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Sex Differences In Empathic Processing As Related To Moral Reasoning  
Patterns In Hypothetical And Real-Life Moral Dilemmas

By

Sheree Anne Bradford

B. A., University of Guelph, 1984

THESIS

Submitted to the Department of Psychology  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Master of Arts degree  
Wilfrid Laurier University  
Waterloo, Ontario  
Canada

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ABSTRACT

Some sex and empathy differences have been found in moral reasoning patterns in adults (e.g., Pratt, Golding, and Kerig, in press; Walker and DeVries, 1985). However, until recently the area of moral judgment was severely restricted by an exclusive focus on the measures of a few researchers such as Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1981, 1984). Gilligan (1977, 1982) has been primarily responsible for the upsurge of interest and resultant diversification of measures in this area of individual differences.

The present paper examined in detail how sex differences and level of empathy affect moral reasoning patterns in individuals between 18 and 25 years of age. Hypothetical dilemmas were rewritten to make them either more or less vivid, within three conditions: 1) Subjective, in which the original dilemma was rewritten to include engaging personal information about the dilemma characters; 2) Objective, in which the original dilemma was rewritten to include non-engaging statistical information; and, 3) Neutral, in which the original dilemma was not altered. Each dilemma was followed by bipolar adjective scales for each character in the dilemma, which assessed the empathy level of the subject for that character. Overall patterns of personal empathy were assessed using the Mehrabian-Epstein scale.

Moral reasoning patterns were assessed through Pratt's Information-Seeking Questionnaire (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Norris, in press), as well as by Pratt's Judgment Questionnaire (Pratt, Golding,

## Moral Reasoning Patterns

Hunter, and Sampson, 1986), and the Gilligan Personal Moral Dilemma Task (Gilligan, 1982). In addition, the type of hypothetical dilemmas was varied to assess whether there was a difference in response due to the structure of the dilemma. Four hypothetical dilemmas were used in the present study, two Kohlberg dilemmas (based on a justice framework) and two Eisenberg dilemmas (based on a pro-social framework).

Empathy for the characters in the dilemmas was found to be highest in the subjective condition, and lowest in the objective condition, as hypothesized. However, this effect of dilemma vividness was only true for individuals high in personal empathy; low empathy individuals demonstrated no difference in responding, regardless of condition.

In terms of moral reasoning, the results of this study indicate that patterns of moral reasoning are related to individual differences in empathy. Personal empathy was the strongest predictor variable, and was mediated in part by character empathy. Sex differences were largely overshadowed by these individual differences in reported personal empathy for both dilemma types. Women did, however, request significantly more information overall than did men on the Information-Seeking questionnaire. Dilemma type also had an effect on moral reasoning patterns. Individuals, regardless of sex, requested more information and endorsed more judgment considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Also, more rights information was sought and more normative/fairness considerations were endorsed for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas.

It is suggested that future research focus on individual

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differences in personal empathy as a motivating factor in relation to the vividness effect, and also in relation to the Kohlberg stage levels of moral reasoning. Furthermore, hypothetical dilemma type should be taken into account in future studies involving the moral reasoning process.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Sex differences in moral decision making have become a controversial topic in the social psychology literature, with Kohlberg's moral development stage theory (1969, 1976, 1981, 1984) at the center. In 1958 Kohlberg first created his stage theory of moral development, basing it on the developmental, justice oriented model proposed by Piaget (1932/1965). Piaget originally theorized that there are two stages of moral judgment which develop as a child develops and acquires more experience in the world. The first stage involves complete compliance to societal norms (for example obeying parental commands without question). The second stage involves a more subjective way of making moral judgments, in that as the child develops he/she thinks more about factors surrounding the rule-based moral situations, particularly the actor's intention, and comes to a decision based on analytical assessment of these factors.

Kohlberg (1971) has broadened and further defined Piaget's notion of moral reasoning: "There is only one principled basis for resolving claims: justice or equality. Treat every man's claim impartially regardless of the man. A moral principle is not only a rule of action but a reason for action. As a reason for action, justice is called respect for persons" (p. 70). Accordingly, Kohlberg (1969, 1971, 1981, 1984) has modelled his cognitive stage theory of moral development on

principles of justice. In Kohlberg's system, the lower stages reflect more concern with compliance to societal norms. In contrast, the higher stages represent a personal sense of right and wrong, taking into account societal norms without blind acceptance of those norms.

Kohlberg has formulated six developmental stages of moral reasoning, grouped into three levels. The first level is the preconventional. Within this level are the first two stages of moral reasoning; children generally reason at this level. The first stage is comprised of simple obedience to authority and avoidance of punishment. The second stage focuses on self-serving individualism, while allowing others to follow this same pattern. The next level, the conventional, is generally utilized by older adolescents and adults, and is comprised of the third and fourth stages. In the conventional level, rules, social expectations, and authority have been internalized. Stage three focuses on relationships and conformity, and concern for the needs of others. Stage four is focused on a more justice-oriented system, in that the social order is maintained by upholding the laws of society. Stages five and six make up the postconventional/principled level. Adults reasoning at this level operate according to self-chosen principles. Stage five is contract-oriented in that basic values and rights, as well as standards agreed upon by society and the self, are crucial components of the reasoning process. This stage is observed only in a minority of mature adults (typically over age 30). Stage six extends this by removing self-interest from the reasoning process. This stage is theoretically interesting, but has not been empirically

observed except in a few individuals (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, and Lieberman, 1983; Walker, 1984).

In order to test the validity of his theories Kohlberg carried out a longitudinal study. He used 193 male subjects who were either 10, 13, or 16 years of age in 1956. These subjects were interviewed every four years until 1977. Kohlberg found a high test-retest reliability correlation that was greater than .95. Level of agreement between the two raters was not quite as high, but was still reasonable at .84. Kohlberg further found that there was a great amount of internal stage score consistency. This is in agreement with the cognitive-developmental theory since it demonstrates that "the logic of each stage forms a structured whole" (Kohlberg, 1984).

Kohlberg's moral judgment stages have continued to be assessed based on interviews about hypothetical dilemmas with structured probe questions attached to detail why the subject arrived at a specific judgment. Complex analysis of these responses by trained "Kohlberg scorers", based on a match-response scoring system, yields a score which indicates the stage level of reasoning. Subjects are also generally assessed on what Kohlberg terms "element" categories. These categories exist within each stage, and indicate the individual's orientation in moral judgment. Element scores are based on the individual's ultimate justification for a certain moral judgment. There are four major element categories, which have their roots in philosophy (Frankena, 1973). The first contains the 'normative' order elements, which define morality from a rule-bound viewpoint. The second is termed

'utilitarian', in which morality is defined as morally right actions that benefit the greatest number of individuals. Next is 'perfectionism', in which moral judgment is based on a need to morally perfect the self and others in order to create a more harmonious society. Finally, 'fairness' elements define morality in terms of objective reciprocity; the individual tends to view a moral situation from the point of view of an impartial observer, who is not primarily concerned with societal laws (Kohlberg, 1976).

Kohlberg's work became controversial when Gilligan (1982) questioned Kohlberg's theories, as well as his method of collecting the data that was used to quantify his stage theory. Kohlberg used an all male subject sample in his moral development studies (1969, 1976, 1981). It was the omission of female subjects that prompted Gilligan to question the implicit assumption that the moral stage development theory applies equally to women. The controversy that has resulted has caused the entire area of sex differences in moral reasoning to be scrutinized by several researchers (Langdale, 1986; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson, 1986; Walker and DeVries, 1985), including Kohlberg himself (e.g., 1984).

In addition, Gilligan (1982) felt that hypothetical dilemmas did not allow for assessment of the total moral reasoning process. Gilligan developed a technique in which real-life dilemmas could be used to assess the spontaneous orientation of a person's moral reasoning. Gilligan's measure, called the Gilligan personal dilemma task, is one in which subjects are asked in an interview setting to recall a personal

dilemma, and then discuss its basis and resolution. According to Gilligan, two separate orientations to moral reasoning exist, justice and care. The justice-orientation is defined as impersonal, or rights oriented, based on the idea of a separate self coupled with an emphasis on justice. The care-orientation is defined as response- or interpersonally-oriented, based on a concept of the relation of the self to others, with an emphasis on care. These two orientations have been hypothesized as sex-related (Gilligan, 1982), with women having a tendency to be care-oriented and men having a tendency to be justice-oriented.

Much of the recent work on moral judgment ~~has~~ entailed empirically assessing Gilligan's (1982) theoretical criticisms. Gilligan has raised many important issues that have powerful implications for the future of moral judgment research. As this review will demonstrate, Gilligan's comments have been central factors in broadening the perspective of researchers in the moral judgment area, to the extent that new methods of examining factors that can influence the moral reasoning process are being developed. The present review examines three of these factors: type of moral problem, sex of subject, and level of empathy observed when reasoning about moral problems.

#### Dilemma Types and Moral Judgment

Two types of standardized hypothetical dilemmas have been extensively studied, Kohlberg's 'justice' or 'prohibitive' dilemmas and Eisenberg's 'pro-social' dilemmas. The dilemma types differ in



emphasis, which reflects the differing views of the researchers involved. As previously mentioned, Kohlberg's dilemmas are oriented toward justice considerations, for example the issue of euthanasia, or of stealing. In many Kohlberg dilemmas a societal law must be broken in order for a character to be helped. For example:

"A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway."

It was this emphasis on societal laws in the Kohlberg dilemmas that prompted Eisenberg to wonder if there might be another dimension to moral reasoning that does not involve judicial issues. As Eisenberg (1982) pointed out, since individuals are raised to follow the laws of society, they might not help someone in need if they have to break a law to do it. However, if the legal issue was removed from the hypothetical dilemmas, the resultant dilemmas might reflect another aspect of an individual's moral reasoning patterns. Eisenberg therefore developed a set of 'pro-social' hypothetical dilemmas, to test her theory that pro-social moral reasoning stages exist in addition to Kohlberg's 'prohibitive' moral reasoning stages. In Eisenberg's dilemmas, a character must choose to help or not help another individual without breaking any societal laws. For example:

"Mr. Brown was walking home from his office alone at night when he saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. The woman was holding on to the purse and

crying for help while she and the man struggled over the purse. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. Mr. Brown was far enough away that he could himself escape without the robber noticing him".

Eisenberg (1978, 1979, 1982) has found that pro-social moral reasoning does exist in conjunction with prohibitive moral reasoning, and with some variation follows the Kohlberg stage system.

Therefore the Kohlberg and Eisenberg hypothetical dilemmas offer contrasting ways of framing moral problems. The Kohlberg dilemmas involve conflicts of rights and prescriptive duties, whereas the Eisenberg dilemmas focus on conflicting needs of others and the self. In addition to these contrasts of perspectives, there have been criticisms raised regarding the issue of how closely the moral reasoning process used to resolve these hypothetical dilemmas parallels the moral reasoning used to resolve everyday dilemmas (e.g., Baumrind, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1977).

Gilligan (1982) acknowledges the usefulness of hypothetical dilemmas, in that these dilemmas can formally assess a person's level of moral reasoning. However, she also feels that moral reasoning involves more than that proposed by Kohlberg, and by implication Eisenberg. As Gilligan (1982) states:

"hypothetical dilemmas, in the abstraction of their presentation, divest moral actors from the history and psychology of their individual lives . . . . In doing so, these dilemmas are useful for the distillation and refinement of objective principles of justice and for measuring the formal logic of equality and reciprocity. However, the reconstruction of the dilemma in its contextual particularity allows the understanding of cause and consequence which engages the compassion and tolerance repeatedly noted to distinguish the moral judgments of women" (p. 100).

In order to look at an individual's 'spontaneous' moral reasoning, Gilligan (1982) created a technique in which subjects in an interview situation were asked to recall a personal dilemma, and then discuss its basis and resolution. Gilligan first used the recall of one particular personal dilemma as a technique in a study on 29 women, aged 15 to 33, who were considering abortion. Gilligan has not reported the abortion study in detail, and the study has been criticized for several reasons (e.g., Walker and DeVries, 1985). However, the measure that came out of the study makes it worthwhile. Since then, added support has been found for Gilligan's contention that both justice and care-orientations are important in moral reasoning. Also, these orientations have been found to be significantly related to sex, at least in adults, although the magnitude of the effect varies from study to study (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Langdale, 1986; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson, 1986; Walker and DeVries, 1985).

The impact of dilemma type on orientation scores has been directly evaluated to assess whether or not "orientations are an artifact of the content of the [real-life] dilemmas, rather than a basic characteristic of an individual's reasoning" (Trevethan and Walker, 1986, p. 1). Trevethan and Walker (1986) used three Kohlberg dilemmas, as well as the Gilligan personal moral dilemma technique, in an interview format involving 80 family triads (mother, father, child). Stage of moral reasoning on both hypothetical and real-life dilemmas was scored. Also, use of justice or care-orientations was assessed for both the real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. Finally, two content analyses of personal

dilemmas were carried out: a global categorization of the personal/impersonal nature of the dilemma; and a detailed issues categorization consisting of 31 items ranging from "marital relationships" to "fighting/nastiness" to "other". Only the results from the adult data will be reported here.

It was found that there was a significant overall orientation difference between sexes. Specifically, significantly more men than women used a justice-orientation on both the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. Conversely, women used a significantly higher care-orientation than men on both the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.

The nature of the relationship to dilemma type was assessed on the real-life dilemmas. These were assessed by deriving two categories: personal (defined as conflicts involving persons with whom the subject has a significant, continuing relationship), and impersonal (defined as conflicts involving persons the subject does not know well, institutions, or personal issues). It was found that adult females reported more personal dilemmas, and adult males more impersonal dilemmas. Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987) report a similar finding.

Moral orientations were examined as a function of the nature of the relationship in the real-life dilemmas. This was done to determine whether impersonal or personal dilemmas 'pulled' one orientation over the other. Trevethan and Walker found that for both sexes a care-orientation tended to be used with those reporting personal

dilemmas and a justice-orientation used with those reporting impersonal dilemmas. This finding indicates that the type of moral dilemma recalled by the subjects was more accurate as a predictor of orientation than was the subject's sex (cf. Pratt, et al., 1986).

Finally, Trevethan and Walker found that adult women reported significantly more family issues regardless of whether they worked outside the home, and men tended to recall more work related issues. This finding is fairly consistent with that observed by Pratt, Golding, and Kerig (in press), in which Pratt et al. found that although men were only marginally more likely to recall dilemmas involving 'religious' and 'institutional' duties than women, women were significantly more likely than men to recall dilemmas focusing on 'family' or 'relational' duties.

Gilligan (1982) has further criticized the validity of hypothetical dilemmas, arguing that her method of having subjects recall a personal moral dilemma yields a more accurate measure than do hypothetical dilemmas. If this were the case then measures based on hypothetical dilemmas, principally Kohlberg's scoring system, would be seriously flawed, since these measures would not be accurately reflecting the moral judgment process of an individual.

Pratt, Golding, and Kerig (in press) looked at the effects of age on real-life and hypothetical moral dilemma judgment. Two Kohlberg dilemmas and the Gilligan personal dilemma recall task were completed by male and female subjects ranging in age from 18 to 75 years. Responses on both the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas were scored by Golding

using Kohlberg's 9-point, global stage scoring system for each dilemma. It was found that subjects scored significantly lower on the personal dilemmas than on the hypothetical dilemmas. This indicates that hypothetical dilemmas probably do reflect the highest level of competence of the subject, a finding that has been corroborated by Walker and DeVries (1985).

To summarize, both the Kohlberg and the Eisenberg hypothetical dilemmas have been useful techniques, as has Gilligan's personal moral dilemma task. However, hypothetical dilemmas typically yield minimally higher stage scores than real-life dilemmas, indicating that the real-life dilemmas might not be accurately reflecting the moral competence of the subject. The main value of the real-life dilemma approach is that it has been used to evaluate subjects' orientations to moral reasoning.

#### Sex Differences in Moral Judgment

When the Kohlberg theory and scoring system (1958, 1969) were first developed, and an all male subject sample was used, it wasn't questioned whether a potential sex difference in moral reasoning was being ignored. Then Gilligan (1977) looked at some previous studies (e.g., Haan, 1977; Holstein, 1976) and noted that women were scoring lower on the Kohlberg stage scale than were men. As Gilligan (1982) pointed out: "prominent among those who thus appear to be deficient in moral development when measured by Kohlberg's scale are women, whose judgments seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage sequence" (p. 18). It is

true that other researchers did not find this sex difference. However, such contradictions between studies at least constituted a problem of unreliability and could be seen as reflecting problems of methodology.

Since this time, Kohlberg (1981) has amended his scoring system, and it has been demonstrated that it is not now the case that women systematically score lower on the Kohlberg stages than men (e.g., Colby and Damon, 1983; Luria, 1986; Walker, 1984). However, men and women do differ in terms of orientations, which are assessed within each stage level. Kohlberg's global stage scores may demonstrate the moral reasoning competence of the individual, whereas orientation scores reflect the preference of the individual when faced with particular problems of moral judgment (cf. Baumrind, 1986). Within each stage level lie differing preferences of an individual, making the Kohlberg scoring system one with horizontal as well as vertical structure.

Even though the Kohlberg stage scores seem to be similar for men and women, Gilligan (1982) has also argued that people have different orientations within each stage level, which are sex related and must also be taken into account. Gilligan (1982), among others (Langdale, 1986; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson, 1986; Walker and DeVries, 1985), has demonstrated the existence of sex-related orientation differences. However, although a trend is present it is weak, leading Walker and DeVries (1985) to comment: "the association between sex and orientation is not as general and basic as has been argued" (p. 24). Studies involving the relationship between sex and moral orientation will be briefly reviewed next.

