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NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION

By

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Bachelor of Arts, Honours, Queen's University, 1982

THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The hypothesis of the paper is that nationalism and integration are compatible with each other, and only conflict when the integrationist tendencies in society become over-bearing. To study the hypothesis to the fullest extent possible, we explored it in both intellectual and concrete terms. Chapter One looks at the literature on nationalism and concludes that it can be used in the integration processes of society. Chapter Two examines how nationalism is treated by the modern proponents of integration. The functionalist, neo-functionalist, federalist and pluralist schools of integration are explored in the chapter. Chapter Three examines the hypothesis in concrete terms with an exploration of how nationalism contributed to nation-state development in Africa. Finally, Chapter Four looks at how nationalism stood as a barrier to expansive integration attempts in Western Europe, particularly in the post-World War II era.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION

It is a misnomer to call the study of politics a science.
More correctly, politics is an activity concerned with the
changing relationships between various societal actors, --from
individuals to international organizations. Since politics is
a multifarious discipline, it is questionable whether any
standardized approach can be applied universally to the field.
One area of disagreement amongst students of politics
centres around the question of the continued relevance of the
nation-state as a necessary political institution. Since the
rise of the nation-state as the prime political reality in the
early eighteenth century, opinions about the institution have
ranged from it being simply an organization of convenience for
one particular group,[1] to a natural organism that could greatly
benefit the whole of society.[2] From a period of relative

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[1] J. Stalin, <u>The National Question and Leninism</u> (Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 16.

[2] Giuseppi Mazzini, "Lecture in London on Italian National
Aspirations, 1852", in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), <u>The Dynamics of
Nationalism: Readings in its Meaning and Development</u>
(Princeton: D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 184-185.

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invincibility that lasted for over two centuries, the whole organizing concept of the nation-state has become somewhat tarnished, particularly since World War II. In that war, the Germans and Italians had no qualms about sacrificing their citizens for the greater glory of the nation-state. If this tendency to belittle the individual for the glory of the nation-state is widespread, then those who seek to destroy the institution would be justified in attempting to replace it with more functional organizations.

Along with the nation-state, another related concept, nationalism, also has come under close scrutiny in the latter stages of this Century. We would have to agree with Symmons-Symonolewicz, who sees the prominent position of nationalism in the political literature resulting largely from the fact that it has been fused with ideologies such as totalitarianism and racism.[3] Thus, it is not at all surprising that the idea of nationalism has fallen into disfavour amongst those who fear that it will hasten a return to extreme political causes. While the above opinion, which holds that nationalism is a dysfunctional holdover from an earlier period of political history, is the dominant position nowadays, we must strive to separate this idea from those ideologies which have used nationalism to further their own ends. Nationalism is not an elaborate theory of history; therefore, it does not possess any particular mode

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[3]Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz, Nationalist Movements: A Comparative View (Meadville: Maplewood Press, 1970), p. 5.

of action.[4] Nevertheless, nationalism is often given the
"importance and a prominence far exceeding the real dimensions
of the phenomenon, almost deifying it as a supreme principle of
human history."[5]

At the same time that nationalism began to be discredited
as a useful tool for political organization, there began to
emerge a new social concept for organizing the world into new
and revolutionary political units. This new principle, integra-
tion, claimed that if humanity followed the prescription that
it presented, political tensions would be minimized and man
could reach new pinnacles of economic, political and social
development. The theory is premised on the perception that
societal values are not distributed equally in the world.
Duverger expresses these sentiments:

> When men struggle to rise above their wretched
> condition and leave behind them a world of privation
> and poverty, when others fight to avoid a similar
> world, to defend their privileges against the on-
> slaught of the oppressed and exploited, it is
> natural for all possible methods of ensuring victory
> to be used, including physical violence: riots,
> revolts, revolutions, civil wars, acts of violence,
> repression, executions, armed seizure of power; the
> way of politics is strewn with corpses. The tendency
> to resolve conflict by bloodshed is ever present.[6]

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[4]Ibid., p. 40, Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 135.

[5]Benjamin Akzin, States and Nations (Garden City: Double-
day and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 209.

[6]Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics: The Uses of Power
in Society (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1977), p. 165.

Along with their evident concern about political conflict, such theorists see integration not as a condition, but rather as a competition that must be constantly won and rewon.[7] In the end, integrationists see their work culminating in the development of a community which:

> . . . will share and centrally regulate activities
> that answer functional problems of all four types:
> adapt to its ecological and social environment,
> allocate means and rewards among its subunits,
> integrate its subunits into one polity, and estab-
> lish as well as reinforce the identitive commit-
> ments of its members.[8]

Thus, the crux of integration would appear to be geared towards breaking down national communities, and in their place, creating some higher form of social organization.

However, before we proceed to alter a historical institution, we must look at the nation-state in the context that Edmund Burke presents to us in his "Reflections on the Revolution in France." In that study, Burke concluded that the proper way of judging a phenomenon was to:

> . . . stand upon that elevation of reason, which
> places centuries under our eye, and brings things
> to the true point of comparison, which obscures
> little names, and effaces the colours of little
> parties, and to which nothing can ascend but the
> spirit and moral quality of human actions . . .[9]

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[7] Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 109.

[8] Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 331.

[9] Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France," in Bernard Wishy, et.al. (eds.), Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 104-105.

If the perfect political arrangements could be introduced into society with one swift thrust -- whether revolutionary or by common consent -- then there would be no need to seek out new organizing principles, as man would already be in possession of such ideas. Unfortunately, such utopian thinking largely remains in the domain of speculation, and has little intrinsic value in the predicament in which presently we find ourselves.

Whether the nation-state continues to be an important political institution in the world seems to depend upon the outcome of a struggle between the two apparently conflicting ideas, nationalism and integration. If we examine both nationalism and integration closely, they do appear to represent quite different political ideals; and, at first glance, nationalism would appear to be a barrier to the peaceful integration of political systems. There can be little doubt that the basic gist of the argument is correct. However, to accept this idea as wholly valid would be in error. It is the argument of this paper that nationalism and integration are compatible and only conflict when the integrationist tendencies in society become too pervasive, thus, threatening the basic political structures and freedoms that individuals in society have grown accustomed to, and with which they identify. This study will take the approach that nationalism contributes to the successful integration of diverse groups into larger political entities, when such integration is beneficial to the participants. However, it also will be argued that when integrationist tendencies become overbearing -- particularly in the post-World War II

period -- and challenge legitimate societal institutions, modern nationalism mediates against such supranational urges and seeks to maintain the primacy of the historical structure.

Being faithful to Burke's prescription, we will examine the hypothesis in the light of many circumstances and over many time periods. Firstly, because we are dealing with a multi-dimensional phenomenon, we must endeavor to explore nationalism to determine its history, nature, and relevance. Nonetheless, we will not attempt to study the concept in the last half of the nineteenth century. An examination of this time period is useful for understanding how nationalism can be used concretely in the process of nation-state development. However, it is the purpose of this chapter to explore the more diffuse preconditions that converged to create nationalistic action in this and other time periods. After we have done this, we should be able to develop a working definition of nationalism and its contribution to society.

Secondly, after looking at the historical development of nationalism, we can proceed to study how the concept is treated in the major schools of integration. The approaches to integration that will be examined are functionalism, neofunctionalism, federalism and pluralism.

Thirdly, once we have derived an understanding of how nationalism has been treated in the integration literature, we can move into a more concrete area and explore how nationalism serves as a device of integration. This will be

done by looking at how nationalism has contributed to the creation of nation-states on the African continent.

Finally, the paper will concern itself with a discussion of how nationalism protects the basic freedoms of the individual against the pervasive integrationist tendencies of the post-World War II era. In this section, we will pay particular attention to how supranational organizations affect the operation of the nation-state, and how nationalism helps deflect the tendencies of these organizations to usurp the authority of the nation-state.

After we have looked at the four chapters in the study, it is hoped that we can re-examine the hypothesis and decide whether it is valid or not. Finally, it is hoped that we can gain some understanding of the complex nature of society, and the multitude of relationships that take place within its bounds.

CHAPTER ONE

NATIONALISM: HISTORY AND VARIATIONS

Before we begin to study our hypothesis in concrete terms,
we must examine the literature on nationalism and integration.
To this end, Chapter One will examine the history and develop-
ment of nationalism as a concept and how it can be applied to
the political development of societies.

i. Nationalism: Historical Development

The French Revolution usually is credited as being the
genesis of modern nationalism. The variety of nationalism that
was created in those revolutionary years provided "some popular
substitute for the sense of belonging in a known public order
which perished with the collapse of feudalism."[1] Although
there may be some truth in this, if we are to develop a full
and comprehensive understanding of the concept, we should
endeavor to seek out the latent elements of nationalism that
were evident in society before the French Revolution.

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[1]Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 81.

Nationalism is as much a psychological concept as a political idea. The basis of the idea lies in our understand= ing of human nature. It is extremely difficult for students of politics to speculate on human nature, and generally this type of investigation should be left to anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists. However, this concern should not prevent us from presenting certain ideas in support of nationalism as a political concept. Aristotle argued that humans were rational entities, and he also contended that their perfectability could be reached only when they bonded together to form a political community.[2] Indeed, Aristotle's idea is basic to our whole understanding of political man. In the earliest of times, the necessity of survival in a hostile environment forced primitive man to develop social communities. Later divisions of labour within these communities created the freedom necessary to further the rationality and perfectability of man. Thus, if large communities were created to service the desires of the individuals who came together to form them, it stands to reason that the nature and shape of these organizations would have their roots in the characters of the men who shaped them.[3]

While we can agree with Aristotle that man is a social animal and strives to create social organizations, we must remember that man is not particularly social with those that he

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[2]George H. Sabine, and Thomas L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1973), p. 121.

[3]Ernest Barker, "National Character", in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 62.

does not know.[4] Since it is comparatively easy for scholars to admit that the fundamental nature of man is illusive at best,[5] we are left in a quandry about what molds these simple communities into more stable and concrete social organizations. It would appear that over time, the members of these loose societies developed a set of complex, but somewhat vague, feelings toward the society that they found themselves inhabiting. Hertz provides an interesting study of this group feeling in his massive work, Nationality in History and Politics: A Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Nationalism. In the study, the author suggests that this feeling is "a specific kind of group consciousness, or group solidarity, which constitutes a bond between the members of a group in regard to the pursuit of certain aims."[6] This consciousness, which Barbara Ward compares to egotism in human beings,[7] is the glue that cements diverse communities into relatively stable national units.

When searching history to find examples of this consciousness, Kedourie warns against trying to impose characteristics

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[4]Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 1.

[5]Boyd C. Shafer, "Men are More Alike", in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 73.

[6]Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics: A Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Nationalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1957), p. 15.

[7]Barbara Ward, Five Ideas that Changed the World (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 155.

upon groups where they arguably did not exist.[8] This is a
valid concern; however, there are many eminent scholars such
as Hayes, Holsti, and Akzin, who have suggested that many
primitive communities developed a semblance of group, or nation-
al consciousness in primeval times.[9] One group that began early
to develop a truly distinctive consciousness were the Jews.
The consciousness that separated the Jews from their neighbors
appears to have been centred upon the idea that they had a
special relationship with the Creator:

> Their historical consciousness projected unity into
> the events of the time and knit these closely together
> into a national history. The concept of universal
> history as a unified process, and with a special
> distinctive role for the Jewish nation at its center,
> appeared, from the time of Amos, more and more clearly
> in Hebrew literature. The task of man as a moral and
> acting vehicle of history -- national history first,
> and later national history in the framework of universal
> history -- was a certainty from the time of the sealing
> of the Covenant under Moses, and attained in the words
> of the prophets of its definite expression. History,
> national and universal -- but the universal always with
> the national as its center -- has its origin in its
> path, and in its end. The path of history was a road
> to its end, the Kingdom of God.[10]

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[8]Eli Kedourie, Nationalism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1960), p. 75.

[9]Carlton J.H. Hayes, "Historical Development of National-
ism, 1933", in Louis L. Snyder (ed.) op. cit., p. 37: K.J. Holsti,
International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1977), p. 34; Benjamin Akzin,
op. cit., pp. 53-54.

[10]Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins
and Background (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 35.

This approach to history and the consciousness that develops from it is symbolic of how a group comes to regard themselves as being special. Thus, Kohn is correct when he asserts that two of the more distasteful traits of nationalism -- the idea of a chosen people and the development of a national messianism -- emerged from this Jewish consciousness.[11] In a study published in 1931, Basil Mathews contended that Jesus transcended the negative principles of Jewish consciousness, and saw national gifts as not being the property of one particular nation to be hoarded, but rather held in trusteeship for the world.[12] However, even if Jesus did represent a new internationalism, the old Jewish principles were too strong to be suppressed and continued to be an evident part of many national movements.

