

**PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT PROVENTION IN
AFRICA**

BY

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DECLARATION

In accordance with Rule G5.6.3, I hereby declare that this treatise, titled *Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Provention in Africa*, is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment to another university or for another qualification.



Mandela. S

Date

April 2017

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late parents, Nosipho Loretta and Boy Livingstone Mandela, both of whom have been pillars of strength and played a critical role in bringing me into this universe. I also wish to dedicate it to my late grandfather, Nelson Mandela, as his role in the South African transition from apartheid to a democratic regime inspired me to take this career path.

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ABSTRACT

South Africa's participation in international peace missions is guided by the White Paper of 1998 and premised specifically on the country's foreign policy objectives based on its vision of "a better South Africa, a better Africa and a better world". South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore sees its national interests as being intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity and prosperity. Since 1994, South Africa has placed itself at the forefront of Africa's peace and security endeavours, trying to transform itself from international villain during apartheid years to Pan-Africanist peacemaker. The country has played an instrumental role in both shaping and setting the normative agenda of the African Union and Southern African Development Community. South Africa's participation in conflict resolution and peace missions in Africa is informed by an understanding of the nexus that exists between peace, security and sustainable development. This research focuses on South Africa's diplomatic and peacekeeping engagement in Lesotho, covering the constitutional and electoral crises from 1994 - 2015 constitutional crisis. The author shows the importance and way forward to resolve conflicts before they become escalated and deadly. The study calls for a 'timely' reaction to disputes and conflicts on the African continent via preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and addressing of underlying issues that give rise to disputes and conflict.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD	-	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
BCP	-	Basotho Congress Party
BNP	-	Basotho National Party
CAR	-	Central African Republic
DIRCO	-	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	-	European Union
EUFOR	-	European Union Force
FPTP	-	First Past the Post
IFOR	-	Implementation Force
IPA	-	Interim Political Authority
JBCC	-	Joint Bilateral Commission of Co-Operation
LCD	-	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LCP	-	Lesotho Congress Party
LPP	-	Lesotho People's Party
MMP	-	Mix Member Proportional System
MTFP	-	Marematlou Freedom Party
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	-	New Partnership for African Development
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity

PR	-	Proportional Representation
SADC	-	South African Development Community
SANDF	-	South African National Defence Force
SFOR	-	Stabilization Force
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
UNPROFOR	-	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
USA	-	United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY

The nature of this study places it in the domain of International Relations (IR) and Conflict Transformation and Management, as it is concerned with how preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention can be used by the South African government as a foreign policy tool in mediating conflict in Africa. My primary interest stems from what I have observed as the rise of the post-apartheid South African government's foreign policy approach, specifically in the management of African conflicts. I will argue that preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention can combine the efficiency of conflict management and other related matters of any government's foreign policy. If this is done well, South Africa may serve as an example on the African continent and in the world.

Brown (2005) postulates that International Relations (upper case), is the academic study of international relations (lower case), which are cross-border transactions of all kinds, that is economic, political, social and other. The purpose of this research firmly places it within a certain terrain of IR, known as Foreign Policy and Security Studies. Most textbooks offer a similar definition of foreign policy, that of foreign policy being a "strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing"(quiet diplomacy), (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2012:15).

There is extensive domestic and international literature on South Africa's role in conflict management and mediation in Africa since 1994. This research will examine the South African Government's role, capacity and record in conflict resolution in Africa. This study will focus on the preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as models for mediation and resolution of conflicts in Africa, aiming to achieve, or at least help, countries to stabilize and start working on sustainable peace and security. Conflict prevention is hardly ever discussed or used in this context and that is what makes this study important and different. Thus, this research will attempt to enhance the current literature aimed at shaping a rational approach to dealing with conflict

management issues in Africa, and offer recommendations for future engagements. Furthermore, in this study the researcher must be mindful of the scope of the research. I will specifically focus on the South African Government's preventive diplomacy in Lesotho to illustrate the arguments discussed and the way forward as proposed by this research.

1.2 BACKGROUND

As a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country, South Africa embraces the concept of Ubuntu as a way of defining who we are and how we relate to others. The philosophy of Ubuntu has played a major role in forging a South African national consciousness in the process of its democratic transformation and nation-building. Understandably, since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing human rights, democracy and reconciliation in the region and on the African continent. According to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's (DIRCO) annual report of 2010, the South African Government has risen to the challenges and is playing a meaningful role in the region, the continent and globally. Notably, efforts have been made by the government in conjunction with various African institutions and leaders to address the on-going challenges on the continent, resulting in increased calls for the South African Government's contributions in Africa (Shillinger, 2009:42).

For that reason, this synopsis assumes that creation of peace and stability through preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention is becoming vital in preventing conflict before it becomes violent and destructive. Some authors assert that on the continental level, one of the challenges facing Africa is that the international community appears intent on trying to wash its hands of large-scale multilateral involvement in Africa's instability and conflict (Peck, 2005:562). Serious questions have been raised regarding the capacity of the African Union (AU) and other bodies to respond to African challenges by actually preventing, managing and resolving conflict.

Peace is vital and of utmost importance in creating stability and development on a continent where many countries have not enjoyed peace for many years. As Thabo Mbeki stated in his address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in

2007, “without peace and stability, Africa may not be able to achieve harmony and the dream of a New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) for sustainable development”. In the same light, in an address to the National Assembly on 17 March 2016, the South African President, Jacob Zuma, postulated that:

The fundamental tenet of our country’s foreign policy is to contribute to building a better Africa that is strong and growing economically, that is stable and at peace with itself... Since the advent of democracy we have worked tirelessly with our sister countries to bring about peace, stability, democracy and development to the African continent. We have been involved in every major initiative to bring about peace, stability and economic development on the continent. Economic diplomacy is an important instrument that we use to pursue our foreign policy goal of building a better Africa in a better world. Critical to our economic diplomatic efforts has been the strengthening of bilateral relations with most countries on the African continent... South Africa’s future remains inextricably linked to the future of its neighbors in the region as well as that of the entire continent of Africa. The growth of our economy, the creation of jobs for our people and our prosperity hinge on the success of these efforts to build a peaceful, stable and prosperous continent.

Additionally, according to the new South African Government’s Foreign Policy White Paper (2012:17), the country has realized that it must play a meaningful, influential and leadership role in an attempt to create peace and stability by mediating current and future conflicts, something that will be of assistance to the AU. Therefore, there cannot be stability in South Africa without the stability of the SADC as a region in particular and without the stability of the African continent in general. In other words, stability in the region and the African continent remains a critical prerequisite for stability and prosperity in South Africa.

Some authors suggest that former Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, were the proponents of the African Renaissance that was based on the promotion of peace, security and the endorsement of sustainable development on the African continent. Using a few cases drawn from publications whose main concerns were not South African foreign policy, the literature emphasizes the unrelenting expectations of involvement and of the reasons why the South African Government, within the context of regional actors, has to be diplomatically involved in mediating African conflicts. This is equally informed by chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, whereby AU policies and sub-regional mechanisms are encouraged to manage and

mediate conflicts in any particular region (Peck, 2005: 562). Although the African Union (AU) seems to be committed, it is clear that it has accepted that South Africa is seen and accepted as one of the main mediators in conflicts since it pursues policy via compliance with international law (Carlsnaes & Nel, 2006: 40). One could also argue the fact that Thabo Mbeki is the AU's leading mediator of conflicts in Africa, showing the reliance on South Africa and its capacity. However, South Africa's capacity to perform these tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a mediator on a number of fronts, remains a challenge.

This study will examine if preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention could be used as an effective foreign policy tool by South Africa in mediating African conflicts. The research will give an overview of the state of affairs and the South African Government's use of preventive diplomacy. The research will also assess the country's capacity to engage in this and recommend how to improve the capacity and practices in the future. This will be critically assessed while looking at South Africa's role, engagement and effectiveness in Lesotho in the 1990s and most recently in 2015.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE INTENDED RESEARCH AREA

Substantial and well-developed literature exists, which covers theories and also focuses on diplomacy, foreign policy, conflict management and mediation issues in Africa. Many scholars have ventured on these topics focusing primarily on theories. However, as mentioned before, in the views of the current writer not enough literature is available that examines whether preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention is a viable model for South Africa's mediation of conflicts in Africa. Existing information on this topic is sparse, with less than a handful of empirical studies focusing on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention within a regional context.

Scholarly literature and popular media has focused on numerous factors that may influence attitudes towards the preventive diplomacy as a model for mediation of conflict in Africa. This research is of the notion that more research and study needs to be undertaken concerning the nature of the South African Government's use of preventive diplomacy, looking at approaches, practices, successes and challenges.

This research will use South Africa's engagement in Lesotho as a case study and will cover the constitutional and electoral crises from 1994-2002 and the 2015 constitutional crisis (see appendix 1 for the chronology of key events in the history of Lesotho since the 1820s). The study will focus on documenting and describing preventive diplomacy as a tool for Africa and the South African Government's role in it, so as to recommend strategies to advance peace in Africa. In this research I will only conduct literature and discourse analysis and not field research.

1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The study will stem from the premise that in spite of the notion of African solutions for African problems, there is no substantial progress regarding timely mediation of conflicts in Africa. Although there have been democratic gains in some parts of Africa and relatively peaceful settlements in Burundi, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Ivory Coast, these remain fragile.

The study will argue for a 'timely' reaction to disputes and conflicts via preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. The writer will show the importance and way forward to resolve conflicts before they become escalated and deadly. The question however, is: does South Africa have the capacity, interest and willingness to engage in the SADC and Africa as a whole, to help prevent disputes from escalating into full-blown protracted conflicts? Also, although there is extensive domestic and international literature on South Africa's international mediation efforts, there is a need to understand and further conceptualise preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a viable model in mediation and prevention of conflicts in Africa.

1.5 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH

Subsequent to the above statement, my intention is to explore the South African Government's preventive diplomacy interventions in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In this research I will endeavour to analyse and address the gaps for a universal hybrid approach on the African continent. Furthermore, as I have mentioned before, there is extensive domestic and international literature on South Africa's mediation successes and failures. The primary aim of this research is to focus on the significance and need for

understanding preventive diplomacy in mediation of conflicts in Africa, aimed at the achievement of sustainable peace and security.

Sustainable peace cannot be achieved unless the underlying issues that give rise to conflict are addressed. The study will thus argue that preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention could be used as a foreign policy tool by the South African government in the mediation of conflict in Africa. The second objective is to enhance the current literature aimed at shaping a rational approach to dealing with the challenges on the continent. It is also designed to be instrumental in assisting African leaders and policy makers to make use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention in the quest to find lasting solutions to African conflicts. As such, the primary contribution of this study is to demonstrate the significance of the role played by South Africa in the SADC and Africa.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary aim of this research is to study South Africa's use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a model for mediating conflict in Africa. To achieve the research objectives the following questions have been formulated:

- What is South Africa's role and record as a mediator of disputes and conflicts in the SADC and Africa?
- How did South Africa use preventive diplomacy to mediate disputes and conflict in Lesotho and what were its successes, challenges and shortcomings?
- Is conflict prevention - as opposed to prevention alone - an answer for future engagements in conflict cases such as Lesotho?

1.7 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Africa requires a rallying point from which to integrate and mobilize resources in order to create sustainable peace and stability on a continent that is characterized by chronic conflicts and underdevelopment. This could be achieved through timely regional interventions into conflicts. The main objective of the study is to analyse South Africa's use of preventive diplomacy and to understand the challenges and prospects for the future use of this approach to conflict prevention. Another objective

is to understand the lessons learned from South Africa's engagement in Lesotho and how these lessons can improve the country's future engagement in mediation and prevention of disputes and conflicts in Africa. The study also intends to advance an argument for conflict prevention as a foreign policy tool for South Africa and as an alternative approach for the mediation of conflict in Africa.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The relevance of this study is to assist in moulding a robust foreign policy tool to be used by the South African Government when mediating in African conflicts. The study will argue that timely use of preventive diplomacy could help forge peace and stability on a continent currently characterized by instability and underdevelopment.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The issues of financial constraints and travelling were not relevant to the study because it was conducted as a desktop research. However, literature on the specific topic may be limited, which therefore means that finding material might prove challenging at times. A more detailed focus on the limitation confronted during the course of this research project will be discussed in chapter six.

1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.10.1 Research Approach

This research is based on the Critical Social Science Approach (CSSA). According to Neumann (2006:94), the CSSA is an approach in social research that places emphasis on addressing surface level distortions, multiple levels of reality and value based activism for human empowerment. A research methodology that is appropriate for this study is a qualitative design. This study will further adopt a case study as part of the research design. This study's focus will be on Lesotho in relation to South Africa's involvement and role in conflict resolution in the country.

1.10.2 Research Design

This study consists of qualitative research and analysis. The methodology used in this research is based on descriptive empirical data from the case study applied to

South Africa's use of preventive diplomacy as a model for mediation of conflict in Africa, using the scientific and methodological problems related to the investigation. However, it should be noted from the outset that this study is not based on fieldwork or questionnaires. The study seeks to propose the use of a hybrid approach - the use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a model for the mediation of African conflict using the case of South Africa's involvement in Lesotho as a unit of analysis. The research design appropriate for this study is a case study and is based on the study of existing literature, which therefore means that it is a literature review and content analysis / desktop research (Neuman, 2006:161).

1.10.3 Level of Analysis

The study will use Lesotho in the context of Southern Africa in particular and Africa in general as a level of analysis. In academic terms the level of analysis is called a meso, as it is neither national nor global but in-between (Babbie and Mouton, 2005:84).

1.10.4 Time Dimension

The study will focus on the role played by South Africa in peace processes in Lesotho from 1994 - 2015, specifically looking at the use of preventive diplomacy. The rationale behind choosing the years 1994 to date is that it will allow the study to capture the most recent developments in the region and of academic analyses over the last two decades.

1.10.5 Data Collection

The study is descriptive in nature and a review of literature on the use of preventive diplomacy as a tool in mediating African conflicts by the South African Government. Data collected through secondary sources will serve to answer the research questions. An attempt was made to read and analyze literature that is relevant to this study and research problem.

1.10.6 Sampling, validity and reliability of the study

Qualitative researchers prefer terms such as credibility, authenticity and accuracy of the study instead of terms like validity and reliability, which are used mainly by

positivist researchers. To ensure credibility of the research, qualitative studies provide detailed information about data collection and analysis, support the findings by other studies and use triangulation (Sarantakos 2005:86). Triangulation is achieved through comparing and contrasting multiple sources of data to enhance the accuracy and quality of the research process and findings (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006:66). As the study is not based on fieldwork or questionnaires, no particular sampling technique will be used. The study will still employ a purposive sampling approach when it comes to the selection of material to read and review – focusing on materials that are relevant for the study. The study will aim to achieve validity and reliability based on the quality and variety of the content analyzed in order to ensure that the research remains objective.

1.10.8 Outline of the chapters

- **Chapter one: General Introduction of the study**

The chapter provided the introduction of the study; outline the research problem, questions, aims, objectives, significance and limitations of the study.

- **Chapter two: Theoretical framework and literature review**

This chapter will outline the critical concepts that are linked to the study. The nucleus of this chapter is the theoretical underpinning of the study coupled with the literature review. The literature review then becomes the integral part of the study as it offers an outline of the sources utilized while conducting this research. The nucleus of this chapter will be the preventive diplomacy and its use as a foreign policy tool in general terms as well as more specifically by the South African Government

- **Chapter three: Research methodology**

This chapter will discuss the methodology used in the study.

- **Chapter four: The case study of Lesotho**

An in-depth background review of South Africa's use of preventive diplomacy as an approach to mediate African conflict, using Lesotho as a case study. A

detailed overview of the conflict in Lesotho and South Africa's role in mediating this conflict will be provided in this chapter.

- **Chapter five: Conflict Provention**

A detailed discussion of Conflict provention as an approach will be offered in this chapter. A hybrid approach to African conflict will be critically evaluated and a proposal will be made that this approach be used as a foreign policy tool with the potential to attain sustainable peace and development in the SADC region and Africa in general.

- **Chapter 6: Key findings, conclusion and recommendations**

This chapter will provide an analysis of the data presented in chapters three and four and present findings that deal with the research questions proposed in chapter one. This chapter will also offer an overall conclusion and recommendations and will culminate in recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The world has had conflict as far back as people can remember. Conflict exists at even the smallest unit, which is between two individuals. In fact some philosophers, such as Aristotle in the *Treaty of Man*, argue that even individuals are in conflict with themselves, about issues of morality and ethics. Conflict, whether personal, interpersonal or societal has claimed incalculable human lives. Conflict, however, has also become the corner stone of human development to a certain degree.

