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**FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE
MAITATSINE MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA**

By

**Katarzyna Z. Skuratowicz
M.S, University of Warsaw, 2002**

**A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of the University of Louisville
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for the Degree of**

Master of Arts

**Department of Sociology
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky**

May 2004

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ABSTRACT

FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE MAITATSINE MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA

Katarzyna Z. Skuratowicz

April 20, 2004

This study is a historical analysis of reasons and dynamics behind the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements. Its purpose is to develop a new conceptual apparatus to the approach toward religious fundamentalist movements that would analyze both external and internal factors influencing their emergence. It is a case study of an Islamic fundamentalist religious movement called Maitatsine in Nigeria. The theoretical background is based upon the concepts of international division of labor and the role of the state taken from development theories, which explain the external factors influencing the dynamics in West Africa, the region where the analyzed religious movement emerged. Analysis of the factors at the micro level is provided with the social movements theories' concepts of mobilization and framing, which explain the organization of religious movements. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's concept of the culture industry, and Antonio Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and counter hegemony are used to analyze the ideological background of the fundamentalist religious movements. Historical context, with the history of Islam, colonialism, and post-independence period in Nigeria are presented in order to provide a background for the study of the Maitatsine movement. Findings indicate that the world dynamics significantly influence economic and political realities of peripheries with weak states. They provoke the increase of the "disinherited" social groups in the capitalist secular system, which include mainly immigrants, foreigners. Consequently, this inflames rising feelings of grievance toward the dominant western culture that is directed by charismatic religious leaders. Religious ideology becomes a strong mobilizing and framing factor that creates counter hegemony and starts controlling members adhering to the fundamentalist religious movement.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the main themes in the events and dynamics of late 20th and 21st centuries is the conflict between spreading processes of globalization on the one hand and the developing popularity of religious fundamentalism on the other. It is a conflict between McWorld and Jihad¹ as Benjamin Barber, a political scientist, names those two forces (Barber, 1992). Scientists view only this binary opposition in local and global relations that seems to be a very clear-cut differentiation without overlaps. McWorld managed to look seductive in a world obsessed with Jihad. The McWorld perspective claims to deliver peace, prosperity, and relative unity at the cost of independence, community, and identity (Barber, 1992). On the other side we have Jihad that delivers a different set of advantages: people find in fundamentalist religious movements psychological and material shelter, support, and a feeling of security (Hiskett 1987, Isichei 1987, Pilaszewicz 1995), a vibrant local identity, a sense of community, solidarity among kinsmen, neighbors, or countrymen. (Barber, 1992).

Fundamentalist religious movements provide all the advantages and disadvantages listed above, however, not all fundamentalist religious movements have to be associated with Jihad and as such with Islam as it is widely perceived in today's society. The main characteristic of fundamentalist religious movements, whether Mormon, Catholic, Evangelical Christian, Muslim, Jewish is a yearning to return to the mythical order and

¹ Barber treats forces of Jihad as anti-modernism cultural forces in general.

perfection of the original church (Krakauer, 2003: 137). One has to also know that there is a differentiation between fundamentalist and orthodox religious movements. As Karen Armstrong (2001) describes fundamentalist movements:

[They] are embattled forms of spirituality, which have emerged as a response to a perceived crisis. They are engaged in a conflict with enemies whose secularist policies and beliefs seem inimical to religion itself. Fundamentalists do not regard this battle as a conventional political struggle, but experience it as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil. They fear annihilation, and try to fortify their beleaguered identity by means of a selective retrieval of certain doctrines and practices of the past. To avoid contamination, they often withdraw from mainstream society to create a counterculture; yet fundamentalists are not impractical dreamers. They have absorbed the pragmatic rationalism of modernity, and, under the guidance of their charismatic leaders, they refine these “fundamentals” so as to create an ideology that provides the faithful with a plan of action. Eventually they fight back and attempt to resacralize an increasingly skeptical world (2001: 2).

On the other hand, even though orthodox religious movements have very strong religious rules, they do not argue for the change of the secular system, and chose to operate within the confines of the system.

We know now that religious fundamentalist movements exist not only in Islam and that they are a very unique form of religious movements. However, when one wants to understand the reasons and dynamics behind the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements by looking at the literature in social sciences about them, it become obvious that the analyses are incomplete. There are several approaches toward religious fundamentalist movements but they all have single focus: some approaches acknowledge only economic and political influences on the movements (Hiskett, 1987; Isichei, 1987; Pilaszewicz) and some acknowledge only the internal factors treating religious movements only as social movements (Smith, 1996; Williams 1994). However, fundamentalist religious movements are neither isolated, independent responses to economic, social, or political conditions, nor a response only to micro-level dynamics.

Everything is interrelated and connected. Those separate analyzes are necessary but they are not sufficient to exhaustively understand the phenomenon of such popularity of fundamentalist religious movements.

The theoretical approach to fundamentalist religious movements presented in this thesis will differ from the single focus approaches, as it will analyze both external (global) and internal (local) factors influencing the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements. The goal is to avoid oversimplifications that cannot lead toward valid and complete explanations of heterogeneous nature and outcome of fundamentalist religious movements as they emerge from different macro and micro structural and historical context and dynamics. The question of this thesis is to ask what factors provoke the emergence, reinforcement or weakening of precisely religious fundamentalist movements and how do they function? In consequence, the purpose of this thesis is to introduce and defend a new conceptual apparatus to the approach toward religious fundamentalist religious movements. It will constitute a method of analysis that represents an alternative to the modes of explanations used by currently prevailing theories.

Given the fact that religious movements emerge in many regions of the world, analyzing all the Islamic fundamentalist movements of the world would be quite superficial. Also, one has to remember that even though there are similarities and patterns in fundamentalist religious movements, each one of them is influenced by its very unique location, history, ethnic composition, and variations in the ideology. This is the reason why this work will focus on the case of Nigeria and precisely on one of the Islamic fundamentalist religious movements called Maitatsine that emerged in Nigeria. Even though this thesis is a case study, it is not concerned with narrating the fundamentalist

religious movement of Maitatsine, but primarily with understanding and explaining the generalizable logic of the dynamics of the movement.

In order to facilitate the subsequent presentation of this alternative theoretical approach it will be helpful to identify major types of social scientific theories used in the analysis of religious fundamentalist movements. Chapter two will elaborate on development theories, from which several concepts will be pulled out in order to contribute to the theoretical approach developed in this thesis. Discussion will center on the concepts of the international division of labor and the role of the state drawn from world system and dependency theories. These will be used to analyze the external economic and political factors playing an important role in the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist religious movements in the neocolonial era. Finally, the conception of relative role of change in the system of dependency of the two theories will be discussed.

However, development theories' approach focuses on external influences that, even though is essential for the understanding of Islamic movements nevertheless it is not sufficient. There is a need for showing internal dynamics as well. In chapter three, the theoretical approach will be expanded by other concepts from theories analyzing internal dynamics such as framing and mobilization concepts from the resource mobilization theory. Additionally, Theodor Adorno's (1998, 2002b) culture industry theory will be used in order to show Western cultural domination of the peripheries. Antonio Gramsci's (2000) concept of hegemony and counter hegemony will be incorporated into the theoretical approach showing the possibility of change under the new emerging religious ideology being a new hegemony.

Social movements theories will be used in our theoretical approach, as religious movements are also social movements. Tarrow (1995) describes social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.” Religion is a difficult term to specify. Common use of this term refers to a theistic religion, however there are billions who practice a religion, live in solidarity with each other and with nature but the concept god is absent. Religion is a situation where people assign to a god or to a devil their own power for creating or destroying. Many theorists wrote extensively about the power of religion and the great changes religion has undergone as societies have evolved. Durkheim defined religion as a “social institution involving beliefs and practices based upon a conception of the sacred” (Durkheim 1978). Additionally, there is a need to point out the uniqueness of religion in African reality, where religion, more than anything else influences the understanding and empirical experiences of the surrounding world. African traditional societies interpret current and past events through the prism of religion and it is religion that provides for its followers stability and identity (Mbiti, 1980: 324). This fact provides a more fertile ground for fundamentalist Islamic religious movement in African countries. The thesis will argue that fundamentalist religious movements are social movements where the agency and identity are strongly related to religious ideology. Additionally, as revolutionary movements², fundamentalist religious movements are bound strongly together by the common feeling of injustice, or grievance caused by economic and political factors. Grievance and the feeling of injustice are ones of the fundamentalist components of social movements.

² Revolutionary movements aim at the general restructuring the system of the society. Different kinds of movements are elaborated in chapter III.

In religious movements, this solidarity and common purpose, as well as the framing process are set and led, in most of the cases, by the leaders of these movements. They create a point of reference for their disciples who were often people without any chance of success in life, and without any material property. They often provide them with food, shelter, and psychological support. However, social movements theories cannot provide the tools for a complete analysis of fundamentalist religious movements because they cannot explain external reasons for their emergence. This is the reason why development theories will be used in order to explain those external influences. In this thesis, it is also argued that fundamentalist religious movements are a counter hegemony to hegemony of Western domination.

As this thesis is a case study, chapter four will discuss the historical and geopolitical context and conditions for the emergence of the fundamentalist movement in question. It will include the history of Nigeria stressing the importance of Islamic relations in the region of West Africa, history of colonialism with its policies and economic situation after the independence in the 1960s, including oil boom, oil busts, and Structural Adjustment Programs.

Finally, chapter five will present the actual analysis of the Islamic fundamentalist religious movement called Maitatsine that emerged in Nigeria. The reason why I chose Nigeria is that it is a country where political, economic, and social dynamics and history show the significance of the process of globalization and at the same time, a country where the importance and presence of Islam is significant. The presence of both systems and ideologies makes this country a perfect case study to analyze the Islamic religious

movements. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (137 million people³). In addition, it is one of the most influential countries in West Africa, both politically and economically. It is also one of the biggest producers and exporters of oil in the world.

The thesis focuses on a case study of the Maitatsine religious movement because it was and is a movement that was created during a very unique period for Nigeria illustrating the external and internal dynamics influencing the emergence of fundamentalisms. It was a period of oil boom in 1970s and then bust in 1980s. The followers of this movement were directly or indirectly connected and touched by those events and by the effect of spreading globalization and experiencing the effects of British colonialism. The movement started in Kano, in northern Nigeria by an immigrant from Cameroon, Muhammadu Marwa. It rejected western economic and cultural domination and called for return to the “true” version of Islam, which, in his understanding, was a complete rejection of modernism. However, Maitatsine also replaced the state in social support, when national social institutions were weak and hardly functioning. At first, in 1950-60s it gathered only several disciples. It was only after several years, in 1970s, and several oversights of the government, the worsening of the economic situation in Nigeria, and many other factors (that we want to analyze closer), that this movement grew bigger and stronger. In 1980, it was strong enough to be able to cause riots in which more than 10,000 people were killed, not only in one city. Those riots were spread throughout the entire area of northern Nigeria. (Hiskett, 1987; Isichei, 1987; Pilaszewicz 1995; Christelow, 1985; Falola, 1998).

³ Information from U.S Census Bureau <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum?cty=NI>

This research uses methods developed in historical sociology, also called analytical history (Singleton, Straits, 1999: 377). It will be a case study of one precise Islamic fundamentalist religious movement in Nigeria, called Maitatsine. Development theories, social movements theories, and neo-Marxists theories will provide the concepts employed in this research.

The data for this thesis will come from secondary sources, which are indirect descriptions of primary sources. They will describe and interpret the past events in West Africa and then, precisely in Nigeria. In the actual analysis of the religious movement one primary source, which is an eyewitness account of the events described, will be used. It will be a testimony of a journalist who was an eyewitness during Maitatsine's activities in Nigeria. A brief history of Nigeria will be presented to provide a historical context for the analysis.

The historical analysis will consist of the testing of the newly created conceptual apparatus on one of the fundamentalist religious movements. Finally, this analysis will examine the social processes from which this specific movement emerged and functioned and will develop causal explanations of historical patterns that led to it. Those explanations seek for a general understanding of the social phenomena of Islamic fundamentalist religious movements.

CHAPTER II

GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical approach that would be appropriate to analyze Islamic fundamentalist religious movements. This chapter will focus on theories that will explain how external and internal social, economic, and political factors influence the emergence of those movements. This is the reason why concepts from world system theory and dependency theory will be used, precisely the concepts of the international division of labor, relationship between the core countries and the peripheries, which includes the importance of the role of the state. Nigeria, being a periphery in the world system is inclined in the relationship with a core country involving unequal distribution of influence and wealth. Participation in the international division of labor has in turn an impact on internal dynamics of a country. Finally, the approach toward change in those two theories will be elaborated, as fundamentalist religious movements are arguing for the change of the political, economic, and social system.

World System Theory

As the world entered the era of globalization, there was a need for additional tools for the analysis of the globalized world. Immanuel Wallerstein was the first one to show how to analyze the world's economic system, to take the entire world system as one unit of analysis. This is probably the largest unit of analysis that sociologists can take into

consideration. Wallerstein was a sociologist influenced by the *Annales* school (history school that used a comparative method involving long periods to examine differences and similarities between societies). He used a geosociological perspective in his theory, which means that the world history is analyzed as the development of one world system. By “system” it means a social entity with a single division of labor so that all the sectors or areas were dependent on the others via interchanges of essential goods (Wallerstein, 1980, vol.1: 7). World system theory also incorporated insights from a Neo-Marxian perspective by focusing on such concepts as unequal exchange, exploitation, and world-market¹. World system theory is based upon historical methodology. Social reality is seen in it as part of historical cycle. It includes long-term studies and studies on large scale, which does not mean that world system theory analyzes only booms and busts but also all the dynamics of the world economy. As units of analysis it takes under consideration more holistic perspective, not the society itself, but the entire historical world systems.

The International Division of Labor

The concept of the international division of labor is the main concept that will be taken from the world system theory in our analysis. It is necessary in order to situate Nigeria in global dynamics and to show the external influences on the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist religious movements. The international division of labor is a single division of labor based upon the relationships between property and occupational relations. The world’s upper class owns or controls the means of production. The working class, with no ownership, performs tasks for the owners. The distribution of

¹Besides Wallerstein, other theorists like Fernand Braudel, Albert Bergesen, or Ronald Schoenberg elaborated on the world system theory. However, the main reference in this theory remains with Wallerstein. This is the reason why we will concentrate on Wallerstein’s work in the presentation of the world system theory and its concepts.

goods is based upon this division, and all the dynamics and their mechanisms try to maintain the dominance of the upper class (Wallerstein, 1979).

The international division of labor is a three-tiered system (Wallerstein, 1980 vol.1: 349-350). The three tiers are the core countries, semiperiphery countries, and periphery countries. The core countries, constituting an upper class, are economically most diversified, wealthy and powerful both economically and militarily. They are highly industrialized and specialized in service industries, finances, and information technologies. They gain enormous profits from direct capital investments in peripheries and get skilled professional labor from them. They produce goods rather than raw materials for export what they can do without worrying for the latter because they have access to large quantity of raw materials and cheap labor force from the exploited peripheral nations. Core countries have many means of influence over noncore countries thanks to their position in the world and their dominance over peripheries. Nevertheless, the core countries themselves are relatively independent of outside control (Wallerstein, 1980: 349).

Peripheral nations, constituting the lower working class, are the least economically diversified and they are at the bottom of the world stratification system. They tend to depend on one type of economy, such as extracting and exporting raw materials to the core countries and are relatively poor economically, with less division of labor with high level of income inequality. They tend to have weak state institutions and be strongly influenced and dominated by the outside nations both economically and militarily. Peripheral nations are also strongly connected to the development of an informal economy (Wallerstein, 1980: 350).

Finally, semiperipheral nations, the middle class, a very important element of the world system, are on the path towards industrialization and a diversified economy. It is the sector able to profit from the “wage productivity squeeze” of the leading countries. Core countries exploiting the peripheral nations import all the extracted from peripheries resources to their markets. However, the core societies are not able to consume all the goods. On the other hand, products that core countries produce for export are in large part inadequate for the needs of periphery nations. This gap is filled by the semiperipheries. They import products from core countries allowing core countries to increase their profit and as such to keep their position of core countries in the world system. Semiperipheries are a “protective shield” that guards the core countries from the rebellion of peripheral nations, and they are the potential “referee” during all the conflicts that may occur (Wallerstein, 1979a: 71-72). They are the “third party.” Semiperipheries are also a point of reference (comparison model) for the poor nations, as an accessible model to follow, as they are not as much developed as the core countries and do not have as much influence but are higher in the world system hierarchy than peripheries.

