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FOUR DECADES OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES TO
NATIVE INDIANS IN ONTARIO: A Contemporary
Attempt to Understand the "Sixties Scoop"
in Historical, Socioeconomic and
Political Perspective

BY

Joyce Barbara Timpson
BSc (University of Toronto, 1966)
MSW (University of Windsor, 1970)
MPA (Queen's University, 1990)

THESIS

Submitted to the Faculty of Social Work
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Doctor of Social Work degree
Wilfrid Laurier University
1993

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALB	Alberta
Acc	Accession
AO	Archives of Ontario
AFN	Assembly of First Nations
BC	British Columbia
BNA	British North America
CAS	Childrens Aid Society
CAP	Canada Assistance Plan
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCSD	Canadian Council on Social Development
CIC	Child-in-Care or Children-in-care
CWC	Canadian Welfare Council
DIAND	Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
DIA	Department of Indian Affairs
DPW	Department of Public Welfare
GP	General Population
IAB	Indian Affairs Branch
INAC	Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
IWA	Indian Welfare Agreement

KCAS	Kenora Childrens Aid Society
KRRDHC	Kenora Rainy River District Health Council
MAN	Manitoba
MCSS	Ministry of Community and Social Services
NAC	National Archives of Canada
NFLD	Newfoundland
NB	New Brunswick
nd	no date
np	no page
NS	Nova Scotia
NWT	North West Territories
OACAS	Ontario Association of Childrens Aid Societies
JOACAS	Journal of the Ontario Association of Childrens Aid Societies
OC	Other Children
ONT	Ontario
ONWA	Ontario Native Womens Association
PEI	Prince Edward Island
RG	Record Group
RRCAS	Rainy River Childrens Aid Society
RSI	Reserve Status Indian
QUE	Quebec
SASK	Saskatchewan

SI	Status Indian
TAP	Technical Assistance and Planning Associates
YUK	Yukon

ABSTRACT

This research seeks to understand the high rates of Indian children in the care of Ontario's Childrens Aid Societies from the 1950s to the 1970s. It examines historically the interaction of public policy, child welfare services and First Nations' social, economic and cultural change. The author uses interview data from Native persons, CAS workers and public servants. In addition, government archives and the records of one child protection agency are used as data sources.

The research examines in-care rates of Reserve Status Indian children from 1955 to 1976 in Ontario and admissions rates in one agency. It uses financial reports to complement and explain some trends. Admissions rates between 1964 and 1974 show variations between and within communities that are analyzed using oral histories, archival data and the literature. An association between sudden change and child-in-care rates is demonstrated.

The reasons for the high rates of Indian children in care are complex. Many of the Ontario Indian children in care in the 1960s and 1970s were children and grandchildren of two generations damaged by the effects of post World War II expansion. Aboriginal people in Northern Ontario experienced serious cultural trauma following relocation, loss of independent means of support, and new educational systems that were incompatible with their traditional beliefs and life styles. These stressors revealed themselves in a high

rate of alcohol abuse precipitating incidents involving the child protection agency. Traditional systems were either strained or inaccessible to the Childrens Aid Societies.


Child welfare workers, faced with new problems in the late 1950s and 1960s, recognized differences and made creative adaptations probably keeping the in-care rates lower than might have been expected. Gaps in jurisdiction and accountability in the larger system prolonged the situation of escalating rates because the out-of-control costs and their implications could not be easily detected.

Three interacting pandemic factors drove program development and hindered the development of more appropriate approaches despite a flexible federal-provincial agreement. They were: equality ideology; an ignorance about Aboriginal people; and lack of systemic disincentives for other approaches in Indian child welfare financial administration. Individual service providers and the public servants were pivotal in hindering or maximizing the agreement's potential. This hinged on their denial or recognition of inherent differences in the First Nations.


Jurisdiction and accountability disputes still prevail. First Nations' self-governing institutions face the dual task of healing the wounds of the past and building appropriate systems to deal with the future.

Mr. Wolf was walking through the bush and he ran into a rabbit. He saw the rabbit, singing his Indian song. As the rabbit sang his song his eyes popped out of his head and danced and swirled through the air, dancing to his Indian song. He stopped singing and his eyes popped back into his head. Wolf said, "O.K. Mr. Rabbit, you are wonderful. Please teach me your gift," and Wolf gave tobacco as his gift to the rabbit. Rabbit said, "Are you responsible?" Wolf said, "Yes, oh yes." "O.K." Rabbit said, "Here is how to sing and play the song on your drum. But... the only thing is you must do this gift three times." Wolf left the rabbit and sang once his eyes danced outside his head. He sang twice, the same thing happened. He sang three times and again success. Now Wolf came to Ottawa and wanted to show his gift and he said, "Just one more time, I do so want to show my gift to my friends." He did and when he stopped singing, his eyes did not pop back into his head. He said, "Oh, my, oh, my." He ran into Mr. Mouse and he said to the mouse, "Oh, dear, oh dear, I was not responsible and have lost my eyes." Mr. Mouse said, "I will give you one of my eyes." Mr. Wolf put in his new mouse eye and it rolled around the bottom of his eyelid. He could only see small detail and single individuals with his mouse eye. Mr. Wolf went on to meet a buffalo and he said, "Mr. Buffalo, I was given a mouse eye but I can only see individuals and I want to see more." Mr. Buffalo said, "I will give you one of my eyes." He put in his buffalo eye and it filled his whole eye. He could see all at once and see far, see the community and the family and the future. He then knew he was equipped to go the Ottawa Conference on Family Violence with his gift to see small detail with his mouse eye and the bigger picture with his buffalo eye....I will speak of one Indian Reserve and community who have used their mouse eyes to see the offender's and survivors' pain. Of how that grew to where they used their buffalo eyes to see how community education, Indian spiritual ceremony, breaking denial, treatment, working with their judge, Crown prosecutor, police, elders, peer counselling and therapists...., that community in their pain have used their mouse eyes and their buffalo eyes in looking at new problems in old ways.

(As told by Maggie Hodgson at the National Forum on Family Violence, Ottawa, 21 June 1989)



Map of Northwestern Ontario in Comparative Perspective to Province
Source: Lakehead Psychiatric Hospital



INTRODUCTION

Why would another Amtegoshi* write a doctoral thesis on an emotionally charged Native-white issue in these days of Native nationalism? I often ask myself this question. From 1976 to 1987 I practised social work in Ontario's remote northwest in the centre of the homeland of the Northern Ojibwa and Swampy Cree. The cultural, linguistic and geographical isolation from the rest of Canada coupled with poverty causes many visitors to describe the area as our Third World. One of my visitors called it "Canada's most closely guarded secret." The work in the North was intense and arduous. My need to reflect rigorously on the fervour of the decade probably motivated my selecting academia after leaving the North.

My first Northern job was with the Kenora Children's Aid Society (KCAS) in Sioux Lookout, Ontario's second most Northerly municipality, and hub of the remote Northwest. It was obvious from the beginning that child welfare services were of crucial concern. In some communities substance abuse, poverty and violence prevailed to an extent that I, already a seasoned social worker, did not know existed.

As child welfare workers, we were often confronted with the dilemma of taking a child from a familiar but dangerous environment to a safe but alien one that might inflict more trauma and emotional damage than the home conditions. In emergencies we often took children to our own homes

*Ojibway for white person

if there were no foster homes. Often pressure came from reserve community leaders to take children into care if no relative or friend would, or could, care for the children.

I recall one situation of possibly needing to drive four Indian children 150 miles to a foster home. It was a winter's night and a snow storm was gathering. I was having difficulty finding someone in the community to take the children because of fear of the children's father. Fortunately, I found an older woman in the community who agreed to care for them on a foster care basis. She was on welfare and there was no furniture in the house except for one large mattress on the floor, on which all four children would sleep. This was just one example where child welfare rules and regulations just did not apply to Northern realities. However, these children were able to maintain contact with their surroundings during the time required for the situation to rectify itself. There is no doubt in my mind it was defensibly in their best interest.

Despite our efforts to keep Indian children out of Children's Aid Society (CAS) care or even in foster homes in their own communities, about 80 percent of the 475 children in the care of Kenora CAS were of Native descent in 1977.¹ The population of the whole Kenora District was just under 60,000 persons and about one quarter were Indians on reserve.² The disproportion between Native and non-Native children in care does not necessarily imply that admitting Native children to care was unwarranted on a case by case basis. The Northern geography and climate offer a new meaning to the criteria for neglect. In the 1970s, many Northern reserve

homes were simple, old, wooden shacks. In the winter most homes were (and still are) heated with wood and temperatures can drop to 40 degrees below zero. A tin stove or oil drum was often used for woodburning. A child left alone, or not dressed properly is at greater risk of serious illness, injury or even death from fire or freezing than in an urban centre. The vast cultural disparities, and the lack of other services left many child welfare workers like myself feeling helpless to serve the best interests of some Indian children.

The implications, however, of the excessive application of the tertiary aspect of the system by one particular population should have suggested the need for examination of the issue. Further, the extensive use of tertiary child welfare services would suggest that if only for financial reasons the bureaucracy would encourage alternatives.

One incident sparked my suspicion that the child welfare bureaucracy could not respond to the North. On January 16, 1979, three year old Sean Mandamin, a Native foster child died from injuries inflicted by his non-Native foster father. On that very day in Toronto, public hearings were in progress into the death of Kim Ann Popen, who died of abuse while under the supervision of the Sarnia CAS. The Sarnia CAS had received scathing, national criticism.³ Several staff were dismissed and the Ministry of Community and Social Services (MCSS) had taken over the agency. Yet, two days after the Mandamin death, the Globe and Mail reported the death in one brief article.⁴ As a Branch Supervisor, my only immediate knowledge of the event came from a routine Supervisor's meeting where an account of the

events of the night of the death and the staff's immediate actions were relayed. There was no case debriefing or examination of the preceding circumstances. I heard nothing more about the circumstances surrounding the death until a year later when a Kenora newspaper reported the trial and evidence of sustained abuse of the child.

It seemed as if the murder of a Native child in a foster home did not warrant the attention of the agency, the government or the public at large. I wondered if the MCSS even knew about it. How could a child's death in Sarnia, seemingly the result of a mistake in judgement, result in such an outcry while a death in Kenora under the eye of the CAS be ignored? The racial implications could not be ignored. Society at large had no appreciation of the humane, moral and political implications of Native realities.

In contrast, today the public is quick to respond to the mistakes of the new Native child welfare agencies. A death of a foster child in a Native home in Manitoba resulted in a provincial court judge ordering all of the children in the home out of the care of the agency. The judge remarked,

The Aboriginal agency's workers do not have the professional qualifications and expertise to deal with the severely damaged children...These children have not received the level and quality of service they desperately need, nor have I any confidence whatever that they will receive that assistance in a timely fashion should the agency continue to have responsibility for their care.

At the time of Sean Mandamin's death, few of the Kenora CAS workers were professionally qualified. It was clear that he did not receive the level and quality of service he needed either.

In the subsequent years I worked with Indian health services. The muddled nature of the administration and bureaucracy of Indian services became obvious. My own organization was part of a confusing agreement between the federal government and the University of Toronto. It was funded by both the provincial and federal governments. In short, the provincial government in Toronto paid the federal government in Ottawa to contract with the University of Toronto to fund a program to be delivered in Sioux Lookout, 2000 km away! The contract seemed subject to little scrutiny. Despite budget regulations, it seemed that bureaucratic improprieties were overlooked as long as the service was delivered.

Were all Indian services under such complex, yet fragmented and unscrutinized structures? Were federal-provincial issues depicted in Indian services? Did the confused jurisdiction and fiscal issues affect the child welfare system for Native people becoming and remaining so out of hand? Was the irrationality of the structures fundamental to the inability of the bureaucracy to respond even to the murder of a Native foster child? How did it all fit with Native community and cultural realities?

Sixteen years of an enjoyable and satisfying association with the hospitable Northerners has been the impetus to answer these questions. I believe that insufficient attention has been given to how our policies and programs have interfaced both at the macro and micro level with the realities of social and cultural change among the Aboriginal people.

This study is an historical analytic account of Indian child welfare in Ontario. It addresses the questions and criticisms that have emerged since

the 1980s in Canada about the child welfare system and Indian people. It specifically focuses on the reasons so many Indian children were taken into the care of Ontario Children's Aid Societies in the 1960s and the 1970s. It focuses on how three factors shaped disproportionate rates of Native children in care: child welfare policy and programs, the socio-economic context of Native communities, and the response of the CASs.

The focus of study, 1951-1984, was a time of much change in Canadian public policy generally and one in which Native communities experienced rapid social, economic and cultural change. I devote particular attention to the period of significant child welfare policy and program change, the 1960s. During this period the number of Native children that came into the care of Ontario Children's Aid Societies escalated markedly while it declined for others.

Although I initially embarked on a study across Ontario, I soon learned that the most compelling areas for study were Northern regions where Indian children were in care in much higher proportions. I have used the case of the Rainy River District in Northwestern Ontario, its child welfare agency and its Native communities to typify the macrocosmic policy and cultural changes in one region. The Family and Children's Services of Rainy River District, formerly the Rainy River Children's Aid Society (RRCAS), was a source of excellent numerical and interview data for the study. I have also drawn heavily on data from its sister agency to the north, the Kenora Children's Aid Society. Both the Kenora and Rainy River agencies serve similar areas and populations but have experienced different

histories and difficulties. I also refer occasionally to other areas to illustrate points or contrasting patterns to supplement my arguments. The similarities and differences embody the themes raised in the research.

The reader is advised to consult initially the glossary of terms at the end of the dissertation, particularly the distinctions between the terms for Native people - Aboriginal, Native, Indian, Inuit, Status Indian, Reserve Status Indian, non-Status Indian, and Metis.

BACKGROUND

The 1980s were watershed years for Canada's Aboriginal people in the recognition of their rights.⁶ The 1990s are years in which these rights will probably be defined and brought to fruition.⁷

In the early 1980s in Canada, child welfare services became a major public issue on which many compelling arguments were made for Native control of Native services.⁸ Scathing criticisms of the application of Canadian child welfare systems to Native people accompanied data about significant disproportions between Native and non-Native children in the care of child welfare authorities. All across Canada, the numbers of Native children in the care of child welfare agencies had escalated dramatically from the 1960s. The phenomenon was branded the "sixties scoop."⁹ A Manitoba enquiry on the practice of placing Indian children in adoption homes in the USA added further fuel to the arguments about the "wholesale market of Indian children."¹⁰ Even today this phenomenon is described polemically. One Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) reporter recently referred to

child welfare officials of the 1960s and 1970s as "sweeping up children like a vacuum cleaner and spitting them out to white adoptive homes."¹¹ Journalist Geoffrey York described the Manitoba policies as a business arrangement with United States. He implied that the "supply" of adoptable American Native children had disappeared under their 1978 legislation limiting cross cultural adoptions of Indian children and Manitoba was meeting the "demand."¹² Another interpretation was that the child welfare system was a deliberate tool of assimilation of Native people much the same as the educational system had been in previous years.¹³

In other forums, polemic descriptions of child welfare practices were made. In 1983 the Alberta Council of Treaty Women asserted,

We do not condone the system that pirates away our children and even exports them to foreign landsWe are saying that this planned process of cultural genocide must cease.¹⁴

The same year, a British Columbia social worker was paraphrased in a report on Indian self-government as follows,

Provincial social workers would literally scoop children from reserves on the slightest pretext in order to 'save' them from what the social workers thought to be poor living conditions.¹⁵

There have been many individual accounts of Native children who fared poorly in adoptions, both in Native and non-Native homes. The most publicized case is Cameron Keely. This young Manitoba Native boy was placed for adoption in the United States with a single man who repeatedly sexually abused him. Keely is now in prison for killing the adoptive father.¹⁶ There are no longitudinal studies which have evaluated the outcomes of the adoptions of those years. The information about success or failure of

adoptions is largely anecdotal with much publicity given to the tragedies. The individual effects notwithstanding, the collective effect on the culture was traumatic.

Before the criticisms of the child welfare system were public, the academic literature of social work or other disciplines rarely addressed Native Child Welfare. In 1959 a Master of Social Work (MSW) student of Aboriginal descent produced a thesis examining 22 cases of Native permanent wards in the Toronto CAS. The study identified serious difficulties in the parents' abilities to provide the basic necessities to very young children.¹⁷ The published social work literature rarely addressed Native issues at all.¹⁸ The only social work literature on Native issues that did exist before the late 1970s was written by front line child welfare workers, foster parents and CAS Board members for the popular but unrefereed Journal of the Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies (JOACAS). This literature covered a wide range of issues from foster care and adoption of Native children to protection and prevention issues. Much of the literature expressed the dilemma of CASs caught between cultural differences and the need to provide protection. It reflected sensitivity to cultural differences.¹⁹ This literature was never referenced by the critics of CAS workers.

Older Native children, often in sibling groups, appeared regularly in the 1960s and 1970s in *Today's Child*, a daily newspaper column which described special needs children for the purpose of finding them adoptive parents. This might lead one to believe that government and social workers

were aware of the extent to which Native children were in care. In reality, it was unnoticed not just by government but, ironically, by the profession most closely associated with it.

The academic nescience of Indian social welfare issues is highlighted by several incorrect or weak statements in the literature. As recently as 1988 in a seminal work on provincialism and Indian policy, sociologists Anthony Long and Menno Boldt stated that when the federal government approached the provinces in 1965 to provide social services to Indians which the federal government would fund, not one province accepted.²⁰ In fact, Ontario did accept the offer²¹ and other provinces made partial agreements (See Appendix A). Other descriptions of the child welfare system portrayed an unrealistic role for social workers in explaining the high numbers of children in care. In a major publication in 1984, a legal scholar gave the following unreferenced reason for apprehensions of Native children:

A weak socio-economic situation in Indian, Metis and Inuit communities creates the appearance of material, if not also physical, deprivation on the part of their children. Social workers tend to conclude that these children are in unacceptable family situations requiring apprehension.²²

It is estimated that 35 to 75 percent of Indians of working age were unemployed in the 1970s.²³ If poverty alone were the immediate reason for child apprehensions, many more than the estimated 4 percent of the registered Native children in care from 1960-1977²⁴ would have been in care. Such assertions do not explain how apprehensions would be justified to the courts.

One 1971 study comparing reasons for apprehensions between Indian and non-Indian families in the Kapuskasing area refutes the claim that Indian children were apprehended for reasons of poverty.²⁵ Neglect (defined as lack of supervision, improper feeding, inadequate clothing or health standards) and desertion accounted for 55.5 percent and 44.4 percent, respectively, all Indian admissions. No white children were apprehended for neglect and only 17 percent were apprehended for desertion. At the same time 3.5 percent of whites were apprehended for "housing and finances" while no Indian children were apprehended for these reasons.²⁶ While failures to provide the necessities of life prevailed and a class bias could exist in the total system, could front line workers' perceptions of poverty *per se* realistically account for a decade or more of escalating numbers of Indian children taken into care and made Crown Wards?

In 1984, not long after the criticisms were at their pinnacle, Ontario passed legislation to protect the cultural rights of Indian children in the care of CASs and mandated the development of Indian child welfare authorities.²⁷ Now, less than a decade later, most of Ontario's First Nations communities are served by an Indian child welfare authority.²⁸ A problem which seemed to be unnoticed for so long by academics and the government saw major political change within a year. It seemed as if shocking renditions, with racist implications of policies and practices suddenly jarred an uninformed public into realizing the injustice.

There had been limited rigorous analysis of the problem before the policy change that year. Guilt-inducing political platforms using terminology

such as "cultural genocide"²⁹ and the "sixties' scoop"³⁰ seemed to stimulate the rapid change. In the furore of the early 1980s, the child welfare system came under attack. Child welfare agencies were criticized on many sides. One recurring prominent theme was the child welfare workers' failure to understand or respect Native culture.³¹ Workers were criticized for not using the extended families on reserves as foster parents, for removing children because of the imposition of non-Native standards of child rearing and care, and for placing the children in white adoptive homes where they would lose their culture. The social and economic conditions that had beset the Native people prompting two major enquiries since World War II³² were secondary considerations to the accusations towards the child welfare system. Before the 1980s, there was an abundance of literature by child welfare workers in the popular Journal of the Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies acknowledging the special conditions and the need for different approaches. In contrast, after 1980 there was little response in the literature by child welfare workers as to their views on the reasons for the high rates of Indian children in care. Considerable ambiguity surrounds the reasons why so many Native children came into care in the 1960s and 1970s.

The ignorance about Native culture and racism cannot be denied as prominent features of Canada's relationship to Native people. Applying these criticisms solely and directly to child welfare workers, however, is only one aspect of a larger problem. Accusing the child welfare system of cultural genocide requires no commitment to examine the damage to Native communities by other policies and programs. The allegations against child

welfare programs deflected from other toxic factors such as educational policies, welfare dependence and alcohol abuse. Rather than attributing racism and cultural misunderstanding to individuals in this research, I have elected to explore how factors operating from the corporate level of public policy to the front line of service organizations contributed to the high numbers of Indian children in care. To historically analyze Indian child welfare policy and its effects, an understanding of the interplay of antecedent cultural and historical forces is necessary. Like Mr. Wolf did in Maggie Hodgson's legend, the problem must also be viewed not just with the Mouse eye but with the Buffalo eye. This applies historically and contemporaneously.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

There is limited systematic documentation of the post World War II social conditions of and programs for Canadian Native people. The recent high profile of Native people has produced many journalistic accounts of their struggles. While this is useful for making political goals, it does not deepen our insight into how the policy went astray and what the appropriate solutions might be within Indian self-governing institutions. Unless the causes of social problems are understood, social service systems will not ameliorate them. Unless the inner workings of an unsatisfactory service system are understood, the same mistakes could reoccur regardless of who controls the system.

The mistakes can recur regardless of whether those in control represent a non-Native or Native government. This point is now receiving attention by Native and non-Native writers. A recent review of Ontario's first designated Indian and Native Child and Family Services revealed a lack of preparedness to take over the service in 1984. The agency has made more apprehensions than its predecessor, the non-Indian agency, often moving children far from home. At the same time, it was accused of leaving some children at risk.³³ It is imperative, however, that these agencies and their staff receive fair treatment by the public and not just a scathing review when things go wrong.

A recent evaluation of the Manitoba Indian Child Welfare agreements made in 1984 revealed that the existing arrangements which do not recognize Indian autonomy have produced "microcosms of the larger issues of self-government."³⁴ The study, and more recent reports of cover-ups of abuse, highlighted the implications for children at risk of mixing the political gains of Indian leaders with service needs. Other reports from Manitoba revealed that 50 cases of sexual abuse from one Indian community had been reported underscoring the magnitude of extensive child welfare problems facing these agencies,³⁵ possibly more than what was known by the non-Native agencies. Given the extent of the problems, it is urgent that workable administrative arrangements and service models be found.

There are many clinical and political issues to address. The concerns facing Native Children's Aid Societies are underscored by recent

acknowledgements of the serious problems which have beset Native families. Chief Phil Fontaine disclosed on national television his own sexual abuse as a child in a church-run boarding school. The Ontario Native Women's Association released a report citing that 80 percent of Native women have been abused by a male.³⁶ Another Native publication stated that virtually no Native person has been unaffected by sexual abuse.³⁷ A Crown Attorney in the Kenora area wrote that on one day in court on a Northern reserve, ten percent of the entire community was charged with an offence.³⁸ The suicide and violent death rate in reserve communities continue to be well above national averages,³⁹ and in some cases have reached mammoth proportions. One tiny community in Northern Manitoba reported 12 alcohol related deaths this year.⁴⁰ Pockets of Northern Ontario have reported clusters of suicides escalating the rate to almost 10 times the national average.⁴¹ The remote part of Northwestern Ontario north of Sioux Lookout reported almost 60 suicides of young persons in the last six years from its population of 14,000. Over half were under the age of 18. In the first one third of 1993, there have already been 13 suicides. Three were from one community over a period of a month.⁴² While the work of non-Indian child welfare workers in the past often took the form of tertiary interventions, Indian people have the greater challenge which is to address the issues which lead to the problems in the first place.

I initially planned to centre this study on my own governments' and culture's response to Native issues, believing that too many non-Native people had focused inappropriately on Native cultural issues and problems

in the past. On the suggestion of Dr. Marlene Brant-Castellano, I integrated the Native perspective as an essential part of the framework. I asked some elders their opinion about a non-Native person doing such a study. Maria Seymour of Sioux Lookout encouraged me to build on my knowledge of the North and not to waste it. Many others expressed their belief in the importance of the approach and shared hours of their time offering unsolicited information and assistance.

I do not expect to enlighten Native people about the effect of government on their lives. Instead, I hope to inform my non-Native colleagues about a serious situation with Native people about which we were silent during one of their most difficult periods. Like many social work researchers, I suffer from the tendency to dwell on measures of suffering. The compelling nature of Aboriginal problems in the last few decades often results in a false portrayal of every Aboriginal person as a walking social indicator ready to become a statistic! I do not mean to convey this. The Native community has suffered more than its share of social problems. Like in every other population however, most Native persons do not have addiction problems; many do not drink alcohol at all; most have never been in foster care; and most have never been treated for a serious mental health problem. In fact, I am awed that the statistics are not higher given the suffering the Aboriginal people have endured. I believe this attests to a strong core of values they have been able to maintain despite 500 years of colonization. I further do not wish intend to convey Native people as

helpless in the face of hegemony. They have disproved this on many occasions.

Although I have attempted to check and recheck my interpretations of some cultural and historical material, I am unable to truly convey the Indian experience with government policies. However, I agree with a Northern colleague who, like myself, felt compelled to commit his experiences and perceptions to paper. Like former Crown Attorney Rupert Ross, I would "risk being corrected than to perpetuate the undisturbed ignorance."⁴³

Endnotes to Chapter 1

1. Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Toronto: Lorimer, 1983), 44. Johnston quoted the 85 percent figure for 1981. Family and Children Services of the District of Kenora, Annual Report 1979 reported 475 children in care at year end. The "80" percent figure seemed to be the usual figure cited at Kenora CAS during my tenure. This figure did not distinguish between those with or without Treaty Status or those of mixed race.
2. Statistics Canada, Population : Occupied Private Dwellings, Cat. 93-918, Table 2-13. The total Status Indian population would be greater because the 1981 Census did not identify those living off reserve. Also many of the children of Native origin would not have Treaty Status.
3. "CAS Director didn't tell board of baby's death inquiry told," Globe and Mail, 16 January 1979, p.12; "Incredible incompetence cited in child abuse case," Globe and Mail, 17 January 1979, p.12; "Relying on CAS in Popen case was the major error probe told," Globe and Mail, 18 January 1979, p.13.
4. "OPP asked to probe death of young child," Globe and Mail, 18 January 1979, p.T2
5. WaWaTay News, "Judge orders kids out of Native child welfare agency," 5 November 1992, 6.
6. In 1982, the recognition of the "existing rights" was entrenched in the Constitution Act after much colourful lobbying by Native groups. See Douglas Sanders, "The Indian Lobby and the Canadian Constitution 1978-1982", in And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act, ed. Keith Banting and Richard Simeon (Toronto: Methuen), 301-332. In 1983, a major Parliamentary inquiry recommended Indian self-government and made proposals for its implementation. See Keith Penner, Indian Self-Government in Canada, Report of the Special Committee (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983).
7. Brian Dickson, Co-chair Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, speaking to the First Peoples and the Constitution conference, endorsed this principle on March 15, 1992 on CBC News World. Public sentiment appears to support this possibility. For example, Stephen Lewis on CBC Morningside March 17, 1992, concurred. The Beaudoin Dobie Commission explicitly supported the inherent right to Indian Self-government. See Report of the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, Chairpersons Gerald Beaudoin and Dorothy Dobie, Ottawa, February 1992. The Constitutional entrenchment of the inherent right to self-government was proposed in the failed Charlottetown Accord escalating the debate to new heights. The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) Chief Ovide Mercredi reports having received numerous letters from "No" voters reassuring him that they

supported this principle despite their vote, Globe and Mail, "Native set to plan own laws," 20 November 1992, A5.

8. Joyce B Timpson, "Indian and Native Special Status in Ontario's Child Welfare Legislation: an Overview of the Social, Legal and Political Context," Canadian Social Work Review (Winter 1990): 49-68.

9. Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Toronto: Lorimer, 1983).

10. Judge Edwin Kimelman, No Quiet Place: Final Report of the Review Committee on Indian and Metis Adoption and Placement (Winnipeg: Ministry of Community Services, 1985).

11. CBC Sunday Morning documentary, "Who's Minding the Children?" 5 July 1992.

12. Geoffrey York, "From Manitoba to Massachusetts," chapter in The Dispossessed: Life and Death in Native Canada (Toronto: Orpen Dennys Ltd.), 201-227.

13. Johnston, 23.

14. Quote of the Alberta Council of Treaty Women in Indian Self Government in Canada: Report of the Special Committee, ed. Keith Penner (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1983), 32.

15. This statement was made in the Penner Report page 31 paraphrasing the Johnston study, page 23, which reported comments to this effect made by a BC Social Worker.

16. York, 201-227; Pat Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations," Canadian Journal of Women and the Law Vol.3(1989):1-17.

17. Marlene Brant, Parental Neglect in Indian Families: A Descriptive Study of Twenty Two Case Records of Indian Families Whose Children Became Permanent Wards of the Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, MSW Thesis, University of Toronto, 1959.

18. Between 1970 and 1980, the Canadian social work journal, The Social Worker, carried only two articles about Native people. One warned in 1976 of the effect of Northern development on the aboriginal people and the other concerned the training of Inuit social service workers. See Gail Noble, "The Canadian North: Economic and Social Development," The Social Worker 44 (1976):12-14. and G. Andrewartha, "Training of Indigenous Non-Professionals: An Analysis of Eskimo Welfare Workers' Perception of Their Role," The Social Worker 44 (Fall, 1976): 2-6. Native child welfare was first addressed in 1981, Pete Hudson and Brad McKenzie, "Child Welfare and Native People: The Extension of Colonialism," The Social Worker 49, 2 (Summer, 1981): 63-66 and 37-88. It was the only article on Native people in the journal until 1986. See Frank Tester, "Still Not Home: The Indian and Native Child and Family Services Provisions in Ontario's Bill 77," The Social Worker 54, 4 (Winter, 1986): 169-163. In contrast, between 1970 and 1980

the popular unrefereed Journal of the Ontario Association of Children Aid Societies featured 19 articles about Native problems. The articles were written by CAS staff, foster parents or board members. Two referred to underlying conditions, seven to service issues, and ten to adoptive and foster care issues.

19. Donald J. Lugtig, "Our experience with an Indian Couple," Journal of the Ontario Association of Childrens Aid Societies VI, 1(March 1963):5-7; Cliff Bennett, "Ojibway Consciousness," JOACAS IX, 10 (December 1966): 2-6; A Morgan, "Apprehension of Indian Children," JOACAS VII, 8(October 1968): 8-9; Christine Albrecht, "Conflict," JOACAS XIV, 13(January 1970): 1-3; Cathy Beamish and Bill Lee, "Dialogue: CCAS and Native People," JOACAS XVI, 1 (January 1973): 9-12; Jean Goodwill, "What the Social Agency Must Know About Indians," JOACAS XI,3(March 1968): 10-13; Paul McClone, "A Program to Offset Culture Shock," JOACAS XVI, 9(November 1973): 7-9; A.J. Kushnier, "Child Abuse in Northern Ontario," JOACAS XIX, 9(November 1976):13-16; Joyce B. Timpson, "The Silent Minority," JOACAS XXI, 2(February 1977): 15-16. There were numerous other articles addressing concerns about Native child welfare.

20. J.Anthony Long and Menno Boldt, "Introduction," chapter 1 in Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada, ed. J.Anthony Long and Menno Boldt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 4.

21. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Province of Ontario, January 1966. This was the Indian Welfare Agreement which is detailed in Chapter 4.

22. Bradford Morse, "Native Indian and Metis Children in Canada: Victims of the Child Welfare System,"22. in Race Relations and Cultural Differences: Educational and Interpersonal Perspectives, ed. Gajendra K. Verma and Christopher Bagley (New York: St. Martens Press, 1984), 259-277.

23. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), Indian Conditions: A Survey (Ottawa: DIAND, 1980), 59.

24. Philip Hepworth,"Native Children in Care," chapter in Foster Care and Adoption in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Council on Social Development), 114.

25. Debbie Glenesk, "A Study of Children Taken into Care," Journal of the Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies Vol.15, (October 1971): 16-21.

26.Ibid., 19.

27. Timpson, "Indian and Native Special Status," 1990.

28. Sandra Scarth, MCSS Director of Child Welfare, interview by author, 15 February 1990.

29. Alberta Council of Treaty Women, in Penner, op.cit, 32.

30. Johnston, 23.

31. Johnston, York, Monture, Morse, op. cit.
32. Canadian Welfare Council and Canadian Association of Social Workers, "Joint Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act," (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council, 1947). H.B. Hawthorne, A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada, Volumes 1&2 (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1966).
33. Stu Cummings, "Review questions Tikinagan's competency," Wawatay News, Sioux Lookout, Ontario, 7 November 1991, page 1.
34. Sharon Taylor-Henley and Peter Hudson, "Aboriginal Self-Government and Social Services: First Nations-Provincial Relations," Canadian Public Policy XVIII, 1(1992): 24.
35. CBC National News, 23 July 1992.
36. Ontario Native Women's Association, "Breaking Free, A Proposal for Change to Aboriginal Family Violence," (ONWA: Thunder Bay, Dec. 1989).
37. Tony Martens, The Spirit Weeps: Characteristics and Dynamics of Incest and Child Sexual Abuse with a Native Perspective (Edmonton: Nechi Institute, 1988).
38. Rupert Ross, Dancing With a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality (Markham: Butterworth Press, 1992).
39. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Quantitative Analysis and Socio-demographic Research and Professional Services Highlights of Aboriginal Conditions 1982-200 Part II Social Conditions, December 1989, 7.
40. "Casualty in the war on alcohol," Winnipeg Free Press, 1 November 1992, page 1.
41. See Joseph Fox, Daniel Manitowabi and J.A. Ward, "An Indian Community with a High Suicide Rate - 5 Years After," Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 29(1984):426. The community in question on Manitoulin Island reported a rate of 267 per 100,000. The rate for the entire island was 23 per 100,000. The national rate was 13-15 per 100,000 for the years in question.
42. Heather Childsforever, community member, Wunnumin Lake First Nation, personal communication, 3 May 1993; Nellie Beardy, Director Sioux Lookout Aboriginal Health Authority, Telephone interview by author, 1 April 1993; Donna Roundhead, "Suicide Epidemic within Nishnawbe-Aski Nation Communities," Brief to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Sioux Lookout, Ontario, 1 December 1992. See Rudy Platiel, "Suicide increase troubles natives: Rate for youth major concern," Globe and Mail, 5 June 1991, 1&2. Similar concerns have been reported among the Inuit, Toronto Star, "Inuit suicides 4 times higher than average studies show," 4 March 1989.
43. Ross, 3.

I

**LITERATURE REVIEW AND
METHODOLOGY**

LITERATURE REVIEW

Only a small body of academic literature has addressed the high numbers of Indian children in care in either Canada or the United States. Much of this literature exists as government studies although a few social work and legal scholars have made contributions. Most of the literature is based on secondary sources and very few studies have used primary data. I will examine the Canadian and American literature separately.

CANADIAN LITERATURE

The review of Canadian literature begins with a 1978 evaluation of Ontario's child welfare policies for which major reforms had been implemented in 1966. It ends with a 1990 study based on questions which arose from the 1978 evaluation and subsequent literature.

In 1978 the Ontario government in conjunction with the federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development* (DIAND) and Ontario Aboriginal organizations conducted an evaluation of the Indian Welfare Agreement (IWA).¹ This federal-provincial agreement was signed at

* Throughout the paper I use several different names for the federal department responsible for Indian administration. The name is indicative of the period. In the years until 1966 it was the Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Then it became the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). In recent years it has been known as Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). Often I use the colloquial "Indian Affairs."

the beginning of 1966 for Ontario to provide the wide range of social services to Status Indians (See Chapter 4). The evaluation of child welfare services occupied a major portion of the study. It identified massive increases in spending and obtained the opinions of 453 Indian people on reserves. The study highlighted the impact of the IWA and underscored the overall inefficiency of the service. Provincially expenses for Indian child welfare services had risen from \$1.7 million in 1972 to \$4.04 million in 1978, a increase of 30 percent per year, but the extent of service delivery to Indians varied across the province. Different CASs were providing different patterns of service. Some were providing predominantly child-in-care (out-of-home) services to Indian children while to others, in-home protection and family support services.

Two CASs in Northern Ontario, Kenora and Rainy River, dealt primarily with Indians while others had few Indian clients. The Societies serving predominantly Indian populations in the North were not funded to account for distances they must travel, enormous caseloads, and time required to work with clients and Band Councils. Bands² had no status or formal input into CAS Boards or budgets as did municipalities under the legislation. Under the IWA, Societies were advanced monies for projected expenditures, were reimbursed for overspending and kept what they did not spend. No reconciliation of costs were required.³

The study reported an interesting finding in its 453 qualitative interviews. Those interviewed believed that CAS services were inappropriate and disagreed that Indian children should be placed in white homes. However, the respondents mentioned housing, income support and employment as areas of dissatisfaction far more frequently than child welfare. This suggests that inferior socio-economic conditions were important stressors on Native community life at that time.

The IWA evaluation was aptly entitled A Starving Man Doesn't Argue. A subsequent study outlined a blueprint of Native control of child welfare. This study entitled Community Care: Towards Indian Control of Indian Social Services, was released in 1980 at a time when the provincial Ministry of Community and Social Services was revamping child welfare legislation. The Ontario government adopted the recommendations of the reports as the justification and blueprint for the beginnings of the transfer of services to Native organizations.⁴

In the meantime other federal studies emerged that exposed further the situation of high numbers of Indian children in care everywhere in Canada. These are described next.

In response to the need for a descriptive national overview of adoption and foster care services, Philip Hepworth and the Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD) compiled child welfare data from across Canada in 1980 including data concerning the disproportionate numbers of Native children in

care.⁵ In Manitoba, they were estimated to account for 60.0 percent of the child-in-care population, in Saskatchewan 51.5, in Alberta 44, in British Columbia 30, and in Ontario 9 percent.⁶ Overall in Canada 20 percent⁷ of the children in care were of Native origin while they constituted just under 10 percent of the population.⁸ In 1976-1977 while only 1.4 percent of all children in Canada were in care, 3.5 percent of Status Indian children were in care.⁹

The CCSD report proposed that the constitutional jurisdictional split (detailed in Chapter 4) resulted in uneven services across provinces. The concern expressed about the jurisdictional issue was that Indian children in some provinces did not receive protection services except in life and death situations while other provinces would not provide even this intervention if payment was not guaranteed. It concluded that the jurisdictional issues increased the probability that Native children coming in care would have emotional problems because the situation would have become very serious by the time intervention occurred. The child's emotional problems in turn would increase the length of stay and affect the ability to place the child for adoption. If many Native children were in long term foster care, this would contribute to rising rates in comparison to non-Native children. The Hepworth overview provided the impetus for a much quoted follow-up CCSD study of Native child welfare by Patrick Johnston.

In 1983, Patrick Johnston documented further the disproportions between Native and non-Native children in the care of child welfare agencies

and sought explanations from senior government officials, child welfare workers and Indian people.¹⁰ It exposed the extent of the problem of Indian children in care such as the information that follows. In 1955 in BC, Native children constituted less than one percent of the child-in-care population but by 1964 they represented 34.2 percent.¹¹ While .96 percent of all children in Canada were in care in 1980, 4.6 percent of Status Indian children were in care up from 3.4 percent three years earlier.¹² The uneven service provision and inconsistent funding arrangements in the provinces and territories were detailed. They are summarized in Appendix A.

Johnston devotes considerable time to the problem of cultural conflict, and cultural misunderstandings by child welfare authorities. He alludes to unemployment, the use of residential schools, and alcoholism as determinants of the high rates of Indian children in care. While the study drew widespread attention to the existence of the problem, providing the first detailed numerical documentation of its extent, it did not elaborate how the social issues contributed to high child-in-care rates. A prominent tone of the study, and the aspect most quoted, implicates the child welfare system while minimizing the effects of the other factors in explaining why so many Native children were in care.

The term "sixties scoop" appeared in the Johnston study and became a symbol of Native people's discontent with child welfare agencies. The implications of the word "scoop" to describe the painful act of taking a child

into protective custody underestimates the nature of child welfare work. The image is one of zealous social workers on a child-saving mission, deliberately frequenting reserves looking for excuses to apprehend Indian children. This depiction is unsupported by other findings of Johnston and Hepworth that refer to such factors as overworked social workers, inability to place Indian children for adoption, and provinces that refused to provide services to Indian communities.

Alberta and Saskatchewan, for example, would not provide child welfare services to Indian communities except in "life and death" situations. Life and death meant simply that child welfare workers would intervene only if requested when there was imminent risk to the child's life. Given such provincial resistance, social workers in these provinces, therefore, would not be looking for excuses to apprehend children. They would be looking for reasons not to do so. Yet both provinces had very high rates of Indian children in care.

In Ontario, the IWA evaluation study had identified that the Northern agencies of Rainy River and Kenora CASs dealt mostly with Native communities. It raised the issues of the vast distances in these regions, and that their budgets did not account for the vast areas that needed to be travelled. The combined Kenora-Rainy River Districts comprise half the area of Ontario, contain about 50 Indian communities and house a total population of about 75,000. Most of the communities are accessible only by aircraft, boat

or gruelling drives over substandard roads.¹³ The portrayal of indiscriminant apprehension of Indian children under such arduous geographical working conditions does not seem plausible in Northern Ontario, or similar isolated regions of Canada where Native communities tend to be located. The costs and time involved in travel and the difficult conditions would be factors that might keep the rates of children-in-care down. These conditions could, however, contribute to longer stays in care once apprehensions had occurred. The main issue is that apprehensions under such conditions would not likely be indiscriminant. They would be based on a sincere belief that a child was at real risk because of neglect, rightly or wrongly perceived.

The Hepworth and Johnston studies provided important statistical ground. Johnston (and others) have attempted to explain the larger issues using speculations and anecdotes about what might have happened at the agency (micro) level. The larger macro policy and jurisdictional issues are advanced as factors but the authors do not develop how they affected the micro agency level. The jurisdiction issues, the refusal of some provinces to provide services and the overwork of child welfare workers would appear to work against there being large numbers of Indian children in care.

In 1981, Peter Hudson and Brad McKenzie conceptualized the child welfare system's relationship to Indian people using the framework of the extension of the colonial relationships between a dominant and subjected society.¹⁴ The authors reject three predominant explanations for Native child

welfare problems - psychosocial problems, cultural conflicts, and socio-economic status. They argue that the first explanation results in more tertiary services which result in the removal of more children; the second, they argue, results in attempts to acculturate Native people to the ways of the dominant society; and the third presumes that poverty and child neglect are directly related. They argue that each of these explanations are ethnocentric and ignore fundamental difference between Native and non-Native societies in these three areas.

Hudson and McKenzie identify colonialism as the predominant feature of the relationship between the child welfare system and Native people. Specifically the cultural colonial relationship is one in which the dominant group persistently by its policies devalues the culture of a subjected people, believing itself to be the sole carrier of a valid culture. The authors argue that the child welfare system parallels earlier attempts to assimilate Native people through the use of residential schools, an evident example of cultural colonialism. They argue that the child welfare system devalued Native culture by not recognizing and using traditional Aboriginal systems of child protection in judging standards of child care by the dominant Canadian norms, and by the persistent use of non-Native foster and adoption placements. The cultural colonialism theory also suggests that traditional systems of protection were devalued by the fact that child welfare workers did not use them.

The McKenzie and Hudson analysis only briefly addresses structural colonialism. This aspect of the colonial relationship involves explicit control and exploitation of the subjected group. In Canada's relationship to Native people, this would entail the imposition of the Indian Act which removed self-governing capabilities, the failure to recognize land rights and the forcible geographical relocation of some communities. The authors do not show any relationship between the effects of structural colonialism and child neglect. Instead they expand ethnocentrism in a power analysis between workers and clients using the cultural colonialism model.

The McKenzie-Hudson arguments focus on the interaction between the Native and non-Native society manifested by approaches of front-line service workers' that reflected cultural colonialism. Explanations linking structural colonialism that might allow cultural colonialist acts to flourish are not addressed.

In a 1985 article, Christopher Bagley criticized the Alberta child welfare system in the 1984 death of Richard Cardinal, aged 17, who had hanged himself in his 16th foster home in 13 years.¹⁵ The Bagley assessment supported an earlier investigation into the case. The investigation pointed directly to ineptness of social workers in not offering support services to the boy's family before apprehension and in not using the extended family to keep him out of care.¹⁶ The multitude of placements points to a system that was

ill-equipped to serve the most rudimentary interest of a child needing substitute care.

Although the adoption of Native children by non-Natives has been the source of much criticism, the security of one home, Native or non-Native, would have been preferable to what befell Richard Cardinal. If the basics of foster care and adoption were so difficult to provide to Native children, it seems likely that social workers with any intelligence or conscience make strenuous efforts not to admit Native children to care knowing the limitations. This would be more true if the province did not acknowledge responsibility because of jurisdictional disputes.

Bagley supports the cultural insensitivity explanations of other scholars but avoids the larger question of underlying family and cultural breakdown that preceded admissions. The child welfare system was branded as abusive, and probably rightly so,¹⁷ but possibly for other reasons than suggested.

In 1985, John MacDonald offered social change factors as fundamental to high rates of Native children in care.¹⁸ He showed that of 2,936 Indian children in care in British Columbia in 1972,¹⁹ less than half were in CAS care. The rest were in the care of extended family, residential schools (for social not educational reasons) and of DIAND with parental consent. MacDonald cites unemployment and poverty which are generally associated with high child-in-care rates as fundamental to the high rates for Native children. Overcrowding, unemployment and out-migration to find better

conditions posed stresses on Native communities. MacDonald also cites reports of graduates of the residential schools about "the disabling effects the schools had on parenting abilities."

MacDonald identifies the roots of the problems as the inability of child welfare services to provide prevention services. The fact that so many children were in substitute care, such as the residential schools and extended family, indicates serious social problems in Native families well beyond the capacity of the child welfare system to handle. The reports of the Native parents indicates that earlier effects of the residential schools contributed to the high rates of children in care. MacDonald is correct in pointing out that the need for substitute care at all is a signal of serious problems.

Anne-Marie Mawhiney proposed a later analysis introducing the concept of hegemony in the dealings of the child welfare system with the Native population.²⁰ She uses the following definition of hegemony,

an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations informing in its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation.²¹

Mawhiney argues that conflicts between the dominant Euro-Canadian ideology of assimilation and Aboriginal society's ideology of separate status were basic factors in the high rates of Native children in care. The dominant society wanted egalitarian treatment of all persons which included state intervention with children. This conflicted with the Aboriginal position of self-determination

through special status. If the Aboriginal position were honoured the dominant society would have disallowed state intervention with children, she argues. Given that non-Native child welfare workers, Mawhiney reports, had no knowledge and skills about cultural differences, apprehensions were high in the 1960-1981 period.

This analysis expands both the ethnocentrism and cultural colonialism theories of Johnston, and Hudson and MacKenzie. It moves the analysis from the relationship between the individual worker and the client to the relationship between the state and the Indian population as a group, leaving the social worker as intermediary. This analysis recognizes that the provision of "equal" services did not serve the interests of Native people in child welfare. It follows that if the state recognized special status, any intervention (if it occurred at all) would have resulted in special, culturally appropriate applications of standards and policies. Services reflecting the special status might also have addressed the reality that the special social circumstances of Native people were not equal to those of other Canadians thereby demanding special approaches.

By the late 1980s, legal scholars began to examine the legislative bias of child welfare laws as a factor contributing to high rates of Indian children in care. Carasco in 1986 argues that the laws do not acknowledge the "indigenous factor," the special character of situations involving indigenous children and the need for a particular rather than a general response. This

would require cultural considerations in all child welfare decisions without which the best interest of the child would not be served. One basic right of a Native child is his or her right to Native culture.²²

In 1989, Patricia Monture, an Aboriginal legal scholar, reiterated the legal bias argument. She argued that even when the law did account for the indigenous factor, it was based on cultural stereotypes of Indian people. Even with the Indian-specific provisions of Ontario's Child and Family Services Act, the courts were yet to fully recognize the best interest of a Native child to be inherent in the recognition of the indigenous factor.²³ These legal analyses begin to address systemic values which biased the laws which impeded the development of alternative approaches therefore increasing the numbers of Indian children in care.

In 1990, Douglas Durst presented another social work opinion concerning fundamental conflicts of community versus individual values as contributing to the destruction and oppression of indigenous culture through inter-racial adoptions.²⁴ Durst demonstrates how adoption policies of placing Native children in non-Native homes parallels the effects of employment policies by reinforcing individual values over collective values. This assessment of conflict of values, while applied to adoptions, might well have been applied to the initial act of apprehension. If the child welfare system had viewed the high rates of apprehensions of Indian children as a collective problem of cultural breakdown, the system might have responded earlier to find

alternatives to apprehension. This assessment has similar features to the analysis of Mawhiney and Monture.

To the beginning of the 1990s, the wealth of child welfare literature used the characteristics and failures of the child welfare system to explain the high rates of Indian children in care. Most of the criticism focused on the workers' failure to appreciate the culture. The literature also tended to focus on the adoption of Indian children by non-Indians, the most tertiary means of intervention in child protection. Other factors such as jurisdiction and different standards of child care are raised but not analyzed as to their effects. Social breakdown and the reasons why traditional systems did not prevent CAS referrals are not addressed. There was little analysis of root causes and why the larger system did not respond to the problems the way it did with non-Indian children for whom in-care rates were decreasing.

This gap in the literature prompted me to explore how funding policies contributed to high rates of Indian children in care. In 1990 I researched the questions concerning jurisdiction and funding raised by Johnston. I made comparisons of the disproportions between Indian and non-Indian children in the provinces and territories for the year 1979.²⁵ My purpose was to determine an association between the existence of a federal-provincial agreement to provide services and disproportions between Native and non-Native children in care.

I grouped the provinces into one of three categories according to the federal-provincial funding arrangements. These categories were: no agreement, partial agreement and special agreement. There were wide variations in funding methods. On the one extreme there was the Northwest Territories system which had the same funding system for Natives and non-Natives. At the other extreme were bifurcated, separate systems for Status Indians.

I compared the proportions among the provinces and territories using the Z test for proportions. A Z score greater than 1.64 at an alpha level of .05 indicated that the differences were significant. The disproportion was largest in provinces where there was no agreement to provide services but where DIAND reimbursed the province for any Status Indian child-in-care placements. Ontario was unusual in that full services mostly funded by the federal government had been available to Indian communities since 1965 delivered through the provincially funded Childrens Aid Societies. Although Ontario's disproportion was significant, it was considerably lower than the disproportion of most provinces. The Z scores for provinces with bifurcated mechanisms were as high as 87.2 (Saskatchewan). Ontario, with a unique arrangement, yielded a score of 4.05. In the NWT all child welfare services are funded identically and the Z score was .5 (no significant difference). Table 2.1 outlines these differences.

Table 2.1 — Status Indian Children (SIC) in Care and all Other Children (Others) in Care as Percentage of the Total Child Population by Funding Arrangement of Province or Territory, 1979-80.

Funding Arrangement	SIC in Care (%)	Others in Care (%)	Ratio Others: SIC	Z Score
<u>Special</u>				
NWT	1.8	1.7	1:1	.5
QUE	4.0	1.3	1:3	3.2*
ONT	2.2	.5	1:4	4.1*
NFLD**	—	—		
<u>Partial Funding</u>				
MAN	4.3	.8	1:5	58.2*
NS	3.7	6.0	1:6	20.7*
BC	5.7	.7	1:8	86.6*
YUK	7.7	.8	1:9	18.8*
<u>No Agreement</u>				
NB	3.0	.8	1:4	8.9*
ALB	7.3	1.3	1:5	8.5*
SASK	4.8	.5	1:9	87.2*
PEI	5.6	.5	1:11	11.3*

* Statistically significant at $\alpha = .05$

** Data on total numbers of children in each category is unavailable since there are no Status Indian Children per se in Nfld. "Native" children constitute 8.5% of all children in care.

The unique position of Indian social services in the public administration structure of Canada produced inconsistent funding mechanisms for Indian child welfare. It is associated with different policy outcomes for Indians than for non-Indians. The relationship may or may not be causal.

In the case of child-in-care rates and federal-provincial arrangements, this study made the argument that the government received only the service

it paid for. In provinces which provided only child-in-care services to Indian children (funded federally), provincial social workers would be called to Indian communities only when conditions had deteriorated to the point where no alternative to apprehension was possible. There would be no funds to provide follow-up services in attempts to return the child. Further, since provinces were not paying child-in-care costs for Indian children there were no incentives at the provincial level to develop services to prevent apprehensions.

Federal-provincial policy did not explicitly encourage apprehending Indian children but by its nature appeared resigned to the fact that Indian child welfare and foster care were synonymous. There were no incentives to provide any other service. Apprehensions were the outcomes by default. Under this structure, cultural sensitivity or the intent to assimilate Indian children would be secondary considerations to the needs of the moment in a life and death situation. The system was set up to pay for only one particular outcome, apprehension. It would also allow cultural insensitivity to flourish when it existed.

Even though in this study Ontario had 658 Status Indian children in care in 1979,²⁶ Ontario did show a lower disproportion between Indian and non-Indian children in care than some other provinces. There is evidence that the majority of these children were from Northern Ontario. The 85 percent of the 475 children in KCAS reported as Native would represent 403 of Kenora CASs children. Also, the Rainy River CAS had 52 Status Indian children in

care at year end in 1976.²⁷ Such large numbers of Native children from two agencies in the North indicate that the Status Indian child-in-care population in the North was also disproportional to the Status Indian child-in-care population throughout Ontario. The disproportion in the North may have been as high as provinces with no agreement to provide services. Hepworth had found that 19 percent of the children in care in all Northern Ontario were Native.²⁸ This evidence suggests that the disproportions between Status Indian and other children in CAS care could be much greater in Northern than in Southern Ontario. If so, it becomes necessary to reexamine my conclusion from the study that the existence of Ontario's federal-provincial agreement for Indian child welfare services was associated with a decreased number of Indian children in care. If the disproportions in the North were as large as they were in the other provinces that did not have agreements, this could indicate that in the North the IWA made no difference to the number of Reserve Status Indian children in care. The socioeconomic and cultural conditions of the Northern Ontario Native people are much different than in the South. This factor alone requires close attention in determining its affect on the rates of Indian children in care.

One major task of this present study is to examine whether, and how, Ontario's unique federal-provincial policy agreement affected the high rates of Indian children in care in Ontario. A study of admission patterns to a

Northern Ontario CAS and the communities it served is used to typify the impact associated with the policy.

AMERICAN LITERATURE

The USA has seen five distinct periods of Indian policy: removal and relocation, 1829 to 1887; allotment and assimilation, 1887 to 1926; self-government, 1928 to 1945; termination, 1945 to 1961; and self-determination, 1961 to the present.²⁹ Following the failed attempt to terminate the special status of American Indians in the mid 1950s, the US government reversed its stand and declared the sovereignty of American Indian Nations.³⁰ Indian jurisdiction over many areas such as marriage, divorce and child custody and the authority of tribes to develop their own regulations on child abuse and neglect followed.³¹ The state continued to exercise its authority over child welfare unquestioned until the mid 1970s, however. After considerable protest and a series of Congressional hearings, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was passed in 1978. This law required state authorities to follow strict guidelines in their dealings with Indian children. They are required to involve the child's tribe, to find Native foster and adoptive homes and to transfer the case to tribal courts when possible.³² Despite more recognition of Indian sovereignty in the U.S., their social difficulties are significant.

The literature indicates a worse situation than in Canada. The numbers in care were probably proportionately much higher; the extent of neglect and

abuse at least comparable and the ability of the child welfare services less equipped to deal with the problems. The problems were similarly attributed to culturally insensitive social workers predominantly but were addressed by government policy earlier.

An estimated 23-35 percent of American Indian children were said to be living out of their own homes.³³ This included children in foster homes, adoptive homes and Boarding Schools. The number of children actually in foster homes may have been lower than in Canada. One author estimated in 1976 that about 6,700 children or 2.0 percent of the under 21 population in 19 states were in foster care.³⁴ Canadian estimates use the under 19 figure. Using the 0-21 year group as denominator yields an underestimation of the number of children in foster care in the USA. Considering that only a few would be in the 18-21 age group, using the 0-21 figure as the denominator gives a smaller percent than if the under 19 year figure were the denominator. Therefore the actual percentage of Indian children in care in the USA would be greater than 2.0 percent, closer to Canada's estimate in 1979 of 3.4 percent.³⁵

Many American Indian children were in Boarding Schools for social reasons, that is parental inability to care for them, and not solely for educational purposes. One estimate asserted that in 1974 there were 34,000 American Indian children in Indian Boarding Schools including 8,000 under the age of ten.³⁶ It is not known what percentage of these figures represent

children in the American Boarding Schools for social reasons but these figures along with the others do suggest, at least, a comparable situation to that of Canada. In Canada in 1974, DIAND reported that 7,641 Indian children lived out of their own homes for social reasons. Of that number 4,112 were in the care of child welfare agencies and 2,271 were in residential schools.³⁷ Based on an estimated Canadian Registered Indian child population of that time of no more than 160,135³⁸ these figures suggest that about 4.5 percent of Reserve Status Canadian Indian children were living out of their homes for social reasons. Given the Indian child population differences between the United States and Canada,³⁹ these figures would suggest that the Americans made more extensive use of boarding schools as child welfare placements than Canada which used foster care more often.

Another author found that between 1969 and 1974 one in eight Indian children in Minnesota was on adoption placement and one in four under the age of one year was adopted. Other states showed Indian children in care at rates 10 to 16 times as high as non-Indians.⁴⁰ These figures suggest a possibly worse situation than the worst case scenario in Canada, Saskatchewan. It highlights the similar regional differences.

In 1969 Dorothy Jones conducted one of the first and only studies that examined the relationship between child welfare authorities and Native communities with severe child welfare problems.⁴¹ In the study of an Alaskan village, Jones identified that at least 28 (1/3) of the community's 84 children

were classified as presenting severe child welfare problems. These problems included homelessness, neglect, and abuse or both neglect and abuse. Of this number 19 (1/3) were removed by child welfare authorities and only 6 (1/3) returned home.⁴² Jones identified child welfare administration problems as restricted budgets, staff shortages and time pressures that prevented staff from devoting time to the community. The service emphasis was placement. This, Jones points out, was no different from child welfare generally in the United States before 1964 although officials were attempting to change this direction. Still, Alaskan children were being placed away from home and in alien cultures.

Jones demonstrated the dilemma of the community and the agency. Child welfare agencies did not have the means to address the issues it faced. The community wanted the neglected and abused children protected both from their parents and from agency practises. At the same time, the community lacked unity on how the situation could be handled, and traditional leadership had lost its authority to intervene. The preoccupation with providing alternate care based on the application of middle-class standards and expectations on lower-class persons diverted its attention from focusing on the community's distinctiveness and the underlying family disorganization. Jones summarized her study with the following observation,

It demonstrates the interplay between the breakdown in community organization and unresponsiveness and uninformed agency practises. The community responds to its organizational failures with a growing

dependency on an agency it distrusts, and thereby intensifies its dilemma.⁴³

The Jones study is one of the only works in either the US or Canada before the major US policy change of 1978 to acknowledge serious child welfare problems in Native communities. In explaining the high rates of Indian children in care, it identified the high rates of child maltreatment in Native communities, community difficulties in handling them alone, and the interplay with the child welfare structure.

The literature which followed in the next two decades was preoccupied with the culturally insensitive responses of child welfare workers.

In 1977, Steven Unger published a series of essays alleging indiscriminant apprehensions of Native children, blaming the lack of knowledge of Indian culture and a desire to save children from poverty.⁴⁴ One essay describes a number of case histories in which the clientele perceived "intimidation, coercion, and legal threats" to surrender their parental rights.⁴⁵ This was said to occur despite parental efforts to work to rehabilitate themselves to regain custody of their children from child welfare authorities. The authors of the article stated,

In Oregon, physical abuse of children is unknown in Indian communities.⁴⁶

Another article in the same work describes similar case scenarios in which a child welfare agency coerced voluntary clients to place their children. In these cases the agency did not offer services such as temporary homemakers,

financial relief, treatment for chemical dependency, employment or marital counselling. In most cases the agency's interventions caused a worsening of the families problems, the article argues.⁴⁷

Unger is quoted in subsequent American works with a similar frequency to Patrick Johnston in Canada. The literature that followed the policy changes in 1978, as in Canada, tended to focus on the implementation of the new legislation, referring to Unger's assessment as the causes for high rates of Indian children in care. This literature still did not address additional causes. It frequently referred to the purpose of the ICWA as protecting Indian families by preventing Indian children from going into non-Indian foster homes. One author quoted a statement of a Congressional Hearing,

It is the policy of this nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which reflect the values of Indian culture.⁴⁸

Such comments ignore fundamental causes of the problems that required the need for foster care. It is as if the way to establish the stability and security of people is equated with setting standards concerning the removal of their children! Steven Unger referred to apprehensions and placement with non-Indian families as being responsible for "the destruction of Indian families," another called it "the ravage of Indian families."⁴⁹ These statements are not unlike the "cultural genocide" charges against the Canadian child welfare system. In both the United States and Canada, the implications were that

child welfare interventions alone were the causes of family and cultural destruction. The perception was presented that Native culture would be preserved if Native foster and adoptive homes were used in child protection. There was no recognition that the need for foster and adoptive placements of any type was itself a sign of other difficulties or that children might have been maltreated.

The recent American literature is beginning to address child abuse in Indian communities. Ronald Fischler in 1985 reported on the extent of child maltreatment in Native homes. Fischler states it is thought to be at least equal to that of others, and cites the difficulties of addressing child mistreatment in Native communities because of its political untouchability, underreporting and denial.⁵⁰ In 1989, Edwards and Egbert-Edwards report that since the implementation of the ICWA, nationally there has been a 25 percent increase in Indian children in care despite decreases in numbers of children of other races in care. They also state that still one third of Indian children-in-care are not in Indian homes.⁵¹ The authors cite numerous reasons for this, namely reluctance to be foster parents, the smallness of reservations, unemployment, alcoholism, and loss of cultural ways through boarding schools to name a few.

Another 1989 study revealed shocking data. A group of mental health clinicians examined case records of 1,155 Indian children from 50 reservations in the Albuquerque, New Mexico area.⁵² Of the sample, 30 percent were in foster or adoptive homes and 12 percent in boarding schools or institutions.⁵³

Twenty percent of the sample suffered from chronic physical illnesses, while eighteen percent had a psychiatric diagnosis.⁵⁴ They found that 67 percent had a history of abuse, neglect, or both.⁵⁵ Emotional neglect accounted for about one third; physical neglect one quarter; and physical abuse 18 percent for girls and 4.5 percent for boys. The prevalence of sexual abuse was reported as 12.3 percent of girls and 2.0 percent of boys.⁵⁶ Of children in their own homes 61 percent had a history of maltreatment. Of those in foster homes, 77 percent had similar histories.⁵⁷ Children who suffered both abuse and neglect suffered the highest frequency of placement.⁵⁸

The authors of the above study did not investigate the specific causes of the maltreatment of the children in the sample but suggested that some are similar to those for the general population, and others are unique to the Indian population. They propose the following reasons: rapid socio-cultural change, gender role changes, failed parenting skills, the changing nature of the extended family and special risks attached to boarding schools.

The study comments on the dearth of studies on child maltreatment in Indian communities and hypothesizes that the overgeneralization about child welfare agencies that lead to the 1978 ICWA fed the "conspiracy of silence"⁵⁹ surrounding the issues. It concludes with a call for the importance of child abuse prevention programs. Considering the significance of children to Indian culture and that over one half the American Indian population are under the age of 18, these programs are essential.

In 1987, Hauswald examined the historical and social change contextual roots of child neglect and abuse. She associated the rates of abuse in the Navajo with accounts of social change offered by people of the area.⁶⁰ Hauswald studied 110 normal and problem Navajo families where child abuse and neglect occurred. Families where child abuse and neglect occurred showed one or more generations of disruption of cultural norms related to forced economic change, residential education systems and the loss of the traditional religion.⁶¹

The American and Canadian literature followed similar trends with Canada a few years behind the USA and yet to address child neglect and abuse. Initially there was almost no literature on the subject other than one American article in 1969 describing conditions of great concern. Next, the literature preceding major policy change in both countries focused on culturally insensitive child welfare workers and the resulting cultural genocide of using non-Indian foster and adoptive parents. After major policy changes, the literature examined the new policies.⁶² Recently, the extent of child maltreatment in Native communities is emerging in the US. Although the Canadian literature at the time of this writing does not yet address the extent of child maltreatment and family breakdown, public testimonies, the media and documents of Aboriginal organizations indicate these problems are now under discussion.

CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE

There are three major criticisms of the literature - its concentration on one aspect of the problem to explain the high rates in Indian children in care and its tendency to make generalizations and its use of comparisons which may be invalid for demographic and identification reasons.

The predominant themes of the Canadian and American literature are cultural insensitivity and the adoption of Native children by non-Native parents. The question arises from the cultural conflict explanations at the agency level as to how child welfare workers would come in contact with so many Indian children alleged to need protection in the first place. In Canada, this is particularly important in light of provincial reluctance to provide any services. The focus on cultural factors with the exclusion of the effects of structural avoids addressing other important causes.

Combining the explanations of the jurisdictional dispute with worker-client power issues is inconsistent. Workers in resistant provinces would probably look for any other possible resource than foster care to care for the child. At most, an outside authority might persuade someone to take responsibility for a child. If the natural helping network of the extended family were strong, the CAS worker would not need to use persuasion for someone to take a child. Indeed, the situation would probably not have come to the attention of the worker in the first place. If the traditional Aboriginal child

caring systems were not strong, it seems unlikely that a white outsider in a power position would be accepted as the facilitator of a cultural practice. At most, the outsider might request a community member to take the child and pay the individual a per-diem allowance. This would not be using a natural system. It would be simply replacing white foster homes with Native foster homes. In addition it would introduce remuneration from the dominant to the subjected group for a traditional practice formerly done naturally and without remuneration. Why traditional practices were not followed more extensively may be because structural colonialism weakened the community's ability to participate in them.

The suggestion that standards of care and discipline in Native communities are different poses many questions. If children were apprehended for reasons concerning perceived danger to their lives, do the critics mean that it was culturally appropriate to expose a Native child to danger? While standards could be different do they mean that Native standards for care are lower? It is unlikely that the literature meant to suggest affirmative answers to these questions, reflecting a need to draw more clear connections between cultural ways and neglect.

Cultural misunderstanding could explain some apprehensions and possibly the wide use of non-Native foster and adoptive homes for Indian children and the lack of programs to recruit more Native homes. It does not

adequately explain the consistently high and escalating rates of apprehensions over an extended period of time, however.

Many aspects of social and economic breakdown would be important determinants in the high rates of Indian child apprehensions. The case of Grassy Narrows is exemplary. Its forced relocation in 1962 and the mercury pollution in 1969 that closed down its fishing industry preceded the highest rate of children in care in 1975 in the Kenora District,⁶³ itself a region with very high numbers of Indian children in care. The effects of social breakdown is an important precursor to cultural misunderstanding. Without the effects of social breakdown there would be little opportunity for cultural misunderstanding.

Most approaches to explaining high rates of Indian children in care have focused on the tertiary interventions that were taken, child apprehensions and adoptions. There is no information about secondary approaches to intervention such as family support or pre-protection efforts of agencies and why they may not have been successful. No attention is given to the dearth of other services for Indian communities which might have prevented the conditions which lead to child apprehensions or assisted in family rehabilitation. Other literature looks at the role of the insensitivity of broader policies in not recognizing Native special status.

The American studies of Jones, Piaseck and Hauswald address the dangerous conditions under which some children might have been living,

conditions which would be unacceptable in any culture. Many of these situations were a result of abandonment or lack of food and shelter because of alcoholism. There were known cases of alcohol-related child deaths. While child care standards may be different and many Native children can take more responsibility for themselves and their younger siblings, there is a limit to what any child could do in extreme situations. The literature does not address these important issues. None of the recent Canadian studies address these issues although the call for recognition of special status could be extended to refer to recognition of special social circumstances.

Placing sole emphasis on the child welfare system's role in apprehension is tantamount to attributing a high rate of some radical medical procedure, such as heart transplant surgery, to zealous heart surgeons without asking why so many people might need them. Instead, one might ask, "Why is there is so much heart failure and why do governments pay, without question, for such risky, expensive and inefficient treatment?" With Indian child welfare there was a failure of most levels of the system to question the existence of the large numbers of Indian children in care. Evidently, there was no such inquisition for either clinical or financial reasons even when the numbers in care were at their highest in the early 1970s. These questions were not raised by governments or in the academic literature.

The high rates of Indian child apprehensions over the 1960s and the 1970s were inconsistent with the direction of child welfare thinking of those

years. Removal from their parents is usually not in the best interest of children. The trauma of separation can be more harmful than most acts of parental omission or commission. The harm done by the separation process has been known to be irreversible.⁶⁴ This fact was recognized in child welfare agencies during the 1970s.⁶⁵ Furthermore, foster care and adoption are very costly. Nationally, the costs of Indian child welfare services increased from \$4 million in 1966-67, to \$16 million in 1975-76, and to \$25 million in 1978-79.⁶⁶ Such increases are so dramatic that one would have expected the cost-minded civil service in the provincial or federal capitals to detect the anomaly and filter concerns to the agency level. This might have prevented the problem from going on for so long until the 1980s when change in direction was made towards Native control of Native child welfare, at least in Ontario.

The second difficulty in the existing literature, particularly those studies which have used numerical data, is the tendency to make generalizations as if Native people were a homogenous group. Regional differences in the historical, socioeconomic and cultural factors mean that different policies could have different impacts at different times. Indian communities have been known to have temporary periods of stresses from which they recover.⁶⁷ Some tribes are wealthy and some are poor. Some Native people are fully integrated with the Canadian society while some in the North live in much the same way as their ancestors. Indian Nations with different cultural traits and life styles, for example the nomadic versus the agriculturalists, have had varying degrees

of difficulty in the acculturation process.⁶⁸ The variations are reflected in the fact that some communities lost the children of families to the child welfare system,⁶⁹ while others lost no children whatsoever even serving as adoption resources.⁷⁰

The third major criticism of the literature is that the numerical data and population estimates in interpreting the existing Native child welfare statistics are confusing and even invalid because of the many legal and cultural meanings of the term "Native." The terms are either undefined or used inconsistently from province to province and from author to author. More localized studies would be useful for this reasons and for reasons associated with classifications and record keeping on Native services. Each province has placed different emphasis on Indian services, affecting the accuracy of data kept and reported. Whether a Native person is classified as Metis, Inuit, Status Indian, non-Status Indian, or Reserve Status Indian poses problems in drawing conclusions from descriptive statistical data. Some provinces may keep separate data only on the latter group for billing purposes to the federal government and may clump two or more of the other four together. Also, in the reporting of the summation data, the groups may be reported as being of one category, "Native," and the differences not delineated. In NWT the issue of Status would not be important to the government because there is no differentiation in the funding. NWT however would be interested in who is Aboriginal and who is not. Therefore "Native" could mean all of Inuit, Metis,

non-Status and Status Indian, and Reserve Status Indian. All five groups have distinct histories, cultures and life styles. Conclusions drawn on the comparisons using provincial reports should be interpreted with caution.

Population estimates pose problems when comparing proportions. Only since 1981 has the Census recorded Indian Status so that on-reserve and off-reserve Indians both could be counted. That year was also the first year the Census reported the populations of individual reserve communities. (Previously the Census reported only the total reserve population for a District) Also, the Census records only persons living on the reserve at the time of the Census. At the same time, the Department of Indian Affairs maintains Band lists which include the names of all those registered as members of individual Bands. Not all Band members actually reside in the community, however. Therefore, DIAND figures vary from Statistics Canada's figures. It is not known how carefully population figures in the above studies have been gleaned down to resemble accurate estimates. There could be further problems in comparisons if DIAND sources and Census data were mixed.

The different policies for each province, the regional cultural and economic discrepancies and the problems inherent in reporting of data on Native people render national or cross-provincial studies problematic. For the above reasons, this study used the case of a small, relatively⁷¹ homogenous region and focused on one group, Reserve Status Indians of Northern Ojibwa descent.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research attempts to look at other explanations for the high rates of Indian children in care in Ontario other than those posed in the literature. I have attempted to address my criticisms of other studies by narrowing the focus of the study. I chose Ontario to examine one type of policy, one region to examine regional differences, and one population, Reserve Status Indians.

The general question of this study is: What factors explain why Reserve Status Indian children were taken into the care of Ontario Children's Aid Societies disproportionately to others from 1956-1974?

