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Conforming to the Will of the Church: The Role of Religious Orientation, Religious Proscription, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism in the Religion-Prejudice Relationship

By

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THESIS

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Abstract

Study 1 was designed to determine the relationships between three religious orientations and three measures of prejudice. Contrary to previous findings, religious Quest (Q) was not negatively correlated with 2 measures of ethnocentrism. However, the associations among dependent measures of religiously proscribed and nonproscribed prejudices, and Intrinsic (I) and Extrinsic (E) religious orientations, supported previous findings. Study 1 also was intended to examine the role of "right-wing authoritarianism" (RWA) and "social desirability" (SD) in the religion-prejudice relationship. Contrary to Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993), no correlational evidence was found to support the hypothesis that highly intrinsic believers are prone to responding in a socially desirable way on overt questionnaire measures of prejudice, however, RWA was positively related to I. When the effect of RWA was controlled in a partial correlation procedure, the negative correlation between self-reported I and ethnocentrism became significantly stronger, while a positive relationship between self-reported I and nonproscribed prejudice was eliminated. Partial correlations between E, Q, and prejudice shifted in a "more prejudiced" direction for both proscribed and nonproscribed measures of prejudice. Study 2 compared behavioural prejudice responses (choosing a black vs. white, and homosexual vs. heterosexual interviewer) with measures of prejudice from Study 1. For proscribed prejudice, self-reported ethnocentrism was not a predictor of discrimination. For nonproscribed prejudice, choosing a heterosexual over a homosexual interviewer was associated with self-reported homophobic attitudes. Finally, results of Study 2 did not support our hypothesis that the I-prejudice relationship is mediated by authoritarian (RWA) attitudes.

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Finally, I extend my love to my wife Gail, to my children Chris and Olivia, and to The Old Bag for putting up with my absence and for supporting me when I needed reassurance.

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Introduction

Empirical evidence suggests that prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviours develop because of, and are maintained by, a myriad of personal, societal and situational factors. Indeed, the word "prejudice" has elicited innumerable definitions, and many models have been proposed to explain it. Unfortunately, none of these models appears to explain completely or to predict prejudicial attitudes or discriminatory behaviours (Duckitt, 1992). Therefore, in this paper we cannot hope to delineate the complex network of variables that have been empirically associated with both prejudice and discrimination. Rather, we focus on one piece of an intricate puzzle — the association between religion and prejudice.

There have been times in the past century when social scientists believed that the relationship between religion and prejudice had been determined (Spilka, 1986). However, new ways of measuring and defining religiosity provided researchers with new evidence that could not be ignored — different religious orientations are associated with prejudice in dissimilar ways (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993).

Batson et al. (1993) proposed several hypotheses concerning three specific religious orientations — intrinsic, extrinsic and quest — and prejudice, based on a sampling of empirical literature. Further, they suggested that certain types of prejudice may be "proscribed" by an individual's religious community (e.g., racism), while others are not (e.g., homophobia). The authors reported that for proscribed prejudice, those who self-reported experiencing religion primarily in an "intrinsic" way tended to be unprejudiced on overt questionnaire measures of prejudice, but not on reported covert

behavioural measures where some element of perceived personal consequence (e.g., being interviewed by a black person) had been built into the experimental design. They interpreted the discrepancy by suggesting that highly intrinsic people presented themselves in a "socially desirable" manner when measures of prejudice were overt. The present studies explored this possibility, but also considered right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) as an alternate explanation for the reported discrepancy.

Previous findings also suggest that right-wing authoritarianism is a strong predictor of prejudice (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duckitt, 1991; Wylie & Forest, 1992), and that it is also positively associated with intrinsic religiosity (Altemeyer, 1988; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). Thus, the present studies were designed to investigate an alternative explanation to the Batson et al. social desirability hypothesis — that RWA may explain why the association between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice reportedly varies between overt and covert dependent measures of racial prejudice (ethnocentrism).

We begin by reviewing the religion and prejudice literature. First, various definitions relating to prejudice will be presented, followed by a consideration of the reported relationships between three religious orientations and two types of prejudice. This will be followed by a discussion of religiously proscribed prejudice and the Batson et al. (1993) social desirability hypothesis concerning the relationships between religious orientation and some types of prejudice. Finally, an alternative explanation for these relationships, RWA, will be presented, followed by a detailed discussion of overt questionnaire measures of prejudice and several covert behavioural experiments which

Batson and his associates have highlighted to defend their criticism of the overuse of questionnaire measures.

Review of the Literature

Prejudice and Religion

Devine (1995) defined prejudice in its most basic form as "negative feelings toward persons based solely on their group membership" (p. 486). Group membership can refer to persons with similar physical characteristics, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, political ideology or other designated similarities. Prejudice sometimes takes the form of ethnocentrism, which "consists of a belief in the unique value and rightness of one's ingroup and a disdain for outgroups to the extent that they differ from the ingroup" (Duckitt, 1992, p. 7). Further, Bierly (1985) reported that outgroup prejudice is indiscriminate, crossing a wide range of groups.

When prejudiced attitudes turn into associated negative behaviour, the term discrimination applies. "Whereas prejudice is an attitude, discrimination is a selectively unjustified negative behaviour toward members of the target group" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p. 3). However, it is important to note "that prejudice does not always lead to discrimination and that discrimination may have causes other than prejudice" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p. 3).

If prejudice is associated with inequity and intolerance, then one might expect religion to decrease prejudice. For the most part, organized religion advocates a moral and righteous code for living that demands of its adherents not only tolerance, but also the love of others; this is especially true of the teachings of Christianity. However, a closer

look at the behaviours of those who profess to be religious often contradicts the expectation that highly religious persons will be less prejudiced than the nonreligious. For example, Batson (1976) has pointed out that while "espousing the highest good, seeking to make all men brothers, religion has produced the Crusades, the Inquisition and an unending series of witch hunts" (p. 30).

Certainly, atrocities committed in the name of religion are not exclusive to past centuries. The Middle East, Northern Ireland, and the former republic of Yugoslavia provide contemporary examples of how religion can apparently be a key factor in fuelling the flames of outgroup prejudice and discrimination.

Indeed, the majority of studies conducted prior to the mid-sixties reported a positive relationship between prejudice and religiosity, although the shape of the relationship — linear or curvilinear — has been disputed (Batson et al., 1993; Hunsberger, 1995). Research changed direction in the mid-sixties when measures of religious orientations emerged, and church attendance was no longer considered to be the primary determinant of an individual's religiousness. The development of measures of religious orientation provided new ways to examine the religion-prejudice issue.

Religious Orientation and Prejudice

Gordon Allport (1966) suggested that it is not religion per se that is at the root of prejudice, but rather the way in which one is religious. He proposed two different ways of being religious. First, an "intrinsic" religious orientation entails experiencing religion as an "ultimate end in itself." Second, an "extrinsic" orientation is a "means used to gain more ultimate self-serving ends" (Batson, 1976, pp. 30-31). Individuals who are intrinsically

motivated live their religion in all facets of their life, while those who are extrinsically orientated use their religion for personal gain, benefitting from church membership (e.g., social and emotional support). Allport reported that those with extrinsic motives were more inclined to be prejudiced than were those with an intrinsic approach to religion (Allport & Ross, 1967).

Allport's dichotomy of intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation is traditionally measured by the Religious Orientation scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). However, there has been much concern regarding the conceptualization and psychometric properties of this measure, for both the Extrinsic (E) and Intrinsic (I) subscales (Hunsberger, 1995; Kirkpatrick, 1993; McFarland & Warren, 1992). Indeed, Batson (1976), in reference to items intended to measure I, proclaimed that "certainly a saint might strongly agree with these statements, but so might a religious conformist who identified with religious dogma, persons, or institutions in a rigid, unthinking, dependent fashion" (p. 32). Further, the psychometric properties of the E subscale especially, have tended to be weak (Batson et al., 1993; Donahue, 1985a, 1985b; Hunsberger, 1995).

Batson (see Batson et al., 1993) has conceptualized a third religious orientation, religious Quest (Q), which was designed to tap three issues originally contained in Allport's definition of "mature" religion that had been neglected in the formulation of the I and E measures. These were complexity of thought in reference to religious issues, healthy doubts about one's faith, and a continual search for answers to life's most perplexing questions. Batson and Schoenrade (1991a, 1991b) provided evidence to support their contention that Q is a bonafide third measure of religiosity that is

conceptually independent of both the I and E orientations. Scholarly opinions have generally concluded that Q is a valid religious orientation (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Burris, Jackson, Tarpley, & Smith, 1996; Hunsberger, 1995), however, some (e.g., Gorsuch, 1988) have questioned the scale's reliability.

Despite criticisms aimed at these three religious measures, the scales have been widely used to measure religiosity in studies of the relationship between religion and prejudice. The majority of research initiatives have concluded that I is negatively correlated with prejudice while E is positively correlated (e.g., Gorsuch, 1988; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988). Some exceptions to this rule have been reported, especially when cross-cultural studies have been considered (e.g., Griffin, Gorsuch, & Davis, 1987). Research has also provided evidence that Q is a negative predictor of prejudice in that persons with high Q scores are on average likely to be more tolerant of outgroups (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996; McFarland & Warren, 1992). Some investigations, however, have not found any significant relationship between Q and prejudice (e.g., Griffin, Gorsuch, & Davis, 1987; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988).

In the end, reviews of the related literature have typically concluded that I and Q are negatively, and E positively associated with prejudice, but the explanations for these relationships have been controversial. Recently, Batson et al. (1993) proposed that religious proscription might offer an explanation.

Religious Proscription and Prejudice

A review of the relevant literature led Batson et al. (1993) to conclude that certain

prejudices are typically proscribed (prohibited) by an individual's religious community (e.g., racial prejudice), while other prejudices may be nonproscribed (e.g., negative attitudes towards homosexuals). Further, they suggested that the direction of self-reported religious orientation-prejudice relationships might be to some extent dependent on the proscription status of the prejudice at issue.

When a prejudice was nonproscribed by a religious community, Batson et al. (1993) reported a positive relationship with I, negative with Q, and no association with E (see Table 1). This finding contradicted Allport's general view of a negative association.

Table 1. Self-reported relationships between proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice and religious orientations.

	Orientation		
Proscription Status	**Intrinsic**	**Extrinsic**	**Quest**
Proscribed Prejudice	Negative or None	Positive	Negative
Nonproscribed Prejudice	Positive	None	Negative

between prejudice and I. However, when proscribed prejudice was examined, the Batson summary indicated that I generally yielded a low negative correlation or no correlation, while E was positively correlated, and Q was negatively associated with dependent measures. Why do the direction of relationships between religious orientation (I and E) and prejudice change when proscription status changes?

One explanation for the reported directional change in correlations involves the issue of religious conformity. According to Batson and his associates (Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978), persons who have high intrinsic scores may be inclined to reply in a "socially

desirable" way. They argue that because intrinsically motivated people "live" their religion, they are more compelled to respond according to what is expected of them by their religious community. In this regard, Batson and associates have demonstrated that on overt measures such as questionnaires, I has been negatively linked with proscribed prejudice, but when covert behavioural measures have been used in experiments, the negative relationship disappears (Batson et al., 1978; Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz & Pych, 1986). They contend that persons with high intrinsic scores more often conform to the dictates of their religious community than do those who score high on the extrinsic subscale — provided there is no personal cost for doing so. We shall return to this issue of overt vs. covert measures of prejudice in a later section of this paper.

How is the proscription status of a prejudice determined? Batson et al. (1993) indicated that racial prejudice is prohibited by most religious communities in North America, and therefore, declared it proscribed; in a similar manner homophobic attitudes acquired the nonproscription label, since many churches apparently tolerate or even encourage negative attitudes towards homosexuals. This manner of categorization may be problematic because there is no evidence to suggest that members of a particular religious community are aware of their church's proscription, or that they accurately interpret their church's position regarding prejudice. It may be that the religious proscription status of racism and homophobia are as these authors have indicated — when using official church position as the determining criteria for proscription status — but the perceptions of parishioners need also be considered.

To conclude that high intrinsics conform to the norms of their religious community

with respect to specific prejudices is premature without first determining perceptions of the faithful. There is little doubt that religious groups attempt to dictate what members are to believe and how they are to act. However, it cannot be assumed that religious people always follow the dictates of their religious community. For example, it is common knowledge that some Roman Catholic couples practice artificial birth control (67.3%), or resort to therapeutic abortion in times of unwanted pregnancy (Balakrishnan & Chen, 1990) even though both practices are in direct defiance of church edicts. It is not the purpose here to suggest that there is no relationship between what the church teaches and what members believe or do, but rather, to illustrate that when the parent commands the child may not always comply. Therefore, testing of the proscription hypothesis should involve asking respondents to indicate their church's position regarding specific prejudices.

According to Batson et al. (1993), the relationship between E and prejudice may be explained by anti-church sentiment. They contend that extrinsically motivated persons may be reacting against religiously generated prohibitions and that they are less concerned about acting in a socially desirable way than are intrinsically motivated people. It might be argued that this explanation contradicts the underlying motives of the extrinsic orientation. That is, if an extrinsically motivated individual engages in religious activity as a means to an end, failure to comply with church decreed values might prove detrimental to his/her cause. For example, establishing and maintaining social or business contacts may be jeopardized by failing to conform to the will of the church.

Batson's social desirability explanation for the above relationships may be inadequate, for it does not consider the association between other variables (e.g.,

personality traits) and prejudice, across the three religious orientations. Further, Gorsuch (1988) questioned the social desirability interpretation for the relationship between I and prejudice, noting that supporting evidence has relied on relationships between I and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1964). The latter measure is confounded by content that is "religiously relevant" (Gorsuch, 1988, p. 214). Watson, Morris, Foster, and Hood (1986) provided evidence to support this criticism. In a series of studies, they examined the relationships among I, SD, and a variety of other personality factors, and they asked respondents to rate each SD item according to its religious relevance. They found that 12 items of the 33 item scale were rated as religiously relevant by the majority of respondents. The researchers concluded that administering the SD as a measure of social desirability to high intrinsics may place the group at a significant disadvantage. Furthermore, although I was weakly correlated with SD in their two studies that had included the measure (r (256) = .21, $p < .01$; r (140) = .17, $p. < .05$), it was inversely related to a number of other self-presentation measures, a finding which questions the validity of the SD as a measure of social desirability. Richards (1994) also found a positive relationship between I and SD (r (178) = .20, $p < .01$). However, Spilka, Kojetin, and McIntosh (1985) investigated the relationship between I and several social desirability measures and found no relationship, nor did Genia (1996) using a shorter 20-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne scale.

Leak and Fish (1989) criticized Watson et al. (1986) on their choice of scales deemed "conceptually similar" (p.356) to the Marlowe-Crowne scale. Instead, they administered Paulhus' Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) to a sample of

introductory psychology students, in order to examine the relationship between intrinsic orientation and both impression management and self-deception, two distinct constructs that are confounded in the Marlowe-Crowne instrument. They reported that intrinsic scores were positively and significantly associated with both impression management (r = .23) and self-deception (r = .27) scores, while neither extrinsic or quest were related. Further, they tested the BIDR for religiously relevant content, in response to Watson et al.'s (1986) concerns regarding the Marlowe-Crowne scale. The BIDR was not found to contain religiously relevant items. This finding cast doubt on Watson et al.'s claim that high I scoring respondents may be at a distinct disadvantage when completing the Marlowe-Crowne scale.

Moreover, Burris (1994) suggested that self-reported pure intrinsics (i.e., those who score above the intrinsic midpoint but below either the extrinsic or quest midpoints) in particular might be more prone to socially desirable response sets as measured by the BIDR compared to those admit to "mixed" motives (i.e., high intrinsic/high extrinsic or high intrinsic/high quest), or those who report relatively low levels of intrinsic orientation. These findings again provide some support for the Batson et al. social desirability hypothesis.

Despite criticisms, we were inclined to use the Marlowe-Crowne measure in the present study for the purpose of comparison with other reported studies. Batson et al. (1978) used this measure in their well documented behavioural study, and most of the consequential research that has investigated the social desirability hypothesis has also used the Marlowe-Crowne scale.

Gorsuch (1988) also questioned the social desirability hypothesis on two other fronts. First, the studies used by Batson and his associates in their meta-analysis spanned almost thirty years, and it was not necessarily social desirable to hold nonprejudiced views throughout this time. Secondly, the studies were conducted in various parts of the United States. He noted that "in the 1940s and early 1950s, prejudice was socially desirable, particularly in the South" (p. 215), adding that in some of these earlier cases highly religious people should have been more prejudiced than the nonreligious — this notion was not supported in the Batson et al. (1993) meta-analysis.

Finally, we must also consider the possibility that intrinsically motivated people may score high on the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale because they are actually more socially desirable. Crowne (1979) admitted that it is difficult to determine whether respondents are denying, or being truthful, about unflattering characteristics. In light of Crowne's observation it may be that the reported negative relationship between I and proscribed prejudice is an artifact of intrinsically oriented persons responding truthfully on measures of proscribed prejudice.

If we set aside the criticisms of the Batson et al. social desirability hypothesis and assume it is correct — that is, persons with an intrinsic approach to religion tend to be concerned about responding in a socially desirable way — we must search for a motivating factor. What motivates the intrinsically orientated individual to respond in a socially desirable manner, while persons with an extrinsic or quest approach to religion reportedly do not? Is there a common personality trait or shared attitude that is specific to those who choose to intrinsically embrace their faith? Previous research findings indicate

that RWA may be one such personality trait.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) described RWA as a personality trait that consists of three attitudinal clusters: 1) authoritarian submission; 2) authoritarian aggression; and 3) conventionalism. The first is defined as "a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives" (1996, p. 6), the second is "a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities" (1996, p. 6), and the third relates to "a high degree of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities" (1996, p. 6). These attitudes are measured on a instrument developed by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), called the Right-Wing Authoritarian scale.

Right-wing authoritarianism has been positively linked to some measures of prejudice (Altemeyer, 1988), including ethnocentric and homophobic attitudes (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996; Wylie & Forest, 1992). But is RWA in any way related to religion? Further, is RWA related to SD?

Altemeyer (1988, 1996) noted that high authoritarians tend to be devoted in their religious faith, especially in regard to church attendance, reading of scripture, and in prayer, and they are not likely to doubt religious teachings. Indeed, the RWA scale is apparently positively related to the I scale (Altemeyer, 1988; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996), and a religious fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), and negatively correlated with the E and Q scales (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). It is important to note

that these studies were correlational, and therefore no causative conclusions can be drawn.

With regard to SD, a search of the literature produced no published studies that have investigated a possible relationship between SD and RWA. It would seem reasonable to suspect that persons who score high on the RWA scale may be inclined to respond in a socially desirable way, given that they tend to submit to authority figures and are prone to conventionalism. Given that both SD and RWA are positively correlated with I, these two variables may be in some way related.

Altemeyer and Hunsberger (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995) suggested that the relationship between religion and prejudice might be easier to understand if the role of RWA is considered. Similarly, Petropoulos (1979) recommended that the testing of any association between religion and prejudice should require control for authoritarianism.

It is argued here that RWA could offer an alternative explanation for Batson et al.'s social desirability interpretation of the intrinsic-prejudice relationships. Moreover, the reported change in correlation between I and prejudice when shifting from overt questionnaire dependent measures of prejudice to covert behavioural dependent measures might also be explained by RWA. Thus, for example, if intrinsically religious persons, on average, tend to score higher on measures of RWA than do extrinsics or questers, this could also contribute to Batson et al.'s reported pattern of relationships between I, E, Q, and prejudice.

