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STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS

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Doing With Faith

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In this paper I seek to address a series of themes surrounding Luther's view of agency and action in "Treatise on Good Works." In Section I, I begin with a statement on what I think Luther intended to say. This is followed by an interpretation of the main theme of the "Treatise," viz., faith and works, (Section II). The next step is to trace some of the implications of this main theme including Luther's view of agency and action as stated in the theological context of the treatise (Section III), a specific application of Luther's view to current ethical method and (Section IV), to introduce a current interpretation of Luther's view of passivity, action and agency (Section V). In doing the latter I was quite surprised and very delighted to discover Eberhard Jungel, and have used some aspects of his views as a gloss on Luther's views.

I. The Shape of the Treatise on Good Works.

Martin Luther was no moral theologian schooled in the nuances of ethical methodology. He was a professor of biblical exegesis. Yet if one approaches the Reformation leaders in terms of their impact on Christian living, then Luther turns out to be by far the more interesting and controversial figure. No where is this more apparent than in the "Treatise on Good Works" where use of the phrase "good works" covers a multitude of moral endeavors, all of which presuppose the centrality of human action and agency.¹ From the very beginning Luther aims to identify a specifically Christian use of the term "good works" which requires that we "watch carefully" for there are many aberrant uses found in certain practices of "trickery and deception" which inevitably mislead us into false and erroneous beliefs.² Hence, much of the "Treatise" is given over to exposing the difficulties with such beliefs. For example, one such difficulty is the notion that there is a relation of consequence between good works and acceptance by God, or a reversal in the proper way that faith and works are ordered. Luther offers a more definitive statement of aim

in the 1535 *Lectures on Galatians* where he describes a theological grammar of “doing”:

Therefore we have to rise higher in theology with the word “doing,” so that it becomes altogether new. For just as it becomes something different when it is taken from the natural area into the moral, so it becomes something much more different when it is transferred from philosophy and from the Law into theology. Thus it has a completely new meaning; it does indeed require right reason and a good will, but *in a theological sense, not in a moral sense*, which means that through the Word of the Gospel I know and believe that God sent His Son into the world to redeem us from sin and death.... Therefore “doing” is always understood in theology as doing with faith, so that *doing with faith is another sphere and a new realm, so to speak, one that is different from moral doing*. When we theologians speak about “doing,” therefore, it is necessary that we speak about *doing with faith*, because in theology we have no right reason and good will except faith.³

This sense of “doing with faith,” different from moral doing will, I believe, provide us with a helpful perspective on Luther’s view of faith and good works. He calls this a “theological sense of doing which is new at least in the way it defines “good works” as something beyond the agent’s projects or undertakings. Luther writes:

The first thing to know is that *there are no good works except those works God has commanded*, just as there is no sin except that which God has forbidden.... Accordingly, we have to learn to recognize good works from the commandments of God, and not from the appearance, size, or number of the works themselves, nor from the opinion of men or of human law or custom, as we see has happened and still happens because of our blindness and disregard of the divine commandments.⁴

Good works is a specifically theological matter for Luther because of its orientation to the commands of God and preeminently the first commandment. In fact, the whole “Treatise on Good Works” can be viewed as a revisionist proposal to rework our language about good works by recalling it to a proper theological use in relation to God’s commands, so that discourse about human action be oriented to the language of divine command. “Orientation” is not used here to imply a heteronomy in the sense that a separate divine will is imposed on the human agent in the same constricted way that legal laws

determine human action: the Decalogue is not law in this sense. Rather it is law understood as precepts, instruction or teaching (*doctrina*).⁵ It seems evident from the character of Luther's exposition that he has in mind faithful persons in Christian community and his explanation of the Decalogue is shaped in discourse which is pastoral in that it has practical significance for a Christian's life of faith, prayer and worship. Counsels directed to the life of personal faith yield a different understanding of the character of good works because they emerge from a context of personal appropriation – one that is implicit within the individual's focus upon a divine personal reality which, even though separate, is powerfully evocative and enabling of human agency. This relational context, presumably, is the source from which we come to understand that “of all things good works should have a single, simple goodness” without which they are just color, glitter and deceit.⁶

