that whether relocation is forced or voluntary, is also not necessarily central to the understanding of its longer-term consequences (although it certainly is vital to understanding relocatees in the transition stage, as it will relate to the range of stresses they encounter). Forced relocation to a nearby or similar environment may well result in better medium to long term (i.e. post transition) adaptation than voluntary relocation involving substantial environmental change.

The range of modifications brought about by relocation seems to be the most useful variable to take into account when seeking to understand people's post-relocation behaviour. This holds across and within particular instances of community relocation, as individual relocatees are not necessarily all similarly placed either before or after relocation. Individuals or families may undergo a greater or lesser modification of their circumstances, and find various opportunities and options open to them, to which they may respond in different ways.

Existing typologies of relocation in Africa do not appear to take the impact of environmental modification upon the behaviour of relocatees adequately into account, and are consequently not of much use in helping us to understand such behaviour.

Chambers focuses on resettlement schemes in a predominantly agricultural context. He defines such schemes (in Belshaw's terms) as

"the planned and controlled transfer of population from one area to another" (Chambers 1969, p 11), adding the qualifying consideration that these schemes also involve "organised attempts to establish people upon the land" (ibid, p 12).

Chambers classifies resettlement schemes in terms of two factors: the physical setting of the scheme ("the arrangement of land boundaries, of housing, of water supplies and especially of irrigation systems" - ibid., p 230) and the form of economic organisation. These two factors strongly influence the nature and workings of a resettlement scheme. Taking the degree of control exercised over these two factors as the key variable, Chambers identifies four "more or less distinct groups along a rising scale of controls over individuals by the management or community, starting with land tenure only, and then adding successively marketing, scheduled services, and a communal economy" (ibid., p 230).

These groups may be represented in tabular form as follows:

Extent of Controls by Scheme Types: Forms of Control Found

Types of scheme	Land boundaries planned and controlled	Central marketing required	Timing of settler	
			production activities centrally determined	Labour and rewards shared
Individual holding	Yes	No	No	No
Compulsory marketing	Yes	Yes	No	No
Scheduled production	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Communal economy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

(ibid., p 231)

Chambers focuses only on the form of economic organisation, effectively disregarding the physical setting of the scheme (an important aspect of the environment) by holding it as a constant factor in his typology. His analysis is geared more towards the administrative aspects of resettlement schemes, than towards understanding the behaviour of their occupants as relocatees. While the kind of control exercised over relocatees in a resettlement scheme is relevant to an understanding of their behaviour as relocatees, Chambers considers this aspect in the light of relationships between settlers and administration, rather than between settlers themselves, as relocatees.

Oyedipe (1983), citing cases of resettlement arising mainly out of dam construction or industrial development, provides a typology of resettlement schemes in Africa in terms of two variables: whether the relocation is of a "forceful" nature, and what sort of "developmental innovations" are associated with the resettlement scheme (ibid., p 3). In terms of the first variable, he distinguishes between schemes in which people are forcefully relocated and those in which they co-operated during the relocation process (ibid., p 15). Co-operation means that the resettled people are persuaded "until they co-operate" (ibid., p 3). This may of course mean that the people eventually agreed to relocation, submitting fatalistically, when they realised that it was inevitable. Oyedipe's distinction between forced relocation and relocation with co-operation appears to be too vague to be of much analytical use. In terms of the second variable of "developmental innovations", Oyedipe distinguishes between schemes in which only "primary" innovative changes were intended, and those in which both primary and "secondary" changes were intended. He argues that "An innovation is 'primary' if the resettled people had it before at the old site and it had to be replaced. It is 'secondary' or 'developmental' if it is new and intended to be adopted" (ibid., p 15).

Oyedipe's typology may be represented in tabular form, as follows:

<u>Nature of Relocation</u>	<u>Type of Innovation</u>	
	a) <u>Primary</u>	b) <u>Primary and Secondary</u>
Forceful	One	Two
With Co-operation	Four	Three

(adapted from p 15)

Oyedipe's typology does not appear to have much explanatory power, as he does not link his two variables to each other so as to generate a theoretical framework for explaining any differences and similarities between resettlement schemes. The case-study to be examined in this dissertation would be classified as type two (in that it is characterised by forceful relocation and the stated intention on the part of the planners to provide both primary and secondary innovation). However, that identification does not by itself help me in my attempt to assess the social or economic consequences of that relocation.

Palmer (1974; 1981) argues that agricultural resettlement schemes should be understood in relation to their wider environment and "in the larger context of worldwide political and economic processes that obviously affect (them)" (Palmer 1974, p 240). The agricultural resettlement scheme is a social system, the members of which (both managers and settlers) have "significant relations with the world outside the geographical boundaries of the scheme" (Palmer 1981, p 174). The dynamics of a scheme and the problems occurring within it, arise out of the interaction and conflict between on-scheme interests and values, and those "generated by large, technologically developed nations and expressed in colonial and imperialistic patterns of bureaucratic expansion" (ibid., p 176). Ultimately the agricultural resettlement scheme must be understood within the "national and international context of agricultural exploitation and ecological imperialism" (ibid., p 177).

Palmer's approach is too general to provide a typology in terms of which to classify and analyse African schemes. He discusses factors such as the reasons for resettlement schemes, their planning, the

question of land tenure and conflict within schemes, but he does not link these factors in any systematic way such that one could account for differences and similarities between schemes, or for the behaviour of settlers in their capacity as relocatees.

Silberfein (1976) provides a broad overview of settlement schemes, emphasising "the limitations of resettlement as a developmental technique" (p 263). Her survey does not address itself to the social consequences of resettlement.

It appears therefore, that existing typologies of resettlement schemes do not pay adequate attention to the aspect of environmental modification arising out of relocation, and are not designed to account for the social consequences arising out of relocation.

#### b) A Brief Classification of Instances of Relocation in Africa

A brief classification of a number of the more important instances of relocation in Africa (other than South Africa) will now be attempted, confining myself to those cases for which some knowledge of the social consequences of relocation is documented. This is an attempt to show the potential usefulness of a focus on environmental modification in the understanding of the social consequences of relocation, and is not intended to be an exhaustive correlation of the environmental and social aspects of relocation in Africa. Although relocatees end up in "resettlement schemes", these vary considerably with regard to the degree to which they involve "the planned and controlled transfer of population from one area to another" (Chambers 1969, p 11) and may have arisen for any of a number of different reasons, e.g. political, agricultural, developmental.

##### 1) The Physical Component

Resettlement schemes which usually involve the most drastic changes of physical environment, both in terms of the distance moved, as well as of the change of terrain, are those resulting from the construction of large dams and from the development of large-scale irrigation and other agricultural schemes. Examples of resettlement arising out of the construction of dams are those related to the Aswan Dam, with



100 000 people being relocated in Egypt and the Sudan (Agouba 1979; Fahim 1973; 1981; 1983; Fernea and Kennedy 1979; Hoyle 1977; Kennedy 1977; 1978; Sorbo 1977); the Kariba Dam, with 55 000 people being relocated in what are now Zimbabwe and Zambia (Colson 1964; 1971; Scudder 1968; Scudder and Colson 1971; 1980); the Volta River Project with 80 000 people being relocated in Ghana (Barrington 1973; Chambers 1970; Kalitsi 1973; Lumsden 1975a; 1975b; 1980) and the Kainji Dam with 42 000 people being relocated in Nigeria (Mabogunje 1973; Oyedipe 1983). Dam resettlement may involve a move of several hundred miles as in the Aswan case, (Fahim 1983, p 31) or a move of fifteen miles in the case of most Kariba relocatees (Colson 1971, p 44). In the Kainji case, the people were relocated five to eight miles from the dam site (Oyedipe, in Mabogunje 1973, p 31 - 32).

Dam resettlement usually means moving people to an unfamiliar habitat. In the Aswan case people were moved away from the Nile, and inland. The Egyptians were relocated between 2 and 6 miles from the Nile River (Fahim 1983, p 55) although up to more than 100 miles from their original homes (Fernea and Kennedy 1979, p 198). The Sudanese Nubians were relocated up to 500 miles away from their former homes (Fahim 1973, map on p 43), approximately the same distance from the Atbara River as the Egyptians were from the Nile (*ibid.*, map on p 46). The Nubian relocatees were therefore no longer able to continue their riverain existence as before. Many of the Kariba relocatees moved from a situation of permanent riverside cultivation to uncleared bush which they had to till by means of shifting cultivation (Colson 1971, p 69).

Examples of resettlement arising out of the development of large-scale irrigation and other agricultural schemes are those relating to the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan (Barnett 1977; Brausch 1964; Culwick 1955; Gaitskell 1959); the Zande Scheme in the Sudan involving 50 000 families (Reining 1966; 1982); the Mwea Scheme in Kenya involving 25 000 people (Chambers 1969; 1973; Singleton 1974) and the Niger Irrigation Project in Mali involving 23 000 people (Hammond 1963).

The large size of such schemes means that people living within the area may have to move considerable distances although in other cases people may stay in their current areas of occupation, which are then put under irrigation. They would then have to move relatively short

distances to new housing allotments. In the case of the Niger Irrigation Project, up to one-quarter of the settlers had come from a neighbouring country, the Voltaic Republic (Hammond 1963, p 12).

The large size of these schemes (the Gezira Scheme is over 2 million acres in extent - Barnett 1977, p 6; the Mwea Scheme involves 30 000 acres of arable land - Singleton 1974, p 53) also means that they amount to a total transformation of the environment, even for relocatees who had previously lived within the area.

The extent of environmental modification varies considerably in the case of smaller-scale agricultural resettlement projects, as they vary considerably in size. In East Africa, examples of such schemes are the Shimba Hills Scheme in Kenya (Palmer 1971); the Urambo tobacco scheme in Tanzania (Baer 1974); the settlement of a small group of Somali pastoral nomads on an irrigation scheme in Kenya (Merryman 1982); the Nyakashaka Scheme in Uganda (Hutton 1968) and the Group Farm Scheme, also in Uganda (Charsley 1968). In West Africa, examples of such schemes are the Niger Project (Baldwin 1957) and various Nigerian Farm Settlement Schemes (Okediji 1965; Osifo 1964; Schwab 1954). In what is now Zimbabwe, a number of irrigation settlement schemes have been established (Reynolds 1969; Weinrich 1975). The size of these schemes varies considerably. The Shimba Hills Scheme catered for 1268 families in 1967 (Palmer 1971, p 20), while the Urambo Scheme involved 1095 farmers (Baer 1974, p 112). The Niger Project catered for 135 families (Baldwin 1957, p 54; 58) while the Ilara Scheme in West Nigeria took 58 settlers (Okediji 1965, p 303).

One of the most drastic modifications was that of the Somali pastoralists who were settled on an irrigation scheme in Northern Kenya (Merryman 1982). The settlers on the Niger Project were similarly cast into a highly modified environment, coming from neighbouring areas with a density of 40 people per square mile to a virtually empty area, where they were put on 36 acre lots (Baldwin 1957, p 16; 25).

Another form of resettlement which has involved a varying degree of environmental modification has been that of villagisation, which has often gone together with attempts at land reform. The most outstanding examples of this sort of relocation are associated with land reform and political control in Kenya, (what was) Tanganyika, and



Uganda (Sorrenson 1967; Apthorpe 1968; Muga 1971 and Njeru 1981) and more recently, with Ujamaa in Tanzania (Abrahams 1981; Boesen et al 1977; Hyden 1980; Proctor 1971; von Freyhold 1979). A policy of villagisation was also adopted by the Belgian authorities from the 1930s onwards in parts of what is now Zaire "to facilitate their administration" (Packard 1979, p 249). The authorities in Algeria (Sutton 1978) and (what was) Rhodesia (Weinrich 1977) resettled rural people in protected settlements during the Algerian war of independence from 1954 to 1961, and the Rhodesian civil war, which escalated in 1972, leading up to independence in 1980.

The literature on land reform in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda focuses mainly on problems of land reform and land consolidation, saying little about the actual process of villagisation. Sorrenson tells us that by the end of 1955, 1.1 million Kikuyu and Embu "had been forced into 854 villages" in Kenya (Sorrenson 1967, p 110). As one of the purposes of villagisation was to move people off the land to enable land consolidation, it would appear that the villages to which people moved must have been within no more than a few miles of their old homes. The distance moved was probably less than this, as the land-owning unit, which was lineage-based, controlled land along one, or possibly more ridges (*ibid.*, p 10). In the Fort Hall area of Kenya it was proposed to consolidate land at the "sub-location" level, where a sub-location usually covered 1 000 to 2 000 acres (*ibid.*, p 169) - less than three square miles. The move would thus have been within daily walking distance and within familiar terrain. These villages were effectively abandoned by 1960, with people resuming their old pattern of dispersed settlement (*ibid.*, p 150).

The villagisation in Zaire also involved people moving only relatively small distances, with several lineage neighbourhoods being brought together into a single village (Packard 1979, p 249). Details are not given as to how far people moved to go into protected villages in the Algerian case (Sutton 1978), but in the Rhodesian case, people moved short distances. Weinrich states that in some areas, people were settled "a stone's throw", or "within sight" of their old homes (Weinrich 1977, p 212, 220), although in some cases, people were up to three miles from drinking water (*ibid.*, p 219).

The amount of resettlement entailed in the villagisation aspect of

the implementation of Ujamaa varied widely throughout Tanzania. In some cases, existing villages were simply proclaimed as Ujamaa villages. In the areas bordering on Mocambique "people were grouped together in villages for national defence purposes" (Hyden 1980, p 101). Where they did actually move (other than on the Mocambique border) "people were simply told to move to the nearest existing village or trading centre and political efforts were made to create an Ujamaa village out of that enlarged unit" (ibid., p 104). Hyden estimates that, with the exception of the Dodoma region of Tanzania, those who actually moved were "a minority" (ibid., p 104).

In the Ngara district of the West Lake Region of Tanzania, people settling in Ujamaa villages came from villages "relatively near the new settlement" (Boesen et al 1977, p 64). These old villages were close enough for settlers initially to keep their wives and children in the old villages, working their fields there, and for the new settlements to be "almost empty over weekends" (ibid., p 64). In the Bukoba and Karagwe Districts of the West Lake Region, settlers in Ujamaa villages came from further afield than in Ngara, and it was not possible for them to maintain ongoing links of the same kind with their old villages. They were "forced to choose much more directly between their access rights in either of the two societies" (ibid., p 90). In one case, a new settlement comprised people from 18 former villages, and in another case, from 24 villages (ibid., p 100).

The actual distance people had to move in the case of Ujamaa thus varied from district to district. It does not, however, seem as if people had to move to a substantially different physical environment in terms of climate, topography, soils, etc.

The above survey of the physical and environmental distance relocatees have had to move in resettlement schemes in Africa is by no means complete. It is merely intended to give some idea of the diversity involved. It is the larger-scale schemes such as those arising out of dam construction or large irrigation projects that usually involve relocatees having to move the greatest physical and environmental distance, because of the comprehensiveness with which such large schemes modify their environment. Although the land reform and Ujamaa programmes have involved the resettlement of more people than the dams and irrigation schemes, their transformation of the

environment has been much less than that of the large schemes. In many cases the villagisation itself has been the only environmental transformation. The physical and environmental distance moved by relocatees has thus been relatively little.

Although physical distance moved is only one of the factors making for changes in the social organisation of relocatees, we may anticipate that the less the environmental adjustment, the less the corresponding social adjustment will be.

## 2) The Social Component.

Resettlement schemes arising from dam construction or large agricultural schemes usually result in much larger communities than people were accustomed to before relocation. This has been the case with relocations in connection with the Aswan Dam (Fahim 1983, p 55-57; Agouba 1979, p 118-199) the Volta River Project (Lumsden 1975b, p 202) and the Kainji Dam (Oyedipe 1973, p 38). Some communities resettled in connection with the Kariba Dam found themselves in larger settlements, while others were rather more isolated than before. People had resettled in 199 villages on the Zambian side of the Zambezi River and some villages were more remote than others (Colson 1971, p 46-48).

While the irrigation-based resettlement at Gezira (Barnett 1977, p 30-33) and at Mwea (Singleton 1974, p 131) have resulted in people living in larger, more densely populated villages than before, this has not been the case with regard to the Zande Scheme. Here families were settled on plots ranging from 20 to 40 acres, and keenly felt the lack of neighbourhood to which they had been used (Reining 1966, p 109).

There is no clear trend in terms of increased size or density of settlements in the smaller-scale resettlement schemes. Where nucleated settlements are formed, as in the case of Ujamaa (e.g. Hyden 1980; Boesen et al 1977; von Freyhold 1979) or in Algeria (Sutton 1978), Rhodesia (Weinrich 1977) and Zaire (Packard 1979) the size and density of communities increases after resettlement. The Ujamaa settlement that Georgulas (1967) cites, appears to have been an exception as people moved from an unusually concentrated settlement to

a settlement of one acre residential plots. On schemes where settlers live on their arable allotments, such as the Urambo Scheme in Tanzania (Baer 1974, p 32) or the Shimba Hills Scheme in Kenya (Palmer 1974, p 245), the density of the settlement may well be less after resettlement, although its size will be greater in the two cases mentioned. Some of the smaller resettlement schemes, catering for only 50 or 60 settlers, such as those in Nigeria or what is now Zimbabwe (eg. Okediji 1965, p 30-33; Schwab 1954, p 487; Weinrich 1975, p 232) result in resettlement communities that are smaller than pre-relocation settlements, but which may be more or less densely populated, depending on the lay-out of the scheme.

There appears to be some correlation between the number of people relocated and the size of post-relocation settlements, inasmuch as the larger resettlement schemes tend to develop settlements larger than pre-relocation settlements. There is however no necessary correlation between overall size of the resettlement scheme and increased residential density. Residential density is related to the internal organisation of settlements, and specifically to whether people live in nucleated settlements or not.

The larger resettlement schemes with their large resettlement villages are usually characterised by an increase in cultural diversity. Thus at Khashm-el-Girba there were three separate Nubian groups represented, as well as the Arab nomads from the area who had been incorporated in the scheme (Fahim 1983, p 55-57, p 99). Resettlement villages arising from the Volta River Project (Barrington 1973, p 55; Dodoo 1970, p 195-6) as well as from the Mwea Project (Chambers 1969, p 100-102) show an increase in ethnic diversity, as do the Shimba Hills Scheme (Palmer 1971, p 20) and the Gezira Scheme (Barnett 1977, p 45-46). A significant exception is the Zande Scheme, which appears to have involved only Zande people (Reining 1966). Smaller settlement schemes show less variety as to ethnic composition. The Niger Project was settled effectively by Nupe settlers only (Baldwin 1957, p 23), while certain Zambian settlement schemes have attracted immigrants from what was then Rhodesia (Phillips 1969, p 106). Inasmuch as the villagisation schemes draw neighbouring settlements together, they do not tend to make for an increase in cultural diversity within settlements.



In general terms it would appear that the larger the resettlement project, the wider the area it affects and the greater distance people have to travel, both in terms of physical distance and in terms of environmental change. The larger settlements which result, usually involve increased ethnic diversity, but not necessarily an increase in population density. The scale of a scheme thus contributes to the social organisation of a resettlement scheme inasmuch as it influences the extent to which relocatees have to adapt, and who their co-relocatees will be, with whom they will have to co-exist.

Another environmental factor which influences the social organisation of a resettlement scheme, is the extent to which people are able or allowed to choose their new neighbours and neighbourhoods. This becomes a significant factor particularly when people from different areas or ethnic groups are resettled together.

In most of the resettlement schemes resulting from the construction of dams, care was taken for people to be settled with co-relocatees of their own choice, as far as this was possible. In the Aswan case, the Sudanese Nubians and the Arab nomads were settled separately, in accordance with their wishes (Agouba 1979, p 119). Where possible, whole Nubian villages were moved together. Those not wanting to live in villages were offered sites in the large resettlement town of New Halfa, where people were also relocated on an ethnic basis and their old sense of identity was preserved (*ibid.*, p 119-120). The Arab nomads were not so happy in their new settlements, as some contained rival tribal groupings, and the nomads had effectively started regrouping on tribal lines through the regrouping of tenants within the various villages (*ibid.*, p 130-132).

While care was taken to respect people's wishes to be relocated with people from their own ethnic group or area, it was not always possible for people to choose their neighbours. Thus in the case of the Egyptian Nubians, houses were allocated to people in terms of the size of their nuclear families. This in turn led to the disruption of extended family units (Fahim 1983, p 59). In the case of the Volta River Project, the core houses with which people were issued meant that many people would be unable to keep on their tenants (Barrington 1973, p 51).

The scale of the relocation process and the fact that people on



occasion had to move in a hurry because of the rising dam waters, meant that even with the best will in the world on the part of the authorities, people's wishes could not always be respected. In the case of some of the resettlement villages of the Volta River Project, the people moved in "considerable disorder" (*loc. cit.*), resulting in the inevitable disruption of neighbourhoods.

Two of the larger schemes in which the allocation of resettlement sites appears to have been made on an arbitrary basis, are the Zande Project and the Niger Irrigation Project. In the Zande case, "A clerk...sorted out the people according to the headman of the new lines (i.e. of plots). Then each group was taken down its line, and a man was assigned to each plot, with little hesitation or question" (Reining 1966, p 115). In the Niger case, the Mossi coming on to the scheme were not allowed to select the part of the project to which they were to be resettled (Hammond 1963, p 15) with the result that although people were resettled with their co-ethnics, they were separated from their kin (*ibid.*, p 22).

On a number of schemes no coherent resettlement policy was effectively possible, as settlers chose to join as individual families or settlers, and the schemes grew at an unpredictable rate, as settlers joined. Examples of such schemes are the Shimba Hills Scheme (Palmer 1971) the Urambo Scheme (Baer 1974) and a number of irrigation schemes in what is now Zimbabwe (Reynolds 1969; Weinrich 1975).

It is not clear to what extent people were able to choose their residential sites in the case of resettlement arising out of villagisation. In the case of some Ujamaa settlements, von Freyhold indicates that there was little solidarity between people in different parts of an Ujamaa village which had arisen through two settlements having been brought together (von Freyhold 1979, p 131). This suggests that the two settlements had been allowed to settle as two separate neighbourhoods, under no compulsion to be intermixed. Bakula (in Proctor 1971, p 26) states that "As the newcomers poured in they were settled according to the village they came from", although it appears that kinship groupings were residentially dispersed in the process. As many new Ujamaa settlements arose out of people moving to the nearest village, resettlement would effectively have been a fairly ad hoc business, with newcomers fitting in around the existing core

village and with some relocatees moving later than others. In the Zairean case "The Belgians eventually had to use force to drive some groups into villages" (Packard 1979, p 249), which suggests that people did not have the time or freedom to choose their neighbours. Weinrich (1977, p 214) states that members of a former village were assigned adjacent residential plots in the new protected villages.

The degree to which people are either allowed, or are effectively able to choose their own neighbours on a resettlement scheme, depends on a number of factors such as the official attitude (or lack of attitude) towards the preservation of pre-relocation ties; the structure of the housing sites supplied in the new areas, and the concept of a family in terms of which they were designed; the speed with which the actual relocation process takes place, and the actual practicabilities of finding a site near a friend or relative during the often rushed and disruptive process of relocation. These factors are not necessarily correlated with the scale of the relocation project.

While relocatees usually find themselves involved in more centralised and more comprehensive political and administrative structures than before relocation, the degree of this centralisation does not necessarily relate directly to the size of the resettlement community. Factors that may all play a role in determining the nature of the emerging political and administrative structures relocatees encounter after moving, include: the political ideology of the government under whose auspices relocation is taking place; the coincidence in time of the processes of relocation and political independence of the nation concerned; the goals of the administrators of agricultural schemes and their desire to control the settler's activities closely in the interests of agricultural productivity; and the ability of governments and the willingness of relocatees to build up an effective local government structure in the resettlement area.

With regard to the relocation relating to the Kariba Dam, Colson argues that "the new political forms that emerged...were largely a product of the towns and the national political life" (Colson 1971, p 175) and related to the formation of political parties and the process of independence in Zambia. A system of chiefs and headmen appointed by the colonial authorities was effectively replaced by a local

government structure controlled by the victorious United National Independence Party. Patterns of local leadership which had evolved at an uncentralised neighbourhood level were disrupted by the breaking up of neighbourhoods through relocation, and were "not clearly reinstated even ten years later" (ibid, p 206).

In the case of the Volta River Project, the Volta River Authority formed Town Development Committees in the new settlements. These Committees contained bureaucrats, party politicians and traditional chiefs or headmen (Chambers, in Chambers (ed. 1970), p 231-232). The Volta River Authority had intended to withdraw its administrative role, but difficulties were experienced in handing over services to government departments and with the disbanding and discrediting of the Committees after the 1966 coup (ibid, p 232). It appears that by 1973, the Volta River Authority was still effectively administering the resettled areas (Kalitsi, 1973, p 84).

Agricultural schemes are usually under the control of either a government or a development agency, allowing settlers a varying degree of say in the affairs of the scheme. In the case of the Niger Project the administration sought to provide settlers with representation by appointing a chief in each resettlement village, with the idea that elders from the various sections of the village would serve as his councillors. Because the chiefs were appointed, and because the elder system was functioning out of its usual context, the attempted representation was not successful. (Hammond 1963, p 16, 25). The Urambo Tobacco Scheme was run by a Co-operative, which was elected by the farmers on the scheme, and which was ultimately answerable to the relevant government department (Baer 1974, p 2). The greatest degree of centralised control is illustrated in a scheme such as the Mwea irrigation scheme in Kenya, which has "a hierarchical structure, with close supervision exercised over tenants" (Singleton 1974, p 128) by an administration which controls all the factors of production on the scheme (ibid, p 130) and which has the power to evict tenants (ibid, p 127-128).

Relocation arising out of villagisation is often related to the authorities' wish to exercise closer control over people, whether for administrative, or ideological purposes. In the case of villagisation arising out of the Ujamaa movement in newly independent Tanzania, the

desire to effect an ideological transformation was strongly apparent. The institution of chieftainship was formally abolished in 1963, and villages were divided up into Party cell units (of the Tanganyika African National Union Party), of ten homesteads. Elected leaders of cells served on Ward Committees, with several Wards making up an Administrative Division (Abrahams 1981, p 33 - 34). Local government and Party structure thus merged, largely superseding colonial and traditional forms of representation.

From the 1930's, the Belgians introduced villagisation in what is now Zaire, "to facilitate their administration" (Packard 1979, p 249), bringing several smaller villages together. The Belgians sought to use what they understood as traditional government to facilitate administration, by appointing village chiefs. These chiefs were usually chosen from the "numerically dominant lineage to administer the affairs of the village" (ibid, p 250-251). This in turn gave rise to tensions between the various lineages in the new villages. In the Rhodesian case, relocatees were under the direct authority of government officials who were stationed in each protected village (Weinrich 1977, p 219), instead of under the authority of the elders of their old villages (ibid., p 226).

The abovementioned social components of environmental change, viz. the size of settlements, the density of settlements, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the degree of freedom relocatees have in choosing their neighbours, and the kind of administrative structure under which they fall all contribute to the patterns of social organisation that develop in resettlement communities.

It is difficult to see a clear correlation between the physical and social aspects of environmental change involved. Although in cases where relocatees move large distances, they usually find themselves in substantially larger communities than before (as in some cases of dam relocation), large-scale settlements can also arise on e.g. agricultural schemes, where settlers come from the surrounding area. Villagisation settlements which are substantially smaller, do however usually involve people moving only short distances. With reservations, it seems that one may in broad terms say that the greater the distance travelled and/or the greater the environmental change (e.g. through the introduction of irrigation), the larger the



resulting resettlement community.

The size of settlements is usually related to the range of ethnic diversity of their members as a larger population is likely to be drawn from a larger and potentially more diverse pool of people. Size of settlement does not necessarily relate to density, as this is a function of the lay-out of a scheme, with villagisation schemes showing a high density in spite of their small scale. Although the degree of choice of neighbours may relate to planners' ideas of phenomena such as optimal family size and ethnic incompatibility or agricultural progressiveness, it does seem that the larger the resettlement area, the greater the administrative and practical problems constraining such choice. The kind of administrative structure resulting from relocation relates to a number of factors, of which the relation between size and centralisation is only one.

Relocation involves a transformation of people's physical and social environment, to which they respond in pursuing their everyday and longer-term goals. The way in which the physical and social factors mentioned combine to present relocatees with new possibilities and problems, will doubtless vary from case to case. It does however seem that a systematic focus on the kind and degree of environmental change involved, will provide a useful vantage-point from which to consider the behaviour of members of relocated communities.

## THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF RELOCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

### a) Introductory Remarks

The last 35 years have seen the relocation of substantial numbers of people, individually and as communities, in South Africa. Much of this relocation has arisen, either directly or indirectly from the implementation of the South African government policy of "apartheid", or "separate development". This policy officially envisages the promotion of inter-group harmony through the process of the residential, social and political separation (and to a lesser extent, the economic separation) of the four officially defined racial groups - the Blacks, the Coloureds, the Indians and the Whites. The Black



group is further divided into various officially defined ethnic groups. Different groups are seen by the policy as properly belonging in particular parts of South Africa, and within certain parts of towns and cities.

To realise this desired state where groups are separated from each other, it has been deemed necessary to set aside areas for the exclusive occupation of particular groups. This process of the separation of the various racial groups goes back a long way in South African history, to the middle of the nineteenth century. It became firmly entrenched with the passing of the Native Land Act (No.27 of 1913) which took "the different African reserve systems in each province and (made) them the basis of the Union's subsequent native policy. It made the reserves the only areas where Africans could lawfully acquire land" (Surplus People's Project 1985, p 83). These areas have been augmented through time, but form the basis of what became the "homeland" areas in which Blacks were to exercise their political rights in terms of the South African government's policy of separate development. Four of these homelands have taken independence from South Africa in terms of this policy. The term "homeland" will however be used throughout this dissertation for purposes of consistency - except in Chapter Two, where for historical reasons, the term "reserve" will be used. Thus the homeland areas have been set aside for Black occupation.

Where people are not currently living in an area set aside for their particular racial or ethnic group, it may be deemed necessary for them to move to such an area. People may be removed as communities or as individuals. It is ultimately the South African government that has the power to decide whether an individual or a community has the right to stay where they are if they are currently living in South Africa (excluding the homelands) or whether they must move to another area, which may include the homelands.

Relocation is to be distinguished from labour migration, where a worker (usually a Black person) will come from a rural or homeland area to a South African town, city or farm (which is usually outside the homelands, although migration does take place to centres in the homelands) to seek employment. The worker comes on the understanding that his or her stay is temporary. On completion of his specified

period of employment, during which he has been deemed by the South African authorities to have been residing legally in a White-controlled area, he will return home to his area of origin, possibly to return for further specified periods of employment.

Urban squatter settlements, such as Crossroads at Cape Town, (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980) should likewise be distinguished from relocation, although they are not unrelated to relocation. People come voluntarily, as individuals and as families, in search of employment and the family life which migrant labour makes difficult. Many people coming to these urban squatter settlements, do so without having the necessary documentation allowing them to stay legally in a city like Cape Town. They may previously have been relocated back to a homeland because they had not had the necessary documents, and now be returning again without documents. Such people live under the threat of being relocated out of such squatter settlements by the authorities, either to the homelands, or to other areas.

b) The Surplus People's Project Survey of Relocation in South Africa

Existing typologies of relocation in South Africa relate relocation, both in terms of cause of relocation (Baldwin 1975; Maré 1980; Nash 1980; Surplus People's Project 1983, 1985) and type of settlement resulting (Surplus People's Project 1983, 1985), to the implementation of the South African government policy of "apartheid" or "separate development".

While questions may be raised as to the usefulness or validity of some of its categories, and the accuracy of some of its statistics (Surplus People's Project 1983, vol. I, p 5), the Surplus People's Project (hereafter referred to as SPP) provides the most comprehensive account available of relocation in South Africa. It also provides the most comprehensive typology of relocation, incorporating those used by Baldwin (1975), Maré (1980) and Nash (1980).

SPP claims that "Since the early 1960s the South African State has uprooted and relocated well over three and a half million people in the name of apartheid" (SPP 1983, vol. I, p 1). SPP lists 11 categories of relocation (in terms of the cause of relocation), all of which are seen to arise from the implementation of the South African

government policy (ibid., p 3-4). "It is not possible to treat it (i.e. relocation) as a single, uniform process, occasioned by a single, uniform dynamic. Nevertheless, the programme of massive, State-sponsored removals of the past twenty-five years as a whole, has been an intrinsic feature of the apartheid State. Removals have served as a major form of control of the black majority" (ibid., p 29). The conceptual unity in what is otherwise a mere listing of 11 causes of relocation involving individuals as well as communities is then to be found in their ultimate source of origin, viz. government policy.

The figure of three and a half million is problematic, as it includes statistics relating to causes of relocation which do not necessarily result from government policy. Farm workers have been turned off farms because of mechanisation, or they may voluntarily have left because they were dissatisfied with their conditions of service. (It is moreover debatable whether a farm worker voluntarily leaving employ should be classified as a relocatee). People have been relocated because of infrastructural developments (e.g. dams, roads) or because of the implementation of conservation or agricultural projects, or because an area has become militarily or strategically sensitive.

SPP argues that up to 1982, and ranked by cause, the largest categories of removals have been

- a) people either being evicted from or leaving White owned farms (1 129 000 people)
- b) people being moved in terms of the Group Areas Act (No.41 of 1950 and as amended) which prescribes the provision of separate residential and trading areas for Coloureds, Indians and Whites (834 000 people)
- c) urban relocation, whereby Black townships in White South Africa are deproclaimed, and their inhabitants are settled in newly established urban settlements within the homelands (730 000 people)
- d) homeland consolidation and "black spot" relocations. "Black spots" refer to Black settlements on either freehold or mission owned land within White South Africa. Inhabitants of a number of black spots have been relocated to Black homeland areas. Homeland consolidation relocation relates to the deproclamation of isolated

parts of homelands that are awkwardly situated in terms of the goal of consolidating homelands into geographically cohesive units. This type of consolidation may involve an exchange of land between White South Africa and a homeland, or even between various homelands (614 000 people) (SPP 1983, vol. I, p 3-7).

The figure of 3.5 million relocatees does not include people relocated within the homelands in terms of the implementation of Betterment planning (SPP 1983, vol. I, p 5), which SPP estimates "has probably removed more people in more places with greater social consequences and provoking more resistance than any other category of forced removal in South Africa" (SPP 1983, vol. II, p 110). Relocation arising from Betterment will be discussed later.

Relocatees (other than Betterment relocatees) in South Africa are seen by SPP as having moved into three main types of resettlement areas

- a) Group Areas townships, established for Coloured and Indian people relocated in terms of the Group Areas Act.
- b) Relocation townships, established within the homelands but often close enough to South African cities to allow daily commuting. These townships have arisen in response to the urban relocation discussed above, to absorb the inhabitants of deproclaimed Black townships in South Africa.
- c) Closer settlements, which consist of residential settlements established, usually in the rural areas of the homelands, and having considerably less facilities than relocation townships. These settlements are intended to take black spot and consolidation relocatees (SPP 1983, vol. I, p 11). For the purposes of this dissertation, the term "closer settlements" will be taken to refer only to the above sort of settlement.

In practice, each of the three types of resettlement area has attracted people other than those for whom they were originally intended, such as people coming from the farms, people seeking accommodation or employment opportunities. Such people have rented accommodation, built rudimentary housing, or squatted on other people's sites.



c) The Environmental Aspect of Relocation in South Africa

The physical and environmental distance people have had to move seems least in the case of Group Area removals, where people have usually had to move within the confines of already existing cities or towns. The distance is greater in the case of relocation townships, where people have had to move to newly created homeland towns outside of their city of origin, although in the case of Mdantsane, (in the Ciskei homeland) the distance moved was only 12 miles. The greatest distance is involved in relocation resulting in closer settlements, where people may move up to several hundred miles, finding themselves in a completely different physical environment.

In the case of all three kinds of relocation settlements, people usually find themselves in larger, and less homogeneous settlements than they were used to. This is because these new settlements usually receive people from a number of communities, thereby increasing in size and diversity. It is rare that, as in the closer settlement at Rooigrond, in the homeland of Bophuthatswana, a community is relocated by itself (S.P.P. 1983, vol.I p 18). Within each type of relocation settlement, there is of course, considerable variation as to the degree to which there has been an increase in size and diversity.

It is not necessarily the case that there is a corresponding increase in the density of settlement. Indians coming from the slum areas of Durban to Phoenix, or Blacks coming from the shanties of Duncan Village in East London, to Mdantsane, may well have found themselves in more spacious surroundings. However, the Coloured people who were moved from Mowbray (a suburb of Cape Town) to other parts of Cape Town (such as Bonteheuwel) have found themselves in denser settlements than before (Western 1981, ch. 8). It is particularly the relocatees in the closer settlements who have found themselves on smaller plots and in denser settlements than they were used to.

In the case of all three kinds of relocation settlements, people have had little, if any say in the choice of their neighbours. People have had to take whatever accommodation or site was available. Thus Hill tells us that in the case of Rylands (an Indian Group Areas



township in Cape Town) "Because of the housing and land shortage in Rylands,...kin and friends may not have found accommodation in Rylands, and live elsewhere" (Hill 1980, p iv). In Mdantsane, a relocation township, "People have to take the houses that are allocated to them by the authorities, and the allocation takes no account of subculture or class" (Mayer 1971, p 299). In closer settlements, with problems of greater density and in some cases, populations which grow at a sporadic and unpredictable rate as more relocatees move in, people are obliged to take whatever accommodation, or open space, is available. The fact that, as for example in the case of Sada closer settlement in the Ciskei homeland, people arrived "in fragmented groups of strangers", rather than "together from one established community" (SPP 1983, vol. II, p 246) has meant that people could only choose from a limited number of known people, inasmuch as they could choose their neighbours at all.

The kind of administrative structure under which relocatees find themselves varies with the type of settlement. People in Group Areas settlements fall under the jurisdiction of the relevant City Council or Divisional Council in their area, and have representative committees which act in a liaison capacity with the City or Divisional Council, which has the ultimate authority over the affairs of the settlement (S.P.P. 1983 vol III, p 43; vol IV, p 427). Relocation townships fall under the ultimate jurisdiction of the homeland concerned, and elect leaders, along the lines of town councils, to administer their affairs (S.P.P. 1983, vol II, p 191-192, p 195, p 203, p 244; vol III, p 120; vol V, p 258). The administrative situation in closer settlements varies considerably, some falling under the South African authorities, some jointly under South African and homeland authorities, and some under homeland authorities. Local leadership, which seems to have advisory and limited administrative capacities, is in some cases elected, in other cases appointed by the authorities (S.P.P. 1983, vol II, p 279-280, p 305, p 323-324; vol III, p 167; vol V, p 234, p 242).

The social consequences of these types of relocation still requires much more detailed study than it has hitherto been given. With regard to Group Areas, relocation research has been done by Hill (1980); Pinnock and Konings (1984); Western (1981) and Whisson (1972), while

the impact of relocation to a homeland township has been assessed by Mayer (1971). Work on the consequences of relocation to closer settlements has been mainly of a questionnaire and life-history nature, rather than of an in-depth, participant-observation nature - not least because of the politically sensitive nature of such research. Here the work of Bekker et al (1983), Green and Hirsch (1983), Krause (1982), Niehaus (1984), Robins (1982), Robinson (1983), Sharp (1982) and the Surplus People's Project (1983) is of relevance.

There does not appear to be a typology of, or framework for the analysis of, relocation in South Africa, that allows us to take account of the different social consequences resulting from different types and instances of relocation. As in the case of relocation in the rest of Africa, I suggest that the degree and kind of environmental modification (both physical and social) undergone during relocation, will provide a useful starting point for understanding these social consequences, and the detailed forms they take.

#### d) Relocation Arising out of Betterment Planning

Let us now turn to that form of relocation which is not discussed in detail by the Surplus People's Project, and with which this dissertation is ultimately concerned - relocation arising out of Betterment planning. A more detailed discussion of the history of Betterment planning, and of various analyses that have been made of it, will be presented in Chapter Two. At this stage, our concern is with those aspects of Betterment planning that have involved the relocation of people.

Betterment planning refers to attempts by successive South African governments to combat erosion, conserve the environment and improve agricultural production in the homelands.

Areas (usually administrative/residential units officially known as "locations") proclaimed as Betterment areas were to be rehabilitated and made economically viable by being divided into residential areas, arable lands and grazing commonage. This meant that people would have to move from their old, scattered residential clusters to newly demarcated residential areas, to allow optimal agricultural usage of the remaining land.

In the Ciskei and Transkei homelands, the relocation arising out of Betterment planning usually involved moving within one's location, from old to new residential areas. In some cases, members of adjacent locations were brought together (e.g. O'Connell 1980, p 273).

In the Transvaal however, the picture seems to have been rather more complicated. Both Yawitch (1981, p 45-47) and James (1983, p 1-3) argue that in the Lebowa homeland, "relocation attributed to Betterment is inextricably linked to other types of relocation (James 1983, p 1). They show how areas which were originally planned as Betterment areas for specific communities have had to adapt to accommodate people relocated from black spots and people evicted from White farms. The population of these Betterment areas is thus far in excess of the number for which provision was originally made. Betterment areas such as these have in effect become closer settlements.

Part of the reason why such Betterment areas have effectively become closer settlements, is that a number of the areas considered by both Yawitch and James are situated on Trust farms, i.e. farms bought from White farmers in areas designated for Black occupation in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. Usually situated on the border of a homeland (James 1983, p 2), such Trust farms have not had a history of established Black settlement for very long. Conveniently situated for migration to South African cities, and not comprising homogeneous communities, they have provided a place of refuge for black spot and farm relocatees. Trust farms proclaimed Betterment areas in the Transkei (Segar 1985) also attracted outsiders, but mainly from neighbouring areas, and on a much smaller scale than in Lebowa.

The different circumstances of Betterment areas in e.g. the Ciskei and Transkei as compared to e.g. Lebowa, suggest that the degree of environmental modification (both physical and social) undergone by relocatees will be substantially different. The social adaptations to relocation made by a historically homogeneous community will be very different from those made by a heterogeneous, constantly growing community.

Not much work has been done on the social consequences of Betterment relocation. The work of Bigalke (1969), de Wet (1981;

1985a; 1985b), de Wet and Mc Allister (1983; 1985), James (1983; 1984), Krige (1985), Manona (1980), McAllister (1985a, 1985b), O'Connell (1980; 1981), Segar (1982; 1985), Spiegel (1985) and Yawitch (1981) provides some information which, where relevant, will be referred to in the course of this dissertation.

#### THE RELEVANCE OF THE RELOCATION LITERATURE TO THE CASE-STUDY TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS DISSERTATION

It has been argued that the stress-based theories seeking to explain the behaviour of relocatees, which have been discussed, are most usefully applied to communities either undergoing or having recently undergone relocation. These are communities which in Scudder and Colson's terms would mostly be in the transitional phase of relocation.

Relocation took place in Chatha (the community to be considered in this dissertation) between 1964 and 1967. These theories are likely to have only limited applicability to a community which has been resettled for nearly 20 years, and which is no longer in the transition stage.

With regard to the ethnography of relocation in the rest of Africa briefly surveyed in this chapter, not many of the cases considered seem usefully comparable to Chatha, where people were relocated within their own community area. The closest comparable cases seem to be the examples of villagisation arising out of land reform and Ujamaa in East Africa, and out of administrative considerations in Algeria, in (what is now) Zaire and in (what was) Rhodesia.

The literature on land reform does not appear to address itself to the social consequences of villagisation, although it does discuss the consequences of land reform. The literature on Ujamaa fares little better. In the words of Hyden, "While we have some idea of the economic effects of villagisation, little work has been done on the social effects of villagisation" (Hyden 1980, p 151). The few examples he cites are all taken from newspaper reports. Some information is provided by Abrahams (1981), Boesen et al (1977), Georgoulas (1967); Proctor (1971); Silberfein (1972) and von Freyhold



(1979). Most of this information relates to Ujamaa villages that had only been established for a few years at the time of analysis, and so has only limited comparability to Chatha as it is today.

Packard's (1979) brief comments on the social consequences of villagisation in Zaire are based on fieldwork about 30 years after villagisation occurred. His comments seem to relate to a reconstruction of the period fairly soon after villagisation, and similarly seem to have only limited comparability to the situation in Chatha. Sutton's comments on the Algerian protected settlements are very general, to the effect that they hastened the "depeasantisation" of a traditional society, and quickened the pace of an established rural-urban drift. It was the women who suffered most from the new concentrated residential pattern, having to keep indoors because of the lack of privacy (Sutton 1978, p 61-62). Weinrich (1977, p 225-228) mentions the disruption of kinship-based villages caused by the protected villages, as well as the disruption of family life, of education and agriculture, as well as the development of serious health and sanitation problems. She does not however, give any detailed information about patterns of social relations within protected villages.

With regard to the ethnography of relocation in South Africa, Betterment relocation seems substantially different from Group Areas relocation, urban township relocation and closer settlement relocation, in terms of the environmental modifications demanded of relocatees. Even with regard to Betterment relocation itself, it has been argued that the comparability of the material is problematic.

The literature thus seems to yield little that is likely to assist in the understanding of thought and behaviour patterns in Chatha today. Where the literature may be useful, is in considering the situation in Chatha during and shortly after relocation, i.e. in the transition stage. I have collected oral accounts of this period. When discussing it, I shall refer to such literature as may be useful.

#### A SUGGESTED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF BETTERMENT RELOCATION

Scudder and Colson argue that in the transitional stage, people cling



to the familiar, changing no more than is necessary in the new situation. People seek to "move the shortest distance...in terms of the psychological and sociocultural context of their lives" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 273). In the stage of potential growth, people respond to opportunities presented by their new environments, and diversify their activities and investments. (ibid., p 281-282).

This suggests that relocatees respond pragmatically to their situation, behaving in such a way as to minimise the stress and risks they encounter, and to exploit opportunities which present themselves in their new situation. This pragmatic, problem-solving type of response seems to be applicable to both broad stages of Scudder and Colson's model, i.e. the risk-avoiding stage (recruitment and transition) and the innovative, risk-taking stage (potential growth and handing-over/incorporation), although what constitutes such pragmatic behaviour under risk-avoiding (stressful) and under risk-taking conditions is likely to be different.

A view of relocatees responding pragmatically to their changing situation seems to allow for a more comprehensive account of their behaviour than a view focusing primarily on the stress-related aspects of relocation. It may be argued that people in all sorts of situations may be seen as responding pragmatically to change, and not only relocatees, and that the argument is therefore rather too general to make sense of relocatee's behaviour as relocatees. Relocation imposes specific kinds of change upon people, in the form of the environmental modification discussed earlier in this chapter. It is by considering the kinds of change of environment and of behaviour that relocation involves, rather than the way in which such changes of behaviour are explained, (i.e. in pragmatic terms), that the specificity of relocatee's behaviour is accounted for.

The idea of people adopting a fairly pragmatic response to changing conditions, seems usefully explained for anthropological purposes, in terms of a broadly transactional approach, where people are seen as allocating time and resources in seeking to fulfil their goals as effectively as possible, within the context of their physical and sociocultural environment.

It may be argued that the proposition that human behaviour is goal-oriented, is so general as to be unable to be disproved. It is a

matter of debate as to whether any theory of human behaviour is able to be disproved, as the substantive concepts (e.g. lineage, ethnic group, class, ego, goal) as well as the relational concepts (e.g. function, contradiction, interaction, transaction) that such theories use, are intellectual constructs devised for analytical purposes. The criteria in terms of which propositions embodying such concepts are held to be proved or disproved, are usually derived from the characteristics ascribed to those concepts. Theories of human behaviour, in terms of the way they are constructed, appear to be largely self-confirming.

I argue in this dissertation that the value of a transactional approach to social change, is that it allows one to account to a greater degree for the detailed behaviour of people responding to social change, than do approaches which account for people's behaviour in terms of e.g. membership of a particular grouping such as a lineage, an ethnic group or a class, or in terms of some more abstract quality of society, such as the assumed tendency towards a state of equilibrium or conflict.

I am concerned here to indicate a style of analysis that will help me to make detailed sense of the social changes that have taken place in Chatha as a result of the implementation of Betterment. What follows is an account of a transactional approach which appears most likely to be useful for the purposes of my analysis.

This does not mean that I necessarily accept uncritically anything that might be called "the transactional approach" as a total theoretical framework, together with all its more abstract considerations about processes of cultural integration, reciprocity or brokerage (e.g. Barth 1966; Paine 1976). It therefore does not seem necessary to give a detailed account of the way the transactional style of analysis has developed from themes portrayed in the work of Firth (1951, 1964) and Leach (1954), and since it came to prominence with the publication of Barth's Models of Social Organisation in 1966, or of the critical comment it has evoked (e.g. Asad 1972; Davis 1973; Paine 1974; Thoden van Velzen 1973; Webster 1977). Where such criticism is relevant to the analysis that I am advancing, I will take it into account.

Riches summarises the transactional approach as follows: "The

transactional approach advanced here rests fundamentally on the assumption that social behaviour is purposive, and is formulated and enacted on the basis of actors' knowledge: it holds that social behaviour should be explained in terms of the goals that it realises, and of the 'stock of knowledge' that makes it appropriate for the goal's realisation" (Riches 1979, p 7).

Goals may be values such as loyalty to one's fellow kinsmen, or they may be specific personal interests such as improving one's reputation, or getting a specific job of work done. Goals may express both specific personal interest, as well as wider values. Thus, being prepared to go some distance to a relative's funeral may serve the personal interest of wanting to keep up the image of a loyal kinsman so that one may appeal to one's kinsmen if in need (and get a good meal at the funeral), as well as re-affirming the wider value of kinship loyalty.

To say that people seek to realise goals does not imply that they do so totally at will, or without constraint. In Barth's words "On the one hand, what persons wish to achieve, the multifarious ends they are pursuing, will channel their behaviour. On the other hand, technical and ecologic restrictions doom some kinds of behaviour to failure and reward others, while the presence of other actors imposes strategic constraints and opportunities that modify the allocations (i.e. of time and resources) people can make or will benefit from making" (Barth 1967, p 663).

The social and physical environment within which people behave provides a context of opportunities for, and constraints upon, the realisation of their goals. People modify the ways in which they set about attempting to realise their goals, and possibly even their goals themselves, in terms of the opportunities and constraints offered by their environment. In more specifically transactional terms, "What people do is also significantly constrained by circumstance...people's allocations are adjusted and adapted in terms of what they experience as the observed outcomes of their behaviour" (ibid., p 665).

Transactionalism does not ignore the wider society within which individuals live and pursue their goals, as Webster (1977, p 10) argues that it does. Because it is concerned with individual behaviour, rather than more abstract processes (such as the impact of

an urban based economy on rural social organisation, or the impact of education on rural perceptions of equality), "the emphasis is on the ways in which people in a local community represent extraneous influences to themselves and act upon them" (Riches 1979, p 11-12). To consider the way people represent extraneous influences to themselves, and act accordingly, does not amount to an overlooking of wider structural, political and economic processes. It amounts to a focus on people's reaction to their perception of these processes, rather than on the impact of the processes themselves. The particular emphasis one selects is a matter of preference, related to the analytical problem in question. The impact of extraneous influences does however affect (although not determine) people's perceptions of them, and so their responses to them.

Barth defines social behaviour as "an allocation of time and resources" (Barth 1967, p 662), implying a scarcity of such time and resources, with people having to choose between competing ends to which to allocate their scarce resources. To say that the transactional approach "assumes that in social behaviour people maximise satisfaction and act rationally" (Riches 1979, p 8), i.e. seek to achieve maximum satisfaction with minimum allocation of resources, need not necessitate a view of man as a greedy 'capitalist' in which the only type of exchange is "market rational exchange" (Davis 1973, p 161). It is not necessarily the case that transactionalism "debases human nature, denigrates the success of human endeavour, and denies the possibility of disinterest" (loc. cit.).

People may have a number of values or interests that they may pursue, all of which require the allocation of time and resources. For example, a man may have a number of goals he wishes to realise in his leisure time, such as working at home so as to better his career, recreation, and spending as much time as possible with his family. He may choose to concentrate on one, or try to achieve a balance between them all. People have limited time and resources at their disposal and allocate them so as best possible to realise the specific goals or mix of goals they wish to.

In specific contexts some goals may be emphasised rather than others. For example candidates for the post of leader of a political



party will seek to promote their individual positions, denigrating each other in public. Once a leader has been chosen, his former competitors will now close ranks behind him, focusing on the goal of winning the election. This does not mean that the various goals that people hold are mutually exclusive. Rather it means that in some contexts, some goals are appropriate and are emphasised, rather than others.

So, within the context of the "stock of knowledge" and the resources at their disposal, people seek to achieve particular goals, or mixes of goals in particular situations, as best they can. To explain behaviour in a particular situation, the analyst would have to know 1) the particular goals people were trying to achieve in it, 2) how they saw the constraints and opportunities operating in that situation, which related to the realisation of those goals and to other goals that they might wish to achieve in other situations.

Whether people's evaluations of the constraints and opportunities operating in a situation, or of the compatibility of various goals that they might hold, are "correct" in terms of an outsider's view, is another issue. The transactional focus is on people's attempts to realise goals in their situation as they see it.

When the actual resources at people's disposal change, or when their perception of the resources available to them changes, we may expect changes in their behaviour. Barth argues that "To explain a changing pattern of activities, we need not hypothesise changed categorisations and values: we can also look at the changed circumstances that may well make other allocations optimal by the same standards" (Barth 1967, p 667). Such "changed circumstances" may or may not include a changed perception of the situation, or may simply involve a changed set of actual resources available, such as land or money or labour. Barth's reference to the "same standards" implies that change is not necessarily a total, holus-bolus procedure, but that it may be partial, and selective. People's values may remain the same, while their behaviour patterns may change, as well as the way they appeal to their unchanged values to rationalise their new behaviour.

People may find themselves in such a radically changed situation that their old values and categories are largely inappropriate, in



which case they would develop new values and categories over time. Alternatively the change may not be so drastic, and inasmuch as old values and categories are applicable to the new situation, and are a known and proven resource, it would suit people to hang on to them and adapt them where appropriate.

By arguing that people allocate time and resources to a number of goals, and so to a number of groupings, a transactionalist approach in a sense commits itself to examining the total allocation process, and not merely its manifestation in one particular sort of grouping, such as a kinship or class group. It thereby does not accept the necessary analytical priority of any one sort of group. "People do not behave in a certain way because they are members of specific groups, but because they have specific goals they intend to reach" (Stuchlik 1977, p 21). Transactionalism commits itself to the detailed study of how specific individuals allocate their time and resources in a way which other analyses, such as equilibrium- or class-based analyses do not. This commitment to detail may however be seen as a weakness. Webster argues that "Transactional analysis, like network analysis, is more methodological than theoretical, giving rise to a far more detailed ethnography than was previously presented" (Webster 1977, p 5) and contends that its "low level of generalisation and theorisation also limits the usefulness of the approach. One is reduced to a detailed description" (ibid., p 9).

To this, I would reply that it depends on the way in which the more detailed ethnography is analysed. Detail that is presented in organised form goes beyond mere description if it shows how specific instances, or patterns of behaviour, can be seen as the expression of people pursuing specific goals in specific situations, and shows how those particular instances of behaviour are seen by the people concerned as more likely to achieve their specific goals than other sorts of behaviour. I contend that it constitutes an explanation of those people's behaviour. This is not to say that it constitutes the only possible explanation of their behaviour. I would argue that, given the assumption that human behaviour is purposive, transactionalism provides for the detailed analysis of that purposiveness and its social manifestations, without necessarily making any assumptions about the priority of any particular goal, or

social grouping.

It is perhaps appropriate at this stage briefly to delineate and justify what has been called "the unit of study" (Comaroff 1982; Sharp 1984, amongst others) on which I will focus in this dissertation, as this relates to the range of social relationships to be considered.

As is argued in subsequent chapters, the history of Chatha village has been such that it has never existed, except in relation to the wider South African society. It was established as a settlement by the British colonial authorities in 1854. It has however existed as a residentially, territorially and administratively isolatable unit since that time.

It was in Chatha as such a unit, isolated from other such units for official planning purposes, that Betterment was implemented in the 1960s. The details of the implementation of Betterment in Chatha were different from those of its implementation in neighbouring villages. It is in Chatha as a residential, territorial and administrative unit, that its members have responded to the implementation of Betterment (with its resultant modification of their environment within that unit) by the South African state, part of the wider society of which Chatha is inescapably a part.

I am looking at the changes brought about as a result of the implementation of Betterment within the village of Chatha, which thus forms my unit of observation. Inasmuch as I am trying to interpret the changes of behaviour that have taken place within Chatha it is the village of Chatha, rather than e.g. the Ciskei homeland, or South Africa as a whole, that is the focus of my analysis. But because Chatha is the focus of my analysis, does not mean that it is the total context of my analysis as well. Betterment was implemented in Chatha as part of a South African government policy towards the homelands. Changes other than Betterment have also taken place in Chatha, that result from its participation in the wider South African society. To make sense of the changes that have taken place in Chatha, I need to consider people's relationships within the village, as well as with their wider society. Different problems are best explained at different levels of comprehensiveness, such as the village, the Ciskei homeland, the South African state, and these different contexts of analysis will be evoked where appropriate.

Let us look more closely at Betterment, and consider the nature of the changes it has brought about in Chatha. I suggest that the changes that have resulted from the implementation of Betterment in Chatha are related to the spatial re-organisation of the village into arable, residential and grazing areas. This has brought about a re-allocation of existing resources such as arable and grazing land, has introduced new resources into the village and facilitated infra-structural development, and has broken up long-established residential and political units. Betterment has thus transformed the relationship of people and groups to resources, and to each other, re-organising their environment.

A link may now be made between the two analytical positions advanced in this chapter, viz. that the kind of environmental modification people undergo during relocation influences their post-relocation behaviour, and that a transactional approach will be most useful in providing a detailed understanding of those consequences.

People pursue their goals within an environment that presents them with certain opportunities for and constraints upon, the realisation of their goals. The spatial re-organisation of people's environment in Chatha brought about by Betterment has effectively transformed that environment inasmuch as it now presents them with a changed residential and social context and with somewhat altered opportunities and constraints in relation to their goals. We could thus anticipate that people will respond to their changed circumstances, adapting their behaviour so as to pursue their goals as effectively as possible in these changed circumstances. A transactional approach to the social changes that have taken place in Chatha is potentially useful because it enables me to consider questions of detail such as whether some areas of community life (e.g. political activity, ceremonial activity, agricultural practices) show greater change than others, accounting for the differences in terms of whether the changes effected by Betterment in specific areas have made "other allocation optimal" (Barth 1967, p 667). It also enables me to explain why some individuals or groups in the village have adopted new patterns of behaviour (e.g. of an innovative, entrepreneurial kind) and why others have not. This is explicable in terms of people's ability to benefit from the changes brought about by Betterment, and in terms of their

perception of the possibility of furthering their goals (e.g. increased personal wealth) by adopting new behaviour patterns in their new situation.

Betterment has brought about the existence of groups having differential access to resources such as land. That is in a sense a starting point. To understand the importance of such new groupings, we need to know what other sorts of reallocation of resources and regroupings have also resulted from Betterment, and how they relate to such groupings. Betterment may, for example have led to a dispersal of kinship-based groups, with the result that kinship groups have lost cohesion as people allocate more time to (non-kin) neighbours than to relatives now living further away. The siting of a resource such as a school in one part of a settlement, rather than another, may have led to groups forming on the basis of relative access to educational facilities. Time and resources may have become re-allocated in a number of different ways, leading to a number of new groupings with cross-cutting membership.

The re-organisation of the environment is likely to have a more marked impact on some aspects of community life than others. One would expect greater social change in those aspects where the re-organisation had re-aligned the relationship of people to resources and to each other to a greater degree. These would be areas where those relationships were predicated on the old pattern of spatial organisation before Betterment. Such areas included the obtaining of access to arable and grazing land, political representation within the village, patterns of neighbourly co-operation, ceremonial groupings and youth associations. These are the areas in which one would expect greater social change as people would potentially have to make greater changes in the "allocation of time and resources" (Barth 1967, p 662) in adapting to their new circumstances.

Correspondingly, one would expect less change in those aspects of community life where relationships had not been predicated (either at all, or not to the same degree as those aspects discussed above) on the old pattern of spatial organisation. Such areas included kinship-based activities, and voluntary associations related to Christianity and formal Western education. People's relationships to resources and to each other in these areas would presumably have been less affected



by the re-organisation of the environment. They would correspondingly have needed to have made less change in these areas of activity.

If behaviour patterns can be expected to change in terms of their relationship to the old, pre-Betterment patterns of spatial organisation, they can also be expected to change in terms of their relation to the new spatial organisation of resources and people. One would expect greater change in aspects of community life where access to resources is more directly related to the new pattern than those aspects where it is not. Such areas include political groupings in Chatha, and the irrigation scheme established at Betterment.

Betterment has led to the formation of two large and one small residential areas in Chatha. Resources such as a clinic, a church, a school have to be placed either in or close to one of the two large residential areas, as the area between them constitutes a slope too steep for building purposes. One would thus expect factions based on membership of the new residential areas to form to compete for privileged access to facilities such as a new school. The way in which village politics operates would also be related to the new local authority structure introduced at about the same time as Betterment.

One would also expect greater changes in the patterns of association of younger people than of older people. This is because older people have spent most of their lives in the old pre-Betterment residential areas, and have forged their ties on those terms, while younger people have spent much or most of their lives in the new residential areas, and have forged their ties accordingly.

The degree of change should thus be greatest in those aspects of community life that had centred on the old spatial pattern and now centre on the new pattern, such as the formation of political factions, or of youth associations or on the irrigation scheme. Correspondingly, the degree of change should be least in those areas where it has been least necessary to change, i.e. those areas which had not been and currently are not centred specifically on past or current patterns of spatial organisation. Such areas would include kinship-, church- and school-based patterns of association.

One would also expect a greater change in the patterns of behaviour of groups or individuals in the village who have been able to benefit from the re-allocation of resources and from the infrastructural



development resulting from Betterment, than of those who have not. Those who saw the opportunity to benefit and were sufficiently motivated and equipped, have made the changes necessary to benefit. Such people would include the settlers on the irrigation scheme established at Betterment, as well as those who have been able to take advantage of the better road-network and denser residential settlements in the village to start their own local businesses (such as shop-keepers, house-builders and taxi-drivers).

The aim of this dissertation is to explain the social changes that have taken place in Chatha as the result of the implementation of Betterment, accounting for the fact that some aspects of community life have changed more than others. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first in-depth study of the social consequences of this kind of relocation.

While Betterment and other forms of relocation in South Africa have undoubtedly taken place because of the implementation of South African government policy, I suggest that they cannot be adequately understood as instances of relocation within an explanatory framework such as that of the South African political economy. Such a framework runs the risk of reducing all instances of relocation to manifestations of that political economy. Concern with the political implications of relocation in South Africa has led analysts to focus on political rather than social frameworks in seeking to understand relocation.

I suggest that instances of relocation in South Africa should be understood as potentially comparable to other instances of relocation throughout the world. To this end I have attempted to construct a framework for the analysis of an instance of Betterment relocation which allows for comparison with similar kinds of community relocation elsewhere in Africa, by focusing on the kind of environmental modification involved.

## CHAPTER TWO

### BETTERMENT PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA: SOME THOUGHTS ON ITS HISTORY, FEASIBILITY AND WIDER POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Betterment planning (or Rehabilitation as it is also known) refers to attempts, started in the 1930's, by successive South African governments to combat erosion, conserve the environment and improve agricultural production in the Black reserves.<sup>1</sup> Activity reached its height after the Tomlinson Commission (The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa) reported in 1955, making its suggestions for the political and economic future of the reserves. The Tomlinson Commission's recommendations were only partly implemented by the South African government, and a large part of Betterment planning after 1955 involved the re-organisation of rural locations (the smallest administrative units) into separate residential, arable and grazing areas for purposes of what planners saw as better land-use. This involved the movement of large numbers of families into centralised, village-like residential areas within their own locations, and the fencing off of residential, arable and grazing areas. This re-organisation of locations was accompanied by (mostly) low-level agricultural interventions, which in most instances have not succeeded in improving productivity. Betterment planning, in a modified form, is still being implemented in some areas.

This chapter seeks to provide an account of the development of Betterment planning, to evaluate its feasibility, and to consider the arguments advanced by various analysts as to why Betterment planning should have been implemented in the first place.

#### A BRIEF HISTORY OF BETTERMENT PLANNING

While the concern of the Administration with themes such as conservation and villagisation goes back a long way before the 1930's (Beinart 1984a, Bowen 1985), the particular forms these concerns took in the case of Betterment planning, are rooted in the Native Trust and

Land Act of 1936 (Act No 18 of 1936). It therefore seems justifiable for analytical purposes to concentrate on the course of events after 1936.

The Act established a body known as the South African Native Trust to administer those areas set aside for exclusive Black occupation in terms of the earlier Natives Land Act of 1913 (Act No. 27 of 1913) as well as those additional areas designated for Black occupation (and still to be made available) in terms of the 1936 Act itself.

The South African Native Trust (hereafter referred to as the 'Trust'), was empowered to adopt "remedial and redemptive measures for the existing reserves" (as well as for land still to be acquired) as "it is notorious that the existing Native locations and reserves are congested, denuded, over-stocked, eroded, and for the most part, in a deplorable condition" (Statement of Land Policy, 1936, p XIX). Land acquired by the Trust was to be used primarily for the purpose of "affording relief...to enable the necessary remedial measures to be instituted" to allow locations to recover. The Trust would start systematically "rehabilitating the existing locations" (loc. cit.). The heart of the matter, however, lay in the "limitation upon the number of the stock...in the Native areas" (ibid, p XX).

Evidence from the Report of the Native Economic Commission of 1930 to 1932 suggests that large parts of the reserves were overstocked and eroded, with conditions being worst in the Ciskei (UG 22/1932, p 3-48). The Statement of Land Policy quotes this evidence, which clearly influenced the South African Native Trust's thinking.

A detailed survey of each location would be made, followed by recommendations relating to such matters as

- a) the definition of residential areas
- b) the definition of arable areas
- c) the demarcation of rotational grazing areas
- d) any necessary fencing
- e) any necessary anti-erosion measures
- f) any necessary stock limitation (Statement of Land Policy, 1936, p.XIX-XX)

The view embodied in the 1936 Act and related documents seems to have been based on the belief that the reason for the bad state of land and agriculture in the Native areas "was primarily a technical one and was chiefly due to 'bad farming' on the part of the peasant" (Yawitch

1981, p 10). What was needed therefore was more effective control if Native agriculture was to improve.

Enabling documentation to put the conservationist intentions of the Government into practice, was provided in the form of Proclamation No 31 of 1939, relating to the "Control of and Improvement of Livestock in Native Areas", which was designed to "combat the evil of overstocking" (No 31 of 1939, p 3).

The Proclamation enabled the authorities, "after consultation with the persons residing in a land unit", to declare any land unit "a betterment area", whereafter they could "assess the number of cattle units which any such area is able to carry" and a count would be taken of all stock within the Betterment area (ibid, p 4). If the count revealed cattle in the area in excess of the assessed carrying capacity, officials of the Department of Native Affairs were empowered to conduct a cull. Culling officers could at their discretion "cull small stock more severely than large stock or vice-versa" and if in their opinion "the merits and demerits of any two animals are substantially equal, he shall first cull the animal belonging to the owner of the larger number of stock" (loc. cit.).

Work had started before World War II broke out, and had mainly involved the construction of fences, erection of contour banks, dams, roads and dipping tanks (Smit 1945, p 3). This work seems to have been undertaken (at least in the Ciskei) only in locations that had requested it (Ciskeian General Council-Proceedings of 1947 Session). Work was seriously hampered during the War period, as "among the technical officers occupied on reclamation work, the proportion on active service was over 50 per cent". In addition, "Fencing materials and machinery became unobtainable and as a result, much development work was stopped" (Smit 1945, p 2).

While work had been started in existing Reserve locations in e.g. the Ciskei and the Transkei areas, it seems to have been concentrated in areas newly set aside for Black occupation after 1936, i.e. "Trust areas" (Ciskeian General Council-Proceedings of 1947 Session; Beinart 1984, p 80; Yawitch 1981, p 13-14). Such areas acquired by the Trust "automatically became Betterment Areas" (Smit 1945, p 2), and therefore the inhabitants' consent was not necessary to start implementing Betterment.



Work in the Trust areas was however hampered, not only by shortages of staff and money, but also by opposition from White farmers who objected to the loss of good farming land, and put pressure on the Native Affairs Commission to excise a number of the more favourable areas and return them to White lands. This the Commission did on a number of occasions. This, together with the fact that expenditure on Black agriculture was only a fraction of that spent on White agriculture, heightened Black opposition to activity in Trust areas (Bell 1978, p 110, 115, 126).

Betterment was taken up with new vigour, and in a somewhat altered form after the War. The new direction was clarified by D.L. Smit, Secretary for Agriculture to the Smuts government at a Special Session of the Ciskeian General Council in January 1945 in a speech entitled "A New Era of Reclamation". Planning Committees were to be set up in each of the four Native Affairs zones (Northern Areas, Natal, the Transkei and the Ciskei). Detailed surveys of areas would be conducted, and plans for their rehabilitation would be drawn up (Smit 1945, p 2-3).

Guidelines governing the Planning Committees' approach would include

- a) settlement of the land "in the most advantageous manner"
- b) demarcation of residential, arable and grazing areas, so as to make the best use of the land
- c) establishment of rural villages to accommodate "families of Natives regularly employed in industries and other services"
- d) settlement of "surplus population" in such rural villages. ("Surplus population", as the term is used in later documents, and the sense in which Smit seems to be using it, relates to those people who were left over after as many members of a specific location had been allocated what was regarded as a viable farming lot, which would enable a man to support his family on a full-time basis from agriculture. If a location currently holding 250 families, could accommodate only 100 viable lots, then the remaining 150 families constituted the "surplus population")
- e) various conservationist and improvement measures, e.g. fencing, diversion banks, contour banks, stock limitation (ibid, p 3-4).

Smit cautioned, like the authors of the 1936 Native Land and Trust



Act and of Proclamation No 31 of 1939, that "The main cause of deterioration in the Native areas is, without a doubt, the keeping of too many stock", adding that "So far stock limitation has been voluntary and the Government sincerely hopes to continue on that principle. But...the Government will not shirk its obvious duty, and will take whatever steps may be necessary to save the land while there is still time" (ibid, p 4).

There would never be enough land to enable "every Native in the reserves to become a full-time peasant farmer" (loc. cit.), and the proposal to house the surplus population in rural villages as near employment centres as possible, formed "an important link between the Government plan for rehabilitation of the Reserves and the large-scale industrial development expected after the war" (loc. cit.).

Smit ended with a plea for co-operation, stating that "Such a change cannot be enforced from above. The plan can be conceived from above, but the change must come largely from the people themselves. They must adopt the plan as their own and work for it to come true" (ibid, p 5).

The post-War approach thus differed significantly from its pre-War predecessor, which had placed its focus mainly on stock farming, seeking to limit stock numbers and erecting fencing to improve grazing, and on the prevention of erosion. The pre-War focus had been on prevention of further deterioration, rather than on the development of viable agriculture in the reserves - although that does appear to have been a long term goal (Statement of Land Policy, 1936, p XIX).

The post-War approach on the other hand, was explicitly directed towards agricultural viability. Its intention to settle the "surplus", non-agricultural population in rural villages would divide the reserve population firmly into two groups, viz. full-time peasant farmers and full-time wage-labourers, whereas many families had previously combined agricultural and wage-earning activities. Relocation of the surplus population would involve the movement of many thousands of people, as well as the undertaking of considerable infrastructural and construction work. The remaining agricultural communities would also have to undergo relocation within their own location, as locations would be divided into residential, arable and grazing areas. The post-War plan would thus require considerable

social and infrastructural transformation of the reserve areas, and developments in these areas were to be linked to industrial development in the urban areas.

Although the 1936 Act could be seen as making provision for the division of locations into residential, arable and grazing areas (Statement of Land Policy, 1936, p XIX), the first clear recommendation of this approach in existing locations (as opposed to Trust farms), appears to have been made by the Young Committee appointed to "inquire into Overstocking in the Transkeian Territories". The Young Committee reported in 1941, recommending inter alia that "a regular and systematic reallocation of homestead and arable holdings and grazing areas in all unsurveyed districts be proceeded with without delay" (Young Committee 1941, p 9, quoted in Moll, 1983, p 96).

Authority was provided for the government's proposals, as put forward by Smit, to be implemented, in the form of Proclamation No. 116 of 1949. This proclamation provided the authorities with much more comprehensive powers than the earlier Proclamation No. 39 of 1939. The 1949 proclamation provided the Native Commissioner with stricter control over all land-use in Betterment areas. For example "the cultivation and use of all agricultural land within that area shall be subject to such rules, orders, notices, directions or prohibitions as the Native Commissioner, in his discretion, may deem fit to impose" (No 116 of 1949, p 403). He was also empowered, as in the earlier proclamation, to conduct a cull of stock if he deemed it necessary (*loc. cit.*). The Native Commissioner was entitled to withdraw any portion of commonage from grazing for conservation purposes (*ibid*, p 405) or to appropriate land, or to suspend temporarily rights to its use, subject to the allotment of other land, or financial compensation (*ibid*, p 407-408). He was empowered to demarcate parts of the area for residential, arable and grazing purposes (*ibid*, p 405). The proclamation provided for each Betterment area (which was still only to be proclaimed as such after consultation with the people concerned - *ibid*, p 402-403) to elect an "advisory committee" to liaise with the Native Commissioner and to assist with the implementation of Betterment (*ibid*, p 409). Any person not complying with the stipulations of the proclamation was liable on

conviction "on a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty-five pounds or, in default of payment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months" (ibid, p 411) - terms basically similar to those laid down in the 1939 proclamation.

Although Smit's "New Era of Reclamation" speech and the 1949 proclamation indicated a new focus in Betterment planning, this new focus was not effectively implemented in locations until after the Tomlinson Commission reported in 1955. In the case of the Transkei, "very little had actually gotten off the ground by the mid-1950's" (Moll, 1983, p 102). By July 1956, 86 locations (out of 887 - ibid, p 142) had been planned, and work ("mainly fencing and engineering work") had been completed in 37 locations. Work had been stopped in 6 locations due to resistance (ibid, p 104). In the case of the Ciskei, work had involved contour ploughing, stock limitation, afforestation, grass-stripping on contour banks, and fencing of the boundaries of locations. Reports indicate that work had been hampered by lack of personnel and equipment. A start had been made with the first rural township, Zwelitsha, near King William's Town, and various irrigation schemes were being investigated (UG 14/1948, p 23; UG 35/1949, p 31; UG 30/1953, p 26; UG 37/1955, p 32, 35; UG 48/1955, p 41). Complaints were being received from some locations that work had effectively stopped or had not even started (Ciskeian General Council-Sessions of 1947, 1948, 1951, 1952).

It seems that it was only on Trust farms that action was being taken to create viable farming units (UG 48/1955, p 63 for the Ciskei; Yawitch 1981, p 13 for the Transvaal reserves; UG 61/1955, p 77). Plans for the re-organisation of locations into arable, residential and grazing areas were being drawn up in the Ciskei, although they made no mention of "surplus" population or of moving people out of the locations to create viable farming units (Planning Committee (Ciskei) 1952a, 1952b).

In 1954, the Department of Native Affairs announced a change of emphasis with regard to Betterment planning. It was argued that the detailed planning approach flowing from the United Party's 1945 proposals for "A New Era of Reclamation" had resulted in a very slow tempo of work, with not much to show by way of actual achievement. The emphasis would accordingly move away from a system of detailed

planning, which concentrated on building up the economic viability of a relatively limited number of locations. The focus would now fall on the halting of erosion throughout the Reserves, as a necessary precondition to the establishment of agricultural viability, which would be a slower process. More specific instructions as to the establishment of such agricultural viability would be issued after the Tomlinson Commission had reported and after the Government had decided whether or not to accept its proposals. The immediate priority was however, to protect the soil-base of the Reserves (Native Affairs Department, General Circular No 44 of 1954, p 3).

The Tomlinson Commission, consisting of ten White people, was commissioned in 1950 and delivered its report in October 1954. Its terms of reference were "to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning" (UG 61/1955, p XVIII). Possible contradictions in the terms of reference of the Commission will be dealt with later. The report, "comprising 3,755 pages, as well as 598 tables, and an atlas of 66 large-scale maps" (ibid, p XVII), is the most comprehensive planning document produced in South Africa in relation to the "Native Areas".

