


A Test for Institutional Innovation: Winnipeg's Unicity

**By Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, Jim Lightbody, Lorna Pawluk, & Cheryl Sherba
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The Institute of Urban Studies





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A TEST FOR INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: WINNIPEG'S UNICITY

BY Dr. Lloyd Axworthy*

INTRODUCTION

Winnipeg: A Test Case

In 1972 a new amalgamated form of local government was established in the Winnipeg region replacing the Metro style of government that had been operating over a decade. In addition, the new scheme included several new institutional wrinkles designed to achieve wider citizen involvement, and a decentralization of political control.

Even though these changes are of recent vintage, the Winnipeg experiment can offer some useful evidence on the pertinence of institutional reform in local government.

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Background

Winnipeg is a city of just over half a million people constituting approximately half the population of the Province of Manitoba. The greater part of all the goods and services produced in the province are generated in the Winnipeg area and it provides most of the jobs and most of the tax revenues needed to run the province.²

Historically, there has been an underlying socio-political consensus shaping the city's political environment. The business oriented Anglo-Saxons who originally dominated city government were firm believers in "good government", "efficiency" and "business principles". They had strong feelings about keeping politics out of local government, and operating local government according to sound no-nonsense administrative procedures. The representatives from ethnic groups, primarily Ukrainian, German and Jewish, who have increasingly taken over municipal political posts seem to have an even stronger belief in these principles of non-partisanship, efficiency and conservatism.

Winnipeg is a slow growth city. The population increase in Winnipeg from 1966 to 1970 was only 5% as compared to 16% in Toronto, 15% in Vancouver, 16% in Edmonton, and 21% in Calgary.³ Thus, while Winnipeg's heterogeneity in population would seem to

indicate the development of a more divergent set of political values, the slow growth has promoted until just recently, the continuation of a more stable traditional outlook. The small property owners who make up a good part of Winnipeg population are concerned about basic services at low cost. As a result, local government has been characterized by its lack of involvement in programs of social reform, the support of civic good works and an overriding concern with keeping taxes low.⁴

Beginning in the 1970's however, Winnipeg began to feel the same kind of pressures for change that are generally part of the urban scene elsewhere in the country. Downtown renewal, transportation systems, suburban land development and the provision of public housing emerged as major issues. In addition, there is the particularly striking problem of substantial in-migration of Native people from rural areas. There is an estimated 30,000 urban Native people residing in the core of the City, most of whom are on the lowest income scale.⁵

These developments have brought to the foreground an agenda of local issues complex and difficult to resolve. Thus, just at the time when a new organization of local government was being introduced, the political, social and economic environment of the city was shifting and new political forces were coming into play. The degree to which the new institutions acted upon the new political climate raises important questions. Have the new institutions opened channels for the expression of new

political forces or has it consolidated the hold of the conservative, business oriented, political groups? Is the city able to plan and initiate innovative programs in response to changing conditions in its downtown core, or to meet problems posed by urban growth? These become, in part the real tests for measuring the impact of Winnipeg's new form of government.

The Metro System

Winnipeg's new system is a successor to a form of local government which in its /^{own time} was considered a reform. In 1960, the Provincial Government introduced a two-tier Metropolitan form of government for Winnipeg.⁶ The division of powers between the separate municipalities and the Metropolitan Corporation was similar to the metro scheme of Toronto, with powers divided between the separate municipalities and a central Metro Council.

Unlike Toronto, the political representation on Winnipeg's Metro Council was not drawn from elected representatives of the respective municipalities. Instead, the city was divided into ten pie-wedged constituencies, each electing a separate councillor. This created a critical separation between the individual political jurisdictions, and the metro level, and enabled the politicians in the respective municipalities to evade all responsibility for the Metro operation.

