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## **Ethics As Grammar: A Note on Method and the Treatise on Good Works**

**Don Irvine**

*Master of Theology Student, Waterloo Lutheran Seminary  
Waterloo, Ontario*

One criterion for the analysis of moral theory is that the method employed be appropriate to the content of the moral view to be analyzed. Philosophical methodology is not always conducive to theological analysis.<sup>1</sup> Whatever else it is, Martin Luther's *Treatise on Good Work*<sup>2</sup> is primarily a theological document; it is generated in a world that John Webster describes as having a "moral ontology."<sup>3</sup> Contrary to modern ethical theory, the document is written against the background of an order of being, a metaphysical framework, in which moral agents and human action are identified in the context of an orientation to the Good construed in terms of the action of God.

Morality on this view is neither a function of consciousness, culture or human autonomy; rather, it is an orientation to a creative divine agency understood as the complete origin, substance and fulfillment of all human action. The human person is envisaged as existing within a moral reality independent of attitude and disposition. The fact that such a moral orientation is characterized by views of revelation, faith, prayer, Christian action and commandment modulates what can count as an appropriate method of ethical analysis.

Contemporary ethical methodologies very often preclude issues arising from the kind of moral ontology found in the *Treatise on Good Works*. For example, modern ethical theory has been dominated by theories of either a teleological (Utilitarianism) or a deontological (Formalism) type. In both instances the interest is in the formation of a criterion for decision-making which appeals to either (a) the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people or (b) a categorical imperative which is a rule requiring action which every rational being, independent of aim, must observe. In both instances the emphasis falls on normative moral standards as determinants of decision-making, human autonomy, and the creation of a theory of

moral obligation based on some basic rule or principle. Such theories are of interest for theological ethicists but hardly capture the theological nuances of the moral world of Luther. One ethicist names the issue thus:

There is no reason to deny that the biblical record and Christian tradition manifest deontological and teleological tendencies, but it is mistaken to assume that Christian ethics requires us to choose either alternative or some combination of the two. For when we do so we inevitably tend to abstract the Christian “ethic” from its rationale by subordinating theological convictions to prior formal patterns of ethical argument.<sup>4</sup>

An interesting alternative to Utilitarian and Formalist views is found in those contemporary theorists acquainted with the views of Aristotle and Aquinas who evince an interest in virtue and the ethics of character. The work of Alasdair MacIntyre,<sup>5</sup> for example, has excited Christian theologians who found much of interest in new themes such as practice, human agency, the role of narrative and community in moral formation. Other writers emerged who have sought to apply the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein to matters theological. In 1985 James C. Edward in his perceptive book *Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life* (1982) claims that Wittgenstein’s central concern throughout his philosophical career was ethics, a “mystical” sphere because its content cannot be said or stated but only shown. While theological concerns did not loom large in Edward’s analysis, such was not the case with Fergus Kerr,<sup>6</sup> who called for a radical revision in our thinking about moral psychology. His view was a serious study of Wittgenstein’s method of linguistic analysis and its implications for traditional views of rational autonomy, theistic argument and the nature of the self/soul. Kerr’s use of Wittgenstein’s method to address important theological and moral issues has been extended by a contemporary writer, Brad Kallenberg<sup>7</sup> who offers a more extensive analysis of the Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas under aspects of Wittgenstein. One year prior to the publication of Kallenberg’s book, James McClendon published the third volume of his *Systematic Theology* in which Chapter Six is

entitled “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian in Philosophy.”<sup>8</sup> Apparently, Wittgenstein has been of interest to some theologians.

### Grammar of Theology

Is it even likely that some aspects of Wittgenstein’s linguistic method can offer assistance in understanding the theology of *Luther’s Treatise on Good Works*? There is reason to think so. Wittgenstein himself made reference to theology draw attention to the use of language. In the *Philosophical Investigations* he states:

One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word “imagination [*Vorstellung*]” is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature (*Wesen*) of the imagination is as much about the word “imagination” as my question is. And I am only saying that this question is not to be decided – neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else – by pointing; nor yet by a description of any process. The first question also asks for a word to be explained but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer. Essence (*Wesen*) is expressed by grammar.<sup>9</sup>

