

# The Connection between Demography and National and International Security – The Case of the E.U.

Prof. Arnon Soffer

Holder of the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa

## **Introduction**

In this talk, I shall focus on demographic processes in Europe compared to the same demographic processes that are taking place in the ring of states surrounding it—North Africa, the Middle East, and also Eastern Europe. As to the time factor: There are researchers who study demographic processes that occur over hundreds of years, and there are those who research processes that take place in a certain country from year to year. My talk will relate to processes that have been occurring beginning some ten – twenty years ago and will continue into the coming ten – twenty years.

In non-professional publications, we find writers who see the end of the demographic danger (Economist, 2007). Let us say that it is insufficient to have a decline, even a dramatic one, in women's fertility in the ring of countries surrounding Europe, because in these regions, some 50%, or only 40%, of the populations consist of children and youth. Therefore, we can expect that in the next twenty years the population in those regions will continue to increase greatly. This is due to the masses of young couples who will enter the fertility period and, as a result, even if there are a small number of children per mother, there will be a

large addition of children in the society as a whole. And so the demographic pressures on Europe are expected to continue from this direction for quite some time.

Along with these comments on demography, there is also need to discuss even if briefly, but right from the outset, the processes and characteristics of modern migration. A distinction must be made between internal migration within each separate state, principally that from the village to the city—and we will relate to this matter in due course—and immigration between countries, international migrations. In this latter type, international migrations, we can make a distinction between migrations for short periods of time, such as trips for purposes of tourism, work, or studies; and permanent migration, such as takes place when people flee from areas of distress (because of wars, terror, or natural tragedies) or seek other employment and personal security and in general aspire to improve the quality of their lives.

United Nations figures show that in 2005, there were 191 million people who migrated from their permanent home. Of these, 74 million went from one developing country to another while 118 million moved from developing to developed countries. About half of the latter went to North America and half to Europe, and a small number to Australia (Population Reference Bureau, Sept. 2007). The UN also reported that 2.6 million people on average migrated every year between 1995 and 2000.

David Graham wrote an article about this phenomenon, entitled "The People Paradox, Human Movements and Human Security in a Globalizing World." He sums up the phenomenon by arguing, though with a cautiousness appropriate for a liberal British analyst, that a close connection exists between migration movements and the security of states or blocs of states—like the E.U. Graham also refers to the subject of the personal security of the migrants. He concludes that the large immigration waves can harm the political, cultural, social, economic, environmental, and security homogeneity of states that are flooded with these migrants. In the same breath, Graham adds that these fears are traditional; that is, irrelevant to the present: "Viewed from a conventional security viewpoint, population movements would only be perceived as a threat if the influx was an invading army or secondarily, a large number of refugees" (Graham, 2000).

Like Graham, the United Nations cannot grasp migration as a problem, except if it results from military occupation or comes about in large waves. In his whole article, Graham devotes one line only to the matter of Muslim immigration to Europe, about which he states, to take a quote from another article: "Some of the most serious threats are felt amongst European population that feels threatened by "Islamification" (Stalker, 1994: 90).

Is this a denial of reality, an avoidance of it, naivety that is perhaps hypocritical as is customary in European academic circles when it comes to this sensitive subject? Perhaps there is nothing in the waves of Muslim migration that will shock the old European order?

But when reading further, one sees in the continuation of Graham's article that he mentions that minorities are at times considered a Fifth Column; that there are many terrorists among them; that they are involved in international crime organizations, and so forth (p. 187).

My talk belongs, it seems, to the conservative stream, which views the cumulative masses of migrants differently—as a threat if and when there is no desire on the part of these migrants to merge into the receiving state; if they wish to change the world outlooks, culture, religion, and basic values of the receiving country; and when they change, be it rapidly or gradually, the cultural, economic, social (religious), political, and security structure of the land that absorbs them.

Graham offers no practical and realistic advice to these issues and how to deal with the great number of immigrants to Europe, especially the populations arriving from North Africa and the Middle East, who are migrants from the developing world and of Islamic by religion.