While there were certain major achievements in the area of public works and transportation, the history of the ten year

operation of Metro is one of unending disagreement between the City of Winnipeg led by Mayor Stephen Juba and the Metro Corporation. Many nasty words were exchanged and more seriously, many needed programs were stymied, particularly in sensitive areas such as the planning of the downtown and new transportation programs. Metro became a convenient political whipping boy for the City of Winnipeg and the Municipalities. It became clear to provincial leaders that major changes were necessary and a blue ribbon commission headed by a former Conservative cabinet member was set up in 1966 to review the organization of local government.

Before the Commission could report however, a provincial election was held and the New Democratic Party under Edward Schreyer took over. One of Schreyer's campaign commitments had been a pledge to set up some form of regional government. But, he was not going to trust a Tory-appointed Commission to give him advice. Instead, a group of Toronto-based consultants were hired and in very short order - a matter of about one year - a very different kind of local government scheme for Winnipeg was proposed.

Unicity Proposals

In December, 1973, the Provincial Government produced a White Paper outlining its plans for the reorganization of Winnipeg, a concept that quickly became labelled UNICITY.

The White Paper proposed the complete amalgamation of all

the municipalities. Council would be elected from forty-eight single member wards, based on an electoral base of 10,000 population. The Mayor was to be elected by a majority of Council members, a departure from the long-standing practice in the city of direct election by the populace at large, a move interpreted as an effort to create a parliamentary style government.

The model of a parliamentary-Cabinet style structure was also seen in the organization of Council and the Administration. There were to be committees dealing with finance, public works and environment, but over the committees was to be a central Executive-Policy Committee composed of the Mayor and other Committee Chairmen, exercising functions of central policy-making coordination. The administrative arrangements paralleled this Cabinet-style executive structure. There were to be three commissioners for each of the committees and a Chief Commissioner as overall executive officer. All the Commissioners were gathered together in their own executive group or a Board of Commissioners to act as the staff arm to the Executive Policy Committee. The political link holding this executive policy making apparatus together was the Mayor who would have to hold the confidence of a majority on Council.

In company with this centralizing, amalgamative arrangement, was a series of proposals designed to decentralize the political system and give the citizen greater access to government. The

White Paper proposed the City be divided into thirteen community committee areas composed of between three to four wards. These were contained approximately within the boundaries of the old suburban municipalities, and within traditional neighbourhood designations within the old City of Winnipeg.

The Community Committees had the power to supervise local administrative functions such as the running of local parks, playgrounds, and libraries, consider applications for zoning variances or development plans and advise the central council on the needs of the local area. Tied in with the Community Committees was another innovation called Resident Advisory Groups (RAGS). Resident Advisors were to be elected each year by private citizens in each of the Community Committee areas, and were to meet at least monthly with the Community Committee on issues of interest and importance to the local area.

In this way the Winnipeg system sought, in effect, to combine two very different goals. While some urban areas have had regional forms of government, and others have experimented with techniques for decentralizing the political system, the proposals for Winnipeg were designed to achieve both these goals with one integrated system, and this is what makes the Winnipeg experience somewhat unique.

Bill 36: A Hybrid System

After a six month period of public hearings and legislative debate the basic outline presented in the White Paper was adopted,

by the Provincial Legislature, but only after a very significant change - a reversion back to direct election of the Mayor. Undoubtedly many Winnipeg citizens were in favour of this move,⁸ but the influence of Steve Juba, the incumbent Mayor of Winnipeg, who wanted to maintain the old method, cannot be discounted. The¹¹ change in the form of mayoralty election had a strong disruptive effect on the neatly laid out formula for strong executive leadership under the Parliamentary model, and resulted in a hybrid system of executive organization on Council. Other more limited modifications included a change from a forty-eight member to a fifty member council, changes in the number of members of the Council Committees and an increase in the base salary of the members.

The Provincial Government selected October 6th, 1971 as election day for the new Council, with the new system officially to begin operation on January 1st, 1972. This hasty introduction of the new system was certainly ill-advised, compared to other local government reform procedures which seem to extend a lengthier transition period in order for administrators and politicians to ease into their jobs.⁹ In Winnipeg, however, it was a case of a crash introduction to the new system, whatever the consequences.

UNICITY: ITS PERFORMANCE

Rule by the Suburbs

What has been the effect of reorganization on Winnipeg?

