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**THE IMPACT
OF TRAIT ATTRIBUTIONS
ON EVALUATIONS
OF POLITICAL LEADERS**

By

Cathy Widdis Barr

B.A., Wilfrid Laurier University, 1985

THESIS

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Master of Arts degree
Wilfrid Laurier University
1987

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ABSTRACT

Evaluations of political leaders have long been considered an important component of the vote decision. Nevertheless, little research has been conducted in Canada on voters' overall evaluations of their political leaders. Indeed, the topic has only recently received much systematic attention in the comparative literature. The study of how voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of candidates affect their overall evaluations of those candidates is an area that has been particularly neglected.

In this thesis, we test three hypotheses about the impact of personality trait attributions on voters' overall evaluations of Canadian federal party leaders. The data for our analyses are drawn from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National Election Studies.

The first hypothesis is that there is a relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that is independent of such factors as party identification, issue positions, and other impressions of the parties and leaders. This hypothesis is supported.

The second hypothesis is that trait attributions will have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and PC leaders second in importance to party identification, and that trait attributions will be second in importance to

issue positions with regard to evaluations of NDP leaders. This hypothesis is only partially supported. For Liberal and PC leaders, the impact of party identification on evaluation is generally surpassed by the impact of positive trait attributions. With regard to evaluations of NDP leaders, the impact of issue positions is generally surpassed by the impact of party identification, positive trait attributions and negative trait attributions.

The third hypothesis is that attributions of competence and integrity will have a greater impact on overall evaluation than attributions of other personality traits. This hypothesis is also only partially supported. The impact of integrity is as great as expected, but the impact of competence is considerably less than has been found to be the case by other researchers.

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On this page I am given the opportunity to acknowledge the contributions made by others to this work. While I cannot hope to adequately thank all of those who have contributed to the production of this thesis, there are several people who deserve particular mention. I would first like to thank the members of my thesis committee: Dr. Steven Brown, whose ongoing advice and direction have been invaluable; Dr. Barry Kay, who provided me with advice and encouragement when I needed it the most; and Dr. Ronald Lambert, whose insightful critiques of earlier drafts have improved both the form and the content of the following work.

I would also like to express my thanks to the faculty, staff, and students of the Political Science Department of Wilfrid Laurier University. In particular, I would like to thank Ian Cotter and Tim Utting for their friendship and support, and Mike Furey, whose word processing expertise made my life much easier than it might otherwise have been. I would also like to thank my parents, Bob and Blanche Widdis, to whom I owe more than I could possibly express. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Robert Barr, whose patience and understanding over the past several years and, in particular, over the past several months, have been well beyond the call of duty.

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CHAPTER I .

Introduction

Evaluations of political leaders have long been considered an important component of the vote decision. The model of voting behaviour presented in The American Voter (1960) identifies voters' attitudes towards issues, parties and candidates as the major short-term factors affecting vote, and party identification as the most important long-term force. More recently developed models of American voting behaviour focus on the reciprocal relationships among the various factors that influence the vote (Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979). While often making quite different assumptions about the psychological processes involved in the vote decision, these models essentially follow the tradition of The American Voter (1960). Comparative candidate evaluations are treated as the primary direct determinant of vote. Party identification and issue positions are viewed as impacting on the vote indirectly, through their impact on candidate evaluations.

Differences between the American and the Canadian electoral systems have caused Canadian researchers to question whether candidate evaluations play as central a

role in the decision-making calculus of Canadian voters. The models of Canadian voting behaviour developed by Keith Archer (1985) and Steven Brown and his associates (1986) posit a direct relationship between party identification and vote, between issue positions and vote, and between candidate evaluations and vote.⁽¹⁾ While they reject as inappropriate to the Canadian context the pivotal role assigned to candidate evaluations by American researchers, Canadian researchers have nevertheless long considered voters' evaluations of political leaders to be an important determinant of the vote decision.

Although their views are based on impressions rather than on empirical evidence, many scholars have regularly attributed both the victories and the defeats of Canadian political parties to the personal images of the party leaders. Mallory (1967) attributes the early successes of the Conservative Party to the "raffish, careless, tough and pliable" Macdonald, who reflected the spirit of post-Confederation Canada (p. 28). The successes of the Liberal Party at the turn of the century can be attributed to the "elegant and eloquent idealism" of Laurier, which captured the spirit of optimism that pervaded the era (Mallory, 1967, p. 28). Beck and Dooley (1967) explain the successes of King as partly due to the failings of his

(1) Throughout this thesis, the term "candidate" refers to candidates for the office of Prime Minister or President and is used interchangeably with the term "leader."

opponents: the "cold and austere Meighan" (p. 79), the "rich, intolerant" Bennett (p. 80), the incompetent "lightweight" Manion (p. 79). Liberal Party successes in the 1950s are often interpreted as due to the benevolent "father image" of Liberal leader "Uncle Louis" St. Laurent (Beck and Dooley, 1967, p. 84).

The resounding victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1958 is commonly attributed to the charismatic appeal of John Diefenbaker. Peter Regenstreif explains the election outcomes of 1962 and 1963 as the result of a cleavage between voters' preferred party and their preferred leader. According to Regenstreif (1965),

... if Canada had an electoral and institutional system similar to that of the United States, Diefenbaker would probably have been elected President-Prime Minister, while the Liberals would have won the House of Commons. Since this is obviously not the system in operation in Canada, and since such "split-ticketing" is not possible, minority government resulted (p. 82).

While the personality of John Diefenbaker dominated Canadian politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the enigmatic Pierre Trudeau has been at centre-stage for much of the last twenty years. John Meisel attributes to Trudeau the same overwhelming importance that Regenstreif attributes to Diefenbaker. According to Meisel (1975), "the Liberal victory of 1968 and the party's 1972 stumble can be explained largely in Trudeau terms. His was the victory and

his the fall" (p. 229).

The insights and interpretations of the above-cited scholars are useful because they help the student of politics to understand the outcomes of particular elections and -- more importantly for our purposes -- they provide anecdotal support for the belief that party leaders play an important role in Canadian politics. However, if we wish to expand our understanding of the importance of political leaders, we must move from impressionistic descriptions and explanations towards generalizations about the behaviour of individual voters. Describing the role of party leaders in particular elections, and explaining their importance with regard to the outcome of those elections, is useful. Nevertheless, a more thorough understanding of the role of party leaders in Canadian politics demands that we direct our attention to the generation and testing of hypotheses regarding the role of candidate evaluations in the vote decision of individual Canadians. (1) Scholarly work of this type is limited in both volume and depth, but the work that does exist clearly indicates that voters' evaluations of political leaders are an important component of the vote decision. Empirical evidence of the independent impact on vote of voters' evaluations of Canadian political leaders is documented in the work of Harold Clarke and his associates

(1) See Elkins and Blake (1975) for a discussion of these issues.

(1979, 1982, 1984) and in the works of Archer (1985) and Brown *et al.* (1986).

Despite the importance attributed to candidate evaluations in both the Canadian and comparative voting literature, this factor is the least understood of the three major determinants of vote: parties, issues and candidates. This situation is not particularly surprising given the orientations of the two models that structure most voting behaviour research. Neither the model of voting behaviour presented in *The American Voter* (1960), nor the "rational choice" models of voting that trace their origins to the work of Anthony Downs (1957), are formulated in such a way that they focus our attention on candidate evaluations. The *American Voter* (1960) model focuses on party identification, which is viewed as an enduring psychological attachment that "colours" voters' perceptions of less central political objects. Rational choice models of voting behaviour focus on policy issues, since it is believed that rational individuals -- that is, individuals who seek to maximize their gains and minimize their losses -- vote for the candidate whose policy positions most closely reflect their own policy preferences.

To say that candidate evaluation is the least understood factor among the three major determinants of vote does not, of course, mean that we know nothing about this factor. Indeed, the volume of literature dealing with

voters' evaluations of political leaders is large and growing. Scholars who examine this issue are generally concerned with two broad questions: (1) what criteria do voters use to evaluate political leaders? and (2) how do voters' evaluations of political leaders impact on the vote decision? Examination of the first question is usually undertaken by scholars whose ultimate aim is answering the second question. This is understandable since, for political scientists, the answer to the first question is ~~significant only within~~ the context of the second. However understandable, emphasis on the impact of evaluation on vote has led scholars to neglect the prior question of the criteria for evaluation. The neglect of this question is particularly acute in Canada. For this reason, this thesis will be limited to an examination of the criteria voters use to evaluate their political leaders. The reader is asked to bear in mind that candidate evaluations are politically relevant because of their potential to influence the vote decision.

Scholars who have examined the question of what criteria voters use to evaluate political leaders have traditionally focused on three factors: parties, issues, and candidate personalities. Both researchers who follow the tradition of The American Voter (1960), and those who adopt the rational choice model of voting behaviour, agree that when voters are asked what they like and dislike about

political leaders, most mention personality characteristics. Despite this recognition of the potential importance of personality judgements in voters' overall evaluations of political leaders, personality judgements have generally been treated as a "residual" component of evaluation -- a component to be noted and then ignored. There are two explanations for this occurrence.

The first explanation relates to the orientations of the two main models of voting behaviour. According to the American Voter (1960) model, voters' evaluations of short-term political objects such as leaders and issues can be explained largely in terms of party identification. As a result of this orientation, researchers who adopt the American Voter (1960) model direct their attention to the question of how party identification affects evaluations of political leaders. Other components of evaluation are considered to be of secondary importance. Researchers who adopt the rational choice model of voting behaviour escape the constraints imposed by the "perceptual screen" view of party identification. However, the tendency of those who adopt this model to be primarily interested in "issue voting" has led them to equate candidate evaluations with evaluations of the issue positions of candidates. Candidate evaluations are viewed as policy evaluations. The influence on evaluation of other factors is acknowledged by those who adopt the rational choice model, but these factors are

generally viewed as less rational and their importance is minimized.

The second explanation for the lack of scholarly attention to voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of political leaders has less to do with the orientations of models than with the orientations of researchers. For many years, most voting behaviour researchers made the implicit or explicit assumption that voters' judgements about the personality traits of political leaders were unstable, irrational and superficial judgements. For example, basing his view on childhood socialization studies indicating that children "personalize" politics, Sears (1969) concludes that attention to the personality traits of political leaders is a "chronologically immature way of dealing with political stimuli" (p. 366). Aside from childhood socialization studies, the main source of researchers' attitudes on the irrationality of voters' judgements about candidates' personality characteristics is the work of Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964) on "levels of conceptualization." According to these researchers, people who view politics in ideological terms have the most sophisticated conception of politics, whereas people "whose evaluations of the political scene . . . [have] no shred of policy significance whatever" have the least sophisticated conception of politics (Converse, 1964, p. 217). Campbell et al. (1960) and

Converse (1964) consider people who discuss politics in terms of the personal attributes of the candidates -- along with those who are unable to say anything at all about politics and those who feel loyalty to a party but cannot explain why -- to be "unsophisticated" in their orientations towards politics.

Although evaluations of political leaders remain one of the least understood aspects of voting behaviour, there has been a great deal of progress in this area in recent years. The increasing methodological sophistication of political scientists, and the willingness to apply precepts drawn from social psychology to the study of candidate evaluations, have led to some particularly fruitful developments. Increasingly, the objects of study are candidate evaluations themselves rather than the impact of such evaluations on the vote decision. There is also an increasing focus on the role of personality judgements in overall evaluation. Views about candidate evaluations have also been changing recently. It has become almost commonplace to assert that voters may be interested in the personality characteristics of political leaders because this information provides them with a means of assessing how these leaders will perform in office (Popkin et al., 1976; Miller and Miller, 1976; Shabad and Andersen, 1979). According to this view, personality judgements are neither irrational nor superficial. The view that personality judgements are unstable is also being

challenged. Researchers have found evidence that voters evaluate political leaders on the basis of "prototypes" or "schemas" that are stable across candidates and endure over time (Conover, 1980, 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Kinder et al., 1980; Miller et al., 1986).

The recent proliferation of scholarly research on the subject of voters' evaluations of political leaders has largely been confined to the American context. Our understanding of how Canadian voters evaluate political leaders is quite limited. The broad objective of this thesis is to develop a basic understanding of voters' evaluations of Canadian political leaders. More specifically, our aim is to determine if there is a relationship between voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of political leaders and their overall evaluations of those leaders that is independent of such politically identifiable factors as party identification and issue proximity. The finding that trait attributions are independently related to overall evaluation will necessitate the examination of two further questions. First, how much variation in evaluation can be attributed to trait judgements relative to other factors? Second, which traits are important in terms of overall evaluation?

We will examine these questions using data from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National Election Studies. Chapter II will be devoted to a review of the existing

literature on voters' evaluations of political leaders. The sources of voters' images of candidates, the factors that have been found to impact on evaluation, and the major controversies pertinent to the study of candidate evaluation will be discussed in this chapter. The theoretical argument of Chapter II will be followed by an empirical argument in Chapters III and IV. In Chapter III we will discuss the hypotheses that our research was designed to test, and the data and methodology used to test these hypotheses. The operationalization of the variables and the development of a trait typology will also be discussed in this chapter. The results of the research are reported and discussed in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V will summarize the research and provide some conclusions based on its findings.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

From our discussion in Chapter I, we know that voters' evaluations of political leaders are considered to be an important component of the vote decision. We also know that candidate evaluations have rarely been the focus of scholarly attention. The study of how voters' judgements about the personality traits of candidates affect their overall evaluations of those candidates has been particularly neglected. As noted above, however, the fact that we know less about candidate evaluations than about issue voting or party identification does not mean that we know nothing about this factor. Indeed, the existing literature contains a great deal of information that is useful to us as we attempt to gain an understanding of voters' evaluations of political leaders.

One of the first problems to be studied by scholars interested in voters' perceptions of political objects was the problem of identifying the sources of political perceptions. Do voters objectively observe reality or do subjective factors distort their observations of reality? The study of this question was greatly influenced by the pioneering works of such scholars as Paul Lazarsfeld and

Bernard Berelson and their associates, and by the work of the researchers at the University of Michigan Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS).

Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates began their research with the aim of studying the impact of a presidential campaign on the formation of votes, but discovered that the campaign had very little impact on the ultimate vote decision of most individuals. In The People's Choice (1944), Lazarsfeld and his associates explain this unexpected finding by arguing that the socio-demographic groups to which people belong incline them to vote for a particular party, and that the campaign merely activates or reinforces these predispositions. In line with their general orientation, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) explain the political homogeneity of social groups as primarily the result of pressures that group members exert upon each other to conform to the group opinion. However, a second explanation is also suggested. This explanation does not focus on external influences but on an internal, psychological process called "selective attention." Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) state:

Voters somehow contrive to select out of the passing stream of stimuli those by which they are more inclined to be persuaded. So it is that the more they read and listen, the more convinced they become of the rightness of their own position (p. 82).

In Voting (1954), Bernard Berelson and his associates

build upon the work reported in The People's Choice (1944). In this volume the process of selective attention is studied in more detail. Berelson and his associates examine voters' perceptions of candidates' issue positions. Their findings include the following: (1) the less ambiguous the objective situation, the more agreement exists between partisan perceptions of the situation; (2) partisans tend to view their candidate's issue positions as similar to their own and the opponent's positions as dissimilar and, in addition, tend not to perceive differences between their own positions and those of their candidate or similarities between their own positions and those of the opponent; and (3) misperception occurs more often among strong partisans than among weak partisans. In attempting to explain selective attention, or selective perception as it is now called, Berelson et al. (1954) employ the psychological theory of cognitive consistency:

. . . perceptual selection must serve a definite psychological function for the individual voter. As in other spheres of activity, so in the political: one function must be to avoid potential stress. The voter must do this, even though unconsciously, by using his perceptual opportunities as a defense or protection against the complexities, contradictions, and problems of the campaign (p. 230).

The authors of The People's Choice (1944) and Voting (1954) are primarily concerned with the sociological determinants of electoral behaviour; psychological

determinants are given only fleeting attention. In The Voter Decides (1954), the first major publication of the researchers at the Michigan Survey Research Center, Angus Campbell and his associates clearly indicate that their main interest is in the psychological determinants of electoral behaviour. Campbell and his associates continue this orientation in their later volume, The American Voter (1960). Their emphasis on the psychological determinants of electoral behaviour means that the SRC researchers focus more attention on the perceptions of the voter than on the stimuli of the campaign.

In their attempt to explain how voters perceive the political world, Campbell et al. (1960) focus on party identification. These researchers assume that voters wish to give order to their images of political objects, and that one way of achieving this order is to transfer "cognitive attributes and affective values from one object to another" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 59). Party identification is central to this process because political parties are the most enduring political objects. New political objects are viewed in terms of their party connections. Additionally, cognitions and affect "initially associated with other objects may survive in the image of the parties after the elements from which they arose have left the political environment" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 60). The impact of party identification cannot, however, be explained entirely

in terms of the longevity of political parties. In attempting to explain why party identification plays such an overwhelmingly important role in shaping voters' attitudes towards other political objects, Campbell and his associates turn to reference group theory. According to this theory, the political party is a reference group -- a group with which individuals develop a psychological identification. The stronger the intensity of this identification, or affective attachment, the greater influence it will have on the individual's perceptions of other political objects. Campbell et al. (1960) state:

Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be (p. 133).

In this manner, partisans ensure that their perceptions of particular candidates and issues are consistent with their long-standing party attachments.

Despite a great deal of evidence indicating that voters perceive political objects selectively, the theory that candidate images are perceiver-determined has not gone unchallenged. One of the major controversies in the study of voters' perceptions of political leaders is between scholars who support the "perceptual balance approach" to image formation and those who support the "image thesis." Supporters of the perceptual balance approach hold that

people wish to avoid stress and that inconsistencies in their attitudes cause stress. Therefore, people attempt to achieve consistency in their attitudes. In the political realm, consistency can be achieved by making judgements about political leaders that are in line with pre-existing partisan attachments. (1) According to this theory, the dominant influence on a voter's image of a candidate is the voter's subjective predispositions. In other words, perceptions are perceiver-determined. An opposing view is held by scholars who support the image thesis. The image thesis holds that perceptions are stimulus-determined; that is, the dominant influence on a voter's image of a candidate is the image projected by that candidate. According to the image thesis.

various campaign actors (campaign managers and advisors, journalists, and the candidates themselves) help create public images of the candidates. These creations are partially contrived, partially a product of chance factors in the campaign, and partially accurate reflections of the candidate's

-
- (1) Perceptual balance theories posit that any enduring, intensely held attitude may become an individual's central, organizing attitude. New stimulus objects will be evaluated in terms of this attitude, and these evaluations will be made consistent with the individual's central attitude. With regard to politics, the most enduring and most intensely held attitude of most individuals is thought to be their party identification. Therefore, most political scientists who study perception speak of bringing attitudes towards other political objects in line with party identification. The perceptual balance approach does not, however, preclude the possibility that other attitudes might serve as central attitudes for some people.

qualities. According to the image thesis, whatever the created and projected image, it is there for all voters to see and respond to in similar ways (Nimmo and Savage, 1976, p. 83).

There is empirical support for both of these theories. McGrath and McGrath (1962) asked a group of Young Democrats and a group of Young Republicans to describe Kennedy and Nixon using fifty semantic differential scales. The McGraths hypothesize that if perceptions are perceiver-determined, then Democrats and Republicans will disagree on which traits best describe each candidate. Democrats will attribute traits such as complex, serious, stable and sophisticated to Kennedy, and Republicans will attribute these traits to Nixon. If perceptions are stimulus-determined, however, then Democrats and Republicans will agree on which traits best describe each candidate. Both groups of partisans will, for example, agree that Kennedy is a risk-taker and Nixon is cautious, or that Kennedy is intellectual and Nixon is practical. McGrath and McGrath (1962) find twenty-nine traits to be perceiver-determined and twenty-one to be stimulus-determined. On the basis of this evidence, they conclude that "the image thesis must be given substantial weight as a basis for accounting for political perceptions" (McGrath and McGrath, 1962, p.246). This conclusion is based on the researchers' belief that the selection of strongly partisan subjects biased the study in favour of the

perceptual balance theory. Thus, the finding that 42 percent of the traits are stimulus-determined is viewed as support for the image thesis.

Roberta Sigel challenges these conclusions. Using data from a survey of Detroit voters, Sigel (1964) finds a positive correlation between partisans' images of the ideal president and their images of their own party's presidential candidate. She finds no correlation between partisans' images of the ideal president and their images of the opposing party's candidate, while independents' images of the ideal president were found not to correlate with their images of either candidate. This evidence is taken as an indication that partisans' perceptions of candidates are perceiver-determined. Sigel (1964) also reports that Kennedy and Nixon are described in similar ways by Democrats, Republicans and Independents. She argues that this finding seems to support that image thesis, but that a closer examination of the images of the two candidates reveals that voters' images of the candidates are almost identical to their images of the candidates' parties. She concludes: "No theory of political perception can offer much promise that fails to take cognizance of the role of parties in voters' political imagery" (Sigel, 1964, p. 496).

It can be argued that neither of these studies adequately tests the perceptual balance approach or the image thesis because neither measures attitude change in

response to stimuli. A study by Blumler and McQuail (1969) overcomes this problem. These researchers use data from a panel study of British voters to examine the impact of the election campaign on voters' images of party leaders. They find that changes in attitudes towards the party leaders are generally in line with changes in attitudes towards the parties, although they note one important exception:

Mr. Grimond's reputation for strength improved throughout virtually the entire sample -- and even with some of the electors who had shifted against his party. For Sir Alec Douglas-Home this pattern was virtually reversed: his strength rating declined even among many of those sample members whose party attitudes had become more pro-Conservative (Blumler and McQuail, 1969, p. 241, emphasis in original).

On the basis of this evidence, Blumler and McQuail (1969) conclude that "the stimulus thesis has received impressive support" (p. 246).

The stimulus-perceiver debate is not yet settled. Some scholars argue that neither the perceptual balance approach nor the image thesis can adequately explain how voters perceive candidates, and that the process should be viewed as a "stimulus-perceiver transaction" (Nimmo and Savage, 1976). Others argue that the perceptual process should be viewed as an inference process (Conover, 1980, 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Feldman and Conover, 1983). According to this view, when voters are faced with a political environment in which information is both sparse and

ambiguous, they use their prior knowledge to make inferences about candidates. Scholars who view the perceptual process as an inference process do not speak of images being perceiver-determined or stimulus-determined. Rather, they speak of political cues, the schemas associated with those cues, and the inferences drawn from those schemas.

While keeping in mind the debate about the sources of voters' images of candidates, we will now examine some of the evidence regarding the causal antecedents of candidate evaluation. Efforts directed at identification of the factors that influence voters' evaluations of political leaders have been a major thrust of research on candidate evaluation. Three major factors are usually identified: parties, issues and candidate personalities. Each of these factors will be examined in turn.

Many researchers have found evidence of the importance of party identification in shaping voters' perceptions of political leaders. We have already discussed some of this evidence as it relates to the stimulus-perceiver controversy, but an additional look at some particularly relevant studies is in order. Converse and Dupeux (1966) report that voters' perceptions of Eisenhower and DeGaulle were affected by the partisan ties that these formerly non-partisan military heroes were eventually forced to adopt. Before Eisenhower became identified with the Republican Party, there was "no reason to believe that

admiration for him had followed any lines of political or social cleavage" (Converse and Dupeux, 1966, p. 324). After he became the candidate of the Republican Party, however, Eisenhower's image took on a partisan dimension -- Republicans evaluated him more positively than did Democrats. Converse and Dupeux (1966) argue that because

. . . party loyalties in the American system remain stable for long periods of time . . . it seems indisputable that with very few exceptions, partisanship antedated and profoundly modified the reactions to Eisenhower. In other words, had Eisenhower chosen instead the Democratic Party, we may assume the relationship would have rotated in the opposing direction: strong Republicans would have decided they disliked Eisenhower (p. 325).

Evidence of the impact of party identification on voters' perceptions of political leaders is also reported by Weisberg and Rusk (1970). These researchers use multidimensional scaling to develop "a dimensional interpretation of the individual's perceptions of and preferences for candidates" (Weisberg and Rusk, 1970, p. 1167). They find that clusters of candidates can be distinguished on the basis of party identification. They go on to compare the relative impact on candidate evaluation of party identification, attitudes on urban unrest and attitudes on Vietnam. Their findings indicate that voters' attitudes on urban unrest and Vietnam have some impact on their evaluations of some potential presidential nominees, but that party identification has a much greater impact on

the evaluations of a much greater number of potential nominees. In a subsequent article, Rusk and Weisberg (1972) replicate their analysis of the 1968 data using data gathered in 1970. The findings reported in the two articles are essentially the same: party identification is the major determinant of perceptions of candidates.

Most of the evidence we have examined so far has involved American data. However, evidence from studies of other countries indicates that the relationship between party identification and candidate evaluation exists elsewhere as well. Trenaman and McQuail (1961), Blumler and McQuail (1969) and Butler and Stokes (1974) present evidence indicating that partisanship influences voters' images of party leaders in Great Britain. With regard to France, Converse and Dupeux (1966) report that voters' evaluations of DeGaulle were affected by party identification, despite the fact that DeGaulle attempted to place himself above partisan politics.

Several Canadian studies report similar findings. LaPonce (1969) reports that his data, gathered in British Columbia in the mid-1960s, indicate that "the leader of one's preferred party is always more friendly, more active, and more powerful than the leaders of other parties" (p. 123). Winham and Cunningham (1970) present evidence from a survey conducted in Hamilton, Ontario, during the 1968 federal election which indicates that voters' impressions of

party leaders are strongly related to vote intention. In Political Choice in Canada (1979), Harold Clarke and his associates provide an analysis of national survey data gathered following the 1974 federal election. These data indicate that levels of affect for party leaders are related to both the direction and the intensity of partisanship. Using data from the 1979 Canadian National Election Study (NES), Archer (1985) employs three-stage least squares regression techniques to estimate the parameters of a simultaneous equation model of Canadian voting behaviour. His findings indicate that party identification has a greater impact on evaluations of Pierre Trudeau and Joe Clark than either issue proximity or judgements about their personal characteristics (Archer, 1985, Table 1, Table 2). Brown et al. (1986) apply the same statistical technique to 1984 Canadian NES data. The findings of Brown and his associates are similar to those reported by Archer (1985). Party identification has a greater impact on comparative evaluations of John Turner and Brian Mulroney than any other factor entered into the evaluation equations (Brown et al., 1986, Table 2).

Although a great deal of attention has been focused on the impact of party identification on voters' evaluations of political leaders, the fact that voters also perceive candidates in terms of issues has not been ignored. Many researchers note that when voters are asked what they like

and dislike about various candidates, a significant number mention policy issues (Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Converse and Dupeux, 1966; Butler and Stokes, 1974). If issues are a relevant component of the content of candidate images, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they also influence candidate evaluation. As was previously noted, Weisberg and Rusk (1970, 1972) find that party identification is the most important influence on candidate evaluation. However, these researchers also find a significant issue dimension in voters' evaluations of potential presidential candidates. Issue concerns are found to have some impact on evaluations of even highly partisan candidates such as Kennedy, Humphrey and Johnson. For candidates who are not widely viewed in partisan terms, the impact of issues is even greater; issues are as important as party in determining voters' evaluations of some candidates. Weisberg and Rusk (1970) conclude:

Party seems to be a useful cue for candidate evaluation when the individual is a new candidate without well-known policy stands. . . . Party will also loom important as a determinant of ratings when the candidate is a well-known national leader of his party. . . . Candidacies based mainly on issues are also possible, even in the major parties. . . . A candidate without a decidedly partisan national reputation may distinguish himself on an issue basis with little regard to conventional party lines (p. 1183).

The strongest evidence for the potential impact of issues on candidate evaluation is presented by Arthur Miller

and his associates in a 1976 article. These researchers employ data from the SRC/GPS study of the 1972 American presidential election, in which respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale their positions on five policy issues: Vietnam, urban unrest, campus demonstrations, rights of the accused, and aid to minorities. Miller et al. (1976) use the responses to these questions to develop a "policy orientation index." Using this index as a measure of issue preferences, the investigators report that issue preferences have a greater impact on evaluations of a battery of twelve political leaders than either party identification or race. In replying to comments on these findings, Miller and Miller (1976) expand the analysis to include a measure of issue salience. Their findings indicate that the relationship between Vietnam policy preference and candidate evaluation is stronger among voters who mention the Vietnam issue as a reason for voting for or against a candidate than among those who do not.