In this regard, Duck and Hunsberger (1996) found in a questionnaire study that RWA correlated positively with I (r (363) = .49) and negatively with E (r (363) = -.23)

and Q (r (363) = -.36). They also used a partial correlation procedure to control for the effect of RWA when correlating religious orientation with dependent measures of both ethnocentrism (proscribed prejudice) and homophobia (nonproscribed prejudice). They reported that the relationships between religious orientation and prejudice shifted substantially following the partial correlation procedure — for ethnocentrism, the negative relationship between I and prejudice increased and the positive relationship between I and homophobia was eliminated. In addition, controlling for the effect of religious proscription in these religion-prejudice relationships resulted in no substantial shifts in the correlations.

The conceptualization of RWA helps to explain why it offers a viable alternative to the social desirability hypothesis. Intrinsically motivated people may be more inclined to conform to the will of the church because they hold attitudes which promote submission to authorities and are more likely to hold conventional views. Therefore, conforming to the teachings of one's religious group regarding minority groups may be related to an individual's degree of authoritarianism.

Questionnaire vs. Behavioural Measures of Prejudice

Batson and his associates (Batson et al., 1978; Batson et al., 1986; Batson et al., 1993) have been consistently critical of the almost exclusive use of questionnaire measures of prejudice in studies of the prejudice-religion relationship. They suggested that people might be inclined to respond in a socially desirable manner when completing overt questionnaire measures of prejudice, and thus might appear to be unprejudiced even though they are actually prejudiced. Batson et al. believe that behavioural measures offer

a preferable alternative, since an element of personal cost can be built into an experiment, and it is easier to make a behavioural measure of prejudice covert. They argue that a prejudiced person's tendency to respond in a nonprejudiced socially desirable way is effectively controlled for in behavioural experiments.

Batson et al. (1993) considered questionnaire measures of prejudice to be "overt," because the real purpose of prejudice measures, both questionnaire and interview type, soon becomes obvious by the way in which scale items or questions are often worded. They suspect that participants respond in accordance with societal norms because they do not wish to look prejudiced. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) also have raised this concern.

Here, we must consider whether anonymity has any impact on participant responses as many paper and pencil questionnaires are anonymous. Even though scale measures of prejudice are often overt, anonymity should encourage people to answer truthfully because there is no fear of identification. Nonetheless, some might argue that respondents are susceptible to demand characteristics. Participant positive self-presentation can serve as a way to gratify the experimenter, or as a means to self-image preservation or fortification.

Batson et al. (1993) highlighted three relevant studies with behavioural measures of prejudice, two of which were designed to compare overt vs. covert measures of prejudice. These two experiments led Batson et al. (1993) to conclude that the negative relationship between I and proscribed prejudice (racial prejudice), obtained on overt questionnaire dependent measures was eliminated when social desirability was controlled by using behavioural measures.

The first experiment (Batson et al., 1978) provided participants with an opportunity to rate a potential white and a potential black interviewer, one of which would then interview them concerning their religious beliefs. Race was made obvious by a photo of either a white or a black student which was clipped to two resumes. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the rating of a potential black interviewer from that of a white interviewer, thus creating an index of racial prejudice. The relationship between I and prejudice (as measured by their behavioural prejudice index) was nonsignificantly positive ($r = .19$) even though I scores had correlated negatively ($r = -.36$) with racial prejudice on an overt questionnaire measure. A statistically significant difference was reported between these correlations. Further, no difference was found between the I-prejudice and E-prejudice correlations. Batson et al. suggested that the addition of a personal cost factor — participants' belief that they would be required to interact with their highest rated choice in a later interview — explained the discrepancy between overt and covert measures for I scale scores. They noted that the potential discomfort of interacting with a black interviewer outweighed the high scoring intrinsic participants' tendency to respond according to social pressures to appear nonprejudiced.

The second experiment (Batson et al., 1986) involved a technique developed by Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) called "attributional ambiguity," which was designed to flush out concealed prejudice. This procedure involved providing participants with an opportunity to attribute their prejudiced behaviour to some factor other than prejudice. Participants were told that the study concerned determining how people choose the movies they watch. After reading written information about two different movies,

they were then asked to make a choice between two theatres. In each theatre sat a confederate, one black and one white. One group was told that one of the video tapes had broken and that the same film would be shown in each theatre, while the other group was told that different movies would be shown. Results indicated that high intrinsics (based on a median split) chose to sit with the black person more often than low intrinsics when they believed the same movie was playing, an overt prejudice condition according to Batson and his associates. However, when they were led to believe that different movies were available for viewing, high intrinsics chose the black confederate no more often than did low intrinsics. Batson et al. suggested that participants were able to allow the different movie to masquerade as the reason for their choice of theatres, and therefore were less inclined to react in a nonprejudiced way. High versus low extrinsics did not significantly discriminate between white or black in either group, while high versus low questers more often chose to sit with the black confederate even in the attributional ambiguity condition.

On the surface it seems that the two experiments described provide reasonable paradigms for future research initiatives. However, on closer examination there is a puzzling anomaly in these two studies. The authors of the first experiment (Batson et al., 1978) claim that high intrinsics were willing to present themselves in a prejudiced manner because there was a personal cost attached to their rating of interviewers, that being that they would have to be interviewed by the interviewer that they had rated highest. In the second experiment (Batson et al., 1986) there was also a personal cost factor built into the experiment for **both** groups, since participants expected to sit and watch a movie with either a black or a white confederate. The authors claimed that when the same movie was

playing (an overt and low attributional condition), high intrinsics were socially conscious about appearing prejudiced and therefore more chose to sit with the black confederate. This reasoning is seemingly contradicted by the results of the first experiment which also was an overt and low attributional condition. Why would high intrinsics more often rate a white interviewer higher in experiment 1 (an overt admission of prejudice), an action explained by the authors as fear of the consequences of being interviewed by a black person, while in experiment 2 they chose to sit with a black confederate (also an overt measure of prejudice) for fear of looking prejudiced? Perhaps the consequences of being interviewed by a black person were perceived as more costly than was watching a movie with one. Additional research is necessary to assess the effectiveness of the personal cost and attributional ambiguity paradigms.

Several issues arise concerning the generalizability of these two studies in which behavioural measures of prejudice were used. First, both studies took place at the same mid-western American university and cannot be generalized beyond a university sample. General replications in different areas of the U.S. as well as in other countries should help to determine the importance of the Batson et al. findings. Second, having negative racial attitudes has become increasingly less acceptable in North American society (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, 1996). It is not known how the results of the 1978 and 1986 studies are relevant in the nineteen-nineties. Replications that use behavioural consequence to assess personal prejudice are needed to address these concerns. At present, there appears to be no published replication of the Batson et al. (1978, 1986) experiments.

Religious Orientation Categorization

Batson et al. (1993) criticized the practice of placing people into religious categories based on individual I and E scale scores. They claim that the practice of categorizing people as either intrinsic or extrinsic, although convenient for research purposes, is inappropriate. Rather, continuous scores are argued to provide an advantage over a split score typology because individuals have scores on each of the three religious orientations, not just one. Further, Batson et al. (1993) reported that I, E, and Q are orthogonal constructs, and are independent of each other. For example, a person who scores high on I does not necessarily have to score low on E and Q. Batson et al. (1986) pointed out that all dimensions are working at the same time in individuals to varying degrees, and that "pressures to be or to appear less prejudiced that were associated with the different dimensions would be operating simultaneously. In some subjects this would produce augmentation; in others, inhibition" (p. 180). Therefore, Batson and his colleagues most often used correlational analyses with individual scale scores, and adopted a high-low scoring split procedure for each of the three religious orientations in making nonparametric comparisons. Recently, the independence of I, E, and Q has been challenged because of a reported inversely curvilinear relationship between I and E, and I and Q (Burris, 1994). However, we attempted to parallel the Batson approach in the present investigation whenever possible for comparison purposes.

The Present Studies

The present studies were designed to test various hypotheses proposed by Batson et al. (1993), first by replicating and extending a previous correlational study (Duck &

Hunsberger, 1996), and second, by utilizing an experimental design involving behavioural dependent measures of prejudice.

The correlational investigation (Study 1) had 4 goals. The first was to confirm the religious proscription status of ethnocentrism and homophobia. Previous evidence suggested that ethnocentrism is a proscribed prejudice, while homophobia is nonproscribed (Batson et al., 1993; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). Two new scales were developed to measure the extent to which ethnocentrism and homophobia were perceived as religiously proscribed.

The second goal was to confirm the reported relationships between the I, E, and Q religious orientations and both dependent measures of prejudice (ethnocentrism and homophobia). Duck and Hunsberger (1996) reported that the hypothesized relationships outlined by Batson et al. (1993) (see Table 1) had been supported on all but 1 of the 6 pairs of correlations. That is, a negative relationship had been reported between I and ethnocentrism, a positive association between I and homophobia, E correlated positively with ethnocentrism and negatively with homophobia, while Q was negatively associated with both dependent measures. Only the negative relationship between E and homophobia was contrary to predictions (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Third, a measure of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) was included in order to assess the Batson et al. (1993) argument that high intrinsics are more concerned about responding in a socially desirable manner than are either high extrinsics or high questers.

Finally, the feasibility of RWA, rather than social desirability, as a viable alternative

explanation for the relationships between religious orientation and prejudice were examined, using a partial correlation procedure to control for the effects of each factor.

The goals of the experimental design (Study 2) were three-fold. First, we intended to investigate the hypothesis (Batson et al., 1993) that the negative correlation between I and proscribed prejudice on overt questionnaire measures of prejudice is eliminated by the use of behavioural measures of prejudice when there is perceived personal cost to the participant, or when an opportunity to attribute prejudice to another factor is made possible by an ambiguous situation.

Secondly, we hoped to determine the role and effectiveness of personal cost and attributional ambiguity as paradigms for measuring prejudiced attitudes. This included comparing overt and covert measures of prejudice. This undertaking is in response to the discrepancy between the Batson et al. (1978, 1986) studies previously considered.

Finally, RWA was tested as a covariate in order to determine if it might help to explain the obtained behavioural relationships between religious orientation and prejudice.

Study 1

The first general purpose of Study 1 was to assess the correlational relationships among the three religious orientations (I, E, and Q), RWA, SD, and three scale measures of prejudice, and further, to determine the perceived proscription status of ethnocentrism and homophobia. Two of the prejudice measures tapped what is thought to be religiously proscribed prejudice (ethnocentrism), and one measure nonproscribed prejudice (negative attitudes towards homosexuals).

The second intention of Study 1 was to re-examine the religious orientation-

prejudice relationships after using a partial correlation procedure to psychometrically control for the effects of RWA, SD, and religious proscription.

This study was designed to replicate the findings of Duck and Hunsberger (1996) with regard to religious proscription and RWA, and further, to investigate the Batson et al. (1993) hypothesis regarding the tendency of high intrinsics to be prone to socially desirable response sets on questionnaire measures of prejudice. Specific predictions were made concerning these issues.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis #1

It was predicted that participants would perceive racism as a religiously proscribed prejudice and homophobia as a nonproscribed prejudice, as per previous research (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Hypothesis #2

The pattern of relationships among the three religious orientations and three prejudice dependent measures were expected to correspond with those of previous findings (Batson et al., 1993; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). That is, I scores would correlate negatively with proscribed prejudice and positively with nonproscribed prejudice, E scores would correlate positively with proscribed prejudice and negatively with nonproscribed prejudice, and Q scale scores would correlate negatively with both proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice. This pattern is similar, but not identical, to that proposed by Batson et al. (1993), and corresponds to the findings reported by Duck and Hunsberger (1996).

Hypothesis # 3

Controlling for the effect of religious proscription by using a partial correlation procedure was expected to yield little change in the zero-order relationships between I, E, Q, and the three dependent measures of prejudice. This was consistent with the findings of Duck and Hunsberger (1996).

Hypothesis #4

It was predicted that Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Desirability (SD) scores would correlate positively with each other. This was expected because of the "implication ... that authoritarians may, in general, be particularly influenced more than most of us by the social comparisons we all make" (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 311). Further, it was predicted that both RWA and SD would correlate positively with I, and negatively with E and Q, consistent with previous research (Altemeyer, 1988; Batson et al., 1978, 1993; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Hypothesis #5

It was hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between RWA and the scale measures of ethnocentrism and homophobia (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). Also, positive relationships between the measures of prejudice and SD were predicted.

Hypothesis # 6a

Partialling out the effect of RWA in a partial correlational procedure was expected to strengthen the zero-order negative relationship between I and proscribed prejudice, and

eliminate the positive relationship between I and nonproscribed prejudice. Further, the reverse was predicted for E. For proscribed prejudice, a predicted zero-order positive relationship was expected to increase after partialling out the effect of RWA, while for nonproscribed prejudice, a predicted weak negative zero-order correlation would disappear. For Q, an expected negative relationship for with proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice was expected to be reduced or eliminated by controlling for RWA. All these predictions were consistent with the findings of Duck and Hunsberger (1996).

Hypothesis # 6b

Controlling for SD was not expected to have an effect on the relationship between I and proscribed prejudice, or between I and nonproscribed prejudice. This prediction was contrary to Batson et al.'s (1993) suggestion that persons with an intrinsic religious orientation have a greater need to respond in a socially desirable nonprejudiced manner (on overt measures of proscribed prejudice). However, Batson et al. (1978) reported that controlling for SD using partial correlations did not significantly weaken a negative relationship between I and an Anti-Negro scale. Only when SD was controlled for by using a behavioural measure of prejudice did they report a significant change in the I-prejudice relationship.

Method

Participants

In November, 1996, students from three regular (day) sections of introductory psychology were asked to complete a battery of measures included in a questionnaire

during regular class time. Six hundred and seventeen students completed the questionnaire (391 females, 213 males, and 13 whose gender was unknown). The ratio of females to males was approximately 2:1, which was approximately the enrollment ratio in this course. Verbal and written instructions for mass testing are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B.

Participation in the study was voluntary, and participants were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time without academic penalty. Course credit was provided for participation, as part of the psychology department's research participation requirement. Each participant received ½ percent course credit for participation.

For analysis purposes, cases were included only if the respondent had indicated a religious affiliation. This procedure was used by Duck and Hunsberger (1996) to assess the perceived proscription status of specific prejudices, and it is consistent with Batson's research which included only students who expressed at least a moderate interest in religion. This inclusion criteria reduced the present sample to 400 respondents (258 females, 133 males, 9 unreported gender) in the analyses reported here. Participant ages ranged from 17 to 41 with a mean of 19.6 years.

Materials

The questionnaire packet included the following measures relevant to the present study: (1) Intrinsic and Extrinsic subscales of the Religious Orientation scale (Allport & Ross, 1967); (2) Quest scale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; 1991b); (3) an Ethnocentrism scale (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992); (4) Attitudes Toward Homosexuals scale (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992); (5) Modern

Racism scale (revised from McConahay, 1986); (6) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996); (7) Religious Proscription items (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996); (8) Religious Proscription subscales (constructed for the present study); (9) Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964); (10) several single-item questions regarding religion and religious affiliation (church attendance, childhood religion, present religion); and (11) a demographic information section (age and sex).

Response Format and Scoring Conversion

All measures, except those mentioned in (9), (10) and (11) above, used a Likert-type response format, ranging from -4 (very strongly disagree) to +4 (very strongly agree), with a response of 0 indicating a neutral position. Any con-trait items were reverse scored and responses were then converted to a 1 to 9 scoring system by adding the constant 5. Finally, scale items were summed to obtain total scale scores.

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (9) was scored using a true (0) or false (1) scoring format. Although a Likert-type response format was initially considered for this scale, it was determined that the original true-false format would enable the comparison of results with those reported by Batson et al. (1978), and with those of several others studies previously referenced.

Measures

Religious Orientation scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). This scale contains 20 items, 9 of which assess intrinsicness (e.g., " I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life"), while 11 measure extrinsicness (e.g., "A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social activity"). The Intrinsic (I) scale has a

possible range of 9 to 81, while the range for the Extrinsic (E) scale is 11 to 99. Typical alphas are in the .68 to .75 range for the Extrinsic subscale, and .75 to .85 for the Intrinsic subscale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991b, Batson et al., 1993). The complete I-E subscale item inventories are presented in Appendix C.

Quest scale. This scale (see Appendix D) was designed by Batson and Schoenrade (1991a; 1991b) and consists of 12 items (e.g., "Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers." Scores can range from 12 to 108. Typically, Cronbach's alphas have been in the .78 to .81 range (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991b; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Ethnocentrism scale (Altemeyer, 1988, Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Formerly called the Manitoba Prejudice scale, this 20-item balanced inventory (see Appendix E) measures respondents' tolerance of minority groups. Typical items include reference to immigration (e.g., "Canada should open its doors to more immigration from the West Indies") or statements about specific racial groups such as Jews and Blacks that are stereotypical (e.g., "Black people as a rule are, by their nature, more violent than white people are"). The possible range of scores is from 20 to 180. Typical Cronbach's alphas fall in the .88 to .90 range (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Modern Racism scale (revised). The original 7-item Modern Racism scale (McConahay, 1986) was designed to tap anti-black sentiment in a subtle way, because there was evidence that other scales' racism items had become too transparent (Duckitt, 1993). For the present study, the scale was altered in order to assess attitudes towards

Native Canadians. One item, "Blacks have more influence upon school desegregation plans than they ought to have," was eliminated due to its lack of relevance to the Canadian context. The 6 remaining items were altered by substituting the words "Native Canadians" in place of "blacks" or "black people", and "Canada" in lieu of "America" or the "United States." Otherwise the original items were not changed. The six- item revised scale is presented in Appendix F. The psychometric properties of the revised scale will be assessed in the present study. It is to be noted that the original 1 to 5 response format was changed to the nine-point Likert-type response format used in this investigation.

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992). This 12-item scale (see Appendix G) assesses negative attitudes towards homosexuals (e.g., "Homosexuals should be locked up to protect society.") The scores can range from 12 to 108, with higher scores indicating stronger homophobia. Typical Cronbach's alphas are in the .88 to .90 range (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. This 30-item scale (Appendix H), balanced against response set, was developed by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) to measure three attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Scale scores can range from 30 to 270. Alphas have tended to be in the low .90s (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996; Duckitt, 1991).

Religiously Proscribed Prejudice Indices (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). The purpose of these brief two-item indices (proscription of ethnocentrism index (PEI) and proscription of homophobia index (PHI)) (see Appendix I) is to assess participants' perceptions of the position of their respective religious community concerning ethnocentrism and homophobia. Four items have been used to determine religious proscription status (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996) and will be included for replication purposes. Two items are combined to form the PEI and two the PHI. There is a possible range of 2 to 18 for each index. Scores above the mid-point (10) indicate religious proscription, while scores below represent religious nonproscription.

Religious Proscription scales. This inventory (see Appendix J) was developed for the present study as a self-report instrument of religious proscription in response to Duck and Hunsberger's (1996) call for stronger measures of religious proscription. They suggested that this was warranted in order to confirm their initial findings using the proscription indices. The measure consists of 2 scales, the first containing 8 items relating to ethnocentric attitudes (Religious Proscription Ethnocentrism (RPE) scale), and the second, 8 items concerning homophobic attitudes (Religious Proscription Homophobia (RPH) scale). Both scales are balanced against response set having 4 pro-trait and 4 con-trait items. Minimum score for each scale is 8 with a maximum of 72. Parallel wording of items was used for both scales to facilitate comparisons between the measures. Psychometric properties are yet to be determined.

