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Hugues Canuel

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Canadian Civil-Military Relations in the Early "Command Era," 1945-1955

Forging a Normative Prescription Through Rational Analysis

HUGUES CANUEL

Abstract: This study challenges the classic view of Canadian civil-military relations (CMR) during the early Cold War as a period of congruence in contrast to the subsequent crises of the early 1960s. Framing the period within Peter Feaver's Agency Theory shows that CMR vacillated through post-war demobilisation and Cold War rearmament, laying the seeds of the more well-known confrontations of the Diefenbaker and Hellyer years. Leveraging this historical case allows one to lay the foundation of a normative prescription for the conduct of CMR as relevant to the particular context of the Cold War as to that of the complex circumstances that Canada faces today.

CANADIAN SCHOLAR DOUGLAS Bland labelled the first two decades of the Cold War the "command era" in his 1987 seminal study *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada.*[1] Some recall these years with nostalgia given the seeming entente between the political class and the military leadership that allowed this middle power to achieve a great deal on the international scene despite the

[1] Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947–1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Co, 1987), 1.

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recent postwar demobilisation.[2] Through the 1950s, Canada grew its armed forces from 30,000 to 120,000 regulars, fought a hot war in Korea, deployed a standing garrison to Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), joined the North American Air Defence (NORAD) umbrella, led the United Nations' first large peacekeeping mission in the wake of the Suez Crisis, all the while developing massive infrastructures on its home soil to support an unprecedented peacetime mobilisation.[3] This stands in sharp contrast to the "Management Era", deemed to have taken hold in 1964, sublimating the previous harmony through controversial innovations, the most well-known being Defence Minister Paul Hellyer's plan to first integrate and then unify Canada's three fighting services.[4] In Bland's view, the politician left his successors with "... an organization in great confusion, a military profession unsure of its values, its history, or its future, and with the old problems still firmly in place."[5]

While an indictment of Hellyer the minister, this last statement also intimates that not all was well prior to 1964. The government of Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker had fallen to the Liberals of Lester Pearson in 1963 largely as a result of its inability to resolve defence dilemmas since taking power in 1957.[6] Neither Pearson nor Hellyer intended for such a fate to befall them and many observers have since linked unification to problems that

[2] See, among others, George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 387–415; Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999), 232–242; and J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004), 15–16.

[3] Douglas Bland, "Military Command in Canada," in Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2000), 125; and Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*, 4–5.

[4] Daniel Gosselin, "The Storm over Unification of the Armed Forces: A Crisis of Canadian Civil-Military Relations," in *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to the Present* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2007), 309–344; and Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 247–254.

[5] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 53.

[6] Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 26–27; J. L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957–1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), 220.

arose under Diefenbaker.[7] But several of these issues were in fact rooted in the legacy inherited from the previous Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent. It is this author's contention that, despite the operational successes of the Canadian military and the apparent harmony of purpose between the political class and the officer corps during the early command era, civil-military relations (CMR) in Canada actually vacillated through these years, leading to the crises that would follow.

This article will show that fluctuations closely matched the varying involvement of political authorities in defence matters while the professional outlook of military leaders remained a constant. This pattern lends itself particularly well to an analysis using the principal-agent framework proposed by Duke University professor Peter Feaver for the purpose of tracing the evolution of relations between these actors.[8] Such an exercise will not only shed light on a period less scrutinised than that of the Management Era but allow formulating a normative element of relevance to twenty-first century civil-military relations in Canada. To do so, the text will look at the varying friction between political leaders and military chiefs over the course of two successive periods, commencing with the uncertainties of the immediate post-war years, then the seeming clarity of the Cold War buildup, before attempting to draw some prescriptive insights from these events. First though, Feaver's Agency Theory will be discussed at greater length.

AGENCY THEORY

A recognised scholar of civil-military relations,[9] Peter Feaver joined a body of authors in the mid-1990s who expressed concerns about

[7] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 35–36; Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada, 1964–1972, Wellesley Paper 3/1973* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 18–19; and R.L. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification, 1964–1968* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982), 2–15.

[8] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

[9] A professor of political science and public policy at Duke University since 2003, Peter D. Feaver completed a PhD in Political Science at Harvard in 1990 and served in government twice, during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. He was also an officer in the United States Navy Reserves through the 1990s. Feaver writes about civil-military relations, security studies, and nuclear weapons. His academic resume can be found at https://fds.duke.edu/db/aas/PoliticalScience/faculty/pfeaver/files/CV.pdf.

a burgeoning crisis in the realm of CMR, particularly in the United States.[10] Seeking to understand these tensions caused many authors to question the fundamentals of civil-military theory as the discipline looked underdeveloped and outdated, relying excessively on the works of early Cold War theorists such as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.[11] Feaver took particular exception to the former's prescriptive norm centred on the exercise of 'objective control' requiring that politicians concern themselves only with matters of policy and grand strategy while the military focused on operational and tactical matters. For the civilians to violate this divide would amount to 'subjective control', an encroachment detrimental to military effectiveness likely to lead to the politicisation of the officer corps.[12]