Gilligan (1982) first used the personal dilemma technique in a study on women who were considering abortion. Gilligan found that women predominantly tended to be care-oriented.

Lyons (1983) further developed the Gilligan personal moral dilemma task, creating a standardized manual to score personal or real life dilemmas. The manual primarily consists of a brief outline of the type of format that should be used for the Gilligan personal moral dilemma task, as well as a coding scheme to categorize individual responses into either a care-orientation or a justice-orientation. According to Lyons (1981), there are five 'considerations of care' and five 'considerations of justice'. An example of a care consideration is "considers the 'situation vs./over the principle'"; an example of a justice consideration is "obligations, duty or commitments" (p. 144). Lyons manual is interesting, although it is not much more than an elaboration of Gilligan's (1981) definitions of care and justice. However, it does help to broaden the base that Gilligan established. Lyons' (1981) study that accompanies the manual is also useful, since it does provide some empirical support for the position that care and justice-orientations do exist. In her study Lyons (1981) found evidence of sex differences in orientations, but used an extremely small sample consisting of 18 males and 18 females ranging in age from 8 to 60 plus years. Lyons' data could be considered tentative, except for the recent corroborative study carried out by Langdale (1986). Langdale used a considerably larger subject sample of 72 males and 72 females ranging from 8 years to 60 plus years. Langdale matched these subjects for education, occupation,



social class, and age. One Kohlberg dilemma (Heinz and the drug), and two abortion dilemmas were assessed by the subjects. Sex differences were found on all dilemmas: men were more justice-oriented, and women more care-oriented.

Other recent studies have used both the Gilligan and the Kohlberg orientation categories to examine sex differences in moral reasoning. A structured technique, the Judgment Questionnaire (JQ), was created by Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987) in order to further study orientation differences. Three out of the four Kohlberg (1976) element categories were utilized in the Pratt et al. study, including fairness, perfectionist, and utilitarian element types. 'Fairness' was defined as a concern about equal exchange between individuals, over and above societal norms, and corresponded to the justice-orientation. The 'perfectionist' and 'utilitarian' elements corresponded to the care-orientation. 'Perfectionism' was defined as a desire to improve the self in a moral sense, as well as trying to create and maintain harmonious relationships with others. 'Utilitarianism' was defined as putting an emphasis on actions that would benefit the greatest number of individuals. The Judgment Questionnaire, Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and the personal moral dilemma task (from Gilligan et al., 1982) were used to assess moral judgment. The Judgment Questionnaire (JQ) allows the subject to indicate how important certain element categories are in deciding about a hypothetical dilemma. The subject is required to indicate how important each statement is in the consideration of the specific moral dilemma on a five point scale

ranging from 'most important' to 'least important'. An example of a Judgment Questionnaire statement for a hypothetical dilemma involving whether a young woman should jeopardize her future by contributing blood to a man who cannot get well without it is as follows: "Will giving blood now contribute more to Anne's growth as a caring human being in the long run?". The statement is an example of the 'perfectionism' element. Thirty-six males and thirty-six females were used from three age levels: 18 to 24 years, 30 to 45 years, and 60 to 75 years. On the MJI, Pratt et al. (1986) found a greater use of the fairness orientation in men reasoning at principled versus conventional levels, but no differences in women reasoning at these higher stages. This interaction of sex and stage for fairness usage replicates previous findings by these authors (Pratt et al., 1984). On the Gilligan personal dilemma task, men demonstrated a significantly more justice-oriented pattern than women. Again, this was primarily observed in subjects using stage five reasoning. Finally, on the Judgment Questionnaire, women were significantly more likely than men to endorse perfectionist and utilitarian considerations, whereas there were no significant sex differences on the fairness category.

Walker and DeVries (1985) also found a significant orientation difference between male and female adults. Walker and DeVries interviewed each family member in 80 family triads, using the Kohlberg MJI. The Gilligan personal moral dilemma task was also used. Responses on both hypothetical and real dilemmas were later scored for orientation, according to the Lyons (1982) manual. Only the results

from the adult data will be reported here. Two results in particular are worth noting. There was no significant difference between responses on the hypothetical and real dilemmas, which is contrary to Gilligan's (1982) contention that the hypothetical dilemmas do not yield the same results as do spontaneously produced dilemmas. The second important finding is that there was a significant overall difference in justice and care-orientations: males were significantly more justice-oriented than females, and females more care-oriented than males, although approximately 20 per cent in each group did not demonstrate a clear orientation.

Walker and DeVries' (1985) results are consistent with the results of the Pratt et al. (1986) study, where 81% of the men were assessed as justice-oriented versus only 44% of the women. They also substantiate the Gilligan (1986) claim that males are predominantly justice-oriented and females are predominantly care-oriented, even though a considerable number of females and males do not fit the prescribed orientations. However, this sex difference was only observed in adults in the Walker study; children showed no consistent pattern of sex differences.

Gilligan (1982) has also theorized that women generally want more information about 'contextual particulars' in order to make judgments about Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. To examine this, Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Norris (in press) created the Information-Seeking Questionnaire to determine whether men and women exhibit differential patterns in requesting further information in regard to hypothetical dilemmas. Pratt et al. had two Kohlberg dilemmas (The Doctor and Judy)

assessed by 126 females and 118 males, ranging from 14 to 75 years. The Information-Seeking Questionnaire is made up of 10 questions, falling into five categories: particular rights information, general rights information, particular consequences information, general consequences information, and contextual (background) information. Subjects were requested to read the ten items and then answer either 'yes, the answer to the question would be helpful in making a decision', or, 'no, the answer would not be helpful'. In terms of sex differences, women overall requested more information than men. However, men and women requested the same kinds of information. As Pratt et al conclude, the fact that there was no sex difference in the kind of information sought indicates that Gilligan's hypothesis that women's judgments are more context-bound and consequence-focused than are men's is questionable.

To summarize, sex differences in moral judgment have been tested using both the standard interview technique (Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1977; Holstein, 1978; Kohlberg, 1958, 1969; Langdale, 1986; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson, 1986; Walker and DeVries, 1985) and a more objective questionnaire format (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson, 1986). It has been found that there are no sex differences in Kohlberg stage level (Colby and Damon, 1983; Luria, 1986; Walker, 1983), which is contrary to Gilligan's (1982) assertions. However, there is support for Gilligan's (1982) concept of orientation differences between the sexes (Langdale, 1986; Lyons, 1982; Walker and DeVries, 1985), even if the difference is not as systematic as Gilligan (1982) first claimed. There is also support for sex differences using the Kohlberg orientation

categories (Pratt, et. al., 1986), although to date there has been relatively little research done in this area. Finally, there are no clear information-seeking differences by sex (Pratt et al., 1986). Women tend to request more information than men, but both sexes request the same kind of information, contrary to Gilligan's (1982) hypotheses. However, little work to date has been carried out on information-seeking in moral judgment.

Empathic Differences in Moral Judgment

Theoretically, empathy has been viewed as part of the moral judgment process (Hoffmann, 1984; Rest, 1984; Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, and Richardson, 1978). However, empathy has only recently been directly examined in moral reasoning contexts (e.g., Pratt, Golding, and Kerig, in press). Empathy appears to be related to level of cognitive development in children (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1971; Hoffmann, 1984). As Hoffmann (1984) has stated: "although, an affect, empathy has a significant cognitive component: older children and adults know that they are responding to something happening to someone else, and, drawing from their knowledge about others and their own experience, they have an idea of what the other is feeling" (p. 285). Presumably all normal adults have the necessary cognitive competencies to experience empathy, however.

Rest (1984) maintains that empathy is central to moral thought. Rest has proposed an interactive four component model of morality, which involves: 1) identification of the moral problem, 2) the processing of possible solutions; 3) evaluation of the possibilities and selection of the most acceptable solution; and, 4) implementation of the solution to the moral problem. Rest includes empathy as an integral part of the first component, identification of the problem, which involves: "interpreting the situation and identifying a moral problem (involving empathy, role-taking, and figuring out how the participants in a situation are each affected by various actions)" (p. 24).

It is interesting that existing theories directly relate empathy to moral reasoning. And it is possible that empathy may be a motivating factor in determining the activation of moral judgment, since it theoretically is strongly related to the moral reasoning process. Paradoxically however, there has been little empirical research carried out in this area. In fact, Hoffman (1984) has criticized cognitive moral theories such as that of Kohlberg. As Hoffman (1984) states "What prompts people to subordinate their own interests. . . . and what makes them feel bad when they harm someone? Cognitive moral theories deal with moral principles like justice and fairness, but, lacking a motive base, these theories have difficulty explaining how these principles become activated" (p. 299).

As noted, empathy in terms of moral reasoning has not been examined at length. However, the related area of sex differences in empathy in adults and children has been well reviewed by Eisenberg and Lennon (1983). Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) comment that sex differences in empathy in general favor women, but that "the results of research concerning sex differences in empathy are highly related to the method of assessing empathy" (p. 119). Sex differences were most consistently found across adult studies when self-report measures, specifically the Mehrabian-Epstein Scale (1972), were used. The Mehrabian-Epstein Scale is a measure of personal empathy. It consists of 36 reflective statements, such as "I get very angry when I see someone being ill-treated". Each statement is followed by a four point rating scale ranging from 'Agree Strongly' to 'Disagree Strongly'. The scale has

been widely used on both children and adults and has been found to yield highly significant results (Barnett, Howard, King, and Dino, 1980; Foushee, Davis, and Archer, 1979; Mehrabian, 1977). Other measures, such as rating emotional responses to hypothetical situations, have also yielded evidence of sex differences, although these differences have been weaker.

Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) relate the demonstrated sex differences in empathy to social stereotypes, rather than to actual sex differences. Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) cite one study (Foushee, Davis, and Archer, 1979) in which men and women rated their feelings on concepts of femininity/masculinity, and the relationship of these feelings to empathy. It was found that both men and women tended to rate empathy as being positively related to femininity and negatively related to masculinity. Given this finding, Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) have stated: "There certainly is reason to believe that males and females might differ in how empathic they would like to appear to others (and, perhaps, to themselves). Emotionality and nurturance are both part of the stereotypic feminine role" (p. 125).

Pratt, Golding, and Kerig (in press) have found evidence of sex differences in adult empathy in relation to reasoning on hypothetical moral dilemmas. They used a unique self-report perspective-taking measure, and asked 28 females and 34 males ranging from 18 to 75 years to evaluate two Kohlberg hypothetical dilemmas (The Doctor and Judy). In an interview situation, subjects were then asked to verbally state the perspective from which they saw each dilemma: a single character,



more than one character, or from the point of view of an observer. Pratt et al. found that there was a significant sex difference in self-reports of perspective-taking patterns. Specifically, men were more likely to take the perspective of an observer, whereas women were more likely to take the perspective of several characters. However, there were no differences in the frequency of reports of empathy for a single character.

The Pratt et al. study (in press) represents the only direct data on sex differences in empathy in relation to moral reasoning. It is a finding which should be replicated and used in conjunction with other measures of moral judgment and of empathy to further examine directly the relations of empathy and moral reasoning. It seems possible that differences in empathy may in fact account for many of the sex differences in moral judgment (Rest, 1983).

#### Framework and Purpose of Study

It is clear that the area of moral judgment is a developing one, in which an increasing number and variety of measures are being utilized in order to look at the entire moral reasoning process. It is also clear that several factors, such as sex, type of dilemma, and empathic level may affect a person's moral judgment in complex ways.

The present study was designed to determine the effect of each of these factors, especially empathy, since empathy has rarely been directly examined in connection with processes of moral judgment. To examine empathic identification with characters in both Kohlberg and

Eisenberg hypothetical dilemmas, a procedure was used in which the dilemmas themselves were rewritten to make them either more subjective or objective in nature. A subjective dilemma was one in which engaging information was written about the character's situation to encourage perspective-taking, and an objective dilemma was one in which non-engaging statistical information was included to discourage perspective-taking. There was also a neutral condition, in which the dilemmas were not rewritten. This manipulation was suggested by research which has been carried out on the 'vividness' effect (for review see Taylor and Thompson, 1982). The vividness effect is an effect in social psychology that occurs when elaborated or image-provoking information is presented to an individual. Research has suggested that vividly presented material leads to greater imageability, which in turn may allow the individual to more easily recall information about the material (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). However, the manipulation has not been used to study moral reasoning patterns previous to this study.

Males and females in the present study were randomly assigned to one of these three empathic conditions. Personal empathy was also assessed via a questionnaire (the Mehrabian-Epstein Scale, 1972), presented at the end of a test booklet. The interview format was not used in this study in order to try to objectify the measures as much as possible. It was hypothesized that there would be a sex by condition interaction in empathy level, due to differing thought processes in moral judgment in men and women. Men would be less affected since they

have traditionally been perceived as more logical (justice oriented), and the logic of the hypothetical dilemma did not change from condition to condition. The only critical features being altered in each dilemma were character names, and information either having a bearing or not having a bearing on the characters.

This study followed a general, hypothesized model (see Figure 1). The model provides an illustration of how each of the variables were predicted to be related, and was tested to determine the possible mediating role of empathy in moral reasoning.




Figure 1. Model Of The Proposed Relationship Between Several Factors, Character Empathy, And Moral Reasoning Patterns.

Briefly, the predictor variables were empathic condition and sex, as well as level of personal empathy and justice/care orientation. Only empathic condition was a manipulated factor, however. All of these variables were hypothesized to have an effect on an individual's empathy level in a particular moral dilemma, which in turn would have an effect on an individual's moral reasoning patterns for that dilemma.

The variables used to measure the effect of empathic condition were character rating scales and a perspective-taking questionnaire. These variables were utilized as dependent variables to measure empathy, and were also used as predictor variables to determine the effect of empathy on moral reasoning. Personal empathy was measured using the Mehrabian-Epstein Scale (1972), and justice/care-orientation was measured using the Gilligan personal moral dilemma task (1982). The dependent variables that were used to measure moral reasoning patterns were the Information-Seeking Questionnaire and the Judgment Questionnaire.

### Hypotheses

There were several hypotheses in this study. In overview, it was hypothesized that there would be a number of effects and interactions of sex, personal empathy, justice/care-orientation, condition, and dilemma type on empathy and moral reasoning. The dependent measures for empathy were the character empathy rating scales and the perspective-taking questionnaire. These empathic measures were predicted to have an effect on moral reasoning patterns, as measured by the Information-Seeking

Questionnaire and the Judgment Questionnaire (see Figure 1). The eight specific hypotheses tested are given below.

1) It was hypothesized that there would be a main effect of condition on empathy and perspective-taking. Both sexes were predicted to demonstrate highest character empathy in the subjective condition; medium character empathy in the neutral condition; and low character empathy in the objective condition. Further, it was hypothesized that there would be no differences by dilemma type for these condition effects.

2) It was predicted there would be an interaction of sex by condition, for character empathy and perspective-taking. Women would demonstrate the highest character empathy and take the position of the character(s) in the subjective condition, and show the lowest amount of empathy for the characters and take the position of an observer in the objective condition. Men would be less affected by condition manipulations than women. The dependent measures for both hypotheses one and two were the character empathy scales and the perspective-taking questionnaire. Both measures were predicted to give a parallel pattern of results. It was further hypothesized that there would be no effect of dilemma type on the sex by condition interaction.

3) It was predicted that there would be an interaction of personal empathy by condition. This would follow the same pattern as that for sex by condition (see above), with high empathy subjects more influenced by condition manipulations. Further, there would be no effect of dilemma type on the personal empathy by condition interaction. The

dependent measures were the character empathy scales, and the perspective-taking questionnaire.

4) It was hypothesized that there would be an interaction of justice/care-orientation by condition. The pattern of interaction would be the same as that for sex by condition, with care-oriented subjects more affected by condition manipulations than justice-oriented subjects (see above). It was further hypothesized that dilemma type would have no effect on the justice/care-orientation by condition interaction. The dependent variables were the character empathy and perspective-taking measures.

It was thus predicted that personal empathy, sex, condition, and justice/care orientation would have an effect on character empathy and perspective taking, which would in turn have an effect on moral reasoning patterns. Dilemma type would also have an effect on moral reasoning. The hypotheses for moral reasoning patterns were as follows:

5) A main effect of condition on information-seeking and judgment considerations. Most information would be sought in the subjective condition, and the least information sought in the objective condition. Furthermore, an interaction of information type and condition was predicted. The most-consequence information would be sought in the subjective condition (since there would be more empathy shown to the characters, and therefore an increased concern about personal consequences), a medium amount of information would be required in the neutral condition, and a low amount of consequence information in the

objective condition. Rights information would not be affected by condition. The dependent measure was Pratt's Information-Seeking Questionnaire.

For the judgment considerations, it was predicted there would also be an interaction of condition and judgment consideration type. The greatest amount of feelings/utilitarian considerations would be demonstrated in the subjective condition (since greater empathy for the characters would presumably be demonstrated in this condition, and therefore an increase in the judgment considerations concerning the feelings of the characters as well as a generalized concern with the characters in relation to society). Further, it was expected that the greatest amount of fairness/normative considerations would be demonstrated in the objective condition, since these considerations are concerned with an objective perspective. Utilitarian and feelings considerations were grouped together as were fairness and normative considerations, following Walker (1986). The dependent measure was Pratt's Judgment Questionnaire.

6) A main effect of personal empathy on information-seeking was predicted. High empathic individuals would seek more information and endorse more considerations overall because of greater engagement with the characters.