The Commission argued that previous attempts at improving agriculture in the Reserves had failed, "not so much because of the inherent conservatism of the Bantu, but chiefly because crop-rotation, lay-farming and similar practices essential to the maintenance and building up of soil fertility, are not possible where the available arable land is insufficient to produce the food requirements of the population; nor is efficient stock farming possible under conditions of gross overstocking" (ibid, p 74). At other times however, the Commission argued that "The real limiting factor is the Bantu himself" (ibid, p 77). Economic farming would not develop "unless the Bantu radically change their present attitude towards their land and livestock...This essential metamorphosis will entail very far reaching changes in their traditional ways of living and thinking...the problems involved are predominantly sociological and psychological" (loc. cit.). A central problem was the attitude towards livestock,



and work was being held up because people were not willing to limit their stock. Men, moreover, took no real interest in cultivation, preferring to sell their labour; they had never been forced by circumstances to cultivate, leaving this to the women (ibid, p 84).

Agriculture was however, only part of a wider problem, and "the so-called Native question is, undoubtedly, the most formidable and urgent of South Africa's problems" (ibid, p 101). It was not a problem that could be dealt with in a piecemeal fashion (ibid, p 106). There was little hope of evolutionary development towards a common society. Such a development would moreover mean that "the control of political power will pass into the hands of the Bantu" (ibid, p 103). There was no middle path between integration and separation (ibid, p 106), and "That the European people will not be prepared willingly to sacrifice their right of existence as a separate national and racial entity, must be accepted as the dominant fact in the South African situation" (ibid, p 103). The only alternative therefore, for cultural and political reasons, was to promote the establishment of separate communities in their own territories (ibid, p 105).

Having adopted the necessity for "separate development" (ibid, p 105-106), the Commission then made a range of proposals relating to the development of the reserves, relating to areas such as agriculture, forestry, mining, industry, religion, health, welfare, education and administration, as well as to the consolidation of the reserves into coherent blocks of land (ibid, p IX-XV). The Commission submitted an estimated budget of £104 million for the first ten years of the implementation of its plan (ibid, p 206).

As my concern here is with Betterment planning and its consequences, I will focus only on the agricultural aspects of the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations. The Commission's aim was to "help the Bantu to develop an efficient and self-supporting 'peasant farmers' class in their own areas" (ibid, p 77). The creation of viable farming lots would, as Smit argued in 1945, involve moving non-farmers off the land into rural villages (ibid, p 152). People giving evidence to the Commission had suggested that a Black family would need to make an income of £120 per year to be able to make a living out of farming full-time. Using this figure to determine the size of farming units, the Commission concluded that "this would mean that at

least 80 per cent of the present number of families in the Bantu areas would have to be removed from the land. Not only would this be impossible to carry out in practice, but from a broad sociological viewpoint, it would be wrong to uproot so large a section of the rural population. Great population problems would be created" (ibid, p 113).

The Commission had interviewed 900 "Bantu farmers" in mixed farming and pastoral regions, of whom 111 had made their living fully from farming. The average gross annual income for this full-time group amounted to £56.6 per farmer. "The Commission accordingly adopted a minimum gross income of £60 as a basis for planning the agricultural development of the Bantu areas" (loc. cit.). This figure was based upon the "present low standard of productive efficiency in Bantu agriculture", and it was argued that if farming practices were improved, this income could be doubled or trebled (loc. cit.).

The land use plan suggested by the Commission, was in its own words, much the same as the current "betterment areas" system, providing for "(a) residential areas divided into plots; (b) arable lands divided into units; and (c) common grazing grounds" (ibid, p 114). The basic difference was that whereas the current Betterment areas had been planned so as to provide all families with equal access to arable and grazing land, "the Commission insists that in future, all stabilised land shall be divided into economic farming units, and that the number of families to be settled as farmers, shall not exceed the number of such units. Sub-maintenance farming cannot be allowed" (loc. cit.). An economic unit was to be calculated in terms of the characteristics of the particular agricultural zone into which it fell, and usually involved a combination of arable land and grazing land for a specified number of animal units (also known as "cattle units") (ibid, p 115).

With regard to the "stabilisation of the land", the Commission recommended that all land in the reserves, including mission farms and land privately owned by Blacks, should be declared Betterment areas. Work should then start in order to prevent further deterioration of soil and grass by dividing Betterment areas into residential, arable and grazing areas and by keeping the number of stock within the limits of the carrying capacity of the area (ibid, p 117-118).

While it was desirable that wherever possible, planning and its implementation should be undertaken "with the consent and co-operation of the inhabitants", where the protection of the soil and its cover demanded it, "stabilisation must be carried out even without such consent" (ibid, p 118). This would be possible, as the necessary powers would have been obtained by the legislation which would proclaim all land in the reserves to be Betterment areas (loc. cit.).

Wherever possible, settlement should take place on the basis of economic units. Where this was not possible, then on half units, but not less than two morgen of arable land might be allocated to each family in mixed farming areas (loc. cit.).

The Commission argued that the currently prevailing systems of land tenure were not conducive to agricultural development. The two broad categories of tenure obtaining in the reserves, viz. communal and individual tenure, offered no real sense of security of tenure. Even individual tenure was "subject to so many conditions and forfeiture clauses that there is no great measure of security of tenure", and there was virtually no difference between methods of cultivation and improvement of the land between holders under communal or individual tenure (ibid, p 151). There could be no pride of the possession of land in which there was "no ownership in the fullest sense of the term", and the Commission recommended that farmers should be granted freehold title to their arable allotments (ibid, p 152). The land, together with its improvements, should be sold to them "at an economic evaluation" (loc. cit.), at a recommended price of £400 per economic unit, payable over 40 years at 2.5 per cent interest (ibid, p 196-197). However, it was also recommended that should a farmer not use arable and grazing land efficiently, "the Trust shall have the right to cancel the title, and after valuing the land and grazing rights, to purchase the unit and sell it to another Bantu" (ibid, p 119). The transition to freehold tenure should be optional, except where the majority of people with land rights in an area wished to make the change, in which case, the change should be compulsory (ibid, p 195).

The Commission suggested that the Department of Native Affairs should organise the provision of services such as credit and market facilities, and agricultural extension staff (ibid, p 120, p 196-197) to the farmers.

The proposals of the Tomlinson Commission were however, only partially implemented. The government cut the Commission's budget for the first ten years by nearly two-thirds, from £104.4 million to £36.6 million, with certain items such as credit facilities, mining development, development of secondary and tertiary industry, and educational facilities falling away completely. The government argued that the provision of credit and of education already fell under the Department of Native Affairs' budget, and mining development still required preparatory work to be done. "For secondary and tertiary development £30,000,000 has been calculated. That is the amount which is really intended for the development of White industries in the Native areas with State assistance...That can help kill the White industries now existing in the White areas....it would be catastrophic for the present economic development of South Africa to establish subsidised White industries in Native areas in competition with the existing White industries. Therefore that £30,000,000 falls away" (The Minister of Native Affairs, House of Assembly, 28/3/1957, quoted by Nieuwenhuysen, 1964, p 9).

One of the corner-stones of the Tomlinson Commission's proposals was the establishment of viable agriculture by the removing of the "surplus population" from the land into rural villages. However, for these rural villages to be viable, industrial employment would need to be provided. The government's withdrawal of the money earmarked for industrial development in the reserves, effectively decapitated the Commission's proposals to transform the reserves, and particularly, agriculture, in spite of the fact that the government still officially supported the recommendation that "the farming population in the Bantu areas should be separated from the non-farming population for whom residential and other provision should be made" (UG 14/1959 - quoted in Yawitch 1981, p 32). The government's subsequent investment in the creation of border industries (industries located within South Africa and close to the reserves) (Nieuwenhuysen 1964, p 18-20) was not able to effect movement out of rural locations because of the limited nature of industrial development, as well as the lack of residential security in townships in South Africa. Accordingly, the government's commitment of £38 million for the establishment of villages, as part of its 1961-1966 "5-year plan" for the reserves (ibid, p 10), has not



had the effect of alleviating pressure on agricultural land. By the end of 1960, only three rural villages had been established in the Ciskei (Houghton 1961). With a small garden and not being allowed to keep stock, families were totally dependent on wage labour, and "many of the families were living in abject poverty" (Houghton 1962, p 18). By August 1962, only 32 villages either had been, or were being established throughout South Africa. The whole 5-year plan envisaged the building of 81,505 houses, (Nieuwenhuysen 1964, p 23) which would cater for only a fraction of the approximately 245,000 families which the Commission estimated would have to be moved off the land (UG 61/1955, p 114). These figures did not allow for population growth.

The government was also not prepared to approve of freehold tenure, arguing that this "would undermine the whole tribal structure". Rather, the "desired aim of stable occupational rights on allotments in Tribal and Trust areas...must be secured rather by modernising the methods and conditions which govern the allotment of land by tribal authorities". (government spokesmen, quoted in Nieuwenhuysen, 1964, p 13). The newly created local authority system, by which the government sought to revive traditional leadership patterns, would probably be threatened by the introduction of freehold tenure, and so the government did away with another important incentive suggested by the Commission to encourage the development of agriculture.

The government did however commit itself to the idea of economic units as well as to "extensive measures...for promoting irrigation farming, sugar-cane production, fibre production, forestry" (UG 14/1959, quoted by Yawitch, 1981, p 32), in addition to its 1954 emphasis on conservation.

Betterment planning thus continued, and implemented the proposals of the Tomlinson Commission in a modified way. Locations were still divided into residential, arable and grazing areas, but plans were modified so as to cater for all the inhabitants of a location, as the "surplus" population was to remain. This meant that only a few, and in some cases, no families, received economic units, as it was policy in the application of the revised planning strategy that no one should lose rights to occupy land as a result of the implementation of Betterment (Board 1964, p 37). Land regarded as unsuitable for cultivation was removed from such use. Where this happened, people

then found themselves with less arable land than before Betterment.

Daniel (1981, p 10) estimates that Betterment planning has occurred in about 80 per cent of the Ciskei, and that about 10 per cent of rural families have received full economic holdings. Moll (1983, p 142) states that by 1964, 386 out of 887, or 44 per cent, of Transkei locations had been planned. Daniel (1970, p 645) estimates that by 1968, 47 per cent of what is now Kwa Zulu had been planned. Betterment planning is still going on in the Transkei and in Kwa Zulu, although in somewhat modified form.

Not only has land use planning not followed the Tomlinson Commission's proposals, but neither has stock limitation. From the time Betterment planning was mooted in the 1930's there has been resistance to cattle culling on the part of rural Black people (Lodge 1983; Hirson 1977; Yawitch 1981). While culling has been enforced in a number of Trust farm settlements (UG 61/1955 p 77, 81), it has not been applied in many non-Trust locations, such as e.g. a number of locations in the Keiskammahoek area of the Ciskei. With the advent of the Tribal Authorities system of local government in the 1950's, chiefs in the Transkei became responsible for the implementation of certain aspects of Betterment planning, and "stock culling ground to a halt, as did many of the other practices designed to restore the land" (Moll, 1983, p 136). The Tribal Authority system had occasioned considerable opposition in its own right, (Lodge 1983; Beinart and Bundy 1980) and chiefs were presumably reluctant to jeopardise their position even further by attempting to enforce something as unpopular as cattle culling.

In effect, what Betterment involved in many locations was the division of the area into residential, arable and grazing sections, with the residents having to move to the new residential areas. Conservation - oriented work was undertaken, together with some initiatives in the direction of promoting agricultural viability, such as the establishing of irrigation schemes, dairy schemes, market outlets and a number of economic units. (see Baker 1960, for details on the Ciskei). By and large however, these initiatives have not made much impact on the productivity or prosperity of Betterment locations. Quail (1980, p 72) estimates the per capita value of agricultural production in the Ciskei at R40 per year.

The situation on Trust farms seems to have varied a good deal. In some areas, people have been allocated fields of five morgen (of differing degrees of viability) (e.g. Segar 1985). In other cases, such as in Lebowa, areas originally planned along Betterment lines, have in effect become a receptacle for people moving, or being moved, out of urban areas, or off White-owned farms. James (1983) mentions a case of a Betterment area which was planned in the 1950's. In 1965, the size of arable allotments was reduced to accommodate newcomers, and since 1968, it has been impossible to get any arable land in the area. James estimates that 70 per cent of the present population has arrived in the area since that time, i.e. 1968 onwards (James 1983, p 37). In such contexts, planning is not an agricultural strategy, but rather "a way of trying to pack in successive waves of people moved to the area: the extreme land shortage has resulted in the proliferation of rural villages and closer settlements" (ibid, p 43). In an area like Lebowa then, "relocation attributed to betterment is inextricably linked to other types of relocation" (ibid, p 3).

Betterment planning as envisaged by the Tomlinson Commission has, for all practical purposes, not got off the ground, and the consequences of the watered-down form of planning that resulted, have varied widely from area to area.

#### AN EVALUATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF BETTERMENT PLANNING

Betterment planning, whether in its pre-1945 phase, when the focus was on conservation and the prevention of erosion, or in its post-1945 phase, when the emphasis was geared more towards creating a viable reserve agriculture, can only be understood within the context of broader South African government policy (whether that of the United Party or of the National Party) towards the question of Black/White relationships in South Africa. The Natives Land Act of 1913 (Act No 27 of 1913) and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 (Act No 18 of 1936) determined the areas and amount of land Blacks would be allowed to occupy. Since 1910, when the Union of South Africa was formed, Black agriculture has fallen, not under the Department of Agriculture, but under the Department of Native Affairs and its successors. Agriculture in Black areas has thus been separately administered and

financed from agriculture in White areas, and has been subject to considerations of "Native" policy, rather than primarily of agricultural policy. The unequal access White and Black farmers have enjoyed in terms of access to land (and to control over it) and to services, financial assistance and markets has been well documented (see e.g. Bowbrick 1970, Tomlinson - UG 61/1955, Wilson, F. 1971).

Inasmuch as Betterment planning has been unable to confront the problems of unequal access directly, as that would involve a fundamental questioning of government policy, it could be argued that Betterment planning could not have achieved its own stated agricultural goals for the reserve areas. Thus we see official diagnoses of the problems of Black agriculture falling between two stools, being either unable or unwilling to confront the issue of unequal access. The Statement of Land Policy just after the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 thus argued that while "it is notorious that the existing Native locations and reserves are congested, denuded, overstocked, eroded" (Statement of Land Policy, 1936, p XIX) yet "Undoubtedly the crux of the whole matter lies in the limitation upon the number of stock carried by the Native population in the Native areas" (ibid, p XX). It would be necessary to see that on Trust farms, land "will not be ruined by malpractices...but will be properly farmed" (ibid, p XXII).

The Tomlinson Commission similarly argued that while on the one hand viable farming was impossible in congested reserve conditions (UG 61/1955, p 74), "The real limiting factor is the Bantu himself", and the problems were predominantly sociological and psychological (ibid, p 77). While the reserve areas were clearly much smaller in extent than the White areas, it should be remembered that, taking rainfall and other factors into account, 100 morgen of land in the Black areas was equivalent to 147 morgen of land in the White areas (ibid, p 117).

Not only did Betterment planning have to accept the division of land and resources and address itself to preventative, and conservationist, rather than developmental strategies, but the resources necessary to implement its aims were not always available (as in the War period and up to the mid-1950's) or forthcoming (as after the Tomlinson Commission reported). In terms of policy options, as well as resources available, the potential efficacy of Betterment



planning was severely limited by the wider South African political and economic context.

The fact that the Tomlinson Commission's members were all White and that it committed itself to solving the problems of the reserve areas within the broad framework of separate development, raises questions as to the representativeness, flexibility and feasibility of its recommendations. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that this severely restricted the range of options it was able to consider in relation to the development of Black agriculture, which it saw as part of "the so-called Native question" (ibid, p 101) rather than primarily as an agricultural problem.

The Commission had considered the figure of £120 per year as an income capable of sustaining a Black family in full-time agriculture. To create units capable of generating such an income would have demanded the relocation of 80 per cent of the Black rural population. This would be sociologically undesirable. The figure of £60 was thus settled on as a basis for planning economic units. This meant that the reserve areas plus the land they would receive under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, would be able to accommodate 60 per cent of the then current reserve population - necessitating the movement of 40 per cent of the Black rural population of about 600,000 families (ibid, p 114). It is arguable that the movement of 240,000 families would still constitute an extremely undesirable social situation. In addition, the Commission would have to come to terms with the increase in families between the time of its report in 1954, and the actual implementation of its proposals at some future date.

Although the Commission argued that the figure of £60 was not unrealistic, this assumption has been queried by Daniel (1970, p 646), Krige and Krige (1956, p 25) and Simkins (1981, p 282) who argue figures of £150 (for the early 1960's), £150 (for the early 1950s), and £100 (for 1955) respectively.

The Commission's desire to establish economic units as a means of establishing agricultural viability and of justifying the re-organisation of the reserve population, is compromised by the realisation that this might not be possible. Where necessary, people should be given half units (UG 61/1955, p 118). This seems to be tantamount to acknowledging that their policy might not be

implementable throughout the reserves, but the Commission does not face the issues of whether families on half units would be compelled to revert back to e.g. migrant labour to make ends meet, or whether such areas (i.e. where half units are prevalent) should be differently organised. In Frankel's words (1957, p 204) "the commission's laborious statistical projections and arithmetical juggling to fit the Bantu population into its allocated 'lebensraum' are a form of whistling in the dark".

Running throughout the Commission's report is an ambiguity about the right to compel people to fall in line with its proposals, and about the necessity of obtaining people's consent and co-operation if an undertaking is to succeed. While consent was desirable, the protection of the soil was of ultimate importance and if necessary, people could be compelled to comply (UG 61/1955, p 118). Similarly, while it was necessary to give people freehold tenure before they would commit themselves fully to agriculture, the Trust should have the right to cancel someone's title if he was not using the soil efficiently (ibid, p 119). Betterment had been resisted from the outset (Beinart and Bundy 1980; Hirson 1977; Kotzé 1982; Lodge 1983; Moll 1983; Seneque 1982; Yawitch 1981) and if consultation had really been a priority, such resistance, together with the arguments advanced through it, would have been taken more seriously in the planning process, and in its subsequent implementation.

There are thus a number of contradictions running through the Commission's report and recommendations, which seem to revolve around the Commission's conception of the basic conservatism and inefficiency of Black farmers, and its acceptance of the viability of the current division of land between Black and White, and of the framework of separate development. These contradictions would surely have compromised the viability of the Commission's proposals, had they been fully implemented in the first place. It seems that these contradictions can be traced back to the Commission's original terms of reference, which, as Hellman has argued, "were in themselves contradictory" (1957, p 1), viz. to develop the reserve areas by effective (i.e. Western) socio-economic planning, while yet preserving "a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native" (Tomlinson Commission, UG 61/1955, p XVIII).

In spite of the problems inherent in the Tomlinson Commission's report, Betterment planning has found favourable comment. Daniel, writing in the context of Betterment planning in Kwa Zulu in 1968, argues that

- a) the cost of the implementation of Betterment schemes is not very high when compared to settlement schemes in Nigeria
- b) the implementation of Betterment has not created debt problems for the settlers, as they have not had to buy their way into the scheme, as people had to in Nigeria. (Had economic units been developed and made available on a freehold basis as originally planned, settlers would have had debt problems, although not remotely approximating the amounts Daniel quotes in the Nigerian cases, where sums of up to £2,500 were involved.)
- c) preliminary surveys of areas before the implementation of Betterment make for more effective planning, although this process needs to be considerably improved
- d) the division of Betterment areas into parts designated for arable, grazing and residential purposes, is a step in ensuring correct land-use practices and reducing soil erosion (Daniel 1970, p 645-646). Cooper (1979, p 378) writing about "homeland agriculture" in general, suggests that this division is basically a good plan for rationalising land-use, although it has not been properly implemented, and so has not led to improved productivity of the land.

These favourable comments refer largely to the planning, rather than to the implementation of Betterment. Daniel, writing ten years later about the consequences of Betterment planning in Kwa Zulu and the Ciskei, has the following to say. "Only a token number of farmers was given full economic holdings...The remainder of the population was settled on smaller non-economic holdings. As rural villages were not established and as no attention was given to improving farming methods, resettlement under the Tomlinson formula was a complete failure, except in so far as suitable lands were demarcated for arable and grazing areas." (Daniel, 1981, p 10).

In fairness to the Tomlinson Commission, the failure of their proposals are due as much as anything else to their partial employment and to the fact that since the early 1970's, areas such as the Ciskei

have focused their agricultural energy largely on capital intensive projects, such as irrigation schemes (Daniel 1981, p 14-15). This has meant that the quality of services supplied to the rural locations has had to be compromised. In the case of Lebowa, Betterment schemes have had to contend with large numbers of immigrants coming from towns and farms, (James 1983, Yawitch 1981) which has rendered the development of viable agriculture out of the question.

Yawitch argues that the Tomlinson Commission was trapped in the ideological framework of separate development, which meant that its members "could not see that the solution to the problem of the reserves, was not a 'reserve' solution, but ultimately a political one" (Yawitch 1981, p 27). "Genuine although misguided" (ibid, p 30) as the Commission's attempt to make the reserves self-sufficient was, "the realities of intense overcrowding, overpopulation and shortage of land, especially in view of the inability of the government to even attempt to implement Tomlinson's plan fully by providing capital, technical advice and infrastructural development" (ibid, p 42) meant that there was no real possibility of the Commission realising its aims. This assessment, viz. that the political constraints on the development of reserve agriculture have proved decisive, applies to Betterment planning in both its pre-Tomlinson phase (which concentrated essentially on the prevention of the further deterioration of the soil and on building it up again) as well as its post-Tomlinson phase (which while also focusing on conservation, went much further in the direction of promoting agricultural viability).

#### BETTERMENT PLANNING IN RELATION TO WIDER GOVERNMENT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

People have speculated as to what broad policy considerations led successive South African governments to plan, implement and adapt the Betterment policy in the reserve areas over a period of more than thirty years - a period which saw the United Party lose power to the Nationalist Party in 1948. Two main lines of argument have been advanced in this regard.



a) The Political Economy Approach

The attitude currently prevalent in the literature, is that "The genesis of betterment proposals and their subsequent implementation should be located within the broader context of structural changes in the economy and in the nature of the state" (Beinart and Bundy, 1980, p 298). Of particular significance in this regard is the changing function of the reserves, from "the supply of a migrant labour force and the support of the dependants of that labour...(to)...the maintenance and control of those who, for one reason or another, are redundant in the industrial and urban areas of South Africa" (Yawitch, 1981, p 44).

This broad line of argument is put forward by, amongst others, Beinart and Bundy (1980), James (1983), Hirson (1977), Lodge (1983), Moll (1983), Seneque (1982) and Yawitch (1981). There are differences of emphasis and interpretation within this broad approach. Thus Yawitch (1981, p 19) does not see the same sharp division of perceived interests between the outgoing United Party and the incoming National Party in the years immediately before and after 1948, as Moll (1983, p 98) appears to, when he argues that "Post-war reserve policy should be seen in the context of the changing balance of class forces represented" (i.e. by the United Party and the Nationalist Party).

Similarly, there are differences as to the role of the Tomlinson Commission in relation to reserve policy. Seneque (1982, p 13) argues that "The Tomlinson Commission report is undoubtedly a blueprint plan and one which sets out to plan the Reserves in a coherent and comprehensive manner in a way which is even more functional to capital and the state's requirements than ever before." Against this, Yawitch (1981), argues that "the need to maintain the reserves as a labour reservoir was one of the main reasons why the South African state would not fully implement the findings of the Tomlinson Commission" (p 43), as to make the reserves "thriving centres of agriculture and industry...would threaten the existence of the migrant labour force as well as the existence of the unemployed mass who could be drawn on when necessary" (p 31).

The detail of the specific differences within this broad approach

need not detain us here, except inasmuch as it serves to suggest that a fairly high degree of speculation seems to be involved in a line of argument that admits of such internal differences.

"The original function of the reserves was to subsidise the costs of mine labour" (Lodge, 1983, p 261) by providing cheap labour inasmuch as the mines did not have to pay workers a wage that would support both themselves and their dependants, as their dependants were held to have access to land in the reserves for agricultural production (ibid, p 262). However, pressure on the land and the absence (on the mines) of able-bodied men, meant that by the 1920's, agricultural production per head was falling, and by the 1930's "the inability of some of the reserves to provide sufficient food for their inhabitants was arousing official concern", and mining interests were worried that "semi-starvation is a very insecure basis with which to build a permanent labour supply" (an extract from a confidential report to the Chamber of Mines in 1937, quoted by Lodge, 1983, p 262). The Betterment initiatives arising out of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, as expressed concretely in Proclamation No 31 of 1939, constituted the "first attempt by the state to deal systematically with this situation" (loc. cit.) of declining productivity and deterioration of the soil. These measures were however meant to improve the reserves, but not to make them viable, lest the flow of migrant labour might be slowed down (Hirson, 1977, p 127).

The direction that Betterment took after World War II was a response to a changed economic situation. The mines had obtained a lot of their labour from outside South Africa, the government was anxious to curb the growth of an increasing urban Black population that had resulted from industrial expansion during the 1940's, and the White farming sector was experiencing a severe labour shortage as tenants were increasingly attracted by urban working conditions (Yawitch, 1981, p 19; Lodge 1983, p 262). The new division of the reserves into communities of peasant farmers and of wage-labouring villages as envisaged by the United Party, "plus the new system of labour control about to be introduced" (i.e. by the Nationalist Party after it came to power)" served the needs of farming ideally" (Yawitch, 1981, p 19).

From the 1950's onwards, the function of the reserves changed from

serving predominantly as a generator and source of cheap migrant labour, to serving predominantly as a source of social control of the growing Black rural population. Growing control over the presence of Blacks in towns and cities, together with the displacement of labour tenants and squatters on farms, as well as of inhabitants of Black settlements outside the reserves ("black spots" in official terminology), meant a massive enlargement of the reserve population (Lodge 1983, p 263).

Lodge and Yawitch argue that it is within the context of the need of the government to control the growing reserve population and to enforce the widely resisted Betterment measures in order to stop further deterioration of the reserves, that the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act (No 68 of 1951) must be understood. Claiming to be re-instating the traditional institution of the chieftainship, the government appointed chiefs as heads of local government units. These chiefs were however to be "salaried officials of the government; they could be deposed and removed by government authorities if it was felt they were not carrying out their duties well enough, and a new chief chosen by the administration could be put in their place. By removing the principle of accountability to the tribal council which had lain at the base of the legitimation of chiefly power, the way was now open to use chiefs as a means to diffuse, control and counter resistance" (Yawitch, 1981, p 20). Lodge describes the Bantu Authorities system created by the Bantu Authorities Act as intended "to provide a cheap repressive administration for a potentially rebellious population" (Lodge, 1983, p 263).

The introduction of the Bantu Authorities system evoked widespread resistance throughout the reserves, not least because the chiefs were now expected to assist actively in the implementation of unpopular Betterment proposals. Resistance to Betterment planning and resistance to the Bantu Authorities system during the 1950's and 1960's were closely connected (Yawitch 1981, p 22; Seneque, 1982, p 11; Beinart and Bundy, 1980, p 304-310; Lodge 1983, p 274-289).

Yawitch suggests that the setting up of the Tomlinson Commission was "in part related to this resistance and to the need to solve once and for all the vexed question of how the reserves were to be managed" (1981, p 24). As the Tomlinson Commission was set up in 1950, the

resistance to which it would have directed itself would have been resistance to Betterment only, as the Bantu Authorities Act had not yet been passed.

Given that the Commission settled for the figure of £60 per year as a viable income for a Black family farming full-time, questions may be asked as to just how serious the Commission's intention was to establish a category of viable peasant farmers. Seneque (1982, p 17) suggests that "the threat of peasant resistance must have pressured the Commission into setting the necessary income for a middle peasant as low as possible", so as to dispossess fewer people of their land and livestock. The Commission then seemingly effectively gave up the idea of establishing a viable peasantry because of the reaction that it anticipated. Order (in the short-term) was of more significance than long-term agricultural viability with possible immediate political costs. Yawitch, on the other hand, (1981, p 30) believes that the Commission "was making a genuine, but misguided attempt to set out a scheme which would make the reserves self-sufficient."

Whatever the Commission's motives may have been, the government rejected central aspects of its proposals. Yawitch (1981, p 30-31, 43) and Moll (1983, p 131) argue that implementation of the Commission's policy would have undermined the government's intended use of the reserves - as a place where Black people could "feed themselves, govern themselves, and still provide the labour basic to the functioning of the central South African economy" (Yawitch 1981, p 31). The political risks involved in moving 50 per cent of the rural population were also too high for the government to take (*loc. cit.*). Moll (1983, p 141) suggests that the Commission's recommendations appear to have been taken note of only if they coincided with state policy of controlling the reserves.

During the late 1960's and the 1970's, the reserves were being inundated with people leaving farms either through eviction or because of poor conditions, and also with people being turned out of cities, towns and "black spots". The function of the reserves then became to accommodate and control a vast and growing rural population who "are redundant in the industrial and urban areas of South Africa" (Yawitch, 1981, p 44). Many of the more recent Betterment schemes in areas like Lebowa were set up to house people who came streaming in



(ibid, p 47), and thus became a part of wider political processes such as relocation and homeland consolidation (also James, 1983, p 1-3). As Yawitch concludes, "whatever the initial intention of those who formulated the policy in the 1930's, (betterment) has become a form of political control" (Yawitch 1981, p 95).

While this approach to the policy considerations relating to Betterment planning contains suggestive lines of explanation and inquiry, a number of issues need further consideration before any judgement can be passed on its usefulness.

Firstly, certain basic economic and demographic data are needed, relating to (a) population figures, land-man ratios, actual stock holdings and agricultural output in the reserve areas, as well as (b) migration rates, population figures, incomes and job demand and availability in the White cities and on White farms, for the period under discussion, i.e. about 1920 to the 1970's. These figures would help us to make a more realistic assessment of whether the strategies imputed to the government during this period do in fact bear any relation to the developing situation. Such a detailed statistical inquiry is however, beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

The focus on the changing function of the reserves seems to look almost exclusively at economic interests, arguing that the government had to control the reserves in different ways as economic circumstances changed. This does not take account of ideological factors, such as developing Nationalist Party ideology. In fact, this approach seems to assume a direct, or very close, convergence of interests between what may be loosely called 'the state' and 'capital'. While this convergence of interests may have existed, it has not been adequately demonstrated. The quotes produced to show the desirability of cheap labour, and that therefore Betterment measures were not meant to make the reserves self-sufficient (e.g. Lodge 1983, p 262; Hirson 1977, p 127) are quotes from mining officials and farmers, i.e. only from one of the two allegedly interested parties.

This apparent assumption of the convergence of interests of state and capital allows some authors within this framework to take what appear to be liberties with the actual chronology of events in interpreting them. Thus Yawitch argues that the new division of the reserves into peasant farmers and wage-labouring villages suggested by

the United Party in 1945 "plus the new system of labour control about to be introduced, served the needs of farming ideally" (Yawitch, 1981, p 19). However, the new labour control measures she mentions, (the Native Laws Amendment Act No 54 of 1952, and the Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act No 67 of 1952) were introduced by the Nationalist Party after its victory in 1948. For Yawitch's argument to hold, the United Party government must have been intending to introduce similar measures itself - which has not been demonstrated.

It also needs to be shown more clearly that if these measures were to channel labour to the White farms, that this would not have threatened the interests of White industrialists in the industrial expansion of post-War South Africa. Smit, in his 1945 speech, had explicitly made the link between the new rural villages and the industrial expansion expected after the War (Smit, 1945, p 4). Again, the need is for detailed economic and demographic data to evaluate the relative labour needs of the agricultural and industrial sectors.

Another apparent chronological liberty relates to the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951. Lodge argues that "a substantial re-organisation of life in the reserves" (1983, p 263) was necessary to meet the effect of measures which were "to massively enlarge the reserve population as various groups were excluded from the urban economy and forced back into the reserves. They were joined by displaced labour tenants, squatters and inhabitants of 'black spots'" (loc. cit.). So, to "provide a cheap repressive administration for a potentially rebellious population, local government was reshaped in an authoritarian fashion under the 1953 (sic.) Bantu Authorities Act" (loc. cit.). However, the measures to which Lodge refers, relate to legislation passed in 1951, 1952 and 1954, as well as to the movement of labour tenants, squatters and "black spot" relocatees - measures taken after the Bantu Authorities Act was passed in 1951. While it may be argued that the government envisaged legislation to be passed in 1952 and 1954 as early as 1951, the major movement of labour tenants and others into the reserves took place in the 1960s and 1970s (Yawitch 1981, p 43; Surplus People's Project 1983, vol I, p 1). If the government had envisaged this massive relocation from the 1960's onwards when it passed the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, this has not

been adequately demonstrated.

It is argued that the government introduced the Bantu Authorities system of local government in order to facilitate control of the reserves (Lodge 1983, p 263; Yawitch 1981, p 20). Yet it is not clear how this system was to give more effective control than the prevailing system of rule through headmen. It could be argued that chiefs, ruling over wider areas than headmen, and in a number of cases, having genuine genealogical claims to chieftainship, could be less easy to control than headmen. In any case, if the Bantu Authority system was needed to control the reserve population, it needs to be explained why it was only introduced in some areas (e.g. parts of the Ciskei) as late as the mid-1960's. The view of the Bantu Authority system as concerned only with control does not take adequate account of developing Nationalist ideology relating to the reserves as a factor in the development of the Bantu Authorities system.

Two reasons are suggested as to why the Tomlinson Commission's proposals were not implemented, viz. that the political risks involved in moving 50 per cent of the rural population were too high (Yawitch, 1981, p 31) and that the implementation of the Commission's proposals would have undermined the government's view of the function of the reserves, viz. to provide a controlled labour pool (Moll, 1983, p 131; Yawitch 1981, p 30-31, 43).

There had been widespread resistance to the implementation of Betterment before it had involved the type of community re-organisation envisaged by Tomlinson. There could have been no reason to suppose that compelling people to move to new residential areas, and to leave their old homes and fields behind, would not have occasioned as much, if not more, resistance. To make sense of the kind of resistance the government was prepared to take on, with regard to Betterment implemented in the form of the amended Tomlinson plan, as well as with regard to the Bantu Authorities system, we need to take account of its conservationist and ideological concerns for the reserves, as well as of its concerns for an effectively controlled labour force.

It would seem at first glance that the suggestion for the establishment of rural villages, as put forward by D.L. Smit, the United Party Secretary of Agriculture in 1945, and taken up by the

Tomlinson Commission under Nationalist rule, would serve to create ready-made, and fairly controllable sources of labour, whether for agriculture or industry. Smit (1945, p 4) had in fact suggested as much. Just how feasible the Commission's suggestions to create viable industries in the reserves would have been, is a matter of conjecture, although Nieuwenhuysen (1964, p 4) and Spooner, (quoted in Moll 1983, p 139) regard Tomlinson's provisions for the creation of industry in the reserves sufficient to absorb the wage-labouring villages, as grossly inadequate. It thus seems that the degree of reserve industry that the full implementation of the Commission's proposals would have created, would not seriously have threatened the migrant labour supply wanted by White industrialists and farmers. It has not been clearly established that the implementation of the Commission's proposals would in fact have jeopardised the existence of such an effectively controlled labour force. To assess that argument, we need more detailed economic and demographic data.

The attempt to locate Betterment planning within the policy context of the function of the reserves in relation to the wider South African economy thus raises a number of issues (of a conceptual, as well as of a detailed nature) which need to be clarified before this type of analysis can be more effectively evaluated.

b) The Approach From The Concern With Conservation

The second line of argument in considering Betterment planning in relation to government policy considerations, is represented primarily by Beinart (1984a). He asserts that the "technical thinking" reflected in agricultural planning exercises such as Betterment planning, "was not borne out of the forces operating in any particular southern African political economy." Such thinking relates rather to a "conservationist concern in the area (which) did not arise originally out of the relationship between state and peasantry, but from the perceived difficulties facing settler agriculture" (ibid, p 54) in the early part of the twentieth century. These ideas were prevalent in agricultural thinking in South Africa, (the then) Rhodesia and (the then) Nyasaland, and officials drew their inspiration from the experience of other Commonwealth countries such



as India, and Australia, as well as from the United States of America (ibid, p 56).

This concern with "the welfare of the soil" (ibid, p 53) which took on the status of something like an ideology to its adherents (ibid, p 59, 82) was propagated by officials who saw the "future of capitalist agrarian development" (ibid, p 59) as threatened by the careless farming practices of White settlers (ibid, p 60) as well as by the feeling by the 1930s that Black methods of agriculture could constitute a threat to the general soil resource (ibid, p 61). The "future of capitalist agrarian development" was thus seen as "dependent on rational planning and the application of technology" (ibid, p 59). The nature of the conservation problem and its solution were seen as "essentially technical in character" and it was argued that intervention by the state was justified because "the process of decline had gone too far for farmers to look after the land themselves" (ibid, p 60).

The conservationist concern, generated and developed in the context of diagnosis and intervention in relation to White agriculture, "was important in leading to recognition and definition of the problem in African areas in the late 1920s and early 1930s" (ibid, p 67). While there does appear to have been an erosion problem in the reserves, this does not mean that it necessarily constituted a severe environmental threat at that stage. The actual degree of urgency would have differed across and even within regions (ibid, p 65).

The concern with conservation was however given a boost by the writings of conservationists in the United States, writing in the context of the great "dustbowl" problem of the Depression years. These ideas were taken up by officials in South Africa. General Smuts, then in General Hertzog's cabinet, is alleged to have remarked in 1936 (the year in which the Native Trust and Land Act was passed) that "erosion is the biggest problem confronting the country, bigger than any politics". (quoted in Beinart 1984a, p 68).

During the 1930's agricultural officials saw their task as "primarily to expand and improve peasant agriculture", and conservation work was seen as a necessary first step (ibid, p 69). Conservationism and the "notion of development" were thus becoming fused in the strands of official thinking (loc. cit.).

The improvement of peasant agriculture was seen as important in its own right, and not necessarily viewed as a threat to the need for an industrial labour supply. Beinart argues (1984b, p 24-25) that "there was fairly general official commitment to the idea that African food supplies, grown by themselves, should be adequate. Even where the relationship of food supply to migrant labour was analysed fully, such as in a report by two doctors in the Transkei in 1938, full subsistence, or even surplus production, was not seen to threaten the labour supply. For some agricultural officers, indeed, migrancy was an evil which undermined peasant agriculture which they were fighting so hard to sustain".

A significant part of the conservationist concern in the reserves related to the limiting of stock numbers, and this was reflected in the first Betterment Proclamation (No 31 of 1939) which made provision for the culling of stock. The threat of culling, however, provoked widespread resistance and it was not effectively implemented until after World War II (Beinart 1984a, p 73). Together with the concern for limiting stock numbers, there was also the desire to control grazing practices more effectively (*ibid*, p 74), and this was allowed for in the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936.

A feeling was however growing among officials that "limited interventions aimed at changing specific aspects of peasant agriculture were inadequate; the whole system of African settlement and land use had to be changed if these were to be effective" (*ibid*, p 76). Planning became more comprehensive. Conservation and subsistence farming were seen as going hand in hand, and it was argued that "Only those with a permanent 'stake in the land'...could look after the land properly" (*ibid*, p 78-79). The idea of the "economic unit", as so much of South African agricultural thinking, was borrowed from the United States, and taken up by the Tomlinson Commission (*ibid*, p 79).

This ambitious and comprehensive approach to the problem of reserve agriculture should be seen, Beinart argues, as part of a "shift towards a commitment to development" and as part of a post-war confidence in "colonial capacities to plan and direct African society" (*ibid*, p 79). Development and control were seen as being interrelated, with planning being seen as the means of achieving both.

"Planning emphasised, and became dominated by, the colonial relationship. It became an important feature of late colonialism" (ibid, p 83).

Beinart states that he is seeking to look at only one particular aspect of official thinking in relation to the reserve areas, viz. conservationism. He is not trying to suggest that "conservationist ideas determined patterns of state intervention" in the reserves (ibid, p 54). A more comprehensive account would have to take account of "questions of political control, food supply and drought, cash cropping, land tenure and labour supply" (loc. cit.).

A number of issues were influential in patterns of land use planning by officials, such as strategic or political issues (ibid, p 76), and depending on the wider political situation, conservationist concerns might have "meshed or conflicted with the other demands being made on rural areas" (ibid, p 54).

#### CONCLUSION

It does not seem as if there is any simple explanation as to the wider governmental policy considerations which led to the planning and implementation of the Betterment programme, and to the particular changes it underwent from its inception in the 1930s. The course of the Betterment programme is perhaps best understood as arising and unfolding as a result of the interplay of a number of interrelated concerns (e.g. to conserve the resource base of the reserves; to develop the agricultural productivity of the reserves, even to self-sufficiency; to make the reserves into a source of plentiful and cheap labour for White-controlled industries; to maintain political control over the reserves for various purposes; to realise particular ideological goals in the reserves, such as Westernisation or ethnic autonomy - or both, as in the case of the Tomlinson Commission). These various concerns have enjoyed different priorities at different times, and so on occasion may have either complemented or contradicted each other - as for example when Yawitch argues that the Tomlinson Commission's proposals to make the reserves self-sufficient did not sit well with the government's desire to keep the reserves as a source of controlled and readily available labour (Yawitch, 1981, p 30-31).

The interplay of these various concerns did however take place within the constraints of two parameters, viz.

1) the separation of the reserves from the rest of South Africa, and their disproportionately small size in relation to the proportion of the South African population they were supposed to accommodate. The delimitation of land as laid down in the Natives Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 was not seriously questioned at any stage during the Betterment programme, and plans were designed within those limits.

2) the momentum of the planning process, which seems to acquire a life and a logic of its own. This momentum is shown for example in the Tomlinson Commission's attempt to persevere with the idea of economic units, even after it had brought the estimated annual income necessary to keep a Black family on the land down by half, from £120, to £60. Even after the government had turned down the Commission's request for £30,000,000 for the development of industry in the reserves, planners still persevered in thinking in terms of economic units.

In an important sense then, Betterment planning did take place within a broader ideological context, which reflected two important colonial themes echoed elsewhere in Africa, viz. territorial separation of the races, with its corollary of the problematic distribution of land, and the bureaucratic-technocratic style of thinking, which gave government officials the right and the duty to intervene in the reserves.

Because it was caught within the confines of this ideological context, Betterment could not confront the problems of "Native agriculture" for what they really were, i.e. political and agricultural problems, rather than administrative problems. As such, Betterment could not have succeeded in its own stated aim of creating a viable agriculture in the reserves.

#### FOOTNOTES

1) I have used the term "reserves" when referring to what are now known as the "homelands", or "national states", because the term "reserves" was official currency up to the late 1950's (i.e. for most of the period dealt with in this chapter), and because a number of the



authors quoted also use the term "reserves". To jump around from "reserves" to "homelands" to "national states" and back as chronology dictates, might be confusing to the reader. I have deliberately avoided terms like "stabilisation", "reclamation" and "rehabilitation" in attempting to delineate various phases of the Betterment programme. These terms have been differently defined at different times. Moreover, particular periods of time would be differently classified, depending on whether the criterion of classification is formal policy statements, or actual developments on the ground.

CHAPTER THREETHE HISTORY OF THE HEADMANSHIP IN CHATHA: 1854 TO 1950

Chatha is a rural African village in the Keiskammahoek area of the Ciskei (formerly part of British Kaffraria), which has been subject to the control of successive central governments since its inception. During the Frontier War of 1850-1853 the Xhosa were driven out of the Keiskammahoek area by the British, assisted by groups of Mfengu. After the war, a group of Mfengu were settled at Chatha, under their headman Jama.<sup>1</sup> Among the various waves of settlers subsequently coming to Chatha, were a number of Xhosa families. Today, 1985, the population of Chatha (approximately 3,100 people) is mainly Mfengu. The prevailing view in the village is that "there is now no difference between Xhosa and Mfengu", and marriage patterns, as well as other forms of co-operation and association, bear this out.

This chapter sets out to trace the development of certain themes in the history of Chatha through considering the history of the headmanship in Chatha from its establishment in the 1850's, up to 1950. 1950 is chosen as a cut-off point for several reasons. Firstly, 1950 saw the appointment of a new headman who held office for 30 years, until the end of 1980. It was during his period of headmanship that the implementation of Betterment took place. As will be argued in Chapter Eight, Betterment has fundamentally transformed the nature of political groupings within the village. The pre-Betterment pattern of village politics as reflected in the headmanship, thus includes the appointment of the new headman in 1950, but not the whole of his career. Secondly, from 1948 to 1950, field research was conducted in Chatha and a number of other villages in the Keiskammahoek District, resulting in the publication of the four volumes of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (Mountain 1952; Houghton and Walton 1952; Wilson et al 1952; Mills and Wilson 1952). The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey serves as the base-line document against which changes in Chatha resulting from the implementation of Betterment may be monitored. This chapter traces the history of Chatha and of the headmanship in particular, up to the period of the

Keiskammahoek Rural Survey.

The headman occupies a pivotal and often uncomfortable position, caught between the interests of his people, and those of the authorities. Both the authorities and the various interest groups among his people wish to control the headman for their own purposes. The headmanship comes to represent contradictory impulses: the desire of villagers to maintain their autonomy in the face of interference by the central government; and that government's desire to control the village as closely as is necessary to meet its administrative and financial objectives. The position of the headman in a colonial situation has been well documented for Central Africa (Barnes 1954, Gluckman et al 1949), as well as for the Ciskei (Wilson et al 1952) and the Transkei (Hammond-Tooke 1975). When asked to tell of the history of Chatha, people speak of this history largely in terms of the history of the headmanship. The interplay of the villagers' desire for autonomy and the government's desire for control is embodied in the headmanship, and forms an important part of the way people talk about the history of the headmanship in Chatha.

A focus on the history of the headmanship will enable us to trace the development of two themes which are relevant to our understanding of the impact of Betterment, viz.

- 1) the village's relationship with the authorities. The villager's perception of their relationship with the authorities at the time of Betterment influenced the way in which they perceived and accepted Betterment when it was announced and later implemented. (The implementation of Betterment will be discussed in Chapter Five)
- 2) the development of political groupings in the village up to the time of Betterment. An understanding of the nature of political groupings before Betterment will help us to account for the impact of Betterment upon village politics.

Three main themes emerge in people's accounts of the history of the headmanship, and in discussion about specific headmen. These themes are

- 1) the right of the Jama lineage to the headmanship of Chatha on genealogical grounds, and that this right was taken away by government intervention. The use of the term "lineage" will be discussed in Chapter Four, but for present purposes may be briefly

defined as those agnates descended from a common male ancestor four or five generations back, who live in the same village. In Chatha, people usually trace themselves back to the male ancestor who settled in Chatha, and regard him as their founding ancestor

- 2) the importance of two territorially based factions within the village in contests for the headmanship
- 3) the power of the authorities to intervene in the villagers' perceived right to elect their own headmen, and the fact that on a number of occasions, the authorities did in fact intervene.

In tracing the development of these themes, I shall be making use of archival, academic and oral sources. Archival sources give us i) access to a time-depth which is greater than the memories of current-day informants, and so help us to place these oral sources within historical perspective. ii) (selective) access to the perceptions of officials, as well as of villagers appearing before them to testify or to submit petitions, as to what was happening at the time. Oral sources give us access to currently held perceptions as to what happened in the past. The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey provides us with an academic judgement of the processes at work in the headmanship at the time at which our inquiry ends, viz. 1950. I, as analyst, will be trying to weave these strands together to form my own perception of the history of the headmanship in Chatha. In Geertz's terms, "we begin with our own interpretations of what our informants are up to, or think they are up to, and then systematise those" (Geertz 1974, p 15) into a "web of significance" (ibid, p 5). In this case I shall be trying to unravel and relate these various perceptions of the history of the headmanship in Chatha into some kind of coherent web.

#### THE ADMINISTRATIVE SETTING

After the Xhosa had been expelled from the area of what now constitutes the Middledrift and Keiskammahoek areas of the Ciskei, (then known as British Kaffraria), the area was declared to be a "Royal Reserve or Domain", designated the "Crown Reserve" (Jubb, nd(a), p 50), and provision was made for the establishment of a village at what is now Keiskammahoek (Jubb, nd(a), p 50). Keiskammahoek fell under a sub-magistracy of the Magistracy of King



William's Town, which was established in 1853 at what is now Middledrift (Jubb, nd(b), p 52), although the Crown Reserve appears to have had its own Magistrate as well. The relationship between the Magistracies of King William's Town and the Crown Reserve is unclear. In 1866, both the districts of Keiskammahoek, which seems to have its own Commissioner from 1865 (Jubb nd(b), p 11), and Middledrift, were incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Divisional Council of King William's Town (Jubb, nd(a), p 67). The Incorporation of British Kaffraria into the Cape Colony took place in 1867 (Jubb, nd(b), p 11). The offices of Civil Commissioner (who administered the divisional council areas of magisterial districts) and Magistrate were combined, being held by the same official - hence correspondence was directed to the "Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, King William's Town". In 1910, the Cape Colony was incorporated into the Union of South Africa.


Up to 1928, Keiskammahoek was under the control of the Department of Justice of the Union of South Africa. On the 1st October 1928, it was formally taken over by the Department of Native Affairs. "The then Magistrate of the sub-district and other members of staff automatically became officers of the Department of Native Affairs; the Magistrate was given the dual title of Magistrate and Native Commissioner. The area of jurisdiction remained a sub-district of King William's Town for judicial purposes, but, as far as Native interests were to be concerned, the Native Commissioner was to be responsible to the Chief Native Commissioner of the Ciskei" (Jubb, nd(b), p 13).

Keiskammahoek attained the status of an independent Magistracy in 1937 (Jubb, nd(b), p 13), with the Magistrate retaining both roles of Magistrate and Native Commissioner, being addressed by either title as the occasion demanded.

#### THE EARLY HEADMANSHIP

In 1854, when Jama and his following arrived at Keiskammahoek, having been despatched by the authorities from Fort Peddie,<sup>2</sup> they were settled at Ngqudeya, in the Gwili-Gwili valley near Keiskammahoek.<sup>3</sup> Soon afterwards, the area in which Jama had settled was granted to

GENEALOGY No.1. Showing the Genealogical Relationship Between Members of the Jama Lineage Involved (or Potentially Involved) in the Headmanship of Chatha.



(\* these names are pseudonyms)

(Note: Informants disagree as to whether Filpas' mother was married to Poni, or was his concubine. Informants also disagree as to whether Zazini was a polygynist, and whether Dlabathi was older or younger than Myalo.)

German settlers by the colonial authorities, and Jama and his followers moved to what is now the Chatha area.<sup>4</sup>

Archival sources do not tell us much about Jama's headmanship. He was one of the Mfengu headmen present at the meeting with Colonel MacLean, the Chief Commissioner for the Crown Reserve area of British Kaffraria, in 1856, at which the headmen and chiefs of the Crown Reserve expressed their opposition to the Administration's intention to grant individual title-deeds on a freehold basis. They objected on the grounds that it would seriously undermine the authority of headmen and chiefs.<sup>5</sup>

Jama died and was succeeded by his eldest son Siswana. (see Genealogy No.1) He died and was succeeded by his younger brother Bucani, who was imprisoned and dismissed for "condoning felony". The Assistant Resident Magistrate reported "having had great difficulty in finding a suitable man to replace him".<sup>6</sup> The genealogy of the Jama family suggests that there was no one as yet old enough to succeed to the headmanship. A relative of the Jama family, Nonqane Mqalo, was brought from Alice to take over the headmanship in 1871.<sup>7</sup>

There is some uncertainty as to the exact dates of the headmanships of Jama, Siswana and Bucani. Official records mention Siswana as headman in 1862.<sup>8</sup>

Two statements submitted to the authorities (in 1874 and in 1883) suggest that Siswana died in about 1868, and that Bucani was dismissed after a few years in office.<sup>9</sup>

Oral accounts of the initial stages of the headmanship are understandably not very detailed, stressing themes such as the move from Peddie to Ngqudeya, and the subsequent move to Chatha. Several informants mention that Chatha was given to Jama in exchange for the land at Ngqudeya, and that it was "the land of the gift", given as a reward for Mfengu support during the Frontier Wars against the Xhosa. The main point stressed in the oral account of the early headmanship, is the role of the Jama line in establishing the headmanship, and their right to it.

#### THE HEADMANSHIP OF NONQANE MQALO (1871-1884)

In 1871, after Bucani's dismissal, Nonqane Mqalo, a relative of the

Jama family, was brought from Alice to take over as headman as Jama's son Zazini was not yet of age. The Acting Resident Magistrate at the time suggested that he "selected Nonqane, the present Headman, son of the Fingoe Chief Mqalo...of the same tribe as Jama."<sup>10</sup> Oral accounts on the other hand, suggest that Nonqane was chosen by the men of Chatha, as the closest available lineal relative. It is not clear what the relationship was, but Mqalo was definitely of the same clan as Jama, i.e. Dlamini. Nor is it clear whether Mqalo was to act as a caretaker until there was a Jama old enough to rule, or whether he was to be permanently appointed.<sup>11</sup>

In 1873, Zazini, the only eligible son of Jama, was circumcised. His supporters took him to the Acting Magistrate, seeking his appointment as headman. He was told to wait for five years, as he was still too young.<sup>12</sup> The Acting Magistrate's comments in a subsequent communication to his superiors indicate that he favoured Nonqane, and that he was antagonistic to Zazini's case ("I wouldn't recommend anybody supported by Cata...some of the thieves and worst men of the location support him." Whereas "the Cata was one of the worst Locations in the Keiskammahoek District, constant thefts of stock being traced into it...(from the time of Nonqane's appointment) thefts at the Cata have been very rare").<sup>13</sup> In 1874, Zazini again appealed unsuccessfully to the Magistrate to be awarded the headmanship.<sup>14</sup>

Zazini's chance came (or so he thought) in 1878, when Nonqane was suspended, and Zazini was appointed headman, as he claimed, permanently.<sup>15</sup> Ten months later, however, Nonqane was re-appointed. The matter was complicated by a rapid turnover of Acting Magistrates at the time: Nonqane was dismissed by one Magistrate, Zazini appointed by a second, and Nonqane re-appointed by yet a third.<sup>16</sup>

Matters came to a head in 1883. In July of that year, Zazini submitted a petition to the Acting Magistrate, claiming the headmanship upon the grounds that Nonqane had been appointed on the understanding that he would only serve as acting headman until Zazini was old enough to take over, and that he (Zazini) had been permanently appointed in 1878.<sup>17</sup> The petition carried 52 signatures. This resulted in an investigation being held before the Acting Resident Magistrate in August 1883.



Both parties had taken attorneys and drawn up statements, Nonqane's statement carrying 31 signatures. Zazini claimed that he held the hereditary right to the headmanship, and that Nonqane had been appointed in an acting capacity for Zazini. Nonqane on the other hand argued that he had been permanently appointed, that no well-founded complaint had ever been made against him, and that Zazini's hereditary claim had not been established, as Siswana's son and not Siswana's brother (i.e. Zazini) was entitled to succeed to the headmanship. Siswana's son was still under age at the time. Headmanship was (so Nonqane argued) moreover not hereditary, but the Government had the right to appoint headmen.<sup>18</sup>

The Acting Magistrate found that Zazini's arguments were "correct", suggesting to higher authority that it was better to control the people through a headman of their own choice.<sup>19</sup> Zazini's claim was upheld, and in 1884 he became headman.

Zazini clearly enjoyed greater support than Nonqane. This greater support was most probably rooted in his superior hereditary claim to the headmanship, as a Jama, rather than merely as a member of the Dlamini clan. Nonqane was in any event an outsider, who had only been living in Chatha for 12 years. To make sense of the nature of the support for the two contestants, which cut across clan and lineage lines, it is necessary to look at how residential patterns were developing approximately 25 years after Chatha had first been settled. In the words of one current-day informant, "people spread out so that they could have grazing for their cattle." The resulting residential pattern was a number of separate clusters of huts, each focused on the immediate availability of resources, such as wood, water and arable land. These clusters of huts were strung out along the ridges of the hills in typical Cape Nguni fashion (Hunter 1936, p 1). Since sons often set up their homesteads near those of their fathers, these clusters usually consisted of households belonging to one or a few lineages. The 1883 petition lists show evidence of such localised lineage groupings beginning to develop.

Over time these residential clusters took on a political aspect, functioning as sub-units for administrative purposes and for the allocation of resources such as arable and grazing land within the village. These iziphaluka (sing. isiphaluka) or village-sections, each

elected their own sub-headmen, who represented the interests of their section at village level, and served as councillors to the headman (The functioning of these village-sections as they existed in 1950, is discussed in Wilson et al 1952, chapter 1). In this manner, six village-sections have developed over time in Chatha, viz. Nyanga, Ndela, Nyokane, Rawule, Jili and Skafu. Their spatial distribution is shown in Fig. No.1 in Appendix A.

Of the 52 names on the petition supporting Zazini, informants have been able to identify 42 in terms of their village-section, and have similarly identified 21 of the 31 supporters of Nonqane. (Current-day informants in the early 1980's are perhaps transposing their 1980's conception of village-section onto the 1883 situation and names, but are at least identifying the residential clusters where those supporters of Zazini and Nonqane lived. We cannot accurately know what political or other significance people ascribed to their residential clusters in 1883).

The residential/village-section distribution of Zazini's and Nonqane's supporters may be represented in tabular form, as follows:

<u>Supporters of Zazini</u>	<u>Village-Section</u>	<u>Supporters of Nonqane</u>
13	Nyanga	4
6	Ndela	1
6	Nyokane	2
6	Rawule	9
7	Jili	5
4	Skafu	0
10	Unspecified	10
<hr/> 52		<hr/> 31

Nyanga was the section where the Jama lineage lived, and was strongly identified with this lineage, being referred to by informants as "the side (i.e. place) of Jama", as the seat of the headmanship. Nonqane lived in Rawule. Both Zazini and Nonqane received their strongest support from their own sections, as might be expected. The rest of Zazini's support is spread fairly evenly throughout the village, while Nonqane's support is more confined to his own section

and to the neighbouring section of Jili. (It is worth mentioning that from Nyanga, Jili is the only village-section that cannot be seen as it is hidden by the ridges and the village-section in between them. Nyanga likewise is invisible from Jili. As we shall see later, political competition within Chatha came to take on the form of an opposition centred on Nyanga and Jili). As Nonqane had been living in Chatha for only 12 years, it makes sense that he had succeeded in building up only local support. His relatively high support from Nyanga may perhaps be explained by the fact that he was closely related to the Jama lineage, and had indeed been brought to Chatha for that very reason. Some people may have supported Nonqane in 1883 to keep the headmanship open for Siswana's side of the Jama lineage until Siswana's son had attained majority, and away from Zazini's side of the lineage.

The differing sources of support for Zazini and Nonqane suggest that the residential clusters/village-sections were beginning to emerge as significant interest groups within the village.

The oral account of Nonqane's headmanship is not very detailed. Some accounts of the history of Chatha do not mention him at all. Those that do, mention that he was called in because there was no Jama available to take over the headmanship at the time. Several informants recall that there was some kind of trouble during his term of office, but are vague as to its nature. No one recalled the confrontation with Zazini, even when specifically asked about it. This is perhaps not surprising as these events took place over 100 years ago, and the headmanship was restored to the Jama lineage immediately afterwards. As we shall see later, one of the major events in the telling of Chatha's history by its inhabitants, from all village-sections, is the loss of the headmanship by the Jama lineage in 1912, as the result of magisterial intervention. This, rather than the interregnum of a relative in the absence of an available member of the Jama lineage, is what people have remembered.

What is significant about Nonqane's headmanship is that it shows that residential clusters and territorial groupings were beginning to take on political significance. These groupings were to feature prominently in future contests around the headmanship, and form a central part of informants' perception of such contests. The majority

of the village wanted Zazini as headman, for reasons which may have related to the fact that he was Jama's son and therefore had a hereditary right to the headmanship. Other reasons may have included 1) the fact that having been in Chatha longer, the Jama lineage had built up a more effective base of support, 2) Nonqane had sought to control cattle-theft, and this may have cost him some support, 3) Nonqane was being kept in office by the authorities, and thus may have been seen as representing their interests, rather than those of the people of Chatha. Whatever the reasons for Zazini's support may have been, he and his supporters consistently framed his argument to the authorities in genealogical terms, i.e. that as a Jama, he was entitled to the headmanship. This was the first time that the "Jama ideology" had had to be explicitly formulated, as Nonqane was the first non-Jama headman, and the first headman around whom there had been any real controversy. In this way Nonqane's term of office seems to have helped give rise to and strengthen the idea that the Jama lineage had a right to the headmanship.

#### THE HEADMANSHIP OF ZAZINI JAMA (1884-1902)

Zazini Jama became headman of Chatha in 1884, and the archival record has little to say about the first 13 years of his term of office. In 1897, Zazini became involved in a protracted dispute with the Village Management Board of Keiskammahoek Village about the boundary between Chatha and Keiskammahoek Village. This dispute dragged on for several years, its resolution not being of any great political or territorial significance.<sup>20</sup>

In 1897, Zazini's nephew Poni (the son of Siswana, and now of age) made an attempt to take over the headmanship. Poni's supporters submitted a petition to the Secretary of Native Affairs, claiming that Zazini was unfit to rule, and that he, Poni, had the right to the headmanship, on genealogical grounds. The petition was signed by Poni and 51 others.<sup>21</sup> The Magistrate regarded the petition in a poor light, noting that "I have never heard any complaints against him (Zazini)...of the 52 signatures, 32 are taxpayers, and the rest are apparently irresponsible young men in the location."<sup>22</sup>

Poni's attempt indicates that he enjoyed some, although not



majority, support in the village, probably from people who wished to re-assert the seniority of Siswana's side of the Jama lineage over that of Zazini's. The distribution of Poni's supporters may be represented as follows:

<u>Village Section</u>	<u>Supporters</u>
Nyanga	9
Ndela	14
Nyokane	4
Rawule	15
Jili	5
Skafu	0
Unspecified	5
	<hr/> 52

Poni predictably received support from Nyanga (his own village-section) and from Rawule (Nonqane's village-section, which had lost the headmanship to Zazini). Poni's sister had married into a Ndela family, and this probably partly explains his support from Ndela. It is not clear why Poni received so much support from Ndela. Poni's challenge does not involve a contest between village-sections, clans or lineages, and it does show the growing coherence of Rawule under the influence of the Mqalo lineage. (It is noteworthy that five of the people who signed Nonqane's petition in 1883 - including Nonqane himself - signed Poni's petition). Rawule gave Poni thirty percent of his support in a contest in which it had little to gain, other than the revival of an old grudge. Poni's support from a village-section not directly involved (in this case, Ndela) again indicates the growing political coherence of the village-section.

The oral record does not say much about Zazini. A descendent of Siswana states that Zazini was to act in Poni's place until he came of age - an interpretation which may well have been coloured by his own position. Several informants see him as succeeding Jama, without mentioning the intervening headmanships of Siswana, Bucani or Nonqane. People claimed not to know of Poni's challenge, even when asked directly. Informants holding these perceptions would have been boys

or teenagers in the 1920's, when the Jama lineage was involved in a concerted effort to wrest the headmanship back from the Sitshitshi lineage, to whom they had lost it through the intervention of the Magistrate in 1912. At this time, the descendants of both Siswana and Zazini were working together, with a united Nyanga and what appears to have been most of Chatha behind them. The oral history and the gossip these informants would have imbibed as youngsters, would have emphasised the unity of the Jama lineage, and the major figures who served as headmen, underplaying or leaving out past divisions (Poni's challenge) and interruptions (Nonqane's headmanship).

#### THE HEADMANSHIP OF MYALO JAMA (1902-1910)

On Zazini's death in 1902,<sup>23</sup> his son Myalo became headman. Official documentation states that "the residents of Cata location were unanimous in nominating Samuel (i.e. Myalo) for appointment."<sup>24</sup> Oral accounts state that Myalo was chosen by the people, and not by the Magistrate. People suggest that Poni was entitled to the headmanship, being of the senior house of the Jama lineage, but that he was not interested in the headmanship, as he was a herbalist at the time. Poni's apparent lack of interest in the headmanship is however thrown into question by claims he later made in 1906 to the effect that people had chosen Myalo above him as they had wanted a younger person whom they could mould to suit their purposes.<sup>25</sup> For whatever reasons, Myalo seems to have been the people's choice for headman. Informants are divided as to whether Myalo was older or younger than his half-brother Dlabathi, and also as to whether Zazini had been a polygynist or not, and if so, whether Myalo's or Dlabathi's mother had been the senior wife.

In May 1905, a group of men were reported to the government forester at Chatha, for allegedly hunting illegally in the forest above Chatha. Among the members of the group was Nelani, who was Poni's full brother, and so Myalo's cousin. Myalo was alleged by the forester to have gone to him and asked him to overlook the matter. In November 1905, an inquiry took place into Myalo's conduct relating to the hunting episode. At this stage, official sympathy had clearly swung away from Myalo, who was seen by the District Forest Officer as

"not in sympathy with such efforts, apparently (i.e. to control hunting). He is plainly either unable, or unwilling to keep his people in control."<sup>26</sup> During the inquiry, Poni gave evidence which strongly contrasted with that given by Myalo and Nelani, and which served to incriminate them.<sup>27</sup>

Soon afterwards Myalo was suspended from the headmanship for six months with effect from the beginning of 1906,<sup>28</sup> and one Cekiso Tontsi (one of Myalo's sub-headmen) acted informally as headman. Early in March 1906, two meetings were held, at which an acting headman was elected. Cekiso obtained 69 votes and Poni 25 votes, and Cekiso was installed as acting headman.<sup>29</sup>

Oral accounts do not make it clear why the villagers should have chosen Cekiso Tontsi instead of Poni, who was the senior male of the Jama lineage. The village may have felt that it was safest in terms of relations with the authorities to go along with the man who was already acting headman, and would in any event, only be temporary. On the other hand Poni's evidence had in a sense betrayed Myalo, and was probably seen by the people at the time as instrumental in his suspension. I suggest that in the face of outside interference, the village was closing ranks behind Myalo and against Poni. Cekiso, not being a Jama, constituted no real threat to Myalo's headmanship. Poni, on the other hand, had shown an interest in the headmanship before, and having a superior genealogical claim to Myalo, would be more difficult to dislodge at the end of Myalo's suspension.

In August 1906, soon after Myalo had been re-instated, Poni made yet another attempt to obtain the headmanship. A petition was drawn up and submitted through a local lawyer to the Department of Native Affairs, requesting the appointment of Poni as headman. The petition, carrying 81 signatures, claimed that Myalo had "failed to carry out the duties required of him as headman, and...has consequently been suspended" and that Poni was entitled to the headmanship of Chatha, "being entitled thereto by Native law and custom, as the direct and lineal descendant of Jama."<sup>30</sup>

The timing of the petition was perhaps unfortunate for Poni. The petition was leaving Keiskammahoek at about the same time as the official approval of Myalo's reinstatement was leaving Pretoria for Keiskammahoek.<sup>31</sup> The Department of Native Affairs argued that "the

petition discloses no grounds which would justify the Government in departing from the decision already arrived at" and upheld Myalo's reinstatement.<sup>32</sup> It would presumably serve no purpose to spark off another competition for the headmanship. This could only aggravate factional instability in the village, and undermine the Government's disciplining of Myalo, as well as its image and authority among the people.

Nyanga	25
Ndela	17
Nyokane	10
Rawule	17
Jili	6
Skafu	2
Uncertain	<u>4</u>
	81


Poni's strongest support came from the village-sections of Nyanga, Ndela and Rawule. Half of his support from inside Nyanga came from the hamlet of Mfaca, the home of two lineages, viz. Mfaca and Mgujulwa. In the hamlet of Mfaca, a certain Mpumpuse Mgujulwa had his home. Mpumpuse was the forest guard who had had to catch the poachers that Myalo had allegedly sheltered during the hunting episode which had led to Myalo's suspension in 1905. Mpumpuse had been attacked (allegedly by Myalo's supporters) while on his way to report the matter to the authorities. He had been one of the chief witnesses at the inquiry in 1905. His position had been made rather complicated by the fact that he was Myalo's uncle (Mpumpuse's sister was Myalo's mother, see Genealogy No.2), and at the inquiry he must have been torn between loyalty to his superiors and to his nephew and headman. Mpumpuse's difficult position as a result of Myalo's apparent attempt to cover up for the hunters, while his (Mpumpuse's) testimony incriminated the hunters, was probably an important reason why the hamlet of Mfaca supported Poni's attempt to oust Myalo in 1906.

As in 1897, his support from Ndela probably stemmed from his affinal links there. Support from Rawule still seems to have centred



GENEALOGY No.2. Showing the Relationship Between Mpumpuse Mgujulwa and Myalo Jama.

(Zazini married Nobhokuva, who was Mpumpuse's sister.  
Mpumpuse was therefore Myalo's mother's brother)



around Nonqane's struggle with Zazini. Nonqane himself and two other members of the Mqalo lineage supported Poni, and most of the people from Rawule supporting Poni in 1906 were members of lineages that had also supported Poni in 1897. In addition, two of the supporters from Rawule were members of Mpumpuse Mgujulwa's lineage.

The data suggested by the petition is not very conclusive, except to indicate the coherence of Rawule behind Nonqane Mqalo, and to show that a large section of Ndela was still backing Poni - probably because of his affinal ties there. Skafu, as the home of Cekiso Tontsi, Myalo's sub-headman (who acted during his suspension), was unlikely to support Poni. Nyanga, the home once more of both incumbent and challenger, cast its support along the lines of personal relationships, with Mpumpuse providing a large part of Poni's support from Nyanga.

What value this petition may have as an indicator of Poni's support must however be modified by the fact that the people had preferred Cekiso Tontsi as acting headman, by 69 votes to 25. The support of several important lineages in Nyanga is missing from the list of Poni's supporters. Poni clearly did not enjoy majority support (in 1902 there were 221 huts in Chatha,<sup>33</sup> and in 1911 there were 299 hut tax payers<sup>34</sup>. This does not necessarily mean that there were between 220 and 300 adult men in Chatha in 1906, of whom only 80 signed the petition. A number of homesteads would have had more than one hut associated with them, and a number of males - heads of household and others - would have been working away as migrant labourers at the time. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Poni did not have the majority of Chatha behind him.)

His support was concentrated in three village-sections (Nyanga, Ndela and Rawule), to which he had personal links, whether through residence, affinal ties, or a common grudge against Myalo. Although a large percentage of people in these village-sections did not support Poni's petition, what is significant is that his personal links to these village-sections could call forth support from them significantly higher than from other village-sections. This again points to the growing importance of village-sections as foci of political support. The almost total absence of support from Skafu (the home of Cekiso Tontsi) suggests some kind of political solidarity

there as well.

The oral record makes no mention of Poni's attempt to oust Myalo in 1906. As with Poni's attempt to oust Zazini in 1897, it changed nothing. In view of the more important crises which were to face Myalo and the Jama lineage from 1909 onwards, when the headmanship was effectively lost to the Jama lineage through the intervention of government officials, it is not surprising that informants recalling past events from the perspective of the 1980's, do not recall events which had no real impact on the course of the headmanship.

It is not clear why Poni did not enjoy the support of the majority of the people of Chatha in his various attempts to gain the headmanship. Oral accounts make it clear that he enjoyed genealogical superiority to Myalo. Yet "the residents of Cata location were unanimous in nominating Samuel (i.e. Myalo) for appointment" as headman in 1902,<sup>35</sup> although Poni had allegedly laid claim to the headmanship at that time as well.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Cekiso had been preferred to Poni during Myalo's suspension in 1906.

Oral accounts suggest that Poni was not really interested in the headmanship until after Myalo's dismissal as he (Poni) was a herbalist. We know however that he tried several times to become headman. The narrators who suggest this reason for Poni's lack of interest in the headmanship may perhaps be rationalising his lack of political success. However, it seems clear that Poni was a herbalist. Whether people regarded him as unsuitable for headmanship because he was a herbalist, or whether there were other factors involved, such as his personality, must remain a matter of speculation.

Myalo was soon to be in trouble with the authorities again. On the 31st of December 1909, the Secretary for Native Affairs authorised the "withholding of his allowance for a period of six months from the 1st idem and that the question of his reinstatement will depend upon his conduct and upon the manner in which he discharges his duty in the interim."<sup>37</sup> On the 18th of March 1910, the Secretary for Native Affairs decided that Myalo was to be taken as dismissed for misconduct as of the 1st of September 1909, i.e. retrospectively.<sup>38</sup>

What had Myalo done? According to a memorandum drawn up by the Department of Native Affairs, Myalo was seen to be guilty of three charges of misconduct.

In March 1909, a certain "Tete of Jama's Location had wilfully misrepresented to residents facts in connection with the Government's decision to collect grazing fees from the Location residents". The Assistant Resident Magistrate of Keiskammahoek "drew attention to the class of men he had to deal with, and added that Jama was even worse, and quite unfit to hold the position of headman, so that the greatest difficulty was experienced in carrying out the decision of the Government". At this stage the Magistracy in Keiskammahoek and King William's Town was clearly displeased with Myalo and they took him to be responsible for Tete's misconduct.

On the 30th August 1909, "Jama was convicted on a charge of contravening GN 642/1899 in having ploughed a portion of the Commonage without the sanction of the Inspector of Locations and he was fined £2 or 3 weeks impt. Jama's defence was that he had received the Inspector's permission". And, on the same day (30/9/1909) "5 residents of the Location were charged with having erected new kraals without permission. In these cases also Jama, in admitting that he had given permission to build, stated that the Inspector had approved. This the Inspector denied and was believed by the Magistrate".

The (Assistant Resident) Magistrate had recommended Myalo's dismissal as he had previously been suspended, and this recommendation had been supported by higher authority.<sup>39</sup>

What does the oral record say about Myalo's headmanship? Accounts vary as to why Myalo actually left the headmanship. Reasons given are

- 1) that there was a quarrel with the authorities about Myalo's involvement with hunting activities (it is stated in several cases that Myalo himself did the hunting)
- 2) that he had given people land without consulting the village council
- 3) reasons which the narrator cannot remember
- 4) that Myalo died in office
- 5) that a rumour was concocted to the effect that Myalo had been hunting, and that the purpose of this rumour was to get Myalo removed from office and to have one of his sub-headmen, Ngxaza Sitshitshi, installed.

The majority of cases refer to the hunting episode, and it is interesting that Myalo is seen to have been dismissed from office



because of hunting (which led to his temporary suspension) and not for obstructing the collection of grazing fees, for ploughing commonage without permission and for lying about having obtained permission for his people to extend their kraals (the reasons stated by the Magistrate). These activities are not raised in the oral accounts. People claimed not to have known about these charges when asked about them.

Except for one brief reference to his suspension, and a possible reference to the inquiry, the oral accounts also do not refer to various major events during Myalo's headmanship, such as the inquiry in 1905, his suspension and re-instatement, and the petition against him and in favour of Poni in 1906.

Why should reference not be made to these major events, or to the reasons for Myalo's dismissal? The hunting episode seems to be seen as the event which actually led to Myalo's loss of favour with the authorities, and so to his downfall. Other events, such as ploughing Municipal commonage without permission, have probably not been mentioned or remembered, as they were seen as incidental to the real cause, i.e. the hunting episode. Similarly, all the events around the hunting episode, such as the inquiry, the different evidence of Poni and Myalo, the suspension and the re-instatement were merely the finer details around the real issue. The important point about Myalo's headmanship (and this is stated in the oral records) is that it lost the Jamas the headmanship and incurred the lasting disfavour of the authorities towards the Jama family. Poni and later on, his son Filpas, were seen to be unable to become headmen, because the Magistrate was thought not to want a Jama as headman.

The perception of Myalo's headmanship can however only be more fully understood when it is seen in relation to, and as in competition with, the headmanship of his effective successor, Ngxaza Sitshitshi. Ngxaza was sub-headman for the village-section of Jili under Myalo and until he (Ngxaza) became headman in 1912. Myalo and his supporters were to contest Ngxaza's headmanship several times until Ngxaza's death in 1930. From the time of Ngxaza's headmanship until the appointment of Makhosana in 1950, political competition within Chatha came to take on the form of an opposition between the village-sections of Nyanga and Jili. This seems to be a development of the opposition

between Rawule and Nyanga reflected during the headmanship of Nonqane, and in Poni's attempts to unseat Zazini and Myalo. The tension between Nyanga and Jili is reflected in oral accounts of the headmanship.

One reason given for Myalo's dismissal was that a rumour had been created to the effect that Myalo had been hunting, and that the purpose of this rumour had been to replace Myalo with his sub-headman, Ngxaza Sitshitshi. This reason for Myalo's dismissal was given by a member of the Jama family, and the implication is that the rumour was started by the people of Jili, in order to install their own man as headman.

Another example of this tension is an alleged intrigue of which I was told by informants who had lived in Nyanga and in Jili before Betterment. The fullest version of the intrigue is as follows.