Feaver proposes, instead, a rationalist framework rooted in microeconomic game theory: "The principal-agent framework is designed to explore problems of agency, how political or economic actors in a superior position (principals) control the behavior of ... actors in a subordinate position (agents)."[13] In pecuniary terms, the principal wishes to extract the maximum effort from the agent at a minimum cost; the agent, on the other hand, hopes to get away with the greatest reward for the least work. This proposition translates into a strategic interaction within a hierarchical relation in CMR terms:

> [T]he civilian principal contracts with the military agent to develop the ability to use force in defence of the civilian's interests. Once the contract is established, the civilian principal seeks to ensure that the military agent does what civilians want while minimising the dangers associated with a delegation of power... The optimal mix of monitoring mechanisms is the one that minimises the incentives and opportunity

[10] Among others, see Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* 22, no. 4 (Winter, 1992–1993), 2–20; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* 35 (Spring, 1994), 3–17; and Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (1998), 375–388.

[11] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).

[12] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 80–85. For a succinct yet thorough introduction to Huntington's overarching theory, see Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 225–229.

[13] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 12.

for the agent to flout the principal's wishes, at the least cost to the principal and while preserving the efficiencies of specialisation that come with delegation.[14]

Agency Theory posits that the military—the agent—will either 'work' or 'shirk' in discharging its end of the contract. It is regrettable that these terms may imply notions of diligence and indolence as Feaver uses them in quite a different way: "Working is doing things the way civilians want, and shirking is doing things the way those in the military want."[15] In other words, "... working involves a good faith effort to represent the principal's interests... the ideal conduct that the agent would perform *if* the principal had full knowledge of what the agent could do and was in fact doing [emphasis in original]."[16] Shirking, as put by another author, "... occurs when the military either fails to diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asks, or does what the civilian asks in a manner which undercuts the civilian's position of greater authority."[17] The resulting construct involves two cost-related variables: how intrusively will the principal monitor the agent's actions—key here is that such ancillary mechanisms have costs attached to them in terms of time, resources, and potentially unproductive friction – and whether the agent will deem the risk of getting caught shirking acceptable and the punishment tolerable.[18] These calculations may result in four outcomes as illustrated below:

	Military Works	Military Shirks
Civilian Intrusive	1	2
Civilian Non-Intrusive	3	4

1. Civilians monitor intrusively and military works (Huntington's subjective control).
2. Civilians monitor intrusively and military shirks (Dysfunctional CMR).

[14] Ibid., 57.
[15] Ibid., 60.
[16] Ibid., 60–61.
[17] Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," *Policy and Management Review* 2, no. 2 (2002), 9.
[18] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 100–102.

3. Civilians monitor non-intrusively and military works (Huntington's objective control).
4. Civilians monitor non-intrusively and military shirks (Laswell's garrison state).[19]

The concept is not without its critics.[20] The model may be deemed overly simplistic due to its linear and binary nature and it evacuates any moral dimension from the concept of military professionalism. For political scientist and military historian Andrew Bacevich, the recourse to an agency framework reveals "...confusion over what it is we want in a civil-military relationship. Peter Feaver dodges the question altogether, content to devise a theory that does not speak to the normative question."[21] Nevertheless, these same shortcomings may commend Agency Theory for the study of CMR in Canada during the period in question. The dearth of check-and-balance mechanisms within the Canadian defence policy-making apparatus at the time, at least when compared with the more complex US system, should prove suitable to a binary analysis where cabinet plays the role of principal and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) that of agent. Neither of these bodies achieved decisions without acrimonious internal debates but both of them presented fairly unanimous views

[19] Concerned with the potential for strategic bombing to dominate warfare in the future, requiring the mobilisation of entire societies on a permanent war footing, Yale political scientist Harold Laswell published in 1941 an influential article considering "... the possibility that we are moving toward a world of 'garrison states'—a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society." Though dated, this concept would be revisited in the United States whenever the military seemed to grow overly prominent such as at the height of the Cold War and during the post-9/11 decade. Harold D. Laswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (January, 1941), 455–468.

[20] For such critical views, see James Burk, "The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber," *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 3 (Spring, 1998), 459; and Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress* (London: Routledge, 2006), 206.

[21] Andrew J. Bacevich, "Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver," *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 3 (Spring, 1998), 452. For a rebuttal, see Peter D. Feaver, "Modeling Civil-Military Relations: A Reply to Burk and Bacevich," *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 4 (Summer, 1998), 595–602.

after such discussions.[22] One will also note the remarkable similarity in professional experience of the few officers that made up the membership of the COSC during these years.[23] The stability in the composition of the agent makes changes in the views and actions of the principal the key independent variable over time, facilitating the application of the theorem even further. Lastly, Feaver's very refusal to formulate normative pronouncements in his study of American CMR—what *ought* to be done—leaves much room to build on a rationalist study of this historical case to draw some inferences relevant to the conduct of civil-military relations in Canada today.