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This 33-item inventory (Appendix K) was designed to "measure individual differences in social-

desirability response bias" (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964, p. 20). There are 18 pro-trait and 15 con-trait items, which originally used a true (1) or false (0) response format. The range of the scale is 0 to 33, with higher scores indicating more socially desirable responding. An internal consistency of .88 using the Kuder-Richardson formula, and a test-retest correlation of .88 (after one month) were reported by the scale authors.

Single-Item Religious Questions. Three of five items have been used in previous studies by Hunsberger to determine religious attendance and religious affiliation (see Appendix L). The remaining two items were respondent age and gender.

Procedure

Several researchers attended 3 sections of introductory psychology daytime classes on pre-determined dates. Verbal instructions (see Appendix A) described the purpose of the study (a survey of various social and religious issues) and the proper procedure for responding on a computer answer sheet. Most students completed the questionnaire in about 40 minutes.

Results

Psychometric Properties of Scales

The psychometric properties of scales are presented in Table 2. Cronbach's alphas ranged from .74 to .88 for the three religious orientation scales. Internal consistency was moderate for both E (.74) and Q (.75) and strong for I (.88).

Each of the three prejudice dependent measures yielded good alphas ranging from .85 to .90, while those for the two new proscription scales were acceptable, although the proscribed homophobia scale (RPH, .84) was psychometrically stronger than was the

Table 2. Psychometric properties of scales

Scale	Number of Items	N	Mean	SD	Mean Inter-Item Correlation	Cronbach Alpha
Intrinsic	9	398	43.32	16.16	.45	.88
Extrinsic	11	395	49.83	12.67	.21	.74
Quest	12	392	60.18	13.43	.20	.75
Ethnocentrism	20	394	68.60	21.97	.27	.88
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals	12	395	39.55	18.44	.43	.90
Modern Racism (Revised)	6	396	22.01	8.74	.49	.85
Religious Proscription (Ethnocentrism)	7	387	43.28	9.72	.32	.77
Religious Proscription (Homophobia)	7	385	27.54	10.46	.43	.84
Social Desirability	33	381	14.60	5.33	.09	.78
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	30	384	138.42	28.21	.17	.86

Note: Variation in N between scales is due to missing data

proscribed ethnocentrism scale (RPE, .77).

A principal components factor analysis with an oblique rotated solution indicated that item #3 in each proscription scale yielded weak mean inter-item correlations with the other 7 items, and consequently, two factors loaded with eigenvalues >1.0, one item on Factor 1 and seven items on Factor 2. Therefore, item # 3 was eliminated from each of the two scales and subsequent factor analyses provided confirmation of two unidimensional proscription measures.

RWA yielded an acceptable Cronbach's alpha (.86), although this was slightly lower than those previously reported for this measure (see Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996).

Crowne and Marlowe's Social Desirability scale (1964) provided only moderate internal consistency (.78), resulting from very weak mean inter-item correlations, the average being .09.

Religious Orientation

Intrinsic scores were negatively correlated with both E, r (399) = -.42, $p < .001$, and Q, r (399) = -.10, $p < .05$. Quest and E were positively associated, r (399) = .30, $p < .001$.

Religious Proscription

Inter-correlations among prejudice and religious proscription measures are presented in Table 3. As expected, both the ethnocentrism index (PEI) and proscribed ethnocentrism scale (RPE) were negatively correlated with each measure of racial prejudice (Ethnocentrism scale and Modern Racism scale). Similarly, a negative

Table 3. Inter-correlations Among Prejudice and Religious Proscription Measures

Prejudice Measure	Religious Proscription Measure			
	Ethnocentrism Index	Homophobia Index	Proscription Scale Ethnocentrism	Proscription Scale Homophobia
Ethnocentrism	-.41***	.02ns	-.25***	.01ns
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals	-.09ns	-.35***	-.06ns	-.32***
Modern Racism (Revised)	-.12*	.03ns	-.14**	.02 ns

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; ns = nonsignificant.

relationship was found between ATH and both the homophobia index (PHI) and homophobia proscription scale (RPH).

Positive inter-correlations among the prejudice measures were as expected: r (400) = .61, $p < .001$ between the Ethnocentrism scale (EM) and Modern Racism (MR) scale, r (400) = .50, $p < .001$ between EM and ATH, and r (400) = .39, $p < .001$ between MR and ATH.

Hypothesis # 1

It was predicted that ethnocentrism and modern racism would be perceived as religiously proscribed prejudices, while negative attitudes toward homosexuals would be considered nonproscribed by participants' respective religious communities. Table 4 shows that mean scores for both PEI and RPE were above their respective mid-points of 10 and 35, indicating that participants, on average, perceived ethnocentrism and racism directed against Native Canadians as proscribed prejudices by their respective religious communities. For the proscribed homophobia measures, the mean scores for both PHI and RPH were below their respective mid-points of 10 and 35. It appears that participants perceived negative attitudes towards homosexuals as a nonproscribed prejudice. In light of these results, dependent measures of racial prejudice (EM) will be referred to as proscribed prejudices, and negative attitudes towards homosexuals will be considered nonproscribed prejudice.

Hypothesis #2

Correlations among religious orientations and dependent measures of prejudice are presented in Table 5. Intrinsic religiosity was negatively correlated with both EM and MR

Table 4. Descriptives of religious proscription indices and scales

Proscription Measure	Description			
	N	Scale Midpoint	Mean	SD
Religious Proscription Ethnocentrism Index	347	10	14.23	2.85
Religious Proscription Homophobia Index	348	10	7.90	4.55
Religious Proscription Ethnocentrism Scale	387	35	43.27	9.72
Religious Proscription Homophobia Scale	385	35	27.54	10.46

Note: Possible range of indices = 2 to 18; Possible range of scales = 7 to 63

Table 5. Inter-correlations among religious orientations and prejudice measures

	Intrinsic	Extrinsic	Quest
Ethnocentrism	-.20***	.13**	-.07ns †
Modern Racism	-.13**	.12*	-.09ns †
Attitudes Towards Homosexuals	.21***	-.16**	-.15**

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; ns = nonsignificant; † = contrary to prediction.

and positively correlated with ATH as predicted. The reverse was true of the relationships between E and the prejudice dependent measures. There was a weak significant positive relationship between E and both EM and MR, and a significant negative relationship between E and ATH. Finally, Q was negatively correlated with both proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice, however the relationship between Q and racial prejudice was nonsignificant for both EM and MR.

Hypothesis # 3

A partial correlation procedure was used to determine the extent to which religious proscription was involved in the religious orientation-prejudice relationship. Zero-order and partial correlations are compared in Table 6. Changes in r were nonsignificant for all zero-order versus partial correlations (test described in Ferguson, 1976, pp. 184-185), although in some cases a previously significant correlation became nonsignificant.

Hypothesis # 4

The correlational relationships among RWA, SD, and religious orientations are presented in Table 7. Contrary to predictions, there was no significant positive relationship between RWA and SD, $r\,(399) = .03$. Both RWA and SD correlated positively with I and negatively with both E and Q as predicted, with one exception. The relationship between SD and E was nonsignificant, although in the predicted direction. Both RWA and SD were negatively correlated with Q as predicted.

Hypothesis # 5

The relationships among RWA, SD and the dependent measures of prejudice are also provided in Table 7. The predicted positive relationships between RWA and each

Table 6. Zero-order and partial correlations between prejudice measures and religious orientation controlling for religious proscription

Prejudice Measure	Control Status	Intrinsic	Extrinsic	Quest
Ethnocentrism Scale	No Control	-.20***	.13**	-.07ns
	Proscription Index	-.14**	.08ns	-.08ns
	Proscription Scale	-.13**	.05ns	-.11*
Modern Racism Scale (Revised)	No Control	-.13**	.12*	-.09ns
	Proscription Index	-.12*	.10ns	-.08ns
	Proscription Scale	-.09ns	.07ns	-.11*
Attitudes Towards Homosexuals Scale	No Control	.21***	-.16**	-.15**
	Proscription Index	.12*	-.10ns	-.17**
	Proscription Scale	.16**	-.12*	-.17***

Note: *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$; ns = nonsignificant.

Table 7. Correlations of RWA and SD with religious orientation and prejudice measures

	I	E	Q	EM	MR	ATH
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.39*** (400)	-.23*** (399)	-.27*** (400)	.33*** (400)	.28*** (400)	.57*** (400)
Social Desirability	.12* (399)	-.06ns (398)	-.12* (399)	-.07 ns (399)	.01ns (399)	-.07ns (399)

Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$; ns = nonsignificant; (N) for each correlation shown in brackets; I = Intrinsic scale; E = Extrinsic scale; Q = Quest scale; EM = Ethnocentrism scale; MR = Modern Racism scale (revised); ATH = Attitudes Towards Homosexuals scale

measure of prejudice appeared. However, SD did not significantly correlate with any of the three prejudice measures.

Hypothesis # 6a

A partial correlation procedure was used to test the involvement of RWA in the religious orientation-prejudice zero-order relationships. It was predicted that prejudice would be reduced in that controlling for the effect of RWA would strengthen negative relationships and reduce or eliminate positive relationships. This hypothesis was supported by the data, as shown in Table 8. The negative relationships between I and both EM and MR were strengthened by the partial correlation procedure.

Similarly, the predicted directional shifts in correlations between both E and Q, and prejudice, were supported. Negative relationships decreased or were eliminated, and positive relationships increased, although the absolute size of shifts in most cases was insignificant.

Hypothesis # 6b

Finally, partialling out the effect of SD did not have any effect on the relationships between religious orientations and prejudice measures (see Table 8), consistent with the hypothesis that SD would have no effect on the religious orientation-prejudice relationships.

Table 8. Zero-order and partial correlations between dependent prejudice measures and religious orientations

Dependent Measure	Control	Intrinsic	Extrinsic	Quest
Ethnocentrism	No Control	-.20***	.13**	-.07ns
	RWA	-.38***	.23***	.02ns
	Social Desirability	-.20***	.13**	-.08ns
Modern Racism	No Control	-.13**	.12*	-.09ns
	RWA	-.27***	.19***	-.01ns
	Social Desirability	-.13**	.12*	-.09ns
Attitudes Towards Homosexuals	No Control	.21***	-.16**	-.15**
	RWA	-.03ns	-.04ns	.00ns
	Social Desirability	.22***	-.17**	-.16**

Note: *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$; ns = nonsignificant.

Discussion

Religious Proscription

The present results support the Batson et al. (1993) hypothesis that certain prejudices are typically proscribed by religious communities, while other prejudices may be tolerated, or even promoted. Specifically, racial prejudice (ethnocentrism) appears to be perceived as a religiously proscribed prejudice, and prejudice directed towards homosexuals (homophobia) is, on average perceived as religiously nonproscribed.

However, removing the effect of religious proscription in a partial correlation procedure had little or no effect on the zero-order religious orientation-prejudice relationships. This was true when controlling for the effects of both the previously tested proscription indices and the new proscription scales. Only the relationships between the intrinsic orientation and ethnocentrism, and I and homophobia were nominally affected by perceived religious community influence, and even then the changes between zero-order and partial correlations coefficients were not statistically significant. These findings challenge the Batson et al. (1993) theory that highly intrinsic individuals tend to conform to the dictates of their respective religious community because they have a propensity for acting in a "socially desirable" way. The present results, instead, suggest that religious proscription has little, if any, effect on personal prejudice.

Still, our findings appear paradoxical. The proscription indices and scales were negatively correlated with both ethnocentrism and homophobia, indicating that as religious community prohibition increased, self-reported prejudicial attitudes decreased. However, controlling for proscription did not have a significant effect on the religious orientation-

prejudice relationships.

We would suggest that perceived religious proscription is relatively independent of the religious orientation-prejudice relationships. In support of this notion, subsequent partial correlations were calculated to control for each religious orientation. We found no significant change in any of the proscription-prejudice relationships. This may have been due to participants reporting their own personal world view, rather than that of their respective religious community, or perhaps they tended to belong to religious communities that promote corresponding attitudes. Finally, reported perceptions of religious proscription might have reflected societal rather than religious norms.

Both the present study and the Duck and Hunsberger (1996) study used an undergraduate university sample to test the proscription hypothesis, thus restricting the generalizability of our findings. Further, neither study addressed the possibility of religious and denominational differences. Members of different religions or religious denominations (e.g., religious fundamentalist Christian denominations) might have conformed more to the proscriptions of their religious community regarding specific prejudices. In light of these limitations, our data suggest that further religious proscription research is warranted. Indeed, Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, and Gorsuch (1996) indicated a need for research to investigate the Batson et al. (1993) religious proscription-prejudice hypothesis.

The Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Prejudice

Specific predictions concerning relationships among religious orientations and the three dependent measures of prejudice were for the most part supported in this study.

Correlations were negative between I and the two measures of ethnocentrism, and positive between I and homophobia. The relationships between E and the dependent measures, as predicted, were opposite those reported for I. Extrinsic scores were positively associated with both Ethnocentrism scale scores (EM) and Modern Racism scale (revised) scores (MR), and negatively associated with self-reported Attitudes Towards Homosexuals (ATH). These directional relationships between I and E and prejudice correspond with those Batson et al. (1993) summarized in their meta-analysis of studies of religious orientation and prejudice (see Table 1).

Batson and his associates reported that Q was negatively associated with self-report measures of both ethnocentrism and homophobia. Duck and Hunsberger (1996) found these same relationships. However, in the present study, Q was not significantly associated with either dependent measure of ethnocentrism (EM or MR), although the correlations were in the expected (negative) direction. Two cross-cultural studies of nonproscribed prejudices (Griffin et al., 1987; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988) also found no relationship between Q and racial prejudice.

Why do some studies find a relationship between Q and prejudice whereas others do not? There are several possibilities. First, the often weak to moderate reported negative relationship between Q and racial prejudice might explain the discrepancy between studies; the negative relationship is not strong enough in all samples to achieve significance. Second, sampling criteria for religion-prejudice studies have tended to include only participants who express an interest in religion, or who have reported regular church attendance. Batson and his associates (1993) tended to select participants if they

reported a moderate interest in religion. For comparison purposes, the present study included only participants who had indicated a religious affiliation. But is this the best method of selection?

In this regard, Spilka et al. (1985) suggested that Batson's criterion for inclusion may be "poorly defined religiously" (p. 439). They cautioned that the Quest scale might be a measure of anxiety born out of religious conflict, rather than an "open-ended, questioning orientation" (p. 440). If this is the case, excluding a portion of a sample because of lack of religious affiliation might eliminate a large number of respondents with relatively high quest scores. Possibly, those who have abandoned their childhood religion, and thereby rejected religious affiliation, are more inclined to score high on a measure of quest. Including religiously nonaffiliated participants in religious studies might tend to strengthen the Q-prejudice relationships by including high scoring questers that traditional inclusion criteria had selectively reduced in number.

We are not suggesting that using truncated samples is incorrect. Indeed, many of the significant negative relationships reported in the related Q-prejudice literature were based on truncated samples. Rather, we suggest that using more broadly defined samples would strengthen the negative Q-prejudice relationships so often reported.

To investigate the possibility in the present study, correlations between Q and the three dependent measures of prejudice were calculated using the full sample of respondents (N = 617). It was found that proscribed prejudice and Q were weakly, but significantly negatively correlated, $r = -.09$, $p < .05$ for EM and $r = -.10$, $p < .01$ for MR. Our findings suggest that it might be beneficial to use broader samples when examining the

relationship between prejudice and Q.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Desirability, and Religious Orientation

Results of this study indicated that RWA and SD are not significantly correlated, contrary to expectation. Apparently, presenting oneself in a socially desirable way has little to do with an authoritarian's need to submit to authority figures and a tendency to be conventional.

All predictions regarding the correlations between RWA and the measures of religious orientation were supported. As previously found (e.g., Duck & Hunsberger, 1996), I was positively related to RWA; E and Q were negatively related to RWA.

Batson (personal communication to Hunsberger, 1996) suggested that some RWA scale items were religiously worded and that there might be some overlap between RWA and I scale items. He suggested eliminating all religiously worded RWA scale items before re-testing the RWA-I relationship. The author complied and found that the strength and direction of the relationship remained basically unchanged even after eliminating the religious items.[1]

Intrinsic religiosity was positively, but weakly correlated with SD, replicating

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[1] Batson was primarily concerned about the appropriateness of using a partial correlation procedure to control for the effect of RWA when examining the relationships between prejudice and the Intrinsic scale because he felt that doing so might eliminate a vital component of the intrinsic orientation. It is important to note that Allport's original conception of the Intrinsic Orientation did not include any of the attitudes measured by the Right-Wing Authoritarian scale.

Batson et al's. (1978) finding. However, in the present study, the strength of this relationship was much weaker than that reported by Batson. The data suggest that higher I scores are mildly related to presenting oneself in a socially desirable way.

The negative correlation between SD and Q indicated that higher questers, on average, were less concerned about "self-presentation" in a socially desirable way, as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. Watson et al. (1986) found that high quest scores were associated with "private self-consciousness," but not "public self-consciousness." This may account for our apparent negative relationship. Private self-consciousness is an awareness of one's inner feelings; public self-consciousness refers to a person's awareness of himself/herself as a social object (Watson et al., 1986).

No relationship was found between SD and E. This finding was contrary to a predicted negative relationship, but is consistent with Batson et al's. (1993) finding that E was not associated with SD.

It must be pointed out that the psychometric properties of the SD scale were weak in the present study. This might have resulted from the SD scale's position (last) in a rather lengthy questionnaire, or possibly from the true-false scoring format which was exclusive to that measure. Also, the available literature suggests that it is unlikely that the SD scale measures what it was designed to measure (Watson et al., 1986).

Regardless of these limitations, it seems apparent that the association between SD and religious orientation may not be as strong as Batson and his associates would have us believe.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Desirability, and Prejudice

Correlations between RWA and the three dependent measures of prejudice were positive, as predicted and consistent with the work of Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) Also, the use of the revised MR scale, that taps prejudice towards Native Canadians, provided further evidence that high authoritarians tend to be "equal-opportunity bigots" (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 115).

The lack of a relationship between the social desirability scale and our three measures of prejudice was contrary to what Batson et al. (1978) had predicted for SD and their Anti-Negro measure. Batson et al. stated that partial correlations between religious orientation and prejudice showed little change when psychometrically controlling for SD because the negative relationship between SD and the Anti-Negro scale was not as strong as had been expected. In this regard it is noteworthy that Batson et al. did not find a significant negative correlation between SD and the Anti-Negro scale for their full sample. Only after they broke their data down by gender did a negative relationship appear, and this occurred only for a small ($n = 29$) female sample.

In light of this reported gender difference, we recalculated separate correlations between SD and our three prejudice measures for each gender and still found no significant correlations between SD and EM (-.08 for males, -.02 for females), SD and MR (-.02 for males, .03 for females), or SD and ATH (-.03 for males, -.02 for females). It must be noted here that the Batson et al. prediction was for proscribed prejudice. Our measure of nonproscribed prejudice (ATH) was tested for comparison purposes only.

This finding, combined with our reported very weak association between I and SD,

cast some doubt on the Batson et al. hypothesis that a negative relationship between I and proscribed prejudice might be an artifact of SD. Further, we questioned the value of controlling for SD in a partial correlation procedure when no relatively strong relationships among the variables existed.

Controlling RWA and SD

The Duck and Hunsberger (1996) findings that controlling for the effect of RWA substantially strengthened the negative relationship between I and proscribed prejudice, and also eliminated a positive relationship between I and nonproscribed prejudice, were replicated in the present study. Likewise, for E, a positive correlation with proscribed prejudice increased and a negative correlation with nonproscribed prejudice was eliminated. For Q, partialling out the effect of RWA slightly weakened the nonsignificant negative correlation with proscribed prejudice and eliminated the significant zero-order negative association with nonproscribed prejudice.