"Nobhokuva Jama (Myalo's mother) was a friend of Ngxaza Sitshitshi. Sitshitshi made a plan (i.e. to gain the headmanship). He borrowed Zazini's certificate of headmanship, telling her that he wanted to help Myalo (i.e. out of his trouble with the Magistrate). She then gave the certificate to him. Sitshitshi took the certificate (book) and went to the Magistrate with some men.

They said to the Magistrate that Myalo had given the books to Sitshitshi so that Sitshitshi could become headman, because Myalo was still young. Then the Magistrate kept the book and Myalo had no certificate to headmanship. They then dismissed Myalo and replaced him with Sitshitshi.

Then the people came in and said they did not want Sitshitshi, signing a declaration. The Magistrate said 'I want Sitshitshi'."

Another version implicates Nobhokuva even more directly in the loss of the headmanship by the Jama lineage:

"Ngxaza came to the headmanship because he was put there by a woman called Nobhokuva Jama - thus Ngxaza obtained the seat of the Jamas".

The story certainly seems improbable, as Myalo would certainly have had his own certificate of headmanship rather than his father Zazini's, and as the Magistrate would not simply have accepted Sitshitshi's declaration without further investigation. However, the story is interesting, for various reasons.

It does not regard the consequences of the hunting episode as the

central cause of Myalo's downfall - the blame is shifted onto the deceit of others, whether Nobhokuva Jama, or Ngxaza Sitshitshi, or both. It also implies collaboration between Sitshitshi (and Jili) and the Magistrate, against Myalo (and Nyanga). Dlabathi's headmanship (Myalo's brother, who succeeded him as headman) is overlooked in the story. The headmanship is seen as having passed straight from Myalo to Ngxaza, and so, from Nyanga to Jili. Both these alleged episodes (the hunting rumour and the intrigue) serve to emphasise the perception of the headmanship as an ongoing process of competition between Nyanga and Jili.

#### THE HEADMANSHIP OF DLABATHI JAMA (1910-1912)

Dlabathi Jama (Myalo's half-brother) succeeded Myalo as headman. Between Myalo's dismissal in April 1910 and Dlabathi's appointment in June 1910, the duties of headman had been shared by Ngxaza Sitshitshi and Cekiso Tontsi. It is not clear from official sources whether a vote took place between Dlabathi and another candidate, although the Assistant Resident Magistrate stated that "After consulting the wishes of the residents of the Location, I beg to recommend the appointment of Jeremiah Zazini (i.e. Dlabathi) as Headman".<sup>40</sup> Oral accounts suggest that he was nominated unopposed.

After a brief period in office, Dlabathi became ill, resigning on the 1st of June 1912, and dying soon afterwards.<sup>41</sup> As his term of office is brief, it is understandable that the oral record says very little about him, other than that he served as headman. Several informants omitted him in their listing of Chatha's headmen. Poni does not appear to have contested Dlabathi's nomination, and it may be assumed that Dlabathi enjoyed majority support in the same way as his half-brother Myalo had.

#### THE-HEADMANSHIP OF NGXAZA SITSHITSHI (1912-1930)

When Dlabathi resigned, Ngxaza Sitshitshi who had been sub-headman of Jili under Myalo, and also under Dlabathi, became acting headman on the Assistant Magistrate's recommendation.<sup>42</sup>

Oral accounts suggest that Ngxaza had been Myalo's and Dlabathi's

senior sub-headman. He would therefore have been the logical person to serve as acting headman. (Indeed, Ngxaza and Cekiso had served as acting headman after Myalo's dismissal). This is probably where the story of the intrigue involving Nobhokuva Jama and Ngxaza Sitshitshi originated. With Dlabathi apparently having had no wife or heir, he would probably have been staying in his father's (Zazini) house, as his mother had already died. Myalo was married at the time, and would have had his own household, having been headman for eight years. So when Dlabathi died, Nobhokuva Jama would have been the person who would have given his papers to Ngxaza (who was senior sub-headman), to take down to the Magistrate, telling him of Dlabathi's death. One account states that "After Dlabathi's death, people wanted Poni - Dlabathi's mother stole Dlabathi's papers and gave them to Ngxaza, because he was Dlabathi's senior sub-headman."<sup>43</sup> Hence the view could have arisen that Nobhokuva had been instrumental in Ngxaza's obtaining the headmanship, particularly as several informants suggest strongly that Nobhokuva and Ngxaza had been lovers.

On the 30th of October, 1912, a meeting was held at Chatha, at which a successor to Dlabathi was discussed. The majority of the meeting wanted Poni Jama, while the rest favoured Ngxaza. The Assistant Magistrate at Keiskammahoek wrote to his superior officer at King William's Town, stating that "Solomon (Poni) Jama is not a man of good character. In the past he has taken no interest whatever in the affairs of the location, and for many reasons, his appointment would in my opinion be a great mistake, and would not be in the interests of the Location". Ngxaza Sitshitshi on the other hand "has been acting headman for some time. His fearlessness in carrying out his duties has not been palatable to some of the residents, and this fact, in my opinion, has been the reason for the opposition to his appointment. He has the support of the more progressive natives of the Location, and I have no hesitation in recommending his permanent appointment as headman."<sup>44</sup>

While the people of Chatha were now prepared to support Poni as the only eligible Jama candidate for the headmanship, the Magistrate was looking for a candidate who would serve the interests of orderly administration. For whatever reason, whether because he was closely associated with the out-of-favour Myalo, or because his previous



attempts at obtaining the headmanship had displeased the authorities, Poni Jama was not seen as a suitable candidate by the Magistrate.

Ngxaza Sitshitshi was appointed as headman of Chatha with effect from the 1st of December 1912.<sup>45</sup> There is little documentary data relating to the first nine years of his term of office. From 1921 onward he found himself fighting to retain his headmanship in the face of a substantial onslaught from the Jama family. (Suggestions as to why Ngxaza was only challenged after nine years in office, will be made later.)

In October 1921 a group of 80 men from Chatha went to the Magistrate, requesting to be relieved of the headmanship of Ngxaza Sitshitshi, and to be placed under Myalo Jama. "They stated that Myalo Jama was their Chief and formerly Headman; that he had relinquished the Headmanship in favour of his older brother Dlabathi; that on the latter's death, Ngxaza Sitshitshi had been appointed, and that this appointment had been made without consulting their wishes. Their only objection to Ngxaza Sitshitshi, apparently, is that he is a commoner".<sup>46</sup>

The new Magistrate, E.D. Beale, found evidence in his former colleague's records to the effect that "Myalo Jama was dismissed, and that Dlabathi resigned; but I cannot trace the correspondence."<sup>47</sup> He then asked the Magistrate of King William's Town for information concerning this correspondence, which had been forwarded to King William's Town. King William's Town sent back a summary of the relevant events, which was to serve as Beale's base-line during the rest of Ngxaza's headmanship.

Here we are able to see processes at work in the transmission of documented information, which are similar to the oral transmission of information.

The previous Magistrate of Keiskammahoek's account of the events, together with his judgments and prejudices, had been accepted by the Civil Commissioner at King William's Town, who had backed up the Magistrate's recommendations. The new Magistrate of King William's Town in turn received the Civil Commissioner's account (via the Department of Native Affairs), and passed it on to the new Magistrate of Keiskammahoek, who would have found it acceptable, because it was only confirming his previous colleague's records, and lending them the

force of higher authority.

Late in November 1921 the Magistrate of Keiskammahoek held a meeting at Chatha, and told them what the official memorandum said regarding the dismissal of Myalo Jama, "and I informed them that there was no hope of his being restored to that post. They have now brought up the question afresh in a new form. They allege that the present Headman has been guilty of misbehaviour including drunkenness". The Magistrate recommended that an inquiry be held.<sup>48</sup>

Late in February 1922, the Magistrate held a meeting at Chatha attended by "106 of the principal men". The following charges were brought against Ngxaza:

- 1) corruption in the distribution of lands
- 2) oppression of widows by taking away lands when their husbands died
- 3) autocratic behaviour
- 4) drunkenness.

The Magistrate only found the charge about drunkenness to have any real substance, excusing Ngxaza's alleged autocratic behaviour on the grounds that "In view of the state of affairs that prevailed in the location, the Headman has probably found it necessary to be forceful and dictatorial".

The Magistrate's personal preference emerged clearly when he wrote "It is only fair to say that in the performance of his official duties Ngxaza Sitshitshi has given satisfaction, and is regarded by the Superintendent of Natives as the best Headman under his supervision. Also that underlying the personal complaints against him, is the desire to obtain his removal in order that Myalo Jama may be reinstated, who claims to be of royal blood and has a considerable following. The proposal was again brought forward and I again informed the people emphatically that under no circumstances would I support their request."<sup>49</sup>

In the Middle of April 1922, a meeting took place attended by the Magistrate, the Superintendent of Native Affairs, Myalo Jama and six other men from Chatha.

Myalo said that he found that the people of Chatha wanted him reinstated, and he wanted to know why this was not possible. He had resigned the headmanship in favour of his younger brother Dlabathi on the grounds that Dlabathi had had a better claim to the headmanship as

his (Dlabathi's) mother had been married by Christian rites, whereas Myalo's mother had been married according to Native Custom. Myalo stated that he had not been dismissed, although he had done two things wrong, viz. to plough a piece of commonage without permission and to be suspended for "hiding" a party of hunters.

The Magistrate thereupon told Myalo that he could not be re-appointed as he had been dismissed, and read him the reasons from the memorandum referred to earlier.<sup>50</sup>

Both official and village attitudes were hardening and on the 13th of July 1922 another meeting was held to inquire into complaints against Ngxaza. This meeting was clearly seen as important as it was attended by the Magistrates of both Keiskammahoek and King William's Town, as well as by the Superintendent of Natives. From Chatha, headman Ngxaza Sitshitshi, three sub-headmen and 162 others were present.

Complaints were brought by 11 men and included charges of drunkenness, corruption in land allocation and insults received from Ngxaza. The Magistrate of King William's Town said that he did not find any of the charges proven and "warned Myalo of the possibility of his being removed if he continued to give trouble". The people should respect the present Headman.<sup>51</sup>

Yet another meeting was held at Chatha on the 21st September 1922. At this meeting the people were told that the Department of Native Affairs supported Ngxaza in his headmanship. Ngxaza submitted three applications for "the three lands belonging in her lifetime to Sarah Anne, widow of Zazini Jama and which were being held by Myalo Jama since her death. Sarah Anne died on 25/4/1922". Myalo claimed the right to these lands as he had paid taxes for his mother, and would give them up himself at the end of the year. However, a note in the minutes of the meeting states that Sarah Anne had not paid hut tax for 1921.

Myalo could not give in to Ngxaza in public, so he argued to save face, and to play for time, that he would give them up himself at the end of 1922. However, the Magistrate had the upper hand over Myalo insomuch as Sarah Anne's hut tax was outstanding. "Myalo Jama instructed to give up the lands in question forthwith and the Inkundla (i.e. Ngxaza's inkundla) to deal with them in the usual manner".<sup>52</sup>

That night, on the 21st of September 1922, Ngxaza's huts were burned down - presumably by Myalo's supporters. Officialdom continued to support Ngxaza. The Magistrate wrote to King William's Town asking for £50 as compensation for estimated damages to his property. Two months later, Ngxaza was awarded £25.<sup>53</sup> Myalo was officially notified that he would be held answerable "for any further offence which may be committed against the person or property of Sitshitshi and which may be associated with the agitation against his headmanship." and the Magistrate of King William's Town wrote to the Secretary of Native Affairs that "With regard to Samuel Jama I would recommend that if possible he be banished from the location...There is little doubt that all this trouble is due to agitation stirred by Jama, and the removal of his baneful influence would, I am of opinion, be of lasting good effect".<sup>54</sup> Such banishment was not however effected, and there appears to be no further correspondence on the matter available in the archival records.

From the end of 1925, Ngxaza started taking extensive leave, and one can only speculate that the pressures in Chatha were becoming too severe for him. His place as headman was taken by his son Zwelibanzi. Correspondence with Zwelibanzi when he was in Johannesburg himself shows that he was in good favour with the Magistrate, and that they were co-operating with regard to keeping Ngxaza in office.<sup>55</sup>

In mid-August 1927, a meeting was held between the Magistrate and six men from Chatha. They alleged that Poni Jama had asked Ngxaza at a meeting to restore the headmanship to Myalo Jama. Ngxaza had suggested that they should call a meeting at Poni's homestead and appoint six men to come and discuss the matter with him. When they did so, and requested that he surrender the headmanship, Ngxaza had allegedly refused and had abused them. It seems that at this time Chatha was to obtain representation on the Bunga (the Ciskei General Council) and that a councillor for Chatha was to be elected. Ngxaza's enemies saw this as a chance to get rid of him, by arguing that they wanted their headman to serve on the Bunga. However, Ngxaza was not acceptable. "We consider that the present headman is not suitable. His conduct is improper. We wish to come into the Bunga in a proper manner". The supporters of Myalo wanted a Jama as both headman and councillor. Poni had accordingly asked Ngxaza to resign the



headmanship before the Bunga session started.

The Magistrate's reply was to separate the offices of headmanship and Bunga councillor "I don't know why you should re-open this question of the headmanship in connection with the Bunga. It is not the headmanship which will carry a man into the Council. It is the people's vote. If you wish to adopt the Bunga and make your Chief the Councillor you can do so, even though he is not the headman. I think you should not mix up these two questions, and so spoil the thoughts of the people on coming into the Bunga. Go home and think of what I say." Ngxaza remained on as headman.<sup>56</sup> Poni Jama became the Bunga member for Chatha,<sup>57</sup> although it is not clear whether he was elected unopposed.

On the 9th of February 1930, Ngxaza Sitshitshi died in office.<sup>58</sup>

What is surprising about Ngxaza's headmanship was that, although the village had voted for Poni in preference to Ngxaza in 1912, it was (according to the archival information available) not until 1921 that serious opposition to his headmanship was demonstrated. It is not clear what happened during the first nine years of his headmanship, or what happened in 1921 to give rise to that serious and sustained opposition. If it was so important to have a Jama as headman, then why did the Jama camp wait for nine years before attempting to replace Ngxaza?

Two possible factors, when taken together, may explain the nine year delay, viz. that Ngxaza had in fact been a good headman up to 1921, and that the division in the Jama camp may have delayed a united assault on Ngxaza's headmanship.

Since Ngxaza had been placed in the headmanship by the Magistrate, it would have served no purpose to have challenged him immediately. This gave him a period of protection in which to establish himself. He had been senior sub-headman under Myalo and Dlabathi. This suggested that he was a capable man, who enjoyed the respect of the villagers although he lacked the necessary genealogical credentials. It is quite possible that, as the oral accounts state, he was a good headman, and that once he had established himself under the protection of the Magistrate, people in Nyanga were prepared to give him a chance.

Quite what happened in 1921 that made a large number of people

change their minds, is not clear. Ngxaza may have made some mistakes such as allocating land in a corrupt way - mistakes that incensed people or gave them reason to believe that these mistakes would amount to adequate grounds for the Magistrate to dismiss him. But if this was the case, then it is not clear why such charges were not made in October 1921, but only in February 1922, after the first attempt to remove Ngxaza on the grounds that "he is a commoner" had failed.

The fact that the first attempt to dislodge Ngxaza was on grounds of his being "a commoner" may be significant. There had been a history of tension between Poni on the one hand, and Zazini and his son Myalo on the other, with Poni trying on several occasions to wrest the headmanship from first Zazini, and then Myalo, and with Poni testifying against Myalo at the inquiry in 1905. While Poni seems to have enjoyed less support than Myalo, he (Poni) clearly wanted the headmanship very much. With Myalo effectively out of the reckoning for at least a few years after his dismissal, Poni (as the only available Jama candidate), enjoyed the support of Nyanga and the majority of the village in the election against Ngxaza. He presumably built up some support during the period after Ngxaza's appointment.

However, the movement to dislodge Ngxaza in 1921 sought to replace him with Myalo, not with Poni. Given the previous tensions within the Jama lineage, this would suggest that Myalo's and Poni's followers had for a time been unable to come to an agreement as to who should be the Jama candidate to challenge Ngxaza. Until the Jamas had sorted out their internal differences, they could not make an effective attempt to regain the headmanship. The fact that the first charge against Ngxaza in 1921 was that he was a "commoner", seems to suggest that there was now a united "non-commoner" (i.e. Jama) front. Whether this Jama unity was hastened by mistakes Ngxaza may have made, in or about 1921, must remain a matter of speculation.

Once the attack on Ngxaza began, the ideology of the right of the Jama lineage to the headmanship was openly mobilised as a resource in the struggle. The fact that it was only mobilised after nine years suggests that, although the right of the Jamas to the Headmanship was an important aspect of many people's thinking in Chatha, it was by no means an absolute consideration. While the Jamas were fighting among themselves, Ngxaza got on with the job. And the people were

apparently content to let him get on with it.

What judgment does the oral record pass on Ngxaza? As may be expected, Nyanga spokesman judged Ngxaza much more harshly than men from Jili. For example:

"He took all the lands and gave them to the people he liked...all the people of Jili and Mqhomo (a family) were given the other people's lands...the lands called Jili were the lands of Jili's people which Sitshitshi took from other people...people of Nyanga and Ndela could not have fields there."

And again from a Nyanga informant:

"He was drinking a lot...he did not just give lands (equitably) to people, if someone came and gave him a bottle of brandy, he would give that man the field."

Jili informants underplay at the charges against Ngxaza:

"Yes, he was a drunkard, but he drank when he had come from the offices (in Keiskammahoek), but in all his work he was always correct. He would firstly go to the office and finish his work. Afterwards he would drink." The charge of drunkenness is not denied, but is directed away from the headmanship. "He was a good headman...so was his son Zwelibanzi".

Similarly it is not denied that Ngxaza received gifts, but this is not described as bribery. "In those days the headman was sometimes presented with a sheep or a cow for arranging somebody's affairs, and some people would say the headman had been bought - but there has been no headman who has had a charge laid against him on this score - they would just say it was a gift." Receiving gifts is part of headmanship, it is argued, and not any crime specific to Ngxaza Sitshitshi.

The people of Nyanga were seen as being unreasonable in demanding his resignation. "They were demanding the headmanship for the Jamas, and there was no reason for it...it was like a vote with no reason."

Ngxaza Sitshitshi was not the first and certainly not the last headman to be involved in doubtful or unpopular land transactions, or to receive gifts or to drink too much. Why then was there such a sustained campaign against him?

The argument from both Nyanga and Jili camps is that the people wanted a Jama. "The people didn't want Ngxaza because he was not the

blood man (i.e. of the correct lineage). Myalo was the blood man...The people wanted Myalo because he was a man among men, and he was Zazini's son" (a Nyanga informant). One Nyanga informant intimates that Ngxaza's real crime was not so much what he was or did, but what he was not - a Jama.

"There was jealousy between Jama and Sitshitshi" says a Jili informant, "because the people wanted Jama (i.e. Myalo) and the Magistrate did not want him...Ngxaza was not of the Jama family". Even Jili informants acknowledge that the majority of village was in favour of Myalo and against Ngxaza. Apart from the fact that he was not a Jama, Ngxaza was acknowledged by people of various village-sections, including Nyanga, to have been a good headman.

Informants of various village-sections (including Nyanga and Jili) state that the contest between Ngxaza and the Jamas represented a contest between the village-sections of Nyanga and Jili, and that the two parties' support was rooted in their respective village-sections. The tension between the northern and the southern parts of Chatha, which had centred on Nyanga and Rawule in earlier disputes now centred on Nyanga and Jili, as this was where the respective protagonists came from in the Jama-Sitshitshi struggle.

What made the contest (once it had started) more acute, was the intervention on the part of the authorities. Perhaps the most significant thing about Myalo's headmanship from the people of Chatha's point of view, was that he was dismissed by an outsider, the Magistrate. Similarly perhaps the most significant things about Ngxaza's headmanship is that he was kept in power by the same outsider. So the struggle was not merely between Nyanga, supporting a Jama, and Jili supporting a (non-Jama) Sitshitshi, but was also a struggle against a Sitshitshi kept in office by officialdom which had sacked a Jama. So Myalo and Poni became symbols of the villagers' right to elect their own spokesmen, and Ngxaza became the symbol of outside interference and control.

That, I suggest, is why the campaign against Ngxaza enjoyed support from village-sections other than Nyanga, and why the Jama camp did not switch candidates during Ngxaza's term of office. Myalo was politically unacceptable (to the Magistrate) but the dignity and autonomy of the village was at stake. The continued support for Myalo



(when evidence indicates division within the Jama camp) instead of proposing another Jama, or even a non-Jama (like Cekiso Tontsi) must be seen in part at least, as an expression of protest against outside interference.

This is also perhaps why there is not much criticism of Myalo's involvement in the hunting episode, even from Jili informants. In being dismissed, he was seen as more wronged against than wrong himself. It could even be argued that Myalo's crimes were 'positive' crimes in the eyes of the people. Protecting hunters against outsiders who control "our" forests, obstructing outsiders in collecting grazing fees, ploughing commonage belonging to outsider's and giving permission to his followers to build huts, (and then to lie in order to protect them) - are acts which may be crimes in the eyes of the outsider's law, but which benefit the people of the village and uphold village autonomy. This may explain why these "crimes" are not mentioned in the oral record, because they are not seen as crimes. What was remembered was the "real" reason for Myalo's dismissal - the intervention of the Magistrate.

I suggest that Myalo and Ngxaza's careers are seen as linked together by outside interference, and that the people of Chatha's perception of them both has been significantly influenced by their perception of that outside interference.

#### THE HEADMANSHIP OF ZWELIBANZI SITSHITSHI (1930-1944)

After Ngxaza Sitshitshi's death, the people of Chatha requested a meeting with the Magistrate for the election of a new headman. Magistrate Beale was away on circuit, but recommended that Zwelibanzi take charge until his return.<sup>59</sup> Soon afterwards, a petition requesting the appointment of Poni Jama, which had been drawn up by an attorney in King William's Town, was submitted to the Native Commissioner at Keiskammahoek in which it was claimed that "the majority are in favour of the election of Solomon Jama".<sup>60</sup> Two weeks later the Magistrate wrote to Zwelibanzi, instructing him to tell the people of Chatha to wait as he (the Magistrate) still mourned the death of Ngxaza, and as the rains had prevented him from coming to

Chatha earlier. He would come in April, to discuss the question of Ngxaza's successor.<sup>61</sup>

Early in June 1930, a meeting was held at Chatha, attended by the Native Commissioner, and a number of Chatha's people. The Commissioner opened the meeting, stating that Ngxaza had been "an outstanding man" and that it "would not be easy to fill that place." He then called for nominations for headmen. Poni Jama's name was put forward. The Commissioner recalled the villagers' attempts to replace Ngxaza Sitshitshi with Myalo Jama, stating that "I told you then that the fire which destroyed Sitshitshi's kraal consumed the last chance that Samuel (i.e. Myalo) Jama might have had ever to regain the Headmanship. Now you are reviving the claims of the Jama family. You wish to bring back the headmanship to the house of Jama. And because you know it is useless to nominate Samuel (i.e. Myalo) Jama, you nominate Solomon (i.e. Poni) Jama. Now, for Solomon Jama, I have respect...But when the people want him for the headmanship there is one thing they forget...his age. The Government has an age when it places its servants on pension, and Solomon is past that age...The duties of a headman require a man to live in the saddle by day and scarcely to sleep at night....I will report your nomination to the Government, but if it is not approved, you must not be disappointed."

The Commissioner then called for other nominations, whereupon two of Ngxaza's staunchest supporters (both from Jili) nominated Zwelibanzi Sitshitshi. The keenness of Poni's followers to restore the headmanship to the Jama lineage is indicated by their request that the Magistrate appoint Poni to keep the headmanship for his son. (Poni's son Filpas was then about 20 to 25 years old). "We wish to reinstate the Jama family. We want to arrange that Solomon become headman so that in time his son may follow him." A vote was then taken, with Poni gaining 48 votes as against Zwelibanzi's 22 votes.<sup>62</sup>

The people's perception (as reflected in oral accounts) that the authorities did not want a Jama as headman, seems borne out by the Native Commissioner's speech quoted above, as well as in his comments to his superior officer in King William's Town. He referred to correspondence relating to the burning of Ngxaza Sitshitshi's huts in 1922, adding that "Solomon Jama is totally unsuited. Silas Sitshitshi (i.e. Zwelibanzi)...is presently acting as headman. He...has

something of his late father's bearing and personality, and would I think, control the location effectively. I recommend his appointment."<sup>63</sup>

In August 1930, the Native Commissioner addressed a meeting at Chatha, announcing the Government's decision to appoint Zwelibanzi. One of Poni's supporters asked why, seeing that Poni was unacceptable, they could not "have been given the opportunity of making another nomination". The Native Commissioner replied that "The Government did not necessarily go by the vote; the Government appointed as Headman the man best suited for that post. Silas Sitshitshi was now definitely appointed and they should loyally support him."<sup>64</sup>

In November 1930, a petition in favour of Poni was again submitted, bearing the same names as the earlier petition in March 1930 (in both cases, the names were submitted in the form of a typed list, although the list had been retyped for the second petition).<sup>65</sup> The new Native Commissioner forwarded it to his superior officer, suggesting that "the petitioners be advised that no reason has been shown to exist why the decision of the Government be departed from".<sup>66</sup> In late December, word was received from the Department of Native Affairs that "as no good reason has been advanced for the appointment of Solomon Jama as Headman of the Cata Location, the Government is not prepared to disturb the existing arrangement".<sup>67</sup>

Magistrate Beale, who had served during most of Ngxaza's term of office, and during Zwelibanzi's appointment, clearly saw Ngxaza and his son Zwelibanzi as more suitable material for headmanship than Myalo and his cousin Poni. Beale had received Magistrate Richards' account of why Myalo had been suspended in 1906, and in terms of this and Myalo's subsequent attempts to regain the headmanship, his attitude towards Myalo had become increasingly negative. Poni's role in the attempt to remove Ngxaza from office, had led to the Magistrate seeing him as part of the same undesirable element that was not prepared to accept the authority of the Magistrate, and was prepared to resort to violence, as in the burning of Ngxaza's huts. Ngxaza and Zwelibanzi had served the Magistrate well in terms of his perception of what a good headman should be, and there was no need to risk orderly administration when the popular candidate represented a climate of opinion in the village which was not predisposed towards

the sort of co-operation which the Magistrate and his superiors wanted. Poni's previous attempts to gain the headmanship in 1897, 1906 and 1912, could not have increased his standing with the authorities.

The petition in favour of Poni, while possibly containing some suspect signatures (including some who were still youths at the time), still shows a clear pattern in terms of the loyalty of specific village-sections, indicating that the northern part of Chatha was solidly behind the Jamas, while they enjoyed only minimal support from the two southern sections, which had over time come to oppose them, viz. Rawule and Jili. No petition in favour of Zwelibanzi is available (if it exists), but we can reasonably deduce from Poni's petition and oral testimony that Zwelibanzi's support came from the southern part of Chatha, and that the division between the northern and southern parts of the village had come to characterise Chatha's political life.

Poni's support may be schematically represented as follows:

Nyanga	45 signatures
Ndela	26
Nyokane	28
Rawule	4
Jili	1
Skafu	<u>16</u>
	120 signatures

Informants from both Nyanga and Jili state that Poni had enjoyed more support, and gained more votes at the meeting in April 1930, than had Zwelibanzi. People from both camps state that the Magistrate supported Zwelibanzi's candidacy, installing him in spite of the fact that Poni had won the most support. "The Magistrate said that we must not burn down Zwelibanzi's houses as he would not give up the headmanship (i.e. the authorities would keep him in office)...Poni's vote was higher, but the Government said it was satisfied by the Sitshitshis - then Jama failed - the Magistrate said he didn't want a Jama - we don't know what caused that, as there were plenty Jamas" (a Jili informant). "The Magistrate wouldn't let Poni be headman"... "The people didn't want Zwelibanzi; they wanted Jama...The government told



Poni he was too old" (Nyanga informants). There is little further documentation available relating to Zwelibanzi's headmanship.<sup>68</sup> Oral accounts state that there was no trouble in the form of a further challenge to his headmanship during his term of office, and both Jili and Nyanga informants suggest that he was a good headman. Like his father, his major failing was that he was not a Jama. Zwelibanzi died in 1944.<sup>69</sup>

#### THE HEADMANSHIP OF DWAYI GCILITSHANA (1944-1949)

There is no documentary evidence available concerning the election of Dwayi Gcilitshana to the headmanship, and we are dependent upon the oral record for information in this regard.<sup>70</sup>

It appears that after Zwelibanzi Sitshitshi's death, groups crystallised out in support of Filpas Jama (son of Poni Jama) and of Nzima Sitshitshi (son of Zwelibanzi). Both men were the subject of rumours - Filpas to the effect that he was not the son of Poni's wife, but of a concubine, and Nzima to the effect that he was not mentally sound. (Both Filpas and Nzima had died before the research on which this chapter is based, was conducted). Neither of these rumours are supported or opposed in a simple Nyanga versus Jili, or northern versus southern Chatha fashion, such that e.g. Jili informants argue that Filpas was the son of a concubine, and Nyanga informants argue that he was the son of Poni's wife.

In any event, Filpas' alleged illegitimacy did not count against him in the eyes of his fellow-villagers. At an election, Filpas clearly defeated Nzima, one informant giving figures of 70 to 80 votes for Filpas, as opposed to about 35 votes for Nzima. Informants from various village-sections (including Nyanga and Jili) state clearly that Filpas defeated Nzima, and suggest that Nzima's possibly being mentally unsound counted against him. Two of Nzima's relatives argue that people did not want him as headman, because he was "uneducated" and because he was "not of the ruling line", i.e. not a Jama. Like his father and his grandfather before him, Nzima's principal failing seems to have been that he was not a Jama. Son of a concubine, or not, Filpas was a Jama in the eyes of Chatha people. Oral accounts suggest that as with earlier contests, support for the two candidates

had run along the lines of Nyanga (and the north of Chatha) versus Jili (and the south of Chatha, which in this particular instance seems to have included some support from Skafu. An attempt will be made presently to account for this possible support from Skafu).

In the event, Filpas' election does not seem to have been supported by the Magistrate, who appointed a certain Dwayi Gcilitshana to the headmanship. Dwayi was sub-headman of the village-section of Skafu. Oral accounts suggest that on Zwelibanzi's death the sub-headman of Jili (one Msuthu Mqhomo) had taken over as acting headman, although he had said he was too old to be considered for headman. One informant states that the Magistrate usually consulted the acting headman before making an appointment, and that Mqhomo had recommended Dwayi. The fact that Mqhomo is thought to have recommended a Skafu man, rather than a Jili man like himself, suggests some closeness between Mqhomo and Dwayi, which may account for Nzima's having apparently received some votes from Skafu.

Informants across village-sections agree that Dwayi was appointed by the Magistrate, and that the real reason for his appointment was that the Magistrate was not prepared to appoint a Jama. In the words of one informant, (from the village-section of Rawule) "the Magistrate said 'the headmanship of Jama is finished - Myalo Jama caused problems with the forest police - my advice is to forget Jama, and to get another person'". - words which almost directly echo Magistrate Beale's rebuke to Myalo Jama in 1922, which has been quoted earlier.

As in previous appointments such as Ngxaza and Zwelibanzi Sitshitshi, the authorities appear to have opted for a man that they thought would serve their interests best, in preference to a popular candidate whose family history had made him suspect. In spite of the fact that he was a government appointee, Dwayi is seen as having been a "good headman". There was "no trouble during Dwayi's time", which may be partly explained by the fact that he was almost 70 years of age on assuming office, and that accordingly people assumed that his term of office would not last very long.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Dwayi's headmanship was that it was during his term of office that the village officially approved of the planned implementation of Betterment in Chatha. The nature of this approval is suspect, and some people place a measure of blame for

the (bitterly resented) introduction of Betterment on Dwayi. That this does not interfere with the view of Dwayi as a "good headman" is probably due to the fact that the actual implementation of Betterment took place more than ten years after Dwayi's death in 1949.<sup>71</sup>

THE HEADMANSHIP OF SIYANDIBA JALI (pseudonym) (1950-1980)

As with Dwayi Gcilitshana, there is no documentary evidence relating to the election of Siyandiba Jali as headman of Chatha. It seems that many people in Chatha still wanted a Jama as headman, and that they were still looking to Filpas Jama as their candidate. There are several different accounts of why Filpas did not make himself available as a candidate. These are: that Filpas felt that he was too old; that Filpas felt that he did not wish to become involved in a contest, and would make himself available only if he was unanimously supported, and withdrew as there was a candidate from Jili; that Aron Gcilitshana, an influential relative of Dwayi, rallied support for Siyandiba; and that "the Government didn't want a Jama - the Magistrate said that he would bring in an outsider if need be, if the people continued asking for a Jama." Whatever the reason may have been, Filpas Jama did not contest the headmanship.

Informants suggest that Aron Gcilitshana enjoyed a following in Chatha, and that he was himself interested in the headmanship. The Magistrate evidently spoke with Aron, suggesting that he remain on as a ranger, rather than seek the headmanship. When it became clear that the Magistrate would not give his backing to Aron (quite why, remains unclear), Aron threw his weight behind Siyandiba Jali, a thatcher from Nyanga, who was not related to any of the previous headmen. Siyandiba, said Aron, was "popular with the White people", having thatched offices at Keiskammahoek. Siyandiba was opposed by Halala Mbolekwa, the sub-headman of Jili, and the acting headman.

Siyandiba does not seem to have been a very influential figure in Chatha at the time, with informants suggesting that "it's not that the people liked Jali especially - it's just that there was no one else from the northern side" (a Jili informant) and that "he was not so highly regarded among the people - they didn't know him - they thought he was alright - also, he had many relatives backing him" (a Nyanga

informant).

Halala Mbolekwa, although he had risen to the position of sub-headman of Jili, was a newcomer to Chatha. Accounts suggest that he was born near Alice, after which his family moved to Chatha, although the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey states that he was "a second generation resident of the village" (Wilson et al 1952, p 12).

Informants across village-sections state that the contest between Siyandiba and Halala was a contest between the northern and southern sections of the village, and more specifically between Nyanga and Jili. The important thing about the two candidates was the sectional interests they represented, rather than their individual merits. The northern side (Nyanga) was identified with the Jama lineage, and some informants suggest that Siyandiba was seen as an intermediary who was to hold the headmanship for the northern side until another suitable Jama candidate was available.

A vote was held, with Siyandiba defeating Halala - by 30 votes, according to Siyandiba himself, and by a large majority, according to other informants. The north/south nature of the contest is clearly reflected in informants' statements. "People did not want the headmanship to be on the other side" (a Jili informant); "the men from that side wanted Siyandiba, the men from this side wanted Halala - and also some from that side" (a Jili informant) "people voted for Siyandiba because he was from the northern side - its very important that - they were still fighting for the side of Jama, because they didn't want it to go down there to Jili" (a Nyanga informant) "that side wanted Halala, this side wanted Siyandiba" (a Nyokane informant).

The fact that Halala Mbolekwa was a newcomer is mentioned by various informants as having counted against him, although it seems clear that this was of secondary importance in the context of the north/south cleavage in the village.

Informants' accounts of the contest between Siyandiba and Halala are confirmed by the account given in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. "In communal villages (i.e., such as Chatha), a...tendency is manifested for people to support a candidate for the office of headman whose homestead is in the same village-section as their own, or in a neighbouring village-section, in order that they may be in close personal contact with him and thus have someone who will look after



their interests. Such a case occurred recently in Chatha where two candidates for the office of headman were nominated, one belonging to an old and well-established family, but uneducated and conservative, and the other progressive, but only a second generation resident of the village. The contest for the headmanship developed not along the lines of the candidates' distinctive qualifications, but as a struggle between the upper and the lower parts of the village in which the respective candidates lived" (Wilson et al, 1952, p 18). The idea that Siyandiba was to hold the headmanship until a Jama was available, is also confirmed in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. "In Chatha, for instance, the first chieftainship belonged to the family of Jama, and although the headman today is one who is not related to him, the people insist that he is not the true chief but is still only holding the position for the true heir; they still refer to themselves as the people of Jama" (Wilson et al, 1952, p 27).

While the people might have argued in 1950 that Siyandiba was not the "true heir", the point is that they elected him when there were several other Jama men (i.e. other than Filpas) who could have been called home to come and challenge for the headmanship. While there may be some truth in the argument that the Magistrate did not want a Jama, Nyanga did not even go through the motions of putting up a Jama candidate.

The contest between Halala and Siyandiba, while still reflecting the north-south division in the village, had been the first time in the history of the headmanship (other than at Nonqane's appointment when there had been no Jama available), that there had not been a candidate from the Jama lineage. This (as well as the first nine years of Ngxaza's headmanship) suggests that the majority of the village, or even Nyanga for that matter, was not unconditionally committed to the idea that the headmanship belonged to the Jama lineage by right. As will be argued presently, the idea of the Jama birthright has been held with differing intensity at different times, in relation to various other factors.

## CONCLUSION

Archival and oral evidence cited suggest that the idea that the Jama

lineage had a genealogical claim to the headmanship, was broadly acknowledged, if not always respected, by the majority of the people of Chatha, including people from Jili.

Within the context of this acknowledgement of the superior claims of their lineage, the Jama lineage was at times deeply divided, with Poni seeking to wrest the headmanship from first Zazini, and then Myalo, and with Poni and Myalo seemingly locked in a struggle during the early years of Ngxaza's headmanship, to decide who should oppose him. The superior genealogical claim of Siswana and Poni's side of the Jama family over against Zazini and Myalo's side was argued by Nonqane and Poni to suit their purposes at different times, and disregarded by the followers of Zazini and Myalo. This illustrates Comaroff's assertion (derived from a Tswana, rather than a Nguni context) that "genealogical rank, and therefore rights to succession and inheritance are distinctly mutable; they give rise to competition between groups of full siblings which comprise the respective constituent houses" (Cohen and Comaroff 1976, p 96). In this case, the respective houses were those of Jama's two wives, and traced to Siswana and Zazini respectively.

Not only genealogical rank within the Jama lineage, but the question of the genealogical rights of the Jama lineage in relation to other lineages, seems to have been mutable. The fact that Jama candidates were opposed by the south of the village on a number of occasions, suggests that the genealogical claims of the Jama lineage was only one of the factors operating in the political process in Chatha.

While people from the south, centred on Jili, might have acknowledged the theoretical claim of the Jama lineage, their interests were better served by having a headman from their part of the village. Where this was possible, as in the cases of Ngxaza and Zwelibanzi, and later in voting for Nzima and Halala, they asserted their self-interest in the face of the prevailing village ideology.

The north of the village, centred on Nyanga, was clearly more committed to the Jama ideology - not least perhaps because it was in their interests to have the headman in their part of the village, and because the Jama ideology was a handy rallying call. They attempted to assert the rights of the Jama lineage on a number of occasions

(e.g. during the headmanship of Nonqane, Ngxaza and Zwelibanzi) and elected Jama candidates in all contests against non-Jama candidates (except in the case of Siyandiba's election). Yet even in the north of the village, the Jama ideology was stronger at certain times than at others. It seems to have wavered during the first nine years of Ngxaza's headmanship and at Siyandiba's election (when it seems that Filpas, the Jama candidate, did not have the backing of the north).

Support for the Jama ideology seems to have been at its height at the time of Myalo's headmanship and during his contest with Ngxaza. While Poni was supported by the north when Myalo was unavailable (e.g. at the elections against Ngxaza and Zwelibanzi), he seems to have lacked the following of Myalo. Myalo did not accept his dismissal and repeatedly tried to dislodge Ngxaza, even when it was clear that he was incurring the anger of the authorities. Myalo appears to have been a man of determination and character, who had the advantage of having been dismissed for "crimes" which had been to the benefit of his people. Here was a man worth supporting, who had the appropriate genealogical credentials. His personality and actions embellished, and became intertwined with, the Jama ideology.

Since the time of Myalo and Poni, members of the Jama lineage who have been eligible, seem either to have lacked the drive to lead a following (e.g. Filpas) or to have lacked sufficient support or interest to seek the headmanship (e.g. Nelani and his sons Themba and Thandabantu or Myalo's son Sizakele). The fact that the north of Chatha chose Siyandiba as their candidate in 1950 suggests that what was important was to secure the headmanship for the north of the village, with the most effective candidate whether he was a Jama, or not. That the Jama ideology had not died, but had rather become less appropriate as there was no effective Jama candidate, is shown by the fact that Maboyis Jama challenged for the headmanship in about 1958 or 1959, (see Chapter Five) and was elected as headman on Siyandiba's retirement in 1980 (see Chapter Eight).

The two territorially-based groups centred on Nyanga and Jili, seem to have developed out of a combination of locality and self-interest. People in the same neighbourhood and part of the village built up ties based on the convenience and intimacy of locality. Although the powers of headmen have been curtailed by a number of government

directives, they still enjoyed considerable control over the allocation of residential sites and residential allotments (Hammond-Tooke 1975, pp 136-138; Wilson et al 1952, pp 24-26; Mills and Wilson 1952, p 10-11). Oral evidence suggests that there were a fair number of disputes about land allocation, and accordingly it was in people's interests to have the headman living in their locality, where he could best serve their interests. The north-south division in the village seems to have developed for these reasons, and showed itself to be a feature of village-politics from the time of Ngxaza's headmanship onwards, through to Siyandiba's election.

The reason why the division should have formed along the lines of a binary split, i.e. into two opposing groups or factions, seems related to the nature of the prize for which the two groups were competing, viz. the headmanship. At one level, access to arable and grazing land and residential sites was divisible, in the sense that each village-section had its own residential clusters and grazing areas, and most of its fields were concentrated in an area fairly near to its residential clusters. People's claims for arable land were made to the headman through their sub-headmen (Wilson et al, 1952, p 11). Members of different village-sections would compete with each other through their sub-headmen for access to arable land. Inasmuch as the spoils were divisible (i.e. individual allotments of arable land), people competed through the appropriate channels, viz. their village-section. What was not divisible, was the ultimate control, within the village, of the allocation of those allotments. Who would get an allotment, rested finally with the headman (subject to the Magistrate's approval). Where the prize is indivisible, one's chances of gaining it are enhanced by smaller groups forming (such as village-sections) forming larger combinations; the logical outcome of which is the two large territorially-based groups opposing each other, viz. the north and the south of the village.

Complicating the interaction of the principles of the claim of the Jama lineage to the headmanship, and of the north-south division, has been the power of the authorities to intervene in the appointment of headmen. Although realising the importance and usefulness of popularly elected headmen, the authorities intervened to maintain or establish what they regarded as good and orderly government. This



intervention took the form of the suspension or dismissal of headmen of whom they did not approve (Nonqane, Myalo) the appointment or protection of headmen of whom they did approve (Ngxaza, Zwelibanzi, Dwayi) and the blocking of candidates of whom they did not approve (Zazini, Poni, Myalo, Filpas) - in spite of the wishes of the majority of the village. As Magistrate Beale clearly stated when he appointed Zwelibanzi, the government appointed the man they thought was best suited for the job, whether he was the popular candidate, or not.

This intervention on the part of the authorities probably strengthened the development of the north-south division, by giving the south a source of strength that they did not have by virtue of numbers or genealogy, viz. the backing of the administration. The fact that the people in the south were presented with a headman in the person of Ngxaza by the Administration, would have strengthened the formation of a political solidarity in the south. Previously (with the exception of Nonqane) the headmanship had been the monopoly of the Jama lineage, whereas now it was in the hands of the south, and worth fighting to keep. This feeling of solidarity through self-interest would presumably have been strengthened by the authorities' appointment of Zwelibanzi, and the south continued to field candidates at future contests for the headmanship. The protection of the south's candidates by the authorities would in turn have evoked resentment from people in Nyanga and in the north of the village, and fostered a feeling of solidarity among those village-sections. Whereas previously, the headmanship had been contested within Nyanga, and within the Jama family, it was now being contested between Nyanga and Jili, and as support grew, between the north and the south of the village. The formation of political groupings based on considerations of locality and self-interest, were fostered artificially by the intervention of the authorities.

This intervention also seems to have affected the fortunes of the Jama ideology. The dismissal of Myalo and the appointment and protection of Ngxaza by the authorities, evoked the strongest manifestation of the Jama ideology, in the campaign to reinstate Myalo. Ngxaza was the first real threat to the Jama monopoly of the headmanship, and he was vigorously resisted until his death. When the authorities blocked the Jama lineage the second time (in appointing

Zwelibanzi) and the third time (in appointing Dwayi), the chances of a Jama regaining the headmanship would have seemed more and more remote, and resistance would have seemed less worthwhile. This, coupled with the fact that the next generation did not seem to deliver any Jama men of the calibre or determination of Myalo or Poni, would have weakened people's adherence to the value of the idea that the Jamas had the genealogical right to the headmanship.

The contest for the headmanship had become less a question of whether a Jama was to be headman (and if so, which particular Jama) and more a question of whether the headman was to come from the north or the south of the village. This was clearly demonstrated in 1950 when Siyandiba Jali (a non-Jama) was put forward as the candidate for the north in the absence of a satisfactory or willing Jama candidate.

#### FOOTNOTES

Archival references (e.g. File BK No 22; File N.A. No 172 (1874); 1/KHK 5/1/1/1) refer to files held by the South African Archives, in Cape Town.

- 1) M.E. Mills and M. Wilson (1952) p 1-2
- 2) File BK No.22 - letter from Middledrift Office to Chief Commissioner, British Kaffraria, 7/3/1854
- 3) File BK No.22 - letter from Middledrift Office to Chief Commissioner, British Kaffraria, 10/8/1854. Ngqudeya is the place-name used by several current-day informants in Chatha to refer to the place where Jama and his followers were settled, and should not be confused with the villages of Upper and Lower Nqhumeya in the Keiskammahoek District
- 4) Oral sources from Chatha
- 5) File BK No.24 - Minute of Interview Between the Chief Commissioner and the Chiefs and Headmen of the Crown Reserve, Keiskammahoek, 14/7/1856
- 6) File N.A. No 172 (1874) - letter from A. Bisset, Civil Commissioner's Office, Seymour-Stockenstrom, to Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 11/5/1874

- 7) File: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek. Letters, etc. Miscellaneous, 1882-1886 - letter from Acting Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, to Secretary of Native Affairs (?) 13/7/1883
- 8) File BK No 28 - letter from Clerk and Interpreter Keiskammahoek, to Secretary to Government (?), King William's Town, 5/11/1862
- 9) File N.A. No 172 (1874) - statement by Booy Mgujulwa and 7 others. Also File: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek. Letters, etc. Miscellaneous, 1882-1886 - petition in favour of Zazini, 5.7.1883
- 10) File N.A. No 172 (1874) - letter from A. Bisset, Civil Commissioner's Office, Seymour-Stockenstrom, to Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 11.5.1874
- 11) In the petition in favour of Zazini submitted on 5/7/1883, the claim is made that Nonqane had been appointed as an acting headman. In his evidence before the Special Magistrate at Keiskammahoek on 20/8/1882, Nonqane claimed that he had been permanently appointed, and not merely until Zazini came of age. (File: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek. Letters, etc., Miscellaneous, 1882-1886)
- 12) File N.A. No.172 (1874) - statement by Booy Mgujulwa and 7 others. Also File: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek. Letters, etc., Miscellaneous, 1882-1886 - petition in favour of Zazini, 5/7/1883
- 13) File N.A. No.172 (1874) - letter from A. Bisset, Civil Commissioner's Office, Seymour - Stockenstrom, to Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 11/5/1874
- 14) File N.A. No.172 (1874) - letter from Fielding, Special Magistrate, Middledrift, to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 28/4/1874
- 15) File: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek. Letters, etc., Miscellaneous, 1882-1886 - petition in favour of Zazini, 5/7/1883
- 16) Ibid.
- 17) Ibid.
- 18) File: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek. Letters, etc., Miscellaneous, 1882-1886. - papers before the Special

- Magistrate, Keiskammahoek at an Investigation into the Headmanship at Cata Location, 20/8/1883
- 19) Ibid.
  - 20) Files 1/KHK 5/1/1/1, 1/KHK 5/1/1/3 and 1/KHK 4/1/6/4
  - 21) File 1KHK 5/1/1/1 - petition for the dismissal of Zazini as headman, submitted to the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town, March, 1897
  - 22) File 1/KHK 5/1/1/1. - letter from Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 10/3/1897
  - 23) File N.A. No.179 (1902) Miscellaneous - Inspector of Locations to Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, 16/8/1902
  - 24) File N.A. No.179 (1902) Miscellaneous - letter from Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 27/8/1902
  - 25) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - petition in favour of Solomon (Poni) Jama as headman, submitted to the Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Colony, August 1906
  - 26) File N.A. Vol 692 No.2690 - letter from District Forest Officer to Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, 30/9/1905
  - 27) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - Inquiry into the conduct of Samuel Jama, Resident Magistrate's Office, Keiskammahoek, 17/11/1905
  - 28) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - letter from Secretary of Native Affairs, Cape Town to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 18/1/1906
  - 29) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - letter from Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 8/3/1906
  - 30) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - petition in favour of Solomon (Poni) Jama as headman, submitted to the Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Colony, August 1906
  - 31) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - letter from Secretary, Native Affairs Department, Cape Town to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town
  - 32) File N.A. Vol.692 No.2690 - letter from Secretary, Native Affairs Department, Cape Town, to L. Ewers, Law Agent, Keiskammahoek, 8/9/1906
  - 33) File N.A. No.179 (1902) Miscellaneous - Hut Tax Return figures,



30/11/1902

- 34) File No. 1/KHK 10 - entry stating that in connection with the number of hut tax payers who removed free produce from Crown Forests, there were 299 huts in Chatha in 1911.
- 35) File N.A. No.179 (1902), Miscellaneous - letter from Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 27/8/1902
- 36) File N.A. Vol.692, No.2690 - petition in favour of Solomon (Poni) Jama, submitted to the Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Colony, August 1906
- 37) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 31/12/1909
- 38) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town 18/3/1910
- 39) The above information and quotes derive from a memorandum drawn up by the Department of Native Affairs, and sent to the Magistrate at Keiskammahoek in 1921. (File: 1/KHK 6/13)
- 40) File 1/KHK 5/1/1/13 - letter from Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 16/6/1910
- 41) File 1/KHK 5/1/1/14 - letter from Assistant Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 15/11/1912
- 42) File 1/KHK 5/1/1/14 - letter from Assistant Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Civil Commissioner, King William's Town, 13/5/1912
- 43) In this account Nobhokuva, who was actually Myalo's mother, is identified as being Dlabathi's mother - which, for all practical purposes, she had become, as Dlabathi's mother had died.
- 44) File 1/KHK 5/1/1/14 - letter from Assistant Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Resident Magistrate, King William's Town, 15/11/1912
- 45) File 1/KHK 6/13 - Information taken from an application for leave by Ngxaza Sitshitshi, dated 26/7/1915
- 46) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Magistrate, King William's Town, 4/10/1921
- 47) Ibid.

- 48) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Magistrate, King William's Town, 23/11/1921
- 49) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Magistrate, King William's Town, 1/3/1922
- 50) File 1/KHK 6/13 - minutes of a meeting held at the Magistrate's office, Keiskammahoek, 19/4/1922
- 51) File 1/KHK 6/13 - minutes of a meeting held to investigate complaints against headman Samuel (Ngxaza) Sitshitshi, 13/7/1922
- 52) File 1/KHK 6/13 - minutes of a meeting held at Chatha, 21/9/1922
- 53) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Magistrate, King William's Town, 12/10/1922; also letter from Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria to Magistrate, King William's Town, 30/1/1923
- 54) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Magistrate, Keiskammahoek to Magistrate, King William's Town 10/10/1922; also letter from Magistrate, King William's Town to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13/10/1922
- 55) File 1/KHK 6/13 - various applications for leave by Ngxaza Sitshitshi, and related correspondence, 1925 - 1926
- 56) File 1/KHK 6/13 minutes of a meeting held at Keiskammahoek, 10/8/1927
- 57) File N/1/1/5/10 - minutes of a meeting held at Chatha, 3/6/1930
- 58) File 1/KHK 6/13 - letter from Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 13/2/1930
- 59) File 1/KHK 6/13 - comment written by Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, on a note reporting Ngxaza's death, 17/2/1930
- 60) File N/1/1/5/10 - petition submitted to Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek, 6/3/1930
- 61) File N/1/1/5/10 - letter from Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, to Silas (Zwelibanzi) Sitshitshi, 21/3/1930
- 62) File N/1/1/5/10 - minutes of a meeting held at Chatha, 3/6/1930
- 63) File N/1/1/5/10 - letter from Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek to Chief Native Commissioner, 5/6/1930
- 64) File N/1/1/5/10 - minutes of a meeting held at Chatha, 27/8/1930
- 65) File N/1/1/5/10 - petition submitted, 27/10/1930
- 66) File N/1/1/5/10 - letter from Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 8/12/1930

- 67) File N/1/1/5/10 - letter from Secretary of Native Affairs, Pretoria to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 24/10/1950
- 68) This is probably related to the fact that in the mid 1970's, the Magistrate's Office, together with almost all magisterial records, was destroyed in a fire.
- 69) The date of Zwelibanzi's death was given to me by one of his daughters.
- 70) This is also probably related to the fire mentioned in footnote 68.
- 71) Personal communication from M.E. Mills, who started fieldwork in Chatha for the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey at the time of Dwayi's death.

CHAPTER FOURCHATHA BEFORE BETTERMENT

This chapter will present an account of Chatha as it was before Betterment, which will serve as a base-line against which to monitor the changes brought about by Betterment. Relocation (such as that brought about by Betterment) effects changes in the physical and social environment in which people live their daily lives, by bringing about changes in their relationship to resources and to other people. This chapter will consider the way in which people organised their relationship to their environment (subject to the control of the authorities) and how this affected the way in which group formation took place.

The primary source on which this reconstruction will be based, is the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, published in four volumes in 1952 (Mountain 1952; Houghton and Walton 1952; Wilson et al 1952; Mills and Wilson 1952). Research for the Survey was conducted from 1948 to 1950. Unless otherwise specified, the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey refers in general terms to the six villages surveyed, which included communal tenure villages such as Chatha. Unless qualifications are made, these generalisations are assumed to apply to Chatha, which was one of the six villages surveyed. In the volume entitled "Land Tenure" (Mills and Wilson 1952), Chatha is singled out and references from that volume apply specifically to Chatha. Use will also be made of Mayer's research done in 1961 on youth associations in a village in Keiskammahoek similar to Chatha (Mayer 1972), as well as of oral accounts of the period before Betterment, collected during my period of fieldwork.

Inasmuch as this chapter discusses Chatha before Betterment, it should not be assumed that the village was in a condition of social stasis. The previous chapter argued that the history of the headmanship, an institution fostered by the colonial authorities, could best be understood by taking into account the way in which the authorities attempted to control the headmanship in their own interests, and the way in which this in turn affected political



reaction and groupings within Chatha itself.

Chatha's relationship with the authorities stretched further than this, to matters such as the payment of taxes, the determination of patterns of land tenure, the protection of forests, and the right to move outside the Keiskammahoek area in search of employment. In addition to their relationship with the authorities, the inhabitants of Chatha increasingly came to participate in the institutions of the wider South African society, through the impact of Christian missionary activity and its corollary of formal education, as well as through increasing involvement in the wider economy, as migrant labourers and purchasers of consumer goods.

The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey takes this ongoing relationship with the wider South African society as part of its area of investigation and analysis. The Survey was however undertaken and written within the broadly structural-functional framework of its day, as is indicated by the title of one of its volumes, viz. "Social Structure". It takes the groups it analyses (e.g. lineage, neighbourhood, village-section, location) largely for granted and seeks to understand people's behaviour and values in terms of such group membership and the roles that go with it. People's behaviour is thus seen as something essentially passive and conforming, rather than as active, self-interested and innovative behaviour which, while taking place within the context of certain groups, may itself influence the nature or composition of those groups.

Similarly, the impact of forces in the wider society upon groupings in Chatha is considered, but almost as if these forces were acting upon an essentially passive situation within the village, rather than as if there were an ongoing interaction between these wider forces on the one hand, and groupings and tendencies within the village which have a dynamic of their own as a result of their particular history on the other (see Comaroff 1982 for such an analysis in the case of a Botswana settlement).

The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey does therefore not pay much attention to factors which would seem to be intimately bound up with the formation and development of social institutions and groups -factors such as the wider physical and social environment, individual interests and behaviour, wealth and power. In fairness, it could not

have addressed such issues, unless implicitly, as they had not yet been explicitly raised and debated in the structural-functionalist tradition in which the Survey was written.

#### PATTERNS OF LAND USE

Chatha is situated in a valley, bounded on three sides by hills, with the Chatha river running through the middle of the settlement (see Appendix A, Fig. No. 1). The upper end of the valley at the slopes of the Amatola Mountains is a forestry plantation, which is fenced off from the rest of the village, and which at the time of the Rural Survey belonged to the South African Department of Forestry. A road runs beside the river up to the forestry station.

Aside from the area set apart by the government for the forestry plantation, land use was planned in accordance with the lie of the land, and the availability of resources. Arable fields extended from the banks of the river and its tributaries up along the slopes of the hills on both sides of the valley, up to the residential settlements. Above these settlements, extending along the tops of the hills, as well as in the Ministerial Grazing Area above the forestry plantation, was the area where people grazed their cattle. Although some simple fences separated fields from grazing commonage, in most places there was no such barrier (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 9). The residential settlements were situated between the riverain arable area and the upper reaches of the hills, which were less sheltered, and which served well as grazing areas. Water could be obtained from the central river or from its tributaries which wound down from the hills, while wood was available from the glades along these water courses as well as from the slopes next to the forest.

Residential settlements consisted of clusters of huts, strung out along the ridges. Due to population density, these settlements had become more concentrated than in the traditional Nguni pattern (Hunter 1936 ch 1), but in 1948 had not yet formed continuous village-like settlements (Wilson et al 1952, p 3, 8). These settlements, or hamlets, consisted of approximately 15 to 40 homesteads, and were separated from each other by "a ridge, a valley, or some other natural physical feature" (op. cit. p 8).

Next to or, more generally, below each homestead was its garden, consisting of a plot of land, enclosed by an aloe hedge or a fence, with a cattle byre next to that. Homesteads were not physically marked off from each other by fences or by boundary stones (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 9). Homesteads consisted of anything from 1 to 5 or 6 huts.

Since sons usually set up their own homesteads near to those of their fathers, the residential settlements or hamlets were usually occupied by households belonging to a few lineages. Thus, in the case of one hamlet consisting of 32 households, 28 belonged to four lineages, all of the same clan. While other hamlets did not attain this high degree of clan coherence, most of the members of a lineage were usually to be found, if not in the same hamlet, then in adjacent hamlets or village-sections.

#### DEMOGRAPHY

There are various estimates of what the size and composition of the population of Chatha was before Betterment. Of these estimates (viz. the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, the 1952 Government Planning Report and the 1958 Government Planning Report), the most accurate information is probably to be found in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, as this Survey conducted three separate household surveys over a period of 16 months.

There are however some serious discrepancies within the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, which render its demographic data of questionable value. Thus, Mills and Wilson assert that the total population (including people away at work) of Chatha was 2,325 people, who lived in 375 homesteads (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 44). This gave an average de jure figure of 6.2 people per homestead (i.e. the total number of people associated with the homestead, whether they were at home or away at the time the surveys were conducted). Taking the four communal tenure villages considered in the Survey (Chatha, Gxulu, Mtwaku and Upper Nqhumeya) collectively, the average de jure population per homestead was 6.2 people, of whom .8 people were away, mostly working as migrant labourers in South African towns and cities (ibid, p 125). This left a de facto figure of 5.4 people per

homestead (i.e. those people actually at home at the time the surveys were conducted).

However, if we look at the details on the actual questionnaire sheets administered during the Survey (which seem to contain some inaccuracies themselves), we find that the de jure homestead population in Chatha was 7.28 people, while the de facto homestead population amounted to 6.14 people. This would give a de jure population of 2732 people and a de facto population of 2303 people for Chatha as a whole, as opposed to Mills and Wilson's figures of 2325 people and 2025 people respectively.

A possible explanation of this discrepancy could be that the de jure and the de facto figures may have become mixed up, such that the de facto figure is inadvertently represented as the de jure figure. This possibility seems born out by the fact that elsewhere the Rural Survey gives "the average number of persons at home per homestead" as 6.1 (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 62). The discrepancy between the figure of 6.2 quoted by Mills and Wilson (as the de jure figure) and the figure of 6.1 quoted by Houghton and Walton, seems to relate partly to the fact that Houghton and Walton took an average of only the first and the third surveys conducted, leaving out the second (ibid, p 62). The apparent correspondence between the assumed "de jure" figure of 6.2 and the seemingly de facto figure of 6.1, does not however explain how the "de jure" figure of 6.2 was broken down into figures of 5.4 people at home and .8 people away, per homestead.

Because of the uncertainty as to how the "de jure" figure of 6.2 people was arrived at, further information which assumes this figure (such as male/female ratios and adult/child ratio - Mills and Wilson 1952, p 122) must also be potentially suspect. Perhaps the best that we can do, is to take the averages from the three sets of questionnaires administered during the Rural Survey as the most reliable figures, and assume that the de jure homestead population was about 7 people, and the de facto population was about 6 people. This would give Chatha a de jure population of 2625 people and a de facto population of 2250 people.

The composition of households in Chatha ranged widely, from two people (a widow and her son) to 22 people (a widow, her unmarried sons and daughters, and her three married sons with their wives and



children) (data derived from questionnaire sheets administered during the Keiskammahoeek Rural Survey). This range corresponded to the differing stages of the developmental cycle at which households found themselves (Fortes 1958). Thus at a given stage, a household might consist of a man, his wife and their children. With time, their daughters would marry into other households, or bear children which they would raise at their parent's home. Their sons would marry and move out and set up their own households, as they could obtain residential sites and arable allotments. A son and his wife and children might remain in his parental home with his widowed mother, and take over the parental homestead and fields when she died. Alternatively, a widow might find herself at home with her unmarried children (plus some grandchildren), or might be completely on her own.

The composition of single households also varied across time as sons, and occasionally daughters, went off to work in the cities, or returned. Children might move in with their grandparents while their parents went off to work. So, although the "monogamous family when it coincides with the homestead, is the simplest form of domestic family...Very rarely, however, does an elementary family live alone in a homestead" (Wilson et al 1952, p 46).

A factor which made for a number of homesteads housing extended families, was the growing shortage of arable land in Chatha. While they were still waiting for a field, young married men would be better off staying with their parents than establishing their own homestead, thereby keeping alive their claims to inheriting a field, as well as having access to the produce of their parents' fields and developed garden. This arrangement would also suit the parents, as they would have access to the labour of a daughter-in-law around the house. In Chatha, 30 per cent of those eligible to hold land (overwhelmingly married men) had not yet acquired fields of their own and of these men, four-fifths were still living in their parents' homes (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 43).

Household composition was thus affected principally by two factors which interacted with the natural domestic cycle, viz. the prevalence of migrant labour and the shortage of arable land for allocation to new household heads. Migrant labour made for the absence of a number of adult males from the village, with the corollary that a large

number of households were effectively headed by women - either as widows, or as wives of migrants. (The impact of migrant labour was, however, temporarily lessened by the availability of a large number of jobs in the Chatha forest plantation during the period of the Rural Survey). The shortage of allocatable arable land meant that young married men stayed at their parents' homesteads longer than they would otherwise have done.

The three estimates (the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, the 1952 Government Planning Report and the 1958 Government Planning Report) give different figures for the number of households in Chatha (375, 350 and 328 respectively). This seems to suggest a progressive decline in the number of households in Chatha during the 1950's, with outmigration being the probable explanation. My own attempts to map out the old pre-Betterment hamlets (see Appendix A, Figs 3 to 6) and to cross-check my lists with the former inhabitants of those hamlets, suggest that there were 335 households in Chatha just before Betterment. Oral accounts confirm that some families had left Chatha before Betterment was implemented (i.e. rather than because of Betterment), although I cannot pinpoint the dates when these families actually left. This outmigration represented the continuation of a trend which the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey found applied to all the locations in the Keiskammahoek District under communal land tenure. "Where there is already saturation in the carrying capacity of the land, it would seem that communal residents who are landless and for whom no further land can be made available must find emigration the only alternative to destitution...during the intercensal decade the exodus was at a rate faster than the natural increase of the population through reproduction...Except, actually, for Chatha, when there was an increase of one person between the 1936 and 1946 enumerations" (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 18).

Such outmigration could well have taken place in the early and mid-1950's (thereby accounting for the drop in the number of households recorded), as it was after the mid-1950's that "the modernisation and extension of influx control" resulted in the effective halting of emigration out of the rural areas to the cities (Simkins 1981, p 271). At the time that Betterment was actually implemented in the mid 1960's, Chatha would have had a total population of between 2300

and 2500 people living in between 330 and 350 homesteads. Both the number of households and the overall population had fallen from the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, presumably as the result of outmigration.

### KINSHIP

Descent among people living in the Keiskammahoek area has always been patrilineal and residence patterns have been predominantly patrilocal. Clan exogamy is observed. Wilson et al (1952, p 46) argue that "the basic form of kinship grouping in the village is the monogamous family, consisting of a husband, a wife and their unmarried child or children...The homestead (umzi) in which the family lives forms the nucleus of the local or territorial grouping".

While the homestead does form the basis of the local grouping, the data that Wilson et al quote in their tables on family composition (1952, p 52 - 56) as well as the data on Chatha in the questionnaire sheets, make it clear that a large number of homesteads did not contain simple nuclear families. One may thus agree with Murray (1981, p 102) who questions "the assumption of the analytical priority of the nuclear family" made by the authors of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. Rather than a nuclear family, what members of the surveyed homesteads had in common were patrilineally based links, either by virtue of the fact that they were descended from a common ancestor associated with that homestead, or because they had married into that patrilineally based homestead, and thereby become identified with it. The basic kinship unit that the authors of the Rural Survey identified in the people occupying a homestead was thus the smallest separate patrilineally based group - rather than the nuclear family.

The homestead was the locus of constant face-to-face relationships, and was a source of emotional identification and economic co-operation, as well as of tension and conflict, relating to the sharing of space and resources. Fifty-seven per cent of all cases of accusation of witchcraft or sorcery occurred between people living in the same homestead. Accusations occurred between all categories of kin within the homestead, both across and within generations, e.g. between husband and wife, between wife and husband's parents or

siblings, between parents and children, between siblings. Eight of these 57 cases reflected the tension between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law, and were related to the fact that the two women saw themselves as competing for access to the earnings of the husband/son (ibid, p 170-177, 182-185).

At a wider - than - household level, the local kinship group was the lineage, or more correctly, those members of a lineage resident in a particular hamlet or village-section, or even the village itself (Wilson et al, p 50). It was not necessarily the case that all lineal descendants of a single ancestor would be settled in only one village-section or only one village, and people in Chatha could have lineage mates in other villages. For practical purposes, however, it was the local group, the "lineage-remnant" (Wilson et al 1952, p 47), that performed the functions of the wider kinship group for its members in the village.

Hammond-Tooke (1984, p 91) uses the term "lineage segments" to refer to such local groupings, arguing that it is only at this local level that the term "lineage" usefully refers to a group with identifiable functions and corporateness (ibid, p 84-91). In this dissertation, the term lineage will be taken to refer to the local "lineage remnant" or "lineage section", consisting of lineage members resident in Chatha, unless stated otherwise.

The lineage remnant functioned chiefly in matters of ritual (which will be discussed later) and in the settlement of disputes. All adult men were members of the lineage court which discussed disputes and civil crimes involving lineage members, attempting to resolve the issues at lineage level. If a dispute involved members of more than one lineage remnant, the matter would be discussed at a joint meeting of the two remnants (ibid, p 67). Within the single lineage court, most disputes were about the inheritance of land (ibid, p 68). When a matter could not be resolved by the lineage court, it would be referred up to the headman's court, and from there to the court of the Native Commissioner at Keiskammahoek (ibid, p 67).

At a more inclusive genealogical level than the lineage was the clan, consisting of people who held themselves to be ultimately descended from a common patrilineal ancestor. The clan did not function as a corporate group, and had no leader, its relevance being



primarily as the group within which exogamy was observed. Genealogically based activity at any corporate level was the business of the lineage (ibid, p 60) and more particularly the lineage remnant which was the local group usually operating at the level of inclusiveness of the village.

### POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The village was centred politically around the headman and his council (inkundla), of which all adult males of the village were members. It provided the forum for decisions affecting the whole village, as well as being the village's link with higher authority in the form of the European Administration (ibid, p 14 - 15). The headman was the only official whose authority was recognised by the Administration as well as the only official who received a salary from the Administration. Appointed by the Magistrate, whether he was the village's popular candidate or not, the headman received his salary from the (then) Native Affairs Department, and his tenure was dependent upon his satisfying the Authorities. His duties included assisting the authorities in the administration of his village. This involved the enforcement of law, the supervision of the collection of taxes, assistance in government programmes such as stock dipping, maintenance of fences and soil conservation and, subject to the authorities, the allocation of land and residential sites (ibid, p 24 - 25). Public matters were discussed, disputes settled, and land allocated at meetings of the village council presided over by the headman. Matters not settled there would be referred to the (then) Native Commissioner's office at Keiskammahoek.

Within the village, the significant internal political unit was the village-section (isiphaluka). Several adjacent hamlets together usually made up a village-section, and it was at the level of the village-section that the relationship between residence and territory, and political loyalty, became apparent. Wilson et al argue that the village-section was primarily a political rather than a geographical unit, adducing cases from villages other than Chatha where the section had actually moved its geographical location, and where some members

had been residentially dispersed, while the section had still continued to function as a political unit (ibid, p 10). While it is important to make a distinction between geographical and political bases of recruitment for analytical purposes, in practice the formation of the village-section as a political grouping, in Chatha, was territorially based (ibid, p 9). Several contiguous hamlets together formed a village-section, which had its own grazing areas, and had most of the fields held by its members close to its residential areas. In order to exploit village-section resources effectively, its members should not be residentially scattered, but close to their resources, so that these could not be utilised by members of other sections. Village-sections competed for access to arable land and grazing. If you ask people where they lived before Betterment, they will invariably mention the village-section. If you ask for more detail, they will specify the hamlet. People associate their village-section with both their former place of residence and their channel of political representation before Betterment.

Each village-section was led by a sub-headman, who was elected by the members of the section. While the Administration preferred to appoint headmen who were the popular choice, it did not always do so. It did not interfere at the level of the village-section, and sub-headmen were popularly elected leaders. The oral record does not suggest that sub-headmen refused to co-operate with headmen appointed by the Administration. It would not have been in their, or their village-section members interests to refuse to co-operate with the headman. Government appointed or not, the headman still had considerable control over the allocation of land.

The sub-headman presided over the village-section council which discussed matters internal to the section. The sub-headmen of the various sections served as the headman's official advisors (amaphakathi), and also represented the interests of their followers at the level of the village council. These interests included matters such as requests for residential sites or arable land, inter-section disputes or unresolved intra-section disputes, and the expression of people's views on administrative matters. Sub-headmen also conveyed directives from the village council, and collected contributions from members of their sections when funds were required for some village

undertaking, or for a local levy (ibid, p 11 - 12, 29 - 30).

People were tied to their village-section inasmuch as they depended on their sub-headman for representation of their interests. This led to a sense of identity among section members, and resulted in people supporting members of their own section in contests for office (ibid, p 11 - 12) as we have seen in Chapter Three. The village-section was a significant source of claims and rewards, and co-operation between its members extended well beyond the mutual support of political candidates, into areas such as agriculture, ceremonial, and the daily domestic round.

#### LAND TENURE

Before Betterment, the communal system of land tenure obtained in Chatha. "The essence of communal tenure...is that members of a village share certain rights in the land attached to their village. They all graze their stock, cut thatching grass, and gather firewood on one portion of the village land - the commonage - and the other is sub-divided into fields which are allocated to individuals to cultivate...Rights over fields may be inherited, but they cannot be sold" (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 8). It was therefore, strictly speaking, the commonage that was communally held, in the sense that all members of the village had rights to use it. Rights to residential sites and arable land were individually held. It could however be argued that even residential sites and arable lands could be seen as communally held, inasmuch as they theoretically reverted back to commonage on the death of the occupier, to be re-allocated by the headman at a village council meeting (ibid, p 12). Technically, people were accorded rights of usufruct, and not of ownership over land. In practice, these rights of usufruct were inheritable, but not saleable (ibid, p 10).

The administration of communal tenure had traditionally been the business of the headman's council, but over the years since 1921 the Native Affairs Department of South Africa had taken an increasingly greater part in controlling the allocation of land and the use of pasture. By 1948, people realised that the land no longer was held for them by their headman, but that it "really belonged to the

Administration which 'could do what it liked with the land and the people living on it'" (ibid, p 8-9). What pertained in Chatha then was a watered down form of communal tenure which allowed the headman to apply the principles of communal tenure only to the extent that they did not interfere with the Administration's concern to give as many people as possible (who had paid their taxes) a piece of land, and to combat erosion (p 8), both in the grazing areas and in the fields. (These two goals were in practice not always compatible.)

Access to arable land was gained by two principal means: through allotment by the village council, or by inheritance. Before the Second World War, sub-division of arable allotments was a well-established practice, and was the means whereby "all the men wanting land were given a piece" (ibid, p 20). In 1939 the registration of fields was introduced, and the sub-division of fields was stopped. "The principle of one man-one lot was established" (loc. cit.). People who held more than one field were not dispossessed of their extra fields, but were allowed to transmit only one field by inheritance, which could not be further sub-divided. People devised strategies to keep their land-holdings in the family. "One old man in the village explained how he was going to give one of his two fields to his son, because when he died his widow would have to choose one of the fields and then the other would be lost to the family. But if he gave the one field to his son while he was still alive his widow would be able to keep the other when he was dead" (loc. cit.). The registration of holdings, plus the fact that holdings had become increasingly smaller through sub-division, meant that sub-division happened increasingly infrequently after the war.

With the increasing scarcity of land, competition for fields becoming vacant was intense, with people attempting to secure fields through strategic gifts to the headman and to their sub-headmen. The increasing involvement of the Native Commissioner in the allocation of fields, however, meant that preference had increasingly to be given to landless applicants who had been paying their taxes the longest, and not to applicants of the headman's or the sub-headman's choice. The idea held by the villagers that close agnatic relatives had a prior claim to a field formerly held by one of their lineage members, and which had not been taken by a direct lineal heir, was not acknowledged



by the Administration (ibid, p 12). This had the effect of dispersing the land holdings of a lineage grouping and, together with other factors like Christianity and education, which provided new bases of group formation, of undermining lineage solidarity (ibid, p 11 - 12).

The Administration recognised the right of a dead man's widow or son to inherit the rights to the use of one of his fields. Only men were entitled to inherit rights to fields, although widows were allowed to retain the use of their dead husband's field. His widow in fact had the first claim to his field, even before her sons. The Rural Survey found that 41 per cent of sampled landholders in Chatha were widows (ibid, p 18). That the field was not her property was indicated by the fact that if she remarried, she would not maintain her rights to that field (ibid, p 18).

The idea of fields as male property was a change from the former practice whereby each married woman was entitled to a field, and passed it, together with her other property, to her youngest son. As land became scarcer, and as men became more involved in cultivation, rights over fields became regarded as male property, to be inherited by the eldest son (ibid, p 18). This change of viewpoint was probably influenced by the desire to maintain the principle of primogeniture in the face of growing land shortage, as well as by the Administration's view of land as essentially male property.

Fields could technically be forfeited if their holders did not cultivate them for several years, or did not pay tax for several years or left the village permanently or (in the case of a widow) remarried. In practice however, very few fields were forfeited, and then only for the latter two reasons (ibid, p 25 - 26). While the possibility of forfeiture was thus not a very real threat, people were unhappy that, because of the Administration's increasing involvement with land allocation, they could not be certain who would inherit their fields, nor how this would affect the integrity of lineage holdings (ibid, p 26).

Unlike fields, sites for building were not in short supply. A young man (or his father) would approach their sub-headman with a gift, requesting a particular site. The sub-headman would then discuss the matter at a meeting of the village section. If the request was approved, the sub-headman would take the applicant to the

headman, and inform him of the section's approval. The application would be discussed and ratified at the next meeting of the village council. Thereafter, the garden site would be marked out. In theory gardens should not have exceeded half a morgen in size, as this was the maximum size allowed for homestead sites (including gardens). Gardens ranged from two acres to a quarter acre in size, with the average size being half an acre (ibid, p 33 - 35).

While the size of arable fields varied, the average size was three and a quarter acres, with the average holding being one and a half fields. This gave an average arable holding of five acres (excluding gardens). Actual holdings varied fairly widely, ranging from ten acres down to less than one acre, with the majority of families (73.2%) having holdings of between two and eight acres (ibid, p 39).