Now this in turn leads Luther to a particular and unique account of the foundation and status of human action, which is found frequently throughout the “Treatise on Good Works.” In commenting on the spiritual rest taught in the Sabbath command, Luther notes “... that we not only cease from our labor and trade but much *more* – *that we let God alone work in us and that in all our powers do we do nothing of our own.*”⁷ Clearly, human actions do not determine or define the agent who is to cease from his own works allowing God alone to work within and this orientation of good human action is sharply distinguished from the orientation to self that is characteristic of the busy worker for merit. Indeed, a greater part of “Treatise on Good Works” is very like an instructional manual for growing into good human actions, which are intimately connected with the agent's trustful submission to the action of God. We may note the respective roles of human and divine action implied here by attending to what Luther considers the most definitive feature of Christian life: “The first, highest, and most precious of all good works is faith in Christ, and as it says in John 6 [: 28-29] ... For in this work all good works exist, and from faith *these works receive a borrowed goodness.* We must make this absolutely clear, so that men can understand it.”⁸

II. The Central Point: Faith and Works

The theme of the “Treatise on Good Works” is the relation of faith and works and Luther reiterates the central affirmation that faith is at

the center of good works. In contrast to those who have made faith into a kind of work, a virtue of its own separated from other virtues, Luther claims that "... faith alone makes all other works good, acceptable, and worthy because it trusts God and never doubts that everything a man does in faith is well done in God's sight."⁹ In remarking on the prohibition against false witness he states that in this commandment "... faith must be the foreman behind this work. Without faith no one is able to do this work. In fact, *all works are entirely comprised in faith*, as I have often said, therefore apart from faith all works are dead, no matter how wonderful they look or what splendid names they have."¹⁰

What is meant by "works are entirely comprised in faith?" Luther surely means something more than a use of "faith" to simply name an ancillary condition for the acceptance of good works, works which could in principle be performed apart from faith but only acceptable when performed in faith. The phrase, "*comprised in faith*," hardly describes a relation which is ancillary or external; rather, it alludes to a relation of internal containment very like the case where Luther speaks of works being acceptable not for their own sake "... but because of faith, which is always the same and *lives and works in each and every work* without distinction."¹¹ A more accurate description of the relation is found in the phrase, "Faith lives in works, just as works are done in faith."¹² The relation is not one in which faith is reduced to a motivational impulse in the agent sustaining what is morally good; nor is it an extra saving power added to good works. It is a relation in which faith incorporates itself into the goodness of the work even providing works with the capacity to be good. Hence, Luther speaks of works "entirely comprised in faith" in the sense that faith is a part of the constitution of the goodness of the good work, it is internal to the definition of good works.¹³ The relation is one in which it is in order to conceive of faith being realized in works or as, Althaus puts it, "'Works' are nothing but the concrete realization of faith itself." He states:

Faith needs works – that is, concrete specific aspects of life – in order to be itself at any point. Faith always needs secular life – just as secular life in turn always needs faith. Believing is not something I do alongside my life in this world but rather in it – in each and every act of living. Faith expresses itself in the form of works. Faith lives in works, just as works are done in faith.¹⁴

This view precludes certain other ways of designating the relation of faith and works. For example, faith and good works are not related *externally*, which is to say that they are *not* in a causal or instrumental relation; faith neither causes good works nor are good works a means to end e.g., to earn merit. We do say that faith and good works are connected *internally* where it is meant that faith *lives in works* and so is a constituent in the goodness of the good work, that is, we mean that faith is *contained within* the goodness of the work. This in turn invites a change in the way we conceptualize good works as a means of achieving something for to say that the connection is internal and conceptual is to invite one to envisage that the very possibility of good works themselves are the gift of faith. So there is no issue of bridging some gap or relation between faith and good works for there is no gap. Rather, we are invited to a faith which informs one's very conception of a good human endeavor; it is a reorientation or re-perception of one's entire attitude to works whereby faith as confident trust from the heart sees all works as gracious gifts pleasing to God. To see this is gift.

