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TOUCHSTONE, WIREPULLER AND TRANSITION: SINO-KOREAN BOOK-DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL FIGHTS IN 1597-1599¹

Xiu Zhi HUANG

Ludong University

College of Liberal Arts

186 Mid-Hongqi Road, Zhifu District, Yantai

Shandong Province, China

huangxiuzhi2006@163.com

Abstract: Embodying an optimistic diplomatic mind in early Joseon Dynasty, *haidongzhuguoji* written by Shin Suk-ju became a main evidence of Chinese official Ding Yingtai impeaching Joseon in the Jeongyu War occurring in 1597 because of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's second invasion. Ding Yingtai's impeachment involved Joseon's king, Chinese generals in Joseon and officials in Beijing in a political maelstrom, which aroused strong reactions of Joseon king and ministers. In this situation, Joseon's diplomatic corps were dispatched to Beijing in order to justify and defend. They made preparations and took action zealously, winning the final victory and achieving the goal consequently. However, this book-diplomacy surpassed the problem of justifying a book, thus there were some complicated

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and subtle meanings in the process. Firstly, This book-diplomacy provided a touchstone of Sino-Korean relationship in Ming Dynasty, explaining the political essence of the relationship. Secondly, This diplomacy resulted from Ming Dynasty's political fights and calmed down also because of Ming Dynasty's political fights, intensively showing both Sino-Korean interdependent political fights and each liege fights. Thirdly, The book-diplomacy became an important turning point of the transformation of Joseon's foreign concept, and Joseon's "Smaller China" mind began to emphasize excluding barbarians, which made an idealistic preparation for the rising "Smaller China" mind in Qing Dynasty.

Key words: The Jeongyu War, *haidongzhuguoji*, Ding Yingtai, Lee Jung-goo, "Smaller China", political fight.

ZAKULISOWE MACHINACJE I TRANSFORMACJE: CHIŃSKO-KOREAŃSKA DYPLOMACJA I WALKI POLITYCZNE W LATACH 1597-1599

Streszczenie: Artykuł dotyczy sytuacji politycznej w Korei Jeongyu podczas wojny, która wybuchła w 1597. Korpus dyplomatyczny Korei został wysłany do Pekinu w celu negocjacji i ochrony kraju. Dyplomaci przygotowywali się do rozmów gorliwie, osiągając ostateczne zwycięstwo i zamierzony cel. Książka o dyplomacji *haidongzhuguoji* zawiera pewne skomplikowane i subtelne znaczenie. Po pierwsze, ta książka dyplomatyczna stanowiła fundament stosunków chińsko-koreańskich za czasów dynastii Ming, wyjaśniając polityczną istotę związków pomiędzy krajami. Po drugie, stosunki dyplomatyczne wynikały z walk politycznych za czasów dynastii Ming, wyraźnie pokazując chińsko-koreańskie współzawodnictwo polityczne. Po trzecie, książka stała się ważnym punktem zwrotnym transformacji koncepcji polityki zagranicznej Korei.

Słowa kluczowe: wojna Jeongyu, *haidongzhuguoji*, Ding Yingtai, Lee Jung-goo, „Mniejsze Chiny”, walka polityczna.

시금석, 배후조정자, 그리고 전환점: 정유재란 시기 중한 간의 서적 외교와 정치투쟁 (1597-1599)

신숙주의 『해동제국기』는 조선 전기의 낙관적 대외관념을 잘 드러낸다. 그러나 도요토미 히데요시가 재차 조선을 침략한 정유재란 시기에 이 책은 명나라 관원 정응태가 조선을 책망하게 되는 주요한 근거가 되며, 이로 인해 조선의 왕과 신하, 정벌군 장군, 북경 관원 모두가 정치적 소용돌이 속으로 휘말려 들어가게 된다. 정응태의 책망은 조선 왕과 신하들의 격렬한 반응을