These findings suggest that RWA scores might act as a moderating variable between religious orientation and prejudice, especially for the intrinsic orientation. Possibly, authoritarian tendencies are an integral part of the intrinsic orientation, and by controlling for RWA, an essential component of I is eliminated. This suggests that the conceptualization of the intrinsic orientation should be reconsidered. The definition of intrinsic religiosity by Allport and Ross (1967) did not in any way suggest an authoritarian component, but the empirical evidence obtained here points to an integral link with RWA.

Batson and his associates have emphasized the role of SD in the I-prejudice relationship. Here, we were unable to find evidence to support their hypothesis. It seems

that SD, at least as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne scale has, little to do with explaining the direction and strength of the correlations among different prejudices and religious orientations. Partialling out the effect of SD resulted in virtually no change to the zero-order correlations across the three religious orientations and three dependent measures of prejudice. This was despite the fact that SD had been positively correlated with I and negatively with Q, although these relationships were weak. Apparently, SD shared little common variance with I or Q and the dependent measures of prejudice. This finding is consistent with previous research (Genia, 1996; Spilka et al., 1985)

Conclusions

Results of Study 1 were important for several reasons. First, we successfully replicated the relationships between self-reported religious orientation and prejudice that were reported by Duck and Hunsberger (1996). Second, it appeared from our results that the Batson et al. social desirability hypothesis concerning the I-prejudice relationship was doubtful and that right-wing authoritarianism seemed to provide a better explanation for the relationship.

However, results of Study 1 warranted a closer investigation of the moderating effect that RWA might have on the I-prejudice relationship. Further, a complete test of the Batson et al. social desirability hypothesis required a comparison between questionnaire measures of prejudice and behavioural measures. Study 2 was designed to do just that.

Study 2

Introduction

Batson et al.'s (1978, 1986) claim that people who score high on the I scale are no less prejudiced than those who score low led them to use behavioural measures of prejudice in order to investigate and control the suspected "contaminant" of social desirability. Further, they concluded that their research demonstrated that the quest orientation is positively associated with a greater acceptance and tolerance of others. However, as outlined earlier, concerns about the Batson et al. (1978, 1986) studies need to be addressed.

Batson et al. (1978) did not include a comparison group of people who did not expect to be interviewed (no cost). The present experiment included both cost and attributional ambiguity experimental conditions. This was done to address this concern, and further, to test the efficacy of both cost and ambiguity as manipulations for future research. In addition, both of the Batson et al. experiments used only a measure of attitudes towards blacks (religiously proscribed prejudice). The present study included both a behavioural measure of racial attitudes and attitudes towards homosexuals (nonproscribed prejudice). It was felt that comparisons between the two types of behavioural prejudice measures might shed further light on the I-prejudice relationship. Apparently, no study has attempted to do this.

Specific predictions are presented after the method section for the sake of clarity. Overall, this generalized replication of the Batson et al. (1978) experiment was intended to compare the religious orientation-prejudice relationships in an overt versus covert

behavioural condition, test cost and attributional ambiguity to ascertain their effectiveness, and finally, to determine the role of RWA in the religious orientation-prejudice relationships when prejudice is measured behaviourally.

Participants

Participation was open only to students in the Introductory Psychology research participant pool from the three classes surveyed in Study 1, so that participants' mass testing scores (from Study 1) were usually available. Nonwhite students were allowed to participate, however, their scores were not included in the analysis of experimental data, since part of the behavioural measure was appropriate only for Caucasian students. Participants were not told that only white students could participate for both ethical and experimental reasons. The researcher categorized each participant as white/nonwhite and a survey question asked about respondents' race. Only participants who self-categorized themselves as white, and who were also classified as white by the researcher were included in the analyses. There were no discrepancies between the researcher's observations and the participant self-categorizations. In total, 256 white students (170 female, 86 male) participated in the experiment. Ages ranged from 18 to 31 with a mean age of 19.6 years. Fourteen Asian, nine East Indian, and four Black students also participated in the experiment but their data were not included in the final analyses.

Materials

Each participant received a booklet that included an informed consent cover page, manipulation page, written instructions (which varied according to cost manipulation), four stimulus pages (designed to tap both ethnocentric and homophobic attitudes), a

response sheet, and an open-ended manipulation check sheet which also asked for specific demographic information.

The cover page (Appendix M) included a statement of informed consent and a request for students signature and identification number.

The manipulation page (Appendix N) informed each participant whether or not s/he had been chosen for an interview. Half of the booklets included an "interview" and half a "no interview" page.

Written instructions (Appendix O) varied according to the cost manipulation. Half of the instruction pages (high cost) informed participants that they **would** be interviewed by one of their interviewer choices (potential interviewers shown on stimulus pages in Appendix P and Appendix S), while the remaining half instructed participants to **imagine** that they would be interviewed (low), but assured that they would not actually be interviewed.

The two ethnocentrism stimulus pages (Appendix P) consisted of a photo of either a white or black male student with an accompanying narrative that described a typical well-rounded graduate student. Each booklet included one stimulus page with a white student and one stimulus page with a black student. Photographs of two different white males and two different black males were varied as stimuli to control for physical characteristics. These different black-white stimulus photo combinations (4) were also counterbalanced with story (2), order of presentation (2), and interview topic combination (4) (see Appendix Q). This provided 64 combinations for each of the two cost conditions. We attempted to choose photos of persons who were similar in characteristics and

attractiveness.[2] At the bottom of each stimulus page, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they desired to be interviewed by that potential interviewer. Responses could range from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so).

For homophobia, the stimulus pages also displayed a photograph with accompanying narratives (Appendix S). As with ethnocentrism, the narrative text (story) described well-rounded male university graduate students. One was depicted as heterosexual, and one as gay. The sexual orientation distinction was introduced by informing the reader that, "*name*, who is gay, lives in Waterloo with his partner Paul." The same counterbalancing procedure was used as outlined above (see Appendix T), with the exception that sexual orientation was included rather than four photo combinations as was the case with the ethnocentrism stimulus pages. Therefore, sexual orientation (2), order of presentation (2), story (2) and topic combinations (4) were counter-balanced for 32 possible combinations for each cost condition.

The response sheet (Appendix U) requested a forced interviewer choice from each set (Set 1, Ethnocentrism and Set 2, Homophobia) and a written reason for each choice.

The last page in the booklet (Appendix V) was designed as a suspicion check. An

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[2] Photographs were evaluated for attractiveness by a panel of independent raters, three male and three female graduate students, prior to the preparation of the stimulus pages. Average attractiveness scores were used to select photos for each of the conditions. T-tests were used to ensure that no significant differences in attractiveness existed among the sets of photos used. The final selection of photos is presented in Appendix R.

open-ended question asked participants to describe what they thought was the purpose of the study.

Design

A 2 (low religious orientation, high religious orientation) X 2 (low cost, high cost) X 2 (low ambiguity, high ambiguity) factorial design was used for both a proscribed and nonproscribed behavioural measure of prejudice. Three separate analyses were performed for each measure of prejudice, one for each of the three religious orientations.

Independent Variables

Religious Orientation. Religious orientation classification for six analysis of variance procedures (ANOVAs) was determined for I, E, and Q by using median splits of the three religious orientation scale scores, collected in the mass testing session (Study 1). That is, those participants who scored below the median on the intrinsic dimension were classified as "low intrinsic"; those above the median as "high intrinsic." The same procedure was used to determine "low" and "high" for the extrinsic and quest religious dimensions. Each set of "low" and "high" variables (I, E, & Q) was used in a separate ANOVA.

Personal Cost. Half of the participants (low cost) were told that they were to rate potential interviewers by **imagining** they were going to be interviewed by each stimulus person. The other half of the participants (high cost) were led to believe that they **would** be interviewed by one of the potential interviewers. Anticipating an actual interview should have been perceived as potentially more costly because participants would expect to meet and interact with the interviewer. Conceivably, this would be more likely to elicit

participants' "true prejudice," following the rationale used by Batson et al. (1978).

Attributional Ambiguity. Interview topic served as the manipulation for attributional ambiguity. "Low ambiguity" participants were informed that each of two potential interviewers were to discuss the same topic during the interview process. Those in the "high ambiguity" cells were presented with potential interviewers who would discuss different topics. This manipulation was designed to provide those in the high ambiguity cells with an opportunity to attribute their "prejudice" to choice of topic. This was not possible in the "low ambiguity" cells because both interviewers were scheduled to discuss the same topic. The manipulation of "topic choice" was designed to parallel that of "movie choice" that Batson et al. had used in the 1986 experiment.

Dependent Variables

There were two types of "prejudice" dependent variables used in Study 2. First, ratings of how much a participant wished to be interviewed by each of two potential interviewers were used to calculate difference scores for (1) ethnocentrism and (2) homophobia. For ethnocentrism, difference scores were calculated by subtracting the ratings given a black potential interviewer from the ratings given a white interviewer. For example, if a white interviewer was given a rating of 8 and the black interviewer was rated 3 on a 9-point scoring key, the prejudice index was calculated: 8-3 = 5. If the white interviewer scored lower than the black interviewer, the index could be negative. The same procedure was used to calculate a homophobia difference score (i.e., rating of the gay interviewer was subtracted from rating of the heterosexual interviewer). Each participant was asked to rate two sets of interviewers — one to measure ethnocentrism

and one to measure homophobia.

The second type of dependent measure consisted of a forced choice between each set of two potential interviewers (black or white; homosexual or heterosexual). That is, each participant was asked to choose one interviewer from each of the sets of potential graduate interviewers. Set 1 required choosing between black and white, and Set 2 required choosing between gay and heterosexual.

Procedure

The experiment took place in a research room in the psychology department, over a period of four weeks during February and March, 1997. A maximum of ten participants could be run in each session because the research room was equipped with only 10 individual booths. This provided privacy for all participants while they completed the research booklet. The number of participants per session ranged from 1 to 10, with 6 being the average per session. Most sessions were held throughout the day, however, one evening session per week was usually made available to accommodate students who were unavailable during the day. Requirements for participation stated that students must be registered in one of the three pre-tested (Study 1) introductory psychology sections, and they must have participated in Study 1. Recruitment was facilitated by sign-up sheets that were affixed to the research bulletin board in the psychology department. One-half percent course credit was provided for student participation. Forty-five minutes was scheduled for each session. Most sessions lasted approximately forty minutes.

The researcher greeted participants outside of the research room and instructed them to take a seat inside in the doorway of any of the available cubicles. After all

scheduled students had arrived, the room door was closed and verbal instructions were read (Appendix W). These instructions explicitly indicated that some of them had been chosen to be interviewed and that this would occur immediately after completing the booklet, while those not chosen would be required to complete an additional questionnaire. This was done to strengthen the cost manipulation. They were also told that they would discover whether they would be interviewed on the second page of their booklet. Further, it was announced that each potential interviewer had been assigned a discussion topic, as indicated in their booklets. This was done to strengthen the ambiguity manipulation by ensuring that participants noticed the interview topics provided at the top of each stimulus sheet.

The actual experimental manipulation for cost was introduced in the written instructions in each booklet, and the ambiguity manipulation was introduced in the four stimulus pages. Equal numbers of booklets were printed with the following cost/ambiguity combinations: low cost-low ambiguity, low cost-high ambiguity, high cost-low ambiguity, high cost-high ambiguity.

Random assignment of participants to booklet condition was accomplished by mixing together different stimulus booklets prior to administration and by allowing participants to choose in which cubicle they wished to sit. Written instructions ensured that the researcher remained blind to which manipulations each participant received.

After any questions, students were instructed to turn their chairs around inside the cubicle and to complete the booklet that was face-down on the desk. They were advised to read the statement of informed consent on the cover page of the booklet, sign the

statement, and provide their student ID number. Also, all participants were asked to stop and wait for further instructions once they had completed the interviewer selection sheet. When all session participants had completed the interviewer selection sheet, they were asked to complete the remaining manipulation check and demographic page, but not to turn back to previous material. After completion they were to place the booklet face down on the desk, turn their chairs back out into the cubicle doorway, and wait for the others to finish. They had been led to believe that the interviews would be assigned at this point. After all participants had completed the booklet, the researcher read a prepared statement regarding the purpose of the study (Appendix X). A discussion of the study followed and students were invited to ask questions and make comments. The researcher asked participants whether they truly believed that they would be interviewed. Only 8 out of the 283 indicated any skepticism, and even the 8 admitted that they weren't quite sure. It seemed that the cost manipulation had worked. Participants were then thanked, asked to not talk about the study with any of their classmates, and dismissed. Written feedback (Appendix Y) was provided in addition to the verbal session.

The booklets belonging to students who had self-identified as non-white were replaced for a future participant, using the same page and stimulus combinations to ensure two complete counterbalanced sets of booklet combinations would be completed by white students. Additional copies of all stimulus pages and instruction pages had been printed specifically for this purpose.

Hypotheses

Religious Orientation, Cost, Ambiguity, in Prejudice Difference Scores

Hypothesis #1. It was expected that six 2 (religious orientation) X 2 (cost) X 2 (ambiguity) ANOVAs would each reveal a main effect for religious orientation. More specifically, high I and high Q participants were predicted to be less prejudiced than low I and low Q on the ethnocentrism difference score, while high E participants were expected to be more ethnocentric than low E participants on the same dependent measure. For the homophobia difference score, high I participants were expected to be significantly more prejudiced than those scoring low on the intrinsic scale and high extrinsics and high questers less homophobic than low extrinsics or low questers respectively.

Hypothesis 2. It was anticipated that there would be a main effect for cost, whereby high cost prejudice difference scores would be higher than those for low cost, with respect to both ethnocentrism and homophobia. The rationale for this prediction stems from the suggestion by Batson et al. (1978) that attaching personal cost in a behavioural measure tends to eliminate participants' tendency to respond according to societal norms, thereby maximizing revealed prejudice.

Hypothesis #3. Higher mean difference prejudice scores should be apparent for the low ambiguity condition compared to high ambiguity. It was reasoned that the low ambiguity group would be presented with an overt measure of prejudice — rating white higher than black — while the high ambiguity group would be able to ascribe a higher rating of white to choice of interview topic (covert). This factor had been included in order to empirically test the claim made by Batson et al. (1986) that using attributional ambiguity is a useful

paradigm in eliciting the real prejudices of respondents.

The Role of Right-Wing Authoritarianism in Prejudice Difference Scores

Hypothesis # 4. Controlling for the effect of RWA in six ANCOVAs should result in changes in main effects from the ANOVAs: (1) a stronger main effect for I for ethnocentrism and the elimination of an I main effect for homophobia; (2) a stronger main effect for E for ethnocentrism and the elimination of an E main effect for homophobia; and (3) an elimination of a Q main effect for both ethnocentrism and homophobia. This prediction was based on the shift in relationships between zero-order and partial correlations reported by Duck and Hunsberger (1996).

Religious Orientation and Forced Interviewer Choice

Hypothesis # 5. Participants scoring above the median on I were expected to tend to choose the black interviewer when the behavioural measure of ethnocentrism was overt (low ambiguity) and have no clear preference for interviewers when the condition was covert (high ambiguity). It was believed that low I participants would tend to choose the white interviewer in both ambiguity conditions on the ethnocentrism forced choice measure. This prediction is based on Batson et al. (1986) where high intrinsics chose to sit with a black confederate in an overt (low ambiguity) condition and did not discriminate in a covert condition (high ambiguity).

Hypothesis # 6. Both high I and low I participants were expected to choose the heterosexual interviewer more often than the homosexual interviewer regardless of ambiguity condition. As homophobia had been identified as a relatively nonproscribed prejudice (Duck & Hunsberger, 1996) it was reasoned that conforming to religious

proscription should be less likely to occur even when the condition was overt. Previous findings have shown that high intrinsic scores are positively related to questionnaire measures of homophobia (see Batson et al., 1993). Therefore no differences in forced choices were expected between overt and covert conditions.

Hypothesis # 7. High Q participants should tend to show a preference for black over white interviewer regardless of ambiguity status, while Low Q participants would show a preference for the white interviewer in both the low and high ambiguity conditions. Batson et al. (1978, 1986) reported that high Q scores were associated with greater tolerance for both overt and covert behavioural measures.

Hypothesis # 8. No preference of interviewer was anticipated for high Q in either low ambiguity or high ambiguity conditions on the measure of homophobia. However, it was expected that the heterosexual interviewer should be chosen more often by low Q participants regardless of ambiguity status.

Hypothesis # 9. Batson et al. (1986) found no significant difference between high and low extrinsic participants on their measure of ethnocentrism. Therefore, it was expected that neither high nor low extrinsic participants should have any preference for choosing black or choosing white for either the overt or covert conditions. No specific prediction was made for the measure of homophobia.

Results

Counterbalancing

To confirm successful counter-balancing, t-tests (for two levels) and one-way ANOVAs (for four levels) of the stimulus sheet factors were used to test for differences in

ethnocentrism and homophobia difference scores. No significant differences in mean ethnocentrism difference score ratings were found for photo combination (4), story (2), order (2) or topic combination (4) for the ethnocentrism stimulus pages. Similarly, story (2), order (2), sexual orientation (2), and topic combination (4) yielded no significant differences in homophobia difference scores.

Prejudice Difference Scores

Prejudice difference scores were calculated as previously described by subtracting the rating of the black potential interviewer from that of the white (ethnocentrism) and the homosexual from that of the heterosexual (homophobia). Means and standard deviations of the raw interviewer ratings were as follows: (1) white, $\underline{M} = 6.46$, $\underline{SD} = 1.60$, (2) black, $\underline{M} = 6.62$, $\underline{SD} = 1.56$, (3) heterosexual $\underline{M} = 7.05$, $\underline{SD} = 1.21$, and (4) homosexual, $\underline{M} = 6.32$, $\underline{SD} = 1.77$. Calculated difference scores for ethnocentrism and homophobia yielded means and standard deviations of $\underline{M} = -.16$, $\underline{SD} = 1.54$, and $\underline{M} = .73$, $\underline{SD} = 1.87$ respectively for the complete (N=256) sample.

Effects of Religious Orientation, Ambiguity, and Cost

In total, six ANOVAs were run to test Hypotheses # 1, #2, and #3. Ethnocentrism difference scores and homophobia difference scores served as dependent variables for three ANOVAs each, corresponding with the three religious orientations (I, E, and Q). Therefore each 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA consisted of high-low religious orientation X high-low cost X high-low ambiguity. Cell means for the six ANOVAs are presented in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

Table 9. ANOVA #1: Ethnocentrism difference score cell means for low-high intrinsic by low-high cost by low-high ambiguity

Cost Status	Ambiguity Status	Low Intrinsic	High Intrinsic
Low Cost	Low Ambiguity	.09	.04
	High Ambiguity	.16	-.36
High Cost	Low Ambiguity	-.12	-.17
	High Ambiguity	-.19	-.74

Table 10. ANOVA #2: Ethnocentrism difference score cell means for low-high extrinsic by low-high cost by low-high ambiguity

Cost Status	Ambiguity Status	Low Extrinsic	High Extrinsic
Low Cost	Low Ambiguity	-.05	.27
	High Ambiguity	.00	-.21
High Cost	Low Ambiguity	-.04	-.23
	High Ambiguity	-.25	-.65

Table 11. ANOVA #3: Ethnocentrism difference score cell means for low-high quest by low-high cost by low-high ambiguity

Cost Status	Ambiguity Status	Low Quest	High Quest
Low Cost	Low Ambiguity	.31	-.26
	High Ambiguity	-.23	.00
High Cost	Low Ambiguity	.06	-.41
	High Ambiguity	-.23	-.64

Table 12. ANOVA #4: Homophobia difference score cell means for low-high intrinsic by low-high cost by low-high ambiguity

Cost Status	Ambiguity Status	Low Intrinsic	High Intrinsic
Low Cost	Low Ambiguity	.50	1.19
	High Ambiguity	1.00	.59
High Cost	Low Ambiguity	.77	.39
	High Ambiguity	.31	.89

Table 13. ANOVA #5: Homophobia difference score cell means for low-high Extrinsic by low-high cost by low-high ambiguity

Cost Status	Ambiguity Status	Low Extrinsic	High Extrinsic
Low Cost	Low Ambiguity	1.0	.45
	High Ambiguity	.88	.70
High Cost	Low Ambiguity	.40	.74
	High Ambiguity	.78	.40

Table 14. ANOVA #6: Homophobia difference score cell means for low-high quest by low-high cost by low-high ambiguity

Cost Status	Ambiguity Status	Low Quest	High Quest
Low Cost	Low Ambiguity	.84	.77
	High Ambiguity	.59	1.0
High Cost	Low Ambiguity	.68	.42
	High Ambiguity	.48	.62

Hypothesis #1. It had been predicted that there would be a specific religious orientation main effect for each of the 6 ANOVAs performed on the prejudice difference scores. However, none of these effects were significant, all *p*'s >.05.