DEBOBILISATION

Following victory over the Axis powers, Canada set about returning to its traditional peacetime footing. Cabinet summarily dismissed the chiefs of staff's ambitious plans for large standing forces and imposed a return to a small professional body geared toward supporting

[22] Colonel R.L. Raymont was employed as Executive Staff Officer to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1951 to 1964 and then retained in the same role under the newly created position of Chief of Defence Staff from 1964 to 1968. He later stated that "... (a)s far as the writer recalls there have been only four occasions when the Chiefs of Staff failed to agree on any matters put before them." R. L. Raymont, *The Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence, 1945–1968: Report to the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces*, Directorate of History and Heritage 87/47, 30 November 1979, Appendix A, 20.

[23] General Charles Foulkes was a member throughout these years, first as chief of the General Staff (Commander of the Army) from 1945 to 1951 then assuming the position of Chairman (CCOS) and passing his army responsibilities to Guy Simmonds for the remainder of the period; only two chiefs of the Air Staff (Air Marshals Leckie then Curtis) and two chiefs of the Naval Staff (Vice Admirals Grant then Mainguy) sat in between 1947 and 1955. Dr. Omond Solandt would also become a permanent member upon his appointment as the first chairman of the Defence Research Board in 1947, a position he retained until 1956 and equivalent in status and authority as that of a military chief of staff. Jason S. Ridler, "Omond Solandt: Scientific Renaissance Man," *INFOR (Information Systems and Operational Research)* 46, no. 4 (November, 2008), 227–228.

national mobilisation were some future conflict to reoccur.[24] The principal had, thus, confirmed its leading role in formulating defence policy. Cabinet was selected as the principal for the purpose of this paper since such matters are "... executive prerogatives of the Crown, the sovereign power that nearly always act on the advice of those members of Parliament who form the governing cabinet."[25] The role of the larger Parliament is that of approving expenditures, a powerful lever but largely circumscribed by party discipline when put to a vote in the House of Commons under the Westminster system.

In fact, the principal could be narrowed down to the person of the prime minister given the sweeping executive powers the individual holds when compared to the American president, especially when controlling a majority of the seats in Parliament. Nevertheless, it is recognised that major decisions are debated and shaped in cabinet as the prime minister typically seeks consensus among colleagues in support of any given policy.[26] Within this circle during the period in question, the minister of national defence (MND) played an active role in shepherding military issues along, those having been first considered in greater details within the Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC). Stood up in August 1945 to replace the Cabinet War Committee, it was unprecedented as a peacetime institution, showing the continued interest of the political class in military affairs, especially as Prime Minister Mackenzie King himself assumed the chairmanship, a practice which would continue under his successor Louis St. Laurent.[27]

[24] This dramatic development is best summarised by Morton: "The navy asked for a task force with 2 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, and 20,000 men. The army's Plan G called for 55,788 regulars, 155,396 in the reserves, and a 'training force' of 48,500 based on compulsory service. The RCAF proposals for 30,000 in a permanent force, 15,000 in auxiliary squadrons, and 50,000 in reserve sounded almost modest. Government response was frosty. The army's yearning for conscription, declared Mackenzie King, was 'perfectly outrageous.' The RCN's plan was cut in half; the army was lucky to be allowed 25,000 regulars and the RCAF would have to be content with 16,000." Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 227. For a more extensive discussion, see James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada—Volume III—Peacemaking Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1972), 77–88.

[25] Philippe Lagassé, "Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight," *IRPP Study* 4 (March, 2010), 6.

[26] J.E. Hodgetts, "Cabinet," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified 14 March 2014, available: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/cabinet/.

[27] Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 107–109; and Raymont, *The Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence*, 9.

The COSC acted as agent within the meaning of Agency Theory. A loose Joint Staff Committee (JSC) had been formed in the late 1920s to coordinate the three services but it had neither collective authority nor a chairman with overriding powers.[28] Renamed the Chiefs of Staff Committee in January 1939, this body endured through the Second World War but effected little synchronisation of the armed forces. The army, navy and air force fought three separate service campaigns within the larger allied strategy, and then eyed each other warily during the uncertainties of peacetime demobilisation.[29] Brooke Claxton, appointed MND on 12 December 1946, played a pivotal role in invigorating the COSC.[30] Membership was consolidated into four principals: the chief of the general staff (commander of the army), the chiefs of the naval and the air staffs, and the chairman of the Defence Research Board, a senior defence scientist.