The Greeks were the other historic people who apparently developed a national consciousness that separated them from their neighbors. While the Covenant with God was the basis for the Jews to consider themselves different from their neighbors, to the Greeks, it was their perceived intellectual and cultural superiority:

> As with the Jews, this consciousness of a differ-
> entiation pervaded all members of the Greek people.
> It became with them a true national sentiment, in
> no way restricted to the nobles or to the literati.
> Thus all Greeks were declared free, not like all

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[11] Ibid., p. 36.

[12] Basil Mathews, The Class of World Forces: A Study in Nationalism, Bolshevism and Christianity (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1931), p. 133.

Barbarians who were subject to a tyrannical king.
The racial differentiation went much further than
with the Jews; it involved elements unknown to
the Hebrews, as strong physical discrepancies
(the Barbarians generally were depicted as extremely
ugly and deformed) and a far-reaching intellectual
and cultural distinction (by reason of which the
possibility of rational thinking and ethical acting
was reserved to the Greeks alone). Sometimes the
Greeks expressed an unbridled and violent contempt
surpassing the most chauvinistic utterances of modern
nationalism.[13]

Thus, we can see that nationalistic characteristics began to
emerge in Greek thought, as they did in Jewish ideology.

If we are correct in our assumption that the Jews and
Greeks possessed knowledge of their own particular uniqueness,
we must wonder why they did not establish a nation-state. As
Hinsley suggests, while national identities were evident in
this time period, the capacity needed to develop the nation-
state was not evident in these communities.[14] Therefore,
while the development of a national consciousness is important,
it does not seem to be enough of a catalyst to cause the
evolution of a new level of political community.

The political awareness that both the Jews and Greeks
lacked, began to be developed in the Renaissance, and continued
to be expanded in the Reformation. In the Renaissance, the
peoples of Europe realized that they were unique beings and
received "inspiration from the ancient classics and from the

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[13]Hans Kohn, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

[14]F.H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System
(Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1973), p. 25.

Old Testament, both now read in a new light and with a new understanding."[15] This new individuality was important particularly when we remember that in the dark ages, the civilized world generally was organized into loosely knit kingdoms. Until the Renaissance, the Roman international traditions were too strong to allow the leadership to think in national terms.[16] In the Renaissance, however, individual nations started to see themselves as unique creations and started to recognize national symbols such as vernacular literature as legitimate expressions of their national state. The Reformation furthered this process by weakening the international powers of the Roman Catholic Church. This disruption "led to the paradox of disintegration on the one hand and integration on the other, simultaneously."[17] Akzin sums up the contributions of both the Renaissance and Reformation to the awakening of national sentiments in Europe:

> With the Renaissance and Reformation, mankind in Europe becomes generally more mobile in a physical sense, and its intellectual horizons broaden, embracing greater knowledge of other and different nations and stimulating perception of the difference. At the same time the role of religion as a common reference-point of political loyalties weakens, while dynastic and feudal allegiance as

[15] Hans Kohn, op. cit., p. 120.

[16] Halvdan Koht, "The Dawn of Nationalism in Europe", in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 30.

[17] Munif al-Razzaz, The Evolution of the Meaning of Nationalism (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), p. 13.

> ultimate justification of a political entity
> is increasingly displaced by the idea of the
> 'natural' right of peoples to be governed in
> accordance with their wishes.[18]

While we can agree that the preconditions for national development originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we must not forget that the seeds of the doctrine were planted many hundreds of years before in the Middle East and Greece.

ii Nationalism: Three Variations on a Basic Theme

Nationalism in the twentieth century has been dressed in many different ideological suits, to support movements that have ranged from Nazism in continental Europe to liberation movements in Africa. Nationalism is not as rigid as a mathematical equation, thus it is understandable that the concept could be used in a variety of ways. As nationalism first was being studied, many national groups contributed unique variations to the theory. However, it is apparent that three nationalities -- English, French and German -- developed highly complex notions of what nationalism meant, and how it should be applied. It would not be an overstatement to say that most, if not all, modern nationalist movements had their origins in one or another of these three variations. In the following section, we will examine each of the three varieties to see how nationalism was developed and used as a vehicle of change.

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[18] Benjamin Akzin, op. cit., p. 58.

The British strain of nationalism is probaly the oldest, and yet the least well known of the three major western varieties of the doctrine. Hayes in Essays on Nationalism concludes: "Nationality has always existed. Patriotism has long existed, either as applied to a locality or as extended to an empire. But the fusion of patriotism with nationality and the predominance of national patriotism over all other human loyalties -- which is nationalism -- is modern, very modern."[19] Hayes' opinion is quite correct if he is talking about continental Europe, where national boundaries were not rigid and the people within the state felt no loyalty to the political apparatus above them. However, if we look at the English, we would have to question the applicability of Hayes' contention. Since the English were able to gain an overall dominance in their region and, simply because Great Britain is an island, there developed a distinctive nationalism. There, nationalism was like a protective shell, under which people could freely interact.[20]

Since England is an island, its inhabitants were separated from other strong nationalities like the French or Germans, and have never, since 1066, experienced territorial defeat at the hands of a foreign invader. In the achievement of their dominant position in Great Britain, the English were able to actively promote the development of their own culture. In the fourteenth century, King Edward III prescribed the use of the

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[19]Carlton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 29.

[20]Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, (New York: D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 23.

English vernacular in his Court, instead of the French or Latin which previously had been used, while Chaucer inaugurated an English literature.[21] Later, the Tudors did much to implant the idea of English uniqueness, by founding a national church and creating a standing Royal Navy.[22]

Thus, the stage was set for the transition to an English nation-state in the seventeenth century, over a full century before this feat was accomplished on the continent. The Puritan Revolution of 1644 was the point of national consolidation, and Kohn suggests that the Jewish ideas of a chosen people, a covenant and messianic expectancy were embedded firmly in the Revolution.[23] However, we do not find the aggressive spirit that we would imagine would be associated with such concepts, but rather the reaffirmation of the individual as the basic element of society. Locke saw that the dignity, liberty and happiness of the individual, were all important and the basis of the natural life.[24] Milton concluded that nationalism was not a struggle for autonomy, but the result of a desire for freedom from authority:

> . . . a nation not slow and dull, but of a quick,
> ingenious, and piercing spirit, acute to invent,
> subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the
> reach of any point the highest that human capacity
> can soar to . . . . what could a man require more

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[21] Carlton J.H. Hayes, _Nationalism: A Religion_ (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 39.

[22] Hans Kohn, "The Genesis of English Nationalism," in Louis Snyder (ed.), _op. cit._, p. 78; Carlton J.H. Hayes, _Nationalism: A Religion_, p. 39, Boyd C. Shafer, _Nationalism: Myth and Reality_ (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1955), p. 71.

[23] Hans Kohn, _Nationalism: Its Meaning and History_, p. 16.

[24] _Ibid._, p. 18.

from a Nation so pliant and so prone to seek
after knowledge? What wants there to such a
towardly and pregnant soil, but wise and faith-
ful labourers, to make a knowing people, a Nation
of Prophets, of Sages and of Worthies."[25]

As there was a fusion of the individual with the state, England was thought to be a radical country, while France was considered to be the bastion of traditional stability -- the exact opposite would be true slightly more than a century later.[26]

Nationalism as an integral part of English national thought did not perish with the demise of the Puritans. The idea of nationalism was so entrenched in the English psyche, that the word <u>nation</u> was generally understood to distinguish between professions within society; Ben Johnson styled physicians "a subtle nation," while Samuel Butler thought lawyers "too wise a nation."[27] Along the same lines, because English nationalism developed into an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary force over time, it did not express itself overty in racial terminology. Bolingbroke, for one, thought that God had created the laws of reason and constitutionalism that were universal in nature.[28] Even in the arena of international politics, Bolingbroke showed the humanitarian nature of English nationalism.

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[25]John Milton, "National Pride, 1644," in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), <u>op. cit.,</u> pp. 80-81.

[26]Hans Kohn, <u>The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background</u>, p. 9.

[27]Carlton J.H. Hayes, <u>Essays on Nationalism</u>, p. 4.

[28]Carlton J.H. Hayes, <u>The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism</u>, p. 19.

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> And it is the prime business of every national
> government to further national interests, when
> the first great natural law requires a foreign
> policy of peace and a reasoned respect for the
> rights and interests of other nationalities.[29]

For Burke, a community developed a unique personality and special political and social structures, which were given tacit consent by the individual members because of their love for their nation.[30] It becomes clear that the philosophers who wrote about English nationalism thought more about institutions than about cultural differences.[31] As a consequence, nationalism in England was one of institutional development and modernity, while at the same time, it served to maintain a continuity between the past, present, and future. Therefore, English nationalism seems to have acquired a positive connotation, as a catalyst for humanitarian progress.

The development of nationalism in France took a different route than in England. English nationalism seemed to possess strong humanitarian traits. However, in the French variety, we find a revolutionary nationalism -- democratic in nature -- which quickened dramatically the national consciousness of France.[32] To understand the genesis of French nationalism, we must look at the work of Rousseau. In France, Rousseau devel-

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[29] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[30] Frederick Hertz, op. cit., p. 326; Edmund Burke, "Defense of Britain's Traditional Nationalism, 1790" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 85.

[31] Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism Movements (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1976), p. 7.

[32] Carlton J.H. Hayes, "Historical Development of Nationalism, 1933," in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 39.

oped ideas of popular government which previously had been examined by Locke in England and by other medieval scholars, including a group of Spanish Jesuit Priests.[33] In essence, the crux of Rousseau's philosophy was based upon the belief that a correct political community could be founded only upon the virtue of its citizens.[34] This view rests upon a particular view of humanity. Rousseau saw man as being characterized by his sympathy for others and his self-conscious drive for preservation. Thus, the purpose of politics in this schema, was to cope with the inequality that is brought about by the creation of the state.[35]

The late eighteenth century in France was a time of great disruptions and change. Until the French Revolution, the boundaries of the state were impossible to establish because of the power retained by feudal lords to establish independent external and internal policies.[36] Unlike England, where the monarchs sought to make state institutions symbols of national unity, their French counterparts did not attempt to create a national myth around them, and resisted the temptation to call

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[33]Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, p. 23.

[34]Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, pp. 21-22.

[35]Anne M. Cohler, Rousseau and Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 131, 135.

[36]Elie Kedourie, op. cit., p. 121.

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the peoples of France, Frenchmen.   Rather, they continued to
address people by nationalities and regions.[37]   As there was a
drive in Western Europe, influenced by the work of Rousseau in
the previous generation, toward the development of modern states
that could consolidate all sectors of society, the monarchy in
France was perceived as an archaic stumbling block.   Adding to
the confusion of the times, France was undergoing a process of
modernization which contributed to the revolutionary nature of
French nationaism:

> The Age of Nationalism generated passions that threat-
> ened to burst the dikes set up by eighteenth century
> reason.   It coincided with the transition from rural
> to urban society, with the growing social dynamism and
> mobilization of capitalism, with the quicker pace of
> life spurred on by mechanized industrialization and
> popular education.   The traditionally organized and
> integrated communities of villages and guilds gave way
> to the unorganized masses of the cities, increased by
> migration from the country.   Masses and mass psychology
> created new problems.   Lacking the stability and security
> of a traditional society, the masses were more easily
> swayed by utopian hopes and stirred by unreasonable
> fears, many of which manifested themselves as national
> or social messianism and irrational hostilities of
> prejudice.[38]

We can see from Kohn's excellent description of the times, that
the social cohesion of society was breaking down in the face of
these new, radical concepts.   Since the French monarchy proved
not to be a viable institution to promote the creation of a new
organized society, nationalism became the instrument with which
to achieve this new social reality.

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[37] Carlton J.H. Hayes, "Historical Development of National-
ism, 1933" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 39.

[38] Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German
Experience, 1789-1815 (Princeton: D. van Nostrand and Company,
Inc., 1967), p. 32.

With the transition of French society from the traditional to the urban, a new middle class began to emerge in the urban areas. They demanded reform because they found themselves stifled by the old system, which was more concerned with the status quo than with the new reality that was developing around them. Once again, we turn to Kohn for a useful commentary on the frustrations that the middle class experienced in this period:

> But in whatever direction the bourgeoisie moved, they found themselves hindered by obsolete privileges, glaring abuses, and the inertia of vested interests. They had acted not only as the lever in the economic progress of the country: most of the great writers of the century, whose thoughts the aristocracy had eagerly accepted had come from the lower classes, and the bourgeoisie had filled with distinction important positions in the administrations, the very positions that demanded initiative and hard work, while the highest ranks in state and church alike were reserved to often less competent members of the aristocracy. The Third Estate felt its strength, and yet it was "enchained." Remove its chains and it would be able to carry the burden of the state to a future of prosperity and happiness, of law and progress for all.[39]

Since the middle class emerged in a period when French society was rigidly controlled by a brittle aristocracy, there was an evident need for more participation in society. This participation and the freedom that it entailed meant the opportunity for the middle class to pursue a myriad of economic, political, and social interactions that previously were closed. The need for freedom and the philosophy of Rousseau merged to

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[39]Ibid., p. 20.

form the foundations of French nationalism. Although the nationalism was revolutionary, its past and present needs demanded that it be democratic. While the Jacobins and Napoleon perverted the idea of French nationalism to promote their own egotistical ends, in reality, they could find little justification in the concept for their actions.

