LANDSCAPES OF DIVISION:

Social Movements and the Politics of Urban and Rural Space in the Grahamstown Region of the Eastern Cape

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the politics of two grassroots social movements, the Unemployed People's Movement (UPM), based in Grahamstown, and the Rural People's Movement (RPM), based in the rural areas near Peddie, forty miles east. Observing that *urban* and *rural* are political designations, the primary question of this thesis is: Do the politics of these social movements challenge the conception of *urban* and *rural* as discrete political spaces? To some extent, it responds to and complicates Mamdani's theory of a bifurcated state in post-apartheid South Africa in which urban zones are the site of civil society and rural zones the site of traditional authorities, and only the former a democratised space (1996). Three themes—race, space, and citizenship—are employed and interrogated in the process of answering the principal question. Broadly historical in nature, and understanding the present political context to be a product of historical processes, the thesis begins with an historical study of the Grahamstown region from the time of the town's founding in 1812 until the end of apartheid in 1994, keeping the three key themes in focus. Then the politics of UPM and RPM are explored through a series of interviews aimed at understanding the context and experience of movement members and seeking their insight into the question of *urban* and *rural* space. Their responses are presented as a dialogue employing a theoretical strategy from Aguilar (2014) that distinguishes between and provides a framework to measure the 'practical scope' and the 'interior horizon' of movements. The thesis concludes with a discussion of important themes arising in the interviews: citizenship, NGOs, and political parties, and, of course, space. The backdrop to this concluding discussion is the xenophobic violence which occurred in Grahamstown in October 2015, helping situate the research and themes within the broader context of South African politics.

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For the people of Grahamstown who lost their community in October 2015,
and the people of Grahamstown who worked to make community anew.

People bring community into being.

INTRODUCTION
URBAN & RURAL: 'THE BURDEN OF PROTEST'

'[C]artography is designed not simply to reflect, to represent by 'capturing' the geography of racialized power. It is meant rather to re-present, to intervene in these racialized relations so as to initiate possibilities of resistance and response.' – Prof David Theo Goldberg in Racist Culture *(1993, 13)*

'Where binaries have meaning, they are dangerous.' – Prof Lungisile Ntsebeza at Thinking Africa Colloquium, Rhodes University (September 2014)

On the First of December 1818, some 565 miles east from the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa, a commando[1] of British soldiers under Colonel Thomas Brereton, with some Boer and African auxiliaries, departed the rather newly established fort and town of Grahamstown heading east towards the Great Fish River. Their purpose was to force Xhosa people following a chief named Ndlambe, who had already been driven violently across the Fish, further east beyond the Keiskamma River so that the 'border'—the Fish River, which flowed between the Cape Colony in the west and land still inhabited by Xhosa in the east—might be 'tranquil' (Mostert 1992, 469). The pretense for the raid was cattle theft committed by Xhosa people against white farmers in the colony, who lived and ran their cattle on land which had been taken from the Xhosa only within the last seven years; land the control of which and access to which was still contested. Serving the interests of tranquility, when Brereton found that the Xhosa had fled the approaching commando and hidden themselves and their cattle in the bush thickets along the Keiskamma, he 'turned his artillery on the bush and kept firing blindly into it' (Mostert 1992, 470)—as indiscriminate as gunfire can be. The cattle that stampeded out of the trees, some 10,000 head, were collected by the commando and driven back to the colony, and another 13,000 cattle were taken in the same raid. Within a few weeks, the Xhosa were raiding the colony for cattle in earnest, because they had lost their most important source of food (Mostert 1992, 470).

In the December 1818 commando, known as the 'Brereton Raid', we can clearly recognise a rationale which has flowed via differently nuanced streams, but steadily nonetheless, through southern and South African political relationships into the present: The colonised space west of the river was governed by laws, and African incursion into it was criminal; it was a civilised space where political belonging—citizenship—was determined by race and allegiance to the British Crown. East of the river was a space (in British imperial-colonial eyes) of illegitimate authorities, an African, uncivilised space inhabited by African (and therefore uncivilised) people, where both space and people were governable or controllable first with violence rather than with liberal

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[1] Originally an Afrikaans word for an armed and mounted raiding party.

systems of law, and then with laws designed for their exclusion. On the contrary, it was a space of established and enduring systems and traditions of political legitimacy and belonging, and the invasion of European soldiers and politicians, violence and politics was resisted for over a century before war and starvation ensured hegemony of the colonial system.

Nearly one hundred years after the Brereton Raid, in Grahamstown, on the 23rd of April 1917, a group of between five hundred and 1,000 African activists marched from the town's 'location'— designated African spaces in South African parlance since the 1830s, referring both to urban and rural areas—to the doors of the Municipal Hall on High Street. Decisions taken by the Municipal Council in 1914 that limited legal access by Africans to reside in Grahamstown to those employed in the city, set unfavourable conditions for leases for Africans, and which limited the number of cattle that could be legally kept by the residents of Grahamstown's locations had been the subject of protest by petition in the city for three years (Southey 1990). Furthermore, compounding the difficulties for Africans in Grahamstown, there had been many evictions from the locations and 'indiscriminate shooting' of Africans. These were the motivation for the march. This protest, during which some of the demonstrators were armed, was a signal not only of frustration with municipal laws but also of a political autonomy extant in the African locations, and therefore it was crushed.

The marchers were met by municipal officials, 'protected by a posse of foot police armed with rifles and bayonets fixed, drawn up in a cordon across High Street…. The Magistrate informed the crowd that he was prepared to listen to their demands only if they approached the authorities' in a reasonable way and ordered them to return to the location. The marchers would not disarm as long as the police were armed, but did retreat to the location (Southey 1990, 7). In traditional commando style, auxiliary paramilitary forces were hastily enlisted and armed and, 'By nightfall, the outskirts of the city [meaning the white section of the city] and especially those areas contiguous with the locations were "'thoroughly picketed'" (in Southey 1984, 247). The Mayor insisted that the Africans must disarm or he would not address their concerns, but the next day almost 1,000 police and paramilitaries invaded the locations, armed and mounted or driving cars, where they surrounded the hill called Makana's Kop and arrested some fifty-five people (Southey 1990, 9-10). Headlines in the *Graham's Town Journal* read, 'Grahamstown Army Marches on the Location' and 'Cavalry Charge on Makana's Kop' (26 April 1917). The spatial-political division demonstrated in the Brereton Raid can clearly be seen in this action as well, and its purpose remained the same: violent control of Africans in specific space, and maintaining a 'tranquil' border.

Almost a century later—a century that saw the implementation of the violent ultra-compartmentalisation of apartheid, as well as formal democracy and the election of a hegemonic African National Congress (ANC) government—in August 2014, members of the Unemployed People's Movement and other Grahamstown residents were once more protesting outside of the (now Makana) City Hall. Several hundred people mobilised against corruption in the municipality, calling for its dissolution; for transparent management of a corrupt Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing program; and against a poor municipal response to a long-lasting and recurring water shortage problem. Also arrayed once again in front of the Makana City Hall was a massive display of militarised police power: several heavily armoured cars as well as smaller South African Police Service (SAPS) vehicles with blinking lights blocked the road and the square on the west side of City Hall, and cordons of police in riot gear stood in front of the building, shields raised. When speakers from the Unemployed People's Movement addressed the activists from a platform immediately in front of City Hall, their backdrop was rendered in SAPS shields and helmets. The meaning was clear: the march and the protest constituted, in the eyes of the municipality, an infringement to be controlled by force.

While no retributive invasion by the police into the township followed the protest in 2014 as it had in 1917, South Africa is nonetheless a country where space and citizenship continue to be politicised, racialised, contested, and controlled. For ten years, Durban-based Abahlali baseMjondolo, 'the largest organisation of the militant poor in post-apartheid South Africa' (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2006), have faced violent (and illegal) eviction and repression from the state when they assert their right to urban land for housing: actions of lived necessity that are termed 'land invasions' by the state. Similar violence has been meted out to shack-dwellers in Cape Town (Knoetze 2014; Sacks 2014) and Johannesburg (Keepile 2010). The repressive narrative imagines the provenance of the repressible poor as 'elsewhere', often meaning 'rural', as in Durban where activists are cast as being from the Eastern Cape Province (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2015a). South Africa is also a country where rural areas, like urban ones, remain intensely undemocratic spaces (Gasa 2015). In 2008 and 2015, major episodes of xenophobic violence occurred which targeted mostly poor Africans from elsewhere on the continent, and, since mid-May of 2015, this violence, it has been argued, has been taken up by the state via Operation Fiela (Nicolson 2015), which has mobilised South African National Defence Force and police units to harass and coral 'foreigners'—many families suspected of foreignness are South African. Operation Fiela includes 'land invasions' among the crimes it will target (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2015b). Behind all of this looms the massacre of thirty-four mineworkers by police at a Lonmin mine near Marikana in the Northwest Province in August of 2012—another

indiscriminate shooting of Africans—which police stubbornly lied about during the subsequent Farlam Commission of inquiry (Tolsi 2015). Marikana is an affirmation that the lives of the (mainly rural) black poor are subordinate to control of the expression of popular and autonomous political will by poor black people and rendered as insignificant next to the necessity and sanctity of mining industry profits. Contemporary South Africa is a context, on the whole, of modes of politics in which the confluence of space, race, and citizenship is of crucial conceptual and practical significance.

The focus of this thesis is this confluence. The theoretical and methodological approach is to problematise the perception of discrete *urban* and *rural* political spaces by historicising the production of those perceived spaces alongside narratives of race and racism; and, in particular, to interrogate the political cogency of *urban* and *rural* in terms of popular politics, via the experiences and politics of two social movements in and near Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape.

Henri Lefebvre first coined the phrase 'the production of space' in his book by that title (1974) in which he argued that '*(Social) space is a social product*' which has 'taken on, within the present mode of production, within society as it actually is, a sort of reality of its own'; furthermore that it 'serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power' (26, emphasis original). However, while Lefebvre imagined contemporary forms of power to be practised through the homogenisation of space (1974, 23), it was the Martinican psychologist, theorist, and activist, Frantz Fanon, who theorized the differentiation of space through power relationships. This latter analysis will be the one more useful here. Fanon located the racialised production of space—of 'a world divided into compartments' ([1961] 1963, 37) governed through different modes and logics—at the center of the system of colonialism. Significantly, both Lefebvre and Fanon theorise a fundamental *resistance* to oppressive space production. The former writes, 'The violence of power is answered by the violence of subversion…. State-imposed normality makes permanent transgression inevitable' (1974, 23), echoing Fanon's more specific formulation of a decade earlier:

> The violence which has ruled over the ordering of colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms and broken up without reserve the systems of reference of the economy, of the customs of dress and external life, that same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native when, deciding to embody history in his own person, he surges into the forbidden quarters ([1961] 1963, 40).

Both the production of (controlled) space and the resistance to systems of spatial control figure in this research. After Fanon, a set of questions can be enumerated that enable a critical method,

analysis, and understanding in regard to the contemporary political situation in South Africa: Fanon writes, 'if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines of force it implies. This approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized' ([1961] 1963, 37). We will be examining this system of compartments, its lines of force, its ordering and geographical layout over two broad historical periods: the colonial period (including apartheid 1948-1994) and, with reconceiving the organisation and decolonisation of society kept optimistically in mind, the post-colonial period since the proclamation of South African democracy and the inauguration of the ANC government (1994-present). The questions we can ask include: What has been the role and import of space and spatial politics in the history of South Africa? How has space been used as an instrument of conceptual and practical control? What have been the forms of resistance to this control? In contemporary, post-colonial South Africa, do aspects of the colonial spatial organisation and relationships persist? (It is argued here that they do.) How are people involved in political resistance in South Africa experiencing space and spatial control? Crucially, do the discrete spaces—the 'compartments'—of the colonial period make political sense from the perspective of people involved in popular forms of resistance in the postcolony? As indicated above, this last question will be directed primarily at the concepts of *urban* and *rural*.

Why *urban* and *rural*? I argue in this thesis that the specific spatial-political division between urban and rural was one of the first articulations of division introduced to southern Africa through colonisation, that it was intimately linked to the development of ideas of race in South Africa, and that this lengthy process has ramifications today both for modes of control and for mobilising resistance. Furthermore, the two leading theorists of the production of space in the post-colony, Mahmood Mamdani and Partha Chatterjee, deal with the ideas of *urban* and *rural*. Considering political space in a post-colonial context requires engaging their work both seriously and critically—seriously because they both corrode specific epistemological assumptions inherent in colonialism and colonial thinking which have been translated to the present dispensation largely through global neoliberalism and its attendant power relations; and *especially* critically if one's purpose is to contribute to the erosion of such modes of thinking. Central to Mamdani's and Chatterjee's work are specific political conceptions of *urban* and *rural* which provide a functional starting point for interrogation of those spaces in the post-colony.

In *Citizen and Subject* (1996), Mamdani theorizes that a bifurcated state (referring equally to 'situation' and 'political entity') emerged in both colonial and post-colonial African countries in

which a fundamental political division falls along the boundary between urban and rural zones. Mamdani argues that, through colonialism, the state was 'organized differently in rural areas from urban ones'; while on the one hand 'urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights', the 'language' of 'rural power' was 'that of community and culture'. The urban areas were governed through direct rule, which aimed at 'the exclusion of natives [sic] from civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society,' while indirect rule in rural areas 'was about incorporating natives into a state enforced customary order' with chiefs as client authorities (Mamdani 1996, 18). One side of the bifurcation—envision the Fish River, c. 1818— was 'governed [through] a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights', while the other side, which 'ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice' (1996, 19).

Mamdani posits a theory of differentiated access to citizenship which is demarcated by the urban-rural divide: urban institutions of civil society govern citizens, while rural, 'customary' power structures rule over subjects (1996, 61). In both cases, the mode of governance experienced by most black people is 'despotism': 'direct and indirect rule [civil and customary authority] are better understood as variants of despotism: the former centralized, the latter decentralized' (Mamdani 1996, 18). In South Africa there is another line of argument that does not consider all rural space in terms of 'customary' or 'traditional' authority, but still considers 'the rural' as an undemocratic space, where citizenship is circumscribed by the 'rule' of commercial agriculture, especially for 'the black majority' (Haupt 2014). Either of these understandings of rural political reality is open to Mamdani's argument that formerly colonised African societies, including South Africa, were deracialised with independence but not democratized inasmuch as the colonially engineered bifurcation between urban and rural has persisted into the postcolony. Mamdani argues in this vein:

> The reform of decentralized despotism turned out to be a centralized despotism. So we come to the seesaw of African politics that characterizes its present impasse. On one hand, decentralized despotism exacerbates ethnic divisions, and so the solution appears as a centralization. On the other hand, centralized despotism exacerbates the urban-rural division, and the solution appears as a decentralization. But as variants both continue to revolve around a shared axis—despotism (1996, 291).

Centralisation and despotism characterise the political experience of many contemporary South Africans. Since 1994, and accelerating in the first fifteen years of this century, the centralisation of political power within the ANC national government coincides with a centralisation of wealth through neoliberal structures that increasingly marginalises those locales and segments of the population that are already isolated politically. Responsibility devolves more

and more to local government, while short resources and corruption hinder the meeting of those responsibilities, and politics by marginalised people are frequently explained and deopoliticised with the phrase 'service delivery' (Hart 2013). It has often been argued that, in the urban areas of South Africa, the politics of the poor are mediated through ghettoization and access to employment, location of and access to housing, and access to water and electricity. However, space remains acutely contested and both land occupations and forced removals still occur, post-apartheid (Hart 2013, 30). However instead of addressing the crucial question of how citizenship is differentiated in South Africa, responses to protest and political activity by the marginalised are framed, from above, in the strictly technocratic terms of 'service delivery' (Gibson 2011, 29-30) or 'law and its enforcement' (Neocosmos 2006a, 4). Alongside neoliberal depoliticisation, the same logic of control of certain segments of the population that we saw mobilised in the colonial era responses to African politics is deployed. Political assassinations and killing of poor activists during protests in Durban (Pithouse 2014), the mass violence of Marikana in 2012, and the militarised xenophobia of Operation Fiela in 2015 demonstrate that government, including national government, resorts increasingly to violent repression—that is, despotism—and this certainly problematises any argument that the repressive practices of the current South African state are very different from the state(s) of the past, even if they are different in scale. In these expressions of state politics is a blending of 'the tyranny of The Market' and the 'discipline of direct colonial rule' at work (Pithouse 2006, 250). In this context, politics outside of the formal, exclusive structures join day-to-day questions of survival on the chopping block of neoliberalism in the practice of politics, to quote Rancière, as 'the art of suppressing politics' ([1992] 1995, 10).

Mamdani's work, like Fanon's, affords us the opportunity to ask a number of important questions. Conclusions to even the most thorough intellectual efforts often leave readers with more unresolved questions than answered ones. Perhaps the writer shares in this dilemma, as well, arriving at 'the end' only to find himself or herself unsatisfied. Maybe it is fortunate for the long process of intellectual work that no question is ever fully answered, but it can be frustrating and difficult to accept in the short term. However illuminating a line of thought might be, it seems that the only end it can achieve is an artificial one. Mamdani's *Citizen and Subject* concludes in this way: with much more to say; with questions. It appears necessary to explore some questions that arise from Mamdani's argument in the hopeful interest of providing some basis for expanding on his project, and, in particular, analysing critically the production of urban and rural political space.

In the last pages of *Citizen and Subject*, Mamdani offers this enjoinder: 'The point is neither to set aside dualisms that mark social theory nor to exchange one set for another more adequate to describing the contemporary situation. Rather it is to problematize both sides of every dualism by historicizing it, thereby underlining the institutional and political condition for its reproduction and for its transformation' (1996, 299). This is a view which has guided my intellectual endeavours, including this thesis, very broadly approached through the following questions: How can we question the logic of divisions? Likewise, how can we challenge divisions, both actual and perceived? Most importantly, what is the shape of a politics that questions—and perhaps challenges—divisions? Coupled with the questions drawn from Fanon, outlined above, we can take a critical and precise approach to 'problematising' the perceived urban and rural political dualism in South Africa. With problematising dualisms and questioning divisions in mind, Mamdani ends *Citizen and Subject* by saying that it is by linking the urban and the rural that formerly colonised African societies will advance the processes of democratisation which have largely eluded them (1996, 297).

More recent literature on South Africa has repeated the necessity of creating this link, both intellectually and politically. Hart and Sitas (2004) call for a more integrated approach to questions of the urban and rural in South Africa. Research, they argue, has itself been largely bifurcated (2004, 32). Similarly, Kepe and Ntsebeza write that there is a 'marginalization of the rural' in scholarship on South Africa (2012, 4-5). Moreover, even though there is an extensive body of literature that explores the spatial aspect of domination and resistance in major urban areas in South Africa (Hart 2013; Selmeczi 2012; Gibson 2011; Neocosmos 2006a) and other parts of the world (Chatterjee 2004; Zibechi 2010), little work has been done on small towns in South Africa. One valuable piece is an interpretation, through Fanon, of spatial divisions in Grahamstown (Pillay 2012), and another is Gillian Hart's book *Disabling Globalization* (2002), which focuses on small towns in KwaZulu-Natal. Significantly, however, integrated discussions of the urban and rural are also lacking (Hart and Sitas 2004).

How can we expand on Mamdani's 'bifurcated state' formulation, with this literature gap in mind? Another set of questions suggests itself, the first question of which is drawn from the important book by Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed* (2004).[2] As mentioned, Chatterjee's

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[2] Although Chatterjee has been referenced, and will be again, this thesis is not intended to engage in the debates of the 'subaltern school', even though Chatterjee is a founding member of that intellectual project. The reader may choose to situate this particular research in the field of 'subaltern studies', but it has no intention of loyalty to subaltern theories or theorists. Alhough valuable intellectual efforts have emerged from 'subaltern studies', the work of attending to the various strains and critiques of this body of work can be more distracting than fruitful. Defining '*the* subaltern' or 'subalterneity', arguing whether these are fixed or flexible concepts—or not concepts at all but specific types or groups of people—are some of the debates which I seek to avoid here except for one brief note below.

work is significant in the study of space in postcolonial societies. Writing about urban India, but with theoretical importance for South Africa and other countries, Chatterjee proposes a distinction between 'real' and 'formal' citizenship (2004, 4), in which only those with access to the former are fully rights-bearing citizens. This same 'analysis has often been applied to post-apartheid South Africa, where the realm of civil society is in fact a small one' (Gibson 2011, 28). South Africans, it is argued, are extended 'formal' citizenship, but the relegation of the majority of the population to a second-rate physical and political space belies a 'real' citizenship for all citizens. This latter group, often considered 'encroachers' and 'polluters' in the urban sphere, are not a part of civil society, but of 'political society' (2004, 140; 40).

Political society is the space of the 'governed' (of Chatterjee's title), and its people make up 'populations', which are governable. 'Unlike citizenship', Chatterjee writes, 'which carries the moral connotation of sharing in the sovereignty of the state and hence of claiming rights in relation to the state, populations do not bear any inherent moral claim' (2004, 136). It is an easily observable fact in any city in the world that some urban people are not afforded the same, or any, access as 'full' citizens to the civil society institutions that are ostensibly urban. As populations, lacking a moral obligation from the state, they are the recipients of services rather than rights, a reality seen and experienced in many South African cities (Chatterjee 2004, 136; Gibson 2011). Mamdani reiterates the conceptual distinction between civil and political society in *Define and Rule* (2012) as follows: 'the modern state ensures equal citizenship in political society while acknowledging difference in civil society, but its colonial counterpart institutionalized difference in both the polity and society' (2). This articulation brings in the process of transition from the colonial state to the postcolonial state, which is of special theoretical importance going forward in this particular inquiry.

Mamdani and Chatterjee complement and complicate each other. Chatterjee reveals clearly the contradictions inherent in the 'centralized despotism' of urban civil society, its limited definitions of and access to citizenship. While, then, we can say that *urban* is not the site of *only* citizens, and having pointed out above that *rural* does not signify *only* customary authority and subjects, we must also acknowledge that the line of bifurcation, at least in a South African context, is not neatly drawn. Therefore, we could ask the questions: How do we account for those segments of society whose access to citizenship is not conterminous with their location in either the urban or the rural? Is there a 'space'—not physical, but political, and, in that way, potentially

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Intellectuals make their best contributions when they are invested not in closed-circuit debates with their colleagues, but when their eyes are turned outwards from the academy with theory as a tool, not as an objective.

transcending the spatial bifurcation—between civil society and customary authority, between the urban and the rural, that has political characteristics of each and potential for linking the two?

The fact of ambiguity leads to other questions. The penultimate chapter of *Citizen and Subject* deals with the concept of 'The Rural in the Urban'. What new angles on the issue, if any, are available if we propose the reverse situation: the 'Urban in the Rural'? Both of these expressions are seemingly paradoxical, but the point is not a subversion or conversion of the urban or rural spaces into their opposites, so obviously we are not proposing the presence of large buildings in the midst of (what would no longer be) farmland, nor the more impractical (but no more extreme) reverse, but rather about a *conceptual* and *political* re-perception of what those spheres mean and how they interact. For inspiration we can look to the work of Norman Etherington, whose misleadingly titled history of South Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century, *The Great Treks* (2001), takes a unique approach. Rather than writing another history from the point of view found in the colonial archive, Etherington attempts a history that has as its vantage point a central location in the High Veld, a repositioning from which the colonial incursions of Europeans can be viewed from without, rather than nearly exclusively from within themselves, and from which 'the agents of colonialism appear first as specks on a distant horizon', challenging the 'pernicious tradition of viewing South African history through the eyes of white colonists' (2001, xiii). He critiques, too, other methods (among them anthropological and linguistic) that, in trying to shift the focus away from the colonial report, 'reproduce by other means the Us/Them binary opposition typical of colonial encounters….We have events, They have ways of life. We have history, They have culture' (2001, xiii)—in the idiom of Mamdani's study, 'we are citizens; they are subjects'. Does a method like Etherington's, very loosely captured in the inverted idea of the 'urban in the rural', have value in the attempt to link these two spheres? Mamdani mentions the connection between 'urban activism' and 'rural discontent' (1996, 220). Can we talk, after Chatterjee and Etherington, about urban discontent manifested in rural activism? Taken further, might the divisions and binaries through which we understand politics and political action in fact be inappropriate to the circumstances that actually obtain and in which many, if not most, people make their lives? The fact, detailed by Mamdani, that people have ties and residences in both the urban and rural spaces makes this a compelling question.

Mainly, Mamdani's argument about the bifurcation of colonial and postcolonial African societies deals with institutions of power and the reproduction of power: an 'institutional segregation' in the words of Jan Smuts, that 'carries with it territorial segregation' (quoted in Mamdani 1996, 6). The idea of 'territorial' spaces being significantly linked to political spaces underlies the argument of this thesis. However, Mamdani's focus on institutions has provided for

one of the major critiques of *Citizen and Subject* as a narrow and 'statist' account (for a sophisticated example see Neocosmos, *forthcoming*, 2016). However, the political landscape of South Africa *has been* ordered largely from above in dialectical relation to what have become suppressed or mutated political traditions and trajectories that are constituted from below. (We will return to this idea of 'above' and 'below', further on). Given this, I would argue that Mamdani established the particular political history which he did with the intention of proposing a particular political future, which, admittedly, comes through quite vaguely. Since civil society is a site of power, especially if one considers the circumscribed nature of civil society—the 'centralized despotism'—Mamdani asserts that 'no reform of contemporary civil society institutions can by itself' effect reform of the 'decentralized despotism' of customary authority which he argues exists in many African societies (1996, 15), and of which we have seen local government increasingly taking on the characteristics. It is the final point made in *Citizen and Subject* that the route to transcending the urban-rural divide cannot be on the same avenues built by power. 'It is necessary to transcend the dualism of power around which the bifurcated state is organized', in Mamdani's words (1996, 301). Pursuing the idea of a different political future, Mamdani asks, 'What social forces can link the urban and the rural?' (1996, 297), and he identifies two ways in which the urban and rural *have* been linked through structures of the state, what he calls 'administrative' and 'political' ways, but goes on to say that the former 'turned out to be coercive' and the latter resorted to clientelism (1996, 300). However, and this is vital going forward, Mamdani asks the question: 'If power reproduced itself by exaggerating differences and denying the existence of an oppressed majority, is not the burden of protest to transcend these differences without denying them?' (1996, 8).

It is striking that the manner of transformation, the different political future, which Mamdani envisions is captured by the phrase 'burden of protest'. This would suggest, in the same vein that our discussion here will take, that it is outside of institutions of power—in the 'oppressed majority'—that the mode of transformation must be sought. Therefore, we can ask, what role do people excluded from or not fully included in civil society have in theorising the urban-rural division and potentially challenging it?—and it is my contention that they certainly have one. What is more, what is the role of people 'outside' of liberal civil society, 'the governed', in initiating societal transformation?—once again, I claim that they have one. It is possible that present in some forms of protest are concepts and politics which suggest a different way of thinking about political space than the way born of and matured through colonialism. Such protest itself, if it does in fact move across spaces, will likely be difficult to categorise. Mamdani writes that 'to create a democratic majority is to transcend' the divisions organised by power, including

the urban-rural divide (1996, 296). We will now turn to those people who bear 'the burden of protest'.

Social space, as we have seen it characterised by Fanon and Lefebvre, involved elements of resistance. As Fanon expresses it, in the context of colonialism, 'the presence of an obstacle accentuates the tendency toward motion' ([1963] 1961, 53). With *motion* in mind, let us look to social movements as potential sources of resistance to spatial delimitation: that is, 'other forces on the boil, because the rationality of the state, of its techniques, plans and programmes, provokes opposition' (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 23).

As noted at the outset, this research is situated geographically in the modern-day Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, and specifically around the city of Grahamstown. Grahamstown played an important role, especially during the early colonial period, in the development of British colonial systems of control and definitions of space and race. Though no longer an important urban centre in South Africa, research in the Grahamstown region still has the potential to provide valuable insight to the questions at hand. As has been explained, the broad questions posed above are considered through the politics and practice of two social movements in the specific area under study: the Unemployed People's Movement, based in and near Grahamstown, and the Rural People's Movement, which operates near Peddie, some forty miles east of Grahamstown. In its most specific construction yet, the primary question of this research is if, in popular politics, at least as they are manifested through social movements in Grahamstown, whether the perception of *urban* and *rural* as discrete political spheres is as cogent as the discourse of and about South African (even popular) politics would suggest; or if these social movements practise a politics that provides an alternative understanding of political *urban* and *rural* space.

As we have seen, the trend of South African politics since the end of apartheid has been an incongruous mix of liberalisation and repression. In particular, mobilisations of popular politics have either been cast as criminal or about 'service delivery', rather than politics. Sidney Tarrow links suppression by liberalisation with social movements and citizenship: 'movements and their potential disruption led national states to […] open new forms of participation to their citizens'; and in this way 'citizenship emerged through a rough dialectic between movements […] and the national state' (1994, 76). In an era when much of the political activity by marginalised people in South African meets with criminalisation and violent repression, it is questionable (at least in many cases) whether a dialectic exists in this shape at the moment, but nonetheless we can look to social movements for examples of popular politics that express an alternative logic to the hegemonic one.

A dialectical theory of social movements that perhaps better explains the politics under examination is developed by Laurence Cox and Alf Nilsen, in their book on a Marxist approach to the study of social movements, *We Make Our Own History* (2014). Through the Marxist tradition, they consider social movements, not (as in Tarrow's explanation) as groups that 'obediently play a constructive role within a set of rules established from above', but as actors with potentially quite different ideas about the organisation of society (2014, 26). In their construction, the dialectic through which social relationships, including citizenship, are constructed does not occur between social movements and the state, specifically, but between 'social movements from below'—that is, movements mobilised and organised around a rationality of 'subaltern groups' (2014, 72)—and 'social movements from above'—that is, movements which seek to sustain the status quo; to 'either reproduce or extend' their power 'and their hegemonic position within a given social formation' (2014, 59-60).[3] 'Social movements from below have shaped the modern world', they write;

> [t]hey have not done so alone, but in conflict with massively powerful movements from above: successive forms of capitalist accumulation, new types of state and hegemony, racist mobilisations and patriarchal movements, new forms of "common sense" and brute force which have all attempted, often effectively, to reinforce existing structures of power, exploitation and sociocultural hierarchies (2014, vi).

This yields the theoretical outcome that specific political and social norms are dialectically produced social hegemonies (in the Gramscian sense); that there is not a social or political order that exists outside of human activity. In other words, to allude once more to Fanon, 'Man [sic] is what brings society into being' ([1952] 1967, 4). Therefore, 'from the abstract consideration of how societies are constituted through praxis […] we return to the immediate and concrete terrain of struggle, mobilisation and alliance-building – but now on our own terms, not taking the given order for granted but seeing it as contingent and capable of being displaced' (Cox and Nilsen, 48). This assumption underlies the following arguments about the historical production of existing politics of space in South Africa and the possibility of alternative politics of space, as well as to the political identities of 'race' and 'citizen', which have been so intimately knitted to space in the South African context. The argument in the following chapters that the spatial politics and relationships in South Africa—specifically the Grahamstown region—were a project of colonialists represents a 'social movement (or series of movements) from above', while the

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[3] Compellingly simply, Cox and Nilsen define 'subaltern groups' as 'social movements from below' (2014, 2). This will be the implicit definition of subaltern employed in this work, if one chooses to see 'the subaltern' in it.

principle purpose of this research, of looking to social movements for a critique of the urban and rural binary, is informed by the contingency of the 'given order'.

Hart, reflecting on Gramsci via Peter Thomas, links this to our earlier discussion: 'far from being "located" in civil society, hegemony traverses civil and political society', such that a certain mode and conception of politics are 'true' until questioned through different ('subaltern') modes and conceptions (2013, 192). Hart demonstrates the practicality for the South African context of understanding 'social movements from above' as all of those things which Cox and Nilsen outline (see above), and the resistance and dialectic through social movements from below in the move by the ANC government from consent to coercion and the proliferation of social movements 'representing concerted expressions of popular antagonism directed at the ANC' (2013, 197-198).

These movements have particular theoretical significance. Cox and Nilsen write, 'Theory…is knowledge that is consciously developed out of experience,' from 'situated praxis' (2014, 8; 56). Furthermore, they identify 'a fundamental confusion in the sort of "critical" analysis which simply dissects the existing structures of society in isolation from the agency which created and maintains them, and which divorces calls for change from any sense of conversation with popular agency' (2014, 206). This research understands this to be true. Therefore, the appropriate source for critical political theory, which is *situated* in praxis, and which does not *necessarily* share in hegemonic assumptions about the world, is in fact 'social movements from below' that mobilise around and because of their lived experience. How, we can ask, do members of the Unemployed People's Movement and of the Rural People's Movement articulate the (their) 'burden of protest'?

This thesis is organised into two parts. Each part is introduced with a short theoretical excursus that reflects on methodology and the approach to the research. The first part, comprising three chapters that focus on the early colonial period, the late colonial period, and apartheid respectively, provides an historical context centred on Grahamstown and the surrounding region. Special attention is paid to the three interlinked conceptual themes presented at the outset: space, race, and citizenship.

The second part proceeds from conclusions drawn out during the historical study: namely, that the conceptualisation of *urban* and *rural* political spaces or spheres is a product of colonial politics, impositions, and culture in which race is profoundly implicated. It is against this divided landscape that the politics of the Unemployed People's Movement and the Rural People's Movement are considered.

In Chapter 4, the content of the interviews with social movement members is presented. The words and ideas of the activist respondents are considered through an 'annotated dialogue'

between the two movements, framed by the discussion of urban and rural political division. A 'theoretical strategy' distinguishing between the 'practical scope' and 'interior horizon' of social movement politics as set out by Aguilar (2014) will structure this dialogue.

Chapter 5 relates events of October 2015 in Grahamstown in which the Unemployed People's Movement, and, to a small extent, the Rural People's Movement, were involved. These are student protests and an outbreak of xenophobic looting. The Unemployed People's Movement supported the former and contested the latter.

The conclusion elaborates on critical themes that emerged in the interviews—namely, non-governmental organisations, political parties, social movement autonomy, and citizenship—and makes an historical argument for how these entities and ideas as articulated by activists intersect or overlay the overarching themes of the thesis. In the process, some specific complexity is brought to the question of urban and rural political space.

PART I: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

First Excursus
Historiography: Methodology and Theoretical Approach

In his *Prison Notebooks*, the Italian Marxist and activist Antonio Gramsci writes, 'One cannot be a philosopher, by which I mean have a critical and coherent conception of the world, without having a consciousness of its historicity' (1971, 324). To think about the world, at least the world of people, is to think historically. Acknowledging the worth of Gramsci's statement, we will approach the concepts of *urban* and *rural* in terms of their historicity; that is, as historically produced concepts with particular material and ontological trappings rooted in specific contexts. Gramsci himself observes in 'Notes on Italian History' that *urban* and *rural* are political spaces roughly corresponding, at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the 'North' and 'South' of Italy. The two spaces were involved in a 'complex city-countryside relationship' of collaboration and antagonism that 'can be studied in' specific 'political programmes' mobilised in Italy in the days of its industrialisation (Gramsci 1971, 90-102). In this case, the context is the period since the colonisation of southern Africa by Europeans, and especially the 19th and 20th Centuries. Crucially, the latter part of the colonial period is chosen not because the event marks the beginning of history in the region (which it does not), but because it initiated a specific historical process through which *urban* and *rural* came to define political space in southern Africa.

Gramsci continues by asking, 'How is it possible to consider the present, and quite specific present, with a mode of thought elaborated for a past which is often remote and superseded?' (1971, 324). Answering this question entails a critical engagement with history and historiography, the details of the former and the worldviews of the latter. The question of *urban* and *rural* that runs through this research is posed in and to the present—indeed, a 'specific present'—but it is historical in its scope and approach. The question and its potential answers are situated within historical time. The purpose in the three chapters that follow is to historicise 'urban' and 'rural' as concepts, to argue *against* their metaphysical permanence, to argue *for* their political and politicised place in history and the historical present. To that end, the three themes introduced above—space, race, and citizenship—provide a useful scaffolding. In fact, these are concepts the practical manifestations of which, like *urban* and *rural*, were fashioned for South/ern Africa in the historical period under review. By historicising these concepts, a critically historical and political methodology can be applied in the part of this research dealing with social movements of the present.