An interaction of personal empathy by information type was also predicted. High empathy individuals would be more concerned with consequence information, whereas low empathic individuals would be concerned with rights information. The dependent measure was Pratt's



### Information-Seeking questionnaire.

An interaction of personal empathy by judgment consideration type was predicted as well. A high empathic individual would demonstrate a focus on utilitarian/feelings concerns. A low empathic individual would demonstrate a focus on normative/fairness considerations. The dependent measure was Pratt's Judgment Questionnaire.

7) A main effect of sex on information-seeking. Women would request more information overall than would men. An interaction of sex and consideration type for information-seeking and judgment considerations was also predicted. For information-seeking, women would be more likely to seek consequence and/or context information, regardless of condition. Men would be more likely to seek rights information. The dependent measure was Pratt's Information-Seeking questionnaire.

For the judgment considerations, men would be more likely to select fairness and normative considerations, regardless of condition, women would be more likely to select utilitarian/feelings considerations, again, regardless of condition. The dependent measure was Pratt's Judgment Questionnaire.

It was also predicted that there would be an effect of sex on dilemma type for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. Women would request more information on the Kohlberg dilemmas than would men; men would be less affected by dilemma type.

8) An interaction of dilemma type and moral consideration types was predicted for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. It was predicted that results from the Information-Seeking questionnaire

would show an orientation towards seeking 'rights' information for the Kohlberg dilemmas and an orientation to seek 'consequences' information for the Eisenberg dilemmas. For the Judgment Questionnaire, preferences for fairness/normative orientations would be higher for the Kohlberg dilemmas, and preferences for utilitarian/feelings considerations would be higher for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Under this hypothesis the dilemma effects would hold true for both men and women.

In addition to testing the above hypotheses, the model in Figure 1 was tested to explore the possible role of empathy as a mediator of moral reasoning. It was predicted that any effects of the predictor variables would be mediated by empathy, which would in turn affect moral reasoning patterns.

#### METHOD

Subjects. There were 96 subjects, 48 male and 48 female volunteers from two Wilfrid Laurier introductory Psychology classes. Subjects were between 18 and 25 years of age, with a mean age of 20.5 and a standard deviation of 1.89.

Design And Conditions. This was a Condition (3) x Sex (2) design, with 16 subjects per cell. The dilemmas were manipulated in order to promote more or less empathy with the characters in the story. There were three conditions: 1) Subjective, in which the dilemma was re-written to include engaging information about the character's situation that should encourage more empathy with the characters; 2) Objective, in which the

dilemma was re-written to include non-engaging statistical information; and, 3) Neutral, in which the dilemma was not rewritten.

Four dilemmas were used: two Kohlberg dilemmas, 'Escaped Prisoner' and 'The Doctor' (Colby and Kohlberg, in press), and two Eisenberg dilemmas, 'The Blood Type' and 'The Robbery' (Eisenberg, 1982). Examples from the neutral condition are given below.

#### Escaped Prisoner

"A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Jim Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mike Jones, an old neighbour, recognized Thompson as the man who escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for".

#### The Doctor

"A woman, Ruth, was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost ~~dr~~ ~~u~~ ~~z~~ ~~y~~ with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain, and that she was going to die in a few months anyway."

#### The Blood Type

"A young woman named Anne had a very rare type of blood. One day right after Anne had begun college and a new job, a doctor called Anne up to ask her to give a large amount of blood to someone named Jack Wilson who was very ill and needed more blood of the same kind as her own to get well. Because Anne was the only person in the town with the sick man's type of blood, and since this was an unusual serious illness, the blood would have to be given a number of times over a period of several weeks. So, if Anne agreed to give her blood, she would have to go into the hospital for several weeks. This hospitalization would make Anne feel weak for awhile, she would lose her new job, and she would be

very far behind in school".

### The Robbery

"Mr. Brown was walking home from his office alone at night when he saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. The woman, Cathy Smith, was holding on to the purse and crying for help while she and the man struggled. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. Mr. Brown was far enough away that he could himself escape without the robber noticing him".

The following versions of the Eisenberg hypothetical dilemma entitled "The Robbery" illustrate the two manipulated conditions used in this study.

#### Subjective Version

"Mr. Brown was walking home from his office alone at night. The office was located in a large modern building, and Mr. Brown was happy to be out in the fresh air. It was late. A couple of blocks ahead of Mr. Brown a woman, Cathy Smith, was hurrying down the street. She was on her way to a play, hurrying to meet her boyfriend in front of the theatre. If only she had been able to get to the bank before she got off work that day she would have been able to take out enough money for bus fare. As it was all she had was her uncashed pay cheque. She clutched her mauve coat more tightly over her slim figure, thinking that it was about time for a new one. Mr. Brown shifted his briefcase to his other hand, and wearily loosened his tie. Suddenly Mr. Brown saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. Cathy Smith held onto the purse and was crying for help while she and the robber struggled. The robber was muscular. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. Mr. Brown was far enough away to escape without being noticed by the robber."

#### Objective Version

"A man, Mr. Brown, was walking home from his office alone at night. Walking is good exercise, and everyone should get into the habit of walking as much as possible. It is estimated that brisk walking will extend life expectancies about 2.4 years. Mr. Brown was walking along the street when he saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. The woman, Cathy Smith, was holding onto the purse and crying for help while she and the robber struggled. Crime rates in this city were quite high. About 6.2 persons per 1,000 could expect to be victims in the course of a single year. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. There were a few empty stores in the area. Mr. Brown was far enough away to escape without being noticed by the robber."

## Measures

Empathy Measures. Empathic process measures consisted of three tasks: 1) The Mehrabian-Epstein questionnaire regarding personal empathic traits; 2) ratings of feelings about each of the characters in the moral dilemmas; and, 3) a perspective questionnaire regarding the subject's point-of-view while considering a hypothetical moral dilemma.

Mehrabian-Epstein Scale. The personal empathy scale was taken from Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). The self-report scale consists of 36 questions. An example of a typical question is: "I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness". Subjects are required to answer each question on a four point scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Although the scale has been used in several studies of empathy and moral judgment (see Eisenberg and Lennon, 1983, Gibbs, Clark, Joseph, Green, Goodrick, and Makowski, 1986), there is no reliability score available. The scale was scored according to the format outlined in Mehrabian-Epstein (1972).

Character Rating Scales. The character rating scales were created for this study using items that would focus on social and evaluative dimensions of the characters. The character scales consisted of the following 8 bipolar adjectives: hard to relate to/easy to relate to; unpleasant/pleasant; uncommitted/committed; hard/soft; incompetent/competent; cold/warm; unfriendly/friendly; hard to get along with/easy to get along with. Each scale is composed of a 7-point rating

scale. For example:

Hard to relate to :\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_: Easy to relate to

Perspective-Taking Questionnaire. This questionnaire has been previously used in an interview format by Pratt, Golding, and Kerig (in press). The questions asked in the Pratt et al. study have been put in a questionnaire format, in which subjects are asked to indicate only one of four possible perspectives. The three perspective choices are: a) from the position of an observer viewing the overall situation?; b) as one particular character? Which one?; c) as more than one character? Which ones?. (There is also a fourth perspective choice: d) other? Explain. This choice was included to cover possible alternative perspectives).

Moral Judgment Measures. There were three moral judgment tasks: 1) the personal moral dilemma task (Gilligan et al. 1982); 2) the Information-Seeking Questionnaire (Pratt et al., in press); 3) the Judgment Questionnaire (Pratt et al., 1986). Performance on the moral judgment tasks was assessed to determine the moral orientation of the subject (justice or care), and/or to determine preferences for element type (fairness, normative, perfectionism, or utilitarian) and judgmental focus.

Gilligan Personal Moral Dilemma Measure. This measure indicated the justice/care-orientation of the individual. The measure has been adapted from the usual interview format into a questionnaire, using

guidelines from Gilligan (1982), and Lyons (1983). Subjects were asked to write their responses to three questions, which were as follows: 1) Please describe a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do; 2) How was the situation resolved; and, 3) Were you satisfied with how you handled the situation? Why or why not?. The Gilligan measure was scored categorically using the Lyon's manual (1983).

Information Seeking Questionnaire. This questionnaire was taken from the Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Norris (in press) study. The questionnaire was created by Pratt et al. and used with two Kohlberg dilemmas (The Doctor and Judy).

The questionnaire is made up of 10 questions, falling into five categories: particular rights information, general rights information, particular consequences information, general consequences information, and context or background information. Subjects are requested to answer either 'yes, the answer to the question would be helpful in making a decision', or, 'no, the answer would not be helpful'. Also, subjects are required to rank the three most important items they would use in helping them to resolve the dilemma.

In the present study the format was essentially the same as that used by Pratt, et al., but new questions were created for each of the four hypothetical dilemmas used in this study (The Robbery, The Blood Type, Escaped Prisoner, and The Doctor). An example of each category for 'Escaped Prisoner', as well as the neutral version of the 'Escaped

Prisoner' dilemma, are as follows:

"A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Jim Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mike Jones, an old neighbour, recognized Thompson as the man who escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for".

Examples of the Information-Seeking Questionnaire:

(Particular rights information). 'Is Jim Thompson endangering the rights of other persons in his neighbourhood in any way?'

(General rights information). 'What are a citizen's obligations regarding knowledge of escapees in this country?'

(Particular consequences information). 'What exactly is going to happen to Jim Thompson if he is turned in?'

(General consequences information). 'Does the act of turning in an escaped prisoner have any effect on the crime rate?'

(Contextual or background information). 'What kind of person was Jim Thompson before his escape from prison?'

Judgment Questionnaire. This questionnaire was created and utilized by Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987). Pratt et al. used this questionnaire with two Kohlberg dilemmas (Escaped Prisoner and Newspaper) and two Eisenberg dilemmas (The Flood and Swimming). The questionnaire consists of 12 questions; two questions each for each of



the element categories (normative, utilitarian, perfectionism, fairness), and two questions each for a feelings consideration and also filler items. Subjects are asked to rate the importance of each question on five point scales ranging from 'Great' to 'None'.

In the present study the format for the Judgment Questionnaire was essentially the same as that used by Pratt et al., except that new questions were created for each of the four hypothetical dilemmas used in this study (The Robbery, The Blood Type, Escaped Prisoner, and The Doctor). An example of the neutral version of an Eisenberg dilemma used in the present study, as well as one example for each of the question types on the Judgment questionnaire is as follows:

"A young woman named Anne had a very rare type of blood. One day right after Anne had begun college and a new job, a doctor called Anne up to ask her to give a large amount of blood to someone named Jack Wilson who was very ill and needed more blood of the same kind as her own to get well. Because Anne was the only person in the town with the sick man's type of blood, and since this was an unusual serious illness, the blood would have to be given a number of times over a period of several weeks. So, if Anne agreed to give her blood, she would have to go into the hospital for several weeks. This hospitalization would make Anne feel weak for awhile, she would lose her new job, and she would be very far behind in school".

Examples of the Judgment Questionnaire:

(Normative). 'Should the courts decide the right course of action in cases like this?

(Utilitarian). 'What course of action will be most beneficial for both Jack Wilson and Anne?'

(Perfectionism). 'Will giving blood now contribute more to Anne's

growth as a caring human being in the long run?'

(Fairness). 'Should Anne give blood, since it is possible that someday she might also need a blood donor?'

(Feelings). 'Would Anne feel better about herself if she gave her blood to Jack Wilson, even though she has to miss some college credits?'

(Filler). 'Does Anne have a close relationship with her family?'

Procedure. Subjects from two different introductory psychology classes were each tested during a lecture period. Subjects were randomly assigned (within sex) to one of the three conditions. Each subject was given a test booklet; the time taken to complete the booklet was within the range of 45 minutes to one hour. However, subjects were told to take as much time as they wished to complete the tasks.

Instructions to subjects were essentially as follows: "Thank you for agreeing to participate. This study on moral problems involves having you first of all recall a moral dilemma that happened in your own life and how the situation was resolved. This will be followed by a hypothetical story problem. After the story will be questionnaires concerning different issues surrounding the story. There are four stories in total. Finally, there will be a questionnaire that concerns how you yourself feel about certain situations. Please remember that all information is confidential. Please answer all questions in the booklet. If you feel that you cannot answer all the questions, please

feel free to withdraw from the study at any time." Subjects were given "feedback forms" to read before leaving, which outlined general information regarding the study.


The test booklet contained the following: 1) the Gilligan Personal Moral Dilemma Measure; 2) one of the two Kohlberg dilemmas; 3) the Perspective-Taking questionnaire; 4) two character rating scales; 5) the Information-Seeking Questionnaire; 6) a second Kohlberg dilemma; 7) the Perspective-Taking questionnaire; 8) two character rating scales; 9) the Judgment Questionnaire; 9) one of the two Eisenberg pro-social dilemmas, 10) the Perspective-Taking questionnaire; 11) two character rating scales; 12) the Judgment Questionnaire; 13) the second Eisenberg dilemma; 14) the Perspective-Taking questionnaire; 15) two character rating scales; 16) the Information-Seeking Questionnaire; and, 17) the Personal Empathy Questionnaire.

Counterbalancing of test materials was as follows (and see Figure 2). There were 16 subjects of each sex per cell in the design, making a total of 48 females and 48 males. Within each cell of 16, eight subjects were presented with the two Kohlberg dilemmas first and the two Eisenberg dilemmas second. The remaining eight subjects were presented with the Eisenberg dilemmas first and the Kohlberg dilemmas second. Within the eight subjects there were four orderings of dilemmas, with two subjects being presented with Kohlberg dilemma one, Kohlberg dilemma two, Eisenberg dilemma one, Eisenberg dilemma two (K1, K2, E1, E2); two subjects getting Kohlberg dilemma one, Kohlberg dilemma two, Eisenberg dilemma two, Eisenberg dilemma one (K1, K2, E2, E1); two subjects

getting Kohlberg dilemma two, Kohlberg dilemma one, Eisenberg dilemma one, Eisenberg dilemma two (K2, K1, E1, E2); and two subjects getting Kohlberg dilemma two, Kohlberg dilemma one, Eisenberg dilemma two, Eisenberg dilemma one (K2, K1, E2, E1). Finally, for each individual the Judgment Questionnaire and the Information-Seeking Questionnaire were counterbalanced so that if the Judgment Questionnaire was presented along with the first dilemma then the Information-Seeking Questionnaire was presented with the second dilemma; the Information-Seeking Questionnaire was presented with the third dilemma, and the Judgment Questionnaire presented with the fourth dilemma.

- <u>THREE CONDITIONS:</u>	<u>NEUTRAL</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>SUBJECTIVE</u>	
	Males	Males	Males	
	n=16	n=16	n=16	<u>Total M: 48</u>
	-----	-----	-----	
	Females	Females	Females	
	n=16	n=16	n=16	<u>Total F: 48</u>
	-----	-----	-----	

COUNTERBALANCING WITHIN EACH CELL



K1= First Kohlberg Dilemma  
 K2= Second Kohlberg Dilemma  
 E1= First Eisenberg Dilemma  
 E2= Second Eisenberg Dilemma

JQ= Judgment Questionnaire  
 IS= Information-Seeking  
 Questionnaire  
 n= Number of subjects

Figure 2. Counterbalancing Of Testing Materials

Questions on the Judgment Questionnaire and the Information-Seeking Questionnaire were randomized using a random numbers table after all questions were created for each dilemma. The character rating scales were counterbalanced for order within each cell.

## RESULTS

The results for the hypotheses regarding character empathy will be reported first (Hypotheses 1 to 4). This will be followed by the results for the hypotheses concerned with patterns of moral reasoning (Hypotheses 5 to 8). Finally, the results from the predictor and mediating variable sets involving the hypothesized model (Figure 1) will be reported.

### Analysis of Empathy Measures

Character Rating Scales. The eight bipolar adjective ratings (on 1 to 7 scales) were factor analysed for each of the two characters in the four dilemmas. Several factors emerged using a principal components analysis with varimax rotation, but only a single consistent first factor was interpretable across all factor analyses. An adjective was retained for further analysis if the loading of its regression coefficient on this first factor was over .50 on average across dilemmas. Five of the adjectives, Pleasant, Soft, Warm, Friendly, and Easy To Get Along With, met this criterion and were retained for further analysis. Table 3 shows the factor loadings, and Table 1A shows the average loading of the factors across all eight characters.

TABLE 1. VARIMAX FACTOR LOADINGS FOR EACH OF THE EIGHT CHARACTER  
EMPATHY SCALES ON THE TWO MAIN CHARACTERS IN EACH DILEMMA

	ESCAPED PRISONER		THE DOCTOR	
	J. T.	M. J.	RUTH	DR.
ETRT	.35880	.13422	.26593	.26608
PLEAS	*.50944	*.57293	*.51165	*.69790
COMM	.09889	.15960	.77293	.08531
SOFT	*.44699	*.76428	*.05190	*.82531
COMP	.37133	.19311	.71207	.39932
WARM	*.82412	*.85716	*.46898	*.84299
FRIEND	*.82390	*.78241	*.56032	*.84299
ETGAW	*.65344	*.62583	*.60722	*.74967

	BLOOD TYPE		THE ROBBERY	
	ANNE	J. W.	CATHY	MR. B.
ETRT	.12899	.14967	.34481	.37499
PLEAS	*.34097	*.45554	*.79729	*.82548
COMM	.36217	-.01266	.12900	.68309
SOFT	*.66293	*.49895	*.79145	*.66986
COMP	.21945	.34719	.09814	.65977
WARM	*.83886	*.70782	*.81931	*.92796
FRIEND	*.90733	*.72720	*.74686	*.90771
ETGAW	*.68186	*.79407	*.69533	*.86999

J. T. = Jim Thompson  
M. J. = Mike Jones  
J. W. = Jack Wilson  
Mr. B. = Mr. Brown

ETRT = Easy To Relate To  
PLEAS = Pleasant  
COMM = Committed  
SOFT = Soft  
COMP = Competent  
WARM = Warm  
FRIEND = Friendly  
ETGAW = Easy To Get Along With

\*Retained for further analysis.



