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**SUMPTUARY GUIDELINES IN
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA'S PAEDAGOGUS
AND
SENECA'S EPISTULAE MORALES**

By

Stephen Crump
B.A. University of Waterloo, 1986

THESIS

Submitted to the Department of Religion and Culture
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Masters of Arts degree
Wilfrid Laurier University
1989

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ISBN 0-315-50088-3

ABSTRACT

This thesis, Sumptuary Guidelines in Clement of Alexandria's Paedagogus and Seneca's Epistulae Morales, explores the similarities between the ethical outlooks of Clement of Alexandria and Seneca, as well as peculiar emphases of each writer. The thesis is introduced with a discussion of the Christian search for identity within the Roman world, and the influence of Stoicism in formulating this identity.

The next two chapters provide the social and intellectual context within which Clement and Seneca respectively wrote. In establishing Clement's backdrop, the cultural, intellectual, and economic settings of Alexandria are examined. The argument is put forth that these various settings all had an impact on Clement's ethical outlook. Following this, certain of Clement's theological and philosophical viewpoints are discussed which bear upon his ethical guidelines. The portrayal of Seneca's background naturally focuses on Rome. Treated are the sumptuary philosophers whom he encountered in the great city, as well as the prominent place of Stoicism there. Personal elements of Seneca's life, as well as the social circles within which he moved, are also examined.

The actual comparison between the ethical guidelines of Clement and Seneca is taken up next. The discussion of this chapter is limited to the topics of drinking and eating as treated by each writer. The respective treatments of these topics by Clement and Seneca vividly display their common ethical motto of moderate participation in the physical world, while also revealing concerns unique to each writer. The concluding chapter makes brief references to the ethical treatment of other areas by Clement and Seneca.

PREFACE

This work has been submitted in January, 1989 as a thesis in requirement for the M.A. degree in Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

The idea for this work was born out of my interests in the early Christians and the classical world. An adequate understanding of early Christianity is possible only when we examine the world in which these religious pioneers found themselves. If we ignore this world and isolate the early Christians from it, then we greatly inhibit our potential for arriving at a true understanding of them. The thought processes, and even moral values, of religious groups are inevitably influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by the surrounding culture. This is clearly evidenced by Clement of Alexandria's Paedagogus, as it is by all of his writings. Clement's moral outlook was heavily influenced by Stoic philosophy. Upon comparing the ethical precepts of the Paedagogus to those put forward in Seneca's Epistulae Morales, the influence of pagan philosophy on Clement's moral values becomes readily evident. Any study of the Paedagogus which ignores Stoicism is bound to fall short, and one of the best ways of approaching the Paedagogus in the light of Stoicism is to compare it to the works of a Stoic moralist, such as Seneca.

Indeed, Clement's ethical precepts have so much in common with Stoicism that a detailed comparison of all the topics covered in the Paedagogus to similar references in the Epistulae Morales would require a scope beyond that of this thesis. Therefore, only the questions of drinking and eating will be treated with any kind of thoroughness, while brief references to other questions will be mentioned in the conclusion. Before this comparison is carried on, I will provide a background sketch for Clement and Seneca; for analyzing writings while ignoring the setting in which the author writes is analogous to studying early Christianity without reference to the world in which it flourished. In the process of this work, all translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Harold Remus for his excellent guidance and perceptive insights. Special mention must also be made of Dr. Peter Erb and Dr. Robert Kelly, both of whom served as readers on my thesis committee.

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Ann.</u>	<u>Annales, Tacitus</u>
<u>De nat. deor.</u>	<u>De natura deorum, Cicero</u>
<u>Ep. Mor.</u>	<u>Epistulae Morales, Seneca</u>
<u>Hist. Rom.</u>	<u>Historia Romana, Dio Cassius</u>
<u>Inst. Or.</u>	<u>Institutio Oratio, Quintilian</u>
<u>Nat. Ques.</u>	<u>Questiones Naturales, Seneca</u>
<u>Paed.</u>	<u>Paedagogus, Clement of Alexandria</u>
<u>Strom.</u>	<u>Stromata, Clement of Alexandria</u>
<u>SVF.</u>	<u>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, von Arnim</u>

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CHAPTER 1
CLEMENT AND SENECA

When studying the origins of Christianity, it is easy to overemphasize the significance of this fledgling movement. When such study is based largely upon early Christian sources - whether canonical or extra-canonical - there is a very real danger of finding here a prominent religious movement for which the Graeco-Roman world merely provides the background. That world becomes a backdrop for the "close-up" of Christianity (Wilken, 1984, xiv). This scenario could hardly be further from reality. The fact of the matter is that "For almost a century Christianity went unnoticed by most men and women in the Roman Empire" (ibid. xiv). When the earliest extant pagan references to Christianity do appear, they breathe an air of puzzlement about and hostility toward this upstart sect (Pliny, Ep. 10.96; Tacitus, Ann. 15.44; Suetonius, Nero 16; Sulpicius Severus, Chron. 2.29).

We should not be surprised at such humble beginnings, however. Christianity originated as a small religious movement in a minor province of the vast Roman Empire (Grant, 1978, 259). Despite local national peculiarities and semi-autonomy (Boren, 1977, 162, 188), this far-flung Roman world was basically one world. Important in establishing a

degree of oneness was the *pax Romana* achieved by Augustus (ruled 27 B.C.E. - 14 C.E.). For two and a half centuries (Boren, 1977, 149), the entire Mediterranean area knew an unprecedented peace within its borders. Furthermore, Hellenistic culture, which had swept across the Mediterranean world with the advent of Alexander the Great (Robinson, 1980, 408-15; Russell, 1967, 1-10), remained a pervasive aspect of life throughout the area and continued to act as a cultural cloak thrown over an otherwise diverse and varied world (Tarn, 1953, 2-3). It is not difficult to imagine that a religious movement which was to begin within this massive, semi-unified world, yet which in essence was quite foreign to it and which lacked roots in antiquity, would have been in danger of being lost in obscurity.

This is a more plausible portrayal of the origins of Christianity than that which makes it the main actor on the stage of the Graeco-Roman world. John Ferguson states:

It is arrant nonsense for some theologians to suggest that true Christianity belongs to a pure Hebraic strain, and Hellenism is an impure accretion. Greek influence was there from the first, not least in "Galilee of the Gentiles" where Greek was freely spoken by the common people. The New Testament was written in Greek, and is dependent upon Greek categories of thought. The omelette is not to be unscrambled (Ferguson, 1976, 60).

Further, H.I. Marrou observes, "Christianity was born in Hellenistic Palestine and developed in the midst of Graeco-

Roman civilization - and it was everlastingly affected by it" (1956, 318).

Being born and growing up in the omnipresent Hellenistic culture offered certain advantages to Christians. They had access to a language and lines of thought that had the potential of facilitating the spread of their message. On the other hand, these early Christians faced an identity crisis. Hellenism would have been encountered on every turn, yet it was necessary that they avoid being swallowed up by this engrossing, assimilating culture. They must have wondered, as did the few early pagans who paid them any attention, just what was their relationship to the surrounding world. What was to distinguish them from their surroundings and what was to be held in common with them?

It is important to recognize the uncertainty of these early Christians concerning their identity within the Graeco-Roman world. We must not allow the fact that we are aware of the outcome blind us to this uncertainty (Markus, 1974, 10). The form which this identity was to take was in no way assured. Rather, it took shape only as a result of much soul-searching and mental deliberation. It was a ladder in which Clement of Alexandria's Paedagogus was a most important rung.

The necessity of arriving at a specifically Christian identity would have been felt especially strongly in the thoroughly Hellenistic city of Alexandria. Indeed we find this to be the case, for near the end of the second century B.C.E. was written what is perhaps the first systematic and extensive guideline to a Christian lifestyle. The emphasis in Clement's Paedagogus is squarely on the relationship of this lifestyle to the broader culture. The detail covered by this work indicates that this relationship was a pressing problem for the Alexandrian Christians and that the pervasiveness of Hellenistic culture in Alexandria moved Christians there to develop a distinctive ethos.

Hellenistic culture did more than that, however. It influenced the shape this ethos was to take. Given the pervasive Hellenism of this cosmopolitan centre, the attitude of assimilation taken by early Alexandrian Christian writings is not surprising.¹ Notwithstanding the

¹Of course, it is not suggested that the prominent Hellenism of Alexandria ensured this assimilationist attitude on behalf of these Christians. The fact that Tertullian rejected popular culture in the Hellenistic city of Carthage and Dio Chrysostom took a similar view of the world in the thoroughly Hellenized center of Antioch refutes such a notion. Moreover, a group of ascetic Encratite Christians, who were radical cultural exclusionists, flourished at Alexandria and objected to the culturally accommodating attitude of Clement (Paed. 2.33.1). What is asserted here is that the prominent Hellenism in Alexandria, as in other centers, forced Christians to come to terms with the world, and that certain of these Christians did so in an assimilationist manner is not surprising.

earlier works of Christian apologists, it was at Alexandria that "the first wide-ranging syntheses of Christianity and Greek culture were being carried out" (Markus, 1974, 45). Evident throughout the writings of Clement is a special appreciation for the Greek philosophers and culture in general. Accordingly, the Paedagogus provides Christians with guidelines for living in the world rather than withdrawing from it. Moderate participation rather than rigid asceticism was Clement's ideal.² In fact, he dedicated an entire sermon, entitled "Who is the rich man who is being saved?," to easing the consciences of the wealthy Christians of Alexandria.

It should not surprise us that in the face of Hellenistic culture these fledgling Christian communities felt such pressure to come to terms with their own identity. The Jewish community, too, with its strong, traditional emphasis upon a people set apart from others for the purpose of God

²"Moderate participation" is the term with which I describe both Clement's and Seneca's ethic regarding the world. This term is appropriate since it indicates the acceptance of the physical world held by both writers, while also signifying the limits which they imposed upon that acceptance. The adjective "moderate" is defined in The Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "avoiding extremes." This is especially fitting since the ethics of Clement and Seneca avoid the extremes of austere asceticism and physical indulgence. For both writers, the guideline for knowing when to stop participating in the world is when the passions begin to be incited. While this guideline consistently points to a strict limitation upon participation in the world, it can, on occasion, result in total abstinence (see pp. 71-73).

had to come to terms with Hellenism. In Palestine, this came to a head in the conflict between Hebraic and Hellenizing Jews during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes (1 Macc. 1-5; 2 Macc. 4-9; Tcherikover, 1959, 152-203). In Diaspora Judaism, the clearest evidence of the effect of Hellenistic culture on Jewish identity is to be found in the writings of Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.E. - c. 50 C.E.). As a thoroughly Hellenized, yet faithful Jew, Philo reacted to the broader culture by accomodating many of its elements to his Jewish tradition. As with Clement, many reflections of this culture, including Greek philosophy and methods of interpretation, are to be found in his writings. Philo's works reveal that the assimilation of religion with culture so prevalent in Clement had been occurring at least two centuries before in Alexandrian Judaism,³ and scholars have justifiably seen in Philo a significant source for and an influence on Clement.⁴

Clement did not have to look outside his own Christian tradition to find such examples of assimilation, however. Examples could be found in the writings of earlier

³In fact, E.R. Goodenough (1962, 91) takes this tendency to assimilation of Hellenism and Judaism in Alexandria back much further: "There had been others before him [Philo], apparently for at least two centuries, who had similarly tried to combine the two cultures."

⁴See, most recently, Annewies Van Den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo in The Stromateis (Leiden: E.G. Brill, 1988).

Christians. By the middle of the second century, educated Christians were aware of affinities between their beliefs and those of pagans. As a product of this time, Justin accepted these similarities (1 Apol. 20-22; 2 Apol. 13), especially regarding Plato as having anticipated certain Christian truths (1 Apol. 59, 60). To account for this, Justin explained that these pagans had learned these truths from the pages of Moses (*ibid.* 44, 54, 59), although their understanding of them was limited (*ibid.* 44, 54, 60, 64). Perhaps not thoroughly satisfied with this explanation, Justin employed the terminology of Stoicism to explain these affinities further. The world was pervaded by a *spermatikos logos*, which was diffused among all peoples, allowing some to catch glimpses of the truth (*ibid.* 46; 2 Apol. 8). However, such glimpses were merely fragmentary and distant perceptions of the truth, the whole of which was revealed in the incarnate Christ (2 Apol. 8, 13). Thus, Christianity marked the completion of humanity's searching after truth. In short, Christianity embodied the fulness of the truth of which the philosophers had caught glimpses. This same line of argument was later taken up by Clement, who regarded philosophy as a preparation for the Gospel (Strom. 1).

An early sketch of this picture of Christianity as the fulness of the truth after which the Greek philosophers had been seeking may be found in the speech addressed to the

Athenians and attributed to Paul in Acts 17. Here, Paul reveals to the Athenians the "unknown God" for whom they had been seeking. As Markus comments, "This could be taken as apostolic warrant for a cultural integration of Christianity in the thought-world of Hellenism" (1974, 44).

In spite of Justin's best efforts, Christianity remained a suspicious, foreign, and barbaric superstition to most pagans. Late in the second century, Christians were being branded as barbarians by outsiders such as Celsus (Origen, Contra Celsum 1, 2). It is interesting that this view was not limited to those outside Christianity. It is somewhat ironic that Tatian, one of Justin's former students, held Greek philosophers in scorn (Orat. ad Graecos 25, 26) and proudly boasted of his Christian barbarism (ibid. 42). Tatian's separatist attitude clearly demonstrates that the assimilationist approach was anything but unanimous amongst the early Christians. The adherents of the separationist outlook were to receive their most important and influential champion in the early years of the third century in the person of Tertullian.

Interestingly, these cultural exclusionists could also claim apostolic authority for their stance. Paul had clearly distinguished between the wisdom of this world, which is foolishness to God, and the foolishness of God, which is

wiser than people (1 Cor. 1:25). It was in this same vein that Tertullian asked, "What is there in common between philosopher and Christian? What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" (Apologeticum 46). Martin E. Marty captures the character of Tertullian: "how far removed he was from the apologists in his constant rhetoric! Ridiculing philosophy, he enjoyed sharpening the offense of the faith.... The world of ancient culture could follow him only through an about face" (1959, 85).

Tertullian's championing of the Christian separatist cause extended beyond the intellectual sphere. He was just as rigoristic in his approach to ethics. Tertullian held an ideal of a distinct Christian lifestyle which was easily distinguishable from, and rejected participation in, the pagan world (De Corona, De Idololatria, De Paenitentia, De Spectaculis).

Tertullian was not necessarily the first to provide detailed guidelines for the Christian lifestyle. The Paedagogus of Clement also marks an early sustained attempt at a distinctly Christian ethos. As will be shown later, Clement in this work takes a more relaxed position toward the pagan world than did Tertullian. Nevertheless, it would be an error to assume that Clement's appreciation for Graeco-Roman culture led him to a complete assimilation of pagan and

Christian values and lifestyles. Although he was not an ascetic, neither was he simply an assimilationist. He felt very strongly that the Christian lifestyle must be clearly distinguishable from that of the pagan world. At the same time, however, Christianity must be lived out in the world rather than in isolation. Clement was truly a Greek, but his first loyalty was to Christ. In his view of the relationship between Christian lifestyle and the world, he may be described in the paradoxical phrase "strict moderate." In this outlook, Clement bears a striking resemblance to the ethics of the Stoic school. Much has been made of the affinities between Stoic and Clementine ethics (Bradley, 1974, 43, Chadwick, 1966, 41; Fox, 1986, 306; Osborn, 1957, 102-07; Paulsen, 1972, 18-20; etc.). Given Clement's love of pagan philosophy, as well as the prominence of the Stoic school at this time in the Roman Empire, such affinities come as no surprise.⁵

In the first two centuries of the Common Era, Stoicism won its place as the leading philosophical school among the Romans, while also carrying significant influence in the Greek world (Sandbach, 1975, 16-18). The Stoa was "the dominant philosophy during the formative years of Christian thought" (Ross, 1974, 124). Thus, when Christians began to

⁵Such affinities are even less unexpected when we recognize that Stoicism in Alexandria dates back to the second century B.C.E. (Arnold, 1911, 99).

formulate a systematized philosophical outlook, it is not surprising that it had many affinities with Stoicism. It would be amiss, however, on the basis of these affinities to refer to any particular Christian from this period as a Stoic. The rampant eclecticism of the time meant that, by accepting certain tenets of Stoicism, these early Christians were also accepting those of other philosophical schools (ibid. 125). Nevertheless, whether or not these Christians consciously borrowed from Stoicism, their debt to this philosophical school in arriving at their own philosophy was substantial.

This indebtedness was particularly marked in the area of ethics, which received especially heavy emphasis from Stoicism. As Stoicism contributed much to the general ethical outlook of the time, it is understandable that the developing ethos of the early Christians had many affinities with it.⁶ Certainly this is true of Clement. His eclectic philosophical outlook has been described as "the common blend of Platonist metaphysics and Stoic ethics together with Aristotelian logic and terminology" (Chadwick, 1966, 40, 41). Although Clement could not accept the pantheistic materialism of Stoic metaphysics, in the field of ethics he

⁶B.M. Ross (1974, 124) states: "Stoic conceptions had become embedded in language, in general moral attitudes, and in the human and natural sciences, all of which had important repercussions on the unconscious presuppositions of early Christian thought."

found an agreeable and useful resource in the Stoic school (ibid. 41).

It was in just this area of Stoic ethics that the philosophical energies of Seneca were concentrated. His main objective in philosophy was to perpetuate the traditional Stoic view of life, referring to metaphysics only insofar as it provided a framework for ethics (Ross, 1974, 117). This does not mean, however, that he downplayed the importance of metaphysical doctrines. In the Stoa, ethical precepts were related to and built upon the foundation of physical dogma (Bradley, 1974, 43). Damianos Tsekourakis refers to the "real passion for unity" held by the Stoics, stating that "all the orthodox Stoics of the Ancient Stoa...presented the three parts of philosophy, logic, physics, and ethics, as closely interrelated and indissolubly united to each other, as a consequence of their wish for unity" (1974, 4). Seneca follows faithfully in this tradition (Timothy, 1973, 4-5). He cites Cleanthes as stating that specific precepts (*praecepta*) are beneficial only when based upon more general doctrines (*decreta* - Ep. Mor. 94.4), which idea he himself fully supports: "The same difference exists between the doctrines of philosophy and its precepts, which exists between the elements and the members; the latter depend upon the former, and the former are the cause of the latter and of all things" (*hoc interest*

inter decreta philosophiae et praecepta, quod inter elementa et membra; haec ex illis dependent, illa et horum causae sunt et omnium - *ibid.* 95.12). Nevertheless, from Seneca's works it becomes apparent that his primary focus was on ethics. He himself sums up the purpose behind his epistles: "For you know that I wish to embrace moral philosophy [*moralem philosophiam*] and to expound all the questions that are pertinent to it" (Ep. Mor. 106.2).

Seneca's moral writings contributed greatly to the ethical atmosphere in the popular world of his time. This is evidenced by Quintillian's indication that Seneca was almost the only author in the hands of young students: *Tum autem solus hic fere in manibus adolescentium fuit* (Inst. Or. 10.1.125). His many and widely read ethical writings made even more secure the place of Stoic morality in the Graeco-Roman world. Although skeptical about Seneca's philosophical and literary abilities, Quintillian recommends reading him because of his admirable moral exhortations: "In philosophy he was not thorough enough [*parum diligens*]; nevertheless, he was an admirable persecutor [*egregius...insectator*] of vices. He produced many clear thoughts and much reading that is suitable for conduct [*morum*]" (*ibid.* 10.1.129). In acknowledgement of his weighty contributions to the general climate of Stoic ethics during the early years of Christianity, even G.M. Ross, though he

is skeptical about Seneca's philosophical prowess (1974, 117-18), is forced to admit that Seneca's "indirect influence on early Christian thought was highly significant" (ibid. 125). This sentiment is echoed by F.H. Sandbach: "No Stoic author has exerted a greater influence on posterity than Seneca" (1975, 149).

