

**TARTU UNIVERSITY**  
**Faculty of Social Science**  
**Department of Political Science**

**Master's Thesis**

**Heiko Pääbo**

**CAPABILITY OF DEPENDENCY POLICIES OF GREAT  
POWER TOWARDS A GEOSTRATEGIC SUBREGION:  
CASE STUDIES OF THE US-CENTRAL AMERICA  
AND RUSSIA-THE BALTICS**

**Supervisor: Ph. D Vello Pettai**

**Tartu, 2004**

## TABLE OF CONTENT

<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY OF STUDY.....</b>	<b>12</b>
1.1. THE CONCEPT OF THE DEPENDENCY OF A GEOSTRATEGIC SUBREGION .....	12
1.2. THE CONCEPT OF DEPENDENCY POLICIES .....	14
1.3. THE CONCEPT OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE DEPENDENCY POLICIES .....	21
<b>CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS.....</b>	<b>27</b>
2.1. INTERVENTION POLICY .....	27
2.2. ALLIANCE POLICY .....	38
2.3. RECOGNITION POLICY .....	48
2.4. MEDIATION POLICY .....	52
2.5. THREATENING POLICY.....	57
<b>CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS (EI).....</b>	<b>63</b>
3.1. INTERVENTION POLICY .....	63
3.2. ALLIANCE POLICY .....	70
<b>CHAPTER 4: MILITARY INSTRUMENTS (MI).....</b>	<b>79</b>
4.1. INTERVENTION POLICY .....	79
4.2. ALLIANCE POLICY .....	84
4.3. THREATENING POLICY .....	89
<b>CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS (II).....</b>	<b>95</b>
5.1. INTERVENTION POLICY .....	95
5.2. ALLIANCE POLICY .....	99
5.3. MEDIATION POLICY .....	102
5.4. PROPAGANDA POLICY.....	104
5.5. DEAL POLICY .....	108
<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>LITERATURE .....</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>APPENDICES.....</b>	<b>130</b>
APPENDIX 1. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS: INTERVENTION POLICY .....	131
APPENDIX 2. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS: ALLIANCE POLICY .....	133
APPENDIX 3. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION POLICY .....	135
APPENDIX 4. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS: MEDIATION POLICY .....	136
APPENDIX 5. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS: THREATENING POLICY .....	137
APPENDIX 6. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS: INTERVENTION POLICY .....	138
APPENDIX 7. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS: ALLIANCE POLICY .....	140
APPENDIX 8. MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: INTERVENTION POLICY .....	141
APPENDIX 9. MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: ALLIANCE POLICY .....	143
APPENDIX 10. MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: THREATENING POLICY .....	144
APPENDIX 11. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: INTERVENTION POLICY.....	145
APPENDIX 12. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: ALLIANCE POLICY.....	146
APPENDIX 13. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: MEDIATION POLICY.....	147
APPENDIX 14. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: PROPAGANDA POLICY .....	148

APPENDIX 15. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: DEAL POLICY .....	149
APPENDIX 16. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS: TOTAL ON TIME SCALE .....	150
APPENDIX 17. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS: TOTAL ON TIME SCALE.....	153
APPENDIX 18. MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: TOTAL ON TIME SCALE .....	156
APPENDIX 19. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: TOTAL ON TIME SCALE.....	158
APPENDIX 20: MAIN INFLUENCE FACTORS OF DEPENDENCY POLICIES .....	161
APPENDIX 21. DATABASE OF THE STUDY .....	168
<b>RESÜMEE.....</b>	<b>178</b>

## Introduction

The title of this study is “Capability of Dependency Policies of Great Power Towards a Geostrategic Subregion: Case Studies of the US-Central America and Russia-the Baltics”. The great powers geostrategy has a global character and it consists of numerous details. All the details build up the structure of the geostrategy of a great power and among them the geostrategic subregions have crucial meaning. Therefore the great powers aim in the control over those subregions and their policies towards the subregions have the character of establishing dependency. The main purpose of this study is to analyse the policies of the process of establishing dependency and to notice the main tendencies, which increase or decrease the ability of a great power to have control over a geostrategic subregion.

The case studies of this study are the US policies towards Central America and the Russian policies towards the Baltics. The US and Russia have implemented policies, which aim in the dependency respectively of Central America<sup>1</sup> and the Baltics.<sup>2</sup> These policies are considered as the cases constituting the case studies in this study. The period, which is analysed in this research, is the period of independency of the states of the subregion. Respectively, in the case study of the US and Central America it is period since 1823 and in the case study of Russia and the Baltics it consists of the two periods: 1917-1940 and since 1990 until today.<sup>3</sup> The long periods are taken into account because their are seen the whole processes where different policies are increasing or decreasing the US or Russian abilities to control respectively Central America and the Baltics.

---

<sup>1</sup> Central America is a territory between the North and South America constituting a connexion between these two parts of the world. Today Central America consists of seven countries: Belize, Costa Rica El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.

<sup>2</sup> The Baltics is a territory of the east coast of the Baltic Sea. The Baltics consist of three countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

<sup>3</sup> The Central American states declared their independence in 1823 being first as a Confederation. At the end of 1830s the Confederation fell apart in the five states: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Panama got independence in 1903 and Belize only in 1982. The Baltic states declared their independence in 1918 but the process of getting independence started already in 1917 and the independence was got from Russia. Therefore the year of 1917 is taken into account as well. In 1940 the SU annexed the Baltic territories and the Baltic states lost the independence for 50 years. In 1990 Lithuania declared re-independence and a year later Estonia and Latvia did the same.

To explain the process of the Dependency Policies it is important to bring out the geostrategic importance of both subregions for the great powers. Both subregions have the crucial importance in the geostrategy of the great powers because due to their location they are the key territories of important geopolitical regions. Central America is a key territory of Latin America. The control over Central America enables the US to observe and to influence the internal developments in Latin America because Central America unites Southern America with Northern one.<sup>4</sup> The Baltics is a key territory of the Baltic Sea region. The Baltics constitute the most important part of the east coast of the Baltic Sea and therefore the location of the Baltic states is geostrategically very important for Russia. Having control over the Baltic states Russia can dominate in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic Sea region connects Russia with Europe and Russians have seen the Baltics as the door to Europe and Russia has a fear that losing its domination in the Baltics would lead to isolation from Europe.<sup>5</sup>

The second aspect of the geostrategic importance of the subregions is their military-strategic position. Central America has two meanings in this context. On the one hand, it has been a buffer zone between Mexico and Latin American countries that the US controlling the subregion can diminish the potential strength of Mexico and control the South American states.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, Central America and the Caribbean are close territories of power vacuum, which attracts the external powers to strengthen their position on the American continent. The fact is that the US is the only great power on the continent. The bases of an external power lead to the decline of the US positions on the continent and through it also in the world.<sup>7</sup> Therefore the US domination in Central America has crucial meaning. The military-strategic importance of the Baltics has a similar character with the Central American one. The

---

<sup>4</sup> PASTOR, Robert A. "A Question of U. S. National Interest in Central America" in *Political Change in Central America – Internal and External Dimensions*, ed. Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, Jörg Todt, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984. pp. 184-215, p. 192-193/ New York Times 08.02.1982

<sup>5</sup> MEDVEDEV, Sergei. *Geopolitics and Beyond: The New Russian Policy Towards the Baltic States in The European Union and the Baltic States: Visions, Interests and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region*, ed. By Mathias Jopp and Sven Arnsward, Kauhavan Sanomalehti Oy, Kauhava, 1998, pp. 235-269. p. 251

<sup>6</sup> Juan de Dios Mayorga, former minister of Central America to Mexico, to Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, Guatemala, October 18, 1828. "Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning Independence of the Latin-American Nations" Vol. II, selected and arranged by MANNING, William Ray. Oxford University Press, New York, 1925, pp. 884-887

<sup>7</sup> FEINBERG, Richard E. "Central America: Options for U.S. Policy in the 1980s" in *Political Change in Central America – Internal and External Dimensions*, ed. Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, Jörg Todt, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984. pp. 172-183, p. 173-174

second city of Russia, St. Petersburg is very close to the Baltic subregion and losing the domination in the Baltic subregion St. Petersburg would be easily vulnerable to possible attacks of an external great power locating its bases in the Baltics.<sup>8</sup> The Estonian islands and the control over the Finnish Gulf is, on one hand, very dangerous for the vulnerability of St. Petersburg and, on the other hand, it cuts Russia from the sea access to the Baltic Sea. Therefore Russia tries to keep the Baltic Sea as a *mare clausum* or at least the Baltic states as the buffer zone.<sup>9</sup>

The third aspect, which describes the importance of the subregions, is their trade-transit position. Central American Isthmus has the crucial importance in the communication line.<sup>10</sup> The importance of the subregion is the little scope of the Isthmus and the central location on the continent. It makes Central America the main transit centre of the continent on the North-South and the East-West direction.<sup>11</sup> The importance of Central America increased significantly after the presenting of the plans to build a Canal through the Isthmus.<sup>12</sup> Also the Baltic subregion is an important transit territory. The trade routes have been established through the Baltics already before the existence of Russia.<sup>13</sup> The Baltic subregion has had different aspects, which makes it attractive for Russia. The ice-free ports of the Baltics have been very important to Russia because they have been the main trade and transit ports through the Russian history.<sup>14</sup> Russia wants to be the main Eurasian trade route between Europe and Asia and the Baltic subregion is the West gate of this trade route.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> VERSHININ, Vladislav A. *Russias national interests and the dynamics of Russo-Baltic relations in The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, edited by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis. Riga, Academy of Science of Latvia, 1998, pp. 519-539, p. 531

<sup>9</sup> PUHELOINEN, Ari. "Russia's Geopolitical Interests in the Baltic Area", National Defence College, Helsinki, 1999. pp. 43-47

<sup>10</sup> The Isthmus is 50 up to 960 kilometres wide and it makes the Central America the narrowest territory of the Continent. ENE 4, Valgus, Tallinn, 1989, p. 472

<sup>11</sup> Edward Livingston, Secretary of State of the United States, to William N. Jeffers, United States Chargé d' Affairs in Central America, Washington July 20, 1831. "Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Inter American Affairs 1831-1860. Vol. III – Central-America 1831-1850" Selected and arranged by MANNING, William R. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1933. pp. 3-9, p. 4

<sup>12</sup> BEMIS, Samuel Flagg "The Latin American Policy of the United States. An Historical Interpretation" Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1943, p. 103

<sup>13</sup> The old trade route from Vikings to Greeks went through the Baltics already in the VIII-IX century. TÕNISSON, Evald. Idatee, Austrvegr, Österled – läänemeresoome perspektiivis in *Austrvegr* 1/1995, pp. 7-10, p. 7.

<sup>14</sup> HINKKANEN, Merja-Liisa. *Bridges and Barriers, pawns and Actors. The Baltic states in East-West Relations in the 1920s* in *Studia Baltica Stockolmiensia* vol. 8 1991, pp. 431-442, p. 432

<sup>15</sup> MEDVEDEV, 1998, p. 254

Having control over the Baltics Russia wants to increase its control over the Eurasian trade route and it will increase the strength of Russia. Taking into account all these three aspects the US and Russia are interested in having control over these subregions or in other words that these subregions would be dependent on them.

This study is analysing the policies of the great powers in the process of establishing dependency of the geostrategic subregions basing on the two above-described case studies. The aim of the study is to evaluate the capability of the policies in that process. The easiest way to evaluate the policy is to compare the desired results with the achieved results. The policy, which has achieved the desired results, is a capable policy. The policy, which has not achieved the desired results, is an incapable policy. This simple analysis is possible to make if the policies are taken as separate phenomena and they are separated from the context of the policies. If we want to analyse the Dependency Policies as a processes of establishing dependency then this criteria is not satisfied. There is needed to see the processes why the two policies which both achieve the desired results could have different influence to the whole process. For example, the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954 did not increase the US ability to control the subregion so much as did the *coup d'etat* in Nicaragua in 1910. Although both US policies resulted in the desired consequences one policy increased the US ability much more. Or an example of the Russian case study, the Soviet threats did not influence on the Baltic states in the same way in the middle of 1930s and in 1939. The SU ability to control the subregion was bigger after the implementation of the threatening in 1939 although both cases succeeded in the desired results. The question remains, why one policy is more capable than the other one. To get the answer this question it is needed to analyse the Dependency Policies according to the context they are implemented so that it is possible to take into account all the different factors, which could influence the policies and their capability of increasing or decreasing the ability of the great power to control the subregion.

In this study the assumption of the grouping is a goal of a great power to make a geostrategic subregion dependent on itself and to have control over the strategic territories. As the above-presented examples showed the policies could have different influences on the whole process. Here I present the main statement of my research: to

evaluate the capability of foreign policies of the great powers in the process of the establishing dependency it is needed to consider whole context of the policy and therefore it is needed take into account additional factors, not only the result of the policy. This analysis will show that my statement is correct and relevant. In result I will bring out the main tendencies, which factors have influenced the most the US policies towards Central America and Russian policies towards the Baltics.

To analyse the big amount of the cases (220 cases) I will divide the policies into four groups of policy instruments: Political Instruments, Economic Instruments, Military Instruments and International Instruments. All the instruments will be divided into several types of policies: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Recognition Policy, Mediation Policy, Threatening Policy, Propaganda Policy and Deal Policy. All the cases will be analysed in the framework of the policy instruments. To evaluate policies I will work out a formula, which will help to consider different factors, which influence on the capability of the Dependency Policies of the great power. The factors are the following: reaction of the subregional states, interest of an external power in the subregion, position of the great power in the world politics, stability of the subregion (before and after the policy implementation), earlier relation between the great power and the subregional states, the result of the policy. I will combine these different factors to make a formula and in the result of this all the cases will get a number value according what I will list the policies. Although the cases will get a number value the calculation bases on the subjective assessment of the cases but to use of a mathematical formula will help to calculate all the factors in the same way. Therefore the aim of the values is not to present a final list of the most capable policies but the goal of the values is to divide the policies into different groups and select the factors, which has influenced on the policies the most. The criteria value of the capability will not be universal for all policy instruments but it is calculated for every policy instrument separately and the capability is analysed in the comparative way according the case studies and the policy instruments. The relative value will be calculated because it takes into account the context of the policy: different case studies have different contexts to implement a policy and also different instruments have different features, which are needed to see through the history in comparison.



Next, I will present the structure of the research. The first chapter is presenting the Methodology of this study more concrete. First, I will present the Concept of Dependency of Geostrategic Subregion in this chapter. Therefore I will define the term of geostrategic subregion, great powers' interest in that context and the term of dependency. Second, I will present the Concept of the Dependency Policies. Therefore I explain the division of the policies in the policy instruments and I will describe all the instruments separately. Thereafter I will present the different types of policies and open the notions of the policy types. According to the given different instruments I will show the differences of the policies too. At the end of that part I will present a table where I bring the examples of all types of policies and instruments. Third I will present the Conception of the Capability of Dependency Policy. Therefore I present first the definition of capability and thereafter I present the Formula of Measures of Capability of Dependency Policies, which will be the main instrument of my research.

The second chapter will analyse the Political Instruments. It will be the biggest chapter of the study and outbalanced in comparison to the others but the reason of this is the outbalanced division of the cases. This chapter will cover almost the half of the analysed cases and therefore it is also the biggest part of the research. In this chapter I will analyse both case studies parallelly: first I will analyse the capable cases of the US policies and then the incapable cases of the US, thereafter I will analyse the capable cases of Russia and then the incapable cases of Russia. After the end of the case study analyse I will resume the main tendencies of the factors, which influence the capability of the policy. In the second chapter I will analyse the Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy and Recognition Policy in both case studies. I will analyse the Mediation Policy only in the US case study and I will analyse the Threatening Policy in the Russian case study because there is not enough cases or there is not any case to analyse in both case studies. At the end of the chapter I will resume the main tendencies, which are characteristic of the Political Instruments.

The third chapter will analyse the Economic Instruments. Similarly to the Political Instruments I will analyse first the cases of the US and then the cases of Russia and I will bring out the capable and incapable cases in the same way. In the end of the case study of every subchapter there will be a short résumé of the main tendencies and in

the end of the whole chapter there will be a general résumé of the Economic Instruments. The Intervention Policy and Alliance Policy of both case studies will be analysed in this chapter.

The fourth chapter will analyse the Military Instruments. Similarly to the previous chapters I will analyse the US policies firstly and thereafter the Russian policies. Firstly I will bring out the capable cases and thereafter I will present the incapable cases. The Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy and Threatening Policy of both case studies will be analysed. In the end I will resume the main tendencies of the Military Instruments.

The fifth chapter will analyse the International Instruments. In this chapter I will use the same structure of analysis as in the previous chapters. The Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Propaganda Policy and Deal Policy of both cases will be analysed in this chapter. And only the Mediation Policy of the US case will be analysed because there is not any case of the Mediation Policy in the Russian-the Baltics case study.

In Conclusion I will bring out the main differences between the two case studies and thereafter I will notice the main factors, which have influenced the capability of both case studies. In the appendix I will present also a concluding table where all the main factors are presented according to the instruments and policies. In addition, the graphics of all the policies and instruments are presented in the appendix.

I have used lots of materials to get the overview of the case studies and to select the cases to analyse. In the study I will make the references on the relevant sources but the amount of the materials has been bigger one. I have used materials in English, Russian, German and Estonian. The biggest problem of the sources has been the partial approach of the history description, which depended on the political background of period of the sources very much. Therefore the critical source analyse is also made during the research but some influence has remained because of the lack of relevant and impartial literature.

The last but not least I would like to express my thanks to the people who have helped and supervised me. I would like to thank my supervisors Mr. Vello Pettai from Tartu

University and Ms. Irina Zeleneva from St. Petersburg University. Vello Pettai helped me to develop the methodological part of the research and Irina Zeleneva helped me to develop the analysis of geopolitical conceptions and the Russian geostrategy. I would like to express thanks to Mr. Rein Toomla and Prof. Rein Taagepera from Tartu University who gave very valuable comments to my research. I would like to thank Mr. Kaido Jaanson and Prof. Andres Kasekamp from Tartu University who helped me to develop my knowledge about the Russian-Baltics case studies. I would like to thank Ms. Mirjam Allik who gave me valuable comments on the mathematical formulations. And I would like to express thanks to Ms. Kristel Ruutmets, Ms. Helle Vent and Mr. Raivo Kaik who made the language correction of my research. However, I am responsible for all mistakes and misinterpretations in this research.

## **Chapter 1: Methodology of Study**

The purpose of the current chapter is to define the study object, to present the assumptions and to describe the method of research. The first part defines the concept of the dependency of a geostrategic subregion, which is considered as the input in the model of a Political System.<sup>16</sup> In other words it is the goal of policies the actor desires to achieve. The second part deals with the concept of Dependency Policies<sup>17</sup>, which is considered as a political system (process) in the model. In other words it is the instruments to reach the goal. The third part presents the concept of the Capability of the Dependency Policies, which is the study object of the current research, and it is the evaluation of the process. At the end of the chapter a formula of the Measures of the Capability of the Dependency Policies is presented.

### ***1.1. The Concept of the Dependency of a Geostrategic Subregion***

The present part deals with the input of the policy making process. There are a lot of different inputs, which initiate the policies, but the objective of the present analysis is to concentrate on the goals of the actor because the analysis of all the factors will make the study complicated. The term of the geopolitical goal in the current research is defined as the interest of a great power to create or maintain the dependency of a geostrategic subregion on itself.

First, I will define the term of a geostrategic subregion. A geostrategic subregion is a part of the notion of a geopolitical region. A geopolitical region is the main study object of geopolitics and political geography, concentrating on different issues of the object.<sup>18</sup> A geopolitical region is not always defined by a political-geographical unit (state) but it can consist of several states. The main indicator of a geopolitical region

---

<sup>16</sup> I developed the model of a Political System presented by David Easton further to make it suitable for the international level. From Easton's model I use the division of the process into three parts but on the international level it is not based on the decision making process. The main emphasis is laid on the chain: goal (input) – means (system) – results (output). The original model is presented in *Framework of Political Analysis*. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965, p. 112. CLARK, Michael. "The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis", in *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, eds. M. Clark and B. White, Elgar, Brookfield, 1990, pp. 27-59, p. 29.

<sup>17</sup> Dependency Policies are actions of a subject towards an object aiming at the dependency of the object on the subject. It is possible to use the terms "dependencising" or "dependencisation" for the Dependency Policies as processes.

<sup>18</sup> KOLOSOV, V. A., MIRONENKO, N. S. *Геополитика і політичеська географія*, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2001, p. 296 (Колосов, В. А., МIRONENKO, Н. С. *Геополитика и политическая география*)

is belonging to a global military-strategic system.<sup>19</sup> Great powers are the main actors of this system dividing the world into several geostrategic areas, which consist of several geopolitical regions but they should not have geographic continuity. A geostrategic subregion is the key part<sup>20</sup> of a geopolitical region and therefore it has a crucial meaning in the context of the geostrategy of a great power. Therefore „*a geostrategic region can be defined as a region within which [a great power's] interests lie, and it considers using political, economic and military instruments of power to safeguard its interests.*”<sup>21</sup>

Second, I will present the definition of the interest of a great power in the context of geopolitics. A state's interests define the goals of a foreign policy, which defines the action of the actor. In the context of geopolitics the basis of state interests is the single-minded strengthening of the geopolitical and geoeconomic power of a state.<sup>22</sup> Different types of states have different strategies to achieve the goals and great powers, having a bigger sphere of interests, use the expansion strategy.<sup>23</sup> The expansion of great powers is a calculated activity, which aims at geostrategic subregions. The goal, which is initiated by great power interests, is to achieve or maintain control over those areas.<sup>24</sup> The control is created by a complex structure of relations between a great power and the states of a geostrategic subregion, which I define as dependency.

Third, I will define the meaning of dependency. Economic relations define the traditional notion of dependency in the study field of international relations: “...*a*

---

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 297

<sup>20</sup> Usually the key part is not the core of a geopolitical subregion but it has a geostrategic meaning through the ability to have the access to the geopolitical region.

<sup>21</sup> SAKHUJA, Vijay. Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication in *Strategic Analysis*:

*A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, August 2001, vol. XXV, No. 5.

[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\\_aug01sav01.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_aug01sav01.html) (16.03.04)

<sup>22</sup> The geopolitical interest is divided into three main categories: physical survival and political independence; maintenance of a state territory and martial-political inviolability of borders; ensuring of security and well-being of its citizens. KOLOSOV & MIRONENKO, 2001, p. 23

<sup>23</sup> According to K. E. Sorokin expansionism is based on the interests of a state and is not defined narrowly as martial aggression but the term takes into account the informational, cultural, religious, political and economical aspects. Ibid, p. 22

<sup>24</sup> The Ratzel's 5<sup>th</sup> Law of Spatial Growth is “*In its growth the state strives toward the envelopment of politically valuable positions*” RATZEL, Friedrich. The Laws of Spatial Growth of States in *The Structure of Political Geography*, eds. R. Kasperson and J. Minghi, Aldine, Chicago, 1969, pp. 17-28, pp. 24-26

*situation in which the economy of certain countries is by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.”*<sup>25</sup> In my analysis I will base on a broader definition of dependency and I do not see it only in the economic terms but also as political dependency, which means to be tied to an external power and to depend on the activities of the power. The emphasis of the notion does not lie in the explanation of underdevelopment but in the explanation of expansion and I assume that dependency is more linked to disparities of power than the structure of an economical system.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the model of “metropolitan-colonial” relations forms dependency but the relations are characterised by informal imperialism.<sup>27</sup> Dependency is the full control of a great power over a chosen object, which in the current study is a geostrategic subregion.

Based on everything mentioned above, I will present the main proposition of my analysis. A great power has the interest to increase the dependency of a geostrategic subregion in order to have control over it because of the crucial meaning of the geostrategic subregion in the system of geostrategic areas. The interest forms into a goal to have the dependency and the goal initiates the activity, which is defined by the concept of Dependency Policies.

### ***1.2. The Concept of Dependency Policies***

The policy process which executes the geopolitical interests of a great power in a geostrategic subregion aiming to achieve control over the crucial area is named Dependency Policies. It is a group of policies having the same goal – to increase the dependency of a subregion on a great power – and therefore it is possible to look at the group of policies as a long process. In the present study I will divide the different policies of a great power into four groups of instruments that a great power can use to increase its ability of dependency of a subregion:

---

<sup>25</sup> DOS SANTOS, Theotonio. The Structure of Dependence in *American Economic Review*, vol. 60, 1970, pp. 231-236, p. 231

<sup>26</sup> FERRARO, Vincent. Dependency Theory: An Introduction.  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm> (13.03.2004)

<sup>27</sup> It is the complex of relations between the superpower and the small states where political independence of the small states formally exists but they are dependent on the superpower by other means (for example, economic ties). Current relations are based on the unequal exchange of the states, which is possible to define by asymmetrical interdependence. KOLOSOV& MIRONENKO, 2001, p. 187

- Political Instruments
- Economic Instruments
- Military Instruments
- International Instruments

In the current part I will define the instruments, which are folders for the policies giving the policies a different feature. The cases of policies are divided into the following groups: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Recognition Policy, Threatening Policy, Mediation Policy, Propaganda Policy, Deal Policy.

First, I will define the instruments of the policies. Political Instruments are defined by the actions which are used as pure diplomatic steps in the world politics. The current instruments take into account only the actions possible to be classified as bilateral diplomatic relations dealing with diplomatic bargaining and its results (treaties, conferences, recognition, etc).<sup>28</sup> Political Instruments are the most frequently used ones in the process of Dependency Policies and the variety of them is exceedingly broad.

Economic Instruments are defined by the actions based on economic relations that create asymmetrical interdependence between the states.<sup>29</sup> Usually Economic Instruments do not force the states to execute the policy a great power wants to but they attract the states to do it. Therefore they are the instruments used for rewarding or supporting the government which the great power influences.<sup>30</sup> Economic Instruments could also be for coercion, which is more likely in the situation of existing dependency.

Military Instruments are defined by the actions which use violent means to persuade another state to take a certain course of action or to obtain something the state

---

<sup>28</sup> For more information about the diplomatic bargaining see HOLSTI, K. J. "International Politics: A Framework for Analysis", New Jersey, 1995, pp. 130-149

<sup>29</sup> KIRSHNER, Jonathan. Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1997, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/kij02/kij02.pdf> (14.03.04)

<sup>30</sup> HOLSTI, 1995, p. 165

possesses.<sup>31</sup> Military Instruments have been used for a very long time and they were the first instruments of the international policy. Earlier the instruments mostly concluded with warfare but later the variety of Military Instruments has broadened.

International Instruments are defined by the actions executed on the international level and usually they are aimed at the attention of the world audience. In the context of the current study the policies aimed at the actors outside the relations between a subregion and a great power are all considered as International Instruments. The policies used on the international level are very different and they are grouped into the different types of the policy.

Second, I will define the different policies used within the above-mentioned instruments. I will present the main concept of the policies and thereafter their peculiarities in the context of the different instruments.

*Intervention Policy (IP)* is a policy used by a great power to exercise its control and influence over a geostrategic region and its crucial states. Intervention can be political, economic, diplomatic, or military; and it includes a broad field of activities aiming to interfere in the internal affairs of the objects.<sup>32</sup> The Intervention Policy in the context of Political Instruments is “*interference in another state’s domestic affairs with a view either to influence or to replace the government.*”<sup>33</sup> Political intervention quite often coexists with military intervention, which is a convention-breaking activity of one state in the territory of another one with the purpose of preserving or changing the political system of that state by usurping its independent decision-making authority through the use of extensive military force.<sup>34</sup> Economic intervention is the policy of a great power which forces states to change their policies by using economic instruments like sanctions, foreign aid, etc.<sup>35</sup> In the context of International

---

<sup>31</sup> AREND, Anthony Clark & BECK, Robert J. *International Law and the Use of Force*, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 2-3

<sup>32</sup> VERTZBERGER, Yaacov Y. I. *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1998, p. 114

<sup>33</sup> JERVIS, Robert. Introduction in *The New American Interventionism Essays from Political Science Quarterly*, edited by Demetrios James Caraley, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999 <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/caraley/intro.html> (06.02.2004)

<sup>34</sup> VERTZBERGER, 1998, p. 114

<sup>35</sup> HOLSTI, 1995, pp. 168-170



Instruments the forcing influence of a great power on a small state outside the bilateral relations is considered the Intervention Policy.

Alliance Policy (AP) is a policy used by a great power to make small states dependent on it through the mutual benefit and expectations that the great power is in the positive relations with a small state. These expectations arise from the common interest and the goal of great powers is to attract the interest of small states.<sup>36</sup> This issue is not only seen as a formal alliance but it is taken into consideration also in the treaties between the great power and the states of a geostrategic region based on the mutual benefit. Thus, the great power is trying to construct asymmetrical interdependence between itself and region states, which is also possible to define as dependency.<sup>37</sup> The difference between the different instruments is the field of cooperation between the great power and a geostrategic subregion but the final goal is to create asymmetrical interdependence. For example, usually the Alliance Policy in the context of Military Instruments aims at the preventive activity to protect the allies for the external attacks.<sup>38</sup> The asymmetrical relations between the powerful great power and the weak small states create the “patron-client” relations, which give the great power the right to control the small states. The economic Alliance Policy creates the “dominant state – dependent state” relations, which increase the economic control of a great power over subregional states.<sup>39</sup>

Recognition Policy (RP) is a policy used by a great power to obtrude its willingness upon small states. If earlier the recognition of new states was more an automatic process if the state met the general conditions<sup>40</sup> accepted by the subjects of world politics then „*in the twentieth century the practice of recognition has changed in some important ways*“.<sup>41</sup> There are two different aspects in this process: (a) the recognition of a new state or the re-independence of the state and (b) the recognition of the new

---

<sup>36</sup> SNYDER, Glenn H. “Alliance Theory: a Neorealist First Cut” in *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer90, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 103-123, p. 105

<sup>37</sup> KEOHANE, Robert O., NYE, Joseph S. “Realism and Complex Interdependency” in *Power and Interdependency: World Politics in Transition*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1977, pp. 401-421, p. 414

<sup>38</sup> LEEDS, Brett Ashley. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes” in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 427-439, p. 428

<sup>39</sup> DOS SANTOS, 1970, p. 232

<sup>40</sup> A defined territory, a permanent population and governmental capacity to have relations with the other states

<sup>41</sup> HOLSTI, 1995, p. 131

government of the state.<sup>42</sup> Great powers have used the policy to make small states obedient to them and to keep the states located in a strategically important region under their control. „*This is just one of many forms of diplomatic pressure designed to alter the behaviour of the target or to express disapproval.*“<sup>43</sup> Usually the Recognition Policy is used as a Political Instrument but in several cases economic means are used to support the political activity.

Mediation Policy (MP) is a policy used by a great power to resolve conflicts in a turbulent subregion that has a strategic importance for the great power. The conflict makes the subregion unstable and the goal of the great power is to stabilise the situation to have control over it. The mediation is exercised by diplomatic means and usually moderation of the conflict is necessary in order to be neutral but in the current cases the policy has mostly a very partial character.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the policy is made in favour of the great power sometimes taking into consideration the interests of small states if it is useful for the great power. Mediation is a purely diplomatic activity and therefore the cases are divided between the Political and International Instruments. The first group deals with the cases where only a great power and the states of a subregion are involved. The second group concentrates on conflict management on the regional or global level.

Threatening Policy (TP) is a policy used by a great power to alter the behaviour of a small state in the way it is useful for the great power. The “*threats are carried out in the hope of altering B’s [in the context of the present research a small state’s] behaviour, which, in most cases, could not be altered by other means.*“<sup>45</sup> The goal of the policy is to warn the small states located in the geostrategic region to obey to the rules offered by the great power. Political threatening uses classical diplomacy to influence small states and remind them of the interest of the great power in the

---

<sup>42</sup> In the first case it is, for example, the recognition of the Baltic states’ independence or re-independence and in the other case, for example, the practice which the US has very often used in Latin America. Ibid, p. 131

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 132

<sup>44</sup> For example in their article James Chace and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos write that during the 19<sup>th</sup> century Great Britain, considering itself as a superpower, was moderating the European conflicts by its understandings of justice „*giving her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done.*” Grand Strategy—Toward a New Concert of Nations: An American Perspective in *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1999, vol. XVI, 3.

[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wpj/wp\\_99chj05.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wpj/wp_99chj05.html) (10.02.2004)

<sup>45</sup> HOLSTI, 1995, p. 126

subregion. Military threatening is the demonstration of the military supremacy of the great power in the subregion or the bordering areas of the subregion to remind the small states of the interest of the great power in the area. The Threatening Policy is usually a background policy to get a desired response from small states to some other policy.

Propaganda Policy (PP) is a policy used by a great power to influence the public of a subregion or the global public. Propaganda in general terms is understood as „...*the preconceived, systematic, and centrally coordinated process of manipulating symbols, aimed at promoting uniform behavior of large social groups, a behavior congruent with the specific interests and ends of the propagandist.*”<sup>46</sup> In the current study the Propaganda Policy is analysed in the context of two instruments. The Propaganda Policy as a Political Instrument is defined as follows: the goal of the great power policy is to affect the whole society or partly picking up “*specific ethnic, class, religious, economic, or language groups within those populations*”<sup>47</sup> to manipulate with them. According to the goal of the policy, propaganda should achieve the support of the population or in other words explain the activity of the great power through a positive prism. “*The content of propaganda is therefore seldom completely “true,” but neither is it wholly false, as is so often assumed.*”<sup>48</sup> The Propaganda Policy as an International Instrument follows the same rule but the target group is different. The aim of the policy on the international level is to create rumours about a counter part (in the context of the current study it is the state(s) of a geostrategic subregion) or to present the narrative of the great power to get permission to execute other policies in the subregion.<sup>49</sup> The Propaganda Policy like the Threatening Policy is a preparatory policy for executing the other policies.

Deal Policy (DP) is a policy used by a great power to get external approval to the activities in a geostrategic subregion. It is a policy not directed to the states of a subregion but it establishes background to the other policies and eliminates a possible external interference. The Deal Policy is executed between two (rarely more) great

---

<sup>46</sup> HAZAN, Barukh. Soviet Impregnational Propaganda, Ardis, Michigan, 1982, p. 9

<sup>47</sup> HOLSTI, 1995, p. 152

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 154

<sup>49</sup> TAYLOR, Philip M. Propaganda From Thucydides To Thatcher: Some Problems, Perspectives & Pitfalls, 1992, <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/arts-pt1.htm> (13.03.2004)

powers that are interested in dividing the spheres of interests and therefore they define the borders in a geostrategic subregion, their rights there or they divide different geostrategic subregions between each other.<sup>50</sup> Although the policy is not directed to the states of a subregion it has a crucial meaning for the process of Dependency Policies – it forms the policy of subregional states as well as the policy of the great power, being for the environment of the described process. The Deal Policy is considered as a soft type of policy because of its indirect (although crucial) influence on the states of a subregion, non-violent character and aims.

At the end of the current part I will present a table which summarises Great power's Politics to execute different instruments and policies with possible examples (table 1).

**Table 1. Great power's Politics**

<b>Policies</b>	<b>IP</b>	<b>AP</b>	<b>RP</b>	<b>MP</b>	<b>TP</b>	<b>PP</b>	<b>DP</b>
<b>Political</b>	Financing a Political Party in another State	Co-operation Agreement	Recognition of a Government	Mediation of a Subregional Conflict	Diplomatic Note	Internal Propaganda in another state	-
<b>Economic</b>	Economic Boycott	Status of the Most Favoured Nation	Financing a Newly Recognised Government	-	Demonstration of a Possible Economic Sanction	-	-
<b>Military</b>	Occupation	Military Assistance	War against a non-recognised government	Peace-keeping	Military Trainings Close to the Border	-	-
<b>International</b>	Disturbance of Foreign Policy Sovereignty	Multilateral Co-operation Agreement	Call of Non-Recognition of a Government	Multilateral Conflict Mediation	Aggressive Security Doctrine	Accusing an international organisation	Secret Protocol (Dividing of Spheres of Interest)

<sup>50</sup> HOBSON, John A. Imperialism: A Study, 1902, <http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Hobson/hbsnImp12.html> (14.03.04)

### ***1.3. The Concept of the Capability of the Dependency Policies***

In the current part I will present the concept of the Capability of the Dependency Policies. For the evaluation of the capability I will present a Formula of the Measures of the Capability of the Dependency Policies and describe a method of the evaluation of the policies.

First, I will define the concept of the Capability of the Dependency Policies. The easiest way to understand the capability of a policy is to compare the output achieved by means of the input. If the result of the policy is a desired goal, then the policy is a capable action. For example, if a great power wants to overthrow the government of a subregional state and it is achieved, then it is possible to consider the policy as a capable one. However in the framework of the process of the Dependency Policies the analysis of the capability is not so easy because two actions which both achieve desired results will differently increase the great power's ability of control over the subregion. The great power's goal is to increase the control over the geostrategic subregion or in other words to increase the dependency of the geostrategic subregion. The policy is a capable one if the result of the policy is the situation which increases the great power's ability of control over the subregion. And, on the contrary, the policy is an incapable one if the result of the policy is the situation which decreases the great power's ability of control over the subregion.

To understand the capability of the Dependency Policies it is necessary to compare the different cases with each other not only taking into account the achieved results and the desired result but also several different factors, influencing the policy process. The ability to have control over a subregion depends on the stability of the subregion, the policies of the subregional states and the existence of other great powers having interest in the subregion. The ability is influenced by background factors, which are also necessary criteria for the evaluation of the process. The background factors are the earlier relations between the great power and subregional states and also the current position of the great power in the world politics. All these criteria are summed

up into the following formula, which I name the Formula of the Measures of the Capability of the Dependency Policies:

$$C = [(R + P_F) \times P + S_A \times S_P] \times R_E \times G^{51}$$

Second, I will explain and describe the parts of the formula separately and I will also present a scale to measure them.<sup>52</sup>

The first part of the formula is the actors' part, which takes into account the different parties of the policy process. The Reaction of the subregional states (**R**) is the first factor, which is directly affected by the policy of the great power. The reaction could be positive, which means supporting the policy of the great power, or negative, which means the activity is not supportive towards the policy of the great power. It is possible that the reaction of the subregional states is absent because of the situation but these are rather exceptional cases. The positive reaction of the subregional states increases the ability of the control of the great power over the subregion and oppositely the negative reaction decreases the ability to control the subregion. The given values of the factor are the following:

- 1 – a negative reaction related to the policy of the great power;
- 0.5 – a rather negative reaction related to the policy of the great power;
- 0 – absence of reaction;
- 0.5 – a rather positive reaction related to the policy of the great power;
- 1 – a positive reaction related to the policy of the great power.

A factor very closely related to the Reaction of the subregional states is the factor of the external power (**P<sub>F</sub>**). The existence of the interested external power determines

---

<sup>51</sup> The formula, which is the main study instrument in the current research, is worked out by myself and the meanings of the abbreviations are the following: **C** – the capability of the policy; **R** – the reaction or response of the states of the subregion to the executed policy; **P<sub>F</sub>** – the third power or external power, having interest in the subregion; **P** – the position of the superpower in the current world politics; **S<sub>A</sub>** – the stability of the subregion after the implementation of the policy of the superpower; **S<sub>P</sub>** – the stability of the subregion before the implementation of the policy of the superpower; **R<sub>E</sub>** – the character of the relations between the superpower and the subregional states before the implementation of the policy of the superpower; **G** – the short-term goals of the superpower, in other words the relation between the achieved and desired result of the policy. The goal of using a quantitative method in the qualitative analysis is to make the huge amount of different cases comparable in order to bring out the main tendencies in the process which is studied.

<sup>52</sup> The measuring of the different factors is based on the qualitative assessment of the case dividing the factors into four to five groups: negative, rather negative, neutral, rather positive, positive.

very strongly the reaction of the subregional states<sup>53</sup> and it also demonstrates the ability of the great power's control over the subregion. The absence of the external power in the subregion increases the ability of control over the subregion and, on the contrary, the strong participation of the external power decreases the ability of control over the subregion. The given values of the factor are the following:

- 1** – there is a strong interest/participation of the external power in the subregion;
- 1.25** – there is a rather strong interest/participation of the external power in the subregion;
- 1.5** – there is a medium interest/participation of the external power in the subregion;
- 1.75** – there is a rather low interest/participation of the external power in the subregion;
- 2** – there is a low interest/participation of the external power in the subregion.

The third factor which has influence on both of the above-described factors is the current position of the great power in the world politics (**P**). The influence is mutual in the context of the process of the Dependency Policies because the previous factors can increase or decrease the advantage of that background factor and the position of the great power can diminish or increase the effect of the previous factors.<sup>54</sup> The strong position of the great power in the world politics increases its ability to have control over the subregion and, oppositely, the weak position of the great power decreases its ability to have control over the subregion. The given values of the factor are the following:

- 0.1** – the great power has a weak position in the world politics;
- 0.5** – the great power has a rather weak position in the world politics;
- 1** – the great power has a medium position in the world politics;
- 1.5** – the great power has a rather strong position in the world politics;
- 2** – the great power has a strong position in the world politics.

The second part of the formula is the environmental factors. It consists of the factors of the subregional stability, which have importance in increasing control of the great

---

<sup>53</sup> A very intensive activity of the external power in the subregion could make the subregional states more obedient to the superpower. The existence of the external power gives an alternative to the subregional states and they can balance between the two or more powers.

<sup>54</sup> For example, a negative reaction and a very strong participation of the external power could nullify the positive effect of the leading position of the superpower in the world politics. Or the effect of the ambiguous reaction and the position of the external powers will be reduced by the strong position of the superpower in the world politics.

power over the subregion and in its possession. The stability is defined by the internal or external stability of the subregion, which includes both the absence of internal conflicts-turbulence and the stability of the position of the foreign policy. The stability is divided into two parts, which sum up as the total stability. The basic factor is the stability after the policy implementation ( $S_A$ ), which assesses the subregional stability as the result of the policy of the great power. An influencing factor on that is the stability before the policy implementation ( $S_P$ ), which is a background factor like the position of the great power described above. The total indicator of the stability has importance in the evaluation of the efficiency but the differentiation between the stability before and after is necessary for presenting the analysis of the policies.<sup>55</sup> The stability increases the ability of the great power to have control over the subregion and, oppositely, the instability decreases the ability of the great power to have control over the subregion. The given values of these factors are the following (they are calculated separately for both factors):

- 0.1** – an unstable situation;
- 0.5** – a rather unstable situation;
- 1** – a moderately unstable situation;
- 1.5** – a rather stable situation;
- 2** – a stable situation.

The third part of the formula is a general background factor, which is the character of the earlier relations between the great power and subregional states ( $R_E$ ). This factor defines the character of the new policy and also the potential response of the subregional states. The earlier relations could also determine the stability of the subregion because the stability reflects the acceptance of the subregional populations. The positive earlier relations increase the ability of the great power to have control over the subregion and, on the contrary, the negative earlier relations decrease its ability of control over the subregion. The given values of these factors are the following:

- 0.5** – negative relations;

---

<sup>55</sup> The involvement of the superpower in the internal conflict increasing the subregional stability and the policy of the superpower which decreases the stability have in total the same effect on the capability of the policy because the ability to have control over the subregion is diminished in general compared with other cases. But it is important to differentiate the stabilities for the analysis of the policies to explain the tendencies because different stabilities have a different influence on the other factors, for example the earlier relations or the reaction of the subregional states, etc.



