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LITERATURES**

**IDEOLOGY IN TRANSLATION/TRANSFER: MEDIA  
COVERAGE ON THE “BRONZE NIGHT” IN EESTI  
RAHVUSRINGHÄÄLING, BBC AND DEUTSCHE WELLE**

**MA thesis**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The present thesis looks at ideology in the translation/transfer of news from a specific linguistic and cultural environment to an international level. More specifically, the thesis focuses on the online coverage of the controversial “Bronze Night” in the articles of the Estonian public broadcaster and two foreign public broadcasters with the aim to find out whether they construct the events from ideologically different viewpoints.

The first part of the thesis provides an overview of the different approaches to ideology, focusing especially on a cognitive approach, and looks at the interaction between ideology and discourse. The chapter also discusses translation as cultural transfer and its relationship with media discourse and ideology. Finally, it introduces a method of discourse analysis which is used in the analysis.

The second part of the thesis analyses the news articles on the Bronze Night published on the websites of Eesti Rahvusringhääling, British Broadcasting Company and Deutsche Welle. The analysis focuses on the general framing strategies, transitivity and lexical choices in the articles in order to see how translation as transfer has affected these aspects, and its possible ideological implications.

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## INTRODUCTION

News should be objective, precise and balanced, or that is at least what is traditionally assumed. Ideology is what average readers do not expect to be expressed in the news, given that they live in a country which respects democratic freedoms. What the readers probably do not think about is that information in the news, especially in the international news, has already passed through linguistic, cultural, institutional and technical filters. Consequently, the information that reaches the readers has been re-presented several times before. As critical linguist Roger Fowler (1991: 88) notes, representation is always representation from some ideological point of view. Thus, we need to look critically at not only what is said in the news, but also how it is said and what might be left unsaid.

The concept *ideology* in everyday usage tends to have a negative connotation as something which distorts people's perception of the world. Ideology is often seen as one of those explicitly formulated and historically controversial sets of ideas like communism or fascism. However, ideology can be understood also in broader terms, which allows us to analyse how it occurs in purportedly neutral (media) texts. Teun A. van Dijk highlights the reasons why avoiding narrow approaches to ideology is more constructive, especially in conflict situations:

...in many social, economic, political and ideological conflicts, the distinction between truth and falsity is not that clearcut. This and many other theoretical reasons suggest that it is more adequate to adopt a general concept of ideology, and to assume that ideologies by definition represent the interests of a specific social group, whether or not /.../ the group's beliefs are based on true social analysis, justified claims or legitimate action. (Van Dijk 2000: 169)

According to van Dijk (2000: 68, 69), ideologies are self-sufficient principles which the members of a group use intuitively to explain the world and answer fundamental questions about the identity of the group, such as who they are and what they stand for.

The present thesis analyses from an ideological viewpoint the transfer of news on the events around the removal of a controversial Soviet monument in April 2007 in Tallinn to the international media. The analysis looks at a selection of online news reports in Estonian

and English from the websites of the Estonian and two foreign public broadcasters. The aim is to determine whether the translational procedures involved in transfer makes the reports to construct the same objects, events and persons differently by linguistic means.

One reason why the coverage on the abovementioned events was chosen is the considerable attention the events received in the international media. The BBC online, for example, published nine articles on the topic during the seven days from the escalation of tensions on 26 April. The second reason is that the events involved a conflict and thus, magnified several issues that are of interest for the present thesis.

The naming of the event in Estonian as well as in foreign press is telling. Estonians and Estonian institutions named the monument and the unrest *pronkssõdur* and *pronksiöö*, respectively. Later, Estonian institutions used direct translations of these names, “Bronze Soldier” and “Bronze Night”, to comment on the affair. The event had great political significance in Estonia and rhetoric around it touched issues that are ideologically sensitive in Estonia and Russia, but also in Europe. However, the controversial nature of the Bronze Night is not reflected in the name, as it consists of terms purely descriptive in their prototypical sense.

As a result, the naming of the event must have caused difficulties for the international press, as it was complicated by three interconnected aspects that are discussed in the thesis. Firstly, in order to make the events comprehensible for foreign readers, they had to translate the cultural specificity into terms that make sense for that audience; secondly, the Estonian coining was of low information value and thus, of little use to news text; and finally, the most important issue: deviating from this neutral name and opting for a more informative phrase entails taking a certain point of view and evaluating the situation. Evaluations, however, are often indicative of underlying ideologies, which makes it relevant to look

closely at the coverage of conflicts – they draw attention to ideologies that otherwise may remain implicit.

Van Dijk (2000: 168) notes that conflict creates a need to legitimise dominance and organise resistance which necessitate clearer formulation and expression of ideologies and values. When reporting a conflict, the journalist is bound to make ideological choices about the angle, choice of information and parties include and/or quote. These choices are reflected in the text, because language allows for different phrasings to describe events, but these alternatives tend to prompt different value judgements (Fowler 1996: 77). So the structure of the text and choice of words may be used, for example, to assign blame or (de)legitimate one of the parties.

Ideologies are maintained and reproduced in social practices, especially in discourse (van Dijk 2000: 193). Following Foucault, Sarah Mills (2004: 43) characterises discourses as sets of statements which operate according to their internal rules and structures. Discursive structures direct the way people assign meaning to objects and events and understand reality (Mills 2004: 46, 48). As an institution, media has its own discursive practices and ideologies about what is considered to be true or false, newsworthy or worthless.

Discussion of media texts from an ideological point of view is especially relevant when we consider the reach their circulation has gained due to globalisation. Next to the social media and search engines, the website of the BBC belongs to the 50 most visited websites in the world. (Google Inc. February 2011). Consequently, the ideological positioning of news texts of corporations like the BBC is of great importance, as they are consumed routinely without much reflection on the underlying values and attitudes. Therefore, they have considerable potential to influence readers' understanding of the world.

Due to the global reach of information circulation, international news reporting entails constantly changing contexts and crossing of cultural and linguistic barriers. Events that

occurred in one cultural environment have to be reported comprehensibly to a foreign audience without specific background knowledge. Thus, even in the cases in which reporting does not involve direct interlingual translation with a definite source text and target text, the international news involves cultural transfer and in this sense, also translation.

The concept of translation as a cultural transfer is linked to the paradigm of cultural translation. Pym (2010: 144) characterises cultural translation as a process in which there is no source text and usually no fixed target text. This approach pays more attention to cultural processes rather than products, as globalisation makes it increasingly difficult to establish concrete and stable “source” and “target” texts and cultures. This is also how translation is understood in the present thesis. Such a broader approach is especially relevant in case of news translation, because as Bielsa and Bassnett (2009: 11) point out, translation in this field is only one instance in a complex process in which information is transferred from one language and culture to another and reshaped to such an extent that it is impossible to ascertain a concrete source and a concrete target.

The present thesis looks at certain linguistic features in the reports of the Estonian and two foreign public broadcasters with the aim to find out whether the transfer of news about the Bronze Night from one cultural and linguistic environment to another as a translational process has created differences in the ideological perspective of the reports and if so, in which aspects these differences occur. Theoretical part of the thesis gives an overview of different theories of ideology, especially of the cognitive approach by Teun A. van Dijk (2000). Secondly, the chapter looks at the concepts of discourse and cultural translation and finally, outlines the discourse analysis method as formulated by Fowler (1991), which is employed in the analysis. Theoretical part is followed by a description of the corpus and analysis of the articles, which focuses on the use of framing strategies, transitivity and lexical structure in the reports of each broadcaster, and their ideological implications.

## **IDEOLOGY**

In his detailed discussion on ideology, Teun A. van Dijk (2000: 101) notes that due to the negative meaning of the notion 'ideology' in everyday usage, some groups and their members may deny having any ideology at all. The meaning van Dijk refers to is related to the Marxist understanding of ideology as 'false consciousness' (ibid. 2).

Marx himself actually never used the concept and it first appeared in the writings of his associate Engels, who defined false consciousness as a set of illusory beliefs involving ignorance or obliviousness of human agents to the forces behind their actions and thoughts, resulting in a misguided interpretation of their motives and source of their ideas (Eagleton 1991: 89). In social setting, it means that ruling classes project their particular interests as interest of all humanity, making the non-ruling classes to serve this interest without being aware of the contradictions between interests of ruling classes and the actual interest of their own classes (Eagleton 1991: 56).

Although based on Marxist foundations, Antonio Gramsci's idea of hegemony provides a more sophisticated approach to ideology and society. Gramscian hegemony is a social relation in which one class dominates the others, but not so much by force as by consent and political and ideological leadership (Simon 1999: 24). In order to become hegemonic, a class has to take into account the interests of other classes and popular demands not directly linked to class. Thus, hegemony is a strategy to unite different social forces by common understanding of the world (Simon 1999: 27). Subordinate classes give to the dominant class an active consent, which requires constant re-negotiation for the dominant class to maintain its superior position (Simon 1999: 72, 73).

A social class can only ascend to hegemony when there is a change in common sense – peoples' uncritical, partly unconscious perception of the world. Common sense is a place for ideological struggle where ideologies contest to determine the everyday meanings of the



peoples' lives (Barker 2008: 67). As such, it can play both a negative and a positive role as the setting for establishing domination as well as creating resistance. Gramsci distinguishes between ideologies as philosophers' systems of ideas and ideologies as psychologically grounded understandings necessary for a social formation. The latter are reflected in the communal modes of living and practical activities of social members by guiding their daily behaviour (Simon 1999: 66). Thus, ideologies have a material existence in practices, institutions and intellectuals as its agents (ibid. 68).

Louis Althusser has also given ideology a wider meaning than earlier Marxists. Althusser (1984: 32) defines ideology as a "system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group", but differently from Marx, it is not the conditions of existence, but relationship to the conditions of existence that people represent themselves deceptively. Ideology comes into being when individuals react to its "interpellation" and subject themselves to ideology by identifying themselves with it and taking up the position it assigns to them (ibid. 49). Similarly to Gramsci, Althusser (1984: 39) thinks of ideology as something material, because ideas are enacted by institutions and realised by individuals in their daily practices. However, Althusser still associates ideology closely with class struggle and domination (ibid. 58).

Due to these somewhat narrow approaches to the notion of ideology, many theorists have preferred to use the concept of discourse instead of ideology during the last two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mills 2004: 26). They have perceived discourse theory as enabling them a more complex analysis compared to the Marxist notion of ideology as a "simplistic and negative process whereby individuals were duped into using conceptual systems which were not in their own interests" (ibid.).

Michel Foucault (1984: 60), whose ideas on discourse have remarkably influenced the later thought in this area, has felt unease with the concept of ideology because of three

reasons. Firstly, ideology seems always to be opposed to what is regarded to be the truth; but for Foucault, truth itself is constructed category. Secondly, ideology seems to presuppose the existence of a subject, a notion from which Foucault tried to distance himself. Thirdly, ideology appears to assume a secondary position in relation to something else which constitutes its material or economic basis (Foucault 1984: 60). However, the decades after Foucault have seen the emergence of broader approaches to ideology which view it as a set of beliefs which cannot be measured against truth criteria. Probably, Foucault felt unease with the concept in its traditional, Marxist sense, not with these newer developments.

Moreover, there is an important distinction that gets lost when giving up the notion of ideology in favour of discourse. Assuming that ideologies are a set of beliefs, mental objects located in the memory (van Dijk 2000: 17) and that discourses are set of statements, then beliefs should not be mixed up with their linguistic expressions. The two are different, but tightly interrelated phenomena, so that most constructive is to view them together. Discourses are vital for the reproduction and expression of ideologies, at the same time also shaping and constructing these ideologies. Filling in the gap between beliefs and statements is one of the main strengths of the van Dijk's approach.

In addition, Eagleton (1991: 8) draws attention to the fact that discarding the notion of ideology would make it complicated to distinguish between the power struggles relevant to society and trivial arguments which may not be related to issues central to whole society. What is more, even though language and discourse play an important role in the (re)production of ideologies, ideologies are expressed and reproduced also in other practices that do not involve text or talk (van Dijk 2000: 191).

Van Dijk's understanding of ideology is one of the recent, more dynamic approaches which have abandoned the strictness of classical Marxism. It is more intricate and takes into account the complicated patterns of influence between ideology on the one hand and

cognition, society and discourse on the other. Van Dijk (2000: 19, 48) defines ideology as “social beliefs shared by specific social collectives or ‘groups’”, in which ‘beliefs’ are taken to be “products or properties of thinking”. These products of thinking include ideas about the world, material and mental objects, truth and falsity, but also evaluations, for example, whether something is right or wrong, pretty or ugly.

The cognitive aspects of this approach link the individual and the group, i.e. micro and macro levels in the functioning of ideologies. In addition, van Dijk’s theory does not presuppose the existence of an absolute truth which would enable us to ascertain the truth or falsity of a belief system. Van Dijk (2000: 25) suggests that beliefs provide a basis for inevitable acts of interpretation which people undertake to understand the world from basic things to complex phenomena. People’s beliefs about the world explain why and how they act meaningfully and intentionally (ibid. 45). Large part of these beliefs are socially shared – individuals interpret the world according to socially learnt categories (ibid. 29)

Social beliefs are shared by a group, society or a culture; personal beliefs are held only by a particular individual. Both personal and social beliefs can be particular, i.e. about concrete phenomena or events, or general, i.e. abstract, context-free understandings about the world (van Dijk 2000: 31). Ideologies are socially shared general beliefs of a group and thus, people’s opinions and knowledge about *particular* people or events, for example, collective experiences of a group, society or culture, can be influenced by ideologies, but are not a part of them (ibid. 32). Ideologies are fundamental because they control and structure other socially shared beliefs (ibid. 116).

The distinction above shows that people’s strictly personal beliefs and knowledge, for example, about when they learnt to swim, cannot be seen as ideological, as they are neither general nor socially shared. Also people’s shared beliefs about particular events, for example about the Fall of Berlin Wall, are not a part of an ideology because they are neither abstract

nor context-free. Nevertheless, the perception of such events may be affected by ideologies and as a collective experience of a group, such an event can become central to group identity and ideology (van Dijk 2000: 32).

In conclusion, ideology can be understood in different ways, from classical Marxist false consciousness to broader understanding of ideology as a set of specific beliefs. The present thesis shall assume a flexible approach which sees ideologies as socially shared, specific beliefs of a group, grounded in the mental structures of people's minds.

### **Ideology and other mental representations**

To understand how ideology as defined above forms an interface between the social mind and structure, the following subsection provides a more detailed account of complex interaction between the mental representations of individual group members, groups, institutions and society. It also discusses how ideologies influence opinions, attitudes and knowledge which guide people's everyday practices.

According to van Dijk (2000: 46), people's 'social representations' or organised clusters of socially shared beliefs such as attitudes, opinions and in some respect also knowledge, feature in ideologies. Social representations affect social interaction, group's self-perception and other-perception and, to a lesser or greater extent, group members' everyday practices and interaction.

Relationship between ideology and knowledge is controversial. Knowledge is often understood as "justified true belief", a shared factual belief which satisfies socially accepted truth criteria (van Dijk 2000: 34, 109). As these criteria which are used to ascertain truthfulness are culturally and historically relative, then the nature of knowledge is relative, and to some extent, also ideological (ibid. 110).

In this respect, van Dijk's approach to knowledge is similar to Foucault's idea of power/knowledge. Foucault sees the two as inextricably linked: power implies knowledge and knowledge implies power; a power relation cannot exist without creating respective field of knowledge nor knowledge without forming power relations (Foucault 1984: 175). This power-knowledge relation determines the forms and fields of knowledge. Knowledge is dependent on truth, which is not objectively verifiable but, rather, produced by the society: "Each society has its regime of truth /.../ that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements," (ibid. 73).