The specific questions are:

Did changes in public policy with respect to Reserve Status Indians result in the increases in the number of Reserve Status Indian children in care?

Did social, economic and cultural change within Indian communities result in increases in the number of Reserve Status Indian children taken into care?

What factors of Children's Aid Societies' administration and practices resulted in increases in the numbers of Reserve Status Indian children in care?

The dissertation treats each of the three questions separately in three distinct sections, Parts II, III and IV. For each question, there are three chapters which are respectively, the context, the findings and the analysis.

The demarcations between the context, the findings and the analysis of a case study such as this are not clear-cut. In qualitative research, the context is very much the problem itself. Many findings are collected to produce a context and much analysis of these facts occurs to determine the context. In the analyses one must use findings other than those of the initial focus of the study. Also, the factors shaping the outcomes are not mutually exclusive. The analysis of one factor may constitute part of the context of another. Because of the unclear boundaries between each factor, some information is repeated. I have attempted to make Parts II, III and IV into complete entities. Following an examination of each factor, I conclude with an analysis of overriding themes that knit together all three factors and the outcomes.

Endnotes to Chapter 2

1. A Starving Man Doesn't Argue: A Review of Community Social Services to Indians in Ontario, Commissioned by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, and Indian Associations of Ontario: Association of Iroquois and Allied Indians, Grand Council Treaty 9, Grand Council Treaty 3, and Union of Ontario Indians (Toronto: Technical Assistance and Planning [TAP] Associates, 1979).
2. A Band is the name of an Indian community. They are also called Indian First Nations. Bands tend to consist of several extended families. It is the smallest level of Indian community government in Canada. Bands range in size from about 40 to 10,000 persons. There are over 500 Bands in Canada and about 100 in Ontario.
3. TAP Associates, summarized from pages 107-108.
4. George Thomson, Deputy Minister of Community and Social Services 1977-1982, interview by author, tape recorded, 10 April 1988, Toronto, Ontario.
5. Philip Hepworth.
6. Ibid., 115.
7. Ibid., 111.
8. The 10 percent figure is my calculation, obtained by dividing the population of Native children of 750,000 by the 1979-1980 population of all Canadian children of 7,864,500 as reported by Johnston, page 55. This represents Native children with and without Indian status. See Glossary.
9. Ibid., 112.
10. Johnston, 40.
11. Ibid., 23.
12. Ibid., page 57.
13. During the 1960s and 1970s, travelling was even more difficult.
14. Hudson and McKenzie, 1980. An updated version of this article is: Brad McKenzie and Peter Hudson, "Native Children, Child Welfare, and the Colonization of Native

- People," in The Challenge of Child Welfare, ed Kenneth L. Levitt and Brian Wharf (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 125-141.
15. Christopher Bagley, "Child Abuse by the Welfare System," Journal of Child Care Vol.2, No.3(1985): 63-69.
16. Ray Thomlison, "Case Management Review: Northwest Region of Alberta Social Services and Community Health" (University of Calgary; Faculty of Social Welfare, 1984).
17. I was aware of a two year old Native child who had been in 25 placements including hospital admissions during my time with KCAS.
18. John A. MacDonald, "Child Welfare and the Native Indian Peoples of Canada," Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 5(1985): 284-305.
19. Ibid., 286.
20. Anne-Marie Mawhiney, "Policy Development as a Hegemonic Strategy: Example of the Child and Family Services Act in Ontario," in The State as Parent: International Research Perspectives on Intervention with Young People, ed. Joe Hudson and Bart Galaway, NATO Advanced Science Institute Series Vol.53, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Klumer Academic Publishers, 1989), 53-62.
21. Mawhiney, 54
22. Emily Carasco, "Canadian Native Children: Have Child Welfare Laws Broken the Circle?," Canadian Journal of Family Law Vol.5 (1986): 111-138.
23. Patricia Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations", Canadian Journal of Women and the Law Vol. 3 (1989): 1-17.
24. Douglas Durst, "The Undermining of Indigenous Cultures Through Well-Meaning Social Programs," Paper presented at the 25th International Association of Schools of Social Work, Lima Peru, August 1990.
25. Joyce B Timpson, "Federal-Provincial Relations, Indian Child Welfare Agreements, and Disproportionate Indian Child-in-Care Rates: Are they related?," Unpublished MPA thesis, Queen's University, September 1990, 25.
26. Johnston, 56.
27. TAP Associates, D19.
28. Hepworth, 115. The other agencies serving large Indian populations were Kapuskasing, Thunder Bay, Timmins, Sudbury.
29. Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytte, American Indians, American Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983).

30. David Sink, "Making the Indian Child Welfare Act Work: Missing Social and Government Linkages," Phylon 43, 4 (December 1982): 360-367.
31. Casimir R. Wichlacz and Joseph Wechsler, "American Indian Law on Child Abuse and Neglect," Child Abuse and Neglect 7 (1983): 347-350.
32. See Barbara Brooks Johnson, "The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Implications for Practice," Child Welfare LX, 7 (July-August 1981): 435-446; Gay Dietrich, "Indian Child Welfare Act: Ideas for Implementation," Child Abuse and Neglect 6 (1982) 125-128; David Sink, "Making the Indian Child Welfare Act Work: Missing Social and Government Linkages," Phylon 43, 4(December 1982): 360-367; Jo Ann Kessel and Susan P. Robbins, "The Indian Child Welfare Act," Child Welfare LXIII,3 (May/June 1984): 225-232; E. Daniel Edwards and Margie Egbert-Edwards, "The American Indian Child Welfare Act: Achievements and Recommendations," in The State as Parent: Perspectives on Intervention with Young Persons, NATO Advanced Science Institute Series Vol.53, ed. Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Klumer Academic Publishers, 1989), 37-51.
33. Barbara Johnson, 436; Dietrich, 125; Edwards and Egbert-Edwards, 38.
34. Barbara Johnson, 442.
35. National Council of Welfare, In the Best Interest of the Child, Ottawa, 1979.
36. Johnson, 437.
37. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Record Group (RG) 10, Accession (Acc.) 88-89/657, File 1/29-1 part. 35, Welfare of Indians General Headquarters to 1979, "An Overview of Demographic, Social and Economic Conditions Among Canada's Registered Indian Population," by Andrew Siggner, 6 July 1979. The rest were in placements by Indian Affairs. Most often these were voluntary and often with relatives.
38. Patrick Johnston, 55.
39. Barbara Johnson (page 442) reports the American Indian 0-21 population was 332,910 in 1976. Patrick Johnston (page 55) reports the Canadian Indian 0-19 population in 1979 was 160,135.
40. Kessel and Robbins, 226. These figures are excessively as to suspect the authors meant 1 in 8 and 1 in 4 children in care rather than of the Indian child population as it implies.
41. Dorothy M. Jones, "Child Welfare Problems in an Alaskan Native Village," Social Service Review 43 (1969):297-309.
42. *Ibid.*, 300.
43. *Ibid.*, 309.

44. Steven Unger (ed), The Destruction of American Indian Families (New York: American Association of Indian Affairs, 1977).
45. Aileen Red Bird and Pauline Melendy, "Indian Child Welfare in Oregon," in The Destruction of Indian Families, ed Steven Unger (New York: Association of American Indian Affairs, 1977), 45.
46. Ibid., 46.
47. Joseph Westermeyer, "The Ravage of Indian Families in Crisis," in The Destruction of American Indian Families, 47-56.
48. Sink, page 360, quoting the United States Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Indian Child Welfare hearings.
49. These are the titles of the book and the article by Westermeyer cited above.
50. Ronald Fischler, "Child Abuse and Neglect in American Indian Communities," Child Abuse and Neglect 9 (1985): 95-106.
51. Edwards and Egbert-Edwards, 40.
52. Joan M. Piasecki, Spero M. Manson, Michael Biernoff, Albert B. Hiat, Sandra S. Taylor, Donald Bechtold, "Abuse and Neglect of American Indian Children: Findings from a Survey of Federal Providers," American Indian and Alaska Native Mental Health Research 3, 2 (Fall 1989): 43-62.
53. Ibid., 48.
54. Ibid., 49.
55. Ibid., 49.
56. Ibid., 51.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 43.
60. Lizabeth Hauswald, "External Pressure/Internal Change: Child Neglect on the Navajo Reservation," in Child Survival: Anthropological Perspectives on the Treatment and Maltreatment of Children, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Boston: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 145-164.
61. Hauswald, 153.

62. The Canadian literature on the 1984 policy changes is not reviewed in this chapter because it did not relate directly to high rates of Indian children in care. They are referred to in Chapter 1. See citation 18 for Tester The Social Worker, and Timpson Canadian Social Work Review.
63. Anastasia M. Shkilnyk, A Poison Stronger Than Love: The Destruction of An Ojibwa Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 38.
64. John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
65. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (MacMillan: New York, 1973) and Before the Best Interests of the Child (MacMillan: New York, 1979). Written in the early and late 1970s these books articulated the approach of good child welfare practitioners which emphasized great caution in implementing radical interventions. In my tenure with the Metropolitan Toronto CAS, this approach predominated.
66. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Indian Conditions: A Survey (Ottawa: DIAND, 1980), 25.
67. See J. A. Ward and Joseph Fox, "A Suicide Epidemic on an Indian Reserve," Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 22 (1977): 423-426 and the follow-up article Joseph Fox, Daniel Manitowabi and J.A. Ward, "An Indian Community with a High Suicide Rate-5 Years After," Canadian Journal Of Psychiatry 29 (1984): 425-427.
68. Nancy Westlake Van Winkle and Philip May, "Native American Suicide in New Mexico," Human Organization 45(4) (1986): 296-309.
69. McKenzie and Hudson.
70. The health and stability of many Native communities was recognized by the Kenora Childrens Aid Society when it placed about 80 of its Native permanent wards in Native homes in the remote Northwestern part of the province between 1964 and 1966. Archives of Ontario (AO), RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, Box 13, file 537, Kenora CAS 1947-1970, letters from Harold Treen, Executive Director, to James Band, Deputy Minister, 1964-1966. The children came from the areas around Kenora and were sent to homes hundreds of miles away that were accessible only by aircraft.
71. Even within the area studied, discrepancies are great. One can argue that a community by community analysis may be the only reliable approach.

3 METHODOLOGY

*Policy Research is a mixture of science, craftlore, and art.*¹

This study is an historical analysis of the interplay between a particular social policy and conditions pertaining to a colonized race of people. Its purpose is to explain a phenomenon within an historical context, and for which the explanations offered so far are incomplete. The study involves social and political history, public policy and a case example. There are no set historical, policy or case study research methods. All three require versatility and the use of a wide range of data sources.² To accommodate to the nature of the study, I have used an adaptation of the naturalistic framework of Lincoln and Guba.³

This chapter describes the rationale for the naturalistic approach, outlines the methods of data collection and analysis, and discusses the trustworthiness of the results. I discuss the problems encountered with the research that necessitated methodological adaptations to maintain trustworthiness. I discuss also the limitations of the research

Majchrzak states that policy research, "operates at the boundaries of research methodology" leaving policy researchers "free to pursue a variety of methodological directions."⁴ Policy research involves the use of eclectic methods and the involvement of the stakeholders.⁵ A case study is

an empirical study that

- * investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when
- * the boundaries between phenomenon are not clearly evident; and in which
- * multiple sources of evidence are used.⁶

Just as there is no defined method of policy and case study research, there is no defined method of historical sociology. If the case study of a policy issue is historical and if many of the stakeholders are not from the researcher's culture, even more adaptation is needed. This research is not exclusively a policy study, an ethnographic study nor an historical study. Therefore, policy research methods alone were not sufficient. An ethnographic or anthropological approach was not enough because the inquiry is historical and involves issues of the culture of both the researcher and the researched. Historical methods were not enough because much of the sensitive historical data came from living members of another culture than the researcher's. The sensitivity of the topic demanded special consideration regardless of the method.

RATIONALE FOR AN ADAPTED NATURALISTIC APPROACH

The important features of the Lincoln and Guba model are: the use of the natural setting, the predominant but not necessarily exclusive use of qualitative methods, an emergent design, the use of purposive sampling, and the use of a case study reporting mode. The predominant feature of the data analysis is inductive analysis that generates theory from the data rather than

beginning with an a priori theoretical framework to which the data is compared. The policy research methods of Majchrzak and the historical methods of Shafer have comparable concepts. The Majchrzak model of policy research highlights the multidimensional focus, the "empirico-inductive" orientation, incorporation of the future as well as the past, the need to respond to study users and explicit incorporation of values.⁷ Cases study research can use either inductive or deductive approaches.⁸

Naturalistic inquiry is carried out in its "natural" setting. Lincoln and Guba qualify this use of the word natural by asserting

No phenomenon can be understood out of relationship to the time and context that spawned, harbored, and supported it.⁹

and

phenomenon... take their meaning as much from their contexts as they do from themselves.¹⁰

This is congruent with the Yin definition of a case study listed earlier. In a pure naturalistic, ethnographic study the researcher would be physically present on the site documenting observations and gathering data from interviews and documents. The "setting" of an historical study would be the "context" which in this case would be the history, conditions and values of Canadian society and Native people of the time period under study.

The Lincoln and Guba model is designed for a single research site concerning present day issues. Majchrzak's model for policy research is based on making recommendations for the alleviation of present day social problems by policy change. This study does not fit any of these parameters. The data

was obtained from over a dozen settings from Ottawa to Winnipeg. The context is not contemporary but is of 20 to 50 years ago. Also, since the years under study, significant policy changes have occurred. The recommendations are based not on changes to the policy under study but on what history teaches us about future policy making.

Several aspects of the study rendered a naturalistic inquiry appropriate and, equally, a deductive approach inappropriate. One factor further making this study conducive to the naturalistic paradigm was my initial proposition about the cause of the high rates of Indian children in care. Based on what Lincoln and Guba describe as "tacit knowledge," an unarticulated understanding of the area,¹¹ I believed from my experience and study, that the reasons for the high rates of Indian children in care formed a web of entwining factors. The concept of mutual simultaneous shaping of multiple realities is the naturalist's parallel to the conventional concept of causation.¹² In policy research Majchrzak warns against the risks of taking a singular perspective on a multidimensional problem.¹³ Furthermore, as Shafer asserts, any historical thesis can be proved if only supporting evidence of an initial hypothesis is presented.¹⁴ Yin cites a common feature of case studies is hypothesis-generation in exploratory studies or "explanation building" in explanatory studies.

As argued in the literature review, to explain high rates of Indian children in care, other authors have alluded to the complexities of Native child

welfare issues while focusing disproportionately on the front line workers at the expense of other factors. I therefore framed the research questions to include how other factors related to socioeconomic change, policy change and CAS administration shaped the high rates of children in care. To include a balance of these shaping factors, this study relied heavily on the testimony of Native people and child welfare workers to provide their particular emic perspective. These factors rendered a deductive rigid methodology of theory verification inappropriate. They also support the use of naturalistic methods to develop "grounded theory," that is theory developed from the data.¹⁵ Therefore an inductive, flexible model was appropriate.

Because of the scarcity of historical documentations of Canadian Native child welfare, primary information from archival documents, Children's Aid Society records and key informants was sought. Although Yin's model of case study research prescribes a predetermined design, the model supports flexibility and revision provided the initial concerns and objectives are not modified.¹⁶ In this historical study, I could not know in advance what material would have been recorded let alone retained three decades later. I could not know which key persons would be alive, reachable, and willing to provide information. Therefore the emergent design of naturalistic enquiry was the only practical approach. Furthermore, the distances involved in gathering the data, the cultural barriers and the sensitive nature of the topic added to the appropriateness of a flexible naturalistic approach.

Some enumerative financial data are presented and simple statistical analyses of child-in-care data conducted as part of the study. The use of quantitative data is not inconsistent with the naturalistic paradigm, although described as "peripheral" at best.¹⁷ On the other hand, their use is supported by the historical method of Shafer¹⁸ and is embraced by Majchrzak as ideal when used with qualitative methods to yield corroborating results.¹⁹ Goldthorpe delineates the value of quantitative data in historical sociology not just for illustration and context, but for the actual testing of specific hypotheses where questions of "more or less" are crucial.²⁰ Yin agrees, advising cautionary postulations about subtle patterns. Case study outcomes which are "gross matches or mismatches" determined by the "eyeballing technique" are to be the bases of conclusions.²¹ In this study quantitative patterns were important. Precision was less important and not always possible. The rationale for their use and the problems with quantitative data are discussed later.

To satisfy the required flexibility, I have used the Lincoln and Guba naturalistic model with features of the Majchrzak policy research model using a case study to support and illustrate how the policy was operational. All methods were adapted to the historical and cross-cultural character of the questions.

DATA SOURCES

There were three major types of data sources - published and unpublished government historical material; primary child welfare agency data; and interviews with key informants. They were:

- * Archival material of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) 1940-1970;
- * Archival material of the National Archives in Ottawa 1950-1965;
- * Annual Reports of the Department of Public Welfare 1950-1972;
- * Miscellaneous government documents including those cited in the literature review;
- * Log books and files of the Family and Children's Services of the District of Rainy River and other historical documents of the agency;
- * Interviews with former and current senior and mid-level employees of the provincial Ministry of Community and Social Services concerning unpublished details of Ministry policies;
- * Interviews with Children's Aid Society Board members and staff in child welfare work in Native communities before 1980;
- * Interviews with members of the Native community including elders; those working in the child welfare field presently; and younger and middle aged members of Native communities not necessarily associated

with child welfare but who have a knowledge of their communities' history and culture.

DESIGN

The naturalistic model, historical methods, case study and policy research concur that although the investigator does begin with questions surrounding the results of other studies, a predetermined design is not possible. Majchrzak quoting Lindblom and Cohen says the design should not be "a frontal attack on the problem" but allows for "its routine adaptation to the problem-solving interaction."²² Lincoln and Guba describe the naturalistic design as having an initial focus based on tacit knowledge and other theory but by the process of continuous data analysis the focus and design shifts,²³ an "emergent design" paradigm.²⁴ Historical inquiry requires that one begin with key questions and tentative hypotheses that are revised as the investigator proceeds.²⁵ Yin's model is the least flexible on this issue but because of the historical nature of the study the initial questions were modified. With all methods, as any study progresses the focus becomes clearer. The initial focus posed broad questions about the whole province over a 30 year period but converged on specific questions over a shorter period using one small case study area.

Lincoln and Guba suggest three phases of emergent design; orientation and overview, focused inquiry and member check.²⁶ In policy research

Majchrzak recommends that study of the social and political environment occur before the research is undertaken. In this study, congruent with the case study model, the social and political environment itself is a major focus of the inquiry. The stage, orientation and overview, became two distinct stages. In the orientation stage, I engaged in an initial study process suggested by Majchrzak. Lincoln and Guba's second stage is "focused exploration" in which in depth information was sought about emerging important issues. This constituted the third stage after the overview. The demarcations between the stages were not always clear. Lincoln and Guba's third stage "member check" in which information is analyzed and documented with the persons interviewed was conducted and usually provided new information.

The time frame for the study proceeded as follows:

Orientation:

- * June 1989: application made for access to the provincial archives;
- * January-June 1990 - submission of initial proposal (January), initial meetings with Ministry of Community and Social Services staff, first dissertation committee meeting (June);
- * June 1990-September 1990 - conducted provincial comparisons of Indian child-in-care rates determining funding mechanisms as important factors in high rates of Indian children in care, questions for further research emerging.

Overview:

* September 1990-December 1991: initial contact with the Rainy River CAS, personal interviews with Indian community members and child welfare service providers in Rainy River, second dissertation meeting and shifting focus of inquiry;

* January 1991-June 1991: collection of provincial and federal archival data, collection of data from provincial DPW Annual Reports, interviews with former service providers from other CASs interviews with former public servants, (moving towards focused exploration);

* July 1991-August 1991: overview of financial records and Indian child-in-care data from government and archival records looking for emerging patterns, exploring patterns in various CASs, (overview and focused exploration occurring simultaneously).

Focused Exploration:

* July 1991-October 1991: analysis of financial records and available Indian child-in-care data for explanations of high rates of Indian children in care;

* September 1991-December 1991: collection of data from the Rainy River CAS primary sources, emergence and analysis of disproportions within the agencies, interviews with Native informants of the area, further interviews with RRCAS staff.

Member Check:

* June-October 1992.

The research questions outlined in Chapter 2 were not formulated as such in the initial stages of the research. The initial question centred around the evolution and nature of child welfare services to Native communities in Ontario and their association with high numbers of Indian children in care over the period of three decades, 1955-1985. I had thought that statistics concerning and the explanations for high numbers of Indian children in care would be found in archival government documents and interviews with public servants.

The overview of archival documents revealed that insufficient data of the type I needed for the initial question existed. Also, the interviews were revealing the possibility that I had overestimated the importance of the policy component and underestimated the role of cultural change in Native communities. At a later point of the research, the resistance of Northern municipalities to CAS consistently emerged. They resisted giving prevention grants and paying for child-in-care costs. On the other hand, they did not block any budgets of agencies that dealt with large Reserve Status Indian populations. I then pursued whether the subsequent lack of municipal involvement in CAS administration played a part in explaining the high numbers of apprehensions through a theory of secondary gain for the CASs. I located detailed government financial data in the Annual Reports but learned

that I could not uphold a strong argument concerning municipalities on the data available. On the other hand, the financial data contained unexpected evidence for other explanations for high rates of Indian children in care. The study proceeded with a number of other blind alley searches and serendipitous twists.

The time-consuming complications in gaining access to provincial archival information was a factor in how the design emerged. In June 1989, I initiated the proceedings with the Archives of Ontario but did not gain access until December 1990. My initial request for 150 files was turned down because of the potential lengthy processing time.²⁷ I resubmitted a list of 32 files identified exclusively as having "Indian" content dated from 1960-1970. I gained immediate access to less restricted older material, however, which unexpectedly provided important contextual information about broader policies with indirect relevance to child welfare. This information was compared to results of interviews I was conducting with Native people. When I later found that the archival material I had waited for contained little about the making or impact of child welfare policy for Native people that would address my initial focus,²⁸ I began to focus on the contents of the older material and the interview data about cultural change.

In retrospect, files on general child welfare issues and social policy might have contained insight into the policy process because Indian issues may

have been addressed alongside others. Further waiting would have been impractical, however.

As the initial focus shifted, I believed that focusing on the service providers as "street level bureaucrats"²⁹ or as brokers³⁰ would be most appropriate. While these themes emerged as important, the data did not clearly explain high rates although it complemented the other emergent information. The information on community changes that was vividly described to me by the Native respondents, however, emerged clearly and repeatedly and was complemented by service providers' information and the numerical data.

During interviews with Indian people from September 1990 to January 1991, information about the shifts in socio-economic conditions constituted a prominent theme resulting in my addressing these issues in subsequent interviews of the next phase. The issues of the high apprehensions of Native children were prominent with younger persons working in the child welfare field who were interviewed but the breakdown in families and socio-economic and cultural changes after the second World War was the strongest theme with the elders.

In the overview phase, I realized that I was asking either the wrong question, or a question that required more context, or a different data source than what I had. Lincoln and Guba describe this aspect of naturalistic inquiry as the investigator not *knowing what he or she does not know*, rather than in the deductive approach, *knowing in advance what one does not know*.³¹ Majchrzak

describes this as the stage of deciding whether to do the study or not. Yin advises that pilot studies are useful in this stage. Because there was never a question of whether the study was to be done, the issue was one of identifying appropriate questions and the multiple shaping factors.

The stages overlapped. The individual groups of data sources (documents, Native community and public servant interviews) each advised the need to refocus but did so at different times. Initially the service provider and Native interviews pointed to this possibility in the fall of 1990. Almost a year later, the archival search and the interviews with the public servants were completed, confirming this. Over the September 1990-June 1991 period, the importance of the policy making process proved to lack evidence. The archival data suggested there was little evidence on which to base an argument and the public servants substantiated this six months later. The service provider and elder Native respondents enlightened me on the perspective of cultural change and increased apprehension rates earlier than the above. By the fall of 1991 I had differentiated disproportionate rates of Indian children in care not only in Ontario, but in Rainy River District, and between reserve communities in Rainy River. I then focused my interviews on the reasons for the differences. Cultural change emerged as a major shaping factor.³² This latter period would constitute the stage of focused exploration.

Originally the area of study was to be an overview of Ontario with comparisons between Northern and Southern Ontario. The dearth of statistical

data and the difficulty in obtaining primary agency data from all of Ontario meant that a provincial overview was not feasible. It became evident too that there were considerable problems in gaining access to census data of individual reserve communities as well as summation data on numbers of all children admitted to care. Child-in-care data for Indian children by communities of origin in summation form were scarce or unavailable. I found only one reference to this in National Archival information of 1958. The sparse data that existed were reported inconsistently within and between the agencies, provincial and federal government records, and other studies.

Between 1964 and 1974, the Rainy River CAS, kept daily logbooks on admissions of children to care, their related moves, foster home moves and placement for adoption.³³ There were agency staff from the early period of the study still working at the agency or living in the area who could be interviewed. The Executive Director, Ron King, had been a key figure in the devolution of child welfare services to Ontario's Native people, and was particularly interested in the study. He offered me full access to old records. This rare source of enumerative data and the easy availability of former staff led me to pursue the District of Rainy River as a single case study, again refining the focus and time frame of the study.

Yin suggests that the site of the case study would be chosen on criteria of significance, that is, a site of unusual or general public interest. The Rainy River CAS served a population base containing about five percent Reserve

Status Indians (about five times the provincial proportion) but its clientele was largely Native. The Northern CASs had gross disproportions of Indian children in care. It was an agency which was criticized indirectly in the Patrick Johnston's study but was also a leader in the divestment of Native control of child welfare. These factors notwithstanding, its accessibility made it exemplary for this reason alone. Without the concurrence of the stakeholders and the data collection they facilitated, a sensitive study of this nature could not be attempted.³⁴

SAMPLING

This section describes the criteria for selection of key informants, the method of gaining accessibility to trustworthy information and the limitations of the sample.

Naturalistic inquiry requires that the sample for interviews not be randomized or representative nor subject to predetermined limits. It should be "purposive" as described by Lincoln and Guba³⁵ or "theoretical" as described by Glaser and Strauss.³⁶ There are no statistical inferences to a population to be made from a purposeful sample as there would be with a representative sample. The goal of the purposive sample is to provide as much variation as possible. The nature of this study meant that a purposive sample was necessary. "Maximum variation sampling" to "document the unique variations....in different conditions"³⁷ was the goal. To obtain interviews with

most of the Native persons, I used personal contacts for references. This resembles "convenience sampling,"³⁸ a method to save time and money. This was, however, a necessary way to attain maximum variation with this sensitive topic. Furthermore, in historical inquiry the researcher is limited by who is alive, well enough and willing to participate.

In this study, no persons who were elders or senior public servants during the early years of the study were alive or well enough to be interviewed. Most persons interviewed from these two groups, were young or approaching middle age during the 1950s and 1960s. The age factor was less an issue in the service provider group where many of the staff, including senior staff, of the time were young during the period.

For the public servant group, I began in 1989 by interviewing the then Director of Child Welfare for the Ministry of Community and Social Services. She facilitated interviews with her current administrative staff and a retired former Deputy Minister. This latter individual paved the way for more interviews with key individuals, referring me to her former colleagues and the then (1991) Deputy Minister who had been instrumental in the policy changes in the North a decade earlier. In the North, I made easy direct contact with public servants.

Locating child welfare personnel in the North was less difficult than expected. Some former staff of RRCAS were permanent residents of the area and were readily accessible. I had no way of knowing the names of the workers

of the time period other than through personal contacts. From the RRCAS, five of the seven persons still living and listed in Appendix E as staff from 1959-1964 were located and interviewed. The remaining two had left the area. One had been with the agency only one year and the other three years. The five interviewed were persons with a long history with the agency or child welfare subsequent to the time period. From 1965-1975, five of the 17 staff now living were interviewed. During this period, there were more staff and higher turnover than the earlier period.

From KCAS, only six workers of an unknown total number, two board former members, one former secretary and the widow of an Executive Director were located. KCAS appears to have had higher staff turnover and higher numbers of Indian children in care. The agency showed less commitment to participate in the study than RRCAS. The inaccessibility of the agency and its high turnover of workers could be factors in the higher rates of children in care in that agency than in RRCAS. KCAS rates, however, were not the focus as was RRCAS data. The Kenora staff supported points made about Indian child welfare in RRCAS and in general. A special attempt was made to interview as many workers and board members in KCAS involved in one incident over the 1964-1966 period. This was done because the events illustrate the magnitude of the difficulties of Northern CASs in serving the Native population, conclusions from which were transferred to other settings.

I approached the issue of access to the Native community with some caution. I am an outsider to the culture in an era of resistance to white researchers and had also been a child welfare worker in Native communities. Through my experience, I knew that approaching key persons by mail or even by phone for interviews would not result in a positive response to be interviewed. Instead I knew that access would more likely be gained by approaching key persons whom I knew. Some of the child welfare personnel referred me to Native elders with whom they had worked. In the Rainy River District where I had few Native contacts, this was important.

Early in the initial stage I gained access to the Board and Executive Director of the Native child welfare agency in the Rainy River District about my research. If I did not know key Native persons personally, I approached my Native or non-Native associates to do so on my behalf. Because the research did not concern one particular Native organization or community I did not feel it was necessary to formally approach any particular Band Council or political organization for formal permission. In retrospect, because the Rainy River District became a case study, it was fortunate that I had made the initial contact with the Native child welfare agency.

In some instances unexpected information caused me to reassess whether I should have developed a stricter protocol. I once checked with the informant whether this would be appropriate even retrospectively. In no case

was I advised that this would be necessary and in one case the person had already cleared their participation with her Band Council.³⁹

I interviewed no fewer than 70 persons,⁴⁰ of whom 35 were Native, 22 were non-Native service providers, and 13⁴¹ were public servants. Of the Native persons, ten were from Southern Ontario (to offer a different perspective), four from Central Ontario areas around Sudbury and North Bay, and 21 from Northern Ontario in the Kenora-Rainy River Districts. Of the latter group, 11 were from the Rainy River District, the case study. The Native respondents represented 17 First Nation communities, of which three were in Southern Ontario, two in Central Ontario and ten in Northern Ontario. Representatives of five of the ten First Nations in Rainy River' District were interviewed.

Of the non-Native service providers, only two were from Southern Ontario and 20 from the Kenora-Rainy River Districts. Of the latter group, seven were from the Rainy River District, the case study. Of the public servants, ten represented the provincial government of which four were, or had been, at Deputy Minister level⁴² and two were, or had been, Directors of Child Welfare. Two others were at the policy administration level and two at the regional level in the North. Two federal public servants, one former and one current, were also interviewed.

After gaining preliminary access to key persons with whom I was familiar, informants were located by the "snowball approach." The criterion for

deciding that the sample size was sufficient was a sense of redundancy, that is until no new categories of information seemed to be forthcoming.⁴⁹ I found that informants were recommending persons that I had already interviewed, indicating that I had reached an adequate sample of persons considered to be informed on the issues.

Copious qualitative data was collected that is not quoted directly in this paper but which provided contextual material, confirmed emerging theories, suggested other avenues of inquiry, or informed me of questions to pursue in depth with others. Frequently interview (and other) data from areas other than the Rainy River District are presented to add supporting evidence. Although the case study is Rainy River, the experience of service providers is included of the similarly situated Kenora District to show similarities or illustrate points. It is an agency that could be classed as the worst case scenario, and for this reason deserves attention.

QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

This section defines the terms of the research questions posed in Chapter 2, presents the questions that guided the qualitative and historical research and discusses how I accessed data from the different sources.

The meaning of policy in this paper incorporates the definitions of both Brooks and Simeon. Brooks defines policy as "the broad framework of ideas and values within which decisions are taken and action, or inaction, is pursued

by governments in relation to some issue or problem."⁴⁴ Simeon defined policy as "what government actually does and why."⁴⁵ Policy includes ideological considerations and guiding principles which knit together government actions. For the purposes here, it includes the decisions concerning the programs to improve Indian life - namely how to bring equal laws and programs to Indian communities, how to equitably fund Indian child welfare, and other related social policies.

The program is defined as the framework of the organizations designated to deliver the child welfare services to the Reserve Status Indian population. This includes the organization, staff characteristics, philosophy and the specific program implementation measures of the Children's Aid Societies.

The socio-economic context of the Native people includes the social, family and community structure, and the means of economic support. Within this context is superimposed cultural change which is the change in norms, values, mores, religious beliefs, and traditional practices of the Native people.

Service providers included staff and Board members of CASs as well as an occasional regional welfare worker who intervened in child welfare matters with Native people.

The names of all persons interviewed are listed in Appendix B along and the questions which guided the interviews in Appendix C.

Archival Searches: The 32 files of the provincial archives were skimmed once and then read in detail in chronological order twice over the

course of six months. Each letter, memo or document was listed and its contents summarized. All references to child welfare, social conditions or specific agencies (issues related to the initial question) were highlighted in the margins of the notes. As the study proceeded, recurrent themes such as policy on alcohol, education, social conditions and equalization of policies were noted. On the second reading, further searches were made for references to the themes that might have been missed when first introduced.

Interviews: I framed the open-ended interview questions with public servants and service providers looking for answers concerning the specific effects of child welfare policy changes. If I was unable to identify from individual interviews anything conclusive to that issue, I became more unstructured allowing the informants to tell me what they believed I should know about government policy and Native people. Later, other themes emerged. These were for example the role of municipalities in child welfare administration, the socio-economic changes after World War II in Native communities, the service providers' methods of coping with high rates of Indian children in care. I began to refocus the interviews emphasizing these emergent themes.

There were important considerations in the interviews with Native people. I would state in advance the purpose of my request either by telephone, or through my contact or in person at the interview. I usually presented my purpose as follows. "I am doing research for a university degree about the child

welfare problems that there has been in your community and would like your views. I would like to know how they were handled, and what you see the cause of the problems. Can you give me your perspective on the problems as you understand (or remember) them." The initial question depended on the role or experience of the informant and what I particularly wanted to know from that person. If my purpose was to obtain a community history I would begin directly with a question to that effect. After the initial question, the informants usually would talk unguided.

In Native culture, it is impolite to interrupt a speaker, especially an elder, until finished. In some regions it is impolite to ask questions of elders. Therefore, I approached my need for clarification carefully. If I was uncertain of the protocol, I would ask the informant how he or she would like to proceed. If they placed the issue back to me I suggested three options: they talk and I ask for clarification later; they talk and I stop them when I need clarification; or I ask all the questions and they respond.

It is common for Native elders not to answer questions immediately or directly. Often there is a long period of silence and frequently, a great deal of context is presented as the response. Sometimes the person tells an anecdote or legend to illustrate his or her response. At times I would receive a response to a question that would initially appear to have no relation to the question. This required that I listen until the informant reached the point of the question. I did not direct most interviews but towards the end of the person's

talk would consult my list to ensure each question had been addressed. The interviews with the elders lasted from two to five hours.

I once travelled seven hours to an isolated reserve to see a woman who had cared for many children in her community without any CAS involvement. She had been expecting my visit. When I arrived she said that she was too ill to talk that day but invited me to have tea with her. I visited for most of the afternoon observing the coming and going of numerous community members most of whom she had apparently fostered. In the course of the afternoon the casual conversation produced all the information that I had intended to ask her.

I do not know if the visitors heard of my coming and purposely visited this woman or if this was a normal afternoon at her place. I suspect both situations applied. The activity could be described as an example of participant observation in the natural setting. It provided insight about the different sense of urgency of time in isolated Native communities. It demonstrated how customary care arrangements would reflect and produce bonds unlike those that exist in non-Native society. It illustrated how cultural misunderstandings could occur. If the issue were a neglected child needing placement, urgency might be an issue with a young non-Native social worker who was unaccustomed to cultural differences and too anxious to exercise the patience necessary for a natural resolution to evolve.

QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

This section defines and justifies the enumerative variables selected and discusses the sources. Considerable time was spent gathering and analyzing this data although precision was not possible. Only general conclusions of "more or less" using the "eyeballing technique," were possible.

Variables:

Costs for services for Reserve Status Indian and Other Children - These costs provided an indication of the extent to which public resources were committed to a particular program option, child-in-care services. The comparison between absolute costs and percentages that were allocated to child-in-care services were important because they illustrated how different policy choices for the two populations were associated with different outcomes in the rates of children-in-care. In the absence of reliable RSI child-in-care data, the financial data for RSI children could be singled out because of its federal source.

Child-in-care counts - This variable was chosen for several reasons. A child's need for care outside its home is an indicator of family and community breakdown as well as societal inability to provide prevention services. In this study, child-in-care counts are usually reported as counts on a single date, usually December 31. This mechanism was problematic because of bias induced

by seasonal variations specific to Native communities making comparisons to non Native communities difficult. Climatic and employment availability could affect child-in-care rates seasonally. To further complicate the data, the rates were sometimes reported as July 31.

Admissions to care to RRCAS 1964-1974 - This variable was chosen for similar reasons to the above child-in-care variable. The admissions figures were more reliable than the single point child-in-care data. It avoided the problems associated with single point data and prevented double counting. Because the data source contained names, counts of separate individuals and proportions were possible.

Adoption Rate - This was measured for those children admitted to the care of RRCAS and also adopted between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1974. This variable provided an indication of several possible factors: the extent of family breakdown; the agency's ability to rehabilitate a family; the ability of the CAS to find and use extended family resources; and the intactness of extended family resources as measured by its ability to care for its neglected children.

Readmission Rate - This variable was used as an indicator of the extent of repeated crises in a family which required CAS care.

Majchrzak favours numerical data over qualitative data in policy research. She states that the qualitative data interpret the quantitative because they give valuable information that "more *rigorous* (emphasis mine) methods may overlook."⁴⁶ In this study, however, the quantitative data sometimes provides support for or interpretation of the qualitative data. I now discuss the significance of the relationship between quantitative and qualitative data in this study.

The child-in-care counts were useful as an objective context of a sensitive, subjective topic. Quantifying assertions of occurrences could throw a different light on the meaning of "high numbers of Indian children in care." Many persons talked of a "scoop" of Indian children. In the operational terms of this study, the scoop of Indian children is approximately equivalent to "disproportionate numbers of Indian children in care." If the disproportion is perceived as meaning Indian child apprehensions were not justified, the numerical demonstration of a disproportion could lead one to pursue explanations such as racial discrimination, different application of the law or cultural misunderstanding. However, if a scoop is perceived to have occurred but no disproportion is demonstrated, the context for the meaning of Indian children in care changes. If one believes that the CAS had no authority to interfere with sovereign Indian nations no matter how serious the neglect, even one apprehension is too many and represents a scoop. Even one adoption to a non-Indian family would be perceived as an act of cultural genocide. In

such a case the prime issue is not whether Indian children were in care in higher or lower proportions to non-Indian children, whether there was neglect or not, or whether the law was applied differently to Indians. The prime issue would be Indian sovereignty and whether non-Indians had the right to intervene at all. The reality of racial discrimination and the differential application of the policy would be secondary to the larger political question.

Another example of a perceived disproportionate number of children, but from service provider's perspective, would be: under arduous conditions taking just one Indian child into care each month would seem like many more apprehensions performed by an urban child welfare worker whose catchment area is within a mile or so of his or her office. Or, if many admissions were for emergency temporary, short term care, it could seem like Indian children were in care disproportionately when the number of Indian children in care at any one time could actually be smaller. The numbers and their context provide meaning to the perceptions.

Similarly, to distant public servants, the detection of high numbers of Indian children in care may be based on its significance to overall spending. If it is not a problem to the budget, no disproportion may be perceived regardless of how high the numbers are. If it is a strain on the budget, a disproportion may be perceived even if the actual number was low. This study uses financial data to illustrate the significance of this point.

The divergence or similarities between the numerical data and subjective perceptions can be explored by constant comparisons and shaping new constructs. From this process, new theory can be generated.

Detailed child welfare financial statements were found in the Annual Reports of the Department of Public Welfare from 1956-1972.⁴⁷ For each agency for each year, the statements showed the breakdown of categories of costs incurred such as costs for children in care as well as the source of funds for each agency. Costs that were billed back to the Department of Indian Affairs, total and child-in-care costs were also detailed. The value of this data was that it showed explicitly the rapid and striking increases in Indian child welfare costs over the two decades. In the absence of trustworthy provincial figures for child-in-care rates, this was useful. It revealed how costs soared enormously, yet, there was nothing to that effect in archival records. This fact lead me to pursue the question of the financial importance of Indian child welfare to the province.

The data for all children in care were from a variety of sources. They were the Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD) publication Foster Care and Adoption in Canada,⁴⁸ a 1964 DPW study, the Report of the Advisory Committee on Child Welfare to the Minister of Public Welfare,⁴⁹ Annual Reports of the Rainy River Children's Aid Society, and a monograph on the history of the RRCAS "A History of the Children's Aid Society of the District of Rainy River."⁵⁰ Data on Indian children in care came from several

sources. They were the CCSD report by Patrick Johnston for data of the late 1970s,⁵¹ the evaluation of the Indian Welfare Agreement for early 1970s data,⁵² the National Archives of Canada for figures of the 1950s,⁵³ and original log books of the RRCAS from 1964-1974.

The logbooks of RRCAS were the most reliable source. They provided useful information on race and residency. Children listed as being the responsibility of Indian Affairs were thereby identifiable on three counts: racially, whether they had Indian Status and whether they were resident of an Indian reserve. Indian children living in municipalities had their Indian status recorded even if DIA was not paying the child care. Because all admissions to care were recorded in the log books, Status Indian and other children's admissions' rate could be compared.

PROBLEMS IN SOURCES OF QUANTITATIVE DATA

Interpreting numerical data from historical secondary sources involved some guesswork. Determination of the Status Indian child-in-care rates from the 1956-1964 period were difficult to make because of inconsistent reporting. Some estimates from archival materials and documents were possible. For example, before 1965, the Department of Indian Affairs⁵⁴ recorded children cared for outside their own home and for whom DIA paid a board rate as "Foster Children." Frequently the records did not distinguish between children that DIA supported directly through its welfare funds (that is those voluntarily

placed out of their homes, usually with relatives) and children for whom DIA reimbursed a CAS for care (usually not voluntarily placed). I made counts of several sources of raw data from DIA archival material. They indicated that about half of all Indian children reported by DIA as "foster children" before 1965 were those cared for by a CAS foster parent, not a relative. After 1965, many more were cared for by CAS.

Both the federal and provincial departments, between and within the departments, reported child-in-care data inconsistently. The provincial Ministry reported rates as of December 31 of most years, and DIA reported the rate as of July 31 for two years and June for another. Admissions to care could show seasonal variations according to weather conditions and employment opportunities. Therefore comparisons using these date were problematic.

On three other occasions both departments reported the total number of children cared for during the whole year. Based on the study of other data, I determined that the child-in-care count at year-end was about 62 percent of the whole year rate. Some years no data were reported at all and the method of reporting would often switch from year to year. Because the archival sources are the only sources I was able to locate concerning early accounts of any children in care, they are reported, but with the necessary adjustments. These early figures should, therefore, be accepted with caution. The problems are noted where the figures are reported.

After the introduction of the IWA in 1965, the reporting of data was more precise for Reserve Status Indians, but still inconsistent. It, too, should still be interpreted cautiously. There were two difficulties in the population data which were used to calculate proportionate numbers of children in care. Census data is reported by the age groups 0-14 years and 15-19 years. Children could be admitted to care under the age of 16 but could be in care until the age of 21. In calculating proportions of admissions to care, I calculated admission rates based on the 0-14 year population base. I assumed that few, if any, of the Indian children admitted to care would be as old as 15 years. I assumed this because this age group would more able to look after themselves in the event of neglect and with shortages of resources they would be seen to be better able to cope with minimal support. I further noticed that in the collection of admission data, there were a number of the non-Indian children admitted to care who were 15 years of age. These children tended to be runaways from other Districts. The admissions of Reserve Status Indians was still higher than Others, indicating that this discrepancy did not bias the result significantly.

Secondly, the child-in-care (single point) proportions were calculated on the basis of a 0-19 year population base. Archival DIA data only reported RSI children under the age of 16. It is probable that a greater proportion of children in care in the 16-19 year age group were non-Indian although there is no information to support this assumption. Non-Indian child-in-care rates

would also include some persons aged 20-21. Even so, the proportion of RSI children-in-care (single point) data was still very much larger than for Others, indicating that this assumption did not cause a directional bias to the results.

Because it was important to determine the populations of individual communities in the Rainy River District before 1981, estimates of the populations were made based on their 1981 Census-reported populations. In making the estimates, I calculated for each community its population's percentage of the District's total 1981 reserve Indian child population. I applied the percentage for each community to the 1969 total reserve Indian child population to determine that community's child population for 1969. This assumed that the rate of entry and exit from the child population count was the same for each community between 1969 and 1981. This could be erroneous if birth rates and migration rates varied from community to community.

TRUSTWORTHINESS

The trustworthiness of a qualitative study is based on criteria as to whether the data are worth paying attention to. This discussion of trustworthiness also addresses some limitations of the qualitative data.

The four criteria for trustworthiness for both conventional and naturalistic research are the principles of truth value, applicability to other settings, consistency across investigators and neutrality. In conventional research they are called respectively, internal validity, external validity,

reliability, and objectivity. In naturalistic research they are called, respectively, credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.⁵⁵

Credibility

Prolonged engagement in the setting, persistent observation and triangulation by the use of multiple sources are essential to credibility in the naturalistic model.

In a non-historical study, researchers spend enough time in the physical setting that respondents would be accustomed to their presence. Without prolonged exposure, informants could gear their responses to please, tease or deceive the researcher, to be uncontroversial accounts of the facts or even give the politically expected response from a person in his or her role. In this study the exposure to the "setting" and persistent observation were a combination of my prior experience in Native services and a two year data collection time. This time is an essential element of historical research called "digestion" by Shafer.⁵⁶

There were important considerations in enhancing the credibility of interview data from all three groups of respondents.

Interviews with Native Persons: It is justifiable to criticize the believability of interview data taken from a member of one culture by a member of another. Whether a Native person would share openly with a member of the colonizing race is one consideration. Whether the researcher

interprets the information ethnocentrically and without cultural empathy is another.

In the interviews with the Native informants, their homes were the "natural settings." As an outsider I planned for long interviews to gain trust and to elicit honest responses.⁵⁷ In my previous clinical work in the North, interviews were much longer than with others. Often the goal was to discuss the issue until resolved. There was usually a long warm-up period to reach the important issues. I found the same in the research interviews.

With the Native respondents before the interview, I addressed three issues during the interviews at a time and to an extent dependent on intuition and my familiarity with the person. I outlined my Northern work experience and interests to establish that this research was not just a passing interest. Second, I described my former position with the Kenora CAS and that I wanted to understand the past. Third, I asked their views about a non-Native person doing this type of research. Although no Native person expressed any discomfort about my former role, the possibility of this as a source of bias exists. It could be inhibit response or provoke anger. It could even expedite credibility of their responses. My experience has been that the more forthright one is in such instances, the more successful is the interaction.

One long time Native associate of mine expressed reticence to be interviewed because I was non-Native. She said she resolved the issue by the realization that her people were not yet trained to do such research which she

believed was necessary. It is possible that others did not feel free to be so forthright. On the other hand, most comments were favourable, focusing on the few numbers of Native people doing research and the need for documentation of the issue.

It is possible to interpret the willing Native participation as an interest in making a political statement about the child welfare injustices. However, many people were interested in talking about the factors of cultural breakdown without attaching blame to anyone. Some were critical of their own people. This may have been a function of my race and former role. Yet, there seems to be no gain in pleasing an outsider in today's political climate and much to gain by forthright responses.

CAS Staff: In these interviews, my past experience was an asset. The CAS workers were sometimes defensive initially referring to the criticism they had faced. One expressed bitterness at being excluded from the Johnston study a decade earlier which indirectly criticized his handling of a case. I explained that my purpose was to search for other reasons for the high numbers of Indian children in care in the past. The reassurance that I also had done this type of work in the North, I believe, enhanced the trustworthiness of the information they offered.

The limitations of the scope of CAS workers interviewed was discussed earlier. One is also limited by time distorting memory with the propensity to remember only the highlights, which in this case were often dramatic

anecdotes. The overall effect, however, is to illustrate the difficulties of even culturally sensitive workers in serving Indian children while protecting them from harm at that time. The CAS staff's stories constitute the basis of one shaping variable in the presence of other variables contributing to the high rates of Indian children in care.

Public Servants: In the interviews with the public servants, I established myself as interested in understanding a complex process and not exposing government mistakes. One retired long time public servant held back no opinions about her perception of government neglect of the situation. Those still in office were more formal and general in their comments.

The verification of all information with another source (triangulation) was a built-in feature of the data sources of the study. Each source - documents, interviews, and numerical data - triangulated one another. The three groups of informants triangulated for the other. Not always could facts be verified this way, however. Frequently there were different versions of the same phenomenon reported (or not reported) by the documents, the numeric data and the informants, and difference between the versions of the three informant groups.⁵⁸ I regularly asked Native people to explain the same phenomenon or cultural or historical feature to me even though explained before. This was not always possible because of the wide variation in ages of the informants and different levels of knowledge. The use of literature from history and anthropology triangulated much of all the data categories.

There was no easy mechanism to engage in immediate and systematic peer debriefing, a process of presenting findings to a disinterested peer who would pose questions and challenges to the researcher. The research involved travel to at least 15 different cities and Native communities extending from Ottawa to Winnipeg. This included extensive periods in the Rainy River District on five different occasions, numerous visits to the Provincial Archives in Toronto, and two extended visits to the National Archives in Ottawa. The diversity of the data would have required daily debriefings. The cost and time that would be incurred did not make this a viable option. The Majchrzak model recommends the use of an advisory committee which would most likely be an appointed body of the overseeing agency doing the policy research. Lincoln and Guba do not recommend the use of any person in authority for such purposes. For practical purposes, the dissertation committee chair, and to a lesser extent other members, acted as debriefers from time to time and reviewed summations of individual categories of data and accounts of chronological events.

The nature of naturalistic inquiry is to revise hypotheses that develop with the emergent design. Enhancing the credibility requires the use of the "negative case analysis,"⁵⁹ that is, the accounting for all cases, to establish credibility. In this study, I had initially believed that rapid increases in children-in-care would have occurred immediately after the introduction of the Indian Welfare Agreement in 1965. On closer examination of the data and

other details, I realized that the increase had been gradual, beginning much earlier than 1965. I revised my thinking about the 1965 policy change as a major determinant but the reason for the misinterpretation generated a new direction in the analysis.⁶⁰

Transferability

The results of the study should be generalized with caution to Southern regions where the context differs. The Northern reserves were economically poor during the years under study and the area's Children's Aid Societies had few other services. The Native people in Southern regions would have had different employment prospects and a longer acculturation period. The larger CASs were more likely to have had different levels of training and experience than in the North and more access to voluntary sources of funding for prevention services.

Policy changes might have been associated with high rates of children in care in other regions but at different time periods. For example, there is evidence of a surge in admissions of Indian children to care in the South just after the introduction of child welfare services in the late 1950s. A theory about the effects of socio-economic change and CAS administration could be used as a starting point for a similar study in a Southern region during that time period.

The multiple factors that mutually shaped the rate of child apprehensions might reveal different outcomes in different regions. There might be greater success of transferring the findings of Rainy River to a District such as Kenora. Naturalistic inquiry cannot provide a blue print for transferability but offers data on which judgements about applicability to other settings are made.

Dependability

Dependability in naturalistic inquiry parallels reliability or replicability in conventional inquiry. Dependability rests on the reliability of the instrument which is the human instrument. The results of this study would vary if the human instrument were to vary in any combination of the following circumstances: experience in Native services especially child welfare; Nativeness; and the timing of the study. Each inquirer may yield a different emergent design. Different emergent designs, different environments and natural changes will render different results. I argue that a replication of this study would not produce the same results.

This study in five years could produce different data because of different interest in the issues by respondents. The present is a time of increased pride for Canada's First Nations as they take control of their own services and governments. The 1990s may be sufficiently distant from the difficult years of the 1960s and 1970s that the ability to reflect on those years with a non-

Native person exists. It is impossible to predict how receptive the informants would be in five years. The data received is much different than what the Johnston study received 10 years ago when there was much bitterness about, and little control over child welfare. Issues such as sexual abuse or high rates of alcohol abuse are discussed in a candid manner not seen a decade ago. Previously these issues were raised judiciously and usually only in a clinical setting. The emphasis that respondents placed on the residential schools in the breakdown of culture could be influenced partially by the attention now devoted to these schools. The publicity revives memories and could be society's permission to talk. This type of information also poses a potential source of error if the respondent expects this is the expected response. Many Native people are undergoing their own healing and may find it cathartic to talk about their pasts. At another time other issues may be more prominent with different levels of sharing possible.

If the study were done by a Native investigator it would likely yield different results. The design and results reflect the work of a clinically oriented, non-oppressed member of the colonizing culture. Native investigators might focus on policies which were violations of human rights, on racist implementations of policies, inconsistencies with other policies, or on child welfare policies' violation of Indian sovereignty. If the study were done a decade from now by a Native person, a clinical and less political perspective might be taken and may resemble mine. I expect that some of the same

information would emerge regardless of who does the study and when. These issues would be interpreted from a perspective that reflected that time. In any case, the responses from the Native informants would differ. The interpretations of the cultural issues would be culture-specific rather than culturally empathic.

Indeed, if I were to do the study anytime in the near or distant future I would expect different results because I would interact in a much different way with the setting. The above notwithstanding, provided that I have employed the appropriate rigour, none of the above issues precludes the credibility of the results of this study. Any new results of the same study would serve to complement and provide new interpretations to this one.

Confirmability

In naturalistic inquiry, attempts to ensure confirmability are made through rigorous and detailed documentation of data. Lincoln and Guba do not recommend taping interviews because it can detract or inhibit the respondent. Note taking forces the interviewer to listen more attentively. In contrast, Yin supports taping to ensure there is no misunderstanding of what was said. I elected to do both when appropriate and permission was granted to tape.⁶¹ With the Native informants there could be aspects of their cultural explanations which I could misunderstand on first hearing. Taping was useful to record emphasis and emotion. I found most public servants spoke quickly

making taping an advantage. Recording the interviews allowed for observing the respondent or to stop writing if the content required extra concentration. I replayed all interviews and made notes of what was missed in the initial note taking, noting themes and categories. The interviews were not transcribed.

All archival sources are listed by reference number and its nature (letter, memo, document and title, sender, receiver), with its contents summarized. All materials of one file are kept together and all material appears in my notes in historical chronological order.

DATA ANALYSIS

From Chapter 2, the general question of this study is: What are the factors that explain why Reserve Status Indians were taken into care of Ontario Children's Aid Societies from 1956-1974? The specific questions are: Did changes in public policy with respect to Reserve Status Indians result in the increases in the number of Reserve Status Indian children in care? Did social, economic and cultural change within Indian communities result in increases in the number of Reserve Status Indian children taken into care? What factors of Children's Aid Societies' administration and practice resulted in the increases in numbers of Indian children in care?

The four strategies for all research are deduction-induction, generalization-verification, construction-enumeration and subjective-objective reconstruction.⁶² The strategies adhered to were: inductive analysis beginning

with the data not the hypothesis; the generation of theory that creates rather than verifies theory; and the reconstruction of categories of data used by subjects rather than applying categories to the data (subjective). In naturalistic inquiry, data is a construction that stems from an interaction between the inquirer and the data source. Data analysis is the reconstruction of the information.⁶³ Data is analyzed by "constant comparison"⁶⁴ meaning that as observations are made and categorized, they are compared to previous observations in that and other categories. The other means of analysis was "typological"⁶⁵ or thematic. These themes were naturalistically derived from the emerging data and were not predetermined.

I diverted from the model by employing aspects of the construction-enumeration strategy and thematic analysis. Enumerative data were useful in demonstrating significant changes in child-in-care rates over time taking into consideration population changes within the Indian and non-Indian populations. One simple statistical test within one of the categories of the enumerative data was used to demonstrate significant differences. Much of the enumerative data was found without prior knowledge of its existence or meaning. Therefore, the questions that it addressed emerged and are interpreted by the qualitative data. Therefore, an inductive approach to much of the enumerative data was taken.

Following a period of studying financial trends in several agencies, the relevant financial data were attained. The exact magnitude of the

enumerations described were less important than the comparative patterns that emerged. The descriptive financial and quantitative data of child-in-care rates posed evidence that child welfare policy for Indians had the potential for different outcomes by its unique situation in the structure of the provincial and federal governments. The analysis of the enumerative data is described first.

QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Rationale for the Use of Reserve Status Indian Population Data

The RSI population was selected as opposed to non-Status or Status Indians off reserve for reasons concerning the original problem and for reliable identification.

The first reason for using RSI rates is because of the statements that CASs intervened on reserves disproportionately. Whether the children were apprehended from on-reserves or off-reserve communities is important to the context of the problem - the right to intervene on reserves, the socio-economic conditions on the reserves and the ability of CAS workers to understand Indian reserve culture. The second reason for using RSI counts is because most RSI child welfare costs were payed for by the federal government. For billing purposes, the CASs recorded Indian Status of a child and the provincial government kept summation data of RSI children in care. They are the only segment of the Indian population for which accurate count data was attainable. It would be equally important to study the rates for non-Status Indian, urban

Status Indian or Metis children in care. However, it would be impossible to discern historically which children were in these categories and what portions of government monies went to each population.

Analytic Procedures

Comparative Allocations of Child Welfare monies for RSI and Other Children for all Ontario:

The following procedures were employed:

1. The escalating of child welfare costs (total and child-in-care) was compared for Reserve Status Indian children and Other Children between 1957-1972 to determine whether policy changes were associated with different changes in total costs (and therefore child-in-care costs)
2. The percentage of total budgets that were spent on children-in-care is compared between Reserve Status Indian children and Others to determine whether policy changes were associated with different significant changes in the percentages spent on child care.

The results of steps 1-2, illustrate the trends in child welfare spending before and after the policy changes of 1966 and illustrate the increases for RSI children. The results of step 2 compare how the resources for RSI and Other children were being spent differently.

Comparative analysis of financial implications of child welfare costs for Ontario for RSI and Other Children:

The following procedures were employed:

1. The calculation of actual costs to Ontario of Indian child welfare between 1966 and 1976 by application of the Indian Welfare Agreement (IWA) funding formula. (See chapter 4)
2. The actual cost to Ontario of child welfare costs for Other Children between 1966 and 1972 by application of the Canada Assistance Plan formula.⁶⁶ (Chapter 4)
3. Calculation and comparison of the percentages of the total Ontario child welfare budget that actual costs for Reserve Status Indians and for Other Children were to the province.

Steps 1-3 demonstrate the financial significance of RSI child-in-care costs to the province. This data allowed the emergence of a theory as to why costs were allowed to escalate disproportionately.

Analysis of the trends in child-in-care rates for all Ontario from 1956-1976 comparing the trend for Reserve Status Indians and Others:

This section analyzes how the 1966 policy changes (CAP and IWA) were associated with divergent outcomes for all Ontario RSI children and Others in child-in-care rates.

1. The trend in total child-in-care rates from 1957-1976 was analyzed to determine whether they rose or dropped proportionately and whether changes were associated with significant policy changes. By tracing the overall rates for all children in care for the years 1957, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1976, I analyzed the changing rates over the two decades of policy

change.⁶⁷ The significant periods of policy change analyzed were 1957-1961, 1961-1965, 1965-1971, and 1971-1976. I took the proportion of all children in care for each year at the beginning of the period and compared it to the proportions at the end of the period. These particular periods were chosen for a combination of reasons: they straddle the specific points of policy change which were 1957, 1962, 1966, and the latter two periods represent the two five year periods after the introduction of CAP and IWA. The fact that these years were either Census years or adjacent to the Census year was also convenient. The child population changed rapidly between 1956 and 1971, but not necessarily in the same direction for Reserve Status Indians and Others.⁶⁸ Therefore the use of the years closest to the Census years minimized error using graphical extrapolation.

A one directional "Z" test of two proportions was administered to test whether the proportion of children in care (p_1) at the beginning of the period were statistically higher than the proportions (p_2) at the end of each period. (The Z test accounts for population differences between both groups, a major factor in comparisons between the Reserve Status Indian population which constitutes a small percent of the Ontario population). The proportions at the beginning of the periods were hypothesized to be higher based on the expectation that the policies

introduced would reduce the numbers of children in care. Beginning with the Null hypothesis (H_0) that $p_1=p_2$, and the Alternative (H_a) that $p_1 > p_2$, a Z score value greater than 1.645 at an alpha level of .05 suggests evidence to reject the Null hypothesis. One would therefore conclude that p_1 is significantly larger than p_2 , that is, that the proportional number of children in care in the latter year is smaller. A Z score value less than -1.645 suggests p_1 is significantly smaller than p_2 and the proportional number of children in care in the latter year is larger. A Z score between -1.645 and 1.645 indicates no significant difference in the proportions of children in care.

2. The trend in child-in-care rates from 1956-1976 compares the trend for RSI children and Others. A one directional Z test of two proportions was administered to test whether the proportion of Reserve Status Indian children in care (p_1) was statistically higher than the proportion of Other Children in care (p_2). It was hypothesized that the proportions of RSI children in care would be higher. Beginning with the Null hypothesis (H_0) that $p_1=p_2$ and the Alternative (H_a) $p_1>p_2$, a Z score value greater than 1.645 at an alpha level of .05 suggests evidence to reject the Null and to conclude that p_1 is statistically larger than p_2 . This would mean that the proportion of RSI children in care is larger than the rate for Other Children. A Z score value less than -1.645

suggests that p1 is statistically smaller than p2 and that the proportion of RSI children in care is smaller than the proportion for Other Children. A Z score between -1.645 and 1.645 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the two proportions.

This section establishes the overall trends in Ontario and is the basis of comparison with the RRCAS.

Comparison of financial and child-in-care data between Rainy River CAS and all Ontario:

The trends for Ontario and the RRCAS demonstrate how the RRCAS changed its focus over years of significant child welfare policy change. The child-in-care rates in Rainy River CAS escalated so much that the agency became more of a child caring agency than was the average Ontario CAS, shifting its focus from non Indians to Indians.

The following procedures were used:

1. The escalation of child welfare costs (total and child-in-care) was compared between Reserve Status Indian children and Other Children (Others) between 1957-1972 to determine whether policy changes were associated with changes in costs;
2. The percentage of total budgets that were spent on children-in-care is compared between Reserve Status Indian children and Others to determine whether policy changes were associated with significant changes in the percentages spent on child care;

3. The trends noted in section 1 steps 1-2, were compared between Ontario and RRCAS descriptively;
4. As for Ontario, I compared the proportionate rates of all CIC at the first and last year of the significant periods 1957-1961, 1961-1965, 1965-1977 and 1971-1977 using the one directional Z test of two proportions. This was tested at an Alpha level of .05, assuming the $H_0: p_1=p_2$ and the $H_a: p_1>p_2$ (p_1 is the proportion in first year in the time period and p_2 for the last year in the time period).
4. A cross-sectional comparison of all children-in-care proportions was made between Rainy River and all Ontario for the years 1957, 1961, 1965, 1971 and 1976 using one directional Z test for two proportions. Testing at an alpha level of .05, assuming $H_0:p_1=p_2$ and $H_a:p_1>p_2$ (p_1 was the proportion of children in care in Ontario and p_2 the proportion of children in care in RRCAS), a score greater than 1.64 is evidence to reject the Null Hypothesis and to conclude that the proportion of children in RRCAS was smaller than for Ontario. Because accurate year end figures for RSI children were not available for RRCAS for 1957-1965, I could not compare the RSI proportion for Rainy River to the RSI proportion for Ontario.

Analysis of disproportionate child-in-care rates within RRCAS:

This section confirms the changing focus of the RRCAS by comparative analysis of admission rates of RSI children and Other children. The following procedure was used:

1. The actual number of individual children admitted to care between 1964-1974 at least once in that year was recorded. The numbers of Other Children placed for emergency protection (that is, children who were not infants being placed for adoption or children on adoption probation in Rainy River District from another District) were singled out and counted for comparison to the admissions of Indian children who were admitted for emergency protection. As before, Z tests for disproportions were administered comparing the proportion admitted of the RSI population with the proportion of Others admitted for emergency reasons, and secondly with the proportion for all reasons.

Comparisons of rates of admissions to care, readmissions and adoptions between the reserve communities in Rainy River District:

This section is a community by community analysis of the disproportionate numbers of Indian children in care, the disproportionate adoption rate between Rainy River District communities, and the disproportionate readmission rate. The data was analyzed non parametrically to produce the following results:

1. The percentage of the estimated mid-point (1969) population represented by the number of individual children admitted to care from each community in the eleven year period (new cases);
2. The yearly number of individuals admitted to care for each community (taken as new cases each year);
3. Determination of the number of RSI children who were admitted and adopted during the 11 year period was made and the community of origin noted and the percentage of children adopted calculated;
4. A determination of the Indian children who were admitted to care more than once during the 11 year period and the community of origin noted to obtain a readmission rate;
5. Determination of the rank order of communities with respect to admission rates, readmission rates and adoption rates.

The comparative differences in admission rates, adoption rates and readmission rates are interpreted from information about the community histories of socio-economic and cultural change from individuals of the respective communities. The relationship between these changes and different rates provide theory to explain the high numbers of Indian children in care. The analysis includes reports of related literature.

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

It was often difficult to establish relationships and causal links between categories by immediate constant comparative analysis. The waiting periods for Archival access and the distances between data sources precluded this optimal approach to qualitative data analysis.

The data is categorized into themes that ground theory explaining the high rates of Indian children in care.

The themes that address the question, "Did changes in public policy with respect to Reserve Status Indians result in the increases in the number of Reserve Status Indian children in care?" are:

- * the effect of the unique federal-provincial jurisdictional situation of Indian child welfare services;
- * the inconspicuous nature of Indian child welfare costs to all governments (provincial, federal and municipal);
- * the recurrence of secondary gain aspects of the funding of Indian child welfare services and their contribution to high rates of Indian children in care;
- * the lack of knowledge of Northern and Indian conditions by DPW;
- * liberal notions of equality and the effect on high numbers of Indian children in care, (relating to other policies).

The themes that address the question, "Did social, economic and cultural change within Indian communities result in increases in the number of Reserve Status Indian children taken into care?" are:

- * the role of education in economic and family breakdown;
- * the role of residential schools in cultural breakdown;
- * the move from traditional economies to wage or welfare income;
- * relocation and economic and cultural breakdown;
- * the role of alcohol.

The themes that address the question, "What factors of Children's Aid Societies' administration and practises resulted in increases in the numbers of Reserve Status Indian children in care?" are:

- * financial conditions of CASs before 1965, the pressure for CASs to have children-in-care if no municipal or voluntary support existed (related to secondary gain at the policy level);
- * secondary gain to CASs of federal funding for Indian child-in-care;
- * CAP funding and increased accountability to the province for services;
- * agency staff actions foster home resources.

These themes are integrated with the other two factors. The overriding theme of the service providers was that of the adaptations they made to the new situations and policy.

Following the analysis of each of the themes for each factor, overriding abstract concepts that cut across all the factors are identified. They are

discussed as broad abstract influences on the concrete policy choices and factors.

The qualitative analysis examines how each factor shaped the high numbers of RSI children in care.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is limited by its focus on the unique situation of Ontario, its wide scope and the limits of available child welfare data. Its historical nature compounds all these factors.

At the heart of Indian child welfare policy has been federal-provincial relations. Ontario has a unique federal-provincial agreement for child welfare which constitutes a major determinant of high child welfare rates. As discussed in Chapter 2, this author concluded earlier that provinces with no federal-provincial agreement tended to have higher rates of Indian children in care than Ontario in 1979. A comparison of the earlier Ontario rates to a province with no agreement could have strengthened the study. Given the costs and cumbersome logistics in obtaining accurate primary Indian child-in-care data, this was impractical. Furthermore, there are numerous problems in interprovincial comparisons as discussed in Chapter 2.

A second limitation is the concentration on the rates for Reserve Status Indian children. Because of the federal responsibility for RSI matters, separate data for these rates and costs were identifiable. Data for non-Status, Metis and

off-reserve Status Indians cannot be tracked historically. As the results show, the latter were in care in very high but undetermined numbers. Because they are included as "Others" in the results, the findings do not reflect the much higher disproportion of all children of Aboriginal origin in care. Other authors have generalized the analysis to all Aboriginal children.⁶⁹ This study has been cautious in this respect because social change may have shaped child-in-care rates differently for each group. Speculations are made periodically, however, about the implications of the findings for these groups.

The third limitation is the focus on admissions to care. In-care rates for RSI children are difficult to locate and inconsistently reported. A more reliable measure of the use of foster care would have been a comparison of total "child-in-care" days, that is, the number of children in care multiplied by the number of days in care for each child. The historical nature of the study prevented obtaining such detailed records, however.

A fourth limitation existed in the sample of CAS staff who were interviewed. Those interviewed were persons who were readily located and/or still working in the child welfare field. It could be argued that staff with a longer commitment to child welfare work and the North would have a different sensitivity to Native culture than those who left the area and/or had a short tenure. This aspect of the study was also limited by who was able and willing to be interviewed.

Endnotes to Chapter 3

1. Quote of P.H. Rossi, J.D.Wright and S.R. Wright, "The Theory and Practice of Applied Social Research," Evaluation Quarterly 2(2): 171-191, in Anne Majchrzak, Methods for Policy Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984), page 1.
2. See Ann Majchrzak, Methods for Policy Research, Applied Social Research Methods Series (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984); Martin Bulmer, "Introduction and Further Readings to Part III, Historical Sources," Chapter 8 in Sociological Research Methods: An Introduction (London England: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1986); R.J. Shafer, A Guide to Historical Method (Homewood Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1974); Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social Research Methods Series (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984).
3. Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Beverly Hills California: Sage Publications, 1985).
4. Majchrzak, 58.
5. Ibid., 23.
6. Yin, 23.
7. Majchrzak, 19.
8. Yin, 99-120.
9. Lincoln and Guba, 189.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 40.
12. Ibid., 67.
13. Majchrzak, 19.
14. Shafer, 175.
15. B.G. Glaser and A.L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (New York: Aldene De Gruyter, 1967).
16. Yin, 54.
17. Lincoln and Guba, 336.

18. Shafer, 160.
19. Majchrzak, 66.
20. John H. Goldthorpe, "The Relevance of History to Sociology," in Sociological Research Methods: An Introduction, ed. Martin Bulmer (MacMillan Education Ltd.: London England, 1986).
21. Yin, 107.
22. Majchrzak, page 66 quoting C.E. Lindholm and D Cohen, Usable Knowledge: Social Services and Social Problem Solving (New Haven Ct.: Yale University Press, 1979).
23. Lincoln and Guba, page 209.
24. Ibid., 41.
25. Shafer, 175.
26. Lincoln and Guba, page 235-236.
27. The Access to Information Act was just 2 years old at the time. Much of the record group specific to the Ministry of Community and Social Services had not yet been processed. Because the contents of the files could not be determined from the Finding Aids, this meant guesswork about what to request and a further delay while the material was processed. The archivist advised me that it would take the staff about six months before they could begin the review of the material and at least one year to process it before making it available to me.
28. There were great variations in the volume of information in files on individual Children's Aid Societies that served Native clientele. The file of RRCAS consisted mostly of polite routine correspondence between the Deputy Minister and the agency. The file for KCAS had much more content.
29. From the concept labelled as such by Michael Lipskey, Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 1982).
30. From the work of Robert Paine, Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic (St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University, 1971).
31. Lincoln and Guba, 209.
32. I never totally abandon the initial question. Even with document searches and latter day interviews I persisted to see if insights into the initial question would eventually emerge.

33. The logbooks started in the middle of 1963 and were discontinued in the middle of 1975, the tenure of one Executive Director who was described as "going by the books."
34. The Kenora CAS might have been an even more unusual case study because of its exorbitant child-in-care rates and other serious problems. My initial discussions with KCAS staff indicated that data sources would not be easily available.
35. Lincoln and Guba, 199.
36. Glaser and Strauss, 45.
37. Lincoln and Guba, 200.
38. Ibid., 201.
39. The contact had already been facilitated by Marlene Brant-Castellano, a consultant to the organization, which I believed was sufficient.
40. A few interviews involved more than one person. They are included in this number.
41. I am including 3 individuals whom I consulted in 1988 for another paper which sparked my interest in this study.
42. Two individuals, then Deputy Minister Robert MacDonald, and former Deputy Minister George Thomson were interviewed earlier, in a study for a term paper on the development of the Child and Family Services Act, Joyce B. Timpson, "The Making of Indian and Native Child Welfare Policy in Ontario 1977-1984: A Study in Cross Cultural Public Administration," unpublished term paper Wilfrid Laurier University Faculty of Social Work, May 1988. The information they offered was used in this study and also generated some of the fundamental questions concerning the policy making process.
43. Lincoln and Guba, 202. I say this with some qualification, however, as each issue was actually the basis for a separate thesis. No new categories of information emerged although the major themes seemed to recur with different perspectives with each person.
44. Stephen Brooks, Public Policy in Canada: An Introduction (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989), 16.
45. Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 9(December 1976):548.
46. Majchrzak, 62.