The Role of the State

The role of the state is an important concept that will be used in the analysis of the Islamic fundamentalist religious movement as it often plays an important role in their emergence. Even though world system theory does not focus on the role that the state plays in the international division of labor, it identifies the tendencies of the weakness of the state in the core countries and in the peripheries. Generally, the higher the position of a country on the international stratification ladder is, the stronger the state institutions tend to be. As a result of the statement above, world system theory acknowledged that

core countries tend to have stronger state institutions and have less income inequality compared to noncore nations. Peripheries have weak state institutions and are strongly influenced by the outside nations (both economically and militarily). As such, they are subjects to the development of an informal economy. Semiperipheries are situated in the middle. With a weak state and its institutions there is a greater possibility for fundamentalist movements to emerge.

Change in the System

World system theory sees the position in the world system's center as a temporary advantage. It argues that within the global capitalist system, the developed Western metropolis has a temporary advantage and there is a possibility of a shift. In the future, the developed nations may occupy subordinate position that is currently being occupied by the peripheral nations. The world system is an equilibrium model, which operates cyclically, along the Kondratieff's cycle with A-phase (upward swing, boom, expansion) and B-phase (downward swing, economic contraction, bust, but also called stagnation). Each cycle lasts 40-55 years. There is also a period of transition during which the entire system (capitalist system from 16th century) will be transformed into something else, and the outcome is uncertain (Wallerstein, 1999: 1). The cycle also shows the possibility of mobility within the world system: from periphery to semiperiphery (by following certain strategies: seizing the chance, promotion by invitation, or self-reliance), from semiperiphery to core country (by economic expansion, manipulation of wages or costs of production), etc. However, the cycle does not make it clear how the change actually happen and what produces it. Also, world system theory does not acknowledge change

within the nations only within the entire world system. The change here is defined as change of positioning in the world stratification.

World system theory can help in the analysis of the global events that occur in the world and as such influence the internal dynamics of the societies. However, societies are formed and influenced not only by world events, but also by internal relations. World system theory does not look and analyze internal relations and culture of the different parts of this world system stratification ladder, it does not show how the relations between the core and periphery work, and does not clarify the exact role of the state in these relations. This is the reason why concepts from the dependency theory are needed deepening the explanations of mechanisms of those relationships.

Dependency Theory

Dependency theory analyzes the relationship between states or multinational corporations and states and its mechanisms. It is still an analysis on a macro level but it is not as large as the world system. It focuses on the expansion and domination of imperialist powers that create the dependency and then underdevelopment of “Third World” countries. It is a binary division of labor with only two kinds of actors: core countries and peripheral countries. Theotonio Dos Santos formulated the definition of dependency as a relationship between two or more countries as follows:

(It) assumes the form of dependence when some countries [dominant /core/center ones] can expand and can be self starting, while other countries [dependent/peripheral ones] can do this only as a reflection of that expansion” (Dos Santos 1971:226).

The focus of this theory is on the structural sociological relations of the actors, which are the states and multinational corporations. It states that the development of a distinct state can only be understood by looking at its insertion into the worldwide economic and political system similar to the world system theory. But, it focuses on

consequences of capital imperialism in the “Third World” countries. Its main focus is on modes of production, patterns of international trade, political and economic linkages between elites in peripheral and core/central countries, group and class alliances in those countries and so on.

Dependency is seen as a general historical process applicable to all “Third World” countries (general patterns of dependency seen from 16th century to the present). It is understood to be an external condition imposed from the outside - not a domain of domestic economy and policy, rather a domain of international economy, an international, unequal division of labor (monopolistic foreign economic policy toward peripheries). Dependency is analyzed mainly as an economic condition. It is a result of the flow of economic surplus from the “Third World” to Western capitalist countries with declining terms of trade of peripheries with core countries. It is a component of regional polarization of the global economy. Expropriation of surplus from peripheries to core countries leads to the underdevelopment of the first, and further development of the latter (Frank, 1969; Landsberg, 1979; Baran, 1957; Amin, 1976; Dos Santos, 1971). Finally dependency is seen as incompatible with development. The development of peripheries is not possible while they remain dependent upon core countries. Autonomy through a break in relations of dependence may not lead to development of the kind achieved in the developed countries of the West, but might lead to a different kind of development, stressing different values. Contact with the West is harmful for the periphery economy because it leads to the development of underdevelopment of peripheries (Frank, 1967). The concepts of the development of underdevelopment by Andre Gunder Frank and the three historical forms of dependence elaborated by Theotonio Dos Santos demonstrate

how the dependency is theorized to emerge and operate as the relationship between the core and peripheries.

Andre Gunder Frank, the leading dependency theorist, formulated the concept of "development of underdevelopment." According to him, underdevelopment is not a natural condition but a creation of long history of colonial domination in "Third World" countries and that countries that became peripheries were in many cases on their own path of development when colonial invasion occurred (Frank, 1969). He stated that global capitalism destroyed or transformed earlier social systems, converting them into sources of its own further development. For Frank, the economic, political, social, and cultural institutions of the underdeveloped countries resulted from the penetration of capitalism, rather than being original or traditional.

In turn, Theotonio Dos Santos distinguished three historical forms of dependence. First one is the colonial dependence without rigid specialization of export materials with monopolized control of the land, mines, social resources and the export of natural resources (raw materials, tropical products, etc.) from the colonized country (Dos Santos, 1971: 226), which after the period of colonialism becomes a peripheral state. Second one is the financial-industrial dependence with a rigid specialization and monocultivation of entire regions. This form of dependency also produces in peripheral nations cheap labor force (skilled or unskilled) provided to the core countries. The core countries needed this cheap labor force during economic booms. However, during economic busts peripheries were absorbing unemployment from the core countries under the form of aid agencies, developing businesses, etc. (Dos Santos, 1971: 227). Finally, Dos Santos recognizes a technological-industrial dependence that emerged in post WWII period. Santos argues

that there are fundamentalist structural limitations placed on industrial development of underdeveloped economies. Industrial development is now dependent upon the existence of the export sector, which is part of the dual economy including exporting nations and importing ones. It is the only way to bring foreign currency into the state. Industrial development of periphery nations is strongly influenced by fluctuations of the balance of payments (more money leaves the country than enters) leading to their deficit. Additionally, highly monopolized international market tends to lower prices of raw materials and raise the prices for the industrial products that makes the balance of payment even harder for the peripheries. The result of the deficit is that foreign capital, and foreign aid become necessary to cover the deficit and to finance further existence of the country (Dos Santos, 1971: 228-230). With the entry of foreign capital, foreign culture enters, which deepens the process of dependency of the peripheries, adding cultural dependency (i.e., McDonald's, Coca-Cola, etc.). In many cases, foreign aid is there to "help" this kind of industrialization. It means the entry of the multinational corporations with the mass-culture that creates "necessary commodities" (cotton t-shirts, plastic buckets, European soaps etc.) that gets rid of the unique culture of peripheries and replaces it with uniform and standardized Western culture.

The effects of the technological dependency for periphery nations are significant. An unequal capitalist development produces the polarization between "traditional" agrarian export sector and "modern" sector of technological, economic, and financial concentration (Dos Santos, 1971; Landsberg, 1979). The use of local cheap labor combined with capital-intensive technology creates profound differences among various domestic wage levels, which produce huge wealth disproportions in societies. This

polarization represents the dual economy within one nation, which results in demographic migrations from the “traditional” agrarian sector to the “modern” technological sector, mainly situated in the cities, what, in turn provokes a decrease of the agricultural sector of the peripheries.

Frank expanded on the idea of the polarization in the dual economy with the concept of the relationship between satellite and metropolis. He showed how dependency relations work also within the peripheries themselves. Colonizers (or neo-colonizers) implanted new cities in the “Third World” with the goal of facilitating the transfer of economic surplus to Western countries. Peripheral country’s cities became satellites of metropolis situated in the West. In turn, these satellites became colonial metropolises (centers of trade and administration) with the respect to the provincial cities. The peripheries were made underdeveloped (made less developed) by the expropriation of their surplus product (the source of investment capital in Marxist theory), under the form of raw materials, minerals, commodities, profits, etc. It was a two-stage process. First the surplus products were expropriated to local capitals/local colonial metropolises, and from there, to Western countries, to core metropolis. The satellite-metropolis system produced even deeper underdevelopment of local satellites as it produced demographic migrations from local satellites to local metropolises leaving the satellites without any labor force and resources (most of the resources were expropriated to the metropolis), which was a factor increasing the disproportions inside the peripheries (Frank, 1969: 9-12). Frank argues that this expropriation of economic surplus products has produced economic underdevelopment in “Third World” countries and development in Western countries.

In the division of labor there are actors that dictate or manipulate the outcomes of the relationship between the core and peripheral countries. One of those actors is the state, which has a significant influence on the internal dynamics of the country. Both, world system and dependency theories were elaborating on its role. However, it is the dependency theory that really focused on it the most.

Bureaucratic-authoritarian state

The nature and role of the state is a concept that has received much focus in dependency theory. Fernando Cardoso and Peter Evans influenced Guillermo O'Donnell (1978) in the creation of a new concept of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state arguing that under military regimes foreign investment grows and becomes so sustained that state institutions and national entrepreneurs no longer play a dominant role in the dynamic industrial sector. This concept argued that with the state being a military regimes some changes take place in the state that influence the relationship with the multinational corporations or core countries. Those changes include centralization of administration, repression forms of social protest, and achievement of "high degree of political tranquility" in the country. Bureaucratic-authoritarian state tries to accelerate economic growth through a combination of public and private enterprises and through "deepening of industrialization" that are pushed by the multinational corporations.

The industrialization led by the military state regime is related to the concept of dependent development introduced by Cardoso (1973) where economic and repressive functions of military state play an important role in the development of the dependent development. Military government wiping out the union leaders (dismantling of working-class power), and other politicians opposed to the regime provoke a "high degree of

political tranquility,” which is good for trade conditions. Dependent development is related very closely to multinational corporations that are part of the neo-colonization of peripheries. They are interested in at least some prosperity for dependent countries because of the markets this prosperity would provide. Their interests coincide with relative economic growth at least in some sectors (industrial) of the economy. So, unlike the classical dependency theory assumed, dependency is not necessarily related to ruralization at the expense of industrialization and will not lead “Third World” countries to export only raw materials. However, Cardoso (1973) agreed that dependent development is crippled because it lacks “autonomous technology²”. The country is obliged to use imported technology (including standardized “cultural commodities”) and must tolerate all the consequences of absorbing capital-intensive, labor saving-technology (Cardoso, 1973). Also, it is based on unequal income distribution, emphasizing luxurious consumer goods as opposed to basic needs, increasing foreign indebtedness, contributing to social marginality and the under-utilization and exploitation of manpower resources – as a result, increasing relative misery in the country (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). The periphery with a dependent development also lacks a fully developed capital goods sector (the middle and upper class are too little). Also, the accumulation, expansion, and self-realization of local capital require and is dependent upon dynamics and fluctuations outside the country – it is inserted in the international “circuit of capital.”

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state also requires some actors that would support the dependent development and keep the multinational investment in the country. This is

² Technology developed in the peripheries. In dependent development most of the technology used in the process of industrialization comes from the core countries, and are provided by the multinational corporations.

where a concept of triple alliance elaborated mainly by Evans (1979) and Cardoso (1972) fits.

Triple Alliance

The triple alliance includes state, local bourgeoisie, and multinational corporations. It often takes place with the emergence of military rule. With the repressive state centralization of administration takes place with the repression of social protest³ as in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. With those changes the peripheral country achieves a “high degree of political tranquility.” The government tries to accelerate economic growth of the periphery through a combination of public and private enterprises. The next step undertaken by the state is the suppression of the local bourgeoisie while new “internationalized” bourgeoisie emerges. State signed contracts with the new emerging bourgeoisie and end pre-existing relations with the local bourgeoisie. The new bourgeoisie is not related to traditional social order and structures as the local bourgeoisie. Those new agreements with the state form a “bridge” between the interest of the nation and this of the entrepreneurs (Evans, 1979). The new bourgeoisie is associated with the multinational corporations as a junior partner and start to control their finances. With the support of the state, very promising opportunities are opened to the new bourgeoisie, at the same time omitting the majority of the society. As a result of this process, forces of modern capitalism are unleashed. Economy is increasingly restructured in accordance with the new patterns of international economic organization (Evans, 1979). Foreign capital is also the greatest advertising sponsors in mass media, so it has the power to influence it and as such foreign culture and ideology have an access to local

³ Useful as the triple alliance system favors only the chosen social class, which results in the increase of disproportions in the society

market what is producing bigger development of economic, political, and mass-cultural dependency. Once more, the effects of the triple alliance can be seen in the increasing disproportions of the peripheral nations and emergence of the dependent development.

Triple alliance and the bureaucratic-authoritarian state concepts are very important showing the role of the state in the establishment of the dependent relationship with the core countries and multinational corporations and in producing increasing disparities in the society that lead to social dissatisfaction, and as such, to protest.

Change in the System

Dependency theories state that peripheral countries should never tighten their ties with core countries. Instead of relying upon foreign aid and foreign technology, they should adopt a self-reliance model that would provoke the decrease and finally stop the dependency toward core countries. Peripheries should rely upon their own paths of development, their own resources, and plan an autonomous national development. It does not mean isolation it just should not be dominated by other countries. There is a need to introduce equal and mutually beneficial terms of trade. Peripheries should get rid of old elite that would not like to resign from their ties with core countries, as they are closely related to foreign investment, interests, etc. Developing nations should finally unite in creating their own cartels as means of confronting the hegemony of industrial nations within the world system (Arghiri, 1972). This is a remedy for change but without a prescription. It is quite obvious that if some group is subordinate, it should end the subordination, but how? This theory does not acknowledge any kind of opposition against the dependency. The peripheries' lower classes are treated as passive ones with a very little capacity for uprising against the exploitation of the new bourgeoisie and

multinational corporations or to core countries' exploitation and all the eventual opposition is suppressed by the military regimes that are very popular in the peripheries. The classical dependency theory argues for the socialist revolution, however, the history showed that socialist revolutions do not work for the improvement of societies' standard of living. Also, the change that dependency theories talk about is at the power relation level of the states only. The change that dependency theory argues for is on the state level that would remove the dependency relationship of the periphery. However, it does not acknowledge the possibility of change within the periphery as a result of the protest against the repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian state's policies toward the society. It does not acknowledge any social grievance against the state. None of the development theories acknowledge the possibility of the emergence of any social movement that would be dangerous to the hegemony of the core countries.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is expected to efficiently suppress all the eventual oppositions and social dissatisfaction. However, there are many dynamics taking place in the society that are not controlled by the state, especially if the state does not provide social support institutions or does not balance the distribution of goods in the society as it is the case in peripheries where triple alliance with a bureaucratic-authoritarian state are present. The analysis of internal dynamics is needed that would discuss the stimuli behind the emergence of the social movements. Thus there is a need for additional concepts outside of development theories that posit the opportunity of resistance to domination.

CHAPTER III

MOVEMENT THEORIES, DOMINATION, AND RESISTANCE

The previous chapter focused on the external factors that may influence the emergence and functions of fundamentalist religious movements. Even though external factors play a very important role in the process of fundamentalist religious movements formation, they are not sufficient in order to create a complete framework and analyze the movements. The internal dynamics of societies also play a significant role in the creation and performance of fundamentalist religious movements. The literature about social movements makes important contributions to the development of a theoretical approach to the analysis of fundamentalist religious movements. The concepts from these approaches reveal how domination leads to resistance and how this resistance was organized.

Social movements are “an expression of the associated activities of some group or field of actors” and “they cannot emerge when people are unable, for whatever reason, to form the minimal solidarity necessary for mounting or sustaining a challenge to authorities or cultural codes” (Goodwin, Jasper, 2004: 6, 19). Resource mobilization theory assumes that the basis for a movement to emerge is a grievance, some kind of conflict. Sidney Tarrow (1994) describes the social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.” William Gamson (1992) supports this definition pointing out

that there are three necessary components for a collective action: injustice, agency, and identity. Injustice is the sense that society at large has failed to provide for a group for which they are responsible. In social movements the sense of injustice needs to be shared. Agency identifies who in the shared injustice group can make the change, who can push enough. It is useful to make the “we” as broad as possible, and yet for many movements it is crucial not to make it so broad that collective mobilization becomes too difficult. Finally, identity is the feeling of “we,” the group that is able to make the change when the opposition to “they” is strong enough. If the distinction between the “we,” and “they” is too abstract, the two become overlapped, thus leading to individual rather than collective action (Gamson, 2000: 2).

