

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
IN THE SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF
ZIMBABWE**

BY

**SHUNGU AGNES GWARINDA
STUDENT NUMBER: 208093684**

**SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION)**

**FACULTY OF ARTS
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY**

DATE: November 2012

**SUPERVISOR: PROF R.S. MASANGO
CO-SUPERVISOR: PROF D. TAYLOR**

Abstract

This study is an interpretive analysis of the roles of NGOs in the social policy process, using the case of postcolonial Zimbabwe. Assessing the period between 2000 and 2010 and the prevailing unique socio-economic and geopolitical crisis, the study engages the major contextual factors influencing evolution of NGOs and their engagement in the policy process. It focuses on the conceptual and state – civil society contestations on the legitimacy of NGO's as well as an assessment of their impact on the social policy process.


NGOs in Zimbabwe have played two major and two minor roles in the social policy process as identified in the study in terms of their prominence and impact on the policy process. That is: policy implementer role complementing state social policy provision, democratisation to pluralism the social policy arena as the major roles; educational role to developing interventions for better social policy and watchdog role monitoring government and other state institutions in meeting the social policy needs of citizens.

The thesis argues that analysis of NGOs is embedded in understanding the role of the state and dialectical relationship between state and civil society. Using a neo-Marxist perspective and social democratic approach to the role of the state in social policy, the theoretical generalisations of the study are that NGOs have a legitimate role to play in the social policy process. However, this is defined by the nature and role of the state itself as central driving agent in social policy. Therefore, the roles NGOs are not exclusive in themselves but are anchored within the contextual framework and its definition of societal spheres within it.

The thesis established the evolution of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe, its impact on the social, political landscape and argues that the democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe requires a political solution embedded in a transformative state as the panacea for building a redistributive and participatory social policy agenda that engages with non-state actors, NGOs included within a developmental framework. Conclusively, the thesis proposes a theoretical distinction between NGOs as service oriented entities and CSOs as forums for associational life and civic engagement.

DECLARATION

I, Shungu Agnes Gwarinda, declare that this thesis in its entirety is my own original work and has not been submitted for any other degree at another university. Due reference is made for all the sources used in this thesis. This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy – Public Administration Degree in the Faculty of Arts at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.



Signature

Date: 29 October 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My completion of this thesis was anchored on the encouragement, engagement and support from 3 significant individuals who dedicated themselves as thinking partners with much patience through this process; my father, Professor Takawira Gwarinda, my supervisor Professor Masango and my study buddy and brother, Tafara Gwarinda.

My colleague through our joint SANPAD PhD journey, Elizabeth Lubinga has been an inspirational voice of motivation and provided a sisterhood to share the joys and pains of the accomplishment we sought to achieve.

Lastly, to my mother, Clara Agritha Gwarinda and sister, Tsungai Cecilia whose groundedness held me steadfast to see this project through to its completion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
LIST OF TABLES	xii
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY.....	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	4
1.3 Purpose of the Study	5
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	6
1.5 Research Questions	6
1.6 Justification of the Study.....	6
1.7 Delimitation of the Study.....	8
1.8 Definition of Key Terms	8
1.9 Overview of Chapters	9
CHAPTER TWO: THE STATE, NGOs AND THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS	11
2.1 Introduction.....	11
2.2 An Overview of the Concept of the State.....	13
2.2.1 Development of the Postcolonial State in Africa	19
2.3 Defining Civil Society: An Overview.....	24
2.4 Non-Governmental Organisations as Civil Society Organisations	27
2.5 Theories on Civil Society	30
2.5.1 Historical Perspective of Theories on Civil Society and NGOs.....	31
2.5.2 Contemporary Theoretical Perspectives on Civil Society	34
2.5.3 A Critique of Theories on Civil Society and NGOs.....	37

2.6	The Social Welfare Policy Process.....	42
2.7	Social Policy in Postcolonial African States: Implications on NGO development	49
2.7.1	Socialist-oriented Post-independence Era: 1960 – 1980s	49
2.7.2	Market-oriented Policy Frameworks: 1981 – 2000	52
2.7.3	Alternative Approaches to Social Policy: 2000 to 2010	58
2.8	The Roles of Non-Governmental Organisations.....	61
2.8.1	Fostering Pluralism and Democratisation	61
2.8.2	Oppositional Role	64
2.8.3	NGOs as Policy Implementation Partners	65
2.8.4	Representing of Interests of Social Groupings	68
2.8.5	Educational Role	70
2.9	Critique of NGOs as Policy Actors in Postcolonial African States.....	70
2.10	Theoretical Framework.....	76
2.11	Conclusion.....	80
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY.....		82
3.1	Introduction.....	82
3.2	Epistemological Approach	83
3.3	Research Strategy and Design.....	85
3.4	Study Population and Sampling procedures.....	87
3.4.1	Target population.....	87
3.5	Research Methods	91
3.6	Data Analysis.....	96
3.7	Credibility/Validity in Qualitative Research	98
3.8	Ethical Considerations.....	99
3.9	Conclusion.....	100

CHAPTER FOUR: THE POSTCOLONIAL CONTEXT IN ZIMBABWE AND NGOS 102

4.1	Introduction.....	102
4.2	Overview of immediate pre-independence period in Zimbabwe	105
4.3	Socioeconomic and Political Context in Postcolonial Zimbabwe	107
4.4	'Socialist' State: Growth with Equity Policy: 1980 – 1990	108
4.4.1	Consolidating Political Independence.....	108
4.4.2	State-led Social Policy and Development.....	110
4.4.3	Economic Growth: Minimal Economic Transformation	114
4.4.4	Towards State and Policy Reform	115
4.5	Market-led Economy and the Regulatory State: 1991 – 2000	117
4.5.1	The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: 1991 – 1995.....	117
4.5.2	Political Reform and the Regulatory State in Zimbabwe.....	119
4.5.3	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation: 1996-2000	121
4.5.4	The Impact of Economic Policy Reforms	122
4.6	Zimbabwe: A State in Crisis – 2000 – 2008.....	128
4.6.1	Economic Meltdown and Socioeconomic Demise	129
4.6.2	Socio-political Instability	135
4.7	Legislative Framework Governing the NGO Sector in Zimbabwe.....	143
4.8	Mapping the Trajectory: Trends in NGO Development in Zimbabwe.....	148
4.8.1	NGOs in the Pre-independence Period	149
4.8.2	Welfare, Rehabilitation and Voluntarism: 1979 – 1981	151
4.8.3	Development, Self-help and Income Generation: 1982 – 1986	153
4.8.4	Service-oriented and Issue-driven NGOs: 1987 – 1991	154
4.8.5	Policy Advocacy, Constitutional Reform and Poverty Alleviation: 1992 – 2000.....	155
4.8.6	Political Advocacy and Humanitarian Assistance: 2000 – 2008	159
4.9	Critique of NGO Development in Zimbabwe.....	162

4.10 Conclusion.....	168
----------------------	-----

CHAPTER FIVE: NGOS AND THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE:

2000 - 2010.....	170
5.1 Introduction.....	170
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Social Sector NGOs in Zimbabwe: 2000 – 2010	171
5.3 Key NGO Activities and Categories.....	185
5.3.1 First Generation NGOs: humanitarian assistance and welfare	186
5.3.2 Second Generation NGOs: community and economic development.....	194
5.3.3 Third generation NGOs: policy advocacy and pluralism	199
5.3.4 Summary assessment NGO categories in Zimbabwe	201
5.4 Role of NGOs in the Social Policy Process	202
5.5 Major Contextual factors informing NGO role(s).....	215
5.5 Qualitative assessment: impact of NGOs on social policy process	227
5.6 Discussion of findings.....	233
5.7 Conclusion.....	242

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR

FUTURE RESEARCH	243
6.1 Introduction.....	243
6.2 Conclusions of the study	243
6.3 Recommendations.....	248
6.4 Limitations of the study.....	252
6.5 Proposed areas for future research	253
REFERENCES.....	254
APPENDICES	281

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CSO	Central Statistical Office
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
GPA	Global Political Agreement
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisations
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-M	Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai
MPSLSW	Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NANGO	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
OCHA	(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VIDCO	Village Development Committee

WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZCC	Zimbabwe Council of Churches
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1: The Policy Process.....	44
Figure 2: Growth of NGOs in Selected African Countries.....	56
Figure 3: Map of Zimbabwe.....	105
Figure 4: Number of Primary and Secondary Schools in Zimbabwe (1979 – 1986).....	112
Figure 5: Inflation Rates in Zimbabwe (2000 – 2006).....	130
Figure 6: Percentage Households Below Food & Poverty Line in Zimbabwe (1995-2003).....	131
Figure 7: Number of Secondary School Enrolments in Zimbabwe (2000 – 2006).....	132

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1: State in Social Policy & NGO Development in Zimbabwe.....	163

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Background to the Study

The trend in African countries has been that liberation from colonial rule brought increased demand for social services, which had previously been denied to black Africans. The postcolonial states responded by playing classical omnipotent roles as instruments of egalitarianism, developing socialist oriented social policy agendas (Gwarinda, 1985:7). In such contexts, the role of civil society in the policy arena was minimal where mostly one-party states or strong central states intervened in the economy and prioritised universal social provision. In Zimbabwe, a strong state from 1980 to 1990 is a case in point where universalist and free basic services were provided by the state, with price controls on and/or subsidies on basic commodities. Civil society mainly constituted welfare, faith-based, rehabilitation organisations whose work complemented state efforts (Raftopolous, 2000) aligned to state policy agendas.

As Dorman (2001:1) points out, the case of Zimbabwe was to some extent different from other African countries as the country maintained an “ostensibly multi-party system” from independence in 1980. Other authors argue that in reality; the independent state functioned as a de facto one-party state (Mandaza & Sachikonye, 1991: 1), however, still focused on high levels of investment in state driven social development.

With time, the role of postcolonial African states in social provision changed, plagued by years of high social service demands and stunted economic growth (Mkandawire, 1999:14). States were faced with public expenditure which exceeded government revenue as well as high budget deficits. According to Nzwei and Kuye (2007:203) ‘many’ postcolonial states had inherited huge debts from the colonial period. To address this, ‘most’ countries turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, and consequently adopted World Bank/IMF neoliberal policy agendas through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). This

called for economic and political reforms (liberalisation). From the 1970s, up to 30 African states adopted SAPs (Adepoju, 1993:4).

Zimbabwe in the 1990's introduced the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), ostensibly thwarting any possible drive towards legislating for a one-party state. In 1990, the government decided it would not legislate for a one-party state. In addition, a number of social policy and economic reforms were implemented. The state liberalised the economy, cut social spending and social provision, and began promoting the development of civil society as critical to the democratisation and public policy process. The state became a regulatory structure (Batley, 2006: 17) which Minogue, Polidano & Hulme (1998) explain, recognises individuals as paramount judges of their own welfare. In neoliberal economies, the family or individual is central in providing for social services and livelihoods (Baldcock, Manning, Miller and Vickerstaff, 1999:73) through participating in the market. The nature of civil society organisations in Zimbabwe also evolved from welfare-oriented to more formalised advocacy based, lobby and interest groups (Raftopolous, 2000) with an increased national focus to promote democratisation and pluralism through mobilising citizen participation in public affairs.

The problem with SAPs in Africa was that they failed to foster socio-economic development and redistribution as had been intended. Ironically, implementation of the programmes reversed the development gains achieved during the socialist era. Scholars indicate that SAPs were not suited to the specific postcolonial contexts in which they were adopted. Strong interventionist states were necessary to address developmental needs and regulate the systemic failures in the typically Western dependent economies which fostered inequalities. Criticising the ill-advised neoliberal policy frameworks, Simon (1997:189) explains that:

SAPs and their conditionalities have been described by their prescribing doctors as harsh medicine required to effect a systemic cure. Yet like most conventional Western medicine, they are directed at the symptoms rather than the underlying causes (Simon, 1997:189).

In other words, the policy reforms failed to resuscitate economic growth and facilitate equitable redistribution of wealth among citizens. From the late 1990s,

after implementation of ESAP, Zimbabwe faced severe fiscal crises, negative economic growth, rising unemployment, and poverty (Moyo & Makumbe, 2000). This situation gave rise to increased voices of dissent and fuelled the growth of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) seeking to fill the vacuum left by the state in social policy, particularly: basic education, primary healthcare and social welfare.

Keane (2003:5) agrees that the NGO sector has experienced phenomenal growth in response to gaps left by ineffective states. From 2000, state incapacity aggravated the declining standards of living. Zondi (2008:2) posits that Africa today is the epicentre of the global social crisis and Dauda (2001:74) adds that the crisis is not only socio-economic but also political, exemplified by polarisation of the political arena in Zimbabwe. Dauda (2001:74) refers to this as the “malaise of state decay” in postcolonial Africa.

In response to the fast growing and diversifying NGO sector, in 2003 Zimbabwe gazetted several legislation and policies to further regulate the sector. By 2006, up to 1500 NGOs were operating in Zimbabwe (National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations, 2006:5). Brown and Timmer (2006:5-6) explain that, “Civil society actors.....are becoming major players in transnational governance and problem-solving...in domains ranging from...poverty alleviation to development.” The state has at times accused NGOs of participating in activities beyond their scope. The 2008 temporary banning of NGO activities in Zimbabwe is a sign of contestations about their role.

In 2008, the 3 main political parties in Zimbabwe; Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara (MDC-M), Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) signed a Global Political Agreement in a bid to address the dire socio-economic and political context through the establishment of an inclusive government.

The evolving socio-political context and the changing role of NGOs mirrors the variant perspectives that exist on the role of civil society organisations; as a force for democratisation through ensuring free associational life, civic participation in public affairs, accountability and transparency of the state; as an instrument of effective social policy as a policy partner to the state (Friedman, 2003:3); and as

an instrument for neo-colonial Western influences pushing for economic liberalism (Murphy, 2005: 354).

Friedman (2003:5) asserts the need to query the conceptualisation of civil society as a “substitute” to the state, while Fagan (2005:530) critiques its lack of capacity to mobilise citizens for pluralism towards democracy. Adding to the debate, Olaleye (2005:31) questions the extent to which civil society should intervene in addressing social problems. Therefore, this study seeks to analyse the role of NGOs in social policy processes in postcolonial states in Africa, using Zimbabwe as a case study. The existing theoretical contestations point to the need for enquiry on this phenomenon.

This study analysed the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe as a visible component of civil society in the country, it also assessed the influence of socio-economic and political context on NGO activities. The focus is on the major NGOs in the social sector operating in Zimbabwe, including official umbrella organisations, peak associations and networks (Robinson & Friedman, 2007:646). The study also identified and examined engagement of local and international NGOs; only organisations that are formally constituted, thereby denoting some form of ‘permanence,’ legal registration, are non-profit and institutionally separate from the state.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Plummer (2002:2) contends that scholars are confronted with the challenge of alternative approaches to effective social policy agendas, the call for good governance and the puzzle of the growing role of non-state actors. Discourse on NGOs is fraught with debate and questions. Nzwei and Kuye (2007:205) argue that service delivery has often failed due to ‘lack of mechanisms to incorporate civil society ...in the national policy processes.’ However, Raftopolous (2000:21) warns of the tendency to ‘exaggerate and romanticise’ the role of NGOs. This resonates with Mercer’s view that discourse on NGOs has been underpinned by liberal democratic assumptions rather than wider debates about the politics of development. This is characteristic of much Anglophone literature which

dominates the subject. Echoing this, Friedman (2003:11) states that 'uncritical' enthusiasm for NGOs as an instrument for effective social policy is unwarranted.

The debates highlight the need for empirical inquiry into the role of NGOs, as supported by Edwards (2009:65) who asserts that contestations exist as to what constitutes NGOs and their role in modern states. To further elucidate, Friedman (2003:18) asserts that state-civil society relations in Africa have been mostly conflictual, often with lack of consensus on the appropriate role civil society organisations should be playing. ***Consequently, the problem statement facing this study is: do non-governmental organisations have a legitimate role to play in African states?*** A case study of Zimbabwe is expected to provide explanations in the theoretical and practical context, for postcolonial African states and/or developing countries that have been facing challenges in socio-economic development, state capacity and democratisation, coupled with a growing civil society sector.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The aim of this study is to analyse the role played by NGOs in the social policy process in Zimbabwe between the year 2000 and 2010. Sachikonye (2004:189) explains that the conditions for democratisation in Zimbabwe improved between 1996 and 1999 in part driven by a vibrant and active civil society calling for reform. However, from 2000, conditions in the country both on the political and socioeconomic front began to deteriorate and continued unabated until 2010 when the Inclusive government came into being. The study seeks to establish and critically assess the role(s) played by NGOs in the country during this period and analyse how the political and socioeconomic context has influenced their chosen activities. The state in Zimbabwe has previously clashed with NGOs on the perceived overstepping of their boundaries in the activities they undertake in the country.

Ironically, this is against close and collaborative relations fostered between the state and NGOs in the immediate post-independence period of the 1980s. To some extent, this indicates a growing divergence in the understanding of the role of NGOs. The Zimbabwe case offers insights into the debates in literature on

NGOs and civil society in postcolonial African states (Dashwood, 2000:14). This is assessed against the study's critique of theoretical perspectives on civil society, a sphere which encompasses NGOs, Therefore, the study seeks to critically analyse from both a theoretical and empirical or practical perspective, the role of civil society organisations, specifically NGOs, in the social policy process in the context of postcolonial states in Africa.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of this study are:

- i. To establish the particular roles played by NGOs in Zimbabwe;
- ii. To analyse the context in which NGOs in the social policy sector operate in Zimbabwe;
- iii. To assess the extent to which the goals and activities of NGOs relate to state defined social policy agendas; and
- iv. To examine the impact of the role played by NGOs on the social policy process in Zimbabwe.

1.5 Research Questions

The main question this study seeks to address is: What is the nature and extent of the role of NGOs in the social policy sector in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2010? The sub-questions of the study are:

- i. How do NGOs participate in the social policy sector in Zimbabwe?
- ii. What are the critical factors informing the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe?
- iii. Has the role played by NGOs enhanced, contradicted, undermined, informed or complicated state policy agendas?

1.6 Justification of the Study

This study aims to contribute theoretical and empirical insights into a continuous debate on the postcolonial state and civil society in Africa. The case of Zimbabwe holds uniqueness in the geopolitical and socioeconomic events which have

unfolded in the country in the past decade, with NGOs featuring prominently in this discourse. However, the interplay of social, political and economic issues facing Zimbabwe and the roles of NGOs as actors are common to African states in transition from minority to majority and from one-party to multi-party democratisation. Though the case study is on Zimbabwe, broad lessons can be drawn for other African countries (Matlosa, 2002: 131). At the centre of these transformative processes has been the question of unrealised outcomes in the socioeconomic sphere that has resulted in increasing poverty levels and various social ills. To a great extent, NGOs have played a key role in attempting to cover the gap in development and social service needs, in the face of limited state capacity.

Efforts by African states, to promote socio-economic development, tackle structural inequality and ensure long-term political stability have not realised the desired results. This, as Labuschagne (2003:1) points out, is evident in the, "...disillusionment with the track record..." and weakness of states on the continent. On the other hand, the proliferation of NGOs seeking to close gaps in social provision and posited as key in fostering pluralism in political processes highlights the need to analyse the role of NGOs in postcolonial African states. Friedman (2003:7) warns that the uncritical promotion of NGOs as a source of social policy is misplaced and should be examined at both the theoretical and practical level. This is an aspect this study seeks to address.

It is important to note there are limitations to the capabilities and at times the intentions of NGOs in addressing the shortfalls of the postcolonial state. This study therefore, is significant in its attempt to assess the roles played by NGOs and examine the impact thereof. In reference to NGOs, Muloongo (2007:4) argues that there is a lack of "...independent assessments or information on where they have been most successful, either as collaborators, alternatives, watchdogs or independent voices of society, let alone any other operative role of civil society organisations." This study will contribute to debates and knowledge on the role of NGOs in postcolonial states, analysing the identified roles that NGOs have played in post-independent Zimbabwe and how the prevailing socio-economic and political environment has influenced NGO activities.

1.7 Delimitation of the Study

The study focuses on Zimbabwe as a case study. Zimbabwe has ten provinces which are run on the same parameters emanating from one central legislature thereby operating on one social policy framework unlike, for example, South Africa which has provincial legislatures that may produce variations in social policy. Zimbabwe is divided into two urban provinces (Harare and Bulawayo) and eight rural provinces which have urban capitals. The research is limited to non-governmental organisations focused on social policy; specifically health, education humanitarian assistance and social welfare.

1.8 Definition of Key Terms

- **Civil Society** – comprises the associational life and public sphere beyond the family and the state. It is underpinned by universalist values and includes NGOs, community groups, charities, professional associations, trade unions and academia (Malinowska-Sempruch, Bonnell & Hoover, 2006:625).
- **Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)** – are independent development actors that are relatively permanent, driven by voluntarism and universalistic values. Alcock, Erskine and May (1999:400) explain that NGOs are agencies that are institutionally distinct from government, may work with government and are at times subsidised by the state to provide social services.
- **Social policy** – is the policy of governments directing action towards a direct impact on the welfare of citizens, providing them with services, safety nets or income (Levin, 1997:25). Baldock *et al* (1999:4-9) explicate that what distinguishes social policy is its concern with distributing resources among people and on interventions to promote the welfare of citizens through education, healthcare and social assistance for vulnerable citizens.
- **Social policy process** – is a cyclical process through which states decide on broad goals and actions to be implemented by governments in the service of citizens. The process includes agenda setting, policy formulation, adoption, implementation, evaluation and revision (Becker & Bryman, 2004:15). Primarily, the cyclical policy process involves the state and various non-state actors (Thornhill, 2007:161), in variant ways or forms.

1.9 Overview of Chapters

This thesis is divided into 6 Chapters. This, first Chapter discussed the purpose of the study and research questions it seeks to address. Chapter 2 – 7 address pertinent theoretical, contextual, methodological and empirical aspects of the study and discuss the findings and conclusions of this these. An overview of the chapters is as follows:

- **Chapter 2: The State, Civil Society, NGOs and the Social Policy Process**, is a review of relevant literature with a critique of the key conceptual and theoretical perspectives on the state, social policy, civil society and NGOs; analysis of NGOs in postcolonial African states and discussion of the theoretical framework informing the thesis;
- **Chapter 3: Research Approach and Methodology**, outlines the epistemological approach, research design and methods used in the study; discussion of the data analysis technique and processes and the ethical considerations of the study;
- **Chapter 4: The Postcolonial Context in Zimbabwe and NGOs**, this chapter discusses the documentary analysis and contemporary, historical and contemporary socio-political and economic environment in Zimbabwe, mapping the trajectory of civil society and NGO development;
- **Chapter 5: The Roles of NGOs in the Social Policy Process in Zimbabwe: 2000 - 2010**, is a discussion and critical analysis of the empirical observations on the role(s) of NGOs in the social policy process in Zimbabwe and an assessment of the effect of contextual factors on NGOs and their work. The analysis is juxtaposed against the effect of the contextual internal and external geopolitical and socioeconomic factors influencing and affecting the roles of NGOs; and
- **Chapter 6: Conclusions, Recommendations and Areas for Future Research** highlights the theoretical arguments of the study drawn from the research findings and analysis thereof. The Chapter also outlines

theoretical and practical recommendations and proposes areas for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: THE STATE, NGOs AND THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS

2.1 Introduction

Reinvigorated debate on the nature and role of the state in Africa has focused on the perceived demise of the postcolonial state, its failure to address developmental needs and stagnated democratisation. This is typically juxtaposed against the promotion of civil society as the panacea to creating a 'third way' viewed as essential in fostering solutions to the problems plaguing African states. The phenomenal proliferation of civil society organisations, most visibly, non-governmental organisations, informed by the neoliberal agendas fostered from the 1980s, has continued to fuel discourse on the state, NGOs and social policy (Edwards, 2004: 21). This chapter presents a critique of the theoretical approaches on civil society and NGOs, an analysis of schools of thought on civil society in postcolonial Africa and outlines the theoretical framework for the study.

The problem facing this study is the question whether non-governmental organisations have a legitimate role to play in the social policy process in African states. The study uses the case of Zimbabwe to provide empirical evidence of what roles non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as civil society organisations play in the policy process in postcolonial African states. The Zimbabwean case offers insights into the debates in literature (Dashwood, 2000:14) on NGOs and civil society. Mueller, Page` and Kuerbis (2004:170) state that review of literature helps to clarify the crux of the research as well as "identify the key theoretical debates and problems" central to the topic. The review of related literature provides theoretical, analytical and empirical insights to guide the study as well as analysis and interpretation of data to answer the research questions (Bell, 1993:33). In this way, this exercise also contributes methodological insights useful for the study.

In this chapter, theories which explain the concept of civil society as the umbrella concept which includes non-governmental organisations are critically reviewed. Tvedt (2004:336) explains, "NGOs are the most visible and tangible actors of civil society and a critical central element of its infrastructure. Therefore, to analyse the

concept of NGOs, it is imperative to discuss theory on civil society. This will provide a framework for the analysis and discussion of the empirical findings of this study.

The theoretical perspectives defining the role played by NGOs within the context of developing countries are discussed. As this study specifically seeks to understand the role of NGOs in the social policy process, this chapter also critiques literature on the policy process, identifying the roles played by non-state actors, specifically NGOs. The literature review sheds light on the traditional roles of NGOs and the major contextual factors influencing these. Notwithstanding the vast body of scholarly literature on civil society, NGOs and “How organised groups shape lawmaking, regulation and policy,” (Mueller *et.al*, 2004:170), the review of literature will identify and focus on the theories and concepts which are pertinent to this study. That is, civil society, NGOs, the policy process and the state rather than the broader frameworks central to social movements and policy in Political Science.

The theoretical and applied perspectives on NGOs as civil society organisations and the development of the NGO sector in developing countries are intrinsically linked to the concept, form and functions of the state. Therefore, this chapter assesses the concept of the state, its characteristics and functions in and how this relates to NGOs as civil society organisations.

Atack (1999:855) explains that Western political theory divides society into 3 main components: the state which holds and practices government power, the private sector which is involved with economic activity and civil society constituting citizens. He further elucidates that it is these 3 sectors which yield different forms of power in society and interact to influence policy processes and the engagement of different interests in society. In their conceptual framework used in researching civil society in Botswana, Carroll and Carroll (2004: 340) include the private sector as part of civil society. Hendriks (2006:489) alludes to the difficulty of distinguishing the boundaries between the state, civil society and the economy given the “complex interactions” amongst the 3 domains as well as the diverse interpretations of the 3 concepts. Similarly, theoretical perspectives on civil society

organisations, including NGOs, postulate that civil society is defined based on its position to the state and private sector. According to Mueller *et.al.* (2004:172),

“Civil society” implies a sphere of autonomous social action wherein...groups compete for citizens’ attention. The groups that form are distinct from governments and commercial firms, yet they interpenetrate state and market and profoundly affect the way both function, especially the degree to which they respond to the political and economic preferences of the population.

In other words, the intrinsic link between the civil society and the state in policy processes provides a basis for understanding the state and its functions. “Scholars of civil society often ignore this dialectical nature of civil society and prefer to look only on the bright side,” (Katz, 2006:345). In the same vein, Casey and Dalton (2006:23), explain that civil society organisations must accept that new governance regimes require new modes of participation in the policy process. The political context and the form of government are critical factors to consider when strategising how an organisation will participate in the policy process.

Kemeny (2002:185) states that in studying social policy, it is imperative that one has to understand the processes of policy formulation and the centrality of political power in this. The inference is that an analysis of NGOs as policy actors is dependent on some level of analysis of the state as an institution within which issues of the practice of political power are embedded. Therefore, this dialectical relationship makes it imperative that in analysing the roles played by NGOs in the social welfare policy process in postcolonial African states, it is important to understand the nature and functions of the state itself as this has implications on the roles played by NGOs. In other words, researching the roles played by NGOs as civil society organisations, it is inevitable to understand in what ways the form and activities of the state inadvertently shape the nature and roles that NGOs play.

2.2 An Overview of the Concept of the State

There is a proliferation of literature on the concept of the state, focusing historically on its roots, development and evolution into the modern twenty-first century state. What is evident is that defining the range of phenomena encompassed by the

concept of the state is as difficult as it is contested terrain. Barrow (1993:3) concedes that existing literature provides no single answer to the question, what is the state? Therefore, it remains a debated and contested concept. Despite the plethora of writings on the state, “it remains an elusive concept to clearly define...” (Barrow, 1993:3). However, it is possible and important to analyse the existing discourse on and approaches to the concept of the state, as well as attempt to deconstruct its meaning and form for purposes of this study.

From a structuralist perspective, the state is viewed as an institution of authority within a defined territorial boundary. Therefore, the state practices its sovereignty within that geographic territory. It primarily consists of a legislative arm which promulgates laws to govern the actions of its citizens; a government which implements and polices the laws promulgated by the legislature and a judiciary whose function is to ensure justice and prosecute against the violation of the state’s laws passed by the legislature. This separation of powers between the branches of the state is seen as a key element in controlling and balancing the power it exercises over its citizens. In essence, the state is an “ensemble of institutions,” (Jessop: 2001, 151) with interrelated functions. Atack (1998: 857) refers to this as the formal-procedural criteria from which the state derives its legitimacy.

The function of the state is to define and provide procedures by which the widest range of goods can be pursued, while preserving social order. Its laws are indifferent to ends and purposes; they do not tell us what to do, they tell us how we may go about doing whatever we do. (Atack, 1999:857-858).

The assertion is that the state is a structure responsible for maintaining law and order which allows private citizens to engage freely in associational life and private enterprise. In other words, it is an institution created by social forces to control human group life and organisations in society (Neocosmos, 2003:342). Therefore, it has a central and omnipotent role in providing an environment in which private citizens can be economically productive live active and free social lives. Bratton (1989:409) confirms assertions by Atack, elucidating that even as an institution that co-exists with other sectors including civil society and private business enterprises, the state seeks to provide an overarching framework within which all

other forms of institutions operate. This means that the role of the state is a regulatory one, as an authoritative structure.

Similarly, Casey and Dalton (2006:25) explain that the state defines the “rules of engagement” and creates the institutional context which can either foster and promote or hinder and suppress participation by NGOs in policy processes. What this definition highlights is that the state is an authoritative instrument through which conditions for social engagement and economic production are established and the competing societal interests are negotiated. Essentially the structuralist perspective posits the state as an institution which governs the interrelated set of positions between itself, civil society and the private sector. It establishes rules to define the roles, resources and relations between the 3 domains.

Debate in academia warns that this is an overly simplistic view of the state and its role in society, what Jessop (2001: 149) refers to as the institutionalist approach. Quoting Gramsci, Jessop (2001:151) refers to the “state in its inclusive sense....political society + civil society,” which moves away from the notion of the state as specific institutions but encompasses an analysis of its “social bases and ...how their functions and effects are shaped by their links to the economic system and civil society.” Therefore, the argument is that theoretical engagement should not be impaired by the structuralist view which fails to recognise the mobile and unclear boundary between the state and society. Criticism of this perspective is that though the definition of the state does include structural elements of government but for it to be more meaningful and reflective of what the state is; approaches must include the underpinnings of political structure in society.

Political theorists who have attempted to invalidate the narrow structural perspective have redefined the state as a political system which predominantly reflects the power dynamics in society. This perspective resonates with Weber’s approach which has greatly influenced modern schools of thought on the state. The approach propounded the state as a political organization of domination which exercises, distributes and mediates power and interests in society.

Barrow (1993:3) provides an analysis of the major theoretical approaches used by Marxist scholars as frameworks for empirical and historical research on public policy and political development. Mirroring the prevailing socio-economic

inequalities in society and the class based-structure and functioning of the state, Marxist theory critiques the state as an instrument of class domination which serves the interests of whatever class controls its central institutions. According to Jessop (2001:150), Marxist state theorists discovered that the form and functions of the capitalist state essentially positioned it as a tool for “capital accumulation and political class domination.” This approach is arguably born of the capitalist state of the nineteenth century under which societal inequalities increased. The argument is that the state primarily served capital interests at the expense of the majority peasants and working class citizens.

Tracing the genealogy of Marxist thinking, Barrow (1993:4) discusses the consequent neo-Marxist approach which conceptualises the state as arena of class struggle. This is borne out if the perceived shortcomings in Marxist theory which primarily views the state as an instrument for capital interests and accumulation. Neo-Marxists posit that the state is an arbitrator between different interests in society. The inference is that the role of the state is to maintain some form of equilibrium between competing classes in the social system and mediate social conflict among social groups. It retains an important role of overseeing the balance between class forces and the maintenance of social cohesion. However, this presupposes its relative autonomy from social groups, allowing it to play a fair and just mediating role. Therefore, while Marxist emphasis is on the dominant nature of the state as an instrument of private capital interests at the expense of vulnerable and working class citizens, the neo-Marxist approach appears to view it as an institution with the ability to foster stability through managing competing class interests.

Post-Marxists conceptualise the state not only as an arbitrator but protector of class interests and social democracy. Post-Marxism asserts the perspective of the state as a promoter of capital accumulation while maintaining democratic legitimacy, presumably by safeguarding the basic needs of vulnerable citizens. Barrow (1993:6) points out the inherently problematic paradox contained in this view which seeks to create synergy between dual systemic imperatives which are mutually contradictory. In an attempt to mitigate the paradoxical nature of its main tenets, the proponents of Post-Marxism highlight added emphasis on welfarism where the state is defined as an instrument for redistributive policies which allow

for the promotion of private and free enterprise on one hand while providing assistance to those who cannot fend for themselves or meet their basic needs on the other. However, there is silence on the effect of failures of free market approaches in redistribution, which tends to give rise to social exclusion and economic vulnerability of citizens.

The post-Marxist approach resonates with proponents of the Keynesian welfare state, which is underpinned by similar principles of an interventionist state. With Keynesianism, state institutions were the chief supplement and corrective to market forces in a 'mixed' economy concerned with economic growth and social integration. This approach has had a profound influence on the nature and role of the modern day state in Africa (Jessop, 2007:14). Globally, it is through this approach that social policy gained prominence and distinctive welfare orientation in so far as it instituted economic and social rights for all citizens, in other words, entitled citizenship (Kidd, 2002: 329).

In this case, welfare is provided for by the state for citizens who are excluded from actively participating in and benefitting from economic activity. This provides a mechanism to support citizens to participate in productive economic engagement and contribute to high levels of demand to foster economic growth, even if they are employed in the low-wage sector. The implication is that social policy is aimed at growing a stable market to feed the economic sectors and capital through fostering collective consumption which is necessary for growth dynamic. Furthermore, social policy in Keynesianism can be viewed as an admission of free market failures that led to societal inequalities and increased vulnerability of sections of the population.

With its redefined role in providing welfare, the state however typically gazettes welfare regimes often tied to conditionalities. It is not purely based on absolute need as defined by individuals but by the state itself. Critics argue that though it is necessary to provide safety nets for vulnerable citizens, state welfare tends to maintain the status quo (Alcock, Erskine and May, 1999:10). This is because the inherent socio-economic inequalities remain and the private sector may be seen as the greatest beneficiary of welfare states which absorb the failures of the market in fostering equitable socio-economic development. Therefore, the welfare

state is positioned as an arbitrator to serve interests of unequal parties, where the class with the greatest influence benefits from using the state to advance its own interests. To some extent, this points to the way in which debates on the state have continued to evolve as scholars attempt to redefine it relative to emerging failures and evolving socio-economic contexts and problems.

Discourse on the concept of the state as an arbitrator of class interests on one hand and an instrument of class dominance on the other denote the two divergent streams of thought. The contestation is mainly informed by ideological positions.

According to Jessop (2007: 12) the modern territorial state must be seen as a very late and by no means final development in state formation from city-states, empires, medieval state-system, and absolutism to modern imperial – colonial blocs. Currently, there are emerging new modes of state formation, predominantly cross-border regions and triad regions such as the European Union. Recent literature portrays that the world is experiencing the development of an embryonic world state. Through globalisation, the early forms of the world state have in various ways continued to influence policy paradigms and processes especially in developing countries. With specific reference to this study, what this means is as the state continues to redefine itself and its roles in society, other sectors intrinsically linked to it are affected. Therefore, there is a direct influence on the nature and roles of civil society.

Summarily, the state is a structural institution embedded in a political system and whose function is to ensure law and order but also to facilitate equitable distribution of resources to promote acceptable standards of living among its citizens. Notwithstanding the ambiguity and debates in academia, there appears to be no hegemonic perspective on the concept of the state. The postcolonial state in twenty-first century Africa has been shaped and its role continuously redefined theoretically and in applied perspectives. Historical contexts and key occurrences have also played a major role in inculcating some of the contemporary characteristics of postcolonial states in Africa. Therefore, it follows logic to map the trajectory of the postcolonial state in order to assess how this has influenced the development and roles of civil society and NGOs in particular.

2.2.1 Development of the Postcolonial State in Africa

Neocosmos (2003:342) makes an observation of the problem with the African state as being a structure and system inherited from a capitalist system which favoured accumulation by a few elite in society, at the expense and disadvantage of groups with minimal access to resources and capital. As a result, most African states in the immediate post-colonial period focused on nation-building, maintaining national security, addressing development imperatives and racial inequalities. This was done through strong and often one-party states that were central in driving economic and social development agendas.

Labuschagne (2003:9) criticises the failure of postcolonial states to reform from their inherited colonial state structures. The scholar argues that many colonial regimes, upon their relinquishing of power, 'unwittingly' "...set the stage for the creation of a centralist state". The author explains that colonial powers left a vacuum in development, a factor which contributed to the consolidation of centralist states in Africa. In addition, postcolonial states had inherited systems which were inherently centralist. Though this may be an accurate analysis of the immediate postcolonial political process, what Labuschagne however fails to recognise or ignores is the critical factor of the fragmented nature of politics and the dangers ethnicism fuelled during the colonial era posed to the newly independent states.

To illustrate Labuschagne's oversight, Heller (2001:135) states that, "The political imperatives of unifying ethnically fractious nations, whose boundaries were the shaky legacies of colonial rule, only heightened the imperative for political centralisation." The need to ensure political stability and national security concerns also had a great influence on the nature of the postcolonial state in Africa. This view is supported by Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991:22-23) who explain that strong one-party states were pivotal to ensuring unity and stability, elements essential for development in independent African states. Therefore, on this tenet, Western powers supported their establishment in postcolonial Africa.

Similarly, Thornhill Odendaal, Malan, Mathebula, van Dijk and Mello (2002:27) concede that the centralised nature of African states in the immediate post-independence periods was a result of conflict that characterised the end of

colonial rule. The civil war in Mozambique, Angola, Biafra war in Nigeria, Sudan are just but some examples of this. This is reiterated by Dashwood (2000: 20) who gives the example of Zimbabwe where for the first six years after independence in 1980, the state invested in consolidating its power and “creating conditions of peace and national unity.” The ethnically based regional demarcations in most countries posed a great challenge to political stability, nation-building and security. Oosthuizen (2006:68) explains that during the 1980s, the apartheid regime in South Africa supported dissident elements in Zimbabwe in attempts to destabilise the country. Similarly, Zambia suffered from cross-border raids orchestrated by the South African apartheid government against the African National Congress bases in Lusaka (Oosthuizen, 2006: 67). Therefore, there was a deliberate effort to promote cohesion and unity through centralising policy-making and governance.

From the 1980s, a number of postcolonial African states experienced economic growth; increasing poverty levels and vibrant debates over the future of the state resurfaced. Scholars and politicians began to suggest the state was becoming too small to solve the world’s big problems and too big to solve the little ones. This inadvertently points to concerns about the limited successes of the state in facilitating socio-economic development, especially in postcolonial African states. The inference is that the state in developing countries has failed to address the developmental needs of its populations and create environments conducive for sustainable economic growth.

Faced with growing political disenchantment and dire socio-economic situations, postcolonial states are now challenged with seeking new bases of legitimation (Dashwood, 2000:20) to counteract threats posed by disillusionment amongst citizens. Carroll and Carroll (2004:341) comment on the receptivity of the state in Botswana to the growth of civil society. This was a way of trying to regain political support, with pressure from an opposition that was gaining political mileage in the country.

According to Hermier (2004:2), in Senegal, public services began deteriorating in the period during the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in the country from 1980. The reduced state expenditure led to low paying conditions for public services resulting in a brain drain from government as civil servants sought

better rewarding working conditions in elsewhere. Consequently, there was a further deterioration of public services as less human resources were available to implement government policy. This view is echoed by Bratton (1989:409) who explains that the loss of distributive capacity of African states in the postcolonial era has been met by a reduction in the states' popular legitimacy developed during the liberation era.

Some scholars argue that the prevailing socio-economic conditions have been predominantly but not exclusively caused by the adoption of neoliberal structural adjustment frameworks whose main tenets included the significant reduction of the structure and role of the state in social policy and economic redistribution. A major weakness of the initial wave of adoption of neoliberal policy frameworks adopted in developing countries was that they focused on structural adjustment of the state institution without emphasising the need to transform its functions including the underlying political system and culture. The main drivers for downsizing of state structures were economic, assuming that cultivating a free market economy and vibrant civil society sector was the building block for economic growth and democratisation processes to unfold. Although the state restructured, there was a lack of transformative processes to foster democratisation and promote broader economic growth and redistribution.

Bratton (1989:421) identifies two ways in which democracy is operationalised and defined:

- In structural terms reflected through the holding of elections and existence of electoral systems for citizens to select their political representatives. This also implies the existence of multipartyism; and
- In behavioural terms where citizens are able and there is space for them to actively participate in political, policy processes. Therefore, there is an arena for engagement of civil society. In addition, democracy is reflected in meaningful completion and civil liberties in society.

Admittedly, much political science literature on postcolonial African states traces the process of decaying of states to their inability to address the developmental needs of their citizens. However, authors warn against blanket tendencies towards

treating the political trajectory of African states as though there is one endemic political structure and system across the continent. Literature engagement points to the need for great caution on this. This is not to disparage the point that similarities exist in some cases while others may provide for predictions based on past developments in countries which have had similar socio-economic and geo-political experiences.

The debates on the state in Africa and its' perceived failure to address socio-economic problems have given rise to several schools of thought on alternatives to state-led systems. Recent literature contains numerous allusions to the call for alternative approaches for a 'watered down' and more engaging state. On such concept, cooperative government is underpinned by the notion that a multi-sectoral approach to governance and policy implementation is required (Thornhill *et. al.*, 2002:27). The proposed alternative is for a new kind of state with a shift from state-based to network-based governance. This has also given rise to development of the concept of 'governance without government.' The commonality which can be found in the different contemporary alternatives is a paradigm shift away from a central state and state-led and dominated policy processes. The proposals posit that non-state actors must have a critical role to play in collaboration with the state for effective policy processes to occur. Fundamentally, these alternative perspectives have resulted from attempts to address the problem of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the state.

As debates about the relevance of the state in its current form progress, streams of discourse on alternatives to the modern state also argue for processes of de-statization. This involves redrawing the internal demarcation between state and non-state apparatuses within the political system as activities are re-allocated across this division. There is a need to resist the idealistic fallacy that expansion of non-governmental regimes renders the state redundant (Jessop, 2007:19). The propositions are that shared technical economic, judicial, administrative, political ideological functions performed by states are shared with non-governmental and private or commercial actors. This is often described as a shift from government to governance. The invisibility in literature, of specific parameters determining the functions and roles points to the complexity of the proposed alternative

perspectives. This is more so in contexts where there are inherent structural and socio-economic inequalities, as well as diverse competing interests.

Researchers warn that emerging alternative perspectives are misleading as they depict a one-way shift in redefining the nature and roles of the state as a key sector in society. The one-sided view disregards the effect that states on different scales gain new responsibilities that were previously ascribed, if anywhere, to the market or civil society. Vellinga (2007:99) is at odds with the proponents of alternative approaches to the state, emphasising that it remains the role of the state to create conditions of general welfare and equity.

Criticism of these alternatives is that they shy away from addressing the roots of state ineffectiveness, which by inference have resulted in the need for non-state actors to get involved in the policy process. Focus should rather be on rectifying the inefficiencies of the modern day state. Arguably, it is naive to assume that inclusion of other players in policy processes may address the gaps and inefficiencies of current state-dominated social welfare policy processes. What Jessop (2007: 12) indicates is that the state is a self-substituting institution which adapts to changing socio-political environments. For example, state managers continually redesign the state through policy adaptations to ensure the state's survival in response to new challenges.

Discourse on the postcolonial state in Africa highlights that there is often a paradoxical effect between the development of the state and that of civil society. Evidence points to the tendency that a reduction in the size and capacity of the state has tended to lead to a reciprocal growth in the development of civil society sector and increase in the number of NGOs seeking to fill the gap left by the state in social provision and development. Hendriks (2006:489) agrees that, "different public spheres emerge out of civil society, often in response to failures in the economy and the state." In other words, as state intervention in social welfare policy changes, there is a direct impact on NGOs as they re-define their roles.

From the 1980s there was a phenomenal growth in the number of NGOs in developing countries. Little (2002:103) highlights the, "resurgence of the concept of civil society," since the 1980s in the interests of redefining and promoting the democratic space between the state and individual life. Literature highlights that

NGOs have become a very visible phenomenon in postcolonial states, with a key role to play in social welfare policy processes. This is portrayed by the various ways in which they have become involved with the state. Clark (1995:597-598) puts forward 3 categories of state-civil society relationships. Firstly, the dependent category is where NGOs are more of 'clients' of the state, implementing government programmes and receiving funds from the state. Casey and Dalton (2006:25) refers to the trend of contracting NGOs as service providers by the state in Australia. Where an NGO is contracted by the state to implement a public or government function, its intervention is at the policy implementation stage and is direct. On the other hand, the way in which the organisation implements the policy and the resultant outcomes can be perceived as an indirect way of influencing policy as the outcomes may inform policy re-formulation.

Secondly, the adversarial relationship is consistent with a situation where there is no commonality between the state and NGOs. The result is that a lack of shared objectives between the state and NGOs tends to give rise to tension. In addition, avoidance and repression are prone to happen (Clark, 1995:595). Thirdly, in the collaborationist category; NGOs share a common goal with the government which is mutually agreed upon but there remains constructive engagement and debate, the case of Brazil and India (Clark, 1995:598). Therefore, NGOs intervene in the policy process through direct or indirect dynamics: collaborative or confrontational.

2.3 Defining Civil Society: An Overview

For purposes of this study, an analysis of the definitions and theoretical approaches to civil society is central to forming the framework for analysis and understanding of approaches which explain NGOs as civil society organisations (Attack, 1999:855). Despite the plethora of literature on civil society, Hendriks (2006:486) points out that it is a vague term which has several meanings and connotations. "The recent surge of contemporary literature on civil society highlights the breadth of interpretations that the term can take on across theories of politics," (Hendriks, 2006:486). In addition, the ambiguity on what civil society does and does not constitute has arisen out of its prolific usage. This implies the difficulty of clearly defining the widely used concept. What is evident in the extensive corpus of academic literature on civil society is its focus on the position

and role of civil society in political processes and state reform in developing countries, mainly African, Eastern European and South American states.

Literally, the word civil refers to communal, universalistic, common, public, social and general. However, civil society is defined as a distinct sphere positioned alongside the state and private enterprise. It consists of several sub-sectors, with NGOs being arguably the most distinct and largest constituent part of civil society in developing countries. The positioning of civil society in the nation state has however evolved over time into a sector that is defined as distinctly independent of and separate from the state, seeking to influence it for the public good. Malinowska-Sempruch, Bonnell and Hoover (2006:625) define it as the public space where private citizens engage freely. This entails an environment outside of the state and beyond the family including NGOs, community groups, charities, professional associations, trade unions and academia. It is also defined as the space between the individual (and family) and the state (Stewart, 1997:11). This further distinguishes it by referring to it as an arena where citizens associate and engage beyond the family but outside of the state. The implication is that apart from the state as an institution and the family as a private entity, all other public spheres where individuals coalesce can be defined as being part of civil society.

Assessing the contemporary definitions of civil society against its documented history in some schools of thought as having its roots in Greek political life highlights the evolutionary process of its disengagement from the state. One perspective is that it acted as the civil arm of the state to encourage political engagement among selected elite citizens in Greek society and has evolved to a sector that is distinct from and independent of the state and does not derive its mandate from it. In contrast, another historical view point is that civil society has always been separate from the state as it sought to counter the dominance of monarchies and religious institutions in determining private associational life and societal values.

Although conceptually civil society is defined as an arena for associational life beyond the state, it is governed by the broader laws and regulations set and policed by the state. It is an arena which to some extent is dependent on the state to create and maintain the environment in which it thrives (Friedman, 2003:11).

Debatably, definitions of civil society are void without mention of its position and characteristic features in society in relation to that of the state.

Though the definitions put forward carry connotations of a sector bound by commonality and shared universal values and goals, in reality, civil society is a heterogeneous sector. At times it consists of oppositional perspectives, contradictory and competitive tendencies. Civil society is therefore characteristically variant, diverse in nature and not as clearly distinct in itself, comprising of a range of entities bound together by either specific or loosely defined commonalities. These include non-governmental organisations, churches, community groups, faith-based and voluntary organisations, charities, professional associations, trade unions, research institutes, think tanks and the media, as well as loosely associated individuals (Malinowska-Sempruch, *et al.*, 2006: 625). Therefore, though viewed as serving universal values and interests, different sub-sectors serve specific interests of societal groupings.

In their case study of civil society in South Africa, van Driel and van Haren (2003:530) focused on NGOs as a diverse sector. The term itself has become more or less synonymous with civil society, subsuming other associational forums, but also pointing to the dominance of mostly professional organisations which operate in a wide spectrum of service sectors. Use of the concept however, gives the false assumption of a unified block with similar goals and objectives. The implication is that civil society is constituted of a diverse array of formal and informal organisations or associations with different constituencies and at times contradictory interests. Similarly, Whitefield (2003:385) confirms assertions by van Driel *et al.*, stating that civil society is not a unified structure and hence cannot be researched empirically as such. This argument supports the study of specific components of civil society rather than as a single sector.

According to Mercer (2002), arguably, the most distinct and largest constituent of civil society in African states is the non-governmental organisation sector. Selian (2004:201) comments that the term non-governmental organisation is changing to civil society organisations in some quarters, portraying how the NGO sector has grown to dominate civil society in postcolonial states. Though the NGO sector

itself is by no means homogenous in nature, it is justifiably distinct to delineate for analytical purposes.

2.4 Non-Governmental Organisations as Civil Society Organisations

This study focuses on a sub-sector of civil society and the NGO sector itself, specifically NGOs whose missions are aimed at the social policy sector. Alcock, Erskine and May (1999:400) define non-governmental organisations as agencies that are constitutionally distinct from government, may work with and be subsidised by the state to provide social services. This explanation assumes that they are relatively permanent institutions and are focused on providing social services to either complement state services or to fill the gap left by the state. It can be inferred from Alcock *et al.* (ibid) elucidate that NGOs are generally formally constituted entities, implying that they typically have some form of structure.

Vaknin (2005:17) states that typically, NGOs are not for profit and non-governmental entities. However, there are some NGOs which are profit-making entities. In agreement, Alcock *et al.* (1999:400) explains that their agenda is mainly to provide social services and alleviate suffering by reducing poverty and representing economically and socially marginalised citizens. Linked to this, some scholars add to the definition of NGOs explaining that they are not-for-profit organisations, whose work is based on public benefit, or serving the interests of their targeted constituents or beneficiaries. Echoing this view, Vaknin (2005:2) states that NGOs are independent development actors that are relatively permanent, driven by voluntarism and universalistic values. This reflects that as civil society organisations, the NGO sector is similarly focused on the public good, and is often based on universally accepted values. The inference is that they aim to promote societal rather than individual and private interests.

In concurrence with the definition of civil society, Hillhorst (2003:220) defines NGOs as intermediary organisations situated between the state and the market that bring about development for the poor and marginalised. The inference is that NGOs are an arena which mediates against the excesses of both with the aim of protecting vulnerable citizens. However, the distinguishing aspect of NGOs from the state when it comes to provision of social services is the NGOs tend to focus

on particular social issues or specific areas of social service provision. In contrast, conceptually, the state is limited in its ability to be selective of services it provides, it remains ultimately responsible for providing social services to its citizens.

In a discussion on the legitimacy of NGOs in development work, Atack (1999:855) emphasises that it is important to acknowledge, “There is a great heterogeneity and variety among development NGOs.” Therefore, similar to civil society, the NGO sector has diverse organisations which play equally diverse roles. Atack further explains that the heterogeneity is resultant from 2 main factors; (i) depending on where they originate, that is, North (Western) or South (developing countries) and (ii) whether they are service organisations focused on helping others or membership organisations consisting of people who are working to help themselves (Atack, 1999:855). Therefore, service organisations mainly consist of professionals and/or development workers with a formally constituted organisational structure.

On the other hand, though membership organisations may also have professional staff, they are predominantly made up of the very beneficiaries or communities seeking to better their life circumstances in the long term. Friedman (2003:16) points out that in South Africa, there is a distinction between non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations (CBOs), with NGOs defined as advocacy or service-related organisations which typically recruit professionals while CBOs are formed as membership associations, consisting partly of beneficiaries and in some instances professionals as well. What this means is that NGOs do not necessarily comprise the constituents which they aim to serve.

The proliferation of literature on NGOs in developing countries invariably shows that it is mainly NGOs originating from Western countries which are service-based. Korten (1990:96) explains that this is because they base “their social legitimacy on the premise that they exist to serve the needs of third parties – persons who are not themselves members of the organisations,” In other words, they provide services to citizens who are not inherently part of the organisation.

To explain the types of NGOs, Atack (1999:856) citing Korten identifies three main categories of NGOs. Referring to them as three generations to denote how NGOs typically develop, they are outlined as follows: (i) first generation NGOs which are

service delivery organisations focusing on provision of goods and services to meet the basic needs of beneficiaries. They provide direct services to meet shortages or gaps in existing systems, providing social welfare and humanitarian assistance, as well as relief services in emergency situations such as war or natural disasters. (ii) Second generation NGOs aim to build local capacity and levels of self-reliance in communities to undertake activities to improve their own livelihoods. (iii) The third generation are NGOs whose work focused on building “sustainable development systems,” (Korten, 1990:115) at local, national and global institutional level through participation in policy processes at the macro level. They seek to influence policy formulation in government and multilateral agencies and therefore work in a wider scope, beyond the individual and community.

The three categories highlight the main areas of NGO activity, that is; direct delivery of services, building the capacity of communities to participate in development and influencing national and global policy agendas. Given the increased globalisation and its influence on national and global policy arenas, Atack (1999: 856) states that it is important to identify and recognise a fourth generation of NGOs which are policy advocates on global issues such as indebtedness of developing countries, unequal international trade and its impact on under-development in developing countries and military spending among other issues.

While first generation NGOs are aimed at short term services, the second generation is more concerned with sustained efforts over a long-term period (Atack, 1999:856) to promote the sustainability and life of social programmes beyond the period of operation of the NGOs themselves. However, it is important to state that individual NGOs may play multiple roles across the 4 main categories, depending on the social issue they seek to address and context within which they operate. It can be deduced from Korten’s three generations that NGOs tend to develop progressively through the interrelated categories. The generations of NGOs identified by Korten are mapped against the developments that have occurred in the policy arena in postcolonial African states.

Literature also identifies quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOS) which have a direct relationship with the state and be fully or partly

funded by it, to meet performance targets and standards set by the state (Alcock, Erskine and May, 1999:401). Baldcock, Manning, Miller and Vickerstaff (1999:57) define QUANGOs as NGOs which are heavily dependent on the state for resources as well as defining and carrying out their mandate. Some authors argue that such NGOs are simply an extension of the state though semi-autonomous. They are set up to implement state run programmes or services. Therefore, they are not distinctly part of civil society, based on its definition as a sphere independent of the state.

Discussing the definition and characteristics of NGOs is critical in identifying the type of NGOs that this study sought to investigate. In essence, the problem facing this study is to identify and analyse the roles played by non-profit, formally constituted NGOs active in the social welfare sector in postcolonial African states. Though an analysis of definitions of NGOs as civil society organisations is essential in delineating the focus of the study, there is a need to discuss the main tenets underlying the main theories on civil society to provide a theoretical foundation for the study.

2.5 Theories on Civil Society

Henning, van Rensburg and Smit (2004:5) define theoretical perspectives as interrelated sets of assumptions, concepts and propositions which constitute a view of the world. Theories provide a basis for analysis of phenomena, as they “set out explanatory and predictive propositions about casual relationships between phenomena,” (Pinker, 2004:77). The purpose of this study is to analyse and provide an understanding of the role of NGOs as civil society organisations in the social welfare policy process and how contextual factors influence the roles they play. Therefore, literature review will guide the critical analysis of theories on civil society which shed light on the concept of NGOs. Schools of thought on NGOs tend to apply perspectives which derive from theories on civil society.

There are divergent views on what constitutes civil society in twenty-first century nation states. Comacroft (1999: 3) describes the situation as ‘conceptual confusion.’ While historically seen as a sector free from political interference and focused on protecting individual property rights in capitalist economies, civil

society in twenty-first century states is seen as central to political processes and policing of the state. Carroll and Carroll (2004: 333) reiterate the divergent and confusing schools of thought, explaining that there are theoretical and practical disputes on the conventional view of civil society. This highlights the importance of understanding theories on civil society and its development as a sector, an exercise facilitated by this literature engagement.

2.5.1 Historical Perspective of Theories on Civil Society and NGOs

Theories on civil society have evolved over several centuries as informed by the evolution of the nation state and the variant ideological and conceptual perspectives that have shaped the structure and role of the state. Therefore, the theories have evolved in reaction to the changing role of the state. Furthermore, the dichotomous political ideologies underpinning the main tenets of theories on the state and its role in society have given rise to equal discordance in theories on civil society.

To explicate the concept of civil society, Seligman (2002:14-15) gives a historical perspective of the roots of civil society as a domain that was not part of the state. The author alludes to civil society in the seventeenth century as an arena from which societal norms and values emerged from the common people as opposed to coming from the ruling monarchies or dominant churches at that time. Tracing the history of modern propositions of civil society, Hendriks (2006:488) explains that in the late seventeenth century, Scottish moralists viewed “civil society as a source of ethics.” In other words, it was theorised as an arena for setting of societal norms and values. This means it was a space through which society contributed to governance by determining acceptable moral standards and good citizenship through which to facilitate peace and harmony. By way of contrast, “Hume to Hegel to Marx have critiqued this romantic conception of civil society,” (Hendriks, 2006: 488), with Hume disagreeing with the notion of universal social norms.

Edwards (2004:38) discusses the classical theories on civil society. The author gives a history of its development and roots in Greek political life as part of the state, a public arena used to ensure associational life, political debate, social engagement, creativity, morality and hence stability. Therefore, civil society was a

creation of the state in its earliest form, a space that was created to promote civility, the fostering of universal societal values. In this way it served the interests of the state in maintaining peace and the status quo. The review of literature therefore highlights allusions to civil society as the moral compass of a society, where citizens debate issues pertaining to the public good, based on universally accepted values and norms. The main element of contention between Seligman and Edwards historical perspective is essentially that comparatively, they trace civil society to different historical periods. Furthermore, while on perspective argues that civil society emergent as a part of the state, the other posits that it resulted from outside of the state and as a way for citizens to counter the state's influence in private and associational life.