Finally, when dealing with German nationalism, we are confronted with a concept that apparently has no one national meaning. We are well aware of the pretensions of the National Socialists, and their use of nationalism as justification for their programme.[40] However, before we dismiss German nationalism as being a vicious and barbarous concept -- which it is in certain forms -- we must explore the ideas that led up to its creation and development.

Germany is not a nation like England, protected from the encroachment of other nationalities by the English Channel, but is situated precariously in the middle of continental Europe. Historically, in this position, the German nation has been caught between East European authoritarianism to the east, and the power of France to the west. This geographical location has made the Germans particularly conscious about their security. The trauma of the Thirty Years War set German development -- both economic and intellectual -- back over half a century.[41]

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[40]For the classic example, see Adolf Hitler, _Mein Kampf_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971).

[41]William J. Bossenbrook, "German Nationalism and Fragmentation," in William J. Bossenbrook (ed.), _Mid-Twentieth Century Nationalism_ (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), pp. 16-17.

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As a result of this, and other territorial shocks that the Germans experienced, there developed a desire to establish a German nation strong enough to resist external threats to their sovereignty. This desire was firmly implanted in German Romanticism:

> Romanticism had a pronounced nationalist bent. Its interest in common men and common things stimulated the study and revival of folk-ways, folk-legends, and folk-music. Its appeal to history meant an appeal to folk-history, to adorned tales of the "good old days" of fanciful national independence and national integrity. Being a literary movement, romanticism exalted folk-language and folk-literature and folk-culture; being philosophic, it attributed to every folk a soul and inherent mental qualities and distinguishing manners and customers; being emotional, it tended to consecrate the peculiarities of national life to inspire a popular worship of nationality.[42]

The major contribution of Romanticism to German thought, since it was an aesthetic revolution with almost feminine sensibilities, was to make Germans aware of the cultural beauty of their nation.[43] To this end, intellectuals such as Schlegel attempted to define the German nation as "a closely knit and all-inclusive family," because "the greater the community of blood and the stronger therefore the perseverance of the past, the more solidly the people would form a nation."[44] While Schlegel's

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[42]Carlton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 53.

[43]Hans Kohn, "Romanticism and the Rise of German Nationalism" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., p. 140.

[44]Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815, p. 183.

ideas could have served as a basis for the creation of the modern nation-state, he thought only in cultural terms and generally was unconcerned about the creation of political institutions. The Greeks had been great without achieving a nation-state, therefore, he thought the Germans could do the same.[45]

Johann Gottfried von Herder also was representative of this mild form of cultural nationalism. Herder lived in an age where nationalities were regarded as barriers to the development of humanity. However, Herder concluded that a true national spirit would promote the cause of peace. Thus, his nationalism did not conclude that the Germans were superior to any other nationality. Rather it essentially was built around the idea of the common unity of mankind.[46] Indeed, Herder's ideas closely resemble those that were developed in isolated Britain. Also, in the thoughts of Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian Minister of Education, and a great admirer of the English system, we find the conclusion that the maximum perfection of society was to be had in the development of a positive national consciousness:

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[45]Ibid., p. 181.

[46]Robert R. Ergang, "Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), op. cit., pp. 136, 139; Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meanings and History, p. 32.

> For Humboldt, nationalism did not represent a
> value in itself; the nationalities received their
> value from the fullness with which they mirrored
> and represented the truly human and from the scope
> of the widest possible freedom which they opened to
> the spontaneity of the individual and to his striving
> for individual perfection.[47]

Humboldt believed that there was an urgent and desirable

need for peoples of various nations to interact with each

other, because it helped the individual become a better

citizen.[48] Since Humboldt was of this opinion, he strongly

opposed any attempts to glorify the German nationality and

wanted to curb this tendency by giving maximum rights to

some form of international community.[49]

However, we must not forget that there was another

variety of German nationalism that developed from the

Romantic period. This strain was more demanding and used

nationalism in more questionable ways. Unlike the more

humanistic variety of German nationalism, this blatant

type was used by its proponents to separate the German

people from other nationalties. To this end, the Grimm

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[47]Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and
German Experience, 1789-1815, p. 207

[48]Ibid., p. 208.

[49]Ibid., p. 210.

Brothers strove to prove that the German language was a
pure dialect.[50] Indeed, the works of the Grimm
Brothers:

> . . . reflected praiseworthy national traits
> of the German people. These included authoritar-
> ianism, militarism, violence toward the outsider,
> and the strict enforcement of discipline. The
> social classes were set apart; the King, the
> count, the leader, the hero, are glorified,
> while the lower classes, the servants and
> peasants depended upon them and obediently
> executing their commands, is praised. In
> contrast stand the avaricious, mendacious middle
> class of merchants and quack doctors and
> scheming Jews -- outsiders who intruded through
> the dark forest into the orderly system of
> manor and village. Hence the loathing for
> outsiders.[51]

There were many Germans, like Johann Fichte, who
wished to speed up the process of Germanization. Fichte
scorned a life of contemplation by stating: "I do not
wish only to think, I wish to act."[52] In the dark days
when Napoleon was defeating the Germans in every encounter
Fichte asked the German people three questions. These
questions were mainly concerned with whether there was a
German nation, if it was worth maintaining and, how it

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[50]K.R. Minogue, Nationalism (New York: Basic Book, Inc.,
1967), p. 7.

[51]Louis L. Snyder. Roots of German Nationalism (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 36.

[52]Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and
German Experience, 1789-1815, p. 229.

could be saved.[53] Obviously, Fichte did believe that

the German nation was worth saving. He hated the

corruption that he saw in society, which made the

application of ruthless means necessary to maintain the

German nation. Thus, it is of little wonder that Fichte

identified with the rational despotism of Machiavelli,

as he already liked the tendencies of the age to subordinate

the individual to the state.[54] To Fichte, "a nationality

is the totality of human beings continually living

together in society and constantly perpetuating themselves

both bodily and spiritually, and this totality is subject

to a certain specific law through which the divine

develops itself."[55]

Friedrich Schleiermacher, who was a preacher and national

philosopher, was the first German theologian to combine nation-

alism with religion, thus creating a powerful form of national

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[53] Johann Gotlieb Fichte, "Addresses to the German Nation,
1807-1808" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), The Dynamics or National-
ism: Readings in Its Meaning and Development, p. 147.

[54] Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German
Experience, 1789-1815, p. 238.

[55] Robert R. Ergang, "Herder and the Foundations of German
Nationalism" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), The Dynamics of
Nationalism: Readings in Its Meaning and Development,
pp. 137-138.

sentiment. Although there were similarities with movements else-
where (Quietism and Jansenism in France, Quakerism and enthusi-
astic Methodism in England[56]), Scheiermacher's Pietism saw the
supreme fulfillment of man not in the attainment of heaven, but
rather in the creation of a state.[57] We must class Schleiermacher
with those German writers who were the most fervent and selfish
in their use of nationalism, because to use the concept in a
religious setting is only to invite exaggerations about the real
significance of the concept and the goals that are being pursued.

Since this strain of nationalism developed into a mixture
of action-oriented philosophy and a sense of supreme mission,
it is not surprising that this potent melange began to depart
from its origins. Among the leading proponents of a superior
Germany, was the propagandist Ernst Moritz Arndt. Arndt, who
was born in Swedish Pomerania, became an advocate of German
unification as a method of curbing French aggression. He tried
to achieve a workable relationship between the individual and
state, something he thought the English had accomplished.[58]
However, while Arndt agreed that the English had a good politic-
al system, he believed that the German nation excelled over all

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[56] Koppel S. Pinson, "Pietism and the Rise of German Nation-
alism" in Ibid., p. 155.

[57] Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German
Experience, 1789-1815, p. 248.

[58] Ibid., p. 264.

others because they were the purest race and spoke the purest language.[59] The idea of mission was used by Friedrich List to promote German expansion. For List, Germany would not be complete until it inhabited all of central Europe, including Holland and Denmark.[60]

Finally, there began to be developed within the bounds of this school of nationalism, ideas of German racial superiority. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn believed that the German Volk was an elemental force of nature and a supreme part of God's own plan.[61] To foster his view of the German community, Jahn played a key role in the creation of three organizations -- military free corps of patriotic volunteers, gymnastic associations for the training of patriotic fighters, and student fraternities imbued with nationalistic enthusiasm -- which had behind them revolutionary racial ideas about the German people.[62] We find the concrete expression of most of these ideas in the work of Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr vom und zum Stein. In a letter to Count Münster, Stein concluded that the traditional boundaries of separated Germany had to give way to a new and great, consolidated nation:

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[59]Hans Kohn, _Nationalism: Its Meaning and History_, p. 36.

[60]Friedrich List, "The National System of Political Economy" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), _The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in Its Meaning and Development_, p. 160.

[61]Hans Kohn, _Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815_, pp. 268-269.

[62]_Ibid._, p. 269.

> I am sorry that you think me a Prussian . . . .
> I have only one fatherland and its name is Germany
> . . . I am devoted with all my heart only to it
> and not to any one of its parts. At this moment
> of great historical development, I am entirely
> indifferent to the fate of the dynasties; they are
> mere instruments. I wish Germany to become great [63]
> and strong, to regain independence and nationality.

In a more flagrant mood, Stein wrote to another friend:

> All Frenchmen of all colour and denomination are
> unbearable to me, mainly because they lack truth
> of character, common sense, and kindness. I doubt
> whether one will be able to conquer and subdue the
> whole of France, but I do not doubt that one will
> be able to take a good part of it and to destroy
> Paris, the seat of all abominations, and I confess
> that I would like to see this spectacle.[64]

This variety of nationalism cannot be condoned in any manner. However, it does show us that the concept is little more than a tool that can be used in many different ways.

In the three societies we examined, nationalism initially was a cry for freedom and equality within society, as well as on the international stage. There is no question that nationalism has been used in dysfunctional ways. This is largely the result of numerous mobilized groups coming to the recognition that societal power could be mustered, if they cloaked their political programmes in nationalist rhetoric. Because of this tendency to make nationalism into a political concept, the idea has largely been discredited. As this section shows, nationalism helped significantly in the formation of modern nation-states. Therefore, we must not always see nationalism as an instrument of disintegration.

[63] _Ibid._, p. 212.

[64] _Ibid._, p. 216.

iii Nationalism: Ideas and Opinions

Nationalism in the post World War II era generally has
been condemned on all sides.   The disenchantment with the con-
cept results largely from the barbarities the Nazis instigated
in the name of nationalism in that war.   There should never be
any lessening of our horror and indignation towards the inhumanity
to man that was evident in National Socialist Germany.[65]   How-
ever, if we look back at the late nineteenth century, we already
find mixed views about nationalism.   On the positive side, we
had liberals such as John Stuart Mill, who concluded: "It is
in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the
boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those
of nationalities . . . Free institutions are next to impossible
in a country made up of different nationalities."[66]   Carrying
on in this tradition, Woodrow Wilson, the liberal nationalist
who became President of the United States, thought that a great
nation is led by a leader who knows "the common meaning of the
common voice."[67]   Such ideas about this type of leadership are
involved intricately in other variations of liberal national

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[65]For a good understanding of National Socialism in Germany
and the horrors of their programme, see particularly Koppel S.
Pinson, Modern Germany (New York: The Macmillan Company, Inc.,
1966), pp. 479-531; Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning:
An Introduction to Logotherapy (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1962), pp. 1-95.

[66]Bernard Crick, op. cit., p. 93.

[67]Hans Kohn, Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth
Century Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), p.2.

thought, since society is seen as an organic whole that is held together by agreement in key areas.[68] Therefore, those who are able to understand these principles would no doubt be more competent leaders.

However, there was no agreement about the value of nationalism in this period. Lord Acton saw the concept as an unworthy ideal and if it was ever put into action, the world would "be marked by material and moral ruin in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind."[69] We also find an excellent exploration of the dangers of nationalism in the work of the famous British writer, George Orwell. When speaking about nationalism, Orwell meant:

> . . . the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled "good" or "bad." But secondly -- and this is much more important -- I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good or evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests.[70]

Also, in the academic circles in the post-World War I and pre-World War II era, there was a growing recognition of the importance of nationalism as a political phenomenon. One

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68Elie Kedourie, op. cit., p. 106.