Framing and Mobilization

Social movements theorists see the emergence of movements as a result of political and economic processes. However, they look at it from the standpoint of the social actors and analyze how and when social actors get together. They point out the importance of “framing” as “conscious, strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996: 6).

Framing is part of the strategy of the movement in order to spread its “word” and activity. As the social actors may or may not follow the leader, being rational actors of the society, it is important for the ideology to be well addressed by the head of the movement. In order to achieve their goals, movements must produce rhetorical packages that explain their claims within existing legitimate boundaries (Williams, 2002: 247). David Snow and Robert Benford (1988, 1992) point out that effective social movement

frames have to grant “diagnostic,” “prognostic,” and “ motivational” functions, which means that they have to explain to movement participants what is wrong, what can be done to fix it, and why should they be involved in this movement. Movement’s claims must make sense to the potential recruits. It implies alignment between what audience already knows, feels, or has experienced. Thus, movement’s ideology must cover familiar ground, even as it offers self-conscious innovations (Williams, 2002: 250). Religious rhetoric and symbols are so often used in social movements. Religion offers both organizational and cultural resources to facilitate mobilization and helps achieve at least some success (Smith, 1996; Williams 1994).

The movement’s success or failure is largely dependent on how well it performs the necessary mobilization tasks. Therefore, social movements largely carry their fate in their own hands. If they organize well, recruit members and mobilize resources they are likely to be successful. If not, they are likely fail. However, the meaning of failure is different for different kinds of social movements as they operate at different level of the social structure and they have different goals. We distinguish four kinds of social movements: revolutionary movements, reform movements, alternative movements, and redemptive movements¹. Revolutionary movements aim at the general restructuring the system of the society, for example from capitalist state to religious state. Reform movements hope to change specific feature of the society without changing the nature of it, for example women’s movements. Alternative movements seek for a limited change among part of the society, for example Christian mothers. Finally redemptive movements

¹ Besides Blumer’s (1951) classification of social movements. He distinguished expressive, general, and specific social movements. His classification analyzed the organization of movements.

want to radically change the individual they engage into, for example Alcoholic Anonymous (Aberle, 1966; Cameron, 1966).

Tilly (1978) suggests a mobilization model that shows the structure of social movement in its attempts to pursue a common interest. This model includes five components: “interests” meaning the shared gains and losses likely to accumulate by the social movement. The second element is the “organization,” which is the extent of common identity and unifying structure. The third element of the mobilization model is the “mobilization” itself that refers to the extent of resources under the collective control of the social movement. The fourth element consists of the “collective action,” which is the extent of a social movement’s joint action in pursuit of common ends. Finally, the fifth element of the mobilization model is the “opportunity” that consists of three components: “power” meaning the degree to which the outcomes of interaction favor the group’s interests over others; “repression,” which are the costs of collective action to the social movement, and finally, “opportunity” or threat that given social movements face in their relationship to governments or other authorities (Tilly, 1978).

Political process theory argues that these are political opportunities that provoke the possibility and friendly environment for the movements to emerge. However, as Jose Saramago formulates it:

The circumstances create the need, and the need, when it is great enough, creates the circumstances” (in: Goodwin, Jasper, 2004: vii)

The concept of “framing” will be useful in the theoretical approach analyzing fundamentalist religious movements because it shows the ways that social opposition in the form of social movements can be organized, how can it emerge, and how it functions. Framing focuses on how social movement organizations go about recruiting and

mobilizing people, raising money, training members, etc. The focus is on the dynamics *inside* social movements and on the structure of the organization. Framing looks at social forces and internal dynamics on the micro level that will help understanding social movements and links the reasons for their emergence to aspects of the social structure of the society. This focus tends to exclude the external dynamics of international relations.

Social movement theories are useful in providing the analysis of the organization of the movement, however their analysis of the mobilization ideology that captures the individual is their weakness. They do not acknowledge the transition from one ideology to another that the individual is subject to. Social movement theories are unable to explain the dynamics between two ideologies. In this thesis we suggest social actors leave one domination in order to enter another one. Social movements are driven by an ideology and led by a leader that transmits this ideology. This ideology shapes actors' perception of reality. In case of fundamentalist religious movements, the individual leaves the hegemony of the "McWorld" in order to enter the counter hegemony of religious fundamentalism. As social movement theories do not acknowledge this, we need to implement to our theoretical approach the concept of hegemony and counter-hegemony elaborated by Antonio Gramsci.

Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony assumes a simple approval given by the majority of a population to a certain direction suggested by those in power where one class had succeeded in persuading the other classes of society to accept its own moral, political, and cultural values. The dominant class governs not through force or threat of force but through consent. People internalize hegemony and govern themselves (Stillo, 1999). As Dominic Strinati puts it:

(...) Dominant groups in society, including fundamentalist but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups (Strinati, 1995: 165).

Gramsci (2000) stated that civil societies are more dominated through hegemony than through coercion, even though he did not exclude the role of coercion. But through coercion the true hegemony will not emerge, as it is the ideology that is internalized that forms the true hegemony. Hegemony is internalized as natural and, as a result, blindly consumed by the masses as social reality. However, this hegemonic consent is not always peaceful, and may combine physical force or coercion with intellectual, moral and cultural inducement.

Hegemony can be understood as "common sense," a cultural universe where the dominant ideology is practiced and spread; something that emerges out of social and class struggles, and serves to shape and influence people's minds. It is a set of ideas by means of which dominant groups strive to secure the consent of subordinate groups to their leadership (Stillo 1999). So, when one social group, or class is able to persuade another class to see the world in this class terms, the new hegemony, counter-hegemony is being born. As the counter-hegemony is fostered and spread primarily by intellectuals², they have to create the new "common sense," as Gramsci sees the spread of hegemony mainly by the "mind revolution," not necessarily by the military one, even though he does not exclude this possibility. He sees the struggle for the new hegemony fought

² In Gramsci's understanding all people are intellectuals but not everybody has a function of one. Intellectuals for him are the representatives of the hegemonic power. He distinguishes two kinds of intellectuals: traditional and organic ones. Traditional intellectuals call themselves autonomous and independent from the dominant ideology and system, they see themselves and are seen as part of the historic continuity, but they can be persuaded to come over to the revolutionary side. Organic intellectuals grow with the new arising counter-hegemony.

through the mass media, ideas, books, music, speeches, etc. In this thesis it is argued that counter-hegemony is created with the emergence of social movements with their own ideology and framing process.

The process of the establishment of the new hegemony is composed with three stages: universalization, rationalization, and naturalization. Universalization is successful when organic intellectuals are able to persuade the society that their interests are the interests of the entire society. Rationalization is the stage where intellectuals rationalize their role and action they undertake in the society as excused and right for the society, as “normal.” Finally, naturalization is the last stage during which the new hegemony becomes reified and becomes a “common sense.” It is a time when the culture becomes the nature (Litowitz, 2000).

Culture Domination and Society

Culture can be part of the hegemony; it can be its tool. However, social movement theories recognize culture only as one of the factors present in the “framing.” It can be true in case of fundamentalist religious movements, as charismatic leaders often call upon the “traditional” beliefs and belonging. However, the most visible culture in peripheries is the western “mcdonalized” culture. Social movements theorists do not acknowledge culture as part of the hegemony. In social movement theories culture is perceived as a foundation for a change. Even though there is a discussion between scholars where to locate it: whether it is a part of objective political opportunities or objective mobilization (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1996: 8; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 1997: 158) culture is not recognized as being part of the oppressive system against which social movements can react. Social movement theorists recognize culture as an opposition of political structure.

They see it as shaping potential challengers' perceptions of objective opportunities and shaping, enabling the actions of protesters. Culture is seen in social movement theories as mobilized by the powerless to challenge the structure (Polletta, 2004: 98). The approach proposed in this thesis recognizes culture as supporting the oppressive political structure, as part of the hegemonic system that Islamic fundamentalist religious movements are acting in response to. In order to validate and support this reasoning, the concept of culture industry elaborated by Theodor Adorno will be presented and added to the theoretical approach that is being developed in this work.

Adorno (2002b) analyzed culture in capitalist system as a commodity. He saw culture not as a factor enabling the protest, but rather as a factor disabling the opposition against the capitalist system. He talked about the culture being a tool of capitalism in order to create people's pseudo individuality instead of the real one in order to have profit out of people as consumers, even during their leisure time. Adorno pointed out that culture as consumption that is part of the hegemony of the capitalist system. As he expresses it:

Deceived masses are today captivated by the myth of success even more than the successful are. Immovably, they insist on the very ideology which enslaves them (Adorno 1947:9).

With the expansion of capitalism, the culture industry expands as well, as it is part of capitalism. Adorno (2002b) pointed out the falseness of culture under the capitalist system that stops being unique and starts to be a false tranquilizer and an exchangeable product that brings profit. He criticized capitalism for dominating social life through the commodification of everyday life. He argued that people could be easily tricked by the capitalist system, as it can sell everything (this is the goal of capitalism – make unending

profit). As the main goal of the culture industry is to maintain the system of capitalism, and as such, to make more and more profit. He also argued that dominant social forces that profit out of those revenues create ideology that keeps people in false consciousness (Adorno, 2002b).

In “Dialectic of Enlightenment,” Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2002a) state that the source of today's misfortune, (we can understand it as the source of underdevelopment), is blind domination. They understand domination in a triple sense: the domination of nature by human beings, domination of nature within human beings, and, in both of these forms of domination, the domination of some human beings by others. They distinguished three modes of domination: social domination, internal domination, and domination of nature. The first designates domination over other people; the second domination of one's self (or “internal nature” which is explained by the emergence of culture industry), and the third domination of external nature (economic domination explained by the dependency theory). Crucially, they saw all three modes as a totality. In order to break this totality, overcoming just one of the three modes of domination would not be enough, all must be surpassed, or none will be (Adorno 1998:250). The third mode of domination elaborated by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002a) is based on external nature, which means external factors. In case of developing countries, this is the domination by developed, core countries that is discussed by the dependency and world system theories.

The term culture industry refers to the production and consumption of mass culture (Adorno, 2002b). Adorno argues that culture no longer emerges from individual people in order to satisfy esthetic needs but it comes from the dominant social forces. The

culture industry includes all mass media and the means of cultural production (art, fashion, etc.) that produce the ideology. Adorno supports his statements by showing how all the standardization of cultural items takes place in societies, how they are regulated, promoted, distributed, and consumed, how it is all an industrial and mass production, like in a factory.

Adorno (2002b) sees culture industry as fundamentally related to the economic system. They are both interrelated as the culture industry arose from capitalism in a way that even culture was turned into an exchangeable and profitable commodity/product. All cultures become commodified under the capitalist system. All individuals are categorized, subsumed, and governed by restrictive social, economic, and political structures that are concerned with profit, not individuals. As such, individuals have become objects like other commodities. The goal of the culture industry is profit, similar to capitalism. This structure forces people to categorize and divide into different conform identity thinking that destroys any critical thinking producing standardized commodified culture. Culture Industry “becomes a mass deception and is turned into means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves” (Adorno 2002b: 7).

Standardization is a result of the characteristics of capitalism, which are mass production, mechanization of the production, distribution, and consumption of the produced commodities. Commodities take life on their own – independent of their production conditions (i.e., McDonald is identified with the United States and its politics, economy and culture while it is only selling food).

What the debate about the Culture Industry implies is that at first it was the bourgeoisie who were creating the ideology. However, nowadays these are the multinationals boards who dictate how, why, and when to think what. People are manipulated even without knowing it. It is a period of culture industry hegemony, and as such, a period of capitalist hegemony as the culture industry spreads with capitalism. It offers the illusion of freedom, but not true autonomous freedom.

People buy into the dominant culture, as they are not offered any other choice. It is internalized as natural and, as a result, blindly consumed by the masses as social reality. As such, Adorno does not see any place for individuality. He says that individuality is impossible in the culture industry. Individuals consume and internalize the pseudo-individuality sold to them by the mass media making them think they are being different and consuming “original” products that are meant to signify the self expression, but still, those are just products that make profit to the dominant class and as such they sustain the capitalist system. “The customer is not a king, as the culture industry would have us believe, not its subject, but its object” (Adorno 2002a: 10).

CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF NIGERIA: ROLE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST

This chapter will present the history of Nigeria with the concentration on Islam, which was a leading ideology of Maitatsine movement. It will be necessary in order to understand the dynamics and reasons for the popularity of the Maitatsine fundamentalist Islamic movement in the country. The chapter presenting the history of Nigeria is needed, as the history in this work being a historical sociology analysis constitutes the data for the analysis of religious movement.

Nigeria is a unique country created artificially during colonization period. It has a unique history and social structure. Its society is geopolitically fragmented into numerous ethnic groups. There are 250 distinct ethnic groups, where Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba are the largest ones. The country is also divided regionally into the north and south. This division goes along religious divisions with 50% of the population being Muslims, 40% Christian, and 10% practicing traditional religions. (Gordon, 2003: xv).

Beginnings

Islam was not the only religion imported into West Africa. However, as it has been present in the region since the 8th century, Islam was able to intertwine with local religions and to function with them in a unique symbiosis. Its influence and role evolved with time. First Islamic missionaries were Arabic and Mauritanian traders who traveled

in 8th century from Southern Morocco to rich lands of West Africa looking for gold, kauri shells, and kola nuts (Jibrin, 1991: 116).

First, Islam was only a religion of traveling traders but very quickly it became a political tool used by local chiefs. It is much later that it was assimilated enough to become a system of beliefs shared by the majority of the region integrating various ethnic groups. From the 10th to the 13th century Islam was spreading gradually and for the most part peacefully. The main agents of Islamization during this period were those itinerant traders, a few scholars, mostly Almoravid Berbers, and indigenous converts (Bugaje, 1987: 1). Local craftsmen like blacksmiths, tanners, jewelers, etc. also played a significant role in the process of Islamization. They were settling among worshippers of local religions and functioning not only as craftsmen but also as agents and bankers representing Diula or Hausa traders. Those two ethnic groups were part of specialized trade organizations that were spreading the word of Islam in Western Africa (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 224).

Hausa people are closely related to the introduction and eventual success of Islam in Northern Nigeria. They are now in majority Muslims and occupy mainly the region of Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger, so the region where the social movement that will be analyzed in this work was situated. Hausa are a mixture of diverse ethnic groups who have used origin myths in order to create a sense of common identity through heritage from common ancestor at a fixed point in the history (Gordon, 2003: 32). They migrated from the Sahara desert due to climatic changes in 8th century B.C. to Central Sudan and settled there. They started assimilating to local ethnic groups (Berbers, Zaghawa, Garamants), which in long historical process (trade and warfare) resulted in the creation

of the Hausa (which means “language”) ethnic group (Miles, 1994). As part of their heritage and common ancestry, Hausa people claim their origin from Bayajidda, a prince from Baghdad (which is a very important place for Muslims). He was supposed to save a city of Daura from a giant snake, and was rewarded by the marriage of the queen of Daura. Their seven sons were the future rulers of seven main/”true” Hausa cities, Hausa Bakwai (Hausa state does not exist – there are separate, autonomous city-states, and each one of them used to have its own specialty in the region – warfare, trade, art, etc.) “next” to seven false Hausa cities Banza Bakwai. Historians relate the character of Bayajidda to legendary Abu Yazid, Islamic leader, who had to migrate from the Middle East toward Sahara, and ended up in Central Sudan. The marriage with a queen would be a symbol of the passage from matriarchal to patriarchal system present in the Islam. The killing of the evil snake is a symbol of the change of religion from local traditional religions to Islam where snake was a symbol of local traditional belief system (Hiskett, 1984, Piłaszewicz, 1994).

Next to Hausa people, another ethnic group that was establishing itself in the Hausaland were the Fulani: nomadic people who’s early records show that they have lived in the medieval Saharan kingdom of Mali. In 15th century certain Fulani clans migrated from Mali to Hausaland. Gradually, their number increased. In 18th century they were considered a significant population in Hausaland consisting in both nomadic cattle-raising clans and the sedentary clan of the Toronkawa. Once the Fulani began living among the Hausa, they started intermarrying with them. Over generations, many Fulani adopted Hausa language and customs. As a result, it became difficult to tell the Fulani apart, and as such the term Hausa-Fulani emerged that is applied to them. Although

Hausa and Fulani are mixture of different people, they are now often identified as one ethnic group (Gordon, 2003: 15). In the future history of the Islam in West Africa, Fulani played a very important role.