As knowledge, similarly to other beliefs such as ideology, is dependent on relative truth criteria, then van Dijk (2000: 111) distinguishes between them by viewing knowledge, differently from ideology, as a part of the cultural common ground. Different ideological groups can still share the same knowledge. However, some knowledge can be regarded as ideological, especially when it concerns social issues central to the attitudes or social position of a group. For instance, creationism is widespread not only in some conservative Islamic societies, where "truth" is set by religious authority, but also in some circles of Western societies, despite the prevailing scientific truth criteria. This shows that what is regarded as true by a community or group is determined by specific truth criteria acknowledged by a particular society or group.

Moreover, interest groups tend to draw attention to such scientific knowledge which serves their specific interest. Other social groups can deny or claim a piece of factual knowledge to be a mere opinion by if they perceive it to favour the ideological position of another group (van Dijk 2000: 112). For example, we have witnessed how one study claims bio-fuels to be a viable alternative to fossil fuels, and another study that their production not only consumes too much energy, but also deprives poorer countries from food crops.

Also relativity of meaning can cause discrepancies in categorising statements as knowledge or opinion, as various groups can understand same concepts differently. Van Dijk (2000: 113-114) illustrates this with the fact that even though several studies have claimed Dutch society to be racist, most Dutch disagree. They do not see the facts presented as indicative of racism, because their definition of racism is narrower than the one used in the surveys. Many descriptive concepts about social relations, like democracy or discrimination, inevitably involve a value judgement, and in some situations, descriptive terms may acquire an evaluative component. For instance, when a politician uses the word 'child' to describe his or her younger opponent, the word takes on an evaluative meaning of 'immature, unable to govern'.

Thus, the traditional perception of opinion being opposite to knowledge is disputable. What is important is that the two are expressed in different types of discourse and substantiated with different types of evidence (van Dijk 2000: 42). While knowledge refers to factual beliefs, opinions refer to evaluative beliefs. Ideologies include also social opinions of a group. Opinions are named 'points of view', because they are usually linked to a certain standpoint and describe not so much the world as the persons holding these opinions, and their judgement (ibid. 33).

Social opinions about specific subject-field form attitudes, which are often connected to social issues as seen from the viewpoint of a specific group (van Dijk 2000: 33, 67). Such social judgement is organised in schemata, mental structures consisting of categories characteristic to the phenomena represented (ibid. 57). Organisation of categories in attitudes mirrors the interests of a group. Whether one or other characteristic, for example nationality, is (de)emphasised in the attitude towards another group depends on the interests of a group (van Dijk 2000: 61). That explains why for example ethnic groups which have lived

peacefully together may engage in conflict when resources, such as land or jobs, get scarce and the category of ethnicity becomes a basis for discrimination.

Attitudes, opinions and ideologies are based on values. Values have a broader, cultural background and they form a basis for social evaluation, so that different ideological groups within the same culture can still share the same values. In order to legitimise its claims, every ideological group has to live up to basic positive values of their culture. However, groups pick from the cultural common ground values which are relevant to their interests, and narrow them down, so that different or even antagonistic groups can emphasise the same values, but give them a different ideological meaning (van Dijk 2000: 74-77).

Gramsci (Simon 1999: 28-29) sees ideologies inextricably linked with common sense. In Gramsci's paradigm, common sense is people's habitual, uncritical perception of the world and a new hegemony can only be created through intellectual and moral reform and transformation of common sense. Gramsci regards common sense, similarly to ideologies, to be specific to smaller social formations than culture, such as social class.

For van Dijk (2000: 103-104), common sense is a set of general beliefs, presupposed social knowledge which belongs to the cultural common ground and provides a basis for the everyday experience of group members. As ideologies are specific group beliefs separate from cultural common ground, then they are not a form of common sense. According to van Dijk (2000: 107), common sense is ideological only at a cultural level and his example that people usually emphasise more that they are socialist or Christian than that they are Western gives an idea how broad a category he has in mind.

Nevertheless, if we consider the ability of subgroups, for example some sectarian groups, to develop their own specific common sense, then van Dijk's understanding of common sense may fail to explain the different forms of common sense within a larger cultural

community. Therefore, in the present thesis, this concept shall be understood in its Gramscian sense.

Social representations need a link which connects the level of individual with the level of society, and the mental objects with actual practices. Van Dijk (2000: 79) suggests that this connection is provided by mental models. Mental models form an interface through which ideologies and other mental constructs are applied and expressed in social practices. A Mental model is a representation of episodes in personal memory and constitutes a subjective understanding of an event. Despite their subjectivity, mental models have a social basis – they are rooted in socially shared knowledge and include both personal and social beliefs and opinions (van Dijk 2000: 78). While interpreting a real-life event or discourse, relevant parts of social representations are activated, adapted to the requirements of the context, and applied to the situation (ibid. 84).

People construct models both of personal experiences as well as the ones mediated by discourse, which means that mental models can be generalised and turned into social representations (van Dijk 2000: 80). When group members experience, read or witness a specific occurrence frequently, they make inferences which are applicable to a number of situations. For them, a belief thus formed turns into shared group knowledge (ibid. 84).

### **Ideologies and groups**

Van Dijk (2000: 103) emphasises that ideologies are *specific* sets of factual and evaluative beliefs *of a group*. Group is here understood as a number of people with common goals, interests, identity, social activities, and with various degree of institutionalisation who share social representations (ibid. 146-147). These conditions cannot be filled without group members sharing some ideological beliefs and vice versa, group ideology can only come into being when people start to organise their activities as a group, which means that groups and



ideologies are mutually constitutive. Ideological groups can be formed at different levels of society and on the basis of different characteristics, such as gender (feminists), ethnicity or age (elderly), profession or goals (environmentalists), norms and values (conservatives), access to resources (employed and unemployed) or social position (elites) (ibid. 70).

Common goals, activities, norms and values constitute the self-schema of the group, which, together with membership criteria, form the group's social identity (van Dijk 2000: 70). As the group schema more or less overlaps with group ideology, then group ideology provides a basis also for group identity (ibid. 120). The identification of an individual group member with the group depends on the extent to which the person's goals, values and activities correspond to the ones of the group.

However, individuals belong usually to several groups and may have multiple ideologies. Thus, the extent of identification with the group identity and expression of some ideology depends largely on the situation (van Dijk 2000: 118-119). There may be situations in which the role of ideological beliefs is irrelevant or in which they remain implicit; or situations in which people consciously choose to express or not to express their ideological views (ibid. 56).

Although group identity is a mental representation, it is still related to practices, dress, objects, settings and monuments. For some groups, an important feature for their identity is a single historical event, like for example the Russian revolution for communists (van Dijk 2000: 123). An essential part of social identity is constructed in intragroup and intergroup discourse. Discourses are sets of sanctioned statements, which express and shape the values, attitudes and meanings of a group. Group-internally, the group identity takes shape in group meetings and other discourse used to solidify the unity and set the agenda; between the groups, it is constructed in discourse for group's self-presentation, defence or legitimisation

(ibid. 125). To avoid extensive repetition, the role of discourse shall be discussed more thoroughly in the next section (pp. 19-28).

Ideologies have several social functions which can be regarded positive, such as evoking resistance, empowering discriminated groups, creating solidarity and group cohesion or maintaining opposition; and functions which are seen as negative, such as concealing true goals or consequences of political action (van Dijk 2000: 138). In the case of dominant groups, ideologies are used to legitimate power. In general, ideologies are the means for groups to organise their aims, daily life and social practices.

In everyday life, many ideologies can seem so natural that people are unaware of having them (van Dijk 2000: 98), in which case the ideological beliefs can be said to have turned into 'common sense' as Gramsci sees it, i.e. unacknowledged view of the world which guides the daily life (Simon 1999: 73). Such implicitness is more characteristic to dominant ideologies, whereas oppositional ideologies are usually made more explicit (van Dijk 2000: 98). For example, feminism and environmentalism are often seen as ideologies, whereas male dominance or consumerism pass for 'natural'. However, the need to explain and defend any hidden or explicit principles arises in case of conflict (ibid. 168).

Van Dijk (2000: 169) defines conflict as "any form of dominance, one-sided or mutual discrimination or other social practices, in which ingroup members are favoured over outgroup members in social interaction". As ideologies represent group interests, then in a situation in which several groups vie for limited resources, ideologies also represent social conflict (ibid. 68). Groups tend to form an ideological image of themselves and others so that We is represented positively and They are represented negatively.

However, conflict is a part of daily social reality and cannot be regarded completely negative. Both in personal life and public issues, negotiating between different opinions averts stagnation and helps to find solutions. As Briggs (1996: 5, 6) notes in his overview of

the research on conflict that while earlier theories saw conflict as a disruption of social balance, then later research has found that conflict plays an important role in the social construction of reality, socialisation and constitution of social relations. In conflict situations, political discourse tries to re-create community and construct common interpretations of past and present. This process shapes the social memory, sets borders to social perception and creates identities and communities by differentiating between a Self and an Other. Conflict and ideological struggle create new cultural communities also in the Gramscian paradigm, as culture for Gramsci is politically and ideologically motivated (Briggs 1996: 5, 6).

To sum up, ideology is understood in the present thesis as a set of social beliefs shared by specific groups or social collectives. This concept is seen as relevant to understand how people's perception, discourse and actions are related to their beliefs. Ideologies influence social opinions and attitudes and are closely linked to values, knowledge and common sense. Group ideologies usually determine the group identity in terms of its goals, membership criteria, values and organisation. Via mental models, ideologies as mental structures interact with discourse, the main means for their expression and reproduction.

## **DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY**

The concept of 'discourse' is perhaps not as controversial as that of ideology, but it is also used in a variety of fields and modified according to the specificity of the field and purposes of the user. In addition, several authors use the concept in more than one meaning. Van Dijk (2000: 194), for example, defines discourse firstly as "specific communicative event" based on a complex set of context features, and secondly as spoken/written text produced as a result of such communicative event. For the present thesis, the first definition is too broad, because as van Dijk (2000: 193) himself notes, such a definition is meant for studying the

relationship between discourse and ideology in general, not focusing on specific aspect or field of discourse. Secondly, it presupposes a more sociologically-oriented approach.

The thesis focuses on how certain linguistic and discursive features indicate underlying ideologies in texts produced in a specific field of discourse in specific languages and cultural environments. Thus, the emphasis is on the interplay of linguistic choices and the resulting viewpoints as sanctioned and constructed in and by these systems. Even though van Dijk's second definition of discourse would allow one to focus on specific texts, it omits several aspects which are necessary for the purposes of the thesis. Firstly, it is useful to pay more attention to the institutionalized nature of discourse, as, for example in Foucault's seminal approach to discourse. Mills formulates Foucault's understanding of discourse as follows [emphasis original]:

...*discourse* as a whole, which is the set of rules and procedures for the production of particular *discourses*, and discourses of groups of statements themselves. Discourses are sets of sanctioned statements which have some institutionalised force, which means that they have profound influence on the way that individuals act and think. (Mills 2004: 55)

The thesis uses the second definition of this explanation, because as mentioned above, it focuses on a particular discourse. The second useful emphasis in Foucault's ideas is on discourse as a regulated practice (Mills 2004: 6). This means that discourses are sets of statements bound together due to some institutional pressure because of their similar origin, context or because they operate in a similar manner, by constructing their subject-matter. In addition, discourses are rule-governed and systematic, which enables us to detect and explain the mechanisms at work in and behind particular texts (ibid. 55).

Critical linguists, who seek to reveal beliefs and values encoded in language by analysing the details of linguistic structures in their social and historical context, have also found Foucault's ideas on discourse useful (Fowler 1991: 67). Kress (cited in Fowler 1991: 42) has thus formulated his understanding discourse as "systematically organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution". Thus, discourses

determine what, who and how can state something and how specific topics should be talked about. They prescribe rules for social and individual actions and people abide by these rules to achieve their personal as well as group goals and to be accepted in a group or society. Usually, the ideological and discursive control in the society belongs to the elites, because they control institutions which offer access to knowledge, provide authoritative opinion, regulate public discourse and consequently, establish truth criteria (van Dijk 2000: 262).

In addition to expression and reproduction, discourse fulfils several other important ideological functions, such as persuasion and legitimation. Ideologies can be expressed at different levels and in various features of discourse, from possible intentions and purposes to concrete properties of texts, such as transitivity and lexical structure. Any discourse structure can be used ideologically, but an expression that is ideological in one context need not be so in some other. The following sections first elaborate on the ideological functions of the discourse and later, on the expression of ideologies at the linguistic level.

### **Ideological functions of discourse**

Before moving to the ideological functions of discourse, it is necessary to discuss how ideologies as beliefs and thus, mental objects, are expressed in discourses as statements. Van Dijk's approach provides a useful explanation.

According to van Dijk (2000: 82-83), the link between ideologies and discourse is provided by context, or more specifically, by context models. Van Dijk (ibid. 211) describes the context as "structured set of all properties of social situation that are possibly relevant for the production, structure, interpretations and functions of text and talk". Context "keys" the discourse meanings and influences all levels and dimensions of discourse. For example, when a serious, institutional piece of writing is cited out of context and ironically, for

instance by a TV-show host to mock the bureaucracy, then its function and meaning change automatically.

Context models are subjective representations of events in personal memory (van Dijk 2000: 82). However, they include both socially shared as well as personal knowledge, attitudes and opinions about the situation. Context models represent how the participants perceive the situation, including the type of the interaction, roles of the participants, their intentions and goals, relevant information, relevant institutional aspects, participants' opinions about the topic or the speaker/writer (van Dijk 2000: 212). Thus, context models have vast influence on how discourse is understood and how it proceeds.

People's interpretation of the situation and their context models are somewhat different, but they have a common part which consists of socially shared knowledge, opinions and attitudes i.e. social representations (van Dijk 2000: 236, 84). This common part is constructed on the basis of information and opinions presented in discourses. When individual group members share their experiences via discourse with other group members, personal event models can become normalised, decontextualised and generalised to such an extent that they turn into social representations and are applied to wider range of experience (ibid. 252). Thus, there is constant interaction: context models influence the interpretation of discourse and discourse influences the construction of context models.

Also Fowler (1991: 41), working in the context of critical linguistics, draws on cognitive psychology and highlights the importance of cognitive models or schemata. He defines schemata as units of socially shared unconscious knowledge, which people use to make sense of the world (ibid. 43). These units also account for discourse comprehension: for example, while reading a text, the reader introduces into the process of meaning construction his/her previous knowledge, guided by the cues in the text and context. This implies that

they have expectations about the organisation and phrasing of discourses, for instance, how a news report or informal conversation is structured and worded.

Van Dijk (2000: 57) describes “schemata” similarly as mental structures which represent commonsense, culturally determined knowledge about objects, scenes or events. Schemata are organised by categories which may have ideological functions, because they determine how people perceive the phenomena, pay attention to preferred items, organise information and identify the genre of discourse (van Dijk 2000: 271). For instance, readers pay attention to headlines, as they expect to find the most important information there, and when negative information about some groups appears in the headlines, then the readers are more likely to form a negative attitude towards this group.

As outlined above, mental models, such as context models and schemata, form an interface between ideologies and discourse. Thus, also the main ideological functions of discourse, (re)production, legitimation and persuasion, involve enacting or changing these models. These processes are dependent on the way people perceive a discursive event, for example, how they evaluate the credibility of the speaker/writer and consequently, how receptive they are to the ideas expressed (van Dijk 2000: 264). For example, readers may automatically take more seriously information in a broadsheet than the same information presented in a tabloid, as they expect a broadsheet to be factual and balanced and a tabloid to be sensational.