Attendance was regularly augmented with the department's deputy minister, the undersecretary for external affairs, the deputy minister of finance and the secretary of the cabinet.[31] The position of chairman did not exist but Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, in view of his seniority in rank, continued the wartime practice of acting as de facto chair.[32] Although the right of service chiefs to meet with the minister individually remained in place, Claxton sought to establish the COSC as the source of collective military advice to the minister in response to government priorities and objectives, as outlined in the committee's revised terms of reference promulgated on 30 June 1947:

> To advise the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet Defence Committee on matters of defence policy and to prepare strategic appreciations and military plans as required. To be responsible for coordinating the efforts of the Armed Services in fulfilment of a single

[28] Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Brown Book, 1995), 32–33; and C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945* (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), 69.

[29] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 40–42; and Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government*, 108–109 and 128–129.

[30] Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1889-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 155.

[31] Raymont, *The Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence*, 25; and Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 114.

[32] Kronenberg, *All Together Now*, 11; and Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government*, 126.

> defence policy ... To investigate and consider in common all matters which may be referred to the Committee by the ministers or the Cabinet Defence Committee.[33]

Thus, as noted by his biographer, Claxton sought to establish the COSC as an important body in the execution of defence policy but also carefully circumscribed its relation to government: "Henceforth, the service chiefs would report to the CDC through Claxton; he would decide what would go forward and what would not."[34] In this sense, the principal obtained the means to intrusively monitor the performance of the agent in response to cabinet directions. Such close control of the defence agenda was required as the prime minister had assigned the MND a strict mandate of peacetime consolidation and drastic reduction of expenditures.[35] Claxton was leery of the support he would get from the chiefs in this endeavour, noting in his memoirs that military planners "... live and work without regards for the facts of national life. Unless they are very closely supervised, they are apt to draw up plans that are utterly unrealistic and impossible of fulfilment."[36]

The challenge was compounded as the minister sought to formulate a lasting postwar defence policy. Shaping an independent position within the nascent East-West confrontation would prove challenging but Claxton carried this through, limiting military input in this process and working instead with Arnold Heeney, clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet, Canada's most influential civil servant at the time.[37] On 9 July 1947, while presenting the department's estimates to the House of Commons, the minister outlined Canadian fundamentals that lasted for the remainder of the Cold War, if not to this day. In his words, the country's armed forces were required:

> 1. to defend Canada against aggression; 2. to assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country; 3. to carry out

[33] Raymont, *The Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence*, 25.
[34] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 162.
[35] Ibid., 159; Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 13; and Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 23–24.
[36] Cited in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada—Volume IV—Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1980), 132.
[37] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 173.

Brooke Claxton, Minister of Defence 1946-1954. [Library and Archives Canada PA-047064]

> any undertaking which by our own voluntary act we may assume in cooperation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the united nations [sic] ... [O]ur first line of defence and the object of all our policy must be to work with other nations to prevent war.[38]

In the same statement, Claxton listed several 'long-term objects of the department and services', the first of which was the "... [p]rogressively closer co-ordination of the armed services and unification of the Department so as to form a single defence force in which the three armed services work together as a team."[39] As pointed out by Bland, it is important to note that these priorities and objectives "... were derived from Canadian needs and circumstances. They were not driven by external commitments, nor were they foreign to Canadian citizens."[40] Several breached Huntington's divide by addressing lower-level organisational and operational issues belonging to the military

38 Canada, *Official Report of Debates: House of Commons: 3rd Session 20th Parliament, Volume VI 1947* (Ottawa: Controller of Stationary, 1948), 5270.
39 Ibid., 5272.
40 Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 15.

realm such as the formation of joint intelligence and planning groups, the integration of arsenals, seeking common standards with 'like-minded countries', etc. Nevertheless, meeting little opposition in Parliament and among the public, actively supported by prime ministers Mackenzie King and St. Laurent after 1948, Claxton set about implementing his plan, focussing on a force of 42,225 regulars to form a modest base for mobilisation using stockpiles retained from the previous conflict.[41]

As well, the minister continued his quest for greater efficiencies and budget savings through the elimination of duplications among the branches of the armed forces, establishing the Combined Services Functions Committee, which laid the basis for merging sixteen of the thirty-one functions it examined.[42] By then, he had already instructed the rearrangement of the three services headquarters along parallel divisions, the promulgation of common military personnel policies, the merger of the three sets of civilian administrators into a single defence civil service under one deputy minister, and an amendment to the National Defence Act to provide for one group of military laws.[43]

There was little the military agent could do to pre-empt the will of the civilian principal in these circumstances, even had the COSC wished to. Although convinced that the debilitating retrenchments of the interwar period should not be repeated, and under pressure from their American counterparts concerned with the nascent requirements for continental air defence,[44] dire recruiting made it difficult for the chiefs to militate for larger armed forces in Canada. A good economy, meagre military pay, and underwhelming prospects for action contributed to severe personnel shortages in the three services with just under 34,000 regulars serving in 1948, well short of the authorised ceiling.[45] On the other hand, officers appreciated that most personnel staying in were highly trained combat veterans, equipped with proven gear, standing ready to support another

[41] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 177; and Peter Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950–2000* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 11–12.