As Islam is not only a religion, but also an administrative, judicial, and philosophical system, the entire states can be formed and function along Koranic laws and administration. In 11th century, when wandering traders were spreading the word of Islam peacefully and slowly in the Hausaland, the first Islamic State of Takrur was formed. During the same time, in 1042 the Almoravid movement¹ declared the holy war in Morocco (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 17). In 11th century they began laying the foundations of an empire covering entire Morocco and parts of Algeria. In 1052 Almoravids declare war on the Empire of Ghana (today's region of southeastern Mauritania and southwestern Mali) that finished with the fall of its capital in 1076 (Badru, 2004: 248). The capital of the Almoravids was the newly founded Marrakech. In 1086 they defeated Alfonso VI of Castile to gain much of Spain.

Muslims, knowing how to read and write in Arabic, were considered more educated and had higher status than followers of other religions. Arabic, the holy language of Koran could be compared at that time to Latin in Medieval Europe. It was not only a language of religion but it was present in education and development of literature. This is the reason why if a chief was a Muslim, he could use the religion as an additional element to legitimize his power. Furthermore, traveling Muslim traders were very influential and wealthy. If a local chief was also a Muslim, he could negotiate better trading agreements with the traders. All those reasons were responsible for such an appreciation of Islam in African societies at first.

¹ The Almoravids came from the island on Senegal River.

Development of Islam

The period between 14th and 16th century is a time when Muslim states of Mali and Songhay emerged and developed into significant political entities in West Africa. During this period Kanem-Bornu reached its mature stage under the rein of Idris Aloma. Many Hausa city-states, e.g. Kano and Katsina became Islamized. This was also a time when educational centers developed and produced many of indigenious scholars like Abdul-Rahman Al-Sa'adi, Ahmad Baba, Al-Barnawi, Mahmud Kati, and many others (Bugaje, 1987: 1). During this time Western Africa was visited by many visiting scholars such as Muhammad Al-Maghili and Ibn Batuta who deepened the knowledge about Islam and fired-up the fascination by this religion among local intellectuals (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 40, 43).

The period between the vital development of Islam and the beginning of the Holy Wars (16th – 19th century) was filled with chaos and invasions. Morocco invaded Timbuktu, the intellectual center of the region. The destruction of the state of Songhay, conquest of Timbuktu, and the Hausa inter-states wars resulted in the dispersion of Islamic scholars in the region. In 18th century, Muslim communities were well established in the region, but still they could not be described as predominantly Islamic.

By the end of 18th century one could observe an increase of disapproval by a number of Muslim scholar toward local un-Islamic customs and behaviors. The scholars started pushing more decisively for the adoption of Islamic alternatives. The kinds of things they objected to were the idolatrous rites of animism: sacrifices and libations to various objects of worship; failure to observe the Islamic food prohibitions and prohibited degrees of marriages (chiefs could have tens of wives); the survival of matrilineal

inheritance instead of patrilineal one that is prescribed by Islam. Scholars also frequently accused Hausa songs and the addiction to dance and traditional music to be impure (Hiskett, 1973: 7-8). This was a sign that Islam is gaining on importance and influence in the region.

Also, Fulani Muslims being a minority in Habe kingdoms felt they were treating unfairly even though with their ability to read and write and being in contact with the “higher” Arabic culture they felt they should be part of the leading majority. As part of the minority, they had to pay taxes that were not included in the Shari’ah law (Islamic law) to which they felt obliged to obey. Also, as Muslim communities were parts of different ethnic groups, Muslims often found themselves fighting against other Muslims, which is a very big sin in Islam. Finally, Muslim Fulani communities were from distinct ethnic groups than those who were in power (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 91).

The growing dissatisfaction with life as it was in the Habe (dynasty ruling in the Hausa city-states) kingdoms, as contrasted with the Islamic ideal, led to several Fulani Islamic movements, from which the one of Shehu Uthman dan Fodio was the most significant (Hiskett, 1973: 8).

Fulani leaders were members of the Quadiyya mystic (sufi) brotherhood/order/*tariqa*². They were representing an elitist mysticism that welcomed Islamic scholars rather than ordinary people. They believed in the divine connection between the brotherhood’s leader and God. They believed and waited for the next prophet to come. Their goal was to reform the society according to the divine Islamic rules. (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 91).

² *tariqa* is the Hausa name for the Sufi brotherhood

Based on the Quadiriyya Islamic rules the Fulani and Tukuler holy wars started in West Africa leading to a significant Islamization of Western Africa, including the region of Northern Nigeria.

Holy Wars

First there was a Fulani jihad³ (the Military holy war) in 1725 in Futa Jalon, today's Guinea, organized by Ibrahim Musa and then his successor Ibrahim Sori. The country Futa Jalon, structured after the victories had a theocratic form. It was an idealistic state organization led by religious leaders. It was a hierarchical structure where the political-religious elite was the state authority (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 93).

The second jihad was led by a member of the Tukuler ethnic group, Sulayman Bal. It took place in Futa Toro in today's Senegal and was led against the "pagan" Fulani of the Futa Toro rulers. In 1776 the successor of Sulayman Bal defeated the Fulani and established a theocratic state where Islam was a national religion. He spread his authority over all the ethnic groups living in the region: Wolof, Soninke, Bambara, and Mandingo (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 94). Futa Toro fell in 1864.

The third theocratic Islamic state that was a result of the military jihad emerged in Dina⁴. It was established by Seku (Shehu) Amadu who was a member of the Fulani scholars related to the Quadiriyya brotherhood. In 1815 he founded the capital of Dina, Hamdullahi⁵, an Islamic state where executive, legislative, and judicial authority was in the hands of Islamic scholars and was based on the Shari'ah law (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 96). The state of Dina survived until the French invasion in 1893.

³ Muslim layers distinguish four types of jihad (that means serving Islam with action): jihad of heart (showing mercy), language (spreading the word), hands (social work), and sword (military) (Danecki, 1998: 255)

⁴ Dina in Arabic means "religion"

⁵ Hamdullahi in Arabic means "Praise the Lord"

Finally, the most radical changes in Islam occurred during Uthman dan Fodio's holy war in the beginning of the 19th century. Dan Fodio's successful jihad caused the establishment of Nigeria's first caliphate. The Sokoto-based caliphate was divided into Emirates, and a single caliph oversaw all the Emirs. A qadi (Islamic judge) was in control of the Shari'ah law to be applied in courts. Islamic law spread quickly over the wide region covered by the new caliphate (Falola, 1998, Piłaszewicz 1994, Gordon, 2003). In place of the chiefs from the Habe dynasty, Shehu appointed his senior lieutenants as Emirs⁶ over the conquered kingdoms. Muhammadu Bello, Shehu's son and successor as caliph (supreme Islamic ruler) later founded the city of Sokoto that became the administrative capital of the Fulani Empire. The empire comprised nearly all the Hausaland and extended its political influence further westward, across the river Niger. Their empire was protected by a screen of ribats (border fortresses) behind which societies were formed according to Islamic ideal model (Hiskett, 1973: 9). However, in the more distant bush areas there were remains of societies that continued to live according to local religions, customs, and traditions (Hiskett, 1973: 11).

It is important to note that Fulani jihads were not wars about the conversion but about the reform. Their goal was not to turn non-believers into Muslims but to turn Muslims into Sunnah followers⁷, the "true" Islam. As the Sokoto Caliphate was established, initial alliances between the literate class of Islamic morality (the ulamas) and rulers quickly dissipated and power conflict arose (Miles, 2003: 53).

⁶ Emir in Arabic means "army commander"

⁷ Sunnah followers consist a majority of Muslims in the Muslim world. They are the most orthodox part of Muslims. They follow the sunnah, "tradition"/tales about prophet Muhammad, based on which the Islamic rulers (caliphs) are chosen based on the traditional, nomadic way in opposition to shiy'a where Islamic rulers have to have roots in prophet's Muhammad family and reject the tradition/tales about the prophet.

During Uthman dan Fodio's holy war time, Islam appeared in the entire Sahel and was accepted by the majority of the population in the area of today's northern Nigeria. In urban areas it took the place of traditional religions, or accommodated traditional religions, and started to shape points of view about the world and society. It started influencing the administration and the ruling system of the Hausa city-states, even though in rural areas local religions still prevailed. The lifestyle of the people started to be one of Islamic solidarity, especially in the *umma* (Islamic community). This feeling of unity among Muslims introduced the division of the society into the Muslims and non-Muslims. This division into in-groups and out-group helped to further the development of precise religious movements aimed at creating and strengthening the solidarity among the members of the group and exclude all "others."

The history of Islam in West Africa goes along with the adaptation of the Holy Koran to local religions. Every African local religion has given a unique beauty to Islam: parts of its local social structures, local beliefs, norms, and values. In African Studies, there is a name for African Islam called "Black/African Islam,"⁸ which differs significantly from the orthodox Islam that was fought for during the Holy Wars of the 19th century, and which is being fought for today. Islam is a religion that is easily adapted to African local social structures and sets of beliefs since it tolerates them more than Christianity does. This is the reason why Islam had greater success in West Africa than Christianity. Islam only in small degree changes African traditional life, allowing for example for polygyny. Even though very often women are subjected to seclusion, they are then "rewarded" by

⁸ The term of "Black Islam" is sometimes viewed as negative by African communities as a reflection of negative aspects related to the word "black" (black plague, dirty, evil, etc.)

the Islamic right of inheritance after the death of their husband. This did not exist in many traditional religions (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 225-226).

In today's Nigeria, the Yoruba (who are, like Hausa, a mixture of diverse peoples) having one of the largest mythologies in their religion (even bigger than Greek mythology) accommodated and incorporated some unorthodox beliefs that gave the Yoruba Islam a different orientation. Southwestern Muslims were less critical of Yoruba indigenous religion and political authority. Muslims did not encourage Imams to displace local kings or to turn the region into theocracy (Falola, 1998: 27). Yoruba Muslims did not call for the Shari'ah to displace local laws or to subvert local authorities.

While orthodox Muslims criticized what they called paganism, many aspects of traditional religions came to influence even orthodox Islamic practices, or at least became tolerated to a degree that enabled people of different religions to coexist. For example, cults of nature spirits exist in some form or another among all African Muslims whatever is their stage of Islamization (Spencer-Trimingham, 1959: 106). This successful accommodation of Islam would later prove to be an element that minimized religious tension and violence in the Southeastern region of Nigeria (Falola, 1998: 27). Even to this day, Yoruba are subjected to customary law rather than to Shari'ah (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 226).

The Igbo, living in east southern part of Nigeria and are a diverse people of more than 200 groups, were the only big ethnic group in present Nigeria that did not convert to Islam. Because of the early contacts with Christian missionaries in early 19th century, Igbo adopted another universal religion, Christianity, which they assimilated into traditional religions.

With the beginning of colonialism, from 1900s, the British significantly changed the relations of power and influence in the region. Mainly, they altered and replaced the Fulani Islamic political units.

Nigeria

The end of 19th century was the beginning of European expansion to Africa. Increased interest among the European powers in colonizing Africa from the late 1870s created a desire to define to "the rules of the game," and to define their respective interests so far as practicable. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 regulated European colonization and trade in Africa (the Berlin General Act was signed on November 15, 1884). West Africa was divided into France and Britain. It was a beginning of colonization of Africa, a military, economic, political, and cultural oppression and domination of one country over another.

Nigeria was an artificially created conglomeration of diverse ethnicities and other loosely related groups. Built by conquest and suppression, the state never acquired any enduring legitimacy or trust from different ethnic groups (Falola, 1998: 52). However, its region had vast deposits of oil, uranium, tin, gold, timber, and rubber that were very useful for the process of capital accumulation for the British who colonized Nigeria (Badru, 1998: 3).

Already in 1861 the British established their protectorate in Lagos that became the first British colony in Nigeria. However, it was only in 1914, January 1, when Lord Lugard, the first British Governor-General of Nigeria finalized the amalgamation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria that were

previously administered as separate territories. This date is generally perceived as Nigeria's birthday (Osaghae, 1998; Gordon, 2003).

The colonial state was coercive in its efforts to establish power and attain narrow economic objectives. Colonial dependence was based on the monopolization of commercial and financial capital of the colony by the dominant country. It controlled the land, mines, social resources, and the export of natural resources (raw materials, tropical products etc.) from the colonized country (Dos Santos, 1971).

Colonizers implanted new cities in the "Third World" with the goal of facilitating the transfer of economic surplus to Western countries. National cities became satellites of Western metropolis. These satellites became colonial metropolises with the respect to the provincial cities. The peripheries were underdeveloped by the expropriation of its surplus product (the source of investment), in the form of raw materials, minerals, commodities, profits, etc. first to local capitals/local colonial metropolises, and then to Western countries. Under noncolonial circumstances this surplus could be used by local governments to produce sustainable development (Alvin, So, 1990).

British and French administration systems and Islam

France had colonies among others in Cameroon and Niger. It regarded its colonies as part of greater France, and people from different cultures were to be assimilated into French civilization. It implied direct ruling model with the tendency of colony's close integration with the French state and culture. For Africans, it meant the introduction of French education system, French administrative system with French officials, introduction of French language on all levels of political, economic, judicial, and social life. Ideally, it was supposed to make new conquered territories an extended France. As a

result, Islam was not a welcomed element in this new model (Hiskett, 1984; Spencer Trimingham, 1959; Piłaszewicz, 1994). France had a dual approach toward Islam in the colonies that showed indecisiveness in their policy: one was pro-Muslim, and the other not so much. Some governors adopted the policy of fostering Islam, as they regarded it as a “stage toward civilization,” and allowed any village that wanted to have a mosque to have one. Muslims were considered as useful interpreters and were often made local chiefs. Similarly, governors allowed Islamic law to govern the personal and social law of anyone who could possibly be called Muslim. The French at first recognized Islamic education and allowed for Koranic schools but later replaced them with French education (Spencer-Trimingham, 1959: 206-207).

Unlike France, Great Britain in Nigeria, introduced a system of indirect rules. It was based on the policy of exploitation of the colony, not its assimilation, with the minimum of British investment, both in financial and in human resources. Indirect rule involved the use of local chiefs called “the native authority,” charged to implement colonial policies. Chiefs appointed as native authorities were responsible for taxation, for implementing British policies, and for the provision of native labor for colonial public works (Badru, 1998: 70). Britain had decided to educate Africans to serve in the colonial administration. This had the advantage of minimizing the need for British administrators to directly tax people or force the colonial policy on them. Theoretically, colonial rule was supposed to be less visible with the native authority, and as such provoked less resistance to colonial rule. It was intended to develop a fully-fledged parallel administrative structure and plausibly create the native authority (Nantang Ben Jua, 1995). Also, it was a reduction of

costs for the British administration (British officials would be more expensive than local ones) (Gordon, 2003: 75).

This indirect rule system helped the spread of Islam and enabled Islamic law to gain greater influence in the region. Under the British rule, Islamic law in Northern Nigeria gradually overruled customary laws (Spencer-Trimingham, 1959; Hiskett, 1984, Piłaszewicz, 1994; Gilliland, 1986). Appointees of the Caliphate and Emirates were imposed as rulers even on the non-Muslim groups as the “native authority” (Osaghae, 1998: 2). However, under colonial rules, Islam was denied any opportunities for political unification and political force. Hiskett (1984) states that this resulted in the fact that colonial occupation weakened, to some extent, the traditional ties in Muslim world, as Muslims were discouraged to undertake pilgrimages to Mekka and other Muslim states (1984: 282-284). The Islamic jihad, intended to purify and spread Islam, became difficult to carry out, as the presence of the colonial government controlled local communities. However, these obstacles for the spread of Islam were noticeable only on macro-level relations. On the micro-level Islam was the element that often tightened inter-group relations. Spencer Trimingham (1959) described social migrations of Islamic migrants to big towns, Migrants were retaining their traditional and religious ties settling in special quarters with their ethnic groups and kept on practicing their traditions and religion. Muslims in the cities were viewed as the most traditional and conservative of all the inhabitants. But thanks to this, people were feeling secure in the new environment (Spencer Trimingham, 1959: 215).