The view that faith is internal to the concept of good works is parallel to the claim that faith is directional: it has focus or orientation to God's action which alone makes good works possible; there are no good works except those which God has commanded and we will always need, according to Luther, to learn to recognize good works from the commandments of God. So the faith which is contained within the concept of good works is directional in the sense that it is oriented to the actions of God identified in the commands of the Decalogue which, on Luther's understanding, is to say that "... this faith, this trust, this confidence from the heart's core is the true fulfilling of the first commandment."¹⁵ One writer rightly notes, "Like Aquinas, Luther thinks that the first commandment is the key to all the others because 'if the heart is in a right relationship with God and this commandment is kept, then all the other commandments will follow of themselves.' The first commandment 'illuminates' all the others and shares its splendor with them."¹⁶ In sum, the correlation of faith and God's action in the exclusive demand of the first command is what leads Luther to say that "... God has promised his grace freely, and he wills that we start by trusting that grace and perform all works in that grace, whatever those works may be."¹⁷

III. Luther on Agency and Action

How does the primacy of faith influence Christian life? Clearly, the emphasis is on the passivity of the moral agent and Luther sets forth the implications of this view. At one level, persons are inevitably involved in action: “Now since the being and nature of man cannot exist for an instant unless it is doing or not doing something, putting up with or running away from something (for as we know, life never stands still), well then, let him who wants to be whole and full of good works begin to exercise himself at all times in this faith in all his life and works.”¹⁸ But Luther is not inferring that such works are being done in a way to merit grace or favor nor is such activity a form of self-actualization. The actualization of the self is *not* primary to Luther and good works, even understood as “religious works,” are those in which “to all appearances God is honored, but in reality the self has been set up as an idol.”¹⁹ One writer properly describes these as mere acts of appeasement and self-righteousness, which exhibit the depths of a self-corruption which turns all goods to itself.²⁰ The focus of Luther’s criticism here is directed to those who calculate benefits accumulating to oneself on the basis of certain kind of moral performances and such action undertaken for self-benefit expose the Christian’s self-orientation to, his/her works – it is a disease of the self which is the curse of sin.

Good works grounded in faith, however, function as a release for the joyful and confident act of thanksgiving to God and service of the neighbour. So, in the exposition of the third commandment Luther emphasizes that true worship precludes actions aimed to appease wrath or secure favor; it is action evoked by the sheer goodness of the object being praised. This is why the third commandment amplifies the first for “... this commandment like the second, should be nothing other than a doing and a keeping of the first commandment, that is, of faith, trust, confidence, hope and love toward God so that in all the commandments the first may be the captain, and faith the chief work and life of all other works, without which ... such works cannot be good.”²¹ In interpreting the commands of the second table, Luther clarifies that the duty to one’s neighbor is founded in the way faith releases the agent from self-concerns to a cheerful trust in God’s goodness. Likewise, the commandment against murder is also rooted in faith: “... if faith does not doubt the favor of God, and a man has no doubt that he has a gracious God, it will be quite easy for him to

be gracious and favorable to his neighbor, however much the neighbor may have sinned against him.”²²

These are some of the many examples indicating how faith, as trustful response to the priority and beneficence of God’s actions, effects the release of the moral agent from self-concerns. But faith also contributes to a proper confidence characterizing good works. At the beginning of the “Treatise” Luther says unequivocally that the first and most precious of all good works is faith in Christ. He then refers to those involved in good works who doubt or do not know whether what they do pleases God and remarks “... that is not faith, nor is it a good conscience toward God; therefore their works are pointless.”²³ Having faith in Christ, however, means that in doing the works that I do I am assured that they are acceptable and pleasing to God and, according to Baylor, this is because faith confers on the conscience the ability to judge persons before acts and acts in the light of persons.²⁴ Here Luther’s point is that faith generates an assurance which amounts to a confidence which in turn tests the goodness of an action: “If he finds his heart confident that it pleases God, then the work is good.”²⁵ So, faith as trust in God’s action frees us from self centered action and the accusations of conscience to an unrestrained confidence: “A Christian man who lives in this confidence toward God knows all things, can do all things, ventures everything that needs to be done, and does everything gladly and willingly, not that he may gather merits and good works, but because it is a pleasure for him to please God in doing these things.”²⁶

Two other key themes bear on human action: first, Luther challenges the distinction between “secular” and “religious” works. “In ... faith all works become equal, and one work is like the other; all distinctions between works fall away, whether they be great, small, short, long, many, or few. For the works are acceptable not for their own sake but because of faith, which is always the same and lives and works in each and every work without distinction.” This egalitarian faith makes complex instructions in good works unnecessary, for a “Christian man living in this faith has no need of a teacher of good works.”²⁷ Since faith is comprised in good works, and since good works are free acts of praise rather than grounds for acceptance or merit, then the correct performance of religious works has little significance. Luther’s case is not simply against religious triviality but against an aberrational understanding of Christian

action. For good works are either directed to God in praise or directed to others in service. Preoccupation with religious techniques is likely another form of absorption in the agent's self-interest.