However, we are not only dealing with a history of concepts but also a history of people, and specifically of people who have been and are coerced to the material and political 'bottom' of a hierarchical society. In a different essay, Gramsci writes, 'The history of subaltern groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic', precisely because '[s]ubaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up' (1971, 54-55).[1] Because of this 'activity of the ruling groups', Gramsci declares, 'Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should therefore be of incalculable value for the integral historian' (1971, 55). In the critical history of the Grahamstown region that follows, 'every trace' of politics from below can be neither identified nor depicted, but in keeping with Gramsci's compelling demand for an 'integral' history, careful attention has been paid to political currents which might flow 'uphill'. The 'activity of the ruling groups' is treated much like Michelle Alexander's tracing of practises of subjugation of black people in the United States from slavery to the Jim Crow laws to mass incarceration with the assumption that 'preservation through transformation' of institutions 'is the process through which white privilege [political privilege of the ruling class] is maintained, though the rules and rhetoric change' (2010, 21).

Just as political movements from below must accomplish this defiant 'uphill' move, so must the historian who encounters the historiography of the oppressor, in the words of Walter Benjamin '[regard] it as his [sic] task to brush history against the grain' ([1940] 2005, np). We might look to Etherington, already introduced, for a neatly worked example of this kind of history: By shifting the historical vantage point away from the colonial centre, he quite literally works against the figurative grain of earlier historiography of South/ern Africa. Another notable example is Ifi Amadiume's critical ethnography of gender in pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria (1987), which, like this thesis, attempts to complicate an established binary. In order to work out an 'integral' history, it is precisely the 'established', that which has undergone establishment, with which we must take issue. In this case, it is the established historiography and the historiographical establishment.

The objective is not merely revisionist. Rather it is the tracing of political ideas through a specific history, to situate them *within* that history rather than above, outside, or beside it. An historian would necessarily begin with primary sources, although, as Etherington puts it, 'A major problem for those who want to create indigenous rivals for embryonic white settlements

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[1] Cox and Nilsen's theory of social movements 'from above' and 'from below' outlined in the introduction and of great use in this research is ultimately Gramscian, in this regard.

such as Plymouth Rock, Botany Bay and Cape Town is that there are no written records to work from' (2001, xiii). However, this thesis is not the work of an historian, and therefore it relies largely on secondary sources, though occasionally primary sources were available. While historical in its outlook, the research is not meant to provide a thorough history but rather to make a point about politics and give context to the politics and actions of the Unemployed People's Movement and the Rural People's Movement, which are discussed in the second part of the thesis. In keeping with the argument about historiography here, I have been critical of the sources when necessary. In particular, I have reproached the elision of politics where it occurs, the argument for or assumption of a natural or apolitical state of society. 'Historians', writes Etherington, 'who think in terms of organic development of pre-destined nation-states include everyone inside the borders as part of "our history". People on the other side of the fence tend to get left out' (2001, 5-6). The argument can be extended to speak of fenced concepts other than simply the nation-state. To follow Fanon, '[S]ociety, unlike biochemical processes, cannot escape human influences. Man [sic] is what brings society into being. The prognosis is in the hands of those who are willing to get rid of the worm-eaten roots of the structure' ([1952] 1967, 4). We—people, not a metaphysical History—generate and maintain 'fences', even when the activity of people abounds to contradict their maintenance. The urban and rural divide is potentially another of these fences which can only be conceived of in terms of histories that define by division. Suspecting worms in the structure, I have sought to dispel the 'organic-ness' and emphasise the *political* aspect of that boundary.

The Haitian intellectual Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes in *Silencing the Past* (1995), in a chapter entitled 'An Unthinkable History', 'When reality does not coincide with deeply held beliefs, human beings tend to phrase interpretations that force reality within the scope of these beliefs' (72). He pursues this argument through the history and historiography of the Haitian Revolution. As Trouillot relates, Europeans living on the eve of that revolution could not conceive of a massive and coordinated revolt by the enslaved people of Haiti. This was based on the ontologically perceived inability of black Africans to conceive of freedom. Up until the revolution, slave owners and European intellectuals alike spoke of its impossibility. Indeed, they continued to deny it during the revolution, as well, and even after the revolution, so that 'in most places outside Haiti, more than a century after it happened, the revolution was still largely unthinkable history' (1995, 95). During those intervening years, Trouillot argues, expanding colonialism had justified its own logic (1995, 95), not least (and maybe most) in the

continent Africa, a small of region of which is our focus here. Trouillot explains the process through which this happened:

> The treatment of the Haitian Revolution in written history outside of Haiti reveals two familiar tropes that are identical, in form (rhetorical) terms, to figures of discourse of the late eighteenth century. The first kind of tropes are formulas that tend to erase directly the fact of a revolution. I call them, for short, formulas of erasure. The second kind tends to empty a number of singular events of their revolutionary content so that the entire string of facts, gnawed from all sides, becomes trivialized. I call them formulas of banalization (1995, 96).

Here, we are not dealing specifically with revolution, but with the possibility of politics and political action—although perhaps of politics that, if magnified in scale and scope, could in some ways be called revolutionary. Two erasures and two banalizations after the fashion of Trouillot are pertinent to the present argument: Through colonialism, politics other than colonial politics are erased, and, even in the process of the formation of *urban* and *rural*, the political contingency of urban and rural is erased. Likewise, the actions of people offering different political options are not recognised as such, and the distinction between 'urban' and 'rural' is dehistoricised and thus banalised. In a history without historicity, 'worldview wins over the facts' (Trouillot 1995, 93).

We can also consider Kristin Ross's discussion (2002) of the student and worker uprising in France in May 1968 in which she interrogates the frequent assessment of that major political event—that 'Nothing happened'. Ross writes of 'the police conception of history', which she derives from Rancière's understanding of the police, as 'less concerned with repression than with a more basic function: that of constituting what is or is not perceivable, determining what can or cannot be seen, dividing what can be heard from what cannot' (2002, 23). The 'police', in this view, act on the moment itself as well as on the memory of the moment until a moment and movement of enormous political mobilisation and significance, like May '68, can be banalised—to make the link to Trouillot—as historically inconsequential, and therefore invisible (or at least not worth seeing). In colonial histories as in colonies, the police are a permanent presence. Indeed, they are a nearly permanent presence throughout these chapters. With the police in view, Trouillot writes, 'The forces [of the production of history] are less visible than gunfire, class property, or political crusades. I want to argue that they are no less powerful […]. The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, the exposition of its roots' (1995, xix).

The subaltern school, which takes at least its name and some of its terminology from Gramsci, has sought to bring those coerced into invisibility back into the historiography of

India. In *Dominance without Hegemony* (1997), Ranajit Guha differentiates between two elitist modes of historiography, colonial and nationalist, both of which, in the context of India, 'proceeded from the standpoint of liberalism to regard the colonial state as an organic extension of the metropolitan bourgeois state and colonialism as an adaptation' of such (x; 3-4). The similarities with Etherington are clear. Guha's argument that '[t]o change the world *and* to maintain it in its current state have indeed been the dual functions of liberal historiography performed on behalf of the class [the elite] for which it speaks' leads him to ask, 'Where then does criticism come from?' (1997, 6; 11). He offers the answer, which obliges an allusion to the 'burden of protest', that criticism comes '[f]rom outside the universe of dominance which provides the critique with its object, indeed, from another and historically antagonistic universe' (1997, 11). Therefore, the historical critique which forms the first part of this research and enables undertaking the second part looks to that 'outside' and 'antagonistic universe' in constructing its historiography of urban and rural political space.

The word 'outside' is of special importance in this research, which deals with the spatial organisation of political life linked to distribution of power in South/ern Africa which has organised and distributed many people into and to the 'outside'. Given our discussion here, the relationship between space and politics in South Africa must be situated historically. There are two processes to be explored in the coming chapters: the first deals with the history of politics in southern African societies; and the second with the hardening and ultimate perceptual reification of a boundary between a politically urban space and a politically rural space. Race and citizenship are constant landmarks through these processes. While the following chapters are not intended to provide either a thorough history of politics in South/ern Africa, or of the political and archaeological transitions that produced the present spatial dispensation, the theoretical aspect of the research requires a grounding in history. The work of thinking critically about political division cannot be accomplished without a departure from the normative historical narratives that, more often than not, are dialectically allied with divisive political agendas. To take one relevant example, Mamdani writes, 'Colonial privilege took two forms: racial and tribal. Both were based on legally sanctioned difference, and both were taken as proof of that difference' (2012, 3). The blending of *a priori* and *a posteriori* justification for political designations (race, class; urban, rural, etc.) yielded an incontestable logic of division. Nevertheless, the object in the following chapters is to contest.

The first historical chapter, which takes the broadest perspective, deals largely with the period around and following the founding of Grahamstown in 1812, and presents an argument for the

definition and racialisation of political spaces in nineteenth century colonial southern Africa that can be conceived of as 'urban' and 'rural'. As a preliminary outline of this argument, we can look to Wilmsen's intersectional theorisation of 'remoteness' in Botswana, in which remoteness is not simply a function of geographical distance from the centre (or centres), but rather 'has three dimensions: geography, economics, and ethnicity'. 'Geographic distance', continues Wilmsen, 'is not even necessary, let alone a sufficient, criterion of remote status. [...]

> As the intersection of any two of these dimensions decreases from the (Tswana) norm, a designation of remoteness becomes more likely; in the intersection of all three stand San-speakers, who are generally conceived to be the most remote from Setswana society even if not from settled villages (1989, 274).

Transposed to the eastern, 'frontier' region of the Cape Colony in the early and mid-nineteenth century, with (generally) European/African in place of Tswana/San this provides a broad argument for the political processes of spatial definition that were tightly bound to politics of race that were and are so fundamental to (but *not* essential to) southern and South African politics since colonisation.

The second historical chapter limits the focus to Grahamstown more narrowly and covers roughly a century from the mid-nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century, from the institutionalisation of Grahamstown's 'locations' to the beginning of apartheid. This chapter covers the development of Grahamstown's urban spatial politics with the colonial (and later, national) politics of rural control, also intimately concerned with space, as a reference. The project of urban-rural distancing argued in the preceding chapter is carried through this period, as well. Importantly, forms of resistance that will be strikingly familiar to a South African of the twenty-first century appear as war ceased to be a political option in the Eastern Cape after the 1870s.

Then the angle is widened once more. The third historical chapter encompasses the apartheid era (1948-1994) by taking account of the consolidation of a particular politics of space, race, and citizenship in South Africa during that time. Special attention is devoted to locating apartheid in the *longue durée* of 'social movements from above' in the South/ern African context and under the three guiding themes of the moment, space, race, and citizenship. As resistance in and nearby Grahamstown shows, alternative politics were likewise reflective of continuity. The historical section of the thesis concludes with two reflections on Grahamstown, one from 1986, just before the end of apartheid, and one from 2012, eighteen years after democracy.

As a postscript, we might revisit Gramsci's question, 'How is it possible to consider the present, and quite specific present, with a mode of thought elaborated for a past which is often remote and superseded?' We might reconsider the intended reading. In South Africa today, the colonial mode of thought (or of rule) is neither remote in temporal distance nor is it superseded by dramatically new lived experience. We might assign to 'remote' the complex definition proposed by Wilmsen—in essence, colonial rurality. We might rethink which past has been superseded, which political trajectories and which narratives have been repressed, suppressed, or erased. If the remote and superseded past is the coerced past of African politics, then the question changes its meaning: 'How is it possible to consider the present […] with a mode of thought [produced in colonialism] elaborated for [in the negative; for *control of*] a past [a history] which is often [rendered] remote and [therefore] superseded?' We need to approach the social movements of the present at the least with uncertainty about the stability of the historical categories, because they are also political categories, in which they work.

CHAPTER 1
POLITICS & COLONIALISM IN THE FISH RIVER COUNTRY

'There stood a British fort named Grahamstown in honour of the region's destroyer.' –
Norman Etherington in The Great Treks *(2001, 64)*

The founding of Grahamstown in 1812 on the western frontier of the land inhabited by Xhosa people was a significant moment in the development of the politics of space and citizenship in South Africa. The British town, in a hollow in the hills some twenty miles west of the Great Fish River, was the symbol in wood and stone and European life of what Noël Mostert has called the 'first great "removal" in South African history' (1992, 389). The town site was the military headquarters of Colonel John Graham in the war of 1811-1812, during which the British finally 'cleared' the fertile region between the Sundays and the Fish Rivers—the Zuurveld—of its Xhosa inhabitants.[1] It was a campaign and 'clearance' which Graham undertook, in the words of Governor of the Cape Colony, John Cradock, with 'a proper degree of terror' (Maclennan 1986, 128). The extent of the violence which drove thousands of people eastward over the Fish River is captured in Cradock's admiring phrase. As Mostert writes, 'By finally succeeding in drawing this line between Xhosa and colony, the Cape government had rolled its power right up to the west bank of the Fish', and this 'military achievement created a new reality by emphasizing separation of the races as a divide between natural enemies and irreconcilable cultures, the only solution for which was complete severance' (1992, 389-390).

While the political situation spanning the Great Fish River in 1812 may have been more complex than Mostert's characterization, two things are certainly clear: the long-unsuccessful colonial project of creating a border with the Xhosa was finally achieved. In delimiting the eastward frontier of the Cape Colony, the river traced an (official) line west of which were colonial subjects of the British crown, east of which lived people who were not. The Fish River border was a demarcation attempted more than thirty years earlier in 1777 by the Dutch government at the Cape, when Governor van Plettenberg 'claimed to have made a treaty' which established the Fish as the colonial boundary (Wells 2012, 78).

This process of demarcating racial categories with specific boundaries had begun in the first years that Europeans settled at the Cape. While it is smartingly racist in its own right, and contentedly so, I. D. MacCrone's *Race Attitudes in South Africa* (1937) provides some of this history. In the mid-1650s, Dutch settlers at the Cape expressed that they wished Africans

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[1] It may also have been the Great Place of Ndlambe, one of the most important Xhosa chiefs during the first stage of British invasion, until the people with Ndlambe were 'cleared' (Holleman 1997, 20).

('Hottentots') would 'erect their huts…a little further off', or that they would 'keep a little further off', and the record shows that they clearly saw the land they occupied as a European sphere in which Africans enjoyed European 'protection' in spite of 'bold allegations that the land belong[ed] to them, and not to the [Dutch East India] Company' (in MacCrone 1937, 25; 27). A canal was proposed to separate the two societies, and even though MacCrone characterises it as 'a clear-cut boundary, segregating the Europeans in an area reserved for them', its purpose was more likely to keep *out* what he calls the 'unfriendly natives' in areas reserved for *them* (1937, 26). In 1657, recommendations were made that the best ways to deal with Africans were to build a line of forts to keep them out or 'to make a clean sweep of all the local Hottentots [sic] by seizing them and banishing them from the country', and only lastly to come to terms with them, although this was considered the cheapest option (MacCrone 1937, 33). Between the 1650s and the turn of the century, a (dubious) policy of 'conciliation' was 'replaced by a more masterful policy of supervision and control by which they [relegated the Africans of the Cape] to a very minor and subordinate position in relation to the European community', and in fact Africans were not considered a part of the community at all (1937, 81). They were, essentially, 'non-citizens', not employed by and bearing no rights under the jurisdiction of the Dutch East India Company.

MacCrone argues throughout his book that religion constituted the main divide between races, initially between free and slave, but that the categories of 'Christian' and 'non-Christian' 'played a fundamental part in determining […] race attitudes and in making [peope] race conscious', such that, by the end of the eighteenth century, skin colour was the most wide spread group distinction employed (by Europeans, at least) (1937, 41; 126-131). Significantly for the argument here, MacCrone places religion at the centre of civilisation, which was perceived to diminish, along with access to religious institutions, as one moved away from the 'centre' (the Cape) (1937, 108; 111-112; 116). 'Remoteness' was conflated with criminality and lack of control of white members of the population (1937, 90). MacCrone is at least as blunt as observers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when he describes such whites as, 'Europeans who, in their contacts with the native inhabitants on the frontier, simply reverted to the level of those with whom they came into contact' (1937, 115). Being far away was to be a part of—or, at least, too close for comfort with—the world and the society of Africans, who were conceived of in racial and derogatory terms.

The official boundary at the Fish River was of little avail. People continued to transgress the artificial border. Perhaps more useful as a reflection of white South African perceptions of

space and race in the years before apartheid and as a demonstration of the durability of such spatial-racial ideas than as an analyses of the late eighteenth century, MacCrone writes about the 'chaos prevailing [on the Fish River frontier] towards the end of the century…as the result of the Kaffir [sic] incursions across the Fish River' (1937, 117), which description envisions the border—as well as the 'chaos'—as *racially* defined, the 'incursions' firstly *as* incursions and secondly as precipitated by *Africans*, and conceives of race in the terms of colonial racism. The 'chaos' was not general, however, for 'between periods of fighting', writes Julia Wells, 'a variety of peaceful co-existence flourished' in the region, in which 'Gonaqua Khoi, San, amaXhosa, Dutch farming settlers, missionaries of several European nationalities, slaves from far and wide, English speaking administrators and military officials all jostled together in a fluid and complex society.' The various political and economic systems of the many groups existed simultaneously (2012, 84).

Although the British border of 1812 was contested and permeable, and though political relationships to the colonial government within the colony were not uniform (at the time, the British administered to mostly Dutch and African people), the border at the Fish River still represented a decision by the colonial government to demarcate citizenship spatially. Most of the people living in the Fish River frontier region did not frame their politics in this way, for theirs—both Boer and African—were lifestyles based on free movement, free association, and political fluidity. This is not to suggest that until the coming of Colonel Graham the various people of the Fish River Country lived in idyllic harmony. Indeed, the Dutch settlers did not respect Xhosa land use, and in turn the Xhosa resisted incursion and had driven out Dutch settlers from the Zuurveld five times before 1812 (Wells 2012, 75; 79-81; 84). However, division of the colony from 'Xhosa territory', a division both spatial and political, had not previously attained the same degree of reification as it did after Graham's campaign.

For considering the politics that existed in the Fish River Country before the arrival of Colonel Graham, there are two critical histories of South/ern Africa which are especially useful here, *The Great Treks*, by Etherington (2001), and *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400-1948*, by Paul S. Landau Landau (2010). While both focus their analysis on the highveld region rather than the Fish River Country, what is now the Eastern Cape, the challenges they present to the assumptions of standard historiography are applicable in the Eastern Cape, nonetheless. The shared crux to their challenges is methodological. Etherington attempts to escape the enticing historical thicket of the colonial archive and the 'pernicious tradition' of historiography this produces (2001, xiii). Landau looks to archaeology and language to

'recover the political praxis' of 'the black and brown complected people who constitute the greatest part of [South African] citizenry today' (2010, 2). In '[assuming] everyone's rationality', and indeed in acknowledging the existence of an historical political praxis (praxes) among Africans, Landau avoids the 'unfortunate result' that Etherington sees in linguistic and archaeological reconstructions, which is 'to reproduce by other means the Us/Them binary opposition typical of colonial encounters' (Etherington 2001, xiii). The critiques supplied by Landau and Etherington are employed here to complicate (and also to clarify) the relationship between citizenship and space. The political formation of the concepts of *urban* and *rural* are the focus. The argument here is that these spatial-political concepts as they occur in modern South Africa derive much of their logic from the country's colonial history.

In many historical analyses, the arrival of Europeans in Southern Africa marked the beginning of the political history of that part of the world. This is a well-known colonialist understanding that evokes the inevitability of 'manifest destiny', to employ the American phrase: the (righteous) bestowal of history by Europeans upon the non-European wastelands. That narrative has been successfully repudiated by many writers and will be dismissed here except as a peculiarly potent racist ontology; that is to say, it has been (and continues to be) historically a significant narrative, though it is historically untrue.

In addition to history, the newly disembarked Europeans brought their own interpretations of local politics. As Landau writes, 'Europeans had *always* thought in terms of tribes, from the very start of their familiarity with the agrarian chiefdoms of South Africa'; differences were, in this view, 'writ forever, in people's bloodlines, with in-migrations and in-marriages peripheral to their continuities' (2010, 124).

In *Popular Politics*, Landau makes several challenges to the common narrative of South African history. Primary among these is that 'the political' was 'born deep in South Africa's past', and that politics was not introduced by or dependent upon various actors acceptable to Eurocentric (at best) or racist political and historiographical projects (Landau 2010, xiv). In many ways, Landau's book adds nuance and an enormous amount of detail to a proposition made by Etherington in *The Great Treks* (2001), already mentioned, that historians must 'reposition' themselves in order not to rely on the vantage point of colonial archive alone (xiii; 5). Landau looks within South Africa for its politics. In particular, he challenges—and meticulously deflates—the durable idea of 'tribe' and 'tribalism' as essential to South African societies; the idea that tribes were in fact the exact form of these societies. He asks, 'How did tribal identities emerge in South Africa – did they emerge?' (2010, 124). The verb 'emerge' is already a departure from most narratives, since it suggests process rather than stasis. Indeed,

stasis is basic to the idea of the tribe. 'By tribes' writes Landau, 'one means affiliations that are taken as primary, inalienable birthrights, uniting culture and blood, and providing a total blueprint for behavior, necessarily diminished by "civilization"' (2010, 124). Viewing Africans as members of tribes led Europeans, according to Etherington, 'to misunderstand profoundly the nature of the relationship between chiefs and their followers. Ordinary people did not give themselves ethnic labels [….] Most people called their group by the names of the chiefs they followed' (2001, 345). As 'tribe' evolved as a concept, it came to include racial assumptions that used biology to determine who was a member of a tribe (Landau 2010, 123; 129; 161).

In contrast to a biological understanding of African societies, of African societies without politics, Landau argues that we should 'speak about [people] in terms of what they were doing, rather than how Europeans came to know them' (2010, 249). To this end, he re-examines the words and names people used to describe and identify themselves, drawing distinction between how they used the words and how Europeans—particularly missionaries—(mis)understood the words. Especially illuminating is the discussion of the word 'bechuana', meaning 'blended together', or 'all mixed', or 'similar'. The word was, he argues, 'most likely the mundane phrase, "yes we are similar" or "the same" (*tshwana*) said to African travelers and Europeans, about themselves and nearby others' (2010, 9-10). Eventually, as the discourse of tribes became widespread in South Africa through colonial expansion, a word denoting similarity came to delimit people specifically. Other words that stood for political rankings or the names of ancestors politically mobilised in 'the present' were likewise subjected to reduction in scope and dynamism and came to signify group specificities that were unchanging. Landau shows how language as the prerogative of 'the people' can be the medium through which political tradition is conveyed and evolves, and yet it can also be a mode for capturing politics, as in the case of missionaries' encounters with and denial of a political tradition: 'Aspects of public life looked religious only in hindsight, when key translations had already been set into discourse and text' (2010, 76).

Methodologically, this is interesting. Language, unlike the written archive, cannot be completely commandeered since it has been shaped by those who use it. Therefore, even though missionaries provided religious readings of African political terms and actions, these things did not immediately—nor ever altogether—change in meaning for Africans. Their persistence in African articulation of politics permitted popular action by Africans up to the apartheid era (the end of *Popular Politics*' historical scope). Landau demonstrates this well in his discussion of the long-lived Samuelite movement, and the related 'Youngmen' movement of the 1920s and Barolong Progressive Association of the 1930s, all movements which carried

on political traditions of African peoples during and well into the colonial period (2010, 169; 174; 196; 220).

The colonial project of remodelling active, popular African politics (or politics of any sort) as timeless, 'tribal' life tended to emphasise the relationship between (or even equate) tribe not only with biological indicators but also with location. Present but not directly explored throughout the arguments of *Popular Politics* is the interplay between space and citizenship. The ways in which these two concepts were deployed throughout the long historical period on which Landau focuses are important in considering the political transformation that South/ern African polities have undergone since 1400. While space and citizenship have been conceived of differently at different times (and often differently even in the same period), there is continuity at least in that they have been used and understood in relation to each other. Two important qualifications must be made to this assertion: First, the ideas that I am referring to as 'space' and 'citizenship' were not defined, necessarily, in those terms through much of the period in question; and second, that, following Landau, I do not consider those ideas as structural or divorced from the basic claims of Landau's book that 'everyone's basic rationality is assumed' and that South Africans acted a living 'political praxis' (2010, xii; 2). It would be easy to collapse space and citizenship into a rigid framework along the lines of 'tribe' (and it has been done), whether that word is used or not, but then only if actual, living people are not allowed to contaminate a vacuous history. Space and citizenship are relational because of politics: the politics which Landau shows to have been always present in South/ern Africa, and not imported by Europeans. At the same time, much of how the space-citizenship relationship has been articulated and accomplished in the past and into the present has been influenced or forced by Europeans or people of European descent. The relation is a complicated one, and the discussion here is necessarily brief and limited in historical scope, with focus on the Eastern Cape and the area nearby Grahamstown, now known both accurately and problematically as 'Frontier Country'.

Landau looks to archaeology to supply much of the information regarding the early period of his study. One important type of archaeological site in South Africa is what has been called the 'Central Cattle Plan', which takes the form of 'trampled manure centers and satellites, and satellites of satellites similarly marked, the main kraal or livestock pen imagined as lying at the heart of the polity' (2010, 46). Such sites, claims Landau, have been too often interpreted as 'individuated [and thus tribal] entities'; this type of site 'registers cattle manure in the middle, nothing more. It says little about politics or history, and should not be understood otherwise' (2010, 46-47).

However, like language, archaeological remains cannot be totally disassociated from the people who produced them, even when decades of interpretation have been based on this separation. Landau links the seemingly static sites with a political tradition based on the 'House', what he describes as an 'ancient tradition of association, inheritance, and unity, at the root of all farmers' politics, embracing all their elements' (2010, 49). Vital to this form of association was that '[i]t involved reciprocal rights in people, rather than in land. It opened the possibility of settlement to immigrants willing to subordinate themselves to a ruling chief of an alliance of farmers and to alter their communal identities' (Landau 2010, 49). Thinking of the Central Cattle Plan sites as 'agrarian towns', Landau proposes that their archaeology was a direct product of the House tradition (2010, 50). This is important because inherent to such a political system was the ability literally to move, to change location, to occupy new space and new political relationships within that space. The 'town', therefore, was a direct result of political action. To risk an anachronism and change of context, we can recall Fanon's formulation, writing of Algerian guerrillas: 'the struggle [which we can read as 'politics' in this case] no longer concerns the place where you are, but the place where you are going' ([1961] 1963, 135). Groups of people could move, and in doing so, redefine themselves *politically*. Landau is careful to show that this did not mean a state of constant warfare, but rather a situation of political opportunity in which there was also continuity. As Landau writes, 'masculine political space, based on cattle transhumance, ancestry, alliances, and chiefs, could remove itself from towns, farmlands, and the woman and children bound to them. But […] on the other side of the spectrum of political behavior, successful chiefs built in stone or defended towns for several generations at a stretch' (2010, 91). The more permanent settlements and polities were legitimated through the notions of House and hierarchy. Nor did the system simply mean that people were leaving their homes and leaders and occupying empty space as a new political entity; moving groups entered into relationships with other groups, often through the 'twin court' structure, in which both traditional house rankings as well as practical power of groups sharing the same space were respected. Junior houses could be the more militarily powerful or cattle wealthy, for instance; in other cases, newcomers took a junior role: 'the elephant that crosse[d] the river [became] a little elephant' (Landau 2010, 66; 34).

Very similar processes of active citizenship obtained in what is now the Eastern Cape at the time that Africans and Europeans began to meet in large numbers there. Chiefly authority among the Xhosa was also legitimated by a chief's followers, and chiefs also entered into complex relationships among themselves that recognised lineage hierarchies as well as practical power. The relationship of the two most important Xhosa chiefs on the Zuurveld in

the years leading up to and following the 1811-12 war, Ndlambe (the 'regent') and Ngqika (his nephew), demonstrates this well. Indeed, their shared (and contested) leadership of the 'house of Rharhabe' Xhosa suggests the twin-court structure that Landau describes, as do the relationships of several other pairs of Xhosa leaders: Gcaleka and Rharhabe, Phato and Chungwa, Hintsa and Bhurhu, Maqoma and Sandile (Wells 2012, 102). Though Ndlambe and Ngqika were sometimes at war with each other[2], Julia Wells argues that there was 'simultaneously another dynamic operating, which was far more co-operative and supportive' and that '[it] should be viewed as a particularly African dynamic of maintaining cohesion among leaders' (Wells 2012, 102). Though Wells argues that this represents a 'particularly Xhosa-style of traditional leadership' (2012, 101), the evidence presented by Landau suggests a more expansive political tradition that was similar among groups both above and below the Great Escarpment, and stretched even further north in the continent of Africa (Landau 2010, 51-53).

As we have already seen, the Eastern Cape region was also a place of mixing of peoples. Martin Legassick writes, 'When the Boers were encountered [in the second half of the 18th Century], the Xhosa assumed they would come to absorb them as they already had the San, Khoi and Thembu' (2010, 13)—not a dissimilar situation from what Landau describes on the highveld: a 'political tradition [that] emphasized in-mixtures of people in several modes […] and deemphasized origins (and skin colour and accent), in pursuit of common, hierarchized, intermarried, growth-oriented settlement' (2010, 124).

Before successive colonial administrations at the Cape curtailed free movement and delimited the meaning and scope of politics, people actively participated in forming their citizenship. Citizenship was linked to the political space that people occupied, rather than the physical space. In the African political traditions of both the highveld and Xhosa areas, political power over physical space expanded by the inclusion of more people in citizenship relationships with leaders rather than in exclusion of people from land in that '[c]hiefship itself was an incorporative institution, and its success lay in bridging differences among varied constituencies. The word for the landed polity…meant everyone in the big meeting, everyone living together, not all blood relations' (Landau 2010, 11).

The arrival of Europeans with new ideas about land ownership and the aforementioned misinterpretations of Africans as 'tribal' also signified new correlations between space and

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[2] And British interference in their conflicts was ceaseless.

citizenship. In very broad terms, the dispossession of Africans of rights to land usage created a situation in which citizenship as well as livelihoods became increasingly linked to specific pieces of land. While space could still be defined by '*who was there*', that 'who' was less and less a product of political action than of rigidly defined identity. The 1777 border (see above) is one early example of how space was delimited in this new way. In that year the Dutch governor of the Cape 'set boundary markers on the ground' between Boers and Xhosa, but 'people from both sides ignored the line. Its only effect was to delay legal recognition of any Boer farms established on the further side' (Etherington 2001, 56). At stake was political belonging or alienation—citizenship, and with it the control of the colonial government. One thing was true of all the advancing borders constructed by the colony: Africans could not own land within the colony, but neither could Africans within the colony live without the land (which they worked as slaves or under various euphemisms for slavery). The borders created by the colonial governments separated people politically while employing distinctions which, like race, could be claimed to have natural rather than political definitions.

Yet, mixing of people in what would have been perceived by southern Africans of the day as 'the normal way' persisted even while the political landscape became more fixed. Writing about the highveld of the 1810s, Landau argues:

> [T]he critical distinction between people on the ground was spatial, not corporeal. Difference was expressed in the shape of their settlements, not the ethnic composition of their inhabitants. [Several African towns] were laid out in the highveld manner, surrounded by arable lands and pastures. They contrasted with Griquatown [and other missionary towns] with their rectangular gardens and plots. Both kinds of town inducted streams of Khoe- and San-speaking and métis people into their lineages and neighborhoods. In them Bantu-speaking farmers and herders and foreigners mixed with one another, just as they had in the past (2010, 14).

At the same time, however, missionaries were coming to make tribal and racial distinctions between people living in the 'highveld manner' and those in the square-housed towns. Later in this process emerged the racial category of 'Coloured': an 'adjunct and alternative to whiteness' that Landau argues was developed in Cape Town and Grahamstown and 'then projected into a different situation involving Bantu-speaking people' (2010, 123). The result was that the mixed populations of South Africa (at least 'mixed' in terms of European understandings, linked with language, Christianity, and incorporation into colonial settlement types and economies) were excluded from the framework of tribalism while the 'black' populations, no less mixed in many cases, were forced into it. Those living in towns in the European mould did not become tribal while those in towns of the African form did.

Citizenship, such as it was, on the one hand was derived from the colony and on the other from the tribe.

Linked to this, I argue, is the emergence of an urban and rural political divide. While people were increasingly identified racially and politically by the form of their settlement, the settlements and the spaces between and around them accrued political significance. This was a process which would have been familiar to Europeans, and familiar in a number of ways. English, Irish, and Scottish people of the seventeenth century had witnessed the great struggle over enclosure—the mass migration, emigration, urbanisation, and exploitation which it produced (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000). Indeed, the English 'plantations' in Ireland were not dissimilar to the British project of settlement in the Fish River Country two hundred years later. These were actions undertaken by armed and mounted soldiers against the resistance of agrarian communities and with destruction of life and livelihood that were mimicked by Graham in 1812, and by nearly all of the British colonial administrators and military officers to see service on the frontier of the Cape Colony. The 'commando' of South Africa resembled precisely the violence of 1640s England, during which one Fairfax, fearing the uniting of urban and rural poor, 'personally led a troop of horse to the most important of the communes, George's Hill, and drove the commoners off the land, breaking their spades, trampling the crops, and destroying their houses' (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000, 118). In Europe and in Africa, following on the heels of the troops came settlers.

There was also a European tradition that linked violence, architecture, and the urban-rural distinction. In Goldberg's discussion of the politics of 'walling', we see that the political classification of a settlement could depend on its physical structures:

> Cities were "razed" not by their complete destruction but by pulling down their fortified walls. Settlements without walls were no longer considered urban, reduced to rural villages by nothing more than the removal of their fortifications. The lack of boundary walls erased the demarcation between town and countryside, lived space and commerce shading into field. Razing the wall emasculated the city, sapping its power and making it as vulnerable to scorching as the rural (2015, np).[3]

Although neither European nor African towns in the Fish River Country were fortified in the manner of European cities, there still emerged a 'wall' logic in what constituted urban space

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[3] James Holston (2008) makes a similar argument in the context of Brazil that has significance for Grahamstown when it was founded and in the two centuries since then. 'The designations "city", "urban", and "rural" are politically defined', Holsten writes, and they are 'subject to political manipulation and consequence'. The city is the 'juro-political' and architectural 'command center of its surrounding region', and 'a municipal seat in a remote region could be urban politically but unurbanized infrastructurally' (150).

and rural space and this was closely linked to citizenship. On the easterly side were the Xhosa settlements organised in much the same way as Landau describes the 'agrarian towns' (2010, 50) of the highveld. Mimicking the course of the Fish River on its western bank stood a double line of British forts built in the decade after the founding of Grahamstown, which guarded— and often were important in extending—the colonial boundary (Makana Tourism 2015, np).

Behind the forts were the quickly growing towns of Grahamstown in the Zuurveld and Port Elizabeth at the mouth of the Sundays River. The arrival of some 4,000 settlers in 1820 into the 'cleared' land between the Bushmans and Fish Rivers changed the landscape quite drastically. Most of them had been urban dwellers in England, without any agricultural experience. Not surprisingly, many of the farms which they had been allotted in the Zuurveld failed and the erstwhile farmers moved to Grahamstown. 'It was their capital,' writes Mostert, 'the most populous place in the east [with more than 3,000 people and 700 houses in 1834], second only to Cape Town in size and scope of its activities. In many respects, it was the focal point of the colony' (1992, 656). The Zuurveld, renamed Albany after the 1812 war[4], was increasingly exploited agriculturally in the European manner: 'In a wide circumference around Grahamstown it had been tamed and dressed with tilled lands, corn and fruit, and irrigation' (Mostert 1992, 658). Wool was becoming a valuable commodity in South Africa, and herding sheep, as opposed to cattle, separated the British settlers from both boers and Xhosa (Mostert 1992, 658).

The emerging situation was one in which the form of the colonial settlement and its economy divided it politically as well as ontologically from the territories further east and north that were still under African control. Peoples' roles and political identities were more and more determined by their relationship and orientation to the colonial border.

And the colonial border advanced.

In 1819, Grahamstown was nearly destroyed in an attack by a Xhosa army led by a man named Nxele (also known as Makana or Makhanda). Nxele's leadership was consistent with forms of leadership of southern Africa as Landau has outlined them. His message blended invocation of ancestors (and aspects of Christianity) with a military project of driving the Europeans 'into the sea'. Though not from a chiefly family, he derived his power, authority, and legitimacy from his followers. Bad luck or too great a concern for chivalry—Nxele announced his plan

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[4] The name is a colonial and imperial curiosity, named after John Graham's second-in-command, Jacob Cuyler, who was born in Albany, New York to a Tory family who fled the American colonies when they ceased to be British.

to attack to Lord Henry Somerset, the military commander at Grahamstown—led to defeat for the Xhosa army at Grahamstown, and a war in which British troops crossed the Fish and drove the Xhosa living there over the Keiskamma River, which flows some thirty miles east of the Fish at the coast, the distance dwindling to fifteen miles and less inland near Grahamstown. The territory between the Fish and the Keiskamma, and north to the Amatola Mountains, was 'ceded' to the colony and was to be preserved as a neutral zone between the colony and the Xhosa (Mostert 1992, 857). Xhosa wishing to cross to the western bank of the Fish River were required, after Ordnance 50 of 1828, to have written permission from a colonial official stating they were entering the colony to work or to trade (Holleman 1997, 27).