On the other side, although the Emirs had power, they were subordinated to white Christian officers. The British reduced the status of the Sultans to that of an Emir. Most

sitting Emirs were removed by the British, and replaced with leaders chosen from the more “faithful to the colony” group. They made it clear to the new Emirs and other high officials that the native authority will maintain their positions as long as they are loyal to their British “masters.” The British also changed the judicial system to lessen the “conservatism” of the Shari’ah law. For the Islamic community the fact that Emirs were implementing British policies that were considered “un-Islamic” demonstrated their impotence to the people (Gordon, 2003: 76). However, regardless of the loss of independent authority, many of the northern traditional religious elite prospered under the colonial rule. The position of Emirs retained considerable authority and functioned as native authority, and they had material benefits because of these functions. Partially, native authority became a platform in maintaining the colonial rule in Nigeria (Gordon, 2003: 78). Later on it became one of the main points in the ideology of the struggle of new Islamic religious movements. The fact that Emirs and other Islamic officials were part of the colonial apparatus provoked that they stopped to be respected by the local Muslims and were considered as part of the neo-colonial oppression. As such, they were called to resign from their positions and accept the “true” Islam.

Emirs working for the British were fighting in their own way. There was a conflict regarding proposed modernizations and secularization of the Shari’ah law by the colonizers. Those propositions were not well accepted by the Islamic intelligentsia who saw those modernizations as a threat to their power and to Islam as a whole (Falola, 1998: 29).

At the same time, native authority that included local chiefs and Emirs needed western educated local administration that was supposed to be created from Africans. As

the British goal was a self-governing colony, the British organized Western schools that were teaching and socializing Africans into Western culture, and producing new class of local clerics, who became “civilized” and who worked for the British administration. These new elite became assimilated to Western culture. They were becoming a bridge between local chiefs who were made responsible for tax collections and keeping order in their villages and the British authority. Indirect rule model was a combination of a new bureaucracy with some remains from indigenous politics. Chiefs, or Emirs who were held accountable to colonial officers, were to administer their own people, and as such they lost the authority for their people by working for the colonizer. While many suffered cutbacks in independent power, several were upgraded in status and enjoyed more power than they had before (Falola, 1998: 51).

Christianity and Islam

With colonization, Christian missionary work expanded in scale and scope. First missionaries arrived in Nigeria in the 1840s. By the end of colonial period, Christianity had emerged as a dominant religion in eastern Nigeria among the Igbo, and as a major religion in west and mid-western Nigeria. Catholic officials used the schools to increase their influence among the population (especially Igbo). In western part of Nigeria, all areas were affected by missionary activity (Falola, 1998: 33). Only Islamic north was always problematic for Christian missionaries. During the 19th century, many missionaries hoped to add the north to the Christian kingdom, but only few of them, dedicated to their mission the most, could tolerate Islam. Many thought that Christianity is superior to Islam, that Islam is a creation of the devil. Those arrogant views about Islam contributed significantly to the hostility between the two religions. Evangelization

in the north was difficult. Missionaries were required to get permission to work from the Emirs and were allowed to work only far from cities or in immigrant communities (Falola, 1998: 34).

Christianity along with the British administration also had problems with the rise of “Mahdism,” a belief present in mystic traditions⁹, which was the greatest Islamic threat to the statehood and the colonial authorities. This was a trans-Saharan anti-colonial movement. It originated from a messianic doctrine similar to that in Judaism. Muslims believed that at the turn of each century, a Mahdi would emerge with the powers to strengthen Islam and make justice triumph and lead all the Muslims to salvation. Many Muslims waited for the Mahdi. Some Mahdists regarded the forces of Lord Lugard as Satan. They saw any pact with the British and subsequent rule by Christians as worse than death (Shedrack Best, 1999).

In all the political, economic, and social changes, that took place with the colonial conquest and in the eventual arrival of the Mahdi, many Muslim communities saw the coming of the end of the world. Increasing industrialization, evangelization, and destruction of traditional social structures were interpreted as an approaching apocalypse. Colonial armies were identified as the army of the savage Gog and Magog that was supposed to threaten the peace of Muslims at the end of the world (Piłaszewicz, 1994: 139). This is when different religious movements with charismatic leaders claiming to be the Mahdi started to emerge started to find large popularity among Africans. One of the reasons that made them fall into those new religious movements was the fact that with colonial administration older loyalties to kings, gods, and chiefs ended, except for the

⁹ mystic traditions include beliefs in saints, mahdis. It is an unorthodox version of Islam, where there is not only the only and unique God that is important. Those beliefs are present mainly in Africa, among brotherhoods.

loyalty toward universal religions (Christianity or Islam, that were pretty recent loyalties). The lack of such allegiances produced also bitter rivalries for power and wealth. As a result of the colonial policy of “divide and rule,¹⁰” intergroup struggles among Nigerians for privileges and resources were promoted.

Only the old caliphate in the north of Nigeria was preserved, while many indigenous chiefs and kings in the country saw their power enhanced (Falola, 1998: 52-53). New classes and elites were forming, especially in the export related agricultural activities and in mining. In the countryside, local officials responsible for the export of natural resources and crops gave rise to the differentiation of the peasantry and emergence of a new African middle class, the comprador/bourgeoisie class (Badru, 1998: 5).

However, this new colonial client-master system contained the seeds of its own destruction. The new class of educated Africans was especially hostile toward native authority. After having accommodated British hegemony for a considerable period of time, the new educated comprador class started clamoring for independence. Most were educated in Christian mission schools. They were located in the expanding cities of the south. The impact of this was twofold. On one hand, these “civilized” elite sought to emulate their masters' lives. On the other, this new educated class felt that their education qualified them for more power and influence over development of their societies. Their ambitions increased after the British allowed them limited participation in the legislative council that was created in Lagos. Although Africans played an important role in the colonial administration, but once the colonial administration was fully developed, the British started marginalizing those Africans who were educated along western models.

¹⁰ By dividing the solidarity of indigenous people, the control over a region was easier for the colonists

As a result of this marginalization, the traditional and religious authorities became the favored ones in the colonial system (Nantang Ben Jua, 1995; Gordon, 2003).

At the same time, traditional and religious leaders were understandably hostile toward the educated Africans. Accepting western standards of living, living in big cities, the new educational elite was not considered as representative of most Africans, as it claimed to be. However, the new elite educated in western system viewed African societies through the prism of European civilization, they wanted to modernize the “backward” traditional societies. With colonialism, elements of racial thinking started to emerge at this time. Africans (the “natives”) were perceived in a negative light, they were viewed as backward ones in comparison with Europeans. The Africans that had western education were considered “civilized” (Gordon, 2003: 82).

The British colonial policy of “divide and rule” was very successful, but resulted in many divisions in today’s Nigeria. Those divisions are visible along the different lines. By supporting the feudalistic, theocratic Hausa-Fulani system in the north, the British have created a significant cultural, political, and economic gap between the northern and southern regions. Closing the north to Christian missionaries, the British prevented people from the northern region to have access to western education by reinforcing Koranic education system in the north. In the 1920s, only 125 elementary schools from the total of 4,000 were in the north. None of the 18 secondary schools were in northern Nigeria (Gordon, 2003: 82). With the popularity of Islamic education in northern Nigeria, western education was perceived as less legitimate or irrelevant. This popularity of Islam provoked the situation, where in order for western educated Muslims to compete

culturally and politically in the North, they had to publicly demonstrate how much Islamic knowledge they possess (Umar, 2001: 140). As Umar (2001) expressed it:

Western-educated Muslims must demonstrate their Islamic credentials more emphatically to compensate for the perceived deficiency resulting from their educational background (Umar, 2001: 144).

What is interesting is that in many cases those western educated Muslims having to prove their Islamic background were establishing new orthodox Islamic movement themselves or joining the ones that already existed.

The north – south division also reveals a fragmentation along religious lines. As Christian missionaries did not have access to northern parts of Nigeria, Islam did not have any obstacles to finish its jihad (conversion into Islam) in the north while Christianity could spread in the south. Additionally, as northern parts of Nigeria were inhabited mainly by Fulani-Hausa people, and southern parts by the Yoruba and Igbo, those divisions reinforced also ethnocentrism of those three ethnic groups and, as a result, increased the tensions between them (Gordon, 2003: 82). Ethnic labels were assigned to every of the three regions (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba) that were administered during the colonial period, what continued after independence. It has created, modified, and reinforced pre-colonial identities, and finally created separate state units that started and continued to develop along different lines and with different rapidity (Osaghae, 1998: 4).

Tensions also increased by the fact of intense migration of people that started during the period of colonialism. Changes in agriculture and development of industry made people move along those changes. For example, many young people from different ethnicities moved to the cocoa plantations (cocoa became major export crop) in the Yorubaland. Many Igbo moved to Lagos, city dominated by Yoruba. In cities, ethnicities

kept living in separated neighborhoods that was often provoking urban tensions (Gordon, 2003: 87).

As we can see, the impact of colonialism on Islam can be viewed from two different angles. On one side, the establishment of internal security, good communication (new railroads, roads, etc.), and even urbanization tended to help the spread of Islam in West Africa. However, on the other hand, introduction of material goods, Western education with new ideas and patterns of behavior, denial for political Islamic unification of different *ummas* across the region and continent were the obstacles for the spread of this religion (Hiskett, 1973: 14).

What is certain is that while Islam received no permanent set-backs, the older generation experienced changes in their way of life, but the new generation grew up accustomed from the start to new culture, set of beliefs, and lived the change of status of their people, from colonial subordination to the challenge of shaping new-born countries.

Independence in 1960

Loyalties to religion and ethnicity in newborn African countries are often more important than loyalty to the state, as the state was created not by Africans themselves, but by a foreign power. This was also the case in Nigeria (Falola, 1998: 50).

The end of colonial rule in 1960 strengthened the Muslim elite in creating an Islamic identity in modern Nigeria. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the head of the Northern People's Congress was committed to the spread of Islam and the identification of Nigeria as a member of the Muslim world. A Nigerian *umma* has emerged, united by religion even though there were differences as to the interpretations of the Shari'ah and the Koran (Falola, 1998: 29-30). Islamization in politics was mainly concentrated in the

Northern Nigeria, where most of Islamized Hausa people lived. With time, Nigerian Islamic parties started to include other ethnicities from southern parts of Nigeria.

With the obvious creation of Islamic *umma* in Nigeria, Muslim world started to be concerned with the spread of Islam in the country. Many countries like Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Libya started to supply Nigeria with books, teachers, missionaries, and money to support the development of Islam in Nigeria (Falola, 1998: 30). These foreign contacts resulted in certain dependences from the sponsors that were influencing political decisions of Nigerian elites and actions of different religious movements.

However, there were also divisions within the *umma* itself that were the effect of different political, economic, and social dynamics taking place in Nigeria and in the Muslim world. In many cases they were the results of different points of interest of certain charismatic leaders that were able to gather a great deal of followers. An important division occurred between the *tariquas* and orthodox movements. Those who were the participants of the *tariquas* were mainly from the old aristocratic families that included in Islam elements of traditional religions that counteracted with the fundamentals of the orthodox Islam¹¹. The leader of the holy war in the nineteenth century, Uthman dan Fodio, was a member of the Quadiyya brotherhood that was present in northern Nigeria for the longest period and was considered as the official brotherhood in the region (Loimeir, 1997: 20). It was an order in which membership was exclusive to members from the local elite. It is with the presence of the second brotherhood, Tijaniyya, that the membership became accessible to the members of lower classes. Facing a danger of losing its influence, Quadiyya reformed its rules. It changed the rule that salvation was possible only through intellectual effort. This regulation excluded masses, as the literacy

¹¹ Like the belief in saints and recognition of the heads of the *tariquas* prophets and saints

among the lower class was very low. Tijaniyya stated that salvation was possible through meditation and modesty that would result in the contact with saints. Those rules were also finally applied by the Quadiriyya brotherhood. The existence of two strong brotherhoods started the division in the *umma*. Prior to the emergence of Tijaniyya in Nigeria, Quadiriyya was responsible for the religious life of all Nigerian Muslims, and it controlled the eventual activities of *ulamas* that came from the outside of Hausa city-states. However, when Tijaniyya started gaining members, both brotherhoods were more occupied fighting each other than taking care of the spiritual needs of their members and fulfilling their responsibilities in the regulations of religious activities. In the 1950s, the conflicts between Quadiriyya and Tijaniyya became so serious that the prime minister of the Northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello created Islamic Advisory Council that was supposed to solve and decrease religious tensions (Shedrack Best, 1999).

Both Sufi brotherhoods have had close relations with successive regimes in Nigeria. Indeed, the top rank of the leadership in both Sufi orders has benefited from the government in various ways. Unlike radical groups such as the Maitatsine, they seemed comfortable with the secular notion of the state and the idea of an Islamic state had a small popularity among their members. Also, brotherhoods themselves were not considered orthodox. There were many elements from traditional religions included in their beliefs and rituals. As such, they have been the targets of revivalist Islamic movements, who tend to identify the Sufi orders with the state, and accuse them of moral bankruptcy and failure (Shedrack Best, 1999).

Preachers that did not sermonize within the lines of mainstream Islam at that time began to have the opportunity to spread their activity as they were not controlled as much as before the “arrival” of the Tijaniyya.

Another element that helped in the emergence of new religious movements was, once again after colonialism, the revival of the belief in the arrival of the *mahdi* (prophet). The end of the world was supposed to be “announced” by many natural disasters, wars, and many other misfortunes. As the economic situation after the independence was not good, Nigeria was experiencing droughts, floods, etc. it was obvious that some would identify those misfortunes with the coming end of the world as they were identified during colonial times. Those beliefs were used by many charismatic leaders who created their movement by announcing themselves to be the *mahdi* and giving proof of the close end of days. This is why Islam helped in the emergence of religious movements during difficult times. This is also one of the reasons why Maitatsine managed to gain so many followers even though after the colonial administration was gone, many villages and ethnic groups went back to their traditional religions and custom law, (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 227) as it was their choice, not an introduced administration or belief system.

Economy and Islamic Fundamentalism

Even though after colonialism private capital remained insignificant, certain trends were already emerging. Nigerians were acquisitive, involving themselves either in high-profit ventures (e.g., real estate, transportation, construction, or oil business) or in handling government resources. Enterprising Nigerians imitated the Europeans and the Lebanese in establishing factories and trading concerns. Those interested in the accumulation of capital recognized the opportunity offered by the transfer of power in the

1950s (emergence of federal system) and 1960s (independence). Civil servants, politicians, and businessmen became predators taking what they could from the state and using it to build capital, invest, and consume, not to build a new state (Falola, 1998: 52).

The emergence of a federal system already in the 1950s ensured regional autonomy, (where the Sokoto caliphate was the strongest region with the loyalty toward Islam) distributed revenues broadly, and divided spheres of authority among regions in the federal government. This tripartite regional structure left Nigerian state unable to manage interregional relations and unable to stop the continuation of ethnic nationalisms (Falola, 1998: 52).

Oil boom and bust, 1970-80

In order to understand the popularity of fundamentalist Islamic movements we have to know what was happening in Nigerian economy, as those movements were related in large part with economic, political, and social dynamics.

After colonialism, Nigeria was left with an infrastructure that relied on production for export, especially cocoa and rubber, palm oil, and above all crude petroleum. The railroads were built only to pass plantations avoiding rural areas that would benefit local people facilitating the communication (Badru, 1998: 47). Big cities were growing, while rural areas were just exploited.

When the oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1957, Nigeria became one of the biggest producers of oil in the world. The production was controlled by multinational corporations, such as Shell, BP, or Gulf Oil. They were supervised by Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, 1999: 265).

After independence, in the 1960s, petroleum became the main source of Nigerian income. Manufacture and the agricultural sectors of the economy have seriously declined. This agrarian decline could be seen in the increase of import of wheat grains, and decrease of income coming from the agriculture. For instance in 1956, agriculture consisted of 63% of Nigerian GDP, in 1980 this percent decreased to 18% of the GDP¹² (Badru, 1998: 49-51). Nigeria became totally dependent on the fluctuations of the international oil market. However, even though the production of the crude petroleum was significant, only a small part of the society was profiting from the governmental/national projects related to oil. Indeed, governmental spendings were mismanaged (Lubeck, 1981; Abdulraheem (et al.), 1986; Osaghae, 1998), and the rest of the economy sectors were declining. Social disparities started to increase rapidly.

During the Arab-Israeli war in the 1970s, the Arab countries' production of oil declined, which caused an increase of the need for petrol from other countries. The prices of oil jumped significantly (Badru, 1998: 49). It was the beginning of the world oil boom from which Nigeria profited a great deal. During this time, the new class that started emerging during colonial times, developed into a new bourgeoisie that was controlling the oil trade and that was profiting from it a great deal; most of them were related in some degree to government officials. They were also increasing the import of luxury products from the West, especially clothes, western food, pop culture, etc. As Barkindo (1993) describes it:

Many people became extremely rich and displayed their wealth by building fashionable mansions, purchasing flashy cars and the latest electronic gadgets for their homes, and taking frequent trips abroad. Several Kano businessmen set a new fashion by buying their own private jets. (Barkindo, 1993: 96).