47. The Department was renamed the Department of Social and Family Services in 1968 and the Ministry of Community and Social Services in 1971.
48. Hepworth, 1980.
49. C.J. Foster, chairman Minister's Advisory Committee on Child Welfare Report of the Advisory Committee on Child Welfare to the Minister of Public Welfare, June 1964.
50. Susan McQuaker, A History of the Children's Aid Society of the District of Rainy River, 1977.
51. Patrick Johnston, 1983.
52. TAP Associates 1978.
53. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6937, file-1/29-4, part 4, Correspondence 1957-1962 regarding the care of foster children.
54. In 1966 Indian Affairs Branch transferred from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration became a department with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
55. Lincoln and Guba, 218-219 and 290-293.
56. Shafer, 178.
57. I also prepared myself for a short interview if I felt unwelcome. Once I had the feeling that the person agreed to be interviewed as a favour to her former CAS worker whom she had seen as quite helpful
58. An example is the placing of a large number of children for adoption in Northern reserves in the 1960s about which there was much mixed information. See Chapter 11.
59. Lincoln and Guba, page 309.
60. There appeared to be an enormous jump in Indian child-in-care rates and exorbitant rises in costs in 1966. This caused me to believe there was a direct and immediate association between the policy and increased rates. I learned that before 1966, child-in-care costs of all Indian children from the Unorganized Territories in care were covered by the province, not the federal government. After 1966, the federal government assumed responsibility for the Status Indian children in the Unorganized Territories. Before 1966, there were a great many of these children in care but they were not identified by either provincial or federal records. They account for a large degree of the sudden jump in numbers after 1966. See Chapters 5 and 6.

61. Three persons would not agree to be taped and with one, a former CAS client, I did not raise the issue. With all the taped interviews, I suggested that the informant instruct me to turn off the recorder if they wished to talk confidentially or to use names.

62. Lincoln and Guba, 333-336.

63. Ibid., 332.

64. Ibid., 335.

65. Ibid., 336.

66. Child Welfare financial reports were not reported in Annual Reports after 1972. Figures after 1972 for Reserve Status Indians only were available from the report A Starving Man Doesn't Argue.

67. These years were chosen for several reason. They represent Census years or years adjacent to Census years. This fact is important because of rapid increases in the child populations in the post war period. They are also close to the actual years in which policy change occurred.

68. The total child population grew rapidly after the war until the 1976 Census when a decrease was noted. The RSI population grew much slower but a rapid increase was seen after 1970.

69. For example, Chris Bagley (Chapter 2, endnote 15) generalized the findings of Johnston and Hudson to the case of Richard Cardinal, a Metis.

II

CHILD WELFARE POLICIES AND ITS EFFECT ON CHILD-IN-CARE RATES

PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT OF INDIAN CHILD WELFARE

At the heart of Indian child welfare policy in Ontario is its unique federal-provincial position as a jurisdictional orphan. Other authors have implicated the jurisdictional issues as factors in the high rates of Indian children in care from the 1950s to the 1970s.¹ How the jurisdiction has influenced the outcome has been unclear, however. Because of the dispute, most provinces provided in-care services in extreme emergencies only. Child welfare authorities usually intervened only when there was no alternative to apprehension. The jurisdictional issue is elaborately connected with the funding agreement for Indian child welfare services in Ontario. In my earlier study I argued that Ontario with its agreement to provide services had a smaller disproportion between Reserve Status Indian and Other Children in care compared to provinces which had no agreements. I proposed that the agreement was influential to this outcome. Given the larger disproportions in Northern Ontario agencies, however, the agreement may not have had the same effect in this region. In this Part II, I attempt to show the connection between jurisdiction and funding arrangements and how together they influenced the rates of Indian children in care.

This chapter details the context of the decision to extend Indian child welfare services and the accommodations made between the federal

government and Ontario. It explores the, legislative, historical and current context of Indian child welfare. The chapter begins with the legislative context, a description of the background to Indian child welfare policies in the post war years including the policy of the Indian Affairs Branch before CAS involvement on reserves. It then describes the Ontario situation and the policy's historical evolution culminating in the decision to divest Indian child welfare to Indian groups.

LEGISLATION

At the time of Confederation the British North America (BNA) Act (now the Constitution Act) placed Indians and their land under the authority of the federal government. The BNA Act Section 94 (24) assigned to the federal government areas within its jurisdiction. "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" specifies that the federal government holds jurisdiction for Indians.² Given its distance, the federal government was thought likely to respect the reserves and treaties already in existence. The federal government's common interpretation of Section 94 (24) is made by constitutional expert, Peter Hogg: The federal government is authorized but not obligated to pass legislation for Status Indians on matters outside its normal legal authority (that is provincial matters).³

Section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act assigned the responsibility for child welfare and family matters to the provinces:⁴

In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say....

(13) Property and Civil Rights in the Province

This provision refers to "civil rights" as opposed to "civil liberties," primarily property, contractual or tortious rights - rights in which a legal rule stipulates that one person is entitled to something from another.⁵ Therefore, Indians as a people are a federal responsibility, child welfare services a provincial responsibility. The federal government could legislate for Indians in child welfare but has chosen not to.

The major areas of federal responsibility, (normally under provincial jurisdiction for other Canadians), were outlined in the Indian Act of 1876. These areas are property, succession and education.⁶ Child welfare legislation was not considered a possible area for state intervention until several decades later,⁷ and therefore was not mentioned in this Act. The federal government could have added child welfare later to its list of areas of responsibility if it chose to do so.

In the 1947 hearings of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Indian Act, the lack of provincial involvement on the reserves was extensively debated.⁸ Subsequent to the hearings an amendment was made to the Indian Act to make provincial laws applicable. Section 88 (then Section 87) was added to state:

Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indian reserves in the provinces...⁹

Because child welfare is not mentioned in any treaty or the Indian Act, and because child welfare laws apply to the general public, provincial child welfare laws would apply to Status Indians after 1951.¹⁰ No secure funding mechanism accompanied the changes in the Indian Act. Until the agreements to extend service in 1956, child welfare agencies provided child welfare services to reserves only on request.¹¹ Because only child placement services would be offered, no pre-protection or family rehabilitation services would be available increasing the chance of a higher rate of Indian children in care.

THE DEPRESSION, WORLD WAR TWO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE

The depression forced Canada to examine federal-provincial powers. The hardships affected different provinces with varying degrees of severity. Welfare costs quadrupled between 1930 and 1937, depleting the resources of some municipalities and provinces. In 1937, Canada established the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations to examine: increased government responsibilities due to economic and social developments; the need for wider possible division of powers and functions between governments; and allegations of duplication and overlapping of powers.¹²

The BNA Act had given the provinces the responsibility for social welfare, a burden which was not expected to grow but which would be a matter of personal responsibility and charity.¹³ The report stated,

Canada's present and prospective economic condition makes it clear that we can neither continue to afford the friction and waste of confronting policies, nor the greater loss due to paralysis of policy arising from a possibly obsolete division of governmental responsibilities and powers.¹⁴

Concerning social welfare, the Commission recommended it remain with the provinces who were,

most likely to design and administer them, not merely with the greatest economy and greatest technical efficiency but with the regard for the social, cultural and religious outlook of the various regions of Canada, which is essential to human welfare.¹⁵

The Commission concluded that exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion over certain areas (specifically Indians and the military) implied a welfare responsibility. This justified the recommendation that jurisdiction for Indian social services remain federal. At the same time, in the health area it warned that the provinces could not protect themselves from the infectious diseases and tuberculosis on reserves as long as Indian health remained under the Dominion.¹⁶ While overlooking that Indians had the right to the advantages of provincial competence in social services, it recommended provincial involvement in health to protect the general population. Indian best interests were not a priority of the Commission.

Before World War II the hallmark of Canadian Indian policy was aggressively assimilative.¹⁷ Special status and reserves were means to protect Aboriginal people and prepare them for eventual entry into mainstream society.¹⁸ The few services that existed for reserves were covered by the federal government under historical Treaty obligations. Indians who remained

registered under the federal Indian Act could not vote or consume alcohol. They were also forbidden to practise the rituals of their traditional religions.¹⁹ Much of the life of Indian reserves was regulated by the federal government. It was expected that Indians would want to be like the mainstream and would wilfully "enfranchise" by receiving a one-time monetary settlement. By doing so they would lose their special status and have all the same rights as non-Indians.

The institutional racism of World War II induced Canadian society to reexamine its own racist laws against its Native people. Because of the federal obligations, Indians did not benefit from social and health services provided under provincial law. The Second World War was also a turning point as far as Canada's orientation towards government involvement in public welfare. Before the war, most personal social services were delivered by charitable organizations. The belief that poverty was a moral issue and the poor were either deserving or undeserving, dominated the few public welfare services that existed.²⁰ Children's Aid Societies which began during the child saving movement of the end of the 19th Century continued to be run by private citizen boards.²¹ Indian Affairs Branch placed orphaned or out-of-control Indian children in residential schools, introduced for Indian education from the late 19th Century. They were usually far from the child's home.²² The Schools were not set up as child welfare resources. In reality, even by the 1970s the

numbers of children in the schools for "social reasons" was not insignificant as was referred to in Chapter 2 and is addressed later.

The misery of the depression coupled with the prosperity of the War preceded an acceptance, if not an expectation, of state involvement in the protection of its citizens from poverty. The philosophy of social security as a universal right emerged.²³ Status Indians had been excluded from Mother's Allowance programs and Old Age Security,²⁴ both programs for the "deserving poor." The sparse material conditions and their ineligibility for these programs because of race was a national embarrassment. The process of extending provincial social programs to Status Indians followed the 1947 hearings of the Select Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Indian Act. The Canadian Welfare Council and the Canadian Association of Social Workers strongly influenced the Select Committee through an emotional brief that highlighted the discriminatory law in light of the poverty they perceived. They made an impassioned case for Indian-delivered services using on reserve foster homes and resources.²⁵ This was an advanced position for the time. The Indian Act was changed to make provincial law applicable on reserves but the other recommendations were not realized for another four decades.

EARLY INDIAN AFFAIRS CHILD WELFARE POLICY²⁶

From 1949, the Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration employed a total of seven professional social

workers for all of Canada to deal with the myriad of social services, child welfare being just one. Three had MSW degrees, one a Bachelor of Social Work (BSW), another a College Diploma and one had no academic credentials but extensive child welfare experience.²⁷ All women, their salaries were about \$3,000 per year in 1950. They were probably more qualified and better paid than most CAS workers, especially those in rural and isolated areas where reserve communities would likely be located. They worked under the supervision of the Superintendent of Welfare Services, World War II veteran Colonel H.M. Jones. According to one former employee, Jones ran his department like the military. His staff addressed him as "Colonel" and stood as he entered the room. As a representative of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Colonel Jones' mission, the former employee stated, was to make Indians into good citizens.²⁸ IAB issued a manual outlining its child welfare policy and Colonel Jones wrote lengthy personal letters to each new recruit about these policies. Social workers made yearly visits to reserves and worked with local service providers such as federal nurses and local IAB agents. They dealt with situations beyond the purview of the latter group, such as placements of handicapped children in outside institutions.

There appeared to be no clear procedures for child welfare services other than to fit situations into federal Indian policies and the realities of Children's Aid Society resources. One duty of social workers was to determine an out-of-wedlock child's Indian "status." In the general child welfare philosophy of the

time, the rights of out-of-wedlock children were inherited through the mother. For Status Indians however the rights of these children came through the paternal line. Any child born to an unmarried Status Indian woman and for whom the father was not Status Indian was denied legal Indian status. These women could receive no federal relief for the children. At that time if they moved to a municipality no provincial aid was available to them because they were Status Indians and under federal jurisdiction.

There are indications that these children were not welcomed by some Indian communities as indicated by later concerns expressed by the Indian Advisory Committee of the Deputy Minister of the Ontario Department of Public Welfare (DPW). The Indian Advisory Committee in a 1961 brief to the federal Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs demanded protection for these children. In its brief it resolved

That more protection and support be provided the Indian illegitimate child on the Reservation. At the same time it is realized that Indian Bands deserve protection from any unwarranted inclusion of an illegitimate child on band lists, particularly where the putative father may be non-Indian.²⁹

IAB called these children trespassers on reserves and Indian Affairs officials expected that they would eventually leave the reserve. Indian Affairs Branch stated this would eventually be in the best interest of such persons and the Indian community at large. In a lengthy letter to a new social work recruit in 1953, Colonel Jones explained the reasons for the policy:

.....to assure the progressive assimilation of people of only part Indian racial origin into the non Indian or "white" community and thereby check the regressive trend of the assimilation of such people into the

more backward Indian communities. In theory this regulation is sound. It protects the "purity of the race" (which is the desire of many Indians themselves, particularly in certain areas), it protects the Indian bands financially (restricting shareholders in Indian monetary and land rights to the full blooded Indians for whom it was intended and who, in fact, are the only legal heirs), and it prevents the development of a race of people who in time would become less Indian than "white" in racial origin, yet would be laying claim to rights and privileges designed for the civilization of a backward group of people.³⁰

Jones' "racial purity" comments resemble views of the eugenists of the earlier part of the Century. Canada largely discarded these views after the European Holocaust³¹ as reflected by policies to eliminate racially based policies. Jones' comments reflect his belief in the superior influence of white blood. There is a twisted logic to forcing mixed race children off the reserve to a life of foster care as a way of protecting the purity of what he considered a "backward" race. Placing a military person with such views in such a position again reflects the low priority of Indians in the direction of the country.

Resigned to the fact that these children could be forced off the reserve eventually, there is no suggestion in the IAB policy manual of how the mother would support the child if unemployed and unmarried. Was the unmarried mother expected to leave the reserve for the hazards of urban life to receive benefits and acceptance for her child? She herself would not be eligible for municipal or provincial benefits until off the reserve at least a year unless she relinquished her own Indian Status. Early DPW archival records indicate that the municipalities opposed supporting these children. The subject was the topic of much bitter correspondence with the Department.³² It appeared to be the position of Indian Affairs Branch that one way or another these children would

find themselves in the care of CASs. Superintendent Jones continued in his letter:

Consequently unwanted children with Indian appearance but not Indian status presented difficult problems in placement. By reason of their appearance they would be accepted as an Indian but as non-Indians they cannot be accepted on the reserves. Consequently they frequently become the problem foster cases well known to the Children's Aid Societies.

Although it believed returning to the reserves was regressive, IAB acknowledged they might need foster care if they did not. It also acknowledged further that foster care would be a problem for the children. Its broader assimilation policies, one of which was to remove Indian Status from these children, precluded the needs of the children for support and normal family life. Several factors, (1) the exclusion of one group of children from having Status, (2) the social workers' role in determining eligibility for Status, and (3) the acknowledgement that members of the excluded group faced a bleak future in provincial care showed little consideration of either the short or long term needs of such children.³³

As far as out-of-wedlock Status Indian children were concerned, Indian Affairs Branch's position is stated in the following excerpt from the same letter:

Unmarried girls are not generally encouraged to relinquish their illegitimate child for adoption. The reason for this is not that the Indian Affairs Branch is unsympathetic to the Child Welfare Philosophy that a child's future is more secure if raised in a home with two parents, but simply the facts and figures on supply and demand. In non-Indian communities there is usually an excess of potential adopting parents over and above children for adoption. In Indian communities the demand is low as most Indian families have as many or more children

as they can cope with, but the potential supply is extremely high owing to the prevalence of illegitimacy. Consequently unless there is reason to expect that an unwanted child will suffer neglect if left with its mother, or a family is known to exist who want such a child for adoption, the girl must plan to keep the baby.³⁴

IAB assumed that out-of-wedlock pregnancy was a strong motivation for relinquishment and a risk for child neglect. Society in general believed that adoption was best for children born out-of-wedlock.³⁵ IAB's support for keeping the child was based on the low supply of foster and adoptive parents to care for the children, not on what the Superintendent or society believed to be best for the child. The Branch's reasons notwithstanding, in Native communities out-of-wedlock births were not a basis for placing children for adoption. If the unmarried mother could not care for her child she was more likely to give it to her own mother or another relative to raise.³⁶ IAB's position here was non assimilative allegedly as a result of practical barriers.

The possibility of placing out-of-wedlock Indian children with non-Indian adoptive parents is not mentioned in the IAB position. It is probable that child welfare authorities were unable to place Indian children in non-Indian homes. This is implied in the comments earlier about the difficulties in placing the non-Status Indian children. It had also been expressed as a concern by the Child Welfare Division of the Canadian Welfare Council. In a 1946 meeting one official said with respect to Indian and Metis children:

..it has been found to be almost impossible to secure homes for these children and as they need vocational training and equipment for trade work, it had been decided that special institutions should be developed for their treatment.³⁷

The Branch encouraged the use of Indian foster homes for Indian children. The local Indian agent could make placements at his discretion except when court action or transfer of guardianship were indicated, in which case CASs were to be contacted. Indian Affairs Branch encouraged its social workers to assist CASs to look for acceptable foster or adoptive homes but to first search for a relative who would take responsibility for a child before pursuing an alternative foster placement:

The success of any child welfare programme is largely dependent on a number and variety of permanent and temporary homes for placement and as the need for Indian homes is increasing in proportion to the advancing assimilation of the Indian race, the problem of home finding is an important part of the Social Worker's job.³⁸

The use of relatives was also a cheaper option for IAB. A common theme in IAB policy was the equating of child welfare with foster care and adoption services. The need for foster care and adoption was acknowledged to be an inevitable consequence of assimilation. In the eyes of Colonel Jones, the need for alternate care would be the price to pay for government goals of acculturation and assimilation. The least expensive route was the preferred however.

IAB was to pay for foster care for any Status Indian child at the equivalent rate of the local accredited child welfare agency. IAB expected parents to reimburse it for any placements although the Branch wanted its social workers to urge relatives to take children for free, stressing the "service" rather than the remuneration aspect of doing so. This was not so different from

underlying philosophies about foster care in non-Indian society, particularly in Northern Ontario, at the time. The Rainy River CAS, for example, relied on foster parents to provide free care. It did not bill the municipalities for child-in-care costs until the mid 1940s despite legislation of 1927 which allowed this.³⁹

Records of the early 1960s indicate that in actuality the IAB paid \$30 per month per child for its own placements and about \$1.80 to \$2.50 per day for CAS placements.⁴⁰ Therefore, there were financial incentives for the local Superintendent not to involve the CAS and to keep children within the Indian community.

IAB fit Indian children into existing realities, a policy by default. There was little leadership from IAB to either acknowledge or accommodate to Indian conditions. Indian children born out-of-wedlock of non-Status fathers and Status Indian mothers were acknowledged to be unwelcome or ejected in their communities because of the policy to remove their Status. They were expected to enter CAS care despite acknowledged problems. Despite IABs belief that children of other unmarried mothers would be better off raised by two parents, it urged its social workers to advise Indian mothers to keep the children because it believed no one else would want the children. There was no indication that IAB encouraged the use of non-Indian homes and no explicit statement whether it believed this was best or not. It is likely that its policy to encourage the use of Indian homes was based on the low supply of non-Indian foster homes coupled with the increased costs of using CAS facilities.

Considerations of existing realities probably overruled cultural appropriateness and even assimilation.

Even when IAB believed it knew what was best for Indians, it colluded with policies it acknowledged were not in the best interest of children. Its position leaves one to conclude that it was unwilling to take measures to see that a child's best interests were served, whether or not its judgement of the problem was a cultural misperception.

The assumptions that IAB had about Indian communities' abilities to deal with child welfare are denied by Indian people. These assumptions were: that Indian communities would not support non-Status Indian children; that an out-of-wedlock Indian child on the reserve would be at risk for neglect; that an Indian mother needed encouragement to keep her out-of-wedlock child; that Indian families would not adopt an out-of-wedlock child because their families were already too large; and that extended families would look after a child as a "service." These assumptions reflect the thinking of non-Indian society of the time about child welfare services to non-Indians. It is no surprise that when child welfare services were extended, there was no question that the same services as to others would be offered with similar assumptions behind them.

THE EXTENSION OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES IN ONTARIO TO RESERVE STATUS INDIANS 1956-1965

In 1951 after the inclusion of Section 88 in the Indian Act, IAB initiated contact with the DPW about providing services to Indians, promising 50

percent reimbursement to the province if it extended such benefits. The newly appointed Deputy Minister James Band had a particular interest in Indians and was instrumental in the creation of the Select Committee into the Civil Liberties of Indians. Band had worked with the Unemployment Insurance Commission in the Kenora and Port Arthur/Fort William areas in the 1930s and was familiar with their situation.⁴¹ He created an Indian Advisory Board with whom he consulted regularly from 1953 to 1968. The Board consisted of Indian representatives from across Ontario. There was a member from as far away as Sandy Lake north of Red Lake. From archival evidence, Band listened and acted on the counsel of the Board.⁴² It is unusual to find such sensitivity to Indians and especially to the North.

The Select Committee was composed of MPPs who had high numbers of Indians in their constituencies and is said to have visited every Indian community in Ontario although transc[^]+
[^]\ +(e available for only eight.⁴³ There is little evidence to be found about the extension of child welfare services to the reserves, although "provincial services" were mentioned.

As a result of the hearings, some of the proceedings of which are discussed in Chapter 7, the province passed in 1955 The Indian Welfare Act, allowing the province to contract with Canada to provide services funded by Canada.⁴⁴ In 1956, a federal-provincial agreement allowed the federal

government to contract with individual CASs to provide the same services to reserves as they did to others.⁴⁵

The agreement stated,

The province shall provide the same grants and assistance to the CAS in their work with Indians as they do in their work with other persons.⁴⁶

This proviso "*same grants and assistance*," may have been the key to the problems which emerged later. In the draft proposal for this agreement, the wording, "*exactly the same services*" was proposed for the agreement to come.⁴⁷

It is noteworthy that James Band had already arranged for the drafting of an Indian-specific amendment into the 1954 child welfare legislation. It proposed that Indian reserves be declared municipalities under the Section 17 of the 1954 Child Welfare Act. At that time, this would have meant provincial liability for 25 percent of the costs of Indian children in care exactly as for Others. Indian Affairs would have payed the remainder.⁴⁸ It had been too late to include the amendment in the current session of Parliament.⁴⁹ The DPW decided that Section 88 of the Indian Act would be sufficient and separate agreements between CASs and IAB were made in 1956 in which the province did not have to pay anything. If not for the timing, Ontario was quite prepared in 1954 to provide the same services to Indians through exactly the same channels. The financial commitment would have been the same as for other. It was prepared to accomplish this by acknowledging the differences through

special legislation. As discussed in Chapter 6, the use of different channels of funding had significant outcomes to the policy.

From 1957 to 1962, each CAS that served reserve communities billed IAB for 100 percent of its child-in-care costs and one dollar per RSI individual in its catchment area per year. From 1962-1965, billing by time units replaced the per capita grants.⁶⁰ From 1957 to 1965, CASs dealt directly with the local IAB agent with regard to any services they provided. This relationship changed with major changes in the funding of CASs in 1965.

In 1965 the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was enacted to enable federal-provincial cost sharing of all "welfare services" to the general population provided by provincial legislation. The plan covers income security and personal social services, one of which is child welfare. Section 2 defines welfare services as:

services having as their objective the lessening, removal or prevention of the causes and effects of poverty, child neglect or dependence on public assistance, and, without the generality of the foregoing includes
(a) rehabilitation services,
(b) casework, counselling, assessment and referral services,
(c) community development services,⁶¹

and goes on to include research, evaluation and administrative aspects of the services. Section 5(1) delineates the fiscal arrangements which obligate the federal government to pay fifty percent of all costs incurred by the provinces and municipalities for welfare services.

Part II Section 11(1) of CAP is entitled "Indian Welfare." It authorizes the federal Ministers of Health and Welfare and of Indian Affairs to enter into

an agreement with any province for the payment of welfare services for Reserve Status Indians.⁵² Only Ontario entered into the agreement intended in Part II, in which the federal government assumed most of the costs of child welfare services to Indian communities.⁵³ Under the 1955 Indian Welfare Act Section 3, Ontario had already contracted with Canada to provide Indian welfare services.⁵⁴ One major difference between the earlier arrangements was that now the federal government billed the province directly through federal-provincial contracts. From 1956 to 1965, the CASs billed the federal government through federal-CAS contracts.

The 1965 federal-provincial agreement between Canada and Ontario is the Indian Welfare Agreement (IWA). Under child welfare services it specified,

services to children including the protection and care of neglected children, the protection of children born out of wedlock and adoption services...⁵⁵

There is no mention of prevention services in the IWA as there was in CAP, and as there would be in the Child Welfare Act 1965. It appears that James Band, at least, expected the reforms of 1965 would prevent children coming into care.⁵⁶ There was also no provision in the agreement for Canada to reimburse the province for its administrative and program support costs.⁵⁷ These differences in the spirit of the IWA may have ultimately limited the ability to provide the same service to reserve Indians, as argued in Chapter 6. The IWA is detailed next.

THE FUNDING OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES IN ONTARIO AFTER 1965⁵⁸

The funding of welfare services for both the general population and Reserve Status Indians is complicated. The reader is advised to consult Figure 4.1 during the description that follows. Social services mandated to the province, such as Welfare Assistance, Family Benefits, Child Welfare Services and Day Care are cost-shared under CAP for the general population among all three levels of government. Although the delivery of these services are under provincial jurisdiction, the federal government assumes substantial fiscal responsibility for them. The municipalities pay twenty percent, the provinces thirty percent and the federal government fifty percent. Where there is no municipality as in the Unorganized Territories (see Glossary), the province assumes the twenty percent portion otherwise assumed by the municipality. The provinces provide and administer the services and bill the federal government for fifty percent of the actual costs.

Under the IWA, the federal government pays the twenty percent for Reserve Status Indians if the Status Indian person lives on a reserve or in Unorganized Territories. Under the IWA, Status Indians in the Unorganized Territories became classed as Reserve Status Indians. (Before 1966, the province covered their costs.) The remaining eighty percent is divided between the federal and provincial governments as determined by a formula based on the difference between the per capita costs for welfare payments for the General Population (GP) and the Reserve Status Indian (RSI) population.

Figure 4.1 — Comparison of Cost Sharing of Welfare Services under the Canada Assistance Plan and the Indian Welfare Agreement.

Plan	Population	Residence	20%			80%	
			Munic share	Prov share	Fed. share	Prov. share	Fed. share
CAP	General	Municipality (including Status Indians in municipality a year)	20%	----	N/A	30%	50%
		Unorganized Territories (except Status Indians)	----	20%	N/A	30%	50%
		Unorganized Territories (except Status Indians)	----	----	20%	5.6%	74.4%
IWA	Reserve Status Indians	Unorganized Territories (all Status Indians)	----	----	20%	5.6%	74.4%
		Reserves					

* The federal portion of the 80 percent is determined by the IWA formula. The 1988-89 figure was 93% of the 80 percent rendering the federal portion of the 80 percent as 74.4 percent of the total (.93 X 80%). Total federal output is 94.4 percent. Provincial output is 5.6 percent.

The formula calculating the percent is: one half of the per capita amount of direct welfare costs to the GP plus the amount by which the per capita cost for direct welfare payments to the RSI population exceeds that of the GP, is all divided by the per capita welfare costs for Reserve Status Indians.

Figure 4.2 illustrates four examples of per capita welfare costs showing how the formula works. Table 4.1 summarizes how the formula yields the federal proportion of the eighty percent.

According to a provincial government source, for the 1988-1989 budget year based on that year's comparative ratio applied to the formula, Ontario claimed 93 percent of its RSI expenditures back from the federal government.⁵⁹ It is to be remembered that it is 93 percent of the 80 percent portion depicted in Figure 4.1. This amounted to \$50 million for all social programs under the IWA, of which \$16-\$18 million were for child welfare.⁶⁰ The percentage of total costs covered by the federal government was, therefore, slightly larger at 94.6 percent (.93 x 80 percent plus 20 percent). The provincial share is 5.6 percent of its output to CASs. As Figure 4.1 also depicts, the provincial share for Others is 30 percent of its output.

The formula provided an unusually flexible arrangement allowing the province to provide extensive services for a small fraction of their costs. Under the IWA the province reimburses each CAS for 100 percent of its costs of services to the RSI population. In turn, the province bills the federal government for the calculated percentage of its costs. Agencies could provide as much protection and child-in-care services to the RSI population they wished and would be guaranteed reimbursement from the province. Under

Figure 4.2 - Calculated Federal Share of Welfare Costs According to Welfare Dependency Ratios Between Reserve Status Indians and the General Population

The formula is:

$$\text{Federal share} = \frac{50\% \text{ per capita GP} + (\text{per capita RSI} - \text{per capita GP})}{\text{per capita RSI}}$$

The examples begin with a high ratio (with proportionately more Reserve Status Indians in receipt of welfare than the general population) and proceed to increasingly lower ratios:

(1)Given: Per capita cost for RSI = \$10
Per capita cost for GP = \$1

Percentage reimbursed,

$$\frac{1/2(1) + (10 - 1)}{10} = \frac{9.5}{10} = 95\%$$

(2)Given: Per capita cost for RSI = \$10\$
Per capita cost for GP = \$ 2

Percentage reimbursed,

$$\frac{1/2(2) + (10 - 2)}{10} = \frac{1 + 8}{10} = 90\%$$

(3)Given: Per capita cost for RSI = \$10\$
Per capita cost for GP = \$8

Percentage reimbursed,

$$\frac{1/2(8) + (10 - 8)}{10} = \frac{6}{10} = 60\%$$

(4)Given: Per capita cost for RSI = \$10
Per capita cost for GP = \$10

Percentage reimbursed,

$$\frac{1/2(10) + (10 - 10)}{10} = \frac{5}{10} = 50\%$$

Table 4.1 — Federal Share of Welfare Costs and Relative Dependency on Welfare Assistance between Reserve Status Indians and the General Population.

Per Capita Costs	Federal Share
Much Higher Dependency of RSI	
RSI \$10	
GP \$1	95%
Twice as High Dependency of RSI	
RSI \$10	
GP \$5	75%
Equal Dependency of RSI	
RSI \$10	
GP \$10	50%

creative leadership, the flexibility and munificence of the IWA could have yielded creative Indian child welfare programs. The province could have set directions for child welfare services for the RSI population, overseen their delivery by CASs, and billed the federal government for most of its costs. The federal government was obliged to reimburse the province at the appropriate percentage provided the parameters fell within the IWA.

The full potential of the IWA was not realized until 1984. The then Deputy Minister, Robert Macdonald, convinced the Ontario Cabinet to approve sweeping reforms in the delivery of Indian child welfare services by the development of Indian and Native Child and Family Services agencies. To convince Cabinet to release \$5 million dollars for the development of such services, he argued that costs to the province would be only 5 percent of this amount.⁶¹

CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS IN ONTARIO

In the past decade, some provinces have made legislative accommodation to authorize Indian groups to operate their own child welfare services, and to require other child welfare authorities serving Indians to involve the respective Bands in child welfare interventions with Indian children. Ontario's provisions are the most extensive.⁶² Among many other provisions in Ontario's child welfare legislation, The Child and Family Services Act, 1985, Part X, Sections 191-196 includes provisions to allow for separate, designated Indian Children's Aid Societies and support for customary care (use of extended family and community members based on traditional customs) of children. The legislation also includes Regulation 206, which allows these agencies to apply for exemptions to any part of the legislation.⁶³ This advanced piece of provincial legislation was negotiated by Indian groups. These provisions were attempts to accommodate Indian self-government in Indian child welfare agencies despite the chronic jurisdictional problems.⁶⁴

Although Indian leaders have expressed a preference for federal legislation for Indian child welfare,⁶⁵ the Deputy Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), announced in 1989 the federal government's intention not to legislate in this area. Harry Swain said:

...the provinces already have child welfare legislation, and have developed the institutional competence to act in this area. Respecting these facts, the federal government has chosen not to legislate. Instead, through DIAND it provides the financial resources to set up and run Indian child welfare agencies, which operate under the aegis of provincial legislation, accreditation and supervision.⁶⁶

The position has also been documented in a discussion paper which in 1989 placed a freeze on the development of new Indian Child and Family Services until a management regime and efficient funding arrangements could be developed.⁶⁷ It would appear that by 1987 the federal government was beginning to notice the escalating costs of Indian child welfare services.

The federal government remains consistent to its historical position to provide financial backing for Indian child welfare services while purchasing the provincial infrastructure to deliver them.

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM

As stated in Chapter 2, the literature has cited the Constitutional position of Indian child welfare as a fundamental reason for high rates of Indian children in care. That is, the dispute about which level of government was responsible resulted in no services except in dire emergencies. Waiting until circumstances were extreme usually meant a child apprehension. It decreased the chances of working to return the child home and increased the chance that the child would have emotional problems, impeding the chances for adoption. Some provinces would not even attempt rehabilitative services because they were not reimbursed for them.

Each level of government has argued that the responsibility for Indian child welfare lies with the other. The accommodations to the jurisdictional

dispute was the federal purchase of the service from the provincial government with the obligation to buy whatever amount the province chose to sell to it.

The Constitutional arrangement is not comparable to other areas of responsibility defined in the Constitution. In a study of the impact of federalism on policy development in a variety of policy areas, Fletcher and Wallace described four types of jurisdictional arrangements: exclusively federal (for example, communications), exclusively provincial (social welfare and health), divided with delegation to the provinces (transportation) and shared (energy, natural resources and economic).⁶⁸ Fletcher and Wallace do not address Indian issues, however. Indian child welfare does not seem to fit any of these models.

Unlike other constitutional areas of responsibility, Section 91(24) is unusual because it assigns exclusive federal jurisdiction over a race of people. Section 92(1) assigns exclusive provincial government jurisdiction over a policy area. What is the impact of such a division of power when the particular race of people perceived to be under exclusive federal jurisdiction require a program which is only under provincial authority? What are the implications if the race of people should need the service even more than the others while this stand-off continues?

Health care to Indians was similarly situated as child welfare. There were parallel disputes over responsibility. Following wrangling over responsibility and disputed interpretations about health care obligations in

some Dominion-First Nations Treaties, the federal government finally conceded to provide health services for humanitarian reasons. It is believed that the government accepted responsibility for Indian health to protect the health of other Canadians as much as to help the Native people. Initially services were an annual visit by a doctor to the reserve and grew to include small health clinics in communities and separate hospital services by the middle of this century. The federal government consistently disclaimed constitutional or treaty obligation.⁶⁹

There were practical problems in attracting health care professionals to the isolated posts where Indian communities are located. One hospital in Northwestern Ontario was staffed at one time by incompetents ejected from practise in urban society.⁷⁰ Another on Vancouver Island, as recently as twenty years ago, was run by an imposter.⁷¹

The debate about jurisdiction ceased when health services became a matter of universal right in the 1960s. Some Indian health services are multi-million dollar enterprises.⁷²

There would not be the same threat to the physical well-being of others if Indian child welfare services were not provided. A moral peril however, may have been at issue. There is one reference to this issue in archival material that said:

..the provinces are beginning to realize that the Indian's welfare is a determining factor in the overall welfare of the province. For example, an Indian delinquent is just as detrimental to the community as is a non-Indian delinquent and a non-contributing group of people within a

province, regardless of racial origin, has a deteriorating effect socially and economically.⁷³

After World War II, societal forces gave rise to the debate that social services were a right not a charity.⁷⁴ This appears to be a motivating force behind Ontario's Select Committee on Civil Rights and Liberties in 1954 which was the precursor to the extension of provincial social services. Like health, Indian child welfare services have become multi-million dollar enterprises. In 1986/87, the federal government spent over \$80 million dollars on Indian child welfare.⁷⁵ INAC estimates for the 1992/1993 fiscal year were \$150,000.⁷⁶

Fletcher and Wallace state that four themes emerge in how federalism affects policy implementation. The outcome varies with regionalism and the nature of the division of power. First, federalism can impede the introduction of new programs because of the many veto points in the system or it can allow innovations because of provincial initiatives. Secondly, if one level of government wants credit for a service but wishes to avoid blame, that level of government can expand the program. Thirdly, federalism can cause a paralysis preventing any change. Finally, federalism can produce new services or resources in regions to promote equity for political gain regardless of the efficiency of the programme.⁷⁷ Federalism, it seems, did make a difference in the introduction and administration of Indian child welfare services. In Ontario, its introduction came in 1956 over half a Century after the general population. In other provinces it came even later.

The jurisdictional position of social services in general has been the topic of debate between the two levels of government. The federal government has assumed considerable power in areas where a benefit was paid directly. Its constitutional authority to do so has been upheld in court challenges.⁷⁸ On several occasions it introduced a constitutional amendment to grant itself authority to administer social programs: in 1940, Unemployment Insurance; in 1951, Old Age Security, and in 1965, the Canada Assistance Plan.⁷⁹ Child welfare services are only one of several programs in a cost-sharing arrangement which deals largely with income security. It has been placed in a similar administrative position to programmes with much different goals.

Not all the provinces have accepted federal initiatives in income security social services. Although Old Age pensions were introduced in 1927, not until 1933 did Nova Scotia enact the program. It was not necessarily the provinces with the lowest per capita income, the fewest resources for developing social services, or the greatest need, which gave the strongest support for federal initiatives. Saskatchewan, a low per capita income province developed its own medicare in the 1950s and supported federal initiatives in social services. Quebec resisted federal initiatives for its own ideological reasons, despite its relative poverty. The better-off provinces such as British Columbia and Ontario entered cost-shared programs first.⁸⁰ Similarly, British Columbia and Ontario agreed to provide child welfare services to Reserve Status Indians early in the 1960s while Saskatchewan did not. Resentment and opposition to federal

interference grew from federal actions. If federal-provincial friction arose from the introduction of these beneficial services for the general population when jurisdiction was comparatively clear, it is no surprise that a deadlock would occur over Indian child welfare services.

In 1969, the federal White Paper was an attempt to comprehensively plan Indian policy. The orthodox liberalism of the Trudeau government saw one solution to Indian problems as the elimination of the special status of Indian services by divesting most services to the provinces. It proposed the termination of federal jurisdiction over Indians and the formal assimilation of their programs through provincial channels. The objections of the provinces which had not been significantly involved in the policy development, were overshadowed by the Indians themselves who rejected the White Paper unequivocally. The Liberal government officially dropped the policy. In its place monies to fund Indian organizations to define their own needs was released.⁸¹

During the development of the White paper, federal government officials made speculations as to why the provinces would resist providing social services. These speculations were summarized by Weaver:

- (1) their belief in exclusive federal jurisdiction;
- (2) their fear of costs if Indians did not eventually become educated and integrated;

- (3) their belief that the federal government would withdraw support when expansions were high;
- (4) their reluctance to provide special programs;
- (5) their inability to measure up to the special facilities which DIAND had been offering to Indians;
- (6) their concern that Indians did not pay taxes;
- (7) their concern that municipalities would not provide services if Indians did not pay taxes.⁸²

Most of these speculated concerns were financial and a resistance to acknowledge special status. Despite these rationales, the fact remains that many provinces still took the official stand that they would not intervene in child welfare situations except in "life and death" situations. Only health care which had a similar jurisdictional conflict carries similar implications if services were not provided. The position of the provinces seems indefensible within the context of the 1960s spirit of equality.

Indian child welfare policy and programs in Canada have been a casualty of broader federal-provincial conflicts. Indians themselves had not constituted a political force strong enough to force a resolution to the jurisdictional impasse. Their adherence to maintaining the trust relationship with the federal government would indicate that they would not seek a resolution per se, but that all their services be under the federal government.

It was moral and public pressure in Ontario that forced some accommodation of the dispute.

SUMMARY

The federal government has the constitutional authority to legislate for Status Indians, is not required to do so, and has chosen not to. Federal legislation has made provincial laws applicable on Indian reserves. Provinces other than Ontario have taken the position in the past, however, that Indians are the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. They have resisted providing child welfare services to Status Indians despite attractive and flexible federal proposals. The federal government has been consistent in its position not to provide the services but to purchase them from the provinces despite provincial resistance to engage in such arrangements.

Ontario has had a much different tradition. Since 1956 the federal government has purchased services from Ontario using the provincial infrastructure of Childrens Aid Societies. There have been three points of major policy change in terms of funding of CASs for Indian child welfare services. They were: 1956 after which CASs contracted to receive from the federal government 100 percent of all RSI child-in-care costs plus a per capita grant; 1962 when the federal government in its CAS contracts replaced the per capita grant with a time units billing system; and 1966 when the federal

government reimbursed the province, not the CASs, for about 95 percent of its total disbursements to all CASs for RSI costs.

Although not the focus of this study, the fourth policy change in 1984 of delegating child welfare services to Indian organizations was a culmination of the impact of the previous three. Its evolution provides a contemporary context with which to view the past. The funding arrangement of the 1965 Indian Welfare Agreement coupled with Indian specific provisions in the 1984 Ontario child welfare legislation enabled Indian Bands to develop their own child welfare services. This was the plea in 1947 of the Canadian Association of Social Workers and the Canadian Welfare Council to the federal government which set in motion the process of service extension. The federal government however adheres to its historical position not to legislate but to purchase the services of the provincial infrastructures regardless of who delivers the services.

A number of themes emerge in the evolutionary context of Indian child welfare policy. In Ontario they are:

- (1) federal-provincial conflicts;
- (2) the emphasis on providing the same services to indians that were provided to others;
- (3) the goal to provide services through the same channels as others;
- (4) no-ceiling federal-provincial financial arrangements

(5) federal-provincial arrangements with no financial or philosophical disincentives for foster care.

The next chapter reports how Indian child-in-care rates changed as the programs described here evolved.

Endnotes to Chapter 4

1. Hepworth, Johnston as noted in Chapter 2.
2. Department of Justice Canada, A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1986).
3. Peter Hogg, "Aboriginal Peoples," in Constitutional Law in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), 551-567.
4. Peter Hogg, "The Family," in Constitutional Law in Canada, 533-549. According to Hogg, the Section 92(16) head of legislative power, "matters of a merely local or private nature in the province," is not assumed to include child welfare.
5. Hogg, "Aboriginal Peoples," 560-562.
6. Canada, An Act respecting Indians, Statutes of Canada, Volume 1, 1950-51, Chapter 29, 131-173.
7. Andrew Jones and Leonard Rutman, In the Children's Aid: J.J. Kelso and Child Welfare in Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982). The first child welfare legislation passed in Canada was in Ontario in 1893. See also John Melichercik, "Child Welfare Policy," in Canadian Social Policy, ed. Shankar A. Yelaja (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1987), 195-223.
8. J Anthony Long and Menno Boldt, "Introduction," in Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada, ed. J Anthony Long and Menno Boldt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 3-20.
9. Canada, The Indian Act, Office consolidation, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, August 1985).
10. Douglas Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces and Aboriginal Peoples" in Governments in Conflict, 151-174. This also paved the way for the provision of all provincial social services, including income security programmes, to Indian communities.
11. This at least was the situation in Ontario. See Clifford J Williams, Decades of Service: A History of the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services 1930-1984, (Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1984. Ontario was one of the most proactive provinces in the provision of services to Indians.

12. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Books I, Canada 1867-1939.
13. Ibid., 43.
14. Ibid., 201.
15. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Books II, Recommendations, 276.
16. Ibid., 35.
17. Roger Gibbons and J. Rick Ponting, "Historical Overview and Background," in Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization, ed. J. Rick Ponting (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 26.
18. Ibid., 27. See also John Tobias, "Protection, Civilization and Assimilation: An Outline of Canada's Indian Policy," in As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows, ed. Ian L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983).
19. J. Ponting and Rick Gibbons, Out of Irrelevance (Toronto: Butterworth, 1980).
20. Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985).
21. Andrew Jones and Leonard Rutman, In the Children's Aid: J.J.Kelso and Child Welfare in Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
22. H.B. Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians in Canada: A Report of Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1966), 336.
23. Guest, 104-141.
24. Ibid., 39 and 145.
25. Canadian Welfare Council and Canadian Association of Social Workers, Joint Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Ottawa, January 1947.
26. This section is based on the following archival documents: NAC, RG 10-vol 8463, File 1/23-21 part 1, Reel #13809, General Social Work Reports 1953-1960. Correspondence from H.M. Jones, Superintendent Welfare Services, to Monica Meade, 7 April 1953, and Reference Manual-Social Welfare.
27. NAC, RG 10 Vol.8463, File 1/23-21, Memo to "W" from Superintendent of Social Welfare, 27 September 1956.

28. Walter Rudnicki, interview with author, Ottawa, 24 April 1992.
29. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, Box 35, file 1388, Indian Advisory Committee 1955-1960, Brief to the federal Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, 11 January 1961. Native people I asked about this practise deny that it would be true. However, it was the perception.
30. Correspondence from H.M. Jones, pages 2-3.
31. Angus McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1990).
32. AO, RG 29, Series 01, Accession 14571/2, Files 645-648, Children's Aid Societies General 1944-1947, 1949-1950, 1951 and 1952-1955.
33. From the results presented in Chapter 5 as well as other indications, it is possible that children in this category might have comprised a large proportion of the Indian children in care in the 1950s.
34. Correspondence from H.M. Jones, page 3-4.
35. Alfred Kadushin, "Principles, Values and Assumptions Underlying Adoption Practices," Adoptions: Current Issues and Trends, ed. Paul Sachdev (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984), 3-14; Alfred Kadushin, Child Welfare Services (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 438.
36. Marlene Brant Castellano, interview by author, tape recording, 26 November 1991, Peterborough Ontario.
37. AO, RG 29, Acc 14571/2, file 202, Canadian Welfare Council, Minutes of Meeting of Child Welfare Division of the CWC, Regina, 14 and 15 March, 1946.
38. Reference Manual-Social Welfare, page 8.
39. Susan McQuaker, "A History of the Rainy River Childrens Aid Society," 25.
40. NAC, RG 10, Vol.6940, Reel#10,990, File 487/29-3, Part 3, Care of Foster Children in the Kenora agency.
41. Dorothea Crittendon, employee of DPW from 1940 to 1985, and Deputy Minister, 1975 to 1979, interview by author, tape recorded, 10 May 1990, Toronto, Ontario.
42. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, Box 35, files 1386-1392, Indian Advisory Committee, 1953-54 to 1968-1970.
43. The communities for which the transcripts are available are Garden River, McGregor Bay, Mississauga, Spanish River, West Bay, Wikewemikong, Cape Croker, Chippewa. The representatives for these communities were all on the Committee. They were John Fullerton-Algoma West, John Johnston-Bruce, Bryan Cathcart-

Lambton. The farthest community from Toronto is Garden River near Sault Ste. Marie. It is unlikely that the whole Committee travelled to the Thunder Bay, Kenora or Rainy River areas because of distances and expenses. In these areas in 1953, only about 6 percent of their population was Reserve Indian.

44. Ontario, An Act to Provide Welfare Services for Indians, Revised Statutes of Ontario (1955) Chapter 33: 127-128.

45. AO, RG 29, Acc.14571/2, Box 37, file 1450, Indians General 1956-59, Memorandum of Agreement Respecting Child Welfare Services For Indians in Ontario made the 23rd February 1956.

46. Ibid.

47. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, box 11, file 463, Child Welfare Branch - Services and Committees 1955-1971, Brief from a federal-provincial conference held 25 February 1955, included in Memo from W.H. Bury Director of Child Welfare to Honourable W.A. Goodefellow Minister of Public Welfare, 4 March 1955.

48. Ibid.

49. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, Box 9, file 375, Childrens Aid Services to Indians 1955, Memo from W.G. Smith Executive Officer to James Band Deputy Minister, 25 March 1955.

50. NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6927, file 401/29-1 part 3, Welfare of Indian of Ontario, Report on Field Trip to Northern Ontario, April 1962.

51. Canada, The Canada Assistance Plan, Revised Statutes of Ontario 1985, Chapter c-1, 5-15.

52. Ibid.

53. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the literature is contradictory on this issue. Long and Boldt (Chapter 1, Endnote 20) state that no provinces took advantage of the federal offer. The Patrick Johnston CCSD study states that a number of provinces have agreements, albeit at times informal and incomplete, with the federal government. The ambiguities of the issue highlight the ubiquitous confusion in attempting to analyze any Indian policy, and the increased difficulty in Indian child welfare policy.

54. Ontario, An Act to provide Welfare Service for Indians, Revised Statutes of Ontario 1955, Chapter 33, 127. The updated reference for the legislation is The Indian Welfare Services Act, Revised Statutes of Ontario 1970, Chapter 218, 859. Because the Act was already in existence and because no other province accepted the federal offer in 1965, Part II of CAP was never proclaimed.

55. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Province of Ontario, Schedule A (f), January 1966.

56. AO, RG 29, Accession 14571/2, Box 12 537, Kenora CAS 1947-1970, letter from James Band, Deputy Minister DPW to Harold Treen, Executive Director Kenora CAS, 1 March 1966. The Deputy Minister wrote "We can expect a considerable decline in the number of children taken into care with the new Child Welfare Act."

57. INAC, Indian Child and Family Services in Canada, Final Report, Appendix 4 (Ottawa, 1987), 4.

58. I am indebted to Moe Diakowsky, Intergovernmental Relations Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, and K.C Wong, Manager, Federal Provincial Cost Sharing, Ministry of Community and Social Services for their assistance in clarifying this complex funding mechanism for me.

59. Moe Diakowsky, Coordinator of Intergovernmental Affairs, Ministry of Community and Social Services, interview by author, Toronto, Ontario, 20 February 1990.

60. Ibid.

61. Robert MacDonald, interview by author, Toronto, 9 April 1988.

62. Joyce B. Timpson, "Indian and Native Special Status in Ontario's Child Welfare Legislation: An Overview of the Social, Legal and Political Context," Canadian Social Work Review 7 (Winter 1990):49-68.

63. Ontario, An Act Respecting the Protection and Well Being of Children and their Families, Statutes of Ontario 1984, Chapter 55.

64. George Thomson, Deputy Minister 1976 to 1977 and negotiator for the new Act in 1984, interview by author, 6 April 1988, Toronto.

65. Cynthia Jamieson, Policy Analyst, Indian Social Services Council, Chiefs of Ontario, interview by author, Toronto, Ontario, March 1988. The Chiefs of Ontario resolved to accept the provincial legislation as an interim measure only pending the passing of federal child welfare legislation or full self-government in which Indians would make their own laws. Chiefs of Ontario Resolution 84/17, Thunder Bay, 30 May 1984, and Resolution 85/21, Toronto, 6 June 1985.

66. Notes from remarks by Harry Swain, Deputy Minister of DIAND to the Manitoba Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, 21 November 1989. page 12. Courtesy of Moe Diakowsky, Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services.

67. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "Indian Child and Family Services Management Regime Discussion Paper," October 1989.

68. Frederick J. Fletcher and Donald C. Wallace, "Federal-Provincial Relations and the Making of Public Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies," in Division of Power and Public Policy, ed. Richard Simeon, Royal Commission on the Economic

Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 125-205.

69. Young.

70. Young.

71. Dara Culhane Speck, An Error in Judgement: The Politics of Medical Care in an Indian/White Community (Vancouver: Talon Books, 1988).

72. Young.

73. NAC, RG 10-Volume 8463, File 1/23-21 par 1, Reel #13809, General Social Work Reports, Reference Manual-Social Welfare, July 1953, page 4.

74. Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985).

75. INAC, Indian Child and Family Services, Appendix 4, 38.

76.

77. Fletcher and Wallace, 192-198.

78. Guest.

79. F.R. McKinnon, "Human Services and the Provincial Governments," in Issues in Canadian Human Services, ed. Murali D. Nair, Robert C. Hain, James A. Draper (Toronto: Ontario Institute for the Studies In Education, 1982), 3-26.

80. Richard Splane, "Human Services in the Federal Government," in Issues in Canadian Human Services, 27-40.

81. Sally M Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1969-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). The suspicion has existed however among both Indians and others that the direction towards assimilation is still what shapes the federal government's Indian policy. See Walter Rudnicki, "The Politics of Aggression," Native Studies Review 3, No. 1(1987):83-93.

82. Weaver, 141.

**MEASURING THE DISPROPORTIONS OF NATIVE
CHILDREN IN CARE IN ONTARIO AND IN RAINY RIVER
CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY, 1956-1976**

This chapter documents the increasing disproportion between child-in-care rates of RSI and Other Children between 1956-1976. It traces the rise in rates for RSI children and the concomitant decline in rates for others. The data illustrates that these disproportions increased as funding policy for Status Indian child welfare services changed in 1956, 1962 and 1966. I compare the overall situation in Ontario with that of the Rainy River Childrens Aid Society to illustrate the regional nature of the disproportions.

The shifts in rates at significant points of policy change demonstrate that the nature of the policy was a significant factor in escalating rates of Indian children in care. In Chapter 9, I will examine community variations in admission rates which suggest that child welfare policy change was not the only factor contributing to high rates of Status Indian children in care.

First I compare financial and child-in-care data between all Ontario and the Rainy River Children's Aid Society. Financial data is used in assessing the escalation of RSI children in care because of the paucity of consistent child-in-care counts. The financial data are used later in the analysis of why the problem of escalating RSI rates seemed to go unnoticed at the bureaucratic level. I then make comparisons of existing child-in-care data between RSI and

Other children in the agency followed by comparisons of child-in-care rates between Rainy River District reserve communities.

NEW POLICIES AND CHANGING COSTS, 1956-1976

Absolute Child-in-Care Costs

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the child welfare spending trends for all children from 1956 to 1972 and for RSI children until 1976, for Ontario and Rainy River CAS respectively. Most of these figures were derived from DPW Annual Reports from 1956-1972. The tables summarize Ontario's and the Rainy River CAS's financial activities showing

- (a) the province's or the agency's total costs,
- (b) total costs for children-in-care only;
- (c) costs recovered from the Department of Indian Affairs for all Reserve Status Indian services;
- (d) costs recovered from Indian Affairs for children-in-care costs only; and
- (e) children-in-care costs for Other Children as calculated by subtraction of RSI child-in-care costs from total child-in-care costs.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the rise in Ontario between 1956 and 1972 in total costs and child care costs for Reserve Status Indian children and Other Children comparatively.

Table 5.1 — Total Disbursements and Child-in-Care (CIC) Costs for all Child Welfare Ontario Children, Reserve Status Indian Children, and Other Children in Ontario Children's Aid Societies, 1956-1976

Year	All Children		Reserve Status Indian		Other Children*	
	Total (\$ Millions)	CIC (\$ Millions)	Total (\$ Millions)	CIC (\$ Millions)	Total (\$ Millions)	CIC (\$ Millions)
1956	10.05	7.5	.0188	.0188	10.0	7.5
1957	11.4	7.5	.0344	.0344	11.4	7.5
1958	12.6	7.3	.0905	.0667	12.5	7.3
1959	13.3	7.5	.0999	.0735	13.3	7.4
1960	14.1	7.9	.1167	.0736	14.0	7.8
1961	14.8	8.2	.1457	.0978	14.6	8.1
1962	15.6	8.6	.1625	.1101	15.4	8.5
1963	17.0	9.4	.2334	.1686	16.7	9.2
1964	18.6	10.4	.2591	.1833	18.3	10.2
1965	21.1	11.9	.3361	.2257	20.7	11.7
1966	25.7	14.0	.7435	.6514	24.9	11.4
1967	31.8	17.5	.9465	.8469	30.8	16.7
1968	37.1	20.1	1.0551	.9553	36.1	19.2
1969	41.5	22.7	1.1852	1.0758	40.4	21.6
1970	48.3	26.5	1.3969	1.2519	46.9	25.2
1971	50.9	26.3	1.5517	1.3745	49.4	24.9
1972	53.6	26.5	1.6630	1.4607	52.0	25.0
1973			1.8507	1.0584		
1974			2.0968	1.4139		
1975			2.6527	2.5376		
1976			3.1404			

Source:

1956-1966 - Annual Reports of Ontario Department of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Sessional Papers 13 1956-68. 1967-1971 - Annual Reports of the Department of Social and Family Services, Sessional Papers 13. 1973 - Technical Assistance Planning (TAP) Associates. A Starving Man Doesn't Argue, 1978, Appendix D-14, Table CW-3.

1974-1976 - TAP Associates, D-15, Table CW-4.

*Totals for Indian Children obtained from addition of Indian Affairs child-in-care reimbursements and grants, both in Annual Reports listed above. Figures for Other Children obtained by subtraction of figures for Indian Children from figures for All Children.


Table 5.2 — Total Child Welfare and Child in Care Costs for All Children, Reserve Status Indian Children, and Other Children in Rainy River Childrens Aid Society, 1957-1972 and 1973-1976

Year	All Children		Reserve Status Indian		Other CIC
	Total (\$Thousands)	CIC (\$ Thousands)	Total (\$ Thousands)	CIC (\$ Thousands)	Total (\$ Thousands)
1957	46.8	24.0	2.1	2.1	22.9
1958	53.8	27.7	2.3	1.3	26.3
1959	53.6	25.3	2.7	1.5	23.7
1960	60.6	29.5	1.4	.8	28.6
1961	62.3	30.8	2.3	1.0	29.8
1962	70.2	36.3	5.4	2.9	33.5
1963	74.8	40.9	8.3	4.9	35.5
1964	73.6	38.5	7.7	2.7	36.3
1965	72.1	36.8	8.0	2.7	34.0
1966	90.2	53.0	67.3	30.5	22.5
1967	128.0	62.4	54.0	47.0	15.4
1968	150.8	86.8	64.0	59.2	27.6
1969	116.6	77.6	82.0	77.6	38.9
1970	200.6	72.7	95.7	89.6	28.5
1971	198.4	95.6	91.0	81.8	13.8
1972	225.2	72.7	95.2	81.5	8.7
1974			123.8	52.4	
1975			164.4	75.7	
1976			164.7	151.1	


Sources:

1956-1966 - Annual Reports of Ontario Department of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Sessional Papers 13, 1957-1968. 1967-1972 - Annual Reports of the Department of Social and Family Services Sessional Papers 13, 1969-1974.

1974-1976 - Figures for Indian Affairs Contributions for child-in-care costs taken from TAP Associates, A Starving Man Doesn't Argue, 1978, Appendix D15 Table CW-4. Total costs from the records of Family and Children's Services of the District of Rainy River.



The rise in total child-in-care costs was slower than total expenditures, reflecting provincial directions to fund protection services to children without removing them from their parents' care. In Figure 5.1, RSI costs are so small as to be unnoticeable. The larger scale of Figure 5.2 illuminates the increases in RSI child-in-care costs. Costs for RSI children rose slowly between 1956 and 1965 but experienced a jump of 188 percent after the introduction of the IWA in 1965. In contrast, the costs of child-in-care services for Other Children took a drop of 2.6 percent in the first year after CAP was introduced, although it resumed its climb the following year. While costs for other children showed a



tendency to stabilize from 1970, the costs for RSI children-in-care costs continued to increase. The sudden increase between 1965 and 1966 for RSI children was partly due to IAB assumption of responsibility for Status Indian children in the Unorganized Territories under the IWA. The decrease in 1974 was noted by the IWA evaluators who were unable to explain it. No one at the agency was unable to explain the decline.¹


From Table 5.1, Indian Affairs expenditures in RRCAS were small before 1965 compared to Other Children. This does not necessarily mean that few Status Indian children were in care. This means either that fewer Reserve Status Indian children were admitted to care and/or their time in care was

very short. Also Status Indian children in care who were residents of towns or Unorganized Territories were not covered by the Department of Indian Affairs contributions before 1965. Town residents were covered by the municipalities and the Unorganized Territories by the province. There could have been high numbers of Status Indian children in care from these areas and not be reflected by Indian Affairs' costs. There could have been many non-Status Indian children in care, such as the out-of-wedlock children of Status Indian mothers and non-Status fathers. These would not be reflected in the IAB costs either before or after 1966.

Between 1965 and 1966, RSI child-in-care costs jumped over ten times. Other Children's costs dropped by a third. By 1972 RSI costs were 40 times higher than their costs in 1957. Other Children's costs in 1972 were 47 percent lower than 1957. These facts are remarkable given that the percentage changes for the province for the same time period was the following: costs for RSI and Other Children were 42 times and three and a half times higher respectively. RRCAS expenditures paralleled the direction and extent of change as the provincial trend for expenditures for RSI children but deviated substantially from the provincial trend for Other Children. Figure 5.3 shows the crossover.

Child-in-care Costs and Policy Change

RSI child welfare costs changed the year after significant shifts in funding occurred. Some of the changes have simple explanations. Others are ambiguous.



Between 1957 and 1958, RSI child-in-care costs doubled for all Ontario but went down for Other Children. In RRCAS in the same years, RSI child-in-care costs decreased from \$2,100 to \$1,300 while child-in-care costs for Others rose from \$22,000 to \$28,000. The overall doubling of RSI costs in Ontario after the introduction of services in 1957 would be expected because of availability of a new service. The drop in RRCAS's child-in-care costs could be explained by the agency's direction. According to Donald Lugtig, Local Director from 1959-1963, in 1959 there were many Native permanent wards in the care of RRCAS for whom there were no possibilities for return home or adoption placement. The Board had instructed him at the beginning of his tenure to

make every possible effort to keep Indian children with their families.² The actual dollar figures of Reserve Status Indian children in care were low at that time. It is possible that these Native children to whom Lugtig referred were non-Status, or payed for by the province or the municipality. The drop in costs in 1958 could indicate the continuation of an early direction of the agency to keep Native children (regardless of Status) at home because of the experience with those who would never go home.

Between 1961 and 1962 in Ontario, RSI and Others' child-in-care costs rose 12.6 percent and 4.7 percent. For the same years in RRCAS, RSI child-in-care costs increased 134 percent and Others' 12.6 percent. RSI costs increased for both all Ontario and RRCAS after DIA changed the reimbursement from the per capita system to time units. The increase was much more pronounced in Rainy River. If the reimbursement for time spent exceeded what was available from the per-capita reimbursements this could serve as an incentive for agencies to be proactive in providing service to reserves. This would not necessarily result in prevention of admissions to care. It could increase the number of children in care by increasing the population the agency reached.

Between 1965 and 1966 in Ontario, RSI child-in-care costs increased almost three times but dropped slightly from \$11.7 million to \$11.4 million for Other Children. In RRCAS, child-in-care costs for RSI children increased 10 times and dropped significantly from \$34,000 to \$22,500 for Others. The threefold increase for Ontario and the tenfold increase for Rainy River is

dramatically. Considering the smaller and gradual increases noticed in Rainy River with the earlier funding changes, much of the sudden 1966 increase in RSI child-in-care costs in RRCAS would be due to the inclusion of Status Indian children from the Unorganized Territories.³ The relatively low reimbursements from IAB before 1965 does not mean that the agency had less success in keeping Indian children out of care. It meant only that it kept many Status Indian children from the reserves out of care.

Child-in-Care Costs as a Percentage of Total Expenditures

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show in-care costs as proportions of total disbursements for RSI and Others between 1956 and 1972 for all Ontario and Rainy River CAS respectively. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the trends.

After 1965 the percentage of the total spent on child-in care went from an average of 42.8 percent to 89 percent for RSI children. In contrast it dropped from 53.9 percent to 25.7 percent for Others. Although the post 1965 changes for both groups in RRCAS as a whole paralleled the directions of the overall provincial trend, the changes were much more pronounced for the RRCAS. As for Ontario, increasing amounts of money made available for Indian child welfare went to the protection of Indian children by taking them out of their homes while increasing proportions of child welfare money for Other Children went to their protection while in their own homes. The changes

Table 5.3 — Child-in-Care Costs for Reserve Status Indian Children and Other Children in Ontario Children's Aid Societies as Percentages of Total Disbursements for that Group, 1956-1972

Year	Indian Children % of child welfare disbursements	Other Children % of child welfare disbursements
1956	100	75
1957	100	66
1958	73	58
1959	74	56
1960	63	56
1961	67	55
1962	67	55
1963	72	55
1964	70	56
1965	67	57
1966	75	54
1967	89	54
1968	90	53
1969	90	54
1970	89	54
1971	88	50
1972	87	48
	mean 1958-1962=68.8 mean 1963-1965=69.7 mean 1966-1972=86.9	mean 1958-1962=56.0 mean 1963-1965=56.0 mean 1956-1972=52.4

Source: Calculated using figures from Table 5.1

were more pronounced for the agency than they were for Ontario. Table 5.5 shows the mean percentages comparatively.

Table 5.4 — Child-in-Care Costs for Reserve Status Indian Children and Other Children in the Rainy River Children's Aid Society as Percentages of Total Disbursements for that Group, 1957-1972



Year	RSI Children (%)	Other Children (#)
1957	100	48.9
1958	56.6	50.1
1959	56.9	46.6
1960	57.0	48.3
1961	44.1	49.6
1962	53.7	51.3
1963	59.7	53.3
1964	35.0	55.2
1965	33.7	53.1
1966	82.8	42.1
1967	85.9	20.5
1968	92.0	31.8
1969	94.6	38.6
1970	93.6	27.1
1971	89.9	12.8
1972	85.0	6.8
	mean 1958-1962=53.7 mean 1963-1965=42.8 mean 1966-1972=89.0	mean 1958-1962=49.2 mean 1963-1965=53.9 mean 1966-1972=25.7

Source: Calculated from figures in Table 5.2. Other Children percents obtained by determining Other Children total costs: total DIA grants were subtracted from total disbursements to get total costs for Others, then calculating the percent using Other child-in-care costs.

Table 5.5 — Comparison of Average Percentage of Child Welfare Monies Spent on Child-in Care Services During Selected Periods in all Ontario CASs and Rainy River CAS, 1958-1972

Period	Reserve Status Indian		Others	
	Ontario (%)	Rainy River (%)	Ontario (%)	Rainy River (%)
1958-1962	68.8	53.7	56.0	49.2
1963-1965	69.7	42.6	56	53.9
1966-1972	86.9	89.0	52.4	25.7

Sources: Figures from Tables 5.3 and 5.4



The decreases for Others and the increases for RSI children are dramatic. The IWA in RRCAS was associated with less success in ensuring that the agency could provide alternatives to child-in-care services RSI children than it was in the rest of Ontario despite the hopes of James Band.

The combined analysis of the data in Tables 5.3 to 5.5 show increasing discrepancies between the two groups following the 1965 policy shift which changed all channels of funding. Increasing proportions of child welfare money spent for Indians and decreasing proportions of child welfare money spent for other children went to child care. In other words, increasing amounts of the money made available for Indian child welfare went to protect Indian children by taking them out of their own homes while increasing proportions of the child welfare money spent for other children went to protect Other Children while in their own homes. This is explained in Chapter 6.

The RSI child-in-care percentage of expenditures for all Ontario rose between 1961 and 1962. It remained at 67 percent (Table 5.3) and rose the following year from 67 to 72 percent. In Rainy River CAS, the 1962 funding change was associated with an increase from 44.1 to 53.7 percent. There was a further jump to 59.7 percent in 1963. The overall effect in the four year average was however, a percentage decrease from 53.7 between 1958 and 1962 to 42.6 between 1963 to 1965.

The switch to time units might have been associated with agency workers providing other than in-care services for RSI children. In the initial

year of the new funding scheme, however, the percentage might be higher because reimbursement on time units gave the agency greater access to a larger population base by more proactive service. This is consistent with information from the staff and Local Director that the direction of the Board and the Director during the 1959-1963 years was to keep RSI children in their own homes as much as possible. One staff recounted that in 1962 the Director encouraged workers to spend casual time in the reserve communities. The worker recalls participating in baseball games and becoming familiar with people informally. It was thought this would improve relations in the event the agency was required to intervene in a child welfare matter. It would also help in finding on-reserve foster parents. This appears to have met with some success as the agency did have a few Native foster parents by 1964.

As the 1960s progressed the agency had become predominantly a child-in-care service for the Status Indian population. One worker who went on educational leave in mid 1964 returned in mid 1967 and immediately noticed the shift in focus. Referrals of non-Indians had decreased because of the belief that the agency existed for Native people only. Non-Native families did not refer themselves nor did others refer them to the agency. Much of the remaining non-Native caseload consisted of unmarried parent work. Two social workers of that time, both in senior administration at the agency today, believe that the troubled non Native cases they see today partly reflects the neglect of this population during the 1960s.⁴

The data indicates a significant increase in the use of child-in-care services for RSI children. The increase could have been a result of increased numbers of RSI children in care, longer stays of RSI children in care or both. The next section confirms that the increased monies were a result of increased numbers of RSI children admitted to care. This was true both for Ontario and for Rainy River CAS.

NEW POLICIES AND CHANGING RATES OF CHILDREN-IN-CARE

All Children

The rates for all children in care for Ontario and Rainy River CAS, respectively, for the years 1957, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1976⁵ are reported in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The years 1957, 1961 and 1965 are the years preceding major policy change in funding Indian child welfare policy and for which comparisons to Indian children in care are made later.⁶ Using 1971 and 1976 illustrates the longitudinal trends and coincides with Census years. Fortunately, all years chosen were either Census years (1961, 1971, 1976) or adjacent to Census years (1957 and 1965). This reduced the need to estimate populations.

To what extent did RRCAS use child care compared to the rest of Ontario? Table 5.8 compares the proportions of all children in care in Ontario

Table 5.6 — Proportion of All Children in Care by Population in Ontario, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1971 and 1976

Year	In Care Population*	Child Population	Proportion (p)
1957	14,409(est)**	1,700,000***	.0084
1961	14,041	2,008,349	.0070
1965	15,222	2,170,000	.0070
1971	16,319	2,208,490	.0074
1976	12,962	2,073,755	.0063

* Calendar year-end counts for children age 0-14 except 1957 which is for ages 0-19 years.

** 1957 estimate of the year end rate based on total children cared for in year reported as 22,514. Subsequent years showed that year end rates averaged .64% of the total rate for the year.

*** 0-19 years population.

Sources:

1957 data estimated from full year total reported in the Report of the Advisory Committee on Child Welfare to the Minister of Public Welfare 1963, Appendix I, page 42.

1961-1976 data from Philip Hepworth, Foster Care and Adoption in Canada, CCSD, 1979, p78.

Child population data from Census of 1956, 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976. Dominion Bureau of Statistics (hereafter DBS), Population By Specified Age Groups, for census subdivisions, 1956, 56. DBS, Population: General Characteristics, Vol.1, 1961 Census of Canada, 22-11, 1962. DBS, Population: General Characteristics, Vol.1, 21-13. Statistics Canada, Population: Specified Age Groups and Sex, 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. 92-772, February 1973, page 65. Statistics Canada, Population: Census Divisions, 1976 Census, Cat. 92-804, 3-23. The populations for 1957 and 1965 were estimated by graphical extrapolation of the Census year population counts.

with Rainy River and the corresponding Z score measures the disproportion for the years 1957, 1961, 1965, 1971 and 1976.

Table 5.7 — Proportion of All Children in Care by Population in Rainy River Childrens Aid Society, 1957,1961, 1965 1971 and 1976

Year	Number of Children in Care*	Child Population (0-19 years)	Proportion
1957	68	11,150	.0060
1961	65	12,162	.0053
1965	72	11,950	.0060
1971	75	11,010	.0068
1976	100	9,450	.0110

Sources:

- * Children-in-Care rates: Susan McQuaker, A History of the Children's Aid Society of the District of Rainy River, 1957-1961 page 47, 1965-1976 page 68. All agency figures are the monthly averages based on the full year's count.

Population figures: 1957 based on graphical extrapolation of 1956 & 1961 census count of 10,981 and 12,162, DBS, Population By Specified Age Groups, 1956, page 73. 1961 - Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Population, General Characteristics, np. 1965 figure estimated by graphical extrapolation between 1961 and 1966 Census counts of 11,918 & 12,162. 1966 Census count from DBS, Population: General Characteristics Census of Canada, Volume 1, Population, page 21-15. 1971 - Statistics Canada, Population: Specified Age Groups and Sex, Cat 92-772, 1971. 1976 - by graphical extrapolation between 1971 and 1981 based on Census counts of 11,010 & 7,970.⁷

Table 5.8 — Cross-Sectional Comparison of Child-in-Care Proportions Between all Ontario and Rainy River CAS, 1957-1976

Year	Ontario p1	Rainy River p2	Z Score*	
1957	.0084	.0062	2.60	(Rainy River smaller)
1961	.0070	.0053	2.23	(Rainy River smaller)
1965	.0070	.0060	1.30	(No difference)
1971	.0074	.0068	.75	(No difference)
1976	.0063	.0106	-5.2	(Rainy River much higher)

* Statistically significant when $|Z| \geq 1.64$ at $\text{Alpha}=.05$

Source: Figures from Tables 5.6 and 5.7

The evidence suggests that before CAP and the IWA, Rainy River CAS had proportionately fewer children in care than the rest of Ontario but ten years later it had proportionately more children in care.

Tables 5.9 shows the measure of disproportion between all children in care in Ontario for each year at the beginning and end of the periods 1957-1961, 1961-1965, 1965-1971, and 1971-1976. Table 5.10 shows the same for Rainy River. Table 5.11 compares Ontario and Rainy River.