Reproduction of ideologies is continuous application, sustaining and changing of ideological beliefs in social practices and acquiring of those beliefs by new social members (van Dijk 2000: 229). On the one hand, ideologies may be conveyed directly through explicitly ideological discourse, such as political speeches or opinion articles. On the other hand, they may be expressed indirectly in discourses which people regard neutral or ideologically irrelevant, such as news reports, scientific research, or children’s literature.

Such implicit ideological expression occurs usually in form of biased representations in habitual discourse production and may be unintentional.

Similarly, acquiring ideologies can take place directly through ideological discourse or indirectly, by making generalisations based on discourse and other social practices, and by sharing opinions with other group members. When participants engaged in a discourse consciously or unconsciously represent a group or institution, then they are likely to reproduce the corresponding ideologies (van Dijk 2000: 230). Thus, their text/talk may display knowledge or allegiance, persuade or manipulate, normalise or compare values. The way they express themselves in discourse affects how recipients construct their mental models (ibid. 233). However, people have usually multiple group memberships which involve different, possibly conflicting social representations. These representations are applied to the situation depending on their relevance, which causes deviation and variation in ideological expression. As a result, ideologies may change in the course of their reproduction.

Another ideologically relevant function of discourse is persuasion. Earlier theories which claimed that people accept blindly everything that is served to them by the public discourse have now been discarded. Rather, consumption of texts is seen as a creative practice, an active sense-making process based on previous knowledge and experience stored in schemata (Fowler 1991: 46). Van Dijk (2000: 244-247) suggests that people's acceptance of ideological beliefs is influenced by several social and cognitive factors, as during the socialisation, they acquire vast amount of social knowledge and learn to differentiate between and assess evaluative and factual beliefs according to corresponding truth criteria. In addition, Fowler (1991: 44) highlights that recipients and producers of a specific discourse have also discursive competence, i.e. knowledge about which statements are allowed in this particular discourse.



Van Dijk (2000: 244-277) finds that a crucial condition of successful persuasion is comprehensibility; people are rarely persuaded by text or talk they do not understand. Secondly, acceptance of an idea depends on the recipient's previous knowledge; van Dijk suggests that people with limited social or political knowledge are easier to persuade. Thirdly, successful persuasion presupposes construction or change of context model, because context model provides information for the evaluation of the discourse (e.g. the credibility of the speaker/writer). Besides context, credibility may be influenced by certain semantic and syntactic structures. For instance, truthfulness of a claim can be emphasised with the use of indicative mood or questioned with a modal verb expressing uncertainty.

When the ideas expressed in a discourse match recipients' previous knowledge, the source is credible and arguments are convincing, then the recipients may adopt the opinion. Otherwise, they may store the beliefs expressed in context model as opinions of the writer/speaker and keep them apart from accepted beliefs (van Dijk 2000: 249). Due to recipients' ability to construct an independent model about the topic of a discourse, the mass media may have the power to determine the topics people think about, but it cannot control entirely what they think about these topics (ibid. 243).

However, opinions inferred from the discourses are often pre-formulated in the discourses themselves (van Dijk 2000: 249). Semantic and syntactic structures of particular discourses are constructed to evoke preferred interpretations and context models. For example, a word "riot" invokes a violent, probably unjustified act, whereas "protest" is likely to activate a different context model which allows one to see the act as more justified. Lexical and syntactic structures suggest whether the information reported is regarded to be true or whether opinions given are represented as such, i.e. evaluative beliefs, not facts.

Furthermore, whether some kind of predicates are evaluative or factual, can also depend on the group ideologies (van Dijk 2000: 251). In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the category "ugly" was

used by some naturalists as a scientific category to divide people into races and label some of them as degenerate (Staum 2003: 24). Modern science regards ugliness as an evaluative category, a matter of taste which cannot be assigned any factual value.

The third important function of discourse from the ideological point of view is legitimation. Van Dijk defines (2000: 255) legitimation as a response to challenge or critique which justifies present or past actions by giving good reasons for such action. The need for legitimation arises only if social power is institutionally controlled. The process of legitimation is based on norms and values, which provide a wider framework for justification. Usually, legitimation becomes necessary in crisis situations, when the actors in power need to prove their right to power (van Dijk 2000: 259).

The self-legitimation of one group often involves delegitimation of opposing groups (van Dijk 2000: 259). When a group challenges the position of a dominant group, the dominant group may respond by delegitimizing the ideologies and identity of the challenging group and questioning the validity of the defining categories of the group, such as membership, goals, norms, values, and social position. Naturally, the dominant group will justify its actions as serving the common good, not as specific group-interest.

Van Dijk (2000: 260-261) describes how legitimation and delegitimation are effected in discourse by means of positive self-representation and negative other-representation. To defend its position, the dominant group may deny the opposing group the access to media channels and question the opposing group's representatives' suitability, expertise or right to speak. They may also try to achieve/regain hegemony by directly or indirectly persuading the members of opposing group to accept the beliefs they initially opposed. Other methods for delegitimizing opponent's discourse include citing out of context, accusations of deviating from common values, focusing on negative aspects of an opponent's discourse or

invoking negative context models by tagging the discourse for example “extremist” or “nationalist”.

To sum up what has been discussed so far, discourse is central to the expression and reproduction of ideologies and the main place for ideologies to fulfil their essential functions, such as persuasion and legitimation. Via mental models, ideologies come to bear on the content and form of the discourse. This process is discussed more fully in the next section.

### **Language and ideological expression**

Hatim and Mason (2003: 39) divide texts according to their rhetorical purpose into two types: monitoring texts aim to explain the situation, whereas managing texts aim to persuade the recipient to accept the speaker’s/writer’s arguments. Explicitly ideological discourse, for example a speech defending party policy, would belong to the last category, because it aims to foreground the preferred opinions in recipients’ mental models, which may eventually lead them to accept the opinions presented (van Dijk 2000: 273). This distinction, however, need not to be as clear-cut because, as explained above, expressions of ideology can occur in the seemingly monitoring texts, such as news articles.

Fowler (1991: 99) points out that there is no fixed relationship between the form and meaning; rather, a linguistic form has a variety of potential “significations in context”. Consequently, ideological importance of a discourse structure or a single linguistic feature depends on the interpretation of context. Van Dijk (2000: 264) suggests that the most relevant contextual features for the expression of ideologies are the type of discourse and participant roles. These two aspects determine the expectations of the participants and influence significantly the construction of mental models. People expect ideological statements from certain types of discourse and certain kind of participants, for example, from

party newspapers or government ministers. As to textual aspects, there are some features which tend to have more potential for taking on ideological meaning than others.

Different authors have analysed ideological expression in discourse by focusing on various linguistic features. Hatim and Mason (2003) look at ideology in translations and focus on cohesion, transitivity, lexicalisation and style. Van Dijk (2000) discusses ideological role of topics, local meaning, explicitness and implicitness, local coherence, lexicalisation, discourse schemata, rhetoric, style and manipulation. Fowler's (1991) ideologically informed analysis of media texts is based on the ideas of critical linguistics and M.A.K Halliday and focuses on transitivity, lexical structure, modality and speech acts. The present thesis employs the methodology used by Fowler, as informative and purportedly balanced news texts viewed here require in depth-analysis of these linguistic aspects which easily escape reader's notice.

Van Dijk's cognitive approach provides a good general framework to explain mental structure of ideologies and how they bear on discourse and social practices. It also explains how the mental representations of an individual and a group or society interact and how personal models can influence social ones. However, these structures are in the minds of people and despite the achievements of neurosciences, we cannot access them in some direct way. The only way to study the workings and content of these theoretical constructs is by analysing their expression in actual discourse.

As van Dijk's main aim is to provide a theoretical groundwork, then he places less emphasis on methodology and detailed linguistic analysis of texts. Ideological analysis of monitoring text types in which ideology is much more implicit requires a more rigorous linguistic analysis. Critical linguistics provides a practical methodological framework for such analysis. Van Dijk (2000: 9) also draws on the works by critical linguists and shares important aspects of their understanding of ideology. Thus, the thesis combines the two

frameworks and uses van Dijk's model-based approach alongside with the method employed by Fowler (1991). In this way, the discussion links the findings of detailed linguistic analysis with underlying mental structures and social context. A more thorough description of Fowler's approach is given in the section on method.

## **TRANSLATION, IDEOLOGY, MEDIA DISCOURSE**

Translation, similarly to ideology and discourse, can be defined and categorised very differently. Traditional, natural equivalence theories adopt a narrower perspective on translation as substitution of concrete source text segments with target language segments of the same value (Pym 2010: 7). In contrast to this, translation is also defined in very broad terms, as expressed by Steiner's (2004: 1) viewpoint that every language act is actually a translation. As the present thesis discusses translational procedures in texts which would traditionally be categorised as parallel texts – original texts compiled in different languages, but comparable as to their similar function and theme (Hansen 2004: 323) – then translation is understood here broadly, as cultural transfer.

The concept of translation as cultural transfer belongs to the paradigm of cultural translation, defined in the introduction, and is mainly associated with the ideas of translation theorist Itamar Even-Zohar. Even-Zohar (1981: 4, 7) advocates a broader, cultural approach to translation, arguing that all products of translational procedures should be dealt with as translations, both concrete texts, for which a particular source text-target text relation can be shown, as well as target texts which can be traced back to one or several specific source models. The practice of considering only actual text translations as suitable objects of translation research has led to the situation in which most of the material produced in translational processes has remained out of the focus of translation theories.

Furthermore, Even–Zohar (1981: 4) suggests that the question of translatability should not be about why a particular source text has no corresponding feature in target text but in which conditions, and in what way, a target utterance/text b is relatable to a source utterance/text a. This means that we should not automatically decategorise translated texts as translations when they do not conform to certain presupposed source text-target text relations. According to Even–Zohar (*ibid.* 6) translationality is on the one hand a principle of processing, the results of which are set by the constraints of the systems or between them, and on the other hand, a general process, the results of which are shaped by its own nature.

Such a broader approach would allow us to categorise international media reports also as transferred products, translations, which do not conform to traditional source text-target text relations, but whose features are clearly relatable to each other when considering the constraints of the systems. As Even–Zohar (1981: 5) emphasises, constraints which operate in translation function not only in relation to the established translational options, but can create totally new translational options. The following paragraphs elaborate on how various constraints, such as journalistic conventions or expectations of readership have turned news translation into something rather different from what is traditionally regarded as translation.

According to Bielsa and Bassnett (2009: 11), translation in the global news industry is a part of the intricate process in which information is transferred into another language and then edited, rewritten and restructured for a new context to such an extent that “any clear distinction between source and target ceases to be meaningful”. So for news translation, faithfulness to the original, if there is one, is not an issue. Writing a report on international events often involves both translating as well as synthesising several texts (*ibid.* 85). They can include pieces from agency despatches and quotes from the persons or documents, which may be translations in the traditional sense.

These news items fulfil a similar, informative function in their cultures and conform to the standards of a respective textual model which usually aims to inform the readers about particular events in a balanced manner. The reports present information according to the expectations of a particular audience and conventions of the genre in a particular culture (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009: 13). When a news item is transferred from one language to another, then often the lead, title, and the order of the paragraphs are changed, unnecessary information is eliminated, relevant background information is added or some part of information is summarized. The outcome is actually a new text which functions as a news for a different audience (ibid. 64). Thus, Bielsa and Bassnett (2009: 8) emphasise the importance of functional translation theories to the news translation: what matters is the equivalent effect, not the linguistic equivalence.

The context is essential, so that local circumstances play a central role in determining how the story is presented in different regions (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009: 94). To adjust the text to the circumstances, even the news angle and emphasis might be changed. Thus, translation creates markedly different versions of international events and contributes greatly to the circulation of global news (ibid. 72).

International news articles may report on the same events, and in this case, they inevitably involve a transfer of concepts from a foreign culture. The events themselves, when reported at international level, can also be seen as translations, because they have to be made meaningful and comprehensible for a particular audience. This transposition entails making linguistic choices between alternatives which evoke different mental models and thus, have different ideological implications. Such a process can be considered a kind of 'translating between cultures' which Wolf (2003: 183) describes as planting other, foreign meanings into cultural practices which are already integrated in and formed by institutions, traditions and history.

Problems of cultural translatability and power, closely linked to ideology and discourse are relevant also to media, especially to international news media. Bielsa and Bassnett (2009: 59) highlight the fact that the constant flow of international news conceals the difficulty of reporting from areas for which the correspondent lacks language skills, access and background knowledge. In contrast to ethnographic writings, which can draw attention to the fact that their representation of the other is a literary construct (Wolf 2003: 184), news reports are a different kind of discourse which does not allow reflective elaborations. Thus, the fact that the international news that reach the reader have been filtered through (foreign) language system and of a foreign cultural lens, is not made explicit. As a result, readers construct their mental models about what they read according to their own cultural knowledge without much reflection on the fact that the events reported take place in a different social reality and system of meanings.

Directly or indirectly, news reporting also means speaking on behalf of another, because journalists present the foreign event as they make sense of it and as they expect the event to be comprehensible to their audience. Sociologist Michel Callon has pointed out that any kind of process in which one person or group says something that is assumed to stand for another group or person is a translational process (Pym 2010: 155). Thus, translation involves formation of power relations, especially when different cultural groups are concerned (ibid. 156).

Many of the changes occurring in local versions of international news are conditioned by the characteristics of media discourse, which, as an institutionalised practice, has its rules about what is to be said, where and how. Fowler (1991: 2, 10) emphasises the fact that news is “socially constructed” and that institutions engaged in news reporting have a certain social, economic and political position, which means that news is reported from a particular



angle. So the news angle of international reports depends not only on the local context, but as all other news, on the angle of the reporting organisation.

Consequently, we could see the activity of an international news reporter as framing in translation. Mona Baker (2006: 106) describes framing as “an active strategy that implies agency and by means of which we consciously participate in the construction of reality”. Baker uses the notion of frame in the meaning of strategic moves made in order to present a particular position from a certain viewpoint. For example, a conflict can be framed ambiguously from ‘civil war’ to ‘terrorist acts’ (ibid 106, 107).

In van Dijk’s theoretical framework, ‘framing’ would correspond to expression of a biased mental model. Both framing and constructing a mental model are processes which establish the meaning. However, as constructing a mental model is necessary to understand the discourse in the first place (van Dijk 2006: 121), then framing as a conscious strategy can be initiated only when the model is already constructed and at the point of being expressed in discourse.

Baker (2006: 107) points out that translation can be regarded as framing both in metaphorical and literal sense. Metaphorically, one frame can be used to understand different events so that these events are translated into terms of one master frame. Literally, translation serves as an interpretive frame, because the words expressed in one language are interpreted as equivalent to the words of some other language. Translation can make use of frame ambiguity and different possibilities to frame an event, as the civil war and terrorist acts example demonstrated.

Translation can (re-)frame the event by using any of the linguistic or non-linguistic means, from visual effects to textual features such as shifts, code switching, selective appropriation of the original material, repositioning of participants, or labelling (Baker 2006: 111, 112). One important framing strategy is framing by labelling, which means that a

lexical item is used to identify a person, group, place or another essential feature in the story. Baker (ibid. 125-126) illustrates this with parallel names of Judea and Samaria/West Bank and their role in the Middle East conflict: the former phrase represents the Zionist viewpoint and automatically signals the user's standpoint. This has forced the international reporters to be cautious in their choice of words. Another relevant reframing strategy to media is selective appropriation of textual material, which means that something is omitted or added in translation in order to emphasise or suppress some aspects of the story in the source text or utterance, or aspects of a larger story to which it belongs (Baker 2006: 114, 122).