First, there have been important political consequences.

In the November election, a group named the Independent Civic Election Committee gained thirty-seven out of the fifty seats. The I.C.E.C. is a non-socialist, normally non-partisan group involving political people who, in provincial or federal politics, would be Conservatives or Liberals. The elections for Unicity Council, following closely on the surprise victory of the N.D.P. provincially, in 1969, was treated with deadly seriousness by the anti-socialist, business groups in the city, resulting in a strong organizational effort and a well funded campaign by the I.C.E.C. The N.D.P., which had made a strong showing in Winnipeg during the provincial election managed to elect only seven. Independents won in five wards, the Communists in one.

In the second civic election held in 1974, the I.C.E.C. maintained its hold on Council but lost eight seats to a disparate opposition made up of the N.D.P., some independent and a new grouping called the Civic Reform Coalition.

The reorganization of government was a major factor in giving the I.C.E.C. its strong hold on Council and reinforcing the position and power of the suburban property owning constituency represented by the I.C.E.C. There are those who contend

that the real source of power in city politics is the property-development industry.¹⁰ But, the importance of the property owning taxpayer who regards his single family home as his castle, and who supports the political group that will serve his interests, should not be overlooked, especially in a city like Winnipeg where they make up the majority of electors.

One could postulate for example, that if the boundaries separating the former old City of Winnipeg from suburban municipalities had been retained, and had the downtown area continued to become populated with a more mobile group of highrise residents, whose political outlook is more reform minded than the prospect of reform urban populist type councillors coming to dominate council at least in the jurisdiction of the central city would have increased - perhaps duplicating the situation in Toronto. As it is, however, the I.C.E.C. majority on Council is heavily dominated by suburban members and they control committee appointments and have the edge in voting strength.¹¹ In fact, two inner city councillors elected under the I.C.E.C. banner in 1974 have since resigned from the caucus over the issue of suburban domination.

As one city hall reporter notes: "Suburban councillors generally want new residential development in their areas, major commercial development in the downtown area and an efficient

transportation system, private or public, connecting the two centers of activity. Their interests are in direct conflict to Inner City Councillors who see protection of established neighbourhoods and redevelopment of deteriorated areas as prime concerns."¹²

The reorganization then has had its influence on the priorities of the city and the policies it has adopted. In contrast to other Canadian cities which are showing signs of some concern over the environmental damage caused by major development projects, Winnipeg City Council has provided support and subsidization of large scale development, premised on the need for generating further tax revenue. There has also been a noticeable lack of attention paid to matters of low cost housing, and a disregard for economic or social development policies that would meet the needs of native people who have migrated to the central city.

Preliminary breakdown of budget figures show expenditure on matters such as recreation, capital works and maintenance being disproportionately allocated to suburban areas. While in part this might be explained in terms of the suburban growth in population requiring heavier investment in public works, it doesn't account for the neglect shown towards the older parts of Winnipeg. Reorganization has influenced a choice of civic priorities favouring suburban residents and against those of the inner city.

Fiscal Administrative Results

The results of the reorganization on the financial and administrative side of city government have been mixed. On the plus side the equalization of mill rates immediately brought greater equity in the fiscal system of the city. Formerly, wealthy suburbs had relatively low mill rates because they could utilize services provided by the central city. In 1972 this came to an end and they had to pay their fair share. For example, the suburb of Tuxedo, a very high income area, had its mill rates go up by 40% compared to only a minor increase for the Central city.

In other areas the results are less clear. The general assessment by politicians, administrators and citizens alike is that the delivery of basic services has neither declined nor improved, although there are some complaints from residents of former suburban areas that services such as road repair or snow clearance are not as efficient.¹³

At the same time critics of the new system were right when they claimed that the costs of amalgamation would be high. Even taking into account the normal annual increase in costs and the necessary start-up costs of a new system, city officials have admitted that bringing services up to common standard, will cost the city substantially more.¹⁴ Time will only tell whether through amalgamation the general level of service will be improved.