69R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 127.

70Louis L. Snyder, "The Historians Understanding of Nationalism, 1954" in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in Its Meaning and Development, p. 23.

pundit concluded: "Political nationalism has become, for the European of our age, the most important thing in the world, more important than civilization, humanity, decency, kindness, pity; more than life itself."[71]   While Hayes tells us:

> Look you at the state of popular feeling in France in
> respect to Germany, or in Germany in respect of France;
> look at the zeal of the Italians for the newer,
> greater Italy, at the enthusiasm of the Poles for a
> Poland restored and united, at the determination of a
> Turkey for and by the Turks. Observe the outcome of
> the latest and greatest war in human annals: on one
> hand, the smashing of the non-national empires of the
> Tsars, the Hapsburgs, and the Sultans, and, on the other,
> the building of the sovereign independence and national
> unity of Czechoslovakia, of Esthonia, of Finland, of
> Greece, of Latvia, of Lithuania, of Rumania, of Yugo-
> slavia.[72]

Again in Hayes, we find:

> Hardly a cloud appears nowadays on the horizon of
> domestic politics, social action, and international
> affairs, which is without a lining of nationalism.
> This fact should be at once obvious, though some
> painful reflection may be required to determine
> whether the lining be of silver or of brass.[73]

Before the Second World War, nationalism became known as a potent force for social change. As Hayes waxed poetic, it became obvious a few years later that what had been obtained by nationalism, could be taken away by the same methods.

Thus, we are left after World War II, with a totally discredited concept. Indeed, Lenin's critical comments about nationalism being a barrier to the development of humanity,

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[71] Louis L. Snyder, "The Meaning of Nationalism" in Ibid., p. 1.

[72] Carlton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 1.

[73] Ibid., p. 2.

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appeared to be quite valid.[74] What World War II accomplished was to ruin most of the long held ideas about society and the men who inhabit it. Under this new light, ideologies that had cloaked themselves in nationalist rhetoric were closely scrutinized and shown to be villains. Nationalism, while still an idea that aroused suspicion, began to be seen to be what it really was, a catalyst for movement, but definitely not an ideology in itself. Armstrong in Nations Before Nationalism, comes to the conclusion that there is a great difference between collectivities that have developed a national feeling over extensive periods of time (Jews and Greeks) and those movements which tried to develop these feelings artificially (Nazis and Fascists); the former is felt more profoundly than the latter.[75]

Nationalism is a diffuse, sometimes creative concept that cannot be praised or condemned easily. Shafer concludes that nationalism "is complex and dynamic. Like all human phenomena it has several dimensions, its structure constantly varies, and it moves with time. As it changes so must scholarly descriptions of it. Tidy formulas do not fit a sentiment . . ."[76]

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[74]V.I. Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Question (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), p. 15.

[75]John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 206-207.

[76]Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality, p. 11.

At the beginning of this chapter we warned against using an idea when we know little about its history and development. Therefore, it was our purpose in this first chapter to understand nationalism by examining the role it played at three significant points in human history. Since nationalism is linked intricately to human nature, it was argued that it had long been at work in society as an integrating device.

In ancient times, the struggle for survival served to create a consciousness that was needed to further the process of group integration. The communal behavior that emerged from this period can and should be regarded as the foundation of modern nationalism. As a device of integration, nationalism was used more concretely in the development of modern nation-states in western Europe. In each society that we studied, the faction that utilized nationalism in their rhetoric, ultimately maintained their hold on or gained ascendancy in society.

This chapter would seem to lend support to our thesis. It was extremely important for us to find that nationalism was indeed an idea that could be used in the integration of diverse groups into more complex social structures. If this assumption were not correct, then the central point of our hypothesis would have been invalid and our study prematurely ended.

As a result of the conclusions that were reached in the chapter, we now can examine how nationalism has been dealt with in the modern approaches to integration.

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONALISM AND THE MODERN SCHOOLS OF INTEGRATION

In the introduction to this paper, we proposed that
nationalism could be used as a device for the integration of
diverse groups into consolidated communities. Having explored
the history and variations of nationalism in the previous
chapter, we now can proceed to examine how the comparatively
recent school of integration views the concept as a political
tool. To accomplish this, we must look at the four major
approaches of the school -- functionalism, neo-functionalism,
federalism and pluralism -- to determine if they are in agree-
ment on the usefulness of nationalism as a tool for societal
development and consolidation.

i. Functionalism: Integration by Non-Political Methods

Functionalist writings have been characterized as being
mainly "about cooperation, collaboration, ploughshares, peace."[1]
Indeed, functionalism is concerned about obtaining all of these

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[1] Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, "Introduction: Functionalism
and International Relations," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor
(eds.), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International
Relations (London: University of London Press, 1975), p. 2.

admirable social goals, as it was developed mainly in response to World War II, and the barbarisms that were perpetuated against humanity in the name of the nation-state. Conflict, in the functionalist sense, is seen as resulting from the inadequacy of the national-state system. Thus, to the functionalists, "nations are the focus of men's irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive forces." Therefore, integration is seen as "an ongoing indirect attack by the national welfare-oriented side of man against outmoded and inflexible institutions and practices invested with the sanctity of age and reinforced by their use in satisfying his non-rational, competitive and often destructive urges."[2]

One of the great deficiencies the functionalists see in the national-state system, is the unequitable distribution of economic and security resources amongst the systemic actors. Because the nation-state is perceived as being too small to cope effectively with these concerns, any attempts by the institution to re-exert its influence in these areas, leads to social inequality and interstate conflicts.[3] Thus, the functionalists are left in a situation that they are not completely comfortable with; they live in a world that is and will

[2]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 81, 73.

[3]Timothy M. Shaw, "Global Interaction on Political Issues" in Gavin Boyd and Charles Pentland. (eds.) Issues in Global Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1981), p. 328; Ernst Haas, Beyond the National-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 20.

continue to be dominated for a long time to come by their nemesis, the nation-state.

Taking into account the undisputed status of the nation-state as a lasting and viable political institution, functionalism seeks to alleviate the negative effects of the state by increasing the ability of groups to interact freely within, and especially outside of, national boundaries. By pursuing a policy of this nature, functionalists do not directly attack the sovereignty of the nation-state, but hope to circumvent its influence by seeking actively to develop these non-political contacts between societies.[4] Even within the nation-state:

> Functionalism proposes not to squelch, but to utilize national selfishness; it asks governments not to give up the sovereignty that belongs to their peoples, but to acquire benefits for all their peoples which were hitherto unavailable, not to reduce their power to defend their citizens, but to expand their competence to serve them...[5]

Indeed, because functionalism is interested primarily in establishing useful contacts that contribute to the development of a peaceful society,[6] the nation-state in this process only

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[4]A.J.R. Groom, "Functionalism and World Society," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations, pp. 94, 98; A. Leroy Bennet, International Organizations: Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 259.

[5]Innis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 352.

[6]Guy Rocher. A General Introduction to Sociology. A Theoretical Approach. (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1972), p. 281.

serves to further the aspirations of the functionalists. Individuals would have learned the benefits of joining together in functional organizations. Therefore, the integrated community would soon become more important than the subunits.[7] This premise relies on the belief that these functional organizations would greatly reduce the possibility of conflict between nation-states, while at the same time, increasing social benefits for their members.

Functional organizations appear to be rooted in the belief, somewhat like Plato's idea of justice, that goodness is derived from a relationship among individuals and groups, which allows everyone to engage in the activity for which he is best suited.[8] This concern for justice also is combined with an implicit acceptance of two biological ideas. Firstly, functionalists find sympathy in Herbert Spencer's notion that growth is common to social, as well as organic systems:

> It is also a character of social bodies, as of living
> bodies, that, while they increase in size, they
> increase in structure. Like a low animal, the embryo
> of a high one has few distinguishable parts; but,
> while it is acquiring greater mass, its parts multiply
> and differentiate. It is thus with a society. At
> first the unlikenesses among its groups of units are
> inconspicuous in number and degree; but as populations
> augment, divisions and subdivisions become more numerous
> and more decided . . . As well, progress from small
> groups to larger, from simple groups to compound groups,
> from compound groups to doubly compound ones, the un-.

[7]Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 75.

[8]Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 29.

likeness of parts increase. The social aggregate, homogeneous when minute, habitually gains in heterogeneity along with each increment of growth, and to reach great size must acquire great complexity.[9]

This the functionalists combined with Spencer's other belief, that "changes of structure cannot occur without changes in function . . .",[10] to develop a phenomenon that seems to be completely natural and compatible with the development of humanity. Such a funtional system would have to meet the four imperatives that Parsons set out: 1) the community would have to meet goals that have been agreed upon; 2) the participants must adapt their behaviour so as to obtain new goals; 3) the participants must retain their learned behaviour and; 4) further integration can and should take place, creating the complex from the diverse.[11]

Functionalists today see the nation-state system under attack on all sides.

In sum, like the individual who comprises them, political and social systems are everywhere under duress, besieged by internal challenges to their integrative capacities and by eternal demands on their adaptive capacities. The ways in which different systems respond to the challenges of interdependence will doubtless vary considerably, the challenges are global in scope and relentless in intensity, allowing no system the luxury of relying on long-standing traditions to sustain its values and move forward its goals.[12]

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[9] Herbert Spencer, "The Evolution of Societies," in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change: Sources, Patterns, and Consequences (New York: Basic Book Inc., 1964), pp. 10-11.

[10] Ibid., p. 13.

[11] M.J. Mulkay, Functionalism, Exchange and Theoretical Strategy (New York: Schocker Books, 1971), p. 52.

[12] James N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World Politics (London: Francis Pinter, 1980), p. 117.

Thus functionalists see the world becoming entangled hopelessly in international organizations, which will control the technological and social welfare tools to service the consolidated community.[13] Since the school uses non-political criteria as the basis for integration, functionalism is a non-controversial process that distances itself from the claims and pressures of nation-states, their populations, and national interest groups.[14] Rosenau is quite accurate in his view of how modern functionalists view integration:

> The functionalist approach anticipates the emergence
> of a global polity through a slow, indirect process
> whereby specialized international organizations per-
> form functions not performed by the nation-state and,
> in doing so, satisfy human needs in the area of their
> specialty. Satisfaction in one area is then conceived
> to spill over into other areas, gradually fostering

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[13]For particularly good studies in this area, see Bernard Crick, op. cit., p. 95-113; Raymond Vernon, "Multinational Enterprize and National Security," in Robert J. ARt and Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Imperialism (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 518-543; Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," in Fred A. Sodermann, David S. McLellan, and David C. Olson (eds.), The Theory And Practice of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979), pp. 31-37; Robert L. Heilbronner, "The Multi-National Corporation and the Nation-State," in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.). At Issue: Politics In the World Arena (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 338-352. For excellent studies of how technology, and technological development furthers this process, see particularly David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1756 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Hugo Radice (ed.), International Firms and Modern Imperialism (London: Pequin Books Ltd., 1979).

[14]Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 167.

an ever expanding community of interests and values
that will weaken the authority of the nation-state
and progressively narrow the range of its legit-
imacy. In its simplest form, functionalism posits
the spill over process as eventually creating such
widespread and deep loyalties to supernational
institutions that the habitual orientations toward
the nation-state will erode and even the most
traditional functions performed by the national
polity will be taken over by "higher" authorities.[15]

While David Mitrany in one of his last academic works, con-

cluded that a political world government was not possible, he

still believed that functionalism was the only concept that

could break the power of nation-state sovereignty.[16]

Although functionalism would appear to be a relatively

simple theory of social change, it presents a multitude of

concerns for the mildest of nationalists. As we saw, func-

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[15]James N. Rosenau, op. cit., p. 60-61.

[16]David Mitrany, "A Political Theory for the New Society,"
in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Functionalism: Theory
and Practice in International Relations, p. 32. In the foll-
owing quote from David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of
Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1972), pp. 123-124, we
find Mitrany's basic reasons why he sees a common unity being
sometime in the distance:
> The argument has grown out of a definite view of the
> historical problem of our time, the chief trait of
> which is the baffling division between the peoples
> of the world. All the great religions, as well as
> the lay creed of humanism, have preached world unity,
> in the sense of a common humanity, yet after centuries
> of such teaching we find ourselves with little sense
> of such unity left in our outlook and actions. This
> is all the more strange as in its material life the
> world has moved far towards a common unity.

tionalism is opposed to the nation-state, and envisions a
process whereby the institution would be circumvented and
gradually fade into oblivion.[17] What is equally disconcerting
about the approach, is that the functionalists do not possess
any certain knowledge about nationalism. Some years ago,
Mitrany concluded the following about nationalism:

> In the analysis of our time, one of the chief sores
> is the nature and working of nationalism. As a
> political problem it is as pressing as it is intri-
> cate, and also very baffling both as to its nature
> and as to its ultimate issue. We cannot know how to
> deal with it until we grasp its nature, and that is
> difficult to grasp in a clear and unified version.[18]

To seek to destroy a concept without fully understanding it is
to invite a host of evils that could outweigh the benefits that
can be derived by demolishing the concept.