With regard to Canada, Clarke et al. (1979) report that the content of voters' images of Canadian party leaders in 1974 included references to issues such as separatism, bilingualism and inflation. Archer (1985) presents findings from the 1979 Canadian NES which indicate that voters' evaluations of Ed Broadbent are more affected by feelings of issue proximity than by either NDP party identification or

beliefs regarding Broadbent's personal characteristics (Archer, 1984, Table 3). Issue proximity has no statistically significant impact on voters' evaluations of Trudeau and Clark (Archer, 1985, Table 1, Table 2). Brown et al. (1986) present evidence from 1984 NES data that echo Archer's findings: issue proximity has a major impact on comparative evaluations of Broadbent, while the impact of issue proximity on comparative evaluations of Turner and Mulroney is not statistically significant (Brown et al., 1986, Table 2).

Attempts at identifying the causal antecedents of candidate evaluation have generally focused on the impact of party identification or, occasionally, on the impact of issue perceptions. It is widely recognized, however, that these factors do not provide an adequate explanation of voters' evaluations of political leaders. After the influences of party identification and issue preferences are accounted for, a substantial portion of the variance in voters' evaluations of political leaders remains unexplained. Most researchers identify the source of this unexplained variance to be voters' judgements about the personality traits of the candidate. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of research dealing with the impact of trait attributions on voters' evaluations of political leaders.

First, we will discuss evidence indicating that voters'

cognitive images of political leaders are dominated by references to the leaders' personal characteristics. Second, we will examine how political scientists have traditionally dealt with the "personality factor." We will then turn to an examination of research dealing specifically with the impact of trait attributions on overall candidate evaluation. Finally, having discussed what the literature can tell us regarding the importance of trait attributions, we will examine the question of which traits influence voters' evaluations of political leaders.

Researchers in the United States, Europe and Canada have found that, when asked what they like and dislike about various political leaders, the majority of voters mention personality characteristics. A longitudinal analysis of responses to the standard SRC/CPS questions on voters' likes and dislikes of presidential candidates is provided by Nie and his associates (1979).(1) According to their categorization scheme, references to personal attributes as the reason for voting for or against a candidate are more numerous than references to either issue positions or party ties in all election years between 1952 and 1972 (Nie et al., 1979, p. 167). Miller and his associates (1986) also

(1) The standard SRC/CPS candidate like/dislike question is worded as follows: "Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the major candidates for president. Is there anything in particular about _____ that might make you want to vote for [against] him? What is that?"

provide data that allow us to compare the frequency over time of references to personal attributes, issues and partisan connections. While their percentages differ from those reported by Nie et al. (1979), the relative frequencies remain basically the same. According to the data presented by Miller et al. (1986), references to personal attributes dominate voters' responses to the like/dislike questions in every election year between 1952 and 1984, with the exception of 1972 and 1984, when references to parties marginally outnumber references to personal attributes (p. 525). Shabad and Andersen (1979) report evidence indicating that between 1952 and 1976 an average of 57 percent of valid first responses to the standard SRC/CPS candidate like/dislike questions referred to the candidate's personal qualities, 29 percent referred to issues and 14 percent referred to the candidate's party ties (p. 23).

Evidence of the dominance of personality traits in voters' cognitive images of political leaders is not confined to the United States. Converse and Dupeux (1966) report that 47 percent of positive references and 34 percent of negative references to DeGaulle were references to his "personal image," while a further 18 percent of positive mentions and 13 percent of negative mentions referred to the

General's "leadership capacities" (p. 299).⁽¹⁾ In 1963, 1964, 1966, 1969 and 1970, Butler and Stokes (1974) asked British electors what they liked and disliked about the leaders of the Labour and Conservative parties. The researchers report that an average of 83 percent of all comments about Labour leader Harold Wilson referred to his "personal characteristics;" with regard to the various Conservative Party leaders, an average of 88 percent of all comments referred to their "personal characteristics" (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 357). Similar results have been found in Canada (Regenstreif, 1965; Winham and Cunningham, 1970; Clarke et al., 1979; Clarke et al., 1984).

Widespread agreement that voters' cognitive images of political leaders are dominated by perceptions of the leaders' personality traits has not, at least until recently, led to extensive study of these perceptions. Despite recognition of trait attributions as potentially powerful determinants of overall candidate evaluation, most researchers have paid only cursory attention to this factor. In a seminal article that established candidate evaluations as a potentially potent short-term source of voting change, Stokes (1966) comments:

The men seeking the Presidency bring to a campaign certain "real" properties as stimulus objects. Some of these belong

(1) The French question differed slightly from the standard American question. French respondents were asked the following question: "Parlant du General de Gaulle, qu'est-ce qui vous plait et vous déplait en lui?"

to the past -- the candidate's role as war hero, his success as governor or senator, his marital difficulties, . . . Other properties have to do with appearance, behaviour, and personal style -- the candidate's smile, the timbre of his voice, his smoothness in dealing with the teleprompter, his willingness to suffer fools gladly . . . (p. 23).

Stokes (1966) does not explicitly reject the possibility that voters' perceptions of these personal qualities could have an independent impact on evaluation. He does, however, assert that perceptions of candidates' personal characteristics can largely be explained by the perceptual balance approach of *The American Voter* (1960). Stokes (1966) argues that impressions of candidates' personal characteristics "do not fall on wholly unprepared ground" (p. 23). According to Stokes (1966), party identification is particularly important in this regard, although he also notes that religion exerted a strong influence on voters' perceptions of Kennedy.

The "personality factor" receives similar treatment in the analyses of Weisberg and Rusk (1970, 1972). At the outset of their 1970 article, Weisberg and Rusk note that factors which may impact upon candidate evaluation include party identification, ideology, issues and candidate personality. The fact that their analysis does not include any measure (or even any further mention) of voters' perceptions of candidates' personalities does not prevent these researchers from concluding that there are two major

determinants of candidate evaluation: parties and issues. In their 1972 article, Rusk and Weisberg add what they call an "important qualification" to their discussion of the factors which influence voters' evaluations of candidates:

The combined impact of party and issues is only moderate at best. Much of the variation in candidate ratings is due to individual response differences among those interviewed which have not been controlled, to unclear public images of some of these figures, and to candidate personality factors which go beyond parties and issues (Rusk and Weisberg, 1972, p. 405).

The authors go on to note that party identification and issue preferences explain little of the variation in the ratings of six of fifteen candidates. These observations do not, however, deter Rusk and Weisberg (1972) from concluding: "the mixture of partisan and issue cleavages is apparent, with party being the dominant element shaping perceptions of candidates" (p. 405).

Studies which explicitly test the relative impact of party identification, issue preferences and perceptions of candidates' personalities on candidate evaluations are recent in origin and few in number. The aim of most of these studies is the development of a simultaneous equation model of voting behaviour. Although the specification of reciprocal relationships is beyond the scope of this thesis, these studies can nevertheless tell us a great deal about the determinants of candidate evaluation. Using two-stage least squares regression techniques, Markus and Converse

(1979) estimate the impact of party identification, issues and candidate personality on candidate evaluation. (1) Their evidence, drawn from 1979 SRC CPS survey data, indicates that party identification, issues and candidate personality are all important determinants of candidate evaluation. Together, these three factors account for 67 percent of the variance in the Ford-Carter evaluation differential (Markus and Converse, 1979, p. 1066). However, the factor which has the greatest direct impact on evaluation is candidate personality, with a standardized regression coefficient (Beta) of .43; party identification and issues have a roughly equal impact on evaluation, with Betas of .29 and -.30 respectively (Markus and Converse, 1979, p. 1066).

A study by Page and Jones (1979) reports the estimates for two models: one recursive and one non-recursive. Both models estimate the impact on candidate evaluation of party identification, issues and judgements about the candidates' personality traits. The variables of both models are operationalized in the same manner, and the data for both models are drawn from the 1976 SRC CPS presidential election

(1) Markus and Converse (1979) operationalize "candidate personality" as a seven-point scale on which respondents are asked to rate the degree to which the candidates have "the kind of personality a President ought to have." This variable, as well as the variables for issues and candidate evaluation, are differential variables. That is, the rating assigned to one candidate is subtracted from the rating assigned to the other in order to obtain a single measure of each concept.

survey.(1) The estimates for the recursive (one-way) model indicate that perceptions of candidates' personal qualities have the greatest impact on evaluation, with a standardized regression coefficient of .39; comparative policy distances are second in importance (Beta = .34); party identification has the least impact of the three variables (Beta = .27) (Page and Jones, 1979, p. 1077). When a non-recursive (two-way) model is specified, the Betas are as follows: candidates' personal qualities, .38; comparative policy distances, .44; party identification, .21 (Page and Jones, 1979, p. 1083). We can see from these statistics that, in 1976, issues became more important relative to party identification and personality judgements when the reciprocal relationships among these factors were taken into account. However, we can also see that the specification of the non-recursive model does not drastically alter the coefficients derived from the recursive model.

Two recent Canadian studies examine the relative impact of party identification, issues and personality judgements on candidate evaluation. The previously-cited study by Archer (1985) finds that party identification is the

(1) Page and Jones (1979) operationalize "candidate personality" as the net number of pro-Republican less pro-Democratic comments offered in response to the standard SRC/CPS open-ended like/dislike questions, including only those comments that refer to the personal qualities of the candidates. This variable, as well as the issues and evaluation variables, is a differential variable.

strongest determinant of voters' evaluations of Trudeau (Beta = .69, $p < .01$); judgements about Trudeau's personal characteristics are also important (Beta = .17, $p < .01$), while the impact of issue preferences is not statistically significant (Archer, 1985, Table 1). With regard to evaluations of Clark, Archer (1985) reports that the most important determining factor is party identification (Beta = .55, $p < .01$), closely followed by personality judgements (Beta = .33, $p < .01$); again, issues do not have a statistically significant impact on evaluation (Archer, 1985, Table 2). Evaluations of Broadbent are affected by issue preferences (Beta = .49, $p < .05$) and judgements about Broadbent's personality (Beta = .36, $p < .01$), but not by party identification (Archer, 1985, Table 3).

The findings of Brown and his associates (1986) also support the contention that judgements about the personality traits of political leaders influence voters' comparative evaluations of these leaders. The leader evaluation equations developed by these researchers include several independent variables in addition to measures of party identification, issue proximity and personality trait attributions. Included in each regression equation are measures of the personality traits attributed to each leader (i.e. to the leader in question and to his opponents), measures tapping the extent to which the leader represents change relative to his opponents, and measures tapping the

perceived regional representativeness of the leader relative to his opponents. The inclusion of a greater number of independent variables in each regression equation reduces the potential impact of any one variable. Nevertheless, these researchers find that attributing positive personality traits to a leader significantly enhances one's comparative evaluation of that leader (Brown *et al.*, 1986, Table 2). For all leaders, the attribution of positive traits has a slightly greater impact on evaluation than the attribution of negative traits.⁽¹⁾ Although Brown *et al.* (1986) hypothesize that "overall evaluation of a leader is a comparative judgement that is likely to be affected by the perceived attributes of his counterparts in the other parties" (p. 10), their findings in this regard are inconclusive. On the one hand, the estimates associated with the "opponents' traits" variables are generally low, and in no instance do they exceed the estimates associated with the measures of the leader's own traits (Brown *et al.*, 1986, Table 2). On the other hand, the researchers note that, at least in one case, this finding is an artifact of the manner in which the comparative evaluation variable was operationalized.

[T]he apparent irrelevance of Turner's

(1) The relevant unstandardized regression coefficients are as follows: Turner: positive traits, 8.2; negative traits, -5.7. Mulroney: positive traits, 9.8; negative traits, -9.1. Broadbent: positive traits, 5.7; negative traits, -2.6. The standard errors of these coefficients range between .9 and 1.1 (Brown *et al.*, 1986, Table 2).

positive and negative traits to Mulroney's comparative evaluation reflects the fact that Turner ranked third in the view of many respondents, and thus Turner was not as frequently used as the benchmark for creating the Mulroney comparative rating (Brown et al., 1986, p. 19).

The findings of Brown and his associates (1986) regarding the relative importance for evaluation of positive and negative trait attributions are at odds with findings reported by Richard Lau (1982, 1984). In a 1982 article, Lau reports findings which indicate that negative information is more important than equally extreme positive information with regard to its impact on evaluations of political leaders. In a subsequent article, Lau (1984) tests two possible explanations for the "negativity effect." The first explanation is the "cost-orientation" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, people are more strongly motivated to avoid costs than to approach gains. If this hypothesis is correct, negativity should increase as potential costs or gains increase. The second explanation for the negativity effect is the "figure-ground" hypothesis, which sees negativity as a perceptual phenomenon rather than as a motivational phenomenon. The figure-ground hypothesis is based on findings which indicate that people's evaluations of other individuals -- including political leaders -- are, in general, overwhelmingly favourable (Lau et al., 1979; Sears, 1983). According to the figure-ground hypothesis, negative information is assigned more importance

than positive information because negative information stands out against the generally positive background of our lives. Lau (1984) reports findings which support both of these hypotheses.

Findings such as those of Markus and Converse (1979), Page and Jones (1979), Archer (1985) and Brown *et al.* (1986) have led scholars to conclude that trait attributions can have a powerful independent impact on voters' evaluations of political leaders -- an impact that is equal to, and perhaps occasionally even greater than, the impact of such factors as party identification and issue preferences. The discovery that trait attributions can have an independent impact on overall evaluation leads one to ask an obvious but important question: which traits impact on evaluation? Voters attribute all sorts of personality traits to political leaders: competence, dishonesty, strength, compassion and arrogance, to name a few. Do all of these traits have an equal impact on overall evaluation, or are some more important than others in this regard? In order to answer this question, we will examine the trait typologies that have been proposed or developed by various scholars.

Early understanding of the traits that voters attribute to political leaders was shaped by scholars who analyzed the cognitive content of voters' candidate images. Campbell *et al.* (1954) note that -- in addition to references to issues, party ties and group associations, voters' images of

Eisenhower and Stevenson include references to the candidates' experience and abilities, leadership, personal attractiveness, speaking ability and "other personal qualities" (e.g. integrity and intelligence). In The American Voter (1960), Campbell and his associates enumerate four major categories of personal attributes. The first category is an unlabelled category containing vague references such as "he's generally a good man." The remaining categories are more specific: the second is labelled "record and experience" and contains references to the candidate's past accomplishments or failures; the third is labelled "qualifications and abilities" and includes references to the speaking ability, strength, decisiveness, independence and education of the candidate; the fourth category, labelled "personal qualities," includes references to the candidate's integrity, warmth, sincerity and likability.

Implicit in these analyses is the belief that attributions of experience, ability and leadership qualities are qualitatively different than "other" personality trait attributions. The distinction between traits such as experience and ability and "other" traits is adopted by Winham and Cunningham (1970), who state that their aim is to separate

. . . general statements about a leader's personality or image from other more objective comments about the leader's qualifications, such as his experience or judgement . . .

Statements falling in the personality and image category were often unspecific comments such as "he's a good man," "I think he's insincere," or "a man of integrity" (p. 40).

Winham and Cunningham (1970) do not explain why comments about a candidate's judgement are any more objective or any more specific than comments about a candidate's integrity. In making the distinction between experience and ability and other traits, however, these researchers are following established practice. Clarke et al. (1979) also follow the orthodoxy when they divide the personal content of voters' images of candidates into a personality category, a style category and a leadership category -- implying, in the process, that there is a distinction among these three types of trait attributions.

Shabad and Andersen (1979) expand our understanding of the dimensions of candidate evaluation by categorizing voters' responses to the traditional SRC.CPS open-ended like dislike questions according to a scheme that is both broader and more precise than those discussed above. The dimensions of evaluation proposed by these researchers are the traditional three: party identification, issue positions and candidate trait attributions. However, Shabad and Andersen's (1979) trait attribution dimension is considerably more complex than is the case in the typologies we have been discussing to this point. It has two broad categories: responses which are political, and those which

are not. References to "non-political" personality traits such as warmth, likability and attractiveness, and references to the candidate's background are included in the first category. Only traits considered explicitly political -- competence, leadership, reliability and trust -- are included in the latter category.

The distinction made by Shabad and Andersen (1979) between political and non-political traits is the explicit counterpart of the distinction made implicitly by Campbell and his associates. However, the distinction between political and non-political traits is somewhat vague. Traits which are relevant to the candidate's ability to perform his/her job if elected are considered political traits. Traits which are relevant in "the interpersonal domain . . . the same things persons think about when forming impressions of personal acquaintances" are considered non-political traits (Swanson, 1981, p. 178). The problem with this distinction is that there is a great deal of potential for overlap between the two categories. Additionally, there is the problem of who decides which traits are relevant to a candidate's ability to perform in office. For example, experience may be a relevant trait for some people, while others might consider experience unimportant but compassion essential.

The trait typologies that we have been discussing to this point were developed on an ad hoc basis from analyses

of voters' responses to open-ended questions asking them what they liked and disliked about political leaders. In other words, the researchers "specify the dimensions which . . . [they expect] voters to use in evaluating the candidates and investigate the extent to which . . . [the voters] appear to utilize those dimensions" (Shabad and Andersen, 1979, p. 25, emphasis in original). A second method of developing a trait typology is to factor analyze responses to closed- or open-ended questions designed to tap voters' views about the personality traits of candidates. The trait dimensions are thus not theoretically imposed; rather, they are allowed to emerge empirically.

The most common closed-ended measure of trait attributions is a set of semantic differential scales which respondents are asked to use in judging various political leaders. Researchers then employ factor analysis to discover the broad dimensions that underlie the specific trait attributions. Early investigators found three dominant dimensions, which they labelled the evaluative, potency and activity factors (Osgood et al., 1957). Warr and Knapper (1968) develop a set of semantic differential scales designed to tap these three dimensions, and submit the responses to these scales to factor analysis. They find that the three dimensions do indeed emerge. Scales that load on the evaluative factor include true-false, wise-foolish, fair-unfair; scales loading on the potency

factor include strong-weak, hard-soft, rugged-delicate; scales loading on the activity factor include sharp-dull, active-passive, fast-slow. Although the three factors emerge from their analysis, Warr and Knapper (1968) note that the potency and activity factors can be collapsed into a single "dynamism" factor.

Donald Kinder and his associates (1979) also employ a closed-ended measure of trait attributions. These researchers present respondents with eight positive personality traits (e.g. open-minded, inspiring, honest, knowledgeable) and eight negative traits (e.g. reckless, weak, power-hungry, selfish), and ask them to indicate whether these traits describe various candidates extremely well, very well, pretty well or not very well at all. A factor analysis of these sixteen traits produces three trait dimensions: a competence dimension, an integrity dimension and an idiosyncratic dimension that is defined by different clusters of characteristics for each candidate (e.g. by humble, warm, and honest for Ford, and by weak, unstable and reckless for Carter).

Although Kinder et al. (1979) do not discuss the impact of the various trait dimensions on candidate evaluation, this question is addressed by Kinder in two subsequent reports (1983, 1985). The trait typology used by Kinder in his 1983 report contains five factors: competence, leadership, integrity, empathy and stability. These factors

-- along with party, ideology and policy variables -- are entered into an ordinary least squares regression analysis. The findings reported by Kinder (1983) indicate that trait attributions have an impact on evaluation that is independent of any direct effects of party, ideology and policy. Of the five traits, integrity has the most impact on evaluations of Reagan, Kennedy and Mondale. Integrity is followed -- in varying order for each candidate -- by competence, leadership and empathy. Stability was not found to have a statistically significant impact on voters' evaluations of any of the three leaders (Kinder, 1983, Table 12).

In a subsequent article, Kinder (1985) uses two-stage least squares multiple regression analysis to estimate the impact on overall evaluation of party identification, ideological orientation, policy positions, affective reactions, and judgements about competence, leadership, integrity and empathy. The results of this analysis indicate that voters' evaluations of Reagan and Kennedy are influenced by judgements about the personality traits these leaders possess, with competence being particularly important. Regarding Mondale, however, Kinder (1985) concludes on the basis of the two-stage least squares analysis that "judgements of Mondale's character seem to be more the consequences than the causes of overall evaluation" (p. 253).

Swede (1984) submits respondents' ratings of candidates on 105 personality traits to principal components analysis. This analysis produces four trait dimensions. Swede (1984) labels the first dimension the "good bad candidate." Positive traits that load on this dimension include decent, compassionate and cooperative, while negative traits include narrow, arrogant and unfair. The second dimension is labelled the "dynamic candidate" and encompasses such positive traits as colourful, inspiring and strong, and such negative traits as dull and boring. Swede (1984) labels the third dimension the "neurotic candidate." This is a negative dimension, encompassing such traits as incompetent, anxious, changeable, ambiguous and dependent. The fourth dimension -- the "dignified candidate" -- is positive and includes traits such as calm, formal and refined.

In addition to reporting the results of the principal components analysis, Swede (1984) also regresses evaluations of Reagan, Mondale, Hart and Jackson onto the four trait dimensions and two variables measuring party identification and ideology. His findings indicate that perceptions on the good/bad dimension and the dynamism dimension have the greatest direct impact on evaluations of Reagan, Mondale and Hart, followed by party and ideology. The good bad dimension also has the greatest impact on evaluations of Jackson, followed by ideology, dynamism and dignity.

Although the trait dimensions reported by Warr and

Knapper (1988), Kinder et al. (1979) and Swede (1984) were produced through factor analysis. The measures of trait attributions that these researchers use nevertheless require respondents to rate candidates on the basis of traits that are specified by researchers. The factor analyses reported by Miller and Miller (1976) avoid this problem. These investigators factor analyze thirty-six personal characteristics mentioned in response to the open-ended leader like/dislike questions contained in the 1972 SRC/CPS presidential election survey.⁽¹⁾ Five dimensions emerge from this analysis. The researchers label these dimensions, listed here in descending order of frequency, as follows: competence, trust, reliability, leadership appeal, and personal appearance.

Miller and his associates (1986) expand upon the work of Miller and Miller (1976). Miller et al. (1986) subject to factor analysis all personal characteristics mentioned in response to the open-ended leader like/dislike questions contained in each SRC/CPS presidential election study from 1952 to 1984. The trait dimensions that emerge from this comprehensive analysis are labelled by the researchers as follows: competence, integrity, reliability, charisma and personal characteristics. Comments referring to the competence, integrity and reliability of candidates are

(1) The factor analysis of open-ended responses was carried out by creating dichotomous variables for all relevant codes.

consistently the most frequent of all remarks concerning the personal characteristics of candidates -- with references to competence outnumbering all other references in every election year. Comments reflecting the "charisma" dimension are less frequently mentioned. The frequency of comments dealing with the candidate's "personal characteristics" (e.g. appearance, age, health, wealth, religion, previous occupations) varies a great deal over the years studied.

We have now examined most of the issues that are pertinent to the study of what criteria voters use to evaluate political leaders. At the outset of this chapter, we discussed the findings of early voting behaviour researchers and the ongoing stimulus-perceiver debate. The findings regarding the impact of party identification and issue positions on overall evaluation were then examined. Finally, we examined evidence regarding the impact on evaluation of voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of candidates. One major controversy remains to be examined before we can conclude this chapter. Our discussion of voters' evaluations of political leaders has assumed that the judgements voters make about the personality characteristics of a candidate influence their overall evaluations of that candidate. However, the possibility that trait attributions are influenced by overall evaluation must also be considered.

In addressing this issue, we are involving ourselves in

one of the longest running debates in the field of social psychology: the relationship between cognition and affect. (1) Cognitions are beliefs: whenever we attribute a particular personality trait to another person, we are saying that we believe that that person possesses the trait in question. As Warr and Knapper (1968) note: "An essential part of forming an impression of another person is to attribute to him certain characteristics" (p. 7). Cognitions are not, however, the only aspect of our perceptions of others. An equally important part of perception is affective response. Whereas cognition refers to thinking, affect refers to feeling. The most basic affective responses are evaluation and preference -- the simple positive and negative reactions we have to others, such as liking or disliking them.

The orthodox position in the debate about the relationship between cognition and affect is that thought is a necessary condition for feeling (Zajonc, 1980; Lazarus, 1982; Fiske and Taylor, 1984). In other words, cognition is necessary for affective reaction to occur. Scholars who hold this view take the following position:

Before I can like something I must have some knowledge about it, and in the very least, I must have identified some of its discriminant features. Objects must be cognized before they can be evaluated (Zajonc, 1980, p. 151).

(1) See Fiske and Taylor (1984) for a review of the literature relevant to the cognition-affect debate.

A great deal of research in social psychology supports the notion that cognitions precede and cause affective reactions. Cognitive consistency theories argue that inconsistent beliefs cause people to feel affective discomfort which, in turn, causes them to change their beliefs in order to maintain consistency. Various lines of research focus on the role of interrupted goals in causing emotional responses. Interrupted expectations have been found to cause arousal, and the nature and extent of the interruption can have an impact on the intensity of the arousal (Mandler, 1982; Berscheid, 1982). Several researchers have investigated the impact of social schemata, or knowledge structures, on affect. Linville (1982) reports findings which indicate that as knowledge structures become complex, affective reactions moderate. Other scholars have found that, over time, people become more capable of making their observations fit into their schemata. This increased organization of schemata has been found to lead to more extreme affective reactions (Tesser and Conlee, 1975). Stereotyping research examines the fit of new information to prior knowledge structures. When people are confronted with a new acquaintance, they make cognitive inferences about that person on the basis of how well he or she fits a stereotypic mold. To the extent that the person fits the stereotype, he or she will receive the affective reaction triggered by the stereotype (Fiske, 1982). Research on the

relationship between affect and obtained or alternative outcomes also supports the notion that cognitions cause affective responses. Researchers have found that emotional response is influenced by obtained outcomes and the perceived causes of those outcomes. For example, the feelings generated by success or failure are mediated by whether subjects attribute their success or failure to their own efforts or to external causes (McFarland and Ross, 1982).

The position that cognitions cause affective reactions finds ample empirical support and is also intuitively appealing. Nevertheless, many scholars argue that affect can also influence cognition. This position also finds empirical support. Wright and Mischel (1982) report findings which indicate that people's moods can have a pervasive effect on their memory and judgement. For example, a person who is in a good mood recalls positive events more readily than negative events, while a person who is in a bad mood recalls negative events more readily than positive ones. Other researchers have found that emotions such as fear, worry and love can interrupt normal cognitive processes (Nielson and Sarason, 1981)

In addition to scholars who hold that affect influences cognition, there are some scholars who argue that affective and cognitive processes are largely independent of each other. One of the best known proponents of the "separate

systems" position is R.B. Zajonc. According to Zajonc (1980), affect occurs faster, and is more basic, than cognition. Zajonc (1980) argues that affect is primary: people make evaluations and then justify them. Affect is also basic: unlike cognition, affective reactions occur among all species of animals. Third, affect is inescapable -- affective reactions cannot be voluntarily controlled. Fourth, affect is irrevocable. Whereas people can be persuaded to change their beliefs, feelings are not easily changed -- even when the basis for those feelings is found to be invalid. Fifth, affect implicates self. Whenever we make an affective judgement, we are describing our own reactions to a stimulus object rather than the object itself. Sixth, affective reactions are difficult to verbalize and are, therefore, often communicated in non-verbal ways. In addition to arguing that affect is more basic than cognition, Zajonc (1980) also argues that affective reactions are not dependent on cognition.

If overall preferences were simply a matter of calculating the combination of weighted component preferences, . . . then the problems of predicting attitudes, decisions, aesthetic judgements, or first impressions would have been solved long ago . . . The analysis of preferences is not simply an analysis of cold cognitive representations that have become hot . . . (Zajonc, 1980, pp. 158-159).

Zajonc's (1980) arguments have been controversial. For example, Lazarus (1982) holds that Zajonc does not

understand the nature of cognition. According to Lazarus (1982), Zajonc incorrectly equates cognition with rationality and erroneously assumes that people are necessarily aware of the factors upon which their cognitions are based. Lazarus (1982) agrees that emotional reaction can occur quickly, but rejects "the assumption that this early presence means that it is detached from or independent of cognitive appraisal" (p. 1021). Despite these arguments, Zajonc's (1980) position on the independence of cognition and affect is supported by several avenues of research. "Mere exposure" research has shown that people have a more positive reaction to familiar objects, even when they do not recognize those objects as familiar (Moreland and Zajonc, 1977). Research in the field of person perception also supports the view that cognition and affect are independent of each other. Dreben, Fiske and Hastie (1979) report evidence indicating that affective reactions can persist even when people do not recall the details on which they are based.