TABLE 1A. AVERAGE OF THE VARIMAX FACTOR LOADINGS ACROSS DILEMMAS

	Average Loading
ETPT	.2529
PLEAS	*.5889
COMM	.2848
SOFT	*.5760
COMP	.3750
WARM	*.7859
FRIEND	*.7873
ETGAW	*.7097

---

ETPT = Easy to Relate to  
PLEAS = Pleasant  
COMM = Committed  
SOFT = Soft  
WARM = Warm  
FRIEND = Friendly  
ETGAW = Easy To Get Along With

\*Retained for further analysis

For all of the eight characters, over 80 percent of the variance was accounted for by this first factor. The character empathy scores for each subject were constructed by summing the ratings on these five adjectives for the two characters of each dilemma.

Moral orientation was treated as a blocking variable, the levels ranging from 1 (justice), 2 (mixed), to 3 (care). Since only 10 individuals (five females and five males) fell into the 'mixed' justice/care category, this category was dropped from the ANOVA analyses. Also, an inter-rater reliability correlation was carried out on the Moral orientation scores, and was found to be .80.

Responses on the personal empathy questionnaire were blocked into high and low by using the median of all scores on personal empathy (Median = 20) as the cut-off point and coding all responses at or above the median 'high' and all responses below the median 'low'. Forty-six of the individuals were in the high category; the remaining 50 individuals fell into the low category.

The Perspective-Taking Questionnaire (PTQ) was treated as a continuous variable, with responses rated on an interval scale from 1 (observer response, or least empathy) to 2 ('empathy for one character') to 3 ('empathy for more than one character'). Possible total score ranges were from 4 to 12 (summed across the four dilemmas) for each subject. Of the total of 384 responses given to the PTQ, 18 were in the 4 ('other') category. These 18 responses were not included in the above scale, but were treated as missing values and replaced with the mean of the other responses given by that individual on the PTQ.

Finally, a Pearson correlation was carried out to determine the relation between the two specific empathy measures, the PIQ and the character rating scales. Correlations were obtained for each dilemma type separately. The correlation of the two measures for the Kohlberg dilemmas was .04 and the correlation for the Eisenberg dilemmas .10. Neither of these correlations was significant ( $p < .05$ ), indicating that the two measures were not related. Thus they are analysed separately below.

#### Tests of Hypotheses 1 to 4: Character Rating Scales and PIQ

Two four-way ANOVAs, Sex (2) x Condition (3) x Personal Empathy (2) x Dilemma Type (2), and Sex (2) x Condition (3) x Moral Orientation (2) x Dilemma Type (2), were carried out on the character rating scales. A similar set of ANOVAs were carried out on the PIQ.

The results from the ANOVAs can be summarized briefly as follows. For the character rating scales there was a main effect of Condition, as well as an interaction of Condition x Personal Empathy and an interaction of Condition x Dilemma Type. Results from the PIQ yielded no main effects, although there was a Personal Empathy x Sex x Condition interaction, as well as a Personal Empathy x Dilemma Type interaction. There were no other main effects or interactions found for either the character rating scales or the PIQ. These results are described below in detail according to order of the hypotheses.

#### Hypothesis 1. Main Effect of Condition on Character Empathy And

Perspective-Taking. There was a main effect of Condition found for character empathy,  $F(2,84) = 3.39, p < .05$ . Character empathy was highest in the subjective condition and lowest in the objective condition ( $M_s = 97.14, 92.03, \text{ and } 87.66$ , respectively). The difference between the subjective and objective condition means was significant by a Newman-Keuls analysis; the difference between the neutral and objective means was not significant. There was also a significant Condition  $\times$  Dilemma Type interaction,  $F(2,74) = 5.28, p < .01$ . Follow-up simple effects ANOVAs indicated that the only significant difference between dilemma types was in the neutral condition. The Kohlberg dilemmas elicited more character empathy than did the Eisenberg dilemmas ( $M_s = 94.78 \text{ and } 89.28$ , respectively),  $F(1,31) = 11.67, p < .01$ . Table 2 provides a summary of the means.

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF MEANS FOR CONDITION BY DILEMMA TYPE INTERACTION  
ON CHARACTER RATING SCALES

CONDITION	DILEMMA TYPE		
	KOHLBERG	EISENBERG	TOTAL
Subjective	95.72	98.92	97.32
Neutral	94.88	89.58	92.23
Objective	87.50	90.26	88.88
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
	92.70	92.92	

There was no main effect of condition found for perspective-taking.

Hypothesis 2. An Interaction of Sex By Condition On Character Empathy And Perspective-Taking. There was little support for this hypothesis. There was no effect of sex x condition for character empathy, whereas there was a Personal Empathy x Sex x Condition three-way interaction for perspective-taking,  $F(2,83) = 3.31, p < .05$ . However, the pattern is complex and difficult to interpret. Furthermore, a Dunn's test for multiple comparisons yielded no significant differences among these means, suggesting these differences were very weak. Table 3 provides a summary of the means.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF UNWEIGHTED MEANS FOR SEX BY CONDITION BY  
PERSONAL EMPATHY INTERACTION ON THE PTO

	^MEANS			
	MALES		FEMALES	
	HI	LO	HI	LO
SUB	3.08(6)	3.55(10)	3.36(11)	3.0(5)
	1.03	1.21	1.35	1.21
NEUT	2.83(3)	3.31(13)	3.38(12)	3.0(4)
	.29	1.05	1.52	.73
OBJ	3.63(4)	2.5(11)	3.45(10)	4.17(6)
	1.24	.87	1.22	1.39

\*Cell sizes are in parentheses; Standard Deviations  
are printed below each mean.

Hypothesis 3. An Interaction of Personal Empathy By Condition For Character Empathy And Perspective-Taking. A significant Condition x Personal Empathy interaction was found for character empathy,  $F(2,84) = 4.06$ ,  $p < .05$ . The pattern of the interaction was in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. High empathy individuals gave highest character ratings in the subjective condition, moderate ratings in the neutral condition, and lowest ratings in the objective condition ( $M = 104.7$ ,  $94.23$ , and  $89.07$ , respectively). A follow-up simple effects ANOVA indicated that the differences were significant,  $F(2,43) = 7.20$ ,  $p < .01$ . Low empathic individuals responded with a lower amount of character empathy, as noted, and did not differ across conditions,  $F(2,47) = 2.77$ ,  $p > .05$ , ( $M_s = 88.53$ ,  $90.09$ , and  $86.56$ , respectively). Figure 3 shows this interaction.






Figure 3. Personal Empathy By Condition Interaction.

Although a Personal Empathy x Condition interaction was not found for perspective-taking, there was a Personal Empathy x Dilemma Type interaction.  $F(1,83) = 8.26, p < .01$ . High empathy individuals were significantly more likely to take the position of the character(s) on the Eisenberg dilemmas as opposed to the Kohlberg dilemmas ( $M = 3.57$  and  $3.00$ , respectively, possible scores ranged from 2 to 6). A follow-up ANOVA indicated that this difference was significant,  $F(1,45) = 11.29, p < .01$ . Low empathy individuals did not significantly differ across dilemma types in a follow-up test. Table 4 provides a summary of the means.

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF MEANS FOR PERSONAL EMPATHY BY DILEMMA TYPE  
INTERACTION ON THE PTQ

	PERSONAL EMPATHY		
	HI	LOW	TOTAL
KOHLBERG	3.00	3.32	3.16
EISENBERG	3.57	3.19	3.38
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
	3.28	3.25	

Hypothesis 4. An Interaction Of Justice/Care Orientation By Condition For Character Empathy And Perspective-Taking. There was no support for this hypothesis. There were no main effects or interactions involving justice/care-orientation for either character empathy or perspective-taking in the ANOVAs described.

The Effects Of Sex, Empathy, And Condition On Moral Reasoning

Hypotheses 5 to 7 deal with the effects of sex, empathy, and condition on the Information-Seeking Questionnaire (IS) and the Judgment Questionnaire (JQ). Five categories of the JQ were analysed, Normative, Perfectionism, Fairness, Utilitarian, and Feelings; the 'Filler' consideration was dropped from analysis since it did not constitute a meaningful element consideration. A Condition (3) x Sex (2) x Dilemma Type (2) MANOVA was carried out on the five information-seeking considerations, as well as a parallel MANOVA on the five judgment considerations retained for analysis.

The results from the MANOVAs can be summarized briefly as follows. There was no main effect of Condition for either information-seeking or judgment considerations. There was however a main effect of Personal Empathy for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. There was a main effect of Sex for information-seeking, but not for judgment considerations. There was a main effect of Dilemma Type for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. There were no other main effects or interactions found for either information-seeking or

judgment considerations on the MANOVAs.

Several ANOVAs were carried out in order to test the specific hypothesized effects of personal empathy, sex, and dilemma type, on patterns of information type or judgment consideration type responding. For information type, the scores from particular rights and general rights considerations were added together, and scores from particular consequences and general consequences considerations were added together.

A Condition (3) x Sex (2) x Dilemma Type (2) x Information Type (2) ANOVA was carried out to specifically test the condition by information type interaction predicted in hypothesis 5. The results of this analysis indicated that there was no interaction of Condition by Information Type.

A Personal Empathy (2) x Sex (2) x Dilemma Type (2) x Information Type (2) ANOVA was carried out to test rights vs consequences considerations as specified by hypotheses 6 to 8. In brief summary, the significant results from this analysis were a main effect of sex, a main effect of dilemma type, and an interaction of dilemma type by information type. Finally, an ANOVA with Personal Empathy (2) x Sex (2) x Dilemma Type (2) was carried out specifically on context information-seeking considerations only. The results from this analysis indicated there were no significant effects of Context information-seeking.

For judgment consideration type, the scores from normative and fairness considerations were added together, and scores from utilitarian

and feelings considerations were added together. Then a Personal Empathy (2) x Sex (2) x Dilemma Type (2) x Judgment Consideration Type (2) was carried out to test normative/fairness considerations vs. utilitarian/feelings considerations as specified by hypotheses 6 to 8. In brief, this analysis yielded a main effect of Personal Empathy, a main effect of Dilemma Type, a main effect of Judgment Consideration Type, and an interaction of Dilemma Type by Consideration Type. All results are reported below in order of the hypotheses.

Hypothesis 5. Effects of Condition For Information-Seeking And For Judgment Considerations. There was no support for these hypotheses. There was no effect of condition for either the information-seeking considerations or the judgment considerations in the overall MANOVAs, nor any interactions with condition. Moreover, none of the five specific information-seeking or judgment considerations showed any condition effects in univariate ANOVAs.

Hypothesis 6. Effects Of Personal Empathy On Information-Seeking And On Judgment Considerations. A main effect of personal empathy was found for both information-seeking and for judgment considerations as hypothesized. For information seeking, there was a significant main effect of empathy,  $F(1,90) = 13.01$ ,  $p < .001$ . There was a similar significant main effect of empathy for judgment considerations,  $F(1,90) = 7.57$ ,  $p < .01$ . The direction was in that predicted by the hypothesis for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. High empathic individuals requested significantly more information than did low

empathic individuals ( $M_s = 4.52$  and  $3.23$ , respectively). Also, high empathic individuals endorsed more judgment considerations than did low empathic individuals ( $M_s = 15.17$  and  $12.77$ , respectively).

There were no significant interactions for information-seeking considerations. However, there was a Personal Empathy x Dilemma Type interaction for judgment considerations,  $F(1,92) = 5.07$ ,  $p < .05$ . High empathic individuals endorsed significantly more considerations on the Kohlberg dilemmas than on the Eisenberg dilemmas ( $M_s = 10.21$  and  $8.56$ , respectively). However, low empathic individuals demonstrated no effect of dilemma type ( $M_s = 8.00$  and  $7.27$ , respectively). Figure 4 provides a graph of the interaction.




Figure 4. Personal Empathy By Dilemma Type Interaction.

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There was also a predicted interaction of empathy by information-seeking type. More consequence information than rights information would be sought by high empathic individuals for the IS. Low empathic individuals would demonstrate a focus on rights information. Further, it was predicted that more utilitarian/feelings considerations would be endorsed by high empathic individuals for the JQ, while low empathic individuals would demonstrate a normative/fairness focus. Results from the four-way ANOVAs (described above) showed that there was no support for this part of hypothesis 6; there were no significant information type x personal empathy interactions.

Hypothesis 7. Effects Of Sex For Information-Seeking And Judgment Consideration. There was a main effect of sex for information-seeking but not for judgment consideration. On the Information-Seeking questionnaire (IS), there was a main effect of sex,  $F(1,90) = 7.61, p < .05$ . Women were significantly more likely than men to request information on all of these considerations. Table 5 provides a summary of the means for the IS, and Table 6 provides a summary of the means for the JQ.

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF MEANS FOR THE MAIN EFFECT OF SEX  
FOR THE IS CONSIDERATIONS.

	MALES	FEMALES	TOTALS
KOHLEBERG DILEMMAS			
GENERAL RIGHTS	* .85	*1.32	1.08
PARTICULAR RTS	1.29	1.47	1.38
PARTICULAR CONSEQUENCES	*1.10	*1.51	1.30
GENERAL CONSEQUENCES	.56	.51	.54
CONTEXT	.81	.74	.77
TOTALS	----- .92	----- 1.11	
EISENBERG DILEMMAS			
GENERAL RTS	.48	.74	.61
PARTICULAR RIGHTS	* .58	* .94	.76
PARTICULAR CONSEQUENCES	*1.23	*1.55	1.39
GENERAL CONSEQUENCES	.63	.83	.73
CONTEXT	.52	.68	.60
TOTALS	----- .69	----- .95	
GRAND MEANS	----- .81	----- 1.03	

\*Significant at  $p < .05$

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF MEANS FOR SEX FOR THE JQ CONSIDERATIONS.

	MALES	FEMALES	TOTALS
KOHLEBERG DILEMMAS			
FAIRNESS	5.46	5.50	5.48
PERFECTIONISM	3.98	4.60	4.29
UTILITARIAN	4.02	5.08	4.55
NORMATIVE	3.65	4.00	3.82
FEELINGS	4.40	4.50	4.45
TOTALS	4.30	4.74	
EISENBERG DILEMMAS			
FAIRNESS	4.35	4.33	4.34
PERFECTIONISM	3.96	4.44	4.20
UTILITARIAN	4.42	4.94	4.68
NORMATIVE	2.13	2.52	2.32
FEELINGS	4.21	4.88	4.54
TOTALS	3.81	4.22	
GRAND MEANS	4.06	4.48	

Within this hypothesis there was the prediction that there would be an interaction of information-seeking type by sex as well as an interaction of judgment consideration type by sex. There was no support for this part of the hypothesis in the Sex x Empathy x Dilemma Type x Consideration Type ANOVAs. There were no interactions with sex in these analyses for either information-seeking or judgment considerations.

In order to examine the context consideration, an ANOVA with Personal Empathy (2) x Sex (2) x Dilemma Type (2) was carried out. There were no main effects or interactions, indicating that this category did not vary significantly by sex, empathy level, or dilemma type.

Hypothesis 8. A Main Effect Of Dilemma Type For Information-Seeking And Judgment Considerations. There was a main effect of dilemma type for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. The ANOVA for information-seeking used to test this (see above) yielded a main effect of Dilemma type.  $F(1,92) = 14.32, p < .001$ . Significantly more information was sought for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas ( $M_s = 2.15$  and  $1.74$ , respectively). A main effect of Dilemma Type was also found for judgment consideration type.  $F(1,92) = 26.55, p < .001$ . Significantly more considerations were endorsed for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas ( $M_s = 9.15$  and  $7.94$ , respectively).

The Dilemma Type main effect for information-seeking was qualified by the predicted Information Type x Dilemma Type interaction.  $F(1,92) =$

64.24,  $p < .001$ . Significantly more rights information was requested for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas ( $M_s = 2.46$  and  $1.37$ , respectively). However, there was no significant effect between dilemma type and consequence information sought ( $M_s = 1.84$  and  $2.12$ , respectively). Figure 5 shows this interaction.




Figure 5 Information Type by Dilemma Type Interaction.

For the JQ there was a main effect of normative/fairness vs. utilitarian/feelings type of consideration sought,  $F(1,92) = 10.03, p < .01$ . Significantly more utilitarian/feelings considerations than normative/fairness considerations were sought overall ( $M_s = 9.11$  and  $7.98$ , respectively). This main effect was qualified by the predicted Judgment Consideration Type x Dilemma Type,  $F(1,92) = 21.45, p < .001$ . Significantly more normative/fairness considerations were endorsed for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas ( $M_s = 9.30$  and  $6.67$ , respectively). However, there was no difference across dilemma type on the utilitarian/feelings considerations ( $M_s = 9.00$  and  $9.22$ , respectively). Figure 6 provides a graph of the interaction.




Figure 6. Judgment Consideration Type By Dilemma Type Interaction.