Centralized Planning and Control

The more serious question flowing from a centralization of authority is whether it has led to an improved system of planning and development control. A major complaint under the old system was the confusion and delay caused by having several jurisdictions responsible for matters of subdivision approval, zoning control, supply of new land services. The new arrangements have in some ways made the old system look like a veritable model of efficiency.

The most serious trouble has been in housing. Bill 36 introduced a series of new requirements to provide a greater degree of public protection on subdivision plans and zoning variations through public hearings and administrative control. The end result was a process requiring ninety different procedural acts, doubling the time for approval. This has been a contributing cause to a serious housing shortage and

escalation in cost in the Winnipeg area, at least in the view of the housebuilding industry.¹⁶

In the area of downtown development, however, the Act did achieve its goal of more effective decision making, albeit with questionable results. Prior to 1971 both the City of Winnipeg and the Metro Corporation had their respective plans for revitalizing the downtown core. Both plans were predicated on major commercial high rise development, but there was a stalemate in execution because of the political differences. Under the new unified system the pro-development forces from the old Metro Council, City Council and suburban councils work together, and have made a series of decisions in support of major downtown development projects. Many of these have been passed with little scrutiny, with one 100 million dollar project involving complicated land transfer from the city being approved in a matter of four days from the time it was proposed by the developer.¹⁷

To counter this unfettered spree of development, some citizen groups have tried to impose the requirement of environmental impact studies on major public works, a little noticed provision of Bill 36. For the first few years of operation under the new Act, administrators of the City didn't bother to apply the environmental impact requirements. But under pressure from the citizen's groups it has been applied, slowing up or altering some projects. This has prompted the Executive Policy Committee into efforts to ask the Provincial Government to rescind the

environmental impact requirements under the Act, so the eventual use of this planning tool is uncertain.¹⁸

In the matter of regional land use and transportation, the unified system has not yet had a chance to fully demonstrate its worth. In 1974 City Council did pass two major proposals. One was plans for major shopping center locations in the suburban areas. This occasioned a sharp conflict between suburban councillors who were for the plan and the Commissioner of Environment who originally tried to limit such development. In the second case the Council has passed some control on land use in the additional zone around around Winnipeg, utilizing the technique of large lot zoning. Without commenting on the worth of each decision, they would appear to have been achieved more readily under the unified system rather than under the old metro system.

In transportation planning, the network of expressway systems adopted by the old Metro Council (W.A.T.S.) have after indreasing public opposition been rejected by the new Council. Nothing new has been offered in replacement and it can ot be stated at this point in time whether the new system will in fact effect the implementation of a regional transportation network.

There are some signs, however, of positive movement in this area. The city has introduced experimental Dial-a-Bus and free downtown shuttle bus services, and has joined with senior levels of government in developing a high speed transit

route using a railway corridor. As well, there appears to be the beginnings of closer coordination of land use and transportation planning, and a new development plan is expected that should show the results of an integrated approach.

While these are good signs, there is looming a more serious concern - the problem of administrative accountability. Any governmental agency that takes the issue of accountability seriously must demonstrate that it meets the requirements of informing citizens, that there is an open procedure for receiving citizen complaints, and that the agency makes its choices based on citizen preference. These requirements are not being met in the Winnipeg system, particularly as a result of the erosion or disappearance of local community office employees and an increasing concentration and centralization of staff downtown.

A prime example of this occurred when the Board of Commissioners proposed and Council accepted a plan for establishing a system that divided the city into six districts for the purpose of administering city services. Such an arrangement is a direct contradiction of the Community Committee formula and clearly indicates that the chief administrators of the City are disregarding the intentions of the Act which sought to provide some degree of local control and supervision over the delivery of services. It thus raises the question of just how well the

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the goal of greater citizen contact and access to city government has been achieved.