In his exposition of Stoic ethics, Seneca was not strikingly original. In fact, his efforts were largely limited to the exposition of the precepts of previous Stoic ethicists (Ross, 1974, 117). Yet, it is this very fact which makes Seneca a valid point of reference in an investigation of the developing Christian ethos during the first centuries of the Common Era. The fact that Seneca took in the best of Stoical ethical ideas rather than attempting to develop original (and inevitably at least somewhat divergent) lines of reasoning means that he represents mainstream Stoic ethics. E.V. Arnold observes that Seneca "appears to us as the last Roman who made a systematic study of Stoicism in the original authorities, and thus grasped the system in its full extent" (Arnold, 1911, 113). It is in just such a writer that we may expect to find affinities with the developing Christian ethos, which was so definitely influenced by Stoicism. Staehlin's index to the Berlin edition of Clement shows that Chrysippus was by far Clement's favourite direct Stoic source (Staehlin, vol. 4,

1980, 34-36), leading W. Richardson to the conclusion that Clement's particular interest lay in earlier Stoicism (Richardson, 1966, 87); therefore we may expect to find affinities between Clement, with his interest in early Stoic ethics, and Seneca, the exponent of early Stoic ethics.

It will be the purpose of this work to uncover such affinities, as well as differences, between the ethics of Seneca and Clement. The question to be asked is the extent to which their respective ethical outlooks coincided and where they differed. In attempting to answer this question, the area of human consumption will be emphasized, while brief references to other topics of concern will also be pointed out.

It should be pointed out that affinities do not necessarily indicate direct influence. It is in no way asserted that Clement consciously relied upon Senecan ethics in his guidelines to a Christian lifestyle. In fact, the lack of direct references to Seneca in Staehlin's index on Clement speaks against such direct influence. Nevertheless, the possibility of a more indirect influence definitely exists. From the above references to Quintillian, we see that Seneca contributed greatly to the general atmosphere of Stoic ethics which was prevalent at his time and which continued to prevail during Clement's lifetime (Chadwick, 1966, 40-

41). As Clement's ethical guidelines definitely reveal Stoic tendencies, such indirect influence may be granted.

First, however, it is necessary to examine the geographical, social, and cultural settings of these two writers. For each was affected by, and was writing in response to, the situation around him. In so doing, we will be addressing the questions of why their ethical outlooks took the form they did, and why they found Stoic ethics so appealing. In effect, we will be attempting to get beyond their writings to an understanding of the men themselves. Only then will a discussion of their writings be truly merited.

CHAPTER 2

CLEMENT'S SITUATION

The maxim that no person is an island is a truism from which none of us is exempt. We are all, to a greater or lesser degree, affected by our geographical and cultural environments, and certainly Clement was no exception. This chapter will locate Clement in time and space, for only in doing so can one arrive at a true appreciation and understanding of his ethical guidelines.

In the centuries subsequent to its founding by Alexander, Alexandria grew to become one of the most prominent cities of the Mediterranean world. As early as the third century B.C.E. it had been referred to as "the city of the world" and "a universal nurse" (Ferguson, 1974, 20). W. W. Tarn observes that "by 200 [B.C.E.] Alexandria was the greatest city of the known world, though Rome passed her later" (Tarn, 1953, 185). Although Rome may have become the most prominent city of the world, Alexandria's status under the Romans can hardly be said to have abated much, for "Alexandria passed finally in 30 B.C. into the hands of Augustus to become, as it still was in Clement's time, the second city of the Roman Empire" (Tollinton, 1914, 33).

Alexandria's greatness was due in part to the fact that it was a glowing example of the best that Hellenistic culture offered. Finley Hooper notes that Alexandria was "destined to replace Athens as the queen city of Greek culture in the...Hellenistic Age" (Hooper, 1978, 421). The most complete description of ancient Alexandria is found in the pages of the imperial geographer, Strabo, from whom we learn of many typically Hellenistic elements in the city. Here was to be found a theatre, amphitheatre and stadium at which were celebrated the quinquennial games, a beautiful gymnasium, and hippodrome (17.1. 9-10). Although numerous races and nationalities were represented in the Alexandrian population (Dio, Or. 32), the term "Alexandrian" proper was reserved for the Greek community (Tarn, 1953, 185). And acting as a seal upon the Hellenistic nature of Alexandria, and as a permanent reminder to it, was the *sema*, the tomb of Alexander, Hellenism's great promoter (Strabo 17.1.8).

Nor were the Greek deities lacking in Alexandria. Near the theatre stood a temple to Poseidon (Strabo 17.1.9) and one of Alexandria's most spectacular monuments was the sanctuary of Pan, from whose summit one could take in the whole of the city (17.1. 10). Alongside such Greek gods were worshipped local Egyptian deities such as Isis and Osiris (Ferguson, 1974, 21), and the god Sarapis successfully bridged the gap between nationalities by combining Greek and Egyptian

attributes (Frost, 1980, 149). In Roman times, the Caesarium provided a place for the worship of emperors (Philo, Leg. ad Gaius 22). At Alexandria, where cults and gods from many and diverse lands were given expression, religious syncretism was common (Tollinton, 1914, 41).

It is little wonder that, in such an atmosphere of dominant Hellenistic culture and religious syncretism, the Christian community needed a strong sense of identity if it was to remain a cohesive and independent fellowship. In such a city, which was referred to in antiquity as "the world" (Tarn, 1953, 185), one could not hide from the world. Thus, the ethos of the Christians would be forced to come to terms with the world in some way. As we shall see later, this is exactly what Clement does in the Paedagogus. In fact, this work is precisely about the relationship of Christians to the world. The establishment of a definite Christian ethos was a major step toward this identity, and this undoubtedly influenced Clement to write a detailed ethical guideline.

There was another element of the Alexandrian environment which was also pressuring the mainstream Christian community to establish its own identity. As evidenced by the impressive finds of texts at Nag Hammadi in 1945, Gnostic Christian groups were flourishing vigorously in Egypt late in the second century. It is inconceivable that these

groups were not prominent in Alexandria, the most significant city of Egypt as well as an important intellectual centre. Indeed, we find this to be the case, for these Christians represented a significant enough threat to the mainstream of Alexandrian Christianity to prompt strong reactions from both Clement and Origen. Perhaps it is significant in this regard that the ethical approach of Clement toward the physical world - moderate participation-avoids, whether conscious or not, either Gnostic extreme of strict asceticism or unrestricted indulgence (Chadwick, 1966, 58-61).¹

One of the most distinctive features of Alexandria was the Museum, an association of learned men (*philologoi andres*) who shared all things in common and were under the supervision of a priest of the Muses (Strabo 17.1.8). Here gathered some of the greatest scholars of the Greek world to do research and to write, and in effect to cause Alexandria to replace Athens as the "new capital of Greek scholarship" (Frost, 1980, 148). The resources available to these learned men were admirably supplied by the largest and most complete library of the ancient world (Frost, 1980, 148;

¹While Gnosticism was undoubtedly a very significant factor in impressing upon Clement the need for a mainstream Christian identity, it is referred to here only briefly since we are concerned specifically with the Paedagogus, which emphasizes the relationship of Christians to the world about.

Marrou, 1956, 189). If Alexandria's repute as an intellectual centre was somewhat diminished by the resurgence of Athens under Marcus Aurelius (Tollinton, 1914, 42-43), it nonetheless long continued as an important academic setting where various viewpoints and ideas were expressed (ibid. 44).

Such a rich academic atmosphere could not but influence the direction Alexandrian Christianity was to take (Bigg, 1886, 41). It is understandable that, while in most Christian communities catechetical instruction was under the auspices of the clergy (ibid.), in this great university city an established Christian school was formed early and charged with this responsibility. The academic nature of Alexandrian Christianity is manifested very clearly in Clement's Stromata and Origen's De Principiis, and is reflected in Gregory Thaumaturgus' comments about the curriculum of study under Origen:

For he deemed it right for us to study philosophy in such wise that we should read with utmost diligence all that has been written, both by the philosophers and by the poets of old, rejecting nothing, and repudiating nothing...except only the productions of atheists.... He thought, however, that we should obtain and make ourselves familiar with all other writings, neither preferring nor repudiating any one kind, whether it be philosophical discourse or not, whether Greek or foreign, but hearing what all of them have to convey (Q. et Pan. 13).²

²This translation was taken from the Ante-Nicene Fathers series, vol. 6, 1886.

According to Eusebius, Clement's predecessor as head of this school was Pantaenus, a convert from Stoicism (Hist. Eccl. 5. 10), to whom Clement, in a now lost passage of his Hypotyposes, refers as his teacher (ibid. 5.11). Although some students with limited capabilities were taught little more than credal formulae, Gregory Thaumaturgus' description of his course of study under Origen reveals the decidedly intellectual nature of this school. The initial stage of study was characterized by dialectical training in logic, with Origen "sometimes assailing us in the genuine Socratic fashion." From here, Gregory advanced to the study of physics, geometry, and astronomy. Next, the student graduated to the study of "those things which excel all in importance" - ethics. This study was comprised of "the divine virtues that concern the moral nature" - prudence, temperance, righteousness, and fortitude. For these subjects, the Greek philosophers were recommended as important sources. The course of study culminated in theology, again with the writings of Greek philosophers and poets serving as recommended reading.³

³This description is taken from Gregory Thaumaturgus' Oration and Panegyric. 7-13. We must not assume, however, that the entire Christian community of Alexandria held such a philosophical view of Christianity. The fact that Clement feels it necessary to devote much of the first book of the Stromata to a defence of his use of philosophy refutes such a notion.

With such an academic bent, we would expect the teaching of this school to have much in common with the philosophical systems of the day. Thus it is that the ethos which Clement develops in the Paedagogus bears striking similarities to Stoicism. Moreover, Pantaenus, who was so wonderfully admired by Clement,⁴ was himself a former member of the Stoa. Although this school differed little from philosophical schools in many respects, its specifically Christian point of departure came in its exaltation of theology above all other subjects (Bigg, 1886, 43).

The importance and influence of this school would have been increased by the slow development in Alexandrian Christianity of a fixed order of ecclesiastical structure and authority (Bauer, 1971, 53-60). Although Eusebius traces a succession of Alexandrian bishops back quite early,⁵ Demetrius, who acceded to the position in 189 B.C.E. was the first powerful figure (Bauer, 1971, 53-8). Moreover, from the writings of Clement, we are able to discern certain established offices, such as presbyters and

⁴See Eclogae Propheticae 56.2, where Clement refers to Pantaenus as "our Pantaenus." Also, it is probable that that Clement's glowing description of a certain Christian teacher in Egypt as "the true, the Sicilian bee" under whom Clement "found rest" (Strom. 1.1.11) refers to Pantaenus (See Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, 1885, 301, n. 9.).

⁵See Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, 1952, 401.

deacons,⁶ but the roles of each, as well as the distinctions between them, remain vague (Ferguson, 1974, 27). While, in most communities, instruction in the ways of Christianity was under the auspices of the local clergy (Bigg, 1886, 41), the retarded hierarchical development of the Alexandrian Christian community meant that such responsibilities fell to the school.

At the end of the second century, the teacher of this school enjoyed a considerable amount of freedom, as strict systems of curriculum and catechetical classifications were absent. This independence was further increased by the fact that the school met at the home of the teacher (Bigg, 1886, 42; Tollinton, 1914, 46-7), and that not until Demetrius appointed Origen as Clement's successor were bishops involved in the appointing of the head of the school (Tollinton, 1914, 48).⁷ Thus, the individual head of the school would have had much influence in determining the nature of the teaching.

As the children of Christians received a normal pagan education at this time (Marrou, 1956, 316, 317-19), the

⁶For example, Strom. 7.3.3 and Paed.3.97.2.

⁷In light of the amicable relationship between Clement and his predecessor as head of the school, Pantaenus (see p. 23 and n. 4), it is possible that, until Demetrius, the process of succession was determined by the outgoing master.

purpose of the catechetical school was to win over educated pagans and instruct educated Christians (Tollinton, 1914, 47). Considering the prominence of ethics in teaching at this time generally, the guiding of adult Christians in a fitting lifestyle would undoubtedly have been a function of this school. Further, we have seen that the relative freedom and independence of the teachers allowed them considerable influence over the particulars of this teaching. We have in Clement's Paedagogus a product of this school. It is a guide to a Christian lifestyle, infused with the Stoic tendencies and cautious appreciation of the world that characterized its author.

There was far more to Alexandria's greatness than culture and learning, however. Here, economic potential was tremendous. At this rich port were situated two harbours which could accomodate the largest of merchant vessels (Strabo 17.1.6). Moreover, a canal connected the western harbour with the Nile, thus making the city a natural thoroughfare for the flow of goods between the interior and the Mediterranean Sea, and thus the entire Mediterranean world (Strabo 17.1.7). Such a setting led Strabo to describe Alexandria as "the great market of the world" (*megiston emporion tês oikoumenês*, 17.1.13). Perhaps as important to Alexandria's economic prosperity as its role as middleman, however, was its tremendous yields of wheat. The

Greeks of the Hellenistic period certainly took full advantage of these rich yields, as Ptolemy became "the greatest corn merchant the world had seen" (Tarn, 1953, 190). The Romans also understood Egypt's potential in this area. Whereas other provinces of the Roman Empire were under the direct control of the local governor, the wealth of Egypt made this province special. It was under the direction of a prefect who was in turn directly responsible to the emperor. Moreover, this prefect was always from the equestrian class, since a member of the senatorial class could not be trusted with the control of so rich an area (Boren, 1977, 156).

A city is in effect the people who constitute it. Therefore one cannot speak of the wealth of Alexandria without expecting to find this reflected in its inhabitants. Where there is a rich city, there will be rich people. The writings of Clement not only bear out this observation, but they also reveal that the members of the wealthy classes were coming over to Christianity in numbers significant enough to warrant close attention. However, as the wealthier Alexandrians turned their eyes toward this new religion, they faced obstacles that reputedly were traced back to its founder and caused some to give up all hope of acceptance within the Christian community (Quis Dives Salvetur 2). After all, it was Christ himself who had said

that it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of heaven (ibid.). Of especial consternation to such people were Jesus' words recorded in the gospels (Mark 10:17-27 and parallels) instructing the rich man to give all he possesses to the poor (Quis Dives Salvetur 4ff). Clement resolves the problem by looking beyond the literal sense of Jesus's words, thus ascertaining the "very spirit of the Saviour and His secret meaning" (ibid. 5). His allegorical interpretation of this passage leads Clement to a conclusion that sounds strikingly Stoic. It is the passions of the soul and will that Jesus enjoins all would-be followers to leave behind (ibid. 12). The proper interpretation of this passage is "to banish from the soul its opinions about riches, its attachment to them, its excessive desire, its morbid excitement over them, its anxious cares, the thorns of our earthly existence which choke the seed of the true life" (Ibid. 11).

The situation of wealthy Christians in Alexandria is given further expression in the Paedagogus. The minute detail which Clement pays to excessive delicacies reveals certain aspects of this situation. For example, we glean from these pages that certain members of the church were in the habit of importing exotic foods (2.3.1-2) and wines (2.30.1-2), and some were concerned about elaborate and fancy clothing

(2.102.2-115.5). We also see that some Alexandrian Christians were in the habit of sleeping on lavish couches, for Clement feels obligated to inform them that such are not suitable for "holy men." Moreover, he allows the continued use of them by those who already possess them (2.78.1). In the same vein, Clement does not prohibit alabaster drinking cups (2.33.3), implying that such were in use by some members of his audience. Finally, he exhorts those rich Christians to use their wealth virtuously by sharing it with others rather than hoarding it all for themselves (2.120.3-6, 3.35.4-5).

It is probable that at least some of these wealthy Christians held positions of civil authority (Chadwick, 1966, 63) and thus enjoyed a degree of social status. If this was indeed the case, then it would have been necessary for them to maintain contacts with the world in order to retain such status. In this, the situation in Alexandria would have been parallel to that in the first-century Christian community at Corinth (Meeks, 1983, 69). Moreover, the presence in the Christian community of such persons would have served as empirical proof against opponents such as Celsus who claimed that Christianity took adherents only from the lower and illiterate classes (Origen, Contra Celsum 3.55). Thus, it would have been important that the ethos developed by Clement appeal to the wealthy, and one means of

doing so was to keep the lines of communication between the world and Christianity open.

In the Paedagogus we find this to be the case. Although the Christians Clement addresses are to have nothing to do with public spectacles and the theatre (3.76.3-78.1), generally their Christianity was lived out in the context of the world about them. Thus, guidelines are given concerning the conduct of Christians at feasts hosted by non-believers (2.9.4ff). Even here, though, there is to be a sharp distinction between the behaviour of those inside and those outside the Christian community. The general guideline for Christian conduct at such gatherings is moderate participation (Paed. 2.10.2). More specifically, Christians are to refrain from gorging themselves in a manner more fitting for dogs and swine than for humans (ibid. 2.11.4). Rather, they are to partake in a decorous way, being careful not to stain the couches or their own chins, and abstaining from talking while they are eating (ibid. 2.13.1). The ultimate objective behind such mannerly behaviour was to make a positive impression on the non-believers present, and so "persuade any of our fellow-guests to virtue" (ibid. 2.10.4).

Thus, we see that, for Clement, an orderly, well-mannered lifestyle was an important means of evangelization. For

this reason, he exhorts Christians to drink in an orderly manner (Paed. 2.31. 1-33.5), to refrain from making ridiculous figures of themselves regarding luxurious items (*ibid.* 2.35.1-36.2), to avoid clearing the throat and wiping the nose at entertainments, as these habits may disgust the others present (*ibid.* 2.60.1), as well as to avoid such shameful practices as scratching one's ears and sneezing, since these "are swinish itchings, and attend unbridled fornication" (*ibid.* 2.60.4). Numerous other examples of similar exhortations could be cited, all of which indicate that Clement was deeply concerned that Christians display proper etiquette - behaviour which was "truly appropriate to the name" of Christ (*ibid.* 2.32.1).

Later in the same work, we see that Clement was writing in reaction to a situation he saw about him. He reveals that there were some in the Christian community of Alexandria for whom such distinctions lasted only as long as did the assembly meeting (3. 80.2-4). Once they leave the Christian gathering, they revert to the ways of the multitude, and are indistinguishable from them. Forgetting their obligations to a mannerly lifestyle, they join the mob in "flute-playing, and dancing, and intoxication, and all kinds of trash" (*ibid.* 3.80.4).⁸ Although Clement appreciated much

⁸Clement would have had ample reason for being concerned about Christians whose lifestyles differed little from the multitude, for Alexandrians were notorious for

that the Graeco-Roman world offered, especially in the area of philosophy, he was adamant that Christians remain distinct from that world. He was in no way a syncretist advocating a complete union of Christian and pagan ways, and ethics was one important area in which he felt Christians could remain distinct and prove a guiding light to others. Clement regarded the goal of Christian ethics to be to "exhibit ourselves as a bright pattern of virtue" (ibid. 2.10.4). Thus, the observation that certain Christians were behaving in a manner identical to the frivolous multitude was undoubtedly a strong incentive for Clement to set out in detail a distinct and highly respectable Christian lifestyle.

Nor should we forget that rumours of Christians practising grossly immoral acts, such as promiscuous intercourse and cannibalism, were circulating within pagan circles,⁹ and that by Clement's time such rumours were quite widespread

their frivolity. This is most clearly expressed in Dio Chrysostom's thirty-second oration. This well-known frivolity sheds light on certain of Clement's descriptions of ignoble manners which he has apparently witnessed, although a degree of exaggeration is still probable. For example, he sets out an example of how not to act at a feast. He rails against those who "all but pitch their faces into the dishes,.... besmear their hands with the condiments...and cram themselves immoderately and shamelessly" (Paed. 2.11.3).

⁹See Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 4.7.10-11; 5.1.14-15; 5.1.52; Tertullian, Apologeticum 4.11; 7.1; Justin, 1 Apol. 26.7; 2 Apol. 12; Tatian, Or. 25.3; Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Aotolychon 3.4.