Relationships Among Predictor Variables. A correlation matrix of the predictors was obtained in order to determine the relationships that the predictors had to each other. Table 7 provides a summary of the correlations, means, and standard deviations for each predictor

TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF CORRELATION MATRIX FOR PREDICTORS

Predictor	**Mean	SD	Pearson Correlations							
			Sex	Cond	Moral Orien	Pers. Emp	Char. Emp(K)	Char. Emp(E)	PTQ (K)	PTQ (E)
Sex			--	.00	*-.18	*-.43	-.11	-.14	.03	-.02
Condition				--	.07	.01	*-.30	*-.31	.09	--
Moral Orient.	1.81	.93			--	.03	.12	.12	.11	.08
Personal Empathy	19.57	11.89				--	*.30	*.36	-.11	.00
Character Empathy (Kohlberg Dilemmas)	92.34	12.41					--	--	.05	--
Character Empathy (Eisenberg Dilemmas)	92.21	13.10						--	--	-.01
PTQ (Kohlberg Dilemmas)	3.16	1.96							--	--
PTQ (Eisenberg Dilemmas)	3.38	1.90								--

\* = Significant at  $p < .05$ 

\*\* = N of subjects equals 96

The correlations of the predictor variables were generally as expected. Sex correlated with moral orientation, point-biserial  $r = .18$ ,  $p < .05$  using a one-tailed test, indicating that men were more likely to be justice-oriented and women were more likely to be care-oriented. Sex was also correlated with personal empathy, point-biserial  $r = .43$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicating that women were more likely to be higher in personal empathy than were men. Personal empathy was positively correlated with character empathy,  $r = .31$ ,  $p < .05$  on the Kohlberg dilemmas and  $r = .36$ ,  $p < .05$  on the Eisenberg dilemmas, indicating that individuals high in personal empathy were more likely to empathize with the characters and individuals low in personal empathy were less likely to empathize with the characters in each dilemma type. Condition (on a 1 to 3 scale) was correlated with character empathy,  $r = -.30$ ,  $p < .05$  on the Kohlberg dilemmas and  $r = -.31$ ,  $p < .05$  on the Eisenberg dilemmas, indicating that individuals in the subjective condition were more likely to empathize with the characters in each dilemma and individuals in the objective condition were less likely to empathize with the characters. The PIQ did not significantly correlate with any of the predictors including the character rating scales, indicating that this measure was not related to any of the other measures.

Specific Moral Reasoning Hypotheses Based On Overall Model The model used (Figure 1) was proposed for this study, and therefore was exploratory in nature. To maximize the amount of exploratory information this study could provide, all of the predictors were

retained for analyses pertaining to moral reasoning patterns. Tables 8 and 9 show the zero-order correlations on which the regression analyses were based for the  $F_1$  and the  $JQ$ .

TABLE 8. CORRELATION MATRICES FOR THE KOHLBERG AND EISENBERG DILEMMAS FOR THE IS

	KOHLBERG				
	GEN RTS	PART RTS	PART CONS	GEN CONS	CONTENT
MORAL ORIENT	*-.21	.06	.03	.02	.01
PERS EMP	*.32	*.18	*.48	.16	.08
COND	.03	-.09	.07	.01	.06
SEX	*-.26	-.14	*-.27	.04	.04
PTQ	-.05	.12	.16	.04	.04
CHAR RATE	.07	.04	*.17	.07	.06

	EISENBERG				
	GEN RTS	PART RTS	PART CONS	GEN CONS	CONTENT
MORAL ORIENT	.07	-.03	-.06	*.21	.03
PERS EMP	*.19	*.20	*.36	.11	.07
COND	.00	-.07	.02	-.08	.06
SEX	*-.21	*-.24	*-.22	-.15	.10
PTQ	.10	*.22	.14	-.06	.06
CHAR RATE	.09	*.25	*.21	.11	.04

\*Significant at  $p < .05$

TABLE 9. CORRELATION MATRICES FOR THE KOHLBERG AND EISENBERG DILEMMAS FOR THE JQ

	KOHLBERG				
	FAIR	PERF	UTIL	NORM	FEEL
MORAL ORIENT	-.07	-.09	.00	*-.17	*-.18
PERS EMP	*.30	*.24	*.40	*.22	*.20
COND	-.10	-.06	-.11	-.14	-.16
SEX	-.01	-.16	*-.28	-.07	-.02
PTQ	.00	.01	-.12	.00	-.04
CHAR RATE	.13	*.18	.13	.11	.10

	EISENBERG				
	FAIR	PERF	UTIL	NORM	FEEL
MORAL ORIENT	-.08	-.13	-.03	*.22	-.06
PERS EMP	.16	*.22	*.28	*.22	*.24
COND	.04	.02	-.12	*-.18	-.12
SEX	.01	-.11	-.13	-.10	-.16
PTQ	.02	*-.26	.06	-.04	-.05
CHAR RATE	.14	.16	*.30	*.21	*.34

\*Significant at  $p < .05$

Moral orientation (3 levels), condition (3 levels), personal empathy, character empathy, and perspective-taking, were treated as continuous variables for all regression analyses. The 10 "mixed" justice/care scores were retained as 2's, so that the moral orientation scores ranged from 1 to 3. As noted, the actual scores for personal empathy were used, as opposed to the personal empathy blocking levels used for the MANOVAs and ANOVAs. Sex was the only dichotomous variable. The two questionnaires assessing moral reasoning were the Information-Seeking Questionnaire and the Judgment Questionnaire.

In order to test the suggested model (Figure 1) the predictors for moral reasoning were entered into hierarchical regressions in two distinct sets. The two character empathy measures of the character rating scales and the PIQ (mediating variable set) were entered together before condition, moral orientation, personal empathy, and sex (predictor variable set) in one group of analyses. Entering the empathy measures first meant that empathy could be examined as a mediator for moral reasoning. Specifically, if empathy was a mediator, as suggested by the model (Figure .), then these empathy measures would be expected to account for most of the contribution to the model if entered first in the hierarchy. However, if the empathy measures were not acting as mediators, they would operate as predictor variables. In order to examine this, the order of entry of the two variable sets was reversed in a second group of analyses. For both groups of analyses, within the predictor and mediating variable sets order of entry of the variables was unspecified.

The analyses that will be reported in detail are those where the hypothesized mediating variable set was entered prior to the predictor set. The differences between the results for the orders of entry will be described for each analysis.

The following sections will first contain a breakdown of the predictors and empathy measures contributing to each of the five IS considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas and for the five IS considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Then a similar breakdown will be presented for each of the five JQ considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas and the five JQ considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Due to the exploratory nature of the hypothesized model in Figure 1, all predictors were reported if they were significant contributors to the model, even if the overall equation was itself non-significant.

#### IS Considerations: Kohlberg Dilemmas

The variables in the mediating set did not have any effect on IS considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas. Table 10 shows a summary of the contribution of each predictor to each of the information-seeking considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas, when the mediating variable set was entered first.



TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS ON EACH IS CONSIDERATION WITH THE MEDIATOR VARIABLE SET ENTERED FIRST, FOLLOWED BY THE PREDICTOR VARIABLE SET

Consideration	Contributing Predictors	KOHLEBERG DILEMMAS			
		Beta	DF	*F-Value	Cumulative Variance
GENERAL RTS	Personal Empathy	.31301	1.91	8.90	10
	Moral Orientation	-.21450	1.90	4.63	14
	Sex	-.22339	1.89	4.12	18
PARTICULAR RTS	None				
PARTICULAR CONSEQUENCES	Personal Empathy	.43409	1.91	21.07	23
GENERAL CONSEQUENCES	None				
CONTEXT	None				
EISENBERG					
GENERAL RTS	None				
PARTICULAR RTS	Character Empathy	.25059	1.93	6.23	6
PARTICULAR CONSEQUENCES	Character Empathy	.21073	1.93	4.32	4
	Personal Empathy	.33539	1.91	10.84	16
GENERAL CONSEQUENCES	Moral Orientation	.22350	1.91	4.86	7
CONTEXT	None				

\*All values listed are significant at  $p < .05$

General rights considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas were significantly predicted by personal empathy, moral orientation, and sex. The overall model was significant,  $F(6,87) = 3.24$ , with 18 percent of the variance accounted for, indicating that the contributing predictors significantly affected responses on these considerations. Specifically, level of personal empathy positively predicted general rights considerations,  $F(1,91) = 8.90$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicating that persons high in empathy requested more general rights considerations than did low empathic individuals. Moral orientation negatively predicted general rights considerations,  $F(1,90) = 4.63$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicating that justice-oriented individuals were more likely to request information about general rights than were care-oriented individuals. Sex predicted general rights considerations,  $F(1,91) = 4.12$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicating that women were more likely than men to request general rights information. Regardless of the order of entry of the two variable sets, the same variables remained significant.

Particular consequences considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas were positively predicted by personal empathy. The overall model was significant,  $F(3,91) = 9.04$ ,  $p < .05$ , with 23 percent of the variance accounted for. Personal empathy was the only significant predictor,  $F(1,91) = 21.07$ , indicating that individuals high in empathy were more likely to request particular consequences information than were individuals low in personal empathy, as expected. There was no difference in these results when order of entry was inverted for the two sets.

There were no significant predictors either for general consequence or context considerations, regardless of the order of entry of the predictors. This indicates that the predictors did not significantly affect the amount of information sought on any of these considerations. There were no significant predictors for particular rights considerations when the mediating variables were entered first. However, when the predicting variable set was entered first a significant effect of sex was found,  $F(1,93) = 5.87, p < .05$ . Women were more likely than men to request particular rights information. This dependence on order indicates that a weak overall sex effect was reduced to non-significance by entering the mediating variables first.

#### IS Considerations: Eisenberg Dilemmas

The mediating variable set did have an effect on moral reasoning for two out of the five IS considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas. See Table 10 for a summary of the contribution of each predictor to each of the information-seeking considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas, when the mediating variable set was entered first.

Particular rights considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas were predicted by character empathy. The overall model was significant,  $F(1,93) = 6.23$ , with 6 percent of the variance accounted for. Specifically, character empathy was a positive predictor of particular rights,  $F(1,93) = 4.32, p < .05$ , indicating that the more positively individuals rated the dilemma characters the more they requested particular rights information about the characters.

When the predictor variable set was entered first, character empathy was still a significant predictor, but in addition to that there was an effect of sex,  $F(1,93) = 4.32, p < .05$ . This indicates that the effect of character empathy was robust, but that the effect of sex was weak, and dependent on order of entry.

For particular consequences considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas, character empathy and personal empathy were significant predictors. The overall model was significant,  $F(3,91) = 5.67$ , with 16 percent of the variance accounted for. Character empathy was a positive predictor,  $F(1,93) = 4.32, p < .05$ , indicating that individuals who rated the dilemma characters more positively were more likely to request particular consequences information than were individuals who did not rate the dilemma characters positively. Personal empathy was a positive predictor,  $F(1,91) = 10.84, p < .05$ , indicating that individuals high in personal empathy were more likely to request particular consequences information than were low empathic individuals, as expected.

Order of entry did affect these patterns. When the predictor set of variables was entered first, the effect of character empathy was lost. This indicates that the effect of personal empathy was partly mediated by character empathy differences.

For general consequences considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas, moral orientation was a significant predictor, although the overall model was not significant. Moral orientation was a positive predictor,  $F(1,91) = 4.86, p < .05$ , with 7 percent of the variance accounted for, indicating that care-oriented individuals tended to request general

consequences information more than justice-oriented individuals. Order of entry of the two sets of predictors did not affect these patterns.

General rights and context considerations were not significantly predicted by any of the variables, regardless of order of entry of the two sets of predictor variables. This indicates that the predictors did not influence the amount of information requested on either of these considerations, and that these patterns were not affected by order of entry of the predictor sets.

#### JO Considerations: Kohlberg Dilemmas

The mediating variable set did not have a significant effect on any of the judgment considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas. Table 11 provides a summary of the contribution of each predictor to each of the judgment considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas, when the mediating variable set was entered first.

TABLE 11 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS ON EACH JQ CONSIDERATION WITH THE MEDIATOR VARIABLE SET ENTERED FIRST, FOLLOWED BY THE PREDICTOR VARIABLE SET

KOHLEBERG DILEMMAS					
Consideration	Contributing Predictors	Beta	DF	*F-Value	% Cumulative Variance
FAIRNESS	Personal Empathy	.25657	1.91	6.13	18
PERFECTION	None				
UTILITARIAN	Personal Empathy	.35701	1.93	12.95	16
NORMATIVE	None				
FEELINGS	None				
EISENBERG					
FAIRNESS	None				
PERFECTION	PTQ	-.27555	1.93	7.74	10
UTILITARIAN	Character Empathy	.30086	1.93	9.26	9
NORMATIVE	Character Empathy	.21216	1.93	4.38	5
	Moral Orientation	-.25510	1.91	6.40	11
FEELINGS	Character Empathy	.34106	1.93	12.24	12

\*All values listed significant at  $p < .05$

For fairness considerations, although the overall model was not significant, personal empathy was a positive, significant predictor,  $F(1,91) = 6.13$ ,  $p < .05$ , with 18 percent of the variance accounted for. This indicates that high empathic individuals were more likely to consider fairness considerations important than were low empathy individuals. This pattern was not affected by order of entry of the two predictor sets.

For utilitarian considerations personal empathy was a positive predictor, and the overall model was significant,  $F(3,91) = 5.61$ ,  $p < .05$ , with 16 percent of the variance accounted for. Personal empathy was significant,  $F(1,91) = 12.95$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicating that high empathic individuals were more likely to consider utilitarian considerations important than were low empathy individuals. This pattern was not affected by order of entry of the two predictor sets.

None of the predictors significantly influenced response patterns for feelings considerations, regardless of order of entry of the predictor sets. This indicates that the predictors did not have a significant effect on how individuals viewed these considerations.

None of the predictors had an effect on perfectionism and normative considerations when the mediating variables were entered first. However, when the predictor variables were entered first there was a significant effect of personal empathy for perfectionism considerations,  $F(1,93) = 7.49$ ,  $p < .05$ . There was also a significant effect of personal empathy for normative considerations,  $F(1,93) = 14.94$ ,  $p < .05$ . High empathy individuals endorsed both consideration types more

strongly. This indicates that the mediating variables partially absorbed the effect of personal empathy for perfectionism and utilitarian considerations on the Kohlberg dilemmas.

#### JO Considerations: Eisenberg Dilemmas

At least one of the variables in the mediating set had an effect for four out of the five judgment considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas. The PTQ mediated one consideration, and character empathy (as measured by the character rating scales) mediated three considerations. See Table 11 for a summary of the contribution of each predictor to each of the judgment considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas, when the mediating variable set was entered first.

The PTQ predicted perfectionism considerations,  $F(1,93) = 7.74, p < .05$ , with 10 percent of the variance accounted for. Individuals who reported that they took the position of an observer when reading the Eisenberg dilemmas were more likely to find the perfectionism considerations important than were individuals who reported taking the position of the character(s). Order of entry of the two sets of predictors did not affect this pattern.

For utilitarian considerations character empathy was a positive predictor and the overall model was significant,  $F(1,93) = 9.26$ , with 16 percent of the variance accounted for. Character empathy was significant,  $F(1,93) = 12.95, p < .05$ , indicating that the more empathy was elicited towards the characters the more important utilitarian considerations became.



Order of entry of the predictors did affect this pattern. When the predictor set of variables was entered first, character empathy was replaced by an effect of personal empathy,  $F(1,93) = 6.80, p < .05$ . This indicates that character empathy mediated the effects of personal empathy differences in the model.

For normative considerations, both character empathy and moral orientation significantly contributed to the overall equation,  $F(3,91) = 3.77, p < .05$ , with 11 percent of the variance accounted for. Character empathy was a positive significant predictor,  $F(1,93) = 4.38, p < .05$ , indicating that as empathy towards the character increased the more important normative considerations became. Moral orientation was a negative predictor,  $F(1,91) = 6.40, p < .05$ , indicating that justice-oriented individuals tended to find normative considerations more important than did-care-oriented individuals.


Although moral orientation remained a significant predictor regardless of order of entry of the two sets of predictor variables, character empathy did not. When the predictor variable set was entered first, personal empathy replaced character empathy as a significant predictor,  $F(1,93) = 4.54, p < .05$ . This indicates that the effects of personal empathy were being mediated by character empathy.

For feelings considerations, character empathy contributed significantly to the model, and the overall model was significant,  $F(1,93) = 12.24, p < .05$ , with 12 percent of the variance accounted for. Character empathy was a significant positive predictor,  $F(1,93) = 12.24, p < .05$ , indicating that the more empathy was elicited towards

2

of/de

2



the characters the more important feelings considerations became. Order of entry of the two sets of variables did not affect this pattern.

None of the predictors significantly affected fairness considerations, regardless of order of entry of the variable sets. This indicates that the predictors did not influence responses on this consideration.

## DISCUSSION

Overview

The results of this study indicate that patterns of moral reasoning are linked to individual differences in empathy. Personal empathy, as measured by the Mehrabian-Epstein Scale (1972), was the chief predictor variable in this research. The finding that personal empathy was central to the moral reasoning process is consistent with aspects of Rest's (1984) theory. Further, it offers a possible motive component to cognitive moral theories such as that of Kohlberg. It is suggested based on ~~the results~~ of the current study that personal empathy may offer one activating motive for responding in a moral judgment situation. Furthermore, sex differences in moral reasoning were largely accounted for, or overshadowed by, variations in individual differences in empathic processes.