Second, Luther has much to say about works and neighbors. In commending selflessness in his interpretation of the seventh commandment, Luther states: "Faith teaches this work of itself. If the heart expects and puts its trust in divine favor, how can a man be greedy and anxious? Such a man is absolutely certain that he is acceptable to God therefore he does not cling to money; he uses his money cheerfully for the benefit of his neighbor."²⁸ Because faith releases an agent to act for the well being of the neighbor, a Christian ethos is characterized by the prevalence of good action towards one's neighbors in freedom from self-interest; the real need is to have self-concern suspended in order that an agent have as much devotion as she ought to human activity for the benefit of her neighbor. "The distinction is between trust in works out of concern for one's own eternal welfare and trust in works out of concern for the needs of another."²⁹ In sum, Luther's appeal to the primacy of faith in his discussion of action in Christian life consolidates a number key features of his moral outlook, especially those concerned with the primacy of divine action and the reorientation of the acting subject and his or her conscious action in response to that primacy. The most obvious consequence of this view is that it leads to an emphasis on the human person as passive and only secondarily an active agent. What does this mean for the discussion of human action?

IV. Passivity and Ethical Action

First, Luther is clear in the "Treatise" about the passivity of faith: "The highest and first work of God in us and the best training is that we let our own works go and let our reason and will lie dormant, resting and commending ourselves to God in all things, especially when they appear spiritual and good."³⁰ In his discourse on the Sabbath command Luther states that in its spiritual intention "The spiritual rest which God especially intends in the commandment is that we not only cease from our labor and trade but much more – that we let God alone work in us and that in all our powers do we do nothing of our own."³¹ Luther is clear that when we rest from our works, thoughts, and life then (as St. Paul says in Galatians 2: [20]) it is no longer we who live but Christ who lives, works, and speaks in

us.³² To be here is to find repose in pleasing God and contentedness in service as opposed to "... he who is not at one with God, or is in a state of doubt, worries and starts looking about for ways and means ..." to influence God with good works.³³ Clearly, the primacy of faith shapes Luther's moral world with emphasis upon the human person as the passive recipient of the work of God and only secondarily as a human agent for now "our works cease" and "God alone dwells in us."³⁴

Second, what the passivity of faith means above all is that the discussion of the acts of human agents takes place first in the indicative and only subsequently in the imperative because the guiding question in Luther's view is not, "What must I do?", but "What has God done?". This has an implication for beliefs about human moral action as in the case of a theologian³⁵ who notes that a primary foundation of Christian life is given in the form of indicative statements, i.e., God has done X and Y for you. The ethical imperatives or obligations associated with Christian life take the form Do X or Y and these are claimed to be logically based on the indicatives or they are not Christian. Often the inference is discussed in a more abstract way as the logical impossibility of deriving an 'ought' statement from a descriptive or an 'is' statement quite independent of the person's faith and action which, I submit, is not the way Luther would construe human moral acts. For one thing, it is the human person as agent and actor who is being formed (or transformed) by embracing certain fundamental indicative affirmations of the Gospel which pertain to God's indwelling so there is something very different packed into an indicative statement than is determined by reference to either its grammatical form or logical relations. For another, it is awkward and simplistic to construe Luther's view as one in which there is a division of the two in a way that we can claim that indicatives do not become imperatives or that imperatives are derived from the indicatives; rather indicatives enter into the formation of our imperatives in the way that our faith is internal to the definition of good works. From another perspective, we may say that Luther's view of persons as moral agents incorporates at once *both* the descriptive and normative aspect of the Christian life. His exposition of the Decalogue assumes that Christians have certain normative obligations placed upon them, which is simply to say that descriptively Christians are understood as

persons whose faith is such that they can be relied upon to follow certain kinds of imperatives they *already embody*. There is, so to speak, a kind of “isness” to the “oughtness” in that what we ought to do is already embodied in what in fact we are. So when Luther addresses us in the “Treatise on Good Works” with a series of instructions and expectations about behavior we are encountering at one and the same time statements about what we are (justified) and what we are expected to do. It is to recognize that good works mean nothing unless they are a manifestation of faith, the faith that lives in works.