¹² Source: Federal Ministry of Agriculture (1984). Information: *Bulletin on Agriculture*. Reproduced from Badru (1998).

On the other hand, even though Nigeria entered the path of quick industrial development, the amount of poor people was still increasing (Abdulraheem (et al.), 1986).

In 1970, after the Biafran Civil War, Nigeria was one of the poorest countries in the world, but after the oil boom it started to have more and more influences in the region. However, the policy of the government was very shortsighted. It was not directed toward the development of social security for the entire society. Also, the government was ignoring the private sector of the country that usually provokes the development of the society's wealth, more so than the public sector. In Nigeria, most of economic sectors were nationalized (Tidjani, 1998: 2).

The accumulation of capital was increasing in 1980s producing great amount of Nigerian currency (Naira) on the market, which in turn, produced high inflation, and decrease of the value of the currency. The amount of local products significantly decreased with the increase of Western goods' import. Agriculture and manufacturing almost disappeared producing massive migrations from rural areas to cities for employment. It produced a situation, where cities became overcrowded.

Many of those who migrated to cities could not find jobs and were joining the masses of unemployed Nigerians. Additionally, with the increase of Western influence the ordinary *ulamas* (Islamic scholars) and *almajirai* (Koranic students) were becoming more and more marginalized in big cities (Barkindo, 1993: 96). This was something that was not supposed to happen after Islamic education¹³. Finally, rural areas turned into places of

¹³ A traditional system of education that was prestigious for its "graduates" especially for boys from rural areas joining a wondering *malam* (Islamic teacher). Boys were paying their *malam* with their work and begging for food (exercising *zakkat*).

extreme poverty while cities turned into enclaves where people could encounter extreme wealth but also extreme misery.

The assumption of national officials was that once the country becomes industrialized, rural areas would follow with economic transformation and development (Badru, 1998: 55). However, Western pop culture and other foreign and luxurious products were still visible only in main cities and became a sign of petrodollars that were accessible only to few.

Even though there were no visible results of the government spending, large-scale projects existed as during the oil boom, filled with optimism Nigerian government started spending money that they borrowed from IMF, WB, and giant Western banks on large-scale projects building freeways, airports, opening programs in education, health care, and welfare services. In addition, all Western organizations were encouraging Nigeria to take loans, as they were also experiencing rapid development and had “petrodollars” to spend, loans were a form of good investments (Dos Santos, 1970).

Examples of those large-scale projects are national investments in rural areas that were mismanaged and not coordinated properly. They were only an excuse for officials to gain additional wealth for personal gain and were not carried with enough professionalism. For example, roads were built with inferior materials in wrong places (Chazan (et al.), 1999: 265). The Green Revolution, which was initiated in early 1980s, only accelerated the decline of the rural areas. This attempt at agricultural revitalization was led by members of the military that were not specialists in agriculture and they saw in these projects possibilities for quick enrichment (Badru, 1998: 55-56).

At the end of 1970s oil prices fell drastically (from \$30 to \$20 per barrel). Of course, it affected Nigeria significantly causing serious economic and social crisis with national debt that surpassed gross domestic product. It was a beginning of the oil bust. However, the government reduced neither national nor the import spending. This resulted in the increase of government deficit and causing problems with the balance of payments. It was a beginning of giant national debts in international banks (Forrest, 1988). The World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) later used those debts as blackmail in order for Nigeria to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Nigeria was in a debt trap.

In addition to the oil bust and increasing unemployment in cities and rural areas, Nigeria was experiencing rough droughts and desertification. This affected significantly already weak production of the agriculture sector of the country (Forrest, 1988). A “rescue” programs were organized in mid-eighties under the name of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) instituted by IMF and WB. This was supposed to assure quick economic rebirth of the country. SAP forced several structural changes in the country subjected to the SAP that were called “conditionalities:”

- (1) Devaluation of local currency and the abolition of foreign exchange control
- (2) Anti-inflationary policies that called for the removal of subsidies on essential items including export of goods; control of bank lending and higher interest rates; elimination of price controls and minimum wages.
- (3) Reduction of state spending on social services (health, education, etc.)
- (4) Trade liberalization – open door policy for investments and import of foreign goods

- (5) Privatization of public enterprises (parastatals) and sale of government shares in private properties
- (6) Open door policy for multinational corporations (including free repatriation of accumulated profits)
- (7) Control and reduction of wage rates
- (8) Raising of taxes

SAPs were a rescue for international banks, not for developing countries. They resulted in the collapse of already weak educational sector, health care sector, and in the further fall in standard of living of the citizens. They did not resolve the problem of debts either (Dos Santos, 1970; Badru, 1998).

Military regimes

Already after six years of independence, democratic Republic of Nigeria experienced its first military coup d'état. From this time on, the military controlled the state¹⁴. Military regimes were controlling civil liberties and political life in the country. The military imposed discipline was only superficial. The military changed its mandate to defend the nation to a mandate whose main function was to promote and protect the political and economic interests of a powerful group of officers. As a result, ethnic clientele and corruption started to be very popular. The ruling class is divided along ethnic, regional, and religious lines (although crosscutting alliances happen to support interests of the elites). After the Biafran, Igbo – Hausa Civil War, most of those officers and presidents were Northern Muslim Fulani-Hausa people (Gordon, 2003: 183).

¹⁴ From the moment of independence in 1960 to 1999, first democratic elections, there was only 10 years of civil government, during the rest of the time Nigeria was ruled by the army

However, with the military rule of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) politicization of religion was forbidden. The result was the loss of control over religious life and politicization of the streets. Ideally, the goal was for every religion and ethnicity to live in peace and harmony, but very often, religious needs of society were expressed not in parliament but on the streets. As was said in earlier part of this chapter, Islam is not only a religion, but also an administrative and judicial system, and as such, it constitutes a political system. Being politically active, it is important for Muslims to have at least some representation in the country's parliament.

To enforce the ruling class, the military and the police forces were strengthened, new equipment were bought. There was a tight relation between the police forces and ruling classes that was helpful during increasing signs of dissatisfaction with the government among the society. Because of corruption, lack of social support, health care, proper education, no civil liberties, and worsening of the economic situation in the country and increasing number of religious groups (Forrest, 1988: 95). The country was in turmoil.

There was an obvious imbalance in the power relations between the state and Islamist movements. Given that the state, which has been under military rule for a long time, tended not to engage in any form of dialogue with perceived Islamic fundamentalists, the chances for confrontation increased. The state's response has been consistently to employ force (Shedrack Best 1999).

Current situation (Western culture and Islam)

Currently, the civilian government rules with the consent of the military. Everything looks as if Nigeria was on the right track to democracy and development of human rights and liberties. However, Nigeria is on the crossroad. In September 1999, Zamfara State

Governor introduced the penal code of Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria. Subsequently eight other northern states followed (Gordon, 2003: 217) even though, as one of the leading Nigerian newspapers wrote:

Punishments such as stoning, flogging or amputation are considered cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by international human rights standards. By ratifying the Convention Against torture in June 2001, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has decided to bind itself not to apply such punishments. Since 2000, amputation and flogging have been carried out in several states of northern Nigeria (Nigeria Today, 2002).

Nevertheless, there is a growing concern among other religious groups in the North and South on this law that is shaking Nigeria to its foundation. The president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who is a Christian Yoruba is against introducing the Shari'ah in the entire country. Ironically, Obasanjo was the one who approved Shari'ah law when he was president under military rule in the late 1970s. Today, Obasanjo says Shari'ah is illegal but has done nothing more than opposing Shari'ah punishments when confronted by the international media during his international trips. Nevertheless, the tensions are growing, both in the country and abroad as Nigeria is subjected to pressures from the international community to solve the "problem with the Islamic law." For instance, recent stoning of several women in Northern Nigeria that were accused of adultery for being pregnant without having a husband, or having sexual relations out of wedlock brought Nigeria negative press. Most known cases that kept international attention were those of Ms. Lawal and Safiya Hussaini.

At the same time, large number of radical Islamic movements and groups emerged, groups like Jamatu Nasril Islam (JNI), Zamfara State Vigilante Group, Ja'amutu Tajdimul Islami (Movement for Islamic Revival), and many others that are supporting the introduction of the Shari'ah as the official law in Northern Nigeria. These are the voices

that are against westernization of social life and acceptance of another form of social, political, and economic structure for Nigeria.

On the other hand there are also protests against the effects of globalization on Nigeria that is described as a form of neo-colonialism. Those are secular protests and have nothing to do with religion but go along with the protests against further impact of West on Nigeria. Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) organized series of meetings about the poverty in Nigerian society. The president of the NLC, Adams Oshiomhole accuses international community that it is helping Nigeria but not in reducing poverty but in “managing” it. His claim is to “create wealth, not manage poverty”(Komolafe, 2002).

Will all religions in Nigeria start working together? Will different ethnicities come up with a compromise and agreement how to live together, or will Nigeria split along one of the fragmentation lines? Will civil liberties be respected in Nigeria? Will the anti-globalization protests work? There are many questions that do not have an answer yet. But we live in transition period of the history that leads to some change and maybe we will be still here to witness it.

Islam, as religion, administrative system, and system of norms and values has a significant capacity to integrate groups and building quite powerful states, such as Kanem-Bornu, Mansa Musa’s Mali, Askia’a Songhay, or Sokoto Caliphate. However, it has also power to destroy current stable systems and introduce chaos and instability, as it is the case with several fundamentalist religious movements that is the subject of this work.

As for now, it is important to know the answers that we can get from analyzing the history. The question is, why those religious fundamentalist movements are needed in

the society and, as a result, so accepted and their ideas so fast internalized? And why are people tended to be attracted to fundamentalist forms of religion? Is it the only way to counteract globalization or neo-colonialism?

CHAPTER V

FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA

In modern times, when changes that emerged with colonialism were the triggers that led to the decomposition of traditional social structures, Islam became the element of reintegration. It was a reintegration not only of people that experienced war or other disasters, but also of individuals that were torn apart from their families, roots, and hometowns (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 226). People experiencing spiritual crisis and disappointment with capitalism turn to an alternative way that the religion of Islam offers. It is a search for a perfect social and political structure. Nowadays, one can observe an intriguing turnover of tendencies; the number of orthodox or even fundamentalist¹ religious movements' supporters seems to increase (Pawlak, 2003). It is a result of raising doubts by nations that are subjected to globalization, doubts about Western values and norms that are so much related to globalization. As a Saudi Arabian ambassador, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan stated: "Foreign imports are nice and shiny or they are high tech "things." But foreign intangible social and political institutions can be deadly" (Barber: 2001, 206).

This thesis aims at developing a theoretical approach analyzing the reasons for the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements. It is a case study, where one movement will be analyzed, a movement called Maitatsine that operated in Northern

¹ We distinguish in this thesis orthodoxy from fundamentalism: orthodox movements operate within the non-Islamic system, while fundamentalist movements reject any non-Islamic systems. For more look Chapter 1.

Nigeria with its apogee of popularity during 1970s – 1980s. This chapter will present an analysis of this movement that will be conducted using the theoretical model developed in second chapter that uses concepts of international division of labor, framing and mobilization process of the social movements, hegemony, and counter hegemony.

As this study is a historical analysis, it will be based on the examination of historical events related to Maitatsine presented in secondary and primary sources. The history of Maitatsine movement is very closely related to the history of Nigeria and the history of Islam in West Africa, this is why during the analysis there will be references to the first chapter of this work where the history of Nigeria and the history of Islam in West Africa were discussed. In this thesis only one movement will be analyzed, even though, many other religious fundamentalist movements tend to have similar patterns. The reader has to remember though that not all the orthodox religious movements are fundamentalist, and as such, not eligible for the analysis proposed in this work. The movement that is the subject of this analysis is a revolutionary movement against the current political, economic, and social system present in the country of the movement's activity or in the entire secular world. The fundamentalist movements argue for the change of the capitalist system. Their goal is to change the system in order to introduce a new one, based on their preferred religion, Islam, especially the core principles of the Shari'ah law. In order to show the differentiation in the Islamic religious movements in Nigeria, several other movements, other than Maitatsine, will be shortly presented in the next section.

In the analysis of the Islamic religious movement, fundamentalist, orthodox, or liberal ones, one has to know and remember that all the movements have wide latitude in

their interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna, and as such, there are no significant barriers in the ideology developed by those movements. The reason for it is the fact that Islamic authority is not unified. There is no institution that would dictate to the Islamic *umma* of the entire world the only valid interpretation of the Koran and Sunna including rules, values, and norms of behavior like it is the case with Christian's Vatican and the person of pope, who is the highest authority in the Christian world. Islamic scholars or religious authorities can only give *fatwa* (advice) (Pawlak, 2003: 156).

Islamic Brotherhoods (orders/tariquas)

In Islam, there are two main approaches to religious life. One is based on interpretations of the Koran and Sunna that are applied to life directly. This approach is used by the *ulamas*, qadi, and theologians. The second approach is represented by the Sufi brotherhoods that are based on the Islamic mysticism. It is characterized by the importance of spiritual life leading to the unification with God. Execution of religious rules is the first step in the path to the unification. It is a very hierarchical structure with leaders of the brotherhood at the top. The leaders are consecrated with the *baraka*, a divine blessing, which allows them to have visions where they see the future and the supernatural world. The brotherhoods leaders were considered saints and were cherished after their death. Their main occupation was, through their work, to plead God for the salvation for "ordinary" people. With the spread of Islam before and after colonialism, brotherhoods took over the role of traditional authorities: promoting agriculture in the countryside, securing social needs to people, and were the connection between the state/colonial authority and the population (Christelow, 1985: 379). Originally, they focused on simple life, modesty, simplicity, and altruism of Mohammed. However,

during colonialism they were made part of the native authority. After independence, brotherhood started to be active in politics of Nigeria (and other states as well). In West Africa, two brotherhoods gained the most popularity: Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya. Qadiriyya was originally an elitist order, accepting only people with Koranic education and from “respected” families. Tijaniyya was a more populist brotherhood gaining more members and becoming a political threat to Qadiriyya. It fired up a conflict that was presented chapter 3. The important thing to notice here is that brotherhoods are blended into the secular system. They have seats in political institutions, and often do not have much in common with the lower class of the society². However, they are among the most liberal religious Islamic organizations in Nigeria.

‘Yan Izala

‘Yan Izala is the name of members of the religious movement called *Gama’at Izalat al Bid’a wa Iqamat as-Sunna* in Arabic meaning “Organization for the Fight against Innovations and for the Strengthening of the Faith.” It is an Islamic movement based on the rules of Wahabbism³. It was established in 1978 by Ismail Idris, but its spiritual founder was Abubakar Gumi, a politician and *ulama* and a professor at the University Bayero in Kano. He was an important figure of the organization *Jama’atu Nasril Islam* (The Community of Islamic Triumph) that was a significant Islamic educational organization founded in 1961, just after Nigeria gained independence. It was concerned with establishing modern Islamic schools (*Islamiyya* Schools) where qualified

² For more reference look in: Loimeier (1997)

³ Wahabbism was originated by Ibn Abd Al Wahhab in 17th century. It calls for the return to the origins of Islam and rejection of all the innovations and new interpretations of the Koran. It rejects the belief in saints and related to it mysticism as derivations of polytheism. It calls for jihad.

teachers taught Arabic language, Islamic knowledge, arithmetic, Hausa, and English (Coulon, 1993: 129).

The development of 'Yan Izala was related to political events in Nigeria. Its popularity increased when the government forbade the existence of political parties. During this period the only way to express political views by the youngsters was through political religious organizations. During the presidential candidacy of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983), who was a Muslim, 'Yan Izala intensified their activity as Abubakar Gumi supported the president, and as a result, the 'Yan Izala movement gained a strong support from the government. During this time, 'Yan Izala started to use more radical methods in their fight for the purity of Islam. Their ideology was basically directed against the Islamic brotherhoods as 'Yan Izala rejected mysticism, the belief in saints, construction of mosques on saint's graves, and miracles that brotherhoods' leaders were capable of, all of which were part of the Sufi's ideology (Loimeier, 1997: 229-231).

Additionally, 'Yan Izala were sponsored by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that were interested in spreading Wahabbism in West Africa, which meant significant supplies of financial support. The financial support led to the development of a significant number of Islamic schools for adult men and women in Northern Nigeria.