This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will give a general conceptualisation of conflict. This section will define conflict from different sociological approaches and offer a rational justification for the argument that conflict is not only destructive but has developmental elements to it. In other words, this section endeavours to lay a solid foundation for the approaches that this paper seeks to propose, which is a hybrid approach to the management of conflict through preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. In so doing, this section will discuss the approach that sees social conflict as a product of social structure, the approach that perceives conflict as a dysfunctional process in social systems, and lastly the school of thought that perceives conflict as functional.

The second section of this chapter will discuss the conflict resolution approaches that are related to the approaches adopted by this study. These approaches will lay a foundation for the approach that this study seeks to propose, which is the hybrid approach to the management of conflict through preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. Also South Africa's role in conflict resolution in Africa will find expression in this chapter.

2.2 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

2.2.1 Conceptualisation of conflict

Conflict ranges from interpersonal conflict to societal conflict and in its most minimal form, can be understood as the irreconcilable difference of opinion or position by two people. For example, if two individuals argue whether the world was created by a God or if evolution is responsible for the world we see today, the two different points of view are an indication of conflict that exists between the two different ideologies of the two individuals who are talking about the same object, which is Earth. At its most extreme form, conflict manifests itself in the form of war, where differences can only be settled by eliminating your opponent so that his point of view does not even exist in the world. This point of view is mostly associated with Carl von Clausewitz, who in his book, *Vom Kriege* (On War), proclaimed that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' (1976:29).

Conflict is therefore understood as the systematic tendency to value the concerns of some groups or individuals more than those of others. In such situations, conflict management becomes a tool of the privileged, used to maintain their privileged positions, leaving the less-favoured the unsettling choice between acquiescence and costly, often destructive action (de Waal, 1989; Ross, 1993:1). However, this reveals that conflict is often the result of divergent interests. In particular, the above statements reveals that conflict has a starting point and an ending point, meaning that it can be measured, controlled or manipulated. The outbreak of conflict and subsequently its ending is, therefore, political.

According to Ross (1993:1), conflict arises from a disagreement about control or use of a valued object such as land. Such conflict can result in quiescent acceptance or it may unleash the unilateral use of force, intense negotiation, a meeting involving many members of the disputants' community, or action by administrative, political or judicial authorities. In fact, Ross concludes that "conflicts are about the concrete interests that adversaries pursue, as well as their interpretations of the motives of opponents."

The middle ground of conflict, (in reference to the minimum and extreme in the previous paragraphs), is known as class conflict. If we are to discuss the sociological approaches to the study of social conflict, and specifically focus on the approach that perceives conflict as the product of social structure, then using class conflict becomes the most obvious way. The class struggle is well documented in literature and is the economic analysis of how society is organized. The class conflict debate stems from the view that individuals belong to particular groups in society that collectively form the closed-knit society that controls access and membership based on particular attributes. In summary, those who have wealth have a tendency to want to keep their wealth and build barriers that will ensure that they keep their wealth and that others don't gain access to it. A classic example of this is the trade barriers and patents that rich countries have on products to ensure that only they benefit from that product at a reduced price. The other side of the coin is those who do not have material wealth, like the third world countries. They are forced to work harder and pay more for the same products that the rich countries have and enjoy. The common words used for this analysis is the 'haves and have nots'. The ones who don't have wealth tend to band together to find strength in numbers. Usually in a society this is most obvious when workers negotiate for salary increases, (like the miners in Lonmin mine in the North West province). Class solidarity becomes a common identity and choices of who to marry or what is fashionable is usually measured and followed along these class lines. Class conflict, therefore, defines political societies, and the most important thing to note is that it is permanent.

According to Stagner (1967) as cited by Mitchell, (1981:15), conflict management is defined as a "situation in which two or more human beings desire goals that they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. This compact definition can be opened out and clarified by saying there must be at least two parties, each of whom is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation. Each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal". It should be noted that the focal point of Mitchell's definition is the clash between two parties over the desired goal, which is relevant to the discussion between two writers mentioned in the above definitions. When the two parties' interests are managed through the process of consensus and compromised, then we start to enter the field of conflict management. Currently, the state is the main actor when it comes to

conflict management, even though many other actors exist at the local level, like community forums, local chiefs and family units, but they are all under the umbrella of the state.

In addition, according to Rhodie (1991:21) as cited by Bradshaw (2008:16), "Social conflict normally occurs where groups of people compete for scarce resources". Understandably, this definition reveals that social conflict is centred in competition over scarce resources in society. Therefore, to a large extent, it can be said that social conflict can arise from competition within the society. In a similar approach, Pruitt and Rubin (1986:14) as cited by Bradshaw (2008:16), state that "conflict means perceived divergence of interests or a belief that the parties' current aspiration cannot be achieved simultaneously."

2.2.2 The Positive Role of Social Conflict in Society or Conflict as Functional

Conflict can be viewed in a positive perspective and can also be the engine of development and transformation in society. Mitchell argues that "it is also open to doubt whether a conflict free society would genuinely be Utopian" (1981:8). By mentioning 'Utopia' the writer means to have an imaginary society that has a perfect social and political structure or system. However, by the phrase "genuinely be Utopian" the writer gives us a different perspective that society cannot function properly without conflict. Therefore, it is clear that the kind of conflict that Mitchell refers to is positive conflict in society.

Similarly, Robert Lee (1964:3) remarks that "social conflict is a likely quest wherever human beings set up forms of social organization. It would be difficult to conceive of an on-going society where social conflict is absent. The society without conflict is a dead society... like it or not, conflict is a reality of human existence and therefore a means of understanding social behaviour..." The aforesaid authors seem to follow the same pattern and belief of the fact that social conflict is the engine of growth and development in society. It is clear that to some extent, after a conflict in society, social change and development takes place. Therefore, in this sense conflict might be the learning platform for both parties that are in conflict.

In a similar approach, proponents of the functionalist school of thought, in attempting to illustrate the contrasting perspectives of the dysfunctionalist school of thought on social conflict, write that partisans of countries relatively satisfied with the status quo are likely to view international war as reprehensible: they would not accept the legitimacy of a “just war” or a “war of national liberation”. Even taking a system perspective does not mean that one must regard conflict as harmful and evil (Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1955; Sumner, 1952; Kriesberg, 1973:3). Thus, to cement this argument, many people believe that properly institutionalized conflict is an effective vehicle for discovering truth, attaining justice, and for the long-term benefit of society as a whole.

According to Bradshaw (2008:15), conflict is very important in a positive sense, in that it challenges us with contradictions that need to be solved... we are always stimulated to do something about conflict – to resolve the problem, or to make the discomfort go away. In this sense, conflict can be seen as the engine of social evolution, pushing us onward, and provoking us to find new ways of organizing and producing. It is clear that social conflict can act as an agent of rejuvenation in an environment to make society start producing again. The author mentions quite an interesting point about social conflict being a stimulus in society that stimulates people to produce in terms of inventing new ways of approaching and developing society for the creation of a better environment for all.

This perspective creates the image of the positive impact of conflict in society, that it creates an opportunity for an environment to change, and grants the inhabitants the opportunity for security, justice, and human development. The writer emphasizes the fact that society without conflict is dead and lacks the opportunities to produce and develop, (Robert Lee, 1964:3 as cited by Mitchell, 1981:8). Similarly, according to Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus (2006:402), "one of the creative functions of conflict resides in its ability to arouse motivation to solve a problem that might otherwise go unattended". In this sense, in a society without conflict, the underlying issues between inhabitants, if be left unattended, could become uncontrollable, resulting in violence.

Following its latent functions, conflict seems to benefit society as it allows society to stimulate the establishment of new rules and stabilize and balance the society. In

this way society becomes healthier and the inhabitants of that society are always awake. Deutsch et al. (2006:418) write that "conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving." This assertion was expounded much earlier by Coser (1956) as quoted in the work of Fry and Bjorkqvist (1997:26), who asserted that conflict is an inevitable by-product of human interaction. Conflicts are consequences of the impossibility of always giving all people involved what they want.

According to Coser (1956), desires and needs are not identical, and the fact that people cannot get all they want does not automatically and in all cases imply that they do not get what they need. With that being said, it is critical to Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994:5) to describe conflict in more careful terms as "perceived divergence of interests, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously". However, Coser (1956) is of the opinion that conflict, although inevitable, is not inherently pathological or always necessarily dysfunctional. On a short-term basis, a conflict may seem dysfunctional, but on a long-term basis, it may be functional and lead to the improvement of the society in question.

Lyons (1993) also suggested that conflict can often be a constructive force in social life. In the same fashion, Levi-Strauss (1956) introduces a different aspect when studying conflict. He suggested that conflicts of different kinds are latent in every culture and the reason why norms are formed is to prevent latent and potential conflicts. Norms are ritualized ways of handling conflict. He further illustrates this view by saying that norms with respect to clothing may serve as an example: for instance, by concealing genitals, sexual excitation caused by visual stimulation is reduced, and sexual conflict to a great extent, is avoided. Therefore, to cement the argument presented by this approach, which echoes the views of the writer at hand is that conflicts really are inevitable. However, they should not be regarded as dysfunctional in all cases, or as a kind of social pathology. Conflicts are of many different types, some functional, some dysfunctional. Some conflicts are harmful, but, in some cases, conflicts may improve society and social relations in the long run (Fry and Bjorkqvist, 1997: 26-27).

In cementing the argument presented by this approach Jeong's examination of constructive versus destructive conflict becomes of utmost importance. Jeong argues that if conflict is considered in itself, to be neither bad nor good, an important question is what conditions give rise to a constructive conflict process. What are the criteria for being constructive or destructive? The author further attempts to answer such questions by arguing that it is in the context of struggle and communication patterns that, in part, the nature of conflict is determined. The constructive or destructive phenomena of conflict can be framed by the feasibility of transforming adversarial relationships, being enhanced by mutual understanding. Thus, the positive and negative aspects of conflict also need to be assessed in light of the means of waging conflict, violent versus non-violent, which have long-term consequences for future relationships (2010:13-14).

2.2.3 Conflict as a Dysfunctional Process in a Social System

Conflict, according to Coser (1956:8) as cited by Fry and Bjorkqvist (1997: 25), can be defined as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources, a struggle in which the aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals”. There are two different views on the necessity or inevitability, of conflict. According to the dysfunctionalist school of thought, conflict is an aberration in society, a kind of social pathology (Parsons, 1951; Smelser, 1962).

Parsons (1951) and Smelser (1962) further contend that conflict can be eliminated by giving all people involved what they need. Conflict is, in accordance with this view, always dysfunctional and does not facilitate evolution or improvement, neither of society as a whole nor of relationships between individuals. Conflict is not an inevitable ingredient of human life. It is here that the evaluation of social conflict by Kriesberg (1973) becomes important, as he argues that the dysfunctionalist school of thought is concerned with the disruptiveness or violence of fights. They perceive a larger collective or system which is threatened or injured by conflict and wish to discover ways of mitigating its disruptive character. Thus, proponents of this school of thought may be troubled by the prospect of international wars or interracial violence. For them, conflict tends to be evaluated negatively. In contrast to the dysfunctionalists, the functionalists, according to Kriesberg, are concerned with the injustice or repression of some categories of people, and siding with that collective,

they are therefore interested in learning how such people may form conflict groups and successfully end or reduce their oppression. Thus, this school of thought tends to perceive such conflicts as necessary and even desirable (1973:2).

Contrary to the popular belief presented by the proponents of the dysfunctionalist school, Jeong (2010:14) argues that, although conflict tends to have negative connotations, not every conflict is harmful if it ultimately produces a creative element for changing societies, while achieving the goals and aspirations of individuals and groups. If the outcomes bring about positive changes, as demonstrated by not only apologies and compensation for the past abuse, but also future prevention of victimization, that can be considered to be constructive. Jeong further illustrates this argument by postulating that non-violent conflict that is aimed at the transformation of oppressive relationships is inherently good and serves as a vehicle of liberation, in contrast to the consequences of accepting the superficial harmony of the status quo.

However, speaking of the social structure, Coser (1956) introduced a different approach to that of Parsons (1951) when he concluded that "conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure in which there is no or insufficient toleration and institutionalization of conflict. The intensity of a conflict which threatens to "tear apart", which attacks the consensual basis of a social system, is related to the rigidity of the structure. Therefore, one can also argue that conflict cannot be deemed as evil in society for what threatens the equilibrium of such a structure is not conflict as such, but the rigidity itself which permits hostilities to accumulate and to be channelled along one major line of cleavage once they break out in conflict.

2.2.4 Social Conflict as the Product of the Social Structure

According to Bradshaw (2008:50), many theorists believe that social conflict is the product of the systematic order of society. The writer takes it further by using the Marxist way of thought to illustrate this view by arguing that, Marxists perceive social conflict as the product of the class structure of society. Thus, the contradictions produced by a particular division of labour fuel a dialectical struggle. It is here that it is critical for the purpose of this assignment to identify dichotomy within the scholars and disciples of this approach. With that being said, Weber, like Marx, saw class conflict to be an endemic feature of a capitalist society.

According to Weber's observations of the society of his era, the end of a common interest of workers and landowners in the success of the harvest, meant the beginning of unavoidable conflict between classes whose only relations were those of the market. Therefore, one can argue that Weber's recurrent concerns were those of perceiving class conflict as a central feature of economic and political life. Thus, Binns contends or suggests that for both Weber and Marx 'ownership versus non-ownership of property is the most important basis of class division in a competitive market'. On the other hand, Beetham's important recent study of Weber's political writings concludes that 'both Marx and Weber... recognized the same power relationships, the same structure of power, in modern society; where they differed was the point at which they sought to apply the lever of political action to this structure' (Binns, 1977:1). In a similar vein, one could argue that it is here that this school of thought perceives conflict as a product of the social structure. The way society is structured makes conflict inevitable, for the labourers (working class) will forever have a conflicting interest to the owners of the means of production (capitalist) thus, such a structure yields conflict. Hence, this school of thought deems conflict as the product of the social structure.

According to Jeong (2010:52), theories based on the traditions of Karl Marx support the idea that a change in human relations inevitably comes out of social conflict. In Marxist analysis, economic forces, especially the forces of production, constitute an essential element in setting the stage for class and other social conflicts. Weber's assertion, coming from a functionalist perspective, however, is that stability and order are explained by complex interrelationships among primary economic and social institutions. For Weber, the functions of a society can be adjusted to underlying conflict situations. In contrast with coercive views of conflict in Marxist traditions, the consensus-equilibrium perspective of society regards conflict as dysfunctional, especially in considering that it creates tensions, disturbances, and strain within a 'harmonious' system. The established roles, functions, and norms serve as a medium in support of order (Parsons, 1951).

From the Marxist perspective, conflict is inevitable and even becomes desirable when the social structures frustrate the needs of the masses or the working class. Thus, it is only the revolution by the proletariat that can result in the ultimate change

in the societal structure. Only then can a classless society materialize. Jeong writes that "from a Marxist perspective, individuals in a particular category are inevitably engaged in a common struggle against those who belong to an opposing one. In essence, group divisions always have an economic base, for it is the material conditions of life that are crucial for understanding social relationships." Thus, since incompatible political interests determined by class relations drive conflict, a consensus-based society can, for the Marxist, be achieved only by a classless society (Jeong, 2010:53).

Marxist analysis attributes structural change not to a sermon on a desire for harmony or goodwill but to political revolution. (Jeong, 2010). According to the Marxist thesis, a fundamental transformation of the system is inevitable when the control of the main economic means by a few brings about further inequality and more discontent (Marx and Engels, 1947). However, Dahrendorf argued that, as a permanent feature of society structural conflict is more generally described beyond class relations. Various social cleavages provide the basis for conflict; this does not refer just to those formed by antagonistic economic interests (Dahrendorf, 1959). Different interests are formed on the basis of structural divisions of domination and subordination (Dahrendorf, 1959). In essence, conflict is a dialectical process that propels the transformation of society by incorporating opposing elements (Jeong, 2010:54).