As the state as an institution gained prominence in society, and with the emergence of liberal democracies and political formations, civil society was redefined as less of a political space but one that was meant primarily to foster social life, preserve morality and private production. Mapping the trajectory of the development of civil society, van Driel and van Haren (2003:538) trace the advancement of civil society to the progression of liberal democracies in Europe and North America in the latter part of the 18th century. In the nineteenth century, the modern tradition of civil society began to theorise it as a public sphere separate from and independent of the state used for private engagement and interests, production, social and political interaction as well as moral action. The underlying principle of the modern tradition is that the role of the state was simply to maintain law and order. In other words, its role was to create a peaceful and stable environment for citizens to engage freely. The proponents of this approach posit that a public space not influenced by the state was necessary to allow for the thriving of private enterprise and promotion of social life and political debate.

The adoption of the modern tradition of civil society meant that the role of the state in regulating citizens and economic production became minimal, with civil society thrust to the centre as the space within which citizens were free to engage as individuals, in political and economic life (Mercer, 2002:7). Significantly, the modern tradition began to highlight the aspect of private and individual interest in capital accumulation, and the reconstituting of the role of civil society in promoting private enterprise or economic activity. While on one hand civil society began to

focus on private production and less on universal public good, on the other; inequalities in socio-economic circumstances of citizens became more pronounced. The failure of this approach to address the socio-economic inequalities and pauperisation in Europe gave rise to criticism of the modern tradition.

Karl Marx critiqued that, as an independent sphere of economic activity, civil society fostered greater inequality between the proletariat and wealthy. Marx's argument is that the sphere needed to be state regulated to guard against the dangers of private interest usurping public benefit and protection of the poor. In other words, lack of state regulation in economic or private enterprise left citizens who were unable to productively participate in economic enterprise vulnerable to the vagaries of competitive and non-state regulated production and capital systems. Essentially, the criticism disagrees with the definition of civil society as an arena operating free of intervention of the state. Adopting a similar approach, Hegel emphasised that civil society should be integrated into the state and its functions (Hendriks, 2006:488). Marx argued against societal dangers of leaving the sector to self-regulate as the interests of working class and peasant citizens were easily usurped by those with power and capital.

Though accepting the inherent weaknesses of the modern tradition and acknowledging its criticism, Alexis de Tocqueville reiterates the definition of civil society as a public sphere beyond the influence and dominance of the state (McIlwaine, 1998:660). However, the main distinguishing principle from modern tradition theorists is that de Tocqueville posits that it as an arena not involved in economic productivity but which coaxes the private sphere and the state to invest in social welfare, therefore, maintaining political and social stability. Ehrenberg (1999:208) admits that this perspective dominates contemporary perspectives of civil society. This is echoed by Mueller, Page` and Kuerbis (2004:169) who explain, "At least since de Tocqueville, collective action by citizens to shape their government and society has attracted attention from scholars."

de Tocqueville's theory takes cognisance of the modern tradition's failure in fostering equitable economic development and redistribution. The main tenets of his theory rest on the conceptual extrication of the private sector from civil society

but positioned as another sector independent of the state and focused on economic production and capital. Tocquevillian theory explains the perspective of civil society as a forum for solving social problems (Fagan, 2005:540) arising from economic liberalism. Therefore, it admits the inherent weaknesses of free market approaches in the context of a regulatory role of the state and hence positions civil society as the realm for addressing the inequality identified by Marx.

Kidd (2002:329) refers to this as the active citizenship approach to welfare where individuals, families, civil society and the private sector have the role of providing for the needs of citizens. While de Tocqueville's theory propounded civil society as a safety net for the economically vulnerable, it failed to propose fundamental change to the inherent systemic fault lines which gave rise to societal inequalities and socio-economic problems. In addition, it exonerated the state from the responsibility of providing for the welfare of the poor, placing that as a responsibility of civil society to address with support from private capital. Instead, it theorised civil society also as a watchdog to guard against the excesses of the state in the practice of political power (Kemeny, 2002:188).

It is evident that the development of theories of civil society has been influenced by the need to define its role in society in response to arising situations. The theories have evolved in reaction to prevailing socio-economic circumstances and the role of the state and private sector in creating and addressing these. Tocqueville's theory predominantly maintained the status quo, promoting the protection of private capital interest through providing welfare for the poor and in so doing, maintaining stability and suppressing possible revolt from the economically disadvantaged. Agreeing with this assessment, Roelof (2003) gives an analysis of the role of NGOs as primarily serving to entrench the hegemony of dominant classes by, "providing a safe, non-conflictive outlet for the cheeky and restless."

2.5.2 Contemporary Theoretical Perspectives on Civil Society

Today, two main views exist. The two main theories on civil society are the Tocquevillian liberal democratic approach (modern tradition), and the neo-Marxist approach (radical approach). Firstly, the neo-Tocquevillian perspective views civil

society as an independent and intermediary sphere between the state and citizens. It is viewed as a voluntary and collaborative sphere of associational life with a mediating role between the state and private economic sphere on one hand, and private citizens on the other. This perspective has grown on the back of efforts to promote a move away from liberal individualism in North America (Hendriks, 2006:488). The inference is that the availability of functional associational spaces is a critical element of ensuring effective democratic processes.

The liberal democratic approach sees civil society for creation and maintenance of democracy, sphere separate from the state and autonomous of political parties. Largely, it is an autonomous sphere of freedom. Alexander (2006:418) reminds of the autonomy of civil society and the “universal ideals that inform it.” Ironically, the neoliberal underpinnings of the current tenets of the liberal democratic approach posit that in the developing world, the role of civil society is fostering a vibrant organisation culture, a prerequisite for democracy, conduit for political and economic democratisation through privatisation and liberalisation. Therefore, civil society is a support structure for democracy at the level of the state; it shapes parliamentary deliberations, is a voice for public opinion, educates citizens in democratic values and is a watchdog for power (Baker, 2002:1). The implications are that the state is minimal in structure and function, mainly playing a regulatory role and leaving the private market and voluntary NGOs to provide for social policy. The liberal democratic approach to civil society is the hegemonic perspective that informs discourse on NGOs, the state, democratisation and social policy in Africa.

The second conceptualisation of civil society is as a sphere of deliberative politics and pluralism whose role is to limit and contest state power (Robinson & Friedman, 2007: 643). The emergence of this perspective has its roots in the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America, which was predominantly driven by coalitions of grassroots social movements and societal groupings. The neo-Marxist approach (McIlwaine: 1998: 651) has its roots in the 1990s political history of Eastern Europe and Latin America. Bartlett (2000:429) emphasises that this view is rooted in the history of the collapse of communist/socialist states in Eastern Europe which to a large extent was the

result of a vibrant, mobilised civil sector. The author explains how similarly in Zambia, the trade union movement played a critical role in bringing change to multi-party democracy during the 1990s (Bartlett, 2000:429). This brought an end to the one-party state which had been officially introduced in Zambia in 1973.

In concurrence, Ehrenberg (1999:208) explains that the “explosion of interest” in civil society re-emerged in Eastern Europe in the 1980s to 1990s, where it mobilised the critical mass that pushed for democratisation. This is echoed by Friedman (2003:4) who adds that the wave of transition in Latin America as well helped entrench the perspective that a vibrant civil society is a critical element in facilitating political change. He further explains his view that to scholars and Western policy-makers, civil society became, “...an essential ingredient in democracy’s birth or renaissance in the developing world,” (Friedman, 2003:4). This was more so as other external interventions had essentially failed to address the perceived problem of communist and socialist states in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

The main tenets of this approach are that the state is the primary embodiment of ethical life and subsumes civil society under its authority (Fine and Rai, 1997:18); there is a dialectical relationship between the state and civil society (McIlwaine, 1998:652-3). Civil society engages representatives in parliament and political organisations. It may legitimise or oppose the state as an institution; is a site of struggle, arena for resistance against authoritarianism and oppression. Baker (2002:132) aptly refers to it as the radical approach, engaged closely with the state but opposing it where necessary for purposes of ensuring redistributive policies. The inference is that the state remains central or at the least interventionist to ensure that livelihoods are protected and citizens have a voice in public processes.

The two approaches to civil society converge on the necessity of a public sphere for associational and political engagement. However, the limitations and specific functions of that sphere, as well as the nature of the state to ensure a thriving civil society, is where there is divergence. The liberal democratic approach is anchored on neoliberal pluralist political theory while the neo-Marxist approach is underpinned by socialist and social democratic tenets. This view is supported by

Bush (2004:4) who argues that the dichotomous views are guided by an ideological premise that essentially sees the “state as bad and civil society, namely NGOs as good.” Kemeny (2002: 185) shares similar sentiments.

While the focus of the neo-Tocquevillean view is on voluntarism with a non-interventionist state which furthers the interests of market -oriented individual liberties (Bush, 2004:2) the other perspective is focused on democratisation and civil society as a force for political change. The point of confluence however, is that both approaches theorise civil society as a democratic space for action to limit state influence and power in public associational and economic life. However, the Tocquevillean liberal democratic approach is rooted in economic liberalism, simply maintaining the unequal status quo (Whitefield, 2003:381). On the other hand, the radical approach is centred on political liberalism and fundamental political change as a route to economic development. Despite the divergent propositions, the historical overview shows that theories on civil society have their roots in European capitalist development (Bush, 2004:4). The point of convergence is that both the state and civil society are focused on fostering public interests and common good.

Literature engagement points to theorisation of civil society in developing countries as a force of democratisation through its promotion of citizen oversight, political pluralism, advocacy and policy dialogue (Hadenius & Ugglå, 1996). The inference is that democratisation is achieved by the increasing accountability and transparency of the state, civic engagement, associational life and participation of the public in political processes. Gyimah-Boadi (1996:118) posits that civil society was in the forefront of democratisation in Africa during the 1990’s through mobilising against one-party states and authoritarian regimes. Current dominant paradigms on civil society and NGOs as civil society organisations are underpinned by the economic liberalist values.

2.5.3 A Critique of Theories on Civil Society and NGOs

The absence of Afro-centric theorisations of civil society is conspicuous in most literature on the topic. From an analytical stand point, it is evident that current theories and much of the vast literature on the history and evolution of civil society

are focused on Western perspectives that fail to adequately acknowledge the existence of forms of civil society in African contexts. This refers to the period prior to its perceived re-introduction in postcolonial Africa in its contemporary, more structured and formalised nature. Bratton (1989:411) argues that while many pre-colonial communities may have lacked nation states, they however had civil societies. This was in the form of a plethora of formations which were responsible for “protecting collective interests”. Examples given include brotherhoods, age-sets, extended families and clans which in contemporary life, are structures which many have adopted in urban settings to create modern forms of associational life.

Bratton (1989:407) argues that currently, NGOs have dominated civil society in Africa. This is denoted in the invisibility in academic discourse of historical perspectives of associational life in African states in the pre-colonial period. The dominant tendency has been to view civil society in its contemporary form as formal associations, professional service organisations, thereby ignoring the informal associational life on the continent.

This criticism is echoed by Clapham (1996:4), who proposes,

A view of international politics from the bottom-up may help, not only to illuminate the impact of global system, and hence on the study of international relations as a whole, which may complement and even correct the perspective gained by looking from the top downwards.

Clapham’s view highlights that to some extent, the analytical lenses and conceptual discourses which guide the study of civil society and NGOs in developing countries is fundamentally based on Western perspectives which dominate academic discourses and global politics. Arguably, the notion of civil society in its contemporary form has predominantly been an exogenous process in states in Africa. Bratton (1989:407) denotes the pre-independence forms of associational life in the decade before the independence wave, including peasant movements, welfare and workers associations, burial societies, church associations and labour unions that existed in Africa. This formed the backbone of liberation movements and foundations for nationalist political parties that eventually brought an end to colonial rule. Characteristically, such forms of associations tended to be membership-based.

Analysing the selected participants in Whitefield's study (2003:389) on civil society organisations in Ghana, it highlights the tendency that civil society in Africa is often limited to urban-based professional organisations. Discussing the status of the NGO sector in Benin, Corre and Gahou (2005:2) explain that most NGOs in the country are urban based with limited capacity to carry out activities on the ground, generally lack professionalism and a sizeable number are 'make-work schemes' founded to create employment. Another criticism they level at the sector is the temporary nature. NGO existence tends to be based on the availability of funding and not on the persistence of social problems they focus on addressing.

In the same vein, Kasfir (1998) states that the popular Eurocentric perspective of civil society as formally constituted, universal organisations gives rise to bias against informal ethnically-based formations that can be found in African states, usually supporting the poor. The inference is the perception is based on exclusionary notions that do not recognise limitations of the poor in forming formal associations. Following the independence of African states, the forms of associational life to some extent decreased as their relevance in the context of a strong state focused on delivering universal services diminished. Mirroring concerns in literature about the complexity of the concept of civil society in the context of developing countries, van Driel and van Haren (2003:537) emphasise the need to deconstruct civil society. They concede that literature on civil society in developing countries is mostly "highly theoretical." Therefore, there is need to analyse the concept's origins, multiple interpretations of meanings and applicability to developing countries.

The main proponents of civil society are neoliberal in orientation, based on the assumption that economic coupled with political reforms and a vibrant civil society are key success factors in promoting economic growth, political pluralism and democratisation. This has become the dominant mantra in discourse on development and governance in Africa where the notion is emphasised that economic failures of postcolonial states are a result of lack of effective democratic systems and processes. The inference is that the problem of bad governance, corruption and a lack of accountability, transparency and pluralism can be addressed by developing a vibrant civil society to promote democratisation. This view is underpinned by the liberal democratic perspective of civil society. The

growth of NGOs in Africa began with the wave of shifts from ostensibly socialist one-party states to multi-partyism against the backdrop of World Bank/International Monetary Fund informed neoliberal economic frameworks which advocated for political reforms and promoted civil society as key to the democratisation process.

Comacroft (1999: vii) critically refers to NGOs as the 'latter day evangelists' of civil society, promoting Eurocentric liberalism in developing countries under the guise of fostering democratisation and development. This criticism is echoed by Friedman and Reitzes (1996) who question the popular idea that civil society fosters democratisation and inclusive development. Katz (2006:335) comments that this perspective is an overly optimistic view of the capabilities of civil society and NGOs. However, it has become an entrenched view in development and policy discourse, which has led to efforts by government to engage civil society in the policy-making process (Akkerman, Hajer and Grin, 2004:82). This implies that it is necessary to also assess the role of the state in shaping civil society and NGOs. Referring to the case of interactive policy-making in the Netherlands, Akkerman, Hajer and Grin (2004:82) caution against the possible effect of such modes of engagement in neutralising the role of civil society, through co-option by the state and minimising active engagement.

Katz (2006:335) states that there is need for society to be wary that NGOs may become part of an extended state, providing a false sense of freedom of association and expression. In other words, civil society is a sector and concept that can be used to foster opposition to repressive states and equally, used as an instrument for passive revolution, creating a facade of 'oversight' of the state.

Analysing the opposing perspectives of civil society, Katz (2006:334) further elucidates that global civil society is perceived firstly as a public space which is being used by capitalist and neo-imperialist forces to advance neoliberal values which favour the current global economic imbalances while posing as a champion for democratisation through providing a space for vibrant political opposition in developing countries. This appears to be criticism targeted at the Tocquevillean liberal democratic approach. Secondly, it is an infrastructure for "counter-hegemonic resistance," which can be used to actively challenge the dominance of

neo-liberalism which has increased social problems and inequality in developing countries which have adopted neoliberal policy frameworks. This view resonates with the neo-Marxist radical approach to civil society.

Comacroft (1999:viii) identifies that scholars are wary that civil society has been conceptualised in a Eurocentric perspective and is just but a form of neo-imperialism, “promoted by latter-day evangelists, NGOs and development agencies.” Falk (2000:48) highlights the problem that neo-liberalist perspectives tend to ignore the “realities of human suffering” that is caused by market failures. They are stringently focused on market and economic growth without paying much attention to the lack of equitable re-distributive mechanisms of such approaches. He points to the “adverse social effects” of the ideological certitudes of neoliberal approaches.

Though much attention has been paid to the development of civil society in postcolonial African states, debate on what constitutes civil society, its relationship with the state and its role continues. Nutley and Webb (2000:29) further argue that there are conflicting interests in policy research and therefore classify any effort by NGOs to influence policy as political. The debate stems from the perspective of civil society in its current form in Africa as an exogenous process driven by global financial institutions, foreign Western governments and donor/aid agencies and dominated by NGOs seeking to promote economic and political liberalism.

In addition, the dominant neo-Tocquevillean approach assumes a dichotomous relationship between that state and civil society. Some scholars argue that the level of conflict and coherence between state and civil society should be seen as an empirical variable instead of a theoretical assumption (Bratton, 1989:429). Bowden (2006:164-165) explains that though de Tocqueville acknowledged the need for a strong state, according to his view strengthening civil society is important to limit the “tyranny” of the “despotic” state. Therefore, there is another value laden assumption that the state is inherently a problematic institution. What it ignores however, is that civil society itself is prone to be a source of inequality and hence the state should play the same role of curbing the excesses of civil society. This concern is also raised by Mercer (2002: 11) who points out;

The neglected perspective that civil society might be conceptualised as a more problematic sphere of competing interests across both state and society; it is not inherently democratic or separate from the state.

In agreement, Gramsci-Marxist economists suggest that there is a need to strike a balance between the state and civil society. Western policy and aid frameworks played an active and deliberate role in shaping the role of non-state actors and NGOs in Zimbabwe, providing funds, technical assistance and logistical support to NGOs (Trade Development Studies Centre Trust, 2002:4).

Summarily, there is lack of consensus among theoreticians on what civil society is and its' role in twenty-first century states, more so, in developing countries. Hendriks (2006:486) alludes to divergent schools of thought among deliberative democracy theorists. One family's view is that civil society's role is to "engage in collaborative practices," with the state. On the other hand, some scholars argue that civil society must essentially work "outside and against the state." Notwithstanding the criticism of the hegemonic neo-liberal perspectives of civil society and the relevance for developing countries, there is consensus that NGOs as civil society organisations have a role to play in social welfare policy processes. It is what those roles should be and the nature of engagement with the state which gives rise to contestations.

2.6 The Social Welfare Policy Process

As this study is aimed at analysing the legitimate role of NGOs in social welfare policy processes, it is important to understand the social policy process itself. Therefore, having defined non-governmental organisations and critically reviewed theories on civil society, it is important to assess the social welfare policy process which is central to this study. Engagement of literature emphasises the state as the primary facilitator of the public policy process. However, the competing theoretical perspectives on the state assign it different levels of responsibility for social policy depending on the main tenets of the ideological stances informing the approaches. The role of non-state actors including NGOs as civil society organisations in the policy process is extensively discussed in the huge body of literature on civil society the state and social welfare policy. The extent and nature


of their involvement is what varies, informed by the role of the state and the prevailing socio-political and economic conditions.

Social policy is the guiding principle of governments directing action towards a direct impact on the welfare of its citizens, providing them with services or income (Levin, 1997:25). Baldock *et al* (1999:4-9) explicate that what distinguishes social policy from other forms of public policy is its concern with distributing resources among citizens and on interventions to promote their welfare through education, healthcare and social assistance for vulnerable citizens. In the same vein, social welfare policy is concerned with the provision of safety nets and mechanisms to protect the economically vulnerable in society. The policy process is cyclical in nature. It is a route through which the state decides on broad goals and actions to be implemented by governments in the service of citizens (Becker and Bryman, 2004:15). It consists of intrinsically linked stages where interaction between various policy actors (Thornhill, 2007:161) involved occurs.

Mutter *et. al.* (1999:244) identify two stages; policy development and policy implementation and describe the process as a policy cycle. This means that it is iterative and points to its progressive nature as a course of action. While Mutter *et. al.* (*ibid*) highlight two broad stages, other scholars further deconstruct the policy process into five stages; agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, evaluation (Dery, 2000:40), each with key distinguishing features.

However, agenda setting, formulation and adoption can logically be classified under policy development as they culminate in the promulgation of policy while implementation and evaluation relate to the broader category of implementation. For analytical purposes however, each of the five stages is discussed to outline what core activities it entails, and identify at what stages and in which ways NGOs participate. Young (2007) also identifies the five key stages and illustratively denotes the key actors, the iterative and cyclical nature of the policy process.

Figure 1: The Policy Process



Source: Young, 2007

As portrayed in Figure 1, policy actors include (i) the state: cabinet, parliament and ministries and (ii) non-state actors: civil society, private sector and donors. Stubbs (2003:321) reiterates that there is a range of key social policy actors at macro and micro level. These include households, communities, local NGOs, the market and the state at both domestic and national level as well as international donors and NGOs, multilateral institutions and other global forces at the supranational level. Young's depiction focuses on key policy actors which points to an assumption that individual citizens are represented or participate at the macro level either through parliamentary representation or civil society forums.

Cobb and Ross (1997:3) describe the agenda setting stage as "the politics of selecting issues for active consideration," where policy makers prioritise social problems. How they are defined determines their consideration of state intervention. This view is supported by Dery (2000:37) who explains that this is where government chooses what to put on the agenda and define as a policy problem that needs intervention. NGOs involved in the social welfare policy process attempt to influence the determination of priority issues and their successful incorporation on the policy agenda. It is at the agenda stage that most NGOs involved in lobbying for policy changes will play a role in highlighting social issues they identify as critical. Their lobbying and advocacy therefore, refers to "an attempt to influence the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective

interest,” (Jenkins, 1987:297). NGOs goals are to advocate for their identified issues to gain agenda status and subsequent definition by government as a policy problem (Dery, 2000:38).

The extent to which NGOs are able to influence agenda setting is to a great extent dependent on their level of access to decision and policy-makers. This access refers to the frequency and nature of interactions with government/parliamentary officials. Nutley and Webb (2000:30) explain that the political climate and ideologies of welfare influence how governments respond to the contributions of non-state actors to particular policy agendas. In agreement, Bryant (2002:90) posits that the profile of policy advocates and governments political ideology are key factors which determine to what extent they are open to information. Political ideology is a critical factor which often determines the public policy frameworks promulgated by the state. Political ideology refers to a “system of ideas or beliefs about society which guides political action,” (Bryant, 2002: 93). The political ideology of policy makers influences their perception or definition of a policy problem and hence how government programmes should respond to address the problems.

Although participatory processes may be in place to allow for contributions of non-state actors in setting the policy agenda, states are often wary of NGOs usurping their power at this stage as this may delegitimize their own role. In Australia, Casey and Dalton (2006:24) indicate that there have been claims that civil society organisations are in fact too powerful and have been capturing policy agendas through advocating strongly and effectively for particular social problems.

The agenda setting stage also includes problem definition aimed at clarifying the cause and impact of a social problem on society. Dery (2000:40) explains that this influences the interventions a government will implement to resolve the perceived problem. It can be inferred that the possibility exists that no interventions may be implemented depending on how the problem is defined or perceived. Furthermore, NGOs may need to continue lobbying to influence the definition of policy problems within the state. In essence, succeeding in putting a social issue on the national agenda does not necessarily translate to formulation of targeted policy to address that societal problem. Literature shows that agenda setting and problem definition

are encompassed in political processes which impact on the successes NGOs achieve at this stage.

The agenda setting stage is followed by policy formulation where the specific intervention strategies are more succinctly developed. The policy formulation stage involves determining a course of action and desired policy outcome. Dery explains the two models of policy making; the technocratic and the political model (2000:39). The technocratic model entails policy formulation based on the outcomes of current or previously implemented policies. The assumption is that there is a higher degree of influence by civil servants where the technocratic model drives policy formulation processes. This is informed by their implementation of government programmes and levels of policy outcomes; policies are more evidence-based or there is an evidence base for policy re-formulation. On the other hand, the political model is where policy adaptations are a consideration of the dominant interests in society, political power and their ideas of what social problems exist in society. However, in the political model, ideological considerations as well as the practice of political power provides the base upon which policy is formed. The similarity between the two approaches is that both ultimately rely on political structures within the state to adopt the policies.

Whether the model for policy formulation is technocratic or political, there are two main approaches to policy formulation which are identified by theorists: top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach is where policy is formulated by a centralised authority while the bottom-up approach entails high levels of influence from the targeted beneficiaries. Hence the target group is a key player at the policy formulation stage. Mutter *et. al.* (1999:243) argue that in top-down policy processes, it is often dominant political and corporate interests that set the agenda and influence policy formulation. The opposite prevails with bottom-up approaches. The assumption is that it is citizen's interests which influence policy agendas. Scholars presuppose that it is the role of NGOs as part of civil society to be the voice of the citizens as they operate at the grassroots and are more knowledgeable of the interests of populations they work with. However, their success depends on whether their evidence base in support of particular policy issues (Nutley and Webb, 2000:43) is aligned to the political perspectives of policy-makers in government. In other words, where evidence bases resonate with

the perspectives of policy-makers, such information is often taken into consideration in formulation of policy frameworks.

The stage following on from policy formulation is the formal adoption or decision-making phase. It is critical to point out that the stages in the policy processes do not necessarily always unfold in the chronological order depicted in much literature on public policy. Hence at this stage, the policy choices (Nagel, 2002:10) that are made are greatly influenced by occurrences at the agenda setting and formulation stage. An inference can be drawn from the term 'policy choices' that there are trade-offs between social problems that require government attention.

The adoption of policy paves way for mobilisation of resources (where available) in government bureaucracy to deliver social programmes in an attempt to realise the policy goals. In other words, this refers to implementation of policy which focuses on the actual process of delivery of services or action taken to achieve the desired outcomes or the policy goals. According to Bressers, Klok and O'Toole (2000:4) policy implementation is a stage in the policy process which involves "...turning a more or less focused input (the 'policy') into a number of diffuse outputs." Therefore, as aforementioned, the policy itself is a statement of intention while implementation of policy is meant to facilitate change in circumstances of targeted beneficiaries. Mazmanian and Sabatier define policy implementation as:

The carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute....Ideally, that decision identifies the problems(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued and, in a variety of ways, 'structures' the implementation process (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983: 20-21).

The inference is that implementation entails the execution of policy directives.

The fifth stage of the policy process is the evaluation stage. According to Rogers-Dillon (2004:8), policy evaluation gained prominence in the 1960s in the fight against rising poverty in the United States. The critical question that this stage of the process is focused on is the effectiveness of social programs in addressing identified social problems. In addition, evaluation of policy has expanded to entail assessment of policy implementation, what Rogers-Dillon refers to as the "auditing function' of policy evaluation. Rossi, Lipsy and Freeman (2004:375) explain that the evaluation stage is as much of a political process as the social

policy process itself in that it includes is characterised by a, “multiplicity of stakeholders” which at times gives rise to tensions at the political and societal level.

Mutter, Virden and Cayer (1999:243) point out the tendency of research on involvement of civil society in policy processes to focus on the national level, thereby missing out on recognising the differences between interest group activity at local and provincial levels. In a case study on interest group influence in the development and implementation of natural resource policy at state-level (regional) in the United States, the authors focused on understanding interest group activity to influence policy at the state-level as opposed to the federal arena (Mutter *et. al.*, 1999:244). The results of the case study indicated differences between interest group activity in federal and state natural resource policy-making. Based on an assessment of civil society in Russia, Proskuryakova, Vandisheva, Belyaeva and Bychkova (2005:3) expose that there were regional differences in type of associations and activities depending on the particular local political and socio-cultural conditions in each region. Therefore in contexts where the policy process is decentralised, it makes more sense to focus research on the local level and vice versa where the system is centralised.

Understanding the iterative stages of the social welfare policy process gives insights into the various core activities that form part of each stage and the broader process. In this way, activities of NGOs in the process can be analysed within the framework of the policy process to provide for in-depth analysis of what particular roles they play and each stage through those activities. The following section therefore, focuses on engagement of literature on social welfare policy in postcolonial African countries, which has resulted from formulation, adoption, implementation and to some extent, evaluation of policy. This outlines the context of social welfare policy and discusses the implications this has had on the development of and roles played by NGOs in the social welfare policy process.

2.7 Social Policy in Postcolonial African States: Implications on NGO development

This section of the chapter outlines the trends in social welfare policy in post-colonial African states and discusses how this has had an impact on the development of the NGO sector in a number of countries across the continent. An analysis of literature on the development of the NGO sector in postcolonial African states points to similar broad trends in the trajectory of NGO development. This can arguably be traced against the significant shifts in social welfare and economic policy as well as the changing role of the state in policy processes.

- (i) Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopolous (2000) explain that during colonial periods, NGOs were to a large extent “disguised” as social clubs as the political space did not allow for politically engaging forms of associational life among black citizens. Typically, NGOs were white-led, focusing on charity work. In the immediate postcolonial period, most NGOs were focused on providing relief services to alleviate the dire needs of communities emerging from conflict situations. The inference is that these were mainly first generation NGOs whose activities were welfare-oriented, focusing on provision of basic goods and services to the poor, displaced and dispossessed.

2.7.1 Socialist-oriented Post-independence Era: 1960 – 1980s

Although the first African countries to gain independence were Libya in 1951, Egypt in 1952 followed by Ghana, the first black African colony to gain independence in 1957 (Apter, 2008:6). The gaining of independence of African states peaked between 1960 and 1980. 17 countries predominantly in West Africa gained independence in 1960 (Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Somalia among others) with the development extending to the East and Southern region from the mid to late 1960s. By 1966, all but 6 countries on the continent were independent. In Southern Africa, Tanganyika (Tanzania today) gained independence in 1961, Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) in 1963, Malawi and Zambia in 1964, Botswana and Lesotho in 1966, Mozambique and Angola in 1965 and Zimbabwe only much later in 1980 (Oosthuizen, 2006:53-54). By this time, only 2 countries had not achieved independence from colonial rule,

South Africa and Namibia. The period of 1960 – 1980 therefore marks the first significant phase of the emergence of postcolonial states in Africa.

In the decades following independence from colonial rule in Africa, socialist-oriented policy models were widely adopted to redress the inherent societal inequalities through redistributing wealth and providing increased access to non-racialised universal social services. Focus was also on promoting egalitarianism. States played a central and strong role in the economy, formulation of policy and provision of universal social services. In Algeria, socialist ideology of the state which was supported by oil revenues in the 1960s-1970s had allowed for public financing of social programmes such as free education which saw school enrolment rise from approximately 17% in 1961 to 93% in 1985 (Sandbakken, 2006:140). However, dropping oil revenue in the 1980s reduced government revenue, leading to an eventual decline in public social spending. The state sought to ensure rights and access to basic services especially for the previously repressed. This was done through promulgation of policies for provision of free services; primary healthcare, basic education and relief assistance. Major infrastructural investments were made to support the implementation of the policy directives.

In postcolonial Tanzania, the one-party state espoused to socialist ideology and adopted socialist-oriented social and economic policy agendas encapsulated in the Ujamaa ideology. Ujamaa was aimed at achieving egalitarianism and universal access to social services for all. The 1965 Tanzanian Constitution formally established a one-party system, giving the ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union's (TANU) the legal framework to determine the policy agenda of the country (van Cranenburgh, 1996). During the country's 1967 Arusha Declaration, the state announced essential health services would be free at the point of access. The Declaration encapsulated TANU's socialist vision and principles of self-reliance for the country. The Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere through the Declaration, outlined the role of the state as, "...it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens..." The country therefore had adopted a social democratic approach to social policy and this was between the periods of 1967 to 1982.

In Ghana a Unitarian policy framework focused on consolidation of power and aimed to increase provision of social services to citizens. This included expanding education and healthcare provision. In relation to education, primary education was made free and compulsory in 1961. The economic and social policy agenda was anchored on socialist ideological principles as well as the perception that socialism was the best method to modernise the country. Ghana's socialist model was influenced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics political ideology. As a new postcolonial African state, the government in Ghana viewed the adoption of socialism as a way of protecting the country's economy from foreign business dominance. Informed by this, several key mines were nationalised. Adesina's (2004:136) observations are that Zambia under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, had also adopted a socialist policy agenda. Zambia between 1964 and 1991 remained a corporate welfare state, taking the lead role in organising and providing social services.

In addition, price controls on basic commodities sought to protect especially the rural peasantry and lower income groups. Scholars state that during this phase in postcolonial African states, characteristically, NGOs complemented state efforts as key development partners, seeking to play a role within state policy agendas through contributing in driving state-led policy frameworks for development. The trend was therefore a move away from philanthropic work to development-oriented activities. Among donors, there was a strategic shift towards partnering with development NGOs to complement state efforts. This resulted in an increase in the number of second generation organisations interested in rehabilitation, reconstruction and developing the capacities of local communities to foster self-reliance, productivity and income-generation (Moyo *et.al*, 2000:4).

Adesina (2004:136) criticises the Ujamaa project in Tanzania as a failure. This appears to be because of the failure to sustain economic growth and fundamentally redistribute wealth occurred against a backdrop of high public social spending as social development programmes relied heavily on state financing. In Zambia, it was the plummeting of copper prices which affected export levels and state revenue realised from this. This was coupled with states facing inherited colonial debts and structurally unequal and exclusionary economies.

Postcolonial Ghana had inherited an economy heavily dependent on a single product, cocoa. When the price of the commodity fell on the global market, this had a devastating impact on export levels and state revenue. Resultantly, economic growth regressed and with that, a parallel growth in informal economy and from the 1980s, the “Black market” where two-thirds of the annual cocoa export was done illegally. Osaghae (2001:22) explains that the parallel informal economic systems were often run with collusion of state officials or civil servants. This had severe implications not only for the economy itself but the effectiveness and efficiency of the public service in responding to service delivery and developmental needs of the population.

In the following years, significant paradigm shifts in social and economic policy were adopted to try and redress the situation. This was in response to stunted economic growth and an unsustainably high public budget supporting the universal and subsidised social programmes. Furthermore, many states were faced with increasing budget deficits within a context of higher populations with rights to access and demanding comprehensive state social services. According to Friedman (2003:20), “A more demanding society has to be matched by a more sophisticated state.” To this end, the significant shift from strong central states focused on redistributive policies to structurally reformed regulatory institutions aimed at promoting economic growth was partly informed by a need to find more efficient and cost effective ways of addressing the needs of the citizens.

2.7.2 Market-oriented Policy Frameworks: 1981 – 2000

From the 1980s, neoliberal policy frameworks quickly gained a hegemonic position in the developing world (Bernstein, 2006:54). This was also against the backdrop of calls for democratisation promoting and incentivising pluralism and liberalisation of political cultures in a number of postcolonial African states. This included functionally one-party states transitioning from mono-party towards multi-party political systems (Matlosa, 2002:152). In Tanzania, the political arena transitioned from an official one-party state as espoused in the 1965 Constitution to the adoption of multi-party politics. Tanzania held its first multi-party elections in 1995 (Oosthuizen, 2006:83).

Zambia had adopted one-party statism in 1973 and in 1991; an Act of Parliament was passed allowing the launching of political parties (Bartlett, 2000:13). Political reform in Zambia was driven by civil society, mainly the trade union movement which offered an alternative to the dominance of the liberation party (Adesina, 2004:139). The first democratic elections occurred in the same year, ending one-party rule in Zambia (Oosthuizen, 2006:82). The new political party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMPD) which became the main opposition in Zambia, was born out of the trade union movement; the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions as well as academics and intellectuals in the country. The MMPD went on to win the elections, breaking the hegemony of XXXX which had ruled Zambia through a one-party mandate from independence in 1964.

Though the main tenets of neo-liberalism in developing countries are anchored on free market economic reforms, state loans and development aid from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) attached conditionalities for political reforms as well. Bernstein (2006:55) reiterates that neo-liberalism was the “divine doctrine” advanced by the World Bank, through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in aid or finance recipient countries.

From the late 1970s, up to 30 independent African states eventually implement neoliberal SAP policy frameworks, Egypt adopted its SAP in 1991 (Bush, 2004:8), Ghana in 1986 and Kenya and Zambia adopted IMF-influenced policies in the 1980s (Adepoju, 1993:4) and Zimbabwe in 1990. Essentially, in these market oriented frameworks, politics is reduced to the state and society to the market. Konings (2003:447) admits that there have been many studies on neoliberal economic and political reforms in Africa conducted in the 1980s – 1990s. However, a gap the author identifies as understudied is the role of NGOs in economic and political liberalisations as the focus has mostly been on trade unions.

Debatably, the implementation of SAPs led to removal of subsidies on social services and basic commodities, liberalisation of economies, privatisation of state parastatals, institution of cost recovery measures and in some cases, devaluation of local currencies (Dauda, 2001:71). State institutions were downsized and its role redefined to a regulatory one, withdrawing from intervening in the economy

and greatly reducing universal social service provision. The promotion of state reduction was premised on the principles that bloated civil services were not only costly but the state intervention in the economy was distorting the markets and negatively affecting economic growth.

Between 1985 and 1986, Tanzania went through a seismic paradigm and policy shift. The country liberalised its economy and with that, the role of the state in social policy. The new approach promoted focused on the privatisation of social services with the government working towards a reduced role in social service provision. According to Kumaranayake, Lake, Mujinja, Hongoro and Mpenbeni (2000:359) in their analysis of growing privatisation in the health sector in Tanzania, this "...was accompanied by the narrowing focus of government away from direct service provision and towards strengthening the traditional policy-setting role and developing its facilitator role in an increasingly diverse sector." Kumaranayake *et.al*, (2000:359) report that by 1990, the Tanzanian government had cut the public budget allocation for the health sector by up to 46%. In addition, the civil service was also reduced by 23 500 civil servants who were retrenched from the employ of the state (Kumaranayake *et.al*, 2000:359). This number represented a cut of more than 10% of the total civil service during that time.

The resultant austerity measures were emphasised as necessary elements for the SAPs to be effective in fostering an environment for the economy to thrive and facilitate growth and redistribution. According to Mwanza (1992:4-7), this premise is what led to the implementation of SAPs in postcolonial African states and abandonment of socialist egalitarianism.


The downsizing of the state and its role in social policy assumed that the liberalised economy would grow and facilitate redistribution while providing opportunities for citizens to actively participate in the economy. The opposite was true as lamented by Bernstein (2006:54) who argues that it became evident state reforms and liberalising of economies were ineffective in fostering economic growth and fighting increasing poverty. The implementation of these policy reforms actually reversed the development gains of the redistributive socialist policies. Economic growth levels remained low and also affected by global market trends in some cases, regressed to negative growth levels.

Dauda (2001:74) explains that in Nigeria, living conditions 'rapidly' deteriorated among the populace following implementation of SAPs in 1986. This is reiterated by Osaghae (2001:22) who describes the resulting emigrations from the country as 'massive' as people went abroad in search of better living conditions. Paradoxically, the economic benefits instead trickled down through "...ethnically based patron-client networks," (Sandbakken, 2006:143). The inference is that the impact of SAPs was that the majority of the population however, was negatively affected. In the same vein, Simon (1997:187) echoes criticism that has been raised by numerous scholars about the "strongly negative social impact of structural adjustments and economic recovery programmes and associated aid conditionalities." State-led welfare withered away, leaving vulnerable populations unable to participate in the economy and without safety nets to rely on.

The economic and political liberalisation extended to promoting the development of civil society to foster democratisation and fill the gap in social service provision left by the receding state. Mercer (1999:21) reports that the number of registered NGOs in Tanzania increased from just 25 between 1986 and 1990 to 604 by 1990, with a higher estimate of 1 800 if non-registered NGOs are included. Similarly, Oda van Cranenburgh (1996:537) maps the growth in NGOs in the country from 137 in 1986 to 470 in the 1990s. In addition, Kajimbwa (2006:6) gives an updated number of 1 500 NGOs in Tanzania by 2005. Of note is that the statistics given by Mercer and Oda van Cranenburgh may be significantly different, however, they both point to the significant growth in numbers of NGOs in Tanzania.

As the adoption of neoliberal economic policy frameworks and state reform later significantly reduced the state's role in social welfare, this gave rise to a parallel and phenomenal growth in the number of NGOs operating on the continent. Commenting on this trend, White (1999:308) laments that, "The rise of the NGOs as the agents of development par excellence has been achieved at the cost of the legitimacy of the state." This implies that the strengthening and growth of civil society organisations and their role in social policy processes, against the reduced role of the state inadvertently led to weakening of state institutions. Therefore, the limitations of state capacity to address the developmental needs of citizens have brought its authority into question.

Figure 2: Growth of NGOs in Selected African Countries



A key trend in Egypt, similar to other African countries is the phenomenal growth in the NGO sector from the 1980s to 1990s. The number of NGOs in the country more than doubled from 7, 500 in 1985 to approximately 15, 000 registered with the state by 1998 (Bush, 2004:7). The organisations sought to fill in the gaps left by the state in welfare provision and address the growing socio-economic problems arising from market failures and worsened by the incapacity of the state to respond adequately. Clark (1995:595) explains that “rolling back the state” also gives greater prominence to NGOs and the private sector. In Tanzania, between 1986 and 2005, the number of NGOs grew tenfold from 137 to 1 500 (Tanzania Association of NGOs, 2005: <http://www.tango.or.tz>). Similarly, in Tunisia, from 1 886 in 1988, the number of NGOs in the country had increased to 5 186 by 1991 (Edwards, 2004:21). The NGO sector began to grow in contexts of high levels of social need and a reduced state with limited and diminishing capacity to address those social needs.

To further elucidate this, Esping-Andersen (1996:5) states that the neoliberal policies delegitimize state social spending and extensive welfare provisions, which inadvertently give rise to ‘mass impoverishment.’ The implication is that this has the opposite effect of legitimising the role of NGOs in stepping in to provide services no longer provided for by the state. The disadvantage being however,

that NGOs as civil society organisations have been unable to provide services at a national scale.

The retraction of the welfare state in Australia has had an impact on the role of NGOs in 2 ways: firstly, a growth in the number of NGOs and secondly, an increase in the outsourcing or contracting of CSOs by government to provide social services Casey and Dalton (2006:29). If the state plays a minimal role in the provision of social welfare services, there is a direct impact of an increased and re-defined role for NGOs. Reflecting on this, Kidd (2002:328) discusses the revival of interest in the role of civil society organisations in shaping social welfare provision. The authors provide empirical evidence that there was a shift in NGO funding by government, from supporting advocacy related to service management related functions in NGOs. Citing the case of Australia, Casey and Dalton (2006:29) comment that CSOS moved from the periphery into a central role in discourses of service delivery and policy development and have become the core of what is now known as the 'Third Force' in public administration.

In Zimbabwe, the adoption of the much criticised free market-based policy reforms eventually contributed to increased socio-economic inequality, poverty and eventual state disengagement from the population (Dashwood, 2000:11-12). The resulting dissenting voices and open criticism of the Economic Structural Adjustment programme (ESAP) mainly emanated from broader civil society including sections of academia, labour and trade unions. Proponents of ESAPs called for the opening up of the political space in the country, in opposition of the defacto 'one-party' state, promoting civil society and NGOs as central in the democratisation process in the country. Therefore, there was a significant redefinition of the roles of NGOS from second to third generation organisations, increasingly involved in lobbying and advocating at national policy level.

The era of failed neoliberal Structural Adjustment programmes or similar market-oriented policy frameworks supports the argument for the central role of the state in driving social policy agendas, social provision and intervention in the economy where necessary to redress market failures. Ironically, the supposedly redistributive effect of the liberalised markets failed to foster sustainable economic growth and instead, gave rise to increased poverty, unemployment, social ills and

socio-economic inequalities among citizens. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and its devastating effects have added another critical dimension to the dire socio-economic situations facing populations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Two-thirds of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world are in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Africa is home to half the number of people living with HIV in the sub-continent (UNAIDS, 2008).

2.7.3 Alternative Approaches to Social Policy: 2000 to 2010

Faced with these dire socio-economic situations and acknowledging the weaknesses of market-led approaches, many postcolonial African states began to abandon the wholesale approach to implementation of SAPs. Rai (2002:51) describes the absorption of 'third world' countries into the open market and globalised economy as being detrimental to development in those countries. "The promise was the trickle-down effect that sustained growth in metropolitan economies would be duplicated in the developing world." This however, did not materialise. Furthermore, Gary (1996:149) elucidates that the shift of international aid in Africa from being allocated directly to African states towards NGOs has strengthened the NGO sector while inadvertently contributing to the weakening of the institutional capacity of the state.

Several African states today are struggling with seeking to redefine the role of the state and develop balanced and effective social and economic development frameworks. These include Nigeria after decades of military rule and issues around land and distribution of oil resources, South Africa and its renewed focus on the developmental state and addressing growing socioeconomic inequalities, Kenya recovering from the 2007 post-election violence, Cote d'Ivoire in its post-conflict transition from the 2002 civil war (Anseeuw and Alden, 2010:1-2). Dauda (2001:71) emphasises that in the twenty-first century, postcolonial states in Africa are still facing dire socio-economic and political crises. It should be added that the impact of high levels of poverty and low and regressive economic growth on the continent have resulted in an electorate which is disempowered to actively participate in deliberative democratic processes (Mandle, 2003). Mandle (2003) further elucidates that impoverished populations do not possess the resources to allow them to actively engage in democratic processes.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005) reports that within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals, which are focused on reaching targeted developmental goals by 2015, most countries by 2005 were off track with the level of inequality within populations widening. The multilateral institution identified international aid as a key factor in addressing poverty, indicating that its current ineffectiveness is resultant from it being wrongly targeted. Falk (2000:47) emphasises that global civil society forces including international financial institutions and transnational companies are now very influential and are often able to sway the development of policies that favour their interests. This view is supported by Taylor, Watts and Johnston (2002:3) who explain that the interest of transnational and international financial institutions is focused on swaying monetary and fiscal policy to their advantage and reducing the government's interference in the economy.

Essentially, it can be argued that the trend in African states to amend existing or develop new legislation to regulate the NGO sector is in reaction to the phenomenal growth in the number of such organisations. Gary (1996:149) highlights the tussle for resources from international aid and power between the state and NGOs. This can be interpreted to reflect the lack of consensus on the roles of each sphere as well the tensions arising from the contested space which both civil society on one hand and the state on the other occupy in varying degrees in various African states. In addition, this implies limited development resources which lead to competitiveness among traditional and contemporary development institutions.

A number of African states have promulgated targeted legislation which requires NGOs to register with the state and providing legal mechanisms for state oversight of the sector and its activities. In Senegal, NGOs must be approved by the government's Ministry of Family Affairs and National Solidarity (Hernier, 2004:2). Legislation provides the legal framework for local governments to actively involve NGOs in project implementation at the local level. It is important to note however that the emphasis is at the local and not national level (Hernier, 2004:2).

Dissenters of increasing NGO regulation raise concerns that the regulation requirements are a way in which governments have begun to silence critics in the

NGO sector and minimise dissenting voices and their impact on arousing political opposition within society. The Egyptian government gazetted legislation that requires civil society organisations to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs (Bush, 2004:7). Notably, the legislation also prohibited NGOs from conducting any political activities in the country. This has led to criticism that the legislation allows for excessive state regulation of the sector, effectively stifling the voice of NGOs in lobbying for the interests of their adopted constituencies. In addition, this has strained the relationship between the state and NGOs. Ironically, the efforts to build civil society in its modern form have led to unintended consequences of increased repression by states as they seek to curb the influence of NGOs on oppositional political processes.

An analysis of pre-independence legislation on welfare and voluntary organisations points to this practice as not being a typically postcolonial phenomenon in Africa as some critiques imply. What is distinct is the level and type of regulation which has seemingly evolved as the geo-political environments change. Consequently the role of NGOs has adapted to remain relevant to the emerging socio-economic and political needs and environment. Scholars argue that legislation provides a necessary framework from which government can regulate whether NGOs are playing their presumed role.

The current trend among NGOs in developing countries has been to form peak associations which represent NGOs. After 1995, the Botswana Council of NGOs was established as an umbrella body for NGOs in the country (Thornhill *et.al.* 2002:43). It is through these associations that NGOs channel advocacy work through these associations. Hence, where individual NGOs may be bound by legal service contracts with the state or by registration requirements, the peak associations still perform the role of advocacy on behalf of member organisations. The associations are also aimed at creating platforms for NGO partner engagement in a bid to better coordinate efforts, the success of which is questionable given the competitive nature of donor funding which affects coordination of activities and partnering.

Jessop (2007: 17) explains that indeed the international context has become more significant in domestic policy and that key players in policy regimes have

expanded to include foreign agents and institutions as sources of policy ideas, design and implementation. Hence there is a key role for states in dealing with the effects of the increasing dominance of capitalist logic on social cohesion and social exclusion. In addition, to the dominance of Western liberalist perspectives, the dynamic in global political and economic influence on developing countries is experiencing the rise of China's influence and impact on global geopolitics and Africa (Oosthuizen, 2006:42). The ensuing result is an increased recognition of the need to seek policy alternatives to address social policy problems.

Currently, there are increasing levels of fourth generation NGOs influencing global or international policy directions. This is emphasised by Salien (2004: 204) who states that by 2000, up to 2,500 NGOs had gained consultative status with the United Nations, with "many thousands more having official arrangements with other organs in the UN system" and various intergovernmental forums. Katz (2006:335) goes on to raise concern that globalisation in itself is an off-shoot of neoliberal perspectives which now dominate in guiding social and economic policies across the globe. What this points to is the increasing influence of international policy making processes and forums.

2.8 The Roles of Non-Governmental Organisations

Friedman (2003:5) states that if a strategy to build strong states and civil societies is to be successful, it is important to clearly define what their respective roles and responsibilities will be in the long term. Other scholars argue that there are inconsistent approaches to the roles of civil society (Hendriks, 2006:490) and by inference; what the role of NGOs is in social policy processes. To some extent, scholars put forward at times conflicting and incompatible roles for NGOs, more so, in the context of developing countries.

2.8.1 Fostering Pluralism and Democratisation

Robinson and Friedman (2007: 644) state that the ability to, and extent to which civil society organisations influence public policy, is a major aspect of their role in promoting democratisation in Africa and other developing countries. Their comparative study of civil society in Uganda and South Africa focused on how CSOs contribute in public policy formulation and legislation through advocacy,

lobbying and mobilisation, challenging the power of the state to dominate political affairs and decision-making. Mutter *et. al.* (1998:253) explain that a critical function of civil society is as watchdogs over programme implementation, assumedly, of policies implemented by the state. This means that they play a critical role in promoting good governance by keeping an eye on what government does or does not do.

Arguably, it may be that this particular role is what has given rise to the characteristically conflictual relationship between African states and civil society organisations as their criticism of government failures or the political environment antagonises. This increasing politicisation of the civil society sector is what has often led to the promulgation of legislation to regulate the activities of NGOs. The inference is that governments do not necessarily feel they are accountable or answerable to NGOs which purport to be representative of the populations they work with, but which themselves do not come into being through any democratic process.

Hadenius and Ugglå (1996) explain that fostering of pluralism is a key role played by NGOs as civil society organisation. This relates to the capacity of civil society to foster political participation; influence the public policy process through advocacy, lobbying and mobilisation; facilitate structured policy dialogue and consultation with state structures. In a case study on civil society in Russia, Proskuryakova *et.al.*, (2005:2) identify 3 main focus areas of civil society in the country: promoting transparency and accountability, presumably of the state, advocating for human rights and pressing the state to provide for social needs, the last of which they identify as the most well-developed role played by civil society in the country. Casey and Dalton (2006:27) postulate that in Australia, survey research shows that a substantial minority of CSOs have advocacy as a primary activity, though it should be kept in mind that the figures are indicative.

Developing states were encouraged and incentivised to adopt not only economic but also state reforms, in a bid to foster democratisation. One key element emphasised as a critical component of democratisation processes was the embracing of the notion and role of civil society to promote transparency and accountability of the state. "...the terrain of development discourse and the range

of aid-funded interventions have become ever more inclusive to encompass reshaping or transformation of political and social practices,” (Bernstein, 2006:55). However, an important question is the credibility of NGOs in fostering accountability and transparency especially as it is not clear to whom or what institution they themselves are accountable to.

Odero (2007:1) explores the dynamics of the changing political disposition in Africa conceding that the pace of democratisation has been slow. This has resulted in persisting weaknesses in the judicial systems and government institutions. Therefore, there is a lack of necessary conditions that promote and enable the establishment and entrenchment of a democratic culture. The environment for political competition and civic engagement remains repressive as some African states are yet to create a public sphere within which vast civil society can freely engage. Characteristically, there are no structures for engagement between state and non-state actors to deliberate and discuss matters of societal concern through formalised mechanisms or state institutions. Odero (2007:1) argues that this should be in Africa’s governance practise; this is yet to be matched by formal structures that institutionalise this acceptance and provide modalities for state-civil society cooperation in governance. Empirical evidence however shows that the existence of formalised structures for engagement between the state and civil society does not necessarily guarantee that such engagement will actually take place.

Even though there is general acceptance that civil society has a role to play in governance practise; this is yet to be matched by formal structures that institutionalise this acceptance and provide modalities for state-civil society cooperation in governance (Odero, 2007:2). However, what this postulation does not highlight is that the lack of creation of these formal structures may in itself be an indication of a salient lack of consensus or acceptance that civil society has a role to play. To support this, Friedman (2003:6) warns that the preconceptions about the role of NGOs in strengthening democratic governance and social policy should be treated as a concept for inquiry rather than, “an established truism.” The development of civil society in postcolonial Africa has largely been an endogenous process, a critical factor which has led to an increasing discord among states, theoreticians and scholars alike about what role NGOs play in democratisation.

In Russia, legislative provisions for state-civil society dialogues have been developed but there has not been any corresponding impact on actual dialogue occurring (Proskuryakova, Vandisheva, Belyaeva and Bychkova, 2005:3). Proskuryakova *et.al.* (2005:1) explain that because of the disabling environment in Russia, the impact of civil society organisations in influencing policies and society has been very weak. The inference is that civil society in Russia has had limited impact on social policy. Takure (2009:5) notes that in Zimbabwe engagement between the state and NGOs remains characteristically tenuous and linkages remain inadequate. This is supported by Clark (1995:595) who states, "...mutual distrust and jealousy appears to be deep-rooted," between the state and NGOs. In some cases engagement is accepted and prominent while in others civil society remains in a continuous struggle to engage in national policy frameworks.

However, Odero (2007:2) does contend that Africa's governance processes are changing, providing spaces for deliberative democratic engagement while civil society is in turn responding to play an enhanced role in this changing context. Though this is a generalised statement, it can be argued that the phenomenal growth in NGOs on the continent as a whole is testimony to the availability of space for civil society. It is however important to note that the different socio-political and economic contexts of different countries on the continent have a significant influence on the level and type of NGO activity in each country. The proposition is that civil society is indeed changing to take up an enhanced role in the ongoing democratisation transition in Africa (Takure, 2009:5).

2.8.2 Oppositional Role

Clark (1995:593) identifies the oppositional role that NGOs play. In the same vein, Hendriks (2006:490) explains the perspective of civil society's role in counterbalancing the power of the state in society by providing opportunities for citizens to engage freely. The inference is that NGOs provide a force to counterbalance the dominance of the state in society, and in that way, protect citizens' freedoms, ensuring that the state continues to serve the often competing interests of its constituent. This is closely linked the role attributed to NGOs in facilitating democratisation through representing weaker members of society, organising them to be more influential in decision-making and resource allocation.

In contrast, Katz (2006:335) comments that this perspective is an overly optimistic view of the capabilities of civil society and NGOs. Analysing Gramsci's theoretical perspectives on civil society, Katz states that there is need for society to be wary that NGOs may become part of an extended state, providing a false sense of freedom of association and expression. As if in evidence, Labuschagne (2003:1) admits that civil society in Africa has been unable to counterbalance the state. In agreement, Roelof (2003) gives an analysis of the role of NGOs as primarily serving to entrench the hegemony of dominant classes by, "providing a safe, non-conflictive outlet for the cheeky and restless." In other words, civil society is a sector and concept that can be used to foster opposition to repressive states and equally, as an instrument for passive revolution, creating a facade for 'oversight' of the state.

2.8.3 NGOs as Policy Implementation Partners

To explain the role of NGOs as complementing the provision of social services geared towards addressing the basic needs of vulnerable communities, Nel, Binns and Motteux (2001:5) explain:

In poor countries, particularly, NGOs frequently have a very defined role to play in addressing various local and governmental constraints and in overcoming the current, so-called, 'development impasse. It seems that NGOs have potential, by virtue of their intermediary position, to facilitate the development process through linking both 'top' and 'bottom.' (Nel, Binns and Motteux, 2001:5).

This implies that in developing countries, NGOs play the role of filling the service delivery gap where communities are unable to cultivate self-reliance and governments cannot adequately provide for citizens basic needs. Furthermore, Robinson *et. el.* (2007: 645) state that the other role of NGOs is 'relieving' the state of social responsibilities as a service delivery partner and safety net to cushion individuals who cannot provide for themselves through the market.

Review of literature shows that the gaps that NGOs fill are not only related to direct provision of services but also funding gaps for social welfare programme implementation. Clark (1995:594) explains that they bring additional resources to fill in the gaps and serve as a response to failures in the public and private sector.

The inference is that the development of NGOs is not only influenced by state failure but also market failures in providing employment and economic opportunities to enable citizens to access social services. Therefore, they play an ameliorative function where state intervention has been ineffective in addressing social problems. Where the state then fails to provide the welfare for the unemployed and poor, NGOs step in to fill the gap.

Literature engagement indicates the perception that comparatively, non-state actors, including NGOs are more efficient and effective in service delivery or programmes implemented outside of the state (Friedman, 2003:5). Gilson, Sen, Mohammed and Mujinja (1994:14) state that NGOs have increasingly been promoted as alternative health care providers to the state, furthering the same goals but less hampered by government inefficiencies and resource constraints. However, the reality of NGO health care provision is more complex. NGOs are also viewed as less politicised than state-led services, as there are less competing interests and priorities to try and balance but the scope of coverage for NGOs is usually confined to specific targeted beneficiaries in defined geographic regions. According to Clark (1995:593), the increasing size of the NGO sector and the building of its capacity position it as an alternative provider of services and development sector. This perspective fails to consider the limited coverage of NGOs and the potential of increasing inequalities through provision of different levels of quality and quantity of services to communities.

Criticism of NGOs has arisen from the lack of coordinated efforts and the fragmented way they work. According to Casey and Dalton (2006:28), competition for resources has increased the fragmentation and stifled information sharing among NGOs. The multiplicity of actors in the implementation of policy gives rise to complexities including duplication, competitiveness and contradictory messaging. Criticism has also been levelled at the way in which official development assistance channelled mainly through NGOs in Africa has led to cases where NGOs “replicate state institutions and behaviour” by so doing, becoming as disengaged from beneficiaries as the state is accused of being (Atack, 1999:859). In addition, given the resource limitations of most African states, creating parallel structures for service provision may indeed lead to less

investment in actual delivery of social welfare services and more spent on maintaining the structures.

The practice of governments of contracting NGOs also has an impact on what roles they play in the policy process or evolve. Fagan (2005:530) explains that in Czechoslovakia, a problem arose where NGO workers evolved into professional activists and state consultants, who in working more in partnership with the state, became less representative of constituents. An assessment of the NGO sector highlights that where NGOs would typically have Programme Coordinators who were activists, the trend is now they are mostly business management people (Casey and Dalton, 2006:25-28). Therefore, their role in “consolidating democratic practice through checks on the state,” is negatively affected (Fagan, 2005: 535). What is worse is that some government contracts restrict advocacy related activities and contain confidentiality clauses which legally bar NGOs from releasing information about the government; effectively silencing possible dissent and criticism of the state. However, empirically, research shows that funding by government does not necessarily lead to a reduction in advocacy by NGOs.