(Wilken, 1984, 17). Moreover, Clement himself refers to a certain Gnostic sect, the Carpocratians, who, he says, engaged in sordid sexual practices during their "love-feasts" (Strom. 3.2.10). If such rumours were being circulated by one Christian group about another, then it is possible that pagans in Alexandria, who would have been less aware of the various groupings within Christianity, were cognizant of such rumours about Christians in general. The overcoming of such rumours may well have provided Clement with a further incentive to guide the mainstream Christians of Alexandria in a respectable lifestyle, and encourage them to conduct themselves in a manner that would win the respect of outsiders.

Having examined the setting of Alexandria generally and the mainstream Christian community there specifically, we must next consider certain theological and philosophical outlooks held by Clement which provide further background for his general ethic of moderate participation.

He believed God, the first cause (*to prôton aition*), to be above place, time, name, and thought (Strom. 5.71.5). God is transcendent. Clement takes up Plato's argument that the transcendent first principle is difficult to know, and even more difficult to explain (*ibid.* 5.81.4ff.; cf. Plato, Republic 511, 517). People need not give up their quest for

the transcendent God, however. Christ, the Logos, is knowledge and truth, of whom knowledge is attainable (Strom. 4.156.1). Christ is knowable, because he is immanent in the world. All the powers of the universe come together in Christ, who is responsible for the unity of the world. At the same time, Christ is one with the transcendent God. Clement exclaims, "Son in Father, and Father in Son" (Paed. 1.24.3). He refers to Christ as "God the Logos, who is in the Father, who is at the right hand of the Father and with the form [of God] is God" (*ibid.* 1.4.1). Thus Clement is careful to distinguish between the transcendent Father and the immanent Son, while maintaining their unity.¹⁰

Being immanent within the world, while simultaneously possessing unity with the Father, the Logos acts as a bridge between humanity and God. People may know the immanent Logos, and thus know the Father, with whom the Logos is one. The unknowable is made known through the revelation of the Logos; thus, Clement's metaphor of the Logos as the face of God (*prosôpon de tou theou ho logos*) through whom God is illuminated (*phôtizetai*) and made known (*gnôrizetai*, Paed. 1.57.2).

¹⁰Here we see an early indication of the Trinitarian problem. The above discussion of the nature of the Logos is based on Osborn, 1957, 38-44.

In the first chapter of the Paedagogus, Clement describes a three-fold method by which the Logos bridges the gap between humanity and God. In the first stage, the Logos is persuasive (*protreptikos*), exhorting people to leave behind old opinions (*tas palaias doxas*, 1.1.1) This aspect of the Logos invites people to salvation, and instills within them a yearning after life, both present and future (1.1.3). The second aspect of the Logos is directive (*hypothetikos*), and is concerned with the actions of people (1.1.2). At this stage, the purpose of the Logos is not to teach, but to improve the soul by training it up to a virtuous life. This practical aspect of the Logos is the tutor (*paidagôgos*) of those who have responded positively to the exhortations of the Logos as *protreptikos* (1.1.4). As *paidagôgos*, the Logos uses commandments and examples to guide Christians in the proper way of life (1.2.1). In the third stage, the Logos takes on the role of teacher (*didaskalikos*), instructing Christians in matters of doctrine and guiding them in intellectual development (1.2.1).

This three-fold view of the Logos bears similarities to Clement's own writings that are too striking to be coincidental. Of Clement's surviving compositions, three may be regarded as major works. These are the Protrepticus, the Paedagogus, and the Stromata. The first of these works is directed toward educated pagans, offering arguments

intended to persuade them to leave behind their "old opinions" in favour of Christianity (Tollinton, 1914, 210-11).¹¹ As we shall see later, the Paedagogus offers specific and detailed instructions on the manner of living which is appropriate for Christians. Whether or not the Stromata reflects the third aspect of the Logos is questionable. Certainly this work is of an intellectual nature, with its overriding emphasis on true knowledge. Thus, various scholars have regarded these three major works as a trilogy, each representing a respective aspect of the Logos, while others have denied that the Stromata corresponds to the *didaskalikos* aspect of the Logos.¹² Proponents of the latter viewpoint regard the Stromata as too unsystematic to reflect the *didaskalos* (Ferguson, 1974, 106; Osborn, 1957, 6). Regardless of this matter, what is obvious - and what is important for this paper - is that the Paedagogus does reflect the second aspect of the Logos. Those under the care of the *paidagôgos* had been won over to Christianity, but had not yet grown to the maturity required for more advanced instruction. They were still prone to

¹¹Ferguson points out that exhortatory discourse (*protreptikos logos*) was a popular tool of ancient philosophers. Certainly its importance to the history of western Christianity is significant, for we cannot forget that Cicero's *Hortensius* convinced Augustine to pursue the contemplative life (1974, 44).

¹²For a summary of the controversy of the correspondence between the three aspects of the Logos and Clement's three major surviving works, see Osborn, 1957, 5-7.

passions which had to be brought under control through moral discipline, to which end the sumptuary guidelines of the Paedagogus are directed. It was the spiritually immature-catechumens and young Christians - that the Paedagogus provided with "instruction in Christian morality and etiquette" (Chadwick, 1966, 31).

Clement explicitly states that the work of the *paidagôgos* is preparatory to that of the *didaskalos*. He states that, upon completing the moral instruction of the Paedagogus, it is time for those who have now been trained in excellent discipline to turn their attention away from the *paidagôgos* to the *didaskalos*, who will reveal to them the deep and hidden truths of scripture and teach them oracles (Paed. 3.97.1-3). Moral integrity is a prerequisite to comprehension of the higher truths about God. Knowledge of such things is reserved for the pure in heart (Chadwick, 1966, 54). The discipline implemented by the *paidagôgos* brings strength and health to the soul by overcoming the passions. It is only after this stage has been attained that the *didaskalikos logos* takes over, teaching and guiding the soul into the necessary knowledge (*gnôseôs epitêdeiotêta*), for only a healthy soul is able to contain the revelation of the Logos (*tên apokalypsin tou logou*, 1.3.1-3).

Ethical precepts are important for Clement because he sees the goal of the Christian as likeness to God (Marty, 1959, 67), for which a moral lifestyle is necessary. Thus, he prays that the *paidagôgos* would grant unto those who follow the precepts of the Lord to perfect the likeness of the image (*to homoiôma plerôsai tês eikonos*, Paed. 3.101.1). In order to ascertain the meaning of the term *to homoiôma tês eikonos* we must consider Clement's anthropology. Clement quotes God's words at the creation of humanity, "Let us make humanity in our own image and likeness" (Paed. 1.98.2-3; Strom. 5.94.4; cf. Gen. 1.7). However, only Christ fulfills this statement. The rest of humanity possesses only the image, not the likeness, of God (Paed. 1.98.3). To perfect the likeness of the image, then, means that the inherent image of God must be made more like the archetype - i.e. God. In the reference from the Stromata Clement states that humanity actually possesses an image of the image of God. The Logos is the image of God, and the human mind is an image of the Logos. Here perfecting the likeness of the image would seem to mean being made more like Christ.

One element in becoming like God is a simple lifestyle. God is in need of nothing, and therefore likeness to God comes, not from gold ornaments and elaborate clothing, but by doing good and by needing as few things as possible (Paed. 3.1.1). Another important element in becoming like God is removal of

the passions. Those who aspire to be like God, who is passionless, must be passionless themselves (Strom. 4.147.1). Clement states that by overcoming the passions, one is able to practice conduct which conforms to God, thus bringing assimilation to the Lord (*ibid.* 2.80.5). He fuses the concepts of passionlessness and simplicity of life with his statement that overcoming the passions through self-restraint results in one's having few needs and thus in drawing closer (*synengizein*) to the divine nature (*ibid.* 2.81.1). According to Bradley, Clement saw renunciation of the passions, not only as bringing likeness to God, but as leading to a mystical union with God (1974, 64).

Thus we see that the suppression of the passions was important for two reasons. First, it gave psychic health to the individual, which was required for further spiritual progress and the attainment of deeper knowledge. Secondly, it brought one nearer to the likeness of the Logos, and thus of God, who was free from passions. We should expect to find, then, that Clement's ethical precepts were geared toward overcoming the passions.

Indeed we find this to be the case. Of all Stoic doctrines, that of *apatheia*, or passionlessness, especially won Clement's approval (Bradley, 1974, 55). Diogenes Laertius cites Zeno's description of the passions as irrational and

unnatural movements of the soul (*hê alogos kai para physin psychês kinêsis*, SVF 1.205; 3.412). Stobaeus defines "passion" in these same words, adding the additional definition of "an excessive impulse" (*hormên pleonazousan*, *ibid.* 1.205). For the Stoics, the ideal human condition was that of *apatheia*, in which the individual is free from the passions and maintains a consistent and tranquil spirit at all times.¹³ Clement's admiration for this doctrine is seen in his statement that the Christian is characterised by quietude (*êremias*), stillness (*hêsychias*), calmness (*galênês*), and peace (*eirênês*, Paed. 2.60.5). In order to reach this ideal state, one must overcome the passions. While Clement accepts the definitions of "passion" cited above, defining it as "a movement of the soul which is contrary to nature and disobedient to reason" (*para physin oun kinêsis psychês kata tên pros ton logon apeitheian*, Strom. 2.59.6), he also offers the additional definition of "an excessive impulse exceeding the measures of reason" (*ibid.*). Thus, self-discipline (*enkrateia*) is required for suppression of the passions (Strom. 2.80.4). Because human nature is subject to passions, *enkrateia* is needed (*ibid.* 2.81.1). Only when one exercises *enkrateia* will proper conduct be possible (*ibid.* 2.80.5).

¹³This Stoic ideal will be seen in the discussion of Seneca in the next chapter. See pp. 60-62.

The ethos which Clement puts forth in the Paedagogus is directed toward self-discipline and renunciation of the passions. He believes that the passions are incited by overindulgence in physical things (see p. 120). As stated above (pp. 27-29), Clement allows for participation in the physical world, but he also places strict limits upon the extent of that participation. Christians are to refrain from indulging up to and beyond the point at which the passions are incited.

Therefore, in the Paedagogus, Clement presents an ethos which prohibits self-indulgence. He sets strict limits upon the degree of participation permissible in the physical world. Henry Chadwick's observation that Clement does not partake of a naturalistic hedonism is something of an understatement (1966, 60). At the same time, Clement accepted the world. Thus he puts forth his ethic of moderate participation.

In order to understand Clement's acceptance of the physical world, we must consider his view of creation. Chadwick states, "The doctrine of Creation is the foundation of Clement's ethic" (1966, 58). For Clement, God is being (*ousia*), and as such is the first principle of the physical world (*tou physikou topou*). God is also the good (*tagathon*), and as such is the first principle of ethics

(*tou ethikou*, Strom. 4.162.5). Clement follows this statement by arguing against those who condemn the material world and the physical life.

Not only was the universe created by God, it is a unified entity. God, through power, embraces all things (Strom. 2.5.4), and the power of God pervades all things (Prot. 73.2). Elsewhere Clement states that all things come together in the Son, who is "one thing as all things, and therefore all things" (*hôs panta en. enthen kai panta*, Strom. 4.156.2). The universe is united because the powers of the Spirit, which (according to Osborn, 1957, 41-42) Clement believes to guide the world, become collectively one thing and culminate in the Son (Strom. 4.156.-2). It is for this reason that the Logos is called the alpha and omega, for he is the unbroken beginning and the end, encompassing all things (*ibid.* 4.157.1). Clement's metaphysical outlook made acceptance of the physical world inevitable, for it was created by God, who is the good (*tagathon*), and given unity by God and the Logos.

Clement goes on to state that this unity extends even beyond the physical world. All existence is unified in God, for "being is one and God is one" (*mias men tês ousias ousês, henos de tou theou*, Strom. 4.165.4). There is one God, "by whom all things are made and created, both the world [ho

kosmos] and the things above the world [*ta hyperkosmia*]" (ibid. 4.167.1). Because of this unity of all existence, nothing, by nature, can be foreign to the world (*ouk an tis eie physei tou kosmou xenos*, ibid. 4.165.4). Moreover, the Logos was both immanent within the world and in unity with the transcendent Father (see above, pp. 32-33). In light of this unity between the physical world and the heavenly realm, Clement's acceptance of the former is not surprising.

The implications of such worldly and supra-worldly unity for Clement's anthropology are significant. He employs the simile of the centaur to describe the dual nature of human beings, who are comprised of an irrational body and a rational soul. The former is concerned about the physical world, while the latter is raised to God (Strom. 4.9.4). The unity between the physical and spiritual realms means that the physical body cannot be despised in favour of the spiritual soul, for the whole human being is a creation of God. There must be unity and cooperation between the body and soul. Clement approves of Plato's assertion that care must be taken for the body if the soul is to attain harmony (*harmonia*, Strom. 4.18.1; cf. Republic 3.410). The soul of the wise person applies itself to the body with respect (*semnôs*) and honour (*timêtikôs*), albeit not with passionate emotion (*ou prospathôs*, Strom. 4.165.2).

Although Clement employed a dualistic anthropology, he rejected any notion of pessimistic dualism. Although the body is inferior to the soul, it is not naturally evil. Clement employs Stoic thought to express his viewpoint. Certain things are neither good nor bad, but ethically neutral (*mesotêtes tines*). Among these amoral things, some are preferable to others (*proêgmena*). The soul also is neutral, but to be preferred over the body (Strom. 4.164.3-5). Clement's view of the physical world prevents him from seeing the body as evil. Therefore, he interprets the biblical condemnation of the flesh, not as condemnation of the body, but of sin (*ibid.* 4.164.2). He regards as ill-reasoning (*oukoun eulogôs*) those who denigrate created existence and reproach the body (*ibid.* 4.163.1).

Clement's outlook led him into polemical attacks against heretical gnostics. He argues that "the soul is not sent down from heaven to that which is worse, for God works all things to the better" (*ibid.* 4.167.4). It was to dispel any false notions about the incorporeality of the incarnation, not for physical nourishment, that Jesus ate while on earth (Strom. 6.71.2). In the third book of the Stromata, Clement argues against the gnostic belief that the physical world and the body are the creations of the demiurge rather than of the omniscient and good creator (Chadwick, 1966, 48, 58). Clement rejects the gnostic ethics of over-indulgence of the

(unimportant) body, on the one hand, or strict asceticism and withdrawal from the evil physical world, on the other (ibid. 58-60).

We have seen that Clement's philosophical and theological doctrines caused him to accept the physical world as a creation of the good God, while also causing him to renounce excessive indulgence in the physical world, which incites the passions. Clement's ethic reflects these attitudes, and is summed up in his statement, "The [true] gnostic is such as to be subjected [*peripiptein*] only to those passions which exist for the maintenance of the body, such as hunger [*peinêi*], thirst [*dipsei*], and similar things [*tois homiois*]" (Strom. 6.71.1). Clement accepts the body and therefore is concerned that its needs be met. However, participation in the world is limited to meeting these physical needs. One is to stop short of that point at which the passions are incited. Accordingly the ethic which he develops in the Paedagogus is one of limited or moderate participation in the physical world. It is not surprising, given Clement's appreciation for philosophy, that this ethic takes on a distinctly Stoic flavour; for Stoicism also accepted the physical world but prohibited participation in it beyond the point at which the passions were excited, as can be seen from the writings of Seneca, to whom we now direct our attention.

CHAPTER 3

SENECA'S SITUATION¹

Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born in Corduba, the capital of the Roman province Baetica, modern Spain (Martial, Epigrams 1.61.7). While it is impossible to fix a definite year to his birth, it must have been between 4 and 1 B.C.E. (Griffith, 1976, 35-6). The son of a well-to-do *eques* (ibid. 1974, 3), Seneca was moved to Rome at an early age, where he received his education. Typically, this education emphasized rhetorical training, and it seems that Seneca learned his lessons well. Dio records that Seneca later delivered a speech in the senate with such graceful elegance that the emperor Caligula was filled with jealousy and wished to put him to death (19.19.7-8). Despite his impressive rhetorical abilities, Seneca's first love lay with philosophy. It is somewhat ironic that Seneca, who apparently had little patience with rhetoricians who were long on style but short on content (Ep. Mor. 40.2ff; 45; 48; 106.12; 111; 114), was accused by ancient critics of this

¹For the section on Seneca's life, the following secondary sources have been used: Miriam T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976); Miriam T. Griffin, "Imago Vitae Suae" in Seneca, ed. by C.D.N. Costa (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, 2 vols. (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959; reprint ed. 1984); Villy Sorensen, Seneca: The Humanist at the Court of Nero, translated by W. Glyn Jones (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1984).

same vice (Suetonius, Caligula, 53.2; Quintilian 8.3.31; 10.1.125-131; Gellius, Noct.Att., 12.2.).²

It was in the philosophers whom he encountered in Rome that he first found the content that was to attract him. Here he was impressed by Papirius Fabianus (Ep. Mor. 11.4; 52.11; 100.12; De brevitae vitae 10.1; 13.9), a member of the Roman philosophical school, the Sextii. This "spezifisch roemische Philosophie" (Pohlenz, 1959, vol. 1: 280) had a significant impact on Seneca, as he received from Quintus Sextius the practice of judging his own works each day (De Ira 3.36.1-3), and in his later years he retained great admiration for this philosopher (Ep. Mor. 64.2ff). Sotion, the Pythagorean, made a strong impression in Seneca's youth and convinced him of the advantages of ascetic dietary habits (Ep. Mor. 49.2; 108.17ff). Perhaps the most significant philosophical influence on Seneca in his youthful days in Rome came from Attalus. It was from this Stoic philosopher that Seneca learned the evils of seeking meaning in material possessions (Ep. Mor. 67.15; 72.8; 81.22; 108.13, 23; 110.14ff). The enormous impact which Attalus had on Seneca can be seen from the latter's confession that certain ascetic habits which he practiced throughout his life were learned from this teacher (ibid.

²For a discussion of style and form in the Moral Essays, see J.R.F. Wright, 1974, 39-69. As will become evident as we proceed, Seneca's life was rife with paradoxes.

108.15). Moreover, Seneca glowingly describes Attalus as "an exalted being, above human dignity" (*sublimem altioremq̄ue humano fastigio*, *ibid.* 108.13), and fondly remembers his days attending his school: "I besieged his school and was the first to arrive and the last to leave" (*scholam eius obsideremus et primi veniremus et novissimi exiremus*, *ibid.* 108.3). In fact, Attalus' ascetic teaching had such an impact on Seneca that he states: "often I desired to leave his school a poor man" (*saepe exire e schola pauperi libuit*, *ibid.* 108.14).

From the above references, we see that many of the influences which had an effect on Seneca were of a sumptuary nature. For example, Sotion convinced him to abstain from eating meat, although Seneca abandoned this practice after a year as it was associated with certain foreign cults (*alienigena sacra*) which were being prosecuted under Tiberius (Ep. Mor. 108.17-22). The influence of Attalus in this regard is clearly manifested. His exaltations of poverty and denunciations of superfluous material possessions often left Seneca with the desire to be poor (*ibid.* 108.14). Moreover, upon hearing Attalus' denunciation of pleasures that exceeded the bounds of necessity, Seneca was inspired to limit his food and drink, abstaining all his life from such superfluties as oysters and mushrooms. In addition, Seneca attributes to the

influence of Attalus his avoidance of perfumes, wine, and the bath (ibid. 108.14-16). Seneca also attributes his use of a "pillow which resists the body" (*culcitam quae resisteret corpori*) to the recommendations of Attalus (ibid. 108.23).

Seneca's Stoic view that fulfillment and peace of mind are not to be found in the gifts of fortune also bears Attalus' influence. It was Attalus who had said that it was better to suffer the tortures of fortune bravely than to enjoy its luxury (Ep. Mor. 67.15). Elsewhere Seneca cites Attalus' simile comparing people who are never satisfied with fortune's gifts to a ravenous dog which devours its food and immediately looks for more. In contrast, the sage is satisfied (*hoc sapienti non evenit; plenus est*), since true happiness disregards circumstances (ibid. 72.8-9). Finally in this regard, Seneca describes how Attalus, while attending an elaborate entertainment, was struck by the emptiness of grandiose displays of wealth. He came to realize that riches are as unnecessary for the possessors as for the onlookers (*supervacuae mihi visae sunt habentibus quam fuerunt spectantibus*) and that by learning to be content with little, it is possible to vie with God for happiness (*Iovi ipsi controversiam de felicitate faciamus*, ibid. 110.14-20).