2.2.5 Criticism of the Sociological Approaches

Considering the sociological approaches discussed above, it is perhaps necessary to examine their reasoning and discuss specific issues by juxtaposing the functionalist, dysfunctionalist and the perspectives that view conflict as the product of the social structure to be able to fully address the topic of this essay. This is perhaps evident in the debate between the consensus and conflict theories. De Tocqueville's (1932) rallying point in this is that "a society can exist only when a great number of men consider a great number of things from the same point of view; when they hold the same opinions upon many subjects, when the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions in their minds". Perhaps one can argue that de Tocqueville or the dysfunctionalist approach's analytical capabilities lack ability as their stance is so utopian in approach that they perhaps perceive society to be the consequence of popular will or common agreement.

According to Demerath and Peterson (1967:263), perhaps the most widespread axiom of consensus theory as dysfunctionists would argue, holds that it is a necessary condition for social structure. Then, to this view, consensus, not conflict, is an engine of social evolution. Then, social structure has come to be defined as excluding those patterns of human actions which are spontaneous and unstructured. Social structure is said to consist of a "set of statuses" defined by relatively stable relationships between people. What follows is a mechanical notion of consensus and conflict as structured and unstructured modes of behaviour respectively. In contrast, Coser's (1956) assertion is that "one safeguard against conflict disrupting the consensual basis of the relationship, however, is contained in the social structure itself: it is provided by the institutionalization and tolerance of conflict. Whether internal conflict promises to be a means of equalisation of social relationships or readjustments of rival claims, or whether it threatens to "tear apart" depends to a large extent on the social structure within which it occurs".

According to the dysfunctionalist school of thought, consensus involves objectification of position, group cohesion, collective representations, common traditions, and rules for inducting and indoctrinating new members; while conflict is perceived as external to social structure, as spontaneity, impulsive action, lack of organization, intuitive response to immediate situations. In contrast, the functionalist contends that to place conflict outside the framework of social structure, or to go beyond that and see conflict as necessarily destructive of the social organism, is to place a definite premium on social equilibrium. It strongly implies that a society can be changed only by apocalyptic or spontaneous methods (Demerath and Peterson, 1967:263).

2.3 PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Preventive diplomacy is not a new phenomenon in conflict management. It seeks to primarily address a political/diplomatic process mandated under chapter VI of the UN Charter in order to prevent disputes from developing between parties, existing disputes from rising into open conflicts, or limiting escalation of conflict when it occurs, notwithstanding the fact that the mediators could be requested to provide limited support in mediating towards preventive diplomacy (Bischoff, 2006:148). Glover points out that preventive diplomacy is employed to forestall policies that

create social and political tension. These policies include human rights violations, (such as denial of individual's freedom of expression, or the right to a fair trial), or discrimination against people on grounds of ethnic, linguistic or religious identity or political belief. (It is) by definition low key, undramatic, invisible, but it is cheaper than peacekeeping or war (Glover, 1995:2).

Researchers often debate a suitable and all-encompassing definition of what preventive diplomacy and other conflict management methods are. This section will provide a comprehensive overview of discourses from scholars and authors who ventured on peace initiatives and processes in Africa. These scholars outline themes and concepts that will form the basis of the analysis for the proposed research that would influence and impact on my study. For example, researchers are not unanimous in the conceptualization and definition of what South African preventive diplomacy in Africa is. There are a variety of those critics specifically on South Africa's quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe, especially the former president of South Africa, Mr. Mbeki. These themes include preventive diplomacy, mediation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding with specific reference to the research study.

For instance, some scholars present preventive diplomacy as actions undertaken in order to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to prevent the spread thereof (Doyle, 2005:530). Some are specific that preventive diplomacy was officially adopted as the strategy for the management of conflicts by the UN member states and the South African Government has to partake in the said strategy. This arrangement can involve confidence building measures, early warning, and possible preventive deployment to reduce the danger of violence and increase peaceful settlements. Researchers are of the opinion that, to resolve a conflict, confidence between conflicting parties or intrastate conflict, a mediator that is neutral and impartial is a prerequisite in any peace process, which is often a key task in the mediation process for a mediator to lay a foundation for substantive negotiation (Kotze, 2009: 55).

According to the United Nations (UN) Agenda for Peace as presented by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992), preventive diplomacy consists of the actions undertaken in order to "prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent

existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur". Involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, and possibly "preventive deployment" of UN-authorized forces. Preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects for peaceful settlement. The rationale for the adoption of this kind of approach by the South African Government is straightforward and compelling: without effective techniques for preventing violent conflict from arising or a recurrence of such violence, large scale conflicts might occur, which would result in instability and war in a continent characterized by chronic conflicts and underdevelopment.

2.4 CONFLICT PROVENTION

John Burton (1990) offers a critical distinction between approaches of conflict prevention as a form of conflict containment through means of dispute settlement and regulation, and prevention directed at removing causes of conflict and promoting conditions in which behaviours become controlled by the extent to which parties value the collaborative quality of their relationship. In such relationships, "exchanges of short-term political expediency are supplanted by long-term policy development, aimed at tackling problems before they become conflicts" (Anstey, 2006:128). This research will adopt the latter approach to conflict prevention called provention as advocated by John Burton (1990), which speaks about addressing the underlying causes of conflict. The research assumes that conflict provention can only be realized when basic human needs are addressed. Thus, this study will seek to understand whether South Africa had this as a goal in its engagement in Lesotho.

According to Burton (1990:18), conflict provention refers to the "removal of causal conditions, and the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative relationships – extends the scope of our concerns beyond the narrow area of conflict resolution". While conflict prevention seeks to curtail the start or a spread of a violent conflict, "once we introduce the notion of provention the total social environment and sources of conflict become relevant. Conflict provention addresses problems of social relationships, and all the conditions that affect them".

The adoption of conflict provention by this study is against the background that most African conflicts are not properly and timeously resolved and settlements are

therefore easily undermined by another breakout of a dispute or conflict as will be seen in the case of Lesotho which is the subject of this research. This, according to this researcher is due to the fact that conflict resolutions do not seek to address the underlying issues which give rise to the conflict situation in the first place. Instead, a great deal of attention is given to treating the symptoms as opposed to the cause. Thus, basic human needs theory and conflict prevention endeavors to address this deficit must be applied to the management and resolution of conflicts. As Burton argues, "prevention is thus concerned with social problems generally, with altering the environments that lead to conflict, and with creating environments that mitigate conflict".

By introducing conflict prevention, Burton seeks to postulate that there are other conflict areas in which there can be no resolutions, and where there must be prevention. The aforesaid author identifies drug-related conflicts, gang violence, terrorism and international conflicts as an example of conflicts that cannot be suppressed or contained and are not appropriate for resolution. Burton argues that such conflicts require prevention. That is elimination by removal of their sources. In this regard, "conflict is redefined to include social problems generally and any set of circumstances that are symptoms of, or sources of, conflicts between specific parties" (1990:18-190).

Anstey (2006), in his book *Managing Change Negotiating Conflict*, postulates that prevention and transformation require a fundamental change in conditions and attitudes of the parties. In the same breath Mayer (2001), as cited by Anstey (2006), argues that reconciliation, which transforms (rather than regulates) conflicts, involves 'deeper, more far-reaching' forms of resolution than agreements. In contrast, Zartman (2001) writes that while prevention is a worthy goal, it is an unrealistic one in the short term as conflict is unlikely to be eliminated from human behavior. Zartman further proposes that efforts should rather be concentrated on reducing conflict escalation and violence. According to Anstey (2006:129), the problem that faces the proponents of preventive diplomacy is quite often the fact that parties see little need for it. There is not yet the imperative of a hurting stalemate or perception of a need to change attitudes or approaches around issues. Thus, having failed to foresee the need to approach relationships differently to prevent conflicts arising or

escalating, parties embroiled in conflicts are often possessed by dynamics that lock them into the crisis of escalation. Further, to be credible, it should not benefit one conflicting party, but all those that are in conflict.

2.5 SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

South Africa is no stranger to the pursuit of diplomatic work. After 1994 the South African government became politically successful when collaborating with other SADC role-players and some AU member states in resolving conflict through diplomatic means. In most cases they relied on multilateral institutions and multilateral diplomacy (Bischoff, 2006:148). In terms of conflict management, South Africa aims to reduce or eliminate violence in order to prevent and resolve conflicts (Wallensteen, 2007: 271).

Peace mission efforts by South Africa emerged within the context of a changed landscape in Africa. The colonial legacy, the struggles against colonial rule, and its subsequent replacement with post-colonial independent governments, shadowed by a global Cold War, ended in the early 1990's. This was replaced by internal conflicts which continue until today. These internal conflicts often manifest themselves in violent armed rebellion between governments and opposition or militia groups (ACCORD, 2007:11). Given the complex nature of the African conflicts, the theoretical underpinnings of this study seek to argue that sustainable peace and stability in Africa can only be realized once basic human needs are addressed.

Shaw (2000, cited in Taylor, 2005:147), postulates that war or conflict is after all the continuation of politics by other means. Therefore, establishing this designed space as our point of departure, the orbit that this study seeks to establish is one that argues that for the establishment of peace, the latent issues which give rise to violent conflicts need to be addressed in a timely manner through the use of preventive diplomacy, before disputes escalate into full-blown wars. President Jacob Zuma of South Africa expressed the following in his State-of-the-Nation address in February 2016:

The African continent remains central to our foreign policy engagements. South Africa continues to support peace and security and regional economic integration through participation in the African Union and the Southern African

Development Community initiatives. We continue to assist sister countries in resolving their issues, for example, in Lesotho and South Sudan. The South African National Defense Force represented the country bravely and remarkably well in peacekeeping missions on the continent.

The preventive diplomacy approach undertaken by the South African government during the constitutional and electoral crisis in Lesotho from August 1994- 2002 and most recently 2015, can be cited as the critical move taken by the government in an attempt to prevent escalation of conflict between the government of Lesotho and the major opposition party in the country. In ensuring sustainable peace and stability in the country, the application of peace-building initiatives in the form of economic and social cooperation to build confidence between the parties remains of critical importance. In recent decades, as cited in the draft white paper on South Africa's foreign policy, "the incidences of inter-state conflict have decreased, although resource driven competition may lead to its resurgence. Due to disruptions in economic activity and political instability, intra-state conflict continues to frustrate sustainable development" (SA Foreign Policy White Paper, 2012:17).

While this study will focus on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, it is important to mention other approaches that are used by governments in resolving conflicts, which often go hand-in-hand with preventive diplomacy. In *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu: White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy* (2012), a fascinating document dealing with South Africa's foreign policy, it is noted that peacekeeping is equally regarded as a contributor and a tool for conflict resolution. The other perception is that peacekeeping is termed as military and civilian deployments in the field with the consent of the parties concerned as confidence building measures to monitor a truce between parties, whilst diplomats strive to negotiate for a long-lasting and sustainable peace. In addition, post-conflict peacebuilding aims to foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence amongst warring parties and to develop the social, political and economic infrastructure against violence and to lay a durable foundation for peace. However, while these are important measures, the study will not be focusing on them but rather on preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and prevention.

Mediation is premised and ensures a holistic approach by various mediators, governments or any actors in finding a political settlement to any specific conflict

using any available resources. Mediation as part and parcel of preventive diplomacy has an interesting history and a variety of origins. Pundits and scholars of conflict managements such as De Coning (2005), argue that mediation is not satisfied with the identical treatment of the causes of conflict, but concerned with the settlement of disputes, and creates opportunities for both conflicting parties. There is a general view that the AU, UN, and sub-regional bodies view mediation as incorporating the implementation of special and positive measures in favor of countries and parties in dispute to eliminate their differences, with the aim of creating lasting peace amongst conflicting parties and neutralizing regional instability. Academics argue that, in the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting to peace building (De Coning, 2005). In Africa itself, it is not something new as countries such as South Africa have partnered with regional organizations in providing solutions, such as management and resolution of conflicts in various parts of the continent. In the SADC, Central Africa, and West Africa to mention a few.

South African mediation in other parts of Africa in the past involved track two diplomacy by South African individuals/government officials such as Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula (Minister of Defence and Military Veterans), the country's Vice President, Cyril Ramaphosa and various diplomatic efforts by both South African diplomats and envoys. Some argue that it may also involve prominent individuals who are well-connected South African businessmen, who are vital for confidence building measures. This includes the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), who have no interest besides offering assistance (Berridge, 2010:243).

Although South African role players' agreement endeavors within the legal framework of internal, regional and international policies in preventive diplomacy and negotiated peace processes, they have failed to develop social cooperation amongst conflicting parties. South Africa's capacity to function and succeed in its preventive diplomacy is, therefore, dependent on its ability to perform in African conflicts in cooperation with other actors. For example, within these agreements, the issues on which parties have to pursue further negotiations need to be spelled out. Moreover, the importance of the return to constitutional legality, transition, democratization and good governance must be brought to their attention.

In terms of preventive diplomacy being viewed as a model for managing conflicts in Africa, it becomes clear that the South African Government's foreign policy of Mr. Mandela's and Mr. Mbeki's administrations believed that there could be no development without peace and security, and no peace without development (Khadiagala, 2006:122-137). As such the advocates of this type of conceptualization argue that the policy in mediating conflicts in the DRC, the CAR, Ivory Coast, South Sudan, etc. has been underpinned and formed part of the NEPAD and the AU. For example, in 1999, Mr. Mandela facilitated negotiations in Burundi on behalf of the international community, the OAU, and the regional parties. According to the Arusha Agreement, Protocol V, Article 4, the agreement allowed the facilitator to continue as the moral guarantor and conciliation agent (Mandrup, 2007:239). The late president Nyerere, who conceded to Mr. Mandela, preceded the mediation efforts. In spite of the lack of clarity over public support for South Africa's Great Lakes strategies, the country pursued an ambitious and commendable foreign policy agenda and linkage approach in regional conflicts (Khadiagala, 2006:122).

For mediation to be successful, all mediators should be perceived as impartial on issues separating the parties of a conflict or be able to influence the said issues (Berridge, 2010:246). In recent diplomacy work, it became public knowledge that Mr. Mandela relied on his personality and aura, and even talked tough to belligerents, as a mediator in both the DRC and Burundi. This was in contrast to Mr. Mbeki who believed in much criticized quiet diplomacy as was the case in Zimbabwe. These mediating efforts by South Africa have been characterized as impartial and an attempt to bring together parties involved in disputes (Khadiagala, 2006:122-137). For example, according to Khadiagala (2006:122), in the DRC mediated efforts were necessary as a result of the violence that had been threatening the already fragile peace process. He notes that the mediating team in Burundi comprised of African mediators external to the conflict and the representative of the Tanzanian authorities. This was the same in the DRC. The South African government, with its officials and a number of African states, instituted several peace initiatives through the regional and sub-regional DRC peace processes. South Africa played an instrumental role in mediating and negotiating the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in December 2002 (Mandrup, 2007:240).

These broad claims on mediation need to be supplemented or checked against South African mediation in Africa. It may further be argued that for mediation to be successful, South Africa requires cooperative efforts by other countries in the region. The involvement of ambassadors in mediation as representatives of the government or the AU may lead to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between a transitional government and rebels. There are debates that some of these envoys might not necessarily have the political clout to sway belligerents, but constant employment of envoys as opposed to heads of states have led to challenges in the conflict resolutions in Africa (Khadiagala, 2006:133).

Another crucial factor of the above is that the heads of states or their government representatives in (any) mediation, may push for the extension of talks and end up in numerous summits aimed at resolving the conflict (Khadiagala, 2006:133). Mandrup (2007:238-242) argues that the efforts in Burundi differed from the Mandela initiative in the DRC in 1997, as the mediation was aimed at finding a political settlement to the conflict that received broad international backing. The initiatives by the mediating party may require the host's blessing, because they may be rejected by the rebel leaders or leaders of the state.

It is not only regionally, but also internationally that the South African government has been actively involved as a mediator. For instance, negotiations following the dilemma between the UK and the EU on the one hand and the Libyan government on the other led to the Lockerbie bombing, resulting in the financial compensations of 2003 (Heywood, 1997:6). Its emphasis on mediation has been built on trust and the promotion of cooperation amongst the actors. In recent mediation in Africa, it became public knowledge that South African mediation efforts, sub-regional organization and the AU would need to be funded by contributions from both the AU's 53 member states and various other donors (Nhema and Zeleza. 2008: 34).