The next comment attends to certain elements of grammar, language and ostensive definition which is then followed by the remark: “Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)”<sup>10</sup> Wittgenstein’s point is that simply asking what ideas or images are, is to construe the inquiry as one where we seek to locate them by introspection assuming that such words denote. But this often becomes a source of philosophical confusion. To propose that we understand these words by considering how we use them in conversation about the inner life evokes the response that we are talking only about “words” rather than the thing itself. But, as Fergus Kerr claims, Wittgenstein’s point is that questions about the inner life are not settled in this manner at all; the answer lies in a *careful inspection of the kinds of things that we are permitted to say given the rules of the conversation.*<sup>11</sup> The kind of object that a thing

is will come out in the kind of things that it is appropriate to say about it. This applies to the words “God” and “soul” as well as “imagination.” To explain what the word “God” means we have to listen to what it is permissible to say about the subject.

Wittgenstein had previously noted that we might often give up explaining words such as “God” or “soul” ostensibly, by pointing; we don’t give up explaining them in substantival terms. He says:

Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word “God.” I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one. For example, people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God. This would throw light on the use of the word. What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word.<sup>12</sup>

This account seems right. Theology in fact has typically involved much critical reflection on what is said about the divine. Theology certainly involves learning what may rightly be said and what has to be excluded people typically involves critical reflection of what people can appropriately say about the divine. Indeed, on Wittgenstein’s view of theological grammar the entire *Treatise on Good Works* can be construed as an attempt to remedy aberrant theological usage by recalling discourse about good works to its proper theological context.

In what sense does Wittgenstein mean that “theology is the grammar of the word ‘God’” and how does this reflect on Luther’s uniquely theological view about human action? Brad Kallenberg alludes to a remark by Wittgenstein, “How words are understood is not told by words alone (Theology),” and introduces it with the statement: “The suggestion that communication requires self-involving participation of speakers in the host form of life has interesting implications for Wittgenstein’s view of religious language.” One implication, according to Kallenberg, is that crossing the communication gap requires direct participation in that form of life in which the concept functions. He describes this as becoming familiar with the “*grammar of such a concept*” before engaging in

conversation.” It is, as Kallenberg puts it, “... the necessity of a self-involving participation in a given form of life for cultivating the skill of hearing the connections between a sentence and appropriate aspects of its context ....”<sup>13</sup>

Now the term “grammar” is used by Luther in the *Lectures on Galatians* and his remark on Galatians 3:11 speaks of an explanation “according to a new and theological grammar” while on verse 3:15 he speaks about consulting the grammar – “not the moral grammar but the theological grammar.”<sup>14</sup> In an excellent study of Luther’s view of theological and revelatory language, Risto Saarinen<sup>15</sup> notes that Johann Eck remarked that Luther believed grammar to be the most important part of philosophy. Eck is referring to Luther’s theses in *Conclusiones tractantes, a libri philosophorum sint utiles aut inutiles ad theologiam* where Luther states that the holy doctrine of theology is conveyed by words so the science of grammar is the most important of the arts for propagating theology.<sup>16</sup> Saarinen also notes Luther’s insistence “that the student of theology should not study the rules for putting words together on the basis of philosophical textbooks but ought to become acquainted with the everyday use of the language.”<sup>17</sup> The art of theological grammar must be distinguished from philosophical grammar because of the presence of unusual subject matter, the new entity (*nova res*). Luther insists that the way of understanding this new entity and the modes of speaking about its properties must be *unique*, although these new ways and modes are nevertheless conveyed by the normal, everyday use of language.

This meant, according to Saarinen, that grammar can never simply be a speculative endeavour, a formal or syntactic discipline of classifying signs, carried out by scholastics. Rather, the specific art of each grammar is determined by its *use* of the words and, accordingly, by the *signification* of those words. This, as Saarinen rightly determines, is to give priority to the semantic and pragmatic features of language. This means that grammar for Luther includes not only words in a language, their relations with other words, together with their meaning or application, *but also* the relation between words and the world as well as the relation of words to their users. The inclusion of these pragmatic and semantic features and the unusual subject matter together compose a unique *Grammatica theologica* which is what Luther has in mind when he aims to outline an “alternative theological semantic which he often refers to as a ‘new’ grammar.”<sup>18</sup>

If Saarinen's analysis obtains, then Luther's theological grammar is a complex of elements: It includes a speaker's use of ordinary language in some context of reference or meaning, the relations between words and what they are about (semantics) as well as the relation of speakers and words (pragmatics). Since Luther does not systematize an overview of theological grammar, it would be of assistance to provide an interpretation which could further an understanding of human action implicit in "Good works." This is a case of particular interest since it is a major theme in *The Treatise on Good Works*, and Luther makes it very clear that there is a unique usage, a special theological grammar of "doing," properly understood as a "doing with faith."<sup>19</sup> But we do require an understanding of the theological grammar of "doing with faith" which is a *unique way of understanding* the use of ordinary words?