[42] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 161; and Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 118.

[43] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 16.

[44] Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–1958* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 9–29.

[45] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 177; Kasurak, *A National Force*, 12; and Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 184.

mobilisation effort if required in the future. The military agent had seen its postwar ambitions defeated but carried on maintaining a small but effective force as dictated by government. In other words, the principal monitored intrusively and the agent worked, a situation of subjective control which, despite Huntington's normative concern, provided the country with suitable armed forces within an effective CMR dialogue for the circumstances prevailing at the time. However, as soon as this equilibrium was set, growing tensions on the world scene precipitated unexpected developments in Canada.

REMOBILISATION

Cold War divisions led Ottawa to join NATO in 1949 and deploy forces to Korea the following year.[46] The 1949–1950 defence budget had been $384 million but, by 1953, it reached $1,907 million, ten times that of 1947.[47] This striking turnaround was reflective of the commonalities of views that existed among the political class and military leaders on the necessity of dedicating such immense national wealth to the East-West confrontation. Indeed, a symbiosis of sorts was achieved between Claxton, by then fully in charge of his portfolio, and General Foulkes, whose prominence in military affairs was reinforced when designated on 1 February 1951 as the first chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC).[48] A cabinet appointment, the post had been created in response to NATO's requirement for a single national representative to the organisation's Military Committee and fitted well in Claxton's vision of greater integration between the services. The choice of Foulkes symbolised the confidence of the civilian principal in his performance, especially

[46] For an extensive treatment of the circumstances surrounding Canada's adherence to NATO and the role of her diplomats and military leaders in shaping the original treaty, see Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 68–128. For Canada joining the fight in Korea, see Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 399–401; Milner, *Canada's Navy*, 201–204; and Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 208–216.
[47] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 238.
[48] Kronenberg, *All Together Now*, 15.

as the Canadian general was also designated the first chairman of the alliance's Military Committee for a two-year rotation (1951–1953).[49]

Joining NATO proved a dramatic departure for Canada. The organisation was the first peacetime alliance provided with its own multinational political apparatus (the North Atlantic Council—NAC), integrated command structure (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe—SHAPE), and assigned standing forces (Allied Command Europe—ACE).[50] Its immediate focus was the defence of the Western European allies against an invasion by the Soviet Union, which held an overwhelming superiority in conventional means. NATO countries committed to building up their forces through national 'force goals', whereby each country pledged army, naval and air contingents, as well as taking on specific roles and missions within the alliance's larger strategy. However, as the Lisbon Conference of February 1952 concluded its proceedings, troop targets had reached overly ambitious levels in seeking to muster on European soil ninety-six army divisions and 10,000 aircraft by 1954.[51] The allies would struggle for the remainder of the 1950s to meet such force goals while faith in the American nuclear guarantee would be shaken as the Soviets developed the means to strike at North America with their own atomic devices.

Canadian engagement with NATO did not fundamentally alter the three defence tasks proposed by minister Claxton in 1947 but the allied strategy did impact the 'long-term objects of the department and the services' outlined in that same statement. These envisioned a small cadre of regular forces available to conduct but a few immediate military missions as their main priority would be to support a large mobilisation, very much as they had done at the outset of the Second World War.[52] But NATO assumed that war was imminent, would commence without warning, and that reserve forces

[49] Yet one must not make too much of the significance of the position within the Canadian military structure at the time. The Chairman was meant as an impartial broker between the three services but he had no overriding authority on them and they retained their right of individual access to the minister. Ibid., 15; Raymont, *The Evolution of the Structure*, Appendix A, 19–22; and Sean M. Maloney, "General Charles Foulkes: A Primer on How to be CDS," in *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 224 and 226.

[50] For Canadian perspectives on the genesis of these NATO organs, see Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 130–189.

[51] Ibid., 222–224; and Lawrence Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History* (London: Cassell, 2001), 48.

[52] Kasurak, *A National Force*, 11–12; and Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 389–390.

would be too late in joining the fight. For the first time, the country was called upon to maintain large standing forces, including forces-in-being permanently garrisoned overseas. Others were earmarked for immediate deployment at the start of the hostilities while ships and aircraft would take up pre-designated war stations without further instructions. Most would act under the operational control of foreign alliance commanders.[53] The Militia, the mainstay of military tradition in Canada from colonial days to the world wars of the twentieth century, would eventually be relegated to civil defence duties, tasked to look after survivors in the wake of an apocalyptic nuclear exchange.[54]

These developments did not immediately impact civil-military relations in Canada. As national force goals and missions were agreed to by political authorities in NATO summits and endorsed by cabinet, the COSC, as the agent, was content to perform the contractual engagement of building up the necessary forces. Of greater interest was whether the principal would continue to monitor as intrusively during this period of remobilisation as it had done during the recent demobilisation. On the one hand, the appointment of Ralph Campney as the first peacetime associate minister in November 1952 seemed to indicate the renewed interest of political authorities for military matters by providing increased monitoring capacity.[55] Influential civil servants continued to attend COSC meetings as well as those of the Cabinet Defence Committee, remaining fully engaged in the military buildup and the evolution of NATO strategy.[56]

On the other hand, several factors contributed to distract the attention of Canadian politicians at this critical juncture. On a personal level, after nearly seven years of strenuous service as minister, Brooke Claxton had grown weary, if not exhausted. Having already spent much time standing up for the RCN in the wake of the 1949 Mainguy Report (concerned with morale in the navy),[57] Claxton then had to wage a lengthy battle with the opposition and

53 Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 18–21; and Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 190–222.