Not only is the distinction between government and NGO providers sometimes difficult to determine because of their operational integration, but NGOs may also suffer from resource constraints and management inefficiencies similar to those of government providers. NGOs cannot be a ‘realistic’ alternative to the state (Friedman, 2003:11) but can provide different approaches and strategies to development which if successful, may be adopted and replicated by the state.

The level of effectiveness of NGOs in the formulation of policy is only realised if the state has the adequate capacity to respond to the needs of its population. Policy development will always require a strong government presence in coordinating and regulating service provision, and an NGO sector responsive to the policy goals of government (Friedman, 2003: 20). However, following the downsizing of the state and cutting of social spending in up to 30 African countries which had adopted structural adjustment programmes Adepaju (1993:4), many of the states were less capable of responding to social development needs and implement effective policies. The inference is that the capacity of both the state and civil society is enhanced in tandem. What is clear is that the one cannot be

substituted by the other, and NGOs as a sector cannot necessarily be used to “tame the state,” (Friedman, 2003: 6).

At best, NGOs can serve as incubators where policy alternatives can be implemented to develop innovations which can later be taken to national scale through the state. Clark (1995:594) refers to this as, “the capacity for innovation and experimentation.” Critiques put forward that NGOs tend to formulate policy alternatives in a manner that is disengaged from the state. By so doing, there remains limited success in advocating for the adoption and scaling-up of these alternatives by the state for the wider benefit of populations.

2.8.4 Representing of Interests of Social Groupings

NGOs also play a role in fostering ‘bottom-up’ approaches to policy formulation. This has helped to encourage the emergence of both policy debate and applied action in many parts of the world, including South Africa, (Nel, *et. al.*, 2001: 3). To reiterate this point, Falk (2003: 285) explains his perspective of civil society as a ‘Third Force,’ a sector which serves as the moral compass or conscience of the world. In addition, Falk singles out NGOs as the sector which can facilitate globalisation from below and counterbalance against the dominant interests of the elite (2003:285). This attests to the ability of NGOs to create space where alternative ideologies grow.

Advocacy by NGOs can be seen as criticism of a recalcitrant government. The inference is that the term advocacy has political connotations hence advocacy activities may be viewed as an affront to the state. However, this may depend on the strategies that NGOs use in advocating and lobbying: whether they are confrontational or engage in constructive dialogues with government.

Tvedt warns that the global civil society sector itself is an unequal space where hegemonic characteristics favour international Western NGOs (2004:146). Increasingly, donor agencies are channelling funding through northern NGOs, some of which have begun to focus primarily on this role of grant management of smaller Southern NGOs. Roberts, Jones and Frohling (2005:1846) refer to these types of NGOs as intermediary organisations which do not actually implement programmes but whose purpose is primarily to connect smaller NGOs to

international funding agencies. Often, subtle paternalism exists in these relationships where 'technical assistance' provided by the intermediary organisations to develop the ability of smaller NGOs to meet the organisational and systems requirements of funders. This phenomenon has created networks which potentially have the negative effect of stratifying NGOs (Hayden, 2002:58) and may be exclusionary in denying access and opportunities for organisations which are not part of these networks. A majority of the intermediary organisations are characteristically northern –based service NGOs.

In their analysis, Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin and Glassius (2008:84) highlight this bias towards Northern NGOs which has not gone unnoticed in the global South. From the 1990s, NGOs in developing countries were beginning to question the legitimacy of Northern based NGOs to represent the needs of poor populations in the South. Fisher and Green (2004:65-66) explain that non-state actors, including NGOs from developing countries "struggle" to participate in international forums or exert their influence in global policy agendas.

CSOs frequently gain influence from the country in which they are based. The geopolitical status and the power associated with, comes from their specific national context, (Fisher and Green, 2004: 76).

It can therefore be inferred that NGOs based in Western states which dominate or have strong influence in global international forums benefit from this influence.

Additionally, Tvedt (2004:140) is concerned that the NGO system is typically defined and controlled by donors who directly influence NGO activities in such a way that they are not always informed by local or national needs of the countries in which they operate. In essence, there is a category of influential and well-resources NGOs, especially international ones, which are more influenced by the policies of donor. This argument is related to criticism that such NGOs and the aid they bring are simply mechanisms through which dominant Western ideological discourses on development are advanced in developing countries (Tvedt, 2004:140). This serves to advance Western notions of development but can also be an advantage in positively resulting in a counter-hegemonic force to curb the excesses not only of the state but of the private sector as well (Salien, 2004:206).

In other words, civil society organisations are a conduit for public opinion or voices. Where states are disengaged from the population, NGOs play an intermediary role to facilitate the reflection of community needs in national policy agendas to promote responsive, relevant and effective policy formulation and implementation. Analysing the context of Australia, Casey and Dalton (2006:24) explain there is increasing debate about government's concerted efforts to 'control voices of dissent,' more so of civil society organisations. The authors point out that the attempts at silencing critics have mostly been targeted at controlling advocacy by CSOs "devoted to the destruction of capitalism." However, Casey and Dalton (2006:24) explain that this is not a particularly new phenomenon as allegations of attempts by government to control dissent by CSOs have been echoed since as far back as the 1970s.

2.8.5 Educational Role

Hadenius and Ugglå (1996) identify the educational role of civil society organisations, specifying the 'observable' attributes that can be used to analyse NGO activities. The educational function is related to their role in democratisation. Nel, Binns and Motteux (2001:3) explain that often, in addition to social capital, external support is often required to initiate and sustain community-led development programmes and it is in most cases, NGOs which play this role. Civil society is responsible for educating citizens to increase a culture of accountability of the state and citizen participation in public affairs and associational life. Based on his analysis of citizen participation and the role of voluntary organisations, Clark (1995:594) explains that NGOs educate and sensitise the public about their rights and services available to them. In this way, they enable and empower citizens to access or lobby for social services they need.

2.9 Critique of NGOs as Policy Actors in Postcolonial African States

Though there is consensus on the existence of civil society and the possible benefits that accrue from NGOs as civil society organisations, as much criticism as glorification has been levelled against the sector.

From their exacerbating presence in overwhelming numbers in Chiapas, Mexico, to their indirect subsidisation of warring factions in the Sudan and

Somalia, to their brazen use of advertising in Bosnia that unintentionally denigrated local reconstruction efforts, to the competition fostered in the relief sector...they have not always helped situations, (Salien, 2004:201).

The inference is that in some instances, NGOs involve themselves in clandestine activities which tend to be divisive and contradictory of state-led development efforts. Moyo *et.al.* (2000:4) state that some NGOs depart from official gazetted policy frameworks and defined priority issues. Giving the example of the 1990s in Mozambique, Clark (1995:597) highlights that up to 170 foreign NGOs were running programmes in the country, the problem being that this was being done “in complete isolation from the state...dividing the country into mini-kingdoms.”

Generally, civil society is considered “amorphous.” The lack of structured and sustained coordination has often been cited as one of the reasons behind the failure of NGOs and other civil society organisations in Africa to actively foster democratic processes in the countries in which they work. Scholars point to the need for increased coalition building between local and regional NGOs (Adeh, 2004:4) and not only with northern countries, which is done for the sake of funding. The fragmented nature of the NGO sector, coupled with the limitations in sustainable funding sources gives rise to accusations of competitiveness that more often than not is driven by individual organisational interests rather than the interests of intended beneficiaries.

The factors which influence the particular roles played by NGOs in the social welfare policy process are based on specific confluences of factors. These predominantly include the political context, policy frameworks, the role of the state and government, socio-economic context (Kenny, 2007:185) donor interests and the capacity of the NGO itself. Khafagy *et. al.* identify the sensitivity around issues of funding. NGOs funded by Western states or donors are often treated with suspicion about the focus of their agendas in the countries where they operate.

The main question is whether the NGOs represent the voices of their adopted constituents or seek to serve the external interests of donors. This sensitivity about externally funded organisations stems from the perceived interference of Western governments in the politics and democratisation of African states. Scholars argue that the critical factor remains the interests of the donors who

provide the funding for organisations activities as the survival of many NGOs is primarily dependent on the availability of funding from Western donors. This concern is echoed by Casey and Dalton (2006:24) who express, “warnings of perils faced by NGOs that dare bite the hand that feeds.” However, the same relates to host governments, which in developing countries may not necessarily provide funding to NGOs but are equally capable of excluding dissenters in consultative processes or worse still, retracting organisations’ registration to operate in their countries.

The conditionalities of official development assistance have been identified as a key factor influencing the roles played by NGOs in Africa. Similarly, the phenomenal growth of the sector has been driven to a large extent by the channelling of ODA through NGOs rather than state structures. Gordenker and Weiss (1995:372) state that from 1995, more than 10% of ODA was provided through NGOs, a major increase from just 0.2% in 1970. The problem however, is that while providing resources for relief and development work, this has led to a regression of NGO roles from policy advocates to first generation organisations whose primary focus is direct delivery of services. Though still critical, this means that there is less focus of NGOs in influencing structural, systemic and policy changes necessary to fundamentally address the characteristic high poverty and low socio-economic development levels in Africa. Worse still, the trend increases competitiveness among NGOs, thereby putting at risk the universal values upon which they purport to operate.

van Driel and van Haren (2003:535) question the “...representation claim” associated with NGOs. In the same vein, Nel *et. al.* (2001:5) highlight recent research which shows that NGOs rarely involve the ‘ultra-poor’ and often operate on undemocratic lines. They argue that this is coupled with their minimal impact, while actually fostering dependency among their beneficiaries. In a study on environmental NGOs in the Czech Republic, Fagan (2005:528) provides empirical evidence of how the organisations become disengaged from the very society they purport to represent. Their focus was on externally defined policy agendas to attract foreign donor funding. At times NGOs lobby government with the aim of increasing their funding rather than as informed by critical societal needs.

Therefore, concerns are that NGOs are not representative of their adopted constituencies.

The formalisation of the sector has ironically had a negative impact on associational political life in the public sphere. Abom (2004:342) raises concerns that in developing countries, 'northern-led' NGOs mostly provide goods and services and have ironically curbed social engagement by fostering dependency through top-down, external and non-participatory approaches that are not anchored in local settings.

While NGOs demand to participate in policy process, this is without critically examining the weak moral base upon which this is done, given that their legitimacy lies neither in any authoritative power or legitimacy drawn from representativeness of constituents. However, Edwards and Hulme (1995:6) explain that NGOs can build their legitimacy through transparency and accountability to constituents and governments in the countries in which they operate. Edwards (1999:26) criticises NGOs that their accountability needs are not geared towards the constituencies they purport to represent or beneficiaries but are "distorted towards the needs of donors." This is worsened by the tendency that most partnerships between NGOs in the developing world and their Western partners are highly unequal and paternalistic, that is, with Western institutions having the upper hand. Katz (2006:336) reiterates this when explaining that the resource dependencies of NGOs shape their agendas.

Unfortunately, the trend is mostly that NGOs in Africa tend to hold themselves accountable to their funders, most of who are Western states or based. Tvedt (2004:140) argues that in relation to the policy process, Southern NGOs (in developing countries) as non-state policy actors can only exert indirect pressure for policy changes through Northern NGOs. The author goes on to propose that international NGOs need to adopt social democratic ideology themselves in order to effectively counter the neoliberal hegemony in development discourse.

Ironically, NGOs often criticise the state on issues of representativeness, transparency and accountability. However, there appears to be a level of hypocrisy in that most NGOs, especially Northern-based organisations often fail to meet the same standards they promote of transparency and accountability. This is

a factor which contributes to characteristically tenuous relations between the state and NGO sectors. Proskuryakova, Vandisheva, Belyaeva and Bychkova (2005:2-3) indicate that NGOs need to practice the same transparency, democracy and due diligence in their own work that they expect of the state. In as much as NGOs play the role of policing the state, the NGO sector itself also needs to be regulated and overseen. A non-interventionist policy environment may not contribute to the development of well coordinated and effective NGO sector as agendas remain scattered and may work in contradiction with other efforts, to the detriment of providing for the social needs of those in need of welfare (Clark, 1995:598). The insufficient coordination leads to duplication of efforts where important gaps are left unaddressed.

Another tendency is towards competitiveness among NGOs as they compete for limited resources and donor funding. In a study of NGOs in Guatemala, Abom (2004:350) identified cases of competition for project beneficiaries among NGOs implementing health programmes. There was also lack of knowledge of activities of other organisations and collective effort. In concurrence, Monan (2002:125) in a case study on NGO intervention in Ghana identified the tensions between northern and local NGOs. Further criticism of the NGO sector is that local NGOs create exclusive beneficiary cohorts which they serve creating a territorial and competitive culture in the sector. Monan concludes that the way in which NGOs work and their programmes are informed by neoliberal policy agendas which promote individualism and factionalism. Ultimately, they encourage factionalism and this is detrimental to the potential achievement of impactful social policy outcomes.

Describing this trend of 'intense' competitiveness within the NGO sector, Kaldor (2003:22) refers to this as "an emerging marketplace of ideas, funders, backers and supporters." The competition has often been fuelled by the managerialism that has crept into NGO culture and increase in demands for quantitative reporting to donors which influences NGO activities and competitiveness. The tendency towards competition contradicts the cooperative principles and collective interests which are assumed to be the mainstay of NGOs in theorisations of civil society.

Referencing empirical evidence from a case study on Ghana, Whitefield (2003:387) explains that the reasons why NGOs failed to foster democracy was because of their close alignment to the state, building consensus on and partnering with it to implement World Bank approved policy reforms. Ghana implemented structural adjustment programme from 1986 (Adepoju, 1993:4).

Moyo, Makumbe and Raftpolous (2000) highlight the perception that NGOs are more effective than the state in addressing poverty because of their ability to mobilise people for participatory development, close proximity to people at relative advantage to government, and are structurally flexible. However, this perception fails to take cognisance of that fact that NGOs are typically not constituted through democratic means and hence may not specifically represent constituencies they purport to represent. In agreement, Friedman (2003: 16) explains that because they can only reach a section of any population, NGOs cannot implement universal services or play the universal allocative function, however, they may complement state efforts towards this.

The review of literature, therefore, exposes that NGOs have been an important component of both the political and socio-economic arena in Africa. Though debates on their role persist, there is commonality on the significance of NGOs to the public policy process in postcolonial states. The divergence appears to be on lack of consensus on what specific roles particular NGOs and other civil society formations should be playing. In addition, the subject of their involvement in political processes raises much contestation as indications from some authors are that the influence of Western countries on postcolonial states has often been channelled through NGOs under the guise of development assistance. Friedman (2003:8) explains that as donor aid influences policy and the enthusiasm for civil society by Western countries is evidenced through the material incentives made available for NGO activity, this is more so in the developing world. Eighty-five percent (85%) of Swedish aid for example is channelled through NGOs (Kaldor, 2003:16). Similarly, much of the culture of NGOs in developing countries has been heavily influenced by Western models.

The critical question however, is whether more effort must be invested in transforming the state and political systems in African states or continuing to build

often parallel organisations which are disengaged from the state. This concern is reiterated by Friedman (2003:5) who puts forward the argument that civil society can only play its role, “if the state enjoys sufficient capacity to respond,” and questions that the “effectiveness of both is enhanced in tandem.” Furthermore, the question should not be whether the state should be regulatory on one hand or interventionist on the other, but rather what combination of the two elements is required in postcolonial contexts. In reference to civil society, Ehrenberg (1999:209) posits that theory on civil society must evolve beyond the intermediary and mediatory role in current dominant discourse, highlighting the limitations of organisations in promoting greater economic justice and political democracy.

Summarily, Kemeny (2002:185) strongly warns against this socially constructed dichotomous portrayal of the state, society and the market. The author highlights the promulgation of the dominant discourse of a “confrontational conceptual distinction and its accompanying narrative of good versus evil” which promotes a polarised view of the state and society. As the relationship between the state, society and the market evolves in the twenty-first century, a new phenomenon between civil society and the private sector is emerging. There are increasing levels of funding from the private sector directly to NGOs whereas NGO funding has been mainly from multi and bilateral state mechanisms. Kaldor (2003:22) cites examples of oil companies in Nigeria and Angola. However, critics warn that this is one way in which private companies limit citizen protests against the long-term problems of exploitation of natural resources and insignificant beneficiation by communities. The proposition is the development of a countering conceptual framework which does not polarise the state and civil society.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework connects the key concepts of a research study (Henning, van Rensburg and Smit, 2004:5) and anchors it in the relevant literature and disciplinary orientation. Theories provide for analysis of phenomena, explaining the relationship between concepts. According to Flinders (1993:103) theoretical frameworks help the researcher to make sense of what is going on in the social setting under scrutiny. Theories are also relevant in setting out explanations and providing frameworks from which predictions about relationships

can be made (Pinker, 2004:77). This means that theory not only facilitates understanding of phenomena but also provide a framework for analysis of research findings.

The Tocquevillean liberal democratic approach assigns the role of fostering democracy and universally acceptable values to civil society, but as a sphere independent of and separate from the state. On the other hand, the radical approach argues that the state remains primarily responsible for ethical life and promoting societal and public good. Civil society is subsumed under the authority of the state and must work with it, in opposition to where necessary, to ensure the protection of interests of citizens.

Essentially, the two approaches are immersed in divergent political perspectives on the state and economy. Political- economic perspectives have greatly informed the nature and form of postcolonial states in Africa and consequently the development and form of civil society, particularly NGOs. Therefore, it is important to also engage with the political - economic perspectives, that is, socialist, neo-liberalism and the social democratic approaches. These approaches have informed political and economic reforms in postcolonial Africa from the 1980s. This has in turn greatly shaped policy frameworks and the role of the state and consequently development of civil society, particularly NGOs.

The main tenets of socialist theory include the development of industrialisation for the common good, egalitarian distribution of goods and services, with an omnipotent state to achieve this. However, there are degrees of variance where the democratic parliamentary process is seen as critical in ensuring consensus on public policy, and relegating market forces to the periphery in the social policy process. Therefore, the public sphere of civil society is limited in its function as provision by the state is universal, controlling of the market through price controls and state subsidising of basic commodities among other strategies.

In direct contradiction, neo-liberalism propounds political and economic liberalism with open market economies to promote economic growth, distribution and social development. The state is regulatory with a reduced public service focusing on stability and maintaining a conducive environment for private enterprise and free markets to perform, "...the state should play a substantially reduced role,"

(Baldock, *et al*, 1999:73). In essence, the neoliberal approach reconceptualises the state as a 'catalyst' in development, an institution which, "steers rather than rows," while the socialist perspective posits the state as a direct agent in development, playing a central and directive role (Friedman, 2003:5). Therefore, policies are no longer the preserve of the state; non-state actors play a major role with a 'minimised state.' On the other hand, the neoliberal assumption of better efficiency of policy through the increased role of NGOs ignores the empirical reality that contraction of the states' role has led to an increase in inequality in societies, inequalities which NGOs have very limited scope to address at a national scale.

The social democracy model can be seen as a confluence of the socialist and the neoliberal approaches. It is premised on the recognition that structural fault lines in the market make state intervention necessary to ensure the welfare of vulnerable groups with universalistic welfare systems (Scandinavian model) (Alcock *et al*, 1999:76). This is seen as a pragmatic way of adjusting society to the inevitable market failures. Vellinga (2007:96) points out that the social democratic model has its roots in civil society, specifically labour movements or trade unions. Therefore, in a social democratic model, civil society is redistributive of power and resources, a voice for the underrepresented. A regulatory and interventionist state provides social security and assistance to the vulnerable and intervenes where the market fails to address development needs and social provision.

In a study on social democracy in Latin America, empirical evidence shows that the model has been adopted in some countries as a way of encouraging economic growth with equity and social policies that support the 'great majorities' (*ibid*). The inference is that social democracy is viewed as a viable option between socialism and free-market neo-liberalism as it emphasises the state's role in providing regulations for the market and protecting those who are vulnerable. Hegel, quoted in Gare (2001) was critical of the 'brutalising effects' of the market –based approach to socio-economic debate which relegated the state to the periphery of welfare provision and social protection. Therefore, as the embodiment of the will of the people, the state ought to 'supervise' the markets and ensure that they address the socio-economic needs of the population. The inference is that though the state protects private interests and property, this should not be at the expense

of universal benefit. In addition, civil society's role is to ensure that universal values are promoted and social protection adequately provided.

Social democratic models require a strong state with capacity to formulate and implement comprehensive social policies. The question which arises is whether African states are capable of implementing social democratic models of development as they require a well established bureaucracy to implement and manage the state-run and financed programmes. Heller (2001: 149) explains the need for "left-of-centre" transformative political parties which are able to foster democratisation while promoting socio-economic growth in developing countries. In an analysis of democratisation and development in Latin America, Vellinga (2007:95) describes social democracy as the "second-best option to socialism" as it fosters political pluralism, creates space for market-related development while at the same time providing social protection for the vulnerable as well as reducing societal inequalities.

On the other hand, social democratic models presuppose a functional economy which can generate government revenue to finance potentially high levels of social spending. The contextual factors in Latin America differ from the conditions which prevailed in Western Europe which made the adoption of a social democratic model possible and successful (Vellinga, 2007:95). In Western Europe the Scandinavian countries have strong social democratic governments. The trend has been to institute market accommodating policy reforms in social policy (Klitgaard, 2007:173). Scandinavian states are often discussed as a homogenous block in relation to social democracy, it needs to be noted that the individual countries implemented variations of the model. In relation to political and socio-economic contexts in African states, several scholars posit that a hybrid form of state is required in Africa, which is an alternative to the old paradigms of socialist, neoliberal or social democratic approaches.

A confluence of theories will be used to provide the theoretical framework for this study. This includes theories on civil society and socio-political perspectives which inform policy paradigms. A social democratic approach to social welfare policy and neo-Marxist approach to civil society will be adopted in analysing the role of non-governmental organisations. Empirical evidence shows that the neoliberal

paradigm for economic and political development in Africa has not only failed to promote socio-economic development but greatly reversed many of the developmental gains that had been achieved in the first decade of independence (Adepoju, 1993:4). The socialist approach improved standards of living but its weaknesses lay in failure to promote effective political pluralism and sustainable economic growth.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the major theoretical frameworks on NGOs, and focused on understanding the development of the sector and major roles played by NGOs in postcolonial African states. As literature shows, it is ill-informed to regard NGOs as the panacea to effective social welfare policy processes. However, in contexts where the state is incapacitated to respond to socio-economic and developmental needs of citizens, it is often NGOs which step in to fill the gap left by a lack of effective state response. Conclusively, the critical factors which have greatly influenced the roles played by NGOs is social welfare policy processes in postcolonial states have been the prevailing geo-political conditions, socio-economic context, the nature of policy frameworks and ideology informing the functions of and roles played by the state.

At an abstract and theoretical level, it is evident that there is consensus on the view that though NGOs have a role to play, the legitimacy of that role can be questionable given that many NGOs are not democratically constituted and are often lacking in being transparent and fully accountable to the constituents they claim to represent. Based on the above discussion, literature identifies the following major roles played by NGOs in the social welfare policy process:

- Fostering democratisation through promoting pluralism, transparency and accountability
- Educating citizens to enable them to actively participate in deliberative democratic processes
- Representing the interests of particular social groupings
- Directly delivering services through implementation of social programmes and

- Countering the dominance of the state and market through playing an oppositional role to hegemonic tendencies.

From these identified roles, observable attributes can be deduced which will inform the methodological design of this study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The practical strategies a researcher employs to gather empirical data from which to draw interpretations and conclusions about phenomenon are primarily informed by the research question(s). Wolf (1993:17) explains that, “research is a way of knowing based on systematic and reproducible procedures that aim to provide knowledge that people can depend on.” However, to some extent, the researcher’s view of knowledge and how we come to know also influences the strategies adopted. Accordingly, this chapter outlines the research approach and the practical strategies this study employed for the empirical aspect; the ontological position, epistemological and methodological approach. Hollway (2008:137) explains that these are interdependent concepts in research which together, inform and provide the framework for research. The author further elucidates that (i) ontology is about “...how the person as subject of research is theorised,” (ii) epistemology refers to “...how the status of the knowledge generation process is understood and (iii) methodology is about “...how these together inform how the researcher goes about finding out.”

In the same vein, Henning, van Rensburg and Smit (2004:36) explain that the selection of a research approach and perspectives implies that research methodology is not only about what methods are used in the study. It also includes considerations on one’s perspective of knowledge, view of the world and the value and limitations of various methods. Therefore, the approach underpinning the methodology is informed by the philosophy of how the researcher sees the world; the ontological position.

The ontological position informing this study is that there are multiple social realities. These are determined by and can be understood through the meanings people assign to phenomenon (Denscombe, 2002:5). This is the idealist ontological position which underpins this study. The idealist paradigm postulates that people’s views and understanding, interpretations and interactions are meaningful properties of social reality. The study focuses on social realities as

explained and understood by NGO actors and the meaning(s) they assign to the role(s) they play in the social policy process. Another tenet of the idealist paradigm is that knowledge is situational and is a social process. This implies that facts are contextual and knowledge depends on socially defined stocks of knowledge available at a given point in time. Therefore, knowledge is socially constructed and context specific.

On the other hand, Denscombe (2002:14-15) discusses the realist paradigm which views the world as consisting of measurable reality which can be researched objectively and independently of the subjectivity people assign to meaning. It is often posited as oppositional or contrary to idealism. However, Denscombe (2002:22) goes on to argue that the dichotomous perspective portraying the idealist against the realist paradigm is artificial, more so in social science research. The author explains that the divergence is mostly in principle or based on theoretical tenets rather than in practice. Reflecting on Wolf's (1993:17) assertions, the inference is that both paradigms in practice are informed by the same basic principles of systematic and procedural research. They are often complementary hence the increased number of mixed-methods research studies (Creswell, 2002: xxiii). Summarily, the idealist paradigm informing this study was therefore assessed as appropriate as it encapsulates the suitable research methods used to facilitate the data collection process.

3.2 Epistemological Approach

While ontology refers to the philosophy of how the researcher sees the world, epistemology is a philosophy of how we come to know about the social realities around us. Epistemology guides the methodological approach of a study (Denscombe, 2002:5). Mason, (2002:16) postulates that one's "theory of knowledge...concern the principles and rules by which you decide whether and how social phenomena can be known and how knowledge can be demonstrated." This implies that epistemology refers to the practical aspects of how we come to know. In agreement, Pinker (2004:77) explains that epistemology is a set of assumptions about what should be regarded as acceptable knowledge; data which can be gathered, and how it can be used to make conclusions about phenomena.

This study adopted an interpretivist approach. Interpretivism postulates that “...phenomenon and events are understood through mental processes of interpretation which are influenced by and interact with social context...” (Henning *et. al.*, 2004: 20). Interpretivism relates to the meaning research participants assign to phenomena, which implies that there are multiple realities (Weiss, 2004). The inference is that a meaningful way to generate data is through interacting with social actors and interpretively analysing their experiences as explained by them; their understanding of the phenomenon in question and the meaning(s) they assign. According to Trauth (2001:249), interpretive research focuses on understanding occurrences, events or facts through the people who go through the particular experiences. Informed by this view, this study seeks to understand the role of NGOs in the social policy process, through engaging with NGO actors to understand the roles played by their organisations as they experience it.

Garrick (1999:149) identifies several assumptions of the interpretive paradigm:

- Individuals have inherent capabilities that can allow for individual judgements, perceptions and decision-making;
- Any event or action is explainable in terms of multiple interacting factors, events and processes;
- It is difficult to obtain complete objectivity involving people who assign meaning informed by their background.

This highlights the importance of context. Hence inquiry in interpretive research is value-laden.

The focus of the interpretivist approach is on in-depth analysis of relatively small samples, use of an inductive approach to make meaning and thick description of phenomenon and the context surrounding it. This focus is dissimilar to the realist-positivist approach which focuses on breadth, deductive analysis (hypothesis testing), large samples and empirical rather than theoretical generalisations.

An aspect Garrick (1999:149) points out about the interpretive approach is that complete objectivity may be difficult to obtain as individuals assign their own meanings to phenomena. Therefore, the research design must consider measures to counter the possibility of this affecting the results of the study. On the other

hand, interpretive research allows for contextual considerations and descriptive analysis of information, aspects which underpin the research design.

3.3 Research Strategy and Design

The research strategy refers to relevant and appropriate methods to get data. This is incorporated into the research design. According to Powell, (1999:21), the research design is;

“...a sequence of events which connects the procedures for collecting the empirical data to the initial research questions on the one hand, and to subsequent data collection, analysis and conclusions on the other.”

Therefore, it is a process of selecting the appropriate methods and instruments for a study. The study design guides the researcher and organises the research process, a key factor in ensuring credibility of the study (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:65). For this study, a qualitative research design was used, specifically a qualitative case study. Alcock *et. al.* (1999) explain that a case study focuses on the nature and meaning of the social world and relationships of power in a bounded system or case. A case study is a data and context driven approach; centres on understanding a particular situation and on process rather than outcomes, “... an intensive description and analysis of a single unit or programme.” (2004:33). It allowed for the in-depth contextual analysis and understanding of a bounded system and the meaning for those involved in it (Henning *et.al*, 2004:41).

Becker and Bryman (2004:57) explain that qualitative methods are an appropriate form of investigation and analysis of contexts and their influence on actors, including “experiences and processes.” According to Mason (2002:25), qualitative research is characteristically “context-sensitive.” Unlike quantitative studies, qualitative approaches do not seek to measure, but to understand interactions amongst phenomena. This study sought to examine the interplay between the roles NGOs play in the social policy process, which and how contextual factors have influenced the roles.

A case study is an appropriate method for an individual research as it allows for a particular problem to be studied in-depth within a limited period of time. In addition, it is an approach which provides for concentration on a single unit and on small

numbers or the selection of small samples within that unit. This has advantages in terms of in-depth analysis as well as practical feasibility of logistical considerations of the study. The disadvantage however, is that a case study limits the generalisability of the findings of the study. Pinker (2004:77) explains that generalising refers to the application of findings beyond the scope of the context of the specific research. However, this study is interested in theoretical rather than empirical generalisations and as the research approach is interpretive, the focus is on transferability of findings.

In a study of civil society institutions in Eastern European post-communist states, Green (2002: 455) highlights the importance of future research agenda focused on detailed and contextual studies of the involvement of civil society in the policy-making process. His concerns are that studies on the development of civil society organisations have tended to focus on quantitative work, on the sheer growth in number of NGOs as a measure of strong civil society. Therefore, to a low extent, this study will hopefully contribute to the much needed body of literature and shed methodological insights on using qualitative approaches in studies on civil society and NGOs. Shaw (2008: 410) agrees that, "...qualitative research makes an important and distinctive contribution to policy...and to research." Similarly, a case study design enables an in-depth analysis of the role played by NGOs by using information-rich participants and data sources from the NGO sector and state.

Struwig and Stead (2001:4-7) however explain that using a qualitative design does not mean quantifiable information cannot be used for deeper inquiry as "interpretation of quantitative data is often of a qualitative nature". In line with this thinking, selected statistical information relevant to reflect aspects related to the phenomena being studied was taken into consideration. This included information on the number(s) of registered NGOs in the Zimbabwe operating in the social policy sector over 3 decades from the 1960s. In this way, the researcher sought to examine the growth of the sector in the country, juxtaposing the growth against the policy reforms and evolving socio-economic and political context. Statistical information on social policy and economic indicators was collected from secondary sources and critically analysed to augment description of the context.

3.4 Study Population and Sampling procedures

3.4.1 Target population

The population of a study is the totality of a group of people or phenomena that is of interest to it, often defined by means of a fundamental common characteristic(s) they possess (Teddlie and Tashakori, 2009:186). In the same vein, the population of this study is NGOs operating in the social policy sector in Zimbabwe. There are more than 1 000 NGOs in Zimbabwe (Benson and Clay, 2003:13). Of these, an estimated sixty-percent are in the social policy sector (Otto, 2009:13). However, of the sixty-percent, some of the NGOs undertake activities that cut across other sectors as well.

3.4.2 Sample and Sampling procedure

Generally, a sample is a portion of a larger group. In research, it is part of and has characteristics of the target population (Gay and Airasian, 2003:124). Therefore, the sample can be used to make inferences about the population of the study. A purposive sampling procedure was used to select NGOs to participate in the study as well as research participants from the selected NGOs. Purposive sampling is the selection of participants that possess particular characteristics, experiences and expertise relevant to the study and are information rich (Struwig and Stead, 2001:122). According to Rubin and Rubin (1995:73) sampling in qualitative research aims to, "...choose people who are knowledgeable about the subject and talk with them until what you hear provides an overall sense of the meaning of a concept, theme or process." This approach was adopted by the researcher. A sample of NGOs was selected to participate in the study.

The sampling was done in 2 stages, utilising 2 related purposive sampling procedures: (i) stratified purposive sampling and (ii) critical case sampling. Teddlie and Tashakori (2009:186) define stratified purposive sampling as identifying of specific subgroups within the research population and then selecting cases from each subgroup, purposively. This is based on the particular characteristics of subgroups of the target population and can facilitate comparisons. Critical case sampling means that research participants are chosen for their particular expertise and perspectives on the phenomena under study (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:72). An

official government register of NGOs was difficult to attain from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the ministry which is responsible for the registration of NGOs in the country. Therefore, several other verifiable and credible registers were sourced and used for the stratified sampling. These were:

- Zimbabwe Cluster Coordination Register compiled by the United Nations agencies in Zimbabwe. This is a register of selected NGOs and multilateral development agencies that form technical working groups and clusters in promoting and supporting identified developmental policy agendas in Zimbabwe;
- Directory of Development Organisations: Africa (2006) – Volume I (<http://www.devdir.org>) which lists and has contact details of NGOs in various African countries, including Zimbabwe; and
- Zimbabwe – Humanitarian Organisations Contact Directory (2010) published by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

Stage 1: Stratified purposive sampling – involved identifying grouping NGOs into distinct strata or sub-groups of the target population. 2 strata of types of NGOs were identified based on geographical presence, country of origin and area of operation of NGOs;

- (i) Local NGOs - defined as those formed in, headquartered and operating only in Zimbabwe. They have operations confined within a specific locality, municipal area and/or province in the country. They may be operations and geographic presence in one or more provinces and districts in the country; and
- (ii) International NGOs – originating from outside Zimbabwe, are headquartered outside the country but have a presence and operations in Zimbabwe as well as other countries.

The stratifying was aimed at distinguishing NGOs by commonly held characteristics and facilitating the selection of NGOs from each group; to guide the researcher in exploring the roles of the 2 types of NGOs and contextual factors influencing the roles they play. The selection of NGOs into the stratified sample

was based on the following inclusion criteria to ensure relevance to the research questions as well as the credibility of data:

- Valid legal registration with the Government of Zimbabwe as per stipulations of the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (Chapter 17:05 of 2003);
- NGOs operating in the social policy sector in Zimbabwe since (or before) the year 2000 and up to 2010 to ensure they have experience of working in the country during the period of interest of this study;
- NGOs whose main and core activities/programmes (at least 50% of their programme budgets and/or level of effort) are focused on the social policy sector;
- NGOs that are not-for-profit organisations and therefore conceptually or in principle, organisations whose work is focused on the public good and public benefit as opposed to profit-making NGOs;
- NGOs with formally constituted operating structures;
- NGOs that are relatively easily accessible for purposes of this study. Some of the local NGOs that may meet the inclusion criteria are based in remote parts of the country and therefore would be a major challenge to reach in terms of logistics.

Stage 2: Critical case sampling – Following on the stratified sampling, critical case sampling was then used to select 10 local NGOs and 5 international NGOs into the sample. From the total 15 selected NGOs, 15 key informants, 1 from each of the NGOs were identified to participate in the study. Key informants were deemed to be information-rich participants with in-depth knowledge and organisational experience of working in the NGO sector in Zimbabwe, as well as knowledge of the role(s) their NGOs play in social policy in Zimbabwe. In addition, participants from, the National Association of Non-governmental Organisations (NANGO) were included in the sample. NANGO is an officially recognised NGO umbrella organisation, representing a large number of NGOs operating in Zimbabwe. In their study on civil society organisations in Botswana, Carroll and

Carroll (2004: 334) emphasised the need for any study on civil society to include representatives from umbrella organisations/coalitions because of their experience coordinating multiple NGOs and playing a representation role. 2 key informants from NANGO were selected as participants in the study.

A total number of 16 NGOs were included in the study sample, including some with a long history of operating in Zimbabwe dating back to 1960s and 1970s, as well as some which started operating in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s/from 2000. 13 participated in the study while 3 (2 local NGOs and 1 international NGO) declined consent and were therefore not included in the study. Reasons given included not wanting to draw attention to their organisations lest they be targeted and victimised by state apparatus for criticising the state. The acrimonious relationship between the state and civil society organisations as well as the polarised political environment was key factors influencing the consenting process.

Consequently, 14 key informants were interviewed, instead of the targeted number of 17. Noted were the concerns that the organisations' internal policy of not participating in any forms of external research studies or inquiries of any form to safeguard their organisations against possible political attention. However, the researcher found that the number of participating organisations and key informants were adequate despite the reduced sample size. Bryant (2001) explains that a small sample is adequate for a qualitative study where the aim is theoretical and not empirical generalisations.

To further elucidate, Wolf (1993:19) argues that case studies are, "not always intended to lead to inferences that are generalisable to wider populations." Theoretical generalisations provide for conceptual insights "which possess a sufficient degree of universality to allow their projection to other contexts," (Sim, 1998:345). Rubin and Rubin's (1995:72) perspective is that in order to extend findings from qualitative studies beyond the study sample, a researcher should ensure completeness of data, ensuring a full understanding and appreciation of the issues under study. In addition, a saturation point should be reached where additional data collection simply reiterates what has already been gathered and does not necessarily add new reflections on the topics being examined. Therefore, this implies that parallels may be drawn with contexts that are comparable but may

still have unique characteristics, such as other postcolonial states in Africa. In this way, the researcher enables the transferability of findings rather than generalisability.

Informed by this perspective, while the researcher had revisited the sampling procedure to identify additional NGOs to include in the study sample to replace the ones that declined consent, the data collection process with consenting NGOs reached a saturation point with recurring thematic issues raised in the interviews; therefore, the need for additional interviews was not necessary.

3.5 Research Methods

Research methods are the techniques, instruments and procedures employed to gather data and process that into evidence (Nutter and Webb, 2000:13). 2 methods were used in this study: documentary analysis and in-depth interviews. According to Flick (2002: 265-266), combining several qualitative methods assists in countering the weaknesses that each method may bring into the study when used individually. Bak (2004) explains that there are advantages to using multiple methods, or combining “literature engagement with empirical work.” The complementary role of each method assists in the verification and validity of findings. According to Flick (2002:266),

The different methodological perspectives complement each other in the study of an issue and this is conceived as the complementary compensation of the weaknesses and blind spots of each single method.

Use of multiple data sources also enriches the depth of the data. There was however, the risk of contradictory findings from different data sources but these would have been vital to analyse as contradictions point to critical aspects of the subject which need further exploring. As Rubin and Rubin (1995:87) point out that in qualitative research, the aim is not necessarily to ensure consistencies but also to understand, if there are inconsistencies, why they exist. Therefore, when contradictory evidence is gathered, it is important first to verify the evidence through an iterative process and also to interpret the meanings and explain the reasons for the contradictions.

3.5.1 Documentary analysis

Documentary analysis as a research method refers to the use of written records or documents such as reports, manuscripts and other written materials. Flick (2002:32) explains that in qualitative research, texts are versions of the world which provide “essential data.” In agreement, Babbie and Mouton (2001: 347) identify records or documentation as main sources of data in research. Regarding the analysis, Bak (2004:25) observes that analysis of documents may be used as a supplementary source of data which could even assist in drawing up relevant questions for the interview sessions. However, this implies that it cannot be used as a main source of data for research, which Atkinson and Coffey in Silverman (1997:47) strongly disagree with. They argue that, “documentary work may also be used as the main topic of qualitative research in its own right.” It is seen as an efficient way of obtaining condensed information. Furthermore, organisations are highly dependent on documentation or paperwork on all aspects of their operations and therefore compile information rich reports, plans and records which can cover a long period of time.

The process involved identifying and selecting documentation relevant to the study. 3 main categories of documents were purposively sampled and critically reviewed. These are:

- Non-Governmental Organisations documents – strategic plans, programme and organisational and programme reports, policy briefs, position and concept papers; official press statements where available;
- National Association of Non-governmental Organisations documents – NANGO official press statements or media announcements, position papers, reports, memos issued to NANGO members, strategic plans;
- State policy and legislative documents – legislative acts, policy documents, policy and budget speeches, official notices and government gazettes to NGOs, Hansard parliamentary debates on NGOs, official press statements on the NGO sector and official statistical records on social policy; and
- Other research studies conducted on NGOs in Zimbabwe.

Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopolous (2000) used documentary analysis in their study of NGOs and politics in Zimbabwe. Their assessment is that it was a rich source of

information on legislation, state policies, missions and visions of NGOs and the activities they implement. For this study, documentary analysis was also viewed as an appropriate source of historical information which was critical in mapping the historical context to explain the contemporary socio-economic and political factors influencing the role and development of NGOs between 2000 and 2010. Another advantage of documentary analysis is that documents do not exist in isolation, there are often relationships between documents and contextual factors which inform the content in them (Mason, 2002:103). Therefore, analysis of documents included the content as well as how some of them related to one another. This was a useful way of denoting critical recurrent themes relevant to the study as well as pertinent aspects and linkages.

Several limitations of documentary analysis had been identified during the research design phase, including accessing the government NGO register. Proponents of documentary analysis also caution that not all official documents are necessarily a transparent representation of organisations (Mason, 2002:106). In other words, the researcher should not be uncritical of documents used in a study. To address the pitfalls, multiple sources of related official and verifiable documents were accessed. Notwithstanding the disadvantages, this does not mean however, that official documents or literature could not be used. Multiple documents were cross-checked as a way of verifying content and interviews were also conducted.

3.5.2 In-depth interviews

Kvale (1996:124) defines interviews in qualitative research as a method of, "...obtaining qualitative descriptions of the life world of the subject with respect to interpretation of their meaning." In-depth interviews were conducted with key informants selected from the 13 consenting NGOs, to solicit their understanding of the roles of NGOs and their assessment of the extent to which the context in Zimbabwe has influenced NGO activities. A semi-structured interview guide with open-ended questions was used to guide the discussions. The guide, had questions sequenced topically, core and sub-questions based on the principal stages of the social policy process and key themes or topics being investigated.

Semi-structured interviews were used to ensure consistency in the questions discussed with the participants.

Open-ended questions allowed for relative flexibility, descriptions, explaining, probing and verification against possible bias, lack of clarity in responses and for additional information. The interviews also allowed for immediate or retrospective elaboration and clarification on the responses from the participants (Gordon, 1992:145). Rubin and Rubin (1995:76) explain that one of the goals of in-depth interviews is, "...to ensure that the results are deep, detailed, vivid and nuanced." Therefore, semi-structured interviews provided for this. 8 of the interviews were tape-recorded and notes also taken (i) as a safety measure in case the tape recording failed; (ii) to also capture key information about the non-verbal cues during the interviews and (iii) to note key points or questions for probing and revisiting as well as notes from which the researcher could paraphrase and confirm information with the participants (Gordon, 1992:165). However, 5 other interviewees declined to be tape recorded and preferred that the researcher only take notes, which had to be done intensively and extensively to capture the interview.

Not all scholars concur with the interview research method as appropriate for studying NGOs. Dorman (2001:6) is critical of interviews as a method used in studies on large numbers of NGOs arguing that these fail to position NGOs within the relevant political context. The author further argues that interviews scrap the surface as one can only categorise NGOs and what they do rather than drilling down to understand what they do and why. In her thesis on NGOs and the politics of inclusion and exclusion in Zimbabwe, Dorman (2001:6) argues that her choice to use participant observation methodology was because it allowed for in-depth analysis and thick description of individual organisations.

However, the need for committed extended periods of time spent in NGOs as a participant observer is inaccessible to some researchers. In addition, as a person embedded in the very system they are researching, the potential for high levels of subjectivity exist. Considering the limitations of interviews as a method in studying NGOs, firstly, this study employed in-depth interviews with a small sample of key-informants from the purposively selected NGOs and not include a large sample.

Secondly, the study used documentary analysis as a complementary method, reviewing documents whose scope extends over an extensive period of time.

In-depth interviewing process: implications for research findings

Senior management in NGOs was targeted for the interviews, as key informants who typically have an understanding of the entire organisations work, strategic agenda and engagement with the state policy agenda. The participants targeted the sampled NGOs included Country Directors, Chief of Parties, Deputy Country Directors and Programme Heads. Firstly, a key observation of the researcher were that international NGOs tended to have a number of expatriate staff among them, unlike the local and national NGOs whose employees were almost exclusively Zimbabwean citizens. This phenomenon is however, not unique to Zimbabwe and is typical of most INGOs (Northern) across the developing world whose leadership tend to be citizens of the home countries where the INGOs headquarters are based.

Secondly, a number of the local nationals interviewed had prior to joining the NGO sector, been in the Zimbabwean public service, had witnessed and been part of the social policy changes that had taken place in the country over the years from the early 1980s to late 1990s, and had moved to the NGO sector as the socioeconomic climate deteriorated and social services provided by the state declined. This point to the impact of the context of the NGO sector vis a vis the state/public service.

Thirdly, all but 3 of the NGOs participating in the study emphasised that their organisation's participation in the study remain anonymous and confidential. Upon probing the reasons why, participants explained that there was heightened sensitivity to the possible politicisation of their participation, drawing of unwanted attention from the state and fear of victimisation by the state. The conflictual relationship between the state and NGOs was also identified as a reason for caution among the participants. The wariness highlights the prevailing tension still in the political climate and politicisation of the civil society sector, despite the Global Political Agreement and Inclusive government which came into place between 2008 to 2010. There was much concern about avoidably and

unnecessarily putting their organisations in the spotlight as this would potentially attract unwanted scrutiny or attention from the state.

Furthermore, the risk factors highlighted extend to donor funding as well. Some donors are strict about not funding organisations perceived to be involved in politics. However, several participants intimated that at times this is at face value. In addition, some participants were critical of the influences of their donors on defining their work informed more by donor interests than identified need on the ground. The fear was that, such criticism would potentially jeopardise the organisations' funding. The issue of fear of state and/or donor repercussions is extrapolated further in Chapter Five which analyses the contextual factors influencing the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe.

Given the above, the researcher found it untenable not to apply confidentiality and anonymity to all the individual organisations which participated in the study, extending to those which had given their informed consent to being identified. The selective exposing of interviewees carries the risk of inaccurate attribution of information to the wrong NGO. An exception however is the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations which is a representative umbrella organisation for NGOs, officially recognised as such by the state. NANGO did give consent to be identified in the study and much of their contribution is publicly available in publications, media statements and memos widely distributed across the country.

3.6 Data Analysis

Data analysis relates to the process and techniques of turning data into evidence with which to answer the research questions including identifying "...themes, trends and relationships" in the data sets (Mouton, 2001:108). Qualitative content analysis was employed to analyse the data from the interviews and document reviews. According to Flick (2002: 75), qualitative content analysis refers to examination of text. Content analysis is underpinned by the identification of recurrent themes in text, which are collated into themes. Although it is important to keep in mind that the process of data analysis in qualitative studies begins at the

data collection phase, is iterative and not necessarily sequential, a guided process was employed. This involved the following broad analytical steps:

- (i) Unitising the data - Firstly, the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, labelled and thereafter checked for accuracy and the interview notes written up. The analysis of the textual data (interview transcripts and documentary analysis notes) then involved identification of units of meaning and naming the units.
- (ii) Coding - Secondly, the researcher focused on allocating initial coding to the units of meanings and clustering of codes into provisional categories. The coding and categorising of the text was done through interpretively deducing key thematic issues from the data. A shared coding frame was developed from the theoretical framework, used for the 2 data sets from the interviews and documentary analysis.
- (iii) Categorising – reviewing of provisional categories and clustering into substantive categories and ordering of categories in relation to the research questions
- (iv) Thematic analysis – identifying of themes emerging from the data categories; analysis of themes against the theoretical framework including relationships between categories; themes identified from data related to research questions; synthesis of findings, propositions, arguments and conclusions.

Content analysis was utilised through the identification of units of meaning; the coding of data and construction of categories and themes using the codes. The data was coded and categorised in order to identify and then examine the themes, relationships and critical issues for analysis and interpretation. Coding involved assigning a descriptive name to the datasets as a way of summarising and identifying the emerging themes relevant to the research questions. Gomm (2004:185) refers to this method as thematic analysis where the analyst looks for themes present in documents and a framework is used to make interpretations, inferences, comparisons and contrasts. Interpretation of meaning was then made and presented descriptively (Holliday, 2001).

To aid the data analysis process, the researcher made use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software, specifically Atlas.ti 5.0. This is a software package designed to facilitate data analysis in qualitative research has significant advantages in its functional elements to organise and manage voluminous text in one project (hermeneutic unit) as well as the code, retrieve and search functions related to this (Muhr and Friese, 2004). Atlas.ti enabled a more efficient coding process through its ability to allow the researcher to order chunks of data into distinct codes, categories and themes; visualisation (Muhr and Friese, 2004:3-4).

It also has the advantages of having various presentational forms for codes and code families, useful for assisting in creating linkages/connections and building of thematic groupings and networks during the analysis process (Konopasek, 2008:11). In addition to supporting the development of networks to analyse relationships between code families and thematic groups, Atlas.ti assists in the credibility of the study as a researcher can demonstrate an audit trail of evidence where themes can be traced back to codes and codes to the raw data and quotations in the hermeneutic unit (Muhr and Friese, 2004:212).

3.7 Credibility/Validity in Qualitative Research

Validity is a concept in research which refers to minimising the alternative interpretations of results obtained (Leedy and Ormron, 2010:101). It also relates to the generalisability of data, or in the case of this study, its transferability; and the correspondence between the data and key theoretical ideas and/or concepts underpinning the study (Pinker, 2004:250). However, internal and external validity in research are concepts originating from quantitative approaches and positivist paradigms and there has been ongoing debate about the relevance in qualitative research (Leedy and Ormron, 2010: 100). Scholars have proposed the use of terms such as trustworthiness, credibility, transferability and verification instead of generalisability and validity (Merriam, 2009:234). Debatably, the ideas of validity are not necessarily problematic in themselves but the technical procedures being applied to qualitative research tend to be inappropriate.

Several strategies were employed to ensure the credibility, trustworthiness and transferability of findings in the study. These included:

- Having a research design, which Rubin and Rubin (1995:85) interpret to suggest that there were standards and therefore, well thought through iterative research processes used in the study;
- Triangulation of sources and research methods (interviews and documentary analysis): this focused on identification of congruent themes and issues from document reviews and interview transcripts; considered within the socio-economic and political context within which they are situated (Bryant, 2001: 44).
- Respondent validation where the researcher shared summaries of interviews with the key informants for them to verify the interpretations and accuracy of information as communicated by them (Leedy and Ormron, 2010: 100). This was pertinent for interviews where participants refused to be tape recorded and the researcher had to rely on taking notes. The verification was critical to ensure that key issues raised had been captured.
- An audit trail of how the empirical component of the study was conducted is also available including the interview transcripts, field notes and documented coding process in the saved Atlas.ti hermeneutic unit for the research study among other forms of evidence. This is what Rubin and Rubin (1995:85) refer to as ensuring the transparency of the study, that the reader of the thesis is able to trace and understand the processes undertaken; and
- Comparing of themes identified against findings from previous related research or other studies on the subject for concurrence or where there was divergence, to understand and explain why.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

Ethics can be defined as the systematic reflection on and analysis of one's moral decisions and actions thereof (Hollway, 2008:137). Taking cognisance of this, definition, research ethics is focused on the safeguarding of human dignity and that research participants are not harmed and/or exploited. Hugman, Pittaway and

Bartolomei (2011) reflect that, "Ethics in social work research increasingly recognises that the rights and interests of subjects must be primary." To ensure ethical considerations in this study, firstly, procedural aspects of ethical considerations were addressed for purposes of this study. Ethics approval to undertake the study was sought and granted by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University's Research Ethics Committee (Human) as well as the relevant research committee in the University's Faculty of Arts.

A letter was written to the selected NGOs through their senior management/directorates, requesting their voluntary participation in the study and explaining the nature and purpose of the research. Further elaboration was provided orally. Substantive components of ethical considerations were informed by the fact that the study involved human subjects being interviewed; therefore, it was important to get their informed consent to participate in the study (Pinker, 2004:152). Shaw (2008:400) advises that it is important to ensure, honesty, respect, privacy and that participants understand their participation is voluntary. Informed consent was sought from each research participant from the NGOs included in the study sample.

Participants were briefed about the purpose of the study and the process the interviews would follow. The researcher assured participants about the privacy, confidentiality, anonymity and requested that they sign an informed consent form before the interviews (Kvale, 1996:153). The option was also given for participants to give their verbal consent for those who preferred that to signing the consent form. Time for debriefing with each participant was also provided for after each interview. For the tape recorded interviews, strict confidentiality and anonymity has been assured by providing a code to label each interview conducted and anonymising of all discussions. Recorded interviews were stored on password protected disks, which will be stored in a secured space. Codes and passwords will be known only to the researcher.

3.9 Conclusion

The researcher observed the strong inhibitions of NGOs to participate in the study except if express commitment was made to ensuring the confidentiality and

anonymity of participants. The informed consent process was a highly sensitive stage of the research interviewing process. The researcher had to take time before the start of the interviews to thoroughly address the concerns of some of the research participants who were willing to participate in the study but completely anonymously, including not signing the informed consent form but giving verbal consent. In 8 cases, the informed consent process extended over a period of several days during the fieldwork where the researcher had to visit the organisations several times, for pre-interview clarification meetings. It was an extended iterative process.

The key informants were concerned about the identification of their organisations in the thesis and were very wary of the possibility of unwanted government or state security attention drawn to them depending on the discussions in the thesis. The informed consenting process was fraught with sentiments of suspicion shared by prospective participants. The qualitative research strategy was therefore advantageous in probing with the key informants to explore the nature of and reasons for the suspicion and high levels of caution among NGOs to discuss with 'outsiders' what they do, and more so the contextual factors informing their activities.

The next chapter outlines and discusses the analysed data from the documentary analysis and key informant interviews, juxtaposing against the theoretical engagement discussed of this thesis.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE POSTCOLONIAL CONTEXT IN ZIMBABWE AND NGOS

4.1 Introduction

The contemporary geopolitical and socioeconomic environment in Zimbabwe has had unprecedented international limelight for a developing country from the year 2000 (Shumba, 2002:327). Significant attention has been paid to the political polarisation, elections and electoral processes, deterioration of diplomatic relations with powerful Western states and the social crises in the country. Bauer and Taylor (2005: 3 – 4) explains that government's initial commitment (albeit rhetorical), to socialist principles in Zimbabwe after 1980 raised 'intense interest' from Western powers, as it did amongst other Southern African states that adopted a similar ideological approach (Mozambique, Angola). Coupled with continued previously colonial capital interests and ownership entrenched in the country, this phenomenon has not abated over the years.

Zimbabwe, among few other countries in the Southern African region also had the largest white settler population in comparison with other regions on the continent giving the region a unique history as well as contemporary geopolitical character fraught with political freedoms contradicted by continuing race-based economies. "These states face severe and potentially destabilising disparities of wealth and resources between rich and poor.....a disproportionate share of the wealth and productive capacity is owned and controlled by a 'non-indigenous' white minority, a situation that has contributed to lingering tensions," (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:9). Kagoro (2004:22 concurs, explaining that the unequal wealth and income distribution in Zimbabwe remains a contributory factor.

The interplay of political tensions, social crises and economic meltdown has resulted in a complex dynamic which had a direct impact on the nature and role of civil society organisations in the country. This chapter discusses these contextual factors, tracing the historical to contemporary environment to contextualise the study and critically analyse the interwoven colonial and postcolonial developments in Zimbabwe. Thus it serves to provide the contextual background within which the

role(s) of NGOs in the social policy process can be critically analysed and their impact examined.

Dorman warns that the failure to position NGOs in a political or historical setting does not provide the appropriate context to explain the actions or inactions of NGOs in relation to their role in democratisation, policy-making and promoting good governance (2001:6-8). Within the same school of thought, Kenny (2007:185) emphasises that understanding the contextual factors provides the framework to analyse and project the trajectory of the role of NGOs. This Chapter therefore, is a critical analysis of relevant literature to provide the historical background, recent and current socio-economic and political environment in Zimbabwe where the study is situated. The systematic analysis of the context is juxtaposed with mapping the trajectory of NGO development and roles they have played in the social policy process in the country.

The contextual analysis also addresses a gap identified in academic studies and literature on NGOs. Mercer (2002:5) in his critique of Western literature identifies a gap in studies on NGOs and emphasises the need for “...more contextualised and less value-laden approach to understanding the political role of NGOs.” In other words, much of the literature is based on theoretical assumptions of what NGOs should be doing, and fails to take into cognisance and give weight to the environments in which NGOs work and how this determines the actual roles they should play. Mercer’s assessment highlights the deficiency in balancing theoretical perspectives on civil society on one hand, and the pivotal contextual factors which influence NGO activity on the other. This is more apparent in literature on NGOs in developing countries (*Ibid*).

Although the focus of this study is specifically from the year 2000 to 2010 in Zimbabwe, this chapter gives a historical and current contextual analysis of the socio-political and economic environment, and its implications for civil society and NGOs in the social policy process. This chapter therefore, provides that contextual framework for the study on NGOs in Zimbabwe. Anseeuw and Alden (2010: 11) reflect on Moyo’s assessment of the current socio-political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe and highlight the need to understand,

....historical and material basis which shapes popular social movements. The interconnected complexity of reforms in Zimbabwe since the 1990s, focusing on the triple transition of economic policy, land reform policy and political liberalisation/succession, explains the shifting perspectives and engagement strategies since 1998.

In light of this assessment, this chapter maps the historical context preceding the year 2000 as this provides the foundation upon which to analyse and understand the current socioeconomic and political landscape which has shaped the development of the NGO sector in the country. Zimbabwe has experienced significant developments in its social, economic and political landscape identified by (i) the pre-independence period of racially discriminatory social policy, (ii) the immediate post-independence period of the 1980s where a strong socialist oriented state played a central role in universalistic social policy, (iii) the 1990s of the market-led approach to economic and social policy with a reduced regulatory state and, (iv) from the year 2000, a crisis period marked by an incapacitated state (Mapuva, 2010: 15) with ineffective policy frameworks, socioeconomic decay, political instability and polarisation of the political landscape. These developments have influenced the role(s) and activities of NGOs in the country.

To give a general overview, Zimbabwe has an estimated population of 12 million, based on the last population census conducted in 2002 (Central Statistical Office, 2010). The country is a unitary state divided into 10 administrative provinces with its parliamentary body, the House of Assembly and national government structures based in the capital, Harare. It is a landlocked country with a total area of 390 757 square kilometres.