V. Interpretation: Passivity, Agency and Action

If the issue around the passivity of faith is not, “What must I do?”, but “What has God done?”, then attention to good works is inevitably directed to “God alone” who “works in us” evoking a passive response characterized as a “cessation” or “receiving.” But is this the only or even the most reasonable way to characterize what Luther has to say about the action of the agent?

Eberhard Jungel is an interpreter of Luther who endorses passivity of faith and believes that Luther’s view of human moral action disputes any view that defines persons by their active self-actualization, especially that of the philosopher Aristotle who claims that “We become just by performing just acts.”³⁶ On this view, being just or righteous is a disposition of the agent who engages repeatedly in actions. It is a view against which Luther states in unequivocal fashion: “We do not become righteous by doing righteous deeds, but, having been made righteous, we do righteous deeds. This in opposition to the philosophers.”³⁷ In a Letter to Spalatin, Luther writes, “We are not, as Aristotle believes, made righteous by the doing of just deeds, unless we deceive ourselves; but rather – if I may say so – in becoming and being righteous people we do just deeds. First it is necessary that the persons be changed, then the deeds (will follow).”³⁸

Luther’s assertion that we act righteously only if we become and are righteous raises a query: How can a person become righteous prior to that person’s deeds? The answer is not to be found in the primacy of agency and action for it stands, according to Jungel, in contradistinction to the primacy of God’s creative action upon the self. This latter action construed as revelation is crucial to Jungel for

it accomplishes a “change of being” which means that the changed person is now only properly understood as *creatio ex nihilo* – created out of nothing.³⁹ In short, what Jungel is contending is that justification underlines the force of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* applied not as a mode of creation but as redemption from sin making it definitively clear that to be justified is to *be acted upon*, to be a *receiver*. The action here is divine revelation, the divine “Word of address”⁴⁰ in which the human person is *interrupted* in a crisis which disrupts self-identity and self-possession in such a way that one is released from domination by works/action and freed to become authentically human. As such, the human person is “defined” by the Word as a hearer distinguished from action in a way that liberates from the compulsion to act and hence becomes free. Jungel supports the implied distinction between person and works by appeal to Luther’s distinction between “inner” and “outer.” He states:

‘It is always necessary that the ... person himself be good before there can be any good works, and that good works follow and proceed for the good person.’ This statement clearly identifies ‘the person’ with the ‘inner man,’ for whom everything depends on the fact that he does not constitute himself. Correspondingly, the person does not constitute itself through its own deeds. The person becomes a doer only through love. On the other hand, the person is constituted by God’s Word and the decision between faith or unbelief which corresponds with or contradicts that Word. But the free or unfree person – dependent upon the decision– is expressed in its deeds. And the medium of its deeds is the outer man.⁴¹

That a person *is* righteous prior to that person’s deeds becomes intelligible with Jungel’s distinction between person (being) and works (doing) for it is persons as beings that are the subject of attributions such as freedom, righteousness or goodness. But it is important not to misunderstand Jungel when he frequently speaks of person or being as “prior to all activity” and fundamentally a “recipient, which can give God nothing but the honor of first receiving itself from him.” In naming this discourse about self as “ontological,”⁴² Jungel is not offering an exhaustive definition of personhood so much as recommending a manner of evaluating human worth, which is not oriented to agency and action. Whatever else the faith that justifies does in the “Treatise on Good Works,” it posits persons without or in spite of works and in doing so entails a

distinction between the truth of personhood and the actuality of works. The implied thrust of Luther's treatise is radical when seen as a reversal of normalcy: being precedes doing.