This cursory examination of some of the literature relevant to the debate about the relationship between cognition and affect cannot do justice to the many arguments and the abundance of accumulated evidence on all sides. This was not its purpose. Rather, its purpose was simply to acknowledge the existence of this important controversy. Most political scientists who examine the question of

voters' evaluations of political leaders implicitly assume that beliefs about party connections, issue positions and personality characteristics influence overall evaluation. Simultaneous equation models generally posit reciprocal relationships between evaluation and party attachment, and between evaluation and perceptions of issue proximity. However, among political scientists the relationship between personality trait attributions and overall candidate evaluation is uniformly assumed to be one-way (Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979; Swede, 1984; Archer, 1985; Brown *et al.*, 1986). Trait attributions are assumed to be a cause of overall evaluation; evaluation is assumed not to impact on trait attributions. A few investigators (Page and Jones, 1979; Swede, 1984; Brown *et al.*, 1986) make this assumption explicit, but even in these cases the controversy over the relationship between cognition and affect is not discussed in any detail.

Since the exploration of reciprocal relationships is beyond the scope of this thesis, a choice must be made regarding which aspect of the relationship between cognition and affect will be investigated. The approach adopted here examines the impact of trait attributions on overall candidate evaluation. This appears to have been, for many years, the traditional approach in social psychology (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), and it is certainly the orthodox approach in political science. We will not, however, assume that

overall evaluations do not influence traits attributions. Nor will we assume that trait attributions and other cognitions can explain overall evaluation completely. As Fiske and Taylor (1984) note: "The relationships between affect and cognition are complex, difficult, and just beginning to be understood" (p. 339). Awareness of this fact is the first step towards untangling those relationships.

This chapter has discussed the disagreement among scholars about the sources of voters' images of political leaders. Supporters of the perceptual balance approach hold that voters' images of candidates are largely determined by the voters' own subjective predispositions. On the other hand, supporters of the image thesis argue that the dominant influence on a voter's image of a candidate is the image projected by that candidate. It has also been seen that research directed at the identification of the factors influencing voters' evaluations of political leaders has focused on three major determinants of evaluation. Party identification has been found to have a substantial impact on overall candidate evaluation. Under certain circumstances, issue positions have also been found to influence voters' evaluations of political leaders. However, most researchers have found that a substantial portion of the variance in voters' overall evaluations of political leaders remains unexplained after accounting for

party identification and issue positions. The primary source of this unexplained variance is generally held to be voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of the candidate.

Although trait attributions are the least understood of the three major determinants of evaluation, recent findings indicate that trait attributions can have a powerful independent impact on evaluation. Scholars who have studied the relationship between trait attributions and overall candidate evaluations have found that traits such as competence and integrity are particularly important with regard to evaluation. In discussing the question of the impact of trait attributions on voters' overall evaluations of political leaders, it is important to keep in mind the controversy surrounding the relationship between cognition and affect. In this thesis, we will be investigating the impact of trait attributions on overall candidate evaluation, but the possibility of other causal relationships is acknowledged.

CHAPTER III

Hypotheses and Methodology

Hypotheses

The primary aim of this thesis is to determine if there is a relationship between voters' judgements about the personality traits of Canadian political leaders and their overall evaluations of those leaders which is independent of such factors as party identification, issue positions, and other impressions of parties and leaders. Although a great deal of research on this question has been carried out in the United States in recent years, Canadian researchers have not directed much attention to candidate evaluations. As a result, our understanding of how Canadians evaluate their political leaders is quite limited. Past research in the United States indicates that trait attributions can have an independent impact on candidate evaluation (Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979; Kinder, 1983, 1985; Swede, 1984). Canadian studies which have touched upon this question as a result of broader research interests report similar findings (Archer, 1985; Brown et al., 1986). On the basis of these past findings, our first hypothesis is that

there is a relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that is independent of other politically relevant factors.

If the evidence supports this initial hypothesis, we will be interested in two further questions: (1) how much variance in overall evaluation can be attributed to trait judgements relative to other factors, and (2) which personality traits seem to be tied most strongly to overall evaluation. The formation of hypotheses regarding these two questions is much more problematic than was the formation of the initial hypothesis because past research in these areas has been less conclusive.

In relation to the first question, American researchers have found that trait attributions generally have a greater impact on candidate evaluations than any other factors (Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979). However, Canadian researchers have found that party identification has a greater impact than trait attributions on evaluations of the leaders of the two traditional parties, while issue positions are more important than trait attributions with regard to evaluations of NDP leaders (Archer, 1985; Brown et al., 1986). The Canadian findings lead us to hypothesize that trait attributions will have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and Progressive Conservative leaders second in importance to party identification, and

that trait attributions will be second in importance to issue positions with regard to evaluations of New Democratic Party leaders.

The formation of a hypothesis regarding which personality traits influence voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders is extremely problematic. Studies of the cognitive content of voters' images of political leaders reveal that attributions of competence and integrity are particularly common, but there is little research on the impact of specific personality traits on candidate evaluations. In one of the few reports of such research, Kinder (1983) indicates that ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis reveals integrity to have the greatest independent impact on overall candidate evaluation. However, in a 1985 article, Kinder reports that -- when two-stage least squares regression techniques are employed -- competence emerges as the most important trait with regard to impact on evaluation. Swede (1984) reports that the two trait dimensions with the greatest impact on overall evaluation are those he labels the "good/bad candidate" (encompassing such traits as decent, arrogant and unfair), and the "dynamic candidate" (encompassing such traits as colourful, strong and dull).

With regard to Canada, Harold Clarke and his associates (1984) list the traits most frequently mentioned by Canadian

NES respondents when they were asked what they liked and disliked about Trudeau, Clark and Broadbent. An examination of the findings presented by these researchers reveals that references to competence, personality in general, and integrity dominate Canadian voters' images of their political leaders. However, there are no Canadian studies which examine the impact of specific personality traits on overall candidate evaluation. In consideration of the findings of both American and Canadian researchers, our third hypothesis is that attributions of competence and integrity will have a greater impact on overall candidate evaluation than attributions of other personality traits.

Sources of Data

Having specified the hypotheses that our research is designed to test, the discussion now turns to a description of the data and the methodology that will be used in the analyses contained in Chapter IV. A model of candidate evaluation will then be specified, and the operationalization of each of the concepts in the model will be discussed. Finally, we will describe the typology of personality traits that has been developed for this research.

The three hypotheses outlined above will be tested using data from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National

Election Studies.(1) These studies are single-wave, post-election surveys of representative samples of the Canadian electorate.(2) The sample design for each survey is a multi-stage, stratified cluster sample, with systematic oversampling of the less populous provinces. In 1974, 2562 respondents were interviewed; 2744 respondents participated in the 1979 study; 3377 people were interviewed in 1984. Because one of the questions relevant to our analyses was asked of a random half-sample in each of the 1974 and 1979 National Election Studies, the analyses presented in Chapter IV will be based on a 1974 weighted sample size of 1201 respondents, and a 1979 weighted sample size of 1353 respondents.(3) Half sampling was not employed in the 1984 NES, the weighted sample size for that election survey is 3380 respondents.

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- (1) Data from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National Election Studies, which were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, were made available by the Studies' principal investigators. The data for the 1974 NES and the 1979 NES were collected by H.D. Clarke, J. Jenson, L. LeDuc and J.H. Pammett. The data for the 1984 NES were collected by R.D. Lambert, S.D. Brown, J.E. Curtis, B.J. Kay and J.M. Wilson. The original collectors of the data and SSHRCC bear no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
- (2) One could use the 1974 and 1979 National Election Studies as a panel, but in this thesis they will be used as single-wave studies.
- (3) Data from the 1980 National Election Study are not used in this thesis because a second question relevant to our analysis was asked of only half of the respondents in that year alone, and the ~~two~~ relevant half-sampled questions were asked of opposite half-samples.

Methodology

Ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis (OLS) will be used to test the three hypotheses outlined above. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique designed to explore the relationship between several independent variables and a single dependent variable. It allows us to estimate the independent impact of a change in the value of each independent variable on the value of the dependent variable by statistically controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. Multiple regression analysis also provides us with a basis for predicting the values of the dependent variable from knowledge of the values of the independent variables.

The basic aim of OLS is to estimate the unknown coefficients of the regression model. These estimates allow us to draw conclusions about the relative importance of the independent variables and about the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The general form of the regression model can be represented by the following equation:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \dots + b_kX_k + e$$

where.

Y is the dependent variable.

a is a constant or intercept term representing the value of Y when each independent variable equals zero.

X_1, X_2, \dots, X_k are the independent variables.

b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k are unknown parameters representing the average change in Y per unit change in the associated X , holding constant the effects of the other independent variables.

e is an error or residual term representing any variance in Y not accounted for by the variance in the independent variables in the model.

The first step in multiple regression analysis is to specify a regression equation which accurately describes the relationships in which we are interested. The research undertaken here requires that nine equations -- one for each of the three leaders in each of the three election years -- accompany each of the two general models. These eighteen equations employ the relevant party-specific and leader-specific versions of each variable. The second step in OLS is to determine if any of the assumptions underlying the use of this technique is violated. Multiple regression analysis makes five basic assumptions. Social science data can never meet all of these assumptions. Nevertheless, researchers must ensure that their data do not depart too drastically from these assumptions, and that the effects of

any violations are taken into consideration when drawing conclusions.(1)

The first assumption of multiple regression analysis is that the dependent variable is measured at the interval level. An interval level measure is generally considered to be a measure which employs standardized measurement units, and thus allows us to make meaningful statements about both the absolute and relative distances between categories. The dependent variable of our model is overall candidate evaluation, which will be operationalized as the familiar "feeling thermometer." The "feeling thermometer" is conventionally regarded as an interval level measure (Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979; Kinder et al., 1979; Kinder, 1983, 1985; Swede, 1984).(2) Respondents are asked to indicate their feelings towards the party leaders on a "thermometer," where scores below 50 degrees indicate unfavourable or cool feelings and scores above 50 degrees

(1) Asher (1984), Aldrich and Cnudde (1984) and Manheim and Rich (1986) provide excellent introductions to multiple regression analysis and its assumptions.

(2) Although this is the convention, it is perhaps not warranted since the interval between, for example, 49 degrees and 50 degrees, is perceived by respondents to be much greater than the interval between, for example, 30 degrees and 31 degrees.

indicate favourable or warm feelings.(1)

The second assumption of OLS is that the regression model is specified accurately. An accurately specified model excludes no important independent variables and includes no irrelevant ones. Although it is impossible to be sure of relationships in the social sciences, this alone should not deter us from using multiple regression analysis to test hypotheses. As Asher (1984) notes:

To the extent that research is guided by solid prior theorizing, the construction of a reasonably well specified model is highly probable and the consequences of whatever specification error is made are likely to be relatively minor (p. 252).

The independent variables included in our model were

(1) In the 1984 NES, the "feeling thermometer" question is worded as follows: "Here is a drawing of a thermometer. It is called a feeling thermometer because it helps us to measure feelings toward various groups of people. Scores between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favourable and warm toward a group of people -- the higher the score, the warmer and more favourable your feelings. Scores between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel too favourable and are cool toward a group of people -- the lower the score, the cooler and less favourable your feelings. If you don't have any feelings at all toward a group of people, just say so and we'll go on to the next one." The 1974 and 1979 election studies employed slightly different wording for the "feeling thermometer" question. Respondents in these studies were informed: "If you don't have any particular feeling about the things we are asking about, place them at the 50 degree mark. If your feelings are very warm toward a particular thing, you would give a score between 50 and 100 -- the warmer your feelings, the higher the score. On the other hand, if your feelings are relatively cool toward something, you would place them between 0 and 50. The cooler your feelings, the closer the score will be to zero. If you don't know too much about any of the items mentioned, just say so and we will go on to the next one."

selected because theory and past research have led us to believe that they influence overall candidate evaluation. Voters' party identification, and their views on the policy positions of the leader and his party have been found to influence overall evaluation. In a political system where political parties are highly visible and salient features of election campaigns, voters' non-policy-oriented views of a leader's party could also have an impact upon their overall evaluations of that leader. Of course, the independent variable in which we have the most interest refers to voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of the party leaders. Finally, impressions of the leader that are neither personality trait attributions nor policy-related views could influence overall evaluation. The operationalization of each of these independent variables will be discussed shortly.

The third assumption of OLS is that the independent variables are not highly correlated with each other -- a situation of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity results in unstable regression coefficients, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the relationships under study. Signs of multicollinearity include regression coefficients that are far larger or far smaller than theory or past findings would lead us to expect; regression coefficients that are negatively-signed when theory suggests that they should be positively-signed or, conversely, positively-signed when

theory suggests that they should be negatively-signed: a high R-squared for the equations, but statistically insignificant regression coefficients; and, dramatic changes in regression coefficients when variables are dropped from or added to the equation.

One of the most frequently used indicators of multicollinearity for a variable is its "tolerance" (Norusis, 1985). The tolerance of an independent variable is the proportion of its variability not explained by the other independent variables. Over the eighteen equations employed in these analyses, the lowest tolerance of any variable is .49. A number of variables have tolerances between .50 and .80, but the overwhelming majority of the tolerance values are above .90. This evidence, along with the fact that the data do not exhibit any of the other signs of multicollinearity, seems to indicate that multicollinearity will not pose a problem with regard to interpretations of the findings reported here.

The fourth assumption of multiple regression analysis is that variables in the equation are measured without error. This is, in Asher's (1984) words, "a patently false assumption" (p. 250). The very nature of measurement in the social sciences means that measurement error -- deviation from the true value of a variable resulting from the process of measurement -- is inevitable. The OLS model has an error term built into it. Thus, the effects of measurement error

are estimated, and can be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions.

Finally, OLS makes the following assumptions about the error term: (1) its mean equals zero; (2) the error terms for each observation are uncorrelated; (3) the error terms are uncorrelated with the independent variables; (4) the variance of the error term is constant for all values of the independent variables (homoskedasticity); and, (5) the error term has a normal distribution. These assumptions about the error term are most likely to be violated if the sample size is small, if the sample is not randomly selected, or if the dependent variable is not measured at the interval level. If these assumptions are violated, the use of OLS is inappropriate and another technique such as probit or discriminant analysis should be used. Fortunately, the Canadian National Election Studies employ large, randomly selected samples and, as mentioned before, the dependent variable we will be using is thought to be measured at the interval level.

Operationalization of Party Identification Variables

The manner in which each of the independent variables in the model is operationalized is important for the interpretation of results. Descriptions and explanations of the measures employed are thus in order. Table 1 provides a summary of all the variables employed as predictors in our

TABLE 1
 Summary of all Independent Variables
 in Each Evaluation Equation

Predictors	Variable Range	Employed in Equations to Test Hypotheses 1 & 2	Employed in Equations to Test Hypothesis 3
Party Identification	0-3	X	X
Positive Party Position	0-1	X	X
Negative Party Position	0-1	X	X
Positive Leader Position	0-1	X	X
Negative Leader Position	0-1	X	X
Positive Party Image	0-1	X	X
Negative Party Image	0-1	X	X
Positive Leader Image	0-1	X	X
Negative Leader Image	0-1	X	X
Positive Traits	0-1	X	
Negative Traits	0-1	X	
Positive Competence	0-1		X
Negative Competence	0-1		X
Positive Integrity	0-1		X
Negative Integrity	0-1		X
Positive Dynamism	0-1		X
Negative Dynamism	0-1		X
Positive Responsibility	0-1		X
Negative Responsibility	0-1		X
Positive Empathy	0-1		X
Negative Empathy	0-1		X
Positive Personal Style	0-1		X
Negative Personal Style	0-1		X
Positive Political Style	0-1		X
Negative Political Style	0-1		X

regression analyses.

The party identification variable is developed from the standard battery of party identification questions. (1) A score of "0" on the party identification variable indicates that the individual does not identify with the party in question. A score of "1" indicates a weak attachment to the party; people who indicate that they identify "not very strongly" with the party or that they have no party identification, but feel "a little closer" to the party, receive this score. A score of "2" on the party identification variable implies that the individual identifies "fairly strongly" with the party in question, while a score of "3" indicates that the individual identifies "very strongly."

Operationalization of Policy Position Variables

One of our most problematic operationalization tasks is the development of a measure of voters' views on the policy positions adopted by the three federal political parties and party leaders. American researchers generally employ

(1) The standard battery of party identification questions reads as follows: "Thinking of federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Progressive Conservative, NDP or what? How strongly _____ do you feel, very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly?" Respondents who do not name a party in answer to the first question are asked: "Do you generally think of yourself as being a little closer to one of the federal parties than to the others?" If yes, "Which party is that?"

measures of issue "proximity" (Page and Brody, 1972; Miller et al., 1976; Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979). These measures reflect the distance between respondents' own positions on various issues and the positions they perceive the leaders as taking. Measures of issue proximity such as those used by American researchers cannot be employed here because the necessary questions were not asked in the Canadian National Election Studies. Although this option is closed to us, other sets of questions that could be used to develop measures of respondents' views on policy issues are available.

The standard battery of questions on issues asks respondents to cite the most important issues in the election; to indicate whether these issues are important to them personally, and if so, why; to identify the party best able to deal with these issues and state reasons for this opinion; and, finally, to indicate the importance of these issues with regard to vote. There are two problems with using this set of questions to develop a measure of respondents' views on issues. The first problem is that these questions do not allow us to determine with any degree of confidence the salience of the issues cited. Respondents are asked to indicate if the issues they mention are important to them personally, but such a direct question is likely to be a highly unreliable measure of actual salience. The second problem with using the standard battery of issue

questions is that, in 1984, there is little variance with regard to the party cited as best able to deal with the issues. Only 10 percent of respondents to the 1984 NES considered each of the Liberals or the NDP to be the best party to deal with the issues mentioned as the most important in the election.(1) For these two reasons, the use of the standard battery of issue questions to develop an issue measure appropriate to the question at hand would be quite problematic.

The policy position variables employed in these analyses are developed from responses to the standard set of questions asking voters to indicate what they like and dislike about the three federal parties and party leaders.(2) Our aim is to determine the extent to which perceptions of issue proximity on salient issues impact on voters' overall evaluations of political leaders. The

(1) Although this is not a problem in the 1974 and 1979 election studies, the problem is severe enough in the 1984 NES to warrant the search for an alternative operationalization of the policy position variables.

(2) The standard "like dislike" questions are worded as follows: "Now, we would like to ask you about your impressions of the various leaders of the federal political parties. Is there anything in particular that you like/dislike about Mr. _____? Anything else? Now, I would like to ask you what you personally think are the good and bad points of the political parties at the federal level in Canada. Is there anything in particular that you like/dislike about the federal _____ Party? Anything else?" Up to three responses were coded for the leader like/dislike questions and up to two responses were coded for the party like/dislike questions.

like/dislike questions tap both the salience of the issues mentioned and the respondents' perceptions of proximity. If an individual spontaneously mentions a policy issue when asked what he or she likes or dislikes about a party leader, it is reasonable to assume that the issue mentioned is salient to that individual. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that an individual who mentions a policy issue as the reason for liking a party or leader approves of the party's leader's position on that issue and, on the other hand, that an individual who mentions an issue as the reason for disliking a party or leader opposes the party's leader's position on that issue.

Each regression equation includes four dichotomous variables designed to capture respondents' views on policy issues. A "positive party position" variable is developed from responses to the "party likes" questions and a "negative party position" variable is developed from responses to the "party dislikes" questions.(1) A score of "0" on these variables indicates that the respondent did not mention a policy, program or ideological position when asked what he or she liked/disliked about the party in question: a

(1) It is important to note that these two dichotomous variables, as well as the other pairs of dichotomous variables discussed in the following pages, are independent of each other. That is, all respondents are asked what they like about all parties and all leaders, and also what they dislike about all parties and all leaders. Therefore, the positive and negative variables are not linear functions of each other.

score of "1" indicates that a policy, program or ideological position was mentioned in response to the relevant party like dislike questions. (1) A "positive leader position" variable was developed from responses to the "leader likes" questions, and a "negative leader position" variable was developed from responses to the "leader dislikes" questions. A score of "0" on these variables indicates that the respondent did not mention a policy when asked what he or she liked/disliked about the party leader in question; a score of "1" indicates that the respondent did mention a policy in response to the leader like/dislike questions. (2)

Operationalization of Residual Image Variables

Included in each regression equation are four dichotomous variables that can be considered "residual" variables because they are formed from all those responses

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- (1) As mentioned in Footnote 2, p. 71, up to two responses to the party like/dislike questions were coded for each of the parties. A score of "1" was assigned if a policy was mentioned at least once. Codes considered to be "policies" are those listed in the NES codebooks under the headings "policies," and "ideology," and those few under the heading "leadership" which refer to policy positions.
- (2) As mentioned in Footnote 2, p. 71, up to three responses to the leader like/dislike questions were coded for each of the party leaders. A score of "1" indicates that a policy was mentioned at least once. Responses labelled "policies" are those referring to the leader's position on or handling of various policy issues. See Appendices for codes that form the "positive leader position" and "negative leader position" variables.

to the party like/dislike questions that are neither issue positions nor references to leaders, and from all those responses to the leader like/dislike questions that are neither issue positions nor references to personality traits. A variable labelled "positive party image" is created using responses to the "party likes" questions and a "negative party image" variable is created using responses to the "party dislikes" questions. Responses used to create the party image variables include references to areas and groups (e.g. for the lower class, aware of the needs of the west, anti-French-Canadian); references to the party's style (e.g. complacency, extravagance, ability to govern); and references to general or specific aspects of the party (e.g. ability to form a majority government, lack of Western representation, not a national party). A score of "0" on a party image variable indicates that the respondent did not give any of these types of responses when asked what he or she liked/disliked about the party in question; a score of "1" indicates that the respondent gave one or more responses of the above type.

The two residual variables that are developed from responses to the leader like/dislike questions are labelled "positive leader image" and "negative leader image." Responses to the leader like/dislike questions that are not references to policy positions or personality traits are placed in the residual image category. The majority of

responses in this category refer to background characteristics such as the leader's wealth, religion, family, age, physical appearance or party affiliation. Also included are responses such as "should have run in his own riding," "doesn't consult his ministers," "has a good team," "forced the election," "a true Canadian."⁽¹⁾ A score of "0" on a leader image variable indicates that the respondent did not give any of these types of responses when asked what he or she liked/disliked about the leader in question; a score of "1" indicates that the respondent gave one or more responses of this type.

Operationalization of Trait Variables

The trait variables employed in our analyses are also developed from the open-ended leader like/dislike questions described above. Since these questions have been asked in the same way in every NES since 1974, their use allows us access to data gathered at three points in time over a ten year period.⁽²⁾ The use of the three data-sets is particularly important because together they provide us with voters' judgements of seven different party leaders (Pierre Trudeau, Robert Stanfield, David Lewis, Joe Clark, Ed

(1) See Appendices for codes that form the "positive leader image" and "negative leader image" variables.

(2) See Footnote 3, p. 60, for an explanation of the exclusion of 1980 NES data.

Broadbent, John Turner and Brian Mulroney). In addition, we have judgements about two leaders at two points in time (Trudeau in 1974 and 1979; Broadbent in 1979 and 1984). The use of the open-ended questions also provides us with a measure of the salience of personality traits in general, as well as a measure of the salience of specific personality traits.

A battery of closed-ended trait ratings was part of the 1984 NES. These closed-ended trait assessments ask respondents to indicate the extent to which they feel particular traits "fit" various candidates. The problem with the closed-ended trait battery -- aside from the fact that it was included in only the most recent NES -- is that voters may or may not consider the traits included in the battery to be important. Therefore, the chance that the trait ratings reflect rationalization on the part of the respondent is perhaps quite high. This problem is at least partially overcome if open-ended assessments are used. Voters' spontaneous mentions of personality traits in response to questions asking them what they like and dislike about party leaders can be considered to be an indication of the salience of traits in general, as well as a measure of the salience of the trait(s) mentioned in particular. Therefore, spontaneous mentions of personality traits are less likely to be the result of rationalization than are closed-ended trait assessments.

Two clusters of variables measuring trait attributions will be employed here. Both are developed from responses to the open-ended sequence of like dislike questions regarding the federal party leaders. Equations designed to test the first two hypotheses will employ two trait variables: one dichotomous variable labelled "positive traits" and another labelled "negative traits". In the first two hypotheses, we are interested only in whether or not a positive or negative trait attribution is made. Our task is thus to divide all responses to the like dislike questions into two categories: traits and non-traits. A trait is an enduring personality characteristic which cannot be directly observed but rather, must be inferred (Warr and Knapper, 1968). All responses to the leader like dislike questions that reference enduring personality characteristics are used to create the positive and negative trait variables. As mentioned above, all non-trait responses to these questions are used to create either the "leader position" variables or the "leader image" variables. A score of "0" on the positive and negative trait variables indicates that the respondent did not mention a personality trait when asked what he or she liked/disliked about the leader in question. A score of "1" indicates that a personality trait was mentioned in response to the relevant leader like/dislike questions.

Trait Typology

In the equations designed to test the third hypothesis about the impact of specific traits on overall candidate evaluation, trait attributions are operationalized as a cluster of fourteen dichotomous variables created from those responses to leader like/dislike questions that reference enduring personality characteristics. Seven trait categories are specified. The seven categories are labelled as follows: competence, integrity, dynamism, responsibility, empathy, personal style and political style. Each trait category is represented by two dichotomous variables -- one for positive mentions (i.e. the trait is mentioned as a "like") and one for negative mentions (i.e. the trait is mentioned as a "dislike"). A score of "0" on these variables indicates that the respondent did not mention the trait in question when asked what he or she liked/disliked about the candidate; a score of "1" indicates that the trait was mentioned in response to the relevant like/dislike question.

The seven trait categories were specified on the basis of past research. Virtually all research on the traits which voters attribute to political leaders -- from that of Campbell et al. (1954) to that of Miller et al. (1986) -- refers to a competence dimension. Responses placed on the competence dimension include references to intelligence, experience, administrative abilities and organizational

skills. Most past research also refers to integrity, although early researchers (Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Winham and Cunningham, 1970) include this trait in the "other personal characteristics" category instead of treating it as a distinct dimension. Trait attributions placed on the integrity dimension include: honest, sincere, straightforward, just, fair, trustworthy, decent, moral, outspoken, well-meaning -- and the opposites of these traits.

The dimension we label "dynamism" also has a long history. Warr and Knapper (1968) note that the activity and potency dimensions can be combined into a dynamism dimension, and Swede (1984) finds a dimension he labels the "dynamic candidate." Traits that we have placed on this dimension have also been found on dimensions labelled "leadership" (Campbell et al., 1954; Clarke et al., 1979; Kinder, 1983, 1985; Shabad and Andersen, 1979); "leadership appeal" (Miller and Miller, 1976); and "charisma" (Miller et al., 1986). Characteristics such as courageous, gutsy, aggressive, dynamic, energetic, forceful, charismatic, ambitious, strong, confident -- and their opposites -- are found on the dynamism dimension.

Most researchers also refer to a dimension labelled "reliability" (Shabad and Andersen, 1979; Miller and Miller, 1976; Miller et al., 1986) or "stability" (Kinder, 1983, 1985). Swede (1984) finds a dimension containing similar

traits, which he labels the "dignified candidate." We have chosen the label "responsibility" because it encompasses references to reliability, stability and dignity. Examples of responses that are found on the responsibility dimension are as follows: calm, cool, broad-minded, open-minded, tolerant, realistic, willing to admit mistakes, careful, serious, mature, works hard, tries hard, steady, reliable, determined, tenacious, reserved -- and the opposites of these traits.

References to "empathy" in past research are less numerous than references to the trait dimensions described above. Swede (1984) finds a dimension which he labels the "good bad candidate." Many of the traits which load on this dimension (e.g. caring, compassionate, insensitive) deal with empathy. Kinder (1983, 1985) suggests that an empathy dimension may be emerging in voters' judgements about the personality characteristics of presidential candidates. However, Miller et al. (1986) argue that closed-ended items which have been found to load on an empathy dimension are largely subsumed by the "group benefits" dimension when open-ended responses are analyzed. An empathy dimension was included in this analysis because an examination of responses to the leader like/dislike questions reveals a significant number of references to "caring" that could not be considered group references, nor could they be placed on any other trait dimension. Responses placed on the empathy

dimension include the following: he is concerned about Canada. Canadians. he is concerned about people. he helps people. he cares. Traits such as sympathetic. kind. generous. understanding and humane are also included on this dimension.

The final two categories are "style" categories rather than "trait" categories. Responses placed in these categories. like those placed in the other five categories. are inferences about enduring personal characteristics. However. the characteristics in these categories are generally less specific than those found in the other categories. They are not comments on personality traits as much as they are comments on the approach. manner and image of the candidate. Examples of responses included in the personal style category are as follows: likable. sense of humour. charming. colourful. interesting. pleasant. friendly. classy. sophisticated. arrogant. sarcastic. conceited. cool. aloof. petty. rude. Examples of responses categorized as political style are as follows: good politician. handles media well. boring. dull. comes across well on T.V. inarticulate. unimpressive. no appeal. (1)

Overview

This chapter began with a discussion of the three

(1) For a complete list of which codes are found in each trait category. refer to the Appendices.

hypotheses that will be tested in the Chapter IV. The first hypothesis is that there is a relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that is independent of such politically relevant factors as party identification and issue positions. The second hypothesis is that trait attributions will have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and PC leaders second in importance to party identification, and that trait attributions will be second in importance to issue positions in the case of NDP leader evaluations. The third hypothesis is that attributions of competence and integrity will have a greater impact on candidate evaluations than attributions of other personality traits.