- 1** – rather negative relations;
- 1.5** – rather positive relations;
- 2** – positive relations.

The last factor of the formula is the short-term goal or in other words the achieved result of the policy compared with the desired result. The last factor has a direct influence on the capability, therefore it is a characteristic factor giving the policy a positive or a negative value. In general, the great power has a goal to increase or maintain the control over the subregion, which is a long-term goal, but every policy has a short-term goal, which is some concrete agenda. It can be a treaty, a conference, conflict management, etc. The other factors compose a complex, which enables or disables the execution of the agenda. It could also be named as the output and evaluating the output in the context of the desired agenda. The given values of these factors are the following:

- 1** – the great power did not execute the agenda;
- 0.5** – the great power mostly did not execute the agenda;
- 0.5** – the great power partly executed the agenda;
- 1** – the great power executed the agenda.

After calculating according to the formula the different assessed factors give a value – a higher value means a bigger capability of the policy.<sup>56</sup> According to the results the different cases<sup>57</sup> are divided into four groups: capable, rather capable, rather incapable and incapable policies. The capability groups are determined relatively based on the context of case studies.<sup>58</sup> The borders between groups are drawn based on the average value of each instrument of the Dependency Policies. Within each instrument I will draw the borders of capability separately because it enables to analyse the cases in the right context. The average value of the current instrument is the border between the capable and incapable cases. The lowest average value of a policy of the current instrument is the border between the rather incapable and incapable cases. The highest average value of a policy of the current instrument is the border between the rather capable and capable cases. The main emphasis is placed on the capable and incapable

---

<sup>56</sup> Values are divided on the scale from 20 to -20.

<sup>57</sup> Two hundred twenty cases are analysed.

<sup>58</sup> Two case studies are analysed: the US-Central America and Russia-the Baltic states.

cases based on which I will bring out the main tendencies, which characterise the capability of the Dependency Policy. The groups of rather capable and rather incapable policies are taken into account in the analysis but they are not described separately because they are transitional groups. The presented tendencies will show how the different factors influence the great powers' ability of control over the subregion and these tendencies present also the main characteristics of the case studies.

\*\*\*\*

The current chapter gave an overview of the methodology of my research defining the main concepts of the current analysis: the Concept of the Dependency of a Geostrategic Subregion, the Concept of Dependency Policies and the Concept of the Capacity of the Dependency Policies. The last one is the study object of my research and therefore, in order to define the instruments of the studies I presented the Formula of the Measures of the Capability of the Dependency Policies.

## Chapter 2: Political Instruments

The present chapter analyses the capability of Political Instruments in the process of establishing dependency implemented by the US and Russia to make the Central American states and Baltic states dependent respectively. The political instruments used by the great powers include the following policies: intervention policy, alliance policy, recognition policy, threatening policy and mediation policy.

### 2.1. *Intervention policy*

The Intervention Policy as a Political Instrument (PIIP) has been a rather incapable policy in both cases. In the case study of the US-Central America PIIP has been the most incapable Political Instrument of the process of establishing dependency but still it has been used very often. In the case study of Russia-the Baltics PIIP has also been a rather incapable instrument. PIIP is the most frequently used policies in practice and 43 cases are analysed in this part of the chapter.<sup>59</sup>

First, I will take under consideration the case study of the PIIP of the US towards the Central American states. The first factor which determines the capability of PIIP in the case study of the US is the relations with the states of the subregion before implementing the policy. The case of the Panama Canal is the best example of a very capable PIIP. Due to the earlier support the Panamanian government was obliged to the US to conclude the treaty favourably to the US.<sup>60</sup> The rights, which were legal according to the international law, gave the US also later the right to intervene actively in the internal affairs of Panama. A similar case was in the middle of the 1920s in Nicaragua, where the government favouring the US was supported and kept

---

<sup>59</sup> See Appendix 1

<sup>60</sup> The US was interested in building the canal through the Panama Isthmus and the right to continue the building of the canal on the territory, which was under the Colombian authority, was given to the control of the US. BEMIS, 1943, p. 149. The Colombian parliament refused to ratify the treaty and soon a revolution supported by the US broke out in Panama region. The Revolution started on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1903 and on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1903 the independence of Panama was declared. The US recognised Panama's independence in 3 days. KOCH-WESER, Volker. "Erwirkungen der Regierung den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika auf die zentral-amerikanischen und westindischen Republiken", Georg Fisher & Co, Berlin, 1936, p. 81. On 18<sup>th</sup> November 1903 a treaty was concluded, which gave the US the right of sovereignty on the territory of the canal, the right to own bases in Panama and the right to occupy the territory of the whole Panama if it is threatening the canal. KUBYSHKIN, Aleksandr Ivanovich. „Anglo-Amerikanskoe sopernichestvo v Central'noy Amerike v XIX – nachala XX veka”, Saratov University Publishing, Saratov, 1994, p. 206. (Кубышкин, Александр Иванович. «Англо-американское соперничество в Центральной Америке в XIX – начала XX века»).

in power with the help of the US forces.<sup>61</sup> In both cases the governments could not have been able to stay in power without the help of the American troops and the US government executed its intervention policy with a big interest due to the strategic position of Nicaragua and Panama. A case which is slightly different but not the least capable one is the case of Guatemala after the *coup d'etat* in 1954.<sup>62</sup> There is a similarity in the American support to the revolting powers but the difference is that the Guatemalan governments remaining in power did not depend so strongly on the US. The abovementioned cases show that the most capable way to execute PIIP is to find political power in the strategic countries and to make them dependent on the external support, which ensures positive relations with the states in the subregion.

The second aspect I would like to point out as a factor of the capability of PIIP is the position of the great power in the world and the lack of other powers in the subregion. The situation is described as the total domination of the US in Central America and therefore the implementation of the US politics is free from the threats of other great powers and the responses of the states of Central America. An extreme example is the case of Panama during the first decade of its existence.<sup>63</sup> The extent of the US intervention was so big that Panama was not considered as a sovereign state by the other Central American states. The strong interest to keep control over Panama was caused by the crucial strategic object for the US in the form of the Panama Canal. The cases of Nicaragua in 1914 and Costa Rica in 1948 prove that due to the dominance in

---

<sup>61</sup> The US carried out invasion to Nicaragua already in 1912 to maintain their most favoured candidate, Diaz, in power. The later president Chamorro held undemocratic elections, which caused dissatisfaction among the nation, which resulted in new elections according to the new election law made by the US advisors. The new president Solorzano asked the American troops, which had left Nicaragua for a year (1925), to come back. The American troops came back and restored the order putting their favoured candidate, who supported the American views in power. YANCHUK, Igor Ivanovich. "Politika SSHA v Latinskoj Amerike, 1918-1928", Publisher "Nauka", Moscow, 1982, pp. 269-270. (Янчук, Игорь Иванович. «Политика США в Латинской Америке, 1918-1928»).

<sup>62</sup> In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Guatemalan government executed a strong socialist policy, which did not please the US. The US initiated a plan to overthrow the government and it was done successfully with the support of the US. After the period of turbulence in Guatemala the *juntas*, which were supported and financed by the US government, were in power and they supported the US policy till the end of the 1980s. FARAH, Douglas. "Papers Expand on U.S. Role in Guatemala" in *Washington Post*, 12.03.1999, World History Archives: Guatemala. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/150.html> (13.12.2003)

<sup>63</sup> Since the construction of Panama the US had a very strong influence on the internal affairs of Panama. The Treaty of the Canal gave the US a right to intervene in the Panamanian politics when the US government thought it was necessary. In the political way the US observed the elections and intervened if the situation was not resolved in the "right way" according to the American thinking. ZUBOK, L. I. "Imperialisticheskaya politika SSHA v stranah Karibskogo basseyna 1900-1939", Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Moscow, 1948, p. 263. (Зубок, Л. И. «Империалистическая политика США в странах Карибского бассейна 1900-1939»).

the subregion the US had a right to change the governments and conclude the treaties strongly favourable to the US, causing a stronger dependency of the states on the US. The Bryan-Chomorro Treaty concluded with Nicaragua in 1914 gave the US broad rights for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal but the treaty was concluded only thanks to the Nicaraguan government, which was installed with the help of the US.<sup>64</sup> It was done in the period when all the other world powers were preparing for WW I and Central America was outside of their interests. The power situation in the subregion was similar in the case of Costa Rica, where the socialistic government was overthrown with the assistance of the US.<sup>65</sup> The end of WW II gave the US totally free hands in Central America and due to the fear of the SU all the socialist governments were despised. The SU did not have enough power to reach outside its continent and help the governments it favoured. The case of Nicaragua in the 1990s is the result of the collapse of the earlier world system and the dependency of Nicaragua is caused by the lack of alternatives in the subregion.<sup>66</sup> The capability of these policies is caused by the lack of other powers in the subregion, which does not give the Central American states an opportunity to use a balancing policy.

The third factor which influences the capability of the PIIP of the US is the aspect of stability. The policy is capable if the US has been able to create stability in the subregion or in its country. The above-mentioned cases of the internal conflicts in Panama (in 1903-1918) and in Nicaragua (in the middle of the 1920s) are the examples regarded as the cases of capable PIIP. The turbulence in Panama was resolved by the US political pressure and accepted till the next elections.<sup>67</sup> The case of

---

<sup>64</sup> KOCH-WESER, 1936, pp. 69-70

<sup>65</sup> The presidential candidate Ulate favoured by the US won the elections in 1948 thanks to the forgery of results. The Election Committee did not declare the results and Ulate was arrested. The ambassador of the US demanded his release. After that he rose in revolt and through Nicaragua the US helped to overthrow the Costa Rican government. GONIONSKIY, Semen Aleksandrovich. „Latinskaja Amerika i SSHA. Oчерki istorii diplomaticheskikh otnosheniy. 1939-1959“, IMO, Moscow, 1960, pp. 199-201. (Гонионский, Семен Александрович. «Латинская Америка и США. Очерки истории дипломатических отношений. 1939-1959»).

<sup>66</sup> The US strongly supported the Nicaraguan elections in 1990 and financed the counter candidate to the former president Ortega (SLNF). The result was favourable to the US and the new government followed the US policy. The next elections were also politically influenced by the US and the US involvement facilitated the US favoured government, which is economically dependent on the US. HAUGAARD, Lisa. “Foreign Policy in Focus: Nicaragua” in *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Vol. 2 No. 32, March 1997, World History Archives: Nicaragua. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/298.html> (13.12.03)

<sup>67</sup> In 1908 the US made corruption investigation, which was not supported by the Panamanian government and was made only after the diplomatic pressure of the US. In 1918 the government did

Nicaragua was also in a very hot situation but the intervention of the US pacified the country and brought the conflict parties to the negotiation table.<sup>68</sup> The US intervention in the 1880s resolved the subregional conflict between the liberals and conservatives.<sup>69</sup> All these cases on the state level and on the subregional level are characterised by the increasing stability, which legitimises the US intervention and therefore these cases of using PIIP by the US are regarded as capable ones.

Second, I will bring out the incapable cases of the PIIP of the US. The first factor which has caused the incapability of PIIP is the response of the states of the subregion. The negative earlier relations between the US and the Central American states and their result as a negative response to the US policies have determined the incapability of PIIP. The response and the earlier relations are important for the US in a situation where there is no US domination in the subregion. In most of the cases the previous relations are the basis of negative responses but as the case of the 1850s shows good relations in the past can also result in a negative response if the intervention policy is executed very openly and radically.<sup>70</sup> The other cases have a clear correlation between the negative earlier relations and a negative response. For example, the cases of Panama (in 1940/1 and 1987/8) are characterised by problematic relations due the ownership of the Panama Canal. The Panamanian government was interested in increasing its rights to the Canal and the US government in maintaining the position it had. It caused several conflicts and both cases were situations where the US government demanded a policy that was not in the

---

not want to declare the results of the elections because the opposition had won but finally they had to do it due to the US pressure. ZUBOK, 1948, pp. 263-264

<sup>68</sup> YANCHUK, 1982, p. 300

<sup>69</sup> In the 1860-1870s the liberals had supported the idea of the Central American Confederation, in 1880 Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador declared that they constructed a confederation and they were also planning to involve Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The last one organised opposition (lead by conservatives) and found support from the US because it was not interested in letting Central America integrated by its own. The intervention of the US calmed the conflict and the subregional conflict was resolved. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, pp. 174-182

<sup>70</sup> In the 1850s the American filibuster Walker made an adventure to Central America to resolve the Nicaraguan civil war but in the end he took over the power and started to conquest the whole Central America. The result for the Central American countries was a strong condemnation, which resulted in warfare. The US government wanted to withdraw from Walker, stating that the government was not responsible for the actions of its citizens. John H. Wheeler, United States Minister Resident in Nicaragua, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States, Granada, December 24, 1855. in *“Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Inter American Affairs 1831-1860. Vol. IV – Central-America 1851-1860”* ed. by MANNING, William R.. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1934. pp. 500-502. The hopes that Walker could integrate Central America as one country, which supports the US, did not come true due to the attack of the Central American governments.

interest of Panama from the Panamanian government.<sup>71</sup> Although the US succeeded in what it wanted, it is not possible to count the policy as a capable one because of the instability and very short-term results. The problem of instability is also in the case of Guatemala in 1953/4. The open and active accusing of Guatemala in communism made the Guatemalan government very strongly oppose the US demands.<sup>72</sup> It is also not possible to count the policy as a capable one because it did not bring stability into Guatemala because internal turbulence and a military *coup d'etat* followed. An even more incapable policy is the case of the Nicaraguan elections in 1984 where the US did not even reach its short-term goals.<sup>73</sup> The straight and opposing policy of the Nicaraguan government both internally and internationally made the PPIP of the US incapable.

The second aspect has already been mentioned in the previous paragraph and it influences strongly the US vulnerability to the responses of the subregional states. An external threat or involvement into the subregional issues has caused the incapability of the PPIP of the US. It is inversely proportional to the criterion of the capability of PPIP that is characterised by the US domination in the subregion. The best examples are the most important subregional conflicts, which are characterised by the ideological opposition between the US and the SU.<sup>74</sup> In the case of Guatemala the

---

<sup>71</sup> In 1940 the US demanded additional military bases in Panama. The president declined the demands, the result was a revolt initiated in 1941 and the new government agreed to satisfy the US demands. GELLMAN, Irwin F. "Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America 1933-1945" John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London, 1979, p. 32. In 1987 the US government gave an ultimatum to Panama for the government to resign but the president continued until the American invasion in 1989. DITRICH, Wolfgang. "Pravda o konflikte v Central'noy Amerike, 1983-1989" Institute of Latin America Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, 1992, p. 182. («Правда о конфликте в Центральной Америке, 1983-1989»).

<sup>72</sup> The US demanded to pay compensation, change the government and political line but the result was a bigger Soviet interest in the subregion and Guatemalan official denial of the demands. As a result Guatemala was expelled from the Organization of the Central American States. The conflict finished with the overthrow of the Guatemalan government initiated by the US in 1954. GONIONSKIY, 1960, pp. 281-282.

<sup>73</sup> In 1984 democratic elections were held in Nicaragua and the US called the right-wing parties not to participate, organised terror acts in the polling stations, etc. where the elections were held and as a result got international recognition. OBOROTOVA, Maria Alekseyevna. „SSHA bor'ba s osvoboditel'nym dvizheniem v Central'noy Amerike (1977-1988)“ Publisher „Nauka“, Moscow, 1989, pp. 98-100. (Оборотова, Марина Алексеевна. «США борьба с освободительным движением в Центральной Америке (1977-1988)»); DIAZ-KALEHHAS, Apolinar. “«Kontador» vyzov proshen: Latinskaja Amerika protiv imperialisticheskikh ambicij SSHA” Publisher “Progress”, Moscow, 1988, pp. 97-98. (««Контадор» вызов прошен: Латинская Америка против империалистических амбиций США»).

<sup>74</sup> Guatemala in 1953/4, El Salvador in the 1980s, Nicaragua in the 1980s.

external power was the least represented<sup>75</sup> but the policy was changed into an incapable one due to the awaking interest of the SU in Central America. Because of the threat of the Soviet expansion the policy was also more radical and it was used also later.<sup>76</sup> The cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua are parallel ones, where El Salvador was on the side of the US and Nicaragua was supported by the SU. In these cases the ideological war was broader and the threat of the Soviet expansion was more real due to the active participation of Cuba.<sup>77</sup> The US policy was not capable because of the Soviet support to the Nicaraguan government, Salvadorian guerrillas as well as the interest of the third powers: Europe and the regional powers of Latin America. The freedom of the US to exercise more capable policies was limited in that way. The limitation of the free activity of the great power gives the states of the subregion alternatives to balance between the different interests and diminish the dependency on the great power.

The third criterion which determines the incapability of the PIIP of the US is the instability caused by the policy exercised. In the same way as the stability or a more stable situation created by the great power intervention legitimises the policy, the less stable situation or instability diminishes the legitimacy of the actions. A situation could be changed instable in the international environment as it was in the case of the Lamar-Zeledon Treaty in 1859.<sup>78</sup> The aggressive policy did not help the US and the situation was not favourable to anybody. Most of the cases are characterised by internal instability. There are several examples in the Panamanian history where the US has caused a very big turbulence. There was a very instable period in the 1960s where the US was trying to oppose aggressively to the willingness of the

---

<sup>75</sup> It is very difficult to regard the Guatemalan government as a communist one – only ¼ of the parliament were communists and in the administration there were 17 communists of the 25,000 civil servants. GONIONSKIY, 1960, p. 281

<sup>76</sup> DOYLE, Kate & KORNBLUH, Peter. CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents, 14.08.1997, World History Archives: Guatemala. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/156.html>

<sup>77</sup> STANCHENKO, V. I. “Central’noamerikanskoy konflikt 1980-1988 gg. (Global’nye regional’nye aspekty)”, Institute of World Economy and International Relations Academy of Science of USSR, Moscow, 1990, pp. 10-11. (Станченко, В. И. «Центральноамериканской конфликт 1980-1988 гг. (Глобальные и региональные аспекты)»)

<sup>78</sup> Nicaragua did not ratify the Cass-Irisarri Treaty, which was more beneficial to the US, and a new treaty was made. According to it the US had an equal position with the other powers and the US started to destabilise the international environment of Nicaragua with different demands to secure its positions. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 143



Panamanians to take over the Panama Canal.<sup>79</sup> Although the US attempted to resolve the problems using power, the policy did not succeed and in 1977 a new treaty was concluded. In 1987 the US government gave an ultimatum to Panama and hoped that a strong policy could help but instead of accepting the ultimatum the policy caused turmoil and nationalistic feelings among the Panamanians.<sup>80</sup> The policy did not succeed until a military invasion. The case of Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s is also an example of an incapable policy.<sup>81</sup> The result of the fighting for almost a decade was the continuing instability in Nicaragua and in its neighbouring countries and the role of the US was only to finance these groups. The instability in the subregion diminished the capability of PIIP even in the cases where the result of the policy was overthrowing the government, which was not favourable to the US.

To conclude the analysis of the case study of the US and Central America it is possible to present the main tendencies of the capability of the PIIP of the US. The positive earlier relations facilitate the implementation of a capable policy but usually the negative earlier relations cause a negative response from the states of the subregion and it diminishes the capability of PIIP. An important aspect is the existence of an external power in the subregion, which gives the subregional state a possibility to choose between the powers and makes PIIP more incapable but the dominating position helps to fulfil a capable policy. Another important aspect is the stability, which as an environmental factor will determine the capability of the policy and legitimise PIIP.

Third, I will analyse the case study of the Russian PIIP towards the Baltic subregion. First, I will bring out the aspect of a position, which influences the capability of the PIIP of Russia. The Russian interventions in the Baltic affairs are more capable in the

---

<sup>79</sup> The first shooting of the demonstrators was in 1959, the tensions started to develop and in 1964 there were huge demonstrations in Panama to take control over the Canal ownership. In 1968 Torrihhos succeeded with the military *coup d'etat* in Panama and took a nationalistic line in policy. GONIONSKIY, 1960, pp. 429-436; OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 13-14

<sup>80</sup> DITRICH, 1992, p. 188

<sup>81</sup> In November 1981 CIA presented a plan that in the neighbouring countries of Nicaragua paramilitary groups will be organised to perform terror acts in Nicaragua as well as to finance the people in Nicaragua who do not support Sandinista government. BUSHUEV, Valery Gennadiyevich. "Latinskaja Amerika – SSHA: revolyuciya i kontrevolyuciya", Publisher "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya", Moscow, 1987, p. 140. (Бушуев, Валерий Геннадиевич. «Латинская Америка – США: революция и контрреволюция»). The groups used a lot of money and there were continuous military conflicts between them and Sandinista governments but the fighting was not successful. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 109-110.

cases when Russia has a dominating position in the world politics. Russia had the strongest position during the independence period of the Baltic subregion at the beginning of WW II.<sup>82</sup> In 1939 the Pact of Mutual Assistance<sup>83</sup> and the installation of the bases of the Soviet troops into the territories of the Baltic countries were capable in two perspectives: the situation gave a beneficial basis for the future incorporation of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, it excluded the dominance of other powers in the subregion. The event formed a good basis for the events in 1940.<sup>84</sup> Due to WW II in Europe the SU had free hands to apply its PIIP in the Baltic states and to make the subregion dependent on itself. The dependency of the Baltics increased very strongly reaching the maximum level – the Baltic governments lost their independence and were incorporated into the SU linking the Baltic subregion closely with Russia for the next 50 years.

The second factor which influences the capability of the PIIP of Russia is the complex of an external power and the acceptance of the great power's policy by the subregional states. The Russian policy has been more capable in the cases where the external influence is strong and therefore the acceptance of the policy by the Baltic governments is rather positive. In the case of the *coup d'etat* in Lithuania in 1926 its government was under pressure from the West and the East (probably more from the West) and Lithuania had to execute a policy of balance.<sup>85</sup> The Soviet interest in the

---

<sup>82</sup> Germany and Great Britain-France concentrated on each other to resolve the problem of the expanding war in Europe. The SU was left out of the war due the pact concluded between Germany and the SU on 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1939. The balancing position which the SU had in this period and the collapse of the security system in Europe raised the position of the SU in the world politics very much.

<sup>83</sup> The pacts were offered to the Baltic governments in the way of an ultimatum and the negotiations were lead by the will of the SU. Estonia concluded the pact 28.09.1939, Latvia 05.10.1939 and Lithuania 10.10.1939. For more information about the turbulent period see TARULIS, Albert N. "Soviet Policy Towards the Baltic States 1918-1940", University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1959, pp. 152-158.

<sup>84</sup> In June 1940 the SU made ultimatums to all the Baltic governments to increase the amount of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states as well as to make the governments more favourable to the SU, GARLEFF, Michael. "Die Baltischen Länder. Estland, Lettland, Litauen von Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart.", Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg, Süosteuroopa-Gesellschaft, München, 2001, p. 165. It was the first step to help to support the revolt of communists, who took over the power and formed the governments, which were lead by the representatives of the SU. In July 1940 the parliaments elected in an undemocratic way applied for the membership in the SU and in August of the same year they were accepted. For a more detailed description of the incorporation process see TARULIS, 1959, pp. 204-249.

<sup>85</sup> Lithuania had problematic relations with Germany due Klaipeda (Memel) region, it did not have diplomatic relations with Poland due to Vilnius region and the SU had a strong interest in the whole Lithuania. Therefore the SU recognised the Lithuanian right to Vilnius territory to be its ally in that question and keep it away from the cooperation with Poland. RAUCH, von Georg. "Balti riikide ajalugu 1918-1940", Detlar, Tallinn, 1995, p. 62

Lithuanian internal affairs was not only limited to supporting the communist activity but also the right-wing political powers, which executed the *coup d'état*, were looking for the support from the SU to be secured from the threats of the West.<sup>86</sup> The SU did not intervene openly in the Lithuanian internal policy but efficiently by getting the people to the power that influenced the Baltic policies. On the other hand, in the cases where Russia has a dominating position in the subregion the response of the Baltic governments has been rather negative or low supporting. These are the examples of the events in 1939-1940. The Baltic governments were trying to find a balance between the SU and Germany but suddenly the last one left them under the influence of the SU. The new situation awoke the Baltic governments but the dominating position of the SU did not give the Baltics any chance to resist.<sup>87</sup> The first negative response did not stop the policy of the SU because it felt the supremacy in the subregion and the SU succeeded in its policy.

Fourth, I will present the cases of PIIP which are rather incapable ones. The first aspect which has changed the PIIP of Russia rather incapable is a negative response of the Baltic governments to the policy. Russia has no chance to execute the capable PIIP if the Baltic states have declared an opposite interest and despite the intensive instruments Russia has used, the results have been rather negative for Russia or they have been compromises where nobody gained politically. An example for the first case is the Russian activities after the collapse of the Russian empire in 1918-1920. The Soviet government had means to be involved in the Baltic internal developments but the result was the declaration of independence of the Baltic republics and a war that lasted two years.<sup>88</sup> The two cases in the late 1990s and at the beginning of 2000

---

<sup>86</sup> Smetona and Valdemaras (leaders of the *coup d'état*) had consulted the Soviet Embassy how to best overthrow the government. After the *copu d'état* the SU approved silently the change and the communists finished their plan to initiate a revolution. ILMJÄRV, Magnus. "Konstantin Päts ja Nõukogude Liidu Tallinna saatkond: aastad 1925-1934" in *Acta Historica Tallinnensia* vol. 3, 1999, pp. 156-223, pp. 213-214

<sup>87</sup> For example, Estonia was thinking about refusing the Pact and starting a war but the hopeless situation where the German embassy did not answer and the superior forces of the SU were standing on the Estonian border forced the Estonian government to agree with the Pact offered. GARLEFF, 2001. p 162

<sup>88</sup> For example, immediately after the revolt in Petrograd in November 1917 a Soviet government was formed in Estonia as an autonomous part of Russia, giving it the right to separate from Russia. The other parties except communists declared independence on 24<sup>th</sup> February in 1918. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 28-31. A similar case was in Lithuania. The Communist party had a low support among the Lithuanians and the Soviet government was not declared in Lithuania but in Byelorussia (Vileyka). Later the Soviet government moved to Daugavpils, which was a part of former Vitebski guberniya and

are the cases of unbeneficial compromises. The case of Latvia in 1998 shows that the Russian political intervention in the internal affairs of Latvia got a very negative response and finally Russia calmed down gaining almost nothing.<sup>89</sup> In the case of Estonia Russia intervened in the internal affairs of Estonia in the conflict of the two Orthodox churches. The Russian intervention did not help to resolve the conflict quicker but made the Estonian government oppose the Russian will and gave even more arguments not to register the Moscow Orthodox Church.<sup>90</sup> The Russian PIIP has had rather incapable results in a situation where the Baltic governments have decided to take another direction, then the Russian PIIP has only caused a lot of emotions without any real political results.

The second factor which has made the Russian PIIP incapable is closely linked with the previous aspect. The negative earlier relations between Russia and the Baltic governments have also given incapable results of policies. The best examples are the cases of Estonia and Latvia in the late 1990s and at the beginning of 2000. The relations between Russia and Estonia and Latvia can hardly be described as positive during the 1990s.<sup>91</sup> The unfavourable ground caused a negative reaction of the Baltic governments, which gave Russia even more eagerness to press its policy on the Baltic states. The negative historical experience with Russia gave the Baltic governments the eagerness to move politically away from the Russian direct influence, which was expressed in the shape of PIIP.

---

under the communist rule. In Lithuania Taryba had power and it gave the power up only due to the Soviet troops. Ibid, pp. 38-42.

<sup>89</sup> In March 1998 the Latvian police had dispersed a demonstration of Russian pensioners, which got very strong criticism from Moscow. Latvia answered with political steps against Russian language minorities in Latvia. The conflict exploded on a broader level and with the help of the mediation of the Western countries a compromise was made that Latvia liberalised its minority policy and Russia established normal relations with Latvia. MEDVEDEV, 1998, pp. 235-269, p. 242

<sup>90</sup> The conflict vegetated during the 1990s and at the end of the 1990s it was brought forward again, the latter part of the conflict is taken to analyse. The issue was that the Estonian government declined to register the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP), which gave Moscow a good possibility to accuse Estonia of the discrimination of believers. The conflict vegetated without any success but was illustrated only by emotional rhetoric. ELAGIN, Viacheslav. Estonia: Difficult Road from Tallinn to Moscow in *International Affairs Magazine*, May-June 2001. No.003. Russian Monitor.

[http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu\\_id=11\\_a\\_998](http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu_id=11_a_998). (13.12.2003) Finally, the Estonian government decided to register EOC-MP in 2003 but it is not possible to count it as a result of the Russian policy.

<sup>91</sup> There were several issues in the Baltic politics which were criticised by Russia like minority policies (except Lithuania) and attempts to get NATO membership. At the same time the Baltic governments criticised the Russian policy in Chechnya, unwillingness to conclude the border treaties and non-recognition of the Soviet occupation.

The third aspect worth mentioning is the destabilising factor. The Russian policies which have caused instability in the Baltic subregion are qualified as rather incapable ones. The biggest instability was caused by the case of 1918-1920. The policies driven by the Soviet Russian government and its puppet governments caused a lot of turbulence and conflicts in the Baltic subregion, which were a reason to lose the support of local people.<sup>92</sup> Instability of a slightly smaller scale was caused in the cases of the last decades because the political intervention was not supported by a military one. In both cases the Russian intervention gave legitimacy to the minority groups in Estonia and Latvia, who were claiming that those governments were discriminating the minorities.<sup>93</sup> The more active demands inside the Baltic countries gave a good ground not to fulfil the Russian demands and not to pay as much attention as possible to them; at least it was the policy of Estonia. Both cases proved the fact that in spite of the Russian activity the Baltic governments were more independent in executing and choosing their policies.

The fourth aspect, which has not been pointed out yet and has an influential meaning for the incapability is the external power. The existence of an external power in the subregion in the complex of the above-stated factors has changed the Russian policies incapable. The case of communist activities in the Baltics at the beginning of the 1920s shows the Russian veiled attempts to organise a revolt in the Baltics to link these countries more strongly with itself.<sup>94</sup> The orientation of the Baltic countries (except Lithuania) was to Poland and Great Britain and both countries had their strong interest in the subregion. The latter ended the Russian civil war and *Entente's* intervention in Russia pushed Russia out of the subregion and its attempts to re-

---

<sup>92</sup> The Russian support to the Baltic Soviet governments and soviets' terrorising activities towards people gave a quick result of the loss of the popularity of the Soviet governments and a more intensive Soviet military invasion put people to support the young Baltic non-communist governments. RAUCH, 1995, p. 34

<sup>93</sup> In case of Latvia the minority question was more directly presented because the social problems, which were the first reason of disturbances, grew into ethnical ones. GARLEFF, 2001, p. 204. In Estonia the question was more directly religious but the registration of the Orthodox Church, which is subordinate to Constantinople, and not to the Moscow Orthodox Church gave a basis for the opinion that it is caused by ethnical reasons. ELAGIN, [http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu\\_id=11\\_a\\_998](http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu_id=11_a_998) (13.12.2003)

<sup>94</sup> In 1921 the Lithuanian police discovered a huge amount of leaflets and weapons; in 1923 the Lithuanian parliament was informed again about the disloyalty of communists and smuggling of weapons and false passports. The Estonian police found a direct connection between the Estonian Communist Party and the Soviet Legation, on 01.12.1924 the *cuop d'etat* attempt supported and financed by the SU failed. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 71-72; RAUCH, 1959, p. 59

establish its position failed. The second example which shows the Russian incapability to make the Baltic states more dependent on itself is the case of “Russia’s Long-Term Course towards the Baltic Countries” in 1997.<sup>95</sup> The result of the attempt of the forceful intervention was the opposite of the expected one. Although in the beginning Russia used a friendlier policy the Baltic countries were not interested in the Russian dominance in the subregion and decided to choose an alternative in the shape of NATO and the US.<sup>96</sup> The Russian attempts to offer an alternative to the Baltics and through it limit their independence linking them more tightly with itself failed.

To conclude the part of the analysis of the PIIP of Russia it is possible to bring out the tendencies which characterise the Russian policies. The Russian PIIP has been more capable in situations where Russia has been a dominating power in the subregion; otherwise the Russian policies have been more incapable in a situation where an external power has been acting in the subregion. The Russian policy has also been capable in a situation of the existence of an external power but only in case of the supporting policy of the Baltic states. The complex of negative earlier relations between Russia and the Baltic states, the destabilising effect and a negative reaction of the Baltic state has resulted in incapable policies of Russia.

## **2.2. Alliance policy**

The Alliance Policy as a Political Instrument (PIAP) has different capability according to the case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America PIAP has been a rather capable policy of the process of establishing dependency but it is characterised by a clear watershed between the capable and incapable cases. In the case study of Russia-the Baltics PIAP has been a rather incapable instrument but the

---

<sup>95</sup> In the present document it is possible to classify two aspects as part of PIIP: protection of the Russian language minorities in the Baltics and denial of NATO membership of the Baltic states. MEISSNER, Boris. “The Occupation of the Baltic States from a Present-Day Perspective” in *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, ed. by Dr. Tālvass Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia, Riga, 1998, pp. 473-488, p. 483.

<sup>96</sup> Russia offered security guarantees to the Baltics, concluded the Border treaty with Lithuania but the Baltics did not accept the Russian policy and at the beginning of 1998 they clearly chose the other superpower to let it dominate in the subregion and protect them from Russia. ČIUGČDA, Donatas. Baltic States in the perspective of Russia’s security policy in *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 99/ 4*. <http://www.lfpr.lt/994/8.doc> (13.12.2003)

division between the different cases is rather small compared to the case study of the US-Central America. PIAP is one of the most used policies in practice and 23 cases are analysed in this part of the chapter.<sup>97</sup>

First, I will analyse the US PIAP towards Central America. The capable cases are characterised by non-direct foreign power influence on the subregion but the existing foreign threat to the countries in the subregion is an important criterion. For example, the case of the canal treaties with Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1900 where they were concluded in the situation when the New Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was signed and the positions of Great Britain were weakened in the subregion.<sup>98</sup> The British were ousted from the region but there was a danger to the possibility of re-establishing the British supremacy. A similar situation is also in the case of establishing the Organization of the Central American States in 1951 when the US was acting for fear of the Soviet involvement to the Central American issues and the Central American states behaved for the same fear, although the SU was not directly involved Central America.<sup>99</sup> The more concerning influence of the third power is presented in the cases of re-establishing the goodwill relations with the Guatemalan government in 1954 and in the case of independence of Belize in 1982. Still the cases described above cannot be considered as real threats but as situations of potential danger.

The second aspect, which characterises the capability of PIAP, is the stability. The US government has created more internal stability of the subregion in most of the capable cases. The most suitable examples are the cases of the years 1951 and 1954. In both of the cases the US had the role of establishing a new system of cooperation. In 1951 there was a danger of communism expansion into the American continent and the US government decided to reorganise the strong front against the communism in the collective way.<sup>100</sup> In 1954 the US government re-established the broken relations with the Guatemalan new government, which was supported by the US. The new government restored the previous situation, creating a stable working system of

---

<sup>97</sup> See Appendix 2

<sup>98</sup> KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 200

<sup>99</sup> GONIONSKIY, 1960, pp. 244-245

<sup>100</sup> In Guatemala, Jacob Arbens was elected president in 1950 and his policy was strongly directed against the American MNCs, having strong socialistic rhetoric to support his activities. It alarmed the US government because the activity of the Guatemalan government evoked the needs of suppressed social groups of the other Central American countries. GONIONSKIY, 1960, p. 281

bilateral relations inside the subregion and with the US.<sup>101</sup> Using PIAP, the US created a very positive environment for its government in Central America, influencing the governments of Central America to develop their policies according to the US wills.

The third aspect is the fear of the governing elite of Central America to get overthrown by other social groups. The governments had a chance to choose between the two options and in most of the cases they supported the supremacy of the US instead of other powers. For example, in 1900 the Nicaraguan government gave a very beneficial condition to the US for the canal territory because they preferred to be protected by the US rather than Great Britain.<sup>102</sup> In 1951 and 1954 the Central American governments had a threat of internal danger – the lower working class was living in very poor conditions and a provoking policy by one state could create a total chaos in the whole subregion. In addition, in 1954 the Guatemalan new government was obliged to the US for the support in the civil war.<sup>103</sup> The clearest case of threats was shaped by the case of the declaration of Belize independence in 1982, where the US had been supporting the Belize anticolonial movement already since the 1940s.<sup>104</sup> The external threat gave the US a good basis for amicable relations with the Central American states and through that threat the asymmetrical interdependency increased between the two countries.

Second, the incapable cases of PIAP of the US in Central America. The first aspect, which characterises the incapable PIAP of the US, is the weak position of the American government in the world politics. It is mostly noticed in the cases of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For example, the alliance policy which was applied in the first half of the century with the goal to get control over the Nicaraguan canal route through the Isthmus. Although the Nicaraguan government laid the strong support US policy in the subregion and the treaty for the canal was signed<sup>105</sup> the policy proved

---

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 320

<sup>102</sup> KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 200

<sup>103</sup> GONIONSKIY, 1960, p. 282

<sup>104</sup> US Federal Research Division: Belize. Foreign Relations. Relations with the United States [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+bz0101\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bz0101)) (08.12.03)

<sup>105</sup> Charles G. De Witt, United States Chargé d' Affairs in Central America, to John Forsyth, Secretary of State of the United States, Guatemala City, January 26, 1837. MANNING, William R., 1933. pp. 140-142, p. 140



incapability.<sup>106</sup> A similar situation was with the case of the Cass-Irisarri Treaty in 1857. The US had a favourable treaty with the Nicaraguan government on the Nicaraguan canal route but similar treaties of other great powers in the subregion decreased the advantages of the US.<sup>107</sup> The weakness of the US, on the one hand, made it more acceptable for the states of Central America to develop friendly relations, which are a basis for PIAP, but, on the other hand, the weakness caused the failure of the US policy because the small allies did not believe in the support of the US and the other great powers did not accept the claims of the US.

The second aspect of the incapability of PIAP of the US is the earlier opposing relations between the US and the states of Central America. The weakness of the US made the American interest more tolerated in the region than the interest of Great Britain but the increasing position of the US caused negative feelings towards the US from the Central American governments. For example, the treaty conflicts between Panama and the US.<sup>108</sup> In 1936 after the strong opposition of the Panamanian government the US government was forced to make compromises.<sup>109</sup> A similar situation was before the closing of the new treaty in 1977.<sup>110</sup> The opposing relations put the US in a very difficult situation during the talks and did not give any advantages, a situation which Panama made use of. The crucial importance of the Panama Canal for the US made the situation for the US even more complicated and pushed the US government to the compromises, which gradually diminished the US

---

<sup>106</sup> The US government got extremely beneficial proposals from the Nicaraguan government for the canal but they never realised the proposals because the US were not willing to take the guarantee of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nicaragua due to its weak power. The situation deteriorated significantly after the establishment of British occupation over Mosquito Coast and the Tigris Islands, leaving to the US the control over the main part of the transit route but closing the control over the mouth of the canals. José de Marcoleta, Nicaraguan Minister to the United States, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of the State of the United States, Washington, May 4, 1854. MANNING, 1934. pp. 404-409

<sup>107</sup> Although the US were using diplomatic pressure to Nicaragua, the other powers did not pay attention to it due to the weak position of the US in the world politics. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State of the United States, to Mirabea B. Lamar, United States Minister Resident to Nicaragua and Costa Rica, Washington, April 01, 1859. MANNING, 1934. pp. 136-140

<sup>108</sup> In 1903 the US supported the independence war of Panama, who gave the US very favourable conditions for the canal treaty. The US had sovereignty over the territory of the Panama Canal and protectorate over the whole territory of Panama, which caused several conflicts between the Panamanians and Americans. The Panamanian governments were interested in diminishing the US role in the region and the US was trying to maintain its position.

<sup>109</sup> KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 67

<sup>110</sup> In the 1960s the relations between Panama and the US were in a very bad condition. Constant violence in Panama and a very cruel answer to them by the US caused very strong nationalistic feelings among the Panamanians. In 1968 the nationalistic militaries made the *coup d'état* and it worsened the relations even more. BUSHUEV, 1987, p. 93.

direct control over the canal and its territory.<sup>111</sup> The earlier opposing relations and the crucial importance of the object together make PIAP very vulnerable but a situation of open antagonism towards one of the subregion countries leads even more incapable results. For example, the diplomatic isolation of the Nicaraguan government and Salvadorian guerrillas at the beginning of the 1980s. Although the strongly right-wing governments had the fear of the strongly left-wing Nicaraguan government the policy of the US to create a broad opposition against Nicaragua was not capable. The governments supported the US policy because they had an example of a negative scenario from real life.<sup>112</sup> The PIAP of the US was to use external threats to the governments of Central America and offer them a possibility to maintain their position. Thus, the alliances were based on threats and therefore they were not very stable, which made the capability of the PIAP very strongly short-termed.

The third aspect is a strong interest of other great powers in the subregion. In the cases of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the supremacy of Great Britain in Central America made the US efforts rather minimal or even worse. The problem in these cases was the US inability to answer the policies applied by Great Britain. In the case of the Panamanian treaty in 1936 the scope of the US activity was limited because of the increasing interest of Germany towards Central America.<sup>113</sup> It caused a friendlier US foreign policy in Latin America called the Good Neighbouring Policy, which limited the capability of the US policies. In the case of Nicaragua and Salvador in the first half of the 1980s it is possible to state that there was a non-direct activity of the SU in the subregion but the SU had a very strong interest towards Central America, especially when thinking of the fact that the SU had an outpost for Central America in Cuba.<sup>114</sup> The negative case of Cuba made the US more radical in its policy and the

---

<sup>111</sup> The treaty of 1936 increased the US annual payment to Panama and also diminished the American control over the Panamanian territory. GELLMAN, 1979, p. 33. The treaty of 1977 increased the annual payment and settled the end of American sovereignty over the territories of the canal in the year of 2000. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 18-20.

<sup>112</sup> The activity of guerrillas in Salvador (they were supported by the Nicaraguan government and Soviet blocs, especially by Cuba) made the other governments of Central America to obey the rules that the US required. OBOROTOVA, 1989, p. 113.

<sup>113</sup> ZUBOK, 1948, p. 441

<sup>114</sup> TARASSOV, Konstantin Sergeevich, ZUBENKO, Vyacheslav Vasilevich. „Тайная война США против Латинской Америки“, Publisher “Международные отношения”, Moscow, 1987, pp. 176-177. (Тарасов, Константин Сергеевич, Зубенко, Вячеслав Василевич. «Тайная война США против Латинской Америки»)

extremism also caused miscalculations of policies, which resulted in the incapability of the PIAP of the US.