'By 1830', writes Mostert, 'the so-called Ceded Territory had become mainly the narrow band of country between the Fish and the Keiskamma rivers and harassment of Xhosa intrusion into it was constant and usually cruel' and, by the middle of the decade, the 'territory was, more than at any time in the sixteen years of its controversial existence, the symbol of the fundamental overriding issue: land' (1992, 857). Mostert carries on, 'Although the land had always, since the earliest days of the frontier, been the underlying issue of conflict, it had never been so entirely central to the confrontation of Xhosa and colonist as it now became' (1992, 857). Land represented not just an economic resource but a political concern as well. African polities, Xhosa in this instance, required land both for sustenance from cattle and cultivation as well as for the legitimation of their political leadership. Maqoma, Ngqika's son and a chief born and most often living in the Amatola region of the Ceded Territory remarked that 'The great reason […] is the land; for our children have increased and our cattle have increased, and we must have that land, as it was formerly our country' (quoted in Mostert 1992, 857), and this explanation refers to more than simply a longing for the tribal home, the 'old hunting grounds' of the colonial myth. The advancing colonial border represented not only dispossession of land but also of political structures based on movement of people and legitimation of leadership with access to land.

In May 1828 a troop of soldiers departed Grahamstown for Maqoma's town near the mission station at Balfour below the Katberg. The people with Maqoma were in transgression of the Ceded Territory defined by the colony, and the colonial government saw this as an opportunity to make some better use of the Ceded Territory than to simply preserve it as a 'neutral' strip of land.

One particular concern at the time was over what to do with 'Khoikhoi'[5] and people of mixed descent. (It was a purely colonial conviction that something must be done with them.) These were the people who would soon come to be identified as 'Coloured'. Governor Cole at Cape Town, in response to complaints of vagrancy, had proposed that the 'Khoikhoi' should be permanently settled as agriculturalists 'adjoining the towns in the colony' (Mostert 1992, 617)—quite literally as an 'adjunct to whiteness', to recall Landau's phrase (2010, 123). In response to a humanitarian trend from Britian, there was a push by some missionaries and officials to grant Coloureds their own land, and in the end it was determined that a settlement would be created in the Ceded Territory with the dual objective of providing (some) Coloured people with their own land and of installing a human buffer between the colony and the Xhosa (Mostert 1992, 617).

Maqoma's people were sent east, and their town burned, and 'within a month of the expulsion […] the first Khoikhoi and 'Bastaard' [mixed race] settlers began occupying the Kat river lands', and the population grew to some 4,000 in the course of the first year (Mostert 1992, 621). Thus was born the Kat River Settlement. Some four hundred square miles of territory was divided and subdivided, with land allotted for villages, for private gardens in the villages, and for common pasturage. Churches, schools, irrigations systems, and houses were built. 'The settlers', Mostert writes, 'were required to build European style-cottages and fence their properties' (1992, 621).

The Kat River Settlement emerged as something of a foil to Grahamstown in the frontier region. As Mostert notes, 'Born in controversy, the Kat River Settlement […] was never to be free of it' (1992, 621). Race was always significant in perceptions of the Kat River Settlement. Many Coloured people migrated there to escape a proposed Vagrancy Act of the early 1830s which allowed 'anyone regarded as a vagrant [to] be drafted to forced public labour or contracted to a farm' (Mostert 1992, 638). Though it was a settlement in the form of the European colony—modelled in part after the original plan for the 1820 settlers and undergoing a similar 'urbanisation' (Mostert 1992, 621)—it was disturbing to whites in Grahamstown, 'rising agrarian capitalists of the Eastern Cape, desiring racial subjugation of labor and dispossession of the indigenous from their land' (Legassick 2010, 36). When land nearby the Kat River Settlement was sold by the government, Coloureds living at Kat River were not

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[5] 'Khoikhoi' is one of many appellations given to and sometimes taken by people living at the Cape when Europeans arrived there or by their descendants in South Africa. Debates surround which, whether 'Khoi', 'Khoe', 'Khoikhoi', or, blended with another given name, 'Khoisan', is the correct term. These people, as well as people of mixed descent, were eventually designated 'Coloured'.

allowed to purchase it, although the land was soon exploited quite profitably by white farmers for raising sheep (Legassick 2010, 35). Because the settlement was not attacked by the Xhosa during periods of war, the Coloureds there were suspected by local whites of conspiracy against the colony (Mostert 1992, 667)—an attitude reminiscent in its form of the anti-Catholic fears of disloyalty common in English history, but inflected more heavily with racial prejudice.

The strange position of the Kat River Settlement and its mixed population on the eastward edging political frontier allows a further discussion of the 'square house' idea, with its complex admixture of architectural, political, and racial perceptions. Colin Bundy stresses two aspects of the role of missionaries in South Africa: 'first, the role of the missionaries as torch-bearers of capitalist social norms and the market economy […] and secondly, their contribution to class formation in African society' (1979, 37). As we have seen, the frontier, with Grahamstown as its hub, was increasingly linked to the colonial economy. Indeed, interpretations of apartheid in the twentieth century that see the 'Bantustan' system as so many labour reserves for white industry, particularly the mines, are convincing to a degree based on the history of a century earlier, when African economies were subsumed by the empire at the same time that the process of division here discussed was under way. However, the class formation that Bundy argues resulted from missionary activity in what is now the Eastern Cape was not the only outcome that has lasted into the present.[6] Alongside race and class and capitalism solidified the urban and rural as raced, classed, and divided political concepts and identities.

Bundy, remarking on the missionaries' 'zeal' for certain settlement forms, asks the key question: 'Why encourage Africans to live in square houses?' He continues: 'The frequency of references in missionary correspondence and publications to the superiority of square over round dwellings is striking – descriptions of square houses in straight streets ring with pride' and notes that transitional houses, neither round nor square, were recommended by one missionary (1979, 37). Square houses and straight streets and rowed gardens, settlement types distinct in form from African towns, not only demonstrated inclusion in the imperial economy but in the colonial society itself; that is, citizenship.[7] Central cattle plan settlements indicated a political and economic 'other'—an 'other' in opposition to the enclosing and undemocratic

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[6] Economic changes during this period will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3.

[7] MacCrone (1937) unwittingly shows how this applied to white people in Southern Africa as well. A traveler among frontier boers in 1776 remarked that they 'love to live in the veld by hunting, and it is anticipated that they will become completely barbarized. I have only found *two* houses that were decently erected…' (footnote, translation, 111-112; emphasis original).

tendencies of British/European society. Such places were, in the racialised mind-set, home to 'kaffirs', 'reds'—utterly the non-urban and therefore the non-citizen.

The Kat River Settlement was not the only project of the British administration of the Cape Colony that blended concerns over race, space, and citizenship. Indeed, from the time of Graham's destruction of the Zuurveld in 1812 and the founding of Grahamstown, both policy and war were increasingly used to micro-manage the interplay of those three political concepts. The 'buffer' between the colony and the Xhosa as well as the forcing of African people into white-style settlements (mainly at mission stations) or into becoming labourers for whites were both employed repeatedly. Indeed, the history from the 1820s on represents largely a struggle by whites in South Africa to perfect the implementation of these tools, and of Africans to adapt to changing situations in which their political options and spaces shrank drastically. In the Eastern Cape, Grahamstown was the centre of support for the colonial side of this struggle. The Kat River Coloured population was castigated by colonial officials and settlers alike, for they 'did not make good use of "the best watered and most fertile district on the frontier". For Grahamstown, this last point was what mattered' (Mostert 1992, 920).

War broke out once more in 1834: the Sixth Frontier War. The wide land between the Keiskamma and the Kei Rivers was annexed to the colony as Queen Adelaide Province by Governor Benjamin D'Urban, and all of the people living there were made British subjects. This was significant in the progression of politics of citizenship in South Africa.

> As British subjects, all of the Xhosa west of the Kei river […] were to submit to the general laws of the Cape Colony, but would retain their own laws and customs for their own domestic government. But their status as British subjects still did not allow them to enter freely the settled areas of the colony. If they crossed the Keiskamma river and passed into the white settlements they could be shot. Nor were they open to the full benefits of British Colonial law, as the Khoikhoi were, for the Province of Queen Adelaide remained under martial law (Mostert 1992, 750).

The restriction of the movement of black people combined with appropriation of political subjectivity prefigured much of the legislation of the next century and a half.

D'Urban also relocated 16,000 or 17,000 'Mfengu' from beyond the Kei to the region of Fort Peddie (in the Ceded Territory) where they would be another living bulwark for the colony and where they could be handily recruited as labourers (Legassick 2010, 45). White settlers were displeased by the location of these particular Africans on good land but were reassured by D'Urban that '"large tracts are still left vacant for occupation and speculation of Europeans"' (Legassick 2010, 47). D'Urban's policies did not last beyond the next war on the

frontier and the Governorship of Harry Smith, but the general project of spatial and political control combined with expropriation of land continued. Harry Smith established 'British Kaffraria' out of the former Queen Adelaide Province (Mostert 1992, 911), in which the twin projects of assimilation and alienation of the people continued: '[Smith] would decide their locations, where they would live under a new dispensation of his own making (Mostert 1992, 936). Punishment of Xhosa entailed confiscation of land, while at the same time British settlers arrived and depleted pasturage and hunting reserves (Mostert 1992, 946).

Then began a century of legislation to hone the political subjectivity of black people and tweak their status and relationship to the land so that white settler interests were best served. Location Acts were passed in 1869, 1876, 1884, 1892, 1899, and 1909. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 'sought more ambitiously to proletarianize large numbers of Africans on "tribal" as well as on "white" lands' (Bundy 1979, 78; 135-137).

The twentieth century saw more of the same style of legislation. The Natives Land Act of 1913 created African 'reserves', which severely curtailed African access to land for the remainder of the century (Bundy 1979). Apartheid, from 1948, solidified this division in abstract as well as practical terms. By the early 1960s, Govan Mbeki could write that 'some 11,000,000 Africans have rights to only 9 percent of the land, while 3,000,000 Whites own and occupy the rest' (1964, 66). Citizenship and space were unambiguously linked by apartheid legislation that made Africans the citizens of independent 'Bantustans', a status 'paid for by the complete loss of citizenship and occupation rights in the rest of the country' (Mbeki 1964, 19). Access to land within these 'homelands'—the biggest of which was the Transkei—was controlled by local 'traditional authorities', a situation that still obtains today in many former homeland areas in spite of the end of apartheid (Ntsebeza 2005, 14). This top-down politics stood in marked difference to the incorporative politics of earlier years.

With this long sequence legislation and with the formation of tribal reserves/homelands, the spatial logic of citizenship was rigidified. Political identity was linked directly to land such that each 'tribe' had its location. By the early 1880s 'free movement was a memory' on the highveld because of growing populations in the region and greater restrictions on African land use (Landau 2010, 169). The option to remake citizenship through physical removal and entering into new political relationships was not available anymore. An important result of the whole process of tribalisation was that political mobilisations that for centuries in southern Africa had been contestations of citizenship did not fit the framework for citizenship that was forged between the colony and the new 'tribes'. In turn, imagining space could not be based on political action but rather on (politicised) apolitical categories that were nonetheless closely

tied to ideas of space and to colonial political projects. The same was true of the eastern part of the Cape Colony through successive programs of colonial direct and indirect rule through the institution of chieftaincy and by the systematic and often simultaneous tactics of extermination, assimilation, and exploitation. 'There seemed', writes Landau, 'sometimes to be two different conversations proceeding at the same time, imagined as one, but actually made to intersect only by the application of force' (2010, 214). This applies as neatly to the political vocabulary of southern Africa in the period discussed as it does to the actual performance of politics. At the outset of *Popular Politics,* Landau writes that 'the case is made that the people of South Africa were historically well equipped to absorb strangers. Hybridity lay at the core of their subcontinental political traditions' (2010, xi). His careful study of those traditions demonstrates a great deal of absorption and hybridity in the terms and forms of political mobilization, but also a great deal of continuity. Colonialism repressed and suppressed this hybridity by controlling political space. Although space and citizenship were both transformed during the long period in question, they remained relational to each other. In general, the long-unfolding trend in terms of both space and citizenship was that rigidity replaced flexibility and the political options available to people were circumscribed.

At the heart of this history of race, space, and citizenship in the Eastern Cape lies Grahamstown. The town itself signified the European, civilised, urban and ultimately 'white' distinction from the African, savage, rural space; and it served as a staging point for incursions into that other space for the purpose of exploiting it. Fort Beaufort and King Williamstown, both further east beyond the Fish River, followed its example as colonial necessity dictated, but Grahamstown remained the most significant town in the frontier region for a long time. In early Grahamstown, it is notable that politics, mostly concerned with the land, were predominantly about the 'rural'; the urban or semi-urban space of Grahamstown was more a site of military and, later on, economic power from which English settlers and administrators attempted to control the politics of the surrounding region. This was often tied to the larger city of Cape Town (not to mention the colonial centres overseas) in that '"a large proportion of money in Cape Town was derived from mortgages on frontier farms and frontier estates"' (Legassick 2010, 60). Put another way, on the colonial frontier the politics of the 'urban' comprised largely the concerns of white settlers as projected onto the countryside and its people.

This was never a purely defined space or politics, however. Complicating this characterization were the settlements for 'Coloureds' such as the one at the Kat River, and the presence of African residents in colonial towns, often labourers, small farmers, farmworkers,

and soldiers. Their politics changed to reflect new dispensations and a new shape to the world, one framed around staunchly defended divisions on the one hand, and upon struggles for spaces of autonomy on the other. 'It is not possible', notes Nomboniso Gasa, 'to understand land dispossession without interrogating its links to other forms of disempowerment and dislocation' (2015). Foremost among these are political disempowerment and dislocation, which were projects undertaken with exceptional vigour—often with 'a proper degree of terror'—by Europeans in South Africa. However, rather than view the colonial period as two centuries before which Africans had politics (now recovered in the academy by the likes of Landau and Etherington from the grasp of colonial and apartheid historiographers) and after which they did not. 'The historical trajectory', writes Landau, 'of South Africa and its people in "precolonial" and "*colonial*" times was one of growth and change, not stasis and defense"' (2010, 249). The three political concepts at play in this chapter—race, space, and citizenship—must be understood in this way. Landau continues, 'The division of the past into pre- and post-phases has been only too convenient to Western imperialism's modes of accumulation' (2010, 249). We must be critical of division not only of time but also of space.

CHAPTER 2
SPACE, RACE, & CITIZENSHIP IN GRAHAMSTOWN, C. 1830 – 1945

'It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil.' – Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth *([1963] 1961, 41)*

'Location matters, which have been intrusive enough of late as to make them almost offensive, are giving cause for further complaint.' – in Local Opinion *(25 July 1914)*

We have seen how the process of Cape colonial expansion and circumscription of African politics produced political identities linked to space. These spatial politics were manifested in separate and *defined* zones—defined meaning not only clear but also referring to the act of definition. The division of people was an intentional colonial project to define citizenship. One of the results of this project was the creation of urban and rural *political* spaces: the former a European space and the latter the domain of Africans under indirect rule. This does not disqualify the actual circumstantial differences between urban and rural areas in terms of population density and economics; it does mean that there were political conceptions about urban and rural derived from colonialism and racism. Therefore, what had become through conquest European farmland represented a continuation of civilization, of European settlement and ideology, while African land was, in such a view, the great un-reclaimed wilderness. We have seen that Grahamstown held a central position in the 'reclamation' as well as in the production of the spatial-racial categories in question.

However, it is important to establish an historical narrative of Grahamstown not only as a part of the colonial frontier as the previous chapter has done, but also as a town—or, technically, as a city—in its own right. There are two reasons: first, because spatial politics were fundamental to Grahamstown's internal development; and, second, because the contemporary questions under examination and the peoples' politics that are the focus of this research are affected by and have developed, in part, out of the politics of the past. Indeed, spatially and politically, Grahamstown's historical and present circumstances show an astonishing degree of continuity. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Grahamstown has been faced with technical problems of water supply, housing, road quality, and health which are manifested differently in the 'locations' and 'town'. In addition, and more importantly, exclusion from formal political structures has affected black Africans living in the locations in shifting but continuous ways during the last century and a half and longer, and the same people have been subjected to various systems of control beginning with the foundation of the locations, through to segregation and apartheid, and still manifested in unequal access to citizenship in the post-apartheid era. Solutions and non-solutions to

Grahamstown's problems have been (and are still) profoundly dictated by the spatial politics that emerged from the European conquest of the region and which produced the current spatial arrangement of Grahamstown.

Four Master's theses completed at Rhodes University are particularly useful in composing a narrative of Grahamstown from the mid-nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century (Gibbens 1982; Sellick 1983; Southey 1984; Torlesse 1993). These theses have accomplished a serious and thorough synthesis of the municipal archive and other local sources spanning the years 1860 to 1945, work which fills a significant gap in literature about Grahamstown. They would be useful to other historical research on this period. However, it must also be acknowledged that these four theses are problematic, and demonstrate repeatedly and obviously the flaws inherent in relying solely on the colonial archive (see Etherington 2001). Though all four sources seem to aspire to a form of historiographical impartiality, they frequently take for granted and uncritically reproduce the colonial opinions and prejudices appearing in the archive. Racist terms are used without or with only inconsistent qualification, and as a group the authors are staunch apologists for Victorian paternalism and humanitarianism. The type of politics which is fundamental to this research is either ignored or not recognised in these sources; they read little differently from the municipal records which inform them, and the term 'politics' is usually limited to elections and municipal council deliberations. Even Southey, seemingly the most critical of the four, asserts that 'Political activity amongst Grahamstown's black people seemed to decline as the twentieth century advanced' (1984, 216), and yet goes on to describe several highly political events that contradict the statement. In short, these four theses are not sympathetic to the research and type of history which is necessary here. Nonetheless, a narrative of space and citizenship in the context of Grahamstown can be gleaned from them.

Chatterjee's 'political society' should remain in mind throughout this history of Grahamstown: the notion of a governable segment of society without access to civil society structures of the city. Following on the bifurcation of colonial space into the urban and rural, and the evolution of race in relation to that distinction, a bifurcated politics materialised in town in which space was in its turn defined by race. The politics of control and repression were organised around governing spaces and maintaining their boundaries, while at times there emerged politics from below, from 'uncivil society', in Neocosmos's nuanced phrase (2011, 374), which transgressed those boundaries both practically and conceptually. In such politics, the question and definition of citizenship was contested. The incidences depicted here elucidate a spatial-racial control of politics within the city of Grahamstown that reflected the logic of urban and rural division mapped

during the colonial conquest of the Eastern Cape as well as, very significantly, political challenges to this order.

In 1829, at the same time that the Kat River settlement was established in the 'Ceded Territory' to the east of Grahamstown, Governor Cole also officially formed another 'location' for Coloured people, on the outskirts of Grahamstown. Originally called the 'Hottentot Location' its name has only been slightly modified during almost two centuries to the 'Coloured Area'. Though these names employ the vocabulary of eighteenth and nineteenth century racism and reflect colonial racial logic, they will both be used here as context requires; but to avoid careless recycling of derogatory language, the latter or also 'Coloured Location' has been preferred when possible. The formation of the Coloured Area demonstrates two things: first that a significant number of people identified as 'Coloured' were living in or very near to Grahamstown; and, second, that the definition and hardening of racial categories linked to political spaces that developed around the Fish River frontier was enacted in town, as well.

The formation of the next oldest location, the 'Fingo Location' or 'Fingo Village', first considered officially in 1841 and enacted in 1848, suggests similar things: that a significant number of African people were living in or very near to Grahamstown and that the colonial administration was intent to control them by establishing a space of governance in which they would live. The name of the location, derived from the name of people living to the east, the 'Fingo' or Mfengu'[1], suggests compellingly a connection to events on the frontier, which was by this time shifting away from Grahamstown. During the frontier war of 1834-36, 'some 16,000-17000 "Mfengu" were resettled from Hintsa's territory [beyond the Kei] to the Fort Peddie area and made British subjects, to act as frontier buffers against the entry of the Xhosa to the Fish River bush' in a similar project to the one at the Kat River. Later in the war, some of these 'Mfengu' were drafted to fight on the side of the colony, and 'were also intended to provide a labour supply to the colonists, and, indeed, their introduction brought a downturn in wages' (Legassick 2010, 45). Not surprisingly, some of the same displaced people ended up in Grahamstown, only a little more than forty miles away from Peddie, and lent their name to the settlement on the town's eastern margin. Gibbens reports a serious concern on the part of the town councillors regarding

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[1] Numerous scholars have complicated Fingo/Mfengu identity, tracing it to the British colonial practise of defining of ethnicities (Webster 1995; Stapleton 1995). One compelling argument (Fry 2010) notes that the 'earliest and clearest means of identifying Fingos was through spatial differentiation' of the places in which groups of people lived and that 'Fingo-ness sprung from a movement, both literal and symbolic, away from the centres of Xhosa authority' (32). Fry's account emphasises complex and fluid politics and identities among Africans (Xhosa), as well as divisive eye with which colonial observers gazed upon African people.

squatters on the town lands (1982, 256), which substantiates such a set of circumstances in the decade between the 1834 war and the establishment of Grahamstown's second location.

Central to the founding of the locations were the issues of control and citizenship. As Gibbens relates, echoing the viewpoints of 1840s Grahamstown, 'Control remained the very necessary motive for the setting up and supervision of the Fingo Location – for, after all, the function of the Municipal Commissioners was primarily to order the civic life of the town in all aspects, to the benefit of all inhabitants. Yet it was hoped through such control to inculcate the civic duties and ensure the rights of municipal householders within the location' (1982, 256). Inherent in this is the conception of the urban space as the site of 'civil society' as opposed to a 'traditional' rural political space. The town space was imbued with the colonial civilising mission, and, at the same time, the settlers of Grahamstown sought to protect political control through spatial divisions. There persisted very strongly in Grahamstown the civilizing ideology of the square houses, discussed in the previous chapter; and rights held by residents of the town itself were supposedly extended to the location residents, with the hope of 'civilizing' them—an attitude emerging from colonial periodicals as 'a common moral code based on the Christian ethic, duty, self-restraint, work and charity' (Gibbens 1982, 256; 21-22).

At the time of incorporation of the locations, there was debate about whether Africans living in Grahamstown could pay rates and vote, and whether locations should be included into the existed municipal wards or form separate ones (Gibbens 1982, 30). The civilisational project of 'town' is apparent in the remarks of one municipal official at the time: 'There was a great number of natives among us, some civilized, some semi-civilized and some just emerging from barbarism, and no provision had been made […] for their representation in municipal matters' (quoted in Gibbens 1982, 30). Significantly, one condition for becoming civilised was being a qualified ratepayer (occupying immovable property with a yearly value of £10) in an (emerging) urban, European space. Citizenship—political belonging—was in the process of codification at this stage; some measure of formal political inclusion was extended by the white colony to Africans living inside its borders and in its towns, but the social and spatial exclusion of the locations and the genuine lack of formal, 'European-style', political power experienced by Africans prefigures the long trend of the next century of rescinding, abrogation, and exclusion that culminated in the institution of apartheid in 1948.

The spatial divisions of Grahamstown were immediately visible. As a description of the town published in *The Graham's Town Journal* in 1882 bemoaned, the approach to Grahamstown from 'the interior' first passed through the reek of slaughter houses and the unsightly 'huts' of the

'Hottentot Location', where people 'in the lowest grade of existence would be a disgrace to the most lawless community'. In the descriptor's opinion, people lived in this way because they were neglected by the municipality (quoted in Gibbens 1982, 238). These words echo the deprecating descriptions of 'Hottentots' by Europeans at the Cape in the mid-seventeenth century, as reproduced faithfully by the likes of MacCrone.[2] They also invoke the prevailing Western imagery of the 'slum' in racialised terms. As Goldberg writes: 'The slum is by definition filthy, foul smelling, wretched, rancorous, uncultivated and lacking care. The *racial* slum is doubly determined, for the metaphorical stigma of a black blotch on the cityscape bears the added connotations of moral degeneracy, natural inferiority, and repulsiveness' (1993, 191-192). In that contemporary portrayal, the senses and the law were violated on the outskirts of town, on the road from 'the interior', where a concrescence of the wild African sphere had formed on the road to the white town, which only needed attention from the whites of that town to be uplifted from its disgraceful state.

Nonetheless, in spite of the accusation of neglect, the nineteenth century writer emphasises that streets were laid out nicely and the Magistrate was in good control of the people (Gibbens 1982, 238). Access to the locations was policed: 'All applicants for being located on the town lands, had to go to the Superintendent, who would point out a spot on which they could build a hut', a license was required in order to remain on city lands for more than a week, and grazing of stock on town lands required permission of the Municipal Council. The two locations were administered differently, displaying once more the defining of race and space in conjunction. Fingo Village was managed by two headmen while the Coloured Location was managed by an assistant field cornet (Sellick 1983, 169). In the 'Fingo Location', all occupants of six months could purchase their allotments, while in the 'Hottentot Location', a person could own more than one allotment, which suggests, consistently with racial understandings of the time, that Coloured people were more able to participate in 'civilised' town life centered around private property than Africans were (Gibbens 1982, 258-259; 261).

For a theory of urban spatial division, Ealham's *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona 1898-1937* (2005) provides a useful framework for understanding urbanisation and bifurcation as coincident processes. Certainly the context of Ealham's work is different, but the work is theoretically valuable. As appropriate to Grahamstown in the mid-nineteenth century as Barcelona fifty years later, Ealham writes, 'for all the high sounding rhetoric of the urban elites and their emphasis on progress and civic equality'—consider the missionary attitude of colonial Grahamstown—'[the city] was not organised for the benefit of all its inhabitants' (2005, 8). He

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[2] See Chapter 1.

continues, 'in social terms a process of urban bifurcation was at work, according to which class divisions became inscribed in space' (2005, 8). As we have seen, the process in Grahamstown was complicated by increasingly definitive articulations of race as well as class (though only partially explored by Ealham, similar racial/ethnic perceptions were mobilised in Barcelona) and by the conceptual division of urban and rural, but we will see that the urban bifurcation presented by Ealham lends itself to a racialised setting such as Grahamstown. The bifurcation (and in fact, there were divisions imposed *within* the 'African' space, as well) of Grahamstown through the institutionalization of the locations was about controlling access to what was conceived as properly 'the city' and the politics that were acceptable in the city. The response in 1868 to a Coloured man's being nominated for member on the Municipal Council was to propose an increase of property qualifications for membership to £1000 because 'it [was] not right that the council should be exposed to the possibility of such an annoyance' (*Graham's Town Journal* 26 October 1868, quoted in Gibbens 1982, 249). As Gibbens concludes from this series of events, 'While the right to vote […] was an accepted right of the location communities and acknowledged as such by the white community, the possibility of a location resident becoming a Council member was regarded as absurd' (1982, 251). The contradiction between professed political inclusion and access to rights of citizenship is clear.

Gibbens is intent to construct an image of the early Grahamstown locations in which racial control is tempered with class realities: 'The lines of division between town and location still owed something to occupation and wage-earning capacity in addition to the enormous cultural and racial divisions. There is no doubt that the situation in the locations and among the location population was both complex and flexible' (1982, 267). Certainly, as Grahamstown was still growing and racial exclusion in a town context was in its early stages (in linear comparison with the twentieth century), there were complicating facts. It cannot be ignored, as they are visible in the historical record, that some poor white people were living in the locations—characterised as 'navvies' (Gibbens 1982, 276)—and that there were exclusions and prejudices around class in the attitudes of Grahamstown residents, but the administration of the locations and the intention of the legislation around locations demonstrates a simple racial strategy. Most basically, the series of Acts affecting locations were called 'Native Land Act(s)', and their concerns were consistent with their titles. The Native Land Act (No. 6) of 1876, which was applied to Grahamstown's locations in 1881, was a reaction to 'squatting' by Africans in the region to the east that had been temporarily the colony of 'British Kaffraria' (1847-1866) (Gibbens 1982, 259; 276).[3]

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[3] The land east of the Keiskamma River, which during the colonial conquest was designated by the British as both 'Queen Adelaide Province' and 'British Kaffraria', was annexed all of three times to the Cape Colony, with each annexation and separation meaning different modes of rule and different definitions of citizenship for the people

In addition to the ongoing enactment of spatial divisions, two episodes in the 1862-1882 period accentuate the way in which this division functioned. The first speaks to the 'civilising' attitude of the town. In 1862, the Bishop of Grahamstown had applied to move an Anglican-run school for Africans, the 'Kaffir Institute',[4] from an elite neighbourhood on the west side of town to the empty barracks at Fort England, in the southeast. The move was opposed by white Grahamstown in the newspapers on the grounds that 'no native location should be allowed in the city' for fear that it would lower property values in the Fort England area, and a petition was signed by fifty householders against allowing a '"colony of natives" within the city' (Gibbens 1982, 241-242). Those in favor of the move emphasised the 'good conduct' and the Christian education of boys at the school (Gibbens 1982, 243). Gibbens dubiously presents this as a matter of class: rich whites on the west side were not affronted by the presence of Africans whereas poor whites nearer to the locations were (1982, 244), however, the concern about the value of the land near the proposed new site for the Institute suggests a different story based not only on property economics but also on politics of space. The presence of the African learners was acceptable except where it might hinder the expansion of white property and the white urban political space; it is clear that there was and was to be a 'white' city which was not available or accessible to Africans.

The second event in the 1862-1882 period that demonstrates spatial division in Grahamstown and, more importantly here, the urban and rural logic that we saw develop during the conquest of the Zuurveld, was the arrival into town of a group of people referred to as 'Oba's Kafirs'. In April 1878, with war once more on the eastward-moving frontier, it was decided that a chief of questionable loyalties, Oba, should be moved away from the frontier. The people with Oba were split into small groups and sent to Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, and Graaff-Reinet. Twenty women and children arrived first in Grahamstown, followed by over five hundred people later in the month. Only some two hundred and fifty remained in Grahamstown, about half of them children (apparently because there was concern about Grahamstown's proximity to the frontier and the danger to the town posed by large numbers of possibly hostile adults; and indeed, many young men from Oba's people had crossed the Kei and joined Sandile in the war). Many of those who ended up in Grahamstown at this time stayed there (Gibbens 1982, 273-274). Gibbens's approach to this event reflects the logic of the 1870s:

> The presence in the locations of 'Oba's Kafirs', unused to location life and unsettled by
> their separation from their tribe and enforced exile, became a nucleus of nightly

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living there. It should be noted that in spite of official colony policy, people and leaders east of the Keiskamma did not acquiesce to colonial rule. Sometimes but not only through war, they actively maintained their modes of politics and their own conceptions of citizenship while adapting to interference by the British.

[4] The term 'Kaffir' or 'Kafir' only appears here where it has been used as part of a proper noun (i.e. Kaffir Institute, 'Oba's Kaffirs'), or where primary sources use it.

> disturbances and riotous living within the Fingo Location. [There were] complaints about the misbehaviour of "Oba's Kafirs" from worthy Grahamstown citizens […] (1982, 276).

Elsewhere, she observes, along with the *Graham's Town Journal*, that by 1879 unrest in Fingo Village was worsened by a "great influx" of "utter heathen" into the location, Oba's people included, and that Grahamstown residents lamented that fewer and fewer of the Africans in the locations were Christian (quoted in Gibbens 1982, 276-277).

Obvious in this is the distinction between Africans from the town and from the country: those arriving from the frontier brought undesirable elements into the locations and were characterised as fomenting 'unrest' and causing 'disturbances'. Grahamstown's white populace were 'gripped by anxieties that the "criminal classes" [were] steadily encroaching on the frontiers of policed society', and outsiders, 'living in a state of nature or primitive barbarism, the criminal heart of darkness in the city', to use Ealham's terms in this context, were maligned as damaging to the integrity of the Christian city (2005, 9; 12). White concern for controlling the people coming to Grahamstown led in 1860 to a new Municipal Location under city control adjoining Fingo Village (Holleman 1997, 38). After the war ended, there were recommendations that a fence should be built around the locations and plot sizes decreased. A 'Native Model Village' was also considered, in which respectable men would be located and afforded brick or stone houses with gardens (Gibbens 1982, 282; 287). Citizenship was closely guarded through spatial and racial control, and imbued in some cases with perceptions of urban and rural that mirrored the logic of the colonial conquest.

Though not always clear on the nature of the 'unrest', there are ideas mentioned repeatedly in the four theses on Grahamstown history that allow for certain insights. During the entire century in question, paramount in the articulation of the paranoia of Grahamstown's colonial whites were morality and health. This is consistent with Ealham's theory and depiction of urban spatial control in Barcelona:

> [T]he moral panics were a guide to repressive action: they profiled the 'danger' represented by 'recalcitrant' and 'diseased' groups (hence the positivist concern with classifying, cleansing and civilising), which had to be excluded from the full rights of citizenship and isolated from 'healthy' and 'respectable' individuals. They were also a justification for closing off the nascent proletarian public sphere, creating a moral and political climate that legitimated the extension of state power on the streets and the establishment of a new system of bureaucratic surveillance to regulate civil society (2005, 14).

That logic was racialised in the African context at the time in question, when unhealthy conditions in African residential areas of colonial cities throughout the continent led to outbreaks of plague

and other disease, and 'this "sanitation syndrome" caught hold of the colonial imagination as a general social metaphor for the pollution of blacks of urban space', and public health was employed as an excuse to remove Africans to city limits and to implement segregation (Goldberg 1993, 1990). When there were instances of plague in Johannesburg and Cape Town, the residences of Africans, depicted as 'slums' were destroyed and the people 'expelled to peripheral locations on sewage farms' (Goldberg 1993, 191). In Grahamstown, Africans were already mostly confined to the margins of the city from the very beginning, but the health fears strengthened the official white desire for separation and control of Africans, not so much as something new at the turn of the century, but as a preservation of the arrangement that had been produced for almost a century.

Sellick, another apologist for Victorian attitudes, reports that '[b]etween 1883 and 1904, the locations were little more than disease-ridden ghettos' (1983, 156). [5] Location residents faced dangerous water shortages, water unfit for consumption, malnutrition, waste disposal and sanitation problems, all of which contributed to high rates of disease (Sellick 1983, 179-183). The descriptions of these 'ghettos' largely follows the opinion that municipal 'neglect' was basic to the problem. However unhealthy they were for residents, the locations did function successfully as spaces of control, and over the last two decades of the nineteenth century this system of control was made more efficient through colonial legislation. Sellick writes of the 'growing desire for a "cordon sanitaire" between Black and White' which led to the Native Reserve Locations Act (No. 40) in 1902 and the South African Native Affairs Commission Report in 1905, which proposed complete territorial segregation. Act 40 was the only one 'passed during the period of 1883-1904 which deals comprehensively with the establishment of Black reserve locations near urban areas': in those areas '[t]he Governor had extensive powers to prohibit blacks from living outside the locations, to regulate the erection of shelters, curfew hours, entry into the location, the carrying of identity documents and eviction of residents regarded as "unlawful"' (Sellick 1983, 159-160).

In spite of the colonial efforts, segregation was incomplete in Grahamstown, and its incompleteness served to emphasise the division of space. As Sellick notes, 'Fairly large numbers of Blacks lived in Dell's row in African Street, and Paradise Row in New Street. Smaller groups could be found scattered throughout the town' whose 'presence […] within the city was barely tolerated by the White citizens. Many of their regular complaints [were] about overcrowding, noise, drunkenness, and the pollution of the surrounds' (1983, 170-171). Indeed in 1886, there were complaints that a town Councillor was 'among the greatest sinners in respect of letting

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[5] There were high instances of especially tuberculosis, and also smallpox, and bubonic plague in Grahamstown around the turn of the century (Southey 1990, 15).

houses in the town to Kafirs' and that the problem of slums would be solved with the introduction of 'legislation to prohibit Blacks from living outside the locations' (Sellick 1983, 171). Other forms of control included the 1888 law prohibiting Africans from carrying weapons in the street, and a curfew imposed in 1912 (Sellick 1983, 173; 187; Southey 1984, 237).