These hypotheses will be tested using data from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National Election Studies. Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression analysis will be used to test these hypotheses. OLS allows us to estimate the independent impact of a change in the value of each independent variable on the value of the dependent variable. Although the data to be employed here do not meet all of the assumptions of OLS, the violations appear to be minimal, and their effects can be estimated.

The final part of this chapter was devoted to a discussion of the operationalization of the various independent variables. Table 1 summarizes the independent

variables included in each set of equations. As can be seen from Table 1, the tests of the first two hypotheses will utilize the following independent variables: party identification, positive party position, negative party position, positive leader position, negative leader position, positive party image, negative party image, positive leader image, negative leader image, positive traits and negative traits. Tests of the third hypothesis will employ the first nine variables mentioned above, but the latter two variables -- the positive and negative trait variables -- will be replaced in these equations by fourteen dichotomous variables representing the positive and negative versions of seven trait categories described above: competence, integrity, dynamism, responsibility, empathy, personal style and political style.

CHAPTER IV

Analysis

Introduction

The first step in testing the three hypotheses discussed in Chapter III is to examine the responses voters give when they are asked what they like and dislike about the various party leaders. Previous research suggests that voters' cognitive images of candidates are dominated by personality traits. If this is found to be true in the Canadian context, then it is reasonable to hypothesize that trait attributions have the potential to influence overall candidate evaluation. Trait attributions are not, of course, the only factors which could influence overall evaluation. Other reasons voters give for liking or disliking a party leader could also impact on their evaluations of that leader. Past research suggests that candidate evaluations are influenced by party identification. In addition, the importance of political parties in the Canadian political system suggests that voters' overall evaluations of a particular leader could be

affected by their impressions of the leader's party. All of these variables have the potential to impact on overall candidate evaluation, and all will be employed in the testing of our hypotheses. For these reasons, we will begin this chapter with an examination of their parameters.

Univariate Analyses

Table 2 presents the percentage of respondents mentioning personality traits, issue positions and other factors in response to the open-ended sequence of like/dislike questions about the federal party leaders. The final column of Table 2 reports the average percentage of respondents who fall into each of these categories. An average of 48 percent of respondents mention personality traits when asked what they like about the various party leaders, while an average of 8 percent mention issue positions and an average of 10 percent mention other factors. When voters are asked what they dislike about the party leaders, an average of 30 percent mention personality traits, while an average of 10 percent mention issues and an average of 13 percent mention other factors.

Clearly, voters' positive and negative images of Canadian party leaders are dominated by trait attributions. References to personality traits are particularly dominant

TABLE 2

Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Personality Traits,
Issue Positions and Other Factors in Response to the
Open-ended Sequence of Like/Dislike Questions about the
Federal Party Leaders



	1974 (N=1201)			1979 (N=1353)			1984 (N=3380)			Aver- ages
	Tru- deau	Stan- field	Lewis	Tru- deau	Clark	Broad- bent	Tur- ner	Mul- roney	Broad- bent	
Likes										
Traits	67%	41%	36%	66%	36%	45%	34%	55%	51%	48%
Issue Positions	8	6	10	5	6	10	3	10	14	8
Other Factors	13	6	7	7	12	4	13	18	8	10
Dislikes										
Traits	41%	46%	13%	41%	40%	6%	46%	36%	15%	30%
Issue Positions	16	9	11	14	7	9	5	9	13	10
Other Factors	9	14	12	16	13	9	16	15	12	13

Note: Cell percentages refer to the percentage of respondents mentioning factors in each category. Up to three responses were coded for each respondent. Therefore, columns do not add to 100 percent.

in voters' positive images of various leaders. In 1974, when Pierre Trudeau won the election, fully 67 percent of respondents mentioned personal characteristics as a reason for liking Trudeau. In 1979, when Trudeau lost the election, this figure drops only 1 percent to 66 percent. The percentage of respondents mentioning personality traits when asked what they like about a party leader surpasses 50 percent in two other cases: in 1984, 55 percent of respondents cite traits as a reason for liking Brian Mulroney and 51 percent cite traits as a reason for liking Ed Broadbent. The percentage of people mentioning personality traits when asked what they dislike about the party leaders in no case exceeds 50 percent. However, in 1974, 46 percent of respondents mention personality characteristics as a reason for disliking Robert Stanfield and, in 1984, the same percentage of respondents indicate that they dislike John Turner's personality traits.

In addition to examining the absolute percentage of voters who mention personality traits in response to the leader like/dislike questions, it is interesting to compare the percentage of people mentioning positive traits with the percentage mentioning negative traits for each party leader. While more people attribute positive personality characteristics to Pierre Trudeau than to any other party

2



leader. 41 percent of voters also attribute negative characteristics to Trudeau in both 1974 (when he won) and in 1979 (when he lost). This is not the case with NDP leader Ed Broadbent. While 45 percent of respondents attribute positive traits to Broadbent in 1979, only 6 percent mention negative traits -- a difference of 39 percent. A similar result is obtained in 1984, with 51 percent of voters mentioning personal traits as a reason for liking Broadbent and only 15 percent mentioning personal traits as a reason for disliking the NDP leader.

As mentioned above, responses to the leader like/dislike questions which seem to reference issue positions are much less numerous than those which can be categorized as trait attributions. Positive issue mentions figure much more prominently in voters' images of the leaders of the NDP, than in their images of the leaders of the other parties. When asked in 1974 what they liked about David Lewis, 10 percent of respondents mentioned issues; 10 percent mention issues as a reason for liking Ed Broadbent in 1979; and, in 1984, 14 percent mention issues as a reason for liking Broadbent. While 10 percent of respondents mention issue positions as a reason for liking PC leader Brian Mulroney, the percentage of respondents mentioning issue positions as a reason for liking any other party leader is less than 9 percent. Negative issue mentions

figure most prominently in voters' images of Pierre Trudeau. In 1974, 16 percent of respondents mentioned policy issues when asked what they disliked about Trudeau and, in 1979, the corresponding figure was 14 percent. These percentages marginally surpass those for NDP leaders, and far exceed those for PC leaders and for the 1984 Liberal leader, John Turner. The fact that Trudeau was the incumbent prime ~~minister~~ in both 1974 and 1979 could possibly account for this finding.

All responses to the leader like dislike questions that are not found in any of the trait categories, or in the issue category, are used to create two residual, "leader image" variables. Responses used to create these variables include references to background factors such as the candidate's age, family, previous occupation, wealth and party affiliation, as well as references to his appearance, and references to specific political events and decisions. As can be seen from Table 2, these types of responses are, for most leaders, slightly more numerous than issue-related responses. However, only with regard to voters' negative images of the NDP leaders do responses of this type even approach the number of trait-related responses -- and this occurs only because of the extremely low percentages of respondents mentioning personality traits as a reason for disliking NDP leaders.

In Chapter III, it was suggested that the responses to the open-ended leader like dislike questions referencing personality traits could be divided into seven categories. Five of the categories refer to traits: competence, integrity, dynamism, responsibility and empathy. The final two categories are "style" categories rather than "trait" categories: personal style and political style. Table 3 displays the percentage of respondents who mention each of these seven categories in reference to each leader. The final column of Table 3 presents the average percentage of respondents who mention factors found in each category.

Of the seven categories, the one with the greatest number of mentions is "integrity." An average of 20.6 percent of respondents mention a trait found on the "integrity" dimension. Of the five trait dimensions, the "dynamism" dimension has the next highest percentage of mentions, with an average of 16.9 percent of respondents mentioning a trait found on this dimension. The "dynamism" dimension is followed by the "competence" dimension; an average of 12.7 percent of respondents mention a factor found on the competence dimension. The categories with the fewest number of responses are "responsibility," with an average of 10.0 percent, and "empathy," with an average of

TABLE 3

Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Factors
in Each of the Trait Categories with Reference
to Each Federal Party Leader

	1974 (N=1201)			1979 (N=1353)			1984 (N=3380)			Aver- ages
	Tru- deau	Stan- field	Lewis	Tru- deau	Clark	Broad- bent	Tur- ner	Mul- roney	Broad- bent	
Compet- ence	19.0	6.1	4.0	29.5	13.6	10.3	13.6	9.6	8.4	12.7
Integ- rity	22.2	23.3	14.0	18.3	14.5	15.6	24.4	26.1	27.2	20.6
Dyn- amism	23.2	23.5	10.1	14.5	22.3	10.3	19.0	21.5	7.7	16.9
Respon- sibility	20.8	7.2	5.6	11.2	12.5	8.6	5.3	7.4	11.0	10.0
Emp- athy	10.3	5.2	5.0	9.4	4.1	6.4	4.8	14.1	7.6	7.4
Personal Style	33.4	16.5	11.0	34.8	15.1	7.8	16.7	16.8	10.3	18.0
Political Style	20.6	28.0	13.7	32.7	15.7	17.1	14.9	12.9	18.2	19.3

Note: Columns do not add to 100 percent because up to three responses were coded for each respondent.

7.4 percent. The number of responses in the two style categories is generally quite high. The political style category ranks second behind integrity, with an average of 19.3 percent of voters giving responses in this category. The personal style category ranks third behind political style, with an average of 18.0 percent of voters giving responses in this category.

From these percentages, we can see that a reasonable percentage of voters give responses which fall into each of the seven categories, but that certain categories (noticeably, integrity and the two style categories) contain a greater number of responses than others. If one compares these percentages to those reported by several American researchers (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960; Miller and Miller, 1976; Miller et al., 1986; Shabad and Andersen, 1979), the most striking difference is the relative infrequency of mentions referring to competence. In their analysis of the nine American presidential elections between 1952 and 1984, Miller et al. (1986) report that references to competence outnumber references to any other personality traits in every election year. Similar findings are reported by the other researchers cited above. Our findings indicate that competence plays a much less dominant role in Canadian voters' images of their political leaders than it plays in

the images American voters have of their leaders.(1)

While the figures presented in Table 3 represent the percentage of respondents giving any response in each of the seven categories, Table 4 divides the seven categories into their positive and negative versions. The average percentage of respondents who mention factors found in each category is found in the last column of Table 4. We can see from Table 4 that for every party leader there is a higher percentage of comments on the positive integrity dimension than on the negative integrity dimension. The dominance of positive comments over negative comments also occurs on the competence dimension, but with two exceptions. Negative competence mentions marginally exceed positive mentions for

(1) There are two possible methodological explanations for this finding: (1) differences in decisions regarding the responses placed on each trait dimension; and (2) differences in question wording between the American and Canadian election studies. With regard to differences in coding decisions, available information on the coding decisions of other researchers indicates that the differences between their coding decisions and the ones employed here are minimal (see, for example, Miller et al., 1986). The second explanation is more plausible than the first. The standard Canadian NES leader like/dislike questions ask the respondent to indicate what he or she likes and dislikes about the federal party leaders. The standard American leader like/dislike questions ask the respondent to indicate what he or she likes and dislikes about a presidential candidate that "might make you want to vote for [against] him?" (emphasis added). The wording of the American question may increase the likelihood of respondents mentioning traits, such as competence, which are clearly recognized as politically relevant. Conversely, the wording of the Canadian question may encourage responses that are as relevant in the realm of interpersonal relations as they are in the realm of politics.

TABLE 4

Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Factors
in Each of the Positive and Negative Trait Categories
with Reference to Each of the Federal Party Leaders

	1974 (N=1201)			1979 (N=1353)			1984 (N=3380)			Aver- ages
	Tru- deau	Stan- field	Lewis	Tru- deau	Clark	Broad- bent	Tur- ner	Mul- roney	Broad- bent	
Competence										
Positive	18.0	4.4	3.6	28.2	4.5	10.1	7.1	7.8	7.1	10.1
Negative	1.2	1.7	0.4	2.3	9.6	0.2	7.3	2.1	1.4	2.9
Integrity										
Positive	16.8	22.6	12.4	12.9	12.3	15.1	15.6	15.2	24.7	16.4
Negative	6.2	0.7	1.8	5.9	2.3	0.6	9.4	12.1	3.5	4.7
Dynamism										
Positive	21.3	3.4	6.7	13.5	4.7	9.0	6.5	18.0	6.1	9.9
Negative	2.2	20.8	3.9	1.0	18.3	1.5	13.9	4.4	1.7	10.9
Responsibility										
Positive	9.8	6.9	4.7	6.9	8.9	7.3	3.6	7.2	9.3	7.2
Negative	11.8	0.3	0.9	4.7	4.1	1.6	1.8	0.3	2.0	3.1
Empathy										
Positive	5.5	4.1	5.0	4.2	4.1	6.4	2.3	13.1	7.6	5.8
Negative	5.1	1.1	--	5.4	--	--	2.7	1.1	--	1.7
Personal Style										
Positive	16.1	8.2	6.1	11.2	8.6	6.0	6.9	9.4	7.4	8.9
Negative	20.4	9.1	5.2	27.1	7.2	1.8	10.2	8.0	3.0	10.2
Political Style										
Positive	19.3	4.8	12.0	31.0	6.7	15.7	5.7	11.2	14.6	13.4
Negative	1.5	23.9	2.0	2.1	9.9	1.5	14.9	1.8	4.5	6.9

Note: Columns do not add to 100 percent.

John Turner, and the percentage of people who feel that Joe Clark is not competent is more than double the percentage who feel that he is competent. With regard to the responsibility dimension, positive comments outnumber negative comments for all leaders except Trudeau in 1974. The only instances where comments found on the negative empathy dimension outnumber comments found on the positive empathy dimension are Trudeau in 1979 and Turner in 1984. In fact, in four cases -- Lewis, Clark and Broadbent (1979 and 1984) -- no respondents mention any factors on the negative empathy dimension.

Of the five trait dimensions, only one -- dynamism -- has a greater average percentage of negative mentions than positive mentions. However, when one looks at the percentage of positive and negative comments for each leader, positive dynamism comments actually outnumber negative dynamism comments in the case of Trudeau, Lewis, Broadbent and Mulroney. Although negative dynamism comments marginally outnumber positive dynamism comments with regard to Turner, the higher average percentage of negative dynamism comments is largely accounted for by the fact that four times as many people feel that Joe Clark is not dynamic as feel that he is, and six times as many people feel that Robert Stanfield is not dynamic as feel that he is.

Regarding the two style categories, the relationship between the number of positive comments and the number of

negative comments varies with each leader. For most leaders, the percentage of people mentioning factors in the positive personal style category is marginally higher than the percentage mentioning factors in the negative personal style category. The most obvious exception is Trudeau -- particularly in 1979 when the percentage of respondents who say that they dislike Trudeau's personal style is more than double the percentage who say that they like his personal style. There is generally a much greater difference between the percentage of positive and negative mentions with regard to political style than with regard to personal style. The percentage of people who mention factors on the positive political style dimension far exceeds the percentage who mention factors on the negative political style dimension with regard to Trudeau, Lewis, Broadbent and Mulroney. The opposite is true for Stanfield and Turner, while negative political style comments marginally exceed positive comments in the case of Clark.

While Tables 3 and 4 can be examined from the perspective of the various traits, they can also be examined from the perspective of the various leaders. From Table 3 we can see that Trudeau's 1974 image is dominated by references to his personal style, while a look at Table 4 tells us that these references are both positive and negative. Personal style and political style comments dominate voters' images of Trudeau in 1979. The political

style comments are largely positive in 1979, as is the case in 1974. However, in 1979 -- the year in which he lost the election to PC leader Joe Clark -- voters' images of Trudeau's personal style are overwhelmingly negative. This finding regarding the "souring" of voters' attitudes towards Trudeau's personal style accords with findings reported in Absent Mandate (Clarke et al., 1984). These researchers note that between 1968 and 1980 there is a marked increase in the percentage of NES respondents mentioning arrogance and conceit (two traits found in the "personal style" category) when asked what they dislike about Pierre Trudeau. The only other major difference between voters' images of Trudeau in 1974 and their images of him in 1979 is a 10 percent increase in the percentage of people mentioning traits found on the positive competence dimension. Through Trudeau's years in office, voters appear to have tired of his personal style, but they become more likely to credit him with experience and intelligence.

Again looking at Table 4, we can see that Stanfield's image is dominated by references to negative political style, positive integrity and negative dynamism. These findings accord with those highlighted by others. Clarke and his associates note in Political Choice in Canada (1979) that Stanfield was criticized by voters for being a "poor speaker," for "lacking dynamism," and for being "uncharismatic" (p.227). These same researchers also note:

"Of those positive personal references . . . [Stanfield] did receive, a very large percentage focussed on his qualities of honesty, sincerity and dedication to his work" (Clarke et al., 1979, p. 226).(1)

Two categories dominate voters' images of David Lewis: positive integrity and positive political style. Clarke et al. (1979) highlight these aspects of Lewis' image. These researchers state that Lewis is "frequently described as honest and sincere, hard-working, or [a] good speaker" (Clarke et al., 1979, p. 228).

With regard to Joe Clark, the most frequently mentioned category is dynamism. A look at Table 4 makes it clear that references dealing with Clark's dynamism are overwhelmingly negative. Next to negative dynamism, the highest percentage of responses with regard to Clark are found in the positive integrity category. These findings are generally in accordance with those reported by Clarke et al. (1984), who note that -- in both 1979 (when Clark won the election) and in 1980 (when he lost) -- voters emphasize Clark's honesty, but criticize him for his indecisiveness and lack of confidence. Although Clarke et al. (1984) stress that Joe Clark's image suffers from a "competence gap" (p. 113), this

(1) Of course, the data used by Clarke and his associates (1979, 1984) are the same as the data used here for the 1974 and 1979 elections. The point of these comparisons, and those that follow, is that the results we obtain using the trait typology described in Chapter III accord with descriptions found elsewhere in the literature.

assertion is not upheld by the findings reported here. Our findings indicate that the "gap" in Clark's image has much more to do with dynamism than with competence. The percentage of people mentioning negative dynamism with regard to Clark is almost double the percentage of people mentioning negative competence, although the percentage of people mentioning the positive versions of these two traits is almost identical.

Turning to voters' images of Ed Broadbent, we can see from Table 3 that, in both 1979 and 1984, the trait categories with the highest percentage of mentions are integrity and political style. From Table 4 we can see that it is the positive versions of both these categories which are dominant. These findings are in line with those reported by Clarke et al. (1984), who note that the two most frequently mentioned images of Broadbent in both 1979 and 1980 are "honesty" and "speaking ability" (p. 115). Our findings indicate that this trend continues into 1984, with positive integrity mentions becoming even more common in that year than in previous years: while 15.1 percent of respondents mentioned they liked Broadbent's integrity in 1979, 24.7 percent made such comments in 1984.

From Table 4 we can see that voters' images of John Turner are dominated by references found in the positive integrity, negative political style and negative dynamism categories. One of the most interesting points about this

finding is that these three categories also dominate voters' images of Robert Stanfield and are the three most commonly-cited traits in the case of Joe Clark. Voters appear to see Stanfield, Clark and Turner in similar terms. These leaders are viewed as honest and sincere, but also as weak, indecisive and uncharismatic, and as poor speakers and unable to handle the media. Considering the fact that both Stanfield and Turner were electoral losers, and that Clark's 1979 brush with victory was exceedingly brief, this combination of traits could perhaps be considered a formula for failure in Canadian federal politics.

Finally, we can turn to voters' images of Brian Mulroney, the man who led the Progressive Conservative Party to a massive electoral victory in the federal election of 1984. No one trait category overwhelmingly dominates voters' images of Mulroney. From Table 3 we can see that the two most frequently cited categories in the case of Mulroney are integrity and dynamism. From Table 4 we can see that the integrity dimension includes an almost equal number of positive and negative comments. While 15.2 percent of respondents to the 1984 NES said that they felt Mulroney was honest and sincere, 12.4 percent stated that they felt he was dishonest and insincere. Given our knowledge of the course of public opinion since 1984, these findings could be viewed as a harbinger of future image problems for Mulroney. Voters' opinions about Mulroney's

dynamism do not suffer from the same dualism as their opinions about his integrity. Over four times as many people mention comments found in the positive dynamism category as mention comments found in the negative dynamism category.

The responses voters give when they are asked what they like and dislike about the various party leaders are not, of course, the only factors - which could potentially affect their overall evaluations of those leaders. Past research has shown that party identification can have a substantial impact on candidate evaluation. The measure of party identification used here takes into account both the direction and the intensity of voters' attachments to political parties. Table 5 presents the percentage of people who claimed various degrees of attachment to the three main Canadian political parties in 1974, 1979 and 1984. Among those who claim an attachment to a particular party, approximately equal numbers are found in each of the three levels of intensity -- with the highest percentage of identifiers claiming a "moderate attachment." An average of 6 percent of respondents report a weak attachment to any one political party; 14 percent claim a moderate attachment; 9 percent report a strong attachment. At all levels of intensity, the percentage of voters who identify with the NDP is considerably lower than the percentage who identify with the other two parties.

TABLE 5

Percentage of Respondents Claiming Various Levels
of Attachment to Each Party in Each Election Year

	1974			1979			1984			Average
	LIB	PC	NDP	LIB	PC	NDP	LIB	PC	NDP	
N -	1127	1120	1121	1353	1351	1351	2981	2996	2979	
No Attachment	51%	75%	89%	60%	72%	88%	65%	57%	85%	71%
Weak Attachment	9	7	2	7	6	2	11	10	4	6
Moderate Attachment	22	11	5	20	14	6	17	22	7	14
Strong Attachment	17	7	4	13	8	4	8	11	5	9
	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>101%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>101%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Note: All columns do not add to 100 percent
because of rounding.

Finally, we must consider the possibility that voters' impressions of a leader's party could have an impact upon their overall evaluations of that leader. The likelihood that party images influence candidate evaluation is particularly great in a political system such as Canada's where one of the major roles of a political leader is to be a party leader. Candidates for the office of Prime Minister are chosen by their parties, and become Prime Minister only if their party wins a majority of seats in the House of Commons. The leader is not generally judged in isolation from his party, but rather is viewed as the leader of a team. Indeed, the only people who have the opportunity to vote for a party leader are those who live in a leader's constituency; all others are eligible to vote only for the local candidates of the various parties. It is, therefore, quite possible that voters' views on the policy positions taken by a party could influence their evaluations of that party's leader. Additionally, voters' views on the non-policy aspects of a party could also influence their evaluations of that party's leader.

As explained in Chapter III, all responses to the party like/dislike questions that refer to policy issues are used to create a series of "positive party position" variables and "negative party position" variables. All other substantive responses to these questions not referring to candidates are used to create a series of residual variables

labelled "positive party image" and "negative party image." The percentage of voters who mention issue positions when asked what they like and dislike about the political parties, as well as the percentage of voters who mention other factors when asked for their party likes and dislikes are presented in Table 6. An average of 17 percent of respondents mention policy issues when asked what they like about the various federal political parties, and the same average percentage of respondents mention policy issues when asked what they dislike about the parties.

With regard to the residual party image variables, an average of 69 percent of respondents mention a factor found in the positive party image category and an average of 71 percent mention a factor in the negative party image category. While these percentages seem quite high, it must be remembered that the party image variables are residual variables. All responses to the party like/dislike questions not referring to issue positions or leaders were used to create these variables. It should not, therefore, be surprising that approximately 70 percent of voters mention any one of the multitude of responses used to create the residual party image variables.

We have now described the parameters of all the independent variables that will be used to test the hypotheses described in Chapter III. However, before

TABLE 6

Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Issue Positions
and Other Factors in Response to the Open-Ended
Sequence of Like/Dislike Questions
about the Federal Parties

	1974 (N=1201)			1979 (N=1353)			1984 (N=3380)			Average
	LIB	PC	NDP	LIB	PC	NDP	LIB	PC	NDP	
Likes										
Issue Positions	25%	13%	14%	18%	13%	12%	21%	20%	14%	17%
Other Factors	61	67	65	74	74	73	67	66	72	69
Dislikes										
Issue Positions	25	12	17	17	13	15	21	12	19	17
Other Factors	69	66	65	77	75	73	71	72	69	71

Note: Columns do not add to 100 because of multiple responses and missing responses.

turning to the tests of these hypotheses, one more variable remains to be described. The dependent variable in the analyses that follow is overall candidate evaluation. As mentioned in Chapter III, overall candidate evaluation is operationalized as the "feeling thermometer."

Table 7 displays the mean thermometer ratings for each party leader, and the associated standard deviations. From the statistics presented in Table 7, we can see that while the mean ratings for the party leaders tend to cluster around 50 degrees, there is also a considerable amount of dispersion around the 50 degree mark (the average standard deviation around the mean is 25 degrees). The fact that the mean thermometer ratings tend to be around 50 degrees or slightly higher indicates that voters' overall evaluations of most party leaders are neutral to warm. The leader with the highest mean rating is Brian Mulroney, who received a mean rating of 63 degrees. The next highest mean rating -- 61 degrees -- was given to Pierre Trudeau in 1974. Robert Stanfield received the lowest mean rating of any of the leaders (47 degrees), although he is closely followed by David Lewis, who received a mean rating of 48 degrees. Stanfield and Lewis are the only two leaders with mean ratings on the "feeling thermometer" of less than 50

TABLE 7
 Mean Thermometer Ratings for Each Party Leader
 and Associated Standard Deviations

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Percentage of Missing Values
1974				
Trudeau	60.7	28	1161	3%
Stanfield	46.6	25	1145	5
Lewis	47.7	25	1068	11
1979				
Trudeau	57.5	30	1322	2
Clark	51.1	25	1296	4
Broadbent	55.6	24	1218	10
1984				
Turner	51.1	33	2882	15
Mulroney	62.9	22	2976	12
Broadbent	57.5	22	2884	15

degrees.(1) The tendency of Canadian voters to evaluate their political leaders positively accords with the "positivity bias" reported by some American researchers (Lau et al., 1979; Sears, 1983).

Test of the First Hypothesis

Keeping in mind the parameters of the independent and dependent variables, we will now turn to the test of the first hypothesis. The first hypothesis is that personality trait attributions are related to overall candidate evaluation independent of such politically identifiable factors as party identification, policy issues, and other impressions of the parties and leaders. This hypothesis will be tested using ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis. Voters' overall evaluations of each leader are regressed on eleven independent variables: party identification, positive party position, negative party position, positive leader position, negative leader position, positive party image, negative party image.

(1) The "feeling thermometer" question is worded differently in the 1984 NES than in the 1974 and 1979 election studies (see footnote 1, p. 64). In 1974 and 1979, respondents with no particular feelings about a leader were asked to use the 50 degree mark, whereas in 1984 such respondents were asked not to rate the leader in question at all. As can be seen from Table 7, this results in a higher percentage of missing responses in 1984 than in the other two election years. The findings reported in Table 7 should be considered with these differences in mind.

positive leader image, negative leader image, positive traits and negative traits.

The regression method used for this analysis is forced entry. The first nine variables listed above are entered into the regression equation in order of decreasing tolerance, but are treated as a single block when the statistics indicating changes in the equation are computed. In other words, the first nine variables are allowed to account for as much variance in the dependent variable as possible, and then the two trait variables are allowed to enter into the equation and account for as much of the remaining variance as they can.(1)

The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11. Table 8 provides the coefficients of determination (R-squared) for each of the equations. The R-squared value is a measure of the variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by the combined effects of the independent variables. Because the sample R-squared value is generally an over-estimation of the population R-squared value, the statistic reported here is the adjusted R-squared. The adjusted R-squared corrects for

(1) This is a conservative approach to the testing of our hypotheses. Forced entry regression was chosen because we are interested in the impact of traits on overall evaluation, after the impacts of the other variables have been taken into consideration. Analyses not reported here indicate that, if stepwise regression is employed, the trait variables enter into the regression equations quite early.