As I mentioned, the present survey will deal only with the recent past and the near future. It will present problems stemming from demography differently in Europe than in its neighbors to the south and to the east. It will also present the process that Europe is undergoing internally in center-periphery relations as a threat that can be transformed into a national security matter.

## **Demographic Processes within the E. U.**

Europe's natural increase is the lowest in the world, and in a number of key countries (like Germany and Russia), it is negative (Table 1).

Table 1: Trends in Population Growth in Europe and South of It (Selected Countries)

Country	Population (in millions)			Natural increase
	2007	2020	2050	2006
Europe				
Poland	38.1	36.7	30.5	0
Croatia	4.4	4.3	3.8	-0.2
U.K.	61	65.8	69.2	0.3
Estonia	1.3	1.2	1.0	-0.2
Latvia	2.3	2.2	1.8	-0.5
France	61.6	66.1	70	0.4
Germany	82.3	79.6	71.4	-0.2
Middle East and North Africa				
Algeria	34.1	43.2	50	1.7
Egypt	73.4	95.9	117.9	2.1
Morocco	31.7	38.9	45.3	1.5
Turkey	74	87.8	88.7	1.2

PR.B., 2007

Thus, the local European population is not growing, and in fact becoming smaller in several places. This means, too, that the local population is getting older. (Table 2, Figure 1) The proportion of retirees, those receiving a pension, in the European Union is very high at present and will reach “terrifying” rates within the next 20-40 years. (Figure 2, Figure 3) In parallel with the increase in the number of retirees, the age group of those who are creatively productive in the economy (i.e., the work force, ages 18-65) is shrinking, and the group of children and youth (up to age 18) is altogether disappearing.

Table 2: The Ageing of Europe, 2002-2050 (% of population over 60)

	2002	2050
Eastern Europe		
Bulgaria	22	39
Czech R.	19	40
Hungary	20	36
Poland	17	36
Romania	19	34
Northern Europe		
Estonia	20	36
Latvia	21	37
Sweden	23	38
U.K.	21	34
Southern Europe		
Croatia	21	31
Italy	25	42
Spain	22	44
Slovenia	20	42
Middle-East and North Africa		

Morocco	6	21
Egypt	6	21
Turkey	9	23

Source: U.N., Ageing 2002.




Figure 1: World Population Growth 1750-2150








Figure 2: Population development until the year 2050

## World



## More developed regions



## Least developed countries





Figure 3: Population Ageing 2002-2050

The question remains: who in the near future will sustain the ever-growing group of retirees? Another question: will sufficient numbers of youth be found to be mobilized into the E.U. army, or

that of Russia, in the near future? Perhaps the question of questions is: will the E.U. be able to exist without absorbing immigrants to fill the missing ranks in the productive age?

While Europe faces a shortage of youth and people of working age, natural increase in the states surrounding it to the south and to the east is high, in fact among the highest in the world. This population doubles itself every 30 years (Table 3). Poverty among this population is rampant, and political instability pushes away people, particularly the educated, prods them to pick up and flee. A recent study of Arab countries found that one in two people express a desire to leave their country and to migrate, generally to Europe.

Table 3: Changes in size of population of the Middle East since 1800 (in millions)

Country	1800	1900	1950	1981	2006	Forecast to 2025	Forecast to 2025
					(data PRB)	(data WB)	(data PRB)
(data PRB)							
Egypt	3.5	10.0	20.0	44.0	75.4	101.0	126.0
Turkey	9.5	14.0	21.0	47.0	73.7	86.0	90.0
Iran	6.0	10.0	34.0	40.0	70.3	89.0	102.0
Iraq	1.0	2.2	5.2	14.0	26.6	44.7	64.0
Syria	1.5	2.2	3.2	9.1	19.5	28.0	36.0
Lebanon	2.0	0.5	1.5	2.6	3.9	4.6	5.0
Palestinians (Gaza+West bank)	0.1	0.2	0.7	1.2	3.9	7.1	11.2
Jordan	0.2	0.3	0.5	2.0	5.6	8.0	10.0
Israel	0.2	0.5	1.5	4.0	7.2	9.3	11.0
Saudi Arabia	5.0	6.0	9.0	10.5	24.1	35.6	47.0
Emirates	0.2	0.2	0.5	1.0	9.1	13.2	17.4
Yemen	2.5	3.0	4.2	7.3	21.6	39.0	68.0
Oman	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	2.6	3.1	4.0
Sudan	2.0	5.0	9.1	19.0	41.2	61.3	84.0
Total ME Population	32.1	54.2	111.7	223.4	387.7	529.9	604.6
North Africa	6.0	10.0	22.2	48.6	81.4	103.0	119.0