'Yan Izala is an example of an orthodox movement that was operating within the political system of the country, and tried to find a way to argue for their ideology through the secular system.

The "Shiite" movement

The Shiite movement is another Islamic political fundamentalist organization with its origins located at university campuses. It originated with Yahaya Al Zakazaki, former

student of Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. During his studies, Zakzaki founded Muslim Student's Society that had a very radical ideology and was often the cause of brutal disturbances and demonstrations.

The movement is incorrectly called by journalists as the Shiite movement. Their roots are strictly Sunni, and the only link with the Shiite Islam is the funding and training that the movement was receiving from Iran, a Shiite state. Zakzaki with others members of the Shiite movement were often guests at conferences in Iran about Islamic rhetoric and revolution. However, with the changes in Iranian politics in 1990s, the Shiite movement decreased significantly its activity.

The ideology of this movement opposes state authority, secular judicial system, and Nigerian constitution. They are also against the Nigerian anthem, and Nigerian national flag (Shedrack Best, 1999). Its ideology is the closest to the one of Maitatsine. However, its members originated mostly from universities in Northern Nigeria, as opposed to the working class or unemployed members of the Maitatsine movement.

The Shiite movement can be considered an Islamic fundamentalist religious movement, even though its members' past was related to the state institutions that they were using during trials in secular court (Shedrack Best, 1999). However, they were protesting against the secular state, and for the establishment of the state based on the Shari'ah law.

There are several other religious groups that emerged in late 1980s. They are mainly student organizations led by matured Islamic *ulamas* that are expressing their dissatisfaction from the politics of the state authority and the economic and political direction that the state is undertaking. However, all those movements, even though they

are orthodox, I would not call them fundamentalist, as they are operating within the political system of the country. The movement that will be analyzed in this thesis nevertheless is a fundamentalist movement that opposed the political, economic, and cultural system of Nigeria and did not want to tolerate any compromise with the capitalist secular political, economic, and cultural system. It is a war over values, culture, and institutions that make up each society.

Structural conditions for the rise of the Maitatsine movement

The fact that Muhammadu Marwa alias Maitatsine managed to create such an influential fundamentalist movement was not only his merit. One would say that along with his charismatic talents and religious attitudes, he came to the right place at the right moment. Situating Maitatsine's movement in the economic, and political reality of the historical period the movement began clearly show the external dynamics that led to the significant popularity of Maitatsine's movement in Northern Nigeria. They are related to the neocolonial economic exploitation of Nigeria by the West along with multinational corporations. Muhammadu Marwa started gathering his disciples in the period of the oil boom at the beginnings of the 1970s. The peak of the popularity of his movement can be dated from 1980 to 1985 when Nigeria was experiencing the oil bust. So, his activity was taking place during the period of transition and instability in Nigeria. In the 1970s' oil boom, when petroleum became the main source of Nigerian income, and the economy started to improve, Nigeria had a chance to enter the path of progress in the hierarchy of international division of labor, to become a semi periphery instead of remaining a periphery state by Wallerstein's (1979, 1980) model of world stratification. Cities opened to increased employment pulling large numbers of immigrants. The role of Nigeria in the

region started to increase, and its military power started to be significant. However, even though the production of the crude petroleum was significant, only a small part of the society was profiting from the governmental/national projects related to oil as the revenues were divided only among the triple alliance formed by the military regime, new bourgeoisie, and the multinational corporations (Evans, 1979). Indeed, governmental spendings were mismanaged (Lubeck, 1981; Abdulraheem (et al.), 1986; Osaghae, 1998), and the rest of the economy sectors were declining, as all the national successful projects were directed only toward the oil industry. Social disparities started to increase rapidly with the raising amount of poor people (Abdulraheem (et al.), 1986).

One can observe this historic period in Nigeria, as process of attaining the next level on the world stratification ladder that was mismanaged by the shortsighted policy making of the State and its relations with the multinational corporations, and the new bourgeoisie in the oil business. Oil businesses, controlled largely by the multinational corporations, showed the continuation of exploitation and expropriation of raw resources of the peripheral Nigeria by the core countries/multinational corporations, like in colonial times. With the entry of multinational corporations, Western culture became widespread with the increasing import of products from the West, especially clothes, western food, pop culture, etc. Barkindo (1993). Western culture coupled with the capitalist system was introducing another system of domination apart from the economic domination: a cultural domination. One can see in this cultural domination Adorno's culture industry hegemony (Adorno, 2002-1). In addition, all Western organizations were encouraging Nigeria to take loans, as they were also experiencing rapid development and had "petrodollars" to

spend, loans were a form of good investments, and at the same time, they were increasing Nigerian dependence (Dos Santos, 1970).

Also, due to the political situation, Nigeria, being a developing country made it easier for Maitatsine to develop, as its social and administrative institutions were not very well developed. The lack of registration of citizens, corruption, and decentralization caused that the state institutions were not very effective in keeping an order in the country. This is when it was easy for an opposition to emerge. With growing disparities, where most wealth was in hands of local elites cooperating with multinational corporations, the ideology, combined with hard economic conditions, chaos in religious administration, and invasion of foreign Western culture resulted in the emergence of a powerful fundamentalist religious movement called Maitatsine. Its ideology was against the ruling elites and the domination of the West.

When the amount of local products significantly decreased with the increase of Western goods' import and agriculture and manufacturing almost disappeared, for the Nigerian population it meant massive migrations from rural areas to cities for employment. It produced a situation, where cities became overcrowded with the increasing number of unemployed and displaced people. But the number of immigrants was still increasing as the cities constituted a promise for a better life: American movies about success, good cars, shops full of products to buy, nice houses, everything around was pulling people into the cities reassuring them that Western consumers goods and culture will provide all the elements necessary for happiness. This is how culture hegemony was blinding the immigrants.

Additionally, with the increase of Western influence the lesser *ulamas* (Islamic scholars) and *almajirai* (Koranic students) were becoming more and more marginalized in big cities. It was a result of the increased migration of *ulamas* and *almajirai* into the cities, and also they were being often replaced in primary schools with secular teachers (Barkindo, 1993: 96). This was something that was not supposed to happen to *ulamas* and *almajirai* after Islamic education⁴ in countries where Islam has almost a status of national religion. Finally, rural areas turned into places of extreme poverty while cities turned into enclaves where people could encounter extreme wealth but also extreme misery. Muhammadu Marwa had a fertile ground in people ready to follow a charismatic leader that would direct their disappointment with western culture that was really unattainable for them. There were many people disillusioned, acknowledging the lack of opportunities for them and at the same time the experiencing the pain from the observation of the extreme wealth and mirages of the “American” dream in television and commercials on the streets that had to remain a dream for the unemployed immigrants. As Maitatsine delivered public sermons, at first many people only listened, still believing that they can make it in the culture industry system. However, with time, and no success, no good job, the number of Maitatsine’s disciples was increasing.

We have described in details how external factors like the international division of labor with its dynamics in the world economy and politics influenced the events on the national level, i.e. demographic migrations, increasing disparities in the cities, and poverty. The fact that Nigeria is a periphery, and was/still is dependent upon the world oil

⁴ A traditional system of education that was prestigious for its “graduates” especially for boys from rural areas was joining a wandering *malam* (Islamic teacher) and walk with him from city to city and listening to *malam*’s lessons. Boys were paying their *malam* with their work and begging for food (exercising *zakkat*). After the “graduation” they could become themselves *malams*, be respected, and improve their living conditions by opening a Koranic school in their home town or becoming member of the town’s council.

market led to the increase in demographic migrations in the country leading in turn to the increase of the population in the city, population that was not able to get a job, so it joined the masses of unemployed groups that were a fertile ground for fundamentalist religious movements like Maitatsine.

The Charismatic leader

Muhammadu Marwa was born in 1920⁵ in Jappai near Marwa in Northern Cameroon. He was a member of the Mofu ethnic group, which was part of the “pagan” group of Kirdi peoples. This group was known for their manufacture of iron products and for their knowledge of herbs, magic, and production of amulets. Marwa also mastered this knowledge, which was useful to him as the leader of the Maitatsine movement (Christelow, 1985: 383).

Until the 19th century Mofu lived in the mountains. However, with French colonization, their policy of land administration, and severe hunger in 1931, the Mofu had to leave the mountains and undertake the practice of the agriculture at meadows. Muhammadu Marwa was among this migration wave. When Muhammadu was 16, he left his family and went to Marwa in Cameroon. Because of the high status of Islam in West Africa. As the Mufu ethnic group was cherishing traditional religions, their status among other ethnic groups was very low. Marwa, who did not want to be laughed at, and wanted to be respected, converted to Islam. Many of his disciples later on also were joining Marwa in order to get respect, as they were the immigrants from distinct ethnic groups in the city. This is where we see that Islam and participation in Islamic religious groups could help. Islam was the integrating element, and an element that was able to increase ones social status.

⁵ However, in his passport, his birthday is in 1927.

Marwa's later ideology was influenced by the fact that he was brought in social mobility up in the region where mahdist traditions were alive. It was a region where Hayatu Ibn Sa'id, member of the Sokoto royal family and a member of the mahdist uprising in Sudan established his camp (Christelow, 1985: 380). In his teachings, Marwa called himself a mahdi, he was supposed to be the last prophet himself. When he lived in Marwa, he worked for a Muslim named Mohammed Arab, who taught him how to read and interpret the Koran. Even though he knew how to read, and even though he was a Muslim already, everybody in Marwa knew that Muhammadu Marwa was from the Mufu group, and thus nobody was respecting him (Zahradeen, 1983)⁶. This made Muhammadu Marwa leave Cameroon and travel to Nigeria. He came to Kano in 1945, as Christelow (1985: 383) states, or in 1955, as Zahradeen states (1983: 19). Kano was at that time the biggest trade and industrial center in the region, as well as the transportation center (Lubeck, 1981: 31). It was inhabited mainly by Muslims and by people with strong connections with the West because of the trade relations.

In early 1960s Marwa started delivering public sermons offending wealthy Hausa people (Zahradeen, 1983). Because of his sermons he was arrested several times and put in prison for a couple of months; first, in 1962 for three months, second in 1974 for a year⁷, and then in 1978 for sermons against the state authority. After his last arrest, he was never seen again preaching publicly. Instead, he was sending his disciples to do it for him. Between 1962 and 1978 Muhammadu Marwa was expelled from Nigeria several times but he was always getting back. Even though he was not popular among the Kano elite or among the authority (that was close to the elite) his popularity among immigrants

⁶ All the details about Muhammadu Marwa come from the Zahradeen book.

⁷ Even though he was sentenced for 10 years. However, after a year of prison, the government changed and the new president, Murtala Muhammad, announced amnesty for the prisoners.

and lower class was increasing. His house became a guarded fortress, and Marwa started to be accompanied always by two bodyguards.

Marwa's income came from his magical and herbal knowledge – he was providing services to those who were able to pay for the service (healing, projecting the future, etc.), and from the money that his disciples were bringing to him⁸. They were getting the money from begging on the streets⁹.

Muhammadu Marwa was preaching in Hausa, as Hausa language was a vehicular means of communication in Kano. However, Marwa was not a Hausa and he never learned how to speak Hausa fluently, he was speaking the “dirty” Hausa, called *gwaranci*, so the Hausa language spoken by the other than Hausa ethnic groups (Pilaszewicz, 1995: 28). It was a derogatory name. Based on the language mistakes that Marwa was committing in his sermons by speaking Hausa, his nickname Maitatsine emerged¹⁰. Marwa used to often repeat one sentence: “The one who does not listen, God will curse.” However, it was consistently repeated with a big mistake, that was saying that God was a woman, which of course could not be possible. Marwa was saying *Wanda ba ta yarda ba Allah ta tsine* whereas it should have been *Wanda bai yarda ba Allah ya tsine*. Based on this sentence he was called Maitatsine: “the one who curses,” but this “one” was a woman, which was derogatory as well. But, his language problems were the reason why Marwa had so much popularity among the immigrants; they knew that he was one of them and that he understood them. And as the immigrants were very numerous in

⁸ Based on the traditional relationship between the *ulama* and *almajirai* (disciples), the disciples were obliged to provide payment for their teacher.

⁹ Giving money to the needing ones is one of the pillars of Islam, so the disciples did not have any problems in getting the money from people, as Kano was inhabited mainly by Muslims

¹⁰ Muhammadu Marwa had also other nicknames, less popular, like Muhammadu Arab, Muhammadu Jabbi, Muhammadu Darka, Muhammadu Mai Tabsiri, or Muhammadu Garka (Falola, 1998: 141).

Kano during the time of the oil boom, and then bust, Maitatsine's fundamentalist religious group gained a significant popularity and had a great men power.

The life of Maitatsine ended rapidly. He died during the first series of riots that he caused. The first riots were directly originated by a letter sent by the governor of Kano, Abubakar Rimi to Maitatsine asking him to remove all the constructions that he and his disciples built illegally in the 'Yan Awaki neighborhood that was occupied entirely by the 'Yan Tatsine. Primary school that was in this neighborhood was transformed by the movement to an additional sleeping place for the members of the movement. All the residents of this neighborhood that were not members of Maitatsine movement were forced to move out, and if they were unwilling to do so, 'Yan Tatsine were using force in order to make them to leave, even some smaller disturbances were provoked during the "moving" sessions when few people were killed. Governor Rimi was receiving many complaints from the displaced residents. However, as Maitatsine was taking care of large parts of the unemployed social groups in Kano and it was shown that many official were bribed by Maitatsine, the movement and Maitatsine himself were left alone. Also, some officials were using Maitatsine's magical services (Nicolas, 1981: 63). So, nothing was done until Maitatsine and his disciples have built some simple constructions (it would be too much to call them "buildings") to accommodate even more 'Yan Tatsine in the 'Yan Awaki neighborhood and did not ask for the permission of the city.

Muhammadu Marwa died 27th of December 1980. Soldiers then cremated his body and spread ashes near his grave in Yanguza village near Kano, or in Ringiyar Zaki (Christelow, 1985). This act was supposed to avoid pilgrimages of his disciples to his grave, which could have provoked further riots (riots did not stop anyway until 1985).

After this event, all of his disciples were forced to escape from the 'Yan Awaki neighborhood where the Maitatsine movement was located. The life of Muhammadu Marwa alias Maitatsine was over, but the Maitatsine fundamentalist religious movement continued to exist and the riots spread to the entire Northern Nigeria.

The riots that started when Marwa was still alive lasted nine days, from the 20th to the 29th of December. The police could not pacify them. It is the army, sent to help the police on the 28th, which managed to take the control over the dissatisfied mob. After those nine days of disturbances, 4,177 people were declared dead (Zahradeen, 1988). However, Maitatsine riots were not over. They started again in October of 1982 in Bulumkutu, near Maiduguri in the state of Borno, and in Kaduna and Rigasa, then in February of 1984 in Yola. Last significant Maitatsine riots took place in April of 1985 in Gombe (Isichei, 1987; Hiskett, 1987; Pilaszewicz, 1955; Zahradeen, 1983,1988).

Mobilization

Maitatsine based his ideology on the displaced people. It was movement of the "disinherited" as Elisabeth Isichei (1987) called it. They were the disinherited from their hometown, as they were immigrants, and disinherited from the city, as they could not find any work that would realize their dreams of wealth and consumer goods that were so present in the city of Kano. In 1980 the number of Maitatsine disciples was estimated as 6-10 thousand people (sic!), and 80% of them came from other cities than Kano, 20% of his disciples were foreigners¹¹ (Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances: 24). The immigrants came to Kano from different countries like Ghana, Niger, Benin, Chad, Togo, Ivory Coast, and like Maitatsine himself Cameroon (Bentsi-Enchill, 1983:

¹¹ It was difficult to establish the exact number of the 'Yan Tatsine as many of them did not have any identification documents.

245). Another group that was vulnerable were the seasonal immigrants migrating to big cities during dry seasons to earn some money, as there was no work during this period in the countryside. They were called the *'yan cin rani* (those who eat during the dry season) (Christelow, 1985: 213). Part of his disciples constituted also young Koranic students, *almajirai*, who treated Maitatsine as their mentor. When Maitatsine stopped showing up in public after his third arrest, his *almajirai* took over the public sermons and the recruitment process. They were lost, poor and already knew that there are not many possibilities for them to get a job, however they were saw wealth around them and the Western culture associated with money. Marwa provided them with psychological and material support and showed them a way to direct their anger.