TABLE 8

Coefficients of Determination and Related Statistics
for the First Set of Multiple Regression Equations

	Adjusted R-squared	R-squared Change	Total Adjusted R-squared	Proportion of Total R-squared Due to Traits
1974 (N=1201)				
Trudeau	.36	.14*	.50	.28
Stanfield	.22	.11*	.33	.33
Lewis	.22	.15*	.37	.41
1979 (N=1353)				
Trudeau	.34	.17*	.51	.33
Clark	.28	.11*	.39	.28
Broadbent	.21	.16*	.37	.43
1984 (N=3380)				
Turner	.15	.16*	.31	.52
Mulroney	.26	.13*	.39	.33
Broadbent	.16	.12*	.28	.43
Averages	.24	.14	.38	.37

* p .001

the inflationary bias of the unadjusted R-squared (Norusis, 1985). The first column of Table 8 reports the R-squared value of the first block of independent variables, which represents the proportion of variance in overall evaluation accounted for by party identification, issue preferences and the residual party and leader image variables. The second column of Table 8 presents the R-squared change, which is the proportion of additional variance in overall evaluation accounted for by the positive and negative trait variables. The third column of Table 8 reports the total R-squared, which represents the proportion of variance in overall evaluation accounted for by all the independent variables combined.

The evidence presented in Table 8 indicates that the average proportion of variance in voters' overall evaluations of party leaders explained by the first nine variables entered into the analysis is .24. The proportion of variance explained by these variables ranges from a high of .36 in the case of Trudeau in 1974, to a low of .15 in the case of Turner in 1984. Adding the two trait variables to the equations increases the proportion of explained variance in the dependent variable by an average of .14. The R-squared change resulting from adding the two trait variables into the analyses ranges from a high of .17 for Trudeau in 1979, to lows of .11 for both Stanfield and Clark. The average proportion of total explained variance

in overall candidate evaluation is .38. The proportion of total variance in voters' overall evaluations of Trudeau in 1979 which is explained by the eleven independent variables is .51. The corresponding figure for 1974 is .50. The lowest total R-squared is .28 -- for Broadbent in 1984.

From these statistics, it is clear that personality trait attributions have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of political leaders. As stated above, the average proportion of additional variance in overall evaluation explained by trait attributions is .14. Another way of demonstrating the impact of trait attributions on overall evaluation is to express the R-squared change caused by the addition of the trait variables to the equation as a proportion of the total explained variance. This manner of expressing the R-squared change is better suited to comparisons among the leaders than the absolute magnitude of the R-squared change, since the latter does not take into account the considerable variability among the total R-squared values.

The results of these calculations are found in the last column of Table 8. We can see from these figures that the leader for whom trait attributions account for the largest proportion of explained variance in overall evaluation is John Turner. The proportion of variance in evaluations of Turner accounted for by all the independent variables is .31, but trait attributions alone account for .16 -- .52 of

the total explained variance! The proportion of total explained variance in evaluations of Broadbent accounted for by trait attributions is .43 in both 1979 and 1984, while the proportion of total explained variance in evaluations of Lewis accounted for by trait attributions is .41. The lowest proportion of explained variance accounted for by trait attributions is .28 (Trudeau in 1974; Clark in 1979), while the average is .37. From these statistics it is clear that there is a substantial relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian party leaders, and that this relationship is independent of the factors we have identified as potentially relevant. We can thus consider the first hypothesis to be supported.

Test of the Second Hypothesis

We can now turn our attention to the second hypothesis. This hypothesis states that trait attributions will have a greater impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and PC leaders than issue positions, party image, and judgements about the leader that do not refer to traits; however, trait attributions will have less impact on evaluations of these leaders than party identification. With regard to evaluations of the leaders of the NDP, the hypothesis states that trait attributions will be second in importance only to issue positions. The findings for 1974, 1979 and 1984 with regard to the second hypothesis are presented in Tables

9-11, respectively. The statistics presented in these three tables are the unstandardized regression coefficients (Bs), the standard errors of the regression coefficients (SEs), and the standardized regression coefficients (Betas) for each of the eleven independent variables in each equation.

The unstandardized regression coefficients represent the average change in the dependent variable per unit change in each independent variable, with the effects of the other independent variables held constant. The B is the appropriate statistic if one is interested in determining the independent impact on the dependent variable of any one independent variable. However, it is inappropriate to interpret the B as an indicator of the relative importance of the independent variables because the absolute magnitude of the B is dependent upon the units in which the variable is measured. The regression coefficients can, however, be made comparable. The independent variables can be standardized by converting raw scores into standard deviation units. New regression coefficients can then be obtained. These coefficients (the Betas) are comparable because they represent the average standard deviation change in the dependent variable per standard deviation change in the independent variable, with the effects of the other independent variables held constant (Norusis, 1985).

Looking at Tables 9-11, we can see that -- of the nine non-trait variables -- party identification consistently has

TABLE 9

Regression Coefficients for Equations
Designed to Test Hypotheses 1 and 2 -- 1974

Predictors		Trudeau (N=1101)	Stanfield (N=1080)	Lewis (N=1010)
Party Identification	B	8.6	7.3	8.8
	SE	(.56)	(.70)	(.92)
	Beta	.37*	.28*	.26*
Positive Party Position	B	2.4	2.9	4.6
	SE	(1.6)	(2.1)	(2.2)
	Beta	.04	.04	.07***
Negative Party Position	B	-.10	-2.5	-4.4
	SE	(1.7)	(2.1)	(2.1)
	Beta	-.01	-.03	-.07***
Positive Leader Position	B	2.5	6.5	11.3
	SE	(2.3)	(2.6)	(2.1)
	Beta	.02	-.06***	.14*
Negative Leader Position	B	-10.3	-3.3	-13.4
	SE	(1.7)	(2.2)	(2.0)
	Beta	-.14*	-.04	-.18*
Positive Party Image	B	-2.4	-3.2	-.66
	SE	(1.5)	(1.6)	(1.7)
	Beta	-.04	-.06***	-.01
Negative Party Image	B	.79	3.1	-2.6
	SE	(1.6)	(1.5)	(1.8)
	Beta	.01	.06***	-.05
Positive Leader Image	B	2.6	8.2	7.7
	SE	(1.8)	(2.7)	(2.4)
	Beta	.03	.08**	.08**
Negative Leader Image	B	-14.5	-11.0	-10.8
	SE	(2.2)	(1.9)	(1.9)
	Beta	-.15*	-.15*	-.15*
Positive Traits	B	18.3	15.8	17.0
	SE	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)
	Beta	.30*	.31*	.33*
Negative Traits	B	-14.2	-10.1	-16.2
	SE	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.8)
	Beta	-.25*	-.20*	-.23*

* p .001

** p .01

*** p .05

TABLE 10

Regression Coefficients for Equations
Designed to Test Hypotheses 1 and 2 -- 1979

Predictors		Trudeau (N=1322)	Clark (N=1294)	Broadbent (N=1216)
Party Identification	B	9.6	8.2	8.3
	SE	(.57)	(.59)	(.76)
	Beta	.36*	.33*	.27*
Positive Party Position	B	3.6	2.4	6.1
	SE	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.8)
	Beta	.05***	.03	.09*
Negative Party Position	B	-1.5	-3.9	.78
	SE	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.8)
	Beta	-.02	-.05	.01
Positive Leader Position	B	4.5	7.7	10.6
	SE	(2.7)	(2.2)	(1.8)
	Beta	.03	.08*	.14*
Negative Leader Position	B	-10.4	-5.9	-9.7
	SE	(1.7)	(2.2)	(2.0)
	Beta	-.12*	-.06**	-.12*
Positive Party Image	B	-.52	-1.6	-1.0
	SE	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.5)
	Beta	-.01	-.03	-.02
Negative Party Image	B	1.0	.87	3.4
	SE	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.6)
	Beta	.01	.02	.06***
Positive Leader Image	B	3.5	7.5	5.4
	SE	(2.3)	(1.7)	(2.7)
	Beta	.03	.10*	.05***
Negative Leader Image	B	-10.3	-6.4	-5.6
	SE	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.9)
	Beta	-.12*	-.09*	-.07**
Positive Traits	B	24.5	12.9	19.6
	SE	(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.2)
	Beta	.38*	.25*	.41*
Negative Traits	B	-14.6	-13.3	-6.2
	SE	(1.2)	(1.1)	(2.2)
	Beta	-.24*	-.26*	-.07**

* p .001

** p .01

*** p .05

TABLE 11

Regression Coefficients for Equations
Designed to Test Hypotheses 1 and 2 -- 1984

Predictors		Turner (N-2616)	Mulroney (N-2711)	Broadbent (N-2608)
Party Identification	B	6.0	5.2	6.0
	SE	(.38)	(.33)	(.48)
	Beta	.27*	.26*	.22*
Positive Party Position	B	-1.2	3.7	3.3
	SE	(1.1)	(.90)	(1.2)
	Beta	-.02	.07*	.06**
Negative Party Position	B	-.40	-4.8	-4.3
	SE	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.2)
	Beta	-.01	-.07*	-.08*
Positive Leader Position	B	9.3	5.1	7.4
	SE	(2.1)	(1.1)	(1.0)
	Beta	.07*	.07*	.13*
Negative Leader Position	B	-7.0	-7.3	-7.6
	SE	(1.6)	(1.1)	(1.1)
	Beta	-.07*	-.10*	-.13*
Positive Party Image	B	-4.2	.05	-1.4
	SE	(1.0)	(.79)	(.99)
	Beta	-.09*	.001	-.03
Negative Party Image	B	3.3	1.9	.54
	SE	(1.0)	(.87)	(1.1)
	Beta	.07**	-.04*	.01
Positive Leader Image	B	4.6	4.1	6.4
	SE	(1.0)	(.84)	(1.3)
	Beta	.07*	.07*	.08*
Negative Leader Image	B	-6.0	-7.9	-.38
	SE	(.97)	(.94)	(1.1)
	Beta	-.10*	-.13*	-.01
Positive Traits	B	15.7	13.9	15.4
	SE	(.79)	(.71)	(.77)
	Beta	.33*	.31*	.35*
Negative Traits	B	-10.3	-10.4	-7.7
	SE	(.75)	(.76)	(.99)
	Beta	-.23*	-.21*	-.13*

* p .001

** p .01

*** p .05

the greatest independent impact on overall candidate evaluation. The average Beta for the party identification variable is .29, and the lowest -- for Broadbent in 1984 -- is .22 ($p < .001$). In comparison, the highest Beta for any of the other non-trait variables is -.18 ($p < .001$) for the "negative leader position" variable in the Lewis equation. One measure of the extent to which the impact of party identification surpasses the impact of the position and image variables is the extent to which the Beta for the party identification variable exceeds the highest Beta for the position and image variables in each equation. This difference ranges from a high of .24 in the 1979 Trudeau equation to a low of .08 in the Lewis equation. On average, the Beta for the party identification variable is .16 higher than the highest Beta for the position and image variables.

The minimal impact of the variables created from the party like dislike questions is particularly noticeable. The average Beta for these variables is .04 and the highest ("positive party position" in the 1979 Broadbent equation and "positive party image" in the Turner equation) is .09 ($p < .001$). The variables created from the leader like dislike questions have a greater average impact on overall evaluation than those created from the party like dislike questions. The average Beta of the variables created from the non-trait responses to the leader like dislike questions is .09 -- higher than the .04 average for the party

like dislike variables, but still considerably lower than the .29 average for the party identification variables. This evidence indicates that -- in comparison to the impact of party identification -- neither voters' impressions of political parties nor their non-trait impressions of the leaders have a great deal of impact on their overall evaluations of the party leaders.

Turning our attention to the impact of positive and negative trait attributions on overall evaluation, we can see that the Betas for the negative trait variables are generally lower than those for the party identification variables. However, the Betas for the positive trait variables are generally higher than those for the party identification variables. The three variables with the greatest independent impact on candidate evaluation are generally as follows: positive traits, party identification and negative traits -- in that order.

In 1974, only the Trudeau equation does not follow this order. In this equation, the Beta for party identification is the highest, followed by the Betas for positive and then negative traits. In 1979, the Trudeau equation is the only one in which the usual order exists. With regard to Joe Clark, party identification has the greatest impact on evaluation, followed by negative traits and then positive traits. This is the only case where the negative trait variable has a greater independent impact on overall

evaluation than the positive trait variable (and only by .01). Along with the case of Trudeau in 1974, it is also the only case where party identification surpasses both trait variables in terms of impact on overall evaluation.

With regard to evaluations of Ed Broadbent in 1979, positive traits have a greater impact than party identification. However, negative traits rank sixth with regard to their impact on evaluations of Broadbent -- after the variables referencing positive traits, party identification, positive leader position, negative leader position and positive party position. This is the only case where factors other than party identification and trait attributions are among the factors with the greatest independent impact on candidate evaluation. In all of the 1984 elections, the three variables with the greatest impact on evaluation are positive traits, party identification and negative traits -- in that order.

Whereas the average Beta for the party identification variables is .29, the average Beta for the negative trait variables is .20. However, the average Beta for the positive trait variables is .33. Except for Broadbent in 1979, the issue position variables do not even come close to rivaling the impact on evaluation of the party identification and trait variables; and, this exception only results from the extremely weak Beta for the negative trait variable, not from the particularly strong Betas of the

issue position variables.

Since all of the trait variables are measured in the same units, we can employ the unstandardized regression coefficients to illustrate more clearly the varying impact of positive and negative trait attributions. The average B for the positive trait variables is 17.0; the average B for the negative trait variables is -11.4. These statistics mean that, on average, attributing a positive personality characteristic to a party leader increases one's evaluation of that leader by 17 thermometer degrees. On the other hand, attributing a negative personality characteristic to a party leader decreases one's evaluation of that leader by an average of 11 thermometer degrees.

Past research leads us to expect party identification to play a major role in voters' overall evaluations of political leaders, and also to expect personality trait attributions to rival the influence of party identification. However, past research does not lead us to expect that negative trait attributions will have less impact on candidate evaluation than positive trait attributions. In fact, the work of Richard Lau suggests just the opposite. It will be recalled that Lau (1982, 1984) reports findings which suggest that negative information is more influential than positive information. Our data do not support Lau's findings. The average Beta for positive trait attributions is .13 higher than the average Beta for negative trait

attributions. Looking at the unstandardized regression coefficients, positive trait attributions increase overall evaluation by an average of 5.6 degrees more than negative trait attributions decrease overall evaluation. Clearly, attributing positive personality characteristics to a Canadian political leader is more strongly related to one's overall evaluation of that leader than attributing negative personality characteristics to him.

From the evidence contained in Tables 9-11, we can conclude that our second hypothesis is only partially supported. The second hypothesis states that trait attributions will have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of the Liberal and PC leaders second in importance to party identification, and that trait attributions will be second in importance to issue positions with regard to evaluations of NDP leaders. The evidence indicates that this hypothesis is strongly supported only in two cases: Trudeau in 1974 and Clark in 1979. For all other Liberal and PC leaders, the impact of party identification on evaluation is surpassed by the impact of positive trait attributions, although negative trait attributions have less impact on evaluation than party identification. With regard to the leaders of the NDP, the hypothesis is not supported at all. As noted above, except for Broadbent in 1979, the party identification variables and the positive and negative trait variables have a greater

impact on evaluations of NDP leaders than the issue position variables.

Test of the Third Hypothesis

We have now examined evidence which indicates that there is a relationship between personality trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that is independent of other politically relevant factors. Additionally, we have presented data which indicate that positive trait attributions generally have a greater impact on candidate evaluation than any other politically identifiable factors, while party identification has a greater impact on evaluation than negative trait attributions. One important question remains to be examined. What sorts of personality trait judgements have an impact on candidate evaluation? Our hypothesis is that attributions of competence and integrity will have a greater impact on overall evaluation than attributions of dynamism, responsibility or empathy, or attributions that are found in the personal style or political style categories.

In order to test this hypothesis, the multiple regression analyses described above were re-run. The first block of nine variables was left unchanged, but the positive and negative trait variables were replaced by fourteen dichotomous variables representing the positive and negative versions of each of the seven trait categories. The results

of these analyses are found in Tables 12-14, which report the data for 1974, 1979 and 1984 respectively. Because the regression coefficients for the party identification, issue preference, party image and leader image variables change only slightly from those reported in Tables 9-11, the statistics relating to these variables are not reported in Tables 12-14. The reader is asked to keep in mind that the statistics reported in Tables 12-14 were generated from multiple regression analyses that included the nine non-trait variables we have been discussing.

Our discussion of the data found in Tables 12-14 will begin with a discussion of the results of each of the nine equations in turn. We will then compare the findings presented in Tables 12-14 with the findings presented in Table 4. Finally, we will attempt to summarize our findings with regard to the third hypothesis.

Looking at Table 12, we can see that the trait variable with the greatest independent impact on evaluations of Pierre Trudeau in 1974 is positive dynamism (Beta = .19, $p < .001$), closely followed by negative personal style (Beta = -.18, $p < .001$). With regard to Robert Stanfield, attributions of positive integrity have a greater independent impact on overall evaluation than attributions of any other personal characteristic (Beta = .24, $p < .001$). The trait variable with the second greatest influence on voters' evaluations of Stanfield is negative dynamism (Beta

TABLE 12

Regression Coefficients for All Trait Categories
in Equations Designed to Test Hypothesis 3 -- 1974

Predictors		Trudeau (N=1101)	Stanfield (N=1080)	Lewis (N=1010)
Positive Competence	B (SE)	7.7 (1.5)	11.4 (3.1)	7.0 (3.4)
	Beta	.11*	.09*	.05***
Negative Competence	B (SE)	-20.2 (5.3)	-6.1 (4.7)	-22.0 (9.7)
	Beta	-.08*	-.03	-.06***
Positive Integrity	B (SE)	9.5 (1.6)	13.8 (1.5)	12.4 (1.8)
	Beta	.13*	.24*	.17*
Negative Integrity	B (SE)	-10.6 (2.5)	-5.8 (7.1)	-7.7 (4.7)
	Beta	-.09*	-.02	-.04
Positive Dynamism	B (SE)	12.5 (1.5)	11.1 (3.3)	12.4 (2.4)
	Beta	.19*	.08*	.13*
Negative Dynamism	B (SE)	-11.4 (4.0)	-8.5 (1.5)	-10.4 (3.1)
	Beta	-.06**	-.15*	-.09**
Positive Responsibility	B (SE)	10.0 (2.0)	7.3 (2.4)	6.6 (2.8)
	Beta	.11*	.08**	.06***
Negative Responsibility	B (SE)	-7.7 (1.9)	-1.8 (11.5)	-8.5 (6.1)
	Beta	-.09*	-.01	-.04
Positive Empathy	B (SE)	11.0 (2.7)	10.5 (3.1)	9.6 (2.7)
	Beta	-.09*	.08*	.09*
Negative Empathy	B (SE)	-14.9 (2.7)	-12.9 (6.0)	—
	Beta	-.12*	-.05***	—
Positive Personal Style	B (SE)	7.2 (1.6)	7.4 (2.2)	13.5 (2.5)
	Beta	.10*	.09*	.14*
Negative Personal Style	B (SE)	-12.5 (1.5)	-9.8 (2.2)	-18.4 (2.7)
	Beta	-.18*	-.11*	-.17*
Positive Political Style	B (SE)	9.3 (1.5)	6.5 (2.8)	12.6 (1.9)
	Beta	.13*	.06**	.17*
Negative Political Style	B (SE)	-8.7 (5.0)	-7.3 (1.5)	-15.1 (4.2)
	Beta	-.04	-.13*	-.09*

* p < .001

** p < .01

*** p < .05

TABLE 13

Regression Coefficients for All Trait Categories
in Equations Designed to Test Hypothesis 3 -- 1979

Predictors		Trudeau (N=1322)	Clark (N=1294)	Broadbent (N=1216)
Positive Competence	B (SE)	13.1 (1.4)	7.8 (2.5)	13.5 (1.8)
	Beta	.20*	.07**	.18*
Negative Competence	B (SE)	-16.4 (4.0)	-7.9 (1.9)	-20.8 (11.2)
	Beta	-.08*	-.09*	-.04*
Positive Integrity	B (SE)	16.0 (1.8)	9.2 (1.7)	13.1 (1.5)
	Beta	.18*	.12*	.20*
Negative Integrity	B (SE)	-12.2 (2.6)	-11.5 (3.5)	-7.6 (6.9)
	Beta	-.09*	-.07**	-.03
Positive Dynamism	B (SE)	8.6 (1.8)	11.1 (2.5)	12.5 (1.8)
	Beta	.10*	.10*	.16*
Negative Dynamism	B (SE)	-10.9 (6.0)	-10.4 (1.4)	-1.2 (4.4)
	Beta	-.04	-.17*	-.01
Positive Responsibility	B (SE)	9.4 (2.4)	4.8 (1.9)	4.4 (2.1)
	Beta	.08*	.06***	.05***
Negative Responsibility	B (SE)	-9.0 (2.8)	-8.9 (2.7)	-1.7 (4.3)
	Beta	-.06**	-.07**	-.01
Positive Empathy	B (SE)	10.9 (3.0)	10.3 (2.7)	9.0 (2.2)
	Beta	.07*	.08*	.10*
Negative Empathy	B (SE)	-11.2 (2.7)	-----	-----
	Beta	-.08***	-----	-----
Positive Personal Style	B (SE)	10.8 (1.9)	8.0 (1.9)	12.1 (2.3)
	Beta	.11*	.09*	.13*
Negative Personal Style	B (SE)	-11.3 (1.4)	-15.1 (2.1)	-8.0 (3.9)
	Beta	-.17*	-.16*	-.05***
Positive Political Style	B (SE)	10.4 (1.3)	6.1 (2.1)	7.1 (1.5)
	Beta	.16*	.06**	.11*
Negative Political Style	B (SE)	-8.0 (4.1)	-7.7 (1.8)	-6.7 (4.5)
	Beta	-.04	-.10*	-.04

* p .001

** p .01

*** p .05

TABLE 14

Regression Coefficients for All Trait Categories
in Equations Designed to Test Hypothesis 3 -- 1984

Predictors		Turner (N=2616)	Mulroney (N=2711)	Broadbent (N=2608)
Positive Competence	B (SE) Beta	8.8 (1.4) .11*	5.9 (1.2) .08*	10.7 (1.3) .14*
Negative Competence	B (SE) Beta	-5.7 (1.3) -.07*	-3.9 (2.3) -.03	-2.9 (3.1) -.02
Positive Integrity	B (SE) Beta	11.7 (1.0) .20*	10.1 (.89) .17*	11.2 (.82) .23*
Negative Integrity	B (SE) Beta	-11.1 (1.2) -.15*	-12.0 (.97) -.19*	-10.0 (1.9) -.09*
Positive Dynamism	B (SE) Beta	5.9 (1.4) .07*	9.8 (.83) .18*	10.5 (1.4) .12*
Negative Dynamism	B (SE) Beta	-6.8 (1.0) -.11*	-6.2 (1.6) -.06*	-1.6 (2.5) -.01
Positive Responsibility	B (SE) Beta	9.5 (1.9) .08*	6.6 (1.2) .08*	8.1 (1.2) .12*
Negative Responsibility	B (SE) Beta	-1.6 (2.6) -.01	-9.1 (5.6) -.02	-1.9 (2.4) -.01
Positive Empathy	B (SE) Beta	9.7 (2.3) .07*	7.0 (.95) .11*	9.6 (1.3) .13*
Negative Empathy	B (SE) Beta	-8.6 (2.3) -.06*	-8.8 (2.9) -.05**	----- -----
Positive Personal Style	B (SE) Beta	9.5 (1.4) .11*	6.8 (1.1) .09*	6.8 (1.3) .09*
Negative Personal Style	B (SE) Beta	-11.5 (1.2) -.16*	-7.8 (1.2) -.10*	-8.9 (2.0) -.08*
Positive Political Style	B (SE) Beta	9.0 (1.5) .10*	5.7 (1.0) .08*	6.5 (.96) .11*
Negative Political Style	B (SE) Beta	-4.4 (1.0) -.07*	-4.4 (2.3) -.03	-6.6 (1.6) -.07

* p .001

** p .01

*** p .05

- .15. $p < .001$). Three trait variables in the Lewis equation have the same Betas. The positive integrity and positive political style variables both have Betas of .17 ($p < .001$); while the negative personal style variable has a Beta of -.17 ($p < .001$).

Turning now to Table 13, we can see that evaluations of Pierre Trudeau in 1979 are influenced by different personality traits than are evaluations of Trudeau in 1974. The trait variable with the highest Beta in the 1979 Trudeau equation is positive competence (Beta = .20, $p < .001$). Positive competence is closely followed by positive integrity (Beta = .18, $p < .001$), negative personal style (Beta = -.17, $p < .001$), and positive political style (Beta = .16, $p < .001$). The trait variable with the greatest impact on voters' overall evaluations of Joe Clark is negative dynamism (Beta = -.17, $p < .001$), closely followed by negative personal style (Beta = -.16, $p < .001$). With regard to Ed Broadbent in 1979, attributions of positive integrity have a greater impact on overall evaluation than attributions of other personal characteristics (Beta = .20, $p < .001$). Attributions of positive competence have the second greatest influence on evaluations of Broadbent (Beta = .18, $p < .001$).

With regard to the federal election of 1984 (Table 14), voters' overall evaluations of Liberal leader John Turner are influenced most by attributions of positive integrity

(Beta = .20, p = .001). Attributions of negative personal style also have a substantial impact on evaluations of Turner (Beta = -.16, p = .001). The trait variable with the greatest impact on voters' evaluations of Brian Mulroney is negative integrity, followed by positive dynamism and then positive integrity (Betas = -.19, .18 and .17, respectively, p = .001). Finally, with regard to Broadbent, the variable with the greatest independent impact on evaluation is positive integrity (Beta = .23, p = .001), followed by positive competence (Beta = .14, p = .001). This closely approximates the pattern observed for Broadbent in 1979, although positive integrity has a slightly greater impact on evaluations of Broadbent in 1984 than is the case in 1979, and positive competence has a slightly weaker impact.

If the regression coefficients presented in Tables 12-14 are compared to the percentages found in Table 4, we can see that the trait categories which are most frequently mentioned by voters with regard to particular party leaders are not necessarily the categories which have the greatest impact on their overall evaluations of those leaders. In the case of Robert Stanfield, the category with the greatest percentage of mentions is negative political style. However, the information in Table 12 tells us that this category has considerably less impact on voters' evaluations of Stanfield than positive integrity, and slightly less impact than negative dynamism. With regard to David Lewis,

negative personal style has as great an impact on overall evaluation as positive integrity and positive political style. despite the fact that the percentage of respondents mentioning attributions in the negative personal style category is less than half the percentage mentioning attributions in the other two categories.

According to both the percentages in Table 4 and the Betas in Table 12, the two most important traits in the case of Trudeau in 1974 are positive dynamism and negative personal style. In terms of percentages, political style follows personal style in importance. When one looks at the Betas, however, it can be seen that political style is not as important for overall evaluation as the percentage of people mentioning this category might lead us to assume. Turning to the case of Trudeau in 1979, we can see from Table 4 that the most frequently mentioned category is positive political style, followed by positive competence and negative personal style. However, looking at Table 13, we can see that attributions referencing positive competence, positive integrity and negative personal style have a greater impact on evaluations of Trudeau in 1979 than factors found in the positive political style category. In other words, although people frequently mention political style as a reason for liking Pierre Trudeau, these attributions do not appear to have as much impact on evaluations of Trudeau as do attributions of some other

personality characteristics. On the other hand, positive integrity has a much greater impact on overall evaluations of Trudeau relative to other traits than we might assume from the percentage of people mentioning traits found in this category.

Turning to the case of Joe Clark, we can see from Table 4 that the most frequently mentioned trait categories are negative dynamism and positive integrity. However, the statistics presented in Table 13 indicate that comments in the negative personal style category have a greater impact on evaluations of Clark than comments referencing positive integrity. Indeed, the Beta for the negative personal style category is stronger than the Betas for all categories except negative dynamism -- despite the fact that this category ranks seventh in terms of the percentages.

We have already noted in the case of Stanfield, Lewis and Trudeau that the political style category appears to have less impact on overall evaluation than the percentage of respondents mentioning this category might lead us to assume. This finding is also supported in the case of Ed Broadbent. The most frequently mentioned category with regard to Broadbent in 1979 is positive political style. However, from Table 13 we can see that this category ranks fourth in terms of its impact on evaluations of Broadbent, behind positive integrity, competence, dynamism and personal style. In the case of Broadbent in 1984, positive political

style is the second most frequently mentioned category, after positive integrity. However, the statistics found in Table 14 indicate that positive political style ranks sixth in terms of its impact on evaluations of Broadbent, behind positive integrity, competence, empathy, dynamism and responsibility.

A similar situation occurs in the case of John Turner. In terms of the percentage of respondents mentioning the positive and negative versions of each trait category, negative political style ranks second. In terms of impact on evaluation, however, this category ranks seventh. The relative impact of negative dynamism on evaluations of Turner is also less than the percentage of respondents mentioning this category might lead us to expect. Although the percentage of respondents mentioning negative dynamism in the case of Turner is double the percentage mentioning either positive competence or positive personal style, all three of these categories appear to have an equal impact on evaluation.