야기시켰고, 이런 상황 가운데 조선은 변론과 해명을 위해 북경에 사신을 파견하였다. 조선 사신은 북경에서 적극적으로 계획하고 행동하여 결국 외교적 승리를 얻어냈다. 그러나 금번의 서적 외교는 이미 서적에 대해 해명하는 문제를 넘어서고 있었으며, 복잡하면서도 미묘한 의미를 내포하는 것이었다. 첫째, 금번 서적 외교는 중국과 한국이 종주국과 속국의 관계라는 것을 검증하는 데에 있어서 시금석이 되는 것으로, 양국관계에서 정치관계의 본성을 보여주었다. 둘째, 금번 서적 외교는 명조와 조선의 당쟁에서 비롯되었고 마지막에도 명조와 조선의 당쟁으로 말미암아 해결되었는데, 이때 양국 상호간에 얽혀있는 당쟁 및 군신 간의 투쟁이 드러났다. 셋째, 금번 서적 외교는 조선의 대외 관념에 있어서 중요한 전환점이 되었는데, 조선의 ‘소중화’ 의식에서 ‘양이’관념이 강조되기 시작하였고, 이는 청대에 고조하게 되는 조선의 ‘소중화’ 의식의 사상적 준비기가 되었다고 볼 수 있다.

핵심단어: 정유재란, 해동제국기, 정응태, 이정귀, 소중화, 당쟁

1. Preface

Many scholars thought the relationship between Joseon Dynasty and Ming Dynasty as a typical suzerain-vassal relation, but in fact, there were still some complicated factors we couldn't ignore in the typical relations. On the one hand, Joseon and Ming had a special intimate relationship. Founded in the wake of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) needed Ming's political approve and military protection, so every king of Joseon must be approved by the emperor of Ming, meanwhile, Joseon also must learn Chinese culture completely and had to pay tribute to Ming. Because of the importance of geopolitics as well, Joseon was the most important allied country of Ming. However, on the other hand, it was also fragile in Joseon-Ming relationship. The two countries usually had some problems even conflicts because of some issues such as Joseon's kingship legitimacy, frontier problem, and the ownership of Jurchens and Joseon-Japan relationship.

In this respect, there were so many complexities in Sino-Korean relationship during Ming-Qing Dynasties that even an inconspicuous incident could trigger sensitive nerves of the two

countries, thus “book-diplomacy”,² which means Joseon sent diplomatic corps to Beijing for disputing or correcting false records in some special books, was a similar incident shocking the two countries. In the beginning of Joseon Dynasty, Ming’s first emperor Zhu Yuanzhang doubted that Joseon’s first king Yi Seong-gye (King Taejo) not only was an anti-Ming minister’s son but also killed the last four kings of Goryeo Dynasty, so some Chinese official and personal books wrote down these records in Ming-Qing Dynasties, meanwhile, it caused a long diplomatic dispute about Yi Seong-gye between Joseon and Ming lasting more than 400 years. Only in the 16th century, around *daming huidian* (大明會典), an important official book of Ming Dynasty, Joseon had spent 70 years finishing correcting Yi Seong-gye’s records until 1588.

But 9 years later, in 1597, Joseon sent envoys to Beijing again for another book-diplomacy, which was more complicated than the former. Firstly, it was the first time that Joseon became a defendant forced to go to Beijing passively. Secondly, it was in the late of the Imjin War that this book-diplomacy happened, when Joseon-Ming allied troops tried to defeat Japanese invasion. Thirdly, it was because of a Joseon’s book *haidongzhuguoji* (海東諸國紀, 해동제국기) that this book-diplomacy happened, which involved of not only the triangular relationships of China, Korea and Japan in history, but also factional struggles of both Ming and Joseon in reality. Actually, it was a political incident named as “Ding Yingtai(丁應泰)impeaching Joseon”.

Several scholars studied this incident, such as Marugame Kinsaku,³ Li Guangtao,⁴ Gari Ledyard,⁵ Lee Gyehwang,⁶ Heo Jieun,⁷ Jeong Eokgi,⁸ Suzuki Kai,⁹ Liu Baoquan,¹⁰ Sun Weiguo,¹¹

² Huang Xiuzhi (黃修志). 2013. “Book-diplomacy: mingqingshiqi chaoxian de shujibianwu shulun”(“書籍外交”:明清時期朝鮮的書籍辨誣述論). 史林 (6).

³ Marugame Kinsaku (丸龜金作). 1939. 朝鮮宣祖朝に於ける明丁應泰の誣奏事件, 歴史學研究 (8-10).