54 Kasurak, *A National Force*, 45–48; and Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 245.

55 Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 246.

56 Examples can be found throughout chapters 4 ("Mobilizing the Deterrent") and 5 ("Sharing the Burden") of Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 190–318; as well as chapter 11 ("Korea and NATO (1950–52)") in Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 207–239.

57 Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 183–186; and Milner, *Canada's Navy*, 193–195.

the media upon the release of the Currie Report in December 1952, a devastating document revealing widespread accounting malpractices in the army.[58] The minister also put on hold any further attempts at integration from the top given the myriad of priorities then driving the expanding defence agenda.[59] Grieving over the loss of his twenty-two-year son in a fishing accident, Claxton eventually retired in July 1954.[60] Meanwhile the larger political class had embarked on an election campaign in the summer of 1953 just as the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, removing much of the public's attention and operational pressures of being engaged in a 'hot war'.[61]

As political interest for defence issues started receding, NATO's strategy underwent another fundamental review. Given the alliance's inability to mount a credible conventional deterrent, the Eisenhower administration announced its 'New Look' policy in October 1953, stating its willingness to use nuclear weapons to deter both a strategic strike against North America and a conventional assault against Western Europe (and allies beyond).[62] This, in turn, led the Atlantic Alliance to adopt in November 1954 the strategic concept outlined in MC 48. That document assumed that a Soviet move across the Iron Curtain with conventional forces would in all likelihood result in the use of atomic bombs in the early stage of the war, including tactical weapons to destroy enemy formations before they could overwhelm the Western allies.[63] Having replaced Claxton as minister of national defence, Campney proclaimed the country's adherence to these views in March 1955, stating that "... MC48 (Final) was approved and represents Canadian government policy. This policy provides that priority must be given to the provision of forces being capable of effectively contributing to success in the initial phase."[64] Although

[58] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 246–257; and Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 238.
[59] Kronenberg, *All Together Now*, 15–16; and Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 49–50.
[60] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 238–241.
[61] Ibid., 257–258; and Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 405–406.
[62] Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 739–744; and Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 400–404.
[63] Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2007), 38–43; and Marc Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 153–165.
[64] Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 47.

Dwight Eisenhower speaks with Pierre Dupuy and Brooke Claxton (right) in Rotterdam, November 1951. [Nationaal Archief (Netherlands) 904-8601]

the remainder of the statement did not formally commit Canada to acquiring nuclear weapons, it clearly endorsed their use at the tactical level and opened the door to such a consideration by putting the emphasis on forces capable of operating on the atomic battlefield.

This remarkable development caused little questioning within Canadian political circles, not that the military agent had left the civilian principal in the dark. Foulkes and the chiefs had been discussing these concerns with their allied military partners since 1951 and senior civil servants were eventually brought in to further define Canada's position. Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson also played an important role in shaping MC 48 when it was brought within the political realm at the North Atlantic Council.[65] Nevertheless, it appears that not much debate ensued when the subject was raised in cabinet and one must ponder whether the ministers fully comprehended the ramifications of the policy put to them by their agent.

A similar concern arises when considering the greater integration of continental defence pursued simultaneously by military planners. Extensive discussions had been taking place within the Canada-US

[65] Ibid., 40–47; and Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 262–273.

Military Cooperation Committee, an organ added in 1946 to the wartime bilateral Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), which continued into the postwar era.[66] As the threat of Soviet bombers to North America grew through the following decade, United States Air Force and RCAF authorities came to envision a defence based on four pillars: timely signal intelligence (through passive sensors spread along the Soviet periphery); attrition at source of the enemy bomber force by Strategic Air Command (SAC); active sensors mostly based in Canada's North to provide early warning; and the ability to disrupt an attack through area and point defence means (fighters and ground-based interceptor missiles dispersed in Canada and the United States).[67]

Military effectiveness required ever greater integration of these means, resulting in a range of incremental initiatives to that effect. Canada granted rights to the United States to use Goose Bay, Newfoundland as an alternate wartime bomber base in 1950.[68] It was agreed in 1951 that American and Canadian fighters could enter each other's air space to complete air interceptions and, later, that they could do the same pre-emptively to initiate an intercept.[69] The Pinetree radar line commenced operations in 1952 with sites mounted in southern Canada to cover North America's industrial heartland. Warning times would then be extended with the decision in 1953 to build the Mid-Canada Line further north and, in 1954, the Distant Early Warning Line in Canada's high Arctic.[70] By 1955, technology had sufficiently evolved to envision an air battle over North America coordinated through the proposed Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), networking weapons and sensors of both nations.[71] But these developments had yet to be discussed extensively

[66] Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 4; and Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, 10–29.