Figure 3: Map of Zimbabwe



Source: Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office: 2006

4.2 Overview of immediate pre-independence period in Zimbabwe

Colonised by Britain between 1890 and 1980, political, economic and social life in Zimbabwe, Southern Rhodesia then, was underpinned by discriminatory policies based on racist principles (Chigora and Guzura, 2008: 514). The white colonial government promulgated and implemented policies that were racially biased and repressive against the majority black population, but benefitting the minority whites

in the country. Colonial rule in Zimbabwe lasted 90 years (World Bank, 1981: ix). Social policy, land tenure and state welfare was exclusionary and provided along racial lines with access limited for blacks.

During the 1960s, liberation war efforts intensified. Liberation movements were driven by the need to redress the land rights, economic marginalisation and disenfranchisement of the blacks (Bhebhe, 1989: 54). A key issue had been the displacement and dispossession of land with discriminatory and segregatory legislative frameworks including the Land Apportionment Act, Tribal Trust Lands, African Purchase Areas and European Areas (Chigora and Guzura, 2008: 515-517). In an attempt to stem the liberation effort, the Rhodesian government began banning black political parties such as the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress and National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1962.

The Rhodesian government gazetted its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from British rule in 1965, (World Bank, 1981: ix). UDI aimed to guarantee white minority rule in the country. African states which had gained their independence condemned the UDI. Kenya declared that it would not recognise the Rhodesian government; Ghana and Tanzania were ready to put troops at the disposal of the OAU and the UN to deal with issue militarily. On the other hand, Britain's reaction was different as military intervention would have meant action against their own kith and kin, a political suicide locally for the government in power at the time.

However, Black Nationalist liberation movements in Rhodesia intensified the armed struggle for independence and majority rule. In response, the Rhodesia government waged war against armed wings of nationalist black liberation movements and political parties such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003: 105). ZAPU was formed after the banning of NDP, and was also later banned in 1964, leading to exiles and the relocation of such parties to neighbouring countries in the Southern Africa region.

A number of voluntary and church-based organisations morally and materially supported liberation efforts of ZANU and ZAPU. Several which existed during this period worked to mitigate the dire social need resulting from the racially biased

and discriminatory social policy affecting the black population by providing welfare and social services. The Rhodesian government gazetted the Private Voluntary Organisations Act: No.63 of 1966 which required that welfare, voluntary, welfare and church-based organisations register with the state (Muzondo, 2006: 2-3). This was aimed at blocking the material and moral lines of support to the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the armed wing of ZAPU. The PVO Act (1966) made provisions for the monitoring, regulation and control of organisations as well as state interference in their affairs. It also provided for punitive measures to be instituted against organisations found to be in contravention of the Act, or supporting liberation war fighters, guerrillas.

To add to its repressive legal machinery the government gazetted the Welfare Organisations Act, passed in 1967 (Saunders, 2000:74-79) requiring registration of welfare organisations. Organisations were closely monitored as some also publicised internationally the human rights abuses of the Rhodesian government, mobilising external support for independence. The liberation war in Zimbabwe ended in 1979 when the Lancaster House talks were initiated between liberation movement leaders, Smith's regime and the British government (Chigora and Guzura, 2008: 520). The result was a ceasefire and holding of the first democratic elections in the country in February 1980 (Mamdani, 2008:17). Zimbabwe gained independence on 18 April 1980. The first democratically elected government led by the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) came to power; underpinned by nationalist, Marxist-Leninist ideology.

4.3 Socioeconomic and Political Context in Postcolonial Zimbabwe

Moyo's assertion is that there is a tendency to oversimplify the crisis in Zimbabwe from the year 2000 (2010: 245). He explains that it is rooted in the pre-independence settlements made and post-independence political and economic developments that have occurred in the country since 1980. The socio-political and economic context in postcolonial Zimbabwe can be divided into four (4) broad phases which have significantly influenced NGOs and their role in the social policy process. The phases are:

- i. 1980 – 1990: The ‘Socialist’ era: state-driven social programmes;
- ii. 1990 – 2000: Market-led economic policy and the regulatory state;
- iii. 2000 – 2008: Socioeconomic crises and political instability; and
- iv. 2009 to date: Transitional phase: negotiated political settlements.

4.4 ‘Socialist’ State: Growth with Equity Policy: 1980 – 1990

The social policy framework adopted by a country is often reflective of the ideological stance and development philosophy of the government in power. In Zimbabwe, the new government’s development philosophy and policy was underpinned by socialist principles, with a centralised state driving universal social policies. The new postcolonial state focused on consolidating political independence, de-racialising and democratising the system of governance (UNDP, 1999: 82-83).

A social democratic approach was adopted, with the state covering the provision of comprehensive social services and increasing social security. Initial attention was on resettlement of communities displaced during the war; reconstruction and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. The state had inherited a strong but dichotomous economy with racial inequalities, colonial debts and a public service geared towards serving the needs of the minority white population, with a strong urban bias (Government of Zimbabwe, 2007:1). It was faced with the challenge of expanding access to social services for a larger population formerly excluded in the Rhodesian era, however with limited financial resources.

4.4.1 Consolidating Political Independence

According to Adesina (2004:136), “...the immediate post-independent political economy of Africa was dominated by commitment to the nationalist project.” In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF led government adopted a reconciliatory approach towards its former oppressors. It consolidated and centralised its political power as the ‘vanguard’ party, underpinned by Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. Dashwood (2000:20) explains that the hegemony of the nationalist movement was a critical factor in creating stability, containing ethnic tensions and promoting national unity. Threats to national security were posed by the apartheid South African government. Internally, the civil strife in the Matabeleland region (Raftopolous,

2004: xi) had the potential to cause full-blown civil war. Oosthuizen (2006:68) explains that the government reacted disproportionately to dissident elements in the southern part of the country, who, supported by the South Africa apartheid government, made attempts to destabilise the country.

Zimbabwe differed from other African countries in that it adopted multi-party democracy (Dorman, 2001: 1). The House of Assembly in Zimbabwe consisted of representation from ZANU-PF with 57 of the 80 black seats in the House, ZAPU 20, the United African Council 3 and the former Rhodesian Front Party the 20 seats reserved for whites under the Lancaster House Agreement (Mamdani, 2008:18). These compromises on representation in parliament (Raftopolous, 2004: x) were aimed at fostering reconciliation and inclusiveness. Therefore, it can be defined as a parliamentary democracy. A number of independent states on the continent had officially opted for one-party statism as a panacea for unity, a central issue driven in part by the need to counteract the ethnic and racial divisions promoted during the colonial period. Several scholars argue that the one-party state was justified as a mechanism to promote political stability given the threats to national security which confronted many post-independent African states (*Ibid*).

Although Zimbabwe was officially a multi-party democracy, some scholars argue that this was superficial or merely cosmetic because of the hegemonic practices of the ruling ZANU-PF. Its party political policies, ideology and philosophy dominated government development policy. Konings (2003:453) observes that the political landscape in Cameroon reflects the political situation in Zimbabwe. Cameroon was a neo-patrimonial postcolonial state, officially a multi-party state but where the “one – party logic persists.” In Zimbabwe, this became further entrenched in 1987 when ZANU-PF and its main opposition party; ZAPU officially merged through the signing of the Unity Accord (Brown and Saunders, 2007: 1287). The net effect was the absorption of the main and the effective political opposition at the time.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:104) argues that ZANU-PF’s hegemony, and the inherently “authoritarian...commandist.....quasi-military tendencies,” of the nationalist liberation movement(s) set the tone for a defacto one-party state in Zimbabwe. The inference is that the policy processes were characteristically top-down and the political landscape generally undemocratic with limitations in the

fostering of pluralism and an active civil society. In concurrence, Bhebhe and Ranger (2003:6-10) explain that the nature of ZANU-PF and the postcolonial state has its foundations in the colonial and repressive legal and state machinery which it inherited in 1980 but failed to fundamentally transform into an effectively democratic institution. What can be deduced from this are the ambiguities of nationalist liberation movements founded on populist democratic principles that informed the liberation war under the banner of democratisation but whose political cultures were inherently contradictory to this.

Arguably, the one-party logic was effective in ensuring stability but with the unintended consequence of stifling pluralism and the democratisation process. This is also evident in the failure to transform inherited oppressive colonial state systems, practices and institutions. According to Saki (2010: 1) Zimbabwe was and still is a "...a unitary state... laws passed by the legislature are applicable without regional exceptions." By definition, a unitary state is a country constitutionally governed as a single unit but which may have administrative regional government institutions with delegated powers from the central state. Therefore in Zimbabwe, the policy process has remained a top-down approach which is highly centralised, with minimal levels of variation at the provincial and municipal level. The inference is that there has always been limited public engagement in the policy process from the local level.

4.4.2 State-led Social Policy and Development

Heller (2001:135) highlights that the postcolonial state was born in the heyday of developmentalism. It was central in developing and implementing extensive social programmes and progressive economic and social development frameworks. Zimbabwe's new economic policy and development approach was encapsulated in the *Growth with Equity* policy. From independence in 1980, the state sought to correct historical structural poverty, redress the social injustices and racial inequalities, a legacy of the colonial period. It established major universalistic social programmes. Government policy was informed by Marxist-Leninist thinking with a strong centralist state driving universal social policies aimed at realising high social development outcomes.

The state was central in driving social and economic development (Dorman, 2001: 49), financing and implementing extensive social and infrastructural development programmes. This meant high levels of state expenditure in reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement and provision of relief services for communities and populations most severely affected by the war. Social policy was aimed at provision of education, health, housing, water and sanitation and was underpinned by the Keynesian commitment to social policy outcomes, development and economic growth. However, limitations in financial resources led to trade-offs in social policy priorities. For example, in 1980, the new government repealed the Old Age Pension Act which had provided social security for white pensioners only (Kaseke, 2003:39). This is because the de-racialising of social policy meant the larger black population which had previously been excluded would now be eligible for the Old Age Pensions. The government used the resource constraints as justification to repeal the Act.


As reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement programmes required significant financing and state coffers were limited, the government worked to mobilise aid and development assistance to support its programmes. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) was held in 1981. It was a call for assistance from international development agencies and foreign governments. The main focus of ZIMCORD was on basic education which was posited as a fundamental human right. Responses to ZIMCORD included from the Australian government which provided expatriate teachers. Agencies such as the Swedish International Development Authority provided resources for the building of schools and curriculum development (UNESCO, 1990: http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/erd/English/wgesa/doc/zimeng/chapter_7.htm). A number of indigenous and international NGOs responded and began operations to collaborate with and complement government efforts. However, some pledges made of foreign aid did not materialise.

Dashwood (2000: 3) explains that social and economic policies in Zimbabwe “explicitly targeted the poor as direct beneficiaries”. A resettlement programme was undertaken to resettle villagers who had been herded into “protected villages” by the Smith regime, to cut off material and moral support for the liberation fighters during the late 1970s. Resettlement programmes were also implemented to

redress the displacement of communities and overpopulation in communal areas which had resulted from the colonial and racist land tenure system. Scholars contend that the results were minimal. There was no fundamental transformation of land ownership patterns and economic redistribution.

Education was a key driver for social upliftment (Dorsey, 1989: 40). The government's policy goal was *Education for All* and it implemented universal free primary education. This was aimed at increasing access for populations for whom access to quality education had been denied and/or limited during the colonial era. The approach was also aligned to the government's self-help philosophy of empowering citizens to drive development and uplift their own communities. This was based on the philosophy of education as a human right, a panacea for development. The World Bank reports that in 1960, the literacy rate stood at 39.4% (1981: vii). Public funds and development assistance/aid were channelled into building schools in both urban and rural areas and on extensive teacher training institutions and programmes. Darmon (2001:61) reports that between 1979 and 1989, the number of pupils enrolled in primary and secondary education increased by three-hundred and thirty-two percent (332%). Figure 4 below illustrates the growth in the number of primary and secondary schools between 1980 and 1986.

Figure 4: Number of Primary and Secondary Schools in Zimbabwe: 1979-1986



The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Zimbabwe Human Development Report: 2000 highlights that the number of primary schools rose from 2 401 in 1979 to 4 234 by 1985; secondary schools from 177 in 1979 to 694 in 1981 and on to 1 548 by 1999. This was a percentage increase of 292% in three years (UNDP, 2000: 87-88). The impact was high as statistics showed growth in secondary school enrolment from 66 215 in 1979 to 148 690 in 1981 and on to 786 154 by 1995 (UNDP, 1999: 27). Therefore, it can be generalised that the education policy in Zimbabwe was a major success and outcomes included a significant increase in literacy levels across the country.

In the health sector, successes were realised in decentralising healthcare by building a structure of primary healthcare facilities in communities, supported by a relatively well-resourced, state-subsidised and strong tertiary hospital referral system. Christian missionary-run hospitals and clinics which existed and served black communities during the colonial period were either taken over or subsidised by the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. Resultantly, there were improvements in access to healthcare and health outcomes. In ten years, infant mortality had been reduced from 79 to 66/1000 and maternal mortality from 145 to 68, 7/100 000 by 1990. Internationally, these indicators of maternal and child health are recognised as key descriptors of the progress in healthcare.

Ward and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) were established at local level, working with District Councils as a forum through which citizen participation in social development was organised and promoted (Higgins and Mazula, 1993:19). These groupings were also meant to provide a democratic space at the grassroots level for citizens to inform government decision-making on social programmes and development projects from the village, ward and district to provincial and national level. However, VIDCOs have been criticised for being a top-down approach which failed to provide a participatory forum for citizens to effectively engage with government. VIDCOs instead mainly mobilised villagers to contribute to infrastructural development in their localities. Numerous state-funded cooperatives were also established to foster collective economic enterprise and self-sufficiency. However, this approach was unsustainable and collapsed due to various reasons including mismanagement and being economically unviable.

Summarily, substantial social development gains were achieved in the first decade of independence with improved outcomes in education and health and declining poverty levels. The social development agenda of the postcolonial state was successful in fostering social upliftment during the first decade of independence in Zimbabwe. However, social inequalities along racial lines remained with minimal transformation of the economy and land ownership.

4.4.3 Economic Growth: Minimal Economic Transformation

Several postcolonial states in Africa such as Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire adopted economic policies which were underpinned by liberal capitalist principles (Nafziger, 1990: 143). Many others, however, including Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, adopted socialist oriented policy agendas. Critics argue that only Tanzania through its Ujamaa project under Julius Nyerere was fundamentally socialist. The inference is that most postcolonial African countries which depicted themselves as socialist instead simply tolerated capitalist economies. However, they complemented this with strong state-financed social programmes.

According to Darmon (2001:46), in postcolonial Zimbabwe, economic policy had always been predominantly capitalist, but tapered with socialist rhetoric. In other words, the structure of the economy did not change. The Marxist-Leninist ideological stance of ZANU-PF; did not filter into the economic policy framework of the country. To explain this, Mandaza and Sachikonye, (1991:37) elucidate that postcolonial states were faced with the paradox of having to address the needs of contradictory class forces; the "expectant peasantry and workers; black bourgeoisie, the postcolonial white settler population seeking continuity," and the hegemonic dominance of Western capital as well as incorporation into the international capital economic system.

In Zimbabwe, the state inherited an agro-based economy. Sachikonye (2002:13) observes that at independence, Zimbabwe was one of the top four more industrialised countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a relatively diversified economy as a middle-income status country. Progressive labour legislation such as government stipulated minimum wage was introduced to protect worker interests and mitigate the exploitative tendencies of the inherited economy. Price

controls and state subsidies on basic commodities such as the staple mealie-meal, cooking oil, bread and fuel were instituted (Dashwood, 2000: 79). These were aimed at cushioning the poor and lower income families including rural peasants. Despite increases in wages in the early years of independence, these were not substantial to fundamentally secure citizens standards of living in the long term. State subsidies essentially subsidised industrialists' and employer's wage costs. Therefore, the state inadvertently entrenched the status quo of economic inequality, mitigating the structural inefficiencies of the economy in fostering economic redistribution.

The state's development agenda was biased towards social development and lacked a similar commitment to economic transformation and redistribution. Consequently, the imbalance resulted in a failure to address the structural inequalities in the economy though significant social development gains were realised. According to Dashwood (2000: 86), white people remained as the wealthy economic class and agrarian elite in Zimbabwe, even though they no longer held political power. By 1990, only 4% of the country's population owned 90% of the country's wealth. The state, through its interventionist approach, attempted and for a time succeeded in maintaining a delicate balance between class, race, local and foreign capital interests after independence.

4.4.4 Towards State and Policy Reform

During the 1980s, the postcolonial state succeeded in consolidating political power, maintaining economic growth and fostering social development. However, by the late 1980s, debate on political reform, pluralism and legislating for a one-party state in Zimbabwe took centre stage. This occurred at a time when international political trends were pushing for democratisation. Geopolitical realignments were shifting spheres of influence. The Union for Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which had been the epicentre of socialist and communist influence collapsed in 1990 (Cliff, 1993: 239). The ripple effect in postcolonial states manifested in the waning of socialist rhetoric and increased discourse on neoliberalism and multi-party democracy.

As the Cold War which pitted Western capitalist states against communist Eastern Europe drew to an end with the collapse of USSR, the West's sphere of influence deepened in postcolonial Africa and South America (wa Mutua, 1995:505). By the late 1980s, the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe had waned. It can be inferred that to some extent, the collapse of the USSR influenced the shift from leftist nationalist agendas. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:101) refers to this as the post-nationalist era. The effect extended to several African states whose liberation movements had had close relations with the USSR. In Eastern Europe revolutions led to the demise of a number of one-party states and transitions to multi-partyism.

Observations in literature reviewed point to the association of socialism and the one-party state approach in theoretical perspectives. This misrepresentation of the tenets of socialist perspectives has taken root in global political discourse. The emerging dominant discourse on development posited socialism and the one-party state approach as barriers to fostering pluralism and democratisation, key tenets for economic development. In 1990, ZANU-PF announced it would not legislate for a one-party state (Mandaza and Sachikonye, 1991:1).

Global ideological shifts occurred at a time when economic growth had begun to stagnate in Zimbabwe; with a negative impact on state revenue. With high social spending and servicing of inherited colonial debts, by 1990, state expenditure outstripped revenue. Though the economic growth rate slowed down, the state did not immediately cut back on social spending. The result was a high budget deficit and government had to borrow money to cover the deficit and fund its social upliftment programmes. The unsustainable nature of social policy and development approach presented contradictory policy choices; maintaining the status quo with an economy dominated by whites and continuing to fund interventionist and ameliorative policy, or fundamental transformation to a redistributive approach. By 1990, discourse revolved around policy shifts to neoliberal macroeconomic policy frameworks and development approach which was inherently contradictory to the ideological position of the ruling party.

4.5 Market-led Economy and the Regulatory State: 1991 – 2000

The high social spending coupled with slow economic growth and unfulfilled pledges of development assistance had strained the state fiscus. In 1991, the government adopted a new macroeconomic policy framework underpinned by a paradigm shift in social and economic policy and the role of the state. According to Bryant (2002:90), a policy change refers to a new direction in public policy and this often occurs because of changes in the social, political or economic context within a country. In Zimbabwe, the change implied a change in the role of the state and NGOs in social policy.

The Zimbabwean government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) (Osirim, 2003: 535) for loans and assistance. This was granted with conditionalities for economic and state reform, liberalisation and deregulation of the economy. The result was a paradigm shift and ideological paradox from previously socialist oriented, universalistic, state driven social policy to a market-oriented macroeconomic policy framework and shift to a regulatory state (Dashwood, 2000: 141). The irony of this neoliberal approach was that ZANU-PF's ideology had been premised on contradictory Marxist-Leninist principles. The new approach was meant to foster economic growth, address the budget deficit, access foreign funding and attract foreign direct investment to bolster the economy. This hypothesis was encapsulated in the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), a market-focused macroeconomic policy adopted in Zimbabwe in 1991. With this, the country was positioned as a model recipient of international aid.

4.5.1 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: 1991 – 1995

ESAP was premised on the notion that economic development was the panacea to social development (Maharaj, 1999: 243). Economic redistribution would be facilitated through market-led growth in conditions of minimal interference in the economy by the state. The market would facilitate the 'trickle-down' of the benefits of economic growth. Therefore, presumably the market would rectify the socioeconomic inequalities and structural distortions (Moyo, 2010: 245) that had not been resolved in the first decade of independence. The individual and family were now seen as primarily responsible for their own livelihoods and the state's

role as creating the conditions for and maintaining a conducive environment for business to thrive.

ESAP focused on economic liberalisation and structural reform of the state; its role in the economy and hence in social policy. It was premised on the hypothesis that liberalisation and deregulation of the economy would stimulate competitiveness in private enterprise (Osirim, 2003: 535); promote economic growth and heighten opportunities for participation of individuals in the economy. Furthermore, this was going to facilitate Zimbabwe's re-integration into the global economy and international markets following sanctions placed on the country during the 1960s – 1970s against Smith's Rhodesian regime. Liberalisation was meant to promote increased foreign investment and export levels.

Implementation of ESAP resulted in the following austerity measures (Gibbon, 1995: 118) and reforms:

- *Liberalisation and deregulation of the economy*: including removal of some price controls and limiting of state subsidies on basic goods including sugar, bread and the staple mealie-meal. Legislation seen as restrictive to private enterprises seeking to operate in the country was amended;
- *Devaluation of the local currency*: based on the premise that this would lead to an increase in the competitiveness of Zimbabwean export goods and materials in the international market, increase export levels and by so doing generate revenue for the state, create increased job opportunities and promote direct foreign investment;
- *Cuts in state social expenditure*: including education, health and welfare, an austerity measure to reduce the state's budget deficit. From 1990 to 1994, the social welfare budget alone dropped by thirty-two percent (32%) – (Dashwood, 2000: 172). Consequently, the size of government had to be downsized in line with its reduced role in social policy.
- *Introduction of cost recovery measures*: in health, education and other social services. Citizens now had to pay user fees for services, some of

which had previously been free or state subsidised. Minimal means-tested exemptions were put in place for low-income households and the indigent.

- *Establishment of safety nets:* or targeted non-contributory, means-tested social assistance to address increasing poverty and unemployment (Kaseke, 2003: 35). For example, the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme was established to provide social assistance to mitigate the social costs of liberalising the economy (Dashwood, 2000: 77). Interventions included exemption from paying user fees for social services for the poor, targeting of food subsidies, employment and training programmes to promote small-scale enterprise; and
- Privatisation/commercialisation of state parastatals to improve their efficiency and transform them into viable entities.

The Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) acknowledged that this period of austerity measures would result in increases socioeconomic problems, however naively assumed that market-led economic growth would eventually arrest the increasing social costs with redistributive elements of market-led growth kicking in. Publicly, this was justified to citizens as 'belt-tightening,' where the ensuing socio-economic hardships from ESAP were a necessary evil for future economic prosperity. The state's role in the economy was reduced to a regulatory one based on the principle that its' intervention distorted the market and stifled growth and competitiveness. However, there is inherent irony in this perspective which Dashwood (2000:14) critiques as the neoliberal paradox of the regulatory, minimal state yet the very state is needed to play a central role in implementing market-based reforms.

4.5.2 Political Reform and the Regulatory State in Zimbabwe

In addition to liberalising the economy, the pundits of neoliberalism emphasised that political reforms were also necessary for the full benefits of economic growth to be realised. The tendency towards one-party states in Africa was denounced as a barrier to economic development. The dominant mainstream discourse was for democratisation and pluralism. Civil society was posited as a key player in the

democratisation process. Its role was to providing an arena for pluralist voices and representation of citizens' interests in political engagement with the state. Adesina's view is that "...discourse demonised the state as the arena of all that was wrong and civil society and private entrepreneurship as the domain of all that is virtuous," (2004:140). The neoliberal discourse of the 1990s conceptually pitted civil society against the state.

Civil society was championed as the domain of public good whose role was to curb the inherent tendencies of the state towards excesses in its exercise of authority over citizens and interference in private enterprise. This was conflictual to the nationalist era of the 1980s which posited the state as a domain of public good, protector of citizens' rights underpinned by the main tenets of the neo-Marxist approach to the state and civil society. The neoliberal era of the 1990s posited civil society organisations as the domain of public good. This perspective is in congruence with neo-Tocquevillean liberal democratic conceptualisation. To a great extent, this approach has heavily influenced the contemporary operationalisation of civil society as non-governmental organisations, formal institutions working in the broader development sector.

In Zimbabwe, the number of NGOs increased. This was also a result of the growing social problems resulting from the failures of ESAP and inability of the state to respond effectively as well as the increased calls for political reform. Civil society organisations began to play an increasing role in political and policy debates. In the 1990s, the growth in NGOs and their foray into advocacy related activities and oppositional and watchdog role set the tone for increasingly adversarial relations between the state and CSOs.

The state's suspicions grew as levels of CSO cooperation with government waned (Darmon, 2001:144). In response to the alternative and critical voices emanating from CSOs and perceived changing role of the NGO sector, the state developed legislation allowing it to closely regulate the sector. In 1995, the Private Voluntary Organisation Act (1966) (PVO Act) was re-enacted as the PVO Act (1995) (17:05) as amended. The Act had previously been used by the Rhodesian government to regulate, monitor and control the activities of welfare/voluntary organisations

sympathetic to the liberation movements. This legislation had remained on Zimbabwe's statute books after 1980.

In the social services sector, the withdrawal of the state left a gap in social service provision. Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991:37) explain that "at best the state has become a mediator between capital and labour." This had a direct influence on the growth of the NGO sector. By 1992, there were up to 800 NGOs operating in Zimbabwe, both indigenous and international (Sibanda, 1994: 2). According to Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopolous (2000) the changes in Zimbabwe occurred at a time when many states in Africa had become "...increasingly unable to deliver even the most basic services to citizens." Heller (2001:132) describes this as an, "era when globalisation has weakened the ability of nation-states to deploy the regulatory and redistributive instruments..." Therefore it was not only the changing global geopolitical environment which supported the growth of NGOs but the social and economic policy context in Zimbabwe resulted in higher levels of social need as the objectives of ESAP remained unrealised. The state downsized its civil service in line with its reduced role in social policy. As salaries in the civil service declined in value due to inflation and the declining value of the local currency, the NGO sector continued to grow and attract civil servants and other professionals as it offered better remuneration.

4.5.3 Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation: 1996-2000

ESAP had evidently failed. In an attempt to rectify this, in 1998, the state adopted a revised policy framework, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998: iv). To a great extent, ZIMPREST was an admission of the shortcomings of ESAP which had failed to prioritise social development. It had assumed economic development was the panacea to facilitating social development as well. Through ZIMPREST the state sought to balance both economic and social development (Dashwood, 2000:142). It heightened focus on local business enterprises; attempting to develop the small to medium business sector and self-employment. To protect local industries, the state increased trade tariffs and duties on imported goods in an attempt to protect flailing local enterprises.

The weakness of ZIMPREST was that it simply emphasised the establishment of additional social protection and assistance. It was premised on the same neoliberal principles as ESAP, and referred to as ESAP II. Roberts, Jones and Frohling (2005:1853) critique is the, “history of development practices in the global South, wherein serial policy failure becomes the fate and fuel of all policy rather than the cause for its rethinking or abandonment.” ZIMPREST was informed by the failures of ESAP. Furthermore, the state failed to provide the financing needed to implement it and remained a “still birth,” (GOZ, 2007:2). The economy continued on its downward spiral, with social conditions worsening against the backdrop of an incapacitated civil service.

4.5.4 The Impact of Economic Policy Reforms

Review of literature indicates a plethora of criticism of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), highlighting not only their failure to foster economic growth and redistribution, but their lack of alignment to country specific contexts. Heller’s critique of SAPs is that,

Blueprints developed in the West are hardly appropriate to the Third World of uneven economic development and pervasive social inequalities, cultural heterogeneity.....the resilience of pre-democratic modes of authority and weak state capacity (2001: 137).

Much of the criticism of SAPs is directed at global financial institutions; and their perceived negative and undue influence on social and economic policy in developing countries. However, it is necessary to similarly criticise the role of states which, despite the evidence of failures of SAPs in other countries, went ahead and implemented them. Kawewe and Dibié (2000:79) argue that the SAPs were an inappropriate public policy for Zimbabwe. ESAP in Zimbabwe was an externally constructed framework, divorced from the historical, social and political context. The economy was not ready to open up to the global market. Domestic and international determinants of social policy; World Bank pressures for ESAP and a growing political elite and bourgeoisie and reconfiguration of class forces in Zimbabwe (Dashwood, 2000: ix) led to growth in support for capitalist policy frameworks. The government did not develop a development strategy to accommodate the needs of the proletariat and peasantry.

The impact included economic demise, increased poverty and unemployment, (Osirim, 2003: 535) falling standards of living, decaying public social services and regression in the development achievements of the 1980s. Konings (2003:448) laments that SAPs effect on the economy, "...forced rank and file to search for alternative sources of income, straddling formal and informal sectors and subsistence farming and engaging in illicit income generating activities..." In Zimbabwe, a parallel/informal economy commonly termed 'black market' flourished. This reduced the state's revenue base.

4.5.4.1 Economic Decline

The same failures of market-led policies experienced in South American and other African states which had implemented SAPs in the 1970s-80s predictably occurred in Zimbabwe as well. Dorman (2000: 3) argues the problem was not with ESAP, but the state's failure to integrate it in its new development strategy and put in place mechanisms to address socioeconomic ills. Although countries in Africa and South America which had previously implemented SAPs were reverting back to welfarist frameworks, after the failure of neoliberal economic strategies, Zimbabwe proceeded with ESAP. ESAP was based on an economic view of development. It was constructed as a mechanism to facilitate Zimbabwe's integration into the global economic system. The economy under ESAP became externally focused. With deregulation of the economy, trade increased for a time. However, this did not translate into real economic growth.

Economic reforms had resulted in a highly competitive environment in which many local industries failed to compete with better resourced multinational companies (Osirim, 2003: 535). These were able to use economics of scale and access to foreign capital to produce and supply comparatively cheaper goods and services. The devalued local currency made locally produced goods less competitive and more expensive to produce as costs of importing materials and machinery increased. Factory closures occurred as businesses crumbled. Consequently, the number of retrenched workers and levels of unemployment heightened (Gibbon, 1995: 118). The public sector was also affected with state parastatals experiencing running losses with a civil service less able to respond to the growing socioeconomic crisis in the country.

The commercial agriculture sector, the backbone of the country's economy, had become increasingly export oriented. More investment was channelled to activities such as ostrich farming, horticulture, cash crops and game farming. The effect was direct as lower levels of grain production affected reserves and food security. The removal of subsidies on farming inputs affected small scale and communal farmers who contributed to maize production in the country. Strategic grain reserves dropped. Government on the other hand, had reduced its role as the grain reserve holder and thus its options in ensuring food security.

The precarious situation was compounded in 1992 when Zimbabwe was hit by one of the worst droughts in the country's history. Faced with grain deficits, the government resorted to importing grain to cover the shortfalls from its low grain reserves. However, the weakened Zimbabwean dollar meant that grain imports were expensive, causing rolling inflation on food prices. The drought exacerbated the economic decline "...resulting in a staggering 10% decline in GDP and decline in government's revenue base..." (UNDP, 2009). Zimbabwe experienced a second severe drought in 1994. In November 1997 the Zimbabwean dollar crashed to its lowest value in the history of the currency. With that the state's inability to service its foreign debts worsened.

4.5.4.2 Increasing Social Problems

Discussing the social effects of SAPs in Ghana, Konings (2003: 458) explains that, "Growing signs of public dissatisfaction with the effects of the SAP emerged that resulted in serious strikes, demonstrations and boycotts." The situation was worsened by the "record" fall in cocoa and gold prices on the world market which severely affected export, hence government revenue and its ability to respond to the social crises. In Zimbabwe there was widespread expression of mass discontent about the dropping standards of living and threat to livelihoods.

Even liberation war veterans, a firm base and constituency of ZANU-PF's political support, expressed their disillusionment about the unrealised postcolonial ambitions of the nation state including lack of fundamental economic transformation and the slow pace of land reform. Their public protests pushed for action on the part of the state. In 1997, the government implemented state-funded grant payouts and pensions for liberation war veterans. This fuelled inflation and

was essentially a stop-gap measure of political expediency. It did not address the critical fundamental issues of economic transformation and land ownership which the liberation war was premised on (Chigora and Guzura, 2008: 520) among other key factors.

In 1998, food riots erupted. The riots were a sign of the rising hardships, anger and discontent among citizens. Workers' union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organised rolling worker stay-aways to protest against the worsening standards of living. University student strikes were rife as less funding was channelled to higher education. This showed the frustration and discontent among citizens about the prevailing conditions and the lack of substantive or effective state intervention. The marketization of social services had put further pressure on families already struggling to cope, with economic worsening conditions. Socio-economic hardships affected both rural and urban populations. The high levels of rural-urban migration during this period can be attributed to the economic decline and growing social problems as people sought employment and economic opportunities in towns and cities. By 1999, there were widespread shortages of basic foodstuffs; bread, maize-meal, cooking oil and sugar.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic also contributed to the social crises. Its impact exacerbated the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. Zimbabwe had been one of the first countries to recognise and respond to the seriousness of the pandemic (Darmon, 2001:89). It was one of the first to screen donated blood for the virus from as early as 1985. Education campaigns were launched by the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MOHCW) and NGOs to try and curb HIV infection rates. Despite this, the HIV prevalence rate grew three-fold from ten percent (10%) among women attending antenatal care in 1989 to thirty-six percent (36%) by 1994. The economically active population were most affected.

Early government efforts to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDs were negatively affected by the weakening public health system. By 2001, the HIV prevalence rate in the general population was very high at twenty-six percent (26%). To mobilise funds to respond to the crisis, a taxpayers AIDS levy of three percent (3%) was introduced to fund the National AIDs Council to develop and implement HIV/AIDs programmes. This put further economic strain on households already struggling to

make ends meet. In reference to the 1990s, Mutangadura (2001:5) explains that “...very limited forms of social protection exist to minimise impacts of the death of an adult female on households in Zimbabwe.” Furthermore, Kawewe and Dibie (2000:79) aptly describe the prevailing conditions as follows:

ESAPs devastation...recurrences of socioeconomic crises that threaten peace and social justice and compounded by natural calamities and the relentlessness of the HIV/AIDS pandemic...social workers are left to scramble for diminishing resources to meet the basic needs of more clients with less.

According to Kaseke (2003:36), government social assistance programmes were poorly funded. The Basic Education Assistance Module established to provide tuition fees for poor children had limited resources while the number of children in need continued to increase as socioeconomic conditions deteriorated. Kawewe and Dibie (2000: 79) lament that state social workers were, “left to scramble for diminishing resources to meet the basic needs of more clients with less.” The net effect was increased levels of school dropouts (Mapuva, 2010: 19) and lower enrolments especially at the secondary and tertiary education level. By 2001 only 2% of the population in need were able to access and benefit from state assistance mechanisms.

4.5.4.3 Heightened Political Tensions

ESAP failed to broaden economic participation. Instead, socio-economic inequalities increased with accumulation of wealth by an emerging small black elite, with political patronage among the ruling party. The deregulation of the economy brought with it the “...convergence of interests of the ruling black elite and whites...” This alienated working class and peasant interests, the main support base of the ruling party. ESAP gave rise to increased levels of social exclusion which Kaseke (2003:34), referencing Holzman and Jorgensen (2001:21) describes as an environment where some benefit from particular policies while others are unable to do so. Cases of rampant corruption involving the political elite in government fuelled the questioning and loss of the legitimacy of the state (Raftopolous, 2004: xi). The alienation of the urban working class and rural populations increased as black elite class interests usurped the focus on social development and nation-building.

Moyo (2010: 248) extrapolates that the economic policy reforms influenced the growing competing social, economic and political interests in the country resulting in polarisation of the political landscape: 'movements' converged around ZANU-PF on one hand and the Movement for Democratic Change (a newly formed political party as explained below) on the other. This includes significant external influences with the MDC receiving "material and ideological support from key Western nations..." and coalescing support from 'largely urban NGOs,' the urban working class and the unemployed. However, the growing crisis rooted in economic structural deficiencies and lack of political and social transformation and non-resolution of critical issues such as land reform was narrowly defined as a growing governance problem in Zimbabwe.

The state's international diplomatic relations deteriorated because of the slow pace of democratisation. Between 1998 and 2002, the government became involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) involving 7 African countries (Rupiya, 2002:257). Its involvement in the Great Lakes region crisis redirected a significant portion of the public budget to finance its engagement; further straining the state fiscus. The World Bank suspended a loan to Zimbabwe in 1999. Other mechanisms of aid were also withdrawn, influenced by the international community's opposition to Zimbabwe's participation in the DRC war and lack of progress towards democratisation (Darmon, 2001:198).

The turning point was the state's announcement of plans to expropriate white-owned land to enable its land redistribution programme. The compulsory land acquisitions pitted the state against its former colonial power, Britain, as the responsibility of compensation for white farmers was disputed between the 2 countries (Chigora and Guzura, 2008: 517). Faced with an increasingly vocal civil society sector, the rolling protest action that characterised the 1990s and growing opposition formations, the ZANU-PF led government reacted with repression against the threat to its legitimacy. State security machinery was used to silence and intimidate dissenting voices, critics of the ruling party and activists calling for political change in Zimbabwe.

Towards the late 1990s, NGOs began organising themselves into issue-driven coalitions. This minimised the ability of government to victimise individual

organisations. CSOs such as the National Constitutional Assembly (comprised of NGO coalitions) were successful in mobilising for constitutional reform, educating citizens on democracy and functions of the state, civil rights and increased public debate on the draft constitution. A new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change was formed and had emerged from CSO coalitions and networks in Zimbabwe. Much of its leadership emanated from the ZCTU, NCA and other prominent think tanks and NGOs operating in the country.

Summarily, the 'trickle-down' of the economic benefits of the neoliberalism failed to materialise. Instead, it resulted in increased poverty (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1998: 879) from 61% in 1995 to 75% in 1999. This cumulatively led to social crises which threatened the stability and legitimacy of the state. By the late 1990s the issue of constitutional reform was firmly placed on the national agenda and a constitutional reform process implemented, culminating a constitutional referendum held in 2000. It is within a politically volatile environment of socioeconomic decay that Zimbabwe ushered in the third decade of its postcolonial existence from the year 2000.

4.6 Zimbabwe: A State in Crisis – 2000 – 2008

The environment in Zimbabwe after 2000 has been marked by a socio-political and economic crisis (Raftopolous, 2004: ix) protracted period of socio-economic hardships in the general population, polarisation of and a volatile political environment. Standards of living deteriorated, aggravated by the economic demise, high unemployment, unprecedented hyperinflation (Moyo, 2010:259), food and fuel shortages, a collapsed health and other social service system. The following extract from the Zimbabwe Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey 2009 report portrays the dire situation;

Zimbabwe has been experiencing a multiplicity of development challenges since 2000 to date.....1999/2000 Cyclone Eline floods that devastated some infrastructure and crops. Furthermore, droughts of 2001/2002, 2002/2003, 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 compounded the.....severe economic instability.....characterized by hyperinflation.....annual inflation rate of 231 million percent in July 2008..... general international isolation of the country. The hyperinflationary adversely affected basic social services delivery in health, education, water and sanitation and social protection.....health and

education sectors.... experienced severe budgetary constraints as well as an exodus of skills to other countries in the region and abroad, thus weakening the country's social delivery system (2010:2).

Though the description is vivid, the report, a government publication, is however silent on the political conditions and their impact on the socioeconomic conditions. In Zimbabwe, the socioeconomic decay has been compounded by the political instability which has plagued the country since 2000. However, it is suffice to say that within this environment, the question of legitimacy of the state has been a central issue. Labuschagne refers to this as the "...deepening political crisis in African states...track record of Africa's failed state," (2003:1).


4.6.1 Economic Meltdown and Socioeconomic Demise

With the spiralling socioeconomic decline, deterioration of social services and increasing hardships, the government in Zimbabwe launched a number of successive macro-economic policy frameworks, implementing various stop gap measures in an effort to stabilise the economy. However, with less capacitated and resourced state institutions, the frameworks did little to reverse the socio-economic decline. In 2001, the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) was launched in an attempt to stabilise the free falling economy and provide a framework for a multi-sectoral approach to redressing the problems facing the country. However, the unravelling political instability stifled any possible economic recovery.

From single digit figures in the 1980s, inflation rose to double digit figures by 1995 and skyrocketed to hyperinflationary levels by 2007. MERP had failed to stimulate economic growth and stem rising inflation. Consequently, a new macro-economic policy framework was gazetted in February 2003, the National Economic Revival Programme (NERP), an "economic revival growth strategy....focused on the restoration of macro-economic stability," (GOZ, 2004: 1). NERP was an agriculture-led strategy, similarly aimed at arresting the heightened inflation, currency depreciation, reduced foreign currency inflows and foreign direct investment, declining export figures and deteriorating social service provision.

To the contrary, circumstances continued to depreciate in both the economic and social sector with depreciation of the value of local currency, heightened inflation as well as decreasing capacity utilisation in all economic sectors including mining, agriculture and energy among others. Inflation continued on an upward trend from 598.7% by December of 2003 to 622.4% by January 2004 (GOZ, 2004:4). Furthermore, the country had experienced a severe drought in 2002, and consecutive failed agricultural seasons in following years. This coupled with the effects of the instability in the agricultural sector resulting from the land reform programme, were critical factors which to a great extent rendered the agriculturally driven policy a failure in achieving its set social and economic development objectives. In addition, public service institutional incapacity limited the extent to which the successive macro-economic policy frameworks could be efficiently and effectively implemented.

Figure 5: Inflation Rates in Zimbabwe (2000 – 2007)




Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe - 2008

Official inflation rates indicate that inflation in Zimbabwe rose from 55.9% in 2000 to 7 892% by 2007 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2008). Economists have pointed out that the official figures may have been understated, and possibly higher than reported. Despite this, the official numbers clearly highlight the dire state of economic meltdown. By 2008, factory capacity utilisation had all but collapsed. The International Monetary Fund reports that in 2009, Zimbabwe's GDP growth rate stood at -14%. According to Konings (2003:449) there was a virtual collapse

of the wage-earning class as a distinct entity. The socioeconomic hardships were worsened by the hyperinflationary environment and complete decimation of the local currency which resulted in cash shortages and de-industrialisation leading to massive job losses and high unemployment.

Between 1995 and 2003, poverty rates doubled from 20% to 48% of households in the country living below the food poverty line, a measure defined as ‘very poor’ (CSO, 2007). The ensuing brain drain of professionals seeking better job opportunities and living conditions in other countries further crippled the country (Chikanda, 2004:1). It is estimated that by 2007, there were up to three (3) million Zimbabweans living and working in foreign countries, the majority in South Africa, the United Kingdom, Botswana, the United States and Australia.

Figure 6: Percentage Households Below Food Poverty Line - Zimbabwe: 1995-2003



Source: UNDP Poverty Assessment Survey, 2003


Figure 6 depicts the increase in poverty levels across the 10 provinces in Zimbabwe with the worst affected, Matabeleland North, Midlands and Masvingo reaching levels of 54% of households living below the food poverty line by 2003. This characterises the high levels of severe vulnerability which has been compounded by the rolling shortages of basic food, household commodities,

electricity blackouts and fuel shortages. In addition, other social sectors: education, health, housing, water and sanitation were also severely affected by the economic meltdown.

By 2005, an estimated 80% of the Zimbabwean population were living below the poverty line, with unemployment and underemployment above 80%. In an attempt to respond to the prevailing situation, the government established the Enhanced Social Protection Project, a short-term social safety net mechanism aimed at alleviating the suffering. Under this, programmes such as the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme were set-up and it has had to be almost continuous due to the dire circumstances and prolonged droughts (CSO, 2010: 27-28).

To illustrate the decline further, in the education sector, school enrolment decreased, although the number of schools continued to rise. The drop in school enrolment was ironically against a country Millennium Development Goal target of ensuring that between 2000 and 2015, all Zimbabwean children complete a full programme of primary education (GOZ, 2004:94). The Central Statistical Office reports that of the reasons for non-attendance at school investigated in the Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey (MIMS) in 2009, 71% cited financial constraints (2010: 14-15).

Figure 7: Number of secondary school enrolments in Zimbabwe: 2000 - 2006



Adapted from Central Statistical Office statistics: 2007

Figure 7 indicates that secondary school enrolment went down from 817 830 in 2000 to 774 922 in 2006; despite the increase in number of schools from 1 586 in 2000 to 2 155 in 2006 (GOZ, 2007:43). However, the high development indicators remained with the literacy rate at 91% by 2008, up from 78% in 1982, a legacy of the first 10 years of high state investment in education.

In the housing sector, the size and number of 'squatter camps' (informal settlements) increased, mainly in urban settings (Mapuva, 2010: 19) as a result of higher levels of urban-urban and rural-urban migration (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1998: 879) as well as high rental rates. The growing urban population put a strain on deteriorating infrastructure. Crippled local municipalities failed to address the housing problem and growing need. The prevailing situation was a source of much societal discontent and disillusionment with the postcolonial state in Zimbabwe and therefore a source of opposition support. In May 2005, the government launched the much criticised Operation Restore Order/Murambatsvina (Moyo, 2010: 260) where urban informal settlement dwellers were removed from their 'illegally' constructed homes and the buildings destroyed.

The displacement was justified by government as enforcing by-laws against construction of illegal structures and stemming the growth squatter camps in urban areas (Mapuva, 2010: 19). However, no alternative housing was provided for affected families. NGOs responded with humanitarian assistance for the displaced. Efforts also focused on highlighting their plight to the international community and advocating against government's actions (Mapuva, 2010:19). To some extent, the intervention by the United Nations Special Envoy on Human Settlements may be partly attributed to NGOs efforts in publicising of these events in the international arena.

Bratton and Masunungure (2006:21) argue that Operation Murambatsvina was a state campaign to "...stifle independent economic and political activity in the country's urban areas..." strongholds of opposition Movement for Democratic Change political support. However, this act further discredited the government. The inference being that the ruling party was using state security institutions to dismantle its political rival, MDC's support base.

In the health sector; it had been decimated by a severe shortage of medical staff and lack of resources including basic medicines. For example, immunisation coverage of all children aged between 12 and 23 months declined from 67% in 1999 to 53% in 2005/06. The percentage of children immunised against measles had also dropped from 79% in 1999 to 66% in 2005/06 (CSO, 2007: 43). Though the rate of HIV infection began to decline, the resource constraints have continued to limit access to treatment for those in need. From 26.5% in 2001, the HIV prevalence rate among adults between the ages of 15-49 was reported to be 23.2% in 2003, to 19.4% in 2005 and declining further to 15.6% by 2007 (United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), 2008). However, only 38% of those in need of treatment were accessing it by the end of that year.

In November 2004, the Government of Zimbabwe launched a new macro-economic policy framework, *Zimbabwe: Towards Sustained Economic Growth – Macro-Economic Policy Framework 2005 – 2006*. The framework was aimed at stabilising the economy, reducing inflation, increasing capacity utilisation in economic sectors. Equal emphasis was also placed on “...resuscitation of public service delivery,” including improving the deteriorating health infrastructure and stemming the brain drain affecting the sector, by allocating more public resources to health, education and social assistance programmes (GOZ, 2004: ii) in subsequent years.

UNGASS reports that even though the country had been facing grave economic challenges, in 2007, government expenditure on health was relatively high at 13.7%. The government had also been implementing the *Strategic Management and Health Sector Reform Programme* aimed at providing better remuneration and working conditions for medical professionals to address the severe brain drain. This however, did little to resuscitate the collapsed public health system which failed to cope with the needs of the population, as in real terms, the higher budgetary allocations were albeit against a currency with a depreciated value. An example is the cholera epidemic of 2008/09 which killed up to 4000 people (CSO, 2010: 3). The severely weak, “virtually collapsed” health system (Chikanda, 2004: 1) struggled to manage the high incidents of the preventable and treatable disease. NGOs stepped in to provide curative and

preventative medicines, going as far as drilling boreholes for water in worst affected areas.

In 2008, the United Nations launched the Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal for Zimbabwe 2008 to mobilise aid for the provision of relief and welfare services to the most affected communities. The Consolidated Appeal described the situation in the country by 2008 as follows:

The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe continues to be impacted by a set of complex, overlapping and often worsening economic and social factors. Spiralling inflation, deteriorating physical infrastructure, the inability of the public sector to deliver basic services, and the severe impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic have led to a decline in the overall health and well-being of the population. The erosion of livelihoods, food insecurity rising malnutrition and the possibility of disease outbreak are putting the already vulnerable population under further distress. (United Nations, 2008:1)

The extract emphasises the dire circumstances in Zimbabwe. Much of the population was surviving either on humanitarian aid from NGOs and/or foreign currency remittances from relatives working outside the country. It also highlights the unstable and unpredictable policy environment which posed great operational challenges for humanitarian actors. It also reflects the critical interplay of political and socioeconomic factors and the negative outcomes affecting the entire population; as well as the difficult environment in which NGOs were operating.

4.6.2 Socio-political Instability

The political landscape in Zimbabwe became highly polarised. The emergence of new and vocal opposition forces had coalesced to form a new political party, the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) formed in September 1999 (Rupiya, 2002:255). In reaction to the challenge to its power and legitimacy, the ZANU-PF led government responded with increasing repression of dissenting voices, intimidation of opposition including critical NGOs and media institutions, especially during election periods (Moyo, 2010:249-250). Rupiya (2002:259) reports that this included the arresting of journalists perceived to be critical of ZANU-PF and supporting the opposition. Therefore, this was tantamount to suppressing

fundamental democratic principles of people's right to freedom of political choice, speech and expression as espoused in the Constitution.

In his assessment of the political culture in Zimbabwe, Sachikonye (2004:193) explains that violence and coercion are, "deeply ingrained in Zimbabwean political culture," inherited from the colonial era and liberation struggle sustained through the post independence period. The inference is that the methods used by the ZANU-PF government to suppress the opposition go against the grain of the democratisation process. The rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly are defined as key tenets of democracy and making of a democratic society (Sachikonye, 2004:188-189). However, these remained inaccessible to the broader population as associational life forms such as public gatherings were viewed with suspicion and were restricted by the state using its security and intelligence structures (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010:203), as well restrictive legal instruments such as the Public Order Security Act.

Ironically, Zimbabwe had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 22 (ICCPR) (1976) of the Covenant states that individuals have the right of freedom of association. In addition, no restrictions should be placed on the ability of individuals to exercise that right other than those provided for by law and which are necessary in a democratic society for purposes of ensuring national security and public safety. This right is also enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 20 (1948), the African Charter on Human and People's Rights of 1981 and Section 21 of Zimbabwe's Constitution. However, in practice, the opposite was true. Though the Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of expression and association, Zimbabwe also has the Public Order and Security Act (2002), a contradictory and restrictive instrument which the state gazetted in response to the rolling protests and as political instability intensified.

In February 2000, a referendum was held to vote on a proposed Draft Constitution to replace the Lancaster House Constitution. Pertinent issues included the lack of separation of powers; lack of independence of the judiciary; the need for more authority for oversight by parliament, curbing the executive powers of and limiting terms of office of the presidency among others (Kagoro, 2005:21). More than 50% of those who voted rejected the draft constitution. This was perceived as a victory

for civil society including coalitions such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) which had led the 'no vote' campaign against adoption of the government-driven document (Sachikonye, 2004:179).

Scholars argue that the vote was a protest vote reflecting the general population's discontent with the political tensions and dire socioeconomic situation in the country (Sachikonye, 2004:179). The inference is that it was less based on the merits and/or demerits of the draft constitution itself. "It was the first sign that the ZANU-PF government was losing grip and becoming increasingly unpopular with the electorate," (Mapuva, 2010: 9). The result heightened tensions between the state and non-governmental organisations and the relations between the 2 sectors became characteristically adversarial.

Matlosa (2002:144) explains that in the 2002 presidential elections, NGOs were highly critical of the Electoral Supervisory Commission in Zimbabwe, as their own role in election monitoring, observation and voter education had been significantly curtailed. In its report on the March 2008 elections, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a grouping of 30 NGOs promoting democratic elections in Zimbabwe, recommended that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission needed to provide more space for NGOs to fill the gap in provision of voter education (ZESN, 2008:7). Sachikonye (2004:189) laments that although conditions for democratisation had improved in Zimbabwe between 1996 and 1999, "...against a background of the ferment in civil society for reform and a certain level of tolerance on the part of the state," from 2000, conditions became increasingly repressive. In his publication on civil and military relations in Zimbabwe during this period, Rupiya (2002:251) describes that it became characteristic of the state to utilise the military and law enforcement institutions against "actual and perceived oppositional political opponents."

The catalyst to the implosion in Zimbabwe was triggered by the land reform question which had remained unresolved for up to 20 years after independence. On the 16th of February 2000, land 'invasions' escalated with liberation war veterans leading the occupation of white-owned farms, something which Marongwe (2003: 157) argues had been occurring since the 1980s but

significantly increased during the late 1990s - 2000. There was frustration that the resolution of this issue had taken too long after independence in 1980.

Government embarked on the 'fast-track' land reform programme to redistribute land (Chaumba, Scoones and Wolmer, 2003:533). The net effect of the farm 'invasions' and expropriation of farms by the government had a knock-on effect on the economy which is predominantly agro-based and further polarised the environment in the country. On the economic front, investor confidence and export levels of commodities such as tobacco and beef fell as production levels decreased on affected farms. Unemployment increased as some of the farm workers from affected farms were left without work as white farmers migrated out of the country (Hellum and Derman, 2004:1785). Coupled with the effects of recurring droughts, this negatively affected food security in Zimbabwe. According to Chaumba, *et.al.* (2003:533), this affected the livelihoods of individuals previously employed on affected farms as well as those in secondary industries built around serving affected farming communities.

On the political front, locally, social conflict (Lahiff, 2003:2) ensued as political opposition voiced its criticism of the land reform programme and its implementation. To illustrate its impact, Hellum and Derman explain that the land reform issue became a highly politicised process in Zimbabwe. At an international level, Western diplomatic relations deteriorated further as the government in Zimbabwe accused the British government of reneging on its Lancaster House commitment to compensate white farmers dispossessed of farms during the land reform exercise.

At regional level, Oosthuizen (2006:108) explains that SADC rebuked the United Kingdom for not honouring its obligation. Anseeuw and Alden (2010:12) state that the case of the land issue in Zimbabwe illustrates the volatility of the politics of land in Africa. The civil war in Cote d'Ivoire in 2002, post-election violence directly linked to land in the Kenya 2007 elections (Anseeuw and Alden, 2010:1) are additional indications of the sensitivity encapsulating issues of land ownership and distribution. In Zimbabwe therefore, this was a catalyst which brought to a head the underlying issues pertaining to the political culture and post-independence democratisation process which had stalled in the country.

In June of 2000 parliamentary election were held but only 50% of eligible voters exercised their democratic right to vote (Matlosa, 2002:138). This indicates high levels of voter apathy, and disillusionment with the electoral system and process (Kaldor, 2003:5). However, Matlosa (2002:138) argues that in Zimbabwe, the problem extends beyond disillusionment with the electoral process to voter fatigue. The author's analysis is that it is also due to the frequency of split timeframes for local, parliamentary and presidential elections. The inference is that the country is almost always in a highly politically charged environment. The election in 2000 was held in a volatile environment, with reports of the state's heavy-handed clampdown on protests and criticism from the broader civil society sector (Sachikonye, (2004:147). ZANU- PF secured 62 parliamentary seats and MDC, contesting elections for the first time since its formation, secured 57. This was the strongest challenge to ZANU-PF's hegemonic rule since independence in 1980.

Kagoro (2005:22) reflects that the presidential election held 2 years later in 2002 was an intensely contested process, marked by violence and intimidation, ZANU-PF won, amid allegations of vote rigging. The parliamentary elections in 2000, presidential elections in 2002 and parliamentary elections in 2005 were characteristically volatile, with accusations of vote rigging and/or electoral fraud. According to Sachikonye (2004:187-189) there were up to 54 politically motivated deaths during the 2000 presidential elections, as well as increased orchestration of intimidation by ZANU-PF. In addition, major criticism was the elections were neither free (the electorate able to vote in a suitable environment) nor fair (reflecting accurate and valid results).

On one hand, some election observers declared the elections flawed and rigged Oosthuizen (2006:107). There were also allegations of vote rigging from the MDC (Moyo, 2010:260). However, on the other, the Southern African Development Community's Ministerial Task Force concluded that the elections were, "...substantially free and fair and were a true reflection of the will of the people of Zimbabwe." Nonetheless, the inference is that the legitimacy of the ZANU-PF victories were therefore questionable.

Western pressure on the Zimbabwean government increased with calls for democratisation, political change, an end to ZANU-PF's hegemony, for its leader,

Robert Mugabe to step down from power and for the state to halt the take-over of white-owned farms. Shumba's (2002:327) assessment is that the 2002 election in Zimbabwe attracted unprecedented international attention that the questions of sovereignty which had never before been an issue became a key theme in debates about the elections and unfolding situation in the country. Diplomatic relations with mainly Britain and the United States soured (Chigora and Guzura, 2008: 514) with the European Union imposing 'punitive external interventions' (Moyo, 2010: 245), the so-called 'targeted sanctions' on the ZANU-PF leader, to resolve the crisis. Escalating the diplomatic stand-off, in December 2002, Zimbabwe withdrew its membership of the Commonwealth. Development aid and assistance "virtually dried up" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2007:3) as the government's relationship with international development partners and multilateral development banks remained strained. This has resulted in most CSOs focusing on ameliorative humanitarian assistance and relief programmes.

NGOs were accused of being conduits of Western influence in supporting the MDC, interfering in local politics and engaging in subversive political activities perceived as an affront to the state. ZANU-PF resorted to its exclusionary approach to critical voices, warning NGOs to refrain from involving themselves in political activities. The Election Directorate issued a directive that individuals representing NGOs would no longer be accredited as election observers (Matlosa, 2002:147). ZANU-PF leader and state President, Robert Mugabe was quoted as follows in the state-run The Herald newspaper:

Our sad experience with non-governmental organisations operating in our country...is that they are set up and financed by developed countries as instruments of their foreign policy....and their objectives include destabilisation and interference with the evolution of our political processes undermining our sovereignty...and promoting disaffection and hostility...against their popularly elected government....hatcheries of political opposition...The moment they seek Governmental power and office as has happened in Binga, we begin to view them differently as political opponents. And political opponents are dealt with politically....They should not cry, for they have redefined the rules of engagement." (*The Herald*, 13 October 2001).

The statement was a potent warning, singling out the NGO sector to desist from engaging in political activities. On the other hand it can be interpreted as

acknowledgement of the potential role of NGOs in mobilising citizens to push for political transformation. In its 2006 report on the role of NGOs in supporting the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Zimbabwe, NANGO described the environment in which NGOs had to work as a “...harsh...minefield,” (2006:14). The clampdown extended to other civil society sectors. In September of 2002, the independent *Daily News* newspaper which was critical of the ZANU-PF led government was shut down by the state. The clampdown on independent media institutions was another indication of the state’s recognition of the capabilities of civil society in its role as a watchdog, in promoting transparency and accountability in governance.