To conclude the analysis of the capability of the PIAP of the US in Central America it is possible to phrase the main tendencies: the US PIAP is more capable in the cases characterised by non-direct influence of other great powers, the stability created and/or the existing external threat to the subregional states. The policy is incapable in the cases characterised by a strong interest and position of other powers, earlier negative/opposing relations between the great power and the subregional states and/or a weak position of the great power in the world politics.

Third, the second case study of analysis of the PIAP is the Russian policy towards the Baltic states. First, I will observe the capable cases. The first aspect that characterises the capable cases of the PIAP of Russia is the positive reaction of the Baltic states. It is important to emphasise that the capability of the Russian policy in this aspect is dependent on the decisions of the Baltic governments. The reasons for the support have been different: to get support from Russia to its independence or to get support from Russia against an external threat. For example, the Decision of the Russian Provisional Government to give autonomy to the Baltic states in 1917<sup>115</sup> or the support of Russian FSSR to the Baltic governments in the process of re-independence in 1990-1991.<sup>116</sup> A positive response from the Baltic states could also be caused by an external threat to the states of the subregion. For example, the case of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the SU and Lithuania in 1926.<sup>117</sup> The response of the Baltic states is an important factor as long as the interdependency between Russia and the Baltics is low or symmetrical. In case the situation changes, i.e. Russia increases the asymmetrical interdependency of the Baltic states, the response of the Baltics does

---

<sup>115</sup> The Russian Provisional Government gave the right of autonomy, which was later supported by the Soviet powers because in a situation of the German attack they hoped that the Baltic governments will support them instead of Germany. TARULIS, 1959, p. 2

<sup>116</sup> The leader of Russia Yeltsin supported the will of independence of the Baltic governments in July 1990 without demanding them to join the new union treaty and in 1991 Yeltsin signed the agreements with the Baltic governments that meant the *de facto* recognition of Baltic independence by Russia. ZĪLE, Lubova. *Baltic-Russian Cooperation During the Restoration of Independence (1990 until 1991 putch)* in *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, edited by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis. Riga, Academy of Science of Latvia. 1998. pp. 489-501, pp. 490-491

<sup>117</sup> Lithuania was threatened by Poland and Germany because both countries had territorial claims to Lithuania – the Vilnius territory questions were unsettled between Poland and Lithuania, Germany had interest in the Klaipėda (Memel) territory, which was occupied by Lithuania. RAUCH, 1995, p. 62

not play an important role any more. For example, the situation in 1939 when the SU demanded the Baltic states to agree with the establishment of the Soviet military bases in their territories.<sup>118</sup>

The second aspect which is characteristic of the PIAP of Russia is the level of external interest. In most of the cases the interest of other great powers has been high or rather high. The Russian interest to increase its positions in the subregion has not been reacted to so negatively if other powers have also been represented. In these cases Russia has been seen as one of the powers to use for diminishing the influence of other ones. It is the case of the SU-Lithuanian Non-Aggression Treaty and also the case of Litvinov's protocol in 1929.<sup>119</sup> In the case of the Soviet Non-Aggression Treaties with Estonia and Latvia in 1932 the external interest was slightly lower but the situation in the world politics was going to be more insecure and the acceptance of the Estonian and Latvian governments can be seen as securing steps towards the SU itself.<sup>120</sup> With this aspect it is important to notice that Russia has had more success in the subregion if the Baltic states have viewed the Russian policies as one among the others and have let the door open for the other options too.

The third aspect which has influenced the capability of the PIAP of Russia is the combined factors: earlier relations, the internal stability of the subregion and the level of external influence. The situation where the earlier relations between Russia and the Baltic states could be described as positive or rather positive ones and where thanks to the policy of Russia the internal stability has increased, usually results in the capable policy. For example, the case of autonomy for the Baltics in 1917, where the decision of the Russian government supported the local processes by stabilising the internal situation and it gave mutual benefit to the Russian government as the Baltic nations

---

<sup>118</sup> Formally talks were held in Moscow to sign the treaty but informally the alliance was created in the way of ultimatum: the Baltics could join voluntarily and without violence or with violence. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 146-155

<sup>119</sup> In 1928 the Kellogg's pact was signed, which was meant to establish a new security system in the world. The SU was interested in securing its borders and in balancing the influence of other powers in the border areas. The SU called the countries to sign the treaty, which starts the Kellogg's pact before all the participants ratified it – the pact got a positive response and it is named in honour of the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov. TARULIS, 1959, p. 77

<sup>120</sup> It is especially about prolonging these treaties and the treaty with Lithuania in 1934/35 because the threats at the beginning of the 1930s were developing more and more rapidly to insecurity in the middle of the 1930s.

supported Russia in the war against Germany.<sup>121</sup> A similar case is the Russian FSSR support to the Baltics in the re-independence process in 1990-1991. The Russian support diminished the harm which could have been caused by the Soviet powers<sup>122</sup> creating that way more stability in the Baltic Republics. An opposite situation where the earlier negative or opposing relations have given capable results needs to be combined with the situation where external powers have left the subregion and give Russia free hands to fulfil Russian interests. Here a suitable example is the Treaty of establishing the Soviet Bases in the Baltic states. The last external power, Germany, gave Russia free hands and despite the earlier negative relations the SU had a capable policy to create the bases to the Baltic countries.<sup>123</sup>

Fourth, I will analyse the incapable cases of the PIAP of Russia. The first aspect which determines the incapability of the PIAP of Russia is inversely proportional to the capability criterion of the response of the subregional states. The negative or rather negative responses of the Baltic states have diminished the capability of PIAP applied or offered by Russia. The Russian offers of alliance activities which are not approved by the Baltic states usually fail. It is the case of the Neutrality agreement in 1923. The Russian policy failed because of the low interest of the Baltic governments and apathy to be the SU allies.<sup>124</sup> A similar situation was in 1935 when the SU was interested in concluding the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Baltic states. Although the situation was in favour of the SU the Baltic states decided to decline and the alliance plan was “delayed” to the future.<sup>125</sup> The Russian offer of alliance relations has also occurred in a more hostile situation as the earlier cases were, in a situation

---

<sup>121</sup> The policy had influence only on Estonia and Latvia because Germans had occupied Lithuania and half of Latvia since 1915.

<sup>122</sup> Yeltsin called up the Russian soldiers not to fight against the Baltics and the *de facto* recognition shows that Russia gives up its imperialistic policy.

<sup>123</sup> GARLEFF, 2001, p. 162

<sup>124</sup> The SU needed a free access to Europe and in 1923 the main interest of the SU was turbulent Germany. The Baltic states located on the closest way to Germany and therefore Russia asked the Baltic states to keep neutrality in Russian-German relations and offered the guarantee of integrity and sovereignty. At the same time Russia was interested in the possibility to use the Latvian territory for the transit of troops to Germany to support the revolution, which was brought out there. The Baltic governments were not interested in the offer, which could make them the Soviet allies and gave a negative response to the plan. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 70-71

<sup>125</sup> In 1926 the SU concluded the Non-Aggression Treaty with Lithuania and in 1932 with Estonia and Latvia. The treaty was prolonged till 1945. The unstable foreign policy position of the Baltic states between the SU and Germany made the governments more amicable to the SU. The Baltic governments calculated different strategies and finally decided to decline the offer not to get the allies of the SU and be hostile to Germany. There was also a foreign pressure (Germany, Great Britain, Poland) to stay out of the treaty. TARULIS, 1959, p. 91

which the Baltic states could not have even expected. For example, “[t]he Baltic states were surprised when during the meeting of the US and Russian heads of state in Helsinki on March 23-24, 1997, Yeltsin announced that Russia would guarantee the security of the Baltic countries and find the good will to maintain positive relations with them.”<sup>126</sup> The offer got a polite but very confident collective refusal of the Baltic governments and the goal of Russia to maintain the Baltic states under the sphere of its influence failed.<sup>127</sup> All these cases show that the failure of the Russian PIAP is caused by the low interdependency between the states and that Russia has not had any proper instrument to involve the Baltic countries in the alliance relations. The later analysis shows that a real danger to the Baltic governments is a capable instrument to get a positive response from them.

The second reason of the incapability of the PIAP of Russia is caused by the position of Russia in the world politics. The Russian alliance policy has been incapable in the cases where Russia has a weak or moderate position in the world politics, which makes it more dependent on other powers and Russia needs to apply a moderate policy of balance. A suitable example of such a situation is the Brest-Litovski Treaty in 1918. Russia was weakened by an internal conflict and WW I, which put it in a weak position in the peace negotiations but gave the Baltic states favourable results.<sup>128</sup> Similar cases are also the offers of guarantees in 1923 and 1997. In both cases the position of Russia in the world politics was rather moderate, in 1923 even weaker than in 1997. Neither Russian offers attracted the Baltic governments nor did the refusal mean any certain threat to them, which could force them to think about a possibility to have amicable relations with Russia. The Russian toothless offers remained without an expected response due the earlier relations, which is the next reason of the incapability of the PIAP of Russia.

---

<sup>126</sup> ČIUGČDA, <http://www.lfpr.lt/994/8.doc> (13.12.2003)

<sup>127</sup> The offer was made in the hope that with the acceptance the Baltic states stay out of the NATO sphere of interests and Russia could maintain and increase its position in the Baltic subregion in the political and military way. The refusal of the Baltic states showed that the policy was made without calculations and based on the hope of fortune because the earlier relations between Russia and the Baltic states were not very amicable to establish a security framework, which was based on the supremacy of Russia. Instead of the acceptance the Baltic governments showed their independence and in several months concluded the Baltic Charter with the US (16.01.1998). MEDVEDEV, 1998, pp. 245-246.

<sup>128</sup> Russia was interested in retreating from the Baltic territories in favour of Germany to initiate antagonism between the Germans and the Baltic nations and to come back as liberators. The hopes of weak Russia did not come true and the later attack to the Baltic territories found a serious counterattack in the form of Independence war in 1918-1920. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 16-17

The third aspect is the character of the earlier relations between Russia and the Baltic states. It is possible to state that the earlier negative or opposing relations also cause the incapable result of PIAP. The cases of guarantees in 1923 and 1997 both prove the statement, especially the case of 1997, where the hostile situation was extremely high.<sup>129</sup> The opposing relations caused a negative response of the Baltic governments to the Russian efforts to be involved in the Baltic affairs. Given that Russia had a rather weak or a moderate position in the world politics in these cases, the capability was strongly up to the decision of the Baltic states. Slightly different factors influence in the case where the earlier relations are rather positive but the result of PIAP is incapable. An additional factor in these cases is the external power, which does not let Russia to exercise the advantages it has. For example, the case of the Treaty of Mutual-Assistance in 1935, where Latvia was interested in having a similar treaty as the SU had with France and Czechoslovakia and the Latvian interest was declined by the intervention of other states (Germany, Great Britain, Poland and Estonia).<sup>130</sup> In general, the opposing earlier relations could cause the incapability of the PIAP of Russia but in some cases the external intervention could diminish the meaning of the earlier positive relations and make the policy still incapable.

To conclude the analysis of the PIAP of Russia it is possible to present the following tendencies. Russian policies are more capable in the cases where the Baltic governments respond to them positively and otherwise PIAP is incapable if the Baltic states are not in favour of them. The strong external interest into the subregion also gives rather capable results but not in the cases of earlier negative relations, which cause the incapability of the policy. The position of Russia in the world politics has also played an important role in the capability of PIAP: the lower the position, the more capable the policy.

---

<sup>129</sup> The Russian policy of the old empire: the concept of Near abroad, unwillingness to conclude the border treaties, Russian minorities issues and the strong denial of Baltics' right to join to NATO, which was concluded in the "Russia's Long-Term Course towards the Baltic Countries", published in February of 1997 (MEDVEDEV, 1998, p. 244) and in July of the same year Russia gave its security guaranties.

<sup>130</sup> STRANGA, Aivars. "Russian and Polish Policies in the Baltic States from 1933 to 1935" in *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, edited by Dr. Tālvass Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia : Riga, 1998, pp.420-441, p. 426

### **2.3. Recognition policy**

According to the case studies the Recognition Policy as a Political Instrument (PIRP) has ambiguous capability. In the case study of the US-Central America PIRP in general has been a rather capable policy. In the case study of Russia-the Baltic PIRP has been relatively more capable than in the case study of the US-Central America. Eight cases are analysed in this part of the chapter.<sup>131</sup>

First, I will analyse the US PIRP towards Central America. The cases based on different background situations and the ability to implement the policy has given different results. I consider the Introducing of the Non-recognition principle in 1907 the capable case. The particular principle was used several times during the period until the 1930s but I decided to generalise the individual cases and analyse only the principle, which the policy was based on. The idea of the Non-recognition policy was to maintain the political *status quo* in Central America with the purpose to conserve the advantageous political-economical relations with the Central American governments.<sup>132</sup> In 1907 at the Washington Conference, this was held with the purpose to resolve the conflict between the Central American states, all the parts agreed not to shelter revolutionary movements against each other and not to recognise the revolutionary governments until they are not approved in the democratic elections.<sup>133</sup> The US government was involved in the agreement as the supervisor and guarantee, getting the possibility to intervene into the internal affairs of the Central American states. The particular policy proved its capability until the Central American governments did not agree to prolong the agreement anymore.<sup>134</sup> It is possible to consider the policy capable because it brought more stability to the unstable region as well as gave the US government a possibility to interfere with the internal affairs of those states without a negative response from the Central American governments. The abovementioned policy also gave a good institutionalised framework for the economical, political and military intervention during the period.<sup>135</sup> The capability of the politics based on the vacuum of power – at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>131</sup> See Appendix 3

<sup>132</sup> YANCHUK, 1982, p. 162

<sup>133</sup> BEMIS, 1943, p. 161

<sup>134</sup> KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 84

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.



century Great Britain withdrew its influence from Central America<sup>136</sup> and Germany had not yet started to enter the Central American affairs<sup>137</sup>. The struggle between the US and Great Britain made the US policy more pleasing to the Central American governments, obtaining the status of a liberator of the colonialism that gave a positive attitude towards the US policy in the subregion.

There are several incapable cases of PIRP and in the following part I will give a general analysis of the incapability of PIRP. During the periods when the US was relatively weak comparing the other great powers in Central America, the recognition policy was not capable. For example, at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the recognition of independence of Central America “*was the greatest assistance rendered by any foreign powers to the independence*”<sup>138</sup> of the subregion and the Central American government<sup>139</sup> was obliged to the US government, applying the most favoured policy to Northern Americans. Nevertheless, the policy was not considered as the capable one because of the fact that instead of a weak colonial power (Spain) came a much powerful one (Great Britain), interfering in the process of establishing dependency for almost a hundred years. Without Great Britain’s interference this process could have been much more successful. The weakness of the US policy was caused by its weak position in the world politics and the strongly interested second great power.

However, the incapability of PIRP could also be caused by the improper policy, which results in the weak internal situation of the great power, as it is the case of Walker government.<sup>140</sup> The recognition of the invader government could be classified as a mistake made by the young and verdant political system, which is interesting

---

<sup>136</sup> KUBYSHKIN, 1994, pp. 190-192

<sup>137</sup> Germany demonstrated its interests in Central America already in the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century but WW I cancelled its plans and the second wave appeared only in the 1930s.

<sup>138</sup> BEMIS, 1943, p. 47

<sup>139</sup> Central America got independence from the Mexican Empire on the 24-th of August 1824, constituting the Central American Confederation, which split up to 5 states (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and San Salvador) a decade later.

<sup>140</sup> In the middle of the 1850s the filibuster W. Walker interfered in the civil war of Nicaragua, taking under his control all the territory of Nicaragua and aiming to unite all the Central American states. The US government did not agree to recognise the government held by Walker but after the strong internal pressure by the Southern States of the US the recognition was given, which turned the Central American governments into war with the American citizens. Antonio José de Irisarri, Guatemalan and Salvadoran Minister to the United States, to W. L. Marcy, secretary of State of the United States, New York, May 19, 1856. MANNING, 1934. pp. 529-533.

achieve short-run benefits from the political action. The limited experience and strong internal struggle caused a situation, which attracted additional great powers to the subregion and made the subregional governments their loyal allies.<sup>141</sup>

To conclude about the US PIRP, it is possible to state that PIRP has been capable in a situation where the subregion is outside of the interests of other great powers because the lack of other interested parts institutionalises the recognition or non-recognition of the great power, leaving the subregional states without an alternative solution and a possibility to appeal. Other very important aspects are the integrity and stability of the internal political system and the position in the world politics.

Third, I will take under consideration the Russian<sup>142</sup> PIRP. The capable cases of PIRP are caused by the common past and very strong interdependency, although it could have a different direction. The first example, which is based on the friendly direction, is characterised by the situation where the great power uses the subregion states to achieve the position of the great power – the common interest through the common enemy. “*The new Russia and its leadership accepted the declarations of sovereignty of the Baltic States as a continuation of the policies of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who had supported Baltic independence claims.*”<sup>143</sup> It brought a broad acceptance among the Baltic governments and gained positive ground for the continuity of the existing interdependency despite the collapse of the previous system.

The second example of the capable PIRP is based on the hostile direction, which is characterised by the imperialistic ambitions of the former empire. It is the case of the former border treaties<sup>144</sup> that are not recognised by the Russian government, having

---

<sup>141</sup> Mirabeau B. Lamar, United States Minister Resident to Nicaragua and Costa Rica, to Lewis Cass, Secretary of State of the United States, Managua Nicaragua, May 28, 1858. Ibid, pp. 676-678

<sup>142</sup> In the case of Russia it is important to emphasise that during the period of the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia played an ambiguous role in the Baltic level: the SU (Gorbachov) and the Russian SSFR (Yeltsin). The two approaches united after the collapse but during the turbulent period in 1990-1991 the policies were different.

<sup>143</sup> KAUPPILA, Laura. *The Baltic Puzzle - Russia's Policy towards Estonia and Latvia 1992 – 1997*, Electronic Publications @ University of Helsinki  
<http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003)

<sup>144</sup> I consider the former border treaties the ones, which were made in 1920 to finish the Baltic Independence war (1918-1920).

the possible threat to get territorial requirements from Estonia and Latvia.<sup>145</sup> The response of the Baltic states was very negative but the Russian government had the leading position in that question, making the Estonian and Latvian governments more indulgent to the Russian policy.<sup>146</sup> The subregional states were too strongly dependent on the great power in that question, thus the negative response did not have any influence on the great power – the only result was the declining relations between the countries. In the point of view of Russia, the policy was capable because the government reached the desired result – maintaining the territories and dictating the negotiations of the border treaties according to its own willingness.<sup>147</sup>

Fourth, the incapability of PIRP in the Russian-Baltic relations. The cases are characterised by the weak and declining position of Russia in the world politics and, on the other hand, a very strong negative response from the Baltic governments. The policy is applied in the situation of increasing instability. The case of the denial of the Baltic re-independence process in 1990-1991 by the SU is considered as the most incapable example of Russian PIRP. The policy was pursued in the period of the collapse of the SU and it did not follow any strategy but it is possible to describe it as agony, which made the political steps also rather unexpected and incapable. The incapability of the policy was facilitated strongly by the feelings of independence among the Baltics, which gave the SU government the shape of an enemy.<sup>148</sup> The present policy had an incapable character and its only capable part, was the fact that it retarded the process of the re-independence of the Baltic governments.

---

<sup>145</sup> After achieving re-independence the Estonian government raised the claim to the lost territories (2300 sq km) in Leningrad and Pskov oblast, and Latvia a little later to the territories in Pskov oblast (1600 sq km). BUSYGINA, Irina. "Russia, the Baltic states and the European Union" in *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, ed. by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia, Riga, 1998, pp. 502-518, p. 508.

<sup>146</sup> STRANGA, Aivars. "Baltic Russian Relations: 1995-beginning 1997" in *Small States in a Turbulent environment: The Baltic Perspective*, edited by Atis Lejiņš & Žaneta Ozoliņa, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, 1997, pp. 184-237. p. 200.

<sup>147</sup> In 1994 Yeltsin declared that the border will be marked unilaterally by Russia and the claimed territories would not be relinquished. Council of Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy: Yurgens, I. & Karaganov, A. study groups. „Analiticheskiy Doklad „Rossiya i Pribaltika“, Moscow, 1997, p. 40 (Аналитический Доклад «Россия и Прибалтика» координаторы рабочей группы И. Ю. Юргенс, С. А. Караганов. Совет по внешней и оборонной политике)

<sup>148</sup> In the March 1990 the Lithuanian government declared the independence, Estonian and Latvian governments followed a moderate way with transition period. The final attack was the referendums in the Baltic Republics in 1991, which all more than 2/3-ly declared willingness to leave from the Soviet Union. GARLEFF, 2001, pp. 185-186.

To conclude the analysis of the Russian PIRP, it is possible to notice a tendency that PIRP has been more capable in Russian activities in the cases where the Baltic governments support the Russian policy and Russia has the power in problem solving. The incapability is caused by the declining position of Russia in the world politics and in most cases the negative attitude of the Baltic governments towards the Russian activities.

#### **2.4. Mediation Policy**

The Mediation Policy as a Political Instrument (PIMP) has been the most capable policy in the case study of the US and Central America. The present part does not analyse Russian policies in the Baltic subregion because the cases of PIMP have not been registered in my database and therefore it is possible to state that the policy is not relevant to the case study of Russia and the Baltics. PIMP is a less often used policy in practice and therefore seven cases are analysed in this part of the chapter.<sup>149</sup> The watershed between the capable and incapable cases is very broad.

First, I will analyse the capable cases. The first aspect which characterises the capable PIMP of the US is the dominating position of the US in the subregion and its strong position in the world politics. The case of the Washington conference in 1922-1923 demonstrates the US domination in the subregion in the best way – in Central America there was a very turbulent period because of the US domination and the policy of *divide et impera*.<sup>150</sup> In 1922 the US convened the Washington Conference on Central American Affairs to resolve the conflicts of Central America under the US domination.<sup>151</sup> The conference was successful and the goals of the US were fulfilled, creating a system of stability among the Central American countries for almost a decade.<sup>152</sup> The next case is the mediation of a conflict between the two states: El

---

<sup>149</sup> See Appendix 4

<sup>150</sup> ZUBOK, 1948, p. 372

<sup>151</sup> In 1921 there was a conflict between Costa Rica and Panama, a bit later a conflict arose between Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The US was partly involved in them as a mediator and as a military force. YANCHUK, 1982, pp. 167-168.

<sup>152</sup> The Agreement of Amity and Cooperation (and 12 other treaties), limited the armament of the states of Central America, founded the Court of Arbitration (half of the judges were from the US) – that all gave a good basis for the stability and the US domination in the region. Ibid, pp. 169-171.

Salvador and Honduras.<sup>153</sup> The particular mediation has a very clear goal to the US to end the old conflict and get new allies to fight against the Nicaraguan regime.<sup>154</sup> PIMP was successful because the US reached the goal and did not waste any time and efforts to the questions which were not important to the US. The last case is resolving the internal conflict in Nicaragua in 1927.<sup>155</sup> The American representative did not only mediate the conflict but as a result of the mediation the US got control over the internal politics of Nicaragua.<sup>156</sup> The clever policy of mediation changed the informal control of the US over Nicaragua to an official one. PIMP was capable in all these three cases in the conditions where the US had domination in the subregion and its position in the world politics was a strong one. It also gave the US the right to lead mediation and legitimacy to be involved in the conflicts.

The second aspect which characterises the capable PIMP is the stability. The US mediation policies which increase stability and diminish conflicts are capable ones. A very capable case is the Washington Conference in 1922/3, giving, on the one hand, the US an ability to influence the Central American governments and, on the other hand, creating stability among the subregional states.<sup>157</sup> The US role of a peacemaker in the subregion strengthened its position as a supervisor and the earlier dominance, which was disturbed by frequent conflicts and turbulence in the subregion, was facilitated by a stable system of conflict management. The case of the internal conflict of Nicaragua in 1927 shows that the US mediation policy was more capable than its

---

<sup>153</sup> In 1969 there was warfare between El Salvador and Honduras but the conflict was not ended with a peace treaty. On 9<sup>th</sup> December 1980 the countries concluded a peace treaty under the US leadership to be allies in the following conflict with Nicaragua. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 71-72.

<sup>154</sup> The only result of the mediation was a peace treaty and even the border question was delayed in the future. It shows that the only goal was to get allies who had normalised relations. DITRICH, 1992, p. 53

<sup>155</sup> The internal conflict in the middle of the 1920s lasted too long and President Diaz favoured by the US was losing his positions. In 1927 Colonel Henry L. Stimson was sent to Nicaragua to mediate the conflict and establish order. He started negotiations between the two opposing parties and the Tipitapi agreement was concluded. YANCHUK, 1982, p. 300.

<sup>156</sup> In 1927 a new election law was adopted in Nicaragua, which gave the US representative an important role to validate the results of elections. "*The elections of 1928 were to take place under supervision and policing of United States forces and authority.*" BEMIS, 1943, p. 213.

<sup>157</sup> Institutions were created which helped to resolve conflicts in a peaceful way and an important aspect is also that the Central American governments agreed to decrease their troops and concluded an agreement about the maximum amount of troops. The countries also agreed that they would not recognise the governments who got in power in an undemocratic way before the new government got a democratic approval from the nation. YANCHUK, 1982, pp. 169-171.

policy of military intervention.<sup>158</sup> PIMP is capable because a non-aggressive way of conflict management makes the different parties more acceptable to the involvement of the US in the conflict and the US has a possibility to lead the peace process according to the interest of its political agenda. An important aspect in the process is that the results of mediation are successful and therefore both parties accept the policy presented by the US.

The third factor which causes the capability of the PIMP of the US is earlier relations. Positive earlier relations between the US and the Central American states make the will of the US to mediate a conflict more acceptable to the conflict sides. The case of the Washington Conference is a very good example of good earlier relations because the US had a dominating position in the subregion and the states were interested in having good relations with the US sacrificing sometimes the relations between each other.<sup>159</sup> In that environment the invitation to the Peace conference was accepted by the states of Central America because they all saw the US as a neutral party in the complex of the conflicts in the subregion. The position gave the American government a favourable situation to make the Central American states more dependent on the US. An even more obvious case of dependency is the peace mediation between El Salvador and Honduras in 1980. The mediation of the US was due to the will to organise a coalition in Central America against Nicaragua. The US used the positive relations with the governments of these states to force them to the negotiation table and to conclude a peace treaty in the shape which did not resolve any problems but gave a formal basis to the US to continue the organisation of the coalition. Thus, the mediation of a conflict should not always bring real results but still it could be capable policy for the mediator.

---

<sup>158</sup> The internal conflict in 1925-1926 was ended by the US troops and the candidate Diaz favoured by the US became the president of Nicaragua. Stability was not created because of the political forces, which did not accept the US occupation in Nicaragua and the US friendly president. In 1927 the US mediator Stimson succeeded in making an agreement with the two parties and in maintaining the right for the US to intervene in the policy of Nicaragua. The opposition of the US continued to fight only on a smaller scale. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

<sup>159</sup> In 1921 the border conflict between Costa Rica and Panama ended with the occupation of the Panamanian territories by Costa Rica. The role of the US was to mediate the conflict but the US gave the green light to Costa Rica gained lot of the US support. The position of the US made the states find the support of the US. ZUBOK, 1948, p. 266.

Second, opposite to the capable cases, incapable cases are characterised by negative earlier relations. The states perceive the will of the US to mediate a conflict in the context of negative earlier relations as an intervention in their internal affairs. It is extreme in the cases where the US has positive relations with one party and rather negative ones with the other party. The case of the mediation of the border conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in the 1850s shows that the will of the US to mediate the conflict was partial and therefore it was not easy to get the trust of one side.<sup>160</sup> The strong partiality and therefore the failure of the policy are also presented in the case of the regionalisation of the Central American conflict at the beginning of the 1980s.<sup>161</sup> The conflict was spreading almost over the whole subregion and the mediation did not work because the US did not recognise one party of the conflict.<sup>162</sup> The incapability of the policy was caused by distrust towards the US and the US partiality, which resulted in an interest conflict, which, in its turn, escalated aggression.

The second factor which causes the incapability of the PIMP of the US is a negative response of the subregional countries. The next logical step after the negative earlier relations is a negative response to the US offer to mediate a conflict because the arisen distrust makes the US attempts incapable to resolve the conflict. The case of the Nicaraguan Costa Rican border conflict in the 1850s is the best example of the following negative response to the earlier relations.<sup>163</sup> In that situation impartial

---

<sup>160</sup> The US demanded Costa Rica to accept the peace plan offered by the US and Great Britain because otherwise the Treaty of the Nicaraguan canal was going to fail. Costa Rica was not interested in accepting the offer because it was an ally of Great Britain but Nicaragua was an ally of the US and therefore Costa Rica was afraid that the mediation of the US was not objective – Costa Rica accepted the mediation when the US and Great Britain joined in their demands. Daniel Webster, Secretary of State of the United States, to Robert M. Walsh, Special Agent of the United States to Costa Rica, Washington, April 29, 1852. MANNING, 1934, pp. 14-17.

<sup>161</sup> In 1981 Panama presented a plan of the localisation of the conflict, which totally denied the role of the US in the subregion focusing on the Central American states only. The US did not support the initiative and made all that it could to participate in the conflict management. The Panamanian president, who supported the plan, was killed in a plane accident and the Panamanian plan was changed with the US one, which due to the partiality did not have effort and the conflict lasted until the end of the 1980s. DITRICH, 1992, p. 56.

<sup>162</sup> OBOROTOVA, 1989, p. 52

<sup>163</sup> Costa Rica answered to the US demands that these were unacceptable to a sovereign state and that the conflict mediation should be supported by both superpowers (the US and Great Britain). Instead of the acceptance of the US demands Costa Rica demanded compensation for the exclusion from the Treaty of the Nicaragua Canal, which gave a basis for the US to demand compensation for the damage caused by the Costa Rican attack to Nicaragua. Felipe Molina, Costa Rican Minister to the United States, to Daniel Webster, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, April 9, 1852.

mediation was not possible anymore and the conflict management was out of the control of the US. The loss of control over the situation is also in the case of the mediation of the Nicaraguan conflict at the beginning of the 1980s. The US strong interest in pushing the Nicaraguan socialist government to renounce the power caused strong hostility from the Nicaraguan side and instead of getting control over the conflict and regionalising it, the conflict globalised.<sup>164</sup> The attempts to manage a conflict in hostile environment are incapable because of the distrust, which causes a negative response to the mediation attempts and therefore the great power will lose control over the situation.

The third aspect which makes the PIMP of the US incapable is the instability caused by the mediation policy. As stabilising efforts increase the legitimacy of the US to be involved in a conflict, then the destabilising activity of the US causes a negative response and therefore it decreases the legitimacy to be involved. The US unwillingness to negotiate the claims raised against its interest characterise the case of the Treaty of the Nicaraguan Canal in 1914. It destroyed the subregional arbitration system, which was created by the US a decade earlier.<sup>165</sup> The unstable environment, which arose after the collapse of the system, diminished the US ability to control the situation and due to the instability in 1922/3 a new system of stability was created.<sup>166</sup> The destabilising factor is also characteristic of the case of the Nicaraguan crisis in the 1980s. The US negative policy towards Nicaragua caused aggression among the nation of Central America and escalated the conflict instead of resolving it.<sup>167</sup> The destabilising factor causes a situation where the great power is very actively involved in the conflict and therefore it does not have any control over solving the situation due

---

MANNING, 1934. p. 269; William L. Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States, to Luis Molina, Costa Rican Chargé d' Affaires at Washington, Washington, May 2, 1855. Ibid, pp. 84-85.

<sup>164</sup> Nicaragua used the right to ask mediation from the global level (UN), additionally in 1982 the other Latin American states were involved through the Managua Conference and also the Soviet block was involved in the conflict through Cuba. DITRICH, 1992, pp. 59-66.

<sup>165</sup> In 1907 the Central American states founded the Highest Arbitration Court of Central America on the initiative of the US. The Treaty of the Nicaraguan Canal harmed the interests of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. They raised a claim against the US and Nicaragua in the Arbitration Court in 1916 but both allies declined the decision of the Court and they were not willing to resolve the conflict because the interests of the US would be harmed. In 1917 El Salvador declined to prolong the Treaty of 1907 and the created system of stabilisation in Central America fell apart. YANCHUK, 1982, pp. 162-163.

<sup>166</sup> See above the Washington Conference in 1922/3.

<sup>167</sup> The US organised a block against Nicaragua in Central America influencing the states not to agree with the mediation, which was not approved by the US, and to initiate a conflict between them and Nicaragua. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 98-100.



to its partiality. Therefore the cases of PIPM which cause subregional instability are incapable ones.

To conclude the current part I would like to present the main tendencies of the capability of the PIMP of the US. It is more capable in the cases where the earlier relations between the US and Central America have been rather positive ones and therefore the mediation of the US is accepted. An opposite situation which is supplemented by a negative response of a subregional state results in the failure of the policy and makes the PIMP incapable. The second important factor is stability – the policy which entails subregional stability is a capable one and otherwise it causes the incapability of PIMP.

### ***2.5. Threatening policy***

The Threatening Policy as a Political Instrument (PITP) has been the most capable policy in the case study of Russia and the Baltics. The present part does not analyse the policy of the US in Central America because the cases of PITP have been rare to make any general conclusions. PITP is a less often used policy in practice and therefore eight cases are analysed in this part of the chapter.<sup>168</sup> There is a very big difference between the two groups, which means that PITP has been either very capable or very incapable.

First, there are two aspects which support the capable use of the PITP by Russia: domination in the subregion and negative earlier relations. First, the PITP of Russia in the Baltic subregion has been capable in a situation where Russia has been the only great power in the subregion having a strong position in the world politics. The cases are from the second half of the 1930s and culminate with the annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. The most capable cases are the following: threatening before and during the process of concluding the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1939 and threatening diplomacy before presenting the ultimatums to the three Baltic states in 1940. In both cases a complex of military and political threats was used to make the

---

<sup>168</sup> See Appendix 5

Baltic governments accept the demands of the SU.<sup>169</sup> Due to the lack of alternatives and a big difference in the forces the Baltic governments accepted the Soviet demands and gave a basis to bigger control over their territories. In the second half of the 1930s the Russian PITP was less capable to compare it with the previous cases but still it is counted as a capable one. The policy was influenced by the interest of other powers in the subregion, for example Germany. The threatening presented to the Baltics had the goal of putting the Baltic countries to think that they cannot forget the Soviet existence in their foreign policy and they should take it as a dominant factor.<sup>170</sup> This deterrence did not take any concrete shape but it had a preparing character, which changed to reality in 1939-1940.

The second aspect is not only characteristic of the capable PITP but also of the incapable one. Usually PITP is applied by a great power in the context of negative or rather negative earlier relations with the subregional states because threatening has the goal of drawing attention to great power's power and bringing back or maintaining the states to be under its influence. It has been so in the capable cases like in 1939 and also in the incapable case in 1996. In 1939 the Baltic governments perceived the threat from the SU and from Germany and therefore the relations were not very good ones.<sup>171</sup> The goal of the SU was to put the Baltic governments to obey the Soviet demands and thanks to the other factors in 1939 the Soviet policy was capable. A negative example is the threatening of Estonia by Russian politicians in 1996.<sup>172</sup> The

---

<sup>169</sup> In June 1939 *Pravda* wrote that the Baltic countries were not able to maintain their sovereignty and they had to hope for to the assistance of the SU. In September when making the offer to Estonia to conclude the Treaty of Mutual Assistance the SU informed the Estonian government that for Estonia it would be better to accept the offer or the SU would solve the problem by its own means. In October the SU informed Latvia that they could occupy Latvia but it was better for them to accept the offer of cooperation. Both of the threatening notes were presented in parallel with the movements of the Soviet troops close to the borders. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 151-159; GARLEFF, 2001, p. 162. In 1940 before giving the ultimatums the SU started diplomatic accusing of Lithuania and the threatening, pushing Lithuania to prepare an exile government. At the same time the Soviet troops gathered on the Lithuanian border. TARULIS, 1959, p. 168, p. 174.

<sup>170</sup> 29.11.1936 A. Zhdanov declared on the 8<sup>th</sup> Soviet Congress that the small states should be concerned about the fact that the SU could have a closer look at Europe through them and using the help of the Red Army. It was overstatement, which was quickly subdued by the Soviet Legations in the Baltic states but the continuing Baltic security issues in *Pravda* made the Baltic governments concern and put them to look for the alternatives. GARLEFF, 2001, pp. 154-156

<sup>171</sup> The perceptions of threat inside the Baltic countries were very different during the second half of the 1930s and even in 1939. Lithuania felt the biggest threat from Poland and later from Germany, Latvia perceived threat mostly from Germany but also from the SU, Estonia was mostly concerned about the SU as the main factor of insecurity.

<sup>172</sup> National rhetoric arose among the Russian politicians in the election campaign and the idea of the autonomous Russian Republic of North-East Estonia was presented. The leader of communists, G

threats were presented in a situation when Estonia had decided to move to the West and started to execute an emancipated policy towards Russia. The threats were taken into consideration but after the calculation of the possible scenarios Estonia decided to continue the chosen way.

Fourth, the incapability of PITP. A strongly linked aspect causing the incapable policy is a negative response of the subregional states to the great power's threatening policy. The last presented case of the year 1996 shows that the negative response of Estonia, which is possible to be classified as non-subjection to manipulation, made the Russian policy toothless and it showed that the statements were only rhetoric but not a real political will.<sup>173</sup> A similar case was in 1923 after the raid of the Estonian police to the Estonian Communist party.<sup>174</sup> A very negative and cruel Estonian response gave the SU even more reasons to start to threaten Estonia but all of that ended without any results.<sup>175</sup> The threatening policy is often used for bluffing and the acceptance of the threats by the small states often depends on the environment in which the countries are behaving. For the great power it is an instrument that can be used to remind its existence and the state will take it into account or not. A negative response to threatening makes the policy incapable if the great power is not ready to realise the threats.

The next aspect which influences the PITP of Russia in an incapable way is an external power. The Russian threatening policy is less capable in the cases where also some other powers are represented in the subregion. It is the case of the warning of the border states against cooperation in 1921.<sup>176</sup> The hostile declaration turned the Baltic states to find another option and to create security through the cooperation of

---

Zyuganov was threatening Estonia with a referendum to separate Narva region from Estonia. All these statements were meant to put Estonia to obey the Russian will. VERSHININ, 1998, p.525.

<sup>173</sup> STRANGA, 1997, p. 204

<sup>174</sup> The raid proved a close relation between the Communist party and the Soviet Legation, which was presented officially also by the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs. It caused a strong protest of the SU. TARULIS, 1959, p. 71

<sup>175</sup> There was a big process of Estonian communists and 149 people were under arrest, 89 of them were put into jail and one of them executed. It evoked a big disaffection in Leningrad and Estonia was threatened with the incorporation into the SU. The ambassador of the SU left Tallinn and Estonia was put under diplomatic pressure. Due to the weakness of the SU and the firmness of Estonia the policy did not bring any efforts. RAUCH, 1995, p. 59.

<sup>176</sup> The Baltic states were warned by the Soviet Congress that co-operation plans were taken as an unfriendly action towards Russia. The goal of Russia was that all the border states stayed separate and the smaller ones were not cooperating with the bigger one. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 64-65

the border states involving Poland deeper in the Baltic affairs that way.<sup>177</sup> Due to the weakness of Russia it could not oppose the Polish involvement and the earlier policy stayed without any real action. A similar case is the Russian Security Doctrine in 2000. According to the doctrine all kinds of means should be used for the defence of the Russian citizens abroad, which was also taken as a threat that the Russian empire is resurrecting by the Baltic governments.<sup>178</sup> Instead of taking into account the warning statement from Russia and trying to obey the Russian dictation on the minority politics the Baltic states called for a positive decision on NATO further enlargement with the other candidates of NATO.<sup>179</sup> The incapability of the Russian PITP was shown in a very obvious way because of the existence of the interest of the external power in the Baltic subregion. The PITP of Russia has been incapable in the cases where the Baltic states have an alternative to be protected from a potential threat.

To conclude the part, I will bring out the tendencies of PITP. Russia has used PITP in the cases where the relations between Russia and the Baltic states have been negative. The capability of PITP depends on the existence of an external power in the subregion: the PITP of Russia is more capable if Russia has a dominating position and the other powers do not have interest in the subregion. In case of another great power the Russian PITP proves incapable; an additional factor which influences in an incapable way is a negative response from the subregional states to threatening.

\*\*\*\*

To conclude the chapter I will bring out the main tendencies characteristic of the capability of the Political Instruments (See Figure 1).<sup>180</sup> To generalise the factors which have made the Political Instruments of the US capable ones it is possible to present the following tendencies. The Political Instruments have been more capable in a situation where the US position has been dominating in the subregion and the

---

<sup>177</sup> Due to the Vilnius conflict Lithuania did not participate in the cooperation but on 17.03.1922 Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Poland concluded the Warszawa Treaty, which was taken as a Military Alliance by Russia. Ibid.


<sup>178</sup> GARLEFF, 2001, p. 205

<sup>179</sup> SMITH, M. A. "Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad", December 2000, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Conflict Studies Research Centre <http://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/documents/pdfs/F71-mas.pdf> (13.12.2003)

<sup>180</sup> In the general analysis a few cases of the Propaganda Policy are presented but in the present chapter I did not analyse the tendencies because the few cases are not enough to make any certain conclusions.

external powers have not been involved or have only indirectly been involved in the subregional affairs. It diminishes the ability to find alternatives for the subregional states and they have to obey the policy offered by the US. An important aspect is also the stability of the subregion. The policies of the US have been more capable if they result in the stability because it gives the US activities more legitimacy. The third important aspect is the positive earlier relations between the US and the governments of Central America because in case of the positive earlier relations the policies are easily adopted and therefore capable. The incapability of the Political Instruments is caused by the external interest and a negative response to the US policies. In this situation the subregional states have alternatives to the policy offered by the US and therefore a decision not supported by a Central American state diminishes the capability of the US policy.

**Figure 1. Average Capability of Political Instruments.**



To generalise the factors which have made the Russian Political Instruments capable ones it is possible to present the following tendencies. They have been more capable

in a situation where Russia has had a positive response from the Baltics and therefore Russia has not had a big chance to influence the Baltics without their acceptance. The Baltic states ability to make independent responses to Russian policies has importance on condition that Russia does not have a dominating position in the subregion or Russia has a weak position and a very high external interest presented. The Baltic response does not matter in the cases characterised by the dominance of Russia in the subregion. The incapability of the Russian Political instruments is caused by a negative response of the Baltic governments and the existing external interest in the subregion. Usually in the cases of the external powers in the subregion the Baltic governments have decided to respond to the Russian policies negatively. An important factor is also an earlier negative experience with Russia, which has caused distrust and therefore the Russian policies have not been capable ones.

### **Chapter 3: Economic Instruments (EI)**

The present chapter analyses the capability of the Economic Instruments in the process of establishing dependency in the case studies the US-the Central American states and Russia-the Baltic states. The economic instruments used by the great powers include the following policies: Intervention Policy and Alliance Policy.