As will be seen in the following chapter, in which certain aspects of his moral viewpoint will be discussed more fully, Seneca's outlook continued to bear the stamp of these philosophers whom he encountered in Rome during his youth. By Seneca's time Rome had replaced Greece as the main centre of philosophy (Pohlenz, 1959, vol. 1: 280). Indeed, the philosophical atmosphere here significantly influenced Seneca and instilled within him a deep and genuine love for philosophy. The most prevalent school in the philosophical setting of Rome was Stoicism (Sandbach, 1975, 16-18), and it is therefore little wonder that as a Roman philosopher Seneca identified himself with this school. In order to find the reasons for Stoicism's popularity with the Romans, we must consider the nature of this people. They were practical people who were devoutly proud of being Roman. Loyalty to the *res publica* was an admirable virtue, and consequently participation in public life was highly regarded and expected of those for whom such a career was possible. Stoic doctrine was in complete harmony with this attitude, as the words of Chrysippus reveal: "the sage [*ton sophon*] will speak in public and take part in the government in such a way, as if wealth, glory, and health were goods" (SVF 3.698). Seneca sums up this attitude in De tranquillitate animi where he recommends "engaging oneself in actions of practical matters [*actione rerum*] and in the

management of the republic [*rei publicae tractatione*] and in civil duties [*officiis civilibus*]" (3.1).

Stoic morality was a natural complement to this Roman practicality. While Stoicism did propound metaphysical doctrines,³ its main emphasis was on the morality of daily living. In fact, its physical doctrines and moral precepts were interdependent, with the former serving as a framework and foundation of the latter (Bradley, 1974, 43; Timothy, 1973, 4-5; Seneca, Ep. Mor. 94 and 95). In De providentia Seneca discusses the Stoic doctrine of a divine providence which rules the world and is responsible for the order of things. This is not mere metaphysical speculation, however. Father, Seneca derives from this doctrine a source of comfort for those experiencing the hardships of ill-fortune. Difficult circumstances are no longer a cause of concern. On the contrary, they benefit those to whom they come and are a sign of God's fatherly love, since it is through them that true character is built (De prov. 2.1ff). Parenthetically, the Stoic concept of providence would have been attractive to the ruling class of Rome on other grounds as well. The people who ruled the world would find justification and

³Bradley correctly regards as an oversimplification "the opinion represented by Zeller, who interpreted Stoicism as a kind of *Lebensphilosophie*.... Old and Middle Stoicism provided more than a theoretic or practical morality; by making original contributions to physical and logical theory, they represented distinct alternatives and responses to Aristotelian and Epicurean doctrines" (1974, 42-43).

comfort in the notion that their exalted position was ordered by God (Sandbach, 1975, 16).

Thus, the serious adherent of Stoicism was strengthened to deal with the hardships of everyday life. This moral strength was augmented by the Stoic denial of harsh external circumstances as evils. Seneca devotes much attention to this idea, and in De providentia he states that apparent ills are not real evils (*non sint quae videntur mala*, 3.1). Therefore harsh circumstances are not to be feared, for they cannot cause real harm. Undaunted, the *sapiens* will stand up to all that fortune can bring against him/her (Ep. Mor. 59.8) and retain a calm and peace of mind through everything (De providentia 2.2). Stoicism offered "an established system of beliefs that would comfort, guide, and support a man in the difficulties and dangers of life" (Sandbach, 1975, 149). It is little wonder that such a philosophy appealed to the practical Roman character, which was more interested in the concrete realities of daily life than in abstract speculation.

Stoic morality also denied that the gifts of fortune constituted true goodness (De vita beata 2.4-3.1). This doctrine led to the conclusion that fulfillment and happiness were not found in advantageous physical circumstances, but rather in a mental calm and steadfastness in the face of any

circumstances (ibid. 3.3-4.3). It has been noted above that the Stoic Attalus influenced Seneca in this direction, and many sumptuary references appear in Seneca's works (Ep. Mor. 17.1-12; 104.34; 108.11ff.; 110.14ff.; 115.9ff.; 119.2ff.; et passim). Stoicism thus took on an ascetic tinge. It was only a tinge, however, for although the Stoics ultimately derived their ethics from Cynicism and thus regarded virtue solely as possessing real, moral value, they attributed to the gifts of fortune a subordinate kind of value (Tsekourakis, 1974, 1). The everyday advantages which make life more enjoyable were acceptable, which doctrine undoubtedly made Stoicism more appealing to Romans. In short, Stoicism avoided cutting itself off from everyday life. The ancient Spartans provide a vivid analogy, for this previously rigoristic people experienced a significant lapse in self-abnegation once they attained the position of undisputed prominence in the Greek world. Severe asceticism does not generally set well with those in a position of world prominence.

Moreover, Stoicism strongly denounced giving heed to the passions. It advocated an austerity which resists excitement over good fortune and melancholy over bad. Seneca suggests that a total lack of mourning is the ideal response to the death of a close friend, although human weakness makes this unlikely (Ep. Mor. 63.1, 13). Elsewhere he

criticizes the Peripatetics because they allow for passions within the *sapiens*, albeit in a limited and moderated measure. He objects that they merely moderate, rather than remove altogether, the passions (*non his tollunt adfectus, sed temperant*, *ibid.* 85.4). The severe character of Roman history made this somber morality appealing. This history was one of austere ancestors, upon whose supposedly upright character the greatness of Rome had been established.⁴ The pen of Livy had made Lucretia the personification of ideal Roman womanhood (1.57-60). Horace negatively contrasts the frivolity of his own generation (*fecunda culpa saecula nuptias primum inquinavere et genus et domos*) to the admirable austerity of the ancestors who won glory for Rome, and is forced to conclude that each progressive generation is worse than its predecessor (*aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit nos nequiores, mox daturos progeniem vitiosiore*, *Ode* 3.6). It is little wonder that Augustus used this virtuous past as an example for his moral reforms which were directed toward achieving social stability (Syme, 1939, 440ff.). The

⁴We must remember that this history was written retrospectively, and was intended to provide contemporary Romans with exemplars of ideal behaviour by which they were to measure their own lives. Thus, history and reality become blurred, and Ronald Syme's observation about these moral Roman ancestors is important: "The Italian peasant may have been valorous and frugal: he was also narrow and grasping, brutal and superstitious. Nor is it evident that the Roman aristocrat of the golden age of the Scipiones was always the paragon of virtue that Cicero and his contemporaries affected to admire. There was another side to that" (1939, 453).

Roman people easily identified the austere, passionless morality advocated by Stoicism with that of their revered ancestors. As a sincere Roman, Seneca shared this admiration of ancestral austerity. He frequently refers to the wonderful dispassion of the Catos as examples of ancient Roman greatness (Ep. Mor. 7.6; 51.12; 71.8ff.; 86.10; 87.9-11; et passim) and favourably contrasts the simple tastes of the ancients at the baths to the luxury demanded by his contemporaries (ibid. 86.4ff.).

In his own life Seneca witnessed incredible fluctuations in circumstances. He knew both the heights and the depths which fortune could bring. Seneca's appreciation of the Stoa, which scorned the onslaughts of fortune and encouraged its adherents to remain steadfast in spite of circumstances, is thus understandable.

All his life Seneca was plagued by ill health. He looks back on his illness:

After [my youth], I succumbed and was brought to the point at which I was filtered down to extreme thinness. I often took up the impulse of ending my life; but the thought of my most patient old father detained me. For I considered, not how bravely I was able to die, but how he was not able bravely to lose me. Therefore I commanded myself to live. For sometimes even to live is to act bravely (Ep. Mor. 78.1-2).

Concerning illnesses, he says "none is unknown to me." One of these was asthma, which he refers to as a preparation or

practice for death (*meditationem mortis*, *ibid.* 54. 1-3). The sternness advocated by Stoicism in the face of external adversity undoubtedly gave Seneca much encouragement in the face of such ill health. He cites the brave example of Claranus, who bears up to his physical weaknesses with true, admirable Stoic indifference (*ibid.* 56.1ff).

In the year 41, Seneca was exiled upon charges of adultery with Caligula's sister, Julia (Dio, Hist. Rom. 60.8). Seneca spent the next eight years on the island of Corsica, until he was recalled in 49 at the instigation of Agrippina (Tacitus, Ann. 12.8). Although there were two Roman colonies on Corsica (Seneca, Cons. ad Helvia 7.9), Seneca despaired of his barbarian surroundings. He apologizes for his corrupted literary style, stating that "Latin words do not easily come to mind for the person around whom the disorderly murmur [*inconditus...fremitus*] of the barbarians echoes, which is burdensome even to the more civilized barbarians [*barbaris...humanioribus*]" (Cons. ad Polybium 18.9). The agony of his exile was deeply felt (Cons. ad Helviam 1.1-4), and had even postponed his writing a consolatory letter to his mother (*ibid.* 1.2-4). He sees himself as one who is held hostage by his own misfortunes (*quem sua mala occupatum tenent*, Cons. ad Polybium 18.9). Perhaps the most telling sign of Seneca's despair is his glowing flattery of Claudius, behind which undoubtedly were

hopes of recall (ibid. 12.3ff.), in spite of apparent resentment toward the emperor, which is revealed in his Apocolocyntosis, a satirical reflection on Claudius' consecration following the death of the emperor (cf. Tacitus, Ann. 12.8).

Seneca's distress may have been heightened by his possible innocence. Dio states that the charge of adultery was invented by Claudius' wife, Messalina, out of jealousy toward her niece, Julia (Hist. Rom. 60.8.5). Seneca's own words from exile (Sorensen, 1976, 112) imply his innocence:

the most extensive matter of injustice [*iniuriarum*] is revealed in those things through which danger [*periculum*] is contrived for us—i.e. in being subject to an accuser, or in a false accusation, or in the hatred of the powerful being incited against us, and all other kinds of robberies that exist among citizens (De const. sap. 9.2).

Once again, Stoicism equipped Seneca with a strength and constancy which helped him to cope. In De constantia sapiens, which was probably written during exile (Sorensen, 1976, 112), he emphasizes rising above the onslaughts of fortune and remaining steadfast in the face of any circumstances. The path which leads to wisdom is steep and rugged, but those who attain it find themselves raised high above all fortune (De const. sap. 1.1). *Sapientes* are described as "unconquered by hardships and scorers of desires and conquerors of all terrors" (*invictos laboribus*

et contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrorum, ibid. 2.1). Indeed, "the sage is secure, nor can he\she be affected by any injury [iniuria] or insult [contumelia]" ibid. 2.3). Regardless of how severe and numerous misfortunes become, the peace of mind of the sapiens will not be disturbed (ibid. 15.1-3).

It is understandable that Seneca read consolatory writings in Corsica (Cons. ad Helvia 1.2), and turned to this type of literary style himself. It was from exile that Seneca wrote the consolation to his mother, Helvia (Pohlenz, 1959, vol.1: 311). He comforts her with assurances that, in spite of his circumstances, he remains content (Cons. ad Helvia 4.2-3). The sumptuary outlook of Stoicism offers him comfort. Although he has been deprived of much, his happiness comes with being content with the necessities of nature. Happiness is found from within oneself rather than in externals:

Little importance attaches to external things [adventiciis rebus], which do not have much influence in either direction. Success [secunda] does not exalt the sage nor does adversity [adversa] bring the sage down. For sages have always attempted to rely completely on themselves and to derive all their joy from themselves (ibid. 5.1).

With mental brawn received from the Stoa, Seneca taunts fortune, saying that its attack "is severe, only when unexpected; the one who always expects fortune's attack easily sustains it.... Adverse fortune crushes no one, except those whom success has deceived.... Those who do not

inflate themselves with rich things are not reduced by changes [in fortune]" (ibid. 5.3-5). Even the deprivation of one's homeland can be endured rather easily (ibid. 6.2ff.).

Seneca's respite came in 49 C.E. when Agrippina, now the wife of the emperor, persuaded Claudius to recall him to Rome. Tacitus suggests reasons for this action. Agrippina believed that, given Seneca's popularity with Romans, it would be a popular move. She also coveted the wise Seneca's advice in regard to her own political ambitions. Most significant for Seneca's future, he was recalled to become the personal tutor of Agrippina's son, the future emperor, Nero (Ann. 12.8). These were good times for Seneca, and when Nero succeeded Claudius in 54 C.E., he realized a prestige and status that must have been unthinkable during his days in Corsica. The specific details of Seneca's responsibilities under Nero are uncertain, although Tacitus (Ann. 13.3) and Dio (Hist. Rom. 61.3.1) agree that he was responsible for the writing of official speeches. Tacitus (Ann. 13.2; 13.4-5; 14.52) and Dio (Hist. Rom. 61.3.3-4.5) also both credit Seneca, along with the praetorian prefect, Burrus, for the effective early years of Nero's reign, and Dio refers to them as "the most wise [*phronimôtatoi*], and at

the same time, most powerful [*dynatôtatoi*], of the men around Nero" (ibid. 61.3.3).⁵

Of course, Seneca's good fortune under Nero extended to finances as well. Jerome Carcopino points out that imperial favours provided a major source of income for the wealthy in Rome (1941, 65). Certainly this was the case with Seneca. In requesting permission to retire from his public duties, Tacitus has him express his appreciation for the emperor by saying "you have heaped upon me so much of honour and of wealth [*tantum honorum atque opum*] that nothing is missing of my happiness except moderation of its use.... You have surrounded me with immense favour and innumerable riches..." (Ann. 14.53). Overwhelmed by Nero's generosity, Seneca wonders whatever became of his relatively humble origins as a provincial eques (*equestri et provinciali*). He asks himself, "Where is that spirit which was content with modest things [*modicis*]? Did it build up such gardens and walk through these estates and abound in such spacious fields, in such extensive capital?" (ibid.). In his response, Nero recognizes his gifts to Seneca as "gardens and capital and villas" (*horti et faenus et villae*, ibid. 14.55). In De vita beata, Seneca himself admits to having massive wealth. Among his possessions are large fields, elegant furniture,

⁵For a discussion of theories put forth by various scholars regarding Seneca's role under Nero, see Griffin, 1976, 67-76.

expensive wine, an aviary, slaves who are richly dressed, and overseas estates, some of which Seneca has not even seen. Moreover, he holds elaborate dinners and his wife wears costly earrings (De vita beata 17.1-2).

The tension between such massive wealth and the ascetic teachings of Seneca mentioned above provoked censure from ancient critics. Tacitus records the objections of Suillius:

By what wisdom, by the precepts of which philosophers, had he obtained, within four years of royal friendship, three hundred million sesterces? In Rome, he set his traps for the childless and their testaments, Italy and the provinces were drained by his excessive usury [*inmenso faenore*] (Ann. 13.42).

Dio lists, among other apparent discrepancies between Seneca's philosophy and life, that, although he criticizes the wealthy and their extravagances, he himself had acquired a fortune of 300,000,000 sesterces and owned 500 tables made of citrus wood and ivory (Hist. Rom. 61.3). Dio also holds Seneca partially responsible for the British revolt of 61 C.E., saying that Seneca recalled, all at once, a loan of forty million sesterces and that he used severe measures to extract it (*ibid.* 62.2).

Seneca's reply to such objections is found in De vita beata. He does not abandon Stoic precepts, but maintains that externals such as wealth and social prestige "glitter

outwardly, but inwardly are worthless [*foris nitent, introrsus misera sunt*]" (De vita beata 2.4). Happiness is found only in a steadfast mind which is unruffled by circumstances (*ibid.* 4.1-3). In true Stoic fashion, he emphasizes that happiness is characterized by a mind which regards "virtue [*honestas*] as the only good, baseness [*turpitude*] as the only evil, and all other things as a worthless throng of things, which neither detract from, nor add to, the happy life, without bringing increase nor loss to the highest good [*summi boni*]" (*ibid.* 4.3). Yet Stoicism did allow him to see certain advantages in, and to retain, riches, and herein lies a further appeal of this school to this man of means. Seneca reflects mainstream Stoic thought when he says that the sound mind is "careful, but not anxious, about the body and the things which pertain to it; then it is attentive [*diligens*] about the other things which add to life, but holds none of these in admiration - the user, but not the servant, of the gifts of fortune [*fortunae muneribus*]" (*ibid.* 3.3). Seneca echoes traditional Stoicism in his view that, although all externals are morally indifferent, some are more advantageous and desirable than others. "Some honour is assigned to some of them, much to others. Make no mistake, then, riches are among the more desirable things [*inter potiora*]" (*ibid.* 22.4). He repeatedly reiterates this sentiment that riches are among the more desirable indifferents, and thus are admissible to,

and preferred by, the *sapiens*, provided they do not dominate the individual or become a source of anxiety (ibid. 21.1-26.4).

The desirability of riches is heightened by the fact that they enable one to display certain virtues which would be impossible without them: "...in poverty [paupertate] there is one kind of virtue - not to be bent [*inclinari*] nor pressed down [*deprimi*] - but in riches temperance [*temperantia*] and liberality [*liberalitas*] and diligence [*diligentia*] and orderliness [*dispositio*] and magnificence [*magnificentia*] have an unobstructed field" (ibid. 21.4-22.1). Wealth enables one to practice the virtue of liberality to others (ibid. 24.2-3). Seneca divides virtues into two camps. One group, comprised of such virtues as "patience [*patientia*], fortitude [*fortitudo*], perseverance [*perseverantia*], and every other virtue which is opposed to hardships [*duris*] subdues fortune," and is born out of poverty and is acquired only through much bitter struggle. The other, comprised of "liberality [*liberalitatem*], temperance [*temperantiam*], and gentleness [*mansuetudinem*]," is known to the wealthy and requires no struggle. In fact, these virtues come so easily that one must use restraint so that the the practice of them does not become excessive. Understandably, Seneca prefers to exercise the latter virtues rather than the former (ibid. 25.5-8).

The good times under Nero were not to last. When the young emperor had his overbearing and manipulative mother, Agrippina, murdered in 59 C.E. (Tacitus, Ann. 14.3-8; Dio, Hist. Rom. 62.11.1-13.5), a major controlling influence was eliminated. Tacitus states that Nero now gave vent to all his desires (*omnes libidines*), which had previously been restrained and hindered by "some kind of respect for his mother [*qualiscumque matris reverentia*]" (Ann. 14.13). He began to give licence to his interests in theatre and chariot racing (*ibid.* 14.14-16; Dio, Hist. Rom. 17.2-21.2). Goaded on by Tigellinus, who, in 62 C.E., replaced Burrus as praetorian prefect and Seneca as Nero's main adviser, and who was in character kindred to the emperor, Nero gave greater reign to his licentious behaviour (Tacitus, Ann. 14.51). The tyrannical nature of Nero, so well known to posterity, became full blown, and the *princeps* had little use for Seneca's moralizing. Seneca and Burrus had worked as an inseparable team, and when the latter died in 62 C.E. - whether by poison or sickness Tacitus is unsure (Ann. 14.51) - the position of Seneca was crippled (*ibid.* 14.52). The fatal blow to Seneca's political career came when the new members of Nero's court complained to the emperor that Seneca was using his enormous wealth to win popularity with the people, that he disparaged Nero's racing and stage activities, and that it was time the emperor cast aside this

magistrum (ibid. 14.52). It was at this point that Tacitus says Seneca sought permission from Nero to retire from his civic duties, and although his request was refused, he effectively withdrew from public life in favour of philosophical studies (ibid. 14.53-56).

Nero's disfavour was a dangerous and, at times, deadly thing to incur. In addition to the murder of his own mother, the sources report that Nero had his stepbrother and potential rival to the throne, Britannicus, murdered in 55 C.E. (Tacitus, Ann. 13.14-17; Dio, Hist. Rom. 61.3-4; Suetonius, Nero 33.3). With the sensible Seneca and Burrus out of the way, Nero's suspicious paranoia was easily aroused. Under the influence of Tigellinus, the exiles, Sulla and Plautus, experienced the emperor's distrust and consequently their own deaths (Tacitus, Ann. 14.57-59). Octavia, Nero's wife, was the next to fall into imperial disfavour. She was exiled, and when Nero's long time mistress and new wife, Poppaea, aroused the emperor's suspicion toward her, Octavia's death was not far off (ibid. 14.60-65). Tacitus further notes that, in the same year of Octavia's murder, Nero was credited with the poisoning of two of his principal freedmen, Doryphorus and Pallas (ibid. 14.66).