⁴ Li Guangtao (李光濤). 1982. “Ding Yingtai and Yang Hao: chaoxian renchenwohuo luncong zhiyi”(丁應泰與楊鎬——朝鮮壬辰倭禍論叢之一), 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊(8-10).

⁵ Gari Ledyard. 1988-89. “Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598”, *Journal of Korean Studies*(6).

⁶ Lee Gyehwang (李啓煌). 1995. 慶長の役の最末期における「丁應泰誣奏事件」と日・明將らの講和交渉, 日本史研究 (389).

⁷ Heo Ji-eun (허지은). 2004. 丁應泰의 朝鮮誣告事件을 통해 본 조·명관계, 史

but I'll explain three questions never answered. Why a book *haidongzhuguoji* could cause a huge diplomacy even shocking East Asia? How did Joseon's envoys finish diplomatic task in Beijing? What influences did this book-diplomacy exert on Sino-Korean relationship and respective political development? In this paper, I'll focus on the role of *haidongzhuguoji* in the process, to explore the profound background and complex influence of the book-diplomacy, finally revealing the characteristic of Sino-Korean relationship during this period.

2. *Haidongzhuguoji's* Author and Motif

What kind of book was *haidongzhuguoji*? Why would it cause shocking political and diplomatic waves on East Asian Sea? Who was its mysterious author?

Shin Suk-ju(申叔舟) was the author of *haidongzhuguoji*. Born in a scholar-gentry family in 1417, Shin Suk-ju had an extraordinary talent when he was young and lived from King Sejong to King Seongjong, going through the reign of six kings. After passing excellently King Sejong's imperial examination, he entered jixiandian (集賢殿), which was the highest policy advisory and academic research institution of Sejong, gained an important official post and began his brilliant political life from then on. However, Shin Suk-ju had several identities, he was not only a politician, but also a scholar, a general and a diplomat. As a politician, he was the most famous minister serving six kings from Sejong to Seongjong, finally assuming the office of prime minister of Joseon for a long time. King Sejo praised him as his best minister like Guan Zhong (管仲), Zhang

學研究 (76).

⁸ Jeong Eokgi (정억기). 2007. 이항복의 정치 외교 활동 연구, 홍익대 대학원 박사학위논문.

⁹ Suzuki Kai (鈴木開). 2011. 丁應泰の變と朝鮮-丁西倭亂期における朝明關係の一局面. 朝鮮學報 (219).

¹⁰ Liu Baoquan (劉寶全). 2011. "Mingwanqi zhongguo he chaoxian de xianghu renshi" (明晚期中國和朝鮮的相互認識), 韓國學論文集 (19). Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press.

¹¹ Sun Weiguo (孫衛國). 2012. "Dingyingtaitanheshijian yu mingqing shiji zhi jiangou" (丁應泰彈劾事件與明清史籍之建構), 南開學報 (3).

Liang (張良) and Wei Zheng (魏徵) of China.¹² As a scholar, he compiled or wrote many important books promoting Joseon's development, such as *dongguozhengyun* (東國正韻) teaching Korean to learn Chinese, *Hunminjeongum* (訓民正音) inventing Korean script, *guochaowuliyi* (國朝五禮儀) establishing Joseon's ritual standard and *haidongzhuguoji* guiding Joseon to associate with Japan. As a general, he led troops to defeat Jurchen of maolian (毛憐), maintained northern border security and wrote some military books in Sejo reign. As a politician, he was highly praised by envoys of Ming China owing to his literary and diplomatic talents, moreover, he was dispatched to China and Japan in person, finally finishing the missions successfully and gaining more honors in East Asia, so he was the important minister in charge of Joseon's relationship with China and Japan (久掌禮曹, 以事大交鄰為己任).¹³ Generally speaking, it was the reforming and developing period from Sejong to Seongjong, when Joseon established its regime and cultural foundation, so Shin Suk-ju was an important minister then who not only dominated Joseon's politics but also affected East Asian international situation.