A reality has been created, then, that invites migrations of great dimensions from south of the Mediterranean, poor and crowded, to Europe, rich but poor in young population. An example is provided by the migration movements in Germany, but this holds for the rest of Europe, as well (Figure 4).

Table 3 shows the dimensions of the migrations in the rest of the European countries—and, on the other hand, the dimensions of abandonment from states south of the Mediterranean.

The researcher Salt did a calculation and found that in order to withstand the gaps being created in the work force in Europe

and the needs of the growing group of retirees, Europe will need between 1 and 13 million new immigrants every year between the year 2000 and 2050 (Salt, 2001). It should be known that the population south of the Mediterranean is Muslim. Islam encourages a high natural increase in accordance with the biblical command of "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth." By virtue of the belief in *dar al-Islam*, a world that is only Muslim, Islam encourages religious mission, from which fanatics spring up who do not believe in democracy and who do not despise terror, jihad, and sacrifice. Even if 95%-99% of the Muslims do not accept terror as a way of life, a single percentage of fanatics is sufficient to change all the rules of the game in the world and to bring about what Huntington called a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 2000).

One can argue, of course, that all this is a primeval fear and unrealistic, given the data of Europe and of the world. For example, the growth of the population in all of Europe totaled some 2 million people between 2005 and 2006. Most of them were immigrants, 1.8 million. Thus, we are talking about merely 3.9% of the E.U.'s total population of 462 million—in other words, a tiny number. In any event, the arguments continues, only 42 million of the residents of the E.U. and the European countries adjoining it are foreigners (Just 8.8% of the total population). Many years will go by, it is claimed, before these foreigners "conquer" Europe. (Figures based on Muenz, 2005.)

It is not difficult to refute this argument. We know that a percentage of foreigners amounting to 10% is enough to create tension among various ethnic groups. And here we have percentages of foreigners that have at present reached more than this: 12.3% in Germany, 22.9% in Switzerland, and 33.9% in Lichtenstein (Figure 5).




Figure 4: Population Movement in Germany (2000)






Figure 5: Percent of Population that is Foreign-borne (in Selected Countries)

## What Is Europe Doing and What Can It Do?

Before we answer this question of what Europe is doing or not doing in the face of these migratory streams into the continent, we must ask what happens if we line up the blessings of migration opposite the damages it causes from the viewpoint of the European Union.

On the damage side of the column, we find threats of religious and tribal friction, harm to local cultural and political values, and perhaps threats of terror. On the benefit side, immigration solves the labor shortage and so maintains the strength and efficiency of the European economy. In the short run, immigration solves some of the economic problems. However, if Europe is flooded with millions of immigrants, a potential that exists from North Africa and the Middle East, most of them poor, ill, uneducated, and Muslim, their assimilation into Europe will be very difficult because of the great difference that exists between the absorbing population and the population absorbed.

The dangers of immigration are possibly not immediate and lie in wait only in the longer run. In any case, the European Union may possibly have missed the train. Can France today chase out 3-4-6 million African immigrants, most of them Muslim? No way. Can it prevent the entry of family relatives of these immigrants? Apparently it cannot now do so. Can it send back to their countries of origin hundreds of thousands of people who infiltrated into

France illegally? Europe may have set up hundreds of detention camps for these infiltrators (See Map 6), but these acts are too late, too little, and ineffective.