Functionalism creates, what Anthony D. Smith calls in his
Theories of Nationalism, sterile definitions of tradition and
modernity.[19] The functionalists tend not to pay much attention
to the emotional attachment that individuals have for their
particular nation-state. It is logical that individuals should
feel considerable loyalty for things that are natural and given
in their lives. Individuals tend to have more emotion for
their family than their fellow employees on the work site.
Simply because a series of organizations provides functions that
contribute to the economic and social development of individuals,

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[17] Innis L. Claude Jr. op. cit., p. 349.

[18] David Mitrany. The Functional Theory of Politics, p. 137.

[19] Anthony D. Smith. Theories of Nationalism (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 50.

does not mean these individuals will give up their allegiance to the nation-state, and look to the functional institutions for all their needs. The distance that separates functional organizations from the individuals which they serve, would appear to preclude communal feelings of loyalty and ownership from developing toward these organizations.[20] It stands to reason that when alienation develops in society, as will happen no doubt in such large bodies, individual behaviour could become extremely dysfunctional. Loyalty would be diffused to the point where societal constraints might not be strong enough to assure the orderly conduct of society. Before dispensing with the idea of the nation-state, we should be reasonably assured that what is being created will be better than what is being destroyed. Change for the sake of change is reckless at best and disastrous at worst.

One of the major assumptions involved in functionalism, is the idea that functional organizations would be more peaceful

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[20] These feelings are extremely important in the legitimizing processes of society. In democracies, citizens usually regard themselves as owners of the nation-state. Even in dictatorial situations, populations usually believe that it is an individual or a group that is corrupt, and the nation-state is also a victim of this corrupt selfishness. If this was not the case, then, we might expect liberation movements not to arise with the purpose of freeing the nation-state from the grasp of individuals or groups, but rather we should see them trying to do away completely with the institution and replace it with some form of supranational organization. This rarely happens. Thus, the nation-state still persists as the institution that is given society's effective allegiance and loyalty.

than the traditional national-state system.[21] This assumption probably is based on the belief that these organizations are coordinated more easily. Again, we cannot be certain whether or not this is the case. For example, if we assume government departments are functional in nature, we find that they have to compete with each other for their share of the community resources. In a world where there is only a given amount of resources, any actors who are concerned with their distribution, will ultimately find themselves in competition over their disposal. One of Mitrany's better known students, A.J.R. Groom, admits that those who look to functionalism as a viable alternative to the nation-state, must have faith that the concept will meet their expectations:

> . . . how can a functional system be made responsible and responsive to the needs of all its participants, and, furthermore, responsive to the needs of totality of functional dimension? How can the functionalist give an assurance that he is not merely exchanging a system of powerful states for a network of systems dominated by powerful interests allied, perhaps, to the rump of powerful states? The simple answer is that he cannot: there is no guarantee that a functional system will not be dominated by power politics. The functionalist can only pin his hopes on cross-cutting, responsiveness, increased satisfaction of felt needs and enhanced welfare as well as an improved sense of participation. Failing this, he will need to resort to building countervailing powers and then open the way back to the very balance of policies from which he is seeking to escape.[22]

Functionalism offers the hope of a peaceful world in the future. However, it remains largely utopian in its perceptions of the

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[21] Charles Pentland, _International Theory and European Integration_, p. 70.

[22] A.J.R. Groom, "Functionalism: Theory and World Society" in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.) _Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations_, p. 106.

world and its presumptions are unproven. While we must not
discard any theory that offers a new approach to the organiza-
tion of society without serious attention, the nationalist must
be worried about functionalism and its tendency to de-politicize
the political.

ii   Neofunctionalism: Supranationality and Institution Building

As the name suggests, neofunctionalism inherits many
theoretical tools from functionalism. Neofunctionalism, like
functionalism, is largely anti-political. The only exception is
in the field of welfare, as political activity in that area is
not likely to cause conflict.[23] The neofunctionalists also have
an evident mistrust for politicians and politics in general,
probably due to their understanding of the nature of the activ-
ity. For them, politics is a very diverse concept, basically
having to do with the processes of conflict and decision making
involved in the distribution of societal resources.[24] Thus,
because politics is portrayed in such a manner, it is logical
that there would develop strong desires to circumvent the nega-
tive qualities of the process, and replace them with more con-
ciliatory and equitable methods of allocating community values.
Both functionalisms share a host of other principles, which
J.S. Nye enumerates for us:

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[23]Nina Heathcote, "Neofunctional Theories of Regional Inte-
gration," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.) Functionalism:
Theory and Practice in International Relations, p. 39.

[24]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Inte-
gration, p. 107.

1) Both stress welfare - neofunctionalists are more realistic about the impossibility of totally separating welfare from politics - they neverthe-less stress its primary importance.

2) Both tend to downgrade the role of symbols and identity and to emphasize utilitarian factors in community formation - neither deals head on with problem of identity or "pooled self-esteem" that is one of the sources of the strength of the nation-state.

3) Both tend to rely on pluralistic societies in which individuals and groups are free to shift their activities and loyalties.

4) Both tend to emphasize the role of the technocrat - though the neofunctionalist technocrat is pol-itically "savvy" and is expected to have close contact with the centers of power.[25]

Where neofunctionalism departs from its predecessor is in its ideas regarding the move from the nation-state to the inter-national level. While functionalism sees the process in evol-utionary terms, neofunctionalism sees the procedure as being a highly thought out programme that should be pushed forward whenever possible. In this sense, Pentland is correct to con-clude that neofunctionalism is far more concerned with pro-cesses, than with goals, conditions, or values.[26] Thus, in this prescription, interactions between elite groups become the basis for integration.

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[25] J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 54.

[26] Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Inte-gration, p. 113.

Since neofunctionalists seem to realize that to further integration all facets of society must be scrutinized and exploited to the utmost, they see the need to create central institutions to coordinate the integration processes. Indeed, this school quickly comes to the conclusion that political communities can be engineered by artificial means.[27] But before they attempt to create institutions, the neofunctionalists show their political confidence by deliberately choosing significant societal sectors that can be planned by efficient technocrats.[28] Haas, in his reinterpretation of functionalism, gives us an account of the conditions needed to create integration in society:

> Functional law stresses the needs of actors, the transpersonality of the task at hand, the informality of procedure, and the avoidance of legal rigidity such as full compliance with detailed texts. It relies on an aura of immanence, which, of course, involves a degree of uniformity in the spontaneous evaluations that the international actors place upon events and needs. In short, it presumes a minimal consensus on what is appropriate to meet the end.[29]

Since the neofunctionalists believe that technocrats and other significant elites must be involved intricately in the integrative process, they assure themselves of relative success in harmonizing the various policies geared towards obtaining their goals. Technocrats, like any group, develop a group consciousness and part of that consciousness, we must assume, is a ten-

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[27]Ibid., p. 118.

[28]J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict Regional Organization, p. 51.

[29]Ernst B. Haas, op. cit., p. 490.

dency to increase their power at the expense of others. By
including such a group in the integrative process, the neo-
functionalists have helped their cause greatly.

At this point, the neofunctionalists begin to expand their
ideas about the design and development of common institutions
which are pushed forward by pressures from society. These
institutions are supposed to develop into the driving force for
community development, and in the process, do away with the
nation-state's capacity to coerce externally, as well as inter-
nally.[30] While this view would appear to be logical, it rests
on certain assumptions as suggested by Keohane and Nye.[31] The
first assumption is that there exist in society favorable
structural conditions for integration to take place. However,
if there is tight governmental control over society, as we find
in the socialist world, there would be no possibility that inte-

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[30]J.S. Nye, op. cit., p. 51; Charles Pentland, "Functional-
ism and Theories of International Political Integration," in
A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Functionalism: Theory and
Practice in International Relations, p. 17; Charles Pentland,
"Building Global Institutions," in Gavin Boyd and Charles
Pentland (eds.), Issues in Global Politics, p. 330;
R.J. Harrison, "Neofunctionalism," in Paul Taylor and A.J.R.
Groom (eds.), International Organization: A Conceptual Approach
(London: Francis Pinter Ltd., 1978), p. 256; Nina Heathcote,
"Neofunctional Theories of Regional Organization," in A.J.R.
Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Functionalism: Theory and Practice
in International Relations, p. 38.

[31]Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "International Inter-
dependence and Integration," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.
Polsby (eds.), International Politics (Reading: Addison - Wesley
Publishing Company, 1975), p. 383.

gration could succeed. Secondly, there is the premise that there would be serious attempts by the participants to coordinate policies. If such commitments are not forthcoming, then integrative initiatives certainly would become mired in confusion. And finally, there is the old functionalist idea that progress in one sector will spill over and further integration in other areas.

Of all the approaches to integration, neofunctionalism is the most honest about how it views the nation-state. The neofunctionalists see the institution as being an obsolete remnant from an earlier time. Thus, nationalism is regarded as more-of a myth than a reality:

> I regard the "nation" as a socially mobilized body
> of individuals, believing themselves to be united by
> some set of characteristics that differentiate them
> (in their own mind) from "outsiders," and striving
> to create or maintain their own state. "Nationalism"
> is the body of beliefs held by these people as legit-
> imating their search for uniqueness and autonomy;
> nationalism is the myth of a successful nation.[32]

The neofunctionalists realize that nationalism is too powerful an idea to attack directly. Therefore, they have developed "a strategy for attacking the castle of national sovereignty by stealth."[33] As Pentland says: "Any function performed by the existing nation-state is a grist to the mill of collective decision-making system . . . the neofunctionalist supranational system could, in theory, not only influence or perform the allocation of material things, but also provide internal physical

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[32]Ernst B. Haas, op. cit., pp. 464-465.

[33]J.S. Nye, Peace in Parks: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization, p. 54.

security and become the prime focus of political loyalties and expectations."[34] In this view, nation-states would lose their ability to carry out important functions, and their sovereignty would be transferred to the new supranational organizations. This process is neatly set out by Heathcote:

> The neofunctionalist theorists have thus contended that, as integration proceeded, the consensus characteristic of the domestic political system would be re-created at the Community Level and so replace power-politics. The sovereign power of the state, no longer needed to supply the framework for peaceful resolution of internal conflicts and unfitted to discharge alike responsibility in the international setting, was in the process of being superseded by the authority of supranational institutions.[35]

The neofunctionalists have created a theory of integration that seems to fill the empty spaces left behind by the functionalists.

What we must do, as we did with functionalism, is question the society that would be created under neofunctionalism. Any organization that is capable of ensuring internal and external security, would have to be coercive by definition. Whether or not technocrats would be any more effective than political leaders in making sure that this power is put to good use is questionable. Technocrats might be more rational in their use of power, but rationality often is impassionate and ruthless.

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[34]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p. 117.

[35]Nina Heathcote "Neofunctional Theories of Regional Integration," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations, p. 41.

What the neofunctionalists might be creating is an organiza-
tional monster, with no political constraints to curb and
modify its actions. Basically we are dealing with the complex-
ities of human nature, and any prescription which places massive
amounts of power into the hands of a small group conceivably is
setting the stage for social tyranny.

iii Federalism: Integration by Legal Methods

Federalism is a word mentioned often in North America,
especially since Canada and the United States stand as examples
of the federal principle. If we look farther afield, we find
federalism being used in Switzerland, India, Australia and,
more questionably, in the Soviet Union. While federalism has
been used successfully in many modern states, its heritage dates
back into antiquity:

> In its original form, the federal idea was a theo-
> logical concept that defined the relationship
> between God and man as one in which both were
> linked by covenant in a partnership designed to
> make them jointly responsible for the world's wel-
> fare. First formulated in the covenant theory of
> the Bible as the basis for God's relationship with
> Israel, this concept of federalism was revived by
> the Bible centered "federal theologians" of Seven-
> teenth-Century Britain and New England who coined
> the term "Federal" -- derived from the Latin foedus
> (covenant) -- to describe the system of holy and
> enduring covenants between God and man which lay at
> the foundation of their world views. For man, this
> covenant was as much a liberating device as a means
> of binding him to God's commandments. By restrict-
> ing his otherwise omnipotent power under the terms
> of the covenant, God granted man a significant
> measure of freedom . . . [36]

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[36]Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Practices of Feder-
alism: A Comparative Historical View (Philadelphia: Center for
the Study of Federalism, 1972), pp. 1-2.