With regard to Brian Mulroney, the regression coefficients presented in Table 14 do not depart greatly from what the percentages found in Table 4 might lead us to expect. However, positive political style ranks seventh rather than fourth, echoing the finding noted in the case of other party leaders. Additionally, negative integrity has a greater relative impact on evaluations of Mulroney than we

might assume from the percentage of people mentioning this category. While fewer respondents mention negative integrity than mention either positive dynamism or positive integrity, negative integrity has a marginally greater impact on evaluations of Mulroney than either of these two trait categories.

In order to summarize our findings regarding the third hypothesis, the average Betas for each of the trait categories were calculated. These statistics are presented in Table 15. The first column in Table 15 is the average of the Betas for the positive versions of each trait variable; the second column is the average of the Betas for the negative versions of each trait variable; the final column is the average of the Betas for both the positive and negative versions of each trait variable. Considering only the positive versions of each trait variable, the seven categories can be ranked in order of their average impact on overall evaluation as follows: integrity, dynamism, competence, political style, personal style, empathy and responsibility. Considering only the negative versions of each trait variable, the seven categories are ranked as follows: personal style, integrity, dynamism, political style, competence, empathy and responsibility. Looking at the combined average Betas for the positive and negative versions of each trait variable, we can place the categories in the following order: integrity, personal style.

TABLE 15

Average Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
for Each Trait Dimension

	Positive Mentions	Negative Mentions	Combined Positive & Negative Mentions
Competence	.114	.056	.085
Integrity	.182	.086	.134
Dynamism	.126	.078	.102
Responsibility	.080	.036	.058
Empathy	.091	.040	.066
Personal Style	.106	.131	.118
Political Style	.109	.068	.088

Note: Averages for each trait category are calculated
for all leaders across all three election years.

dynamism, political style, competence, empathy, responsibility.

Clearly, attributions of empathy and responsibility have the least impact on overall candidate evaluation of the seven trait categories. When the categories are ranked according to their impact on evaluation, empathy consistently ranks sixth and responsibility consistently ranks seventh. The relationships among the other five categories are more complex. When only the positive trait variables are ranked, integrity, dynamism and competence -- in that order -- are followed by political style and personal style. However, negative personal style has a greater average impact on evaluation than negative integrity or negative dynamism, and negative political style has a greater average impact than negative competence. When the positive and negative versions of each variable are combined, integrity again becomes the most important trait, but personal style remains, on average, more important than dynamism, and political style remains more important than competence.

A second manner of examining the relative importance of the seven trait categories is to examine the R-squared changes caused by the addition of each trait pair to the various equations. This information is useful because, unlike the Betas, the change in R-squared can be interpreted as the percentage of variance in overall evaluation

accounted for by each trait category. The R-squared changes caused by the addition of each trait pair to the various equations are presented in Table 16. The data presented in Table 16 indicate that an average of 4.3 percent of the variance in candidate evaluation is accounted for by attributions of integrity. Attributions in the personal style category account for an average of 2.9 percent of the variance in candidate evaluation, while attributions of dynamism account for an average of 2.4 percent of the variance. An average of 1.8 percent of the variance in evaluation is accounted for by attributions found in the political style category, and an additional 1.8 percent is accounted for by attributions regarding competence. Finally, attributions regarding empathy account for an average of 1.2 percent of the variance in overall candidate evaluation, and attributions of responsibility account for an average of .09 percent.

When the statistics presented in Tables 15 and 16 are compared to the percentages found in the final column of Table 3, we can see that political style has a weaker relative impact on overall evaluation than the average percentage of people mentioning this category would lead us to expect. While political style ranks second in terms of average percentage of mentions, this category ranks fourth in terms of its impact on evaluation. The only other major difference between the percentages and the regression

TABLE 16

R-squared Change Caused by the Addition
of Each Trait Pair to the Regression Equations

	Compet- ence	Integ- rity	Dyna- mism	Responsi- bility	Emp- athy	Personal Style	Political Style
1974 (N=1201)							
Trudeau	.018*	.024*	.036*	.019*	.021*	.040*	.018*
Stanfield	.010*	.051*	.027*	.006**	.010*	.019*	.019*
Lewis	.006**	.029*	.023*	.005***	.008*	.046*	.036*
1979 (N=1353)							
Trudeau	.040*	.039*	.010*	.010*	.012*	.038*	.025*
Clark	.013*	.020*	.036*	.008*	.007*	.031*	.012*
Broadbent	.032*	.040*	.024*	.002	.009*	.017*	.014*
1984 (N=3380)							
Turner	.015*	.063*	.015*	.007*	.008*	.037*	.015*
Mulroney	.006*	.065*	.034*	.007*	.014*	.018*	.008*
Broadbent	.018*	.058*	.015*	.013*	.015*	.013*	.015*
Averages	.018	.043	.024	.009	.012	.029	.018

* p .001

** p .01

*** p .05

statistics is the fact that, on average, more people mention factors on the responsibility dimension than factors on the empathy dimension. However, the statistics presented in Tables 15 and 16 indicate empathy has a greater impact on evaluation than responsibility.

The evidence presented in Tables 12-16 indicate that our third hypothesis, like our second one, is only partly supported. Attributions regarding integrity generally have a greater impact on overall evaluation than attributions of other personality characteristics. However, attributions regarding competence do not seem to be particularly important. The competence dimension ranks fifth when the combined positive and negative trait categories are ordered according to the strength of their average Betas, and ties for fourth when they are ordered according to the percentage of explained variance. The most important category after integrity appears to be personal style rather than competence, and the personal style dimension is followed closely by the dynamism dimension. This finding is contrary to American findings which indicate that judgements regarding competence have the greatest impact on overall candidate evaluation of all categories of personality trait attributions.

Overview

We began this chapter with an examination of the

parameters of the independent and dependent variables to be used in these analyses. This section of the chapter was supplemented with a discussion of the extent to which our findings regarding the traits that Canadian voters attribute to their political leaders are in line with the findings noted by other researchers. The remainder of this chapter was devoted to the examination of evidence regarding the three hypotheses developed in previous chapters.

The first hypothesis states that there is a relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that is independent of other factors identified as politically relevant. This hypothesis has been supported with evidence from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National Election Studies.

The second hypothesis is that trait attributions will have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and PC leaders second in importance to party identification, and that trait attributions will be second in importance to issue positions with regard to evaluations of NDP leaders. This hypothesis is strongly supported only with regard to evaluations of Trudeau in 1974 and Clark in 1979. For all other Liberal and PC leaders, the impact of party identification on evaluation is surpassed by the impact of positive trait attributions. As it pertains to evaluations of NDP leaders, the hypothesis is not supported at all.

Issue positions have generally less impact on overall evaluation than party identification, positive trait attributions and negative trait attributions.

The third hypothesis states that attributions of competence and integrity will have a greater impact on candidate evaluation than attributions of other personality traits. This hypothesis has also been only partially supported. The impact of integrity was found to be as great as expected, but the impact of competence was found to be considerably less than has been found to be the case in the United States.

CHAPTER V

Summary and Conclusions

The broad objective of this thesis has been to improve our understanding of Canadian voters' evaluations of their political leaders. Little research has been conducted in Canada on candidate evaluation. Indeed, the topic has only recently received much systematic attention in the comparative literature. Although voters' overall evaluations of political leaders have long been considered to be an important component of the vote decision, the factors which have the potential to influence overall candidate evaluation have only rarely been examined. Particularly neglected has been the study of how voters' judgements about the personality traits of candidates affect their overall evaluations of those candidates.

Most researchers who have examined the factors which are thought to influence voters' overall evaluations of political leaders have focused on the impact of either party identification or issue positions. However, it has been found that a substantial portion of the variance in overall candidate evaluation remains unexplained after the effects of party identification and issue positions have been taken into consideration. The primary source of this unexplained

variance has generally been held to be voters' judgements about the personality traits of the candidates.

Despite recognition of the potential importance of trait attributions for overall candidate evaluation, only a few studies have actually tested this relationship. These studies indicate that trait attributions can have a substantial impact on overall candidate evaluation. The existing literature on the relationship between trait attributions and candidate evaluations thus presents us with an intriguing situation. On the one hand, the evidence indicates that trait attributions are a major determinant of candidate evaluation. On the other hand, we know very little about the impact of trait attributions relative to other factors and, in particular, we know very little about which personality trait attributions impact on evaluation.

The specific aim of this thesis has been the testing of three hypotheses regarding the impact of trait attributions on Canadian voters' evaluations of their political leaders. The three hypotheses correspond to the three basic questions outlined above. The first hypothesis, which was based on past research findings, was that there would be a relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that was independent of other factors identified as politically relevant. The second hypothesis was also based on past findings. This hypothesis was that trait attributions would

have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and PC leaders that was second in importance to party identification, and that trait attributions would be second in importance to issue positions with regard to evaluations of NDP leaders. The third hypothesis was the most difficult to formulate because of the inconclusiveness of past research. This hypothesis stated that attributions of competence and integrity would have a greater impact on candidate evaluations than attributions of other personality traits.

Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression analysis was used to test these three hypotheses. The data for our analyses were drawn from the 1974, 1979 and 1984 Canadian National Election Studies. Two sets of regression equations were specified. The first set -- designed to test the first two hypotheses -- included eleven independent variables: party identification, positive party position, negative party position, positive leader position, negative leader position, positive party image, negative party image, positive leader image, negative leader image, positive traits, negative traits. The second set of equations -- designed to test the third hypothesis -- employed the first nine variables listed above, but replaced the positive and negative trait variables with fourteen variables representing the positive and negative versions of seven trait categories. The seven trait categories developed for

these analyses were labelled as follows: competence, integrity, dynamism, responsibility, empathy, personal style and political style.

As mentioned above, the first hypothesis was that there would be a relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of Canadian political leaders that was independent of other politically relevant factors. This hypothesis was supported. The inclusion of the positive and negative trait variables as predictors of overall candidate evaluation significantly enhanced our ability to explain and predict Canadian voters' overall evaluations of their political leaders.

The second hypothesis was that trait attributions would have an impact on voters' overall evaluations of Liberal and PC leaders that was second in importance to party identification, and that trait attributions would be second in importance to issue positions with regard to evaluations of NDP leaders. This hypothesis was strongly supported only with regard to evaluations of Trudeau in 1974 and Clark in 1979. For all other Liberal and PC leaders, the impact of party identification on evaluation was surpassed by the impact of positive trait attributions. As it pertained to evaluations of NDP leaders, the second hypothesis was not supported at all. Issue positions had generally less impact on overall evaluation than party identification, positive traits, or negative traits. The test of the second

hypothesis also revealed the unexpected finding that positive trait attributions had a greater impact on Canadian voters' evaluations of their political leaders than negative trait attributions. Past research indicates that the opposite is true in the United States.

The third hypothesis -- that attributions of competence and integrity would have a greater impact on candidate evaluation than attributions of other personality traits -- was also only partially supported. The impact of integrity was found to be as great as expected, but the impact of competence was found to be considerably less than has been found to be the case in the United States. On average, attributions found in the personal style and dynamism categories had more impact on overall evaluation than attributions regarding the competence of the candidate.

The most significant finding of this thesis has been the strength -- relative to other factors -- of the relationship between trait attributions and voters' overall evaluations of political leaders. While we hypothesized that there would be a relationship between trait attributions and overall evaluation that was independent of the other factors identified as politically relevant, we did not anticipate that positive trait attributions would surpass even party identification in terms of impact on overall evaluation. Clearly, our understanding of candidate evaluation is not complete unless the "personality factor"

(as it was labelled by early electoral behaviour researchers) is taken into consideration.

Aside from our findings regarding the relative importance of trait attributions for overall candidate evaluation, one of our most interesting findings deals with the relative importance for evaluation of positive and negative trait attributions. American researchers have found that negative information is more important with regard to overall evaluation than positive information. Our findings indicate that the opposite appears to be the case in Canada. Positive trait attributions had generally much more impact than negative trait attributions on voters' overall evaluations of the Canadian party leaders in the 1974, 1979 and 1984 federal elections. How can we account for this finding?

Two hypotheses have been suggested to account for the "negativity effect." According to the figure-ground hypothesis, negative information is assigned more importance than positive information because it stands out against the generally positive background of our lives. Our evidence indicates that Canadian voters generally evaluate political leaders in as positive a light as do American voters. Therefore, the figure-ground hypothesis cannot account for our findings regarding the importance of positive information relative to negative information.

The second hypothesis that has been suggested to

account for the negativity effect is the cost-orientation hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, people are more inclined to avoid costs than to approach gains. Therefore, the greater a leader's perceived potential to impact on one's life, the more important negative information about that leader becomes. This hypothesis can help us account for our findings. Perhaps Canadian voters are less inclined than American voters to feel that their political leaders are likely to have a major impact on their lives. This could be true for a variety of reasons, including: the indirect election of the Prime Minister; the lesser relative importance of Canada in global affairs; the restriction of the Prime Minister's role to that of head of government; the perception of the Prime Minister as merely the "first among equals;" the power of provincial premiers. If Canadian voters do not feel that their political leaders are likely to have a substantial impact on their lives, then they would not consider the "costs" of negative factors to be as high as would their American counterparts. In such a situation, Canadian voters would be more likely than American voters to risk the "costs of the negative" for the potential "gains of the positive." Thus, positive information would be assigned more importance than negative information.

One of the most useful and important tasks undertaken for this thesis was the development and testing of a common trait typology created from voters' responses to open-ended

questions which asked them what they liked and disliked about the federal party leaders. The purpose of this typology was to determine specifically which personality traits have the greatest impact on overall candidate evaluation. Our findings indicate that attributions of integrity, personal style and dynamism had the greatest impact on Canadian voters' evaluations of their political leaders. While other traits occasionally emerged as important with regard to evaluations of particular leaders, the above-mentioned trait categories tended to have the greatest impact on voters' overall evaluations of most of the party leaders in our study. Two particularly interesting findings emerged from the tests of the trait typology.

We compared the percentage of people who mentioned factors in each of the trait categories with the results of the multiple regression analyses designed to estimate the impact of the various categories on overall evaluation. This comparison revealed that the impact of political style on evaluation was much weaker than the percentage of people mentioning this category might lead us to expect. In other words, although people frequently mentioned political style as a reason for liking or disliking political leaders, these attributions did not have an impact on overall evaluation that was commensurate with their frequency. There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, comments

regarding political style could be particularly superficial attributions which are easily made by even the most politically unaware respondents. If this is the case, then we could hardly expect such comments to have a great deal of impact on overall evaluation. The second explanation is related to the first. Perhaps attributions regarding political style are, more than other attributions, the effect rather than the cause of overall evaluation. Vague, superficial attributions would certainly be the most likely candidates for such a rationalization process.

The second interesting finding regarding the trait typology was the weak impact of attributions referring to competence. American research has shown that competence is usually the trait with the greatest impact on American voters' evaluations of presidential candidates. Apparently, Canadian voters put much less emphasis on competence in evaluating their political leaders than do their American counterparts.

Elsewhere, we discussed two possible methodological explanations for the finding that Canadian voters mentioned competence less frequently than American voters when asked what they liked and disliked about their political leaders.⁽¹⁾ Our conclusion was that coding differences could not account for the finding, but that differences in question wording perhaps could. Specifically, it was noted

(1) See footnote 1, p. 93.

that the American question wording might encourage respondents to mention traits such as competence, which are clearly recognized as politically relevant, while the Canadian question might encourage responses that are not necessarily political in connotation.

This explanation cannot, however, account for the finding that attributions of competence have less impact on Canadian voters' candidate evaluations than they have on the candidate evaluations of American voters. For an explanation of this finding we must look beyond methodology. We have already alluded to one possible explanation. Perhaps Canadian voters are less likely to emphasize competence in evaluating their political leaders than are American voters because Canadian voters believe that their leaders do not have the potential to have a great deal of impact upon their lives. If this is the case, then a particularly competent leader could not improve one's situation very much and, conversely, a particularly incompetent leader could not do a great deal of harm. Under such circumstances, attributions of competence would not be expected to play a major role in determining overall candidate evaluation.

This thesis has not begun to address many of the crucial issues with regard to evaluations of political leaders. Its most serious limitation is that the research methods employed are unable to untangle the causal

relationships between trait attributions and overall evaluation. While we can estimate the impact of trait attributions on overall evaluation, we cannot estimate the impact of overall evaluation on trait attributions. This limitation is particularly important given our findings with regard to attributions of political style.

A second limitation of this research is the extent to which we can generalize from the findings reported here. For example, can we generalize to the period prior to 1974 or to the period since 1984? Can our findings, which are based on analyses of voters' evaluations of federal political leaders, be extended to the provincial level? To what extent do our findings apply to other countries, particularly to western European countries that share Canada's parliamentary form of government? The answers to these questions await further research.

Other areas for future research include a more directed examination of the relative impact of positive and negative trait attributions on overall evaluation, and further study of the role of judgements regarding competence in Canadian voters' overall candidate evaluations. The explanations suggested here need to be tested and, if they are found to be inadequate, replaced with better explanations. An additional question for future research is the question of how people make inferences about personality traits. Are such inferences perceiver-determined, or are they stimulus

determined? Or, are inferences made on the basis of schemas, as current lines of research suggest?

One final question, of particular interest to political scientists, involves the extent to which the relationship between overall candidate evaluation and vote varies with the basis for the evaluation. That is, do candidate evaluations based on trait attributions have more or less impact on the vote decision than evaluations based on party identification or issue positions? Do evaluations based on attributions of integrity, for example, have more or less impact on the vote decision than evaluations based on dynamism or personal style, for example? In this thesis we have not dealt with the relationship between overall candidate evaluation and vote, preferring instead to concentrate on the prior and long-neglected question of the criteria for evaluation. Nevertheless, as we acknowledged in Chapter I, candidate evaluations are politically relevant because of their potential to influence the vote decision. Therefore, the obvious extension of the research reported here is to add vote to the analysis.

It is hoped that other researchers will address themselves to this question, as well as to the other questions mentioned above, in order that we may further improve our understanding of this important aspect of Canadian voting behaviour.

APPENDIX A

Codes for Leader Like/Dislike Questions -- 1974

[Source: H.D. Clarke, J. Jenson, L. LeDuc and J.H. Pammett (1982). 1974-1979-1980 Canadian National Elections and Quebec Referendum Panel Study Codebook. 2nd Release. Windsor, Ontario.]

Pierre Trudeau -- Positive Mentions

1. Trudeau Competence

- 01. intelligent, smart, capable, bright, clever, knows what he is talking about, brilliant, shrewd
- 16. intellectual, scholar, well-educated
- 55. like the way he is running the country

2. Trudeau Dynamism

- 07. good leader, leadership qualities, his leadership, best leader, ideal leader, strong leader, good man for the job
- 14. dynamic, energetic, forceful, vigorous
- 26. his courage, guts, spunk, bravery
- 27. decisive, able to make decisions, doesn't evade the issue
- 29. aggressive, stands behind his convictions
- 42. has a way with people, has charisma, his popularity, magnetism
- 47. confident, very positive
- 50. he acts quickly
- 52. his ambition
- 61. he is strong

3. Trudeau Integrity

- 02. honest, sincere, straightforward, frank, direct, has integrity
- 05. good man, fine man
- 17. outspoken, says what he thinks, blunt, mind of his own
- 28. he is just, fair
- 53. he keeps his promises or most of his promises, made a lot of good promises
- 78. his independence

4. Trudeau Empathy

- 34. he is concerned about Canada, interested in Canada, he has done a lot for Canada, anxious to lead Canada well and to do what is best for Canada
- 35. he is concerned about people, interested in people, understands people, interested in Canadians

- 36. he has helped the people
- 39. he is for all walks of life, everyone
- 44. not patronizing
- 76. sympathetic, understanding (unspecified)

5. Trudeau Responsibility

- 06. works hard, doing a good job, tries hard, gets things done
- 08. calm, cool, easy manner, unruffled
- 21. broad-minded, open-minded, tolerant
- 40. serious, mature, careful, controls himself
- 54. willing to admit mistakes, make compromises
- 63. he is realistic
- 66. doesn't make too many promises
- 86. I have confidence in him

6. Trudeau Personal Style

- 03. personality, nice personality, nice person, I like him, likeable
- 10. sense of humour
- 18. charming, a ladies' man
- 19. modern, up to date, progressive, moves onward, trying to change things
- 20. colourful, flamboyant, flair, his style, classy
- 23. interesting
- 24. swinger, skier, athlete
- 25. cheerful, pleasant, always smiling
- 41. a gentleman, dignified, distinguished, I respect him
- 43. refreshing, different, 'nicest egomaniac around'
- 73. his approach, manner, the way he acts, general like (unspecified)
- 74. he travels
- 79. his outlook on life

7. Trudeau Political Style

- 04. good speaker, speaking ability or manner
- 12. bilingual
- 22. a good politician
- 30. good internationally, good in foreign affairs
- 46. handles problems or crises well
- 62. he is a diplomat, statesman
- 71. handles press well
- 72. good image
- 77. the way he handles meetings, knows how to direct questions
- 80. comes over on TV very well

8. Trudeau Image

- 31. the way he handled FLQ, La Porte affair

- 64. he has a good team
- 65. ran a good campaign
- 68. he did a good job in minority government or when he had a lot of opposition
- 75. he keeps people or the country informed of what is going on
- 09. good family man, his family, his wife, has settled down
- 13. French Canadian
- 15. he is young, youthful, looks young for his age
- 45. good upbringing, comes from a good background, a good lawyer
- 51. he has his own money, is a rich man, not in it for the money
- 11. good-looking, handsome, his appearance
- 48. not a bad chap, he is O. K.
- 49. he is outstanding, perfect, the ideal man, like everything about him

9. Trudeau Issue Positions

- 32. the way he is handling Quebec, against separatism, keeping Quebec in Confederation, anxious for Quebec and the rest of Canada to get along
- 33. stands up for French language of French people, he represents them magnificently
- 37. he cares about old people, has done a lot for old people, for the pensioners, increased old age pensions
- 38. he is for young people, done a lot for younger generation, helps students, lowered drinking age
- 56. trying to keep peace
- 57. work he did as Minister of Justice, overhauling of Criminal Code, his views on homosexuality or abortion, people free to do what they want
- 58. becoming more socialistic
- 59. he is concerned about inflation, high prices, cost of living and is trying to do something about it
- 60. raised family allowance, widows' allowance, allowance for disabled
- 67. like his ideas, most of his ideas, good ideas, young ideas
- 69. the way he handled employment, jobs
- 70. like his policies (unspecified)
- 81. done a few things for the farmers (any mention of farmers or agriculture)
- 82. his attitude towards business
- 83. medicare, other welfare
- 84. economic policies (including taxes)
- 85. the way he is handling the oil crisis
- 87. he gives help to the municipalities
- 89. he wants to build a sea port

Pierre Trudeau -- Negative Mentions

1. Trudeau Competence

- 41. the way he runs country or government
- 70. too intellectual, smart

2. Trudeau Dynamism

- 36. he is just a figurehead, a front man
- 44. not a good leader
- 52. relies too much on some of his ministers or career civil servants
- 82. not aggressive enough, too conservative
- 84. changes his mind too often
- 91. really not a man

3. Trudeau Integrity

- 23. he doesn't keep his promises, too many promises
- 24. he is dishonest, not sincere
- 32. doesn't answer questions directly, avoids taking a stand on issues, slow on decisions, generalizes too much, dodges the issues
- 54. he is unfair
- 78. I don't trust him

4. Trudeau Empathy

- 05. not concerned about people, not interested in people, doesn't understand people (the needs or problems of the people), doesn't do enough for people
- 08. lack of concern for the country or Canada, only interested in country at election time
- 10. lack of concern, interest, or understanding (unspecified)
- 33. "shrug of shoulder attitude", "so what attitude"

5. Trudeau Responsibility

- 02. travels too much, takes too many holidays
- 03. playboy, playboy image or antics
- 04. doesn't get much done, hasn't done much, doesn't attend to business
- 09. lack of concern about what is going on in government, not concerned about his job
- 12. spends too much of our money (taxpayers' money) on himself
- 42. could do a lot better, could do more
- 53. he is impatient
- 74. his temper
- 89. his emotions show through

6. Trudeau Personal Style

- 01. too arrogant. arrogant at times. overbearing
- 25. his language. uses bad words. swears. is rude
- 27. sarcastic
- 28. conceited. inflated ego. snob
- 29. personality. not a likeable man. just don't like him
- 30. manner. attitude. the way he acts. general approach (unspecified). outlook on life
- 31. his informality. not dignified. too flamboyant
- 34. too dictatorial. too independent. doesn't consult his ministers enough
- 38. too ambitious. power-hungry. do anything for votes
- 39. cool. aloof. not friendly
- 83. too narrow
- 90. not a typical wholesome Canadian

7. Trudeau Political Style

- 26. he talks too much
- 35. image he presents as leader of Canada. not an admirable leader
- 50. not a politician
- 72. too outspoken
- 73. poor speaker

8. Trudeau Image

- 40. Trudeaumania style. the way he won votes with women
- 51. his cabinet shuffle
- 69. his behaviour with the press. belittles the press
- 75. his speeches during the election. the train
- 79. he uses his wife to gain popularity. worried his wife into the hospital. too much publicity about his private life
- 80. spends too much time with his family
- 92. he criticizes others too often
- 22. he is French
- 48. he is too rich. never had to suffer or work
- 49. his marrying such a young girl
- 67. he is a non-veteran
- 46. his party. he is a Liberal. his politics
- 11. everything
- 37. his appearance. looks. specific mannerisms. voice
- 45. his majority
- 71. he has changed
- 93. he doesn't use his wife to gain popularity

9. Trudeau Issue Positions

- 06. not concerned about. not interested in or doesn't understand the working people or working class

- 07. not concerned about. not interested in or doesn't understand the poor
- 13. gives or loans too much money to other countries. foreign aid
- 14. too much money is spent on grants (O.F.Y., L.I.P., Canada Council)
- 15. spends too much money (other specific mentions)
- 16. spends, wastes too much money (unspecified)
- 17. gives too much to Quebec or French Canada. favours French Canada or Quebec
- 18. French language issue. catering to bilingualism. shoving French down our throats
- 19. too much for Ontario or Ottawa
- 20. too much for the east. forgets the west
- 21. not enough done for Quebec. thinks of other provinces before us in Quebec
- 43. not do anything or much about inflation. cost of living. high prices. Mrs. Plumtre. his policies on inflation
- 47. too extreme in his thinking. too socialist.
- 55. oil policy. fuel crisis. pipeline
- 56. handling of unemployment. unemployment insurance
- 57. handling of old age security. not enough for aged
- 58. handling of welfare. abuse of welfare
- 59. handling of foreign affairs
- 60. handling of immigration
- 61. handling of Quebec question. separatism
- 62. handling of large corporations. too much for large corporations
- 63. handling of American control
- 64. handling of taxes. taxes too high
- 65. handling of agriculture or farm problems. not enough for farmers
- 66. handling of legislation on moral issues. views of homosexuality or abortion
- 67. handling of L.I.P., O.F.Y. programmes
- 68. dislike his policies (unspecified)
- 76. lack of policies. no set policies. don't hear about his policies
- 77. too much for east and prairies (ignores B. C.)
- 81. his economic policies
- 85. his ideas (unspecified)
- 86. doesn't do anything about unions. doesn't prevent strikes

Robert Stanfield -- Positive Mentions

1. Stanfield Competence

- 01. intelligent. capable. clever. brilliant
- 56. he is experienced. has the potential
- 57. would make a good administrator. is a good administrator

2. Stanfield Dynamism

- 07. good leader. would make a good prime minister. has leadership qualities
- 26. his courage
- 43. he is a go-getter. stands behind his convictions. a fighter

3. Stanfield Integrity

- 02. honest. sincere. has integrity. straightforward. conscientious
- 05. good man
- 16. trustworthy
- 24. high moral standards. doesn't swear. decent
- 40. has good intentions. means well. willing to try
- 42. he is respected. admired. I respect or admire him
- 61. he is outspoken. speaks his mind
- 63. wants to be fair. fair man

4. Stanfield Empathy

- 23. he is kind. generous. sympathetic. understanding
- 34. he is concerned about Canada
- 35. he is concerned about people. Canadian people. in touch with people
- 36. he has helped people. done a lot for people. would help people

5. Stanfield Responsibility

- 06. works hard. tries hard. does his best
- 08. calm
- 27. steady. reliable
- 28. earnest. serious
- 29. determination. keeps trying. has stamina. tenacity. persistent
- 41. has a lot of stamina
- 51. plans carefully