The findings from ~~the~~ study will first be summarized according to the hypotheses. Then each of the predictors will be discussed in turn in order of relationship to empathy processes and moral reasoning. The discussion concludes with a section on future research suggestions.

Summary Of Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1 To 4: Empathy Measures. The predictions for hypotheses 1 and 3 were clearly supported for character empathy. There was a main effect of condition as predicted in hypothesis 1, as well as an interaction of personal empathy by condition as predicted in hypothesis

3, on the character rating scales. The most empathy for characters was elicited in the subjective condition, and the least empathy was elicited in the objective condition. Furthermore, high empathic individuals gave the highest character ratings in the subjective condition, and the lowest character ratings in the objective condition. Low empathic individuals, as predicted, did not differ according to condition. The PTQ offered the only support for hypothesis 2, which predicted an interaction of sex by condition. However, the three-way interaction for perspective-taking which was found here was not a trustworthy finding (see below for discussion). This suggests that there is no substantial support for hypothesis 2 for either of the empathy measures. Hypothesis 4, that there would be an interaction of justice/care orientation by condition, was not supported for the PTQ or the character rating scales.

Therefore, personal empathy and condition had a significant effect on character empathy, which supports hypotheses 1 and 3. However, for the PTQ there was no support for hypotheses 1, 3, or 4, and only questionable support for hypothesis 2.

Hypotheses 5 To 8: Moral Reasoning Measures. Hypotheses 6 and 8 were supported for information-seeking and judgment considerations. Also, the pattern of results for information-seeking and judgment considerations was essentially the same for both hypotheses. There was a main effect of personal empathy, as predicted by hypothesis 6. High empathic individuals requested more information and also endorsed more judgment considerations than did low empathic individuals. There was

also an interaction of personal empathy by dilemma type for judgment considerations only. High empathic individuals endorsed more considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas, whereas low empathic individuals did not differ by dilemma type. Hypothesis 8 predicted an interaction of dilemma type by moral consideration type for both information-seeking and judgment considerations. The interactions were in the direction predicted, and there was also a main effect of dilemma type for information-seeking and judgment considerations. Significantly more information was requested and more judgment considerations were endorsed for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Moreover, significantly more rights information was sought and more normative/fairness considerations were endorsed for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas. There was no significant difference between dilemma type for consequence information or for utilitarian/feelings considerations.

Hypothesis 7 predicted a main effect of sex for information-seeking and for judgment considerations, which was supported only for information-seeking, and was in the direction predicted. Women were significantly more likely to request information than were men. However, the sex by information type predictions from hypothesis 7 were not supported. Finally, there was no support for hypothesis 5, which predicted main effects of condition for information-seeking and judgment considerations, as well as condition by information type interactions.

To summarize, personal empathy and dilemma type did have a significant effect on both of the moral reasoning measures, which

supports hypotheses 6 and 8. Sex had a significant main effect on information-seeking but not on judgment considerations, which lends partial support to hypothesis 7. Condition did not have an effect on either of the moral reasoning measures, which was contrary to the prediction made in hypothesis 5.

#### Contribution Of Individual Predictors To Empathy And Moral Reasoning

Character Empathy. Character empathy was related only to personal empathy and condition among the predictor variables. The expected sex and moral orientation differences in character empathy did not appear. Highly empathic individuals, regardless of sex, responded more empathically towards the characters in the dilemmas than did low empathic individuals.

In general, character empathy was partially related to the process of moral reasoning in the altruistic dilemmas of Eisenberg, but not those of Kohlberg. Character empathy predicted several information-seeking and judgment considerations, largely as a mediator of personal differences in empathy. It is noteworthy that all five instances of predictions from character empathy involved considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas and focused on specific information affecting characters. This is in contrast to Rest's (1983) position that the Kohlberg and Eisenberg dilemmas do not assess different dimensions of moral reasoning.

Specifically, for information-seeking, particular rights information was predicted by character empathy on the Eisenberg

dilemmas. The greater the amount of character empathy that was elicited, the more particular rights information was requested by the individual. Also, particular consequences information was predicted by character empathy for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Individuals who were highly empathic towards the characters requested particular consequences information more frequently than did those who were not empathising with the characters.

These findings make sense, since if an individual were empathising with the characters, more particular rights and particular consequences information which would directly concern the characters would plausibly be sought.

For judgment considerations, character empathy predicted normative, feelings, and utilitarian considerations. For normative considerations, as an individual's empathy for the characters increased, so did endorsement for normative considerations increase. This is the opposite to what was expected, since a focus on normative considerations indicates a rule bound, objective viewpoint. The finding for character empathy in this case is therefore difficult to interpret. The feelings consideration was also predicted by character empathy for the Eisenberg dilemmas. This is sensible, in that it would be expected that persons who empathised with the characters in the Eisenberg dilemmas would also be concerned with their feelings. Utilitarian considerations were endorsed by those with higher levels of empathy for the characters in the Eisenberg dilemmas. Since empathy for the characters could be considered a global concept and utilitarian considerations involve



endorsing morally right actions 'that benefit the greatest number of individuals involved', it is likely that high character empathy could lead to endorsement of this consideration.

Perspective Taking. Self-reported perspective-taking, as measured by the PTQ, did yield some results that were contrary to those expected, as well as indicating some differences between the Kohlberg and Eisenberg dilemma types. In general, however, the scores from the PTQ were not affected by condition manipulations, and showed little relationship to other variables.

The PTQ was not related to sex, which is not consistent with previous research (Pratt, Golding, and Kerig, in press). Pratt et al. found that women more often than men demonstrated higher empathy by taking the position of the character(s) in the dilemmas, whereas this was not observed in the present study. However, the difference between the two studies may be explained by the fact that in the Pratt et al. study the PTQ was administered using an interview format, whereas the current study used a self-report questionnaire. It could be that the questions asked on the self-report measure were not clearly interpreted by participants. Alternatively, individuals may have self-reported themselves differently from the way they would have answered in an interview. In any case, since the PTQ did not correlate with the other empathy measures, in the self-report format used for the present study, it can not be considered an effective measure of empathy.

In terms of moral reasoning, the PTQ was a significant predictor

only for perfectionism judgment considerations on the Kohlberg dilemmas. However, since the PTQ did not correlate with any of the other measures this isolated effect cannot be discussed in any meaningful manner.

Condition. The condition manipulation of dilemma vividness was effective in differentially eliciting empathy for the characters in the dilemmas. However, this effect was mediated by the effects of personal empathy. As predicted, only high empathic individuals were affected by the manipulation of vividness, and this was in the manner predicted. Low empathic individuals demonstrated no effect of vividness. Although condition did affect character empathy, it did not affect moral reasoning, in the context of this study. This suggests that the manipulations of empathy were simply too weak to have an effect on moral reasoning patterns.

Personal Empathy. Personal empathy on the Mehrabian-Epstein scale was clearly related to sex. Women were much more likely to be highly empathic than were men. High empathic females numbered 33 to 15 low empathic females; high empathic males numbered 13 to 34 low empathic males. This finding is consistent with the Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) review that indicated that women report themselves high in empathy more often than do men. However, the present results argue that such differences are more than simply a reporting artifact, in that higher empathy individuals did respond differentially to the characters in the moral dilemmas, and reasoned differently about moral problems.

In terms of moral reasoning, personal empathy was a strong predictor for a number of the information-seeking and judgment considerations. As noted, personal empathy was strongly related to character empathy, which acted as a mediator for its effects in several cases.

Specifically, general rights information on the Kohlberg dilemmas was predicted by personal empathy. Highly empathic individuals requested more general rights information than did low empathic individuals. These results for general rights are surprising, since Gilligan (1982) would have predicted that men would be most likely to request general rights information. If sex were replaced by personal empathy, it would be expected that low empathic individuals would request general rights information rather than high empathic individuals. Perhaps the current findings on this consideration are due to an unsureness about knowledge of general legalistic issues among the high empathy individuals who sought more information on this consideration; however, this is speculative.

As noted, personal empathy predicted a focus on particular consequences information for the Eisenberg dilemmas, and also predicted a focus on particular consequences information for the Kohlberg dilemmas. The finding that high empathic individuals requested these considerations more than did low empathic individuals is consistent with the predictions of this study. It is also consistent with Gilligan's (1982) hypothesis regarding sex differences, if sex is replaced by personal empathy. High empathy individuals would replace females, and

low empathy individuals would replace males.

For judgment considerations, both character empathy and personal empathy predicted utilitarian considerations. Individuals high in personal empathy found this consideration more important than did low empathic individuals. Surprisingly, fairness considerations were also predicted by personal empathy, in that high empathy individuals found this consideration important on the Kohlberg dilemmas. This finding does not seem to be consistent with Gilligan's (1982) hypothesis on sex differences. Again, if sex were replaced by empathy, high empathic individuals should have been less concerned with a fairness focus on the Kohlberg dilemmas, and low empathic individuals more concerned with the fairness considerations.

Moral Orientation. Moral orientation patterns in relation to sex were examined independently of analyses, to make sure that the subject sample used in the present study did not differ from other studies using this age range. The subject sample was comparable to that used in Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987), once moral orientation was collapsed over stage level. In their second study, Pratt et al. found that although unmarried men were more likely to be justice-oriented than care-oriented, unmarried women were about evenly split between orientations (i. e., about 50% care-oriented and 50% justice oriented). It wasn't until after the women had been married and had children that an increase in care-orientation became evident in the Pratt et al. (1987) data. A similar pattern was observed in the current study. The

men in the current study were much more likely to be justice-oriented than care-oriented, but the women were about evenly split in orientation. In the present study participants were not asked about their marital status, however it is unlikely due to their age that many were married.

Therefore, moral orientation doesn't appear to be as strongly sex-differentiated as claimed by Gilligan (1982). Moral orientation is a measure that seems to be mediated by factors such as marital status, at least in women. Congruent with this, the correlation between sex and moral orientation, although consistent with previous research, was quite weak.

Moral orientation, as measured by the Gilligan technique, was a significant predictor of general rights information-seeking considerations for the Kohlberg dilemmas, and of general consequence considerations on the Eisenberg dilemmas. Moral orientation was also a significant predictor of normative judgment considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas. Furthermore, moral orientation showed consistent patterns for these three considerations. Individuals who were justice-oriented demonstrated a focus on general rights and normative considerations. Individuals who were care-oriented were high in seeking general consequences information. These patterns are of noteworthy consistency with the moral orientation predictions of both Gilligan (1982) and Kohlberg (1976). It is ironic that this consistency across measures is present even though the technique developed by Gilligan for measuring moral orientation may have questionable reliability (see

below).

Sex. Sex was related to personal empathy, consistent with previous research, in that women report themselves high in empathy significantly more often than do men (Eisenberg and Lennon, 1983). Sex was also weakly linked to the Gilligan moral orientation task, in the direction of previous research (Lyons, 1983). Women were more likely to be care-oriented, and men were more likely to be justice-oriented.

Sex significantly affected amount of information-seeking on three of the five IS considerations in particular; as well, there was an overall sex effect. Moreover, these sex effects were mediated by personal empathy. General rights, particular consequences, and particular rights information were sought significantly more often by women than by men. The finding that women requested more information overall than men is consistent with Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Norris, (in press). The finding that women asked for more particular consequences information is consistent with Gilligan's assertion that women require more consequence information than men (Gilligan, 1982). However Gilligan also argues that women typically ask for more context information about the Kohlberg dilemmas than do men, which has not been found either in the Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Norris (in press) study or in this one. Moreover, the finding that women requested more general rights information than did men is clearly contrary to the Gilligan view that men should find these justice-related considerations more important than would women.

More information was sought for the Kohlberg dilemmas than for the Eisenberg dilemmas, regardless of sex. It has been argued that the Kohlberg dilemmas are part of a different dimension than are the Eisenberg dilemmas, and perhaps cause sex differences in responding due to the Kohlberg emphasis on legalistic issues (Eisenberg, 1984). The Pratt et al. study (in press) had examined sex differences in information-seeking only for Kohlberg dilemmas, and it might have been argued by Gilligan that such dilemmas pose special problems for women's interpretations. However, the results from the current study indicate that all individuals request more information on legalistic dilemmas as opposed to altruistic dilemmas. Also, women request more information than do men, regardless of dilemma type. Thus it seems clear that greater information-seeking by women is not a specific response to Kohlberg's 'justice' dilemmas per se.

Although results on the JQ were interpretable, they were contrary in some respects to those found by Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987). Pratt et al. found that women tended to endorse perfectionism and utilitarian considerations, whereas men tended to endorse fairness considerations. The current study found that empathy rather than sex predicted responses on the JQ.

The differences between the Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987) study and the current one may be due to the restricted age group used in the present study. The Pratt et al. study used 72 participants ranging in age from 18 to 75 years. Education level varied but was generally quite high, and was used as a covariate at each of three age

groups. The present study used 96 university students, ranging in age from 18 to 26. Pratt et al. found that sex differences frequently occurred only at higher moral stage levels (cf. Pratt et al., 1984). It is possible that the majority of the subjects used in the present study were reasoning at lower stage levels, given their level of education. However, no measures of stage level were obtained for this study, so this interpretation is speculative at present.

Dilemma Type. Although dilemma type was not conceptualized as a predictor variable, it did have a clear effect on moral reasoning patterns. Significantly more considerations on the JQ were endorsed on the Kohlberg dilemmas than on the Eisenberg dilemmas, regardless of condition or sex. On the IS as well there was increased information-seeking for the Kohlberg dilemmas as opposed to the Eisenberg dilemmas. This seems to suggest that the Kohlberg dilemmas are more cognitively complex than are the Eisenberg dilemmas, resulting in increased requests for information as well as more diversity of considerations. In addition, the significant dilemma type by consideration type interactions for the IS and the JQ showed a similar pattern, which is consistent with previous research (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson, 1987). Responses on the rights considerations and normative/feelings considerations were 'pulled' by the Kohlberg dilemmas (Trevethan and Walker, 1986). These interactions were independent of sex, indicating that there is a need for control of dilemma type in moral reasoning studies, something that Gilligan (1982) and Lyons (1983)



have neglected to do in their research.

### Summary And Future Research

The present study was designed to manipulate subjects' empathy for the characters in moral problems, using variations in the vividness with which the dilemmas were presented. The finding of an interaction effect, that high empathy individuals were affected by the manipulation of vividness while low empathic individuals were not, is intriguing, and offers a possible individual difference explanation why the vividness effect has been termed 'elusive' (Taylor and Thompson, 1982). As Taylor and Thompson point out, "the prototypic model [for vividness] may be one in which stimulus characteristics and perceiver characteristics interact to produce a vividness effect" (p. 175). Further research should address the issue of whether personal empathy is a determining factor in obtaining effects of vividness in other domains, particularly in the area of recall. Studies might examine memory for hypothetical moral dilemmas and problems in terms of such individual differences, for example.

The PTQ and the Gilligan moral orientation measure were less effective in the current study than expected. The Gilligan orientation measure was consistent, but showed only limited prediction to information-seeking and judgment considerations. However, this may reflect its low reliability found in the Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987) study. In study two, Pratt et al. asked 40 subjects to recall two personal moral dilemmas in an interview situation. Only 60

percent of the subjects showed consistency in moral orientation by giving either two justice responses or two care responses. The remaining 40 percent gave one of each response type. As Pratt et al. correctly point out, this level of consistency in orientation response type is not significantly above chance. Perhaps the limited predictive ability of the Gilligan measure in the current study is a result of such weak reliability for a single dilemma index of orientation. It is suggested that the Gilligan moral orientation measure, using a single personal dilemma, is not adequate for assessing stable moral orientation patterns. Nevertheless, in the three instances where moral orientation did predict considerations, the Gilligan orientation measure did relate to the Kohlberg measures used, showing consistency between the two. The concept of moral orientation is clearly capturing some consistencies in the moral reasoning process, which suggests that it should be tested with more reliable measures.

The PTQ did not correlate with any of the other predictors. However, given the previous success that Pratt, Golding, and Kerig (in press) had using the PTQ, it is highly possible that the difference between the two studies in presentation type influenced the results. As noted, in the Pratt et al. study the PTQ was presented in an interview format. However, in the current study the PTQ consisted of a self-report questionnaire. Subjects were required to put a checkmark beside one of four possible perspectives. It is possible that had subjects been allowed to elaborate on their perspective choice in an open-ended format the self-report PTQ might have yielded results similar

to that found by Pratt et al.. However, at this point it must remain speculative.

In terms of moral reasoning, it is clear that our vividness manipulation did not have an effect on the aspects of moral reasoning that we assessed, since no condition effects on moral reasoning patterns were obtained. However, character empathy and especially personal empathy were central predictors of responding on both the IS and the JQ. This suggests that further research on the role of individual differences in personal empathy among adults for moral reasoning is clearly needed. There has been little such research to date within the Kohlberg paradigm. It seems possible that aspects of the sex differences described by Gilligan and others are generated by sex-linked differences in empathic processes elicited by moral dilemmas (e. g., Rest, 1983). The robustness of predictive effects for the Mehrabian-Epstein personal empathy measure attests to its construct validity as an index of important differences in empathic processes among adults.

It would be interesting to focus future research on moral reasoning and empathy differences in relation to the Kohlberg moral reasoning stage levels. Specifically, a study could use the JQ, the MJI, and the Mehrabian-Epstein empathy measure, to determine whether empathy differences at higher reasoning levels would yield the same pattern of results obtained for sex differences in the Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1987) study, while showing weaker differences for subjects reasoning at lower stage levels.