Between 1957 and 1961, Rainy River was an agency which used child-in-care services less than the rest of Ontario. By the middle of the sixties through to the early seventies the rates were comparable to Ontario but by the mid seventies were higher. The agency did not experience a drop in the child-in-care rates in the late 1950s when they were dropping in Ontario, nor did it experience a rise after 1965 when they were rising overall. An upward trend occurred after 1971 and the child-in-care rates were disproportionately higher than the rest of Ontario by 1976. The financial data indicates that the increase was due to increased RSI children in care.

Overall in Ontario the proportion of children in care dropped between 1957 and 1976 but, ironically, the greatest drop occurred in the late 1950s before any major change in funding occurred.

Table 5.9 — Proportional Changes in Child-in-Care Rates Over Significant Time Periods for All Ontario CASs, 1957-76

Period	Z Score*	Interpretation
1957-1961	15.6	Proportionally fewer children in care in 1961 than in 1957.
1961-1965	0.0	No significant difference in rate between 1961 and 1965.
1965-1971	-5	Proportionally more children in care in 1971 than in 1965.
1971-1976	13.9	Proportionally fewer children in care in 1976 than 1971.
1957-1976	23.3	Proportionally fewer children in care in 1976 than in 1957.
1965-1976	8.8	Proportionally fewer children in care in 1976 than 1965.

* Statistically significant when $|Z| \geq 1.64$ at $\text{Alpha}=.05$

In fact the rate increased after the funding changes of CAP before a downward trend occurred in the early 1970s. This increase could be due partially to the overall increase in social work staff in Ontario. Between 1966 and 1980, social work staff increased by 58 percent giving child welfare services access to the a greater percentage of the population.⁸ It is possible that the 5 year period after the introduction of CAP was an adjustment period during which time CASs hired more staff. Initially this might result in more apprehensions before the system adjusted the practice to fully make prevention operational for others.

Table 5.10 — Proportional Changes in Child-in-Care Rates Over Significant Time Periods for Rainy River CAS, 1957-1976

Period	Z Score*	Interpretation
1957-1961	.9	No significant difference in proportion of children in care in 1961 than in 1957.
1961-1965	-.72	No significant difference in proportion of children in care in 1961 and 1965.
1965-1971	-.73	No significant difference in proportion of children in care in 1971 than in 1965.
1971-1976	-2.92	Proportionally more children in care in 1976 than 1971.
1957-1976	-3.45	Proportionally more children in care in 1976 than in 1957.
1965-1976	-3.85	Proportionally more children in care in 1976 than 1965.

* Statistically significant when $|Z| \geq 1.64$ at $\text{Alpha}=.05$

While Ontario's child-in-care rates decreased, Rainy River CAS's increased. The number of social work staff rose 50 percent from four⁹ in 1966 to six¹⁰ in 1978. This increase might be considered comparable to the provincial increase of 58 percent. It is not comparable if one considers that the rising child-in-care rates in RRCAS made the overall workload greater.

Table 5.11 — Comparative trends in Child-in-Care Rates over Significant Time Periods between All Ontario CASs and Rainy River CAS, 1957-76

Period	Interpretation (Ontario)	Interpretation (Rainy River)
1957-1961	Proportionately fewer children in care in 1961 than 1957	No significant difference in proportion of children in care in 1961
1961-1965	No significant difference in rate between 1961 and 1965	No significant difference in proportion of children in care in 1965 than in 1961
1965-1971	Proportionately more children in care in 1971 than 1965	No significant difference in proportion of children in care in 1971 than in 1965
1971-1976	Proportionately fewer children in care in 1976 than 1971	Proportionally more children in care in 1976 than in 1971
1957-1976	Proportionately fewer children in care in 1976 than 1957	Proportionally more children in care in 1976 than in 1957
1965-1976	Proportionately fewer children in care in 1976 than 1965	Proportionally more children in care in 1976 than 1965

Changing Proportions of Reserve Status Indian Children in Care 1957-1979

Table 5.12 reports counts of RSI children in care between 1957 and 1979 in Ontario. The figures were located in four different sources. Because of the different reporting methods of the sources, estimates were made in some cases. The population of RSI children was also estimated for the years between 1957 and 1977 because exact figures could be located only for 1957 and 1977. The results in Table 5.12 should be interpreted with these facts in mind. The

Table 5.12 — Numbers and Proportion of all Reserve Status Children Cared for in Ontario, 1957-1979

Year	RSI Children in CAS Care Single Date*	RSI Population **	Proportion
1957	90 (est)		
1958	75 (est)		
1959	154 (est)	15,221	.005
1963	250 (est)		
1966	970		
1972	1238		
1973	1217		
1974	1110		
1975	1149		
1976	1078	15,334	.04
1977	661		
1979	658		

Sources:

- * 1958, 1959 & 1963 figures are estimated based on the average count that 50% of Indian Affairs reported "foster children" were in CAS foster care. The 1957 single date data estimated as 62% of the year's total. The 1957-1963 data is from National Archives RG 10, Volume 6937, file-1/29-4, part 4, Correspondence 1957-1962 regarding the care of foster children. The 1966 figure from TAP Associates D25. The 1972-1976 data are from TAP Associates, D-19, Table CW-8. 1979 from Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System, p 56
- ** 1958 figure from National Archives of Canada citation above, 1977 figure from TAP Associates, D-11, Table CW-1. It should be borne in mind that the 1958 and 1977 populations of Reserve Indian children do not vary because of migration that has occurred from the reserves to urban centres in recent decades. Johnston (1983) reports that the total on-reserve and off-reserve Indian population of persons 0-19 in Ontario in 1979 was 30,495.

results should be interpreted to illustrate the overall pattern of change over the two decades rather than for precise disproportions.

Table 5.13 — Number of Children Other Than Reserve Status Indians in Care in Ontario, 1957-1978

Year	Other Children in Care*	Total Population Other Children**	Proportion (p)
1957	14,264	2,054,779	.0069
1958	14,202	2,149,779	.0066
1959	14,387	1,844,779	.0078
1960	14,188	1,924,779	.0073
1963	13,456	2,034,779	.0073
1966	16,673	2,188,854	.0076
1972	13,872	2,151,779	.0064
1973	13,052	2,114,779	.0062
1974	12,608	2,074,779	.0060
1975	12,755	2,024,779	.0063
1976	11,884	2,058,564	.0057
1977	12,470	2,058,664	.0061
1979	13,350	2,058,664	.0065

Sources:

* 1957-1958 figures estimated based on total children cared for in year assuming year end rate is 64 percent of total year's rate, from Report of the Advisory Committee on Child Welfare to the Minister of Public Welfare, Appendix I p42. Figures and populations are 0-19 years. 1959-1976 total child-in-care rates less Indian child-in-care rates (Table 5). Total rates from Philip Hepworth, Foster Care and Adoption in Canada, Canadian Council on Social Development, 1980, p78. 1977-1978 rates from Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System, p43.

** Population totals estimated by plotting data graphically of Census year data of 1956, 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976 and estimating by straight line extrapolation to get total population and then subtracting the RSI population of 15,221. 1957-58 are 0-19 years.


Changing Proportions of Other Children in Care 1957-1979

The number of Other Children in care was calculated using the estimates for Indian children in Table 5.12. Table 5.13 illustrates these rates showing estimated populations for the same years for which RSI data was presented. Table 5.14 and Figure 5.6 compares them to RSI rates.

Table 5.14 — Proportions of Reserve Status Indian and Other Children in CAS care by Population in Ontario, 1957-1978

Year	Proportion RSI (p1)	Proportion Others (P2)
1957	.0059	.0069
1958	.0049	.0066
1959	.0101	.0078
1963	.0164	.0073
1966	.0637	.0076
1972	.0813	.0064
1973	.0799	.0062
1974	.0729	.0060
1975	.0749	.0063
1976	.0703	.0057
1977	.0431	.0061
1979	.0429	.0065

Source: Figures from Tables 12 and 13



Although the proportion for Other Children rose and then fell over the 1957-1979 period, it was stable compared to the RSI children-in-care rates. For the RSI population, there is a large jump between 1958 and 1959. This would be expected because by 1958 all the contracts between IAB and CASs were completed allowing increased access to the population. Agencies would then be accustomed to the new service. The next jump in proportion for the RSI population was between 1963 and 1966. As discussed earlier, this increase is partially explained by Indian Affairs Branch taking over the payments for Status Indian children from the Unorganized Territories. Although the Reserve Status Indian population in care was increasing, a large although unknown portion of the increase was due to Status Indian children from the Unorganized Territories. Although the rise in RSI children in care was not abrupt, it rose steadily over the 1959-1975 time period. Table 5.15 shows the results of the analysis of the different proportions.

The proportion of Reserve Status Indian children in care in 1957, the first year after DIA contracted with CASs, was not significantly different from the proportion of Other Children that came into care. The proportion of Indian children in care was significantly lower in 1958 but was significantly higher in 1959 than Other Children. This matches the increases in costs for RSI child-in-care services noted after 1958, one year after the beginning of the extension

Table 5.15 — Measures of Disproportions Between Reserve Status Indian Children In Care and Other Children in Ontario, 1957-1979

Year	Z Score	Indication
1957	-1.49	Fewer RSI Children in care but no significant difference
1958	-2.58	Fewer RSI children in care, significant difference
1959	2.77	More RSI children in care, significant difference
1963	14.77	More RSI children in care, significant difference
1966	80.6	More RSI children in care, significant difference
1972	106.6	More RSI children in care, significant difference
1979	52.7	More RSI children in care, significant difference, rate of increase declining

of services. By 1963 the rates for Indian children were clearly higher and by 1966 were exorbitantly so after one year of the Indian Welfare Agreement. (Again, part of this sudden change after 1965 was due to the inclusion of RSI children from the Unorganized Territories in DIA responsibility). By 1972 the disproportion was exceedingly high.

A parallel comparison between RSI and Other Children of single-point child-in-care data could not be made for Rainy River CAS. Also, a comparison of RSI rates in RRCAS to Ontario could not be made because single point data for RRCAS did not exist that differentiated the RSI child population from Others. The financial data of the previous section, however, did indicate that the extension of services after 1958 was associated with a drop in RSI children

in the care of RRCAS. The policy change might have had a different effect in helping RRCAS keep RSI children out of care than it did for the rest of Ontario.

Much of the interpretation of the above results are speculative. Accurate numerical data was difficult to find and the existing data was not reported in a consistent form. It is safe to conclude however that RSI rates were escalating as rates for Others were declining. It is also safe to say that in RRCAS, the disproportion was greater than for other parts of Ontario. A comparison of the admissions of RSI and Other children to the Rainy River CAS between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1974 provided a more accurate measure to assess how the 1965 policy change shaped the number of RSI children in care. These are discussed next.

Disproportionate Admission Rates Between RSI and Other Children in Rainy River CAS

Table 5.16 shows the actual number of individual children admitted to care for each year between 1964-1974. It includes all Status Indian admissions regardless of residency - reserve, the Unorganized Territories or a municipality. Judging by the circumstances listed as the reason for requiring care most admissions to care of the Status Indian child population were for protection where abandonment and helplessness of the child or incapacitation

Table 5.16 — Number of all Status Indian and Other Children Admitted Annually to the Care of the Rainy River Children's Aid Society, 1964-1974

Year	Number of SI Children Admitted for Emergency Protection	Number of Other Children Admitted (all reasons)	Number of Other Children Admitted for Emergency Protection
1964	17	14	6
1965	16	32	21
1966	32	24	13
1967	24	19	10
1968	37	29	19
1969	32	25	8
1970	23	30	13
1971	34	14	6
1972	51	10	7
1973	32	25	18
1974	31	35	27

Source:

Original Log books of the Family and Children's Services of the District of Rainy River 1964-1974.

Note:

These figures represent neither the incidence of admissions nor the total number of children in care in a year. They are the actual numbers of individuals admitted to care, some more than once, that year.

of the parent was indicated. Most of the admissions to the care of RRCAS in the Other Children category were for non-emergency reasons. These would be adoption placements at birth and adoption placement of Crown Wards from other Societies. The reasons for admissions from either group were not reported although this would have been useful information in demonstrating the service provided to each group.

It is interesting to note the shift between 1965 and 1966 in Table 5.16. In the two years preceding the IWA there were a total of 33 (17+16) Status Indian and 27 (6+21) Other Children admitted by the RRCAS for protection reasons. In the two subsequent years there were a total of 56 (32+24) and 23 (13+10) admissions to care of children from the respective groups for protection. The largest change occurred in the year following the introduction of IWA and CAP in which the number of Status Indian children admitted went from 16 to 32 while the count for Others went from 21 to 13.

The rate for the all Status Indian population remained higher after 1966 than for Others although the latter began to rise in 1973. The prevalence of non Indian children admitted to care for emergency protection fluctuated in contrast to the distinct rise of the prevalence rate of Status Indian children. It is curious to note that before 1966, there were indications that the emergency admission rate of Other Children might be rising, however it appears to drop in 1966. For every year after 1965 except 1970, the number of Status Indian children admitted for emergency reasons only was greater than the number of Other Children admitted for all reasons. In 1970 there were more Other Children admitted than SI children but only 40 percent (13 out of 30) were for emergency reasons.

Table 5.17 breaks down the Status Indian admissions according to type of residence (Reserve, Unorganized Territory, Municipality) to illustrate that

Table 5.17 — Number of All Status Indian Children Admitted to Care of Rainy River CAS by Category of Residence Community, 1964-1974

Year	Total Status Indians	Reserve Status Indians	Unorganized Territories	Municipalities
1964	17	1	10	6
1965	16	2	9	5
1966	32	32		
1967	24	24		
1968	37	37		
1969	32	31		1
1970	23	23		
1971	34	32		2
1972	51	33		18
1973	32			
1974	31	29		2

Source: Original Log books of the Family and Children's Services of the District of Rainy River 1964-1974.

Status Indian children not just from reserves were a significant proportion of Indian children in care before 1966.

Table 5.17 confirms that children from the Unorganized Territories represented a significant percent (50 percent) of the Status Indian population of children in care before 1966. It shows a curious jump in admissions of children from the reserves - increasing from 2 in 1965 to 32 in 1966. This could be a reporting issue. Staff may have no longer differentiated residence of Status Indians because they were classified as Reserve Status Indians for billing under the IWA.

Another curious fact is noted from Table 5.17. From 1971 to 1972, the admissions of RSI children jumped from 34 to 51, dropping to 32 the next year.

Table 5.18 — Population of All Children, Reserve Status Indian Children and Other Children in the 0-14 Age Range in Rainy River District, 1964-1974

Year	All Children	Reserve Status Indian Children	Other Children
1964	9,600	540	9,060
1965	9,500	555	8,945
1966	9,340	575	8,765
1967	9,100	590	8,510
1968	8,900	605	8,295
1969	8,550	625	7,925
1970	8,450	640	7,810
1971	8,205	660	7,545
1972	7,950	655	7,295
1973	7,650	650	7,000
1974	7,400	645	6,755

Sources:

Populations based on Census Data extrapolations from; DBS, Population: General Characteristics, Volume 2, 1961 Census of Canada, microfiche np; Statistics Canada, Population: Specified Age Groups and Sex, 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. 92-772, page 82; Statistics Canada, Population, occupied private dwellings, private households, census families in private households, 1981 Census of Canada, Cat. 93-918, Table 2-27. Population for Other Children by subtraction of RSI figures from the total figures.

Eighteen of the admissions in 1972 were of Status Indian children living in a municipality. These children were from three different families and threedifferent communities (Big Island, Big Grassy, and Manitou Rapids). Seven had been admitted before and 11 had not. None was readmitted before the end of 1974. None were placed for adoption. These admissions from the town of previously RSI children may have reflected a trend in off-reserve migration and the stress of relocation to an urban settings. In one family the female head had moved the family to town to escape her spouse's alcoholism

and requested the placements to allow her to obtain medical help. Another family had moved to town to find employment.¹¹

Table 5.18 shows the estimated populations of the two groups in Rainy River District based on graphical extrapolations of Census Data of 1961, 1971 and 1981.

Using figures of Tables 5.16 and 5.18, Table 5.19 compares the proportion by population of individual children admitted to care in the 0-14 age range for each group showing the total proportions for RSI children requiring emergency protection, the proportion of Other Children admitted for emergency protection and the proportion of Others admitted for all reasons.

For all years, the admissions of RSI children was disproportionate to the admissions of Other Children. Of particular interest is the change between 1965 and 1966 which saw a jump in admissions for RSI children and a drop for Others with the measure of disproportion for emergency reasons rising from 5.5 to 17.4 for emergency reasons and for all reasons from 4.3 to 14.9. Although the admissions for Others fluctuated, the disproportion between SI child admissions and Others was consistently high both for emergency and for all reasons.

(2) Using Year End Rates

For specific years for which appropriate data were available, Table 5.20 compares the year end proportions of Reserve Status Indian children in care

Table 5.19 — Comparative Proportions of Status Indian and Other Children Admitted to the Care of the Rainy River Children's Aid Society 1964-1974

Year	RSI Children	Other Children for Emergency Protection	Other Children All Reasons	Z@	Z#
1964	.020	.0007	.0015	10.7	8.2
1965	.016	.0019	.0036	5.5	4.3
1966	.052	.0015	.0027	17.4	14.9
1967	.058	.0012	.0022	19.6	17.4
1968	.059	.0023	.0035	17.2	15.5
1969	.053	.0010	.0032	17.9	14.5
1970	.037	.0017	.0038	9.3	10.1
1971	.052	.0008	.0019	18.3	16.2
1972	.096	.0010	.0014	25.0	24.3
1973	.052	.0026	.0036	14.5	13.4
1974	.060	.0040	.0052	14.8	13.3

* Statistically significant when $|Z| \geq 1.64$ at Alpha=.05

Z@ Measures disproportion between RSI children and Others for emergency protection

z# Measures disproportion between RSI children and Others, all reasons

Sources:

Calculated using data from Tables 5.16 and 5.18

with the proportions of Other Children in care in RRCAS. The measures of disproportion in Tables 5.19 and 5.20 between Reserve Status Indian Children in care and Other Children illustrate that in the 1970s, Reserve Status Indian children were both admitted to and in care of RRCAS in higher proportions to Others. Even though the in-care proportion changed little from 1965 to 1971, the composition of the group changed over these years from predominantly non-Indian to predominantly Reserve Status Indian children.

Table 5.20 — Single Point Comparative Proportions of Reserve Status Indian Children and Other Children in Care of Rainy River CAS 1957, 1972, 1976

Year	RSI CIC (0-19)	RSI Pop.** (0-19)	P	Total CIC	Others CIC	Pop. Others (0-19)	P	Z Score
1957	* 4	620	.006	70	66	10,530	.0060	.1
1972	35	775	.045	48	13	10,235	.0013	17.5
1976	52	765	.068	100	48	8,685	.0055	16.5

Sources:

* Based on the observation that 53 percent of "foster children" listed by DIA were in CAS care, this estimate was made from a figure of 7 "foster children" reported by DIA, National Archives of Canada, RG 10, Vol 6937, File 1-29/2 part 1, Reel C-10989, Correspondence 1957-1962 regarding the care of Foster Children, Memo "Helpless Children."

** Populations for 1957 and 1972 were graphical extrapolations of Census counts of 1956 and 1971. The 1956 census count was 510, DBS, Population By Specified Age Groups, 1956, page 73. The 1971 census count was 660, Statistics Canada, Population Specified By Age Groups and Sex, Cat 92-772, page 82.

Reserve Status Indian figures are year end figures from TAP Associates, A Starving Man Doesn't Argue, Appendix D19 Table CW-8. Figures for Other Children by subtraction of RSI figures from Total. Total Child-in-care figures are monthly averages for all children from Susan McQuaker, A History of the Children's Aid Society of the District of Rainy River, pages 47 and 68.

The years 1957, 1972 and 1976 were the only years for which data for RSI children based on year end counts were found.

Provincial data parallel to the above comparisons of admissions to care would have been valuable to assess the trend in other CASs which served large reserve populations. The initial analysis examines the changes in proportions based on single point data. The increase in single point data disproportions could be due partially to RSI children remaining in care longer than Other Children. This could reflect several conditions: the rehabilitative ability of the

agency with the families of the RSI children, the extent of immediate or extended family breakdown and the potential for change in the family, and the ability to place the Native children for adoption. On the other hand, the number of children actually admitted to care for each group on a yearly basis deepens our understanding of what was occurring in the Native community and the protection practises of the agency at that time.

As for Ontario, the child-in-care rates for Other children in RRCAS decreased. However, the rate probably did not decrease because of RRCAS's prevention efforts for Other Children but because the focus shifted to Native children. This shift may have been a result of the increasing number of crisis situations with the Native population in the area which diverted the attention of the agency from other fields of service and created the perception of the agency being a Native agency.

SUMMARY

In Ontario, Reserve Status Indian children were rarely in care before 1959. They were in care disproportionately to Other Children by 1963 and in care excessively so a decade later. The rate of Indian children in care grew despite decreases in the rates for Other Children in care. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the Rainy River CAS went from using foster care less than average when it served mostly non-Native clients, to using it more with RSI children constituting most of the children in care.

Several themes emerge from the data reported in this chapter. They are:

(1) shifts in RSI child-in-care rates and increased resources spent on in-care services were associated with new billing procedures at both the provincial and agency levels;

(2) 1966 as the watershed year when major shifts in costs and Reserve Status Indian children-in-care occurred at both the provincial and agency level.

The next chapter analyzes how government policies and programs shaped these rates.

Endnotes to Chapter 5

1. Because of a change of administration that year it may have been a budget reporting problem.
2. Donald Lugtig, interview by author, 15 November 1991, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
3. The boreal and rural nature of Rainy River District means that it would likely have more Unorganized Territories than average.
4. Ron King and Betty Mcleod, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Frances Ontario, 26 September 1990.
5. These years were chosen for several reason. They represent Census years or years adjacent to Census years. This is important because of rapid changes in the child populations in the post war period. These years are close to the actual years in which policy change occurred.
6. I am treating 1957 as the year preceding the full extension of services. Contracts with the CASs were still in the negotiation stages at the end of 1957. AO, RG 29, Accession 14571/2 Box 35, file 1387, Indian Advisory Committee/ Select Committee 1955-1960, Minutes of the Meeting of the Indian Advisory Committee, 10 December 1957.
7. Census' publications of 1961, 1971 and 1981 showed population breakdowns of individual areas in detail but publications of the Census data conducted in 1966 and 1976, report only the District's population, resulting in the need to estimate the populations.
8. H. Philip Hepworth, Child Neglect and Abuse, in The Challenge of Child Welfare, ed. Kenneth Levitt and Brian Wharf (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), 33.
9. McQuaker, 70.
10. Ibid, 71.
11. Interviews with former RRCAS clients who requested anonymity.

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS EFFECT ON DISPROPORTIONATE RATES OF RESERVE STATUS INDIAN CHILDREN IN CARE

In Chapters 4 and 5, I identified a number of recurring themes in Indian child welfare policy development and outcome. The nature of the federal-provincial issues, financial arrangements and CAS billing procedures were enmeshed in Canadian governments' attempts to provide egalitarian services to the RSI population through the same channels as others. They were all associated with high, escalating and unchecked rates of RSI children in care surrounding the year 1966. This chapter analyzes how these factors contributed to high rates of Reserve Status Indian children-in-care using three themes:

- (1) federalism and the federal government's position to depend on reluctant provinces or provincial agencies to provide Indian child welfare services at federal expense;
- (2) increased use of child-in-care services as billing procedures changed;
- (3) no-ceiling federal-provincial financial arrangements.

The overriding "same services," the driving force of policy and program choices, is enmeshed with federalism, billing procedures, and no-ceiling arrangements. Because of its peculiar nature, I discuss the no-ceiling Indian Welfare Agreement separately which was a federal-provincial attempt to provide the same services through the same channels from 1966.

THE EFFECT OF FEDERALISM ON INDIAN CHILD WELFARE

This analysis of federalism's effect on the rates of children in care utilizes the framework of the Fletcher and Wallace model described in Chapter 4, namely the division of power, innovation versus impediment to policy development, competitive expansionism, and equity versus efficiency.

The jurisdictional division could not be described as shared or divided. Roles, however, became divided between the two levels of government. One level of government funded the service while the other used its infrastructure to deliver service. The arrangement cannot be classed as a delegation of child welfare jurisdiction since the provinces already had the jurisdiction for child welfare. Until the post World War II era, the constitutional confusion provided rationales for both levels of government to do nothing, the "paralysis" that Fletcher and Wallace describe. This paralysis was associated with virtually no RSI children in care except in very rare circumstances.

Although generally speaking federalism hindered Indian child welfare policy development in Canada, it appears to have worked to accelerate change in Ontario after 1954. The province initiated public consultation with Indians and signed a federal-provincial agreement forthwith. Despite the subsequent escalating rates of Indian children in care in Ontario in the mid sixties, Ontario's lower disproportion indicates that the presence of CAS services other than in-care services did keep many Indian children out of care. The nature of the 1965 Canada-Ontario Indian Welfare Agreement accelerated policy

development towards Indian control beginning in the late 1970s. At that time, Ontario exploited its arrangement with the federal government, extracting considerable resources using the five cent dollar arrangement. The flexibility of the funding arrangement has allowed expansion to develop services which attempted to address, if only symbolically in the 1985 child welfare law, Indian self-government issues. There was indication in Ontario, at least by 1987, that Indian child-in-care rates had stabilized under the new agencies. Therefore, federalism used in this way may have been associated with success in keeping children out of care.¹ One evaluation cited earlier alleged that one agency, Tikinagan Child and Family Services, has admitted more children than its predecessor, the Kenora Childrens Aid Society.² This could be a result of the Native agency's greater access to the previously isolated Native population.

It does not appear to have been an issue initially that either government competed to expand to avoid blame since neither government wanted involvement. The harsh criticism of the federal government in 1947 during the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Indian Act appears to have hastened the federal governments expansion of services to Indians through the provinces. It could be argued that after the harsh criticisms of provincial child welfare policies in the 1970s, the province of Ontario, at least, chose to expand the programme by divesting and offering more resources to Native organizations to run their own services.

The equity versus efficiency theme of Fletcher and Wallace states that federalism produces new services in regions to promote equity for political gain regardless of the efficiency of the program. In the case of Indian child welfare, the distribution of Indian child welfare resources by the federal government appears to have had no economic or political base. It is difficult to apply the equity versus efficiency theme directly to Indian child welfare and its effect on child-in-care rates. Indians did not have the vote until the middle of this century³ and usually have not been a significant electoral force in the past because of their small, widely distributed population.

The political motivation to purchase provincial services was likely the attention drawn to the poor conditions on reserves when World War II institutional racism was fresh in the minds of Western countries. The decision on resource distribution was based on whichever province would agree to the federal offer. Provinces were not arguing over these resources. Ontario, the wealthiest province, was the most interested in entering into an agreement with the provincial government. Saskatchewan, a have-not province, was not. It is notable that both Ontario and Saskatchewan were at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of disproportionate numbers of Indian children in care in 1979.⁴ If resources had been distributed equally and efficiently by wider provincial acceptance, the national rates of Indian children in care might have been less, especially in places like Saskatchewan (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1 for comparison). If Ontario had been given less, in light of its traditional interest

in providing Indian services, it may still have provided the services utilizing CAP reimbursements. This argument based on the political force of the Indians is hypothetical because the Indians, the recipients of the service, were not major players in the decision. The potential providers of the service, the provinces, were also not politically dependent on the Indians and showed no interest in providing the service.

Fletcher and Wallace noted that when one level of government is assigned exclusive jurisdiction to a policy area, there is little incentive for either level to cooperate with the other. Neither the federal nor provincial governments argued that it held exclusive jurisdiction for Indian child welfare. They argued that the other was exclusively responsible. There was even less incentive to cooperate than there would be if there were agreement about exclusivity. This was less of a problem in Ontario because of a more favourable economic situation. It also had a history of leadership in child welfare.

Federalism, therefore, had a different effect on Indian services than it did on services for the general population. First it hindered and then facilitated them.

It is difficult to be definitive about how federalism contributed to high rates of Indian children in care in Ontario. It may have served to reduce the numbers at some periods and increased them at others. Before 1956, federal disputes lead to a "hands off" policy towards Indian people by the provinces and CASs. Between 1956 and 1962, CAS involvement appears to have been

reactive to crises by providing mostly in-care services. A comparison of Ontario rates of Indian children in care in those years to those of other provinces would be useful to determine how successful Ontario CASs were in keeping children out of care under those arrangements, especially after 1962 when provision for proactive service existed.

Judging by the steady increases after 1962 and even greater increases after 1966, the IWA response to federal-provincial difficulties would seem to have been an important factor in high rates of RSI children in care. Compared to increases in other provinces where there were no federal-provincial accommodations, Ontario's disproportions were small 15 years after its introduction. Without these accommodations in federal-provincial relations many more Indian children would have been in care in Ontario. Compared to other provinces, federalism as accommodated in Ontario did make a difference.

Federalism initially meant that the same services *could not be delivered* to reserves. The IWA allowed agencies to *attempt to deliver* the same services in Ontario after 1965. Two questions emerge that are addressed later: the appropriateness of the same services given the special circumstances and whether the same services were possible if funding sources were different.

CHANGES IN CHILD-IN-CARE RATES FOLLOWING CHANGES IN BILLING POLICIES

In the previous chapter, Table 5.1 illustrated three well-defined rises in costs for all Ontario RSI children:

- (1) a doubling between 1957 and 1958;
- (2) an increase of more than 50 percent between 1962-1963; and
- (3) an increase of almost 300 percent between 1965 and 1966.

The other changes were:

- (1) increases in RSI children in care beginning before 1963 (Figure 5.6);
- (2) a peak in the proportion of RSI children in care in 1972 in Ontario;
- (3) a decline in the rates of Other Children in care.

Rainy River CAS went from providing child-in-care services less than the average Ontario CAS to providing them more. The clientele went from being predominantly non-Native to predominantly Native.

The detailed costs for Indian child-in-care services for three agencies, Brant County CAS, Kenora CAS and Rainy River CAS assist in the explanation of the above results. Brant County and Kenora are used for comparison to Rainy River to illustrate how the same policy changes were associated with different outcomes in different regions. Table 6.1 lists the costs for 1958 to 1972. Figure 6.1 illustrates the changes over the critical period of 1960 to 1970 when two program changes occurred, the switch to time units and the IWA. These changes are explained as follows:

1957&1958: The doubling of RSI costs reflected the introduction of the CAS contracts the negotiations for which continued throughout 1957. The availability of the service resulted in more children in care because CASs were

Table 6.1 - Reserve Status Indian Child-in-Care Costs for Brant County, Kenora and Rainy River CAS, 1958-1972

Year	Brant \$	Kenora \$	Rainy River \$
1958	12,961	15,531	1,348
1959	2,932*	15,631	1,558
1960	13,785	8,727	843
1961	11,546	6,706	1,029
1962	16,229	7,709	2,872
1963	39,676	5,330	4,986
1964	46,230	4,200	2,694
1965	58,916	2,106	2,737
1966	85,516	37,714	30,487
1967	80,004	53,227	47,015
1968	78,079	63,308	59,174
1969	86,046	79,301	77,643
1970	117,421	88,251	89,565
1971	137,943	103,267	81,755
1972	146,226	127,527	81,479

Sources: Ontario Legislative Assembly Sessional Papers 1960-1970. Ministry of Community and Social Services Statistical Summaries 1970-1973.

* By adding all figures for that year, it was determined that this figure is a misprint.

now reimbursed to go on reserves. Previously, the lack of reimbursement had been the main obstacle to CASs providing protection services to reserves despite the 1951 changes to the Indian Act.⁵

1962-1963: Increases in RSI costs increases were associated with a change in the way IAB grants were determined. In 1962, CASs billed on a time units basis, no longer the per capita system. Now CASs would account for all time spent in service and bill accordingly. Table 6.2 breaks down the changes in the three agencies from 1962-1963 showing an association between this policy change and increasing rates of Reserve Status Indian children in care.




Table 6.2 — IAB Protection Grants and Child-in-Care Costs for Brant County, Kenora and Rainy River Childrens Aid Societies, 1962 and 1963

Year	Brant		Kenora		Rainy River		Ontario	
	Grant (\$)	CIC Costs (\$)	CIC Grant (\$)	CIC Costs (\$)	CIC Grant (\$)	CIC Costs (\$)	Grant (\$)	CIC Costs (\$)
1962 (per capita)	6,787	16,229	7,348	7,709	2,469	2,872	52,421	110,119
1963 (time units)	8,221	39,697	6,956	5,330	3,257	4,986	65,239	168,604
Change	+21%	+144%	-5%	-30%	+32%	+74%	+25%	+53%

Sources:

1962 and 1963 data: Annual Reports of Ontario Department of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Sessional Papers 13, 1964-1965, and 1965-1966.

For Ontario on the average the change to the time unit system was associated with increased overall costs and increased child-in-care costs for RSI children. An increase in the grants and child-in-care costs occurred for Brant County and Rainy River, but a decrease occurred in Kenora. There are several explanations why the 1962 change to time units would be associated with both an increase and a decrease in child-in-care costs, depending on the agency. With the per capita system, there had been no requirement to deliver services other than child-in-care services to receive the grant. If the agency chose not to be proactive in service, it could respond only on requests for protection as they had done from 1951 to 1957.

Before 1965, CASs raised most of their own funds for services other than foster care (see Chapter 10). The IAB per capita protection grants could have served as a cushion for the struggling agencies for which they did not have to account. On the other hand, under the time units system, the agencies needed to document time spent. This could have been an incentive for proactive services.

Proactive service could have served to provide early intervention and prevented admissions or, by simply allowing accessibility to a wider population base, increased the number of admissions. It is possible too that the time units system encouraged over reporting of time spent in service to the RSI population. A days work which may have included visits to several non-Indian

families and one RSI family might easily have been billed as a whole day's work to IAB.⁶

Brant County experienced a 144 percent increase in child-in-care reimbursements after 1962, much higher than the provincial total of 54 percent. This could indicate two related possibilities: (1) that time units encouraged proactive services towards Reserve Status Indians which in turn was associated with more RSI children in care because of greater access to a larger population base, (2) that more time was spent in other activities surrounding the children being in care such as court work or attempts to rehabilitate the family. Rainy River experienced a \$2,000 increase in RSI child-in-care costs. While small in absolute terms it was a 74 percent rise from 1962. In both agencies, the 1962 change was associated with increased access to the population. Brant County experienced a larger increase in child-in-care costs after 1962. In Rainy River, the smaller increase in child-in-care costs might have reflected the success of the casual time workers were spending on reserves to gain community support.⁷

Kenora presented a much different picture however. There is archival evidence supporting the speculation that there was little proactive work on the reserves under the per capita system. In July 1962, Indian Affairs Branch officials proposed the change to time units in a meeting with the Kenora CAS Local Director. The Director requested permission to bill on the per capita basis for the remainder of the year because the per capita grant would be

larger than if the agency billed for time it spent that year.⁸ The IAB grant for Kenora dropped from \$7,348 in 1962 to \$6,956 in 1963 indicating it was giving less time to RSI services. Its RSI child-in-care costs also dropped from \$7,709 in 1962 to \$5,330 in 1963 after the switch to time units. The small IAB child-in-care reimbursements suggest the prospect that Kenora workers did not take many Status Indian children from reserves in its care in the early 1960s, or if they did, they kept them in care only a very short time. Archival data supports this. In a 1964 letter of concern from the KCAS Local Director to the Deputy Minister, it was noted that the agency had 200 children in its care, 150 were "of Indian origin," many were long term Permanent Wards, and that the costs for these children were mostly charged to the province.⁹ This latter fact suggests that these children would have been either non-Status Indian children or Status Indian children living in the Unorganized Territories but not on reserves. In Kenora the switch to time units did not result in a significant increase in costs for Status Indians on reserves. This, evidently, was because of serious problems in the vast Unorganized Territories of Kenora District that left little time for the reserves. If reserve children were being admitted to care only for short periods, this suggests that conditions were favourable for the children's return to their immediate or extended families.

In all three agencies regional variations could have determined how the change in billing influenced the number of children in care.

1965-1966: From Table 5.1 in the previous chapter, the 300 percent increase in RSI child-in-care costs for Ontario is striking but an unknown portion of the increase is IAB's assumption of financial responsibility for Status Indian children from the Unorganized Territories who were previously not classed as RSI. It is impossible to determine how much of the 300 percent increase represented increased numbers of RSI children in care and how much was the new visibility of the children from the Unorganized Territories because of billings to the province. The total amount charged to the province for all children in the Unorganized Territories in 1965 was \$614,364 and dropped to \$223,907 in 1966.¹⁰ This difference is accounted for by IAB assuming costs for Status Indian children for the Unorganized Territories. Judging by the difference of approximately \$400,000, about two thirds of Ontario's cost in the Unorganized Territories were for Status Indian children. This indicates that many Status Indian children in Ontario taken into care before 1965 were not living on reserves.

Most CASs in the province which served Indians experienced sharp increases in RSI child-in-care costs between 1965 and 1966. Brant County for example increased from \$58,916 to \$85,516, Kenora \$2,106 to \$37,714 and Rainy River from \$2,737 to \$30,487. Judging by the trend for RSI child-in-care costs to continue to escalate after 1966 into the 1970s, the 1965-1966 increases reflect both the absorption of Status Indian children from Unorganized Territories into the records of IAB contributions and an increase from the

reserves. This was substantiated in Chapter 5 when the admissions to RRCAS were broken down by residency at admission (Table 5.17). This reflects either changing conditions on the reserves or a different approach to RSI services by the CAS, or both. The changing conditions on reserves are explored in Part III of the dissertation.

Like the 1962 changes, the IWA would have allowed for more proactive activities on reserves. In the presence of other factors such as socio-economic and cultural changes and unemployment, this would bring to the attention of child welfare workers potential protection situations. If workers were not familiar with the community or Indian culture, the potential for more admissions to care was greater. These factors are explored in more detail in Parts III and IV.

The Unorganized Territories

The evidence in Northern Ontario suggests that Indian children from the Unorganized Territories constituted a significant proportion of the children apprehended during the 1950s and 1960s. Brant County does not have vast tracts of Unorganized Territories that the North does. There was a smaller rise in costs for Brant County in 1966 due to the inclusion of Status Indian children in IAB reimbursements. This provides a new perspective on the allegations of extensive child welfare interference on reserves in the 1960s. The conditions associated with living in the Unorganized Territories were much

different from reserves. Families often lived in an isolated cabin on a lonely road, in a logging camp or in a small hamlet. There would be no community sanctions against the use of alcohol as on reserves. There would be much less chance of extended family members (or anyone else) living in the vicinity willing and able to assist with child care. In cases of children left alone or where the necessities of life were not provided, there would have been little alternative to apprehension of neglected children. Increased apprehensions of reserve children occurred later. From Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1, it is noteworthy that major increases in child-in-care costs occurred in 1962 in Brant County when they were minimal for Kenora and Rainy River. They went up in 1966 for Kenora and Rainy River. They went up in Brant County in 1966 but dropped thereafter for a few years. By the late 1960s however, costs began to escalate rapidly for all three indicating increasing children in care from the reserves.

Is the Sixties Scoop an Accurate Term?

The notion of a "sixties scoop" may be an inaccurate depiction of what occurred from 1956 to 1976 as far as RSI children were concerned. Although statistics may indicate sudden rises in child-in-care costs after the 1965 IWA, it appears that the actual escalation in RSI rates was gradual from 1958 onwards. Also, rates continued to rise unabated into the 1970s

Table 6.3 Percentage of all RSI Children in Care, Ontario and Rainy River CAS, 1966-1990.

Year	NATIONAL		ONTARIO		RRCAS	
	RSI %	Others %	RSI %	Others %	RSI %	Others %
1966	3.4		6.4	.8		
1967	4.2					
1968	4.6					
1969	5.1					
1970	5.4					
1971	5.6		8.1	.6		
1972	5.6				4.5	.1
1973	5.9					
1974	6.0					
1975	6.3					
1976	6.5		7.0	.6	6.8	.6
1977	6.2		9.9			
1978	6.5					
1979	6.2		4.3	.7		
1980	6.0					
1981	5.4	1.2				
1982	4.8					
1983	4.2					
1984	4.0					
1985	4.0					
1986	3.5					
1987	3.8					
1988	3.9	.8				
1990	4.0	.4				

Sources: RSI National data from QASR, Basic Departmental Data, 47. National data for Others from Philip Hepworth. Ontario data from Table 5.14. Rainy River data to 1976 from Table 5.20; later data from TAP Associates, page D20. 1990 RSI data from INAC, Growth in Federal Expenditures on Aboriginal Peoples, Background Paper for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, February 1993. 1990 National data from Child Welfare League of America/Canada.

Table 6.3 compares the proportions of the RSI population in care from 1966 to 1988 for Canada, Ontario and RRCAS. The proportions for the latter

two from Chapter 5, have been converted to percentages and rounded off to one decimal point.

A decade following the IWA, nationally the rate of RSI children in care in 1976 (6.5 percent) was much higher than the year after the IWA (3.4 percent). Two decades after the IWA however, the rates had receded to 1966 levels (3.5 percent). Unlike in the 1960s however, Indian children taken into care now are less likely to be placed for adoption outside their communities or culture because of new legislation and the emergence of new Indian agencies. The need to use alternate care may not have changed, however. While the official "in-care" figures may be lower, children may still be placed away from their parents with relatives under CAS supervision and not be evident by in-care data. It is impossible to know how many children received protection in homes that were not officially foster homes.

The data indicates that the Ontario and Rainy River rates followed a similar trend to the national rates but were higher and peaked earlier. The peak for all Ontario was 8.1 percent in 1971, much higher than the national peak of 6.5 percent in 1976. By 1976, the Ontario rate was still higher than the national level. Thereafter, however the rate fell below the national level. The Rainy River rate was, in 1976, higher than the national level. By 1979, as discussed earlier, Ontario had fewer RSI children in care both as a percentage of the RSI child population, and proportionate to Other Children.

The IWA, unique to Ontario, was associated with a higher percentage of RSI children in care than the national average in the first decade of its existence. This does not mean that it directly caused the rise. Later the IWA was associated with a lower rate of Indian children in care than other provinces. The reasons for the cyclical pattern are associated with the nature and potential of the IWA which is discussed next.

THE INDIAN WELFARE AGREEMENT

This section explores the nature of the IWA for Reserve Status Indians showing how it was different from programs for Others. (See Glossary for definition of terms)

Systemic Lack of Incentives in the IWA

The purpose of the IWA was to provide services to the reserve population on the same basis as to other Ontarians through the same channels. The federal objectives of child welfare were delineated in the Canada Assistance Plan. The IWA was intended to be a subsidiary of CAP which outlined the goals of prevention and the wide range of child welfare services (Chapter 4).¹¹ Under the terms of the IWA, as long as the services fell within the specified terms, the federal government reimbursed the province for about 95 percent of its costs.

The federal government's no-ceiling agreement to fund 95 percent of Ontario's RSI welfare costs depends on the high number of the RSI population

receiving public assistance. The higher this rate, the greater is the federal portion of the 80 percent of the 80-20 funding arrangement. As noted in Chapter 4, if the per capita welfare costs of RSI and Others were equal, the federal government's share would be 50 percent, exactly the same percentage it pays for everyone else under CAP. From the federal perspective, administrative assimilation of RSI social services to the provinces would be almost complete.

The paradox of the welfare agreement is that its munificence to provincial child welfare depends on higher relative social assistance costs for Reserve Status Indians. As long as RSI per capita welfare costs are considerably greater than the general population the province is advantaged. As long as Indians are not self-sufficient, the federal government pays for most of the costs of their social services. Because the province would not be covering these costs, there would be no incentive for it to introduce programs for the RSI population designed to reduce welfare dependency such as retraining or job creation.

If the relative dependency ratio of Reserve Status Indian declines, so do the province's revenues for their assistance and child welfare. In 1984, the province's ability to introduce Indian self-administered child welfare programs relied on the continued existence of high Indian social assistance rates. The ability of the province to make these significant reforms during a time of restraints for the general population, depended on the 95 percent,

approximately, federal assumption of costs. The province could have introduced creative child welfare programs at little cost as long as Indians were much more dependent on welfare than the general population. Such programs might have been special attempts to use indigenous case-aides, to encourage and recruit Indian foster homes or short term emergency care on reserves. With all costs covered for child welfare there was no incentive to introduce cheaper or different services which might have included measures to keep Indian children out of foster care. An argument has been made that the loss of children produced more problems of hopelessness for parents who lost motivation to change their situations so the children could return.¹² Increased hopelessness at both an individual, family or community level would decrease the chance of moving off welfare. In this way the IWA was self-sustaining.

The IWA and its Relationship to Agency Programs

The IWA had the potential for creative child welfare programs which would protect Indian children while in their own homes and would lessen the trauma to those who did require in-care protection. The IWA gave the flexibility for CASs to introduce a myriad of services suited to the geography and culture of these areas. Some possible program options were on-reserve shelters, on site reserve case-aides for emergencies, or special staff to find Native foster homes. Despite the escalating costs to the federal government and the high numbers of Indian children in care, the leadership to initiate

change did not come from the provincial or federal governments. It came from cooperative efforts between Indian communities and interested individuals in certain CASs. The first major change came in 1975 when Brant County CAS opened a Branch office on the Six Nations reserve.¹³ The second was the prevention workers program in Rainy River District in 1979.¹⁴ An earlier attempt to introduce such programs by the London CAS in 1966 failed initially. The attempts to implement change illustrate how the IWA had the potential to both impede and accelerate change. These are described next.

Since 1957, the London CAS had assigned one social worker to Native communities in Middlesex County but believed the service was inappropriate and inefficient. It had worked with the Band Councils of Muncey, Caradoc and Oneida in developing a proposal for Native case aides. Archival documents show that as early as September 1966, the London CAS initiated correspondence with the DPW and Indian Affairs Branch for the hiring of Native community workers who would assist in the prevention of child apprehensions on the three reserve communities it served.¹⁵

IAB initially rejected the proposal based on the rationale that such positions would duplicate services intended to be offered by the IWA. The Regional Director of Social Programs stated,

it would tend to separate the Indian community from the rest instead of bringing it closer.....A person employed by the Children's Aid Society would have to meet certain professional standards and would be subject to a professional supervision, both of which should ensure that the services provided are equal to those available in non-Indian communities.¹⁶

In a later correspondence the agency defined its needs as follows,

The aim is to reach out to help families earlier and to prevent troubles earlier. In large communities such as London, we learn of problems early from relatives, neighbours, schools, nurses, police and other officials. We have homemakers, day nurseries, employment offices, special school services, clinics, and numerous other resources to call upon to assist the families requiring rehabilitation. When children must be removed we have a receiving home and a variety of foster and group homes to provide substitute care. Because we are an outsider and because the Caradoc communities lack these collateral services, we can state without question that the Caradoc Reserve is getting only a second rate service. It is generally impossible to help rehabilitate a family without resources and frequently when we apprehend children, they stay with us permanently.... Among the more urgent needs are day nurseries, recreation and adult education programs, a receiving home, foster homes and above all an Indian resident of Caradoc to serve as a social or community worker on the Reserve.....We see such a person who is familiar with and known in the community learning of problem situations much earlier. With training he or she would be available to handle some of the matters directly, provide information or advice about available resources and services or make referrals. ¹⁷

Essentially, the agency recognized that the same services were not available for Native communities if admissions were to be reduced. By September 1967, London CAS Local Director M.T.O'Brien had convinced higher levels of IAB of the wisdom of its proposal to employ a case aide for which IAB would reimburse the province. O'Brien presented common sense logic to IAB,

If you are prepared to pay \$8,000 per month for the present services which are less effective than they should be, would you not be prepared to risk \$8,000 over a two year period to let us try a programme which we think could be beneficial? ¹⁸

IAB agreed. However, in November 1967, the Ontario Director of Child Welfare advised Indian Affairs Branch,

In the light of the absence of an agreed upon concept of the role of the proposed staff on the Reserve, I would suggest that we defer any decision on this matter for the present. Meanwhile, the London Children's Aid Society is very involved with its merger with the local

Family Service Association and rightly considers that the proposed personnel would take a lot of time which they are not presently in a position to give.

The agency's experience with the Indian communities indicated it had as clear a direction as anyone could about creating a special service. The project was blocked at the middle level of the DPW, Child Welfare Branch. The adherence to providing the same services for Indians emerges in the initial IAB response. At the provincial level, the Child Welfare Branch showed less interest in London's Indian Child Welfare than in its administrative goals.

A decade later, the Rainy River CAS received quite a different response when it attempted to implement a similar program. It had assigned a community development social worker to live close to one reserve with a high rate of children in care to identify local persons as resources. Next the agency proposed a program to hire these persons to work to keep children needing protection in their own community. Following a visit by, then, Deputy Minister George Thomson who personally saw the cultural and geographic disparities, the program was approved without delay. George Thomson had accepted the Minister of Community and Social Services' invitation to head the Child Welfare Branch to make significant reforms in child welfare. He did so on the condition that he report directly to the Minister and have the necessary authority to make changes. The position of Associate Deputy Minister of Child Welfare was created.

A decade earlier, the office of the Director of Child Welfare had blocked the potential of the IWA, even though the costs to the province would have been negligible, because of inability to acknowledge the need. The objective to provide the same services through the same channels was prominent in the decision of Child Welfare Branch about London CAS. Had the Director of Child Welfare been convinced and the program been approved, Indian children in Middlesex County might have been prevented from needing outside foster care.

The stimulus for the major reforms of 1984 in Ontario was the reorganization of the MCSS undertaken in 1977 designed to reform the delivery of child welfare services in all Ontario. The evaluation of the Indian Welfare Agreement in 1978 supported the directions of the Ministry. Personal visits to Rainy River District by George Thomson, and Valerie Gibbons, Regional Director in the newly decentralized Northern office in Sault Ste Marie, convinced these individuals of the need for rapid change.¹⁹

The Rainy River prevention workers' program formed the basis of Indian self governing child welfare programs in the North. Legislative changes for Indian child welfare programs were included in the draft legislative reform. These changes came close to dissolution with a change in MCSS administration, however. In 1984, a personal invitation by Deputy Grand Chief of the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation, Bill Nothing, to then Deputy Minister Robert MacDonald to the isolated North resulted in an almost instantaneous

agreement to release \$5 million over 5 years for special Indian programs and even more advanced Indian-specific provisions than originally proposed.²⁰

The provision of the same services through the same channels using the federal-provincial purchase of service model was a strong theme for Indian child welfare policy. It was emerging however that differential funding mechanisms produced administrative conditions which were not the same. These conditions worked both for and against reform. If services were equal, the answers to the following questions would be more clear:

Why were these reforms not introduced earlier with either IAB or provincial cooperation and to a wider extent across the province? Why did escalating costs of RSI child welfare not alert the Ontario bureaucracy to attempt different, cheaper means of serving Indian children? Why did the federal government not initiate alternatives when costs were escalating? These questions are partially answered by examining the actual impact Indian child welfare costs had on the budgets of the respective governments.

DIFFERENTIAL FUNDING MECHANISMS AND ACTUAL COSTS

This section demonstrates how the IWA funding agreement contributed to the sustained higher rates of RSI children in care. It shows how Indian child welfare costs would be unnoticed by provincial and federal governments leaving no urgency to create alternatives.

Absolute and Relative Costs to the Province of Indian Child Welfare Services

After the introduction of CAP, overall increases in absolute child-in-care costs accompanied decreasing proportions of disbursements spent on in-care services (Chapter 5, Table 5.3). More resources were directed at prevention services. Eventually there was a decrease in the overall number of children in care. Therefore, some success can be noted provincially in attempts to provide protection services to all children without taking them into care. On the other hand, success for the RSI population did not parallel the success for Others.

As described in Chapter 4, the IWA formula determined the federal-provincial share of the 80 percent cost-shared portion of child welfare expenses which has never exceeded 94 percent (and were 93 percent in 1988-89).²¹ Assuming for simplicity 94 percent for each year from 1966-1972 and taking into consideration that the other 20 percent is covered totally by the Department of Indian Affairs, the federal share of the total provincial output for RSIs calculates to be 95.2 percent $((94\% \times 80) + 20\% = 95.2\%)$. The total Indian Affairs contribution listed in the Annual Reports represents the Indian Affairs share only, which for purposes here is 95.2 percent of the provincial output to CASs. From this, I calculated the actual provincial contribution. The costs in relative terms were calculated by taking the provincial contribution as a percentage of the total child welfare budget. These amounts and percentages are shown in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 — Actual and Relative Costs of Reserve Status Indian Child Welfare as Percentages of Total Ontario Child Welfare Budget, 1966-1972

Year	Total Child Welfare Budget* (\$ Millions)	Reserve Status Indian Costs to Province (\$) [(X x 1.05)-X]x.48	Reserve Status Indian Costs as Percentage of Total Budget (%) (\$RSI/total)
1966	25.7	37,175	.14
1967	31.8	47,325	.15
1968	37.8	52,755	.14
1969	41.5	59,926	.14
1970	48.3	69,845	.15
1971	50.9	77,585	.15
1972	53.6	83,150	.16

Source:

* 1966-1971 Annual Reports Department of Social and Family Services Legislative Assembly of Ontario Seasonal Paper 13, 1967-1970, 1971-1972 Statistical Supplement Annual Reports Ministry of Community and Social Service, 1992-1973.

In 1972 the actual provincial output was \$83,150. Although more than double the output six years earlier, the actual amount spent by the province on Indian child welfare services by 1972 was small.

Indian Child Welfare Costs and Costs for Others Compared

The difference between the costs for RSI child welfare to the province and for Others is great. To determine the amount the province actually spent for Other Children, we consider the child-in-care costs for Other Children from the figures in Table 5.1.

To obtain the provincial share of these costs under the CAP agreement, 30 percent of that figure is calculated. Table 6.5 shows these calculations and the percentage they represented of the total budget for each year.

Between 1966 and 1972, the actual total cost to the province of RSI child welfare services were \$38,000 and \$83,000 in 1966 and 1972 respectively. For Others, its costs were \$7.5 million and \$15.6 million respectively. The RSI figures constituted between .14 and .16 percent of the budgets of those years.

Costs to the province for Other Children represented 30 percent of the total budget. Despite growing disproportions of Reserve Status Indian children in care, their costs would not stand out as extraordinary to the provincial treasury because the majority of costs were reimbursed by the federal government. The province's financial commitment was negligible in relation to the proportional demands of its other child welfare commitments. One would not expect that the total Indian child welfare costs, of which most were for foster care, would alert cost-minded bureaucrats to the need to find alternatives to foster care as a principle mode of service. Even though actual costs to the province jumped 100 percent between 1966 and 1972 and doubled again to \$200,000 by 1977, these amounts are still small for a province such as Ontario.

If the province had been assuming full responsibility for Indian costs, the rapidly increasing costs for Indian children (most of which were for child

Table 6.5 — Actual and Relative Costs for Other Children's Child Welfare as Percentage of Total Ontario Budget, 1966-1972

Year	Total Child Welfare Budget* (\$ Million)	Total Costs for Other Children** (\$ Million)	Actual Provincial Costs for Other Children (30% of previous column) (\$ Million)
1966	25.7	24.9	7.5
1967	31.8	30.8	9.2
1968	37.8	36.1	10.8
1969	41.5	40.4	12.1
1970	48.3	46.9	14.1
1971	50.9	49.4	14.8
1972	53.6	52.0	15.6

Source:

* 1966-1970 Annual Reports Department of Social and Family Services Legislative Assembly of Ontario Seasonal Paper 13, 1967-1971
1971-1972 Statistical Summary Annual Reports Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1972-1973

** From Table 6.1

care) might have been detected, warning of the need to develop alternatives to child-in-care services for reserve communities.

Based on this argument, why would the federal government which was paying for the service, not question the escalating costs for Indian children in care? At the federal level there is an indication that increasing child welfare costs were equally invisible as discussed next.

Federal Costs and Indian Child Welfare Costs

Nationally Indian child welfare costs escalated from \$4 million in 1966 to \$16 million in 1978 to \$25 million in 1978.²² Table 6.6 compares the cost expenditures and the total national budget. It shows that Indian child welfare

Table 6.6 — Indian Child Welfare Expenses for Rainy River Children's Aid Society, Ontario, Canada, 1966, 1971, and 1976.

Year	Rainy River CAS	Ontario	National
1966	67,300	743,000	4,040,000
1971	91,000	1,551,700	11,000,000
1976	164,700	3,140,000	16,000,000
Increase: (times)	2.4	4.2	4

Source: Ontario & Rainy River from Tables 6.1 & 6.2 National Figures from DIAND, Indian Conditions, page 25

increases for RRCAS, Ontario and Canada. The increase for the RRCAS are also included here to maintain the agency perspective which is discussed later. Despite the 240 percent increase at the agency level, 420 percent provincially and 400 percent federally, Indian child welfare costs were small compared to other INAC social service expenses. Table 6.7 shows that child welfare was the only social expenditure to decrease as a percentage of the Social Expenditures budget. In 1970, Indian child welfare was 13.9 percent of the budget dropping to 10.3 percent in 1978.

Furthermore, costs for social programs were small in comparison to other federal costs for Indians. Table 6.8 illustrates Indian child welfare costs compared to other areas including total Indian social programs, total Indian

Table 6.7 — Social Support Expenditures, All Federal Programs For RSI

Social Services	1970/71		1978	
	(\$ Thousands)	(%)	(\$ Thousands)	(%)
Social Assistance	34,627	41.1	104,049	45.0
Child Care	11,680	13.9	24,788	10.3
Alcoholism	167	0.2	5,539	2.3
Other Social Services (Adult Care, Day Care, Welfare Aids)	1095	1.3	9,880	4.1
Medical Services	36,599	4.0	94,002	38.8
Sports and Recreation	99	0.1	2,211	0.9
Legal Services and Native Justice			1,689	0.7
Total	84,267	100	242,158	100

Source: Reproduction from Indian Conditions, page 108.

expenses increased only 212 percent, the lowest of all the increases listed. Compared to the other services for Indians the increase from 1970 to 1978 are small.

In 1970, child welfare costs were 32 percent of health care costs and 34 percent of social assistance costs. In 1978, it was 28 and 34 per cent of the totals of these areas respectively. Indian child welfare costs were a very small portion of the total federal budget for Indians. In 1970, Indian child welfare

Table 6.8 — Canadian Indian Child Welfare Cost Changes in Comparative Perspective to other Federal Expenses Between 1970 and 1978

	1970	1978	Increase (%)
All Federal Expenses*	15,089 million	47,636 million	350
All Indian Expenses	260 million	829 million	318
Health & Welfare Expense for Non-Indians*	3,191 million	15,748 million	393
Total Social Expenditures for Indians**	84,267 thousand	242,158 thousand	287
Social Assistance for Indians**	34,627 thousand	104,049 thousand	300
Medical Services for Indians**	36,599 thousand	94,002 thousand	256
Child Welfare Services for Indians **	11,680 thousand	24,788 thousand	212

Source:

* DIAND, Indian Conditions, page 108 and Table 6.5

** DIAND, Indian Conditions, page 117

costs constituted a larger percentage of the Indian Social Expenditures budget and the second largest Social program, next only to Social Assistance.²³ By 1978 child welfare was a smaller percentage of the Social Expenditure budget and had dropped to third place, behind Medical Services. Ironically as child-in-care rates were escalating, its significance to the federal treasury declined. Federally, the importance of these costs actually decreased in relation to other

expenses. Its obscurity would not alert provincial or federal policy makers to consider less expensive interventions. More fiscal pressure on the bureaucracy might have resulted in more attention to facilitating the development of alternatives to foster care.

Summary

This section presents reasons why Indian child welfare costs rose without government initiatives to abate them. The nature of the funding agreements placed rising costs in an insignificant fiscal position provincially.

Child welfare in Ontario was moving towards in-home services for children while child welfare for Reserve Status Indians was moving towards more in-care protection services. While child-in-care costs remained stable for Other Children, they escalated for RSI children. While the emphasis on prevention increased for other children, it decreased for RSIs. While child-in-care rates for Other Children rose modestly after 1965, they rose significantly for Indian children. When Other Children's child-in-care rates stabilized, they stayed high for Reserve Status Indians. In absolute terms the rates were escalating. In relative terms costs were declining.

CONCLUSION

The heightened awareness of an apartheid-like Indian policy after World War II was a major factor in the decision to equalize provincial laws including the extension of provincial social services to reserves. This drive towards equal

laws and services was superimposed upon IAB policy makers' perceptions that Indian approaches to child welfare were the same as non-Indians. The unique jurisdictional split of Indian child welfare made the provision of equal services difficult to implement. The accommodations served both to increase and decrease the rates of Indian children in care.

Two factors, invisible costs at both levels of government and greater access to a population, merged with a mind set of IAB officials that equated child welfare services for Indians with foster care and contributed greatly to a continued rise in Indian child-in-care rates after 1956.

The extension of services gave greater access of CASs to Indian communities. This access increased with each change in funding. Access alone increased the chance of higher rates of foster care merely because access increased the population base. If the population was at higher risk for neglect than others, the chances of a high rate were even greater.

In the agreements of 1956 and 1962 the funding body (IAB) related directly to the service providers (the CASs). The direct billing arrangement between 1957 and 1962 put CASs and the source of funding in close contact through local offices of IAB and the agencies. In contrast, in the 1965 agreement, the IAB at upper levels would relate to an intermediary, the province. The IWA allowed for some family services and minimized the number of RSI children in care eventually. The billing procedures under the IWA, however, created a situation of provincial bureaucratic inability to detect

increasingly high rates of Indian children-in-care. At the federal level, the priorities and costs of programs resulting from the failed 1969 White Paper proposal to eliminate the jurisdictional split pushed national Indian child welfare expenses into oblivion.

If the province paid for child welfare services itself, it could have responded earlier with prevention initiatives and would have given more attention to proposals such as that of the London CAS. At the federal level, if child welfare services had shown up as increasing and out-of-control, the federal government would have been more likely to propose alternatives as it did for social assistance. The jurisdiction impeded bureaucratic initiatives to change.

RSI children in Ontario did not receive the same services as Indian children in most other provinces. Although it was the intention, Ontario RSI children did not receive the same services as other children in Ontario because of different funding channels. There could be little move towards prevention for Indian children without the same checks and balances for costly child-in-care programs. Furthermore, the outcomes in terms of child-in-care rates would not be the same if the population had different needs from those for whom the service was designed. Over the two decades, it became clear to service providers that the same services were neither available nor appropriate, if the best interest of Indian children were to be realized. It

became an issue of equity through special services rather than equality of service.

The percentage of Indian children in care in Ontario was slightly higher than the national average rate in the initial years following the IWA. The IWA did not cause the higher rates in those years. It was only one factor which influenced and shaped the rates. The IWA eventually supported services which kept many RSI children from needing in-care services. Federal-provincial accommodations of the IWA both increased and decreased the rates.

The IWA both impeded and accelerated the development of new programs. The province's minimal financial commitment accelerated policy change towards Indian involvement when influential persons were convinced of the need. Without individual interest, this same lack of involvement impeded change provincially. Federally, the government would support new programmes if it saved money. The support for culturally appropriate or special services at both the provincial and federal levels depended on the fiscal implications for that level of government. In the early 1950s IAB took the most practical and cheapest route with children of unmarried mothers, even when IAB believed it was not the best plan. In the 1980s, the introduction of culturally appropriate services would not have occurred so quickly in Ontario if special services were funded by the province on the same basis as CAP.

The jurisdictional split kept RSI children out of care initially but subsequent policies, the IWA in particular, played a role in the sustained high

numbers of Indian children admitted to care. The IWA eventually lessened the numbers of RSI children who would potentially be in care in Ontario however by allowing child welfare workers the opportunity to spend time finding alternatives to admissions. Influential individuals convinced of the need for change could effect change by exploiting the jurisdictional issue and the nature of the IWA. The jurisdictional division set in motion political forces which changed the policy direction producing easily available monies for Indian-controlled child welfare services. Ontario, which overall may have needed these new services less than other provinces, again took advantage of a federal initiative.

Part II explored how policy and program choices in Ontario shaped the rates of Indian children in care between 1956 and 1976. Other factors - social, economic and cultural change in Indian communities - predicated the need to involve child welfare authorities. These are explored in the next section.

Endnotes to Chapter 6

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2. James N. Docherty & Associates, A Comprehensive Review of Tikinagan Child and Family Services Executive Summary, October 1991, 3.
3. Rick Ponting and Michael Posluns, Out of Irrelevance (Toronto: Butterworth, 1980)
4. Timpson, "Federal-Provincial Relations, Indian Child Welfare Agreements, and Disproportionate Indian Child-in-Care Rates: Are they related?," 1990.
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6. Muriel Casson, interview by author, 2 November 1992, Red Rock Ontario.
7. As reported in Chapter 4.
8. NAC, RG 10, Vol 6927, file 401/29-1 part 3, Welfare of Indians of Ontario - Report on Field Trip to Northern Ontario, nd circa July 1962.
9. AO, RG 29, Acc 14571/2, Box 13, file 537, Kenora CAS 1947-1970, Letter form Harold Treen to James Band, 28 January 1964.
10. Annual Report of the Ontario Department of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Sessional Papers 13, 1968
11. As stated earlier in Chapter 4, Part II of CAP was not proclaimed because of little provincial interest. The IWA was the model on which the federal government meant to mould services across Canada if the provinces had accepted.
12. This is an argument put forth by Brad MacKenzie in "Social Work Practice With Native People," in Introduction to Social Welfare, ed. Shankar Yelaja (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985).
13. Lance Sams, "Indian Children: All in Indian homes thanks to Six Nations Band Council," Ontario Indian Vol.5 No.4 (April 1982): 27. Lance Sams, former Assistant Executive Director of Brant County CAS, telephone interview by author, 11 February 1990, Waterloo to Florida. Wilma General, elder member of Six Nations First Nation and first Native Board member of Brant County CAS, interview by author, 13 February 1990, Oshwegan Ontario.

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17. Ibid., correspondence from M.T. O'Brien to Joseph Dufour Indian Development Branch, 12 July 1967.
18. Ibid., Correspondence from J.G. McGilp, Regional Director of Indian Affairs Ontario to M.T. O'Brien, 13 October 1967.
19. George Thomson, interview by author, 10 April 1988, Toronto; Val Gibbons, interview by author, 28 May 1991.
20. Dick Lightbown, interview by author, 12 April 1988, Toronto, Ontario. George Thomson, interview by author, tape recorded, 10 April, 1988, Toronto. Robert MacDonald, interview by author, 6 April 1988, Toronto. The development of the 1984 Indian specific legislation and the creation of the Indian Child and Family Services was documented in a separate study by the author. Joyce B Timpson, "The Making of Indian and Native Child Welfare Policy in Ontario 1977-1984: A Study in Cross Cultural Public Administration," unpublished paper for Social Work 721, Wilfrid Laurier University, May 1988.
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III

**SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CHANGES
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
INDIAN CHILD IN CARE RATES**



In a workshop for Cree and Ojibwa human service workers on children and their drawings, a five year old boy demonstrated the meeting of hunting/gathering and industrial/communication cultures. The top drawing was interpreted by Fred Thomas: In the dreams of Indian children this age, an animal appears which is to be the child's guiding spirit throughout his or her life. The child will typically draw the animal. In this isolated community many people practise traditional pursuits but there is full access to television through satellite communication. The pleasant boreal scene contrasts with the waring Ninja turtles' drawing below.

**THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND
THE DECISION TO EXTEND PROVINCIAL SERVICES
TO INDIAN COMMUNITIES, 1940-1955**

It is essential to explore the socio-economic setting which preceded the 1960s and the decision to expand child welfare services to Indian communities. This chapter explores two perspectives - those of Indian people experiencing rapid cultural change and those of the non-Indians delegated to address what was seen as a problem of poverty and inequality. The non-Indian perspective set in motion a set of policies that by-passed the Indian reality and contributed to high rates of children in care in the 1960s and 1970s.

The information for this chapter is from three sources - Aboriginal people, government Archives and supporting literature. I have drawn heavily on transcripts of the 1955 Ontario Select Committee on Civil Rights and Liberties of Indians, an enquiry that was seminal to the decision to extend provincial services to Status Indians.

Initially I outline the social and economic conditions in Aboriginal communities preceding and following World War II including an account of how they addressed child welfare traditionally. Next I highlight the important themes from testimonies of the Select Committee that addressed inequities in Aboriginal communities.

PRE AND POST WAR CONDITIONS IN ONTARIO ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES

Before World War II, Status Indians on reserves were left alone by government services. The federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration's Indian Affairs Branch employed a Local Superintendent (known locally as the "Indian agent") in various locations around the country to administer the few services provided by Treaties and through the Indian Act. The services of interest to this study were medical services, welfare relief and education. Most of the services were rudimentary at best. Health care in isolated regions consisted of a one day visit per year to reserves,¹ and welfare which by 1955 was \$12 per month.²

The Aboriginal people consulted in both Northern and Southern Ontario stated that in the pre war years, they lived simply and independently as farmers, trappers and fisherman. A few were employed in industry, depending on the proximity to wage employment. Living conditions in most areas were probably no worse economically than those of other depression era Canadians. The Northern Ojibway ate fish, moose, otter, linx and bear. They used all parts of the animal such as bear grease as a lard substitute and animal skins for clothing and footwear.³ The right to hunt and fish all year round coupled with generally less dependence on government actually meant that the Native people were probably better off than non-Native in the area.⁴ Those consulted believed that their basic food, clothing and shelter needs were adequate.

Health in Northern Ontario, however, was a problem. Tuberculosis due to overcrowding and poor sanitation was endemic.⁵

Community members joined forces to assist each other in hard times. Although people stated that they were poor, they claim that there was always enough food to feed another mouth. In the boreal forests around Rainy River, Kenora and Temagami for example, the Northern Ojibwa lived in extended family groups. One extended family usually consisted of a set of grandparents, some of their offspring and spouses and their children. As hunters of fish and game and gatherers of vegetation, they lived and travelled according to the seasons and movement of game. The grandparents provided much of the nurturing and teaching of the children while the more youthful parents concentrated on daily survival tasks. For four months each summer, several extended families would congregate in settlements around which Hudson Bay fur trading posts evolved.⁶ These settlements were precursors to Indian reserve communities created by the purchase of the land by the federal government.⁷

During the summers, the people tapped maple syrup, gathered berries, took day hunting trips or whatever other activity was possible in their region. IAB operated seasonal schools in many areas. Summers were also a time for celebrations and for arranging marriages between members of the different families. Marriages were arranged by the elders during these gatherings according to strict selection rules of a clan system. One basis for arranged

marriages was the prevention of consanguineous unions.⁸ The evolution towards a more stationary habitat varied from region to region depending on the proximity to towns, the diminished abundance of game and dropping prices of furs. Permanent settlements were encouraged by IAB to allow easier distribution of food relief, as food shortages were frequent in places such as the North West Territories. It would also allow IAB to introduce services such as education.⁹

In Southern Ontario, the Iroquois had been agriculturalists before the arrival of the Europeans. Although the respondents from Akwesasne and Tyendinaga attested to being poor in pre war times, food production was sufficient to survive, people shared and traded what they had and no one went hungry, they will remember.¹⁰ On Manitoulin Island the farming done by the Odawa people was said to be competitive with that of the non-Native communities.¹¹ After the war, however, farming declined everywhere, not only in Native communities. In Akwesasne and on Manitoulin Island, the sale of cream had been lucrative but after the war new regulations and more sophisticated technology forced many Indian farmers out of business.¹² On Manitoulin Island jobs in the vicinity were less available for Indians than for others. Because of their isolation, they would need to relocate to where the language differed, discrimination was common, and where the closeness of the extended family would be lost. Although Southern and Northern conditions varied, many cultural similarities exist.