In March 2008, Zimbabwe held harmonised presidential and parliamentary elections. Observer missions from Western countries were denied accreditation to monitor the elections. However, representatives from regional bodies such as the African Union (AU), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and several member states sent observer missions. The result of the election was disputed. The Pan-African Parliament issued a statement stating that the atmosphere during the elections was neither free nor fair and SADC expressed that the pre-election period had been characterised by violence and intimidation of voters (EISA, 2008: <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zim2008runoff.htm>). The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) delayed announcement of the presidential result, fuelling speculation and concerns of vote rigging and that ZANU-PF had likely lost the election to the opposition MDC.

The ZEC is an institution which the MDC had long accused of being partisan or biased towards ZANU-PF (Rupiya, 2002:260). According to Rupiya (2002:260) this was exacerbated by the, “...controversial role was use of armed forces as the Electoral Supervisory Commission after the chair and his deputy resigned earlier, citing lack of funding and government interest in the body.” This also implies that it was prone to political influence and interference and therefore, not an independent credible institution, giving rise to scepticism about the outcomes of elections won by ZANU-PF.

The result announced later on the 2nd of May 2008 reflected that the opposition MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai had amassed more votes (47.87%) than the ZANU-

PF's Robert Mugabe (43.24%) (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, 2008). However, the votes fell short of an absolute majority needed to secure the presidential seat as required by the Electoral Act 2008 (Chapter 2:13 as amended). A presidential run-off election was declared, despite protestations from MDC, civil society and critics of Mugabe's regime. The MDC withdrew from the run-off (EISA, 2008). However, this was still conducted on the 27th of June 2008 and ZANU-PF's candidate, Mugabe declared the winner, with 90% of the vote. He was sworn in 2 days later on the 29th of June 2008.

The situation led to an intense political impasse which threatened to completely destabilise the country. SADC intervened to facilitate a negotiated political settlement. The then President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki was appointed as mediator between ZANU-PF and the 2 MDC formations (one led by Morgan Tsvangirai: MDC-T and the other by Arthur Mutambara: MDC-M). In September 2008, a Global Political Agreement was signed by ZANU-PF and the 2 MDC factions, paving the way for the formation of an Inclusive Government (Government of National Unity) with a two-year mandate to normalise conditions in the country, facilitate constitutional reform, create conditions for free and fair elections. The position of Prime Minister which had been abolished during the 1990s era of state reform was created and assigned to the Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) faction. The MDC-Mutambara faction, the minor opposition, took on the Deputy Prime Minister position.

Article XVI: Section 16.3 and Article XX: Section 20 of the GPA spells out its objectives of returning the country to stability and for the inclusive government to urgently address the economic meltdown, humanitarian needs of the population and create suitable conditions for elections. Due to the disputes between ZANU-PF and the 2 MDC formations about implementation of the GPA, the inclusive government itself was only established in September 2009 (Saki, 2010). This was almost a year after the signing of the agreement and after much deliberation and political wrangling about several provisions including positions of governorships and sharing of ministerial portfolios.

One of the first priorities of the new government has been to stabilise the economy. Government suspended use of its local currency in 2009, adopting the

United States dollar as legal tender (along with other foreign currencies including the South African Rand and British Pound). The Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was launched in 2009 as a policy framework to guide the implementation of targeted programmes to promote socio-political and economic stability. One of the focus areas of STERP was a social protection programme, food and humanitarian assistance, education, health and strategically targeted vulnerable sectors. The effort is also to rehabilitate the collapsed social, health and education sectors (GOZ, 2009: <http://www.zimbabweprimeminister.org>). During the transitional period, the government has managed to stem hyperinflation and minimally resuscitate the economy.

Kagoro (2005:20-21) argues that Zimbabwe's crisis of governance must be located within the context of dysfunctional political parties which became disengaged from the electorate and are inherently undemocratic in practice, riddled with regional and ethnic biases. In concurrence, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 101) explains that the nationalist paradigm in Zimbabwe has become "bankrupt." However, the author ironically, propounds the need for, "a post-nationalist perspective grounded in civil society and social movements," (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003: 101). However, this fails to directly address the noted demise of effective political parties which have become distant from constituents. Discussing civil society in post-communist states in Eastern Europe, Green (2002:455) admits that the promotion of CSOs has at times been at the expense of political parties. The lack of viable alternatives in political parties has affected the democratisation process in developing countries. The political crises point to the need for the democratisation debate to centrally position the role of political parties and development of strong oppositions for it to be effective.

4.7 Legislative Framework Governing the NGO Sector in Zimbabwe

Saki (2010) explains that operations of NGOs in Zimbabwe have always been addressed through legislation since the colonial era. The Friendly Societies Act (1891) was passed by the colonial government to recognise welfare associations, religious, philanthropic and social clubs in Rhodesia. Organisations were mainly foreign Christian organisations, "tolerated...in so far as they provide material and moral support to the colonial government and did not question the treatment of

natives (Takure, 2009: 9). However, laws passed in later years became restrictive as urban-based nationalist movements were formed and the liberation war intensified, a major threat to the colonialist state.

The Private Voluntary Organisations Act (1965) and the Welfare Organisations Act (1967) were gazetted after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence which led to an intensification of the liberation struggle. It was aimed at curtailing the activities of NGOs supporting the liberation movements. The legislation was used by the Rhodesian government to monitor and control the actions of welfare and voluntary organisations believed to have linkages with the liberation movements and which were exposing the atrocities committed by the Rhodesian government and security forces (*Ibid*). The Act was a repressive piece of legislation passed by an undemocratic state to control the activities of CSOs and take punitive measures if the activities were deemed to be illegal or working against the state.

The practice of gazetting legislation to regulate the voluntary sector continued after independence in 1980. However, during this period, the NGO sector worked closely with the state to support the new postcolonial government's rehabilitation, reconstruction and nation-building efforts. A number of voluntary organisations had supported the liberation struggle and aimed to complement the developmental and nationalist agenda of the new ZANU-PF led government. State-civil society relations were generally cooperative such that though the Welfare Organisations Act (1967) had not been repealed, its restrictive provisions did not affect the operations of NGOs at the time. In 1981, the Zimbabwe Red Cross Act (1981, Chapter 17:08) was passed, amending Section 2 of the Welfare Organisations Act (1967, Chapter 93). The new law was to constitute the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society (ZRCS) as the national Red Cross in Zimbabwe, "...auxiliary to the public authorities," but as an "...independent voluntary aid society." Its' legal mandate is to, "...carry out and assist in work for the improvement of health prevention.....alleviation of suffering.

As state-civil society relations evolved in the 1990s with the growing role of CSOs in political debates and service provision, the Private Voluntary Organisation Act of 1995 (Chapter 17:05) was enacted. The PVO Act (1995) required the compulsory registration especially of international or foreign-based NGOs. In addition, NGOs

needed to have Memorandum of Understanding with the government in order to implement their activities in the country. The Act gave the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW) the authority investigate, de-register and suspend the operations of any organisation with due reason, as well as influence the board/trustee compositions of NGOs. Furthermore, the government could investigate the records of organisations operating in the country, including financial records for information on sources of funding.

To illustrate abuse of the Act, Rich (1997:17) explains that in November 1995, the Minister indefinitely suspended the Executive Committee of the Association of Women's Clubs (AWC), a membership-based NGO. However, it was not immediately apparent why they were removed. A 'caretaker' administration appointed by the Minister was installed to oversee the affairs of the Association which later challenged the legality of the intervention before the courts of law. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the AWC which contested the actions arguing the Minister's actions were unconstitutional; it had not been given the opportunity to respond to the charge levelled against them before action was taken (Zimbabwe Law Reports, 1997: 186). In 2002, the medical director of Amani Trust, an NGO formed in the 1990s aiming to work with victims of torture, organised violence and providing human rights education and advocacy was arrested. The charges were publishing false statements prejudicial to the state. In part due to this harassment and the criminalising of non-registration of NGOs under the PVO Act, Amani Trust closed down its operations. What this demonstrated was the growing scepticism of the state about the growing NGO sector and the increasing voices of dissent emanating from it.

In 2004, the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, 2004 (NGO Bill) was tabled in parliament and if passed would effectively repeal the PVO Act (1995). Its preamble stated the Bill's purpose as, "...for the registration of non-governmental organisations, to provide an enabling environment for the operations, monitoring and regulation of all non-governmental organisations..." (International Bar Association, 2004:2). It was passed by parliament on the 9th of December 2004. However, by the end of 2008, it had not been signed into law. According to Kagoro (2004: 23) the NGO Act is a disingenuous attempt by the state to shield itself from scrutiny by its own citizens. The Bill was met with criticism and opposition from

civil society organisations as an instrument which would enable the state to misuse its authority to control and interfere in the operations of NGOs it perceives as threats in undertaking supposedly subversive activities.

To critics of the Bill, the timing of its tabling was aimed at curbing CSOs mobilisation of communities to vote for the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections. It reflected the state's perception of NGOs as a political threat to the hegemony of ZANU-PF. The Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Paul Mangwana expressed in an address to Parliament in July 2004 that;

Some NGOs and churches are causing too much confusion in the country because they are converting their humanitarian programmes into politics...The government cannot allow that to happen, so we are saying they should go under scrutiny where we revise all modalities of their operations in the country, (GOZ Hansard, 2004).

Therefore, the drafting of the NGO Bill can be interpreted as a reaction by the state to control and regulate NGOs, especially in politically related activities. In addition, it reflects the states perception of NGOs as conduits of foreign interference pushing for regime change in the country; and efforts to 'depoliticise' the NGO sector. The International Centre for Civil Society explains that Section 17 of the NGO Bill would restrict CSOs, from using foreign funding to sponsor activities even remotely related to political engagement or involving participation in "issues of...political governance." It can be inferred from the statements and provisions of the Bill that the state's approach to NGOs is underpinned by the principle that they do not have a role to play in political processes.

Key elements of the Bill would mean the following for NGOs operating in Zimbabwe:

- Compulsory registration, with restrictions placed on foreign funding of politically related NGO activities such as governance and human rights;
- Prohibition on the registration of a foreign NGO if its sole purpose is 'issues of governance' or the "promotion and protection of human rights and political governance issues;

- Establishment of a controlling/regulatory body, NGO Council, with a disproportionately higher level of representation from government than the NGO sector. The Minister would be able to nominate a large number of the members of the council. The NGO Council would have the authority to investigate individual NGOs and possibly suspend their activities if deemed appropriate;

- Distinguishing of local and foreign NGOs.

In its analysis of the NGO Bill, the International Bar Association comments that it is 'almost identical' to the PVO Act of 1966. However, it has additions which have made the Bill more 'draconian' than Smith's restrictive legal machinery (2004: 2). The Bill would put in place instruments the state could use to further scrutinise the operations of NGOs and gave the Minister of MPSLSW the authority to restrict the operations of any NGO under investigation. It did not however have legal provisions for NGOs to appeal against actions taken by the Minister. It can be inferred that the categorising of NGOs is an attempt to divisively weaken coalitions and increase the vulnerability of individual CSOs. In this way, the state is able to weaken the potential development of a critical mass of civil society's force to push for political change. Although the Bill was however never signed into law by the President and has since lapsed (ICNL, 2010: 1), its drafting shows the deliberate efforts by the state to closely regulate and monitor the NGO sector.

On the legal frameworks that have been promulgated to regulate and/or monitor the NGO sector, Kagoro (2005: 7) argues that NGOs must not be forced to register in order to be recognised. However, this beleaguers the question of how they can be held accountable. Ironically, Kagoro proposes that tax laws and fiscal legislation should, "...provide for exemption from income and profit taxes for NGOs.....also provide other tax benefits such as exemptions on customs duties....tax benefits to people and companies that fund NGOs in order to encourage giving..." (Kagoro, 2005:7). The irony lies in the proposed selective use of legislation only when it appears to benefit CSOs. This thesis argues that some form of registration is required to foster good governance; accountability and transparency in NGOs as well.

In fairness, Kagoro concedes that there is nothing wrong with insisting on NGO regulation as this is important for financial accountability (2005: 25), however, points out that 'normal' practice is that independent bodies regulate themselves and if there is government representation on their bodies, such representation is "minimal." In Zimbabwe, examples of legislation such as the Architects Act (Chapter 27:01) and Legal Practitioner's Act (Chapter 27: 07) have provided for the establishment of professional regulatory bodies with democratically elected representatives for profession specific sectors. However, the application of such an approach to the NGO sector is problematic as they are not professional bodies. There are inherent differences between NGO activities and the focus and missions of professional bodies.

4.8 Mapping the Trajectory: Trends in NGO Development in Zimbabwe

Previous sections of this chapter have mapped the social, political and economic context in Zimbabwe. This focuses on mapping the development of the NGO sector. Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopolous' empirical work on NGOs in Zimbabwe provides an analysis of the sector, juxtaposing this with the political, policy and economic context. The authors outline trends in the development of NGOs in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2000. Moyo *et. al.* (2000:4) identify 4 phases categorised chronologically and by the dominant roles played by NGOs during each phase. These are adapted for purposes of this thesis as follows:

- i. Welfare, rehabilitation and voluntarism: 1979 – 81
- ii. Development, self-help and income generation: 1982 – 1986
- iii. Service-oriented and issue-driven NGOs: 1987 – 1991
- iv. Policy advocacy, constitutional reform and poverty alleviation: 1992 – 2000.

The phases identified by Moyo *et. al.* are consistent with Kaldor's (2003:16) observations that a typical cycle in NGO development is, (i) focusing on immediate relief (ii) localised developmental projects and (iii) ultimately advocacy focused work relating to broader policy and societal issues, first at national and then global level. However, it is typical for NGOs to revert to relief efforts depending on the conditions prevailing in their areas of operation. Moyo *et.al.* identify 4 phases; this

thesis identifies a fifth phase to build onto that and to provide the basis to map the trajectory forward:

- v. Post-2000: Political advocacy and humanitarian assistance.

Phase 5 has been influenced by the social crises, changes in the political landscape, political instability and economic demise. This study seeks to investigate and analyse the roles played by NGOs during this fifth phase. However, an assessment of the historical background of NGO development prior to the year 2000 provides; the foundation to analyse the current state of the NGO sector; map the trajectory of NGO development in Zimbabwe and the role(s) they have played in the social policy process.

4.8.1 NGOs in the Pre-independence Period

Dorman notes that the first category of important African organisations in Zimbabwe were formed between the 1910s and 1920s and consisted of burial societies, welfare and urban workers' associations (2001:125). Examples are the Rhodesian Native Association, the Rhodesian Bantu Voter's Association and Bantu Congress. Welfarist organisations were also formed such as the Gwelo Native Welfare Association and the Southern Rhodesia Native Welfare Association seeking to address the welfare needs of the black urban poor, ignored by the colonial government (Takure, 2009: 10). Dorman's assessment points to a gap in the portrayal of the advancement of civil society in Africa. The oral nature of black African history has led to lack of recognition of pre-colonial black African associational life in contemporary literature and studies on civil society and NGOs in African countries. The exogenous nature of the process and development of civil society as it is defined today has distorted the theorisation of civil society in a manner biased against recognition of its existence in pre-colonial African associational life.

Arguably, to some extent, it is from pre-colonial forms and principles of associational life that urban based organisations developed in the 1910s-20s as increasing numbers of black urban dwellers (Mapuva, 2010: 10) sort to build the same societal support and engagement forums that still existed in the rural areas. Therefore, contemporary studies of civil society should rather be on the

'emergence' of civil society organisations in Zimbabwe as formalised institutions. This can be traced back to the colonial era of the 1920s where groupings including worker associations, trade unions, social and skills clubs, mostly membership-based organisations, became a feature of the social landscape in the country. Most black African nationalist political parties were born out of the convergence of social movements, trade unions, public associations and supported by voluntary and welfare organisations.

Indigenous welfare organisations also existed, aimed at covering the social service gap left by the government's social policy biased against and discriminatory towards the black population. The period between the 1950s and 1970s saw the increase in voluntary and church-based organisations in providing welfare support as the number of urban dwellers increased with migration from rural settings. Voluntary organisations typically desisted from openly engaging in liberation political activities to avoid reprisal from the Rhodesian government. An example is the Jairos Jiri Association, formed in 1969 by a black man, to provide training and self-help activities for the disabled (Sibanda, 1994: 6).

The church-based organisations and missionaries were a major player in the provision of welfare and other social services. "Churches themselves provided massive social support to liberation fighters and their families," (Raftopolous and Savage, 2004: 259). For example, the Council of Churches formed and registered Christian Care in 1967, a welfare organisation which still operates in Zimbabwe today. Church-based organisations such as the Catholic Church's, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace documented liberation war atrocities and human rights abuses committed by Rhodesian security forces (Muzondo, 2006).

Christian missionaries played a significant role in providing education and medical services to black Africans in underserved areas. Major hospitals were built in Christian missions such as in Morgenster – Masvingo Province, Nyadire – Mashonaland East Province, Mount Selinda – Manicaland Province and Mnene – Midlands Province among others (Zvobgo: 1986: 110). These continue to provide medical services to surrounding communities and serve as referral centres to peripheral clinics. In postcolonial Zimbabwe, mission schools have retained a reputation for provision of quality secondary school education in Zimbabwe.

During the colonial era, many liberation fighters came from mission schools; many nationalist leaders are people who had had missionary school education.

The intensifying of the liberation struggle heightened the role of voluntary and welfare organisations in supporting the war and providing welfare to the displaced and vulnerable. The CSOs played a salient role in the push for independence in Zimbabwe. In reaction to this the Rhodesian government gazetted legislation to regulate and monitor the activities of civil society organisations in an attempt to cut political, moral and material support for the liberation war. The history of CSOs support for the liberation war and ties with the liberation movements including ZANU-PF and ZAPU set the backdrop for a collaborative relationship with the newly formed government of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980.

4.8.2 Welfare, Rehabilitation and Voluntarism: 1979 – 1981

Dorman (2001:128) explains that from 1980, welfare organisations which had supported the liberation war redirected their efforts to rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives. Moyo *et.al.* (2000:4) explain that this was the first phase of redefining the role of NGOs in the Zimbabwe. A complementary and cooperative approach was adopted to support the state's development and nationalist social policy agenda. Therefore, NGOs reinvented themselves to remain relevant in the new political context, respond to the emerging social needs and to align with the new policy agenda of the postcolonial state.

The Zimbabwe Red Cross Society for example, gives its history as an organisation which functions, "as an auxiliary to government in all its programmes," however, maintaining its autonomy and independence from the state (Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, 2010: <http://www.redcrosszim.org.zw>). It had started as a branch of the British Red Cross Society but evolved to focus on complementing state efforts in social relief and humanitarian efforts. NGOs also supported the resettlement of displaced communities including demobilised war veterans.

From previously focusing on welfare and relief services pre-1980, organisations expanded their activities to include rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives. Organisations such as Danhiko and Zimbabwe Project worked with liberation war veterans to support the demobilisation process. They provided basic and

vocational education and technical skills training to help their integration back into society. Focus was also on building basic infrastructure such as sanitation: Blair/pit latrines, dip tanks for livestock, clinics, drilling of boreholes, local road and bridge construction. In poorer regions, the Food for Work approach was implemented by the state where able-bodied citizens in need of and provided with food and other forms of aid would work on infrastructural projects in their communities. This was not limited to state aid. NGOs providing food aid were encouraged to use the same underlying principles to avoid contradicting government's approach. Some schools of thought argue that this approach was aimed at mobilising public participation in nation-building on one hand and also to discourage dependence on aid and welfare on the other.

The previously white-run umbrella organisation for voluntary organisations, the Southern Rhodesia Council of Social Services was reconstituted as the Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise (VOICE) in 1981. As an umbrella organisation, VOICE's mission was to promote collective engagement and support of self-help projects - supporting new emerging non-governmental organisations. The state extended financial support to VOICE as well as other voluntary organisations. This signified its recognition of the role of NGOs and its limited capacity to address the social development needs of the population alone. Hence the ZIMCORD conference which sought to mobilise financial aid and development assistance to implement government's social and reconstruction programmes.

The NGO landscape itself changed with the entrance of international NGOs which had previously not and/or stopped working in the country during the 1960s – 70s. UNESCO explains that,

Serious involvement of international agencies, NGOs and foreign governments in education and other sectors in Zimbabwe started in earnest when Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980. Prior to independence, no agency or foreign government, except apartheid South Africa could be seen as openly associating itself with a rebel state (<http://www.unesco.org>).

It can be inferred that the number of NGOs working in the country increased during the immediate post-independence period. In addition, the NGO landscape now included both indigenous and international NGOs based in foreign countries.

Therefore, it can be deduced that most of the voluntary organisations working in Zimbabwe by 1980 were mainly local ones. The (re)entry of international NGOs in the country began at independence in 1980.

4.8.3 Development, Self-help and Income Generation: 1982 – 1986

Part of the government's development strategy entailed fostering local economic development through empowering and developing communities to initiate and sustain economically viable projects and enterprises. In congruence, the second major phase of NGO development was the shift towards empowerment focused programmes as ameliorative welfare provision, resettlement and rehabilitation turned to developmental and income-generation initiatives. NGO activities included vocational skills training, agricultural and other income-generation projects and supporting cooperatives (Moyo *et. al.*, 2000:4). Consequently, numerous cooperatives were established mainly in rural areas. The emerging trend was the growth in membership-based NGOs, associations and self-help groups. Many of the groups were supported by the state and larger well-funded NGOs. However, many failed to sustain themselves due to poor management and/or failure to develop viable local markets for their products/produce.

The relationship between the state and civil society organisations continued to be mainly collaborative. In addition to independent NGOs, a number of organisations were established as 'quasi-NGOs' (QUANGOs) or government organised NGOs (GONGOs), state-funded and operating as semi-autonomous state institutions. They also implemented targeted social programmes, aligned to and to complement government programmes (Rich, 1997:17). NGO programmes were however less bureaucratic than the state and therefore better able to mobilise and facilitate community development projects. The period 1982 – 1986 was therefore characterised by development as well as welfare oriented activities.

In his analysis of literature on NGOs and civil society, Mercer (2002:14) observes that from the 1980s, the increased funding for service oriented NGO programmes in developing countries resulted in many NGOs implementing social initiatives but with no political agenda. He explains the "general trend towards focusing on donor-funded service provision at the expense of political activities has been

noted in literature.” However, this notion assumes a liberal democratic approach to NGOs and civil society that these institutions have a political role to play in society.

4.8.4 Service-oriented and Issue-driven NGOs: 1987 – 1991

The latter part of the 1980s was characterised by growth in the number of NGOs working in Zimbabwe. The roles began to expand beyond welfare and development initiatives to include advocacy and professional service related activities, playing an educational role in communities. To some extent, this reflected the improved socioeconomic circumstances in the country with reduced poverty and greater access to social services as a result of the government’s aggressive social development policy after independence. The changes in NGO activities implied a paradigm shift from a basic needs to development approach. NGOs began providing professional services to government, communities, development agencies and local professionals. Types of services included technical assistance on social and economic projects; consulting on development projects, research and information services, training and project management. Resultantly, there was an increase in NGOs employing professional and technical experts to build organisational capacity to provide an array of services.

A new trend emerged, advocacy oriented NGOs formed as interest groups or issue driven entities. Key social issues pushed on to the national agenda included gender equality and women’s rights, environmental issues and rights of the physically impaired. Examples include CAMPFIRE focused on environmental issues. Some of the issue-driven NGOs realised significant successes of efforts to address the needs of constituents they serve. Sibanda (1994: 13-14) explains that it was only after formation of the Zimbabwe Federation of the Disabled (ZIMFOD) in 1989 that the government began to constructively engage with the sector. ZIMFOD succeeded in its advocacy for the promulgation of the Disabled Persons Act (1992, Chapter 17:01 – as amended), which was based on the draft it had developed. The Act provided for the welfare and rehabilitation of disabled persons and promoted the respect of rights for affected persons. Prior to that, individual NGOs such as the Zimbabwe Council for the Blind and the Zimbabwe National League for the Deaf among others, had focused on promoting the addressing of

issues affecting the own constituents. Government had found it difficult to respond to the numerous varying policy demands (*Ibid*).

A number of think tanks were also established, networking with academia, participating in political debates and informing discourses on the developmental path and political change in Zimbabwe. With the growing focus on advocacy related work, the geographic scope of NGOs broadened from local project oriented organisations and initiatives to more provincial and national level. This was driven by the aim to influence broader national issues (Moyo *et. al.*, 2000:4). Many setup their national head offices in urban areas, predominantly the capital, Harare. This phenomenon was deemed as strategic and necessary for them to access the relevant policy actors and policy-making state structures.

In response to the evolving and growing NGO landscape in Zimbabwe, by 1990, VOICE had evolved into the National Association of Non-governmental Organisations (NANGO), decentralising as a wider representative body of NGOs in the country. NANGO became the officially recognised umbrella body for NGOs and continued to receive a grant from the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. While advocacy and service orientation increased, it is important to note that many NGOs continued to undertake multiple activities including implementing welfare related work, provision of professional services as well as advocacy. By the end of the first decade of Zimbabwe's independence, the types of NGOs in Zimbabwe had increased.

4.8.5 Policy Advocacy, Constitutional Reform and Poverty Alleviation: 1992 – 2000

By the late 1980s, indigenous and international NGOs involved in advocacy in addition to humanitarian, relief and poverty alleviation had grown. The implementation of ESAP in 1991 led to state receding from a central role in social policy. This left a gap in social welfare provision. ESAP failed to stimulate economic growth and promote redistribution, resulting in a regression in the development gains which had been made in the first decade of independence (Mamdani, 2008:17-21). With low and negative economic growth rates and rising inflation coupled with state austerity measures, poverty levels and unemployment

increased. The Poverty assessment study of 1995 indicated that 62 per cent of the population were living below the poverty line (Kaseke, 2003:33), up from 25 percent in 1990. This was in the context of a minimalist state and assumed market-led social policy in a failing economy.

Consequently, NGOs stepped in to fill the gap left by the state and respond to the growing socioeconomic problems. By 1992, there were up to 800 NGOs in Zimbabwe, both indigenous and international (Sibanda, 1994:2). Moyo *et. al.* (2000:4) explain that the 'crisis and stress of ESAP on society' resulted in NGO focus on poverty alleviation and drought relief. Comparatively, in Bangladesh, the increased legitimacy of NGOs in playing a role in addressing the socioeconomic problems was paralleled by a decline in the legitimacy of the state (Mercer, 2002:18). Mercer (*ibid*) refers to this as the "virtual parallel state" where the NGO sector begins to play a central role in social policy in comparison to the state itself.

Tracing of the political and socioeconomic context in postcolonial Zimbabwe shows that from the late 1990s, NGOs had begun to increasingly play an advocacy role. Some organised against the increase in poverty, rising unemployment and the need for political reform – pluralism. The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) observes that, "Following independence, and as the socio-political situation in post-independent Zimbabwe deteriorated in the late 1990s, there was a huge shift of emphasis by both old and new CSOs to issues dealing with democracy and governance," (ICNL, 2011:1-2). NGOs were actively participating in political debate on constitutional reform; broadening public debate on political change; providing civic education on democracy, voter and human rights and the rule of law.

Therefore, apart from stepping in to fill the gap in social welfare provision, the growth in the number of NGOs was encouraged as a way of developing active civil society. Roberts *et.al.* (2005:1859) describes the "spectacular growth in the number and significance of NGOs" as a phenomenon caused by the "almost ubiquitous" neoliberal influenced downsizing of the state and the promotion of civil society organisations by the international monetary institutions. By 1992, there were up to 800 NGOs in Zimbabwe, including both indigenous and international organisations (Sibanda, 1994:2). The advent of neo-liberalism in Zimbabwe

brought with it heightened focus on the democratisation process and the role of civil society as a key force in fostering pluralism.

During the late 1980s there had been an increased advocacy role among NGOs, but this had mainly focused on community or interest groups. In the second decade of independence, the focus was more on the need for political change and constitutional reform. Darmon (2000:167) reports that in 1990 when ESAP was introduced, there had been limited levels of state engagement with civil society organisations on the content and form of the policy. With the development of Phase 2 of ESAP, ZIMPREST in 1994, NGOs demanded space to actively participate in and contribute to the policy development process.

Mercer (2002:8) defines this as a democratic transition phase where citizens are mobilised for political change. The author distinguishes this from democratic consolidation, where there is increased citizen participation, civil society engagement and the ability to check the excesses of the state. Organisations such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), a visible and controversial NGO was founded in 1992 focusing on issues of human rights, critical of the repressive tendencies of the state towards critical voices. (ZimRights, 2009: <http://www.zimrights.co.zw>). The increased political pressure from CSOs and the general population constituted a democratic transition phase based on Mercer's definition. However, in Zimbabwe it led to a tumultuous political environment from the late 1990s derailing into the political instability from the year 2000. Therefore, the democratic transition in Zimbabwe has not fully matured as fundamental political changes have not occurred.

During the 1990s in Zimbabwe, civil society organisations moved from the fringe to the mainstream political discourse on democratisation. In response the PVO Act (1995) was re-enacted as an instrument to provide for the monitoring and control CSOs. The Act requires compulsory registration of NGOs, forbids receipt of foreign funding for governance related work; human rights NGOs could not be registered if they were foreign NGOs and indigenous NGOs were treated as foreign if any of their directors were either foreign nationals, not permanent residents or citizens not domiciled in Zimbabwe. NGOs had to strike a delicate balance between advocacy role and maintaining cordial relations to enable

continued engagement with the state and operations in the country. The state sought to 'depoliticise' the NGO sector, at one point banning them from implementing voter education programmes during pre-election periods. The accusation was that NGOs were focusing on political instead of development activities. This highlights the perspective of the state on the role of NGOs.

Mandaza and Sachikonye are critical of NGOs role in promoting democracy. They theorise that democracy encompasses political, economic and social processes, "Clearly the question of the economy is central to that of democracy..." (1991:33-36). Their observation is that though ZANU-PF failed in its mandate to facilitate economic transformation (1991:33-36). Similarly, civil society failed in its bias towards political reforms and lacklustre push for economic transformation. Therefore, the role of civil society organisations in the democratisation debate was largely confined to political processes.

As more NGOs were involved in political related activities, they began organising themselves into issue-driven coalitions to minimise the ability of government to victimise individual organisations. It is through such coalitions and networks that in 1997, the National Constitutional Assembly was formed to promote public education and widen the public debate on constitutional reform. The NCA was formed through a network of up to 135 NGOs and civil society formations including the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), workers' unions and academia among others. The coalition campaigned against the adoption of the government-led draft constitution using an openly confrontational strategy against the state-led draft.

The government had established a Constitutional Commission whose mandate was also to educate citizens and facilitate public participation in the constitutional reform process towards the referendum held in 2000. Therefore, government saw the NCA as an affront to the legitimacy of its institutions, an unnecessary duplication of the role of the Commission. It was composed of representatives from various sectors including NGOs, academia, political parties and churches among others. In essence therefore, there existed parallel, forums; one civil society led and the other state-led. This set the stage for an adversarial relationship between the two institutions.

Furthermore, the state accused the NCA of having and masking subversive political ambitions, influenced by foreign agendas. Although both the Constitutional Commission and NCA were supported by foreign donor funding, government accused the NCA of serving the neo-colonial imperialist agenda of its foreign donors. CSOs were split between participating under the auspices of the Commission or the NCA. The ZCC, which had been central to its formation, eventually pulled out of the NCA because it had become too political. The Zimbabwe National Students Union also withdrew and chose to engage more formally in the constitutional reform process through the Commission (Darmon, 2001:209). This period led to an increase in debate and discourse about the role of NGOs and other civil society organisations in political processes in Zimbabwe.

The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) announced in September 1999 and the existence of NGO and NCA activists in its leadership structures fuelled the government's mistrust of the NCA and other NGOs aligned to it. Some of MDCs leaders were also members of the NCA. The biggest trade union in the country, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), also had linkages with the MDC as some of the opposition party's leaders had been in the leadership of the ZCTU. According to Konings (2003:457) the trend in trade unions alliances with political parties is a problematic phenomenon in a number of African countries; giving the example of Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The NCA was successful in mobilising voters to reject the draft constitution in the referendum of February 2000; a turning point marking a defeat of ZANU-PF and indication of its loss of a component of the public vote. Takure explains that these events had a profound debilitating effect on state-civil society relations. Where the state feels a threat to its legitimacy through the activities of NGOs, relations often sour and mechanisms are put in place against the perceived threats (2009: 4-5). Within this political environment, by 2000 the NGO sector in Zimbabwe had undergone changes as the socioeconomic and political context evolved.

4.8.6 Political Advocacy and Humanitarian Assistance: 2000 – 2008

Moyo (2010: 245) explains that the institutional framework to address the polarisation in Zimbabwe has collapsed and resulted in a confrontational approach

to resolving differences and therefore efforts for changes in the socioeconomic and political environment in the country. The author further elucidates that the, “uneven building of civil society capacities focusing on oppositional capacities,” promoted by external influences, has greatly influenced the perceptions on NGOs, the government’s perception of them and the roles they play (2010: 246). State-NGO relations deteriorated further post-2000 after the sector raised concerns about the conditions in which the fifth parliamentary elections were held in June of that year. Some NGOs questioned the election results which had announced a narrow victory for ZANU-PF.

Any opposition from civil society was seen as treachery (Labuschagne, 2003:9). The Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, at the official opening of the Fifth Session of the Fifth Parliament of Zimbabwe held on the 20th of July 2004, expressed in his opening speech, “NGOs must be instruments of the betterment of the country not against it. We cannot allow them to be conduits of foreign interference in our national efforts.” In 2009, the outgoing Minister of Health and Child Welfare, Dr David Parirenyatwa was quoted in the state daily, *The Herald*, “NGOs should complement government efforts instead of us complementing their programmes,” (2009). The statements emphasise the hostile and distrustful relations between NGOs and the state and clearly indicate the expectations of the state of what NGOs should and should not be doing. Interpretively, it can also be deduced that the NGO sector in Zimbabwe has become a significant player with a strong presence in the country.

According to Clark, NGOs dependence on foreign donors fosters mistrust (1995: 595). Several key notes can be deduced from the pronouncement, lack of tolerance of criticism and opposition from NGOs on the part of government; an attack on the ruling party assumedly an attack on the nation state and intolerance of NGOs alignment with foreign governments and donors. In a memo issued on the 4th of June 2008, the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare announced a temporary ban on all NGO activities across the country, “I hereby instruct all PVOs/NGOs to suspend all field operations until further notice.” (GOZ, 2008:1). NGOs were accused of contravening and breaching the terms and conditions of their registration as stipulated in the PVO Act.

As the socio-economic situation deteriorated in Zimbabwe, the focus of NGOs increasingly turned to provision of humanitarian and social assistance for the poor. The survival of millions of Zimbabweans living below the poverty datum line has depended on relief services provided mainly by NGOs (Kagoro, 2005:23). The assistance has been focused in the form of services such as food aid, clothing, primary school fees and subsistence agricultural inputs to support food security (Mutangadura, 2005:6). The United Nations reports that the World Food Programme (WFP), a multilateral agency of the UN and its partners had assisted up to 1.5 million people with food assistance between January and March 2007 alone. Larger NGOs such as World Vision International, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), had assisted up to 770 000 people with relief aid. NGOs such as FOCUS, Plan International and Christian Care stepped in to provide social relief and assistance programmes in some urban and rural areas.

It can therefore be deduced that through the protracted periods of social crisis, economic meltdown and political instability, NGOs have played a vital role in delivery of assistance to the vulnerable. Due to their structural flexibility and being less bureaucratic, where NGOs did respond, the impact and response was swift. However, critics of NGOs explain that their poverty-related programmes are rarely anything more than ameliorative. In other words, they have not fundamentally empowered people and tend to provide more relief aid than substantive mechanisms to enable people to change their life circumstances.

Within the transitional period of the Global Political Agreement, the state's focus has been on restoring basic service provision and turning around the economy. The relative political stability is however based on a temporary arrangement and is yet to be resolved in a sustainable long-term resolution. Therefore, it can be argued that the NGO sector in Zimbabwe will remain dynamic and evolving in response to the unfolding political events and changing landscape in the country. This leaves open the need for continued research and mapping of the trajectory of NGO development and redefining of the role(s) of CSOs, analysed against the political developments and outcomes of the transitional period.

4.9 Critique of NGO Development in Zimbabwe

The critical review of literature on NGO development in Zimbabwe reflects the dialectical relationship between the state and civil society organisations and the direct influence of the geopolitical environment as well as changes in socioeconomic circumstances on the roles of NGOs. Table 1 below is a matrix reflecting and summarising the interplay of and parallel development of the NGO sectors against the increasing incapacity of the state. The ICNL estimates that there are over 5 000 civil society organisations in Zimbabwe. Pedzisa, T., Minde, I., and Twomlow, S., (2010:6) estimate that there are up to 1 400 registered NGOs in Zimbabwe. The challenge in determining an accurate figure is that there is no publicly available database of registered legal entities (2010: 5) which makes it difficult to accurately enumerate the number of NGOs, including those working in the social services sector. The variance between the figures quoted above may lie in the criteria and parameters used to identify organisations including formal registration, formal/informal entities as well as at what point in time the estimates were done as NGO numbers have changed over time.

Watkins, Swindler and Hannan 2012: 295) content that it is near impossible to accurately confirm the number of NGOs working in developing countries at a point in time. Several scholars have devised methodologies to try and address this empirical challenge by searching available NGO directories for counts of NGOs and aggregating information. However limitations are use of potentially non-comprehensive directories which do not contain information on all NGOs. An example given is of Bangladesh where the World Bank estimates the country has up to forty-five thousand (45 000) NGOs while the Ministry of Social Welfare in the country references a count of approximately one thousand eight hundred organisations (1 800), (Watkins et. al., 2012: 296).

Acknowledging the empirical limitations and informed by the inability to specifically access a full official record of NGOs registered with government in Zimbabwe the researcher relied on NGO directories, cross-referencing and aggregating, as well as estimates identified in several government and parliamentary records to estimate the growth of NGOs in Zimbabwe. Available data therefore, allowed for mapping of the trend in growth of NGOs in Zimbabwe.

Table 1: Matrix - Role of the State in Social Policy and NGO Development in Zimbabwe

Period (years)	Social/Economic policy orientation	Role of state in social policy	Social Sector NGO Activities	Number of NGOs (registered)	State-CSO Relations	
Colonial	1890 - 1979	Racially biased & discriminatory	Colonialist regime	Voluntary, welfare and associational clubs	300	'Cordial' and Distrustful
				Church-based organisations		
Post-colonial	1980 - 1990	Socialism – universalist	Central state-driven social policy & development	Community development & self-help projects	500	Collaborative, complementary
	1991 - 1999	Neoliberalism – market-led policies	Regulatory (neoliberal orientation) state – minimalist welfare	Policy-advocacy; Constitutional reform & human rights	800	Oppositional & Adversarial
				Minimal welfare		
	2000 - 2008	Populist - reactive policy frameworks (<i>welfarist</i>)	Minimal – reduced capacity & resources	Humanitarian assistance; relief & welfare	1 120	Conflictual, tense
Constitutional & political reform, human rights						
2008 - 2010	Transitional (<i>welfarist</i>)	Incapacitated state – transitional period	Humanitarian assistance	1500	Transitional – distrustful	

Interplay of contextual factors

The activities and roles of NGOs in postcolonial Zimbabwe have evolved in response to factors internal to the organisations, political and socioeconomic developments and changes in the country. Influences have also emanated from dominant global political ideologies and donor driven agendas. In the 1980s, state-CSO relations were collaborative. However, in the 1990s – 2000s, with growing polarisation of the political environment and NGOs playing a stronger political role and promoting democratisation, relations have been characteristically contentious and adversarial. The curtailment of CSOs during the Rhodesian era was done under the guise of defending national sovereignty against so-called ‘terrorists.’ This is more so with foreign funded and/or based NGOs. It can be argued that while termed the voluntary organisations, the assumption was it being ‘apolitical.’ However, with the increasing foray into political activities, advocacy and democratisation, discourse was formed to specifically distinguish sector ‘non-governmental organisations’ from the state as an institution.

Assessing the nature of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe, Labuschagne indicates that “...civil society is restricted to large centres such as Harare and Bulawayo...,” (2003: 20) while the critical mass needed to mobilise for political change is predominantly in rural settings where the majority of the Zimbabwean population resides. The problem is organisations consequently lack strong linkages with the majority underprivileged urban working class and rural poor and therefore are disconnected from “mass-based rural constituencies,” (Mercer, 2002:14-15). Critics have pointed out the geographical selectiveness of some NGOs. This, coupled with their hierarchical nature, they at times fail to represent the grassroots. Predefined notions are that the development and growth of a strong black middle class is key in growing a strong civil society. This to some extent explains that focus in urban settings (Dashwood, 2000: ix). In Brazil, many NGOs have been co-opted into social welfare provision by the government. The effect is the legitimisation of the prevailing structural inequalities and failure to foster fundamental economic transformation.

According to Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin and Glassius (2008:83),

Claims of NGO representativeness, comparative effectiveness, democratic operations and proximity to constituencies or clients are being challenged not only by governments but also by social movements and civil society organisations that do not define themselves as NGOs.

They erode the ability of citizens to mobilise themselves. This implies that citizens' engagement with the state is compromised as NGOs take on the representational role. Mercer (2002:8) explains that while NGOs in Latin America have been successful in representing the concerns of indigenous peoples there, in Southern Africa, NGOs are mainly staffed by the urban, educated middle class. Therefore, not all scholars concur with the notion that strengthening NGOs promotes democratic development. This is a theoretical assumption which ignores the potential of NGOs to dominate and inadvertently stifle associational life and civic engagement in policy processes.

According to Labuschagne (2003:1) exposes that NGOs have often been unable to productively engage governments. A review of literature elucidates the inability of NGOs to counterbalance the power of the state in African countries. In addition, they have failed to mobilise a critical mass for citizens' active participation in the policy processes and promote political change in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Several factors are identified, (i) lack of capacity, (ii) minimal consideration of political cultures (iii) questionable organisational transparency and accountability (iv) implementation of policy agendas contradictory to state priorities and (v) ineffective coordination of NGO efforts.

A major criticism of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe during this period was the lack of cohesion and uncoordinated way in which programmes were implemented. The lack of effective coordinated effort is a weakness identified in literature as having affected the levels of success of the NGO sector in influencing policy processes. In its 2006 report on the role of NGOs in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in Zimbabwe, NANGO itself laments that "efforts remain fragmented, unsupported and within an ever decreasing operational space," (2006:6). Therefore, not only has the lack of effective coordination affected realisation of positive results, but the environment within which NGOs have had to work has further stifled their efforts.

Dorman laments that institutions such as NANGO consistently failed to mobilise the growing NGO sector in Zimbabwe (2001:166). A classic example was its failure to notify its members of the development of the PVO Act (1995) and only tried to take futile action when the Bill had already progressed to parliament. Though it decentralised its operations from 1990, by 1996, NANGO regional offices were

increasingly dysfunctional due to financial and administrative problems. According to Dorman (2001) of the up to 800 NGOs registered with the Ministry, less than half (140 – 300) were members of NANGO.

Though NGOs have been defined as a key element for democratisation in liberal democratic perspectives, ironically, the CSO sector in many developing countries has been accused of lacking transparency and accountability. Akeh (2004: 1) asserts that although the government in Zimbabwe has lacked transparency, similar accusations have been levelled against NGOs. This is informed by the phenomenon where foreign funded NGOs are more accountable to foreign donors than constituents they serve and the governments of the countries they work in. Defined as the 'transparency deficit' this is where NGOs do not disclose necessary information in their countries of operation but do so to external foreign donors. Such factors have contributed to the souring of relations between the state and NGOs including perceptions that NGOs are agents of foreign Western donors and major aid agencies.

Generally, there has been a rise in demands on increased transparency of the NGO sector, focusing on how they use their funding and the sources of funding. Perceptions are that much of the funding is used to support the expensive lifestyles of NGO professionals and other funds are sometimes pocketed by individuals. Therefore, less is used for the beneficiation of constituents served by the NGOs. Akeh (2004) advises that NGOs need to be more transparent by publishing information about what they do as well as being open to social scientists seeking to survey NGO experiences, successes, failures and problems. This may help to produce unbiased analysis of the sector.

Ironically, Akeh suggests that donors need to provide political support to NGOs and apply pressure on the government "including punitive sanctions' for non-compliance in allowing free-association. However, with the government always having accused donors, especially foreign ones of using NGOs to interfere in the political process and governance of the country, this suggestion would if carried out, only serve to further polarise the state and NGOs, fuel mistrust and de-legitimise organisations as to whose interests they serve. Moyo *et. al.* state that "some NGOs depart from officially stated policy frameworks and development problems considered critical by

government.” As Simon points out that NGOs often implement programmes that are more in line with donors’ rather than recipients priorities.

The nature of international funding mechanisms for NGOs inherently breeds competitiveness which has been to the detriment of coordination of NGO efforts. This is evident in cases where NGOs sometimes press for diverse and at times contradictory policy changes through individual organisations that cater for narrow focused needs. Though this cannot be attributed to funding, NGOs representing the interests of the disabled in Zimbabwe is a case in point.

Adeh’s view is that internal factors affecting NGOs in Zimbabwe include lack of leadership, have inadequate organisational capabilities, bad governance structures and management; waste resources and have insufficient skills (2004). Most are donor driven with expatriate technical staff and leadership and not membership-based, thereby compromising their autonomy. The author does however criticise the hierarchical nature of most NGOs with centralised decision-making instead of decentralising this function to personnel who work in the field, directly engaging with communities or beneficiaries. Heller (2001: 146) warns that the move towards technical expertise has resulted in struggling NGOs losing their previously clear political direction. Some do not have the capacity to participate meaningfully in the policy process.

Despite the challenges facing the NGO sector and the internal weaknesses in organisations, Adeh does however concede that NGOs still have the ability to organise from the grassroots, mobilising community groups that discuss common problems and therefore inform NGO strategies and programmes to respond to identified needs. This is one advantage that they hold over the state as an institution, which some scholars have criticised as “too big to solve the world’s small problems.” According to Clark (1995: 594), NGOs also have the ability to reach poor people especially in inaccessible areas.

Summarily, the critique of NGOs in Zimbabwe highlights a critical aspect of the need to ‘bring the state back in’ as a pivotal institutional in fostering democracy, social and economic development (Jessop, 2001: 16 - 17). Empirical research on East Asia does confirm that the state is capable of and must play a central role in driving economic and social development. According to Adesina (2004:88) this school of

thought is informing a new trend emerging on the rediscovery of the state's role in social and economic development. The hypothesis is that the agency of the state is necessary to redress imperfect markets. Modern examples given are the industrialised countries of East Asia which have demonstrated the central role of the state in promoting development as they intervened extensively in the economy, fostering growth. Arguably, much of this however is context specific. Dashwood agrees that there can be no one blue print.

Although anti-statist perspectives underpin much of the contemporary discourse and theory of civil society and social policy, Deacon (2005: 19) explains that this has begun to change in current discourse of social welfare policy. He elucidates that the, "...tide has turned from the period of the 1990s when a targeted and means-tested safety net future for welfare policy especially in the context of development was being constructed.....evidence for a universal approach to welfare." Therefore, there is recognition of the need to re-engage the state in social policy. Such an approach however would require the state to play a central role, which would have implications for the role of NGOs.

4.10 Conclusion

The socioeconomic and political context in Zimbabwe has presented a dynamic and volatile environment between 2000 and 2008. The year 2000 was a turning point of the build up of key political and socioeconomic processes of previous years. The social crises, economic meltdown and political instability have been significant factors influencing the activities of NGOs and their roles in the social policy process. Areas of focus have included humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation and relief services in the context of abject poverty and severe need for provision of basic needs for the vulnerable. However, in addition to the internal factors, external global ideological shifts, dominant theoretical perspectives and development paradigms have had an impact on the NGO sector in the country.

The progression of state decay and its near demise from 2000 was paralleled by significant increase in the number of NGOs in the country. The scope of NGO activities broadened beyond welfare, development and social service provision to advocacy and lobbying for good governance, accountability and transparency of the

state. The foray into politically related activities in the hegemonic political environment greatly influenced the shift from the more collaborative and complementary of state-civil society relations to increasingly acrimonious, and conflictual. The utterances of senior political figures over the years indicate the divergent perspectives of the role of NGOs. The empirical work to be undertaken in this study will seek to identify the roles in the social policy process as understood by NGOs, identify actual role(s) played and critically analyse this for consistency and against the theoretical framework, context in which they have been operating and impact in Zimbabwe thus far.

CHAPTER FIVE: NGOS AND THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE: 2000 - 2010

5.1 Introduction

The current chapter presents the empirical findings and discussion on the role of NGOs in the social policy process in Zimbabwe, juxtaposed against the main contextual factors influencing NGOs in the postcolonial state. Informed by the neo-Marxist or radical approach to civil society and social democratic ideology on the role of the state and business sectors; the researcher critiques the roles of NGOs in Zimbabwe. The core premise of the radical approach is though the state is primarily responsible for ethical life and promoting societal and public good, civil society, is subsumed under the authority of the state and must work with it and oppose it where necessary, to ensure protection of the interests of citizens.

Similarly, the key assumptions of the social democratic perspective are that civil society should work to ensure the redistributive role of the state in regards to power and resources among the underrepresented (Vellinga, 2007:96). It also addresses market failures and coaxes private capital to invest in development and social programmes. Social democracy was borne out of recognition of the inherent structural weaknesses of the market in redistributing wealth and ensuring citizens welfare. Therefore, it propounds the need for an interventionist state with a civil society sector which fundamentally (i) facilitates the substantive structural changes to the market to promote the safeguarding of the welfare of the broader society and (ii) provides social security mechanisms to protect vulnerable citizens where market failures have not been able to address their development and welfare needs.

Contemporary theoretical perspectives on civil society and non-governmental organisations espouse the educational, oppositional, democratisation, representation and policy implementation roles of NGOs. Notably, NGOs are influenced by the prevailing socioeconomic and political environment in a specific geopolitical arena. The study sought to establish and critically analyse the nature and extent of the role of NGOs in the social policy sector in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2010. Specifically, the researcher aimed to identify and examine how NGOs participate in the social policy

process; analyse the critical factors informing their role(s) and assess the impact of NGOs on the state social policy agenda.

In Chapter Four, the researcher critically analysed the postcolonial context in Zimbabwe, mapping the significant historical and recent intertwined socio-political and economic events which have culminated in the conundrum of social crises, political tensions, polarisation and economic decline; within which NGOs have developed and operate. Identifying the contextual analysis provides the framework within which the discussion and analysis of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe is positioned and understood. The complexities and interplay of the economic meltdown, socio-political strife, and ideological shifts on the role of civil society are critical factors that have significantly shaped the NGO sector and its role(s) in the social policy process in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the sector has been characterised by conflicting perspectives on what role(s) NGOs should play.

NGO discourse has been juxtaposed with the political strife, polarisation, and socio-economic crisis of the period between 2000 and 2010 and evolving roles of NGOs. This study thus, analysed the role of social sector NGOs in social policy during this period and assessed the extent to which NGOs have interfaced with the state and impacted on the social policy agenda. This relates to the extent to which the role played by NGOs has enhanced, contradicted, undermined, informed or complicated state policy agendas.

5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Social Sector NGOs in Zimbabwe: 2000 – 2010

Zimbabwe has a diverse and intricate network of local and international NGOs. The civil society and NGO sphere and its role has been a bitterly contested arena. The researcher sought to first establish a macro-level view of the broader layout of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe. This provided a sector framework from which to analyse and assess their activities and roles; interaction within the sector and how it engages with the state, business sphere and public in relation to social policy. The researcher investigated 2 key phenomena; (i) primary characteristics of and how the NGO sector is organised and (ii) the core activities and programmes implemented by NGOs from which their primary roles in the social policy process were deduced.

From the 1980s to late 1990s, numbers of registered NGOs were in the hundreds (Central Statistics Office). By 2003, there were over one thousand (1 000) registered NGOs in Zimbabwe. By 2008, Zimbabwe had up to one thousand five hundred (1 500) formally registered NGOs operating in the country with an estimated number 3 times more operating as unregistered local community-based organisations or informally organised entities. With a national population of up to thirteen million (13 000 000) one thousand five hundred NGOs crudely translates to one organisation for every eight thousand six hundred (8 600) people. This assessment portrays how large the NGO sector is in Zimbabwe.

The majority of NGOs are local organisations, formed and headquartered locally. However, there are numerous international NGOs (INGOs) originating from Western countries but which are highly prominent and dominate the NGO environment in Zimbabwe, dominate the NGO social sector landscape. INGOs, as entities, have wider national presence, geographic coverage, incomparably higher levels of donor funding. They therefore tend to have higher levels of technical expertise and the ability to attract skilled personnel as they are better funded and hence offer better remuneration in comparison to local NGOs.

▪ **NGO Forums and Coordination in Zimbabwe**

NGOs in Zimbabwe are required by the law to register their entities. However, there is no provision in the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (1995), for a Non-Governmental Organisations monitoring or coordinating body or structured NGO mechanism within government. The Non-Governmental Organisations Bill (2004) sought to address this gap by proposing the establishment of a National NGO Coordinating Council. However, in the tense and polarised political environment, civil society organisations and opposition political parties believed that the Bill was an attempt by ZANU-PF to establish legislation to curb the political activities of mainly foreign NGOs. They were perceived by the ruling party as supporting regime change agenda of their Western home countries. The Bill failed to pass through Parliament and was eventually shelved on the back of extensive criticism and later overtaken by events as the 3 main political parties signed the Global Political Agreement in 2010.

Therefore, without an NGO coordinating body and with numerous NGOs in the country during the period 2000 – 2010, there was need to (a) coordinate the sectors'

activities, minimise duplication and overlap and (b) provide a space for collective NGO engagement with the state given the often conflictual relationship between the two spheres. Although there is a Policy on Operations of NGOs in Humanitarian and Development Assistance Sector in Zimbabwe (2003), individual NGOs and various government spheres have to get clearances from national and provincial authorities for meetings to be conducted with NGOs at district and provincial government levels. A defining feature of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe is the existence of several NGO coordinating forums. Each of the key informants interviewed during the study explained at length the central roles the forums play in the sector.

The various forums become prominent in the mid to latter part of the decade mainly as a response to (i) the heightened humanitarian and social service needs with hundreds of NGOs providing service but not particularly coordinated and (ii) the fear among NGOs of being targeted and victimised by state apparatus especially those active in the political domain, human rights field and social sector ones that were critical of the collapsing state of social services. Therefore, in the absence of a government led NGO coordination mechanism, it is suffice to say that the forums have been a welcome approach to some NGOs operating in Zimbabwe

The key observation is that the forums are an important phenomenon to understand as to a great extent, they define how social service NGOs engage and attempt to coordinate their activities in Zimbabwe. A theme emerging from the interviewees is that organisations are members of at least one coordinating forum. However, this is characteristic of NGOs based in the urban areas that are aware of the various forums. Indications are that community-based organisations based at a very local level are often not involved in or members of the various forums. One interviewee highlighted,

The beauty of the humanitarian environment in the country is that we have various clusters; we have for instance the food security cluster where in terms of interventions informed by best practices either identified locally or beyond the clusters, we inform each other in terms of what's morally acceptable at this point in time on studies carried out based on other experiences by other partners from elsewhere.

Organised into sectoral working groups, the forums function as platforms for shared learning among organisations, a safe collective from which to conduct tripartite

consultations with Government, NGOs and multilateral development agencies, and plan interventions. The key prominent forums are namely:

- *National Association of Non-governmental Organisations (NANGO) Membership and Thematic Sectors* – NANGO is the formally recognised umbrella NGO body in Zimbabwe, representing the NGO sector and with registered NGO members operating under the governance structures and regulations of the organisation;
- *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Clusters* led by UN agencies with loose NGO membership or participation. OCHA has had a presence in Zimbabwe since 2006;
- *Inter-Agency Standing Committee Country Team (IASC)* - operating as a Humanitarian response coordinating mechanism with select NGO membership; and
- *Church and Civil Society Forum* – consisting of 19 organisations and mainly focused on governance related issues.

NANGO Thematic Sectors

Whenever government engages NGOs on national issues they come to NANGO.

The National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) is the official NGO umbrella body in Zimbabwe. NANGO has been in existence since before independence in 1980, the organisation revamped itself and decentralised from the capital, Harare, opening up regional centres in other Provinces upon realising the need to engage with multitudes of other NGOs spread across the country. also In terms of coordinating the involvement of its members, NANGO employs a 'cluster approach' to organising and coordinating the participation of its NGO members based programmatic focus and organisational interest. The issue-focused or topical sectors are as follows:

- *Social policy oriented* - Humanitarian Sector, HIV/AIDS and Health Sector, Children's Sector and Disability Sector;
- *Politics, rights and governance oriented* - Human Rights Sector, Women and Gender Sector;
- *Culture and sociology oriented* - Media and Arts Sector, Youth Sector and;
- *Economic and development oriented* - Economic Sector, Land and Environment Sector.

With 10 thematic clusters or sectors, each cluster has a sector representative drawn from the NGO members. Its membership is formed by a diverse range of NGOs with equally diverse interests. Members have voting rights depending on the form of their membership in NANGO. Local NGOs have voting rights within NANGO governance structures. On the contrary, INGOs and other civil organisations which are not formally registered in the country as NGOs but are members of NANGO (trade unions, churches) are classified as associate members. They participate in clusters and committees, but do not have voting rights in the representative body's governance structures.

NANGO has up to a thousand (1 000) registered members falling into the various Sectors. The NGOs operate at both national and provincial level. Since the organisation decentralised in 2007, opening regional offices (in several provinces), the membership in NANGO and participation has increased. The inference is that prior to this, participation by NGOs was centred in Harare, thereby limiting engagement with Provincial or district based organisations.

Key informants in NANGO explained that the Thematic Sectors are associational spaces where NGOs discuss common or collective strategies to programming or to engaging with the state on pertinent policy and governance issues. Participation of members is not necessarily restricted to a single Thematic Sector as many NGOs are involved in multi-sectoral programmes and are consequently members of multiple Sectors. Notably, NANGO membership is dominated by local NGOs. INGOs

due to their form of registration in Zimbabwe do not have voting rights in NANGO governance structures. Therefore, this gives space to local NGOs to lead the Thematic Sectors and to an extent, decision-making processes. However, this does not preclude indirect INGOs influence. Though INGOs do not have voting rights in governance and decision-making processes, they are Associate Members. This implies a deliberate recognition of the need to emphasise the role of local NGOs in informing representative NGO decision-making forums within NANGO.

United Nations Partnership and NGO Clusters

The UN Partnership and Cluster approach in Zimbabwe was endorsed and adopted following a workshop in June 2007 by various 'representative' NGOs, donors and UN agencies. However, they were only formally established and gradually rolled out from March 2008. The adoption of the clusters resulted from the escalating humanitarian need, interventions required and attempts to coordinate these, while facing the complexities of working in a politically tense environment and politicised civil society sector. The strategy was adapted from the global United Nations cluster approach to coordinating humanitarian and relief services in affected countries where UN agencies work. The Clusters are voluntary groupings of NGOs organised according to programmatic focus or area of operation.

The UN Clusters primarily include NGOs working in the social services sector. They are coordinated under the auspices of the United Nations and its lead agencies in Zimbabwe (World Food Programme, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Health Organisations, UNAIDS and others). There are so a number of civil society organisations and government institutions on the clusters. These include for example, the Zimbabwe Teachers' Association, Zimbabwe Farmers Union as CSOs and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority and Ministry of Health and Child Welfare as government entities among others.