In general, selective appropriation of material is part of news construction, which begins with choosing the events that are seen as newsworthy. Newsworthiness is not an inherent property of the events, but assigned to them according to the commonly held, almost unconscious criteria among the journalists about what their audience expects (Fowler 1991: 13). These criteria are a mix of journalistic conventions, shared values, timing and nature of sources. Fowler (1991: 13-14) discusses a number of these criteria as described in sociological research and, similarly to Bielsa and Bassnett, highlights their dependence on cultural context.

Some news values, for instance the size of the event (number of people involved or affected) are less culture-dependent. However, several others, such as meaningfulness or reference to elite people and persons, are clearly more culturally-determined (Fowler 1991: 15) and thus, have also greater ideological implications. Meaningfulness prioritises events which involve people perceived similar to the audience or affect the audience directly. Fowler (ibid. 16) argues that this news value is rooted in homocentrist ideology, reflecting society's preoccupation with countries or people which are seen to be similar to oneself. Meaningfulness favours a polarising discourse which divides people into ingroup(s) and outgroups(s), Us and Them, and presupposes a society without internal divisions. Another

strongly ideological news value is reference to elite people or persons, which explains the constant attention on economically or politically powerful nations.

The discussion above shows that in the international news flow, translation has transformed into something different of what it is traditionally considered to be. As translation in global news is strongly influenced by conventions of media industry on the one hand and cultural factors of the other hand, then broader, cultural and functional approaches are necessary to understand its dynamics, including how translation as transfer influences ideology in news reports.

## **METHOD**

The sections on ideology and discourse described how beliefs and values of a society or a group are encoded in the texts in produces. Therefore, by careful linguistic analysis and contextualisation, these beliefs and values can be tracked down and made explicit. That is also the aim of critical linguistics, which Fowler (1991: 67) formulates as follows:

Critical linguistics seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language – and which are below the threshold of notice for anyone who accepts the discourse as ‘natural’.

One of the features which can bring about significant differences in the point of view is transitivity. For critical linguistics, transitivity is the basis of representation which allows us to analyse events and situations as being of certain type, such as action, process or state (Fowler 1991: 71-73). What is relevant for the expression of ideology is that the same event can be represented in different ways and language users have to make choices which tell us how they perceive the event or want it to be perceived by others.

Usually, transitivity involves three elements: a noun, which constitutes the semantic nucleus of the clause; a verb or adjective which designates the event/state of affairs presented in the clause, and one or more nouns or noun phrases signifying the participants

(Fowler 1991: 73-74). Action as a type of event involves usually a deliberate activity which is controlled by the agent, for example a clause “mayor *declares* his support”. While actions entail a change in the state of affairs, then in case of states, the verb or adjective in the clause refers to a state, like for example in “another *overpaid* official”.

In addition, the transitivity structure of a clause assigns the participants certain roles, which may indicate power relations or how responsibility and blame are assigned. *Agent* is someone who performs an action; *affected participants* are participants to whom something is done or happens. The most usual type of affected participants is *object* – thing or creature physically affected by an action or a process (“protesters smashed a *car*”). Another type of affected participant is *patient* – an animate participant, usually human, to whom something is done (“dog attacked a *bicyclist*”). The participant who benefits from the action performed in the clause is called *beneficiary* (cup *winners* received the awards) (Fowler 1991: 75-76).

Fowler (1991: 77) also discusses the relevance of syntactic transformations, such as passivisation and nominalisation, to the analysis of ideological expression in discourse. Transformation is syntactic variation which allows one to express the same propositional content with different syntactic ordering (ibid. 78). Fowler suggests several functional reasons for such variation: firstly, passivisation enables one to avoid indicating clearly who bears the responsibility for the action in the clause by shifting the focus from the agent to some other participant. Secondly, the passive allows some information to be deleted and other to be foregrounded. Thus, the use of the passive is especially common for example in official language.

Another relevant transformation to ideological expression is nominalisation (Fowler 1991: 79- 80). Nominalisation is the use of nouns instead of verbs to express the same idea, for example, *deviation* in place of *deviate*. Nominalisation brings about significant changes in the syntax and creates possibilities to describe an event or situation from an ideologically

different point of view. Similarly to passivisation, it allows one to leave substantial amount of information unexpressed. Moreover, nominalisation can result in mystification and reification – processes and qualities are treated as things so that they become impersonal and countable like material objects, for example a phrase “*demonstrations* against the *building* of a road through a forest” (BBC 9 November 2010).

The aspect that probably reveals the most about ideologies underlying a particular discourse is its lexical structure. Fowler (1991: 80) characterises vocabulary of a language as a map of objects, concepts, processes and relationships about which culture needs to communicate. Relationships Fowler refers to are those between reference and sense; reference makes it possible to use a word to designate some object or phenomenon in the real world, for example when saying ‘a tree’ to a large plant on the roadside (ibid. 81). Sense is the relationship between the words, the meaning we assign to a word as to other, related concepts; for example, ‘tree’ is a plant and ‘flower’ is also a plant, but a tree is not a flower, so ‘plant’ is a general term in relation to which we can define ‘tree’.

Thus, vocabulary represents the world for a culture, categorises and segments it according to the preoccupations of a given culture, and maintains its values and experience (Fowler 1991: 54, 82). From a cross-cultural point of view, these preoccupations can be regarded ideological. The frequency with which terms about some topic occur in a specific discourse imply the relative importance of the things they denote. When certain words occur often in certain discourses, then they become the markers of this area of experience which the recipients recognise and which serves as a basis for their expectations (ibid. 84). The categorising function of vocabulary plays an essential part in the reproduction of ideology as it enables one to discriminate groups simply by labelling them.

The discussion above indicates how much the choice of words may reveal about ideologies underlying a discourse. Van Dijk (2000: 205) explains ideological expression in

discourse with the help of mental models: discourse meanings are created by activating relevant parts of mental models which include opinions and attitudes encoded in the lexicon. According to the model activated, language users choose from words with similar denotation an expression with preferred connotation. The selection of words in a particular situation depends also on contextual factors such as social position, gender, age, social role, and circumstances. For example, this variation is used to map out relationships between groups: ingroup refers to outgroup(s) usually with a word that designates as well as evaluates them. Often, a negative or neutral term is used to refer to outgroups and a positive or neutral to refer to ingroups (van Dijk 2000: 270).

The thesis analyses linguistic features described by Fowler and framing strategies explained in the previous section in the articles of the Estonian and two foreign public broadcasters. The analysis aims to find out whether the articles construct the events of the Bronze Night from ideologically different perspectives, and in this case, how these differences relate to translational procedures involved in the transfer of news to international level. Thus, the thesis looks at framing strategies, transitivity and lexical structure in the articles of each broadcaster, discusses how they may influence the construction of mental models, and in case of international reports, whether and how they have changed in transfer.

However, as pointed out above, every reading is an active process of interpretation, dependent on the previous knowledge of the reader. The author of the thesis is no exception so that the articles in the thesis are analysed by a person who has grown up in and is inevitably influenced by the Estonian cultural context. Thus, the thesis does not aim to provide any definitive interpretations, but rather map out the complex changes and translation processes of different levels that take place while information moves from one context to another, and propose possible interpretations that readers may give to the different discursive expression of this information.

## DATA

In order to take a look at the translational procedure in the transfer of news to international information flow and possible changes in the viewpoint, the sources include two English-language broadcasters and an Estonian-language broadcaster. The articles analysed were gathered from the online news archives of the Eesti Rahvusringhääling (ERR) (Estonian Public Broadcasting), German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) and the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) World Service by using search options on the sites. The language of ERR articles is Estonian, articles by the BBC and DW are in English.

First, the three news providers were selected as they are public broadcasters and receive financing from the public resources: ERR and DW from the state budget (Riigikogu 2007) (DW 2004), BBC World Service by a government grant (BBC n.d.). Thus, they are answerable to the public and their impartiality and independence are required by law and/or clearly brought out in their mission statements. Such guaranteed impartiality evokes greater trust in the audience and therefore, any implicit beliefs underlying their manner of reporting should be made explicit. What is more, as public broadcasters, their mission is to represent their country to the world and to “increase tolerance” (ERR n.d), “bring people together for shared experiences” (BBC n.d.), “promote intercultural dialog” (DW n.d.).

The BBC was included in the selection of sources due to its wide reach: it is the only news website which made it into the list of 50 most often visited websites in 2011 (Google Inc. 2011). Established in 1932 (BBC n.d.), its international service has also considerable experience in international broadcasting. DW was included to bring in a public broadcaster which has an international reach, but represents a continental European perspective. Established in 1953, it initially aimed at Germans abroad (DW n.d.). Differently from the BBC, which phrases one of its purposes as “Bringing the UK to the world and the world to

the UK”, DW identifies itself more with the European perspective by stating that “We have a cultural mission and present the culture from Germany and Europe”.

The articles selected for analysis were published in a five-day time span following the peak of violent protests in Tallinn in the late evening of 27 April and the night of 28 April. In these five days from 28 April to 2 May 2007, the BBC published six articles on the topic, DW three articles and ERR eighty five articles. On the one hand, the large difference in the number of articles is natural, as in Estonia, the event had a considerable direct impact on many peoples’ daily lives. On the other hand, this difference is attributable to the manner of reporting of ERR, which shall be discussed in detail below.

The corpus of the articles also includes reports on the events that were tightly related to the Bronze Night, such as the blockade of Estonian embassy in Moscow, or the visit of Russian Duma delegation to Estonia. In the articles by the BBC and DW, these events are also explicitly linked to each other and often reported as one set.

DW covers the affair mainly from the viewpoint of international politics, as reflected for example in the title “Merkel Calls Putin Over Missile Row and Violence in Estonia”. The article bundles the events in Estonia together with Russia’s anger over the US plans to station inceptor missiles to Poland and the Czech Republic. The reports start with the diplomatic moves prompted by the Bronze Night at international level and then move to the unrest itself.

In contrast to this, the BBC retains the focus on Estonia and on the tensions between Russia and Estonia, paying less attention to the role of the European Union. These tendencies are exemplified also by the titles of the reports, for example “Tallinn tense after deadly riots” or “Russian officials lambast Estonia”. Each article also includes a sentence or two from the earlier reports on the topic, so that the reader gets an overview of the previous developments.



ERR, however, reports separately on each turn of events at international as well as national level. This is illustrated by titles such as “Soome peaminister avaldas toetust Eesti valitsusele” (“Finnish Prime Minister declared support to Estonian government”), “Merkel kutsus Ansipit ja Putinit mõistlikkusele” (“Merkel urged Ansip and Putin to be reasonable”) or “Vahistatud on 46 inimest” (“46 people arrested”). Occasionally, it is questionable whether the events covered are relevant enough to publish a separate report on them, for example “TÕE<sup>1</sup> avaldas politseile ja valitsusele toetust” (“TÕE Declared Support to Police and Government”). This manner of reporting, publishing bits of information frequently (resulting in 13–20 items a day), in part explains the immense difference in the number of articles.

Another notable characteristic of the ERR articles compared to the DW and BBC reports is shortness. While the average length of the BBC articles is 490 words and of DW articles 576 words, then the ERR articles are on average 113 words, and almost half of them under 100 words. These reports usually give brief information on the changes in the situation or pieces of statistics (e.g. number of new violations or arrests) or report single reactions to the issue at international level, for example the statement by Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. These reports are usually very short, approximately four sentences.

There are only seven articles which exceed 250 words. Two of them are basically condensed versions of the addresses by Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. The longest article, over 600 words, is also a condensed version of a public address by President Toomas–Hendrik Ilves. These longer articles consist mostly of quotes from the addresses. Other longer articles report on the meeting between the Minister of Education and the head teachers of Russian schools, the demarche of the EU to Russia on the embassy blockade, and the final results of the excavations on Tõnismäe.

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<sup>1</sup> TÕE - Tallinna õpilasesindus (Tallinn Student Council)

In order to better observe how translation as transfer works in cross-border news reporting, a selection was made from the complete corpus of ERR articles on the basis of their topic. The 30 reports chosen report on the same developments or/and include some of the same information as the BBC and/or DW articles. Such thematic restriction enables us to compare those articles in Estonian and English that are likely to use the same concepts, describe the same events, persons or objects, or to include the same quotations.

The sample is representative of the whole corpus of ERR articles considering the length of the articles. However, such selection inevitably disfavours reports on developments which were relevant mainly to the local audience, such as the short reports on the number of arrests or uneventful night. These aspects are not disregarded in the BBC and DW reports, but they receive considerably less attention. Compared to all 85 items, the final sample includes also fewer articles which summarise the opinions of Estonian public figures (politicians, a sociologist and a writer).

The analysis below looks separately at the articles of the three broadcasters and focuses on general framing strategies, transitivity and lexical structure to find out whether the transfer of news from one cultural and linguistic environment to another as a translational process creates differences in the ideological perspective of the reports. Secondly, the thesis discusses which mental models such frames and linguistic choices would prompt the readers to form, and how these choices are linked to cultural and institutional factors.

## **ANALYSIS**

### **Framing strategies**

Translation in the articles on the Bronze Night in English can be viewed on two levels. On the one hand, there is the linguistic level – translations of quotes from the statements by Estonian politicians, English equivalents to Estonian events, objects, groups and persons. On

the other hand, there is the general level of models and frames – the reporters/translators construct personal event models and translate the foreign concepts and realities into terms they can comprehend. Subsequently, they frame the event for their readers in the reports, influenced by social representations, personal and institutional ideologies, and what they consider relevant for their audience.

This translation procedure begins with the transfer on the conceptual level and proceeds with setting the angle and framing strategies. In the chosen reports, the analysis first focuses on various aspects which influence the general frame, such as choice of information and reported opinions, the manner of attribution, appropriation of textual materials, separation of factual and evaluative material and distancing. Other ideologically relevant features, such as transitivity and lexical choices, are discussed more thoroughly in separate sections.

The perspective of the reports is determined also by what the BBC, DW and ERR consider newsworthy and whom they see as their audience at first place<sup>2</sup>. Secondly, the viewpoints of the articles differ also because Estonian and English provide different linguistic means to describe the events, both in terms of grammar and lexis. Even though these means fulfil more or less similar functions, they may still change the emphasis or meaning.

All these aspects, from framing strategies to the choice of words, determine the ideological viewpoint of the reports and which kind of mental models they prompt the readers to construct.

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<sup>2</sup> The website of DW explains that “DW is /.../ targeted to anyone interested in Germany and Europe, but in particular opinion leaders – and future opinion leaders” (DW 2010). On its website, the BBC World Service audience is not explicitly defined, but its scope can be guessed from BBC’s public purpose to build “global understanding of international issues” and that “English will continue to be the core global offer, serving influencers around the world.” (BBC n.d.).

### **Framing strategies in BBC reports**

What is characteristic to the BBC articles is thorough background information: all reports include a short chronology in the middle of the article titled “ESTONIA-RUSSIA TIES” [emphasis original] with dates of the beginnings and ends of Russian occupations and the German occupation in Estonia during the 20th century. In addition, each article includes the same four to six sentences which give the conflicting Estonian and Russian perceptions of the memorial, the size of Russian minority in Estonia, their status as non-citizens and the extent of human losses Estonia suffered during the Soviet occupation. The background information provided frames the conflict as one rooted in the controversial past.

The BBC articles tend to present general descriptions of the situation or what can be regarded as “facts” by using passive or nominal constructions so that attributing a description to some source is avoided, except in the few cases when the information is attributed to news agencies. As another option, a reporting verb, such as ‘describe’ or ‘report’ is used which indicates that the description of the situation is mediated. Italics in the examples here and in the rest of the analysis are used to emphasise parts of the text relevant for the analysis:

By Saturday morning the situation in central Tallinn *was described* as calm, but the authorities are braced for more trouble.