One contemporary proposal to capture the key elements in Wittgenstein's analysis of meaning germane to this unique understanding is that offered by Brad Kallenberg. He begins with an analysis of the concept of "form" found in the developing views of Wittgenstein from his early to later writings. Navigating a diversity of interpretations, he indicates the earliest use of "form" to denote the logical structure of reality in the *Tractatus*; while after 1931 the word became associated with the phrase "language games" which spoke of the irreducible social character of human life. The notion "form of life" then began to predominate in Wittgenstein's later views and in the *Philosophical Grammar* "form" becomes analogous to "grammar" that "describes the use of words in the language."<sup>20</sup> Meaning in this context has to do with rules of use upon which speakers agree. Kallenberg cites Wittgenstein: "We say that we understand its [a word's] meaning when we know its use, but we've also said that the word 'know' doesn't denote a state of consciousness. That is, the grammar of the word 'know' isn't the grammar of a 'state of consciousness,' but something different. And there is only one way to learn it to watch *how the word is used in practice*."<sup>21</sup>

The rules that govern a speaker's use of language are inextricably bound up with the manner of their daily lives – with what Wittgenstein calls their "form of life" – the stream of life and thought in which words have meaning. But skill is required for the language user who seeks fluency and this is not simply a matter of vocabulary and sense (Speculative grammar), for "how words are understood is

not told by words alone (theology);” rather, it is practice which gives words their sense. For example, the correct use of the word “God” requires that one must be familiar with the place that the language-games of prayer and confession play in the activities of praying and confessing.

On this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s “form of life,” Kallenberg proposes that meaning include at least the following elements:

**(1) Meaning is a function of the vocable context.**

That is, “A sentence gains its sense from the immediate context of the language-game in which the sentence is located.” The example offered is the sentence “All men are brutes,” which has a very different nuance in the language-game of theology than in the language game of a jilted lover. The language-game, however, is but a part of the flow of an ongoing conversation where the application and interpretation of words fluctuate.<sup>22</sup> Another writer notes that the appeal to the language game also captures Wittgenstein’s notion that words are related to the world in that they are a *part* of the world; they come together in activities, language-games, constitutive of practices that comprise the human world. McClendon observes that Wittgenstein presented a series of imaginary games to enable his students to grasp a way of construing word-world relations in real life:

In one game, a primitive builder instructs his assistant by ordering any of four needed stones: blocks, pillars, slabs, or beams ... In another, children play word-games as they learn their native language ... Again, a shopper secures “five red apples” from the green grocer ... Or a military commander gives battle orders and receives reports ... In each of these examples there is a relation to the way things are, yet crucially, these relations include the deeds and needs and intention of the participants. No game can even be understood as a human activity (i.e., no proper sense of ‘meaning’ can arise from its words) apart from the forms of life, practices such as building, shopping, playing or fighting, that make up human endeavours. Together these practices constitute our world.<sup>23</sup>



“Meaning” in these dimensions is depicted not only in terms of the sense of vocable but in terms of a more inclusive relation of words and world.

- (2) In addition to vocable context, Kallenberg notes that Wittgenstein used the term “surroundings” to signify the behavioural context, which contributes to the sense that a speaker gains from a sentence.**

Presumably, the allusion is to the existence of a multiple of language games in the person’s linguistic community. For example, giving explanations is a correlate of requesting information or clarification; it presupposes a certain degree of linguistic understanding on the part of the learner, e.g., the ability to ask for the meaning of a word, which requires training. The latter is a learning context presupposing recognition of an authority. Kallenberg cites Wittgenstein’s example of a lie: “a lie has a peculiar surrounding,” because one cannot announce an intention to tell a lie and then succeed in fooling anyone. Rather, a lie succeeds as an act of deception only when other behavioural components are in place: “Only when there is a relatively complicated pattern of life do we speak of pretence.” A wry grin, averted eyes, a lush, a shuffle, and the game is up!<sup>24</sup>