Hypothesis #2. It was expected that difference scores for both prejudices would yield a main effect for cost. That is, the difference scores of participants who had expected to be interviewed (high cost) would reflect significantly higher prejudice mean difference scores than would those who were told they were not going to be interviewed (low cost). However, cost was not a significant factor in any of the six ANOVAs, all *p*'s >.05.

Hypothesis #3. Predictions suggested that low ambiguity participants would be relatively less prejudiced than high ambiguity participants for both difference measures (ethnocentrism and homophobia). Again, the predicted main effects were not significant, all *p*'s >.05.

Interaction. Just one interaction was significant in the six ANOVAs. A cost X ambiguity X intrinsic religiosity three-way interaction was significant for the homophobia difference score, $F(1, 244) = 4.91$, $p < .05$ (see Table 12). The variance accounted for by the interaction was less than 2%.

The Role of Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Hypothesis # 4. It had been predicted that when RWA was used as a covariate in six ANCOVA models, it would tend to modify previously found (ANOVAs) religious orientation main effects. Because religious orientation did not predict prejudice difference scores (see Hypothesis # 1 above), attention here focused on RWA.

For ethnocentrism, RWA was not a significant covariate of difference scores for

the ANCOVAs. However, the effect of the covariate was significant for the homophobia difference score ANCOVAs involving Intrinsic, F (1, 243) = 8.56, $p < .01$, Extrinsic, F (1,243) = 10.09, $p < .01$, and Quest, F (1,243) = 9.75, $p < .01$.

Forced Interviewer Choices

Chi-Square Statistical Tests. Chi-square nonparametric tests were used to test the significance of forced choice frequencies. Specific hypotheses required within group comparisons (e.g., black versus white choice) in a specific group (e.g., low intrinsic) as well as 2 X 2 comparisons (e.g., black versus white choices by low versus high intrinsic). Therefore, results for forced choices (black versus white; heterosexual versus homosexual) are reported for both within group comparisons (e.g., high intrinsic only) and between group comparisons (e.g., low intrinsic versus high intrinsic).

Total Sample Forced Choices. The total sample and gender breakdown[3] of forced choices with chi-square statistics for each set of stimuli is presented in Table 15. Overall, participants chose the black and heterosexual interviewer significantly more often than the white or homosexual interviewer. However, when gender was taken into consideration, female participants chose black over white significantly more often than males who showed no clear preference, chi-square (1, n = 254) = 5.45, $p < .05$, and males chose heterosexual over homosexual more often than females who did not clearly differentiate

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[3] Gender comparisons were not pertinent to the greater goals of Study 2. However, comparisons were made to determine if gender of participant impacted on overall sample choice.

Table 15. Frequencies and percentages of forced choices, with chi-square statistics, by sample and set

Forced Choice	Sample	Black	White	df	Chi-square	p
Set 1	Total N = 254	150 (59.1 %)	104 (40.9 %)	1	8.33	< .01
Black vs. White	Females n = 170	109 (64.1 %)	61 (35.9 %)	1	13.55	<.001
	Males n = 84	41 (48.8 %)	43 (51.2 %)	1	.05	>.05
Forced Choice	**Sample**	**Homosexual**	**Heterosexual**	**df**	**Chi-square**	**p**
Set 2	Total N = 254	98 (38.6 %)	156 (61.4 %)	1	13.24	< .001
Homosexual vs. Heterosexual	Females n = 169	77 (45.6 %)	92 (54.4 %)	1	1.33	> .05
	Males n = 85	21 (24.7 %)	64 (75.3 %)	1	21.75	< .0001

between the two, chi-square (1, n = 254) = 10.38, p. < .001.

Forced Choices and Religious Orientation. Forced choices by religious orientation median splits for the ethnocentrism dependent measure and frequency chi-square statistics are presented in Table 16. Overall, high I participants chose the black (66.6 %) more often than the white interviewer (33.4 %), while those scoring low on I showed no significant preference for black (53.1 %) over white (46.9 %). A chi-square comparison of black versus white forced choices between low I versus high I for ethnocentrism indicated a significant difference between the I groups, chi-square (1, n = 250) = 4.79, $p < .05$, such that high intrinsic scorers chose black over white significantly more often than did low intrinsic scorers who showed no interviewer preference.

Low E scoring participants did not favour the black (57.9%) over white (42.1%) interviewer, however, high E scorers did choose the black interviewer (61.3%) more often than the white (38.7%). When low E versus high E forced choices were compared, the value of chi-square (1, n = 250) = .29, $p > .05$ was not significant.

An identical pattern was found for Q with low Q scorers showing no preference between black (54.8%) and white (45.2%) interviewer and high Q preferring black (64.5%) over white (35.5%). Again, the low versus high orientation comparison was not significant, chi-square (1, n = 250) = 2.47, $p > .05$.

For the homophobia forced choices, also presented in Table 16, low I scorers chose the heterosexual interviewer (63.9 %) significantly more often than the homosexual interviewer (36.1 %), while high I was associated with no significant preference. However, there was no significant difference between the low and high I groups,

Table 16. Forced choice results and chi-square statistics for ethnocentrism and homophobia by religious orientation median splits

Forced Choice	Sample	Black	White	df	Chi-square	p
Set 1 Black vs. White	Low Intrinsic	69 (53.1%)	61 (46.9%)	1	.49	>.05
	High Intrinsic	80 (66.6%)	40 (33.4%)	1	13.33	<.001
	Low Extrinsic	73 (57.9%)	53 (42.1%)	1	3.17	>.05
	High Extrinsic	76 (61.3%)	48 (38.7%)	1	6.32	<.05
	Low Quest	69 (54.8%)	57 (45.2%)	1	1.14	>.05
	High Quest	80 (64.5%)	44 (35.5%)	1	10.45	<.01
Forced Choice	**Sample**	**Homo-sexual**	**Hetero-sexual**	**df**	**Chi-square**	**p**
Set 2 Homosexual vs. Heterosexual	Low Intrinsic	47 (36.2%)	83 (63.8%)	1	9.97	<.01
	High Intrinsic	51 (42.5%)	69 (57.5%)	1	2.70	>.05
	Low Extrinsic	47 (37.0%)	80 (63.0%)	1	8.57	<.01
	High Extrinsic	51 (41.5%)	72 (58.5%)	1	3.59	>.05
	Low Quest	51 (40.2%)	76 (59.8%)	1	4.92	<.05
	High Quest	47 (38.2%)	76 (61.8%)	1	6.84	<.01

chi-square (1, n = 250) = 1.05, p >.05.

Low E scorers tended to choose heterosexual (63.0 %) over homosexual (37 %), as did high E scorers (58.5 % for heterosexual versus 41.5 % for homosexual) though this latter tendency only approached significance, p = .06. Again, no significant difference was apparent when the low scoring and high scoring E groups were statistically compared, chi-square (1, n = 250) = .52, p > .05.

Finally, both low Q scorers (59.8 % versus 40.2%) and high Q scorers (61.8 % versus 38.2%) significantly preferred the heterosexual over the gay interviewer. A chi-square comparison yielded no significant difference in preference between the low and high Q groups, chi-square (1, n = 250) = .10, p >.05.

Overt Versus Covert Measurement. In order to compare the present findings with those reported by Batson et al. (1986), forced choices made by the three religious orientation high and low groups were examined taking ambiguity status into account. Batson and his associates argued that choosing white over black in a low ambiguity condition (same interview topic in the present study; same movie in Batson et al. 1986) could be perceived as an overt admission of racial prejudice, while a high ambiguity condition (different interview topics here; different movies in Batson et al. 1986) was covert, providing participants with a means to justify a white over black choice.

Hypothesis #5. With regard to intrinsic median splits and the forced choice ethnocentrism measure, it had been predicted that high scoring I participants would choose the black over white interviewer more often when the ambiguity condition was low (overt). Presumably, respondents would not have been able to use interview topic as

justification for choosing white over black. This prediction was supported with 64.3 % of participants choosing the black interviewer (see Table 17). In the covert condition (high ambiguity), it had been predicted that those scoring high on I would show no preference for either the black or white interviewer. Again, high I scorers preferred the black interviewer (68.8 %) over the white (31.2 %). This finding was contrary to prediction. It was predicted that low I scorers would choose the white interviewer significantly more often in both low and high ambiguity conditions. This prediction was not supported as low I scorers showed no clear preference between black and white interviewer in either the low or high ambiguity condition. A chi-square comparison indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between high I and low I forced choices for the overt condition, however, for the covert condition, the pattern of choices between the pro-black high I group and the undifferentiated low I group was reliably different, chi-square (1, n = 126) = 4.60, $p < .05$. The pattern of forced choices did not change for either intrinsic group when comparing overt versus covert conditions; high I scorers remained relatively pro-black while low I scorers did not discriminate. This hypothesis was not generally supported.

Hypothesis # 6. In regard to forced choices made for set 2 (homophobia measure), it had been predicted that both low I and high I participants would be more inclined to choose the heterosexual interviewer in both the overt (low ambiguity) and covert (high ambiguity) conditions. This was not the case (see Table 18). There was no clear choice of interviewers for high I scorers in either low or high ambiguity conditions. The low I group did not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual in the overt

Table 17. Overt versus covert comparison of ethnocentrism forced choices by religious orientation median splits.

Median Split	Overt Condition *			Covert Condition *		
	Black	White	Chi-Square	Black	White	Chi-Square
Low Intrinsic	38 (55.9%)	30 (44.1%)	.94, $p > .05$	31 (50.0%)	31 (50.0%)	.00, $p > .05$
High Intrinsic	36 (64.3%)	20 (35.7%)	4.57, $p < .05$	44 (68.8%)	20 (31.2%)	9.0, $p < .01$
Low Extrinsic	40 (59.7%)	27 (40.3%)	2.52, $p > .05$	33 (55.9%)	26 (44.1%)	.83, $p > .05$
High Extrinsic	34 (59.6%)	23 (40.4%)	2.12, $p > .05$	42 (62.7%)	25 (37.3%)	4.31, $p < .05$
Low Quest	39 (55.7%)	31 (44.3%)	.91, $p > .05$	30 (53.6%)	26 (46.4%)	.29, $p > .05$
High Quest	35 (64.8%)	19 (35.2%)	4.74, $p < .05$	45 (64.3%)	25 (35.7%)	5.71, $p < .05$

Note. All chi-square comparisons have df = 1; * overt condition indicates low attributional ambiguity; covert condition indicates high attributional ambiguity; percentages are shown in brackets

Table 18. Overt versus covert comparison of homophobia forced choices by religious orientation median splits

Median Split	Overt Condition *			Covert Condition *		
	Homo-Sexual	Hetero-Sexual	Chi-Square	Homo-Sexual	Hetero-Sexual	Chi-Square
Low Intrinsic	27 (41.5)	38 (58.5)	.17, $p > .05$	20 (30.8)	45 (69.2)	9.62, $p < .001$
High Intrinsic	24 (40.7)	35 (59.3)	.15, $p > .05$	27 (52.9)	24 (47.1)	.80, $p > .05$
Low Extrinsic	28 (41.2)	40 (58.8)	2.12, $p > .05$	19 (32.2)	40 (67.8)	7.47, $p < .01$
High Extrinsic	23 (41.1)	33 (59.8)	1.79, $p > .05$	28 (41.8)	39 (58.2)	1.81, $p > .05$
Low Quest	29 (42.6)	39 (57.4)	1.47, $p > .05$	22 (37.3)	37 (62.7)	3.81, $p < .05$
High Quest	22 (39.3)	34 (61.7)	2.57, $p > .05$	25 (37.3)	42 (62.7)	4.31, $p < .05$

Note. All chi-square comparisons have df = 1; * overt condition indicates low attributional ambiguity; covert condition indicates high attributional ambiguity

condition, but preferred the heterosexual interviewer (69.2 %) in the covert condition. A within group comparison of 2 interviewer choice between overt and covert conditions for either low I or high 1 was not significant, and further, both intrinsic groups did not differ from one another in pattern of choices for either the overt or covert condition.

Hypothesis # 7. As predicted, black preference for high Q scorers, regardless of ambiguity condition, was supported. Frequencies and statistical analyses are presented in Table 17. The high Q group favoured the black over the white graduate student 64.8 % of the time in the overt condition and 64.3 % in the covert condition. Contrary to prediction, low Q scorers did not provide a clear interviewer preference for either the low or high ambiguity condition. Again, comparison of within group overt versus covert frequency patterns for each of the two Q median split groups was nonsignificant, as were high versus low Q comparisons for each level of ambiguity.

Hypothesis # 8. Low Q had been expected to be associated with a heterosexual preference regardless of ambiguity condition. Although this was the finding for the covert (high ambiguity) measure (62.7 % chose heterosexual), there was no clear preference for the overt condition (low ambiguity) (see Table 18). A no preference prediction for those scoring high on Q regardless of ambiguity condition was not supported. For the overt condition, no particular preference was shown for either heterosexual (60.7 %) or gay interviewer (39.2 %) by high Q scores as predicted, while there was an unexpected heterosexual (62.69 %) preference in the covert condition. High Q versus low Q frequency comparisons for each level of ambiguity, and low ambiguity versus high ambiguity comparisons for each Q median split group, yielded no significant differences.

There was no support for this hypothesis.

Hypothesis # 9. Predictions were only supported regarding the low E group. It was hypothesized that no race preference would be apparent for either low E or high E scorers regardless of ambiguity condition. This was true for the overt (low ambiguity) and covert (high ambiguity) conditions for low E and the low ambiguity condition for high E where no preference tested significant. However, high E was associated with a pro-black preference in the high ambiguity covert condition where two-thirds (64.3 %) of participants chose the black interviewer. No within group overt (low ambiguity) versus covert (high ambiguity) comparison, or between group (high E versus low E) comparison for either ambiguity condition was significant.

Although no specific predictions were made for the forced choice measure of homophobia, both low and high E groups showed no preference between sexual orientations for low ambiguity (overt). High extrinsics also failed to differentiate between interviewers even when the condition was covert, however low extrinsics did have a preference of heterosexual (67.8 %) over gay in the covert condition. Further frequency comparisons were all statistically nonsignificant.

Intrinsic Orientation and Forced Choice Ethnocentrism Measure

Batson et al. (1986) used a point-biserial correlation procedure to compare religious orientation scale scores with participants' seating choices in both a low (overt) and high (covert) ambiguity condition. We have done so here for comparison purposes.

Although there was a significant difference in interviewer forced choice preference between low I and high I scorers for ethnocentrism on the chi-square analyses reported

above, point bi-serial correlations calculated between intrinsic scale scores for each ambiguity condition did not yield significant correlations, $r_{pb} = -.06$, $p > .05$ for the low ambiguity group and $r_{pb} = -.10$, $p > .05$ for the high ambiguity group.

Correlational Analyses

Most of the hypotheses were not supported in Study 2. In an attempt to understand the religious orientation-prejudice relationships in terms of both Study 1 and Study 2, a series of correlations were carried out. Table 19 shows zero-order and point-biserial correlations among two questionnaire dependent measures (Study 1), two difference scores (Study 2), and the two forced choice measures (Study 2). There was no association between the ethnocentrism difference score and the questionnaire measure of ethnocentrism. The ethnocentrism scale was significantly related to all of the other dependent measures, including the homophobia measures of nonproscribed prejudice. Even the forced choice measure of ethnocentrism (a behavioural measure) was weakly, but significantly, associated with the ethnocentrism scale. These findings could be interpreted as lending some support to the Batson claim that some participants tend to self-report a lack of prejudice and yet respond differently when prejudice is measured behaviourally. However, we must also question the validity of our behavioural measures, especially the difference scores.

Table 19 also shows no relationship between the difference score for ethnocentrism (EDM) and any of the nonproscribed homophobia measures (both Study 1 (ATH) and Study 2 (HDS and HFC). Finally, there was no significant relationship between the proscribed ethnocentrism (EFC) and nonproscribed homophobia (HFC)

Table 19. Zero-order and point-biserial correlations among two scale measures, two difference scores, and two forced choice measures of prejudice.

	HDS (Study 2)	EM (Study 1)	ATH (Study 1)	EFC Set 1 (Study 2)	HFC Set 2 (Study 2)
EDS (Study 2)	.04 (255)	.01 (251)	.06 (251)	.66 *** (254)	.06 (253)
HDS (Study 2)		.33 *** (252)	.49 *** (252)	.10 (254)	.64 *** (254)
EM (Study 1)			.56 *** (252)	.13 * (250)	.27 *** (250)
ATH (Study 1)				.14 * (250)	.36 *** (250)
EFC Set 1 (Study 2)					.10 (253)

Note. * $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$; figures in brackets indicate number of cases; shading = point-biserial correlations; EDS = Ethnocentrism Difference score; HDS = Homophobia Difference score; EM = Ethnocentrism scale; ATH = Attitudes Towards Homosexuals scale; EFC = Ethnocentrism Forced Choice; HFC = Homophobia Forced Choice

forced choice measures. These data indicate, that at least in this study, being racist does not necessarily imply being homophobic and vice versa.

Table 20 shows the relationships between the three religious orientation scale scores and the dependent measures of prejudice. This behavioural sample indicates that significant relationships between prejudice and religious orientation were limited to only the questionnaire measures of prejudice. The four significant correlations confirm a pattern found in Study 1, although MR was no longer associated with any of the religious orientations in this smaller sample. There were no reliable relationships between religious orientation and any of the behavioural prejudice measures.

Zero-order and point-biserial correlations between RWA and the dependent measures of both Study 1 and Study 2 were computed. These are presented in Table 21. RWA was a significant predictor of each of the three questionnaire measures of prejudice (EM, MR, and ATH) and also the homophobia difference score (HDS) and homophobia forced choice (HFC) measures. However, there was no significant correlation between RWA and either the ethnocentrism difference score (EDS) or the ethnocentrism forced choice measure (EFC).

Manipulation and Suspicion Checks

Participants had been asked to write a reason for both their ethnocentrism (Set 1) and homophobia (Set 2) forced choices. These responses were coded yes (1) or no (0) according to common themes (see Table 22) that were determined from the written material. Eight common coding categories were selected for both forced choice sets, while a positive and negative category was created for race and sexual orientation.

Table 20. Correlations between prejudice measures and religious orientations.