Understandably, when Seneca, out of favour with Nero, withdrew from public life and concentrated his efforts on

philosophical pursuits, he thought much about death.⁶ His moral letters to his friend, Lucilius, in which death is a prominent theme, date to this period of his life (Sorensen, 1976, 190; Griffin, 1976, 305; Russell, 1974, 72). In these correspondences, Seneca reveals that he is anticipating his own death. He states, "having had enough, I await death [*mortem plenus exspecto*]" (Ep. Mor. 61.4) and "I was already loathing myself, already despising the remains of my broken life, about to pass over into that infinite time [*in immensum illud tempus*] and into the possession of eternity [*in possessionem omnis aevi*]" (ibid. 102.2). Although the letters are addressed to Lucilius, reflected in them are Seneca's attempts to encourage himself in the face of death. Thus, death is not an evil, nor to be feared (ibid. 4.3; 22.16; 24.11-14; 24.17-21; 30.5; 30.9-17; 36.9-12; 82.15-19, 23). He confidently exhorts that "so much is death [*mors*] not to be feared that through the benefit of death nothing is to be feared" (ibid. 24.11) and "death carries no disadvantage [*incommodum*]" (ibid. 36.9). In order to emphasize this, he cites examples of Cato the younger, Caecilius Scipio, and Bassus, all of whom died bravely (ibid. 24.6ff.; 30.4ff.). His aim in accumulating these examples (*exempla*) is not to exercise his mental power

⁶Undoubtedly, his ill health, including asthma, then known as *meditationem mortis* (Ep. Mor. 54.2), and the fact that Seneca was now an old man would also have caused him to think about, and prepare for, death.

(*ingenium*), but to encourage Lucilius to face and oppose that which seems most terrible (*maxime terribile*, *ibid.* 24.9).

Mental preparation is the key to overcoming the fear of death. By contemplating death while living, one will meet it bravely and accept it without despair (Ep. Mor. 4.5; 4.9; 26.4ff.; 30.12; 36.8; 61.1-4; 82.16). Peace of mind may accompany Stoics even in death, if they are prepared for it. Thus, Seneca comforts himself by reading philosophers on the eternity of the soul (*ibid.* 102.2). He makes the human soul to say "when that day comes in which this mixture of the divine and the human is separated, I shall leave behind the body [*corpus*] here where I found it and return myself to the gods" (*ibid.* 102.22). Elsewhere he cites the Stoic doctrine of reincarnation in order to alleviate Lucilius' (and his own) fears of death (*ibid.* 36.10-12).

Seneca's concerns about his precarious situation were not unfounded. Tacitus records that Seneca was personally familiar with Piso, the leader of a conspiracy against Nero in 65 C.E. (Ann. 14.62; 15.60ff.). It is doubtful whether Seneca actually took part (Griffith, 1976, 367; Sorensen, 1976, 313), but, given his situation of imperial disfavour, as well as Tigellinus' railings to the emperor about the sedition of Stoics (Tacitus, Ann. 14.57), it was perhaps

inevitable that Nero would suspect his involvement. Thus, in the year 65 C.E., at the command of Nero, Seneca took his own life (ibid. 15.60-64; Dio, Hist. Rom. 62.25).

While Clement's relationship to the world was moderate participation, that of Seneca is not so easy to define. We find paradox here. As noted above, a tension existed between his writings and his lifestyle. At a time when large land estates (*latifundiae*) were the most stable form of investment and thus a sign of wealth (Boren, 1977, 170, 189), Seneca's acreage far exceeded his own needs (De vita beata 17.2). At a time when country villas were in vogue for the wealthy of Rome (Carcopino, 1941, 197), Seneca possessed these (Tacitus, Ann. 14.55-55). At a time when wealthy Romans were vying against each other for the most elaborate dinner feasts (Carcopino, 1941, 267-69), Seneca hosted parties, the mere attendance at which was an art (De vita beata 17.2). At a time when rich Romans possessed slaves in unbelievably vast numbers (Boren, 1977, 200-01), Seneca owned so many that personal acquaintance with all of them was impossible (De vita beata 17.2). At a time when the wealthy augmented their finances by vast loans at high rates (Carcopino, 1941, 67), we are reminded again of Dio's reference to Seneca's high-interest loan of forty million sesterces to the Britons (Hist. Rom. 62.2). We also learn from De vita beata that Seneca owned elegant furniture, that

he drank vintage wine, and that his wife wore expensive earrings (17.2).

Thus, we are taken aback when we encounter in Seneca's writings scorn for superfluities. Seneca the philosopher maintains that the great-souled person scorns great things and prefers the ordinary to the excessive (Ep. Mor. 39.4). He exhorts his readers to despise externals (*externa*) and to be content with that which is honourable (*honesto*, *ibid.* 74.6). He professes to prefer a hard, toilsome lifestyle to one of luxury, since the latter tends to soften one's soul (*ibid.* 82.2). The steadfast spirit is the one which has forsaken externals (*ibid.* 82.5). He makes reason to dictate, "Relinquish riches, which are either a danger [*periculum*] or a burden [*onus*] to the one possessing them" (*ibid.* 84.11), while he regards the porches of the elaborate houses of the rich as "slippery ground" (*ibid.* 84.12). Finally, he states that the soul is at its greatest when it has laid aside all that is extraneous (*ibid.* 87.3).

While a tension exists between such sentiments and Seneca's superfluous lifestyle, one must not see too much of the ascetic in Seneca's writings. Despite the ascetic tendencies recorded earlier, the overall impression that one receives concerning Seneca's attitude to the world from his writings is not much different from Clement's. His basic

outlook allows for possession of material goods and involvement in the world, but in moderation. In Aristotelian fashion, he describes the preferable lifestyle as a mean, intermediate between good and common customs (*inter bonos mores et publicos*). Moreover, "philosophy demands frugality [*frugalitatem*], not punishment [*poenam*]" (Ep. Mor. 5.5). The basis for Seneca's rejection of strict asceticism is the Stoic ideal of a life which accords with nature, for "this is contrary to nature, to torment one's body, to hate easy elegance [*faciles...munditias*], to desire squalor [*squalorem*], and to eat food which is not only plain [*vilibus*], but also hideous [*taetris*] and uncouth [*horridis*]" (*ibid.* 5.4). Upon encouraging Lucilius to partake in certain sumptuary practices, he does not forbid the possession of wealth, but rather advocates a calm, unsolicitous attitude toward it (*ibid.* 18.13). Seneca's attitude toward wealth is that it is permissible as long as it does not become too important to, or take control of, the individual (*ibid.* 74.17).

This attitude toward wealth brings to mind Clement's interpretation of Jesus' instructions to the rich man to give up all his possessions, as discussed above (p. 27). As with Seneca, Clement allows the possession of riches (see pp. 27-28), while disallowing a solicitous attitude toward them. Furthermore, Seneca (see p. 62) and Clement (see p.

28) share similar notions about the generous use of wealth, which both feel should be shared with the less fortunate.

Additional similarities between the proper attitude toward the world as put forth by these two writers are discernible. It was noted earlier that Clement permitted attendance at the feasts of non-believers, but the attending Christians were to stop short of ill-mannered overindulgence (p. 29). Such advice resembles that of Seneca to Lucilius concerning partaking in the Saturnalia festival in Rome. He despairs of the licentiousness of most of the participants, who are "drunk and vomiting" (*ebrii ac vomitantes*), and discourages Lucilius from such behaviour. Yet he maintains that prudent participation is desirable, so that one is neither conspicuously aloof nor giving full reign to the passions (Ep. Mor. 18.4).

Behind Clement's discouragement of such unrefined behaviour was a concern to make a positive impression on, and attract, those outside the faith (see pp. 29-30). Similar concerns were held by Seneca. He discourages a life of austere poverty since a neglected appearance and a radical rejection of all material goods will repulse others (Ep. Mor. 5.1ff.). Seneca believes that following the traditional customs of society is essential to winning over the unconverted, since a Cynic lifestyle which differs too drastically from the

norm repels and scares off "those whom we wish to improve [quos emendari volumus]" (ibid. 5.3).

Acceptance of traditional social practices had its limit, however. Although Rome, like Alexandria, was an immensely wealthy city, its wealth was concentrated in the hands of a relative few (Carcopino, 1941, 64-66, 73). As the wealth of the upper class increased, so too did the number of slaves which they owned. The result was that many opportunities for employment otherwise available to freemen were occupied by slaves and freedmen (Boren, 1977, 200). Moreover, the living expenses in Rome were notoriously exorbitant. According to Juvenal, the price of an excellent house in Sora, Fabrateria, or Frusino equalled the cost of renting a dark attic for a year in Rome (Sat. 3.223). He also states that it was especially difficult to rise out of poverty in Rome, where a large rent was required for a wretched lodging, and where feeding slaves was so expensive that their masters had just enough to acquire frugal meals for themselves (ibid. 3.164-68). The situation in Rome had such devastating effects that many members of the middle class lost confidence in the value of work (Carcopino, 1941, 73-74). Thus we find in Rome a large number of socially disenfranchised citizens. The appeasement of this stratum of the population was effected by public shows (Boren, 1977, 205; Carcopino, 1941, 210-11). Boredom is a breeding ground

for political instability, and the shows alleviated the tedium of the unemployed who had too much free time.

The shows largely consisted of performances in the theatre,⁷ chariot races in the circus, and gladiatorial games in the amphitheatre. It is not surprising that, in the electric atmosphere surrounding the games, passions were liable to run free. Theatrical performances increasingly played on the passions of the audience with their "stark tragedies or sensual productions guaranteed to titillate an audience quickly responsive to their eroticism" (Carcopino, 1941, 228). At the gladiatorial games, "the spectators panted with anxiety or hope.... At every wound which the gladiators inflicted on each other, the public - trembling for its stakes - reacted with increasing excitement" (ibid. 240). As for the races, "The truth is that the Roman crowd revelled in these spectacles where everything combined to quicken their curiosity and arouse their excitement" (ibid. 215).

Thus one is not surprised to find Seneca advocating abstinence from the shows. He emphasizes that nothing corrupts good character as thoroughly as does attendance at the shows, "for there vice [vitia] cleverly creeps up on one through pleasure [voluptatem]" (Ep. Mor. 7.2). Seneca's

⁷Boren (1977, 206) and Carcopino (1941, 221ff.) point out that, by Seneca's time, theatrical performances consisted of pantomimes rather than classical theatre.

indignation is understandable, as he writes these words in response to an especially cruel form of the gladiatorial games which he had the misfortune to attend, in which the victims were deprived of any means of armed defence (ibid. 7.2-5). Seneca's account reveals a gravely regrettable side of the Roman character, for the crowd, rejoicing, passionately cried out in favour of these cruel murders (ibid. 7.5).

Upon hearing the roar of the cheering crowd attending the games, Seneca laments the popularity of such attractions while so few individuals concern themselves with philosophical pursuits (ibid. 80.1-3). The fact that so many are drawn with tremendous zeal to hear the flautists in the theatre while the numbers attending philosophical schools is minimal causes him to feel shame for the human race (ibid. 76.4). Seneca's concerns about the ill effects on human character of the licentiousness of the shows, and consequent boycotting of them, were shared by Clement (Paed. 3.76.3-78.1).

These concerns reflect a more general outlook held by these two writers. They both believe that the majority of people direct their energies in wrong paths. Through poor judgement, the masses focus mainly on their material wants, whether through desire for wealth or through gratification

of the physical senses. Both these men have a message for humanity. Both have a mission to arouse the spiritual yearnings within people, and believe that human beings will find the fulfillment they desire only when they shift their focus from the physical to the spiritual.

Finally, there are indications in Seneca's letters that, after an illustrious political career, he repudiates the benefits which it brought him. He repeatedly trivializes—even rejects — any importance or fulfillment which may be thought to result from titles, honours, or wealth. He emphasizes the fleeting and uncertain nature of honours, riches, and influence (Ep. Mor. 74.7), and states that those who pursue *divitiae*, *honores*, and *potentia* are deluded (*ibid.* 81.28). Moreover, he refers to the quest for office as pompous (*tumida*), vain (*vana*), and empty (*ventosa*) (*ibid.* 84.11). Seneca had realized the best that Roman life had to offer in a physical sense. The honours and wealth which he accrued under Nero have been discussed above. Now, in his retirement and as he thinks back over his career, he comes to the unfortunate conclusion that his accomplishments were rather empty and unimportant. Such denouncements of honours and wealth by one who had acquired both in extreme measure do not necessarily betray hypocrisy. They are spoken from the voice of experience. Seneca personally realized honours,

office, and wealth, and his advice is to seek fulfillment elsewhere, for it is not to be found here.

Also reflected in these sentiments is the voice of a philosopher. He favourably compares wisdom, which results only from much diligent study, to titles, influence, and authority, which may be bestowed haphazardly and at random (Ep. Mor. 84.11). After his retirement from public life, Seneca withdrew into the contemplative life of philosophy, and it was from this position that he looks back over his life. It was only then that he found the spiritual fulfillment that was his truest desire. He speaks of a sudden change which he has undergone (*subitam mutationem mei*), rejoices over the progress that he observes in himself each day (*quantum momenti adferre mihi singulos dies videam*), and boasts that he is not only being improved, but transformed (*intellego, Lucili, non emendari me tantum sed transfigurari*, *ibid.* 6.1-3). It is little wonder that, in this frame of mind, he rejects honours, titles, and wealth as truly important. From this situation he recommends a life of philosophical seclusion, with its accompanying peace of mind, over one of public activity and offices, which will inevitably involve unwanted pressures (Ep. Mor. 19.1ff.).

In fact, peace of mind is the main theme of Seneca's epistles, around which all else revolves. According to Stoicism, this was linked with, and dependent upon, an attitude of indifference toward the physical world. It is for this reason that Seneca discusses ethics in relationship to the world. When he advocates scorning wealth, delicacies, wine, elaborate furnishings, and even death, it is because, according to Stoicism, this is the way in which peace of mind is achieved. The Epistulae Morales emphasize the proper relationship toward the world; for Stoicism held that it was in this relationship that the all-important happy life consisted.

Clement also felt the importance of a proper relationship toward the world as a basis for the happy life - a life pleasing to God. It remains to compare this relationship as put forth by both Seneca and Clement.

CHAPTER 4

SUMPTUARY GUIDELINES CONCERNING HUMAN CONSUMPTION

A comprehensive comparison of sumptuary guidelines as presented in Clement's Paedagogus and Seneca's Epistulae Morales would be a virtually endless undertaking. Therefore the discussion will be confined to the topics of drinking and eating. There are various reasons for this choice.

First, there are the structures of these two works. The Paedagogus is a systematic exposition in which the various moral questions are discussed in order, each chapter dealing with a particular problem. This approach is appropriate, for Clement regarded the Christian life as "a system of reasonable actions [*systêma...logikôn praxeôn*]" (Paed. 1.102.4). Thus, Clement, in his discussion of the individual's proper relationship to the world, deals with its various aspects severally and in order. On the other hand, Seneca's concept of this relationship focusses on one main theme - peace of mind, as this related to the proper attitude toward the physical world. Thus, while individual aspects of morality are important for Seneca, his references to them merely provide examples of specific ways in which this attitude is to be manifested, and often tend to be rather brief and somewhat random. There is a very notable exception to these observations, however. Seneca's eighty-

third letter deals specifically with drunkenness, although numerous allusions to this topic appear elsewhere in his epistles as well. Clement also devotes an extensive chapter to this matter. Thus, drunkenness is the one topic which receives extensive elaboration from both authors, and, as such, is an appropriate starting point for this discussion.

Both writers also give much attention to the topic of eating. While Seneca does not devote a whole letter specifically to this subject, references to it are numerous throughout his letters, displaying many interesting aspects of his moral outlook. Clement's chapter on eating is one of the longest in the Paedagogus, revealing the concern which this matter held for him.

Largely because of the significant amount of attention which both authors give to the topics of drinking and eating, their discussions of these two subjects are quite representative of their respective moral outlooks. Their similar attitudes of moderate participation are admirably displayed in their discussions of these topics. At the same time, these discussions display the distinct concerns of each author, and thus reveal differences in their respective moral emphases.

Finally, the topics of drinking and eating admirably complement each other. They form a cohesive unit, combining to establish the subject of human consumption. Thus, the following discussion will centre on drinking and eating as put forth by Seneca and Clement, keeping in mind that their views on these matters are reflective of their general moral outlooks.

In keeping with their general attitudes of moderate participation, both Seneca and Clement allow for consumption of wine in limited amounts. For both, drunkenness marks this limit. Clement, as he so often does, quotes, although rather loosely, from Ecclesiasticus to support his position. He states that, for the instructed person (*anthrôpô pepaideumenô*), wine is sufficiency (*to hikanon*, Paed. 2.34.4; cf. Ecclus. 31.19). These same sentiments are echoed by Seneca, who speaks of drunkenness and its accompanying vices, "which even the tolerant person [*tolerabilis homo*] shuns, not to mention the perfect and wise person [*perfectus ac sapiens*], who is satisfied to extinguish his\her thirst [*sitim extinguere*]" (Ep. Mor. 83.17).

For both Seneca and Clement, then, the wise person avoids drunkenness. This opinion is inevitable, for both writers believe that intoxication impairs reason. Quoting from

Menander,¹ Clement declares that consumption of unmixed wine (*akratos*) does little to compel one to be wise (Paed. 2.22.1). He also compares the mind of an intoxicated person to the helmsman of a storm-tossed ship. Like the helmsman in such dire circumstances, the mind of one in this state "is made dizzy by the darkness of the storm [*ilingia tō zophō tēs kataigidōs*], having gotten away from the harbour of truth [*tou tēs alêtheias...limenos*]" (Paed. 2.28.3). Similarly, Seneca refers to drunkenness as voluntary insanity (*voluntaria insania*, Ep. Mor. 83.18) and states that it corrupts and debases one's soundness of mind (*vitiatur enim exasperaturque sanitas mentis*, *ibid.* 83.26).

An interesting element in this problem is introduced by Clement. In the daytime, reason is to be maintained in full measure, for this is imperative for competence in "divine meditations" (*tais theikais phrontisin*) and "more sober readings" (*tois anagnōsmasin tois nêphaliōterois*). Consumption of wine, with its ill effects on reason, is simply not suitable to such activity. However, when evening arrives, marking the end of such occupations for the day, a slight dulling of the wits is permissible: "But towards evening, about the time for supper, one may use wine, when we are no longer devoting ourselves to more sober readings [*tois anagnōsmasin ...tc's nêphaliōterois*]" (Paed. 2.22.1).

¹See Staehlin, vol. 1, 169, n. line 9f.

Of course, moderation remains the limit: "but even here, it is to be but a little wine [*oligô tô oinô*]" (ibid. 2.22.2).

The inevitable result of impaired reason is the giving way to the passions. As with all ancient philosophical schools, Stoicism saw reason as in direct opposition to the passions, an outlook shared by both Clement and Seneca. Clement regards the reason (to *logistikon*) of drunkards to be situated in the intestines rather than the head, and to be enslaved to desire (*epithymia*) and wrath (*thymô*, Paed. 2.34.1), and the brains of drunkards to be under the influence of pleasure (*tên philêdonian*) and anger (*ton thumon*, ibid. 2.34.2). Again, the ideal of moderate participation arises, for a little wine actually makes one more amiable toward friends and servants alike, but overindulgence (*paroinethis*) results in violence (*tên hybrin*, ibid. 2.23.2).