Electoral Involvement

The new system was designed to encourage participation by citizens in two ways. First, by increasing the electoral involvement of citizens and adding to minority representation through the small ward system. In this it has been no more successful than other local governments.¹⁹ It appeared from the sixty percent turnout in the first election that progress has been made. In the second election, turnout fell to thirty-five percent, about the level under former municipal schemes. People vote when there is a competition of people or issues.²⁰ The reorganization of local government, at least in Winnipeg, has had limited effect in inducing such competition. In fact the 1974 election saw ten council seats filled by acclamation. While there are many suggestions on how to increase voter awareness in municipal elections, it appears that the particular design of the Winnipeg system is not necessarily one of them. To be fair the turnout in civic elections held in supposedly reform-minded cities such as Toronto and Vancouver is no better!

Community Involvement

The second way of improving citizen involvement and perhaps the most heralded aspect of the new government system in Winnipeg was the Community Committee - Resident Advisory system, designed to give local citizens close contact and access to city decision makers. This was to be a continuing

institutional framework whereby private citizens could advise councillors on matters affecting the local neighbourhood.

The Resident Advisory Groups began well. Over four hundred people were active in the initial thirteen resident advisory groups with membership ranging in each from about twenty to over two hundred in one. They organized themselves usually into committees corresponding to the committees on Council, i.e., works and operations, environment finance, and several undertook special tasks such as neighbourhood planning projects. Most of the resident advisors were people who had been community activists previously and who now saw in the R.A.G.'s a new vehicle to pursue their concerns.²¹

The work of the Resident Advisors however, was seriously constrained by a lack of resources and support from either the City Administration or the Provincial Government. Very technical documents were referred to the R.A.G.s; many tasks of neighbourhood contact and communication were left to the volunteer citizen members by councillors, all without any significant staff or financial help.

This reflected the generally unenthusiastic attitude by most city councillors and administrators towards R.A.G.s. In a survey conducted among councillors, when asked if R.A.G.s should be given additional support, fifty percent said no, thirty-four percent said yes.²² Council has never seriously discussed the role of R.A.G.s or citizen involvement generally.

It appears that they are viewed as apart from the normal governing process.

In part, this view is deserved. R.A.G. members themselves admit that they have not been very successful in communicating with their respective communities, nor in involving many citizens. Because of strong dominance of citizen activists, R.A.G.s often found themselves talking about matters of little interest to the general population. As a result they become marked as a forum for the "troublemakers".²³

The R.A.G.s however, have shown at times that they can be an effective forum for citizens. On those occasions when additional outside resources available from university groups, private planning organizations or community development agencies were made available, the Resident Advisors have played an effective role. In three inner city community areas the R.A.G.s have become sponsors of neighbourhood planning ventures which have involved residents in determining the planning options for their own area. In another case the R.A.G.s became the forum where serious public opposition was raised to a combined federal, provincial, municipal plan for railway relocation. A coalition of citizen groups and social agencies using research material from a university-based transportation economist opposed the plans and through a series of presentations in various community committee-resident advisory meetings were able to mount enough opposition to have the original proposals stopped and sent back for reworking by the consultants.

These signs of vitality in the new neighbourhood structures are limited, however to a few areas of the city. In general the R.A.G.s are slowly declining in influence and involvement by citizens. In fact some councillors publicly have already called for an abolition of the system and many councillors and civic administrators privately see little use for the system.²⁴ Citizens are not aware of the existence of the R.A.G.s and make virtually no use of the institutions.

CONCLUSION

The impact of reforms in Winnipeg's scheme of local government will continue to unfold in patterns presently undetected. Therefore judgments on its performance must be tentative. Certain preliminary observations about the Winnipeg experience, however, can be offered.

First, it is obvious that too much is expected of institutional reform. There has been a tendency, particularly noticeable amongst Canadian provincial governments to use local government reform as the placebo for urban ills. The prescriptions of an older generation of political scientist that reorganizing local government will solve problems of ineffective decision making, inefficient administration, apathy by the populace, have been adopted by provincial governments in New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba, and have led to major efforts at government reorganization. In fact this provincial tinkering with the machinery of local government seems preferable to undertaking major political action on land use, transportation, tax reform, and planning.