It has also come to light that the absence of adequate resources and effective mediators continues to pose a challenge for South Africa's Government. Khadiagala (2006:122-131) argues that during the mediation in Burundi, the summit appealed to the international community to support the peace process and to make resources available to support the encampment, disarmament, demobilization, and integration of combatants into the army. The South African mediators were required to approach

the UNSC to back the South African mission and the initiatives to support the agreements reached through mediation. According to Khadiagala (2009), the regional organizations, the representatives of states as chairperson and others as the chairpersons of the regional initiative are key to the mediation of peace settlements. Mr. Zuma is an SADC mediator in Zimbabwe, and according to the Sunday Times, his colleagues in the region view elections as the only way to address conflict. In Zimbabwe, which has been locked in a political stalemate for a decade (Sunday Times, 4 September, 2010), South Africa's international acceptance as a mediator is informed by its compliance with both national and international laws and policies that govern the international system. Also, due to the international expectation as the hegemonic power in the region, the South African Government is prepared to be seen as a peacemaker (Solomon, 2008: 55).

In line with the aforementioned insinuations, Khadiagala (2009) argued that mediation might fail to get the two parties to negotiate and sign a ceasefire agreement if the external parties support either of the parties in dispute. For example, the mediated agreement normally states that the ceasefire should be effective within the agreed time frame. Despite the emphasis on the recent literature, Nathan (2005) perceives that the key to effective mediation lies in understanding, managing and transforming the political and psychological dynamics of serious conflict that make conflicting parties resistant to peaceful negotiation. These parties may be required to assemble the conflicting combatants to move to the assembly points with their weapons and be disarmed later (Khadiagala, 2006:124-129).

The significance of preventive diplomacy is that it has evolved over time. It has become clear that the duty of the every mediator is to find a durable solution to any mediation process using any approach to conflict. However, different scholars, such as Crocker, view mediation as varied as mediators themselves, including the idea of processes undertaken by an outside party to establish or maintain peace in any conflict (2005:53). Berridge argues that major global powers are not the only actors that are involved in mediation efforts. The South African Government played a key role in mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis (2010:240). Mediation of a conflict may be a form of compliance or a process of measuring the extent of policy and legal compliance by any mediating state. In the same vein South Africa plays a significant

role in the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, Republic of Southern Sudan, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe etc., by virtue of permanent neutrality, as well as an opportunity to play its role as the mediator. The most important mediators in the context of the international arena are states that are acting singly or collectively, or regionally in areas such as the SADC, AU or via any international organization such as the UN (Berridge, 2010:238).

As Zartman and Touval (2005:433) state, "mediation is best thought of as a mode of negotiation in which a third party such as South Africa helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find themselves". They further believe that impartiality and acceptability of the mediators is the key to mediation, and a third party like South Africa, which is impartial on issues affecting Africa, is fundamental. In Africa specifically, the South African Government's assistance in negotiation of disputes through preventive diplomacy can be in the form of good offices such as those of Mr. Mandela, Mr. Mbeki, and Mr. Zuma. In other words, a president (either sitting or former president), or an ambassador, a minister of a department of international affairs and cooperation or from another government department, or maybe an ambassador of a state, engages in mediation and encouraging the parties in a dispute to find a political settlement (Kotze, 2009:81). However, Bilder is referenced by Crocker et al. (2005:64) to differentiate between the passive activity of providing good offices and the most proactive role of the mediator. He argues that "good offices and mediation are techniques by which the parties, who are unable to resolve a dispute by negotiation, request or agree to limited intervention by the third party to help them break an impasse". Further, the South African role may lie only in conciliation and mediation, by being an active participant in the negotiations as authorized or expected to contribute in that role. Nathan (2005) mentions that mediation is a method of mitigating the concerns through the presence and support of an intermediary peacemaker who is not party to the conflict, enjoys the trust of the disputants and whose goal is to help them forge agreements they find acceptable.

In mediation, the mediator makes proposals based on agreements entered into and information supplied by the parties. This can be used in regional conflicts and also in internal conflicts in Africa. Since World War II (1945), mediators have been the representatives of international organizations such as the UN or specifically

appointed committees like the Organization of African Unity (OAU). But recently, the trend is to move away from the UN through the UNSC towards the use of powerful governments in the mediation role, even powerful individuals as with Mr. Mandela in both Burundi and the DRC, as well as Kofi Annan in Kenya in 2007/08 (Kotze, 2009:81). Though not a new phenomenon in diplomacy, lately the use of mediation has changed significantly, characterized by mediation that involves the intervention of an individual or state, requiring authority to mediate that particular conflict.

2.6 PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-BUILDING

The key to beneficence is peacemaking, which is basically defined by Kofi Annan as "the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties and negotiate a settlement of dispute" (Aning, Addo, Birikorang & Sowatey, 2004:12). In Africa specifically, the efforts to achieve peace include a process of diplomacy, mediation, and negotiations designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means, as espoused in chapter VI of the UN Charter. This entails the judicial settlement of disputes, mediation, and other forms of negotiations.

Doyle (2005:530) writes that peacemaking is mediation and negotiations designed "to bring unreceptive parties to agreement" through peaceful means as espoused in chapter VI of the UN Charter. In terms of this proposed study, peace-building is viewed as a measure designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic and cultural institutions capable of mediating conflicts, as well as strengthening other mechanisms that create or support the creation of necessary conditions for sustained peace (Fisher, 2000:7). After considerable debate and disagreements regarding the exact meaning of peacebuilding, the then UNSG modified his position in 1995 in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, and suggested that peacebuilding could be preventative (Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 1995).

According to An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 1992), post-conflict peacebuilding refers to measures organised to foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties, to develop the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and lay the foundation for a durable peace. Peace-building, according to Anstey (2006:129), (or

conflict transformation), requires fundamental attitudinal changes in relations between parties and a huge investment in seeking to eliminate conditions that generate conflict.

Mandela (2010) argues that peace-building is a long-term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. Thus, it is the phase of the peace process that takes place after peace-making and peacekeeping. However, conflict management techniques such as peacekeeping and peacemaking lies beyond the scope of this study and will not be dealt with. Nathan (2004:1) as cited by Mandela (2010:2), argues that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence, is a necessary condition for the establishment of a secure community. In short, it is practically impossible to attain peace without first addressing simple human securities. Consequently, the theoretical framework used in this study is: the Basic Human Needs Theory as advocated by John Burton (1990).

On matters relating to "international peace and security" the United Nations has decisive authority to impose itself on any country or dispute in the world. This power goes far beyond any power ever given to any other international organization and it introduces a radically new kind of legal hierarchy into inter-state relations (Hurd, 2014:137). According to Hurd (2014), the UN's powers over international security began with Articles 24(1) and 39. These define an organization that has the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Art. 24(1)) in world politics and that has the authority to decide what kind of collective response is warranted in times of crisis (Art. 39).

The obligations that states take on with respect to international security are highly constraining on state sovereignty and as a result, the politics of compliance and enforcement are extremely interesting. This paper begins by examining states' obligation regarding international security, paying specific attention to international peacekeeping and peace-building in particular, to illustrate the tensions and similarities between the two approaches to international security.

The aim of peacebuilding, in the words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, is "to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies" – that is a peace that will endure long after the departure of the peace-builders themselves

(1999b, para. 109; Paris, 2004:2). Similarly Boutros-Ghali, Annan's predecessor, defined the purpose of peace-building as the attempt "to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (1992:11).

According to Paris (2004:5), peace-building missions in the 1990s were guided by a generally unstated but widely accepted theory of conflict management: the notion that promoting "liberalization" in countries that had recently experienced civil war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. In the political realm, however, liberalization means democratization or the promotion of periodic general elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience.

In the economic realm, liberalization means marketization, or movement toward a market-oriented economic model, including measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion in the economy and maximizing the freedom for private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their respective economic interests. Peace-building missions launched between 1989 and 1999 varied in many respects. According to Paris (2004:5), their most striking similarity is that they sought to transform war-shattered states into "liberal market democracies" as quickly as possible.

Underlying the design and practice of these operations was the hope and expectation that democratization would shift societal conflicts away from the battlefield and into the peaceful arena of electoral politics, thereby replacing the breaking of heads with the counting of heads; and that marketization would promote sustainable economic growth, which would also help to reduce tensions. Peace-building in this sense was a specific kind of social engineering, based on a particular set of assumptions about how best to establish durable domestic peace.

According to Paris (2004), this approach tends to be more problematic than anticipated. If the test of successful peace-building is simply whether large-scale conflict resumed in the aftermath of a peace-building mission, then most of the operations conducted in the 1990s were successful, because in all but three cases

(Angola, Rwanda, and Liberia), large-scale hostilities have not resumed. But if we use the standard of success articulated by Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali – namely, the establishment of a "sustainable" peace, or a peace that will endure long after the peace-builders depart from the country – then the picture becomes less favourable. International efforts to transform war-shattered states, according to Paris (2004:6), have in a number of cases inadvertently exacerbated societal tensions or reproduced conditions that historically fuelled violence in these countries. The very strategy that peace-builders employed to consolidate peace – political and economic liberalization – seems paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence in several of these states.

According to Sandole (2010:8), at first glance, peace-building seems to break down nicely into the "building" of "peace". It therefore depends on what kind of peace one looks at, for there are at least two types: negative peace and positive peace (Galtung, 1969). Negative peace mostly refers to the absence of hostilities, usually between states and other units. This absence can be achieved through either prevention of likely violence (proactive) or suppression of ongoing violence (reactive). Thus, ceasefires are experiments in temporary negative peace, which may or may not lead to peace settlements, which would be more substantive approaches to negative peace.

While negative peace might be a necessary condition of positive peace, it tends to be an insufficient condition, although some might claim that over an extended period of time, positive peace could conceivably arise from negative peace (Sandole, 2007). Sandole further argues that negative peace is not an optimal condition, because it stops short of dealing with the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of the conflict which might escalate, or has escalated, to the violence that negative peace measures would address. The utility of positive peace measures, at least in theory, deal with the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of a conflict which might develop, or has developed, into manifest violence.

Peace-making, according to Otunnu and Doyle (1998:2) refers to mediation and negotiations designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means, such as those found in chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peace-making initiatives

seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences. In his book *Peace-building: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Context World* (2010:11), Sandole defines peace-making as follows:

Using the metaphor of a “burning house” common to diplomats and the military, third-party interveners could, depending upon the likely or actual intensity of the “fire” (Fisher, 1997; Fisher and Keashly, 1991), do any or all of the following:

- *Preventive diplomacy (violent conflict prevention): Take steps, based upon early warning, to prevent a house from “catching on fire” in the first place (proactive).*
- *Peacekeeping (conflict management): when the house is on fire, either because of the failure of violent conflict prevention efforts or through avoidance of their use, taking steps to prevent the fire from spreading (reactive).*
- *Peace-making: when attempts to prevent the fire from spreading have failed, then attempt either:*
- *Coercive peace-making (conflict settlement): Suppressing the fire (reactive)*

And/or

- *Non-coercive peace-making (conflict resolution): Dealing with the underlying causes and conditions of the fire (reactive), which establishes a basis for:*
- *Peace-building "writ small" (conflict transformation), or what John Burton calls conflict prevention: working with the survivors of the conflict on their long-term relationships so that the next time they have a problem, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighbourhood, or the larger commons in the process of dealing with it (reactive/proactive).*

In supporting this assertion, Ramsbotham et al. (2005:162) point to a number of cases where conflicts have been settled by negotiation.: Examples include the ending of apartheid in South Africa, the ending of the internal conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the settlements in Mozambique and Namibia and the Ta'if Accord which brought the civil war in Lebanon to an end. In contrast, however, peace-building, which is a conflict transformation approach, refers to measures

organized to foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties to develop the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and to lay the foundations for a durable peace (Otunnu and Doyle, 1996:3). Peace-building, according to John Burton, means conflict prevention: working with the conflicting parties in their long-term relationships so that next time they have conflicting interests, they do not have to resort to violence to settle their differences. This approach can, therefore, be classified as reactive and proactive in nature (Sandole, 2010:11).

Sandole (2010), further postulated that peace-building is a dynamic approach and process, comprising a number of third-party interventions, with different actors performing different tasks. The underlying assumption is that, given the complex nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War/post-9/11 worlds, only some combinations and sequence of approaches – in contrast to any single one– is necessary to capture the complexity of conflict in any given situation. As already indicated, peace-building tends to be reactive, hence post-conflict peace-building, (peacemaking) deals with the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict necessary to establish the basis for peace-building. This occurs when third parties attempt an intervention only after the emergence of an actual violent conflict involving significant human rights violations.

In discussing reactive and proactive peace-building, Sandole (2010:13) contends that in ad hoc reactive peace-building, members of the international community initially focus on one particular type of intervention (in Bosnia, conflict management through the United Nations Protection Force, (UNPROFOR)). However, if that fails, they may move on to other types. In Bosnia this consisted of conflict settlement through the NATO bombing of Serb forces and then following the Dayton Peace Accords, peace enforcement with the Stabilization Force (SFOR), followed by the Implementation Force (IFOR), and eventually the European Union Force (EUFOR).

By contrast, proactive peace-building is what third-party interveners would attempt before violent conflict occurs. In this case, interveners would design and implement an intervention to achieve violent conflict prevention. This is what Alger (2007:312-15) means by "long-term peace-building", which includes Lund's (2009) comprehensive use of conflict prevention. If that fails, interveners may decide on a

strategy of partial ad hoc reactive peace-building – i.e., selecting one or more options and then, for example, moving first to conflict management, (preventing the conflict from spreading), and if that fails, to conflict settlement (coercively suppressing violent conflict). Sandole (2010) therefore, reminds us that peace-building, whether reactive or proactive, ad hoc (single objective or comprehensive (multi-objective), minimalist (negative peace) or maximalist (positive peace) – is a multilateral and not a unilateral process.

Peace-building builds upon the work of peacekeepers' aims to prevent the recurrence of hostilities by promoting sustainable peace. Hence, there is complementarity in the fact that peacekeepers target direct causes while peace-builders focus on the underlying causes of violence. The complementarity between these two strategies is enhanced in the case where UN agencies carry out operations or where peace-building operations are carried out by organizations with long-standing strategic collaborations with the United Nations (Gurley 2000:35).

Peace-building however, is complicated by the fact that the two largest contributing nations to operations are India and China, which are guided by strong Westphalian principles and actively denounce the dissemination of democratic governance structures to unwilling states. "Democratic politics are contentious, and in the context of a post-war environment, rapid political liberalization could exacerbate fear and hatred between contending rivals" (Joshi 2013:369). Consenting to peacekeeping operations does not necessarily indicate that a government is open to the adoption of neoliberal values. However, these operations are presented as a joint package.

China supports the deployment of peacekeepers at the request of host governments but believes that broader socio-political interventions carried out under the banner of peace-building lie outside the realm of foreign actors (Mohan & Gippner, 2015:53). The bone of contention is the question of the role of the state's responsibilities and the role of international actors within states in conflict. China is noted for its strict adherence to the paramount position of state sovereignty in the broad sense. This has been strengthened by the use of foreign troops to depose leaders, as occurred in Libya, which may have caused China to veto action in Syria.

2.7 CONCLUSION

Conflict is as old as nature, and man's inhumanity to man predates recorded history. In cases of traditional peacekeeping requiring the consent of the parties, the combinations of humanitarian, political, and military efforts are dynamic and complementary. In chapter VI of the UN Charter, *On Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, a number of instruments for peacemaking are mentioned, such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and a resort to regional agencies or arrangements. As a further step, a peacekeeping force could be deployed on the ground. In cementing this section, the paper has provided an exploration of peacemaking and international peace-building and discussed sociological approaches that perceive conflict as either functional or dysfunctional conflict as well as structural conflict.

According to the factors mentioned and discussed above, conflict in the positive sense plays a significant role in society. It acts as an ingredient for a productive society and this means that a society without conflict is less productive and can result in a dead society. However, we cannot avoid acknowledging the fact that conflict in society can result in dysfunctionality within the structures and organization of that society. We also have to be cognisant of the fact that society is a composition of class struggles. These manifest themselves in various forms, which at times become violent. Karl Marx in his manifesto best stipulated the conditions and form in which these struggles take place. Equally, the genuine struggles that are waged by the various classes at times are captured by certain individuals who use genuine grievance to achieve their own goals/meet their own ends. This has become known as the greed versus grievance debate. This is best articulated by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). This chapter discussed preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention and the related conflict resolution approaches and has provided a substantial argument as to why this study opts for these two approaches when mediating conflict in Africa in general, using Lesotho as a case study. The next chapter will discuss in detail the methodology used in this study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEACH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The nucleus of this chapter is to discuss in detail the research design, methodology and approach adopted by the study. The level of analysis and time dimension of the case study. The data collection, sampling and data analysis will be explained. The chapter will also discuss the validity and reliability and the limitations of the study.