Seneca disdained drunkenness, not so much as an evil in itself, but as an enticement to passions. Drunkenness is not the source of vice, but rather reveals it (*non facit ebrietas vitia, sed protrahit*, Ep. Mor. 83.20). Through its effects, lustful individuals (*libidinosi*) do not even wait for the privacy of their own bedrooms before indulging their desires (*cupiditatibus*, ibid). The haughtiness of the arrogant (*insolenti superbia*) is increased, as is the

cruelty of the violent (*crudelitas saevo*) and the malignity of the spiteful (*malignitas livido*, *ibid*). Citing the acts of Mark Antony, Seneca also emphasizes the drinking of too much wine as the prelude to cruelty (*fere vinolentiam crudelitas sequitur*, *ibid*. 83.26).

The ideal relationship between reason and the passions was the subjugation of the latter to the former. Both Clement and Seneca regard the proper human condition to exist only where this ideal relationship is realized (Ep. Mor. 37.4; cf. Paed. 1.101.1ff.), as both see the peculiar nature of humanity, by which humanity is distinguished from the animals, to consist of reason (Ep. Mor. 76.9, 11, 16; 124.22-23; cf. Paed. 1.101.1-102.1). Intoxication must be unacceptable for Clement and Seneca since it upsets this proper anthropological relationship, giving passions sway over reason.

For adherents of the Stoic school, in which the passions are to be repressed in favour of a calm steadfastness of mind, such a situation is simply unacceptable. Thus, the antipathy for drunkenness felt by Clement and Seneca is precautionary. Renunciation of drunkenness is seen as an effective means of preventing the passions from gaining ascendancy. Once again, Clement includes an element of the discussion which is missing in Seneca. The stages of life

determine the appropriate degree of eschewal. The younger members of the community are most susceptible to the passions and therefore total abstinence is required.

It is resolved that young men [tous paidas] and women [tas koras], for the most part, be kept away from this drug. For it is not right to pour into the seething stage of life the hottest of fluids, wine, as if adding fire to fire, from which wild impulses [hormai te agriai], inflamed desires [phlegmainousai epithymiai], and fiery habits [diapyron êthos] are kindled, and young men, heated from within, become prone to desires [tas orexeis].... And it is necessary, as far as possible, to attempt to quench the impulses of youth [tas hormas tôn neôn], by removing the Bacchic fuel of the threatened danger, and by pouring the antidote of the inflammation, which will hold down the smouldering soul and contain the swelling members and put to sleep the excitement of desire already stirred [ton erethismon tês êdê saleuomenês epithymias] (Paed. 2.20.3-21.1).

However, the older members of the community are permitted to indulge, again the limit being the point of intoxication, since their passions have been dulled over time, and their reason is more firmly established and less susceptible to the onslaughts of the passions. (Paed. 2.22.3-4).

This view of passionate children compared with reasonable elders recalls the Stoic denial of the possession of reason by children.² This viewpoint is reiterated by Seneca, who

²Alexander Aphrodisiensis states, "If it is said that children are not yet reasonable, then they are neither just nor unjust...but upon undergoing a change to reason, they immediately become evil" (ei êe legoien mêdepô tous paidas logikous einai, dio mêde dikaious mêde adikous...metaballontas d' eis to logikon euthus eivai kakous, SVF 3.537).

regards as errant (*errare*) any notion that people are endowed with reason from birth, rather than arriving at it with age (Ep. Mor. 124.7ff.). It is at youth that the peculiar quality of people becomes reason, and it is therefore at this stage in life that one first possesses reason: *infans fuit; factus est pubes, alia eius proprietates fit. Ille enim irrationalis est, hic rationalis* (*ibid.* 118.14). Clement's concern for free-running passions in the young coincides with this doctrine, as reason is solely that which keeps the passions in check.

It is ironic that Seneca, the Stoic who engrossed himself in, and found wondrous delight in, philosophy, expressly rejects logical arguments against the evils of drunkenness. Displaying admirable independence from his Stoic predecessors, he rejects as laughable (*derideatur*) Zeno's syllogism "proving" the vice of drunkenness (Ep. Mor. 83.9ff.), and as mistaken (*falsum*) Posidonius' defense of it (*ibid.* 83.10-11). He asks, "If you wish to show that the good person [*virum bonum*] ought not to become drunk, why use syllogisms [*syllogismis*]?" (*ibid.* 83.18). He advocates a moral approach, directly attacking drunkenness on the basis of the evils to which it leads: "how much better it is to charge drunkenness [*ebrietatem*] openly and to expose its vices [*vitia*]" (*ibid.* 83.17). Using this method, Seneca launches his declamations against drunkenness. He goes on

to emphasize the irrational state of intoxication, and the passions to which it gives sway, as discussed above. Direct harangues against the vices accompanying inebriation are far more effective in displaying the unacceptability of this state than carefully arranged words and arguments (ibid. 83.18ff.).

Clement's sumptuary guidelines reveal a very practical morality. This functional moralist always looks for, and finds, aspects of utility in the various subjects under consideration.³ The guideline for discerning a thing's utility was its benefit to humans. Clement is confident that God has created each element of the world to fulfill a specific benefit for humans:

For the father is very careful of humanity, and provides it alone with with his own personal art. Thus, the scripture says, "water and fire and iron and milk and the finest wheat flour and honey and the blood of the grape and olive-oil and clothing - all these things are for the good of the righteous [tois eusebêsin]" (Paed. 2.76.5).

Although he warns that it is not good to use all things, he states: "for the most part, all things have been made for the sake of humans [heneken tôn anthrôpôn]" (Paed. 2.14.4).

³E.F. Osborn sees Aristotelian influence in Clement's tendency to point out a specific function of the things which he discusses. Osborn makes the connection between the utility of a thing and its excellence (aretê) in Clement, suggesting influence from Aristotle's idea that each art has its own specific end (1957, 100).

Moreover, the proper use of a thing depends on its utility to humans being realized. This utility marks the boundary between acceptable participation and unacceptable superfluity. Any other use for purely pleasurable purposes is superfluous, and to be avoided. Clement cites the negative example of the prodigal son, stating that "it is not proper for us, as prodigals [*asôteuomenous*], to abuse the father's gifts, as did the son of the rich man in the gospel" (Paed. 2.9.2). Thus, wine possesses a certain utility for humans, and use in accordance with this utility is acceptable. Wine benefits humans as medicine (*ibid.* 2.19.1), and as a source of warmth during the cold evenings (*ibid.* 2.22.2-3): "it is pleasing, therefore, to proper reason [*tô orthô tô logô*], to drink because of the cold of winter until the cold is expelled from those who are subject to it; and at other times as a medical treatment [*tên therapeian*] for the intestines" (*ibid.* 2.29.2). In every element discussed in the Paedagogus, Clement discerns a use to humans, in accordance with which the respective elements are to be used (see pp. 120ff).

Thus, for Clement, humankind is extremely important in the overall scheme of the world. So much so that the *raison d'être* of all the elements of the world is to benefit humankind. Humankind is the centre of the world to which all else caters, and for which all else exists. This

importance is heightened when it is learned that this arrangement is providential. The great creator and planner of the world thought so highly of humankind that the elements of the world were created and ordered for the special purpose of catering to human needs (Paed. 2.76.5). Such "specio-centricity" is not surprising, considering Clement's view of providence. We have seen above that he viewed God as personal, caring deeply for humans and arranging the various aspects of the world specifically for their benefit. Thorkild Jacobsen points out that elevation of humankind's importance necessarily accompanies personal religion. He regards an outlook, inevitable in personal religion, in which humans matter supremely to the divine as "self-importance almost without limits" (1976, 150). So, too, Clement's perception of humankind as so important that the elements of the world were created for its benefit can be seen as stemming from his personal view of God.

This personal aspect is missing from the basic Stoic doctrine of God. The corporeal theology of Zeno, who believed God to be *sôma* (SVF 1.153), was adhered to by subsequent Stoics. Chrysippus affirmed Zeno's identification of God with the cosmos (*ibid.* 2.1022; cf. *ibid.* 1.163). The materialistic philosophy of Stoicism identified God with the material principles of ether, fire,


or spirit (*pneuma*),⁴ Bradley, 1974, 44). In the Stoic equation, God equals nature, a materialistic pantheism that did not set well with Clement's incorporeal view of God (Strom. 1.51.1-2). The Stoa rejects any notion of a transcendent, personal deity exercising providence especially for the welfare of humankind. As the divine infuses the world itself, providence (*pronoia*) in the Stoic outlook originates within the universe, which operates under universal law (SVF 1.176) and which has been ordered by nature into the best possible order (SVF 1.172; Cicero, De nat. deor. 34.86;). With such an impersonal view of providence, it is not surprising that Seneca's writings lack the idea, so prominent in Clement, that all things were made for the benefit of humans. God did not consider humankind as the center of the world, and it would be presumptuous to assume that all things were made for its benefit. Thus, "Seneca especially found that man was apt to swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of which only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and where day and night, summer and winter would continue of themselves, even if no man observed them" (Arnold, 1911, 205). He explicitly states "for God did not make [*neque...fecit*] all things for humankind. What part of so great a work is committed to us?" (Nat. Ques. 7.30.3). This

⁴In the Stoa, even *pneuma* was corporeal, consisting of material fire and air (Bradley, 1974, 44).

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statement by Seneca coincides with the fact that, unlike Clement, in his moral emphases he does not require a special utility for humans in the various aspects of the world.⁵

The question of food was tackled by both writers with the same principle in mind as was that of drinking, i.e., that moderation, but not superfluity, was acceptable. Proper diet is restricted to necessities, while delicacies and excesses are to be avoided. Clement instructs his audience to shun delicacies and "partake of few and necessary things [*διο παραιτέον τὴν λιχνηίαν ὀλιγὸν τινὸν καὶ ἀνᾶγκαιὸν μεταλᾶμβανοντας*]" (Paed. 2.10.1). He succinctly summarizes his outlook: "Excess [*ἡ ἀμετρία*], being an evil in all

⁵In spite of the Stoic doctrine of an impersonal God, certain members of the Stoa paradoxically saw a personal aspect in religion. This is seen clearly from Cleanthes' hymn to God, in which Cleanthes, in awe of divine omnipotence, praises the latter in obvious exaltation. The basis for a sense of personal relationship with God can be gleaned from the early lines, where Cleanthes makes much of the sharing of reason by God and humans: "I hail Thee, Zeus, with whom there is no man forbidden converse: we are of Thy race; of all the beasts that live and walk the earth only we have a semblance of Thy Reason: so shall I ever hymn Thee and Thy power" (this translation, Sandbach, 1975, 110-11). This openness to a rather personal view of God explains the otherwise surprising fact that certain Stoics felt comfortable in combining their basic doctrine of an impersonal God with that of a providence which is concerned for the well being of humans and which has arranged the world for utility to them. With closer similarities to Clement than to Seneca on this account, Cicero states that all things have been made and provided for the sake of humans (*omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata, De nat. deor.* 53.133), while Chrysippus sees the distinct purpose of utility to humans in horses, dogs, lions, leopards, pigs, peacocks, fleas, and even mice (SVF 2.1152, 1163).

things, is utterly refuted when it concerns food," (Paed. 2.11.4). Clement declares that one's diet is to be "simple and truly plain [*haplê de hautê kai aperiergos, alêtheia katallêlos*], fitting for simple and plain children" (Paed. 2.2.1). He therefore disapproves of those who "ravage agreeable food [*tên eukolon brôsin*], i.e. bread, shaking off the nourishment of the wheat, so that the beneficial part of the food is disgraced for pleasure [*oneidos ginesthai hêdonês*]" (Paed. 2.3.2).

Similarly, Seneca exhorts his reader(s) to distinguish clearly between necessities (*quid sit necessarium*) and superfluities (*quid supervacuum*, Ep.Mor. 110.11). He even prescribes measures designed to enable people of means to find contentment in mere necessities. He encourages Lucilius to set aside intervals of three or four days during which he is to eat the meanest fare and wear crude and shaggy clothing. The food to be eaten during these intervals is more meagre even than that offered to prisoners awaiting capital punishment (*ibid.* 18.11). One purpose behind t' practice is to prepare for the inevitable times to come when fortune will turn its back and remove the gifts which it has temporarily bestowed. By following this practice during prosperous times, the inevitable onslaughts of fortune will be borne more easily (*ibid.* 18.5ff.). Clement offers similar advice, stating that by fleeing

luxury people will prepare themselves to endure "involuntary labours" (*tous akousious... ponous*, Paed. 3.41.1).

Seneca bases this advice both upon the example of Epicurus (Ep. Mor. 18.9) and his own experience. As discussed above (pp. 54ff.), Seneca knew the heights and depths to which fortune could take one. He realized that momentary prosperity offered no guarantees about the future. He had learned to mistrust fortune as being given over to extreme fluctuations, and his letters are rife with warnings against fortune's inevitable assaults (*ibid.* 8.3-4; 13.1-3; 63.7-16; 92.2; 113.27-28; *et passim*).

This unstable character of fortune meant that a steadfast peace of mind could not be found in material possessions, which may be withdrawn at any time. Stoic doctrine held that one should maintain a calm tranquility regardless of external circumstances. It was this lesson that the advice on eating discussed above was intended to teach, as the participants will come to realize that poor means in no way adversely affect happiness and that peace of mind (*securitas*) does not depend upon fortune (Ep Mor. 18.7). They will learn that joy and true pleasure may be secured even from a meagre diet of water, barley, and a morsel of barley bread (*ibid.* 18.10).

Rather than demanding the luxurious diet of "fastidious people, flowing in luxury" (*delicatis et luxu fluentibus*), the sage easily endures meagre fare, such as gruel and warm water (*sorbitationem, aquam calidam*) (ibid. 78.25). The sage will even despise lowly bread, considering grass to be as suitable for human consumption as for cattle: *tunc te admirabor, si contempseris etiam sordidum panem, si tibi persuaseris herbam, ubi necesse est, non pecori tantum, sed homini nasci* (ibid. 110.12). Implicit in this outlook is the Stoic notion that happiness does not consist in physical things. One must learn to be content with little, rejoicing over water and barley (ibid. 110.18). Seneca then takes this line of thought a step further. Citing the inspiring words of Attalus, he encourages his readers to scorn even these dietary necessities; for it is no more noble to be dependent upon the plainer elements of fortune than upon silver and gold (ibid. 110.18-20). Thus, while as a Stoic, Seneca could accept the physical aspects of life, he held a special appreciation for those who were able to turn their backs on even the scantiest of means.⁶

⁶This can also be seen from his admiration for Demetrius. As one without a cloak to wear and rugs upon which to lie, Seneca lauded the fact that this contemporary Cynic philosopher lived up to his ascetic teaching. He lauded him as *non praeceptor veri, sed testis est* (Ep. Mor. 20.9).

Conversely, Seneca ridicules those whose culinary tastes are extravagant. Through his derisions, we catch glimpses of the luxurious dietary habits of certain members of the upper classes. As a wealthy Roman, Seneca moved in these social circles and his knowledge in this area was undoubtedly firsthand. He speaks of culinary superfluities such as flamingo tongues and thousand-pound boars (Ep. Mor. 110.12). He complains of the consumption by some of mushrooms, oysters, and lavish fish sauces imported from the provinces (*ibid.* 95.25). He refers to a certain dish in which mussels, trimmed oysters, sea-urchins, and mullet fillets were mixed together, lamenting that the mixing of these foods was itself doing the work appropriate to the stomach: *in cena fit, quod fieri debebat in ventre* (*ibid.* 95.26-7). Like Clement, Seneca had a practical side to his morality. He deplored the waste associated with such extravagance, noting that the person for whom such meals are prepared enjoys but a small portion (*ibid.* 89.22; 114.26-7). Furthermore, dainties ultimately meet with the same inglorious end as do plainer types of food (*ibid.* 110.13), which argument Clement also mentions (Paed. 2.4.2; 2.10.2).

The importation of exotic delicacies was of particular displeasure to Clement. As mentioned above (p. 27), this practice was being carried on by certain wealthy members of the Christian community at Alexandria. It was of grave

concern to Clement that, among other dainties, lampreys were being imported from Sicily, oysters from Abydos, cockles from Methymna, and fowl from Phasis and Media (Paed. 2.3.1-2). Even these do not provide sufficient variety for those with insatiable appetites, and Clement complains that the "gluttons" (*hoi gastrimargoi*) completely change the taste of them with sauces (*ibid.* 2.3.2). Seneca, too, has only negative things to say about such practices. He states that people ought not be considered unfortunate simply because they do not enjoy oysters from the Lucrine lake near the wealthy resort of Baiae in Campania (Ep. Mor. 78.23). People are able to eat only a small portion of the shell-fish which they import from far-off waters (*ibid.* 89.22). The fish-sauces imported from Rome's allies burn the stomach (*ibid.* 95.25).

Both Clement and Seneca register disgust at the lengths to which the insatiable are driven in order to enjoy such a varied diet. Clement regards them as being greedy (*hoi pleonektai*) and solicitous (*polypragmones*), and says they seem to sweep the world as if with a dragnet in order to satisfy their luxurious lifestyles (Paed. 2.3.2). Such sentiments are quite similar to those expressed by Seneca, who criticizes those whose "boundless and insatiable gullets" (*quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula*) drive them to search throughout both land and sea for delicacies and to

pursue their prey with hooks and snares and nets (Ep. Mor. 89.22).

Again, the practical side of Seneca's moralizing can be seen in his denunciation of such wide dietary variety. As a Stoic, Seneca believed that a life lived in accordance with nature was the key to happiness. Relating to the diet, this meant that food should meet the natural, physical requirements of the body. Nature demanded that certain conditions be met. The purpose of eating is to meet these conditions, and thus satisfy nature. A varied menu of wonderful delicacies is no more capable of fulfilling this purpose than is the meanest fare. It matters not to nature whether hunger is satisfied with common bread or that made from fine wheat. The important thing is not that the stomach be delighted, but filled (*ventrem non delectari...sed empleri*, Ep. Mor. 119.3). Hunger is not an ambitious thing, and is content merely to desist (*contenta desinere est*). The food by which it is made to desist is not a concern (*quo desinat, non nimis curat*, *ibid.* 119.14). A diet of necessities accords with nature, whereas anything beyond this is undesirable superfluity; for it was established by the very author of the universe (*ab illo mundi conditore*), who appointed the laws of living (*vivendi iura*), that people should exist in well-being, but not in luxury (*ut salvi essemus, non ut delicati*, *ibid.* 119.15).

Seneca here employs the Stoic doctrine of life in accordance with nature to support his moral guideline of moderate participation.

Clement also holds an unfavourable view of extensive variety in diet. He advocates simple and unencumbered meals (*to deipnon estô liton hêmin kai euzônon*), unmixed with diverse varieties (Paed. 2.7.3). Upon witnessing people who indulge in dainties such as pastries, honey-cakes, and sweetmeats, and who pursue all kinds of various dishes, he laments that greediness (*hê lichneia*) is unbounded among people. He comes to the conclusion that all such people are nothing other than all jaw (*ibid.* 2.4.1). Clement does allow for some variety, however, and even lists some permissible edibles in order to show that one may enjoy a "wholesome variety" while maintaining "temperate simplicity." The items on this list are not especially appetizing in themselves, and Clement may have had some difficulty in persuading his audience to restrict themselves to them. They include root vegetables, olives, some herbs, milk, cheese, ripe vegetables, and all kinds of food without sauces (*ibid.* 2.15.1). Those items are most desirable which do not require cooked preparation, but are more immediately usable (*ibid.* 2.15.3).

Clement provides practical reasons for the limitations which he places upon the variety of delicacies allowed in the diet. It was stated above that he regarded everything as having a purpose, the fulfillment of which would benefit humanity (pp. 85-86). The purpose of food is to supply health and strength (*hygeia te kai ischys*). Plain food fulfills this purpose better than do delicacies, as it is useful both for digestion (*tas anadoseis*) and lightness of body (*tou sômatos tèn kouphotêta*), which in turn lead to growth, health, and proper strength (*auxêsis te kai hygeia kai ischys dikaia*, Paed. 2.2.1).