The fact that only three per cent of households were landless (this figure had risen to ten per cent by the time of the 1958 Government Report on Chatha) does not however mean that landlessness was not a problem in Chatha. If individuals eligible to hold land (such as married men and widows) are taken into account, rather than total households, then 30 per cent of those eligible to hold land had no fields of their own (ibid, p 43). This landlessness and the unequal distribution of arable land between households, were to some extent offset by the fact that a number of households gained access to additional arable land by means of share cropping, hiring or borrowing land from other households with larger holdings (ibid, p 41).

The system of land tenure prevailing at the time of the Rural Survey was thus the result of two major factors, viz. the intervention of the authorities, and an increasing shortage of available allocatable arable land. The fact that the Administration had prohibited strangers from acquiring residential sites (and effectively, therefore, of arable land as well) since 1930 (ibid, p 34), had the effect of maintaining the homogeneity of the village's population. The growing shortage of arable land meant that the Administration forbade subdivision of fields in order to prevent the emergence of unworkably small fields, and also favoured people who had paid their taxes in the allocation of fields. This in turn gave rise to a growing number of landless young men and to the dispersal of what were

were fairly coherent blocks of land held by separate lineages.

### AGRICULTURE

Although the household formed the effective unit of economic co-operation in terms of pooling of resources (Wilson et al 1952, p 71), it was by and large unable to provide the labour or equipment necessary to cultivate its fields. In Chatha during the 1949-1950 agricultural season, 14 out of 62 households (22%) surveyed in a sample, were able to plough independently, while in Upper Nqhumeya (another communal tenure village) only eight out of 74 households (11%) ploughed their fields independently (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 102). Households thus formed ploughing teams, pooling their resources.

Data relating to the relationships of co-operation between cultivating households are available for Upper Nqhumeya. Since this was also a communal tenure village, it may be assumed that fairly similar patterns would have prevailed in Chatha.

#### Patterns of Co-Operation Between Households Ploughing Fields in Upper Nqhumeya During the 1949-1950 Season

<u>Location of Households Assisting Each Other</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
Same Village Section	52 cases
Other Village Sections	12 cases
Other Villages	2 cases
	<hr/>
	66 cases
	<hr/>

(Wilson et al 1952, p 20).

Four-fifths of cases of co-operation were between households of the same village-section, indicating the viability and convenience of village-section ties and of neighbourhood. These cases may also be considered from the perspective of possible kinship relationships between co-operating households.

<u>Relationship Between Households Assisting Each Other</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
Agnates	22 cases (33%)
Agnates and Affines	2 cases ( 3%)
Agnates and Non-Relatives	4 cases ( 6%)
Clansmen	2 cases ( 3%)
Affines	13 cases (20%)
Maternal Relatives	4 cases ( 6%)
Non-Relatives	19 cases (29%)
	<u>66 cases</u>

(Wilson et al 1952, p 69).

While in the majority of cases (71%), assistance was received from relatives, agnates were involved in only 45 per cent of cases. So the high percentage of cases of assistance (79%) from people of the same village section cannot be explained solely in terms of the fact that agnates mostly lived in the same section. The ties of locality and convenience between members of the same village section clearly stretched further than the bonds of agnatic kinship. In addition to practical considerations such as proximity and the availability of equipment, people themselves cited personal preference, disagreements with relatives, and the desire to work with fellow Christians as their reasons for co-operating with non-agnates (ibid, p 70).

Whatever their preferences were, people clearly chose to exercise them with members of their own village section. People were united in their co-membership of a village section, and there was "extensive borrowing and co-operation within the hamlet and village section" in communal tenure villages (ibid, p 17). It is not surprising that these forms of solidarity should have been expressed in agricultural co-operation, which seems to have operated in terms of reciprocity, rather than of commercial considerations.

Oral evidence suggests that there was little hiring of oxen for ploughing. People either ploughed in companies or borrowed cattle, repaying their debt in some other form of assistance. Likewise, there was little hiring of labour (on cash terms) for tasks like hoeing or weeding. People would brew beer and call a work party. This is confirmed by data from Upper Nqhumeya, where during the 1949/1950 season, 29 out of 35 fields were weeded by work parties, while six



(17%) were weeded through recruiting hired labour (ibid, p 20).

Those people who did not have arable land of their own, or who had less than they felt they could work, could gain access to arable land by means of share-cropping (whereby one party provides the land, while the other provides everything necessary to its cultivation, e.g. oxen, seed and labour, and the crop is shared); hiring (whereby the use of the land is leased out on an annual basis and the lessee is entitled to all the produce of the land); or borrowing (whereby a field or a portion of it is made available free of charge, and the recipient is allowed to keep the crop). During the 1949 season, ten out of 75 sampled families (13.3%) either leased, lent out or made land available on a share-cropping basis to other households, while 11 families (14.7%) gained access to land in this manner (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 41). This means that just over a quarter of families were involved in land-sharing arrangements. It is not clear between whom share-cropping and leasing arrangements took place, but borrowing usually took place in cases where "there was some close kinship tie between the two parties" (ibid, p 31).

The product of all this co-operation and labour was relatively little. Crops in the 1948/1949 season were negligible because of severe drought, and in the following year, described as a good season, (Houghton and Walton, 1952, p 157) yields were as follows:

Maize	5,5 x 200 lb bags per morgen
Sorghum	2,5 x 200 lb bags per morgen (adapted from p 161 - 163)

Given that the average land-holding (including gardens) was 2.6 morgen per household, the maximum yield per average family could be about 14 bags of cereals per year. Vegetables were also planted in the fields, although only yielded "a small quantity" (ibid, p 160). Cultivation of winter crops was minimal, with only 2 families cultivating winter wheat in the 1949/1950 season (ibid, p 163). This was in part due to the practice of driving cattle into the fields during winter to eat the maize stalks. It was "therefore clear that, even in a good season such as 1949/1950, the production of the area is totally inadequate to support the population for the whole year, and that a considerable quantity of food has therefore to be imported" (ibid, p 160).

Reasons given for this low productivity included a shortage of:

arable land, which led to land not being rested, to crops not being rotated, and to unsuitable land coming under the plough;

a shortage of capital to enable farmers with sufficient land to develop it;

a shortage of effective ploughing oxen, as people often had too few oxen to pull a plough, or after drought years, their oxen were too weak to do so;

a shortage of the necessary implements due to a shortage of money

a shortage of available labour, as a result of the high incidence of migrant labour;

a shortage of rain (ibid, p 154-157).

Households pooled their resources in an attempt to overcome these shortages, and in the 1949/1950 season, all the fields surveyed in the sample taken in Chatha were cultivated fairly extensively (ibid, p 162). "It is nevertheless not uncommon to find that some of the available arable land has remained uncultivated because there was no one to do the ploughing" (ibid, p 157), or because the other necessities could not be found.

In addition to these physical shortages, certain practices were also cited as being responsible for low productivity. These included: repeated monoculture (of maize)

limited attempts to build up the fertility of the soil

failure to adopt new agricultural practices

allowing cattle into the fields in winter (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 154 - 157; Mills and Wilson 1952, p 130 - 131).

As with arable land, stock were not evenly distributed throughout the community. While most households owned cattle (73%), less owned sheep (42%) and goats (33%), with one-sixth of households owning no stock at all. While the average cattle-owning household had five head of cattle, individual holdings went as high as 34 cattle, 95 sheep and 32 goats. The three wealthiest stock owners owned respectively

34 cattle 70 sheep and no goats

7 cattle 70 sheep and 32 goats

11 cattle 95 sheep and 16 goats, and held respectively 10 acres, 2 acres and 5 acres of arable land (data derived from questionnaire sheets administered during the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey).

In 1949, income from agriculture (calculated in cash and kind for

crops and stock, but not including income from the recorded sale of stock which was almost negligible) amounted to just over 25 per cent of the estimated average household income of £36 7s 4d (adapted from Houghton and Walton 1952, p 106). In all probability, agriculture would have contributed a larger part of the annual income in 1950, when maize yields more than doubled (ibid, p 161-162), but agriculture was at best a sub-subsistence activity, as "None of the families investigated in Keiskammahoek District make a living out of farming, and few of them have sufficient land to do so, even with considerably improved techniques" (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 128).

### INCOME

The major part of a household's income (70%) was derived from wages and salaries earned from employment. The total average annual household income (including all sources of income) was £36 7s 4d, and the average annual household cash income was £25 12s 0d (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 106). Chatha was in an unusually fortunate position at the time of the Rural Survey, as the Forestry Department was then employing a large number of people in the Chatha forest, replanting large sections of it (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 118). Two-thirds of the sampled households earned more than half their cash income inside the Keiskammahoek District, and averaged an income of £27 17s 7d per year, of which 70 per cent was derived from wages and salaries earned within the District. The remaining households, which earned more than half their cash income outside the District, averaged an income of £20 15s 0d, of which only eight per cent was derived from wages and salaries within the District (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 107). The temporary employment provided by the Department of Forestry thus masked the heavy reliance of Chatha's inhabitants upon money coming into the community from the outside, as well as the fact that in more normal times there was only a limited source of employment locally available. Average annual incomes would also normally have been lower than during the period of the Rural Survey's investigation.

RITUAL AND CEREMONIAL GROUPINGS

Ritual activity relating to the lineage was effectively the concern of the lineage remnant, or local lineage grouping, in Chatha, rather than of the lineage as a whole (some of whose members might be living in other villages). The leader of the local remnant, who was usually "the primogenitive male descendant of the lineage founder" (Wilson et al 1952, p 61), was the person through whom any member of the remnant would approach their ancestors (ibid, p 63), and he was responsible for performing or supervising any necessary ritual (ibid, p 64).

Although clansmen were entitled to attend any rituals relating to a lineage of their clan, in effect only those who lived close by or were on very friendly terms with the household head concerned would do so, and by and large only lineage remnant members were present (ibid, p 64). For more important occasions, such as the sacrifice of a beast in the event of illness, or the funeral rites of an elderly member of the lineage, more distant agnates (i.e. both geographically and genealogically) would be invited, and members of the remnant working in town would be informed (ibid, p 64 - 65).

Maternal or sororal kin would attend rituals if they lived nearby, or if relationships were very close with the person holding the sacrifice. They would however be specially invited to sacrifices where they were directly involved, as when for example an ill person's maternal ancestors needed to be propitiated, as in such a circumstance only the patient's maternal kin were able to make the sacrifice (ibid, p 65).

Where a ritual concerned a woman's husband, her kinsmen might be invited to attend. As a woman remained under the influence of her own ancestors, as well as coming under the influence of her husband's, it might on occasion be necessary for her agnates to undertake sacrifices on her behalf in matters relating to her own ancestors (ibid, p 66).

Unrelated people often attended rituals, and assisted with the preparations. Pagans did not like this assistance, claiming that a sacrifice was a lineage affair. In practice, it was the young wives married into the lineage who were expected to help with preparations, while the daughters of the lineage assisted if they wished to (loc. cit.).



While a Christian woman might decline to participate in rituals relating to her own lineage, she was obliged to assist at rituals relating to her husband's group (ibid, p 66 - 67). Christian kinsmen might or might not be invited to attend lineage rituals, and some would attend, although perhaps declining the meat and the beer. "In general however, religious activities are a kinship bond for pagans only and the acceptance of Christianity, more than any other factor, undermines the solidarity of the lineage remnant in this sphere" (ibid, p 67).

Although other categories of people attended lineage rituals, and were on occasion specifically invited, the key aspects of lineage rituals were the concern of the local lineage remnant, and more specifically of its pagan members.

The village-section also functioned as an important social and ceremonial unit. At initiation schools, all the initiates from one village-section shared an initiation lodge separate from those of other sections (ibid, p 16). Young men from the village-section would assist with the chopping of wood for the building of initiation lodges, and the chopped saplings would be dragged by cattle belonging either to fellow lineage members or village-section mates (oral testimony). In preparing for a ceremony, the young wives of the section were expected to help with tasks such as grinding mealies, collecting wood and water, and cooking (ibid, p 19). When a member of the village-section died, fellow members would not work in their fields before the funeral, and the young men of the section would dig the grave. Members of a section, or of several sections grouped together as a unit, would sit together at beer drinks, circumcision feasts and weddings, being given food and drink separately from other sections. This same commensal solidarity also took place at the village level, with members of the village sitting together when attending ceremonies in other villages (ibid, p 16). Informants state that in Chatha, the six village-sections paired off into three groups (Nyanga and Skafu; Ndela and Nyokane; Jili and Rawule) at feasts, receiving their food and drink.

These groups correspond to what are known as isithebe (pl. izithebe) groups, or hospitality groups among other Cape Nguni peoples (Hammond-Tooke 1963; Bigalke 1969). While among the Mpondomise, these

hospitality groups were organised around lineage segments (Hammond-Tooke 1963, p 307), in most cases, as in Chatha, they were organised along territorial lines (ibid, p 313-315). While some older people use the term izithebe to refer to these hospitality groups, the term does not enjoy general currency in Chatha today. People refer to "those people", or refer to the groupings by name, viz. Komkhulu (Nyanga and Skafu), Phesheya (Ndele and Nyokane) and Mzantsi (Rawule and Jili).

At a wider, ethnic level, it appears that it was only at circumcision ceremonies that Mfengu and Xhosa identity was ritually manifested. Xhosa and Mfengu people initiated their youths separately, with some differences in procedure, although this was not always the case. If there had been intermarriage, Mfengu and Xhosa youths might be circumcised together (Wilson et al 1952, p 199). There is no evidence to suggest that groupings at circumcision ceremonies or feasts were organised on an ethnic basis.

Ceremonial and ritual groupings were thus organised principally along the lines of kinship and locality. Within these principles further sub-groups were formed along the lines of sex and age. Thus the cattle-byre, where sacrifices are made, was a male preserve, although daughters of the lineage or clan were permitted to enter it (ibid, p 117). The ceremony of circumcision was exclusively a male preserve. Men and women sat separately at feasts. Men (of over approximately 40 years) sat in the cattle-byre during feasts, while youths sat outside. Women were also divided into senior and junior groups, which sat separately (oral testimony). The preparation and the cooking of the food was undertaken by the youths and young wives of the lineage or village-section concerned (ibid, p 117).

#### VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

Voluntary associations in Chatha were recruited along three lines, viz. Christianity, Formal Education and Village-Section membership.

About three-fifths of the Keiskammahoek area's population was in some way involved with Christian beliefs and church activities, and Christian based associations formed the largest potential group cutting across traditional lines of association viz. locality,

kinship, sex and age (ibid, p 136). As mentioned above, a number of Christians withdrew from pagan activities which involved beer, regarding themselves as superior to their pagan kinsmen. Church associations, which cut across kinship and village lines, were organised along denominational lines, although members of particular denominations readily attended the services and functions of other denominations, as the different denominational associations were organised along broadly similar lines (ibid, p 138). Although other denominations were represented in the village, Chatha was effectively Methodist (oral testimony).

However, elements of traditional social organisation were still retained in church associations. Married women were defined in terms of their husband's lineage, and a woman marrying a man of a different denomination would take up membership of his family's denomination. Sex and age also served as principles of organisation with Women's and Girl's Associations and Men's and Young Men's Associations being formed (ibid, p 136, 140), and with male authority obtaining in church organisation (ibid, p 136).

An offshoot of the church-based associations were the various gift clubs, which were concerned to assist members with the funding of their children's weddings. Contributions were made, and listed, on the understanding that they would be reciprocated in due course (ibid, p 165-166). Most of these clubs did not, however, limit their membership to Christians, but also admitted pagans (ibid, p 166). Although in theory open to men, these gift clubs consisted almost exclusively of women, and were indicative of the changing nature of sex roles. As a result of the absence of males due to migrant labour, and the increasing economic and educational advances made by women, the administering of household financial affairs was increasingly becoming a part of women's contribution to the domestic economy (p 168).

With up to two-thirds of the children in a communal village like Nqhumeya enrolled at school (ibid, p 144) education was coming to play a central role in village life. More Christians were enrolled at school, and stayed at school longer, than pagans (ibid, p 146), and more girls attended village (i.e. primary) schools than boys, although roughly equal numbers of boys and girls went on to secondary school

(ibid, p 147). Education therefore served potentially to reinforce the pagan/Christian cleavage, and to increase the status of women. Differences relating to Christianity and to education found expression in the formation of various groups. Unschoolled boys tended to stick together, having played, fought and herded together instead of going to school. Their interests tended to beer drinks and pagan concerns (ibid, p 156). Their lack of education led them to unskilled jobs.

Men with some schooling would look for employment in more skilled spheres and tend more towards urban attitudes and practices (loc. cit.) The most highly educated formed a professional elite, cutting across age and sex lines, which stuck largely to itself.

The School Committee was responsible for assisting with the administration of the village school. Elected by the village council, it was the only formal organisation at village level which was associated with formal education (ibid, p 154).

Village-section membership was the basis for recreational associations to which boys and girls, and young men and unmarried women, belonged. Males were dominant in these associations, and since circumcision was the critical divide between boyhood and manhood, there were two different associations: one for uncircumcised boys, and one for circumcised young men. Girls identified with the group to which their brothers or boyfriends belonged (ibid, p 158).

The Boy's Association (iBhavu) usually involved boys of 14 to 20 years, and girls of 14 to 18 years of age (Mayer, 1972, p 34). A local Boy's Association was recruited on village-section lines, and was hierarchically organised, promotion being achieved through winning stick-fighting contests (ibid, p 40). Overnight gatherings were regularly held, to which members of other associations might be invited. Such gatherings saw the boys dancing to the clapping of the girls, with stick-fighting between members of the various associations attending (Wilson et al, p 1952, p 160).

An annual feast was held at Christmas time, lasting anything up to a month, at which nightly beer-drinking and courtship would take place, with the boys and girls going back home by day. Members of other associations would be invited on some nights to share in the festivities and to compete in the dancing (ibid, p 160 - 161).

The activities of the Parliament (the association of young men and



unmarried young women - iPalamente) were organised on village-section lines similar to those of the Boy's Association, but on more self-controlled and dignified lines. The "raucousness, violence and openly non-marital sexuality" associated with the Boy's Association was looked down upon by members of the Parliament (Mayer, 1972, p 21).

The Parliament also had its own internal hierarchy, which was observed during the distribution of beer at feasts. Members of other Parliaments were invited to these feasts, and to the Christmas celebration. Instead of stick-fighting and dancing, social occasions were characterised by singing and competition between choirs of the various Parliaments (Wilson et al 1952, p 162).

Like the Boy's Association, the Parliament rendered community assistance, with the former helping with weeding, while the latter helped with agriculture and hut-building (ibid, p 162). The Parliament carried the approval of the village council (Mayer 1972, p 27), while the Boy's Association was regarded as undesirable, and their beer parties and some of their dances had been limited by various village councils (ibid, p 45). The main activity of the Parliament, however, related to its role at Christian weddings. The respective Parliaments to which the bride and the groom belonged, assisted with the preparations for the wedding, also parading through the community on horseback, and holding horse-races, as well as singing competitions (Wilson et al 1952, p 162). The fact that the Parliament participated in Christian weddings did not however preclude or discourage pagans from joining (ibid, p 163).

Both associations, recruited along village-section lines, incorporated both pagans and Christians, both educated and uneducated people, and so served to mitigate possible cleavages developing along those lines. This inter-sectional hospitality and competition helped to foster a sense of identity which later assumed a political significance when men began to take a part in administering the affairs and interests of their village-sections. Voluntary associations thus both affirmed and cut across traditional principles of group formation, rather than replacing them completely. It was however education, with its ability to introduce a new measure of status and a new set of ideas and ambitions, that cut most strongly across the old principles of kinship, sex, age and locality.

### STATUS AND DIFFERENTIATION

Sex and age were the major bases in terms of which social differentiation took place, and also regulated the division of labour. Men were always seen as superior to women, and within each sex, seniority by age denoted superior status (Wilson et al 1952, p 107).

Women were not allowed to hold political office, or to participate in village politics. They were not allowed to attend meetings of the village or village-section council unless the issue under discussion concerned them directly, and then a woman was to be represented by a man, not speaking for herself (ibid, p 115). Women similarly did not attend lineage meetings or moots unless directly involved (p 116). Men controlled and inherited land, and women were in theory not supposed to take agricultural initiatives, such as deciding which crops to sow, or whether to construct a contour bank, without their husband's permission (ibid, p 107-108). Women could not intercede with the ancestors (ibid, p 116), although daughters of the clan were allowed to enter the cattle-byre during ceremonial or rituals (ibid, p 117). There was greater restriction for a woman in her husband's homestead than in those of her lineage, where she could enter the cattle-byre, and if need be, handle stock, herd and even plough (ibid, p 117). Age conferred greater status on women, both old men and old women being identified with and eventually becoming ancestors (ibid, p 108).

Age, together with sex, largely determined an individual's membership in particular social groups, as well as the extent of his/her participation in community activities. All adult (i.e. circumcised) men were allowed to attend village meetings, and to speak. Older men sat together, separately from the younger men, who were expected to listen rather than to speak, and to defer to their elders (ibid, p 115). Seniority by age determined the right to speak first at lineage council meetings. On ceremonial occasions, the young men, or the young women (depending on the nature of the occasion), would prepare the food (p 117) and young married women would sit separately from the older women, as the younger men would sit separately from their elders. Circumcision for males and marriage

for females was the critical divide between childhood and adulthood, and children did not participate in the affairs of adults, but formed their own associations and groups (ibid, p 111 - 113).

Status was conferred by land ownership, but there was no hard and fast distinction between the landed and the landless, as occurred in freehold villages, as every married male who paid his taxes was entitled to land, and would in theory get land if he waited long enough (ibid, p 5). The length of time that an individual or his family had lived in the village was also a measure of status (ibid, p 7).

At the time of the Rural Survey, the more traditional criteria by which status had been measured, namely sex, age, land ownership and family history were being increasingly cross-cut by factors such as wealth, education and Christianity.

The capacity of young men and women to become wage-earners, was making for a divergence of interests and values within the community, along generational lines. Older criteria based on seniority and sex were being challenged by the growing economic independence of the younger generation (ibid, p 125) and young married couples sought to establish their own homesteads. Women's ability to earn money was giving them potential independence from male control (ibid, p 127).

This tendency to redefine the relationship between the generations and the sexes was reinforced by the growing number of children attending school, and by the emergence of a small professional elite (ibid, p 127, 156). Interests generated by education were "undermining the traditional respect of youth for age and the subservience of children to their parents" (ibid, p 155). The educated regarded themselves as superior to the uneducated, and teachers, ministers, clerks or nurses, regardless of sex or age, were accorded high status (ibid, p 127).

Closely related to education, was Christianity. Christians regarded themselves as superior to pagans, and for social purposes, two separate social groups appeared to be forming. Much of pagan life was centred on the preparation and drinking of beer, which was important both ceremonially, and in the recruitment of work-parties. As many Christians declined to drink beer, they excluded themselves from social activities involving beer, and so tended to seek the

company of their fellow Christians (ibid, p 137). There was, however, no rigid pagan/Christian distinction. A number of Christians were not prepared to forego beer, or its associated religion of the ancestor cult (ibid, p 130 - 131), and there was considerable Christian/pagan intermarriage (ibid, p 134). Pagans participated in Christian activities, and there was no sign of conscious residential segregation along Christian and pagan lines (ibid, p 135). The Christian/pagan distinction was used to highlight other cleavages. For example, a young married woman, who was Christian and educated, would not be prepared to cook indefinitely for her lesser educated, pagan mother-in-law, but would seek to establish her own hut with her husband (ibid, p 123) where she could control her own household budget.

Cutting across traditional lines of sex, age and seniority, an elite was emerging, consisting of young, relatively wealthy and educated men and women, whose activities centred around school and church activities (ibid, p 156 - 157). Their numbers were as yet too small to affect the basic criteria of the old order, which, although shaken by the challenges of wage-earning and education, was still the order of the day.

### CONCLUSION

Within the limits allowed by the authorities, land use was organised in accordance with the lie of the land and the availability of resources such as wood, water, arable land and grazing land. Residential and political groups were organised accordingly, taking into account the fact that kin usually wished to settle next to each other.

Local groupings thus combined the two principles of kinship and territory, and those principles were reflected in patterns of association and co-operation and in ceremonial and recreational organisation. Cutting across these local groupings were the relatively more recent principles of Christianity, formal education and wealth, which introduced new criteria of association and of status determination, in addition to those of age and sex.

At the everyday level, people moved largely within their own hamlet and village-section, going about their daily household tasks and



social pursuits. Outside of the immediate family and neighbourhood, the effective unit of identification and co-operation was the village-section, and it was the viability of this unit that was to be fundamentally challenged by the coming of Betterment.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE COMING OF BETTERMENT IN CHATHA: 1947 TO 1969.

This chapter traces the history of the planning and implementation of Betterment in Chatha from two different points of view, viz.

1) that of officialdom, as evidenced in official documents, correspondence and interviews, i.e. the administrators of Betterment; and  
 2) that of the people living in Chatha - the recipients of Betterment. An attempt will then be made to account for some of the important differences between these two points of view. In conclusion, the situation in Chatha will be briefly compared with the implementation of Betterment elsewhere in South Africa as well as with villagisation schemes elsewhere in Africa. Some parallels will be drawn between people's experience of the implementation of villagisation and Scudder and Colson's account of the experience of relocatees in the transitional stage of their four-stage model of the relocation process, discussed in Chapter One.

#### THE PLANNING OF BETTERMENT: THE OFFICIAL PERCEPTION.

Soon after World War II (probably 1947), a meeting was held at the neighbouring location of Mnyameni, which was attended by villagers from the three locations of Chatha, Gxulu and Mnyameni. At this meeting, various government officials told the people about Betterment schemes, showing them pictures of crops growing under favourable conditions. The people were asked if they wanted such good crops and good grazing in their locations, and they replied that they did.<sup>1</sup>

On 21 July, 1947, the Native Commissioner at Keiskammahoek held a meeting at Chatha, at which the 70 taxpayers attending expressed themselves in favour of Betterment, doing so "unanimously".<sup>2</sup>

A committee was later chosen by the people of Chatha, to liaise with the authorities on the implementation of Betterment. This nine member committee signed a document, requesting that "the provisions of Proclamation No 31 of 1939, the provisions of which we are fully acquainted with, be applied to the said Cata Location".<sup>3</sup> Accordingly,

on 31 October, Chatha, Gxulu and Mnyameni locations were proclaimed Betterment areas in terms of Government Notices No 2260 and 2262 of 1947.<sup>4</sup>

From then onwards, the three locations of Chatha, Gxulu and Mnyameni were taken together for planning purposes, although separate detailed plans were drawn up for each location and Betterment was implemented separately in each case. The Magistrate responsible for the implementation of Betterment in these three locations (although the Magistrates were not involved in the actual drawing up of plans) suggests that these three locations were taken together for planning purposes, because they lay in the same catchment area.<sup>5</sup>

Although the people of these three locations had applied to have Betterment introduced in terms of Proclamation No 31 of 1939, it was effectively applied under the terms of Proclamation No 116 of 1949 and the guidelines of the Tomlinson Commission, which reported in 1954. These later terms were much more comprehensive, allowing inter alia for the division of locations into arable, residential and grazing areas. This division has necessitated people having to move away from their old residential sites - perhaps the strongest grievance people voice against the implementation of Betterment. While oral sources suggest that the villagers officially accepted Betterment under its 1939 provisions, they might not have done so had they known what it was to involve under later provisions.

A Planning Committee was established for the Ciskei, to draw up plans for the implementation of Betterment in Ciskei locations. It started work in the Keiskammahoek District in May 1951.<sup>6</sup> It conducted surveys in Chatha, Gxulu and Mnyameni, covering aspects such as population, area, topography, soils, climate, agriculture and infrastructure. In November 1952, Chatha was found to be overgrazed, and it was suggested that tracts of arable land situated on river banks and steep slopes would have to be withdrawn from cultivation, as they were "causing considerable erosion" (Report on Cata Location, 1952, p 2). Chatha should be divided into arable, residential and grazing areas, eight grazing camps be fenced off, the remaining arable area be divided into one morgen lots to be re-allocated to the (then) present land-holders, and a drastic stock cull be carried out. (p 4-6)

The report on Chatha was accompanied by a memorandum from the

headman, complaining that the proposed residential sites (.16 morgen) were too small, that the proposed stock cull (from 1256 to 740 cattle-units) was too drastic, and that the proposed compensation (£500) for demolishing and rebuilding the mission school was inadequate. The implementation of the plan would cause dissatisfaction.<sup>7</sup>

A similar report on Gxulu location (Report on Gxulu Location, 1952), submitted later in November 1952, contained similar proposals for Gxulu, and elicited similar responses from their headman. He felt that the proposed cull (unspecified) was too drastic, and that the proposed arable allotments of one morgen were too small. As a proposed grazing camp contained some of the Gxulu's best arable land, he wanted the demarcation of grazing camps to be reconsidered.<sup>8</sup> The available correspondence does not indicate whether the headmen's complaints were taken into account in further planning.

The Gxulu report contained the additional proposal that a dam be constructed, allowing the gravitational irrigation of an area of about 100 morgen under lucerne or other fodder crops, which could be used to provide feed for the cattle of the three locations. This would provide feed in dry years, and lessen the extent of any necessary culling. (p 4 - 6)

Reactions to the reports on Chatha and Gxulu were forthcoming from the Agricultural Officer and the Native Commissioner. These reactions were significant inasmuch as they voiced criticisms which were to apply to the final report which was submitted in 1958, as well as to its preliminary stages in 1952. The Native Commissioner felt that:

a) in the absence of a policy directive on rural planning from higher authority, the reports' suggestions should only be seen as an interim measure. As such, it was not sound policy to uproot the local people and spend large sums of money on compensation in a temporary action which might be rendered obsolete by a later policy directive, which might involve another removal. (p 1)

b) the plans aimed at the reclamation of the land, while effectively ignoring those who lived on it. "Soil erosion" was as important a problem as soil erosion. (p 1)

c) arable allotments of one morgen on dryland would simply perpetrate the existing situation, which was "acknowledged to be bad", and so would serve no useful agricultural purpose. (p 3)



d) unless it had adequate water, sanitary and recreational facilities, and unless the people were "embarking on a progressive enterprise" (i.e. economically), the new concentrated residential areas would be counter-productive. The men would still have to go to labour centres to work, "and a village populated by pauper women, children and old people will become a slum area,...Malcontents are better apart." (p 3)

Instead of re-arrangement of physical resources, he recommended economic diversification, centred on "the only crop which flourishes here under all conditions, viz. the trees". Those parts of the location unsuitable for arable and grazing purposes should be put under forest, and sawmills and a timber industry be developed. To feed these foresters and workers, a dairy industry based on fodder plots under irrigation (as proposed) and vegetable gardens under irrigation, should be established. The community would thus be divided into landless locally employed wage-earners, and landed food-producers, selling their food locally. (p 2)

Demographic pressure (an estimated 175 people per square mile) made planning difficult, and the acquisition of a part of the 30 sq mile Keiskammahoek commonage, "too large for genuine urban settlement", should be considered as an area for additional settlement of the rural inhabitants of the area. (p 3)<sup>9</sup>

The Agricultural Officer felt that the object of creating economic or sub-economic units with the planned allocations was simply unrealistic. He argued that "No family consisting of approximately 7 members can make a living on 1 morgen on dry land with 1.2 cattle units". The objective of a situation where arable lands, livestock and grazing were in a sound and productive relationship was also unrealistic in terms of the planned dispensation. Regular application of manure, rather than rotational cropping with leys and artificial fertilizer, would restore soil fertility. In any event, leys required manure to revitalise the soil effectively. The necessary amount of manure required a proportionate number of livestock, having grazing all year round. Gxulu was overpopulated, and if part of the population could not be absorbed elsewhere, then the Native Commissioner's proposals for a forestry based economy should be implemented. (p 1)<sup>10</sup>

The Planning Committee for the Ciskei operated under the authority

of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Ciskei, and so worked independently of the Magistrate and local officials in the districts in which they did their planning work. The Magistrate commented on location plans drawn up by the Planning Committee, sending his comments to the office of the Chief Native Commissioner, who made the final decisions, or referred problems in the planning process to Pretoria. The Magistrate thus did not have any power to override the Planning Committee. The Planning Committee did not consult with the people. It drew up the plan which was then put to the people for discussion and possible modification. "They had no right to consult with the people." That was the Magistrate's task. Quite how the consultative process worked, is therefore not clear.<sup>11</sup>

The Magistrate who wrote the criticisms and suggestions mentioned above, states (personal communication) that higher authority was prepared to consider his proposal for developing a forestry-based industry, on condition that he could obtain co-operation from all the villages involved. Dr. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, had expressed his support for the proposal on a visit to the area, "on condition you can get 100 per cent approval - otherwise one match might undo all the good work". The Magistrate had obtained the approval "of most of the people, but Mnyameni wanted to consult their attorneys - they came back and opposed it", their attorney stating that "we oppose anything until there are equal rights."<sup>12</sup>

While the afforestation proposal was at least considered, the Magistrate's and the Agricultural Officer's other proposals do not seem to have been taken into account, and the Planning Committee's suggestions were channelled up to higher authority. It is not clear quite where in the chain of bureaucratic command the problems arose, for 1953 saw an attempt by the Chief Native Commissioner to persuade higher officials in Pretoria not to implement the scheme. "Pretoria's plan" was so vague that he had had trouble in explaining it to the people. He had discussed it with the headmen of the three locations, who "do not favour the suggestions, and indicate that their people do not either."<sup>13</sup> In a second letter he argued that it would be futile to employ a scheme such as this without the support of the people, as it would not succeed, whatever its planning merits might be. The proposal that some land-owners be persuaded to cede their land rights

- whether voluntarily, or by force - was again futile, as the people would refuse.<sup>14</sup>

Both the Native Commissioners at Keiskammahoek and King William's Town realised that a scheme that did not meet the people's real needs or have their consent, could not succeed.

The Secretary of Native Affairs' reply to the Chief Native Commissioner at King William's Town's concerns, is not available, and it seems that for the next few years nothing much happened. In 1957, the Chief Native Commissioner received a letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs, suggesting that the Betterment of Gxulu, Chatha and Mnyameni had been delayed. because there had not been clarity about existing forestry policy or plans for these locations. The Chief Native Commissioner was requested to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee to review and consolidate the existing plans. The Committee was also to consider the possibility of extending the Chatha forest to a viable commercial unit, and to look at the possible use of land not suitable for forestry, for full agricultural use and occupation, as well as the foundation of (concentrated) villages within the three locations.<sup>15</sup>

Pretoria's reply appears to have taken account of the Native Commissioner at Keiskammahoek's suggestion to look into the development of a local forestry-based industry. What was meant by full agricultural use and occupation of land not suitable for forestry, or by the foundation of villages, is not clear. (The Tomlinson Commission had published its report in 1955, but it is not clear whether its approach had been incorporated in the Secretary for Native Affairs' instruction to the Chief Native Commissioner at King William's Town. No mention was made of economically viable agricultural units, or of moving people out of locations in order to make such units possible - both of which were proposals central to the Commission's thinking).

Whereas the Native Commissioner at Keiskammahoek had argued for the afforestation of areas not suitable for agricultural and pastoral purposes, Pretoria argued the other way - for the agricultural use of land not suitable for afforestation. The Native Commissioner saw afforestation as a use of the (otherwise) less suitable land, whereas Pretoria's proposal might well have meant that land which was suitable for both afforestation and agricultural or pastoral purposes, would

have been put under trees, leaving only limited land available for agriculture.

It is not clear what the Department of Native Affairs envisaged in suggesting a forestry-based approach for the planning of the three locations - whether for example they were looking to forestry to create the employment necessary for the creation of the industrial villages envisaged by the Tomlinson Commission, or whether their major concern was conservationist, with viable agriculture a secondary consideration. It is also not clear to what extent these suggestions were designed specifically for these three locations, or had broader relevance.

The Ad Hoc Committee was formed and authorised to meet in February 1958.<sup>16</sup> The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of the Magistrate (as Native Commissioner), an Engineer, three Agricultural officials and two "Bantu Representatives" (the headmen of Chatha and Mnyameni). As there was a change of Magistrates while the Ad Hoc Committee was preparing its report, neither of the two Magistrates involved could give me much detail about either the Ad Hoc Committee or the Advisory Committees. Villagers' accounts were not of much help either. Advisory Committees were formed in the three locations, and these acted as a channel of communication, to discuss the Ad Hoc Committee's proposals, and solicit people's responses. It is not clear how effective these Advisory Committees were. The Native Commissioner reported that "on 2/4/1958 I held meetings with the advisory committees of these locations - they were unanimous in their support of the proposal for a rural township" (this involved some people moving out of the locations to a new settlement so that the others could have viable agricultural units).<sup>17</sup> At a later meeting the Advisory Committee was concerned that inadequate residential sites were being made available.<sup>18</sup> The Advisory Committee's comments were all made within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee's proposals. As will be argued later, it seems unlikely that they supported these proposals, and were probably doing what they could to improve a situation which they did not believe they could fundamentally prevent, or change.

The Ad Hoc Committee's report, entitled "Rehabilitation and Settlement Report on Gxulu, Mnyameni and Cata Locations:



Keiskammahoek" was submitted in October 1958. The report was 49 typed pages in length, and carried the signatures of the Native Commissioner (of Keiskammahoek), an engineer, three agricultural officers and the headmen of Chatha and Mnyameni.

As regards Chatha, the report gave the following statistics:

- a) Chatha had a population of 1880 people, made up of 328 families
- b) Of these 328 families,
  - 296 (90%) had both land and stock
  - 27 (8,5%) had no land but had stock
  - 5 (1.5%) had neither land nor stock.
- c) Of the 495 morgen of arable land under cultivation in 1958, only 193 morgen (39%) was held to be suitable for cultivation - the rest would have to be withdrawn (this figure of 495 morgen seems to refer to fields only, and not to gardens).
- d) Average yields (for all three locations) were estimated as
 

Maize	2 bags per morgen
Sorghum	1 bag per morgen
Beans	.5 bag per morgen
Peas	.25 bag per morgen
- e) The available 3045 morgen of grazing land was overstocked, and could carry only 1084 (67%) of the 1600 cattle-units grazing on it in 1958, as one cattle-unit required three morgen of grazing land.
- f) These cattle-units were made up as follows
 

Cattle	918	Sheep	2180	Goats	746
Horses	91	Donkeys	6		

5 Sheep or 5 goats were equal to one cattle-unit.
- g) 1320 morgen of Chatha's total area of 4860 morgen was forest plantation, under the control of the South African Department of Forestry, and the South African Native Trust. This left an effective 3540 morgen for habitation, agriculture and grazing purposes.

Questions may be asked about the accuracy of these statistics. According to the report, 1300 of the 1880 members of Chatha's population were tax payers, which would imply that less than one-third of the population were under the age of 20 years, which seems rather unlikely. In addition, figures with regard to population, arable land, cattle-units and households with access to arable land and stock differ significantly from those of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey.

These differences may be tabulated as follows:

	<u>Keiskammahoek Rural Survey</u>	<u>1952 Report</u>	<u>1958 Report</u>
Population	2640 (de jure) <sup>19</sup>	1594 ("total")	1880 (un-specified)
Arable Land (excluding gardens)	890 morgen <sup>20</sup>	334 morgen	495 morgen
Households with arable Land	two estimates, viz. 86% <sup>21</sup> and 97% <sup>22</sup>	73%	90%
Households with stock	84% <sup>22</sup>	56%	98%
Households with neither Land nor stock	0% <sup>22</sup>	23%	1.5%

At this stage, it seems most useful to seek to understand the planning process in its own terms, assuming that the Ad Hoc Committee regarded its report as accurate enough to act upon.

The report recommended that dryland farming should take place "on a mixed farming basis, with animal husbandry as the more important aspect" (p 11), and that an irrigation scheme should be established, which would accommodate 30 families on one-and-a-half morgen of arable land per family. (p 15) The substance of the report's recommendations centred on the idea of an economic unit. On a full economic unit, a family would have a "total gross income" of R120 per year (p 20). It was thought that at that time a family could live off such an income, and that it would not be necessary for members of the family to go and work in the cities as migrant labourers. In this connection the report talks of the establishment of "a stable rural peasantry" in the

three locations. (p 41)

What was an economic unit? On an economic unit, a family's gross income from yield from land plus livestock would be at least R120 per year. (Whether this R120 included income in cash, as well as in kind, or not, is not specified). Economic units might be weighted in terms of more arable land and less cattle, or vice-versa. In Chatha's case, an economic unit was to consist of three morgen of arable land as well as 17 head of cattle, each requiring three morgen of grazing. As there were 193 morgen of arable land available, this meant that Chatha could sustain 64 economic units.

It was envisaged that the development of 64 economic units would be the eventual state of affairs. In the meantime, it was suggested that Chatha could accommodate 128 dryland farmers with access to 1.5 morgen of arable land each. (p 21) The number of cattle-units per family was not specified, but it would presumably be half of the original 17 units. In addition there would be 30 irrigation settlers, each with 1.5 morgen of irrigated land and two cattle units. (p 15) Chatha could thus accommodate 158 families. (This left 170 families in Chatha who were as yet unaccounted for in terms of the Betterment scheme.) With time, the more successful farmers would displace the less successful farmers and Chatha would consist of 64 dryland economic units and 30 irrigation based economic units. The manner in which this "displacement" was to take place, and who was to decide who was to be displaced, were not specified in the Report.

Again, the calculations of the Report are problematic.

Total arable requirements would be as follows:

$$30 \times 1.5 \text{ morgen irrigated land} + 64 \times 3 \text{ morgen dryland} = 237 \text{ mg}$$

Total grazing requirements would be as follows:

$$30 \times 2 \times 3 \text{ morgen (for irrigation settlers)} \\ + 64 \times 17 \times 3 \text{ morgen (for drylanders)} = 3444 \text{ mg}$$

Total residential requirements would be as follows:

$$30 \times .25 \text{ morgen (for irrigation settlers)} \\ + 64 \times .5 \text{ (for drylanders)} = 39.5 \text{ mg}$$

$$\text{The total land requirement would thus be} \quad \underline{\underline{3720.5}} \text{ mg}$$

However, the total area of Chatha left after the forest area had been taken into account was 3540 morgen, or 180.5 morgen less than the plan stipulated. At one place (p 18) the figures add up to the available land if the dryland arable land is left out of the calculation (193 morgen) and at another place they seem to add up, if the grazing land set aside for the irrigation scheme (180 morgen) is left out of the calculation. (p 20)

Perhaps a more serious oversight than miscalculating by about 180 morgen, is the failure to come to terms with the problem of how families on half economic unit allocations would be able to make a living on an estimated R60 per year, and still be able to become successful enough to oust the less successful farmers, and so eventually to acquire full economic units. Such families would continue to be dependent on migrant labour, and so would be confronted with shortages of the full-time labour necessary to succeed in mixed farming. Nor was the question considered as to where families would get the money to acquire initially eight, and then finally 17 cattle to farm "on a mixed basis, with animal husbandry as the more important aspect". (p 11) The average holding was nearly five cattle units, but, as the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey suggested, the holdings were very uneven (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 175).

What was to happen to the 170 families in Chatha who were not to get half economic unit allocations, and later, to the 64 families who would be displaced by the more successful farmers? The report argued that "if the three locations were to be settled with a stable rural peasantry, i.e. with a minimum of half economic units" (p 41) then the situation could be described as follows:

#### 1) Present Position (1958)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Land Owning Families</u>	<u>Non Land Owning Families</u>	<u>Total Families</u>
Gxulu	269	93	362
Mnyameni	386	44	430
Chatha	<u>296</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>328</u>
	<u>951</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>1120</u>



2) Proposed Settlement on Dryland and Irrigation

<u>Location</u>	<u>Half economic unit settlers (families)</u>	<u>Irrigation settlers (families)</u>	<u>Total Families</u>
Gxulu	110	40	150
Mnyameni	190	40	230
Chatha	<u>128</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>158</u>
	<u>428</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>538</u>

3) Surplus Population

<u>Location</u>	<u>Land-owning Families</u>	<u>Non Land-owning Families</u>	<u>Total Families</u>
Gxulu	119	93	212
Mnyameni	156	44	200
Chatha	<u>138</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>170</u>
	<u>413</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>582</u>

More than half of the families in the area would have to move, and it was assumed that those currently landless would automatically move. (p 41) "A site suitable for a rural township adjacent to, or within the area planned" should be found to which the "surplus" population could be moved. (p 42) The areas suggested were the Keiskammahoek municipal area near Gxulu, and European owned farms which could be bought up. The European farmers in the district had in fact offered their farms for sale to the Department of Native Affairs. It was made clear that "the proposed township is unlikely to develop into a healthy urban community without the simultaneous development of an industry, which can be operated with unskilled labour." (p 42) Recommendations were made for the establishment of a permanent water supply, enabling crops and vegetables to be grown, and for the establishment of a secondary school with an industrial bias. These factors would reduce dissatisfaction at the move. Compensation would have to be paid to these families for loss of lands (approximately R80 per family) and for the loss of their huts (about R20 per family). (p 44)

The families to be moved would be selected by the Advisory

Committees in the villages, subject to the approval of the Native Commissioner. It was implied in the report and in earlier correspondence that the poorest families, and those least interested in agriculture, would be moved.

The report further recommended that:

- 1) dryland and irrigation residential areas, as well as arable and grazing areas, be fenced off.
- 2) in Chatha there would be
  - a) 8 dryland grazing camps (total area 3045 morgen) and 4 irrigation grazing camps (total area 180 morgen)
  - b) 3 dryland arable areas (total area 192 morgen) and 1 irrigation arable area (total area 45 morgen)
  - c) 2 dryland and 1 irrigation residential area. This implied that the people would have to move from their residential hamlets to their new residential areas.
- 3) a 12 year crop-rotation cycle be implemented, and that people be persuaded to apply manure and superphosphates to their lands.
- 4) livestock be reduced over several years in accordance with a culling guide to be "drawn up by the district and approved by the Native Commissioner" (p 36). The organisation of stock sales should be encouraged to dispose of surplus stock.
- 5) dairy-farming should be encouraged and "when the people have indicated their interest", dairies should be built. (p 36)
- 6) compensation should be paid to families moving to the new residential areas, but that it was not possible to specify the amount at that stage. (p 23)
- 7) Stock should be improved by the introduction of quality bulls and rams. (p 36)
- 8) The introduction of fish-farming be considered. (p 38)

The official (government and local government) view of rural Betterment may be briefly summarised as follows: rural villages such as Chatha were seen as overpopulated and overgrazed. This led to a deterioration of arable as well as grazing land, and a subsequent decline in agricultural production, as well as in the standard of stock. It was essential that this deterioration be halted before it became worse, and the people became subsequently poorer. Increasing

rural poverty would lead to increasing migrant labour and potential community and family instability.

Officials differed in their prescription of solutions. The Native Commissioner had pleaded in 1952 for afforestation, while the earlier Planning Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee (clearly influenced by the Tomlinson Commission) had put their faith in mixed farming, and the removal of surplus people and stock to effect the best possible restoration and use of the land. This in turn would enable agricultural production and the standard of livestock to build up again, enabling people once again to make a living off the land. The necessity for migrant labour would decrease, and so communities would become more settled and stable.

But for this restoration to take place, the weakest would have to go - those people who were poorest and least suited to agriculture, and those animals that were least "desirable" for breeding purposes. Alternative employment would have to be found for those people who left.

This view of Betterment was geared to the preservation of the land as a necessary prerequisite for the Betterment of the people. Implied by this view, and openly stated in several reports, was the idea that the people themselves were the cause of the deterioration, that their culture and their farming methods were somehow to blame. What they needed was to be taught, and organised. The way in which the Planning Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee stuck to their basic plans (drawn up in essence before any consultation with the local people) shows that they felt that the people themselves did not have anything valuable to contribute to the re-organisation of their own environments, or futures. Even the consent of the people to any proposals was not a crucial step, (although clearly desirable), and the warnings of the Chief Native Commissioner at King William's Town in 1953, about the importance of obtaining the people's consent, fell on deaf ears. In any event, the broad outlines of Betterment policy had been laid down by Proclamation No 116 of 1949 and subsequently by the Tomlinson Commission.

This view of Betterment also failed to come to terms with the problems confronting agriculture in the homeland areas such as shortages of arable lands, equipment, money, labour, extension

services and market and credit facilities.<sup>23</sup> Again the earlier comment that under existing conditions, arable allotments of one morgen on dryland would simply perpetuate the existing situation, "which is acknowledged to be bad", was overlooked.<sup>24</sup> The bureaucratic tendency to believe in the power of planning, in the inherent superiority of organisation, led Betterment planners to focus on the planning rather than the implementational phase of Betterment. This enabled them to overlook the fundamental problems which their plans were designed to resolve, and to concern themselves with problems such as whether the fences in the grazing camps should have four or six strands, or what sorts of bulls should be introduced on the irrigation scheme and in the herds of the dryland farmers.<sup>25</sup>

In fairness to the planners, the political context within which their brief was drawn up, made it difficult for them to address the fundamental problems mentioned above. For to ask what sorts of shortages of land, etc. existed and why these had come about, would be to ask political questions which queried the framework of the planning brief, viz. the homeland policy emanating from the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts.

Solutions to the problems of Black agriculturalists had to be conceived within the framework and constraints of "Native policy". Agricultural planners had to accept land allocation and influx control as cornerstones of their planning. This affected the way they could acceptably analyse problems such as overpopulation and soil deterioration in their proposals to their superiors. They could not challenge the parameters within which Black agriculture was operating. What they could do, was re-organise what they found within those parameters. If re-organisation was the only variable over which they had control, they would put all their faith and all their energy into the planning process.

#### THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BETTERMENT - THE ADAPTATION OF THE OFFICIAL PERCEPTION.

The key to the planning of the three locations was the establishment of a rural village to take the surplus population, who would not be involved in full-time farming, and this was dependent upon the



acquisition of suitable land by the South African Native Trust.<sup>26</sup> The Magistrate at the time recalls having had problems in trying to obtain the farms owned by Europeans in the area which had been declared Released areas (i.e. designated for Black occupation) for the Trust.<sup>27</sup>

In July 1961, he wrote to his superior officer, the then Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner at King William's Town, advising that the purchase of the ground for the proposed rural township would take some years, and that the proposed division of arable land would have to be reconsidered, as the proposed surplus population would now not be able to move out. For Chatha he recommended that the available 192 morgen of arable land be redivided into smaller lots to accommodate those who had been landowners previously.<sup>28</sup>

The following division was eventually suggested in December 1961:

2 full economic units of 3 morgen each	6 morgen
54 half economic units of 1.5 morgen each	81 morgen
<u>210</u> half morgen lots	<u>105</u> morgen
266 landowners to have access to	192 morgen

If the 30 irrigation settlers were added, this would give a total of 296 landowners, which was the number of families that the Ad Hoc Committee's report recorded as having land in 1958.

The 266 dryland landowners and the irrigation settlers were each to be granted .25 morgen residential sites, while the 32 non landowning families were to be granted .125 morgen sites.

A plan which had in 1958 set out to give families three morgen of arable land and had cut this down to one-and-a-half morgen so as not to have to move too many families off the land immediately, had thus had to adapt to a situation where people would not be moving off the land at all and where in 1961, most families were to be allocated only half a morgen of land.

Very little official documentation after 1961 is available, and I have attempted to construct a chronology of events from oral accounts and land allocation records kept by the Chatha village secretary, and from title deed records.<sup>29</sup>

In 1961 and 1962, arable, residential and grazing areas were boundary fenced, and residential allotments were demarcated in the two new dryland residential areas. In 1962, people were allowed to choose their own sites in the new areas. This they did by standing on the

sites of their choice on an appointed day. Their name was then entered next to the number of the site on official records.

The Magistrate at the time states that there were some problems with the allocation of residential sites at Gxulu and Mnyameni. (The same problems may well also have obtained at Chatha). People wished to have their close family on sites next to or close to them. So, for example, a man would want his son on a site next to him - only to find that the site had already been allocated to someone else, or that several people wanted that site. Where possible, sites were subdivided, but often people's wishes could not be fulfilled. In the Magistrate's words, "you had to sort it out on the spot...we couldn't go back...I don't know that our planning had taken that into account to any serious extent."<sup>30</sup>

People began to move in 1963. However, everybody did not move at the same time, as they waited until they had the necessary money, labour and materials to make the move. Some 60 families were already living in one of the newly demarcated areas (Nyanga) which largely coincided with the residential settlements of two hamlets of the old village-section of Nyanga. Some of these families had to move their houses to fit within the newly demarcated sites. In the words of one informant, "our house is now where our garden was". The remaining families had to move from their old sites into the two new residential areas, and were paid compensation money for the inconvenience and the loss of their homes. It seems that by 1967 everybody had moved.

Dryland arable allotments were demarcated, and allocated in two phases, in 1964 and 1968. Fields were allocated in the same way as residential sites, with people standing on the fields of their choice. It seems however, that fields were allocated singly, rather than by everybody standing on the fields of their choice at the same time. People whose old fields fell within the newly demarcated areas, were acknowledged by the people to have first rights to new sites, often choosing an allotment which was part of their own old field. People whose old fields were on the site of the proposed irrigation scheme, were apparently also given preference in the selection of fields by the allocating officials - an official from Keiskammahoek, and the headman. Some of the 192 morgen set aside for dryland cultivation had to be removed, as it was found to be unsuitable. This cancelled land

comprised 34 allocations, or an estimated 17 morgen. Records suggest that about 245 allotments were finally allocated, the great majority of which were half morgen allotments.<sup>31</sup> Oral accounts suggest that a number of people lost the use of their fields during the process of the demarcation and allocation of the new lands, as their old fields fell within the new areas. This would mean that some people lost up to five year's cultivation as a result of the implementation of Betterment. They do not appear to have been compensated for this loss.

People were told of the irrigation scheme, and that they could join it if they wished (i.e. until it was filled up) at a meeting held in about 1964 or 1965 - at a time when a number of families were already established in the new residential areas. Work on the irrigation scheme started in 1966, and the subsequent meeting at which people chose to join the irrigation scheme must have been held in 1967, as by 1967 people were building houses in the irrigation scheme's residential area.

There were conditions attached to joining the irrigation scheme. People should have no sheep or goats, be limited to four cattle per household, and there should always be a person working full-time on the scheme. The scheme could finally accommodate only 24 families, and 21 joined almost immediately, the other three joining over the next five years. Fields were allocated by the settlers drawing numbers out of a hat. Production on the irrigation scheme started during the 1968/1969 agricultural season.<sup>32</sup>

In 1961, when the idea of the rural township to which to move the surplus population was dropped, officials had to adapt their approach to Betterment. Since the "surplus" population was going to stay, the idea of a village based on half economic units, which would eventually be converted into full economic units, had to be dropped as well. It is not clear from where the directive that all families who had had land before Betterment should still have land after Betterment came, but it had the implication that people would now have considerably smaller arable holdings than they held previously.

With the idea of the economic unit, seems to have gone the idea of culling stock. Perhaps officials felt that, having had their land-holdings substantially reduced, people would not stand for a stock

reduction. Oral accounts suggest that there was no culling of stock in Chatha. The two cornerstones of the original Betterment plan, namely the removal of surplus people and the culling of stock, were thus removed before the scheme had begun to be implemented. What remained was to prevent further deterioration of the grazing areas and arable lands. The grazing camps and arable lands were accordingly fenced off, and the people moved to the new residential areas. Arable lands were re-allocated, grazing camps re-opened on a rotational basis and the irrigation scheme was made available.

A scheme intended to improve the standard of living of rural villagers had run into trouble as a result of its partial implementation. The people had lost arable land, and had not been given what they had been promised. The scheme accordingly had to adapt so as to minimise the harmful effects of its own disruption. The most constructive option open in the circumstances would perhaps have been to have abandoned the scheme entirely in late 1961 when it became clear that the rural township was not on the cards. The project was clearly no longer able to realise its own goals. By the end of 1961 the only environmental change had been the fences which had been erected. Some of these might well have been retained and served a purpose under the old residential pattern.

The option of withdrawal was however not politically viable. The development of homeland agriculture had been conceived of in terms of the re-organisation and more effective use of the environment, in conjunction with the lessening of human and animal density. To go back on that approach would have meant a fundamental revision, not only of homeland agricultural policy, but of "Native policy" in general. This could well have been awkward to politicians and bureaucrats at various levels of authority. With the failure of the strategy of developing rural townships occurring throughout areas such as the Ciskei, all that remained of the Betterment policy was its organisational aspect. That it was applied in situations where the stated goals of Betterment could clearly not be attained, must evidently be understood in terms of its wider political significance as part of wider "Native policy", and in terms of the logic and momentum of the planning process, as discussed in Chapter Two.



THE VILLAGER'S PERCEPTION OF THE COMING OF BETTERMENT.

The villager's term for the Betterment scheme is iTrasti. The Betterment scheme is seen by people as part of an ongoing process of government activity in the village. As a result of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, and of Proclamation No 31 of 1939 and subsequent government directives, officials had been at work at times in Chatha, putting up fences and erecting contours, encouraging farmers, etc. The "Trust" as a process is thus seen as starting in the headmanship of Zwelibanzi Sitshitshi (1930 - 1944). So "the Trust started during Zwelibanzi's time as headman, and became confirmed during Dwayi's (Gcilitshana) time" (i.e. 1944-1949).

"Trust" as relating more specifically to the Betterment scheme, is traced to the meetings in 1947 at Mnyameni and at Chatha. At the Mnyameni meeting the people were told about Betterment schemes, and shown pictures of crops growing under irrigation, and asked if they wanted such schemes. "The people agreed and clapped their hands...they welcomed this thing." It is not clear exactly what the people were told or what they thought they had been told, but oral accounts suggest that they did agree to the idea of Betterment, and that a number of people did want what they thought it would bring. One informant said that the people came back, saying that the grazing camps would be fenced so that their children would not have to go out herding and would be able to attend school more regularly. The people had wanted that. It is unlikely that the people were told at that stage that they would have to move, as the initial plans for Chatha and Gxulu had not yet been drafted.

People state that at the meeting at Chatha in 1947, officials discussed the problem of soil erosion at Chatha, and how it was affecting the quality of the people's cattle, as the grazing was deteriorating. It was suggested that contours should be dug to prevent soil washing away, and that the government would employ people in Chatha to dig the contour banks. The people were asked what their feelings were on the matter, and were less enthusiastic about Betterment than at the earlier meeting at Mnyameni.

A speaker (who had been nominated to speak by the people of Chatha

beforehand) stood up and said: "You White people are like God to us, and we accept what you suggest". The possible significance of the people's public acceptance of Betterment will be discussed later in this chapter. The Magistrate then instructed the headman and his council to form a committee. They should choose people whom they trusted, as they would be the village's representatives in discussions with the government.

One account suggests that various speakers did in fact voice their disapproval at the meeting, and that the Magistrate came back a few months later to discuss the matter once again, and that by this time most of the people were in agreement with Betterment. Another account states that headman Dwayi Gcilitshana had on his own initiative gone to the Magistrate, and told him that the people of Chatha wanted Betterment, while in reality they were very much against it.

These two accounts suggest that some people were opposed to Betterment, even if they felt constrained (for whatever reason), to say at a public meeting that they did want it. One comment, although not entirely clear, suggests that this was the case, by distinguishing between what people wanted and what they did: "The people didn't vote for or against Trust, because they agreed to it in front of the Magistrate. Tontsi was the speaker who was nominated by the people, and no other speaker opposed him".

The committee, consisting of nine men (one of whom was acting for the headman) duly signed the document, committing Chatha to accepting Betterment. The nine men were made up of a relative of the headman (acting for him) and either the sub-headman or a representative of each of the village-sections.<sup>33</sup>

One signatory gave a dramatic, if somewhat unlikely, account of the signing of the document. "We were given a foolscap paper to sign, and they all signed. There was nothing on the paper, and I did not wish to sign it. They were asking me to sign, and I asked why I should sign a blank piece of paper. The acting headman whispered to me that I should sign...so I signed, and the papers went to Pretoria with our names on, that the people of Chatha had agreed that their area should be under the Trust."

This account of events is unlikely as the signatures appear almost immediately beneath the wording of the document, which simply states

that Chatha's residents unanimously agreed to request the implementation of Betterment in terms of Proclamation No 31 of 1939, and that the undersigned had been authorised by the village to request this formally.<sup>34</sup>

The significance of the account more probably lies in the feeling it expresses: that the people were possibly being cheated, that they had been obliged to assent to something, the outcome of which was unclear, like a blank foolscap page. This sentiment is expressed in other oral accounts.

For several years nothing much seems to have happened in Chatha, although some surveys were being carried out, and the Advisory Committee (i.e. the committee of nine people) was liaising with the various planners. Informants state that they "forgot" about Betterment.

Round about 1960, when fencing of camps and arable areas was about to start, there appears to have been a meeting at which the people were told that they would have to move from their old houses, to the new residential areas. "Now the time is finished to stay (all over Chatha) - all those houses, must all be in one place." People were told that they would all have to stay in one place so that the cattle could have grazing camps, and so that their children could go to school. People indicate that they were angry, and stated that they had not realised that their fields would be cut up, and that they would have to move. The White official at the meeting had simply said "You agreed to the Trust", and would not back down.

At about that time the houses of the headman, together with those of two of his sub-headmen, burned down in the same night. An informant suggests that "The people burned their houses down because they were angry about the Trust - some people did not want it, and in the meetings they (i.e. the headman and the two sub-headmen concerned) were the main speakers". The headman at the time feels that his huts had been burned by people protesting against the coming of Betterment. This seems likely as he was caught between his people and government officials who were busy planning and implementing Betterment. People had wanted to hire lawyers to attempt to fight Betterment in the courts, but he had argued against this, on the grounds that it would be futile, and would amount to throwing away good money. Arguments of

this sort could have painted him in the colours of a collaborator.

The burning of the headman's houses seems to have coincided with an attempt by some people in Chatha to replace him with Maboyis Jama, who was put in jail for a few days on suspicion of having been involved in the arson. Maboyis himself claims that he had been called back from Cape Town in late 1958, having been told by the headman that he, Maboyis, should come home to take over the headmanship. On arriving home, Maboyis claims that the headman was no longer prepared to hand over the reins, and that he was able to obtain the support of the local chief in order to retain his position. When the headman's houses burned down, "the headman said it was me, to blacklist me". Maboyis seems to have enjoyed some support, strengthened no doubt by opposition to Betterment. (One informant argues that Maboyis claimed that he would prevent Betterment). This support was not enough, among either the village, or the authorities, to obtain him the headmanship.

Officials then began the fencing off of grazing camps, arable areas and the new residential areas. The residential areas were divided up into individual sites by tractors dragging lengths of chain, which were used as units of measurement. When the fencing was completed, a meeting was called at the headman's place, at which the people were told to come on an appointed day and choose their sites. On the appointed day "Leppan himself (the Magistrate) came with a book - he started at Kwili (part of Nyanga village-section) saying that people must stand on the plot they wanted - they stood there and were registered." People with arable land before Betterment were evidently allocated residential sites before those without land. "There was trouble because a person who had no field would say that he had a field" in order to get the residential site that he wanted.

It appears that people were not allowed to move en bloc in such a way that people from e.g. Rawule could occupy sites 1 to 60 and people from Ndela sites 61 - 130, etc. "The magistrate said that if they put Rawule and Jili together, there would be trouble and they would fight - that's why he mixed them all up". Some people suggested that they had wanted to move together with their hamlet, or village-section mates, while others (seemingly a minority) had wanted to move away from their neighbours - possibly because relationships had been tense.

In any event, the practical problems involved in the selection of



sites made it unlikely that any coherent village-section patterns could emerge in the new areas. Firstly, those people whose sites were already in the new Nyanga residential area stayed where they were and other people had to fit in around them. Secondly, everybody wanted a good site, as close as possible to wood and water, and many people therefore found the sites which they wanted already occupied.

Some comments may serve to illustrate the ad hoc nature of the selection of residential sites. "I chose this place because it was the only place I could get because all the others were taken"... "I chose to live here because it was close to my home - it's also close to the forest and the river"... "The people went to stand on their sites at night, so when you got there, the sites were occupied"... "I came here to get away from witchcraft".

There was confusion as to exactly who would have to move. "We at Nyanga were not worried about moving, because the talk was that we would not have to move...then it was changed, and we had to move". People were also uncertain as to whether the old village-section hamlets would simply move to central points, becoming more concentrated, or whether an entirely new residential pattern was called for. "It seemed as if we (from a hamlet of Ndela) were being moved to Ndela so that we could unite again - it seemed as if the people at Ngxangxasini would move to Mfaca (two hamlets of Nyanga), but that's not what happened, and we were all put together".

People did not all move at the same time "because they didn't have the money or things to build with". Some people sold stock to raise the necessary money for building. People without labour had to find it where they could. "We carried things from over there on our heads and brought them here - I took this roof across there - I asked young men and boys to carry the roof because I had no one to help me". Those people whose sites were already situated in the new residential area of Nyanga were more fortunate, only having to move "a little" to fit into the newly demarcated sites. "The land surveyor said I was lucky because only one of my five houses was taken from me", the other four falling within the new site.

People were compensated for the move, but the terms are not clear. Accounts suggest that people were paid before the move, at the time that they selected their sites. "We asked with what we would be

building, and Leppan (the Magistrate) said that he would pay us for the houses we were leaving at the camps - then he paid us". Compensation was computed in terms of the number of houses a family had before moving, and one informant states that she got £30 (R60) for her five houses. When she complained, she was told that she could "give the money back if you don't want it". One informant claims that some families received no compensation. Whatever compensation people received, they still had to save money to be able to afford the move.

Some people were apparently unwilling to move, but moved as they had been told that people refusing to move would have their houses either demolished or burned. No houses were destroyed, but one informant states that one person was fined £10 (R20).

Once in the new residential areas, people either brewed beer or slaughtered a goat for the ancestors, informing them that they had arrived at their new homes, and ensuring that the ancestors would still continue to look after them in their new homes. "They (i.e. the ancestors) followed me...they did not complain (when I moved)...there would have been signs if they were angry with me...I was safeguarding against that by brewing beer". While most people seem to have brewed or slaughtered only at their new sites, some people had brewed or slaughtered before leaving their old homes, and then inversely, slaughtered or brewed at their new homes. People invited relatives (paternal and maternal consanguines and affines) as well as village-section mates and other friends. People do not appear to have concentrated on any specific category of associates, but relatives and village-section mates seem to have been well represented at these rituals.

People's anxiety seems to have been directed towards the unknown life in the new residential areas, rather than towards the presence of evil in the form of e.g. witchcraft. "We were worried, because we had been used to that life - now we were going to start a new way of life...we were not (worried about witchcraft) because we knew that it had nothing to do with it; it was only the Government that decided that we must now live one way and then live another way - it's not witchcraft - witchcraft is a different thing, for example if I die, people will say so-and-so is killing her".

The process of allocating fields was similar, with people selecting

fields as they could, with the proviso that people who had larger fields, or whose fields had been where the irrigation scheme was to be, were given first choice.

"A person's (old) field could be divided into perhaps three plots. People with title deeds were told to go and stand on the places they liked...those whose fields were cancelled (i.e. did not fall within the new arable areas) would take those plots which were left". People were "overtaken", (i.e. could not get the site they wanted) and resentment is expressed at the fact that the fields "were not all the same size". People were anxious to get suitable sites, and "all the people who had titles were pushing each other there at the fields", and "people who had been blocked on that side, had to come and choose a field on this side". In spite of the tensions, "there was no trouble". Contesting sites was apparently of no avail, because "when people fought about a site, it would be given to another person" if it could not be established who had first occupied it.

Oral accounts do not make mention of the fact that fields were allocated in two separate stages, viz. 1964 and 1968,<sup>35</sup> and only a few accounts mention that people were without any fields to cultivate for several years while the new arable allotments were being demarcated and allocated. In the words of one informant, "All those fields at the back were closed - we went for three or four years without cultivating".

While the people were busy moving, officials started working on the irrigation scheme. People were told that the government was making fields for the people which they could irrigate and so farm better. At a meeting people were told that they could join the scheme. There were however conditions attached to joining, such that (1) irrigation settlers should have no sheep or goats on the scheme, but only four cattle, chickens and two pigs, (2) there should always be an able-bodied adult working full-time on the allotment. People could not go back to their original huts, but should live on the irrigation residential area. Twenty-one families joined immediately, but it took some time to fill the scheme. They came "one by one", some people applying for allotments, and then changing their minds. Those choosing to join were allocated their fields by drawing lots, except for the headman and another man whose old fields coincided with the

demarcation of two of the irrigation allotments. They were awarded those particular allotments.

#### THE VILLAGERS' MORAL PERCEPTION OF THE BETTERMENT SCHEME

The coming of the Betterment scheme is seen as something quite arbitrary, as an act of White government officials which was unrelated to anything the people themselves had done. "The Trust is the law of the White man"... "we were guilty of nothing - we were moved by the Whites for nothing - we just saw that we were moved by White people"... "Its just that, being ruled, it was the rulers who told us to come here - we were told to move".

Betterment is seen as the cause of, and the process by which, the people came to be moved into concentrated residential settlements. This move is perhaps the basic perception of what Betterment was all about. "Trust is the removal of people from one place to another - it's the rule from the government which says that the people must all come together in one place - it's the government's idea that we live together in a location"... "I call it a Trust, because its that which made us live close together".

One informant saw the government officials as having a purpose in moving people into concentrated settlements. "I thought that the government did this so that people would live together in a location, and form streets, because it was not easy for the government to find people in the forest - people might not pay tax for up to ten years - the government decided to collect everyone in one place to get hold of the people who did not pay tax".

Betterment is also seen as a process of regimentation, of loss of freedom. "Before our removal...there was no fence around our houses - our cows were grazing freely in the forest - now we are in jail - we are handcuffed - here our cows no longer give milk".

The events most frequently mentioned in people's accounts of the Betterment scheme emphasise the awareness of the Betterment scheme as having been imposed upon them. These events relate to

- a) meetings at which the people were told that the scheme was coming, or were told to move
- b) developments in which government intrusion in the village is



perceived - the making of fences, the laying out of fields and residential areas, the move itself

c) the people's choices to move to the irrigation scheme or not. Even this choice was an imposed choice between two situations not of their own making or preference, i.e. the new residential area, or the irrigation scheme.

The Betterment scheme is seen as having been thrust upon the people in spite of their having objected to it. "The Trust came by force, because when the people said 'No, we don't want the Trust', the Magistrate said 'Your headman said you wanted the Trust' - even there at the office, at Keiskammahoek, the people said that they didn't want the Trust". Moreover Betterment was implemented with the aid of the threat of force. "The Magistrate said that a grader would be sent to destroy the house of one not moving"... "Nobody wanted to move, but under the fear that you would be jailed, you moved - it was said that the one who did not move, would be jailed". In the event, Betterment became identified with White officialdom and the government. "The Whites said we must move"... "The Whites took us across to Nyanga"... "Trust is the law of the White man".

Indications of the strength of feeling against the implementation of Betterment were the people's desire to hire a lawyer to contest Betterment, and the fact that the headman and two of his sub-headmen's houses were burned down. In two other villages in the Keiskammahoek area, people did hire lawyers, but to no avail.

A sense of intrusion into the integrity and well-being of the village is strongly evident in people's accounts. Here was the White man, the government, moving into the village, erecting fences, re-organising the village, and telling people that they would have to move. "We saw the White man and his people - they had chains - they were making lines - we just saw (i.e. these things happening)". The continuous use of the third person ('they') in people's accounts emphasises their perception that Betterment was something which was essentially the affair of outsiders: a procession in which they had not been consulted, and over which they had no control.

The headman seems to have been caught in the middle, and became identified with the scheme. Some informants see the two headmen during whose terms of office Betterment was planned and introduced, as

being in some measure responsible for it. The headman was seen as evading his moral responsibility to his people. "We always went to the headman, but he didn't answer us".

The people's puzzlement and fear at what was happening to them is apparent in their accounts. "Trust took us (across the river) - we didn't know why we moved - we just saw when they made the lines - then they said we must move - they didn't tell us why they were making the lines - we didn't know which side of the lines to stay - we didn't ask the White man why he was moving us - because we were afraid". In the words of a female informant "we didn't ask because only men can ask - I don't know if the men did ask".

People felt quite helpless in a situation which was beyond their control. "You can do nothing under the Trust - you cannot rule yourself - you are controlled by the Trust - the Trust caused people to move"... "We didn't like to come here, but we came because the Government said we must move - if the Government says you must move, you don't say anything - you just move - look now the Government has made a dam there, but we don't say anything - because its the Government, we can't do anything"... "I don't know where the Government got the land for the Trust, because Government is Government - everything is his".

As mentioned earlier, people did not revert to supernatural explanations such as witchcraft to explain their situation. The power of "Government" was self-evident, and had been demonstrated amply in the past, e.g. in the dismissal and appointment of headmen. No supernatural recourse was necessary.

The move itself was seen in terms of hardship. People "suffered to move", struggling to find the necessary money, labour and resources to move. Another factor making for the experience of the move as painful, was that many men were away at work. When the time came to move, woman had to make the decision as to when to move, but without adequate information, and without the consent of their husbands. Several male informants state that they came home to find their houses no longer standing and their families moved across the river. Coupled with the hardships endured at the time of moving, was the loss of several season's cultivation for many households, because of the re-

allocation of arable lands.

Having been moved once, the people fear they may be moved again. "Nobody can stop Trust now - even now Trust does as it likes - even now we are under Trust - Trust can put us near King William's Town if it likes". With the construction of a dam downstream, the arrival of resettled people from several hundred miles away, and the removal of another village to a resettlement camp because of the construction of another dam in the area, all having happened in the last ten years, people are fearful of being moved. "They say we mess in the river, and so we may move".

People feel a sense of having been betrayed by the White officials, of having been misled by them as to what Betterment actually involved. "Then we lived as the government told us to - the story (what happened) is not the same as you (i.e. Whites) told us - you must tell the truth"... "The White man does not do as he promises (in the matter of Betterment)"... "The White men were coming and saying that there would be irrigation - they wanted to take the countryside (i.e. for their own purposes)".

Betterment is however not perceived in an entirely negative way by all informants. One informant saw it as part of a process of modernisation which has had some benefits. "The Trust had some sense - you say now that it is hurting you, but you buy cars and zinc roofs - there were no such things - previously we slept in huts which were leaking - and when the Trust came in, the country became civilised - there was no furniture previously, and we closed the doors with sacks". This comment probably refers to the fact that every household in the new residential areas is now accessible by road, and people have been able to transport consumer goods to their houses much more easily than before. In addition, several informants acknowledge the potential benefit of the rotational grazing camp system, and state that they were grateful for the chance that it would give them to send their children to school.

But overwhelmingly, the Betterment scheme is seen as having had negative consequences, even by those people who are prepared to acknowledge that it may have had some benefits. Some of the major negative consequences are seen as related to the move to the new residential areas. The move involved leaving the old residential

areas, to which the people were very much attached. This made for changes in people's neighbours and for the disruption of old social ties, and also resulted in crowded settlements. "What I liked most (about the old place) was that we were not grouped together...our houses are far apart from each other - we do not like being grouped together". The residential concentration is seen as having negative hygienic and social consequences. "There were no people suffering from certain diseases - since they were not living close together, they were not easily infected - now that we are all together, we get diseases - the Trust killed us like that, because we encountered diseases which we did not know". Social tensions are also seen as arising. "When people are living in separate hamlets, a thing from over there would not cause trouble here - now an animal of mine moves around here, and goes to that man's place - if we don't like each other, he will destroy my animal - people don't like each other because of unimportant things"... "People hire other people's huts here because they are too weak to build - that is nonsense to go and live at other people's houses, just as if you were in town - what will you do if they throw you out? It's better to live close to your own family". Residential concentration is seen as disruptive of social relations in the above quotes, inasmuch as there is no longer any space to move in with one's own family in the new areas. The concentration has also had the effect that, since residential sites have been laid out in streets, some people's gardens are behind their houses. This is a source of dissatisfaction as people feel that they cannot effectively keep a check on their gardens and stock when they are not in direct sight, and so they feel more vulnerable to theft.

Negative consequences are also seen as stemming from the re-organisation of arable and grazing land. People keenly feel the loss of their old fields - "our fields were taken from us and were given to other people" - and are aware that their current holdings are smaller than the old ones. "There were no acres in that time - people ploughed as they liked, as they knew they were able to". It is also remembered that some people lost their fields altogether. "The government said there was not much land - we want to know about that and that's what we are crying about".