Federalist principles also can be seen at work in the early
non-Christian world, particularly in Greece, where the city
states would ban together occasionally to fend off the aggress-
ions of neighbors.[37]

As we have seen already with the Jews and Greeks, there
are many reasons for the creation of communities. We would
have to agree with K.C. Wheare when he concludes that those
who come together in federations, usually have a common purpose
that cannot be obtained without union. However, as he also
points out, the participants fully expect to maintain a large
share of their individual sovereignty.[38] In the American
Federalist Papers, we find rather sophisticated ideas about the
diverse nature of politics. To these writers, federalism was
intertwined intricately with notions of popular government
which had democracy and republicanism as its handbearers.[39]
Therefore federalism presents an interesting study for students
of nationalism since there are two diametrically opposed ten-
dencies within any federal system; those being centrifugal
versus centripetal movements.

One of the major characteristics of federalism is its
ability to make the political process more stable.[40]

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[37]Sobei Mogi, The Problems of Federalism: A Study in the
History of Political Theory. (London: George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., 1931), p. 21.

[38]K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford Univers-
ity Press, 1956), p. 1.

[39]Martin Diamond, "The Federalist," in Morton J. Frisch and
Richard G. Stevens (eds.) American Political Thought: The
Philosophic Dimensions of American Statesmanship (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 53.

[40]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 115.

Friedrich has allowed that nationalism probably is the strong-
est political force in the contemporary world.[41] However,
this does not prevent the federalists from presenting numerous
ideas that presumably showed the superiority of their system.
Firstly, notions about the desirability of the system for the
individual, and his or her acceptance of the concept are put
forward. This is an idea largely developed from the fact that
most federations were created in order to alleviate a communal
sense of insecurity, or a desire for some economic or social
benefit that could not be secured if the many sub-units main-
tained their individuality.[42] Indeed, a nationalist would find
federalism to be a tolerable alternative to anarchy. This is
because federations can evolve to accommodate changing reali-
ties of the times.[43] The supposed ability of federations to
adapt to new circumstances, emanates from the fact that politics
would be the prime mover within the integrated system. The
virtue of federalism is that it is a framework which allows for
the centralizing principles of authority, security, and admin-
istrative rationality to work in conjunction with more nation-
alistic tendencies for autonomy.[44] Friedrich goes so far as to

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[41] Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and
Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968),
pp. 30-31.

[42] Ramesh Dutta Dikshit, The Political Geography of Federal-
ism: An Inquiry into Origins and Stability (New Delhi: The
Macmillan Company of India, Ltd., 1972), p. 220; K.C. Wheare,
op. cit., p. 36.

[43] Ramesh Dutta Dikshit, op. cit., p. 2.

[44] Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Inte-
gration, p. 157.

suggest that a new societal mentality develops in federal
systems:

> In successful federal regimes there develops in
> time something that has been called the "federal
> spirit" or the "federal behavior." It is a highly
> pragmatic kind of political conduct, which avoids
> all insistence upon "agreement on fundamentals"
> and similar forms of doctrinaire rigidity. Such
> behavior proceeds in the spirit of compromise and
> accommodation. It is molded by the knowledge that
> there are many rooms in a house that federalism
> builds.[45]

The second attraction of federalism to the positive

nationalist is the protection that it offers to the subunits.

Federalism supposes the ability to unite without destroying

the components that originally surrendered their sovereignty.[46]

Thus, when necessity dictates that a group of regional enti-

ties come together, federalism seems to offer an alternative

to some form of higher integration.[47]

The first feature that makes federalism appealing to those

who seek to maintain a semblance of sovereignty for the sub-

units is the commitment that each of the sub-units and the

individuals within them has the basic right of equality with

any other part of the federation. This means that if there are

weaker members in the federation who cannot meet the economic

and social needs of their citizens, the federation would guar-

antee the sub-unit sufficient resources to raise its standard

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[45]Carl J. Friedrich, op. cit., p. 39.

[46]op. cit., p. 183.

[47]William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signif-
icance (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964), p. 5.

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of living to the federation's average.[48]   The positive
nationalist would see this policy as being beneficial because
he knows the world is becoming increasingly more complex.
Thus, a variety of integration that is constructed loosely is
far more desirable to the alternative, total assimilation into
a tightly controlled system.

Closely connected to the benefits that can be realized by
sub-units in a federal system, is the freedom that is available
to the individual in such an arrangement:

> Individual freedom does not imply that each individ-
> ual is free to do whatever he likes. He lives in
> society and this implies that his freedom is necess-
> arily limited by the equal freedom of the other indi-
> viduals in society. He is only one among a large
> number of units in it. His freedom is therefore
> freedom under law. It guarantees his freedom by pre-
> venting encroachments against it by others and in the
> process of guaranteeing the freedom of others, it
> prevents him from encroaching on their freedom. And
> law has to be administered by Judges. All this does
> not make his freedom unreal. This is the only kind
> of freedom that is possible. Similarly in a federa-
> tion every government is a unit along with other units
> in a political system. The freedom and independence
> to which it is entitled cannot be absolute. It is
> limited by the equal freedom of the other units.[49]

The idea of equality under a central authority also is
attractive, simply because of the equal freedom that it implies.
Such a programme, where freedom is distributed fairly amongst
all the systemic actors probably is the most equitable political
arrangement that can be implemented successfully.

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[48]K.C. Wheare, op. cit., p. 260.

[49]Manidipu Venkatranqaiya, Some Theories of Federalism (Gane-
shkhind: The Poona University Press, 1971), pp. 21-22.

The idea that federalism, by its very nature, never can abandon its concern for parity within the system is a widely held idea.[50] However, the idea must be scrutinized closely before we can support this claim whole-heartedly. As we know, federalism is rooted in constitutionalism. Therefore, it draws much of its strength from legal notions of fairness and justice.[51] While we recognize that such notions are desirable, we also realize that in any legal system there are two concerns. One is the continual process of re-interpretation of laws and, the other is the tendency to treat certain individuals or groups more "equally" than others. The former concern evolves naturally from federalism, while the latter is a trait of human nature and can never be rooted out of any political system.

The flexibility of the legal approach of federalism, while a useful and politically aware method, causes concern for the stability of the system. Thus, when federalists talk about autonomy, we must agree with Teune, who suggests that there is a substantial difference between legal and actual autonomy.[52] If the rules of the game can evolve toward something entirely different than had been originally intended, the sub-units could find themselves alienated within the system. In fact, the ability of federations to resolve conflict largely depends

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[50]Daniel J. Glazar, The Ends of Federalism: Notes Towards a Theory of Federal Political Arrangements (Philadelphia: Center for the Study of Federalism, 1976), pp. 22-23.

[51]For a good study of the legal aspects of federalism, see Edward McWhinney, Federal Constitution - Making for a Multi-National World (Leydon: A.W. Sijhoff, 1966).

[52]Henry Teune, "The Future of Federalism: Federalism and Political Integration," in Valerie Earle (ed.) Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Itasca: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 222.

upon the size, number and similarity of the sub-units, as well as what originally brought them together into a federation.[53] Thus, there really is no way of knowing what kind of politics will be practised in a federation, since the nature of decision making in these systems is more of a vertical than a horizontal process, where profound conflicts may be masked under a disguise of legalism.[54]

The assumption that federations are more peaceful than other forms of organization also must be questioned. If we look at the history of federations, we find their internal and external relationships are no more peaceful than other forms of social organization. Because of the nature and variety of politics, federalists believe that if you create suitable structures, peaceful relationships will follow. Above all, federalists are realists:

> If they (the federalists) have anything in common,
> it may be their civilized acceptance that, in life,
> not all is black and white; that political theory
> never squares with reality; that the power relations
> of two or more individuals, groups, tribes, cities,
> regions, or states cannot be put together in tidy

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[53]R. Watts, "The Survival or Disintegration of Federations," in R.M. Burns (eds.) One Country or Two? (Montreal: McGill - Queen's University Press, 1971), p. 60; R. Watts, "Survival or Disintegration?" in Richard Simeon (ed.) Must Canada Fail? (Montreal: McGill - Queens University Press, 1977), p. 48.

[54]Ronald L. Watts, Administration in Federal Systems (London: Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1970), p. 17; Edward McWhinney, Comparative Federalism: States' Rights and National Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 13.

> heaps in the way that our predecessors boxed
> "sovereign" and "non-sovereign" legislatures;
> that always there are loose strands, untidiness,
> paradoxes, inconsistencies; that there are no
> pure cases of "federal" states, only mixtures,
> hybrids, and occasionally aberrant "monsters"
> defying all efforts to trap human institutions
> in iron-clad Linnaean categories.[55]

There are no iron-clad guarantees about any political organization that one might join. The assurances of security that are interwoven in federalist theory are not as substantial as they appear. Following on this concern, it is not entirely certain that any organization which styles itself as a federation will in fact retain any of the true characteristics of a federation. One of the most basic concepts associated with federalism, is the dual nature of citizenship within the system. But as Claude points out:

> A federalist formula for the distribution of powers
> and functions is merely a starting point. It is
> quite possibly true that the gradual transformation
> of a federal into a unitary system is the only course
> of development compatible with its survival; in this
> case, federalism is either an abortive attempt at
> unity, doomed to end in dissolution, or an interim
> step toward centralization, destined to be transcended.[56]

If Claude is correct, then federalism as an organizing principle could be just as dangerous for the continued existence of the sub-units as are the two functionalisms. At first glance, federalism appeared to have been an approach that would not have attempted to usurp total sovereignty from its sub-units. However, on closer inspection, this concept is

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[55]S. Rufus Davis, <u>The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time In Quest of a Meaning</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 156.

[56]Innis L. Claude, Jr., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 385.

filled with avenues that could lead to the creation of organizations that have little to do with federal principles or federalism in general.

iv   Pluralism: Integration Through the Defense of Groups

Pluralism is a concept that can be studied in a number of ways.[57]   Indeed, if we try to suggest that there is one definition that adequately would describe the concept, we would not be successful.   We must content ourselves with a general idea of the meaning of pluralism.   One useful generalized statement is by Anthony Smith who concludes that, "pluralism refers to the conception that the world order and liberty depend on the realization of nation-states, each of which contributes to the common fund of humanity by expressing its own cultural character in a state of its own."[58]

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[57]For a particularly good study of the numerous views of pluralism, see David M. Ricci, "Background to the Study of Community Power: Liberalism, its Decline, Power Analysis, Schumpeter and After," in Edward Keynes and David M. Ricci (eds.) Political Power: Community and Democracy Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970.

[58]Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 170-171. There are two other statements about pluralism that we should be aware of.   Firstly, in Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 137, we find the following definition:

> The concept that modern society is made up of heterogeneous institutions and organizations that have diversified religous, economic, ethnic, and cultural interests and share in the exercise of power.   Democratic pluralism is based on the assumption that democracy can exist in a society where a variety of elites compete actively in the decision process for the allocation of values, and that new elites can gain access to power through the same political processes.

Pluralism would appear to be basic to human nature. Lasswell contends that there exist eight values in society -- power, enlightenment, wealth, well being (or health), skill, affection, rectitude (which involves both righteousness and justice), and deference (or respect) -- which affect life and politics in nearly every instance.[59] Most, if not all, of these values are group shared. Thus, while the individual is involved in the pursuit of power, he also must be in pursuit of enlightenment to be able to understand how to obtain his goal. He must have the wealth and well-being to be able to reach his goal. He must have affection for the goal to be driven towards it. Finally, he must hope to obtain both the

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And in Robert C. Neville, The Cosmology of Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 292, we also find:

> A pluralistic society is one comprising several publics, doubtless overlapping and shifting in many respects, each attempting to organize the socio-physical resources to provide the proper environments for its desired social form. Each social form in turn is a way, or part of a way, by which persons in the group want to live their lives. A human way of life, however, involves creativity, in small if not great ways. Therefore each person has a private interest in his social form as the environment for his own special creativity. Now this creativity is so important, so our civilization has brought us to see, that a desirable social order is one that recognizes individual privacy as such, in the form of integrity. Without social pluralism, there is no diversity of social forms. Without diversity of social forms, there are no social options for choice of how one lives, one's creativity is inhibited by the social order. The recognition of individual integrity by people in their public capacities, reflected in the social orders established, entails a social order with pluralism.

[59] Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1974), p. 14.

rectitude and deference that comes with power. Man, even in his basic desires, is torn between a number of different ends. The complexity that is evident in the actions of man, would seem to be translated to group situations and their actions. No one man can be loyal only to one group -- society is too complex to allow one allegiance to supefsede all others.