The Clusters operate as advisory and collective forums that aim to bring some level of coordination and sanity to an ever growing and diverse sector with multiple programmes as well and some level of coordinated efforts into the sector. In theory, the UN clusters define minimum service standards and packages to guide NGO

interventions and are, also forums for multisectoral coordination of activities and shared learning. They are associational spaces where organisations share concerns and strategies about operating in the difficult environment and through which NGOs collectively engage with Government. In addition to individual organisations having direct relationships and MOUs with Government line Ministries, the clusters are representative groupings through which NGO priorities are presented to and discussed with the state without fear of reprisal against individual NGOs.

It doesn't raise eyebrows especially when sensitive issues are discussed or brought to the attention of these clusters. If it were independent entities like ourselves you know the relationship that exists in the country between NGOs and government and then it has been worse since the early 2000s therefore we really need a UN agency to take the lead.

The clusters are deemed as a safe space within which issues that NGOs would not normally openly discussed can be aired. This corroborates the discomfort among NGOs which participated in the study to be openly identified in the thesis. NGOs are wary of being openly critical of the state and government for fear of victimisation and state scrutiny. The UN clusters in Zimbabwe consist of ten clusters thematically categorised as follows:

- *Social policy oriented clusters*; Health cluster; Nutrition Cluster; Food Aid Cluster; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster; Education Cluster;
- *Economic and infrastructural development oriented clusters*; Agriculture Cluster; Early Recovery Cluster (now named Economic Livelihoods, Infrastructure) and Institutional Capacity Building Cluster; and
- *Coordination oriented clusters*; *Multi-Sector Cluster*; Coordination and Support Services Cluster; Protection Cluster.

Each cluster is led by a designated UN agency and/or NGO. The UN Clusters however, are based only in Harare. This centralised approach tends to be exclusionary to local NGOs based outside of the capital. INGOs benefit however as most tend to have their country offices in Harare with smaller satellite offices in other Provinces where they have operations. Therefore, they have better access to the UN

Clusters than local NGOs based outside of the capital city. However, an important observation in the study was that NGOs are not strictly bound by the decisions of the clusters.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Country Team (IASC) in Zimbabwe functioned as a Humanitarian intervention coordinating mechanism. The IASC comprised of a government Ministry, UN Humanitarian agencies, the Red Cross, three 'so-called representative' NGOs making ground level policy decisions and guiding implementation of the Consolidated Appeal for humanitarian assistance from 2008. However; it is described as not being a widely representative forum for NGOs, inflexible in its inclusion criteria and therefore, excluded multitudes of organisations.

Church and Civil Society Forum

Other forums include the Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF) which consists of 19 organisations. It was formed by Church and civil society organisations in as a way to coordinate efforts to promote peace and reconciliation from Zimbabwe's violent pre-independent political life and the post-independence political strife which escalated in the late 1990s to 2010. The CCSF has worked in partnership with NANGO (which serves as the Secretariat for the Forum), seeking to partner with Government to facilitate nation building and promoting a national framework for peace, national healing and reconciliation (NANGO, 2010). The forum works through consultative meetings and discussions sessions across the country, which culminate in submissions and position papers shared with Parliamentary portfolio committees, to Cabinet, Parliamentary hearings and/or in academic forums. However, it is mainly focused on governance related issues and to a lesser extent on social policy oriented matters which are of specific interest to this study.

▪ **Analysis of Key NGO Forums and Networks**

It can be deduced that the NGO sector in Zimbabwe is stratified in two ways, (a) by area of focus or programming and (b) by size, resources, capacity and country of origin of the NGO. Although it can be argued that the NGO sector in Zimbabwe is not homogenous and therefore, the multiple NGO forums are a necessity to address the diverse interests and focus areas of the organisations, the multiplicity of the forums

is an important factor to analyse. Though the forums are aimed at coordinating the activities of NGOs, in contradiction, multiplicity to a large extent signifies the disjointed NGO effort that has split interests and mechanisms.

As the study was aimed at analysing the role of NGOs in the social policy process, in relation to the NGO coordinating mechanisms, the researcher focused on the social policy oriented UN Clusters and NANGO Thematic Sectors. While the UN clusters are primarily focused on social sector issues, especially humanitarian and relief interventions, the ten NANGO Thematic Sectors are broader in scope. The analysis of the coordinating forums contributes to the assessment of the implications on NGO involvement in the social policy process. It provides an in-depth view of the broader sector; linkages in Zimbabwe and a perspective of social sector NGOs at a macro level.

The formation and existence of the forums have primarily served five pertinent purposes;

- i. as associational spaces for information and strategy sharing as organisations operating in a complex environment;
- ii. a safe space for collective engagement with the state where state-NGO relations have been characteristically adversarial;
- iii. a 'secure' forum to critique the state as representative bodies, in a manner which protects individual organisations from possible victimisation or reprisal;
- iv. a CSO 'policy' agenda setting forum for identification of policy and service delivery priorities; and
- v. coordinating forums attempting to synergise the activities of NGOs to minimise duplication, overlap and promote better geographic coverage of underserved areas, by avoiding over concentration of NGOs in 'popular' areas.

Firstly, key informants emphasised that the contentious relationship between the state and NGOs and the tense political environment prevailing during the period under study made it necessary for a safe collective body to engage with the state.

NANGO creates space for NGOs to be involved in national processes. It ensures that NGOs are able to operate if constituted properly according to Zimbabwean law.

The inference is that fear of individual organisational victimisation and scrutiny was a key factor which has influenced the formation of the forums and membership of NGOs in these. In essence, the forums have served as a collective protective body through which organisations, periodically engage with and critique the state.

Secondly, the UN Clusters and NANGO Sectors have similar issue-driven focus areas. However, on one hand, the NANGO Sectors include a rights and governance related focus or also politics oriented. NANGO emphasises but its social services as well as rights, governance and politics oriented agenda. One of its primary activities includes an advocacy role and engaging in national political discourse. On the other hand, the UN Clusters are service oriented and do not overtly denote politically oriented issues. On the part of the UN, this is arguably informed by the fact that (a) the UN is a government oriented multilateral body.

The UN typically derives its mandate from a state policy framework in any host country where it has a presence and that has a recognised government is in place. Therefore, its primary relationship is with government and (b) the clusters consist of many INGOs in Zimbabwe, which have often been accused by the ruling ZANU-PF of supporting the opposition MDC. Therefore, the absence of a governance and/or politics oriented cluster in the UN forums highlights its deliberate effort to 'depoliticise' the service delivery focused work of social sector NGOs within the clusters.

Thirdly, although the forums aim to coordinate NGO activities, it was ironical to the researcher who could not establish any direct ways in which the UN Clusters and NANGO Thematic Sectors engage or interact to coordinate their activities. On the

contrary many NGOs are part of both forums. Therefore, to a great extent, there is duplication and overlap of the coordinating functions of the two mechanisms where there are clusters/sub-groupings with which focus on similar topical issues.

Fourthly, inequalities and biases between local NGOs and INGOs are rampant within the various coordinating forums in Zimbabwe. On one hand, the NANGO Sectors and membership is biased towards local NGOs while on the other, UN clusters are dominated by Northern-based INGOs which constitute the majority membership in a number of the clusters. As NANGO decentralised to five regions, this approach appears to have increased access for local NGOs spread across the country due to increased accessibility of the umbrella body. Each UN Cluster is led by a UN agency but co-led; by an NGO lead as well, selected from among a group of global lead agencies identified at global UN level. However, at the time of the study, evidence shows that all the NGO co-leads in the UN Clusters were INGOs.

To illuminate, the Education Cluster is co-led by UNICEF, Save the Children – UK and GOZ; the WASH Cluster is co-led by UNICEF and Oxfam (OCHA, 2010). There are no local NGOs that are co-leads on of any of the UN Clusters. Helen Keller International (HKI) was co-lead of the Nutrition Cluster for a brief period of time but later stepped down from this role in July 2009 due to lack of clear terms of reference on the role of the organisation and funding for personnel seconded to undertake the work involved. Ironically, OCHA issued invitations for co- HKI indicated its interest in taking up this role and co-leading on the Nutrition Cluster. The organisation was confirmed albeit without any consultation amongst the cluster members or without any process to select from other organisations that had expressed an interest in the co-lead role.

Research shows that this trend is not unique to Zimbabwe (NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project, 2010: 3-4). Evidence from the review confirmed that there was no prioritisation of the participation of national NGOs, particularly in cluster co-leadership. The researcher probed on this and one key informant's explanation clarifies that in Zimbabwe;

Some international NGOs also play proxy to the UN agency, but this also depends on the level of experience of the international NGO... You can always have an NGO, especially an international NGO which can co-share some of these coordination activities.

Perceptions are that local NGOs lack the relevant experience and capacity to take on lead roles within the broader sector. Therefore, assumptions are made that INGOs are comparatively better positioned to lead NGO coordination work in Zimbabwe than local NGOs.

Local NGOs do participate but in the context of Zimbabwe it has been a challenge for most local NGOs. They have limited experience; well I'm not saying they don't hire qualified staff. But if we look at the global experience of that particular agency, there is very little to bring to the table. But in terms of playing an oversight role on the cluster they will have very limited experience.

Ironically intrinsic knowledge of local NGOs of the country context and experience working in Zimbabwe is not as valued as INGOs. In other words, under the auspices of UN Clusters, while local NGOs are members, they do not have a role in leading the coordination of the forums. This illuminates the paternalistic relationship between local and INGOs within the UN Cluster forums. In their analysis of NGO relationships, Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin and Glassius (2008:84) highlight that paternalism between INGOs from the global North and NGOs from the global South are a prevalent phenomenon in developing countries. The relationships assume the inability of Southern NGOs to undertake roles beyond service implementation without the involvement of Northern NGOs.

In congruence, Fisher and Green (2004:65-66) explain that NGOs from the global South struggle to gain space to substantively participate in and exert influence in global policy agendas, but can do so within their own country contexts. While to some extent this applies to the circumstances in Zimbabwe, it highlights that even within national contexts; INGOs tend to dominate the policy space including the resources available for NGOs work. The status quo in the UN Clusters assumes and perpetuates the superiority of INGOs over local NGOs. On the other hand, the NANGO Thematic Sectors recognise the leadership roles of local NGOs.

However, this does not discard the limitations and problem local NGOs have related to human, institutional and resource capacity which is a hindrance to the level and form of their participation in key national NGO forums in Zimbabwe. An international review of national NGO participation in leadership of UN Cluster forums within their own countries revealed that, in Zimbabwe, “without funding or significant staff numbers (the two are often related), only a larger perhaps international NGO will be able to volunteer for the co-leadership role,” (NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project, 2010: 6).

Hence it can justifiably be concluded that Northern-based INGOs, dominate the social policy agenda, process and interactive space. The researcher posits that there is need for levelling of the NGO playing field to rid the imbalances between local and INGOs and ‘big bother relationships’ between UN agencies and NGOs on one hand, and among better funded Northern NGOs and local ones on the other.

We need to redefine our role as an international NGO. We need to think seriously about partnerships and building the capacity of local NGOs.

Fifthly, the establishment of the NANGO Thematic Sectors and UN Clusters points to a gap in clear mechanisms to coordinate and monitor NGO activities in the Zimbabwe. Although the Clusters and Thematic Sectors serve a key purpose, they do not have authority over NGOs; decisions from these forums are not binding to member organisations. Hence the forums are unable to enforce the collective decisions or resolutions of their members. The forums focus on a level of coordination in theory, information and strategy sharing and as a collective safe space to periodically engage with the state on intervention priorities.

Therefore, while a legal framework on one hand exists to govern the registrations and activities of NGOs, there lack a mechanism to actively monitor and hold NGOs accountable. Where this happens, due to the highly politicised environment in Zimbabwe and the conflictual relations between the state and NGOs, the monitoring by state Ministries is often viewed as unnecessary scrutiny and bullying aimed at

curbing NGO support for oppositional politics, influences from Western funders against the ruling regime and the possibility of inciting citizen protest.

Ironically, a theme arising from the discussions on monitoring NGOs was that NGOs view themselves as 'self-monitoring,' and assume there is no need for the state to monitor what they do. This view points to a romanticised perspective of civil society organisations as moral and ethical.

I also think that NGOs look at themselves as messiahs of the world that they come in and want to resolve all the problems that governments have failed to address. And I think that is wrong.

Furthermore, it illuminates the misconception that assumes the higher moral ground that NGOs take and double standards in that they call for the transparency and accountability of the state on one hand, yet not recognising that NGOs themselves, as public institutions, should similarly be transparent and be accountable to the public and/or state. NGOs need to build their legitimacy by being equally accountable and transparent to constituents and government; not only accountable to funders. A key informant concedes that at times, the scrutiny and monitoring of NGOs by the state is warranted. The informant exposed that:

Sometimes NGOs would distribute expired drugs therefore government became more intrusive in its engagement with NGOs.

It can be deduced that while ulterior motives have at times state scrutiny of NGOs has been excessive or open to political abuse, the need for the monitoring of the sector to protect the interests and wellbeing of citizens is necessary. Zimbabwe however suffers from lack of a systematic, fair and transparent approach to monitoring civil society organisations. The concept of NGO monitoring is controversial and raises heated debate in civil society discourse. There are divergent perspectives on whether this is required and whose responsibility it is. The neo-Marxist or radical perspective posits that NGOs are subsumed by the authority of the state. This implies that they are accountable to and should be monitored by the state. Paradoxically the neo-Marxist approach also posits that civil society is also meant to curb the authoritarian tendencies of the state and promote distributive policies.

The neo-Tocquevillean perspective and its various permutations emphasises the independence of civil society as separate from the state and to some extent assumes a perpetually oppositional and adversarial role. This approach argues that is it contradictory for the state to play a monitoring and coordinating role for NGOs. Furthermore, it warns of the danger of compromising the independence of the NGO sphere and hence its ability to perform its perceived democratisation, oppositional and welfare functions.

Ultimately, the researcher argues that NGO coordinating bodies with the authority to hold NGOs accountable are necessary to ensure relevant community priorities are addressed. Though in theory it is plausible, in Zimbabwe, the lack of state institutional infrastructure to perform this function is a major problem. The NGO sector and the state itself lacks a capable institutional infrastructure to monitor and oversee NGO activity in a transparent and non-politicised manner. However, this thesis posits that NGOs cannot be accountable to themselves. They serve public interests, are public institutions that must account for their work.

5.3 Key NGO Activities and Categories

The researcher observed a key theme that individual NGOs typically have multiple programmatic areas of focus. However, the main activities during the period under study are identified, analysed and discussed thematically. The study also then categorised and mapped the activities of NGOs as the observable attributes that define the roles played by NGOs within the social policy process (Young, 2007).

Korten's (1999:856) three main categories of NGOs, expanded by Atack's fourth category were used as a framework to identify and categorise the observable attributes of NGOs to establish the nature of NGO activities and roles played by social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe. Korten's framework is underpinned by four categories of NGOs based on the type of activities they are engaged.

- *First generation NGOs* aimed at providing short term ameliorative basic goods and services to the vulnerable and indigent. They cover public social service and gaps and market failures in welfare, humanitarian and relief services, target and operate at the individual and community level;

- *Second generation NGOs* aimed at building the capacity, promoting economic self-reliance of local communities to improve their own livelihoods. Therefore, they seek to empower communities and target individual, family, community and local level;
- *Third generation NGOs* focus on longer-term sustainable development, participating in national and global level policy processes. They seek to influence government policy formulation and liaise with multilateral agencies on this. The scope of work is beyond the individual and community but macro and national level to promote development of progressive policy frameworks that guide government activity to provide social services that are responsive to citizen's needs. Furthermore, third generation NGOs have heightened interest in participatory democratic policy processes, increasing citizens engagement, access and freedom of expression; and
- *Fourth generation NGOs* focus on advocacy on fundamental global geopolitical and economic issues, seeking to transform the dominant perspectives that influence global politics and inequities between the global North and South. These operate at the supranational level, also seeking to democratise global political processes.

The four categories however, are not entirely exclusive in themselves in relation to categorising NGOs. There are NGOs that implement activities that cut across several of the NGO categories. However, a thematic selection and analysis of their core activities and larger programmes was used to allow for categorisation on this basis. The following is an assessment of the social sector categories of NGOs in Zimbabwe based on the key activities identified during the period 2000 to 2010.

5.3.1 First Generation NGOs: humanitarian assistance and welfare

The most visible and dominant type of NGOs operating in Zimbabwe are first generation organisations. Their focus is on provision of humanitarian, relief and welfare services as safety nets to assist vulnerable communities. Humanitarian

assistance, relief and welfare services are typically emergency short term and ameliorative to remedy and prevent extreme human suffering, disasters and loss of life. The NGOs provide for basic human needs: food, emergency medical care and temporary shelter. In Zimbabwe, the humanitarian assistance and relief services that were a priority during the period under study. It marked a significant shift in the focus of NGO work from policy advocacy, constitutional reform and poverty alleviation during the second decade of Zimbabwe's independence (Moyo and Makumbe, 2000:4).

Post 2000, with the dramatic change in the fortunes of the country it also means that we had to review in terms of how best we could respond to the emerging need.....we then saw an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the country. It was multifaceted to say the least.

All interviewees in the study identified the year 2000 as a historic and defining point when the NGO sector made efforts to respond to the critical need of the population. However, this is not to say all NGOs in the country shifted their work to humanitarian assistance and relief services.

From the year 2000 onwards, the humanitarian needs in Zimbabwe grew phenomenally. This became the largest programme portfolio in the NGO sector. Although humanitarian and relief services are often temporary, in Zimbabwe, interventions have lasted over a decade. Such prolonged interventions are a phenomenon that literature explains are typically found in war or armed conflict situations. Therefore, Zimbabwe is a unique case, a country not in armed conflict but significant political tensions and strife and resulting in dire levels of need.

We started primarily as an implementing party for the World Food Programme, so basically food aid. In 2005 we started to diversify because the agreement was that continuously giving handouts to people is not the best way of resolving issues. So we started some agriculture projects and then the cholera outbreak in 2008 shifted our attention to WASH activities in both rural and urban.

The primary activities of first generation NGOs in Zimbabwe have been provision of food aid, welfare assistance as well as primary and HIV/AIDS healthcare services.

- **Food aid programmes**

The severe drought and crop failure in 2000 resulted in poor grain yields and further weakened already low levels of national food security levels and the ability of the state to provide aid. Exacerbating circumstances was the decline and eventual near collapse of the economy which combined with political tensions culminated in chronic food shortages. This left Zimbabwe in a chronic state of need for food aid. The Government of Zimbabwe, through the Grain Marketing Board launched a subsidised food aid programme, appealing to external donors and organisations to support the effort as it alone had been unable to meet the demand for food aid. Government, in collaboration with the WFP, launched several Consolidated Appeals for aid and resources for humanitarian interventions over the decade. The first Consolidated Appeal Programme (CAP) was started in 2006.

The World Food Programme reports that by 2010, an estimated one million eight hundred thousand people (1, 8 million) were in constant need of food aid or some of form of humanitarian assistance on an annual basis (United Nations, 2011). The main provider of food aid outside of the state is the multilateral UN agency the World Food Programme. It sub-contracts multiple NGOs that distribute the food aid to targeted beneficiaries and manage related programmes at the ground level. The NGO sector to a great extent redirected their activities to address the high levels of need for food aid. As one NGO key informant expressed:

... (name of NGO) has become synonymous with food aid.

This emphasises that the main programme of the organisation was food aid distribution to affected communities. The main activities undertaken by NGOs included sourcing and distribution of food aid in targeted priority areas. These extended to implementation of school feeding programmes; therapeutic nutrition support for malnourished children and nutrition programmes for HIV/AIDS patients on treatment programmes. Such programmes have provided a safety net for communities faced living in food insecure environments or situations.

The majority of NGOs implementing food aid programmes in Zimbabwe are INGOs. These organisations have the institutional infrastructure, capacity, experience in other country contexts with humanitarian programmes access to and the ability to

raise donor funding to respond to humanitarian situations. The major NGO players of food aid interventions in Zimbabwe are Care International, Oxfam Great Britain, World Vision International, GOAL, Christian Care, Save the Children – UK, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Plan International, Concern Worldwide and Catholic Relief Services among others. The local NGOs that are involved in food aid are typically as local sub-partners of the INGOs, working in hard to reach areas or where the INGOs do not have an operational presence.

- **Emergency and primary health services**

The second key humanitarian and relief service area has been health services including (a) emergency healthcare interventions and (b) primary healthcare and HIV/AIDS treatment and support services.

With cholera for example, cholera came in, people did not seem to be prepared for it. When we intervened we said okay, we want people to have access to safe water immediately but we also look into the long term. So we did a lot of cholera in schools, in health facilities, in communities. Currently we are doing clean-up campaigns, more of prevention.

In 2008, the cholera outbreak triggered a massive NGO and government emergency response to curb the spread of the intestinal infectious disease which caused up to 4000 deaths. Urban areas were hardest hit by the outbreak due to unreliable water services, which saw many areas going for months, if not years without running water. This was compounded by the decaying water and sewerage infrastructure leading to poor sanitation. The government and NGO response to the cholera outbreak was multi-faceted.

Targeted at the short term immediate emergency needs, NGOs additionally embarked on household water purification systems and commodities programmes for domestic use to purify and treat water; emergency medical treatment services, setting up crisis centres and undertaking massive education campaigns to promote hygienic practices in communities. More substantive programmes were implemented under Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) interventions. These included drilling of communal boreholes mainly in urban townships and rehabilitation of dams to resuscitate infrastructural and local government capacity to provide clean and safe

water sources for communities. This activity is discussed under infrastructural development programmes of NGOs in Zimbabwe.

In addition to emergency health services, NGOs have been involved in providing primary healthcare and HIV/AIDS care and treatment programmes.

At the peak of the crisis between 2006 and 2008, people were being referred from state to mission hospitals or clinics where we NGOs operate.

During the 1980s to mid-1990s, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) invested in building a strong health system, decentralising to provide accessible primary healthcare augmented by an established health referral network of services. Consequently, health services provided by NGOs mainly focused on health education, campaigns in communities and supporting government to develop its capacity to deliver healthcare. With the peak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1990s to 2000 onwards, on one hand and decline in government capacity to provide healthcare on the other, the public health system began to deteriorate. The public health sector was severely affected by staffing shortages and shortages of basic medicines and medical equipment.

The gravity of the healthcare problem in Zimbabwe is highlighted by the fact that in some health institutions; citizens were unable to access basic primary healthcare in state health institutions. Resultantly, the public increasingly relied on non-state health service providers including private for those who could afford; faith-based hospitals and NGOs providing health services or supporting state institutions. NGOs began to increasingly provide (i) direct healthcare services and (ii) health commodities to communities and public health facilities (iii) secondment of health experts and advisory services to the Ministry of Health and (iv) health education to communities and training of community health workers and relevant government staff. Chief among the NGO health related interventions in Zimbabwe have been involved in is HIV/AIDS.

Over the years we have also expanded our portfolio, with the coming in of HIV and AIDS we realised there was a need for us also to partake into prevention and then of course care and support of the people living with HIV and AIDs and also affected by AIDs.

All the NGO interviewees' who participated in the study, in describing the work their organisations do, identified some form of HIV and AIDS programming, either as direct and/or social support services for those infected and/or affected by the virus. This extends to food assistance for the HIV/AIDS infected and affected, with NGO tailoring their food aid to support Antiretroviral Treatment programmes.

Notably, there is an observable distinction between the type of NGOs which provide medical and those that provide related support services. Local or indigenous NGOs and Community Based Organisations are the ones that tend to play a critical role in providing non-clinical community-based care and support services, health education and awareness campaigns. These organisations are less well funded and typically struggle to recruit highly skilled and specialist health personnel. Consequently, their programmes are characteristically limited to health education, palliative and home based care to the impaired.

Examples include Mashambanzou Trust, an organisation which has palliative care units in the poor high density suburbs of Harare and also conducts HIV education and awareness campaigns. Mavambo Orphan Care Trust focuses on orphans (mainly children with parents lost to HIV/AIDS) and vulnerable children. Batsirai Group, formed in 1988 by healthcare workers based in Chinhoyi Hospital provides home-based care for HIV patients, voluntary HIV counselling and testing and community education. These are but a few illustrative examples of the hundreds of local NGOs providing supportive health services in various locations across the country.

INGOs in healthcare tend to provide the clinical care and treatment services. Examples include Elizabeth Glasier Paediatric AIDS Foundation, Save the Children, Action Aid International Zimbabwe, Medicin San Frontiers, World Vision International, Populations Services International, Plan International, Catholic Relief Services and PACT among other prominent INGOs in Zimbabwe. INGOs are also involved in health commodity provision and distribution aimed at improving the supply of drugs and equipment in public health facilities. In addition, they provide expertise of health professionals and build the capacity of auxiliary health workers.

- **Social welfare assistance**

Welfare or social assistance programmes provide ameliorative safety nets to support minimum basic standards of living for poor and vulnerable citizens. The researcher deduced that the main welfare assistance activities of NGOs in Zimbabwe are cash-based social assistance; provision of basic household commodities and institution-based care homes for the vulnerable and indigent.

NGOs provide cash-based social assistance and provision of basic goods/commodities. It involves the provision of conditional and non-conditional cash assistance as a safety net. Several key informants explained that means-tested approaches are employed by NGOs to identify individuals and families who qualify for cash assistance programmes. Indications however were that this form of welfare has been very limited due to previous cash shortages in Zimbabwe making it an unfeasible approach to welfare assistance. NGOs also began providing vouchers instead of cash, for beneficiaries to purchase basic foods and commodities during the period of severe food shortages. In addition, interviewees explained that cash assistance programmes tended to be difficult to justify to donors as compared to provision of basic foodstuffs and household goods including blankets and clothing and as these are generally preferred as less open to abuse or misuse of funds and corruption.

On one hand, the cash transfer programmes have primarily been aimed at relieving/alleviating lack of household income to provide for basic needs. Examples include Concern Worldwide's cash transfer programme for families to purchase foodstuffs and reduce the need for distribution of food aid. The Norwegian Refugee Council also has a cash transfer programme. On the other, a number, albeit few of the NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services that have such programmes see beyond the immediate short term benefit and instead, that they also help to encourage local economic activity as the cash is used in local businesses within communities, "*...that way we also help stimulate the local economy.*" Therefore, the approach also takes into cognisance the longer term need to develop a long term solution to poverty, the socio-economic problems and structural inequalities. In this way, NGOs contribute to building opportunities for social assistance beneficiaries, to be weaned from the need for welfare.

Care homes include children's homes for abused and/or orphaned children, old people's homes and care centres for abused women and the disabled or mentally challenged. A negative impact of the conditional and non-conditional social assistance programmes provided by NGO actors in Zimbabwe has been the significantly less of attention to and support of traditionally institution-based forms of social welfare. During the decade under study, NGO social assistance increased phenomenally, provided directly to beneficiaries within their households and/or communities. The opposite is the case for support to institution-based forms of welfare such as old people's homes, children's homes, mental institutions and hospices caring for the terminally ill. However, this is also influenced by the paradigm shift in contemporary social welfare approaches to less of institution-based services unless where housing as a benefit is needed. The positioning of NGOs as a vehicle for distribution of social assistance has therefore to a great extent overshadowed institution-based forms of assistance, much to their detriment.

A major component of the welfare effort has been support to HIV/AIDS orphans. By 2001, the country had an estimated 780 000 AIDS orphans (UNAIDS, 2002) with a capacity of just 0.5% in registered orphanages able to accommodate and care for the children. The 'street-kid' phenomenon in Zimbabwe exemplifies the impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis as well as the disintegration of the extended family structure which became less able and therefore unwilling to support orphaned children due to the increased burden amidst socioeconomic dire straits. Organisations such as the Family AIDS Caring Trust, a local organisation which was established in 1987 began scaling up its projects to address the devastating effects of the pandemic on children. By 2004, there were up to 200 local organisations (NGOs and CBOs) engaged in projects to support orphans and vulnerable children.

A characteristic feature of NGO welfare assistance programmes in Zimbabwe is that they primarily target women, children, the ill and elderly among their key beneficiary groups. For example, HelpAge Zimbabwe, an international welfare organisation primarily focuses on the needs of the elderly. Men are not a distinct target group except those falling within the category of the elderly, mentally and/or physically disabled as well as more recently, prisoners in state prisons plagued by food and medicine shortages. The majority of NGO, social welfare programmes target women and children as a priority populations. They do so less discriminately than with men

and include able-bodied women of productive age but who are in dire household economic circumstances.

The phenomenon highlights the accepted vulnerability of women. Reasons cited are that gender inequalities disadvantage women more than men. This is more so in environments of civil, political and socioeconomic strife. Concepts such as the feminisation of poverty have gained prominence in discourse on poverty welfare policy agendas in postcolonial contexts (Government of Zimbabwe, 2009:9). The GOZ in 2009 reported that the feminisation of poverty was reflected in the higher prevalence of poverty in female than male-headed households. To illustrate, statistics on poverty reported in the Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals 2000 – 2007 Mid-Term Progress Report portray that seventy percent (70%) of female-headed households live below the total consumption poverty line (TCPL). In comparison, sixty percent (60%) of male-headed households are similarly affected.

5.3.2 Second Generation NGOs: community and economic development

Everyone looks forward to the day when things will be back to normal and ...like any other NGO is also thinking the situation has stabilized enough for us to move out of emergency and relief to more recovery towards development interventions.

Similar to first generation NGOs, second generation organisations provide services that focus at an individual and/or community level. The difference however is that second generation NGOs and their activities are aimed at longer term development, building and sustaining acceptable livelihoods. NGOs interviewed for the study highlighted their interventions focus on developing self-reliance among communities, empowering them to improve their socioeconomic circumstances, Four thematic focus areas were identified during in the research as key second generation activities that NGOs were involved in are food security and agriculture programmes; infrastructure development projects; community capacity building and economic empowerment and education support programmes.

- **Food security and agriculture programmes**

With heightened issues around food security, we started distributing inputs to the farmers, while of course we would provide for the softer aspects such as capacity building.... but which at the end of the day improve food security at household level.

Influenced by the recurring drought and years of erratic rainfall patterns since 1992, the country continuously faced low food crop yields and declined agro-based economic activity, and this is an agrarian based economy. The ripple effect on food security and economy growth was therefore significant. NGOs therefore, began to refocus on food security and agricultural activities to promote self-sustenance, nutrition and health as well as better country preparedness.

The core activities involving NGOs are (i) providing agricultural inputs to subsistence and small-scale farmers; (ii) agricultural skills training for farmers and rural households and (iii) agricultural extension services to support rural and emerging farmers. The NGO support in some areas has extended to working with new farmers resettled under the Government's Land Reform Programme. Programmes include irrigation schemes, livestock rearing food gardens and crop production, with some extending to agro-processing initiatives supported by the NGOs. Examples of NGOs that implement these programmes include Adventist Development and Relief Agency, promoting sustainable food production, Concern Worldwide's conservation farming programme; Africare which has multiple agriculture focused programmes and Oxfam Great Britain which provides farming inputs to household farmers among others.

- **Public infrastructural development**

In the 1980s, NGOs contributed to government efforts to build public infrastructure such as roads, clinics, schools, community recreational facilities, boreholes and dams among others. This somewhat waned during the 1990s due to advances made in infrastructural development as well as declining donor assistance and government funds to resource projects. However, the need for infrastructural development remained in underdeveloped, mostly rural areas, as well as maintenance of existing

infrastructure. Between 2000 and 2010, public infrastructure including roads, schools and hospitals deteriorated significantly.

The area most affected by infrastructural decay was Water and Sanitation, Hygiene (WASH) systems where in urban areas; these had hardly been improved while urban populations continued to grow, straining the existing water and sewerage systems. Urban areas were most affected with dilapidated infrastructure, compounded by water shortages. In 2008, the crisis in WASH infrastructure exploded, resulting in a cholera outbreak. The cholera outbreak of 2008 which led to the death of up to 4 000 people catapulted water and sanitation to the centre of the national policy agenda as a critical area of need which required an emergency response.

In relation to WASH infrastructure, NGOs embarked on programmes to drill and rehabilitate communal boreholes; rehabilitated dams and water storage infrastructure to provide safe and clean drinking water in areas where shortages have been severe. UNICEF reports that it contributed assistance towards the drilling and rehabilitation of up to 250 boreholes (UNICEF, 2010). Examples of NGOs that have undertaken these activities include Africare, ADRA, Care International – Zimbabwe; Action Aid, Oxfam and Plan International among several others.

Infrastructural development among NGOs has also included constructing of agricultural support facilities. Other areas of infrastructural development have been in agricultural infrastructure with NGOs constructing irrigation systems to support agricultural enterprise; cattle or livestock dip tanks mainly in rural areas.

▪ **Community development and economic empowerment**

Helliker (2008:241) describes the NGO sector in Zimbabwe as having been 'socially thick' in the 1980s to mid-1990s with most NGOs focusing on community development and social programmes. However, the Helliker further explains that in the 1990s and into the third decade of independence, NGOs had begun to disengage from community development activities and the sector had become 'socially thin,' The political and protest agenda had dominated the civil society and NGO arena. Therefore, by 2000 with the devastating drought and deteriorating economic situation, the community development work of NGOs became less of a priority yet again as the humanitarian needs took precedence.

Few organisations such as the Jairos Jiri Association maintained a focus on developmental activities. However, these have continued to be targeted at the physically disabled and mentally challenged which has always been the organisation's mandate. Jairos Jiri provides opportunities for vocational training, skills development and support for self-help projects that enable its beneficiaries to be productive and economically active. The Norwegian Refugee Council is another example, an organisation which also provides vocational training but is aimed at out-of-schools youth. It had only recently set-up its operation in Zimbabwe in 2010 following on the relative stability brought by the Global Political Agreement.

Therefore, to a minimal extent, NGOs in Zimbabwe have also been involved in building community capacities and economic empowerment programmes. In relation to community capacity building, key activities have focused on training and coordinating numerous volunteers to provide health education and other home-based care services in communities. Batsirai Group for example has five thousand (5 000) volunteers working in districts where the NGO operates. The volunteers, though not remunerated for their work, are recruited from local communities and maintain the knowledge and skills provided through the training, long term.

People that are not getting any training from us at all but see what we are doing and they go and do it by themselves, which is how we measure the successes of the project. We do not measure it against the number of people that we were saying we are going to help anyway.

While recognising the short-term emergency responses to the humanitarian situation, key informants in the study emphasised the need for more substantive interventions which enable and support individuals and communities to be self-reliant for the long-term. In this regard, NGOs acknowledge that they are not necessary a permanent feature and this requires enabling communities to sustain themselves when NGOs are no longer there to provide for or facilitate development for them.

- **Education support/assistance**

User fees were introduced and most people because they had been made redundant, they were unable to participate in the mainstream economy, they had limited access to basic services that included even health, education etc. So we then moved in with some protection, social protection

programmes as it were, focusing mainly on children, assisting the children with school fees.

In its third decade of independence, Zimbabwe experienced a decline in primary and secondary school enrolments; increase in school drop-outs the economy deteriorated affecting household incomes (ref); could no longer afford sending their children to school between 2000 and 2010. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS pandemic decimated the population, leaving high numbers of orphans without caregivers or guardians. Government schools were affected by the resource shortages, impacting on the quality of education. In response to this growing crisis, NGOs development education support programmes targeted at primary and secondary education level. The support is mainly in 3 forms: (i) school fees assistance for pupils from poor and/or child-headed households, (ii) provision of educational materials including books and uniforms and (iii) institutional resource support directly to schools.

NGO school fees assistance has been mainly targeted at orphans and vulnerable children, providing them with school fees to enable access to education, to attend school. Therefore, the schools fees assistance is determined on a means-tested basis. This augments government BEAM programme which also provides fee waivers and assistance to needy pupils. NGO have also provided resource grants to schools to support the continued basic functioning of some of the worst affected education institutions by providing for textbooks, rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and procurement of teaching and learning material. For faith-based and/or mission schools, faith-based NGOs and churches continued to sustain their schools despite reduced state subsidies.

In a report on the country's progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (2015), NANGO (2006: 41) laments that the country was facing the problem of reduced donor investment on one hand, and the lack of alternative resource systems to support programmes on the other. Therefore, due to the pressing humanitarian needs especially food assistance and health care services, less attention has been paid to longer term development issues.

5.3.3 Third generation NGOs: policy advocacy and pluralism

Towards the late 1990s early 2000s, there was an upsurge in human rights NGOs most of them registered as Trusts.

The concept of advocacy in this study refers to promoting particular policy priorities or interests with the aim of influencing their adoption on government's formal policy agenda. In the same vein, pluralism aims to bring multiple voices to the policy process to promote democratisation through participatory approaches and citizen engagement in policy development. The rise of advocacy NGOs in the 1990s was on the back of the global and national neoliberal agenda (Moyo et.al, 2004). A key feature of the decade was the establishment of a number of Human rights and political advocacy oriented organisations, many of them registered as Trusts. Examples include Amani Trust, the Human Rights Forum, Zimbabwe Election Support Network and the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. Therefore, it is suffice to highlight that by the start of the third decade of Zimbabwe's independence, the country had a relatively established and active civil society sector with third generation NGOs.

The priority activities of these organisations include advocacy for constitutional and political reform; lobbying against human rights violations and promoting the respect of human rights. These NGOs programmes aim beyond the individual and community level, focusing on macro-level (national) policy advocacy and sustainability of NGO interventions. Resultantly, the policy advocacy arena has been a hotly contested space with different types of NGOs participating through a diverse range of approaches and mechanisms. These activities are what set the NGO sector on a collision with the ruling ZANU-PF government, which accused NGOs of working in support of the MDC-T.

Consequently, there were high levels of caution and discomfort among key interviewees in the study to discuss advocacy related topical issues or work related to third generation activities. A recurring theme from the key informant interviews are that much of the policy advocacy work of social sector NGOs is done "behind the scenes" or through other larger representative bodies for fear of individual victimisation and/or scrutiny of organisations. Emphasis was made that the type of advocacy their organisations are involved in is not on political related issues per se

but focused on social service related policy issues. However, from a conceptual perspective, the policy process itself is inherently political. It often involves the competition to dominate between divergent political ideologies, in influencing or defining policy fundamentals, the involvement of political representatives and their political parties.

As a result, while some organisations continue to conduct their advocacy work as individual organisations, the majority have chosen to do so under the auspices of NGO networks such as the Church and Civil Society Forum and NANGO among others. Through NANGO, NGOs advocate for their policy priorities and options as a sector. They do this by engaging with Parliament directly and lobbying with individual influential politicians, through submissions of positions papers, policy briefs and research evidence to inform policy. However, this does not assume there is always consensus among NGOs on what policy priorities and approaches are adopted. Furthermore, the motives for NGO participation in policy advocacy varies from working towards the public good as well as self-serving organisational interests where NGOs aim to promote issues related to their own programming, in order to influence donor investments. Therefore, an aspect of competitiveness pervades the policy advocacy arena amongst NGOs and the policy agendas they promote.

An assessment of the types and locations of organisations involved in policy advocacy indicates that few local social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe can be categorised as third generation organisations which focus on longer term sustainable development. It is predominantly human rights and governance oriented organisations that focus on third generation type activities. In Zimbabwe, these have mainly been aimed at promoting political reform and democratisation. Social policy related advocacy activities in Zimbabwe are the domain of either well established national level NGOs, INGOs and/or apex and network organisations such the Zimbabwe AIDS Network, a grouping of NGOs involved in HIV/AIDS programming as well as NANGO, which assumedly represent the perspectives of grassroots organisations as well.

The study established that local NGOs working in the social sector in Zimbabwe have some level of involvement in policy advocacy and pluralising the policy arena. Smaller local NGOs, primarily based at district level have limited access to decision

and policy makers and hence, are less likely to be involved in policy advocacy work, especially at national level as Zimbabwe has a centralised state and policy process. Therefore, the geographic location of the majority of local NGOs, which tend to be outside the capital Harare is a major barrier or obstacle negatively affecting their ability to access and participate in policy discussions.

However, NANGO seeks to play this coordinating role with a decentralised system with their institutional presence in several Provincial settings outside of Harare. On the contrary, International NGOs tend to have their country offices in the capital Harare and have been successful in developing strategic government networks to support their policy agendas. However, summarily, social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe are typically not third generation in themselves, however, do engage to a less extent in some third generation type activities, mainly through umbrella bodies and NGO coalitions.

5.3.4 Summary assessment NGO categories in Zimbabwe

Several key themes can be drawn from the assessment of the nature of NGO activities in Zimbabwe. Firstly, there are no NGOs in Zimbabwe that can be categorised as fourth generation NGOs with core activities that relate to advocacy, functioning and aimed at a supranational level seeking to change global economic and geopolitical dynamics to more equitable global geopolitics and balanced economy. Notably, key informants explained that global geopolitics and the global economy have to a great extent influenced the political and socioeconomic strife in Zimbabwe and ultimately, their organisations' activities. However, no local or INGO entities operating in the country are involved at the supranational level. What this means is that the socioeconomic circumstances in a country dictate the category of NGOs required. On the other hand, it points to the contextual constraints relating to the socio-political environment which has limited the level and extent of NGO development to first, second and third generation organisations, amongst other factors.

Secondly, the study confirms that the NGO sector in Zimbabwe is characterised by first and second generation NGOs. This implies that NGO activity is to a great extent service-oriented and aimed at the individual beneficiary level and community level as

well. Furthermore, it depicts that the levels of social need and economic development are such that NGO involvement in the policy process is mainly at the implementation stage. In addition, there is a wide range of diverse activities that the NGOs undertake and organisations typically implement multiple programmes that may jointly cut across several NGO categories for the 1 organisation. It is important to note however that advocacy focused NGOs do exist and play a critical role in the political domain.

Thirdly while typically the trajectory of NGO development progresses from first to second and then third generation organisations, in Zimbabwe, a regression in the socioeconomic conditions had the reverse impact on NGO activities, During the 1980s to the 1990s, a number of organisation had transitioned from a relief aid to development focused. However, as a result of the burgeoning social welfare and humanitarian needs post-2000, the organisations have had to change focus back to relief aid in order to contribute to the effort to address the food aid needs of vulnerable communities. This development highlights the direct influence of social and economic context on the role and activities of NGOs.

5.4 Role of NGOs in the Social Policy Process

Drawing from the identified main activities and categorisation of social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe, the researcher establishes and analyses the key roles the organisations have played in the social policy process. Underpinned and critiqued from a neo-Marxist approach to civil society, the study juxtaposes the role(s) of NGOs against the social democratic perspective's role of the state in social policy. Thematically, the roles of social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2010 established in this study are:

- i. **Social policy implementers:** playing a complementary role to state efforts, providing social services to vulnerable citizens. In other words, directly delivering services, implementing social programmes;
- ii. **Watchdog role:** monitoring state social policy and interventions to promote transparency, accountability and good governance;

- iii. **Democratisation role:** fostering pluralism through providing a democratic associational space for citizen and political engagement; and playing an oppositional role to counter the dominance of the state and market's hegemonic tendencies (McIlwaine, 1998: 652 – 3); and representing the interests of populations. This can be inferred to be a political role in influencing the social policy agenda and policy development;
- iv. **Educational/development role:** promoting self-reliance in communities; educating citizens to enable them to actively participate in deliberative democratic processes

The various roles played by NGOs was drawn from the observable activities they have undertaken in Zimbabwe and as reflected in organisational strategic plans that guide the operations of the NGOs.

- **Social Policy Implementers – complementing state efforts**

We are an implementing agency and play a subservient role to the line Ministry. As an NGO we should be complementing government efforts so it is not our primary responsibility to be the main service delivery agent.

The complementary role of NGOs can be viewed in 2 facets, in terms of ideological and political agendas on one hand, and on the other, in terms of active engagement, joint planning and reviewing of programming. Social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe are significantly involved in the latter, the policy implementation stage of the social policy process. As social policy implementers, they have provided basic goods and social services to vulnerable communities. The main types of services, as previously outlined, have been in health, education support, humanitarian assistance, relief services and social assistance or welfare. NGOs play a complementary role to government which acknowledges the central role of the state in social policy. In addition, complementarity implies alignment of NGO activities with state social policy frameworks, and seeking a harmonised approach in support of government programmes.

In 2003, the Government launched the Zimbabwe National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children with participation from NGOs and multilateral agencies. A key informant in the study pointed out that;

When the National Action Plan (2003 – 2010), supported by UNICEF was implemented; the agreement was that there was not enough capacity in government to drive the programme, so there was a lot of work done through NGOs....It eventually became a government driven programme.

UNICEF, USAID and UNAIDS were the key donors funding the Action Plan. However, between 2000 and 2010, due to the significantly reduced institutional and resource capacity of the state, social service provision was severely affected. In response, NGOs stepped in to try and reduce the gap. Government on its own was unable to adequately respond to the growing crisis and in partnering with NGOs, acknowledged their important role as well as its own limited capacity. Robinson *et. al.* (2007:645) explain that NGOs are responsible for relieving the state in providing basic goods and services to citizens. The aim is therefore to cover gaps left by the state in providing safety nets for those who cannot provide for themselves through the market.

But what we do is we talk to government and identify gaps within the system and all we do is to try and help close those gaps. So there is no programme that we start on our own without the involvement of government at all levels, national, provincial and district level.

The assertion to a great extent dispels the generalised perception and assumptions that state-NGOs relationships in Zimbabwe are generally typically adversarial. The researcher presents that this is an inaccurate generalisation as there are cases to the contrary. However, it is the case that state reactions to NGO activities have been previously general across the entire sector. There are social sector NGOs whose approach is one of harmonising their work with what the government's policy priorities are. Characteristically, it is organisations with a history of working in Zimbabwe from the 1980s or prior to independence, which appear to work directly with government in implementation of social policy interventions. The Red Cross Zimbabwe specifically highlights that it derives its mandate from government programme frameworks, is a member of the IASC and is often a representative organisation in government-led task forces or committees on health and social services related joint interventions.

We work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture especially Agritex. We used to work very closely with Agritex, and we would work with the Agriculture Extension Officers within the provinces.

To extrapolate further, organisations such as the Red Cross specifically derive their mandate based on government social policy and priority programmes. Consequently, there has developed a level of government reliance on NGOs to step in and cover service delivery gaps to try and ensure continued service delivery to communities.

Even district social services or water and sanitation sub-committees, they know they come to us and they say we are overwhelmed.

The above assertion implies that there is an assumption that NGOs have the resources and capacity to assist where government fails. It also highlights that the role of NGOs as policy implementers has been at all levels from national to local district level where government has been unable to meet the demand and need for services.

In their complementary role to the state as social policy implementers, NGOs in Zimbabwe, NGOs confirm the radical approach's principle of the fundamentally dialectical relationship between the state and CSOs. Furthermore, while NGOs are not strictly part of the government apparatus, their activities aligned to complementing the state's policy implementation agenda can be interpreted to be a form of being subsumed within the state in a conceptual sense. On the other hand, the neo-Tocquevillean approach argues that civil society and NGOs are independent of and separate from the state. However, the policy implementation role of social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe exposes the interdependence of the state and NGOs in delivering social services.

In conceptual discourse on civil society and NGOs, there is a downplaying of the policy implementation role of NGOs. The researcher argues that this is influenced by the hegemonic neoliberal agenda which has emphasised the democratisation role of NGOs in the developing world, more so in postcolonial African and post-communist South American and Eastern European states. In Zimbabwe, the failures of the market-oriented economy; ravages of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the population and political strife led to the re-emphasising of the role of social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe. From a neo-Marxist approach (radical) perspective, the state is central in

social and economic policy and civil society, is a site of struggle which is part of the state and engages with it to ensure redistribution through social democratic principles. However, in Zimbabwe the role of NGOs as policy implementers 2000 and 2010 became less complimentary and more central, especially in the provision of humanitarian and social assistance services.

Clarke (1995:593) explains that as implementers, NGOs are alternatives to the state. Friedman (2003:5) argues that NGOs are comparatively more efficient and effective in service delivery than the state itself. The inference is that as alternatives in policy implementers, NGOs are a substitute to the state. The researcher concedes that though it may appear that NGOs are more efficient than the state in implementing policy, it is however, an unbalanced comparison. Firstly, NGOs are much smaller in size, less bureaucratic and can afford to be selective in what programmes they implement. Therefore, they tend to be better able to implement interventions with better efficiency than the state. Secondly, NGOs serve select sub-populations or geographic areas within the country.

Arguably, they have the luxury of selecting specific programmes to implement whereas the state assumes responsibility for the broad spectrum of social and other services. NGOs have the option to confine themselves within specific geographic areas or to serving targeted populations. Therefore, the researcher posits that NGOs cannot be viewed as an alternative but a supplementary arm to the state in implementing policy.

- **Democratisation Role – pluralising the policy process**

There was much caution on discussion of this topic with the respondents. Key informants revealed that the democratisation role of NGOs is often discussed with much caution and fear. The interviewees emphasised to the researcher that the type of advocacy they are involved in is not on political matters per se. The perception is that democratisation involves participation in the national political agenda including pushing for constitutional and electoral reform; human rights and regime change.

The neo-Marxist approach posits that a strong civil society is a supportive space for democratic processes. McIlwaine (1998; 652 – 3) explains further that NGOs not only foster democratisation through providing a democratic associational space for

citizen and political engagement; promoting pluralism but they also play an oppositional role to counter the dominance of the state and market hegemonic tendencies. However, the state is central in providing opportunities for participation as well as curbing the exploitative capitalist tendencies of private capital or capitalist economies. The inference is that civil society democratises both the political as well as business or economic arena as well, promoting redistributive policies.

By the dawn of the new millennium and the start year 2000, state – NGO relationship had shifted dramatically due to the changing role of NGOs and growing civil society sector focused on promoting pluralism in the social policy process. A Member of Parliament reflected and remarked as follows about the change in state – NGO relations in a house sitting:

Why is it that from the year 2000, the Government has suddenly made a complete and abrupt turn with regard to the good works that all these years the civic society has always played? (Member of Parliament, Mr Chaibva; Parliamentary debate on the NGO Bill - Hansard, 16 November 2004: 1621).

The Parliamentarian's critical question was a response in a parliamentary debate on the introduction of the repressive NGO Bill in Parliament in November 2004.

A vocal and critical civil society called for greater political reform, transparency, redress of human rights violations and greater accountability of the ZANU-PF led government. The government reacted by tightening the regulatory framework for NGOs introducing and enforcing stringent registration requirements under the PVO Act (1995). NGOs may oppose the state where necessary, lobbying for redistributive policies (Baker, 2002:132). McIlwaine, (1998:652-3) explains that NGOs as civil society organisations are an arena for resistance against authoritarianism and oppression. In other words, foster public interests through contesting the power of the state when necessary to curb its dominance and tendency towards excessive use of power over citizens (Labuschagne, 2003:1).

Criticism of the state led to accusations of reprisals and strong-handedness by the state in stifling dissenting voices. Against this background, the social sector NGOs adopted a more salient and cautious approach to their democratisation agenda, shying away from the confrontational approach which had dominated state civil society engagement in the 1990s. The continuing status quo has predominantly

remained overt between the state and Human rights, governance oriented organisations.

The activities of NGOs have been increasingly viewed as a political affront by the state and an attempt to sow dissent and protest among the populace. This resulted in the unforeseen temporary ban and suspension of all NGO activities in 2008 by the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Nicholas Goche. General Notice 99 of 2007 issued by the Minister read in part:

It has come to my attention that a number of NGOs involved in humanitarian operations are breaching the terms and conditions of their registration as enshrined in the Private Voluntary Organizations Act [Chapter 17:05], as well as the provisions of the Code of Procedures for the Registration and operations of Non Governmental Organizations in Zimbabwe. As the Regulatory Authority, before proceeding with the provision of Section (10), Subsection (c), of the Private Voluntary (sic) Act [Chapter 17:05], I hereby instruct all PVOs/NGOs to suspend all field operations until further notice.

NGOs were accused of using food aid and other humanitarian programmes as a front and entry point to communities for the purpose of engaging in political activities, clandestinely garnering support for the opposition MDC. The suspicions were fuelled by the harmonised parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for later the same year. In other words, the state accused NGOs of going beyond their mandate and engaging in political mobilisation against the conditions of their registrations under the PVO Act. It can therefore be concluded that the state views the role of social sector NGOs as non-political and that their democratisation roles is a highly contested subject.

There is a distinction with specifically advocacy focused NGOs. However, admissions from several respondents were that rather than directly confront the state in seeking to democratise the policy process, their organisations have adopted a salient and at times clandestine approach to their democratisation and oppositional role. Upon probing on this aspect, respondents explained the history around the development of the NGO sector in postcolonial Zimbabwe is key in understanding this phenomenon.

NGOs have provided a space for citizens to engage on socioeconomic and political affairs in Zimbabwe, but as one respondent emphasized, not as freely. This is due to the culture of self-censorship that has become a characteristic among organisations aiming to avoid unwanted state scrutiny and being perceived as unduly critical of and oppositional to the state. An important observation is that NGOs involved in social sector activities have tended to steer clear of openly opposing the state in fear of victimisation and affecting of operations. Kagoro (2004) explains that this phenomenon points to the failure of government to accept criticism in a responsive manner.

The strategies NGOs have used to encourage citizen engagement in the policy process include (i) lobbying on policy priorities under the auspices of umbrella bodies, NGO networks or coalitions, (ii) influencing individual politicians in power including Ministers and parliamentarians and (iii) membership in government Ministry forums involving NGOs or as part of advisory bodies working directly with state Ministries, (iv) publications including policy briefs and positions papers shared through formal parliamentary mechanisms, with line Ministries or through academic institutions.

A key informant illustrated that his organisation is a member of a Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture advisory body, which has a number of NGO representatives on it. The advisory body has several sub-committees mandated to review, analyse and propose policy priorities and implementation strategies for the Ministry to fulfil its mandate of providing education. Other activities undertaken by the NGOs include analysing the Ministry's budget and providing direction and concerns on budget priorities. Other state Ministries have various technical working groups which have NGO representation participating on them. Technical Working Groups also include key decision-makers within Ministries, technical experts, representation from multilateral agencies. In this way, the study assumes NGOs promote redistributive budget policies by influencing equitable allocations. Another strategy used is targeting and approaching sympathetic politicians who are representatives in Parliament or are Cabinet Ministers to lobby and advocate for various social and political issues on their agenda. In this way, NGOs aim to bring multiple voices to the education and other social policy process.

However, the NGOs rarely act as individual organisations, preferring to work as coalitions or NGO/civil society networks, including academic institutions. NANGO, for example, has established a number of forums which include diverse civil society organisations which advocate and engage in state policy processes on a range of political, governance, human rights and social policy related issues. The forums include several churches in Zimbabwe and church of faith-based organisations which are generally perceived to be more neutral, non-oppositional to the state or aligned to the Movement for Democratic Change. Therefore, NANGO also works with Zimbabwe National Council of Churches as well as business sector forums to synergise lobbying on common interests with the state.

NANGO also leads a Budget Coalition, an NGO forum which actively seeks to influence the national public budgeting process. The Coalition makes collective submissions to Parliament and the Ministry of Finance on budget priorities to influence the public budgeting process. The Coalition meets is a recognised forum which meets and engages directly with the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Finance to present 'NGO demands.'

The term demand can be defined as a command and uncompromising position and which descriptively, denotes a somewhat confrontational and non-engaging stance. The inference is that being part of civil society comes with rights to make demands of the state and its institutions. Further analysis by the researcher is in explaining the role of the Budget Coalition, the key informants spoke of the 'NGO demands' that the body aims to be included in the public budgeting process. No mention was made of citizens' demands.' It begs the question therefore of whose demands NGOs and the Coalition represent as they engage with the state to influence how the public fiscus is distributed and what issues are prioritised.

The researcher therefore assumes that the interviewees and in that, NGO perceptions are that what the Coalitions demand of the state are a reflection of the demands and assumed needs of the general citizens. It could not be established what mechanisms the Coalition uses to gather public opinions on the budget process, which the body then represents to government. Therefore, there is a significant assumption that NGOs represent their beneficiaries or populations they serve and hence, have the mandate to make represent those demands to the state

on their behalf. The question arises therefore, of the role of political parties in representing citizens' needs and demands where civil society organisations step in to do so.

The democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe has focused on political pluralism. However, conceptually, NGOs also have a role to engage with private capital to promote redistribution to fundamentally address the inherent weaknesses of liberal markets in facilitating broad development. In this way, they democratise the economy, meaning the private business sphere as well. The neo-Marxist and neo-Tocquevillean perspectives concur that civil society must counterbalance the hegemonic and excessive tendencies of both private capital and the state. NGOs in Zimbabwe rarely address the exploitative tendencies of private capital in Zimbabwe. Or lobby for economic reforms. If anything, NGO forums such as NANGO form coalitions with private business, as a counterbalance to influence the state.

This does not absolve the role of the state which from a social democratic perspective informing this study, must intervene in the economy where necessary to promote redistribution and curb the tendency of private capital towards serving only elitist interests and not addressing the impact of market failures on societal development. Cautioning against the romanticised democratisation role of NGOs and the impact on the citizenry, Roelof (2003:52) states that NGOs may serve to entrench the hegemony of dominant classes as they provide a facade and non-conflictive safe outlet for the "cheeky and restless." In other words, they become the organised discontented, inadvertently limiting the engagement of the broader citizenry.

We channel government in the so-called right direction by putting forward creative models but which do not make a fundamental difference and simply work to maintain the status quo.

This means that NGOs can foster action against dominance and non-redistributive policies and can also equally pacify citizens into inaction – passive revolution. Some scholars have argued that NGOs have a problem in that they tend to 'think for their intended beneficiaries' and hence they create a 'dependence syndrome' rather than economic self reliance (Helliker, 2008:241).

Several NGOs indicated that their role is to represent the views of the beneficiaries they serve and communities unable to access and engage with the social policy process. While several scholars point to the representation role of NGOs as a distinct one the researcher challenges this assumption and argues that the representation role is a component of the democratisation role of NGOs. Van Driel and van Haren (2003:535) question the representational role often associated with NGOs, arguing that most of them are undemocratic themselves in the way they operate. Communities do not have much opportunity to influence the programmes NGOs implement in their areas. One NGO's key informant lamented as follows:

Our communities and their structures have also not reached a stage where they can say, look, if you are not going to do what I want go out. Unfortunately it becomes a political game, not in the sense of politics but it becomes a power game and I think that the communities have just given up and decided whatever comes we take.

The inference is that they are more of professional than membership based organisation which serve but do not represent the constituents they serve. The authors argue that expect for membership based NGOs, the rest have a typically top-down approach to their activities and engaging with beneficiaries. They rather represent the interests of the donors than constituents.

The researcher does concede however that this applies to membership-based organisations which do not tend to be a key feature of the NGO landscape in Zimbabwe. Massive social movements of the 1990s including students' unions, workers unions and other mainly urban-based protest movements gave birth to the militant protest culture in NGOs in the country, and were representative of the needs and perspectives of their constituents. However a careerist phenomenon has overtaken the sector, informed in part by the economic decay against a comparatively well resourced donor-funded NGO sector.