- (3) One readily understood behavioural component of grammar is gesture.**

Kallenberg cites a familiar Neapolitan behaviour of brushing the underneath of the chin with an outward sweep of the fingertips of one hand taken to indicate disgust or contempt. Fergus Kerr who cites Wittgenstein notes this feature of gestures:

In my heart I have determined on it. And one is even inclined to point to one’s breast as one says it. Psychologically this way of speaking should be taken seriously. Why should it be taken less seriously that the assertion that belief [*der Glaube*] is a state of mind? (Luther: ‘Faith [*der Glaube*] is under the left nipple.’)<sup>25</sup>

The point is that the gesture of laying a hand on one’s chest when taking an oath is like the clutching on one’s brow when solving a

problem; such gestures are not less serious than the view that faith is an inner state or a thought is in the head. Faith, like thought, is often *visible*. More obvious, however, gesturing has a manifest linguistic character since we often explain our understanding of a gesture by translation into words and the understanding of words by translating them into gesture. Like words, gestures are intertwined in a net of multifarious relationships.

**(4) Part of gesturing is the acknowledgement that one part of human behaviour consists of responses like the shedding of tears, gasping when endangered or beating one's breast.**

Kallenberg describes these gestures as "... so basic that a perspicuous description of language can go no deeper than a record of these" and notes that Wittgenstein applied the epithet "primitive" "... in order to emphasize their givenness for the functioning of language."<sup>26</sup> What is important here is that such gestures are not adopted to explain one's meanings; rather, they are one's meanings. They are gestures enacting faith, repentance, delight rather than 'real' states of mind having an obscure mental existence in the speaker's mind. In addition to these responses – as well as the vocable and behavioural – part of the weave of human behaviour, is learned, social and conventional. Children do not learn that chairs exist; they learn to climb on chairs, sit in chairs, play musical chairs, etc. Using language is anchored in our way of living and acting and only by involvement in the pattern of living can one learn to use the word "chair" with facility. Kallenberg concludes:

Thus the "stage-setting" or "grammar" upon which successful linguistic interplay depends involves not only the relation of words within a sentence, but also the relation between the sentence and the rest of the language-game, the relationship of this language-game to the rest of the conversation (hence, to the whole system of language-games), and the place of this conversation in the activities (both primitive and conventional) of our daily lives. *This complex weave of contextual connection* is what Wittgenstein wants his readers to glimpse in the phrase, "form of life."<sup>27</sup>

Here, the use of language is anchored in our way of living and acting so the use of a language – its sense and significance – is constitutive of the speaker’s world and reflects a community’s form of life. In sum, this is a view which retains vocables and linguistic syntax (scholasticism) but also captures the unique uses of ordinary language in its pragmatic and semantic dimensions (Luther) and hence is able to convey the *nova res*.

If this account is taken as a reasonable interpretation of the use and significance, which Saarinen identifies as the uniqueness feature of theological usage, then there is material content to Luther’s view of “theological grammar.” It is to claim that the grammar of a word (i.e., the pattern of its use) cannot be conceived apart from the way the surrounding social group lives, acts, speaks, sees, hears, and thinks. There is a twofold dimension to theological uniqueness here: the first lies in the presupposition that the social group in which contextualization occurs is ecclesial community. Secondly, Luther is clear in his account of human action that it be understood theologically – that is, be delineated clearly from other ways of thinking and speaking. Hence Luther writes:

Therefore we have to rise higher in theology with the word ‘doing,’ so that it becomes altogether new. For just as it becomes something different when it is taken from the natural area into the moral, so it becomes something much more different when it is transferred from philosophy and from Law into theology ... ‘[D]oing’ is always understood in theology as doing with faith, so that doing with faith is another sphere and a new realm, so to speak, one that is different from moral doing. When we theologians speak about ‘doing,’ therefore, it is necessary that we speak about doing with faith, because in theology we have no right reason and good will except in faith.<sup>28</sup>

Now in the *Treatise on Good Works* Luther does seek to provide content and specificity to this notion of a theological grammar of “doing with faith.” He insists that good works are understood not by reference to the alms or plans of the agent but by the discourse of divine command. He writes:

The first thing to know is that there are no good works except those works God has commanded .... Therefore, whoever wants to know what good works are as well as doing them needs to know nothing more than God's commandments .... Accordingly, we have to learn to recognize good works from the commandments of God, and not from the appearance, size, or number of the works themselves, nor from the opinion of men of human law or custom, as we see has happened and still happens because of our blindness and disregard of the divine commandments.<sup>29</sup>

This understanding of theological (not moral) grammar suggests that *The Treatise on Good Works* be viewed as an attempt to revise the received use of good works by reinstating a contextual connection with the command of God that determines proper usage.