	Zero-order					Point-Biserial	
	Questionnaire Measures			Difference Scores		Forced Choice	
	EM	MR	ATH	EDS	HDS	EFC	HFC
Intrinsic	-.18** (252)	-.02 (252)	.16* (252)	-.06 (251)	.07 (252)	-.08 (250)	.01 (250)
Extrinsic	.06 (252)	-.02 (252)	-.26*** (252)	-.06 (251)	-.11 (252)	-.05 (250)	-.08 (250)
Quest	-.03 (252)	-.04 (252)	-.16* (252)	-.07 (251)	-.05 (252)	-.04 (250)	-.05 (250)

Note. EM = Ethnocentrism scale; ATH = Attitudes towards homosexuals scale; MR = Modern racism scale (modified); EDS = Ethnocentrism difference score; HDS = Homophobia difference score; EFC = Ethnocentrism forced choice; HFC = Homophobia forced choice; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; shaded area indicates point bi-serial correlations

Table 21. Correlations between prejudice measures and right-wing authoritarianism

	Zero-order					Point-Biserial	
	Questionnaire Measures			Difference Scores		Forced Choice	
	EM	ATH	MR	EDS	HDS	EFC	HFC
RWA	.37 ***	.55 ***	.36 ***	-.04 n.s.	.19 **	.02 n.s.	.24 ***
	(252)	(252)	(252)	(251)	(252)	(250)	(250)

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$; RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale; EM = Ethnocentrism scale; ATH = Attitudes Towards Homosexuals scale; MR = Modern Racism scale (Revised); EDS = Ethnocentrism Difference Score; HDS = Homophobia Difference Score; EFC = Ethnocentrism Forced Choice; HFC = Homophobia Forced Choice;

The frequencies of people using each coding category explanation for their forced choice selection are listed in Table 23. Many participants listed several reasons for each choice (e.g., common interests and similar family background) and these reasons were each coded according to the (1) yes or (0) no coding system. The most common reasons given for choice were topic, common interests, personality, and family background. There were no significant differences in no versus yes frequencies between ethnocentrism (Set 1) and homophobia (Set 2).

To determine whether the ambiguity manipulation had worked, we compared the number of no versus yes responses for the topic category between high and low ambiguity groups. In the low ambiguity condition, 15 people did, and 113 did not mention topic as a reason for their forced choice on the ethnocentrism measure (Set 1), whereas 83 (yes) versus 44 (no) high ambiguity participants wrote that topic had influenced their decision. There was a highly significant difference for this comparison, chi-square (1, $n = 255$) = 77.51, $p < .00001$. Likewise, for the homophobia measure (Set 2), there were significantly fewer people in the low ambiguity group, 25 (yes) and 102 (no), than in the high ambiguity group, 74 (yes) and 54 (no), who indicated topic as a reason for choice, chi-square (1, $n = 255$) = 39.02, $p < .00001$. These results indicated that the ambiguity manipulation had been successful.

We had no written check to see if the cost manipulation had worked. However, during debriefing sessions the experimenter asked all participants if they had believed that interviews would take place. Only eight participants during the four week study said that they had suspected that no interviews would take place. Many people indicated that they

Table 22. Coding scheme used for written explanations for forced choices

Theme	Explanation
1 Topic	Mentioned topic by name (e.g., volunteering), or stated that th topic influenced their choice.
2 Personality	Made any comment relating to the perceived personality of the interviewer (e.g., easy-going, open-minded).
3 Social	References that related to social activity or having a girlfriend.
4 Age	Mentioned the potential interviewer's age (e.g., that he was the same age)
5 Common Interests	The potential interviewer had shared interests with the participa (e.g., likes fishing)
6 Family Background	Similarities in family background were mentioned (e.g., number of siblings; parents' occupation; grew up or lived the same hometown)
7 Goals and Education	Participant referred to the present or future goals or education o the interviewer (e.g., career and academic goals).
8 Physical	The physical appearance of the interviewer or the photograph wa mentioned. (e.g., he looks like he would be easy to talk to).
9 Race (Set 1 only) Positive Response	Race of interviewer was mentioned as the reason for choosing black.
10 Race (Set 1 only) Negative Response	Race of interviewer was mentioned as the reason for choosing white.
11 Homosexuality Negative Response (Set 2 only)	Homophobic tendencies were mentioned by the participant as reason for choosing the heterosexual interviewer.
12 Homosexuality Positive Response (Set 2 only)	The participant indicated a curiosity or an appreciation of being interviewed by a homosexual interviewer

Table 23. Frequencies of coded responses by ambiguity condition for forced choices

	Set 1 Black vs. White		Set 2 Homosexual vs. Heterosexual	
	No	**Yes**	**No**	**Yes**
Topic	158	98	156	99
Personality	162	94	186	69
Social	225	31	240	15
Age	231	25	253	2
Common Interests	151	105	154	101
Family Background	204	52	178	77
Goals and Education	219	37	231	24
Physical	209	47	217	38
Race (Set 1 only) Positive Response	255	1		
Race (Set 1 only) Negative Response	256	0		
Homosexuality (Set 2 only) Negative Response			227	28
Homosexuality (Set 2 only) Positive Response			228	27

Note: N = 256 for Set 1; N = 255 for Set 2 (1 participant did not make a forced choice).

were nervous about being chosen to be interviewed; still others said that they were disappointed because they were looking forward to the interview. Thus we were relatively confident that the cost-no cost manipulation had worked.

Finally, participants had been asked to complete an open-ended suspicion check after completing the booklet. Responses were coded according to whether or not the participant was able to determine the real purpose of the study. A score of (0) was assigned when there was no indication of suspicion, a (1) when prejudice or stereotyping was mentioned, and a (2) when the response suggested that the person might know. A large number of people (n = 106) were able to adequately identify the purpose of the study, compared to 100 who did not and 46 who may have known. Chi-square comparisons of forced choice frequencies (i.e., black versus white and homosexual versus heterosexual) by the three suspicion categories were all non-significant, chi-square (1, n =252) = .98, $p > .05$ for ethnocentrism (Set 1), and chi-square (1, n = 252) = .23, $p > .05$. To ensure that participant suspicion had not impacted on the results of the study, all ANOVAs and correlations were recalculated controlling for suspicion. No significant changes occurred in any of these analyses. The debriefing session that followed the experimental session provided an opportunity to ask participants about their suspicions. Many people indicated that they had suspected our purpose only after being asked to respond to the open-ended question.

Discussion

Study 2 was undertaken with three purposes in mind: (1) to assess the relationships between three religious orientations and two types of behavioural prejudice

(religiously proscribed ethnocentrism and religiously nonproscribed homophobia) in both overt (low ambiguity) and covert (high ambiguity) experimental conditions and to make between ambiguity group comparisons; (2) to investigate the role and efficacy of "cost" and "attributional ambiguity" in this type of research; and (3) to assess the role of RWA in the religious orientation-prejudice relationship when prejudice is measured behaviourally. However, results of the present study raise more questions than they answer.

The Effect of Religious Orientation, Cost, Ambiguity on Prejudice Difference Scores

The results of the ANOVAs (Hypothesis #1) were contrary to predictions, showing no main effect for any of the three religious orientations for either the ethnocentrism or homophobia difference score dependent measures.[4] These results are consistent with those of Batson et al. (1978) where correlational analyses revealed no significant relationship between racial difference scores and I, E, or Q.[5] These data

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[4] Inclusion criteria for religious orientation analyses were not restricted to those who identified with a specific religious orientation as had been the procedure in Study 1. Concerns regarding the exclusion of participants scoring high on the Quest scale, less power due to sample size, and empty or low n cells, all contributed to the decision to perform the analyses on the full behavioural sample (N = 256). However, all ANOVA's and correlational analyses were subsequently tested using a reduced religious sample (n = 162), including only those who reported an affiliation with any Christian or non-Christian religious group, and this made no difference in our findings.

[5] These authors did report a negative relationship between racial prejudice and Q, however, this was only after combining questionnaire and behavioural measure scores

suggest that religious orientation is not related to personal prejudice in a situation requiring interaction with a person who is dissimilar in race or (usually) sexual orientation.[6]

The lack of significant results for either the cost (Hypothesis #2) or the attributional ambiguity (Hypothesis # 3) manipulation call into question the effectiveness of these variables when measuring prejudice, both in the present study, and possibly for the Batson et al. (1978, 1986) studies. Batson et al. (1978, 1986, 1993) have argued that a situation involving personal consequence controls for a socially desirable response set — presumably, responses on a behavioural measure of prejudice are more "truthful". Their hypothesis was based on the findings of two experimental studies (1978, 1986) in which there was no high-low "cost" comparison. The present study included high and low cost groups, but results indicated there was no significant variation in prejudice difference scores between conditions. It might be suggested that the cost manipulation in the present investigation was weak, or that respondents may have detected the purpose of the manipulation. However, feedback sessions indicated that the vast majority of participants believed that they would or would not be interviewed. Nor can we dismiss the possibility that instructing low cost participants to "imagine" that they would be interviewed may have unknowingly created a high cost condition. We can only conclude that, apparently, the expectation of being interviewed or not, did not significantly affect respondents'

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and using both psychometric and behavioural control for SD scores.

[6] For ethical reasons, participants were not asked to disclose their sexual orientation. Thus, we can not assume dissimilarity of sexual orientation for all participants.

interviewer ratings.

Similarly, in the present study there was no main effect for attributional ambiguity. Having a choice of interviewers with identical topics or different topics made no difference on individual interviewer ratings. It may have been that participants did not take the interview topics into serious consideration. However, written reasons for making each forced choice indicated that some low (11.7 %) and high (65 %) ambiguity respondents did consider the interview topic in making their choices. We considered the possibility that participants may have placed a greater importance on narrative information than on topic when rating interviewers. This possibility cannot be dismissed because many respondents did report being influenced by the narratives. However, in parallel with the present study, the Batson et al. (1986) study provided brief movie descriptions before participants were asked to choose a theatre. The frequency of participants choosing to sit with the white as opposed to the black confederate for the high ambiguity group (choice of movie) may have been an actual movie choice rather than an act of racial discrimination.[7] It is difficult to determine the congruency of choosing what to watch (Batson et al., 1986), and choosing what to discuss (the present study).

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Batson and his associates might argue here that they had counterbalanced confederate with movie, confederate with theatre, movie with theatre, and movie with the side of room. It would seem that the small sample size used in the 1986 experiment (n = 17 in the overt condition; n = 27 in the covert condition) would have made a complete counterbalancing of all confounding effects impossible.

Another explanation for the nonsignificance of cost and ambiguity in the present study concerns the ratings of the extent to which participants wanted to be interviewed by each potential interviewer. Because participants were also asked to make a forced choice between interviewers they might not have felt any reason to rate one interviewer more favourably than the other on the initial rating. Consistent with this interpretation, mean difference scores for both ethnocentrism and homophobia were extremely small, although standard deviations indicated a reasonable amount of variance between scores. Thus, there is some concern here about the validity of the difference scores in the present study. In comparison, Batson et al. (1978) asked participants to rate two potential interviewers, but did not request a forced choice; interviewer ratings would have directly affected interviewer assignment. Unfortunately, these authors did not report mean difference scores, so there is no way to compare our ratings with theirs.

Actually, in the present study, point-biserial correlations between the respective difference scores and forced choices were strong for both types of prejudice. If students had consciously intended to provide relatively equal ratings between potential interviewers as a gesture of fairness, or even kindness, it might be expected that the observed point bi-serial relationships might have been lower. It is also possible that ratings had nothing to do with racial or sexual orientation discrimination, but rather were a reflection of other factors (i.e., narrative information, photograph, interview topic).

Choosing an Interviewer

We were surprised that, overall, participants preferred the black over the white interviewer by a margin of 3:2. On the other hand, the preference of the heterosexual over

the gay interviewer by 2 of 3 respondents was expected given the stigma attached to being gay in Western society. When these choices were broken down by gender, it became apparent that women (but not men) on average were relatively pro-black and men (but not women) preferred the heterosexual interviewer. Therefore, we would suggest that future research in this area should consider gender as an independent variable.

Comparing ethnocentrism forced choices for high, and low, religious orientation (based on median splits) revealed that high I, E, and Q participants chose black over white significantly more often, but low I, E, and Q participants did not differentiate between the races. However, comparing high versus low choices within each orientation yielded a significant difference only for the I comparison; high intrinsic scorers chose the black interviewer significantly more often than did low scorers. This result provided some evidence that suggested that even on a behavioural measure of prejudice, high intrinsics can show an inclination toward greater tolerance. Of course, there is still the possibility that high intrinsic scorers were worried about "appearing prejudiced" in the eyes of the researcher. If this were true, it would support the Batson et al. (1993) social desirability hypothesis.

The forced choice measure of homophobia indicated a significant tendency to choose a heterosexual interviewer for the low I, E, and Q, and high Q groups. High I and E scorers did not differentiate between sexual orientations, however, no low versus high within orientation comparisons yielded differences. This suggests that religious orientation was not behaviourally predictive of our measure of nonproscribed prejudice. Further, we did not find Q to be a negative predictor of homophobic attitudes on our

behavioural measure, which was contrary to the generally accepted finding that Q is negatively related to homophobia at least on questionnaire measures (see Batson et al., 1993). Quest scores did not predict tolerance of homosexuals, nor did they predict intolerance.

The testing of our hypotheses regarding religious orientation and overt (low ambiguity) versus covert (high ambiguity) behavioural measures of prejudice yielded little change in the above pattern. All groups, both high and low, showed no interviewer preference in the overt condition. For high ambiguity, where choosing heterosexual was not necessarily an admission of prejudice, low I, E, and Q, and high Q, statistically preferred the heterosexual interviewer, while high I and high E scoring participants did not discriminate. Here, there were no significant differences between respective groups on either high versus low or overt versus covert chi-square comparisons. This suggests that homophobic behaviour is not significantly related to religious orientation.

What can we conclude from the forced choice dependent measures? First, religious orientation, for the most part, seemed to have little to do with personal prejudice when prejudice was measured in a situation involving behavioural consequence. Second, no significant relationship between questionnaire and behavioural measures of proscribed prejudice was readily apparent (except for a very weak relationship between EM and EFC), however, for nonproscribed prejudice both types of measure were positively related. Third, our findings were not in agreement with those of Batson et al. (1986) who found a marginally significant shift in I-prejudice point-biserial correlations when comparing overt versus covert condition forced choices (choosing to sit with a white

confederate). Finally, we did find a significant difference between the high and low intrinsic scoring groups in a general comparison of forced choices, a finding which suggested that high scoring intrinsics were less prejudiced than low scoring intrinsics in our sample. However, caution must be taken in interpreting this result because a negative point-biserial correlation between intrinsic scale scores and participants' ethnocentrism forced choice was not significant.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

We had expected that RWA would be a significant predictor of both ethnocentrism and homophobia in the ANCOVA procedures. This was supported only for the measures of homophobia, and is contrary to previous findings that RWA is positively associated with questionnaire measures of racial prejudice (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988, Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). Again, the Batson criticism regarding questionnaire measures of prejudice and their ability to tap true prejudicial attitudes must be addressed in regard to religiously proscribed prejudice. It appears from our data that participants were more willing to discriminate against a gay interviewer than they were a black interviewer, although we cannot be sure that choosing white and heterosexual over black and homosexual was an intentional act of discrimination. All measures of homophobia, including the scale measure from study 1, correlated positively with one another, as well as with RWA. This might account for the fact that RWA was a significant covariate in the ANCOVA procedure for homophobia difference scores, but not for ethnocentrism difference scores.

The lack of a positive RWA-ethnocentrism relationship for the behavioural

difference score and the forced choice ethnocentrism measure, again suggests that something might be wrong with both ethnocentrism behavioural measures. It is difficult to determine why no relationship was found between RWA and the behavioural proscribed prejudice measures, yet the usually reported positive relationship between RWA and nonproscribed prejudice (as measured on self-report questionnaires) was behaviourally confirmed. We can only speculate that white versus black prejudice might be a non-issue at this primarily white populated university.

These findings regarding RWA and the ethnocentrism behavioural measures do not support our contention that RWA is a reasonable alternative to the Batson SD hypothesis in explaining differences between questionnaire and behavioural measures of racial prejudice and the Intrinsic orientation. Controlling for RWA did not dramatically affect the significance of I, E, or Q when the ANCOVA procedures were performed, which was contrary to predictions. Further testing of the RWA hypothesis will be necessary with more valid behavioural measures of proscribed prejudice before any meaningful conclusions can be made.

General Discussion (Studies 1 and 2)

Study 1 used self-report scales to measure prejudiced attitudes as well as religious orientation, and for the most part, the pattern of results supported previous research (Batson et al., 1993; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). It was also determined in Study 1 that ethnocentrism and negative attitudes towards homosexuals were, on average, perceived as religiously proscribed and nonproscribed prejudices respectively. Further, controlling for the effect of religious proscription through partial correlations did not substantially change

the original zero-order correlations for ethnocentrism or homophobia. This replicated the results of Duck and Hunsberger (1996).

What are the implications of these findings? Batson et al. (1993) theorized that highly intrinsic people outwardly tend to conform to the will of their religious community with respect to the tolerance of others. For example, prohibition of racist attitudes by church authorities would promote greater acceptance of ethnic minorities when attitudes are assessed on overt questionnaire measures of prejudice. However, the present findings suggest that knowing or perceiving the church's position regarding specific types of prejudice, has little impact on respondents' ethnocentrism or homophobia scale scores.[8]

Study 2 explored previous findings (Batson et al., 1978, 1986) that showed a shift in the I-prejudice relationship between questionnaire and behavioural measures of prejudice. That is, high I scorers had been reported to be no less prejudiced than low I scorers when prejudice was measured covertly, even though on overt measures I was associated with racial tolerance. In addition, the Q orientation had been consistently associated with greater tolerance whether the measurement condition was overt or covert.

In the Study 2 ANOVA analyses, the lack of significant main effects for I suggested it was not related to personal prejudice when measured behaviourally, consistent with the Batson position. In the present study, participants might not have felt

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[8] Although not previously reported in this paper, correlations were calculated between the proscription scale and index scores, and the behavioural prejudice difference scores and forced choices in Study 2 with the same "no association" result.

a need to differentiate between interviewers in their ratings because they were later required to make a forced choice in each stimulus set, a task they were aware of from the outset of the experiment. In the Batson et al. (1978) study, respondents were led to believe that their rating of each interviewer would decide who they would be interviewed by. Thus "personal cost" might have been present in the Batson experiment during the rating process, but probably not in the present study until forced choices were made.

Therefore, it is suggested that our forced choice measure of prejudice might have been the better one in Study 2, since it was the measure which potentially involved direct personal cost. The results for the forced choice measure revealed very different results from the difference scores discussed above. First, there was an overall tendency for participants to choose black and heterosexual over white and gay respectively. Choosing the black interviewer was unexpected and contrary to what happened in the Batson et al. (1978) experiment. This might be explained by sample and time differences. The present study was run in a Canadian university, and Canada boasts a multi-cultural society where racial diversity, at least on the surface, is embraced. The United States has long been known for racial tension between black and white. It might be that young Canadians are less prejudiced than young Americans because of multi-cultural education provided in Canadian schools, though empirical verification of this speculation is needed. It is also possible that attitudes have changed in the last 20 years due to various factors, such as increasing concern in the media regarding the ills of racism and discrimination. Dovidio and Gaertner (1986) indicated that black stereotyping has been decreasing in the media, and that black people have become more and more noticeable in television and film. In

light of this, it may be that public consciousness of possessing egalitarian attitudes and displaying nonprejudiced behaviour has played a part in participants' responses in Study 2. Possibly, the need to appear nonprejudiced might have overshadowed any perceived personal cost.