Conversely, a lavish variety of diet leads to ill health. Clement calls upon his readers to spurn a wide variety of foods which cause bad bodily habits and stomach disorders (Paed. 2.2.2). He argues that the body does not benefit from an extravagant variety. Rather, those who employ the most frugal fare are the strongest and healthiest, as can be seen from the fact that servants tend to be stronger (*ischyroteroi*) and healthier (*hygeinoteroi*) than their masters, as do husbandmen than the land owners (*ibid.* 2.5.2). Indeed, a diet which exceeds sufficiency is injurious, as it makes the body vulnerable to disease (*episphales de eis noson ergazomenê to sôma*, *ibid.* 2.7.3).

It is not just the body that suffers from a lavish variety of food. A rich diversity of viands also makes the soul dull (*nôthê men tèn psychên*, Paed. 2.7.3). Abundant eating produces in the soul impatience (*dyspatheian*), forgetfulness (*lêthên*), and folly (*aphrosynên*, *ibid.* 2.17.3). Not only are those who partake of the most frugal fare (*eutelestatais trophais*) physically stronger than others, they are also wiser, just as philosophers are wiser than the wealthy (*phronimôteroi, hês philosophoi plousiôn*, *ibid.* 2.5.2). Clement quotes Plato in this context, with his appreciation for this philosopher revealed in the epithet which he applies to him. This "truth-seeking philosopher" (*ho tèn alêtheian ezêlôkôs tôn philosophôn*) rejects the popular notion that the happy life consists in a full dining table which is filled twice each day, in not sleeping solely at night, and in whatever other practices that accompany this life. Plato states that no one under heaven who had pursued such practices from youth would be able to be wise, regardless of how wonderful a natural constitution one may possess (*ibid.* 2.18.1). In this discussion, we see an example of the early Christians' habit of regarding the philosophers as indebted to the scriptures for their knowledge (see pp. 6-8). Clement states that, in expressing the sentiments discussed above, Plato was kindling the spark (*to enausma...zôpyrôn*) of Hebrew philosophy, as he was acquainted with David (*ou gar apystos ...tou Dabid*), who

feasted all the men and women of Israel with coarse bread, baked bread, and hot cakes upon the return to Jerusalem of the ark of the covenant (ibid. 2.18.2).

A Stoic bit of metaphysics may be inferred from Clement's discussion of the relationship between diet and health. "It is said," he states, "that the bodies of children, in increasing to their height, attain to proper growth from deficiency of food." Clement accepts this saying and provides the reason for its truthfulness: "for [then] the spirit [*pneuma*], shooting up to its growth, is not hindered by abundance of food blockading the free flow of its course" (Paed. 2.17.3). The Stoa held that all objects were penetrated by a spirit (*pneuma*), comprised of air and fire (Sandbach, 1975, 75; 77). This *pneuma* is responsible for the size, shape, and other various qualities of each object (ibid. 77). This doctrine would provide a logical foundation for Clement's concern that an unimpaired spirit is essential for proper growth of the human body.

Seneca shares Clement's belief in a correlation between diet and health. He draws a comparison between contemporary humanity and a former race of people, in which the latter, because of their more frugal diet, were the physical

superiors of the former.⁷ The bodies of these ancient people were strong (*firmus*) and firm (*solidus*) because their food was as yet not corrupted by art and pleasure (*artem voluptatemque*) (Ep. Mor. 95.15). It was when people began to experiment with a variety of dishes and sauces that they experienced pallor (*pallor*), wretched thinness from indigestion (*miserabilior ex cruditatibus macies*), as well as a number of other physical ailments. Some of these include dropsy (*in totam cutemumor*), yellow jaundice (*luridae bilis*), internal ulcers (*interni ulceres*), innumerable kinds of fevers (*innumerabilia februm genera*), and countless other diseases (*alios innumerabiles morbos*) (*ibid.* 95.16-18). He goes on to ask whether his readers do not believe that mushrooms have baleful hidden effects (*occultos operes*), that summer snow causes the tissue of the liver to wrinkle (*obducere*), that oysters bring on muddy heaviness (*limosa gravitas*), and that salt from costly fish-sauces burns the stomach with decay (*urere salsa tabe praecordia*) (*ibid.* 95.24-5).

Seneca focuses this concept of an ancient, frugal race of humanity on the Roman ancestors specifically. It was mentioned above that Romans were proud of an austere ancestry, to which they looked for moral paradigms (pp. 53-

⁷Here, Seneca seems to allude to the "Golden Age" of humanity, which was popular in Latin literature and which he discusses explicitly in Ep. Mor. 90.4ff.

54). Seneca compares the training of the young men of Rome (*iuventuti nostrae*) in ancient and contemporary times. He rejects as liberal studies (*studii liberales*) those arts, including culinary skills, which contribute to pleasure and which were being taught in his time. By contrast, the ancestors (*maiores nostri*) trained their young men in the skills of spear throwing, stake whirling, horse handling, and the management of weapons (Ep. Mor. 88.18-19). Presumably, it is the Roman situation that Seneca has in mind when he complains that once success (*felicitas*) has spread luxury far and wide amongst a people, that which had previously been considered customary (*more*) and usual (*solita*) is abandoned for more extravagant indulgences (*ibid.* 114.10). The ascendancy of Rome in power and wealth brought increasingly lavish tastes among Romans. Those things which had satisfied the ancestors were loathed by the contemporary generation as being lowly (*sordidus*) (*ibid.*). One area in which these new, extravagant tastes were manifested was dinner banquets (*ibid.* 114.9). Seneca transfers the idea of the correlation between a lavish diet and ill health from the individual sphere to the communal, as he states that luxuriousness of banquets (*conviviorum luxuria*), as well as elaborate dress, are marks of a sick state (*aegrae civitatis indicia*, *ibid.* 114.11).

Seneca had a Roman forerunner in this idea that a varied diet conflicts with health. He had learned from Sotion that Sextius had also taken this line of argument, believing *bonae valitudini contraria esse alimenta varia* (Ep. Mor. 108.18). Sextius' solution to this problem was to limit himself to a vegetarian diet. Besides the reason just given for abstaining from meat, he also believed butchery to be a cruel custom (*crudelitatis consuetudinem*, *ibid.*). Sextius was not the only prominent philosopher who had abstained from meat. Pythagoras offered a far more interesting reason for doing so. Upon the death of the body, the soul is transferred (*transeuntium*) from one form into another. The soul which had previously indwelt a human body may, upon the death of the person, be transferred to the body of a member of a different species. Thus, in killing and eating any animal, one may actually be committing parricide by attacking and violating the soul of a parent (*ibid.* 108.19).⁸ Seneca was obviously impressed with this precept of abstinence from meat, and adhered to it for a time. However, while still in his youth, he abandoned it upon the request of his father; for the emperor Tiberius was growing uneasy about, and outlawed, certain foreign cults which were

⁸Clement was also aware of this theory, and was not impressed by it. While he saw the eating of meat as acceptable, he states that "any one of the righteous" (*tis tôn dikaiôn*) who abstains does so out of rational reasons, "not as Pythagoras and his followers who dream of the transmigration [*tên metendesin*] of the soul" (Strom. 7.32.8).

characterized by this same practice and which were entering Roman society (ibid. 108.22).

For the Christian Clement, Jesus furnishes the supreme example of refraining from a superfluous diet. Jesus displayed true frugality (*tês alêthous euteleias*) when he fed the disciples with bread and fish. Moreover, "that fish then which, at the command of the Lord, Peter caught, intimates agreeable [*eukolon*], God-given [*theodôrêton*] and temperate [*sôphrona*] food" (*Paed.* 2.13.2-14.1). Jesus' disciples were practicing the frugality (*euteleian*) which he had taught them when they offered him fish to eat after his resurrection (*meta tên anastasin*, ibid. 2.15.2). Given such recorded examples of Jesus partaking of fish, as well as the prominence of the fishing occupation within the ranks of the apostles, Clement's acceptance of fish as one of the allowed edibles is to be expected.

While Jesus provided Clement with the example par excellence of temperate dietary habits, other stalwarts of the Christian faith provided further inspiration. Clement was privy to a tradition which limited Matthew's diet to seeds, nuts, and vegetables. He glories in John the Baptist, who ate locusts and honey and strained self-control to the utmost (*hyperteinas tên enkrateian*). He even cites the

example of Peter abstaining from pork, although he was rebuked for doing so by the Lord (Paed. 2.16.1ff.).

Seneca had his own, Roman exemplars of frugal dietary practices. The ascetic influences of Attalus on Seneca have been mentioned above (pp. 46-47). He informs Lucilius that this Stoic teacher inspired him to restrict his food and drink (*libebat circumscribere gulam ac ventrem*, Ep. Mor. 108.14), and that he had persuaded him to abstain from such dietary superfluities as oysters and mushrooms forever (*ibid.* 108.15). He fondly remembers Attalus' railings against an ultra-elaborate entertainment, the overly excessive pomp of which first caused Attalus to be repulsed by riches and seek contentment elsewhere. Works of gold and silver were paraded, as were coloured tapestries from-far off lands and throngs of slaves (*ibid.* 110.14ff). In this context Seneca is reminded of Attalus' exhortation to vie with God for happiness in the consumption of water and porridge: *habemus aquam, habemus polentam, Iovi ipsi controversiam de felicitate faciamus* (*ibid.* 110.18). Tubero, whose modest banquet contrasts strikingly with that described by Attalus, provides Seneca with a further worthy example of Roman temperance. Characterizing the public feast put on by Tubero were wooden couches, goatskins rather than tapestry, and vessels of earthenware rather than silver or gold. Seneca enthusiastically proclaims that it was more

of a censure against excessiveness than a feast (*censura fuit illa, non cena*) and is so taken by the whole event that, on the basis of it alone, he ranks Tubero alongside the Catos (*ibid.* 95.72-73).

If Seneca admired the modest banquet of Tubero, he certainly knew of ones similar to that which repulsed Attalus. He vividly describes and derides feasts in which fresh oysters from the Lucrine lagoon near the wealthy resort of Baiae are enjoyed, heating implements accompany the food from the kitchen into the dining room so that the food remains hot, pork is snubbed as too common, and those with insatiable demands for variety reject birds served whole in favour of greater variety (*Ep. Mor.* 78.23-24). He repeatedly deplures the fact that a plurality of cooks is required to satisfy the insatiable appetites of the banquet revellers (*ibid.* 78.23; 89.22; *ibid.* 95.24). Such scenes provide examples of the upper classes' excessive indulgences. This is the social stratum to which Seneca belonged, and his knowledge of elaborate banquets was firsthand.⁹ He was personally acquainted with the excesses which marked these banquets, and in his writings finds them objectionable.

⁹We need only consider the accusations of extravagant living brought against Seneca to realize that he himself hosted such banquets (*De vita beata* 17.2).

Clement also rejects this style of feasting. He objects, not only to the delicacies consumed, but also to the behaviour associated with such feasts. It was mentioned earlier (p. 29) that Clement permitted participation in such feasts, but rejected the ravenous conduct associated with them. He describes, perhaps in an exaggerated fashion, the proceedings at such banquets:

and how unprofitable [*achreion*] it is for people to rise on the couches, all but throwing their faces at the dishes, peeping out from the couches just as from nests....and how irrational [*alogon*] to besmear their hands with the condiments or continually to stretch out for the sauce, not tasting, but eagerly snatching and pouring immoderately [*ametrôs*] and disgracefully [*aschêmonôs*] (Paed. 2.11.3).

In contrast to such objectionable behaviour, Clement advocates a much more reserved demeanor. He prohibits conduct appropriate to slaves and smacking of intemperance, and encourages laying hold of the food set before one in a moderate fashion. One is to maintain undistorted the dignity of one's face, to avoid disgracing oneself while eating, and to reach for one's food in an orderly manner (*meta taxeôs*, *ibid.* 2.13.1). As pointed out above, Clement viewed such dignified conduct as an important evangelizing tool (pp. 29-30). By acting in this manner, Christians could prove a "distinct pattern of virtue" (*enarges hypodeigma aretês*) to non-believers, such as Christ does for Christians, and thus "persuade our fellow-guests to virtue"

(*protrepoimecha ep' aretên tôn synestiômenôn tinas*, *ibid.* 2.10.4).

Clement feels compelled to deal with another, specifically Christian element of this question of banquets. Agape feasts were characteristic of certain Christian communities of the time, including that at Alexandria. Certain members of the Alexandrian community were abusing these feasts in a way that Clement saw as "expelling the good and saving work of the Word" (*apopneonta, to kalon kai sôtêrion ergon tou logou*, *Paed.* 2.4.3). These members had managed to introduce into the agape feasts features which shifted the emphasis to the satisfaction of physical longings. They erroneously applied the term agape to meals which included savours and sauces (*ei d' agapên tines tolmôsi kalein athyrô glôttê kechrêmenoi deipnaria tina knisês kai zômôn*, *ibid.*). Drinking, delicacies, and smoke¹⁰ (*potô te kai tryphê kai kapnô*, *ibid.*) were further unacceptable elements of these misnamed agape feasts.

It should be pointed out that Clement does not prohibit entertainments characterized by such elements. He states that it is suitable for Christians to refer to their meetings and gatherings of good cheer (*tas...tê euphrosynê synagôgas*) as dinners, breakfasts, and receptions (*deipnaria*

¹⁰Perhaps implying incense.

te kai arista kai dochas, Paed. 2.4.4). He reinforces the acceptability of such parties with scriptural references to banquets. While such gatherings are acceptable, Clement is adamant that Jesus did not regard them as agape feasts (*tas toiautas de hestiaseis ho kyrios agapas ou keklêken*, *ibid.*).

Unfortunately, Clement provides no information as to the nature of the acceptable agape feasts practiced by the Alexandrians. Rather, he juxtaposes physical banquets with spiritual interpretations. He states that agape is, in reality, heavenly food and a reasonable banquet (*agapê de tô onti epouranios esti trophê, hestiasis logikê, Paed.* 2.5.3). He quotes the gospel of Luke, "blessed is the one who eats bread in the kingdom of God" (*makarios hos phagetai arton en tê basileia tou theou, ibid.*; cf. Luke 14.15). Love (agape) for God is heavenly feasting, contrasted with physical, earthly meals. Clement says that "if you should love [*kan agapêsês*] the Lord your God and your neighbour, this is heavenly feasting in the heavens [*en ouranois estin hautê hê epouranios euôchia*]; but the terrestrial [*hê de epigeios*] is called a dinner [*deipnon*]" (*ibid.* 2.6.1). The meal with which Clement is most concerned consists of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit (*dikaïosynê kai eirênê kai chara en pneumatî hagiô, ibid.* 2.6.2).

Such a spiritualizing tendency is typical of Clement (see p. 127), and indicates the allegorical interpretation of scripture, of which so many early Christians were so fond. This method of interpretation, which sought spiritual meanings behind scriptural texts, was very popular in Alexandria, as is seen most clearly in the works of Philo two centuries before Clement and those of Origen immediately following Clement. Clement is thus at home in the interpretive traditions at Alexandria when, in referring to the fish which Peter caught as an example of simple and acceptable food (see p. 103), he sees in the coin which was taken from the fish's mouth an exhortation for Christians to remove prodigality (*tên asôtian*) and covetousness (*tên philargyrian*) from their lives (Paed. 2.14.1).

The question of Christian participation in banquets hosted by non-Christians posed another problem for Clement. The issue of the proper Christian attitude toward food that had been sacrificed to idols had been a matter of concern at least since the time of the apostle Paul (1 Cor. 8.1ff.; 10.18ff.). Clement bases his discussion of this topic on the above references from Paul, as well as Paul's discussion on the consumption of meat in general (Rom. 14.1ff.). However, while Paul seems to vary his position depending on the viewpoint from which he approaches this problem, Clement

is firm and consistent. At one point Paul argues that idols are nothing, and therefore food sacrificed to them is permissible to Christians. Nonetheless, abstinence is required in the presence of those for whom such food is still an issue (1 Cor. 8.4ff.). Later in the same letter, however, he declares that sacrifices to idols are sacrifices to demons, "and I do not want you to be participants with demons" (1 Cor. 10.20). It is this latter position which Clement takes up. He quotes this passage to show that Christians are to abstain (*aposchesthai*) from such food (Paed. 2.8.3-4). Clement makes a definite distinction between Christians and non-Christians, stating that the food of those who are being saved (*sôzomenôn*) must be distinguished from that of the perishing (*phthimenôn*, *ibid.* 2.8.4). Christians, whose consciences are holy, are to loathe the demons to which such food has been sacrificed (*dia de tēn syneidēsēn tēn hēmeteran hagian ousan kai tōn daimoniōn dia tēn bdelyrian, hois epikatōnomastai, mysattomenous*, *ibid.* 2.8.4). For the philosophically inclined Clement, the argument that participation in the tables of demons by those who had been made worthy to share in divine and spiritual food contradicted proper reason (*ouk eulogon*) was all-important (*ibid.* 2.9.1).

Interestingly, Paul's primary argument in this context is taken up only secondarily by Clement. Paul had emphasized

that abstinence from food sacrificed to idols was to be observed for the benefit of those with "weak consciences," for whom such practices may prove a "stumbling block" (1 Cor. 8.7-13; 10.27-33;). Clement takes up this argument after that discussed above by quoting 1 Cor. 8.7. He argues that Christians ought to abstain, "moreover, because of the instability of those who conceive of many things in a manner that makes them liable to slip [*olisthêrôs*], whose consciences [*hê syneidêsis*], having been weakened, are defiled" (Paed. 2.8.4). Therefore, in establishing a proper relationship between the Christian community of Alexandria and the world, this is one area in which Clement draws very clear distinctions and in which Christians are to remain separate from others.

This discussion of food sacrificed to idols provides an interesting context in which Clement makes a very Stoic statement. He quotes Paul's statement that neither consumption of, nor abstinence from, such food affects a person's worth (Paed. 2.9.1; cf. 1 Cor. 8.8). He supports this by referring to Matthew 15.11, where Jesus says that it is the words which proceed from people's mouths, rather than the food which they consume, that defiles them (Paed. 2.8.4). On the foundation of these passages, and in the midst of his renunciation of food sacrificed to idols, he declares the consumption of such food to be "indifferent"

(*adiaphoros*, *ibid.* 2.9.1). Clement makes much of this Stoic notion of *adiaphora* in his discussions of food. He maintains that Christians are to regard the extravagance of food at elaborate banquets as indifferent (*adiaphoran*, *ibid.* 2.10.2). He rejects the Hebrew classification of certain foods as unclean, explaining that, for Christians, the use of these foods is "indifferent" (*adiaphoros*, *ibid.* 2.16.3).

These comments by Clement express a fundamental doctrine of Stoic philosophy, and so disclose Stoic influences. Seneca provides clear examples of this Stoic doctrine of "indifference." He equates the Latin term *indifferentia* with the Greek *adiaphora* (Ep. Mor. 82.10). He defines *indifferentia* as those things which are neither good nor bad (*id est nec bona nec mala*, *ibid.*). He also refers to this category as *media*,¹¹ and includes within it riches, strength, beauty, titles, kingship, death, exile, ill health, and pain (*ibid.* 82.14). While that which is good may be possessed only by good persons (*quod nisi bonus non habet, bonum est*) the *media* or *indifferentia* may be possessed by either good or bad persons, and thus include the physical elements of life such as money, beauty or high social standing (*ibid.* 117.9). In Orwellian fashion, Seneca goes on to state that certain of these indifferents are more indifferent than others. For example, hair style is more

¹¹Literally, "intermediate, between good and evil."

indifferent than is the question of death (*non enim sic mors indifferens est, quomodo utrum capillos pares an inpares habeas, ibid. 82.15*).

This last reference from Seneca entails the Stoic idea that the *media* are further divided into the two categories, "advantages" and "disadvantages," which doctrine is explicitly discussed by Seneca. He defines advantages (*commoda*) as those things which contribute to life more of use than of annoyance (*commodum est, quod plus usus habet quam molestiae, ibid. 87.36*). All *media* contain some elements which make life more enjoyable and some which make it less so. The *commoda* contain more of the former, whereas the disadvantages (*incommoda*) contain more of the latter (*ibid. 87.36-7*). Herein lies the difference between *commoda* and *bonum*, for the latter contains benefits unmixed with hindrances (*ibid.*)¹².