After defeating Japanese pirates of Tsushima Island (己亥東征), Joseon and Japan signed a treaty (癸亥條約), which controlled kinds of Japanese trade forces by means of Tsushima Island. As one of Joseon's representatives, Shin Suk-ju went to Japan to sign the treaty, so he began to write *haidongzhuguoji* after repatriating and finally finished it in 1471. The book mainly recounted Japan (95%) and Ryukyu, describing Japan's every emperor, general, island, official, culture, etc., therefore this book were both an comprehensive investigation about Japan and a reference normalizing Joseon-Japan trade meanwhile. Shin Suk-ju said the goal of the book was to help Joseon to control Japan and maintain Joseon's marine safety.¹⁴

Shin Suk-ju had been always worrying about Japan all his life, when dying in bed, the king Seongjong asked whether he had a final wish, and he said: "I wish our country Joseon could live with Japan in peace forever." (願國家無與日本失和)¹⁵ However, it wouldn't

¹² An Jonghwa (安鍾和). 1993. 國朝人物志. Seoul; 明文堂. p. 105. The book was written in late Joseon Dynasty.

¹³ *Joseon Seongjong Sillok* (朝鮮成宗實錄)卷 56, 成宗六年六月戊戌條。

¹⁴ Shin Suk-ju (申叔舟)著, Tanaka Takeo trans. 1991. *Haidongzhuguoji*(海東諸國紀). Tokyo; 岩波書店. pp. 301-303.

¹⁵ *Tongwenguanzhi* (通文館志). Seoul; 首爾大學校奎章閣韓國學研究院. 2006. p.

have occurred to him that his final wish would failed and Joseon would be at war with Japan for 7 years, moreover, his book *haidongzhuguoji* would worsen the war situation.

3. Ding Yingtai Impeached Joseon by *haidongzhuguoji*

In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi commanded Konishi Yukinaga and Kato Shima to lead nearly 200,000 Japanese soldiers to invade Joseon with a dream of conquering Ming China, which was usually called the Imjin War. During less than three months, Joseon lose its two capitals including Seoul and Pyongyang, “Joseon almost lost its all land, about to cross the Yalu River to China, so Joseon dispatched constant envoys to Beijing for military aid. After discussion, Beijing imperial court thought it necessary to help Joseon because it was a fence of China”.¹⁶ Consequently, Ming’s troop just defeating Ningxia rebellion in the west turned round to the east to help Joseon to resist Japan for seven years. In the process, Ming and Japan ever tried to negotiate peace to end the war but failed, so in 1597, Japan’s second invasion called the Jeongyu War took place again. Ming’s Emperor Shenzong punished the relevant ministers negotiating peace, appointed Xing Jie (邢玠), Ma Gui (麻貴), Yang Hao (楊鎬) as the new leaders of Ming’s troop. Just in this year, the three generals reached Joseon one after another to attack Japan’s troop. Yang Hao hold Hangang River and Taedonggang River in the west of the capital, suppressed Japan’s further attack, defended the military transport channel and removed the threat from Seoul, which was highly praised by Joseon’s King Seonjo and ministers. After entering Seoul and gaining two victories in Jishan (稷山) and Ulsan (蔚山), Yang Hao encountered a failure, causing many injuries and deaths in Taosan (島山), so Ming’s troop retreated into Seoul. But Yang Hao and Xing Jie reported the battle as a victory to Beijing and understated the casualties, which was supported by cabinet ministers such as Zhang Wei (張位) and Shen Yiguan (沈一貫) in Beijing.

As a censor official along with Ming’s troop, Ding Yingtai (丁應泰) reported Yang Hao’s failure to the emperor and accused his

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¹⁶ *Mingshi*(明史)卷 320 朝鮮傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 8292.

disguising casualties and colluding with Beijing's ministers.¹⁷ Angry with Ding's exposing, Emperor Shenzong ordered to dismiss Yang Hao from his post and replaced him with another general Wan Shide(萬世德).¹⁸ However, because of Joseon's appreciation of Yang's rescuing Seoul and worry about Ding's suggestion of never adding soldiers and army provisions, Joseon dispatched envoys to Beijing to defend Yang Hao, hoping the emperor to "withdraw the decision, encourage Yang Hao and finish defeating Japan".¹⁹ Meanwhile, twenty-three Chinese generals including Wu Weizhong(吳惟忠), Mao Guoqi(茅國器), Xu Guowei(許國威) also wrote to the emperor to defend Yang Hao and advised the emperor to withdraw the order for the sake of the overall situation.²⁰ Actually, Yang Hao was impeached in the circumstance of Ming's political struggles, but he was impeached strongly again by Ding Yingtai because of Joseon's defending. Ding accused Yang of his order of building a defending city for Joseon, which Ding thought would offer Joseon a chance to betray Ming. Obviously, hard to bear Joseon's another defense, Ding Yingtai found a Joseon's book *haidongzhuguoji*, thought there were some evidences of Joseon's disloyalty to China and colluding with Japan. So he wrote an open letter to Ming's Emperor Shenzong, in which he impeached Joseon's king, Ming's military officials in Joseon and several ministers in Beijing (屬藩奸欺有據, 賊党朋謀已彰事).²¹