In addition, the forced choice results of Study 2 indicated that high intrinsic scorers tended to be pro-black when compared to low intrinsic scorers who did not show any tendency to prefer a black or white interviewer. This same tendency appeared within the covert condition, where choosing white could not have been attributed to interview topic. That is, high I scorers still preferred the black interviewer, contrary to Batson et al.'s (1986) finding for seating choice. In their experiment high intrinsics chose to sit with a black confederate significantly more often in the overt condition and did not differentiate in the covert condition. In the present study, a significant correlation between the forced choice ethnocentrism measure and the ethnocentrism scale (Study 1) was positive but weak. This provided further evidence to suggest that the I-prejudice relationship may not be an artifact of social desirability as Batson and his colleagues have suggested; participants's forced choices weakly reflected their ethnocentrism scale scores. However, we must be cautious in drawing hasty conclusions. Although chi-square tests confirmed a an overall pro-black choice for high I scorers (based on a median split), point-biserial correlations between intrinsic scores and ethnocentrism forced choices failed to yield a significant negative relationship.

What about Quest? No main effect was found for the low versus high quest groups on the ANOVAs using difference scores for either proscribed or nonproscribed

prejudice, nor were any significant differences forthcoming on the forced choice measures. Similarly, neither the overt (low ambiguity) nor covert (high ambiguity) conditions revealed any support for quest as a predictor of greater tolerance as has been found on questionnaire measures of prejudice (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Batson et al. 1978, 1986; 1993; Duck & Hunsberger, 1996). Actually, both high Q and low Q chose the heterosexual interviewer more often than the homosexual in both the high and low ambiguity condition.

Similarly, E was not a significant factor in the ANOVAs where difference scores had been used. Nor did any of the forced choice comparisons between high and low extrinsic groups reveal a significant forced choice preference.

These forced choice findings suggest that Batson et al.'s (1978, 1986, 1993) claim that high scoring intrinsics respond differently on questionnaire measures of prejudice than they do on behavioural measures, must be seriously questioned. Not enough research has investigated the Batson claims, yet in the literature much has been made of these now classic findings. If behavioural measures of prejudice do produce different associations than do self-report scale measures, the validity of much of the religion-prejudice literature would be called into question.

We believe that our data provide some evidence to suggest that Batson et al.'s 1978 and 1986 reported findings regarding behavioural versus questionnaire measures of racial prejudice and religious orientation need further empirical investigation before any conclusions can be made.

Our comparison of data from Studies 1 and 2 indicated that self-reported

prejudice, more specifically ethnocentrism, does not necessarily translate into discriminatory behaviour. We found no relationship between self-reported ethnocentric attitudes and behavioural difference scores, and only a weak positive relationship between the ethnocentrism scale and our forced choice ethnocentrism measure. However, all the homophobia measures were positively correlated. Further, no religious orientation was related to proscribed or nonproscribed difference scores. This may have reflected a tendency by respondents to be egalitarian, much in the same way as Dovidio and Gaertner (1986) described "aversive racism." The aversive racist responds in a manner which helps to preserve his or her self-esteem by being conscientious about doing the right thing in terms of social norms. This notion parallels the Batson et al. social desirability hypothesis with respect to high scoring intrinsics. However, religious orientation did not significantly correlate with the Marlowe-Crowne SD scale in the present study. Further, our forced choice behavioural measure of ethnocentrism did indicate that the high intrinsic scoring group chose the black over white interviewer more often than the low intrinsic scoring group in an overall comparison, and also in the covert (high ambiguity) condition. This finding was contrary to that of Batson et al. (1986).

In summary, Batson et al. (1978) found that I was not correlated with ethnocentrism difference scores when participants rated a white and a black interviewer. Our study found the same thing — there was no relationship between I scale scores and either the ethnocentrism or homophobia difference scores. Further, Batson reported that Q was negatively correlated with behavioural difference scores — Study 2 did not find any relationship between Q and behavioural difference scores. In 1986, Batson and his

associates reported that I was negatively associated with an overt behavioural measure of prejudice but not associated with a covert behavioural measure. They concluded that when ambiguity was high, high intrinsic scorers did not succumb to socially desirable responding, and therefore, they acted according to their real prejudices. Our data suggest that high intrinsics tended to act less prejudiced in the covert condition than in the overt condition. As well, Batson et al. (1986) reported that Q was negatively related to prejudice. In study 2, ethnocentrism was not negatively associated with any religious orientation, regardless of ambiguity condition. Chi-square analyses did indicate that high I scorers were relatively less prejudiced than low I scorers in the covert condition, but, a nonsignificant point-biserial correlation between I scale scores and the forced choice ethnocentrism measure cast some doubt on this finding.

The above summary helps to clarify differences between the present study and those reported by Batson and his associates. When the present study and those of Batson were compared, there was agreement that relationships between questionnaire scale measures and behavioural measures of prejudice tended to be different. However, we did not find that I was associated with a significant shift between overt and covert behavioural measures of prejudice. If anything, the shift in the covert condition was in the opposite direction of our prediction — high I scorers chose black over white more often, while low I scorers did not discriminate. This finding suggests that social desirability was not likely influencing participants' behaviour as Batson would have us believe. Of course we cannot be sure that our ambiguity manipulation was strong enough to make a difference. Thus, further research might help to determine if questionnaire and behavioural measures of

prejudice are measuring the same thing.

Finally, the relationship between RWA and prejudice was not confirmed for the ethnocentrism behavioural measures, although the expected positive association did appear for the homophobia behavioural measures. In addition, social desirability was not related to any of the behavioural measures of ethnocentrism or homophobia. Our suggestion that RWA might be an alternative explanation for reported relationship shifts between high I scorers and racial prejudice when measured on overt and covert measures of prejudice, was not supported in the present investigation. Study 1 provided evidence via partial correlations to support our RWA hypothesis, however, no evidence in Study 2 was supportive. What happened here is unclear. RWA still predicted homophobia behavioural scores, but it fell considerably short on the ethnocentrism measures. This discrepancy with respect to RWA and proscribed prejudice, and the previously mentioned concerns, indicate that the validity of the behavioural measures in this study might be a major concern for our results.

Limitations

Several limitations of the present studies need to be considered. First, the use of a Canadian university sample limits the extent to which our findings are generalizable. Although much of the related religion-prejudice literature involves the use of psychology students, studies need to be undertaken that use samples that better represent the general population. Further, we do not know whether our findings apply to other university students in different regions of Canada or North America. Especially important here is the fact that Canada is a multi-cultural society, one in which diversity is generally welcomed.

Measuring prejudice in Canada may be very different than in the United States where racial prejudice has traditionally been a social problem. Therefore, we need to consider the possibility that ethnocentric attitudes may not be an issue at Canadian universities.

Second, results of Study 2 indicated that the validity of our prejudice difference scores was a concern. There was no way of determining whether the differences in participants' interviewer ratings reflected prejudiced attitudes, or simply a preference based on other factors. If the difference scores in Study 2 were not a reflection of prejudice, we could not legitimately expect a relationship between them and questionnaire measures of prejudice.

Finally, we attempted to measure both proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice for each participant; as a result, the likelihood that participants would detect the real purpose of the study might have increased. Actually, a large number of participants reported that they suspected we were measuring prejudice.

Conclusions

Despite these limitations, our findings lend themselves to the following conclusions:

1. For our sample of introductory psychology students, scale measures of ethnocentrism and homophobia confirmed well-documented relationships between religious orientation and prejudice (Study 1).

2. Ethnocentrism was on average perceived by respondents as a religiously proscribed prejudice, while homophobia was perceived as religiously nonproscribed (Study 1).

3. Religious proscription-nonproscription was related to scale measures of personal prejudice, however, controlling for the effect of proscription had no impact on the religious orientation-prejudice relationships (Study 1). No relationship was apparent between our index and scale measures of proscription and either behavioural measure of ethnocentrism or homophobia (Study 2).

4. Social desirability, as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale, was weakly related to the intrinsic and quest religious orientations, supporting previous findings by Batson et al. (1978). However, controlling for the effect of SD has virtually no effect on the religious-orientation prejudice relationships (Study 1).

5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism was related to all dependent measures of homophobia, both questionnaire and behavioural, but only to scale, not behavioural measures of ethnocentrism (Study 1 and Study 2).

6. No evidence was apparent in the present study to suggest that high I scorers tended to react differently on overt versus covert behavioural measures of racial prejudice, as reported by Batson et al. (1986). If anything, high scoring I participants tended to be less ethnocentric in the covert condition (Study 2).

7. Religious orientation was predictive of both ethnocentrism and homophobia when scales were used to measure prejudiced attitudes (Study 1). However, religious orientation appeared to be unrelated to behavioural measures of ethnocentrism and homophobia, although some evidence indicated that the Intrinsic orientation was negatively associated with racial discrimination (Study 2).

Whether the present experiment was a fair assessment of discrimination or not,

remains to be seen. As pointed out, methodological deficiencies or weak manipulations may have been responsible for our pattern of results. Additional research will be necessary to determine the validity of using behavioural measures to assess discrimination, and further to understand how these behavioural measures relate to self-reported attitudes of prejudice. However, it seems that the present studies have provided enough evidence to suggest that the Batson et al. (1978, 1986, 1993) notions concerning religious proscription, and overt versus covert measures of prejudice, should be re-examined.

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Appendix A

Verbal Instructions Mass Testing Study 1

My name is Robert Duck and I am working on my MA degree in psychology. Today we will be distributing a questionnaire which asks your opinions concerning various social and religious issues. The data collected here will be of value to several students in the department who are in the process of completing their masters theses. Your participation today is voluntary and much appreciated. You may withdraw at any time during the administration of the questionnaire without academic penalty, and you are not obligated to answer any specific question. However, it is important for our analyses that you answer all questions, if possible. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions. All of your answers should be recorded on the computer scoring sheet provided, using a lead pencil. Completely blacken the circle which indicates each response. When you have finished, raise your hand and one of us will come to collect both your questionnaire and answer sheet. Please do not write anything in the question booklet, we will be reusing them. If you have any questions please raise you hand. You may begin.

Appendix B

Written Instructions Mass Testing Study 1

This survey is a part of an investigation of student opinion concerning a variety of social and religious issues. Your responses are confidential. Participation in this project is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, in which case none of your responses will be included in the analyses. Should you want further information about the study, please contact the researcher (name, phone). Before you begin, print your name and ID number on the back of the computer "bubble sheet". This is so that we can make sure you are awarded course credit for participating in this study, and to match your responses in any follow-up research.

You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("-4") with one idea in a statement, but moderately disagree ("-2") with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel "on balance" (that is,"-3" in this example). Please indicate your reaction to each statement by blackening a bubble according to the following scale:

-4 if you very strongly disagree
-3 if you strongly disagree
-2 if you moderately disagree
-1 if you slightly disagree

+4 if you very strongly agree
+3 if you strongly gree
+2 if you moderately agree
+1 if you slightly agree

0 if you neither agree or disagree

Appendix C

Intrinsic/Extrinsic Scales

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Scale Items of the Religious Orientation Scale
Allport and Ross (1967)

Extrinsic Scale

1. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life.
2. It doesn't matter so much what I believe so long as I lead a moral life.
3. The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.
4. The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships.
5. What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.
6. I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.
7. Although I am a religious person I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.
8. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social activity.
9. Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to protect my social and economic well-being.
10. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to establish a person in the community.
11. The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.

Intrinsic Scale

1. It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation.

2. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church.

3. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.

4. The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those said by me during services.

5. Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being.

6. I read literature about my faith (or church).

7. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather than a social fellowship.

8. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.

9. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life.

Appendix D

Religious Quest Scale

Religious Quest Scale
(Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; 1991b)

1. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.
2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
3. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
4. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and purpose of my life.
5. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
6. I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years.
7. I find religious doubts upsetting.
8. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my world and in my relation to my world.
9. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
10. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
11. God wasn't very important to me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of my own life.
12. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.

Appendix E

Ethnocentrism Scale

Ethnocentrism Scale
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992)

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1. There are entirely too many people from the wrong sorts of places being admitted into Canada now.

2. In general, Indians have gotten less than they deserve from our social and anti-poverty programs. [C]

3. Canada should open its doors to more immigration from the West Indies.[C]

4. Certain races of people clearly do NOT have the natural intelligence and "get up and go" of the white race.

5. The Vietnamese and other Asians who have recently moved to Canada have proven themselves to be industrious citizens, and many more should be invited in. [C]

6. It's good to live in a country where there are so many minority groups present, such as blacks, Asians, and aboriginals. [C]

7. Arabs are too emotional and hateful, and they don't fit in well in our country.

8. As a group Indians and Metis are naturally lazy, promiscuous and irresponsible.

9. Canada should open its doors to more immigration from Latin America. [C]

10. Black people as a rule are, by their nature, more violent than white people are.

11. The people of India who have recently come to Canada have mainly brought disease, ignorance and crime with them.

12. Jews can be trusted as much as everyone else. [C]

13. It is a waste of time to train certain races for good jobs; they simply don't have the drive and determination it takes to learn a complicated skill.

14. The public needs to become aware of the many ways Blacks in Canada suffer prejudice. [c]

15. Every person we let into our country from overseas means either another Canadian won't be able to find a job, or another foreigner will go on welfare here.

16. Canada has much to fear from the Japanese, who are as cruel as they are industrious.

17. There is nothing wrong with intermarriage among the races. [c]

18. Indians should keep on protesting and demonstrating until they get just treatment in our country. [c]

19. Many minorities are spoiled; if they really wanted to improve their lives, they would get jobs and get off welfare.

20. Canada should guarantee that French language rights exist all across the country. [c]

Note: [c] = con-trait item for which scoring is reversed

Appendix F

Modern Racism Scale (Revised)

Modern Racism Scale (Revised)

1. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to **Native Canadians** than they derseerve.

2. It is easy to understand the anger of **Native people** in **Canada.** $_{C}$

3. Discrimination against **Natives** is no longer a problem in **Canada.**

4. Over the past few years, **Native Canadians** have gotten more economically than they deserve.

5. **Native Canadians** are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.

6. **Native Canadians** should not push themselves where they are not wanted.

$_{C}$ Indicates reversed scored item

Words in **bold** have been changed to adapt the scale to a Canadian sample and to change the prejudice target to Native Canadians.

Appendix G

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)

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1. I won't associate with known homosexuals if I can help it.
2. The sight of two men kissing does NOT particularly bother me. [C]
3. If two homosexuals want to get married, the law should let them. [C]
4. Homosexuals should be locked up to protect society.
5. Homosexuals should never be given positions of trust in caring for children.
6. I would join an organization even though I knew it had homosexuals in its membership. [C]
7. In many ways, the AIDS disease currently killing homosexuals is just what they deserve.
8. Homosexuality is "an abomination in the sight of God."
9. Homosexuals have a perfect right to their lifestyle, if that's the way they want to live. [C]
10. Homosexuals should be forced to take whatever treatments science can come up with to make them normal.
11. People should feel sympathetic and understanding of homosexuals, who are unfairly attacked in our society. [C]
12. I wouldn't mind being seen smiling and chatting with a known homosexual. [C]

Note: [C] = con-trait items for which scoring is reversed.

Appendix H

Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale

Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)

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1. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.

2. It is wonderful that young people can protest anything they don't like, and act however they wish nowadays. [a]

3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion, than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.

4. People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. [a]

5. What our country *really* needs , instead of more "civil rights," is a good stiff dose of law and order.

6. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

7. The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is the head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the better. The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it. [a]

8. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. [a]

9. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.

10. There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody's being a homosexual. [a]

11. It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants. [a]

12. Obedience is the most important virtue children should learn.

13. There is no "one right way" to live your life. Everybody has to create his *own* way. [a]

14 Once our government leaders condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

15. Government, judges and the police should never be allowed to censor books. *

16. Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done.

17. In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up.

18. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. *

19. Some young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they get older they ought to become more mature and forget such things.

20. There is nothing really wrong with a lot of the things some people call "sins." *

21. Everyone should have his own life-style, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes him different from everyone else. *

22. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.

23. Authorities such as parents and our national leaders generally turn out to be right about things, and the radicals and protestors are almost always wrong.

24. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow. *

25. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. *

26. The *real* keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow.

27. We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change. *

28. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our truth path.

29. Students must be taught to challenge their parents' ways, confront the authorities, and criticize the traditions of our society. [a]

30. One reason we have so many troublemakers in our society nowadays is that parents and other authorities are forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly.

Note. [a] = con-trait item for which scoring is reversed.

Appendix I

Proscribed Religious Items

Proscribed Religious Items
(Hunsberger, 1995)

WHAT DOES YOUR RELIGIOUS GROUP THINK ABOUT ISSUES?

Think for a moment of your religious group, and what its position is on the following issues. In general, to what extent does your religious group approve or disapprove of the following? (If you do not identify at all with any religious group, skip this page. Use the following scale to indicate on the answer sheet the extent to which your religious group approves or disapproves of each issue.

-4 very strongly disapproves
-3 strongly disapproves
-2 moderately disapproves
-1 slightly disapproves

+4 very strongly approves
+3 stronly approves
+2 moderately approves
+1 slightly approves

0 neither disapproves or approves

1. Allowing greater numbers of immigrants into Canada.
2. Treating all racial minorities as equal in every way to white people.
3. Homosexuality.
4. United Nations use of military force to intervene in world conflicts.
5. Premarital sexual activity.
6. Racial intermarriage.
7. Men and women as equals in all aspects of society.
8. Equal rights for gay (homosexual) persons.

Appendix J

Religious Proscription Scales

Religious Proscription Scales

Religious Proscription Ethnocentrism scale

1. My religious group tries hard to make all people feel welcome regardless of their ethnic background.

2. If a Native Indian became a leader in my church/synagogue, some members would switch to a different church. [c]

3. My minister/priest/rabbi would chastize me if I stated that I didn't like Blacks.

4. Our minister/priest/rabbi would feel uncomfortable performing an inter-racial marriage. [c]

5. If I were to take a Black friend with me to church/synagogue, some members of my church would avoid us. [c]

6. It would **not** be difficult for a Chinese person to be elected to a position of authority in my church/synagogue.

7. Even though I was taught in church/synagogue that all people are equal regardless of their colour, many people in my church don't believe what they preach. [c]

8. An activist concerned with Native Canadian rights would be welcomed as a guest speaker in our church/synagogue.

Note. [c] = con-trait item for which scoring is reversed.

Religious Proscription Homophobia Scale

1. My religious group tries hard to make all people feel welcome regardless of their sexual orientation.

2. If a homosexual became a leader in my church/synagogue, some members would switch to a different church. [c]

3. My minister/priest/rabbi would chastize me if I stated that I didn't like homosexuals.

4. Our minister/priest/rabbi would feel uncomfortable performing a same-sex marriage. [c]

5. If I were to take a known homosexual friend with me to church/synagogue, some members of my church would avoid us. [c]

6. It would **not** be difficult for a homosexual to be elected to a position of authority in my church/synagogue.

7. Even though I was taught in church/synagogue that all people are equal regardless of their sexual orientation, many people in my church don't believe what they preach. [c]

8. An activist concerned with gay rights would be welcomed as a guest speaker in our church/synagogue.

Note. [c] = con-trait item for which scoring is reversed.

Appendix K

Social Desirability Scale

Social Desirability Scale
(Marlowe & Crowne, 1964)

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1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. $_c$
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. $_c$
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. $_c$
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it. $_c$
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. $_c$
11. I like to gossip at times. $_c$
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. $_c$
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. $_c$
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. $_c$
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
17. I always try to practice what I preach.
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.

19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget. $_{c}$

20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.