[67] Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 26.

[68] Ibid., 12–13. This agreement also provided for overflight rights in Canadian airspace for American (and, later in the decade, British) nuclear-armed bombers conducting peacetime transits.

[69] Joseph T. Jockel, "The Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD," in *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 165.

[70] Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, 43–50 and 72–85; and Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 23–26 and 34.

[71] Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, 62; and Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 24.

in the Canadian cabinet despite the inherent challenges they involved in terms of national command and sovereignty.[72]

This pronouncement reflects two important trends in the evolution of CMR in Canada in terms of agency. First, the principal had been acting much less intrusively in the management of military affairs, a tendency begun in the waning days of Claxton's tenure as minister and continued under Campney, who would prove more a caretaker than an active shaper of policy as viewed by a contemporary observer: "(The minister) seemed content to adopt a low profile and preferred to act to recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff in implementing defence policy rather than the initiation of new measures."[73] This laissez-faire was also reflective of Prime Minister St. Laurent who— contrary to his predecessor Mackenzie King— was reluctant to intervene in the day-to-day affairs of his cabinet colleagues, a tendency that was likely to produce quite different results when dealing with a proactive Claxton in the 1940s and a reluctant Campney in the 1950s.[74] Secondly, the agent's contractual obligations seemed to migrate ever so subtly from serving Canadian priorities to those of the larger alliance as the country's defence policy came to narrowly reflect a 'strategy of commitments' dictated by the needs of NATO and continental defence.[75] As pointed out by Douglas Bland, military Chiefs came to "... identify their professional responsibilities and institutional interest with strategies written outside Canada."[76] A former Chief of the Defence Staff subsequently observed that the officer corps "... had great difficulty differentiating between its own institutional interests and aspirations, and the real interests of the state, viewing both as coincident when, in fact, they are often very different."[77]

72 Jockel, "The Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD," 171–172; and Granatstein, *Canada 1957–1967*, 102–105.

73 Colonel R.L. Raymont quoted in Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 32. See also Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 52.

74 Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 14.

75 Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy*, 21; and Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 49–51.

76 Bland, "Military Command in Canada," 129.

77 Gerry Thériault, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View," in *The Military in Modern Democratic Society* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 10.

The matter of the agent's greater adherence to alliance commitments rather than that of the national interest as envisioned by the principal is worthy of mention in this evaluation as Canadian civil-military relations did not evolve in isolation. The influence of Canada's allies could in fact be included as an additional independent variable in the application of Feaver's analysis to this case. The Basic Security Plan (BSP) negotiated by the military authorities in 1946 and agreed to in February 1947 by the Canadian and American governments provided an initial rational for maintaining minimal standing forces in being, at least in terms of ships and aircraft, to respond to the continental defense responsibilities implied therein.[78] Canadian generals and admirals would refer to NATO force goals long after the 1952 Lisbon Conference to shape their force estimates and budget submissions to the minister. However, neither Mackenzie King nor St. Laurent viewed the BSP as a formal defence pact—thus undercutting its value as a basis for the military establishment to lobby for increased allocations—while both the principal and the agent shared a common commitment to meeting the requirements generated by the Atlantic Alliance to the end of the period covered in this paper. It would be after the mid-1950s that divergences over such commitments would assume a greater role in the context of civil-military relations in Canada and provide an avenue for advocates from abroad to act as an independent variable worthy of inclusion within an agency theory analysis of those later years.

PRESCRIPTION

The events discussed above indicate that once Canada was firmly engaged on a course of Cold War mobilisation, 1951 being the approximate turning point, Canadian CMR went through a subtle but fundamental realignment as the principal slowly abandoned its most intrusive ways of monitoring. That is not to say that the military went about shirking from thereon. Indeed, the chiefs of staff continued to work diligently in mounting the forces required to achieve the NATO and continental defence objectives assigned to

[78] Milner, *Canada's Navy,* 167–168; and Ray Stouffer, *Swords, Clunks & Widowmakers: The Tumultuous Life of the RCAF's Original 1 Canadian Air Division* (Trenton: Canadian Forces Air Warfare Centre, 2015), 17.

Canada. In agency terms, Foulkes and his colleagues did not "fail to diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asked, or did what the civilian asked in a manner which undercut the civilian's position of greater authority." Rather, they pursued military effectiveness to the extent that the principal let them. In that sense, civilian-military relations had gone from a period of subjective control during the demobilisation phase to one of objective control with the principal refraining from intervening in the crafting of military strategy and the details of its implementation.