The newly created reserves did not experience the prosperity of other Canadians communities. By the middle of the 1960s, 16 percent of Registered Indians in Canada lived away from their reserve, by the mid 1970s, 27 percent and by 1981, 30 percent.¹³ Housing was inferior even by 1985. By 1985, 45 percent of Native housing in Canada did not meet basic standards. Apparently 38 percent were overcrowded and 38 percent still lacked running water and toilets.¹⁴ The life expectancy in 1964 was 60 years for males and 69 for females compared to 72 and 79 for the Canadian rate. By 1981, the national standardized mortality rate for Natives was 9.5 per 1,000 compared to 6.1 for others. In 1976 and 1983 the major cause of death for Native people was cited as accidents, poisonings and violence, cited as four and three times the national average.¹⁵

Some Southern communities had access to waged employment after the war to fill the gap created by the failure of farming. In the Cornwall area, the building of the St. Lawrence Seaway produced many jobs for the Akwesasne people. After the completion of the Seaway, the reputation of the Mohawks as manual labourers and their ability to work at heights led to construction jobs in the United States. As the affluence increased, so did the abuse of alcohol.¹⁶

The Native respondents expressed striking and candid concern about the effect of alcohol on their culture since the 1950s. Some history of the laws surrounding alcohol use by Native people is appropriate here. The European

fur traders introduced alcohol as one of the commodities for trade to the Native peoples not long after the beginning of the fur trade in the 17th Century. European compliance with the Indian traders' demand for alcohol ensured their loyalties and the continuance of the fur trade. When alcohol-related violence increased, Indian leaders unsuccessfully pleaded with the Europeans not to trade liquor.¹⁷ Finally, in 1839, the sale of alcohol to Status Indians was prohibited to protect the Indians from being "debauched by the accoutrements of civilization."¹⁸ Other writers have noted additional reasons for the ban. The early Jesuits saw the use of alcohol as hindering their ability to convert the Indians to Christianity. In 1683, one Jesuit Father Thierry Beschefer wrote,

"...And drunkenness are great obstacles to their Conversion.....It may also be said that, when They overcome these obstacles, It is difficult to find better Christians."¹⁹

Almost two Centuries later, Rev. Peter Jones, a Wesleyan minister of Mohawk origin described the evils that the Europeans introduced to the Ojibwa. He wrote in 1861:

This was the polluted source whence flowed poisonous waters that contaminated and deadened every good feeling of the heart. No people, as a body, can be addicted to this crying sin than the natives of America. Previously to the introduction of Christianity among them, I have often seen such scenes of degradation as would sicken the soul of a good man; such as husbands beating their wives, and dragging them by the hair of the head; children screaming with fright, the older ones running off with guns, tomahawks, spears, knives, and other deadly weapons, which they concealed in the woods to prevent the commission of murder by their enraged parents; yet, notwithstanding this precaution, death was not infrequently the result.²⁰

One writer believes that European interest to protect the fur trade by protecting the trappers was a major consideration in banning alcohol.²¹

Virtually all the Aboriginal respondents cited the abuse of alcohol after its full legalization as a major agent in the demise of their community and family life. Those interviewed described the pre war reserves as happy communities and noted the legalization of alcohol as a turning point. Before the war, many communities hosted alcohol-free events in which people from the surrounding communities, cottagers and American tourists readily participated.²² This is not to suggest that conditions in the communities were ideal before alcohol was reintroduced. Some Treaty Indians gave up their Indian Status for this right. Others consumed alcohol by making their own brew from common foods such as raisins and tomato juice treated with yeast. Others purchased alcohol from bootleggers for exorbitant prices or by frequenting nearby towns in the USA as in the case of Couchiching near Minnesota.²³ Alcohol abuse was a concern but the respondents stated that its effect on communities was insignificant until the laws changed.

In the revised Indian Act of 1951, Indians received the right to purchase alcohol in taverns but not from provincial outlets to consume at home. The use of intoxicants on the reserve (including the home brew) was still outlawed, however.²⁴ The purchase of spirits in provincial outlets was a matter of provincial law. The limitations were impossible to enforce and bootleggers took great advantage of the situation.²⁵ In 1956 following the Select Committee

hearings, Ontario changed the law to allow Indians to purchase liquor in provincial outlets.

In addition to the effect of alcohol, education was an equally important agent of social change as described by the respondents. Before the war there were three types of schools. A few communities had day schools. In other areas, the children were sent to residential schools often far from home. In some Northern trapping communities, IAB provided seasonal schools which accommodated the hunting and gathering cycles of the Northern Ojibwa. After the war a shift occurred as IAB expanded education. Day schools were opened on some reserves replacing the residential schools. On others, bussing to nearby provincial schools replaced Day Schools and residential schools. Residential schools or Day Schools replaced the seasonal schools in the North.

The residential schools had been in existence for many decades. Run by churches and financed by IAB, their purpose at the turn of the century was unequivocally to destroy the influence of reserve life. Lithman quotes a 1904 government document:

As a civilizing factor the advantage of the removal of the pupils from the regressive influence of home life is shared pretty equally by the industrial and boarding schools, although the latter are generally situated on or near reserves with a view to overcoming the strong objection manifested by the parents to the removal of their children to any great distance.²⁶

Indian education became compulsory after changes to the Indian Act in 1951 for all children aged 7-16 years. A child who turned 16 during the school term could be required to complete the term.²⁷ Section 118 gave a truant

officer the powers of a peace officer with the authority to enter an Indian home to "enforce the attendance of Indian children,"²⁸ to "take into custody" to transport any child to a school using "as much force as the circumstances require."²⁹ Under compulsory education, parents who did not send their children to school could receive a five dollar fine or a ten day jail sentence.³⁰ More likely IAB withheld the Family Allowance cheque although officials used the threat of the jail sentence to gain compliance.³¹ The RCMP were sent to investigate non-attendance at school. One IAB official stated,

The RCMP are the truant officers. If they are more than 5 days away from school, the allowance is "clipped." The RCMP are required to send in reports on the big agencies to the Indian Superintendent.³²

One respondent reported that an RCMP officer entered the bedroom of a woman in his community at 2:00 AM looking for her truant son!³³ School attendance in Ontario was compulsory for all children off reserves. The provincial law differed, however. The compulsory age for attendance was 8-14 years and there was no jail sentence in the law for failing to send one's children to school. If non-Indian children failed to attend school, the "attendance officers" could charge the parents of the children.³⁴ This was in contrast to the federal "truant officer" who had the authority to forcibly apprehend Indian children. The federal law was more authoritarian and punitive than the provincial law. The use of a national police threatening jail sentences to ensure school attendance of Indian children is little short of tyranny.

The greatest problems occurred in the residential schools. These schools were located near towns such as in Kenora, Sioux Lookout, Sault Ste. Marie, Massey, and Brantford for example. Some were located right on the reserves such as Couchiching near Fort Frances and Fort Albany on the James Bay coast.

Many of the older Indian respondents spoke of their residential school experiences with anger, but more often with great sadness about their desperate loneliness. Upon entering the school, the children were bathed, deloused, and their heads shaven. Some wore uniforms. The children were forbidden to speak their Native tongues both in and out of the classroom and were strapped if caught doing so. Children who reported other children's infraction of this rule were rewarded with chocolate bars.³⁵ One staff member of 18 years with the Moose Factory School and the Pelican Lake School near Sioux Lookout reported that an actual physical barrier separated the boys from the girls. The children were strapped if caught talking across the barriers, even to their siblings of the opposite sex. The children went home only in summer months, if they had a home. Not until the 1960s were Christmas visits possible.³⁶

Although the schools are receiving attention currently, abuses have been reported for several decades in the literature.³⁷ The residential schools are not universally perceived as negative, however. Many Native people report that the parents wanted their children to receive an education and therefore complied

willingly, sending their children away to residential school if day schools were not available.³⁸ Some Indian adults reported that the discipline of the residential schools was necessary.³⁹ Josiah Charles addressing the Assembly of First Nations National Inquiry into First Nations Child Care said,


I lived in a residential school for nine years, and if it wasn't for residential schools I, along with about 100 others, would not be where we are now. It upsets me when people target residential schools as being bad. It wasn't all bad. It was there for a reason, that reason was to educate the native people, and it did that.⁴⁰

Until 1979, the Pelican residential school near Sioux Lookout was used by many Native parents who wished to continue to trap as a couple even though Day schools on reserves were available. In later years things had much improved. At Pelican School, the teachers hired Indians to teach trapping skills.⁴¹

Recently, the sexual abuse by the custodians of the residential schools has been made public. Manitoba Chief Phil Fontaine disclosed on public television that he was a victim of sexual abuse by Catholic priests as did the celebrated Cree playwright Tomson Highway.⁴² The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has produced several works on the subject.⁴³ Recently a reunion of the Fort Albany School facilitated the disclosure by 30 attenders that they had been physically and sexually abused at the school. Reports of two suspicious deaths of children were also reported.⁴⁴ Less well known is the extent of abuse between the children themselves. One anonymous respondent spoke of the overcrowding at Pelican school in which there was one adult

Pic of the Past

Sioux Lookout Indian Residential School - 1939



Submissions can be sent to: The Sioux Lookout Bulletin, Box 1389, Sioux Lookout, Ontario POV 2T0, or dropped off during business hours at 40 Front Street.

Source: The Bulletin, Sioux Lookout, 13 October 1992.

supervisor for 50 children. With staff unable to monitor the activities of the children, some children victimized others. The respondent spoke of physical and sexual abuse by both genders of their same gender. The memories of these experiences are present today in many Indian adults. It frequently prevents cooperation and consensus between adults who were childhood enemies.

A noteworthy theme was that the abuse was secondary to the loss of the culture and language. The religions were denigrated and children told that their parents would go to hell. At Pelican School, staff were required to attend church several times a day, even on days off, as an example to the children. Failure to do so resulted in reprimands or dismissal.⁴⁵

In communities where residential schools replaced seasonal schools, the parents would continue to hunt and trap while the children were away at school, increasing the gap between the parents and the children. In communities where Day schools replaced the seasonal schools, the father only continued to trap. Alone he performed all the chores of building the camp, setting and checking traps, skinning and tanning of hides, cutting wood and other activities required to keep the camp in operation. These time consuming chores were previously shared by the extended family members. Trapping alone resulted in a much smaller yield for the time spent.⁴⁶ The implications for family stability of such long separations are evident. With the declining fur prices yielding little more than a subsistence existence, year round education make its full time pursuit even more impractical.

While the children from the more isolated communities often went to residential schools after the war, children from areas close to towns were often integrated with the provincial schools in the nearby towns. IAB contracted with the provincial Departments of Education to accept Indian students in exchange for capital expansion and tuition grants. As a result, the number of Indian children in provincial schools went from 775 in 1953 to 5,157 in 1966.⁴⁷ The Indian respondents reported that these changes in the education system had significant impact on their family and economic lives. In communities where bussing children to provincial schools replaced Day schools, extra economic pressure was placed on the families. One mother said,

For a large family it meant hardship to clothe each child to the standard of the school of White Society and to make lunches whereas previously they went home at lunch break.⁴⁸

Without hydro and plumbing in many reserves, it was a remarkable feat to send families to the provincial schools. Residents of the communities of Bear Island, Akwesasne and Couchiching reported that the children adapted the more boisterous ways of non-Indian children after bussing was introduced. Some parents felt that the children lost their respect for them because they themselves had little schooling and often spoke no English.⁴⁹ Another respondent who was bussed from Serpent River to Elliot Lake encountered racism for the first time at the age of seven. A Chief's daughter, she recalls insults of "dirty Indian" she heard from the non-Indian children and fighting between Indian and other children in the school yard.⁵⁰ The bussing to the

provincial schools was a major stress on parental authority and Indian self esteem.

The impact of schooling systems has been profound. Regardless of whether an Indian child attended a residential school, a reserve Day School or a provincial school, the economic, social and cultural price was high. The education system hastened the demise of traditional pursuits. The emotional and psychological damage is now emerging, the extent of which is not known.

The traditional life and education of Indians before the arrival of the Europeans is described by Native educator and scholar Verna Kirkness. The following are excerpts from her summary:

The teaching was done by the family: parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles all played a unique part in the child's development. The most important aspects of traditional Indian education was spiritual learning. ...Indians learned that they were responsible to the one Great Spirit, the Creator, the Ruler of all things; that their main purpose on earth was to consecrate their lives to the service of their peoples; that they must keep the feasts, learn the dances, respect the taboos, and observe the customs of their tribes; ...

Traditional Indian education was also linked to economic survival. Children were taught at an early age to utilize their environment. Since independence and self-reliance were valued ancient concepts, both boys and girls learned how to hunt, trap, fish and farm - whatever livelihood their particular environment offered. Basic learning for survival included dressing, building temporary and permanent shelters, curing certain illnesses, preparing and preserving foods, and travelling on land and water.

In this traditional education, the community was the classroom, its members were the teachers, and each adult was concerned that each child lived a good life...Because their education held Indian culture, values, and customs in high esteem, it helped the child to develop his potential within his society and his image of himself as an Indian.⁵¹

Before the second World War, many aspects of the traditional life described by Kirkness flourished in some form in Ontario's Native communities.

THE CARE OF ORPHANED AND ABUSED CHILDREN BEFORE THE EXTENSION OF SERVICES

Before the War, CASs were not known in Indian communities and most people stated there was no need for them.

In serious cases such as the sexual abuse of children, Northern Ojibwa community sanctions could be swift and harsh. Banishment from the community was customary, no easy sentence considering the harsh sub-Arctic climate and conditions.⁵² Several respondents commented on the effect of the Ojibwa language in dealing with child abuse. Child abuse was in the category of an "Oh-je-e-tim." There is no English equivalent for this word. It carries the weight of many generations of teachings and connotations of something that hurts people individually and collectively punishable by the Creator. An Oh-je-e-tim is "just not done"; it is "how it is," and "is absolutely true." The elder reported that the way one would tell another person not to commit child abuse is "quite scary" carrying with it a powerful message that this is just not done.⁵³

The customs for finding substitute parents varied slightly from community to community and Indian Nation to Indian Nation. Often the sister of the biological mother was seen to have a special relationship with the child.

Among the Mohawks, a meeting of the extended family was held to decide who would take responsibility for a child. There were no rules and the final decision was based on who was willing and able to do so.⁵⁴

In the large Northern Ojibwa family groupings, children who were cousins lived like siblings and several adults took parental roles. Older children cared for the younger ones. Many Northern Ojibwa refer to a great aunt as "grandmother," or biological cousins as "sisters and brothers."⁵⁵ The biological relationship of a person to children was less important than the bonding that occurred between them. In the event of the death of biological parents no special arrangements needed to be made because the child would have already established close relationships to a number of caregivers. The child would have many aunts and uncles, older siblings and grandparents who provided both materially and emotionally.

In the Northern Ojibwa community of Lac Seul west of Sioux Lookout, if the couple's marriage had been arranged by the parents, the father of the wife would assume responsibility for her children in the event of her demise. It was thought that the man's new wife would not accept the children of the previous wife and that they should return to those responsible for arranging the marriage.⁵⁶ In some groups, the sister of the mother customarily took the responsibility for the care of her sister's children.⁵⁷

A parent who felt he or she could not care for a child would often approach a childless couple and ask them to raise the child. In the Northern

Ojibwa culture, if a child was seen to be neglected or abused, it was acceptable for a couple to approach the parents and offer to take the child.⁵⁸ According to one elder adult adopted as children, an adopted child had to "earn his keep" by doing more chores than normal.⁵⁹ Another younger adult, who was often punished more severely than her other children in the adopted family, believed that she was deliberately treated more harshly to "toughen her up," to make up for the lack of extended family in the future. She remains very attached to her adoptive parents.⁶⁰ According to the elder, abuse was more likely when extended family took in orphans out of obligation to the tribe, not for want of another child. Abuse of adopted children was unacceptable, however, and adopting a child for extra help was considered abuse.⁶¹

In some communities, there were couples who naturally served as foster parents. Often this occurred simply by the child's parents asking the couple to care for the child. This could be temporary or permanent. Usually these were couples who could not have children of their own and would raise foster children as their own. They would assume all the roles even as grandparents once the adopted children had their own children.⁶² I visited the home of one of these women in Bear Island. There was a continuous stream of visitors all afternoon of well wishers and persons for whom she had been substitute parent at one time or another. This is apparently the norm at her house attesting to the affection she enjoys from the community.

In all areas of the province surveyed, respondents thought that grandparents were the most common substitute parents. One Northern respondent felt that the use of grandparents might have been a more recent custom, particularly in the North where life was more nomadic and communal.⁶³ It is important to remember that in some Native societies, girls married young and grandparents themselves would not be very old⁶⁴ and would be strong and energetic enough to assume this role.

The idea of formal rules regulating precisely who was responsible for the care of children was foreign to most Native communities. Children were a community responsibility more than of one or two individuals. Rights and responsibilities for children were not limited to the biological parents. Considerations such as practicality and natural bonding guided any decisions about neglected and abused children.

No formal legal proceedings were administered in most Native adoptions. Between 1940 and 1945, the Ontario Department of Public Welfare had on record only 9 legal adoptions by Indian parents. Most were adoptions by male step-parents of their wives' children born out-of-wedlock. One case was noted of an adoption of an Indian child placed by a local CAS with an Indian couple, and another of a placement of a child for whom it was uncertain whether he or she was Indian.⁶⁵

The adoption practices of the Native people were well known by members of nearby non-Indian societies. The Mohawks were known for their

love of children and it was not unusual for non-Indian Canadians to place children with Indian families.⁶⁶ Two such adoptions are referred to in the literature.⁶⁷ Residents of Manitou Rapids, Six Nations and Akwesasne however, state that adoption of non-Indians was not a rare event as this literature implies. One occurred in the Six Nations reserve and the other in Manitou Rapids in Rainy River District. The child in Six Nations has acted as a spokesperson for his community at times.⁶⁸ The child referred to in Manitou Rapids was raised as an Indian, married an Indian and speaks fluent Ojibway.⁶⁹ No legal adoption proceedings were followed but the children in question acquired Band memberships receiving full legal Indian status. Some of the children were of French and Italian Canadian background and apparently today pass as full blooded Indians, while only a few community members are aware of their biological heritage.⁷⁰

These attestations of Indian people today contrast to the perceptions of Colonel Jones of IAB in 1951, whose instructions to the social work staff reflected no awareness of traditional systems of absorbing children into communities.

When Traditional Systems Could Not be Utilized

If no extended family or other community member could care for an orphan or neglected child or if the child were out of control or delinquent, the Indian agent could plan for the child. Frequently these children were sent to

residential schools far from their homes. The Schools were the precursors to CAS involvement in Indian communities and remained as a significant placement option until their closures. In 1953, one IAB official reported that the majority of Indian children in the 67 residential schools in Canada were from such conditions.⁷¹ One respondent reported that he was sent to residential school in 1955 even though other children in his community went to a nearby provincial school. He had been raised in poverty exacerbated by alcoholism and his parents did not have money to clothe him properly for the outside school.⁷² In 1970, the federal government estimated there to be 235 children in the Northern Ontario schools from poor home conditions, of which an estimated 100 would require CAS protection if the schools were not housing them.⁷³ In 1973 DIAND reported that nationally 2,271 Status Indian children were in residential schools for "social reasons." This figure represents 32 percent of the Status Indian child population in care and 3.3 percent of the entire Canadian Status Indian population.⁷⁴

The introduction and eventual phasing out of residential schools occurred at different times throughout the province. Although residential schools were no longer the principle means of education in Southern Ontario by the 1950s, remnants of the practice in the North continued until the middle of the 1980s. Parents who were full time trappers would often send their children to the Pelican residential school near Sioux Lookout. Two others were operated in the area by the Mennonite Central Committee and were known for

their strict discipline and belief in corporal punishment. Parents sent their children to the Mennonite schools voluntarily believing they would receive better training and discipline. The Mennonite residential schools taught not only academic subjects but also home economics and carpentry which have not been available in the Indian Affairs Day schools.⁷⁵

During my tenure with the Kenora CAS, the residential schools in the area continued in their role as substitutes for Children's Aid placements. The schools could accommodate large sibling groups lessening the separation trauma to the children. I recall placing a family of seven in the Pelican School. According to the former Administrator, the School just accepted them to prevent the need for CAS care, often keeping no records and did not bill the agency.⁷⁶

THE ONTARIO SELECT COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS OF INDIANS

The perceived poor conditions in Native communities had become a source of concern and national embarrassment after the second World War. The holocaust sparked the issue of legalized racism. Furthermore, that Indians could not vote, consume alcohol, or receive provincial services without giving up their legal Indian Status was an embarrassment given the unique contribution of Indian soldiers to the war. It was recently publicized that Canada's most decorated soldier was Tommy Prince, a Saulteaux Indian from Manitoba.⁷⁷ Aboriginal soldiers were also used to communicate across enemy

lines in their Native tongues because enemy forces could not decode the Aboriginal languages.⁷⁸

In 1947 a federal enquiry and an impassioned plea by the Canadian Association of Social Workers and the Canadian Welfare Council brought attention to the poverty of Indian communities.⁷⁹

The newly appointed Deputy Minister James Band had a particular interest in Indians, having worked as an Unemployment Insurance Commission officer in the Thunder Bay and Kenora area in the 1930s.⁸⁰ Following IABs approaches to DPW about extending services to Indians, Band gently reminded his Minister of his (the Minister's) own interest in Indians but had already taken the initiative to employ the services of University of Toronto anthropologist Dr. Martin Greenwood to advise the legislature with respect to Indians.⁸¹ Greenwood's report outlined explicitly the framework within which Indian policy in Canada existed. The position paper focused on the reserves as segregationist and that protection had hindered Indian self-sufficiency,

...intended as cradles of civilization, [the reserve] has become the grave of a peoples' hopes. It represents security above all else - a safeguard of the basic necessities of life only, offering little chance of advancement.⁸²

The separate status of Indians was seen clearly as a type of apartheid and destructive to self-sufficiency, an view that later would influence Parliamentarians.

James Band conducted his own cross-the-province survey of the DPW District Welfare Administrators. He solicited by mail any information they

could offer him on the conditions of Indian people in the respective area concerning,

- (1) their past experiences and knowledge of treatment of Indians with regard to welfare matters;
- (2) the type of care that should be granted;
- (3) the general question of employment for Indian men and women.⁸³

The responses were usually brief with many of the Administrators admitting they had only limited personal knowledge of Indian people, and no professional knowledge. Few Indians living within the provincial jurisdiction received welfare. The responses of the Administrators ranged on the one hand from excessively exalting the race to obliquely racist. Characteristic derogatory responses were cautious references to different attitudes towards work and marriage. One respondent commenting on out-of-wedlock children said, "Indians do not look upon marriage as we do." As for work habits he said, they "let tomorrow take care of itself." Of the 13 responses, five explicitly referred to helping Indians be like the white man through education, close contact with whites and equalization of programs. Mid-level administrators held views that Canadian society should place Indians on the same level as non-Indians but that this could only be done through physical integration, equality in service provision and education.⁸⁴ The administrator for Port Arthur which served Northwestern Ontario stated in his letter that he knew little about Indians. However, like the others he offered his opinion,

Education in these matters would automatically bring about their acceptance and assimilation in our community....The need for reserves would appear to be fast diminishing and the Indians should take their role in the community by paying taxes and carrying their share of responsibility in return receiving the same benefits as others in their community.⁸⁵

Interested in public consultation, James Band convinced Goodefellow to consult with the Indians. Shortly thereafter, Premier Leslie Frost announced a major enquiry, the Select Committee into the Civil Liberties of Indians. The press release announcing the process said,

a better way of life for the Indian population of Ontario seems assured for the future....Premier Frost gave the green light to an almost total review of Indian life in Ontario. The action of the Committee will be directed toward benefits which might be extended to Indians without discrimination.⁸⁶

In the Select Committee's transcripts, one is struck by the emphasis placed by the non-Indian Committee members on the right of Indians to consume alcohol and to vote, especially the former. The testimony of Indian and non-Indian witnesses with respect to the right to consume alcohol supported, although not unanimously, this right. The reputation of Indian World War II veterans as responsible consumers of alcohol was repeatedly raised. One Committee member said wryly, they could "get shot, but not half shot."⁸⁷ An Indian war veteran remarked about his time overseas, "I have had to put more drunks to bed that were whites than I ever did Indians."⁸⁸ Universal sanctioning of alcohol consumption rights was not forthcoming from the Indian community, however. The Chief of Garden River said,

I am against drinking among the Indians. I would be interested if something could be brought in that would benefit the IndianYou are offering us something that we do not want."⁸⁹

Chief Willie Horton of Manitou Rapids was "dead against" it.⁹⁰

The transcripts of the Select Committee indicate that the issue of alcohol was raised by the Committee members, all of whom were Parliamentarians, not the Indians. The draft report waxed eloquently of the ability of Indian people to handle alcohol the same as any white man. The agenda of the Committee was to equalize access to alcohol although not apparently the first priority of the ordinary community members who attended the meetings. The interests of the non-Natives to address legalized racism may have taken precedent over the pleas of some Indians not to equalize liquor laws.

Three communities, St. Regis, New Osnaburg, and Whitefish Bay, took an official position against changing the voting and alcohol laws.⁹¹ On the voting issue, Brigadier Martin, an Indian advisor to the Committee, quoted the sentiments of the Longhouse people of the Mohawk Nation,

..they feel that the Dominion Government has no damn right to give them the vote.⁹²

The three communities that opposed alcohol privileges were also against voting rights. They feared that voting was equated with citizenship and would affect their special status under the Treaties. Subsequent to the hearings many Status Indians still refuse to vote⁹³ or even to participate in Census or similar government rituals.⁹⁴

Alcohol consumption rights have not been welcomed by some elders. In 1977, one elder from New Osnaburgh, a dissenting community, pleaded to the Royal Commission on the Northern Environment to ban alcohol abuse among Indians because it was killing her people including the children.⁹⁶ Referring to a child who had frozen to death while his parents were somewhere else drinking, elder Maria Kwandibens said emotionally in the Ojibwa language,

You must imagine that child going around the house seeking warmth...There was a stove but it was not lit. This is the effect of alcohol."⁹⁶

Mrs. Kwandibens' plea parallels those of Indian leaders in the days of the fur trade to ban the use of alcohol among their people. The effects of alcohol still plague Indian communities. Recently following a police shooting of an intoxicated gun-wielding resident of a Northern Manitoba community, the community revealed a dozen alcohol related violent deaths this year.⁹⁷

It was a common theme of the Select Committee that education was the only means by which Indian people would improve their conditions. For some non-Indian delegates to the Select Committee this could happen only by abandoning traditional ways. The Supervisor, Indian Training Services, commenting on the poor attendance of Indian children at school, said,

It is the fault of the parents in most cases. Once in New Brunswick I went to 5 schools and there were not more than 15 attending in all of them. They go over to Maine with their parents, picking potatoes.⁹⁸

and

We ran a seasonal school at Lansdowne House for four months in the year, but the agent sold us on the idea that we could operate the year round. We got people to teach but the attendance went down to three in September.⁹⁹

...this thing of taking children out on the trap line is just crazy, but you cannot tell an Indian that. But it is the old story - the Indian just catches the game, and the wife has to skin the animal and all that. There is really no reason why she should do this -- but the whole family go out on the trap lines. Then of course, the children don't get to school.¹⁰⁰

Bryan Cathcart, MPP Lambton, commented,

Of course, fishing would be an incentive for them to play hookey.¹⁰¹

The officials viewed Indian traditional ways of providing for themselves as, at best, recreation and at worst a waste of time. They afforded no value to the livelihood and independence the Indian economy facilitated. The comments about a husband trapping alone reflects excessive ignorance of the difficulty of this endeavour, not to mention its importance to family integrity.

The Supervisor outlined how the recently revised Indian Act of 1951 had enabled Indians living on reserves close to towns to be integrated into the provincial schools. The federal government was granting funds to the provincially supported school boards to expand and operate their schools. At that time, there were 15 such agreements nationally.¹⁰² By 1965 nationally, 25,207 of the 57,265 Status Indian children in schools were in provincial schools. IAB was giving \$2.5 million to provincial boards to accommodate these children.¹⁰³

The final report to the Minister of Public Welfare concluded,

Education is the only hope of the Indian for the eventual assimilation with us.¹⁰⁴

The Committee came to the following conclusions in its report:

The long range aim of all Indians who spoke to the Committee and of all non-Indians who gave testimony, is the development of the Indian to the point where there needs to be no differentiation between races.¹⁰⁵

and,

Several witnesses expressed regret at the fading away of the Indian dialects and the general lack of the use of the Indian tongue. Generally, Indians are realizing that their language must soon be relegated to the status of a hobby if their people are to meld with the rest of the population. Yet there are pockets of Indians who will refuse to use anything but their own language in intercourse [sic] with non-Indians (although there was evidence that they understood English perfectly).¹⁰⁶

and,

Several generations will be born before the Indian takes his place alongside his Ontario neighbour with full equality - neither maintaining his present exceptional benefits, nor his almost imaginary disadvantages. But the length of time before this happens will depend largely on how successful the educational program is, and how willing the Indians are to leave the protective shelter under the provisions of the Indian Act.¹⁰⁷

Since the 1955 hearings, two generations of Indian people have attained education. With education, the demands for special status, land rights and separate political rights have escalated. The attempt in 1969 to abolish special status failed.¹⁰⁸ Indian leaders at least now appear willing to accept nothing less than the inherent right to self government, an aspiration supported by other Canadians.¹⁰⁹ This right has been recently proposed for enshrinement in the Charlottetown Accord proposing First Nations' governments as a third order of government.¹¹⁰ Chief Ovide Mercredi of the Assembly of First Nations who negotiated the provision is a lawyer who was born on a trapline.

Education has not increased the Indians' desire for assimilation as the Committee expected. It has increased the desire for special status.

Although paternalistic and patronizing in tone, the Committee members seemed anxious to present Indian people in the best light possible. Unfortunately, in its zealous desire for reform, the Committee overlooked the consistent wish of Indians to preserve their way of life under the "protective shelter" of the reserves intended only as "cradles" until assimilation occurred. The isolated pleas not to change the alcohol laws were unheeded and one law was passed for all. The Committee interpreted Indian testimony as a green light to introduce laws and programs which would not differentiate Indians from others. Assimilation in the sense of making Indians like white Canadians appears to have been utmost in the minds of Committee members, although not for the Indians. It is an ironic twist that Tommy Prince died on the streets of Winnipeg as an alcoholic in 1977.

The result of the Select Committee Hearings was an almost universal acceptance of the recommendations including:

- (1) the right to vote in provincial elections,
- (2) the right to purchase liquor in retail outlets,
- (3) the expansion of provincial services to Indians.

Nowhere in the transcripts were child welfare issues found.

SUMMARY

Despite outcries about Indian poverty, most Indian people surveyed believed that community life before the second World War was happier and more cohesive than today. Compared to conditions elsewhere, reserve communities may have been better off than other communities during the depression. Child welfare was not thought to be an issue in the 1940s and 1950s because neglected children were absorbed by customary arrangements.

Broader forces in the dominant society began to impinge on Indian communities after the war. Declining fur prices and education policies intertwined to hasten the demise of traditional and non-waged work. Equal laws and education would advance the Indian people, policy administrators thought. The policy makers' perception that Indian problems resulted from poverty and lack of non-Indian schooling accompanied views that existing traditional ways were retardants to Indian advancement. The viability of the traditional economy was waning for several reasons. The expansion of education contributed to its demise stressing family life while providing insufficient economic rewards. From the perspective of the Indian people across Ontario, the availability of alcohol was a major turning point for family and community life.

The provincial government's intent was justice and equality for Indians believing that these goals would be attained by "sameness." As a result, the

province extended the franchise and all its social services to Indians. Underlying all the policy makers' decisions was the belief that Indians wanted and needed to be like the white man. The Indian people during the early years indicated their interest in a fair deal with the Province. While they supported education, there is weak evidence that they believed fairness would be attained through voting and alcohol privileges, or provincial child welfare services.

Several themes emerge in the discussion of the socio-economic context of Native communities and child welfare,

- (1) Separate status and laws as hinderance to advancement and equality;
- (2) Education as the means to attain equality;
- (3) The relationship between education systems and the decline of the traditional Indian life and economy;
- (4) Alcohol as a symbol of equality.

I next examine the Rainy River District communities and rates of children in care. I present brief histories of the communities with high rates of admissions and adoptions and the socio-economic factors identified as important for each community.

Endnotes to Chapter 7

1. T. Kue Young, Health and Cultural Change: The Indian Experience in the Central Sub-Arctic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
2. AO, RG, Acc. 14571/2, Box 35, file 1387, Indian Advisory Committee 1955-1960, Memo of W.G. Smith to James Band, 13 July 1955.
3. Sam Crane, Elder Member of Lac Seul First Nation, interview by author, 31 October 1992, Sioux Lookout, Ontario.
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
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Map of Rainy River District

Source: Ontario Department of Highways



RATES OF CHILDREN IN CARE IN RAINY RIVER DISTRICT FIRST NATIONS' COMMUNITIES 1964-1974

This chapter examines the variations in the rates of admissions, readmissions and adoptions of children from the Rainy River District. I first highlight the demographics and social indicators of the District. I then present the data for the First Nations' communities and sketches of the histories of the five communities with the highest rates for the variables studied.

THE RAINY RIVER DISTRICT

The Rainy River District is distinct. It is unique in its history, geography and climate. It has a large Indian population which has had relatively recent contact with non-Indian society. The District's social indicators suggest social and economic disadvantage for the whole population.

A major historical feature of Rainy River District was the farm land appropriation to white settlers at the turn of the Century. After the second World War, a combination of low prices and higher wages in industry resulted in the abandonment of farming. Paper mills and tourism now form much of the economic base. While the area was once covered with farmland, only a handful of farms remain.¹ Many of the non-Indian inhabitants are descendants of settlers who were farmers, loggers, or trappers. Hunting and fishing are popular recreation activities.

The District stretches from east to west from Lake of the Woods to Quetico Provincial Park following the Rainy Lake/Rainy River chain which is the boundary for the state of Minnesota and Ontario. In 1971 its 8,000 square miles had a population density of 2.6 persons per square mile in Northwestern Ontario compared to 647.2 for Central Ontario and 21.7 for Ontario on average.² The urban-rural mix of the Rainy River District was 66.6 percent and 33.5 percent respectively compared to 82.4 and 17.6 for Ontario.³ Native people comprised 7 percent of the population compared to .8 percent of the Ontario population. Natives were the 5th largest ethnic group following the British and Northern Europeans.⁴

The centre of the District is the border town of Fort Frances, 350 km west of Thunder Bay in the middle of the boreal forests and lakes of Northwestern Ontario. There are three major towns: Fort Frances with a population of 8,865; Atikokan, population 4,275; and Rainy River, population 940.⁵ These towns were established and continue to depend on the forest industry and more recently, tourism.⁶ The rest of the population live in small hamlets, villages and Indian First Nation communities.

Rainy River District has had some of the most disturbing social indicators in Ontario. In 1969, the District combined with Kenora District had the lowest per capita incomes in Ontario. Rainy River District had the largest percentage of incomes in the under \$2,000 per annum category.⁷ In 1971, the illiteracy rate for adults over 15 was 8.9 percent compared to 5.4 for the

province.⁸ In Northwestern Ontario generally, the standardized mortality rate was 1.2 per 1,000 population compared to 1.0 for Ontario.⁹ In 1974, the infant mortality rate was 21.4 per 1,000 births compared to 13.4 for Ontario.¹⁰

In 1973, the rate of suicide and self-inflicted injuries in the 15-17 age group in the District was 8.2 per 100,000 population compared to 1.3 for Ontario, and well above Northeastern Ontario, which was second, with 2.9 per 100,000.¹¹ In the combined Kenora-Rainy River District, the overall suicide rate was twice that of Ontario jumping from 18.1 to 27.7 per 100,000 population from 1971 to 1979. Suicides were the third leading cause of accidental and violent death.¹² In Rainy River District, the alcohol consumption rate was estimated to be 13 litres per capita annually compared to 10 for Ontario. In 1975, alcoholism was the tenth leading medical diagnosis compared to its rank of 29th in Ontario. Alcoholism was the most frequently diagnosed mental disorder, with males comprising 75 percent of all diagnosed alcoholics.¹³

Despite the profusion of social problems, the Rainy River District had almost no services to address such difficulties until the late 1970s. There was no addictions treatment centre or mental health in-patient or out-patient service. The closest facility was the Lakehead Psychiatric Hospital in Port Arthur (now Thunder Bay) almost 300 miles away. An alcohol treatment facility opened in 1969 in Port Arthur. A counselling service at the Laverendrye Hospital in Fort Frances opened in the late 1970s. Not until 1982

was a mental health counselling service specific to Native people available.¹⁴ During the time period of this study, family physicians and the Rainy River Children's Aid Society were the only support services available for either the Native or non-Native population.

Socially, Rainy River District's high level of poverty, illiteracy, mortality rates, suicide and alcohol consumption distinguish it from the rest of Ontario. Demographically, it is different by its largely rural and thinly distributed population, and its larger proportion of Native people. The paucity of services to address its problems is particularly distinctive.

The Ojibway People: Archaeologists have found evidence of at least 5,000 years of Aboriginal inhabitation of Quetico Park and the surrounding areas. Traditionally, the Ojibwa hunted in small family groups in the winters and congregated in the spring with perhaps three to fifteen other families for celebrations and traditional pursuits. In the spring they gathered to collect maple sugar sap and in the summer, berries. In the late summer, the group disbanded and small families pursued the harvesting of wild rice. By November the small family groupings were back to their isolated winter activities.¹⁵

The fur trade did much to alter the cycle of life. The Hudson Bay Company established itself in the District in 1777. As Aboriginal dependence on the fur trade and European goods increased, summer camps formed on trade routes. Catholic missionaries accompanied fur traders to most areas with

new medicines, schooling and the Christian doctrine.¹⁶ In 1873, Treaty #3 between Canada and the Ojibwa of the area established reserves around these settlements to the north, east and west of Quetico Park.¹⁷

The Ojibwa of Rainy River District were not Christianized until 1921, as much as a century after others in Northern Ontario, and several centuries after their Southern counterparts. Many remained pagan.¹⁸ The Society of the Midewiwin, a league of Shamans which taught ancient traditions and cures came to the area and still exerted strong influence in the area in the 1930s.¹⁹ A Catholic residential school on the Couchiching reserve served as the major agent of Christianization until its closure in the early 1950s. A large number of the now over-60 Ojibwa population of the District attended the school before World War II. Attendance was not as widespread as after the war when education became compulsory. Children attended on the consent of their parents or if there was no person to look after them. Abuse existed at the school as it did elsewhere.²⁰

There are ten First Nation communities in Rainy River District. The degree of acculturation and isolation of the Native people varies. It varied even more during the period of this study. The largest of the 10 reserves in the District has an on-reserve population of 420. The other communities have small concentrated populations. In 1956 the reserve Indian population was 1,099 while the total population of the district was higher, 25,283.²¹ One reserve community lies adjacent to Fort Frances and resembles the outskirts

of any Northern town. Before 1964 at least three of the communities could be reached only by plane, train or motor boat. Today, in the more isolated communities, many elders still speak no English and hold many of the values and beliefs of their ancestors.

For reference, Table 8.1 lists the ten communities with alternate names by which each community is known, their 1981 Census populations, their 1984 Band List count and the percentage of out-migration of each community. The community populations and out-migration rates vary. The types of schooling available and the rate and processes of transition to the waged economy also vary significantly. Of importance to this study is the differences in the numbers of CAS admission and adoption rates and how they were associated with other factors.

The admission data is presented for all the communities. Five of the ten communities for which the rates are highest and for which reliable comparisons were possible are discussed in detail. In the text, I have attempted to use the simplest name for the community.²²

Five communities are omitted from the discussion. Admission data was not available for Sabaskong (Ojibwas of Onegaming) and Stangecoming. In the 1960s and 1970s Kenora CAS served Sabaskong because of its accessibility. Stangecoming was not inhabited during the period of study and no census data were available to determine proportions. Lac La Croix, Nicickousemenecaning (Red Gut) and Naicatchewenin had low admission rates and no children

Table 8.1 - Rainy River District First Nations, Common and Alternate Names, 1981 Census and 1984 Band List Population Counts and Percentage Out-migration.

Name*	Alternate* Name	Population ----- Total 0-14yr		Band List Count	% Out- migration
Big Grassy		185	75	301	38
Big Island		55	30	214	75
Couchiching		385	140	750	49
Lac La Croix	Neguagan Lake	185	70	242	24
Manitou Rapids	Rainy Lake	195	75	492	60
Naicat- chewenin	Rainy Lake 17A & 17B North West Bay	155	70	193	20
Nicickouse- menecaning ("where the little otters play")	Red Gut Rainy Lake 26A	75	50	116	35
Ojibways of Onegaming	Sabaskong	255	100	359	29
Seine River Stangecoming	Rainy Lake 18C	170	70	385 40	56 100
Total		1660	680	3092	46

* The names in the first columns are those used in the IAB Band Lists. The alternates were confirmed through the Thunder Bay office of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

Source: 1981 populations from Statistics Canada, Population, occupied dwellings, private households, census families in private households, selected characteristics, Ontario, Cat.93-918, Tables 2-14, 2-27&2-29. Band List counts from INAC Band List of the Family and Childrens Services of the Rainy River District as of December 31, 1984.

adopted during the time period. Insights could have been gained by examining the histories of these communities which had fewer problems

DISPROPORTIONATE CHILD-IN-CARE RATES BETWEEN INDIAN COMMUNITIES IN RAINY RIVER DISTRICT

The admissions from communities of origin of the Status Indian children admitted to care between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1974 reveal disproportions between and within the Indian communities.

Different Admission Rates from Different Communities

Table 8.2 lists each community in Rainy River District showing the following: its 1981 0-14 year population, the estimated 1969 mid-point 0-14 population, the number of individuals admitted between 1964 and 1974 and the rate of admission. For our purposes the rate of admissions is treated as prevalence, that is a count of all those admitted to care during this period.

A total of 270 individual Status Indian children in Rainy River District over the eleven year period required CAS care. This gives a period prevalence rate of .38 or 38 per 100 population using the mid point population of 720. The proportions (p) ranged from .08 to .70 with a mean of .32 calculated for children for whom a home community was identified. Residence could not be determined for 25 children. In Seine River the period prevalence was 74 per 100 population, in Manitou Rapids 64, in Big Island 63, and Big Grassy 38. In

Table 3.2 — Admissions of Children to Care of RRCAS
by Community, 1964-1974.

Community	0-14yr Count 1969	Admission (numbers)	p (per 100)
Big Grassy	80	30	.38
Big Island	32	20	.63
Couchiching	148	41	.18
Lac LaCroix	74	8	.11
Manitou Rapids	80	51	.64
Naicatchewenin	74	9	.12
Red Gut	53	7	.13
Sabaskong	106	9	.08
Seine River	74	52	.70
Stangecoming Residence undetermined		18 25	
Total	720	270	.38

Sources: 1981 populations from Statistics Canada, Population, occupied dwellings, private households, census families in private households, selected characteristics, Ontario, Cat. 93-918, Tables 2-14, 27 & 29. **Note:** Populations of individual Indian communities were not listed by Statistics Canada before 1981 resulting in the need to estimate the mid-point populations of the communities. Only the total reserve populations for the whole Rainy River District were recorded before 1981. The 1969 mid-point population for the total number of reserve children 0-14 years of age was estimated graphically plotting the 1961 count of 492, the 1971 count of 774 giving a 1969 estimate of 720. This 1969 figure of 720 is 105.6% of the 1981 count of 680. Assuming a uniform population decline between communities between 1969 and 1981, the 1969 populations for each community were estimated as 106% of each community's 1981 counts. The results were rounded to the nearest whole number. The total was 721, not 720, due to round-off error.

Table 8.3 — First Nations Communities in Rainy River District With Above Average Prevalence of Children Admitted to Care of Rainy River CAS

Community	P	0-14 population (mid point)	Number of Children Admitted
Seine River	.70	74	52
Manitou Rapids	.64	80	51
Big Island	.63	32	20
Big Grassy	.38	80	30
Total		266 (36.9% of 720)	153 (56% of 270)

contrast, the figures for Couchiching, Lac La Croix and Sabaskong were 18, 11 and 8 respectively.

Of the children in care, over half, 56 percent, came from four communities which had 36.9 percent of the 0-14 year population. See Table 8.3

The disproportionate rates among the communities in the District suggests either different levels of distress and family breakdown among the communities, or inconsistencies in administration of agency policy from community to community, or inconsistencies between workers' decisions to intervene.

Variations Within Communities

Table 8.4 shows the breakdown in admissions for each community for each year.

The patterns are inconsistent both between and within communities. Regularly, Seine River and Manitou Rapids had children admitted to care from 1965. Big Island had no children admitted to care until 1970 but had one of

Table 8.4 - Number of Children Admitted to Care of RRCAS From Each Community for Each Year, 1964-1974*

Year	Big Grassy	Big Island	Couch- icking	Lac LaCroix	Manitou Rapids	Naicat- chewadin	Nick- cousene- cating	Ojibways of Ongaming	Seine River	Stange- coming	Unknown	Total
1964	2		2	2			1	1			7	15
1965			1		2		5	1	5	3	3	20
1966	6		8		5				2	11		32
1967	2				7	5			7	3		24
1968	2		14		12			5	4			37
1969	5		10	2	2	1			12			32
1970		1	6	1	1	2		1	11			23
1971	5	4		1	12	1			7		4	34
1972	5	9	2		11		1	3	10	1	9	51
1973	7	9		2	13					1		32
1974	5	2	10		9				3		2	31

* These figures are actual cases for the year

the highest eleven year period prevalence rates of the group. Couchiching admissions were sporadic and inconsistent. Red Gut had six years with no recorded admissions.

If the admission rate was indicative of stresses on a community, stresses on communities were not uniform. Stresses would have been sometimes chronic, sometimes periodic and sometimes sudden. The variations in the admission rates would have reflected different degrees of agency access to different communities. Road and telephone accessibility allow protection situations to come to the attention of the agency more frequently. Communities closer to Fort Frances would have more visits from the CAS and other agencies and therefore more sources of potential referrals. The people from the area would also have easier access to towns where often the children came to the attention of the CAS while parents were on temporary visits.

Readmission Rates

Table 8.5 shows the number of children in care more than once by community. Of 270 children admitted to care, 46 or 17.0 percent were admitted more than once and 224 or 83.0 percent were admitted only once.

Adoption Rates

Table 8.6 lists the adoption rate for each community. Over the eleven year period 44 or 16.3 percent of the children admitted were adopted.

Table 8.5 - Readmissions to Care by Community in Rainy River District, 1964-1974

Community	Number Admitted (cases)	Number Admitted more than Once	Total Readmission [*] Adm. %	
Big Grassy	30	8	38	27
Big Island	20	3	23	15
Couch-iching	41	12	53	29
Lac LaCroix	8		8	0
Manitou Rapids	51	11	62	22
Naicat-chewenin	9		9	0
Red Gut	7		7	0
Sabaskong	9		2	11
Seine River	52	10	62	19
Stange-coming	18		18	0
Unknown	25		25	0
TOTAL	270	46	316	17

* Number admitted more than once as percentage of number of cases.

Table 8.6 — Percentage of Children Adopted of those Admitted to Care in Rainy River District, by Community, 1964-1974.

Community	Number Admitted	Number Adopted	Percent of Admissions Adopted	Adoption rate for whole community*
Big Grassy	30	9	30.0	12
Big Island	20	6	30.0	20
Couchiching	41	6	14.0	1.6
Lac LaCroix	8	0	0	0
Manitou Rapids	51	5	10.0	6.6
Naicatchewenin	9	0	0	0
Red Gut	7	0	0	0
Sabaskong	9	4	44.0	4.0
Seine River	52	12	23.0	
Stangecoming	18	2	11.0	17.2
Unknown	25	0	0	N/A
Total:	270	44	16.3	6.1

* Based on 1969 estimated mid-point populations from Table 8.2

From the logbooks, I determined that the agency placed 78 children in total for adoption during the period. The other 34 (78 minus 44) were newborns and older children in care prior to 1964, either RSI or not.

The adoption rate could be interpreted in any one of several ways or combinations thereof: (1) the extent of permanent breakdown of the immediate

family preventing the return of the child to the family, (2) the ability of the agency to offer rehabilitative services to the immediate family, (3) an indication of the ability of the extended family to look after neglected children, (4) the agency's efforts to utilize the extended family in lieu of adoption, (5) lack of effort to place for adoption or inability to place cross-culturally. Using the figure of 44 and the mid point population of 720, this meant that 6.1 percent of the Status Indian children in Rainy River District were adopted during that period. If children are included who were admitted before January 1, 1964 (and adopted before December 31 1974) or adopted after December 1974 (who were admitted before that date) this percentage would be higher.

Although national and provincial adoption data is rare and unreliable for accurate comparisons²³ there is some possibility of comparing the Rainy River First Nations' rate to others. Hemphill et al report an annual adoption rate of .924 per 1000 total population in 1971 in Ontario.²⁴ The Rainy River rate per 1000 population (using the total population of 1660) is 29. If children adopted who were not in the sample were also included, the figure is even higher.

The 6.1 percent is a high proportion yet the 44 adoptions represented 16.3 percent of the admissions between 1964 and 1974. All the children adopted during that period were placed in Ontario. One was placed with a Native family elsewhere in Ontario. None was sent to the United States during the period.

Some comparisons are possible between the RRCAS data and the rest of Ontario. The figure of 16 percent is actually smaller than other figures on adoption rates of children in care but it should be remembered that this represented 44 children while there were others in care before 1964 who were also adopted. From the logbooks it was determined that in 1971, 8 RSI children were adopted and in 1974, 10. From Table 5.20, the percentage of RSI children-in-care adopted was calculated. Table 8.7 illustrates comparison to other parts of Ontario. The comparison of the numbers of adoptions as a percentage of single point in-care data with the percentage of the 1964-1974 admissions poses some problems. However, the trend indicates that the adoption rate of RRCAS of RSI children in care was lower in 1971 for RRCAS (22.9 percent) than it was in 1972 for the province (37.3 percent). The RSI adoptions were higher in 1974 (25.0 percent) than Northwestern Ontario generally in 1974 (12.7 percent), and slightly higher than Southwestern, Central and Eastern Ontario.

For the children who were adopted, the number of admissions before permanent placement was determined. Table 8.8 shows the breakdown according to community of origin. From Table 8.6 it was determined that of the 270 children, 226 were not adopted. A total of 224 (270 minus 46) children were admitted only once. If 32 were adopted after one admission many of the remaining 192 were one time temporary admissions of children who went

Table 8.7 - Percent of Children-in-care Adopted in Selected Years in Ontario Compared to Rainy River CAS.

Year	Percent Adopted*
1961	41.6
1966	44.1
1971	37.3
1974	21.4
Regions 1974 only*	
Southwestern	23.2
Central	23.0
Eastern	24.5
North Eastern	15.0
North Western	12.7
Rainy River 1972 (8 adoptions and 35 in care)	22.9
Rainy River 1974 (10 RSI adoptions and 40 estimated in care)	25.0
Rainy River 1964-1974 (admitted and adopted during period)	16.0

Source: Ministry of Community and Social Services data reported in Kenora Rainy River District Health Council, Interim Report, Appendix A, Table 3.2.

home. Therefore, in the Rainy River District, 71 percent of the children admitted in the period were in care once and returned home during the period. The children placed for adoption were most likely to be in care only once. Of the 44 Status Indian children adopted, 32 or 72 percent were admitted only once to care in the 1964 to 1974 period and 12 or 28 percent were admitted

Table 8.8 — Number of Admissions to Care Before Adoption of Children Placed for Adoption by Rainy River CAS, 1964-1974.

Community	One Admission	Two Admissions	Total Adoptions	Percent Adopted after one Admission
Big Grassy	7	2	9	77
Big Island	5	1	6	83
Couchiching	2	4	6	33
Manitou Rapids	5		5	100
Sabaskong	4		4	100
Seine River	7		5	12
Stangecoming	2		2	100
Total	32	12	44	72

more than once. The total readmission rate for all RSI children admitted was 17 percent. The picture emerges at the one extreme of a large number of emergency one-time admissions of children to care and on the other extreme a smaller percent 11.5 percent (72 percent of 16 percent) of serious cases for which even one return home was not attempted.

Admission, Readmission and Adoption Rates Compared

Table 8.9 shows the eleven year period prevalence rate for all three variables, the proportions of children admitted and readmitted, and the

Table 8.9 — Prevalence Rates of Admissions to Care, Readmission Rates and Adoption Rates by Community in Rainy River District, 1964-1974.

Community	Period Prevalence Admission Rate (Per 100 Population)	Readmission Rate (%)	Adoption Rate of Admissions (%)
Big Grassy	38	26	30
Big Island	63	15	35
Couchiching	18	29	20
Lac La Croix	11	0	0
Manitou Rapids	64	22	10
Naicatchewin			0
Red Gut	12	0	0
Sabaskong	13	0	
Seine River	8	22	100
Stangecoming	70	19	23
Unknown Origin	N/A	0	11
	N/A	0	0
	x=33	x=12.1	x=20.8

proportion of those admitted who were adopted during that period. Table 8.10 lists the communities in descending order of prevalence for each variable.

Table 8.10 — Rank Order of Communities for Admission Rates, Readmission Rates, Adoption Rates.

Community	Admission Prevalence per 100	Community	Rank by % Readmission	Community	Rank by % Adopted
Seine River	.70	Couchiching	29	Ojibways of OneGaming	44
Manitou Rapids	.64	Big Grassy	25	Big Island	35
Big Island	.63	Manitou R	22	Big Grassy	30
Big Grassy	.38	Ojibways of	22	Seine River	23
Couchiching	.18	Seine River	19	Couchiching	20
Nickicouse- menecamang	.13	Big Island	15	Stangecoming	11
Naicatchewin	.12			Manitou Rapids	10

The communities with the highest admission rate did not rank equally high for the readmission or adoption rate. Seine River had the highest admission rate, the 5th highest readmission rate and the 4th highest adoption rate. Manitou Rapids had the second highest admission rate but the lowest adoption rate. The highest admission rates (Seine River) was compared to the lowest (Naicatchewenin) using the Relative Risk measure: a child in Seine River had a 5.8 times greater chance of being admitted to care than a child from Naicatchewenin (.70/.12). A child who was admitted to care from Big Grassy had three times more chance of being adopted than a child from Manitou Rapids (30/10). The reasons for these variations are discussed later in relation to the histories and cultural change of the communities.

Summary and Conclusions

The results of this section illustrate the following patterns:

- (1) wide variations in the admission rates between communities;
- (2) variations in the numbers of admissions within communities; some years and clusters of years had much higher rates than others;
- (3) a low overall readmission rate;
- (4) lower than expected proportion of RSI children admitted who were also placed for adoption;

(5) children who were adopted were more likely to be in care only once than those who were not adopted.

The variations in the outcomes suggest several possibilities or combinations thereof:

- (1) agency policy was not administered uniformly to all communities; or
- (2) agency policy was administered uniformly but communities were inherently different resulting in different outcomes of a uniformly administered agency policy.

Overall the emerging pattern is an active emergency service to Status Indian children requiring temporary crisis care. For five of the communities CAS in-care services were used much more than others. CAS focus was on different communities at different times. The overall proportions of admissions of Status Indian children requiring care in the District was very high as was the rate of adoption for the size of the Status Indian population. The rate of adoption of the children admitted was lower than expected in light of the criticism of widespread adoptions of these children. All but one child went to a non-Native family but none left Ontario during the time period.

The results in this section raise questions about community variations. The community histories reported next reveal wide variations in inherent features of the communities.

COMMUNITY HISTORIES

Seine River²⁵

Seine River is located 100 km east of Fort Frances and west of Atikokan. It is about one kilometre from Highway 11 but is isolated from other organized communities. The closest community is the hamlet of Mine Centre about 30 km west.

Until the 1950s, the people lived traditionally, as described earlier, in small family groupings as hunters and trappers congregating with other families in the summer. A seasonal school operated on the reserve during the summer and marriages were still being arranged during the summer gatherings. It is said to have been a community which kept many of its traditional rituals well into the late 1960s. Some children attended residential school in Fort Frances while their parents trapped. This ceased in the 1950s when IAB built a Day School on the reserve to grade 8.

With the decline of fur prices, trappers obtained work as pulp cutters. Apparently Seine River men were particularly adept as cutters. Gradually the technology progressed from the use of men, to the use of horses, to the use of machines. By the early 1970s jobs were scarce and welfare had become a major source of income. Welfare receipt doubled between 1969 and 1970, doubling again between 1973 and 1974.²⁶

Before 1964 residents could travel to towns only by small plane or train to Fort Frances or Atikokan. The elders spoke little or no English and traditional rites such as those surrounding birth, puberty, marriage and death were observed.

In 1964 the Trans Canada Highway was completed and opened. Shortly thereafter a store keeper applied for a license for a liquor outlet. The Native informant believed that this was to accommodate the tourist trade but a non-Native informant was less generous in assessing the motivation, asserting that the storekeeper saw the potential for liquor trade with the residents of Seine River. Both the residents of the community and Children's Aid personnel cited the building of the road as a critical factor for the community. The elder informants from all the communities also cited the introduction of easily available alcohol as a major force in the turmoil the communities experienced in the 1960s. The present Chief of Seine River said that problems existed before this but the road was "the icing on the cake."²⁷

By 1978 the alcohol and violence of Seine River had become a source of concern to the social agencies and hospitals of the Fort Frances area. Out of concern for a worsening problem, a Native alcohol worker at the Fort Frances LaVerendrye hospital compiled the deaths from the community. He shared them with me for this research. Tables 8.11 and 8.12 shows the pattern. Data for individual communities of this type is rare and the events of the deaths are

Table 8.11 — Deaths of Seine River Residents at LaVerendrye Hospital Showing Ages and Relation to Alcohol, 1968-1978.

Year	Age at Death	Cause of Death	Relation to Alcohol
1968	80	natural	
1969	79	natural	
1969	nb	stillborn	mother a heavy drinker
1969	65	natural	
1970	74	natural	
1971	48	asphyxiation	yes, direct
1971	34	uncertain	yes
1971	38	hit by car	yes
1972	65	natural	
1972	23	uncertain	
1972	43	uncertain	
1972	nb	stillborn	mother alcoholic mother
1972	4 days	asphyxiated	intoxicated
1972	4 days	asphyxiated	mother intoxicated
1972	46	housefire	yes
1973	31	uncertain	
1973	1 year	pneumonia	yes (neglect)
1973	1 year	pneumonia	yes (neglect)
1974	24	car accident	driver drunk
1974	12	car accident	driver drunk
1974	22	car accident	driver drunk
1974	30	car accident	driver drunk
1974	37	car accident	driver drunk
1974	25	car accident	driver drunk
1974	35	car accident	driver drunk
1975	47	uncertain	yes
1975	62	cirrhosis	yes

Source: Original data collected by Ernie Bird formerly Alcohol Counsellor for the LaVerendrye General Hospital in Fort Frances. Does not include deaths which occurred while in a hospital in larger centres, nor expected home deaths from natural causes. Abbreviation nb=new born.

Table 8.12 — Numbers of Deaths by Relation to Alcohol and Mean Age in Seine River 1968-1978.

Category	Number of Deaths	Mean Age
Natural, no alcohol	10	73.7
Accidental, no alcohol	1	
Unknown under 1 year	3	
Alcohol Related, Over 1 year of age	27	33.6(age known for 24 only)
Alcohol Related, 1 year of age or less	6	
Deceased drinking	20	32.1
Deceased not drinking	11	17.1
Total (Alcohol Related):	31 (65.9%)	17.1
Total (All):	47	32.1

known only because the collector of the data shared his personal knowledge with me.

The average age of all non-infant deaths by natural causes was 73.7 years. This is well above the national Indian 1971 life expectancy of 60 for males and 66.2 for females and favourable to the national rate of 69.3 and 76.3.²⁸ The average age of non-infant deaths as a result of alcohol abuse was 33.6 years. The average age of death by those whose own alcohol abuse directly contributed to their deaths was 32.1 years. The average age of death as the result of the abuse of alcohol by a person other than the deceased was much younger, 17 years. Of the eleven persons in this last category, seven were simultaneously killed in a truck accident in 1974. Six of the alcohol-related

deaths during the decade were infants under the age of one year in the care of their parents. A set of twins were accidentally smothered by an intoxicated adult. Another set of twins died of pneumonia precipitated by neglect. Another two infants of alcoholic mothers died at birth. Of the 31 confirmed deaths from alcohol abuse, 27 or 90 percent were violent. Of the deaths from all cause, 29 of the 47 (61.7 percent) were accidental or violent. At least 65.9 percent of the deaths directly or indirectly resulted from alcohol abuse.

The Seine River situation was as severe as, or more severe, than other areas in Canada. A one year study of deaths in southern Albertan reserve communities showed that 52.8 percent of the deaths that year were a direct or indirect result of alcohol abuse. The same study showed that about 40 percent of deaths were due to the deceased's own use of alcohol.²⁹ In the Seine River data the death rate because of the deceased's own use was 42.5 percent. In the Alberta study, 46.3 percent of the alcohol deaths involved violence compared to the Seine River figure of 61.7 percent. The overall violent death rate for Alberta was 12.8 percent over the same time period. In 1968 the violent death rate for the non-Native Canadian population was 9.0 percent, and 27.9 percent for Canadian Natives.³⁰ Table 8.13 compares the Seine Rivers death rate from alcohol related violence to the above figures.

Table 8.13 — Alcohol Related Deaths in Seine River Compared to Other Groups

Community	Alcohol Related (%)	Alcohol Related Deceased's Use (%)	Alcohol Related Violent Deaths (%)
Seine River	65.9	42.4	61.7
Alberta Study (Natives)	52.8	40	46.3
Canadian Natives			27.0*
Alberta			12.9*
Canada			9.0*

Sources: LaVerendrye Hospital Fort Frances for Seine River and Menno and Boldt, Deaths Styles Among Canada's Indians for Alberta and Canadian data. *All violent deaths

Because of alcohol abuse Seine River lost a significant number of its members in their prime parenting or grandparenting years. It lost seven children as a result of adults abusing alcohol.

The year 1974 recorded the highest number of alcohol related deaths. However, all these deaths were the result of one single incident in which the victims were thrown from the back of a truck driven by an intoxicated driver when it hit a rock cut. The next highest year for alcohol related deaths was 1972 with six of the seven deaths occurring as a result of alcohol abuse.

CAS case activity was high in Seine River. A letter in 1978 to Ernie Bird, the then Native alcohol counsellor at Laverendrye Hospital, from the

Executive Director of the RRCAS indicated that the agency had 11 families from Seine River on its caseload, 10 of whom were under its supervision because of alcohol abuse. This compared to 25 non-Native family cases in the Atikokan vicinity, 9 of which were alcohol related.³¹

The picture emerges of a community in great turmoil. The conditions of Northern Indian communities make alcohol abuse extra hazardous. The closeness to water, dilapidated housing and the hazards of the frigid winters escalate the dangers of alcohol. From the testimonies of the Native and non-Native respondents alcohol abuse was greater in Seine River than other First Nations communities in Rainy River District.

In 1978 Ernie Bird organized a major meeting of agencies and interested person's in Fort Frances to share concerns about Seine River's problems. Only two person's from the community attended.³²

Ernie Bird believes that the community could have withstood the shocks if it had not lost its language and adherence to traditional ways. Judy Bird, a former resident, believes that alcohol was used initially out of curiosity but that the dependence on welfare was the most devastating blow increasing its use.³³

Within two decades the traditional ways of an adapting aboriginal society were destroyed accompanying one of the most serious child welfare situations in the province.

The information indicates that Seine River was a community distinctly different from other reserve communities in Canada and Rainy River District in the acculturation process. The data of alcohol-related deaths and children-in-care data is associated negatively with acculturation. Its alcohol related mortality rate and its rate of children admitted to CAS care are exemplary compared with non-Native and Native communities both within and outside Rainy River District.

Summary

In the years following World War II several major changes came to Seine River. They were

1. the introduction of Day Schools following relative isolation and a system of seasonal schools or residential schools;
2. a gradual move to the wage economy and decline in independent earning power;
3. sudden access in 1964 to the non-Indian culture by the building of the road through the community;
3. sudden easy availability to alcohol, associated with a higher than average mortality rate from alcohol abuse.

It had the highest admission rate for the District and one of the highest adoption rates. Child deaths related directly to alcohol abuse. Alcohol abuse precipitated CAS interventions for most children.

Manitou Rapids³⁴

Manitou Rapids is located 30 km west of Fort Frances adjacent to the town of Emo. It straddles the crossroads of Highways 71 and 11 on the banks of the Rainy River and the Minnesota border.

In 1917 several small reserves created by Treaty 3 in 1873 and scattered along the Rainy River were amalgamated into one community. The key informant believes that the reason for the amalgamation was to build a Day School. An historian writes that the amalgamation was a result of the 1873 signing of Treaty 3 with the federal government. After four and a half decades, the community received the lands on which they had agreed to in the Treaty.³⁵ The only pre World War II on-reserve Day School in the District was established at that time in Manitou Rapids.³⁶ The people of Manitou had supported themselves from the land which was abundant with wild game, maple sugar groves, wild rice, fish and berries. After the amalgamation, Indian Affairs Branch introduced farming to the community. It was part of the government's assimilation attempts by promoting self-supporting landholders. It was also subsidiary to the plan to encourage non-Native farming settlements in Northern Ontario through land appropriation.³⁷ A large portion of the reserve was cleared for farming, greatly reducing the trapping potential of the land.

In the 1930s tourist camps were opened providing added employment for the Manitou Rapids residents as guides and housekeepers. During the Depression the community people could support themselves from the land as well as or better than the non-Native people of the area. The internal trade of beef, milk and eggs and fish between fishermen and farmers meant that no one went hungry during the pre-war years. As an indication of its relative prosperity, the community adopted the occasional non-Native child given to families by poor non-Indian families.³⁸

The respondent, born in 1929, described her early life as one lived in equilibrium with the environment. Those persons who trapped and fished would move to where game or fish moved and knew the timing of their activities by the flow of the water, by the stars, the weather, the colour of the trees rather than by a calendar or clock. Sharing of the land's resources and labour was believed to be a part of life. Living in this balance meant that a person would be spared ill-health. The land, the environment and the culture were integral to the culture of the Ojibwa.

Ruth Landes describes the Manitou Rapids community in the 1930s in colourful terms as told to her by a Mrs. Maggie Wilson. Landes' description of the marriage customs and kinship systems denote a society which ignored both federal laws that outlawed its spiritual practices and churches which forbade anything other than sexual relations within monogamous church-sanctioned

unions.³⁹ This is not surprising given that Christianity did not take hold in the area until the 1920s.

The highways in the District were completed about 1933. After the war farming in general failed in Northern Ontario. Modern machinery replaced horse drawn ploughs and farm abandonment was common because of the inability to compete.⁴⁰ The ability to trap on the reserve diminished because so much land had been cleared. The respondent interprets the failure of farming as a result of the Creator's intent for the Ojibwa to nurture the land in a different way than farming. They were meant to be hunters and gatherers and the users of herbs, she believes. She also pointed out that IAB gave no training in agriculture as they do for new programs today. Indeed, farming requires an affinity to the land quite different from that required of hunters and gatherers, and a much different structure to one's life. Unlike the Ojibwa who attempted farming, the settlers who came to Rainy River District under land appropriation programmes came to the area specifically for the farmland they were offered and presumably a knowledge of farming.

Another major change occurred in 1947. The government required all trappers to have a license for a specified trapline. Traplines would no longer be shared as was done traditionally. Coatsworth noted a system of shared land and resources through a distribution system handed down by heredity in the sugar bushes harvest as well.⁴¹ The respondent sees the issuing of trapping license as the beginning of the breakdown of the sharing tradition. Hugh Brody

describes how this change was significant in Northern British Columbia. Licensing confined trappers to a specified area hindering them from following the movements of the animals.⁴² In Manitou Rapids the loss of so much land to farms coupled with government regulations would have been a double deterrent to continuing traditional ventures.

The respondent states that the people became frustrated, suffered from low self-esteem, and felt like nothing. She describes the 1960s as the years when sharing stopped and the norm was "every person for themselves." Parents lost control. People drank heavily. The people in general began to believe that parents drank so their children would be taken away. People would call in the CAS and not take responsibility for anyone else's children.

Welfare receipt escalated in the 1960s doubling between 1969 and 1970, much like Seine River.⁴³ In 1972 a saw mill was built in the community and welfare went down by a third between 1972 and 1973. Admissions to care were consistently high from 1964 onwards and escalated when the saw mill opened. Very few children were placed for adoption from the community during those years, however.

The informant from the community was emphatic that the introduction of alcohol was the scourge to the Ojibwa of Manitou Rapids. As mentioned in Chapter 7, at the Select Committee hearings the Chief of the community spoke out against changing the laws in 1953 to allow Native people to purchase alcohol from retail outlets.

Summary

The major stressors to Manitou Rapids were identified as:

1. the loss of its traditional life style of hunting and gathering by government policy of assimilation
2. the loss of economic support when the substitute economic base collapsed as a result of failed government policy
3. the introduction of alcohol at the time of economic decline

Big Island⁴⁴

Big Island is a tiny community 80 km from the town of Fort Frances. Before 1959, it had been a typical hunting and trapping society with a reserve community located on an island in the Lake of the Woods. It was about 50 kilometres from the point of contact to non-Native society, the town of Morson on Highway 621. In 1959, the federal government moved Big Island to marshy land adjacent to the reserve of Big Grassy. One community member believes that the community was moved by IAB because its existence hampered the tourism. It is probable too that the decision to move the community was administrative convenience as part of IAB's overall direction of the time to provide public services and education. By the 1970s, housing and the employment situation was allegedly deplorable. The 1981 Census population was a mere 25 percent of the number of persons registered as Band members.

A 75 percent migration rate from the reserve possibly reflected the grim conditions of the community. In 1977, Big Island had the highest rate of welfare assistance in Ontario.⁴⁵ In 1974, its rate was double that of the next highest community in Rainy River District.⁴⁶(See also Chapter 9, Table 9.2)

Summary

Big Island community experienced several important shocks:

1. relocation
2. sudden contact with non-Native society.
3. sudden access to alcohol
4. unemployment
5. loss of significant numbers of community members

Big Grassy⁴⁷

Big Grassy is located on the provincial Highway 621, 100 kilometres west of Fort Frances on the Lake of the Woods near Morson. Before the second World War many children attended the residential school in Fort Frances where they spent most of the year, returning home only for holidays. People supported themselves as trappers and woodcutters. There was no welfare. Martin Tuesday, a man in his mid forties, reported his early childhood on the trapline in the 1950s as a happy time compared to the dire poverty and

frequent hunger experienced afterwards on the reserve. He emphasized that life on the trapline was not one of poverty.

He recalls that alcohol abuse began in his community in the 1950s and was an activity of the 30-40 year age group of his parent's generation. He believes that alcohol was supplied by tourist camp owners to their Indian guides. Although there was a provincial school available to the children in Morson and Bergland his parents sent him to the Fort Frances residential school because poverty prevented them from clothing and feeding him to the standard of the provincial school.

The alcohol abuse peaked in the 1960s. Although there was seasonal employment of guiding, trapping, fishing, and wild rice gathering, there were only two or three permanent jobs for Natives in Morson. Martin Tuesday believes that the alcoholism was the result of the poverty, the oppression of the culture and traditional pursuits. There was one fishing license for the whole reserve with a quota. There was no permanent employment. The other informant from the community, a man in his sixties, attributes alcoholism to the experiences of the residential school from which he graduated in 1946. He unapologetically states that the reality of the 1950s and 1960s was that alcohol abuse was so widespread that it is difficult to find anyone who can recount the events of those years.⁴⁸

In 1964 a major event shocked the community highlighting its social and cultural turmoil. Until that time the community had continued spiritual

practices with ancient symbols such as the drum despite the Christian teachings. The community drum in Ojibwa culture is more than an instrument to create music. It is a sacred artifact made from wood and animal skins and is handed down from generation to generation. It symbolizes life, and the drumming is the heartbeat of the people. At Christmas time a 30 year old cultural leader died in an alcohol-related incident. The elders decreed that the sacred drum should no longer be used because its power would be misused if mixed with alcohol. It is not uncommon for the community drum to be put away on the instruction of elders when alcohol has taken hold of a community.

Apparently after the drum was put away in 1964, alcohol abuse escalated. Moses Tom, an elder from the community and advisor to the Native child welfare agency, marks the year of the Indian Welfare Agreement of 1965, as the year children began to be taken away from his community.

Big Grassy had one of the highest admission rates of children to RRCAS. It was also the first community to participate in the on-reserve Native child welfare prevention program in 1979.⁴⁹ The 1980s coincided with better employment and the takeover of services by communities. The elders allowed the drum back into Big Grassy in the early 1980s.

Summary

Big Grassy experienced the following major forces:

1. large numbers of the generation born in the 1920-30 period were sent to residential schools for most of the year where attempts to destroy the language and religious beliefs were prominent
2. poverty and unemployment in the post War years
3. the alcohol related death of a cultural leader

The contact with non-Native society and accessibility to alcohol appears to have been more gradual than for the other communities. The effects of the loss of culture from the residential schools were identified as major determinant of the alcohol abuse problems experienced by the Big Grassy community.

Couchiching⁵⁰

Couchiching lies adjacent to the east side of Fort Frances. It is the largest First Nations community in the District. In some sections the community is indistinguishable from Fort Frances. It has concentrations of modern homes in suburb-like neighbourhoods. Some are set in pleasant woodland settings.

In the interwar years the community prospered. Elder Frances McPherson recalls a mixed work force of waged and self-employed workers. A non-Native had opened a mill on the reserve on the condition that he would employ its residents. Many men worked full time at the mill while others guided, trapped and fished for a living. Others found seasonal employment with small bush airlines which served the tourist trade. A few others had jobs

in Fort Frances with its main employment resource, the mill now known as Boise Cascade. In the mid 1950s, she and her husband were approached by the Indian Affairs social worker to adopt a child from another community, which they did. This is a possible indication of IAB's view of the stability of the community.