/.../

Squads of police *were seen moving* around the area where the memorial used to stand.

In few cases, descriptions are attributed to inanimate “reports” (“Reports said Russian police scuffled with pro-Kremlin youth activists /.../”).

With the abovementioned strategies, descriptions are separated from direct evaluations or possibly provocative opinions. The latter are carefully attributed with a reporting verb and quotation marks:

Moscow Mayor *Yuri Luzhkov called for* "a boycott of all things connected with Estonia," at a May Day rally on Tuesday.

*He said Estonia had dismantled* the Soviet memorial "in the most barbaric way".

In this way, the broadcaster distances itself from the statement and shows clearly that it reports someone else's point of view. Such distance is usually maintained throughout the BBC articles.

There is only one sentence, repeated in half of the articles, in which BBC's role as a mediator is clearly indicated by attributing the observation to its own correspondent:

*The BBC's Richard Galpin says it is being perceived as one insult too many by local ethnic Russians, after what they feel has been years of discrimination against them by the majority Estonian population.*

The lexical choices, which emphasise the subjectivity of the opinion mediated in this sentence, will be discussed further in the section on lexical structure.

### **Framing strategies in DW reports**

DW articles are modest with background information, which is limited to a sentence in each article describing the different historical meaning of the monument for the both sides.

Compared to the BBC, the DW reports do not keep a strict balance between the different parties. A parallel presentation of Estonians' and Russians' conflicting perceptions of the statue as in the BBC occurs in one article out of three; in another, only Estonians' opinion is explicitly given and in the third, Estonians' viewpoint is stated in the middle of the article and Russians' perception at the end of the article:

*Estonians see the bronze memorial as a symbol of 50 years of Soviet occupation following World War II.  
/.../*

*Many Russians consider the statue in Tallinn to be a poignant memorial to the huge losses suffered by the Soviet Union in defeating Nazism and have complained at the status of ethnic Russians in Estonia, alleging discrimination.*

Such presentation of opinions may foreground one or the other and incline the reader to see the claims of one of the parties more justified.

As mentioned in the section on data, DW articles focus on the international reactions to the affair and blockade of the Estonian embassy in Moscow, touching only slightly the events in Estonia. The actions of the EU are strongly identified with Germany's probably

because in 2007, Germany was holding the presidency of the EU, which is also mentioned in one of the DW articles. Occasionally, the EU and Germany assume a more prominent role in the reports than Estonia. The article “Merkel Calls Putin Over Missile Row and Violence in Estonia” is a good cue to the general angle by reporting that “Putin had voiced "serious concern" over the events in Tallinn” and “The German government statement Saturday said Merkel had urged both Putin and Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip to keep a lid on the row”. With the exception of a sentence from the spokesman of the Estonian embassy, the Estonian side is represented only with the generalising assessment “Estonians see the bronze memorial as a symbol of 50 years of Soviet occupation”. The other two articles include more statements by Estonian officials, such as Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand.

In contrast to the BBC which limits itself to the statements of Russian officials, the DW articles focus more on reactions in Russia, relying on the information of news agencies such as RIA Novosti and Interfax. The articles feature a smaller number of participants representing the Estonian side than the BBC articles, and report less their statements or actions.

Interestingly enough, DW does not cover the visit of the Duma delegation to Estonia, which was proposed by Chancellor Merkel and which is covered by the BBC and ERR. However, DW describes thoroughly the protests of Russian youth organisations and the emotional opinions of newspapers and supermarket owners:

"We are against the removal of the *soldier-liberator* in Tallinn and consider such actions *inadmissible*," Interfax quoted a spokesman for the Sedmoi Kontinent supermarket chain as saying.

/.../

In the city of Pskov, 20 kilometres (12 miles) east of Russia's border with Estonia, several dozen protesters brought an empty coffin to the Estonian consulate, *RIA Novosti* reported.

They were stopped by police while attempting to unfurl a banner reading: "*A spike in the head for the fascist beast, then the grave!*"

Specific phrasing of the excerpts above cue the readers that the quoted statements are explicitly ideological. Thus, they may incline to distance themselves from the militancy of

the protesters and keep the protesters' viewpoints apart from personal event model and accepted version of the events, just as the reporting phrases distance the broadcaster from protesters' opinions. What is worth noting is that the Pskov incident was not directly linked to the main developments and did not receive any attention from the BBC or ERR.

In contrast to the BBC articles, the reporting clause tends to be at the end of the sentence in the DW articles. The readers of the BBC learn first about the author of the statement/issuer of the information and then about its content. This may influence how readers evaluate the information, because they may judge the statement before they read it by the reliability of the speaker. The latter is part of a context model the readers activate when they engage in a communicative situation (van Dijk 2000: 212). In the case of DW, the opposite applies: the readers may evaluate the information without considering the source. Therefore, although both broadcasters cite their sources and attribute statements properly, it seems that the BBC frames the information so that the reader's attention is drawn to the authors of the statements and sources.

### **Framing strategies in ERR reports**

Framing strategies of ERR differ considerably from the ones of the BBC and DW: firstly, the ERR reports focus on single aspects and rarely use parallel textual structures to state the arguments or describe the actions of the conflicting parties. Secondly, the ERR reports usually include very little or no information on the previous developments – probably, it was assumed that the Estonian readers keep themselves informed. In general, the structure of reports allows us to divide them roughly into three types. However, the boundaries of these types are by no means clear-cut and they only help to get a basic overview of the texts.

The articles of the first type describe the general situation, the actions performed with the memorial, or the excavations on the site of the memorial. These articles make up about a

fifth of the final sample of the articles and their most typical feature was frequent use of the passive. Thus, they are discussed in more detail in the section on transitivity.

The second type contains articles which are basically summaries of statements by officials, mostly by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Urmas Paet<sup>3</sup>. These articles constitute little more than a fifth of the final sample. The usual structure of the titles, consisting of the name of the person quoted, colon and a sentence describing its content show that the articles report someone's statement or opinion:

*Ansip: vandaalid häbistavad sõdurivaprust ja vabaduseideaale*  
*Paet: Venemaa ründab Eesti kaudu Euroopa Liitu*  
*Venemaa: Tallinnas rahutuste käigus tapetu oli Vene kodanik*  
*Teadlane: võimalikud sanktsioonid puudutaks Vene ärimehi*

No such structure is used in the BBC or DW titles, as they cite several persons and sources.

In general, the articles of the third type consist of direct quotations with summarising sentences between them:

"Ma olen kindel, et huligaanide rünnak selle pihta, mida me kõik kalliks peame – meie laste turvalisus, meie mälestused, meie maa – liidab meid veelgi tugevamalt ühte. Me ei tohi lasta *vihakülvajatel saada rahva lõhestajateks* või eelarvamuste istutajateks". Ansipi sõnul kord riigis tagatakse ja kurjategijaid karistatakse. /.../ Monument on *terve ja kahjustamata*. Nii võimalikud säilmed kui hauatähis *viiakse* oma uuele kohale *Kaitseväe kalmistul niipea, kui vajalikud ettevalmistustööd on tehtud*," märkis Ansip

ERR dedicates a whole article to Ansip's speech quoted above. The BBC, however, appropriates only some phrases from that address and distances itself carefully by using reported speech and reporting phrases at the beginning and in the middle of the sentences:

Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip urged Estonians not to allow what he described as *those sowing hatred to divide the country*. Adding that the monument was "*safe and undamaged*", he confirmed that the any soldiers' remains found would be moved to the Defence Forces Cemetery "*as soon the necessary preparations are completed*".

Compared to ERR, the BBC discards the rhetoric, except for the first sentence, which is probably meant to convey the government's attitude. Otherwise, the BBC summarises points which it considers relevant for an international audience: what has happened to and what will become of the monument. Such appropriation reframes the speech as rather brief and factual.

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<sup>3</sup> In the whole collection of 85 ERR articles, there are very few which report the opinions or evaluations by specialists or other non-politicians: there is one which reports on an opinion of an economist, two on the assessments of social scientists and one an opinion of a columnist.



ERR, however, quotes lengthy paragraphs which delegitimize the cause of the rioters, ask people to remain calm, and justify the actions of the government.

In contrast to the BBC and DW articles, which report also the arguments and reactions of the Russian or side, the ERR reports tend to under-represent the opinions of other parties. That applies not only to the voices from Russia, but also to the voices in Estonia which were critical of government action<sup>4</sup>. Although the Russian side is often written about, their commentaries tend to be missing or limited. Partly, this may be attributed to the high publication frequency and time restrictions, but partly, it may be an intentional strategy.

Even though ERR uses reporting verbs such as ‘arvas’, or ‘ütles’, it is not that careful with distancing itself. At the same time, the reported statements are obviously biased and aim to legitimize the opinions and actions of the Estonian side and delegitimize the Russian side [bold original]:

**Välisministeerium avaldas imestust Venemaa riigiduuma delegatsiooni käitumise üle, sest delegatsioon keeldus osalemast eelnevalt oma juhi poolt kooskõlastatud programmist.**

Eesti pool koostas külalistele väga sisuka programmi, mis /.../ oli kooskõlastatud delegatsiooni juhi, riigiduumaväliskomisjoni aseesimehe Leonid Slutskiga, teatas välisministeeriumi pressitalitus./.../ Samuti hakkasid riigiduuma liikmed esimesest momendist esitama ebareaalset nõudmisi./.../Keeldumist põhjendati nõudega korraldada kohtumine pressiga kinniste uste taga Vene saatkonnas, toetudes absurdsele väitele, et vastasel juhul pole kõigil ajakirjanikel juurdepääsu pressikonverentsile.

Here, the phrasing used evaluates the Russian delegation negatively and emphasizes their unreliability by stating that it did not respect previous agreement (“keeldus kooskõlastatud programmist”) and made unrealistic (“ebareaalset”) demands. The last sentence provides also delegation’s commentary while pre-evaluating their claim as being absurd (“absurdsele väitele”). Such evaluation might originate from the statement of the Foreign Ministry, but the article does not distance itself from the rhetoric of the statement.

The articles of the third type mostly use the active voice and, compared to the articles of the second type, include much less direct quotations and report or quote more the statements

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<sup>4</sup> The initial corpus of 85 articles includes only four articles which report on opinions critical of government action: one of an opposition politician, one of a coalition politician of Russian background, and two of sociologists.

by different parties. Their topics concern either the visit of the Duma delegation or diplomatic moves of Estonia, the EU or Chancellor Merkel. This type with over ten articles made up the largest proportion of the examples. Once again, titles provide an idea of their content and structure:

Merkel avaldas Eestile toetust  
 Euroopa Liit nõuab Venemaalt Viini konventsiooni täitmist  
 Eesti välisministeerium esitas Venemaale noodi  
 Duuma delegatsioon tunnustas Eesti poole koostöötahet

An interesting nuance is that the article “Duuma delegatsioon tunnustas Eesti poole koostöötahet” is the only one which places Estonia in the object position and the Russian side, represented by the Duma delegation, in the subject position. Such strategy, showing a representative of the opposing party as acknowledging that We are right serves to legitimate and represent the ingroup positively (van Dijk 2000: 282).

The overall reframing and change of perspective in translation of news can be effected not only with general strategies such as the choice of information and manner of attribution, but also with linguistic devices, such as transitivity and lexical choices, which are discussed in the following two sections.

## **Transitivity**

Before looking at transitivity in the articles of the three broadcasters, it has to be noted that transitivity structures in Estonian and English are somewhat different: Estonian tends to employ the impersonal voice instead of the passive to avoid revealing the agent. The impersonal functions similarly to the passive, but differently from the active-passive constructions in the Indo-European languages, the personal-impersonal constructions in Finno-Ugric languages do not pertain to the object of the sentence but rather, express the relation between the grammatical subject and the agent (Erelt et al. 1995: 73). The

impersonal shows that the activity is performed by an indefinite animate agent, whereas the personal voice makes the agent explicit and places it in the subject position.

Because of the grammatical resources available, the BBC and DW employ the passive to conceal the agency, whereas the ERR articles, as they are written in Estonian, employ mainly the impersonal for the same purpose.

### **Transitivity in BBC reports**

In general, the BBC reports are very careful with transitivity structures, especially when attributing statements to some source. The effort to maintain balance is made not only in respect to which information and whose statements to present, but also how to present them. For example, conflicting opinions in the sections of background information are given in parallel by using plain active sentences:

Estonians *say* the soldier symbolised Soviet occupation. Russians *say* it is a tribute to those who fought the Nazis.

Such simple structure consisting of the agent as a subject, followed by a verb marking verbal action and a quotation or summary is also used to report statements of institutions or politicians to make clear who claims what. These parts of the articles are as a rule presented by juxtaposing opposing sides, a sentence/section giving the point of view of one party followed by the viewpoint of the opposing party:

Foreign Minister Urmas Paet *said* Moscow had made provocative statements and meddled in Estonia's internal affairs.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin *has voiced* serious concern over the removal of the World War II monument.

In half of the articles the titles are also in the active voice, with 'Estonia' in the subject position as the agent:

Estonia blames Russia for unrest  
Estonia shuts consulate in Moscow  
Estonia unearths Soviet war dead

Titles are essential, because they key the interpretation of the article and guide the way readers construct the model about the event (van Dijk 2000: 271). Usually, authoritative participants appear in subject positions and less powerful ones in object positions (Fowler 1991: 98). Thus, Estonia in these titles is presented not as a passive victim but as an active agent. Only one of the titles of the BBC articles, “Russia accused of 'attack on EU’”, is in the passive. In this title, the agent is implicit and ‘Russia’ is in a less powerful object position as patient.

When the articles give general descriptions of the situation not attributed to someone else, the BBC prefers the passive:

A tense calm *is reported* in Estonia's capital, Tallinn, after two nights of clashes between ethnic Russians and police over a Soviet war monument.

Few exceptions to this usage occur for example when the descriptions are attributed to “reports” or “correspondents” (e.g. “Correspondents said a crowd of more than 1,000 demonstrators gathered /.../).

Naturally, the passive is used when it is not clear whether the information is correct and mentioning of the source is avoided, as was the case with the rumours about the second death:

There have been *unconfirmed* reports of a second death, but the Estonian government has denied this.

Interestingly, passive and nominal constructions prevailed also in the sentences describing the actions performed with the memorial:

The *decision to remove* the Soviet monument has strained relations with Russia  
The statue *was re-erected* on Monday at a military cemetery in Tallinn, away from the city centre.  
It [the statue] has now *been relocated* to a military cemetery, away from the centre of the capital Tallinn.

The agency behind the removal is clearly indicated only few times, as in “Estonia's government would not reveal where it took the 1.83m (six foot) statue”. Passive and nominal constructions omit the agent and refocus the story on the action so that the sentence assigns no responsibility or blame (Fowler 1991: 78).

The BBC resorts to passive or nominal constructions also when reporting violent actions:

A tense calm is reported in Estonia's capital, Tallinn, after two nights of *clashes* between ethnic Russians and police over a Soviet war monument.

One man *was killed*, 153 people *were injured* and some 800 *arrests were made* as the Russians resisted the removal of the bronze statue of a soldier.

However, agency behind violent actions is indicated when it seems essential to the description of the events or when such an indication is a part of a claim attributed to someone else:

Police *fired tear gas* and rubber bullets and protesters *trashed* shops

The Estonian ambassador to Russia, *Marina Kaljurand*, *told* the BBC's Europe Today programme that up to 500 young people had been "*shouting, committing vandalism*, writing on the walls of the embassy, *throwing stones*".