Whereas the rotational grazing camps were perhaps initially



regarded as a good thing, they are no longer seen as serving their purpose as people no longer respect that purpose. "People are being selfish now, sending cattle into closed camps - people were cutting fences and sending their cattle into the forests - now everybody thinks that they do not see the benefit of the Trust, so that they think the best thing is to take their cattle and put them in the closed camps...it was better in the (old way) - the cattle knew their camps (i.e. grazed in the old grazing areas set aside for each village-section)". People resented the fact they they, rather than the Ranger, were expected to repair fences, and were not paid for it, while the Ranger impounded their cattle. "So people were helping to fix fences, only to have their cattle impounded - they saw this as a government trick". Anger was also caused by the belief that the Ranger was not impounding all cattle, including his own, with equal diligence. As a result people "now do not care" about respecting the grazing camps, and the Ranger is unable to be everywhere at the same time.

In a more general sense Betterment is seen as having brought a decline in both agricultural productivity and moral energy. This is linked to a romanticisation of the pre-Betterment period as a time of plenty and of freedom. "Before Trust, we were milking well - I was harvesting 12 bags of beans and a house full of maize - my maize cobs were very large until the Trust came - the food decreased and you could get only a little maize"... "Before Trust we lived as we like to live". Now, there is economic hardship and a feeling of helplessness. "Now the village has no aims - even its headman is dead"... "Now we are just standing, watching things go their way"... "We endure...we have been trying for a long time through the chiefs, nominated and elected chiefs, but nothing happens - we don't know if maybe God will resolve the problems so that the grandchildren can rest". Frustration is expressed in angry terms. "It's a waste - that's what we have got here"... "This is a bloody place - jou gat (i.e. "your arse", in Afrikaans) - this is no place"... "this fucking Trust". Betterment is seen by the community as having been an unnecessary intrusion into their lives, which has brought with it a decline in people's fortunes, both economically and personally.

THE DECISION TO JOIN THE IRRIGATION SCHEME - A CHANGE IN THE  
VILLAGERS' PERCEPTION

In 1966 or 1967 the villagers were given the choice of joining the irrigation scheme. Twenty-four of the then approximately 370 families in Chatha (328 families in 1958, compared with 415 families in 1981), eventually chose to join. This took some time. Several people applied and then changed their minds. Twenty-one families were registered as scheme members by October 1968, with the remaining three families coming over the next five years. A government official recalls having had trouble filling up "two or three or four plots...that land was not so good - it had to be worked up - but the people were reluctant, and the good land was gone in two-two's".<sup>36</sup> It is not clear that the three latecomers were, however, necessarily put onto the less desirable plots, and in any event 1.5 morgen of flat irrigated land, even if of lesser quality, would be far more desirable than .5 morgen of dryland arable land, or in the case of the landless, or those whose lands had been cancelled, no arable land at all.

It seems that many villagers were not keen to join the irrigation scheme. This may tell us something about how they saw the irrigation scheme in relation to the Betterment scheme as a whole.

Eighteen heads of household on the irrigation scheme gave the following reasons for joining (some gave more than one reason):

16 replied to the effect that they wanted to farm on irrigated land, to have enough food for themselves and their children, to sell their crops to make money to send their children to school.

3 had joined because their old fields had been where the irrigation scheme now was.

1 had received a bad field in the new dryland allotments.

1 had had no field before Betterment.

2 had felt that the irrigation scheme might offer greater security of tenure than the dryland settlements.

(Only one person gave landlessness as the reason for joining. Accounts suggest that six or seven households joining the scheme were landless. However, people's decisions to join the scheme cannot be adequately explained in terms only of an opportunity to obtain arable land. People who had previously had land, had joined the scheme, and

people who had previously not had land, had not joined. The motive for joining was probably to obtain good land in order to farm better, and so to feed and educate their children).

Twenty-two heads of household who had chosen not to join the scheme gave the following reasons (some giving more than one reason).

9 felt that they were not healthy enough to have to work "standing in water" as they thought irrigation farming would demand, or that they were not strong enough or did not have enough labour available for the work they would have to perform on the scheme. "They would be working in the fields, even in summer or winter, it would be the same".

4 felt that on the scheme they would not be able to work away as migrants, which they wanted to do.

4 argued that they had thought that as they had not had fields where the scheme was, that they had no real right to live there. The irrigation scheme was the right of those who had had fields there, or who lived in the old village-section of Ndela, immediately above the irrigation scheme.

4 did not want to go to the scheme (reasons unspecified).

2 wanted to stay in the new residential area (reasons unspecified).

2 were either away or busy moving at the time the irrigation scheme was made available.

2 did not want to accept the limitations the scheme would impose, whether in terms of having no sheep or goats, or in terms of the rules of the scheme.

1 knew nothing about what the scheme might involve.

1 had a good field, which had not been badly affected by the re-allocation of arable lands.

1 felt that the people had been forced from their old homes. "If the government says we can go back, we will go back, but then to our old houses, not to Trust (i.e. the scheme)". It would presumably be an indignity to go back to one's old area, but not to one's old houses.

Most of these responses associate the scheme with something negative - loss of freedom to migrate, imposition of conditions of labour in their own fields, loss of stock, impairment of dignity; or with an assumed inability to cope with the demands of the scheme -

lack of labour, inadequate health, or lack of knowledge. The Betterment scheme had already undermined the autonomy and dignity of the people by making them move. It had not honoured its promises. To go into the irrigation scheme would be to submit to further control (no small stock, no migration, etc.) and so to sacrifice even more of one's autonomy and dignity to a government scheme that had already proved itself untrustworthy. It might even smack to fellow-villagers of collaboration with the officials who had brought about Betterment. In any event, the scheme was an unknown quantity, and until it proved itself, it would be foolhardy to sacrifice a job in the city. In the words of one informant, "The people didn't choose the scheme because they would die in all the water - no it's not like that - they didn't know what it would be like there, so they were saying that it was because of the water that they were not joining".

Those who joined the scheme clearly saw it as offering them new possibilities. Given that they had to move, it made better sense to move to 1.5 morgen of irrigated land, than to .5 morgen of dryland. Of the 24 families on the scheme 14 moved straight from their old village-sections to the irrigation scheme, while the rest first moved to, and had assessed the situation from, the new dryland areas.

There do not seem to be any clear sociological differences in terms of age, sex, education, migration experience, networks within the village, or landlessness between the dryland and irrigation household heads at the time, which might have influenced their decision to join or not to join the scheme. However, 14 of the 24 households came from the old village-section of Ndela. Of these 14, seven are from three lineages of the same clan, and another six are from two lineages of different clans.

The composition of the irrigation settlement in terms of original village-section and number of lineages represented may be instructive, and may be shown as follows:



<u>Village-Section</u>	<u>Lineage</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Households</u>
Ndela (14)	Pama	Tshezi	3
	Nkohla	Tshezi	2
	Singqomo	Tshezi	2
	Mboso	Mqocwa	3
	Rode	Qhinebe	3
	Nqxafane	Sukwini	1
Nyanga (3)	Nduku	Kwayi	2
	Pama	Tshezi	1
Nyokane (5)	Thethe	Mkomo	3
	Mqhatazana	Dlamini	1
	Sobhuza	Jwara	1
Skafu (1)	Tontsi	Bhele	1
Jili (1)	Lugwali	Bhele	1

The prominence of Ndela households on the scheme would make sense as they were closest to the scheme before Betterment (although a number of people from other village-sections had had land where the irrigation scheme now is), and as informants have indicated that they had not joined the scheme because they thought it was in a sense the right of people from Ndela, or people whose fields had previously been there. The distribution of clans and lineages in Ndela before Betterment was as follows:

<u>Lineage</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Households</u>
Ngxafane	Sukwini	11
Mboso	Mqocwa	10
Pama	Tshezi	8
Nkohla	Tshezi	8
Singqomo	Tshezi	7
Nophakela	Gatyeni	6
Dingeni	Tshezi	4
Rode	Qhinebe	3
Nxanga	Mkhwemte	3
Stemela	Jola	2
Ndlazulwana	Mbuyisa	1
other		1
12	9	64

So, allowing for the concentration of people from Ndela joining the irrigation scheme, and taking into account the concentration of members of the Tshezi clan on the scheme, we still need to ask: why those particular Pama, Nkohla, Singqomo families, why those particular Mboso families?

Twenty-four families transformed their initially negative perception of the irrigation scheme into that of something offering them new possibilities. For this possibility they were prepared to risk a further loss of autonomy and dignity at the hands of officials who had once already been thought not to have kept their promises. They were also risking going against public opinion by perhaps being seen to identify with the much resented Betterment process. They were prepared to take these risks and to take a chance on an unproven quantity, for reasons which an analysis in terms of sociological variables does not reveal.

Whatever their reasons for joining the irrigation scheme, the people on the scheme today see the Betterment scheme in substantially less negative terms than the drylanders, who strongly emphasise the move from the old homes, and its forced nature. This difference may be partly explained in terms of the respective economic positions of the drylanders and the irrigation settlers today. The drylanders are agriculturally worse-off than before, while the irrigation settlers are substantially better-off than before. While most households on the irrigation scheme derive an income from migrant labour as well as from the irrigation scheme, a number of households on the scheme produce more than their subsistence needs from the land.

I suggest that the people in the dryland areas see the Betterment scheme as a single-phase event, i.e. the move. As a result of the move, they have lost their old homes and a large portion of their arable lands, and have nothing to show for it. Their subjective experience is that the Betterment scheme has not kept its promise, and that their lot has worsened. So it is not surprising that the move from their old homes should be central in their perception of Betterment.

The people on the irrigation scheme see the Betterment scheme as a two-phase event, namely the initial move, as the first phase, and the irrigation scheme with its benefits as the second phase. The

irrigation settlers today have 1.5 morgen of irrigated land, the use of tractors and cultivators, and the help of an agricultural officer - as well as the earnings of members of their families who are away on migrant labour. In spite of initial hardships (phase one) they have benefited (phase two). For the 14 families that moved straight from their old homes to the irrigation scheme, the move would probably not have been as depressing an experience as it would have been for the drylanders, as they were moving to something new, but with potentially beneficial prospects. Inasmuch as they had created a choice for themselves by opting for the scheme, their experience of loss of autonomy and dignity would not have been as severe as it has been for the drylanders. The benefits of phase two have effected the irrigation settler's perception, recollection and evaluation of the Betterment scheme as a whole. The memories of the past experiences of both drylanders and irrigation settlers has been affected by their subsequent experiences.

#### THE DIFFERENCE IN OFFICIAL AND VILLAGE PERCEPTIONS OF THE BETTERMENT SCHEME.

One of the important aspects of the implementation of Betterment in Chatha relates to the differences in the perception of government officials and of the villagers themselves as to

- a) the state of the soil and vegetation before Betterment was implemented, i.e. whether the Betterment scheme was necessary in the first place
- b) whether the scheme was implemented with the people's consent.

An attempt will now be made to account for these differences.

In terms of long-term considerations of maintaining the environment and the quality of stock, the area was over-grazed, overpopulated and eroded in the period during and shortly after World War II. The drought of the late 1940's could only have aggravated the situation. The Planning Committee which reported in 1952 and the Ad Hoc Committee which reported in 1958, together with officials stationed in the Keiskammahoek area, concluded from the surveys conducted that the overutilisation and erosion of the soil were serious problems, which required urgent attention.

In addition to such environmental problems, officials felt that "The majority of Natives have no love for the soil as agriculturalists"<sup>37</sup> and that the farming techniques and land use practices of Blacks in the area left much to be desired. It was thus necessary that non-agriculturalists should be moved off the land, and that viable land use patterns and agricultural practices be introduced among those who remained as farmers.

For officials, with their long-term view of environmental preservation, and their belief in the effectiveness of planning, (Beinart 1984a) it was clear that intervention of the kind envisaged by Betterment planning, was necessary. Officials may have differed as to the desirability of certain strategies, such as afforestation or the desired size of arable allotments.<sup>38</sup> They were however agreed that intervention was necessary to save the soil, as well as to enhance the viability of Black agriculture.

The villagers, who now see the pre-Betterment situation as a time of plenty, were probably not operating with the same long-term view, but with a short-term, survival-oriented view. In these terms, a "good year" would be seen as one in which the people had managed to produce a usual, or better than usual crop, and had not lost any stock. Indeed, the ability to come through a drought year could be regarded as an indication that things were basically sound. The villagers' perception of the Betterment scheme as impinging on their freedom, and as reducing their arable allotments, has led to a romanticisation of the pre-Betterment period as a time of relative plenty, in which Betterment was not necessary.

From its inception with Proclamation No 31 of 1939, Betterment planning had met with widespread opposition of varying intensity throughout the Ciskei, and throughout South Africa as a whole, and became coupled with resistance to the Tribal Authorities system (Beinart and Bundy 1980; Hirson 1977; Lodge 1983; Moll 1983; Seneque 1982; Yawitch 1981). The Ciskei General Council had initially asked the government in 1945 to "hold up the whole of the new scheme" relating to the "New Era of Reclamation" announced by the government in 1945 (Hellman 1949, p 190). "Throughout the region there were protests - protests against the use of government branding of cattle in Peddie, against culling and against 'rural villages'. People were



arrested and people's committees were formed to organise their defence, and there were threats of a resort to arms to protect the cattle" (Hirson 1977, p 126).

During the War years, little Betterment work was done in the Keiskammahoek area, focusing on locations which had officially requested Betterment, and locations do not appear to have been pressured into accepting Betterment at that stage. However, the people of the Keiskammahoek area would surely have heard of the culling of stock on Trust farms in Released Areas, as well as of the arrests mentioned above. While it appears that some people did want Betterment, it must have seemed that it would come, as it had done elsewhere, whether they wanted it or not.

In this context, the elected speaker's comment to the meeting held at Chatha in 1947, that "The White man is like God to us, and we accept what you say", was probably deliberately ambiguous. Chatha's experience of Magistrates having dismissed and appointed headmen against the community's will, together with what they had heard about Betterment elsewhere, had taught them that what the White man wanted, would happen. Betterment, whatever good it might bring could, like Almighty God, not be stopped, and to oppose it would only bring suffering upon the community. To say "we accept what you say", was merely to acknowledge the inevitable - although the White Magistrate hearing these words, and the comparison to God, probably took them to signify the consent of the community.

Opposition to Betterment did occur in the Keiskammahoek area. In 1949, 105 men from Mnyameni location who were working in Cape Town, sent several letters through an attorney to the Magistrate at Keiskammahoek, objecting to the erection of fences along the boundaries of the location. Their objection was overruled.<sup>39</sup> Two headmen were dismissed because they were in opposition to Betterment, and fences were cut in several locations from the mid-1950's onwards. In one village, people threatened to shoot officials implementing Betterment.<sup>40</sup> Betterment planning took longer to be applied in those locations which offered resistance, but in the end, it was applied.

While officials acknowledge that there was opposition to Betterment, they felt that the majority of the people wanted it. Resistance was seen as due to the influence of the African National

Congress, which opposed the implementation of Betterment throughout the Ciskei. It influenced young migrants in towns, who then came home and spread the idea of resistance among people. (This resistance was presumably linked to the resistance to Betterment and the Tribal Authorities' system occurring throughout South Africa).

Resistance is also acknowledged by officials to have arisen in regard to the stipulations of Betterment itself, especially when it became clear that people would have to move from their old homesteads - something which does not seem to have been emphasised at the meetings in the late 1940's, as it was not yet clearly a part of Betterment policy. On the whole, however, "the majority were keen" to have Betterment introduced, as they understood that it had something to offer.<sup>41</sup>

The officials' view that Betterment schemes were supported by the people was probably influenced by the fact that they generally liaised with the headmen and their Advisory committees, which they saw as representative. Thus one official states that "the headman and his committee were definitely prepared to stand by the Department (i.e. of Native Affairs) and its schemes for improving the economic standard of farmers...yes, they had the backing of their people".<sup>42</sup>

Such committees (and particularly the headmen, who are paid by the government) were caught between their commitments to represent their own people and the government. At certain times they told the authorities that they did not want Betterment, while yet having signed for their villages to accept it. Rather like the local government officials who had also voiced their concerns about Betterment to higher authority, they were caught up in a situation they could not control - Betterment was on its way, regardless, and it must have been only natural for both officials and committees to hope that something good might come of it after all. Plans of locations neatly divided into arable, residential and grazing areas, together with elaborate calculations about projected incomes and irrigation projects, would probably have impressed men who did not always have enough education to make sense of what they saw on paper.

Although elected to speak on behalf of their co-villagers, the committee members' own impressions of what they had been shown and told by the authorities would in turn have influenced their ideas of

what their people wanted. Officials in their turn, taught to believe that headmen were authentic spokesmen for their people, and listening for anything that might suggest consent, could easily have come to believe that these committees, and therefore their villages, really did want Betterment.

However committee members may have interpreted the Betterment plans, and whatever they may have hoped for, the situation changed dramatically when it came to the implementation of these plans, and specifically when it became clear to people that they would have to move. The burning of the headman's and two of his councillors' houses on the same night, which villagers and the headman himself ascribe to the fact that they were seen as favouring Betterment, made it clear to committees and officials that some people did not want Betterment any more, whatever they might have wanted or said they wanted in the past. People did not want to move, and they remain convinced that Betterment was forced upon them against their wishes.

The nature of public meetings at which Betterment was discussed, may also have led to different perceptions on the part of officials and villagers as to whether the villagers wanted the scheme. At large public meetings, problems of audibility, comprehensibility, effective translation and boredom may arise. People often hear only part of what is being said, and then extrapolate for themselves. This affects their perception and recollection of what was discussed and approved.

Another factor making for misunderstanding was that women apparently did not attend all the meetings at which Betterment was discussed. A male informant states that women attended none of the meetings relating to Betterment. Men who were working away at the time of the meetings could not have attended them either. Every family would not have had an equally informed picture of events. This was further complicated by the fact that some men were away at the time of the move. Their wives had to make the decisions relating to the move. When these men came home, the move was either in process, or completed. Lack of information, as well as the disruption of the domestic decision-making process, would have added to the confusion and uncertainty people would have felt. In the circumstances, it would have been natural for people to have felt that the move had been forced upon them.

### SOME COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

The negative experience that people in Chatha had of the coming of Betterment is echoed in accounts of Betterment elsewhere in South Africa. People experienced the move from their old residential areas to new ones as something which had been forced on them against their will (James 1983, p 39; O'Connell 1980, p 273; Yawitch 1981, p 56), whereas in one area of the Transkei, people were happy to move because they saw themselves as moving from a damp and unfavourable area to a better area, in which their new fields were substantially better (Segar 1985, p 2). This latter case, where people found themselves better off than before, resembles the case of the irrigation settlers in Chatha, who chose to join the irrigation scheme, as they saw that it would offer them improved circumstances.

In most cases however, like the rest of Chatha, people found themselves worse-off after Betterment, with less land than before (James 1983, p 39; O'Connell 1981, p 46; Yawitch 1981, p 42, 57). People also lost stock in some cases through the imposition of culling programmes (Bigalke 1969, p 7) although in other cases culling was actively and successfully resisted (James 1983, p 41).

As in Chatha, people in other areas found themselves competing for the best sites and fields, and local officials were prepared to accept bribes in order to secure sites and fields for people (Segar 1985, p 2; Yawitch 1981, p 79). In areas such as Lebowa, where people have been streaming on to Trust farms which have been declared Betterment areas, large squatter settlements have sprung up (James 1983; Yawitch 1981). This has also happened in the Transkei, but on a lesser scale (Spiegel 1985).

The pattern of relocation in the case of the Lovedu seems atypical inasmuch as "existing districts (were allowed to be) settled on contiguous plots of their own choice, under the existing headman, rather than being placed higgledy-piggeldy, on a first come, first-served basis, as had been the case elsewhere; also that, should it be necessary to place more than one district together in one large planned settlement, each existing recognised area should form a unit under its own headman" (Krige 1985, p 7). This is what most people in



Chatha had wanted, but were either not allowed, or not able, to achieve.

The move to the new residential sites was a painful experience for people, as it was in Chatha, (James 1983, p 39; O'Connell 1980, p 273; Yawitch 1984, p 83) being forced upon them against their will. An exception is the case of St. Paul's in the Transkei, mentioned above, where people were happy to move to the new area, where they felt they would be better off (Segar 1982, p 29; 1985, p 2). Another possible exception relates to an area in the Transkei, where Betterment is in the process of being planned. As yet only a small number of people have applied for sites in the new residential area. Half of these applicants are women, who are widows or have been deserted by their husbands, and are possibly keen to break away from the control of their husband's agnates and "to establish their own independent homesteads" (Mc Allister 1985a, p 92). The rest of the community, however, does not want to move, and rather like the people of Chatha who "forgot about Betterment" after the initial meeting with officials, are carrying on as normal, building new homesteads (ibid, p 88).

People experienced the move to the new residential sites as disruptive of existing kinship and neighbourhood groupings (Bigalke 1969, p 7; O'Connell 1981, p 46-47), being unable to find sites close to their kinsmen, and being confronted with neighbours who were strangers. This feeling of disruption was coupled with a feeling of powerlessness to stop the process of Betterment (James 1983, p 39-41), with community leaders such as headmen becoming estranged from their followers although they were unable to do anything to stop proceedings (Mayer 1980, p 57; O'Connell 1980, p 273). Although people expressed their opposition to relocation (James 1983; O'Connell 1980; Yawitch 1981), and although there was fierce resistance in some areas of South Africa, in most cases, people gave in to the inevitable and moved without offering substantial resistance.

The experience of the coming of Betterment in Chatha as fundamentally negative, and forced on people against their will, and as resulting in social disruption and economic loss, is reflected to a considerable extent in accounts of Betterment in other parts of South Africa.

As with Betterment, the move into concentrated villages elsewhere in Africa was also an anxious and socially disruptive experience, which took place largely against the people's wishes, and often involved economic hardship.

In the case of Ujamaa villages, it seems that in a large number of instances people were compelled by the authorities to move (Abrahams 1981, p 45; Von Freyhold 1979, p 126-127; Musoke, in Proctor 1971, p 6). In one case, compulsion took the form of the withholding of famine relief to those not joining Ujamaa villages (Von Freyhold 1979, p 127). In some cases, people did join Ujamaa villages voluntarily, anticipating that they would gain access to better arable land, as well as to government assistance (Musoke, in Proctor 1971, p 6; Von Freyhold 1979, p 171). In the case of villagisation in the (then) Belgian Congo, as well as in the Rhodesian and Algerian war situations, people were unambiguously forced to move into the new settlements (Packard 1979, p 249; Sutton 1978, p 63; Weinrich 1977, p 212).

This gave rise to considerable hardship and anxiety, with people having to build hastily (Abrahams 1981, p 45) in new settlements not of their own choice or design. People feared the consequences of concentrated residence, being concerned about concomitant health problems, as well as an increased vulnerability to witchcraft (Abrahams 1981, p 45; Packard 1979, p 249-250). Being in organised settlements would also make people more accessible to tax-collectors (Von Freyhold 1979, p 127).

Although attempts were made to take account of people's former residential and village-groupings in the new Ujamaa settlements (Abrahams 1981, p 110; Bakula, in Proctor 1971, p 26), social patterns were disrupted, with people being separated from their kinsmen (Bakula, in Proctor 1971, p 30). People appear to have clung to their old ties of kinship and friendship during the first few years of life in the new settlements, and there was little evidence of neighbourhood or village solidarity. In some cases, tensions and rifts developed between members of different villages relocated in the same new Ujamaa settlement (Abrahams 1981, p 74; Boesen et al 1977, p 64, 146-147; Bakula, in Proctor 1971, p 26; Von Freyhold 1979, p 129, 131, 174). New neighbourhood patterns started emerging after

three or four years (Boesen et al 1977, p 146-147; Von Freyhold 1979, p 144-145). In the Congo case, the disruption of formally lineage-based neighbourhoods in the new settlements gave rise to increased individualism and new social tensions, which found expression in increased accusations of sorcery (Packard 1979, p 250-253). Similar disruptions and tensions also arose in the Rhodesian case (Weinrich 1977, p 225-226).

These social disruptions have in some cases been accompanied by economic hardship and loss. In the Congo case, people were further from their gardens, which made them "more difficult to protect and farm" (Packard 1979, p 249), while in some Rhodesian protected villages, people's cattle had been taken away from them, and curfew conditions made it difficult for people to cultivate their fields (Weinrich 1977, p 212, 229). In Ujamaa villages, conditions differed widely, as there was considerable variation in the size of the communal field which all the villagers worked together, as well as in the ratio of privately to communally cultivated land (Von Freyhold 1979, p 90-91). Boesen et al (1977, p 57, 59) give figures for the Ngara District of Tanzania, which suggest that people in non-Ujamaa villages have nearly twice as much arable land, as well as more stock, as people in Ujamaa villages. Economic loss was compounded by administrative incompetence and by "the absence of any reliable system of financial control" (Von Freyhold 1979, p 87) in a number of Ujamaa villages.

Accounts of the implementation of Betterment in South Africa, and of villagisation elsewhere, and particularly the aspect of moving to new residential areas, echo characteristics of relocatees under stress, as described by Scudder and Colson in the transitional stage of their model of the relocation process.

People felt powerless and confused, and uncertain as to what the future would hold for them (cf. Scudder and Colson 1982, p 269-270), and tried to cope with their stress by "forgetting about Betterment" after the initial meetings at which it had been discussed, carrying on as normal (ibid, p 271-272, and also Mc Allister 1985a, p 90 for a Transkeian example). The wish to "cling to the familiar" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 273) and to move "into new settlements with relatives (and) former neighbours" (Scudder 1984, p 21) is reflected in people's

wishes and attempts to settle close to their kinsmen and to maintain old residential patterns. The discrediting of leadership characteristic of the transitional stage (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 270) is reflected in the burning of the headman's houses in Chatha, and by the attempt to replace him.

Relocation is of itself a potentially stressful experience, even in the case of villagisation, where the degree of environmental transformation is considerably less than in the case of relocation arising out of e.g. dam construction, or large agricultural schemes. Relocates in the context of villagisation demonstrate stress-avoiding behaviour, which although less dramatic than that of relocates in larger schemes, can usefully be understood in terms of the transitional phase of Scudder and Colson's model of the relocation process.

#### FOOTNOTES

Access to files quoted in this chapter were obtained through the Magistrate's Office at Keiskammahoek (Files N1/1/5(1); N1/15/6; N8/5/3(5); N8/5/3(8)) and through the Department of Agriculture and Forestry of the Ciskei Government (Files (47) N2/11/3/9; (47) N2/11/3/10; (47) N2/11/3/11).

- 1 This meeting is mentioned in the oral accounts of the coming of Betterment, as narrated by some of the inhabitants of Chatha
- 2 File N/8/5/3(5) - letter from Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek to Chief Native Commissioner, 17/9/1947
- 3 Petition signed 15/8/1947, accompanying the letter in footnote No.2
- 4 Government Gazette 31/10/1947, p 323, 324
- 5 Personal communication from A.W. Leppan (Magistrate at Keiskammahoek May 1958 to 1965) 26/11/1984
- 6 File N/1/15/6 - Annual Report for the District of Keiskammahoek, for the year ended 30/6/1951
- 7 File (47) N2/11/3/10 - Complaint by Chatha headman, 10/11/1952
- 8 File (47) N2/11/3/9 - Report on Gxulu Location, Keiskammahoek District: Native Member's Comments, 23/12/1952
- 9 File (47) N2/11/3/9 - Native Commissioner's comments on Ciskeian



- Planning Committee's Report and Recommendations, December 1952
- 10 File (47) N2/11/3/9 - Agricultural Officer, Keiskammahoek to Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek
  - 11 Personal communication from A.L. Schaffer (Magistrate at Keiskammahoek 1952 - May 1958), 2/11/1984
  - 12 Ibid.
  - 13 File (47) N2/11/3/11 - letter from Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town to Secretary of Native Affairs, Pretoria, 19/2/1953
  - 14 File (47) N2/11/3/11 - letter from Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town to Secretary of Native Affairs, Pretoria, 25/3/1953
  - 15 File (47) N2/11/3/11 - letter from Secretary of Native Affairs, Pretoria to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 4/3/1957
  - 16 File (47) N2/11/3/11 - letter from Chief Native Commissioner (Cape) to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 17/8/1957
  - 17 File (47) N2/11/3/10 - letter from Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 16/4/1958
  - 18 File (47) N2/11/3/10 - note on meeting with Advisory Committee of Chatha, 23/4/1958
  - 19 Calculated from the questionnaire sheets administered in Chatha during the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey
  - 20 Mills and Wilson (1952) p 44 (with figures converted to morgen)
  - 21 Calculated from Table XI, in Mills and Wilson (1952) p 44
  - 22 Calculated from the questionnaire sheets administered in Chatha during the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey
  - 23 Mills and Wilson (1952) ch 8; Houghton and Walton (1952) ch 6
  - 24 File (47) N2/11/3/9 - Native Commissioner's comments on Ciskeian Planning Committee's Report and Recommendations, December 1952
  - 25 File (47) N2/11/3/10 - Rehabilitation and Settlement Report on the Gxulu, Myameni and Cata Locations, Keiskammahoek District, October 1958
  - 26 File N/1/15/6 - Annual Report for the District of Keiskammahoek, for the year of 1958 (27/4/1959)
  - 27 Personal communication from A.W. Leppan (Magistrate at Keiskammahoek May 1958 to 1965) 26/11/1984
  - 28 File (47) N2/11/3/10 - letter from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner,

- Keiskammahoek to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, King William's Town, 27/7/1961
- 29 A list of title deeds kept at the Magistrate's Court at Keiskammahoek
- 30 Personal communication from A.W. Leppan (Magistrate at Keiskammahoek May 1958-1965), 26/11/1984
- 31 A list of title deeds kept at the Magistrate's court at Keiskammahoek
- 32 Records kept in the Agricultural Officer's office at Chatha
- 33 File N/8/5/3(5) - petition signed 15/8/1947
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Compilation of land allocations by the Village Secretary of Chatha - in possession of the headman of Chatha.
- 36 Personal communication from Mr. Jakob, (an agricultural official at Keiskammahoek at the time), November 1979
- 37 File (47) N2/11/3/9 - Native Commissioner's comments on Ciskeian Planning Committee's Report and Recommendations, December 1952
- 38 Personal communication from A.L. Schaffer (Magistrate at Keiskammahoek 1952 - May 1958), 2/11/1984
- 39 File N8/5/3(8) - letter from A.O. Sutton, Attorney, Cape Town to Chief Native Commissioner, King William's Town, 30/8/1949. This letter was accompanied by a list of the complainant's names. Also, letter from Native Commissioner, Keiskammahoek to Chief Native Commissioner, 14/9/1949
- 40 File N/1/1/5(1) - meeting held at Mbem's Location 12/5/1955. Also, personal communication from A.W. Leppan (Magistrate at Keiskammahoek May 1958 - 1965), 26/11/1984.
- 41 Personal communication from A.W. Leppan, 26/11/1984
- 42 Personal communication from A.W. Leppan, 26/11/1984

## CHAPTER SIX

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES IN CHATHA SINCE BETTERMENT

A number of changes have taken place in Chatha since Betterment was implemented in the mid-1960's, which have had an impact upon the day-to-day lives of people in the village. While a number of these changes are directly attributable to Betterment, other changes have come about independently of Betterment, while in the case of yet other changes, the impact of Betterment and of independent factors are not so clearly distinguishable.

This chapter sets out to discuss some of the major changes that have taken place, indicating in what measure they are attributable to the implementation of Betterment or to other factors, and considering how they affect the people in the village. By giving a general outline of the changes that have taken place in Chatha, this chapter provides a background for the more detailed discussions of particular changes to be examined in the next three chapters.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES

The physical environment of the village has been substantially transformed, as a direct result of the implementation of Betterment. The old pattern of land use has been replaced by a new and different pattern, imposed as part of the Betterment exercise. The old residential clusters, scattered along the hillsides, and strategically located in relation to resources such as wood, water, arable and grazing land, have disappeared. The village area is now divided into three physically separate kinds of area which are fenced off from each other, viz. residential, arable and grazing areas, with the boundaries of the forestry plantation remaining unchanged. The physical lay-out of the village as it is after Betterment is shown on Fig. No. 2 in Appendix A.

There are now three residential areas, two of which accommodate the great majority of the villagers, and the third of which, the smallest, accommodates 24 families who have settled on the irrigation scheme.

The two large residential areas (Nyanga, which has 269 homesteads, and Skafu, which has 139 homesteads) are situated on the same side of the village, on several adjacent hillsides, stretching down to the road and the river, which run through the middle of the village area. The irrigation settlers' residential area is located on the other side of the village, i.e. on the other side of the river and the road. (As in Chapter Four, the people associated with a homestead, i.e. identified by occupants of that homestead as belonging to the homestead - whether they were actually in Chatha at the time, or away e.g. as migrant labourers or scholars - are taken to compose the "household" associated with that homestead.)

The new residential area of Nyanga consists of one large area of 219 homesteads, and a smaller area of 50 homesteads. These two areas are separated at various points by a gully. Although seen by everyone as part of the larger area of Nyanga, the smaller area has its own name (Kwili), as it was a separate hamlet (also named Kwili) in the old village-section of Nyanga before Betterment. Both Nyanga (new) and Skafu are situated on hills sloping down towards the river, and are separated from each other by a ravine, involving a fairly steep descent from Nyanga to Skafu. The residential area of the irrigation scheme, being smaller, is situated near the bottom of the hill on which it is situated, and is separated from the road and the river by a stretch of flat irrigated land. To walk from the furthest point of Nyanga to the furthest point of Skafu takes about 30 minutes, while to walk from one of these points to the top homesteads on the irrigation scheme takes about the same time. The hill on which Nyanga is situated, is steeply sloped, and walking back up it takes a good deal longer than going down.

People draw water from the river, or from one of its tributaries. The central stream of the river and its stronger tributaries are perennial. Wood for fuel is collected from the wooded areas near the top of Nyanga and Skafu, from across the river, or from those parts of the forest that are legally accessible to the villagers. Stock are grazed in the newly demarcated and fenced grazing camps up on the mountain (where the old Ministerial Grazing Area was before Betterment), and along the hills where the former village-sections of Ndela, Nyokane, Rawule, Jili and part of old Skafu were. Manure for



use as fertilizer or for house cleaning and decoration, as well as thatching grass, is obtained from the grazing camps.

In many cases, people have to walk further to fetch wood and water, or to get to their fields, than they did before Betterment. Those households in Nyanga who have their fields in the arable block next to Nyanga, (arable block A on Fig. No. 2) or those households in Skafu who have their fields in the arable block next to Skafu (arable block C on Fig. No. 2), and most of the households on the irrigation scheme, are not much further from their fields than before Betterment. Most of the dryland households have their fields in the more distant arable blocks (D, E, F on Fig. No. 2), and their fields are up to 45 minutes' walk from their homesteads.

The new residential areas are laid out in streets, which, because of the slope of the hill or erosion, are not all negotiable by vehicle. The fronts of the houses face down the slope of the hills towards the river. This means that the houses in Nyanga and Skafu face east, while the houses on the irrigation scheme face west. On one side of the street (the bottom side), the gardens are in front of the houses, and on the other, the gardens are behind the houses, as the houses are situated next to the roads. Most residential sites are fenced off, and within these sites, virtually every garden is fenced off. The cattle-byre is also situated within the residential site, and consists of a rectangular structure of wood, poles and branches. Some homesteads have an additional byre for small stock. The majority of residential sites are .25 morgen in size, while the rest are .125 morgen in size. There is no fixed garden size, as people have laid out their gardens individually within their residential sites, but gardens are clearly smaller than before Betterment, when the average garden size was about half an acre or .25 morgen (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 35).

The distribution of the old village-sections in the new residential areas may be inferred from Figs No. 7 to 10 in Appendix A. One former village-section (Nyanga) had consisted of four hamlets, while four of the five others had each had more than one hamlet. These old hamlets had an identity of their own, and this internal diversity within former village-sections is not indicated on the diagrams of the new residential areas. While people identify with their former village-

section for ceremonial and organisational purposes (e.g. collection of funds for village undertakings, allocation of government-funded drought relief jobs), they still have strong emotional ties to their old hamlets and to their neighbours there.

Affiliations of current households to the old village-sections are as follows.

<u>Old Village-Section</u>	<u>Nyanga</u>	<u>Skafu</u>	<u>Irrigation Scheme</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nyanga	91	8	3	102 (24%)
Ndela	60	1	14	75 (17%)
Nyokane	58	15	5	78 (18%)
Rawule	21	35	0	56 (13%)
Jili	30	38	1	69 (16%)
Skafu	8	42	1	51 (12%)
Recent Immigrant	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	<u>269</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>432(100%)</u>

The proportional strengths of the village-sections in terms of numbers of households has remained fairly constant compared with the situation before Betterment. My attempts to reconstruct the old village-sections as they were before Betterment, gave a figure of 335 homesteads. The distribution of households by village sections before and after Betterment may be represented as follows:

	<u>± 1960</u>	<u>1981</u>
Nyanga	83 (25%)	102 (24%)
Ndela	66 (20%)	75 (17%)
Nyokane	59 (17%)	78 (18%)
Rawule	47 (14%)	56 (13%)
Jili	50 (15%)	69 (16%)
Skafu	<u>30 ( 9%)</u>	<u>51 (12%)</u>
	<u>335</u>	<u>431</u>

The only notable changes have been Ndela, which has declined by 3% and Skafu, which has increased by 3 per cent. The three old village-sections that have shown the greatest growth in terms of numbers of households, rather than overall percentage of households, are Skafu (70 per cent growth), Jili (38 per cent growth) and Nyokane (32 per

cent growth). This is probably related to the fact that in 1972, 55 new residential sites were allocated in the new Skafu residential area. Seventy per cent of these new sites were taken by people from the old village-sections of Skafu, Jili and Nyokane.

The majority of households associated with the old village-sections of Nyanga, Ndela and Nyokane are to be found in the new residential area of Nyanga, while the majority of households linked with the old Jili, Rawule and Skafu are to be found in the new Skafu. This seems most plausibly explained in terms of a combination of two factors, viz. the relative proximity of old village-sections such as Nyanga, Ndela and Skafu, to the new residential areas, and the availability of sites in these new residential areas. The old area of Ndela was closest to the new irrigation scheme, and this is reflected in the fact that the majority of the households on the irrigation scheme came from the old Ndela.

The arable land (other than the irrigation scheme) remaining after land deemed to be unsuitable had been taken out of cultivation, is divided into six large blocks, each of which is boundary fenced. There is no internal fencing within any of these blocks, except in a few cases where people have fenced off their own fields. Fields are separated from each other by contour banks. Fifty-six per cent of the 408 dryland households (i.e. the rest of the village other than the irrigation scheme) have arable holdings, the great majority (over 90%) of which are half a morgen in size. The quality of the soil of all fields is not the same, with those fields closest to the river having the best soil.

The irrigation scheme's land extends along a large stretch of the river, and is divided up into 24 plots of one and a half morgen each. As with the blocks of arable dryland, separate holdings are not fenced off from each other. Some fields are more favourably placed than others in terms of irrigability.

Most grazing camps are further away from the residential settlements than arable areas are, and extend up into the hills, as well as above the forestry plantation. All grazing camps are fenced off. There are eight grazing camps (totalling 3045 morgen) set aside for use by the dryland households, and four smaller camps (totalling 180 morgen) set aside for use by the irrigation settlers.

Betterment has thus brought about the re-organisation of the village area into separate residential, arable and grazing areas, and created an irrigation scheme in the village. The fencing off of these areas has effectively frozen the land use pattern. It is no longer possible, as it was before Betterment, to extend residential areas into grazing land, or to convert arable land into grazing land, or vice-versa. This freezing of the land use pattern means that land use can no longer be adjusted to allow for population growth. This is reflected in the growing percentage of landless households, as well as in the growing shortage of residential sites (to be discussed later in this chapter).

#### INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGES

The implementation of Betterment, and the years after Betterment, have seen infrastructural changes in Chatha, in the form of the laying out of roads, the erection of fences and several government sponsored buildings, the building of a school, a clinic and two shops, and the establishment of a bus service.

The old road which ran through the village has been improved. From this road, two minor roads lead up into the new areas of Nyanga and Skafu, and a road also leads off across the river to the irrigation scheme and its residential areas. From these minor roads, the streets of the residential areas branch off. These streets are not always straight, following the lie of the land. Various other roads branch off, providing access to fields and grazing camps, some of these deteriorating into tracks. The arterial road is passable in all weather. The minor roads leading up to the residential areas are usually also viable in all weather as they are on slopes. The lesser roads and streets may become impassable after wet weather, and some of them are badly eroded, being impassable to vehicles in any weather. The forestry plantation has its own internal network of roads. Roads are maintained by the Ciskei Government.

A daily bus service runs to Keiskammahok, leaving for the town at about 8 am and returning at about 2 pm. The trip takes about half an hour. In practice the bus often runs late, and is used by people going to Keiskammahok for shopping or for administrative purposes,



i.e. people who are not constrained by the demands of punctuality, as commuters would be, who might work in the village of Keiskammahoek.

Chatha has a primary school, and a junior secondary school which takes pupils up to standard eight. The primary school, which was rebuilt at Betterment, is situated in the new Skafu residential area. Its premises consist of concrete rectangular buildings with corrugated iron roofs. The junior secondary school makes use of the Methodist Church, and of some huts, in Skafu. The clinic, situated next to the road at the bottom of the new Skafu residential area, is staffed by a nursing sister, and has a water storage tank and a telephone.

A concrete house was built for the agricultural officer who was assigned to Chatha at the time of Betterment, but it is no longer in use as the last two agricultural officers have lodged with the forester. On the irrigation scheme is another concrete building, which serves as a storage shed for the scheme, and as an office for the agricultural officer. A dip for stock has also been built in the village, on the Nyanga side of the village.

In addition to government financed buildings such as those discussed above, two shops, one of which includes a bottle-store, have been erected privately. A number of households have built houses with guttering, from which rainwater is channelled into storage tanks or drums.

Infrastructure which existed before Betterment includes the forester's house, which has several outbuildings, a water storage tank and a telephone; and two church buildings, one catering for the Methodists (who form the dominant congregation in Chatha) and the other for the handful of Catholics in the village.

Some of this infrastructural change, such as most of the roads and fences, the school and the agricultural buildings, are the direct result of the implementation of Betterment. Other developments such as the clinic, the two shops and the bus service are not a direct consequence of Betterment, as much as a response to the opportunities provided by the new concentrated residential settlements and the improved road network resulting from Betterment.

## POLITICAL CHANGES

Political changes that have taken place since 1950 will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight, and only a brief outline of these changes will be given here. The most important overall political change has been that the village has lost a good deal of the power and autonomy it had over its own affairs, to central government.

With the advent of Betterment, control of land use has effectively been taken out of the hands of the villagers. Arable and grazing areas have been fenced off from each other, and are no longer mutually convertible. All available arable land has been redemarcated and reallocated under a system of certificates of occupation, which allows greater control by the Magistrate than was the case before Betterment. Allocation of arable land has effectively been taken out of the hands of the headman and his council.

In addition to the increased power of the office of the Magistrate, the villagers have now also become answerable to a new form of local government (the Tribal Authority) as well as to the newly emerged political machine of the Ciskei National Independence Party, under which the Ciskei is today effectively a one-party state. These three branches of government - the Magistracy, the Tribal Authority and the political party overlap at local government level in such a way as to deprive village politics of much of its former autonomy. Much of the business of village meetings is taken up with the announcement and discussion of government directives and the collection of government or party levies.

The formation of the two large new residential areas resulting from Betterment has altered the composition of political factions within the village. With the demise of the village-sections, these two new areas are emerging as the two new interest groups which compete for resources within the village. The members of the irrigation scheme, with one or two exceptions, side with the new residential area of Nyanga. People no longer compete for access to arable or grazing land (as its control has effectively been taken out of their hands), but for the favourable siting of resources coming into the village, such as infrastructural developments like schools, clinics, roads; seeking to have these located favourably in relation to their own residential

area.

#### DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

It was estimated in Chapter Four that at the time of Betterment in the mid-1960's Chatha would probably have had a total population of between 2300 and 2500 people living in between 330 and 350 homesteads.

Today there are 432 homesteads in Chatha, of which about 415 are permanently occupied. The remaining homesteads are closed up for months or even years on end, as their inhabitants are all staying outside the village in a town or city where one or more of the household members are working. These people have not necessarily left Chatha permanently, and may return to Chatha for holidays every year or few years. Some men or women have obtained the right to have their families with them in cities such as Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth or Cape Town, and use this right to keep their family together, and to educate their children at urban schools. The total population of Chatha has thus been calculated in terms of the remaining 415 occupied homesteads.

Two household surveys were conducted in 1981. The first survey, conducted in January 1981, covered 58 dryland households (14 per cent of dryland households), and gave the following household composition.

<u>Total Household Size</u>	<u>People at Home</u>	<u>People Away</u>	<u>Migrants Away</u>
7.98	6.26 (78%)	1.72 (22%)	1.5 (19%)

The second survey was conducted from July to September 1981 and covered 104 households (24 per cent of all households in Chatha) including households on the irrigation scheme, and gave the following household composition.

<u>Total Household Size</u>	<u>People at Home</u>	<u>People Away</u>	<u>Migrants Away</u>
7.41	5.54 (75%)	1.87 (25%)	1.52 (21%)

If these two surveys are taken together, then the following household composition emerges.

<u>Total Household Size</u>	<u>People at Home</u>	<u>People Away</u>	<u>Migrants Away</u>
7.61	5.80 (76%)	1.81 (24%)	1.51 (20%)

This would give a total (de jure) population of 3247 people and a de facto population of 2505 people, with 782 people away from Chatha in 1981. Children at school in the Keiskammahoek area have been counted as part of the de facto population, as they come home over weekends, and because people in the village usually include them in their count of "at home" population.

Although the percentage of migrants away from home is much the same in landless (19.6%), as opposed to landed dryland households (20.7%), there are some differences in size and composition. Landless households are smaller (6.77 people) than landed households (7.88 people). Landless households also have younger household heads, and are characterised by a two-generational household structure to a greater degree (55% of cases) than landed households (26% of cases). These differences seem related to the fact that on the whole, landless households have been established more recently, accounting for most of the households established since Betterment. With time, it seems likely that these differences will diminish as the developmental cycle takes its course.

The size of households on the irrigation scheme is much the same (7.66) as dryland households, although fewer people are at home (5.57 or 73 per cent of the household), while slightly more people (2.09 or 27 per cent of the household) are away. One-quarter of the members of households on the irrigation scheme work away as migrants. There does not seem to be any apparent reason why households on the irrigation scheme should have more migrants than dryland households.

This may be compared with the composition of households at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (1948 to 1950), when the average household was made up as follows:

<u>Total Household Size</u>	<u>People at Home</u>	<u>People Away</u>	<u>Migrants Away</u>
7.28	6.14 (84%)	1.14 (16%)	.99 (14%)

(source: questionnaire sheets used in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey)

The size of households has increased negligibly (5%), while the



percentage of household members away from home, and the percentage of migrants, have increased more substantially.

The fact that total household size is effectively the same in 1981 as it was 30 years ago, may probably be explained by the fact that at both periods, there were factors constraining young married men with their own families from starting their own homesteads. At the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, the constraining factor was shortage of arable land. Landless young men tended to stay in their parents' homesteads until they received their own allotments. In 1981, the constraining factor was shortage of residential sites. The new residential areas are effectively unable to accommodate new sites, as they are filled up. The headman has applied to the relevant authorities for permission to convert part of a grazing camp into an extra residential area. In 1978, the village secretary had drawn up a list of 50 young men who were waiting for residential sites, and the number is said by the people in the village to be growing. In addition, the process of obtaining a residential site involves a time-consuming bureaucratic procedure with correspondence going between Chatha, Keiskammahoek and government offices at Zwelitsha.

Given that the Betterment plan had set aside only a limited area for residential purposes, it could only have been a matter of time before the available space in the residential areas was taken up. Betterment planning was based on the idea of people leaving overcrowded villages. When the "surplus" population could not be accommodated elsewhere, the planners had to accommodate them within the redemarcated residential areas as best they could. As a result, at least 40 per cent of residential sites in the dryland areas are only .125 morgen in size, with the rest having sites of .25 morgen each. Betterment could not accommodate an increase in population.

The percentage of the members of the household that are away has risen considerably, and this appears to be due to a number of factors. Firstly, the percentage of migrants has risen. At the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, a large number of people from Chatha ("many of the men from Chatha") were employed in replanting the forest (Mills and Wilson, 1952, p 118). Today, the forest plantation provides work for about 30 people from Chatha. Betterment has left many households with less than half of the amount of arable land they

had held before Betterment, and the percentage of landless households (as opposed to young men who are theoretically entitled to land) has risen dramatically from an estimated 10 per cent before Betterment (1958 Government Report) to about 40 per cent. Income-earning opportunities in both cash and kind within Chatha itself have thus fallen significantly, thereby raising the dependency of the average household on earnings derived from work in the larger centres. In addition, real cash earnings have more than doubled in the 30 years since the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. This has given rise to an increased standard of living, together with an increased desire for consumer goods such as furniture, paraffin stoves, household utensils, radios, etc. Secondly, the percentage of non-migrants away from home has risen, and this appears to relate largely to the increased number of pupils studying at secondary schools outside the Keiskammahoek area. The increase in the percentage of household members away from home at any time thus reflects both a decrease in local sources of income, as well as an increase in standard of living and a desire for consumer goods and education.

It may at first glance appear puzzling that the population of Chatha has shown a growth rate of only 35 per cent over the last 20 years (i.e. just before Betterment up to 1981). It should however be borne in mind that the growth in the number of homesteads has been in the order of about 29 per cent. Household size has remained effectively the same.

The only plausible explanation can be that a substantial number of young men and women have left Chatha during the last 20 or so years, who would otherwise have married and raised children in Chatha. (This does not include women from Chatha who have married men from outside Chatha, as they are cancelled out by women from outside Chatha who have married men in Chatha). A survey of 58 households (14 per cent of Chatha) shows that 19 adults, either as single people without children, or as married or separated people with their families, have permanently left Chatha during the last 20 or so years. Taking Chatha as a whole, this would mean that some 136 such adults have left permanently, taking their offspring and their reproductive capacity with them. As the average middle-aged couple in Chatha today has three or four children, this would represent a population loss of

about 700 people. If this figure was taken into account, then the population of Chatha would have grown from about 2400 in the early 1960's to about 3900 in 1981 - a growth of 63 per cent in just under 20 years, which does not seem an unrealistic growth rate.

As was the case at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, the size and composition of households varies widely, being influenced by much the same set of factors, viz. the developmental cycle, separated women bringing their children back to their natal home, unmarried women bearing children, labour migration, a number of younger adults leaving the village permanently. Households sampled varied from a widow living on her own to a household of 16 people (a widow; her separated daughter plus her children; her two sons, plus their wives and children; and her unmarried son). At present, the size of households is much the same as at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey for reasons discussed earlier. This reflects a balance between the rate of population growth and the rate of growth of the number of homesteads, which may soon be upset, as the residential areas are effectively unable to accommodate new residential sites. As the number of young married men unable to obtain housing sites rises, the size of households will rise (unless they are able to emigrate, or unless a grazing camp is made available for a new residential area).

As was the case with the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, the majority of households today are effectively headed by women, either as widows (47.6%) or as wives of absent migrants (21.9%). Men, either retired, (21.9%) or working locally (5.7%) and home on leave from migrant labour (2.8%) make up just less than one third of the effective household heads. Although the percentage of households headed by widows today is roughly the same as at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (53.4% according to the Survey's questionnaire sheets), the overall percentage of households effectively headed by women is higher today, as the percentage of household members (including male migrants) away from home has risen.

Household size and structure have thus not changed significantly since 1950, except that the percentage of household members who are away from home has risen, and with it, the percentage of households effectively headed by the wives of absent migrants. Other than being a

contributory factor to the rise in migration rate, Betterment has not as yet had any major impact on household composition. As pressure on residential sites rises, Betterment will however increasingly have the effect of trapping young men in their parents' homes, and so of increasing household size or of increasing the rate of emigration out of Chatha. It is not clear to what extent Betterment has already increased the rate of emigration out of Chatha. It was argued earlier that this process had been in evidence before Betterment. While rural "push" factors certainly are influential in people's decision to leave the rural areas, urban "pull" factors, such as the availability of jobs and accommodation and the degree to which influx control regulations are actually enforced, probably play a decisive role in the decision.

#### ECONOMIC CHANGES

The most important economic change that has taken place in Chatha since 1950 has been that the annual cash income of the average household (i.e. a household not involved in entrepreneurial activity or on the irrigation scheme) has risen by 169 per cent, from R51-20 (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 106) to about R840-00 (see Appendix B). The fact that annual incomes were higher than usual during the years of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey because of the fact that many men were working in the forest at the time (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 118), means that real cash incomes have in fact risen by more than 169 per cent during the last 30 years, if incomes in more normal years in the early 1950's are taken into account. This rise relates to cash earned almost exclusively outside the agricultural sector, and has thus taken place independently of the implementation of Betterment.

Inasmuch as arable allotments are considerably smaller than before Betterment, and a greater percentage of households are landless, Betterment has reduced household income in kind. Allowing for inflation, the real value of income in kind from crops in 1981 is roughly speaking 70 per cent of what it was in 1950 - R50-00 in 1981 as opposed to R11-70 in 1950 (Houghton and Walton, 1952, p 106). It is however the case that households are less dependent upon crop cultivation than in 1950, when income in kind from crops



(predominantly maize) made up 19 per cent of a "cash plus income in kind from crops" income of £31-9-2 (R62-92), whereas in 1981, income in kind from maize made up six per cent of such a composite income.

Although agricultural production has declined, real income has increased, and the average household is substantially better off than before Betterment. The reasons for this increased welfare have nothing to do with Betterment, but are rather to be found in the growth shown by the South African economy (with the real value of Black wages rising threefold in the gold mining industry during the 1970's - Parsons 1979, p 11), and by the fact that rural Blacks have come to receive old age pension grants over the last 30 years. In spite of Betterment, people are better off.

This increased welfare is manifested in most households in the form of material goods, food, and wooden doors, windows, corrugated iron roofs, beds, furniture, primus stoves, kitchen utensils, radios and clothing - articles which people by and large did not possess before Betterment. People have also increasingly invested in education of their children.

Today, 90 per cent of children between the ages of six and 18 years (inclusive) are at school, and a number of people over the age of 18 years are still at school. A number of children repeat some years several times, so that the majority of children up to 18 years of age would still be in primary school, with those in the higher grades at secondary school being over 18 years. Although statistics for school attendance in Chatha before Betterment are not available, in Upper Nqhumeya (a village in many ways similar to Chatha), "two-thirds of the children in the village" between the ages of six and 18 years (inclusive) were enrolled at school at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (Wilson et. al., 1952, p 144). The increased school enrolment reflects a growing ability and desire to educate one's children, and is also facilitated by the fact that people in the new residential areas are closer to the school. Increased school attendance is also facilitated by the building of a number of secondary schools in the district, together with the fact that the Chatha itself now has a junior secondary school, which takes pupils up to standard 8.

The rise in real wages of households has also meant that a number

of people have been able to establish themselves as entrepreneurs in Chatha, as there is more money in circulation in the community. Today there are two shopkeepers in Chatha, as well as 13 people who make their living by building and thatching houses, and running a "private" taxi-service to Keiskammahoek. They employ approximately 20 people. About 10 other people who work in larger towns and cities, and have vehicles, also run a part-time taxi service when at home in Chatha. There are about 30 vehicles owned by people with homes in Chatha. In addition to these entrepreneurs, there are about a dozen diviners and herbalists operating in Chatha, although they do not practice full-time. A number of people are teachers, and five of the teachers at the Chatha schools are from the village.

Income within this entrepreneurial group is difficult to determine. One of the shopkeepers claimed to have a monthly turnover of between R6,000 and R7,000 (which is quite feasible in terms of local population and income figures). One builder claimed to have built seven houses during the course of 1984, at an average cost of R800 each. Income within this group varies widely. The two wealthiest households are definitely those of the two shopkeepers. Next would come those households that either combine various sources of income, such as being a builder and using their vehicle as a taxi, or have managed to purchase a pick-up truck, as well as a small tractor, and run both a taxi and a tractor hire service. However, trucks and tractors are not infrequently out of order. The least prosperous would be those such as the less successful builders, diviners or herbalists, and it is not necessarily the case that their households are much better off than the average dryland household.

Households on the irrigation scheme are clearly better off than dryland households, as they have access to level, irrigated land. They enjoy much higher yields from their fields than drylanders, and sell their produce in Chatha. Most of the households on the irrigation scheme have members working away as migrants, so that they enjoy an income from agriculture, as well as from remittances and pensions. Yields and sales on the irrigation scheme will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

With the exception of the entrepreneurial households, and the irrigation scheme, the remaining 90 percent of households are

overwhelmingly dependent upon money coming into the community from the outside, in the form of wages and salaries, or pension payments. The average monthly (non-entrepreneurial, non-irrigation) household cash income of about R70 per month in 1981 was made up as follows:

income derived from remittances	46%
income derived from pensions	34%
income derived from local sources	20%

While it is quite possible that a number of households underdeclared their cash income, declared household incomes ranged from no apparent cash income to R153 per month. Of surveyed households (78, or 19% of dryland households), three quarters received income from remittances (R40 per month being the average remittance), one half (50%) received income from pensions (R33 per month) and one-quarter (26%) received income from local sources. Of locally derived income, two-thirds was derived from government-paid salaries paid to people working either at the forestry plantation (at an average salary of R60 per month in 1981) or on the drought relief scheme (at an average salary of R40 per month in 1981). Only a very small percentage of monthly household cash income (something like 7%) was derived from self-employment, or sale of wares, such as wood, tobacco, vegetables, etc., i.e. from income generated within the community.

Income in kind is in effect impossible to monitor, except by means of an intensive research project conducted over time, focusing almost exclusively on such income. Migrants may bring home clothes for family members in one particular year, but not for several years thereafter. Gifts within the community may range from free meals to the gift of a goat or a sheep to someone at their son's circumcision, or at a wedding or funeral, or may involve assistance with labour for cultivation or house repairs. Receiving food and drink is also a form of repayment for similar presentations made by oneself. Perhaps the only form of income in kind that is at all measureable, is crop returns, and even here, it is only maize yields that may be measured with any reliability. Declared maize yields for the 1981/82 season averaged two bags of maize off the cob obtained from fields and just over half a bag of maize off the cob obtained from gardens. Vegetables are picked and eaten when ready, and not stored or counted (except for something like pumpkins).

Cash income generated within the community and income in kind together make up only a small percentage of household income, and dryland households remain heavily dependent upon money coming into the community from the outside. Inasmuch as income in kind from crops now makes up a smaller percentage of household income than before Betterment, people are now more dependent upon the wider South African economy than before. In this regard, Betterment has failed in its aim to lessen and eventually eliminate that dependence.

The community may thus be divided into three broad groups in terms of source of income, viz.: the entrepreneurs, who make their living on a full-time basis by the selling of goods and services; the irrigation settlers, who make a living from a combination of agriculture and migrant remittances and pension payments; the dryland households, who depend almost exclusively on money coming into the community from outside, in the form of wages, remittances, pensions and grants. Whether dryland households have access to arable land or not, does not make enough difference to their income to justify separating the landed and the landless into separate economic groups. The yields obtained from fields are too low and too sporadic to warrant such a distinction between households, which all have access to gardens. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, yields obtained from fields are low, and many landed households do not consider these yields worth the risks and costs of cultivation, and a large number of fields (anything from one-third upwards) lie uncultivated each year.

In terms of higher and lower level income groups, the community may also be broadly divided along the above lines. The two shopkeepers are undoubtedly the two wealthiest men in Chatha, and together with the more successful builders and taxi drivers, they constitute the highest income group, followed by the irrigation settlers and then the dryland households. Within each group there is considerable variation of income, depending on personal fortune and the household's position in the developmental cycle.

Household expenses relate to things like the purchase of food and clothing, the paying of school fees and the purchasing of uniforms and books, the payment of taxes and donations to government projects, visits to the clinic or the private general practitioner at Keiskammahoek, the costs of cultivation - hiring the tractor and



purchasing seed and fertilizer - social costs, such as bridewealth payments, and the smaller, but more regular contributions necessary at funerals and certain other ceremonies.

Food, which is the major item of expenditure in almost every household, is bought in bulk monthly, if remittances are regular, or every two months in the case of pensioners, as pensions are paid every second month. Bulk buying may be paid for in cash, or put on account for which the Chatha shopkeepers impose an extra charge of up to 15 per cent. Both shops in Chatha, as well as most of the shops in Keiskammahoek, allow people to run accounts. Most people prefer to shop in Keiskammahoek, as the local storekeepers in Chatha ask higher prices, although they deliver goods to one's doorstep free of charge. People who buy goods in Keiskammahoek have to go down there by bus, bring their goods back by bus, and then carry them home up the hill. In 1983 the cost of a return ticket to Keiskammahoek was 80c.

One widow's account of her shopping may serve to illustrate the process: "I receive my pension, and then I catch the bus to pay my food account. Then I make another account - I take 1/2 a bag of mealiemeal, 50 kg of samp, 25 kg of flour, 25 kg of sugar, a big packet of tea, a packet of fat, flavouring for the soup - all the things that are better for my children - also I buy some meat. I give the pension money for food. Then I haven't got any money, but I thank Mr X (the shopkeeper) that he gives me credit and waits for me to pay - he has great imbeko (respect) because he allows me to buy on account. I am afraid to buy too much on account because I will not save anything. Otherwise, if sickness comes, the money will go to the doctor and I won't be able to pay the account. I want to balance my account".

Many households are dependent on the credit facilities extended by shopkeepers, and pay most of their income into settling their accounts for food. In the words of another widow, "I do shopping. Then we haven't got money for a long time. I have an account at Y. That's how we live". Smaller items, such as milk, bread, margarine, fat, soap, salt, matches, etc. are bought as needed from the local shopkeepers in Chatha.

Although substantially better off than in 1950, people are nevertheless operating on low income budgets (R70 per month for an

estimated 5.8 people at home) and see themselves as poor and struggling. Talk of hardship, poverty, hunger and illness are part of everyday conversation and reflects the ongoing situation in a number of households. In addition to being low, household budgets are vulnerable to unexpected fluctuations, either of income, or of expenditure, as people seldom have much money in reserve. While migrant remittances provide a greater proportion of household income than pensions, remittances are less predictable, both in terms of frequency and amount. This unpredictability is keenly felt by those waiting at home, who have to plan for expenses without knowing when money will be sent, or whether it will be enough. So a woman's son remits "sometimes" or "when he wants to". The husband or son who "thumela qho" (remits regularly), is a prized asset, and is spoken of with pride.

The domestic economy is for many people characterised by uncertainty. Income, crop yields, health and expenditure are seen as largely unpredictable and uncontrollable.

#### CONCLUSION

A number of changes have taken place in Chatha since the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, as a result of Betterment and various other changes in the wider social, political and economic environment of which Chatha is a part. The people of Chatha find themselves in a transformed village environment, over which they now have less control than they had before. While this transformation has benefitted a minority in the village, such as the irrigation settlers and the entrepreneurs, it has left the majority worse-off than before in terms of access to arable land. The re-organisation of their environment has however brought benefits in the form of infrastructural developments in the form of roads, fences, a new school building, an irrigation scheme and (indirectly) a clinic, a bus service and two shops.

While the people have less political power in the sense that they are now subject to a new form of local government as well as to a party political organisation (in addition to the Magistrate), they have an increased economic well-being inasmuch as the real value of

household cash incomes has risen substantially (169%) over the last 30 years. While for many people the domestic economy is still characterised by uncertainty, people are increasingly able to achieve an improved standard of living through the purchase of consumer goods, and through investment in education to prepare their children for a better future.

Some of the social and economic consequences of these changes will be considered in the next three chapters.

CHAPTER SEVENAGRICULTURE

A number of changes relating to agriculture have taken place in Chatha since the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, and most of these can be directly related to the implementation of Betterment. While Betterment was intended to promote agriculture, the situation today is that less people cultivate their fields, and maize yields are lower, than in 1950. This chapter sets out to assess the current agricultural situation in Chatha, and to consider the extent to which it can be related to the implementation of Betterment.

Betterment has divided the inhabitants of Chatha into three groups for agricultural purposes, viz. the households of the irrigation settlers, which each have rights to 1.5 morgen of irrigable land, the dryland households which each have rights to .5 morgen of rain-fed land, and landless households, i.e. those households that have rights to no arable land at all, other than gardens, to which every household has access inasmuch as it has a residential site. All households have rights of access to grazing land, whether they have rights to arable land, or not. It may be argued that natural population increase would of its own accord have led to a rise in the number of landless households, even had Betterment not been implemented. However, the land tenure system introduced by Betterment (which will be discussed in more detail later) has deprived land use patterns of the flexibility they had before Betterment, which provided various ways for landless households to gain access to arable land.

DRYLAND AGRICULTURE: CHANGES IN ACCESS TO RESOURCES SINCE BETTERMENT

Dryland arable holdings are considerably smaller than before Betterment. The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey and the 1958 Government Report differ as to the size of arable holdings before Betterment, giving figures of 2.4 morgen (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 39) and 1.6 morgen (calculated from various figures given in the 1958 Government Report) respectively. Whatever the size of the average arable holding



was before Betterment, it was clearly considerably larger than the average holding of .5 morgen today. This fall in the size of arable allotments results from the fact that the Betterment planners removed 61 per cent of arable land from cultivation as it was judged unsuitable for cultivation, and because space was needed for roads, diversion banks and stream protection (1958 Government Report, p 18-19). Some further land was subsequently withdrawn from cultivation during the actual implementation of Betterment.

Official records relating to the holding of arable and residential allotments are incomplete. These records suggest that while there are a few arable allotments as large as three morgen, a few of one morgen, and a few of .25 morgen, the great majority of allotments (90%) are .5 morgen in extent.

Not only are allotments smaller, but fewer households (in terms of actual numbers) now have access to arable land. Before Betterment, 296 households had access to arable land (1958 Government Report, p 10). Records obtained from the village secretary who was involved in recording land allocations at the time of Betterment, suggest that 245 dryland allotments were finally allocated.

Taken together with the 24 households on the irrigation scheme, this means that about 270 households were allocated land at Betterment. In theory this means that about 26 households lost land as a result of Betterment. However, some young men who did not have arable land before Betterment were allocated land at Betterment, which suggests that before Betterment some allotments had fallen vacant, without being re-allocated. These allotments had probably belonged to households that had left Chatha permanently either before or during Betterment, without transferring their allotments to someone resident in Chatha. Somewhat less than 26 Resident households therefore actually lost land as a result of Betterment, and inquiries in the village suggest that the figure may have been closer to 15. A few of these households have left Chatha, while the rest, who were apparently not compensated for their loss, continue to live in Chatha. Their household size and structure is much the same as other dryland households in Chatha.

A further ten households lost their fields in the late 1970's, as their fields lay in an area which would be submerged by the waters of

a dam which was built below Chatha, and completed in the early 1980's. A piece of land was cleared for these households at the top of a grazing camp, but it has proved unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, and these ten households have effectively been rendered landless. There are now approximately 235 dryland households (58% of all dryland households) with rights to arable land. Taken together with the 24 households on the irrigation scheme, about 260 households (60 per cent) now have arable land in Chatha, whereas before Betterment 90 per cent of households had arable land.

Many people are now living further from their fields than they were before Betterment, when the fields associated with a village-section were generally situated below its residential clusters (or hamlets), stretching down towards the river. The two largest blocks of arable land are about 45 minutes' walk from the middle of the Nyanga residential area. The disruption of the allocation of land along village-section lines, has also meant that many people have new neighbours on their arable allotments. Whereas previously one's neighbours on the lands would be predominantly from one's own village-section, today they could be from anywhere in the village.

Gardens are smaller than before Betterment, when their average size was just under .25 morgen (Mills and Wilson, 1952, p 35). About 60 per cent of the residential allotments in Nyanga and Skafu are .25 morgen in size, while the rest are .125 morgen in size. Gardens vary in size, as the garden forms part of the total residential site, and individual households determine the size of the area they wish to use for housing, and for their gardens. Most gardens are boundary-fenced, to protect crops from stock damage.

The amount of grazing land available has increased slightly, from 3045 morgen (1958 Government Report, p 10) to 3184 morgen, which has been divided into eight grazing camps totalling 3004 morgen set aside for use by dryland households, and four grazing camps totalling 180 morgen set aside for use by the irrigation settlers (*ibid*, p 24). In practice, the distinction between the dryland and the irrigation camps is not strictly observed, and particularly in dry years, people from both parts of the community graze their cattle in the same camps. Grazing camps are boundary fenced, and operated on a rotational basis. This rotational grazing policy is enforced with varying degrees of

success by a grazing ranger, who impounds cattle caught grazing in closed camps. The owners of such cattle are fined, and the proceeds go into a fund controlled by the headman's council, for use by the primary school committee.

The old principle whereby grazing was run on a village-section basis, and whereby "the cattle knew where to go to graze", has thus fallen away. Today, cattle from any part of the village graze in any open camp.

Dipping records suggested that in 1980 (i.e. before the severe drought of 1982/83 which killed many animals) there were 1124 cattle, 839 sheep and 480 goats in Chatha. At a rate of five head of small stock equalling one cattle-unit (which was the rate used by the 1958 Government Report), there were 1388 cattle units grazing on 3184 morgen of land in 1980. This means that each cattle-unit had 2.3 morgen of grazing land in 1980.

If we take the figures of the 1958 Government Report as an indication of the state of affairs before Betterment (even though it has been argued that these figures are problematic), then the general agricultural welfare of dryland households in 1958 and 1981 may be compared as follows:

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1981</u>
Land under Cultivation	495 morgen	±130 morgen
Average Arable Holding	1.6 morgen	.5 morgen
Families Without Arable Holdings	10%	about 42%
Average Garden Size	.25 morgen	less than .25 morgen
Families Without Gardens	potentially 0	potentially 0
Cattle-Units	1600	1388
Grazing per Cattle-Unit	1.8 morgen	2.3 morgen
Families Without Stock	5%	23%
Families Without Land or Stock	5%	14%

Compared with 1958, the dryland households are

- 1) Worse-off in terms of the size of arable allotments and gardens.
- 2) Worse-off in terms of total number of cattle-units.
- 3) Better-off in terms of the amount of grazing available per cattle-unit.
- 4) Worse-off as a group. Today there are more families without arable land, without stock, or without either, than in 1958.

These statistics relating to the distribution of resources, do not however tell us about the quality of resources such as arable and grazing land. A survey of the quality of the vegetation in the grazing camps, as well as of the soil in arable and other areas was conducted early in 1983 - at the height of a very severe drought. The survey's conclusion was as follows: "Both the vegetation and the soil indicate that most of the land available to the villagers has been seriously misused. A combination of overgrazing and other poor management techniques have resulted in vegetation that is very unproductive, and soils that are deficient and extremely susceptible to drastic erosion. However, with appropriate techniques, the existing macchia and grassland areas could undoubtedly be rehabilitated, and could provide good grazing land. Such grassland could also be maintained by correct management with appropriate stocking rates" (Phillipson and Furness, in de Wet and Mc Allister 1983, pp 98-99).

The fact that households have less arable land available to them, is directly related to the implementation of Betterment. Not only did Betterment make for a clear separation between arable and grazing land (so that conversion from one to the other was no longer possible), it actually took about 60 per cent of existing arable land out of cultivation.

The fact that four times as many households are landless as was the case before Betterment, must be attributed to natural population increase as well as to Betterment. Even without Betterment, the incidence of landlessness would have risen as a result of population growth. (It was argued in Chapter Four that the registration of fields, together with the fact that population increase had already led to substantial subdivision of fields, which meant that fields had become too small to subdivide further, had the result that by the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, subdivision of fields had effectively ceased in Chatha). However, Betterment has deprived existing patterns of land-use of their flexibility which allowed them to accommodate landlessness to some extent. The fencing off of arable from grazing areas, precludes encroachment on grazing land, and post-Betterment arable holdings are too small to make sharecropping viable. There are now 235 arable allotments, and unless some grazing land is officially or unofficially converted into arable land, the number, and



percentage of landless households can only grow with time.

The decline in the number of cattle-units, and the corresponding increase in the amount of grazing available per cattle-unit, are not related to the re-organisation of the village resulting from Betterment. Rather, they relate primarily to variations in rainfall and grazing control, which are reflected in the types and amount of grass available to animals. The drought of 1982/83 killed a large number of animals in Chatha. Dipping records for 1984 suggest that there are 551 cattle, 713 sheep and 717 goats in Chatha - giving a total of 837 cattle-units, each with access to 3.8 morgen of grazing. Household herds have shrunk in size in comparison with 1980, and a number of households have lost all their stock.

The poor quality of the soil may be more directly ascribed to the implementation of Betterment than the poor quality of the vegetation in the grazing camps. The fact that arable holdings are now much smaller, means that those that are regularly cultivated, are more intensely cultivated than before, and that the soil becomes progressively poorer as it is rested less frequently. This deterioration is hastened by the fact that people plant the same crops (maize, plus potatoes or beans) year after year, and by the fact that people do not use fertilizer.

The poor quality of the vegetation is due largely to a "combination of overgrazing and other poor management techniques" (Phillipson and Furness, in de Wet and Mc Allister, 1983, p 98).

A programme designed to eradicate macchia and to re-establish and maintain grasses was applied to Chatha grazing camps between 1967 and 1975. While it "gave promising initial results...(it) was discontinued due to administrative problems", and the macchia has re-established itself (ibid, p 96). In addition to the discontinuing of this programme, grazing management from within Chatha itself has not been very effective, with people cutting fences and damaging gates to enable them to graze their stock in camps which, in terms of the rotational grazing plan, have been officially closed. During times of drought, the idea of camp rotation appears to be dropped, with all camps being thrown open.

Betterment was designed not only to re-organise a village like Chatha along more economically productive and conservationist lines of

land use, but also to provide the necessary agricultural extension services to back up that new pattern of land use. The quality of the soil and the vegetation remains poor, largely as a result of poor land use, which could have been avoided had the necessary extension services been available. To blame Betterment for not providing those services is to blame it not for what it did (re-organise the village), but for what it did not do, i.e. for its incomplete implementation. Inasmuch as Betterment created a new land use pattern, for which it could not provide the necessary back-up services, Betterment, together with the unwillingness of a number of Chatha's people to respect the new land use pattern, must share the blame for the poor state of the soil and vegetation in Chatha.

The conditions of access to physical resources such as arable and grazing land has also changed. With Betterment, the number of arable allotments was finally determined, and arable areas clearly separated from grazing and residential areas. It was therefore no longer possible for arable lands to revert to commonage, or for commonage to be converted into arable land. Betterment has deprived the land use system of its flexibility, not only in terms of conversion between commonage and arable land, but also in terms of informal subdivision or consolidation of holdings. Arable land is no longer transferrable laterally between kinsmen, but in effect inheritable only within the household. Arable allotments are now effectively passed from a man through his widow to his (usually eldest) son, and are not divisible, so that only one son can inherit land. The other brothers will not inherit any arable land, and if they secure their own residential site in Chatha, will add to the ever-growing number of landless households in Chatha.

Some examples of this process may be given:

- a) Nonasi, a widow, died and her field was transferred to her son Mzonke, whose brother Vuyisile has his own homestead, but no field.
- b) Nopassage, a widow, died, and her field was transferred to her eldest son, Malusi. Two of Malusi's brothers were allocated fields at Betterment, while a third brother has the use of a field belonging to a widow with no sons, and his fourth brother has his own homestead, without a field.
- c) Madoda died, and his field was transferred to his son Phakamile,

whose three brothers have their own homesteads, but without fields.

d) Zolile was allocated a field at Betterment. He then decided to join the irrigation scheme, and transferred his field to his son Malayisha, whose two brothers are now no longer living in Chatha.

As noted in Chapter Six, a number of men have left Chatha permanently since Betterment was introduced. Since this pattern of permanent emigration was established before Betterment, and since the laws governing the movement of Black people from areas like the Ciskei to cities like Johannesburg and Cape Town have become stricter during the two decades since Betterment, it is not possible to say to what extent this emigration is related to Betterment.

The headman's meeting no longer has any role to play in the allocation of land. In the words of a former headman, "When a man dies, his wife signs for the field. When the wife dies, the son will sign for the field. The approval of the village meeting is not necessary. When I'm dead, my wife will go to the headman and say 'headman, go and change this site to my name', and she will go to the Magistrate with him. The meeting has no role to play...it's not discussed at a meeting".

If however a landowner was to die, leaving no surviving spouse or child or child's widow, (i.e. if a household was to terminate completely with the landowner's death), the allotment would come up for reallocation at a meeting of the headman's council, where it would be discussed and reallocated. Of the 39 cases of transfer of arable allotments listed in the official records, all have been transmitted within the household as follows

to a man's widow	21 cases
to a son from his father	8 cases
to a son from his mother	7 cases
to the wife of a dead son from his mother	<u>3 cases</u>
	<u>39 cases</u>

Up to 1980, the dryland households enjoyed very little by way of agricultural extension services. The agricultural officer in the village was attached to the irrigation scheme, and if he or she was so inclined, could provide the drylanders with assistance after he had seen to his duties and the settler's needs on the irrigation scheme.