Firstly, Ding said Joseon had been colluding and trading with Japan for a long time according to the book, so it was not worthy of Ming's sympathy that Joseon suffered invasion from Japan. Secondly, Ding thought Joseon worshipped Japan and disrespected China, because the book wrote Japan's reign title such as Kangzheng (康正), Kuangzheng (寬正), Wenming (文明) in bigger characters above but wrote Ming's reign title such as Yongle (永樂), Xuande (宣德), Jingtai (景泰), Chenghua (成化) in smaller characters below. Thirdly, Ding censured that Joseon was disloyal to China even despised China, because the book mentioned that Joseon's kings unexpectedly had a posthumous title (廟號) such as jong (祖), jo (宗),

¹⁷ *Mingshi*(明史)卷 320 楊鎬傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 6687.

¹⁸ *Mingshi*(明史)卷 320 朝鮮傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 8297.

¹⁹ *Mingshi*(明史)卷 320 朝鮮傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 8298.

²⁰ *Joseon Seongjo sillok*(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 102, 宣祖三十一年七月癸巳條。

²¹ *Joseon Seongjo sillok*(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104, 宣祖三十一年九月癸卯條。

which only Chinese emperor owned, moreover, Shin Suk-ju criticized some Chinese martial emperors such as Emperor Wudi of Han Dynasty, Emperor Yangdi of Sui Dynasty.²² After pointing out the three important evidences, Ding satirized that Joseon brought Japan's invasion upon itself, and transferred disasters to Ming China by entreating for aid, so Ding suggested reprimanding Joseon king and ministers together with many Ming generals in Joseon, submitted *haidongzhuguoji* to Ming imperial court and asked the court to check up on whether Joseon deceived Ming and whether Ming's generals in Joseon collude with each other for favoritism.

After reading Ding's report, Emperor Shenzong immediately ordered to make an investigation and not to accuse each other again for the overall situation, but emperor didn't change his decision and still hastened Wan Shide to replace Yang Hao in Joseon.

4. Joseon's Reaction and Lee Jung-goo's Refuting Ding Yingtai

As an intelligence agency and think tank, Seungjeongwon (承政院) soon collected the relevant materials including Ding Yingtai's impeachment and Emperor Shenzong's order of investigation. After seeing them, King Seonjo was very nervous and grieved. He decided to suspend him from his duties and wait for the investigation of Ming's censors (俟罪待命), leaving government affairs to the prince Gwanhaegun.²³ But his decision made Seungjeongwon feel awkward, because it means a stop of Joseon's administration. So Seungjeongwon told King Seonjo that Joseon should dispatch envoys to Beijing to explain Ding Yingtai's false accusation according to the book, meanwhile Seungjeongwon also advised King Seonjo should retract the order of being suspended from his duties because it would worsen the tense atmosphere Ding Yingtai created. However, King Seonjo had no response. In view of this situation, prime minister Yu Seong-ryong (柳成龍) and many ministers of every department all urged King Seonjo, but King Seonjo insisted on his decision like Zhougong (周公) which also averted suspicion in Zhou Dynasty.

²² *Joseon Seongjo sillok*(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104, 宣祖三十一年九月癸卯條。

²³ *Joseon Seongjo Sillok* (朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104, 宣祖三十一年九月癸卯條。

He ordered the ministers to go to Ming troop to cry and express complaints instead.

But in fact, King Seonjo never really gave up his authority, instead he ordered envoys to go to Beijing to defend Joseon and guided some key steps of the book-diplomacy. Finally Joseon chose Lee Hangbok (李恒福), Lee Jung-goo (李廷龜) and Hwang Yeo-il (黃汝一) as the three responsible envoys of diplomatic corps to Beijing.