The principle implied by the transitivity patterns here seems to be that the broadcaster should not give any explicit evaluations. The BBC uses transitivity structures which help to create balance and avoid favouring one specific model. However, certain lexical cues in the articles may prompt the readers to construct their models in a different way.

### **Transitivity in DW reports**

Transitivity structures reflect the general frame of DW which tends to foreground the role of the EU/Germany. In contrast to the BBC titles, in which Estonia is mostly the subject and the agent, the DW titles place the EU/ Chancellor Merkel into these roles:

*Merkel Calls Putin Over Missile Row and Violence in Estonia*

*EU Pledges Help in Estonia-Russia Row*

*EU Urges Russia to End Estonia Embassy Blockade*

“Estonia” in these titles is only a part of a modifier (e.g. “*Estonia-Russia Row*”) or adverbial (“in Estonia”). Instead of decisive actor as in the BBC articles, it is presented as in need of aid in the DW reports:

The European Union *has promised to help* end a virtual siege of the *Estonian embassy* in Moscow sparked by the removal of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn, *Estonia's Foreign Minister Urmas Paet said* Tuesday.

Here, Estonia occurs as a modifier and the Estonian embassy as a representation of Estonia is in the weaker role of beneficiary. Interestingly, the promise of help is not made directly by an EU representative, but mediated by the Estonian Foreign Minister. Moreover, the role of the agent is assigned to the EU who “has promised to help end virtual siege of the Estonian embassy”. In the BBC reports on the same topic, Estonia occurs in a more active role, marked by use of direct quotes by Mr Paet:

Mr Paet called for a "vigorous" EU reaction to Moscow./.../ "We find it necessary that the reaction on behalf of the European Union to the behaviour of Russia should be as vigorous as possible," he said.

Direct quotations of EU officials which DW has chosen to report often use the passive and nominal constructions, which avoid indicating responsibility:

"We hope that the whole issue behind this *will be solved* between the Russian government and the Estonian government through *dialogue and negotiation*," the European Commission spokeswoman said.

The expression of support to Estonia is not that direct; rather, taking sides is evaded. It is left up to the two countries, “the Russian government and the Estonian government” to decide who should take the initiative. Occasionally, the reported statements assign both Estonia and Russia the role of the patient and Germany(Merkel)/the EU the role of the agent, showing that the former have equally misbehaved and are now admonished by the latter:

The German government statement Saturday said *Merkel had urged both Putin and Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip to keep a lid on the row by showing restraint* and restoring parliamentary contacts as soon as possible.

Compared to the BBC articles, the DW reports use much less the passive voice and prefer nominalisation to avoid indicating agency:

The *row over the removal* of a Soviet war memorial from Tallinn's centre erupted in *riots* that began there last Thursday, leading to 900 *arrests* and the *death* of a Russian citizen identified by officials only as Dmitri.

The sentence above leaves many questions open, from who riots against whom to who killed the Russian citizen. The rest of the article provides insufficient information to answer them.

Despite using nominal constructions, DW articles are not that careful with transitivity structures and indicate agency also where the BBC opts for passive, such as the actions performed with the memorial:

The protest came after *Estonian authorities removed a controversial Soviet war memorial* from central Tallinn for relocation at a military cemetery.

As mentioned above, DW pays considerable attention to the embassy blockade. Descriptions, paraphrases, or quotes concerning the actions of the Russian youth organisations are detailed and in the active voice, showing clearly the agency:

About 100 youths from pro-Kremlin organisations Young Guard and Ours *have ringed* the Estonian embassy since Friday, *chanting* anti-Estonian government slogans and *pointing the barrel* of a green inflatable tank at it. /.../

One Russian demonstrator *broke into* the grounds of the Estonian embassy in Moscow on Tuesday afternoon and *cut down and desecrated* its flag in a row over the fate of a Soviet war memorial.

Consequently, the violence is shifted from Estonia to Russia, as the unrest in Estonia is described rather sparingly in comparison to vivid depiction of protests in Russia.

### Transitivity in ERR articles

Differences in transitivity structures in the broadcasters' reports vary according to the topic and article type. Some ERR reports are similar to the DW articles, by being less careful with agency and using less passives than the BBC. However, the articles of the first type (described in the section on framing strategies), similarly to the BBC reports, avoid indicating agency. The titles of these reports are also mostly in the impersonal:

Tallinnas, Jõhvis ja Kohtla-Järvel *peeti kinni üle 600 isiku*  
 Politsei *on* praeguseks *kinni pidanud* ligi 800 inimest  
 Pronkssõdur *püstitati* kaitseväge kalmistule

The first two articles contained a lot of numerical data, resembling a statistical report, and the agent, if indicated, was a law enforcement institution. Otherwise, impersonal constructions prevailed. The second article illustrates the tendencies [bold original]:

**Tallinnas on politsei kolme päevaga kinni pidanud 800 inimest, vigastada on saanud 153 inimest, kellest 29 on politseiametnikud.** /.../Vahi alla võtmist *taotleti* 64 isiku puhul, teatas Põhja politseiprefektuur. Reedel ja ööl vastu laupäeva *peeti kinni* ligi 600 isikut, kellest 21 puhul *taotletakse* vahi

alla võtmist./.../Laupäeva hommikuks fikseeris politsei 49 objekti, mille puhul *on toime pandud* vandalismiakte.

Impersonal constructions ( e.g. “taotleti”, “peeti kinni”, “vigastada on saanud”) decrease the valency of the verbs – the reader learns that people were hurt and arrested, but who did it and why remains unclear. Lack of any further information neutralises a violent and emotionally loaded event down to a procedural description.

The BBC and DW reports of the same date, 28 April 2007, also contain the data given in the report discussed. Similarly to ERR, it is presented with nominal and passive constructions:

The row over the removal of a Soviet war memorial from Tallinn's centre erupted *in riots* that began there last Thursday, *leading to 900 arrests* and the *death of a Russian citizen* identified by officials only as Dmitri. (DW)

One *man was killed*, 153 people *were injured* and some 800 *arrests were made* as the Russians resisted the removal of the bronze statue of a soldier. (BBC)

The frame for the action has remained similar in transfer: DW and the BBC use the noun ‘arrest’, ERR the verb ‘kinni pidama’. However, ERR employs this verb also in the active, attributing the action to “the police”, which may serve to show to the Estonian readers that the law enforcement is in control. In case of injuries, the BBC uses the verb ‘injure’ in the passive, and prefers passives throughout the sentence; the ERR, however, uses infinitive and past participle (“vigastada on saanud”) to avoid naming the agent who caused the injuries.

The ERR reports of the second type are mostly in the active, as the titles illustrate:

*Ansip: vandaalid häbistavad sõdurivaprust ja vabaduseideaale*

*Paet: Venemaa riindab Eesti kaudu Euroopa Liitu*

*Venemaa: Tallinnas rahutuste käigus tapetu oli Vene kodanik*

The second report here provides an example of reframing by transitivity structures in translation. The statement reported in “Paet: Venemaa riindab Eesti kaudu Euroopa Liitu” is covered in the BBC article “Russia accused of ‘*attack* on EU’”. The ERR title attributes the claim to Mr Paet, but the paraphrase of its content assigns Russia the role of the agent and an aggressor. The BBC uses an equivalent noun (“*attack* on the EU”) for an action expressed



with an active verb (“*ründab*”) in the ERR article. As the ERR title is in the indicative and without a reporting verb, then it seems not so much to report as to state that Russia is attacking the EU. The BBC however, uses the passive, adds a reporting verb and quotation marks, thereby shifting the focus from Russia’s action to the act of accusation. The titles of the DW reports do not give Estonia or its representatives a participant role and once again, shift the agency from Estonia to the EU by covering what is probably the response to Paet’s statement from the EU in “EU Pledges Help in Estonia-Russia Row”.

The speeches quoted in the second type of articles were mainly in the active, rendering the body text of the reports also in the active. The report “Venemaa: Tallinnas rahutuste käigus tapetu oli Vene kodanik” is a mixed-type case:

*.../Samas väitis Venemaa välisministeerium, et nad ei tea tapetu nime ega surma põhjuseid, vahendas Interfax ministeeriumi teadet. Eesti riigiprokuratuuri sõnul pole Vene kodaniku surm kuidagi seotud politseiametnike tegevusega, teatas Eesti välisministeerium*  
*Õöl vastu reedet pussitati Tallinna kesklinnas toimunud rahutuste ajal Tatari tänaval Dmitrit (s. 1987), kes suri hiljem haiglas. .../ Tänaseks kogutud tõendid viitavad sellele, et Dmitri suri massilistes korratustes osalenud isikute omavahelise tüli käigus saadud vigastuste tagajärjel.*

The sentence structure treats “Venemaa välisministeerium” and “Eesti riigiprokuratuur” equally, both occur as the subjects in active sentences. However, when the article describes the circumstances of the death of the Russian citizen, it resorts to intransitive verbs and impersonal and nominal constructions characteristic to police reports.

DW and the BBC opt for the same constructions when reporting the death of the Russian citizen. Here, the transfer does not involve any reframing in terms of transitivity. The BBC is rather consistent in using passives to describe violent actions:

The dead man *has been named* by the Russian embassy in Tallinn as Dmitri Ganin, 20, an ethnic Russian who was permanently resident in Estonia and held Russian citizenship.  
 Estonian authorities have said he *was stabbed* by another demonstrator and that police *had no involvement* in his death. (BBC)

The row over the removal of a Soviet war memorial from Tallinn's centre erupted in riots *.../ leading to 900 arrests* and the *death of a Russian citizen* identified by officials only as Dmitri. (DW)

The articles of the third type are also mostly in the active; the same applies to their titles:

Merkel *avaldas* Eestile toetust  
 Euroopa Liit *nõuab* Venemaalt Viini konventsiooni täitmist

Eesti välisministeerium *esitas* Venemaale noodi

The same participants, the Estonian embassy in Moscow/the Foreign Ministry from the Estonian side, Russia/the Duma delegation from the Russian side, Chancellor Merkel/the EU from the European side fill in different combinations the main semantic roles and syntactic positions in the titles of these articles. All three occur in the subject position more or less equally, with the exception of the EU and Merkel who do not occur in the object position.

The Estonian side, when in the object position, tends to be the beneficiary (“Merkel *avaldas Eestile* toetust”), but the Russian side, the patient (“Euroopa Liit *nõuab Venemaalt* Viini konventsiooni täitmist”). Thus, similarly to the DW articles, this type of the ERR reports assigns the EU the most powerful role. However, like the BBC, they frequently give also Estonia or its representatives the role of the agent who acts against Russia which then occurs as the patient (“*Eesti välisministeerium esitas Venemaale* noodi”).

In the body of the third type of articles, Estonia or its representatives tend to occur as the agent equally with other main parties, even if the title assigns this role to the EU or Duma delegation. This is demonstrated by the way speech acts are assigned to the parties, for example, in the report “EL lubas abi Eesti Moskva saatkonna töö normaliseerimiseks”:

EL on lubanud /.../ Saksamaa välisminister Frank Walter Steinmeier lubas /.../  
 Välisminister Urmas Paet rääkis /.../ sõnas /.../ juhtis tähelepanu /.../ Välisministeerium pressiesindus teatas  
 Kremli-meelse noorteliikumise Naši aktivistid takistavad /.../

However, a few articles retain the transitivity structure set by the title, for example “Merkel kutsus Ansipit ja Putinit mõistlikkusele” leaves Chancellor Merkel in the role of the agent. The report presents the information with almost the same transitivity structures as the DW article which reports that “Merkel had urged both Putin and Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip to keep a lid on the row by showing restraint”. However, the order of mentioning assigns the importance to the affected participants differently: the ERR article mentions Ansip first, whereas the DW articles mention Putin first. In this way, the articles create slightly different impression of the importance of the addressees.

## **Lexical Structure**

As emphasised in the theoretical part, the choice of words, especially labelling is highly informative about ideologies expressed in discourse. Lexical choices and naming practices are central to (de)legitimation for constructing the ingroup and the outgroup (van Dijk 2006: 125). Baker (2006: 122) has shown how words used to designate, for example, an event or a place serve as labels which frame a whole story in a particular way and guide readers' response. In a news report, reframing would mean changing the angle.

The most revealing and problematic in the Bronze Night coverage are probably the labels for the conflict parties, the monument, and the unrest it sparked. Even if the labelling does not involve direct linguistic translation, it definitely entails translation on the conceptual level and reframing of the story according to news values and needs of a particular audience.

### **Lexical structure in BBC reports**

The choice of label for the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia is problematic because as with many other groups, the Russian-speakers do not form a homogenous group and by today, their first language may be their only common denominator. It is worth noting that the BBC articles do not present any opinions of the representatives of this group, although its members were the main participants in the protests and the following violence.

The BBC uses phrases on different levels of generalisation to refer to Russian-speakers in Estonia. The most frequent label in the articles is "Russians", which is used seventeen times; "ethnic Russians" is used seven times of which six appear in the "ESTONIA-RUSSIA TIES" [emphasis original] section. The phrases "local ethnic Russians" and "Estonians of Russian origin" are used three and two times, respectively.

"Russians" is the most general and the most problematic label, because as mentioned above, language is sometimes the only Russian feature they share. The label provides a basic description and categorises the group in a clear, but misleading manner. This label is also

used to state the group's opinion in formulaic phrases "Estonians say X. Russians describe/say Y", which shows that "Russians" are seen as a homogeneous formation, although it includes different people, some of whom may hold other opinions. Categorising people into 'groups' often involves stereotyping, which makes people or events comprehensible, but overlooks individual differences (Fowler 1991: 17, 92).

Labels "local ethnic Russians" and "Estonians of Russian origin" are used the least. The phrases indicate that the Estonian Russians are associated with Russia mainly due to their origin and refer to the "Estonian"/ "local" part of their identity. The former phrase appears in half of the articles in a sentence providing the opinion of the group as seen by a BBC reporter:

*The BBC's Richard Galpin says it is being perceived as one insult too many by local ethnic Russians, after what they feel has been years of discrimination against them by the majority Estonian population.*

This account is more careful with words than the "Estonians say X. Russians say Y" construction: first, the phrase "BBC's Richard Galpin says" shows clearly that the opinion is mediated. Perception verbs 'perceive' and 'feel' indicate subjectivity and emphasise that the claim is an opinion rather than a fact. However, phrases such as "years of discrimination" serve as a cue for the schema of repressed minority. In two cases, the BBC uses also a neutral label "supporters" [of the monument], which defines the group based on the attitude towards the monument without relating the group to an ethnicity.

The BBC label frames also the other conflict party, "Estonians", as a monolithic ethnic group. This label occurs in the articles fifteen times. The opposition between the two groups is constructed clearly in parallel phrases "Estonians say X. Russians describe/say Y":

*Estonians say the soldier symbolised Soviet occupation. Russians describe it as a tribute to those who fought the Nazis.*

"Estonians", like "Russians", occurs with the verbs of subjective perception such as "say" and "believe" or as an object of a violent action in the section of background information:

“During the years of Soviet occupation after the war tens of thousands of Estonians *were killed*”.

However, the BBC is much more careful with ethnicity labels when referring to the people who turned violent, although “ethnic Russians” are associated with the riots in noun constructions. The participants in the unrest are tagged as “protesters”, “crowd of demonstrators”, “people” or once clearly negatively as “Johvi looters”. Alternatively, naming them is avoided with passives and nominal style. In one article, a sentence shows that “ethnic Russians” clashed with the police, two other articles which associate this group with the violence reframe the group as subgroup of Estonians with the label “Estonians of Russian origin” [bold original]:

**A tense calm is reported in Estonia's capital, Tallinn, after two nights of clashes between ethnic Russians and police over a Soviet war monument.**

*Estonians of Russian origin rioted* last week in protest at the decision to move the statue of a Red Army soldier.