Therefore, to the extent that drylanders had access to government-subsidised tractors, or seed, fertilizer and insecticide, it was through the good offices of the irrigation scheme's agricultural officer, and after the needs of the settlers had been served. An attempt by some drylanders to start their own co-operative society to organise supplies from government sources did not get off the ground, due to a lack of adequate financing and organisation. Other than the programme to improve the grazing camps discussed earlier and the presence of a full-time grazing ranger, the drylanders have enjoyed little by way of extension services in the years following Betterment.

Since 1981, the Ciskei government has managed to provide a considerably improved extension service. Chatha as a village (i.e. drylanders and irrigation settlers) now share an agricultural extension officer with the neighbouring village of Mnyameni. People are able to hire tractors and to purchase controlled packages of seed, fertilizer and insecticide from the Ciskei Department of Agriculture, on credit. To have half a morgen ploughed and planted, together with the necessary maize and vegetable seed, cost about R60-00 in 1981. This improved extension service appears to be linked directly to the coming of Ciskeian independence from South Africa, and to the Ciskei government's decision to commit itself to agricultural development at the level of small-scale, dryland operations, moving away somewhat from the policy of committing agricultural funds largely to capital-intensive irrigation projects. As such, it has come about independently of Betterment.

The agricultural changes that have come about in Chatha since the mid-1960's (i.e. when Betterment was implemented) can largely be ascribed to the consequences of Betterment. The actual re-organisation and redistribution of physical resources such as arable land, gardens and grazing land constitute the major changes, and are directly the result of Betterment. The inadequate management of these resources and the lack of provision of adequate extension services to utilise these resources do not amount to major changes as such, as they largely reflect the situation before Betterment. It is only in the last few years that any significant changes in the provision of extension services has taken place.



DRYLAND AGRICULTURE: ACTIVITIES AND YIELDS

Arable allotments are effectively only cultivated during the summer months, i.e. after it has rained any time after September or October. By far the most frequently cultivated crop is maize. Some households will cultivate only maize, while others will plant vegetables such as beans, potatoes, pumpkins and melons in between the rows of maize. As plants begin to emerge, people will spend time in the fields, hoeing and weeding until crops are ready to harvest. Vegetables are ready to harvest from six weeks to two months after planting. Maize is usually harvested from April onwards, through to June, although people may pick green maize from February onwards.

After maize has been harvested, the villager's cattle are turned loose in the fields to graze on the maize stalks before returning to the grazing camps. This effectively precludes winter cultivation, except in the gardens. Activity in the fields during the winter months is largely confined to people ploughing in the remaining maize stalks, and so turning the soil over.

Labour for cultivation is obtained from one's own household, and supplemented by assistance from relatives and friends. As will be shown later, there is a high degree of dependence on labour obtained from outside the household. Ploughing is done either with cattle, or by tractor. Again, there is a high degree of dependence on cattle obtained from outside the household.

Where ploughing is done by tractor, people may hire them from either the Ciskei Government, or from private sources. The Ciskei Government provides the tractors, together with drivers and planting machines at subsidised rates (at a cost of R16-25 to plough and plant half a morgen in 1981). This service is however subject to availability, and when the tractors are late in arriving, people may turn to private owners, or to oxen. Where ploughing is done with cattle, men and schoolboys do the actual ploughing. An adult male, or older teenager will usually hold the plough, while the span of oxen may be led and helped on by one or two men, or schoolboys. Sowing involves walking behind the plough, and sowing seed in the open furrow. This may be done by anyone, male or female. The furrow is closed by the action of the ploughshare in ploughing the next furrow.

Alternatively, seed may be mixed with manure in a cultivator, which is then pulled behind the plough.

Hoeing is usually done by women, although men who are at home over the summer holiday period, may assist their womenfolk. Reaping is usually done by available members of the household, and the crops may be carried home in bags on top of the head, or carried on a sled drawn by cattle.

Other than the hiring of tractors (and much more rarely, cattle) and the buying of seed when seed from previous seasons is depleted, there is little cash investment in agriculture. Only a few farmers have fenced off their fields, and until the Government credit scheme started, little use had been made of purchased fertilizer or insecticide. There appears to be little formal remuneration in cash or kind for assistance offered in terms of labour or cattle. Such assistance is repaid through reciprocal favours, in both agricultural and other matters.

Decisions relating to cultivation (e.g. whether or not to cultivate this year, whether to use a tractor or oxen, what to plant, whether to buy seed or use old seed) are overwhelmingly taken by the effective head of a household, i.e. the adult at home who is in charge of the household (e.g. a migrant's wife). The majority of these effective heads of household are women.

Yields are difficult to measure, but in 1981/82, the average maize yield reported per half morgen allotment was between three and a half and four bags of maize on the cob, which converts to roughly one and three quarter 200 lb. bags of maize off the cob. This figure includes households that cultivated and received no yield, and does not take into account the eating of green maize before harvesting. Yields varied from less than half a bag to a claimed 20 bags on the cob (although this last claim seems unrealistically high). About 40 per cent of households reported yields of two bags or less (on the cob), while about the same percentage reported yields of between four and five bags (on the cob). Converted to morgen lots, the average maize yield would be between three and a half and four bags of maize (off the cob) per morgen, which is nearly two bags less than the figure of roughly five and a half bags reported for the 1949/1950 season (Houghton and Walton, 1952, p 162). It is not possible to get any

detailed estimates of vegetable yields, as people take vegetables intermittently from their fields. However calculated, the produce gained from the arable allotments is not nearly adequate for subsistence purposes. These low yields, together with various other factors (to be discussed presently) give rise to the fact that in successive years, up to half of the arable allotments lie uncultivated.

Gardens are much more frequently, and more intensively cultivated. Maize again is grown in almost all gardens, together with a wide range of vegetables such as beans, potatoes, pumpkins, melons, beetroot, spinach, carrots and peas. Tobacco is also grown in a number of gardens. Conditions relating to labour, traction, investment, etc are much the same as in the arable allotments. The average yield of maize is 1.2 bags of maize on the cob. The garden does however make a significant contribution to household diet in the form of vegetables, which are grown all year round. Gardens are usually fenced off and are close to the house, and so are relatively safe from the predations of stock or thieves. Being closer to home and smaller than fields, gardens are more easily worked. Accordingly, in December 1981, 112 out of 120 gardens surveyed were cultivated.

In addition to arable allotments and fields women may gain access to a patch in a Zenzele (literally "do it yourself") garden. There are two Zenzele gardens in Chatha, each fenced off and each within less than 100 yards of a nearby stream. A patch is usually about two paces square. Both Zenzele gardens are fully occupied at the moment, but a woman may join if a vacancy arises. An annual subscription of R1-00 per year is payable, and membership is open to any women of the community, whether her household has an arable allotment or not. Because of their size Zenzele plots do not need to be ploughed, and can be easily handled by one woman. Zenzele gardens are well cultivated, and provide a woman with the time or energy with the opportunity to undertake some extra cultivation (in addition to her household's garden and possible field), with the benefit of water close by. During 1984, a piece of land in one of the grazing camps was ploughed up to start a community garden where people would pay a fee for the right to cultivate part of that piece of land, and where the produce would be sold, and the profits shared among the

participants. It is not clear exactly how this co-operative venture will be organised.

Cultivation in Chatha does not provide drylanders with anything like their subsistence requirements, and the bulk of each household's food requirements is bought at shops. How long people's maize yields serve them depends on whether (as a number of households do) they feed their reaped maize to their pigs and chickens, and buy samp at the shops. Some households which reaped six or more bags of maize on the cob in mid-1984 still had maize over by November 1984, while others which reaped four bags had used their maize by September. However, as people buy samp as well as crush and eat their own maize, and also feed it to their pigs and chickens, the period of time they take to use their maize does not by itself tell us much about its contribution to their subsistence - except that, with very few exceptions, it is essentially supplementary to their main source of food, viz. their cash income.

Stock farming likewise makes a limited contribution to subsistence, largely because stock holdings are so small. Stock holdings in 1981 (calculated from a 1 in 5 survey of dryland households) were as follows:

<u>Type of Stock</u>	<u>Percentage of Stock-Holding Households</u>	<u>Number of Animals per Stock-Holding Household</u>
Cattle	66%	4
Sheep	31%	6
Goats	34%	4.5

Twenty-three per cent of surveyed households had no stock at all in 1981. After the drought of 1982/1983, that figure is likely to be much higher, and stock-holdings much lower.

Cattle and small stock are grazed in the new camps. Cattle are generally left in the camps, being brought down to be dipped every fortnight, while small stock are brought home on a daily basis. Herding is undertaken by whatever male is available, and retired men, children home from school, unemployed young men, or next door neighbours, may take the animals to pasture.

Cattle and small stock are usually slaughtered only on ceremonial or ritual occasions, and so provide only a sporadic source of meat.



Some of these occasions are more private and some more public than others, and so will involve varying attendance. Bigalke (1969, p 105) recorded 58 slaughtering in Tshaba Location in the East London District during a 22 month period from 1967 to 1969. Thirty-two of these involved a goat and 26 an ox. Some of the ceremonials he recorded however no longer happen in Chatha, and a large number of those involving the sacrifice of a goat are more private in nature. If the 26 sacrifices involving an ox are taken as more public in regard to the distribution of the meat, this would mean that meat would be available to adults and to some children in the location about once a month. I do not have comparable data for Chatha, but the idea of a public feast about once a month on average does not seem unreasonable, with supplementary private feasts adding a less regular supply of meat. Poultry and pigs also provide an occasional source of meat, with poultry also supplying eggs. As poultry and pigs live largely off scraps around the house, they are not as vulnerable as cattle and small stock to the ravages of drought.

Informants' comments suggest that milking of cattle and small stock is rare, and provides only a very limited source of milk. Hides of slaughtered animals are kept, and used for mats, thongs, whips, etc. Only a very limited sale of stock appears to take place. Stock sold at stock sales during the 1979/1980 agricultural year totalled 46 large stock units for the whole Keiskammahoek District and 70 large stock and three small stock for the Keiskammahoek Township (Ciskei Government 1980, Appendix, Table 15). During the drought of 1982/83/84, sales rocketed as people got rid of stock before they died (Ciskei Government 1983, p 8; 1984, p 11), with five and a half thousand cattle being sold in the Ciskei during the 1982-1984 period. In the 1984/85 year, sales slumped to 12 cattle units for the Keiskammahoek District, as a result of the devastating losses incurred during the drought (Ciskei Government, 1985, p 18-19). In normal years stock sales are low (Steyn 1982, p 16 quotes a cattle-selling rate of two per cent for the Ciskei as a whole), as people cannot afford the risk of selling what limited stock they do have, as they may need them for traction, or for unexpected social or ritual purposes.

All in all, livestock farming provides only a limited contribution to people's income, whether in cash or in kind. Extension services related to livestock do not extend much beyond the compulsory fortnightly dipping of cattle and small stock, and the presence of a grazing ranger to supervise the maintenance of rotational grazing in the camps.

#### DRYLAND AGRICULTURE: THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CULTIVATION

It is thus clear that agriculture provides at best only a supplementary source of subsistence, and that people are overwhelmingly dependent upon money coming into the community in the form of salaries, remittances and pensions in order to be able to buy the bulk of their food. If agricultural activities produce so little, it may well be asked why people persist with them.

Stock, as a means of communicating with the ancestors, and of meeting social obligations of hospitality as an occasional source of food, as a source of status, and (in the case of cattle) a source of traction, have a value of their own. Moreover, they require relatively little labour to maintain, and in good years, one's herd may grow. Keeping livestock may therefore be seen as a sensible investment.

With regard to cultivation, it is not so clear that the energy and the expense involved are well invested. During the 1980/1981 agricultural year, which was not an unduly dry year, just less than half of the arable allotments in Chatha were cultivated. This contrasts sharply with the 1949/1950 year, when all the fields sampled in the Keiskammahoeck Rural Survey were cultivated, at least in part (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 162). People in Chatha in 1980/1981 clearly saw cultivation as a much less worthwhile investment than they did in 1949/1950.

A number of constraints operating on effective cultivation have been identified throughout Southern Africa (de Wet 1985 for the Ciskei, Lenta 1985 for Kwa Zulu, Wallman 1969 for Lesotho, Weinrich 1975 for what was then Rhodesia, Westcott 1977 for the Transkei). These constraints include a) a shortage, at the household level, of the labour necessary to cultivate effectively, due to the high

incidence of labour migration and of school-going teenagers b) a shortage of traction, due to a shortage of cattle, or the limited availability of tractors, or the lack of money to hire cattle or tractors c) a lack of equipment, such as ploughs, fences, etc. d) a shortage of effective extension services to provide people with access to tractors, seed, fertilizer, insecticide, advice and motivation e) a lack of money and of a predictable income, due to poor wages and low and unpredictable remittances, to enable people to afford access to the above necessities f) a lack of accessible market outlets, to motivate people to produce cash crops, such as vegetables or tobacco, and to provide people with an additional source of income g) the unpredictability of rain. Drought decimates yields and either weakens or kills cattle needed for traction purposes. The above shortages and uncertainties affect some households more severely than others, depending on their relative demographic and economic positions.

While the impact of these constraints cannot be denied, it must be remembered that they also applied in 1949/1950, when 100 per cent of sampled fields were cultivated, and that some of them were identified during the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (Houghton and Walton 1952, p 154-157). In spite of these constraints people still cultivated their lands, pooling resources and labour, or repaying assistance with part of the crop. Today many people do not see it as worth their while to pool their assets and cultivate, and many fields lie unused.

There appear to be various reasons for this withdrawal from cultivation. While yields were low during the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, fields were on average nearly five times as large as they are today. Hard work in the fields provided a more worthwhile yield, which was also large enough for people to pool resources, or to make sharecropping or payment in kind a feasible proposal. If you ask people why they do not sharecrop today, their answer is usually very simple, to the effect the arable holdings are too small to make it worthwhile.

I was able to trace seven cases of sharecropping between dryland households during the 1980/1981 season, and three cases during the 1981/1982 season. While there may have been other cases, the incidence of sharecropping is clearly down from the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, when 11 per cent of households had been

involved in sharecropping arrangements during the 1949/1950 season. The desirability of gaining access to land on the irrigation scheme is another matter, and during the 1981/1982 season, ten dryland households, most of them landless, gained access by means of sharecropping, or hiring, to plots belonging to eight of the 24 irrigation settlers. By the same token, yields on .5 morgen lots are too small to justify payment in kind (in crops). These low yields are also too small to justify people investing in agriculture as readily as they did in the past.

In an important sense, people are not as dependent on agriculture as they were in the past. As we saw in Chapter Six, the real value of the average household income has risen by 169 per cent from the period of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey to 1981, and today agriculture contributes a much smaller proportion of a household's overall annual income, which is made up overwhelmingly of cash. Although they would be classified as poor by any South African poverty-datum-line test, people are mostly able to survive without the low yields provided by cultivation.

Whereas before Betterment, everybody cultivated on an equal footing, today the people on the irrigation scheme are clearly cultivating under more favourable conditions than the drylanders. They have access to level, irrigated land, to tractors, to extension services - facilities which drylanders also want. People tend to look to the government to provide them with these services, arguing that they are too poor to be able to afford them. It seems that the irrigation scheme has provided them with an image of agriculture as a relatively easy, government-supported activity. Thus, when I have asked people what, if anything, they need to cultivate well, they often answer in terms of government support, that they need tractors, or seed and fertilizer, or for the government to fix the fence between a grazing camp of an adjacent village and a large block of fields. When I have asked people why, if they haven't got oxen or can't afford to hire a tractor, they don't cultivate by hand with a spade, they have reacted as if that was unthinkable: "never" - "how can we cultivate by hand when it is so hot?" - "fields are too big to cultivate by hand" - "people can die like that". One old man of 75 years, who usually actively cultivates his garden, commented that



people were too lazy to cultivate their fields by hand. "People are blockheaded - even though they are hungry, they are still lazy".

People bemoan their lot with regard to cultivation, giving reasons such as the following for not cultivating:

"I had no one to work the field".

"I had oxen, but no one to plough".

"I had no cattle to plough".

"My cattle were too thin to plough".

"The ground was too hard to plough - even for the tractor".

"The tractors were late".

"The tractors were busy".

"I had no money to hire labour".

"I had no money to hire the tractor".

"I had no money to buy seed".

"The fences are broken, so the cattle eat the crops".

While these complaints are genuine enough, they may also involve a degree of rationalisation of the fact that people are not prepared to make the effort to cultivate - perhaps principally because their higher real incomes mean that they do not have to cultivate to survive. On the other hand many of the heads of households in Chatha are elderly widows, some of whom have tuberculosis, and whose household consists of a migrant son, a daughter-in-law who must keep house, and grandchildren who are at school throughout the week. It is not every household that has members with the physical strength or time (except at weekends) to take a spade and turn over half a morgen of soil.

Cultivation is a demanding business, in terms of time, energy and money. Given that many people do not really have to cultivate and given the low returns they get when they do, it is not surprising that when conditions (such as rain, remittances, family at home, tractors arriving on time) are not favourable, they do not cultivate their fields.

The situation is different with regard to gardens, which most people cultivate. Gardens are smaller than fields, are as a rule fenced in, are situated in one's residential site, and are in full view of neighbours and other members of the community. The incentives, and the social pressures to cultivate one's garden, are

greater than in the case of one's field. People do not have to walk long distances to their gardens, and can spend time in their gardens between other domestic chores. Being fenced in, gardens are relatively secure against stock and to some degree against theft in a village where one's actions are more publicly observable than at the fields. The costs of cultivating gardens is less than fields, as gardens are smaller. Although people try to cultivate their gardens with ox-drawn ploughs or tractors, a number of households do cultivate by hand.

The fact that people plant a diversity of vegetables in their gardens, and cultivate them throughout the year, provides a fairly steady and more directly observable and controllable supply of food, than fields. Although more private than fields, in the sense of being part of the homestead site, gardens are for that very reason also more publicly on show, and one's achievements and activity (or lack thereof) more readily observable.

#### PATTERNS OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN DRYLAND HOUSEHOLDS

Before Betterment, people co-operated predominantly with people from their own village-section in order to obtain the labour necessary to cultivate their fields. While in the majority of cases (71%), assistance was received from relatives, agnates were involved in only 42 per cent of cases. So the high percentage of cases of assistance (79%) from people of the same village-section cannot be explained in terms of the fact that agnates generally lived in the same village-section. Assistance was also received from affines and non-relatives, many of whom were from the same village-section. Bonds of neighbourhood and political co-operation as well as consideration of practicality made for a cohesiveness between members of a village-section, which expressed itself in patterns of agricultural co-operation (see Chapter Four pp 155-157).

It will now be considered to what extent the disruption of old residential and territorial patterns and the formation of new residential and neighbourhood patterns are reflected in current patterns of agricultural co-operation. During the 1981/1982 season, a considerable number of fields were not cultivated, and of those that

were, nearly half (48% in my sample of 94 dryland households) were ploughed by tractor. To get a more representative picture, patterns of co-operation were monitored in gardens as well as in fields. (This does not give a distorted picture, as in almost all cases where people cultivated both fields and gardens, they used the same labour in both cases). In the sample of 94 households, 20 supplied all their own labour needs, while the other 74 entered into co-operative arrangements with members of 116 other households. Of these, only a handful were paid in cash as hired labour, and patterns of agricultural co-operation seem best explained in terms of wider loyalties and reciprocities, relating to criteria such as kinship, territory and friendship.

After these relationships have been analysed in terms of such criteria, the way in which the people themselves view these relationships in which they are involved, will be considered.

These relationships may firstly be considered in terms of the criterion of former village-section membership, and are represented in tabular form, as follows:

<u>Affiliation to Former Village-Section</u>	<u>Number</u>
Help received from household of same former village-section	76 (66%)
Help received from household of other former village-section	35 (30%)
Help received from household of unspecified former village-section	3 ( 3%)
Help received from household of another village	<u>2 ( 2%)</u>
	<u>116</u>

Compared to the pre-Betterment situation, there is a decrease in the recruitment of help from one's own former village-section (although it still accounts for two-thirds of cases) and an increase in help from other former village-sections. This is not surprising if we consider that members of one's former village-section are now scattered throughout the new residential areas. In these circumstances, the tie shows a remarkable tenacity.

Perhaps the explanation for these enduring ties is to be found in the nature of the kinship relations between co-operating households.

For the purposes of delineating categories of kinship, I have taken the relationship between two co-operating households as that between the two male heads of household (whether currently dead or alive). If an unmarried woman is living in a homestead where she is clearly the senior adult, she has been reckoned as the head of that household. While many households are headed by women, either de jure as widows, or de facto as the wives of absent migrants, their social identity is reckoned in the village in terms of the household and lineage into which they have married, and their rights to arable land are reckoned in terms of their relationship to their husband's household. Households are thus socially and legally defined in terms of their male head - whether he be dead or alive.

I have further distinguished between relationships of close and distant consanguinity, and close and distant affinity, calculating the degree of relatedness as follows:

- a) a relationship between two households is one of "close" consanguinity if it is between the household of a man (or his widow), and that headed by his father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter (if his sister or daughter is unmarried) i.e. his first degree kinsfolk
- b) all other relationships of consanguinity between households are "distant"
- c) a relationship between two households is one of "close" affinity if it is between the household of a man (or his widow) and that headed by his wife's father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter (i.e. if his wife's sister or daughter is unmarried), or that headed by the husband of his sister, daughter or mother (i.e., where his mother is married to a man who is not his father)
- d) all other relationships of affinity between households are "distant".

These distinctions are made for analytical purposes, and are not necessarily shared by the people of Chatha. People definitely do distinguish between kin and non-kin, and distinguish between first degree kin and other kin, although categories tend to be used in general, i.e. classificatory-type terms. As one old man remarked:



"Nowadays, nobody is not related to the other person - so I can't say we are not related (i.e. he and the person about whom he and I were talking) - let me say we are not related".

Definition of the relationship between households in terms of the relationship between their male heads, means that the ambiguity of certain relationships, which have both consanguineal and affinal characteristics, is overlooked. Let us assume that A's sister B is married to C, and that her son D helps A to cultivate his field. At the personal level, the relationship between A and D is consanguineal (A is D's mother's brother). At the household level, the relationship is however one of affinity. Because of the fact that a woman and her children are socially and legally identified with her husband's household, I have elected to portray relationships at the household level.

The relationships of co-operation in ploughing and planting may thus be portrayed in terms of kinship, as follows:

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Same Former</u> <u>Village-</u> <u>Section</u>	<u>Other Former</u> <u>Village-</u> <u>Section</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>Unspecified</u> <u>Former</u> <u>Village-</u> <u>Section</u>	<u>Total</u>
Close				
Consanguines	24	0	0	24 (21%)
Distant				
Consanguines <sup>2</sup>	19	1	0	20 (17%)
Close Affines	5	14	0	19 (16%)
Distant Affines	19	8	0	27 (23%)
Non-Relatives	8	10	0	18 (16%)
Unspecified	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8 ( 7%)</u>
	<u>76 (66%)</u>	<u>37 (32%)</u>	<u>3 (3%)</u>	<u>116</u>

1) including 2 cases from other villages

2) all "distant consanguines" in this sample are agnates, i.e. either lineage members (18 of 20 cases) or clansmen (2 of 20 cases).

Help was received fairly equally from consanguines (38%) and from affines (39%), and from close relatives (37%) and distant relatives

(40%). The overall percentage of cases receiving assistance from kinsmen (77%) has risen in comparison with the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey figure of 71 per cent (Wilson et al 1952, p 69), with less help being received from non-relatives.

Whereas kinship ties would explain co-operation with people of one's former village-section in the case of agnates (since agnates usually were of the same village-section), this is not necessarily the case with affines and non-relatives.

It is possible that people co-operate with households that live close to each other in the new residential areas, and that the high coincidence of co-operation with kinsmen and former village-section members could be best explained in terms of the convenience of residential proximity and newly developing ties of neighbourhood.

I have distinguished between households which are close together, a medium distance apart, or far apart. Again these are my categorisations, designed to take account of the lay-out of the new residential areas. Households have been taken as

- a) "close" together if their homesteads are up to seven homesteads apart, i.e. if they are within the same street. Homesteads which face on to different roads, but which abut onto each other, (so that e.g. my garden at the back of my site looks into your garden at the back of your site) have also been taken as being close together. People's perception of "who are my neighbours?" is more localised than this measurement. They identified people not more than four homesteads away and in most cases, closer
- b) a "medium distance" apart if they are up to half way across the same residential area apart, i.e. up to ten minute's walk apart
- c) "distant" if they are situated further apart.

The 109 relationships of co-operation for which proximity was established may be classified as follows:

<u>Distance</u>	<u>Same Former Village section</u>	<u>Other Former Village section</u>	<u>Total</u>
Close	19	15	34 (31%)
Medium	43	10	53 (49%)
Far	<u>11</u>	<u>11*</u>	<u>22 (20%)</u>
	<u>73 (67%)</u>	<u>36 (33%)</u>	<u>109</u>

\* including 2 cases from other villages

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Close Distance</u>	<u>Medium Distance</u>	<u>Far Distance</u>	<u>Total</u>
Close Consanguines	8	13	3	24 (22%)
Distant Consanguines	3	12	3	18 (16%)
Close Affines	4	8	7	19 (17%)
Distant Affines	10	11	5	26 (24%)
Non-Relatives	9	8	1	18 (16%)
Unspecified	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4 ( 4%)</u>
	<u>34 (31%)</u>	<u>53 (49%)</u>	<u>22 (20%)</u>	<u>109</u>

While relationships of agricultural co-operation clearly cannot be separated from fairly common-sense economic questions such as whether my neighbour or my father possesses oxen, or a ploughshare, or has people able to undertake agricultural labour in his homestead, some distinct patterns of co-operation emerge from the sample, which seem to override factors such as the chance distribution of economic resources. Something like four-fifths of these relationships are with kinsmen, two-thirds are with former village-section members, while just less than one-third are with households within a distance of seven homesteads of each other.

Seen from the perspective of an outsider, it seems clear that patterns of agricultural co-operation are not predicated upon the criterion of proximity in the new residential areas, and that people prefer the known and trusted ties of village-section and kinship. The rise of instances involving kin indicates that the strategic value of kinship has shifted with the changing context. Within the old village-sections, one had ties with neighbours who were not

necessarily kinsmen, and so various trustworthy options were open. In the new residential areas neighbourhood is still an unproven asset, so people tend to utilise kinship as a resource.

While the residential relocation brought about by Betterment has in one sense put pressure on patterns of association based on old residential and territorial groupings, it has in another sense facilitated the maintenance of those relationships by bringing people closer together in the concentrated new residential areas. The area of the new Nyanga residential area takes up only a part of the area taken up by the old Nyanga village-section. In many cases, one's former village-section mates are not significantly further away in the new residential areas, than they were before Betterment. The current heads of households have formed their network of relationships in the context of the old village-sections, and unless Betterment places any real burden on the maintenance of those relationships (which it does not), there is no clear reason why people should not adhere to tried and trusted friends, merely because they now have new neighbours.

As in 1949, there is little hiring of oxen for ploughing. People who do not plough with tractors, either borrow cattle or plough in companies. During the 1981/1982 season 47 households (in the sample of 94 dryland households) pooled their cattle with other households in a company (6 instances), hired cattle (2 instances), or borrowed cattle (39 instances). The 49 relationships involved between the 47 co-operating households may be portrayed as follows:

<u>Nature of Relationship</u>	<u>Same Former</u> <u>Village-section</u>	<u>Other Former</u> <u>Village Section</u>	<u>Total</u>
Close Consanguines	12	0	12 (26%)
Distant Consanguines	1	1	2 ( 4%)
Close Affines	2	7	9 (20%)
Distant Affines	8	9	17 (37%)
Non-Relatives	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6 (13%)</u>
	<u>25 (54%)</u>	<u>21 (46%)</u>	<u>46</u>

(3 relationships were not identifiable)

Here again there is a very high reliance on relatives, in 87 per



cent of the cases, with a higher dependence on affines than on consanguines. Help is drawn fairly equally from people of one's own and other former village-sections.

The relationship between co-operating households may be looked at from the angle of proximity of residence. Forty-two relationships were identified as follows:

<u>Distance</u>	<u>Same Former</u> <u>Village-section</u>		<u>Other Former</u> <u>Village-section</u>	<u>Total</u>
Close	5		10	15 (36%)
Medium	13		4	17 (40%)
Far	<u>4</u>		<u>6</u>	<u>10</u> (24%)
	<u>22</u> (52%)		<u>20</u> (48%)	<u>42</u>
<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Close</u> <u>Distance</u>	<u>Medium</u> <u>Distance</u>	<u>Far</u> <u>Distance</u>	<u>Total</u>
Close Consanguines	2	7	2	11 (26%)
Distant Consanguines	1	1	0	2 ( 5%)
Close Affines	3	3	3	9 (21%)
Distant Affines	5	5	4	14 (33%)
Non-Relatives	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u> (14%)
	<u>15</u> (36%)	<u>17</u> (40%)	<u>10</u> (24%)	<u>42</u>

Proximity of residence is clearly not the major factor in determining from whom one borrows cattle, as only 36% of cases of co-operation are with households close by. As former village-section membership is also not a decisive factor, we must look to kinship relations as the key to the borrowing and sharing of cattle for cultivation.

Given that cattle for ploughing are not in ready supply, households with no cattle or inadequate cattle must look where they can to fill up their ploughing teams. People turn to kinsmen for help, and take whatever kinsmen they can find who have cattle and are willing to lend them. Hence the spread of assistance in terms of agnates and affines, members of one's own and other village-sections, and closeness or

distance of residence. People turn to kinsmen because they are more liable to lend one their cattle than non-kin. The only two cases of hiring of cattle found in the sample, were between non-kin.

As with the recruitment of assistance with ploughing, people continue to utilise pre-Betterment relationships to gain access to cattle in the context of the new residential areas, where most of one's old friends and one's relatives are still within easy walking distance.

Only four cases were found in the sample where labour was hired for assistance with hoeing or harvesting. For the most part households perform these tasks themselves. Overall there appears to be little commercialisation of assistance in the agricultural process. This seems to be the case for a number of reasons: fields and gardens are relatively small, people do not have the money to hire assistance (particularly when returns are very low), and established relationships and patterns of reciprocity exist. Where people do not reciprocate directly with their labour or cattle, they may do so in other non-agricultural ways.

The way in which people conceptualise the nature of their relationship with those households with whom they co-operate, seems directly related to their present, i.e. post-Betterment proximity. Those who live close to such households classify their relationships as one of neighbourhood, and of convenience, whether they are from the same former village-section or not.

Thus I chatted to the wife of an elderly migrant who had cultivated with her next door neighbour, who had come from a different village-section and was not a relative.

Question: So, you are now cultivating together with Vuyisile? (i.e. the neighbour)

Response: Yes.

Question: Why are you now working with him, and not with Khawulela or Sithonga? (i.e. lineal kinsmen of her husband, from the same village-section).

Response: We did not quarrel with them, but we ran short of oxen - some were left with one beast and others with two - so each one combined with the person next to him.

Question: Vuyisile came from Jili village-section, and you came from

Ndela village-section - isn't it important that you should not co-operate with people coming from a different village-section?

Response: No, it is not.

Question: Is the fact that you are not related to each other, not important?

Response: No, it is not important. The only thing is neighbourhood.

Question: But before Betterment, you cultivated with people from your village-section.

Response: Yes, before Betterment I was working with my husband's family, together with Khawulela and Sithonga, because we were all together there.

Similarly, I talked to a man of about 60 years, who had cultivated with his brother from the same village-section, who now lived close to him, and with a distant affine, also from the same village-section, who also now lived close to him.

Question: Do you cultivate with your brother Tolbert?

Response: Yes, when we cultivate, we are together, with oxen, with everything - we are not separate.

Question: But in 1981, you also cultivated with Mbuyiselo (i.e. the distant affine) Have you been ploughing with him for a long time?

Response: Yes, the whole thing.

Question: Why do you prefer to cultivate with him?

Response: It's not that I prefer him - but we are a company.

Question: But why do you form a company with him?

Response: Everybody does work with another person.

Question: Does he live near to you?

Response: Yes...in the next house.

Question: Are you related to Mbuyiselo?

Response: I am not related to Mbuyiselo - we are just neighbours.

Question: Is it not important that he came from isi Xhotyeni (i.e. a small part of Jili village-section, across the river from the main part of Jili) and you from Jili?

Response: Important in what way?

Another elderly man cultivated with a household from his same former village-section, to whom he was distantly related (but said "let me say that we are not related") and who was now his neighbour. When I asked him why he cultivated with that household, his reply was

quite straight-forward: "He has got cattle. That's why I like to cultivate with him".

Whereas people's neighbours may have come from the same village-section, and whereas that was the original basis of their relationship in the new residential areas, the fact that they are now neighbours has become the core of their relationship. The fact that they were from the same village-section, or are related, is now seen by them as secondary. The way in which such neighbours see their relationship has changed over time.

Those people who live further away (i.e. a "medium distance" or "far") see their relationship of co-operation in terms of criteria of kinship and old village-section membership. Thus a man of about 65 cultivated with a distant affine who lives on the irrigation scheme and who came from a different village-section. His wife explained that they co-operated with Zanele (the distant affine, who also supplied the cattle to cultivate their field) "because he is the husband of my mother's sister".

Question: Oh yes, but does he live far away?

Response: Yes, he lives far away.

Question: Is it not better to cultivate with people who stay near to you?

Response: Hm, no, Zanele lives far away.

The wife of a migrant cultivated with her husband's father and with Tana (a non-relative), both from the same village-section, and living a "medium" distance and "far" away respectively.

Question: Why did you cultivate with father Khaya?

Response: He is a family member.

Question: I see. But Tana is not a family member, is he?

Response: No. No he's not a family member.

Question: I see. But why do you cultivate with Tana?

Response: He was our neighbour...there at Jili while we were still there.

An old man cultivated with a friend, who was a distant affine and from the same village-section and who now lives "far" away.

Question: In 1981, you cultivated with Ngenisile Jajana, didn't you?

Response: When I grew up when we were cultivating with Jajana's family.



Question: Why do you cultivate with Ngenisile?

Response: Ngenisile is a child from the family of my grandmother.

Question: But, Ngenisile doesn't live close to you does he?

Response: No, he stays close to me. We were staying close to each other (i.e. in the old village-section).

Question: Where does he stay in relation to you now?

Response: Up over there, at Maseti's place.

Question: But you and Ngenisile both came from (the old village-section of) Nyokane, didn't you?

Response: We were both born there at Nyokane...people who are relatives, are only separated from each other by death.

The idiom of kinship may also be used to embellish a long-standing friendship, formed in this next case in the context of the old village-sections. A man of about 50 years cultivated with a friend from the same part of the same former village-section. For all practical purposes they were unrelated, belonging to clans which could be seen as having distant links in the past. Yet it was in terms of the fact that "he is a relative" in terms of this distant and possibly putative connection, that the co-operation was explained to me.

People who co-operate with other people from the same old village-section may represent the relationship in terms of village-section membership, or of kinship. Often both criteria apply to the relationship, and the examples quoted suggest that in such cases, people tend to emphasise their kinship links. However, this does not invalidate the importance of the old territorial proximity. People had a lot of relatives in other village-sections before Betterment. What is significant is that they formed lasting friendships with those relatives from the same village-section, with whom they were in frequent contact, and that these friendships have not been weakened by the new territorial arrangements resulting from Betterment.

This contrasts with the situation reported by Bigalke, where a few years after Betterment, patterns of agricultural and economic co-operation were centred on the new residential areas (Bigalke 1969, p 10-11). This seems to be related to the fact that new residential areas are far apart, and are situated on "Three of the highest ridges in the location" (ibid, p 8). People are thus further apart from members of their old residential areas than they are in Chatha, and it

would make sense that more local groups would form the basis for economic co-operation.

Bigalke's data is, however, ambiguous. He states that "although co-operative working groups may contain lineage members who live in the same ummango (i.e. ridge), such groups are composed mainly of unrelated people." (ibid, p 24). Yet of 12 cases of co-operation in ploughing for which he gives details, four were with brothers, one with a husband's brother, one with a sister's son, one with a mother's brother's son, one with a lover, and four with neighbours (ibid, p 12). Bigalke adds that in the context of co-operation "kin ties are still a most important integrating factor, since they enter into most relationships. Ties of friendship and neighbourliness play a part, but only within a limited area. As yet, the village is too new a social unit to have fostered the emergence of interaction based chiefly on non-kin ties." (ibid, p 34). This ambiguity makes it difficult to assess the impact of relocation upon patterns of co-operation.

Manona found that in Burnshill in the Keiskammahoek area of the Ciskei (where Betterment was implemented in the 1940s), agricultural and general economic co-operation involved "small groups of people who lived in the same neighbourhood" (Manona 1980, p 120). These groups consisted of relatives as well as non-kin.

I found similar patterns in another area of the Ciskei (the Amatola Basin, where Betterment was implemented in the early 1960s) where I worked briefly in 1981. Two-thirds of cases of agricultural co-operation were between households living within six adjacent homesteads of each other. Co-operation was predominantly with kinsmen (70% of all cases of co-operation), who usually lived in the same neighbourhood (De Wet 1985, p 109-111).

In both Burnshill and the particular part of the Amatola Basin where I worked, Betterment has had little impact on existing neighbourhood patterns, as the existing residential clusters have remained intact, with the more outlying households moving into these clusters. Many households did not have to move at all. As existing neighbourhoods were not significantly transformed (as they were in the case of Chatha), it seems logical that patterns of co-operation should have remained largely unchanged.

James describes two agricultural schemes which were implemented on Trust farms in Lebowa, after Betterment had been implemented. In one case, a group of 30 farmers joined a cotton-growing project sponsored by the Lebowa government (James 1983, p 25-28), and in the other, a co-operative was established, again with government assistance, which provided agricultural services to those who could afford them (James, 1984).

In both cases, people who had joined the cotton project or the co-operative, hired people from the area to work on their lands. Kinsmen and neighbours were paid in kind, which served to "reassert the personal component of a relationship that is otherwise becoming rapidly depersonalised" (ibid, p 10), while strangers were paid in cash. This more contractual type of relationship reflects the different circumstances of Betterment areas in Lebowa, where the earlier settlers had received land, and the more recent settlers had received only residential sites. A Trust farm in Lebowa is in a sense a community of strangers, where new settlers are continually coming in. It is not surprising that cash-based relationships should develop between those older, landed settlers who have been able to benefit from government-assisted projects, and the newer, landless settlers with whom they have no ties of kinship, co-residence or friendship.

There seems to be only a limited amount of information of any detail relating to patterns of co-operation in other instances of villagisation in Africa. In the case of Ujamaa, research was done mainly in villages that were only a few years old, and suggests that new neighbourhood ties were slow in developing. People tended to associate and co-operate with people from the same pre-Ujamaa village, and with relatives (Abrahams 1981, p 74, 110; Bakula, in Proctor 1971, p 26, 31; van Freyhold 1979, p 174). It makes sense in a new settlement, in the transitional stage of relocation, that people should seek to "cling to the familiar" (Scudder and Colson 1982, p 273).

#### IRRIGATION AGRICULTURE

The households on the irrigation scheme are clearly better off than they were before Betterment, having access to the same amount of

arable land on average as they had had before (according to the reckoning of the 1958 Government Report), with the crucial difference that it is now level, irrigated land, as well as having access to slightly more grazing land per head of cattle. This improved welfare is the direct result of the implementation of Betterment, of which the irrigation scheme is part.

In addition to their agricultural good fortune, the irrigation settlers also benefit from the 169 per cent rise in the real value of cash income that has taken place since the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (see Chapter Six), as they have members of their families working away as migrants, and they receive pensions. The irrigation settlers are at the moment better off than their dryland counterparts in every way, as not only are they agriculturally better off, but they have more migrants per household (1.9 as opposed to 1.51) and receive more pensions (66% as opposed to 50% of households). No household on the irrigation scheme does not have access to either migrant remittances or to pensions, and a number have access to both.

There are 24 arable allotments on the irrigation scheme, and the scheme can therefore accommodate 24 families. These 24 allotments average 1.5 morgen in size, ranging individually from 1.4 morgen to 1.6 morgen. Each allotment is further subdivided into a number of plots, with embankments between them. On average, each allotment is divided into 18 such plots. The idea behind the division of allotments into plots was to facilitate irrigation, and to encourage crop diversity and rotation. In 1979, three-quarters of tenants had cattle, at an average of four units per cattle-owning households, while two tenants had sheep.

The scheme is watered by gravitational irrigation. Two weirs have been cast across the river, such that operation of the irrigation scheme does not jeopardise the supply of water further downstream. Indeed, if the river drops below a certain level, the irrigation supply would be cut off. From the weirs, the irrigation water is diverted through a series of open concrete furrows and a storage dam. Furrows run alongside the arable allotments in such a way that water may be diverted into any plot by placing a gate in the furrow. Water then builds up in the furrow, and overflows through indentations in the furrow. Although the system works quite well in practice, a few



fields are less favourably placed for irrigation as they are less level than others and at the end of the irrigation furrows. Their supply of water is thus affected by any blockages or leakages along the furrows.

Tenure is held in terms of a certificate signed by the (then) Bantu Affairs Commissioner, entitling occupation, and entitled "Permission to Occupy". This entitles the tenant to occupy a specific arable allotment, as well as a specific residential allotment on the scheme. Use of the arable allotment requires residence on the scheme. Failure to meet the conditions of tenancy may result in expulsion from the scheme (although such expulsion has never occurred).

The principal conditions relating to tenancy (not all of which are mentioned in the certificate of Permission to Occupy but which are known to agricultural officers as well as tenants), are

- 1) that the tenant must be continually on site, not being absent for more than 14 days without approval. This is understood to imply that the person permanently on site should be an able-bodied adult male, able to do any hard work that might arise
- 2) that tenants must follow the instructions of the agricultural officer who advises them
- 3) that tenants must pay the prescribed rental (currently R6-00 per annum for use of water furrows)
- 4) that tenants must plough only by means of the government supplied tractors and not with oxen, as this may damage embankments, and because oxen-drawn ploughs do not plough deeply enough to air the soil
- 5) that tenants may have only four cattle and keep no sheep or goats.

In effect these conditions are not always met (not least because in some years the government tractors have not arrived), but nobody has yet been expelled from the scheme, as agricultural officers have tended to turn a blind eye.

Although the certificate of "Permission to Occupy" states that rights of occupation are not transferable, the same inheritance procedures apply as relate to dryland allotments, viz. that rights pass to the holder's spouse and then to his/her son. Thirteen of the original tenants have since died and in each case the tenancy has passed to their widow or in the event of a woman to a son, (and in one case, a daughter). At the moment the scheme is full, but in the event

of a vacancy arising as a result of a tenant having no heir, or being expelled, it appears that the vacancy would be discussed at a meeting of the headman's council, and an allocation made. A number of the older tenants had sons who had married and had obtained their own residential sites either before or soon after Betterment. This leaves them with only one or two sons still attached to the household. In other cases, where the sons were too young to obtain their own site, households have three or four (in one case, five) adult sons, some of whom are married, still attached to the household. The lack of available residential sites in Chatha is thus affecting households on the irrigation scheme in the same way as dryland households.

The organisation of the scheme is undertaken by the agricultural officer and the settlers themselves, who select a committee to organise various activities on the scheme and to discuss problems with the agricultural officer. The committee is responsible for keeping the furrows and sluices clean and for reporting any leakages, broken fences, etc., as well as assisting the agricultural officer, e.g. in convincing people that certain agricultural procedures should be adopted. The committee is re-elected every two or three years and consists of six or seven persons. The actual organisation of the scheme is however not very effective. There has been a high turnover of agricultural officers (four in the last six years) which creates problems of continuity and co-operation on the scheme. Some furrows are cracked and sluices and furrows are frequently not cleaned out when blocked. Tractors arrive late, and in one season, this severely disrupted ploughing on the scheme.

A credit scheme and a marketing service, taking produce to King William's Town were started when the irrigation scheme opened. They have been discontinued since the mid-1970's. People were failing to repay their loans, and the marketing service seems to have run into transport problems, as well as a demand for goods superior to those produced on the scheme. The local Keiskammahoek market for fresh vegetables has effectively been provided for by the large Gxulu irrigation scheme close to the town. Chatha's irrigation settlers sell their produce largely within the village of Chatha, i.e. to the drylanders.

The irrigation scheme now operates with the same credit scheme as

the drylanders, which was initiated in the early 1980's, and which is operated by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture. This enables people to have their fields ploughed and disced (i.e. the soil broken up) in mid-winter, and then ploughed, disced and planted in late spring; as well as to obtain maize seed, beans, peas, fertilizer and worm-killer on a year's credit at 2.5 per cent interest per year. Most of the tenants on the scheme availed themselves of this opportunity. The bill for mechanised cultivation of one morgen and for the seed and insecticide and fertilizer came to a total of R140-00 in a number of cases.

Of the 24 tenants on the scheme in 1984, nine were still the original tenants, nine were the widows and six were the children of the deceased original tenant. (In two cases the original tenants, although still alive, had transferred tenancy to their sons). The average age of tenants in 1983 was 60 years. Seven tenants worked in full-time jobs off the scheme, although five were home over weekends, or potentially so. The administration and working of their allotments was left to their wives. This meant that the arable allotments on the scheme were almost entirely effectively run on a day to day basis by women, as 15 of the tenants were female in 1983, and of the remaining nine, seven were away at work during the week.

While the irrigation settlers do not differ much in household composition or stock-holdings from drylanders, the differences become apparent once we look at what the irrigation settlers produce. In summer they grow maize, potatoes, peas, beans, pumpkins and melons, and in winter wheat, barley, cabbages, potatoes, tomatoes, peas and lucerne. During the summer about half of the plots are put under maize (the figure for the 1980/1 season was 55%), with vegetables sometimes planted in the same plots as maize. It is not however the case that all plots are cultivated, and in the 1980/1 season about one-seventh of plots were under weeds by the middle of January at a time when the crops were clearly visible in the other plots. Most of the cultivation takes place in summer, after which the soil is turned by ploughing. Mainly vegetables are planted in winter, with a few settlers also putting in wheat, barley or lucerne.

Maize is planted after ploughing in October or November, and is ready for reaping in April or May, although people take green maize

before reaping time. Wheat is planted in June or July after the maize has been reaped and the remaining stalks ploughed in, and is reaped round about December. Vegetables planted in winter and spring are ready for picking in November and December. Optimal use of plots thus involves crop rotation between winter and summer grains, and vegetables, which can be grown all year round.

Yields are difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy, although it is clear that families on the scheme are getting much better returns than those on the dryland allotments. Maize is the only crop for which most households can give an estimated yield. Maize cobs may be carried home in large sacks (usually such a sack full of stripped maize, i.e. maize off the cob, would weigh 90 kg.), or sometimes by a sled, drawn by cattle. People usually state how many bags of maize on the cob they harvested. A bag of maize on the cob is normally taken to represent half a bag of maize off the cob. It is however not always clear how full the initial bags of maize on the cob were when reaped. So during the 1978/79 season, maize yields reported by farmers averaged 17 bags off the cob, and individual yields varied from 0 to 50 bags. Even here one cannot convert a total crop into an average yield per morgen, as some farmers put more of their plots under maize than others. Yields from vegetables are impossible to measure, as the farmers sell their vegetables to the drylanders on an ad hoc basis. People will come and buy, say, six cabbages from the farmer in the field, or he will take his wares and sell them in the dryland areas, or take some home from the fields to cook.

Relatively little cultivation takes place in the gardens, and in some years, up to half of the irrigation settlers' gardens are uncultivated, except perhaps for some tobacco. People say that they could not get hold of a tractor to plough their gardens, or that there were "shortages". People presumably put all their resources into the cultivation of their best soil, i.e. the arable allotments under irrigation, as this is where they get worthwhile returns.

Prices and units of sale are highly variable, being determined by the farmer, and largely by the context of the sale, e.g. how much is being sold, and to whom. In 1979, farmers were selling their maize at between R10 and R16 per bag of maize off the cob. Examples of other



sales discussed in December 1979, were

potatoes - per "bekile" (a tin container of variable size measured in one case as six inches in diameter across the bottom and six inches deep): at 25c; at 30c; at 20c

- per bag (it is not clear what size is indicated here as talk of "small" and "large" bags bears no clear relation to price variation): at R5-00 per small quarter bag; at R2-00 per quarter bag; at R2-00 per quarter bag; at R2-00 per large bag

pumpkins - per pumpkin, by size: at 20c to 80c; at 50c for large pumpkins; at 20c to R1-00; at 15c upwards

peas - per "bekile" (5 cups): at R1-00

- per bag ("bigger than a bekile"): at R1-00 or R2-00

cabbages - per cabbage: at 10c or 20c; at 25c a small cabbage; at 15c to 20c

beans - per cup: at 25c

carrots - per bunch: at 15c

barley - per bunch: at R2-00

lucerne - per bail: at R3-00, at R5-00

Maize is the most extensively planted crop, and farmers tend to keep most of what they reap. Farmers kept an average of 80 per cent of their maize yield from the 1978/79 season. It therefore seems likely that the majority of their cash income from sales will derive from vegetables. Irrigation farmers do not have any transport costs to offset their income, as they sell their crops almost exclusively within the village of Chatha itself since the market link-up with King William's Town fell through in the mid-1970's. No percentage of takings is paid to any official, either formally or informally, and so farmers are able to keep all their profits.

The farmers on the scheme make considerable use of the government-supplied tractors and planters, using them to plough and plant as many plots as they can afford. In the 1979/1980 season, all the farmers in a sample of 16 made use of the tractors to plough 185 plots. They ploughed 81 plots with cattle, of which 27 had been already ploughed by tractor, (i.e. part of the 185 plots) and were being planted by ox-drawn planter on the second ploughing. All but three of the 16 farmers made use of the government supplied planters, which were used to plant maize and beans. Other crops were planted by hand.

Finances dictate the use of government tractors and planters, and people economise by using the tractors and planters on only a limited number of plots. A number of people on the scheme who had made use of the new credit scheme in the 1981/82 season were still carrying debts over into the 1982/83 season. This debt is seemingly due to two reasons. Firstly, the credit scheme had just got under way, and was not yet strictly enforcing repayment by a specific date. Secondly, a number of farmers on the scheme keep all their maize, selling only vegetables, and so take longer to pay off their debts - particularly if pressure to do so had not yet effectively been applied. In such circumstances, people would be inclined to meet other expenses first (such as educating their children).

When cattle are used to cultivate plots, (as happened throughout the scheme at the end of 1984, when there were problems obtaining the tractors), assistance is recruited along the same lines as among drylanders, viz. from close relatives, and from members of the same village-section. Where assistance is not obtained from a fellow settler on the irrigation scheme, but from drylanders, their assistance is usually rewarded by allowing them to have access to one or two plots of the irrigated allotment concerned. (This may be through sharecropping or hiring arrangements, or as a simple gift).

Although they assist each other with regard to labour and oxen, members of the irrigation scheme see themselves as operating independently of each other, and not as a company of any sort. Occasional remarks are made about "X using the water furrow so that I can't use it", or to the effect that "the scheme would be good if the people on it were friends". There is however very little else to suggest that there is any tension or sense of competition among members of the scheme. People do not compare their crops to those of other members of the scheme, or speak disparagingly of them. They frequently visit each other. As the 24 households on the scheme are a good 10 to 15 minutes' walk from the other two residential areas' nearer houses, the members of the scheme are thrown upon each other for company. In addition, four lineages each have three households on the scheme, and there are further clan and affinal ties between various households.

Members of the scheme are very much aware that they are much better

off than their dryland colleagues, and feel that given the chance now, many drylanders would opt to join the irrigation scheme. They are aware that their children are benefiting, both in terms of nourishment, and in terms of the better education that the money from the sale of crops enables them to afford.

Nevertheless, they feel, with a few exceptions, that it is better to work on one's own, rather than to go into a co-operative venture where everybody plants the same crops, sells together, at the same prices, etc. Initially the scheme was geared to co-operation, but "when the people of Trust said that we should reap our lucerne together and sell it together, they didn't do so - some people didn't reap their lucerne, but put their cattle in their fields - that's why I say its better to work alone". Some people's crops are better than others, are ready before others, some people are lazy. People accordingly prefer to work on their own. A major factor leading to this independent attitude was the falling away of the market link to King William's Town. People were paid fixed rates for their crops and had to co-operate to facilitate the transport arrangement. Once that fell away, people started selling their crops in Chatha, each at his own price. So, "it's better to work alone, because we are not all the same - some have fertile soil, others don't; some work, others are lazy; some cultivate wheat, others don't".

The fact that farmers on the scheme are able to plough a large number of their plots by tractor gives them an independence from other households as regards sources of traction and labour. This, together with the fact that they pay for traction, probably makes for a greater awareness of the economics of the enterprise. Accordingly people prefer to go it on their own and make what they can.

The tenants by and large see themselves as having security of tenure on the scheme. Several speak of the allotments as belonging to them because they have a title deed to the allotment, or because they keep all the income from their cultivation. Others are more cautious, saying that "I am not sure whether the fields are ours, because they are under the officials of the Trust" or "its not yours - it's the government's - if you don't cultivate it for a long time, government can take your field".

People differ as to whether they pay rent for the fields. Some are

clear that the annual payments of R6-00 for water rights is not rent, but "tax for the furrow". Others see this payment as equal to rent. Pensioners appear to be absolved from the need to pay this fee.

Most people believe that their children are entitled to inherit their fields, but are aware that such inheritance is conditional upon the child's living on site, working the allotment, and paying the water fee. Some are more precise, saying e.g. that "there is no inheritance - they told us that if our child wants to have the inheritance, he can have it if he stays at the Trust - if he doesn't want to stay here, he won't have an inheritance - that's why I say there is no inheritance". For these few, inheritance is seen in terms of freehold tenure where inheritance is not dependent on occupation or use, and they are aware that they do not enjoy freehold privileges.

Farmers are aware that they must obey the agricultural officer's requests. "The rule of the Trust is to do what the agricultural officer says". While aware that he does in theory have the power to expel people from the scheme, people do not see this as a real threat. They know that the agricultural officer tends to turn a blind eye to practices such as not living on scheme, ploughing with oxen instead of tractors, etc. "He has the authority to throw you off if you don't work - but now, he doesn't throw us off, he just tells us to work"... "they haven't thrown anyone out yet". In any event, a violator would be given a chance. "He first will call you before a meeting for the irrigation scheme to tell the people that you don't want to cultivate - then (if you don't change) they will tell the government - then they will take you out of the scheme".

While people are not so concerned about expulsion, they are not sure whether the scheme will remain confined to 24 tenants. The government may, in the perception of some people, expand the scheme to include some of the current dryland allotments. People are also wondering what will happen to their sons. "Trust is not full, because we have sons, and they must have fields - we want somebody to allocate fields for them". People perhaps see expansion of the scheme in terms of its incorporating more land, rather than in terms of allotments being subdivided. But in the end, as with most things, "I don't know who will decide, because I am not the chief - he is of the government".



Farmers on the scheme see their major problems as

- 1) the sporadic nature of the supply of goods such as seed, fertilizer, etc. and particularly of the tractors necessary to cultivate, on the part of the government
- 2) the lack of transport to market their crops
- 3) the lack of money to be able to plough and plant all their plots mechanically, and to farm properly.

The late arrival or the non-arrival of tractors is a particular source of annoyance and inconvenience. "It's not easy to cultivate now, as the tractors don't come regularly. Some use oxen, and others get the tractors late"... "The tractor comes from Gxulu - before the tractor comes here, you pay money - it takes its time coming, it does not come when you want it". The irrigation scheme had had its own tractor at the beginning of the scheme, but it had been moved to the irrigation scheme at Gxulu, about 8 km. away. Since then people feel the tractor service has become sporadic. Supplies of seed were not always regular either, and people complained that they had difficulty obtaining seed.

People feel the lack of a market outside Chatha, where they could market their crops more competitively. The government is seen as having taken the market facility at King William's Town away. "Now we do not have the money to take our crops to market". The irrigation farmers do not however appear to have made an attempt to pool resources and hire a local truck to take their crops to market. People look to their agricultural officers and to government officials to take the initiative.

The lack of ready cash is felt as a constraint on people's ability to cultivate, and people cite this as a reason for using the government tractors and planters on certain lots only, while cultivating the others by ox-drawn plough, or not at all. Likewise people feel they are unable to afford to buy seed when they need it.

These problems as perceived by the farmers are real enough and relate to a lack of initiative and organisation on the scheme as well as the financial and administrative limitations within the Ciskei Department of Agriculture. The ineffectiveness of the irrigation committee and its apparent lack of drive, results in overgrown and leaking furrows, in cattle grazing in irrigation allotments because

fences are not kept repaired, and in the farmers not being sufficiently organised and motivated to keep the agricultural officer motivated, to get the best service out of him. The committee's ineffectiveness is, of course, the result of the lack of pressure and support on the part of its constituency, the farmers.

The role of the agricultural officer is probably a major factor making for the above apathy. People wonder about the value of organising themselves when the agricultural officer is not always able to ensure the arrival of tractors and equipment, or has not succeeded in regaining them a market. The scheme has had four officers in the last six years, several of whom have been only too keen to get transferred out of Chatha, and who have geared their extension activities around catching the Friday afternoon bus to Keiskammahoek. Some of these officers have clearly not had either the training, the motivation or the personality required for the job.

The lack of effectiveness or application of these officers is at least partly to be ascribed to the bureaucracy of which they are a part. The Department of Agriculture of the Ciskei is understaffed. The Ciskei had an estimated 30 agricultural officers in 1980 (Quail 1980, p 74) and is struggling with problems of staffing, training and administration. It is accordingly not adequately equipped to ensure the deliveries of goods, the maintenance of machinery, the extension of market links or the provision of basic extension services.

While some agricultural officers show little interest in their work and make little attempt to keep accurate records, others come to their job, full of motivation. The young woman on the scheme in 1980 tried to get a co-operative established for the scheme, so that its members could buy government-subsidised seed and fertilizer through a more direct route than they were doing at the time. Her efforts came to nothing and her attempts to help the settlers secure tractors also encountered problems. She subsequently obtained a transfer elsewhere.

While the irrigation farmers face constraints on their capacity to produce good crops, they are still very much better off than their dryland counterparts. They had crops during the 1982/83 season when the drylanders suffered a total maize crop failure in their fields. The irrigation farmers can produce a crop in almost any year and their crops leave them visibly better off than the drylanders. Why then do

they not clean and repair furrows and fences, and organise themselves more effectively? In 1981, Chatha got a new and active headman who has already succeeded in improving conditions for the drylanders by getting large tracts of fence repaired and new fences put up. He has taken an active interest in promoting agriculture. The irrigation settlers could find a ready ally in him in their search for better services and markets.

Two possible answers suggest themselves. Firstly, the irrigation farmers are not dependent solely on their agriculture, each having nearly two migrant labourers per family working away and remitting money. This income, which helps pay their agricultural costs, means that in terms of overall income they are living substantially better than the drylanders. The incentive to produce larger crops may accordingly not be so pressing. Secondly, the average age of the farmers is over 60 years, and most of them (15) are 64 years and older. The five men on the scheme under 50 years of age are all working at full-time jobs, four of them outside Chatha. There is a shortage of younger, more active decision-makers on the scheme. This problem may rectify itself as the older generation is replaced by their children, and the average age of farmers drops.

The irrigation settlers do not seem to have invested their higher incomes in consumer goods, and their furniture, radios, etc. are not on average superior to those found in dryland households. The poorer households on the irrigation scheme are furnished on a standard lower than that of most dryland households. People on the irrigation scheme eat a lot of what they produce. They appear to invest their cash income largely in the health and the education of their children. In 1979, ten children from the scheme were studying at secondary schools outside Chatha and at an agricultural college. There were three teachers and several civil servants associated with households on the scheme, who were reaping the benefits of the fact that their parents were able to afford to give them an education better than children in most dryland households.

#### CONCLUSION

The agricultural changes that have taken place in Chatha have resulted

primarily from the implementation of Betterment, viz. the smaller size of dryland arable allotments, the rotational grazing camps, and the irrigation scheme. Dryland households are now agriculturally speaking much worse off than before, and it is only the substantial rise in the real cash income of households (i.e. non-agricultural income) that has saved these households from possible slow starvation. Drylander's lack of agricultural initiative should be understood in the light of this higher real income as well as of their drastically reduced land holdings. Cultivation is often not worth the expense and the effort, making only a marginal contribution to overall household income, and for many households, is no longer essential to their survival.

Patterns of co-operation are still focused largely on former village-section membership and kinship ties, rather than on one's new neighbourhood. This survival of old patterns of co-operation seems explicable in terms of considerations of convenience, viz. that one's old partners are still within easy walking distance in the new residential areas.

The households on the irrigation scheme are clearly better off agriculturally than before Betterment, while still encountering some problems with obtaining the necessary agricultural services, and also displaying a lack of initiative in going about rectifying their problems. This inertia is due partly to the fact that they are relatively well off (in terms of food needs at least), and partly to the fact that the settlers are of an age when most other people would have retired.

Betterment has thus partly succeeded in one of its aims, viz. creating a group of self-subsistent peasant farmers. ("partly", because a number of households on the scheme need access to migrant remittances to finance their cultivation). Its other - unintended - achievement has been to make dryland agriculture an activity so unrewarding that many households do not even bother to cultivate their allotments.



As stated in the Preface (p vi - vii), parts of the contents of the full version of this chapter have been omitted or summarized in copies of this dissertation deposited in the Rhodes University Library.

CHAPTER EIGHT  
VILLAGE POLITICS

This chapter sets out to provide an account of the way the political process in Chatha has changed since the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. Various structural changes have taken place, both within Chatha and in its wider environment, which have affected this political process. These structural changes will be discussed, and their impact on the pattern of village politics assessed, and illustrated, through the presentation of several case-studies. The extent to which changes in Chatha are usefully comparable to political changes arising out of the implementation of Betterment elsewhere in South Africa, as well as in the case of villagisation resulting from the implementation of the Ujamaa policy in Tanzania, will be assessed in the concluding section of the chapter.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES AFFECTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Political activity in Chatha since the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey has been influenced by changes within the village itself, resulting from the implementation of Betterment, as well as by developments in the wider political environment of the Ciskei administrative unit. Internally, the village-section has ceased to function as an effective political unit. Although it still serves some administrative purposes in the post-Betterment situation, its main functions have been taken over by the headman's council. Political competition within the village now no longer runs along the lines of village-sections or territorially based groups of village-sections, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four, but along the lines of the two new large residential areas of Nyanga ( $\pm$  265 homesteads) and Skafu ( $\pm$  135 homesteads), with the irrigation scheme supporting Nyanga. The reasons for the irrigation settlers' support of Nyanga are probably closely related to the fact that their residential area is closer to Nyanga than to Skafu, as well as to the fact that 22 of the 24

households on the irrigation scheme were from the old village-sections of Ndela, Nyanga and Nyokane, which have a much higher percentage of members in the new Nyanga area than the new Skafu area. The reasons for this competitiveness will be discussed later.

Whereas in the past the village was answerable to higher authority through the office of the Magistrate, it is now answerable to that higher authority in three ways:


- a) through the office of the Magistrate and the various government departments which have offices in Keiskammahoek. With the advent of self-government in the Ciskei in 1972, several government departments established branch offices at district level, with officials reporting directly to their departmental superiors at Zwelitsha (the administrative centre of the Ciskei). The Magistrate still acts as representative for certain government departments, such as Justice, Internal Affairs, Office of the President and Finance (Kotzé 1983, p 441-442)
- b) through the Tribal Authority system of local government, which was designed to be based on the traditional chiefly system of authority (Groenewald 1980, p 88) and which became operative in the Keiskammahoek District in about 1960
- c) through the Ciskei National Independence Party. In 1972, the Ciskei homeland was granted "self-governing" status, and in 1973 the first elections were held. The Ciskei National Independence Party (C.N.I.P.) won the election and by the 1978 election it had consolidated its position, winning every contested seat (Charton and Tywakadi, 1980, p 145). The three remaining Chiefs (who are ex officio members of the Ciskeian Parliament, or Legislative Assembly) have subsequently joined the C.N.I.P., and today the Ciskei is a de facto one-party state (ibid, p 147). Under the C.N.I.P., the Ciskei took its independence from South Africa in December 1981. Today, Chatha has its own C.N.I.P. committee, which is elected at a village meeting and which serves as its link with central C.N.I.P. structures.

The ways in which the village is officially linked with higher authority is shown in Diagram No.1.

(a) The Demise of the Old Village-Sections

The demise of the village-section has resulted directly from the

DIAGRAM No.1. De Jure Administrative Structure of the Ciskei.



implementation of Betterment. As a result of the people having to move from their old hamlets, the village-sections no longer exist in any territorial sense, as their members are scattered all over the new residential areas. With Betterment, all available arable land was re-allocated. Grazing is no longer organised on a village-section basis either. The role of the sub-headmen in the allocation of land has thus fallen away. These changes have meant that the village-section no longer functions as an effective political unit, as its (former), members' interests are no longer realised through their village-section membership. People's interests now focus increasingly on the new residential areas, and on the affairs of the village as a whole.

The old village-section does however still play a role in village politics, but more as a unit facilitating administration, rather than as an interest group. Households still retain their old village-section affiliation, and village-sections still appoint sub-headmen. The sub-headmen are responsible for acting as a channel of communication between the headman's council and the people of the village. From time to time they call meetings of members of their former village-sections for this purpose, or to discuss matters particular to their village-section, e.g. a dispute among members. The non-territorial nature of this organisation may be seen by looking at Figs No. 7, 8, 9 and 10 in Appendix A, which show the distribution of households associated with former village-sections throughout the new residential areas. A system of representation based on sections of the new residential areas might seem to be more practical. The fact that people adhere to the old system suggests that they still value the associations and relationships deriving from it.

The collection of funds for village undertakings and the distribution of some benefits, take place on a village-section basis. Sub-headmen have lists of the heads of household in the village who are affiliated to their particular village-section. In 1983 a number of drought-relief jobs were made available to the people of Chatha. These involved fixing fences, filling in dongas, etc., and involved remuneration of R2-00 per day, with the bill being paid by the Ciskei Government. Each sub-headman was asked to bring a list of the names of the neediest people in his village-section to the headman. All the sub-headmen met together with the headman, discussed the proposed



names, and decided on the final list of successful applicants. The larger village-sections were entitled to a proportionately larger number of allocations.

Sub-headmen are elected by their former village-section members and are men who have completed their working careers. The post carries no financial remuneration, but sub-headmen enjoy status and influence in the village, and it seems that these are the major incentives leading people to accept the office of sub-headman. Although the election of a sub-headman comes up for approval before a village meeting, this approval is a mere formality. Today, although there are the two large new residential areas, as well as the irrigation scheme, there are seven sub-headmen, as there were before Betterment.

Four of the sub-headmen (those for Nyanga (2), Ndela and Nyokane) reside in the new residential area of Nyanga, while three (those for Rawule, Jili and Skafu) live in the new residential area of Skafu. It so happens that the majority of households with ties to (old) Nyanga, Ndela and Nyokane are living in (new) Nyanga, while the majority associated with Rawule, Jili and (old) Skafu, live in (new) Skafu. While it may appear to make sense that a sub-headman should stay in the area in which the majority of the members of his old village-section stays, this has not always been the case. The previous sub-headman of Rawule (who retired several years ago) stays in (new) Nyanga, while the previous sub-headman for Nyokane (who died several years ago) had lived in the new irrigation scheme.

In the case of the old sections of Nyanga and Skafu, it does however appear to be important that their sub-headmen and the majority of their households reside in (new) Nyanga and (new) Skafu respectively. The present basis of village politics reflects competition between factions in these two new areas, and the old sections of Nyanga and Skafu provide ready-made bases of support. (Old) Nyanga and (old) Skafu were the two village-sections least disrupted by Betterment, as their old residential areas were either already in, or next to, the new residential areas. (Old) Nyanga and (old) Skafu are also the numerically strongest village-sections in (new) Nyanga and (new) Skafu respectively. It is therefore not surprising that they have become bases for the recruitment of political support in the new residential areas for matters in which

these two new areas see themselves as in competition.

(b) Changes in District Administration and Local Government

Although the Magistrate officially handed over a number of his duties to various government departments with the advent of self-government in the Ciskei, and "relinquished his supervisory and co-ordinating activities at district level" (Kotzé 1983, p 442), he is still the most important and influential administrative official at District level. While officially the main function of the Magistrate's office is judicial work (ibid, p 448), it has authority over a wide range of issues such as control of local revenue, supervision of Tribal Authorities, and of chiefs and headmen, administration of the allocation of land, handling of ministerial inquiries. The Magistrate himself sits on a number of local boards and committees and helps co-ordinate the various government departments in the district (ibid, p 442-443, 447). In Keiskammahoek the Magistrate represents the Departments of Finance, Justice, Internal Affairs, Manpower and the Office of the President.

"The magistrate in his personal capacity is therefore empowered to do certain things which are not reflected in the functions of any of the divisions, sections and sub-sections of the magistrate's office. This places the magistrate in a special position, which is enhanced by the seemingly wide discretion conferred upon him by (his) list of duties" (Kotzé 1983, p 447). In practice, his supervisory and co-ordinating activities at district level do not appear to have been significantly altered.

From the point of view of the people at village level, the Magistrate is undoubtedly the most influential administrative official in the District. If anything, his power over them has been increased by the fact that he now controls land allocation more directly than he did before Betterment. People still see him as the co-ordinating official at District level, although his authority may at times be compromised by the power and presence of C.N.I.P. officials.

Politics at the village level since Betterment, has also been affected by the introduction of the Tribal Authorities system of local government, described for the Ciskei as follows:

"The passing of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951 effected a radical change in the structure of local government in the Ciskei. Up to this time the policy of the White administration had been to rule Blacks through government-appointed headmen who were placed in charge of demarcated 'locations' serving as basic administrative units. Although these headmen were directly under the control of magistrates, they settled minor cases locally and discharged certain duties which were delegated to them. Other local government responsibilities were undertaken by District Councils (also under the control of magistrates), which in turn were affiliated to the Ciskei General Council which was constituted in 1934. Although the District Councils were empowered to advise magistrates on a wide variety of matters affecting the people they represented, they achieved little, mainly because they had limited financial resources. However, in contrast with what was to happen after 1951, the District Councils had no traditional roots and tended to attract the better educated people in the various districts. On the other hand, the Act abolished the Council system, shifting the administrative focus from the headmen and providing for the establishment of Tribal Authorities which were associated with the chiefdoms which once existed in the area. The Tribal Authorities were headed by chiefs who were to be assisted by councillors under a system which sought to revive traditional leadership. This implied chiefly rule and rule through elders. The system of local government in the rural areas of the Ciskei was thus changed from direct rule to rule through traditional leaders." (Manona, 1985, p 69). The change is represented in Diagram No.2.

The status of these "traditional" leaders varies from case to case as the government is empowered in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act to appoint and dismiss chiefs of its own accord. It is not always the case that chiefs and their Tribal Authority councillors enjoy much legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. Chiefs depend for

DIAGRAM No.2. The Old Council System Compared with the New Tribal Authority System of Local Government.

The Council System (see Wilson et al 1952, p 23)

Department of Native Affairs

Chief Native Commissioner  
of the Ciskei - chairman of

Native Commissioner  
(Keiskammahoek) - chairman of

Ciskeian General  
Council

Keiskammahoek  
Local Council  
(6 members, 2 of whom  
were appointed by the  
Native Commissioner,  
and 4 of whom were  
"elected" by the local  
taxpayers of Keiskamma-  
hoek)

Local Taxpayers

The Tribal Authority System

Ciskei Legislative Assembly

Government Departments  
(Office of the  
President)

Regional Authority  
(Keiskammahoek)

Magistrate  
(Keiskammahoek)

Tribal Authorities (e.g. Keiskammahoek North)  
(each village elects several members, and the  
Chief or the Magistrate may appoint additional  
members)

Village Councils  
(e.g. Chatha)



their political survival upon the approval of higher government officials. (Several chiefs have been temporarily suspended during the last few years.) They therefore do not need to be as responsive to the wishes of their constituents as if they were elected officials. Their dependence on support from above also means that they effectively have limited freedom to respond to the wishes of their constituents. The dependence of the Tribal Authority on such support from above is underlined by the fact that they are dependant for their annual budgetary allocations upon central government. Consequently, Tribal Authorities have come to be identified with the central government, and in some cases are seen by the people as effectively representing its interests, rather than their own. Councillors who serve on Tribal Authorities tend to be headmen (ex officio) and older men who have completed their working life and generally have fairly low educational qualifications, and correspondingly, a limited ability to handle the paperwork and bureaucratic procedures with which they are faced. Tribal Authorities thus have limited effectiveness as local government structures, in both representative as well as administrative terms (ibid, p 69 - 89). Councillors' incentive to contribute actively to the welfare of the Tribal Authority and its constituents is somewhat diminished by its limited effectiveness. The Chief and headmen and the secretary (who is a civil servant - Groenewald 1980, p 89) receive salaries for their duties, which include Tribal Authority work. The other members are not remunerated. As with sub-headmen, their motivation would seem to be linked to considerations of status and influence within their village, and to cultivating relationships of patronage outside the village.

Tribal Authorities are linked up to higher authority in three ways:

- (a) through the office of the Magistrate
- (b) through the chief
- (c) through the Regional Authorities.

The Magistrate as the local representative of the Department of Justice, performs a judicial function. Chief's courts deal mainly with matters of customary law, whereas Magistrate's courts deal with "other civil and criminal matters" (Quail, 1980, p 98). A complainant may choose to be tried by either the chief's court (i.e. the Tribal Authority court) or by the Magistrate, and may appeal from the chief's

court to the Magistrate. The Quail Commission found that "magistrate's courts were taking on more powers and chief's courts fewer powers...(and that) magistrate's justice was today generally preferred" (loc. cit.). The Magistrate also acts in an advisory capacity towards the Tribal Authorities, attending some meetings.

Through their chiefs, Tribal Authorities have access to government departments through the Department of the President (Kotzé et al 1985, p 38) and at a de facto level, to the Ciskei Legislative Assembly, as they are members in two capacities, viz. in their traditional capacity as chiefs, and inasmuch as they are also ex officio Members of Parliament (Charton 1980, p 176-177). The Legislative Assembly and Government departments in turn pass directives and demands down the system to the people, with these being announced and discussed at village meetings.

Two or more Tribal Authorities combine to form a Regional Authority, composed of the chief plus one or more representatives from each Tribal Authority (Groenewald 1980, p 88-89). In 1969, Regional Authorities were stripped of all their executive functions, and reduced to advisory bodies (ibid, p 89). These Regional Authorities liaise with Government departments through the Office of the President, which means that as with Tribal Authorities, they are advised by the Magistrate. Through their chiefs, they also have access to the Ciskei Legislative Assembly (Manona 1985, p 72).

The administrative structure of which the Tribal Authority is a part, is represented in Diagram No.1, although the lines of command linking the Tribal Authority to higher authority are not clearly distinguishable and in practice become intertwined.

There are two Tribal Authorities in the Keiskammahoek District, viz. Keiskammahoek North Tribal Authority and Keiskammahoek South Tribal Authority. Chatha, together with several other villages, belongs to the Keiskammahoek North Tribal Authority. The chief of this Tribal Authority is acknowledged to have genealogical title to the chieftainship. The Tribal Authority consists of the Chief, the Secretary, 11 headmen and 12 other representatives, one of whom is a shopkeeper, and the rest of whom are retired men, are mostly elected by their villages.

Chatha is represented on the Keiskammahoek North Tribal Authority

by the headman (ex officio), and two other members, one of whom was nominated by the Chief, and has been serving on the Tribal Authority for a number of years, and the other of whom was elected by the village at a public meeting. All three of these representatives come from the residential area of (new) Nyanga, although it does not appear as if nominations for the Tribal Authority are contested, one informant stating that the member chosen by the village, was unopposed.


Hammond-Tooke (1975, Chapter 11, 12) gives an account of the establishment of the Tribal Authorities system and of the new administrative structure of which they are part in the Transkei, which is broadly similar to that outlined above for the Ciskei.

(c) The Introduction of Political Parties in the Ciskei

The way in which local government operates on the ground has however been drastically transformed by the advent of party politics in the Ciskei, and by the emergence of the Ciskei as a de facto one party state under the C.N.I.P. The growing power of the C.N.I.P. has meant that local government institutions such as the Magistracy and the Tribal Authority have become increasingly identified with the C.N.I.P. In the words of an influential political figure in Chatha: "there is no difference between the Tribal Authority and the C.N.I.P. - it is all the same government".

Diagram No.3 attempts to show a more de facto picture of the administrative structure of the Ciskei.