#### ***3.1. Intervention Policy***

Intervention Policy as an Economic Instrument (EIIP) has a different capability in two case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America EIIP has been an incapable policy and the difference between the policies is clearer and the extent of scale of measures of capability is rather wide. In the case study of Russia-Baltics EIIP has been a capable policy and the difference between the cases is not so clear and the extent of scale of measures of capability is smaller. Twenty-six cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>181</sup>

First, I will analyse the US EIIP towards the Central American states. The first aspect which is characteristic of capable cases is the framework of good relations. Earlier positive relations and the positive response based on them gave the US possibility to increase its ability of control over the subregion. For example, the Bryan-Chomorro Treaty in 1916 was the second step in the process of establishing economic control over Nicaragua.<sup>182</sup> It was based on the positive earlier relations, which gave the US possibility to move on and get the positive response from the Nicaraguan government. Using such policy the US gained an advantage over leading the Nicaraguan economy and through it the Nicaraguan policy too. The other cases of the patron-client relations are Panamanian obedience in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>183</sup> and the Charta of Punta

---

<sup>181</sup> See Appendix 6

<sup>182</sup> In 1911 the US gave to Nicaragua loans to take over the Nicaraguan foreign debt to Great Britain and reorganized the Nicaraguan National Banks and the Americans bankers got the control over the Nicaraguan custom institutions. Although the US Senate did not ratify the treaties it was the first step for the economic control over Nicaragua. BEMIS, 1942, pp. 160-163. In 1916 the Bryan-Chomorro Treaty established the supervision of Nicaraguan finances by the US. The new debt was given to Nicaragua, liquidation of foreign debt to other countries, control over the Nicaraguan budget. The US approved this agreement and that way it got enormous control over Nicaragua. YANCHUK, 1982, pp. 255-256.

<sup>183</sup> Panamanian government was heavily dependent on the economic and military aid from the US after WW II and therefore Panama was extremely anticommunist to obey the guidelines from the US. In

del Este in 1961<sup>184</sup>. These cases show that the economic dependency between the US and the Central American states were built up on the good earlier relations and partnership, which made the governments obedient to the US demands.

The second factor which determines the capability of EIIP is the stability. The US EIIP has been more capable in the cases where the situation has been rather stable and the US involvement has influenced positively on the stability. In the case of the Bryan-Chomorro Treaty the earlier step of the US government was increasing the stability and the Treaty based already on the stable base, increasing the stability of Nicaragua even more. This situation enabled the US government to get the control over Nicaragua, which had been a key country in Central America. The second case is a little bit different from the Bryan-Chomorro Treaty. The build-up of San Salvador after the civil war of the 1980s did not make a stable base to the US economic activity in the 1990s but the direction chosen by the Salvadorian government gave this opportunity.<sup>185</sup> The established stability facilitates the execution of control over the San Salvador and keeps it through the economic instruments under the US political control even today.

Second, I will analyse the factors which describe the incapability of the EIIP of the US. The first of them is the stability of the subregion. The unstable environment of policy execution or the policy, which causes the instability, defines the incapability of the EIIP of the US. The economic expansion of the great power in a subregion can create the turbulence in the ownership issues. It is the case of the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century where the American enterprises came into the Central American market and

---

1953 the Panamanian government prohibited the communist movement in Panama. MARTZ, John D. "Central America: the Crises and the Challenge", University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1959, pp. 280-281.

<sup>184</sup> It was a programme of foreign debts, which were given out by the US and therefore the use of those debts was also controlled by the US. It gave the economic control over the activities of the Central American governments. SELEZNOV, Georgy Konstantinovich. " "Doktrin Johnsona" – ugroza Latinskoy Ameriki", Znanie, Moscow, 1967, pp. 13-16 (Селезнев, Георги Константинович. ««Доктрина Джонсона» – угроза Латинской Америки»).

<sup>185</sup> The Salvadorian government chose the open economy policy and it brought a lot of investments from the US to San Salvador. It helped to build up the Salvadorian economy, to establish stability in the country but, on the other hand, the economic openness increased the dependency of Salvador on the US that today "[d]ollars have gradually replaced colóns, which are no longer printed. In practice the economy has become dollarized, with the colon only used in isolated rural areas." The US State Department: El Salvador <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8975.htm> (09.12.03)



the complex questions of ownership were not easily decided.<sup>186</sup> The American policy, which did not take account the decisions of the local governments, caused only misunderstandings and instability in the subregion and therefore the control over the strategic areas was very uncertain. Similar to the previous case was the situation in Guatemala in 1940s.<sup>187</sup> The economic expansion of the American enterprises caused the action of the local people and it formed the policy of the Guatemalan government.<sup>188</sup> The Economic Instrument used in this case was the cancelling of economic and military aid to Guatemala.<sup>189</sup> The US policy caused the instability in the subregion and the expansionistic policy did not facilitate establishing the control over Guatemala. EIIP had direct political aim at the end of 1970s when the US was interested in supporting the old dictator on power in Nicaragua. After that he was overthrown the US tried to support the non-leftist political parties but after the success of leftwing parties the US aid diminished drastically.<sup>190</sup> Although the goal of the US policy was to cause the instability for changing the Nicaraguan government, the established stability diminished the US ability to have control over Nicaragua.

Next factor, which describes the incapability of the EIIP of the US, is the negative reaction of the Central American governments. The US policy has been incapable in the cases the policy has been not supported by the partners. In the case of the 1850s the protests and Nicaraguan negative policy towards the US were conditioned by the

---

<sup>186</sup> The King of Mosquito Coast gave out the grants without having control over the activity and divided the territories, which should be under Nicaraguan authority, it caused the ownership problems. Finally, Americans decided to take over the strategic areas and open the communication routes between the West and East coasts without asking permission from local governments. Luis Molina, Nicaraguan Chargé de Affaires at Washington, to Lewis Cass, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, October 1, 1859. MANNING, 1934, pp. 770-773

<sup>187</sup> Neither the companies in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century nor the MNC in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were not governmental enterprises but all of them had close links with the US government by what they could be influenced on.

<sup>188</sup> The Guatemala new government executed socialist policy to protect its citizens for the MNCs and a target of this policy was the United Fruit Company (UFCO) in the second half of 1940s. The latter had got the privileges from the former Guatemalan dictator Ubico and the new government wanted to take away these privileges. UFCO turned to US State Department to protect its rights and it caused the years of instability in Guatemala until the socialist government was overthrown. MARTZ, 1959, pp. 47-52

<sup>189</sup> From 1946 to 1954 Guatemala was removed from the aid programmes of the US. ADAMS, Richard N. "Social Change in Guatemala and U.S. Policy" in *Social Change in Latin America Today. It's Implication for United States Policy*, Adams, Richard N., Gillian, John P., Lewis, Oscar, Patch, Richard W., Holmberg,, Allan R., Wagley Charles, Bryson, Lyman, Vintage Books, New York, 1960, pp.-231-284, pp. 236-237.

<sup>190</sup> The US aid to Nicaragua constituted from the total share in 1978 14,9%, in 1979 15,7% and in 1980 37,6%. After the success of Sandinista movement in Nicaragua in 1980/1981 the share fell to 5,3% in 1981 and 1,2% in 1982. Next year it was cancelled. GARI, Jose. "Bilateral Development Assistance to Central America", in *Central America: Crises and Possibilities*, ed. Rigoberto Garcia, Institute of Latin American Studies Monograph nr. 16, Stockholm, 1988, pp. 112-134, p. 119.

activity of American entrepreneurs who pursued their economic benefit. The economic activity caused the negative basis for the further relations and Nicaragua and the other Central American states took the measures to diminish the power of American entrepreneurs.<sup>191</sup> The US attempt to make Honduras financially dependent in 1911 failed because of the negative response from Honduras.<sup>192</sup> Although a decade later a short-term goal to establish the economic dependency was succeeded, the policy was not very capable.<sup>193</sup> Two Honduran cases show that EIIP is incapable in the cases when the subregional states do not agree to obey the policy of great power. The additional instruments should be needed to support EIIP, as it was the case of Panama in 1987-1988.<sup>194</sup> EIIP has proven its incapability in the situation of non-supporting activity of the subregional state.

The third factor, which influences negatively the capability of the EIIP of the US, is the external power. The US policy has been incapable when the external power has had the interest in the subregion. In the case of market struggle in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the presence of British enterprises put the American ones under pressure of the Central American governments because Americans did not have a dictating position of monopolies. Therefore the activities undertaken were incapable. Unlike the previous case the Panamanian sanctions even increased the interests of external

---

<sup>191</sup> Guatemala declined the proposal to establish Steam communication from Ystapa to Panama, Honduras and Nicaragua annulled the treaties with American companies and the taxes were increased for the American enterprises. Henry Savage, in charge of Legislation of the United States in Guatemala, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States, Guatemala City, May 31, 1853. MANNING, 1934, pp. 340-341; Henry Savage, in charge of Legislation of the United States in Guatemala, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States, Guatemala City, November 10, 1854. Ibid., pp. 422-425; John H. Wheeler, United States Minister Resident in Nicaragua, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of state of the United States, Granada, February 26, 1856. Ibid., pp. 506-508.

<sup>192</sup> The US signed with Honduran government a similar treaty to the US-Nicaraguan Treaty (1911) but the Honduran Congress did not ratify and delayed its economic dependency ten years. KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 74.

<sup>193</sup> In 1923 the Honduran foreign debt was taken over by Americans and it gave to the US ability to be involved in the Honduran internal policy. Its incapability was proved quickly. The year later the US had to use military instruments instead of economic ones to keep the Honduran internal policy under the American control. YANCHUK, 1982, pp. 175-176

<sup>194</sup> The US put the Panama under the economic sanctions in 1987/8 because America was interested in the collapse of Panamanian government. Due to the sanctions the GDP of Panama fell 25% in 1988 and the income diminished 54%. KURASHEVA, I. M. Panama: posledstviya ekonomicheskikh sankciy SSHA in *Centralnaya Amerika i Kariby*, ed. Bekarevich, A. D., Institute of Latin America Academy of Science USSR, Moscow, 1991, pp. 179-191, p. 184 & p. 186. (Курашева, И. М. Панама: последствия экономических санкций США в «Центральная Америка и Карибы» Бекаревич, А. Д.) However the crucial affect of the US policy did not make the Panamanian government obedient to the US and the military invasion was needed to overthrow the government. Caribbean Basin Initiative: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belize/bz\\_appnd.html](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belize/bz_appnd.html) (09.12.2003)

powers.<sup>195</sup> It was a reason why the sanctions did not succeed. Therefore it is possible to state that the external power makes the US EIIP incapable.

Concluding the analysis of the EIIP of the US it is possible to notice the tendency that EIIP is capable if the earlier relations between the US and the Central American states have been rather positive and the response of the subregional governments based on them is positive. If the response is negative the policy has rather incapable character. Important aspect is the environment of policy because the stable situation increases capability and to opposite, the instable environment causes the incapability of EIIP. The third aspect, which causes incapability, is the presence of the interests of an external power in the subregion.

Third, I will analyse the EIIP of Russia. The first aspect which influences on the positive way is a positive response of the Baltic governments to Russia. The Russian EIIP has been capable in the cases the Baltic governments are following the Russian policy. The obedience of Baltic states is succeeded through the economic tools. It is the case of transit policy in the middle of the 1920s when Russia used it as a tool of influencing the internal policy of Estonia.<sup>196</sup> Although Estonia was ready to respond negatively to Russia the positive decision was made and Estonia demonstrated its loyalty to Russia. The similar blackmailing is the case of Lithuania in 1994.<sup>197</sup> Lithuania had to take into consideration the economic benefits and to the obedience to Russia and it enabled to gain more. Although both cases are characterised by the situation where the first step was made by the Baltic states the use of Russian economic tools against the Baltic governments made them to accept the Russian politics. A non-direct influence on resolving of controversy is also characteristic of both cases.

---

<sup>195</sup> Panama started to diminish the economic dependency on the US: Chinese from Hong Kong got the Panamanian citizenship, the economic aid from the EC increased and relations with Mexico and Taiwan were tightened. KURASHEVA, 1991, pp. 187-188

<sup>196</sup> Transit to Estonia was under political pressure during the 1920s and it could not develop naturally as it did in Latvia. In 1923-1926 Russia was playing with the economic tools, closing the transit to Estonia and transferred it to Latvia because of the foreign policy of Estonia. The Estonian policy to resist to Russia did not succeed and Estonia accepted the Russian demands to change the minister. HINKKANEN, 1991, pp. 434-439.

<sup>197</sup> Lithuania charged the higher fees for the transport of cargo to Kaliningrad than to Klaipeda. Russia united that question with the military transport and denied to implement the most-favoured-nation status for Lithuania. The latter one agreed with the Russian demands. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003)

The second factor, which facilitates Russia to pursue a capable policy, is its position in the world politics. The medium or a little bit weak position of Russia enables to reach more capable results. The important additional feature is that Russia has relatively strong position towards the Baltic states in these cases because of low external interest. In the middle of the 1920s Russia/the SU was recovering from the harms of the civil war therefore the Russian position was not very strong one but through the earlier economic dependency the Baltic states were still dependent on Russia. The last one enabled use to the situation where the Baltic states were not yet involved as the full members into the world trade and therefore Russia had an important role as a trade partner for them. In general medium or rather weak position enabled Russia to make more acceptable because there were non-direct links between the political and economic decisions. The similar situation was in the middle of the 1990s when Russia used the economic tools to make Lithuania obedient, having the economic power over last one.<sup>198</sup> Russia had the political claims against Lithuania and was not able to resolve the controversy politically. Political positions of Russia were rather weak and Russia used against Lithuania the economic tools, which demonstrated the relative strength of Russia.

Fourth, I will analyse the factors which cause the incapability of EIIP. The first of them are the earlier relations and the responses based on them. The negative and clashing relations before cause the negative response, which disables the capability of EIIP. The activity of Trade Chambers in Baltics in 1920s demonstrated the well-planned economic invasion but it is not possible to consider as the capable one because of the strong opposition of Baltics.<sup>199</sup> The distrust was created with the juggling transit policy and deepened by the robust market expansion. Therefore the activity of the Soviet Trade Chamber was incapable. The robust policy of Russia towards Estonia and Latvia in the 1990s caused again the distrust and the policy was

---

<sup>198</sup> In 1995 26,3% of Lithuanian foreign trade was with Russia, in addition, Lithuania depended strongly on Russian energy and raw materials. STRANGA, 1997, p. 209.

<sup>199</sup> For example, in 1923 the Soviet Trade Chamber was established in Estonia. It did not find support among the Estonian businessmen because they saw it as an obstacle in the Estonian-Latvian trade relations. Some years later they understood that Soviet Chamber is established to get the monopoly Estonian market. In 1927 Estonian Trade Chamber initiated the campaign against the activity of Soviet Trade Chamber, provoking the other Baltic states. ILMJÄRV, 1999, pp. 176-177.

replied with the disobedient policy from the Baltics.<sup>200</sup> Russia decided to use the economic dependency to influence on the Baltic governments but the very clear and strong negative response from Estonia and Latvia and real actions against the Baltics made the policy incapable. In 1994-1995 Russia established the strongest economic sanctions towards Estonia but these did not give any success.<sup>201</sup> The disobedient policy of Baltic states proves the incapability of the Russian policy.

The second aspect which describes the incapability of EIIP is the loss of stability. Russian policies, which are accompanied with the destabilising effects, have not been capable. The instability was the result of activity of the Soviet Trade Chambers in the 1920s. The policy of overthrow of market share and also the economic instability among the Baltic businessmen was a reason of the negative response. Even clearer situation was in the case of 1990s in Estonia and Latvia. The Russian policy of economic sanctions and threatening with them affected the economic stability of the Baltic states but it caused the political instability among the Russian-language population in these countries too. It caused the negative response, which made the executive policy incapable. The effect of economic instability of the Russian policy towards Estonia in 1994-1995 is an example of opposite effect to the expected results. The expectations that Estonia will be more obedient to Russian demands because of the need of Russian market did not realise.<sup>202</sup> Estonia restructured its foreign trade and the new trade partners from the West established the stability to the Estonian economy. It diminished the dependency of Estonian economy on Russia even more and Russia lost its control more. The instability, which causes the negative response or changes the economic structure, makes incapable the EIIP of Russia.

---

<sup>200</sup> Russia raised the question of discrimination of minorities in Estonia and Latvia. In 1993 supply of gas was cut, in March 1995 and July 1996 Russian Duma called for the economic sanctions against Estonia and Latvia, in 1997 Russia decided to put Estonia to change the minority policy with the help of economy sanctions, in 1998 trade sanctions against Latvia. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003); STRANGA, 1997, pp. 203-211; MEDVEDEV, 1998, p. 242.

<sup>201</sup> Russia refrained to grant to Estonia the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status and at the same time it doubled custom tariffs to the non-MFN countries. The trade between Estonia and Russia decreased and Estonia started to find new markets and did not to obey the Russian political demands, leaving Russia without the political gains of the policy. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003).

<sup>202</sup> Estonian food industry (dairy products, meat and fish particularly) were directed to the Eastern market and the affect of diminishing the export to Russia was strong. Ibid.

Concluding the analysis of the Russian EIIP, it is possible to notice the main tendency. Russian policy has been capable in the cases where Russia had medium or rather weak position in the world politics but relatively strong position for the Baltics. Therefore the blackmailing policy had got a positive response from the Baltics and it made the policy capable. Affects of destabilising policy of Russia caused incapability of EIIP because they had diminished the ability of controlling the subregion. Also the negative relations diminish the capability of EIIP.

### **3.2. Alliance Policy**

Alliance Policy as an Economic Instrument (EIAP) has a different capability in two case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America EIAP has been very capable policy and the difference between EIAP and EIIP is very large. In the case study of Russia-Baltics EIAP has been rather an incapable policy but the difference between EIAP and EIIP is not very large and EIAP has rather the same quality as EIIP. Eleven cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>203</sup>

First, I will analyse the US EIAP towards the Central American states. The first factor, which influences on a policy in a way of increasing its capability, is the relations between the US and Central America. Earlier positive relations facilitate the US to establish a capable alliance policy. For example, in the 1950s and the 1960s the US policy was to support the Central American governments, which favoured the US. The alliance relations were based on the economic co-operation between those states and the US in this period. Therefore the US government established new structures in the subregion.<sup>204</sup> The Central American governments supported the new structures because of the pro-American attitude among the local elites. It eased the execution of the policy and increased American control over the subregion.<sup>205</sup> The second example of long and positive co-operation are the US-Belize relations. The US supported

---

<sup>203</sup> See Appendix 7

<sup>204</sup> In the 1950s several common institutes were created, aiming to technical progress. In addition, the common economic structures were introduced: abrogation of the trade barriers and tariffs, Central American Bank, Central American Clearing House. All this steps were aimed to the American Common Market. PERKINS, Dexter. "The United States and the Caribbean", Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1966, p. 39.

<sup>205</sup> GARCIA, Rigoberto. "Integration or Disintegration: the Central American Common Market", in "Central America: Crises and Possibilities", ed. Rigoberto Garcia, Institute of Latin American Studies Monograph nr. 16, Stockholm, 1988. pp. 74-91, p.77

Belizean independence movement and therefore the image of the US was positive among Belizean elite. The US continued the favourable policy towards Belize in the economical terms and got back the support from Belize.<sup>206</sup> A little bit different case is the Pan-American Union<sup>207</sup> from 1890. Earlier there were not very strong supporting relations. The US proposal was accepted and the institution was created, giving the US the leading role in Latin America at the turn of the century. The positive response and mostly the earlier positive relations have been the basis for the capable alliance policy.

The second aspect, which is characteristic of the capable cases of EIAP, is stability. The US alliance policy which brings about the stability is usually the capable one. The case of building up the structures of economic co-operation in the 1950s-1960s is accompanied by the stabilising elements for the Central American states. The economic co-operation diminished the probability of conflicts between the Central American states and the control over the working of the structures due to the big investments from the US brought about the capability of the policy. The new and even more closely linked policy is the case of CAFTA.<sup>208</sup> On one hand, the agreement will develop the Central American economy, bringing in the investments and increasing the trade between those countries, on the other hand, it increases the economic dependency between the US and Central America. Both results are creating the stability in Central America but it is lead by the US, which is the last goal.

The third aspect, which characterises the capability EIAP, is the low external interest in the subregion and usually accompanied by the strong position of the US in the world politics. The capable economic alliance policy has occurred in the situation

---

<sup>206</sup> "In the late 1980s and early 1990s, United States foreign assistance to Belize totaled between US\$9.3 million and US\$10.7 million a year." U.S. Federal Research Division: Belize. Foreign Relations. Relations with the United States: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+bz0101\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bz0101)) (08.12.03). Later direct aid decreased but Americans continued to play the most important role in the Belizean economy. The U.S. Department of State: Belize <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1955.htm> (09.12.03)

<sup>207</sup> Although the Union has had the political dimension it was initiated mostly for the economic purposes by the US. The political dimension was brought in by the Latin American states that saw it as an instrument to diminish the US supremacy in the continent. KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 45.

<sup>208</sup> At the turn of 2004 the talks of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) were concluded and the treaty was signed. It is the free trade agreement between the US and five Central American states (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signed the treaty on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December 2003; and Costa Rica on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January 2004) it is worked out considering Free Trade Area of America (FTAA). Office of the United States Trade Representative: <http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/cafta.htm> (01.04.2004)

where the political supremacy has been already established and the economic policy could it support. Until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the US had strong counterpart in Central America in the shape of the British Empire. At the turn of the century the last one lost its positions<sup>209</sup> and the US could strengthen its positions. The Pan-American Union (although included all of Latin America) gave to the US the possibility of executing the economic means to pressure its willingness on the other countries. Central America was the first field due to its strategic meaning for the US. The other cases are characterised by the very strong position of the US and the difference is only in the counterpart in the subregion. The SU was the external power that established the outpost in Cuba in the 1950s-1960s. It proves the Soviet interest in the subregion but the meaning of Central America was different for the SU.<sup>210</sup> The political dominance was strengthened by the economic means of “protecting” Central America against the SU. In the case of Belize the external power was Great Britain but after the decolonisation of Belize it had only diminishing interest toward the country. The political dominance was created and the policy continued by the economic means. In the case of CAFTA the main external power was the EU, which had a great struggle with the US because of the field of their economic interests at the end of 1990s.<sup>211</sup> The political dominance of the US was not an issue but the activity of the EU shows that the US is not the only one who is interested in Central America economically. Although it is not possible to consider that the interests of the EU are strong. The strong position in the world politics and political dominance in the subregion enables to execute the capable EIAP.

Second, I will analyse the factors which make EIAP incapable. The first of them is the strong external interest in the subregion. The EIAP of the US has been incapable in the cases the US has been struggling with other great power for the dominance in Central America. It was very difficult to execute the policy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The case of the co-operation treaties in the first half of the 19-th century<sup>212</sup> is characterised

---

<sup>209</sup> KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 190

<sup>210</sup> The SU was interested in the outposts, which are as close as possible to the US like Turkey was for the SU and therefore Caribbean were more important than Central America.

<sup>211</sup> The conflict was called Bananas War: the EU was interested in buying the bananas from the former European colonies and it harmed the Central American market, which was in the hands of Americans.

<sup>212</sup> The US was interested in concluding the Treaty of Commerce and Amity, which would facilitate the economic relations between the countries and open Central American market for the Northern Americans. Henry Savage, in charge of the Legation of the United States, to John C. Calhoun, Secretary of State of the United States, Guatemala City, November 26, 1844. MANNING, 1933, p.



by the very strong British position in Central America and weak position of the US. The last one proposed several treaties to the Central American governments and the proposals were also accepted by those states but the policy was not capable. The British supremacy nullified all the success achieved through the agreements.<sup>213</sup> Thus, it is not possible to consider the case as a capable one because of the strong external power in the subregion. A little different case is the Nicaraguan conflict in the 1980s because of the negative response to the US. Nicaragua had a big financial assistance from the US but the last one decided to cut down it in 1983, aiming to the collapse of Nicaraguan government.<sup>214</sup> The policy did not succeed because the great interest of the SU. The Nicaraguan government had a possibility to choose partners. When the old partner (the US) did not support anymore then the other great power was kindly helpful to aid the new government. The policy of the US was incapable because of the involvement of an external power.

The second aspect, which is characteristic of the incapable cases, is the instability. The US EIAP has been incapable in the cases of instability and the activities, which have decreased stability make the policy even more incapable. The activity of the US in the middle of 19<sup>th</sup> century was highly instable because of the internal conflicts in the Central American states and their balancing policy between the great powers. This situation did not facilitate the economic expansion because the US had to protect its positions politically and militarily. The case of the ending of the financial assistance for Nicaragua is also characterised by the high instability in the subregion. The action of the US had the aim to prove the disability of a communist government to the world and of the Sandinista government to the Nicaraguans illegitimacy.<sup>215</sup> The weakness of Nicaragua and the warfare against Nicaragua created very complex situation in the

---

235. After the rapid growth of population of the West Coast (Oregon and California) the US had interest in the strategic projects (canal route, railway etc). Elijah Hise, United States Chargé d' Affairs in Guatemala, to Juan J. Bonilla, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Salvador, Guatemala City, December 8, 1848. Ibid, p. 293.

<sup>213</sup> For example, after the conclusion of the treaty of the Nicaraguan Canal between the US and Nicaragua, the British Navy occupied the strategic territories, which gave the control over the whole Canal to Brits. Ephraim George Squier, United States Chargé de Affaires in Guatemala, to John M. Clayton, Secretary of State of the United States, León Nicaragua, October 25, 1849. MANNING, 1933. pp. 418-423.

<sup>214</sup> The case is considered as an alliance policy because of an example of negative alliance and the affect of the alliance dependency. The Nicaraguan share of US aid to Central America fell from the 37,6% in 1980 to 0% in 1983. GARI, 1988, p. 119.

<sup>215</sup> DITRICH, 1992, pp. 61-62

subregion, which was not controlled by the US. In that situation the economic tools escalated the conflict and instability decreased the US position in Central America.

Concluding the EIAP of the US I notice the main tendencies. EIAP has been capable in the cases the amicable relations cause the positive response to the US policy. Important aspects are also the increasing stability and low external interest in Central America. In the opposite situation where there is a high interest of external power in the subregion and the policy is executed in the unstable environment the EIAP of the US has been incapable.

Third, I will analyse the EIAP of Russia. The first aspect, which characterises the capability of EIAP, is the weak position of Russia in the world politics. Russian policy has been capable in the cases the position of Russia in the world politics has been weak one and mutual economic needs exist between Russia and Baltic states. In the case of the Riga conference in 1922 the civil war was finished lately in Russia and the *Entente* countries did not recognise Russia. Therefore Russian position in the world politics was very weak and even more, Russia was not integrated into the world economic system. The Baltic states having got independence lately were interested in continuing the Russian-European trade flows through the Baltic subregion. The conference established a good basis for the further development and economic dependency.<sup>216</sup> Although later the goodwill policy was not used because Russian position was strengthening and the small allies were not needed. Also the case of Russian support for the Baltic re-independence process in 1990 based on the mutual needs.<sup>217</sup> Russia as well the Baltic states had interests to resistance the SU and therefore the parties of co-operations were equal and it worked. Russian policy was needed and accepted by the Baltic states as long Russia was weak and needed vital support from the small countries but after the strengthening of positions the alliance activity was not possible.

---

<sup>216</sup> From the 29<sup>th</sup> to the 30<sup>th</sup> of March 1922 Russia invited Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland (as the observer) to a conference in Riga. There were agreed to establish mutual business relations and bilateral trade agreements. States agreed to protect their interests together at the Genoa conference. TARULIS, 1959, p.66.

<sup>217</sup> The SU introduced an economic blockade against Lithuania in March 1990. Russian SFSR supported Lithuania and other Baltic states economically. In August 1990 the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Moldova, Leningrad Oblast, Leningrad city and Moscow city met to discuss the occurred situation and Russia offered to conclude bilateral treaties to resist to the Soviet sanctions. The parties concluded the treaties in September. ZĪLE, 1998, pp. 491-492.

The second aspect is strongly connected with the previous one. The Russian EIAP has been capable in the cases the policy has got positive responses from the Baltic governments. In 1922 the Baltic governments supported Russian initiative. Although they were political enemies they were interested in the economic co-operation. The mutual needs made the Baltic governments amicable and the co-operation could develop but in the situation when Russia started to execute unequal partnership the acceptance of the Baltic governments vanished and the policy lost its capability. A similar case was the support in 1990. The Baltic governments appreciated the Russian support as long Russia took over the SU position and the co-operation changed to be between unequal partners. In this situation the Baltic states were interested in diminishing the co-operation and the later policy failed. The acceptance of the Baltic governments has an important role in the capability of EIAP.

The third factor, which is characteristic of a capable EIAP of Russia, is the stability. The Russian policy is capable if the situation is not very stable but the activity will increase the stability. The instability will make the Baltic governments more amicable for Russia and can increase the interdependency. In 1922 the Russian proposal helped to increase economic stability of the new states and to develop their economies. Therefore the proposal got also the positive responses from the Baltic governments. Even more crucial was the Russian assistance in 1990 when the Baltics faced the SU policy, which aimed to the economic collapse of the subregion. The stabilising effect of the Russian policy brings about the positive response of the Baltic governments and the capability of the EIAP of Russia increases.

Fourth, I will define the factors, which influence on the Russian EIAP as the negative one. The first factor, which is characteristic of incapability of EIAP, is a strong external interest in the subregion. Russian policy has been incapable when an external power is parallelly represented strongly in the subregion. The case of financial aid to the Baltic soviet governments in 1918/9 was a failure of Russian policy.<sup>218</sup> Parallelly the *Entente* supported the non-soviet governments in Baltic and the Russian policy

---

<sup>218</sup> Russia promised to Estonian Soviet Government to give 10 million roubles of loan, later it increased to 50 million; Latvian Soviet Government got 20 million roubles. But the new governments asked new sums soon. The financial help did not help the Soviet Governments. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 37-45.

could not have success because of the strong foreign interest in the subregion. The interests were a little different in the case of Estonian-the SU agreements.<sup>219</sup> The external interest was lower one but the activity of the SU was opposed because Estonians did not want to diminish the external interest in the subregion. The existence of an external interest in the subregion makes the Baltic states look for them and it makes the Russian policy incapable.

The second aspect, which describes the incapability of the EIAP of Russia, is the character of earlier relations. The earlier negative relations between Russia and the Baltic states influence on the EIAP as a factor of incapability. In the case of support of the Soviet Governments in 1918/9 the earlier relations were hostile due to the warfare and aggression. The given aid was not seen as the assistance for the whole Baltics but as for the communists. Therefore the effect of policy was minimal and the Baltic governments fought against the Soviet Russia. In the case of the Estonian-the SU agreements in 1926 the negative earlier relations are even clearer. The change in the amounts of transit flows through Estonia made the Estonian government cautious towards Soviet proposals and the existence of an external interest (Poland) made the policy incapable. Both factors influenced on the decision of the Estonian government negatively and Estonians disagreed to conclude the treaty. The earlier negative relations did not bring about the positive result because of the low level of trust and unwillingness to co-operate.

To conclude the analysis of Russian EIAP I notice the main tendencies. Russian policy has been incapable in the situation its position is weak one and therefore the alliance activity is based on the mutual needs. An important factor is also the stabilising effect of the policy and the policy is proposed in the unstable moment. These factors bring about the positive response from the Baltic governments, which all together make the policy incapable. The strong external interests and earlier negative relations make the Baltic states resist to the Russian policies and EIAP is in those cases incapable.


---

<sup>219</sup> The representative of the SU proposed to Estonia Security Guarantee Treaty, aiming to the retreat of the Baltic states from the co-operation with Poland and from the League of Nations. For that the SU proposed very beneficial trade agreements. Estonia did not agree. ILMJÄRV, 1999, p. 168

\*\*\*\*

To conclude the chapter I will bring out the main tendencies, which are characteristic of the capability of Economic Instruments (See Figure 2).<sup>220</sup>

**Figure 2. Average Capability of Economic Instruments.**



To generalise the factors, which have made the US Economic Instruments capable one, the following tendencies are possible to notice. The US policy has been capable one in the cases when earlier relations have been amicable between the US and the Central American states and therefore the US government has found support to its policies from the Central American governments. A negative response usually causes an incapable result. Important aspect is also the environment of the execution of a policy. The more stable is the environment the more capable is the policy executed by the US. And to opposite, the more unstable the environment is the possibility of incapable results is higher. The US EI has been more incapable in the cases where the external interest exists in the subregion and the US government had the strong competition in the process of establishing dependency.

<sup>220</sup> In the general analysis few cases of Recognition Policy are inserted but in current chapter I did not analyse the tendencies because the rare cases are not enough to make any certain conclusions.

To generalise the factors, which have made the Russian Economic Instruments capable, the following tendencies are possible to notice. Russian policies have been more capable in the situations Russia had rather weak position in the world politics and in several reasons it made the Baltic governments behave amicable towards Russia. Important aspect is also the influence of Russian policy on the stability of subregion. The stabilising effect causes rather capable policy and destabilising effect causes rather incapable policy. The strong external interest and earlier negative relations cause also incapability of the policy.

## Chapter 4: Military Instruments (MI)

The present chapter analyses the capability of Military Instruments in the process of establishing dependency in the case studies the US-the Central American states and Russia-the Baltic states. The Military Instruments used by the great powers include the following policies: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy and Threatening Policy.

### *4.1. Intervention Policy*

Intervention Policy as a Military Instrument (MIIP) has different character in different case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America MIIP has been rather incapable policy. In the case study of Russia-Baltics MIIP has had a capable character. Twenty-three cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>221</sup> Most of the cases are rather-capable or rather-incapable ones and it is difficult do analyse only clearly capable or incapable cases. Therefore I have also taken partly into account the transitional groups to bring out some tendencies.

First, I will analyse the MIIP of the US in Central America. The first aspect, which helps the US to implement the capable MIIP, is the position of the US in the world politics and dominance in the subregion. The MIIP has been capable in the cases the US has strong position in the world politics and it has the dominating position in the subregion. The occupation of the key state of Central America Nicaragua in 1912-1933<sup>222</sup> took place in the period when, on one hand, the position of the US has increased in the world politics and, on other hand, the US kept the other powers out of the Central American affairs.<sup>223</sup> The situation gave the US the position to lead the “free hand” policy in Central America and the military intervention had success because the US had capacity to hold the occupation forces in the territory of Nicaragua. The leave-out of the European powers from the Central American affairs gave the US free hands to implement the policy it wanted and the Central American states did not have any possibility to balance the US policy. Although all parties in

---

<sup>221</sup> See Appendix 8

<sup>222</sup> “1912-1933 (except 1925) a small force of United States marines maintained the Government of Nicaragua in office, supervised and policed elections, and trained up a Nicaraguan constabulary.” BEMIS, 1943, p. 164.

<sup>223</sup> The US position in the world politics increased due to the WW I, looking up to one of the world great powers. Except the W. Wilson’s policy the US had position to implement the policy of Monroe Doctrine, aiming the separation of two continents (American and European affairs).

Nicaragua did not accept the US occupation they did not have any chance to get some external help, which could help to drive out the American forces.<sup>224</sup> The second case of MIIP is also a part of Nicaraguan occupation. It was not the direct military intervention but it was the build-up of the US friendly army.<sup>225</sup> The presence of the US marines in Nicaragua was a good ground for the military reorganisation of Nicaragua based on the instruction of the US, giving to the last one the total overview of the National Guard and the ability to intervene in the Nicaraguan internal affairs. The external political background that made the occupation successful facilitated also the army reorganisation. The most of the rather capable cases are also characterised by the similar position of the US in Central America and they are mostly from the same period.<sup>226</sup>

The second aspect, which describes the capable cases, is the character of the relations between the US and the Central American states. The MIIP of the US has been more capable in the cases the policy of the US has been partly accepted by some of the parties in Central America. The US policy is presented not as the intervention but as the assistance to the “right party”. The occupation of Nicaragua demonstrates this situation very well. The first intervention in 1912 based on the request of Nicaraguan government as well the second intervention in 1926.<sup>227</sup> Therefore the US government had legitimacy for the occupation of Nicaragua and it made the policy successful. The military assistance made the Nicaraguan government very dependent on the US and it was the goal of the US government. The dependency increased due to the friendly relations with one party with the US. The second capable case is in the framework of

---

<sup>224</sup> Opposition of Nicaraguan government did not accept the US occupation and they started to fight against it and the government amicable to the US. Very strong opposition and active fighting took place in the second half of the 1920s. The only external power which assisted Nicaraguan opposition was Mexico but the aid was not very big (continued the shipment of arms after the embargo the US suggested to the Latin American states). BEMIS, 1943, p. 211.

<sup>225</sup> The US occupation defended the Nicaraguan government and additionally the advisors of the US army organised the National Guard of Nicaragua to take over the function of defence of the US amicable Nicaraguan government. KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 70.

<sup>226</sup> The capable and rather-capable cases of MIIP took place in 1904-1947. The main factors that diminished the measures of capability were the increasing external interest and negative response from the subregion.

<sup>227</sup> The opposition of the Diaz’ government did not accept the US-amicable policy and revolted against it. Diaz asked help from the US and the next day the American marines landed on the Nicaraguan coast and the main cities were taken under the control of the US troops. KOCH-WESER, 1936, pp. 68-69 In 1923 the US government stated that the American troops would leave Nicaragua in 1925 but after that the American marines leave the country the opposition started the revolt and the government asked to return the American troops, which were fighting in the civil war the next years. YANCHUK, 1982, pp. 283-286.



the previous case and the origination of the National Guard based on the friendly relations between the Nicaraguan and the US governments. The measures of capability of rather-capable cases are also correlated by the relations' factor. Positive relations give base for need or acceptance to the policy made by the US.

Second, I will define the factors, which decrease the capability of the MIIP of the US. The first of them is the low stability. The MIIP of the US has been incapable in the cases the policy is implemented in very unstable environment. The low stability disturbs the US ability to control the situation, which makes the results of military intervention unexpected and therefore the policy is rather incapable. At the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s the situation in the Panama Canal Zone was very unstable.<sup>228</sup> The use of military instruments only escalated the problem and increased the instability. As a result the military tools were changed with the political instruments, which enabled to calm down the conflict situation and start the talks about the Panamanian demands. The second case is the US support to the Contras activity in Nicaragua in 1980s.<sup>229</sup> The hope of the US government to coordinate the fighters against Sandinista government did not succeed because of the unstable environment. The ideological division of the Central American states heavily harmed the subregional stability and the US military tools defeat due to the communist movements in subregion escalated the instability even more. The US policy resulted with failure and instead of military instruments the political ones were used. The cases which are grouped as the rather incapable ones are also characterised by the instability factors.<sup>230</sup>

---

<sup>228</sup> Panamanians demanded the nationalisation of Panama Canal, following the example of the action of the Egypt government about the Suez Canal in 1956. Americans were afraid of losing the control over the strategic object. They used extreme tools to resolve the problems and they shot at the demonstrators. The policy increased the instability in Panama and during the decade the situation was out of control. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 13-14.

<sup>229</sup> In November 1981 the US Security Council decided to originate military bases in the neighbouring countries of Nicaragua to prepare the soldiers for fighting with the Sandinista troops in Nicaragua. Also a plan was made to organise the opposition to the Sandinista government and unite the fighting against Contras. GLINKIN, A. N., SUDAREV, V.P. "Central'noamerikanskiy konflikt: ot protivoborstva k uregulirovaniyu", Institute of Latin America Russian Science Academy, Moscow, 1992, p. 73. (Глинкин, А.Н., Сударев, В.П. «Центральноамериканский конфликт: от противоборства к урегулированию»).

<sup>230</sup> For example, the Walker activity in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century or the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954 or the military intervention into Panama in 1989 all of them are characterised by the very unstable environment where the US interfered.

The second aspect, which is characteristic of the incapable cases, is the reaction of the subregional states to the US activities. The policies, which have got negative response from the Central American governments, are usually incapable ones. The negative response to MIIP means usually the armed conflict, which makes the environment unstable, harms the relations in the future and can change the attitude of subregional states. These factors decrease capability of the US ability to have control over the subregion diminishes. The Panamanian case demonstrates the incapability of the military tools because the tensions in Panama were not diminished but increased because of the very brutal action of the US. It escalated the negative attitude towards the US among Panamanian even more and it caused the Panamanian endeavours to increase their independence.<sup>231</sup> A similar case is the Nicaraguan one in the 1980s. The US military assistance of the Contras decreased the ability to find a peaceful solution because of the increasing distrust between Nicaragua and the US. An aggressive policy made the Nicaraguan government to find the new allies and to globalise the conflict. It decreased the US domination in Central America and also the dependency of Nicaragua from the US. The negative responses from the Central American governments, which escalate the conflict and through it increase the attention of the rest of the world on Central America, makes the US policy incapable.

To conclude the analysis of the MIIP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. The policies have been capable one in cases the US had strong position in the world politics and the external powers are staying out of the subregion. It is important to add that the US activity should be legitimated by the positive responses from some parties from the Central America. The negative response causes the conflict, which increases the instability of the subregion and after all decreases the ability to have control over the subregion. It makes the policy incapable.

Third, I will analyse the case study Russia-the Baltics. The Russian MIIP has been rather capable and there are not any incapable cases. Some cases are qualified as rather incapable one and in the conclusion of this part I will add the possible factors, which could make the MIIP incapable. The first aspect, which characterises the capable cases, is the Russian domination in the Baltics and Russian strong position in

---

<sup>231</sup> In 1968 the military *coup d'etat*, which brought to the power the nationalistic army and the Panamanian demands increased even more. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 13-14.

the world politics. Russian policy has been capable in the situation the other powers have left from the Baltics and the small states are alone face-to-face Russia. It was in the cases of 1939-1940. In August-September 1939 Germany left the Baltic states to the sphere of influence of the SU and the latter started to execute its rights.<sup>232</sup> The “free hand” enabled the SU to bring its troops into the Baltic states without violence and the SU should not to have been afraid of that someone would question its right to have these territories. The military presence enables to influence on the political way of the Baltic states and have the control over their activities. The second case is the *coup d’etat*’s in the Baltics in 1940. The SU enjoyed the freedom of action and it increased its army concentration in the Baltics to change the political system in these countries and make them obedient to the SU.<sup>233</sup> The military tools were very capable instruments to fulfil the political will and made the Baltics strongly dependent on the SU. The policy would not be possible in the situation if the other powers had their interests in the subregion. Because of that the other power would challenge the SU the act of occupation of the Baltic states.

The second aspect, which is characteristic of the capable cases, is the acceptance of the subregional states to the policy of great power. The conditions of the policy are ultimatum to the small states and their acceptance is blackmailed. Both capable cases had an acceptance from the Baltic governments and it gave formally legitimacy to the SU activity in the Baltics. Again the military instruments were very important because they were the main tools for the chantage based on the military presence in the Baltics. It enabled the SU to demand the total obedient from the Baltic states. The non-acceptance could bring other results like the Finnish example proved.<sup>234</sup> The first acceptance from the Baltic states in 1939 was the reason for the second acceptance in 1940 because of the very high military concentration on the Baltic territory. Therefore

---

<sup>232</sup> After the concluding of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the SU concluded the agreements of mutual assistance with all three Baltic governments: Estonia 28.09, Latvia 05.10 and Lithuania 11.10. 1939. According the agreements the SU had right to bring up to 30 000 solders in the territory of Baltic states. GARLEFF, 2001. p. 162.