Yet, the case of Winnipeg shows that reorganizing into a regional scheme may have limited effect on the delivery of services and does not carry by itself the means of achieving good regional planning. A strategy of wholesale change in the system involving a good deal of disruption may be less useful than specific institutional corrections.²⁵

It is also important to realize that the impact local government reorganization has on a city is secondary to the impact of actions by senior levels of government. What the federal government decides in matters of housing legislation, airport location, tax incentives for industry, has a much greater impact on the economics and social health of an urban region than any local government reform. What the provincial government might do in the way of alleviating property tax burden, the kind of aid given for urban transportation, the land use controls on the urban periphery, the location of provincial offices and facilities can affect a city much more vitally than the imposition of a metro or a regional government scheme. Focusing therefore on local government reform can become a case of misplaced priorities.

This is not to suggest that institutional change should be ignored, as it has a major role in influencing the division of political power within a city. While the basic social political forces are not changed by the institutional system, their form of expression is channeled differently by new institutional frameworks, and this will have

a strong impact on the policy choices of the city. In Winnipeg reorganization brought about a political system highly oriented toward the concerns of suburban residents, an outcome quite the reverse of the intentions of the original Unicity proposal.

Another area where institutional arrangements can be important, but where usually little attention is paid, is in the design of structures appropriate for dealing with the inter-governmental arrangements of the city. Few cities, Winnipeg included, have structures designed specifically for the task of dealing with senior levels of government, of relating to rural municipalities on the borders, or for undertaking many of the myriad functions that a city must perform in a complex intergovernmental system.

On the other end of the scale, institutional reorganization also has an important role in overcoming the growing estrangement between individual citizens and government. Traditional political activity is often seen by private citizens as meaningless. Government administration and planning is not responsive or accountable.

In Winnipeg, innovative steps were taken to overcome these problems. But, unfortunately, the good intentions of the Act were never carried through. The Resident Advisory Groups were not given any real assistance in the crucial first stage of their operation. Civic administrators, hostile to the idea of decentralization or any form of citizen control were allowed to establish administrative districts that run counter to

community committee or resident advisory systems. City politicians and the Provincial Government were half-hearted in setting forth the goals of citizen involvement and have never established an action program for developing a meaningful form of public participation.

Many innovative techniques were open to them - neighbourhood development corporations, community information systems, urban resource centers. But, they were never tried.

The Winnipeg reorganization was old fashioned reform. It was primarily designed to overcome problems of fragmentation and of achieving some governmental unity in planning and administration. In these endeavors it met with some success, but not enough to warrant the disruption that was caused, or the bureaucratic centralization that has become part of the new system. A more serious omission was that the reform did little to meet problems of inter-governmental relations, of citizen activism, of social and economic development, of decentralizing authority and power, of the need for new managerial techniques and reorganization. While lip service was paid to such concerns in the original White Paper, the actual design of the new system fell short of the mark.

The Winnipeg case also shows that a shift of attention from local government to provincial and federal governments might be a more productive strategy in gaining solutions to urban problems. Local government is basically the provider of services. It does not have the scope nor the resources to

tackle the critical issues of urban growth, planning, transportation, economic development and social policy. These are matters for senior levels of government. Yet a great deal of energy is expended fussing over local government reform.

In fact, if there is to be government reform, it might better occur on the senior levels of government. Provincial governments could use new institutional forms to order land use, to enable citizens to plan their communities, to have low income housing programs that are initiated and managed by the occupants. The federal government should be working out ways of altering the immigration flows from the major urban centers and distributing economic activity more evenly across the country.

A careful look at the Winnipeg experience provides some useful lessons. First that local government reform is an overrated undertaking. And, secondly, when it is undertaken it should be aimed at goals very different from the traditional exercise of setting up a regional, centralized system. If such a lesson can be learned from the Winnipeg case, then it was a worthwhile experience.