DIAGRAM No.3. De Facto Administrative Structure of the Ciskei





This intertwining of party and local government and administrative structures is illustrated by the fact that there has been some overlap between the personnel of the Tribal Authority and the Regional C.N.I.P. branch - and that the Magistrate, although not on the C.N.I.P. branch committee, is chairman of its local steering committee, which is responsible for organising Independence celebrations and fund-raising.

Today, virtually every adult resident in Chatha is a member of the C.N.I.P. and C.N.I.P. business (which should strictly speaking be discussed at C.N.I.P. meetings in the village) is discussed at village meetings. Collections for C.N.I.P. funds are made through village channels, such as the sub-headmen. Chatha has its own C.N.I.P. branch committee, which is elected at a special village meeting.

People are very much aware of the power of the C.N.I.P., and accept the inevitability of its demands and pervasive influence. Awareness of this pervasiveness led the villagers concerned to check that the 24 people selected for drought relief jobs (funded by the Ciskei Government through the Tribal Authority) in 1983, were all C.N.I.P. members.

There are thus various kinds of officials, and various avenues of representation operating at the level of the Keiskammahoek Magisterial District. The Magistrate is an administrative official who is an appointed civil servant, while C.N.I.P. branch members are politicians, either elected, as in the case of the M.P., or appointed, as in the case of party officials. Chiefs fall somewhat in between, fulfilling an administrative role and having limited official authority on the one hand, and as ex officio M.P.'s, being directly involved in party politics and the activities of the Legislative Assembly on the other hand. On the ground, these various avenues of authority and representation seem to be intertwined in such a way that in practice they cannot be clearly separated.

These structural changes have had a direct effect on the political process at village level, for through these changes, the people of Chatha have lost power to their wider environment in a number of ways. At the same time, these changes have provided opportunities for access to new resources and paths of patronage.

By re-allocating all available arable land and by fencing off

grazing camps, and transferring control of these resources more effectively into the hands of local government officials such as the Magistrate, Betterment has deprived the village of the power it once had to allocate those resources. The delimiting of fixed residential areas, (designed to take the population of the village at the time of Betterment, i.e. 20 years ago) has meant that the residential areas are full, with more than 50 young men and their families on a waiting list for sites. Betterment has thus meant that people now have considerably less control over resources within their village than they had before.

The way in which Betterment has delimited residential and arable areas and caused the registration of sites and fields, has led to a situation which is effectively a reversal of the situation before Betterment. Before Betterment, there was room available for residential sites, as there were no fixed boundaries between residential and grazing areas in the old village-sections. There was enough flexibility in the allocation of arable land for there to have been a number of disputes about it.

With the redelimitation and re-allocation of arable land with Betterment, and with arable land effectively not coming up for re-allocation any more, land disputes seem to be a thing of the past. A number of residential sites have come up for re-allocation, although I have come across only one case where this led to a dispute. As competition for residential sites increases, people may try to persuade or pressurise the headman and his committee when sites fall vacant. A possible consequence of Betterment may well be an increase in the incidence of disputes about residential sites.

The continuing power of the Magistrate has been accompanied by the emergence of new forms of control within the wider political environment, viz. the Tribal Authority system and the C.N.I.P. The de facto overlap and the identification in the minds of the people between these three forms of outside authority, has reinforced people's feeling of powerlessness, which was occasioned by the implementation of Betterment against their will. This overlap has on occasion given rise to confusion and resentment among villagers, who feel that urhulumente, (government), a blanket term for higher authority, is making increasing inroads into the community.

The policy of "separate development" and the proliferation of local government structures it has occasioned, has also provided increased budgetary allocations from the South African government for development of homelands, which has in turn resulted in more schools, clinics, roads, agricultural services, etc. becoming available for distribution in these areas. Villages, and groupings within villages, compete for these prizes. The proliferation of local bureaucracy has also meant that increasing opportunities for patronage have arisen, for villages and village politicians seeking to further themselves.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

As was the case before Betterment, the headman is still the senior government representative in the village, and the village council (inkundla) over which he presides, is still the highest court of decision and appeal in the village. The headman is assisted by a committee, which is elected by the village at a meeting of the village council.

The committee has largely administrative functions such as the supervision of general village maintenance, e.g. fences, and lavatories, or looking after the running of grazing camps and arable lands. These portfolios seem to be largely nominal, having little actual substance. In the event of a residential site or arable allotment falling vacant, the committee is responsible for its re-allocation.

Village council meetings are open to all adult members of the community. In practice, meetings are attended by men, with women attending only when there are issues which concern them directly. When they do attend, women sit in a group, separately from the men.

The business of village council meetings consists largely of local village affairs (such as the administration of drought relief, the fencing of grazing camps, the impounding of cattle, the election of committees, the settlement of disputes), as well as the announcement and discussion of government or C.N.I.P. business and directives, and the collection of contributions to various causes. Examples of funds to which households have contributed money in recent years, have been: the extension of the primary school in Chatha

the extension of the secondary school in a nearby village  
 the erection of a hall-cum-shearing shed in Chatha (which is yet to be erected)

the building of a secondary school in Chatha (which is yet to be built)

annual C.N.I.P. conferences

extensions to the buildings of the Ciskei National Shrine of Ntaba ka Ndoda, near King William's Town.

Cases which are unresolved at the village council may be heard on appeal at the Tribal Authority, after which appeal may be made to the Magistrate's Court at Keiskammahoeck. Ciskei business affecting Chatha such as drought relief, road construction, collection of funds, government directives, etc. is passed down to the village council through the offices of the Tribal Authority, the Magistrate and government departments or the Regional C.N.I.P. branch.

In addition to the village council committee there are three school committees - one for the currently existing primary school in Chatha, one for the junior secondary school and a liaison committee to facilitate contact between teachers and pupils in the event of problems arising. These committees are elected by the village at special meetings held at the primary school.

Extensions of the village council are the village-section councils (discussed earlier) and abafana (male youth) groups, made up of circumcised young men of up to approximately 40 years of age. These groups are organised along former village-section lines, although various groups appear to be merging. Each group has its own "sub-headman" and elected committee, as well as its own council, at which it discusses its own business. From this council, matters are referred to the senior sub-headman of the village-section. If he is unable to resolve a matter, it will be referred to the headman's council. These groups assist the headman by conveying decisions of the senior meeting, by being "the eyes of the community" (assisting in maintaining order and preventing crime) and by raising funds for village undertakings. Although members of these abafana groups, as circumcised and therefore adult men, are allowed to attend village council meetings, their participation is of a limited nature. No abafana member or leader currently serves on any of the committees



discussed earlier. The abafana groups play a limited and essentially supportive political role, and a considerable part of these groups' activities are of a more ceremonial nature.

Also outside of the more direct political process in the village, are lineage groupings, which meet to discuss matters relating to their members. These meetings usually discuss matters such as weddings, circumcisions and funerals, and would only take on a more directly political nature when handling disputes which otherwise would occupy the attention of higher councils. Lineage meetings are attended mainly by men, although women (who are usually the wives of male lineage members, but may also be lineage daughters) also attend these meetings.

#### THE ORGANISATION OF VILLAGE POLITICS

It may at first glance seem puzzling that the two new political groups emerging in Chatha (Nyanga plus the irrigation scheme, and Skafu) are in most cases fairly proportionately represented on the committees mentioned, and that nominations are put forward until a committee is full. Of the 45 positions on these committees, 29 are held by Nyanga and its supporters on the irrigation scheme, while 16 are held by Skafu and a supporter on the irrigation scheme. Nine people each hold portfolios on two committees. Of these, five are from Nyanga, three from Skafu and one (a Skafu supporter) from the irrigation scheme. Why should village committees not be an area of competition in which Nyanga and Skafu seek to gain maximum representation?

Village politics in the sense of groups competing for power or resources, is not conducted along committee lines. These committees do not seem to have sufficient power to warrant any group wanting to take them over completely. The village council committee performs an essentially administrative task, acting as a channel to higher authority. The portfolios relating to village maintenance have little actual substance. Perhaps the committee's only real powers relate to the re-allocation of vacant residential sites (something which does not happen very often), and to the settling of disputes and imposing of fines - neither of which provide much scope for self-enrichment. The Tribal Authority and C.N.I.P. committees function largely as

channels for directives coming down from higher authority and have to appear before village meetings with demands (financial or otherwise) originating from these authorities. The primary school committee's task is to look after the upkeep of the primary school. The secondary school committee likewise serves the junior secondary school, while the liaison committee is there in the event of teacher-pupil relations deteriorating.

Committee business is public knowledge inasmuch as there are members from the different parts of the village on committees, and as committee business comes up for discussion at village meetings. This seems to serve as a relatively efficient check on potential embezzlers. This check, together with the fact that committee membership carries no remuneration, means that there is no financial incentive for individuals to join committees.

The incentives leading people to join committees seem to be of a different sort than direct access to power. Membership of a committee provides one with status, enables one to build up influence within the village and to develop contacts with potentially useful bureaucrats in the Ciskei government, and provides one with an organisational basis to use as a resource in the event of some worthwhile prize becoming available within the community. The ambitious, or community-minded, can thus get themselves elected to a committee without being excluded on the grounds of living in a particular part of the village.

Since the implementation of Betterment, Chatha has received a new primary school building and a clinic. These resources have been placed in one of the two new residential areas (Skafu), as they cannot be placed on the steep slope between them. The village is about to receive a secondary school, and its proposed location has been a subject of dispute within the village for the last few years.

The fact that Nyanga and Skafu are separated by a fairly steep slope, and that its members obtain their wood and water at different places, has led to people spending most of their time and developing new relationships within their respective residential areas. Inasmuch as incoming infrastructural resources will be placed in such a way as to favour one area at the expense of another, a sense of competition is developing between interest groups in the two areas. This has become particularly evident in relation to the proposed new secondary

school.

Village politics is thus increasingly becoming organised along the lines of the new residential areas of Nyanga and Skafu. The actual business of contesting resources and reputation is dominated by a number of prominent village personalities, who identify with one or the other side. While some of these key personalities are well placed in terms of membership of several village committees, the explanation for their influence should not be sought in a simple equation of multiple role occupation and public influence. A number of other individuals, less well connected in terms of official committees, also wield considerable influence in village life. Their influence is located in the fact that they have access to financial resources (e.g. entrepreneurs), are ceremonially influential (as herbalists, lay-preachers, spokesmen at ceremonials, sub-headmen), or are seen as commanding personal dignity. Political influence in village affairs thus relates to a wide range of personal abilities and attributes.

The leader of the Nyanga camp is

Maboyis (60 years) He is the headman of Chatha and a member of the lineage (now reduced to four households in Chatha) which is deemed by the whole village to be genealogically entitled to the headmanship. He is ex officio a member of the Tribal Authority, and is a lay-preacher.

The leader of the Skafu camp is

Sobantu (70 to 75 years) He is an influential figure in church and educational matters, and is a sub-headman. His local lineage group in Skafu includes several teachers, and entrepreneurs. Sobantu is undoubtedly the most effective political figure in Skafu.

There is a sense of competition and at times of enmity and suspicion developing between members of these two new areas. These feelings are particularly strong on the Nyanga side, led by Maboyis, and are directed more towards a group of people in Skafu, and towards its leader (Sobantu) in particular, than towards the residents of Skafu as a whole.

The Nyanga shopkeeper is the wealthiest man in Chatha, and there are several other entrepreneurs in Nyanga who, like those in Skafu,

combine various means of income, such as house-building and using their pick-up truck as a private taxi. The Nyanga entrepreneurs, however, operate as individuals. The intellectual and entrepreneurial talents of Sobantu's group are more co-ordinated than those of Nyanga. Members of Sobantu's group number some of the better-off and better-educated people in Chatha, have a finger in several pies (church, education, enterprise, village-section politics). They are viewed with envy and suspicion by the people of Nyanga, who see them as a potential threat to their own interests. People in Skafu to whom I have spoken, who are not part of Sobantu's group, do not seem to see them as a threat in the same way - not least perhaps because they would share in whatever benefits Sobantu's group might bring to the Skafu side of the village.

Part of the reason for the antagonism felt by Nyanga residents towards Sobantu's group relates to the fact that both the village clinic and the primary school (which was rebuilt after Betterment) are situated in Skafu. Sobantu and his group are seen by Nyanga residents as having obtained the clinic and the school by essentially underhand means, when they should, by right of numbers, have been placed in Nyanga.

A member of Sobantu's lineage and a prominent member of the previous village council committee, who lives on the Nyanga side of the village, expressed the feeling as follows: "the people wanted the present school at Nyanga and the headman gave it to Skafu. The people wanted the clinic at the Catholic Church (i.e. on the Nyanga side) and the headman gave it to Skafu. I don't know why...there is only one man at Skafu who wants the (secondary) school there - the people of Skafu call the people of Nyanga amaqaba (i.e. pagan, uneducated)...the people of Skafu don't use the clinic so much, the people of Nyanga use it much more...we want the primary and the secondary school here as Nyanga is bigger than Skafu".

Whatever the reasons for the location of the clinic and the school may have been, this statement by a relative of Sobantu's (together with similar comments from another of Sobantu's relatives living in Nyanga) shows the importance of sectional interest in shaping people's perceptions of the political process in the village. This sectional interest is strong enough to cut across lineage lines, and the form it



takes (i.e. tension between the two new residential areas relating to competition for resources) relates directly to the spatial re-organisation of the village as a result of Betterment.

There appear to be more common-sense reasons as to why the clinic and the primary school are both in Skafu. The first school in the village, which also served as a church, had been built towards the end of the last century, and had been situated in one of the former village-sections in such a way that it was not readily accessible to all of the village. At about the turn of the century, it was decided by the village to move the school to a more central site in what is now new Skafu, next to the Methodist Church which had been built there. It was logical to build the school next to the church, as the school would have fallen under the church's administration in those days. The church building also served as a classroom.

When the first plans for the implementation of Betterment were being drawn up in 1952 (before the introduction of the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which effectively transferred the control of Black education from church and private institutions to the state) the planners proposed to build the new primary school where the old school had been, next to the church building, which was to remain where it was. Again, since the church was still administering the school, and as the school could make use of the church building if need be, this seemed a logical decision - which was effectively made by officials of the then Department of Native Affairs, and not by village politicians.

As regards the clinic, the (then) headman states that "the Catholic Church chose their site, and then the clinic people. I said they could have their site next to the Catholic Church, but they said there was no place for them to drive an ambulance up that hill. So I said they should show me a site. They could not, so I said 'what about those old disused fields over there'". The site where the clinic is now situated is in the new Skafu residential area, borders directly on the main road running through the village, and is readily accessible to traffic. Taking accessibility by road as well as relative accessibility to both Nyanga and Skafu residents into account, the clinic is probably correctly placed.

Whatever the merits of the siting of the school and the clinic may be in practical terms, they are seen by people in Nyanga as the result

of intrigue and manipulation on the part of Skafu residents, spearheaded by Sobantu's group. The tension between the politically more prominent members of Nyanga and Sobantu's group is openly expressed at village-meetings.

While in the field I live in a house in Nyanga, near the current headman (I was unable to avoid this location, and for reasons of personal friendship have not attempted to change it.) This has meant that I have become caught up in the tension between Nyanga and Skafu, becoming identified with Nyanga. With one exception, Sobantu and the principal members of his group have been cautious and evasive in discussion. Living in Nyanga has meant that I have built up better relationships with people there, and have had access to unsolicited Nyanga talk and gossip. Where I make use of gossip as a source of information, I have attempted to make this clear.

### THREE CASE-STUDIES OF VILLAGE POLITICS IN ACTION

#### (a) Case No 1 The Election of a New Headman

In 1980, the incumbent headman, Jali, who was 80 years old, and had been headman for 30 years, gave notice of his intention to retire at the end of the year. There was immediate and widespread support for Maboyis Jama from across the village. The history of the headmanship and the role of the Jama lineage in it, has been discussed in Chapter Three. People in the village speak of the headmanship as belonging to the Jama lineage by right, and spoke in 1980 about that right being restored, as Maboyis was now available and of a suitable age (55 years). The two other eligible members of the Jama lineage (Themba and Sizakele) were both pensioners, not well and not interested in the headmanship. The relationship of Maboyis to the former Jama headmen is shown diagrammatically in Genealogy No.2 in Chapter Three.

The old village-section of Nyanga had been the seat of the Jama lineage before Betterment. After Betterment, the new Nyanga residential area had grown up around the old Nyanga homesteads. This overlap between the old and the new Nyanga reinforced Maboyis's identification as the Nyanga candidate, and there was no prospect of his being opposed from within (new) Nyanga, which seemed solidly

behind him - on the traditional grounds that an opportunity had now come to restore the headmanship to the Jama lineage. In terms of the history of the headmanship and of Betterment, this would help restore the idea of some measure of autonomy over their own affairs to the villagers.

There were however rumours that there would be an opponent, and various people from Skafu were reportedly interested. Names mentioned were:

Tutu, a member of several village committees and from the former village-section of Jili (the previous four headmanships had involved struggles between the village-sections of Jili and Nyanga before Betterment);

Mlungisi, Sobantu's nephew and a key member of his group, who served on several village committees;

Sobantu himself.

Some of Maboyis's supporters had recalled him from Cape Town (where he was working) early in 1980, to make sure that he would be on hand and available. I do not know whether these supporters contributed towards the keep of Maboyis and his family, as he was now not earning an income. He spent the rest of 1980 seeing and being seen at social events in the village. By the time of the meeting to nominate candidates for the headmanship in December 1980, Maboyis Jama was the favourite for the post.

The meeting was late in starting, the headman stating that the headmanship was a matter of election, not of inheritance, and that there should be a number of candidates so that there could be a vote. (This was not a spoiling tactic, but compliance with local government regulations). He had been delaying as he could not see Tutu, one of the rumoured candidates at the meeting. Tutu was in fact in hospital, recovering from a stick-fight wound, but it became clear at a meeting two days later, at which he was present, that he was not intending to compete for the headmanship. Of the other two rumoured candidates, Mlungisi was present at the meeting, but Sobantu was not. Calls were

made for candidates to come forward.

Maboyis Jama then moved to the front of the meeting, and sat down, indicating his availability. He was proposed by his first cousin, Themba Jama. No other candidate came forward. The meeting then developed into a series of speeches and exchanges as to whether Maboyis should be appointed as there were no other candidates. His followers seemed divided as to strategy. Some wanted him appointed straight away, while others called for correct procedure, lest he be overruled on a technicality. It was clear at this stage that Maboyis would become headman, and it was better to play by the rules and wait until it was clear no other candidate was forthcoming, while also enjoying superiority at the meeting over the Skafu residents who were present. "Let candidates come forward openly, and not spoil matters by going around the back...if a person has something to say, let him come up front. There must not be two meetings in one meeting".

During these exchanges Mlungisi, a rumoured candidate, entered the proceedings to voice the position of his uncle's group, which was that while Maboyis enjoyed majority support, he certainly did not enjoy unanimous support. He made the following two essentially spoiling points in his speeches during the meeting

(a) "I would not have spoken, had I not felt that even a doll should be put up as a candidate to stand together with my father's brother Maboyis (Maboyis's sister is married to a 3rd cousin of Mlungisi)...as we know that our hearts are with Maboyis, not all our hearts are with my father's brother Maboyis...I don't care for being headman myself, but I would put myself up as a candidate against my father's brother Maboyis, just so that there could be opposition. He knows that as we want him, he will win, and that he will get a high number of votes - but not alone (i.e. unopposed) men, not alone Maboyis!"

(b) "You think that it's a light matter, appointing a headman - it's serious. Even at this meeting, boys and women do not have the vote - let the boys who have got reference books be allowed into the meeting to vote". Women and uncircumcised youths are not allowed to vote for the appointment of a headman, and Mlungisi's remarks were passed over.

The meeting closed with the secretary reading the minutes, which ended as follows: "There were 53 men at the meeting and they all voted for Mr. M. Jama to be headman".



Two days later the Chief of the Keiskammahoek North Tribal Authority and his retinue arrived at what would have been the meeting at which Chatha would officially have voted for a headman had there been more than one candidate. Candidates were again called for and again only Maboyis was nominated. He was then confirmed as headman by the Chief.

Maboyis Jama had been appointed headman without being opposed. People in both Nyanga and Skafu state that he was the popular candidate and that there were no serious alternatives. Both Tutu and Sobantu appear to have enjoyed some following, although it is not clear that either of them seriously wanted the headmanship. One of Sobantu's lineage members who is otherwise fairly antagonistic towards him, stated that Sobantu did not want the headmanship, but that another member of his lineage was pushing Sobantu's possible candidacy. Mlungisi was the least likely of the possible candidates to have attracted support. The tone of his speeches at the nomination meeting made it clear that he was not seriously calling for a candidate to oppose Maboyis, but rather was seeking to voice antagonism, delay proceedings and detract momentarily from the sweetness of Maboyis's victory.

Given that Nyanga was solidly behind Maboyis, Skafu could still have provided a significant show of opposition had they been united themselves. The fact that there were various rumoured candidates from Skafu suggests that they were not thus united. In the words of a Skafu informant, "some people wanted Tutu, some wanted Sobantu. There was no agreement when Jali retired". A candidate with only partial backing from within Skafu would have been humiliated, and damaged any further political strategies he may have had in mind.

Had the post of headman had enough actual power for the headman to deliver worthwhile patronage to his followers it might have been worth Skafu's while to put forward a candidate who could perhaps have been acceptable to a number of Nyanga voters on e.g. genealogical or other personal grounds. The patronage that a headman can deliver is however, limited. The headman and his committee no longer have control over the allocation of arable and grazing land, and are effectively under the control of the Tribal Authority and the C.N.I.P. The likelihood of a Skafu headman procuring significant privileges for

his residential area with two-thirds of the village in Nyanga and bitter about the location of the clinic and the primary school, was very remote. Under the circumstances it was not worth Skafu's while to nominate a candidate.

In any event, the post of headman is an arduous one, involving the headman being out of the village for up to four or five days in many weeks, attending meetings of the Tribal Authority, the C.N.I.P. or on other village business. Maboyis was prepared to accept this work-load in order to restore the headmanship to the Jama lineage, and to do this he left his job in Cape Town. Sobantu and his group had other strings to their bow, which were more worthwhile than the honour of being a hard-pressed headman.

The tension between a largely united Nyanga behind Maboyis Jama, and Sobantu's group in Skafu points to a growing tension between two sorts of power in the village viz. de jure, formal and administrative power, as embodied in the headmanship and the formal channels of communication with higher authority, and a more de facto power based upon educational and entrepreneurial ability. The local C.N.I.P. branches in Chatha and in Keiskammahoek do not seem to align themselves clearly with either group.

The way in which these two sources of power have developed has been influenced by the advent of Betterment and by the centralising tendencies which have developed in Chatha's wider political environment. These centralising tendencies have placed constraints upon the range, and the attractiveness of formal power, while the advent of Betterment has provided opportunities for the development of entrepreneurial power. The formation of larger, new residential areas, together with the improved road network resulting from Betterment, has provided entrepreneurs with easily accessible markets. Sobantu's group, which is educated and organised, is becoming a significant factor in village life. Much of the tension between Nyanga and Sobantu's group (which may in time take an increasing number of Skafu households with it, if it can deliver the necessary patronage) relates to the interplay between the bureaucratic, formal and the entrepreneurial, informal avenues of power in the village.


Case No 2 The Choosing of a Site for the Proposed Secondary School

There had been talk for several years about Chatha getting a senior secondary school, which would take pupils up to Standard Ten. Like other schools, it would be paid for on a fifty-fifty basis, by the people of Chatha and the Ciskei Government.

Under Siyandiba's headmanship in 1980, the villagers had considered three possible sites for the new school, and rejected them, largely because of their inaccessibility. One of these sites had been at a spot across the river, and about equidistant from the Nyanga and Skafu residential sites, while the other two sites had been on the Nyanga side, in a grazing camp next to the forest. In 1981, under the headmanship of Maboyis Jama, the village had voted for a site on the Nyanga side (marked N in Diagram No.4), which was next to a road, and which consisted of several people's fields. It seems that the two large residential areas voted as blocks, with Nyanga, and most of the irrigation scheme voting for the Nyanga site, and Skafu voting against it and for a site on the Skafu side, near the clinic (marked S on Diagram No.4). The school would be a significant resource for the people near it. For one thing, pupils would be buying sweets and food from the nearest shop, and it therefore made a great difference where the school was placed. Either the Skafu shopkeeper or the Nyanga shopkeeper would stand to make a good deal of money out of the pupils. Secondly, not every village could have a high school, and pupils from neighbouring villages would come to the Chatha school. A number of these would want to be boarders, and would be looking for hired accommodation as near to the school as possible. The location of the school could bring benefits to those able to cash in on the situation. This, in the opinion of Nyanga informants, was the sort of reason why Sobantu subsequently led a campaign for a Skafu site. Similar sentiments have been expressed on the Skafu side about Nyanga's intentions.

From 1982 to 1985, a number of meetings were held about the location of the secondary school, some of which were attended by Ciskei government officials. People from Nyanga argued that the school should be located at the Nyanga site, as this was where the village had voted that the school should be. The majority of

DIAGRAM No.4.: Proposed Sites for the New Secondary School in Chatha  
 (scaled down from Native Affairs Department, Ciskei, Plan No. C1566:  
 not drawn to scale)





households in Chatha was on the Nyanga side of the village, and Skafu already had the primary school on its side. Several government officials felt that the secondary school should be located on the Skafu site, as it was to serve not only Chatha, but several neighbouring villages as well, and the Skafu site was the most central site for this purpose. This argument suited people from Skafu's purposes very well, and they used it frequently at meetings. In June or July 1985, officials came to survey the proposed Skafu site below the clinic, and by November 1985, it seemed as if the authorities had finally committed themselves to the Skafu site.

This case-study again emphasises the growing tension between the formal, bureaucratic and the informal, entrepreneurial aspects of power in village politics. It also shows that centralised local government and party structures, while constraining the political process at village level in a number of ways, can also provide competing groups within the village with access to political patrons to help them achieve their ends. Both the formal and the informal power groups attempted to use the political structure to their advantage in this case.

### Case No 3 A Letter from the School Committee

It had been agreed after Betterment that money raised from people being fined for their cattle grazing in the wrong camps or in other places, should go to help with school finances for the existing primary school. In 1981, the school committee had written a letter, asking for money. They had followed this up with two subsequent letters. The issue was discussed at a village meeting early in 1983.

The meeting developed into a tussle between Sobantu, who was representing the school committee, and Maboyis and several Nyanga members of his village council committee, about what had happened to the letters and whether there was money available in the cattle pound fund. Sobantu was able to use his position as a member of the school committee (but not a member of the village council committee) to drive Maboyis and his committee onto the defensive for their alleged lack of action in the matter.

While Maboyis is vulnerable in the political domain he commands,

because it is public, Sobantu is relatively secure in his political domain, which is largely private. Three of the areas in which he has influence are essentially closed groups, to which Maboyis's supporters do not have effective access, viz. the village-section grouping of (old) Skafu, his lineage-grouping in Skafu, and the entrepreneurial group which has developed within that lineage grouping. While members of Sobantu's lineage from both Nyanga and Skafu get together for ritual purposes, the residential separation of Nyanga and Skafu has given each of the two lineage sub-groups a coherence of their own, which can only serve to strengthen Sobantu's influence. Another area of Sobantu's influence, the primary school committee, is more public in nature. However, he and his group have this committee firmly in hand, and he undoubtedly has the necessary efficiency to run the committee effectively. Sobantu's influence in church affairs is also considerable, although a large number of the lay-preachers are from Nyanga. He occupies an important position in the church, and is an effective and popular preacher.

While he still chooses to involve himself in village politics, Sobantu's position seems fairly secure for the foreseeable future. Where Sobantu's group does become potentially vulnerable is where it becomes involved in public affairs, which are the business of the village meeting. In one such instance, the village meeting sat on a dispute between Mlungisi and Bekekile (one of Maboyis's allies from Nyanga). Both these men were on the village council committee. The meeting heard the story of the dispute for over an hour, eventually giving them both a suspended fine for causing a disturbance.

What is interesting for our purposes is that one of Sobantu's group (Mlungisi) was involved in a dispute in which he had technically been at fault, and when the issue came before a public meeting, a number of Maboyis's supporters had used their position of advantage at a public meeting to bait and pressure Mlungisi, and through him, Sobantu.

### Conclusion

The major structural changes that have affected the political process in Chatha since the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey have been:

- a) the re-organisation of the village into arable, grazing and residential areas. This was a direct consequence of Betterment, and has resulted in the demise of the old village-sections as political units within the village. Instead of six territorially-based village-sections, there are now two large new residential areas, and a small irrigation scheme. Members of former village-sections are now scattered throughout the new residential areas
- b) a change in the nature of the resources for which political competition is conducted. People no longer compete for the re-allocation of resources originating within the village, such as arable and grazing land. The land use pattern has been frozen by Betterment, with arable and grazing areas fenced off from each other. Control of these resources has largely been taken out of the hands of the villagers themselves, and rests with officials such as the Magistrate. People now compete for control of resources coming into the village, such as infrastructural developments (schools, the clinic), entrepreneurial opportunities, and avenues of political patronage
- c) the introduction of new local government and party political structures (the Tribal Authority system and the C.N.I.P.). While these structures, and the way they are interwoven with the local administrative system at Keikammahoek, have subjected the village to stronger control by central government, they have also provided opportunities for political patronage.

Within the context of these changes, the political process in Chatha is coming to be characterised by competition between two territorially based interest groups (viz. Nyanga plus most of the irrigation scheme, and Skafu). Before Betterment, competition for the headmanship (and through the headman, for a greater degree of access to arable and grazing land) was conducted along the lines of two territorially based groups, viz. the north and the south of the village. Competition still occurs along territorial lines, which now reflect the new lay-out of the village, and is conducted to obtain the most favourable location of infrastructure, and the control of entrepreneurial and other opportunities.

This is not to say that Nyanga and Skafu present two united camps, which see themselves as in competition with each other at all times.

People are united across the residential areas by ties of kinship, friendship and village-section, and come together for ceremonial and other purposes. The competitiveness relates mainly to the area of incoming resources, although it is strengthened by the physical separation of the two areas. People's antagonism is directed mainly towards the person of the two leaders, viz. Maboyis and Sobantu.

The entrepreneurial opportunities provided by the concentrated residential areas and the better road network, has resulted in the development of a new informal, entrepreneurial type of leadership within the village, which is characterised by Sobantu and his group. This contrasts with the more formal pattern of leadership, represented by Maboyis. Although supported by the local authorities as officially being representative of the people, this formal leadership, embodied in the headman and his committee, has been considerably weakened by the structural changes above. In Maboyis's case, this formal leadership coincides with another type of leadership, viz. that based on genealogical grounds. Maboyis was appointed unopposed to the headmanship because he is a Jama - something which is still clearly important to a large number of people in Chatha.

The interplay of the entrepreneurial and formal patterns of leadership is affected by the territorial factor, in a way which at present serves to uphold the formal pattern of leadership in the village, in spite of the fact that it has lost power to central and local government structures. The entrepreneurs in Chatha do not form a unified group. The Nyanga and Skafu entrepreneurs are in competition with each other, and it is in their respective interests to advance the political cause of their own residential areas. This division, together with the fact that Maboyis has the support of the larger residential area, strengthens the position of the formal style of leadership in Chatha in relation to its entrepreneurial counterpart.

There is not much in the literature on Betterment that is directly comparable to the material discussed in this chapter. Krige talks of the headman losing the power of the allocation of land to agricultural officials, and states that "A headman is today uncertain of what his new duties include" (1985, p 7). Although she mentions that districts were resettled as residentially coherent groups under their headmen



when several districts were moved into a single residential area, (loc. cit.), she does not discuss the process of political competition.

Other accounts of Betterment talk of conflict between pre-Betterment groupings in the new residential areas either at Betterment or in the first few years afterwards. Bigalke (1969, p 32-3) cites an instance of conflict between members of two izithebe (hospitality groups). O'Connell (1981, p 46) mentions tensions between immigrants coming into a village and the original inhabitants of the village, with the immigrants claiming that they were not allocated land in a fair fashion. Spiegel (1985, p 6-7) mentions that the long-established Hlubi settlers in an area sought to prevent more recently established Thembu settlers from keeping residential rights in the area, now that it was to be proclaimed a Betterment area. These examples suggest the utilisation of the pre-Betterment groupings as interest groups in the period during and shortly after Betterment, and as such are not directly comparable to the situation in Chatha, where people have been settled in the new residential areas for twenty years now.

Pre-Betterment groupings may however remain important in the new context. In the case of a Trust farm that was declared a Betterment area in Lebowa, the political process was influenced by the fact that both Pedi- and Ndebele-speaking people had settled there, under the authority of a Ndebele chief. The Pedi minority alleged that the chief had favoured his fellow Ndebele-speakers in matters such as the allocation of land (James 1984, p 15).

Most of the case-studies of Ujamaa also refer to villages which had only been settled for a few years. Here it appears that pre-settlement groupings also assumed importance in the new settlements. In one case where the majority of the people in the new settlement came from two different parts of the area, "the village split up into two fighting factions", with one group finally leaving the village (Boesen et al, 1977, p 64). Von Freyhold cites a case where two clans, which had been occupying adjacent territories were brought together in a single village. The social distinction between the two clans was "quite prominent" in the new village, with one clan, (being better off), tending to "look down" upon the other (Von Freyhold 1979,

p 128-129).

Pre-Ujamaa patterns of differentiation seem to have been carried over into Ujamaa settlements, particularly in cases where there were opportunities for some farmers to advance themselves, as in tea production, or dairy schemes. These were dominated by the "upper strata" (i.e. the wealthier members) of the old villages, who could afford to avail themselves of the new opportunities (Boesen et al 1977, p 136) and to employ labour (ibid, p 120).

Like the Ciskei under the C.N.I.P., in Tanzania under the TANU (Tanganyika/Tanzania African National Union), the political party exercised a central influence at the local level in the 1970's. This influence was heightened by the fact that (unlike the Ciskei, where chieftainship was re-established under the Tribal Authorities system) chieftainship and headmanship were abolished as political offices soon after Tanzania became independent (Abrahams 1981, p 33). In practice it became difficult for non-Party members to be elected to positions of authority at village level (ibid, p 78).

There does not seem to be much detail as to the dynamics of village politics in Ujamaa villages, which each elect a village committee. Evidence suggests that territorial divisions within the new settlements do not play a role in these committees. Abrahams (ibid, p 87) cites a case of an Ujamaa village which elected a committee which consisted of the longest established members of the village. Von Freyhold gives examples of committees consisting mainly of the wealthier and more influential members of the village (1979, p 152, 165), as well as a case where conflict between the younger and the older generation was expressed in a village-council election (ibid, p 173-174). A number of criteria thus seem to be important in the political process in Ujamaa villages, but territorial division is not one of them.

The fact that political competition in Chatha operates along territorial lines seems to be largely the result of the lay-out of the new residential areas after Betterment. Nyanga and Skafu are two discrete areas, separated by a fairly steep ridge. This separation has led to people identifying to an increasing extent with their new residential areas, where, as a matter of convenience, they spend most of their time. The fact that key community resources (such as the

proposed senior secondary school) must inevitably be located more favourably for one residential area than another, has led to members of Nyanga and Skafu seeing themselves as in competition with each other for these resources. This sense of competition is heightened by the physical discreteness of, and distance between these two areas.

CHAPTER NINEPATTERNS OF RITUAL AND CEREMONIAL ASSOCIATION

While an analytical distinction may be made between ritual and ceremonial, such that ritual would be directed towards a transcendental reality, such as God or the ancestor spirits, whereas ceremonial would not (Wilson 1971, p 3), in practice the distinction is not easily made. While an activity may have a predominantly ritual focus, it will have its more ceremonial aspects, and vice-versa. The activities to be discussed in this chapter will be seen to embody both aspects.

As was the case at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, there are still three major principles of association for ritual and ceremonial purposes, viz. kinship, territory and Christianity, which are cross-cut by the principles of age and sex. Education is relevant to church-based association in the sense that people leading services or funerals must be able to read from the Bible. However, education and relative wealth, although sources of status, do not function as principles of association in the ritual and ceremonial spheres.

This chapter sets out to examine the way in which these principles of association operate and overlap, as they are manifested in actual cases of ritual and ceremonial activity. The focus will thus be on the groups involved in ritual and ceremonial activities, rather than on the symbolism of these activities. Ways in which the operation of these principals of association have changed will be indicated, and an explanation of these changes will be attempted.

KINSHIP-BASED ACTIVITIES: AN EXAMPLE OF THE UKUBUYISA RITUAL

As an example of the way in which kinship currently functions as a principle of association in Chatha, an account of a particular ritual (the ukubuyisa ritual) will now be discussed in some detail. While there are other types of kinship-based activity besides this particular kind of ritual, it is felt that the way in which kinship functions as a principle of association would be best illustrated by a



detailed examination of one kind of kinship-based activity, rather than by a more general discussion of a number of such activities.

When a senior member of the community dies, members of his lineage will assemble to slaughter an ox to "accompany" him (ukukhapha) on his passage into a sort of liminal state, where he is not yet firmly established as an ancestor who is in communication or relationship with the living members of his lineage on earth. A year or even several years later, the members of his lineage will again slaughter an ox, to establish him as now being in communication, in relationship with them. This second slaughtering forms the central focus of the ritual known as the ukubuyisa or ukuguqula ritual (literally "to bring back", or "to turn around").

The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey makes only very brief mention of the ritual (Wilson et al 1952, p 65, p 196), while other accounts of the ritual among the Cape Nguni are also brief (Bigalke 1969, p 115 - 117; Kuckertz 1984, p 274; Olivier 1976, p 37 - 39; Raum and de Jager 1972, p 177 - 178). There is thus no substantial account of the ritual with which to compare this account at any level of detail, or against which to assess possible changes. This account will thus seek to bring out the principles of association manifested in one example of the ritual, and where possible to relate their manifestation to aspects of the current physical and social environment in Chatha.

In some aspects, this example of the ukubuyisa ritual is not typical, inasmuch as it involved the slaughtering of a goat (ibhokhwe yokutshayeleva - the goat to sweep the way clear) a week before the ukubuyisa ritual, and as at the ukubuyisa ritual the beast did not bellow as it should have when slaughtered. A diviner was immediately consulted about the matter. These irregularities were an unexpected bonus, offering additional perspectives on the principles of association involved.

The slaughtering of the ukutshayeleva goat is not all that atypical. Informants suggest that people tend to slaughter an ukutshayeleva goat before the ukubuyisa ritual if a number of years have elapsed since the death of the person for whom the ukubuyisa ritual is to be performed, or if there has been conflict or illness in the family. The purpose of slaughtering the goat is to inform, or to "waken" (ukuvusa) the ancestors as to the coming ukubuyisa ritual.

a) The Ukutshayeleva Phase of the Ritual

On a Friday afternoon in November 1984, a gathering of 14 men and youths (abafana) and 10 women assembled at the house of Sipiwo, a man of nearly 60 years, for the slaughtering of a goat in preparation for the slaughtering of an ox to buyisa (to bring back) Sipiwo's father, Madoda (L) (see Genealogy No.3). The men were: four men of the Daba lineage (Sipiwo, 2, 5, and 16) and three Daba youths, i.e. abafana, or young men (7, 8, and 13); Sipiwo's brother-in-law; three neighbours, and three others. The women were: Sipiwo's wife; his daughter; several wives of Daba men, and several iintombi zomzi. (literally "daughters of the homestead". These are usually female members of the lineage - whether married or not - but the category can also include clanswomen and women with consanguineal links to the lineage.)

The slaughtering of the goat was necessitated by the fact that Mzwandile (2) (Sipiwo's father's brother) had had a dream in which his father (E) (who was also Sipiwo's grandfather) had appeared to him, requesting that a goat be slaughtered for him. Members of the lineage sensed that something was amiss, but were not sure what the problem could be.


Proceedings were effectively initiated, and then conducted by Mzwandile (2), who was the oldest living member of the Daba lineage, and Sipiwo's father's older brother. He announced that they were there to "tshayeleva" (to sweep the way clear) in preparation for the bringing back of Sipiwo's father (L). To the accompaniment of rhythmical clapping and singing, Sipiwo started stirring the ubulawu medicine (with which he was later ritually to wash himself) in a billycan.

Sipiwo, together with several other men (including 2 and 5) then went up to the cattle-byre. There first Mzwandile (2), then Sipiwo and Fudumele (5) called upon Sipiwo's father to "come back".

They returned to the house for a brief spell, where Sipiwo, again to the accompaniment of singing and clapping, stirred the ubulawu medicine. The men in the party, together with a number of iintombi zomzi then made their way up to the cattle-byre for the slaughtering of the goat. The Daba men and youths, (Sipiwo, 2, 5, 7,

GENEALOGY No.3.

Genealogy of the DABA Lineage, Showing the Relationship to SIPHIWO (11) Of Daba Men or (through them) Their Wives, Who Attended the Ukubuyisa Ceremony for Siphwi's Father in November 1984.



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(all names in this Genealogy are pseudonyms)  
 (Dead People have been attributed letters: e.g. Daba (A)  
 Living People have been attributed numbers: e.g. Siphwi (11))

8, 13, 15 and 16) together with one of Siphiwo's neighbours (a non-relative) and the iintombi zomzi then entered the cattle-byre.

Mzwandile (2) announced the goat, saying "Here is your goat, mfokabawo (my brother), so that you can come back to your children". Siphiwo caught the goat, slipped the family spear ("spear of the home") through its legs and prodded it in the stomach so that it bleated before he cut its throat with a knife. The iintombi zomzi then left the cattle-byre, and a number of men and youths (including Siphiwo's brother-in-law and three of his neighbours) entered the cattle-byre, to help skin the goat. A fire was lit and a piece of meat called intsonyama (from under the right shoulder of the goat) was given to Siphiwo and Mzwandile (2) to eat. Mzwandile (2) then announced that there was now beer available. After Siphiwo had drunk of the beer, it was then made available to the men and the youths inside the cattle-byre, with each group receiving one beaker.

When the umbilini (the insides of the goat which included the liver) had been cooked, it was served to the men and youths after the first piece had been given to Mzwandile (2). The intestines were to be given to the women. When the umbilini had been eaten, the men returned to the house, where there was beer available, which was announced by Mzwandile (2) and apportioned to the men, youths and women by Siphiwo. The gathering started breaking up after 9 pm.

On the Saturday morning, a number of people started arriving at the house from dawn onwards, adding to the number of those who had spent the night at Siphiwo's house. For the next few hours there was a group of about 20 men (including Siphiwo, 2, 5, 15 and 16, as well as several abatshana, i.e. sons of women born into the lineage, and neighbours and non-relatives) and 20 women (most of whom were either married into or born into the Daba lineage) coming and going in the hut in which the beer was being drunk.

At about 10 am the men started drifting up to the cattle-byre. Mzwandile (2) announced that "here is intlalelo" (i.e. the throat and front parts of the goat), and after it had been cooked on the fire, it was distributed by Siphiwo. The rest of the meat was chopped up and put in a three-legged pot to cook. Two beakers of beer were then distributed, one to the men and one to the youths, after which a number of men simply sat chatting, waiting for the afternoon's meat,



when the rest of the goat would be served.

By about two o'clock, a gathering (which consisted of Siphiwo, 2, 5, 15 and 16, and a clansman, together with a number of women either born into or married into the Daba lineage), had assembled in the house. Again there was singing, clapping and dancing (consisting of people shuffling around in a circle in an anticlockwise direction) while Siphiwo again stirred up the ubulawu medicine into a froth. Speeches were made by Mzwandile (2), Siphiwo, Fudumele (5) and the clansman, calling for the coming home of Siphiwo's father.

After this, Mzwandile (2) and Siphiwo led the men and the iintombi zomzi into the cattle-byre. The men consisted of: Siphiwo, 2, 5, 8, 15 and 16; three abatshana; a clansman; two neighbours and a few other men. Mzwandile (2) opened proceedings with a brief speech. After a dish of bones had been put in front of Mzwandile (2), Siphiwo held a dish for the iintombi zomzi from which they took portions of meat, and then left the cattle-byre.

Men from the rest of the village then entered the cattle-byre. The bulk of the meat was then put into eight dishes and allocated by Siphiwo, with the men eating in the cattle-byre, and the women eating outside the house in two groups, viz. the iintombi zomzi, and the rest. Mzwandile (2) announced two beakers of beer, which do not appear to have been allocated in any particular way. After the beer had been drunk, the men started dispersing.

On Sunday night, Siphiwo went alone into the cattle-byre and ritually washed himself with the ubulawu medicine he had prepared earlier. The necessary preparations had now been made for the performance of the ukubuyisa ritual the following weekend.

Male attendance at the proceedings during the weekend of the ukutshayelela ritual was characterised by a core of people who were present most of the time, and a more fluid population that was present mainly when meat and beer were made available.

The core consisted of five members of the Daba lineage, (Siphiwo, 2, 5, 15 and 16) and to a lesser degree, of Siphiwo's brother-in-law and five neighbours (four of whom were not related to Siphiwo, and one of whom was a maternal relative). Two of these five neighbours had been Siphiwo's direct neighbours before Betterment. The other three had lived in other village-sections before Betterment. At the

centre of proceedings throughout the three days were Siphwiwo (whose father was to be brought back) and Mzwandile (2) who was the eldest male member of the Daba lineage (and effectively regarded as its senior member), and who led the proceedings. Four of the five Daba men (Siphwiwo, 2, 5 and 15) were based in the new residential area of Nyanga. (Tiso (15), was currently living in a nearby village but his father's home was in Nyanga). One of the five (16) was from Skafu, and the other Skafu members of the lineage were to make their appearance the following week at the ukubuyisa ritual. The presence of Siphwiwo's neighbours at proceedings was explained in terms of their being an ummelwane (neighbour). The importance of the value of neighbourliness and of the attendance of neighbours at rituals is well attested in the literature on the Cape Nguni (e.g. Kuckertz 1983, p 121; Mc Allister 1979, p 65).

Various aspects of proceedings were more private, and kinship-focused, while other aspects were public, being open to any member of the village. Thus the actual slaughtering of the goat was a lineage affair. With the exception of an unrelated neighbour, the people in the cattle-byre were all male members of the lineage, or iintombi zomzi. Similarly, Mzwandile (2), as the senior member of the lineage, was given meat before anyone else, and the iintombi zomzi were fed before the general gathering of men on the Saturday afternoon. The meeting in Siphwiwo's house on the Saturday afternoon, when the ubulawu medicine was stirred, was centred on the lineage (involving Daba men, a clansman, iintombi zomzi and wives of Daba men). It is not clear why the similar meeting the night before was more public in nature. It is appropriate that at times of heightened contact with the ancestors, the discreteness of the lineage-group should be emphasised (e.g. at the slaughtering of an animal or at the first tasting of sacrificial meat). As will be demonstrated in terms of the actual ukubuyisa ritual, the group accorded discreteness at rituals is focused on the lineage, although it extends to clansmen and consanguines such as abatshana (sons of women of the lineage).

While as a male myself, I spent most of the time with the men, I was able to monitor the attendance of women at proceedings from time to time. A group of about 25 women were coming and going throughout the proceedings. They consisted of wives of men of the Daba lineage,

and of the Tshezi clan, of women born into the Daba lineage, and the Tshezi clan, and of women related consanguineally to Siphiwo, principally through his mother. Of this group, a core could be identified which included: Siphiwo's sister and four daughters; the wives of Siphiwo, K, M, N and 2; and four other women related consanguineally to Siphiwo, mainly through his mother. A number of these slept at Siphiwo's house during the proceedings.

Within this group, a clear distinction was made between the iintombi zomzi (which stretched to include consanguines) and the wives of the lineage. Only daughters of the homestead were allowed into the cattle-byre, and daughters and wives were served their food separately. Although all the women sat on the same side of the hut (i.e. the right hand side as one enters the hut), they effectively grouped themselves into these categories.

b) The Ukubuyisa Phase of the Ritual.

At about 9.30 am on the following Friday, a gathering of six Daba men (Siphiwo, 2, 5, 6, 14 and 15) together with six women (Siphiwo's wife, sister, one of his daughters, a lineage daughter, and the wives of K and 2) were assembled inside Siphiwo's house. In the same way as the previous week, Siphiwo was preparing the ubulawu medicine, to the accompaniment of singing and clapping and comments calling for the spirit of his father to return to them. Outside, a number of young married women (abafazana) from nearby homesteads were assisting with preparations for the day's cooking.

The six Daba men then went up to the cattle-byre, where a number of men and youths were already present. Beakers of irhewu (an unfermented maize drink) and beer were brought into the cattle-byre for the assembled men and youths. Two cattle, one of which was the beast to be slaughtered, were led into the cattle-byre. It was felt that there were not enough people present to perform the sacrifice. In Mzwandile's (2) words, "there are no people here, so I cannot do anything. The matter is not ours, it is for the people". The Daba men, together with some of their clansmen, returned to the hut rejoining the lineage wives and daughters there.

Mzwandile (2) announced that Siphiwo's father was to be brought

back that day, and expressed the wish that things should go off without problems. Sipiwo then made a speech, emphasising the importance of unity within the lineage and the clan. He expressed the wish that this homecoming would bring about health and good fortune for all members of the Tshezi clan. To clapping, singing and dancing, Sipiwo then again stirred and tasted the ubulawu medicine.

The hesitancy on the part of Sipiwo and Mzwandile (2) to go ahead with the sacrifice in the absence of a large enough gathering, and their speeches about the favourable outcome of events, indicated an hesitancy or nervousness on their part, which was probably related to Mzwandile's (2) dream and the uncertainty which it occasioned.

The men then again went up to the cattle-byre, followed by the iintombi zomzi. Mzwandile (2) and Sipiwo led the Daba men into the cattle-byre, where the beast (which belonged to Sipiwo) was waiting. A number of men and youths (two abatshana, Sipiwo's brother-in-law, and two non-relatives who were not neighbours) followed them in, to assist with catching the beast. The beast was caught by its legs being trapped and bound together by means of a long rope, and thrown on its left side. Mzwandile (2) approached the beast, passing the spear through its legs and across its stomach, prodding it, in order to make it bellow. The beast was however, quite silent. Lineage members gathered round, prodding and hitting it in the stomach, and calling on Sipiwo's father to "come back". Mzwandile (2) then squatted behind the animal's head to perform the killing act, which consisted of severing the spinal cord from the brain by slipping a knife in below the base of the beast's skull, and sawing through the spinal cord. Even during this process, which took several minutes, the beast was silent. The men around the beast became frantic, prodding the beast, and pulling its tongue, but to no avail, as it died without giving the necessary bellow which would have indicated the approval of the ancestors.

Something was clearly very wrong, and the Daba men plus one of their clansmen went into one of Sipiwo's huts to discuss the matter. It was decided to consult a diviner. Sipiwo, 2, 5, and 15, together with ten women (Sipiwo's sister, two of his daughters, three other Daba-born women, two clanswomen, the married daughter of a Daba-born woman, and Sipiwo's mother's brother's daughter) set off to consult a



female diviner who was not related to the Daba lineage.

What emerged from the consultation was that Siphwi's father (i.e. the man whom the people were seeking to bring back) had himself not brought his father back properly and that "your (i.e. Siphwi's) grandfather is asking something from you". There had been various irregularities at the time. The beast just slaughtered had been "withheld" because Siphwi's grandfather (F) had not been brought back yet, and he was preventing the beast from bellowing. Siphwi would have to slaughter a beast to bring back his grandfather properly, and then slaughter a beast to bring back his father.

After leaving the diviner, a meeting took place outside Siphwi's house, with all the men and women being called down from the cattle-byre. Siphwi and Mzwandile (2) informed the meeting what had happened, and after several speeches by Daba and Tshezi men, the men returned to the cattle-byre.

While Siphwi and his consanguines had been consulting the diviner, the other men had slaughtered the beast and started cooking the meat. The diviner had stated that the meat of the dead beast should be eaten as ordinary meat, as the ancestors were no longer involved with the beast. "This is no longer a custom". However, certain ritual procedures were still followed in the eating of the meat. The intsonyama meat (as in the case of the goat, taken from under the right shoulder) was placed on sprigs of leaves in a basin, as is customary at an ancestral ritual. The iintombi zomzi came into the cattle-byre. They and the Daba men and several clansmen, together with several abatshana (sons of lineage daughters) were given portions of the intsonyama meat by Mzwandile (2) and Tiso (15). The iintombi zomzi then left the cattle-byre. The group of male consanguines then ate the umxhelo portion of meat from the aorta of the beast, which is reserved for the men only. The umbilini (the innards) of the beast was then served up to the whole gathering of men in the cattle-byre in basins without leaves. Three beakers of beer were then brought up to the cattle byre, with Mzwandile (2) allocating one to the group inside the cattle-byre (consisting predominantly of men, with a few abafana) and two to the group outside the cattle-byre. The men then sat around, chatting over the beer and a subsequent serving of coffee, dispersing towards evening.

Saturday morning saw a gathering of men in the cattle-byre for the eating of the intlahlelo meat (the portion of meat along the sternum bone). The group consisted of: Siphiwo, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14 and 15; Siphiwo's brother-in-law; three of his neighbours; an affine, and several other men. The meat was served, together with two beakers of beer - one for the men in the cattle-byre, and one for the youths outside.

The Daba men present with the exception of Vanana (3), who was from another village, then gathered in a hut to discuss the problems relating to their consultation with the diviner. An often heated discussion, which also touched on other lineage matters, went on for over three hours. The meeting then broke up with most of its members going up to join the other men in the cattle-byre.

At about 2 pm, another lineage-focused gathering took place in Siphiwo's house, with a number of Daba men (Siphiwo, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14 and 16), and iintombi zomzi present. Thandekile (9) and Vumisile (10) had just arrived from a nearby town where they worked, and Zithulele (4) was assisting with the cooking of the meat in the cattle-byre. Siphiwo again stirred up the ubulawu medicine to the accompaniment of clapping, singing and dancing, and exhortations for the bringing back of Siphiwo's father.

The group then went up to the cattle-byre, which at that stage was empty. The Daba men and several clansmen, together with several abatshana and the iintombi zomzi entered the cattle-byre. After a brief address by Mzwandile (2) they were served the first portions of the meat for the afternoon by Thandekile (9) and Khulele (14). Again the meat was placed on sprigs of leaves in a basin. The iintombi zomzi then left, and the other men who had been waiting outside, came in at about 2.30 pm. The meat was dished out in bowls containing samp and distributed to the men and youths (who were not grouped in any clear fashion) by members of the Daba lineage, under Siphiwo's direction. Tea, and later beer were served, with the men either staying and chatting in the cattle byre, or dispersing. The Daba men, with two other men - one a relative by marriage, and the other a non-relative, (and not a neighbour) then again gathered in a hut. Although the problems related to bringing back Siphiwo's father were raised,

conversation was general and relaxed, and a bottle of brandy was shared by the men present.

On Sunday afternoon, a group of about 14 men and abafana (Siphiwo, 9, 12 and 15, a clansman, Siphiwo's brother-in-law, two abatshana, two neighbours and four others) were gathered in the cattle-byre to share the last of the meat, and to burn the bones of the slaughtered animal. After some beer had been served, the gathering broke up.

Proceedings drew to a close with a gathering of men and women (kin and non-kin) in the house, disposing of the last of the beer and a bottle of brandy. That night Siphiwo went alone to the cattle-byre, and ritually washed himself with the ubulawu medicine.

Male attendance was again characterised by a core of kin and non-kin, which was larger than the previous week. This was in keeping with the more important nature of the ukubuyisa ritual, as well as probably with the greater amount of food and drink that was available.

The core again centred on the Daba lineage, with several members being present who had not attended the previous week's proceedings (viz. Khulele (14), who lives on the edge of the Nyanga residential area, overlooking Skafu; Zithulele (4) and Mzwamadoda (6) who live in the Skafu residential area, and Vanana (3), who lives in a village about 10 miles away). The other members of the male core were Siphiwo's brother-in-law, two abatshana, a distant maternal relative, a distant affine, and four others. This latter group (i.e. non-lineage members) included two of Siphiwo's neighbours (a maternal relative and a non-relative - both of whom had also been his neighbours before Betterment), as well as four other men who live fairly close by, i.e. in the street either above or below Siphiwo's house.

As with the previous week, there was a group of about 25 women present throughout most of the proceedings. Virtually all of them were related to Siphiwo's household, either as agnates (i.e. daughters of the lineage or clan) or as wives of lineage members, or as consanguines who ranged widely in the nature of their specific relationship to Siphiwo. The core group again consisted of Siphiwo's sister and daughters, several wives of his lineage mates (K, R and 2), and several consanguines, with about two-thirds of the core being the same as that of the previous week.

In addition to them, a group of abafazana (younger married women) were assisting with preparations. They, together with a number of the older women, spent the nights during the ritual weekend, at Siphwi's house. While some of the abafazana were wives of younger Daba men, the majority were not relatives. They were helping in their capacity as friends, and were not immediate neighbours of Siphwi's household.

Again, various aspects of proceedings were more private and kinship-focused than others. As regards the men, such occasions were: when the ubulawu medicine was being stirred; the slaughter of the beast; the visit to the diviner; the tasting of the intsonyama and umxhelo meat; and the various meetings (other than the public meeting in front of Siphwi's house) held to discuss the problems arising out of the beast's not bellowing. At its widest, as at the eating of the intsonyama and umxelo meat (where abatshana, clansmen and a neighbour who was a maternal relative to Siphwi were present), the kin-focused group was more of a consanguineal than an agnatic group. However, it clearly had an agnatic and at times, lineage focus. This narrower focus was shown particularly during the visit to the diviner, and the first meeting thereafter to discuss the implications of what had happened. It is understandable that during such moments of heightened tension and importance, the focus of the kin-based group should be narrowed down to lineage members.

The presence of lineage members living in the new residential area of Skafu at only the ukubuyisa phase of proceedings, should not be ascribed simply to a possible de facto segmentation of the lineage along residential lines, although this does appear to be developing in the case of another large lineage in Chatha. The members of the Daba lineage who now live in Skafu had before Betterment lived in the old village-sections of Rawule and Jili, while (with one exception) the Nyanga members had all lived either in the old Nyanga or Ndela village-sections before Betterment, which were close to each other. The Nyanga Dabas have always identified strongly with their Ndela mates, arguing that the first Daba settler in Chatha (A) had lived in Ndela. Although most of the Nyanga and Ndela Dabas are slightly more closely related to each other than they are to the Jili and Rawule Dabas, there are exceptions, and genealogical closeness does not seem to hold the key to the lesser involvement of the Skafu group. It



should rather be sought in a combination of the factors mentioned, viz. genealogical distance, people's former village-sections and new residential areas, and the important subjective factor of personal affection.

As regards the women, the more kinship-focused occasions were the same as in the case of the men, except that they did not attend the two meetings where the beast's not bellowing was discussed. Within the female kin-focused group, a distinction was made between agnates and consanguines on the one hand, and wives of Daba men on the other. While both groups were present at the gatherings where the ubulawu medicine was stirred, and while both groups slept at Sipiwo's house during proceedings, there were certain activities that were open to agnates and consanguines only. These were: being present at the slaughtering; the tasting of the intsonyama meat; and the visit to the diviner. As with the men, this group had a wider than agnatic composition, and a number of the women were only fairly distantly related to Sipiwo. This is brought out clearly in the composition of the group of women who were present at the divination session. The iintombi zomzi group, although spoken of as being women born into the lineage and expanding to accommodate clanswomen, in practice seems to include consanguines. These two groups of women (i.e. agnates/consanguines and affines) also sat separately at gatherings in the house, or when eating food, although on occasion this spatial distinction was less clearly maintained.

The gatherings at which the ubulawu medicine was stirred were not attended by non-kin during the ukubuyisa phase of proceedings, whereas non-kin had been present the previous week. This may reflect the heightened importance of the ukubuyisa phase as compared with the ukutshayelela phase, and a corresponding sense of awareness of the discreteness of the kin-focused group.

There does not appear to have been much change in the general pattern of ancestor ritual described in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, where the word "pagan" (as used below) seems to have been used in a fairly loose sense, referring effectively to people who performed ancestor rituals. The leader of the lineage group - in this case, Mzwandile (2) - was responsible for supervising the ritual (see Wilson et al 1952, p 63). The ritual was "essentially the concern of members

of the lineage remnant rather than the clan" (ibid, p 64), and they, and particularly their sisters and wives, slept at the homestead during the period of the ritual. Lineage members living outside the village were invited to attend (ibid, p 64 - 65) as is evidenced in the attendance of two men viz. Vanana (3) and Tiso (15), and two of Siphiwo's daughters from other villages in the Keiskammahoek district, as well as Mzwandile's (2) two sons (9 and 10) from further afield. While not "all the pagan members of the lineage living in the village" were present (ibid, p 65), not least through age or illness, all the Daba men at home at the time were present for at least part of the proceedings. Both maternal and sororal kinsmen (ibid, p 65) as well as neighbours were present.

There has not been any significant change in the composition of the kin-based group attending rituals (such as the ukubuyisa ritual) as a result of Betterment, because there has not had to be. Had Betterment moved people from concentrated to more scattered residential areas, one would have expected changes in the patterns of attendance, as a result of the additional distance people would have to walk. As matters now stand in Chatha, it is easier for more people to attend rituals, as they are now mostly living closer together than before. While all the Daba men in Chatha at the time attended at least part of the proceedings, a number of women (whether Daba-born or Daba wives) do not appear to have been present. They seem to have been mostly either very old or to have been mothers with young children who would have been kept busy at home. To judge by the attendance at this particular ritual, lineage solidarity as expressed at important rituals does not appear to have declined significantly since the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey.

However, the fact that most of the members of the lineage who now live in Skafu were present only at the ukubuyisa stage of proceedings, may point to the beginnings of a process of segmentation along the lines of the new residential areas. The week before the ukutshayeleva phase of the ritual one of the Skafu members had expressed doubts as to whether he would attend it, as it was far to walk, and he was feeling tired. (He did not attend the ukutshayeleva phase, but did attend the ukubuyisa phase). Skafu-based members do not attend all lineage activities in Nyanga, and daily visiting patterns reflect the

relative distance between Nyanga and Skafu, with Dabas resident in Nyanga and the new irrigation scheme seeing each other much more frequently than they see Dabas resident in Skafu.

The development of a division within another large lineage along Nyanga/Skafu lines seems more advanced. Each group evidently has its own meetings to discuss matters which are not of major ritual significance, although they do attend each other's rituals. The fact that this is the lineage-section to which Sobantu belongs, and that several of his lineage members are openly antagonistic towards him in the context of political issues such as the secondary school, may however have contributed to the developing division within that lineage. That antagonism does however seem to have arisen as a result of the creation of the new residential areas.

Where there does appear to have been a change, is with regard to the increasing participation of non-relatives in rituals. At the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, "pagans had frowned upon the assistance of unrelated women in preparing the food, arguing that this should be the work of wives of lineage members" (Wilson et al 1952, p 66). In this case, assistance was lent by a number of unrelated abafazana (young married women) of the neighbourhood, who even slept over at Siphiso's home.

In 1950, "Unrelated people, although not invited, are usually present at rituals" (loc. cit.). It is thus normal practice for non-relatives to be present at rituals among the Cape Nguni (see also Hunter 1936, p 244, 267; Kuckertz 1983, p 121; Mc Allister 1979, p 65). However, non-relatives featured prominently throughout proceedings in this case, with some men and women sleeping at Siphiso's home. This contrasts with Hunter's observation among the Mpondo that "The neighbours were only really interested in the feast. Many of them did not arrive until after the beast had been killed" (Hunter 1936, p 244). It also contrasts with the general impression created by the description of lineage ritual in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, that the role of non-relatives was largely peripheral: "Many visitors attend when beer is provided and after a beast has been slaughtered, they add to the general air of festivity with singing and dancing" (Wilson et al 1952, p 66).

This apparent increase in the role of non-relatives in ritual seems

to be at least partly related to the implementation of Betterment, which has broken up the old pre-Betterment residential patterns. Before Betterment the households associated with a particular lineage were usually located in one or a few hamlets, and in some cases, formed fairly coherent residential clusters (see Figures 3 to 6 in Appendix A). Lineage members usually had their fields in the same areas, and sought to keep land within the lineage. People's neighbourhoods and their neighbourhood-based activities had a distinct agnatic aspect. In many cases, one's neighbours were one's kinsmen. By breaking up these old residential clusters, Betterment has placed people in new neighbourhoods, with a much lower kinship density. Social events, such as rituals, have therefore become less exclusively kinship-focused, as they are taking place in a more heterogeneous neighbourhood setting. A number of non-relatives, both male and female, who attended the ukubuyisa ceremony, were from Siphwo's neighbourhood area in the new Nyanga residential area. A ritual is both a kinship as well as a territorial occurrence, as it happens in a particular neighbourhood. Betterment has not undermined lineage solidarity (although, as argued above, there are signs that the new residential areas may be starting to have an effect in this regard). By transforming the nature of the neighbourhoods within which rituals take place, Betterment has made rituals into more public, in the sense of less kin-exclusive, situations. While the central aspects of ritual are still agnatically or even consanguineally based, people participate increasingly in the rituals of the (non-kin) members of their new neighbourhoods.

Another change, which has also seemingly opened out the composition of groups attending rituals, has been the continuing influence of Christianity. As will be argued in the next section of this chapter, this has been enhanced by Betterment.

The ritual separateness of "pagans" and Christians mentioned in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (ibid, p 67; p 130) was not apparent in this ritual. It seems that this distinction may have been stronger in some villages than others, and that it may have been used rather ideal-typically in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. In fact, when presiding over the distribution of the meat among the men in the cattle-byre on the occasions of both the ukutshayelela and the



ukubuyisa phases, Sipiwo said a brief, but explicitly Christian grace.

In no rituals that I have attended in Chatha have I come across, or sensed, the kind of kinship or religious exclusiveness ascribed to pagans in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. Neighbours and non-relatives freely lend assistance, and (with a very few exceptions) Christians freely attend rituals, partaking of meat, beer and brandy.

Most of Chatha is (at least) nominally Christian today, and there has been an established church presence in Chatha for about a century in the form of a church building. With very few exceptions, people do not seem to have any moral or theological problems reconciling the tenets and practices of Christianity and the ancestor cult (see also Pauw 1975). Lay-ministers participate freely in rituals. The fact that the pagan/Christian distinction is no longer socially important also makes events such as rituals less exclusive than they apparently were at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey.

The two examples of the ukubuyisa ritual among Cape Nguni groups which are described in any detail are those by Bigalke for the Ndlambe of the East London district (Bigalke 1969, p 115 - 117) and by Olivier for the Gcaleka of the Transkei (Olivier 1976, p 37 - 39). The case described by Bigalke seems too atypical to enable a useful comparison. The ritual was performed for his father by a man who had no lineal kin living in his village, and who summoned fellow clansmen from neighbouring villages to the ritual. When the sacrificial beast was prodded in order to make it bellow before slaughtering it, it refused to bellow and the ritual was abandoned. Olivier gives a general description of the ritual in which the information concerning social groupings involved in the ritual is of an ideal, rather than a specific nature. He states that all members of the lineage and the clan are advised of the ritual, that members of the lineage are obliged to attend the ritual, that wives of the lineage are distinguished from daughters of the lineage by the fact that the former wear special clothing and beads (Olivier 1976, p 38) and that members of the clan and "relatives" (Afrikaans: verwante) eat the intsonyama meat in the cattle-byre (ibid., p 38 - 39) and that men and women eat separately (ibid, p 39).

Both these cases, while showing broad structural similarities to

the ritual described above in terms of phases as well as of groupings involved, do not usefully lend themselves to a comparison which might help to make sense of possible aspects of detail and group composition in the Chatha case - Bigalke's because it is an incomplete and rather atypical case in the sense that the man performing the ritual had no lineage-mates in his village, and Olivier's because it does not provide any specific detail.

#### CHURCH-BASED ACTIVITIES: A FOCUS ON FUNERALS

By breaking up old territorial and residential patterns, Betterment has served to weaken the importance of the distinction between pagans and Christians reported in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey. By bringing people into concentrated residential settlements, it has seemingly also enhanced the influence of the Christian churches, and particularly the Methodist Church. People are now much closer to the physical building of the Methodist church, and to other Christians, the great majority of whom are Methodists.

Chatha's participation in Christianity is very largely through the channel of the Methodist Church, for historical reasons. The Methodists have a long-established presence in Chatha, and the current Methodist Church building was erected (in what is now part of the new Skafu residential area) just after the turn of the century. The only other church building in Chatha is that of the Catholic Church, which was erected (in what is now part of the new Nyanga residential area) in 1958. The siting of these two church buildings was effected before Betterment was implemented, and thus cannot be related to any post-Betterment considerations, such as the emergence of interest groups based on the new residential areas of Nyanga and Skafu (as discussed in Chapter Eight).

For all practical purposes, Chatha may be said to be a Methodist community. While other denominations, such as the Catholics, the Church of England, the Apostolics, and the Zionists are operative in Chatha, they form small groups (there would not be more than ten Catholic households in Chatha), which lack both the size and organisational complexity of the Methodists in Chatha. Chatha is thus effectively Methodist, not only by force of numbers, but also because

their greater numbers and degree of organisation mean that religious activities which are conducted publicly at village level, and involve participation by members of various denominations (such as funerals), are dominated by Methodist presence and procedures.

The leadership of the Methodist Church in Chatha is male, and is effectively self-selected, consisting of about 20 lay-preachers (usually middle-aged or older men). One becomes a lay-preacher by passing an oral examination in church doctrine and biblical studies, which is organised by the Church. Being an effective orator, or having popular support, are not therefore the criteria by which lay-preachers are elected. While being a lay-preacher undoubtedly involves increased status in the community, and may well be a useful asset in competition in village-politics, it is a position in theory open to all who have the commitment and are prepared to make the effort to pass the necessary tests. Leadership patterns within the Church should thus be understood primarily in Church terms, although they may also be relevant in other contexts within the village.

The three lay-preachers in the senior positions of authority in Chatha are Sobantu (from the new residential area of Skafu), Ngenisile (from the irrigation scheme) and Zolile (from the new area of Nyanga). They occupy different positions in the local structure of the Methodist Church.

Each congregation in the Keiskammahoek area is led by a Society Steward, or if it is large enough, by several Society Stewards. These are nominated by the Methodist Minister for Keiskammahoek, and will usually carry the support of the lay-preachers in the congregation, although the lay-preachers are officially not allowed to nominate candidates, but only to approve or reject the Minister's nomination. All the congregations in the Keiskammahoek area together make up the Keiskammahoek Circuit of the Methodist Church. The Circuit meets quarterly. Meetings are open to all Society Stewards and lay-preachers in the Keiskammahoek area, and are presided over by the Minister. The Circuit is led by two lay-preachers, who are the most senior lay officials under the Minister. They are nominated by the minister, with the Circuit meeting having the right to approve or reject the Minister's nomination, but not (officially) to make its own nomination.

Sobantu is one of the two senior officials in the Circuit. There are two Society Stewards in Chatha, of whom Ngenisile is the senior and Zolile the junior. These three men are all over 70 years of age. Officially, Sobantu has no authority over the Chatha congregation, other than to see that the Society Stewards are running it properly. Unofficially, he appears to exercise considerable influence.

The women have a Manyano Association, which consists of a society of women who get together for purposes of worship during the week, and for organising church-based activities. Prominent in the women's grouping are Sobantu's wife (who is elected to her position by the Keiskammahoek Circuit, largely on the recommendation of the Chatha lay-preachers), as well as a few women from both the new residential areas, who are elected to their positions by the Chatha congregation. In terms of both male and female leadership patterns, church considerations, rather than intra-village interest - groups, appear to be the deciding factor in people's election to office.

Sobantu, as a senior official on the Circuit, is probably able to influence the Minister and the Circuit in nominating officials for the Chatha congregation. Thus his wife and his ally on the school committee (Ngenisile) occupy the leading positions in the Methodist Church at Chatha, albeit with the support of the lay-preachers of Chatha. This does boost the status of the political group that Sobantu leads, and provides it with a source of influence in the village.

The area of religious life in which the Church's presence is most strongly manifested, is not the regular weekly services, but funerals. The regular weekly services are poorly attended (the few services to which I went were attended by less than 20 people), and adhere fairly strictly to the order of service. While weddings are joyous community events, the Church's role in them is actually very limited, amounting to the couple being given an address by a lay-preacher, the singing of one or a few hymns, and a few prayers. In many cases people have been formally married by the Magistrate, or by customary rites, and going through the motions of a Church wedding is of a social and ceremonial, rather than ritual significance. It is the feasting and the other celebratory activities that form the substance of weddings. It is at funerals that the life of the Church in Chatha is most vibrant, and at



which community participation at a religious, rather than a social or ceremonial level, is most marked.

The main events of a typical funeral in Chatha (abstracted from funerals I have attended, and from informant's comments) will now be briefly outlined, after which the nature of the groupings involved will be considered.

When someone dies, kinsmen (both consanguines and affines) are informed and gather at the house of the deceased. There they are joined by friends and neighbours, who have come to commiserate, to pray, to assist with preparations, and generally to express their solidarity with the bereaved family during the days leading up to the funeral. The night before the funeral there may be an all-night vigil of singing and prayers, attended by kinsmen, friends and members of the women's Manyano Association, if the deceased was a Methodist.

On the morning of the funeral, a beast will be slaughtered if the family is able to afford one. While this beast will supply the meat that the funeral guests will be served after the Christian funeral service, it also usefully serves as the sacrificial beast for the ukukhapha ritual, which is the ritual in terms of which a person is "accompanied" on the first stages of their becoming an ancestor. This slaughter is conceived of, and attended, in terms of a lineage ritual, and is not a public, church-based occasion. People (including lay-preachers) state that it often happens that the same beast is used for both purposes, and do not see this as a theological problem at all. In one lay-preacher's words, "You don't know when you will have a beast again. Ukukhapha and a funeral are the same thing". Informants state that this fusion pre-dates Betterment. Pauw cites similar evidence of the ukukhapha ritual and the funeral becoming merged. Ukukhapha "is now performed on the day of the funeral, ostensibly to provide food for guests" (Pauw 1975, p 177).

Some abafana (youths) will dig the grave. Whereas formerly, a grave was dug by the abafana of the village-section of the bereaved household, abafana affiliated to other (previous) village-sections now also help in this task. Thus if a funeral is being held in new Nyanga residential area, the abafana who live in new Nyanga will assist with the digging.

As the time for the funeral (usually about midday) draws closer,

people start to gather at the homestead, the men and the women in separate groups. There are usually a number of women who are gathered, with the principal female mourners, in the hut in which the coffin is lying (or if there are a large number of such women, in several huts). They have been there praying and singing, some right through the night. As people arrive, they will make a small donation (usually of 20c) towards the costs of the funeral. Relatives and members of the deceased's former village-section usually make larger donations. These donations are written down in a book by the person collecting them on behalf of the family. He may or may not be a relative. People sit around, waiting for proceedings to start, chatting in a quite normal and unsubdued fashion.

As the time for the service itself approaches, lay-preachers may go to speak to the mourners gathered in the hut where the coffin lies. The coffin is then brought out, followed by the principal mourners and the other women gathered in the hut.

At this stage of proceedings, the service takes one of two courses, depending on whether the service is to take place at the church, or simply outside the homestead (which happens in the majority of cases). If the service is outside the homestead, the people gather around the coffin. The women, who sit separately from the men, form two groups, viz. the principal mourners (who are usually members of the immediate family and who have blankets wrapped around their bodies, and on occasion, faces), and the rest of the women, many of whom will be dressed in their church association uniforms. The service is led by a lay-preacher (usually by Sobantu or Ngenisile) and consists of various lay-preachers praying and preaching, interspersed with close friends or family members talking about the deceased, and with the frequent singing of hymns. It is decided beforehand by the lay-preachers which ones will take part, and they are not necessarily all Methodists, or whatever the denomination involved may be. Messages of condolence or of greeting, as well as donations from close friends and relatives (who may well be present at the service) are then read out, either by lay-preachers, or by relatives or friends. The coffin is then carried by bearers to the grave, where the people re-assemble.

If the service is to be held in the church, the coffin and the principal mourners are usually transported there by pick-up truck,

with the rest of the mourners walking to the church. The same basic procedure is followed as when the service is held at the homestead, with the coffin and the lay preachers being situated at the front of the church, and the service being led from the pulpit. The architecture of the church together with the constraint of straight rows of seats means that groupings are not as clearly demarcated as outside the homestead, where people can more easily sit in groups. From the church the coffin is transported to the grave, either by bearers, or by means of a pick-up truck.

Men who are agnatically related to the deceased person, (in the case of a woman, members of her lineage) usually form a prominent portion of the pall-bearers, the rest of whom may be relatives, friends or neighbours. In one case no lineage members of either the deceased woman or of her husband (who had died several years before her) were involved as pall-bearers, the majority of whom were characterised by the fact that they came from the same former village-section as the dead woman's husband.