In 1870, the Municipal Locations had been expanded, and a section north east of Fingo Village had come to be known as 'Tantye' or 'Tantjie' (Holleman 1997, 38). Under the 1881 Municipal Regulations, Fingo Village and the Coloured Location were supervised by the 'Government Inspector of Locations' for Albany District. 'Three headmen were answerable to him for the administration of these locations: an Mfengu […] and a Thembu […] in the Fingo Village and a Coloured […] in the Hottentot Location' (Southey 1984, 192), identifications which reflect the preservation of official division of Africans not only from whites but from each other as well through ethnicity. The three 'headmen' were responsible for the collection of quitrents. In an effort to better control the locations during the first decade of the twentieth century, their control was bureaucratised and standardised.[6] As Southey relates, 'All huts and streets were numbered, stock branded, and all money derived from the locations [was to be] spent there, and no longer to be absorbed into general revenue. A new register was to be opened, and full information recorded' (1984, 193).

In rural areas, the intensification of spatial control was also under way. 'Private locations' were instituted through Act 33 of 1892, which required white farmers to register all the Africans living on their farms. The farmers 'were liable to a fine if more than the specified number of non-wage earning Africans resided' on their land, which 'led to evictions in some areas' and coerced labour in some cases. Subsequent acts in 1899 and 1909 created more specific regulations for African residence on farmland and the relationships between white farmers and Africans, largely aimed at removing 'squatters' from white farmland (Southey 1984, 225). The private locations proliferated. In 1900, there were sixteen private locations in Albany district, sixty-one two years later, over eighty in 1903, and by 1912 almost 6,000 African people lived on 143 private locations (Southey 1984, 226-227).

Interestingly, many of the white fears—the practises they sought most to control among Africans—were the same in town and in the country: farmers' meetings were concerned with

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[6] Even in 1912, Fingo Village and the Coloured Location were still Government Locations, distinct from the Municipal Location(s). All three were administered under different legislation, which largely affected access to property and the payment and collection of rates. There was conflict in the Grahamstown Municipal Council over whether the Municipal Locations should take on the regulations of the Government Locations or vice versa (Southey 1990, 17).

labour, theft, squatting, and (always) alcohol production and consumption, in particular of sorghum beer—the 'Kafir beer evil' (Southey 1984, 226). On squatting in rural areas, *The Graham's Town Journal* opined that 'large portions of the Eastern Province will in a few years be nothing better than a native area' (3 June 1905, quoted in Southey 1984, 226). The evictions of Africans from nearby farms, as well as some voluntary relocation to towns, including Grahamstown, created anxiety among whites. Echoing, in the context of the town, the motivations behind the Brereton of 1818, *The Graham's Town Journal* reported in 1909 that there were some four hundred 'loose natives' in the Grahamstown locations who had come in from rural areas, and that these people were responsible for increases in stock theft and other crime, leading to stricter control of access to the locations in town (3 September 1909, quoted in Southey 1984, 227; 228).

A shift of focus to contemporaneous events in Natal allows another exploration of the developing spatial control project of British colonialism in Southern Africa. In 1908, in response to an uprising (Maphumalo) in 1906, a ward system was introduced which would 'redefine chiefly powers in "territorial" rather than "personal" terms' (Ngonyama 2014, 83). Personal relationships between chiefs and people involved the provision of land on which homesteads and farms could be founded in return for tributary service, and thus 'transcend[ed] territories' (Ngonyama 2014, 85). As Crown Lands were sold from the 1880s onwards in Natal, many Africans were forced to move back to 'already overcrowded locations'. Although chiefs raised funds to purchase any available land, in 1903 'the Land Department was "instructed" to reject bids by Africans for crown lands', thereby limiting chiefly ability to provide land to their people. The introduction of wards further decreased the authority of chiefs, forcing many people to change their allegiances (citizenship) based on where they lived (Ngonyama 2014, 88; 90). As Ngonyama explains, 'the policy of "merging" and "eating up" polities, which would facilitate redefining boundaries within the context of "indirect rule", was not new', but the ward system in Natal differed in that 'for the first time, the authority of [chiefs] would be officially bounded territorially so as to eliminate "tribal mix up"' (2014, 93). Inherent to the logic of the ward system was the same process of destruction of African political systems and legitimacy that Landau (2010) theorises and which was explored in relation to the Eastern Cape in the preceding chapter: 'With the Ward System, the traditional notion [that … 'a chief is a chief because of the people'] was replaced by the notion that a chief is a chief because of the space/territory in which he resides'—the logic of fixity, once again (Ngonyama 2014, 101). The words of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Arthur J. Shepstone, in 1909 illuminate without question the centrality of the idea of *space* to the colonial project at the beginning of the twentieth century:

> With the *area* and population so greatly increased, and *civilization spreading*, slowly though it be, *in every direction*, it is manifest that governing the Natives has come to be a task of *vast proportions* as well as one of peculiar difficulty and complexity (Ngonyama 2014, 88; emphasis added).

The proliferation and regulation of 'private locations' on farms in the Eastern Cape, the increasing rigidity of location policy in Grahamstown and the control of locations and Africans through 'headmen' that was going on at the same time displays a consistency of rationalisation and practise in dealing with Africans in both urban and rural areas.

In spite of their dismissal in the analyses of colonial Grahamstown periodicals, as well as in the four theses informing this chapter, politics existed among Africans living in the locations. Unfortunately, they are mostly visible in these sources in relation to specific moments of repression, since subaltern politics after the fashion of Chatterjee are not entertained. Indeed, politics by Africans in this period seem to generate quite serious confusion for the researchers: 'Evidence', writes Southey, 'of political organization in Grahamstown on a local level is non-existent; but Grahamstown's blacks nonetheless reacted to threats to their rights, and made their voices heard', in partial contradiction of the assertion a few pages earlier that African Separatist churches were active in the locations, where they caused 'tremendous trouble', and that 'political activity was intermittent amongst Africans' (1984, 224; 215-16). Gibbens and Sellick refrain from most analysis beyond 'unrest' and mentioning the extent of the Cape franchise. However, politics can be detected which threatened the colonial agenda of spatial control (not ignoring the war in the Eastern Cape in 1878-79). These politics will be important going forward, when the focus of this research shifts to contemporary Grahamstown. The framing of the administration of the locations as technical concerns of public health and crime are mimicked in the 'service delivery' and 'illegal land occupation' rationalisations of 'restlessness', to use the degrading word, among poor Africans in South African cities in 2015.

   In spite of shrinking access to the vote in the 1880s and 90s (and continuing afterwards) and the apparent lack of success of formal political organizations such as the local Vigilance Association, the South African Native Congress, and Native Education Association (Sellick 1983, 157-158; 160-164), African people in Grahamstown were frequently politically active. In one instance, in 1887, residents of the Coloured Location refused to pay rents because repeated complaints about the state of roads in the location were not answered (Sellick 1983, 177). At the beginning of the twentieth century, repression was preoccupied with squatters and with 'unemployed people residing in the locations', who 'were regarded as a source of danger', which led to legislation and police forces being mobilised against them (Southey 1984, 231-233). Police,

said *The Grahamstown Journal* in 1908, were 'carrying on a regular crusade against squatters and vagrants in the city locations' (quoted in Southey 1984, 232). An action by thirty-five Cape Mounted Police into the locations in 1911, which resulted in fifteen arrests of 'illegal inhabitants' resulted in a petition and protest, but the City Council ignored the demands (Southey 1984, 233).

A newly appointed Location Inspector, unpopular for his strict enforcement of the law, was assaulted by one man in 1913. More importantly, the appointment led to several protest meetings, and a petition signed by eighty-eight women living in the location complaining of 'indifference to their interests and the way in which they had been treated by the inspector' was delivered to the City Council in July 1913. The Council ignored the petition on three grounds: it was brought by women, some of these women had been convicted of brewing beer (for which they were supposed to have left the location), and all the names had been written by only two of the women (Southey 1984; 1990, 16). Three years later, women again protested at City Hall, this time regarding the water supply to the locations. They were first accompanied by a spokesman but after inaction on the part of the municipality, a larger group of women went to City Hall demanding that the water problems should be resolved (Southey 1984, 203). Southey, in a rather more sophisticated analysis of Grahamstown during this period than his thesis, argues that the revolt in 1917 as well as the many smaller protest actions during the years 1913-1918 'illustrated that the city authorities, despite the formidable array of laws that they had built up during the previous two decades [and longer] did not enjoy the control that they imagined they exercised in the city' (1990, 10). A 'deputation of tenants from the location' in 1916 forced the city council to concede some of the provisions of its rigidified lease laws, but political action by Africans continued, leading to the armed march in April 1917 (stayaways and boycotts had also been considered). 'Despite the show of official strength', as Southey refers to the regiment-sized force that attacked the locations and arrested protesters, Africans would not sign new lease agreements, and by September some 350 of 500 refused to sign. The Council determined to revise the lease agreements in favour of the tenants (Southey 1990, 19), and the cattle quota was raised from three to five, but this was accompanied by tightened security and police raids for 'illegal' liquor increased (Holleman 1997, 41). Still, in the face of increasingly strict control over their lives, residents in Grahamstown's locations managed to resist the terms of the lease agreements. 'The city council', writes Southey, 'was constrained by the actions of the location residents themselves' without outside help from or association with formal political organisations, though often with recourse to legal systems that demonstrated an exercise by Africans of what citizenship rights were available to them (1990, 20-23).

The conviction of women for brewing beer was part of an ongoing political conflict in Grahamstown. Alcohol abuse by Africans was decried consistently by white residents from the time of the foundation of the locations in Grahamstown, and violence and 'unrest' in town was largely attributed to alcohol, with clear racial and spatial inflections, as we have seen. Indeed, the 'question of liquor in general and "kaffir-beer" in particular runs threadlike through the history of the African working class in South Africa' (La Hause 1982, 66). Further east in the port city of Durban, the control of the sale and consumption of alcohol in municipal beer halls was devised as a means of control of African people and African mobility as well. The alcohol available in 'peri-urban areas' was illegal, while that for sale near the 'hostels'[7] was managed by the government. In addition, the money spent on beer was used to pay the salaries of public officials, and for services for Africans. The monopoly on beer in Durban led to protest, in which 'the total system of coercion and social control; the Durban system, its web of coercive regulations and penal sanctions' were contested. Boycotts of the beerhalls were staged in Durban during 1929 and 1930 (La Hause 1982, 67-68; 72)

In Grahamstown, a Municipal Beer Hall was constructed in Fingo Village 1938 with the same objective of regulating the sale of alcohol in the locations while paying for their maintenance (Torlesse 1993, 160). 'The brewing of sorghum beer', writes Southey, 'was widely regarded by the white inhabitants of Grahamstown as a practice to be curtailed at all costs' (1984, 213). Brewing was grounds for eviction, but many location residents—mainly women, but also some men—relied on brewing for their livelihoods (Southey 1990, 16). The moral argument that Africans were violent or otherwise a problem in town was constantly repeated during the eighty year period reviewed by the four theses on Grahamstown, and served, like public health concerns, to depoliticise the actions of Africans living in the locations. Such a 'localization of crime', says Goldberg, 'serves a double end: It magnifies the image of racialized criminality, and it confines the overwhelming proportion of crimes involving the racially marginalized to racially marginal space' (1993, 197). We saw the same understanding at play in the earliest days of European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope: both the local African population and the Europeans who made their way into the 'barbarous' countryside were cast as criminal. In Grahamstown, how much of the vague 'unrest' or 'violence' which was attributed to drunkenness was actually motivated by political convictions cannot be known, but it is unlikely, given the instances of political action that are recorded, that every time a black African was called unruly, it was simply a case of public drunkenness.

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[7] Barracks for workers

While political activity by Africans in the surrounding rural areas is obscured in the sources utilised here, the information about farmers' politics can provide insights into what was going on there. Significantly, local farmers—organised as the Albany Farmers' Association—were highly invested in the politics of the town. Not only were their fears the same as the whites in town, as has been seen, but they were intent on absolute control of those Africans who did live in town. Farmers wanted extremely strict control of the locations: police stations to be built and manned there, the disarming of Africans throughout the entire Eastern Province, prohibition of liquor, and pass laws. They supported curfews for the locations in 1909 and 1912 (Southey 1990, 14). There were rumors of several African scouts being sent from the town locations to surrounding farms and to Peddie 'to try to raise an insurrection' (Southey 1984, 249)—whether this was an instance of fear mongering or based in part on truth is unclear.[8] During the major conflict in 1917 described at the very beginning of this thesis, which was considered by white authorities and observers of the period to be a 'violation' by poor Africans into the political space of the white city, the local farmers accused the magistrate of being too gentle in his response, and demanded the arrest of the deputation that mediated the conflict (Southey 1984, 252). Repression was organised spatially, but in certain ways it transcended the urban and rural division, which suggests that resistance was also not confined in terms of this distinction.

Although Grahamstown's importance on the frontier declined from the mid-nineteenth century—it was second largest to Cape Town until the 1860s—due to the advance of the frontier towards the Kei River in the east, the foundation of King William's Town and Queenstown and the growth of East London as a port (Gibbens 1982, 14; 18-19), the spatial politics that attended Grahamstown's establishment and early projection of colonial politics and military power continued to crucially affect the political lives of people living in the town and its surrounds.

Leading up to and following the Union of South Africa in 1910, segregation was increasingly formalised. The Natives' Land Act (27) of 1913, following the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission report of 1905, codified territorial segregation and legislated the institution of traditional authorities over African areas. Africans, under the Act, could only buy land in 'Scheduled Native Areas', which amounted to 'one-eighteenth' of the entire Union of South Africa (Plaatje [1916] 1982, 24). Sol Plaatje, an important black intellectual in early twentieth-century South Africa, transcribes the Land Act debate in the Union Parliament in *Native Life in South Africa* ([1916] 1982). What becomes clear reading the transcription is that the debate

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[8] In either case, it is reminiscent of accusations by seventeenth century slave-owners at the Cape that Africans outside of colonial control were inciting slaves to run away, as seen in MacCrone (1937, 32).

was over what form control of Africans ('Natives') would take: on the one hand was the repressive control '[Orange] Free State law' which came to be the law of the whole country through the Act; on the other was the tradition of British liberalism. We have seen the latter's civilizing mission and its hypocrisy played out in Grahamstown. The distinction is characterised by one Member of the Union Parliament[9] as between 'repression' and 'inspiration', that 'They had inspired the natives to a certain extent, but no sooner had they created an appetite than they had told the natives they should go no further' (quoted in Plaatje [1916] 1982, 75). In the words of another Member[10], elucidating the idea of space linked with 'civilisation', that is, with citizenship, repression meant 'a sort of kraal in which all the natives were to be driven, and they were to be left to develop on their own lines. To allow them to go on their own lines was merely to drive them back into barbarism; their own lines meant barbarous lines' (quoted in Plaatje [1916] 1982, 39). The 'result of a legislative jumble [that] is "the law"', writes Plaatje, made it 'illegal for Natives to live on farms except as servants in the employ of Europeans' and he feared that the same policy would soon come to apply in urban areas ([1916] 1982, 69; 71-72). Plaatje emphasises the homelessness that the Natives' Land Act enforced upon Africans, even to the point of burying a child in a 'stolen grave' because its parents were not allowed to own land ([1916] 1982, 90). At a political meeting at Sheshugu in late 1913, Plaatje learned from local Africans that the Act 'was raging with particular fury in the old Cape districts of Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, King Williamstown, and East London', which includes the area under study here (Plaatje [1916] 1982, 180).

Lamenting the failure of the British 'civilisation' and Cape liberalism in which he had had faith, Sol Plaatje observes that the 'worst feature' of the passage of the Land Act was that it demonstrated the lack of citizenship of black African people in South Africa: 'God in the heavens alone knows what will become of the hapless, *because voteless*, Natives, who are *without a President*, "*without a King*", and with a Governor-General *without constitutional functions*, under task-masters whose national traditions are *to enslave the dark races*' ([1916] 1982, 76; emphasis added). Deprivation of access to formal political structures went hand in hand with dispossession of the land. South Africa was not for Africans, following the lead of the the Orange Free State, which an MP[11] said, 'had told the coloured people plainly that the [Orange Free State] was a white man's country, and that they intended to keep it so' (quoted in Plaatje [1916] 1982, 45).

At the time of the passage of the Natives' Land Act, of 4,500,000 'black South Africans', '[o]ne and three-quarter millions [lived] in Locations and Reserves, over half a million within

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[9] C. H. Haggar (Roodepoort)
[10] J. X. Merriman (Victoria West), former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony (1908-1910)
[11] J. G. Keyter (Ficksburg)

municipalities or urban areas, and nearly a million as squatters' on white farms (Plaatje [1916] 1982, 21). At the same time, the population of the locations at Grahamstown was some 7,000 in total, in three or four locations (whether the Municipality administered areas were considered as one or two). The year 1914, following the Natives' Land Act, saw increasing restrictions on these people's lives. In January, it was adopted that 'any inhabitant of the city could graze up to ten head of cattle or twenty-five sheep on the commonage [the locations were on the commons], but residents of the location were severely restricted': in the Municipal Location, only three cattle or eight sheep were allowed, and the number was also small in the Government Locations, depending on property value (Southey 1984, 242). Running more livestock on commonage was punishable by a £5 fine or prison. Laws were also passed that controlled leases based on employment in the city, that forbade domestic workers from remaining at their employers' homes overnight, and that prevented Africans from owning land and property in white areas. Resistance continued, and in November of that year, a meeting in the location passed a resolution against the lease agreement (Southey 1984, 242-243). In 1926, almost all livestock were required to be registered with the municipality; in response, 245 people signed a petition against the regulation, which was an '"interference" against their rights and privileges (Torlesse 1993, 123-124).

The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, 'the adoption of which was optional by municipalities, empowered local authorities to set aside locations for African occupancy, stop whites from owning land in them, and regulate financial administration' and also restricted African movement and the brewing of sorghum beer (Southey 1984, 255). The Act did not apply to Fingo Village (still a government rather than municipal location), and was only applied to Grahamstown Municipal locations in 1938.

Coercive control through public health continued as well, including forced delousing, quarantine hospitals, and home invasions (during a smallpox outbreak in 1914). Censuses were another form of making control more efficient, and based on censuses taken in the 1920s and 30s, the Council determined that there were 2042 'redundant' African inhabitants in Grahamstown (Torlesse 1993, 147). In 1938, black men were required to become employed within six days of arrival in town, or face arrest and fines or prison. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act also 'made provision for the removal of convicted "won't works" to [farms]' (Torlesse 1993, 148).

An analysis of the first hundred and more years of the locations in Grahamstown shows an increasing level of control exercised by white governments against African residents through both legislation and coercion (the distinction need hardly be made). Such was the trend throughout the country, in both urban and rural areas, which attained its most intense and systematic form during apartheid beginning in 1948. Formal citizenship for Africans, which in the early days of

Grahamstown was somewhat grudgingly permissible under colonial liberalism, was curtailed drastically until it was withdrawn entirely under apartheid with the creation of the 'Bantustans' as 'independent' nations under 'traditional authorities'[12]. This institutionalised the indirect rule policies of the preceding hundred years, and is the basis for Mamdani's argument for a bifurcated state—urban civil society on the one hand, and rural traditional authority on the other: a dispensation that did not allow for a successful democratic project at the ending of apartheid, 1990-1994. As we have seen here in the context of Grahamstown, access to urban 'civil society' was not available to everyone—whatever the 'civilising' posturing of the mid-nineteenth century might suggest—and, specifically and acutely, it was denied to black Africans again and again in an increasingly harsh and precise manner. Crucially, the form of exclusion took similar forms in both urban and rural areas, largely through the control of specific spaces defined by race. There is evidence that resistance was also similar—or even linked—in town and country.

The historical information in this chapter is partially revisited in Chapter 5 in the context of important political events in Grahamstown in 2015, and it provides opportunities for looking at contemporary politics in terms of space, race, and citizenship.

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[12] See Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3
APARTHEID'S SPATIAL ORDER OF RACE & CITIZENSHIP

*'[W]e have to take cognisance of the fact that ours is far from a normal society.' – Steve Biko
in* I Write What I Like *([1978] 2004, 13)*

Apartheid merged two political expressions of modernity: *race* and *indirect rule*. The former, argues Goldberg, 'is one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity' (1993, 3), and the latter is, according to Mamdani, a 'quintessentially modern form of rule in a colonial setting' (2012, 1). We have seen that race and indirect rule, in their South/ern African manifestations, were developed, utilised, combined, and altered through a long process of limiting the political autonomy of African people through colonial conquest, and how the Fish River Country, the 'eastern frontier' of the British Cape Colony, centred on Grahamstown, was important to and directly illustrates the politics of that process. So, 'modernity'—politically contingent and non-universal, a 'social movement from above'—modernity, as it came to be expressed through hyper-colonialism in South Africa, was swaddled in racialised patterns of rule, direct and indirect, that latticed the political landscape. Fused to these two strands was a third: Since the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold in the 1880s, the subsequent ascendance of the mining industry, and the hot-burning fuel this provided for colonialism, southern Africa and its people were scarred by an extractive and exploitative capitalism. Race, indirect rule, and capital were the tripod upon which the ultra-modern apartheid state was braced.

Instituted from 1948 with the election of the National Party representing a white supremacist constituency of only one-fifth of the total population, apartheid proceeded as a honing of the colonial and repressive modes of control and the politics of race and of citizenship which had been ongoing in South/ern Africa for some three centuries. While deriving its three-legged form from these political and economic instruments of oppression—race, indirect rule, and capital—apartheid sought to perfect them: to institute a state-systemic answer to minority European racist rule of a majority African population.

As I have argued in the context of the Grahamstown region, politicised *space* was significant to both the development of and the implementation of racial oppression. This is not to say that race is a purely spatial category, that racism is only a spatial institution, or that space was indeed the most important factor in the politics of race; but that space *was* a facet is historically clear, and that, apart perhaps from skin colour, the most blatant manifestation of racial control and political circumscription, of repression, and of racialised experience was indeed spatial. Therefore, this particular spatial expression and mode of race and racism is especially useful in thinking about both historical and contemporary politics in South Africa. The argument to

be distilled from the preceding two historical chapters is that space was racialised (and vice versa) between the urban and the rural as well as within those areas; and the argument to carry forward through this chapter is that the same concepts of racialisation and spatialisation were foundational to apartheid.

'Race', Goldberg reminds us, has no 'single sedimented meaning', but nonetheless it 'impart[s] specificity' to people (1993, 80). While the argument thus far has been to reveal an historical production of racialised political space(s), race and racism, during that process, accrued and were asserted through numerous other and often contradictory articulations. Nonetheless, Goldberg goes on, race 'is irreducibly a *political* category' (1993, 87). Racial and racist categories are utilised politically to define people, to generate difference and distance, in short, to segregate or at least to create the necessary logic for segregation, in order that the exclusion of some people is made possible. Echoing Wilmsen[1], Goldberg observes, 'Distance is not, at least not primarily, to be interpreted spatially or geographically but in terms of difference— and so in terms of the reinvented articulation of racist concepts. "Generative metaphors" of sameness and otherness rule spatial relations' (1993, 203). By the time of the institution of apartheid, race in the South African colonial context had had its specificities and indicators— its rules—defined, and those rules, pliable though they were when politically necessary, were applied to two things: people and space. During and through the violent imposition of colonial political hegemony, spatial difference was normalised alongside racial difference, and both could be used to elide problems other than race—more real, perhaps, than racist problems— while informing and providing for the control of differences.

Apartheid emerged from just such a *racist culture* (also, the title of Goldberg's book), and its institution relied upon the accepted racial rules as well as the flexible and contradictory, that is, *political* nature of race. Posel remarks, 'Apartheid's principal imaginary was of a society in which every "race" knew and observed its proper place – economically, politically and socially', and goes on: 'Race was to be the critical and overriding faultline: the fundamental organising principle for the allocation of resources and opportunities, the basis of all spatial demarcation, planning and development, the boundary for all social interaction' (2001, 52). Some aspects of this 'organising principle', such as location of residence, had been practised widely in South/ern Africa for more than a century, as the history of Grahamstown's locations has shown, and had roots even earlier, while, for other aspects, there was new legislation

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[1] See First Excursus.

codifying racial separation in marriage and sex, in access to public and educational facilities, and to cities (Posel 2001, 66). The classification of race—as African, Coloured, Indian, or white—which was the prerogative of white people, was subjective, based upon conventions 'which had grown up during the hundreds of years we [Europeans] have been here' (in Posel 2001, 55). Any aspect of one's appearance, no matter how minute, arbitrary, or violating, might determine one's race. One's hair, language, education, associates, politics, preferred alcoholic drink, and even one's furniture could be used to determine race. A person could be deemed to be or choose to be a member of one race in certain situations, and a different race in another (Posel 2001, 59-65). Space continued to be as significant to race as it had been in the past:

> Classifiers typically fired off a battery of questions to establish a spatial sense of people's race: where they were born, where they had gone to school, where they lived, where they had grown up, where their friends lived, where their children were schooled, where and with whom their children played. In a tautological denial of the desirability of racial mixing, classifiers tended to read off an individual's race from the dominant racial character of his or her residential area and community of associates (Posel 2001, 60).

The ordering of space, urban and rural, which we saw elaborated in the locations of Grahamstown reached a neurotic crescendo under apartheid. Indeed, part of the motivation for the white political minority that instituted apartheid had been the accelerating urbanisation of Africans after the 1913 Land Act and especially after the Second World War, which was viewed 'in South Africa as across the colonial world […]as disorderly and dangerous' (Hickel 2014, 140; also Posel 2001, 52). Perhaps a phrase better capturing white supremacist fears would be 'Africanisation of urban areas'. 'The very existence', Hickel writes, 'of urban black South Africans seems to threaten the basic categories that underpinned both colonialism and social science theory, which drew structuralist distinctions between rural/tribal/African and urban/modern/European' (2014, 141). Grahamstown, though not an industrial city like the fastest growing urban areas, underwent its own population growth during these decades of the twentieth century (Southey, 1990).

The 'answers' to this 'problem' of African urbanisation that were supplied by the apartheid state were the same as they had been in 1657[2], to create and police a definite line between Africans and Europeans, and/or to 'make a clean sweep' of Africans from spaces perceived as European. These processes were employed in both urban and rural areas through the

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[2] See MacCrone (1937) in Chapter 1.

intensification of township management, the modification and solidification of the reserves as 'homelands' ('Bantustans'), and the forced removal of African people.

It is necessary, in examining *how* space was controlled, to also provide an explanation for *why* it was controlled, or else *how* means very little. Critically interrogating *why* requires a digression back into history. A classical liberal explanation of apartheid poses racism and a white supremacist state as irrational and ideological (in Friedman 2014, 5-7), but this first contradicts the potential rationality of racism(s) (Fanon [1964] 1967, 32; Gordon 2015, 85-86; Goldberg 1993) and, secondly, influential Marxist explanations and critiques of the apartheid state. As this latter school of analysis has shown, an explanation of apartheid is not possible without taking into consideration its third buttress: capitalism.

The Marxist critiques are represented, notably and significantly, by Harold Wolpe's 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power' paper (1972), which first repudiates an exclusively ideological explanation for segregation apartheid—that is, the liberal account of racist white people intent on domination—and implicates the demands of capitalism in the institution of apartheid. Wolpe critiques a view in which 'the increased racial oppression manifested by Apartheid' were premised on the understanding that 'the governing National Party's ideology is more racist than that of its predecessors' (1972, 426). He goes beyond previous accounts (Wolpe cites Legassick 1972) by arguing that apartheid did not simply perpetuate an economic system demanding control of cheap migrant labour enabled by the creation of the African 'reserves' in 1913, but that control was 'crucially a function of the conditions of the production and reproduction of that labour-power' which was sought through specific changes to the structure of the South African economy, namely 'the virtual destruction of the pre-capitalist mode of production of the African communities in the Reserves and, therefore, the economic basis of cheap *migrant* labour-power and the consequent changes [to] "tribal" political institutions' that this predicated (1972, 428).

Steven Friedman observes that Marxism, by focusing on economic relationships, allowed for a critique of the white, English-speaking South African population, which customarily self-absolved itself from complicity in Afrikaner bigotry, while '[a]fter Wolpe and his colleagues, history accepted the Marxist assumption that capitalism and apartheid were connected' (2014, 10; 14). It is a necessary connection to make, but requires the qualification that racial domination—not for its own sake, not out of some inexplicable meanness—had been a political and economic imperative for colonialists seeking to exploit southern Africa/ns since Europeans arrived in the region, a period during which economic relationships and the practises of

exploitation were not always or only driven by capital and capitalist accumulation. Significantly, the modes of racial domination and control of populations had been developed over three centuries during which capital had increasingly played a significant role but was not ubiquitous or even the most significant aspect of the political economy. Aimé Césaire, the Martinican poet and communist, asks the question '[W]hat fundamentally is colonization?'— his answer, that it is precisely 'to extend to a world scale the competition of [Europe's] antagonistic economies' ([1955]1972, 2), is frankly true, but his later point that colonialism is a process of 'proletarianization and mystification' of societies that were 'communal' and 'not only ante-capitalist…but also *anti-capitalist'* ([1952] 1972, 7, emphasis original) does not properly square with the context of the colonialism practised and experienced in the Cape region of Southern Africa.

'In South Africa [sic]', writes Wolpe, 'the development of capitalism has been bound up with first, the deterioration of the productive capacity and then, with increasing rapidity, the destruction of pre-capitalist societies' (1972, 432). It is important to note that these pre-capitalist societies were themselves at times European and colonial, and not exclusively African.[3]

A permanent European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope *did* arise precisely out of a process of extending Europe's economies 'to a world scale'. Ships of the English and Dutch East India Companies rested, watered, and provisioned at the Cape on their voyages to and from 'the East' from the end of the sixteenth century, and a Dutch outpost followed on the heels of a Dutch claim to the Cape in 1652 (Mostert 1992, 88-94). There did not immediately ensue any effort to expand colonialism in southern Africa or to exploit its resources beyond a trade in cattle with African people living near the Dutch fort, whom even the racist MacCrone acknowledges, 'had the advantage, since they possessed the monopoly of the only commodity that was of any value to the Europeans' (1937, 21). It is a capitalist's assessment of the situation, but the local economy of the Cape, though linked to an expanding global capitalist imperialism, was far from capitalist. The Dutch East India Company did not seriously consider the possibility of exploiting the Cape agriculturally for the benefit of their economic empire, and the first agricultural 'free burghers' were only nine in number (Mostert 1992, 129). The expansion of the colony inland was not carried out through capitalist exploitation, as was already happening in the Americas at the time. MacCrone and Mostert both portray the

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[3] 'Pre-capitalist' here denotes a society or economy that historically became or was subsumed by capitalist modes of production and not a society or economy 'intending' to become or inevitably to become capitalist. It is possible, despite some views to the contrary, to use 'pre-capitalist' without assuming a capitalist teleology.

decidedly 'pre-capitalist' nature of the 'settlers' in the Cape region of southern Africa, who are perhaps better referred to simply as Europeans, or boers, given their predominantly rather unsettled existence. As Mostert writes, 'the farms of those who held land were huge and sometimes far apart' and the boers' 'way of life', moving with 'their herds and their flocks', 'had come to resemble that of the indigenous populace in many more ways than the obvious ones of cattle and transhumance':

> [T]hey had no restless material ambitions, no dreams of sudden riches. They hunted ivory, but had no gold fever, did not seek diamonds and other treasure. They did not possess the drive, as pioneers did in other new worlds, to conquer the wilderness, with visions of cities and expansion and prosperity. Their manner of living bore the appearance of poverty, for they had no material possessions to speak of […] (Mostert 1992, 526).

Although Legassick argues that the idea of 'commerce' was introduced with the arrival of the 1820s settlers to the Grahamstown region and effected an economic 'revolution' (2010, 22), even these latter arrivals, who were quite literally 'imported' to be farmers in the fertile, recently 'cleared' Zuurveld/Albany District, quickly abandoned cultivation for stock farming in the manner of boers and Xhosa (Mostert 1992, 546).

Certainly, European colonialism in southern Africa was marked, as it was everywhere, by dispossession, violence, enclosure (of different sorts), notions of private property, and the arrival of a finance economy, but true capitalist exploitation, it could be argued, did not really begin to take hold until the 1840s. In those years, merino sheep were introduced to the eastern part of the Cape at the same time that British wool production declined and manufacturing increased. Imports to Britain then became necessary, and Southern African wool was cheaper than Australian wool. In the late 1820s, wool export was worth £1,300 and in 1846, £200,000. The growth of this wool industry motivated appropriation of more Xhosa land, which in turn precipitated yet another war in the region, its seventh in seven decades (Mostert 1992, 859-860). From then on, and accelerating drastically with the discovery of gold and diamonds in the last quarter of the century, Africans in colonial southern Africa were subjected to the violent 'transition' captured in the title of Colin Bundy's important work *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (1979), from 'their precolonial existence as pastoralist-cultivators to their contemporary status: that of sub-subsistence rural dwellers' (1).

Still, even in what can be characterised as a pre-capitalist colonial Southern Africa, there had *always* been a demand for labour. In the first year of Dutch settlement, the colony's commander, Jan van Riebeeck, had requested that agricultural labour be imported from China,

and within four years the first slaves had been delivered to the new colony (MacCrone 1937, 27; 31). Slavery was not abolished in the Cape Colony (which had 'become British') until 1834, and the effects of abolition on the lives of former slaves, who were immediately apprenticed to their former masters for as long as six years, and on the economic practises of colonists, was minimal (Mostert 1992, 633). After the rise of export trade, the demand by white farmers was always for more labour. Leasing poor, low-value land to Africans created 'quasi-feudal relationships' that 'provided a short-term answer to white labour needs' and produced rent incomes (Bundy 1979, 45). Later in the nineteenth century, with the change in the South/ern African economies brought about my mining in the northern interior, 'a growing number of Africans sought work in the towns, as skilled and unskilled labour', something which had been going on progressively alongside land appropriation, and these newly urbanised people 'worked in the diamond mines, upon road, rail, and harbour projects, evincing a keen awareness of wage levels and employment conditions' (Bundy 1979, 66). Therein are found the ever-searched for proletariat of the Marxists. Frederick Cooper warns against the gaps inherent in a Marxist analysis of urbanisation, suggesting that the 'very term…suggests a self-propelled process' through which people 'enter the mainstream of history', but that this entails the fallacy of 'adaption', of 'inevitable…movement into urban life' (1983, 12). Indeed, in the context of our argument, certain strains of Marxism would affirm the spatial logic of colonialism, of racialised, backward rurality. Cooper argues, 'the bounds of an approach to space that stressed the linkage of production combined with minimal daily reproduction in rural areas have been transcended…. As soon as one admits that the actions of noncapitalist classes matter, the determinant logic of capital comes into question' (1983, 29).

It is also crucial to note that the first few decades of the twentieth century saw urbanisation and impoverishment not only of Africans but of white people as well. An increase of 'capitalist farming, especially including fencing' did not take real hold in South Africa until after the First World War, but when it did, accompanied by recurrent and coinciding droughts and recessions, it created a population of 'poor whites' large enough to draw attention as the 'poor white problem' (Bonner 2011, 259-260). Poor people of any race could have been the 'proletariat' which both capitalists and Marxists require, but the political objective of maintaining *racialised* control of the economy, of perpetuating a colonial system *along with* capitalism, required differentiating the potential proletariat racially. This is rationally consistent with a racist project, and does not disqualify capitalism as foundational to apartheid's implementation, mid-twentieth century. In addition to the control of labour and the economy which white South Africans intended, there was a necessity for *political* domination, since the people to be

controlled made up the enormous majority of the total population. Apartheid not only preserved the products of the economy for the white minority, but political institutions as well, including citizenship. The outcome of this is that pre-apartheid and apartheid South Africa did not represent only a racialised economy (capitalist or otherwise) but a thoroughgoing racialised society moved by a racist culture as discussed above.

Let us return to Césaire momentarily, hopefully to reconcile the tensions in the preceding paragraphs. Marx tells that at the heart of capitalism is alienation (1844). As Césaire shows in his *Discourse on Colonialism*, the concept of alienation takes on different meanings in the colony and effects different alienations than are encapsulated in the relationship between labour and production. Colonialism involves alienation of labour, alienation from the land and its resources, but also from pre-colonial—or, better put, non-colonial—political institutions and cultures and individual and collective identities[4], and, above all, from humanity—both locally, in the treatment of the colonised as less than human, and globally in that the colonised are barred from joining the 'civilised', 'human' world which prospers through their alienation. Césaire's *Discourse* shows the profound pervasiveness of colonialism's alienating tendencies: it bereaves the colonised not only of practical considerations like land, but also of their politics and even their metaphysics.

The consequence of colonial alienation is that the colonised become racialised 'things', 'objects'. In his essay on alienation, Marx wrote, 'the human being (the laborer) does not feel himself to be free except in his animal functions', to the extent that '[t]he animal becomes human and the human becomes animal' (1844, np). It is in this, the alienation of people from their humanity, that anti-colonialism finds itself in communism: 'the labourer' in Marx is easily replaced by 'the colonised' in Césaire. Apartheid, Posel observes, preserved 'white civilisation' alongside 'white economic prosperity' (2011, 321). More broadly articulating the needs of colonialism, the project in South Africa leading up to and following on 1948 was to reserve inhumanity for people considered 'non-white'.