There were no modern facilities, no running water, and no heating other than wood stoves in Couchiching before the war. For everyone the effort to keep fed, clean and warm was a significant part of the day's activities. There was no time to be depressed. Mrs. McPherson recalls a community in which everyone shared. If a hunter killed a deer, he would butcher it and place the meat on the kitchen table, and anyone could come and help themselves. The community held regular alcohol-free dances and non-Native residents of Fort Frances often joined in the festivities. If a parent died, there was no need for the CAS. The child "remained family," as she described the use of extended families.

Alcohol consumption was rare in the community until the law changed in 1956. Before this, those who wished to drink travelled to nearby International Falls Minnesota where there were no restrictions. There were deaths due to alcohol off the reserve but the children were kept safe in the community.

Before the second World War, the children of Couchiching went to a residential school located on the reserve. IAB policy was to require all children

to board at the schools whether they lived close or not. The Couchiching children went home only on Sundays and holidays. However they were more fortunate than the children from the more distant communities such as Big Grassy who went home only at year's end.

In the late 1940s several changes occurred in Couchiching. The mill on the reserve closed and employment had to be sought elsewhere. In 1949, the Department of Indian Affairs began bussing Couchiching children to Fort Frances schools reserving the residential school for children from isolated communities. The closing of the School to the Couchiching children was not seen at the time as a positive factor. The Native children became rowdy and aggressive after mixing with the non-Native children. Alcohol abuse increased during the 1950s but there was still little violence in the communities.

Mrs. McPherson, age 75, described the three generations with which she is familiar. The members of the generation before hers were the independent trappers, fishermen and rice pickers who made a life on their own outside the wage economy. The next generation (hers) were the mill workers. Her husband worked for 30 years as a mill worker. Her own generation, she describes, as the one that "fell apart." This generation lost the language, were the first to abandon the culture and religion, and the first to use alcohol to any extent. The third generation is her children's, the white collar workers now involved in Indian political and service organizations that have devolved from the provincial and federal governments.

Summary

The following stresses were identified as important in the history of Couchiching:

1. the full legalization of alcohol
2. the move from the residential school system to integration with the non-Native children in Fort Frances

SUMMARY

Table 8.14 summarizes the data for the communities from the first part of this chapter. The following factors were identified:

1. residential school experiences and to a lesser extent the move to provincial schools
2. welfare availability
3. relocation
4. the abuse of alcohol after its legalization
5. loss of Self-esteem, religion and culture
6. the availability of CAS services facilitating parental irresponsibility

The suddenness of the stressors emerges as important. Seine River experienced instant accessibility to white society and alcohol in 1964; Big Grassy experienced the loss of its traditional economy, no substitute employment, poverty, and the loss of its symbols in 1964; Big Island was resettled in 1959 and lost its traditional economy. Manitou Rapids and Couchiching experienced

Table 8.14 --- Summary of 1964-1974 Admission, Adoption and Readmission Counts and Rates From Five Rainy River First Nations Communities

Community	Pop 0-14 yr 1969	adm. (Prob.)	Readm. of adm. (%)	Adp. (#)	Adp. adm. (%)	Adp. after 1 adm. (%)	Adp. 0-14 yr pop. (%)	Census Population as % Band List
Seine River	74	54 (p=.7)	19	12	23	12	16.2	44
Manitou Rapids	80	51 (p=.6)	22	5	10	100	6.3	39
Big Island	32	20 (p=.63)	15	6	35	83	18.8	24
Big Grassy	80	20 (p=.38)	26	9	30	77	11.3	61
Couchiching	148	41 (p=.18)	29	6	20	33	4	51

Abbreviations: pop. - Population
adm. - Admissions
prob. - Probability
readm. - readmissions
adp. - Adoptions

Sources: Tables 8.2 to 8.8.

these stressors earlier or gradually. All communities identified the access to alcohol in the early 1950s as significant. All communities experienced the missionaries' attempts to replace of the religion. All but Manitou Rapids were subjected to the residential school after 1920.

Why did the numbers of children admitted to care differ? The next chapter analyzes how the major factors contributed to rates of children in care within the context of the inherent community differences.

Endnotes to Chapter 8

1. Ida Olsen, Cecelia McComb, Wesly Harland, Anne Lovey and Maurice MacMillan, The River of Time: A History of Emo (Emo: Emo Historical Society, 1978).
2. Kenora Rainy River District Health Council (KRRDHC), Interim Report on Adult Mental Health Services in Ontario, Spring 1977, page 46.
3. Kenora Rainy River District Health Council, Presentation to the Ontario Council of Health Committee on Mental Health Services in Ontario, January 1983, Appendix A, Table 2.2.
4. KRRDHC, 1977, 58.
5. All populations are based on the 1986 Census figures, Ministry of Supply and Services, Profiles Ontario: Part 1, Population and Dwelling Characteristics, Census Divisions and Subdivisions, Cat. 94-111, pages 360-368.
6. Matt Bray and Ernie Epp, A Vast and Magnificent Land: An Illustrated History of Northern Ontario (Thunder Bay: Ontario Ministry of Northern Affairs, 1984).
7. KRRDHC, 1983, 52.
8. KRRDHC, 1983. Appendix A, Table 6.2.
9. KRRDHC, 1977, Appendix A, Table 5.1.
10. Ibid., Table 2.3.
11. Ibid., Table 3.3.
12. Ibid., 126.
13. Ibid., 43.
14. Ibid.
15. Emerson Coatsworth, The Indians of Quetico (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), and Ruth Landes, Ojibwa Religion and the Midewiwin (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 1-16.

16. Bishop. See also R.W. Dunning, Social and Economic Change among the Northern Ojibwa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), concerning the Ojibwa much farther to the North of Rainy River at Pikangicum.
17. David McNab, "The Administration of Treaty 3: The Location of the Boundaries of Treaty 3 Indian Reserves in Ontario, 1873-1915," in As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows, ed. Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lusier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983), 145-163.
18. Christopher Vecsey, Traditional Ojibwa Religion and its Historical Changes (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1983).
19. Landes, 1968, 71.
20. Moses Tom, elder resident of the Big Grassy Reserve, interview by author, 27 September 1990, and Eva Morrissette.
21. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Population By Specified Age Groups 1956, 73.
22. Many First Nation communities have reverted to their original Ojibwa names. Some have short names that are also found in documents.
23. Sandra Hemphill, Susan McDaniel and David Kirk, "Adoption in Canada: A Neglected Area of Data Collection for Research," Journal of Comparative Family Studies XII, 5 (August, 1981):509-515.
24. Ibid., 510.
25. The information for this community was obtained primarily from Judy Bird, former resident of Seine River and group home worker Couchiching First Nation, and her husband Ernie Bird, resident of Couchiching Reserve and Mental Health Worker, Anishnabeg Counselling Services, Fort Frances.
26. NAC, RG 10, Vol. 69, File 485/29-1, part 2, Welfare of Indians Fort Frances agency. The rates are presented in more detail in Chapter 9.
27. Andrew Johnson, personal communication by author, 11 November 1992, Thunder Bay, Ontario.
28. DIAND, Indian Conditions, 15.
29. George K. Jarvis and Menno Boldt, "Death Styles Among Canada's Indians," Social Science Medicine 16 (1982): 1345-1352.
30. Jarvis and Boldt, 1348.
31. Correspondence from Ron King, Executive Director RRCAS to Ernie Bird, Mental Health Worker LaVerendrye Hospital, 24 April 1978.

32. Correspondence from Ernie Bird to Lesly (sic) Metcalfe, Community Health Nurse, 28 March 1978.
33. Judy Bird.
34. The chief informant on the history of Manitou Rapids interviewed by author 16 December 1991 wished to remain anonymous.
35. David T. McNab, "The Administration of Treaty 3: The Location of the Boundaries of Treaty 3 Indian Reserves in Ontario, 1873-1915," in As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows, ed. Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lusier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983), 145-163.
36. Emo Historical Society. See also Agnes Speaker and Ann Wilson, Two Generations of Ojibway Women's Stories (Grand Council Treaty #3: Kenora, nd).
37. Matt Bray and Ernie Epp, A Vast and Magnificent Land: An Illustrated History of Northern Ontario, ed. Matt Bray and Ernie Epp (Thunder Bay: Ontario Ministry of Northern Affairs and Lakehead University, 1984). See also Emo Historical Society, A History of Emo, Emo Historical Society: Emo, 1982).
38. This was confirmed a key informant from the community. Ruth Landes wrote of a blond full-blooded white boy legally adopted under provincial law before her field work in the 1930s.
39. Ruth Landes, The Ojibwa Woman (New York: AMS Press, 1969) and Ojibwa Sociology (New York: AMS Press, 1969).
40. A Vast and Magnificent Land.
41. Coatsworth.
42. Hugh Brody.
43. NAC, RG 10, Acc.84-85\112 Vol.69, file 485-29-1 part 1, Welfare of Indians Fort Frances Agency, monthly reports of District Superintendent.
44. The history of this community was relayed to me by Martin Tuesday of Hudson Ontario, member of the Big Grassy Band, interview by author, 15 December 1991.
45. TAP Associates, 80.
46. NAC, RG10, Vol.69, File 485/29-1 part 2, Fort Frances Welfare of Indians General, calculated from monthly reports.
47. From personal communication with Big Grassy Band members Moses Tom, 27 September 1990 and Martin Tuesday, 15 December 1991.
48. Moses Tom.

49. Ron King. See King and Maloney, 1979.

50. I was fortunate to have been able to talk with four members of this communities, three of whom were elders. As a community with a century of proximity to non-Native society it was not difficult to locate persons willing to talk about the community. The informants from Couchiching were Frances McPherson, former foster and adoptive parent, Eva Morrissette, Katharine Buckshot, and Ernie Bird.

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CHANGE
IN RAINY RIVER FIRST NATIONS COMMUNITIES AND
CHANGING RATES OF ADMISSIONS TO CARE**

This chapter discusses how the factors identified in Chapter 8 shaped the rates of Reserve Status Indian children in care in Rainy River District.

None of the factors stands alone as a causal factor but interacts with others within the context of the history of each community creating conditions shaping the rates of admission of children in care. For the purposes of analysis, the six factors identified are collapsed into four general significant change agents in the histories of the five communities. They are:

- (1) education, in particular the Residential Schools;
- (2) the shift in the economic base from hunting and gathering to the wage economy, or to unemployment and welfare;
- (3) relocation of communities from traditional lands to lands assigned by DIA;
- (4) alcohol abuse.

I first present a chart form summation of the factors in Table 9.1. The dates of significant changes are noted for each community. For some factors a check mark denotes its identification by informants as important for that community. Where there is a blank space, that factor was either not applicable or not identified. Next I analyze the effect of each factor on the community using the literature available, the interview data and data from

Table 9.1 — Significant Factors Affecting Reserve Communities in Rainy River District with High Rates of Children-in-Care 1964-1974

	Education		Economic Base		Relocation	Accelerated Contact	Alcohol
	Residential	Day Schools	Move to Wage Economy	Welfare			
Seine River	✓ 1940s	1950	post WWII	✓ 1970		✓ 1964	✓ 1964
Manitou Rapids	pre WWI	1915	post WWII & 1972	1970	1917	1933	✓ 1951
Big Island	✓ 1920s-50s	1959		1969	✓ 1959	1959	✓ 1959
Big Grassy	✓ 1920s-50s	1950s		✓ 1970		✓	✓ 1951
Couchiching	✓ 1920-1949	1950	1930s grad.				✓ 1951 grad. from pre WWII

similar areas. I have drawn on data concerning two Northern Ojibwa communities in the Kenora District, Grassy Narrows and New Osnaburgh. These communities have had similar problems and histories to some Rainy River District communities.

The Church Run Residential Schools

Almost all informants from the Rainy River District identified the residential school system as a major factor, if not the turning point, in the breakdown of their families and culture. A number of people attributed the high incidence of alcohol abuse following the war to the effects of the Schools. The factors identified were the regimentation, the teaching that aboriginal religions were superstitious and evil, and the prohibition against speaking their own language. Most of the informants referred to the cruel punishment of shaving heads, emotionally sadistic behaviour of the staff, isolation, and public flogging of children for infraction of the rules. When asked about sexual abuse, most respondents said that they were aware of this happening elsewhere but did not have personal knowledge of it.¹ The respondents cited the strict adherence to rules and schedules as harmful. The graduates would return to their bush communities where survival called for a more inner-directed approach to life. They would be unable to manage the discipline required to live from the land. The abuse notwithstanding, the loss of the culture was implicated as the worst effect of the residential schools.

The residential schools have been implicated by Natives and non-Natives professionals and non-professionals, in the mental health field in both Canada² and the United States. Poor mental health, suicide, sexual abuse and the formation of personality disorders are all cited as the residential school syndrome.³ Professionals have cited the lack of adequate parental role models as important factors in the difficulties of being parents. Others have cited serial caregivers and the effect of separation of a child at an early age as prescriptions for psychopathy.⁴ Boarding schools for Indian children still exist in the United States. A recent study of 188 high school students in the southeastern United States revealed that 58 percent of the children in the schools were clinically depressed.⁵ This is because they are still used for delinquent and neglected children in the US.⁶

The interpretation by Native people of the effect of residential schools differs from non-Native clinical interpretations. One Aboriginal explanation focuses on the loss of culture and language as the fundamental problem. The connection between the residential schools and the loss of culture lies in the disruption of the human development cycle as theorized by the Ojibwa. The theory is illustrated in the imagery of an Ojibway legend describing the dream of Weegwauss as told to the wise man Chejauk.⁷ It is condensed as follows:

There are four stages in life which are envisioned as four steep, treacherous hills which humans climb relentlessly with no stopping, no looking back and with the sole goal of reaching the top. The first hill has crowds of young children ranging from infants at the bottom to those about 7 or 8 years old at the top. The children are alone and left to crawl and scramble their way to the top. Some die and are lost. The second hill has youth, although fewer in number, with the 7 and 8 year old at the bottom and youths at the top and those in between making their way up the hill. On this hill there is laughter and energy. The boys learn the skills of gathering food and the defence of the others. The girls learn the skills of cooking, sewing, teaching, mixing of medicines and looking after others. On the third hill men and women usually travel together working diligently. Little laughter is heard and few pleasures are had on the third hill. Many stumble and slump to the ground before reaching the top. On the fourth, the steepest hill, are a few frail figures ascending the jagged edge. Unlike the persons on the other hills, the few on the fourth hill shout encouragement to the fallen and the faint on the second and third hills. Many die on the fourth hill but many struggle on pushed by an inner spirit despite the loss of strength and companions. They are sustained by having lived out their visions and helping others in their climb. Only a very few reach the summit. To reach the fourth hill is considered a great gift from Nature. Those who reach this stage are respected for their strength and knowledge. Old age is to be respected not disparaged. Its task is to pass on knowledge to those yet to traverse the hills.

This legend explains many aspects of Native life. It illustrates the developmental tasks in the Ojibwa life cycle. It shows how life in the bush required an inner directed discipline if one were to survive. External sanctions were not necessary to discipline a child. The legend also demonstrates a sophisticated body of knowledge of human development only recently theorized by non-Indian culture.⁸ The inner directed approach to child rearing also emerged only recently in non-Indian culture.

The task in the 7-15 age group was to learn the skills of life and the bush. This knowledge came from the elders, not necessarily the parents who

were preoccupied performing the laborious tasks of survival. In traditional Ojibwa society the chores of everyday survival were hunting, setting of traps, skinning and tanning furs, gathering wood and water, to name a few. This left little time for natural parents to teach the children.

The stages of life described by Erikson⁹ both differ from and resemble the Ojibwa journey over the hills of life. According to Erikson, the task in the school-aged stage is identity formation through learning from significant adults and teachers. This parallels the Ojibwa journey up the second hill where the skills of life and the land are learned. In Erikson's theory, old age is the time for individual reflection and retrospection, but in Ojibwa theory it is the time to pass on one's knowledge of life's journey to the group on the lower hills. This knowledge was particularly directed at the children.

From 1920 to the mid 1950s, many early school-aged Ojibwa children of the Rainy River District were removed from their families for ten months every year until the age of 15 or 16 to attend the residential schools. The schools interfered with identity formation and learning by separating children from their significant teachers. In the residential schools they were told that their innate identity was inferior, if not evil. Adult role models in the schools often did not offer alternatives with which they would identify. During the children's years on the second hill of life, grandparents on the fourth hill were intended to teach Ojibwa children living skills. Instead, abusive aliens were teaching the Ojibwa children foreign languages, religions and subjects they may never use

in reserve life. The teachers were members of a culture which promoted external sanctions as the way to raise children, and which had not yet appreciated the effect of separation on the emotional development of children.

The children returned home at age 15 emotionally, linguistically, and culturally at the age at which they left. The regimentation of the schools robbed them of the inner directed self-discipline needed for bush survival. In desperation many had children of their own while still children themselves. They had no life skills to cope later with the stresses of relocation, unemployment, welfare, and the easy access to alcohol. If the language had not been suppressed, the young Ojibwa parents of Rainy River District may have been able to recover the teachings they missed that would buffer the shocks which confronted them in the mid-fifties to mid sixties.

One could argue that Indian residential schools were no different or worse than non-Indian Boarding Schools or even public schools of the times. The differences, however, were that educational methods reflected the overall approach of non-Indian society to life. To Indian children it would be assaultive, aggressive and exceedingly violent. Furthermore, they did not have access to parents for solace. The goal was also different for the two groups. In the Indian schools, the goal was to destroy the attachment to the life into which the children were born. They became "orphans with parents."¹⁰

Verna Kirkness' work (Chapter 8) described the Indian community as the classroom and its members as the teachers.¹¹ Her work and the work of

anthropologists who have studied the Ojibwa religion underscore how traditional Ojibwa religion, culture and lifestyle exist as a holistic entity, not as compartmentalized factions. All animate and inanimate objects had a "Manitos" or spirit and rituals existed in all activities, including rituals in hunting and gathering activities.¹² The effects forced attempts by the residential schools to replace the Ojibwa religion with Christianity cannot be underestimated. Vecsey wrote in 1983 that the Ojibwa have abandoned their traditional beliefs but have not embraced Christianity more than nominally. They lost the integrative function of their own religion without adopting a new world view.¹³ Writing about Grassy Narrows he states, "The Manitos are discredited yet the Christian deity hold no hope."¹⁴ He quotes a resident of Grassy Narrows describing his feelings about the Roman Catholic Church,

They looked like honest people, like people who wouldn't hurt anyone.
But the Roman Catholic Church always has been so bossy, even today.
Their way is disrespectful, disrespectful, disrespectful.¹⁵

Eva Morrissette, an elder of the Couchiching First Nation, summed up the effects of the residential schools on her attitude towards religion: She recalls the abuse of three girls who were caught running away. In the presence of the Indian agent, his secretary and the RCMP, the school director who was a priest, pulled the girls by the hair to the front of the classroom where he punched and kicked them. The elder said, "Who could you tell? They were all there. And now they wonder why people won't go to church."¹⁶ Destroying faith in the Ojibwa religion was not a simple matter of replacing one set of

deities with the Christian God, it was the destruction of the entire way of life leaving only a vacuum. In an interview concerning the imagery of the rape scene in his controversial play *Dry Lips Oughta Move to Kapuskasing*, Tomson Highway said about the Catholic church,

Its not so much hate as much as tremendous sadness at how a beautiful idea went wrong;...The missionaries made such a mess of things. In the rape scene (in *Dry Lips*) a woman is raped with a crucifix. On a metaphorical level, the scene symbolizes the matriarchal religion raped by the patriarchy, the Goddess raped by the God.¹⁷

The effects of residential schools are widespread in Native communities. Any explanatory factor -- the separation from significant caregivers, the loss of religion and culture, the loss of the principle teacher, the abuse -- would induce problems in later life for any child of any culture. Many Ojibwa children experienced all of these factors. The effects are intergenerational.

Children who had left their families to attend these schools at 7 or 8 years of age any time between 1940 and 1960, would graduate between the mid 1940s and the late 1960s. Many of these confused young people would be in their child bearing years at a time when the traditional economy had declined and unemployment was prevalent. Alcohol law: had changed and the provinces were now extending social assistance and child welfare services to their communities. This generation of residential school graduates would be vulnerable to a variety of stresses that would result in situations in which they would have difficulty caring for their offspring.

Residential schools alone cannot be blamed for high rates of Indian children in care. They existed for many years before, and many grandparents of these children were themselves products of the schools. Furthermore, the residents of the communities of Lac La Croix, Naicatchewenin and Nicickousemenecaning were graduates of the schools and admissions rates to CAS care from these communities were negligible. The interaction of the effects of the schools with other factors together shaped conditions conducive to high rates of children admitted to CAS care.

Economic Shifts

From Independence to Welfare Dependence

The respondents identified unemployment and welfare dependence as a major factor of breakdown in the communities. The decline of the traditional economy, unemployment and welfare dependence are intricately connected and preceded the transition to the waged economy.

Indian Affairs archival material contained a summated yearly report of the welfare expenditures from 1961 to 1965 of the Fort Frances office. It also contained monthly reports for most of the months of those years of the welfare expenditures from December 1968 to 1974. From this material, I added the total reported welfare expenditures for the year, computed a monthly average and made a yearly estimate of expenditures for each community. I took the 1969 mid point population for each community to yield an average annual per

capita welfare income for each community for each year from 1961 to 1974. This information is reported in Table 9.2¹⁸ and is plotted in Figure 9.1 for the five communities identified in Chapter 8. The rank order of the communities as far as welfare costs were concerned in 1961 and 1974 are shown in Table 9.3.

The data shows sizable increases in the welfare income in the 1960s. There were wide variations among communities and the variations changed during the period. In 1961, the community with the highest per capita (Big Island) was over 7 times that of the lowest (Red Gut). In 1974, the highest per capita (Big Island) was 16 times the lowest (Lac LaCroix). In 1961 Big Island welfare income averaged 3.4 times that of Seine River. In 1974 it was 2.7 times that of Seine River and had dropped to 5.1 times that of Red Gut. Some of the rise in absolute costs were due to a 1965 decision of IAB to equalize federal and provincial welfare rates. According to IAB documents, this accounts for only 50 percent of the rise in the 1965-1966 year.¹⁹ The rise in relative costs appear to be due to worsening abilities of the communities to support themselves from traditional pursuits and even seasonal employment.

Table 9.2 — Annual Per Capita Welfare Income By Indian First Nation Community in Rainy River District, 1961-1969 and 1970 - 1974[ⓐ]

Community	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
	(\$)										
Big Island	6.80	39.00	52.62	107.31	99.89	201.89	233.64	352	149.99	212.37	476.2
Big Grassy	5.87	6.30	20.52	41.54	61.94	91.06	172.13	143	264.60	130.49	205.59
Couchiching*						55.35	76.58	106	60.90	67.58	127.60
Lac La Croix	2.87	3.04	3.46	4.81	11.16	16.21	15.32	15	26.44	32.82	28.61
Manitou Rapids	6.76	22.82	21.07	25.69	26.80	48.78	109.45	108	90.47	34.9	54.97
Naicatchewenin	2.30	3.95	1.94	13.16	25.27	63.57	51.28	54	35.47	103.46	127.54
Nickouse-menecaning	.92	4.74	6.24	11.35	11.40	48.78	66.01	92	44.45	52.51	91.64
Ojibways of Onegaming	1.73	9.28	12.54	33.92	23.34	59.52	52.14	51	83.38	103.24	121.94
Seine River	1.98	6.25	8.85	15.22	20.01	52.14	101.74	108	92.16	84.31	177.7
Stangecoming**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

ⓐ Based on estimated populations from 1961, 1966, 1971. 1969-1974 data obtained from monthly reports where all 12 months not reported, yearly averages estimated using monthly averages for available monthly data.

* Not found for 1961-1965

** Population figures not available to calculate per capita figure.

Source: Calculated from Indian Affairs Archival data, NAC, RG10, Vol 69, File 485/29-1 part 2




Table 9.3- Rank Order of Annual Per Capita Welfare Costs in Rainy River First Nations Comparing 1961 and 1974

1964	\$ Costs	1974	\$ Costs
Big Island	6.80	Big Island	476.20
Manitou Rapids	6.76	Big Grassy	205.59
Big Grassy	5.87	Seine River	177.70
Lac LaCroix	2.87	Couchiching	127.60
Naicatchewenin	2.30	Sabaskong	121.94
Seine River	1.98	Naicatchewenin	121.54
Sabaskong	1.73	Red Gut	91.64
Red Gut	.92	Manitou Rapids	54.90
Couchiching (no data)		Lac LaCroix	28.61

Source: Table 9.2

In 1978 the IWA evaluation²⁰ reported that Big Island had the highest welfare dependence of all Ontario communities with 65 percent of the population dependent on social assistance. In comparison, in the Six Nations reserve near Brantford only 3 percent were on welfare.²¹ The evaluation reported the averages for five other areas for 1979. I list them here for comparison:

- * Treaty 3 District which includes all Rainy River District and some Kenora District communities - \$251.70;
- * Treaty 9, communities in the far Northwestern and Northeastern Ontario - \$393.85;
- * Union of Ontario Indians, central Ontario - 249.70;
- * Allied Iroquois and Algonquin Indians - \$156.62; and
- * Unaffiliated - \$101.62.²²

The average for Rainy River District in 1974 was \$156.20. I was unable to locate figures for the Rainy River communities for 1979 to compare their per capita rates with other areas. However, the figures illustrate wide variations within areas, between areas and over time in Ontario's First Nation communities. Some communities in the northern part of the province were largely dependent on welfare income.

As a group the five communities with the highest rates of child admissions had higher per capita welfare rates than those which had low rates. Otherwise there is no distinct pattern within the individual communities

associating increased welfare dependency to increased admissions of children to the care of the CAS.

Seine River, the community with the highest rates of children in care had lower welfare expenditures than Big Grassy and Big Island. Seine River had lower expenditures than Manitou Rapids in the early 1960s, higher after 1969 and lower in 1972. The years from 1968 were years of increased violence and death from alcohol abuse in Seine River. In examining the admissions for those communities for each year until 1969 (Table 8.4) both were moderate each year. Manitou Rapids is close to Emo and Fort Frances and would have had potentially better employment opportunities than the people of Seine River which did not have road access to other community until 1964. Seine River still had the benefit of employment in pulp cutting possibly serving as a protection against welfare dependence. There appears to be only a gradual rise in welfare expenditures after the opening of the road to Seine River in 1964. The increase was less than the communities where there was little work, namely Big Grassy and Big Island, and not much larger than Couchiching which had higher employment opportunities and lower admission to care rates.

The drop in the per capita welfare rate in 1972 in Manitou Rapids after the opening of the saw mill is interesting. In 1974, Manitou Rapids was the only community which had a lower dependence on welfare than in 1970. In 1974 the per capita rate for Manitou was only 8 times the 1961 rate, compared to Big Grassy, Big Island, and Seine River which were 34, 70 and 89 times greater than their 1961 rates respectively. By 1974 the Band Council was

concerned about new social problems accompanying the change. The Band wrote to the Department of Indian Affairs,

The Band is attempting to solve unemployment problems with the development of a sawmill and logging operation over the past three years which has resulted in steady employment for the majority of the reserve residents. During this period the efforts of the community have been directed to the development of this sawmill which, in some ways, has resulted in the creation of social problems on the reserve. In addition to this we have accepted a community plan which has resulted in our living in closer proximity to each other than in the past which tends to compound the problem.....The funds which are available through the community affairs program are insufficient to provide us with the necessary services of water and sanitation which are associated with this style of living. We would ask that consideration be given to additional funds being made available so that we can have these necessary services whereby we can enjoy the style of life which is common to other Canadian people.²³

Although the social problems are not specified, the high CAS admissions were probably one of the social problems noted from 1971 to 1974. The admissions to care jumped from one in 1970 to twelve in 1971 remaining high until 1974 (Table 8.4). The year 1971 was the first year there was no increase in welfare for that, or any other community. "No increase" could be interpreted as a de facto drop in welfare dependency if rate hikes and population increases are taken into consideration. Welfare dependency dropped in 1972 but the rate of children in care did not.

Why would seeming prosperity, better housing and a move to collective independence accompany an increase in admissions to care? I consulted both a Labrador study and the informant from the community on this question. A mid 1960s study of the Naskapi Indians of Labrador demonstrated a comparable phenomenon. The Naskapi alternated between in the winter living

as nomadic hunters and in the summer as wage earning fishermen. In the winter they were described as desperately poor but shared their food willingly among each other and adhered to traditional social organizations. In the summer they earned well on the coastal area, however, the sharing stopped and many inter-familial arguments erupted. The investigators concluded that in the winter the activity itself was of primary importance while in the coastal area the material gains were primary and the activity was the means to this end only. The study concluded that the two worlds offered the Naskapi the chance to realize their dual values of both sharing and having. The coastal activities had little social and ritual meaning for the Naskapi and therefore the cultural world lacked meaning. There are parallel but even more dramatic changes occurring today with major land claim settlements and self-government. In the early 1980s, the community of Hobbema in Northern Alberta received millions of dollars in oil revenues from its traditional lands. The money was distributed among the Band members. For several years thereafter, the community experienced a rash of suicides, alcoholism and family violence.²⁴

The informant from Manitou believes that the new found monetary wealth influenced the people to abuse alcohol. She believes that CAS availability induced irresponsibility. "Someone else can look after them!" was the attitude. Neighbours were fearful of taking the children and so would call the CAS. As in Labrador, less sharing and less use of traditional and natural ways of providing protection for children followed the sudden switch to full

employment of a wage economy. The Band Council identified closer proximity of houses as an issue. The farmers or trappers would have been accustomed to space and independence. The new arrangements would produce tension tantamount to the dynamics observed when groups are relocated.²⁵ Kinship groupings could also be lost or antagonistic families forced into close contact. Either of these situations would result in extended families being less able to protect neglected children. As in Grassy Narrows after its relocation, community members began reporting incidents of their neighbours neglect to the CAS.²⁶ Sudden change for these communities, from non-Indian perspectives for the better, produced turmoil not dissimilar to that produced by relocation.

Welfare Availability and the Demise of Traditional Pursuits

The welfare increase in Rainy River District can be placed in perspective to information from the more northerly but similar Sioux Lookout District. Costs in 1965 jumped 85 percent in this District. Although DIAND officials estimated that fifty percent of these costs were a result of the rate adjustment, the Department also recognized other factors. Based on an average family size of five, the average family income from earnings was \$652. For the same year, the average annual family income from welfare was \$74.26 per capita or \$371.30.²⁷ Welfare dependence in the area was lower than Rainy River and Ontario overall and income from working was more lucrative. Fishing, trapping, mining, pulp logging and tourism were the many sources of employment. It is not known whether full wage employment was possible. It

is known, however, that the Northern Ojibwa were fishing and trapping less, and welfare was the replacement.

The Northern Ojibwa of Sioux Lookout District had been self-sufficient in fur trade with the Europeans for several centuries. By the 20th Century trapping was less lucrative and fewer families could rely on this means of income.²⁸ An Indian Affairs report concerning New Osnaburgh provides insight into the process by which it replaced the traditional economy.²⁹ The welfare income for New Osnaburg from 1961 to 1965 is shown in Table 9.4. The per capita welfare income is low in comparison to that of Rainy River District.

DIAND reported that the 1965 figure of \$76.04 represented 49 percent of the population in receipt of welfare. This indicates that the per capita rates for Big Island (\$100) and Big Grassy (\$62) probably represented, respectively, more and less than 49 percent of the populations in receipt of welfare in the years before 1965. In New Osnaburgh, welfare assistance doubled between the time of its relocation and 1964, and doubled again with the rate adjustment in 1965. Big Island's rate went up at least 14 times between the relocation and 1965.

In the same DIAND report, the rationale for the increase in welfare dependence in light of an existing traditional economy and employment opportunities is presented. Earning a living as a lone trapper or commercial fisherman and maintaining family life was not compatible with educating children in the Day Schools. In a 1966 meeting between the Band and DIAND,

Table 9.4 - Total Welfare Income and Per Capita Income for New Osnaburgh,*
1961-1962 to 1965-1966.

Year	Total Welfare Income	Per Capita
1961-62	\$ 6,500	\$18.31
1962-63	\$ 8,200	\$23.09
1963-64	\$12,000	\$33.80
1964-65	\$13,000	\$36.62
1965-66	\$27,000	\$76.06

*Based on a population figure of 355.

Source: NAC, RG 10, Acc.84-85/112, Vol. 104, file 494/42-2 part 1, Welfare of Indians Sioux Lookout, Memo from Regional Supervisor of Social Programs to Regional Superintendent of Development, Ontario, 12 December 1966.

the former asked the latter for assurance that families would receive a welfare allowance while trappers were away. DIAND's response is recorded is in the following excerpts from the minutes of the meeting:

The men wanted assurance that families would receive partial assistance while they were off on traplines, where it was necessary because of children attending school. These requests were discussed and it was agreed that partial assistance would be granted but only where there were children of the family in school, that they were in regular attendance, and the husband or head of the family was out trapping for a considerable period -- not just out for a snowshoe hike. It was pointed out that everyone must take advantage of available fur; those that were not (unless certified by a medical authority as unfit) would not be eligible for assistance.³⁰

The report explained how the Superintendent had been unable to enforce his wishes. The Regional Office in Ottawa had stated,

It is our responsibility to issue welfare assistance where the need exists, regardless of whether the Indian is willing to work or otherwise.³¹

The report continued,

The pressure is still heavy on the present staff to be even more lenient than in the past with respect to welfare assistance. The line of least resistance, in these areas where living standards are so low, is to grant assistance, when requested, with few exceptions. This attitude is made almost mandatory by the support being given to the Indian people by the Federal Member for the riding.³²

Apparently, New Osnaburgh residents who were denied welfare by the local office complained to the Member of Parliament, who in turn sought an explanation from the local agent. Thereafter DIAND granted almost all requests for welfare regardless of employability. At work were perceptions of Indian poverty and political pressure. DIAND did agree to pay a foster care rate for school-aged children left behind in the settlements to facilitate others participating in family trapping. This appears to have assisted some people to continue the venture. One woman raised in New Osnaburgh stated that trapping for several months in the spring and fall remained viable in New Osnaburgh as a supplement to welfare until the mid 1970s. Successful fall trapping meant that families enjoyed a prosperous Christmas season. Whole families went trapping together and the Band attempted to accommodate the school year to trapping seasons. Animal rights movements pushed fur prices so low eventually that breaking even was impossible. One important family ritual facilitating the dual values of sharing and having was extinguished.

Indian Affairs Fort Frances agency documented that it administered in 1968 a total of \$50,296 in welfare assistance to Rainy River Bands with total populations of 1442 (\$35 per capita average). It estimated that if all employable persons were working (full employment), only \$1,845 in welfare

would have been issued (\$1.28 per capita).³³ Most of the communities however had little employment. The decline in the munificence of the traditional economy, the extension of welfare services and the introduction of Day School education combined to place considerable stress on Northern Ojibwa lifestyle and culture.

All the communities with high numbers of children admitted to care depended excessively on welfare. There is no simple relationship between increased welfare dependence and rising rates of children-in-care in these communities, however. In fact when Manitou Rapids began to shake its dependency, child-in-care rates rose. Seine River had a lower welfare dependency than some other communities but the highest child-in-care rates. Welfare dependence is a confounding factor in the presence of other factors. For example, education became a hinderance to maintaining the traditional economy. Another factor was the economic vacuum into which communities fell when the traditional pursuits desisted. In the presence of sudden welfare dependence or sudden wage economy, the risk of child admissions to care increased.

Couchiching's experience is an example of a community with a gradual transition to a wage economy. People had a choice of traditional self-employed pursuits, traditional waged work (guiding) or waged employment (tourism or logging). Although welfare dependence was significant, the demise of trapping was not met with only that welfare alternative.

Relocation and Economic Change

The decline in fur prices and IAB's attempt to introduce education and employment prospects stimulated Indian Affairs Branch to relocate many Indian communities in the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and the northern parts of the provinces.³⁴ Increasing shortages of food and the need for easier distribution of relief were likely incentives for trapping families to agree to live in permanent settlements.³⁵ To what extent the Native people were involved in the relocation schemes is not known. Some relocations are said to have been forced, to make way for megaprojects. Others state that IAB held the "carrot" of services to them to obtain their agreement.

The Grassy Narrows documentation is the most well known case of the effects of relocation on Indian communities. Anastasia Shkilnyk reports that the Indian Affairs office in Kenora had no record of the 1962 move of the reserve. She states that the move was forced.³⁶ Vecsey reports that at the time of the move, no religious leader existed who could consult the spirits about the advisability of the move.³⁷ Seemingly the people were uninformed about the move. The documentation of the social disintegration that followed is dramatic. Child welfare problems were just one of many. In 1977, 56 children from the community were admitted to the care of the Kenora CAS, the highest rate in the Kenora District.³⁸ The single point rate in January 1977 for children in care from Grassy Narrows was 16.8 percent of the child population.

The community of New Osnaburgh, also moved in the 1960s, is another case. In November 1977, 10 percent of its children were in care.³⁹ The community attributes its difficulties with alcohol and violence to its forced relocation which occurred gradually from 1960 to 1963.⁴⁰ Others have debated the importance of relocation on Grassy Narrows arguing that other communities have successfully relocated and that the demise of the commercial fishing economy by mercury poisoning of the English-Wabigoon River system was more significant.⁴¹ The combined effect of the move and loss of economic base within a decade is associated with many problems in Grassy Narrows.

Shkilnyk noted in the Grassy Narrows study that its residents abandoned their tradition of sharing and helping, "abdicated to the very institutions that maintain their dependence on external sources of life support."⁴² This meant that in times when children might require protection, neighbours did not provide care. Instead they would call the Children's Aid Society.

A seminal account of the effects of forced relocation is a 20 year study of the Gwembe people of Zambia. Scudder and Colson note multidimensional stress characterized by the breaking of kinship and friendship groupings, the demise of spiritual rituals which were tied to the locality, the loss of status of the leaders and quarrels over land ownership. The theory formulated is that relocated communities behave as closed systems. To cope with the stress, they resist any change following relocation clinging to familiar people and

institutions.⁴³ The effect is not different from the effects on the Naskapi moving between traditional and waged work described earlier by Henrikson.

The study of three Cree communities of Northern Manitoba relocated in 1960 for hydro development is close to the Ojibwa situation. The communities allegedly showed no social problems in the early 1960s. Loney noted that a decade following relocation, health standards declined, alcohol abuse became widespread, crime increased, and welfare became the predominant form of income. The harvest of wild meat went from over one hundred thousand pounds in 1961 to 7,000 in 1965 indicating a breaking down of the traditional economy.⁴⁴ Recently a Winnipeg newspaper reported from one of those communities, 130 of its 450 children were in foster care. Of this number only 25 were in reserve homes. In 50 cases, the reason for care was alcohol or solvent abuse and in 70 cases, "neglect or lack of parenting."⁴⁵

In this investigation, Native people said that relocation from their traditional lands was one of the most traumatic things that could have occurred. One respondent described it as tantamount to rape. From my own experience of discussing this issue with Native people, I have concluded that the special relationship to the land is one that has no analogy in non-Aboriginal cultures, nor is it one we can fully appreciate or describe.

The communities of Manitou Rapids and Big Island were both relocated but at different times and under different circumstances. The variant child welfare data reflects these differences.

The amalgamation in 1917 of several Bands into the Manitou Rapids Band was a result of Treaty negotiations and apparently voluntary. Unlike Grassy Narrows when it moved, the traditional religion of Manitou was still strong in 1917.⁴⁶ Also, the relocation preceded the introduction of farming, a means of independent support. Until the second War the economy remained mixed with some families continuing their winter trapping in small family groups and returning to the main community for the traditional summer activities of celebrations, trading of furs and schooling for the children.⁴⁷ According to the informant for the community, the mixed economy of agriculture and hunting and gathering assisted the community to survive the pre World War II and Depression years. Welfare subsidies did not exist. The relocation, because of its timing, was not associated with hunger, dependence and alcohol abuse as in Grassy Narrows.

Manitou Rapids also had a low adoption rate. The RRCAS social workers assigned to the community in the early 1970s stated that there was family support in the community which made the return of foster children to the community possible. In contrast, fewer extended family members were available in Big Island to provide support according to this same worker.⁴⁸ As reported in Table 8.1, there had been a seventy five percent migrations out of Big Island Band by 1985 (as opposed to Manitou Rapids' 60 percent). The apparent response in Big Island to the effects of the vacuum left by relocation and unemployment was to go elsewhere. Many of those who stayed had difficulties with alcohol. The CAS worker for the reserve reported that the few

non-drinking Native homes on the reserve were used as foster homes and were always full in the 1970s.⁴⁹

The timing of relocation is important and pertains to other socio-economic factors. Big Island relocated to a place where the only means of support was welfare. When Manitou Rapids relocated, welfare was not an option. Farming was introduced and fishing and trapping continued, providing independence to the community. Manitou Rapids' access to the road came two decades later. Conceivably there was a means to obtain alcohol through bootleggers and easy travel to the United States. However, both means would be very expensive and one would need transportation. At the time of relocation, it was a time of relative cultural cohesion and less vulnerability to the destruction of alcohol, which nevertheless, was difficult and expensive to obtain legally or otherwise.

Big Island had little access to alcohol before its relocation because of high costs of transportation and more community controls on alcohol consumption. Unlike Manitou Rapids, however, the trauma of relocation and the hopelessness engendered by the lack of a means of economic support would render the Big Island people vulnerable to the sudden, easy availability of alcohol.

Whether the trauma of relocation or the loss of means of support is the cause of the problems of these communities, the effects were an increase in alcohol abuse and a decrease in the ability to utilize natural helping systems.

Alcohol Abuse

The susceptibility of Native people to alcohol abuse has been debated at length. Religious, social, economic and physiological reasons have been proposed. Culture-specific reasons, depression, and grief from earlier and current losses are plausible causes of alcohol abuse. They all are applicable to the Rainy River First Nations.

Dailey hypothesized that during the initial years of contact with the European traders alcohol was in demand for the rapid dream states it induced. Dream states were important in the Aboriginal religions. Dailey also saw alcohol consumption as a defensive force against the threat to community cohesiveness of Christian conversion. Non-Christian Indians, while intoxicated, were alleged to murder Christian Indians as a way of lashing out at the white intruders.⁵⁰

Alcohol abuse by Native Americans has been difficult to define and understand. One estimate is that 60 percent of American Indians abstain from alcohol as opposed to 30 percent of non-Indians.⁵¹ The popular myth has been that Indians have an uncontrolled desire for alcohol and exhibit uncontrolled behaviour under its influence. The opposite school of thought is that "alcoholism" in Indians is non-existent because Indian alcohol abuse does not fit the common criteria for non-Indians. Joy Leland has argued that there is insufficient evidence to support either theory and that studies taking an emic view accounting for culture and colonization are needed.⁵²

The existence of a physiological susceptibility to alcohol has been proposed. Biochemist Lillian Dyck discusses this possibility concluding that there is no basis at this time to show any biological predisposition.⁵³ Studies on some populations have demonstrated some genetic factors in alcoholism. Other studies show a tendency for members of the Mongoloid race to be deficient in an enzyme which metabolizes alcohol, the deficiency of which causes very unpleasant sensations. Hence, the physiology factor would act as a deterrent to alcoholism. One study reported by Dyck, showed no difference in the existence of this enzyme between New Mexican Indians and Caucasians. If the Ojibwa did have a genetic predisposition to alcohol, the smaller range of marriage partners in small Ojibwa societies would increase the genetic role in alcoholism.

A Mohawk psychiatrist described how cultural traits are important. The norm of restraining from demonstrating strong or violent feelings was necessary in the harsh environment and the close living conditions of the Woodland Indians. Today, the hostility engendered by the frustrations of daily living and distant bureaucracies could explode under the influence of alcohol. The object of the anger is unspecific. Often they themselves or intimates are the victims of the outburst.⁵⁴

Other writers have noted the widespread incidence of depression among Native people, a precursor to alcoholism.⁵⁵ The recent revelations about residential school abuse and a report by the Ontario Native Women's Association that eight out of ten Aboriginal Women have been abused or

assaulted, would be an indication of widespread depression among Native people.⁵⁶ In a study of psychiatric services to the James Bay Cree, the authors found that 44 percent of the persons referred to a psychiatric service were depressed and suffering from a grief reaction.⁵⁷ One well known Ojibwa elder, a recovered alcoholic and counsellor writes,

Over the years, as I listened to close to two thousand native patients share their inner problems and hurts, I began to see a pattern. Almost everyone was bothered by the same two problems -- unfinished grieving and separation from their parents during childhood or teenage years.⁵⁸

The Indian people of the Rainy River District have suffered multiple losses: loss of parents in early childhood, loss of loved ones from disease before World War II, and deaths from accidents, drowning and fires associated with living conditions in sub Arctic conditions and substandard housing.

Seine River suffered at least 31 alcohol-related deaths between 1968 and 1978. The average age of the victims was 26. Six were infants. In a community with a population of 170, the loss of almost 20 percent of one's family or friends has profound implications. One resident who was one of 10 boys in a sibline of 15, reported that he is the only male left in the family. All the others died for alcohol-related reasons. Whilst community members report that Big Island and Big Grassy are recovering from alcohol abuse with the advent of new economic opportunities, Seine River still has serious problems. Given the pandemic grief that would exist, this is not surprising.

There were 14 suicides among residents of Rainy River District First Nations between 1975 and 1980, a rate of 61.7 per 100,000.⁵⁹ This is over four

times the Canadian rate, two and a half times the Ontario Indian and Inuit rate, and almost double the Canadian Indian and Inuit rate.⁶⁰ In at least half of the suicides, the victim used alcohol. The victims came from eight of the ten communities with five from one community.⁶¹ Three of the 14 victims were under the age of 16.⁶² I was unable to locate the researcher in that study to confirm which community had the five suicides. One informant from Seine River, however, believes it was her community. One estimate states that about 25 percent of Indian deaths reported as accidental were actually suicides.⁶³

Any one of the explanations for alcohol abuse would explain the high abuse rate in the Rainy River communities.

The alcohol-related deaths from violence would increase the despair and depression perpetuating the abuse. Its dependency makes addressing the causes impossible. The Native people in the District forthrightly state that alcohol is an impediment to their well-being. This was stated in the fur trading days when their leaders asked white traders not to trade spirits for furs. It was said in 1956 when a few voices of dissent at the hearings of the Select Committee voted against the change. It was said in 1977 by Maria Kwandibens of New Osnaburgh who pleaded for a ban on alcohol to her people to prevent more child deaths. In God's Lake Narrows Manitoba, it has claimed 12 lives this year despite a community ban on its use.⁶⁴

Non-Indian interests to preserve the fur trade in 1836 lead to discriminating laws forbidding Status Indians full access to alcohol. Non-Indian interests to make Indians "equal" through equal laws facilitated the

reversal of the laws. Unfortunately, the change in law did not include comparable medical and other support services to deal with the deleterious effects. Not until 1969 was the first Native alcohol treatment centre in Canada opened.⁶⁵ For Rainy River District residents, alcohol treatment became available in 1969, but only from a psychiatric hospital five hours' drive from home.

Not all Native people believe that excessive drinking was for the reasons cited. One woman talked about the mining town to which her trapper parents moved when fur prices dropped in the 1950s. She believed it was just a way of having a good time with something new in their lives.⁶⁶ Some Native people I interviewed believed that the many centuries of European conditioning to alcohol contrasted to its relative newness to them, accounts for differences in the reaction to alcohol. Others have definitive opinions about alcohol. One respondent reported that his father, raised in a traditional way to respect the elders' word, adhered to everything his own mother told him with the exception of her request that he not drink alcohol. One resident of Grassy Narrows described the effects of alcohol on his people as a poison stronger than the love one has for one's children.⁶⁷ Today, many communities have by-laws forbidding alcohol within their boundaries. Many Native people categorically reject that alcohol has any place in their cultural or personal lives. Regardless of the reasons for alcohol abuse, most Indian people would agree that it has been an impediment to dealing with deeper issues. As Martin Tuesday says, alcohol is an Oh-je-e-tim, and just should not be. This feeling is expressed in

a poster produced by the National Native Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program the caption for which is large letters stating simply, "Drinking is Not Indian."⁶⁸

Just as the Indian people cite alcohol as a major destructive force, the RRCAS workers overwhelmingly stated that it was the precipitating event in the admission of children to care. Usually, the situation to which they responded was one of children left alone in dangerous conditions while the parent were drinking. Leaving children alone in the North is far more a threat to life and safety than in an urban setting. The abuse of alcohol is not the cause of situations leading to escalating Indian children in care. It was only the precipitating event of many underlying causes. In the 1960s CAS workers dealt only with the symptoms of the underlying causes which only now are being uncovered, and which challenge Native child welfare agencies to address.

THE STRESS OF SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND COMMUNITY VARIATIONS IN CHILD WELFARE DATA

Each stressor affected each community differently. This section summarizes their interaction and how in each community they affected admissions to care.

Two informants described the generation born in the decade or two preceding World War II as the critical link to later problems. The members of the critical generation would now be aged 60 to 75. They were the first to suspend traditional pursuits, to use alcohol and to lose the Ojibway language. Unlike their offspring, however, this generation both as children and as young

parents in the 1940s and 1950s were protected by the cultural safety net of their parents. Their parents were not subjected to conversion from their religion, nor were they subjected to compulsory residential school attendance. They had almost no government means of support but had the means to feed themselves from their own efforts off the land. Alcohol was less available to them as young parents and its use was usually confined to areas outside the reserves. The cultural value of keeping family together was stronger because the older members of the extended family itself were stronger.

When the members of this critical generation reached the 1960s, it felt the impact of residential schools, relocation and the changing economy. Deprived of a normal childhood by any culture's standards, they had no role models of parental behaviour to emulate. The damage to self-esteem would be extensive. As parents they would have great difficulty. If they were in the 40 to 60 age group in the 1960s they may have found themselves caring for the children of their children who were experiencing the effects of all the factors and expressing it through alcohol abuse.

By the 1960s, the fabric of the cultural safety net was weakened and in some cases broken by forced change, in particular by alcohol abuse. The presence of government services and support in 1965 made the relinquishment of traditional roles easier. The more time that had passed from the end of World War II the farther grandparents and parents were from the cultural safety net that absorbed the effects of change. Community cohesion lessened. Crises in the members of this generation and their children, some of whom

would now have their own children, lead to situations where their children would be brought to the attention of the CAS. A weakened extended family system and a weakened respect for elders broke under the strain of alcohol abuse. The loss of communal sharing and helping at a time when it needed it most lead to inabilities of communities to care for their own children requiring protection .

I spoke with two persons, both about 65 years of age, who had attempted to care for their daughter's children in the 1960s under the supervision of the RRCAS. In both cases these grandmothers had been to residential school and in one case only the daughter. Their daughters, both chronic alcohol abusers, would frequently take the children from their care without permission to dangerous situations. The grandparents eventually asked the CAS to take the children believing they would be safer there. Conceivably, with earlier generations the elders carried more authority to care for the children and the children would respect the arrangement. The grandparents of the 1960s also attended the schools and they too had lost much. The grandparents might have been more steadfast in their determination to keep the children had their cultural roots not been shaken. Community controls and support might also have been stronger. Indeed, even if child welfare problems had existed relinquishment of the children to CAS was not an option. Like welfare and education, CAS availability was just one of the new conditions which facilitated relinquishment of traditional practices.

The Communities

Seine River moved gradually to the wage economy before the 1960s with the logging operations. Its welfare rate was moderate compared to the other communities. The generation who were the parents in the 1960s had attended residential schools. The road access to the community and the sudden access to alcohol were the immediate precursor to high rates of children in care. The ability of the extended network to cushion child welfare problems was seriously eroded.

Big Grassy had a very high welfare dependency rate, earlier experiences with residential schools than Seine River, and earlier, easy availability to alcohol. The parents at the upper end of their child bearing years in the 1960s had attended residential schools in the 1940s but many of the younger parents had not. There were few jobs. Subsistence traditional economies were fading out and were replaced with welfare. The death of the cultural leader marked the temporary setting aside of cultural ways and a steady pattern of admissions to care in the subsequent years. Big Grassy's admissions rate was comparable to Seine River's. Big Grassy is recovering, however, and Seine River is in the beginning stages of recovery.⁶⁹ The differences appear to be in the timing and suddenness of the changes.

Big Island was unknown to the CAS as far as child apprehensions were concerned until a decade after its relocation. Many community members attended the residential schools before 1959 but thereafter the children attended the provincial school in Morson. Welfare dependency was the highest

of all reserve communities in Ontario. The community had sudden, easy access to alcohol in 1959, a similar situation to Seine River. Relocation and the sudden lack of independent income are the obvious stressors. The relocation could have shocked the community increasing its vulnerability to alcohol.

The effects of the community trauma do not appear to have had an impact on child admission rates until the 1970s. The child welfare rates were high but, as reported in Chapter 8, the rate was skewed by the admission of two large families of 6 and 9 children. With the one family of nine children, the agency had been giving intensive support to the single parent mother who was killed in an automobile accident. It is difficult to predict whether the children would have needed care had the mother lived. The child welfare problems of Big Island, although serious, were far less than Seine River or the other relocated communities described. There were few extended family members to draw on because of movement out of the community. It is difficult to say whether moving away was an unhealthy sign of broken kinship ties or a healthy sign of moving to better opportunities just as the Ojibwa had done traditionally in the hunting and gathering context. Although available foster homes in the community were full, these resources did exist. Unlike other relocated communities, the community appears to be recovering. The community moved back to its original site in 1982 and alcohol abuse has subsided.

Manitou Rapids relocated in 1917 apparently with its consent. In the years that followed, the subsistent economy of farming and the traditional

economy complemented community values of sharing. There was a Day School on the reserve in the 1930s which meant that the residential school was not the only means of obtaining non-Indian schooling. Welfare dependency was moderate in comparison to the other communities.

The specific stressor reported was the legalization of alcohol in 1951. Although people used alcohol before this it was by brewing one's own concoction or by obtaining it in the nearby United States. Admissions to care were steady in the early 1960s. The remarkable factor is the rise in rates after the introduction of almost full employment through a Band operated enterprise. The community, however, ultimately maintained its ability to care for most of its own children as only a few children were adopted out of the community. The elder respondent made observations about the existence of the CAS as an encouragement to consume alcohol. People knew that if they left the children alone they would be looked after, she stated. They must also have known that there was sufficient support in the community that the children would probably be returned. This is an interesting comment on dependency on government, not necessarily dependence on welfare.

Couchiching experienced the stress of all the factors but in moderation and gradually. Its residential school days ceased in 1949. Even so, the children who had attended had weekly contact with their families unlike the other communities. Two studies done recently on contact between adults and youth in an Ojibwa community gave interesting results. One study showed that there was almost five times as many hours contact per week in the 1930s between

Ojibwa children and their parents as in the 1980s.⁷⁰ The follow-up study found that the greater the contact for both groups, the less family dysfunction in terms of alcohol abuse and leaving children alone that existed. It also found there was less chance that the children would use alcohol or engage in delinquent behaviour.⁷¹

The contact, albeit minimal, between the Couchiching children of the 1930s and 1940s with their parents and elders might well have protected them from dysfunctional behaviour in the 1960s. The community had a gradual transition to a wage economy. There was diversity and choice between traditional pursuits, seasonal employment, and permanent jobs in Fort Frances. Access to alcohol availability was gradual although the effects of the law changes were cited as traumatic. Welfare dependency was moderate although considerable. The admission rate was the lowest of the five communities. The adoption rate was similar to Manitou Rapids which also experienced a gradual transition.

It would be valuable to conduct an extensive history of each community, detailed case histories and reasons for admissions. It would be equally valuable to study the histories of the communities which had low, or non-existent, rates of apprehensions to determine what kept them intact.

CONCLUSION

Admissions rates in Rainy River District indicated the breakdown of individual, family and community strengths. Adoptions rates indicate serious,

even permanent breakdown. No single factor alone predicts high rates for either.

The four stressors: residential schools, the move from traditional to wage or welfare economies, relocation and alcohol abuse, were associated differently for each community with high admission and adoption rates. The timing of the occurrence of each stressor and its interaction with other factors shaped how it contributed to cultural breakdown which leads to child neglect and CAS interventions.

Residential school influence was a precursor to longer term breakdown and was extreme in three of the five communities, less so in one, and minimal in another. Without the cultural destruction of the residential schools, the communities could have coped with the effects of the other factors. The move from a traditional economy to welfare or employment was associated with an increase in child-in-care rates. Relocation was associated with moves away from traditional economies often to welfare. Coupled with changing laws and increased access to alcohol, relocation increased the rates of children in care. In all five communities, alcohol abuse was the necessary precursor to high rates. Without alcohol, the other factors would not have created conditions leading to abandonment and neglect which alerted the CAS. The problem was circular. Alcohol abuse worsened the effects of other factors. Its dangers also affected community morale and abilities to use traditional caring systems. Until recently, alcohol has rendered it difficult to confront the distress created by residential schools and other factors.

The overall attribute and effect of the stressors are major social and economic change. The underlying factors making these changes major stressors are suddenness, the lack of an informed choice in the change, and the lack of alternatives to fill the void created by the change. In a pre-industrial society, the time frame of "sudden" could be different from "sudden" for industrial societies. In a society which had seen little change for centuries, change over one hundred years is sudden. Rapid changes occurred in Rainy River District First Nations communities between 1951 and 1965, less than a generation. This would be classed as a shock more than sudden change. The "degree of shock" might be a more appropriate term to describe and compare the changes to the communities.

Both communities which had the lowest adoption rates, Couchiching and Manitou Rapids, experienced a lower degree of shock and maintained more choices as they moved towards the wage economy. Manitou Rapids had the choice to send children to Day School or to residential school. Couchiching children in residential schools had the choice of access to their families on a weekly basis unlike the other communities where the children had no choice but to be cut off from their families.

In Seine River the sudden access of a traditional society to the industrial world and to alcohol predominated. In Big Island, the parents of the 1970s would have been teenagers when the community relocated. This sudden disruption combined with the hopelessness of no employment in young adulthood was a prescription for out-migration or alcoholism. In Big Grassy,

the parents of the 1960s were residential school graduates and many were severe alcohol abusers. The loss of the cultural symbols and the shock of the death of a cultural leader preceded high admission rates. The high admission and adoption rate reflects strong interaction of all the factors. In Manitou Rapids, the extended families of the 1960s and 1970s had lost fewer cultural ways through residential schools. Their relocation was not followed by destitution. They were able to cushion the effects of unemployment and alcoholism in their offspring by assisting with child protection when necessary. Couchiching had fewer, readily identifiable sudden stresses to contend with. It reported high alcoholism rates, however, and its welfare dependence was high despite its proximity to employment. Its slower acculturation rate and existence of choices kept the admission and adoption rate moderate despite its easy access to alcohol.

Without residential schools and relocation, alcohol use may have been solely recreational rather than an escape from misery. Without alcohol, communities could have dealt with the effects of the residential schools and relocation earlier. Residential schools and sudden change were *necessary but not sufficient* reasons for high rates of children in care and adoptions. Alcohol abuse was *necessary and sufficient* for high rates of children in care. On the other hand, it was a *necessary but insufficient* reason for high rates of adoption.

Education became compulsory in 1951 and all alcohol laws were equalized by 1956. Communities were relocated from 1959 to the early 1960s. Indian Affairs welfare payments were equalized with the provincial programs

in 1964. In 1965, the introduction of fully funded child welfare programs unequivocally legitimized and supported CAS interventions on reserves. While believing that the same services were necessary to make Indian people equal, policy makers did not account for grossly unequal problems resulting from inherent cultural differences and the effects of severe and sudden changes. The social, economic and cultural turmoil sparked alcohol abuse bringing neglect to the attention of the Children's Aid Society. A child welfare policy geared for the dominant cultural had been introduced. It was designed for a society on the verge of economic development not decline. It addressed this neglect in a way that, did not *cause* but *allowed* high numbers of Reserve Status Indian children to be in care.

In Part III, a number of themes identified in Part II reemerge in different forms. Lack of knowledge, misunderstanding or denigration of the Aboriginal culture by non-Indians are again evident. The provision of the same laws and policies in areas other than child welfare was proposed as the solution. Again, the move to deliver the programs, namely education, through the same channels as others was prominent. The effects of placing education in provincial channels emerge but with less significance than the earlier policy of channelling education through the churches. The same policies did not create the same programs or results. The population and its needs were different from the population for which they were created. How the intermediaries addressed these new problems in the subject of Part IV.

Endnotes to Chapter 9

1. No respondent made a personal disclosures of sexual victimization to me. One respondent did refer to sexual abuse on between older and younger children as a result of poor supervision in the dormitories.
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 9. Erik Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968)
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 11. Kirkness, 448-449.
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 14. Ibid.
 15. Quote of Simon Fobister, Ibid.
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IV

**THE CHILDRENS AID EXPERIENCE
AND INCREASING RATES OF
INDIAN CHILDREN IN CARE**

THE CONTEXT OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICE ADMINISTRATION 1940-1966

In Part III, I examine the experience of Children's Aid Society services providers in the North during the time of escalating rates of Indian children in care. In the criticisms of the system child welfare workers have not presented their perspectives. In this Part, I present accounts of CAS workers in the north and how agencies and staff attempted to accommodate their practice in an unsupportive environment.

As I have done in other parts of this thesis, I include information from Rainy River and Kenora Districts. Additional information from KCAS is included because it illustrates in the extreme the difficulties faced by agencies serving Native communities. The Kenora and Rainy River Districts are similar but the agencies differ. The KCAS services 37 Northern Ojibwa communities, and had even greater numbers of Indian children in care in the 1960s. The problems in Kenora were more severe. The District spans 300,000 square kilometres and the agency has had severe staffing and administrative difficulties which are described in detail in Chapter 11.

In 1977, 18 percent of all the Native children in care in Ontario were in Kenora CAS's care.¹ The efforts of this chronically troubled agency to provide child welfare services to Native people are important to report. The KCAS represents an ultimate example of the problems encountered by mainstream agencies in the 1960s and 1970s in addressing Indian child welfare. By its

extreme conditions and problems, its story provides insights into the difficulties in addressing the disproportionate rates of RSI children in care in the early and middle years of service extension.

In this first chapter, I present the context against which CAS programs developed in the years before World War II until 1966.

CHILDRENS AID SOCIETIES, 1940-1956

Children's Aid Societies were established in Ontario at the turn of the century as private charities under elected voluntary boards mandated by provincial legislation. Initially all services were voluntary including foster care. In 1927 the province mandated the municipalities to pay child-in-care per diem rates.² Today most provinces deliver child welfare services directly. Ontario's Children's Aid Societies are unusual in that they are privately run organizations carrying a legal mandate that is not dissimilar at time to that of the police, with even more powers. Under child welfare legislation a CAS worker who suspects a child requires immediate protection may take, without warrant or consent, custody of the child and hold the child in a "place of safety."³ A CAS worker may do so using force if necessary and hold the child up to five days without a court hearing.⁴ During the time period of this study, the child welfare authority could hold the child for up to ten days.⁵ CASs are now described as Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations

(QUANGOS).⁶ Their position remains unusual with privately elected boards mandated to administer and supervise officers of the law.

Until the 1960s, the provincial government took a hands-off approach to CASs. In the 1940s, the Child Welfare Branch of the Department of Public Welfare was little more than a record keeping operation. During World War II, it was preoccupied with the settlement of the British War children whom Canadian families were fostering.⁷ Other duties of CASs during the 1940s consisted of unmarried parent work, supervision of soldier's families, adoptions, support for single parent families, and foster care for children of parents who were unable to provide for them.⁸

There was little government assistance for CASs prior to 1948. Societies had little accountability to the department of Public Welfare. Although there was no defined concept of "the best interests of the child" per se, the basic belief was that taking children into care was usually not in their best interest except in exceptional circumstances. Caseloads were high in agencies serving rural areas. In Brockville CAS for example, five social workers served 800 families, most of whom were in rural areas.⁹ The workload implication makes it unlikely that CASs took children into foster care unless danger to life were imminent or there was no one else to care for an abandoned child.

CASs took an equally distant approach to Native clientele as DPW did to the CASs. In 1951, the federal Indian Act was amended, spelling out that provincial law was applicable on Indian reserves.¹⁰ After that, CASs could

enter reserves but in Kenora and Rainy River Districts they did not do so unless it was considered a severe emergency involving life or death. Although IAB reimbursed CASs for child care costs, there was no agreement covering related costs such as travel. Not only were costs a consideration, but many CAS staff stated that they defined Native standards of child care as a matter of life-style differences.

The Rainy River Children's Aid Society¹¹

Before 1924, all child welfare work in the District was carried out by volunteers under an Board but was supported by an autonomous Board. That year the Department of Public Welfare appointed one of the Board members, Mr. Alexander MacKenzie, to be the agency's first paid Local Superintendent. A letter from the provincial Superintendent, J.J. Kelso made it clear that as little money as possible was to be spent on children in care. As a one person operation, MacKenzie performed all child welfare duties by himself. The Board did all administrative work. In 1933, the agency survived on a grant of \$1,940 from the province and \$920 payment from the municipalities for children in care costs.¹² In 1934, the DPW decided to dispense with MacKenzie's salary and to serve the District from Port Arthur (now Thunder Bay) instead, 350 km to the east.

In 1935, even minimal coverage of the District would be impossible. Winters in Northwestern Ontario are inhospitable, harsh and long. They

extend from about late October until late March. Blizzards and temperatures drop as low as minus 40 degrees Centigrade make winter travel dangerous. In 1935 the only means of transportation between Port Arthur and Fort William was train. Even when interpreted within the context of the era, such a decision to serve the District out of Port Arthur is little short of insensitive.¹³

The Board decided to incorporate as a charitable organization and raise its own funds rather than be served from Port Arthur. It supported itself from a minimal government grant (\$100 in 1937) and charitable donations. In 1936, Mr. MacKenzie died and another board member, Mrs. Florence Tibbets, took his place. In her first year she accomplished the following: placed 61 children in foster homes, made 184 home visits, conducted 198 office interviews, made 6 court appearances, wrote 233 letters and travelled 4,368 miles!¹⁴ Although, the Child Protection Act of 1927 required municipalities to pay for the maintenance of children in foster care, the RRCAS attempted to adhere to the early philosophy of the child welfare movement to place children with relatives or in free homes. The voluntary spirit persevered into the 1940s. Not until the early 1940s did the Society begin to fully enforce the provision in the Act.¹⁵ By 1943, only 20 percent of its income came from private sources and the rest from the municipalities. In 1950, the Society raised a healthy \$6,287.32 in its own organized campaign.¹⁶

Like many CASs in remote areas, the Rainy River Children's Aid Society in the 1940s and early 1950s was a two or three person operation. A

Director, a secretary and possibly one social worker arranged for relief and support to soldiers' families, single parents, and the poor, and were involved in the resettlement of British war children. No services were provided to the Indian population before 1957 except in dire emergencies. The main sources of income for the Society other than private donations the agency could raise were the child care reimbursements from municipalities and the province. In 1956, the Rainy River municipalities made their first voluntary donation amounting to \$925.¹⁷ The fundraising tradition initiated in the late 1930s continued through to the 1960s. Until 1965, a large part of the efforts of the Board of Directors was devoted to private fund raising from private sources. As late as 1963, activities such as tag days and used clothing sales were common activities not of just board members but of the social workers.¹⁸

The Kenora Children's Aid Society

The KCAS had sparser beginnings. It did not incorporate a Board of Directors until 1938. Until then all child placements were carried out by the mayor as part of his duties. One mayor, a Mr. W. Carruthers, carried on his child welfare duties without pay from 1934 to 1938 after he had retired. In 1947 he initiated correspondence with the Child Welfare Branch asking for reimbursement for these years of service.¹⁹ In his support a Mr. D.M. McLellan wrote to James Band reflecting the spirit of Carruthers and social welfare personnel of the era,

...inherent desire to serve unselfishly and was so pleased by expressions of appreciation that he failed to give sufficient consideration to the financial remuneration to which he was entitled.²⁰

The Child Welfare Branch did not reimburse him.

In the mid 1940s KCAS employed just a Local Director and a secretary. The Director, Mrs. Lulu Ronan, was a former Latin teacher. The agency served a massive area of which most was hinterland. In those years there was no contact with the reserve communities north of Red Lake and Sioux Lookout.²¹ Muriel Casson, the secretary from 1946-1950 stated that she performed CAS duties including apprehensions, placements, and even court work. She was promoted to caseworker at the age of 23. Ronan directed Casson to admit "as few children as humanly possible." There was little contact with Native families other than assistance with clothing and Christmas hampers for the families living close to or in the towns. Frequently Native parents would drop into the CAS office to chat about matters such as Family Allowance cheques. CAS staff did not travel to Indian reserves during those years. They would intervene with Indian clients visiting towns only if specifically requested by the police or Indian Affairs' officials. The circumstances were usually of children left alone. If the children from reserves were taken into care while in town they were quickly returned to their parents or relatives in their communities. White foster parents were reluctant to take Indian children for fear of harassment by parents. If the parents were incapable of taking the children, the CAS would place the children with relatives on the advice of Indian Affairs

who would pay a small welfare allowance to the relative. Later, people on the reserves refused to look after other people's children and appeared reluctant to be involved. The pressure of child protection referrals caused Casson to make a practice of visiting the reserves near the Kenora area on Treaty Day with the Indian Affairs officials simply to become acquainted with the community, with community leadership and to make CAS presence felt.²²

Casson believes that Indian children were rarely taken into care for two reasons: circumstances which might otherwise warrant apprehension in a non-Indian family would be attributed to culture and life style, and Indians were considered the exclusive responsibility of the federal government legally and financially. Therefore, a "hands-off" approach prevailed.

The workloads of the workers were enormous. One former worker, who had been a foster child in the 1940s, recalls being in several foster homes. He saw the Director only when he moved foster homes. Once the foster parents moved the children. On another occasion, he and his siblings moved themselves because no one else could! Years later as a worker he read his own file. It consisted of only a half page of writing, mostly documentation of the foster home changes. He did not know he was part Indian until he read that as well on his file.²³

Racial tension in the late 1950s was high in Kenora centring on non-Native objections to the visible abuse of alcohol by some Native people.²⁴ In contrast to the town's residents, Ronan displayed a sympathetic confidence in

the Native clientele in the midst of much criticism of Native people. In 1958 she wrote to Deputy Minister James Band thanking him for granting Mothers Allowance to Indian mothers. She wrote,

a forward step in integrating our Indian population. The allowance for a mother and her children helps her both materially and mentally. Her thinking is 'The DPW thinks I am good enough to get an allowance and I will live up to it.' We have seen no misuse of the money.²⁵

Equal support was not forthcoming from the municipalities for the CAS however. The agency made vigorous attempts to establish a Receiving Home in Kenora. A house was purchased but the neighbours protested the change in by-law. The Planning Board objected outright and despite promises to change the by-law, the municipality did not do so.²⁶

CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATION IN ONTARIO BEFORE 1966

Before 1966 and the reforms of CAP, CAS costs were covered by a myriad of sources. The municipalities and provinces reimbursed CASs for child-in-care costs for all children in the municipalities and Unorganized Territories, respectively. Indian Affairs Branch payed for Reserve Status Indian children, a category defined by the residency of the mother if living less than a year off a reserve. If the parent of the child had lived in a municipality more than a year, the municipality was responsible. Often municipalities disclaimed responsibility for children refusing to pay because of a dispute about location or length or residency. It was particularly a problem if a parent had lived in several municipalities in the year, and more problematic if the

person was Status Indian. In many cases the court ruled which municipality or level of government was responsible. Some Societies hired lawyers exclusively for the purpose of proving residency and some court cases lasted for years.²⁷

Any services to children in their own homes were supported by CASs' own efforts through private campaigns and discretionary protection grants negotiated with sympathetic municipalities. Because of their historically private nature, a CAS could resist interference from the DPW and make its own policies. For its funding, each CAS would negotiate a per diem child-in-care grant with the municipalities in its catchment area. The grant incorporated the foster care rate and a portion for administrative costs such as office space and salaries. Each year's negotiation for the total grant would be based on the previous years' child-in-care statistics. Some Societies negotiated with as many as 26 municipalities. The CASs could negotiate protection grants from the municipalities for the purpose of providing services to children in their own homes. Municipalities varied in their willingness to give discretionary grants to CASs according to their perception of the viability and efficiency of using money in this way.²⁸

The relationship between the Northern CASs and the municipalities is important context for Indian child-in-care services in the North. Many anecdotes underscore the frustration of CAS-municipality relationships in Northern areas.