Jungel captures some the meaning implicit in Luther's theme of the primacy and passivity of faith found in the "Treatise" and forcefully reminds us that our personhood is not embodied in our action, yet there is room to ask how the passivity of faith involves human action – action which is more than a receptivity bordering on passive acquiescence. Luther himself is not without a view about this matter when he states, "that our works cease and that God alone works in us, is accomplished in two ways."⁴³ The first way has to do with our own effort; the second way, through the effort or urging of others. In the latter way a person is active as an agent in relation to the world in which we are disciplined to learn by way of our interaction with others about matters such as illness, property, honour, etc. In this sphere of relations to the world a person may well be envisaged as an active working subject but what obtains here would be qualitatively different in the human person's relation to him- or herself. In the sphere of the relation to one's self the encounter is one of passivity for in confronting our own will desires and senses "it is not possible for a man to direct his own life. He must commend himself to God's governance and rest."⁴⁴ So construed, Luther himself is suggesting a limit on the sense in which a person is essentially an acting, active and working subject.

What Jungel adds to this is not only contained in his presentation of Luther's distinction between person and work, "inner" and "outer," but in his view that there is a creative passivity modeled in the activity of liturgical worship. Here, against the background of *solo verbo, sola fide* Jungel aims to affirm human action grounded in passivity without compromising the primacy of God's determinative action. He expounds Luther's sacramental theology endorsing an "exclusively Christological use of the term 'sacrament'," in which it is "... understood and celebrated as *God acting upon us*, and is not perverted into our handling of God in the form of a work of piety." Jungel then applies this to the notion to the Catholic view of sacramental representation and the correlative description of Church as a sacramental event which he believes need not be rejected but clarified in terms of the "... character of that representation as *action*." Jungel does this by proposing what is called a soteriological

distinction within the concept of action whereby he differentiates between Creator, creation and the saving work of God by which he means "... that every human action is characterized by a fundamentally *receptive* action, by a *creative passivity*, that is, by faith rather than by good works in which we seek to do something to God in direct correspondence to his benefits. More simply: 'to let God perform his work – and this alone is the function of the church's action'."⁴⁵

Given Jungel's view of the essential elements of liturgical worship – a service to God which lets God perform his work – we have a model of human action in worship which is a *receiving*. This is an exercise of faith incapable of degenerating into acts of human self-realization since the liturgical action of the church is the very opposite of religious self-realization.⁴⁶ In the receptive faith of liturgy the Church asks, "What should we do?," and the basic response to God's act of speaking his holy Word to us is that we in turn speak to him in prayer and hymns of praise.⁴⁷ Here, prayer and praise are responsive actions or works with no causal or instrumental uses nor any motivations and goals other than the sheer goodness of the One praised. This is action in passivity and appears to be very similar to that order of spontaneity that Luther has in mind when he speaks of faith in the heart during the mass: "The heart must grow warm and melt in the love of God. Then praise and thanksgiving will follow with a pure heart ..."⁴⁸

Notes

- ¹ John Macquarrie, "Act, Action Agent," in *The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, ed. J. F. Childress and J. Macquarrie (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), pp. 8f. Contemporary moral theologians distinguish between "act" as the deed done; "action" as the doing of it; and the "agent" as the doer. The related term "agency" is often attributed to a person to indicate either (a) the force or power to bring about an effect and (b) the "doing" or acting which brings about a certain effect. Often "agency" is used to capture the notion of acting freely in deciding where the assumption is often that the moral life primarily consists of a sequence of decisions.
- ² Martin Luther, "Treatise on Good Works," in *Luther's Works: The Christian in Society*, Vol. 44 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), p. 21. He states: "For the greatest question has been raised, the question

of good works, where immeasurably more trickery and deception is practiced than anywhere else, and where the simple-minded man is so easily misled that our Lord Christ has commanded us to watch carefully for the sheep's clothing under which the wolves hide themselves (Matt. 7:15. There is no silver, gold, precious stone, or rare treasure that has as many substitutes and flaws as good works."

3 Ibid., pp. 262f.

4 Ibid., p. 23. In this paper I have followed the meaning of "doing" as laid out in John Webster's excellent presentation on "The Grammar of 'Doing'." Other segments of this paper that are indebted to Webster's presentation are found on pp. 5ff., and pp. 10f. Cf. John Webster, *Barth's Moral Theology, Human Action in Barth's Thought* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998).