6. Stanfield Personal Style

- 03. nice person. like him. good personality
- 10. sense of humour
- 14. he is a gentleman. dignified
- 17. he is humble. home style. modest. not a show-off. naive
- 25. nice friendly fellow. pleasant person. warm
- 30. more human. down to earth
- 47. he is different
- 64. his manner. his way (unspecified)

7. Stanfield Political Style

- 04. good speaker. improved speaker
- 12. he tries very hard to learn French. his French isn't bad
- 22. a good politician. old-time politician. has political style
- 31. he is a statesman. like a statesman. diplomat
- 38. liked him on TV. good impression on TV
- 53. has a good image
- 55. aware of his bad image. knows his faults

8. Stanfield Image

- 45. he did a good job in Nova Scotia
- 49. he performed well in campaign. wanted to deal with issues
- 59. good job in opposition
- 09. he is a family man. has a nice family
- 13. Nova Scotian. typical of eastern provinces. from the maritimes
- 15. any mention of 'old man' in a favourable context. also coded for other attributes. for example. 'sincere old man'. 'pleasant old fellow'
- 20. he is a good or smart businessman
- 54. loyal to party. represents the party
- 11. nice-looking. looks honest or sincere. his appearance
- 18. he is O. K.. not bad. just a man
- 21. better than Trudeau. as good as Trudeau (any mention)
- 46. his qualities. some things (unspecified)
- 66. too bad he lost. I feel sorry for him
- 68. his long underwear
- 70. proud to be a Canadian
- 71. he likes to garden
- 73. if he was a French Canadian he would do better

9. Stanfield Issue Positions

- 19. too much for Nova Scotia
- 32. is concerned about inflation. high prices. cost of living and trying to do something about it
- 33. like his policies on wage and price controls. any mention of controls
- 37. he cares about old people. would raise pensions
- 44. I like his ideas. good ideas
- 48. like his policies. good policies
- 50. helps industry
- 58. for the working man
- 60. would save us money
- 62. interested in the west
- 65. he is trying hard in Quebec. with French people
- 67. his economic policies
- 69. raised family allowance
- 72. he cares about unemployment
- 74. he helps Indians

Robert Stanfield -- Negative Mentions

1. Stanfield Competence

- 33. not intelligent enough. not capable. not a good thinker. ineffectual
- 68. unorganized

2. Stanfield Dynamism

- 01. not dynamic enough. too slow. lacks drive
- 02. not decisive enough. too hesitant. not sure of himself. not confident
- 07. not a good leader. doesn't have or lacks leadership qualities. just isn't the man for the job. would not make a good prime minister. not right man for the party
- 08. not aggressive enough. not enough fight in him. lack of fire. not forceful
- 09. too weak. not strong enough. we need a stronger man
- 15. undecided on issues. couldn't seem to stick to one point
- 31. doesn't inspire confidence. lacks confidence of people or party. doesn't impress people. seems lost
- 36. not much charisma. no appeal. leaves you flat

3. Stanfield Integrity

- 24. he is dishonest. not sincere. too superficial

4. Stanfield Empathy

- 17. his apathy. indifference. very cool
- 48. not interested in people

5. Stanfield Responsibility

- 54. he is not a realist

6. Stanfield Personal Style

- 03. personality. poor personality. lacks personality
- 25. he is rude
- 28. too arrogant. boastful
- 29. too petty. too narrow-minded. too much of a granny. too provincial
- 30. attitude. manner. just his way. his approach. general dislike (unspecified)
- 40. too quiet. doesn't say much
- 58. too ambitious. too anxious. obsessed with majority
- 64. too honest. too good a person

7. Stanfield Political Style

- 04. poor speaker. can't get message across. any mention of lack of speaking ability or manner of speaking
- 05. speaks French poorly. doesn't speak enough French. don't understand his French
- 06. boring. not colourful enough. dull
- 26. he talks too much
- 34. not a politician
- 35. poor image. no public appeal
- 38. his appearance on TV. doesn't come across on TV
- 44. no appeal to young. just for the old
- 62. doesn't have international respect. not good in foreign affairs

8. Stanfield Image

- 18. didn't do a good job as Premier of Nova Scotia
- 23. too many promises
- 27. too critical. not constructive in his criticism. personal attacks
- 32. poor campaigner. smutty campaign
- 39. too sneering. derisive
- 41. didn't like what he did in Moncton, what he did to Leonard Jones
- 42. forcing the election
- 43. doesn't know when to give up
- 45. biased
- 47. he hasn't done much. done a poor job
- 59. carries a grudge
- 10. too old. his age. we need a younger man
- 22. he is English. looks English
- 56. he is too rich
- 55. he is a Conservative. his party. his politics
- 11. everything
- 37. his appearance. looks
- 61. Diefenbaker (any mention)
- 63. got credit for new flag

9. Stanfield Issue Positions

- 12. his wage and price controls or freeze. price freeze
- 13. his policies. platform
- 14. his ideas. most of his ideas
- 16. not modern enough. old fashioned ideas. not up with the times
- 19. too much for Nova Scotia
- 20. more for the east
- 21. can't represent French Canada. not popular in Quebec and he hates French people
- 46. backed off from conservative principles
- 49. not interested in working people
- 50. not interested in the poor

- 51. too much for the rich
- 52. too much for industry or big business
- 53. not doing much about inflation, cost of living, high prices
- 57. not for the old, Liberals give more to aged, policy on pensions
- 65. lowered unemployment insurance, welfare policy
- 66. no policies
- 67. socialist approach
- 69. he left Nova Scotia, not concerned with Nova Scotia

David Lewis -- Positive Mentions

1. Lewis Competence

- 01. intelligent, knows what he is talking about, bright, capable, smart
- 76. experienced

2. Lewis Dynamism

- 07. good leader, has leadership qualities, would make a good prime minister
- 26. his courage, guts
- 27. decisive, able to make decisions
- 29. aggressive, fights for what he believes, stands behind his convictions
- 53. determined, he keeps trying
- 61. he is strong
- 75. his energy
- 77. can convince me

3. Lewis Integrity

- 02. honest, sincere, straightforward
- 05. good man
- 17. outspoken, speaks his mind
- 38. he is just, fair, reasonable
- 44. admits when he does not know answer
- 78. not in politics just for the money

4. Lewis Empathy

- 20. he is humane, sympathetic, understanding
- 34. he is concerned about Canada, done a lot for Canada
- 35. he is concerned about common and ordinary people, interested in people
- 36. he helps people
- 43. genuinely concerned about problems, he understands, he cares

5. Lewis Responsibility

- 06. good worker. works hard. he tries hard. gets things done
- 08. calm. comes on quietly
- 24. down to earth type of man. practical. realistic. common-sense. more ordinary
- 79. serious

6. Lewis Personal Style

- 03. nice person. personality. nice man. I like him. likeable
- 10. sense of humour
- 18. charming
- 23. interesting. fascinating
- 25. friendly. easy to talk to. warm. charisma. pleasant
- 74. his style

7. Lewis Political Style

- 04. good speaker. a very fine speaker. articulate. manner of speaking. enjoy listening to him
- 12. speaks good French. he is bilingual
- 15. he is dedicated to his party. works hard for the NDP
- 22. a good politician
- 31. he is a good statesman
- 49. good at compromise
- 50. ability to clarify issues and the way he puts them across
- 71. his TV appearances. steals the show in panel discussions

8. Lewis Image

- 30. did a good job in opposition. kept other parties on their toes or in line. did a good job in Ottawa. good opposition leader
- 57. his campaign. went door to door
- 66. would be a good candidate
- 69. did a lot for his constituency
- 09. his wife. his son. good family man
- 13. he is scottish
- 14. because he is a foreigner
- 16. self-educated man. self-made man
- 63. good business man
- 81. he is retired
- 11. nice-looking. his smile. friendly face
- 48. he is O. K. has good points
- 54. true Canadian
- 65. sorry he lost election. treated badly in election
- 80. third party is necessary to split votes

9. Lewis Issue Positions

- 19. I like his ideas. good ideas

- 21. his policies, programmes, platform
- 32. he is concerned about inflation or high prices or cost of living and trying to do something about it, like his policies on how to handle inflation or prices
- 33. his efforts for French Canadians
- 37. he cares about old people, has done a lot for old people or pensioners
- 38. he is for working man or working people
- 40. he is for labour
- 41. he is for the working class
- 42. he is for farmers, does more for agriculture
- 45. works for poor, under-privileged
- 46. like his ideas on corporate taxes, big corporations (any mention)
- 47. really believes in socialism, lives up to his ideals
- 51. like his idea about getting pensions at sixty
- 55. policy on housing
- 56. trying to get more industry
- 58. not controlled by big business
- 59. his policy on exposure of where campaign funds come from
- 60. better immigration policy
- 62. policy on guaranteed wage
- 64. policy on taxes
- 68. other specific welfare policies
- 70. tried to help west or west coast
- 72. attitude toward bureaucracy
- 73. his promises sound good

David Lewis -- Negative Mentions

- 1. Lewis Competence
- 33. not capable, doesn't know what he is talking about
- 2. Lewis Dynamism
- 07. not a good leader, wouldn't want him as leader of government
- 08. not aggressive enough
- 09. too weak, not strong enough
- 17. didn't stick to what he said, changes his mind, erratic
- 18. mysterious, hedges, doesn't give decisions
- 66. too easily led by radical members of his party
- 3. Lewis Integrity
- 24. insincere
- 25. makes statements without fact, or twists facts
- 31. his attitude toward Canadian people, manipulation of people
- 46. don't trust him, don't believe him

54. too influential. his manipulating ways

4. Lewis Empathy

No mentions.

5. Lewis Responsibility

35. not realistic. too visionary. solutions sound so easy

6. Lewis Personal Style

19. he is too pushy or aggressive. always fighting or arguing

22. over-confident

28. too arrogant

30. attitude. manner. his way. general dislike (not specified)

36. lack of personality

44. he is a clown

49. too ambitious

55. domineering. bit of a dictator

61. his single-mindedness

65. not a constructive person

7. Lewis Political Style

23. not a good image for the party. doesn't benefit the NDP. they should have a man like Trudeau

26. poor speaker. too repetitive

27. sensationalistic

34. not a politician

43. speaks French poorly

47. he is boring

58. didn't like him on TV

64. changed his image

8. Lewis Image

04. he brought the government down. forced the election

14. supported the Liberals or Trudeau too much

15. didn't support the Liberals enough. found too much fault with the Liberals

16. lost in his own riding. ran a bad campaign

21. verbal attacks. name-calling. never gives other party credit

32. too political. worked too hard for his cause. not enough support from own members

42. too meddlesome

48. overdoes his opposition. doesn't know how to utilize power

57. too much control in the last house

62. wouldn't help workers when they were on strike

- 68. his quitting the party
- 10. too old
- 59. his sons
- 67. his Jewishness that comes out
- 01. his party, his politics, he is in the wrong party
- 11. everything
- 29. easy for him to make promises when he knows he won't get in
- 37. his appearance, looks
- 44. he is a clown
- 63. wouldn't vote for him

9. Lewis Issue Positions

- 02. his policies, platform, some of his policies, his program
- 03. his ideas, NDP philosophy
- 05. corporate rip-off, against corporations
- 06. ties with unions, don't like unions
- 12. too socialistic, socialism
- 13. welfare program, welfare state
- 20. more for the east
- 38. do away with free enterprise, control of industry, nationalization
- 39. people think of socialism as communism
- 41. old age pension at sixty
- 45. can't represent French Canadians or Quebec
- 50. too close to communism
- 51. more for west
- 52. seems against anyone with money
- 53. afraid of FLQ
- 56. policies involve spending of too much money
- 60. other specific policies (women's issues, medicare, education, unemployment, inflation)

APPENDIX B

Codes for Leader Like Dislike Questions -- 1979

[Source: H.D. Clarke, J. Jenson, L. LeDuc and J.H. Pammett (1982). 1974-1979-1980 Canadian National Elections and Quebec Referendum Panel Study Codebook. 2nd Release. Windsor, Ontario.]

Pierre Trudeau -- Positive Mentions

1. Trudeau Competence

- 01. intelligent, smart, capable, bright, clever, knows what he is talking about, brilliant, shrewd, perceptive
- 18. intellectual, scholar, well-educated
- 46. handles problems crises well
- 55. like the way he ran the country or government
- 87. more experienced
- 90. good administrator

2. Trudeau Dynamism

- 07. good leader, leadership qualities, his leadership, best leader, ideal leader, strong leader, good man for the job
- 14. dynamic, energetic, forceful, vigorous, man of action
- 26. his courage, guts, spunk, bravery
- 27. decisive, able to make decisions, doesn't evade the issue
- 29. aggressive, stands behind his convictions
- 43. has a way with people, has charisma, his popularity, magnetism
- 47. confident, very positive
- 50. he acts quickly
- 52. his ambition
- 61. he is strong

3. Trudeau Integrity

- 02. honest, sincere, straightforward, frank, direct, integrity
- 05. good man, fine man
- 17. outspoken, says what he thinks, blunt, mind of his own
- 28. he is just, fair
- 53. he keeps his promises or most of his promises, made a lot of good promises
- 78. his independence

4. Trudeau Empathy

- 34. he is concerned about Canada, interested in Canada, he has done a lot for Canada, anxious to lead Canada well and to do what is best for Canada
- 35. he is concerned about people, interested in people, understands people, interested in Canadians
- 36. he has helped the people
- 39. he is for all walks of life, everyone
- 44. not patronizing
- 76. sympathetic, understanding, sensitive. (unspecified)

5. Trudeau Responsibility

- 06. works hard, doing a good job, tries hard; gets things done
- 08. calm, cool easy manner, unruffled
- 21. broad-minded, open-minded, tolerant
- 40. serious, mature, careful, controls himself
- 54. willing to admit mistakes, make compromises
- 63. he is realistic
- 66. doesn't make too many promises
- 86. I have confidence in him

6. Trudeau Personal Style

- 03. personality, nice personality, nice person, I like him, likeable
- 10. sense of humour
- 19. modern, up to date, progress onward, trying to change
- 20. colourful, flamboyant, flair, his style, classy
- 23. interesting
- 24. swinger, skier, athlete
- 25. cheerful, pleasant, always smiling, friendly
- 41. a gentleman, dignified, distinguished, I respect him
- 43. refreshing, different, 'nicest egomaniac around', his arrogance
- 74. he travels
- 79. his outlook on life

7. Trudeau Political Style

- 04. good speaker, speaking ability or manner
- 12. bilingual
- 22. a good politician
- 30. good internationally, good in foreign affairs
- 62. he is a diplomat statesman
- 71. handles press well
- 72. good image
- 73. his approach, manner, the way he acts, general like (unspecified)

- 77. the way he handles meetings. knows how to direct questions
- 80. comes over on TV very well

8. Trudeau Image

- 31. the way he handled FLQ La Porte affair
- 64. he has a good team. picks best people for jobs
- 65. ran a good campaign
- 68. he did a good job in minority government when he had a lot of opposition. he is good in opposition
- 75. he keeps people or the country informed of what is going on
- 09. good family man. his family. has settled down. good father to his children
- 13. French Canadian
- 15. he is young. youthful. looks young for his age
- 45. good upbringing. comes from a good background. a good lawyer
- 51. he has his own money. is a rich man. not in it for the money
- 89. handles family problems with class
- 92. he is Catholic
- 11. good-looking. handsome. his appearance
- 48. not a bad chap. he is ok
- 49. he is outstanding. perfect. the ideal man. like everything about him

9. Trudeau Issue Positions

- 32. the way he is handling Quebec. against separatism. keeping Quebec in Confederation. anxious for Quebec and the rest of Canada to get along
- 33. stands up for French language or French people. he represents them magnificently
- 37. he cares about old people. has done a lot for old people. for the pensioners. increased old age pensions
- 38. he is for young people. done a lot for younger generation. helps students
- 56. trying to keep peace
- 57. work he did as Minister of Justice. overhauling of Criminal Code. his views on homosexuality or abortion. people free to do what they want
- 58. becoming more socialistic
- 59. he is concerned about inflation. high prices. cost of living and is trying to do something about it
- 60. raised family allowance. widows allowance. allowance for disabled
- 67. like his ideas. most of his ideas. good ideas young ideas
- 69. the way he handled employment. jobs
- 70. like his policies (unspecified)

- 81. done a few things for the farmers (any mention of farmers or agriculture)
- 82. his attitude towards business
- 83. medicare, other welfare
- 84. economic policies (including taxes)
- 85. the way he is handling the oil crisis, energy crisis
- 91. he is a federalist

Pierre Trudeau -- Negative Mentions

1. Trudeau Competence

- 41. the way he ran the country or government
- 70. too intellectual, smart, talks down to people
- 93. made a mess of things, left a mess for Clark to clean up

2. Trudeau Dynamism

- 36. he is just a figurehead, a front man
- 44. not a good leader
- 84. changes his mind too often

3. Trudeau Integrity

- 23. he doesn't keep his promises, too many promises
- 24. he is dishonest, not sincere
- 32. doesn't answer questions directly, avoids taking a stand on issues, slow on decisions, generalizes too much, dodges the issues
- 78. I don't trust him

4. Trudeau Empathy

- 05. not concerned about people, not interested in people, doesn't care about people, doesn't understand people, their needs, problems of the people, doesn't do enough for the people
- 08. lack of concern for the country or Canada, only interested in country at election time
- 10. lack of concern, interest, or understanding (unspecified)
- 33. shrug of shoulder attitude, 'so what' attitude
- 91. he has lost touch with the people

5. Trudeau Responsibility

- 02. travels too much, takes too many holidays
- 03. playboy, playboy image antics
- 04. doesn't get much done, hasn't done much, doesn't attend to business
- 09. lack of concern about what is going on in government, not concerned about his job

- 12. spends too much of our money (taxpayers' money) on himself
- 42. could do a lot better. could do more
- 53. he is impatient
- 74. his temper
- 89. his emotions show through

6. Trudeau Personal Style

- 01. too arrogant. arrogant at times. overbearing
- 25. his language. uses bad words. swears. rude
- 27. sarcastic. ridicules
- 28. conceited. inflated ego. snob
- 29. personality. not a likeable man. just don't like him
- 30. manner. attitude. the way he acts. general approach (unspecified). outlook on life
- 31. his informality. not dignified. too flamboyant
- 38. too ambitious. power-hungry. do anything for votes
- 39. cool. aloof. not friendly
- 83. too stubborn. not flexible

7. Trudeau Political Style

- 26. he talks too much
- 35. image he presents as leader of Canada. not an admirable leader
- 72. too outspoken
- 73. poor speaker

8. Trudeau Image

- 34. too dictatorial. too independent. doesn't consult his minister enough. one man show
- 40. Trudeaumania style. the way he won votes with women
- 51. poor cabinet. unable to keep good members. poor choice of men
- 52. relies too much on some of his ministers or career civil servants
- 69. his behaviour with the press. belittles the press
- 79. he uses his wife to gain popularity. worried his wife into the hospital. too much publicity about his private life. don't like his private family life
- 80. spends too much time with his family. his personal life
- 90. he was in too long. shouldn't have run again
- 22. he is French
- 48. he is too rich. never had to suffer or work
- 49. his marrying such a young girl. Margaret. his separation
- 87. he is a non-veteran
- 46. his party. he is a Liberal. his politics
- 11. everything
- 37. his appearance: looks. specific mannerisms. voice

9. Trudeau Issue Positions

- 06. not concerned about. not interested in working people. working class
- 07. not concerned about. not interested in the poor
- 13. gives or loans too much money to other countries. foreign aid
- 14. too much money is spent on grants (O.F.Y., L.I.P., Canada Council)
- 15. spends too much money (other specific mentions)
- 16. spends. wastes too much money (unspecified)
- 17. gives too much to Quebec or French Canada. favours French Canada or Quebec
- 18. French language issue. catering to bilingualism. shoving French down our throats
- 19. too much for Ontario or Ottawa
- 20. too much for the east. forgets the West
- 21. not enough done for Quebec. thinks of other provinces before us in Quebec
- 43. not do anything or much about inflation. cost of living. high prices. his policies
- 45. his attitude towards atlantic and the prairie provinces
- 47. too extreme in his thinking. too socialistic. communistic
- 54. his stand on capital punishment
- 55. oil policy. fuel crisis
- 56. handling of unemployment. unemployment insurance
- 57. handling of old age security. not enough for aged
- 58. handling of welfare. abuse of welfare
- 59. handling of foreign affairs
- 60. handling of immigration
- 61. handling of Quebec question. separatism. Canadian unity
- 62. handling of large corporations. too much for large corporations
- 63. handling of American control
- 64. handling of taxes. taxes too high
- 65. handling of agriculture or farm problems. not enough for farmers
- 66. handling of legislation on moral issues. views of homosexuality or abortion
- 67. handling of other specific issues
- 68. dislike his policies (unspecified)
- 81. his economic policies
- 85. his ideas (unspecified)
- 86. doesn't do anything about unions. doesn't prevent strikes

Joe Clark -- Positive Mentions

1. Clark Competence

- 01. intelligent. capable. clever. brilliant. smart. knows what he is doing
- 33. will clean up the mess. put Canada on feet again. everything will change for the better
- 56. he is experienced. has the potential
- 57. would make a good administrator. organizer

2. Clark Dynamism

- 07. good leader. has leadership qualities
- 14. energetic. has vitality. enthusiastic
- 16. he is confident. assertive
- 26. his courage
- 43. he is a go-getter. stands behind his convictions. a fighter. aggressive
- 52. his ambition

3. Clark Integrity

- 02. honest. sincere. has integrity. straightforward. conscientious
- 05. good man
- 24. high moral standards doesn't swear. decent
- 40. has good intentions. means well. willing to try
- 42. he is respected. admired. I respect or admire him. proud of him
- 63. wants to be fair. fair man. democratic. does not favour one part of country. neutral

4. Clark Empathy

- 23. he is kind. generous. sympathetic. understanding
- 34. he is concerned about Canada
- 35. he is concerned about people. Canadian people. in touch with people
- 36. he has helped people. done a lot for people. would help people

5. Clark Responsibility

- 06. works hard. tries hard. does his best
- 08. calm. cool
- 27. steady. reliable
- 28. earnest. serious
- 29. determination. keeps trying. has stamina. tenacity. persistent. keen. willingness to learn
- 51. plans carefully. takes his time

6. Clark Personal Style

- 03. nice person, like him, good personality
- 10. sense of humour
- 17. he is humble, home-style, modest, not a show-off
- 25. friendly, pleasant person, warm
- 30. more human, down to earth, can make mistakes
- 45. a nice change, fresh approach, new blood, it was time to give him a chance, we need a change
- 47. he is different
- 64. his manner, his way style (unspecified)
- 74. his laugh, belly laugh

7. Clark Political Style

- 04. good speaker, improved speaker
- 12. bilingual
- 22. a good politician, has political style
- 31. well thought of internationally, did well on his trip to Africa Japan, foreign policy
- 38. liked him on TV, good impression on TV
- 59. not a one man show, a team man, consults with ministers, accepts other opinions
- 69. his disregard of the media

8. Clark Image

- 49. he performed well in his campaign, wanted to deal with issues, campaigned hard
- 58. he has a good team, selected good people
- 09. he is a family man
- 13. like his wife, good looking wife, she supports him
- 15. he is young
- 61. he is a Westerner, Albertan
- 66. he is a Catholic
- 54. loyal to party, represents the party
- 11. nice good-looking, looks honest or sincere, his appearance
- 18. he is ok, not bad, just a man
- 21. better than Trudeau, as good as Trudeau (any mention)
- 46. his qualities, some things (unspecified)
- 65. reminds me of Diefenbaker
- 75. everything

9. Clark Issue Positions

- 19. conservative, moderate
- 20. he is a good man, more favourable to business
- 32. is concerned about inflation, high prices, cost of living and trying to do something about it
- 37. he cares about old people
- 41. his promises, good promises
- 44. I like his ideas, good ideas, new ideas
- 48. like his policies, good platform

- 50. understands young people
- 53. his mortgage deductability plan
- 60. would save us money. restraint on spending
- 62. interested in the West. knows problems of the West.
will do more for West
- 67. handling Quebec problem well
- 68. handles provinces better. ready to discuss with them
- 70. his view on capital punishment
- 71. his view on Petro-Can
- 72. he cares about unemployment
- 73. his view on embassy in Jerusalem

Joe Clark -- Negative Mentions

1. Clark Competence

- 11. not experienced enough
- 33. not intelligent enough. not capable. not a
good thinker. ineffectual

2. Clark Dynamism

- 01. not dynamic enough. too slow
- 02. not decisive enough. too hesitant. not sure of
himself. not confident
- 07. not a good leader. lacks leadership
- 08. not aggressive enough. not enough fight in him
- 09. too weak. not strong enough. we need a stronger man
- 15. undecided on issues
- 31. doesn't inspire confidence in him his ability.
doesn't impress people
- 36. not much charisma. leaves you flat. wishy-washy

3. Clark Integrity

- 24. not sincere. don't trust him. dishonest
- 50. he is out for himself. in politics for easy income

4. Clark Empathy

No Mentions

5. Clark Responsibility

- 12. hasty decisions. speaks and thinks later.
changes his mind too often
- 18. his impatience. not conservative enough
- 49. travels too much
- 54. he is not a realist

6. Clark Personal Style

- 03. personality. poor personality. lacks personality
- 25. he is rude
- 28. too arrogant. boastful. pompous. conceited
- 29. too stubborn
- 30. attitude, manner, style, general dislike (unspecified)
- 40. too quiet. doesn't say much
- 58. too ambitious

7. Clark Political Style

- 04. poor speaker. lack of speaking ability. manner of speaking
- 05. doesn't speak enough French
- 06. boring. not colourful enough. dull
- 16. lacks 'savoir-faire.' lacks finishing touches. clumsy
- 26. he talks too much
- 34. not a politician
- 35. poor image. no public appeal. not well-known
- 38. his appearance on TV. doesn't come across on TV
- 62. doesn't have international respect. not good in foreign affairs

8. Clark Image

- 17. bungles. makes mistakes
- 23. too many promises. unrealistic promises. won't be able to keep his promises
- 27. too critical. not constructive in his criticism. personal attacks
- 32. poor campaigner
- 47. he hasn't done much. hasn't taken over
- 48. he doesn't consult his ministers. too independent
- 61. should have opened parliament sooner
- 63. selection of cabinet - Flora
- 10. too young. not mature enough
- 22. he is English. Irish
- 41. his wife. his wife not using his name. his wife is too domineering
- 55. he is a Conservative. his party. his politics
- 37. his appearance. looks. walk
- 39. his nervous laugh
- 42. not a Canadian
- 51. no better than Trudeau

9. Clark Issue Positions

- 13. his policies. platform (unspecified)
- 14. his ideas. most of his ideas
- 19. helping Quebec. to separate
- 20. anti-French
- 21. his attitudes towards handling of Quebec (general)

- 43. embassy move to Jerusalem (any mention)
- 44. selling of Petro-Can. any mention of Petro-Can
- 45. cutting down on civil service. lay-offs
- 46. too many refugees
- 52. too much for industry or big business
- 53. not doing much about inflation. cost of living. high prices
- 56. hasn't done anything. much about employment
- 57. views on medicare. welfare. old age pension
- 59. oil gas policies. prices

Ed Broadbent -- Positive Mentions

1. Broadbent Competence

- 01. intelligent. knows what he is talking about. capable. smart
- 76. experienced. mature. a professional

2. Broadbent Dynamism

- 07. good leader. has leadership qualities
- 26. his courage. guts
- 27. decisive. able to make decisions
- 29. aggressive. fights for what he believes. stands behind his convictions
- 53. determined. he keeps trying. ambitious
- 61. he is strong. impressive
- 75. dynamic. energetic
- 77. confident

3. Broadbent Integrity

- 02. honest. sincere. straightforward. integrity
- 05. good man
- 17. outspoken. speaks his mind
- 28. he is just. fair. reasonable. democratic

4. Broadbent Empathy

- 20. he is humane. sympathetic. understanding
- 34. he is concerned about Canada. done a lot for Canada
- 35. he is concerned about common and ordinary people. interested in people
- 43. genuinely concerned about problems. he understands. he cares

5. Broadbent Responsibility

- 06. good worker. works hard. he tries hard. gets things done

- 08. calm. cool
- 16. the way he conducts himself. controls himself
- 24. down to earth type. practical. realistic. common sense
- 31. steady. constant. stable
- 49. not too radical
- 54. would keep his promises

6. Broadbent Personal Style

- 03. nice person. personality. nice man. I like him
- 10. sense of humour
- 14. a loner
- 18. charming. gentleman
- 25. friendly. easy to talk to. warm. pleasant
- 74. his style

7. Broadbent Political Style

- 04. good speaker. articulate. manner of speaking. enjoy listening to him
- 12. efforts made to improve his French speaking French
- 13. attitudes towards problems. handles problems well
- 22. a good politician
- 30. did a good job in opposition. talks to both parties
- 50. ability to clarify issues. keeps people informed
- 71. his TV appearances. steals the show

8. Broadbent Image

- 15. he is dedicated to his party. works hard for the NDP
- 72. good campaign
- 09. his wife. good family man
- 36. he is young
- 67. his party. it is a good party
- 11. his appearance. any mention
- 23. everything
- 48. he is ok. has good points
- 51. he wants Clark out
- 55. I would like him to run for other party
- 58. like Trudeau

9. Broadbent Issue Positions

- 19. I like his ideas. good ideas. fresh ideas
- 21. his policies. programmes. platform
- 32. he is concerned about inflation or high prices or cost of living and trying to do something about it. like his policies on how to handle inflation or prices
- 33. medicare. health care issues
- 37. he cares about old people. policies for aged
- 38. he is for working people
- 40. he is for labour
- 41. he is for the working class

- 42. opinion on unions
- 44. trying to do something about our natural resources
- 45. works for poor. under-privileged
- 46. like his ideas on corporate taxes. big corporations (any mention)
- 47. really believes in socialism. lives up to his ideals
- 56. would create more jobs. do more about unemployment
- 57. attitude toward Petro-Can
- 60. better immigration policy
- 64. policy on taxes
- 68. other specific welfare policies
- 70. tried to help West. helped the West

Ed Broadbent -- Negative Mentions

1. Broadbent Competence

- 33. not capable. lack of political understanding

2. Broadbent Dynamism

- 07. not a good leader. wouldn't want him as leader of government
- 08. lacks poise
- 09. too weak. not strong enough
- 17. changes his mind. erratic
- 32. fears his own party
- 66. too easily led by radical members of his party. misguided

3. Broadbent Integrity

- 24. insincere. don't trust him
- 41. doesn't act on unpopular issues

4. Broadbent Empathy

No Mentions

5. Broadbent Responsibility

- 05. he hasn't done doesn't do much
- 18. his temper. impatience
- 25. not informed enough. irresponsible statements
- 29. easy for him to make promises when he knows he won't get in
- 35. not realistic. too visionary. solutions sound too easy

6. Broadbent Personal Style

- 15. not flexible enough
- 16. his personality
- 22. too serious
- 28. too arrogant, egotistical
- 30. attitude, manner, his style way, general dislike (unspecified)
- 61. his single-mindedness

7. Broadbent Political Style

- 26. poor speaker, his voice
- 27. sensationalistic, exciteable
- 43. speaks French poorly
- 47. he is boring
- 58. didn't like him on TV, in TV debate

8. Broadbent Image

- 14. supports the Liberals too much, more Liberal than NDP
- 19. aggressive, always arguing fighting
- 21. name-calling, never gives other party any credit
- 34. over-estimates the importance of his party
- 39. hasn't enough good people working for him
- 42. interferes too much, give Clark a chance
- 57. he lost the election
- 59. don't like way he campaigned
- 20. too English
- 01. his party, his politics, he is in the wrong party
- 10. unable to carry out policies because party too weak
- 11. everything
- 31. his attitude toward Canadian people
- 37. his appearance, looks
- 63. wouldn't vote for him, don't agree with him

9. Broadbent Issue Positions

- 02. his policies, platform, some of his policies, his program
- 03. his ideas, NDP philosophy
- 04. radical changes ideas
- 06. ties with unions, don't like unions
- 12. too socialistic, socialism
- 23. doesn't support industry
- 36. his economic policies
- 38. against legalizing marijuana
- 44. he supports the separation of Quebec
- 45. poor relations with Quebec
- 51. more for West, nothing for east
- 56. policies involve spending of too much money

APPENDIX C

Codes for Leader Like/Dislike Questions -- 1984

[Source: R.D. Lambert, S.D. Brown, J.E. Curtis, B.J. Kay and J.M. Wilson (1986). 1984 Canadian National Election Study Codebook. Waterloo, Ontario.]