Another implication with respect to theological ethics is that actions, which are the subject of moral or ethical appraisals, are only properly theological because of their orientation to the command of God. That is, theological ethics to be *theological* is oriented to and focussed upon the command of God. Now "command" in this usage is not understood as a Kantian imperative, a universal moral prescription, mandating the enforcement of divine determination on human agency. Luther's exposition and the etymology of Torah suggest that 'the law' is here understood as "to give direction," "to point the way." It is interpreted this way by George Lindbeck who notes that Luther does not regard divine command in the Decalogue as law but "... instruction or teaching (*doctrina*) of the type which can variously be termed *praeceptum Gebot*, and *mandatum*."<sup>30</sup> In this respect it is interesting that there is no polemic against law in Luther's exposition of the Ten Commandments. Rather, the explanation of the Decalogue is shaped in pastoral discourse about the life of practice in faith, prayer and worship. It is this kind of discourse which enables the personal appropriation implicit in the focus or orientation to a divine personal reality. This reality which, though separate, enables that responsiveness in human agency which generates what Luther calls a "simple, single, goodness" in good works without which they are mere colour, glitter and deceit.<sup>31</sup>

According to Luther, the orientation of human action to the divine command involves a special place for the first commandment. Indeed, it is the special role of the first command coupled with the concept of practice that displays the uniqueness of theological grammar. Luther states:

Because this commandment is the very first of all commandments and the highest and the best [the one] from which all others must proceed, in which they must exist and abide, and by which they must be judged and assessed. Compared with this work the other good works are like the other commandments would be if they were without the first and as if there were no God.<sup>32</sup>

There are positive duties involved here. The second commandment to honour God's name is not merely to forbid cursing, the seeking of approval, fame and honour,<sup>33</sup> rather, we are to use God's name properly addressing God in praise, preaching and singing and "... in every way laud and magnify God's glory, honour and name."<sup>34</sup> But Luther also identifies a specific relation because he claims that the first commandment is indispensable to the second commandment because "This, like all the other works, cannot be done without faith."<sup>35</sup> The teaching of the third commandment to hallow God's name also "... compels faith to call upon God's name .... So faith comes right through the third commandment, and back into the second again." Luther states the interconnection: "See what a pretty golden ring these three commandments and their works make of themselves! See how the second commandment emerges from the first commandment and its subject, faith, and runs into the third, and the third in turn works back through the second into the first!"<sup>36</sup>

So the faith of the first commandment coheres all commandments and this also applies to the second table of the Decalogue, which involves our relation to our neighbour. Honouring father and mother, for example, is also an expression and exercise of faith without which "... no work is a genuine living work: it is neither good nor acceptable."<sup>37</sup> But honour is never an indiscreet deference to authority because such authority is delimited by what God expects in the first three commandments. That all the commandments are

included in the faith of the first commandment means that it is not enough to refrain from doing harm to our neighbour. On the contrary, it is expected that we return good for evil, neither thinking nor speaking evil of them, praying and thinking the best for them.<sup>38</sup> Once again, faith is the connecting link of this commandment to the first commandment: "For if we do it in faith and bring faith to bear upon it never doubting God's grace and favor ... It will be quite easy for him to be gracious and favourable to his neighbor."<sup>39</sup>

Luther's exposition does not presume that the so-called "moral commandments" of the second table are conceptually separable from the ostensibly "religious" commandments of the first table. Indeed, each command in the Decalogue is conceptually *inseparable*, that is, interconnected because each is sequenced in a manner which relates it to the first command which establishes "... the aseity, the absolute primacy and the sheer gratuity of divine action: at the beginning of the Decalogue stands the divine self-definition and its radically exclusive demand."<sup>40</sup> Its role is strategic in governing the type and direction of the explanation offered in the other commands and as such it functions as a meta-command; it indicates a general direction for a whole range of behaviour by relating everything by faith to the one God. In sum, Luther assumes that the precepts that follow the first commandment in the Decalogue are but a commentary on the faith implicit in the first and great commandment.