Another possible study could look at the Kohlberg 'substage' or type, much in the manner of Gibbs, Clark, Joseph, Green, Goodrick, and Makowski (1986). Gibbs et al. used 134 high school students to examine a variety of moral reasoning and cognitive tasks and their relationship to the Kohlberg substages. According to Kohlberg, within each stage level an individual can be classed as either making moral judgments from a type 'A' perspective or from a type 'B' perspective. A type A individual is limited to reasoning from the perspective of existing societal laws and conventions. A type B individual reasons from an 'ethically ideal' perspective. Gibbs et al. examined several factors, including Kohlberg stage level using the MJI and personal empathy using the Mehrabian-Epstein scale. Gibbs et al. hypothesized that type B subjects would be high in personal empathy as well as high in field independence. A field independent person would be one who is autonomous and relatively uninfluenced by conformity pressures. The Mehrabian-Epstein scale was used as a correlate, but since it did not correlate with any of the other measures used by Gibbs et al. it was excluded from further analyses.

Unlike the Gibbs et al. study, the present study did find a strong general relationship between moral reasoning and personal empathy, suggesting that this cognitive factor does influence moral judgment, although not in the way suggested by Gibbs et al.. In the current study personal empathy did have an effect on the JQ, which also examines differences in types within stage level. However, it is possible that personal empathy differences may also be evident between vertical stage

levels, which were not assessed in the present study. Therefore, it would be interesting to carry out a study in which personal empathy would be assessed in addition to Kohlberg stage level to determine whether level of personal empathy varies in relationship to increased complexity of moral reasoning. Empathy differences could similarly be studied using the IS, to further examine the extent to which empathy affects moral reasoning patterns.

Finally, differences in dilemma types were not demonstrated in terms of the impact of vividness manipulations. However, in terms of moral reasoning, character empathy predicted JQ and IS considerations for the Eisenberg dilemmas, but not for the Kohlberg dilemmas. Specifically, the more engaging the characters were in these altruism dilemmas, the more important certain moral reasoning considerations became. These findings indicate that although dilemma type seems to have no relation to vividness within this paradigm, it does relate to the role of character empathy in moral reasoning. As well, in the current study the Kohlberg dilemmas elicited significantly more requests for information and more judgment considerations. These results argue against the position that the Eisenberg dilemmas do not represent a different dimension of moral reasoning (Rest, 1983). Instead, the results suggest that the Kohlberg dilemmas, perhaps because of their emphasis on legal issues, may be more cognitively complex than the Eisenberg dilemmas, and do in fact represent a different dimension to the moral reasoning process. Furthermore, the dilemma type by consideration type interactions indicate that the Kohlberg and Eisenberg

dilemmas represent distinctive dilemma types which elicit differential moral orientations as measured by these information-seeking and judgment considerations. Consistent with Walker and DeVries (1985), individuals might use a different orientation depending on the type of dilemma under consideration. Future research will need to take this dilemma content type into account, extending the types of dilemmas studied beyond Kohlberg's traditional justice measures.

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APPENDIX A Sample Test Booklet

Consent Form

I agree to participate in the research study on moral reasoning patterns. The study is being conducted by Sheree Bradford, an M. A. student in psychology at Wilfrid Laurier University, under the supervision of Dr. Michael Pratt, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University. I understand that all results are confidential, and that I may withdraw from the study at any time.

Please sign your name below if you agree to participate in this study.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please print your name and address in the spaces provided below.

Name and Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

We would appreciate it if you would answer the following questions. Please remember that all answers are confidential.

What sex are you? Male Female

What is your age? \_\_\_\_\_

What is the last education level you obtained? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

RECALL TASK

Instructions: Please answer all of the questions below.

1. Please describe a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do.

2) How was the situation resolved?

3) Were you satisfied with how you handled the situation? Why or why not?



ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Jim Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, gradually saved enough money to buy his own business, and married a local girl. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mike Jones, an old neighbour, recognized Thompson as the man who escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mike Jones report Jim Thompson?

Why or why not?

From which perspective did you mostly consider this dilemma when you were making your decision? (Choose one only).

a) From the position of an observer viewing the overall situation? \_\_\_\_\_.

b) One particular character? \_\_\_\_\_ . Which one? \_\_\_\_\_ .

c) More than one character? \_\_\_\_\_ . Which ones? \_\_\_\_\_ .

d) Other? \_\_\_\_\_ . Explain \_\_\_\_\_ .

INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "Escaped Prisoner". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
 Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

#### RATING SCALES FOR JIM THOMPSON

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "Escaped Prisoner". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
 Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

#### RATING SCALES FOR MIKE JONES

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

**ESCAPED PRISONER**

Please indicate how important each of the considerations listed below would be in helping you to decide about this dilemma.

Considerations in Deciding:

Importance:

Great Much Some Little None

1) Does Mike Jones have to report Jim Thompson because the precedents for the law involved in this case are important ones for the maintenance of an appropriate legal system?					
2) How will the rights of all parties in this case be most fairly preserved?					
3) Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, does that encourage more injury and harm of others?					
4) Would Mike Jones feel badly if Jim Thompson isn't reported and then commits another crime in this city?					
5) Since the aim of punishment is rehabilitation and Jim Thompson is already rehabilitated, would punishment serve any useful purpose in Jim Thompson's case?					
6) Does Mike Jones have to do what the law says no matter what?					
7) Has Jim Thompson repaid his debt to society fully by his good behavior?					
8) Would God expect us to report Jim Thompson in such a case?					
9) Could Mike Jones get in trouble with the police later on if he doesn't report Jim Thompson?					
10) If Jim Thompson is locked up again after all his efforts, will he feel justifiable anger at the system?					
11) What course of action will lead to the best long-term consequences in Thompson's and Jones' lives?					
12) Is Mike Jones a good friend of Jim Thompson?					

THE DOCTOR

A woman, Ruth, was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

Should Dr. Jefferson give Ruth an overdose of pain-killer?

Why or why not?



From which perspective did you mostly consider this dilemma when you were making your decision? (Choose one only).

a) From the position of an observer viewing the overall situation?\_\_\_\_\_

b) One particular character?\_\_\_\_\_. Which one?\_\_\_\_\_

c) More than ~~one~~ character?\_\_\_\_\_. Which ones?\_\_\_\_\_

d) Other?\_\_\_\_\_. Explain\_\_\_\_\_

INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "The Doctor". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

RATING SCALES FOR RUTH

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "The Doctor". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
Extremely. Quite. Slightly. Neither. Slightly. Quite. Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

RATING SCALES FOR DR. JEFFERSON

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

THE DOCTOR

Some people who read this story think there is not enough information for them to make a decision. Which of the following questions would you like to have answered about this problem? Please put a checkmark in one of the spaces provided after each question.

	YES I NEED TO KNOW THIS	NO THIS WOULD NOT BE OF ANY HELP TO ME
1. Will it encourage people to value human life less highly if Doctor Jefferson gives the drug to Ruth?	_____	_____
2. What effect would giving the drug to Ruth have on Dr. Jefferson's own life?	_____	_____
3. Is Ruth pressuring Dr. Jefferson to act against his own conscience?	_____	_____
4. How will Ruth's family feel if her life is ended this way?	_____	_____
5. What kind of person is Dr. Jefferson?	_____	_____
6. What, precisely, are the general obligations to protect human life that doctors have to agree to in their medical oath?	_____	_____
7. What are the laws in this country concerning mercy-killing?	_____	_____
8. Can Dr. Jefferson obtain legal right through the courts to administer the drug?	_____	_____
9. In the long run, does breaking the law for good reasons usually result in better laws?	_____	_____
10. What has the relationship between Ruth and her husband been like?	_____	_____

Please rank the three questions that you would most like to have answered in the spaces provided below.

\_\_\_\_ Most Important      \_\_\_\_ 2nd Most Important      \_\_\_\_ 3rd Most Important

## THE BLOOD TYPE

A young woman named Anne had a very rare type of blood. One day right after Anne had begun college and a new job, a doctor called Anne up to ask her to give a large amount of blood to someone named Jack Wilson who was very ill and needed more blood of the same kind as her own to get well. Because Anne was the only person in the town with the sick man's type of blood, and since this was an unusual serious illness, the blood would have to be given a number of times over a period of several weeks. So, if Anne agreed to give her blood, she would have to go into the hospital for several weeks. This hospitalization would make Anne feel weak for awhile, she would lose her new job, and she would be very far behind in school.

Should Anne give Jack Wilson her blood?

Why or why not?

From which perspective did you mostly consider this dilemma when you were making your decision? (Choose one only).

a) From the position of an observer viewing the overall situation?\_\_\_\_\_

b) One particular character?\_\_\_\_\_. Which one?\_\_\_\_\_

c) More than one character?\_\_\_\_\_. Which ones?\_\_\_\_\_

d) Other?\_\_\_\_\_. Explain\_\_\_\_\_

INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "Blood Type". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

#### RATING SCALES FOR ANNE

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with



INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "Blood Type". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
 Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

RATING SCALES FOR JACK WILSON

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

BLOOD TYPE

Please indicate how important each of the considerations listed below would be in helping you to decide about this dilemma.

Considerations in Deciding:

Importance:

Great Much Some Little None

1) Is it fair for the doctor to ask Anne to make this sacrifice for someone she doesn't know?					
2) Should the courts decide the right course of action in cases like this?					
3) Should Anne give blood, since it is possible that someday she might also need a blood donor?					
4) Will giving blood now contribute more to Anne's growth as a caring human being in the long run?					
5) What does God tell us to do in cases such as this?					
6) What course of action will be most beneficial for both Jack Wilson and Anne?					
7) How will Jack Wilson handle it if he finds out that a donor was found and she decided not to help?					
8) Will Jack Wilson be able to use this experience of receiving blood to become a giving person himself?					
9) Would Anne feel better about herself if she gave her blood to Jack Wilson, even though she has to miss some college credits?					
10) Does Anne have a close relationship with her family?					
11) Could Anne get in trouble for not giving blood?					
12) If Anne does give her blood, will that encourage others to contribute their blood to people who need it?					

THE ROBBERY

Mr. Brown was walking home from his office alone at night when he saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. The woman, Cathy Smith, was holding on to the purse and crying for help while she and the man struggled. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. Mr. Brown was far enough away that he could himself escape without the robber noticing him.

Should Mr. Brown help Cathy Smith?

Why or why not?

From which perspective did you mostly consider this dilemma when you were making your decision? (Choose one only).

a) From the position of an observer viewing the overall situation? \_\_\_\_\_

b) One particular character? \_\_\_\_\_ . Which one? \_\_\_\_\_ .

c) More than one character? \_\_\_\_\_ . Which ones? \_\_\_\_\_ .

d) Other? \_\_\_\_\_ . Explain \_\_\_\_\_ .

**INSTRUCTIONS:** In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "The Robbery". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
 Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

#### RATING SCALES FOR CATHY SMITH

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

INSTRUCTIONS: In this section you will be asked to give your impression of each character in "The Robbery". Please indicate on each scale how you felt towards each character. The character's name you are to rate will be printed at the top of each scale. Each rating scale has seven places, and you are asked to place a checkmark in the place that in your opinion best describes the character. The seven places on each scale should be interpreted as follows:

A : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : B  
Extremely, Quite, Slightly, Neither, Slightly, Quite, Extremely

It is important that you mark every scale for each character, and that you do not give a character more than one rating mark on each scale.

RATING SCALES FOR MR. BROWN

Hard to relate to : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to relate to

Unpleasant : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Pleasant

Uncommitted : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Committed

Hard : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Soft

Incompetent : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Competent

Cold : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Warm

Unfriendly : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Friendly

Hard to get along with : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Easy to get along with

THE ROBBERY

Some people who read this story think there is not enough information for them to make a decision. Which of the following questions would you like to have answered about this problem? Please put a checkmark in one of the spaces provided after each question.

	YES I NEED TO KNOW THIS	NO THIS WOULD NOT BE OF ANY HELP TO ME
1. What kind of relationship does Cathy Smith have with her boyfriend?	_____	_____
2. Will it encourage people in any way to value others less highly if Mr. Brown fails to assist Cathy Smith here?	_____	_____
3. Supposing Mr. Brown is frail and ill, does he have the right not to get involved in these circumstances?	_____	_____
4. What will happen to Cathy Smith if Mr. Brown doesn't help her?	_____	_____
5. Would Mr. Brown be violating any of the laws in this community in any way if he fails to help Cathy Smith?	_____	_____
6. Will Mr. Brown feel all right about himself later if he fails to help Cathy Smith now?	_____	_____
7. In the long run, does helping someone like this serve to reduce the overall crime rate in the community?	_____	_____
8. What kind of a person is Mr. Brown?	_____	_____
9. Supposing an observer like Mr. Brown has a weapon of some sort, does he have a legal right to use it in these circumstances?	_____	_____
10. Can Mr. Brown identify Cathy Smith as a neighbour or someone he knows?	_____	_____

Please rank the three questions that you would most like to have answered in the spaces provided below.

\_\_\_\_ Most Important    \_\_\_\_ 2nd Most Important    \_\_\_\_ 3rd Most Important



## INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions, using the rating scale indicated at the end of each question. The rating scale ranges from 1 (Strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Please circle the number which best reflects how the statement applies to you.

1. It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group. 1 2 3 4
2. People make too much of the feelings and sensitivity of animals. 1 2 3 4
3. I often find public displays of affection annoying. 1 2 3 4
4. I am annoyed by unhappy people who are just feeling sorry for themselves. 1 2 3 4
5. I become nervous if others around me seem to be nervous. 1 2 3 4
6. I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness. 1 2 3 4
7. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problems. 1 2 3 4
8. Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply. 1 2 3 4
9. I tend to lose control when I am bringing bad news to people. 1 2 3 4
10. The people around me have a great influence on my moods. 1 2 3 4
11. Most foreigners I have met seemed cool and unemotional. 1 2 3 4
12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a job training center. 1 2 3 4
13. I don't get upset just because a friend is acting upset. 1 2 3 4
14. I like to watch people open presents. 1 2 3 4
15. Lonely people are probably unfriendly. 1 2 3 4
16. Seeing people cry upsets me. 1 2 3 4
17. Some songs make me happy. 1 2 3 4
18. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 1 2 3 4

19. I get very angry when I see someone being ill-treated. 1 2 3 4
20. I am able to remain calm even though those around me worry. 1 2 3 4
21. When a friend starts to talk about his problems, I try to steer the conversation to something else. 1 2 3 4
22. Another's laughter is not catching for me. 1 2 3 4
23. Sometimes at the movies I am amused by the amount of crying and sniffing around me. 1 2 3 4
24. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people's feelings. 1 2 3 4
25. I cannot continue to feel okay if people around me are depressed. 1 2 3 4
26. It is hard for me to see how some things upset people so much. 1 2 3 4
27. I am very upset when I see an animal in pain. 1 2 3 4
28. Becoming involved in books or movies is a little silly. 1 2 3 4
29. It upsets me to see helpless old people. 1 2 3 4
30. I become more irritated than sympathetic when I see someone's tears. 1 2 3 4
31. I become very involved when I watch a movie. 1 2 3 4
32. I often find that I can remain cool in spite of the excitement around me. 1 2 3 4
33. Little children sometimes cry for no apparent reason. 1 2 3 4
34. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me. 1 2 3 4
35. After acting in a play myself, or seeing a play or movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character. 1 2 3 4
36. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character. 1 2 3 4

APPENDIX B Hypothetical Dilemmas For Each Condition

SUBJECTIVE VERSIONS

## ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison. The cold prison walls receded in the distance as he ran without stop toward freedom. Finally, after several nights of furtive journeying he came to a town. The man rested. He decided to stay in the town, and took on the name of Jim Thompson. Jim married a local girl. For 8 years he worked hard, saved enough money to buy his own dry-cleaning business, and gave most of his profits to charity. Then one day a neighbour of his, Mike Jones, who lived in a blue-painted frame house with a white picket fence around it recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for. Mike's face was strained as he looked first at Jim raking his leaves next door, then at the peaceful town, and the children playing in his own backyard.

## THE DOCTOR

A woman by the name of Ruth was dying of cancer which could not be cured, and she had about six calendar months to live. There was a chestnut tree outside her window, which had many small chestnuts on it. Ruth was in such pain that it made her almost crazy at times. During her calm periods she would ask her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, for an overdose of pain-killer so she would die. She complained to Dr. Jefferson that the pain was terrible, and she would die soon anyway. Dr. Jefferson was aware that he could be prosecuted if he did what his patient wanted. Dr. Jefferson had many patients. On this day the doctor sat in his large brown office chair. The chair rocked slowly back and forth. Dr. Jefferson had to decide whether or not to give Ruth an overdose of pain-killer. He thought of the problem of Ruth, and sighed deeply, turning over the options in his mind. He did not notice when the light from his office window began to dim, as the day turned into night.

## THE BLOOD TYPE

A young woman named Anne had a very rare type of blood. She lived in an apartment building on the north side of town. The building she lived in was brick, and pigeons loved to nest on the roof and deep window ledges. One day right after Anne had begun college and a new job, her doctor called Anne up to ask her to give a large amount of blood to a man by the name of Jack Wilson who was very ill and needed more blood of the same kind as her own to get well. Anne was the only person in town with Jack Wilson's blood type. Since this was an unusual type of illness, the blood would have to be given a number of times over a period of several weeks. Jack lay in his hospital bed, unable to get up. It was getting so that he was so weak from his blood condition that even sitting up in bed was an effort. Jack restlessly watched the nurses and doctors hurrying past his open doorway. He wondered what it would be like to be full of that kind of energy again. Anne had to make a decision. If she agreed to give her blood, she would have to go into the hospital for several weeks, she would feel weak for awhile, lose her new job, and be very far behind in school. Anne had had to struggle to get into college, and had just managed to be admitted, even though she often worked very hard and late into the night. She might be able to postpone college, but there would be no guarantee she would ever be able to get back in, or that she would be able to do the work after being out for a length of time.