At the graveside, the women again sit in two groups, viz. the principal mourners and the rest, while the men do not appear to organise themselves internally on any clear pattern, with members of the lineage(s) concerned not forming any coherent group. The coffin is lowered into the grave, while one or more lay-preachers conduct the final rites. After they have cast earth into the grave, while incanting a standard Christian "dust to dust"-type invocation, the people file past the grave, taking some soil from a spade and casting it into the grave. They then leave - the women first and then the men, who remain to shovel in the soil and cover over the grave.

People then proceed back to the house, where they sit down outside, men and women in separate groups, and are served food - typically the meat from the beast slaughtered that morning, and potatoes and cabbage, after which tea and bread are served. The food has been prepared by kinswomen (who may be either iintombi zomzi or wives of members of the lineage of the deceased) and by neighbours who have assisted them. It is served in bowls, and is served by younger men who are usually either agnatically or affinally related to the homestead concerned, or who are associated with the former village-section to which it belonged. Visiting lay-preachers or kinsmen from

outside Chatha, together with some of the local lay-preachers and kinsmen, are invited into the homestead where they are served food at a laid table, instead of eating with their hands and a spoon for vegetables, as the rest of the people do outside.

After people have eaten, they go home. Some close relatives (agnates as well as affines) remain behind, spending the night at the homestead. In the morning they will be joined by other kinsmen, and will eat meat especially set aside for them.

In a specifically denominational context such as a regular church service, or in matters of church organisation, denominational membership overrides other principles of association, such as kinship and territory, and is modified in its expression only by the principles of age and sex. In more public contexts, such as funerals, denominational membership, and even Christianity at a non-denominational level, operates alongside principles such as territory and kinship, rather than replacing them.

Thus we see that the beast that is slaughtered to provide food for the congregation after the funeral, may also serve as the ukukhapha beast for purposes of the ancestor cult, although the meat is consumed along non-ritual lines (e.g. there is no ritual-tasting of the intsonyama meat at the killing). The day after the funeral kinsmen eat meat set aside for them. The principle of kinship as a basis of association is also demonstrated in the gathering of kin at the house of the deceased, the distinguishing between the core-group of (kin) female mourners and the other women present, the composition of pall-bearers and the lending of assistance in funeral and food preparations. The principle of territorial association is loosely present in the amount donated by former village-section members, and in the serving of food after the service.

But it is important to note that the principle of kinship that is manifested throughout is not that of the agnatic group as an exclusive entity, but of kinship as a more cognatic principle, operating as a norm of support rather than of descent. There is no attempt as in the ukubuyisa ritual to distinguish an agnatically based group of consanguines, as in the eating of various portions of the sacrificial meat. Agnates as well as affines are involved, and non-relatives are also clearly involved in important parts of the funeral process, such



as gathering at the house before the funeral, helping with preparations, acting as pall-bearers and servers of food.

It could be argued that the widening of the core ritual group from an agnatically based group to an open-ended kinship group which also involved non-kinsmen could be ascribed to weakening of lineage coherence resulting from Betterment. However, this kind of widening of the core group, where the distinction between consanguineal and other kin is effectively not made, is not manifested in the ukubuyisa situation, or even in an essentially territorially organised ceremonial such as an umgidi, where the iintombi zomzi (daughters of the homestead) receive their food and drink separately from other women.

Church-based groupings cut across agnatic and territorial groupings. It seems that it is the specifically church-based nature of a ritual like a funeral that leads to the other two major principles of association, viz. kinship and territory, becoming more flexibly employed in those aspects of church-based activity which are not specifically determined by church doctrine and procedure.

The Keiskammahoek Rural Survey does not give an account of a Christian funeral with which the current situation might have been compared. It argues that "Christianity potentially undermines the principles on which the kinship structure, and to a lesser degree, the social structure are founded", but does not give any detail as to the interaction of Christianity, kinship and territorial groupings. Hammond-Tooke (1962, p 232-233); Hunter (1936, p 350) and Pauw (1975, p 102-104) give accounts of Christian funerals among the Cape Nguni, which are broadly similar in outline to the situation pertaining in Chatha, except that Hunter mentions that a sheep instead of a beast was slaughtered, and that it was slaughtered after the corpse had been interred.

Pauw's account of a Christian funeral in the Transkei is interesting in that the principle of agnation seems to have been more prominent than is the case in Chatha. Members of the deceased person's lineage (Simanga) and their wives had kept watch with the deceased on the night before he died, as they were expecting his death. The grave was dug and the beast slaughtered by Simanga men and neighbours. The coffin was carried to the service and subsequently to

the grave by members of the deceased's lineage. Simanga men who were lay-preachers did not take part in the service, and "were not grouped with the other church leaders, but with their kinsmen" (1975, p 104). Pauw adds that "At a funeral one often hears of the imilowo, the patrilineal relatives, and sees the males acting as a distinct group" (loc. cit.).

There seem to be several reasons for the greater emphasis on agnation in this case which may cast light on the situation in Chatha. Mlanjeni (the area where Pauw worked) had not had Betterment, and there were a number of residential clusters, including "four large clusters of homesteads varying in size between twenty-six and thirty-three, each representing a different clan. Such a large cluster usually consists of two or three closely related lineage groups or fragments of lineage groups" (ibid, p 42). The area was divided along Red/School lines, "and homesteads of the two categories tend to be concentrated in different neighbourhoods or in different parts of a single neighbourhood" (ibid, p 41). Of the School neighbourhoods some were predominantly Methodist, others predominantly Anglican (ibid, p 43), with a Methodist mission having been established in 1898 (ibid, p 45). The Simanga lineage was located in two neighbouring clusters (each of which was partly Red and partly School) and was numerically dominant in the School parts of those neighbourhoods, which were also predominantly Methodist (ibid, p XIV). The Simanga lineage accounted for one-quarter of all Methodists in Mlanjeni (ibid, p 45). The coincidence of the numerical dominance of the Simanga lineage and their adherence to Methodism, meant that Methodism was almost synonymous with being a Simanga in those neighbourhoods. It is therefore not surprising that the principle of agnation should have featured so strongly in this Simanga funeral.

This case suggests that the fact that certain activities are church-based does not necessarily mean that other principles of association become more flexible in such situations, as appears to be the case in Chatha. Christianity provides the potential for principles such as kinship and territory to become more flexible inasmuch as it provides an alternative principle of association. The extent to which this potential for flexibility is realised depends on the degree to which kinship and territorial groupings coincide and so

reinforce each other, as well as the extent to which church groupings coincide with, or cut across these other principles of association. In the Mlanjeni case, kinship, territory and denomination coincided in such a way that they seemed to reinforce each other.

In Chatha by contrast, such a degree of coincidence does not pertain. Betterment has broken up the old residential and territorial groupings. This has resulted in the dispersal of a number of previously residentially coherent agnatic groups (see Figures 3 to 6 in Appendix A for an indication of pre-Betterment residential patterns). This has lent a flexibility to the operation of the principles of kinship and territory, as we have seen in Chapters Seven and Eight, as well as in this chapter. This complements the similar tendency introduced by Christianity. The impact of Christianity has also been heightened by the fact that the community is very largely Methodist, and that Betterment, by bringing people into concentrated residential settlements, has brought the Methodist Church and its activities more directly into people's lives. It is in the light of the interaction of the principle of voluntary association introduced by Christianity, with the impact of Betterment upon patterns of kinship and territory that we should seek to explain the open-ended way in which the principle of kinship operates in church-based situations, such as funerals, in Chatha.

#### AN EXAMPLE OF TERRITORIALLY-BASED ACTIVITIES: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CIRCUMCISION OF A BOY

As was indicated in Chapter Eight, the physical re-organisation of the village area resulting from Betterment has had a significant impact on patterns of political association that were related to pre-Betterment patterns of residence and access to resources - primarily because the change in residential patterns coincided with changed patterns of gaining access to resources. It would seem reasonable to expect that residential relocation would have less impact upon the organisation of activities where such relocation does not necessarily affect the way in which resources are distributed. This is because there would be less direct incentive to change. At the same time, new residential

patterns make for the formation of new social ties, and for changing perceptions of one's own particular sub-grouping within the village as a whole. An area of activity which had been organised primarily on territorial lines, but where one's access to resources is not directly affected by changes in residential patterns, would thus be a useful area in which to assess the impact of residential change on patterns of organisation and association.

Such an area is found in the set of events leading up to the circumcision of a boy (the rite of passage whereby he becomes a man).

Before Betterment, these events were organised predominantly along territorial lines, with a village-section, or two adjoining village-sections in combination, forming the units of organisation. The way in which these units functioned will be explained in the course of discussion.

The account which follows gives an outline and discussion of the main events concerned, and is derived from the observation of a number of such circumcisions, and the activities leading up to them.

A boy may be circumcised on his own, or more usually, together with several of his age-mates. Boys are usually around the age of twenty years when they are circumcised. Whereas before Betterment, boys were usually circumcised with several age-mates from their own village-section (Mills and Wilson 1952, p 205; and oral accounts), this is no longer necessarily the case. Today there is a tendency for boys from the same new residential area (e.g. Nyanga together with the irrigation scheme, or Skafu) to be circumcised together, although on occasion boys from both new areas are circumcised together.

A man's decision to circumcise his son is announced at a beer-drink. The date of the proposed circumcision is announced, and arrangements may be discussed for preparations, such as the fetching of wood for the building of the initiation lodge. Such preparations require assistance, and the beer drink serves both to advertise the coming festivities, and to ask for assistance in getting everything ready.

A few days before the actual circumcision ceremony, a group of men go off to cut saplings for the building of the hut. Where boys from only one of the former village-sections are to be circumcised, it is usually the case that only cattle belonging to households from that



former village-section are used to drag the wood from where it is chopped to where the circumcision lodge is to be built. Men of different former village-sections usually come along to help. Where boys of different former village-sections are being circumcised together, the various sections are supposed to cut saplings separately, taking the wood to the site of the lodge with oxen from the village-section associated with that particular initiand. In the words of a 20 year old uncircumcised boy: (If a boy from a household associated with the former village-section of Jili and a boy from a household associated with the former village-section of Nyanga are to be circumcised together), "the men from Jili and from Nyanga (i.e. from households associated with these former village-sections), go to fetch the wood separately, and when they reach the place where the hut will be, they will pool the wood and build together". In practice, this does not appear to happen frequently. More usually, the various parties will pool cattle and fetch wood together, with men of their own and other sections helping.

New residential areas appear to be becoming bases of co-operation. Thus, when boys from the irrigation scheme have been circumcised, cattle have been supplied by their own households, as well as by members of the irrigation scheme belonging to different former village-sections. When initiands have come from either Nyanga or Skafu, men coming to help fetch wood have been predominantly from the residential area concerned. This kind of selective assistance would make sense, as most of an initiand's friendships have been formed in the new residential areas. Where initiands are from both new areas, men from both new areas come and help.

By contrast, and for the same reason that friendships would have been formed mainly in one's own hamlet and village-section before Betterment, a boy was circumcised together with age-mates from his own village-section, and assistance was obtained mainly from within one's own village-section (Wilson et al 1952, p 16).

After the wood has been left at the site of the lodge, the men repair to the houses of the initiands for food and drink, going from house to house in turn. The men usually sit outside the cattle byre, on a log, or simply on the grass or the ground. The men of about 40 years and above sit separately from the abafana (i.e. circumcised

young men of up to 35 or 40 years of age, who might be married and have homesteads of their own, although many abafana are single men).

On arrival the men are served with tea or coffee and bread. This is served by several younger abafana of the former village-section of the initiand's household who carry the kettles full of tea and coffee, together with buckets containing enamel mugs and also buckets containing chunks of freshly baked bread. These younger abafana are referred to as abafana bancinci (young abafana).

A bottle, or several bottles of brandy are then produced. Brandy is served by a man taking the bottle and a tot-glass around, and giving each man a tot in turn. Where there is only one bottle, both the men and the abafana will be served brandy by the same server (injoli), with the men usually being served first. Where there are two bottles, the men and the abafana will each get a bottle, with each group being served by an injoli of their own age-group. The iinjoli (servers) may be from the same village-section as the initiand, but on occasion are not. The procedure is more informal at a gathering after chopping wood or hut-building than at the celebration on the night before circumcision, when as will be seen, former village-section distinctions are more strictly observed. For these more informal gatherings, it seems to suffice that the servers are from the same new residential areas as the initiand.

Beer is also served, having been brewed by the women of the house. It is carried out to the gathering in three legged pots or in plastic drums. It is then ladled into bekile, or smaller tin containers which are passed around. The beer may be carried out by men or abafana of the same former village-section as the initiand's household, or by relatives (usually agnates). The beer is ladled into the smaller containers and may be distributed (by putting a bekile down in front of a group of men) by the server or someone else involved in the proceedings, such as the initiand's father. People disperse once the beer has been consumed. If there are several initiands, they will go on to the next initiand's house, where they will be served in like fashion.

A day or two later, the men meet at about 8 am at the site of the lodge, to build the hut. The men are mostly from the new residential area from which the initiands come. Where initiands from both the new

Nyanga and the new Skafu residential areas are involved, men from both these areas will come and help. The bulk of the work is done by the younger men. At various stages during the work, breaks may be taken, when beer and brandy are served. The brandy is supplied by the fathers of the initiands. Where several initiands are being circumcised, the father of the senior candidate, or a close relative, will direct proceedings, deciding when to take breaks, allocating bottles, etc. Again, the servers may or may not be from the former village-section of the initiands concerned, although where youths of only one former village-section are being circumcised, the servers usually are from that section.

After the lodge has been built, the men repair to the houses of the initiands going from one to the other in turn, where they are again given food and drink. There may be some samp and vegetables, which is served in large enamel bowls placed before a group of men, so that several men will eat, either with spoons or some other utensil, from the same bowl. Tea and coffee with bread are again served by the abafana bancinci of the former village-section of the initiand's household, and beer and brandy will be served as before.

On the day before the initiands are due to be circumcised, they are shaved in the cattle-byre of their homestead. Unless the initiands concerned are close agnates, each initiand will be shaved separately at his own homestead. The initiand is usually shaved by an agnate, his head being shaved clean by means of a clipper and razor blades. Men of the initiand's former village-section are exhorted to attend the shaving, and the men and abafana who attend this early morning ceremony (from 5 am onwards) are predominantly former village-section members and agnates, including clansmen from other former village-sections. A bottle of brandy is produced and distributed. The server is usually an agnate, rather than a former fellow village-section member. On three separate occasions, the server was respectively a lineage member from the same former village-section (once) and a clansmen from a different former village-section (twice).

The ukungcamisa ritual also takes place at the same gathering as the shaving. A goat is slaughtered and meat from the right foreleg (the intsonyama portion) roasted on a fire and given to the initiands present. On one occasion when two close agnates were being initiated,

the ceremony took place in only one cattle-byre, with two goats being slaughtered, and each initiand was given the intsonyama portion from a separate goat. The men in the cattle-byre are then given roasted meat from the goat. Current ukungcamisa proceedings appear fairly similar to those described by Mills in Burnshill village in 1950 (Wilson et al 1952, Appendix B).

If there is to be beef available at the feast later that afternoon, the beast will be slaughtered at this time. The beast is killed in the same manner as in a more explicitly ritual situation, such as the ukubuyisa ceremony discussed earlier in this chapter. As with the slaughtering of the ukungcamisa goat, the ancestors are held to be present at the slaughtering of the beast. Thus on the morning of an umgidi in December 1981, the following comments signified the approval of the ancestors: "the beast bellows"... "they have agreed" - "I say the old men have agreed...the Bhele (a clan) ancestors have agreed". The slaughter of the ukungcamisa goat and of the beast (with the agnates eating the liver of the goat in this particular case), emphasises that initiation has a ritual and agnatic, as well as a territorial dimension.

Women belonging to the lineage or clan of the initiand (iintombi zomzi) are allowed into the cattle-byre, and come in to speak to the initiands, to assist with preparations and cooking, and to receive food and drink.

This incorporation of the "daughters of the homestead" rather than the daughters of the former village-section, emphasises the discreteness of the agnatic group. Women married into the lineage do not come into the cattle-byre, which is associated with the ancestors. This discreteness of the agnatic group will again be emphasised later in the day's proceedings at the feast, and as with the ukubuyisa ritual, shows that the territorial dispersion of the lineage with Betterment has not seriously altered conceptions of the agnatically based grouping as a discrete group for ritual purposes.

Although the daughters of the homestead are singled out symbolically, it is however, the wives who are singled out to do the work. The cooking and preparations for the feast fall to the women married into the former village-section, and particularly those below about 35 years, the abafazana. Abafazana of former village-sections



other than that of the initiand may however be seen lending assistance with preparations.

After they have been shaved, the initiands go off to the forest for the day to gather leaves and medicines for the circumcision the following day. They return to the village in the afternoon, and on their return the series of imigidi (feasts sing. umgidi, pl. imigidi) begins, with the initiands and the people proceeding from the household of one initiand to another in turn. The order in which households are visited is determined beforehand.

People sit in various social groupings at imigidi which emphasise the grouping principles of age and sex and, in the case of the iintombi zomzi, agnation, to receive their food and drink. Men of over about 40 years sit inside the cattle-byre, while abafana sit outside the cattle-byre. Women of over about 35 years sit together, while the abafazana congregate around the cooking hut, where they are also doing most of the work. Outside the cattle-byre, and in a group on their own, are iintombi zomzi. Uncircumcised boys and unmarried girls congregate afterwards in a hut, where they receive food and beer and dance all night.

Meat and cooked vegetables (usually potato, samp and cabbage) are dished into large enamel bowls and a bowl allocated to a group of men (who are not officially seated in any pattern) or to abafana. The person supervising the distribution of the food need not necessarily be an agnate or a former village-section colleague. There are a few men who perform this service at imigidi in the new Nyanga area, cutting across former village-section lines. The food is normally announced by the household head or a senior male agnate in a brief speech. After the food has been eaten, tea, coffee and bread are served by the younger abafana of the former village-section concerned. The initiands sit in a corner of the cattle-byre, and are served food separately. Up to this point some abafana and young girls may have been sitting with them, eating and talking.

Brandy and beer are then brought in. The brandy bottles are usually carried in by the household head and/or male agnates, a bottle in each hand, and laid down in the cattle-byre. The beer is usually carried in in three-legged pots or plastic drums by abafana of the lineage and the former village-section. By this stage the young girls

and abafana have left the cattle-byre. On one occasion an umfana was ordered to leave, and it is sometimes announced "men inside, abafana outside". The conversation hushes and the male head of house announces that there are so many bottles of brandy and so many drums or pots of beer. These are then allocated to the men in the cattle-byre and to the abafana. Brandy is the more highly prized drink, and the men will usually be allocated about two-thirds of the bottles of brandy, while beer will be more evenly divided between the two groups. Women are allocated beer and brandy separately. Men then thank the head of house for his hospitality on behalf of their village-section or hospitality group.

Beer may be served immediately, being poured into smaller tin containers and put in front of a group of men. Beer is thus drunk without men forming into any particular groupings (other than separating themselves from the abafana). With brandy, it is different. If there are enough bottles of brandy allocated to the men (usually about ten bottles), these are apportioned on the basis of former village-section, and men are given tots of brandy by servers, after grouping into three drinking sets of two former village-sections each. If there are not enough bottles, the men will drink brandy in the same way as beer, i.e. without forming any special groupings. In such cases, it is not necessary that the server is from the former village-section of the initiand. In one case where there were five bottles for the men, these bottles were distributed by three servers associated with the old Nyanga village-section, whereas the initiand's father was from the old Skafu village-section, although living in the new Nyanga residential area. As with the distribution of food, there are several men who function as servers at imigidi in the new Nyanga area, regardless of the old village-section of the initiand's household.

If there are enough bottles, their distribution becomes much more formalised. Someone will formally allocate bottles of brandy on the basis of former village-section, holding up each bottle in turn and calling out the names of the former village-sections or their sub-headmen. The man who allocates the bottles is usually either an agnate or from the same former village-section, although in one case a man was asked to allocate the bottles at an umgidi held at the

homestead of a maternal kinsman.

In a case in December 1981, where three initiands from the former village-section of Nyanga, resident in new Nyanga, were to be circumcised, bottles were allocated by a clansman from the former Nyokane village-section.

Fourteen bottles were announced, and he called them as follows:

Madoda! (name of the Komkhulu sub-headman)

Velile! (name of a former Zondi sub-headman)

(Komkhulu and Zondi are the two sub-sections of the former Nyanga village-section, each of which have their own sub-headmen)

Sobantu! (name of the sub-headman of the former Skafu village-section)

Mzantsi! (a reference to the former village-section of Rawule)

Mafani! (surname of the sub-headman of the former Jili village-section)

Johnson! (name of the sub-headman of the former Nyokane village-section)

Thulani! (name of the sub-headman of the former Ndela village-section)

Gxulu! (a neighbouring village)

Mnyama! (a neighbouring village)

Nongawuza! (a reference to the nearby village of Mnqukwane)

Ikhaba! (a reference to the abafana, who got three bottles)

(The remaining bottle was allocated to the men of the former Nyanga village-section as the umgidi was being held at a household associated with the old Nyanga section.

The former village-sections combine as follows to receive brandy: Nyanga and Skafu; Ndela and Nyokane; and Rawule and Jili. These combinations are the same hospitality groups as men sat in before Betterment, and are known respectively as: "Komkhulu" ("those of the great place" i.e. the seat of the chief or in this case, headman. This must not be confused with the sub-section of old Nyanga of the same name, which is part of this larger Komkhulu); "Phesheya" ("those from across the way"); and "Mzantsi" ("those from down below there"). While it happens on occasion that the men from e.g. Komkhulu may be served their brandy by two iinjoli, one from Nyanga and one from Skafu, or that the men from e.g. Mzantsi may be served by two iinjoli,

one from Rawule, and one from Jili - as often as not, one injoli suffices for all the men of the two-section unit. Each visiting village distributes its bottle among its present members.

If the men sit in essentially the same groupings as before Betterment, it needs to be asked why bottles are apportioned (or at least, publicly apportioned) by former village-section, rather than the hospitality groups referred to above.

A number of men in the village, including Siyandiba himself, tell the following story to explain this. Before Betterment, brandy had played a relatively small role at umgidi, with only one or a few bottles being drunk. These were distributed without any ceremony, the injoli simply serving everybody in the cattle-byre in turn. If there was enough brandy, the abafana might get a bottle.

After Siyandiba became headman in 1950 (and still before Betterment), his son Khayaletu was circumcised. He was given a large number of bottles of brandy for the occasion, including one from each of his seven sub-headmen. When he was announcing the food and drink he apportioned the bottles by village-section, calling out the names of the sub-headmen. It seems as if at that umgidi, and for some time in the future, brandy was served to men who had divided up their hospitality groups into their constituent sections, and who were grouped by village-section. The old pattern then seems to have re-asserted itself, and the combinations re-emerged, although people still continue to allocate brandy by village-section when there are enough bottles to do so.

What is perhaps most significant about Siyandiba's contribution to umgidi groupings, is that today it is effectively only for brandy that men now group into territorially-based associations. Men do not now form such groups to consume meat and beer as they did in the past, but do so for brandy, as they say they did not do in the past.

Men coming into the cattle-byre may sit next to anybody. Little clusters based on former village-section membership and on the hospitality groups discussed above, do tend to form - although one could certainly not speak of these as approximating three large, coherent groupings corresponding to the three combinations. It is only with the arrival of the brandy, i.e. after the meat and some beer has been consumed, that any public attempt is made to get people into



groups.

When the brandy is being brought and announced, servers or leading members of a hospitality group try to get their members to sit together as a group. People may move as individuals of their own accord, so that it is not as if the men all get up and regroup themselves at the same time. By the time brandy is being served, the men are usually grouped in more or less coherent territorially-based associations. The details vary however. In November 1983, at a rather late stage of proceedings, when brandy was already being served, a number of men got up and moved to their respective sections. On another occasion in December 1981, it was raining as the brandy was being allocated. People were already fairly coherently grouped. There was a brief, informal discussion between the men and their servers as to whether it was necessary to arrange the gathering formally. The meeting felt that as it was going to rain hard fairly soon, formality was not in order. Men received their brandy, which was distributed by servers from the three hospitality groups, leaving soon afterwards. Where groups are not discretely seated, the server of the group concerned will act as a further sorting mechanism, giving tots to his members outside already formed clusters. The actual situation is therefore fairly flexible.

At an umgidi in December 1983 the server for Jili and Rawule (Mzantsi hospitality group) served men seated in a long row along the wall of the cattle-byre. At the edge of the group was a man from Nyanga. The server allocated tots as follows: the Nyanga man - Jili - Rawule - Rawule - Rawule - Rawule - Jili (this man gave half of his tot to a friend from Nyanga) - Jili - himself (several tots) - back down the row, finishing with the man from Nyanga. People may and do on occasion give their tot to a friend of a different former village-section or hospitality group. This is seen as being quite acceptable. A man should not however actively seek to obtain brandy from a bottle belonging to a group other than his own. People say that such a man would be told to go back to his own group's bottle, and I have not seen men trying to obtain brandy in this way when e.g. their group is larger than another. If a man, particularly an older man, is seated with his friends and out of his group, he will however not be denied a tot.

There seems to be some flexibility in bottles not specifically allocated to a particular Chatha village-section. So a bottle allocated to another village like Gxulu may be drunk entirely by the few Gxulu members present, or shared with their friends in Chatha, regardless of former village-section. Similarly a bottle may be allocated to the iindevu (i.e. the greybeards) and is theoretically only for the older men of the initiand's former village-section. In practice, old men from other former village-sections are given tots from that bottle. A bottle may be allocated to the headman in respect and in gratitude for his allowing the circumcision lodge to be built on Chatha territory. The present headman is a teetotaler, and this bottle may be appropriated by his former village-section (Nyanga), or spread around.

The distribution of brandy to men at imigidi gives symbolic expression to the emotional significance that particularly the older men still attach to their former village-sections. An articulate caller can use names, surnames, clan-names and even nicknames relating to village-sections and their present or former sub-headmen to evoke the old distinctions and to create a feeling of well-being for people who achieved their adulthood and many of their memories in the old village-sections. Thus at an umgidi held at new Nyanga for two initiands from the old village-section of Ndela, the caller allocated a bottle to Ndela, as well as calling a bottle for a man (long dead) who had been a previous Ndela sub-headman. He had lived in the junior hamlet in Ndela, and under him his hamlet had enjoyed considerable status.

The old territorially-based hospitality groups have weakened to the extent that they no longer operate for the distribution of meat or beer among men, functioning only when there is a fairly large amount of brandy. For practical purposes (situations of plentiful brandy apart), the new residential areas of Nyanga and Skafu are taking on the role of hospitality groups, although servers not infrequently are from the relevant former village-section. A few individuals regularly act as servers at imigidi in the new Nyanga area, regardless of their former village-section affiliation. The question arises as to why new hospitality groups have not been formally developed, which operate along the lines of the new residential areas, particularly if the

growing political tension between them is taken into account.

Two possible reasons suggest themselves. Firstly, the old hospitality groups consisted of groupings smaller than the new residential areas. The old village-sections were units characterised by internal political and economic co-operation, where people had a strong sense of moral unity with neighbours of several generations' standing. The new residential areas are too large and too recently established for people to have developed that sort of intimacy, and (as evidenced by patterns of agricultural co-operation), neighbourhood ties have been slow in developing. Secondly, the old village-sections of Nyanga and Skafu were part of the same hospitality group (Komkhulu) before Betterment. The sense of ceremonial unity established between the two former village-sections across several generations would tend to count against the formation of new ceremonial groupings in which former partners were in a sense opposed to each other.

Bigalke (1969, p 37-38) worked in the Ndlambe district of Tshabo near East London, where the new residential groupings arising out of Betterment often resulted in the members of hospitality groups being widely separated. A few years after Betterment, people were considering forming new hospitality groups which would coincide with the new residential areas. People were becoming reluctant to attend feasts outside their own residential areas if they were old or if the weather was bad. When he went back to the field in 1978, Bigalke (personal communication, November 1985) found that "It would seem that the 1969 idea of changing izithebe (hospitality) groupings had not been translated into action. The names of the pre-Betterment groupings still came up in 1978-1981, and there were no new izithebe groupings". In spite of the fact that people were widely separated from members of their hospitality group, (more widely separated than in the case of Chatha) the composition of the izithebe groups had not changed, although it was not clear to what extent people were still participating in these groupings.

In order to understand why people have not formed new hospitality groups, we need to consider the interplay of factors of inconvenience and inappropriateness, such as the size and non-intimate nature of the new residential areas, and factors of sentiment and affection, such as

older people's attachment to their former village-sections and the sense of autonomy that they associate with life in their old hamlets before Betterment.

The question remains as to why the old hospitality patterns should be temporarily resuscitated at imigidi when it comes to the drinking of brandy. It may be argued that because brandy is a luxury, people wish to group themselves in such a way that they would get as much brandy as possible, or at least a fair share, and that grouping into hospitality groups would ensure this. This argument does not however, seem to hold much force. It is only when there is a lot of brandy that people form such groups to drink it, i.e. when the risk of being served short is less. In any event, some hospitality groups are larger than others, depending on the size of particular former village-sections, and the number of members of each section present on the day. Food and beer are quite acceptably apportioned without people having recourse to regrouping themselves. There appears to be no clear argument on grounds of optimising distribution, for drinking brandy in such groups.

I suggest that brandy is a highly prized drink, which has taken on a range of symbolic associations, and which would serve as an appropriate medium through which to symbolise people's attachments to their old village-sections and the relationships they developed there.

Until 1961 Black people in rural areas were not legally allowed to buy spirits over the counter without a permit. This restriction was lifted in terms of an amendment (Act No 72 of 1961) of the Liquor Act (Act No 30 of 1928). This restriction, coupled with the price of a bottle of spirits in relation to a rural household's income, has contributed in part to brandy being seen as a "special occasion" drink. This scarcity-value of brandy ties in with informant's accounts of imigidi in the years before Betterment, when there was usually only one, or at most a few bottles available..

These days brandy is more freely available, in at least three senses. Firstly, the restriction on Black people buying brandy has been lifted. Secondly, people's real incomes have risen by 169 per cent since 1950. Thirdly, brandy has become accepted as currency in communication with the ancestors, which oral accounts suggest was not the case to nearly the same extent before Betterment. Brandy is thus



more freely available, and is able to be publicly consumed, at a wider range of occasions than was the case previously.

Brandy seems to set the seal of approval on an event, or to make it complete. So, for instance, a man coming home from a migrant contract could not hold his head up in front of his kinsmen and community if he did not bring a bottle or two back with him. Bridewealth negotiations would be incomplete, perhaps even improper without the bridegroom's party producing the brandy. And an umgidi would indeed be a humiliation to a family that could not produce at least a couple of bottles on the day. Because of its social and (on occasions) ritual appropriateness and its scarcity-value, brandy serves as an appropriate symbol through which to express people's attachment to their old village-sections; their regrouping into old hospitality groups for its consumption, becomes a celebration of enduring and valued relationships, and a fitting end to proceedings at an umgidi.

The abafana (young men of up to about 40 years) sit separately from the men, and usually outside the cattle-byre. They receive their food and drink, as they did before Betterment, as a single, undifferentiated group. Each former village-section theoretically has its own abafana servers, appointed by the abafana of that section.

In fact, the serving of brandy amongst the abafana is tending to be organised more and more along the lines of the new residential areas. There are several abafana servers in the new Nyanga area, who are mainly associated with old Nyanga, Ndela, and Nyokane. They serve at imigidi held in the new Nyanga area or on the irrigation scheme, whether the households of the initiands concerned are from their own former village-section or not. When speaking to abafana about the organisation of distributors at imigidi, it is evident that the distinctions between particular former village-sections are becoming less clear. Several senior abafana living in the new Nyanga did not know who the appointed injoli for the old Skafu section was. Although abafana from the new Nyanga and new Skafu areas attend ceremonies and feasts in both areas, there have been signs of tension between the abafana of the two areas, and they attend occasions in their own residential area on a more regular basis.

The fact that abafana do not, and never have, grouped themselves by sections at imigidi, has probably served to hasten the process of

ceremonial identification with the new residential areas. Unlike their parents, the abafana have acquired their friends and associations, not in the old village-sections, but in the context of the new residential areas.

The declining importance of the old village-sections for ceremonial and hospitality purposes among the abafana is also shown in the decline of the "Christmas" feasts. Once a year, the abafana and girls associated with a former village-section would club together, buy a sheep and brew some beer, and have a feast. This was a less elaborate continuation of a similar celebration described in the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey (Wilson et al 1952, p 160). The last "Christmas" feast for the abafana of old Nyanga seems to have been held early in 1979. Informants in both the new Nyanga and the new Skafu areas cannot give reasons for its disappearance. A new institution, whereby a group of young people from the whole of Chatha go for a picnic excursion somewhere in the Ciskei around Christmas time, is emerging, and is organised by the youth of the new Skafu residential area.

Like men, women divide into groups on the basis of age, with women of about 35 years and older sitting together as a group. It seems that before Betterment, women sat in the same three hospitality groups as did the men. They are served with tea, bread and coffee, and with meat and vegetables as the men are, without moving into any hospitality groups. The way in which women receive alcohol is, however, different. They do not organise themselves into hospitality groups, but stay together as a group. The village-section of the initiand is however symbolised by the identity of the server, as the brandy is distributed by women married into the former village-section associated with the initiand's household. At an umgidi in December 1983, brandy was distributed by the mother of the initiand, as well as by women married into her husband's lineage and clan. The three servers were described as all being married into the same lineage. The younger women (under 35 years) congregated around the huts where the cooking was being done, and were mainly married to men from Ndela (the former village-section to which the initiand's household belonged). These younger wives (abafazana) were doing most of the cooking and preparation for the celebration. They received their food

and brandy as a group.

Women are thus classified into groups for ceremonial purposes on the basis of their husband's former village-section affiliation, both for distribution of hospitality (through female iinjoli) and for purposes of recruiting assistance. There is however one important exception, viz. the iintombi zomzi (daughters of the homestead). They occupy a privileged position as regards both preparation and distribution of food. This group congregates separately from the other women and abafazana at imigidi, usually gathering outside the cattle-byre, or in a hut. They do not take part in the preparations for the imigidi, and receive their food and alcohol separately, with women from among their own number serving as distributors.

We have thus seen that the residential relocation brought about by Betterment has had a marked impact on the organisation of activities and the formation of groupings in relation to the preparation for a youth's circumcision. Before Betterment, these events had been organised on a village-section basis, and ceremonial groupings reflected people's village-sections and also combinations of village-sections. While not absent, the discreteness of the former village-section has become eroded as the basis for the recruitment of initiands for a lodge, and for the organisation of activities such as the supply of cattle and labour for the fetching of the wood to build the hut, the building of the hut itself, and the distribution of brandy and beer during work-breaks and (among the abafana), during imigidi. Increasingly, it is the new residential areas that are becoming the unit around which these activities are organised. The area in which the discreteness of the former village-section seems to be most preserved, is in the preparation and serving of food. The abafazana (young married women) who cook the food and the abafana who serve it, are mainly recruited from homesteads of the same former village-section as that of the initiand. It would make sense that this more private and domestic aspect of activities should show less evidence of change than the more public aspects discussed above, which involve the presence of larger numbers of people.

The other major change has been the virtual disappearance of the old hospitality groups among adults, which are activated only for the distribution of brandy. The changes have been more thorough among the

women, who no longer regroup into hospitality groups, but merely appoint distributors from the appropriate former village-section. Such hospitality groupings also used to operate at weddings, but they have also fallen away in that sphere.

One must thus deduce that residential relocation has significant impact upon patterns of association based upon pre-relocation territorial groupings and that with time new patterns, related more directly to new territorial arrangements, will emerge. This is happening among the abafana, who increasingly identify themselves with their new residential areas, and has effectively happened in the case of the youth associations, whose membership consists predominantly of uncircumcised boys, and schoolgirls. Whereas, before Betterment, these associations were organised along village-section lines, (Wilson et al 1952, p 158 ff) they are now organised along the lines of the new residential areas of Skafu and Nyanga. These youngsters have never lived in the old hamlets and village-sections, and have formed most of their friendships and ties in the context of the equivalent (although, larger) unit, viz. the new residential area.

This contrasts with the position in Burnshill, where youth groups are still recruited along the old territorial lines (Manona 1980, p 129). The fact that their composition has not changed, is probably related to the fact that the old residential areas on which they were based, have remained much the same as before Betterment.

Also serving as a principle of association during these activities is the principle of agnation, for a man cannot perpetuate his lineage until he is circumcised, and therefore able to marry, and the ancestors are involved in the proceedings - as is shown by the ukungcamisa ritual and the beast which is slaughtered. The principle of agnation is manifested in activities such as the shaving of the initiands, the slaughtering of the goat and beast, the presence of the iintombi zomzi in the cattle-byre during the slaughtering, and by the fact that they receive their food and drink separately at imigidi.

As with the ukubuyisa ritual, we see that kinship-organised activities are differently affected by residential relocation than territorially-based activities, and are much better able to withstand the impact of such relocation. The basis of their organisation is not explicitly territorial, and the patterns of residential proximity



effected by Betterment have not made it much more difficult than before Betterment to sustain such relationships.

### CONCLUSION

Unlike agriculture (Chapter Seven) and village politics (Chapter Eight), ritual and ceremonial activity have not been affected by major changes in Chatha's wider environment, such as the development of new forms of local government or party politics, or changes in agricultural policy and extension practices. Perhaps the most significant change for ritual/ceremonial purposes, has been the greater availability of brandy, which has had an impact upon the organisation of imigidi, and which has increasingly become incorporated into ancestor ritual. The basic changes that have taken place in ritual and ceremonial activity thus seem to be related more directly to the impact of the residential relocation resulting from Betterment, than has been the case with politics or agriculture.

The same three basic principles of ceremonial and ritual association active at the time of the Keiskammahoeek Rural Survey (viz. kinship, territory and Christianity) are still operative, and are still cross-cut by the complementary principles of age and sex. The way these three basic principles of association currently operate and interrelate, seems to be related to the impact of Betterment. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, considerations relating to wealth and education do not seem to be relevant for ceremonial and ritual purposes, although they certainly do afford people status in a general sense.

Although Betterment has led to the dispersal of lineage and clan members through breaking up the old residential hamlets, it has led to a modification, rather than to a decline of kinship-based ritual activity. While lineage-section members may no longer be living next to each other, they are mostly within easy walking distance of each other. The expression of lineage-section solidarity as evidenced at important rituals such as the ukubuyisa ritual, does not appear to have been seriously compromised by residential relocation. The composition of the kin-based group at such rituals has not shown any significant change, with agnates, consanguines and affines attending

and participating in much the same way as before Betterment. There are however signs that a process of segmentation, along the lines of the two new residential areas of Skafu and Nyanga, is beginning to take place, with kinsmen attending rituals and meetings in the new residential area in which they reside, more frequently than in the area in which they do not reside. To the extent that this is happening, new territorial groupings arising out of Betterment are affecting processes of kinship-based association.

The new residential and territorial groupings have also meant that people have in many cases found themselves with non-neighbours as kinsmen. The neighbourhood context within which kinship rituals take place has changed, having less kinship-density than before Betterment, and this has resulted in the increasing attendance and participation of non-kinsmen at kinship-based rituals. This does not appear to have compromised the integrity of the more private, more specifically kinship-focused aspects of such rituals, although it has meant that the wider congregation within which the kin-core operates, has become less kinship-focused, and more public.

Groupings which before Betterment were recruited exclusively on territorial lines, have been much more severely compromised by residential relocation. Before Betterment, activities relating to e.g. preparations for the circumcision of a boy, were organised along village-section lines. Today the significance of groupings based on former village-section membership in such activity is considerably less. These activities are increasingly becoming organised along the lines of the new residential areas of Nyanga and Skafu, with the irrigation scheme becoming closely identified with Nyanga. The decline of the significance or discreteness of former village-section based groupings, is greatest in the more public aspects of such activity, such as the cutting of saplings for building the initiation hut, the building of the hut, and the festivities. Correspondingly, the decline of the role of these former village-section based groupings has been least in the more private aspects, such as the shaving of the initiands, the preparing and the serving of the food (as opposed to its more public distribution).

Related to the declining role of the former village-section based group, has been the decline of the old hospitality groups, which had

been based on combinations of former village-sections. They now come into play only at the distribution of brandy at imigidi, and this seems to be an attempt by the older men to use a highly prized drink such as brandy, as a means to express their attachment to the old territorial groupings and to the relationships that they developed there.

The impact of residential relocation upon groupings based on pre-Betterment territorial lines has been even more marked among younger people, who have not spent most of their lives in the old hamlets and village-sections, as their parents had. The abafana (some of whom spent the first ten or fifteen years of their lives in the old areas, and so have some attachment to the old categories) are increasingly identifying with their new residential areas. While still using the language of the old village-sections when talking about their ceremonial activities, those activities are effectively organised along the lines of the new residential areas, with distinctions between former village-sections becoming blurred.

The organisation of the youth associations, whose members consist predominantly of uncircumcised boys, and schoolgirls, is run directly along the lines of the new residential areas. Before Betterment, they were organised along village-section lines. However, today's youngsters in Chatha have never lived in the old hamlets and village-sections, and have formed their friendships and ties in the context of the equivalent (although larger) new residential areas.

This fact may explain why an aspect of the events leading up to a boy's circumcision, which may seem private rather than public, (viz. the selection of the initiands who are circumcised together) has not retained more of a village-section character. Boys wish to be circumcised with their friends, who are recruited mainly along the lines of the new residential areas, and without apparent regard to considerations of former village-section.

Although groups recruited along kinship and territorial lines before Betterment have been affected by residential relocation, those which were recruited exclusively along territorial lines have (rather predictably perhaps) been most affected, with such groups showing greatest change among younger people.

Christianity provides a principle of association (viz. that of

voluntary association based on personal belief) which cuts across the principles of kinship and territory. This makes for a greater flexibility in the way these latter two principles are employed, with groupings based on kinship and territory becoming more open-ended. This process has been in operation in Chatha for nearly 100 years, long before Betterment was implemented, and has been strengthened by the fact that Chatha has always been essentially a one-denominational community, viz. Methodist. This unifying effect across kinship and territory was, however, somewhat offset by the development of a division between pagans and Christians.

It is not clear from the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey what the importance of this division was in Chatha, or what forms it took. Discussions with people about the history of their families or of the village, do not create the impression that it was a significant social or theological division in Chatha. It was probably a matter of emphasis, with people subscribing (as they do now) to a blend of ancestral and Christian beliefs, and with some people being relatively more pagan and others relatively more Christian.

In any event, the distinction has no apparent social importance in Chatha today, and this seems at least partly due to the implementation of Betterment, as well as to other factors, such as the continuing impact of formal education. By bringing people into concentrated residential areas with new neighbours, Betterment has brought people who were relative pagans and people who were relative Christians, into increasing everyday contact with each other.

The lines along which church-based activities are organised (i.e. voluntary association) have not been affected by the territorial changes resulting from Betterment. However, the impact of Christianity via the Methodist Church seems to have been enhanced by Betterment. People are now closer to the church building, to more Christian people, and to church-based activities. In making for a greater flexibility in the operation of groupings formed along territorial or kinship lines, church based activities complement a similar tendency resulting from the residential relocation arising out of Betterment.

Ritual and ceremonial groupings are becoming increasingly open-ended. While the focus of a particular grouping will still be



kinship-based, or territorially-based, or church-based, it is no longer exclusively so. Non-kin participate increasingly in kinship-focused rituals, territorial lines are blurring and becoming more broadly defined, and the pagan/Christian distinction is of no major significance.

This opening out of such groupings is part of a long historical process, and can be related to a number of factors such as the impact of Christianity, migrant labour (with its implications for relationships between men and women, and migrants and their parents) rising population density, land shortages, and formal education. The impact of Betterment has however had the effect of accelerating this process by breaking up old residential patterns and territorial groupings. It is in terms of the implementation of Betterment that the scope and the rate of change in the composition of ritual and ceremonial groupings in Chatha, may best be explained.

### CONCLUSION

This dissertation has attempted to assess the social and economic consequences arising out of the implementation of a type of agricultural scheme, known as Betterment Planning, in a rural village in the Ciskei homeland of South Africa. Betterment involved the re-organisation of the village area into clearly demarcated residential, grazing and arable areas. This re-organisation involved the residential relocation of the people living in the village, and this dissertation has focused largely on that relocation, and its consequences.

It has been argued in Chapter One that the existing literature on relocation is of limited use in seeking to understand social patterns in Chatha in the early 1980s. An attempt has accordingly been made to develop and apply a framework which would enable me to come to terms with those social patterns.

The theoretical literature on relocation focuses on the element of stress associated with relocation, with the most clearly developed position being that of Scudder and Colson. Apart from various problems relating to the concept of stress itself, (e.g. problems of measurement, and of differing individual and group experiences of, and response to, stress), stress-focused approaches to relocation operate at a fairly high level of generality. This limits their ability to account for responses to different types of relocation. The applicability of such stress-focused models is effectively limited to the most stressful period of the relocation process, i.e. the period immediately before the move, the move itself, and the first few years of adjustment afterwards. People's accounts of being relocated in Chatha, as well as accounts of relocation arising out of Betterment and villagisation elsewhere, (discussed in Chapter Five) echo some of the characteristics of relocatees under stress, as described by Scudder and Colson in the "transitional stage" of their model of the relocation process. The degree of stress-avoiding behaviour appears to be less in the case of villagisation than in the case of larger scale relocation projects. This suggests that the degree of stress undergone has been less in the case of villagisation, where a less drastic modification of people's environment has resulted.

The stress-based model loses a good deal of its explanatory power when applied to communities which have passed through the period of adjustment after relocation. As the people of Chatha were relocated in the mid-1960s, they can no longer be held to be in the transitional phase of the relocation process. Although it can account for the fact that people become more innovative and risk-taking in their behaviour once they have passed through the transitional stage, a stress-based analysis is unable to account for the particular kinds of groups and patterns of relationships that then develop in a community. Such a stress-based analysis would not be able to explain why groupings relating to e.g. agricultural co-operation, political competition or ceremonial activity take the form that they presently do in Chatha.

An environmental approach to the study of the social impact of relocation has been advanced in Chapter One, in which it is argued that relocation modifies people's physical and social environment in a number of important ways. People respond pragmatically to change, seeking to adapt as best as possible. Different kinds of relocation transform people's environments in different ways (across, as well as within communities) and we may reasonably expect people to respond to relocation in different ways, according to the nature of their new circumstances.

On the assumption that people respond pragmatically to their situation (whether in a risk-avoiding way at some stages of the relocation process, or a more innovative way in other phases) a broadly transactionalist approach would potentially seem to be most useful in seeking to make detailed sense of people's responses to relocation. Within the context in which they find themselves, i.e. their sociocultural, economic and physical environment, people seek to achieve a number of goals as effectively and appropriately as possible.

Relocation presents people with a modified environment, and with a modified set of opportunities and constraints relating to the goals they wish to achieve. People may respond by either changing the means by which they seek to obtain their goals (e.g. by opting to join the irrigation scheme in Chatha, rather than continuing to make a living as a migrant labourer), or they may change their goals (e.g. they may stop competing for access to arable land, and rather seek to obtain

the most favourable access to certain strategic resources, such as the proposed secondary school in Chatha). Alternatively, if the new circumstances are not sufficiently changed, it might not be in people's interests to change their behaviour patterns (e.g. patterns of agricultural co-operation in Chatha today are substantially the same as they were before Betterment, as old friends and partners are still within easy walking distance of each other).

The value of such a transactional type of approach is that it potentially enables one to account for different kinds of response within the same community, as different aspects of community life, and different individuals, are likely to be differently affected by relocation (e.g. the reasons why the main two political rivals in Chatha employ different kinds of arguments and strategies, relate, *inter alia*, to the size of their respective residential areas).

Most of the ethnographic literature on relocation in Africa is concerned with large-scale resettlement programmes, arising out of dam construction (e.g. Aswan, Kariba), or irrigation or large agricultural schemes (e.g. Gezira, Mwea, Shimba Hills, the Zande Scheme). Some smaller schemes (e.g. the Niger Project) have involved placing people on large holdings, where they have become residentially dispersed, rather than more clustered, as is usually the case in most resettlement schemes. The closest comparable cases to Chatha, in terms of the kind of environmental modification involved, appear to be the villagisation schemes arising out of land reform and Ujamaa in East Africa, and out of administrative considerations in Algeria and (what are now) Zaire and Zimbabwe. The literature on such villagisation does not tell us much about the social consequences of the relocation involved, and gives only very general information on issues such as those that I have attempted to discuss in detail in this dissertation, such as patterns of agricultural co-operation, political competition or ceremonial and ritual association. There is thus little material in the literature on comparable instances of relocation in Africa that may be used to illuminate my findings in Chatha.

There is a growing body of literature on relocation within South Africa. Most of it has however focused on types of relocation rather different to that resulting from Betterment, viz. relocation relating



to the implementation of the Group Areas Act (No 41 of 1950), to the formation of relocation townships in the Black homelands, and to the formation of closer settlements in the homelands.

A number of people have written on Betterment and reference has been made to their work in this dissertation. While discussing social relationships within Betterment areas in general terms, they provide little detailed information in this regard. The major exception is Bigalke (1969), who provides detailed information on ceremonial groupings and some detail on patterns of economic co-operation. The central concern of his work was, however, not with the social consequences of Betterment. It is thus fair to say that this current dissertation presents the most detailed account to date of the social consequences arising out of Betterment relocation in South Africa.

Analyses of relocation in South Africa (including some analyses of Betterment, e.g. James 1983; Yawitch 1981) have sought to understand it in terms of the implementation of the South African government policy of "apartheid" or "separate development". While this policy undoubtedly is at the root of much of the relocation that has taken place in South Africa, it seems that such relocation cannot be adequately understood as relocation, within an essentially political explanatory framework, such as the South African political economy. This would run the risk of reducing all instances of relocation to manifestations of government policy, thereby potentially losing sight of other important variables which would help explain differences in response to different experiences of relocation. Instances of relocation relating to Group Areas, to homeland townships, to closer settlements and to Betterment are all intimately bound up with South African government policy, which cannot be divorced from our understanding of them. They are, however, four different kinds of relocation, involving four different kinds of environmental transformation, and potentially different kinds of social consequences, for the relocatees concerned. (Within each broad category, the circumstances of particular cases of relocation may also vary widely. In the Ciskei and the Transkei, Betterment has usually involved people moving within their village or immediate surrounding area, from old to new residential settlements, while in Lebowa, Trust farms originally planned as Betterment areas have effectively become

closer settlements, accommodating people coming from other areas.) It is hoped that the focus on environmental transformation advanced in this dissertation will contribute to a more detailed understanding of the social consequences of relocation in South Africa.

Shortly after the Tomlinson Commission's report had been published in 1955, several anthropologists wrote in strong terms about the destructive social effects that its implementation would have. Krige and Krige (writing in the context of the Lovedu people) argued that Betterment would lead to: the undermining of family life; a growing individualism; the destruction of the system of checks and balances inherent in Lovedu political structure, with the resulting decline of law and order; the disruption of kinship networks; and a structural cleavage between the estimated 90 per cent of the Lovedu population who would have to be moved off the land to allow for viable economic units, and the remaining 10 per cent, who would have all the land (Krige and Krige 1956, p 19-20). Their concluding judgement on the Tomlinson Commission's proposals as a whole (of which those on Betterment were only a part) was as follows: "So little sociological insight is there in the recommendations of the Tomlinson Report, that so far from preserving Bantu social life, we can think of no more effective means (short of those adopted in the Russian Revolution) of breaking down and sweeping away the whole of the social order" (ibid, p 21).

Hellman argued in similar terms, asserting that the implementation of the Tomlinson Commission's proposals would sweep away "the old Bantu culture...in its entirety" (Hellman 1957, p 2).

Although Betterment has had a decided impact upon social relationships, and has broken up some social groupings and weakened others, or made them more flexible, nothing of the scale envisaged by the Kriges and by Hellman has occurred in areas such as Chatha. The Tomlinson Commission's proposals were not implemented in their entirety. Betterment itself was implemented in a highly watered down form from that proposed by the Commission, and could therefore not have succeeded in its intention to create viable agricultural communities. Had its proposals been fully implemented, the Tomlinson Commission would have led to a far-reaching transformation of the environment in which rural Black people found themselves, and so could

potentially have had the kind of social consequences predicted by the Kriges and by Hellman.

An attempt will now be made to draw together the various ethnographic themes discussed in this dissertation and to account for the particular impact that Betterment has had in Chatha, by considering the way in which it, together with various other political and economic factors, has affected the physical and social circumstances in which the people of Chatha find themselves today.

Three major changes have taken place since the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, which have affected the lives and relationships of people in Chatha, viz.

- a) the implementation of Betterment
- b) changes in the wider political environment, viz. the homeland policy, and specifically the introduction of the Tribal Authorities system of local government as well as of party politics
- c) the rise, over 30 years, of the real value of cash incomes by 169 per cent.

These three changes interact with each other and with ongoing processes such as labour migration, formal education, Christianity and a limited amount of permanent emigration from Chatha. One cannot consider the impact of Betterment in isolation from other changes and processes, all of which are combining to transform the environment in which the people of Chatha find themselves, and within which they act. Although Betterment has introduced specific changes, the impact of these changes are best understood within this wider context.

Household size has remained much the same as it was 30 years ago, partly because then, as now, there are factors constraining young married men with their own families from starting their own homesteads. Thirty years ago, the constraining factor was shortage of arable land, and landless young men tended to stay in their parents' homesteads until they received allotments. Today, the constraining factor is shortage of residential sites, as the new residential areas are now full. The phenomenon of a bounded residential area is a direct result of Betterment. If household size starts rising because an increasing number of young men cannot obtain residential sites in the village, and cannot find a foothold elsewhere, this will be as a consequence of the implementation of Betterment.

Although roughly the same number of households are headed by widows as at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, household structure has been somewhat modified by the fact that the percentage of household members (predominantly men) working away as migrant labourers has risen. This in turn means that a higher percentage of households are effectively headed by women, either as widows, or as the wives of absent migrants.

While there are probably a number of reasons for this increased migration rate, two factors have certainly played a role. Their combined impact is such that the rate of migration would have risen, even if the fact that an unusually high number of men were employed in replanting the Chatha forest at the time of the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, is taken into account. As a result of the fact that Betterment has taken away 60 per cent of arable land in Chatha, land-holdings are smaller and a lower percentage of households have access to arable land (whether formally or informally) than before. As a result, households have become more dependent upon migrant labour. The second factor has arisen quite independently of Betterment, viz. that the real value of cash incomes has risen by 169 per cent over 30 years. This rise serves as an added incentive for people to go to work in the cities.

Betterment has effected a fundamental change in the allocation of arable and grazing land, which before Betterment was organised along the lines of the old village-sections. Control of the allocation of land has effectively been taken out of the hands of the villagers. As anticipated in Chapter One (p 54), this has had a significant social effect, as it has transformed the relationship of people to resources. The village-section no longer serves as the most important internal political unit in the village. Together with the fact that its former members are now residentially dispersed, the rationale for its serving as a political unit, viz. the allocation of land, has fallen away.

The re-allocation of arable land resulting from Betterment has also had a fundamental effect upon the distribution of arable land between households. Whereas before Betterment, actual land-holdings varied widely in size, Betterment has brought about two types and sizes of arable holding, viz. the irrigation allotments of 1.5 morgen each and the dryland allotments of .5 morgen each.



Betterment has created a kind of inequality that did not exist before, viz. that found between households with irrigated allotments (who are substantially better-off than before in agricultural terms) and households with dryland allotments (who are substantially worse-off than before in agricultural terms). It has also increased the relative size and the rate of growth of the landless group in Chatha, by removing arable land. The distinction between (dryland) landed households, and landless households has however become economically less significant as the dryland allotments are now so much smaller.

The fact that Betterment has created two types of arable holdings, has led to two different sets of cultivation practices. With one exception (who hired out his plots for the 1984/85 season), the irrigation settlers' plots are mostly cultivated, either by themselves, or by people to whom they make a few plots available. Betterment has provided them with a worthwhile resource (irrigable land), of which they make use. On the other hand, Betterment has taken a lot of their land away from the drylanders, and a large number (up to 50 per cent in some years) do not cultivate their fields. Many people do not find the inputs or energy required to cultivate .5 morgen of dryland worthwhile when measured against the returns. This is in clear contrast to the 1949/50 season when all households sampled in Chatha cultivated their fields. In many cases, these fields were considerably larger than .5 morgen, and provided yields large enough to make cultivation a worthwhile enterprise.

Dryland households are able to forego the possible yields from their diminished holdings only because there has been such a substantial increase in real cash incomes over the last 30 years, which enables them to be able to buy their food. Had there not been this substantial increase, an unintended result of Betterment might well have been a starving community. Although people are agriculturally worse-off than before, they are better-off in an overall sense, as their overall income is higher.

An area where one would have expected substantial changes is in the area of inter-household co-operation. Before Betterment, their neighbourhood and village-section was the area within which people co-operated and assisted each other. This was reflected in patterns of agricultural co-operation. With the formation of the new residential

areas, one would have expected such patterns to have become focused on the new neighbourhoods. However, patterns of agricultural co-operation today still strongly reflect the influence of old territorial ties, with 66 per cent of cultivating households finding assistance from their former village-section mates (whether kin or non-kin), and only 30 per cent from people in their new neighbourhoods.

Betterment has brought people closer together in residential terms, and they do not have to walk very much further today to maintain a relationship with a former village-section mate, than they had to before Betterment. As such, there is no clear reason why people should not continue to cultivate with their old friends and partners. This contrasts with Bigalke's finding that agricultural and general economic co-operation were focused on the new residential areas (Bigalke 1969, p 10-11). This seems understandable, as the new residential areas were far apart (*ibid*, p 8) and one's former associates were not as readily accessible as is the case in Chatha.

Within the context of that group of old friends and partners, there has however been a slight change in emphasis. There is now a slightly higher degree of co-operation with kinsmen than before, with affines playing a more prominent role than before. The range of kin to which people turn for assistance, has stretched, which makes sense when one considers that agnates and lineage-members are no longer co-residents to the extent to which they were before Betterment.

It is not that new neighbourhood ties are not forming. Neighbours are in and out of each other's houses all day, and are spoken of and gossiped about, with affection. However, people still walk up and down the village to visit their kinsmen and old pre-Betterment neighbours and friends. The scattered residential hamlets before Betterment had lent themselves to the formation of fairly coherent and intimate neighbourhood groups. It was in that context that most of the household heads in Chatha today formed their close friendships and kin ties. The fact that everybody is now within fairly easy walking distance (at least within each residential area) means that people can now maintain regular contact with a wider range of people than before. The concept of neighbourhood and of kinship seem to have stretched; people are not as dependent upon, or seemingly as intimate with, their

immediate neighbours or kinsmen as they were before Betterment.

While Betterment has created different kinds of agricultural opportunities, it has created another kind of opportunity as well, viz. that for entrepreneurial activity. People have been brought together into concentrated residential settlements, which have a functional network of roads running through them. This new situation has provided potential entrepreneurs with a market, which is all the more viable because of the fact that there is more money circulating in the community as a result of the rise in the real value of wages. A number of people have responded to these opportunities, (in the same way as some people responded to opportunities offered by the irrigation scheme), starting shops, and various other undertakings.

There are thus three broadly distinguishable kinds of income groups in Chatha today, viz. the entrepreneurs, the irrigation settlers and the drylanders. Drylands yields are too low to make for any meaningful economic distinction between landed and landless households, which both depend upon money derived from wages and pensions for their livelihood.

These three income groups do not however form the basis of political groupings within the village. Such groupings are rather to be explained in terms of certain changes within the wider political system of which Chatha is a part, as well as in terms of the new residential groupings that have resulted from Betterment.

Betterment has taken the allocation of land out of the hands of the villagers, and this has taken power away from the headman. This, together with the introduction of the Tribal Authorities system of local government, and the rise of the Ciskei National Independence Party, has meant that the villagers have lost a large degree of the control that they had enjoyed over their own affairs before Betterment. The government policy of separate development, in terms of which this loss of power has taken place, has, however, also provided increased budgetary allocations from the South African government for the development of the homelands. This has resulted in infrastructural development, with more schools, clinics, roads, agricultural services, etc. becoming available for distribution in these areas. The proliferation of the local bureaucracy that the homeland policy has created, has also presented villagers with

increased opportunities for seeking political patronage to help them further their own interests.

The prizes for which groups compete within Chatha have thus changed, largely as a result of Betterment and of these changes at a wider political level. Groups no longer compete for the headmanship, and for control of arable and grazing land. They now compete for favourable access to infrastructural developments coming into the village, such as schools and the clinic.

Although the nature of the prizes has changed, the nature of the political groupings has changed in content, rather than in kind, remaining territorially based. Before Betterment, competition was conducted between village-sections, for access to land, and between the north and the south of the village for the headmanship (as demonstrated in Chapter Three). Today competition runs along the lines of the two large new residential areas of Nyanga and Skafu. While the fact that there are two large areas tends to promote the development of two factions, this tendency is also furthered by the nature of prizes such as the clinic or the secondary school. Like the headmanship, they are indivisible. Because of the lay-out of the village, such infrastructural developments will be placed in such a way as to favour one residential area at the expense of the other, as the only possible "neutral ground" is taken up by the irrigation scheme. This encourages the development of competition along binary, factional lines. Where the prize was divisible, as arable and grazing land were before Betterment, competition was conducted along village-section lines. Today the allocation of drought-relief jobs is an example of a divisible prize, and distribution is organised along the lines of the old village-sections, and not along the lines of the new residential areas.

Betterment, together with the rise in the value of real wages, has encouraged the development of entrepreneurial activity in Chatha, and this is reflected in the emergence of an entrepreneurial type of leadership in the village. It is characterised by Sobantu and his group, and contrasts with the more formal style of leadership, characterised by Maboyis. As demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the entrepreneurs of Chatha are not a unified group, being divided along the lines of the new residential areas, and this type of leadership



does not as yet constitute a serious threat to its more formal counterpart. Sobantu the entrepreneur and Maboyis the headman used different strategies and arguments in their attempts to attain their goals, partly because of the relative size of their respective support groups, which are related to the relative size of the new residential areas resulting from Betterment.

Some ceremonial and ritual activities have shown more change than others. As anticipated in Chapter One (p 54-55) activities based on kinship ties or church ties have not changed as much as those based on territorial ties.

Kinsfolk are still close enough to each other to be able to attend important events and rituals, and the composition of the group of kinsmen participating in central aspects of such activities, does not appear to have changed significantly. The new territorial patterns are however beginning to make themselves felt. There are signs that people prefer to attend kinship activities held in their own residential area. While this is in a sense a question of convenience, it suggests that the new residential areas may be having an affect upon the way people perceive and evaluate their relationships to kinsmen, emphasising relationships with those kinsmen in their own residential area, regardless of actual genealogical relationships.

The new residential areas have also seemingly affected the composition of the wider group attending kinship-based activities like the ukubuyisa ritual discussed in Chapter Nine. The new neighbourhoods are less kinship dense than the old neighbourhoods were before Betterment, with the result that neighbourhoods, and with them the people attending kinship rituals and activities, have become more diverse and open-ended.

Church-based activities likewise show little evidence of change in their organisation, which was never territorially based, although they seem to have grown in importance, as a result of the fact that people are now living closer to the church building, and to on-going church activities, such as funerals or meetings in the neighbourhood. Households that were more pagan and households that were more Christian before Betterment now live next to each other, and the pagan/Christian distinction is of no social significance in the village today.

Christianity continues to act as a alternative principle of association, cutting across the principles of territory and kinship. In this regard it complements the effect of Betterment, which through the formation of new residential areas, has also cut across kinship and former territorial groupings. In the context of Betterment, Christianity cuts across the new residential areas, which are forming separate social units in various other contexts.

Ceremonial activities which were based on pre-Betterment territorial groupings, have undergone the greatest degree of change, with changes being more far-reaching among the youth.

The old hospitality groups have largely fallen away, and are revived only for the distribution of brandy at circumcision feasts, and then only when there is sufficient brandy. As the focus of people's everyday relationships, the new residential areas are increasingly becoming the focus of ceremonial organisation. This contrasts with Bigalke's (1969) finding that the old hospitality groups were active in the Thsabo area near East London. It should however be borne in mind that he was doing research a few years after Betterment, when the new residential areas had only recently been established. As it was, people were contemplating changing the composition of hospitality groups to fit in with new residential patterns (Bigalke, 1969, p37). When he went back to the area in 1978, some fifteen years after Betterment, he found that the old hospitality groups were still in existence, and that no new groups had been formed (Bigalke, personal communication 1985). It is not clear to what extent they were still active, i.e. whether they were falling away, as in Chatha, or were still functioning in the same way as before Betterment.

Among the abafana (youths) the distinctions between the old village-sections are becoming increasingly blurred, and their ceremonial activities are for all practical purposes organised along the lines of the new residential areas, where they have spent most of their lives. While having spent some time in the old village-sections as children, most of their experiences and loyalties relate to life in the new residential areas. Among the teenagers, there is no trace of the former boys' associations (iibhavu - pl.), which were based on the old village-section lines, and a number of them are not familiar with

the term ibhavu (sing.) at all. As might be expected, their groupings today are based entirely on the new residential areas, which are what they have known all their lives. The old territorial grouping has been substituted for the new. Manona reports that the old ibhavu groupings are still functioning in Burnshill (Manona 1980, p 129-30). This appears to relate to the fact that the residential areas on which these groups were based before Betterment have not been fundamentally transformed by Betterment, in contrast to what has happened in Chatha.

Whereas the community can be divided into three groups for purposes of ranking income, viz. the more successful entrepreneurs, the irrigation settlers and the rest of the village, this ranking of income does not appear to correlate itself to any clear patterns of social stratification. Status is derived from various sources, such as education, being a lay preacher, serving on the various village committees, having children and grandchildren, having a commanding presence - as well as having material possessions.

The successful entrepreneurs in the village, and particularly the two shopkeepers, are seen as wealthy, and on occasion are spoken of as greedy. Attitudes towards them are, however, rendered ambivalent by the role that they play in village-politics and life. They serve as an important source of credit in the community. The Nyanga shopkeeper serves on the local committee of the Ciskei National Independence Party (C.N.I.P.) and is seen by the villagers as representing their interests in this regard. The Skafu shopkeeper's father is Sobantu, who plays a leading role in church and school matters. Like the shopkeepers, the other entrepreneurs in Chatha are influential members of either the Nyanga or the Skafu political faction, and are tied to other people in the village in this way.

Possible antagonism towards entrepreneurs is further modified by the fact that, with one exception, they have all been born and raised in Chatha, and so are bound to their clients by ties of kinship, village-section, residence, and affection. The exception is the Nyanga shopkeeper, who is an outsider, having arrived ten years ago. He has involved himself in the community, attending community events and meetings, although to a lesser extent than the other entrepreneurs, who have been born in Chatha. He recently demonstrated his identification with the village by having his son circumcised in

Chatha, although his natal home is in the Transkei.

There does not appear to be a division developing between the irrigation scheme and the rest of the village. Although people on the irrigation scheme are substantially better off than drylanders, this has not been a barrier to social intercourse within the village. People visit, attend ceremonies, marry and lend agricultural assistance without any apparent regard to the river and the fences between the irrigation scheme and the rest of the village.

There are various reasons for this. The irrigation settlers do not push their good fortune down the throats of the drylanders, many of whom are envious of the irrigation settlers, and wish that they had joined the scheme at the time. The fact that one-third of the irrigation farmers make some of their plots available on a sharecrop or hire basis to drylanders, probably also helps to soften antagonisms. There is little talk about theft from the fields of the scheme, and drylanders do not feel that they are charged exorbitant prices for produce. What antagonism there is, is towards one or two individuals, who are seen as being selfish, by not allowing drylanders to cultivate those plots that they themselves do not use.

Most of the heads of houses who moved at Betterment, or their wives, are still alive. They moved with already established bonds of kinship and village-section, which now continue to tie them to people in dryland households. This contrasts with the situation in Lebowa, where the agriculturally better-off households on the development projects were not bound by such ties to the rest of the community which had moved in more recently, and where agricultural labour was recruited on a contractual basis, with evidence of social differentiation between the two sections of the community (James 1983, p 25, 28; 1984, p 10).

People in Chatha today are bound to each other by a wider number of ties than they were before Betterment, as they are linked to each other by pre-Betterment, as well as by post-Betterment territorial ties. This has had the result that on the whole, groupings have become less exclusive and more flexible in the context of the new residential areas. With the passage of time, this flexibility may lessen, as older people die, and as ties to the old pre-Betterment groupings fall away. Groups may develop which are based more strongly



on economic considerations, or on the lines of the new residential areas. The entrepreneurs and the irrigation settlers may emerge as more distinct social groupings than they are at present, and political and ceremonial activity are likely to become organised along the lines of the new residential areas to an increasing extent.

The extent to which this kind of economic or territorial exclusiveness will assert itself, will depend on a number of factors. If the division between Nyanga and Skafu becomes stronger, this will soften distinctions between the irrigation settlers (who identify with Nyanga) and the rest of the village, as well as between the entrepreneurs (who at present identify with their respective residential areas) and the rest of the village. Most people in Chatha marry within the village, and Chatha is effectively a one-denominational village. People are becoming better educated, with an increasing number of young people becoming teachers or civil servants. These cross-cutting factors will in their turn influence the nature of groupings in the village, as will any significant economic or political changes in the wider environment (such as e.g. the effective abolition of influx control, the emergence of a new political party in the Ciskei, rising wages, or rising unemployment).


The changes in patterns of social relationships that have taken place in Chatha since the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey are in large part due to the way in which Betterment has transformed the village environment, and the way in which this change has interacted with wider political and economic changes. Within this modified environment, people have continued to pursue their various economic, moral and social ends, some of which have themselves become modified or changed. Pre-Betterment patterns of association have changed to the degree to which they have become inappropriate or inconvenient as a means of expressing and meeting people's goals in the post-Betterment situation, and to the degree to which new patterns have become more convenient or appropriate in this regard. Current patterns of association reflect elements of both the old and the new orders. The way in which they may change in the future will depend on the interplay of factors discussed in the previous paragraph, and the way in which those factors combine to modify the physical and social environment in which the people of Chatha live their lives.

APPENDIX A: Figures Relating to Land Use and Residential Patterns  
Before and After Betterment in Chatha

- Figure No.1: Chatha Before Betterment, Showing the Distribution of Village-Sections
- Figure No.2: Chatha After Betterment
- Figure No.3: Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Nyanga
- Figure No.4: Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Ndela
- Figure No.5: Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Jili
- Figure No.6: Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Skafu
- Figure No.7: Post-Betterment Residential Area: Nyanga - Main Section
- Figure No.8: Post-Betterment Residential Area: Nyanga - Sub-Section Kwili
- Figure No.9: Post-Betterment Residential Area: Skafu
- Figure No.10: Post-Betterment Residential Area: Irrigation Scheme


APPENDIX A: Figure No.1.: Chatha Before Betterment, Showing the Distribution of Village-Sections

(Not drawn to scale)



APPENDIX A: FIGURE NO.2. Chatha After Betterment

(From Native Affairs Department, Ciskei, Plan No. C1566: not drawn to scale)





APPENDIX A: FIGURE NO.3.

Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Nyanga (hamlets: Platana and Kwili)

(showing distribution of lineages and clans at household level)

Lugwali    Lugwali    Ntusi    Luthi    Mgamama    Mgamama    Ndlazulwana  
 (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Cirha)    (Nguni)    (Thembu)    (Thembu)    (Mbuyisa)

Jama        Pama        Dibela    Koti        Ntusi        Yaze        Mbolekwa    Stemela    Dhenge  
 (Dlamini)    (Tshezi)    (Miya)    (Gqwashu)    (Cirha)    (Leta)    (Mkhwane)    (Jola)    (Cirha)

Lugwali    Lugwali    Mgamama    Mbhalo        Gcilitshana    Ntusi        Momothi    Ndlazulwana  
 (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Thembu)    (Dlambulo)    (Radebe)    (Cirha)    (Krila)    (Mbuyisa)

Koti (Gqwashu)        Mbhalo (Dlambulo)

Sodumo        Mbhalo        Mbhalo        Gcilitshana    Momothi    Rode        Gcilitshana  
 (Dlamini)    (Dlambulo)    (Dlambulo)    (Radebe)    (Krila)    (Qhinebe)    (Radebe)

Dhenge (Cirha)

Lugwali    Lugwali    Lugwali    Lugwali    Lugwali  
 (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)

Rode        Lugwali    Lugwali    Lugwali    Lugwali    Pama  
 (Qhinebe)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)    (Tshezi)

Jama        Jama        Sodumo    Yalezo    Yalezo  
 (Dlamini)    (Dlamini)    (Dlamini)    (Bhele)    (Bhele)

Pama (Tshezi)

Nduku (Kwayi)

Pama (Tshezi)

(The lineage with which each household is associated, is underlined (e.g. Pama), and the clan with which it is associated appears in brackets, either below or next to, the household (e.g. Tshezi))

APPENDIX A: FIGURE NO.4.

Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Ndela (hamlet: Ndela proper)  
 (showing distribution of lineages and clans at household level)

						<u>Dingeni</u> (Tshezi)	
						<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)	
						<u>Ngxafane</u> (Sukwini)	
						<u>Ngxafane</u> (Sukwini)	
						<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)	
	<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)					<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)	
	<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)			<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)	
	<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)	<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Nkohla</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)	
				<u>Dingeni</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)	<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)
		<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)	<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)
			<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)				<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)
<u>Ngxafane</u> (Sukwini)	<u>Ngxafane</u> (Sukwini)	<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)	<u>Singqomo</u> (Tshezi)
		<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)		<u>Pama</u> (Tshezi)	<u>Mboso</u> (Mqocwa)	<u>Ngxafane</u> (Sukwini)	
				<u>Dingeni</u> (Tshezi)			

(The lineage with which each household is associated, is underlined (e.g. Pama), and the clan with which it is associated appears in brackets, either below or next to, the household (e.g. Tshezi))



APPENDIX A: FIGURE NO.6.

Pre-Betterment Village-Section: Skafu

(showing distribution of lineages and clans at household level)

				<u>Tontsi</u>						
				(Bhele)						
<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Gcilitshana</u>						
(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Radebe)						
<u>Tontsi</u>				<u>Tontsi</u>						
(Bhele)				(Bhele)						
<u>Tontsi</u>				<u>Mgujulwa</u>						
(Bhele)				(Tolo)						
<u>Tontsi</u>										
(Bhele)										
<u>Gcilitshana</u>	<u>Mpuqa</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Gcilitshana</u>
(Rhadebe)	(Cirha)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Rhadebe)
<u>Gcilitshana</u>	<u>Gcilitshana</u>	<u>Gcilitshana</u>	<u>Gcilitshana</u>	<u>Mpuqa</u>	<u>Bhaliwe</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Tontsi</u>	<u>Gcilitshana</u>	
(Radebe)	(Radebe)	(Radebe)	(Radebe)	(Cirha)	(Dlamini)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Bhele)	(Radebe)	
										<u>Gcilitshana</u>

(The lineage with which each household is associated, is underlined (e.g. Tontsi), and the clan with which it is associated appears in brackets, either below or next to, the household (e.g. Bhele))





APPENDIX A: FIGURE NO.8.

Post-Betterment Residential Area: Nyanga - Sub-Section Kwili (50 households)  
 (showing distribution of households of former village-sections)

KEY

- KEY A = Nyanga
- B = Ndela ..
- C = Nyokane
- D = Rawule
- E = Jili
- F = Skafu


		<u>NYANGA</u>					<u>KWILI</u>				
		A	A	A		C	A	A	B	A	street 4
		B	A	A		A	A	A	A		
			A	E	B	B	D	A	B	A	street 3
C	A	A	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	B
	A	F	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	street 2
			D	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	B
B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	street 1



APPENDIX A: FIGURE NO.10.

Post-Betterment Residential Area: Irrigation Scheme (24 households)  
 (showing distribution of households of former village-sections)

KEY      A = Nyanga  
               B = Ndela  
               C = Nyokane  
               D = Rawule  
               E = Jili  
               F = Skafu







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Keiskammahoek Files: Assistant Resident Magistrate, Keiskammahoek, etc, Miscellaneous, 1882 - 1886

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##### (a) Department of Native Affairs

- i) Report 1945-1947 (UG No 14/1948)
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- iv) Planning Committee (Ciskei) (1952a) Report on Gxulu Location, District of Keiskammahoek. (source: Keiskammahoek Magisterial Offices, File No (47) N2/11/3/9 - Rehabilitation - Gxulu Location; held at Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Ciskei)
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