Seneca adheres to mainstream Stoic thought in his belief that virtue alone constitutes the good. While all *commoda* and *incommoda* are of indifferent value, they are made honourable if they are treated virtuously; likewise, those

¹²Although this discussion of the Stoic doctrine of "indifference" is admittedly brief, it suffices for the purposes of this paper, since it shows the way in which Clement's and Seneca's moral guidelines relate to this doctrine. For more extensive and technical discussions, see Inwood, 1985, 197-201, and Tsekourakis, 1974, 1-44.

which are treated in a base manner are made inglorious (*omnia ista per se non sunt honesta nec gloriosa, sed quicquid ex illis virtus adiit tractavitque, honestum et gloriosum facit; illa in medio posita sunt; interest, utrum malitia illis an virtus manus admoverit, Ep. Mor. 82.12*). As a case in point, Seneca cites the example of death as met by Cato and Burrus respectively. That of the former was a glorious thing since Cato faced it bravely, while that of the latter was disgraceful since it was met in a cowardly fashion (*ibid. 82.12-14*). Thus it is not the thing itself, which is morally indifferent, that matters, but that it be treated in a virtuous manner.¹³

An interesting parallel to this idea may be inferred from Clement's discussion of food sacrificed to idols. In this context Clement quotes words from Paul's discussion of the corruption of meat in general by Christians. He recites Paul's exhortations to those who partake to refrain from despising those who do not partake, and to those who do not partake not to judge those who do (*Paed. 2.10.3 cf. Rom. 14.3*). He explains the reason for these exhortations by quoting Paul's words in *Rom. 14.6*, which state that those who partake do so to the Lord, and those who do not partake do so to the Lord (*Paed. 2.10.3*). We have seen above that

¹³For the Stoic idea that an action is made honourable by virtuous treatment, see Tsekourakis, 1974, 45-60, and Rist, 1969, 97-111.

Clement regarded food sacrificed to idols as indifferent. He now implies that the manner of participation or abstinence is significant. What matters is that one partake or abstain in a virtuous manner - i.e. out of commitment to the Lord.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the sumptuary guidelines of Clement and Seneca in the areas of drinking and eating have much in common. Moreover, their specific ethical precepts point to a common general moral attitude - i.e. moderate participation in the physical world. We have also seen that each writer brings to his discussion of morality specific emphases which reflect his own background. From past experience, Seneca mistrusts fortune, and advises his reader(s) to prepare for times of ill-fortune. He fondly remembers the frugal moral example of Attalus, and admires the austere Roman ancestors, especially the Catos. Clement is concerned about the issues of agape feasts and food sacrificed to idols. Both speak out of a context of Stoic thought, Seneca more so and more explicitly than Clement, who also stands in, and draws on, the Christian tradition in Alexandria.

Their discussions of drinking and eating are reflective of their treatments of other ethical areas. Clement's acceptance of the world is evidenced by the fact that he regards overly ascetic sleeping habits as "cynic vanity" (*kenodoxias...kynikés*, Paed. 2.78.1) and by his statement that the wearing of gold and soft clothing is not to be

completely prohibited (ibid. 3.53.1). At the same time, his ideal of frugality and simplicity is maintained throughout his discussions. Dishes and drinking cups made of common earthenware are to be preferred over those made from silver, gold, or glass (ibid. 2.35.1ff.). While overly ascetic sleeping habits are to be rejected, so too are extravagant bed clothes, gold-embroidered carpets, and beds "softer than sleep" (*hypnou malakôteras eunas*, ibid. 2.77.1). One's bed must be simple (*aphelei*) and frugal (*litê*, ibid. 2.78.3). Luxury in clothing is to be rejected. Sleek silk cloth and bright colours achieved through dying are prohibited (ibid. 2.107.3ff.). The same principle of strict moderation applies to shoes, which are to be free of gold embroidery (*ta chrysa anthema*, ibid. 2.116.1), to perfumes and ointments (ibid. 2.61.1ff.), and to jewelry and precious gems (ibid. 2.118.1ff.).

Seneca encourages frugality with regard to these same things. He maintains that the bare hand serves the purpose of a drinking cup as well as do goblets made from gold, crystal, or murrine (Ep. Mor. 119.3; cf. 90.14; 119.14; 123.7). Like Clement, Seneca rejects overly soft bedding, boasting of his own practice of sleeping on a very firm pillow (ibid. 108.23) and regarding as dead those who recline on perfumed couches (ibid. 82.3). He takes austerity in sleeping habits even farther than Clement, as

he admires Demetrius (ibid.20.9) and the ancients (ibid. 90.41) who slept on the hard ground without covering. Seneca's admiration of the latter extends to their austerity of dress. This exalted ancient race did not possess embroidered clothes or weave golden cloth (ibid. 90.45). Like Clement, Seneca opposes the making of clothes from silk (ibid. 90.15). He concludes that elaborate dress is a sign of a diseased state (ibid. 114.11). Perfumes, ointments (ibid. 86.13; 88.18; 122.3), and make-up (ibid. 79.18) are to be rejected as vain superfluities. Nor is Seneca impressed by those who hold precious gems and metals in high esteem.

A very interesting similarity between the writings of Seneca and Clement appears concerning this matter of precious gems and metals. Seneca again extols the simplicity of the ancients, who did not search "in the lowest parts of the earth" (*in ima terrarum*) for gold, silver, or transparent stones (Ep. Mor. 90.45). He deplores the fact that his contemporaries are not content with the necessities which God has placed on the surface of the earth and which are easy to attain, but are obsessed with tiresome explorations for the luxuries which, being harmful to humanity, God placed far beneath the earth (ibid. 110.9-10). These sentiments are echoed by Clement, who says that God has arranged the necessities of life, such as water and air, so

that they are easily attainable. Not content with such things, however, those who have been "condemned to death" (*hoi ten epi thanato kekrimenoi*) dig up superfluities, such as gold and jewels, from below the earth and seas, where God has hidden them (Paed. 2.119.3-120.1).

Seneca's denunciation of superfluous houses and estates certainly derives from personal observation. The wealthy of Rome spent lavishly upon themselves, investing endless fortunes in their homes. The most notable example was the golden palace of Nero, which is described by Suetonius (Nero. 31). It is quite possible that Seneca has this elaborate construction in mind when he criticizes the building of a residence consisting of, among other superfluities, mobile ceiling panels and hidden pipes which spray perfumes (Ep. Mor. 90.15). He encourages his reader(s) to relinquish gold and silver and whatever else burdens (*onerat*) their homes (*ibid.* 104.34). He also reprimands those who possess country estates that rival provinces in size (*ibid.* 90.39; cf. 89.21). Again he extols the ancients who were content to live under the open skies, in contrast to the contemporaries who dwell in houses as big as cities and shrink in terror whenever a crack appears in their frescoes (*ibid.* 90.42ff; cf. 90.7-10).

Tension between reason and the passions also comes out in the topics other than drinking and eating. Clement advocates refraining from the use of garlands (*stephanôn*) and unguents (*myrôn*) because these incite pleasures (*hêdonas*) and rashness (*rhathymias*, Paed. 2.61.1). He argues similarly concerning brightly coloured clothing, stating that it inflames the excited eye to thoughtless blindness (*tên anoêton ophthalmian*, *ibid.* 2.108.1), and that purple on women's clothing inflames the passions (*tas rhathymias*, *ibid.* 2.114.4) of men. Clement summarizes this idea of the passions incited by indulgence in physical things: "but pleasure [*hêdonê*] unaccompanied by utility is a slander of specious customs and a drug of arousal" (*ibid.* 2.68.4). Besides these concerns, Clement emphasizes frequently that over-indulgence in physical things impairs the reason, and he often equates such over-indulgence with foolishness and ignorance (*ibid.* 2.81.1; 2.103.3; 2.107.5; 2.118.1; *et passim*). Clement's view of the relationship between reason and the physical life is summed up in his discussion of sleeping, where he relates reason to simplicity and frugality (*ibid.* 2.78.3).

Seneca compares those who place much importance on magnificent furnishings for the home and artworks to unreasonable children. He cites Aristo as saying that the only difference between such adults and children is that the

things which the former hold as dear are more elaborate and costly than those which the latter cherish (Ep. Mor. 115.8-9). He believes the masses, who place value on physical things, to be unreasonable and misguided (Ep. Mor. 72.7-11; 74.13-15; 76.6; *et passim*). In contrast, only the sage attains virtue because only the sage scorns the things which the misguided mob values (*ibid.* 72.4; 76.16-19). Seneca's view of the relationship between reason and the physical life is most clearly revealed, and most thoroughly treated, in his ninetieth letter, in which he adamantly rejects Posidonius' argument that the various aspects of culture (*artes*) were discovered and granted to society by the philosophers (90.7ff.).

It was stated earlier (p. 86) that Clement regarded utility as the limit of acceptable participation. He regarded any indulgence beyond usefulness as superfluous, and thus unacceptable. Clement is so concerned about using things according to their utility, that he emphasizes usefulness in each matter which he discusses. He prefers earthenware cups to those made of silver and gold since the latter become too hot to handle when hot liquid is poured into them (Paed. 2.35.1). Since utility rather than expense is the measure of a thing's worth,¹ knives of silver with ivory handles are

¹This same idea is discussed by Seneca. The worth of things like ships, swords, and the carpenter's rule is dependent upon the proficiency with which they perform their

no better than ordinary knives. Likewise, earthenware wash basins and clay lamps are as valuable as those made of more expensive material, since the former perform their respective functions as well as do the latter (ibid. 2.37.2-3). Clement offers practical reasons for prohibiting the use of featherbeds, stating that the feathers gather to form mounds on either side of the body and thus make it difficult for the one sleeping to turn over (ibid. 2.77.2). One of Clement's more outlandish arguments from utility involves the use of plain beds. He states that the bed (*hê klinê*) is to have smooth feet, since superfluous workings form paths upon which creeping things grab hold and do not slip off (ibid. 2.78.4). Likewise, "what is useful [to *chreiôdes*] in clothing is to be preferred" (ibid. 2.110.2). The only appropriate reasons for wearing clothing are for covering the body and protection against the elements (ibid. 2.106.3; 3.55.3; cf. Seneca, Ep. Mor. 90.21). God has made unguents for use as medicines and not for indulging the pleasures (*hêdypatheian*), and they are to be employed accordingly (ibid. 2.69.2-3). Concerning unguents, Clement proclaims, "In general, these also have been made for our use" (*tên hêmeteran euchrêstian*, ibid. 2.76.3). Clement even allows for the wearing of gold rings, but again in conjunction with practicality. These are not to be used as ornamentation,

respective functions, and not upon the superfluities with which they are decorated (Ep. Mor. 76.13-14).

but generally as seals (ibid. 3.57.1). Moreover, men are not to wear the ring on the joint of the finger, as do women, since this would hinder the work of the hand (ibid. 3.59.1). Clement's attitude toward this matter of utility is summed up in his statement that "we assign no place to pleasure [hêdonê] which is not engaged in profitable use to life..." (ibid. 2.68.1).

As with dietary simplicity (pp. 102-103), Jesus provides Clement with the purest paradigm for the ethical life in general.² For example, Clement interprets the words of Psalm 45.7-8 to mean that the Lord is anointed with unguents (tô myrô). Therefore, the use of ointments, albeit in moderate amounts, is permissible (Paed. 2.65.3-66.1). In addition, garlands of flowers are not to be worn on the head, for this would be unreasonable (alogiston) since the Lord was crowned with thorns (ibid. 2.78.3). Clement glories in the fact that Jesus, "the lowly God and Lord of all" (*ho atyphos theos kai kyrios tôn holôn*), ate from an inexpensive bowl and, dressed merely in a linen towel, washed the feet of the disciples. Moreover, this great exemplar of humility ate and drank from clay vessels, not demanding dishes of silver or gold (ibid. 2.38.1-2). Clement

²The concept of *imitatio Christi* is, of course, evident in the earliest Christian writings (1 Cor. 11.1; 2 Cor. 8.9). Clement is an early and adamant advocate of this notion, twelve centuries before Thomas à Kempis.

encapsuals his view of Jesus as the ideal example of frugality by saying Jesus "set up use [*tên chreian*] rather than extravagance as his aim [*skopon*]" (ibid. 2.38.2).

Again, scriptural figures other than Jesus also serve as admirable examples of frugality. As an example of simple sleeping habits, Clement cites Jacob, who used a rock for a pillow (Paed. 2.78.3; cf. Gen. 28.11). John the Baptist, clad in camel hair clothes, Elijah in sheepskin, Isaiah in sackcloth, and Jeremiah in linen are cited by Clement as worthy models of frugal clothing (Paed. 2.112.1-113.1). Again John the Baptist is a commendable example of simplicity in the wearing of shoes (ibid. 2.117.4). Clement regards Elijah as encompassing the frugal life, referring to him as "a beautiful pattern of frugality" (*kalon hypodeigma tês euteleias*). Clement cites the passage where Elijah sits under a thorn bush and consumes bread and water brought to him by an angel (1 Kings 19.4-6), regarding this generally as a glowing example of a life unencumbered by an abundance of superfluties (Paed. 3.37.3-38.2).

As with dietary practices (pp. 104-105), Seneca has Roman exemplars of frugality in various aspects of the physical life. He applauds the humble bath at the otherwise elaborate villa of Scipio, and laments over the comparatively luxurious bathing habits of the contemporary

generation (Ep. Mor. 86.4ff.).³ His admiration for Cato is revealed again, as he recounts how this model of frugality used to take so few possessions on his journeys that they were carried by the same nag upon which he rode (*ibid.* 87.9). Seneca lauds Fabricius Luscinus for scorning wealth and refusing to compromise his principles in return for gold (*ibid.* 98.13; 120.6). He wholeheartedly agrees with Horace's opinion that it matters not whether one drink from costly or inexpensive cups (*ibid.* 119.14).

In the discussion of Clement's treatment of eating, certain specifically Christian problems, such as *agape* feasts (pp. 107ff.) and food sacrificed to idols (pp. 109ff.), were examined. Distinct concerns of the Christian community at Alexandria are revealed in others of Clement's ethical discussions as well. His treatment of food sacrificed to idols is echoed in his discussion of the wearing of flowered garlands. Christians are to refrain from wearing garlands because they are dedicated to idols. Clement's refrain, "we must not have a share with demons" (*ou dê koinônêteon oud' hopôstioun daimosin*, Paed 2.72.2-73.2), certainly brings to mind his previous discussion of food sacrificed to idols. Clement's treatment of sleeping habits also contains a distinctiy Christian emphasis. He maintains that

³Compare Seneca's description of the elaborate baths to that mentioned, and lamented over, by Clement (Paed. 3.31.1ff.).

Christians, who have the "watchful Word" (*ton logon ton egrêgoron*) indwelling them, ought not to sleep all night long, but rather should be awake by night. This is especially so "when the days are waning" (*malista hopote hai hêmèraî phthinousin*, Paed. 2.81.4-5). It appears that this is a reference to the parousia, thus showing that, even though, and as the Paedagogus shows, Christians were concentrating much attention on life in the world, a degree of expectation of the Lord's return still remained within the mainstream Christian tradition of Alexandria.⁴ Another specifically Christian concern is revealed in Clement's discussion of hair. Here, we read of the custom of elders (*ho presbyteros*) granting blessings by laying their hands upon the heads of others. Clement prohibits the covering of one's head with the hair of other people (*allotriôn...trichôn*), since the blessing through the laying on of hands would then not be instilled upon the one for whom it was intended, but upon the head of the one whose hair is acting as a covering (*ibid.* 3.63.1). Clement's Christian emphasis also comes out in his taking up of Paul's analogy of the physical bodies of Christians as temples of God. Clement uses this analogy to encourage his audience to

⁴To interpret Clement's words *malista hopote hai hêmèraî phthinousin* as referring to the parousia seems more satisfactory than as referring to the end of the day and coming on of night, especially in light of the reason which he gives for doing so: "as through wakefulness, to partake of a longer period of life" (*hôs pleiona chronon tou zên dia tèn egrêgorsin metalambaneîn*, Paed. 2.81.5).

refrain from sexual fornication (ibid. 2.101.1; cf. 1 Cor. 6.15; 19).

Clement's tendency to employ spiritual interpretations for the physical aspects which he treats is seen throughout his moral precepts. Upon denouncing indulgence in the use of unguents, Clement exhorts women to direct their attention toward the "royal ointment" (*tou aleimματος tou basilikou*) and the "holy unguent" (*hagio...myro*) - i.e., Christ and the Holy Spirit respectively (Paed. 2.65.2). In the midst of repudiating excessive fondness for precious gems, he laments that so little effort is exerted to find "the sacred stone, the Word of God" (*hagiô...lithô, tô logô tou theou*, ibid. 2.118.5). When giving instructions about the proper mode of bathing, Clement states that "the best bath wipes off the uncleanness of the soul [*tês psychês aposmêchei ton rhypon*] and is spiritual" (ibid. 3.48.2). The reason Clement gives for prohibiting the wearing of rings for ornamental reasons is that "according to scripture, instruction [*paideia*] is a golden ornament for the sage [*phronimô*]" (ibid. 3.58.2).

Accompanying this spiritualizing tendency is Clement's fondness for allegorical interpretation, which he employs to align scriptural references with his own attitude of strict moderation toward the physical world. Thus, concerning

perfumes and things which give off a pleasurable odour,

Clement states:

if it is said that the Lord, the great high priest [ton megan archiereia], offers up to God the incense of sweet fragrance [tês euôdias to thymiama], we are not to suppose that this is an offering and sweet smell of incense, but that the Lord offers up the acceptable offering of love [to tês agapês dektion], the spiritual fragrance, upon the altar (Paed. 2.67.1; cf. Ex. 30.7; Eph. 5.2; Phil. 4.18).

Likewise, in denouncing elaborate clothing, Clement interprets the Psalmist's description of a queen decked out in raiments of gold with golden fringes as not referring to literal, luxurious clothing. Rather, this is a description of the church, which is clothed in "undefiled adornment" (*akêraton...kosmon tês ekklêsias*), and of the elect (*hoi eklektoi*), who are indicated by the gold fringes (*ibid.* 2.110.2).

Thus we see that Clement's and Seneca's discussions of drinking and eating have a number of similarities with their treatments of other ethical matters, and are representative of their respective moral outlooks. The general attitude of a limited acceptance of the physical world is maintained by both writers throughout their ethical writings.

So similar are the moral outlooks of Clement and Seneca that distinct differences of opinion are rare, if they exist at all, in their respective sumptuary guidelines. While one

may be hard pressed to find differences of opinion between these two moralists, differences of emphasis are discernible. Such differences are predictable in light of the vastly dissimilar backgrounds from which each writes. Seneca's home was Rome, the center of the Latin world. Although a philosopher, Seneca's intimate involvement in the court of Nero brought him into the mainstream of the Roman world. On the other hand, Clement hailed from the thoroughly hellenized city of Alexandria, in the distant but important province of Egypt. As head of the Christian school at Alexandria, he would have had little or no time to be involved in the practical affairs of state. Most significantly, Clement was a Christian whereas Seneca was not. His theological beliefs did much to shape his ethical outlook. It was stated earlier that the Christians of Clement's time were attempting to establish an identity in relation to the larger world about them, and certainly this was true of the mainstream Christian community at Alexandria. Thus Clement is concerned about matters which are important in establishing this identity - matters which, of course, do not even occur to Seneca.

If these differences in emphasis between Clement and Seneca are to be expected, so too are the similarities between their sumptuary guidelines; for they share the common factor of Stoic ethics. By Clement's time, the Stoa was

concentrating its efforts primarily on ethics. This moral emphasis can be clearly seen from the work of Musonius Rufus, who flourished a century before Clement, and whose "rules and maxims governing proper conduct are wholeheartedly incorporated into the Paedagogus" (Bradley, 1974, 59).

By examining Clement's and Seneca's discussions of drinking and eating specifically, and by showing that these discussions are representative of their respective moral outlooks generally, I have attempted to provide specific examples which illustrate these similarities and differences of emphasis.

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