## THE ROBBERY

Mr. Brown was walking home from his office alone at night. The office was located in a large modern building, and Mr. Brown was happy to be out in the fresh air. It was late. A couple of blocks ahead of Mr. Brown a woman, Cathy Smith, was hurrying down the street. She was on her way to a play, hurrying to meet her boyfriend in front of the theatre. If only she had been able to get to the bank before she got off work that day she would have been able to take out enough money for bus fare. As it was all she had was her uncashed pay cheque. She clutched her mauve coat more tightly over her slim figure, thinking that it was about time for a new one. Mr. Brown shifted his briefcase to his other hand, and wearily loosened his tie. Suddenly Mr. Brown saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. Cathy Smith held onto the purse and was crying for help while she and the robber struggled. The robber was muscular. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. Mr. Brown was far enough away to escape without being noticed by the robber.

NEUTRAL VERSIONS

ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Jim Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, gradually saved enough money to buy his own business, and married a local girl. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mike Jones, an old neighbour, recognized Thompson as the man who escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.



THE DOCTOR

A woman, Ruth, was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

## THE BLOOD TYPE

A young woman named Anne had a very rare type of blood. One day right after Anne had begun college and a new job, a doctor called Anne up to ask her to give a large amount of blood to someone named Jack Wilson who was very ill and needed more blood of the same kind as her own to get well. Because Anne was the only person in the town with the sick man's type of blood, and since this was an unusual serious illness, the blood would have to be given a number of times over a period of several weeks. So, if Anne agreed to give her blood, she would have to go into the hospital for several weeks. This hospitalization would make Anne feel weak for awhile, she would lose her new job, and she would be very far behind in school.

THE ROBBERY

Mr. Brown was walking home from his office alone at night when he saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. The woman, Cathy Smith, was holding on to the purse and crying for help while she and the man struggled. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. Mr. Brown was far enough away that he could himself escape without the robber noticing him.

OBJECTIVE VERSIONS

## ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison. In general, the escape rate for prisoners is low, the probability of a successful escape being about .06. The man moved to a new area of the country, a rather remote area. The town which the man inhabited was mid-sized, with around 20,000 inhabitants. It had several streets, and the downtown had been recently renovated. Several fast-food chains were in evidence, and a few department stores. There was a self-serve gasoline station on the corner. The man took on the assumed name of Jim Thompson. For 8 years he worked, saved enough money to buy his own business, and married a local girl. Then one day a neighbour of his, Mike Jones, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

## THE DOCTOR

A woman, Ruth, was dying of cancer which could not be cured, and she had about six months to live. Several forms of cancer exist, and it attacks all kinds of people, in all walks of life. It is estimated that 10,000 people in this country alone will contract some form of cancer this year. The woman was in such pain that it made her almost crazy at times. During her calm periods the woman would ask her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, for an overdose of pain-killer so she would die. She complained to the doctor that the pain was terrible, and she would die soon anyway. The doctor was aware that he could be prosecuted if he did what his patient wanted. The Hippocratic oath has been in effect since 2000 B.C., and is still highly respected among all the doctors practicing in the area of general medicine. Dr. Jefferson had to decide whether or not to give Ruth an overdose of pain-killer.

## THE BLOOD TYPE

A young woman named Anne had a very rare type of blood. Having rare blood can be interesting as a conversation piece, but it is also the case that it can be a potentially dangerous thing to have. The RH Factor is one such blood disorder, which affects one in 20 people in this country. One day right after Anne had begun college and a new job, her doctor called her up to ask her to give a large amount of blood to someone named Jack Wilson who was very ill and needed more blood of the same kind as her own to get well. The chance of Anne having the same blood type as the sick man was about .03 percent. Anne was the only person in town with the sick man's blood type. Since this was an unusual type of illness, the blood would have to be given a number of times over a period of several weeks. So, if she agreed to give her blood, she would have to go into the hospital for several weeks, she would feel weak for awhile, lose her new job, and be very far behind in school.

## THE ROBBERY

A man, Mr. Brown, was walking home from his office alone at night. Walking is good exercise, and everyone should get into the habit of walking as much as possible. It is estimated that brisk walking will extend life expectancies about 2.4 years. Mr. Brown was walking along the street when he saw an apparently unarmed man attempting to take a woman's purse. The woman, Cathy Smith, was holding onto the purse and crying for help while she and the robber struggled. Crime rates in this city were quite high. About 6.2 persons per 1,000 could expect to be victims in the course of a single year. Few, if any, other people were in the area of the robbery. There were a few empty stores in the area. Mr. Brown was far enough away to escape without being noticed by the robber.

APPENDIX C Judgment Questionnaires And Scoring Key



ESCAPED PRISONER

Please indicate how important each of the considerations listed below would be in helping you to decide about this dilemma.

Considerations in Deciding:

Importance:

Great Much Some Little None

	Great	Much	Some	Little	None
1) Does Mike Jones have to report Jim Thompson because the precedents for the law involved in this case are important ones for the maintenance of an appropriate legal system?					
2) How will the rights of all parties in this case be most fairly preserved?					
3) Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, does that encourage more injury and harm of others?					
4) Would Mike Jones feel badly if Jim Thompson isn't reported and then commits another crime in this city?					
5) Since the aim of punishment is rehabilitation and Jim Thompson is already rehabilitated, would punishment serve any useful purpose in Jim Thompson's case?					
6) Does Mike Jones have to do what the law says no matter what?					
7) Has Jim Thompson repaid his debt to society fully by his good behavior?					
8) Would God expect us to report Jim Thompson in such a case?					
9) Could Mike Jones get in trouble with the police later on if he doesn't report Jim Thompson?					
10) If Jim Thompson is locked up again after all his efforts, will he feel justifiable anger at the system?					
11) What course of action will lead to the best long-term consequences in Thompson's and Jones' lives?					
12) Is Mike Jones a good friend of Jim Thompson?					

THE DOCTOR

Please indicate how important each of the considerations listed below would be in helping you to decide about this dilemma.

Considerations in Deciding:

Importance:

Great Much Some Little None

	Great	Much	Some	Little	None
1) Will Dr. Jefferson feel too much guilt if he breaks his medical oath to administer the drug?					
2) Can Dr. Jefferson stand to watch Ruth's lingering death if he doesn't give her the overdose?					
3) What are the rights of a dying patient in a situation like this?					
4) Can Ruth really expect Dr. Jefferson to give her the overdose, when both of them know it is morally wrong?					
5) Will some other patients ultimately benefit if this precedent isn't set and the overdose is not given to Ruth?					
6) Is Dr. Jefferson required to adhere strictly to the law, regardless of what patients ask?					
7) What course of action will bring the most happiness and sense of peace to both Ruth and Dr. Jefferson?					
8) What do Ruth's friends think of the way the situation is being handled by Dr. Jefferson?					
9) Is it fair for the courts to prosecute Dr. Jefferson for murder if he gives the overdose?					
10) What will contribute most to Dr. Jefferson's development as a caring human being?					
11) Will Ruth achieve the most dignity and sense of integrity by dying as she wishes?					
12) How long has Ruth been a patient of Dr. Jefferson's?					

BLOOD TYPE

Please indicate how important each of the considerations listed below would be in helping you to decide about this dilemma.

Considerations in Deciding:

Importance:

Great Much Some Little None

1) Is it fair for the doctor to ask Anne to make this sacrifice for someone she doesn't know?					
2) Should the courts decide the right course of action in cases like this?					
3) Should Anne give blood, since it is possible that someday she might also need a blood donor?					
4) Will giving blood now contribute more to Anne's growth as a caring human being in the long run?					
5) What does God tell us to do in cases such as this?					
6) What course of action will be most beneficial for both Jack Wilson and Anne?					
7) How will Jack Wilson handle it if he finds out that a donor was found and she decided not to help?					
8) Will Jack Wilson be able to use this experience of receiving blood to become a giving person himself?					
9) Would Anne feel better about herself if she gave her blood to Jack Wilson, even though she has to miss some college credits?					
10) Does Anne have a close relationship with her family?					
11) Could Anne get in trouble for not giving blood?					
12) If Anne does give her blood, will that encourage others to contribute their blood to people who need it?					

THE ROBBERY

Please indicate how important each of the considerations listed below would be in helping you to decide about this dilemma.

Considerations in Deciding:

Importance:

Great Much Some Little None

1) Is it really fair to expect Mr. Brown to help when he doesn't even know Cathy Smith?					
2) Will Mr. Brown grow as a person if he gets involved in helping Cathy Smith?					
3) Is Mr. Brown strong enough to actually subdue this robber, or is he so frail that he might be seriously injured?					
4) Does someone not getting involved in a crime like this contribute to a lessened sense of community in the future?					
5) Should private citizens take the law into their own hands in what is clearly a police matter?					
6) Should Mr. Brown consider that he would want someone to help him if he were to be victimized?					
7) Are Cathy Smith and Mr. Brown about the same age?					
8) Can Mr. Brown ignore the teachings of the Bible to love thy neighbour?					
9) Do people who help resist crimes in this way feel better about themselves later?					
10) What action by Mr. Brown now will be best in the long run for both Cathy Smith and himself?					
11) What kind of past life has the robber had?					
12) How would Cathy Smith feel if she realized that Mr. Brown did not make an attempt to help?					

SCORING KEY FOR EACH DILEMMA

## ESCAPED PRISONER

- 1) Perfectionism
- 2) Fairness
- 3) Utilitarian
- 4) Feelings
- 5) Perfectionism
- 6) Normative
- 7) Fairness
- 8) Normative
- 9) Filler
- 10) Feelings
- 11) Utilitarian
- 12) Filler

## BLOOD TYPE

- 1) Fairness
- 2) Normative
- 3) Fairness
- 4) Perfectionism
- 5) Normative
- 6) Utilitarian
- 7) Feelings
- 8) Perfectionism
- 9) Feelings
- 10) Filler
- 11) Filler
- 12) Utilitarian

## THE DOCTOR

- 1) Feelings
- 2) Feelings
- 3) Fairness
- 4) Normative
- 5) Utilitarian
- 6) Normative
- 7) Utilitarian
- 8) Filler
- 9) Fairness
- 10) Perfectionism
- 11) Perfectionism
- 12) Filler

## THE ROBBERY

- 1) Fairness
- 2) Perfectionism
- 3) Utilitarian
- 4) Perfectionism
- 5) Normative
- 6) Fairness
- 7) Filler
- 8) Normative
- 9) Feelings
- 10) Utilitarian
- 11) Filler
- 12) Feelings

APPENDIX D Information-Seeking Questionnaires And Scoring Key

## ESCAPED PRISONER

Some people who read this story think there is not enough information for them to make a decision. Which of the following questions would you like to have answered about this problem? Please put a checkmark in one of the spaces provided after each question.

	YES I NEED TO KNOW THIS	NO THIS WOULD NOT BE OF ANY HELP TO ME
1. Has Jim Thompson as a neighbour ever been dishonest to Mike Jones in the past?	_____	_____
2. Have there been legal precedents in this country for not turning in escapees in such circumstances?	_____	_____
3. What sort of relationship has Jim Thompson had with his wife?	_____	_____
4. In the long run, does breaking a law for good reasons usually result in better laws?	_____	_____
5. What exactly is going to happen to Jim Thompson if he is turned in?	_____	_____
6. What are a citizen's obligations regarding knowledge of escapees in this country?	_____	_____
7. How will Mike Jones feel about things if Jim Thompson is in fact returned to prison?	_____	_____
8. Is Jim Thompson endangering the rights of other persons in his neighbourhood in any way?	_____	_____
9. Does the act of turning in an escaped prisoner have any effect on the crime rate?	_____	_____
10. What kind of person was Jim Thompson before his escape from prison?	_____	_____

Please rank the three questions that you would most like to have answered in the spaces provided below.

\_\_\_\_\_ Most Important      \_\_\_\_\_ 2nd Most Important      \_\_\_\_\_ 3rd Most Important

## THE DOCTOR

Some people who read this story think there is not enough information for them to make a decision. Which of the following questions would you like to have answered about this problem? Please put a checkmark in one of the spaces provided after each question.

	YES I NEED TO KNOW THIS	NO THIS WOULD NOT BE OF ANY HELP TO ME
1. Will it encourage people to value human life less highly if Doctor Jefferson gives the drug to Ruth?	_____	_____
2. What effect would giving the drug to Ruth have on Dr. Jefferson's own life?	_____	_____
3. Is Ruth pressuring Dr. Jefferson to act against his own conscience?	_____	_____
4. How will Ruth's family feel if her life is ended this way?	_____	_____
5. What kind of person is Dr. Jefferson?	_____	_____
6. What, precisely, are the general obligations to protect human life that doctors have to agree to in their medical oath?	_____	_____
7. What are the laws in this country concerning mercy-killing?	_____	_____
8. Can Dr. Jefferson obtain legal right through the courts to administer the drug?	_____	_____
9. In the long run, does breaking the law for good reasons usually result in better laws?	_____	_____
10. What has the relationship between Ruth and her husband been like?	_____	_____

Please rank the three questions that you would most like to have answered in the spaces provided below.

\_\_\_\_ Most Important    \_\_\_\_ 2nd Most Important    \_\_\_\_ 3rd Most Important



## BLOOD TYPE

Some people who read this story think there is not enough information for them to make a decision. Which of the following questions would you like to have answered about this problem? Please put a checkmark in one of the spaces provided after each question.

	YES I NEED TO KNOW THIS	NO THIS WOULD NOT BE OF ANY HELP TO ME
1. What is expected in this society in terms of personal sacrifice to save others' lives?	_____	_____
2. Is the doctor pressuring Anne to act against her own sense of what is appropriate?	_____	_____
3. How will Anne feel about it later on if she chooses not to give the blood now?	_____	_____
4. What are the rules in this country concerning doctors contacting potential donors to solicit?	_____	_____
5. Will it encourage other members of the community to be more helpful themselves if Anne gives blood here?	_____	_____
6. In the long run will human life be valued more highly as a whole because of a helping act of this sort?	_____	_____
7. Can the doctor obtain a specific judgment in the courts to force Anne to give the blood anyway?	_____	_____
8. What has the relationship between Anne and her doctor been like?	_____	_____
9. What would happen to Jack Wilson if Anne chose not to give her blood?	_____	_____
10. What kind of a person is Jack Wilson?	_____	_____

Please rank the three questions that you would most like to have answered in the spaces provided below.

\_\_\_\_\_ Most Important      \_\_\_\_\_ 2nd Most Important      \_\_\_\_\_ 3rd Most Important

THE ROBBERY

Some people who read this story think there is not enough information for them to make a decision. Which of the following questions would you like to have answered about this problem? Please put a checkmark in one of the spaces provided after each question.

	YES I NEED TO KNOW THIS	NO THIS WOULD NOT BE OF ANY HELP TO ME
1. What kind of relationship does Cathy Smith have with her boyfriend?	_____	_____
2. Will it encourage people in any way to value others less highly if Mr. Brown fails to assist Cathy Smith here?	_____	_____
3. Supposing Mr. Brown is frail and ill, does he have the right not to get involved in these circumstances?	_____	_____
4. What will happen to Cathy Smith if Mr. Brown doesn't help her?	_____	_____
5. Would Mr. Brown be violating any of the laws in this community in any way if he fails to help Cathy Smith?	_____	_____
6. Will Mr. Brown feel all right about himself later if he fails to help Cathy Smith now?	✓ _____	_____
7. In the long run, does helping someone like this serve to reduce the overall crime rate in the community?	_____	_____
8. What kind of a person is Mr. Brown?	_____	_____
9. Supposing an observer like Mr. Brown has a weapon of some sort, does he have a right to use it in these circumstances?	_____	_____
10. Can Mr. Brown identify Cathy Smith as a neighbour or someone he knows?	_____	_____

Please rank the three questions that you would most like to have answered in the spaces provided below.

\_\_\_\_ Most Important      \_\_\_\_ 2nd Most Important      \_\_\_\_ 3rd Most Important

SCORING KEY FOR EACH DILEMMA

## ESCAPED PRISONER

- 1) Particular Rights
- 2) General Rights
- 3) Context
- 4) General Consequences
- 5) Particular Consequences
- 6) General Rights
- 7) Particular Consequences
- 8) Particular Rights
- 9) General Consequences
- 10) Context

## BLOOD TYPE

- 1) General Rights
- 2) Particular Rights
- 3) Particular Consequences
- 4) General Rights
- 5) General Consequences
- 6) General Consequences
- 7) Particular Rights
- 8) Context
- 9) Particular Consequences
- 10) Context

## THE DOCTOR

- 1) General Consequences
- 2) Particular Consequences
- 3) Particular Rights
- 4) Particular Consequences
- 5) Context
- 6) General Rights
- 7) General Rights
- 8) Particular Rights
- 9) General Consequences
- 10) Context

## THE ROBBERY

- 1) Context
- 2) General Consequences
- 3) Particular Rights
- 4) Particular Consequences
- 5) General Rights
- 6) Particular Consequences
- 7) General Consequences
- 8) Context
- 9) General Rights
- 10) Particular Rights