Figure 6: Detention Camps for Illegal Immigrants in Europe (2005)

Between the “sit and do nothing,” “business as usual” states and states that take action and change trends, it seems that Europe has chosen an intermediate strategy. It indeed recognizes a threat to the foundations of European society and does everything to minimize this threat. Nonetheless, it faces a dilemma: on the one hand, it is interested in transmitting to itself, to its neighbors, and to the world at large messages of brotherhood among nations, understanding to the weak, and humanitarianism; at the same time, however, it is acting to put a brake to immigration into it. I derive this conclusion on the basis of Europe’s deeds, which do not exactly accord with its declarations: Europe refuses to admit Muslim Turkey into the E.U., and there is only one possible explanation for this—the fear of adding 70 million Muslims more to the 20-30 million that already are ensconced in Europe.

Europe recently appended Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Baltic states and is now in the process of admitting Bulgaria and Romania. The only explanation that I can offer for these steps is that a decision was taken (perhaps in the proverbial smoke-filled room) to admit Christian countries, from which will come the needed labor force to generate Western Europe's economy in the coming years. No more use of cheap Muslim labor, but Christian workers now. At the same time, Europe is erecting detention camps, building fences and walls on its external borders, and strengthening fleets that are to restrict the dimensions of the infiltration of illegal immigrants into the continent.

But Europe can do much more to respond to the expected shortage of young labor on the continent:

It can postpone the retirement age from 65 to 70 or even 75. In this way, millions of workers will return to work who are entering the senior age. The work week can possibly be extended, thereby gaining millions of hours now missing from the European economy.

Other steps may be taken in the trend to increase the limited labor force; for instance, to admit more women who take care of children into the employment cycle by awarding grants and incentives and having support systems for them.

It is not unavoidable that advertising efforts, accompanied by much economic support, will reverse the wheel of childbirth and women will be encouraged to have more children.

In parallel to this activity within Europe, Europe will assist the states of the ring surrounding it to the south with financing and development means. It is clear to Europe that every additional person absorbed into the labor force in Morocco or Egypt or in the southern Sahara will give up on his intention to migrate to Europe.

## **Demography on the European Internal Front**

### **A Strong Center vs. Weak Peripheries**

The demographic phenomenon of a strong economic center vs. the poor and sinking peripheral areas is nothing new, but it has intensified in the era of globalization. Economic concerns that embrace the world are not interested in the national marginalities. Economic efficiency is found in the power centers in the giant cities and close to international airports. The consequence is well known: millions all over the world abandon the rural regions and villages and stream toward the center cities. However, in the large economic blocs there is another trend: states of the center—the core—France, Germany, and the Benelux countries, found to the right and to the left of the Rhine River axis, are the strong states,

and they attract more and more of the labor force, capital, and culture, and do so at the expense of the crumbling periphery. The result is that Paris, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Brussels, and London become ever more powerful while the more distant peripheral countries like Poland, Eastern Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states, experience a negative migration, with the best of their youth streaming toward the core states and their cities and leaving the periphery desolate (**Table 4**).

Table 4: Migration in Representative States in Europe and Its Environs

I. States Absorbing Immigration				
	2002	population	2006	population
	(per 1000)		(per 1000)	
Ireland	4.9	18,000	13	57,000
U.K.	1.6	95,000	4.0	244,000
Germany	2.3	185,000	1.2	100,000
France	0.7	38,000	2.0	123,000
Italy	200	118,000	5.8	344,000
Croatia			2.6	11,500

II. States outside Europe Exporting Immigrants				
	2002	population	2006	population
	(per 1000)		(per 1000)	
Algeria	-1.8	52,000 -	1.0	52,000
Egypt	-1.2	80,000 -	2.0	146,000
Morocco	-1.5	44,000 -	2.0	63,000
Sudan	-2.6	77,000 -	1.0	38,000
Tunisia	-0.8	8,000 -	1.0	10,000
Total				
North Africa	-1.6	261,000		329,000
Turkey	-0.8	54,000 -	5.9	436,600
Georgia	-5.78	30,000 -	-	

III. States within Europe Exporting Immigrants				
	2002	population	2006	population
	(per 1000)		(per 1000)	
Albania	-19	60,000 -	3.0	90,000
Latvia	-2.0	5,000 -	1.0	23,000
Estonia	-8.0	10,400 -	0.3	5,000
Bulgaria	-4.9	37,730 -	1.8	13,800
Poland	-0.5	20,000 -	1.0	38,000
Romania	-0.5	12,000 -	0.5	100,000
Ukraine	-2.0	100,000	-	-

Source: International Migration Movement, 2006, 2002, PRB 2006

This is a threat to the social-cultural-economic well-being of the countries of the periphery in the E.U., and the danger in this development is no less than the external threats described above.