21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. $_{c}$

23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. $_{c}$

24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings.

25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.

26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.

27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. $_{c}$

29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. $_{c}$

31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.

32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. $_{c}$

33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

Note. ^{c} = con-trait item for which scoring is reversed.

Appendix L

Single-Item Religious Questions

Single-Item Religious Questions

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1. How many times would you say you ordinarily go to church in a month? If never, blacken the "0" bubble. If once a month, blacken the "1" bubble, if twice a month, blacken the "2" bubble, and so on. if you go to church more than 9 times per month, simply blacken the "9" bubble.

2. With which religious group do you presently identify yourself or think of yourself as being?

   0 = Protestant
   1 = Catholic
   2 = Jewish
   3 = Muslim
   4 = Hindu
   5 = Buddhist
   6 = Mormon
   7 = Some other religious group
   8 = Personal religion (no affiliation with any religious group)
   9 = No religion

3. If you presently identify with a Protestant religious group, which denomination? [If you do not identify with Protestant religion, skip this question]

   0 Anglican
   1 United Church
   2 Lutheran
   3 Baptist
   4 Presbyterian
   5 Mennonite or Brethren
   6 Pentecostal
   7 Salvation Army
   8 two or more different Protestant denominations
   9 a Protestant denomination not listed above (please print it on the back of the computer sheet)

4. Age _____

5. Sex _____

Appendix M

Cover Page

Name: _____

Student I.D.# _____

Statement of Informed Consent

I understand that I am being asked to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Robert Duck (ext. 2988) under the supervision of Dr. Bruce Hunsberger (ext. 3219), of the Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University. The purpose of this study is to determine how the amount of information and format of information presentation affects the way in which people form first impressions.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I may withdraw from this study at any time without academic penalty. Furthermore, I agree to allow my responses to questions to be used in this study, provided this information is kept confidential and that it will only be used by the researcher and his thesis advisor for research purposes.

Feedback concerning the overall results of this study will be posted (by April 1, 1997) on the research feedback bulletin board located near the Psychology office on the second floor of the science building. In addition, the researcher will provide additional feedback during a scheduled PS100 class after data collection and analysis has been completed.

If I have any questions about the research, I may contact the researcher or his thesis advisor.

Participant's Signature: _____

Date: _____

Appendix N

Manipulation Pages

You have **NOT** been chosen to be interviewed. When choosing interviewers please **IMAGINE** that you**WILL BE** interviewed by **ONE** of them!

You **HAVE** been chosen to be interviewed. When rating potential interviewers, please **REMEMBER** that you **WILL BE INTERVIEWED** by one of them!

Appendix O

Written Instructions

(Low Cost Participants)

We are conducting a study to determine how people form impressions of each other when limited information is provided in different ways. Research suggests that first impressions tend to be long lasting, and that only after getting to know a person better, do we alter our initial judgment. Some people claim to be a good judge of character, but are they really?

In this study we use various communication styles to provide information about a person. In some information booklets photos are used, while in others there is no visual information. Also, different written presentation styles may be provided in either narrative or resume format. These written styles are not always the same from one participant to another. In addition to this, the **interview topic** has been provided for each potential interviewer. You will find each interviewer's topic highlighted in large type.

Here, you will encounter **two** sets of interviewer profiles (2 profiles per set). For **each** set of profiles, we ask you to do three things: First, for each of the two interviewers in each set, **imagine** how "comfortable" you think you would be if you were to be interviewed by that person, and then rate each of the interviewers accordingly on the nine point scale provided at the bottom of the sheet. Please take as much time as you need and remember to read the information about each interviewer very carefully before rating them.

Second, for **each set** of paired profiles (Set 1 consists of interviewers A and B; Set 2 consists of interviewers C and D), choose the person you would most prefer to interview you. That is, make your first choice between interviewers A and B, and then choose between interviewers C and D. Mark your **two** choices on the response sheet which is the second last page of your booklet.

Third, after making your selections, tell us why you chose each person. Space is provided on the response sheet for this purpose. When you have finished please wait for further instructions. **Do not turn to the last page** of the booklet until you are instructed to do so.

(High Cost Participants)

We are conducting a study to determine how people form impressions of each other when limited information is provided in different ways. Research suggests that first impressions tend to be long lasting, and that only after getting to know a person better, do we alter our initial judgment. Some people claim to be a good judge of character, but are they really?

In this study we use various communication styles to provide information about a person. In some information booklets photos are used, while in others there is no visual information. Also, different written presentation styles may be provided in either narrative or resume format. These written styles are not always the same from one participant to another. In addition to this, the **interview topic** has been provided for each potential interviewer. You will find each interviewer's topic highlighted in large type.

Here, you will encounter **two** sets of interviewer profiles (2 profiles per set). For **each** set of profiles, we ask you to do three things: First, for each of the two interviewers in each set, **determine** how "comfortable" you think you would be if you are to be interviewed by that person, and then rate each of the interviewers accordingly on the nine point scale provided on the response sheet. Please take as much time as you need and remember to read the information about each interviewer very carefully before rating them.

Second, for **each set** of paired profiles (Set 1 consists of interviewers A and B; Set 2 consists of interviewers C and D), choose **the person you prefer to interview you**. That is, make your first choice between interviewers A and B, and then choose between interviewers C and D. Mark your **two** choices on the response sheet which is the second last page in the booklet. Remember, you will be interviewed by **one** of these two people, depending on which team is currently available.

Third, after making your selections, tell us why you chose each person. Space is provided on the response sheet for this purpose. When you have finished please wait for further instructions. **Do not turn to the last page** of the booklet until you are instructed to do so.

Appendix P

Ethnocentrism Stimulus Pages



Set 1: Interviewer A

Interview Topic: Religious Issues

James Graham is a 25 year old psychology graduate student, specializing in physiological psychology. James was born in Windsor, Ontario, and moved to Toronto at the age of six. His father is a physician at Toronto General Hospital and his mother is a homemaker. James is the oldest of four children. He has two brothers, Greg and Andrew, and one sister, Julia. Presently, James lives in Waterloo and attends Wilfrid Laurier University. He enjoys reading, watching movies, swimming, and cycling. He doesn't have time for anyone special in his life at present because of the hours he dedicates to his school work. James hopes to finish his Masters degree this spring and has applied to continue his studies at the doctoral level.

Please think about <u>how much</u> you would like to be interviewed by this graduate student concerning religious issues and then circle your appropriate response on the scale provided below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not At All								**Very Much So**

Set 1: Interviewer B

Interview Topic: Volunteering

Rick Braydon is presently enrolled as a first year student in the graduate psychology program at Wilfrid Laurier University. He is 23 years old and was born in Toronto, Ontario. At four years old, he, his parents, and younger brother Raymond, moved to Mississauga, where his parents still reside. Rick enjoys going home at least one weekend a month. His father is employed as the general manager of a small importing firm in Oakville, Ontario. Mrs. Braydon attends classes at York University on a part-time basis. Rick hopes to continue his studies at the doctoral level and eventually find employment as a researcher. Presently, he enjoys spending time with his girlfriend Julie. Reading is a "chronic" pastime for Rick. He also enjoys listening to music and especially getting away to fish during the summer months.

Please think about <u>how much</u> you would like to be interviewed by this graduate student concerning volunteering and then circle your appropriate response on the scale provided below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not At All								**Very Much So**

Appendix Q

Counterbalancing

Counterbalancing for Ethnocentrism

W1/A/T1/S1	B1/B/T1/S2	W1/A/T2/S2	B1/B/T1/S2
W1/A/T1/S1	B1/B/T2/S2	W1/A/T2/S1	B1/B/T2/S2
W1/A/T2/S2	B1/B/T2/S1	W1/A/T1/S2	B1/B/T1/21
W1/A/T2/S2	B1/B/T1/S1	W1/A/T1/S2	B1/B/T2/S1
B1/A/T1/S1	W1/B/T1/S2	B1/A/T1/S2	W1/B/T1/S1
B1/A/T1/S1	W1/B/T2/S2	B1/A/T1/S2	W1/B/T2/S1
B1/A/T2/S2	W1/B/T2/S1	B1/A/T2/S1	W1/B/T1/S2
B1/A/T2/S2	W1/B/T1/S1	B1/A/T2/S1	W1/B/T2/S2
W1/A/T1/S1	B2/B/T1/S2	W1/A/T2/S1	B2/B/T1/S2
W1/A/T1/S1	B2/B/T2/S2	W1/A/T2/S1	B2/B/T2/S2
W1/A/T2/S2	B2/B/T2/S1	W1/A/T1/S2	B2/B/T1/S1
W1/A/T2/S2	B2/B/T1/S1	W1/A/T1/S2	B2/B/T2/S1
B2/A/T1/S1	W1/B/T1/S2	B2/A/T1/S2	W1/B/T1/S1
B2/A/T1/S1	W1/B/T2/S2	B2/A/T1/S2	W1/B/T2/S1
B2/A/T2/S2	W1/B/T2/S1	B2/A/T2/S1	W1/B/T1/S2
B2/A/T2/S2	W1/B/T1/S1	B2/A/T2/S1	W1/B/T2/S2
W2/A/T1/S1	B1/B/T1/S2	W2/A/T2/S1	B2/B/T1/S2
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W2/A/T2/S2	B1/B/T2/S1	W2/A/T1/S2	B2/B/T1/S1
W2/A/T2/S2	B1/B/T1/S1	W2/A/T2/S2	B2/B/T2/S1
B1/A/T1/S1	W2/B/T1/S2	B2/A/T1/S1	W2/B/T1/S1
B1/A/T1/S1	W2/B/T2/S2	B2/A/T1/S2	W2/B/T2/S1
B1/A/T2/S2	W2/B/T2/S1	B2/A/T2/S1	W2/B/T1/S2
B1/A/T2/S2	W2/B/T1/S1	B2/A/T2/S1	W2/B/T2/S2
W2/A/T1/S1	B2/B/T1/S2	W2/A/T2/S1	B1/B/T1/S2
W2/A/T1/S1	B2/B/T2/S2	W2/A/T2/S1	B1/B/T2/S2
W2/A/T2/S2	B2/B/T2/S1	W2/A/T1/S2	B1/B/T1/S1
W2/A/T2/S2	B2/B/T1/S1	W2/A/T1/S2	B1/B/T2/S1
B2/A/T1/S1	W2/B/T1/S2	B1/A/T1/S2	W2/B/T1/S1
B2/A/T1/S1	W2/B/T2/S2	B1/A/T1/S2	W2/B/T2/S1
B2/A/T2/S2	W2/B/T2/S1	B1/A/T2/S1	W2/B/T1/S2
B2/A/T2/S2	W2/B/T1/S1	B1/A/T2/S1	W2/B/T2/S2

Note: W1 = White Photo 1, W2 = White Photo 2, B1 = Black Photo 1, B2 = Black Photo 2, A = Position A, B = Position B, T1 = Topic 1, T2 = Topic 2, S1 = Story 1, S2 = Story 2

Appendix R

Stimulus Photographs

Ethnocentrism Photographs

Black Photo 1

Black Photo 2

White Photo 1

White Photo 2

Homophobia Photographs

Appendix S

Homophobia Stimulus Pages



Set 2: Interviewer C

Interview Topic: University Life

Peter Stanton is twenty-four years old and was born in Cornwall, Ontario. His mother is a public school teacher, while his dad runs an engineering consulting firm. He has two sisters, Ursula aged 14 and Rebecca aged 18. His only brother, Stephen, is 12 years old. Peter describes his relationship with his family as "pretty close." He is studying developmental psychology in the general experimental graduate program at Wilfrid Laurier University. Peter, who is gay, lives year-round in Waterloo with his partner Paul. He has a passion for crossword puzzles, murder mystery novels, soccer, and hockey. He hasn't decided whether he will continue his studies after earning his Masters degree, although he admits finding a job may be difficult.

Please think about <u>how much</u> you would like to be interviewed by this graduate student concerning university life and then circle your appropriate response on the scale provided below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not At All								**Very Much So**

Set 2: Interviewer D

Interview Topic: Family Values

For the first eight years of his life, John Martin lived with his family in Midland, Ontario. Shortly thereafter, the Martin family moved to Etobicoke, when his father was transferred to the Toronto office of the accounting firm for which he worked. Until John's later teens, his mother was a homemaker. Now she works part-time as a receptionist at a downtown bank. John has a sister, Jill, who will soon be seventeen. John, who turned twenty-four in December, hopes to earn a doctoral degree in social psychology upon completion of his masters degree in psychology at Wilfrid Laurier University. John lives in Kitchener during the school year and hopes to marry Louise, his long-time girlfriend, after he completes his degree. He enjoys jogging, tennis, and listening to good music.

Please think about <u>how much</u> you would like to be interviewed by this graduate student concerning family values and then circle your appropriate response on the scale provided below.

1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
Not At All								***Very Much So***

Appendix T

Homophobia Counterbalancing

Homophobia Counterbalancing

C1/C/S3/G/T1	C2/D/S4/H/T1	C1/C/S3/G/T2	C2/D/S4/H/T1
C1/C/S3/H/T1	C2/D/S4/G/T1	C1/C/S3/H/T2	C2/D/S4/G/T1
C1/C/S4/G/T1	C2/D/S3/H/T1	C1/C/S4/G/T2	C2/D/S3/H/T1
C1/C/S4/H/T1	C2/D/S3/G/T1	C1/C/S4/H/T2	C2/D/S3/G/T1
C2/C/S3/H/T1	C1/D/S4/G/T1	C2/C/S4/H/T2	C1/D/S3/G/T1
C2/C/S3/G/T1	C1/D/S4/H/T1	C2/C/S4/G/T2	C1/D/S3/H/T1
C2/C/S4/H/T1	C1/D/S3/G/T1	C2/C/S3/H/T2	C1/D/S4/G/T1
C2/C/S4/G/T1	C1/D/S3/H/T1	C2/C/S3/G/T2	C1/D/S4/H/T1
C1/C/S3/G/T1	C2/D/S4/H/T2	C1/C/S3/G/T2	C2/D/S4/H/T2
C1/C/S3/H/T1	C2/D/S4/G/T2	C1/C/S3/H/T2	C2/D/S4/G/T2
C1/C/S4/G/T1	C2/D/S3/H/T2	C1/C/S4/G/T2	C2/D/S3/H/T2
C1/C/S4/H/T1	C2/D/S3/G/T2	C1/C/S4/H/T2	C2/D/S3/G/T2
C2/C/S4/H/T1	C1/D/S3/G/T2	C2/C/S4/H/T2	C1/D/S3/G/T2
C2/C/S4/G/T1	C1/D/S3/H/T2	C2/C/S4/G/T2	C1/D/S3/H/T2
C2/C/S3/H/T1	C1/D/S4/G/T2	C2/C/S3/H/T2	C1/D/S4/G/T2
C2/C/S3/G/T1	C1/D/S4/H/T2	C2/C/S3/G/T2	C1/D/S4/H/T2

Note. G = Gay, H = Heterosexual, C1 = Photo 1, C2 = Photo 2, C = Position C, D = Position D, S3 = Story 3, S4 = Story

Appendix U

Response Sheet

Choosing Your Interviewer

Now that you have read about each of the four potential interviewers and have indicated how much you would like to be interviewed by each, we ask you to choose ONE person from each set. Remember, if you have been chosen for an interview, one of your choices from either Set One or Set Two will be the person who interviews you.

Please **circle** your appropriate choices. Choose **one** interviewer from Set 1 and **one** interviewer from Set 2. In the space provided after each set of selections, use a few key words or sentences to explain why you chose that interviewer.

Set 1

Circle Either: Interviewer A Interviewer B

_____

_____

_____

_____

Set 2

Circle Either: Interviewer C Interviewer D

_____

_____

_____

_____

STOP!

DO NOT TURN THE PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED

Appendix V

Manipulation Check and Demographics

Researchers are often interested how participants perceive studies. This feedback is important because it helps when designing future studies. Briefly describe what you think this study is about using one or more key words or sentences.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Finally, please fill in the following general information about yourself.

Age: _____
Sex: _____
Race: _____
Place of Birth: _____
Your Religion: _____
# of Siblings: Brothers _____ Sisters _____
Father's Occupation: _____
Mother's Occupation: _____

Appendix W

Verbal Instructions

Welcome, and thank you for volunteering to participate in this study. Please note that on your desk is a booklet that you will be asked to complete in a moment. But first, there are several things which you should know before beginning. Do not open the booklet until you are instructed to do so. Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw without academic penalty at anytime. The data collected in this study will be confidential and stored in a secure location. You will receive ½ research credit for your participation.

Some of you will participate in a short interview immediately after you have completed the booklet; some of you will not be interviewed. On the second page of your booklet you will discover the category to which you have been assigned. If you are chosen for an interview, be assured that the interview will be no more than ten minutes in length. If you are not selected for an interview you will be asked to respond to an additional short questionnaire. Room and interviewer availability make it impossible for everyone to be interviewed.

Please read the statement of informed consent, which is on the cover page of the booklet, and if you agree to participate, sign on the appropriate line and include your student I.D.#. This is important so that you receive credit for participating. If you are not registered in Section A, B, or C of PS100, that is Dr. Eikelboom's and Dr. Hunsberger's classes, you are not eligible to participate in this study. If there is anyone here who is not in either Section A, B, or C of PS100 raise your hand.

While you are completing your booklet, we ask that you not communicate with each other. Written instructions are provided on the third page of the booklet. Please read these carefully before proceeding. If you have any questions during the session please raise your hand. Are there any questions now? You may begin.

Appendix V

Final Verbal Instructions and Verbal Feedback

Final Verbal Instructions
(Read After All Participants Have Completed the Response Sheet)

Please turn to the last page and complete the booklet. After you have finished, turn the pages back to the statement of informed consent and do not re-open the booklet.

Verbal Feedback

Before I tell you the purpose of this study, I would like you to know that your student number will be used to match your present responses with those you provided during the mass testing session in November. After this has been done, the statement of informed consent will be removed from the booklet and used for assigning course credit. Access to your responses will be restricted to myself and Dr. Hunsberger and neither of us will attempt to match your name with your responses.

First, I will tell you that no one will be interviewed. Secondly, the accompanying stories and student names are purely fictitious. None of the potential student interviewers are students at W.L.U. This study was designed partly to determine if being interviewed or not being interviewed affects your choice of interviewers. Social psychologists who study impression formation have identified other factors which may also influence the way we perceive others. Age, personal interests, race, gender, social status, sexual orientation, and interview topic are factors which are included in this study, and some of these will be used in the analysis of data. I will provide more complete feedback in your PS100 class after the data for this study has been collected and analyzed.

If for any reason you feel that you do not want your responses included in this study, bring your booklet to me at the end of this session and it will not be used in the analysis. Otherwise, leave the completed booklet on the desk in front of you when you leave.

Finally, I would very much appreciate if you would not discuss this study or its purpose with anyone until after I have visited your PS100 class. Once again, thank you for your participation.

Appendix Y

Written Feedback

Social psychologists who study impression formation have identified a number of factors which may influence the way we perceive others. Age, personal interests, gender, and social status, are factors which have been identified. Some of these will be used in the analysis of data in this study. I will provide more complete feedback in your PS100 class after the data for this study have been collected and analyzed.

For a better understanding of issues relating to impression formation we direct you in your introductory psychology text to chapter 18 (pp.613-619) regarding "attitudes", and chapter 19 (pp.644-649) concerning "attraction."

Please feel free to contact the researcher, Robert Duck (ext. 2988), or his advisor, Dr. Hunsberger (ext. 3219) if you have any further questions regarding this study.

Once again, thank you for your participation in this study.

TEST TARGET (QA-3)





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