<sup>233</sup> The SU made ultimatums to the Baltic governments that they would let even more Soviet troops to enter into their territories in June 1940. After the opening of the borders of the Baltic states the Soviet troops backed a small group of local communists in the *coup d’etat* organised from Moscow to change the Baltic governments with the puppet governments dependent on Moscow. TARULIS, 1959, p. 240.

<sup>234</sup> In 1939 the SU made proposal also to the Finnish government to conclude the agreement of mutual assistance but the Finnish government declined the proposal. It was the cause of the Winter War between Finland and the SU. Finland lost the war but it did not lose the independence because of the fact that the SU could not get the right to have the military bases on the territory of Finland.

the acceptance of the Baltic governments is not possible to consider as the voluntary reaction but blackmailed positive response. However the SU implemented the policy having the formal legitimacy and it made the policy capable.

Concluding the analysis of Russian MIIP I notice the main tendencies. MIIP has been capable in the cases Russia had the absolute dominance in the subregion and the external powers have lost their interest towards the Baltics and therefore Russia had freedom to implement its MIIP. In that situation the Baltic states have been in the situation they could not to resist the Russian policy and therefore Russian policy can get the acceptance from the Baltics. Concluding the rather incapable cases it is possible to notice the tendency that the Russian MIIP has been incapable in the cases when there is a great external interest in the Baltic subregion and Russian position in the world politics is weak one. Therefore the Baltic states had possibility to resist to the Russian MIIP.

#### **4.2. Alliance Policy**

Alliance Policy as a Military Instrument (MIAP) has different character in different case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America MIAP has been very capable policy. In the case study of Russia-Baltics MIAP has been the least capable policy. Fifteen cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>235</sup>

First, I will analyse the factors, which are characteristic of the capable cases of MIAP in the case study the US-Central America. The first of them is the relations between the US and the Central American states. The good earlier relations give the Central American states positive attitude towards the alliance policies with the US. A very good example is the Hay–Bunan-Varilla Treaty in 1903.<sup>236</sup> The military assistance gave the ability of the total control over the Panama territory. And the US used the right often because of the strategic meaning of Panamanian territory. The goodwill relation also describes the case of the assistance to the Guatemalan governments in

---

<sup>235</sup> See Appendix 9

<sup>236</sup> The US supported the Independence War of Panama and as gratitude for the assistance the US received according the treaty concluded 18.11.1903 the right to intervene in the Panamanian internal affairs. The US used that right already next year and thereafter it intervened quite often. KOCH-WESER, 1936, pp. 66-67.

1950s-1980s.<sup>237</sup> Guatemalan governments needed the US assistance to liquidate the opposition and therefore Guatemala agreed to be dependent from the US for the given military assistance. The mutual goodwill relations that are a base for the alliance policy support the capable policy. It increases the asymmetrical interdependencies between the US and the Central American states.

The second aspect, which describes the capable cases of MIAP, is the external interest. The US MIAP has been more capable in the cases where an external power, which is hostile towards the subregional states, is represented strongly in Central America. The balancing policy has put the Central American governments to decide for the US, which has promised defence. The case of the Columbian-the US treaty in 1869 the first party was interested in finding protection against the European powers and gave the US the right to control partly Columbian territory.<sup>238</sup> The fear of the European powers made the Central American states more obedient to the US and they demanded the protection from the US. The situation was beneficial for the US because the saviour image made the states voluntarily to obey the US interests. The case of freeing the Mosquito Coast in 1893 is an example of the voluntary obedience.<sup>239</sup> A little different case is the Honduran military bases in the 1980s.<sup>240</sup> The bases were established for the preparation of fighting against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Honduras did not invite the US to help but the last one used the good relations with the Honduran government to settle the military bases on

---

<sup>237</sup> After the overthrow of Arbez government in Guatemala the US made the Guatemalan governments dependent on itself. The US helped to organise and finance the death squads, which fought against the left-wings opposition. For example, “1966 - U.S. Special Forces participate in army counterinsurgency campaign that kills more than 8,000. Emergence of right-wing death squads blamed for killing 30,000 in next seven years.” “Chronology Of Guatemala's 36-Year Civil War”, by Reuter, 29 December 1996. World History Archives: Guatemala. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/161.html> (13.12.2003).

<sup>238</sup> Great Britain and France showed their interests in Central America and the territory of Panama, which in that moment was under Columbian rule, had a strategic meaning because of the potential canal route. Columbia lead a balancing policy between the superpowers and in 1869 it decided for the US, giving to the last one the right to take the troops freely on Panama territory and the US had to guarantee the sovereignty and integrity of Columbia. MEDINA KASTRO, Manuel. “Soedinennye Shtaty i Latinskaya Amerika XIX veka. (Istoriya ekspansii SSHA)”, Progress, Moscow, 1974, p. 307 («Соединенные Штаты и Латинская Америка XIX века. (История экспансии США)»).

<sup>239</sup> In 1893 Nicaragua took control over Mosquito Coast but Great Britain did not accept it and the Brits made a landing on the coast. The Nicaraguan government requested help from the US, which sent out its ships and demanded from Great Britain to leave the territory. The last one did it and recognised the dominance of the US in the subregion. Nicaragua got the coast territory but at the same time the only strong balancing power against the US was expelled from Central America and the American dominance began. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, pp. 190-192.

<sup>240</sup> The US built up the military facilities in Honduras, for example during the 80s Honduras became a country with the biggest density of airports. GLINKIN, SUDAREV, 1992, p. 45.

Honduran territory. The policy was implemented in the framework of the Cold War and the external interest of the Central American states of protecting from the SU. But this alliance policy was initiated mostly by the US than the Central American governments.

The third aspect, which is characteristic of the capable cases, is the stable environment of the implementation of a policy. The stability in the subregion increases the capability of the US ability to control the subregion is bigger. The case of the Hay–Bunan–Varilla Treaty in 1903 was the result of an independence war but the war ended quickly and the stability was restored in Panama. The US supporting policy helped also very much to restore stable situation. In addition, the guarantee the US gave according to the Treaty also facilitated the re-establishing a stable environment. Another case, the establishing of the Central American Defence Council (CONDECA) in the 1960s was a tool, which increased the stability in the subregion.<sup>241</sup> The US aimed to achieve the stability through the coordination of the military affairs of Central America to have control over those states and to use them against a common enemy if it would be needed. In the 1990s the US military assistance continued in Central America and the main programme to increase stability in the region through the military institutions was the Humanitarian and Civic Assistant.<sup>242</sup> The programme aimed the rebuilding and restoring the normal civil-military relations in Central America after the decade-long war. The US leading role in the programme enabled to control over the restoration process. MIAP in the stable environment is capable policy and used often by the US.

---

<sup>241</sup> The Council meant the bilateral military agreements between the US and Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. In the framework of the Council the parties organised common military trainings and the military assistance from the US to Central America. It was a part of the integration of the subregion, which decreased possibilities of conflicts and increased mutual understandings. VISHNJA, G. F. “SSHA-Latinskaya Amerika: vneshnepoliticheskie otnosheniya v sovremennykh usloviyah (1968-1976 gg.)”, Nauka, Moscow, 1978, p. 61. (Вишня, Григорий Федотович. «США – Латинская Америка: внешнеполитические отношения в современных условиях (1968-1976 гг.)»).

<sup>242</sup> “*These "humanitarian" activities [Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)] by the U.S. military have in recent years become one of the most important ways in which the United States relates to the Central American militaries.*” U.S. Military Civic Action Programs and Democratization in Central America in *The Democracy Backgrounder*, A publication of the Interhemispheric Resource Center, Vol. 1, no. 3. 6 September, 1995. World History Archives: Central America. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/004.html> (09.12.2003).

Second, I will analyse the main factors, which is characteristic of the incapable cases of the MIAP of the US. Opposite to the capable cases usually the instable environment leads to the incapable results because of the unpredictable results. For example, in 1982 the US plan to increase its military control over the subregion did not succeed because of the instability in the subregion.<sup>243</sup> The US had a difficult task to coordinate different countries to resolve the same problem and finally the US policy of the Nicaragua issues failed. The prolonging the Contra bases in Honduras failed also at the end of the 1980s because of the internal instability and protest of Hondurans.<sup>244</sup> The policy failed and the US lost one of the most important allies in the subregion during the 1980s. In addition, the instability causes the unpredictable responses from the Central American governments. In both cases the US government expected the positive response from the Central American governments because of the positive earlier relations but the instability caused the denying answer to the US proposals.

To conclude the analysis of the capability of the MIAP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. MIAP has been capable in the cases the positive relations have existed already a long time and the alliance policy is accepted by the states based on the goodwill relations. An important factor is also the strong external interest, which makes the Central American states accept the alliance policy proposals. A crucial factor is stability of the subregion – a stable policy environment results in the capable outcomes and instability of the subregion leads to failure of the policy.

Third, I will analyse the capability of MIAP of Russia. There is not any capable case in my database and therefore I bring out only the factors, which describe the incapable policies. The first factor, which makes the Russian MIAP incapable, is the character of earlier relations. The negative past between Russia and the Baltic states causes the incapability of Russian policy towards the Baltics. For example, the case of Russian

---

<sup>243</sup> In the beginning of the 1980s the US had a plan to localise the Nicaraguan conflict and it originated the common military action against Nicaragua but it failed because unstable and conflicting relations between the Central American states: there was distrust between Honduras and El Salvador, Guatemala was weak and it was not interested in the helping El Salvador, Costa Rica did not have army. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp. 106-108.

<sup>244</sup> In Tegucigalpa a huge anti-American demonstration took place and 60 000 people demanded the closing of the Contra bases. The Honduran government had to follow the public opinion and a new agreement was not signed. Lonely Planet: Honduras: [http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/central\\_america/honduras/history.htm](http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/central_america/honduras/history.htm) (13.12.2003).

troops withdrawal in 1993/4 was an end of forced alliance and therefore the relations between Russia and the Baltic states had a negative feature. Russia had an interest to keep the troops on the Baltic territory to maintain its ability to have control over the subregion as long as possible but the Baltics were interested to get free from the Russian influence as quick as possible.<sup>245</sup> The negative past did not make the Baltic governments well disposed to the Russian interests and the former “alliance” was resolved as quickly as possible. The Russian action impeded only a little the resolving process but the policy was as an incapable one.

The second aspect, which supported strongly the Baltic governments, was the external interest and Russian position in the world politics. The weak position of Russia and the strong interest of Western countries increased the weakness of Russian demands. After the collapse of the SU Russia became the successor of the former Soviet empire which collapsed also economically and therefore Russia was dependent on the Western countries. This situation decreased heavily the strength of the position of Russia in the world politics and it gave to the Baltics governments a possibility to lobby at the Western governments that the last could influence on Russia. The Western countries had the interest in the Baltics to integrate the subregion into the Western structures. This plan found a broad acceptance from the Baltics and Russia found that the subregion is moving to the sphere of influence of the West.<sup>246</sup> In conclusion, Russia was constrained to change its policy because of the Western demands to move back from the Baltic subregion.

To conclude the analysis of Russian MIAP I will notice the main tendencies. First of all, Russia has used MIAP towards the Baltics very little because the Baltic states have not seen Russia as their military ally. The negative perception of the Baltics is because of the negative past between Russia and them and the relations had rather

---

<sup>245</sup> Russia planned to start the withdrawal in 1995 and it would last at least till 1999 because Russia understood that it is the main instrument, which is possible to use to keep the Baltics under its control. The Baltic governments perceived the situation a similar way and therefore they started to lobby on the international level to get free from Russian troops as quick as possible because they had interest in destroying the Soviet occupation legacy quickly and to secure against the similar cases in the future. Finally, Russia had to recheck its plans. „Analiticheskiy Doklad „Rossiya i Pribaltika“, 1997, p. 38.

<sup>246</sup> The Baltic governments stated their interest in integrating into NATO and the EU. The NATO was the Russian main old enemy of the Cold War period and the Baltics plan was unacceptable to Russia. If Russia understood that in military way it is not possible to keep the Baltics under its control the Russian government started to use the International and Political Instruments. One of them was the concept of ‘near abroad’. GARLEFF, 2001. p. 200.



secessionistic character. The earlier negative relations and the weak position of Russia enable the Baltic states to use to make incapable the Russian attempts to maintain its positions in the subregion. The external power having an interest in the Baltic subregion decreases the capability of Russian MIAP even more because of the wish of Baltic states to be secured against Russia.

### ***4.3. Threatening Policy***

Threatening Policy as a Military Instrument (MITP) has different character in different case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America MITP has been very incapable policy. In the case study of Russia-Baltics MITP has been rather capable policy. Ten cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>247</sup>

First, I will analyse the case study of the US-Central America. The US government has not been successful in using the MITP and therefore the analysed cases are only incapable ones. The first factor, which makes the US policy incapable, is the external power. The strong external interest makes the MITP of the US incapable because the Central American states have the alternatives and they try to balance between the different powers. The threatening is meant as the attention to show that the great power has really the power expected from it. The case of the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century the US government was struggling for its better business conditions in Central America with Great Britain and France and therefore the US politicians wanted to use the military threats to prove the US power and to get the same advantages that were hold by the European great powers.<sup>248</sup> The policy did not have an effect and the US positions were stronger due to the concrete policy implemented later not because of the threatening. A little bit stronger effect had MITP in the 1980s.<sup>249</sup> Although it is not possible to state that the threatening changed the policy of Nicaragua but it made the latter more careful and its government paid more attention to the military trainings

---

<sup>247</sup> See Appendix 10

<sup>248</sup> “*I will say here, that I deem it to be necessary that an American Man of War should occasionally make its appearance in the Ports of Central America to inspire the people and Governments of these States with due respect for our Country*” Elijah Hise, United States Chargé d’ Affairs in Guatemala, to James Buchanan, Secretary of the United States, Guatemala City, December 20, 1848. MANNING, 1933, pp. 294-296, p. 294.

<sup>249</sup> From August 1981 till May 1985 the US organised at least fifteen big military manoeuvres and trainings in Central America and Caribbean, aiming to threat the Nicaraguan government. Nine of them were held on the territory of Honduras or Costa Rica (neighbouring countries), some of them very close to Nicaraguan border. DIAZ-KALEHHAS, 1988, pp. 77-78.

in the subregion. The Nicaraguan government could be able to continue its course because of the foreign assistance, which it got from the Soviet block. Therefore the threats of the US were not capable.

The second aspect, which describes the incapability of the MITP of the US, is the low stability. The threatening could increase the instability but usually they are implemented in the unstable situation. The US is not able to get control over Central American states and therefore the threats are used. It is more characteristic of the case of the threatening Nicaragua than of the power struggling in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, the situation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was very unstable in Central America because of the internal conflicts and different parties tried to find the support from the different external powers. In described situation the US policy failed because of the demonstration of the military power did not affect directly on any party. In the case of Nicaragua the threatening was closely connected with preparations of the Contras in Honduras.<sup>250</sup> The threatening and a real danger were partly united and therefore the increasing instability in the subregion did not conduce to the conflict management but it escalated even more the conflict. The use of MITP in the unstable environment results in failure because of the unpredictable outcomes.

To conclude the analysis of the MITP of the US, I will notice the main tendencies. The US has not very often used MITP and these have been incapable cases. The main factors, which cause the incapability of the MITP of the US, are the external power, which enables the subregional states to balance between the powers, and the instability, which makes the object of threatening too vague or escalates the conflict situation in the subregion even more.

Second, I will analyse the MITP of Russia. The first factor, which increases the capability of MITP, is the dominance of Russia in the subregion. Russian threatening has been more capable in the cases it has the strong position in the world politics and the external power had low or non-interest in the Baltic subregion. The described situation was at the end of the 1930s. The threatening was very usual instrument during the 1939/40 when the SU aimed the occupation of the Baltic territories. The

---

<sup>250</sup> DITRICH, 1992, p. 101

capability of the Soviet threats increased with the German moving away from the Baltics.<sup>251</sup> The Baltic governments did not have any counter power against the SU and they faced alone with the SU. The latter would not even to fight against the Baltic armies but the demonstration of its army was enough to make the Baltics obedient to itself.<sup>252</sup> The threats had very serious meaning for the small states and the fighting seemed to be a suicide. Therefore the domination of the SU made the threats effective and helped to implement the desired policy.

The second aspect, which is characteristic of the capable cases of MITP, is the character of earlier relations. The earlier rather negative or distrusting relations make MITP capable because of the unpredictability of the behaviour of the great power. The threats made by the great power are perceived more real if the earlier relations are hostile. For example, the case of the threatening in the second half of 1930s shows that the rather negative relations made the Baltic states vulnerable to the SU threats.<sup>253</sup> And the SU kept the Baltic governments under the pressure because it wanted to demonstrate its increasing position and to remember to the Baltic states that they are on the sphere of the interests of the SU. The threatening was meant to change the character of the relations that the Baltic governments would understand that it is better to have amicable relations with the SU than the hostile ones. The negative past increased the fear among the Baltic states and it made them to behave more balancing way, which was useful for the SU.

---

<sup>251</sup> In April 1939 the Red Army organised big manoeuvres at the Estonian border that Estonia and Latvia would take seriously the ally proposals of the SU. The SU activity made the Estonian and Latvian governments to look for the aid from Germany. In the end of June the Soviet navy sailed three days by the Baltic coast, Estonia and Latvia concentrated even more on Germany. In September during the talks between Estonia and the SU the threatening incidents made Estonian government already to obey the Soviet will. RAUCH, 1995, pp. 97-101. In October the SU demanded from the Baltic governments to increase the amount of Soviet troops on their territories they agreed because of the concentration of Red Army at the borders was strong argument to agree. TARULIS, 1959, p. 163.

<sup>252</sup> For example, in September 1939 Estonia considered to deny the proposal of mutual assistance pact but the Red Army concentrated on the border (up to 250 000 men, 700 field guns, 600 tanks. Estonia had 15 000 men, 200 field guns and 16 tanks). The Estonians shifted quickly the plans of resistance out of the agenda. In 1940 the Lithuanian delegation saw the demonstration of the Red Army at the SU-Lithuanian border when they arrived from the Moscow talks. In the same time Latvian border guards were attacked from the SU and the SU began the blockade Latvian harbours. In Estonia the Red Army also started to concentrate at Tallinn and at the border 90 000 men were waiting for the entering. TARULIS, 1959, pp. 180-181.

<sup>253</sup> The flights of the Soviet planes over the Estonian territory, unexpected visits of Soviet warships to Tallinn and Riga, border incidents on the SU-Estonian border made the Baltic governments concern on their future and Estonia, Latvia started to move closer to Germany. RAUCH, 1995, pp. 85, 94.

The third factor, which makes the MITP of Russia capable, is the instability. The bigger instability in the foreign policy of the subregional states the more capable is MITP. Very good examples are the situations before the Agreement of Mutual Assistance in 1939 and the ultimatums in 1940. The military movements in the border regions of the Baltic states and the demonstration of the potential danger brought about the obedience of the Baltic governments. Their position in the international affairs enabled the capability of the SU policies. The position of buffer states increased the capability of their foreign policies in the period the great powers divided the spheres of influence. The Baltic governments were obedient to the SU manipulations because they realised that they did not have any other solution. The SU manipulated the Baltic governments with the military threat and achieved the control over the subregion.

Third, the aspects describing the incapability of the MITP of Russia are the instability of the subregion and the weakening position of Russia. The threatening of the Baltic governments has not been capable one when the relations between Russia and the Baltics are in transition. It is characteristic of the situation of the process of the Baltics re-independence. In 1990 after the Lithuanian declaration of re-independence the SU tried to force Lithuania to return.<sup>254</sup> The Lithuanian government did not change its course because of the vague situation and the weakening position of Moscow. Therefore the threatening did not have any effect to Lithuania. The second case is the linking the Russian troops withdrawal from Estonia and Latvia with the minority issues in 1992.<sup>255</sup> The internal situation in Estonia and Latvia was a little unstable and the Russian statements about the discrimination increased the instability even more. Although Russia did not have any strong position in this process and the agreements were signed without any bigger changes in Estonian and Latvian legislations. The threat that the troops would remain on their territories did not work because Russia did not have enough power to fulfil its words.

---

<sup>254</sup> The Red Army organised a demonstration of its military equipment and the movements of the tank divisions in Lithuania. GARLEFF, 2001. pp. 183-184.


<sup>255</sup> In October 1992 Yeltsin suspended the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics and stated that the agreements about it would not signed before the Estonian and Latvian governments have brought their legislations of minorities in the line of international standards. Russian troops had to stay to protect Russian civilians against possible attack and discrimination. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003)

To conclude the analysis of the MITP of Russia I will notice the main tendencies. The Russian MITP has been capable in the cases it had the dominance in the subregion and the Baltic states were without any alternatives to protect themselves against Russian threats. The earlier negative relations and instable situation of foreign policy conduce to the capability of MITP. The weak position of Russia and instability in the Baltics makes the Russian MITP incapable and the Baltics are not obedient to the manipulations of Russia.

\*\*\*\*

To conclude the chapter I will bring out the main tendencies, which are characteristic of the capability of Military Instruments (See Figure 3).

**Figure 3. Average Capability of Military Instruments**



To generalise the factors, which have made the Military Instruments of US capable ones, it is possible to notice the following tendencies. The US policy has been capable in the cases when earlier relations have been amicable between the US and the Central American states and therefore the US government has found support from the Central

American governments to its policies. Usually a negative response causes also an incapable result. Important aspect is also the environment of the execution of a policy. The instable environment causes usually the incapability of the policy but the more stable is the environment the capability is bigger. The strong position of the US also helps to implement a capable policy but the presence of an external power will increase the capability if the US has used Alliance Policy but in the case of Intervention Policy the capability is increased by the lack of an external power.

To generalise the factors, which have made the Russian Military Instruments capable, it is possible to present the following tendencies. Russian policies have been more capable in the situations Russia had strong position in the world politics and the external powers have lost their interest in the Baltic subregion. The weak position and big external interest in the Baltics have caused the incapability of the policies. Earlier negative relations could cause the capability and incapability depending on the used policy. The Alliance Policy is incapable due to the negative relations but the Threatening Policy is capable because of earlier negative relations.

## Chapter 5: International Instruments (II)

The present chapter analyses the capability of the International Instruments in the process of establishing dependency in the case studies the US-the Central American states and Russia-the Baltic states. The International Instruments used by the great powers include the following policies: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Mediation Policy, Propaganda Policy and Deal Policy. Most of the cases are rather capable or rather incapable ones and therefore in this chapter I will describe also some cases from the transitional groups to explain the main tendencies.

### 5.1. *Intervention Policy*

Intervention Policy as an International Instrument (IIIP) has been rather incapable policy in both case studies. In both case studies it has also the same relative capability; it means that in comparison with the other policies of International Instruments IIIP has the medium quality. Seven cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>256</sup>

First, I will analyse the capability of the IIIP of the US. The main factor, which characterises the capable policy of the US, is the earlier positive relations with the subregional states. The good relations enable to achieve the positive resolving of the interest conflict on the international level. The case of Bidlack Treaty in 1846 was a result of the goodwill relations between the US and Columbia, which eliminated the occurred disadvantages of the US.<sup>257</sup> The Treaty was proposed and agreed because of the good relations between the US and New Granada. It showed that two states from the American continent wanted to resist against the domination of the European great powers, which had colonised the American territories and therefore there was distrust was between the American and European relations. New Granada trusted more the US, which did not implement any colonising policies, than the European powers. The goodwill relations brought about the capable policy of the US.

---

<sup>256</sup> See Appendix 11

<sup>257</sup> Great Britain and France denied neutralising the Panama Isthmus territory, which alarmed Americans because the American trade could be discriminated. Therefore New Granada proposed a treaty to the US, which guaranteed “*the United States and its citizens the right of way or transit across of the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that then existed or that might charged to the citizens of New Granada*”. BEMIS, 1943, p. 104. The treaty eliminated the possibility of discrimination of American trade.

Second, I will analyse the incapability of the IIP of the US. The first factor, which has decreased capability of IIP, is the earlier negative relations. The US has not been able to achieve advantageous results in the situations the relations between the US and a Central American states have not been on the goodwill basis. The case of Guatemalan-Great Britain Treaty in 1860 was a document, which weakened the US positions in Central America.<sup>258</sup> The agreement was concluded because Guatemala was interested in the protection against the American filibusters, organised disorder in Central America a decade before. A similar case was the action of the Latin American states in 1927/8. At the Pan-American Conference the Latin American states agreed the motion of non-intervention, which should impede the US activities mostly in Central America and the Caribbean.<sup>259</sup> It was a reaction towards the domination of the US in the subregions and it was initiated by the numerous American interventions. The third case is also a reaction of a Central American states. The conflict in the 1960s between the US and Panama developed to the international level and the US had to resolve it on the UN level.<sup>260</sup> The negative relations makes the subregional states to find help from outside the subregion and it diminishes the capability of the US policy because the US control over the subregion diminishes.

The second aspect is closely connected with the previous one. Usually the earlier negative relations bring the negative reaction to the US policy. The negative response shows the non-acceptance and independence of the subregional state to make the denying decision. In the case of the Guatemalan-Great Britain Treaty the first one did not accept the US protest and referred to the independence.<sup>261</sup> The case of non-

---

<sup>258</sup> In 1860 Guatemala and Great Britain concluded a Treaty, which gave Great Britain bigger economic advantages than the US had in Guatemala. The balance between the US and Great Britain, which was established with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was destroyed and the US concerned about it. Antonio José de Irisarri, Guatemalan Minister to the United States, to Lewis Cass, Secretary of State of the United States, Brooklyn New York, July 9, 1860. MANNING, 1934. pp. 908-910.

<sup>259</sup> In 1927 the Latin American states originated a principle of non-intervention, which was a result of the US interventions in Central America and Caribbean. In 1928 a motion of the principle was agreed at the VI Pan-American Conference. The US did not agree because it found that the US should protect its citizens. KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 47.

<sup>260</sup> In the beginning of the 1970s the Panama issue was the world politics issue because of the disability of the US and Panama to resolve it on the bilateral level. The conflict was discussed at the UN Security Council and in 1973 there was made a session on that issue in Panama. It was a strong Panamanian lobby, which brought the issue on the international level. OBOROTOVA, 1989, pp.16-17.

<sup>261</sup> Guatemala stated that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a bilateral agreement between the US and Great Britain and nobody asked an approval from Guatemala. The Guatemalan government said that the US should resolve the issue with the Great Britain not with Guatemala. Antonio José de Irisarri,



intervention principle the motion was agreed although the US did not agree and it was against the US interests. The lobby the US representatives made on the conference did not work and the policy failed. A similar situation was in the case of Panama conflict. The US stated that the conflict is the bilateral issue and that the world should not interfere into it. Panama did not accept it and the discussions continued on the international level. The negative reaction towards the US policy disturbed the US to execute the control over the subregion and diminished the dependency of subregion.

The third aspect, which diminishes the capability of the IIP of the US, is the external power. IIP has been incapable if there is a strong external interest towards that issue and the subregional states are able to involve the external power in the policy. In the 1927/8 Central America could involve the whole Latin America to support them and to stay against the US domination. In the 1970s Panama managed to involve the Soviet block in the conflict and therefore Panama was able to reach to the UN SC level. The support to Panama was strong and eight countries proposed even a resolution about the Panama issue but it was finally denied by the US veto.<sup>262</sup> A provoked external interest is bringing the attention of the external powers on the subregion and it gives the subregional states possibility to balance between the different powers and the balancing decreases the US ability to control the subregion.

To conclude the analysis of the IIP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. IIP has been capable in the cases when the earlier goodwill relations give advantage to the US in comparison with the other powers. IIP has been incapable in the cases the negative relations cause a negative attitude towards the US and the subregional states will not accept the US policy. Therefore they try to involve the external powers in the subregional issues to be able balance between them.

Third, I will analyse the capability of the IIP of Russia. There is not any really capable case of IIP but some are rather capable ones. Therefore I will shortly bring out the main tendencies, which make the policy more capable. The main factor, which increases the capability of the IIP of Russia, is the acceptance of the Baltic states by

---

Guatemalan Minister to the United States, to Lewis Cass, Secretary of State of the United States, Brooklyn New York, July 9, 1860. MANNING, 1934. pp. 908-910.

<sup>262</sup> BUSHUEV, 1987, p. 93

the Russian policy. The acceptance could be due to the strong dependency from Russia as it was in the case of the expulsion of the SU from the League of Nations in 1939.<sup>263</sup> Or the acceptance is because of the willingness to prove the rightness of their policies, as it was the case of the establishing of the OSCE Missions in Estonia and Latvia in 1993.<sup>264</sup> The acceptance is not very easy to reach but it is needed because IIP has not been capable if the Baltics do not agreed with the policy.

Fourth, I will bring out the main factors, which make the IIP of Russia incapable. The first factor is the disapproval of Russian policy by the Baltics governments. In 1992 the Baltics did not agree with the Russian wish to continue to host Russian troops on their territories and therefore they started to resolve the problem on the international level.<sup>265</sup> The second aspect is the external interest in the issue. The Baltics could provoke the interest of Western countries and especially the US one, which lead to the international approval of withdrawing the Russian troops from the Baltics. The strong influence from Western countries on Russia made also the process possible because the weakness of Russia at that moment. The weak power position and external pressure lobbied by the Baltics changed the Russian mind and the troops were withdrawn in 1994.

To conclude the analysis of the IIP of Russia I will notice the main tendencies. The Russian IIP is more capable in the cases the Baltic states accept the Russian policies. In the cases they do not accept the Russian policy the Baltic governments try to find international support and involve the external powers in the conflict issue. The support of the external powers will influence on Russia and Russian policy will fail. Russia is weak to resist this influence. Therefore weak position and strong external interest with negative response are the factors of the capable IIP.

---

<sup>263</sup> The Baltic states decided to be neutral in the voting because they wanted to vote for the resolution but due the strong dependency they could not do it. TARULIS, 1959. p. 165

<sup>264</sup> Russia accused Estonia and Latvia in discrimination of the Russian-speaking minorities. To prove the non-discrimination the Estonian and Latvian governments were agreed to open the OSCE Missions. MEISSNER, Boris. "Vene poliitika Balti regioonis proovikivina Venemaa suhetes Euroopaga" in *Akadeemia*, 1995, vol. 7 (76), pp. 1347-1381, p. 1364

<sup>265</sup> In 1992 the Baltics raised the issue in CSCE summit, also they called the NATO assistance and the US support. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003)

## 5.2. Alliance Policy

Alliance Policy as an International Instrument (IIAP) has been capable policy in both case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America IIAP has been used not very often because the alliance policy is used more on bilateral level. In the case study of Russia-Baltics IIAP is more used policy because the Alliance Policy is more fruitful on the international level. Eight cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>266</sup>

First, I will analyse the capable IIAP of the US. The case of establishing the Pan-American Union in 1890 is an example of the capable IIAP. The factors, which influence on the capability, are rather weak interest of external power and relatively strong position. At the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century the competition between the US and Great Britain was ending. The US had the economic domination and quite soon it achieved also the political one. Therefore Great Britain did not have very strong interest in the Central American affairs and the Pan-American Union pushed the Brits even more out from the subregion because it was based on the Monroe doctrine<sup>267</sup> that contrasted American states with European ones. The Pan-American Union was accepted because the US had enough power to protect the rights of the Latin American states and it gave the credibility to the organisation. The strength of the US was also in other terms a reason to accept the idea. The Latin American countries (and especially the smaller ones like the Central American states) saw the organisation as the instrument to resist against the excessive domination of the US.<sup>268</sup>

Second, I will analyse the incapable IIAP of the US. The case of Nicaragua Canal plans in 1849 is considered as a case of the incapable IIAP.<sup>269</sup> The factors, which made the case incapable one, are the strong external power, the weak position of the US and the instability in subregion. The supremacy of Great Britain in the subregion made the US dependent on the British interest. Although the US had relatively better

---

<sup>266</sup> See Appendix 12

<sup>267</sup> The principles of the Monroe doctrine (1823, President James Monroe) – (1) non-colonization, (2) abstention of the United States from the wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves, (3) America for Americans. BEMIS, 1943, p. 50.

<sup>268</sup> KOCH-WESER, 1936, p. 45

<sup>269</sup> The US wanted to get control over the territory of planned Nicaraguan Canal. Therefore it concluded treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras but Great Britain did not wait for the moment the US would have the right for the territories and Great Britain occupied the Tiger Islands, which gave the control over the whole canal and through it also the control from Panama to San Diego. Ephraim George Squier, United States Chargé de Affaires in Guatemala, to John M. Clayton, Secretary of State of the United States, León Nicaragua, October 25, 1849. MANNING, 1933. pp. 418-423.

relations with the Central American than Great Britain the US did not have a strong position in the world politics. Therefore Americans had to follow the British interests and Brits did not let the Americans to take over one of the most strategic area in the subregion. The Brits used the direct policy as the occupation of the Tiger Islands and also they initiated the instability by building up the fronts in Central America.<sup>270</sup> In result, the US policy to get control over the Nicaraguan Canal territory failed and therefore the policy is considered as the incapable one.

To conclude the analysis of the IIAP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. IIAP has been capable one in the cases when the US had strong position in the world politics and the external power interest in the subregion was weak one. In the case where the situation was opposite IIAP was incapable.

Third, I will analyse the factors, which are characteristic of the capable IIAP of Russia. The first aspect is the acceptance of the Baltic governments. IIAP has been capable in the cases where Russia has made a proposal, which has increased the benefit of the Baltic states and therefore it has got a positive response. The case of London convention was a broad document, securing the border area of the SU.<sup>271</sup> The Baltic states were interested in getting definition of aggression to have a basis for the future appellation if the SU could violate their rights. The broad scope of the document was also acceptable for the Baltic states and therefore they agreed the document and gave the SU a possibility to use the document as it wanted to find any motive to “protect” itself in the future. Also the case of Vilnius in the 1920s and 1930s was based on the benefit of Lithuania.<sup>272</sup> The Policy was a capable one because the support to Lithuania gave the SU the voluntary Lithuanian dependency of foreign policy.

---

<sup>270</sup> Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador supported the US, Costa Rica and Guatemala supported Great Britain. KUBYSHKIN, 1994., p. 64. The weaker position of the US put it to a difficult position to find the support from the whole subregion. The US needed the local support more than Great Britain and two fronts made the US position relatively worse than the British one.

<sup>271</sup> On the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1933 the London Convention for the Definition of Aggression was concluded. All the neighbours from Estonia to Afghanistan and Lithuania signed the document, which defined all the possible means, which could be count as hostile one towards each other. TARULIS, 1959. p. 82.

<sup>272</sup> In 1920 the Vilnius district was united with Poland. Lithuanians considered as a serious act of violation of Lithuanian right on that territory. During two decades the issue was up between Lithuania and Poland. The Soviet Russia and later the SU always supported Lithuanian claims on the Vilnius district. In that question Lithuania had a strong ally on the international level and in 1939 the SU made sure to give over the Vilnius territory from Poland to Lithuania. GARLEFF, 2001, pp. 146-147.

The second aspect, which characterises the capable IIAP, is the rather good relations between Russia and the Baltic states. Relatively positive relations bring about the acceptance of the Baltic states towards Russian politics. The case of London Convention was made in the period the Baltic states had concluded lately with the SU the mutual non-aggression pacts and there was a period of positive relations. The proposed document with a desired content resulted in success. The Vilnius case demonstrated the good relations even more. The SU was the only great power, which supported the Lithuanian claims and it caused positive atmosphere of the SU-Lithuanian relations. Lithuania had the best relations with the SU comparing with other Baltic states. Although it is not possible to state that this slightly positive character considered as the goodwill or amicable relations.

Fourth, I will analyse the incapable IIAP of Russia. The East Locarno Pact<sup>273</sup> in 1934 is an example of incapable IIAP. The Pact was not concluded because the other regional powers Germany and Poland did not have interest in concluding the agreement. The proposal, which could be a capable one because the other factors were favourable, failed because of the interests of the external powers. Germany and Poland were not interested in binding their hands with this kind of agreement because they had other interests. Therefore they did not agree and the Pact was not concluded. The low interests of Germany and Poland made also the smaller states suspicious and the Pact lost its attraction if the other powers stayed out and the SU was the only power, which was interested in concluding the agreement.

To conclude the analysis of the IIAP of Russia I will notice the main tendencies. The Russian IIAP has been capable one in the cases the Baltic governments accept the Russian policy because of the hoped benefits. It is also important that the policy is implemented in the framework of rather positive relations. The activity of external powers, which does not share the same goals with Russia, makes the IIAP incapable.

---

<sup>273</sup> In 1934 the SU proposed to make a multilateral agreement of the security guarantees, which included the states from Finland to Germany and Czechoslovakia. France could be the guarantee. TARULIS, 1959. pp. 88-89.

### **5.3. Mediation Policy**

Mediation Policy as an International Instrument (IIMP) has been incapable policy. It is analysed only in the case study of the US-Central America because Russia has not mediated any conflict in the Baltics. There is a capable case of IIMP and other cases are in transitional groups. Seven cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>274</sup>

First, I will analyse the capable case of the IIMP of the US to notice the main factors of capability. The capable case is the Washington Conference in 1907.<sup>275</sup> The conference increased the involvement of the US in the Central American affairs: it gave the US the control over the intersubregional affairs and also internal affairs of the subregional states. The main factors, which characterise the capable case of IIMP, are the stabilising effect and the low external interest. The conference was held in the situation the subregional states were in very serious chain of conflicts. The conference ended the wars and established institutions, which could resolve the further conflicts in peaceful means. It gave the legitimacy to the US policy. The second important aspect is that the US involved together with Mexico in the conflict but the last one lost quickly its interest in the process and the US could have the dominating position. Therefore the US could lead the policy, which made the Central American states dependent on the US. The helpful assistance, on the one hand, and withdrawal of the other external power, on other hand, made the US policy capable.

Second, I will analyse the factors, which cause the incapable IIMP of the US. The first of them is the strong external interest. The US mediation or its participation in the mediation process has been incapable if additionally to the US an external power has been actively participated in the mediation process. The case of Nicaraguan conflict management at the first half was an example where the US denied the external interest and wanted to achieve the desired results without external powers.<sup>276</sup> The external

---

<sup>274</sup> See Appendix 13

<sup>275</sup> In 1906 several conflicts between the Central American states caused a real turbulence in the subregion. The US and Mexico offered a mediation to these states. The last ones agreed and in 1907 a conference was held in Washington. As a result of the conference a bunch of agreements was concluded. The most important one were the following steps: the principle of non-recognition (see the subchapter 2.3) and the establishing of the Central American Court of International Justice. The US and Mexico participated as an observers but in reality the US got a crucial position and a guarantee right. BEMIS, 1943, p. 161.

<sup>276</sup> The Contadora group was working on the mediation process and they tried to make an impartial resolution. The Nicaraguan government was even agreeing but the US did not want to join the agreement. The Soviet block was also interested in the conflict management and they supported the

powers did not give the US chance to organise the conflict favourable itself. The US managed to organise the other Central American states to support the American policy but the external powers diminished this effect by globalising the conflict management. It leads to the incapable results of the IIMP of the US. The second case is the Esquipulas Peace Agreement in 1987.<sup>277</sup> The neutral document, which was not in favor of the US, was possible because of the different mediators and the Central American states balanced the US power with the other external powers. It diminished the success of the US in the mediation process. Thus, the Esquipulas Peace Agreement was not favourable resolution for the US.

The second aspect, which describes the incapability of the IIMP of the US, is the not acceptance of the subregional states. The cases where at least one party does not agree with the mediation of the US result in the incapable policy. For example, the case of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border conflict in the 1850s did not succeed because of that.<sup>278</sup> It is not possible to mediate the conflict if the US is partial in that issue and the great power involvement is considered as a support to one side. The case of the beginning of the Nicaraguan conflict in 1978-1979 was an example of the partial mediation.<sup>279</sup> The process failed already because of the one party at the talks did not agree with the plan. The conflict was intensified because of the other parties did not participate and it escalated the internal instability even more. The capable mediation requires the acceptance of all parties but if the great power wants to skip some of them or the plan is partial and unfair the mediation becomes incapable one.

The third aspect is the low stability. The conflict is an unstable environment for the policy implementation and it makes very difficult to implement a capable policy. The

---

Nicaraguan government in the UN. Some of the Latin American states supported the Nicaraguan government and they joined later with the Contadora group. GLINKIN&SUDAREV, 1992, pp. 101-103.

<sup>277</sup> The US put together a peace plan and the representatives of five Central American states went to Guatemala (Esquipulas) to finish the conflict. The US plan was not accepted but the plan of the Costa Rica President was taken as a basis of agreement. It was an open door for the external powers (EEC, OAS, UN etc). The US approved the agreement but it criticised the document very much because the Contras were not mentioned in the document and the US interests were not protected. DITRICH, 1992, pp. 202-213.

<sup>278</sup> The US and Great Britain mediated the border conflict on San Juan River. They held secret talks in Washington where they did not invite Nicaragua. The last one did not agree with the offered plan and the mediation failed. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, pp. 97-98.

<sup>279</sup> The US mediated the moderate opposition and leader of Nicaragua Somoza. The other parties were not invited to the negotiation. It gave a partial character to the mediation. However the US favorite did not agree to give up the power and the talks failed. OBOROTOVA, 1992, p. 52.

goal of the great power should be increasing the stability and it increases the control over the situation. The mediation policy bringing about bigger instability is incapable one. The case of the beginning of Nicaraguan conflict in 1978 showed that a failed mediation escalated the conflict and it resulted in a decade of bloodshed. The following mediation led by the US intensified the conflict more and more and instead of stabilisation of the situation brought about the legitimacy to mediate the US position as mediator devaluated. Thus, the increasing instability leads incapability of IIMP.

To conclude the analysis of the capability of IIMP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. IIMP has been capable one in the cases the US policy is stabilising the situation and the other external powers are retreating from the process, giving the US the domination. In the opposite situation the destabilising policy and strong interest of an external power will lead to the incapable results. An important factor is also the acceptance of all parties in the mediation of the US because the non-acceptance could be an additional factor, which leads to incapable results.

#### ***5.4. Propaganda Policy***

Propaganda Policy as an International Instrument (IIPP) has been rather incapable policy in both case studies. In the case study of the US-Central America IIPP has been relatively more capable one than in the case study of Russia-the Baltics. In the case study of Russia-Baltics IIPP has been the least incapable one. Fourteen cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>280</sup>

First, I will analyse the factors, which increase the capability of the IIPP of the US. There is not clearly any capable case but the rather capable cases. Therefore I will notice only the main factors, which bring about more capable results. The first one of them is the combination of the position of the US in the world politics and the representation of an external power in the subregion. The strong position makes the presented propaganda more capable one but it is important to notice that the subregion should be a marginal interest field of an external power. It enables the US to reflect the situation in the subregion to the world audience in the way it is beneficial to the

---

<sup>280</sup> See Appendix 14



US. The case of preparation of the Guatemalan government overthrow in 1954<sup>281</sup> and agitations against the Panamanian government in 1964<sup>282</sup> based both on the communism fear and any external power did not look into the conflicts because the arguments presented by the US were reliable because of the US position in the world politics. The second factor, which increases the capability of the IIPP of the US, is rapid change of the attitude, which bases on the internal change of the subregional state. The change of leading elite in a Central American state could cause the change of the attitude of the US to this state. The rapid attitude change makes the world audience believe in the more reliable great power than a new government of a small state. Therefore the internal changes and instability of the new governments brings about the reliability of the US and it results in the capable policy.