This reconsideration of some of the historical period already presented in this thesis is meant to complicate a narrowly Marxist or economic explanation of apartheid, though, as Friedman points out, Wolpe's Marxism was 'an important antidote' to 'crude[r]' forms (2014, 16). Wolpe demonstrates that the need for tightening control on African labour was on the minds of white South Africans through the 1940s, when political action among African people was also frequent; 'the policy of Apartheid developed as a response to this urban and rural challenge

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[4] See Chapter 1 and Landau (2010).

to the system which emerged inexorably from the changed basis of cheap-labour power' (1972, 445-446; Posel 2001, 52).   Still, apartheid's systems of differentiation, control, repression, and exploitation were normalised over a very long history and were not always associated directly with capitalism. That is not to say that capitalism had no role in apartheid, and indeed the correlation is a necessary one, but rather to historicise a somewhat limited view of the origins of apartheid and to stress that the reason for spatial and racial control, which is still the subject of this discussion, should be considered as the outcome of diverse political processes. Posel warns against 'the risk of caricature', writing that apartheid 'was more internally fractious and fractured, historically fluid and complex, than the formulaic reductions can possible render' (2011, 319). Apartheid represents one instantiation in a series of related and overlapping 'social movements from above' that at some stages included, and finally came to be fully invested in, capitalism. We can now look more closely at how apartheid altered and maintained the methods of control regarding race, space, and citizenship, and how the concepts of *urban* and *rural* were manipulated during the apartheid years.

Apartheid's spatial and racial landscape of control was delimited in the Group Areas Act of 1950. Goldberg summarises the main points of the Act: specific residential zones for each racial group with clear physical—natural or artificial—boundaries between them; access to 'industrial sites or the central business district' and 'common amenities' that did not require people of one race crossing the areas of others; where such crossing was unavoidable there should be buffer zones; industry should be arranged around urban areas to give more direct access; and the 'central business district [was] to remain under white control' (1993, 193). A sort of intimate planning and manipulation that will be familiar from the discussion of the development Grahamstown's locations—the race-specific residential areas, the 'Native Model Village', the Municipal Beer Hall—characterised the definition and administration of space after the Group Areas Act. The 'square house' trope of the missionary days had not disappeared, and was developed pseudo-socio-scientifically, imbued with the racialised spatial logic we have seen. In 1951, an urban planner envisioned 'a township comprised of free-standing nuclear-family houses', but where the apartheid state could 'reproduce aspects of "native society" for the purposes of enhancing social control', and so the township was organised around a central point to facilitate surveillance and to 'replicate the concentric structure of domestic space in rural areas' (Hickel 2014, 145). In contrast to shack settlements in the Cato Manor area of Durban, a '"well-planned" township […] gives new hope and joy to thousands. The Bantu [sic] becomes intensely house-proud' (in Hickel 2014, 147-148).

European orderliness was still opposed to African disorder, and the 'transposition', as it were, of 'rural' settlement patterns—'African' patterns akin to the tribalised 'Central Cattle Plan'[5]—reinforced the African-ness of rurality. This gives question to the argument (Posel 2011, 337) of 'detribalisation' in the early 1950s, as does the 'ethnic' character of urban townships in the same period (also Posel 2011, 350). Control of settlement patterns and types of housing, including another iteration of 'square house' ideology, also persisted in the administration of the rural reserves (Soni and Maharaj 1991, 55)[6].

Such subtle attention to a tribalised configuration as innately African proceeded from the system of indirect rule which obtained in the rural areas, the legitimacy of which was carefully reinforced in the urban setting while it was strengthened in rural areas through legislation. In rural areas, the reserves 'scheduled' by the 1913 Land Act were tailored and gerrymandered into ethnic 'homelands'—the alternative name, 'Bantustan', captures more perfectly the colonial, contrived, and *imposed* character of these political spaces. This had profound implications for spatial differentiation of citizenship. In the late 1950s, faced with frequent political protest after a decade in power, the apartheid government

> Rejected the earlier notion of detribalisation on the grounds of an allegedly irrevocable and primordial 'tribalism' that characterised the African psyche. In consequence, all Africans were believed to be culturally and spiritually anchored in an ethnic 'homeland', whether or not they had ever set foot in the place. Apartheid's planners then inaugurated another shift, in advocating the allocation of 'self-government' to these homelands (a renaming and political configuration of the erstwhile African Reserves). One of the early renditions of apartheid had been as a means of racial 'separate development' – but conceptualised largely in spatial terms [in the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959] (Posel 2011, 341).

The reserves were created in 1913[7] amidst the rhetoric of safeguarding 'traditional' forms of governing, but these traditions were simply structures of indirect rule. They differed in different parts of the country depending on 'the nature of each initial encounter between' Africans and white colonialism (Bonner 2011, 275). For instance, the Tranksei—the reserve formed out of the region into which most Xhosa had been confined once their military

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[5] See Chapter 1 and Landau (2010). Furthermore, all instances of 'tribe', 'tribal', 'tribalised', 'de-' or 're-tribalised' must be considered with a critical skepticism after Landau. The terms are used here in reference to other literature where they appear.

[6] Soni and Maharaj (1991) use geography to argue that the apartheid state's manipulation of space produced 'tensions', 'manifested in the creation of several new settlement forms which […] challenge our traditional understanding of urban and rural' because of the 'urban function' of some rural settlement forms. Therefore, 'the dichotomy between rural and urban patterns of development […should] be challenged in the South African context' (47).

[7] See Chapter 2.

resistance to colonial expansion was finally broken in the 1870s—was administered by colonial magistrates through headmen in order to undermine chiefly authority, as opposed to the puppeteering of chiefs in Natal (Bonner 2011, 275). This no doubt arose from the manner in which the African people of the Transkei had been wrapped into colonial rule—through nine wars over one hundred years, during which chiefs had been responsible for organising massive military resistance to colonial violence. It was, nonetheless, a system of indirect rule. Apartheid government relationships to African chiefs were not markedly different, except in terms of the balance of power, from some of the early 'frontier' relationships: The political manoeuvrings involving Ngqika, Ndlambe, and the British[8] more than a century earlier were as much a matter of colonial 'assaults on the authority of oppositional chiefs and the invention of claims to chiefly authority on the part of those more pliable, if popularly illegitimate' as were the apartheid politics of the Bantustans (Posel 2011, 350).

As women and young people came to frighten administrators of the reserves more than a chiefly challenge did, the powers of chiefs and 'tribal institutions' were strengthened. The Natives Administration Act of 1927 'decisively separated white and African administration' and granted 'sweeping and arbitrary new power' to the Department of Native Affairs and to chiefs, which '[brought] all Africans in the reserves under tight state control by retribalising them' (Bonner 2011, 1976). The Natives Land and Trust Act of 1936 added more land to the reserves while curbing access to land outside of them (Mabin 1991, 35). Wolpe is once again of use in showing that the reserves blended pre-capitalist and capitalist economies in the favour of the white minority by spatially managing the two (1972, 433-439). Where Wolpe requires criticism is in his assertion that '[w]hereas Segregation provided the political structure appropriate to an earlier period, Apartheid represents the attempt to maintain the rate of surplus value and accumulation in the face of the disintegration of the pre-capitalist economy' (1972, 432-433). The 'political structure' was not appropriate only to an earlier period, but, through a number of adjustments to the basic structure, deeply appropriate to the white supremacy of the mid-twentieth century.

The apartheid government 'strengthen[ed]' and 'bureaucratiz[ed]' chieftaincy in the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act (Posel 2011, 349). A decade later, self-government for the ethnic homelands[9] was enacted and administered territorially much like we saw with the ward system

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[8] See Mostert (1992) for an exhaustive account of this political triangle.
[9] The ethnic groups with corresponding homelands were: Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho, Venda, Ndebele, Swati, and Tsonga.

in Natal[10]. As Posel writes, 'This variant of indirect rule promised self-government to those who identified with chiefly norms', by 'reinventing, bureaucratising and disciplining tradition as part of the wider project of creating "political order"' (2011, 350). Self-government, in reality, limited African rights both inside and outside the homelands, but especially for African people living in cities and on white farms, where their residences were viewed as 'outposts' of the homelands (Beinart [1994] 2001, 218; 162). This withdrawal of rights intensified in the 1970s, when self-government became nominal 'independence'. Between 1976 and 1981, the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda homelands accepted independence (Beinart [1994] 2001, 223). Africans from these homelands lost South African citizenship, and were therefore 'foreigners' in South Africa, without political rights. In 1980, the South African state, intent to dispense with its obligations to as many Africans as possible, redrew the borders of Bantustans to include locations near major cities (Beinart [1994] 2001, 212). Alan Mabin (1991) examines how, during the course of apartheid, the majority of rural Africans went from living—were coerced from living—on white-owned farmland to living in the reserves, sometimes in urban-dense settings, and how in conjunction with this massive, enforced movement of people came a steady deterioration of political rights. Between 1960 and 1990, some 3.5 million African people were subjected to forced removals, during which the Bantustans were intentional repositories for the 'surplus' people, providing also 'the repressive apparatus to control' them (Soni and Maharaj 1991, 53-54).

None of these shifting, contradictory extensions of and limitations to citizenship of Africans during the apartheid era are much surprising in consideration of the shifting, prevaricating, sometimes blundering official relationships enforced on African people by the colonial administrators of the past. For example, the Ciskei, the reserve-homeland-Bantustan nearest to Grahamstown, was none other than the 'Ceded Territory'-'Queen Adelaide Province'-'British Kaffraria' of the previous century, and each of its new official designations brought, like those of old, new official 'citizenships', all of them 'formal' in the sense that Chatterjee and Mamdani use the word, and representing more about forms of governance/rule than about rights. The Transkei, a little further east, was declared independent in 1976. But, 'What are the rights of this Transkeian citizen, the man [sic] who is no alien and yet is treated as an alien, without the privileges granted to the immigrant settling from abroad in the Republic?' asks Govan Mbeki: 'The Transkeian citizen' has 'no say whatsoever in the government that rules

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[10] See Chapter 2

him' whether in South Africa or in the Transkei, where the chiefs are 'responsible to [the South African] government and not to the Transkeian citizen (1964, 20).

Many people, faced with the many new attacks that apartheid laws and police made against their livelihoods and political lives, did not acquiesce to the new terms of their governance. A number of famous instances of resistance to apartheid—women's resistance to pass laws in the 1950s, Sharpeville 1960, 16 June 1976, and the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement in the '70s and of the United Democratic Front in the '80s—are beyond the scope of this chapter, though their historical significance cannot be questioned. One important series of events, however, are the 'Mpondo Revolts' of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which contested the Bantu Authorities and the Betterment schemes. Sarah Bruchhausen (2015), arguing for more careful attention to the question of rural resistance, shows how these revolts were linked to urban forms of protest and in some cases informed them. Significantly, the activists of the Mpondo revolts created autonomous political spaces for themselves—on hills or mountains, most famously at Ngquza Hill—and were subjected to massive violence and massacre. The same logic enacted in violence since 1811 is clear: African political space must be controlled, with violence if necessary. The region where the revolts had taken place, 'Pondoland', was bundled into the Tranksei homeland under repressive indirect rule.

Closer to Grahamstown, in the first half of the 1980s, eight communities in the 'Border Corridor'—white South Africa between the Ciskei and Transkei—resisted their removal to or incorporation into the homelands through popularly elected committees called Residents' Associations (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 137). This was 'an explicitly political struggle' directed against the South African state as well as the homeland authorities in the Ciskei who ruled what Mbeki calls 'its exhausted earth and sunken peasantry' (1964, 69). The Residents' Associations managed to force the South African Supreme Court to grant 'a permanent reprieve from the threat of removal to all eight communities'. The threats persisted from other angles, however. Despite what could be described as 'service delivery' bribery from the state's Department of Development Aid in exchange for 'participation in government structures', intended to weaken the popular political movements, the Residents' Associations maintained their democratic mandate and did not break down under the Department's pressure (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 138-139). Some communities had already been removed, however, when the Ciskei assumed its sham independence in 1981. In what has been described as 'voting with their feet', a form of politics highly reminiscent of the politics described by Landau (2010) up to the beginning of apartheid as well as of the many moments

of resistance to eviction in South African cities today, some people resisted simply by choosing where they would live.

> The people of Blue Rock (in the Border Region of South Africa) had been forcibly removed into the Ciskei during its initial establishment and settled at Potsdam. Increasing dissatisfaction with their new circumstances in the bantustan culminated in a decision by the community in 1987 to risk the wrath of the South African and Ciskeian authorities and march back to South Africa. The South African government transported them back to Potsdam, where they faced assault, harassment and murder. Despite the disastrous consequences of the march, their resolve to leave the bantustan was undiminished, and they marched again, this time back to their original home at Blue Rock (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 140).

In a second case, the Ciskei-South Africa border divided the town of Peelton in 1981, but the complete incorporation of Peelton into the Bantustan was enacted in 1988. Protest and resistance to the incorporation provoked violent repression from the Ciskei government police and military, who attacked the residents in 1989, destroying houses, arresting almost a hundred people, and driving more than a thousand people across the border into South Africa (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 140). It was an action that demonstrated the 'despotic' nature of indirect 'customary' rule in the homelands. The South African government eventually granted these 'refugees' land in South Africa (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 141), which, considering the situation, constituted a politically significant if practically limited victory for popular politics under apartheid.

Apartheid forms of control both practically and culturally—and seemingly intentionally, by all accounts—reproduced the basic notion that 'African' was innately 'rural' while 'urban' was 'white'. This resonates most powerfully, perhaps, in the intensification of 'influx control' through 'pass laws' during apartheid, which explicitly limited African access to cities.[11] 'It is accepted Government policy', wrote one official, 'that the Bantu [sic] are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic for as long as they offer their labour here' (in Soni and Maharaj 1991, 49). Such policy led to the criminalisation of millions of Africans living in cities and the denial of obligations to these residents by the apartheid government. Even after reform of the pass laws in 1986, 'only 1.7 million blacks in the independent

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[11] Pass laws had a long history in South/ern Africa. The first instance of their use was in 1797. The 'Hottentot Proclamation of 1809 required 'Khoisan' people to have a permanent, registered dwelling place and a pass to travel between districts. Passes were also used on the frontier, for instance Ordnance 50 of 1828 (see Chapter 1). Pass laws were used most repressively in the twentieth century beginning with the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and then in subsequent legislation. The history of implementation of and, more importantly, of resistance to pass laws is significant, but there is not space for it here. The important point to draw from 'influx control' is that the legal rights of Africans to the city were limited or none.

homelands [became] eligible for South African citizenship' and some 5 million '[were] subject to more rigid control, including work permits, fines and deportation' (Soni and Maharaj 1991, 59).

Nevertheless, Africans resided in and fought for access to urban areas as well as for their rights within the cities and towns. As Soni and Maharaj note, alongside the growing 'rural slums' and 'displaced urban settlements' created by apartheid coercive policy, 'an attempt to ward off state control and repression, as well as a struggle for survival in urban areas' resulted in the equally fast-growing 'squatter settlements abutting major urban areas' and the 'greying' of urban areas (that is, their becoming racially mixed) (1991, 61).

This was a fraught process, in Grahamstown as much as any other place. Grahamstown, at the onset of apartheid, was faced with an enormous crisis of housing, which has not been solved as of 2015. In 1952, it was estimated that 1,000 houses were required to solve overcrowding and poor housing for Africans, and 200 each for Coloured and white people, respectively (Lancaster 2013, 71). What is now the 'Joza Location', administered by the municipality, was built on the flats above the crest of Makana's Kop between 1957 and 1962, but the rents there were sometimes prohibitively high for people in need of the housing. The Group Areas Act was strongly contested in Grahamstown, and its implementation was much delayed and never complete. Fingo Village was proclaimed a 'Coloured' area in 1957, 1965, and 1970, which would have entailed the removal of 5,500 legal residents to the Ciskei. However, free-hold arrangements had been granted in Fingo Village in 1855, and legal action by the residents won the maintenance of the free-hold rights. In 1980, Fingo Village was 'deproclaimed' (Holleman 1997, 29; 32).

The Municipal Beer Hall, as has been noted, was the object of resistance from the time of its opening in 1939. In 1946, a memorandum from the Grahamstown Branch of the National Council for African Women announced that the Hall was 'the worst public building in this town' and that they had 'no evidence that the profits that accrue from the sale of beer are used specifically for the benefit or the improvement of the location' (in Lancaster 2013, 85). Grahamstown residents participated in the country-wide Defiance Campaign beginning in August 1952, and some were arrested and jailed for disregarding pass laws and attending meetings. The Beer Hall was boycotted at the same time (the only boycott of its kind in the country during the Defiance Campaign), and hundreds of people protested outside of the building, demanding a 'milk bar' and preventing people from entering. The Hall was stoned and partially burned (Holleman 1997, 44-46). The boycott, which lasted into May 1953, shows effective community political organising and resistance in spite of Lancaster's bafflement at

its coincidence with but (somehow) disconnection from the Defiance Campaign and his repeated assertion that it demonstrated 'no political motives' (2013, 91-94) [12].

In the 1980s, with the institution of Black Local Authorities—the 'Rini [sic] Council', in Grahamstown—an urban application of indirect rule, Grahamstown was once again the site of resistance. The 'street committee' popular structures of the United Democratic Front emerged in the town, and members of the Black Local Authority were threatened and some resigned. A boycott of white shops was organised, and residents demanded the building of 3,000 houses, removal of the South African Defence Force from townships, a minimum wage, unbanning of public meetings, lifting the state of emergency, resignation of the Rini Council, an end to evictions, opening of facilities to all, business sites for hawkers, an end to unfair dismissals, and improved facilities in the townships (Holleman 1997, 48). The response, as ever, was militarised. Police were stationed at the 1830s fort on Gunfire Hill overlooking the town with floodlights aimed at Joza, and then patrolled Raglan Road, the main road through the locations in order to 'keep a watchful eye on the township' (Holleman 1997, 12; 48).

We have reached the 'end', at least for the moment's purpose, of a long political period during which the 'bifurcation' of *urban* and *rural* South Africa had been effected, both through accident and engineering. This occurred in the state, as Mamdani argues, in the division of 'civil society' from 'traditional authorities'. By the end of apartheid in 1994, the two 'despotisms' under which urban and rural people are governed had been emplaced, laced with a history of coercive, intentionally divisive politics. Ashley Westaway has argued that, for the rural areas of the former homelands in the Eastern Cape (a province after 1994), the years since the advent of democracy in South Africa have been more about 're-imagining and re-enforcing practices of segregationism, in a modern guise' than about dismantling such practises (2012, 121). Similarly, Nomboniso Gasa notes that post-1994 legislation 'directly echoes some of the most troubling aspects of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, especially in its creation of "traditional authorities" and its reinforcement of the old Bantustan boundaries' (2015, np). *Rural* space is complicated by the existence of areas not under 'traditional authorities'. The more or less 'formerly' white rural areas remain undemocratised areas where the 'values of South Africa's Constitution are not a reality for its rural citizens' (Haupt 2015, np). The farmworkers strikes in the Western Cape at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013, and the extreme repression

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[12] A fifth installment in the uncritical 'Grahamstown Series' of Rhodes University history theses, this one announces in the title that it attends specifically to 'white English-speaking' perspectives.

with which they were met (Fogel 2013), is demonstrative of the truth in this statement as well as the persistence of violence as the preferred arbiter of politics from below. The discussion of the Rural People's Movement that follows relates the experience of some people who live in rural areas but are not governed under 'traditional authority'.

Ben Maclennan concludes his history of the terror campaign that produced the city of Grahamstown with a sketch of the city in 1986 that moves with the region's history:

> Grahamstown today has barely twelve and a half thousand white residents, who live in relative affluence on the western side of the basin. On the eastern slopes – the slopes down which Nxele's men charged in 1819 – live some forty-five thousand blacks, descendants of the Xhosa and other tribes [sic], and the 'coloureds', crowded together in ghettos which periodically erupt into violence. The police, however, ensure that the unrest is never allowed to spread across the stream which ran red at the battle of Grahamstown and which is now known by the Xhosas as Egazini [sic], the place of blood (232).

The same words could have been written of Grahamstown, with modification of a few numbers, at any stage in its history, so consistent with each other were the many articulations of white control of African lives and politics. Indeed, Sarita Pillay makes the same distinction between Grahamstown's east and west in 2012. Her focus is on the people residing in eThembeni, a 'shack settlement' built in Grahamstown's east in the early 1990s. Along with official attention and promises of services, the residents of eThembeni have become disillusioned with local government, despite the new national democracy. Their citizenship appears worthless in the absence of nearly every 'service' which the state purports to supply, while envelopment in the ward system puts the people at the mercy of the state, which is corrupt and unresponsive— despotic—impaired by what Gillian Hart identifies as 'tensions between fierce fiscal austerity combined with massive new responsibilities for local government on the one hand, and invocations of local participation, social justice on the other – with all this playing out on viciously uneven terrains carved by the racial geographies of apartheid, and opening to a global economy' (2013, 97) . Pillay writes that since eThembeni has been 'integrated into the official state sphere, residents are restricted and constrained in their space. They are reliant on the state for the shaping of their space, or else face possible repression or dispossession. eThembeni's residents are […] a people coerced in space' (2012, np).

Coercion in space, I have insisted, is a political strategy that in South Africa has included among the tools and contrivances of colonial and state control the articulation of the *urban* and the *rural* as separate spheres of politics. Indeed, urban and rural appear, in this historical review, as politicised spaces rather than essential zones in which politics occurs. Fanon enjoins

us to remember that 'colonialism has often strengthened or established its domination by organizing the petrification of the country districts', 'where vital statistics are so many insoluble problems', forcing rural dwellers to 'rush toward the towns, crowd into tin-shack settlements, and try to make their way into the […] cities founded by colonial domination' ([1961] 1963, 109; 111). Between these two spheres manufactured by colonialism, Fanon writes, there is a great antagonism, which stains the politics of the struggle for independence and the politics of its success ([1961] 1963, 107-123). Colonialism, Fanon has argued, three and a half decades before Mamdani, lays out a great distance between urban and rural, sets them at odds with one another, and estranges them politically. Such is 'coercion in space'.

Still coercion in space has engendered resistance. There have always been, as we have seen, political traditions among those most 'coerced in space' which have put the lie to hegemonic political 'truth' by the recognition of other options, which have rendered boundaries porous, and which have pursued politics that are open-ended.

PART II: CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Second Excursus
Social Movements: Methodology and Theoretical Approach

So far, the narrative here has been largely concerned with 'social movements from above' that have impacted on South Africa's political landscape of space, race, and citizenship; that have greatly affected politics after South African democracy in 1994; and which have implications acutely experienced in people's lives in the present. It bears reiterating that one of the permeating themes and consequences of the history just related has been the political division of *urban* from *rural*, achieved through a long process of restriction of political autonomy, conceptually racialised. Throughout that narrative, we have seen aspects and moments of an opposing logic visible in different forms of political traditions or resistance. Some of these, specifically the 'pre-colonial' politics theorised by Landau (2010), were the political means by which authority and social and political relations were legitimised or delegitimised without necessarily altering or requiring the alteration of the structure of society. However, during the many years of colonial and apartheid political hegemony, a specific spatial and racial politics of control was developed and implemented, and alternatives, once the *norm*, were increasingly mobilised as *resistance*. Racial-spatial demarcations of politics dictated the emergence of different politics that were both indicative of and opposed to the divisions contrived from 'above'. No space, as we have seen, whether urban or rural, was monolithic or utterly separate. Yet, even in accounts that consider *links* between the urban and rural, there is little effort to question the logic of employing those categories in political analyses: perhaps better put, those are spaces in and over which politics are acted out, but not themselves accountable to any particular political project. Their accountability, after looking at the history, is persuasive.

The past, watched for long enough, blends into the present. Such is the case with this particular version of the past. Arrived at the present, we can finally turn to a discussion of contemporary 'social movements from below' with the motivating question in mind: do they present a challenge to the logic of distinct 'urban' and 'rural' political spaces?

My research with the Unemployed People's Movement and the Rural People's Movement (RPM and UPM)[1] began rather unlike research. It began with a four hour wait and then, when the wait was over, three hours walking in the rain, paying of respect to a family who had lost a daughter, and pursuit by a very large dog. Still, that day's episodes revealed important things about

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[1] These acronyms will be employed throughout Part II in order to avoid tedious use of the movements' full names.

community organising and about the experience and workings of a social movement of people marginalised from (or within) their society: For such a social movement, sometimes the office rent is in arrears and must be paid *now*; transport, other than one's feet, is unreliable, inconvenient, and often an indulgence; the importance of personal relationships, of knowing and being connected with the community members and what happens in their lives, is vital; and even little projects can be difficult, without resources. Lastly, a meeting with a foreign, anonymous MA student is trumped by the exigencies and constraints of living and organising, but that even such a meeting finds its time and place, even if it is on rain-soaked streets.

A foreigner, a linguistically limited stranger, my initial interactions with members of UPM and RPM, as this account illustrates, were also strange and limited. Nonetheless, my acquaintances and local knowledge improved and subsequent meetings were better coordinated and more valuable in terms of research. In the first phase of research, I undertook a broadly-defined program of 'participant observation' during which I spent fully a year meeting regularly with movement members; attending meetings, events, workshops, and protests; and essentially 'learning' Grahamstown and what it means to be a social movement in South Africa, today. 'Participant observation,' according to Laurier, 'involves spending time being, living or working with people or communities in order to understand them […]. The basis of this approach is to become, or stay, as close to the spatial phenomenon being studied as possible and it is thereby quite distinct from methodologies that emphasize distance and objectivity' (2010, 116). My first year of interaction with UPM and RPM comprised precisely this. At the same time, in the university setting, I was immersed in historical texts about the Eastern Cape and engaged in learning about contemporary South African politics. Both of these subjects were also learnt 'in the field'. The necessity to make this spatial distinction—laden with insinuations of the *urban* and *rural*—in Grahamstown, where the formerly all-white university named after the British Empire's most ambitious imperial capitalist sits at the western (white) end of town, opposite and opposed to the (black and coloured) locations in the east, is meaningful in itself, and indicting of methodological practice accepted by the academy. Nonetheless, I did 'field' work.

There were some limitations, in this phase of research, but the nature of the research permitted them. Not a speaker of isiXhosa, my 'observation' was often very strictly that: when I was with movement members, I learned by watching, rather than listening. Important insights came even from this limitation. Not understanding words gave me more time to pay attention to other things, for instance, that often when UPM call a meeting in a community, more women attend than men. Because of lack of transport on my part and inconsistent transport for the movement members,

my observation included more UPM events than RPM, but RPM members were frequently in Grahamstown, and this offered opportunities to engage.

Eventually, I was sometimes a 'real' participant, with an active role; on one occasion I attended a workshop as part of RPM. The inherent and necessary 'observation' and 'participant' aspects of the methodology both featured in my first year and after (Laurier 2015, np). It is important to note, especially in light of the limitations mentioned above, that at no point did I intend or attempt to obtain or to provide a thorough ethnography. The participant observation phase of my research was more about making the later phase—interviews—firstly possible, and also well-informed and fruitful.

More necessary, and ultimately far more important, was learning about *people*. The year of participant observation necessarily involved getting to know people whom I could later involve in the interview phase of research. My attendance and participation at meetings and events also allowed people to become familiar with me (as a necessary aspect of participant observation [Kawulich 2005, 2]). However, though rewarding research and interviews became possible, my relationships with many people were not always directed towards the eventual end of interviewing them, which remained, for much of the time I have known UPM and RPM members, a distant prospect. We interacted—at different times, in different situations, and with different people—as guests or hosts, 'observers' (on my part), colleagues, and friends. Sometimes, we were comrades in political action. I had numerous conversations (in English) with movement members, asking what a particular event was about, why it was happening, what they thought about the circumstances, if they considered something to be a success, and many more general conversations about the political situation in Grahamstown and South Africa today. The diverse styles of interaction and observation demonstrate several participant observation roles available to the researcher—'participant as observer', 'observer as participant', and 'complete observer' (Kawulich 2005, 8)—and while some were more useful than others, I learned while in each role.

I also learned a great deal from people about their individual stories. These conversations did not constitute interviews, but, once again, made the eventual interviews as rich as possible. Still, some of the people who provided interviews for this research remained acquaintances, but such was the nature of the research. The advice extended by Laurier (2010) not to learn participant observation from a book, but rather simply to do it, informed my approach. As Laurier writes, the methodology 'acquires the shape and scale of its phenomena', and the year (and more) which I spent shared between university study and participant observation has suited the method of data collection that I have employed.

The responses of sixteen people—seven unstructured, one-on-one interviews with members of UPM and a nine-person focus group with RPM—have provided the bulk of the information that follows in Chapter 4 and the subsequent concluding analysis. The interviewing method was intentionally broad in order to give the respondents the time to develop their thoughts, to say what they thought they should say, and also to allow questions to develop organically out of the conversation rather than to impose certain ideas—which would effectively have been constraints—on the discussion until they seemed appropriate. In short, I let the respondents lead, as much as possible.[2] We would normally begin with discussing how the respondent had become involved in their social movement. Then we would move on to why the social movement was important, what the respondent thought the movement's role was in the community, with encouragement to elaborate when some idea or subject seemed notable, unclear, or potentially useful to my research topic. More focused questions were along the lines of these: How important is it that social movements create links to each other? Are there ways in which your social movement has linked up with other social movements? What challenges are there to creating these links? As it became clear from some interviews that the role of non-governmental organisations was an important topic, I initiated conversation around that topic in the interviews. At some point during each interview, I would introduce the fundamental question I was exploring—the *urban* and *rural*—and, with both of us sufficiently 'warmed up', we could have more pointed discussion around that idea. In this way, a number of important insights and ideas came out of the conversations—some which I was hoping to learn, and others which were unlooked for and often much more significant. The reason for the difference between the one-on-one interviews with UPM and the focus group with RPM members was simply that this is what the respondents preferred. In structuring and working through the focus group, the same unstructured style and the same progression of ideas was employed, and generally the conversation productive and interesting. Going forward, I will use only the words 'interview' or 'interviews', but this encompasses both the interviews and the focus group.

This style of interviewing was motivated, simply, by the position that the answers to the questions I am exploring, and the reasons behind the answers, are well-known to the people I am interviewing. Expressing this stance politically, Nigel Gibson writes, 'The first challenge for radical intellectuals is to listen' (2011, 215); methodologically, it demands intentionally not 'imposing an a priori [sic] categorization that may limit the field of inquiry' (Fontana and Frey

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[2] See Bryman ([1989] 1995, 147-151) or Fontana and Frey (1998, 56-66) for thorough discussions of unstructured interviews.

1998, 56). At no time did I presume that this research was generating insight into their lives. What I am able to do (with resources and time that they do not have) is situate their experience and knowledge into a broad historical scaffolding, and potentially offer a new way for intellectuals in the academy (not the only place they work) to think about this specific spatial-political framework of *urban* and *rural*. Therefore, what the respondents want to tell me—what they think is important, what specific experiences and ideas motivate *them*—is equally if not more important than the specific question which motivated me. Gibson understands an intellectual's role as 'a fundamentally anti-systemic dialectician, who begins by engaging with a poor people's movement and thereby challenges the research community's assumptions and practices', and who understands this as 'a process and a praxis' (2011, 215).

This particular 'dialectic' draws on Marx via Raya Dunayevskaya's Marxist Humanism. Affirming the necessity of connecting thought and actions she writes, 'If you know the exact relationship between OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE, between PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION, and don't consider any of that as abstract, you then realize it is abstract only if you haven't made the connection of objective and subjective' ([1978] 2006, np; emphases original). Elsewhere, she explained what this means in terms of method, that it is 'absurdity […] if the method were the proof' of itself; rather '[t]he proof can only be in practice, in the actual development of society itself' ([1957] 2000, np). Theory as a process and a practice, Gibson argues, can only be difficult and contradictory (2011). This research attempts to question an epistemic division—urban and rural—through ideas generated from within social movements and within the academy, and therefore is inherently contradictory.

Two theoretical approaches proved useful in conducting and analysing research with social movement members, given the contradictions that exert various influences on this approach. Cox and Nilsen's Marxist theory of social movements has already been mentioned and proved useful in thinking about the history reviewed here. They argue that theory is not the exclusive prerogative of the full-time intellectual. 'Theory', they write, 'is knowledge that is consciously developed out of experience, that has been worked through using experience as a touchstone, that has become explicit and articulate, and has been brought to a level where it can be generalised' (2014, 8). They carry on, 'Theory [. . . means] going beyond the immediacy and situatedness of a particular experience. "Going beyond" means trying to understand the wider ramifications of, and underlying processes that give rise to whatever we experience as problematic and frustrating in our everyday lives' (Cox and Nilsen 2014, 10). The movement members that I interviewed have a wealth of experience and reflection upon that experience to offer to the project of theorising, and theorising happened actively during the interviews. Dunayevskaya phrases this succinctly: 'No

theoretician, today more than ever before, can write out of his [sic] own head. Theory requires a constant shaping and reshaping of ideas on the basis of what the workers themselves are doing and thinking' ([1957] 2000, np). While the people involved in this research are not 'workers' as Dunayevskaya imagined workers, the point remains valid that *people* must inform theory.

'Social movements from below', Cox and Nilsen explain, grow out of people's 'experience of a concrete lifeworld that is somehow problematic relative to their needs and capacities, and from their attempts to combine, organise and mobilise in order to do something about this' (2014, 72). It follows that social movement theory can only be generated in social movements. Therefore, I questioned what members of UPM and RPM find 'problematic'—an overused and vapid word which in this case refers to political, social, and economic confinement to 'the extensions of society', to use the phrase of one UPM member—and what they 'do about this', and, in what they do, whether potential exists for 'going beyond'.

To determine an answer to this last question would imply that the social movements themselves—or, more precisely, social movement members—have come to a clear answer. This is not the case. What can be accomplished here is the study of a moment in the dialectic of practice and reflection, historically situated, and limited in scope—albeit an intentional, focused study with comprehension and explication as an objective. This introduces the second theoretical underpinning of the interview phase of this research. Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar, whose important and impressive study of the massive social movements in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, *Rhythms of the Pachakuti* (2014), has proved useful in concretising my methodological approach. Bolivia, while it differs in many ways from South Africa, has parallels enough to argue for a shared approach to social movements in the South African context. Indeed, aspects of Mamdani's theory of 'despotism' and Gill Hart's analysis of the crisis of South African local government are readily apparent in Aguilar's description of Boliva: a 'political framework superimposed on the general population, especially in rural and marginal urban areas, which functions basically for controlling inhabitants and collecting taxes' rather than to 'organize peaceful coexistence between legally equal citizens'; a system the 'shape' and 'internal logic' of which are 'clearly colonial in origin' and marked by 'extreme division' and 'racist contempt' (2014, 35). Aguilar argues that indigenous communitarian tradition informed the success of collective action against this structure, which is not my argument here, though it may be useful in assessing movements in different place and time contexts in South/ern Africa. Perhaps significantly, struggles in Bolivia were able to link movements across and between urban and rural spaces (Aguilar 2014, 13; 35; 45-46; 105; 122; 174; 176). It is Aguilar's approach to studying these movements which is most important to this research.

Aguilar writes, 'The theoretical strategy that I propose does not follow the tradition that privileges the production of *objective knowledge*. Instead, it follows the tradition that supports *practical understanding* of the social experience of rupture, resistance, and challenge to the social order' (xxi). This is the approach taken here. Whether rupture and challenge exist, we shall explore in the next chapter.

Aguilar provides the most important and specific facet of my interviewing methodology. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, she makes the distinction between a struggle's 'practical scope' and its 'interior horizon'. The former is:

> [A movement's] real material force, its disruptive capacity, its internal vitality to continue and advance, its associative networks, its importance in the group of struggles in a country and in the world, and so on. These elements can be 'observed' from the outside.

And the latter:

> [The] discrepancy between what is done and not said, between what is said and not done, and in what implicitly or explicitly appears to be a desire or potential. In other words, it relates markedly to the collective *type of subjectivity* that is produced during times of rupture from daily life, rebellion, and uprising (Aguilar 2014, xxiv).