5 George Lindbeck, "Martin Luther and the Rabbinic Mind," in Peter Ochs ed. *Understanding the Rabbinic Mind: Essays on the Hermeneutic of Max Kadushin* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 151.

6 "Treatise," p. 22.

7 Ibid., p. 72.

8 Ibid., pp. 23f.

9 Ibid., p. 26.

10 Ibid., p. 113.

11 Ibid., p. 26.

12 Paul Althaus, *The Ethics of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 17.

13 Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950). See pp. 140f., where Ramsey offers his statement on the point being made here: "Properly understood, however, what is called in question by this doctrine is not so much the *saving power* of good works, as the *goodness* of all *so-called* 'good' works done without faith. Let it for the moment be granted that *if* really good works were done apart from salvation by faith, they would indeed have power to save. But according to Luther, this is a hypothesis contrary to fact. Faith first gives 'works' the *ability to be good*; it does not simply add some supplementary saving power to good works. Faith saves the goodness of 'good works;' it enters into the very constitution of goodness; it does not simply save the agent who otherwise or without faith performs good works. Works done, even martyrdom suffered, for the constitution of saving one's own soul are not even good works, much less saving works."

- 14 Althaus, *The Ethics of Martin Luther*, p. 17.
- 15 Ibid., p. 30. His exposition of the first table of the Decalogue exposes meanings which he repeatedly relates back to the first commandment.
- 16 Stanley Hauerwas, "The Truth About God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful Speech," in Stanley Hauerwas, *Sanctify Them in the Truth, Holiness Exemplified* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), p. 51.
- 17 "Treatise," p. 33.
- 18 Ibid., p. 34.
- 19 Ibid., p. 32.
- 20 D. S. Lage, *Martin Luther's Christology and Ethics* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), p. 107.
- 21 "Treatise" p. 60.
- 22 Ibid., p. 103.
- 23 Ibid., p. 24.
- 24 M. G. Baylor, *Action and Person, Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), p. 228.
- 25 "Treatise," p. 25
- 26 Ibid., p. 27.
- 27 Ibid., p. 26.
- 28 Ibid., p. 108.
- 29 Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics*, p. 138.
- 30 "Treatise," p. 74.
- 31 Ibid., p. 72.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 71, 73.
- 33 Ibid., p. 27.
- 34 Ibid., p. 73.
- 35 Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom, A Primer in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 92f.
- 36 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 91f., 1103 b 1.
- 37 Martin Luther, "Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (1517)," in Timothy F. Lull, ed., *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings* (Minneapolis: Fortress press, 1989), p. 16.

- 38 Jungel, "The World as Possibility and Actuality," p. 105, in Eberhard Jungel, *Theological Essays*, trans. John B. Webster (Edinburgh, Scotland, T & T Clarke, 1989). See footnote #38 on page 105 where Jungel acknowledges the quotation is from M. Luther as also *The Letter to Spalatin*, 19 October 1516, *LW* 48, p. 25. Also cited is the dispute with Aristotle in Luther's comments on Ps. 85.13 in the First Lectures on the Psalms. II: Psalms 76-106, *LW* 11, pp. 173f.
- 39 Ibid., pp. 146, 107.
- 40 Eberhard Jungel, *The Freedom of a Christian, Luther's Significance for Contemporary Theology*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1988), p. 65.
- 41 Ibid., p. 77. Jungel is quoting Luther at this point.
- 42 Ibid., pp. 79, 81.
- 43 "Treatise," p. 73.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Eberhard Jungel, 'The Church as Sacrament,' In *Theological Essays*, trans. John B. Webster (Edinburgh: T & T Clarke, 1989), pp. 194, 196, 199,202, 203. Note on p. 203: "To let God perform his work – this and this alone is the function of the church's action. Since 'in all ... sacraments and in the sermons' no one 'gives God anything or does him any service, but instead takes something,' the activity of Christian worship is 'not a work but only and exercise of faith'."
- 46 Ibid., p. 203.
- 47 Ibid., 204. Jungel is quoting with approval from Luther's *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, *LW* 36, p. 56, where he states: "In the liturgical action of the church, 'nothing else ... should happen than that our dear Lord himself should speak his holy Word to us and we in turn speak to him in prayer and hymns of praise'."
- 48 "Treatise," p. 56.