Second, I will analyse factors of the incapability of the IIPP of the US. The first of them is the strong external interest, which is involved in the conflict or is mediating the conflict. An involved external power can support the subregional state with the contra propaganda and bring up the conflict on the international level, building up the coalition against the great power. It was the activity of the Soviet block during the Nicaraguan crisis in the 1980s.<sup>283</sup> The neutral powers interested in the mediation of the conflict decrease also reliability of the great power propaganda. The neutral powers are able to influence on the world audience the most because information provided by them is taken as the most reliable. It is the activity of the European states and Contadora group.<sup>284</sup> Therefore the great power has an interest to exclude the

---

<sup>281</sup> The US government stated in 1954 that the Guatemalan government has made wrong changes and it is dangerous to the US, the UN and the entire world, which is against the communist power. MARTZ, 1959, p. 47.

<sup>282</sup> The shooting of Panamanian demonstrators was condemned on the world level but the US was not punished but the US action was qualified as an asymmetrical means of the conflict management. The decision was done because of the US strong lobby based on the communism threat in Central America. JACKSON, Eric. The beginning of the end of the Panama Canal Zone, 28.12.1999, World History Archives: Panama. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/354.html> (13.12.2003)

<sup>283</sup> Cuba was the closest ally of the Nicaraguan government and Nicaragua was connected with the Soviet block through Cuba. It strengthened the Nicaraguan positions in the conflict. GLINKIN& SUDAREV, 1992., pp. 137-139.

<sup>284</sup> European states recognised the elections of Nicaragua in 1984 although the US stated that the elections were undemocratic. European states demanded also that the US would end the support to the Contras in Central America and withdraw its troops from Honduras. OBOROTOVA, 1989, p. 112 The Contadora group was an *ad hoc* union established by Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela in 1982 to mediate the conflicts in Central America. NOLAN, Cathal J. Longmani maailmapoliitika leksikon. Olion, Tallinn, 1999, p. 51.

world level mediation and to resolve the conflict by itself. The subregional states are interested in involving the external neutral powers to resist the great power attacks.

The second factor, which decreases the capability of IIPP, is the earlier negative relations between the US and the subregional state. The framework of the negative relations is a factor, which decrease the reliability of the propaganda, because it shows that the great power is partial in the conflict and it increases the possibility that external powers could be involved in the conflict management. The case of the Nicaraguan conflict in 1984 showed that the US strong opposition to the Sandinista government provoked the interests of the external powers to mediate the conflict and to keep the US apart from the conflict management because the US organised “dirty policies” against Nicaragua.<sup>285</sup> Therefore the great power is interested in the quick resolving of the conflict that its partial position is not presented on the international level and that the world audience believes in its propaganda.

To conclude the analysis of IIPP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. IIPP has been rather capable in the cases where the US had strong position in the world politics and any external power is not strongly involved in the conflict. The rapid change of attitudes of the US towards the new government is also important. In the opposite cases when the external interest is high and it impedes the freedom of action of the US and the dragged conflict, which has proved by the partial position of the US, leads to the incapable IIPP.

Third, I will analyse the factors, which increase the capability of the IIPP of Russia. There is not clearly any capable case but only rather capable one therefore I will notice only the main tendencies, which could increase the capability. The capability of IIPP increases in the situation Russia has the strong position in the world politics and therefore the propaganda is made to explain the policy already implemented by Russia. The propaganda has the stabilising effect, meaning that Russia justifies the action afterwards. After the concluding the Mutual Assistance Agreement between the SU and the Baltics an effective propaganda wave was held in the Baltics and German

---

<sup>285</sup> The International Court decided in Hague in 1984 that the US should stop the blockade and chantage of the Nicaraguan ports and respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Both sides had to impede the expansion of the conflict and the conflict would stay under the jurisdiction of the International Court. DIAZ-KALEHHAS, 1988, pp.73-74.

mass media and also on the international level. The SU demonstrated its peaceful wishes.<sup>286</sup> The strong position of the SU did not lead to argue with the SU and it could enjoy the acceptance of the agreements.

Fourth, I will analyse the factors of incapability of the IIPP of Russia. The first of them is the framework of the negative relations. The earlier negative relations and an emotional propaganda cause the incapability of that policy because the extreme accuses diminish their real meaning. These accuses are considered as a non-reliable information and it increases the external interest in the subregional affairs. The external powers decrease the domination of the great power in the subregion and they can drive out the great power from the subregion. It was the case of the minority rights issues at the beginning of the 1990s.<sup>287</sup> The Russian propaganda was a result of the policies, which diminished the dominance of Russians in the Baltics. It was a result of separation of the former colonies from the centre and it caused the angry reaction. The external powers came to resolve the problem and to find out the real situation. It resulted in the unreliability of the Russian propaganda. The framework of negative relations caused the failure of the Russian IIPP because it pulled near the external powers, which proved the unreliability of the Russian propaganda.

The second factor decreasing the capability of the IIPP of Russia is the weak position of Russia. The Russian propaganda is not accepted by the world audience in the cases when Russia is too weak to undertake anything to protect its positions. The Russian propaganda sounds as a threatening but due to the weakness the presented message is not taken seriously. It is the case of the concept of 'near abroad'.<sup>288</sup> The caused propaganda was only a rhetoric instrument, which did not have any deeper meaning in the world politics because Russia was too weak to implement anything to protect its

---

<sup>286</sup> TARULIS, 1959, p. 143

<sup>287</sup> Russia accused Estonia and Latvia of the discrimination of the Russian-speaking minorities. The Baltic states were accused of the holding an apartheid and of the ethnic cleansing. Russia made a strong propaganda at the UN and at CSCE. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003). The external interest increased in the ethnic issues of Estonia and Latvia. The Western organisations send the observers to Estonia and Latvia but none of them agreed with the Russian accuses and the propaganda did not have any effect. STRANGA, 1997, p. 205.

<sup>288</sup> Russia started to use the term about the states of former SU in 1993. The goal was to mark the borders of Russian sphere of interests. It started also a big wave of negative propaganda towards the Baltic states and it destroyed the possibility of the goodwill relations. MEDVEDEV, 1998, pp. 237-238.

interests. The case of Chechnya war in 1996 was also an action of the weak power, which was not able to prove its words and this was not taken seriously.<sup>289</sup> The weakness of Russia makes the propaganda not reliable and weak (without any real support) therefore it causes the incapability of IIPP.

To conclude the analysis of the IIPP of Russia I will notice the main tendencies. The capability of IIPP has been increased if Russia had a strong position in the world politics and it made the Russian words to believe. The weak position and the framework of negative relations pulling near the external powers make the Russian IIPP incapable one.

### ***5.5. Deal Policy***

Deal Policy as an International Instrument (IIDP) has had different capability measures. In the case study of the US-Central America IIDP has been rather capable one but it has not been used very often because the US has been the only great power on the continent and most of the other great powers have not represented equally with the US. In the case study of Russia-Baltics IIDP has been rather incapable one and it has been used more often because Russia has continually competed with other great powers in the Baltics. Eight cases are analysed in this subchapter.<sup>290</sup>

First, I will analyse the capability of the IIDP of the US. The capable case is the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1900.<sup>291</sup> The main factors, which characterise the capability, are the increasing position of the US in the world politics and the decreasing interest of the external power. At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the US position increased thanks to the rapid industrialisation and economic growth. The US did not reach on the level of the European states in political terms but on the American continent its position was stronger. Therefore the logical step was that the US wanted to change the older treaty

---

<sup>289</sup> The Baltic states accused Russia of the violation of human rights because of the Chechnya war. Russia answered to it with the propaganda that the Baltics support the Chechnya separatists morally and economically. MEDVEDEV, 1998, pp. 241-242.

<sup>290</sup> See Appendix 15

<sup>291</sup> The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty concluded in 1850 divided the sphere of influence in Central America between the US and Great Britain. In 1898 the US made proposal to change the Treaty, they did it but the US did not agree and it did not ratify changes. Then a new Treaty was concluded, which gave the US the right to own and protect the Canal, which had to unite the West and East Coast. It annulated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and Great Britain moved its main interests away from Central America. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 199.

of spheres of influence with Great Britain. The last one had concentrated more on the European issues because of the change of the power structure, which was initiated in Europe. The US used the opportunity to gain from the power changes and therefore the policy implemented by the US was capable one.

Second, I will analyse incapability of the IIDP of the US. The case of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850 was an incapable example of IIDP.<sup>292</sup> The Treaty gave equal rights to both sides but Great Britain had better position in the moment of concluding the Treaty and it did not surrender its advantages but the US closed with the Treaty opportunities to get the advantages that Great Britain had already. Therefore this policy was a failure and it is possible to consider as an incapable policy. The factors, which influenced on it, were the strong external power and a weak position of the US in the world politics. Also the inexperienced foreign policy, which was not ready to meet the old and experienced great power, brought about the failure. Great Britain outmatched the US and the results, which seemed to be in the beginning very successful, occurred soon the obstacles in the Central American affairs.

To conclude the analysis of the IIDP of the US I will notice the main tendencies. IIDP has been capable in the cases the US had strong position in the world politics and an external power is losing its interest in the subregion. In the opposite situation where the US had a weak position and an external power had a strong interest in the subregion the IIDP of the US has been incapable one.

Third, I will analyse the capability of the IIDP of Russia. There have not been clearly capable cases of IIDP. Some cases are rather capable ones and I will notice the main tendencies, which can make the policy more capable. It is possible to deduce the three factors, which bring about the capability of IIDP. The strong or rather strong position of Russia is needed that it would be a partner to make a deal. It is the case of the

---

<sup>292</sup> In the late 1840s Great Britain activated its actions in Central America, occupying strategic positions in the subregion. The US stated that it would occupy some states in Central America to get equal positions with Great Britain. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 65. Finally two superpowers decided to agree to have control over Central America together. In 1850 the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was concluded. According the Treaty the US and Great Britain had equal rights in the subregion and all the advantages they would get in the future had to expand to another. BEMIS, 1943, pp. 106-107. The agreement was concluded without asking anything from the subregional states. KUBYSHKIN, 1994, p. 67.

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939<sup>293</sup> or Yeltsin's letter to Clinton in 1996<sup>294</sup>. The second important aspect is an interested external partner to make a deal. The policy has been more capable in the cases if there has been something to trade because potential partner should get something as good the Baltic subregion is. The location of the Baltic states is very "hot" and if a great power has to give up the interest in the Baltics it should get something as valuable. If Russia is able to offer it the policy is capable. The third aspect is the instability of the environment of the Baltic foreign policy. The policy is more capable in the situation when the position of the Baltic states is not clear and nobody has confirmed its rights or surrender the interest in the Baltic subregion. It means that the policy is more capable the Baltic states are left to the grey zone in the foreign policy.

Fourth, I will analyse the incapability of the IIDP of Russia. The first factor, which makes IIDP incapable one, is the external power. The low interest in making a deal causes a failure and the incapability of policy. The external power could have lower interest in the subregion or it does not see the necessity for the deal. It is the case of the SU-Polish Baltic declaration in 1933.<sup>295</sup> Poland did not have any interests to make a deal with the SU because it did not have any crucial interests in the Baltic subregion. In this period Poland had bigger interests in Germany and the agreement was not concluded. A similar case was in 1934 when the SU made the same proposal to Germany. Germany did not agree because it did not see the necessity of this agreement.<sup>296</sup> Germany had bigger interest in Central Europe than in the Baltics and therefore the agreement was not concluded. The external power could also be not agreed if the offer had been made. It is the case of the SU negotiations with Great Britain and France in 1939 spring-summer.<sup>297</sup> The agreement was not succeeded

---

<sup>293</sup> The SU and Germany concluded a secret protocol. They divided the Eastern Europe between each other. The SU got the Baltic states. The protocol concluded without any consult with the states agreed about. GARLEFF, 2001, pp. 158-160.

<sup>294</sup> The Russian President Yeltsin wrote to the American President Clinton that the US would not state public support to the Baltic membership in NATO. The US did not present it and Russia took it as a diplomatic victory. KAUPPILA, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003).

<sup>295</sup> The SU offered to Poland to guarantee the sovereignty and integrity of the Baltic states and to have a right of intervention if the internal developments of these states are not suitable to Poland or the SU. STRANGA, 1998, p. 422.

<sup>296</sup> TARULIS, 1959, pp. 86-87

<sup>297</sup> The SU, Great Britain and France wanted to conclude an assistance agreement in the case the war would brake out. The SU was interested in getting the right to act in the Baltics but Great Britain and

because the parties did not find a compromise. The SU could not offer anything to Great Britain and France that they could agree in giving the SU free hand in Baltics. The unwillingness to reach the deal is the most important factor of incapability of IIDP.

The second factor, which influences on the lower scale, is the reaction of the subregional states. If the subregional states do not agree with the deal and it is stated public on the world level then it could diminish the possibility to achieve the deal. This aspect is relevant only if the deal is made publicly. The case of Poland and also the case of the trilateral negotiations both had a strong denial from the Baltic governments. The disagreement influenced on Poland and it was an argument not to conclude the agreement with the SU.<sup>298</sup> Great Britain and France also resisted making an agreement, which is against the free will of the Baltic states.<sup>299</sup> The active lobby of the subregional states on the international level could result in the failure of a deal.

To conclude the analysis of IIDP of Russia I will notice the main tendencies. IIDP is more capable in the cases the Russia has strong position and a partner interested in making a deal. The instable foreign policy environment of the Baltics brings about to a capable policy. The low interest of the external power to make a deal and strong protest from the subregion causes the incapability of the IIDP of Russia.

\*\*\*\*

To conclude the chapter I bring out the main tendencies, which are characteristic of the capability of International Instruments (See Figure 4). To generalise the factors, which have made the International Instruments of US capable ones, it is possible to notice the following tendencies. The US policies have been capable if the external interests in Central America have been low and the US has had a strong position. It leads to the domination. The framework of positive relations brings also capability. The strong external interest and weak position of the US lead to the incapability. The earlier negative relations and non-acceptance from Central America cause also an incapable result.


---

France were skeptical in this point. ILMJÄRV, Magnus. "Eesti ja Läti Nõukogude Liidu, Suurbritannia ja Prantsusmaa läbirääkimistes 1939. aastal" in *Acta Historica Tallinienisa* vol. 6. 2002, pp. 125-173.

<sup>298</sup> TARULIS, 1959, p. 87.

<sup>299</sup> ILMJÄRV, 2002, p. 134

**Figure 4. Average Capability of International Instruments.**



To generalise the factors, which have made the Russian International Instruments capable ones, it is possible to present the following tendencies. Russian policies have been capable ones in the cases when Russia has had a strong position in the world politics. The acceptance of the Baltic states brings about also the capable results. The strong external interest in the Baltics has led to the incapable results of Russian policies. The weak position of Russia in the world politics and the non-acceptance of the Baltic states cause incapability of the Russian policies.



## **Conclusions**

The present study analysed the policies of the great power towards a geostrategic subregion. The policies are initiated by the interest of great power to get control over the geostrategic subregion, which means that the great power aims at the dependency of the subregion. The policies are a part of the process of establishing dependency and they could conduce or impair the process depending on their capability. Therefore the title of this research is “Capability of Dependency Policies of Great Power Towards a Geostrategic Subregion: case studies of the US-Central America and Russia-the Baltics”.

In this framework two case studies are presented – the US policies towards Central America and the Russian policies towards the Baltic states. Both subregions have crucial meaning for the respective great powers in different ways. The subregions are key territories of important geopolitical regions – Central America is a key territory for Latin America and the Baltics is a key territory of Baltic Sea region. They have also strategic-military meaning for respective great powers and the economic meaning of the subregions has a crucial position in the geoeconomy of the great powers. Central America has the only Canal, which unites the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific one, and the Baltics with its ice-free ports is a door on the West-East trade route. Considering these aspects the US and Russia have interests to have control respectively over the Central America and the Baltics. This study analysed the Dependency Policies of the US towards Central America and Russian one towards the Baltics.

The purpose of this study was to analyse the policies of the process of establishing dependency and to notice the main tendencies, which increase or decrease the ability of a great power to have control over the geostrategic subregion. Therefore I showed that the policy analysis, which takes account only the goals and results in comparison of the desired results with the achieved ones, does not describe the policies as a process sufficiently. Thus, I also proposed to take into account also other factors, which are influencing on the policy process. I proposed to consider the following factors: reaction of the subregional states, interest of an external power in the subregion, position of the great power in the world politics, stability of the subregion

(before and after the policy implementation), earlier relations between the great power and the subregional states, the result of the policy. Considering all these factors it is possible to evaluate the policies in the right context. It was the main statement of my study that I proved during the analysis, presenting the main tendencies, which factors have influenced most the capability of the policies in the process of establishing dependency.

Methodological instrument of this study was the Formula of Measures of Capability of Dependency Policies. The formula combined the above-mentioned factors and with its help it was possible to give the number values of the policies. Every factor had a qualitative scale equal to the number values, which were given considering their impact in the system. All the cases got a value on the scale from -20 to 20 points. The criterion was given that higher points reflect more capable policy according to the values and they were listed according to it. The formula helped to systemise 220 cases according to the equal criteria, which took account the above-mentioned factors in the same way. The formula had two main parts: the actors (subregional states and external power) and environment (stability), which both were influenced by the condition factors (respectively the great power's position and earlier stability). Another condition factor (earlier relations) influences on both parts of the formula. The achieved result of the policy adds the general character of the policy.

In the study the different policies were divided into four groups of policy instruments: Political Instruments, Economic Instruments, Military Instruments and International Instruments. All of them have their own features and they form the characters of different policies. The policy instruments were divided, in their turn, into several types of policies: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Recognition Policy, Mediation Policy, Threatening Policy, Propaganda Policy and Deal Policy. All the policy types were not analysed by every policy instrument because there were not possible to find out the cases, which were suitable for all the groups. The cases were analysed in the context of the policy instruments and the criterion value of the capability of the policy was relative one. It means that the borderlines were drawn inside the case studies and political instruments basing on the comparison of the policies, which had the same features and the same implementation context. The inside comparison was made because of the purpose of the study: to bring out the main tendencies of what kind of

the factors increase and decrease the most the ability of the great power to control the geostrategic subregion.


The study consisted of five chapters, which followed the methodology. The first chapter was the methodology chapter and I presented the main concepts of the study in it: the Dependency of Geostrategic Subregion, Dependency Policies and Capability of Dependency Policies. I defined the notion of the geostrategic subregion and I explained the great power's interest on establishing the dependency of the subregion. I also defined the policy instruments and according to the instruments I defined the policies mentioned above. In the end of the first chapter I presented the Formula of Measures of Capability of Dependency Policies as the main methodology instrument.

In the following four chapters the case studies were presented. Every policy instrument was a chapter. All of them followed by the same scheme of analysis. I presented the different policy types in separate subchapters. In every subchapter I analysed firstly the cases study of the US policies – first the capable cases and thereafter the incapable cases. Secondly I analysed the Russian policies – the capable and incapable cases. In the end of the analysis of the case study I presented the main tendencies, which described the capability and incapability of the policies. The second chapter of this study was the Political Instruments, which consisted of five subchapters: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Recognition Policy, Mediation Policy and Threatening Policy. Due to the lack of relevant cases the Russian Mediation Policies and the US Threatening Policies were not analysed. The third chapter of this study was the Economic Instruments, which was divided into two subchapters: Intervention Policy and Alliance Policy. The fourth chapter dealt with the Military Instruments, which consisted of three subchapters: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy and Threatening Policy. The last chapter was International Instruments, which was divided into five subchapters: Intervention Policy, Alliance Policy, Mediation Policy, Propaganda Policy and Deal Policy. The Russian Mediation Policies were not analysed due to the absence of the cases.

Using the above-described methodology I concluded that the Dependency Policies of the US have been more capable than the Russian ones because the implementations of the policies of two great powers have been in different environment (See the Figure

5). The most capable policies of the US have been the policies of Economic Instruments. The policies of the Political Instruments have been quite capable in the case study of the US. The incapable policies have been the Military Instruments and the least capable policies are the International Instruments. In the case study of Russian policies the most capable policies have been the Military Instruments and also the policies of the International Instruments have been capable too. The Economic Instruments and Political Instruments have been less capable.

**Figure 5. Average Capabilities of Instruments of the Great Powers**



There are several reasons why the results of two case studies have been so different. I present three main explanations: ideology of the foreign policy of the great power, bilateral relations between the great power and the states of the subregion and powers' concentration. First, the difference of the great power's ideology of the foreign policy is very different in the US and in Russia. The US foreign policy bases on the conception of the liberal-maritime power. Therefore the foreign economy relations prevail over the political-military policies in the US foreign policy. The US foreign policy is characterised by the principle that the foreign economy relations are supported by the political and military means. Thus, the most capable policies are the

Economic Instruments. The Russian ideology of foreign policy is characterised by the conception of the conservative-continental power. Therefore the Russian foreign policy elite has preferred to use the political-military means and the foreign economic relations are rather background instruments in the foreign policy. The foreign economy relations are used as an extra instrument, which could support the political-military means. Thus, the Military Instruments of Russia have been more capable policies and the Economic Instruments have been more incapable.

The second aspect is the bilateral relations between the great power and the states of the subregions. The centripetal forces are characteristic of the relations between the US and the Central America states. The last ones perceive the US as a partner and a power they are interested in the bilateral co-operation. The US has never had officially the territories of the Central American states (except the territory of Panama Canal) and the relations have mostly been non-opposing. However the US had a very strong position in Central America. Therefore the Political Instruments of the US have been more capable and the Military Instruments, which cause stronger opposition, have been incapable. In addition, most of the issues are resolved on the bilateral level between the US and the Central American states. The issues, which have been raised to the international level, have been serious conflicts. The resolving of these conflicts has not been successful because of the other powers, which are involved in the conflict management. Thus, the International Instruments of the US have been less capable. The centrifugal forces are characteristic of the Russian-Baltic relations and neither the Baltic states nor Russia perceive each other as partners and therefore the development of bilateral relations is impeded. Russia has ruled territories of the Baltic states and the independence of the Baltic states is a result of separation from Russian empire. Therefore the bilateral relations between Russia and the Baltic states have an opposing character mutually. It has decreased the capability of the Political Instruments of Russia. Lots of the issues are raised on the international level where the bilateral problems are resolved. Thus, the International Instruments of Russia have been more capable.

The third aspect is the power concentration near to the subregion. The US has been the only real great power on the continent of America and therefore the US domination over Central America has been questioned not very often in the history.

Some of the European powers have tried to compete with the US in Central America but the geographical advantages of the US have favoured the US in this competition. In addition, the expansion of the European powers to America is perceived as imperialism and it gives the US moral advantage. Therefore the Economic Instruments and Political Instruments have been more capable because they have been less aggressive and often they demonstrate the American solidarity. The US has not had a necessity for military domination over Central America to strengthen its positions in the subregion. Therefore the US Military Instruments have been incapable because of the aggressive feature and diminishing the American solidarity, repelling the US from Central America. On the contrary, Russia has always fought for its positions in the Baltics because in Europe there is a high concentration of powers and the conflicts between them are very common phenomenon. Therefore it has been necessary to Russia to dominate militarily in the Baltics to secure its positions in the subregion. It has changed the Military Instruments of Russia more capable than the others. The continued competition of great powers in the Baltics has produced the alternative options for the Baltic states. The above-mentioned centrifugal powers lead the Baltic governments to decide for the opponent of Russia and it has made the Political Instruments and Economic Instruments less capable.

Taking into account the above-described context I will conclude the main tendencies, which increase or decrease the ability of a great power to have control over the subregion.<sup>300</sup> The most influencing factor has been the external power in the case of the US policies. In the cases where the external power(s) has low interest in the Central American affairs the US policies have been more capable to increase the ability of the US to have control over Central America. And otherwise, if it has been the strongest factor in the cases where the external power(s) has had a strong interest in the Central American affairs the US policies have been less capable. The existence of an external power in the subregion has given an alternative option to the Central American governments. The second factor, which has influenced on the US policies in Central America, is the stability. The US policies, which are implemented in the stable or increasing stability environment have been more capable to increase the US ability to have control over Central America. And otherwise, the US policies have

---

<sup>300</sup> See Table 2 in Appendix 20

been less capable in the unstable or destabilising environment. The strong influence of the environment is because of the political culture of the subregion and this influence is characteristic of the relations between the US and Central America. The third factor, which influences on the capability of the US policies to increase its ability of having control over the subregion, is the character of the earlier relations. The earlier positive relations have conduced the capability of the US policies in Central America. The earlier negative relations have decreased the capability of the US policies. In this aspect the above described influences of the centripetal forces in the bilateral relations. The fourth factor, which has influenced on the capability of the US policies, is the response of the Central American states to the US policies. The supporting reaction policy of the Central American states has increased its ability of the US to have control over the subregion and the negative response has decreased this ability. This factor has a small influence on the US policies because the US has power enough to ignore the reaction of Central America if the above-listed factors are in favour of the US. The less influencing factor has been the US position in the world politics. The strong position of the US has increased the ability of the US to have control over the subregion and otherwise, the weak position has decreased this ability. The weak influence of this factor is connected with the separate location of the US from the other powers and mostly the constant strength, which makes the observation of this factor worse.

The factors, which have influenced the capability of the Russian policies to increase the ability of Russia to have control over the Baltics are not clearly mutually related as it was in the case study of the US and Central America. The most influencing factors, which have increased the Russian ability to have control over the subregion, are the Russian strong position in the world politics and the supporting response of the Baltic governments to Russian policies. It means that the Russian policies are more capable in the cases where Russia is strong and its positions in the Baltics are not questioned or can force its willingness in the Baltic states. Or in the cases where the Baltic states, which try to withdraw from Russian interest sphere, do not perceive any big threat and they will accept the policy. The most influencing factor, which decreases the Russian ability to have control over the Baltics, is the strong external interest in the Baltics. The Russian interest has a high potential to clash with the interests of the other powers due to the above-described high concentration of the

powers and therefore this factor influences most the Russian policies negatively. The negative response of the Baltic governments has also strong influence on the incapability of the Russian policies. It is connected with the above-described centrifugal forces and if Russia is not able to force its policies on the Baltic states the policies will decrease the Russian ability to have control over the subregion. The third factor, which influences on the capability of Russian policies, is the weak external interest in the Baltics and it enables Russia to dominate in the subregion. The weak external interest decreases the possibility of clashes of the powers in the subregion. The weak external power influences less on the capability of the Russian policies than the strong interest because usually the strong interest of an external power occurs at the same time with the decrease of the Russian position in the world politics and during this change the external power can influence more on Russia. The weak position is the next factor, which leads to incapability of Russian policies. It could cause the strengthening of the centrifugal forces and domination of the external powers in the subregion. A similar way the negative framework of the Russian-the Baltics relations leads to the incapability of Russian policies. The mutual distrust, which is caused by this framework leads to negative response of the Baltic governments. On the other hand, the weak position of Russia can be the factor, which increases the ability of Russia to have control over the subregion, but it is only in using the Economic Instruments and Alliance policy of Political Instruments because in these policies the Baltic states perceive the Russian weakness to get benefit from the Russian policy. The less influencing factor of Russian policies is the stability because the Baltics is relatively stable subregion and it is difficult to observe the influence of stability. It is possible to point out that the instability of foreign policy situation of the Baltics conduce the capability of the Russian policies because it has enabled Russia to use the vague situation and to strengthen its positions in the Baltics. Instability in the Baltics can lead to incapability but this tendency is not very well proved.

To conclude I notice that the case study of the US-Central America is more corresponded with the model of the methodology and different factors are more correspondent. The factors are not strongly correspondent in the Russian-the Baltics case and the same factors could lead to capability and incapability of the policy depending on the combination of the other factors. Basing on that situation I assume



that Central America is more dependent on the US than the Baltics on Russia. This assumption is not proved in this study. To prove the assumption it is needed work out the criteria of Measures of Dependency, which enable to evaluate the dependency of the subregion. This study evaluated the capability of the policies, which is the evaluation of the process but the result was not evaluated. To evaluate the dependency it is needed to make another analysis.

## Literature

### Books and articles

**Adams, Richard N.**

“Social Change in Guatemala and U.S. Policy” *Social Change in Latin America Today. It's Implication for United States Policy*, Adams, Richard N., Gillian, John P., Lewis, Oscar, Patch, Richard W., Holmberg, Allan R., Wagley Charles, Bryson, Lyman, Vintage Books: New York, 1960, pp.-231-284

**Arend, Anthony Clark & Beck, Robert J.**

*International Law and the Use of Force*. Routledge: London, 1993

**Bemis, Samuel Flagg**

*The Latin American Policy of the United States. An Historical Interpretation*.

Harcourt, Brace and Company: New York, 1943

**Busygina, Irina**

“Russia, the Baltic states and the European Union” *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, ed. by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia: Riga, 1998, pp. 502-518

**Clark, Michael**

“The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis” *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, eds. M. Clark and B. White, Elgar: Brookfield, 1990, pp. 27-59

**Diaz-Kalehhas, Apolinar**

«Контадор» вызов прошен: *Латинская Америка против империалистических амбиций США*. Прогресс: Москва, 1988

**Ditrich, Wolfgang**

*Правда о конфликте в Центральной Америке, 1983-1989*. РАН ИЛА: Москва, 1992

**Dos Santos, Theotonio**

“The Structure of Dependence” *American Economic Review*, vol. 60, 1970, pp. 231-236

*ENE 4*. Valgus: Tallinn, 1989

**Feinberg, Richard E.**

“Central America: Options for U.S. Policy in the 1980s” *Political Change in Central America – Internal and External Dimensions*, eds. Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, Jörg Todt, Westview Press: Boulder, 1984, pp. 172-183

**Garcia, Rigoberto.**

“Integration or Disintegration: the Central American Common Market” *Central America: Crises and Possibilities*, ed. Rigoberto Garcia, Institute of Latin American Studies Monograph nr. 16: Stockholm, 1988, pp. 74-91

**Gari, Jose**

“Bilateral Development Assistance to Central America” *Central America: Crises and Possibilities*, ed. Rigoberto Garcia, Institute of Latin American Studies Monograph nr. 16: Stockholm, 1988, pp. 112-134

**Garleff, Michael**

*Die Baltischen Länder. Estland, Lettland, Litauen von Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart.* Verlag Friedrich Pustet: Regensburg; Süsteuropa-Gesellschaft: München, 2001

**Gellman, Irwin F.**

*Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America 1933-1945.* John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, London, 1979

**Hazan, Barukh**

*Soviet Impregnational Propaganda.* Ardis: Michigan, 1982

**Hinkkanen, Merja-Liisa**

“Bridges and Barriers, pawns and Actors. The Baltic states in East-West Relations in the 1920s” *Studia Baltica Stockolmiensia* vol. 8, 1991, pp. 431-442

**Holsti, K. J.**

*International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.* New Jersey, 1995

**Ilmjärv, Magnus**

“Konstantin Päts ja Nõukogude Liidu Tallinna saatkond: aastad 1925-1934” *Acta Historica Tallinnensia* vol. 3, 1999, pp. 156-223

**Ilmjärv, Magnus**

“Eesti ja Läti Nõukogude Liidu, Suurbritannia ja Prantsusmaa läbirääkimistes 1939. aastal” *Acta Historica Tallinienisa* vol. 6, 2002, pp. 125-173

**Keohane, Robert O., Nye, Joseph S.**

“Realism and Complex Interdependency” *Power and Interdependency: World Politics in Transition*, Little, Brown: Boston, 1977, pp. 401-421

**Koch-Weser, Volker**

*Erwirkungen der Regierung den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika auf die zentral-amerikanischen und westindischen Republiken.* Georg Fisher & Co: Berlin, 1936

**Leeds, Brett Ashley**

“Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 427-439

**Manning, William R.** (ed.)

*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning Independence of the Latin-American Nations Vol. II.* Oxford University Press: New York, 1925

**Manning, William R.** (ed.)

*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Inter American Affairs 1831-1860. Vol. III – Central-America 1831-1850.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, 1933

**Manning, William R.** (ed.)

*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Inter American Affairs 1831-1860. Vol. IV – Central-America 1851-1860.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, 1934

**Martz, John D.**

*Central America: the Crises and the Challenge.* University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1959

**Medina Kastro, Manuel**

*Соединенные Штаты и Латинская Америка XIX века. (История экспансии США).* Прогресс: Москва, 1974

**Medvedev, Sergei**

“Geopolitics and Beyond: The New Russian Policy Towards the Baltic States” *The European Union and the Baltic States: Visions, Interests and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region*, ed. by Mathias Jopp and Sven Arnswald, Kauhavan Sanomalehti Oy: Kauhava, 1998, pp. 235-269

**Meissner, Boris**

“Vene poliitika Balti regioonis proovikivina Venemaa suhetes Euroopaga” *Akadeemia*, 1995, vol. 7 (76), pp. 1347-1381

**Meissner, Boris**

“The Occupation of the Baltic States from a Present-Day Perspective” *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, ed. by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia: Riga, 1998, pp. 473-488

**Nolan, Cathal J.**

*Longmani maailmapoliitika leksikon.* Olion: Tallinn, 1999

**Pastor, Robert A.**

“A Question of U. S. National Interest in Central America” *Political Change in Central America – Internal and External Dimensions*, eds. Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, Jörg Todt, Westview Press: Boulder, 1984, pp. 184-215

**Perkins, Dexter**

*The United States and the Caribbean.* Harvard University Press: Massachusetts, 1966

**Puheloinen, Ari**

*Russia's Geopolitical Interests in the Baltic Area*. National Defence College: Helsinki, 1999

**Ratzel, Friedrich**

“The Laws of Spatial Growth of States” *The Structure of Political Geography*, eds. R. Kasperson and J. Minghi, Aldine: Chicago, 1969, pp. 17-28

**Rauch, von Georg**

*Balti riikide ajalugu 1918-1940*. Detlar: Tallinn, 1995

**Snyder, Glenn H.**

“Alliance Theory: a Neorealist First Cut” *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer90, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 103-123

**Stranga, Aivars**

“Baltic Russian Relations: 1995-beginning 1997” *Small States in a Turbulent environment: The Baltic Perspective*, ed. by Atis Lejiņš & Žaneta Ozoliņa, Latvian Institute of International Affairs: Riga, 1997, pp. 184-237

**Stranga, Aivars**

“Russian and Polish Policies in the Baltic States from 1933 to 1935” *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, ed. by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia: Riga, 1998, pp.420-441

**Tarulis, Albert N.**

*Soviet Policy Towards the Baltic States 1918-1940*. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1959

**Tõnisson, Evald**

“Idatee, Austrvegr, Österled – läänemeresoome perspektiivis” *Austrvegr* 1/1995, pp. 7-10

**Vershinin, Vladislav A.**

“Russias national interests and the dynamics of Russo-Baltic relations” *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st century*, ed. by Dr. Tālvas Jundzis, Academy of Science of Latvia, Riga, 1998, pp. 519-539

**Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I.**

*Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decision*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 1998

**Zile, Lubova**

“Baltic-Russian Cooperation During the Restoration of Independence (1990 until 1991 putch)” *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: Political, economic, and legal problems in the context of international cooperation on the doorstep of the 21st*

century, ed. by Dr. Tālvass Jundzis. Academy of Science of Latvia: Riga, 1998, pp. 489-501

Аналитический Доклад «Россия и Прибалтика» координаторы рабочей группы И. Ю. Юргенс, С. А. Караганов, Совет по внешней и оборонной политике: Москва, 1997

**Бушуев, Валерий Геннадиевич**

*Латинская Америка – США: революция и контрреволюция. Международные отношения:* Москва, 1987

**Вишня, Григорий Федотович**

*США – Латинская Америка: внешнеполитические отношения в современных условиях (1968-1976 гг.).* Наука: Москва, 1978

**Глинкин, А.Н., Сударев, В.П.**

*Центральноамериканский конфликт: от противоборства к урегулированию.* Российская Академия Наук Институт Латинской Америки: Москва, 1992

**Гонионский, Семен Александрович**

*Латинская Америка и США. Очерки истории дипломатических отношений. 1939-1959.* ИМО: Москва, 1960

**Зубок, Л. И.**

*Империалистическая политика США в странах Карибского бассейна 1900-1939.* Академия Наук СССР: Москва, 1948

**Колосов, В. А., Мироненко, Н. С.**

*Геополитика и политическая география.* Аспект Пресс: Москва, 2001

**Кубышкин, Александр Иванович**

*Англо-американское соперничество в Центральной Америке в XIX – начала XX века.* Издательство Саратовского Университета, Саратов: 1994

**Курашева, И. М.**

*“Панама: последствия экономических санкций США” Центральная Америка и Карибы,* Бекаревич, А. Д., Академия Наук СССР Институт Латинской Америки: Москва, 1991, pp. 179-191

**Оборотова, Марина Алексеевна**

*США борьба с освободительным движением в Центральной Америке (1977-1988).* Наука: Москва, 1989

**Селезнев, Георги Константинович**

*«Доктрина Джонсона» – угроза Латинской Америки.* Знание: Москва, 1967

**Станченко, В. И.**

*Центральноамериканской конфликт 1980-1988 гг. (Глобальные и региональные аспекты).* Академия Наук СССР Институт Мировой Экономики и Международных Отношений: Москва, 1990

**Тарасов, Константин Сергеевич & Зубенко, Вячеслав Василевич**  
*Тайная война США против Латинской Америки. Международные отношения:*  
Москва, 1987

**Янчук, Игорь Иванович**  
*Политика США в Латинской Америке, 1918-1928.* Издательство «Наука»:  
Москва, 1982

### **Internet Sources**

Caribbean Basin Initiative [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belize/bz\\_appnd.html](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belize/bz_appnd.html)  
(09.12.2003)

**Chace, James; Rizopoulos, Nicholas X.**  
“Grand Strategy—Toward a New Concert of Nations: An American Perspective”  
*World Policy Journal*, Fall 1999, vol. XVI, 3,  
[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wpj/wp\\_99chj05.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wpj/wp_99chj05.html) (10.02.2004)

“Chronology Of Guatemala's 36-Year Civil War”, *Reuter*, 29 December 1996, World  
History Archives: Guatemala. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/161.html>  
(13.12.2003)

**Čiugčda, Donatas**  
“Baltic States in the perspective of Russia’s security policy” *Lithuanian Foreign  
Policy Review* 99/ 4. <http://www.lfpr.lt/994/8.doc> (13.12.2003)

**Doyle, Kate & Kornbluh, Peter**  
“CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents”, 14.08.1997, World  
History Archives: Guatemala. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/156.html>

**Elagin, Viacheslav**  
“Estonia: Difficult Road from Tallinn to Moscow” *International Affairs Magazine*,  
May-June 2001. No. 003. Russian Monitor.  
[http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu\\_id=11\\_a\\_998](http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu_id=11_a_998) (13.12.2003)

**Farah, Douglas**  
“Papers Expand on U.S. Role in Guatemala”, *Washington Post*, 12.03.1999,  
World History Archives: Guatemala.  
<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/150.html> (13.12.2003)

**Ferraro, Vincent**  
*Dependency Theory: An Introduction.*  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm> (13.03.2004)

**Haugaard, Lisa**  
“Foreign Policy in Focus: Nicaragua” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Vol. 2 No. 32, March  
1997, World History Archives: Nicaragua.  
<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/298.html> (13.12.03)

**Hobson, John A.**

*Imperialism: A Study*. 1902,

<http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Hobson/hbsnImp12.html> (14.03.04)

**Jackson, Eric**

*The beginning of the end of the Panama Canal Zone*. 28.12.1999, World History

Archives: Panama. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/354.html> (13.12.2003)

**Jervis, Robert**

“Introduction” *The New American Interventionism Essays from Political Science*

*Quarterly*, ed. by Demetrios James Caraley, New York: Columbia University Press,

1999 <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/caraley/intro.html> (06.02.2004)

**Kauppila, Laura**

“The Baltic Puzzle - Russia's Policy towards Estonia and Latvia 1992 – 1997”

*Electronic Publications @ University of Helsinki*

<http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/thebalti.html> (13.12.2003)

**Kirshner, Jonathan**

*Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War*. Cornell University Peace

Studies Program, 1997, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/kij02/kij02.pdf> (14.03.04)

Lonely Planet: Honduras:

[http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/central\\_america/honduras/history.htm](http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/central_america/honduras/history.htm)

(13.12.2003)

Office of the United States Trade Representative:

<http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/cafta.htm> (01.04.2004)

**Sakhuja, Vijay**

“Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication” *Strategic Analysis:*

*A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, August 2001, vol. XXV, No. 5.

