# Social Dynamics of Gang Involvement: A Mathematical Approach

## Abstract

Gangs have played a signi cant role in the social and political history of the United States, and continue to impact the country today, as gang violence and participation rates continue to grow. In this paper, we explore the dynamics of gang involvement between at-risk individuals, gang members, and reformed gang members using an SIR-type model. We investigate the effect that social in uence of reformed gang members has on the "at-risk" population using a general function, which takes into account the cost of gang membership and a threat factor. Our results show that the in uence of the reformed population is highly sensitive to initial gang member population size, recidivism, and cost.

## 1. Introduction

The NYGS estimates a 28% increase from 2002 to 2009 in the number of gangs throughout the country, with over 28,000 active gangs.

Gang involvement is a product of personal choice, sociocultural setting, and social inuence; gangs commonly involve youth, are concentrated in areas of poverty, and are composed of racial and ethnic minorities.

We reason that reformed gang members, who have experienced many of the same challenges, may serve as the most effective mentors for "at-risk" individuals.

2. Model

Our model is based primarily on the model constructed by Sánchez et al., which models the impact of nonlinear social in uence on drinking behavior(1). The key difference is that our model includes a reducing function, f (;;r), on , to represent the effect that reformed gang members serving as mentors have on at-risk youth. f (;;r) must be a positive, decreasing smooth function that includes a threatening factor, , which represents the potential risks to reformed gang members who work to prevent gang involvement.

Figure 1: Gang involvement grouped into s (at-risk population), g (gang members), and r (reformed gang members).

Our system of nonlinear differential equations is given by:

$$s^{0} = f(;;r)sg s;$$
  
 $g^{0} = f(;;r)sg+rg (+)g;$   
 $r^{0} = g rg r:$ 

where s + g + r = 1. We work with the following example of the reducing function:

$$f(;;r) = \frac{1+r}{1+r}$$

 Table 1: Parameter De nitions

| Parameter | De nition               | Values  |
|-----------|-------------------------|---------|
|           | recruitment rate        | 0.009   |
|           | departure rate          | 0.00015 |
|           | cost of gang membership | [0,1]   |
|           | threat factor           | [0,1]   |
|           | recidivism rate         | 0.005   |
|           | gang departure rate     | 0.0027  |

Joshua Austin<sup>1</sup>, Emily Smith<sup>2</sup>, Sowmya Srinivasan<sup>3</sup> Advisor: Dr. Fabio Sanchez <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> University of Maryland, Baltimore County, <sup>2</sup> Lin eld College, <sup>3</sup> Bryn Mawr College, <sup>4</sup> Arizona State University <sup>2</sup> emsmith@linfield.edu, <sup>3</sup> ssrinivasa@brynmawr.edu, jaustin1@umbc.edu, <sup>4</sup> fabio.sanchez@asu.edu

3. Mathematical Analysis

Gang-free equilibrium:  $(s_0; g_0; r_0) = (1; 0; 0)$ Reproductive numbers:  $R_0 = -+$  and  $R_- = -+$ We study two cases of the endemic equilibria: when

= 0 (Absence of Threat Factor) 3.1 Solving for the endemic equilibria when = 0 yields  $a_2g^2$ 

> $a_2 = R_0;$  $a_1 = (+)R_0(1 R) +$  $a_0 = (1 R_0)$ :

Figure 2: (a) Backward bifurcation with = 0.00015 =and varied ; (b) Time series with = 0.00015 = 0.0 $R_0 = 0.9474 R = 1.4035$  and initial gang populations 5%

1 (Presence of Threat Factor) 3.2 0 < Solving for the endemic equilibria when 0 < 1 vield

> $a_3 = {}^2R_0;$  $a_2 = (+)R_0 1 R + R_0 +$  $a_1 = +(+) R_0 + R + R$  $a_0 = {}^2(1 R_0):$

Figure 3: Forward-backward bifurcation with parame = 0.009 = 0.8, and varied . (a) = 0.0044 R = 1.54

Region 1: A necessary condition for no positive equilibria is 0 < Region 2: A necessary condition for two positive equilibria is 0 < Region 3: A necessary condition for three positive equilibria is ' Region 4: A necessary condition for a unique positive equilibriu

| S   | 4. Nume  |
|---|--|
|   | We use numerical simulations to analy  |
| = 0 and when 0 < 1.   |  |
| $g^{2} + a_{1}g + a_{0}$ , where:   |  |
| R;  | Figure 4: Gang population time series for 0 < 1. (a) Region 1; (b) Region 2; (c)   |
|   | 5. C   |
| 0:009 = 0:0027 = 0, = 0:005<br>009 = 0:0027 = 0:004 = 0:3,<br>% (endemic) and 1% (gang-free).<br>$s a_3g^3 + a_2g^2 + a_1g + a_0, \text{ where:}$<br>R +  | The social in uence of reformed gang is sitive to gang population size in the at-Keeping recidivism rates low and encodividuals in an at-risk environment plarecidivism rate is low, a high value of point where it is possible to reach a gat A lack of opportunities could lead refort fore, programs that help gang members or job placement, could help lower recide Cost of gang membership also has a sit f cost is low, there is little that refort involvement. Though policy cannot dire grams that educate individuals about joining gangs. Ref 1. Sánchez, F., Wang, X., Castillo-Chat Drinking as an epidemic: A simple to Evidence Based Relapse Prevention (2006). 2. Xiao, Y., and Tang, S., Dynamics of ir cination model. Nonlinear Analysis, 1 |
|   | 6. Ackn  |
| eters = $0:00015$ = $0:0027$<br>5439(b) = $0:004 R$ = $1:4035R_0 < R_c < 1 \text{ and } R > 1.< R_c < R_0 < 1 \text{ and } R > 1:I < R_0 < R_0 \text{ and } R > 1:m is 1 < R_0 < R_0 \text{ and } R > 1.$ | This research was conducted in the Math<br>at the Mathematical, Computational ar<br>project has been partially supported by gr<br>- Grant DMPS-0838705), the National Se<br>the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the O<br>We would like to extend a special thank<br>with the chance to participate in this wor<br>to thank Dr. Fabio Sánchez for his exte<br>guidance throughout this project. Finally,<br>Soho, Dr. Karen Rios-Soto, and the othe<br>vided their expertise.  |

erical Analysis

yze the long-term gang population dynamics.

or the forward-backward bifurcation when c) Region 3; (d) Region 4.

## Discussion

members on the at-risk population is highly sen--risk environment.

couraging reformed gang members to mentor inays a major role in gang involvement. When the can shift the forward-backward bifurcation to the ang-free equilibrium when  $R_0 < 1$ .

rmed gang members to return to gang life; therers reintegrate into society, such as tattoo removal cidivism rates.

signi cant impact on gang population dynamics. med gang members can do to in uence gangectly increase the cost of gang membership, prothe true costs could help discourage them from

## eferences

ávez, C., Gorman, D.M., and Gruenewald, P.J. mathematical model with recovery and relapse, . Edited by Katie Witkiewtz and G. Alan Marlatt,

nfection with nonlinear incidence in a simple vac-11 (2010), pp. 4154-4163.

## nowledgments

nematical and Theoretical Biology Institute (MTBI) nd Modeling Sciences Center (MCMSC). This rants from the National Science Foundation (NSF ecurity Agency (NSA - Grant H98230-11-1-0211), Of ce of the Provost of Arizona State University. ks to Dr. Carlos Castillo-Chávez for providing us

nderful research opportunity. We would also like tensive support, encouragement, and invaluable we extend thanks to Dr. Baojun Song, Dr. Edme ner MTBI faculty and graduate students who pro-