Some municipalities took aggressive and meticulous measures to disprove their responsibility to pay for a child whose residence they disputed. In the North many municipalities were small, poor and had low tax bases. In 1958, the Northwest Municipal Association served notice to IAB that the municipalities of Northwestern Ontario had resolved to refuse to pay for child-in-care costs for any child from reserve.²⁹ By mistake the court had judged the municipality whose boundaries were adjacent to a child's reserve to be responsible for the per diem rate. The child was eventually made a permanent ward and placed for adoption. The municipality successfully appealed the permanent wardship order based on the mistaken residency.³⁰ IAB had readily agreed to reimburse the municipality and urged it to drop the appeal. The municipality refused stating that it wished to stress the point that the reserve was not part of the municipality!³¹

The current Executive Director of RRCAS recounts another instance in the early 1960s in which the members of two municipal councils argued over the residence of a non-Indian child living on the boundary of two municipalities. The two men personally took their maps and measuring tapes to the child's residence to prove in which municipality the child resided. Apparently arguments and shouting matches about responsibility were not uncommon.³² Nevertheless, Rainy River municipalities donated some prevention monies to RRCAS.

The Kenora CAS had similar problems. According to one former board member, the Kenora District municipalities viewed the CAS as a nuisance. They resisted paying for any children in care whether they were Indian or non-Indian.³³ The Kenora District municipalities contributed almost no discretionary monies to the Kenora CAS. After 1954 the municipal contributions were negligible, usually \$25 a year in total. The failure of Kenora District municipalities to contribute voluntarily to child welfare work was attacked in public by the agency's Local Director, Harold Treen. At a speech to the Rotarian Club in Kenora in March 1964, he outlined the work of the Society and the large numbers of children in care who were mostly of Native origin. He blamed the "tambourine-on-the-street"³⁴ approach to fundraising and challenged municipalities of the area to assist, pointing out that 90 percent of other municipalities in Ontario did so. He pointed out that the municipality of Keewatin was the only Society to give money for prevention (\$25!). He said,

We don't expect the police department to give their services, and also raise the money for the program, nor the fire department, nor the dog catcher.³⁵

Two months later Harold Treen had approached the municipality of Kenora for a \$4,500 grant to enable the Society to provide more family services thus preventing admissions to care, and to save the town money in child-in-care costs.³⁶ By July he had solicited the assistance of every municipality in the District by letter, attempting to point out that the total costs of foster care

for one child for a year were \$14,585, and that prevention was more efficient.³⁷ The response of municipalities in 1964 was to donate \$75 in 1964. A year later Treen again lashed out in public at the District's indifference. The following is a quote from an interview with Treen in a special feature on the Native people of Kenora by a Winnipeg paper:

'I used to think of this place as another Selma, Alabama. There are people here who are opposed to just about any sociological change. And the only criteria they have of my job is that they keep costs as low as possible. They would like me to go around and pick up all these kids and keep them quietly in some big warehouse....Last year Kenora gave nothing in the way of municipal grants to the Children's Aid Society. An angry Treen attached to his annual report a sheet showing amounts of grants made to branches of the society in the province. In towns of comparable size, they ranged from \$2,000 to \$17,000.³⁸

Kenora municipalities responded in 1965 by donating a total of \$125 to the Society for prevention.

The ability to raise money from private campaigns varied from agency to agency, Table 10.1 shows the variations and changes in percentages of total income from voluntary monies (municipal and donations) for two agencies from the North and two from the South of the province between 1956 and 1965.

By 1965 the abilities of CASs to raise separate funds for prevention services varied throughout the province. In 1956 the total municipal grants were \$322,650 or three percent of the budget for the whole province. The Kenora CAS received \$25 from its municipalities, Rainy River CAS \$925, Waterloo County CAS \$25,616 and Brant County nothing.³⁹ In 1965 the total municipal grants were \$1,254,956 or six percent of all agency revenues. The

Table 10.1 - Percentages of Revenues From Municipalities and Private Donations in 1956 and 1965

Agency	1956		1965		Private Total
	Municipal %	Private	Total	Municipal %	
Rainy River	1.7	13.0	14.7	1.9	8.2
Kenora	0	8.0	8.0	.1	.8
Brant	17.0	18.0	35.0	0	13.9
Waterloo	17.0	1.2	18.2	14.7	1.9
Ontario	3.0	10.0	13.0	6.0	7.0

Sources: 1956 and 1965 data from Annual Reports of the Ontario Department of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Sessional Papers 13, 1957-1958 and 1966-1967.

Kenora CAS received \$125 from its municipalities, Rainy River \$3,332, Waterloo County \$56,527 and Brant County nothing.⁴⁰ Dependency on allnon-statutory funding varied from agency to agency but decreased in the Northern agencies. Although Rainy River District municipalities were donating discretionary monies, they held a legacy of resisting paying child-in-care rates. Kenora District municipalities seemed oblivious to CAS needs. The Northern agencies did not have United Way sources of funding as did Southern agencies such as Brant County placing them in an even more disadvantaged position financially.

In 1965, a new Child Welfare Act in Ontario accompanied change in the overall funding of CASs. The law included a clause mandating CASs to provide services which would prevent circumstances leading to the need for protection.⁴¹ Each Board of Directors would negotiate the total budget each year with both the municipalities and the province. In the private structure model, the board operated the agency under DPW guidelines. Before the introduction of CAP, Ontario's CASs had more autonomy but less financial security but the financial solvency of an agency could be guaranteed only if there were children in care. Changes in funding in 1966 relieved Northern agencies of major difficulties: negotiating on a case by case basis with municipalities, justifying prevention monies to hostile or resistant municipalities, and directing energy into fundraising. Agencies negotiated total budgets with the province and indirectly with the municipalities. Agencies

which served Indian communities no longer dealt with IAB. Instead, they negotiated with the province on behalf of Indian services on the same basis as they did for others. It is remarkable that despite these hardships the child-in-care rates in the province and in RRCAS declined in the years before 1965 (Chapter 5). Status Indian children from the Unorganized Territories and non-Status Indians were a large portion of Indian children in care before 1965. Few Status Indian children from reserves were in care.

SUMMARY

CASs in the first two-thirds of this century existed as private organizations with little interference and little support from government. It seems that the provincial government had less interest or knowledge of the Northern agencies and certainly no interest in interfering in their activities. Foster homes that would take Native children were hard to find. There was resistance from municipalities to pay for any child and more resistance to pay for Native children.

The Rainy River and Kenora Children's Aid Societies are distinct not only for their tradition of voluntarism but for the context of hostility within which they were expected to deliver child welfare services to Native people. They delivered the service amidst geographical, parsimonious and racial hostility.

The contextual themes that emerge in CAS administration in the years surrounding the extension of services to Native people are as follows:

- (1) funding incentives for high child-in-care rates, namely child-in-care per diems as the only ensured source of revenues versus municipal resistance to pay,
- (2) seeming public resistance to support Native child welfare while supporting the child-in-care mind set of Native child welfare
- (3) grossly under-resourced and under-staffed agencies.

Endnotes to Chapter 10

1. TAP Associates, 101.
2. Andrew Jones and Leonard Rutman, In the Children's Aid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
3. Defined in the legislation as a "receiving home or an institution for the care and protection of children" in Section 20 of the Child Welfare Act 1965, Statutes of Ontario 1965, Chapter 14, 41-78, and as a "foster home, a hospital, and a place or one of a class of places designated as such..." in Section 37 of the Child and Family Services Act 1984.
4. Ontario, Child and Family Services Act, Section 40.
5. Ontario, Child Welfare Act 1965, Section 23.
6. Melichercik, 1987.
7. Dorothy Crittendon, Ontario Public Servant for 35 years and Consultant with the Ministry of Community and Social Services, interview by author, tape recording, 9 May 1991, Toronto.
8. AO, RG 29, Acc 14571/2, file 72, Annual Reports, Children's Aid Branch, Department of Public Welfare, 1941.
9. Jim Bayly, former social worker and Executive Director of Brockville CAS 1952-1960, interview by author, tape recorded, 26 November 1990, Kingston, Ontario.
10. Canada, An Act respecting Indians, Section 88, Statutes of Canada, Volume 1, 1950-1951.
11. The information in this section is from the following sources: Public Archives of Ontario, Record Group 29, Series 01, Accession 14571/2, Box 14, Children's Aid Society Rainy River; Susan McQuaker, The History of the Children's Aid Society of the District of Rainy River; personal communication with Norma Houghton, case worker RRCAS 1956-1971, Betty Mcleod, caseworker RRCAS 1963-1991, Ron King Caseworker RRCAS 1960-1962 and present Executive Director, 27 September 1990 and 17 October 1991; Department of Public Welfare reports 1933-1934 to 1963-1964.
12. Department of Public Welfare, Report of the Minister of Public Welfare, 4th Annual Report 1933-1934, Table 2.
13. This decision is one of the first recorded that reflects the insensitivity of the provincial government to the North.

14. McQuaker, page 24.
15. McQuaker.
16. Department of Public Welfare Child Welfare Division Annual Report 1950-1951, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Sessional Papers 18 1952-53.
17. Department of Public Welfare, Annual Report, 1956-1957, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Sessional Papers 18, 1958-1959.
18. Ron King and Betty Mcleod, interviews with author, tape recording, 26 September 1990.
19. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, Box 13, file 537, Kenora CAS 1947-1970, correspondence from W.C. Carruthers to P.W. Heise, nd.
20. Ibid., correspondence from D. McLellan to James Band, 10 November 1947.
21. Muriel Casson, Secretary Kenora CAS 1947-1950 and child welfare worker in Northern Ontario 1950-1990, interview by author, tape recorded, 11 October 1990, Nipigon Ontario. The situation was the same in Rainy River CAS as reported by McQuaker.
22. Muriel Casson. On the anniversary of the signing of the Treaties between Canada and each First Nation, a entourage of federal officials visit the community. They ceremoniously give each Band member their "Treaty payment" which is an annuity promised to every Band member for the relinquishment of the land. In the North the amount promised was \$4 or \$5 per person depending on the region. Treaty Day hosted many celebrations including feasts and games. Before medical service were extended, it was the only time the community had a physician's visit. The practice of Treat Day exists today in modified form. The amount of the annuity is the same.
23. Peter Louttit, interview by author, 14 October 1992, Dryden Ontario.
24. AO, Acc.14571/2 Box 35, file 1387, Indian Advisory Committee 1955-60, Minutes of Meeting of Indian Advisory Committee of the Indian Welfare Services Act, 10 December 1957.
25. Ibid., correspondence from L. Ronan to James Band, 19 March 1959.
26. Ibid., internal correspondence from James Band to W.H. Bury, Director of Child Welfare, 15 April 1959.
27. Dorothea Crittendon.
28. Dorothea Crittendon.

29. NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6937, file 1/20-4-0 part 1, Policy Matters Regarding Care of Children, Letter from Charles Bobb, Clerk-Treasurer of the Municipality of Chapple to Gordon Cooper, IAB Fort Frances, 5 October, 1958.
30. Donald Lutig, interview by author, 15 november 1991, Winnipeg Manitoba.
31. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6939, file 485/29-4 part 1, Care of Children Fort Frances Agency 1949-1960, Memo from J.H. Gordon to Child Welfare Division IAB, 2 October 1968 and letter from R. Charbonneau, Local Director Rainy River CAS to F.F. Cooper Fort Frances, Indian Affairs Branch, 24 February 1959.
32. Ron King. interview by author, 18 November 1991, Fort Frances Ontario.
33. Tom O'Flaherty, interview by author, 15 October 1991, Kenora, Ontario.
34. Kenora Daily Miner and News, "C.A.S. care for one child could cost a municipality \$14,000," 17 July 1964, pages 1 and 14.
35. "Rotarians hear of formation and work of Children's Aid Society", Kenora Daily Miner and News, 3 March 1964, pages 1 and 7.
36. "Children's Aid asks for Grant-in-Aid", Kenora Daily Miner and News, 29 May 1964, page 1.
37. "C.A.S. care for one child could cost a municipality \$14, 585", Kenora Miner and News", 17 July, pages 1 and 14.
38. Ian Adams, "The Indians: an abandoned and dispossessed people", The Winnipeg Tribune Weekend Magazine, 31 July 1965, pages 2-6. Quote from page 4.
39. Annual Report of the Minister of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Sessional Paper 13, 1957-1958.
40. Annual Report of the Minister of Public Welfare, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Sessional Paper 13, 1966-1967.
41. Ontario, The Child Welfare Act 1965, Sections 6(2)(b).

**THE EXPERIENCE OF NORTHERN SERVICE PROVIDERS AND
ESCALATING RATES OF RESERVE STATUS INDIAN
CHILDREN IN CARE**

Who were the service providers entrusted to child protection in the north in the years of disproportionate numbers of Indian children in care? Were they, as the literature suggests, culturally insensitive middle class enthusiasts out to "save" Indian children from the "fate" of the reserve life? Where were they from? What were their qualifications and experiences? Under what kind of conditions and administration did they operate? How did they cope with their demands? How did their practice shape disproportionate rates of Indian children in the care of CAS? This chapter addresses these questions. In the discussion I occasionally refer to members of the Boards of Directors as they too are service providers, and some historical evolutionary features of the agencies to illustrate the context under which the service providers worked.

Appendix E lists the staff of the RRCAS during each year from 1955 to 1978 as taken from the agency's history book.¹ Appendix F profiles the staff of that era of both Rainy River and Kenora CASs in cases where I was able to locate the information.

THE STAFF

The staff of both agencies had an interesting mixture of youth, maturity and backgrounds. Many of the individuals were from the North and had close associations with Native people in some way or another.

Peter Louttit, a half Indian man had been a foster child of a KCASs board president. He had left the air force at 27 and wanted to give something back to the agency. Jack Copeland had been a independent fur trader in the communities in the remote Northwestern Ontario, beyond Sioux Lookout and Red Lake. An Ojibwa man had taught him to skin and tan furs and he spoke some of the Indian language. Jim Campbell, a newcomer to the area, had been an artist and guide in the Rainy River area in the 1960s. He knew the area, the people, and some of the Ojibwa language.

Norma Houghton was an experienced nurse and married a teacher who later became involved in Indian adult education. Betty (Oshust) McLeod was recruited from Saskatchewan and married a member of the Couchiching First Nation in the mid 1960s. Muriel Casson was from Kenora and in 1946 began to work at age 19 as secretary to the Director and only other staff person of the Kenora CAS, Lulu Ronan. Ronan was a former Latin teacher. A year later Casson found herself promoted to caseworker dealing with problems she had never even heard of! She retired in 1990 after a 44 year career in child welfare in Northern Ontario.

Based on the information provided from and about the workers, other than largely being untrained in social work, one cannot generalize about their youth, life experience or lack thereof, or insensitivity to Indian culture. They did not represent the elite of Fort Frances or Kenora.

All of the workers interviewed, however, knew little or nothing about child welfare when they began their jobs and were naive to the problems they would encounter. Their often unorthodox approaches to difficult situations in a difficult time depicts the meeting of a non-Aboriginal policy with the changes in social, cultural and economic realities of the Aboriginal people.

THE RESPONSE OF NORTHERN CASs TO NEW PROBLEMS

After the extension of services in the mid 1950s, workers in Rainy River CAS began to receive referrals concerning child neglect on reserves from other services providers such as nurses, welfare workers and teachers. Referrals did not come from the communities until later. The workers interviewed from the 1950s and the early 1960s stated that initially, as far as they knew, a reserve was a collection of houses. They had no knowledge of leadership or family kinship networks. There was no office or building designated for the Band government. They did not know that the Chief and Band Council members operated out of their homes. They did not know that seemingly abandoned children might have been watched by neighbours or relatives. One worker who grew up in the area stated that Indians were quite separate from non-Indian

society in her childhood and most people, herself included, knew nothing about them.²

In 1956, Norma Houghton was one of two staff in the entire agency and the only one in the Fort Frances office.³ In the initial years of service extension, the agency would receive reports of neglect from a reserve, she would fly into the reserve, frequently finding children alone without adequate food or supervision. She did not know that the person next door might be a relative, or that the reserve leadership could be approached to rectify the situation. She described her workload as "frantic" and herself as "constantly running with barely time to do anything".⁴ In all cases, situations as they presented themselves, were thought to involve danger to the child.

In a later correspondence to me Houghton, now 84, wrote,

Some but not enough time and effort was given to maintain some contact with the parents. Alcohol was rampant and I personally went to local bars on many occasions in an effort to find parents and take them home.⁵

Frequently there were no foster homes to accommodate these children and workers would take the children to their own homes.⁶ After an apprehension, the 10 day court limit would quickly approach, the children would become settled and before long the children were Crown Wards.⁷ In the 1950s and 1960s, police court judges presided over child welfare courts in the North. The concept of legal representation for parents was unheard of. Usually the CAS was granted what it requested.⁸

According to Norma Houghton, usually the children spoke no English and when sent to school were given IQ tests that labelled them as slow.⁹ Not enough Native foster homes were available. She wrote of one experience with a non-Native and Native foster mother:

Two little Indian children about 5 & 6 years of age were placed in a white foster home. The foster parents complained bitterly about the children stealing jam etc. out of the refrigerator at night. For once an Indian foster mother was found - a jolly motherly type of person. I had told her about the pilfering and when I visited in a few days I asked if she was having any trouble. She chuckled and said, 'I gave them a whole pail of jam and they ate it all. All were sick and now they don't want anymore.' Problem solved.¹⁰

The foster mother's use of traditional self-directed disciplining of the children was highly respected by Houghton.

Muriel Casson described her child welfare work in the isolated town of Red Lake in the early 1950s. The following anecdote and its context illustrates the merging of new policy, changing social and economic conditions for Reserve Indian and the accommodation necessary by one Northern CAS to address new problems:

With the post war decline in fur prices, IAB encouraged Indian families from the isolated reserves north of Red Lake and Sioux Lookout to move to the mining towns of Red Lake and Pickle Crow. The families moved to the abandoned prospectors shacks or built their own structures in an area outside the town which became known as "The Tomahawk Centre." One Indian Affairs report described the shacks,

one room shacks with ply rough lumber lined on outside and walls and roofs with tar paper and inside a collection of cardboard, newspapers and other materials available.¹¹

Indian agents reported that the homes were kept clean and the people well-fed. The miners were payed \$200 per month. IAB reported only one case of welfare assistance in 1960 suggesting the prosperity of those who came from the North to work in the mines.¹² In 1954, 300 people of whom 120 were children in a total of 60 families lived in the Tomahawk Centre.¹³

Alcohol abuse was high and many charges for drunkenness in public places were laid which carried a fine or a thirty day jail sentence. Casson reported that there were numerous referrals from the courts for temporary foster care when all available caretakers of a family would be incarcerated. The agency soon began to prepare for these emergencies. Regularly before the court date, Casson would approach the police for the names of those likely to be sent to jail. She would ask the judge (who would preside over both police and child welfare matters) to stagger jail sentences so that one adult would be available to care for the children. In other cases, she would go from door to door in the village asking someone to care for the children for which IAB payed a welfare allowance.

This worked well apparently. Alcohol abuse charges were so widespread that families were willing to provide this favour in the event they ever needed it in return. Given the population figures cited above, there would be two adults for every child in the village. Probably one or more adult relative had

moved to Red Lake with the families making the utilization of traditional child caring systems possible. The neighbours were probably all related and did what they might have done if the courts had not thought it necessary to refer the children to CAS when it sentenced the parents.

IAB payed a foster care rate and CAS visited the provisional foster homes to oversee the child's well-being. There would be no child welfare court involvement. The CAS was not comfortable with the practice but believed it was the most sensible way to serve the best interest of the children. The arrangements appeared to have worked at least for a few years. Indian Affairs recorded no Status Indian children in CAS care from Red Lake until the end of 1959.¹⁴ One respondent who grew up in the Tomahawk Centre remembers well the drinking parties but does not recall being neglected or in danger. She is a successful foster home worker for Tikinagan Child and Family Services in Sioux Lookout. As a person aware of CAS services she expressed puzzlement that CAS was never around when she was growing up in the 1950s. She was nor aware of any children taken away.¹⁵ Muriel Casson stated the residents of the village did not know her official role and called her "the nurse with the red car" and often asked her questions of a medical nature. They would have been familiar with white women as nurses in the Northern communities from where they came.

The reports of the workers about their reluctance to bring Reserve Status Indian children into care in the early years of service extension is

supported by the financial data of Chapter 6 and Indian Affairs Archival data. IAB reported that in 1957 there were only 7 RSI children in RRCAS care and 27 in KCAS care. The total number of RSI children in care in Ontario was 166.¹⁶ A few years later, Kenora however had many permanent wards. In August 1962, the Kenora CAS had 104 permanent wards for a population base of 30,992 while Rainy River had 36 permanent wards for a population base of 22,732.¹⁷ Although many were Native children, as stated earlier, these children were either non-Status Indian or Status Indian from the Unorganized Territories, not from the reserves. The hands-off approach to the reserves appears to have been associated with there being fewer RSI children in care.

Between 1957 and 1962, the total number of children receiving in-care services in the province of Ontario had been dropping steadily despite increases in population. As well, the average workload of children assigned to workers was dropping. The in-care population dropped from 22,514 to 21,984, the number of children assigned per CAS worker dropped from 50 to 41.¹⁸ Overall in Ontario the increase in protection caseloads in the province overall accompanied the decrease in numbers of permanent wards in care.¹⁹

This was not the case in Northern Societies however, according to workers of the time. Indian children, previously not likely to be taken into care because of funding and jurisdictional issues, would now come into CAS care. Caseloads in KCAS soared with often 60 to 100 children on the caseload, most of whom were Native.²⁰

Betty McLeod, a new BSW, during her first months on the job in the fall of 1963 worked in the Fort Frances office with one colleague and no Director. She described herself as so frightened of the responsibility that she cloistered herself in the office doing paper work hoping there would be no emergencies. In 1964 she left to obtain her Master of Social Work degree returning in 1967 to find that the agency then served almost only Native people. She recalls that one non-Native person was referred to her for counselling but refused help because the agency was for Native people. There were no other family or individual support services in Fort Frances at that time.²¹

From 1964, RRCAS operated under the administration of Joe Skinner, retired from the Port Arthur CAS. A supervisor was hired, and more cases went to court. At least two workers, Betty Oshust and Jim Campbell returned to University for their MSW degrees and returned. The introduction of the Indian Welfare Agreement in 1965 accompanied a move towards professionalization of the agency.

Jim Campbell reports that the direction of the agency concerning taking children into care was clear in the late 1960s. In an emergency, one searched first for a relative or friend for placement before admitting a child. One did everything possible to avoid an admission. The demands for emergency service were increasing, however. He cited an instance in which 21 children were admitted to care in one weekend. There had been a weekend celebration and the children were abandoned on an island. Although one of the workers

thought the children could have managed on their own, under the legal mandate they believed there was no alternative but apprehension.²² In hindsight, someone could have been hired to stay with them.

Campbell had a number of single parent women on his case load from Big Grassy and Manitou Rapids. He reported that the parents and even the children would often request foster care. He referred to one group of children in the town of Fort Frances who on occasions would walk over to the Receiving Home and admit themselves when left alone or fearful of the drinking in the home. He referred to one case of finding a family of children unsupervised in a cabin by the road in a snow storm in which it appears the roads would be closed and the parents would not return. He spoke of times when he would wait at a house where children were left alone until the parents came home rather than admit the children. He related the case of four toddlers found locked in a cabin for several hours in 90 degree heat. He emphasized that the workers were not trying to do counselling casework nor were they out to snatch children. They were saving lives of children they believed to be at acute risk.²³

The Kenora CAS, at least, took the least intrusive approach possible to Indians and Indian communities before 1956. The reasons were a combination of financial and jurisdictional considerations and a recognition of, although not an understanding of, cultural differences. As private organizations they exerted their discretion to adjust practices to Indian conditions which might be

perceived as illegal with non-Indian families, for whom they could not argue jurisdictional ambiguities.

In the 1960s child welfare referrals escalated and workers found extended family on the reserves near the towns reluctant to take children. Many more families from Northern communities had moved to Red Lake. Frank Leutschaft, a long time worker with the Kenora CAS reported several of his experiences when he served the Red Lake area. He described his work as "always flying by the seat of my pants." He described an incident which occurred one night in 1969, which illustrates the difficulties.

An anonymous caller asked him to investigate the safety of a newborn thought to be in a house full of intoxicated adults. He took his wife with him to assist. The house was several miles outside the town of Red Lake. He found a tar paper shack with a tin wood stove. The baby was snug and warm under the skirt of the unconscious mother. It was -30 degrees outside, the fire was out and the house ice-cold. For fear of someone accidentally tipping over the tin stove, he chose not to make a fire.

Knowing that the grandmother lived a mile across the lake, he took the child to his wife in the car and started his lone trek across the ice to find the grandmother. The grandmother spoke no English but by gesticulation he described the scene requesting that she look after the child. The grandmother said an unequivocal "Kawin," the Ojibwa and Cree word for "No." Leutschaft does not know why she refused, but guesses that she was either tired of her

daughter's drinking and wanted to teach her a lesson, or feared that the daughter would take reprisals. There were no foster homes. He placed the child in the hospital.

This same worker described another situation of having nowhere to place four siblings from the town of Ear Falls. There was an outbreak of hepatitis at the Receiving Home in Red Lake and they could not go there. He left Ear Falls at 11:00 pm with all the children for a foster home in Ignace, 200 miles of lonely highway away, returning to his home in Red Lake to prepare for work that day.²⁴ Despite the chronic shortage of foster homes and workers' attempts to avert admissions to care, the number of Native children swelled.

When Leutschaft would have a child in care from the North, he would contact his Supervisor, former fur trader Jack Copeland. Copeland would hear the family name and would know from which community the child originated. Leutschaft would inform the community by two-way radio of the need for a home for the child. Usually a relative would come by plane into Red Lake and pick up the child forthwith at the relatives own expense. There would be no need for wardship or court proceedings. Using the extended family was a necessary procedure to take. There were few foster placements especially for whole families of children. Workers such as Leutschaft, a parent himself and a former school teacher, described the loneliness and anguish on the faces of the children in the Receiving Home and did all he could to find a family member who could care for the child. He believed that the law required CAS

take wardship in such cases and that placing children with relatives was not legal. A mild mannered man, he found himself making authoritative directives to parents about whom they could not have in their homes based on his knowledge of persons who abused alcohol with the parents. He states that he always had the feeling that this was operating outside the law, but he felt there was no alternative to serve the best interest of the children.²⁵

The agencies faced discrimination against their Indian wards. One non-Indian Kenora CAS board member of the sixties said, "If I were an Indian, I'd not let my kids near the town of Kenora."²⁶ Before the province made efforts to coordinate adoptions, Indian children in care (or children of other minority groups) were not considered to be adoptable by non-Native people. Many non-Native foster parents would not take Native children and often when they did, the children experienced discrimination.²⁷ Jack Copeland deplored the practise of placing Indian children in white foster homes. He observed,

Kenora was a very prejudiced town. White people like Indian babies but when they grow up and the other kids are invited by friends to sleep over somewhere, the Indian kids get left out.²⁸

Universally, the workers interviewed referred to the pain of watching Indian children in long term care. Norma Houghton said, "There was nothing for them" and this motivated her to find permanent placements through DPW adoption resources. Peter Louttit said he knew the pain of not belonging. Frank Leutschaft said it broke his heart to see the loneliness on the faces of the children in the Receiving Home in Red Lake. All the workers remarked on

the pain of watching many children go through a series of six or seven foster homes.

Norma Houghton referred to the difficulty in placing Indian children for adoption. Native applicants were rare. Not only were any parents hard to find but laws about placing Roman Catholic children with non-Catholics hindered a number of potential placements. There were few Catholic applicants and most of the Rainy River First Nations children were Catholic. She began to indicate the children's religion as "Pagan" to DPW to allow placements with Protestants.²⁹ About her adoptive work she wrote the following comments to me:

There have been much criticisms for placing these children for adoption but there was no other choice. The alternative was years in different foster homes and many ended up in Training School. I refuse to feel guilty and believe I never did it lightly. I am happy with the changes that have evolved and that it is no longer necessary.³⁰

The workers' views on the adoptions of Native children were mixed. Some believed it was a mistake and others felt that there was no alternative under the conditions of the times. Ron King remarked on the irony of placing a child from a poor reserve home on adoption with a wealthy Southern Ontario family in a luxurious home. She was immediately registered for piano lessons.

The workers interviewed from the Fort Frances and Kenora Societies state that involvement of Southern Ontario in Northern agencies was minimal and that Societies were virtually on their own. Neither the province or the Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies took any interest. Ron King

reported that the OACAS Executive Director once planned a visit to the North combining it with a camping holiday with his family, arriving at his convenience when everyone was to be on holidays. King stated that the Program Supervisor from Toronto visited only once a year. Budgets were unquestioned and always approved. The year wage and price controls were imposed, the board approved and the Ministry granted without question, a 16 percent increase in staff salaries. The DIAND representative in Fort Frances never questioned the agency about its expenses for Indian children.³¹ Marie McDiarmid, the agency statistician, stated that not until 1980 did DIAND begin to ensure that all the Status Indian children it payed for were its responsibility and not the province's.³²

There were many pressures on CASs and their staff to admit Indian children to care. Likewise, there was no resistance from the federal, provincial or the municipal (after 1965) level of government to pay the continuously escalating costs. At the same time, no level of government showed interest in assisting the agencies with the horrendous problems they were facing. The only disincentives against admitting Indian children to care existed at the front line. These disincentives were practical issues associated with the arduous Northern conditions and lack of foster homes. In addition, the emotional disincentives of watching the pain of these children was the greatest motivation to choose the "least detrimental alternative," which in their minds was usually not apprehension.³³

In the early days of the extension of services the problems described were not foreseen. During the middle years, these lessons caused workers to make their own accommodations.

I will next describe in more detail the events of a few years in the Kenora CAS. In a desperate attempt to deal with overwhelming demand and racism, it planned and carried out the en masse placement of Indian children in homes in the far North. These particular adoptions were raised repeatedly in my discussions with informants. They represent a desperate attempt to deal with the effects of social change in Native communities. The experience of Kenora illustrates how even the most committed individuals found change impossible under the conditions of the time.

THE RESPONSE OF THE KENORA CHILDRENS AID 1964-1966

The essence of 1960s Indian child welfare policy, the response of service providers, and the experience of the Indian community is encapsulated in the troubled attempts of the Kenora Childrens Aid Society to provide services.

By the beginning of the 1960s there was considerable concern about the conditions of the Native people of the area around the town of Kenora. The most prominent problem was the high profile of alcohol abuse by people from the surrounding reserve communities.³⁴ The non-Native residents were concerned about the effect on the tourist industry and had imposed stiff fines on public drunkenness, explicitly citing their "re-implementation against

Indians."³⁵ In November 1965, 400 Indian people of the area marched silently through the streets of Kenora protesting the lack of hydro, telephone and other basic necessities in their communities, seeking "an end to poverty, ignorance, dirt and disease." They also wanted an alcohol treatment center.³⁶ The town was enraged by the accusations of racism made against it then and the previous summer. The march was organized by the Indian-White race relations committee of Kenora which had warned of violence if change did not occur.³⁷

Although much of the alcohol abuse would not involve children, often it did. Often families from the reserves would travel as a unit to Kenora. Parents would socialize in the bars in the evening and the children would stay outside. On other occasions parents would leave the children at home without providing for the basic necessities. At other times, the parents would be away for so long that a relative or friend who had been asked to look after the children would call the Society asking for removal of the children. A few occurrences of this type did not constitute the basis for applications for permanent wardship. Cases in which fear existed for childrens' lives on a chronic basis and/or where there appeared to be little interest of the parents in the children would eventually lead to their permanent wardship.³⁸ By the mid 1960s there were many children in care but most were non-Status Indians or Status Indians for the Unorganized Territories.

The Board of Directors in the 1950s held what was described as self-righteous values. A trio of male members, Ted Burton, the Crown Attorney;

Charlie Wingfield, a probation officer; and Max Lasherfeld, the Fire Chief of the paper mill, found themselves at consistent odds with the rest of the board particularly over the hiring of staff. Ted Burton says,

If they had a choice between somebody who was brisk and efficient who had the interest of Native people at heart and a born-again Christian who did not smoke or drink, they wanted the born-again Christian. Charlie and I would want the person who was efficient.³⁹

Once a board member visited one of group home parents on Christmas Eve and saw a bottle of beer on the table. This warranted a special meeting. The Board had a charitable focus and "wanted qualified people who would work for nothing." The agency had no membership and held no Annual Meetings and followed no rules. The trio deliberately connived to be named as the personnel committee.⁴⁰

In 1963, the Personnel Committee went on a campaign to recruit a qualified director. Harold Treen had visited Kenora CAS in 1963 as an Executive Officer of the Department of Public Welfare conducting a study of permanent wards for the Minister's Advisory Committee on Child Welfare. He was an MSW and had a short but distinguished career in child welfare. He had been a supervisor at the Kitchener-Waterloo CAS and before his public service appointment, Executive Director of the Perth County Childrens Aid Society in Stratford. Streamlining adoption regulations and a commitment to the development of older child adoptions apparently had been the major thrust of his career.⁴¹ Apparently it was a request by him to DPW Deputy Minister James Band to find an adoptive home for three siblings that sparked the

Today's Child column. He sent pictures to Band who asked the Toronto Telegram to do a feature article, much to the disagreement of Director of Child Welfare Betty Graham.⁴²

Treen found the Kenora agency to be in "the worst mess" and agreed to work on some of the difficulties on a temporary basis. Described by his widow as an idealist and an "angry young man," he wanted to see what he could do for the agency. For several months, the Kenora board's new Personnel Committee aggressively courted him. Despite an offer from the Province of a senior position with the Department of Public Welfare, the Personnel Committee successfully wooed Treen, offering him a salary of \$10,000. He became Kenora's first Director with social work qualifications and the highest paid Executive Director of any CAS in Ontario.⁴³

Ted Burton, a young lawyer and board member, became involved in Indian activism in the 1960s. He describes Treen as young and vigorous who ran the agency like a business rather than it running him. Treen had enjoyed a positive and long standing working relationship with James Band. There were numerous letters between the two men during Treen's tenure at Kenora. Just after his arrival in January 1964, Treen wrote to Band that the agency had 100 open cases, 200 children in care and two social work staff! Keeping children settled, handling emergencies, and handling court work left no time for anything else, he stated.

The Lakehead agency had fewer children in care and three times the staff. He wrote:

I am not even thinking of hiring trained social workers since any of them from Southern Ontario would likely take the first bus home. As the agency is going through a financial crisis, they couldn't afford to pay the salaries... There are a multitude of small but significant problems needing attention that will take another couple of months to sort out. Some of these are related to mismanagement by the Board.⁴⁴

Treen thought that he could return to Toronto by Easter, three months after his arrival, leaving things in better shape. Treen was described as a person who would not check with Toronto or the text books to make his decisions. He would "shoot first and ask questions later." He was impatient with inefficiency but unaware of how slow change might be in a small Northern Ontario town. There were numerous problems with the system which placed Indian children in Kenora foster homes. Indian-white race relations were tense, the foster home shortage was dire, unsavoury characters preyed on the Native female wards, and natural parents interfered with placements.⁴⁵ In addition, as described in Chapter 10, the agency received almost nothing from the municipalities for prevention.

The first task of Treen and the Personnel Committee was to hire, against the wishes of the board, Jack Copeland and Peter Louttit. Apparently the Board objected to hiring these "tough guys who had never been to university."⁴⁶

The team of Treen, Copeland and Louttit worked well together spending many hours socializing after work.⁴⁷ Treen knew little about Indians and the

North and the other two nothing about social work. Treen had come to the agency committed to the idea of one child, one family through adoption as the best plan for children in permanent care. Louttit knew the pain of separation and of not belonging. Copeland had lived closer to Indian culture than most whites in the area and had many Northern contacts. Copeland believed that Indian adults should be looking after Indian children and made no bones about stating this in public. He stated that he would say that he had "no damn business on reserves," and that Indians should have been "looking after their own damn kids." He believes today having the responsibility for their own child welfare might have stopped the drunkenness prevalent in Kenora in the sixties.⁴⁸ He acknowledged that the Indian people around Kenora had little reason to trust white agencies but was frustrated by their reluctance to become involved in child welfare.

Apparently Treen and Copeland conceived of the idea of placing the many Indian permanent wards (then numbering about 100) for adoption in the far North where Copeland had traded furs for so many years. The far Northwestern corner of the province contains 27 small First Nations communities which had minimal contact with the rest of Canada until the second World War. Even today some people do not speak English and pursue traditional pursuits from the land. In the mid 1960s, the communities were even more isolated. In July 1964, seven months into Treen's Directorship, an exploratory trip into the communities to discuss adoptions was made. In

September, a planeload of 8 children flew into the isolated community of Sandy Lake.⁴⁹

Treen had informed Deputy Minister James Band in advance of the plan by telephone, referring in a letter to Band of 29 September 1964 to a telephone call to this effect. Treen reported that 350 people came to meet the plane and that a community feast had been held to welcome the children.⁵⁰ By winter a total of twenty five children had been placed and plans for another 25 were in the planning.

The adoptions received wide spread publicity described as "contrary to federal policy."⁵¹ (See Appendix G) The agency enlisted the cooperation of the local judge who agreed to finalize the adoptions bending the rule of not requiring the adoptive parent to be present at the court hearing.⁵² The effect of the children's English speaking skills on the other children in the communities was repeatedly mentioned. The press reported it as one of the advantageous of the adoptions,

...the children have something to give the reservations...They speak excellent English and help improve the English of both older and younger people on the reservations where Cree and ojibwa is the main language,..⁵³

No one mentioned that most of the children did not speak Cree or Ojibwa. One of the adoptees then age 9, now aged 38, did not realize he was an Indian when he was placed in the North.⁵⁴

The precise number of children taken to the North in this manner is not known. Jack Copeland states that he placed 73 children in his seven years

with the agency. In 1964 and 1965, the agency's four workers placed a total of 176 children for adoption.⁵⁵ This compares with 1979 when 24 workers placed 45 children.⁵⁶ The amount of preparation and follow-up in 1964 and 1965 would have been minimal if any existed at all.

Comparing the adoption figures both before these years and in relation to the number of staff there were to carry out the procedures, it is simple to conclude that the term the local people use for the mid 1960s adoptions, "the drop off," is not a misnomer. In one of two known references to the adoptions in the literature, Sylvia Burnford wrote about her trip to Sandy Lake a few years after the adoptions,

There was a particularly disturbing account that I heard many times concerning a plane load of children sent up from the Children's Aid for placement, either adoptive or as foster children. Those families who had put their name down for a child - and many who had not - went down to meet them at the dock and take their choice. No one in any position of responsibility or knowledge, minister, teachers, or nurse, was consulted as to the desirability or background of the applicants: no official came to inspect. Undoubtedly most of those children would eventually be happier in their new families than in the sterile restrictive atmosphere of an orphanage, for Indian families are generously expandable to the orphans and strays of their own people, and cases of neglect and cruelty almost unheard of.⁵⁷

Burnford's perception that ministers, teachers and nurses were appropriate authorities to consult and her belief that neglect and cruelty were unknown in Indian communities, reflects little understanding of Indian communities. Burnford went on to suggest that the role of some children was that of "unpaid servant." Indian people have used the term "slave" to describe the treatment of some of the adoptees.⁵⁸ This appears to have been true for many children.

A number of them have died violently, committed suicide, are in jail and some have done well.⁵⁹

By the time that I arrived in the area in 1976, the story of the "drop-off" had reached legendary proportions. One worker Lois Mombourquette, was working with some adoptees. In consultation with her Supervisor, she had released identifying information to them and facilitated reunions of siblings separated in the drop-off. This was done in defiance of provincial regulations that allowed only non-identifying information to be given out.⁶⁰

The account of the drop-off was that about 75 children were sent up to the North in a DC-3 aircraft. At the docks of the communities anyone could take a child who appealed to them. Hence the name "drop-off". Ted Burton believes that home studies were done albeit perfunctorily. Peter Louttit and Jack Copeland disagreed stating some applicants were actually rejected. Donald Mamakeesic was an interpreter for Copeland and Louttit during the first couple of visits. He remembers the exploratory visit of Jack Copeland. He recalls lineups of people in the community hall giving the demographic particulars of their families.

Mamakeesic believes that some of the adoptions were successful. If the people's motivation to adopt was correct according to Indian custom the adoptions usually were successful. If the couple were childless or wanted to replace a deceased child with a child the age of the lost child, this was positive motivation. If the motivation was to acquire extra labour, it was not. When

abuse or neglect of any of these children was known to exist, no one knew what to do. There were no phones in the communities and CAS workers were generally not known to the communities.⁶¹

The criticism of the drop-off adoptions were the lack of preparation of the children, separation of siblings, and no consideration for the age of the adopted child in relation to the ages of the others in the family. The older Indian children from the white homes in the towns had difficulty in making the transition from the amenities of television, hydro, running water, to the harsh labour-intensive life of the North. Furthermore, most of the older children spoke only English, would have had little contact with Native people and no sense of Native identity.

Unlike in other areas, the bitterness towards the Kenora CAS in the far North is not directed at the taking of children from the communities, and not necessarily for the adoptions. The bitterness is directed towards what was seen as the abandonment of the children by the lack of follow-up. Mamakeesic said that no one knew who to contact when they saw a child abused. There were no phones in the communities and the CAS workers were perceived not to have visited again. Louttit states that follow-up visits were made. Donald Mamakeesic is unable to understand why it was so easy to get a child then and yet almost impossible today.

Harold Treen was criticized for many of his attempts. He was part of the Kenora Indian-White Committee meeting which organized the November 1965

protest march. Before the march, he described in public an incident he witnessed of a drunk white woman who was ignored while harassing people in a building, while a bit later an intoxicated Indian woman was ejected forthwith from the buildings.⁶² The Winnipeg Tribune reported more of Treen's remarks,

The only difference between the racial situation here and in the U.S., said Mr. Treen, is that the white man in the United States is actively hostile to the Negro, while in Kenora, the white man "ignores" the Indian.⁶³

At later conference in November, Treen made a plea for better understanding of the plight of Indians and their battle with alcohol and for the white community to set a better example,

Why is it that we haven't transmitted more of the better qualities to him and to his culture instead of many of our worst features?⁶⁴

Treen's outspoken approach about Kenora's racism caused him many struggles with his board and the Kenora public.

Treen was accused of racism when the agency fired an Indian employee, Fred Kelly. According to two staff of the time, Kelly was hired to compile a list of families and extended families in the reserve communities to facilitate placement of children on the reserves.⁶⁵ He was fired after two and a half months for not doing this apparently. The press coverage of the firing indicated that Treen fired him because of his participation in the march which Treen denied. Treen himself had supported the march and was criticized by the CAS board for this support.⁶⁶ It would appear that Kelly might have been fired for

organizing the march during the time that he was to be finding foster homes for Kenora CAS children.

During Ted Burton's time on the board, he would buffer Treen's unpopular decisions to the board to make his difficult job easier.⁶⁷ Treen obviously saw the futility of the existing CAS administration and wanted to change the approach from that of a charity to a professional service. Having worked with the Waterloo CAS, which as reported earlier in 1965 raised 14.7 percent (\$56,527) of its 1965 budget from the municipality's discretionary donations (Chapter 10), the hostility and apathy of the Kenora municipalities would have seemed untenable.

Harold Treen died suddenly in May 1966. Following a difficult board meeting, he slipped on ice and broke his leg. He died several months later of complications from the injury. His former colleague, Lois McGee remarked that just before his death the spark inside of him had died. The story of Harold Treen is one of just many of those who recognized the special problems of Indian child welfare but were unable to find solutions that would work.

After Harold Treen's death Stephan Charko, Program Supervisor from Toronto, was appointed as Director. Jack Copeland became the Assistant Director. He was not able to provide clinical casework supervision to the workers most of whom had no social work training, however his knowledge of the North was invaluable in returning Indian children to their extended families.

The years 1968-70 were more tumultuous years for the agency. Stephan Charko's wife fell ill and required the medical services of a large city and he returned to Toronto. One of the mandates of the Child Welfare Branch had been to amalgamate agencies in close proximity. The Fort William and Port Arthur Societies joined leaving one Director, Herb Dawson, unemployed. He was close to retirement.

Apparently against the advice of Child Welfare Branch the Kenora board hired him as Local Director. He had suffered a stroke and some mental impairment.⁶⁸ His impairments were overlooked by the board. He was unable to provide supervision, prepare a budget and apparently was often verbally inappropriate.⁶⁹

A recently hired MSW from California, a Mr. Charlie Smiley organized the concerned staff to write a report to the Board and to a number of outsiders about the situation. One secretary became involved in doing all the photocopying of the correspondence and consequently came under fire from the board. Both Mr. Smiley and the secretary resigned. Apparently the Director also submitted a letter of resignation. The Board held a five hour meeting in April 1970 to discuss the crisis. They accepted the resignation of the secretary and Charlie Smiley. They did not accept the Dawson's resignation as he was due to retire in July. At the same meeting they decided to ask for the resignation of the Assistant Director, Jack Copeland, on the grounds that his position was redundant. The Child Welfare Branch Director agreed with the

latter decision on the grounds that an agency the size of Kenora did not require an Assistant Director!⁷⁰ It is difficult to believe the Branch did not recognize the special conditions of KCAS by its comments, "an agency the size of Kenora."

Within the space of ten years, Kenora had four Executive Directors and two Acting Directors. They all left under unhappy circumstances. The belief of those interviewed was that the inability of the private board to appreciate the seriousness of the Kenora District's child welfare problems was fundamental to the problems. Although there is no documentation on staff turnover in the agency, it seems doubtful that it could have been anything other than very high.

Many of the staff who were interviewed were those who had stayed. Some reported they took more children into care early in their tenure than when they were more experienced. They knew families and communities better and were in better positions to assess the risks to children. Continuous staff turnover would increase the numbers of children in care because new staff would not know families. They would not have the appreciation of the implications of Indian children in long term care in Northern towns. After some experience they would realize that admissions should be avoided and made every attempt to make this so. Furthermore, a constant change in leadership would hinder any new directions from coming to fruition.

A more favourable staff situation occurred in Rainy River. There were only two Directors during the 1960s, one of whom stayed a total of 8 years. Before his appointment in 1976, the current Director had a fifteen year association with the agency as a worker and board member. Appendix E indicates relative staff stability. The ability to do obtain the data for this research reflects of the stability of the agency.

AFTERMATH AND THE DIVESTMENT OF CONTROL TO FIRST NATIONS GOVERNMENTS

Kenora

In 1970, the Kenora agency hired a Director who stayed for 14 years. The agency experienced unprecedented growth. Its budget in 1967 was \$237,189 with \$126,083 for child-in-care costs.⁷¹ By 1970 it was \$386,181 and by 1972, \$599,000, with child-in-care costs of \$227,940 and \$308,998 respectively.⁷² In 1977 it had a group home, an Assistant Executive Director/Supervisor in Kenora, 6 workers in Kenora, a Supervisor in Dryden, 4 workers in Dryden, and 4 in each of the Sioux Lookout and Red Lake offices. (The latter two offices were supervised by one person from Dryden.) There were approximately 18 workers and two Supervisors in four different offices to deal with 37 reserve communities, four towns and numerous hamlets - an area larger than the size of France.

That year the eighteen staff dealt with 1053 children in care for the whole year, 563 new admissions to care, with 490 children in care at year's

end.⁷³ This averages 31 admissions per worker annually, 60 children in care annually and a year-end, in-care caseload average of 33 children. The workers all carried generic caseloads which meant for one case they did all the family work, child care and often their own home finding. In addition they processed private adoptions, official guardian reports, and travelled extensively in the Kenora District's huge catchment area. Expansion and more money did not decrease the numbers of children in care.

At the beginning of 1964, Kenora CAS had 200 children in care and a 1963-64 budget of \$162,884. By 1976 there were 490 children in care at year end. The most recent budget figure obtained was for 1972, almost \$600,000. Therefore a three hundred percent increase in budget by 1976 accompanied a 150 percent increase in children in care. By 1979, there were three more supervisors and 24 field staff. That year the murder of the Indian foster child Sean Mandamin by his foster father occurred. The death was discussed in an administration meeting immediately after focusing only on the events of the night of the death. In administration meetings to which I was party, there were no discussions or debriefings about the predisposing factors that workers had missed. As a Supervisor in a Branch office, I learned all the details of the case from the newspapers during the trial. In the meantime, MCSS was undergoing reorganization stimulated by the numerous baby deaths in Southern Ontario.⁷⁴ To my knowledge MCSS did not investigate the agency's

part in this death. The worker for the case, an inexperienced young man with no social work training, was fired.

The history of the Kenora agency embodies all the weaknesses of 1960s Indian child welfare policy. The unabated escalating costs and expansion, the escalating numbers of children in care, the utilization of untrained and unsupervised staff reflect the inconsequential nature of Indian child welfare to the bureaucracies and lack of accountability. In 1978, the concerned front-line Kenora CAS staff spoke privately to the IWA evaluators of the serious problems including the lack of supervision. This was communicated directly to the Deputy Minister. These concerns resulted in the inclusion of Native prevention workers in the agency.⁷⁵ In 1982, the discontented staff leaked confidential case information to the Deputy Minister expressing their belief about incompetent management, focusing on cases where it failed to investigate child abuse cases properly. This ultimately resulted in MCSS taking over the agency in 1984.⁷⁶

Two years later, almost five years to the day after the Mandamin death, and after the MCSS had put additional resources into the agency, MCSS seized control of the agency and fired its upper management.⁷⁷ Almost immediately MCSS began to negotiate with Nishnawbe-aski Nation to take over its own services. The IWA facilitated a \$5 million commitment from MCSS to develop the agency. This agency, Tikinagan Child and Family Services, developed almost immediately. After two years experience in direct service, it became a

designated CAS in 1987. In 1991 it was under criticism by its own First Nations government. The criticisms were similar to those levied against the non-Native agencies - the service was not using cultural methods and was taking too many children into care, while many children were also being left at risk.⁷⁸

Rainy River

The history of the Rainy River Indian agency took a more planned route. Rainy River CAS initiated a change in direction in 1975. Ron King, former worker, probation officer and board member became the Executive Director in 1975. He noted that upon his return, something had been lost since the early sixties when the agency was making attempts to establish closer more positive relations with the reserve communities. The numbers of Indian children in care had been steadily rising since 1972 despite the workers' attempts to prevent this and the utilization of adoption networks. A new approach was necessary. In 1977 King hired Tim Maloney, an MSW with community development background. In an attempt to acquire the trust of the people, Maloney immediately went to live in a trailer in Morson adjacent to the Big Grassy reserve. He spent much of his time hanging around the reserve getting to know people. Soon he was able to establish rapport with the communities of Big Grassy and Big Island.

Maloney took a practical approach to child welfare. In late August the people went on the wild rice harvest habitually leaving the children alone. This always meant increased numbers of children in care who went back home. As this became predictable Maloney suggested preparing for the crisis and diverting funds for an alternative. The RRCAS staff set up a dormitory in the gymnasium and organized meals and recreation for the children during the day for the week or two that the parents would be away. Possibly the children could have managed on their own. This could represent an example of CAS workers misunderstanding Indian culture by not appreciating the independence of the children or the strengths of the remaining community members to provide. Legally the agency was obligated to intervene in some way even if it did appreciate the cultural differences, however. The elder from Manitou Rapids who believed that the CAS presence only encouraged irresponsibility and government dependence, would probably not have approved. From the agency's point of view, it solved a problem of escalating and unavoidable admissions to care.⁷⁹

Two individuals, Moses Tom and Joe Big George, became resources through whom he was able to place children. The success of the approach led the agency to apply for special funding through the Ministry of Community and Social Services to hire these men as the first Native prevention workers in the area. The program was approved in 1979 following a minimum of delay from the government. In 1977, the MCSS had decentralized to Sault Ste.

Marie. The IWA evaluator's personal warning to Deputy Minister George Thomson prompted a personal visit to the area. He was immediately impressed with the urgency with which change needed to occur.

A parallel process had been occurring with the Rainy River Tribal Council. Using the consulting services of the IWA evaluator, it created a separate corporation and developed a model for Indian child welfare.⁸⁰ It was to become the first Indian child welfare authority in Ontario, receiving its designation as a Children's Aid Society in 1987, Weechi-it-e-whin Child and Family Services. To date there is no information available as to its performance as there is for Tikinangan in Sioux Lookout.

SUMMARY

The staff of Northern CASs were often persons from the area in which they worked. They had a variety of backgrounds from fur traders to electrician. Only the Local Directors were social work trained. The most CAS experience possessed by new workers was as a board member, adoptive parent or foster child. The workers could not be classed as having mainstream life styles or values. People in the Northern areas had, at best, little knowledge of Indians, and worst, were hostile towards them. Persons who worked with Indians hopped in and out of boats and airplanes to make home visits, searched for parents in Northern pubs, walked across frozen lakes in mid-winter, trapped and skinned furs, played baseball with reserve residents, and lived in trailers

next to reserves to become acquainted with the people. These activities would not likely be attributed to mainstream culture.

All the workers other than the Local Directors knew nothing about child welfare when they started. With a few exceptions, most of the workers knew little about Indian culture, however, they did know that extended families customarily looked after children. They stated that they removed children from situations which they believed constituted a danger to their lives. They believed that there were times when children might have coped but the clarity of the law on abandonment obligated them to act.

The Northern CASs during the 1960s operated with few staff and a Director who was also the only supervisor. In 1964 and 1968 respectively, Rainy River and Kenora hired a supervisor. The agency personnel reported, and archival documents supported this, that municipalities resisted paying for any children in care. There was no resistance from Indian Affairs concerning billings. Judging by the amount of Archival material, Indian Affairs Branch had better communication with the local agencies than did the province.⁸¹ Senior bureaucrats did not appear to appreciate the unique needs of the agencies which served native people.

CAS administration in the North could be described as "loose." In a time when CASs were shedding their charitable focus to becoming public services, northern agencies maintained their relative independence by government default. This may have facilitated workers to develop adaptive responses to

new problems such as those of Muriel Casson in the Tomhawk Village and the adoption drop-off.

The Northern CAS workers coped with arduous conditions of climate and distances and large numbers of children in care. In light of their beliefs that an apprehension would prevent death or injury, it is unsubstantiated that this was an imposition of a middle-class non-Indian standard. Even if they judged wrongly, it would be unconscionable to not intervene in such cases. The definition of what is dangerous to a child may vary from culture to culture but in extreme climates and isolation, cultural interpretations of what constitutes danger may vary less so. Nevertheless, child welfare workers believed generally that children were better off with their parents and made unusual attempts to not take them into care or return them home.

The themes which emerge in the findings concerning the service providers in Northern Ontario CASs are:

- (1) workers use of special provisions in protection practises, adoptions disclosures, reporting of a child's religion in response to special circumstances of Native children
- (2) lack of understanding of Indian culture by the workers but acknowledgement of differences
- (3) disincentives to take children into care - lack of homes, difficulty in finding adoption homes, multiple foster placements
- (4) limited training of CAS staff as social workers

(5) high turnover of staff producing administrative problems in Kenora although less so in Rainy River.

Endnotes to Chapter 11

1. McQuaker, 49 and 70.
2. Diane Stafford, 22 September 1992.
3. Norma Houghton, interview by author, 27 September 1990, tape recording, Fort Frances, Ontario.
4. Betty McLeod, Norma Houghton, Ron King, separate interviews by author, tape recordings, 26 September 1990.
5. Norma Houghton, follow-up correspondence to author, 22 September 1992.
6. Norma Houghton.
7. Ron King.
8. Muriel Casson.
9. Norma Houghton.
10. Ibid.
11. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6929, file 487/29-1, part 1, Reel #C-10,987, Welfare Services to Indians Sioux Lookout, correspondence to G. Swartman Superintendent Indian agency Sioux Lookout from W.J. Harvey Assistant Indian Agent, 2 February 1954.
12. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6929, file 401/20-1 part 2, reel 984, Welfare of Indians of Ontario, memo to Regional Superintendent from Superintendent Sioux Lookout, 23 March 1960.
13. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6929, file 487/29-1, part 1, C10,987, Welfare Services to Indians Sioux Lookout, correspondence to G Swartman Superintendent Indian Agency Sioux Lookout from W.J.Harvey Assistant Indian Agent, 2 February 1954. The village was also described by Betsy Beardy who grew up in the village, interview by author, 11 December 1991, Sioux Lookout.
14. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6940, file 487/29-4 part 2 Reel #C-10,990, Care of Foster Children in the Sioux Lookout Agency 1956-1962, Placement forms.
15. Betsy Beardy, 20 October 1992.

16. NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6937, file 1/29-4-0 part 1, Reel 10,989, Policy Matters regarding care of children in private of foster homes, Memo Care of Helpless Children, undated, unaddressed and unsigned. The memo does not specify whether this was single point data or the total for the whole year. The figures are presented for the sake of comparisons. The total reported in Ontario was 166 Indian children.

17. Report of the Advisory Committee, Study of Permanent Wards of the 55 Children's Aid Societies in the Province of Ontario, Appendix "A", page 36. The data do not differentiate between Indian and non-Indian children. Verbal reports of some workers of the time attest that the majority were Native, with Rainy River running a 60:40 ratio (Ron King) and Kenora 80:20. (Correspondence from Harold Treen to Deputy Minister James Band, 1964). The term "Native" probably referred to all categories of Aboriginal peoples.

18. From Report of the Advisory Committee on Child Welfare to the Minister of Public Welfare, C.J. Foster Chairman, November 1964, Appendix "F", COMPARATIVE FIGURES AND COSTS PERTAINING TO THE CHILDREN IN CARE OF THE 55 CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETIES OF ONTARIO 1957-1962.

19. From the report of the Advisory Committee on Child Welfare to the Minister of Public Welfare, Chairman C.J. Foster, November 1964, Study of Permanent Wards, page 38.

20. Lois McGee, interview by author, tape recording, 3 November 1990, Waterloo Ontario.

21. Betty McLeod.

22. Betty McLeod also referred to this incident. I was unable to find this documented in the logbooks and to discern which year it was. It may not have been logged as the children all went home immediately.

23. Jim Campbell, interview by author, tape recording, 12 June 1992, Guelph, Ontario.

24. Frank Leutschaft, interview by author, 25 September 1990, Dryden, Ontario.

25. When I joined the agency, I soon heard of Frank's reputation of driving around all night to find someone to take a child to avert admissions, "a real protection worker," one person said.

26. Ted Burton, interview by author, 15 February 1991, Thunder Bay, Ontario.

27. Jack Copeland, telephone interview by author, & November 1990; Muriel Casson, op cit.

28. Jack Copeland.

29. When I first saw the term "pagan" listed in the log books, it struck me as derogatory until Norma Houghton explained how she used this to circumvent the problem of religion in adoptions.
30. Norma Houghton, correspondence 22 September 1992.
31. Ron King, telephone interview by author, tape recording, 24 June 1992.
32. Marie McDiarmid, interview by author, 26 September 1990. Fort Frances, Ontario.
33. This concept was popular in the late 1970s in the North as a guide to practise. The Northern workers had put this into practise intuitively before the phrase was coined by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit in their work, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, op cit.
34. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, file, 1387, Indian Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting 10 December 1957. The public alcohol abuse in Kenora was of a concern of the Indian Advisory Committee to DPW Deputy Minister James Band. This Committee was comprised predominantly of Indians from Southern Ontario.
35. Kenora Daily Miner and News, "Local Liquor Offenses May Face Stiffer Penalties," 31 July 1965, 1.
36. G.E. Mortimore, "Ojibway: a polite demand for aid," Globe and Mail, 26 November 1965, 7.
37. Duart Farquharson, "Warning of Racial Violence, Whites, Indians meet in Kenora," Winnipeg Tribune, 16 November 1965.
38. Muriel Casson.
39. Ted Burton, interview by author, tape recording, 16 February 1991, Thunder Bay, Ontario.
40. Ibid.
41. Harold Treen had conducted the Review of Permanent Wards on the DPW Minister's Advisory Committee on Child Welfare 1963-1964. After his death, a tribute to his efforts in this area appeared in "Tribute to Harold Treen," Journal of the Ontario Association of Childrens Aid Societies, Volume 9, Number 7 (July 1964): 7.
42. AO, RG 29, Acc 14571/2, Correspondence from Harold Treen to James Band, 16 March 1964.
43. Joan Treen, interview by author, 26 November 1990, Peterborough, Ontario; Ted Burton.
44. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, file 537, Kenora CAS 1947-70, Correspondence from Harold Treen to James Band, 28 January 1964.

45. Ted Burton, op cit.
46. Ted Burton.
47. In this type of work in the North, with the propensity to become over involved in solving grave problems, discussions about what can be done go on after hours. The conversations while socializing probably formed the basis of adoption practices of the agency.
48. Jack Copeland.
49. Jack Copeland, "Adoption of Indian Children," JOACAS (January 1965): 7-9.
50. AO, RG 29, ACC 14571/2, file 537, Kenora CAS, Correspondence of Harold Treen to James Band, 29 September 1964.
51. "Place 26 Children in adoption in Ten Days", Kenora Daily Miner and News, 30 April 1965.; Perry Anglin, "Back to reservation, Indian children adopted", Toronto Star, 11 February 1965; Back to the Reserve", Stratford Beacon Herald, 11 February 1965.
52. Ted Burton.
53. Perry Anglin, "Back to the reservations, Indian children adopted, "Toronto Star, nd. circa February 1965, courtesy of Joan Treen. See also Jack Copeland, "Adoption of Indian Children," and AO, RG 29, Acc 14571/2, Kenora CAS, Correspondence from Harold Treen to James Band 29 September 1964.
54. Frank Redsky, interview by author, tape recorded, 18 February 1990, Sioux Lookout, Ontario.
55. AO, RG 29, Acc. 14571/2, file 537, Kenora CAS 1946-70, Kenora CAS Annual Report. In 1964, 75 were placed and in 1965, 101.
56. Family and Children's Services of the District of Kenora, 1979 Annual Report.
57. Sylvia Burnford, Without Reserve (Boston:Little Brown, 1969), 141. Burnford's comments embodies some of the same that the designers of the adoption policy possessed. Her indication that the agency did not ask "anyone in authority", meaning a non-Native teacher or nurse, expresses the knowledge of reserve organization typical of non-Natives of the time. The Kenora CAS consulted the Indian authorities of the communities. They were to be later criticized for bypassing Indian Affairs which found it had 30 more children to educate in its school in Sandy Lake. Burnford's visions that foster children lived in orphanages expresses common misperceptions of child welfare in the sixties. Her assertion that abuse was unknown in the Native communities is reminiscent of the noble savage image of the North. This was probably one of the mistakes of the Kenora CAS as well in planning these adoptions.

58. Peter Louttit; Donald Mamakeesic, interview by author, tape recorded, 18 February, 1991, Sioux Lookout, Ontario; Frank Redsky, interview by author, tape recorded Sioux Lookout, 26 February 1991.
59. Frank Redsky, Donald Mamakeesic. I became aware of many of the adoptees fates through my work with the Native mental health service in Sioux Lookout.
60. Lois Mombourquette, telephone interview by author, tape recording, 17 November 1990, Sioux Lookout, Ontario.
61. Through my work in the North, I became aware of about a half dozen adults adoptees of the drop-off with serious problems who had experienced cruelty in their adoptive homes.
62. "Local liquor offenders may face stiffer penalties", Kenora Miner and News, 1,4 & 8.
63. Duart Farquharson, Warnings of racial violence: whites, Indians meet in Kenora, The Winnipeg Tribune, 16 November 1965, 1.
64. "Conference heard talk by C.A.S. Director, Kenora Daily Miner and News, 16 November 1965, 6.
65. Lois McGee and Jack Copeland.
66. Winnipeg Tribune, "March Organizer is given notice by his employer," 29 November 1965, 2; Stratford Beacon News, "Deny Indian Fired Due to March," 29 November 1965; Duart Farquharson, "Indians want Kelly to stay in his work," Winnipeg Tribune, 30 November 1965, 19.
67. Ted Burton.
68. Betty Graham, interview by author, tape recording, 28 May 1991, Toronto, Ontario.
69. Lois McGee.
70. AO, RG 29, ACC 14571/2, file 537, Kenora CAS. Memo from Betty G. Graham, Director of Child Welfare, to the Honourable John Yaremko, Minister of the Department of Social and Family Services, 14 April 1970. In my discussions with Ms Graham she was unable to recall the reasons for her opinion although she did recall that Jack Copeland was considered a "trouble maker."
71. Department of Public Welfare, Annual Report, Legislative Assemble of Ontario, Sessional Paper 13, 1968-1969.
72. Ministry of Community and Social Services, Statistical Supplement to Annual Reports for fiscal years ending 1971 and 1973.

73. The staff complements come from my personal knowledge of the agency; the child-in-care data from the 1979 Annual Report of Kenora CAS.
74. Keith Norton, interview by author, 1 April 1988, Toronto Ontario.
75. Dick Lightbown, interview by author, 8 April 1988, Toronto, Ontario and George Thomson, interview by author, 13 April 1988, Toronto, Ontario.
76. George Thomson.
77. Robert MacDonald, interview by author, 6 April 1988, Toronto. See also Sylvia Stead, "Ontario cites danger to Kenora children, takes control of CAS," Globe and Mail, 19 January 1984, 1-2.
78. Jim Doherty Associates, *A Comprehensive Review of Tikinagan Child and Family Services Executive Summary*, October 1991.
79. Diane Stafford.
80. Del Support Services, To Serve and Protect (Toronto: Thunderbird Graphics, 1985).
81. There was nothing of significance in provincial archival records for RRCAS other than routine form letters. The DPW's only correspondence with the KCAS was that initiated by Harold Treen, and memos from the Director of Child Welfare during the staff crisis in 1969.

**BUSH-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
SERVING A CHILD'S BEST INTEREST AS BEST THEY COULD**

Lipsky developed a theory of the lower level public servants in human services. He coined the term "Street-Level Bureaucracies" in describing their dilemmas.¹ The framework fits much of the practice of Northern Ontario CAS personnel in the 1960s and 1970s who found themselves dealing with unfamiliar circumstances not on the street but in the boreal forests.

The theory states that the decisions, the routines and devices to cope with uncertainties and work pressures of public servants become the public policies they carry out. Public sector workers carry a considerable amount of discretionary authority. The situations are too complex to be reduced to formulae, their decisions require sensitive observations and judgements. Street level bureaucrats need to find the balance between compassion and flexibility, impartiality and rigid application of rules. Street-level bureaucracies typically are chronically inadequately resourced; the demand for services increases to meet the supply; goals are unclear. Performance is hard to evaluate using quantitative criteria. Because the larger context, including the difficulties involved in service delivery, is not relevant to the clients, they often cannot evaluate the service providers' performance appropriately. Street level bureaucrats might be performing at their maximum but clients' may still perceive their own needs to be unmet.

Street-level bureaucrats reflect the culture of the context in which their agencies exist. Their responses to work stresses arise out of the work situation, but their context or directions are coloured by prevailing cultural assumptions. Street-level bureaucrats normally are directed to be efficient and cost effective but exist under varied community goals which are inconsistent with work pressures. For example, in Northern CASs the community pressures to protect children by providing foster care was inconsistent with the volume of referrals and with what CAS workers believed to be in the children's best interest.

The dilemma of the Northern CAS workers was eloquently expressed in 1968 by a Supervisor at the Thunder Bay office in response to public pressure to provide more intervention on Indian reserves. He wrote a brief response in the OACAS Journal.² I have reproduced it in its entirety in Figure 12.1. The innuendos of the writer's prose convey the frustration and dilemma of the bush level bureaucrat that a simple paraphrase of the article could not.

CASs were one of the few public services available to address a mammoth problem that society in general did not acknowledge. The public's approach was to address the problem by inappropriate interventions in the name of equality. At the same time there was little commitment to pay for either inappropriate or appropriate interventions. As Morgan says, if the CASs

Figure 12.1 - Apprehension of Indian Children

A. Morgan

Apprehension of Indian Children

Out of a recent meeting concerning itself yet again with the distressing plight of the Indian in our small Northern fringe settlements, this time graced by the presence of the sitting Member of Parliament, the esteemed gentleman was heard to voice the following comment:

He was shocked to find the filth and squalor, the amount of overcrowding, to see small children waiting for their parents outside the beverage parlour, and to learn of families selling their welfare vouchers to obtain money for liquor rather than obtain food for the children.

The inference that followed was that this placed the Children's Aid Society in a vulnerable position and the question then arose as to *whether or not these children should be even left in the community because of the conditions of neglect in their homes?*

With due respect I suggest that it places the Children's Aid Society in the position it has always known itself to be . . . viz: That it lives in proximity with and is fully knowledgeable of Indian children who are technically neglected by reason of the life-pattern of their families.

We have known for years of literally hundreds of Indian families squatting on the fringes of small Northern communities living in conditions of filth and squalor with poorly motivated parents - described by our former Federal Member, Douglas Fisher to the Canadian public in the press as - "The worst placed of my constituents . . . a blot on the Canadian conscience". We have already many such children from such homes and daily get more from delinquency hearings at Juvenile and Family Court.

If the Children's Aid Society were 'to do its job', basing its thinking on the fact that all the social needs and inadequacies affecting the Indian would be met by removal of the children from their environment as advocated, one can imagine the increase in budget, staff, and facilities

needed . . . and all for a negative concept.

I am not being facetious when I say that the collective arrival of children into care would be likened to the march of the Pied Piper.

No, I'm afraid this appeasing of social conscience through mass apprehension of the children fails to meet the real problem. It might as conceivably be argued that the present acute housing problem could be solved through keeping the movie houses open all night - on the basis that its program automatically provides the shelter, warmth, refreshments, etc., as the Children's Aid Society's program of child care, by legislative definition, assures the Indian child of decent hygienic care and attention so blatantly lacking in his own home environment.

The sad feature I'm afraid is that the Children's Aid Society is being used unfortunately for just this purpose . . . to meet or alleviate the distressing social needs of the Indian family that are unmet by society in general, through care of the children . . . and it is more than convenient I sometimes think, that the evidence of neglect in his Indian home is more than enough to assure the Court's granting the wardship order necessary to provide this care.

I think the whole position of the role of the Northern Children's Aid Societies in relation to this problem should be presented, if necessary through appropriate bodies to the Legislature itself, with a view to enactment of an appropriate program or increasing the scope of other existing agencies, (e.g., Department of Social & Family Services, Education, etc.) to meet the socio-economic needs of the Indian people rather than the use of one or two existing agencies, out of character, because their program happens to fit a major aspect of the problem.

Mr. Morgan is District Supervisor, Geraldton Branch, CAS Thunder Bay.

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were applying the same standards to the Indian communities as they did to others, many more children would have been in care

The term "best interest" was not a defined concept until the 1984 legislation in Ontario. In the 1954 child welfare legislation, the definition of "neglect" included words such as "improper" or "unfit," and "incompetence or

misfortune" to describe caretakers and living conditions.³ This left CAS practices open to a wide spectrum of cultural and regional interpretations. In Ontario's 1965 child welfare legislation, the term neglect was substituted by "in need of protection" using much the same criteria as the 1954 Act.⁴ The Act mandated CASs to provide

counselling and other services to families for protecting children and for the prevention of circumstances requiring the protection of children.⁵

There were no criteria of what constituted a child's best interest as there are now but, in general, CASs believed a child was usually better off at home than in care. In the 1984 Ontario legislation, Section 37 (3) spelled out cultural background as a criterion for determination of a child's best interests. Section 37 (4) goes a step further specifying the cultural background of an Indian or Native child as a "special best interest" criterion.⁶

There are indications that after the initial years of service provision, the workers in the North learned to consider a Native child's cultural background when judging "best interest." In deciding the best interest of a child and the need for protection, the possibility of loss of life was paramount in the minds of the Northern CASs workers interviewed. Many knew that the best interests of children, especially Indian children, were undermined by the trauma of coming into a foreign environment. They recognized the special risks to Indian children in care. This motivated many of the discretionary decisions of Northern workers.

The Northern CAS workers did not reflect Southern Ontario culture from where child welfare laws originated. Nor did they necessarily reflect Northwestern Ontario non-Native culture from which they came. As their backgrounds indicate, many of them represented a marginal sub-culture not fitting either the dominant culture or Native culture. In their environment, race relations were strained and close Indian-white contact through work or marriage was not the norm. Some CAS workers conflicted with mainstream society personally and professionally.

In early CAS days, goals, if set at all, were set by individual boards whose main functions were fund raising. The goal was clearly to keep children out of care whenever possible. At government levels, the goals for Indian child welfare were not defined as prevention as for other Ontario children when CAP and IWA were implemented. The reason for the omission notwithstanding, whether an oversight or a reflection of the DIAND's perception of child welfare, no one noticed that the prevention goals were not met for Indian children. For persons close to the clientele, that is municipalities and CASs, one goal was to offer any alternative to foster care before 1965, although for different reasons. However, the Kenora municipalities were not interested enough in this goal to give the CAS any prevention monies. Keeping children out of care was expressed strongly as the priority of the Kenora and Rainy River agencies. Public pressure to intervene was strong. On the other hand all levels of government were reluctant to be involved to help agencies meet any of their

goals. After 1965 governments continued to be distant from the front-line of CASs and even more distant from the problems of CASs serving Indians. There was no direction for Indian child welfare.