The processes of aging that were mentioned earlier are accelerated, as well, in these states, and the future picture is not all rosy. The interrelationship of the three phenomena may be found in the power centers of Europe. In the large cities, migrants from elsewhere on the globe (generally Muslims) meet those from the country's peripheral regions, and the cities become very cosmopolitan, with inevitable tension among the locals, the domestic foreigners as it were, and the external foreigners (Figure 7). It is not by chance that most of the race-related incidents occur there.




Figure 7: Immigrants in the big cities of Germany (2000)

## **Conclusion**

---

The economic-cultural-democratic flowering of the European Union does not ensure its general security or the national security of its member states.

We have pointed out that the demography of Europe constitutes a real threat to its economic and societal foundations and that the waves of migration of various populations that differ from

those living in Europe might alter the character of the continent from end to end.

Despite the fact that it is not nice or politic to say these things aloud, we are facing a clash of two civilizations: local Christian vs. Islam, which is immigrating within. The process may be wrapped in words of one kind or another, but the phenomenon is clear. It is a process, as we have hinted, that is also related to demography. The economic centers are flowering and prospering, but at the expense of each nation's periphery and of the marginal areas of the European Union as a whole.

Europe is in a complex demographic bind: on the one hand, it has an honest desire for equality, humaneness, and assisting the weak; on the other hand, there are large fears of the continuing mass immigrations, that they might cause the loss of its identity and the loss of its security.

In the meantime, the population of Europe is becoming smaller and older while the countries outside the EU are growing faster and poorer, and their residents want to enjoy the best that Europe can offer them.

Expansion of the member states of the European Union provides one answer to the process; however, it also leads to increasing the gap between center and periphery within the EU itself.

As we have pointed out, some of the existing problems have a solution, whether immediate or long term. Among others, there is need to change European foreign policy. Thus, for example, the relationship to the Turkish army and to its function in maintaining democracy in that country may be changed. Another example is the possibility of aiding the ring states with the intention of reducing their negative migration.

In conclusion, I will pose a question: if Europe's geostrategic-demographic-economic policy were to fail, what then? What will happen?

In such a case, the population of Europe will undergo a change, and it will gradually turn into a more varied human mosaic than at present. Ethnic tensions will worsen, as will gaps between center and periphery, rich and poor. The foundations of democracy in Europe will be undermined even further than what is happening today. As a counter-response, one can expect the rise of racist movements in Europe and attempts to push out foreigners. Terror, violence, fanaticism will grow stronger and accompany Europe for many years to come.

The dream of the fall of walls of separation, of a continent without the need for armies, of a world all at peace—this dream affects Europe and the readiness of its inhabitants to understand the world correctly. This dream, which affects the entire world, is about to explode in the face of reality. There is indeed a close

relationship between demography and the national security of the states of Europe and that of the E. U. as a whole.

## **List of Sources**

*Economist*, (July 20, 2007), How to deal with a falling population, p. 13.

Graham, D.T. (2000), "The People Paradox in human movements and human security in a globalizing world," in D.T. Graham and N.K. Poku (eds.), *Migration, Globalization and Human Security*, London: Routledge.

Haaretz, (August 20, 2007), Ireland offers another model for absorbing immigrants from Europe.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations*, Jerusalem: Shalem Pub.

Migration in Germany, facts and figures, *Deutschland*, No. 6 (2000), p. 44-45.

Muenz, R. (2006), European population and migration in 2005, *Migration Information Source*, June.

Population Reference Bureau (2007), *World Population Data Sheet*, Washington.

----- (2007), *Population Bulletin*, vol. 62, no. 3, September.

Salt, J. (2001), *Current Trends in International Migration in Europe*, Council of Europe.

United Nations (2002), *Population Ageing*, Population Division, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs,

United Nations (2002, 2006), *International Migration*, Department of Economics and Social Affairs