3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH

This research is based on the Critical Social Science Approach (CSSA). According to Neuman (2006:94), CSSA is an approach in social research that places emphasis on addressing “surface level distortions and multiple levels of reality and value-based activism for human empowerment”. There are three forms of Critical Social Science Approach (CSSA): dialectical materialism, class analysis, and structuralism (Neuman, 2006:94). The approach is associated with Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). In their bid to propose a more transformative and developmental approach to a social research, Marx and Engels wrote that:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas;... The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that... the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx and Engels, 1947:39).

The approach according to Neuman “critiques and transforms social relations by revealing the underlying sources of social relations and empowering people, specifically less powerful” (2006:95). Similarly, Fay (1987) writes that “in CSSA, the purpose is to explain a social order in such a way that it becomes itself the catalyst, which leads to transformation of this social order”. The ultimate goal of this research is to empower, transform and perhaps alter the status quo. Kincheloea and McLaren (1994:140) as quoted by Neuman (2006:95), stated:

Critical research can be best understood in the context of the empowerment of individuals. Inquiry that aspires to the name critical must be connected to an attempt to confront the injustice of a particular society or sphere within the

society. Research thus becomes a transformative endeavor unembarrassed by the label “political” and unafraid to consummate a relationship with an emancipatory consciousness.

A research methodology that is appropriate for this study is a qualitative design. The study adopts qualitative design instead of quantitative design because of the nature of the research and the research design it adopted. However, both approaches complement each other in most cases as Ragin (1994: 92), cited by Neuman (2003:16), argues that:

The key features common to all qualitative methods can be seen when they are contrasted with quantitative methods. Most quantitative data techniques are data condensers. They condense data in order to see the big picture... Qualitative methods, by contrast, are best understood as data enhancers. When data are enhanced, it is possible to see key aspects of cases more clearly.

The study seeks to propose the use of a hybrid approach - the use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a model for the mediation of African conflict using the case of South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho as a unit of analysis. Thus, a qualitative design is more appropriate than quantitative because it enables the study “to not narrowly focus on a specific question, but rather ponder the theoretical-philosophical paradigm in an inquisitive, open-ended settling” (Neuman, 2006:15). The philosophical underpinning is called the basic Human Needs Approach as advocated by John Burton (1990). This theoretical framework will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

This study will adopt a case study as part of the research design. To be specific, the study will be of an idiographic strategy; meaning that the study is “solely interested in understanding the particular and specific event or case within its own context” (Babbie and Mouton, 2007:272). Similarly, Neuman (2006:91) describes an idiographic technique as a “type of explanation used in interpretative social science in which the explanation is an in-depth description or picture with specific details but limited abstraction about a social situation or setting”. The case study technique as a research design, according to Lune, Pumar and Koppel (2010:374), focuses on a single case as the unit of analysis. Lune et al. further argue that “one of many

advantages of the case study approach is that it offers the opportunity to triangulate multiple methods and theories, providing rich contextual explanations” (Ibid.).

Babbie and Mouton (2007) identify six types of case studies, of which this study finds one that is suitable: studies of countries and nations - which is typical in international and comparative politics - where the focus is on a country or bloc of countries. This study’s focus will be on Lesotho in relation to South Africa’s involvement and role in conflict resolution in that country.

3.2.1 Research Design

This study consists of qualitative research and analysis. Qualitative researchers often depend on interpretive or critical social science and adopt the language of “cases and contexts”. The methodology to be used in this research will be based on descriptive empirical data in the form of a case study applied to South Africa’s use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a model for the mediation of conflict in Lesotho. However, it should be noted from the outset that this study is not based on fieldwork or questionnaires. The research is based on the study of existing literature, which therefore means that it is a literature review and content analysis / desktop research (Neuman, 2006:161).

3.2.2 Level of Analysis

The study will use Lesotho as a level of analysis. In academic terms the level of analysis is called meso, as it is neither national nor global but in-between (Babbie and Mouton, 2005:84).

3.2.3 Time Dimension

The study will focus on the role played by South Africa in peace processes in Lesotho from 1994 - 2015, specifically looking at the use of preventive diplomacy. The rationale behind choosing the years 1994 to date is that it will allow the study to capture the most recent developments in the region and of academic analyses over the last two decades. As alluded to above, Lesotho will be the case that the researcher will be studying. However, the study will also reflect on South Africa’s

similar engagement in other countries in order to better contextualize the issues and concepts under study.

3.2.4 Data Collection

The study is descriptive in nature. Data will be collected through a comprehensive search and review of literature on the use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as a tool in mediating African conflicts by the South African Government. Data collected through secondary sources will be used to answer the research questions. The materials that will be consulted include books, academic journals, media reports, government publications and reports from international organizations. I endeavoured to read and analyze literature that is relevant to my study and research problem.

3.2.5 Sampling

This study employed a purposive sampling approach to select material to read and review – focusing on materials that are relevant to the study. Apart from the general literature on preventive diplomacy, conflict management and conflict prevention, the literature on South Africa's conflict management role in Africa as well as in Lesotho, was part of the sample.

3.3 CONTENT AND DATA ANALYSIS

In analyzing the data collected for this study, content analysis was identified and used as the approach for data analysis. There are two types of content analysis, the quantitative content analysis and the qualitative content analysis. This research used qualitative content analysis. According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1278) as cited by Bezuidenhout et al. (2014:191) qualitative content analysis is often defined as a research technique “for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns”. Qualitative content analysis enables the “systematic analysis of social artifacts to provide an in-depth understanding” of the research topic. In contrast to quantitative content analysis, it does not involve the counting of words and codes; rather qualitative content analysis enables the researcher to identify subjective themes and patterns that may emerge from a particular text (Bezuidenhout et al.,

2014:191). Elsewhere, Bezuidenhout et al. write that “qualitative content analysis is mostly an inductive approach which researchers can use to develop theories or test existing theories”. According to Zhang and Wildemuth (2009:319) as cited by Bezuidenhout et al. (2014), qualitative content analysis “pays attention to unique themes that illustrate the range of meanings of phenomena rather than the statistical significance of the occurrence of particular texts or concepts”.

Content analysis is an approach for collecting and analyzing the content of the material used in the study. Therefore, “the content might refer to words, meaning, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes, or any message that can be communicated”. Content analysis is critical and appropriate for this study because the data used in this study includes books, newspapers, journal articles, speeches and official documents (Neuman, 2006:310-311). Neuman adds that “content analysis is nonreactive because the process of placing words, messages, or symbols in a text to communicate to a reader or receiver occurs without influence from the researcher who analyzes its content” (2006:310-311).

3.3.1 Using deductive approach in qualitative content analysis

According to Bezuidenhout et al., qualitative content analysis can either be conducted deductively or inductively. The distinction between deductive and inductive is found in the use of existing theoretical framework. “Contrary to grounded theory, where you create your own framework (inductive), in deductive qualitative content analysis you are led by existing theories, thus a preconceived and pre-structured theoretical frame work” (2014: 234). This study adopted a deductive approach to data analysis. It is argued that a deductive approach enables the researcher to “argue from the general to the specific”, that is to say “conceptual framework, which is derived from applicable theories (the general) will be used to identify several specific codes within the text that are grouped into several specific themes (the specific)” (Ibid.).

3.3.2 Using deductive coding in qualitative content analysis

Deductive codes are also called a priori codes and are developed before examining the data. These themes that will be generated will be linked to the literature and theoretical framework chapter and be interpreted within the context of the case study

used in this research. In conducting qualitative content analysis according to Bezuidenhout et al., it is critical to collate data into themes while assigning it into broader categories of related meanings. Thus, “this process of grouping data into categories is referred to as coding. Coding can be understood as a system that makes the process of analysis manageable” (2014:235).

The goal of qualitative coding in this study is not the counting of data, but rather what Strauss (1987:29) describes as the fracturing of data. In simple terms, fracturing of data means dividing the data into codes and concepts and rearranging and ordering them into meaningful categories. The process of coding is of paramount importance in this study as it will enable the study to contribute the findings to the conflict discipline.

3.4 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY

To ensure credibility of research, qualitative studies provide detailed information about data collection and analysis, support the findings by other studies and use triangulation (Sarantakos, 2005:86). Triangulation is achieved through comparing and contrasting multiple sources of data to enhance the accuracy and quality of the research process and findings (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006:66). Similarly, Neuman describes triangulation as “the idea that looking at something from multiple points of view improves accuracy” (2006:149). The study aims to achieve validity and reliability based on the quality and variety of the content analyzed in order to ensure that the research remains objective. The research approach adopted in this study becomes critical in dealing with the validity and reliability of the study. According to Neuman (2006:99), the Critical Social Science Approach “tests theory by accurately describing conditions generated by underlying structures and then applying that knowledge to change social relations”.

3.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The issues of financial constraints and travelling are not relevant to this study because it was conducted as a desktop research. However, literature on the specific topic may be limited, which therefore means that finding material might prove challenging at times. A more detailed focus on the limitation confronted during the course of this research project will be given in chapter five.

3.6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter discussed in detail the research approach adopted by the study, identified the research design that is appropriate for the study and also discussed the following: level of analysis; time dimension of the case study; data collection; sampling and data analysis. The chapter also briefly discussed the validity and reliability of the study and offered the limitations of the study. Lastly, a detailed discussion on content analysis as the data analysis method used in conducting this study was offered.

The nucleus of the next chapter will be an in-depth background review of South Africa's use of preventive diplomacy as an approach to mediate African conflict, using Lesotho as a case study. A detailed overview of the conflict in Lesotho and South Africa's role in mediating this conflict will be provided in this chapter. The chapter will also propose conflict prevention as an appropriate approach when dealing with a deep-rooted social conflict such as that in Lesotho.

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY OF LESOTHO

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter endeavours to provide an in-depth background review of South Africa's use of preventive diplomacy as an approach to mediate African conflict using Lesotho as a case study. A detailed overview of the conflict in Lesotho and South Africa's role in mediating this conflict will be provided in this chapter ('see appendix 1 for the chronology of key events in the history of Lesotho since the 1820s').

The relations between Lesotho and South Africa 'have come full circle' over the four decades of Lesotho's independence in 1966: 'from cordiality in the 1960s to early 1970s; to tension and confrontation through the mid-1970s to mid-1980s; a thaw in the late 1980s to early 1990s; down to the current active co-operation' (Selinyane, 2006:59). The distinguishing figure in this cycle of relations has been the instability and turmoil so prevalent in South Africa's economically challenged and militarily weaker neighbour. The electoral miscarriages of the 1970 general election just five years after the country gained its independence led to a situation where the parliamentary government generated a deep-rooted armed campaign by self-exiled opposition leader of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), apparently conducted from South African soil. "Though the war was partly blamed for the military coup of 1986, which unseated the Basotho National Party (BNP) Government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan after 16 years of de facto one-party rule, the South African connection was never omitted in the accounts of the putsch. Under the military regime, the two countries concluded the treaty for the massive Lesotho Highlands Water Project for the sale of water from Lesotho's highlands to South Africa" (Selinyane, 2006:59). The Highlands Water Project is perceived as being in South Africa's strategic interest, which prescribes resonance of relations between the two countries.

According to Selinyane (2006), the persistent political turmoil that characterized most of the second half of the twentieth century in Lesotho did not subside with the change to multiparty politics and constitutionalism in 1993. However, the rejection of

the March 1993 general election results, which the BCP won by a landslide, by the dominant opposition parties, the BNP and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), continued to abet a palace-led dissolution of the government in August 1994, which was hardly two years after the first democratic election in nearly a quarter of a century. The mediation process led by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana, after a month of public protest, facilitated a relatively stable transition based on an eight-point memorandum of agreement signed in Maseru in September 1994, which restored the Lesotho Government.

The recurring political crisis which was evident in the events of 1998, following another rejection of the election results, cultivated the political grounds for a possible coup. Subsequent to the failure of the South African led mediation to ameliorate the constitutional and political crisis, South African led military intervention proved to be much better as it facilitated the return to a relative normality. Thus, “an all-party Interim Political Authority (IPA) – a type of constituent assembly running in tandem with the government – was set up to pave the way for a re-run of the election, which came to pass in May 2002. The election produced a ten-party parliament with a one-party cabinet, as the ruling LCD again won 79 of the 80 contested constituency seats, leaving the other 18 parties to share the residual 40 compensatory seats under the newly adopted electoral model. The settlement was made possible by South Africa’s strategic interests and intimate knowledge of the Lesotho situation, procurement of the support and co-operation of the region’s states through a regional organisation, Pretoria’s commitment to action without prevarication when the need arose, and the willingness of the parties to the Lesotho dispute to accept South Africa’s brokerage” (Selinyane, 2006:60).

Based on the pattern of events dating as far back as 1993, the rejection of the elections more than once, and the re-elections after the mediation process, much of the recurring political crisis in Lesotho can be attributed to the fallacy of the Western-style democracy and the idea that elections will always resolve the deep-rooted social conflict affecting the African states. It could also be argued that the proclivity to assume that an electoral process can bring about political stability in any state characterized by deep-rooted social conflict, further protracts the conflict as many issues remain unaddressed. Therefore, it is against this background that the next

chapter will propose the use of conflict prevention to assist the use of preventive diplomacy when mediating the African conflict.

4.2 THE NATURE OF THE LESOTHO PROBLEM

The political turmoil characterized by the street protests by the followers of the main opposition in their bid to reject the general election results and impel the Independent Electoral Commission to nullify the results and declare re-election became the actual scenery to the constitutional debacle of May-September 1998. The underlying trigger to this political turmoil was the deep-seated lack of trust and agreement between parties on what governs the political institutions. The obstacle however, was embedded in the ruling party's lack of unity, accompanied by the government's relations with various organs of the state which suffered equally from the deficit of internal cohesion (Selinyane, 1998; Selinyane, 2006:61).

4.2.1 A tradition of violence

The post-colonial history of Lesotho has been centered on the struggle for power during and after elections, the unattended issues of political immunity, and a recurring need for military intervention in the country's political processes. Since Lesotho's independence in 1966 to date, the country has witnessed four military coup d'état's, coupled with changes of government and two unsuccessful coups (Motsamai, 2015: 2).

Lesotho's political and electoral history could be classified into six different epochs. According to Motsamai (2015:2-3), the first is the post-independence era dating from 1966-1970. The Basotho National party (BNP) was the victor in the first election. Subsequent to the BNP electoral victory, the country was bedeviled by political disputes, escalating to violent confrontation between the BNP and the main opposition party, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). Thus, the country became an authoritarian one-party state. This was evident through the BNP declaring a State of Emergency, abolishing the constitution and denying the country a smooth political transition when it lost the election in 1970 against its main rival, the BCP. Thus, the BCP leadership was forced into exile as mass oppression, followed by political killings and detainment without trial of its members, ensued.

The Basotho National Party was deposed by a military coup in 1986 and military dictatorship ruled Lesotho for the next seven years. Lesotho held its first democratic elections in 1993 and it could thus be argued that the period 1993-1998 was the consolidation of democracy for the country. The BCP emerged victorious in the 1993 democratic elections, however the BNP-led army aggressively opposed the election results, inflicting hostility on the BCP. The dismissal of the results was supported by the BNP and Marematlou Freedom Party and King Letsie's support of this dismissal in August 1994 resulted in what became known as the palace coup. It was against this background that the SADC staged its first intervention in Lesotho in 1998 with South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe facilitating the return of the BCP to office. The BCP was in government until 1997.

In 1998 The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), a splinter party from the BCP, won the elections by a landslide victory and governed Lesotho until 2007. This period from 1998-2007 was characterized by relative stability as compared to previous years, despite the deep-rooted post-election contestation. The election was conducted through an electoral system called the First Past the Post model (FPTP). This 'winner takes all' electoral system facilitated the one-party dominance disadvantaging the smaller parties. Following this landslide victory was the rejection of election results by the BCP and the BNP, citing irregularities in the election process, and despite their historical antagonistic relations, they spuriously formed an alliance to contest the 1998 election results. This alliance of convenience mobilized the supporters to shut down the capital, Maseru, and hindering the LCD from assuming the reins of government. Thus, mass protests ensued which escalated into violence and political instability for weeks (Motsamai, 2015:3). This resulted in the establishment of the Langa Commission and SADC military intervention, which will be articulated in detail later in this chapter.