Both of these facets, directions, or definitions contain more than will be explored here, but the concept of 'observed', 'real material force, and 'the discrepancy' between words and actions are useful, if not necessary, to approaching an analysis of the politics of social movements with a specific question in mind. On the one hand, the actual 'shape' of the social movement(s) can be mapped and explained, while, on the other hand, there is potential for identifying in the social movement(s) an alternative articulation of politics, produced in the movement itself, to the hegemonic politics of the day. Crucially, the two 'hands' just alluded to belong to the same entity. They represent different aspects and reveal important tensions and opportunities, but are not, at least for what *actually can be called a social movement*, divorceable. They communicate the dialectic inherent in praxis and generative of theory. In terms of research, this translates to what Gibson calls a 'willing[ness]' on the part of intellectuals 'to engage awkward facts and articulate a consciousness full of contradictions' (2011, 219). So, in analysing our open-ended interviews, I looked for these two strands of the movements in question, taking my cues from the people actually involved.

Like Cox and Nilsen, Aguilar argues that the hegemonic political and social norm—elite normality, 'a heavy anchor that fixes social relationships in the past and inhibits and traps the collective production of political horizons' (2014, xliii)—is an 'illusory social synthesis'. Aguilar

identifies the modern state in this synthesis (2014, xxii-xxiii). 'Order', if it exists, is political, produced, and maintained.

The contingent nature of political hegemony allows that '[t]here are times in history when social conflicts, confrontations, and upheavals transcend the constrictive framework designed for their administration and control' (Aguilar 2014, xxiii). In indigenous Bolivian traditions, this time is called 'Pachakuti', interpreted as a '"turning or inverting" of time and space' (Aguilar 2014, 50). The 'practical scope' and 'interior horizon' strategy is useful in relation to the idea of 'Pachakuti', because we are able to conceive of struggles as partially successful or partially failed while still accepting that they produce a different understanding of 'time and space'; that is, they articulate an alternative politics to state-oriented or state-produced politics. Praxis may reflect an 'interior horizon' which does not achieve implementation, but which is no less real as a conceptual mode with *potential* for expression. 'Inversion' or 'turning' may exist on the interior horizon.

However, after Aguilar's formulation, it must be asked: Do we need only to look to specific 'times' of explicit 'upheaval', when in fact certain modes of 'inversion' are frequent and do not constitute a (concrete) upheaval? Better expressed, *is the political reality complicated enough most of the time* that generally a different approach than the top-down articulation of spaces and of politics becomes necessary to explain them? The specific struggles of UPM and RPM are not of a scale that can change South Africa in the way the struggles between 2000 and 2005 did in Bolivia, but they are aimed at changing people's daily lives, and in that way reflect a different logic that 'gradually lessens the preference for material value over real people' (Aguilar 2014, xxv) and may not be limited to antagonistic divisions (i.e. urban-rural) inherent to a specific politics, that is, the politics produced through the colonial organisation of power through race and space. Michael Neocosmos writes about 'thinking in excess':

> [People] are in other words capable of reason, of thinking beyond their social location and conditions, of thinking an excess beyond the simply given extent of the social division of labour and its corresponding social identities [...]. Without this 'excessive' character, politics is simply conflated with 'the political', with party, the state and political community [...]. [E]xcess is always excess over something, namely the extant, with the result that there is always a relationship between the thought of what is and the thought of what could be [...]. The excessive-expressive dialectic is thus what structures the thought of emancipation (*forthcoming*, 2016, 25).

Political excess, we can argue, is possible without practical success.

Cox and Nilsen speak of 'going beyond', Aguilar of a 'praxis of disruption and escape' (2014, xxxvi), and Neocosmos of 'excessive' politics. All three of these theoretical formulations are about what Aguilar calls 'explaining [conflict] in a way that breaks the conceptual fetish of categorization as the basis for knowledge' (2014, xxviii). All three also demand an actional

approach. Perhaps the most important theorist of decolonisation, Fanon follows his exposition on the 'Manichean' colonial world with the 'aggressive' response of colonised people to their being 'hemmed in' by the 'compartments' of colonialism. In the midst of the aggressive outburst, when it happens, it is 'an urgent matter to decide […] how to conduct and organize the movement', and, '[i]f this coherence is not present, there is only a blind will toward freedom' ([1961] 1963, 52; 59). In terms of this conversation, what follows explosion is politics. Once more we see the centrality of a dialectic in praxis, concretised in Aguilar's twin concepts: 'practical scope' and 'interior horizons'.

Three crucial theoretical points must be taken forward. The first is that people involved in social movements are more concretely described as being involved in the politics of thinking, doing, and living. The second is that 'going beyond' the particularities of experience, which Neocosmos understands in emancipatory terms, is political and actional. This is compelling, given the importance of *movement* in the moments of resistance that appeared in the history of spatial coercion just reviewed, and the 'transcending' quality implied in Mamdani's 'burden of protest'. Third is that the dialectic between practice and reflection is where theory develops, and that this dialectic exists in social movements. Therefore, the people involved—who are political and also actional—are authors of theory.

We will now look to the words of members of UPM and RPM for a critical approach to understanding *urban* and *rural* political spaces.

CHAPTER 4
URBAN & RURAL MOVEMENTS: AN ANNOTATED DIALOGUE

'The movement expresses both force and reason.' – Nigel C. Gibson in Fanonian Practices in
South Africa *(2011, 215)*

'We learn from them. They learn from us.' – Activist, Rural People's Movement

The UPM and RPM are both organisations working to improve the lives of the people living in their communities, to educate and mobilise people politically, and to remain, to differing degrees at different times, organisations that challenge the political status quo. Although they are political, they are not political parties and they are intentionally not affiliated with any political parties. Sometimes, their projects bring them into open confrontation with established political authority. They might be called 'community political organisations'; they might also be classified within Chatterjee's 'political society' as discussed above; but we will retain the designation used so far—'social movements'—with the understanding that the term 'social' does not preclude people's thinking and acting 'politically'. UPM's and RPM's political bases in their communities and work for those communities are evocative of Raúl Zibechi's assertion, in a study of Andean social movements, that '[c]ommunity […] deserves new attention, not as an eccentricity of the past that resists dying, but as a dynamic of both common production and common association with overwhelming political relevance' (2010, 136). Community in his formulation does not refer to the assumed 'communal'—read 'traditional', even 'pre-colonial'—society, but rather to the shared existence of people, eminently and fundamentally modern, that does not immediately denote a 'state'. Both UPM and RPM assert the political relevance of their community—that is, of the people who, through the processes of formal democracy linked to neo-liberal capital and to a recent past of exclusionary, racialised colonialism, are not considered relevant to politics or to the making of decisions that affect their daily lives. We have seen how space, race, and citizenship were manipulated and institutionalised towards the conceptual and material enforcement of this 'irrelevance'.

The insistence on relevance as well as of an alternative way of doing politics is explicit for both UPM and RPM. As one member of UPM explained the founding of the movement:

> *We started it in 2009 in August, after the discussion amongst former activists [that] something has to be done. Something has to be done. […] In August 2009, indeed this was materialised, and then the Unemployed People's Movement was formed. The hall was full to its capacity. People heeded the call.*

What 'had to be done' was the galvanisation of a political mobilisation to contest what he described as a corrupt local government that was simply going about its own business without

accounting to or for the people it governed—in short, the absence of actual democracy. Why did 'something have to be done'?

> *It was about giving up. Nothing [was] being done. These [local government] people are just doing it; they are corrupt. There [was] no counter power. They [were] not being challenged. There [was] no dissenting voice coming [from] outside. And I think we have been able to play that role.*

Similarly, a man involved with RPM explained that post-apartheid democracy was not what people had hoped for:

> *We thought actually that democracy would be a bottom-up approach, but it appears that it is a top down approach. In fact, people are not given a chance to participate in most of decisions and the laws that affect them.* [Interpreter's translation]

In response to this political marginalisation, RPM seeks to open an avenue to political participation for its members beyond the limited democracy of electoral politics. The same man later expanded on this point:

> *When the democratic government took over […], some people of course went to take their post in the government […]. We had huge expectations, but after we saw that in fact this government is in fact similar to the other one. They keep promising, but nothing happens. We decided to revive again, and bring about struggles for the community.* [Interpreter's translation][1]

UPM is based in Grahamstown itself, and RPM in the rural areas around Peddie, a little over forty miles further east. One will recognise this area as the 'Fish River Country', the region of intense political contestation in the nineteenth century where we saw racial-spatial political practises and structures develop, as well as resistance. Given the insights arising from the historical review, a consideration of the two movements simultaneously is both intellectually and politically significant. The discussion in this chapter observes the intentions delineated in the first excursus on historiography and considers UPM's and RPM's contexts and politics as historical (though not in order to provide a complete history of either movement). Consequently, we will begin with a short introduction to both movements: in their own words, how they came into existence, how they work, and the issues that they face. In this way, a clear sense of the roles that the movements play in their communities and of their modes of politics can be brought to the argument of this research.

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[1] Where a second translation was done, other than the interpreter's rendering, the original Xhosa is also provided.

The more focused purpose in this chapter is to put UPM and RPM, through the words of some of their members, into a dialogue around the question of *urban* and *rural*. Now, UPM and RPM cooperate on demonstrations and events, some of the members know each other and frequently discuss social and political ideas with each other (and day to day things, of course). Therefore, the 'dialogue' is not unique to this research, but also exists (and to a much fuller extent) in real life. That dialogue—of a longer duration, reinforced with activity, and informed by complete understanding of experiences—is richer than the abbreviated account which can be provided here. However, this project aims, as outlined in Second Excursus, to look to activists for theoretical knowledge, and, through this specific annotation of the political ideas expressed by UPM and RPM members, to incorporate their ideas into the political discourse of urban and rural space that is the focus of this research. This chapter comprises mainly the content of interviews (empirical information), the analysis and discussion of which will be the function of the concluding chapter that follows.

After the introduction of the social movements, the dialogue will be organised into two sections in which the 'practical scope' and 'interior horizon' strategy structures how we will examine 'how' or 'to what extent' UPM and RPM cooperate or do not cooperate and which opportunities for unity or division exist between them. We will then turn to what people think about these practicalities and about possible alternatives—in short, the politics—since the question is less about how the physical spaces of urban and rural are transcended or transgressed and much more about the political geography that includes both urban and rural areas. The first dialogical section will address the 'practical scope' of the movements' activism and the times when they have connected; and the second will consider the 'interior horizons' of the movements, again with attention focused on the possibilities for and challenges to cooperation.[2] For both sections, the question of *urban* and *rural* provides a contextual backdrop as well as a critical objective. Because this chapter deals largely with modes of politics, space is mentioned less often than in the preceding (or following) chapters. However, three important points regarding space should be kept in mind in reading this chapter: First, the modes of politics in question are framed by the specific shape of spatial politics that we saw developed historically; second, the 'top-down' modes of politics which are mentioned frequently by members here are important in replicating those same spatial demarcations, and this will be explored more closely later; and, third, remembering Lefebvre, that the 'production

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[2] For discussion of the concepts 'practical scope' and 'interior horizon', see Aguilar (2014) or Second Exursus.

of space[s]' is inherently conditional upon 'the modalities of their genesis' ([1974] 1991, 16)—that is to say, different modes of politics will produce different politics of space.

The Movements

Cox and Nilsen (2015) write of social movements as encountering and then choosing to contest 'a concrete lifeworld that is somehow problematic relative to their needs and capacities' (72). Certainly, the 'lifeworld' in which UPM and RPM members live, in which the members of their communities live, are concretely problematic in many ways—the symptoms of the pathological inequalities in South African society. In order to impart a clear picture of the two movements before turning to more abstract themes, members' explanations and descriptions of this experience are provided here. One older man, a lifelong resident of Grahamstown who lives in eThembeni, talked about his reasons for joining UPM:

> *The problem is that I'm still suffering, you see. So that's why I want[ed] to join the movement of the UPM. I know everything about the people who are suffering, who are still suffering again. [They say] I'm free, but there is no free for me. Because I am living in the squatter's camp, you see. There is lack of water, lack of housing, and jobs, and the school—our children do not get [an] education. But in 1994, they said to us there are better life, better education. But still now there is nothing going right. So that is why I'm a member of UPM, because I'm still suffering, I'm not working, and I'm still living in the squatter camp [in] the shacks.*

The specific issues that this man outlined—water, housing, unemployment, education—were reiterated often by members of both UPM and RPM; indeed, by everyone. The issues of housing, water, and roads were raised in regard to both urban and rural areas, issues that are resonant with problems that Grahamstown's residents raised at least as early as the 1860s. Combined with these problems, which are characterised by the lack or inadequacy of something, are notions of dignity, voice (or voiceless-ness), and people's will to be involved in the organising of their own lives and the politics of their country.

   UPM was formed when activists convened community members in the 'informal' or 'shack' settlement of Phaphamani in Grahamstown to mobilise for the provision of electricity by the municipality.

> *They were refusing to give people electricity in Phaphamani and Zolani. So we blocked the roads. They arrested us, 'cause they were saying there is no money. While they were releasing us they were delivering electric poles there* [laughs]. *So that place has electricity now.*

Another major action in UPM's history was the 2011 'bucket system' protest, aimed at the lack of proper toilets which many people in Grahamstown faced. In October of that year, community members dumped buckets of human waste in Grahamstown's City Hall. A member of UPM later explained the reasoning:

> It takes the suffering that is usually hidden away as a private shame and makes it a public embarrassment to the government [...] When people experience their suffering as a private shame, things don't change. But when this suffering becomes politicised and collective action can be taken, especially in elite spaces, things really can change (in Knoetze 2013, np).

RPM came into being in a less confrontational manner. As an RPM member narrated, after attending a National Land Summit held in Cape Town (2005), at which it became apparent that 'there was not an organised voice of the landless people', a Grahamstown-based NGO, Masifunde Education and Development Project Trust (hereafter referred as 'Masifunde'), along with rural community members launched RPM in 2007 'to organise a voice for the landless, a voice for the women'. Though the same member stated the RPM 'did not come up through the struggle'—meaning, it did not begin with protest action like UPM—it was intentionally formed in order to challenge a 'problematic' experience through self-representation.[3] For one example, in July 2010, RPM submitted a statement to the South African Parliament regarding repeal of the Black Authorities Act (1951). The statement explained:

> In the last 2 weeks, we as the RPM went village by village to seek the opinions of our members, supporters and the broad community about the repeal of the Black Authorities Act (BAA). We went to the villages of Nobumba, Ndlambe, Pikoli, Ndwayana, Prudhoe and Mgababa. People were shocked that this law was still existing. They thought that we lived in a new South Africa. When we told them that this Act introduced tribal authorities they remembered all the pains they suffered under tribal authorities. They then asked us whether the repeal of this law will also mean the removal of the chiefs who are now coming back to rule them. We said that yes the BAA will go but the chiefs will remain. They were unhappy about this. They gave us one clear and loud voice: Mayihambe i-Black Authorities Act kwakunye namantshontsho ayo[4]. After the village meetings, we also spoke to community leaders at a separate meeting. The message to us was the same: mayimke i-Black Authorities Act, maziphele tu ii-tribal authorities, singabemi boMzantsi Afrika omnye[5] (RPM, 2010).[6]

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[3] The presence of an NGO is acknowledged to have some bearing on the matter of representation, as will be discussed in detail below.

[4] 'The Black Authorities Act and its puppies [legislative offspring] must leave'.

[5] 'The Black Authorities Act must leave, the tribal authorities must completely end; we are the citizens of one South Africa'.

[6] The Black Authorities Act of 1951 was repealed 31 December 2010.

While they are only some of the actions that RPM and UPM have taken, these episodes and their explanations illustrate the reasons why UPM and RPM were formed and something of the role they have played in their communities in the last several years.

Another specific issue experienced as materially problematic is the corruption of municipal and other government officials, which in some cases leads to poorly built Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing and other government projects and to indefinite waiting periods for such housing dictated by a corrupt list by which people obtain RDP housing. As related in the introduction, one major protest demonstration organised by UPM called for the municipality to be dissolved because of corruption, including in regard to housing. Corruption is also an issue affecting people's lives in the rural areas. A young man in RPM related that:

> *The issues of development and corruption, the housing projects, the sanitation, you know, they've always been a problem. Even now you'd find that with the project that is going on now for the toilets, you'd find that already if you go around some areas they are already collapsing, but millions of money have been put for that project, so there's a lot of corruption.*

Or, as a woman in RPM said:

> *Let's say you just trying something that will develop or benefit the community, for example the crèche. When you go to the municipalities to ask for funds, they will promise, and promise, and promise, and promise, and promise, 'til you lose hope.* [Interpreter's translation]

Members of UPM and RPM participated, alongside the Black Student Movement from Rhodes University, the local NGO Masifunde, and the United Front (a South Africa Leftist organisation) in another anti-corruption march in September 2015.

RPM intentionally seeks to build women's power in their communities, and UPM 'does a good job', according to one member, of addressing 'women's experiences' and 'women-related challenges'. Members of both movements mentioned rape and abuse of women and children as specific problems in their communities. Rape, said a member of UPM, 'has become huge even in Grahamstown alone, besides South Africa'. RPM members spoke of rising crime in their area, including home break-ins and the sale of alcohol and tobacco to underage people.

These specific issues raise an important point about the politics of the two movements that is linked to the discourse around movements in South Africa more generally. People's struggles in South Africa are often cast from outside (or, perhaps, from '*above*')—both by the state and

from within the academy—as 'service delivery' protests (Gibson 2011; Hart 2013), a classification that is insufficient in several ways. By focusing on the moment of protest, it obfuscates the ongoing work of community organising; it presents the 'service'—water, housing, roads, security, anti-corruption, etc.—rather than the people involved in protest as the protagonist (or antagonist) of the moment; and, proceeding from both of these problems, it hides the political nature of the action. Trouillot offers a lucid analog in his discussion of Haiti just before its revolution in 1791, when the defiant, violent, and political actions of enslaved people were written off as isolated occurrences—'the rebellious slave' was made out to be nothing more than 'a maladjusted Negro', and his or her action 'drained of its political content' (1995, 83). So we see the trivialisation and banalisation of politics by poor, black people. It is not the position here that social movement members are incorrect to speak of service delivery, or that services comprise an inferior or illegitimate set of demands. Rather, the purpose, seemingly both logical and necessary, is to centre the words of activists in this discourse on service delivery.

Members of UPM and RPM mentioned better service delivery as one of the objectives of their movement or poor service delivery as one of the problems with government. For example, at an RPM march in Grahamstown in 2014 a reporter was told that 'the municipality should prioritise services' (Gotywa, 2014). Another member of RPM said in our interview:

> *What you can notice is that ever since the post-apartheid era [...] the basic services do not come to people. People do not receive the basic services. As we have seen coming along the road, the road is very bad. Even here, this is supposed to be a preschool [or] crèche. It is not in a good standard for people even to sit within it.* [Interpreter's translation]

Similarly, a young woman in UPM explained:

> *The most things that [UPM] is working on is in terms of service delivery and the corruption in the municipality.*

Nonetheless, it remains entirely possible to be political about services. She continued by saying that UPM is 'fighting for what rightly belongs to the community'. Significantly, she discussed membership in UPM as follows:

> *I would say...it is people who are coming [...] to get helped from the UPM, because [they are] seeing how the other* [sic] *political parties have failed the community, I will put it that way. So the UPM doesn't speak for the community, but the community speaks for themselves through UPM.*

This understanding is reminiscent of the reasons given by the other respondents from UPM and RPM for the founding of the movements, provided above. While this woman explained that services are some of the specific issues that UPM takes up with the municipality, she also asserted the 'right' to those services as well as the 'right' of the community to demand them and to take action to obtain them. There is a link to the implementation of 'bottom-up' democracy which speaks to issues of citizenship. Recall that, for Chatterjee, 'rights' signify citizenship and 'services' governable populations (2004, 136). Indeed, given the need to *'fight'* for things like electricity, water, and housing, neither of the terms 'service' and 'delivery' seem appropriate to the situation. In a follow-up conversation, the same woman from UPM said that 'the people do not fight only for services, but also for dignity', because of the fact that the government does not account to the people as it is supposed to, including in terms of services. She cited UPM's early struggle against the bucket-system as an example of this intersection between services and dignity. Another young woman involved with UPM explained that:

> *Looking at UPM, it's not about protesting for service delivery only, but it's also about helping people [...]. Last year UPM buried like three people, because they* [UPM] *were* helping *people, so there's a lot in social movements than just protesting for service delivery.*[7]

The two concepts of *politics* (thinking and acting politically) and *helping* the community are linked for members of both UPM and RPM who understand their movements as having the role of enriching the political consciousness and encouraging the political participation of the people in their communities. This was expressed in a number of different ways:

> RPM Member, speaking on the first task undertaken by RPM: *It was to teach the people about their rights, for you find that people think they are done a favour, because they don't know what is in the constitution, so the first thing was to teach people about their rights* [...]. [Interpreter's translation]

> RPM Member: *We have been training and also learning about the laws, mainly those that affect people, for example the Communal Rights Land Act, the Traditional Bill Act* [sic]*, which was delayed because mainly we challenged it.* [Interpreter's translation][8]

> UPM Member: [UPM has the role of] *letting people know what's going on around them, and making sure that they know [...] they have right to have a safe house, water, and all that stuff; and also to change people's mindset [...]. Since UPM was formed, like, many people have guts to stand up to the municipality right now. As you've seen that there was a protest a few days, a few weeks, ago that was not organised by UPM,*

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[7] She refers to fundraising for funeral expenses, which frequently present a difficult financial challenge to people with small incomes.
[8] Communal Rights Land Act 11 of 2004 and Traditional Courts Bill B1 of 2012.

but people knew that because of the protests that were made by UPM they knew that they could also do protests. It's in their right to do things like that.

UPM Member: *I think the role of the UPM must be to raise the awareness and consciousness. You must get the RDP house, but you must understand why the RDP house is being built in the extensions of society. You must understand why you don't have water […]. We must understand why there's no electricity […]—the structural cause. We must be able to understand budget. I think these are the things we must understand if we want to change the society […]. Fundamentally our role must be to change society through the local struggle.*

Once again, the issue of rights is prominent, and citizenship, specifically the rights of formal citizenship in South Africa, and this will form an important part of the analysis that follows in Chapter 5 and the conclusion. Importantly, the contradictions of engagement with the institutions of formal politics while remaining, in different ways, movements outside of them will be addressed.

Practical Scope

Not surprisingly, the 'practical scopes' of the two movements are directly linked to the problems in their communities which they have taken up as issues on which they focus or the subjects of protest. These are markedly similar for each movement and the two movements often collaborate on events and demonstrations. One member of RPM recalled three different marches in the year leading up to our interview in which RPM and UPM had both participated or which they had planned together. Of course, they are different movements with people living in different places, so not every issue is the same. RPM helps people with the issue of land claims, while UPM has developed a function of working with people who are having problems obtaining RDP housing. Though these particular functions are similar, they are also locally specific in terms of rural and urban settings.

Two woman involved in RPM gave a somewhat different responses, naming practical differences between urban and rural movements as well as giving reasons for how rural movements could benefit from linkages to urban movements:

Yes, in fact from the rural country you'd find that the government does not listen to people compared to the towns. So we need to share that experience—what they do. Perhaps [their burning] is why they are listened to. [Interpreter's translation]

The other thing that would help would be to occupy the space of the media [which is] easier in townships than in rural areas. [Interpreter's translation]

And a woman from UPM agreed that a difference exists and explained it this way:

> *You'd find most of the people in the rural areas find it difficult to stand up and fight for what they think is right for them. But here in towns like Grahamstown, you'd find people standing up.* [Interpreter's translation]

Her explanation for this discrepancy had to do with the perception that electoral politics was the mode of politics in which people most often participated in rural areas, and described this as a form of oppression. We will return to this idea, momentarily.

There are other differences, as well. For instance, RPM has some members who live under traditional authority as well as some members who do not, and this entails a different set of political agendas and disputes than UPM contend with in Grahamstown. As one member of RPM said:

> *A certain distinct thing that I think should be mentioned is the issue of the rural democracy. Whereas in the townships they are ruled by democracy, if I can say. Whereas here there are imposed chiefs, so that makes it a little different, because you have an imposed leader that you have no say in. So that's something that makes these struggles a bit distinct. I'm not rebuking the importance of trying to link them together. It's very important.*

Recently, RPM joined a number of other mainly rural organisations picketing the Eastern Cape Provincial Government's appeal of a court ruling that allowed people in the Cala Reserve (in the former Tranksei) to elect their own leaders (headmen). The statement of protest read, in part, 'We collectively condemn the decision of the provincial government to launch this appeal. This appeal amounts to a denial of rural people their right to enjoy the full fruits of their own democratic customary practise. This appeal shows that the provincial government regards rural people as non-citizens' and went on to distinguish between an urban and rural experience of citizenship (rnews, 6 August 2015). In this specific instance, we can see the bifurcation of authority between 'civil society' and 'traditional authority' that Mamdani wrote about. Still, the urban-based UPM was included among the organisations that signed the statement against non-democratic rule of 'traditional' authorities.

Most of the RPM members interviewed for this research come from the Prudhoe area, some eighteen miles south of Peddie centre. Although we could see an area under traditional authority from the room where we were speaking, one man said, 'We do not have chiefs here, so we will not speak much about chiefs'. Nonetheless, traditional authority and 'rural democracy' or the lack thereof are issues affecting the lives of some RPM members and not

UPM members, though the latter movement shows solidarity with them in that aspect of the struggle.

The practical scope of the movements' politics is limited by the fact that, as one UPM member phrased it, the two movements have separate 'jurisdictions'. 'We can't,' he said, 'go to rural areas because RPM works there, but we work with them.' There was also the issue of local NGOs working in the rural areas, and so, because of them, if UPM extended their work into those areas it would cause 'commotion'. This is despite the fact that when people have problems 'whether they see "RPM" or "UPM", they just come', including people with 'farm-related problems'. Some people have come to UPM with problems that they feel would be better addressed through the movement than through the NGOs working in their areas, but UPM is reluctant to take up these issues because of the aforementioned 'jurisdictions' and the 'commotion' that would result from working outside of the acknowledged boundaries.

Still, though it is mainly RPM that deals with land claims, UPM has had some involvement in this matter. The narration of one such case from Committee's Drift, some twenty-five miles east from Grahamstown, makes for a rather dramatic story:

> We [were] fighting for this community because they missed a deadline to claim land. That was two years back. The land belonged to the state, so there was this white farmer who was using the land—terrorising the community, killing their animals. So we organised a protest, about two years back. We went straight there. We demanded [the farmer's] livestock and we gave it to [the community]. The police were there, and we told the police that the only way you are going to resolve this—because you aware of these cases and you haven't acted—so the only way to stop us is when you incarcerate us and shoot us. So we took the community to the land, we gave them their livestock, we told the white farmer that they will be working on this land.
>   The department called us. We attended meetings. The former mayor, the outgoing mayor, wanted that land as well, that farm. We fought that. The department called [saying] we can resolve this matter. Why can't we give UPM about twenty hectares in that farm, to work the land, and then we allow the Department to take decisions, we don't fight with the department, we support what the Department [does]? And we refused. The community continued to enjoy the rights on that land.

This sort of action by UPM is not usual, however, and it was described as 'going the extra mile' when UPM has worked outside of Grahamstown.

Members accept their different 'jurisdictions' to some extent, and some people acknowledged the function of their movement as specific to a certain place in that, practically, they encounter some different problems, and the same people cannot be everywhere at once. For instance, one member of RPM stated:

> Of course you'd find that sometimes you do align with some other movements to be involved in certain struggles. But the fact that in terms of the geography we're still in

the rural areas that proves that we're sort of conserved into certain specifics focused only on the rural country.

Similarly, a woman who has been involved in UPM since their first action at Phaphamani believes that movements should keep their identities as movements but march together on issues that affect them in common.

The limiting—the 'conservation', to use the term just quoted—of movements to Grahamstown or to the rural areas, as it is explained by members of UPM and RPM, does not stem principally from the movements or members themselves, but rather from outside. Two specific influences were cited and explained by many members of both movements to be limiting to the efficacy and action of social movements as well as of the opportunities for working together by causing tensions within and between social movements. These are NGOs and political parties (or party politics). For the purposes of this chapter, we will look at how members of the two social movements in question understand these influences and how exactly they are limiting, and the conclusion will include a more thorough discussion of their answers within the context of this thesis.

The overwhelming response from members of both movements was that, although NGOs can be valuable in terms of providing transportation, training, and other functions requiring funding, the relationships between NGOs and social movements can be, and often are, unequal. One young man in RPM explained the problem succinctly, raising the two most important issues: autonomy and funding:

> *NGOs themselves tend to dominate the movements and they don't give the autonomy to the movements to work freely [….]. Even if there are people who can think critically, who can work at ground level, but they don't have space to do that because if the NGOs draft a program for the funders then they get the funds […]. If that struggle […] you want to engage on is not on the program then they won't do it, because they have to be accountable to their funders.*

Members of both movements talked about NGOs 'dictating' to social movements, about how they can cause conflicts between social movements who looking for much needed funding and resources, and within movements, as well. When I brought up rural areas with one UPM member, he immediately turned the conversation towards NGOs:

> *The issue even for us here, we are struggling a bit for funding and stuff. It becomes worse to them. Even their struggle is getting manipulated by NGOs. Even those NGOs that come to fund them, they want them to deal with their [the NGO's] issues*

> *so that they can ask [for] more funding for their operation, different from what [the rural people] asked funding for.*

This can lead to people 'forgetting their struggles' through constant interaction with an NGO that focuses on specific local issues that can divert attention from other local problems or from problems that are not limited to the local area or people but which are not conceived of or treated in broad terms by NGOs. 'Dependence', in this analysis, can make people 'lose focus of the actual struggle'.

UPM has a different relationship with NGOs than RPM does, and maintains greater autonomy although it is often dependent on NGO funding for paying rent for its offices and other practical expenses (for which, currently, it is unfunded). Still, UPM has dealt with several different NGOs and funders during its existence. A young woman in UPM explained:

> *It can tend to be not good for social movements to work with NGOs because NGOs tend to control social movements. They want them to do their work. They have terms [.…]. You go this certain way […]. If the UPM wants to help someone, then if the NGO does not okay that, then the social movement will not be involved with that kind of person. So I think that NGOs should not be working with social movements. They should just let them be.*

Although RPM were formed by an NGO, Masifunde (Helliker 2013, 323), they are conscious of the situation that this creates, and often spoke of the ways in which NGOs 'dictate' to movements. While acknowledging the utility of the relationship, the words of one RPM member clarify the issue of autonomy, and exactly how NGO relationships can impinge upon movement independence and decision making:

> *Because the RPM for example has no funds [without NGOs], it's hard to do something that is outside of the programs for example of Masifunde. So we have to bow there for the money. So they will control what must be done and how it should be. But then, on the other side…well, they do help because the programs we do are similar.* [Interpreter's translation]

This sort of imposition has directly affected the relationship between UPM and RPM in different and contradictory ways. As one member of RPM explained:

> *Initially when we talked about this we were of the idea [that] we should probably meet with UPM and build one movement. Of course that would be in talks and talks and suggestions, and see where it goes. But when the NGO [unspecified] came they imposed, 'No, it's fine. This should be RPM and this should be UPM but you should find ways to connect in terms of the struggles only'.*

However, an NGO-led initiative called Inyanda has attempted to bring both UPM and RPM under its umbrella along with other Eastern Cape movements in rural areas and in Kingwilliamstown. The understanding by many people was that this is indicative of self-serving NGOs rather than legitimate attempts to create large-scale movements.[9] One RPM member said that this sort of 'enforced' relationship between urban and rural movements, in which NGOs decide that unity is needed and then force 'these movements to work together and also to work in a certain way' are not viable—'You can't enforce it. It has to run smoothly'.

It was a young UPM member who spoke most strongly against the influence of NGOs, emphasising their need for funding even to the point that they 'make money through the communities' problems', saying that they are 'like municipalities', and characterising the NGO-social movement relationship as 'abusive'.

> *I'm no longer interested in going to workshops or going to those kind of meetings. I believe that [NGOs] only want to get our ideas and then implement them in their own ways [...]. They only force ideas to the people, and make the people to believe that this is the only way that this thing will be able to work. Even here in Masifunde[10] [...] they ask you for ideas, and then they already know what they are going to do. They ask us to be creative and come up with ideas. But when we did come up with ideas, it was only after that that [we heard], 'We already have a plan'.*

Her summary was that NGOs 'use and abuse' social movements in order to fulfill their need for funding. This was a view shared by many people. Another woman said, 'NGOs are like capitalists. They survive by sucking the blood of social movements', and she agreed with others that they could be a factor in keeping social movements apart.

In a particularly memorable moment during one interview, the UPM member I was interviewing called for another man, a UPM member as well, to join us. He was asked, had he eaten today? No, he had not. Did he come early to the office? At eight in the morning. How long had he been there? 'Just look now', he answered, indicating his watch. It was five in the evening. This brief exchange was meant to illustrate for me the differences between the daily workings of social movements and NGOs: how they operate and the circumstances in which they operate. As one activist put this, more analytically:

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[9] The Inyanda (United) National Land Movement is a project of the Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE), which features in the next chapter.

[10] While not affiliated with Masifunde in the official way of RPM, UPM do have an unofficial relationship with Masifunde perhaps similar to one between 'neighbours'. However, it appears unstable, but movement members were not particularly forthcoming about it because of the frequent closeness of people in RPM, UPM, and Masifunde. If anything, this is indicative of NGOs causing tension or division in and between social movements.

> *Socially, everything happens day by day. You can have your yearly plan, but here you must be easy to adapt to changes socially. If you can't be easy to adapt, it's becoming a problem. And NGOs like to make people administrators of the struggle, rather than the action doers. They like to take those people who are in the forefront, to take them to the administration part of the struggle. They take them.*

Now we will turn to the other dynamic which came up as potentially divisive: party politics. Kirk Helliker compares the relationship of movements and NGOs with those of movements with political parties. He writes of the '[w]ariness on the part of rural movements with regard to political parties (and the state broadly) because of the possible ensuing incorporation into – and subordination to – the representative politics of the state' (2013, 319). The imposing role of NGOs mirrors the relationship that community members, including those involved in social movements, might have with the state through participation in electoral politics.

As mentioned, UPM and RPM are not political parties, nor are they aligned with any political parties, although their members are allowed to and sometimes do participate in electoral politics or have party affiliations. An explanation of this was similar in some ways to the moment just recounted from the UPM office. 'For example', said a member of UPM, 'I am a member of AZAPO':

> *As a political party [...] you want to help people who have the membership of your party. Most of the time they are the priority. But with [a] social movement, [...] every social issue is a priority, even if you are not a member. For example, UPM buried many people out of fundraising for them, which no political party did before, if you are not a member. Even the councillors who get salaries [...] they were not doing that.*

Members of both movements explained that party affiliations are at least intended not to create conflicts within the movement, either for or between individuals, but that this did not always happen. It is perhaps best captured by a woman in RPM who combined the point with some of the problems caused by community organising in a space of party politics:

> *When you enter these houses, going house to house signing people up [for RPM], carrying your papers, when you enter there, it is difficult for people to join RPM even though it was explained to them that it was an organisation for 'upliftment' and it is not going to snatch someone's cap and it is not going to snatch their organisation that they [are part of]. But it doesn't [come across] well, which is why I'm saying that there's a need for other people—maybe people that aren't us, or maybe we plus other people can explain properly that RPM is an organisation for 'upliftment' and is not a political party and we are not politicking. If you are part of the ANC you are going to stay a part of your ANC.[11]*

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[11] Xa ungena kewzizindlu ungena umzi nomzi mos uyajoyinisa uphethe amaphepha wakho xa ufika phayana abantu kunzima ukujoyina iRPM nangona babeyicaciselwe iRPM bayiva ukuba ngumbhuto wophuhliso

Even within the movement, party politics present a challenge to unity and to political action. One man in RPM talked about how this occurs, when a member might see his or her political party as the object of criticism:

> *And they don't want to toyi-toyi[12] against their organisation. Let's call it 'political application', because if a person let's say maybe he's [sic] in a high position of the ANC [he] won't want to go forward to the municipality and toyi-toyi against [his] organisation.[13]*

They had also experienced councillors claiming that RPM was a political party in order to confuse community members and keep the movement small because the councillors 'did not want people to challenge their positions'.

Similarly, a woman in UPM explained that more significant than NGOS in creating divisions in social movements were political parties, for reasons much like those just cited by RPM members. She also reminded me that political parties, and she singled out the ANC, do not like social movements because they change the consciousness of people who then might challenge politicians and parties. It was therefore a priority for politicians and parties to make sure that they 'deal with the movements separately [interpreter's translation]'.