The BBC frames the violent events in Tallinn with the labels “riot” and “unrest” (used five times both). These labels or their derivations appear often in the title or the lead, showing that, in terms of labels, the BBC frames the event as a violent protest of a discriminated minority. Other phrases used to refer to the unrest are “two nights of rioting” (used twice), “rioting and looting” (used twice), “violence”, “clashes”, and the “events”.

The monument itself is described in the BBC reports for example as “Soviet war monument”, “controversial monument of a Soviet soldier”, “1.83m (six foot) statue”, “statue of a Red Army soldier”, “the Soviet memorial, “a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier” or “the World War II monument”. The first two phrases are used twice, the third three times and others appear once. The statue is also referred to simply as “the monument”, “the memorial”, and “the soldier”. Most phrases define the object first based on its commemorative function as a ‘monument’ and its “controversial”, “Soviet” origin or relation to “Red Army” – and as such, embodiment of the Soviet ideology. Only two phrases mention its physical

characteristics. In the BBC reports, the word “Soviet” links the statue also to the background information in the articles which offers important lexical cues to the international reader:

**1918:** Estonia gained independence from Russia /.../

**1944:** *Soviets* return as Nazis retreat /.../

During the years of *Soviet occupation* after World War II, tens of thousands of Estonians were killed.

The people who protested at the Estonian embassy are generally named as “protesters” (used three times) or, focusing on their age as “(Russian) youths” or “young people”. Another set of labels, such as “pro-Kremlin youth activists, “pro-Kremlin youth groups” or “Russian youth organisation “Nashi”” (used once each) describes them through their ties to the government, which frames the situation as an event which serves specific political interest.

### **Lexical structure in DW reports**

Due to the different framing strategy, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia figures much less in the DW reports. It is mentioned twice as “ethnic Russians” and once as “Russians”. Thus, the Russian minority is seen as a homogenous group defined only in terms of its ethnic background. The DW reports identify them with Russian Russians by using the label “Russians” to refer also to Russians in the context of World War II, which shows them as sharing what is considered to be a common experience of all Russians:

Estonians see the monument as a symbol of their country's illegal occupation by the Soviet Union, but most *ethnic Russians* see it as a tribute to *Russians' sacrifice* in the victory over Nazism.

The label “Russians” (as minority in Estonia) occurs only with perception verbs, such as ‘see’, ‘complain’ and ‘allege’. Similarly to the BBC, these verbs are used to mediate the viewpoint of the group and indicate subjectivity of the evaluation. Also DW uses the cue word ‘discrimination’ when describing the assumed opinion of “Russians”:

Many Russians /.../ *have complained* at the status of ethnic Russians in Estonia, *alleging discrimination*.

Nevertheless, with the quantifier ‘many’ DW indicates that not *all* Russians in Estonia may share the opinion. As DW mentions the violent events in Estonia only briefly in nominal

constructions, then it does not show the agency behind the riots nor name the protesters or associate them with the local Russian minority.

As in the BBC reports, the opinion of the Estonian side is given as the viewpoint of “Estonians”. The label shows that similarly to “Russians”, “Estonians” are assumed to be a homogeneous group. The label is used once in each of the three articles with the verb ‘see’ to mediate what DW assumes to be the shared opinion of Estonians as a group:

*Estonians see the statue -- a monument to Red Army soldiers who died while fighting fascist forces during World War II -- as a reminder of 50 years of Soviet occupation.*

DW refers to the state besides “Estonia” also with descriptive synonyms “their [Russians’] Baltic neighbour”, “Baltic state” and “former Soviet Republic” which probably should show to its reader the geographical/historical links between the two countries. However, the phrases define Estonia by its relation to Russia and as one of the Baltic States, not a unique entity.

Similarly to the BBC, DW frames the events in Estonia in general with the labels “riots” and “unrest” (both used twice). Other phrases, such as “violence over monument”, “protests”, and “rioting” appear only once. However, “rioting” and “protests” are used in the same sentence to indicate that the events exceeded a “protest”:

*The move [the monument being relocated] sparked protests, which rapidly spilled over into the worst rioting Estonia has seen since the Russian Revolution.*

International broadcasters label also the monument similarly. DW names the statue frequently as “a Soviet war memorial” (used four times), “Soviet-era war memorial”, or “statue” (both used twice). Other labels, such as “a controversial Soviet war memorial”, “a monument to Red Army soldiers”, or “a Red Army war memorial” appear once. As in the BBC, these labels define the monument based on its “controversial” relation to the Soviet regime. However, DW prefers “memorial” instead of “monument”. The former makes a slight difference in framing as it originates from Latin ‘memorial’ (memory) (Oxford

Dictionaries Online n.d.) and thus emphasises more the statue's emotional value as an object of remembrance.

In general, both international broadcasters separate the emotional vocabulary of statements from the body text by marking them as quotes. However, when the reports give opinions of a group which were not expressed directly but are probably broadcasters' evaluations, then DW tends to use more emotional vocabulary than the BBC:

Estonians say the soldier symbolised Soviet occupation. Russians describe it as a *tribute* to those who fought the Nazis. (BBC)

Many Russians consider the statue in Tallinn to be a *poignant memorial to the huge losses suffered* by the Soviet Union in defeating Nazism and have complained at the status of ethnic Russians in Estonia, alleging discrimination. (DW)

Also the vocabulary of some reporting clauses in the DW reports is clearly evaluative:

"We are finally convinced. Estonia is a fascist state," *thundered* the Moskovsky Kosmolets *tabloid*, which in its headline used a stylized "SS" symbol in place of the letter "s" in the word Estonia.

Lexical choices such as "thundered" and "tabloid" emphasise emotionality and seem to foreground the impulsiveness of the reactions in Russia.

DW defines the demonstrators at the Estonian embassy in Moscow similarly to the BBC. The general labels "protesters", "demonstrators", "(youth) activists" and "youths" appear once or twice, defining the participants as to their activity or age. The second set of labels describes the protesters as organised groups defined by age and political affiliation, e.g. "pro-Kremlin organisations Young Guard and Ours", "the Nashi (Ours) youth group", "Kremlin-backed Nashi group". Differently from the BBC and ERR, DW translates the Russian names of the groups into English, bringing out the nationalistic nature of the groups.

### **Lexical structure in ERR reports**

The lexical choices in the articles of the international broadcasters and ERR differ markedly in several aspects. Some changes are inevitable, as the ERR reports are aimed at



Estonians as a specific audience. Moreover, the choices in the BBC and DW articles are made from the options available in English, but Estonian offers very different options.

The BBC and DW label the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia usually “Russians” or “ethnic Russians”. In the ERR reports, the Estonian equivalent to this label, ‘venelased’, occurs only a few times in a paraphrase or a quote. Most importantly, it is not used to refer to the Estonian Russians but to Russian Russians, as in the first excerpt below. In the second excerpt, the reference remains somewhat unclear:

Paet avaldas lootust, et pärast tulevaid Venemaa valimisi väheneb ärevus *venelaste* endi seas ning Eesti-Vene suhetesse saabub suuremat mõistmist.

Välisministri sõnul näitavad Vene telekanalid Eesti politseinike terrori käes vaevlevaid "süütuid" vene rahvusest kodanikke ning edastavad uudiseid, nagu tapaks politsei kinnipeetavaid ning Eesti sõjaväele olevat antud käsk tulistada *venelasi*. Välisministri hinnangul näitab see meie *kaasmaalaste* poliitikas ära kasutamist.

The second excerpt illustrates how Estonian politicians redefine the Estonian Russian-speakers as “kaasmaalased” – ‘compatriots’ and frame the group the BBC and DW call “ethnic Russians” as Estonians, but not in terms of ethnicity, but of common values. The ‘compatriots’ are separated from the violent protesters, whom the Prime Minister labels in his speech as “vihakülvajad”:

"Ma olen kindel, et *huligaanide* rünnak selle pihta, *mida me kõik kalliks peame* – meie laste turvalisus, meie mälestused, meie maa – liidab meid veelgi tugevamalt ühte. Me ei tohi lasta *vihakülvajatel* saada *rahva lõhestajateks* või eelarvamuste istutajateks.

ERR seems to tacitly agree to labels used by the Prime Minister, as it only quotes or summarises his words without any commentary or information. The speech constructs the conflict as not between “Estonians” and “Russians”, but between “huligaanid” (Estonian for ‘hooligans’) and Us “meie”, who share what is held dear by all – “mida me kõik kalliks peame”. Thus, similarly to the BBC, the labels for the rioters are general and neutral, such as “isik” (person) or “inimene”, and do not refer to ethnicity:

**Tallinnas on politsei kolme päevaga kinni pidanud 800 inimest, vigastada on saanud 153 inimest, kellest 29 on politseiametnikud.** Neljapäeval ja ööl vastu reedet pidas politsei Tallinnas kinni üle 200 *isiku*, kellest kohus on vahi alla võtnud 27. Vahi alla võtmist taotleti *64 isiku* puhul.

Few strongly negative labels, such as “märatseja” (rioter) and “vandaal” (vandal) occur in the ERR articles when the broadcaster paraphrases or quotes politicians or officials. However, derivations from these stems appear in descriptions not attributed to some other source:

Laupäeva hommikuks fikseeris politsei 49 objekti, mille puhul on toime pandud *vandalismiakte*. Eelneval hommikul fikseeriti *märatsemise* ohvriks langenud objekte 99.

When the connotation and denotation of Estonian ‘vandalism’ and its English equivalent are the same, then the connotation of derivations from ‘märatsema’ differ slightly from ‘riot’: the first meaning of ‘to riot’ is to participate in a public disturbance and the second, to behave in an uncontrolled way. In Estonian, however, the emphasis is on the second meaning which is to behave in a very irritated manner or violently due to loss of self-control (Eesti Keele Instituut n.d.). Compared to more neutral derivations from ‘protest’ and ‘demonstrate’ in the BBC and DW reports, the strongly negative Estonian labels deprive the violent “protests” of legitimacy and frame the action as a mere crime.

In contrast to the BBC and DW, ERR does not need to construct a group “Estonians” or describe the clashing perceptions of the statue. ERR journalists and their audience form this group and what the monument symbolises is their shared cultural knowledge. It is the group whom the Estonian politicians construct as one “We” with the law-abiding Russian minority, and who should identify itself with the participant “Estonia” in the articles. This does not mean that all ethnic Estonians approved of the actions of the government.

ERR frames the violent events most often as “rahutused”, which occurs eight times in the final sample of the articles. Other labels, such as “massilised korratused”, “vandaalitsemine” and “märatsemine” occur once. The first phrase is relatively descriptive, the last two strongly negative. The usual translation equivalent to ‘rahutused’ is ‘unrest’, a label used also by the BBC and DW. ‘Unrest’ denotes a disturbance usually involving public protest and ‘riot’ a disturbance of a peace by crowd (Oxford Dictionaries Online n.d.), so that ‘unrest’

emphasises more the political motivation behind the events. Also the Estonian ‘rahutused’ refers to a disturbance aimed against the ruling order (Eesti Keele Instituut n.d.).

The monument itself is frequently named in the ERR articles as ‘pronkssõdur’. The label occurs nine times in the final sample (three times in quotes). Abbreviation ‘nn.’ (‘so called’) is used in front of it only once, which indicates that the object is considered to be readers’ shared knowledge. ERR refers to the monument also as “hauatähis” and “mälestusmärk”; the former is used five times (two times in quotes), the latter once.

As briefly discussed in the introduction, the Estonian coining “pronkssõdur” or “Bronze Soldier” is a euphemism which describes the monument in terms of a neutral physical property. The label enables the writer/speaker to bypass its controversial characteristics, such as its initial purpose as a Red Army memorial, origin as a Soviet-era object, or the resulting symbolic value. The BBC and DW use exactly these characteristics to describe the monument in order to show why the memorial causes antagonism. In Estonia, reference to Red Army or Soviet era would most likely stir up the emotions of many readers. Estonian labels that define similar monuments based on their origin and purpose, such as the popular “punamonument” have a clearly negative connotation for the Estonian reader.

ERR reports label the protesters at the Estonian embassy in Moscow similarly to the BBC and DW articles. More general labels, used once each, describe them as “noored” (youths), “demonstrandid” (demonstrators), “noorteliikumise aktivistid” or scathingly as “määratsevad noored” (rioting/raging youths). However, more frequently than the BBC or DW, ERR prefers to label the protesters in terms of organisation-membership and ties to the government, for instance as “Kremlimeelsed noorteühendused” (Kremlin-minded youth associations), “Venemaa noorteühendused Naši ja Molodaja Rossija” (Russian youth associations Naši ja Molodaja Rossija), or “Kremlimeelse noorteliikumise Nashi aktivistid” (activists of Kremlin-minded youth movement Nashi). Such labels are numerous and mostly

used once. They frame the situation as an incident which serves very specific political interest, emphasising Russia's will behind the events.

The analysis demonstrates that the translational procedures in the transfer of news about the Bronze Night to international level has resulted in marked differences in how the BBC, DW and ERR chose the information and how they use transitivity structures and labels to present and frame these events. The next section discusses how and why these differences may have occurred, and their ideological implications, that is, which mental models the framing strategies used by the broadcasters would incline the readers to form.

### **Framing and models**

Translation on the level of single concepts is interrelated with the transfer/translation of frames and models. Labels outline the event (s), groups involved, and the monument, thereby shaping a certain viewpoint and favouring certain event models. Readers need to construct an event model to comprehend the discourse about the situation, and as the analysis shows, there are notable differences in how the events are represented and which models each viewpoint supports.

The analysed reports can be seen as discursive expressions of the event models that the journalists constructed for themselves. As explained above, such models are necessary to understand what happened and they reflect not only personal understanding of the events, but also socially shared representations – ideologies, opinions, attitudes and values. The authors of the reports fill above all their professional and institutional role as journalists of a certain broadcaster. Thus, the reports reflect to a greater or lesser extent professional and institutional ideologies which are coded in the texts via framing strategies and linguistic choices.

The framing strategy of the BBC favours the model about the event as a conflict between Estonia and Russia over a Soviet symbol. Directed by the cues in the texts, the readers are prompted to form an event model accordingly. The labels frame the violence in Estonia as “unrest” or “riot” – a violent public disturbance with political undertones around a statue defined essentially as a “Soviet war” monument. Thus, the readers are guided to see the issue as a controversy between a former Soviet state trying to get rid of a political symbol and defy the will of the former occupier.

Furthermore, the labels construct the parties as homogeneous ethnic groups, frequently referred to as “Estonians” and “Russians”. These groups or representatives of the Russian or Estonian side are the main participants and tend to occupy the main semantic roles and syntactic positions. The articles contain background information the BBC considers relevant, which, however, further supports the model of binary historical conflict. Nevertheless, in descriptions of violent actions, the reports refrain from prompting the readers to assign responsibility by using passives, nominal clauses and other than ethnicity-based labels.

Some lexical cues, such as “years of discrimination by majority of Estonian population” may evoke the stereotype of oppressed minority vs dominant majority and favour a corresponding model. However, a paragraph in each BBC report about the status of Russian-speakers in Estonia is probably one way to keep the readers from constructing stereotypical models. In addition, the BBC presents factual and evaluative statements with different linguistic structures, which makes it easy for the readers to keep the opinions quoted apart from personal event model. Parallel presentation of different views favours activating various, possibly conflicting, social representations, which also the parties of conflict play upon (e.g. former occupier versus the former occupied). Careful attributions, separation of fact and opinion, balanced presentation of opinions and background information allow the

readers to construct event models other than the ones favoured by the framing strategy of the BBC.