4.2.2 The onus of exile

The BCP, as the land-slide victor of the 1993 elections, missed the opportunity of transformation from 'exiled opposition' to 'state party' throughout its ranks. The former military wing of the party, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), was dislodged and repudiated by the leadership upon return from exile. The soldiers' calls for redress through either monetary compensation from a national fund or integration

into the state security establishment were overlooked. The unintended consequence of these developments was the unleashing of militarily trained and discontented men into society. Thus, the chances of an armed insurgency, which obviously posed a threat to the security forces and ruling elite, became more of a reality (Matlosa, 1997).

Internally, the race for power widened a rift and deepened factionalism in both the Cabinet and Parliament (Pule, 1999). This was further escalated in June 1997 when the Prime Minister, with the support of the majority of parliamentarians, ventured into forming a new party, the LCD, “which he immediately declared the ruling party, thus condemning the election-winning BCP to opposition status overnight. While this turn of events was technically constitutionally admissible, it also raised issues of trust, and further fuelled calls for reform or change of the electoral model to allow for recall or its equivalent for those who betray their mandate in parliament” (Matlosa, 1997).

4.2.3 The fragmented military

January 1994 was characterized by the full-scale battle which broke out between the two camps of the army, commonly viewed as pro-BCP and pro-BNP respectively. Selinyane (2006:62) argues that, “though the incident had a pay demand as its immediate background, it also had political undercurrents, coming as it did only two months after the November expulsion of four senior officers. Only three months later, in April 1994, four cabinet ministers were rounded up and detained by some units of the army, but later escaped to South Africa where they remained for a good part of the year. On that occasion, the Deputy Prime Minister was killed by the army units”. The intrusion of the arms underground supply into the country with the aid of the cohort of corrupt members of parliament (MPs), fueled the political turmoil. Consequently, in 1995 some MPs, including segments of the former Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), were arrested by intelligence operatives in connection with these malicious and corrupt acts, which posed a threat to the security of the state. However, the Home Affairs minister’s peculiar intervention facilitated the repatriation of the South Africans without due process.

4.2.4 The opposition and the crisis

Due to the fragility of the government, the major opposition BNP became a vital driving force behind the political turmoil that ensued subsequent to the 1993 elections. The disarray which became the order of the day within the ranks of the military was partly attributed to the leader of the main opposition BNP, who was also a previous veteran minister and military government official, which led him to be convicted for sedition. The June 1997 manipulation of power by the Prime Minister through the formation of the LCD in parliament, had the unintended consequence of mobilizing and uniting the opposition parties. Thus, the BNP and the MFP mobilized and led mass protests in an attempt to compel the king to abjure the LCD from taking over the reins of government. These attempts by the opposition parties proved to be futile and the only card at their disposal was the next election. However, the LCD won the 1998 election with an overwhelming majority and the revolt ensued immediately as the opposition parties vehemently dismissed the results (Matlosa, 1997).

According to Selinyane (2006:64) “the problem of political instability in Lesotho is clearly one of election dissatisfaction and lack of an institutionalized mechanism for dealing with it. Whether 1970, 1993, 1998 or even 2002, the rejection of the election results by the losing side has resulted in a national upheaval of sometimes catastrophic proportions. In each instance, the discontented side invoked the wrath of its followers to resolve the problem. But in opening the gates for a mass storming of the system, the elites also inevitably undermined the very rules that allowed the system to function as an effective mediator of the inter-elite conflicts”.

“It is the paradox of this elite disposition that the voting citizens are quickly released back into general society as soon as the elite goals are in sight, without being allowed to determine the content of the end product. This elite non-observance of the rules of the game has reinforced a perception that the side that rakes up the most turmoil is most likely to have its way, with a resort to physical violence when that fails. This predilection has not been a monopoly of the opposition” (Selinyane, 2006). This propensity to resort to elections and re-election whenever there is a dispute between the parties then begs the question about the extent to which the electoral system can be perceived as an institutional mechanism to mitigate electoral disputes

and curtail the political turmoil thereafter. Debates about democratic transition in Africa have tended to question the value of regular elections and multi-partyism that does not necessarily deepen state-society relationships (Nyangoro and Shaw, 1992; Olukoshi and Wolgemuth, 1995). However, “this weakness of Lesotho’s political system dictates the texture of South Africa’s intervention, which faltered precisely on failing to tackle this challenge” (Selinyane, 2006:65-66).

4.3 RESOLUTION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION

4.3.1 The January 1994 military crisis

When the fault lines in the army became evident to the public through the shooting of the head of the Air Wing on 15 January 1994, Pik Botha, then the Foreign Minister of South Africa, flew to Maseru to secretly engage the government of Lesotho, the opposition and the two army factions. Subsequently, the South African Foreign Minister delivered the country’s concerns to five neighboring countries (Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Swaziland), and extended these concerns to the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Commonwealth immediately deployed envoys to Maseru. The common concerns that these missions carried was the veto of any unconstitutional change of government (Nkiwane, 1997).

The diplomatic initiatives were not in time to counteract the turmoil and fighting broke out before their full effect materialized. Subsequently, the Head of States of Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa, together with the ANC President, Nelson Mandela, convened in Gaborone in order to find creative ways to mitigate and ameliorate the Lesotho crisis. This meeting produced a Task Force comprised of Foreign Ministers from each of these three countries, whose first task was to travel on a fact-finding mission to Lesotho, followed by a visit by Presidents Mugabe and Masire. Selinyane (2006), citing Nkiwane (1997), writes of this mission as follows:

The mission made recommendations that included an impartial inquiry into the causes of friction in the army, an assurance of the neutrality of the civil service, and clear lines of communication between the army and the various government ministries, as well as confirmation of the legitimacy of the monarchy in Lesotho’s

polity, and a possible integration of some LLA personnel into the army (Lesotho Defence Force Commission, 1995).

4.3.2 The August 1994 constitutional crisis

There was a proclivity on the side of government to fail its co-protagonists and mediators when issues of amelioration led to the dissolution of the government by King Letsie III in August 1994. Subsequent to the dissolution of the government, an interim government was established by the king. This act provoked mass action in the form of protests and marches to the royal house, which were met with force by the military. Thus, an amalgamation of local civil society organizations into an 'Alliance for Democracy' became evident and the Alliance organized national strikes for almost 5 days. It was against this background that the triad of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana expeditiously convened in Gaborone, signaling an explicit note of discontent and tabled a deadline for the restoration of the government (Selinyane, 2006).

The second meeting of the triad in Pretoria a week later had the OAU secretary general Salim Ahmed Salim, King Letsie III and Prime Minister Mokhehle in attendance. The underlying issue addressed in this meeting was the vehement call for the restoration of government. The failure to heed this call would result in economic sanctions with possible military action as a last resort. Thus, an agreement between the parties was made public on 14 September. However the resolution revolved around South Africa's will to act and "any threat to resort to force hung on South Africa's co-operation or, at least, acquiescence. Under the circumstances, South Africa was more than willing to be useful. In fact, South Africa made a habit of mounting aerial and infantry exercises on the border with Lesotho during the repeated clashes of the early 1990s" (Selinyane, 2006:67).

The historical and geographical relations between South Africa and Lesotho were paramount as there was a real possibility of South Africa declaring economic sanctions against a country that it completely surrounds, with a 90 percent dependence on South Africa for food imports, 40 percent dependence for adult male employment, and a remote possibility of military reaction. Before democracy in South Africa, these sanctions were once applied against Lesotho. However, it was

Mandela's adamant stance that avoided military intervention, which was favored by Mugabe and Prime Minister Mokhehle (Sejanamane, 1995; Hanlon, 1995).

4.3.3 The May 1998 electoral crisis

The August 1998 constitutional crisis adopted a unique character as opposed to the first crisis. The mass action by the opposition alliance was immediately followed by the High Court application for the nullification of the election results of 1998 and the dissolution of government. However, the court ruling stressed the judicial limitation of powers on matters that involve the dissolution of government and that according to the constitution only the King is vested with powers to dismiss government. Thus, following the police permit for the opposition parties to march to the palace, the opposition camped outside the palace gates for a week, awaiting the response of the King. This was followed by the complete blockade of the capital, Maseru, on the 10 August 1998. South Africa immediately intervened, sending a delegation led by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki to engage the leaders of government and opposition and seek to ameliorate the situation before it escalated into violence (Selinyane, 2006:68).

The South African preventive efforts yielded results as the parties agreed to the formation of a commission of inquiry. The commission was to investigate the validity of the 1998 election results and the authenticity of the claims made by the opposition. The commission was chaired by a South African judge, Pius Langa, and its members consisted of delegates from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana who had formed part of the 1994 agreement. The Langa Commission began its work on 14 August 1998 and two weeks later Thabo Mbeki published the interim report of the commission in which, according to Radio Lesotho (26 August 1998), it was publicly declared that 98 per cent of the electoral process was characterized by faults and irregularities. Following the allegations that there were fraudulent tendencies which characterized the elections as per the interim report of the Langa Commission, Lesotho's government ministers were vehemently against the use of such terms in the report. Selinyane (2006:69) writes that the "government ministers in Maseru mounted several campaigns on Radio Lesotho to ban the word 'fraud' from the national political vocabulary in the discourses about the crisis. In subsequent weeks, the word was avoided by all major players, including foreign mediators and the

Langa Commission". However, the unintended consequences of this gesture were the fundamental misdiagnosis of the problem, as was the solution, with grave implications for the process of democracy.

The Langa Commission investigation processes were open to the members of the public during the proceedings. The commission immediately exposed the compromising weakness in the profile of the elections. As the Langa Commission headed towards the conclusion of the inquiry, the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), tabled their view of the crisis, contending that among other things, that if the final recommendations of the Langa Commission included the dissolution of the LCD government, The Principal Secretaries should take over the reins of government until the next elections. They did not want the option of a government of national unity to be considered, but this was the preferred option of the opposition (PFD, 1998). In September 1998 the SADC summit was scheduled to convene in Mauritius and all concerned parties to the Lesotho crisis were invited to discuss the final report of the Langa Commission. The opposition parties vehemently declined the invite stating that domestic affairs cannot be resolved on foreign soil (Selinyane, 2006:69-70). Subsequently, the streets of Lesotho descended into chaos as disregard of law, 'including arbitrary impounding of government cars, total shutdown of civil service offices and intermittent hijacking of ordinary citizens' vehicles became the order of the day' (Selinyane, 2006:69-70). According to Motsamai (2015:3), "The findings of the Langa Commission were controversial, as the opposition challenged their veracity. The dissidents alleged that the report had been doctored and that the interim report claimed that the election was invalid".

4.3.4 Intervention by South Africa and Botswana

The Lesotho Government was convinced that a political resolution would be contrary to its interests, and it therefore began to lobby for military resolution abroad. On 10 September 1998, the Prime Minister requested that the SADC intervene militarily in Lesotho; and almost instantly a memorandum was concluded between Lesotho and South Africa providing for the deployment of South African troops in Lesotho from 16 September, with Lesotho paying all the costs of the intervention (Langa Commission, 1998). Subsequently, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) conducted a raid in Lesotho which was later joined by the Botswana Defence Force.

Makoanyane and Ratjomose barracks in Maseru became the targets of this incursion as well as the Maseru palace grounds and the Katse Dam LDF base. Consequently, the central business district of Maseru experienced massive looting and arson that reduced the city to a state of chaos in a day. This massive looting and arson quickly spread to other towns in the southern region of the country, including Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek (Leon Commission, 2001).

Despite the unintended consequences, the intervention by the SADC-member militaries paved the way for the talks to resume and restored some degree of stability. South Africa had a predetermined outcome for the Lesotho crisis and was willing to go the extra mile for its agenda to materialize. On the South African National Television, the then Deputy President of South Africa announced that the SANDF had intervened militarily in Lesotho following reports of a military coup in Maseru, citing *The Star* of 22nd September 1998 and confirmed that this military action was not necessary based on the study of the unfolding development on the ground. This military intervention by South Africa was further confirmed by the radio announcement by the LDF command on 22 December 1998, saying that "on the eve of the September Raid, an agreement had been reached by all sides in the army debacle to convene and find common ground regarding the crisis of lawlessness in the capital" (Selinyane, 2006:71). The adamant character shown by South Africa to resolve the Lesotho crisis was cemented by President Nelson Mandela in his television statement of 13 October 1998 as he stated that South Africa is confident that their proposed plan will emerge eventually.

The Interim Political Authority (IPA) was established and a consensus was signed by the four disputant parties (LCD, BNP, BCP and MFP). This agreement stipulated that the national affairs during the transition to the election over a period of 15 to 18 months would remain fully in the hands of the LCD government, subjecting the rest of the parties to mere advisors of government through the channels of the Interim Political Authority (IPA) (Selinyane, 2006:72). According to Motsamai (2015:4), the IPA ushered in an adoption of a new electoral model, the Mixed Member Parallel (MMP), which was the composition of the FPTP and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. This new electoral model prevented the development of a 'winner-takes-all' electoral result and promoted the multi-party parliament. According to

Selinyane (2006:72), “while this intervention restored stability, it was skewed in favour of the ruling party in a way that cost it a precious opportunity to restructure the perpetually capricious politics of Lesotho”. Similarly, Motsamai (2015:4) argues that this change of the electoral model failed to transform the violent political culture of the country as demonstrated by the events subsequent to the 2007 elections.

Regarding the South African engagement and intervention, Selinyane (2006:72) writes that:

The South African military intervention monetarily removed politics from the menu of solutions. The deteriorating situation in Maseru dictated a need for external mediation. An agency for such mediation already existed in the form of the troika of guarantors of the 1994 agreement. The ruling party preferred a military solution that would ensure its supremacy and shift the focus from the essence of alleged electoral fraud. This was made possible by the September raid. South Africa, however, failed to take a panoramic view of the Lesotho crisis. The government had refused to integrate the LLA into the national army, an omission that became a central node of the confrontation leading to the ruling party’s split of 1997, and laid the foundations for the 1998 debacle. The government ignored the Lesotho Defence Force Commission’s advice to discharge from the army specifically named promoters of instability in the force, and opted instead to promote them to higher ranks. The government failed to act on the recommendations of the 1995 National Dialogue conference, such as election model reform and the establishment of an electoral court to deal with poll disputes. South Africa, alongside two other guarantors of the 1994 agreement, was privy to all these omissions and seemingly condoned them. South Africa’s prevarication created room for the situation to slide into chaos. Mbeki’s failure to present the Langa Commission’s report, and South Africa’s failure to secure the ruling party’s presence at the talks when the report was finally released, sent strong signals to both contending sides that South Africa was being soft on the government. In the end, South Africa chose the least intractable way out, namely to bolster the incumbent elites on the pretext of government-to-government assistance.

4.4 SUCCESS FOR HEGEMONIC STABILITY

Despite its weaknesses, the intervention by South Africa was successful in creating stability and peace, and holds crucial lessons for future South African foreign policy and particularly engagement in Africa. Intervention in foreign conflicts is always accompanied by uncertainties. Lesotho, however, was to some extent a success for South Africa. Some critics like Southall (2003) perceived South Africa’s intervention

as an 'unlikely success' and in the same vein South Africa was qualified as being a bully towards Lesotho by some writers (Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, 2003). Similarly, Makoa (1999) characterized South Africa's intervention as neo-imperialist tendencies. South Africa's intervention, according to Habib and Selinyane (2004), paved the way for future hegemonic interventions, which have the potential for the forging of peace and stability by South Africa on the African continent.

The Lesotho crisis gave South Africa a degree of experience in dealing with foreign conflict in the SADC and beyond. Subsequently, the country assumed a leading role in the case of Zimbabwe and Swaziland. According to Selinyane (2006:78) the critics of South African intervention "chastised what they termed South African foreign policy's schizophrenic tendency of acting with resolve at one point and opting for recalcitrance in the name of a need for multilateralism at another. Indeed, their case was, that to be a quintessential hegemon, South Africa needed to pull together all these strands in its relations with the region and the continent".

It could be argued that in Lesotho's constitutional crises, South Africa's interventions and successes thereof were eased by the political intercourse that existed between the regional leaders. However, what cultivated the regional unity towards Lesotho was the leading role that South Africa played. Pretoria's resolution to advocate for a negotiated settlement made it possible to avoid a military intervention during the January 1994 military debacle and the August 1994 'palace coup' (Selinyane, 2006:79). In the same vein, Sejanamane (1995) argues that though the possibility of a military intervention was justifiable, 'the incentives to act were also tangible to both sides in the conflict'. The feud and the lack of trust between the parties in the conflict required the mediators to exercise a considerable degree of impartiality and a deep understanding of the Lesotho crisis. "This was the role played by Rusty Evans, former Director General of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, in forging the agreement between the Palace and State House in September 1994, while the itinerant missions of the OAU and the UN proved to be less effective" (Selinyane, 2006:79).