- **Watchdog role – monitoring state policy actions**

The definition of the term watchdog is an overseer and supervisory authority which ensures that activities are within regulation and policy. Kagoro (2000: 23) explains

that civil society organisations in Zimbabwe have acted as watchdogs over the political protagonists as the political crisis unfolded in Zimbabwe. This trend is confirmed by Sibanda (1994) who, among the four roles he assigned to NGOs in the country, highlighted the watchdog or bridge role aimed at NGOs guarding against the excesses of the state and ensuring public interests are protected. In Zimbabwe, the watchdog role of social sector NGOs has entailed monitoring the development and implementation of social policy, its relevance and responsiveness to the needs of citizens.

The main strategies employed by NGOs in monitoring government include sitting on relevant parliamentary processes within the public gallery where possible. In attending parliamentary sessions, NGOs use the opportunity to observe policy debates which informs the positions and strategies they devise to advocate on strategies to monitor state performance. Furthermore, they review and critique state policy as well as conduct public hearings to assess its responsiveness to social needs. Other key informants intimated that their monitoring role is in order for their organisations to keep abreast of developments in the social policy and political arena, and ensure that their programmes remain aligned to the states agenda in order to avoid being accused of working outside of the state policy framework. Therefore, NGOs in this role hold the state accountable in carrying out its public mandate.

The empirical observations on Zimbabwe are that the operating environment of NGOs had limited their monitoring role. In addition, a watchdog role denotes a level of authority to hold the state accountable, being able to call out and critique with authority and freedom where the state has failed. The observable realities are that the watchdog role of NGOs has given rise to tensions between the state and civil society sector. In other contexts, the judiciary would be seen as the institution to protect the rights of civil society in performing its role in society and curbing the state. In Zimbabwe however, the judiciary has been viewed as a partisan institution prone to political influence from ZANU-PF. This has resulted in a conundrum for NGOs in executing their perceived watchdog role over the state.

- **Educational role**

We have tried to bring in new innovations which are cost effective but also acceptable to the community. We talk of things like conservation farming to try and increase the yield per acre within the household.

Empirical observations of the study illuminate that NGOs in Zimbabwe have an educational role which entails (i) developing new ways to promote better social service delivery and (ii) educating communities. Sibanda (1994), in a study on NGOs in Zimbabwe in the 1990s identified the educational role of organisations, as innovators and incubators where ideas and policy alternatives are designed. The purpose is to inform state policy agendas and strategies for service implementation. The author highlights that the NGOs are specifically educators of government. However, this role was to a much less extent during the period between 2000 and 2010 as the focus of social sector NGOs was the humanitarian and emergency responses.

With comparatively better resources and less bureaucracy than state institutions, NGOs are better able to experiment in programme intervention strategies and undertake innovative exercises from which the state and government can learn.

Sometimes when we advise them on how best to do something, they just choose to ignore and do things the way they see fit. Sometimes it works sometimes it does not. But where we strongly believe in the mechanisms we advise on, we then do it ourselves in our programmes just to show them that it works.

It can be inferred that the NGOs therefore see themselves as incubators of policy alternatives and innovations to inform government implementation strategies. In addition to developing strategies for implementation of policy, the organisations accumulate information that they provide to government, and the analysis of the information becomes a vital source of policy alternatives. Researcher combines the 2, educators & innovators, same/similar, develop, share to improve/knowledge.

The second educational role of NGOs has been educating communities on an array of topical areas including chief among them health and HIV/AIDS and minimally, on environmental issues especially in rural areas as well as income generation type

strategies where such programming exists. It is true to say that NGOs have also educated citizens on constitutional, human rights matters as well as the political electoral process to encourage participation in political elections. However, key informants in the study were cautious of explaining further what this entails as such activities are viewed as political activities by the state, which social sector NGOs believe that as it may, there are organisations such as Musasa Project, whose work is primarily focused on fighting violence against women and this is partly done through educating and empowering women on rights and advocating for constitutional reforms that encapsulate the equal citizen rights of women in the country.

5.5 Major Contextual factors informing NGO role(s)

The researcher identified and analysed the major contextual factors which have informed the role of social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2010. Notably, while the study focusing on a specific period, the contextual factors are drawn from a complex underlying historical political trajectory in Zimbabwe commencing in the pre-independence period. The critical interplay of these factors have led to a complex web of socioeconomic and political influences emanating from both national and global level. In explaining what has informed their organisation's activities in the country, a key informant explained that it is, "...the situation in Zimbabwe and the relevance of our themes to the current situation."

Findings from the key informant interviews confirm the contextual factors identified in the documentary analysis and discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. However, the findings extrapolate further on the levels and types of influences the environment has had on NGOs and their assessment of the phenomena. This provides for a descriptive analysis of the 'situation' as understood by NGO participants in the study. The research established that there are five major contextual factors which have shaped the role of NGOs in the social policy process in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2010. These are;

- Reduced role of the state in social policy;
- Political strife and divergent ideologies on role of civil society;
- Socioeconomic crisis and sustained economic decline;
- Regulatory framework for NGOs; and

- Donor interests and global geopolitics.

It is pertinent however, to note that the identified factors are not interrelated. Their interplay has resulted in a unique socio-political and economic environment.

(i) Reduced role of the state in social policy

Uncertainties in the Public Service arise from inefficiencies in service delivery, delays and reversals in policy implementation and discretionary change of rules, (Government of Zimbabwe, 2004:79-80).

The decline in institutional capacity of the state and government in Zimbabwe has been one of the major factors informing the role of NGOs in the social policy arena. Growth in the number of NGOs and prominence in social policy was paralleled by the reduced role of the state and decline in its' capacity to respond to the social policy, economic and development needs of the population. In the 1980s - 1990s, the state in Zimbabwe was a central socialist-oriented institution, portraying itself as an instrument for social equity. In this context, NGOs played a complementary role seeking to support the state in its development agenda. The state commanded direct support for its policy agenda.

By the 1990s, the role of the state and ideology informing its approach to social policy shifted significantly to a down-sized regulatory one, assuming its economic liberalisation drive would lead to a growing economy through the market.

The coming of ESAP brought socioeconomic impacts on the population and you could see retrenchments, so many people made redundant by the introduction of ESAP. So what it meant was the government at some point had to back step in terms of their role as a carer of the people as it were.

The result was transference of social responsibilities onto the individual. The conceptualisation of neoliberal economic policy in Zimbabwe was that the market, would absorb and support the social policy needs of citizens that the state was no longer providing for. The ensuing market failures and negative economic growth resulted in high levels of social need. Murisa (2004: 23) explains that twenty-thousand (20 000) workers had lost public sector employment by 1995 due to the restructuring of the civil service and twenty-five thousand private sector employees were affected by the decline in the economy. The rapid decline in government

institutional capacity from the year 2000, coupled with the collapsing economy created a gap in social services including welfare

Some government programming had to a great extent been dependent on external development aid and/or assistance. However, with the increasing political tensions with Western donor countries from where the bulk of aid assistance emanated, minimal development assistance was channelled through government systems. The reverse was the case for NGOs through which Western donors increasingly preferred to channel development assistance into the country. The net effect was the increased role of NGOs to provide for social needs of targeted communities and the growth in the size and number of organisations due to the availability of funding.

The Keynesian welfare perspective propounds that the state as a welfare instrument is there to correct the problems and failures of the market economy. However, in Zimbabwe, the problem with the state's role in social policy lies in the observable realities of its lack of bureaucratic capacity to address the social and welfare needs of its citizens.

Local authorities for the first time became incapacitated to provide basic services to their own people. It was a national issue.

The assertion illuminates that the issue of state capacity permeating all levels of the state from national, provincial and local/district authorities. NGOs stepped in to try and play a role in filling the gap created by the economic decline but which the state was increasingly unable to fill.

State organs realized that they cannot move without NGOs but NGOs also understand that without government support there is very little that you can do. It also protects you a lot in terms of things that can go wrong in the field and that is your fallback strategy.

This confirms Katz's (2006:345) assertion that there is a dialectical relationship between the state and NGOs or civil society. The development or regression of the one sector has a direct impact on the other. The inference is that the NGO sector is not independent from the state. The two are in fact, inter-dependent. Therefore, with the changing of the role of the state in social policy in Zimbabwe, this had an inevitable impact on the role of NGOs in the country.

(ii) Political strife and divergent ideologies on the role NGOs

We find out that some other organisations are aligned to political parties which create problems for us because we are not.

The most identifiable characteristic of the environment in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2010 is the political strife. In relation to how the political strife affected the role of NGOs, this can be viewed in two facets (i) the political polarisation, its impact on the economy and societal needs and (ii) the involvement of NGOs in the political arena and resulting relationship between the state (with ZANU- PF as the ruling party) and NGOs. The decade began against the backdrop of re-energised NGOs, civil society and church-based organisations that had strayed into and increasingly become involved in the political arena in the late 1990s. Their activities began to include voter education and the training of electoral agents to monitor political elections.

In the late 1990s, there was an increase in Human Rights NGOs registered as Trusts, therefore relations between NANGO and the government soured due to the perceived regime change agenda.

The development of advocacy and politically oriented organisations was driven by the hegemonic neoliberal era of democratisation and the ideologies various permutations positing civil society organisations and NGOs as fundamental to the democratisation agenda. Therefore, NGOs in Zimbabwe began to operate as key players in the political arena, a new phenomenon in the country and setting the sector on a collision course with the hegemonic ZANU-PF led government.

After the land invasions and food riots of the late 1990s early 2000s the relationship between government and NGOs became very sour because of the perception from the regime and government always accusing NGOs as having mobilised and incited the protests.

In 2000, ZANU-PF lost the constitutional referendum against the intense lobbying by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). During the same period, the Movement for Democratic Change had just been established and a number of its founders emanated from the NCA, trade unions and several NGOs in the country. This turn of events set the stage for a bruising Parliamentary election in June 2000 with the MDC posing the strongest opposition yet to ZANU-PF's hegemony since independence. Therefore, the political activism of NGOs in the 1990s coupled with the origins and

alliances of the MDC with the civil society sector led to the state perceiving NGOs as oppositional, political interferers and a threat to the legitimacy of the ZANU-PF government.

There is a lot of suspicion; about what is the agenda of an NGO if it comes into their area, exactly what are they trying to do.

This illuminates the highly politicised environment within which NGOs work and their involvement in this, directly and/or indirectly. The mistrustful relationship that exists between the state and civil society organisations have been a key factor in influencing where and how they operate in Zimbabwe. Discourse on the role of NGOs is nuanced with political connotations and alluding to the state of affairs in the political landscape in the country. A key theme from the key informant interviews is that social sector NGOs have had to try and 'depoliticise' their image and activities to avoid rising their registrations being revoked and the existence of their social programmes especially.

There is always the risk of politicising of programmes. So we are always careful of how we introduce ourselves and programmes in communities. We also always make sure that we align with the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and government's strategy. We are one of the few NGOs that have not been touched by political controversies and we work in of the controversial districts in the country.

In 2008 when the Minister for MPSSLWS issued a temporary ban on NGO food aid distribution activity in the country, even traditional chiefs came out in support of the ban. This is ironic as the concept of chieftaincy denotes the role of custodian of the welfare of communities and hence in supporting the banning of NGO activities, though temporary, would have a direct impact on the livelihoods of communities the chiefs reside over. The President of the Zimbabwe Council of Chiefs, Chief Fortune Charumbira was quoted in the government newspaper, *The Chronicle* (09 June 2008) accusing "Western-funded" NGOs of creating systems parallel to government structures and thereby undermining the state. Additional accusations were that NGOs had been politicising food aid in rural areas, using it as leverage to campaign for the opposition, thereby functioning as political parties and not as NGOs.

Several international organisations were singled out and named in the newspaper reports as the main culprits. They include Care International, ADRA and Save the Children – UK among others. To some extent it corroborates the researcher's assertion that INGOs dominate the humanitarian assistance or food aid programmes in Zimbabwe, No mention was made of local NGOs. However, this could also be related to the perception that foreign NGOs come with a hidden political agenda backed by their Western government funders. Therefore, they were identified as the main transgressors by the government representatives. Other organisations however, such as World Vision and Christian Care were described as "...even handed in their work and generally operating professionally." As both organisations are religious based, this confirms the assumption that churches and church-based organisations have been viewed as not intransigent in their criticism or opposition to the ZANU-PF led government where this has occurred.

What is apparent is that tensions between the state and NGOs typically escalate during periods of political elections. The climax that led to the temporary banning occurred during the period leading towards the first harmonised Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2008. Although specific organisations were targeted, the temporary ban somewhat applied to all NGOs working in food aid and distribution programmes. Therefore, the political strife had a direct impact on their work and role in providing humanitarian assistance to needy communities.

Bauer and Taylor (2005) explain that Zimbabwe has resisted multiple forms of pressure from far more "powerful" developed states to remove President Robert Mugabe. With many NGOs as recipients of funding from the aforementioned countries, this association and the rising activities of NGOs in activism and political engagement has led to their branding as agents of Western states seeking to exert opposition political pressure and influence in the national political agenda. Though the primary focus has been on NGOs involved in Human Rights and political advocacy work, the net effect is that this has affected the NGO sector in its entirety, with social sector NGOs either exercising extreme caution in their dealings, seeking to quietly stay under the radar to avoid scrutiny and victimisation.

With the signing of the GPA, relations have improved but there is still much suspicion of foreign funded NGOs and tension.

The signing of the Global Political Agreement has led to some level of stability and waning of the level of tensions and polarisation. With this improvement in the political environment, the circumstances within which NGOs operate has also improved somewhat. It is pertinent however to highlight as emphasised by the key informants that organisations, that NGOs remain cognisant of the political innuendos related to their work and cautious in understanding that the Inclusive government in place is a temporary political arrangement. The context in Zimbabwe remains a highly politicised environment where the protagonists and citizens await the outcome of constitutional reform process and addressing of the remaining milestones as laid out in the GPA.

(iii) Socioeconomic crisis and sustained economic decline

Post 2000 with the dramatic change in the fortunes of the country it also means that we had to revisit in terms of how best we could respond to the emerging needs. We then saw an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the country.

Faced with the unfolding humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis, NGOs began to redirect their programming and funding towards social service oriented interventions. A number of the NGOs including Care International and GOAL for example, first started working in Zimbabwe as a result of severe drought and crop failure which gave rise to the need for food aid. Care International began operations in Zimbabwe after the 1992 drought and GOAL as a result of the drought in 2000. Both organisations, including many that started off in response to a similar humanitarian crisis, continued to work in the country, expanding their programme portfolios to include other social and economic sector programmes.

Many companies were closing and coupled also with natural factors, the rains were also playing tricks on the farming community. It was either you had too little or too much rain resulting in food insecurity.

Zimbabwe has been faced with a double-edged crisis, a collapsing economy on one hand, unable to provide adequate employment or economic opportunities for its citizens and on the other a social crisis with extremely high levels of vulnerability and welfare needs among the population. The socioeconomic crisis was juxtaposed

against decreasing government institutional capacity to respond to the exploding needs of the population. The desperate levels are signified by the several economic recovery plans that the government has developed during the course of the decade in an attempt to stem the economic decay and begin to stimulate growth.

However, the way in which this has been intertwined with endogenous and exogenous geopolitical factors meant that a change in the political climate was necessary for the recovery plans to begin to realise positive results. In 2001, the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme was developed, the National Economic Revival Programme in 2003, National Economic Development Priority Programme in 2006; Zimbabwe Economic Recovery Strategy in 2009 and the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme launched with the signed GPA In 2009 as well. Despite the multiple frameworks, they all failed to slow down the economic decline and put the country back on the path to recovery.

The Southern African regional Poverty Network reports that the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe was worsened by the Government's Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order. Families residing in structures government considered to be illegal housing structures as well as informal businesses were removed from urban settings and the shelters destroyed. Based on Government estimates, one hundred and thirty-three thousand households (133 000) were evicted during the Operation. The UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe estimated in total, up to six hundred and fifty thousand people (650 000) were directly affected through the loss of shelter and/or livelihoods.

In 2006, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee members participating in the Consolidated Appeals Process for Zimbabwe highlighted the danger that the humanitarian situation as likely to continue to deteriorate in 2006, particularly due to the steady decline of the economy.

With the HIV and AIDS crisis, it led to a high number of the orphan population because in the early 2000s we had around 200 000 or so documented orphans in the country and that actually came like a blow to the country because it was ill-prepared to respond to the orphan crisis. So we had to provide nutrition support one way or the other.

It can be deduced therefore, that the high levels of human suffering and vulnerability have been a major factor taken into consideration by NGOs in determining their role and activities in the social policy arena. Other circumstances during the period under study include the cholera outbreak in 2008. All key informants identified the outbreak as one of the most significant occurrences of the decade which their organisations had to redirect some of their funding and programming to contribute to addressing the catastrophe.

However, all the respondents gave a hopeful view of the trajectory of the circumstances in Zimbabwe and their role as organisations.

The situation in 2010 has stabilized enough for us to move out of emergency and relief to more recovery towards development interventions. There is a shift even in terms of our programming, our setup and the way we engage with government and other partners.

With the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2010 and the adoption of the United States dollar (among other foreign currencies) as the operating currency in Zimbabwe (dollarisation) the economy began to stabilise and begin to resuscitate its productive capacity and industries.

(iv) Donor funding, interests and agendas

Even during the period when it was difficult to get donor funding, we did not struggle as the other NGOs did.

As a result of the political strife in Zimbabwe and soured diplomatic relations with Western donor countries, aid and development assistance declined from 2000 onwards. Suffice to say, levels and types of funding received by NGOs is a key factor informing the work they do. Several key informants explained that while donor funding and interests are a determinant of the roles their organisations play, more emphasis was placed on the fundamental political and socioeconomic circumstances. Be that as it may, the existence or none thereof of donor funding is the very lifeblood and determines the very survival of the majority of NGOs.

We follow what the donor is saying but what the donor is saying is not necessarily applicable to the situation. We have not reached a stage where we can say, no, you can take the money elsewhere.

Scholars are concerned that donors typically control the NGO system and directly influence NGO activities (Tvedt, 2004:140). The concern is that NGOs sometimes implement activities as informed by the donor's agenda and less by beneficiary interests or local context. The inference is that there is a risk that the activities are not informed by the needs of and/or by targeted beneficiaries themselves. The assertion by the key informant confirms that. However, this cannot be interpreted as a universal phenomenon but confirms that it is a factor which has influenced the role and activities of NGOs in Zimbabwe.

The funder would give us a framework and this guy I worked with down there in the donor country would guide me in terms of what they produced for their beneficiaries and I would produce similar for Zimbabwe looking at the market that we have.

Furthermore, government in Zimbabwe has several times accused NGOs of being used by foreign donors to undertake clandestine political activities, in other words, being funded for hidden political agendas.

Our sad experience with non-governmental organisations operating in our country...is that they are set up and financed by developed countries as instruments of their foreign policy....and their objectives include destabilisation and interference with the evolution of our political processes undermining our sovereignty...and promoting disaffection and hostility...against their popularly elected government....hatcheries of political opposition, (*President Mugabe: The Herald, 13 October 2001*).

Directly or indirectly, overtly or in a clandestine manner, donor requirements and interests have had an influence on the roles played by NGOs in the social policy process and beyond in Zimbabwe. It has evidently shaped the NGO sector including its development and priority issues. The increase in advocacy focused organisations for example, has been influenced by the increase in donor funding for related programming. The researcher therefore concludes that external factors such as available funding opportunities lead to scenarios where NGOs prioritise funder requirements. In other words, it is the nature and priorities dictated by donors. It is important to point out though that there are some donors, whose funding priorities are derived from state social policy frameworks.

One key informant argued that although some donors through NGOs, may have their own hidden agendas in Zimbabwe, this does not completely rule out that there have been benefits to the country through the programmes the organisations implement.

At the end of the day, even if they come with hidden agendas, the country would benefit, if we are to put down policy to say when you come, make sure you uphold the policies that Zimbabwe has put place.

(v) Bureaucratic regulatory framework for NGOs

Why is it that setting up an NGO in Zimbabwe it is so difficult, why?

Chapter 4 analysed the historical and contemporary context in Zimbabwe, identifying the legal framework regulating NGOs as one of the major factors which have influenced development of the sector. There is however, the operational and bureaucratic framework as well. The legal framework defines the registration modalities of organisations while the bureaucratic framework defines the how NGOs are required to undertake their activities at the local/district level, including the nature of working relationships with line Ministries and district authorities.

In relation to the legal framework, the key informant interviews aimed to probe on NGOs explanations of the regulatory framework and its implications on their organisations. A key illuminating aspect raised in the interviews was that there are variances in the registration requirements for local and those for international NGOs. Therefore, NGOs interpretation of the PVO Act (1995) and how it is implemented augments the legalistic view discussed in the previous Chapter 4.

Firstly International NGOs need to be cleared by the Ministry of Regional Integration and International Relations before they can be registered to work in Zimbabwe. The clearance includes for expatriate staff the organisation bring to work in the country to work. The connotations are that there is deeper scrutiny into the possibility of political as the Ministry is not a service but rather political oriented entity. Furthermore, the INGOs do not have to register through the standard NGO registration process used by local NGOs. International organisations are required to register with the Ministry of Justice as a Trust, which in terms of Zimbabwean law, are not recognised as NGOs even though they do perform the same roles as NGOs.

It appears that International NGOs do not have to register under the PVO Act. Memorandums of Understanding with the relevant line Ministry and clearance from security apparatus is sufficient for them to operate. Previously, it appears INGOs were required to have signed an MOU with line Ministries relevant for their areas of work and then make submission to the Registrar for Private Voluntary Organisations. What stood out in discussions on NGO registration is that the requirements appear to change periodically and hence different organisations registering at different points in time have had to go through differing processes as well.

On the other hand, local NGOs are required to first register with their District Social Service offices in the areas where their headquarters are based. Depending on their assessment of the organisation, the District Social Service office then forwards the application with a recommendation to the central office of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social welfare for confirmation of registration. All in all, both processes signify a highly centralised and top-down approach to the regulation of NGOs in the country,

This feature is further elucidated by the bureaucratic protocol which governs NGO – government relations from district level as outlined in the Policy on Operations of NGOs in the Humanitarian and Development Assistance Sector in Zimbabwe (2003). All organisations complained that in order to work effectively within the localities they operate in, good relations are required with District authorities. An inhibiting factor is that there is disempowering bureaucracy put in place to manage NGO government relations from local level. The inference is that this has been a key factor contributing to the tenuous relations between the state and NGOs. District or local level authorities cannot hold meetings with NGOs working in their jurisdiction without clearance or notification of Provincial Authorities while Provincial Authorities cannot do the same without clearance from National Government.

A strategy some organisations have used to avoid or sidestep the seemingly cumbersome and very bureaucratic process of registering as NGOs, church or faith-based organisations (FBOs) have opted to register themselves under the auspices of their mother churches to which they are affiliated. This appears to be a less taxing process with fewer requirements and as church affiliated entities, the organisations

are less prone to government scrutiny and hide behind the veil of the churches they fall under.

5.5 Qualitative assessment: impact of NGOs on social policy process

This study also aimed to qualitatively identify and assess the ways and extent to which the roles played by NGOs have impacted on the social policy process. The researcher sought to establish whether NGO activities have either enhanced, contradicted, undermined, informed or complicated state policy agendas. The study sought to gain an in-depth understanding of NGOs view on and interpretation of the impact they have had in social policy in Zimbabwe. There are mixed reviews on the impact the roles of NGOs have had on the social policy process and environment in Zimbabwe when assessed from 2 facets: (i) positive impact and (ii) negative impact. These both pertain to short-term and long-term implications.

I want to correct a few misconceptions. It is not Government's view point that all NGOs are bad. We have had a number of NGOs who have made meaningful contributions to the development of this country. They have done sterling work particularly in the area of social development and charity, (Minister Mhangagwa, 2004)

Firstly, the most prominent feature of social sector NGOs' success in Zimbabwe has been the humanitarian effort and how that has to a great extent mitigated a severe human catastrophe and possible human disaster and greater loss of life. One of the major role of NGOs during the period under study has been ensuring the survival of millions who have been in constant need of food aid in Zimbabwe. Their role in food distribution has essentially averted a human catastrophe (Ncube, 2010: 1). The World Food Programme and UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) statistics show that in 2006 alone, more than 1 million people in need were provided with food assistance. Through this, NGOs have contributed to the social policy implementation process significantly as service providers, in addition, where the state's limited capacity had left gaps in social and welfare service provision. In this way, NGOs have enhanced the social policy process by augmenting and if not taking the lead in the humanitarian effort.

The main reason is the local authority does not have resources or local community does not take initiative to ensure that they rehabilitate these water points. On handing over to local authorities and District Development Fund, it has been a mixed blessing in respect to water and sanitation infrastructure, where we have done borehole rehabilitation lately. Upon completion of these projects we have handed them over to the local authority together with DDF.

Secondly, NGO roles have also strengthened government programmes working directly with various government institutions and undertaking developmental work that would typically be the direct responsibility of government. This has mainly been in the area of infrastructural development where investments made by NGOs have left long-term infrastructure to benefit communities and which has relieved government of the unfulfilled responsibility in some areas.

Thirdly, through their mere involvement in the policy process in one form or another, NGOs have fostered pluralism. Their inclusion in government working groups, participation in parliamentary processes and advocacy to lobby for identified policy priorities has influenced the agenda setting, policy formulation stages. However it can be argued that their role in pluralising the policy arena has been at a superficial level as it is more organisational than citizen engagement that they have succeeded in fostering. Be that as it may, the involvement of NGOs has begun to entrench over the years, an unwritten understanding that policy development is no longer the exclusive domain of an omnipotent state but a process that needs to be inclusive of various relevant non-state actors.

Fourthly, NGOs efforts have influenced positive policy outcomes where interventions they implement have resulted in direct and indirect, immediate and long-term beneficiation among communities.

We have seen communities taking a role on their own to say in the future we cannot let these water points break down, as a community we have to take initiative and sustain these borehole. So they have come up with vibrant ideas in terms of how they can be maintained....local resources pulled from those users themselves have been put aside to ensure that once boreholes or water pumps breakdown they are able to maintain it. But in some situations this has not been the case.

On the other hand, the most significant criticism of NGO work in Zimbabwe during the crisis period between 2000 and 2010 is that their implementation of social services has focused on short-term beneficence. Although NGOs succeeded in mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe and lessening human suffering and vulnerabilities of communities they serve, scholars argue that NGOs have not succeeded in promoting a self-reliant citizenry nor have they fundamentally change the structural inequalities that predispose particular sections of society to vulnerability and poverty. This implies that the social policy process itself has continued to focus on ameliorative benefits and less on social development related long-term objectives.

We have allowed our communities to glorify poverty. I have been in situations where I have said, look, some villagers, they have 300 head of cattle, so children can go to school. They do not eat well and when an organization comes with food handouts they are the first to eat. So we need to address intellectual poverty more than income poverty.

The approach used by NGOs to implement food aid programmes has to a great extent undermined and contradicted the fundamental principles underpinning the state's approach to welfare provision in Zimbabwe. Government's approach is based on the food for work principle which requires recipients of food aid to actively participate and work in community development projects. The food for work method was the predominant approach used by the state and partnering NGOs in the 1980s where communities participated in the construction of public infrastructure in their localities, and other activities in exchange for food assistance. However, NGOs did not take this into account and were freely giving non-conditional food aid to targeted communities.

In research on NGOs and food aid in Zimbabwe, Ncube (2010) found that the NGO programmes have created a dependency syndrome in some communities, and eroded the values of self-reliance. The researcher states that furthermore, the approach used by NGOs has had a negative impact on subsistence production levels in rural communities and citizens attitude towards food aid as a free and easy source of sustenance. This implies that the years of sustained food aid programmes which are primarily handouts, while ameliorating the immediate needs of vulnerable

communities have had a negative impact on the attitudes of communities towards self sufficiency.

We used to give food aid and cash transfers freely to our beneficiaries but had to change to align with government's food for work programme and now money for work so that we are not seen to contradict government's wish not to create dependency among the people.

The GOZ issued a directive instructing all NGOs with food aid programmes to adhere to the 'Food for Work' approach as stated in the Policy on Operations on NGOS in Humanitarian and Development Assistance in Zimbabwe as well as the National Strategy for Income Transfer to Vulnerable Groups Through Rural and Urban Public Works. This has been extended to cash transfers, to discourage the mentality of free handouts and re-instil values of work for benefit among communities. The state's lack of monitoring capacity however, had enabled organisations to implement their own programme approaches. This failure to take cognisance of the possible long-term risk of perpetuating aid dependence in communities is a phenomenon that has become a challenge in postcolonial states where aid assistance and NGOs provide a recognisable portfolio of public social services.

However, the government mechanisms to closely monitor adherence to these policies has been weak and uncoordinated. This reiterates the lax level of regular monitoring and absence of a consistent standardised monitoring framework for NGOs in the country. Rather the supposed heavy handedness of the state in monitoring NGOs has been politically motivated. In addition, the decade of unprecedented need meant that much focus was placed on getting the aid to people and with a collapsing public service infrastructure especially in rural areas; the public works programmes had been very limited.

Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin and Glassius (2008:84) discuss the bias towards international NGOs and more importantly that there is now recognition of the inequalities and growing disgruntlement among local NGOs and host governments, questioning the legitimacy of INGOs in representing the needs of poor people or beneficiaries in developing countries.

NGOs and how they operate in Zimbabwe have also contributed, not as the sole actors, to fostering inequalities. At one point, the NGO sector provided among the best paying job opportunities in the country.

I could not stay with the programme when government took over because my package was a lot bigger, 10 times bigger than everyone else who was there. So for me to continue I knew government would not be able to up the salary.

In addition to the overall brain drain from migration out of Zimbabwe, over the years, the civil service lost many employees to the NGO sector which offered better and more secure remuneration; at times pegged and paid in foreign currency/US dollars for foreign funded organisations even prior to the dollarisation of the economy.

...pay huge sums of money and create a social gap bigger than it should normally be where we have people who have much much more than others because at times...The NGOs, especially the local ones being set up they look for funds they get funds from somewhere else and they set up an NGO, not to assist the end person but to elevate themselves..

In addition to fostering inequalities, this has resulted in a culture of careerism that has developed amongst professionals working in the NGO sector. Societal rather than individual private interests should inform the work of NGOs. Despite this, a number of NGOs have actually been set up with private interests in mind and to create self-employment opportunities funded by donors. Benin, Corre and Gahou (2005:2) argue that a number of NGOs in Ghana surveyed in their study, were primarily 'make-work schemes' rather than organisations founded on altruistic principles. To a great extent, this has had negative implications on the altruistic, voluntarism and universalist principles which have been the foundation of civil society and the work it does.

One of the major problems as pointed out by several interviewees has been that NGOs have created parallel systems and structures and to a small extent, becoming miniature replications of the state itself in the way they operate. This portrays the huge social service gap left by the state which has enabled scenarios where NGOs presence and role in communities supersede that of the state.

So there is a frustration because they want to do things but they do not have the resources to do those things. With NGOs invariably they have those things, and even with us we have been saying we have to reduce the visibility of the organization and promote the government departments that we have. Even in terms of our food security interventions we are reducing the amount of time that our field officers stay in the field. So that AGRITEX becomes more prominent because that is their responsibility. And if you look at it from a sustainability point of view AGRITEX is the one that is going to be there but we will go out.

The deteriorating government bureaucratic capacity to lead the social policy agenda is in contrast to the increasing capacity of the NGO sector. Nonetheless, the recognition by NGOs remained that the state should play the central role in service provision, in addition to providing supportive development assistance to communities.

Conceptually, the policy process is a competitive arena where ideological perspectives seek to dominate and societal and class interests are negotiated. Similarly, the donor funding environment for NGOs is fraught with competition where organisations not only seek to influence funding priorities but also to submit winning bids or applications for funding.

There is a lot of fighting for space. There is a lot of competition coming from other NGOs, both locally and internationally.

Literature does confirm this sentiment as Casey and Dalton (2006:28) explain that competition for resources has led to increased fragmentation, minimal coordination among NGOs and protectiveness over information. This phenomenon is fraught in Zimbabwe where NGOs tussle for strategic connections and relationships with influential people in government who may sway policy imperatives in line with the organisations' areas of expertise and operation. In policy discourse, oppositional tendencies among NGOs themselves occur as they represent or subscribe to divergent interests and ideologies themselves. Sibanda (1994: 10) observed that NGOs sometimes press for diverse and at times contradictory policy changes. The 'fighting for space' also relates to donor relationships as this informs access to funding to sustain organisational operations. The increased number of actors (state

and non-state) in a policy process in Zimbabwe. This has now extended to NGO forums and the NGO representation role of umbrella or apex organisations.

There is also the Federation of NGOs which allegedly has no known offices but is often called by government when convenient and is aligned to ZANU-PF. NANGO on the other hand reports that it is not aligned to any political body but is simply an apex.

The NGO sector in Zimbabwe has become a significantly politicised arena and with that, inadvertently the policy process as well. Engagement on social policy is tinged with political innuendos and at times, misdirects political debates from fundamental societal social policy priorities to political agendas pertaining to political alliances and allegiances. Therefore, although the policy process is inherently political, the polarisation in the political landscape has extended to the civil society sector.

5.6 Discussion of findings

The research asserts that the role(s) played by NGOs in Zimbabwe is a hotly debated and contested discourse and subject in the political arena in the country. Firstly, the ZANU-PF led government on one hand widely accepts the welfare, educational and development role of NGOs. However, the discordance arises in relation to the political and democratisation agenda of civil society organisations, social sector NGOs included.

Some NGOs and churches are causing too much confusion in the country because they are converting their humanitarian programmes into politics...The Government cannot allow that to happen so we are saying they should go under scrutiny where we revise all modalities in the country, (The Herald, 5 April 2004).

Reiterating the concern of NGOs involvement in national politics, in a Parliamentary sitting to review and debate the Parliament Legal Committee's Report on the NGO Bill (2004:1737) Minister Mangwana, the then Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare expressed that;

Those few who are in the area of governance who have attempted to undermine the Government of Zimbabwe...We do not expect organisations whose main objectives are to champion the extension of legal knowledge and establishment of libraries and assistance to the indigent to go further and

encroach on purely political ways and attempt to derail the settlement of democratic processes in this country.

On the contrary, opposition political parties, mainly the MDC – T has typically had strong alliances with civil society organisations, as its bedrock and foundation lies in the civil society and social movements of the 1990s; hence the tendency to associate NGOs with their support for the opposition political parties in Zimbabwe.

Secondly, it is suffice to state that the contestations oh whether NGOs have a democratisation and political role in society have largely been underpinned by the exogenous development of the civil society democratisation agenda of the 1990s which firmly established itself during a period where the state itself faced questioning of its legitimacy; due to its inability to serve the social policy and economic development needs of its citizens and promote fundamental political reform. Therefore, the prominent oppositional political role of NGOs calling for accountability and open critique of the state saw the period 2000 – 2010 marked an escalation of the conflictual relationship between the two spheres; and an effort by the state to ‘redefine’ the role of NGOs outside of the political arena. Therefore, the conflict arose from the threat posed to the legitimacy of the state, association of NGOs with Western powers seeking to change the political dynamic in Zimbabwe and the perceived crossing of the role boundaries that define the roles of what NGOs should and should not do.

Thirdly, the researcher argues that the democratisation agenda and political transformation role assigned to NGOs has been overly romanticised and led to the underplaying of the need to foster a vibrant multiparty agenda in Zimbabwe as a strategy to reform the political landscape. The study argues that there is need to distinguish between the role of civil society organisations and oppositional political parties in democratising the political space in Zimbabwe and promoting state reform or transformation.

Kagoro (2005:20 - 21) concurs in explaining that Zimbabwe’s crisis of governance must be located within the context of dysfunctional political parties. The author further criticises how political parties in Zimbabwe are disengaged from the electorate are undemocratic in practice (with regional and ethnic biases), and are plagued with ideological and moral bankruptcy. Therefore, the creation of a stable

and thriving participatory political environment should lie with the political protagonists elected as representatives in society (where electoral processes are legitimate).

Fourthly, the separateness and independence of NGOs from the state has been promoted as part of the dominant democratisation discourse with much donor funding channeled to resourcing this development. This approach has, to a great extent, continued to define the dichotomous relationship between the state and civil society. An observable attribute on the social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe is that newer generation organisations tend to subscribe to the modern approach to civil society which sees NGOs as separate from the state. This pertains to organisations formed or which set-up operations in Zimbabwe on the wave of the neoliberal and democratisation era in the 1990s. Characteristically, they tend to be oppositional in their approach, open about their political opinions and blunt with their critique of the state and its failures, more demanding in their approach to calling for state accountability and transparency. The ideological underpinnings of these organisations tend to be drawn on the neo-Tocquevillean approach to civil society as independent and oppositional to the state. It can be inferred that this has defined the nature of relationships and approach the NGOs have had to engaging with the state.

On the contrary, NGOs with a long history in Zimbabwe and church-based organisations adopt a more engaging and coaxing approach with government. The NGOs tend to employ a collaborationist approach to working with government. That refers to NGOs that share a common goal with the government which is mutually agreed upon but there remains constructive engagement and debate (Clark, 1995:598). In Zimbabwe, the older NGOs had ties with the liberation movement prior to independence and therefore, it can be inferred that with a somewhat shared history, there are levels of trust between the state and these NGOs.

These NGOs which have been in the country since the pre or immediate post-independence period have been less affected by the political strife in the country. Due to their long experience and having seen the transformations in the country over the decades, they are savvier in dealing with political issues and staying under the radar. In some cases, their long term historical relationships with government and politicians from the liberation era have held them in good stead. Some of the

organisations interviewed started operating in the country from the late 1960s – early 1970s and hence have a deeper understanding and knowledge of how to operate in the country and the sensitivities around political issues and how to engage effectively in the policy arena.

We are one of the few NGOs that have not been touched by political controversies. And we work in one of the controversial districts in the country if you take Makoni, Hurungwe, Buhera, they are difficult areas to work in but we have been there since 2002 and we have not been given the impression that we are no longer wanted. If anything I think the complaint is that we have not done enough for the people.

An illuminating empirical finding to be emphasised from the study is that the dichotomous view of the state and NGOs in Zimbabwe or oppositional role of these organisations is a theoretical assumption and empirical variable. Although the overarching perspective and dominant literature on NGOs in Zimbabwe emphasises the oppositional role of organisations, the complementary role in social policy implementation as collaborators has been a major feature defining social sector NGO work between 2000 and 2010. This aligns with the theoretical framework of this study which does not necessarily polarise the state and civil society. The radical approach posits that civil society works with and is part of the state however it assumes an oppositional role where necessary to protect citizens' interests and promote redistribution. An oppositional role therefore does not necessarily translate to a conflictual relationship.

The double standards that exist in the NGO arena pose a paradoxical situation where NGOs in Zimbabwe have called for transparency and accountability of the state, while the notion of mechanisms for making NGOs accountable to citizens and government were an unwelcome thought. While they propound scrutiny of the state and its operations, they do not subscribe to the need for the same scrutiny of NGOs as it is to be assumed that their altruistic principles govern their operations. In addition, their accountability is essentially donor driven. It is hence understandable why the legitimacy of NGOs in the social policy process has been a questionable aspect as their accountability lies not with the citizens they serve or state within which they operate but to whomsoever enables their operations through funding.

This thesis argues that in Zimbabwe, the democratisation role of NGOs requires re-conceptualisation. It has narrowly focused on the political domain, pushing for pluralism in social policy processes and greater involvement of non-state actors. While this remains relevant, this study posits that this is just but one component of the democratisation agenda in postcolonial states. Pluralism and enabling participatory processes is not an end in itself, but towards promoting redistributive policy which leads to reduced inequality and seeks to change the fundamental structural weaknesses that foster inequality.

In addition, most of the NGOs purporting to focus on democracy focus on the political aspects of democracy, electoral reforms, accountability of the state, transparency and respect for human rights. However, the economic aspects of the democracy agenda are seldom addressed. There have been very few calls for fundamental economic transformation to rectify the structural barriers and inequalities that renders the mainstream economy less accessible to the majority of the population. This thesis argues that the way in which the concept of democratisation of the policy process is defined and operationalised in theoretical perspectives on civil society is problematic. It primarily references political agendas and needs to explicitly reference the economic aspects of democratisation as well.

The democratisation role of NGOs as it pertains to representation is another aspect that is questionable in terms of its portrayal in relation to the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe. Firstly, the researcher argues that it is a role that is subsumed within the democratisation role as representation is not an end in itself. It seeks to bring plural voices to the policy arena. Secondly; it is beyond the legitimate role of NGOs to represent populations, unless given the mandate to do so, which from an assessment of the research case study, is very minimal.

Admittedly however, the case is the reverse when it comes to the representative role of membership based organisations which do exist in Zimbabwe albeit minimally. The researcher argues that non-membership based organisations which constitute the bulk of NGOs in Zimbabwe, should play a facilitative role in creating opportunities for citizens to engage directly in the social policy process. As they are not elected institutions themselves, more so, democratically elected, it is therefore a fallacy that NGOs can legitimately play a representational role for parts of societies they serve.

Furthermore, the promotion of their representation role brings into question what then the role of elected political representatives is when NGOs claim this role as well.

NGOs rather highlight the plight and needs of citizens and this is recognised in the way in which the socioeconomic needs of vulnerable communities in Zimbabwe has been widely publicised across the globe over the years. This has been significant in drawing attention to the plight of thousands of people suffering in poverty and hunger. While this might seem contradictory to the assertion by the researcher on the representation role of NGOs, there is a difference between highlighting priority policy issues and representing or, speaking on behalf of a people which implies an officially given mandate to do so, which many organisations assume as they work with communities. The long term problem however, is that they have been unable to build the social capital and responsible citizenship necessary for citizens to be able to hold their government to account. Rarely do NGOs deliberately promote and build the voice of beneficiaries to enable them to engage with the state themselves. There is a need to promote the development of membership- based organisations that can legitimise the representation role of NGOs as well as foster the active participation and engagement of its members within the social policy arena.

The distinction between local and international NGOs and the dominance of INGOs in the NGO sector in Zimbabwe is evidence of an entrenched unequal and paternalistic relationship and dynamic within the sector. The prevailing inequalities in the global economic and geopolitical arena are mirrored and translate themselves into civil society structures in developing countries. Consequently, the engagement of INGOs in the social policy process at national level and in strategic social sector NGO forums tends to continue to be dominated by INGOs. Manji and O’Coill (2002:567) critique the role of international development organisations in Africa, indicating that the development of formal NGOs in Africa as they are known today emanated from voluntary and missionary organisations which cooperated in Europe’s colonisation of the continent.

The scholars argue that this historical phenomenon has to an extent sustained itself where the tendency is towards NGOs perpetuating the control of Africa by Western nations has continued and had an adverse effect of undermining, “...the struggles of

African people to emancipate themselves from economic, social and political impoverishment and oppression.” The authors emphasise that in order for development NGOs to begin playing a key role in supporting the emancipator agenda in Africa, there is need to disengage from their paternalistic ‘missionary position’ and paternalistic approach which they have inherited from their precursors.

It also implies that NGOs in their modern form have also usurped the traditional forms of civil society in Africa. Eurocentric approaches to NGOs have failed to recognise, harness and build on the existing structures and formations in African societies (extended family, brotherhoods, age-sets formations). Therefore, they have also failed to sustainably build social capital as a foundation for developing capable and self-reliant communities. Instead of looking within their own community systems for development assistance and welfare where the state and market are fail to provide for this, people now look to NGOs to help. The problem therein lies in the exogenous thrust and nature in which the NGO sector has developed in Zimbabwe.

The exogenous nature of the growth of civil society and NGOs in their contemporary form in developing countries has therefore been to the detriment of fostering local civil society and activeness in political processes by citizens in the affected countries. It can also be inferred that NGOs (INGOs and local), because of their dominance of associational life and having a ‘self-appointed’ role as representatives of the poor and vulnerable, have to a great extent contributed to the passiveness and silencing of independent citizen-led associational life and the public arena within which citizens engage with and confront the state. Because they dominate the discourse in holding the state and politicians accountable, political representatives increasingly account less to their constituencies and rather invest more of their efforts, in confronting issues with NGOs.

Regarding the dialectical relationship between the state and civil society, the study pointed out that the level of effectiveness of the NGO sector in enhancing the social policy process depends on the capacity of the state to respond, drive the development of relevant social policy and promote a conducive environment within which the needs of citizens can be addressed and private capital can thrive. Friedman (2003:20) posits that the development of relevant policy will always require the existence of a strong government, capable of responding to policy needs and a

strong NGO capable and willing to support the policy goals of the state. The researcher agrees with this statist approach.

The nature and functions of the state itself has a direct impact or influence on the nature and functions of NGOs. Where the state itself is weak, the extent to which NGOs thrive is limited as the state provides fundamental space and organisation for NGOs to function. Therefore, NGOs are in a way part of the state and must engage with it. NGOs are subsumed under the state's authority and the state itself is the primary embodiment of ethical life (Fine and Rai, 1997:18). However, this approach assumes a responsible and ethical state. Therefore, where the state fails in exercising of its authority, tension arises as has been the case in Zimbabwe.

The situation in Zimbabwe has been that the state itself has been preoccupied with the economic agenda and political agenda. Social policy has tended to focus on humanitarian and welfare assistance as a reaction to unfolding socioeconomic crisis and not social policy as a vehicle to substantially improve the livelihoods of citizens. The state has been unable itself to fully respond to the social policy needs of its citizens as well as provide a stable environment within which those needs could be fully addressed by other sectors. From a political perspective Kagoro (2002: 22) laments that after the March 2002 presidential elections there was a crisis of legitimacy of government and ZANU-PF as the ruling party as the election was marred in violence and controversy among other factors.

An assessment of the major activities of social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe confirms cycle of development of NGOs from relief to development to policy advocates. However, it refutes the one-directional way in which this process is portrayed and discussed in literature. The unfolding of events in the country illuminates the bi-directional nature of NGO development as well as that Korten's NGO categories are not strictly exclusive. Organisations may straddle across categories depending on the mix of activities they are involved in. Nevertheless, for purposes of categorising organisations for analytical purposes, the primary purpose of the organisation, largest of the portfolio of programmes in terms of budget and/or coverage among other factors are taken into consideration to determine the categorisation of the organisation.

The unique conditions prevailing in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2010 led to an interesting trend where second and at times third generation NGOs resumed first generation type activities they had stopped implementing during the late 1980s following the major gains made in social policy and development. A number of organisations resumed implementing relief and humanitarian services due to the identified high levels of need. Therefore, inarguably, the contextual factors greatly influence the roles played by NGOs in the social policy process. In the context of Zimbabwe, it was primarily, (i) socioeconomic crisis, (ii) geopolitical strife, (iii) reduced role of the state in social policy provision and (iv) the regulatory framework for NGOs.

This thesis proposes that there is need for re-conceptualisation of NGOs as part of civil society. The study established that there is a distinction between (i) service-oriented NGOs that are technocratic in nature and operate within the policy implementation stage of the policy process (first and second generation) and (ii) NGOs whose work is squarely focused on the political arena, advocacy oriented and involved primarily at the policy agenda setting and formulation stage of the policy process (third and fourth generation). From the perspective of the radical approach, arguably, service oriented organisations cannot be defined as public arenas for civic engagement towards promoting redistributive state and market approaches. Their focus is on mitigating the effects of market as well as state failures in social policy.

Advocacy oriented organisations however seek to change the fundamental and inherent structural inequalities and fault-lines that tend to perpetuate the interests of capital classes to the detriment of a universal development agenda that widely benefits society. Therefore, there is a distinction between NGOs as service providers and NGOs as civil society organisations though they may not be mutually exclusive.

Though the state de-racialised policy and legislation, the same colonial repressive instruments and tendencies remained inherent. This highlights the need for re-focus on the transformation of the postcolonial state in Africa from the inherently repressive institutions they were designed to be, fostering inequality and repression to responsive and democratic institutions accountable and transparent to citizens, capable of fostering stability and redistribution for more equitable access to both political and economic processes.

5.7 Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has argued that social sector NGOs in Zimbabwe have been defined by two major roles deduced as chief among several during the period under study: (i) policy implementation of welfare-oriented social services: a humanitarian and welfare agenda and, (ii) pluralising the policy arena through an oppositional discourse. The period 2000 to 2010 presented a unique and complex web of social, geopolitical and economic factors that exploded into a transformative and climatic decade of crises in Zimbabwe's postcolonial life. This greatly influenced the roles of NGOs which have firstly, mainly been involved in the implementation of social policy, responding primarily to humanitarian and welfare needs in select vulnerable communities they work with; and secondly, in pushing for pluralising of the policy arena through participation of civil society organisations, and less so of an engaged and active citizenry.

It cannot be assumed that where there is growth in the number of NGOs in a national state, this translates to democratisation and substantive development or fundamental changes in the political, social and economic lives of citizens. The growth and promotion of NGOs and civil society in Zimbabwe directed attention away from the need for a transformative state and support for this process. The democratisation role of NGOs is an overly romanticised notion which is often put forward without the requisite juxtaposition with the role of political parties in fostering democracy. The propounding of the role(s) of NGOs have failed to include in the discourse, the position and role of oppositional political forces in society, assuming the state as a homogenous institution which civil society will seek to oppose. As the social service provision role of NGOs is juxtaposed against the role of the state in social policy, the role of NGOs in democratisation needs to be similarly juxtaposed against the concept of multiparty political democracy to enable clearer conceptual role definition.

In the chapter that follows, Chapter 6, drawing on the analysis of the empirical findings of the study and theorisations, the research puts forward the conclusions of the study and proposes recommendations on the role of NGOs in the social policy process in postcolonial states. The recommendations also extend to proposals on the theoretical perspectives on civil society and non-governmental organisations.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

6.1 Introduction

The problem facing this study was to critically analyse whether NGOs have a legitimate role to play in postcolonial African states. The researcher set out to establish and critique the major roles played by NGOs in the social policy process, using Zimbabwe as a case study. Assessing the period between 2000 and 2010; the researcher sought to understand the contextual factors that have influenced NGO development and the nature of engagement with the state in social policy. The dynamic geopolitical and socioeconomic situation in Zimbabwe presented a unique case of within which to interrogate the concept of NGOs in postcolonial states. This study critically analysed the theoretical contestations, assumptions, empirical variables on the role of NGOs in the social policy process in Zimbabwe as well as the contextual realities facing NGOs in the postcolonial state.

The study affirms the legitimacy of the involvement of NGOs in the social policy process. However, it warns that NGOs have had a tendency of inculcating a passive culture among citizens as they fail substantively empower an active and engaging citizenry. They have tended to claim the associational space between private citizens and the state, thereby bringing confusion and tensions in the engagement between state, political protagonists, citizens and civil society. Therefore, while the legitimacy of NGOs as a sphere of society and with a role to play in the social policy, this thesis argues that the role is dependent on the nature of the state and impact on social beneficiation among populations and citizen engagement with the policy process.

6.2 Conclusions of the study

NGOs in Zimbabwe have played two major and two minor roles in the social policy process as identified in the study in terms of their prominence and impact on the policy process. That is: policy implementer role complementing state social policy provision, democratisation to pluralism the social policy arena as the major roles; educational role to developing interventions for better social policy and watchdog

role monitoring government and other state institutions in meeting the social policy needs of citizens. Three major contextual factors have influenced the roles of NGOs in Zimbabwe, the political strife, socioeconomic climate and changing role of the state in social policy.

Drawing from the empirical realities and theoretical critique of this study, the researcher proposes that there are theoretical generalisations and practical evolutions of the NGO sector that are pertinent to the realisation of a legitimised and responsible civil society sector that can build a capable and engaged citizenry.

This thesis propounds the need for a revived statist approach to social policy. This can be interpreted as reemphasising the need to transform postcolonial states as central but from being instruments inherently designed to protect private individual interests and have therefore, failed to radically change the circumstances of their citizens, transform their economies into accessible arenas where citizens productively engage to support their social policy needs and provide welfare for the vulnerable and ensure a fair economy.

Gramsci, quoted by Jessop (2001:151) argues for a redefinition of the state not in the structuralist sense but to the “state in its inclusive sense....political society + civil society.” This proposes a move away from the notion of the state as specific institutions but encompasses an analysis of its “social bases and ...how their functions and effects are shaped by their links to the economic system and civil society.” In that way, the state and its functions are informed by its context and circumstances of its citizenry. This is in congruence with the neo-Marxist approach which argues that civil society and its components are subsumed by the state, engage with and/or oppose it where necessary.

Theory on democracy in postcolonial states needs to be anchored in the multi-party discourse that was central in political reform language in the 1990s and 1980s. This, the researcher laments, was unfortunately superseded by the neoliberal civil society discourse and in modern day Zimbabwe, there still lacks a vibrant and viable multi-party culture to sustain a substantive political transformative process. The hegemony of ZANU-PF remains. Oppositional politics need to be rooted on a sound agenda and ideological foundation. The researcher contends that MDCs opposition and regime change agenda has failed to yield a viable alternative. Its association with

NGOs and so-called neo-colonial forces is a phenomenon that had been a central of criticism by ZANU-PF, in a bid to question the legitimacy of opposition forces in Zimbabwe.

Research on NGOs requires a thorough contextual analysis to understand what informs the roles they play and the impact this has on the socio-political and economic environment in a nation state. The context in Zimbabwe has had a profound impact on the role of NGOs which has brought to the fore empirical observations that challenge contemporary theoretical assumptions about NGOs and civil society.

A social democratic approach provides for a redistributive approach informed by the socio-political and economic dynamic of the nation state; social welfare needs of its citizens; interventions required to sustain an inclusive economic agenda and which does not protect private interests etc at the expense of universal benefit. Heller (2001: 149) refers to this as left of centre politics which is needed but with a strong capacitated state in postcolonial Africa. However the problem of resourcing the state in Africa has served as a hindrance where it lacks and paradoxically a condition where it is available, for capacitation and fundamental transformation of the postcolonial state in Africa.

While the role of NGOs in social policy provision has been an accepted position within the social policy space in Zimbabwe, the politicised democratisation agenda remains a hotly contested terrain. Bratton (1989:421) identifies two ways in which democracy is operationalised and defined: (i) in structural terms reflected through the holding of elections and existence of electoral systems for citizens to select their political representatives. This also implies the existence of multipartyism; and (ii) in behavioural terms where citizens are able and there is space for them to actively participate in political, policy processes. Therefore, there is an arena for engagement of civil society. In addition, democracy is reflected in meaningful completion and civil liberties in society. Zimbabwe has tended to engage in a structural approach to democracy allowing for systematic electoral processes and the existence of multiple political parties. However, scholars argue that this form of democracy is not substantive as the political space in Zimbabwe has remaining a volatile and

polarised arena with two protagonists fighting for a hegemonic position in the state machinery.

While the neo-Marxist perspective states that civil society counters the hegemonic tendencies of the state towards authoritarianism, Katz (2006:335) comments that this perspective is an overly optimistic view of the capabilities of civil society and NGOs. In Zimbabwe, despite the proliferations of NGOs in the 1990s, they have failed to fundamentally push for a transformation of the political and economic landscape in the country. Their role and levels of success in building citizen engagement and fostering equitable redistributive approaches is questionable.

Labuschagne (2003:1) admits that civil society in Africa has been unable to counterbalance the state and Roelof (2003) explains that NGOs entrench the hegemony of dominant classes by, “providing a safe, non-conflictive outlet for the cheeky and restless.” In other words, civil society is a sector and concept that can be used to foster opposition to repressive states and equally, as an instrument for passive revolution, creating a facade for ‘oversight’ of the state with citizens usurping their space to engage with the state for formalised civil society organisations. Emphasis should instead be placed in promoting multi-partyism and a political space that encourages the growth of capable political opposition that helps keep a balance on the authoritarian tendencies of dominant political parties.

This thesis further argues that the NGOs and CSOs need to be conceptually distinguished as interrelated but distinct role players within the civil society sphere. From the empirical study and critical analysis of documentary evidence and theoretical observations, NGOs may be redefined as service-oriented organisations and CSOs as formalised associational spaces for citizen engagement, formed as representative of the populations they serve, a mandated representational role.

NGOs as a sector are a permanent feature of society and nation states, in one form or another. However, as organisations, they have a life span or are temporary either as entities and/or with regards to the work they do. The nation state and its state institutions are a permanent phenomenon of the geopolitical life of societies since time immemorial. Therefore, the thesis argues that there is need for refocusing on the state, its role, legitimacy and capacity in relation to social policy. The

democratisation role that has been fostered on NGOs does not leave sustained capabilities amongst the citizenry to engage with the state to address their needs.

Transformation of the state itself is required through either (i) integration of institutions that foster accountability and transparency as an inherent and/or (ii) inculcation of strong multiparty political culture to ensure accountability within state institutions themselves. The purpose of the Church and Civil Society Forum which seeks to promote the move away from a 'culture' of state violence which the country inherited from its colonial past is an indication of the need for transformation of the state system in Zimbabwe and how state institutions which have remained inherently the same state instruments that were used to maintain a minority race-based government and political system prior to 1980, have never been transformed to align with the principles of a liberated postcolonial state as espoused during the liberation struggle by liberation parties.

The researcher argues that the NGO sector in Zimbabwe lacks accountability in terms of its undertakings and public mandate. The non-existence of a fair and capacitated institutional infrastructure or body designated to oversee the activities and operations of NGO is problematic. A form of coordinating and monitoring body is vital to foster accountability and transparency in the sector, which is often 'unregulated.' Such an entity (or entities) would be responsible for not only monitoring the work of NGOs to ensure it is in accordance with regulations but coordinating NGO activities to (i) minimise duplication (ii) ensure underserved areas are also covered and NGOs are deployed as per need, (iii) there is a structured and systematic way in which the state engages with the NGO sector and (iv) ensure the ethical distribution of NGO resources in social policy programmes.

Understandably, as the capacity of the state to deliver on the most basic of services dwindled, it is inconceivable that there would be capacity to coordinate NGOs. Furthermore, regulation becomes problematic where it is abused to restrict associational freedoms and political opposition and perceived threats. An NGO sector accountable to its nation state and citizens is a rarity that lacks in the least sense in Zimbabwe. Accountability is rather a donor-focused principle which undermines the authority of the state and fails to respect the democratisation that it seeks to promote and engage with citizens on.

Assessing the levels of access to opportunities for engagement in the social policy process for NGOs operating at various levels (national, provincial, district), the study identified that the highly centralised policy process in Zimbabwe, is inherently exclusionary of citizens, civil society and NGOs that are unable to physically access the policy spaces where engagement occurs. A paradigm shift towards a more decentralised and/or devolved regionalised approach though ideal in facilitating more participatory policy processes, if not carefully conceptualised, may also perpetuate regional inequalities which already exist. However, decentralisation is a better mechanism to build participatory approaches and accessibility not only for local organisations but citizens as well. The tendency that, everything typically is centralised in Harare, is a deep-rooted problem in Zimbabwe.