Curiously, although members of both movements spoke strongly about how their movements are non-aligned and non-discriminatory of membership in regard to party politics, and both talked about how such politics can trouble their attempts at mobilisation, party politics came up as a specific problem *between* the movements, as well. Indeed, one woman in UPM identified party politics as the 'biggest challenge' to cooperation between UPM and RPM. She said that the 'extent of the relationship [between UPM and RPM] is only for joining together in marches'. When asked why, she elaborated on the role of party politics, making a point that came up repeatedly in interviews with members of UPM. The problem, she said, arose 'because some of the members of the RPM belong to the ANC, I'll put it that way, and then we as the UPM we have members who are members of some political parties'. She then

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ayizoxutha ikepusi zakhe ayizoxutha mbutho wakhe anawo. But ayingeni kakuhle la nto le ndithi iyafuneka kukhe kuphindwe kukhe kuze mhlawambi abantu abangesithi of nathi plus nabanye abantu abazakubacacisela kakuhle hle ukuba iRPM ke ngombutho wozophuhliso ayingombutho wapolitiki awupolitiki. Ukuba uyi-ANC uzakahlahla uyila ANC yakho.

[12] Protest

[13] And abafuni uku-toyitoyela umbutho wabo. Sithi "political application," because ukuba umntu let's say mhlawumbi he's a ukusikhundla esiphezulu se-ANC abazufuna ukuyaphambili kwamasipalati ayo-toyitoyela umbutho wakhe.

reiterated the point, in almost the same words as the RPM member above, that the social movements are not parties and members are allowed to keep their party loyalties:

> [A]s the UPM we always say that when we come to the office, leave your party cap outside, and when you come to the UPM you are the UPM only, even though you belong to the ANC or [another party].

Her understanding was that RPM was different, and that this created division between the two movements, going so far as to say that they 'don't want to work as a collective':

> The RPM, I think to them because they think that the UPM is fighting with [against] the ANC—but the UPM is not fighting with the ANC, the UPM is only fighting for what rightfully belongs to the community, that's all—so to them they believe that UPM is fighting with the ANC.

This was a statement peculiar to UPM members speaking about RPM. Three made the point explicitly. While their understanding of the situation is intimate and should be accepted as sincere, it remains that RPM members were also willing to question the ANC or ANC affiliations, as we have seen. This suggests broad internal divisions on the issue of political parties as well as contradictions in the way both UPM and RPM are able to address party affiliations. The basic and important point that needs to be taken forward is that political parties came up as a dividing force and in complex ways.

One man in UPM, whom we heard speak on the issue of suffering above, historicised the situation, saying that the problem of disunity began when the ANC became the ruling party in 1994, before which the ANC had been part of the struggle against apartheid and more united with other parties and movements.[14] It was the formation of the ANC government which led to a situation in which the 'other political parties made decisions [that] they have to fight' with the ANC. He understood the role of UPM as 'to show that there are still other things we're supposed to fight about' than merely the contestation of elections and state control. His account complements another member's assertion that 'People are coming to get help from the UPM [because] the political parties have failed'. These form an important statement on politics and the politics of UPM (in particular) and social movements more generally: that they have a role or responsibility to be political in ways that parties are not. This is an important point which will be taken up in the conclusion.

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[14] Although even this is complicated by anecdotes about tensions between the ANC and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) during the 1980s.

The sense of the various and related themes brought up and statements made by members of UPM and RPM seems to be captured in the words of one RPM member who said:

> *The party politics or the formal politics will always create these cleavages […]. We should sometimes forget about party politics because they will always separate the movements.*

Julian Brown (2015) has looked at the way some other social movements have engaged with electoral and party politics with various and difficult to measure results. While choosing this avenue enables the elections to be contested and shifts the politics within elections, it can also have consequences of demobilisation, cooptation, and the necessity to formalise a movement's structure and organisation in ways that fundamentally change a movement (117-119). Brown recounts Abahlali baseMjondolo's shift from a 'no vote' stance to support for the Democratic Alliance (DA) in KwaZulu-Natal in 2014, observing that this resulted in tensions and conflicts within the movement and between Abahlali and other movements (2015, 120-121), which is a consequence consistent with what UPM and RPM activists have argued in relation to party politics. UPM and RPM have not taken this route, as we know. Still, the issue of engagement with formal political structures is one to which we will return in the conclusion.

Interior Horizons

The interior horizon of a politics or political movement is more fluid than its practical scope or the objective issues for or on which it works; it is both driven by and limited by these practical experiences, encompasses their contradictions, and yet contains the possibility of thinking beyond them. Therefore, the shape and scope of the interior horizon is harder to define and measure. As Aguilar, from whom the 'interior horizon' strategy is borrowed, writes, the measuring of this horizon is 'primarily' accomplished through 'collective acts', and is worked out in the formation of distinct political subjectivities (2014, xx; xxiv). It is important to remember also that this process is historical, and history, which has occupied much time here, is also useful in demarcating the span of political horizons. Like Aguilar, Raúl Zibechi writes about Bolivia, but his argument is just as pertinent in a South African context. 'A kind of epistemological earthquake occurs', Zibechi writes, 'when those who have occupied the depths of society for centuries—Indians and women, etc.—emerge as subjects, which calls into question the subject/object relationship, one of the most pernicious legacies of colonialism' (2010, 83). Indeed, this 'epistemological earthquake', the potential for its happening, sits at

the very heart of the questions that motivated this research. The specific subjectivity interrogated here is of those people whom historical processes have rendered excluded, but who understand their historical role as working towards an inclusive future through struggle against the problems of the present.

In this dialogue between UPM and RPM, the simplest responses to questions about cooperation, about linking struggles, about the relationship between urban and rural struggles and movements will provide a starting point from which the complexity of an interior horizon or horizons can be elaborated. In the words of some of the activists: 'We are fighting together' [UPM]; 'Yes, the struggle is one' [RPM]; and, beginning to entertain an analysis, 'Struggles must connect at the end of the day. They are all the struggle of exclusion' [UPM]. In these words, on a most basic level, there is a political commitment that does not limit itself to an urban or rural context, or to a political context in which *urban* and *rural* are necessarily divided. As one person said, 'When the hammer of oppression falls, we will all be counted under that hammer'. This politics is given form in terms of the practical scope, especially the similarity of problems and experiences faced by UPM and RPM members. When asked whether movements in town and in rural areas should link up, one RPM member responded:

> *Yes, it is necessary as the struggles are very related. [We share] a similar struggle for water, sanitation, housing, because housing is as bad in the rural areas as it is in the town. That is why you find that when the UPM does marches the RPM goes and support and vice versa.* [Interpreter's translation]

The understanding of some was that the movements could work in their areas and remain different movements while also working together when the issues were shared. The most definite expression of this opinion made reference to the NGO-led Inyanda project and the lack of autonomy in this 'unity'. If unity should emerge, it should be unity brought about by the social movements themselves, not under any 'umbrella', in this view. This idea of keeping movement identity was also associated sometimes with the idea that, at times, issues that should be taken up in common were not, because of too much focus on one problem or another that did not create room for cooperation. Land was among these. Although the specific issue of land had come up in two interviews as a potentially divisive issue because of the way that RPM focused on land, it was a member of UPM who pointed out that 'we all need land, even here in town', and she was later supported by a member of RPM who said, 'The issue of land is not only for the rural areas. People even in the cities they need houses, they need land for their houses, for cattle, all those things we ignore'. He said this while making the point that

movements should aspire to constitute 'a mass struggle for social change' that could effect the 'transformation of society'. Quite clearly, speaking with members of both movements, whatever specific problems they tackled or political contradictions developed in the process, they expressed a desire—importantly, a desire couched in political terms—that South African society could be changed for everyone, not just for their members, not just in their area, and not only on the issues which defined their struggle. Again, this demonstrates a politics that does not limit itself to urban and rural spaces but has an expansive horizon. Even though this politics is usually manifested in marches and solidarity, it is very much present in the thoughts of the people involved in the movements, and motivates their involvement in collective actions.

An RPM member spoke on the importance of mobilising people to make viable connections among different rural struggles, while one UPM activist considered the possibility of expanding UPM outside of Grahamstown to nearby villages where it could 'work closely with RPM' to increase membership. Pressed on this point, on why it had not happened, the same person said, 'It hasn't happened because we just focused on the problems that are here. We didn't look outside of Grahamstown. That's why it hasn't expanded yet'. How important is it to make links to other social movements? I asked one UPM activist. 'Very, very, very important', he said, and then corrected me, moving the conversation beyond 'social movements':

> *Actually even communities themselves, even neighbours, community is so much important. […] So if you are believing in the kind of struggle we're in, you need that kind of community […]. I so much believe in unity. I so much believe in unity. Working together—you know even as a family, doing things together is better.*

The idea of space and the influences of space often crept into conversations with UPM and RPM members when discussing this question of how the movements could go forward in their struggles. The same UPM member who envisioned a closer relationship with RPM also observed spatial politics at play in Grahamstown. She believes that UPM focuses too much of its attention on 'town', as opposed to the township:

> *I think that UPM can get more members if they go to the communities and have some of the events that they always have at Rhodes in the community so that people can see UPM, it can be visible to people. Because if everything that the UPM does is done in town then the people can't see that, because not everyone is always in town, so if the UPM can like move from here in town to the location and be more involved in the location than they can get new members.*

So far we have discussed UPM as located in a particular space, the township, the excluded zone, or the 'extensions of society'—a pregnant phrase in the view of history. Further

discussion around the ideas raised by this UPM member—how UPM might inscribe, modify, or, still, potentially challenge the urban spatial divisions we have seen carved onto Grahamstown since its founding—will be taken up in Chapter 5. What is significant in the words of this activist is the fact that strengthening the movement, in her view, requires a shift in spatial logic and activity, which in turn signifies a shift in politics.

Similar ideas came out from the RPM interviews. One member spoke about the decline in member numbers and what the cause of that might be and how it might be rectified:

> *As a social movement you should also focus on the social contradictions if you want to change society […]. You should not only focus on the parliamentary politics […]. You should bring something new to the people. I guess that's why you find that the numbers have decreased because not all people are interested in that type of politics, but I believe everyone can play a crucial role. But we've ignored that space.*

His reference to the formal sphere of politics as a separate 'space' from that in which 'everyone' can play a role is an important point in terms of the inquiry here as well as an important political point. It shares with the argument made by the UPM member the spatial aspect of politics, and in particular a politics that will change society to become more inclusive. 'Social contradictions' this activist says, including the division between urban and rural politics, can be worked out in 'people's spaces':

> *We tend to ignore the spaces used by the people. We only focused on the politics as in the parliamentary politics […]. We ignore a lot these spaces used by the people, the cultural spaces, the music spaces […]. Those spaces are […] very important and it would be easy to build links […] or find cracks to build links along—across the whole world if we [were] able to use those spaces.*

Such creative conceptions of how politics and space could reshaped were more often (though definitely not exclusively) held by younger members of the two movements, who, far from being naïve, were able to at once note and accept the 'social contradictions' of their experience and to move beyond them. However, members of all ages conveyed ideas around these 'people's spaces', even if they did not use the word. Indeed, if we look back to the reasons for which the movements were started, to constitute alternative, 'dissenting' political movements from 'outside' and from the 'bottom', 'up', then the politics of space has been present throughout the discussion, both in thought and in the lived, historical experience of the people of UPM and RPM. It is an experience also laden with historical contradictions that complicate the very idea of 'people's spaces' and the ways with and boundaries within which the movements are able to work. If one person's words provided a concise, political, and forward-

looking synopsis of what could be a shared interior horizon, it is one woman from UPM who spoke of broadening the meaning of community and in doing so, challenging the political forces of division which act upon the world of her experience. She communicated this eloquently:

> *We would be speaking with one voice, and there would be no dictators within us. It would be us facing our experiences. If we become just a community, and share our own experiences, and find a way of dealing with them.*

In these words are an aspiration to unity, an assertion of the necessity of autonomy, the centering of the knowledge that stems from experience, the importance of community in making struggles around those experiences, and the hope of employing these principles and strengths towards a project of self-reflective collective action. This review of UPM and RPM members' words can be situated in the broader discussion of space with a question: How would the 'modalities' of such politics, to refer to the quotation from Lefebvre above, be significant in the production of political spaces while acting through and being acted upon by the spatial divisions produced through other modalities?

CHAPTER 5
CONTESTED SPACES & CONTESTED CITIZENSHIPS IN GRAHAMSTOWN

'Class, gender, and racial distinctions made possible the actual practice, if not the formal idea, of "degrees of citizenship", whereby some come to possess greater claims to being part of the nation than others, and others are often close to being foreigners or largely "rightless" because politically weak and marginalized.' – Michael Neocosmos in From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners' *(2006, 72).*

During October 2015, the last month of this research, South Africa and Grahamstown were the sites of massive political mobilisations in which race, space, and citizenship were deeply implicated and experienced. Student protests against university fees and other issues such as the outsourcing of university support staff were staged across South Africa in what became a partially coordinated national struggle with local variation and diverse movements. In Grahamstown, this coincided with the mobilisation of xenophobic violence in the city. While the specific reasons informing and motivating these political actions have not been the focus of this thesis, and the ways in which race, space, and citizenship factored are somewhat different in their particulars than what has been examined here, still it would be improper scholarship to conclude a study of contemporary politics in and around Grahamstown without mentioning the most intense weeks of politics experienced there during the course of the research. In the period of some ten days, these two distinct but not unrelated sequences of political events changed the shape of Grahamstown's politics while also exhibiting continuity with the long history of politics in Grahamstown.

Because the events recounted here are limited, for the most part, to the actual town of Grahamstown, UPM were intimately affected and involved, while RPM were involved only occasionally. Therefore, like Chapter 2, this chapter focuses very closely on town with reference to rural areas when it is appropriate. The politics of space around both the student protests and the xenophobic violence will be explored with attention to the role that UPM played during both events.

On Monday, 19 October, Rhodes University was blockaded and shut down by students joining in a countrywide series of protests against the scheduled increase of what are, for some, already unaffordable fees for tertiary education. The students were also motivated by what has been called 'decolonisation' of higher education and by the disadvantaged access to universities faced by especially working-class, black students that had been the subject of more localised struggles beginning in March and continuing during the year (Naicker 2015). From the start of political activity by students at Rhodes in March, UPM had been involved and offered

support, which usually took the form of UPM's participation in marches and of informal discussions with student activists. Some members of UPM were also members of the most prominent group of political students, the Black Student Movement (BSM), for much of the year. In general, UPM, and, to a lesser degree, BSM, viewed collaboration as a necessary part of their programs, explained through a discourse of uniting student and community struggles. Rhodes University's site at the extreme western end of Grahamstown emphasises its elite-ness, its inaccessibility, and its distance from the black and poor township in the east. The one UPM member who mentioned Rhodes in the last chapter spoke of it as distant from the community but also suggested that a connection between UPM and BSM would be an important link to make. The student movement's links with UPM differed from other times that people in the western end of town had associated with UPM: for instance, the August 2014 protest, when some (non-organised) students and suburban Grahamstown residents joined UPM outside City Hall.[1] Their participation was motivated by a city-wide water shortage, and not by solidarity for UPM or the other issues faced by township residents. There remained a spatial (and largely racial and class-based) political distinction between participants from the township and the 'town'. When asked whether this participation should be viewed positively or not, the same UPM member explained:

> *No, it wasn't a good thing, because they only started getting involved with the community when they were affected. Why can't they always get connected to the community [...]? They only were there because they were affected by the water shortage. When they are not affected they do not want to be part of it.*

A different approach was apparent at times in the relationship between UPM and BSM. Rather than inscribed, Grahamstown's spatial divisions were sometimes challenged through this political relationship. For instance, BSM and UPM planned a joint march from Fingo Square (in the old 'Fingo Location') to Rhodes on 28 May 2015 under the banner 'Decolonise this Institution' in order to highlight the colonial character of Grahamstown and the university's position in it. Although miscommunications resulted in only a small number of UPM members participating in this march, the BSM, joined en route by some members of the community, undertook the march and its fundamental politics were still performed.

When the BSM began protest action in earnest in late August, UPM members continued to be involved. Their involvement was possible because of their urban location; some members of RPM showed interest in BSM, but did not participate in their protests or meetings.

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[1] See Introduction.

Demanding a long term solution to the university's short vacation accommodation problem[2], BSM began an occupation of the university's Council Chambers in the Main Administration Building on 26 August which lasted for over a month, and, on many days, UPM members participated in the occupation. The occupation was a contestation of space in multiple ways. Students occupied the symbolic decision-making chambers of the university (which the university was keen to end), and they 'redecorated' it with black-and-white pictures of important black and African revolutionaries, thinkers, artists, and militants. However, the participation of UPM brought a different dimension to the occupation, in which community members accessed the (in this case, literal) 'ivory tower', named after a British imperialist whose exploitation of South/ern African people had involved their separation from the land and an important moment in their 'coercion in space'.[3] The student struggle, which had begun with objectives of improving the experience of working-class, black students at Rhodes as well as of making the university more accessible to working-class, black students is an important one in Grahamstown, where high school matriculation rates (except at the expensive, elite high schools) are extremely low (Westaway 2015), and very few local students attend the university which is within walking distance of their homes. The opportunities for solidarity between students and UPM, and, in the beginning of September, for unity among the student movement, UPM, and National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) members who work at Rhodes and mostly live in Grahamstown's township were clear, though such solidarity has not been fully realised. Nonetheless, when the national student protests began, UPM members once again joined the students at Rhodes.[4]

Let us return to Monday, 19 October. Members of UPM participated in the student protests at Rhodes and EMC that day, because the issues of class, race, and access to education were as much theirs as they were the students'. A few hours after the protest at Rhodes began in the early hours of the morning, students from Rhodes marched to nearby Eastcape Midlands College (EMC) to show solidarity with EMC students whose protest beginning on Friday had

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[2] Beginning in March, BSM had been critical of the university's policy of requiring students to leave during the two short vacations each year or to pay an expensive fee to remain in residences. The costs of travel or the residence fees were a constant source of financial hardship for some students and their families: just one way in which the university was exclusionary of poor or working-class students, the majority of whom are black. The occupation ended in an important if negotiated success for the students.

[3] Cecil Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony when the Glen Grey Act (1894) was passed, which was one of the many Acts to affect detrimentally African people's relationship to the land, the economy, and to limit their involvement in the colony's politics. He was also a capitalist whose mining ventures accelerated the exploitation of African labour. Indeed, changing the name of the university is among BSM's and other political students' objectives.

[4] Firsthand account

been met with police violence. Solidarity was extended because the students at Rhodes, who had burned tires and blocked roads just the same as the students from the college, had not been met with aggression from the police. The issues of race and space were certainly at play: Rhodes is an elite and formerly all-white university, with a relatively diverse student body, while EMC's student body is mostly black and located in a wealthy neigbourhood of Grahamstown. The assumed criminality of black people in 'white town' mimicked the logic whetted during colonialism and systematised under apartheid.[5] Shortly after the Rhodes marchers arrived at EMC, students from both institutions were dispersed with stun grenades. The protesters returned to Rhodes to regroup, and in the mid-afternoon marched back to EMC. After an hour, SAPS ordered the students to disperse, which they refused to do until five o'clock. SAPS then scattered them by force, deploying more stun grenades and a mobile water cannon. A mass meeting organised at Rhodes in the evening included members of UPM.

Rhodes University remained closed for the duration of the week while nationally the scale and scope of both the student protests and their repression intensified. In addition to the rebellion against structural oppression through class and race, the question of citizenship remained at the core of the protests posed in the forms of who had a right to the higher education institutions of South Africa and who had a right to determine the content and future of higher education in South Africa. At Rhodes, the students demanded that the levy for foreign students be reconsidered and standardised across the country's universities. As part of the national demonstrations, on Wednesday, 21 October, Rhodes students and staff marched through town, taking a route passed EMC. Police had issued a permit for this march, and monitored its progress.[6]

However, while the students marched on Wednesday, another protest by the taxi drivers' associations in Grahamstown had initiated violence in town. When the mayor failed to meet with the protesting taxi drivers, who had delivered a petition bringing attention to the terrible state of Grahamstown's roads and the rise of violent crime, they turned their frustration against 'foreign'-owned shops or 'spaza shops' owned by Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Somali, and Ethiopian residents of Grahamstown. It was a premeditated move. Some of the taxis taking part in the protest had xenophobic slogans painted on them, and a crowd was mobilised by the taxi drivers to attack and loot the shops, beginning in Bathurst Street not far from the centre of

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[5] See Chapters 2 and 3.
[6] Firsthand account

town and then proceeding into the township. The xenophobic violence was legitimated by the looters on the basis of rumours that a 'foreigner'—an 'Arab', a 'man with a beard'—had killed and mutilated several women in recent months; rumours which SAPS in Grahamstown had done nothing to dispel in spite of repeated warnings by UPM members and other Grahamstown residents that they could result in violence (Unemployed People's Movement 2015).

For almost a week, looting, destruction of property, and threats continued against shops and shop owners, and the attacks came to target shop owners from Malawi, Palestine, Senegal, Nigeria, China, Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, and Zimbabwe. Some three hundred shops were looted and several hundred people were displaced. This violence differed from earlier instances of xenophobic mobilisation in South Africa, for example in May 2008 April 2015[7], in that only two people were injured and the 'foreigners' under attack were mostly defined as Muslim rather than as 'other African'.

Xenophobia as a feature of politics is not new in Grahamstown, and the history of space, race, and citizenship which has been developed through the first three chapters of this thesis shows moments and modes of xenophobic politics in the town itself. Indeed, the history of Grahamstown's differentiated spatial politics has threads of xenophobia running through it from the beginning. A brief review is useful, here. As we have seen, the voluntary arrival and forced relocation of Africans to the immediate Grahamstown area during the 1830s and 1840s, spurred the colonial government's decision to set up the first official African 'locations' in Grahamstown. These were days when Africans were counted as 'foreigners' in the Cape Colony. Through the latter half of the nineteenth century, fear and suspicion of Africans arriving in Grahamstown from further east on the advancing colonial frontier, inflected the particular racism of the town and region. In this xenophobic view, in which to be African was to live perpetually on the edge of criminality, to be 'more African', from the rural frontier, was even worse.[8]

In Chapter 2, we saw that a great fear of both the unemployed and of 'vagrants' or 'illegal inhabitants', which often referred to African people from rural areas, was prevalent at the turn of the twentieth century, driven by the town's white population and working through the police. We also saw that the criminalisation of brewing of sorghum beer was strongly linked to racist and xenophobic perceptions of 'African-ness'[9]. A properly historicised account of xenophobia

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[7] Neocosmos's study of xenophobia as a political discourse in South Africa shows that it has been a problem since the transition to democracy in 1994 (2006a, 1).
[8] See Chapter 1 and O'Halloran (2015c).
[9] See Chapter 2.

in South Africa that draws on such local examples would be valuable in analysing the politics of today. Here, we should note the overtones of *urban and rural* that worked in the early movements of xenophobic politics in the example of Grahamstown, the ways in which race and 'foreign-ness' are intertwined today, and the possibility that this discourse, originally levelled *against* inhabitants of Grahamstown's locations, could have been internalised by their descendents. As mentioned, Grahamstown's particular xenophobic politics did not target 'African-ness', but rather was Islamophobic in nature. The modes of xenophobia are not the precisely the same as in the past, but the spatial divisions through which they operated are not lost, either. In South Africa more broadly, xenophobic violence and politics have retained much of their racialised character.

In April 2015, xenophobic attacks in Durban targeted foreign-born Africans, particularly Congolese people, as well as people from the Eastern Cape (imagined as rural) living in informal settlements. To be poor and African—the 'more African', the worse—were the criteria for victimisation. When members of Abahlali baseMjondolo organised a (legal) anti-xenophobia march, it was violently prevented by police. Abahlali baseMjondolo identified the police, the ruling party, and local taxi drivers as supporters and instigators of xenophobic violence in Durban (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2015a).

Shortly afterwards, beginning in July 2015, Operation Fiela deployed SAPS and army units to combat crime by rounding up 'foreigners' and other 'illegal inhabitants', including people who are part of land occupations around the country. Poor people, Africans from other countries, and Africans living in informal settlements are targeted. The same understanding that the authorities employed over a century ago in Grahamstown, which views 'illegal inhabitants' (foreigners) and 'unemployed people' as problems, which led *The Grahamstown Journal* to observer in 1908 the 'regular crusade' against 'squatters and vagrants', is at work today. It legitimates, as it did in colonial Grahamstown, various forms of prejudicial politics and violence. It also emphasises the notion that poverty signals non-belonging, or, alternately, that poverty breeds violence, both of which conceptions involve spatial assumptions, being largely aimed at township residents.

As in Durban, local politicians and businesses are implicated in Grahamstown's xenophobic politics. At a meeting convened by Makana Municipality at City Hall on Friday, 23 October, the Mayor, Acting Municipal Manager, and Speaker asserted that the municipality and SAPS would handle the situation but did not then proceed in subsequent days to ameliorate either the political situation or the emergency needs of the affected people. No SAPS representative attended the meeting, and a Democratic Alliance (DA) ward councillor expressed her belief,

highly enabling of xenophobic action, that when the 'foreigners' came back, they should have fewer shops.[10]   The night before, community members had been present when an ANC councillor had addressed a crowd, informing the people that the foreigners would go (O'Halloran 2015b). Grahamstown's taxi associations actively instigated and supported the looting by bearing xenophobic slogans and transporting looters for free, according to community members.

Also like in Durban earlier in the year, and, indeed, in Grahamstown in the past, the police have had a central role (Mba 2015). Inexplicably, SAPS have claimed that their 'restoration of order' and 'support' of the 'foreigners' after the week of looting was a success for Operation Fiela (IOLnews 2015). In contrast to this narrative, Grahamstown shop owners affected by the looting as well as members of UPM have recounted police behaviours that ranged from indifference, to laughing at people whose shops were being looted, to facilitation of and participation in the looting. In addition to their failure to respond to the Grahamstown community's fears and warnings, the immediate aggression exercised against students by SAPS at EMC contrasted sharply with instances on Wednesday in which police allowed people to loot shops; and, despite many arrests, the contrast between policing in the township (for township residents) and in the wealthy quarters (against young black people) shows a stark spatial divide (O'Halloran 2015a). Indeed, the spatial division of Grahamstown was glaring. The police line strung across Beaufort street, declaring and dividing with yellow tape and rifle-bearing officers the zones in which looting would be tolerated and would not be—the township, and the 'town'—was reminiscent of the logic of crime, criminality, and control of earlier Grahamstown.[11] Southey's depiction of events in 1917, when the white town was 'thoroughly picketed' against the 'unrest' in the township, is worth recalling (in 1984, 247).

Members of UPM protected shops under attack in the first hours of the xenophobic crisis, and worked over the following days to try to end the violence and looting. In the emergency meetings convened by UPM after the onset of the xenophobic looting and destruction, members of both UPM and RPM were present and affirmed the right of the shop owners to live and trade in South Africa and Grahamstown, not as foreigners who had the appropriate documentation but as community members who, in both their countries of origin and in South Africa, had to confront the same exclusions as the locally- and South African-born people.

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[10] Firsthand account
[11] See Chapter 2.

. In an interview exactly two weeks before the beginning of the xenophobic crisis in Grahamstown, a UPM member brought spatial arguments into our discussion of the political situation that eventually produced the crisis. This conversation warrants quoting at length.

> *For example now in the location people are in fear [...]. There is this fear of the crime growing. There [is] this new thing that it is said to be happening, of taking peoples parts, killing, murdering people. And people came to us with that. Even during the march, [a UPM activist] was called aside by women who were saying, 'No, no, we don't want you talking with the municipality only, we have this burning issue because we are living in fear in our communities'. We went in a meeting with the [police] at the police station but we were sent to the police station in Joza. When [there was] a report back to those women, they suggested that there should be a march that goes there to the Joza police station.*

This matter of being sent to a different police station is significant. As the man resumed:

> *The [town] is divided into two. Most of us after the river[12] [...], we're supposed to do everything that needs involvement of police in Joza, then this [station] is in town. So that's why we couldn't get tangible results here.*
>
> *Apparently the things of the past, even after the 1994 change, core issues didn't change. There is still black and white, because this one police station actually is like an extension of security of a white monopoly. Whereby for example if there's a break in or a robbery at Checker's [grocery store in the CBD], they can be easy dealing with that. [But] usually in the community, in the township, there are many cases they are dealing with—you know, differences between people, where there are fights and all those stuff—but in this side it's more about financial problems, guarding the finance, the whole economical sense of it. It's an individual economical [sic] sense, the break ins and such.*

The way people are treated at these police stations differs, as well. In the Joza station, people wanting to open a case are usually required to produce a suspect, which is not the case at the other police station catering to the mostly white population. The way the police responded before and during the xenophobic attacks is consistent with this this racial-spatial argument. As I have argued elsewhere, the police do not serve the township community—'the' community, in many people's perceptions—but control it (O'Halloran 2015a).

When the affected women, calling themselves Voices of the Foreigners' Wives, along with UPM, RPM, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and support from other local organisations, students, academics, and residents, organised a protest against xenophobia, crime, violence against women, and poor service delivery at City Hall on 30 October, the Mayor refused to accept their memorandum—a patent announcement, made uncountable times

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[12] The river which divides the town roughly in half, east of which is the township. It earned the name eGazini in the battle of 1819. See Maclennan (1986).

in the history of Grahamstown, that only some residents enjoyed access to the protection and services of the formal authorities. In the days before the march, as the municipality and police manoeuvred to prevent any public protest by the women, the mayor had told these women that she had 'forgotten' about them. It requires little effort to proceed from this 'forgetting' to an invocation of the phrase 'surplus people' that was so fundamental to the project of exclusion in twentieth century South Africa.

It is important to note that, like the historical exclusionary project, the events of October accentuate the importance of *citizenship*. Following that, it is also crucial to remember that, historically, citizenship had spatial referents (at times determinants) and that particular forms of xenophobic and racist politics had spatial overtones, as well. October's events in Grahamstown evinced spatial politics and demarcated space in specific ways, as we have seen. These can be linked to the question of citizenship as it has appeared throughout this thesis.

In the words of UPM and RPM members, we saw that citizenship emerged through the language of rights—rights belonging to the community and rights claimed by the community from the government. The discussion of service delivery, of service delivery as masking of politics but also as political in actuality, as well as the emphasis placed by members of both movements on 'bottom-up' politics and practises have made the question of citizenship an important one here. We will continue to pursue the concept through the moment of the xenophobic attacks, on the first morning of which UPM and RPM convened a meeting in order to address the problems both politically and practically. As one man of fifty years who lives in a shack on the outskirts of Grahamstown had said in our interview during calmer times, 'But everybody, this is our country—everybody, no matter you are white, not matter you are black, no matter you are green, we are here in South Africa'. This logic, put into clear practise during the crisis, demonstrates an open and egalitarian approach to the issue of citizenship, and a different definition practised by the state.[13] During the looting, UPM, RPM, Masifunde, and other local organisations including the Makana branch of the EFF party mobilised to stop the attacks and to talk with community members about the struggle that the shop owners shared with them, no matter where they were born.

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[13] Neocosmos writes, 'Xenophobia emanates in society as a direct outcome of the hegemony of a state discourse of nation-building and human rights—in other words of citizenship….Xenophobia is a product of the parameters of this discourse and of the obscuring, subordination, or defeat of an alternative popular-democratic political discourse which had stressed a different understanding of citizenship and the nation' (2006a, 21).

In contrast to these actions and the politics behind them, the xenophobic Islamophobic violence that took place in Grahamstown in late October 2015 offered a different logic of citizenship: a closed and exclusionary approach conceived through narrow definitions of identity and belonging. Though most of the 'foreign' shop owners who were attacked are South African citizens and most are married to South African women, they were considered by some to be outsiders who do not belong—who, whatever the official documentation might say, were not citizens of South Africa. People were mobilised around this political logic, through and by local business and political interests, to drive 'foreigners' out of Grahamstown.

Analysing xenophobia in South Africa, Achille Mbembe has argued, with some melodrama:

> A mass of structurally disenfranchised people have the feeling of being treated as "foreigners" on their own land. Convinced that the doors of opportunity are closing, they are asking for firmer demarcations between "citizens" (those who belong) and "foreigners" (those who must be excluded). They are convinced that as the doors of opportunity keep closing, those who won't be able to "get in" right now might be left out for generations to come – thus the social stampede, the rush to "get in" before it gets too late, the willingness to risk a fight because waiting is no longer a viable option (2015, np).

While Mbembe may begin to explain some of the causes of xenophobia in South African society, he neglects the xenophobic politics articulated and enacted not only by the 'disenfranchised masses', but also by 'social movements from above', which Neocosmos describes (2006a) and which were visible in Durban in April 2015 and in Operation Fiela (see above). In Grahamstown in October, this 'top-down' xenophobia was observable in the words of some municipal councillors who agreed that the foreigners should go or should at least have fewer shops in the township (O'Halloran 2015b). The politics of citizenship which motivated UPM and RPM members during the Grahamstown crisis was of shared political belonging, despite the oppression and exclusion—the poverty—which affected them.

Neocosmos (2006a) writes that xenophobia is 'a discourse and practice of exclusion from community'; furthermore, 'this process of exclusion is a political process' 'concerned with exclusion from citizenship [that] denotes a specific political relationship between state and society' (15-18). Historically, xenophobic politics have been strongly linked to colonial racism and to the manufacture of inequality still experienced in South Africa today. Xenophobia has been a politics of oppression and control of poor people and 'foreigners'— those who are deemed not to belong, who have most often been identified as Africans. The state, in its many forms from the colonial period through apartheid and into the post-1994 era, has actively participated in defining 'foreignness' in ways that exclude poor, black people.

Monopolies and business interests—beer, taxis, shops—have had a role in deciding who and what is 'foreign', in producing exclusion and in inciting violence. In the daily experiences of xenophobic mobilisations in Grahamstown, the spatial politics that are central to this thesis, which were clear historically, are bluntly manifested. In recent years, poor people have been mobilised against other poor people and Africans against other Africans in this project of exclusion, control, and oppression. It is part of Mamdani's argument that this sort of conflict among members of the oppressed working-classes has, in South Africa just before the end of apartheid, made clear urban-rural distinctions, as in violence in mining hostels in the Transvaal in 1990. Importantly, political parties, the apparatuses of indirect rule, and the rationalities of both were pivotal during that instance of urban-rural division (1996, Chapter 7). Similar modes of top down politics will be discussed in the next chapter.

Beginning to turn this discussion of citizenship and the xenophobic crisis of October towards the question behind this research, we can look to James Holston's distinction, developed in the study of urban settings in Brazil, between two modes of citizenship, 'entrenched' and 'insurgent' (2008, 6). The difference is another formulation of 'formal' citizenship and practical experience of differentiated citizenship set out in the introduction through Chatterjee's explanation of 'political society', with Holston's emphasis on the capability of those who lack access to formal rights to produce forms of political belonging or citizenship. The 'entrenched' form of citizenship considered here lends itself to exclusion. As Neocosmos writes, '[Xenophobia] is a consequence of an understanding of politics which presupposes boundaries and territories the other side of which is populated by others who do not possess the rights which we enjoy. It is therefore linked to the rise of the territorial state in Africa as this develops primarily with colonialism/apartheid and which is then consolidated in the post-colonial period' (2006a, 18). The spatial exclusion of the past, which entrenched a certain form of citizenship, is among the political precursors of contemporary modes of exclusion.

Forms of insurgent citizenship, Holston argues, are the outcome of 'democratic disjunctions' or politically enforced inequalities because of which 'insurgent citizenship disrupts established formulas of rule, conceptions of right, and hierarchies of social place and privilege' and 'erodes entrenched practices of domination and deference that gave the everyday its sense of order and security' (2008, 274). It is important that 'insurgency', in this usage, is political: the manufacture of citizenship, whether from above or below, can shift the political organisation of space. Indeed, the political history of the Grahamstown region from the

beginning of the colonial conquest through the end of apartheid represents one such process through multiple stages.

Julian Brown (2015) has applied this theory of insurgent citizenship to contemporary South Africa, arguing that in the political actions of many South Africans—acts and people that are often considered not political because they are not organised through formal state politics—the construction of new forms of citizenship not limited to the state conception is possible. Brown focuses largely on possibilities for political opening—that is, what is often termed 'emancipatory politics'—but rightfully acknowledges that closed and exclusionary politics are also possible. The example he provides of the latter are South Africa's increasingly common xenophobic attacks. The importance of state involvement in these politics, which Brown concedes, highlights Holston's point that 'entrenched' and 'insurgent' citizenship are 'entangled', and the latter can be implicated in the perpetuation of the former as 'a mechanism to distribute inequality' (2008, 7). This entanglement, concludes Holston, 'both corrodes the old regime and perverts the new' as insurgent citizenship can 'irrupt on the very foundations of the entrenched' and yet become 'bogged down by the past it inherits as well as confronts' (2008, 313). While our focus has been on the possibilities of more open politics, particularly in terms of space, it is a crucial observation that 'social movements from below' are sometimes about limiting politics, as well.