Theologians interested in the moral dimensions of the Decalogue have proposed that the commandments are readily understood as associated with particular moral practices.<sup>41</sup> That is, to issue the Commandment is to presuppose a practice and to show a way of conduct with regard to that practice. The law forbidding adultery and, by implication, other sorts of sexual license, can only have meaning in a culture that practices marriage. This promotes the claim that the individual commands are interrelated as *practices*, which is to say that Luther's interpretation of the law requires that we assume the existence of a people who are part of a community constituted by interconnected practices which make the law serve the purpose of worshipping God.<sup>42</sup> Other practices are involved here: to issue the command to honour fathers and mothers makes no sense except in a community where there *are* fathers, that is, where there is a system of kinship making the role of fathers and other relatives socially visible. Stealing presupposes the practice of stewardship of property.

The interrelation of the commandments coupled with the role of the first commandment allows the discernment of certain ethical relationships. Of course, this is no guarantee that refraining from bearing false witness ensures that we will be trustworthy and faithful in marriage. At the same time, just as we are only able to name and identify violence by discovering the practices of peace in which we are embedded, so we are only able to name, identify, and see the connection between our sins by the practices that constitute a community made possible by the faithfulness of worshipping God. Similarly, it is good to speak the truth, but without acknowledging the One who is truth, it is problematic to understand how any human speech could be truthful and trustworthy. Again, one interpreter develops the connection between truth-speaking and stealing by showing how they are positive and negative witnesses to God's generosity and the "cause of covetousness is distrust, while on the other hand, the cause of generosity is faith." Stephen Fowl quotes Luther's statement that stealing "... fights not only against theft and robbery, but against every kind of sharp practice which men perpetrate against each other in matters of worldly goods. For instance, greed, usury, overcharging, counterfeit goods, short measure, short weight, and who could give an account of all the smart, novel, and sharp-witted tricks which daily increase in every trade."<sup>43</sup> Fowl observes that such practices only manifest the fear that there will not be enough. Lying is fuelled by the same presumption that people do not have the time to learn how to speak truthfully to one another.

So the interconnection of the commandments and the inclusion of the role of practices enable a theological grammar in which language use is constitutive of the speaker's world and reflects a community's form of life. It is to expose the material conditions of "how we should practice and use faith in all good works which Luther deemed to be his task in *The Treatise on Good Works*.<sup>44</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Risto Saarinen, "The Word of God In Luther's Theology," *The Lutheran Quarterly* 1990:31-44. Remarking on Luther's understanding of "grammar" he says, "The rules of philosophical language violate the subject matter of Theology ...":39.

- <sup>2</sup> Martin Luther, "Treatise on Good Works," In *Luther's Works*, Vol. 44 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 21-114.
- <sup>3</sup> John Webster, *Barth's Moral Theology, Human Action In Barth's Thought* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 152, 153.
- <sup>4</sup> Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom, A Primer In Theological Ethics* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 23.
- <sup>5</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue, A Study In Moral Theology* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
- <sup>6</sup> Fergus Kerr, *Theology After Wittgenstein* (London, United Kingdom: SPCK, 1986).
- <sup>7</sup> Brad Kallenberg, *Ethics as Grammar, Changing the Postmodern Subject* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001).
- <sup>8</sup> James McClendon with Nancey Murphy, Jr., *Witness, Systematic Theology Volume 3* (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 2000). Wittgenstein's religious orientation has been a topic of interest to many of his interpreters and biographers though McClendon in Part II, Chapter 6 of his work makes his position clear: "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian In Philosophy."
- <sup>9</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell, 1975), pp. 370-371.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 373.
- <sup>11</sup> Fergus Kerr, *Theology After Wittgenstein*, pp. 145 ff.
- <sup>12</sup> Alice Ambrose, "Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935," From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald (Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 2001), p. 32.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110. Kallenberg is citing from Wittgenstein in *Zettel* § 144 and his remarks are directed to the self-involving character of theological discourse where words are not only vocables of a language but rooted in the "stream of life" giving them their proper senses; communication requires self-involving participation in the host form of life.
- <sup>14</sup> Martin Luther, "Lectures on Galatians – 1535" in *Luther's Works*, Vol. 26 & 27 (St. Louis, Missouri: 1963, 1964), pp. 262ff. Cf. pp. 4f., 6, 8, 32, 38, 267.



- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., 39. Saarinen is remarking on WA 2.267.32-35, WA 6.28-29, and WA 6.29.5-8.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., 39. He says: "... Luther includes in 'grammar' both the linguistic syntax and meaning as well as the use (*significatio, usus*) of language, because he thinks that the grammar of the biblical text is determined by the text's message. Because the meaning (*sensus*) and the subject matter (*res*) of the words thus become connected to the grammatical word-level, Luther's position was called a 'realistic' understanding of grammar."
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 41.
- <sup>19</sup> Martin Luther, "Lectures on Galatians – 1535" in *Luther's Works*, Vol. 26, p. 262.
- <sup>20</sup> Kallenberg, *Ethics as Grammar*, p. 103. He is citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar* §60, tr. Anthony Kenny, ed. Rush Rhees (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1974).
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 105. The citation is from *Philosophical Grammar* §34.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup> James McClendon Jr. with Nancey Murphy, *Witness, Systematic Theology Volume 3*, p. 251. McClendon is quoting from the Blue and Brown Books, 77-79; 17, 81; and *Philosophical Investigations* §1, §2, §7. §19).
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 105. While not essential to this issue there is Wittgenstein's view about avowals in the background. He claims that telling lies and deceiving are intentional attitudes which are meaningful but not because they allude to inner mental processes. Rather we ascribe such attitudes to persons and *they* are meaningful when (a) they are avowals, i.e., *express, display* but not describe the attitude which is intentional and meaningful if there are not grounds for questioning the sincerity of the speaker. (b) What the speaker means is clear from how, if the occasion arises, he explains, clarifies, elaborates his utterances, what consequences he derives from them and the replies and reactions he accepts as pertinent. (c) Context that involves how the sentence uttered fits into the topic of the conversation, the speaker's background and about whom or what he had reason to speak. Cf. Hans-Johann Glock, *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell, 1996), p. 181.
- <sup>25</sup> Fergus Kerr, *Theology After Wittgenstein*. Kerr is quoting from the *Philosophical Investigations* §89.

- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 106.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 107.
- <sup>28</sup> Martin Luther, "Lectures on Galatians – 1535" in *Luther's Works*, Vol. 26, p. 262.
- <sup>29</sup> "Treatise on Good Works," p. 18/4, section 1, lines 1-10.
- <sup>30</sup> George Lindbeck, "Martin Luther and the Rabbinic Mind," in Peter Ochs, ed., *Understanding the Rabbinic Mind: Essays on the Hermeneutic of Max Kadushin* (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholar's Press, 1990), p. 51.
- <sup>31</sup> "Treatise on Good Works," p. 22 (17/3)
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 22/8 line 5.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., 29/15 line, 30-32.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 27/13 line 7,8.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., 27/13 line 5.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 49/35 line 27, 28. He says on p. 49/35 line 14-18: "The first work is to believe and to have a good heart and confidence in God. From this flows the second good work, to praise God's name, to confess his grace, to give all honor to him alone. Then follows the third, to worship God by praying, hearing the sermon, meditating upon and pondering God's benefits, and, in addition, chastising oneself and keeping the flesh subdued."
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., 53/39, line 30-33.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 61/47, line 19-22.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 62/48, line 22-25.
- <sup>40</sup> John Webster, *Barth's Moral Theology, Human Action in Barth's Thought* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1998), p.161.
- <sup>41</sup> James Wm. McClendon, Jr., *Ethics: Systematic Theology, Volume I* (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon, 1986), p.177.
- <sup>42</sup> Stanley Hauerwas, *Sanctify them In the Truth, Holiness Exemplified* (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon, 1998), p. 52. "...In order for us to know what it means not to steal or not to tell a lie, we must understand why it is that none of the commandments can stand on their own and why it is that their vital interconnection is necessary for the formation of a community of a people capable of friendship with one another and with God (p. 54 ST)."

<sup>43</sup> "The Treatise on Good Works," p.64/50, line 3.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 18/4, line 3.