There were some potential information behind Joseon's reaction. Firstly, The most essential reason of the king's abnormal performance was the king's anxiety about his kingship legitimacy, which was threatened by Ding Yingtai's impeachment. In Sino-Korean relationship and Confucian mind, Joseon king was not only the king and the father of Joseon people, but also the minister and the son of Ming emperor, because the source of Joseon king's authority was from Ming emperor. Moreover, if Joseon king was not disloyal because of impeachment, the whole Joseon people would be also not disloyal.²⁴ During the whole Joseon Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism became the most important ideological tool because it helped Korea gain a new social ideal, social elite and national spirit.²⁵ Secondly, King Seonjo pretended to give up his authority but actually controlled the whole thing and book-diplomacy, which indicated that King Seonjo's decision had some performing meaning on account of Confucian moral. Thirdly, Seonjo doubted how Ding Yingtai found the book (應泰之得此書, 予甚疑之耳),²⁶ so he would probe deeply into the matter. Finally, Joseon's political struggles became more intense after the impeachment. At that time, the Southerners including premier Yu SeongRyong and Admiral Yi Sun-sin (李舜臣) controlled the government, but with the death of Yi Sun-sin in the final naval battle and Ding Yingtai's charge, the Southerners was attacked by the Northerners, So Yu Seong-ryong was also forced to resign himself in the process.

Lee Jung-goo refuted Ding Yingtai's impeachments one by one in the diplomatic articles, which was prepared to send

²⁴ Gari Ledyard, "Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598", *Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 6 (Washington, 1988-89), pp. 96-98.

²⁵ Martina Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology*, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center for Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1992, pp. 92-110.

²⁶ *Joseon Seongjo sillok*(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104, 宣祖三十一年九月乙巳條。

to Beijing imperial court. Generally speaking, Lee Jung-goo expressed three parts of explanations to aim at Ding's impeachments. Firstly, Joseon had been always regarding Japan as barbarians and beasts, and the goal of associating with Japan was to help China to gain Japan's trends. Secondly, both *haidongzhuguoji* and its author Shin Suk-ju were negligible 100 years ago and the bigger or smaller reign titles should be a historical writing habit as well as China. Thirdly, Joseon was guilty of using the posthumous title only owned by China, but Joseon was so loyal completely to China that even a little boy admired China when just learning to speak and write (三尺孩童, 才辯一語, 便知天朝).²⁷ From Lee Jung-goo's explanations, we could find some minds Joseon want to express to Ming: Ming China was the middle of the world and Japan was the only barbarian country never paying tribute to Ming China, so Joseon was the only civilized country really admiring Ming China. In a word, Joseon was a complete "Smaller China"(小中華).

5. Envoy's Diplomacy & Beijing's Response

Joseon's envoys spent three months reaching Beijing in 1599, when Ding Yingtai openly accused Xing Jie once again, another commander instead of Yang Hao, of bribing Japan to negotiate peace.²⁸ It initiated a serious consequence, not only making Joseon and Ming's ministers, censors, generals suffer a culpable accusation, but also making Emperor Shenzong angry. Because then Japanese troop was defeated back to Japan and the war had put an end, Ming imperial court was making preparations for declaring and celebrating victory, but Ding's accusation of "bribing Japan to negotiate peace" meant that Ming didn't gain a whole victory in spite of devoting 7 years, more than 100,000 soldiers and millions of money, which would made Emperor Shenzong disgraced. So after receiving Ding's accusing article, Emperor Shenzong didn't give a response,²⁹ which betokened that Shenzong had lost patience and confidence to Ding and Ding would

²⁷ Hwang Yeo-il (黃汝一). *Yinchalu* (銀槎錄). Im Gi-jung (林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集 (8). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. pp. 251-254.

²⁸ *Ming Shenzong shilu* (明神宗實錄)卷 330, 萬曆二十七年正月丙午條.

²⁹ *Ming Shenzong shilu* (明神宗實錄)卷 330, 萬曆二十七年正月丙午條.

fail ultimately.