FOOTNOTES

1. The material is drawn from a more extensive study undertaken by the Institute of Urban Studies at the University of Winnipeg, published in the spring of 1974, although some new data has been added. See Lloyd Axworthy, James Cassidy, Unicity: The Transition, (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1974).
2. Government of Manitoba, "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area", December 1970, p.2.
3. See the Globe and Mail, Toronto, November 9 1971.
4. Winnipeg has a rate of 60% single family home ownership. For a discussion of how population characteristics, including property ownership influence political behavior and policy outcomes, see: Edmund P. Fowler, Robert Lineberry, "The Comparative Analysis of Urban Policy: Canada and the United States", Harlan Hahn, ed., People and Politics in Urban Society, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).
5. Don McCaskill, "Migration, Adjustment and Integration of the Indian into the Urban Environment", unpublished Masters Thesis, Carlton University, 1970.
6. Up to 1960 the urban region of Winnipeg had been divided into government between a central City of Winnipeg and a group of surrounding municipalities, along with a number of regional boards and commissions looking after water supply and public transit. For discussion of the situation pre-Metro, and an expanded history of the Metro years, see: George Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years" in Ralph Krueger and Charles Bryfogle, eds., Urban Problems, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 359.
7. For a collection of views on the meaning of the White Paper proposals, see Lloyd Axworthy, ed., The Future City, (Winnipeg: The Institute of Urban Studies, The University of Winnipeg, 1971).
8. For an amplification of survey results see Axworthy, Cassidy, op. cit.
9. For example, in Britain orientation periods of two to three years were set aside for councillors and administrators to develop an understanding of reform structure and organize traditional techniques. See Joyce Land, Alan Norton, Setting Up New Authorities, (London: Charles Night and Co., 1972).

10. See James Lorimer, The Real World of City Politics, (Toronto: James, Lewis, and Samuels, 1972).
11. Eight out of ten members of the Executive Policy Committee are from the suburbs.
12. Robert Matas, "Ghost of Metro Lingers on Council", (Winnipeg: The Winnipeg Tribune, November 9 1974).
13. This is based on a series of interviews with public officials and a survey of the populace. A more comprehensive assessment of administrative performance of the new system is difficult to achieve at such an early stage, although work has now begun by the author in analysing budget changes. See Axworthy, Cassidy, Op. cit., p. 38, 39.
14. In the Winnipeg Free Press, October 18 1974, Chief Stewart stated that the cost for unifying the police force would be an additional \$400,000.00.
15. See "Building Sites: A Prime Component of Housing", a report prepared by Underwood McLellan for the Winnipeg Housebuilders' Association, 1973, p. 29.
16. Ibid., pp. 22-25.
17. "City's Trizec Study Takes a Beating" (Winnipeg: The Winnipeg Free Press, December 20 1974).
18. See Lloyd Axworthy, Don Epstein, "Urban Populism", a paper presented to Canadian Studies Conference, (Toronto) June, 1974.
19. Some individual instances of minority representation did occur. In the first election the director of the Indian-Metis Friendship Center was elected in a downtown ward. He declined to run for a second term but his seat was won by a representative of the Chinese community.
20. Sydney Verba, Norman H. Nie, Participation in America, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
21. Lloyd Axworthy, J. Cassidy, Unicity: The Transition, (Winnipeg: The Institute of Urban Studies, The University of Winnipeg, 1974), p. 117.
22. Ibid., p. 117.
23. For a discussion of the issue differences between citizen activists and general range of citizens see Verba and Nie, op. cit., Chapter 5.

24. See Robert Matas, "Citizen Role in Big City Government to be Scrapped", (Winnipeg: The Winnipeg Tribune, November 16, 1972).
25. For comments on this point, see Edward Basefield, James Q. Wilson, City Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); J. K. Friend, J. M. Power, C. J. Yewlett, Public Planning: The Inter Corporate Dimension, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974); Norton Long, The Unwalled City, (New York: Basic Books, 1972); and Scott Greer, The Urbane View, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
26. See Harlan Hahn, "Reassessing and Revitalizing Urban Politics", in Harlan Hahn, ed., People and Politics in an Urban Society, (London: Sage Publications, 1971).