The 1998 multilateral intervention in Lesotho was led by South Africa, which prescribed the nature of this intervention. Despite the challenges that existed, the multi-state composition of the Langa Commission adjured the trust of the parties.

When the Lesotho government requested South African military intervention, this was done through the consent of the troika partners. South Africa's commitment to the creation of peace and stability on the continent remains undoubted. According to Selinyane (2006:79), the creation of peace and stability on the African continent is a project that requires the leadership of a hegemonic state that would also invest the resources to support such an ideal. Indeed, South Africa has invested its resources in an attempt to help Lesotho to develop its infrastructure and its economy. Evident in this assertion was the reopening of talks for the next phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, and the agreement for the commencement of Phase B of the project, which has since been concluded. According to Selinyane (2006), "in an economy the size of Lesotho's, this project is a mammoth component, shown by the dedication of the government ministry. Indeed, the Central Bank of Lesotho, in its annual survey of the national economy, remarks regularly about the effect of the project's activities on swings in the country's gross domestic product". In addition, the withdrawal of the visa requirement and yearly renewal of study permits for Lesotho students in South Africa attests to the improving relations between the two states. There is only one university in Lesotho that has a student population of roughly five thousand. Often, this number is shouldered by South African universities and TVET colleges. In cementing this, the September bilateral consensus was arrived at on condition that Lesotho would pay for the costs of military assistance. However, South Africa wrote off all the debt owed to it, assessed at R80 million. According to Selinyane these are characteristics of a comprehensive hegemonic approach (2006:80).

4.5 CONCLUSION

The chronic political instability in Lesotho has always involved South Africa in its resolution. South Africa has played a leading role in the resolution of the Lesotho constitutional debacle 1990-1994 together with other SADC countries. South Africa and Lesotho shared common struggles against colonialism and Apartheid and thus, this historical bond has created inter-dependency between the two states. Lesotho's move to a constitutional dispensation in 1993 enabled the political elites to enjoy close political relations with South Africa. The healthy political relations between the two states enabled South Africa to intervene and mediate in the protracted disputes

of the recalcitrant Lesotho political class. However, the backdrop of South Africa's intervention and mediation was the failure to inculcate responsibility to the conflicted parties to sustain the stability of their political system and institutions. The strong political institutions would enable the opposition parties to apply checks and balances and enable the resolution of disputes between political elites. When the country was embroiled in political turmoil once again in 1998, South Africa was compelled to resort to military intervention to ameliorate the situation and pave the way for the talks between the belligerents. The intervention, at first, was met with a lot of opposition, resulting in the capital, Maseru, deteriorating into a state of chaos and anarchy. However, it was ultimately consolidated, culminating in a transition that produced a multi-party parliament. South Africa's adamant stance to invest in the economy of Lesotho ensured that political stability is grounded on sound reconstruction.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONFLICT PROVENTION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

It is of paramount importance to highlight from the outset that there is not a lot of literature on provention. Therefore, in this chapter the researcher relied mostly on Burton as a source. This presents both a challenge as well as a need to do more research on this approach to social conflict.

The 11 September 2011 (9/11) attack on the United States, the November 2015 Paris terror attacks, the 2011 invasion of Libya by NATO forces resulting in the civil war in this country, the annexation of Crimea in Ukraine by the Russian Federation in March 2014, the recurring Boko Haram terror attacks in Nigeria, the deep-rooted conflict in Syria, Sudan and South Sudan are some of the key recent and/or current violent conflicts that confirm predictions made by John Burton dating as far back as two decades ago.

Burton predicted more than twenty years ago that “there are compelling analytical reasons to assume a continuing escalation in the incidence of conflict, and levels of violence associated with it. There are reasons to believe that, given present social and political trends, and given traditional means of control, there will, in fact, be at all social levels, an escalation of conflict at a cumulative rate” (1990:50-51). This increase in conflict has occurred alongside the introduction of progressively more sophisticated policies of deterrence on a global level that seem to be forcing a reconsideration of policies in great and mid-power relationships, for ‘provention’ – Burton’s concept which will be discussed in more detail below - at that level is now a precondition of survival.

The dominant view is that conflicting behaviours can be deterred. However, if this approach does not prove successful, all conflicts can be contained provided sufficient coercion is employed (Burton, 1990:13). This is what traditional preventive diplomacy seeks to advance. However, this section of the paper advances an argument of conflict provention which is a complete opposite of preventive diplomacy. This chapter will discuss the concept of conflict provention in order to

address the objective of this research. The outline of this chapter will be as follows: the chapter will offer a brief discussion of prevention and social problems; a detailed discussion of conflict prevention as an approach; latent and manifest conflict; and the cost of treating symptoms using Galtung's ABC Triangle of conflict as an explanatory and analysis tool.

5.2 CONFLICT PREVENTION

John Burton (1990) offers a critical distinction between approaches of conflict prevention as a form of conflict containment through means of dispute settlement and regulation, and prevention, directed at removing causes of conflict and promoting conditions in which behaviors become controlled by the extent to which parties value the collaborative quality of their relationship. In such relationships, "exchanges of short-term political expediency are supplanted by long-term policy development, aimed at tackling problems before they become conflicts" (Anstey, 2006:128).

Anstey (2006), in his book *Managing Change Negotiating Conflict*, postulates that prevention and transformation require a fundamental change in conditions and attitudes of the parties. In the same breath, Mayer (2001), as cited by Anstey (2006), argues that reconciliation, which transforms (rather than regulates) conflicts, involves "deeper, more far reaching" forms of resolution than agreements. In contrast, Zartman (2001) writes, that while prevention is a worthy goal, it is an unrealistic one in the short term as conflict is unlikely to be eliminated from human behaviour. Zartman further proposes that efforts should rather be concentrated on reducing conflict escalation and violence first. According to Anstey (2006:129), the problem that faces the proponents of preventive diplomacy is quite often the fact that the parties see little need for it.

There is not yet the imperative of a hurting stalemate or perception of a need to change attitudes or approaches surrounding issues. Thus, having failed to foresee the need to approach relations differently to prevent conflicts arising or escalating, parties embroiled in conflicts are often possessed by dynamics that lock them into the crisis of escalation. Further, to be credible and lasting, a solution to any conflict

should not benefit one conflicting party, but all those that are in a conflict (Zartman, 2001).

According to Burton (1990:3), conflict provention means “deducing from an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of conflict, including its human dimensions, not merely the conditions that create an environment of conflict, and the structural changes required to remove it, but more importantly, the promotion of conditions that create cooperative relationships.” The term provention was invented because “prevention” has a negative connotation. Conflict provention refers to the removal of underlying negative conditions, and the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative relationships. This approach to social conflict extends the scope of our concerns beyond the narrow area of conflict resolution. Provention is thus concerned with social problems generally, with altering the environments that lead to conflict, and with creating environments that mitigate conflict.

5.2.1 Provention and social problems

Conflict is a multi-faceted phenomenon with a number of causes. Thus, any approach that seeks to address any conflict situation should take into account the complexity of the conflict at hand. This section of the paper is influenced by an awareness of the complexity of conflicts, within societies and internationally, that could not be contained when treated by the enforcement of legal norms or by means of coercive power. This is where it becomes critical to highlight that a “failure to recognize that there are two quite different types of conflicts- those that are subject to the application of social and legal norms and coercive processes, and those that are not” (1990), is at the heart of the argument of this paper on the handling of conflicts within and between societies. In his public lecture titled “Breaking the Cycle of Violence” at the Institute for Peace & Justice Distinguished Lecture Series, Galtung postulated that the basic thesis of conflict is that wherever there is violence, there is unresolved conflict. Unresolved conflict means there is an incompatibility of goals, including issues that have not been resolved, superseded or transformed. That conflict can be directly between actors who have conscious goals or it can be structural, between parties that have their own interests. Thus, for violence to stop, the conflict must be resolved (2001).

In the age of growing inequality and unemployment within societies, terrorism, ethnic conflict and scarcity of resources, governments seem to be in a state of confusion on foreign and strategic policies that seek to address these social ills. According to Burton, “there is a growing number of ethnic and tribal conflicts that remain unresolved in addition to problems with military governments. Across continents jails and correction centres are overcrowded and, moreover, seem not to achieve their purpose” (1990:14). This argument is supported by the example that the majority of people who are sent to jail return to their communities after their release. In many instances, the time in jail does not lead to rehabilitation. “Deterrent and coercive approaches do not lead to the discovery or removal of causes of conflict in any particular case, and do nothing to stop others occurring” (Burton, 1990:14).

In cementing this argument, South Africa is a case in point. According to the Justice and Correctional Services Minister, Michael Masutha, there are approximately 160 000 prisoners in South Africa but the system has the capacity to accommodate only 120 000. This means that South African prisons are overcrowded by approximately 40 000 prisoners. Masutha claims that the current levels of overcrowding in correctional centres in major provinces like Western Cape, Kwazulu Natal and Gauteng are between 200 and 300% above capacity. Referring to the Pollsmoor prison in the Western Cape, the minister attributed the challenge of prison overcrowding to the “particular socio-economic circumstances in areas of the Western Cape, such as congestion in the townships and the Cape Flats, fuelled by the serious crime rate resulting in the problems at Pollsmoor” (News24, 2016-12-23). It is against this background that Burton concludes that “the traditional orientation that focuses on the primacy of authoritative institutions as the means of control implies an invalid assumption: that social conflict is due to human deformities rather than to structural or institutional deformities, and can be controlled, therefore, by deterrents, constrains and coercion” (1990:32).

Conflict prevention seeks to address deep-rooted disputes and conflict. Deep-rooted conflict includes cases of conflict with political elites/authorities, between political elites and among persons and groups in societies. Symptoms of deep-rooted conflict include “hostage taking, illegal strikes, public protest movements, ethnic violence, terrorism, gang warfare, and many other forms of intractable opposition to authority

at one social level on another” (Burton, 1990:15). The conflict in Lesotho is the case in point. The containment of conflict within existing frameworks is not possible, except over severely limited periods of time.

Burton argues that such conflicts require alterations in norms, institutions and policies to bring adjustment within the range of human acceptability and capability. Therefore, this requires an analysis of the total situation and an appropriate remedy, rather than merely the containment of dissident behaviours (1990:15). Social instability and human survival issues cannot be resolved in the absence of an explanatory and preventive approach to them. Often, the intervention approach to violent conflicts, such as peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy, seek to address only the symptoms of conflict, such as violence or the threat of violence and the cost of treating symptoms is far more expensive than treating the underlying causes giving rise to such conflicts. The short-sightedness of these approaches leads to the neglect of the real causes of conflict, hence the frequent recurrence of conflict after a period of stability, as evidenced in the case of countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan, and many others.

5.2.2 Provention implies change

Unlike preventive diplomacy, which is a quick-fix and case by case approach to conflict escalation, provention is the long-term policy approach that aims to eliminate the sources of conflict. According to Burton, “explanations of behaviour that direct attention to the need to adjust systems to people, rather than the other way around, provides a predictive base that usually points to the necessity to alter environments and conditions as the means of provention” (1990:236). In other words, provention requires change or transformation of the existing structures and institutions through policy that is geared towards addressing the underlying causes of conflict in the society. Conflict provention as a policy, argues Burton, is a requirement of survival in a nuclear or any other age (1982). Proventive measures are relevant to those who are concerned with policy-making at local, regional, corporate, administrative and parliamentary levels, as well as in international organisations, and require far deeper background knowledge of the sources of conflict, and of the environmental changes that would be required to *provent* it (Burton, 1990:257).

5.3 MANIFEST AND LATENT CONFLICT: THE COST OF TREATING SYMPTOMS

Issues that pertain to social stability and human survival cannot be addressed if there is an absence of explanatory and preventive approaches to them. Burton postulates that the 20th century has been characterized by a major shift to securitization, investing in major and costly industry in security checks, while little attention is given to the sources of robbery and terrorism. Financial muscles are concentrated more on jails and very little on the sources of deviant behaviours. Europe and the West “impose their institutions and values on peoples of other nations in the name of democracy and freedom, but there is little analysis and understanding of the oppressive circumstances that have led peoples and nations to their present condition, or their present felt needs for taking steps toward their independent development” (Burton, 1990:17). In the later chapters of his book *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, Burton writes that:

In the global society, great powers are still operating on the traditional assumption that other nations can be coerced into behaving in certain ways. This is the approach adopted by greater powers to “terrorism”, to competing economic and political systems, and to small states that seek to establish alternative political systems. It is predictable that war is frequently the result, despite the relatively weak position of small states. It should come as no surprise that small states can “win” conflicts with greater powers. Great powers have not yet come to terms with their failures to control by military force, because they have as yet little understanding that there are human needs that are not for trading and cannot be suppressed (1990:40).

Meanwhile, the costs of containing conflict and violence - that is of treating symptoms by traditional coercive means - are more than societies can afford. The misdiagnosis of conflict comes with a proclivity from governments to be obsessed with treating the behaviour and not the underlying causes that give rise to the conflict, whether violent or non-violent. Sandole’s (1987:289) distinction between genotypic (underlying) and phenotypic (behaviour), of the phenomena of conflict is the critical point of departure for this section:

What most of us think when we observe conflict situations are phenotypical phenomena: the claims and demands of the parties, their behaviour, (of an attack by one side on the other), the results of their behaviour (casualties) and level of their interaction (interpersonal, intergroup, inter-organisational and international). It is also

on the phenotypical plane that we observe differences among the specific manifestations of these abstract levels; family community, environmental, labour management, and interstate conflict and conflict management. According to Bradshaw (2008:16), the underlying, invisible and giving rise to the phenotypic phenomena, are the genotypic. Mitchell (1981:17-32) takes this distinction further by separating conflict into three components:

- The underlying conflict situation, or contradiction;
- Conflict attitudes;
- Conflict behaviour.

According to Mitchell, it is of paramount importance to distinguish the existence of conflict from its behavioural manifestations. Galtung (2002), as cited by Bradshaw (2008:17), argues that social conflict is a complex phenomenon, which refers to the behaviours, attitudes and structural underpinnings of contention among the social collective.

5.3.1 Manifest and Latent Conflict: The ABC Triangle of Conflict



Figure 5.1: The ABC Triangle of Conflict. Source: Adapted from Galtung (1979:72).

Conflict is defined “in terms of incompatibilities, of contradictions, and that should not be confused with the attitudinal and behavioural consequences of conflict, often destructive (hatred and violence against objects and people)” (Galtung, 1979:105). They all come together in an ABC triangle, as illustrated in the figure above. Adopting Galtung’s ABC triangle and using it as a tool for analysis, one could argue that preventive diplomacy is more concerned with the manifest conflict. The manifest conflict refers to the behaviour within a conflict situation, such as fighting and violence. As argued in chapter 2, preventive diplomacy, according to the United Nations (UN) Agenda for Peace, as presented by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992), consists of the actions undertaken in order to “prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”. Involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, and possibly ‘preventive deployment’ of UN-authorized forces”. Preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects for peaceful settlement. The basic tenets of preventive diplomacy are to prevent violent conflict from escalating.

Conflict prevention, however, is also concerned with the latent conflict (attitudes and contradictions). The approach as proposed in this research, takes a holistic approach rather than a narrow view of conflict, as mostly evident during preventive diplomacy. Conflict prevention seeks to address the underlying causes of violent conflict. Transformation and development are at the core of conflict prevention in this regard. The concern is not with the elimination of violent behavior, such as protests and fighting, but rather with the transformation of such attitudes and behavior through addressing basic human needs. Addressing the behavioral forms of conflict as illustrated in the ABC triangle above does not solve the fundamental causes of violent conflict, but merely treats the symptoms. This point has been advanced in detail in the section above. In other words, preventive diplomacy alone is not sufficient to address conflict, whether domestic or international. A more holistic approach is needed. This research will propose an approach in the next chapter.