In Beijing, Joseon envoys made great efforts to gain diplomatic victory. Firstly, they collected Ming's newspapers called *tongbao*, *dibao*, *tiben* (通報, 邸報, 題本) or official documents to understand Ming's political trends. In order to understand the attitude and working procedure of Ming imperial court, Joseon envoys tried their best to ask their translators or Chinese petty officials to collect those newspapers or documents, sometimes even by means of bribing to some officials. For example, after knowing that Emperor Shenzong ordered the ministry of war to discuss Ding Yingtai's impeachment together with other ministers and censors from the newspapers or documents, envoys immediately transcribed more than forty Lee Jung-goo's explanatory articles according to the format of each department.³⁰

Secondly, they visited several important ministers such as premier Shen Yiguan, justice minister Xiao Daheng (蕭大亨) to gain their supports. According to some handbooks about Ming's ministers, Joseon envoys were informed of a fact that Shen Yiguan and Xiao Daheng were the most relevant and important ministers, so they specially visited the two ministers. In front of Shen Yiguan and Xiao Daheng, envoys submitted the explanatory article to them and told the false accusation one by one by pointing *haidongzhuguoji*.³¹ The two ministers were both willing to help Joseon envoys due to a realistic reason, because Ding Yingtai also accused them.³² Especially Xiao Daheng, he played an important role in the diplomatic activities of Joseon envoys, even personally instructing envoys how to defend and succeed.

Thirdly, they distributed the refuting articles to all kinds of departments to win public opinion support. After knowing the emperor ordered the ministers to discuss, envoys transcribed the refuting articles day and night, very anxious to prove Joseon's innocence to all departments of Ming. On the one hand, Envoys' efforts made Beijing officials understand the sequence of Ding's

³⁰ Hwang Yeo-il (黃汝一). *Yinchalu* (銀槎錄). Im Gi-jung (林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集 (8). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. pp. 342-343.

³¹ Lee Hangbok (李恒福). *Chaotianlu* (朝天錄). Im Gi-jung (林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集 (9). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. pp. 61-65.

³² Lee Hangbok (李恒福). *Chaotianlu* (朝天錄). Im Gi-jung (林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集 (9). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. p. 64.

impeachment, on the other hand, many Beijing officials became curious to Joseon books such as *haidongzhuguoji*, *yudishenglan* (與地勝覽), *kaoshicuoyao* (考事撮要), etc., even some of which were presented to Beijing officials. Then Xiao Daheng was very glad to see some Joseon books as evidence together with *haidongzhuguoji*, he asked Joseon envoys why not usually submit these books to Ming China. Finally, *haidongzhuguoji* and *guochaowuliyi*, both written by Shin Suk-ju, were kept in the ministry of Justice as evidences involved.³³

In fact, before Joseon envoys entering Beijing, many ministers criticized Ding Yingtai's false charge. For example, Xing Jie, commander of Ming troop in Joseon wrote a letter to Emperor Shenzong against Ding's impeachment twice, mentioned Ding's impeachment had triggered indignations of Joseon people even pasting some papers on the temple dedicated to Guan Yu to curse Ding, and he also accused Ding actually colluded with the doves including Zhao Zhigao (趙志舉).³⁴ Without doubt, after Joseon envoys entering Beijing and making diplomatic efforts, Shen Yiguan and Xiao Daheng both criticized Ding Yingtai. After a centralized meeting, Beijing ministers came to an agreement, submitted each view to the emperor, all proving Joseon's loyalty. As the responsible minister of Ding Yingtai's impeachment, Xiao Daheng submitted an article summarizing general opinions to Emperor Shenzong. He thought it was so irrational that Ding Yingtai cooked up charges due to his personal gain because it had caused some confusions in all directions, so he advised emperor to remove Ding's post to return to his hometown or to come back to Beijing to receive emperor's punishment. Meanwhile, he suggested that someone must be sent to Joseon to revoke the king in order to keep Ming-Joseon relationship.³⁵ Consequently, Emperor Shenzong followed Xiao Daheng's advice.

A month later, Ming's army returned to Beijing from Joseon, thus Emperor Shenzong published an imperial edict celebrating Ming-Joseon victory of defeating Japan (平倭詔), in which emperor

³³ Hwang Yeo-il(黃汝一). *Yinchalu*(銀槎錄). Im Gi-jung(林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集 (8). Seoul: 東國大學出版部, 2001. p. 407.