[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\\_aug01sav01.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_aug01sav01.html) (16.03.04)

**Smith, M. A.**

“Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad”, December 2000, Defence

Academy of the United Kingdom Conflict Studies Research Centre

<http://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/documents/pdfs/F71-mas.pdf> (13.12.2003)

**Taylor, Philip M.**

*Propaganda From Thucydides To Thatcher: Some Problems, Perspectives & Pitfalls.*

1992, <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/arts-pt1.htm> (13.03.2004)

The US Federal Research Division: Belize. Foreign Relations. Relations with the

United States <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi->

[bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+bz0101\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bz0101)) (08.12.03)



The U.S. Department of State: Belize <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1955.htm>  
(09.12.03)


The US State Department: El Salvador <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8975.htm>  
(09.12.03)

“U.S. Military Civic Action Programs and Democratization in Central America” *The Democracy Backgrounder* a publication of the Interhemispheric Resource Center, Vol. 1, no. 3, 6 September 1995, World History Archives: Central America. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/004.html> (09.12.2003)

## **APPENDICES**

## Appendix 1. Political Instruments: Intervention Policy

**Figure 6. Intervention Policy as Political Instrument on Time Scale**



### *Cases of the US-Central America*


<i>Cases of the US-Central America</i>	<i>Capability</i>
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1848	8.50
The First Walker's Invasion, the I half of 1850s	-0.53
Walker's Attempts to Unify Central America, in the middle of 1850s	-0.05
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1859	2.00
Hindering of the Process of Building up the Central American Confederation, the 1880s	5.50
Establishing of Panama state, 1903	13.00
The First Treaty of Panama Canal, 1903	12.50
Interventions in Panama Internal Affairs, 1908-1918	9.00
<i>Coup d'etat</i> in Nicaragua, 1910	1.38
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, 1914	5.63
Elections Reform in Nicaragua, 1923	8.63
<i>Coup d'etat</i> in Panama, 1941	2.50
Political Crisis in Costa Rica, 1948	5.50
Expelling of Guatemala from the Organization of the Central American States, 1953	-1.75
Invasion in Guatemala, 1954	0.58

(Appendix 1 continues)

Assistance of Guatemalan Governments 1954-the 1980s	10.00
Demonstration in Panama, 1959-1964	-1.25
Ending of the Somoza's regime in Nicaragua, 1978-1979	6.00
Human Rights' Policy, the 1970s	-4.00
<i>Coup d'etat</i> in Nicaragua, 1979	-3.25
Salvadorian Crisis, the 1980s	0.80
Establishing of Contras Resistance in Nicaragua, 1982	0.30
Political Boycott of Nicaraguan Government, in the middle of 1980s	-1.00
Naming Panama as an Instability Zone, 1988	-1.25
Build-up of Salvador, the 1990s	4.13
Build-up of Nicaragua, the 1990s	6.50
Nicaraguan Elections, 1996	5.25
<b><i>The Cases of Russia-the Baltics</i></b>	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Independence War, 1918-1920	-0.71
The Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	-0.26
Communists Activities in the Baltic states, the first half of 1920s	-1.88
<i>Coup d'etat</i> in Lithuania, 1926	2.44
Spy scandal in Latvia, 1927	-3.00
Presidential Elections in Estonia, 1934	2.44
Destabilising the Internal Affairs in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	-1.19
Ultimatums to the Baltic States, 1940	3.38
"June Governments" in the Baltic States, 1940	3.05
Annexation of the Baltic States, 1940	2.53
August events in Moscow, 1991	-1.38
Refusing to Conclude the Border Treaties, the 1990s	-1.22
The Long-perspective Strategic Plan of Russia in Relations with the Baltic States, 1997	-1.50
Russian-Latvian Crisis, 1998	0.47
Resolving the Orthodox Church Issue in Estonia, the 1990s	0.66

## Appendix 2. Political Instruments: Alliance Policy

**Figure 7. Alliance Policy as Political Instrument on Time Scale**



### ***Cases of the US-Central America***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Occurring the Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, the 1820-1830s	3.00
Cass-Irisarri Treaty, 1857	1.25
Treilinghausen-Savala Treaty, 1884	-2.25
Canal Treaty with Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 1900	12.75
The Second Treaty of Panama Canal, 1936	-3.38
Organisation of the Central American States, 1951	14.50
Renewing of the Relations with Guatemala, 1954	13.50
The Third Treaty of Panama Canal, 1977	-4.00
Diplomatic Isolation of Nicaragua, the 1980s	-4.69
Gaining Independence of Belize, 1982	13.00

### ***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***


	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Autonomy right of the Baltics, 1917	1.88
Brest-Litovski Treaty, 1918	-1.88
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	0.25
Riga Conference, 1922	2.13

(Appendix 2 continues)

Guarantees of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity for the Baltic states, 1923	-3.50
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Lithuania, 1926	2.06
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia, 1927	-3.50
Litvinov's Protocol, 1929	5.25
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia and Estonia, 1932	6.38
Proposal of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1935	-2.25
The Mutual Assistance Treaty ('Bases Agreement'), 1939	5.50
RFSSR Support in the Process of Regaining of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	2.44
Security Guarantees for the Baltic states, 1997	-1.31

*Appendix 3. Political Instruments: Recognition Policy*

**Figure 8. Recognition Policy as Political Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***


	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Gaining Independence of Central America, 1823	2.10
Recognition of Walker's Government, 1856	-0.10
Non-recognition principle, 1907	10.50

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Recognition of Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918	-0.13
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	-0.06
Denying of Re-independence of the Baltic states, 1990-1991	-3.00
<i>De facto</i> Recognition of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	3.75
Non-recognition of the Old Border Treaties, 1992	5.63

*Appendix 4. Political Instruments: Mediation Policy*

**Figure 9. Mediation Policy as Political Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***

Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Border Conflict, the 1850s

Ignoring Arbitration with Nicaragua, 1916-1917

Costa Rica-Panamanian Border Conflict, 1921

Washington Conference, 1922-1923

Stimson mission to Nicaragua, 1927

Honduran-Salvadorian Peace Treaty, 1980

Regionalisation of the Nicaraguan Crisis, the First Half of the 1980s

***Capability***

2.25

-2.63

5.25

12.00

8.63


9.38

-1.03



## *Appendix 5. Political Instruments: Threatening Policy*

**Figure 10. Threatening Policy as Political Instrument on Time Scale**




### *Cases of Russia-the Baltics*

	<i>Capability</i>
Warning of the Border States for Co-operation, 1922	-2.75
Reaction to the Limitation of the Communist Movement in Estonia, 1923	-2.50
Border Conflicts, the Second half of the 1930s	3.66
Political Pressure before the Bases Agreement, 1939	8.25
Preparation of the Baltic Annexation, 1940	6.75
Hindering of the Baltic Process of NATO Integration, 1995-2003	-0.66
Russian Elections Campaign: North-East Estonia Issue, 1996	-1.69
Russian Security Doctrine, 2000	-0.75

## *Appendix 6. Economic Instruments: Intervention Policy*

**Figure 11. Intervention Policy as Economic Instrument on Time Scale**



### *Cases of the US-Central America*


<i>Cases of the US-Central America</i>	<i>Capability</i>
CALMC's Activity, the first half of 1850s	-1.69
Exploring the Market of Central America, the 1850s	-0.88
USATC's Activity, the 1850s	-0.63
Economic Occupation of the Mosquito Coast, the 1880s-1890s	8.44
Taking Over the Foreign Debt of Nicaragua, 1911	5.63
Taking Over the Foreign Debt of Honduras, 1911	-0.75
Bryan-Chomorro Treaty, 1916	13.00
Establishing of Economic Dependency of Honduras, 1923	1.25
Economic Assistance to Panama, the 1940s	13.50
Activities of UFCO in Guatemala, the 1940s	-5.50
Re-establishing the Dependency of Guatemala, the 1950s	2.25
Punta del Este Chart, 1961	15.00
Assistance to Nicaragua, the 1970s	-5.00
Financial Assistance to the Central American States, the 1980s	5.10
Panamanian Economic Sanctions, 1987-88	-1.15
Build-up of El Salvador, the 1990s	10.13
Build-up of Nicaragua, 1990-ndatel	3.50

(Appendix 6 continues)

<i>The Cases of Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>Capability</i>
Transit through Estonia, the 1920s	6.00
Soviet Trade Chambers in the Baltic States, the 1920s	-1.00
Soviet Reforms in the Baltic Republics, 1940-1941	1.08
Policy of Compatriots, the 1990s	-0.72
The MNF to Lithuania, 1994	6.38
Liquidation of MNF Status of Estonia, 1995	-1.13
Building of Russian Ports on the Baltic Sea Coast, the second half of the 1990s	-2.44
Change of railway tariff to Estonia and Latvia, 1996	1.13

*Appendix 7. Economic Instruments: Alliance Policy*

**Figure 12. Alliance Policy as Economic Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***


	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
The First Commerce and Amity Agreements, the 1840s	3.00
Pan-American Union, 1890	8.44
Economic Integration of Central America, the 1960s	15.00
Cutting off the Nicaraguan Financial Assistance, 1983	-1.60
CBIDP, the 1980s	8.25
Assistance to Belize, the 1980s-1990s	14.00
CAFTA, 2003	15.00

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Financial Assistance to the Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	-0.75
Riga Conference, 1922	2.13
Proposal of the Non-aggression Treaty with Estonia, 1926	-1.50
Support of the Process of Regaining of Independence, 1990-1991	3.94

## Appendix 8. Military Instruments: Intervention Policy

**Figure 13. Intervention Policy as Military Instrument on Time Scale**



### ***Cases of the US-Central America***

### ***Capability***


Occupation of the Mosquito Coast in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Conflict, the 1850s	1.58
The First Walker's Invasion, 1855	2.10
Walker's War with the Central American States, 1856-1858	-0.30
Non-action against Walker, 1856	-0.01
The Second Walker's Invasion, 1860	-0.18
Internal Crisis of Panama, 1904, 1918, 1921, 1925	3.25
The First Invasion to Nicaragua, 1912	2.88
Invasion to Honduras, 1923	6.00
The Second Invasion to Nicaragua, 1926	3.50
Nicaraguan Occupation, 1912-1924, 1926-1933	5.50
Build-up of Nicaraguan National Guard, the 1920s	10.13
Establishing of Bases in Guatemala, the first half of the 1940s	-1.15
The Extra Bases in Panama, 1940-1942	3.00
Prolonging the Extra Bases in Panama, 1947	4.50
<i>Coup d'etat</i> in Guatemala, 1954	0.75
Demonstrations in Panama, 1959-1964	-2.50
Military Aid to Contras, the 1980s	-1.05
Invasion to Panama, 1989	0.51

(Appendix 8 continues)

<i>The Cases of Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>Capability</i>
<i>Coup d'etat</i> by Bolsheviks, 1917	-0.05
Baltic Independence War, 1918-1920	-0.09
Military Bases in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	6.75
Bases Agreement, 1939	3.25
<i>Coups d'etat</i> in the Baltic States, 1940	2.75

*Appendix 9. Military Instruments: Alliance Policy*

**Figure 14. Alliance Policy as Military Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***


	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Agreement of Preventive Defence of Panama Isthmus with Columbia, 1869	10.50
Expelling of Brits from the Mosquito Coast, 1893	9.00
Support to the Panamanian Rebellious, 1903	14.00
Assistance to the Guatemalan Death Squads, the 1950s-1980s	10.00
Establishing of the Defence Council of Central America, the 1960s	11.25
Military Aid to the Central American States, the 1970s-1980s	4.65
Using the Defence Council of Central America against Nicaragua, the first half of 1980s	-4.20
Contras' Bases in Honduras, the 1980s	11.00
Military Aid to Salvadorian Government, the 1980s	3.08
Closing Down the Contras' Bases in Honduras, the end of the 1980s	-3.50
Military Assistance to Central America, the 1990s	16.00
Leaving from the Territory of Panama Canal, 2000	-5.25

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Military Assistance to the Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	1.05
Polish-Russian War and Lithuania, 1920	0.80
Withdrawal of Russian Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994	-2.25

*Appendix 10. Military Instruments: Threatening Policy*

**Figure 15. Threatening Policy as Military Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***

Strengthening of Positions in Central America, the First Half of 19th Century	<b>Capability</b> -1.50
Military Exercises in Central America and Honduras, the 1980s	-1.50


***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

Leading Estonia to Sign the Treaty, 1919	<b>Capability</b> 0.14
Power Demonstrations at the Baltic Border Regions, the Second Half of the 1930s	3.38
Power Demonstrations, 1939	6.50
Leading Estonia to Sign the Bases Agreement, 1939	6.50
Introducing the Military Bases in the Baltic States, 1939	3.25
Preparation for Annexation, 1940	3.25
Denying Lithuanian Independence, 1990	-4.05
Stopping the Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1992	-1.00



*Appendix 11. International Instruments: Intervention Policy*

**Figure 16. Intervention Policy as International Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***


	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Bidlack Treaty, 1846	5.50
Protest to Guatemala about the British-Guatemalan Treaty, 1860	-0.50
Concept of Non-Intervention, 1927-1928	-0.75
Denying of the Panama Issue, the 1970s	-0.63

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Expelling of the SU from the League of Nations, 1939	1.50
Establishing of the OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, 1993	2.00
Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994	-1.25

*Appendix 12. International Instruments: Alliance Policy*

**Figure 17. Alliance Policy as International Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***

Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, 1849

***Capability***

-1.55

Establishing of Pan-American Union, 1890

5.25

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

Expelling of the SU from the League of Nations, 1939

***Capability***

1.50

Establishing of the OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, 1993


2.00

Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994

-1.25

*Appendix 13. International Instruments: Mediation Policy*

**Figure 18. Mediation Policy as International Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***

Washington Conference, 1907

Beginning of Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978-1979

Compromises in Nicaraguan Crisis, the first half of the 1980s

Nicaraguan Crisis, the 1980s

Activity of Contadora Group, the 1980s

Esquipulas Treaty, 1987

***Capability***

5.36

-3.10

0.50


-2.03

0.88

-1.03

## *Appendix 14. International Instruments: Propaganda Policy*

**Figure 19. Propaganda Policy as International Instrument on Time Scale**



### ***Cases of the US-Central America***


	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Preparation of Guatemalan <i>Coup d'etat</i> , 1953-1954	1.58
Demonstrations in Panama, 1959-1964	1.38
"White Book" 1981	0.53
Destabilising the Nicaraguan Position, the First Half of the 1980s	0.14
Hague Court Decision, 1984	0.26
Delegitimisation of Nicaraguan Government, 1984	-0.25
Invasion to Panama, 1989	0.83

### ***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Lithuanian Occupation of Klaipeda, 1924	1.08
Mutual Assistance Treaty, 1939	2.38
Policy of "Near abroad", the 1990s	-0.38
Human Rights Issue in Baltics in EC and UN, 1992	0.56
Human Rights Issue in Baltics in EC and UN, 1994	-0.56
War of Chechnya, the second half of 1990s	-1.13

*Appendix 15. International Instruments: Deal Policy*

**Figure 20. Deal Policy as International Instrument on Time Scale**



***Cases of the US-Central America***

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850

***Capability***

-2.00

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1900

3.94

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

Baltic Declaration with Poland, 1933

***Capability***

-3.00

Security Guarantees with Germany, 1934

-1.69

Security Guarantees with Great Britain and France, 1939

-0.25

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939

2.05

Additional Protocol with Germany, 1939


4.00

Yeltsin's Letter to Clinton, 1996

2.56

Appendix 16. Political Instruments: Total on Time Scale

Figure 21. Capability of Political Instruments on Time Scale



<i><b>The Cases of the US-Central America</b></i>	<i><b>Capability</b></i>
Gaining Independence of Central America, 1823	2.10
Occurring the Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, the 1820-1830s	3.00
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1848	8.50
Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Border Conflict, the 1850s	2.25
The First Walker's Invasion, the I half of 1850s	-0.53
Walker's Attempts to Unify Central America, in the middle of 1850s	-0.05
Recognition of Walker's Government, 1856	-0.10
Cass-Irisarri Treaty, 1857	1.25
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1859	2.00
Hindering of the Process of Building up the Central American Confederation, the 1880s	5.50
Treilinghausen-Savala Treaty, 1884	-2.25
Canal Treaty with Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 1900	12.75
Establishing of Panama state, 1903	13.00
The First Treaty of Panama Canal, 1903	12.50
Non-recognition principle, 1907	10.50
Interventions in Panama Internal Affairs, 1908-1918	9.00
Coup d'etat in Nicaragua, 1910	1.38

(Appendix 16 continues)

Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, 1914	5.63
Ignoring Arbitration with Nicaragua, 1916-1917	-2.63
Costa Rica-Panamanian Border Conflict, 1921	5.25
Washington Conference, 1922-1923	12.00
Elections Reform in Nicaragua, 1923	8.63
Stimsoni mission to Nicaragua, 1927	8.63
The Second Treaty of Panama Canal, 1936	-3.38
Coup d'etat in Panama, 1941	2.50
Political Crisis in Costa Rica, 1948	5.50
Organisation of the Central American States, 1951	14.50
Expelling of Guatemala from the Organization of the Central American States, 1953	-1.75
Renewing of the Relations with Guatemala, 1954	13.50
Invasion in Guatemala, 1954	0.58
Assistance of Guatemalan Governments 1954-the 1980s	10.00
Demonstration in Panama, 1959-1964	-1.25
Ending of the Somoza's regime in Nicaragua, 1978-1979	6.00
The Third Treaty of Panama Canal, 1977	-4.00
Human Rights' Policy, the 1970s	-4.00
Coup d'etat in Nicaragua, 1979	-3.25
Salvadorian Crisis, the 1980s	0.80
Honduran-Salvadorian Peace Treaty, 1980	9.38
Regionalisation of the Nicaraguan Crisis, the First Half of the 1980s	-1.03
Diplomatic Isolation of Nicaragua, the 1980s	-4.69
Gaining Independence of Belize, 1982	13.00
Establishing of Contras Resistance in Nicaragua, 1982	0.30
Political Boycott of Nicaraguan Government, in the middle of 1980s	-1.00
Naming Panama as an Instability Zone, 1988	-1.25
Build-up of Salvador, the 1990s	4.13
Build-up of Nicaragua, the 1990s	6.50
Nicaraguan Elections, 1996	5.25

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

***Capability***

Autonomy right of the Baltics, 1917	1.88
The Right of Self-determination presented by the Bolsheviks, 1917-1918	-1.58
Recognition of Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918	-0.13
Brest-Litovski Treaty, 1918	-1.88
Independence War, 1918-1920	-0.71
The Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	-0.26
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	-0.06
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	0.25
Riga Conference, 1922	2.13
Warning of the Border States for Co-operation, 1922	-2.75


(Appendix 16 continues)

Guarantees of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity for the Baltic states, 1923	-3.50
Reaction to the Limitation of the Communist Movement in Estonia, 1923	-2.50
Communists Activities in the Baltic states, the first half of 1920s	-1.88
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Lithuania, 1926	2.06
Coup d'etat in Lithuania, 1926	2.44
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia, 1927	-3.50
Spy scandal in Latvia, 1927	-3.00
Litvinov's Protocol, 1929	5.25
VOKS' Activity, the 1920s-1930s	-1.69
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia and Estonia, 1932	6.38
Presidential Elections in Estonia, 1934	2.44
Proposal of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1935	-2.25
Border Conflicts, the Second half of the 1930s	3.66
The Mutual Assistance Treaty ('Bases Agreement'), 1939	5.50
Political Pressure before the Bases Agreement, 1939	8.25
Communist Propaganda among the Baltic Nations, 1939-1940	1.38
Destabilising the Internal Affairs in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	-1.19
Ultimatums to the Baltic States, 1940	3.38
"June Governments" in the Baltic States, 1940	3.05
Annexation of the Baltic States, 1940	2.53
Preparation of the Baltic Annexation, 1940	6.75
Denying of Re-independence of the Baltic states, 1990-1991	-3.00
De facto Recognition of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	3.75
RFSSR Support in the Process of Regaining of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	2.44
August events in Moscow, 1991	-1.38
Non-recognition of the Old Border Treaties, 1992	5.63
Refusing to Conclude the Border Treaties, the 1990s	-1.22
Hindering of the Baltic Process of NATO Integration, 1995-2003	-0.66
Russian Elections Campaign: North-East Estonia Issue, 1996	-1.69
Security Guarantees for the Baltic states, 1997	-1.31
The Long-perspective Strategic Plan of Russia in Relations with the Baltic States, 1997	-1.50
Russian-Latvian Crisis, 1998	0.47
Resolving the Orthodox Church Issue in Estonia, the 1990s	0.66
Russian Security Doctrine, 2000	-0.75



*Appendix 17. Economic Instruments: Total on Time Scale*

**Figure 22. Capability of Economic Instruments on Time Scale**



***The Cases of the US-Central America***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Gaining Independence of Central America, 1823	2.10
Occurring the Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, the 1820-1830s	3.00
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1848	8.50
Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Border Conflict, the 1850s	2.25
The First Walker's Invasion, the I half of 1850s	-0.53
Walker's Attempts to Unify Central America, in the middle of 1850s	-0.05
Recognition of Walker's Government, 1856	-0.10
Cass-Irisarri Treaty, 1857	1.25
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1859	2.00
Hindering of the Process of Building up the Central American Confederation, the 1880s	5.50
Treilinghausen-Savala Treaty, 1884	-2.25
Canal Treaty with Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 1900	12.75
Establishing of Panama state, 1903	13.00
The First Treaty of Panama Canal, 1903	12.50
Non-recognition principle, 1907	10.50
Interventions in Panama Internal Affairs, 1908-1918	9.00
Coup d'etat in Nicaragua, 1910	1.38
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, 1914	5.63
Ignoring Arbitration with Nicaragua, 1916-1917	-2.63

(Appendix 17 continues)

Costa Rica-Panamanian Border Conflict, 1921	5.25
Washington Conference, 1922-1923	12.00
Elections Reform in Nicaragua, 1923	8.63
Stimsoni mission to Nicaragua, 1927	8.63
The Second Treaty of Panama Canal, 1936	-3.38
Coup d'etat in Panama, 1941	2.50
Political Crisis in Costa Rica, 1948	5.50
Organisation of the Central American States, 1951	14.50
Expelling of Guatemala from the Organization of the Central American States, 1953	-1.75
Renewing of the Relations with Guatemala, 1954	13.50
Invasion in Guatemala, 1954	0.58
Assistance of Guatemalan Governments 1954-the 1980s	10.00
Demonstration in Panama, 1959-1964	-1.25
Ending of the Somoza's regime in Nicaragua, 1978-1979	6.00
The Third Treaty of Panama Canal, 1977	-4.00
Human Rights' Policy, the 1970s	-4.00
Coup d'etat in Nicaragua, 1979	-3.25
Salvadorian Crisis, the 1980s	0.80
Honduran-Salvadorian Peace Treaty, 1980	9.38
Regionalisation of the Nicaraguan Crisis, the First Half of the 1980s	-1.03
Diplomatic Isolation of Nicaragua, the 1980s	-4.69
Gaining Independence of Belize, 1982	13.00
Establishing of Contras Resistance in Nicaragua, 1982	0.30
Political Boycott of Nicaraguan Government, in the middle of 1980s	-1.00
Naming Panama as an Instability Zone, 1988	-1.25
Build-up of Salvador, the 1990s	4.13
Build-up of Nicaragua, the 1990s	6.50
Nicaraguan Elections, 1996	5.25

***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

***Capability***


Autonomy right of the Baltics, 1917	1.88
The Right of Self-determination presented by the Bolsheviks, 1917-1918	-1.58
Recognition of Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918	-0.13
Brest-Litovski Treaty, 1918	-1.88
Independence War, 1918-1920	-0.71
The Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	-0.26
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	-0.06
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	0.25
Riga Conference, 1922	2.13
Warning of the Border States for Co-operation, 1922	-2.75
Guarantees of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity for the Baltic states, 1923	-3.50
Reaction to the Limitation of the Communist Movement in Estonia, 1923	-2.50

(Appendix 17 continues)

Communists Activities in the Baltic states, the first half of 1920s	-1.88
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Lithuania, 1926	2.06
Coup d'etat in Lithuania, 1926	2.44
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia, 1927	-3.50
Spy scandal in Latvia, 1927	-3.00
Litvinov's Protocol, 1929	5.25
VOKS' Activity, the 1920s-1930s	-1.69
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia and Estonia, 1932	6.38
Presidential Elections in Estonia, 1934	2.44
Proposal of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1935	-2.25
Border Conflicts, the Second half of the 1930s	3.66
The Mutual Assistance Treaty ('Bases Agreement'), 1939	5.50
Political Pressure before the Bases Agreement, 1939	8.25
Communist Propaganda among the Baltic Nations, 1939-1940	1.38
Destabilising the Internal Affairs in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	-1.19
Ultimatums to the Baltic States, 1940	3.38
"June Governments" in the Baltic States, 1940	3.05
Annexation of the Baltic States, 1940	2.53
Preparation of the Baltic Annexation, 1940	6.75
Denying of Re-independence of the Baltic states, 1990-1991	-3.00
De facto Recognition of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	3.75
RFSSR Support in the Process of Regaining of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	2.44
August events in Moscow, 1991	-1.38
Non-recognition of the Old Border Treaties, 1992	5.63
Refusing to Conclude the Border Treaties, the 1990s	-1.22
Hindering of the Baltic Process of NATO Integration, 1995-2003	-0.66
Russian Elections Campaign: North-East Estonia Issue, 1996	-1.69
Security Guarantees for the Baltic states, 1997	-1.31
The Long-perspective Strategic Plan of Russia in Relations with the Baltic States, 1997	-1.50
Russian-Latvian Crisis, 1998	0.47
Resolving the Orthodox Church Issue in Estonia, the 1990s	0.66
Russian Security Doctrine, 2000	-0.75

*Appendix 18. Military Instruments: Total on Time Scale*

**Figure 23. Capability of Military Instruments on Time Scale**



***The Cases of the US-Central America***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Strengthening of Positions in Central America, the First Half of 19th Century	-1.50
Occupation of the Mosquito Coast in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Conflict, the 1850s	1.58
The First Walker's Invasion, 1855	2.10
Walker's War with the Central American States, 1856-1858	-0.30
Non-action against Walker, 1856	-0.01
The Second Walker's Invasion, 1860	-0.18
Agreement of Preventive Defence of Panama Isthmus with Columbia, 1869	10.50
Expelling of Brits from the Mosquito Coast, 1893	9.00
Support to the Panamanian Rebellious, 1903	14.00
Internal Crisis of Panama, 1904, 1918, 1921, 1925	3.25
The First Invasion to Nicaragua, 1912	2.88
Invasion to Honduras, 1923	6.00
The Second Invasion to Nicaragua, 1926	3.50
Nicaraguan Occupation, 1912-1924, 1926-1933	5.50
Build-up of Nicaraguan National Guard, the 1920s	10.13
Establishing of Bases in Guatemala, the first half of the 1940s	-1.15
The Extra Bases in Panama, 1940-1942	3.00
Prolonging the Extra Bases in Panama, 1947	4.50
Assistance to the Guatemalan Death Squads, the 1950s-1980s	10.00
Coup d'etat in Guatemala, 1954	0.75

Demonstrations in Panama, 1959-1964	-2.50
Establishing of the Defence Council of Central America, the 1960s	11.25
Military Aid to the Central American States, the 1970s-1980s	4.65
Using the Defence Council of Central America against Nicaragua, the first half of 1980s	-4.20
Contras' Bases in Honduras, the 1980s	11.00
Military Aid to Salvadorian Government, the 1980s	3.08
Military Exercises in Central America and Honduras, the 1980s	-1.50
Military Aid to Contras, the 1980s	-1.05
Closing Down the Contras' Bases in Honduras, the end of the 1980s	-3.50
Invasion to Panama, 1989	0.51
Military Assistance to Central America, the 1990s	16.00
Leaving from the Territory of Panama Canal, 2000	-5.25


***The Cases of Russia-the Baltics***

***Capability***

Coup d'etat by Bolsheviks, 1917	-0.05
Military Assistance to the Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	1.05
Baltic Independence War, 1918-1920	-0.09
Leading Estonia to Sign the Treaty, 1919	0.14
Polish-Russian War and Lithuania, 1920	0.80
Power Demonstrations at the Baltic Border Regions, the Second Half of the 1930s	3.38
Military Bases in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	6.75
Bases Agreement, 1939	3.25
Power Demonstrations, 1939	6.50
Leading Estonia to Sign the Bases Agreement, 1939	6.50
Introducing the Military Bases in the Baltic States, 1939	3.25
Coups d'etat in the Baltic States, 1940	2.75
Preparation for Annexation, 1940	3.25
Denying Lithuanian Independence, 1990	-4.05
Stopping the Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1992	-1.00
Withdrawal of Russian Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994	-2.25

*Appendix 19. International Instruments: Total on Time Scale*

**Figure 24. Capability of International Instruments on Time Scale**



***The Cases of the US-Central America***

	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Bidlack Treaty, 1846	5.50
Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, 1849	-1.55
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850	-2.00
Protest to Guatemala about the British-Guatemalan Treaty, 1860	-0.50
Establishing of Pan-American Union, 1890	5.25
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1900	3.94
Washington Conference, 1907	5.36
Concept of Non-Intervention, 1927-1928	-0.75
Preparation of Guatemalan Coup d'etat, 1953-1954	1.58
Demonstrations in Panama, 1959-1964	1.38
Denying of the Panama Issue, the 1970s	-0.63
Beginning of Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978-1979	-3.10
Compromises in Nicaraguan Crisis, the first half of the 1980s	0.50
Nicaraguan Crisis, the 1980s	-2.03
"White Book" 1981	0.53
Destabilising the Nicaraguan Position, the First Half of the 1980s	0.14
Hague Court Decision, 1984	0.26

(Appendix 19 continues)

Delegitimisation of Nicaraguan Government, 1984	-0.25
Activity of Contadora Group, the 1980s	0.88
Esquipulas Treaty, 1987	-1.03
Invasion to Panama, 1989	0.83
<b><i>The Cases of Russia-the Baltics</i></b>	<b><i>Capability</i></b>
Vilnius issue, the 1920s-1930s	2.25
Moscow Conference, 1922	1.15
Lithuanian Occupation of Klaipeda, 1924	1.08
London Convention, 1933	8.63
East Pact, 1933	-1.88
Baltic Declaration with Poland, 1933	-3.00
Security Guarantees with Germany, 1934	-1.69
Vilnius issue, 1939	6.30
Expelling of the SU from the League of Nations, 1939	1.50
Mutual Assistance Treaty, 1939	2.38
Security Guarantees with Great Britain and France, 1939	-0.25
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939	2.05
Additional Protocol with Germany, 1939	4.00
Policy of "Near abroad", the 1990s	-0.38
Human Rights Issue in Baltics in EC and UN, 1992	0.56
Establishing of the OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, 1993	2.00
Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994	-1.25
Human Rights Issue in Baltics in EC and UN, 1994	-0.56
War of Chechnya, the second half of 1990s	-1.13
Yeltsin's Letter to Clinton, 1996	2.56





*Appendix 20: Table 2. Main Influence Factors of Dependency Policies*

<b>Instruments</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Capability</b>	<b>Intervention Policy</b>	<b>Alliance Policy</b>	<b>Recognition Policy</b>	<b>Mediation Policy</b>	<b>Threatening Policy</b>	<b>Propaganda Policy</b>	<b>Deal Policy</b>
<b>POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS</b>	<b>UNITED STATES</b>	<b>Capable</b>	Positive earlier relations Low external interest Stability	Medium external interest Stability	Low external interest Stability	Positive earlier relations and reaction Stability	–	–	–
		<b>Incapable</b>	Negative earlier relations Negative reaction High external interest	High external interest Negative earlier relations Weak position	High external interest Weak position	Negative earlier relations and reaction Instability	–	–	–
	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>Capable</b>	Strong position Low external interest	Positive reaction High external interest Weak position	Positive reaction	–	Strong position Low external interest	–	–
		<b>Incapable</b>	High external interest Negative earlier relations and reaction Instability	Negative reaction Negative earlier relations	Negative reaction Weak position	–	High external interest Negative reaction	–	–

<b>Instru- ments</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Capability</b>	<b>Intervention Policy</b>	<b>Alliance Policy</b>	<b>Recognition Policy</b>	<b>Mediation Policy</b>	<b>Threatening Policy</b>	<b>Propaganda Policy</b>	<b>Deal Policy</b>
<b>ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS</b>	<b>UNITED STATES</b>	<b>Capable</b>	<b>Positive</b> earlier relations <b>Positive</b> reaction <b>Stability</b>	<b>Weak</b> external interest <b>Positive</b> earlier relations and reaction <b>Stability</b>	-	-	-	-	-
		<b>Incapable</b>	<b>Negative</b> reaction <b>Instability</b>	<b>High</b> external interest <b>Instability</b>	-	-	-	-	-
	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>Capable</b>	<b>Medium or</b> weak position <b>Positive</b> reaction	<b>Positive</b> reaction <b>Stability</b> <b>Weak</b> position	-	-	-	-	-
		<b>Incapable</b>	<b>Negative</b> earlier relations <b>Instability</b>	<b>Negative</b> reaction <b>Negative</b> earlier relations <b>High</b> external interest	-	-	-	-	-



<b>Instruments</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Capability</b>	<b>Intervention Policy</b>	<b>Alliance Policy</b>	<b>Recognition Policy</b>	<b>Mediation Policy</b>	<b>Threatening Policy</b>	<b>Propaganda Policy</b>	<b>Deal Policy</b>
<b>MILITARY INSTRUMENTS</b>	<b>UNITED STATES</b>	<b>Capable</b>	Partly positive reaction Low external interest Strong position	Positive earlier relations and reaction Strong external interest Stability	-	-	-	-	-
		<b>Incapable</b>	Negative response Instability	Instability	-	-	Instability Strong external power	-	-
	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>Capable</b>	Strong position Low external interest Partly positive reaction	-	-	-	Strong position Low external interest Negative earlier relations Instability (foreign policy)	-	-
		<b>Incapable</b>	High external interest Negative reaction Weak position	Negative earlier relations Weak position High external interest	-	-	Weak position Instability (internal)	-	-

<b>Instru- ments</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Capability</b>	<b>Intervention Policy</b>	<b>Alliance Policy</b>	<b>Recognition Policy</b>	<b>Mediation Policy</b>	<b>Threatening Policy</b>	<b>Propaganda Policy</b>	<b>Deal Policy</b>	
<b>INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS</b>	<b>UNITED STATES</b>	<b>Capable</b>	<b>Positive</b> earlier relations	<b>Weak</b> external interest <b>Strong</b> position	–	<b>Low</b> external interest <b>Stability</b>	–	<b>Strong position</b> <b>Low</b> external interest <b>Positive</b> earlier relations	<b>Strong</b> position <b>Low</b> external interest	
		<b>Incapable</b>	<b>Negative</b> earlier relations <b>Negative</b> reaction <b>High</b> external interest	<b>High</b> external interest <b>Weak</b> position	–	<b>Partly</b> negative reaction <b>Instability</b> <b>High</b> external interest	–	<b>High</b> external interest <b>Negative</b> earlier relations	<b>Weak</b> position <b>High</b> external interest	
	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>Capable</b>	<b>Positive</b> reaction	<b>Positive</b> earlier relations <b>Positive</b> reaction	–	–	–	–	<b>Strong position</b> <b>Instability</b> (foreign policy)	<b>Strong</b> position
		<b>Incapable</b>	<b>Strong</b> external interest <b>Negative</b> reaction <b>Weak</b> position	<b>High</b> external interest	–	–	–	–	<b>Weak</b> position <b>Negative</b> earlier relations <b>High</b> external interest	<b>Negative</b> reaction



*Appendix 21. Database of the Study*

**POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS**

**Recognition Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Gaining Independence of Central America, 1823	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.10	2.00	1.00	2.10
Recognition of Walker's Government, 1856	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.10	1.00	1.00	-1.00	-0.10
Non-recognition principle, 1907	1.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	10.50
<b>Average</b>								<b>4.17</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Recognition of Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918	1.00	1.25	0.50	0.10	0.50	1.50	-0.50	-0.13
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.50	0.10	0.10	-0.50	-0.06
Denying of Re-independence of the Baltic states, 1990-1991	1.00	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.00	1.50	-1.00	-3.00
De facto Recognition of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	1.00	1.25	0.50	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	3.75
Non-recognition of the Old Border Treaties, 1992	0.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	5.63
<b>Average</b>								<b>1.24</b>

**Alliance Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Occurring the Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, the 1820-1830s	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	2.00	1.00	3.00
Cass-Irisarri Treaty, 1857	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.25
Treilinghausen-Savala Treaty, 1884	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	-0.50	-2.25
Canal Treaty with Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 1900	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.00	12.75
The Second Treaty of Panama Canal, 1936	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	-0.50	-3.38
Organisation of the Central American States, 1951	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.00	14.50
Renewing of the Relations with Guatemala, 1954	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	13.50
The Third Treaty of Panama Canal, 1977	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-4.00
Diplomatic Isolation of Nicaragua, the 1980s	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	0.50	1.50	-0.50	-4.69
Gaining Independence of Belize, 1982	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	13.00
<b>Average</b>								<b>4.37</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>



Autonomy right of the Baltics, 1917	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.88
Brest-Litovski Treaty, 1918	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.50	-1.00	-1.88
Peace Treaties of Independence War, 1920	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.50	1.00	0.10	1.00	0.25
Riga Conference, 1922	1.00	1.75	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	2.13
Guarantees of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity for the Baltic states, 1923	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.50	1.75	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	-1.00	-3.50
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia, 1927	0.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	-1.00	-3.50
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Lithuania, 1926	1.00	1.25	1.00	0.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	2.06
Litvinov's Protocol, 1929	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.25
Non-aggression Treaty between the SU and Latvia and Estonia, 1932	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	6.38
Proposal of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1935	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	-1.00	-2.25
The Mutual Assistance Treaty ('Bases Agreement'), 1939	0.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	5.50
RFSSR Support in the Process of Regaining of Independence of the Baltic States, 1990	1.00	1.25	0.50	1.00	0.50	1.50	1.00	2.44
Security Guarantees for the Baltic states, 1997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.31
<b>Average</b>								<b>1.03</b>

#### Intervention Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1848	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.00	8.50
Treaty of Nicaraguan Canal, 1859	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	2.00
The First Walker's Invasion, the I half of 1850s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.00	1.25	1.00	0.10	1.00	1.50	-1.00	-0.53
Walker's Attempts to Unify Central America, in the middle of 1850s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.10	0.50	1.00	-1.00	-0.05
Hindering of the Process of Building up the Central American Confederation, the 1880s	0.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	5.50
Establishing of Panama state, 1903	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	13.00
The First Treaty of Panama Canal, 1903	1.00	1.75	2.00	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	12.50
Interventions in Panama Internal Affairs, 1908-1918	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	9.00
Coup d'etat in Nicaragua, 1910	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.38
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	5.63
Elections Reform in Nicaragua, 1923	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	8.63
Coup d'etat in Panama, 1941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.50
Political Crisis in Costa Rica, 1948	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	2.00	1.00	5.50

	1.00							
Expelling of Guatemala from the Organization of the Central American States, 1953	1.00	1.50	2.00	0.50	1.50	1.00	-1.00	-1.75
Invasion in Guatemala, 1954	1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.50	0.50	1.00	0.58
Assistance of Guatemalan Governments 1954-the 1980s	0.50	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	10.00
Demonstration in Panama, 1959-1964	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-1.25
Ending of the Somoza's regime in Nicaragua, 1978-1979	0.50	1.75	2.00	1.00	0.50	2.00	1.00	6.00
Human Rights' Policy, the 1970s	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	-1.00	-4.00
Coup d'etat in Nicaragua, 1979	0.00	1.50	2.00	0.50	0.50	2.00	-0.50	-3.25
Salvadorian Crisis, the 1980s	0.50	1.25	2.00	0.10	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.80
Establishing of Contras Resistance in Nicaragua, 1982	1.00	1.25	2.00	0.10	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.30
Political Boycott of Nicaraguan Government, in the middle of 1980s	0.50	1.25	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-1.00
Naming Panama as an Instability Zone, 1988	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-1.25
Build-up of Salvador, the 1990s	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	4.13
Build-up of Nicaragua, the 1990s	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	6.50
Nicaraguan Elections, 1996	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	5.25
							<b>Average</b>	<b>3.50</b>
<b><i>Russia-the Baltics</i></b>	<b><i>R</i></b>	<b><i>Pf</i></b>	<b><i>P</i></b>	<b><i>Sa</i></b>	<b><i>Sp</i></b>	<b><i>Re</i></b>	<b><i>G</i></b>	<b><i>C</i></b>
Independence War, 1918-1920	0.50	1.25	0.50	0.10	1.00	1.50	-1.00	-0.71
The Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	1.00	1.25	0.50	0.10	0.50	1.50	-1.00	-0.26
Communists Activities in the Baltic states, the first half of 1920s	1.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	1.50	1.50	-1.00	-1.88
Coup d'etat in Lithuania, 1926	1.00	1.25	1.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	2.44
Spy scandal in Latvia, 1927	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	-1.00	-3.00
Presidential Elections in Estonia, 1934	0.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	2.44
Destabilising the Internal Affairs in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	0.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	-0.50	-1.19
Ultimatums to the Baltic States, 1940	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.00	3.38
"June Governments" in the Baltic States, 1940	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.10	1.00	0.50	1.00	3.05

Annexation of the Baltic States, 1940	0.50	2.00	2.00	0.10	0.50	0.50	1.00	2.53
August events in Moscow, 1991	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.38
Refusing to Conclude the Border Treaties, the 1990s	0.50	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	-0.50	-1.22
The Long-perspective Strategic Plan of Russia in Relations with the Baltic States, 1997	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.50
Russian-Latvian Crisis, 1998	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	0.47
Resolving the Orthodox Church Issue in Estonia, the 1990s	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	0.66
							<b>Average</b>	<b>0.25</b>

#### Threatening Policy

<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Warning of the Border States for Co-operation, 1922	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	-1.00	-2.75
Reaction to the Limitation of the Communist Movement in Estonia, 1923	0.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	-1.00	-2.50
Border Conflicts, the Second half of the 1930s	0.50	1.75	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.50	0.50	3.66
Political Pressure before the Bases Agreement, 1939	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	8.25
Preparation of the Baltic Annexation, 1940	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	6.75
Hindering of the Baltic Process of NATO Integration, 1995-2003	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	-0.50	-0.66
Russian Elections Campaign: North-East Estonia Issue, 1996	0.50	1.75	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.69
Russian Security Doctrine, 2000	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	-0.50	-0.75
							<b>Average</b>	<b>1.29</b>

#### Mediation Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Border Conflict, the 1850s	0.50	1.25	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	2.25
Ignoring Arbitration with Nicaragua, 1916-1917	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	-0.50	-2.63
Costa Rica-Panamanian Border Conflict, 1921	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	5.25
Washington Conference, 1922-1923	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	12.00
Stimsoni mission to Nicaragua, 1927	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	8.63
Honduran-Salvadorian Peace Treaty, 1980	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	9.38
Regionalisation of the Nicaraguan Crisis, the First Half of the 1980s	-	1.50	2.00	0.10	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.03

	0.50								
<b>Average</b>									<b>4.84</b>

**Propaganda Policy**

<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>	
The Right of Self-determination presented by the Bolsheviks, 1917-1918	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.10	0.50	1.50	-1.00	-1.58	
VOKS' Activity, the 1920s-1930s	0.50	1.75	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	-0.50	-1.69	
Communist Propaganda among the Baltic Nations, 1939-1940	0.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	1.38	
<b>Average</b>									<b>-0.63</b>

**ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS**

**Recognition Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>	
Nicaraguan Government, 1918	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	15.00	
Liquidation of an Economic Federation, 1920-1922	-1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	0.50	2.00	-1.00	5.63	
Non-recognition of Salvador, 1932	-0.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	-5.00	
<b>Average</b>									<b>10.31</b>

**Alliance Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>	
The First Commerce and Amity Agreements, the 1840s	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	2.00	1.00	3.00	
Pan-American Union, 1890	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	8.44	
Economic Integration of Central America, the 1960s	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	15.00	
Cutting off the Nicaraguan Financial Assistance, 1983	-0.50	1.25	2.00	0.10	1.00	1.00	-1.00	-1.60	
CBIDP, the 1980s	0.50	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	8.25	
Assistance to Belize, the 1980s-1990s	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	14.00	
CAFTA, 2003	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	15.00	
<b>Average</b>									<b>8.87</b>

<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>	
Financial Assistance to the Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-0.75	
Riga Conference, 1922	1.00	1.75	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	2.13	
Proposal of the Non-aggression Treaty with Estonia, 1926	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	-0.50	-1.50	
Support of the Process of Regaining of Independence, 1990-1991	1.00	1.25	0.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	3.94	
<b>Average</b>									<b>0.95</b>

**Intervention Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
-------------------------------	----------	-----------	----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	----------	----------