The 'inherited past' mingles colonialism with liberalism, and liberal modes of citizenship inflected with colonial concepts, especially of race, are key to this discussion. One useful conceptual distinction which Brown borrows from Engin Isin for the South African context is between 'activist citizens' and 'active citizens', in which the former contest the politics of the state while the latter contest the operation and efficacy of its institutions (2015, 61). 'Existing practices', Brown writes, 'may guide the ways in which these enactments occur, but they do not determine them. Political acts are creative: they enable new forms of identification to emerge. In the context provided by practises of citizenship as the basis of political agency, they enable new kinds of citizens to emerge' (2015, 61). This 'activist-active' distinction might be made in relation to UPM and RPM, and was even made to some extent by some of the members of the movements. As one RPM member explained,

> *The struggles in the towns they are noticed and people are listened to. Maybe it's because of how they demonstrate. They would even block roads, burn places, whereas in the rural areas we just complain but we do not burn things, thinking that we are saving ourselves [by] keeping peace, so it would be important to have that linkage [to struggles in town].* [Interpreter's translation].

Indeed, though this statement was not specifically about UPM, and many other urban struggles and social movements could be inserted as examples, UPM's approach to politics is often more confrontational than RPM's. They both participate in marches and petitioning, but UPM, especially in its early years, has burned tires and dumped buckets of human waste in government buildings, which RPM has not done. However, that is not meant to suggest that UPM are some kind of a renegade group or that RPM are not challenging the state in some ways. They both engage with the institutions of the (liberal) state: the municipality, the police, and the courts. Both movements can be recognised in what Brown depicts as 'disruptions of the political order [that] serve to provoke incremental and instrumental changes that open up spaces for new developments, for the potential redistribution of goods, power, and authority, and for an increasingly just social distribution' (2015, 62). In part because of this similarity, UPM and RPM are able to cooperate on many issues and to some extent it demonstrates a way in which politics is not immediately defined by the space in which people or a movement live and operate or by their location in urban or rural settings.

However, while Brown ultimately has faith in the ability of formal liberal institutions, and in particular of the law and courts, to effect change or to be changed under pressure from 'insurgent citizens' in order for a more just society to emerge, this does not altogether mesh with the ideas of many members of UPM and, to a lesser extent, RPM, despite the fact that they engage with those institutions at times. Many see these institutions, the state, and formal politics as sometimes tools and more often as adversaries (although sometimes both, simultaneously) in their struggles, but also as inherently broken. Brown is clear on these contradictions inherent in 'insurgent citizenship' and notes there are 'several strategies' available to activists and communities that include confrontation and engagement (2015, 116), sees the possible 'harnessing' of movements' disruptive political power by engagement with formal structures (2015, 125), but also views the formal avenues as necessary to the success of 'insurgent' forms of citizenship rather than fundamentally politically contingent. Assertions of political equality and agency are, in Brown's view, about exposing inequality in daily experience and in access to the formal arenas of citizenship (2015, 149). The 'new forms of identification' and 'new kinds of citizenship' of which Brown writes are asserted both in and out of liberal structures of citizenship, but the existence of those structures is not challenged. The 'opening of politics' or a more 'open' politics refers to the expanding of current modes of (liberal) citizenship applied to different or more people. The possibility that those structures might be altogether dismissed through the constitution of a different form or forms of

citizenship not dependent upon or defined through those institutions is not very seriously explored.

While practically, as the two social movements in question are currently constituted, there does not appear to be potential for self-removal out from the current state's authority and a reconstitution of authority in new political space as we have seen possible in Landau's analysis of pre-colonial politics, the 'interior horizons' of many UPM and RPM members certainly imagine a different dispensation than the current one and they are not invested in maintaining the structures they have to deal with in their struggles. For some examples (not without complexity and contradiction), UPM has demanded the dissolution of Makana Municipality, and RPM have been involved in challenging the existence of 'traditional authorities'. Neither movement is invested in the continuation of a particular mode of top-down political authority should it become 'more equal'. In the words, 'it will be us facing our experiences', is found a clear renunciation of forms of representation by or through others.

In spite of the daily differences of experience, and, indeed, also because of their similarities, members of UPM and RPM can assert that 'the struggles are the same'. They are 'bottom-up' and egalitarian. Far from 'utopian', their politics simply do not always rely on liberal definitions of citizenship and liberal modes of defining citizenship. They are assertions, perhaps hard to discern amidst the ubiquity of the state and its politics, of the current order's contingency and of a true 'open-endedness' that is the basis of Brown's argument, if made in the context of liberalism (2015, 163). It should be noted that forms of liberalism (linked, as ever, to forms of despotism) at work historically were important to defining people through race, tribe, and citizenship in ways that were increasingly spatialised.

The national student uprising and the outbreak of looting are undoubtedly a part of the longer narrative of political movements recounted through the first three chapters, and their place in South Africa's history deserves close attention. As Neocosmos has argued, the (now recurring) crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is a feature of the country's crisis of democracy (2006a), and the students categorically expressed their position that their struggle was an effort to hold the state accountable to its people and to have universities that are accessible to and function for the people of South Africa (Naicker 2015). Perhaps *urban* and *rural* space were not at stake in these events, but space certainly was, as well as citizenship, and race—in this case, with black or 'Arab' as referents. In Grahamstown, UPM members, so important in this research, worked hard during the crisis to quash the xenophobic rumours, to end the looting, and to provide needed supplies and support to the affected families. After members of UPM went

through the township distributing flyers with an anti-xenophobic message and speaking to residents, one UPM member said, 'We heard two things. We heard about the rumours [of the murderer being a foreigner], and we heard the frustration of unemployment.' While xenophobia is not a natural progression from poverty, we cannot divorce both frustrations from the politics of inequality and exclusion that have a long history in South Africa and Grahamstown, and which we have seen UPM and RPM working against. In Grahamstown, xenophobic politics affected most the people who live in the township, the space of exclusion.

These two mobilisations of October, one which seeks to democratise higher education in South Africa and has met with repression from universities[14] and the state and one which seeks to exclude through violence and is countered with activism driven by shared humanity, shared rights, and shared struggle is the backdrop not only for the conclusion of this research but for the immediate future of UPM and RPM, and of other social movements across South Africa. Although a different focus is necessary for concluding here, this political context now in the process of being reshaped and its significance for many of the concepts interrogated in this research must be acknowledged. With this in mind, we will turn once more to the question set out at the beginning: do the politics of social movements offer a critique of the notion of discrete urban and rural political spaces?

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[14] Except when they marched to EMC, Rhodes students did not have police deployed against them in October 2015 as students did in almost every protest across South Africa. They had encountered police earlier in the year, however, when an attempt was made to prevent BSM members from entering a meeting of the university Senate on 28 August.

CONCLUSION
'STILL MORE THINGS WE'RE SUPPOSED TO FIGHT'

'The elite will attach a fundamental importance to organization, so much so that the fetish of organization will often take precedence over a reasoned study of colonial society.' – Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth *([1961] 1963, 108)*

Closing an argument on space demands a return to its primary theorist, Lefebvre. Writing in the second half of the twentieth century, he observes, 'The state is consolidating on a world scale. It weighs down on society (on all societies) in full force; it plans and organizes society "rationally", with the help of knowledge and technology, imposing analogous, if not homologous, measures irrespective of political ideology, historical background, or the class origins of those in power' ([1974] 1991, 23). As a 'social movement from above', the state in Southern/Africa has undergone great shifts in its political organisation of space as indigenous political systems were usurped by processual colonial systems that produced apartheid and then the emergence of a liberal-democratic state in 1994. Throughout the period reviewed here, *urban* has been persistently separated 'from above' from *rural*. As Lefebvre continues, 'Space in its Hegelian form comes back into its own. This modern state promotes and imposes itself as a stable centre – definitively – of (national) societies and spaces' ([1974] 1991, 23).

The state conceived of as operating as a 'stable centre' imbued with the Hegelian relationship between domination and subservience is crucial to the argument here. The discussion[1] on engagement and confrontation with state institutions by social movements and the way in which citizenship politics can be 'entangled' brings to the fore perhaps the most significant point coming out of the interviews with UPM and RPM: the issue of 'social movements from above'. The specific movements which were repeatedly mentioned and explained in the interviews are political parties, which are organisations for the contestation and perpetuation of the state's politics, and NGOs, usually categorised within 'civil society', which, though not the state itself, is certainly within the ambit of state power and logic (Neocosmos 2006b). Political parties and NGOs emerged in the interviews as potentially (and often) divisive within and between social movements. This deserves close attention because of the historical processes of spatial and political division from above that transpired in the Grahamstown region.

We will begin with NGOs. The relationship between NGOs and social movements is first and foremost an unequal relationship. As many of the members of UPM and RPM explained,

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[1] See Chapters 4 and 5.

funding for their movements comes (or can come) almost entirely from NGOs, which often creates a situation in which social movements are dependent upon and subordinate to NGOs. As people also explained, this allows NGO agendas (which are likewise motivated by funding) to be pressed upon social movements. This is corroborated by Helliker, who writes, 'The historical evidence suggests very strongly that this interface [between NGOs and social movements] is marked broadly by movement subordination to the dictates of NGO dispositions and imperatives' (2013, 325). For an anecdotal example, we can look to the narrative outlined by one woman employed by an NGO working in the rural Eastern Cape: Her NGO was formed in the late 1970s in response to the crisis of education in the Eastern Cape, but after the change in government in the mid-1990s, overseas funding was no longer available for education work and the issues on which the NGO focused became food sovereignty and small-scale farming.[2] While this was also ostensibly a response to local need, the weight of funding in the shift of focus demonstrates the 'top-down' political imposition that can occur in NGO-social movement relationships in which funding determines how and for what people should or will be political. The difference in approach just mentioned between UPM and RPM may be traceable to their different relationships with NGOs: RPM is closely connected with Masifunde in Grahamstown, which perhaps limits their options in terms of how to protest—NGOs do not promote the burning of tires, etc. It is likely that the decision to be more engaged with formal institutions rather than confrontational is an aspect of relationships with NGOs, which operate within the sphere of those formal institutions rather than outside. The significance of this to space will be engaged shortly.

Helliker writes that NGOs 'occupy a contradictory and tension-riddled social space marked by pressures involving simultaneously upward and downward accountability, referring to global funders and local communities, respectively', and that, because of this, 'NGOs tend to suture their world and bring a simple coherence and logic to it, and normally in a manner which is consistent with the prevailing social order' (2013, 318). One (perhaps extreme) example occurred during the course of this research, when RPM members attended a national conference for rural movements organised by the Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE) in Port Elizabeth in September 2014. On the first day of the conference, movement members were asked to discuss their experience of encounters with the government, and one major problem that was cited was how movements were often expected, at government-convened meetings, to read through and endorse long documents that had not been

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[2] This was the only interview undertaken with an NGO employee during the course of this research.

distributed in advance for careful consideration. This was acknowledged by the NGO employees as a serious problem, but on the second day of the conference, a draft 'constitution' for a national rural mass movement was presented with the expectation that it could be discussed and decisions taken as a scheduled portion of the day's programme in spite of the fact that only the handful of people who had drafted the document had seen it before and there were not enough printed copies for everyone in the room.[3] The similarities to what was experienced by social movement activists as common government practises towards them are almost humourous, except that they demonstrate a marked lack of respect for the time and ideas of social movement activists. The likening made by one woman in UPM, who was at the conference, that NGOs 'are like municipalities', comes to mind. One RPM member who also attended this particular conference said, 'I assume, maybe you have seen that the views of the other people were mainly ignored' by the NGO staff. 'There is part of it', he went on, 'that is turning into sort of a meetings movement only—nothing practical. You'd find that mostly, the NGOs, that's what they do: there is a meeting, they write down a report, then that's it. They will get the funds for whatever next time'.

The connection between NGOs and state politics (not only state-like practises), is very important here. 'NGOs themselves are normally state-centred in their practices', writes Helliker, and continues,

> Additionally NGOs regularly reproduce their own kind of representative politics vis-à-vis their interactions with movements, in that they claim to act on behalf of (and sometimes at the behest of) grassroots communities and movements. For these reasons, movement can be 'sucked into' a representative-type of polices and demobilised as a result (2013, 319).

In a similar vein, Nigel Gibson's analysis of NGO-social movement relationships echoes some of the words of UPM and RPM members in that many of the relationships 'have led to the demobilization and fracturing of many of the movements and forums' (2006, 15).

Though I just characterised TCOE's botched attempt at listening to social movement members as 'extreme', the reality is that NGO connections to state politics can be much deeper and pointed and, at times, much more destructive of social movement politics 'from below'. While acknowledging that not all NGOs are bad, Gibson argues that 'the boom of NGOs over the past twenty years is a product of both state and market forces with many NGOs stemming indirectly from government' (2006, 21). The state and market forces in the period to which

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[3] Firsthand account

Gibson refers, the mid-1980s through early 2000s, were increasingly tied into a global, neo-liberal political economy, a trajectory and mode of politics which Gillian Hart has included among the factors producing the contemporary 'South African crisis' (2013). We will return to how the crisis extends beyond neo-liberalism momentarily.

In his exhaustive account of Haitian politics from the end of the Duvalier dictatorships in 1986 until the ruinous earthquake in 2010, *Damming the Flood* ([2007] 2010), Peter Hallward details the crushing impact of NGOs on 'bottom-up' political movements.[4] In Haiti, Hallward shows, the United States, Canada, and France had imperial interests in preserving low-wage manufacturing and textile export sectors that were directly threatened by the end of dictatorship and the democratic election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, an important figure in the grassroots political movement Fanmi Lavalas, who enjoyed the support of the huge majority of Haitian people, who were (and are) extremely impoverished. Although the United States eventually committed marines to Haiti in 2004 for the removal of Aristide and the conservation of the country for a tiny elite which shared American interests, NGOs played an enormous role in the containment of democratic politics and the neo-liberalisation of Haiti during the 1990s and early 2000s. 'NGOs', writes Hallward, 'provide rich countries a morally respectable way of subcontracting the sovereignty of the nations they exploit' ([2007] 2010, 179). Hallward cites the United States Agency for International Development on its own statistics, that in 2001 USAID and partners had 'almost 1,000 organizations with total membership exceeding 200,000 people' in Haiti—an example of NGO and governmental organisation links—which are at the forefront of the 'American plan' of neo-liberalisation of Haiti ([2010] 2007, 179). Not only do NGOs 'tend to disrupt and then disempower the lives of the people they are supposed to support', for instance, by taking people away from productive and necessary work in agriculture, to use Hallward's example which invokes *urban* and *rural* dichotomies, but 'the expansion of an inter-connected NGO sector serves to consolidate rather than challenge the hegemony of the cosmopolitan elite' to the point that 'NGOs now provide the main institutional and ideological mechanism for the reproduction of Haiti's ruling class' (Hallward [2007] 2010, 179-181). In Haiti, this included the discrediting and demobilising Haiti's largest popular political movement in a cogent example of Rancière's phrase used once here already: 'politics as the art of suppressing politics' ([1992] 1995, 10).

Haiti has experienced perhaps the most penetrative and vicious patterns of neo-liberal imperialism through impoverishment in the world, and certainly in the Western Hemisphere,

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[4] The period covered is almost exactly the same in which Gibson observes the burgeoning of NGOs.

although the lessons regarding NGOs and their close association with neo-liberal state politics and markets are valuable in other locales as well, not least in South Africa (Pithouse 2006, 256). Harri Englund has argued, in his study of NGOs in Malawi (2006), that NGOs, which are often closely linked to state politics, carry on patterns of paternalism that obtained during Malawi's colonial and post-independence periods. 'NGOs', Englund writes, 'exercise a form of self-control [on politics from below]. Their discourse is elitist, even though many of the self-proclaimed experts of freedom, democracy, and human rights do not belong to the elite' (2006, 20). However, the point is not only to make '[t]he key critique of NGOs' as 'elite organizations, funded by donors (local and international business, national and foreign governments)' that 'entrench existing paternalistic relations between the organization and the people' (Gibson 2006, 21-22), but to expose the ways in which NGOs practicing such politics are significant in the production of political space. As we saw in the interviews with UPM and RPM members, the idea of 'jurisdictions' as specifically associated with NGOs; and, through or because of NGOs, with social movements.

The tendencies of NGOs to replicate state thinking, to 'dictate' to social movements, and to work within 'jurisdictions' cannot be disassociated from each other and their combined results suggest two important insights. The first is that, in some contexts, NGOs can be important in the process of categorising people and politics as *urban* or *rural*. An RPM member used the word 'conserved' to explain the way in which movements' politics can be delimited 'from above'. For instance, land is considered to be part of the rural programme by many NGOs despite the assertion made by both rural and urban activists that 'we all need land', and the explicit centrality of land to such urban movements as Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban. The particular cases of UPM and RPM bring out another possible way in which NGOs are implicated in the production of urban and rural space. The thesis began with Mamdani's location of 'civil society' in the urban—a theory complicated by Chatterjee's work on urban spaces of the 'governed'[5]—and the historical chapters demonstrated how, under colonialism, *urban* areas projected a politics onto *rural* areas while dividing the two politically. The positioning of NGOs within 'civil society' suggests that NGOs are part of projecting urban, civil politics and power onto rural areas and people, to the extent that 'civil society' is not only to be found in urban areas but also demarcates urban areas. Working through state logic, NGOs can operate under and re-inscribe such notions of the 'civil' urban and the governable rural.

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[5] See Introduction.

The different relationships that UPM and RPM have with NGOs are potentially illustrative of just such a situation. UPM may be able to extricate themselves more easily from domination by NGOs because they live and work in an urban community that allows for the possibilities of a variety of different alliances to be formed. For UPM, some of these possible alliances are with academics, students, lawyers, journalists, trade unions, sports clubs, churches and religious leaders, and other community members. Because these are unregulated alliances based on personal interactions—and, in those ways, different from relationships with NGOs—they are more equal. Members of UPM can associate and work with people and on issues of their choosing, and disassociate with people as they see fit, which is fundamentally different from the relationships with NGOs described by movement members. Students and academics can offer access to internet, printing, and library resources; they can also assist with preparing statements or work as writers for the media. These relationships need only be preserved for as long as they work for the movement. Because the university brings visiting academics, there is also the opportunity for making countrywide and international connections. Sometimes these visitors are willing to offer support, and this has been the experience of UPM. There is also the opportunity for connections to other movements and other types of movements, for instance between UPM and BSM, or UPM and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, the Landless Workers Movement, (MST), in Brazil. Both UPM and RPM have been able to send members to MST events in Brazil—the second such exchange is currently happening, as of November 2015—but some MST members who are visiting South Africa are based in Grahamstown, and can be in regular interaction with UPM members. Links to Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban, which has thousands of members, also strengthen UPM's ability to negotiate a greater degree of autonomy from NGOs. Most important are the opportunities for connections and interactions with other members of the community. During the xenophobic crisis, for example, important relationships between some of the affected families and UPM were formed. Masifunde was also involved, but as a partner, not as a directing force. These relationships were possible because of the urban setting in which UPM works.

This is not dissimilar to Ealham's argument in his spatial study of repression and resistance in Barcelona, in which 'face-to-face contact' was an important factor in creating political urban communities, especially among the poor, many of whom had migrated to Barcelona from rural areas (2005, 25;86). Similar rural to urban migration has been a longstanding part of social experience in South Africa, often, though not in Grahamstown's case, because of

industrialisation.[6] One UPM member spoke about the recent proliferation of game farms in the nearby rural areas, which has forced people formerly living and working on commercial farms to move to towns, including Grahamstown, because now 'there are lions' and 'no one to talk to'. Amidst this increasing isolation of rural areas in the Fish River Country, RPM, though they still inhabit conventional farmland, do not have the same means of creating political alliances that are available, within walking distance, to UPM. We heard RPM members speak about how town-based movements have better access to and more attention from the media, and how modes of protest differ between urban and rural areas, with more confrontational protest possible in urban areas because it is not 'safe' in rural areas.[7] One UPM member said that manipulation by NGOs 'is worse for them', referring to RPM. The way in which UPM members were critical of RPM's inability to escape the influences of party politics, supported by the experiences of organising related by RPM members, also speaks to a continuing urban- and civil-society-projected politics working in rural areas.

This introduces the second important idea arising from the discussion of NGOs. Given NGOs' emergence out of and continued immersion in the modes of state politics, not least in their top-down functioning and rationalities, the state also appears as a divisive force. This is not a new idea. Indeed, it is the fundamental argument in Mamdani's *Citizen and Subject*, and we saw it enacted and enforced historically by the colonial state(s) in terms of an urban and rural division. Considering the problem historically, neo-liberalism does not present itself as the primary energy behind this division. Even if NGOs are an extrusion of neo-liberal policies, they are engaged in drawing new types of boundaries around old politics, or, perhaps, old boundaries through new politics. Hart thinks about the 'South African crisis' and 'the transition from apartheid in ways that go beyond narratives of "elite pacting" and neoliberalism', that look to 'the intertwining of race and nationalism in relation to histories of dispossession and accumulation' (2013, 21).

Race has formed a central facet of the history and politics presented here, taking into account more of dispossession than of accumulation, but nationalism has not been part of the narrative, as yet. While this is not the place to consider the history of African nationalism in the Grahamstown region, nationalism does influence the present in significant ways that were mentioned in the interviews with UPM and RPM members, particularly in terms of party politics and, most specifically, the ANC. The ANC was influential, though certainly not alone,

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[6] See Chapter 3.
[7] See Chapters 4 and 5.

among the political forces that combined to bring an end to apartheid, and it has been the ruling party since the transition to democracy. In spite of its significance during the struggle for racial democracy, the ANC has increasingly demonstrated an anti-democratic mode of rule, beginning most explicitly with the evictions of mostly poor, black shack-dwellers at Bredell near Johannesburg in 2001 (Hart 2013; Brown 2015), persistent in the violent repression of poor, black activists in Durban for over a decade (Pithouse 2014), continuing through the massacre of poor, black miners at Marikana in 2012, and visible, most recently, in the riot weaponry employed against mainly working-class, black students in 2015. As Richard Pithouse has written in regard to the political struggles of South Africa's urban poor, 'It was often assumed that the urban question would be automatically resolved by the success of the national struggle. With every day that people continue to make their lives amidst shit and fire, every eviction, every beating, every case of torture and every murder that assumption becomes ever more fantastical' (Pithouse 2013, np). Making a similar point in relation to rural areas, no less a figure than the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform linked political struggle, nationalism, and inequality when he remarked in 2013, 'It is inconceivable that after a century of struggle, and after 18 years of democracy, social relations in the countryside can continue to mirror the patterns of apartheid' (quoted in Helliker 2013, 317). As the history presented in this thesis has demonstrated, and has also been argued by Neocosmos (2006b), it is not accidental that the current state in South Africa employs modes of violent control in similar ways to the colonial states of the past, nor that these have spatial determinants.

An important thinker who theorises nationalism in colonial, transitional, and post-colonial contexts, who has remained close by throughout this argument and appears now once again, is Fanon. 'History teaches us clearly that the battle against colonialism does not run straight away along the lines of nationalism,' writes Fanon, and continues with his usual eloquence:

> National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been. The faults that we find in it are quite sufficient explanation of the facility with which, when dealing with young and independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state. These are the cracks in the edifice which show the process of retrogression […] ([1961] 1963, 148-149).

Arguments around how race and 'tribe' or ethnicity are being politicised in contemporary South Africa can and have been made, but the significant point here is that what are definitely categories wrought on the colonial forge, like race and tribe, are not dispelled by the transition

through nationalism to independence. As analysed in Chapter 1, in Souther/ern Africa and in the Grahamstown region of the Eastern Cape, what I have called the 'Fish River Country', the processes of defining these categories worked, in part but importantly, through spatial referents and politics. The historically important but contestable divide between *urban* and *rural* politics was drawn in these processes, and, if we accept Fanon's analysis, has the potential to be preserved or redrawn in nationalism.

In light of this, the frequent references by UPM and RPM members to political parties and specifically to the ANC as a dividing political force bear great weight. The party of national liberation (as opposed to the National Party of apartheid) appears as a major factor in the 'distrust' between urban and rural movements, much as Fanon argued it could in the course of the struggle for national liberation ([1961] 1963, 109; 117; 128). However, bearing in mind the post-independence context of South Africa, Fanon's arguments around the 'pitfalls [*mésaventures*] of national consciousness' in the post-colony are particularly useful. In this period, according to Fanon, the nationalist movement which has formed the state detaches itself from the people in the service of foreign capital, the party 'sinks into an extraordinary lethargy', it 'becomes an administration', and the unity, actual or professed, of the struggle years is broken in deepening reaffirmations of exclusionary politics, among which, notably, Fanon counts xenophobia: the 'foreigners are called on to leave, their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked' ([1961] 1963, 156-171). Such a crisis is readily apparent, and has been argued by many, to exist in South Africa today.

However, South Africa's political crisis does not only arise from nationalism, as we have seen. Michael Neocosmos (2006b) draws together the various issues at hand: the state, neoliberalism, nationalism, 'civil society', colonialism, and 'subaltern' or 'popular' politics. It is important in any discussion of South African politics to keep these elements in mind as interrelated, with multiple strata of contradiction and dependence. Race and space have their place in this political admixture, as well, based on the historical arguments here. In any case, to disregard the relationships among these strands of politics can quickly lead to an unconstructive reductionism.

Like Gramsci, Neocosmos stresses the links between the state and society, and particularly between the state and 'civil society'. He asks whether the violently oppressive nature of states in Africa and the 'human rights'[8] discourse that goes on in spite of it are not 'two sides of the same liberal coin' (2006b, 56). 'Both alternatives', argues Neocosmos, 'proposed by

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[8] See Englund (2006) on NGOs and paternalism.

power for Africa, namely neo-liberalism and state nationalism, are founded on liberal precepts and are fundamentally authoritarian' (2006b, 59). These forms of power are, in Africa, excretions of the colonial period in which contemporary imperial projects from Europe and North America find nourishment, as do the corruption, violence, patriarchy, xenophobia, and other exclusionary forms of politics that have frequently followed colonialism in the African context (Neocosmos 2006b, 56). Turning to the position of civil society in this political context, we saw that the rise of neo-liberalism coincided with the multiplication of NGOS. Neocosmos argues and shows how '[c]ivil society regularly excludes democratic politics from its domain, and it has largely come to contribute to the constructing of a state consensus, rather than' enabling democratic politics (2006b, 59). The conclusion reached by Neocosmos is that politics must be considered and applied, if democratisation of society is the objective, which do not work in the same modes as state and civil society thinking and are not limited to the politics of the state and civil society. Mamdani's argument, accepted throughout this thesis, is that this entails bridging the urban-rural divide.

Fanon centres the failure of the 'national bourgeoisie'. In South Africa, it can be argued that there is a liberal as well as a national bourgeoisie, since political legitimacy is, in many cases, dependent upon the ANC, the party of national liberation and now the ruling party, which has aligned itself with global neo-liberalism. 'A bourgeoisie', Fanon writes, 'that provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission' by not taking into account the consciousness, energies, and actions of the whole people ([1961] 1963, 204). This bears similarities to what one RPM member said about 'the old politics', the politics of contesting the state, that result in a 'hierarchical social structure' that in turn excludes people:

> *If you want to mobilise people, to organise a big massive movement, you know, for a mass struggle, then you should not impose things on people. Of course then, talking about consciousness—that people don't have political consciousness—I don't believe that. I think everyone is aware of what side of the class he or she belongs to. […] So if we were to look to the other way to do things—not to impose, but to work with the people—[and]not ignore [but use] the knowledge of the people.*

In these words he was talking about several things: about the play of 'the old politics' within social movements, about the influence of party politics on movements, and about the way in which NGOs and the state both treat the 'knowledge of the people […] who were not lucky enough to go to school'. These different influences and problems cannot be divorced from each other, but are intertwined. In an interesting story relayed to me, when UPM took a no-

vote or 'small party' (meaning not the ANC or DA) stance in the national elections in May 2014, the NGO Masifunde did not approve—a gesture that asserts the linkages between 'civil society' and the state. Whether this specific stance by Masifunde has any bearing on RPM's politics and the way in which RPM and UPM relate did not become clear, but certainly activists made plain that both NGOs and party politics were acting on the movements' relationship, and the link between them is not to be dismissed.

Fundamentally, the link is occasioned by ideas about society's organisation, which the one man from RPM portrayed just above as 'hierarchical'. The epigraph to this chapter, once again from Fanon, on the elite fetishising of organisation which precludes a 'reasoned study of colonial society' offers a way to meld the many strands of thought working here. What preceded the interrogation of UPM and RPM's politics had every intention of providing a 'reasoned study of colonial society', and what came out of that was an understanding that politicised space was of great conceptual and experiential significance during the colonial period and the particular effects of this are still experienced by many. The propensity for 'social movements from above' to organise the political terrain over which 'social movements from below' mobilise, spatially and in other ways, did not end with the colonial period and apartheid, an argument suggested by the understandings of UPM and RPM members regarding political parties and civil society NGOs. Indeed, the possibility of these movements 'from above' structuring society along the same fault lines that colonialism established is apparent. It should be noted that even UPM's and RPM's organisation as concretely defined movements begins to be affected by the problems of 'fetishised' organisation, especially in the case of RPM, which is patrolled more closely because of its NGO affiliation. Like all movements, though, they change with their context, as in the case of the xenophobic attacks during which the function and shape of the movements was altered in response to the crisis. They were able to organise differently—'outside' or 'beyond'—the specific categories developed in and encouraged through entrenched colonial and national politics of race, space, and citizenship.

In terms of our driving question, what is clear is that space acts on UPM and RPM in several different ways, or that they occupy several types of political spaces produced through different modes of politics. UPM has inherited a partitioned town in which space is divided in terms of race and class and politicised by those referents. RPM struggle against the undemocratic tendencies of 'rural democracy'. In many ways, they exemplify Chatterjee's 'political society', which is conceived of as governed politically rather than as participating in politics. Yet, UPM, like political actors of Grahamstown's past with whom they share similar situations, engage with the formal political structures and civil society. There is not an unbridgeable gulf between

UPM and those structures. The same is true of RPM, who inhabit, perhaps, a more complex political spatial geography. Though rural in the historically produced and politicised sense of the term, they also have some access to the same structures of formal state politics; they are also affiliated with an NGO, and thus in close association to 'urban' 'civil society', which is therefore not precisely and exclusively urban as Mamdani has argued. We have seen the same sort of ambiguity present in urban areas and urban politics, as well.[9] At the same time, RPM as an organisation crosses spaces that are under municipal authority and traditional authority, and members live on land that was historically both commercially farmed and part of the Ciskei Bantustan. As one member explained it:

> *From the people who lived on farms under white people back then, the government put them closer to the chief, and then the chief does enforce its rule or impose its rules upon the people. The main contradiction is that the chief is supposed to help to develop the people.*

On account of this, RPM's politics considers and engages with both structures in the complex project of 'rural democracy'. Still, some RPM members can speak of themselves as 'remote' from towns and urban politics, where struggles are able to gain more attention, purchase, and momentum.

The first conclusion to be drawn from this sketch of UPM's and RPM's spatial politics is that Mamdani's bifurcation is an incomplete interpretation of the South African political landscape, at least in the Grahamstown region of the Eastern Cape. Even when one considers how these social movements engage with the state—whether the state refers to 'civil society' institutions or the 'traditional' authorities—they do not engage exclusively with one or the other, and particularly RPM, though UPM has supported them in issues of 'rural democracy', as well. Therefore, even in a state-centred approach via social movements, the critique of Mamdani as state-centric can be upheld when one considers the political life of ostensibly 'urban' and 'rural' South Africans involved in social movements. This sort of political relationship seems to be explainable through Brown's tracing of social movements in their interactions with civil society, or in Tarrow, who writes about how the 'potential disruption' by movements 'led national states to […] open new forms of participation to their citizens' (1994, 76). However, this leads to the question of whether 'bottom-up' cannot also be an expression of 'top-down' in different guise.

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[9] See Introduction.

A second conclusion, which is of great significance to understanding the politics of the social movements in South Africa today, is the role of NGOs in producing different types of political space working through spatial divisions between *urban* and *rural*. Given the frequent links between social movements and NGOs, the delimitation of politics and of political spaces by NGOs in ways that show continuity with oppressive politics of the past and the present should be taken seriously.

What can be certain is that the political landscape produced through 'social movements from above' is more complicated than bifurcation would suggest. If nothing else, social movement politics have demonstrated that. Still, the purpose was to examine social movements as outside of the state, and while it has arisen that indeed many social movements not only of the 'from above' variety but also 'from below' are not fundamentally challenging the state but are acceding to the form of its politics, and while the two movements in question sometimes fall among these, there are other times when UPM and RPM are acting outside of the formal political arena. The xenophobic attacks in Grahamstown described above have demonstrated this. Even while they petitioned the municipality for assistance, UPM[10] were mobilising in the community on their own terms and around a different understanding of politics than that with which, based on their actions, the municipality and police was operating.

So far, this analysis has largely accounted for the 'practical scope' of these social movements, and situated them within the region's political history. In turning back to the 'interior horizons', it is valuable to look to Aguilar once again. She writes, 'collective emancipatory action and its deep transformation of social, economic, and political relationships *needs to be considered from a separate and distinct channel* from the political struggle for government and state control' because these two types of politics 'move at different speeds and through different paths' (2014, xxxvii; emphasis original). Although they are 'separate and independent of one another', 'each exists in relation to the other because together they define political realty at a given place and time' (2014, xxxvii). They are 'entangled', to relate to Holston's argument, above. Therefore, despite what appears to be the continuation of an epistemic and political division between urban and rural space, legitimated in different 'social movements from above' and often acceded to even by the 'social movements from below' that sometimes challenge them and sometimes work with them, we cannot discount what happens in those times when

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[10] RPM were involved in seeking a political solution to the crisis on the first morning, but later transportation proved to be an obstacle to their participation.

rupture occurs. Because of the massive student strikes, October 2015 was a time of rupture in South Africa, and possibly part of a longer and harder to define period of rupture. The experience of active xenophobic politics during the same time denotes a rupture in the particular case of Grahamstown, as well, including for the social movements in question who defined for themselves a role based on a different politics, even if the day to day or month to month experience and practise of those social movements does not constitute a rupture.

But those moments of actual rupture when collective action produces politics require and substantiate the existence of interior political horizons. Therein is found the dialectic of action and reflection already discussed.[11] On the interior horizon of these movements the idea of discrete urban and rural political spaces might not exist, or, at least, might not define politics. Indeed, the words of some activists suggest that an effort must be made to move beyond those spaces, but that this movement is limited by various political forces that repartition urban politics and rural politics without including the politics of all the people this affects, once again operating through and enforcing exclusion of some from the 'legitimate' realm of politics. Fanon wrote of 'cracks' which widen to divide people politically, while we heard from one activist[12] of 'cracks' which could be traced in order to unite people 'across the whole world if we were able to use' the spaces of the people. What exactly those spaces of the people are or can be is uncertain, and no attempt to guess will be made, for they require the practise of politics by living people if they are to be worked out. However, they would certainly appear differently on a map than the spaces which have been organised through many years by colonialism and capital, each in diverse forms, which have orchestrated the present divisions.

We saw in Landau (2010)[13] the definite possibility of ordinary people defining political spaces for themselves. We have also seen a long history of people challenging various movements from 'above', and there are people who continue to contest such politics. Members of UPM and RPM are clear that they do not accept that the world of their experience is the only way in which the world can be organised or that the current dominant politics is the only politics. The essence of this alternative politics is perhaps apprehended in an assertion that rings true in the recent experience of social movements during the xenophobic violence, 'Every challenge you get into, it makes you different […]. Every challenge brings different organisation […]. The ideas change all the time. Even the idea of today, even [tomorrow] it can change, even if it was a good idea'.

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[11] See Second Excursus.
[12] See Chapter 4.
[13] See Chapter 1.

Perhaps the plot of this argument has progressed since we first saw the phrase 'the burden of protest'—that is the hope, anyway—or maybe it has not; but it appears that, given the momentary nature of politics and experience and the way in which history works in and out of the politics of the moment, no conclusion can go further than agreement, lent legitimacy through the words of activists, that protest must span urban and rural space. In the words of one man, the man who lives the eThembeni shack settlement in Grahamstown, who says that he and many are still suffering, who detects no freedom in his and others' experiences despite the advent of democracy, who sees all the excluded involved in one struggle, the importance of social movements of the people is that 'they try to show that there are still more things we're supposed to fight.' In fighting, it is possible that new configurations of political space could be conceptualised and organised, through modes of politics that are different than the modes that produced and produce divided spaces, different than those which emplace cordons of police between the spaces of rights and of control.

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