John Turner -- Positive Mentions

1 Turner Competence

- 01 intelligent, smart, capable, competent, clever
- 16 intellectual, well-educated
- 54 well-informed
- 87 more experienced, experienced, past experience
- 90 good administrator, business-like, organized

2 Turner Dynamism

- 07 good leader, leadership qualities, good man for the job
- 14 forceful, convincing, dynamic
- 26 his courage, guts, bravery, his determination, dedication
- 29 aggressive, stand behind his convictions, arrogant
- 42 has a way with people, charismatic
- 47 confident, sure of himself, can admit ignorance, can admit mistakes
- 52 his ambition
- 61 he is strong, firm

3 Turner Integrity

- 02 honest, sincere, straightforward, frank, integrity, decent
- 05 good man, I respect him, I believe him
- 17 outspoken, says what he thinks, mind of his own, forthright
- 27 doesn't evade the issue
- 28 he is fair
- 53 would have kept his promises
- 37 specified his policies

4 Turner Empathy

- 34 he is concerned about Canada, anxious to lead Canada well, to do what is best for Canada
- 35 he is concerned about people, interested about people, compassionate
- 76 sympathetic, understanding, more human, down to earth

5. Turner Responsibility

- 06. works hard, tries hard, would have done well
- 06. calm, cool, aloof
- 18. charming, a ladies' man
- 40. serious, earnest, thinks before he speaks
- 63. he is realistic
- 66. middle of the road
- 77. he is reserved, conservative

6. Turner Personal Style

- 03. personality, nice personality, nice person, I like him
- 20. his style, classy, sophisticated
- 21. open-minded, tolerant, easy to get along with, not arrogant
- 25. friendly, smiling, humorous
- 41. a gentleman, distinguished
- 56. a new face
- 72. good image, impressive
- 79. pat women on the backside
- 73. his approach, manner, attitude, general like

7. Turner Political Style

- 04. good speaker, speaker ability or manner
- 13. bilingual, policies on
- 22. a good politician, good political background
- 30. would have been good internationally, a good diplomat
- 43. the way he handles the media
- 44. puts his points over on TV, handles himself of TV
- 74. good with his inner party circle
- 80. good leader for opposition

8. Turner Image

- 09. good family man, his wife, his family
- 13. he is from the West, will help the West
- 15. he is young
- 23. he is a Liberal, his party
- 31. he is a good business man, successful, good business background
- 32. old enough to make mature decisions
- 36. wants to rebuild the Liberal party, do his best for the party
- 45. good upbringing, comes from a good background, a good lawyer
- 55. has a better team, getting a team together
- 60. his English, English Canadian, not French
- 64. attempts to create a more unified party, brought new outlook to the party, dedicated to the party
- 92. he is a Catholic, religious

- 10. good athlete
- 11. good looking, handsome, his appearance
- 19. a good Canadian
- 46. better than Trudeau, succeeded Trudeau, not Trudeau
- 48. not a bad chap, he is ok, give him a chance
- 49. like everything about him
- 50. same as Mulroney
- 51. similar to Trudeau, as good as Trudeau
- 58. he lost the election
- 59. makes more sense than Mulroney
- 78. stood up to Trudeau
- 98. miscellaneous

9. Turner Issue Positions


- 33. would represent Canada as a whole, unify Canada
- 38. he is for the young people
- 39. able to do something for working people, can relate to working people
- 57. did not like patronage appointments
- 62. restrains unions
- 65. greater understanding of issues
- 67. like his ideas, good ideas, new ideas
- 68. stand on women's rights, abortion, social issues
- 69. his promises about unemployment, job creation
- 70. like his policies (unspecified), some promises
- 71. housing policy
- 82. his attitude toward business, more free enterprise
- 84. economic policies, ideas (includes taxes)
- 93. he is good for certain areas of Canada, more for West
- 94. he ran in B.C., represents the West, understands the West

John Turner - Negative Mentions

1. Turner Competence

- 13. inexperienced, away from politics too long, out of touch, not qualified
- 33. can't work under pressure, he bungles, makes mistakes
- 42. incapable of running the government, incompetent, poor track record
- 57. not well-informed, doesn't know the facts
- 60. lacks organization, disorganized in his political movement

3 of/de 3



Mitsubishi

2. Turner Dynamism

- 06. no charisma. can't relate to general public
- 14. not dynamic. forceful enough. wishy-washy. weak. not impressive
- 44. not a good leader. not in control of party
- 50. not confident. unsure of himself. insecure. not decisive enough
- 51. relies too much on others. lets other people manipulate him
- 52. listens too much to some of his ministers. advisors
- 84. changes his mind too often

3. Turner Integrity

- 07. too slick. a showman. glib. too smooth shallow
- 23. he didn't keep his promises. too many promises
- 24. he is dishonest. not sincere. not trustworthy. phoney
- 32. avoids taking a stand on issues. dodges the issues
- 38. power-hungry. ruthless. too ambitious
- 40. he is an opportunist. there for the prestige. self-centered
- 41. he's a politician
- 78. I don't trust him

4. Turner Empathy

- 05. not concerned about people. not interested in people. the needs. doesn't do enough for people
- 08. lack of concern for Canada
- 10. lack of concern. interest (unspecified)
- 91. he his party lost touch with the people

5. Turner Responsibility

- 53. he is impatient
- 61. impulsive. makes decisions too quickly. speaks before he thinks contradicts himself. inconsistent
- 74. his temper. loses control. sulks

6. Turner Personal Style

- 01. too arrogant. patronizing. dogmatic
- 25. his language. rude
- 27. sarcastic
- 28. conceited. inflated ego. snob. pretentious
- 29. personality. don't like him. his character
- 30. manner. attitude. the way he acts. general approach (unspecified)
- 34. too dictatorial. not a team player

- 39. cool. not friendly, aloof. pompous
- 55. over-confident. too sure of himself. didn't admit mistakes
- 67. patronizing to women. chauvinist

7. Turner Political Style

- 15. his laugh. phoney. nervous laugh. his smile. his nervous cough
- 26. he talks too much
- 44. not a good leader. not in control of the party
- 45. not a politician
- 49. does not express himself well. inarticulate
- 54. he gets nervous. tense. nervous when he talks. not a ease with public
- 58. his TV appearance. not prepared for debates. poor debater
- 62. lack of ability to react. answer questions
- 77. speech mannerisms. stutters. stammers. mumbles. abrupt
- 73. poor speaker
- 86. his French is bad. poor
- 90. does not present himself well. not impressive. lacks charisma. not polished

8. Turner Image

- 02. his family attitude. wife
- 03. left the party. did not get along with Trudeau
- 56. not prepared. ready for campaign. election
- 59. did not all the issues. not properly briefed on all issues
- 64. can't have positive attitude. nothing constructive. obstructionist
- 65. he ran in the West. should have run in own riding
- 70. the way he re-entered politics. a chosen leader
- 71. called election too soon
- 75. the way he ran his campaign. poor campaign assistants
- 76. campaign criticizing other party. party leaders. out for a fight
- 83. should not have changed party
- 92. the bum patting episode. no respect for women
- 22. he is English
- 48. he is rich
- 87. he's a lawyer
- 46. his party. ~~he is a Liberal.~~ he is in wrong party
- 47. people who supported him. same cabinet as Trudeau
- 09. He is like Trudeau. agrees with Trudeau. a puppet of Trudeau
- 11. everything
- 35. image he presents as a leader of Canada
- 43. blames Trudeau for failure of party
- 37. his appearance. looks. mannerisms. eyes
- 79. similar to Mulroney
- 98. miscellaneous

9. Turner Issue Positions

- 16. cancelled the Queen's visit
- 17. his attitude towards women's rights issues
- 18. French language issue
- 19. favoured the West over the east, Quebec
- 20. too much for the east, forgets the West
- 21. too arrogant toward Quebec
- 36. he is for the middle class upper class, elitist
- 31. not concerned about, doesn't relate to working class, poor people
- 63. following old policies, no new ideas, not much of a change
- 66. his stand on abortion issue, women's issues
- 68. dislike his policies (unspecified)
- 69. not concerned about farmers
- 72. has socialist tendencies
- 80. he is really cutting Reagan
- 81. his economic policies (including taxes and interest rates)
- 82. the patronage issue, gave in to Trudeau
- 85. his ideas (unspecified)
- 93. miscellaneous specific policies or lack of policies
- 94. he represents big business, his association with big business

Brian Mulroney -- Positive Mentions

1. Mulroney Competence

- 01. intelligent, capable, clever, smart, well-prepared, knowledgeable, knows his job
- 21. well-educated, well-schooled
- 56. he is experienced, has the potential, qualifications
- 57. he is a good administrator, manager, organizer, ran a major corporation

2. Mulroney Dynamism

- 07. good leader, has leadership qualities, strong leader, good image for leader, good Prime Minister
- 14. energetic, enthusiastic, vigor, dynamic, aggressive, forceful
- 16. he is confident, sure of himself, level-headed
- 26. his courage, guts, he is strong
- 29. determination, decision, definite stand on issues, out to settle problems
- 52. his ambition
- 64. charisma, has a way with people, good with public

3. Mulroney Integrity

- 02. honest, sincere, integrity, straightforward.
open, direct, trust him
gives confidence
- 05. good man, good person
- 17. he is simple, honest
- 24. he is decent, high moral character
- 40. has good intentions, willing to try, will try
to do a good job, doing a good job, will try
to keep his promises, keeping his promises
- 43. stands behind his convictions
- 63. wants to be fair, does not favour one part of
country, neutrality
- 79. outspoken, not afraid to speak his mind

4. Mulroney Empathy

- 23. he is sympathetic
- 30. more human, down to earth
- 34. concerned about Canada, can draw Canada together,
good for Canada, believes in Canada
- 35. concerned about people, in touch with people
- 36. he would help people, cares for people,
understanding of people

5. Mulroney Responsibility

- 06. works hard, tries hard, tries hard, does his best,
dedicated, will work hard, will try
- 08. calm, cool, relaxed, easy going, doesn't lose
his temper
- 27. steady, reliable
- 28. serious, firm
- 32. open-minded, listens to people
- 37. practical
- 51. plans carefully, takes his time, thinks things
through, cautious
- 77. concerned about issues

6. Mulroney Personal Style

- 03. nice person, like him, good personality
- 05. good man, good person
- 10. sense of humour
- 25. friendly, pleasant person, warm, outgoing
- 45. a nice change, fresh approach, new blood,
we need a change
- 76. he is a positive person

7. Mulroney Political Style

- 12. bilingual
- 22. a good politician, his political style
- 31. well thought of internationally, communicates well with foreign countries
- 38. good impression on TV, debates, did well in debates
- 49. he performed well in his campaign, ran a good campaign
- 61. he is a conciliator, mediator
- 71. performs well in the house, knowledge of issues
- 73. speaks good French
- 80. the way he handles himself, aptitude, manner, comes across well
- 83. like the way he handles things, his approach
- 93. handles media well
- 94. convincingly projects his views to others

8. Mulroney Image

- 53. he wants to rebuild his party, pulling, pulled the party together, good for the party, has support of the party
- 58. selected good people, good organization behind him
- 59. consults with ministries, listens to advisors, issues
- 09. he is like a family man, includes wife
- 13. like his wife, good-looking wife, she supports him
- 15. he is young
- 19. working class background, will understand help the working man, small town boy
- 20. he is a good business man, has business background, experience
- 78. he is Quebecer, French-Canadian
- 80. business approach to government
- 84. he is a good Irishman
- 87. worked his way up, made it on his own
- 91. he is Catholic
- 11. good-looking, looks honest, his appearance, his smile
- 18. he is not bad, ordinary Joe, as good as anybody
- 74. like his voice
- 75. everything
- 81. well-groomed, dresses well
- 98. better one of the three, better than Trudeau, Broadbent, Turner

9. Mulroney Issue Positions

- 33. will put Canada on feet again
- 41. his promises, good promises
- 42. for middle class, average person
- 44. I like his ideas
- 46. for the farmer
- 47. women's issues (abortion equality)
- 48. like his policies, good platform

- 50. understands young people, views on youth
- 60. would save us money, cut spending, wages
- 62. interested in the West knows problems of the West, will do more for the West
- 65. knows a lot about economy, concerned about it, approach to the economy
- 66. unite French and English
- 67. he knows the problems of Quebec
- 68. handles provinces better, ready to discuss with them
- 69. for business, respects small business, free-enterprise attitude
- 70. trying to reduce the deficit, views on deficit
- 72. he cares about unemployment, promises more jobs
- 85. stand on social issues, has welfare conditions at heart, concern for poor
- 86. appointed Stephen Lewis, did not fire all Liberals
- 90. like his tax policies
- 92. Canada U.S. relations good

Brian Mulroney -- Negative Mentions

1. Mulroney Competence

- 11. not experienced enough in politics, came into politics at the top, green
- 31. doesn't inspire confidence in him, his ability, nervous
- 47. he hasn't done much, going to ruin country
- 67. doesn't do his homework, no brains

2. Mulroney Dynamism

- 01. not dynamic enough
- 02. not decisive enough, vague, evasive, not sure of himself, dodging questions, not definite
- 07. not a good leader, lacks leadership
- 09. too weak
- 12. hasty decisions, changes his mind too often
- 36. not much charisma, leaves you flat, wishy washy

3. Mulroney Integrity

- 20. opportunist
- 24. not sincere, don't trust him, dishonest, phoney, two-faced, sly
- 33. uses catch-phrases that have no meaning, stock answers
- 51. out for the vote, nothing for Nova Scotia only during election
- 58. too ambitious, too prepared, too good to be true, too well-organized, too agreeable, yes man, too nice
- 68. too smooth, glib, too much polish, slick, smug, plastic

4. Mulroney Empathy

- 50. he is out for himself, too much for himself
- 65. lack of concern for the average human being, not help people

5. Mulroney Responsibility

- 05. too emotional, too sensitive

6. Mulroney Personal Style

- 10. patronizing
- 22. aggressive, too aggressive
- 28. too arrogant, pompous, conceited, cocky, showman
- 03. personality
- 30. attitude, manner, style, general dislike, everything shifty eyes
- 44. too much laughing, smiling, joking, too flip
- 71. over confident, too positive about himself, too sure of himself, too deep

7. Mulroney Political Style

- 04. poor speaker
- 04. poor speaker, the way he speaks, repeats himself
- 16. lacks savoir-faire, lacks finishing touch, clumsy
- 26. he talks too much, always seems to be preaching
- 32. poor campaigner
- 34. not a politician
- 35. poor image
- 92. debating style

8. Mulroney Image

- 17. he was involved in unseating responsible for the fall of Joe Clark in Winnipeg
- 23. too many promises, unrealistic promises, won't be able to keep his promises, not keeping his promises
- 27. too critical, puts down leaders parties, name calling, sarcastic, demerits others rather merits own
- 38. too much power, scares me, too many drastic changes
- 48. doesn't consult his ministers, agree with other ministers
- 53. too secretive, not running open government
- 78. his closing of the iron ore mines (Schefferville), leaving people unemployed in northern Quebec city, conduct a iron ore mines
- 80. uses his wife as a pretty picture, wife follows him as a shadow
- 18. business background, free-enterprise attitude
- 41. his wife, she spends a lot of money
- 62. his background, company he keeps

- 74. he's French, stresses fact that has French power
- 91. limited business experience, not as good at looking after business as Turner
- 55. he is a Conservative, his party
- 08. dislike everything
- 19. too much like Turner
- 37. his appearance, looks, looks slick, looks dishonest, smile
- 39. his chin, jaw, mouth
- 46. smokes two packs a day
- 76. his voice, not clear, too quiet, tone of his voice, not loud enough
- 77. no different from the rest, stereotype politician
- 90. only there as anti-Liberal vote
- 98. miscellaneous

9. Mulroney Issue Positions

- 13. his policies, platform (unspecified)
- 14. his ideas
- 15. undecided on issues, no clear cut policy, evasive on specific issues
- 21. should have taken action stand on death penalty, capital punishment
- 25. Cut down social programme, social policy, family allowance
- 29. caters to foreign countries, lack of foreign policy
- 40. put gas prices up
- 42. his stand on specific issues, federal corporations (metric)
- 43. his stand on women's issues, abortion rights, sexual equality, wife beating
- 45. increased cabinet 32-40 ministers, promised to decrease civil servants
- 49. collects ideas from others, no change from Liberals
- 52. too much for industry, big business, Bay Street image
- 54. not tuned into working people, labour
- 56. too right-wing economically and militarily
- 57. views on old age pensions
- 59. cutting instead of creating jobs, not helping employees
- 63. spends too much
- 64. budget, sales tax
- 66. avoid budget issues, pretends to have solutions to economic problems, economic programme
- 69. too close connection with U.S., tried to sound like Reagan
sell Canada to U.S., new style American politician
- 70. too much of an easterner, everything for the east, nothing for the West, chose ministers from the east
- 72. pushing French language, force people to speak French, too strong on his French language bit, more languages than French

- 73. too much of a Quebecer. all for Quebec. cater to Quebec from Quebec
- 75. favours wealthy. upper crust. cannot deal with poverty. too wealthy
- 79. doesn't deal with face women's issues
- 81. cutting arts budget
- 82. fiscal policy. interest rates. deficit
- 83. energy policy
- 84. environment policy. acid rain
- 85. defense policy. cruise missile policy. warmonger
- 87. for middle class
- 93. nothing farmers. rural

Ed Broadbent -- Positive Mentions

1. Broadbent Competence

- 01. intelligent. knows what he is talking about. capable. smart
- 59. business knowledge
- 70. well-educated
- 76. experienced. a professional
- 80. well-versed in international politics
- 81. well-informed

2. Broadbent Dynamism

- 07. good leader. has leadership qualities
- 26. his courage. guts
- 27. decisive. able to make decisions
- 44. relates well to people. good image. charisma
- 61. he is strong. impressive
- 75. dynamic. energetic
- 77. confident

3. Broadbent Integrity

- 02. honest. sincere. straightforward. integrity. open. conveys trust
- 05. good man
- 17. outspoken. speaks his mind
- 28. he is fair. open-minded. willing to listen
- 29. aggressive. fights for what he believes. stands behind his convictions
- 47. really believes in socialism
- 54. would keep his promises
- 63. has good intentions. means well
- 85. sees government as being equitable to all segments of society

4. Broadbent Empathy

- 20. he is humane, sympathetic, understanding, compassionate
- 34. he is concerned about Canada, would do a lot if elected
- 35. he is concerned about common, ordinary people, interested in people
- 43. he understands, cares
- 58. knows problems of Canadians, what Canadians want
- 65. he is simple

5. Broadbent Responsibility

- 06. good worker, works hard, he tries hard, gets things done
- 08. calm, cool
- 24. down to earth type, practical, realistic, common sense
- 31. steady, stable, dependable, consistent
- 53. determined, he keeps trying

6. Broadbent Personal Style

- 74. his style, attitude, manner, presents himself well
- 03. nice person, personality, nice man, I like him
- 05. good man
- 10. sense of humour
- 14. attitude is progressing, positive attitude
- 18. charming, gentleman
- 25. friendly, easy to talk to, warm, pleasant

7. Broadbent Political Style

- 04. good speaker, articulate, manner of speaking, enjoy listening to him
- 12. efforts made to improve his French, speak French, bilingual
- 13. attitude towards problems, handles problems well, handles questions well
- 16. the way he conducts himself, controls himself
- 21. efforts made to improve his French, speak French, bilingual
- 22. a good politician
- 23. does well in debates, good debater
- 50. ability to clarify issues, keeps people informed
- 57. knows parliamentary procedure
- 71. his TV appearance, steals the show
- 72. good campaign

8. Broadbent Image

- 15. he is dedicated to his party, works hard for the NDP
- 27. too critical, put down leaders, parties, name calling, sarcastic, demerits others rather than merits of his own
- 30. does a good job in opposition, strong name in opposition

- 79. he keeps in touch with his constituency
- 92. does not mud sling
- 09. his wife, good family man
- 55. I would like him to run for other party. he is in wrong party
- 11. his appearance, any mention
- 48. he is ok. has good points
- 49. everything
- 69. better than the other two

9. Broadbent Issue Positions

- 19. I like his ideas, good ideas
- 32. concerned about inflation, high prices
- 33. Medicare, health care issues
- 36. speaks for, appeal to minorities
- 37. he cares about old people
- 38. he is for the working people
- 40. he is for labour
- 41. he is for the working class
- 42. opinion on unions
- 46. like his ideas on big corporations
- 45. works for poor, under-privileged, concern about poor
- 51. his stand on issues, firm stand on issues
- 56. would create more jobs, do more about unemployment, his stand on unemployment
- 60. his ideas about external affairs
- 62. women's rights, social issues
- 64. policy on taxes
- 66. has good economic policy, tries to keep expenses down
- 68. has good people working for him
- 73. his armed forces policy
- 78. understands the needs of the middle class
- 82. concerned about farmers
- 83. concerned about the West
- 84. concerned about language rights
- 86. position on Auto Pact
- 87. his position on nuclear disarmament
- 90. his views on capital punishment
- 91. he can help the provinces
- 94. not as business-oriented as the others

Ed Broadbent -- Negative Mentions

1. Broadbent Competence

- 05. he doesn't do much work
- 15. doesn't seem too intelligent, bright, a bit naive
- 25. not informed enough, makes irresponsible statements

- 33. not capable
- 38. unorganized, not prepared
- 79. he has no answers

2. Broadbent Dynamism

- 09. too weak, not strong enough
- 13. too easily persuaded
- 17. changes his mind
- 31. too neutral
- 73. lacks confidence, not confident enough

3. Broadbent Integrity

- 08. he is an opportunist, out for himself
- 24. insincere, don't trust him
- 29. easy for him to make promises when he knows he won't get in
- 41. doesn't act on unpopular issues
- 52. he is a politician
- 60. fence jumper, butters up to whichever side he needs to get what he wants
- 70. he's desperate for votes
- 82. he avoids direct questions

5. Broadbent Responsibility

- 18. his temper, impatience
- 27. excitable
- 35. not realistic, too visionary, solutions sound too easy

6. Broadbent Personal Style

- 16. his personality
- 28. too arrogant, over-confident
- 30. attitude, manner, style, general dislike
- 46. too outspoken, too forward
- 47. he is boring, dull, no flair
- 61. his single-mindedness
- 71. he reminded me of Trudeau
- 83. he's full of hot air

7. Broadbent Political Style

- 22. not good with people, lacks public image, charisma, not a good image
- 23. talks too much
- 26. poor speaker
- 43. speaks French poorly
- 58. didn't like him on TV in TV debates
- 59. didn't like the way he campaigned
- 78. he's a very opinionated speaker
- 94. not as articulate smooth as Mulroney

8. Broadbent Image

- 07. not a good leader, wouldn't want him as leader of government
- 14. supports the Liberals too much, more Liberal than NDP
- 19. aggressive, always arguing, fighting
- 21. name calling, never gives other party any credit, criticizes other candidates, party leaders
- 34. over-estimates the importance of his party
- 51. difficult, a mud-slinger, obstructionist
- 53. too critical
- 54. too party oriented
- 55. been in too long, overrun his time limit as leader for NDP
- 69. very negative in his remarks, he's negative
- 76. he tends to put his foot in his mouth
- 85. nitpicks over insignificant things
- 92. doesn't concentrate enough on unity of his party
- 98. attracts bad publicity to the NDP
- 20. too English
- 01. his party, his politics, he is in the wrong party
- 39. doesn't have enough good people working for him
- 37. his appearance, looks
- 42. has no hope of forming government
- 63. he is no different from the rest
- 80. find it hard to take him seriously

9. Broadbent Issue Positions

- 02. his policies, platform, some of his policies
- 03. his ideas, NDP philosophy
- 04. radical ideas
- 06. ties with unions, don't like unions, labour movement
- 12. too socialist, socialism
- 32. mild form of communism, communistic look on life, too far left
- 36. his economic policies
- 44. no respect for taxpayers money
- 45. poor relations with Quebec
- 48. too involved with women's issues, pushes women's rights too much
- 49. stand on abortion
- 50. too nationalistic
- 56. policies involve spending of too much money, higher unemployment benefits
- 57. the nuclear arms issue, policies, NATO
- 62. too many handouts
- 64. his stand on capital punishment
- 65. too anti-American
- 66. leans toward French language issues
- 67. his attitude towards business, anything big, powerful
- 68. his attitude towards foreign investment

72. his policy regarding interest rates
74. for bringing in the wearing of helmets and seatbelts
75. too much for the east
77. he tends to stereotype the workers
81. concentrates too much on one class
84. he's very sincerely wrong
86. he's old-fashioned in his ethic
87. social issues (unspecified), programmes (unspecified)
90. wants too much government-control
91. doesn't put enough effort into getting provincial support. general support
93. supports metric system, conversion into metric
96. nothing at all disliked

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