5.4 CONCLUSION

As argued in the previous chapters, prevention is an invented approach. The absence of a suitable word reflects the fact that prevention of an undesired event by

removing its causes, and by creating conditions in which it cannot occur, has not been a focus of attention of societies or scholars. This chapter has discussed conflict prevention in detail, drawing from the work of John Burton. Galtung's ABC triangle of conflict was adopted in this chapter as a tool for analysis in order to differentiate between preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. This enabled the writer to provide theoretical clarity about a need to propose an alternative approach to the mediation of conflict in Africa. The next chapter will provide findings, recommendations and the conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER SIX

KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As South Africans we are proud of our achievements but we also recognise that the challenges that lie before us are no different to those faced by the region and indeed Africa as a whole. Common needs and interdependence dictate a common interest in regional integration and reconstruction (Nelson Mandela, 1995).

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to explore the use of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as approaches for the mediation of violent African conflicts. In his writings, Galtung was the first to propose the concept of positive and negative peace; the latter was described as an “absence of violence, absence of war.” The former, which he described as integration of human society and the provision of basic human needs to all members of the society (Galtung; 1964:2), is the one that is of most interest for this study. The concept of peace is premised on the problem statement that, in spite of the notion of African solutions for African problems, there is no substantial progress regarding timely mediation of conflicts in Africa in order to safeguard stability, peace, people’s rights and the provision of basic needs to all.

This study proposed that sustainable peace requires conflict prevention, which facilitates the creation of positive peace, which some see as a “stable social equilibrium in which the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war” (Reychler, 2001:12). This study argued that sustainable peace is characterized by the absence of physical and structural violence and the elimination of discrimination and self-sustainability (Reychler, 2001:12). Its aim is to move a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well-being. According to Bigdon and Korf (2004), positive peace could be described as “conflict transformation”. Conflict transformation can be achieved by searching for the causes of conflict, which are often deeply rooted in human needs, dignity, recognition, safety and freedom. Johan Galtung’s (1964;

1969) illuminating distinction between positive and negative peace is a useful point of departure to analyze preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention approaches to peace and conflict research.

Galtung postulates that peace can be defined as an “absence of violence” and that violence is “the cause of difference between the potential and the actual”. This approach allows him to differentiate between personal and structural violence. At the centre of personal violence is the individual, whereas structural violence more broadly focuses on whether the societal structures in which people live, enable them to realize their full potential. Thus, Galtung argues that peace and conflict research must not only focus on eliminating the immediate causes of war (creating negative peace), but also create societal structures conducive to long-term peace and general welfare (creating positive peace), (1969:167-168).

Peace and conflict researchers are often concerned with the wider goals of development (Gleditsch, 2004). This study argued that human-centred development based on conflict prevention is the necessary alternative for sustainable peace and development. The study used the Southern African region as the level of analysis, adopting Lesotho’s experiences of violent conflict and South Africa’s engagement in peacemaking as a case under the spotlight. To facilitate this study the following research questions were formulated:

- What is South Africa’s role and record as a mediator of disputes and conflicts in the SADC and Africa?
- How did South Africa use preventive diplomacy to mediate disputes and conflict in Lesotho, and what were its successes, challenges and shortcomings?
- Is conflict prevention - as opposed to prevention alone - an answer for future engagements in conflict cases such as Lesotho?

This chapter will offer an overall conclusion of the study. The chapter will present the data analysis of the study and the findings and also introduce a Blended Social Conflict Approach, which is coined in this research and is still a work in progress, as a type of model for the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa. The chapter will end with recommendations for future research. Recommendations can be about

further work on the Blended Social Conflict Approach, doing similar research on different countries, doing comparative research on the same issues, etc.

6.2 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It could be argued that South Africa's preventive efforts and peace-building operations in Lesotho have yielded mixed results, and have fallen short in addressing the recurrence of conflict and enhancing the potential to achieve sustainable peace in Lesotho. In chapter four it was presented that despite preventive efforts by South Africa, Lesotho always relapsed into political instability after a period of relative stability. The concept of conflict prevention, as presented and proposed in this research, stresses the need to shift attention from deterrence and suppression of conflict to addressing the underlying issues that give rise to violent conflict. This, in a sense, is an ideal embodied in the draft white paper on South African foreign policy, perceiving peace and development as intractable and linked, and stipulating that intra-state conflicts continue to frustrate sustainable development in Africa, as this does not often materialise in the aftermath of disputes, conflict and violence. The section below will present key findings that emerged from the study.

6.2.1 Ten key findings of the study

- The lack of tolerance and the cancer of mistrust within Lesotho's political parties are the driving forces behind the political violence that has in turn become a mode to defend and advance political causes and the interests of various parties. This toxic political atmosphere is further perpetuated by the historical context of factionalism and the institutionalization of political violence.
- The failure of political parties in Lesotho to reach a lasting agreement on the fundamental causes of political turmoil are cited as a second key finding. This proclivity has embedded an attitude of resistance by governments of the day to address administration short-falls, such as corruption and a need for institutional reforms and their full implementation.
- Thirdly, the failure to separate the military from the country's politics is a sign of an ailing political system. The use of the military to settle political disputes

by governing administrations has led to the politicisation of security institutions in Lesotho, which in turn creates the complexities in the system. This leaves the country prone to military coups during and after elections.

- The proclivity of the SADC to rely on elections to bring an end to instability as well as addressing the protracted security challenges in Lesotho has proven to be ineffective in the light of recurring political turmoil. The quick-fix approach to stability that is always used, fails to address the underlying causes which give rise to the instability in the country. Thus, as in the past, the electoral outcomes in Lesotho have never been able to resolve the protracted rivalries between parties or create an environment that ameliorates and mitigates the instability of governance.
- The lack of unity and co-ordination from the SADC regarding the crisis in Lesotho and the form of intervention thereof, deprived Lesotho of a sustainable peace in a country characterized by chronic conflict and instability. The SADC's failure to comprehend the deep-rootedness of the political instability in Lesotho fuelled the recurrence of this instability.
- The previous finding identified the shortcomings of the SADC; this is followed by South Africa's mediation efforts. The backdrop of South Africa's intervention and mediation was the failure by SADC to inculcate responsibility to the conflicted parties to sustain the stability of their political system and institutions. South Africa, on the other hand, has failed to galvanize the full support of the SADC region prior to its military intervention in Lesotho and this has had a devastating impact on South Africa on the mediation front. The opposition groups in Lesotho have perceived South African involvement as being biased towards the ruling party and this has had a negative impact on subsequent settlements.
- The preventive measures by South Africa and the SADC failed to comprehend the underlying issues giving rise to the recurring crisis in Lesotho. Although the Lesotho conflict is multi-faceted, the Westminster electoral system introduced by Britain towards the dawn of Lesotho's independence in 1966, could be identified as one of the latent issues that led to the instability in Lesotho's politics. This system was based on a First-Past-The-Post electoral

system and it became the latent cause of the manifest conflict which characterized the Lesotho political system for decades.


- The SADC and South Africa's intervention measures seem to be geared towards addressing the manifest forms of conflict and little attention is given to the underlying issues giving rise to the instability in the Southern Region in particular and Africa in general. The failure to comprehend the complexity of African conflict in an age of scarce resources has a contributing effect on the security of the continent.

The study has identified a need for South Africa to adopt a clear strategy on the management and intervention of international conflicts. Carvalho and Nganje argue that "countries often see engagement in conflict prevention as part of a pragmatic approach, where the international community is expected to do more with fewer resources," and recommend that countries like South Africa "should play an active role in defining its own strategies for conflict prevention, reducing the risk of it becoming side-lined and underfunded at a global level" (2016:30).

South African foreign policy needs to be restructured in order to incorporate conflict prevention as an approach to the mediation and resolution of conflict in the SADC in particular and Africa in general. The South African intervention into any conflict in Africa needs to be geared towards addressing the latent forms of conflict simultaneously with the manifest forms of conflict. The failure for any foreign policy to comprehend the complexity of social conflict, whether violent or non-violent, has the potential of protracting the very same conflict it seek to address.

The need for a clear foreign policy approach to the management and resolution of conflict in Africa has led to this research to study the successes and short-falls of South African preventive efforts in other countries to address the gap in the foreign policy. It is against this background that this study proposes the use of conflict prevention in order to achieve the transformation of conflict and development in the region and on the continent. This is done through a proposed model, which is a work in progress by this author:

6.2.2 Blended Social Conflict Approach



Conflict transformation and development

Figure 6.1: Blended Social Conflict Approach

The Blended Social Conflict Approach, as coined in this research, is the combination of preventive diplomacy, which is concerned with preventing the escalation of disputes into violence, and conflict provention, which refers to the removing of underlying causes of conflict through development and transformation. This hybrid model needs mediation processes as a facilitating agent to enable conflict provention and preventive diplomacy. The model assumes that the ultimate results would be conflict transformation and development. Transformation speaks to the transformation of violent and destructive conflict into non-violent and positive conflict, which acts as an agent for change. Development will result from the building of institutions and the fair distribution of resources, which address basic human needs. The model in this research is briefly introduced and still needs further work and tuning. This model could be used by the South African government as a foreign policy tool when mediating conflict in Africa.

The South African foreign policy on African security needs to prioritize the establishment of institutions that will enable sustainable peace. These institutions should allow the country in a state of instability to manage and transform its own

conflict and not rely on foreign intervention. In the same breath, these institutions should promote development in others to achieve sustainable peace. The institutions and platform for mediation and negotiations conducted by locals as opposed to foreign officials, are more strategic for sustainable peace.

6.3 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research

The study confronted limitations on certain approaches such as conflict prevention. The concept of conflict prevention is a relatively new approach to the resolution and management of conflict. The approach was introduced by John Burton in 1990 and little has been written on that approach by others since Burton. This creates difficulties for those who want to expand on this approach as the literature on it is lacking. Another limitation of the study was a focus on only two approaches - preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. There are a number of conflict management approaches that this study could have compared and contrasted in order to arrive at the recommendation of an appropriate approach for the mediation of African conflict. However, due to time and space constraints and what was feasible for the completion of the study, the author adopted only the two above-mentioned approaches.

For the purpose of this study, the author had to follow the research questions strictly in order to address the aims and objectives of the study. However, the author has intentions to do further research on the topic and expand this study by proposing the use of conflict prevention as a model for the mediation of conflict in Africa and elsewhere. Another limitation of the study was the method used to collect the data. The author relied on secondary data and desktop research. This was the only feasible method available as the author was under financial constraints. Thus, visiting Lesotho and even Pretoria to conduct field research was not feasible at this point. Perhaps, for a longitudinal research project with sufficient funding, the author will explore the possibility of conducting field research and interviews in order to have a mixture of primary and secondary sources in any future study.

6.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The relevance and significance of this study is that it assists in molding a robust foreign policy tool to be used by the South African government when mediating

African conflicts. The study argued that timely use of preventive diplomacy could help forge peace and stability on the continent currently characterized by instability and underdevelopment. The answers to the research question provide possible answers to address the complex issues pertaining to security, development and peace in Southern Africa. Conflict prevention then becomes a critical approach, as it seeks to address the underlying issues. Addressing the latent conflict means that basic human needs become the focus of any mediation process. The hypothesis therefore, is that the mediation process will prioritize issues of development, which will then enable sustainable peace and security.

6.5 CONCLUSION

This qualitative study has critically argued that preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention can combine the efficiency of conflict management and other related matters of any government's foreign policy. If this is done well, South Africa may serve as an example on the continent and in the world. This research has examined the South African government's role, capacity and record in conflict resolution in Africa. The locus of the study was on the preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as an approach for mediation and the resolution of conflicts in Africa, aiming to achieve, or at least help, countries to stabilize and start working on sustainable peace and security. The study used the South African government's preventive diplomacy efforts in Lesotho to illustrate the arguments discussed, and proposed the use of conflict prevention as an alternative approach to attain sustainable peace and avoid the recurrence of instability as is the case in Lesotho currently.

Using the Critical Social Science Approach as a data analysis tool, the author presented findings collected in chapters three and four and proposed conflict prevention in chapter five as an alternative approach for the management and resolution of conflict in Africa. Chapter one was the general introduction of the study, the objectives, research questions, and the methodology used was briefly discussed in this chapter. Chapter three discussed the methodology adopted by this study in detail and chapter four gave an in-depth discussion and analysis of the case study adopted by this study. Chapter six briefly discussed conflict prevention and proposed it as an approach for future use while intervening in conflict in Africa and elsewhere.

Lastly, this chapter has offered a bird's eye view of the entire study and a brief reflection of all chapters, and presented a summary of the findings of the study. There was also a brief discussion of the limitations and significance of the study.

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Appendix 1: A chronology of key events

DATES	EVENT
1820s	Basutoland founded by Moshoeshoe, who unites various groups to repel challenges from Zulus.
1834	Territorial encroachment by Boer trekkers starts decades of conflict.
1860s	Becomes a British protectorate.
1871	Annexed to the Cape Colony without people's consent.
1884	Becomes a British colony after revolt against Cape Colonial rule. Paramount chiefs retain large degree of autonomy.
1939-45	World War II, with 20,000 Sotho serving in the British forces.
1950s	Political parties emerge, press for independence.
Independence	
1966	Independence as Kingdom of Lesotho, with Moshoeshoe II as king and Chief Leabua Jonathan (Basotho National Party) as prime minister.
1970	Opposition Basutoland Congress Party leads in polls but Chief Jonathan suspends constitution, sends king into temporary exile.
1986	South Africa blocks borders, demanding expulsion of anti-apartheid activists. Major-General Justin Lekhanya replaces Chief Jonathan in coup.
1990	King Moshoeshoe II goes into exile. His son is sworn in as Letsie III.
1991	Lekhanya forced out by Colonel Elias Tutsoane Ramaema, who lifts ban on political activity.
1993	Basutoland Congress Party comes to power in elections.
1994	Fighting among rival army factions.

King Letsie III restored

- 1995** Moshoeshoe II restored to throne, but dies in a car crash. Letsie III restored as king.
- 1997** Basutoland Congress Party dismisses Ntsu Mokhehle as leader. He forms the Lesotho Congress of Democrats (LCD).
- 1998** LCD wins general elections, Pakalitha Mosisili becomes prime minister. Opposition stages protests against results. Rioting breaks out. At government's urging the South African Development Community (SADC) sends military force to help restore order. Multiparty Interim Political Authority is established to review the electoral process and organise next elections.
- 1999** Last of South African and Botswanan troops sent to quell 1998 unrest withdraw.
- 2000** Tens of thousands of people and heads of state attend King Letsie III's marriage to Karabo Montsoeneng at national sports stadium in Maseru.
- 2002** Masupha Sole, former head of Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, found guilty of accepting bribes from foreign construction companies in return for business on Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which supplies water to South Africa.
- 2002** Ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) wins parliamentary elections, held under new system which gives smaller parties voice in parliament. Poll endorsed by international observers but rejected by opposition as fraudulent.

Mosisili's second term

- 2002** Prime Minister Mosisili is sworn-in for a second five-year term.
- 2004** Prime Minister Mosisili declares state of emergency, appeals for food aid. Aid officials say hundreds of thousands face shortages after three-year struggle against drought.
- 2004** Official opening of first phase of multi-billion-dollar Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which supplies water to South Africa.
- 2005** First local elections since independence: Voters choose

representatives for 129 local councils. Opposition parties boycott the vote and allege a lack of preparation.

2005 Lesotho launches programme to offer HIV tests to all citizens.

2006 October - Lesotho marks 40 years of independence from Britain with a new flag.

Former communications minister Thomas Thabane and 17 other MPs leave the ruling LCD to form the opposition All Basotho Convention (ABC).

Early elections

2007 Ruling LCD wins early parliamentary elections, taking 61 of 80 constituencies; leader of the opposition ABC challenges the outcome.

2007 General strike following opposition call for action in protest over allocation of parliamentary seats.

2007 State of emergency declared as Lesotho experiences its most severe drought in 30 years.

2007 Five charged with high treason for their alleged role in attacks on the homes of the opposition leader and cabinet ministers.

2009 Premier Mosisili survives an apparent assassination attempt.

2011 Government and opposition announce deal over allocation of parliamentary seats at the 2012 elections, aimed at easing a dispute over the 2007 vote.

Seven suspected mercenaries charged in connection with 2009 attempt to kill Prime Minister Mosisili.

2012 Thomas Thabane becomes prime minister following elections.

2012 Lesotho facing one of its worst food crises in living memory, according to World Food Programme.

2014 Prime Minister Thabane flees to South Africa, accusing the military of trying to overthrow him.

2015 Pakalitha Mosisili becomes prime minister at the head of a coalition formed after early elections.