Depicting Maitatsine's disciples shows clearly that all three functions of social movements: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational suggested by David Snow and Robert Benford (1988, 1992) were granted. People that were joining Maitatsine already felt some degree of dissatisfaction resulted from their economic position in the society, as that they could not find any good job as they were expecting arriving to Kano. It was not difficult for Marwa to persuade his followers that there is something wrong going on for them, as his ideology was aligned between what his audience already knew, felt, or had experienced; his ideology covered familiar ground. This is how he "fulfilled" the diagnostic function of the social movement. Also, with the use of the authority of Islam and adequate interpretations, Marwa was able to show his disciples a solution to their problems, which included following the path of Islam, basically meaning to follow his word as he claimed to be the next prophet. The followers, thanks to Maitatsine's charisma and the authority of Islam felt that Marwa knew how to "fix" the situation and how to

provide them with answers and solutions, they felt that the best thing that they could do was to follow Maitatsine, as he was the next prophet. This is how both prognostic and motivational functions were also fulfilled.

Maitatsine recruited his followers from railway stations and bus stations where young people were arriving from the countryside or other countries and staying there, as they had nowhere else to go. He, and later his trained disciples were delivering public sermons getting attention from those who were frustrated with social inequalities, unequal distribution of wealth in the city and lack of opportunities for the *gardawa* (“ordinary” people). An individual, migrating from home in the countryside toward the city where he/she was encountering a dazzling consumerist culture from the West but is not able to reach it and grab it experienced a crisis - ideological, moral, existential, and material one. The collapse of the traditional structures and beliefs was often leading to find a new identity in Islam that was giving an opportunity to reintegrate to a social movement that was providing prestige related to religion, prestige that otherwise would be unattainable (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 226). This is the moment when the grievance and dissatisfaction of immigrants was emerging. This was the moment when the immigrants, future Maitatsine’s disciples were ready to enter a social movement, that in this case, was a fundamentalist religious movement and internalize a new counter hegemony of religious fundamentalism.

In Islamic fundamentalist religious movements, religious solidarity and common purpose is set, in most of the cases, by the leaders of these movements. Maitatsine, as the leader of the movement created a point of reference for his disciples that were often people without any chances of success in life, and without any material property. He first

provided them with food, shelter, and psychological support. They found in the movement psychological and material shelter, support, and a feeling of security (Hiskett 1987, Isichei 1987, Pilaszewicz 1995). Those were the first steps of framing: ideological, psychological, and material support. Marwa formed the agency and identity present in social movements, relating his ideology to Islam, and using the strong feeling of grievance among the “disinherited.”

The Role of the State

Movements like Maitatsine oppose with their counter hegemony the state authority and foreign hegemony, but they also replace the state in social support, when national social institutions are weak or hardly function or exist. In Nigeria, even though state resembled the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, which was part of the triple alliance. However, with weak civil society, weak private sector, the state was unable to push the country toward further development of social support and infrastructure. In this respect, Nigerian state can be viewed as weak. For example, one of the arguments put forward to explain why the Nigerian government did not do anything to stop the activity of Maitatsine was that this religious movement took care of the problem of unemployed immigrants in the cities, however, as the events showed not for long and with unwanted consequences (Christelow 1985). We can see here the role of the state increasing the popularity of Maitatsine. Because of the fact that the government had weak social institutions, related and concerned only with the bourgeoisie, other alternatives had to emerge. A taxi driver, asked why people join Islamic fundamentalists answered:

When people are treated like animals, social institutions are corrupted, one can get arrested for nothing, get bitten for nothing it would be enough to tell people where the Fundamentalists are located and many would follow them (Pawlak, 2003: 153).

It follows what a sociologist, Donald Crumsey (1970) said:

For popular violence arises in situations, where states claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and direct it against the people. Most popular violence is a response to state or ruling-class violence (Crumsey, 1970: 1).

By filling up the gap of social support for the groups of unemployed in the city of Kano and supporting it with oppositional religious ideology, Maitatsine created a very strong and dangerous social movement for the city authorities. It had a very strong mobilization model (Tilly, 1978), as social movements theorists would see it. It had a very strong organization with a very strong collective identity based on religious ideology and common experiences of deprivation and strong feelings of grievance. Islam, having a hierarchical structure enabled it to create such a construction of the Maitatsine movement that was able to mobilize resources under the form of disciples in very structured and effective way. Maitatsine's disciples were giving public sermons that were part of the recruitment process. They were also providing shelter, food, and psychological support to new potential 'Yan Tatsine (disciples of Maitatsine). Maitatsine with all his disciples were living in a neighborhood in Kano called 'Yan Awaki. In 1979 (the peak of its popularity was in 1980) the entire neighborhood, couple of blocks, was occupied by the 'Yan Tatsine. Also, thanks to the structure of the relationship between the teacher and student in Islam, Maitatsine did not have to worry about the financial resources of his movement, his disciples had to provide him, as the teacher with financial support for his mentoring and teachings. The disciples, as it was mentioned, were getting the money from begging on the streets, and from part time jobs that they were able to find. All the riots that were caused by Maitatsine proved that the movement was very strong, and well organized. Also, with the rule of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) politicization of religion was forbidden. The result of this decision was the loss of control over religious life and

politicization of the streets. Finally, with the increasing population in Kano, unregulated laws about preachers, what they were allowed and not allowed to do or preach, Maitatsine movement had all the political, economic, social opportunities to become a strong social movement that many other social movements never had.

Resistance

Maitatsine's ideology, based on Islamic fundamentalism, was a counter hegemony that fought against the domination of the West and related to the West local elites. He saw the economic domination of the West, but also the culture industry that expanded in the non-western countries. As a revolutionary movement, Maitatsine wanted to break the domination of the self by following the strict rules of religion and not those of capitalist profit making system. And finally, he wanted to break the economic domination of the West by attacking and destroying their symbols (cars, watches, plastic products), strategic buildings (police stations, town hall) and by constituting their own public and administrative system. Maitatsine wanted to break all three modes of domination distinguished by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeheimer (2002a): social domination, internal domination, and domination of nature.

Maitatsine was also against the Islamic Sufi brotherhoods as they were part of the corrupted system and did not practice the "true" Islam by the fact that they worshipped saints, which is part of the traditional African beliefs (Islam however is also based on traditional nomadic beliefs and customs). The attitude of 'Yan tatsine toward the tariquas was the fact that the riots in 1980 started two days before the anniversary of the Tijaniyya founder, one of the main tariquas in Kano, Sidi Ahmad Al Tijani. The celebrations of this anniversary constitute an important event in the Tijanniya religious calendar (Christelow,

1985: 376). The tariqas were identified with the state authority that in turn was related to the West, and as such they were part of the system that needed to be boycotted by Maitatsine. And Muhammadu Marwa was attacking, in his sermons, literally everything that was part of Western culture including watches, bikes, tobacco, and even plastic bags (Christelow, 1987: 217-221). A Hausa newspaper, *Maganar Kano* (The Kano Voice) was reporting¹²:

When they were preaching, they were repeating all the time that every Muslim in the city must get rid of watches, glasses, or any jewelry. They claimed that Muslims should not travel by plane or carry more than 10 Naira [Nigeria currency] (after Pilaszewicz, 1995: 30)

Cultural and linguistic diversity in Nigeria allowed the British during colonialism to impose a policy of “divide and rule” that saved them significantly colonial expenses. Reinforced ethnic rivalries created alienation and animosity among different ethnic groups (Badru, 1998: 70).

Muhammadu Marwa was stating that his entire ideology came from the interpretation of the Koran. One has to know that next to the direct interpretations of the Koran, there were the secret meanings (*badini*) of each verse, words, or even individual letters, so the number of interpretations could be unlimited and each fragment of the Koran could have many different meanings (Hiskett, 1987: 218). Additionally, Maitatsine rejected the Sunna and the Hadiths that are the sayings of the prophet Mohammed. He stated that reading any other book than Koran is an offense to Islam (Kastflet, 1989: 83).

Muhammadu Marwa also exchanged the name of the prophet Mohammed by his own name (what was not difficult, as they both had the same first name) and named himself the next prophet. As the prophet, he required from his disciples total obedience.

¹² Muhammadu Marwa did not leave any written sermons nor documents with his ideology, so the only sources that are available are those from newspapers and from the ‘Yan Tatsine testimonies.

He claimed that his purpose was to cleanse the Islamic religion of materialism and to purify its religious practices (Okoli, 1982). However, in his practice, Maitatsine himself was using elements from the Mufu traditions, like: hypnosis, use of amulets, and herbs.

As we argued earlier, fundamentalist religious movements, being revolutionary movements fight with their ideology against cultural dependency, against the Western culture industry. They are supposed to be social movements fighting for the liberation of the society from any ideological dependencies. However, as we mentioned already, one can observe at the Maitatsine example, fundamentalist religious movements were introducing and indoctrinating their followers into another form of hegemony, counter hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism. Before entering the movement of Maitatsine, his future disciples were internalizing the standards of Western culture present in the cities, trying to gain as much material consumer goods as possible. In the cities, lost migrants were forgetting about their traditions and culture, becoming a shell filled only with materialistic needs able only to consume and survive. They were becoming human shells filled with culture industry, a result of removal of the traditional culture and efforts to assimilate to the new environment of the city. Charismatic Muhammadu Marwa, thanks to the intelligent framing and mobilizing process captured, those who tried to live up to western standards in African reality but could not and were often left the only possibility to beg in order to survive. They were then indoctrinated and converted to new counter hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism with traditional elements (that is hypocritical from the very beginning). The entire process of the establishment of the new hegemony composed with three stages: universalization, rationalization, and naturalization

(Litowitz, 2000). were processed in Maitatsine movement. He managed to persuade his followers to the rightness and obviousness of his ideology.

However, as it was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there exist no institution that could dictate the unique interpretation of Koran, so if somebody is persuasive enough, he can get acceptance like Maitatsine did, without any judicial or excommunicating consequences.

The popularity of the Maitatsine religious movement decreased significantly after the last riots in 1985. One can still encounter some smaller disturbances in Nigeria where the 'Yan Tatsine are blamed. However, currently, there are larger and more significant fundamentalist religious movements that emerged after Maitatsine.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

My research will contribute to the level of knowledge that social science has about fundamentalist religious movements by developing a new theoretical approach that will exhaustively analyze the emergence and functioning of Islamic religious movements. This research is important because, especially nowadays one hears of anti-globalization protests arguing that the superpowers like United States (nowadays the only superpower in the world) cultivate and provoke the hatred it experiences from other nations (in present times, Islamic Nations), but nobody really explained what are the reasons of this phenomenon. My research might document the source of part of that hatred, and maybe the beginning for a dialogue based on understanding between the two sides.

This knowledge could allow change of attitudes and thus maybe based on the theoretical approaches we could take action to decrease the amount of religious fundamentalist movements, not only Islamic ones, and to make us aware of the consequences of globalization. As Barber (1992) concluded the conflict between globalization and religious fundamentalism: "Neither McWorld nor Jihad is remotely democratic in impulse. Neither needs democracy and neither promotes democracy." So, how fundamentalist religious movements emerge? What is the favorable environment for the emergence of this kind of movement, and how the "free world" of capitalist system influences those movements? The new theoretical approach presented in this thesis will be able to answer those questions.

Maitatsine movement emerged in a peripheral country during the oil boom and then bust of 1970s and then 1980s, when a lot of people migrated to cities believing the great opportunities from the time of oil boom still existed. However, the cities had already a high rate of unemployment and did not need a supplementary work force. Additionally, with growing economic disparities, most wealth was in hands of local elites cooperating with multinational corporations. The analysis of Maitatsine presented in this thesis showed that followers of the religious fundamentalist movements tend to be people that did not find their place in the dominant culture, which facilitated them seeing the injustice and “true face” of Western exploitation. In the case of Maitatsine, they were displaced, foreigners, unemployed, poor people that could not identify with the dominant ideology and they were captured by the religious leaders in the moment of insecurity, hesitation, and doubting that were easy to mobilize into religious movement. One of the social movement theorists, Edward Shils (quoted in Buechler and Cylke, 1956: 156), states that the extremists/fundamentalists must be deeply alienated from the complex of rules, which keep the strivings for various values in restraint and balance. We elaborated in this thesis that many followers of religious movements come from a lower class of the society (in many cases, from the lowest possible one)¹.

The analysis of the external factors showed that the position of a country in the international division of labor system with its economic and political consequences influence the emergence of religious fundamentalist movements. During economic crisis or war, when the future is uncertain and many people lose their jobs, the poverty rate is getting higher and the state is not able to provide social support to its society, fundamentalist religious movements occur. People start to look for explanations of their

¹ However, there exist orthodox movements that include mainly educated people from higher social classes

situation and start looking for the shelter and security religious movements provide (Isichei 1987; Hiskett 1987). This is the moment when people start to see the injustice and feel grievance, which is the first steps toward mobilizing a new social movement.

While the state can prevent the emergence of new movements, we showed in this thesis that it would not do it. We showed the significance of the role of the state in the emergence of religious fundamentalist movement. As these movements tend to emerge in countries where states are weak and involved in the triple alliance with the multinational corporations and newly emerged bourgeoisie, and as such they are not interested much in the prosperity of its population. This fact gives fundamentalist movements one more advantages as they provide the social support that the state fails to provide.

Thus religious ideology, combined with hard economic conditions, chaos in religious administration, (the conflict between brotherhoods), and invasion of foreign, Western culture resulted in the emergence of a powerful fundamentalist religious movement against the ruling elites and the domination of the West. This picture pointed out the conflict between the hegemony of the culture industry and the emergence of the counter hegemony of the Maitatsine's Islamic fundamentalism. Thanks to the understanding of external influences, we managed to see what made people be dissatisfied enough to join a very structured religious movement.

As people are affected by external factors, there is a need for a leader with an ideology to lead them and unify them. Here, we showed the use of social movement theories where David Snow and Robert Benford (1988, 1992) pointed out the necessity for frames that have to grant “diagnostic,” “prognostic,” and “motivational” functions. In case of Maitatsine, Muhammadu Marwa pointed out the problem of Nigerian society

related to western domination, showed solving this problem by rejecting any elements of western culture, and following the norms and values of Islam. Finally, as religion offers both organizational and cultural resources to facilitate mobilization and helps achieve at least some success (Smith, 1996; Williams 1994), Islam served also a motivational function². Also, as the agency and identity of the religious movement were closely related to religious ideology of the religious leader, with three components of mobilization and framing satisfied (feeling of injustice, agency, and identity) it was very easy for Muhammadu Marwa to create a strong religious movement and to lead his followers wherever he wanted to what led to catastrophic consequences. However, as we saw, social movement theories were not able to analyze the change that fundamentalist religious movements' disciples, as Maitatsine's ones, had to undertake switching from western culture hegemony to religious ideology. This is where we saw the need to introduce the Antonio Gramsci's concept of counter hegemony (Gramsci, 2000). The three necessary functions of social movements, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational ones were perceived in our analysis as part of the establishment by the movement's leader of the counter hegemony.

From the analysis of the Maitatsine movement, one could observe that the counter hegemony does not have any chances to succeed if the original hegemonic system provides some kinds of satisfaction to the individuals. If the individuals have at least some satisfaction with the current hegemonic system, they will not be willing to make

² The success of Islam in African societies is related to several factors. It is an entire system that reintegrates individuals torn away from their roots. It is related to the feeling of superiority over other social groups and feeling of brotherhood among Muslims, and finally, it suggests new beliefs, norms, and values without the need to reject the old ones – in contrary to Christianity (Piłaszewicz, 2000: 239). Additionally, as it does not have any unique valid rules and norms, it can be adjusted along the ideology of the charismatic religious leader.

any efforts in order to make a change. This is why in order for a social movement to emerge some degree of grievance is necessary. Disciples of Maitatsine were believing and living under the culture industry hegemony, as they moved from their home towns, forced by the hard economic conditions caused by the dynamics in the world system, in order to encounter a better life that culture industry was supposed to provide. However, when they did not succeed, dissatisfaction emerged and they became easy souls to the counter hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism represented by Maitatsine.

Toyin Falola (1998) states that:

Islamic preachers and teachers present Islam as a coherent worldview that protects its followers from moral decadency, corrosion brought by industrialization, and political errors. Islam continues to spread, making most of the mass media to reach old and new members (Falola, 1998: 31).

However, what form will these teachings take? Will the Islamic organizations liberal, orthodox, or fundamentalist? Unfortunately, nobody knows the answer to that question. However, hopefully, this case study will create a fundament for a wider understanding of the emergence and popularity of Islamic, Christian, and other fundamentalisms in the world.

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