CALMC's Activity, the first half of 1850s	-0.50	1.25	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	-0.50	-1.69
Exploring the Market of Central America, the 1850s	-1.00	1.25	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	-0.50	-0.88
USATC's Activity, the 1850s	-0.50	1.25	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-0.63
Economic Occupation of the Mosquito Coast, the 1880s-1890s	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	8.44
Taking Over the Foreign Debt of Nicaragua, 1911	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	5.63
Taking Over the Foreign Debt of Honduras, 1911	-1.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.50	-1.00	-0.75
Bryan-Chomorro Treaty, 1916	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	13.00
Establishing of Economic Dependency of Honduras, 1923	-1.00	1.25	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.25
Economic Assistance to Panama, the 1940s	1.00	1.25	2.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.00	13.50
Activities of UFCO in Guatemala, the 1940s	-1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	2.00	-1.00	-5.50
Re-establishing the Dependency of Guatemala, the 1950s	-1.00	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.50	2.00	0.50	2.25
Punta del Este Chart, 1961	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	15.00
Assistance to Nicaragua, the 1970s	0.50	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.00	2.00	-0.50	-5.00
Financial Assistance to the Central American States, the 1980s	1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.00	2.00	0.50	5.10
Panamanian Economic Sanctions, 1987-88	-1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.50	2.00	-0.50	-1.15
Build-up of El Salvador, the 1990s	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	10.13
Build-up of Nicaragua, 1990-ndatel	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	3.50
	<b>Average</b>							<b>3.66</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Transit through Estonia, the 1920s	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	6.00
Soviet Trade Chambers in the Baltic States, the 1920s	-1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	-0.50	-1.00
Soviet Reforms in the Baltic Republics, 1940-1941	-1.00	2.00	2.00	0.10	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.08
Policy of Compatriots, the 1990s	-0.50	1.75	1.50	1.00	1.00	0.50	-0.50	-0.72
The MNF to Lithuania, 1994	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	6.38
Liquidation of MNF Status of Estonia, 1995	-0.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.13
Building of Russian Ports on the Baltic Sea Coast, the second half of the 1990s	0.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-2.44
Change of railway tariff to Estonia and Latvia, 1996	0.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	1.13
	<b>Average</b>							<b>1.16</b>

#### MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

##### Alliance Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Agreement of Preventive Defence of Panama Isthmus with Columbia, 1869	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	10.50
Expelling of Brits from the Mosquito Coast, 1893	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	9.00

Support to the Panamanian Rebellious, 1903	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	14.00
Assistance to the Guatemalan Death Squads, the 1950s-1980s	0.50	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	10.00
Establishing of the Defence Council of Central America, the 1960s	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	11.25
Military Aid to the Central American States, the 1970s-1980s	0.50	1.75	2.00	0.10	1.50	2.00	0.50	4.65
Using the Defence Council of Central America against Nicaragua, the first half of 1980s	-0.50	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.00	2.00	-1.00	-4.20
Contras' Bases in Honduras, the 1980s	1.00	1.50	2.00	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	11.00
Military Aid to Salvadorian Government, the 1980s	0.50	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.00	1.50	0.50	3.08
Closing Down the Contras' Bases in Honduras, the end of the 1980s	-1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	0.50	2.00	-1.00	-3.50
Military Assistance to Central America, the 1990s	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	16.00
Leaving from the Territory of Panama Canal, 2000	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	-0.50	-5.25
							<b>Average</b>	<b>6.38</b>
<b><i>Russia-the Baltics</i></b>	<b><i>R</i></b>	<b><i>Pf</i></b>	<b><i>P</i></b>	<b><i>Sa</i></b>	<b><i>Sp</i></b>	<b><i>Re</i></b>	<b><i>G</i></b>	<b><i>C</i></b>
Military Assistance to the Baltic Soviet Governments, 1918-1919	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.10	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.05
Polish-Russian War and Lithuania, 1920	0.50	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.10	1.00	1.00	0.80
Withdrawal of Russian Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994	1.00	1.50	1.00	2.00	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-2.25
							<b>Average</b>	<b>-0.13</b>

#### Intervention Policy

<b><i>The US-Central America</i></b>	<b><i>R</i></b>	<b><i>Pf</i></b>	<b><i>P</i></b>	<b><i>Sa</i></b>	<b><i>Sp</i></b>	<b><i>Re</i></b>	<b><i>G</i></b>	<b><i>C</i></b>
Occupation of the Mosquito Coast in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rica Conflict, the 1850s	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.10	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.58
The First Walker's Invasion, 1855	-0.50	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.10	2.00	1.00	2.10
Walker's War with the Central American States, 1856-1858	-1.00	1.25	1.00	0.10	0.50	1.00	-1.00	-0.30
Non-action against Walker, 1856	-1.00	1.00	1.00	0.10	0.10	1.00	-1.00	-0.01
The Second Walker's Invasion, 1860	-1.00	1.25	1.00	0.10	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-0.18
Internal Crisis of Panama, 1904, 1918, 1921, 1925	-0.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	0.50	2.00	0.50	3.25
The First Invasion to Nicaragua, 1912	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	2.88
Invasion to Honduras, 1923	-1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	6.00
The Second Invasion to Nicaragua, 1926	-0.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.50
Nicaraguan Occupation, 1912-1924, 1926-1933	0.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.50
Build-up of Nicaraguan National Guard, the 1920s	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	10.13
Establishing of Bases in Guatemala, the First Half of the 1940s	-1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.50	2.00	-0.50	-1.15
The Extra Bases in Panama, 1940-1942	-1.00	1.25	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	3.00
Prolonging the Extra Bases in Panama, 1947	-0.50	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.50
Coup d'etat in Guatemala, 1954	-1.00	1.50	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.75
Demonstrations in Panama, 1959-1964	-1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	0.50	2.00	-0.50	-2.50

Military Aid to Contras, the 1980s	-1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	0.50	2.00	-0.50	-1.05
Invasion to Panama, 1989	-1.00	2.00	2.00	0.10	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.51
<b>Average</b>								<b>2.14</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Coup d'etat by Bolsheviks, 1917	-1.00	1.00	0.10	0.10	0.50	1.00	-1.00	-0.05
Baltic Independence War, 1918-1920	-1.00	1.25	0.50	0.10	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-0.09
Military Bases in the Baltic States, 1939-1940	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	6.75
Bases Agreement, 1939	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	3.25
Coups d'etat in the Baltic States, 1940	0.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	2.75
<b>Average</b>								<b>2.52</b>

#### Threatening Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Strengthening of Positions in Central America, the First Half of 19th Century	0.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	2.00	-0.50	-1.50
Military Exercises in Central America and Honduras, the 1980s	1.00	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-0.50	-1.50
<b>Average</b>								<b>-1.50</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Leading Estonia to Sign the Treaty, 1919	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	0.10	0.10	1.00	0.14
Power Demonstrations at the Baltic Border Regions, the Second Half of the 1930s	-0.50	1.75	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	3.38
Power Demonstrations, 1939	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	6.50
Leading Estonia to Sign the Bases Agreement, 1939	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	6.50
Introducing the Military Bases in the Baltic States, 1939	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	3.25
Preparation for Annexation, 1940	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	3.25
Denying Lithuanian Independence, 1990	0.00	2.00	2.00	0.10	0.50	1.00	-1.00	-4.05
Stopping the Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1992	-1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.00
<b>Average</b>								<b>2.25</b>

### INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

#### Alliance Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Plan of Nicaraguan Canal, 1849	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.10	0.50	2.00	-0.50	-1.55
Establishing of Pan-American Union, 1890	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	5.25
<b>Average</b>								<b>1.85</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Vilnius issue, the 1920s-1930s	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	2.25

Moscow Conference, 1922	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.50	0.10	1.00	1.00	1.15
London Convention, 1933	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	8.63
East Pact, 1933	0.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	1.50	-0.50	-1.88
Vilnius issue, 1939	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	0.10	1.50	1.00	6.30
<b>Average</b>								<b>3.29</b>

#### Intervention Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Bidlack Treaty, 1846	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	0.50	2.00	1.00	5.50
Protest to Guatemala about the British-Guatemalan Treaty, 1860	-1.00	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	-1.00	-0.50
Concept of Non-Intervention, 1927-1928	-1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-0.75
Denying of the Panama Issue, the 1970s	-1.00	1.25	2.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-0.63
<b>Average</b>								<b>0.91</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Expelling of the SU from the League of Nations, 1939	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	1.50
Establishing of the OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, 1993	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	0.50	2.00
Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic States, 1993-1994	-1.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	-1.00	-1.25
<b>Average</b>								<b>0.75</b>

#### Propaganda Policy

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Preparation of Guatemalan Coup d'etat, 1953-1954	-1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	0.50	1.50	1.00	1.58
Demonstrations in Panama, 1959-1964	-1.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.38
"White Book" 1981	-1.00	1.50	2.00	0.10	0.50	1.00	0.50	0.53
Destabilising the Nicaraguan Position, the First Half of the 1980s	-1.00	1.25	2.00	0.10	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.14
Hague Court Decision, 1984	-1.00	1.25	2.00	0.10	0.10	0.50	1.00	0.26
Delegitimisation of Nicaraguan Government, 1984	-1.00	1.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-0.25
Invasion to Panama, 1989	-1.00	1.75	2.00	0.10	1.50	0.50	1.00	0.83
<b>Average</b>								<b>0.63</b>
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Lithuanian Occupation of Klaipeda, 1924	0.50	1.25	0.50	2.00	0.10	1.00	1.00	1.08
Mutual Assistance Treaty, 1939	0.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	0.50	2.38
Policy of "Near abroad", the 1990s	-1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	-0.50	-0.38
Human Rights Issue in Baltics in EC and UN, 1992	-1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.56
Human Rights Issue in Baltics in EC and UN, 1994	-1.00	1.25	1.50	1.50	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-0.56



War of Chechnya, the second half of 1990s	-1.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.50	-1.00	-1.13
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.33</b>							

**Deal Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850	0.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	0.50	2.00	-0.50	-2.00
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1900	0.00	1.25	1.50	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.00	3.94
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.97</b>							
<i>Russia-the Baltics</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Baltic Declaration with Poland, 1933	-0.50	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	-1.00	-3.00
Security Guarantees with Germany, 1934	-1.00	1.25	1.50	0.50	1.50	1.50	-1.00	-1.69
Security Guarantees with Great Britain and France, 1939	-1.00	1.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-0.25
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939	0.00	1.00	2.00	0.10	0.50	1.00	1.00	2.05
Additional Protocol with Germany, 1939	0.00	1.75	2.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00
Yeltsin's Letter to Clinton, 1996	-0.50	1.25	1.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	1.00	2.56
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.61</b>							

**Mediation Policy**

<i>The US-Central America</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Pf</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sa</i>	<i>Sp</i>	<i>Re</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>C</i>
Washington Conference, 1907	0.50	1.75	1.50	2.00	0.10	1.50	1.00	5.36
Beginning of Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978-1979	-1.00	1.75	2.00	0.10	0.50	2.00	-1.00	-3.10
Compromises in Nicaraguan Crisis, the first half of the 1980s	-0.50	1.50	2.00	0.10	0.10	0.50	0.50	0.50
Nicaraguan Crisis, the 1980s	0.50	1.50	2.00	0.10	0.50	0.50	-1.00	-2.03
Activity of Contadora Group, the 1980s	0.50	1.25	2.00	0.10	0.10	0.50	0.50	0.88
Esquipulas Treaty, 1987	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	0.10	0.50	-0.50	-1.03
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.10</b>							

**“Suurriiklikute poliitikate suutlikkus geostrateegilise subregiooni sõltuvustamise protsessis: USA-Kesk-Ameerika ja Venemaa-Baltikumi näitel”**  
**Heiko Pääbo**

**Resüme**

Minu magistritöö teema on “Suurriiklikute poliitikate suutlikkus geostrateegilise subregiooni sõltuvustamise protsessis: USA-Kesk-Ameerika ja Venemaa-Baltikumi näitel”. Töö eesmärgiks on analüüsida suurriiklike poliitikaid geostrateegiliselt tähtsate subregioonide suhtes ning välja tuua erinevaid faktoreid, mis suurendavad või vähendavad suurriigi võimet omada antud ala üle kontrolli.

Töö koosneb 5 peatükist: metodoloogia, poliitilised hoovad, majanduslikud hoovad, sõjalised hoovad ja rahvusvahelised hoovad. Metodoloogia peatükk defineerib peamised kontseptsioonid, millele uurimus tugineb. Lisaks esitan ma põhieelduse, millele tuginedes defineerin suurriigi ja subregiooni vahelised suhted sõltuvustamise protsessi raames. Lisaks sellele jagan ma selles peatükis suurriiklikud poliitika kontseptuaalselt nelja ossa, mis moodustab ka järgneva uurimuse struktuuri. Poliitika jagunevad poliitilisteks, majanduslikeks, sõjalisteks ja rahvusvahelisteks hoobadeks (instrumentideks). Samuti defineerin ma erinevad suurriiklikud poliitika lähtuvalt eelpooltoodud nelikjaotusest. Töös vaadeldavad poliitika on Interventsioonipoliitika, Liitlaspoliitika, Tunnustamispoliitika, Vahendamispoliitika, Heidutuspoliitika, Propagandapoliitika ja Sobingupoliitika. Peatüki lõpus esitan ma Sõltuvustamispoliitikate suutlikkuse määra valemi, mis on peamiseks analüüsivahendiks minu uurimuses.

Järgnevad neli peatükki on kahe näidisobjekti analüüsimine. Näidisobjektideks on USA ja Kesk-Ameerika suhted ja Venemaa Balti riikide suhted mõlema subregiooni iseseisvumisperioodi jooksul. USA näite puhul on vaatluse all periood 1823. aastast tänapäevani, Venemaa näite puhul 1917-1940 ja 1990. aastast tänapäevani. Sellised pikad perioodid on valitud seetõttu, et anda terviklikku pilti suurriikide suhetest vastavate subregioonidega. Töö käigus on analüüsitud ligemale 220 erinevat juhtumit, mis jagunevad neljaks erinevaks poliitikafoovaks. Need omakorda jagunevad erinevateks poliitikafoovadeks. Iga poliitikafoov on analüüsitud kahes osas: USA näitel ja Venemaa näitel, mis mõlemad omakorda jagunevad kahte ossa – suutlikud ja mittesuutlikud poliitikafoovad. Iga poliitikafoov moodustab omaette alapeatüki, mille lõpus

toon välja peamised tendentsid, mis suurendavad või vähendavad suurriikide võimet omada kontrolli geostrateegilise subregiooni üle. Uurimuse teine peatükk vaatab poliitilisi hoobasid, mis tuginevad bilateraalsele diplomaatilisele suhetele suurriigi ja subregiooni vahel. Poliitilised hoovad jagunevad omakorda järgmisteks poliitikateks: interventsioonipoliitika, liitlaspoliitika, tunnustamispoliitika, vahendamispoliitika ja heidutamispoliitika. Kolmas peatükk analüüsib majanduslikke hoobasid, mis tuginevad bilateraalsele välismajandussuhetele. Majanduslikud hoovad jagunevad interventsioonipoliitikaks ja liitlaspoliitikaks. Neljas peatükk uurib sõjalisi hoobasid, mis kätkevad endas sõjaliste vahendite kasutamist bilateraalses suhetes. Sõjalised hoovad jagunevad interventsioonipoliitikaks, liitlaspoliitikaks ja heidutuspoliitikaks. Viimane, viies peatükk analüüsib rahvusvahelisi hoobasid, mida rakendatakse väljaspool bilateraalseid suhteid suurriigi ja subregiooni vahel. Rahvusvahelised hoovad jagunevad interventsioonipoliitikaks, liitlaspoliitikaks, vahenduspoliitikaks, propagandapoliitikaks ja sobingupoliitikaks.

Antud töö keskendub suurriiklike poliitikate hindamisele. Kõige lihtsam tee poliitika edukuse hindamiseks on vaadata, kas saavutati loodetud tulemus. Antud mõõdupuu sobib üksikute poliitikate hindamiseks eraldatuna kontekstist. Kui vaadelda poliitikaid ühtsesse protsessi kuuluvana, siis antud kriteeriumist ei piisa, sest kaks poliitikat, mis mõlemad saavutavad soovitud eesmärgi, võivad omada erinevaid mõjusid protsessi kulgemisele. Seetõttu on vaja analüüsida poliitikaid vastavalt kontekstile, et võtta arvesse kõiki võimalikke aspekte. Antud uurimuses on poliitikaid grupeerivaks aluseelduseks suurriiklik huvi muuta geostrateegiliselt tähtis subregioon endast sõltuvaks, et kontrollida neid strateegilisi alasid. Sellest tulenevalt võib üks edu saavutanud poliitika suurendada tunduvalt vähem või rohkem suuriigi võimet kontrollida geostrateegilist subregiooni kui teine edukalt elluviidud poliitika. Selleks, et aru saada ja eristada erinevate poliitikate tulemusi, on vaja vaadelda tervet poliitika elluviimise konteksti, mis võimaldab hinnata poliitika suutlikkust sõltuvustamise protsessis. Siit tulenevalt esitangi oma töö põhiväite – suurriiklike välispoliitikate hindamiseks on vaja jälgida tervet konteksti ja mitte üksnes tulemuse saavutamist või mittesaavutamist. Oma uurimusega tahan näidata selle väite paikapidavust ning sellele tuginedes ka välja tuua, millised on peamised tendentsid, mis on mõjutanud USA poliitikaid Kesk-Ameerikas ja Venemaa poliitikaid Baltikumis.

Järgnevalt avan sõltuvustamise protsessi mõiste, et aru saada, miks suurriigid omavad eesmärki kontrollida geostrateegilist subregiooni. Geostrateegiline subregioon on osa geopoliitilisest regioonist, mis võib koosneda mitmest riigist. Geopoliitilised regioonid kuuluvad globaalsesse sõjalis-strateegilisse süsteemi, kus peamised mängurid on suurriigid. Suurriigid jagavad maailma vastavalt oma huvidele mitmeks geostrateegiliseks alaks, mis võib sisaldada erinevaid geopoliitilisi regioane. Geostrateegilised subregioonid on võtmetähtsusega, kuna läbi nende on võimalik saada ligipääs geopoliitilisele regioonile. Seetõttu on suurriigid huvitatud kontrolli saavutamisest subregiooni üle, omamaks mõjukat positsiooni geopoliitilises regioonis. Iga riigi geopoliitiliseks huviks on oma geopoliitilise ja geomajandusliku võimu suurendamine. Erinevatel riikidel on erinev huvide ulatus ja strateegiad, kuidas nad oma huvisid suudavad ellu viia. Kuna suurriikide huvifäär on suurem kui väikeriikidel, siis on peamiseks suurriigi strateegiaks ekspansioon, mis hõlmab nii poliitilist, majanduslikku, kultuurilist kui ka sõjalist ekspansiooni, saavutamaks võimalikult suurt mõjusfääri. Mõju saavutamiseks on vaja omada tähtsat positsiooni geopoliitilistes regioonides. Seetõttu on geostrateegilised subregioonid väga tähtsal kohal suurriigi välispoliitikas. Eesmärgiks ongi nende alade üle kontrolli saavutamine ehk sõltuvustamine.

Mõistmaks geostrateegilise regiooni tähendust, toon siinkohal välja nii Kesk-Ameerika kui ka Baltikumi rolli vastavalt USA ja Venemaa geostrateegias.

- 1) **Mõlemad subregioonid omavad võtmetähtsust suuriikidele**, kuna nad kujutavad endast oma asukohaga oluliste geopoliitiliste regioonide võtmeid. Kesk-Ameerika on USA-le võtmeks Ladina-Ameerikasse. Omades kontrolli Kesk-Ameerika üle, on USA võimeline jälgima Ladina-Ameerika siseseid arenguid ning neid mõjutama, kuna Kesk-Ameerika ühendab Põhja- ja Lõuna-Ameerikat. Baltikum omakorda on Venemaa jaoks Läänemere regiooni võti. Moodustades olulisima osa Läänemere idarannikust, on Balti riikide positsioon Läänemere ääres väga tähtis. Omades kontrolli Baltikumi üle, on Venemaa suuteline domineerima Läänemere regioonis. Läänemere tähendus on Venemaa jaoks ühendustee Euroopaga, mistõttu läbi ajaloo on peetud Baltikumi ka Venemaa kontaktpunktiks Euroopaga.
- 2) **Mõlemad subregioonid omavad olulist sõjalis-strateegilist positsiooni**. Kesk-Ameerika on olnud koos Kariibi basseiniga USA jaoks ühest küljest

puhvertsooniks Mehhiko ja Lõuna-Ameerika riikide vahel, et USA saaks kontrollida seda, mis temast lõunas toimub. Teisalt on see subregioon ohtlikult lähedal USA-le, mistõttu mõne agressiivse suurvõimu positsioneerimine Kesk-Ameerikas võimaldab seal luua USA-vastase võitluse baasid USA-le ohtlikus läheduses. Arvestades, et seni on olnud USA ainus suurvõim kontinendil, oleks kontinendivälise suurvõimu baaside tekkimine USA julgeolekule väga ohtlik. Samamoodi on Baltikum oluline sõjalis-strateegiline subregioon Venemaa jaoks. Baltikumi lähedal asuv Venemaa teine linn St. Peterburg on väga kergesti haavatav, kui Venemaa on kaotanud oma positsioonid Baltikumis. Eesti saared ja Soome laht on ühest küljest ohtlikud St. Peterburgi julgeolekule, teisalt lõikavad nad Venemaa ära Läänemere ühendusest. Seetõttu on Venemaa üritanud hoida Baltikumi kas kinnise pooleldi sisemerena või jätnud Balti riigid määratlemata puhvertsooniks.

3) **Mõlemad subregioonid omavad olulist kaubandus-transiidi positsiooni.**

Kesk-Ameerika tähendus seisneb tema kitsuses, olles kitsaim territoorium Ameerika kontinendil, mis on kahe ookeani vahel. Samuti tema keskne asukoht kontinendil muudab ta peamiseks transiidi keskpunktiks põhja-lõuna ja ida-lääne vahel. Kesk-Ameerika geostrateegiline tähtsus tõusis hüppeliselt ookeane ühendava kanali ehitamisplaanidega. Ka Baltikum on oluline transiidiala ida ja lääne vahel. Kaubateed läbi Baltikumi on liikunud juba enne Vene riigi tekkimist ja Baltikum on omanud transiidi mõttes erinevaid märksõnu, mis on Venemaad huvitanud. Venemaa jaoks on olnud väga ahvatlevaks Balti jäävabad sadamad. Samuti näeb Venemaa endas peamist Euraasia kaubateed, mille läänepoolseks väravaks on Baltikum. Omades kontrolli Baltikumi üle, on Venemaa suuteline omama kontrolli ka lääne-ida kaubavoogude üle ning suurendama sellega oma tugevust.

Arvestades kõik neid erinevaid aspekte, mille pärast USA ja Venemaa näevad vastavalt Kesk-Ameerikat ja Baltikumi olulisena, on ka nende poliitikad suunatud sellele, et neil oleks vastavate alade üle kontroll elik antud subregioonid oleksid nendest sõltuvuses.

Selleks, et sõltuvust tekitada, viivad suurriigid ellu erinevaid poliitikaid, mis võivad suurendada või vähendada suurriigi võimet omada kontrolli subregiooni üle. Neid poliitikaid ei ole võimalik vaadelda üksnes seoses, kas poliitika saavutas oodatud

tulemuse või ei. Loomulikult on oluline jälgida, kas poliitika saavutas oodatud tulemuse, kuid see on mõjutatud veel mitmetest erinevatest faktoritest, mida kõiki tuleb arvesse võtta, et hinnata poliitikat kas suutlikuks või mittesuutlikuks. Selleks olen välja töötanud Sõltuvustamispoliitikate suutlikkuse määra valemi, mis arvestab lisaks poliitika konkreetsele tulemusele ka teisi lisafaktoreid, mis on olulised sõltuvustamise protsessis. Antud valem on peamiseks instrumendiks erinevate juhtumite analüüsimisel ning võimaldab lõpuks esitada põhitendentsid, mis on mõjutanud USA poliitikaid Kesk-Ameerikas ja Venemaa poliitikaid Baltikumis.

Väljatöötatud valem arvestab lisaks veel järgmisi faktoreid: regiooni stabiilsus, subregionaalsete riikide reaktsioon, teise suurvõimu olemasolu subregioonis. Samuti on oluline arvestada varasemaid suhteid suurriigi ja subregiooni vahel ning suurriigi enda positsiooni maailmapoliitikas. Kõik need on summeeritud järgmisse valemisse.

$$C = [(R + P_F) \times P + S_A \times S_P] \times R_E \times G$$

**C** tähendab poliitika suutlikkust. Antud valem jaguneb oma põhisulult kahte gruppi: poliitika osalejate pool ja poliitika elluviimise keskkond. **R** on subregionaalsete riikide reaktsioonipoliitika, mis on tihedalt seotud teise välisjõu kohaloluga subregioonis (**P<sub>F</sub>**). Neid mõlemaid mõjutab uuritava suurriigi positsioon maailmas (**P**), mis võib eelnevate mõju kas suurendada või vähendada. Teine pool valemist on poliitika keskkond, mis jaguneb omakorda kahte gruppi: stabiilsus enne poliitika rakendamist (**S<sub>P</sub>**) ja stabiilsus pärast poliitika rakendamist (**S<sub>A</sub>**). On oluline jälgida keskkonda, mis on tekkinud. Seda mõjutab poliitika eelne keskkond, mistõttu poliitika, mis on elluviidud eelnevalt ebastabiilses keskkonnas, ei saa isegi stabiilsust kasvatades omada eriti suurt suutlikust, võrreldes teiste juhtumitega. Veel üheks faktoriks on eelnevad suhted suurriigi ja subregiooni vahel (**R<sub>E</sub>**), mis mõjutavad kõiki eelnevaid faktoreid. Viimasena on arvesse võetud poliitika tulemus (**G**), kas poliitika saavutas oodatud tulemuse või ei.

Kõikidele faktoritele on antud nelja- kuni viielisel skaalal numbriline väärtus, et oleks võimalik summerida kokku numbriline väärtus, mis võimaldab järjestada erinevad poliitikad nende suutlikkuse alusel skaalal –20 kuni 20. Väärtused igale faktorile on välja jagatud skaala alusel positiivne, pigem positiivne, neutraalne, pigem negatiivne, negatiivne. Erinevatele faktoritele antud väärtused on järgmised. **Subregionaalsete riikide reaktsioonipoliitika (R):**

- 1 – mittetoetav reaktsioon;
- 0,5 – pigem mittetoetav reaktsioon;
- 0 – reaktsiooni puudumine;
- 0,5 – pigem toetav reaktsioon;
- 1 – toetav reaktsioon.

**Teise välisjõu kohalolu subregioonis ( $P_F$ ):**

- 1 – tugev välisjõu kohalolu subregioonis
- 1,25 – pigem tugev välisjõu kohalolu subregioonis
- 1,5 – keskmine välisjõu kohalolu subregioonis;
- 1,75 – pigem nõrk välisjõu kohalolek subregioonis;
- 2 – nõrk välisjõu kohalolek või selle puudumine.

**Suurriigi positsioon maailmas ( $P$ ):**

- 0,1 – suurriigi nõrk positsioon maailmapoliitikas;
- 0,5 – suurriigi pigem nõrk positsioon maailmapoliitikas;
- 1 – suurriigi keskmine positsioon maailmapoliitikas;
- 1,5 – suurriigi pigem tugev positsioon maailmapoliitikas;
- 2 – suurriigi tugev positsioon maailmapoliitikas.

**Stabiilsus enne poliitika rakendamist ( $S_P$ ) ja stabiilsus pärast poliitika rakendamist ( $S_A$ ). Mõlemad faktorid on arvestatud eraldi järgmise skaala alusel:**

- 0,1 – ebastabiilsus;
- 0,5 – pigem ebastabiilsus;
- 1 – keskmine ebastabiilsus;
- 1,5 – pigem stabiilsus;
- 2 – stabiilsus.

**Eelnevad suhted suurriigi ja subregiooni vahel ( $R_E$ ):**

- 0,1 – negatiivsed suhted;
- 0,5 – pigem negatiivsed suhted;
- 1 – neutraalsed suhted
- 1,5 – pigem positiivsed suhted;
- 2 – positiivsed suhted.

**Poliitika tulemus ( $G$ ):**

- 1 – suurriik ei suutnud saavutada soovitud tulemust;
- 0,5 – suurriik pigem ei suutnud saavutada soovitud tulemust;
- 0,5 – suurriik osaliselt saavutas soovitud tulemuse;

1 – suurriik saavutas soovitud tulemus.

Antud tulemusel alusel on poliitikad järjestatud põhimõttel, et kõrgem tulemus tähendab kõrgema suutlikkusega poliitikat. Nende tulemuste alusel on poliitikad hoobade siseselt jagatud nelja gruppi: suutlikud, pigem suutlikud, pigem mittesuutlikud ja mittesuutlikud. Poliitika hindamine arvestab näiteobjektide konteksti, mistõttu suhtelise skaala alusel on arvestatud suutlikkuse määr mõlema näiteobjekti puhul eraldi. Samuti suutlike ja mittesuutlike juhtumite vahele tõmmatud piir lähtub konkreetsest hoovast: kogu hoova keskmine tulemus moodustab suutlikkuse-mittesuutlikkuse piiri. Kõige kõrgem poliitika tüübi keskmine tulemus moodustab piiri pigem suutlike ja suutlike juhtumite vahel ja kõige madalam poliitika tüübi keskmine moodustab piiri pigem mittesuutlike ja mittesuutlike juhtumite vahel. Analüüs keskendub suutlikele ja mittesuutlikele juhtumitele, kuna see võimaldab välja tuua selgeid tendentse, mis soodustavad või pärsivad suurriiklike sõltuvustamispoliitikaid subregioonis. Pigem suutlikud ja pigem mittesuutlikud juhtumid on arvesse võetud küll analüüsis, kuid nende üleminekugruppide juhtumeid eraldi ei kirjeldata, kuna nad ei võimalda välja tuua selgeid tendentse.

Kasutades eelpool kirjeldatud metodoloogiat, selgitasin uurimuse käigus välja, et USA sõltuvustamispoliitikad on olnud suutlikumad kui Venemaa omad, kuna kahe suurriigi poliitikate ellurakendamine on toimunud erinevates keskkondades. USA sõltuvustamispoliitikatest on kõige suutlikumad olnud majanduslikud hoovad, seejärel poliitilised hoovad. Vähesuutlikud on olnud sõjalised hoovad ja kõige vähesuutlikumad on USA näite puhul olnud rahvusvahelised hoovad. Venemaa näite puhul on kõige suutlikumad olnud sõjalised hoovad, samuti on suutlikud olnud rahvusvahelised hoovad. Majanduslikud hoovad ja poliitilised hoovad on olnud Venemaa näite puhul vähesuutlikud.

Kahe näidisobjekti erinevate tulemuste põhjuseid on mitmeid. Toon siinkohal välja kolm peamist: suurriigi välispoliitiline ideoloogia, suurriigi ja subregiooni vahelised bilateraalsed suhted, võimude paiknevus.

**Esiteks suurriigi välispoliitiline ideoloogia.** USA välispoliitikat iseloomustab liberaal-merelise jõu kontseptsioon. Seetõttu on ka USA välispoliitikas domineerivaks



suunaks välismajanduspoliitika esikohale seadmine poliitilis-sõjalise välispoliitika ees. USA välispoliitikat iseloomustab majanduspoliitika toetamine poliitilis-sõjaliste vahenditega. Seetõttu on ka enim suutlikud poliitikad majandusliku hoova alla kuuluvad. Venemaa välispoliitikat iseloomustab konservatiivne-kontinentaalne kontseptsioon. Seetõttu on Venemaa välispoliitikas domineerivaks suunaks poliitilis-sõjalise välispoliitika esikohale seadmine välismajanduspoliitika ees. Viimane on pigem toetavaks vahendiks poliitilis-sõjalisele välispoliitikale. Seetõttu on ka Venemaa sõltuvustamispoliitikatest suutlikumad sõjalised hoovad ning majanduslikud hoovad on vähesuutlikud.

**Teiseks aspektiks on suurriigi ja subregiooni vahelised bilateraalsed suhted.** USA ja Kesk-Ameerika suhteid iseloomustab pigem tsentripetaalne jõud, mistõttu Kesk-Ameerika riigid näevad USA-s partnerit ja jõudu, kellega soovitakse arendada aktiivseid bilateraalseid suhteid. USA ei ole otseselt kunagi omanud Kesk-Ameerika riike, hoolimata sellest, et tema mõju nendes riikides on väga tugev, ja neid suhteid ei iseloomusta ka selge vastandumine. Seetõttu on USA poliitilised hoovad olnud suutlikud ja sõjalised hoovad, mis tekitavad tugevat vastandamist, on olnud vähesuutlikud. Samuti on enamus küsimusi suudetud lahendada USA ja Kesk-Ameerika suhetes bilateraalsel tasandil, mistõttu rahvusvahelisele tasandile jõudvad küsimused on eelkõige teravad konfliktid, mille lahendamine välisjõudude sekkumisel ei ole olnud USA jaoks edukas. Seetõttu on ka USA rahvusvahelised hoovad olnud vähesuutlikud. Venemaa-Balti suhete puhul on iseloomustavaks jooneks tsentrifugaalsed jõud, mistõttu Balti riigid ei näe Venemaal partnerit ja jõudu, kellega soovitakse arendada aktiivseid bilateraalseid suhteid. Venemaa on omanud Balti riikide territooriumeid ja nende iseseisvumine on Venemaast lahkulöömise tagajärg. Seetõttu on bilateraalsed suhted üldjoontes vastastikuse negatiivse hoiakuga. See on muutnud poliitilised hoovad vähesuutlikuks ja paljud küsimused on viidud rahvusvahelisele tasandile ning alles seal on bilateraalsed küsimused suudetud lahendada, mistõttu on rahvusvahelised hoovad olnud enam suutlikud.

**Kolmandaks aspektiks on võimude paiknemine subregiooni ümber.** USA on ainus tõeline suurvõim Ameerika kontinendil, mistõttu ajaloo käigus on tema domineerimine Kesk-Ameerikas tekitanud tunduvalt vähem küsitavust kui Venemaa positsioonid Baltikumis. Erinevad Euroopa suurvõimud on üritanud USA-ga võistelda

Kesk-Ameerikas, kuid USA geograafiline eelisseisund on selles konkurentsis toonud võitjaks USA. Lisaks sellele on Euroopa jõudude laienemist Ameerika kontinendil võimalik käsitleda kui imperialistlikku aktsiooni, mis annab moraalselt USA-le eelisseisundi. Seetõttu on USA poliitilised ja majanduslikud hoovad olnud suutlikud, kuna need on olnud väheagressiivsed ja demonstreerivad ameerika solidaarsust. USA ei ole pidanud oma positsiooni kinnitamiseks sõjaliselt subregiooni üle domineerima. Seetõttu on ka USA sõjalised hoovad olnud vähesuutlikud, kuna need on agressiivsed ning seetõttu ameerika solidaarsust mittetoetavad ja USA-st eemale tõukavad vahendid. Baltikumis on Venemaa pidevalt pidanud oma positsioonide eest võitlema, kuna Euroopas on erinevad suurvõimud niivõrd kokku pressitud ja suurvõimude vaheline konflikt on kerge tekkima. Seetõttu on Venemaa sõjaline domineerimine Baltikumis üks olulisemaid positsioonide kinnitamisevõimalusi. See on muutnud ka Venemaa sõjalised hoovad suutlikumaks võrreldes teiste hoobadega. Pidev suurvõimude konkurents Baltikumis on võimaldanud sealsetele riikidele alternatiive, mistõttu eelpool väljatoodud tsentrifugaalsed jõud panevad Balti riike otsustama pigem Venemaa konkurentide kasuks, mistõttu on ka poliitilised ja majanduslikud hoovad vähesuutlikud.

Antud taustast lähtuvalt võib vaadelda erinevaid faktoreid, mis muudavad suurriiklike sõltuvustamispoliitikaid suutlikuks ja mittesuutlikuks. **USA poliitikaid enim mõjutav faktor on välise jõu osalus või mitteosalus poliitika elluviimisel.** Kui Kesk-Ameerikas on olnud madal teise välisjõu huvi, siis on USA poliitika olnud ka suutlikumad USA kontrollivõime suurendamisel subregioonis. Sama seos kehtib ka vastupidi, kui Kesk-Ameerikas on olnud kõrge teise välisjõu huvi, siis USA poliitika on olnud vähem suutlikud. Seda eelkõige seetõttu, et välismõju olemasolu on tekitanud Kesk-Ameerika riikidele võimaluse valida erinevate suurriikide vahel. Teiseks oluliseks aspektiks on stabiilsus. **USA poliitika on olnud suutlikumad stabiilses keskkonnas või stabiilsust kasvatavas keskkonnas ja sõltuvustamispoliitika on olnud vähem suutlikud ebastabiilses keskkonnas või destabiliseerivas protsessis.** Poliitika keskkonna tugev mõju on tingitud antud regiooni poliitilisest kultuurist ja iseloomustab ka USA ja Kesk-Ameerika bilateraalseid suhteid. **Kolmandaks aspektiks toon välja eelnevad suhted, mis mõjutavad USA poliitikate suutlikkust suurendada tema kontrollivõimet Kesk-Ameerika üle.** Positiivse iseloomuga eelnevad suhted on kaasa aidanud poliitika

suutlikkusele, negatiivse iseloomuga suhted on vähendanud poliitika suutlikkust. Siinkohal tuleb välja juba eelpoolmainitud tsentripetaalsete bilateraalsete suhete mõju. **Neljandaks aspektiks toon välja Kesk-Ameerika riikide reaktsiooni USA poliitikale.** USA poliitikat toetav vastus on suurendanud poliitika suutlikkust ja USA poliitikat mittetoetav reaktsioon on seda vähendanud. Antud faktor on väiksema mõjuga, kuna USA on eelnevate faktorite olemasolu korral suuteline eirama Kesk-Ameerika riikide reaktsioone. **Kõige vähem mõjutavaks faktoriks on olnud USA positsioon, mis oma tugevusega on kaasa aidanud poliitika suutlikkusele ja oma nõrkusega seda vähendanud.** Selle faktori nõrkus tuleneb sellest, et USA positsiooni ei ole eraldatuse tõttu teiste suurvõimude poolt nii tugevalt küsitavuse alla seatud. Samuti ei ole võimalik seda väga hästi jälgida, kuna see ei ole olnud eriti muutuv faktor.

Venemaad enim mõjutanud faktorid ei ole üks-üheselt vastastikusel seoses nagu USA omad. **Venemaa poliitikate suutlikkust enim mõjutanud faktorid on Venemaa tugev positsioon ja Balti riikide positiivne reaktsioon Venemaa poliitikale.** Nende faktorite suur mõju tuleneb sellest, et Venemaa on suuteline oma poliitikaid edukalt ellu viima kas siis, kui tema positsiooni ei seata küsitavuse alla ja Venemaa saab oma poliitika Balti riikidele peale sundida, või siis, kui Balti riigid, kes üritavad eemalduda Venemaast, ei näe poliitikast suurt ohtu ja on nõus poliitikat aktsepteerima. **Venemaa poliitikate mittersuutlikkust kõige enam mõjutav faktor on tugev teise suurriigi huvi.** Kuna Venemaa huvide kokkupõrkumise tõenäosus teiste suurvõimude huvidega Baltikumis on suur, siis mõjutab tugev välis huvi ka kõige rohkem Venemaa mittersuutlikke poliitikaid. **Samuti mängib suurt rolli Balti riikide mittetoetav reaktsioon Venemaa poliitikatele.** See on jällegi seotud tsentrifugaalsete jõududega, mistõttu ei ole Venemaa suuteline oma poliitikaid Balti riikidele peale suruma, kui nad ei ole sunnitud seda vastu võtma või kui see tundub neile mitte kasulik. **Kolmandaks aspektiks, mis mõjutab Venemaa poliitika suutlikkust, on madal välis huvi, mis võimaldab Venemaal domineerida Balti subregioonis.** See on jällegi seotud suure võimalusega huvide kokkupõrkeks. Madal välis huvi mõjutab poliitika suutlikkust vähem kui tugev välis huvi, kuna tugeva välis huvi korral on Venemaa positsioon maailmapoliitikas tavaliselt nõrgenemas ja see võimaldab Venemaa kontrollivõimet Baltikumi üle vähendada. **Nõrk positsioon ongi järgmine faktor, mis muudab Venemaa poliitikat mittersuutlikuks.** See aitab kaasa nii

tsentrifugaalsete jõudude esile kerkimisele kui ka suurendab välisruumi subregioonis. **Samaväärselt muudab Venemaa poliitika mittesuutlikuks Venemaa-Balti suhete negatiivne raamistik**, mistõttu valitseb vastastikune usaldamatus ja poliitika leiavad negatiivse vastuse. **Oluline on välja tuua, et Venemaa nõrk positsioon võib olla ka poliitika suutlikkusele kaasaaitavaks faktoriks, kuid seda üksnes majanduslike hoobade ja poliitilise hoova liitlaspoliitika puhul.** Venemaa nõrk positsioon kutsus esile Balti riikide positiivse reaktsiooni, kuna nad ei näe Venemaal endale ohtu. **Kõige vähem Venemaa sõltuvustamispoliitika mõjutav faktor on stabiilsus**, kuna Baltikum on üpris stabiilne subregioon ja seetõttu ei mõjuta ka stabiilsuse faktor eriti Venemaa poliitika. **Baltikumi välispoliitiline ebastabiilsus on kaasa aidanud Venemaa poliitika suutlikkusele**, kuna see on võimaldanud Venemaal ära kasutada ebaselget välispoliitilist olukorda ja oma positsiooni Baltikumis sellel momendil kinnistada. **Ebastabiilsus Baltikumis võib kaasa tuua Venemaa poliitika mittesuutlikkuse**, kuid seda faktorit ei ole olnud võimalik juhtumite puudumise tõttu kontrollida.

Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et USA-Kesk-Ameerika näide vastab paremini esitatud mudelile ja erinevad tendentsid on vastastikusel suhtel. Venemaa-Balti näite puhul ei ole võimalik välja tuua vastastikusel suhtelisi faktoreid või siis sama faktor võib erinevate poliitika puhul või erinevate faktorite kombinatsioonide puhul kaasa tuua nii poliitika suutlikkuse kui ka mittesuutlikkuse. Kuna USA-Kesk-Ameerika näite puhul on võimalik selgemalt välja joonistada tendents kui Venemaa-Balti näite puhul, siis võib eeldada, et Kesk-Ameerika on USA-st rohkem sõltuv kui Baltikum Venemaast. Antud väidet on aga vaja veel tõestada, töötamaks selle jaoks välja sõltuvusmäära hindamiskriteeriumid, mille alusel saab hinnata sõltuvust. Antud töö hindas üksnes poliitika suutlikkust, mis on protsessi potentsiaali hindamine, kuid ei hinnatud tulemust, milleks on sõltuvusmäär. Selle jaoks on vaja läbi viia järgmine uurimus.