³⁴ Xing Jie(邢玠). 2010. *Jinglve yuwo zouyi*(經略禦倭奏議). Qingdao: Qingdao Press. pp. 113-139.

³⁵ *Ming Shenzong shilu*(明神宗實錄)卷 332, 萬曆二十七年三月辛未條。

said:“ Ming China has been not only benevolent to rescue the respectful country but also martial to destroy the contemptible country.”(我國家仁恩浩蕩，恭順者，無困不援；義武奮揚，跳樑者，雖強必戮！)³⁶

However, the matter caused by Ding Yingtai was not over. King Seonjo ever asked how Ding Yingtai gained *haidongzhuguoji*, so he began to probe into the matter and punished some officials contacting with Ding Yingtai.³⁷ One year later, one enlightened reading book for children about Ding Yingtai appeared in Joseon, in which Ding was demonized as a foe of Joseon.

6. Conclusion: Touchstone, Wirepuller and Transition

The war is the continuation of the politics, while the diplomacy is the prolongation of the interior, which means that the diplomacy occurring in the war will reveal the essence of interior political struggles and international relationships. It was obvious that Japan wanted to establish a new East Asian political and economic order instead of Ming China by the Imijin War and the Jeongyu War in late 16th century, which connected Ming, Joseon and Japan closely.³⁸ Because of Ding Yingtai's impeachment by *haidongzhuguoji*, historical and realistic relations among the three countries became a sensitive problem in the war and diplomacy. But in the whole diplomatic process, Sino-Korean book-diplomacy around *haidongzhuguoji* had surpassed the diplomatic meaning and possessed a complicated and delicate significance, which was specially conducive to understand both Sino-Korean relationship and respective politics.

Firstly, This book-diplomacy provided a touchstone of Ming-Joseon relationship, explaining the political essence of the relationship. King Seonjo's worry about his kingship legitimacy and Ming's suspicion about Joseon's loyalty should be two keys

³⁶ *Ming Shenzong shilu*(明神宗實錄)卷 334, 萬曆二十七年四月丙戌條。

³⁷ *Joseon Seongjo modified sillok*(朝鮮宣祖修正實錄)卷 33, 宣祖三十二年九月丁未條。

³⁸ Kenneth M. Swope. 2007. "Perspectives on the Imjin War". *Journal of Korean Studies* (Vol. 12, No. 1). p. 160.

of the book-diplomacy. Gari Ledyard pointed out Joseon king performed the Confucian morals when in the war, but the essence of these Confucian morals was the anxiety for kingship legitimacy. Moreover, from the beginning to the end, Ming China never stopped suspecting Joseon's loyalty, today Ding Yingtai doubted Joseon would collude with Japan in 1598, while tomorrow Xu Guangqi (徐光啟) would also doubt and accused that Joseon would colluded with Jurchen in 1619.

Secondly, This diplomacy resulted from Ming Dynasty's political fights and calmed down also because of Ming Dynasty's political fights, intensively showing both Sino-Korean interdependent political fights and each liege fights. Why could a petty censor Ding Yingtai accuse so many people from Joseon king to main ministers, other censors and generals? It was just because he got supports from two powers. One was the support of Ming's doves, which realized that Ming China became weaker because of saving Joseon and Jurchen rising in the northeast. The other one was the support from Emperor Shenzong, who ever openly praised Ding Yingtai in order to use his impeachment to control the ministers.³⁹

Thirdly, The book-diplomacy became an important turning point of the transformation of Joseon's foreign concept. In Shin Suk-ju's era, Joseon had an optimistic confidence in East Asia, but in Lee Jung-goo's era, Joseon became very pessimistic, guilty and worried about weaker Ming and stronger Jurchen. So this book diplomacy amended Joseon's diplomatic mind in the era of Shin Suk-ju, Joseon's "Smaller China" mind began to emphasize excluding barbarians, which made an idealistic preparation for the rising "Smaller China" mind in Qing Dynasty.

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³⁹ Gu Yingtai (谷應泰). 1977. *Mngshi jishi benmo* (明史紀事本末). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. p. 977. The book was written in early Qing Dynasty.

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