This evolution should have translated into a positive development from a Huntingtonian perspective as the principal did not monitor intrusively and yet the agent worked. However, the issues that came to the fore after Diefenbaker took power in 1957, contributing with such deleterious effect to the ensuing crisis in civil-military relations, came about largely as a result of military initiatives in the preceding years. Unilateral adherence to NATO strategy would eventually call for troops and aircraft equipped with tactical nuclear weapons—Honest John rockets for the army, Mk28 thermonuclear bombs for the air force's CF-104s, atomic depth charges for the Navy—while government had not yet committed to acquire such weapons.[79] Continental defence necessitated different interceptors than those used in Europe, leading to the promulgation of unique requirements that called for the unaffordable CF-105 (the failed Avro Arrow project), as well as the demand for nuclear-tipped missiles for the CF-101 fighters and the BOMARC land-based batteries.[80] Necessary sovereignty compromises were not fully comprehended by civilian authorities until after they had signed the NORAD agreement and such fundamental misunderstandings would contribute to the confused reaction of Canada to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.[81] By 1964, Canada could no longer afford its armed forces. Newly appointed Minister of National Defence Hellyer could reclaim Claxton's aphorism that "military planners live and work without regards for the facts

[79] Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 159–170; and Kasurak, *A National Force*, 67–73.

[80] Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb*, 59–67; and Granatstein, *Canada 1957–1967*, 105–109.

[81] Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, 104–111; and Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis*, 218–219.

of national life" and ignore the COSC as he set about publishing his controversial White Paper.[82]

Determining the right and wrong of the arguments used by the camps involved in the defence debates of the Diefenbaker years is well beyond the purview of this paper.[83] However, the study of the first decade of the command era underscores key findings. The rational analysis used therein illuminated effective civil-military relations during the demobilisation period despite unfolding in conditions of subjective control. The remobilisation that followed was accompanied by a subtle transition to objective control but this did not equate to the betterment of CMR as Huntington would have posited. A crisis did not immediately arise since the military agent continued to work but the erosion of civilian oversight led to a growing gap in the interpretation of the civil-military contract. The agent pursued forms of military effectiveness that would not necessarily be endorsed by the principal had it remained closely involved, a dissonance that came to the fore with a vengeance when the latter resumed more intrusive monitoring.

This rational analysis suggests a fundamental normative prescription contrary to the Huntingtonian diktat. Thriving civil-military relations in a liberal democracy such as Canada require the continued involvement of the political class in defining the country's defence policy, determining the strategy to implement it, and scrutinising its detailed execution. The military should accept, and indeed should demand some form of intrusive monitoring by civilian authorities over the long term, whether defence issues are topical or not at any given time. This would allow for a continued dialogue between politicians and the officer corps to educate each other on their current concerns and interests, and avoid sudden disruptions in

[82] Department of National Defence, *1964 White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1964), available: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1964-eng.pdf. For a précis, see Douglas L. Bland, "Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence," in *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 212–215.

[83] Adequate summaries and discussions on this topic may be found in chapter 5 ("The Defence Débâcle, 1957–1963)" of Granatstein, *Canada 1957–1967*, 101–138; Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 242–246; and J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, "Unification and the Strong-Service Idea," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives—Context and Concepts* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 136–137.

CMR as a result of dissonances appearing during periods of isolation between the two camps.

CONCLUSION

Few doubt that Canada achieved a great deal as a middle power during the 1950s and many have cited a seeming congruence between the political class and the officer corps as a key factor for these successes. Huntington's supporters would argue that objective control was largely responsible for this situation as the normative ideal for a liberal democracy was in place at the time. And yet, this essay demonstrated that the receding political oversight of rapidly evolving military developments during these years would contribute to later CMR crises as the country's strategy of alliance commitments grew unaffordable. Adopting a rationalist framework to analyze the early command era in Canada allows one to formulate an initial normative prescription centered on the continuous involvement of the civilian principal in military affairs. While such intrusive monitoring of the agent may seem improper as a form of subjective control, unbroken dialogue of the sort that took place during the late 1940s would alleviate the potential for the military to shirk in response to unexpected interventions by politicians in defence matters. Regrettably, Feaver's Agency Theory falls short of providing a solution to the challenge of gaining and maintaining such dedicated interest from the political class, an issue likely to continue bedeviling civil-military relations in Canada in the future.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain Hugues Canuel, Royal Canadian Navy, is the Director of Programmes at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario. He oversees the curriculum development and the delivery of a variety of programmes for select senior officers of the Canadian Armed Forces and those of allied and like-minded nations, Canadian public servants and private sector leaders. Candidates are called upon to develop the skills and abilities required for command and joint staff appointments, as well as assuming future strategic responsibilities within a complex global environment. Captain Canuel is a graduate of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean and a

doctoral candidate in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, struggling to complete a dissertation on the rebuilding of the French Navy during the challenging decades of the early Cold War era.

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