6.3 Recommendations

Drawing on the empirical and theoretical findings of the study, the researcher proposes the several recommendations on (i) re-conceptualising theorisations on NGOs, the state and social policy and (ii) the role of NGOs in the social policy process and the functioning of the NGO sector, based on the analysis of contextual factors informing the role of NGOs including global geopolitics and national socio-political and economic environment. The researcher proffers the following recommendations:

- **Recommendation One** – the levelling of the NGO arena to address the imbalances between local and international NGOs. The research proposes the instituting of positive biases to building the capacity of local NGOs. As organisations with intrinsic knowledge of the local context local NGOs, should be given fair opportunities to design solutions for service delivery and strategies to build a culture of civic engagement in communities where they work. It is evident that the exogenous growth of civil society and existence of dominant Northern based INGOs has stifled the development or evolution of indigenous entities capable of playing the third sector role to more substantively and sustainably complement the social policy agenda in their own countries. Hence the central engagement of local NGOs in the social policy arena is often overshadowed by the dominance of INGOs. The

researcher recommends that postcolonial states take the responsibility to promote mechanisms to ensure inclusive NGO funding mechanisms, develop engagement processes that support and encourage participation of local NGOs.

- **Recommendation Two** – the development of institutionalised, supportive and open NGO coordination mechanisms. There is need to ensure the accountability of NGOs within the nation states they serve. The study identified that the level of transparency and accountability of NGOs within postcolonial African states is problematic. This tends to externalised, as influenced by the fact that the major sources of NGO funding and ideological influences are external. The researcher propounds that the establishment of institutional mechanisms to monitor and promote accountability a within the NGO sector is critical to ensure (i) they serve the needs of citizens and (ii) are truly representational of the communities they serve as they purport to engage on their behalf in social policy processes. However, it is necessary that such institutions be guarded against political influence and abuse in the potential targeting of oppositional civil society entities.

- **Recommendation Three** – the conceptual distinction between service-oriented organisations and organisations focused on fundamental societal, structural and political change. The convolution of theoretical perspectives on civil society and the dominant phenomenon of NGOs have masked the fundamental variations between NGOs that seek fundamental societal, political and economic transformation on one hand and NGOs that are service-oriented entities, providing temporal ameliorative and supportive social services. Therefore, the researcher recommends the redefining of civil society organisations as a concept that relates to transformative organisations which work to build social capital and civil engagement to foster developmental, redistributive change and democratisation. The concept of non-governmental organisations should be confined to service oriented entities whose primary purpose is to provide goods and services to communities.

- **Recommendation Four** – the building of vibrant civic engagement in social policy processes. While NGOs have played a representational role, the extent of this and authenticity as representative of the voices of their communities may be questionable. In addition, NGO usurping of civic engagement roles in policy processes may stifle citizen participation. Therefore, it is necessary to begin building social capital and a culture of citizen participation which is a sustainable approach to fostering pluralism in policy processes.

- **Recommendation Five** – promoting of membership-based organisations where intended beneficiaries of NGO and civil society organisations' work are themselves involved in the decision-making processes as well as implementation of NGO activities. This would firmly entrench the representational role of NGOs and ensure channelling of the voices of relevant communities in social policy processes through the participation of the very members of those communities.

- **Recommendation Six** – transformation and re-developing of the postcolonial state and its role as central provider of social policy and to intervene in a skewed economic structure requires a paradigm shift from the hegemonic liberal democratic models of the contemporary state. A central state aligns with the high social and economic development needs of postcolonial African states that render large populations unable to cater for their own social policy needs through the market. The growth of African economies is pertinent to address social policy needs however; the structural inequalities in economies require a continued central state to facilitate redistribution. Hence the study proposes a refocusing of discourse on social policy, state and non-state actors to state transformative processes required to strengthen postcolonial states as central agents of social policy and facilitators of economic development.

- **Recommendation Seven** – rebuilding of aspects of 'African' or indigenous forms of associational life which are relevant to contemporary postcolonial contexts. Given the temporary and fragile nature of the externally driven funding environment for NGO work, communities are often always at risk of

losing the institutional as well as material support provided by externally funded NGOs. However, rebuilding social capital provides a foundation for communities to draw on in empowering and supporting themselves to address their social and economic needs, more so in contexts where due to incapacity, the state may fail to provide safety nets to protect the basic needs of its citizens.

- **Recommendation Eight** – an interventionist approach of the state in economic development to facilitate redistributive policies as well strengthening of the role of NGOs in propounding, advocating and capacitating citizens in demanding redistribution of economic opportunities and redress to promote equity. The delayed intervention of postcolonial states in redressing economic and social imbalances inherited from race-based colonial systems poses a major problem for the advancement of social policy gains and socio-political stability. Zimbabwe's inherited socio-political and economic structure at independence in 1980 required fundamental and bold transformative processes to enable redistribution and fostering of equity. However, the government's strong social policy to an extent superficially addressed the need to create broader and more equitable economic access and social development opportunities. Therefore, it remained with significant disparities in the socioeconomic circumstances of its citizens (Bauer and Taylor, 2005) coupled with lack of a vibrant mechanism for state accountability.

The role of NGOs to promote redistribution is an assumption and through this study, could not be established as an empirical reality. It is therefore a central responsibility of the state to facilitate redistribution as the caretaker and protector of the broad interests of its citizens. Where this fails, the stage is set for social and political clashes, class struggles, as citizens seek ways of addressing inequities that are perpetuated and disadvantage sections of society while benefitting others.

In Zimbabwe, delays by the state and ruling party in addressing the skewed colonial legacy provided a breeding ground for the socio-political and economic crisis the country found itself in between 2000 and 2010; resulting in

an aggressive and bruising strategy to 'belatedly' (Bauer and Taylor, 2005) foster redistribution and transformation of the socioeconomic structure in the country. This study posits that states in Southern Africa though they differ, share characteristic traits on social inequalities and political and state institutions inherited from their colonial histories. Nonetheless, Zimbabwe's decline serves as a warning, as several countries within the region face some common challenges in the twenty-first century. Although Zimbabwe must also confront the challenge of reconstruction it appears the political negotiated process has brought a level of stability that will be important to harness for political and economic transformation if the trajectory of the state's future is to be a positive one.

6.4 Limitations of the study

This study sought to critically analyse the role of NGOs in the social policy process in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Although the study was well designed and the objectives of the study fully addressed, there were several unavoidable limitations. Firstly, the study was not specifically designed to thoroughly evaluate the impact of NGOs on the social policy process in Zimbabwe. It can be considered that a complementary quantitative evaluation of impact may have provided further insights into this question the study sought to interrogate.

While the sample of the study was aimed at selecting key informants from local as well as INGOs to provide a perspective of their roles in the social policy process, reaching a diverse number of local NGOs and INGOs from different parts of the country was problematic. Hence some bias towards Harare based organisations is embedded in the study. Secondly, the study analysed a small subset of a large NGO sector, therefore, the findings cannot be generalised, in addition as this was not intended for this study. Furthermore, the some of the empirical evidence is based on self-reported roles as shared by NGOs though effort was made through triangulated methodology to verify some of the information shared by key informants. While acknowledging the limitations, the research proffers a comprehensive and analytical assessment of the roles of NGOs in the social policy process in Zimbabwe.

6.5 Proposed areas for future research

From the study, the researcher proposes and recommends that future research should:

- Critically analyse African forms of associational life and the impact of endogenous growth of civil society;
 - Assess dynamics between local and INGOs and implications thereof on development of local NGOs;
 - Critique the reform of the postcolonial state in Africa and approaches for a transformed state.
-

REFERENCES

1. Primary Sources

1.1. Government Gazettes and Policy documents

Central Statistical Office – Zimbabwe (2007) **Demographic Health Survey: 2005-2006**. Government Printers: Harare.

Central Statistical Office - Zimbabwe (2010) **Zimbabwe Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey 2009**. <http://www.zimstat.co.zw> (Accessed 1 March 2011).

Government of Zimbabwe (1986) **Annual Report of the Secretary of Education**. Government Printers: Harare.

Government of Zimbabwe (1998) **Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, 1996 – 2000**. Government Printers: Harare.

Government of Zimbabwe, (2003) **Policy on Operations on Non-governmental Organisations in Humanitarian and Development Assistance**. Government Printers: Harare.

Government of Zimbabwe (2009) **Millennium Development Goals Mid-Term Progress Report: 2000-2007**. <http://www.undp.org.zw> (Accessed 15 August 2010).

Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, **All Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs)/Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)** – Memo – 4 June 2008 (Government of Zimbabwe) – Reference: SW/21/3

1.2. Government Statutes

Republic of Zimbabwe, (2009) **Global Political Agreement: 15 September 2008** <http://www.zimbabweprimeminister.org> (Accessed 21 March 2009).

Republic of Zimbabwe, (2004) **Parliamentary Debates**, Vol. 31, No. 22: 16 November 2004, Jongwe Printing & Publishing Co: Harare.

Republic of Zimbabwe, (2004) **Parliamentary Debates**, Vol. 31, No. 22: 23rd November 2004, Jongwe Printing & Publishing Co: Harare.

Republic of Zimbabwe (2001) **Disabled Person Act: Chapter 17:01**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/DISABLED_PERSONS_ACT_17_01.pdf (Accessed 6 April 2010).

Republic of Zimbabwe (1979) **Frederick Clayton Trust Act: Chapter 17:02**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/FREDERICK_CLAYTON_TRUST_ACT_17_02.pdf
(Accessed 6 April 2010).

Republic of Zimbabwe (1979) **Masonic Education Fund Incorporation Act: Chapter 17:03**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/MASONIC_EDUCATION_FUND_INCORPORATION_ACT_17_03.pdf (Accessed 6 April 2010).

Republic of Zimbabwe (2002) **National Social Security Act: Chapter 17:04**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/NATIONAL_SOCIAL_SECURITY_AUTHORITY_ACT_17_04.pdf (Accessed 6 April 2010).

Republic of Zimbabwe (2001) **Private Voluntary Organisations Act: Chapter 17:05**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/PRIVATE_VOLUNTARY_ORGANIZATIONS_ACT_17_05.pdf (Accessed 6 April 2010).

Republic of Zimbabwe (1981) **Red Cross Society Act: Act 30/1981**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/ZIMBABWE_RED_CROSS_SOCIETY_ACT_17_08.pdf (Accessed 6 April 2010).

Republic of Zimbabwe (2001) **Social Welfare Assistance Act: Chapter 17:06**.
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms%5CActs%5CTitle17_WELFARE_AND_CHARTABLE_INSTITUTIONS/SOCIAL_WELFARE_ASSISTANCE_ACT_17_06.pdf

1.3. NGO and other organisational documents

National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations, (2006) **Zimbabwe NGO Corporate Governance Manual**. <http://www.nango.org.zw> (Accessed on 12 June 2008).

National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (2006) **Zimbabwe Civil Society Millennium Development Goals Report, 2006: Finding a voice, making space**. <http://www.nango.org.zw> (Accessed 15 March 2010).

National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (2010) **Church and civil society submissions: towards development of a national framework for national healing, integration, and reconciliation in Zimbabwe / Church and Civil Society Forum**. Harare.

NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project (2010) **The participation of NGOs in Cluster Co-Leadership at Country Level: A review of experience**. <http://www.icva.ch/doc00004217.pdf> (Accessed 27 October 2012).

United Nations (2008) **Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe 2008**. <http://uchaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1634> (Accessed 10 August 2010).

United Nations Development Programme (1999) **The Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1999**. United Nations. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/africa/zimbabwe/ZHDR1999-Globalisation.pdf>

United Nations Development Programme (2000) **The Zimbabwe Human Development Report 2000**. United Nations. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/africa/zimbabwe/ZHDR2000-Governance.pdf>

United Nations Development Programme (2005) **The Zimbabwe Human Development Report: International cooperation at a crossroads – Aid, trade and security in an unequal world**. United Nations.

United Nations Development Programme (2009) **Zimbabwe Human Development Report 2009**. United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly (2008) **Report on HIV/AIDS – Follow-up to the declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS: Zimbabwe Country Report**. http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/zimbabwe_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf. (Accessed 11 October 2010).

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2010) **Zimbabwe – Humanitarian Organisations Contact Directory**. <http://ochaonline.un.org/zimbabwe> (Accessed 10 February 2011).

Zimbabwe Election Support Network, (2008) **Report on the Zimbabwe 29 March 2008 Harmonised Elections and 27 June Presidential Run-off**. http://www.zesn.org.zw/publications/publication_276.pdf (Accessed 10 February 2011).

Zimbabwe Law Reports (1997) *Holland & Others vs Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare* (1): pp186.

Zimbabwe Red Cross Society (2010) *In the Community*. <http://www.redcrosszim.org.zw> (Accessed 10 August 2010).

1.4. Newspapers, News services

The Herald, 13 October 2001, “*Mugabe warns against meddling.*”

The Herald, 5 April 2004, “*NGOs causing confusion.*”

The Herald, 17 February 2009, “*I leave a happy man: Parirenyatwa.*”

2. Secondary Sources

2.1. Books

- Adepoju, A. (1993) **The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Population in Africa**. Heinemann: New Hampshire.
- Alcock, P., Erskine, A. and May, M. (eds.) (1999) **The Student's Companion to Social Policy**. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, UK.
- Alexander, J.C. (2006) **The Civil Sphere**. Oxford University Press. New York.
- Anseeuw, A. and Alden, C. (eds), **The Struggle Over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics and Change**. Human Sciences Research Council Press, Cape Town.
- Atkinson, P and Coffey, A. (1997) *Analysing documentary realities*. In D. Silverman (ed), **Qualitative Research**. Sage Publications: London.
- Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2001) **The Practice of Social Research**. Oxford University Press Southern Africa: Cape Town.
- Bak, N. (2004) **Completing Your Thesis: A Practical Guide**. Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria.
- Baker, G. (2002) **Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices**. Routledge: London.
- Baldock, J., Manning, N., Miller, S. and Vickerstaff, S. (eds) (1999) **Social Policy**. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Barrow, C.W. (1993) **Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, neo-Marxist, post-Marxist**. The University of Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin.
- Bauer, G. And Taylor, S.D. (2005) **Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition**. Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA.
- Becker, S. and Bryman, A. (2004) **Understanding Research for Social Policy and Practice: Themes, methods and approaches**. The Policy Press: Bristol: UK.
- Bell, J. (1993) **Doing Your Research Project: A guide for first-time researchers in Education and Social Science**. Open University Press: Buckingham.

- Benson, C. and Clay, E.J. (2003) *Disasters, Vulnerability and the Global Economy,*” in Kreimer, A., Arnold, M. and Carlin, A. (eds) **Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disaster Risk.** World Bank, Washington.
- Brynard, P.A. and Hanekom, S.X. (1997) **Introduction to research in Public Administration and Related Academic Disciplines.** Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.
- Clapham, C. (1996) **Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival.** Cambridge University Press: UK.
- Comacroft, J. (ed) (1999) **Civil society and The Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives.** University of Chicago Press: United States.
- Creswell, J. (2003) **Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches: 2nd Edition.** Sage Publications Inc: London, UK.
- Dashwood, H.S. (2000) **Zimbabwe: the political economy of transformation.** University of Toronto Press, Canada.
- Denscombe, W. (2002) **Ground rules for good research: A 10 point guide for social researchers.** Open University Press: Buckingham.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (2000) **Handbook of Qualitative Research: Second edition.** Sage: London.
- Edwards, M. (2004) **Civil Society.** Polity Press: UK
- Edwards, M. (2009) **Civil Society.** Polity Press: UK.
- Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1995) *“NGO performance and accountability: Introduction and overview,”* In **Non-Governmental Organisations – Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet.** M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds): Earthscan, London: pp3-16.
- Ehrenberg, J. (1999) **Civil Society: The History of an Idea.** NYU Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1996) *“After the golden age? Welfare state dilemmas in a global economy,”* in G. Esping-Andersen (ed), **Welfare state in transition: national adaptation in global economies.** Sage: London: pp1-31.

- Falk, R. (2000) *“Resisting globalisation from above through globalisation from below,”* in Gills, B. K. (ed) **Globalisation and the policies of resistance.** Macmillan: London: pp46 – 56.
- Falk, R. (2003) *“On the Political Relevance of Global Civil Society,”* in J.H. Dunning (ed) **Making Globalisation Good: The moral challenges of global capitalism.** Oxford University Press: Oxford: pp 280 – 300.
- Fine, R. and Rai, (1997) **Civil Society: Democratic Perspectives.** Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Flick, U. (2002) **An Introduction to Qualitative Research (2nd Edition).** SAGE Publications Ltd: London.
- Flinders, D.J. and Mills, G.E. (eds) (1993) **Theory and Concepts in Qualitative Research: Perceptions From the Field.** Teachers College Press: New York.
- Gay, L.R. and Arasian, P. (2003) **Educational Research: Competencies for analysis and applications, 7th edition.** Pearson Education Ltd.
- Gibbon, P. (ed) (1995) **Structural Adjustment and the working Poor in Zimbabwe.** Nordic Africa Institute.
- Gomm, R. (2004) **Social Research Methodology: A Critical Introduction.** Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire.
- Gordon, R. (1992) **Basic Interviewing Skills.** Ithaca: Peacock.
- Gwarinda, T.C. (1991) **Socialism and Education: An Introduction.** The College Press: Harare.
- Helliker, K. D. (2008), *“Dancing on the Same Spot: NGOs”*, in Moyo, S., Helliker, K. D and Murisa, T. (eds.), **Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe.** S&S Publishers, Pietermaritzburg.
- Henning, E., van Rensburg, W. and Smit, B. (2004) **Finding Your Way in Qualitative Research.** Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria.
- Hillhorst, D. (2003) **The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, diversity and development.** Ateneo de Manila University Press: Quezon City.

- Holliday, A. (2001) **Doing and Writing Up Qualitative Research**. Sage: London.
- Hollway, W. (2008) “*The importance of relational thinking in the practice of psycho-social research: ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics*,” in Clarke, Simon; Hoggett, Paul and Hahn, Herbert (eds) **Object relations and social relations: The implications of the relational turn in psychoanalysis**. London, UK: Karnac, pp137–162.
- Jenkins, J. (1987) “*Non-profit Organisation and Policy Advocacy*,” in W. W. Powell (ed), **The Non-profit Sector – A Research Handbook**. Oxford University Press: New Haven.
- Jessop, B. (2007) “*Hollowing out the ‘nation-state’ and multi-level governance*” in P. Kennet (ed) **Handbook of Comparative Social Policy**. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 11-25.
- Keane, J. (2003) **Global Civil Society**. Cambridge University Press: UK.
- Korten, D. (1990) **Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda**. Kumarian Press: West Hartford.
- Kvale, S. (1996) **Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing**. Sage: London.
- Lavalette, M. and Pratt, A. (2005) **Social Policy: Theories, Concepts and Issues**. Sage Publications Ltd.
- Leedy, P.D. and Ormrod, J.E. (2010) **Practical Research: Planning and Design, Ninth Edition**. Pearson Education International: New Jersey.
- Levin, P. (1997) **Making Social Policy: The Mechanisms of Government and Politics, and How to Investigate Them**. Open University Press: Buckingham.
- Maharaj, B. (1999) “*Local economic development: the panacea for growth and development in Southern Africa?*” in **La question urbaine en Afrique austral: perspectives de recherche**. Karthala Edition: pp243 - 258

- Mandaza, I. and Sachikonye, L. (1991) **The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate**. SAPES Trust, Harare.
- Mandle, J.R. (2003) **Globalisation and the poor**. Cambridge University Press: United Kingdom.
- Mapuva, J. (2010) **Citizen Participation and Local Governance: Case Study of the Combined Harare Residents Association (Zimbabwe)**. Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Marongwe, N. (2003) *“Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the New Politics of Land in Zimbabwe,”* in Hammar, A., Raftopolous, B. and Jensen, S. (2003) **Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis**. Weaver Press, Harare.
- Mason, J. (2002) **Qualitative Researching**. Sage Publications Inc: London.
- Mazmanian, D.A. and Sabatier, P.A. (1989) **Implementation and Public Policy**. University Press of America: Lanham.
- Merriam, S.B. (2009) **Qualitative Research: A guide to design and implementation**. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco.
- Minogue, M., Polidano, C. and Hulme, D. (eds) (1998) **Beyond the New Public Management: Ideas and Practices in Governance**. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Mkandawire, T. (1999) *“Shifting Commitments and National Cohesion in African Countries,”* in Wolhlegemuth, L., Gibson, S., Klasen, S. and Rothchild, E. (eds) **Common Security and Civil Society in Africa**. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikanstitutet.
- Mouton, J. (2004) **How to Succeed in Your Master’s & Doctoral Studies: A South African Guide and Resource Book**. Van Schaik: Pretoria.
- Moyo, S., Makumbe, J. and Raftopolous, B. (2000) **NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe**. SAPES Books, Harare.

- Moyo, S. (2010) *“The Zimbabwe Crisis, land reform and normalisation,”* in Anseeuw, A. & Alden, C. (eds), **The Struggle Over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics and Change**. Human Sciences Research Council Press, Cape Town.
- Muhr, T. And Friese, S. (2004) **User’s manual for Atlas.ti 5.0: 2nd Edition**. Scientific Software Development: Berlin.
- Mwanza, A.M. (ed) (1992) **Structural Adjustment Programmes in SADC: Experiences and Lessons from Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe**. SAPES Books: Harare.
- Nagel, S. S. (2002) **Handbook of public policy evaluation**. Sage Publications Inc.: UK.
- Nutley, S. and Webb, J. (2000) *“Evidence and the Policy Process,”* in Davies, H., Nutley, S. & Smith, P. (eds), **What Works? Evidence- based Policy and Practice in Public Services**. The Policy Press: Bristol.
- Olaleye, W., Kabemba, C.K. and Karume, S. (2005) **Negotiating the Impasse: Challenges and Prospects for Democratisation in Zimbabwe**. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa: Pretoria.
- Oosthuizen, G. (2006) **The Southern African Development Community: The organisation, its policies and prospects**. Institute for Global Dialogue: Midrand, South Africa.
- Osaghae, E.E. (2001) *“Exiting from the Existing State in Nigeria,”* in Bekker, S.B., Dodds, M. and Khosa, M. (eds) **Shifting African Identities**. Human Sciences Research Council Press: Pretoria.
- Pinker, R. (2004) *“The role of theory in policy research”* in Becker and Bryman, **Understanding Research for Social Policy and Practice: Themes, methods and approaches**. The Policy Press: Bristol, UK.
- Plummer, J. (2002) **Focusing Partnerships: A Sourcebook for Municipal Capacity Building in Public-Private Partnerships**. Earthscan Publications Ltd: London.

- Powell, M. (1999) **An Analysis of Policy Implementation in the Third World.** Ashgate Publishing Ltd: Vermont, USA.
- Rai, S.M. (2002) **Gender and the Political Economy of Development** Blackwell Publishers: UK.
- Raftopoulos, B. in Moyo, S. (2000) *"The State, NGOs and Democratisation,"* **NGOs, The State and Politics in Zimbabwe.** SAPES Books, Harare.
- Raftopolous, B. and Savage, T. (2004) **Zimbabwe: injustice and political reconciliation.** Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Cape Town.
- Roelof, J. (2003) **Foundation of Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism.** SUNY Press: New York.
- Rogers-Dillon, R. (2004) **The welfare experiments: politics and policy evaluation.** Stanford University Press: California.
- Rossi, P.H., Lipsey, M.W. and Freeman, H.E. (2004) **Evaluation: a systemic approach: Seventh Edition.** Sage Publications Inc.: UK.
- Rubin, H.J. and Rubin, I.S. (1995) **Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data.** Sage: Thousand Oaks.
- Rupiya, M. (2002) *"Civil-military relations in Zimbabwe: Is there a threat?"* in R. Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams, **Ourselves to know: Civil-military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa.** Institute of Security Studies: Pretoria: pp251-263.
- Saunders, R.G. (2000) **Never the Same Again: Zimbabwe's Growth Towards Democracy.** Edwina Spicer Production: Harare.
- Seligman, A.B. (2002) *"Civil Society as Idea and Ideal,"* in W. Kymlicka (ed), **Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society.** Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ: pp13-33.
- Silverman, D. (ed) (1997) **Qualitative Research: theory, method and Practice.** Sage Publications Ltd: London.

- Struwig, F.W. and Stead, G.B. (2001) **Planning, Designing and Reporting Research**. Pearson Education: Cape Town.
- Taylor, P.J., Watts, M. and Johnston, R.J. (2002) "Geography/Globalisation," in R.J. Johnston, P.J. Taylor and M. Watts (eds) **Geographies of Global Change: Remapping The World**. Blackwell: Malden MA: pp1-18.
- Taylor, R. (ed) (2004) **Creating a Better World: Interpreting Global Civil Society**, Kumarian Press: Bloomfield CT.
- Teddlie, C. and Tashakori, A. (2009) **Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and Behavioural Sciences**. Sage Publications Inc: London, UK.
- Thornhill, C., Odendaal, M.J., Malan, L., Mathebula, L., van Dijk, H.G. and Mello, D. (2002) **An Overview of Intergovernmental Relations in Africa: The Southern African Development Community**. SAFPUM Publishers: Pretoria.
- Trauth, E.M. (2001) **Quantitative research in IS: issues and trends**. Idea Group Publishing: Hershey.
- Yin, R.K. (1994) **Case Study Research: Design and Methods**. 2nd Edition. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks.
-

2.2. Journal Articles and Other Sources

- Abom, B. (2004) "Social capital, NGOs and Development: A Guatemalan Case Study," **Development in Practice**. Vol. 14, No.3: pp342 – 353.
- Adeh, I. (2004) "Fostering Accountability in Zimbabwean Civil Society," **The International Journal of Not for Profit Law**. Vol. 6, Issue, 3: http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/Vol6iss3/special_4.htm (Accessed 15 August 2009).
- Adesina, J.M. (2004) "NEPAD and the challenge of Africa's development towards the political economy of a discourse." **Society in Transition**. Vol. 35, No.1: pp125-144.

- Akkerman, T., Hajer, M. and Grin, J. (2004) "*The Interactive State: Democratisation from above?*" **Political Studies**. Vol. 52: pp82 – 95.
- Apter, D.E. (2008) *Ghana's Independence: Triumph and Paradox*. **Transition**. Issue 98: pp6 – 22.
- Atack, I. (1999) "*Four Criteria of Development NGO Legitimacy,*" **World Development**. Vol. 27, No. 5: pp855-864.
- Bartlett, D.M.C. (2000) "*Civil Society and Democracy: a Zambian case study,*" **Journal of Southern African Studies**. Vol. 26, No.3: pp429 – 466.
- Batley, R. (2006) "*The Changing Role of the State in Local Governance,*" **Managing Local Governance**. Commonwealth Secretariat: United Kingdom.
- Bernstein, H. (2006) "*Studying Development/Development Studies,*" **African Studies**. Vol. 65, 1: pp45 – 62.
- Bhebhe, N. (1989) "*The Nationalist Struggle, 1957 – 62,*" in Banana, C.S. (ed) **Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe, 1890 – 1990**. The College Press: Harare.
- Bowden, B. (2006) "*Civil Society, the State and the Limits to Global Civil Society,*" **Global Society**. Vol. 20, No. 2: pp156 – 178.
- Bratton, M. (1989) "*Beyond the State: Civil society and Associational Life in Africa,*" **World Politics**. Vol. 41, No.3: pp407 – 430. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010506> (Accessed 17 March 2009).
- Bratton, M. and Masunungure, E. (2006) "*Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe,*" **African Affairs**. Vol. 106: Issue 422: pp21-45. <http://afaf.oxfordjournals.org/content/106/422/21.short> (Accessed 3 April 2011).
- Bressers, J., Klok, P.J. and O'Toole, L.J. (2000) "*Explaining Policy Action: A Deductive but Realistic Theory,*" paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Quebec, 2000. <http://www.utwente.nl/ctsm/research/governance/index.html> (Accessed 14 August 2009).

- Brown, L.D. and Timmer, V. (2006) "*Civil Society Actors as Catalysts for Transnational Social Learning*," **International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations**: Vol. 17, No.1: March 2006.
- Brown, R. and Saunders, C. (2007) "*Zimbabwe: Recent History*," in Frame, I. (ed) **Africa South of the Sahara**. Europa Publications: pp1287 – 1295.
- Bryant, T. (2002) "*Role of Knowledge in Public Health and Health Promotion Policy Change*," **Health Promotion International**. Vol. 17, No. 1: Oxford University Press: pp89 – 98.
- Brynard, P. (2005) "*Policy Implementation: Lessons for Service Delivery*," **Journal of Public Administration**: Vol. 40, No.4, pp661.
- Bush, R. (2004) "*Civil Society and the Uncivil State: Land Tenure Reform in Egypt and the Crisis of Rural Livelihoods*," **United Nations Institute for Social Development**.
- Carroll, T. and Carroll, B.W. (2004) "*The Rapid Emergence of Civil Society in Botswana*," **Commonwealth and Comparative Politics**. Vol. 42, No. 3: pp 333-355.
- Casey, J. and Dalton, B. (2006) "*The best of times, the worst of times: Community-sector advocacy in the age of compacts*," **Australian Journal of Political Science**. Vol. 41, No. 1: pp23-38.
- Chaumba, J., Scoones, I. and Wilmer, W. (2003) "*From jambanja to planning: the reassertion of technocracy in land reform in south-eastern Zimbabwe?*" **The Journal of Modern African Studies**. Vol. 41: pp533 – 554.
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=190483> (Accessed 11 March 2011).
- Cheeseman, N. and Tendi, B. (2010) "*Power-sharing in comparative perspective: the dynamics of 'unity government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe*," **The Journal of Modern African Studies**. Vol. 48: pp203-229).
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7757384>

- Chigora, P. and Guzura, T. (2008) "*A History that Haunts the Present Generation: An Analysis of the Origins of the Land Problem in Zimbabwe,*" **Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa**. Vol. 10, No.2: pp514 – 537.
- Chikanda, A. (2004) "*Skilled Health Professionals' Migration and Its Impact on Health Delivery in Zimbabwe,*" **Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper No. 4**.
<http://www.uz.ac.zw/science/geography/chikandapub.html> (Accessed 10 January 2011)
- Clark, J. (1995) "*The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary Sector,*" **World Development**. Vol. 23, No.4: pp593-601.
- Cliff, J. (1993) "*Donor-dependence or donor control?: The Case of Mozambique,*" **Community Development Journal**. Vol. 28, Issue 3: pp237 – 244.
- Corre, G. and Gahou, E. (2005) "*Non-state actors in Benin: Dialogue on Cooperation is getting organised,*" **In Brief**. No. 3E. European Centre for Development Policy Management.
- Dauda, A. (2001) "*The Authoritarian State and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Africa: A case study of Nigeria, 1983 – 1995,*" in Rworuire, A., **Social Problems in Africa: New Visions**. Praeger Publishers: United States.
- Deacon, B. (2005) "*From 'Safety Nets' Back to 'Universal Social Provision' Is the Global Tide Turning?*" **Global Social Policy**. Vol. 5, No.1: pp19 – 28.
- Dery, D. (2000) "*Agenda Setting and Problem Definition,*" **Policy Studies**. Vol. 21, No. 1: pp38 – 47.
- Dorsey, B. (1989) "*Educational Development and Reform in Zimbabwe,*" **Comparative Education Review**. Vol. 33, No.1: pp40-58.
- Edwards, M. (1999) "*International development NGOs: Agents of foreign aid or vehicles for international cooperation?*" **Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly**. Vol. 28: pp25-37.

Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, (2008) **Zimbabwe: 2008 Presidential Election Results: First Round.** <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zim2008results5.htm> (Accessed 9 March 2011).

Fagan, A. (2005) *“Taking Stock of Civil Society Development in Post-communist Europe: Evidence from the Czech Republic,”* **Democratisation**. Vol. 12, No.4: pp528 – 547.

Fine, R. (1997) *“Civil society theory, enlightenment and critique,”* **Democratisation**. Vol. 4, No.1: pp7-28.

Fisher, D.R. and Green, J.F. (2004) *“Understanding Disenfranchisement: Civil Society and Developing Countries’ Influence and Participation in Global Governance for Sustainable Development,”* **Global Environmental Politics**. Vol. 4, No. 3: pp65- 84.

Friedman, S. (2003) *“The state, civil society and social policy: setting a research agenda,”* **Politikon**: Vol 30 (1), pp3-25.

Friedman, S. and Reitzes, M. (1996) *“Democratisation or bureaucratisation? Civil society, the public sphere and the state in post-apartheid South Africa.* **Transformation**. Vol. 29 pp55-73.

Gare, A. (2001) *“Post-modernism as the Decadence of the Social Democratic State,”* **Democracy and Nature**. Vol. 7, No. 1: pp77 – 99.

Garrick, J. (1999) *“Doubting the philosophical assumptions of interpretive research,”* **International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education**. Vol.12, No.2: pp147–156.

Gary, I. (1996) *“Confrontation, cooperation or co-optation: NGOs and the Ghanaian state during structural adjustment,”* **Review of African Political Economy**. Vol.23, Issue 68: pp149-168.

Gilson, L., Sen, P.D., Mohammed, S. and Mujinja, P. (1994) *“The Potential of Health Sector NGOs: policy options,”* **Health Policy Planning**. Vol. 9, No. 1: pp14-24.

- Gordenker, L. and Weiss, T.G. (1995) *“Pluralising global governance: Analytical approaches and dimensions.”* **Third World Quarterly**. Vol. 16, No. 3: pp357-387.
- Green, A.T. (2002) *“Comparative Development of Post-communist Civil Societies,”* **Europe-Asia Studies**. Vol. 54, No.3: pp455 – 471.
- Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1996) *“Civil Society in Africa.”* **Journal of Democracy**. Vol. 7, No.2, pp118-132.
- Higgins, K.M. and Mazula, A. (1993) *“Community development: a national strategy in Zimbabwe,”* **Community Development Journal**. Vol. 28, No. 1: pp 19-30. <http://www.cdj.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/1/19.full.pdf> (Accessed 19 March 2010).
- Hadenius, A. and Ugglä, F. (1996) *“Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic development: What can states and donors do?”* **World Development**. Vol. 24, No. 10: pp1621 – 39.
- Hayden, R. (2002) *“Dictatorships of virtue: States, NGOs, and the imposition of democratic values.”* **Harvard International Review**. (Summer): pp56-61.
- Heller, P. (2001) *“Moving the state: The politics of democratic decentralisation in Kelara, democratic South Africa and Porto Alegre,”* **Politics and Society**. Vol. 29, No.1: pp131-163.
- Hendriks, C.M. (2006) *“Integrated Deliberation: Reconciling Civil Society’s Dual Role in Deliberative Democracy,”* **Political Studies**. Vol. 54: pp486 – 508.
- Hellum, A. and Derman, D. (2004) *Land Reform and Human Rights in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Balancing Individual and Social Justice Through an Integrated Human Rights Framework,”* **World Development**. Vol.32, Issue 10: pp1785-1805.
- Hermier, A. (2004) *“Non-state actors in Senegal: Towards a strategy for political action,”* **In Brief**. No 3C: July 2004, European Centre for Development Policy Management.

- Howell, J., Ishkanian, A., Obadare, E., Seckinelgin, H. and Glassius, M. (2008) “*The backlash against civil society in the wake of the Long War on Terror,*” **Development in Practice**. Vol. 18, No. 1: pp 82-93.
- Hugman, R., Pittaway, E. and Bartolomei, L. (2011) “*When ‘Do No Harm’ Is Not Enough: The Ethics of Research with Refugees and Other Vulnerable Groups,*” **British Journal of Social Work** <http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/03/01/bjsw.bcr013.abstract> (Accessed 3 June 2011).
- International Monetary Fund (2009) **Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa: October.** <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2009/Afr/eng/sreo/009.pdf> (Accessed 19 March 2010).
- International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, (2011) **NGO Law Monitor – Zimbabwe** <http://www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan044923.pdf> (Accessed 10 January 2011).
- International Bar Association (2004) **An Analysis of the Zimbabwean Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, 2004.** <http://www.lexisnexis.com/presscenter/hottopics/Analysis.pdf> (Accessed 24 November 2010).
- International Centre for Civil Society (2004) **Zimbabwe’s Draft Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, 2004: Comments by the International Centre for Civil Society Law:** September 2004 (http://www.iccsl.org/pubs/index_doc.html) (Accessed 24 November 2010).
- Jessop, B. (2001) “*Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections and Redirections,*” **International Review of Sociology**. Vol. 11, No. 2: pp150 – 173.
- Kagoro, B. (2005) “*The Prisoners of Hope: Civil Society and the Opposition in Zimbabwe,*” **African Security Review**. 14(3): pp19-29.

- Kajimbwa, M. (2006) “NGOs and their role in the Global South,” **International Journal for Not-for-Profit Law**. Vol. 9, Issue 1: <http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol9iss/art-7.htm> (Accessed 10 June 2011).
- Kaldor, M. (2003) “Civil Society and Accountability,” **Journal of Human Development**. Vol. 4, No.1: pp 5-27.
- Kaseke, E. (2003) “Social exclusion and social security: the case of Zimbabwe.” **Journal of Social Development in Africa**. Vol. 18, No. 1: pp33-48.
- Kasfir, N. (1998) “Civil Society, the State and Democracy in Africa,” **Commonwealth and Comparative Politics**. Vol. 36, No.2: pp 123-149.
- Katz, H. (2006) “Gramsci, Hegemony and Civil Society Networks,” **Voluntas**. Vol. 17: pp333-348.
- Kawewe, S.M. and Dibie, R. (2000) “The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on Women and Children: Implications for Social Welfare in Zimbabwe,” **Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare**. Vol. 27, No. 4: pp79-107.
- Kemeny, J. (2002) “Society versus the State: The Social Construction of Explanatory Narratives in Social Policy Research,” **Housing, Theory and Society**. 19: pp185-195.
- Kenny, S. (2007) “Non-governmental Organisations and the Dialectics of the State and Civil Society,” **Science Direct**, 39(2007), pp185-199.
- Khafagy, F., Kandil, A. and Baradei, L. E., **Civil Society in Egypt: external and Internal Constraints**.
- Kidd, A. (2002) “Civil Society or the State? Recent Approaches to the History of Voluntary Welfare,” **Journal of Historical Sociology**. Vol. 15, No.3: pp328 – 342.
- Klitgaard, M.B. (2007) “Why Are They Doing It? Social Democracy and Market-Oriented Welfare State Reforms,” **West European Politics**. Vol. 30, No. 1: pp172 – 194.

- Konings, P. (2003) "*Organised Labour and Neo-liberal Economic and Political Reforms in West and Central Africa*," **Journal of Contemporary African Studies**. Vol. 21, No. 3: pp 447 – 471.
- Konopasek, Z. (2008) "*Making Thinking Visible with Atlas.ti: Computer Assisted Qualitative Analysis as Textual Practices*," **Forum: Qualitative Social Research**. Vol.9, No.2: pp1-21.
- Kumaranayake, L., Lake, S., Mujinja, P., Hongoro, C. and Mpembeni, R. (2000) "*How do countries regulate the health sector: Evidence from Tanzania and Zimbabwe*," **Health Policy and Planning**. Vol.15, No.4: pp357-367. <http://heapol/oxfordjournals.org/content/15/4/357.full.pdf.htm> (Accessed 10 June 2011).
- Labuschagne, P. (2003) "*Revisiting civil society in Africa*," **Conference Proceedings: African on A Global Stage – 2003**: African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific. <http://www.afsaap.org.au/Conference/2003/Labuschagne.pdf> (Accessed 15 March 2010).
- Lahiff, E. (2003) "*The Politics of Land Reform in Southern Africa*," **IDS Bulletin** Vol. 34, No.3 (July 2003).
- Little, A. (2002) "*Rethinking civil society: radical politics and the legitimization of unpaid activities*," **Contemporary Politics**. Vol. 8, No. 2: pp103-115.
- Malinowska-Sempruch, K., Bonnell, R. and Hoover, J. (2006) "*Civil Society – a leader in HIV prevention and tobacco control*," **Drugs and Alcohol Review**: 25, pp625-632.
- Mamdani, M. (2008) "*Lessons of Zimbabwe*," **London Review**. Vol. 30, No.23: pp17-21.
- Manji, F. And O’Coill, C. (2002) "*The missionary position: NGOs and development in Africa*," **International Affairs**. Vol.78, Issue 3: pp567 – 583.
- Matlosa, K. (2002) "*Election Monitoring and Observation in Zimbabwe: Hegemony versus Sovereignty*," **Africa Journal of Political Science**. Vol. 7, No. 1: pp129-154.

- McIlwaine, C. (1998) *“Contesting civil society: reflections from El Salvador,”* **Third World Quarterly**. Vol. 19, No. 4: pp651 – 672.
- Mercer, C. (1999) *“Reconceptualising State-Society Relations in Tanzania: Are NGOs making a difference?”* **Area**. Vol. 31, No. 3: pp247 – 258.
- Mercer, C. (2002) *“NGOs, civil society and democratisation: a critical review of the literature,”* **Progress in Development Studies**. Vol. 2, No. 1: pp5-22.
- Mohan, G. (2002) *“The disappointments of civil society: the politics of NGO intervention in Northern Ghana,”* **Political Geography**. Vol. 21, Issue 1: pp125 – 154.
- Moharir, V. (2000) *“Administrative reforms and socio-economic change: Some international perspectives on their implications for education and training,”* **The State of Public and Development Management in South Africa: The Mount Grace II Papers**. University of Stellenbosch.
- Muloongo, K. (2007) **The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Social Justice and Sound Developmental Policies in SADC: A Case Study of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe**. Report prepared for CIVICUS: World Alliance: Johannesburg.
- Mueller, M., Page, C. and Kuerbis, B. (2004) *“Civil Society and the Shaping of Communication-Information Policy: Four Decades of Advocacy,”* **The Information Society**, 20: 169-185.
- Murphy, J. (2005) *“The World Bank, INGOs, and Civil Society: Converging Agendas? The case of universal basic education in Niger,”* **Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations**. Vol. 16, No.4: pp353 – 374.
- Mutangadura, G.B. (2001) *Women and AIDS in Southern Africa: The case of Zimbabwe and its policy implications.”* **Jenda: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies**. Vol.1, No.2: <http://www.jendajournal.com/jenda/vol1.2/toc1.2.htm> (Accessed 5 July 2010).

- Mutter, L.R., Virden, R.J. and Cayer, N.J. (1999) *“Interest Group Influence in State Natural Resource Policymaking,”* **Society and Natural Resources**: Vol. 12, pp243 – 255.
- Muzondo, T. H. (2006) NGOs, Legislation and Self Regulation in Zimbabwe. http://www.kubatana.net/docs/opin/muzondo_ngos_legislation090609.doc (Accessed 10 December 2010).
- Nafziger, W. (1990) *“African Capitalism, State Power and Economic Development,”* **The Journal of Modern African Studies**. Vol.28, No.1: pp141 – 150.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2003) *“Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century,”* **Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution**. Vol.3, (1): pp99-134.
- Nel, E., Binns, T. and Motteux, N. (2001) *“Community-based Development, Non-governmental Organisations and Social Capital in Post-Apartheid South Africa,”* **Human Geography**. Vol.83, No.1: pp3-13.
- Neocosmos, M. (2003) *“Neo-Liberalism versus State Nationalism: Beyond State Thinking in Southern Africa,”* **Journal of Contemporary Studies**. Carfax Publishing. <http://www.epnet.com/academic> (Accessed 27 August 2009).
- NGO Consultancy Africa (PVT) Ltd (2010) **Civil Society Legislation in Zimbabwe History and Development**. <http://www.ngoconsultancyafrica.org/files/Civil%20Society%20Legislation%20in%20Zimbabwe%20History%20and%20Development.pdf> (Accessed 15 November 2010).
- Nzwei, O.I. and Kuye, J.O. (2007) *“The Developmental State and Conceptual Interpolations: A comparative policy-targeting for South Africa within a global context,”* **Journal of Public Administration**. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp 195 – 210.
- Oda van Craneburgh, (1996) *“Tanzania’s 1995 Multi-party Elections: The Emerging Party System,”* **Party Politics: An International Journal for the Study off Political Parties and Political Organisations**. Vol.4, Issue 2: pp535 – 547.

- Onwuegbuzie, A.J. and Leech, N.L. (2004) *“Enhancing the Interpretation of ‘Significant’ Findings: The Role of Mixed Methods Research,”* **The Qualitative Report Volume**. Vol. 9, No.4: pp770-792.
- Osirim, M.J. (2003) *“Carrying the Burdens of Adjustment and Globalisation: Women and Microenterprise Development in Urban Zimbabwe,”* **International Sociology**. Vol.18, No.3: pp535 – 558.
- Otto, R. (2009) **NGOs and Humanitarian Reform: Mapping Study in Zimbabwe – Report**. Channel Research. <http://www.icva.ch/doc00003655.pdf> (Accessed 11 March 2011).
- Pedzisa, T., Minde, I., and Twomlow, S., (2010) **The use of participatory processes in wide-scale dissemination of micro dosing and conservation agriculture in Zimbabwe** Paper presented at the *Joint 3rd African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE) and 48th Agricultural Economists Association of South Africa (AEASA) Conference*, Cape Town, South Africa, September 19-23, 2010. <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/95779/1/22.%20Zimbabwe%20participatory%20research.pdf> (Accessed 13 March 2012).
- Potts, D. (2000) *“Urban unemployment and migrants in Africa: evidence from Harare, 1985-84.”* **Development and Change**. Vol. 31, No.4: pp 879 -910.
- Potts, D. & Mutambirwa, C (1998) *“Basics are now a luxury: perceptions of structural adjustment’s impact on rural and urban areas in Zimbabwe,”* **Environment and Urbanisation**. Vol. 10, No. 1: pp55-76.
- Proskuryakova, L., Vandisheva, E., Belyaeva, N. And Bychkova, E. (2005) **An Assessment of Russian Civil Society: CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Russian Federation**. http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Russia_executive_summary.pdf (Accessed 8 February 2010).
- Rich, S. (1997) *“The State of NGOs in Zimbabwe: Honeymoon Over?”* **Southern Africa Report**. Vol. 12, No. 3: pp17-20.

- Roberts, S.M., Jones III, J.P. and Frohling, O. (2005) “NGOs and the Globalisation of Managerialism: A Research Framework,” **World Development**. Vol. 33, No. 11, pp1845 – 1864.
- Robinson, M. and Friedman, S. (2007) ‘Civil Society, Democratisation and Foreign Aid: Civic Engagement and Public Policy in South Africa and Uganda.’ **Democratisation**. Vol.14, No.4, pp643 – 668.
- Sabatier, P. (1998) “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,” **Journal of European Public Policy** 5 (March): pp98-130.
- Sachikonye, L. (2002) “Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis and democratisation,” **Review of African Political Economy**. Vol.29, Issue 91: pp13-20.
- Sachikonye, L. (2004) “Constitutionalism, the Electoral; System and Challenges for Governance and Stability in Zimbabwe,” **African Journal on Conflict Resolution**. Vol.4, No.2: pp171-195.
- Saki, O. (2010) **The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law**. Vol. 12, Issue 2. http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol12iss2/special_9htm (Accessed 10 January 2011).
- Salien, A.N. (2004) “The World Summit on the Information Society and Civil Society Participation,” **The Information Society**. 20: pp201-215.
- Sanbakken, C. (2006) *The Limits of Democracy posed by Oil Rentier States: The cases of Algeria, Nigeria and Libya*,” **Democratization**. Vol. 13, No.1: pp135-152.
- Shaw, I. (2008) “Ethics and the Practice of Qualitative Research,” **Qualitative Social Work**. Vol. 7, No. 4: pp**400-414**.
- Shumba, G. (2002) “A critical reflection on the 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe,” **African Human Rights Law Journal**. Vol. 2, No. 2: pp327-346.
- Sibanda, H. (1994) “NGO Influence on National Policy Formation in Zimbabwe,” **Institute for Development Research Reports**, Vol. 11, No.2: pp1-24. <http://www.worlded.org/docs/Publications/idr/pdf/11-2.pdf> (Accessed 10 August 2010).

- Sim, J. (1998) "Collecting and analysing qualitative data: Issues raised in the focus group." **Journal of Advanced Nursing**. Vol. 28, No.2: 345 – 352.
- Simon, D. (1997) "Development Reconsidered: New Directions in Development Thinking," **Human Geography**. Vol. 79, No. 4: pp 183-201.
- Stewart, S. (1997) "Happy ever after in the market-place: Non-governmental organisations and uncivil society," **Review of African Political Economy**. Vol. 24, No.71: pp11-34).
- Stubbs, P. (2003) "International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy," **Global Social Policy**. Vol. 3, No.3, pp319-348.
- Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations, 2005 <http://www.tango.or.tz> (Accessed 15 March 2011).
- Thornhill, C. (ed) (2007) **Journal of Public Administration**. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp161-162.
- Trade and Development Studies Centre Trust (2002) **The New ACP-EU (Cotonou) Agreement: A User's guide Part 2: Non-state actors and the new ACP-EU Partnership Agreement**: Harare
- Tvedt, T. (2004) "Development NGOs: Actors in a global civil society or in a new international social system?" in R. Taylor (ed) **Creating a better world: Interpreting global civil society**. Kumarian Press: Bloomfield CT: pp133-146.
- van Driel, F. and van Haren, J. (2003) "Whose interests are at stake? Civil society and NGOs in South Africa," **Development Southern Africa**. Vol. 20, No.4: pp529 – 543.
- Vaknin, S. (2005) **NGOs – The self appointed altruists**. Global Politicia: <http://globalpolitician.com/2569-international> (Accessed 3 February 2010).
- Vellinga, M. (2007) "Social Democratisation and Development Strategy: An Alternative to Neo-liberalisation in Latin America," **Journal of Third World Studies**. Vol. XXIV, No. 2: pp 95 – 107.

- wa Mutua, M. (1995) *“Putting humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The Dilemmas of the Postcolonial African State,”* **Brooklyn Journal of International Law**. No.21: pp505.
- Watkins, S.C., Swindler, A. and Hannan, T. (2012) *Outsourcing Social Transformation: Development NGOs as Organisations*. **Annual Review of Sociology**. Vol. 38: pp285 – 315.
- Weiss, E. (2004) *“The claim for qualitative policy research: A Mexican case,”* presented at the **OCED – U.S. Meeting on Evidence-Based Policy Research** April 19-20, 2004 Washington D.C. www.excelgov.org/usermedia/images/uploads/PDFs/OCED-Weiss.pdf (Accessed 19 March 2005).
- Whitefield, L. (2003) *“Civil Society as Idea and Civil Society as Process: The Case of Ghana.”* **Oxford Development Studies**. Vol. 31, No.3, pp380 – 400.
- White, S. (1999) *“NGOs, Civil Society and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of Representing the Poor,”* **Development and Change**. Vol. 30: pp3-7-326. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/PDF_XLS/AccountAndRep/11-Bangladesh-White-NGOs%20CS%20and%20State-1999.pdf (Accessed 11 March 2011).
- Wolf, R.M. (1993) **Judging educational research based on experiments and surveys**. UNESCO: http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/TR_Mods/Qu_Mod4.pdf (Accessed 11 March 2011).
- World Bank, (1981) **Zimbabwe Country Economic Memorandum**. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/17/000012009_20040617140230/Rendered/PDF/290580Zim.pdf (Accessed 15 March 2011)
- Young, J. (2007) **Networking for impact. Experiences from CTA supported regional agricultural policy networks.**
- Zondi, S. (2008) *“Southern African Development Community Social Policy Framework: A response,”* **African Journal of Development Studies**. Vol. 1, No. 13.

Zvobgo, C. J. (1986) "*Medical Missions: A Neglected Theme in Zimbabwe's History, 1893 – 1957,*" **Zambezia**. Vol. 13, No. 3: pp109-118.
<http://www.archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol13n2/juz013002004.pdf>
(Accessed 10 January 2011).

2.3. Theses and Dissertations

Bryant, T. (2001) **The Social Welfare Policy Change Process: Civil Society Actors and the Role of Knowledge**. Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of Toronto: Canada.

Dorman, S.R. (2001) **Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe**. Doctoral thesis, Published - Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics and International Relations in the Division of Social Studies at the University of Oxford.

Murisa, T., (2004), **Food (in) Security in Zimbabwe: An Evaluation of the Development Ideologies that Define Patterns of Land Reform**, MA Thesis, Leeds University.

Ncube, L. (2010) **NGOs and Food Aid in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of World Vision International Food Aid Strategy Intervention in Gwanda District**. MA Thesis. University of Witwatersrand.

Odero, J. A. (2007) **How is governance being redefined in Africa to allow for substantive Civil Society participation**. Unpublished Thesis. Faculty of Social Sciences, Aalborg University: Denmark

Takure, S.M. (2009) **A history of intolerance? An Analysis of the history of state-NGO relations and the implications on organisational performance**. Master in International Studies in Philanthropy and Social Entrepreneurship: University of Bologna (Unpublished Thesis).

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Letter of Request to Research Participants

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE DOCTORAL RESEARCH

Dear Sir/Madam,

(Assigned code of selected organisation)

I am a doctoral student registered in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University's Faculty of Arts (Department of Political and Governmental Studies) in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape Province of South Africa; studying towards a Doctor of Philosophy (Public Administration) degree. As per the degree requirements, I am conducting my doctoral research entitled: ***An analysis of the role of Non-governmental Organisations in the social welfare policy process: the case of Zimbabwe.***

I am writing to request your organisation's voluntary participation in this research as a key informant in interviews. My thesis seeks to understand what role non-governmental organisations play/have played in the social welfare policy process in Zimbabwe, specifically from the year 2000 to the present. I will provide the necessary information to assist you to understand what is expected of you (participating organisation).


The interviews will be strictly confidential. You and your organisation will not be named nor linked in any way to any of the information you provide. I would like to tape record the interview, only if you are comfortable with this arrangement. The voice recordings will be stored on password protected compact disks. A code will be assigned to identify the disks and only I, the researcher will have knowledge about the codes. The material collected will be used only for purposes of this study and for possible development of academic publications. I will ask that you sign the informed consent form to indicate your voluntary participation in the study, a copy of the signed form will be provided to you. However, you may wish to verbally consent to participate in the study.

You may decide to withdraw from the study at any stage in the process and there will be no negative consequences for the withdrawal. In the event that you decide to withdraw, you are entitled to any material that may have been collected from you.

You are free to ask questions or seek clarifications at any point in the study and may contact me, the researcher, on the telephone number provided below. The results of the study may be presented at academic conferences and in specialist publications and your identity will remain anonymous and confidential at all times.

By participating in this study, your organisation could contribute to an understanding of the social welfare policy process, specifically how non-governmental organisations participate in this process.

Yours faithfully,



Shungu Agnes Gwarinda

D.Phil - Public Administration Student

Student Number: 208093684


Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

Tel: +27 (0)21 466 9160

Cell: +27 (0)72 177 2265

Email: shugwari@yahoo.co.uk

Appendix 2: Letter of confirmation to research participants



Appendix 3: Research Interview Guide

Name of student (researcher): Shungu Agnes Gwarinda

Study Programme: Doctor of Philosophy (Public Administration), Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa

Student Number: 208093684

Research Topic: An Analysis of the Role of Non-Governmental Organisation in the Social Policy Process: The Case of Zimbabwe

RESEARCH INTERVIEW GUIDE

The purpose of this interview is to obtain information and experiences from Non-governmental Organisations on the role(s) they have played in the social policy process in Zimbabwe: 2000 – 2010. The interview also seeks to gain insight into the historical and current trajectory and development of the NGOs in the social sector in Zimbabwe and find out the contextual factors that have shaped/influenced their roles in the country.

- *Social policy = education, health and welfare (focus on vulnerable communities)*
- *NGOs selected involved in education, health and welfare in varying degrees and playing diverse roles.*

4 broad categories of questions:

- *NGO presence in Zimbabwe, operations, roles played*
- *Contextual factors influencing roles played*
- *Understanding of linkages with state social policy agendas and activities*
- *NGOs assessment of impact of the role it has been playing over the years.*

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

SECTION A

Objective 1: *To establish the particular roles played by non-governmental organisations in Zimbabwe*

Question 1: *How do NGOs participate in the social policy sector in Zimbabwe?*

1. Could you tell me about the background of your organisation, its origins, history and current presence in Zimbabwe?
2. What is the purpose of your organisation? (vision/mission/organisational goals)

3. In relation to the purpose of the organisation, what kind of activities/programmes does your NGO undertake/is involved in Zimbabwe?

Probe – policy related meetings, liaisons, community engagement etc (lobbying advocacy)

4. How do you develop programmes/what determines how/what you do as an organisation?
5. From a theoretical perspective, Social policy process includes agenda setting, policy formulation, policy development/adoption, implementation, evaluation. How would you describe the role of your organisation in the social policy process in Zimbabwe?
6. Could you give some examples where you think your organisation has successfully played the roles you have mentioned? Where you have not? (probe critical success factors/failures)
7. What were the goals and objectives of the specific roles you have played?
8. To what extent your organisation's role(s) in the social policy process in Zimbabwe corresponded to the goals and objectives the organisation has set out?

SECTION B

Objective 2: To analyse the context in which NGOs in the social policy sector operate in Zimbabwe

Question 2: What are the critical factors informing the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe?

9. What are the key factors that have influenced the role/programmes of your organisation in Zimbabwe since the year 2000? Probe:
 - Social
 - Economic
 - Political
 - Legislative
 - Funding
 - Government policy)

9a. Factors internal to your NGO

9b. External factors

10. How would you describe the way in which each of the key factors has influenced the roles that you play/have played?

11. In your experience, what has been the key role of your NGO in the social policy process over the last 10 years (since 2000)? Do you foresee this changing with the evolving context in the country or do you think that this should change in any way?

SECTION C

Objective 3: *To assess the extent to which the goals and activities of NGOs relate to state defined social policy agendas*

Question 3: *Has the role played by NGOs enhanced, contradicted, informed or complicated state policy agendas?*

12. Are there any state institutions that you engage with in playing your role?

13. Which modes of interaction with state institutions do you use/have you used?

14. How best can you describe your organisation's interactions with the state?

15. How would you describe the approach of the state towards NGOs involved in social welfare in the country? How would you describe your approach?

SECTION D

Objective 4: *To examine the impact of the role played by NGOs in Zimbabwe.*

Question 3: *Has the role played by NGOs enhanced, contradicted, undermined, informed or complicated state policy agendas?*

16. How would you describe the level of your organisation's achievements in the roles you have played in the social policy process in Zimbabwe over the last 10 years?

17. Which of your activities/programmes do you think have had the most impact/success? Why?

18. General – future organisational and or programmatic trajectory?

Appendix 4: Memo - Suspension of NGO Activities, 2008

Telephone: 790871/7
Telegrams: "SECLAB"
Private
Bag 7707/7750,
Causeway



MINISTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE, LABOUR
AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Compensation House
Cnr Fourth Street and Central Avenue
HARARE


Reference: SW/21/3

4 June 2008

**TO: ALL PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS (PVOs)/NON
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOs)**

It has come to my attention that a number of NGOs involved in humanitarian operations are breaching the terms and conditions of their registration as enshrined in the Private Voluntary Organisation Act [Chapter 17:05], as well the provisions of the Code of Procedures for the Registration and operations of Non Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe (General Notice 99 of 2007).

As the Regulatory Authority, before proceeding with the provision of Section (10), Subsection (c), of the Private Voluntary Act [Chapter 17:05], I hereby instruct all PVOs/NGOs to suspend all field operation until further notice.


Hon. N T Goche (MP)
**MINISTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE,
LABOUR AND SOCIAL WELFARE**