Pluralism always has been geared toward the idea that if centralization and tyranny were to be halted and relative freedom maintained, groups within the political whole must be allowed to exist and their development fostered. Aristotle thought that the only way to maintain tyranny was to dissolve all existing traditional groups and associations, while Aquinas in the same light was extremely wary of any attempts to centralize power.[60] Pluralism re-affirms these concerns and chooses the diverse over the centralized at every level of integration. Pluralism puts the individual before the group, the group before the nation-state and the nation-state before the international community. Since the pluralists see the benefits of the whole political community, their ideas would seem to be applicable to all sizes and mixtures of social organization.[61] As Dahl contends, there are three basic reasons why pluralism helps communities reduce conflict:

(1) Because one center of power is set against another,
    power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled,
    and limited to decent human purposes, while coercion,
    the most evil form of power, will be reduced to a
    minimum.

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[60] David Nicholls, Three Varieties of Pluralism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 6.

[61] Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford-Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 34, 112.

(2) Because even minorities are provided with opportunities
    to veto solutions they strongly object to, the consent
    of all will be won in the long run.

(3) Because constant negotiations among different centers
    of power are necessary in order to make decisions,
    citizens and leaders will perfect the precious art of
    dealing peacefully with their conflicts and not merely
    to the benefit of one partisan, but to the mutual
    benefit of all the parties to a conflict.[62]

Indeed, the pluralists would claim that at the highest level of

political complexity, a system geared to coordinating groups

and not destroying them would lead to a stable international

community.[63]

Along with federalists such as Friedrich, the pluralists

see the gradual development of changes in the political atti-

tudes and behaviour of individuals.[64] Pluralists require the

development of this new awareness to make their system a viable

political alternative. If this understanding can be brought

about in society, then the advantages of a pluralist system are

evident:

> Assuming the ultimate feasibility, the desirability
> of a system of cultural diversity within a framework
> of political and economic unity can hardly be con-
> tested. Such a system would be compatible with the
> existence of a healthful variety conducive to the
> enrichment of human civilization. It would not pre-
> clude the blending of national cultures, but would
> provide the noncompulsive circumstances most propi-
> tious for that sort of development.[65]

[62]Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States:
Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967)
p. 24.

[63]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Inte-
gration, p. 45.

[64]Ibid., p. 48.

[65]Innis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities: An Internation-
al Problem (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 91.

Since pluralists hold that all relationships are based upon power and are in constant flux, their prescription would prevent any group from gaining any prolonged political domination over the integrated system.[66]

Many interesting ideas emerge from pluralism that are useful contributions to organizational theory. Firstly, since pluralism places importance upon the diverse elements that converge to create a stable society, it realizes that the nation-state is still a useful institution. Along with functionalism and neofunctionalism, pluralism sees international integration as not emanating from the nation-state.[67] However, unlike those theories, pluralism requires assimilation only to the extent that it is needed to maintain the system.[68]

To pluralists, political integration is a phenomenon that leads to the development of a highly complex political system. However, before such a system can be considered workable, a sense of community (which includes effective institutional methodology and the development of group consciousness within society) must be created so as to rule out the possibility of

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[66] Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: the Pluralist Alternative," in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner (eds.) Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 31-35.

[67] James J. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 158; Ralph Pettman, Human Behavior and World Organization (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 275; Charles Pentland, "Building Global Institutions" in Gavin Boyd, and Charles Pentland (eds.) Issues in Global Politics, p. 328.

[68] Hamid Mowlana and Ann Elizabeth Robinson, "Ethnic Mobilization and Communication Theory," in Abdul Said and Luiz R. Simmons (eds.) Ethnicity in an International Context (New Brunswick: Transition Books, 1976), p. 52.

widespread conflict within the system.[69]   This does not mean

that there cannot be conflict within the community, but that it

be of a nature that does not threaten the relative stability of

society.[70]

The real problem with pluralism is derived from the very

fact that it is a largely unstructured democratic concept. We

must concur with Dahl in his views of how democracy functions:

> Patterns of democratic government do not reflect a
> logically conceived philosophical plan so much as
> a series of response to problems of diversity and
> conflict, by leaders who have sought to build and
> maintain a nation, to gain the loyalty and obedience
> of citizens, to win general and continuing approval,
> of political institutions, and at the same time to
> conform to aspirations for democracy.[71]

If we do combine this tendency for random decision-making with-

in the bounds of an international political community,[72] we

would have an unruly system at best. However, on the whole,

pluralism would appear to be the most productive form of inte-

gration for the positive nationalist.

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[69]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives, p. 4;
Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration,
p. 31.

[70]For a particularly good group of studies in this area, see
Robert A. Dahl (eds.) Political Oppositions in Western Democra
cies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[71]Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States:
Conflict and Consent, pp. 22-23.

[72]We find a good working definition of a political community
in Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International
Level (New York: Archon Books, 1970), p. 40.

v   Chapter Two: Conclusion

In the thesis we argued that nationalism contributed to
the process of integration. And with our conclusions in hand
from Chapter One, we might have expected that nationalism
would have been dealt with favorably in the integration liter-
ature. However, this was not the case.

The two more recent approaches to integration -- function-
alism and neofunctionalism -- seem not to perceive any signif-
icant role for nationalism in the world today. Indeed, these
two approaches regard nationalism as a negative force that must
be broken if integration can proceed. It became obvious that
the two functionalisms do not view the basic structures of
society with as much affection as they regard the more compli-

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A political community may be defined as a community of social
transaction supplemented by both enforcement and compliance.
In this sense, it is a community of persons in which common or
coordinated facilities for the making of decisions and the
enforcement of commands are supplemented by habits of compli-
ance sufficiently widespread and predictable to make success-
ful enforcement in the remaining cases of noncompliance prob-
able at a feasible cost.

We find another useful definition of a political community in
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of
Leaders and Forces, p. 4. To Etzioni, a political community
is defined in three points:

a)   An effective control of the uses of the means of
     violence (though it may delegate some of this control
     to member units);

b)   it has a center of decision making that is able to
     effect significantly the resources and rewards
     throughout the community;

c)   the community is the dominant focus of political
     identification for the large majority of politically
     aware citizens.

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cated social organizations that they wish to create. The other theories of integration -- federalism and pluralism -- would appear to regard nationalism with more approval than the two functionalisms. Nevertheless, it is only pluralism which recognizes that political stability must flow from the simple to the more complex structures of society. Nationalism is the social cement that holds society together.

While not gaining an abundance of support for our thesis in the chapter, the diverse nature of the literature suggests that integration can be approached in many different ways. After exploring the history and nature of nationalism and integration in the first two chapters of this study, it is now time to examine our thesis in more concrete terms. To accomplish this, the first step is to explore how nationalism contributes to the formation of nation-states. This best can be done in modern terms by an examination of the creation and development of African nation-states.

CHAPTER THREE

NATIONALISM AS A DEVICE OF INTEGRATION

Many years ago at a meeting of the Institution for
Religious Studies in New York, the prestigious liberal philoso-
pher R. M. MacIver stated that there were two universalistic
concepts (democracy and religion) that inspired a greater unity
in the world.[1] We may, or may not, agree with MacIver's ideas.
However, it is evident that he did not take into account the
unifying influence that the nation-state has on the world. We
have only to look at the various movements in the world that
are geared toward creating a nation-state to realize that the
concept is still a powerful instrument for integration. While
the institution might be the harbinger of the evils of excess-
ive national egotism, it also should be thought of as a necess-
ary step toward the realization of a people as a sovereign
community. This perception of the nation-state as a step toward
freedom is particularly important to those societies which
struggle against forms of political internationalism to win
their autonomy.

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[1] R.M. MacIver, Group Relations and Group Antagonisms
(New York: Institute for Religious Studies, 1944), p. 218.

Dealing with Africa particularly, the recognition of the nation-state as a vital component in the process of freedom did not penetrate African thought originally. We can probably date the development of an African consciousness -- or at least the creation of a black awareness -- from the late nineteenth century, when there was a movement among both African and American blacks for equality in their respective regions. In 1896, Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, the first American Negro to receive a doctorate from Harvard University, published a study on the inhumanities and suppression of the slave trade. In that same year in England, J.E. Casely-Hayford gained admittance to the British bar, and became prominent in both the Aborigines Rights Protective Association and the National Congress of British West Africa in the early years of this century.[2]

While there were signs of a national consciousness developing in the colonies, there were, however, other learned people in the colonies who saw the nation-state as the root of the evils of greed and westernization. Of them, the Indian poet and philosopher Sir Rabindranath Tagore stands prominent as one of the more lyrical proponents of this view. To Tagore the nation-state was an efficient mechanism that effectively dehumanizes the individual:

> In the West the national machinery of commerce and
> politics turns out neatly compressed bales of
> humanity which have their use and high market value;
> but they are bound in iron hoops, labelled and
> separated off with scientific care and precision.

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[2]Victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity (New York: George Braziller, 1966), p. 81.

Obviously God made man to be human; but this modern
product has such marvellous square-cut finish,
savouring of gigantic manufacture, that the Creator
will find it difficult to recognize it as a thing
of spirit and a creature made in His own divine image.[3]

Tagore's perception of nationalism is no more positive than

his view of the nation-state:

> The spirit of conflict and conquest is at the origin
> and in the center of Western nationalism; its basis
> is not social cooperation. It has evolved a perfect
> organization of power, but not spiritual idealism.
> It is like the pack of predatory creatures that must
> have its victims. With all its heart it cannot bear
> to see its hunting grounds converted into cultivated
> fields.[4]

While Tagore's thought might have been heart-felt expressions

of the evils associated with the nation-state and nationalism,

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[3] Sir Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism (London, The Macmillan
and Company, Ltd., 1918), p. 6. Also, in the same study, p. 133 -
134, we find these sentiments being expressed in poetic form:

The Sunset of the Century

The last sun of the century sets amidst the
blood-red clouds of the west and the whirlwind
of hatred.

The naked passion of self-love of Nations, in its
drunken delirium of greed, is dancing to the clash
of steel and the howling cries of vengeance.

The hungry self of the National shall burst in a
violence of fury from its own shameless feeding.

For it has made the world its food,
And licking it, crunching it and swallowing it in
big morsels,
It swells and swells
Till in this midst of its unholy feast descents the
sudden shaft of heaven piercing its heart of grossness.

[4] Ibid., p. 21.

to try to deny the ascension of these concepts is to attempt to block the natural progression of society. The annals of history are filled with movements to create a cohesive and workable sovereign state. Considering how the world has developed since Tagore's time, it is safe to assume that his very real concerns were set aside in favor of the natural tendency of nation-state development.

When we talk about flows of history in Marxist terms, it is always in language that suggests the ultimate demise of nationalities.[5] Others, writing in the field, intimate that "perhaps nationalism in underdeveloped areas is nothing more psychologically than shared, semi-articulated discontent based on the real or fancied grievances and conveniently directed against the "outside" who have exploited "natives".[6] Marxian analysis is exciting and complex, but the school is not applicable entirely to societies emerging into a modern political reality after long periods of alien subordination and unorganized chaos. In the study of Africa, we must not look, however correct it might be, for signs that the whole idea of state creation is not functionally appropriate for the region. The world is composed of a group of states which even in their penetrated condition, largely retain the loyalty of their citizens. Trying to bypass the nation-state in Africa is a

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[5] Edmund Wilson, To Finland Station (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1953), p. 198.

[6] Carl Leiden, and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 107.

questionable endeavor, since the move to more sophisticated
forms of organization requires a political "savvy" that is
often lacking on that continent.

We find that nationalism can act as a catalyst for the
peoples of many continents to seek freedom in a variety of
ways. We find Minoque concluding that nationalism is less a
theory when it travels from region to region than an expression
of a people's desire to win a particular goal:

> Nationalism is a set of ideas, but as they travel
> from continent to continent, these ideas add up
> less to a theory than to a rhetoric, a form of
> self-expression by which a certain kind of polit-
> ical excitement can be communicated from an elite
> to the massses. These ideas are chameleons that
> take on the colour of the locality around them . . .[7]

Nationalism in this context may not mean anything more than
replacing alien oppression with a home grown tyrant, but as
Crick points out, if you are going to be oppressed, it is
better to be oppressed by your own people than by foreigners.[8]
This desire to be out from under the thumbs of alien tryanny
has spurred nationalistic movements through the ages, from
Germany's fear of a strong France in the nineteenth century,
to Canada's recent economic and energy policies towards the
United States.

Africa needed some form of nationalism to serve as a
catalyst for breaking the antiquated colonial system. Firstly,
the development of a truly "African" nationalism was required

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[7] K.R. Minoque, op. cit., p. 153.