The general framing strategy of DW favours a model about the events as a conflict between two states where an international organisation has to interfere. International level becomes the main setting, but the dispute is not so much between Estonia and Russia as between Germany/the EU and Russia. The initial conflict between the ex-occupier and the ex-occupied is shifted to the background. The violence in Estonia is labelled similarly to the BBC as “unrest” or “riot”, around a “Soviet war memorial”, as the statue is defined based on its political and historical meaning. Highlighting specific incidents such as flag desecration and excavations at the memorial site emphasise the symbolic nature of the conflict even more.

The information presented in DW focuses on diplomatic moves, the blockade of the Estonian embassy in Moscow and protests in Russia. Vivid descriptions in the active of fervent reactions in Russia shift the focus from the violence in Estonia to that in Russia. Covering events such as the Pskov incident may further prompt forming an opinion of the Russian protesters as “nationalist” and questioning their cause. However, as the German culture after the WW II has emphasised the guilt of Nazism, then highlighting the incident may also legitimise the cause of Russian youths as protecting the memory of the ones who fought against Nazis.

The transitivity structure of the DW reports rarely gives Estonia a participant role. Rather, Germany/the EU or its representatives tend to assume the main semantic roles and act on Russia, either as a mediator who admonishes both sides or as a supporter of Estonia when the claims of the latter are legitimated by international norms. DW also labels the parties to the conflict in Estonia as “Estonians” and “Russians”, favouring a simple binary model of an ethnic conflict between homogeneous groups. This tendency is stronger than in

the BBC as “Russians” are identified with the Russian Russians and their identity is not linked to Estonia. Nominal style and passives enable the reports to leave out information and not to delve into the complexities of presence, status and identity of Russian minority in Estonia.

ERR played a different role for its audience compared to the BBC and DW, which influenced its framing strategies and models it inclines the readers to construct. ERR articles favour forming either a series of models or a highly complex model, as they report on each episode without relating them much to other developments. For DW and the BBC, reporting the Bronze night involved transfer of information, generalisation and binding the events into a causal and/or temporal sequence, of which the violence in Estonia was only one part. Thus, they incline their readers to construct one, more or less complex model about the whole set.

By using specific textual structures for each topic, the ERR reports support forming models about three related events: first, the events at national level (violent protests in Tallinn and Jõhvi); secondly, the embassy blockade and the dispute between Estonia and Russia; and thirdly, the reactions at international level, such as the moves of the EU, statements by foreign politicians and governments. However, these models would overlap at times.

The framing of the events at national level favours a model of conflict as one between Us, the law-abiding citizens of Estonia, and Them, the hooligans, secretly supported by Russia. The reports frame the violence as “rahutused”, which is equivalent to the BBC and DW label “unrest”, but the participants differ. The ERR articles neither use labels that favour constructing the parties as ethnic groups nor name the violent protesters by their ethnicity. Label “venelased” (Russians) is reserved for Russian Russians. The reports tacitly agree with the labels used by the Estonian politicians, which define the parties not in terms of ethnicity, but of common values. Otherwise, ERR resorts to neutral statistical language, passives and

nominal constructions to avoid indicating agency. ERR labels also the monument based on its material as “pronkssõdur”, which may keep the readers from activating negatively biased models, which the Estonian equivalents to phrases “Soviet” or “red” may prompt.

The framing of the dispute between Estonia and Russia is similar to that of the BBC and DW: transitivity patterns and lexical choices support a model of a binary conflict between Estonia and Russia, but with two important differences. Firstly, ERR prompts the reader to see Russia as an undoubted aggressor by tacitly agreeing to the tone and vocabulary of the discourse of Estonian government ministers and officials. Reports are in the active and use reporting verbs moderately. Thus, they do not create enough distance between ERR and the ideologically-coloured statements of Estonian politicians who aim to delegitimize their opponent by showing that Russia violates the shared international norms.

Secondly, the reports of ERR show the EU’s support to Estonia as unequivocal, compared to a more hesitant tone in the DW reports. The parties to the dispute are Estonia and the EU, who share the common European values, and Russia, who deviates from these values. Such model is favoured by the statements of Estonian politicians to which ERR gives priority without balancing them much with other opinions. The reports frequently assign the Estonian representatives main semantic roles, especially that of the agent, so that Estonia is not passive but acts vigorously against Russia.

However, there is one important participant whose representatives are not given the possibility to speak out, although the members of this group were the main participants in the protests. The BBC and DW label them mainly as “Russians” or “ethnic Russians”, and ERR redefines and divides them through the mouth of politicians into “kaasmaalased” and “huligaanid”. The three broadcasters quote mostly Russian officials, assumed to represent the views of ethnic Russians in Estonia. However, it is questionable whether Russians in Russia are the adequate to speak for the Estonian Russians. In addition, the labels the BBC



and DW use present them to the reader as more or less homogenous, and on the basis of their actions, as dissatisfied and “alleging discrimination”. However, the Russian-speaking community in Estonia is diverse, including both those who deny Estonia as an independent state and those who regard it as their homeland.

## CONCLUSION

Millions around the world take some time as a part of their daily routine to read a newspaper turn on the radio or visit some news website. Thus, in the globalising world, international news has become a commodity of mass-consumption, which often makes its consumers impervious to how their evaluations are guided by the discourse in the reports and ideologies encoded in them. Furthermore, the majority of newsreaders probably do not acknowledge that in case of international news, they read translations, information transferred, filtered and often reframed for a particular audience.

Therefore, the thesis looked at the coverage of the so called Bronze Night in the English-language online reports by the British Broadcasting Company (the BBC), German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW), and the Estonian-language reports by Estonian public broadcaster Eesti Rahvusringhääling (ERR). The analysis aimed to find out whether the transfer of news about the events in Estonia involved a change in the point of view and, if so, how these changes were produced by linguistic means and which implications they may have.

The thesis drew on the cognitive approach to ideology by Teun A. van Dijk which defines ideology broadly as a set of social beliefs and links it with mental constructs. The analysis was conducted with the discourse analysis method described by Roger Fowler. Translation was defined in the thesis according to the ideas of Itamar Even-Zohar as cultural transfer. Translational procedures were further discussed on the basis of Bielsa's and Bassnett's overview of translation in global news and Baker's research into translation and conflict.

Via international news reports, the information about the events was transferred from Estonia as a specific cultural and linguistic environment, to the English-speaking media and to the flow of international news. It was a transfer from one distinct environment to another over linguistic, cultural and institutional barriers. The exact movement of information about

the events was difficult to track down: the BBC and DW articles did not assign authorship to a certain person or indicated clearly whether the broadcasters had a correspondent on the spot or not. Thus, it was not possible to pin down to which extent the broadcasters based their material on the discourse on the event in Estonian.

Regardless of the impact the discourse in Estonian might have had on the material, the linguistic strategies and vocabulary that the foreign broadcasters chose to report the event function as translations on a conceptual level. The English articles in the BBC and DW and the Estonian ones in ERR may not be equivalent on a linguistic level, but they are equivalent on a conceptual level as texts of the same genre and function. Their difference is conditioned by the fact that for adequate description of the event, the journalists of the international broadcasters needed to (re)frame the events and choose the linguistic means which would give the best overview of the events to their mixed readership.

Such translation/transfer of news involved ideological (re)framing, which in case of Bronze Night was partly inevitable, taking into account the immense differences between the interests of the readerships. As the analysis showed, different frames and changes in viewpoint in the broadcasters' reports occurred both on a general level in choice of information, attribution patterns and structure of the articles, as well as in specific discourse structures, such as participants' semantic and syntactic roles, use of passives, and labelling.

The analysis showed that the first definition of the situation in the reports of the Estonian and the foreign public broadcasters was similar. ERR framed the events on a basic level as "rahutused" and the BBC and ERR as "unrest" or "riot". However, a noteworthy reframing, mainly by transitivity structures and choice of information, occurred in case of the main participants. ERR framed the conflict in Estonia as unrest provoked by unruly persons or "huligaanid", whose criminal activity is incited by Russia. Estonia, Russia and the EU are

shown as main participants by their semantic roles. Estonia often appeared as the agent who with the EU's support defended its legitimate (in contrast to Russia) interest against Russia.

The BBC transferred the events as a conflict between Estonia and Russia, by placing them into main semantic roles and keeping balance in text structure between the information on and quotes from the two. The EU was assigned no special importance in transitivity patterns, vocabulary or choice of information.

DW reframed the conflict by prioritising the aspects concerning the dispute over the events at international level between the EU/Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other hand. This frame was constructed by transitivity structures in which Estonia rarely had a semantic role and occurred usually as a modifier. In addition, information chosen emphasised the fervent reactions in Russia, shifting the focus away from violence in Estonia. Thus, DW translated the event as a dispute between the "major global players".

An essential reframing concerned the central object of the events. In translation, "pronkssõdur", used in the reports of ERR, turned into "Soviet war memorial/monument" in the BBC and DW reports. This reframing has strong ideological implications, as a designation with a low information value is replaced by one which sets the object and, consequently, the events into a specific historical and political context. Thus, it prompts the readers to construct the model of the event as a dispute between the former occupied with the former occupier.

Another reframing in translation with important ideological consequences occurred in labelling of the groups. ERR tacitly agreed to the labels used by the Estonian ministers and state officials, which divided the Russian-speakers in Estonia into law-abiding citizens, "kaasmaalased", and lawbreakers, "huligaanid". When translating the events for international audience, the BBC and DW redefined this group based on their ethnicity as "Russians" or "ethnic Russians". In Estonia, such labels would emphasise the ethnic

division. They frame the event as an ethnic conflict and incline the reader to form an event model according to a familiar schema of minority's struggle against the majority. These labels are informative, but they construct the Russian-speaking minority as a homogeneous group, which misleads the international reader also in the sense that they see this group as identifying itself with Russia and Russians. This defines their ambiguous status and identity, which may have played an essential role in the events, much too clearly.

However, the ERR reports, by tacitly agreeing with the discourse of the Estonian ministers and officials, which aimed to legitimate their actions and call for unity, gave little attention to different voices in the Estonian society. Similarly to international broadcasters, ERR failed to present opinions that would adequately present the viewpoint of the Russian-speakers in Estonia or their various subgroups.

Another relevant point is the extent to which the broadcasters, despite favouring a certain model about the events, constructed the space for the reader to negotiate and question the viewpoints presented. The broadcasters did this by separating fact and opinion, distancing themselves from opinions by reporting verbs, quotation marks and perception verbs when mediating opinions. Consequently, also the truth value of the claims changed in translation.

As ERR did not distance itself from the discourse of the Estonian ministers and officials, then it also sought to delegitimize the Russian side and their discourse. The balance was best in the BBC articles, which, despite cueing some typical models, carefully balanced the information on the parties in terms of text structure, mark opinions, separated these from body text, and distanced the BBC from statements/information of other sources by clear attributions. In addition, thorough background information in the reports described the ambiguous status of Russian-speakers in Estonia. DW distanced itself by clear attributions and marking of opinions, but its choice of information showed that it favours a certain perspective.

Being aware of how and why events are presented when they are transferred to the international news flow and its ideological consequences is of great relevance both for people directly involved in the transfer as well as for the readership of the broadcasters, which ranges from average citizens to policy-makers. For news translators, this knowledge is necessary to understand that their linguistic choices influence strongly how the readers construct the event and how the text inclines them to evaluate the situation.

For the journalists, this awareness means recognising that when they report international news, they act as translators no matter whether they translate concrete texts from one language into another or not. When they choose a label for an event, an object, or a group they translate a foreign reality into the language and conceptual system of their audience, often reframing and redefining these concepts from a different perspective. In addition, such reframing in transfer/translation of news begins not from choice of words, but of information, its ordering in the text and the way it is presented syntactically.

To the readers, analysing translation of international news from ideological perspective shows that they should be careful when constructing their understanding of events on the basis of news reports and think critically of how the language used guides their judgement. Although generalisation, omission and shifts in focus are to some extent inevitable, the readers should be aware that description of events in one particular text is only one option among many, especially when the report translates the foreign reality into comprehensible terms for an audience in another cultural and linguistic environment.

The present thesis is multifocal and discusses several interrelated issues: ideology, discourse, translation and media. Without paying attention to the relationship between those factors, the analysis of international news and the relevance of how they are presented as texts would remain somewhat superficial. Thus, the thesis is meant to be neither purely on translation nor ideology. Rather, the work aims to look at ideological differences in

translation, understood as cultural transfer, in news while considering the particularities of media discourse.

In sum, the analysis of news reports by the BBC, DW and ERR showed that the translation of the events of Bronze Night for the international audience involved noteworthy reframing and shifts in the points of view. The events were transformed from a complex and multi-layered set into one, comprehensible series, which cues the readers to shape their model(s) of the events according to the familiar models of ethnic minority-against-the-majority conflict. Thus, this translational procedure involved reframing, omission and generalisation, but also adding and making explicit of culturally specific information, which for the Estonian reader was socially shared knowledge.

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## RESÜMEE

TARTU ÜLIKOOL  
GERMAANI, ROMAANI JA SLAAVI FILOLOOGIA INSITUUT

**Jaanika Hirv**

**Ideoloogia tõlkes/ülekandes: pronksiöö kajastus Eesti Rahvusringhäälingus, BBCs ja Deutsche Welles**

**Ideology in Translation/Transfer: Media Coverage on the “Bronze Night” in Eesti Rahvusringhääling, BBC and Deutsche Welle**

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Annotatsioon:

Käesolev magistritöö vaatlleb ideoloogiat uudiste tõlkes/ülekandes spetsiifilisest keele- ja kultuurikeskkonnast rahvusvahelisesse meediasse. Konkreetsemalt keskendub töö pronksiöö kajastusele kahe välismaa ja ühe Eesti avalik-õigusliku meediakanali kodulehtedel avaldatud artiklites et välja selgitada, kas eri meediakanalid konstrueerivad sündmuseid ideoloogiliselt erinevatest vaatepunktidest.

Töö teoreetiline osa annab ülevaate erinevatest ideoloogiateooriatest, eriti kognitiivsest lähenemisest, ning vaatlleb ideoloogia ja diskursuse omavahelisi seoseid. Lisaks käsitletakse ka tõlget kui kultuurilist ülekannet ning selle seoseid meediadiskursuse ning ideoloogiaga. Peatüki lõpus tutvustatakse diskursuseanalüüsi meetodit, mida rakendatakse hiljem analüüsis.

Töö empiiriline osa analüüsib Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu, British Broadcasting Company ja Deutsche Welle veebilehtedel pronksiöö kohta avaldatud artikleid, võttes lähema vaatluse alla raamimisstrateegiad, transitiivsuse ja sõnavaliku. Analüüsi eesmärgiks on välja selgitada, kuidas tõlge kui ülekanne on neid aspekte mõjutanud ning mil viisil see mõjutab artiklite ideoloogilist vaatenurka.

Analüüs näitab, et vaatamata sarnasele üldraamile on Eesti avalik-õigusliku ja välismaa analoogsete meediakanalite pronksiöö kajastuses olulisi erinevusi. Eestis toimunud sündmuste ülekandega rahvusvahelisesse meediasse on kaasnenud üldistamine, rõhuasetuse muutus ning osaliste ümberdefineerimine. Olulisemad lahknevused ilmnevad selles, keda konstrueeritakse konflikti osapooltena ning otsustajatena, kuhu paigutatakse sündmuste raskuspunkt ning kuidas defineeritakse sündmusega seotud sotsiaalsed grupid, selle allikaks olnud monument ning rahutuste tagamaad.

Märksõnad: ideoloogia, tõlge, ülekanne, diskursus, meedia, pronksiöö