Although money was less of a problem after the IWA made funding Indian child welfare easier after 1956, foster home resources were chronically scarce and resistance to take Native children existed. The more the policy changed to fund more Indian child welfare, the more money was spent for providing child-in-care services for them. The same policy was designed for urban conditions where far fewer children were in care although the funding was still based on in-care days. The difference was that mainstream agencies were achieving a measure of confidence and competence in serving children in their own homes, the focus of prevention. They were moving from the thrust of child welfare from the child saving days of foster and adoptive care to a mind set of prevention. A transitional situation in Native communities existed that was parallel to the early 20th century urban regions in their transition from rural to industrial life. The mind set of mainstream society, however, was that child welfare and particularly Indian child welfare was synonymous with foster and adoptive care. This was reflected in the media (witness *Today's Child*) and in funding principles.

Even though budgets were still based on the number of children in care, the in-home service aspect played a larger part in determining budgets after CAP was introduced. The funding method premised on in-care services applied

to the Native population in crisis made the use of tertiary in-care services inevitable. Agencies in the North had been able to keep non-Indian children out of care like the rest of Ontario in the late 1950s, but they were caught unprepared for the new problems they faced with the Native population in crisis as the 1960s progressed. The demand for foster care rose to meet the supply of money to pay for it.

One cannot say that actions such as the drop-off adoptions in 1964 and 1965 were mistakes. Such incidents need interpretation within the context of the conditions and knowledge of the time. As far as the renegade Kenora CAS Director Harold Treen and his staff could judge, the Indian wards faced a bleak life of several foster homes and impermanence in a racist environment. The idealized notion was at work that in traditional Native societies in the North child abuse did not exist and that Northern communities were all welcoming. This unrealistic view overshadowed common sense that would demand that there be much more preparation. This "noble savage" perception is common with well meaning non-Indians wishing to help Indian people.

Although there are reports that many of these adoptions ended in tragedy, some worked out. If the children had stayed in foster care they faced a life of several foster care moves and possibly training school as far as the CAS workers could discern. If they were adopted through a more thorough planned process to caring parents, their lives could still have been equally tragic if their early lives had been traumatic. There has been no study of these

adults or comparison to other adoptions either with Natives or non-Natives that would provide the data on which to make this judgement.

An increase in spending coupled with the concomitant increase in Indian children in care measures the impact of the misplaced policy. This was the outcome in Northern child welfare street-level bureaucracies. Increasing the monies available given the social context of the Northern communities spelled conditions in which more Indian children could come into care. Given the lack of supervision and worker overload, in-care services did not necessarily mean an improvement in a child's welfare, as the case of Sean Mandamin demonstrates.

The bush-level bureaucrats of the North took many risks in attempting to address the conflicting goals to protect children's lives while serving what they perceived as children's best interests. To do the right thing, they took many creative measures. To find a permanent home for a child, Norma Houghton bent the truth about religion to circumvent the religious obstructions to placing Roman Catholic Indian children. By speaking out on racism in Kenora, Harold Treen risked personal and professional isolation. To find permanence for foster children in their own culture, he made a decision about children which has been severely criticized. Some would argue that were it not for the stress of attempting to find alternatives to the existing system, he might not have died so young. To keep Indian children from the loneliness of separation from family Frank Leutschaft regularly risked his own health and

well being. To serve Indian children's best interests, workers took risks by operating in a manner which they themselves believed to be scarcely legal by influencing judges or circumventing court and administrative procedures when placing a child with its relatives. Lois Mombourquette and her Supervisor bypassed confidentiality and disclosure regulations in order to reunite Indian siblings separated in the 1960s. Finally in 1982, the workers in Kenora broke loyalties to their employer and risked dismissal by reporting to the Deputy Minister their concern for the Indian children of Kenora District.

There are parallels and differences between the past and the present. Child welfare practice in the 1990s is far more controlled and structured than in the 1960s and 1970s. The Indian agencies must now operate under the more rigid structures of new legislation that has removed many discretionary powers for workers. Although well funded, they are no better or worse equipped to deal with the problems than the agencies were in the 1960s. Many of the Native workers lack the qualifications, the same as the workers did in the past yet they are able to be much culturally sensitive.

CASs serving First Nation communities in the past were concerned with emergency protection and immediate threats to well-being. The Indian agencies are in the position whereby they must find treatments for the underlying causes which precipitated such interventions and healing the long term results of the interventions. The agencies of the 1990s are under much more public scrutiny than those of the past while their task is more difficult. These Ontario

agencies have not utilized Regulation 206 in the Child and Family Services Act allowing them exemptions from any part of the act. This type of discretion helped the bush-level bureaucrats in the 1960s and 1970s to respect cultural differences and to prevent many admissions.

Given the pressures of child welfare work in the North and the lack of public acknowledgement and support, high staff turnover has been a reality. Staff turnover and CAS administration issues interfacing with a population in severe cultural crisis would contribute to the high rates. Chronically inexperienced personnel and disrupted leadership would result in a lack of corporate knowledge of individuals, communities and culture. Children-in-care would not receive consistent attention. Increased expansion without a foundation, leadership or clear goals could only accompany increases in single point rates and inappropriate apprehensions under such circumstances. This applies to the newly formed Native agencies as well which, in some areas have recorded 100 percent staff turnover in a year.⁷

CONCLUSION

In the early days of service extension, child welfare workers did not understand Native culture and the role of the extended family in child protection. They took a hands-off approach to Indians for jurisdictional reasons but also because they acknowledged that cultural and social differences did exist between Native and non-Native society. The difficulties of performing

child welfare duties in a racist environment with Northern realities forced workers to make accommodations to the conditions when services were fully extended. Agency mandates were clear that workers should make every effort to keep children out of care wherever possible regardless of race. Traditional systems were less accessible even to culturally sensitive workers because of breakdown in community values, out-migration and inability of extended families to cope with the demands.

The major reasons the workers apprehended so many children in Rainy River District was a belief that children's lives would be endangered if not apprehended. The infant deaths in Seine River illustrate that the agency was not successful in meeting even this fundamental goal of protecting children from death. The focus on the actions of child welfare workers undervalue factors set in motion long before Childrens Aid Societies even existed.

The criticisms imply that CAS systems were mechanisms of social control of Indian communities. While the larger system was a mechanism of control, to suggest that child welfare workers were agents of social control is misleading. Callahan suggests in an article making a feminist analysis of child welfare, female clients in child welfare agencies have always used the agencies for their own purposes despite the social control underpinnings of the service.⁸ This perspective fits the Northern situation of the 1960s and 1970s. Indian people often used CASs to their advantage by using their services voluntarily and making referrals when their own social control was weakened. To paint

Indian communities as helpless victims of the CAS hegemony underestimates their abilities which are obvious in today's political climate. Just as the street level bureaucrats made their own interpretations of the policies, many Indian people saw their own uses for CASs in their time of crisis.

It is impossible to use the apprehension rate to evaluate the actions of CAS workers in Northern Ontario in the 1960s and 1970s. A higher or lower number of Indian children in care would not mean CAS workers were working more or less or that their work was more or less effective. The all-night ventures of workers such as Frank Leutschaft to keep children out of care would not show up as in-care statistics or as financial items. They may not even appear in a case recording. The evaluation of his performance could be classed as heroic in terms of his goal of protecting Indian children's lives while maintaining their special best interests as Indian children. There is no way of evaluating the consequences of not intervening in such situations. The children may have frozen or burned. On the other hand, the crisis may have passed with no consequences. It may have been a one time occurrence and the family never again brought to CAS attention. The mother of the child in the cabin from whom he took the infant may argue that he intervened inappropriately; the grandmother may have criticized him for not keeping the child. At issue was the perception of real harm coming to a child.

Some Native people today would say that despite all the dangers, the CAS had no business intervening at all.⁹ One scholar asserted that if

Canadian society respected Native special status and culture, it would not have allowed any intervention at all.¹⁰ It would be unconscionable if some service, as inadequate as it is judged, were not offered to Native communities during the 1960s and 1970s. It should be remembered that it was the non-recognition of special status in other policy areas, not just child welfare, that created conditions that lead to child neglect.

These conflicting evaluations reflect Lipsky's theory of human services workers being the prime policy makers. It reflects their need for discretion and the dilemma in evaluating the decisions of street-level bureaucrats.

The Northern child welfare workers were correctly defensive about their mistaken judgements being targeted as prime reasons for disproportionate rates of Indian children in care. Considering the conditions they faced, the obstacles encountered, and the risks they took they did acknowledge differences even if they did not understand them. At the point of apprehension, they believed they were saving lives of children, not saving them from a poverty stricken reserve life as they have been accused of doing. They attempted to mediate between a people in crisis and a society that devalued their clientele. They did so in a hostile environment using policies that could not respond appropriately to the serious problems the clientele faced.

Cultural misunderstanding and imposition of non-Native values by front line workers could easily occur in the milieu of the North. Declining socioeconomic conditions and an unresponsive bureaucracy would permit these

conditions to flourish when they existed. Undoubtedly they account for some apprehensions. They do not adequately explain however the unabated escalation of admissions of RSI children at a time of inadequate services to meet the demands and numerous problems in the population served. The unnoticed efforts of many child welfare workers, grandparents and extended family members to keep Indian children with their families and communities probably reduced the numbers of Reserve Status Indian and other Indian children who might have been in care in Ontario during the period of study.

Endnotes to Chapter 12

1. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individuals in the Public Services (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980).
2. A. Morgan, "Apprehension of Indian Children," Journal of the Ontario Association of Childrens Aid Societies VII, 8(October 1968): 8-9.
3. Ontario, An Act to consolidate and revises The Children's Protection Act, The Children of Unmarried Parents Act and The Adoption Act, Section 11 (1) (e), Statutes of Ontario, Chapter 8, page 35.
4. Ontario, The Child Welfare Act, 1965, Section 19 (b), Statutes of Ontario 1965, Chapter 14, page 50.
5. *Ibid.*, Section 6 (2), 43.
6. Ontario, Child and Family Services Act, 1984, Statutes of Ontario 1984, Section 37 (3) and (4), Chapter 55, 626.
7. Peter Hudson, "Manitoba's Indian Child Welfare Services: In the Balance," Perspectives on Social Services and Social Issues, ed. Jacqueline S. Ismael and Ray J. Thomlison (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1987), 259.
8. Marilyn Callahan, "A Feminist Perspective on Child Welfare," in Ideology, Development and Social Welfare: Canadian Perspectives, ed. Bill Kirwin (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1991), 139-156.
9. Meeting with Board of Directors Weechi-it-win Child and Family Services, 25 September 1990.
10. Mawhiney, 1989.

V

CONCLUSIONS

Long time ago, when the world was new, there were two caterpillar people -- who loved each other very much. Now, as happens, the husband died, and the woman was so sad that she didn't want to talk to anyone -- didn't want to be around anyone. And so she covered herself with her shawl and begun walking, crying softly. For a whole year she walked, and because the world is a circle, she returned to where she had started. Then the Creator took pity on her. He said, "You've suffered too long. Now's the time to put aside your sorrow. Step into a new world of colour, a new world of beauty". Then the Creator clapped His hands, and she changed into the Butterfly. And so it is for our Indian people, the Butterfly is the symbol of everlasting life and the hope of a better world to come.

(Legend of the Warm Springs Indian people from Tafoya, "The Widow as Butterfly")

CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS THAT SHAPED DISPROPORTIONATE RATES OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN CARE

The disproportionate rates of Indian children in care in Ontario is explained the simultaneous merging of post World War II changes that shaped a probability for high rates.

This chapter synthesizes the conclusions that answer the questions: What role did child welfare policy play in disproportionate rates of Indian children in care? What role did socioeconomic changes play in disproportionate rates? What role did practitioners play in the disproportionate rates? Three themes underlying all areas were: the ideology of equality interpreted as sameness; recognition or non-recognition of aboriginal differences (cultural misunderstanding); and incentives or disincentives in program choices.

THE IDEOLOGY OF EQUALITY

The belief that Native people's equality was impeded by separate status, physical separation, different laws and different administrative channels drove early policy decisions. Canadian resistance to special status for anyone is still evident as witnessed in positions advanced by the "No" side in the October 26 Referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.

Equality in law or equality of opportunity is described as freedom from discrimination. A modern day legal philosopher described equality of opportunity as "Free to try. Born to lose."¹ Equality of outcome is attained by affirmative action, and special services for special circumstances. As early as the year 1282, the philosopher Aristotle had recognized that

justice considers that persons who are equal should have assigned to them equal things...There is no equality when unequals are treated in proportion to the inequality existing between them.²

Special status for special circumstances, therefore, is not discrimination although this view was not that of early policy makers. Equality in law drove the equalization policies for voting and alcohol use, education and child welfare.

There were fundamental clashes between the concepts of equality of the policy makers in the 1954 Ontario Select Committee hearings and several First Nations. Unlike the policy makers, the three First Nations that voted against the franchise and alcohol privileges were arguing special status.

The predominating ideology favoured equality of programs delivered through the same channels. Policy makers did not implement the same programs as for others in these assimilative programs, however. The education laws were more oppressive. The use of non-secular bodies to administer education was regressive. In child welfare the concept of prevention was overlooked.

MISUNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE

Cultural misunderstanding prevailed in earlier decisions about education, relocation, wage or welfare income and equalization of alcohol laws. At times these decisions reflected less an ignorance of Native culture and more an ignorance of the human condition.

Native people would not agree that their circumstances before World War II were any less favourable than those of others. Hugh Brody's analysis of the trapping societies of Northern British Columbia proposes that white observers only perceived poverty, destitution and savagery in the Aboriginal life-style because what they believed made life worth living. The ability of the Native people to survive in brutal climates with few possessions and amenities were perceived as deprivation.³

Brody demonstrates the incomparability of urban and trapping economies and societies. Besides differences in values and material consumption there is a strong hidden economy in traditional cultures.⁴ Brody analyzed the dollar value of the hidden economy in the communities where fish and game supplemented welfare or seasonal incomes. The estimated annual potential dollar value of meat per household ranged from \$3,718.60 to \$6,497.02.⁵ Brody states that the hunters and trappers are,

poor people whose tables are always laden with meat...There is a great difference between a poor household that has a reliable source of meat and a household that experiences the remorseless and debilitating effects of urban poverty.⁶

Brody concludes,

Living off the land in general, or by hunting, trapping or fishing in particular, is associated with poverty; but a shift away from such harvesting creates the conditions for poverty.⁷

The policy makers misunderstood or ignored the importance of the traditional economy to family unity. The relocation of the Ojibwa reflected no comprehension of the tie to the land and the effect on the economy. The introduction of farming in RRCAS suggests policy makers' ignorance of the skills and knowledge required for farming.

The material poverty of the bush was perceived to be correctable only by education as understood in non-Indian terms. The actions of the church residential schools was not only a misunderstanding of Native culture but an ignorance of child development, ignorance of the effects on children of separation from their parents, and ignorance of the effect of child abuse on child and adult mental health.

Even more than *misunderstanding* of the culture, the *invisibility* of Indians and Indian child welfare, is crucial. The workers in CASs usually knew nothing about Indians when they started their jobs. Even though raised in the same regions, some said they rarely saw Indians while growing up. Social workers, the profession expected to take the most interest, wrote little about the issues. Until 1980, almost the only social work literature in Canada on Native services was written by CAS personnel in direct contact with Indian communities. Many policy makers appear to have associated child welfare more with in-care services than in-home protection. There was no mention of

child welfare in the Select Committee Transcripts. There was no mention of escalating rates of children-in-care in the provincial Archival files, and surprisingly no mention of it in the Indian Advisory Committee minutes. .

From the National Archives records, welfare costs appeared to be more of a concern. The increases in costs in child welfare meant little to the provincial and federal governments compared to these and other commitments.

SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES

In 1951 Colonel Jones supported placements with extended family particularly if they cost nothing (Chapter 4). Placements within communities cost less than with CASs. Support for use of extended family were financially not culturally based.

Before CAP, municipal child-in-care per diems were the most secure source of income for Ontario CASs. High rates of children-in-care could have served as a secondary gain for CAS survival, reducing the incentive to keep children out of care. Overall in Ontario, however, child-in-care rates declined in the 1950s (Chapter 5). CASs were able to provide protection to children in their own homes despite the funding arrangements that favoured in-care services. The funding method was not a *systemic incentive* for children to be in care. Because government policy provided no rewards for in-home services, there were *no systemic disincentives* to in-care services.

In the North, municipalities served as hostile watch dogs of child-in-care rates posing difficulties for CAS personnel, a built-in check on rates. Rainy River CAS received some discretionary monies from its municipalities for prevention, but Kenora CAS received almost nothing. The private fund raising efforts of RRCAS was impressive for an agency its size but KCAS was less successful. For KCAS, having children in care would be a necessity for it to operate at all, an absence of *systemic disincentives* to keep children out of care. The easy availability of IAB money and the relatively unquestioned existence of in-care costs for Reserve Status Indians would systemically offer a *raison d'etre* for KCAS. IAB money was not associated with large numbers of Indian children in care from reserves before 1966, however. This supports the proposal that both KCAS and RRCAS maintained their commitment to avoid admitting Indian children to care if possible despite lack of funds to do otherwise.⁸

With CAP, the province gained more authority over CASs. The RRCAS, however, was left alone by the government. Escalating Indian costs did not pose a problem to the provincial government because of its low fiscal investment in the service. CASs which predominantly served reserves increased their budgets unquestioned at little cost to the province. Finances were not questioned nor was the fact that the services were predominantly child-in-care services. Ontario had no stake in providing leadership to Northern CASs to develop other approaches. Financial incentives for cheaper

services seem to have driven DIAND to support the alternatives proposed by the London CAS. The possibility of cheaper alternatives precluded ideology.

Similarly, in 1979 with the RRCAS prevention program and in 1984 with the change in legislation, the lack of financial barriers to the province to develop new programs facilitated their early implementation.

Eventually the belief in culturally appropriate, different, services became acceptable if they were cheaper or cost little. Ontario passed an advanced piece of legislation and developed well-funded services run by Native people at little cost to itself.

THE ROLE OF POLICY

The post war debate concerning the rights to social assistance and services for all Canadians culminated in 1966 with the Canadian government assuming a major portion of responsibility for costs for services for all Canadians. In Ontario, it assumed almost all responsibility for Reserve Status Indians.

The shift in funding of RSI services made the province the gatekeeper between the CASs and IAB. Although fiscally accountable to the federal government, the lack of financial responsibility gave the province no incentive to examine more effective means of providing services which would also have been cheaper. Costs for RSI services escalated while the provinces addressed other priorities with its newly legitimated authority over CASs.

With the responsibility for Status Indian children from the Unorganized Territories now with IAB, a significant financial burden was lifted from the province.⁹ This was another factor removing provincial interest from what was happening to Native children.

Child welfare prevention was not stressed as it was with non-Indian society producing a global mind set that accepted in-care services. The ideologies of the policies mixed with abortive attempts to equalize programs created conditions which shaped high rates of children in care. The failure to implement the same channels of accountability pushed rising costs of Indian child welfare and the high rates into oblivion. This immobilized the bureaucracy from providing cheaper or more effective alternatives. The link between the program and the ideology of equality of opportunity was not made.

Child welfare costs were not a priority with DIAND. Post White Paper developments took increasing proportions of its resources. The escalation in social assistance costs were of great concern. While IAB wanted to reduce welfare costs, to do so would have reduced the munificence of the IWA to the province. The province had no incentive to reduce welfare costs and to do so would have increased its responsibility for other social services to the RSI population. IAB had little control over the province's direction in child welfare. Indeed, it is probable that IAB equated child welfare services with foster care and adoption. The fostering to the province of the administrative orphan, Indian Child Welfare, served provincial interests predominantly. It was an

arrangement of convenience only and fell into an even greater chasm in the bureaucracy than previously.

The federal-provincial Indian child welfare arrangements of the 1960s and 1970s resembled a polite custody battle between busy parents. The more affluent parent (probably the father) pays the other to care for the child who does so out of historical obligation (that is, the mother). The dutiful benefactor parent honours without question all requests for child support. The busy parents, however, neglect their child's developmental and emotional needs. Both parents are too preoccupied to notice that their neglect has produced an inappropriately poorly fed unhealthy individual. When someone finally complains about an upset and out-of-control off-spring, the parents recognize their neglectful ways and begin to pay attention.

The child welfare policy gave no clear direction and contained inadequate accountability. It allowed rates to rise without questioning from either level of government, and served to block proposals for cheaper in-home services.

THE ROLE OF SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE

Many post war socioeconomic changes for Northern Native people meshed with the provision of formal schooling. Providing education was one reason for relocating communities. Education contributed to the demise of traditional pursuits causing sudden transitions to wage or welfare economies.

These changes in location and the ability to be self-sufficient lead to the decline in mutual helping traditions. These changes were superimposed on the parents and grandparents of the 1960s, a decade or two out of residential school. The residential schools expedited the loss of the Ojibwa language and hence access to the traditional teachings. The residential schools had profound psychological and emotional impacts on this generation, the long term effects of which are not known.

A major tragedy of the residential schools was their failure to provide the adequate secular education they were contracted to provide because of the attention to Christianization.¹⁰ They failed to offer an acceptable alternative culture or religion to the one they set out to destroy.¹¹ They left a large number of graduates vocationally, emotionally and spiritually unable to cope with the simultaneous shocks of relocation, the loss of the traditional economy, and the sudden availability of alcohol. The first generation of casualties were grandparents of the 1960s. The second generation were the parents of children apprehended.

The sudden socioeconomic changes created conditions which lead to widespread alcohol abuse, also suddenly possible in the name of equality, bringing children to the attention of CASs. At the same time weakening traditional helping systems decreased the chances that extended family would be able to care for these children.

THE ROLE OF THE PRACTITIONERS

At the CAS front line, equality concepts, cultural misunderstanding and incentives and disincentives took a different shape. In the London CAS in 1967, the Director knew that non-Indians' lack of knowledge of the culture demanded a different approach and that hiring a local person (albeit untrained in social work) was necessary to address the problems and to avoid unnecessary admissions of children to care (Chapter 6). The senior public servants resisted because of their belief that special services would separate the Indian community more.

In the North, although the workers did not understand Native culture, they soon learned that extended families were a placement resource on whom they could call.

At the front line level in the Northern agencies, workers' choices were motivated by: the scarcity of foster care resources; the overwhelming work demands; and the knowledge of the often unhappy fate of Indian children in long term foster care. Consequently, at the point of apprehension the paramount criterion for apprehension was the risk to a child's safety, not acculturation. The child welfare workers did acknowledge the unequal social and cultural circumstances of Indian children and found new ways to deal with new problems. Many of the CAS workers' actions described in Chapter 11 would be considered undesirable or illegal in some Southern settings. Northern workers did not understand Indian culture but knew that Indian people were

different enough to warrant different treatment. With experienced workers and those from the North, this acknowledgement lessened the numbers of Indian children who could have come into care.

CONCLUSION

The invisibility of Indian people in general and Indian child welfare in particular were important for escalating, unchecked rates of Indian children in care. Policy makers who overlooked differences proposed equal services. Equal policies were not what was needed and ironically were not provided. The laws, channels and accountability were not the same. The results placed Indian communities in crisis. In Northern areas where change came quickly, alcohol abuse was high, placing the safety of many Native children at risk. CAS service providers were faced with new problems with foster care as the only antecedent ways of dealing with them and no direction from government. Adaptive work at the front line compensated for the inappropriateness of the service for Indian communities. Front line child welfare workers' recognition of cultural differences combined with their own disincentives to take children into care forced them to administer a different service than they might have for non-Indians. These disincentives were the scarcity of foster homes, arduous working conditions and their own intuition to look for alternative approaches.

Applying to a crisis-ridden population policies designed for a less vulnerable population often left few alternatives to child apprehensions.

Native people are correct to cite lack of understanding of their culture as at the root of the high rates of children in care before they took over their own services. They are correct to cite cultural genocide. The destructive processes, however, began long before the extension of child welfare services or the Indian Welfare Agreement. Without this breakdown, serious neglect would not have occurred or would have been handled by traditional systems. With child neglect presenting itself as life and death emergencies, there was often no alternative to apprehensions which escalated as conditions changed. The nature of Ontario's Indian child welfare policy both helped and hindered the situation. It allowed there to be casework services at the front line which reduced the numbers of children in care but prevented reforms towards a more appropriate policy suited to the special conditions, ultimately increasing the rates.

The lack of many types of knowledge and understanding at all levels of the system shaped policies that were significant in the escalating unchecked rates of Indian children in care. Child welfare agencies were faced with the results of these policies and the challenge of finding ways of doing no further damage.

Endnotes to Chapter 13

1. Anne Bayefsky, "Defining Equality Rights," in Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ed. Anne Bayefsky and Mary Eberts (Toronto: Carswell, 1985),5.
2. Bayefsky, 2-3.
3. Brody, 60.
4. Brody, 12.
5. Ibid., 204.
6. Ibid., 212.
7. Ibid., 213.
8. As mentioned before, it is possible however, that KCAS might have used its IAB grant for other services as a cushion for its general functioning with the rest of the population. In this way there was a secondary gain for the agency.
9. It is impossible to determine the amount. In 1965, the costs to the province for children in the Unorganized Territories was \$614,364 while its total budget was \$20,7794,988 (DPW Annual Report 1965). Some of these children would be non-Indians and some non-Status Indians. In the North, it appears many were Status Indians.
10. Roger Gibbons and J. Rick Ponting, "Historical Overview and Background," in Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization, ed. J. Rick Ponting (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 28.
11. Vecsey.

**LESSONS OF THE SIXTIES SCOOP:
SIGNIFICANCE FOR FUTURE POLICY DEVELOPMENT
IN FIRST NATIONS' SERVICES**

An historical policy study can guide the organization of present day social work services. In this study three significant areas were examined historically - the background and outcome of a policy, the rapid social changes as Indian culture interfaced with the policy, and how service providers adapted to the new demands.

The 1960s are behind us and history cannot be changed. Some would argue that now is the time to look at solutions not causes. Others would argue that once First Nations' people control their own services, they will not make the same mistakes. There are valuable lessons to be learned from the mistakes of the 1960s that could be repeated.

Canada's First Nations are on the brink of a hopeful future, free of the colonial heritage of the past 125 years and free to heal the wounds of 500 years of contact with European societies. Land claims are being settled and Native people administer large numbers of their own services. By 1989 they controlled almost 70 percent of the funds allotted to them compared to only 20 percent in 1972.¹ Despite its defeat, the Charlottetown Accord gave prominence to the inherent right to self-government.²

The optimism for Aboriginal rights parallels the Canadian hope of the 1950s and 1960s for just and equal societies. In the exuberance of those years

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mistakes were made. Comparable mistakes can be made by Aboriginal groups in their enthusiasm.

Several lessons about the effects of unresolved jurisdiction and lack of accountability are transferable to the present situation. There are lessons about treating causes rather than effects, and lessons about collective changes.

Jurisdiction

Ontario First Nations have consistently argued that responsibility and jurisdiction for the welfare of Indian children and families rest with their governments. The major Ontario First Nations organization, the Chiefs of Ontario, agreed in the mid 1980s to consult with MCSS in implementing the proposed new legislation but only,

as an interim measure until such time as Indian government mechanisms are instituted for the provision of Child and Family Services to Indian people.³

The Chiefs later affirmed their rights to exclusive jurisdiction in child welfare and stated with respect to the legislation,

Nothing in this Act shall abrogate or derogate from the customary law or rights of Self-Government or other rights of Self-Government or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.⁴

Unlike the jurisdictional disputes of the past, the First Nation level of government, is attempting to gain acknowledgement of exclusive jurisdiction in an area claimed exclusively by the province. While the dispute in child welfare is not federal-provincial, it is now First Nations-provincial. The dispute

is no longer about the vindication of jurisdiction but a dispute arguing for exclusivity.

Although the Assembly of First Nations leadership supported the inherent right to self-government in the failed Charlottetown Accord, administrative models of self-government remain undefined.⁵ A continuum of possible models has been suggested by David Hawkes. At one end of the spectrum is the administration of delegated services only. At the other end is a third order of government which holds the authority to make and administer its own laws.⁶ Others have described self-government in non-administrative spiritual terms, "a matter of the heart'- an emotional not an intellectual concept."⁷ Oren Lyons describes it as separate from anything in the Canadian polity.⁸ The rejection of the Accord will likely focus more attention on defining self-government. Or perhaps the rejection of the Accord by the on-reserve Native people reflects a widespread belief in the Lyons' view of self-government.

The present self-governing Ontario Indian and Native Child and Family Service agencies fall under the delegation of responsibility model. The provincial-First Nations jurisdictional arrangements would be classed as delegated or shared using the Fletcher and Wallace models described in Chapter 4. The latter model of Hawkes, if adopted, would place the jurisdiction in the classification of "exclusive" as defined by Fletcher and Wallace. As Fletcher and Wallace noted, in federal-provincial relations, shared jurisdiction

has resulted in intergovernmental conflict; and exclusivity has resulted in little incentive to cooperate. Either extreme in jurisdictional arrangements could have serious effects on Indian child welfare programs. This is particularly so if sensitive issues cause other governments to take a hands off approach. The federal-provincial comparison may be inappropriate for federal/provincial-First Nation relations but no other Canadian model exists from which to draw analogies.

In June 1990, the "NO" vote of Manitoba MLA Elijah Harper, contributed to the blockage of the 1987 Constitutional Accord illustrating Aboriginal political power. In August 1990, the Oka crisis reflected the propensity for violence if Aboriginal rights are ignored.

In attempts to appease political opinion, the federal government may overlook important jurisdictional and accountability issues in Aboriginal self-government provisions. The 1966 policy changes contained no adequate evaluation or accountability mechanism. The program was soon seen as inappropriate and out-of-control by those delivering it but the situation was difficult to correct.

Jurisdiction must be streamlined with clear lines of financial and service authority.

Accountability

Before 1965, CASs had considerable autonomy. The Department of Public Welfare took a hands-off approach. In theory, they were accountable to their Boards who governed them and to the municipalities and private donors who funded them. After 1965, CAS accountability was directed to the province, now their principle funding source, despite the continued Board Structure. The other funding source, the municipalities, could hold the Societies accountable by their mandatory representation on CAS Boards. There was no mandatory provision for Indian Affairs or Band Council representation on Boards. Some attempts were made to involve Native people on the Boards but the attempts were voluntary and success in recruitment was not proportional to the efforts.⁹ CASs in Northern areas with large reserve populations had no formal accountability to the population who formed the bulk of its clientele and no representative of the major funding body, Indian Affairs, on its Boards. The municipal representatives had no incentive to question expenses for Reserve Status Indians as they did in the past. The province approved all expenses unquestioned in RRCAS as did Indian Affairs representatives. There was no accountability in either direction.

Under existing arrangements for Ontario Indian child welfare agencies, the agencies are legally accountable to the province, not to their own government organizations. They are accountable to their own people through

Indian Boards which govern the agencies. It is not known what level of autonomy from the Indian governments is advisable or possible for these Boards. The current structures intimately link the Indian political structures and the child welfare agency. In the initial stages of the development of the Indian Child and Family Services for Rainy River District, community Chiefs comprised the majority of the Board of Directors. Elders served as advisors.¹⁰

Recent disputes between the Manitoba government and the Indian agencies, which are in the same delegated jurisdictional relationship to the province as the Ontario agencies, highlight the fact that political and child welfare goals must be separate. In August 1991, a woman staged a hunger strike on the lawn of the Manitoba legislature demanding provincial intervention. She alleged that her estranged husband, had influenced the agency to seize the children from her care. He was a Chief and Board member of the local Indian Child and Family Services and there was a child abuse allegation against him.¹¹ In another agency, a 13 year old ward of the Dakota-Ojibwa Child and Family Services committed suicide in 1986. A coroner's jury ruled that the agency's Board (comprised mostly of Chiefs) covered up sexual abuse of the boy because it involved the alleged perpetrator who was a Chief and Board member. Other incidents surfaced in the investigation about political interference in attempts to protect Board members.¹² The judge implicated the Manitoba government for its "hands off" approach to the Native agencies.¹³ The province has conceded its error.¹⁴

Mixing politics and legal mandates in child welfare will be harmful to child welfare. On the other hand the support of child welfare programs by the polity is crucial for their success. Resolving jurisdictional and accountability difficulties may be the greatest challenge facing these agencies.

Until First Nations regain economic bases, these agencies will continue to receive all their funding from other levels of government. Members of First Nations are exempt from income taxes by Treaty rights and Indian governments do not tax their own people. If no formal accountability to the funding government and their constituencies exists, the Indian agencies will be in a similar accountability conundrum to those which served Indian communities in the 1960s and 1970s. Child welfare policy and program choices, if inappropriate, will go undetected until a public outcry demands change as occurred in Manitoba.

Peter Hudson and Sharon Taylor-Henley attribute the Manitoba problems to incomplete self government arrangements.¹⁵ As they point out, Indian Child and Family Services have become instruments of self-government in the lack of formal recognition of self-government. The problem has been exacerbated by INAC's continued adherence to the purchase of the provincial infrastructure and its insistence that the province hold the authority. INAC's position ignores the entire constitutional process since 1982 in which the inherent right to self-government has been the central issue, they argue. It places the province in the untenable situation of carrying the responsibility for

standards while having no voice in the funding. Hudson and Taylor Henley assert the all governments must commit themselves to the welfare of children first, and that INAC should focus on effectiveness more than efficiency. They urge INAC to take more leadership to help the agencies further the goal of self-government in Indian Child and Family Services. They argue that experimental models of intergovernmental arrangements should be tried. Given the complexity of the issue and the lack of antecedent conditions, this is a sensible approach to resolution. It would need to involve all parties - the federal and provincial governments, Indian politicians, and Indian service providers. Furthermore, Indian and non-Indian governments must meet as equals. The issues raised here point to the complexity of resolving the administrative difficulties created in Indian child welfare.

In the early 1960s, Indian child welfare programs assisted the federal government's agenda for assimilation, and served to advance Ontario's agenda for equality. The mistakes of non-Native child welfare services fuelled arguments in Indian self-government talks supporting the denial of deeper problems. A decade later, the Native agencies continue to be platforms for unresolved political agendas but the emergence of the deeper problems now compels a resolution. Until the agendas of the respective governments focus on the specific needs of children, child welfare services will continue to confront serious problems regardless of who controls them. The strong resistance to self-government by the National Native Women's Association in concern for the

safety of women and children was recently made apparent. "Self-government gives the right for Native men to abuse Native women," said one document.¹⁶ The mixing of political and service issues may be a major impediment to any acceptance of self-government at the community level.

Streamlining jurisdiction and accountability to one First Nations government with clear accountability to First Nations people in the next logical step.

Treating Causes Rather Than Symptoms

The effect of history and social change on mental health and family life that precipitated child welfare interventions is evident. First Nations will feel the profundity for years and possibly generations. If children are to be protected from abuse today or from being abusers tomorrow, large scale community programs of healing and teaching will be necessary to offset the legacy of residential schools, relocation, loss of cultural ways and losses due to alcohol. At the same time communities will require assistance to adjust to the cultural change made inevitable by current political developments. The rapid impact on the culture will likely engender new problems. In Seine River in 1964, the opening of the road to this isolated community precipitated a situation from which the community has not yet recovered. In Manitou Rapids in 1973, a move away from welfare dependence was associated with a temporary increase in children in care. In the 1980s, the sudden wealth from

oil revenues in Hobbema preceded a period with an exorbitant suicide rate, many family break-ups, and violent deaths. Economic and political improvements will impose new stresses engendering new problems. All major land claims and self-governing arrangements should build in supports services for individuals, families and communities to deal with the shock of rapid change, even if the change seems positive.

If self-government ensues without rigorous thought of the social effects of history and accountability administrative details, self-government could become an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Future historians may judge faulty self-governing arrangements to be yet another agent of cultural genocide. George Erasmus, Co-Chair of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, expressed his belief that the Aboriginal rejection of the Charlottetown Accord reflected the communities' knowledge that healing must occur before self-government can succeed.¹⁷

In a recent survey about Native counselling courses, the respondents universally raised the issue of healing as a necessary component to all counselling curriculum. Virtually all the Native educators, students and administrators interviewed emphasized that persons hired as counsellors must first undergo their own healing or the programs will fail. Many of the Native persons in the Native social service agencies experienced sexual or physical abuse, residential schools or foster homes. They may be recovered alcoholics or children of alcoholics. Many have experienced all of the above. Most

Canadian Native counselling curricula include time or staff in the curriculum to deal with this reality.¹⁸

Approaches in child welfare which address the suffering of whole communities are needed. Therefore, Indian child welfare programs cannot be funded on the basis of the numbers of children in care. The ONWA study showed that 80 percent of Native women have been abused. The aftermath of the attempted suicides in Davis Inlet revealed an entire community suffering from depression.¹⁹ Four percent of Status Indian children are in care, now ten times the national average (Chapter 6). Mainstream solutions such as shelters and the laying of charges seem woefully inadequate in light of the extent of these problems. The continued use or overuse of tertiary approaches that treat and remove victims will divide Native communities because of further breakup of families.

The Assembly of First Nations acknowledges the complexity of child welfare viewing it not from a child-centred tertiary perspective but from that of the family and community. It has stated,

We recognize that the issues surrounding and faced by child and family services are much broader than the Non-Native conception of child welfare, and includes areas such as, mental health, with family violence, suicide, child abuse and addictions, wellness/healing approaches, young offenders, loss of parenting abilities and repatriation. It is also recognized that comprehensive, community, regional and national approaches are required in addressing these issues.²⁰

The authority for the clinical areas included in AFN's vision exist under different jurisdictions and legislation. For example, the federal government has

been reluctant to assume responsibility for mental health in its health services. The federal government funds only two First Nations mental health programs.²¹ Both are in Ontario. A third, also in Ontario, is funded by the province. Family violence initiatives are usually provincial while addictions programs available to First Nations are both provincial and federal.

The Indian agencies will need to address the residential school syndrome. They may confront en masse disclosures of sexual victimization. They will require the ability to research and revive time honoured cultural practices and treatment methods which address contemporary realities. A child welfare agency is unable to rebuild an entire society. All self-governing organizations - health care facilities, schools - will face mental health concerns. Successful economic development will require good mental health of the population. The coordinated approaches of political organizations will be necessary. Simply transferring of the services, building new organizations or using Native workers is not sufficient.

George Podson of Nicickousemenecaning First Nation described how Native people change:

If you imagine two jars full of ants, one are white people, the other are Indians, you will notice different things. In the white jar one ant will crawl out and go on to better things and then some others will follow. Even sometimes one will put a ladder down to help his friends. In the other jar, one will try to get out but the others will pull him down. When everyone is ready and the time is right, they will all climb out together.²²

This story emphasizes the Native ethic of mutual helping but that the success and healing of Native communities will be a collective effort. Its message demonstrates the need for a non-fragmented approach to all services.

A new age of political activism was stimulated by the June 25, 1969 release of the *White Paper* proposal for assimilation of Aboriginal people's programs through provincial channels and termination of special status.²³ The change in two decades towards possible recognition of Aboriginal government as a third order of government is extraordinary. In 1992, Assembly of First Nations Chief Ovide Mercredi enjoys national and international recognition for his leadership.²⁴ Maggie Hodgson, Executive Director of the Nechi Institute, Canada's first Native substance abuse treatment centre predicts complete sobriety for her people by the year 2000. She often tells the following legend as a message of hope to and about her people:

In the mid 1800's there was an Hopi prophecy which said: Our Indian people are in midnight and we will come out of our midnight into our day to be world leaders. This change will start when the eagle lands on the moon. No one understood this business of an eagle landing on the moon. In the 1960s when the first space ship landed on the moon they sent word back to the world, "THE EAGLE HAS LANDED." That week the first Indian Alcohol and Drug Program was set up. The native Alcohol Programs have been the primary instruments in dealing with addictions prevention and treatment in an holistic way. They have been catalysts in the renewal of the Indian Culture. For good social change to happen it has to have a "spirit" of healing to it, an energy, a vision, and movement. The native Alcohol Programs have been the rebirth of our culture. See The Spark!²⁵

The federal government released the *White Paper* less than a month before the Eagle landed on the moon, July 20 1969.²⁶

Endnotes to Chapter 14

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20. AFN, "National Strategy in First Nation Child and Family Services," January 1993.
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24. CBC News on 27 October 1992 reported that Mercredi was recognized in a London England concert hall where many persons approached him for a handshake.
25. Maggie Hodgson, "The Eagle has Landed," paper presented to Canadian Psychiatric Association Section on Native People's Mental Health, Annual Meeting, Thunder Bay, September 29, 1989. See also Hodgson, Canadian Women's Studies, 1989.
26. Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year, 1970 ed., s.v. "Neil Armstrong."

GLOSSARY

Aboriginal: In its capitalized form, a descendent of the original inhabitants of North America before the arrival of the European settlers in the late 16th century. It includes a person who is Indian, Inuit, Metis or any blood mixture of these groups. One author points out that the term "original" would be more appropriate because the prefix "abo" denotes "away from."^{*}

Band: A group of Status Indian persons usually members of one large extended family. Usually members of one Band occupy one reserve although there may be several tracts of land in use by one Band. It is used interchangeably with the term First Nation. In 1982, there were 577 Bands in Canada.^{**} A decade later there are more because of recent land claim and legal changes. Bands often have more than one reserve.

Child: For the purposes of this study a child is any person eligible to be in the care of a Childrens Aid Society. The context is important if age is a consideration. It usually is a person under the age of 16 but CAS wardship can extend until the age of 21. In the period of this study, only persons under the age of 16 could be admitted to care. If the context is "children admitted," it means the children were under the age of 16. If "children in care" is used, it includes persons up to the age of 21.

Child-in-care: A child who has been admitted to a foster home, group home or institution of a designated Children's Aid Society for protective care because of parental inability to care for the child.

First Nation: A term which has been common for the last decade to refer to an Indian reserve or an Indian Band. Some persons use the term to refer to any of the classifications of Native people listed here.

Indian: A distinct racial group of Native people who inhabit the area south of the tundra of North America. Indians comprise six recognized cultural regions. There are ten major linguistic groups comprising 58 dialects. From a legal perspective there are Status Indians, Reserve Status

^{*}Patricia Monture, see Chapter 2, Endnote 23.

^{**} DIAND, Information (Ottawa,1987),6

Indians, and Non Status Indians. They number about 400,000 in population.

Inuit: A distinct racial group of Native people who inhabit the tundra area of Northern Canada and some parts of Northern Quebec. An Inuit person holds the same legal status as a Status Indian or Reserve Status Indian. In 1985, there were an estimated 28,000 Inuit in Canada.*

Metis: This term has several definitions. It often refers specifically to the descendants in Western Canada of the original European fur traders and Aboriginal women who adapted the life style of both cultures. The Metis are often classed in the Non Status Indian grouping. It can also refer to any person of mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal descent. In 1981, a total of 98,260 Canadians identified themselves as Metis.*

Native: As used here in capitalized form refers to a descendent of the indigenous inhabitants of North America before the arrival of the European settlers in the late 16th century. It includes persons who identify themselves as Indian, Inuit, Metis or any blood mixture of these groups. The word is capitalized to denote ethnicity.

Non-Indian: A person who is not a Status, Reserve Status or non-Status Indian. It usually does not refer to Metis or Inuit. It is similar to non-Native. It can refer to any non Aboriginal race.

Non Status Indian: A Native person who identifies himself or herself as Indian but is not registered with the Department of Indian Affairs for the purposes of the Indian Act.** Indian persons lack legal Status for a variety of reasons. Before 1985, an Indian woman who married a non Indian or a Non Status Indian lost her Indian Status as did her children. Before amendments to the Indian Act in 1951 an Indian lost his or her Status by a one time cash settlement granting him or her rights denied to Status Indians such as the right to consume alcohol or to vote. Some Indians lost their Status if they earned a University degree many years ago. In 1981, 75,110 Canadians identified themselves as Non-Status Indian.*

Other Children: In its capitalized form, this refers to children who are not Reserve Status Indians.

*DIAND,7

**DIAND,2.

Others: In its capitalized form this refers to any person who is not a Reserve Status Indian.

Registered Indian: A person who is registered with the federal government as an Indian for the purposes of the Indian Act. For our purposes the term is synonymous with Status Indian.

Reserve: A tract of land set aside for a tribe or Band by the federal government originally for its protection from non-Indian encroachment. Reserves can be one of several in a Band. In 1982, there were 2,252 reserves in Canada.

Reservation: A term used in the United States synonymous with the Canadian term "reserve."

Reserve Status Indian: A Status Indian person who has lived on a Indian reserve designated under the Indian Act within the last year. Special tax, health care and educational assistance privileges accompany reserve status. This term originated in the 1965 Indian Welfare Agreement with the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services. In its capitalized form, it is a bureaucratic term which originated in 1965. For MCSS purposes, it included Status Indian Persons who are resident of Unorganized Territories. For the purpose of this study, persons or children who are not Reserve Status Indians are termed Others or Other Children.

Status Indian: A person registered with the federal government according to the terms of the Indian Act.^{*} Status Indians are registered with the Department of Indian Affairs originating from Treaty agreements between Indian tribe and the government of Canada. Status Indians are eligible for special rights and privileges if living on a reserve. Technically, Status Indians lose these privileges if living off an Indian reserve for more than one year although this appears not to be strictly enforced. In 1986, there were an estimated 374,200 Status Indians or 1.5 percent of the Canadian population.^{**}

Unorganized Territories: These are any public lands, which are not reserves, without municipal organization.

^{*}DIAND,2.

^{**}DIAND,6.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A**FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS¹****Provinces with Special Arrangements**

NWT: There is no difference in funding between Status Indian services and those for all others.

Quebec: In the 70's contracts were made with individual Bands by the federal government. Under the James Bay and Northern Quebec agreement, through a cost-sharing agreement with the province, provincial regional boards with Indian members administer all social services to the Indian people in the North. Other Status Indians have access to other services, cost-shared between the two levels of government.

Ontario: Through a comprehensive agreement at the federal government's initiative during the formation of CAP, Ontario entered an agreement with the federal government in which the province provides the full range of all social welfare services including child welfare, and is reimbursed according to a formula based on relative welfare dependency rates between the Status Indian population and others. This amounts to about 93 percent of the total costs. Ontario is the only province to have this arrangement although this was what the federal government had in mind when it passed Part II of CAP.

Newfoundland: This province entered Confederation in 1949 and therefore its Indians are not covered by Treaties. However the federal

¹ Johnston, 24 -62.

government has assumed responsibility for payment of child welfare services as a result of an agreement that recognized the extreme disadvantage of Newfoundland Indians. The federal government covers ninety percent of all costs incurred.

Provinces Which Offer Full Range of Services, Partial Funding

Nova Scotia: In 1964 Nova Scotia signed a memorandum of agreement that Indians on reserves would receive the same services as others. The federal government paid one hundred percent of child-in-care costs and one hundred percent of related administrative costs.

British Columbia: In a 1962 informal agreement, the province agreed to provide the full range of protective services with one hundred percent of protective and child-in-care costs covered by the federal government.

Yukon: By agreement in 1961 the full range of services would be offered to Indians with one hundred percent of child-in-care costs covered and a fixed amount for related costs.

Manitoba: Fourteen bands in the south of the province have access to the full range of services, including some family services, by a 1966 agreement. The northern bands covering 75 percent of all Manitoba Bands were covered by no agreement at all. The federal government covered one hundred percent of the child-in-care costs.

Provinces With No Formal Agreement

New Brunswick: Services are provided as required and as requested only. The federal government covers one hundred percent of child-in-care costs and the other services are billed under the general CAP agreement.

Alberta: This province intervened only in the case of life and death situations. All child-in-care costs were covered by the federal government.

Saskatchewan: This province was most adamant in adhering to a policy of intervention in extreme cases only. Although the Department of Indian Affairs could intervene in voluntary situations, its officials invoked provincial authorities in life and death situations.

Prince Edward Island: This province extended services only when needed. Foster care costs were reimbursed but administrative costs were not.

CATEGORIES OF FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS BY PROVINCE AND TERRITORY²

Funding Arrangement	Federal Portion	Comments
<u>Special</u>		
NWT	All residents funded identically	
QUE	Cost-shared, not specified.	Some contracts with Bands.
ONT	93%	
NFLD	90%	No Status Indians
<u>Partial Funding</u>		
NS	100% CIC costs, administrative costs covered.	
BC	100% CIC costs Other costs, unspecified.	
YUK	100% CIC costs; unspecified fixed amount for other costs.	
MAN	100% CIC costs	No agreement for 75% of Bands
<u>No Agreement</u>		
NB	100% CIC costs.	Services provided as required and requested.
ALB	100% CIC costs.	Intervene in life and death only.
SASK	100% CIC costs.	Extreme reluctance to intervene.
PEI	100% CIC costs.	Services as requested

² The information on funding and jurisdictional arrangements is all from Johnston, pages 7-16, although the classifications are mine. Appendix B outlines the details for each province and territory. The limitations of the Johnston information and my interpretations are discussed later.

APPENDIX B

Interview Questions

Specific questions which guided the interviews were:

From the Indian Perspective

- (1) What were the ways that your communities ensured that orphaned or abused children were protected from acts of commission or omission of their parents?
- (2) What changes in your communities resulted in conditions which lead to child neglect and other symptoms of community breakdown?
- (3) How do you describe the changes that occurred in your communities? What do you view as the causes of the breakdown, if applicable? What were your community's experiences with the child welfare system during the various periods as clients, as observers, as leaders, and as current service providers? How are present directions in the delivery of services by Indian agencies reflective of and integrated with the past child welfare practices and negative experiences of Indian people which lead to the chaos which proceeded the high numbers of child apprehensions? What is the Indian view of sovereignty as it applies to child welfare? How do you see this integrating traditional ways with present services?

From the Service Providers' Perspective

- (4) What stands out in your memory from when you first began your work in child welfare at the agency?
- (5) What were typical scenarios encountered that required intervention?
- (6) How did you decide whether apprehension was warranted? What attempts were made to address the cultural difference?
- (7) What obstacles did you face?

From the Public Servants' Perspective

- (8) Who were the significant senior public servants behind initiatives to introduce services in the 1950s, to expand them in the 1960s and to turn them

over to Indian governments in the 1980s? What pressure points moved the system? What factors influenced these people to influence change in the system?

(6) To what extent did the introduction of the Indian Welfare Agreement influence the expansion of CASs which served Indian communities?

(7) What involvement did the Ministry of Community and Social Services have with Northern Ontario CASs which served remote areas? Were senior officials aware of the conditions of the remote North and of significant events in child welfare in the area? Did Indian services take priority with senior officials at any time, and what obstacles did they face with other levels of the provincial government in implementing policy?

APPENDIX C

List of Persons Interviewed (in chronological order)

Robert MacDonald	Deputy Minister MCSS 1983-1989
Georg Thomson	Deputy Minister MCSS 1976-1982
Dick Lighbown	Consultant
Sandra Scarth	Director of Child Welfare MCSS, 1989
Moe Diakowsky	Intergovernmental Relations, MCSS
K.C. Wong	Federal-provincial Cost Sharing, MCSS
Maria Seymour	Elder Member Lac Seul First Nation
Frank Leutschaft	Caseworker, Kenora CAS, 1968-1992
Ron King	Local Director Rainy River CAS, 1975-1992, Caseworker Rainy River CAS, 1960-1962
Betty McLeod	Employee Rainy River CAS, 1963-1992, caseworker to Assistant Director
Norma Houghton	Caseworker RRCAS 1956-1980
Tom Dawyduk	Caseworker KCAS 1977-1979, Assistant Director RRCAS, 1980-1986
Marie McDiarmid	Statistician RRCAS, 1980-present
George Simard	Executive Director Weechi-it-ewhin Child and Family Services
Moses Tom	Elder advisor to Weechi-it-ewhin Child and Family Services
George Calder	Statistician, KCAS
Bonnie Rimstad	Assistant Director KCAS
Glen Teflin	Consultant

Jean Still	Secretary KCAS 1964-1986
Georg Potson	Member Red Gut First Nation, Language Consultant Ojibwa Cultural Centre
Ab Johanson	Field Officer and District Administrator, MCSS, Kenora
Peter Louttit	Former foster child KCAS early 1940s and caseworker, 1964-1970
Tom Chisel	Member Lac Seul First Nation, Supervisor Tikanagan Child and Family Services
Cathy Chisel	Member Lac Seul First Nations, formerly of Manitou Rapids, Executive Assistant Tikanagan Child and Family Services
Sam Crane	Elder member Lac Seul First Nation
Madeline Crane	Elder member Lac Seul First Nation
Sarah McKay	Member Big Trout First Nation, one-time client of Thunder Bay CAS, Health Consultant Shibogamou Tribal Council
Mae Katt	Member Bear Island First Nation, Health Director Nishnawbe-aski First Nation
Muriel Casson	Secretary 1947-1950, caseworker 1950-1960, Kenora CAS, Thunder Bay CAS 1960-1992
Garnet Angeconeb	Member Lac Seul First Nation
Ernie Benedict	Elder member Akwesasne First Nation
Sally Benedict	Historian Akwesasne First Nation
Lois McGee	Caseworker Kenora CAS 1966-1969
Judythe Little	Lawyer and provincial court judge, Kenora
Jim Carroll	Indian service worker, MCSS Sioux Lookout
Tom Goff	Social Development INAC, 1990
Florence Woolner	Caseworker, Kenora CAS 1972-1976

Jack Copeland	Caseworker, Kenora CAS 1966-1970
Lois Mombourquette	Caseworker, Kenora CAS 1976-1980
Linda LaForte	Supervisor, Tyendinaga Family Child and Family Services
Jim Bayly	Social worker and Assistant Director Brockville CAS, 1950-1960
Marlene Brant Castellano	Member Tyendinaga First Nation Co-director Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
Joan Treen	Widow of Harold Treen, Local Director of Kenora CAS, 1964-1966
Wilma General	Board member Brant County CAS, Oshwekan Branch
Donna Loft	Supervisor, Brant County CAS, Oshwekan Branch
Lance Sams	Assistant Director Brant County CAS, 1970-1980
Eva Maracle	Elder member Tyendinaga First Nation
Melba Thomas	Caseworker, Brant County CAS, Oshwekan Branch
Irma Bull	Caseworker, Brant County CAS, Oshwekan Branch
Ted Burton	Board member Kenora CAS 1963-1965, Crown Attorney Kenora in 1960s.
Frank Redsky	Adult adopted child from Kenora CAS in 1965, member of Bearskin Lake First Nation
Donald Mamakeesic	Elder member of Sandy Lake First Nation
Tillie Missabe	Foster mother Bear Island First Nation
Tom Saville	Elder member of Bear Island First Nation
Katie Saville	Elder member of Bear Island First Nation
Dorothea Crittendon	MCSS employ 1940-1985, Assistant Deputy Minister 1960s

Val Gibbons	Regional Director MCSS 1977, Deputy Minister 1991
Betty Graham	Director of Child Welfare 1964-1975
Ted O'Flaherty	Legal counsell Kenora CAS, Board member in 1960s
Diane Stafford	Caseworker RRCAS, 1970-1992
Eva Morrissette	Elder member Couchiching First Nation
Katherine Buckshot	Member Couchiching First Nation
Frances McPherson	Elder member Couchiching First Nation
Ernie Bird	Elder member Couchiching First Nation, Clinical Director Annishnabeg Counseling Services
Don Lugtig	Local Director RRCAS, 1947-1963
Walter Rudnicki	Director Social Development DIAND, 1963-1969
Bill Fobister	Director of Education Grassy Narrows First Nation
Peggy Saunders	Community volunteer Sioux Lookout
Martin Tuesday	Member Big Grassy First nation
Tom Payash	Elder member Grassy Narrows First Nation
Sammy Payash	Elder member Grassy Narrows First Nation
Jim Campbell	Caseworker RRCAS 1967-1974
Ray Graham	Administrator Pelican Residential School, 1960-1979
One anonymous elder from Northwestern Ontario reserve	
One anonymous elder from Central Ontario reserve	
One anonymous person adopted by customary arrangement	

APPENDIX D

CONSENT TO USE INFORMATION

I, _____, of _____
have agreed to be interviewed by Joyce Timpson for research for her
Doctor of Social Work thesis for Wilfrid Laurier University. I
consent to her using in the written document any information I have
conveyed my name as the source of such information. I give this
consent with the following exceptions:

Date: _____

Signature: _____

AGREEMENT TO USE OF IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

I, _____, of _____ Ontario participated in the doctoral research of Joyce Timpson as a key informant. I agree to allow Ms Timpson to use my name in connection with any personal information which I relayed to her about myself and my adoption in any research report or publication, if the use of names is indicated.

I will not hold her liable for any breach of confidentiality provided the information is conveyed as I have told it. I have read the preliminary account of what I have told Ms Timpson.

Any limitations on the publication of identifying information, or corrections to the information I conveyed, are as follows: _____

Signed: _____

Witness: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX E

LOCAL DIRECTORS AND SOCIAL WORK STAFF (1955 - 1964)

YEAR	LOCAL DIRECTOR	CASE SUPERVISOR	SOCIAL WORKER(S)
1955	C.E.R. Thompson		S. Greary
1956	R. Charbonneau		M. Guild
1957	R. Charbonneau	K. Green	M. Guild ; N. Houghton
1958	R. Charbonneau	K. Green	M. Guild* N. Houghton
1959	D.J. Lugtig		M. Guild* N. Houghton
1960	D.J. Lugtig		J. Fraser* N. Houghton R. King
1961	D.J. Lugtig		J. Fraser* N. Houghton R. King
1962	D.J. Lugtig "		J. Fraser* N. Houghton V. Skrief
1963	J.B. Skinner		J. Fraser*- M. Harding B. Oshust
1964	J.B. Skinner		J. Fraser* N. Houghton D. Skuce

*social worker(s) in
Atikokan office.

Source: McQuaker 70-71

LOCAL DIRECTORS AND SOCIAL WORK STAFF
(1965 - 1978)

YEAR	LOCAL DIRECTOR	CASE SUPERVISOR	SOCIAL WORKER(S)
1965	J.B. Skinner		J. Fraser* N. Houghton D. Skuce
1966	J.B. Skinner	R. O'Donnell	J. Fraser* N. Houghton D. McLeod (Skuce) J. Campbell
1967	J.B. Skinner	R. O'Donnell	J. Fraser* N. Houghton B. Oshust J. Campbell
1968	J.B. Skinner	R. O'Donnell	J. Fraser* N. Houghton B. McLeod (Oshust) J. Campbell
1969	J.B. Skinner	R. O'Donnell	J. Fraser* N. Houghton B. McLeod J. Campbell
1970	J.B. Skinner	R. O'Donnell	J. Fraser* N. Houghton J. Campbell D. Stafford M. Kotyk J. Brink
1971	J.B. Skinner	R. O'Donnell	J. Fraser* J. Campbell M. Kotyk J. Brink D. Stafford M. Heise
1972	G.H. Antram	R. O'Donnell	B. Brigidear* J. Campbell D. Stafford M. Heise
1973	G.H. Antram	B. McLeod	M. Semple* B. Brigidear* D. Stafford J. Campbell W. Fowke P. Zyllich J. Vansickle

(continued)

YEAR	LOCAL DIRECTOR	CASE SUPERVISOR	SOCIAL WORKER(S)
1974	G.H. Antram	B. McLeod	M. Semple* D. Hanson* D. Stafford W. Fowke J. Vansickle B. Gurski
1975	R.W. King	B. McLeod	S. Kerr* D. Hanson* D. Stafford J. Vansickle L. Devlin K. Theule
1976	R.W. King	R.W. Smith	S. Kerr* G. Hoggarth* K. Theule D. Willis D. Stafford J. Vansickle
1977	R.W. King	R.W. Smith	G. Hoggarth* K. Brown* T. Maloney L. Treftlin C. Cox J. Vansickle
1978	R.W. King	R.W. Smith	G. Hoggarth* K. Brown* T. Maloney L. Treftlin C. Cox L. Doyle

*social worker(s) in
Arikokan office.

APPENDIX F

Staff Profiles - Rainy River and Kenora CASs

Rainy River CAS

Name: Marion Guild
Workperiod: 1956-1959
Personal: Daughter of DPW Manager who was also CAS Board member. Parents had been adoptive parents.

**Qualifications/
Experience:** BSW, no work experience prior to CAS

Age Started: 25

Name: Norma Houghton
Workperiod: 1956-1971
Personal: Resident of Fort Frances
**Qualification/
Experience:** Registered Nurse
Age Started: 49

Name: Jack Fraser
Workperiod: 1960-1971
Personal: From Aitokokan. A non Native infant was abandoned on their doorstep. They adopted the child. Jack became interested in Board work and later took a staff position.

**Qualifications/
Experience:** Electrician.
Age Started: 50s

Name: Ron King
Workperiod: 1960-1962 as worker, Executive Director 1975 to present
Personal: Born and raised in Fort Frances
**Qualifications/
Experience:** BA in Philosophy, Probation Officer, Board Member from 1970 to 1975.

Age Started: 24

Name: **Betty Oshust McLeod**
Workperiod: 1963-1964, 1967-1970, 1974-1976, 1980 to present

Personal: Born in Saskatchewan, married into Native community in Rainy River District.

Qualifications/
Experience: Welfare worker 1961-1962, MSW 1967

Age Started: 23

Name: **Donna Skuce McLeod**
Workperiod: 1963-1964,
Personal: From Saskatchewan
Qualifications/
Experience: BSW
Age Started: 23

Name: **Don Lugtig**
Workperiod: Executive Director 1957-1963
Personal: Had been a foster child himself, not from the area.
Qualifications/
Experience: MSW, experience in the USA.
Age Started: 30

Name: **Joe Skinner**
Workperiod: Executive Director 1963-1971
Personal: From Thunder Bay
Qualifications/
Experience: Retired Executive Director from Port Arthur CAS
Age Started: 60s

Name: **Rita O'Donnell**
Workperiod: Supervisor 1966-1970
Personal: From the area, sister-in-law to local judge.
Qualifications/
Experience: MSW, had worked away several years in hospital social work in Montreal
Age Started: 40s

Name: **Jim Campbell**
Workperiod: 1966-1973 (with two years away at University)
Personal: Not from area but had worked as guide for eleven years while an artist.
Qualifications/
Experience: BA in Fine Arts, no prior experience in social work, then studies for MSW
Age Started: 38

Name: **Diane Stafford**
Workperiod: 1970-present
Personal: From the area, married to a logger/farmer. Adoptive parent (non Native children)
Qualifications/
Experience: Diploma in Social Services, no prior social work experience
Age Started: 22

Kenora

Name: **Muriel Casson**
Workperiod: Secretary 1946-1947, caseworker 1947-1958, welfare worker for DPW 1958-1960, caseworker Thunder Bay CAS 1960-1990.
Personal: From Kenora
Qualifications/
Experience: Secretarial Training, no work experience before CAS
Age Started: 21

Name: **Peter Louttit**
Personal: Had been a foster child, part Indian heritage
Workperiod: 1964-1970

Qualifications/
Experience: Air Force pilot, no social work experience
Age Started: 28

Name: **Jack Copeland**
Personal: From the area, had worked as a fur trader all his life and knew many Native people in the North, was able to communicate in Ojibwa.

Workperiod: 1964-1971, caseworker and then Assistant Director
Qualifications/
Experience: No social work training, hired for his knowledge of the people in the area.
Age Started: mid 50s

Name: **Frank Leutschaft**
Workperiod: 1968-present
Personal: From the area.
Qualifications/
Experience: Teacher training and one year experience.
Age Started: 27

Name: **Lois McGee**
Workperiod: 1966-1970
Personal: From Southern Ontario, recruited by Executive Director who was colleague at Stratford CAS.
Qualifications/
Experience: BSW when started and had experience at the Stratford CAS
Age Started: 34

Name: **Harold Treen**
Workperiod: Executive Director, 1964-1966
Personal: From Stratford Ontario
Qualifications/
Experience: MSW, Executive Director of Perth County CAS, Executive Officer with DPW.
Age Started: 35

Name: **Lois Mombourquette**
Personal: From Hamilton Ontario, has stayed in the area and is currently the editor of the native newspaper in Sioux Lookout Ontario.
Workperiod: 1976-1979
Age Started: 24

APPENDIX G

Back to reservations, Indian children adopted

By PERRY ANGLIN

Star Staff Writer

Northern Indian children are being returned to reservations in the first concentrated effort to adopt them into Indian homes.

The Kenora Children's Aid Society has flown 25 Indian youngsters to homes on isolated reservations, breaking sharply with a federal policy of keeping them in white communities.

Their return to reservations are antiquated and they want more Indian assimilated into white communities.

Mr. Treen, director of the Kenora CAS, said today that the children are being returned to their reservations, but once they're off the reservation, the Indian Affairs department will help them like a hot potato.

White children, and the Kenora CAS, said today that the children are being returned to their reservations, but once they're off the reservation, the Indian Affairs department will help them like a hot potato.

So the Kenora CAS just fall back on sending the Indian children back to the reservation to be legally adopted by Indians.

Six-year-old twins who had been shunted between four white foster-homes were sent to be adopted by a young couple on the Sandy Lake reservation 350 miles north of Kenora.

They had been emotionally disturbed children, given to bed-wetting and trouble-making.

"But as soon as they were on the reservation they blossomed," said Jack Copeland, assistant director of the Kenora CAS. "Their troubles just disappeared."

The CAS officials said that the best possible treatment for emotionally disturbed children is a country home, where they can chop trees, paddle canoes, and help with animals.

"I don't know of anything more therapeutic," Mr. Copeland said.

COMMUNITY PARTY

It works both ways. The Indian communities appreciate the children—

community party was held the night the twins arrived with 17 other children in Sandy Lake—and the children have something to give the reservations.

"They speak excellent English and help improve the English of both older and younger people on the reservations where Cree or Ojibway is the main language," Mr. Copeland said.

He said he was told by a teacher on the Pikangikum reserve 150 miles north of Kenora that she had trouble getting Indian children to speak English outside the classroom.

"But three of the six children who went there were of school age, and soon they had all their classmates chatting in English outside school."

Mr. Treen also said the adopted children get more attention in schools on the reservations, and are happier there.

"They are happier with their own people," he said. "In addition, it's better for

them to have a family that has a financial responsibility for them, and doesn't have a welfare agency worker in the picture."

Another reason for starting the program was a lack of Indian families living outside reservations who were interested in adopting the children.

About 80 per cent of the 200 children under care of the Kenora CAS are Indian, most of them boarded in white foster homes.

The program prompted some white foster-parents to adopt nine Indian children they were boarding.

"When they realized we meant business and were really moving the children out to the reservations, these foster parents decided to legally adopt the children," Mr. Treen said.

The society has immediate plans to send another 25 children to reservations for adoption, but arrangements are now held up by the difficulty of making

flights in cold weather to inspect potential homes.

The parents who adopt the children can be childless couples, couples with small families—even those whose families have grown up and left home. The chief qualification for a couple—love for the children.

The program could serve as a pattern for further adoptions on to reservations—Mr. Treen sees no limit yet to the number of his children younger than eight who could be adopted.

So far there hasn't been a complaint about the homes which have taken the first 25 children, he says.

Unless you consider what happened to one child whose new family exercised its right to give him a new name, when he arrived on a remote reserve barefoot in radio communication with the rest of the world.

They chose to call him Ringo.

The Stratford Beacon-Herald

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1965

Dad: Back To The Reserve

A former Stratford man, Harold W. Treen, has been getting himself into the news by unorthodox methods in the care of Indian children.

The Children's Aid Society in Kenora District, in extreme North-western Ontario, has been chartering space on aircraft to take Indian children back to isolated reserves, where they can live with their own people. This action is news, because it is the policy of the Dominion Government to educate Indian children in white communities, to help along the process of integration. In the Far North, Indian children leave their families for the school year to live in school dormitories, and get their education while living in white communities.

Mr. Treen is director of the Kenora Children's Aid Society. From 1955 until the summer of 1962, he was on the staff of the Perth Children's Aid Society, with the exception of a few months in 1958 when he was office supervisor for the CAS in the neighboring county of Waterloo. He was director of the CAS in Perth for the last three and a half years he was here.

In Perth there is no problem about placing Indian children, on or off reserves. There are no reserves, and although there are plenty of people of Indian descent, they are so completely integrated that there is no recognizable Indian problem.

Kenora is different. Among 200 children under the care of the CAS in Kenora District, more than 150 are Indian.

Beginning in the autumn of 1964 the Kenora CAS has been deliberately sending some Indian children back to the reserve: about 25 have been flown so far. The reason for thus flying in the face of official policy is strictly practical. The children are being sent back to the reserves because of a lack of Indian families off the reserves, who are in position to adopt children. Most of the Indian child wards in Kenora are boarded with white families in foster homes. A few have been adopted by white couples. Since the policy of sending children back to the reserves was started a few months ago, nine Indian children have been adopted by white couples who were previously providing foster homes for them. Mr. Treen is inclined to think that the prospect of having a child sent back to the reserve prompted some of the white couples to take the step from being foster parents, to being adoptive parents.

In explanation of the back-to-the-reserve policy, Mr. Treen is quoted as saying: "They feel in Ottawa that reserves are antiquated and want more Indians assimilated into white communities. That's fine in theory but once they're off the reserve the Indian Affairs Branch drops them like a hot potato, whites ostracize them and they are even resented by other Indians."

Theories are fine, no doubt, but human beings don't always fit the pigeon-holes the theorists design for them.

PLACE 26 CHILDREN ON ADOPTION IN TEN DAYS

"They want us to get lost", said Mr. Harold Treen, director of the District of Kenora Children's Aid Society.

Mr. Treen seemed cheerful, even jubilant, over this assessment. He was speaking of the children, formerly wards of the society who have been happily adopted by families in the northern reserves. When the C.A.S. workers arrive to make the check which they are obliged to make after placing children on adoption probation the youngsters take to the bush. They have found the security which can be gained only by really belonging to a family, and they don't intend to be deprived of it.

The Kenora society's aggressive program to find adoption homes for its permanent wards has attracted a

great deal of attention throughout the province with both the minister and deputy minister of Welfare recognizing the importance of this work and giving every co-operation to it. Government planes at no cost to the municipality have been made available to take these children to their destination after the C.A.S. workers had completed their investigations.

NORTH WELCOMES YOUNGSTERS

Within a remarkable ten day period, 26 children were placed on adoption probation by the Kenora C.A.S. Of these permanent wards 18 were placed on northern reserves. One child was placed in Indiana, one in Saskatchewan, and several in Southern Ontario. They ranged in age from two months to twelve years.

At long last the uprooting, the insecurity, the moving from home to

home, an average of six moves per child which is sometimes unavoidable in foster care, have come to an end for these children. Their problems have begun to come to an end too. There is 12 year old Joe probably the most happy fellow. He was the victim of 14 moves and had developed almost every kind of problem a person with so many uprootings could develop. He was wanted and loved, nevertheless, by the warm-hearted couple who took him, and now guess what? He is found to be very smart, very intelligent and a natural leader.

KIDS BLOSSOM

There were two young fellows around six years old who had reacted to their several rejections by striking back as best they could with bad habits. Sensing their acceptance by their adopting parents, they almost miraculously put aside their hostilities. A sheaf of pictures in the C.A.S. office shows the other happy parents with their healthy, well-dressed, adopted children.

How has the changes in the youngsters come about? Mr. Treen gives the Indian families of the North top marks for parenthood. They make fewer demands upon the children and thus lessen the pressures upon them. They are affectionate and have their children with them at all times, when fishing, trapping or going about their daily chores.

In the affectionate atmosphere given them the children actually blossom? Mr. Treen says. The school teachers in the north welcome the coming of these children for their knowledge of English helps them with the teaching of this language to the others. A pilot who travels extensively throughout the North has written to the society expressing his appreciation of what he has actually seen in this adoption picture: happy, changed children and parents who are made to feel their worth through being trusted with their care.

In all, there have been 43 children adopted on northern reserves. There is a total of 86 children on adoption probation at the present time.

Indians Lacking Homes Are Sent to Reserves

KENORA (CP) — The Children's Aid Society here has embarked on a policy of returning Indian children in its care to reserves to be adopted by Indian families rather than trying to keep them in foster homes here.

Already, the society has shown 25 children to homes on isolated reserves, contradict-

ing a federal policy of keeping them in white communities. Harold Treen, director of the society, says, "They feel in Ottawa that reserves are antiquated and want more Indians assimilated into white communities."

That's fine in theory, but once they're off the reserve, the Indian Affairs Branch drops them like a hot potato, whites ostracize them and they are even resented by other Indians.

The Kenora society began its present policy last fall. One reason for starting it was a lack of Indian families living outside reserves who were interested in adopting children.

About 80 per cent of the 200 or more children under the society's care in Kenora are Indian—most of them boarded in white foster homes.

Mr. Treen says the new plan prompted white foster parents to adopt nine Indian children they were boarding. Persons who adopt children can be childless couples, couples with small families, or those whose families have left home, said Mr. Treen.

Harold Copeland, assistant director of the society, said the program works both ways. The Indian communities appreciate the children and the children have something to

Kenora Daily Miner and News
30 April 1965
page 1.

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