[8] Bernard Crick, op. cit., p. 72.

to create a sense of community, and thus unite a diverse

people in the cause of freedom. In historical times, those

like Aristotle who spoke about integrating a community,

assumed that the integrating polity would be of a homogeneous

nature.[9] It stands to reason that a society composed of indi-

viduals with very similar backgrounds would integrate faster

and more smoothly than one with huge cultural differences. In

such cases, there would have to be created in society, a notion

that would act as a device for uniting the disparate groups

into a strong force for reform and liberation. Secondly, we

have to remember that non-colonial nations were not built by

the conscious efforts of men.[10] Again we can see the necessity

of finding an idea that could create the illusive sense of

unity in the newly developing societies of Africa. Ferkiss

concludes that nationalism is the prime force that can be used

in the drive towards community devlopment in Africa:

> Had nationalism not existed, decolonization would
> never have taken place. In individual cases the
> process may have been sped up, and disjunction
> between preparation for and the actual event of
> freedom may have resulted, but this was inevitable.

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[9] Billy J. Dudley, "Military Government and National Development in Nigeria," in David R. Smock, and Kwamena Bentsi-Enehill (eds.) The Search for National Integration in Africa (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 32.

[10] Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Reflections on Constitutionalism for Emergent Political Orders," in Herbert J. Spiro (ed.) Patterns of African Development: Five Comparisons (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 14.

> Those who waited for freedom as a gift would be
> waiting still. Had not the probability of African
> mastery existed, an African apprenticeship in self-
> rule would never have taken place, or once begun
> would have been of infinite duration.[11]

The western powers helped create African nationalism by creating the infrastructure needed to develop nation-states. The early intellectual elites that were trained in the European educational system became aware of the idea of the nation, and realized that this was a concept that could be used to resist their colonial masters.[12] Thus, we have a situation where there was a group of politically significant Africans emerging with western ideas of liberty, equality and nationalism, being denied access to their own home administrations. It is little wonder that these sophisticated elites began to feel alienated from the political structures of the colony.

The nationalism that was created in Africa was of a progressive nature since such movements usually did not coalesce around ethnic groups, but surrounded the whole population of a colony.[13] Akintoye sees this phenomenon developing from the very nature of the colonial system:

> The colonial authorities gave each colony or protec-
> torate common national boundaries, a common national
> name, a common national capital city, a common central
> government, a common official language and certain
> other common institutions. In this way, they laid
> the foundations of the modern states of Africa. This
> is perhaps the most important development resulting
> from European colonial rule.[14]

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[11] Victor C. Ferkiss, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

[12] Hugh Seton-Watson, Nationalism: Old and New (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967), p. 13.

[13] Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 27.

[14] S.A. Akintoye, Emergent African States: Topics in Twentieth Century History (London: Longman Group Limited, 1976), p. 2.

In the beginning, nationalistic movements in Africa were basically genteel in nature, carried on as a leisure activity. This variety of nationalism was centered around an ideology comprised of six prongs. These prongs were:

1) The African desire to participate in the central government of the country.

2) The African desire for economic justice that recognizes the principle of "equal work for equal pay," regardless of the colour of skin.

3) The African desire for full political rights in his own country.

4) The African dislike of being the means for the white man's ends.

5) The African dislike of being treated as a stranger in his own land.

6) The African dislike of the laws that prescribe for him a permanent position of inferiority.[15]

While these qualities are familiar ingredients of African nationalism, we must not fall into the trap of assuming that all varieties of nationalis in Africa are the same. It would seem that there are three distinct types of nationalism in the region -- negative, modernizing and integrative -- which have different approaches to community development. It is the purpose of the next sections to explore these varieties of African nationalism, and to attempt an understanding of how each is used to support independence movements on that continent.

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[15] Ndabaningi Sithole, "White Supremacy and African Nationalism," in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson (eds.) The Political Awakening of Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 91.

i   Negative Nationalism: Freedom Through Superiority

The study of African nationalism has suffered from many
misunderstandings over the years. For some, any attack on
European domination in the region constituted the development
of nationalism by its inhabitants.[16] It is difficult to
appreciate the development of such a diverse concept amongst
a people when so little is known about its nature. However,
when dealing with the search for freedom in Africa, it becomes
obvious that one of the most travelled routes is an approach
that uses nationalism as a device to exemplify the relative
superiority of the subjugated communities over their oppressors.
It would appear that much of the gist of this approach is
derived from the very nature of their persecutors.[17] In colon-
ial times, theories of cultural difference were used to ration-
alize the dominance of one people over another. Writings by
colonialists, scholars, and missionaries painted a picture of
pre-colonial Africa as being inhabited by barbarians and
savages.[18] In this light, then, it seems quite correct for the
Europeans to colonize Africa to bring civilization to that dark
continent. In the "civilized" world, tales of the African

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[16] Anthony D. Smith, _Theories of Nationalism_, p. 212.

[17] Leo Kuper, _Race, Class, and Power_ (London: Gerald Duck-
worth and Company, Ltd., 1974), p. 246.

[18] S.A. Akintoye, _op. cit._, p. 14.

"savages" were read eagerly, while social theorists suggested that the intelligence of the primitives were stunted by a pre-logical mentality, which was fundamentally different from that of civilized man.[19] Even after these assumptions were questioned and economic exploitation became the focal objective of colonialism, the imperial powers stated that the African peoples that they ruled never constituted a nation.[20] Thus, we see a pattern of thought emerging in Europe, which made Europeans appear somewhat more human than those whom they governed in Africa.

Whatever way we look at colonialism, the basic fact remains that as a system, it asserts the right of an alien people to govern less developed peoples. In developing a nationalism to counteract colonialism, Africans are confronted with numerous problems. Probably the most perplexing problem faced by nationalists in Africa today is the basic structure of the nation-states that were left behind by the imperial powers. As Hodder contends, and it only stands to reason if we look at a map of Africa, we find some countries that could be considered to be too small (Gambia, Togo, Ruanda) and some that may be too big (Sudan, Nigeria, Zaire), while fourteen are totally land locked, thus are dependent upon the good will of their neighbours for access to the ocean.[21] Therefore, beacause there were no

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[19] Guy Rocher, op. cit., pp. 467-486.

[20] Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 381.

[21] B.W. Hodder, Africa Today: A Short Introduction to African Affairs (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1978), pp. 101-102.

rational boundaries to the colonial states, African national-
ists needed to promote some feeling that could make their
populations see themselves as somewhat superior to their
oppressors. In the years before World War II in black Africa,
this national moral superiority was centred mainly in religious
groups. The ideology of these groups found its roots in the
Old Testament, where they identified with the Jews, while the
colonizers were the Egyptians, or the oppressors.[22] It is
easy to see that such a comparison would tend to make the
Africans feel that they were more moral in their pursuit of
freedom than were the imperial powers in their repression.

This feeling of moral superiority that the Africans felt
they had over their colonial rulers, was furthered by their
participation in World War II. Africans contributed much in
the way of material and human resources to the allies, but more
importantly, what they saw in the war years only promoted this
feeling:

> During the war the African came into contact with
> practically all the peoples of the earth. He met
> them on a life-and-death-struggle basis. He saw
> the so-called civilized and peaceful and orderly
> white people mercilessly butchering one another
> just as his so-called savage ancestors had done in
> tribal wars. He saw no difference between the
> primitive and civilized man. In short, he saw
> through European pretensions that only Africans
> were savages. This had a revolutionary psycho-
> logical impact on the African.[23]

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[22] Victor C. Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 85.

[23] Ndabaningi Sithole, "White Supremacy and African Nation-
alism," in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson (eds.) op. cit.,
p. 91.

Also, Africans saw Europeans living in poverty and degradation. Thus in short, the white man was no longer the God that he once was.[24]

There developed after World War II, a sense of Negro destiny and actualization that was lacking previously. In theories such as Negritude, ideas bordering on nihilism were developed about the African.[25] In this light, "nationalism becomes the new religion, with its own galaxy of devils, angels, ascetics, militants and priesthood."[26] Indeed, Western trained African leaders who sought to create their own nation-states, developed movements such as the Mau Mau in Kenya that were a complex mixture of nationalism and traditionalism.[27]

In the early 1960's after many African states received their independence, we can see a negative nationalism being used by the new states in an attempt to create a unique national identity. The group best representing this position,

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[24] Victor C. Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 91.

[25] Abrola Irele, "Negritude: Literature and Ideology," in John Middleton (ed.) Black Africa: Its People and Their Cultures Today (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 385; Charles F. Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism," in David E. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (Glenoce: The Free Press, 1964), p. 189.

[26] David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 56.

[27] James Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," in Peter J.M. McEwan, and Robert B. Sutcliffe (eds.) Modern Africa (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), p. 166.

the Casablanca bloc, would probably have agreed with Stalin
when he concluded:

> National distrust, national segregation, national
> enmity and national conflict are, of course, stim-
> ulated and fostered not by some "innate" sentiment
> of national animosity, but by the striving of
> imperialism to subjugate other nations and by the
> fear inspired in these nations by the menace of
> national enslavement.[28]

Thus the member countries of this grouping described themselves
as being militant, nationalist, radical Pan Africanist, positive
neutralist, anti-colonist, African-Arab socialist (except
Morocco), and activists.[29] It would seem that such negativism
would increase significantly the possibility of tensions in the
international arena, while at the same time, bonding a popula-
tion together on the principles of distrust and militancy. It
is one thing to create a nation-state with the ideas of freedom
and equality for a disfranchised people, but it is another thing
to try to develop such a political organization based on such
nonprogressive principles. Indeed, such organizations would be
anti-humanitarian in their nature and would have to be consid-
ered as a step backward in the evolutionary process of human
development.

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[28] J. Stalin, op. cit., p. 20.

[29] Arnold Rivkin, The African Presence in World Affairs:
National Development and its Role in Foreign Affairs (New York:
The Free Press, 1963), p. 15; K.R. Minogue, op. cit., p. 109.

There were mixed opinions about the nature of colonialism
in the imperial countries around the turn of the century. In
England, the controversy centred around who was really benefit-
ing from the colonial situation. Kipling thought that colon-
ialism was good for India and bad for England; Indians enjoyed
good British administration, while the British suffered, because
they made all of the sacrifices. On the other hand, Cecil
Rhodes thought that the policy was beneficial to both parties
concerned.[30] From this line of thought, a good definition of a
colonized community would be that it is "a society which is
economically not very advanced and whose economic, political,
cultural and social development is subjected to all the relation-
ships of dependence in which it finds itself necessarily involv-
ed with one or several societies which are economically more
advanced."[31] The common strain of thought throughout the colon-
ial period was one that is put forth adequately by the preceding
quote. In more understandable terms, it was premised on the
idea of a higher economic and supposedly more culturally advanced
society, helping a lesser people reach the heights that have al-
ready been scaled by the colonizers.

There is a tendency to regard ethnic groups as drags on the
modernization process because it is believed that they divert

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[30] Karl W. Deutsch, _Nationalism and its Alternatives_, p. 74.

[31] Guy Rocher, _op. cit._, p. 499.

energies, fragment the nation-state, and preserve irrational

patterns of human behaviour.[32] In addition, Emerson sees

people like Toynbee denouncing traditional nationalism as a

corrupting and poisonous force that destroys the political

life. Toynbee was even less happy with its spread to the

colonial areas because it was not congruent with their needs

and circumstances.[33] There were certain schools of thought

in Africa that agreed with the hypothesis that the past had

been a hindrance to modernization in the region. An early

leader of Guinea, Sekou Toure, suggested that the tribal

chiefs were feudalists who lived off the exploited peasant

masses.[34] A determined nationalist, Toure would never deny

the past and proceed to create a new and alien reality for his

people. To dismiss a major character such as the tribal chief

in the traditional lives of the people would cause a radical

modification in their social reality. Institutions must change.

Nevertheless, such radical alterations propel people into new

forms of existence and cut traditional ties -- however dracon-

ian they may be -- in a community. The trouble here is that

often people's loyalties are anchored upon such institutions

and eliminating them would cause alienation to spread in society.

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[32] Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 3.

[33] Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 378.

[34] Sekou Toure, "African Emancipation," in Paul Sigmund (ed.) The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 213.

Scientific and technological theories which made possible the creation of modern industrial states in Europe were also applied to African colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[35] Those Africans, especially in French and Portuguese colonies, who succeeded in obtaining the highest level of civilization, were supposed to be granted European citizenship with all its rights and privileges.[36] While relatively' few Africans ever obtained this status, it did serve to show them that modernization was a hard and painful exercise.

To help in the transition from rural to urban existence, various urban associations were developed to help baffled ex-tribesmen adapt to the new industrial society. At the same time, modern organizations such as trade unions became the bastions of nationalism.[37] These organizations were no doubt striving for the protection and betterment of their members. However, any organization that has been created for a specific purpose such as a trade union, will seek to develop and protect its own position relative to other groups in society. In essence, these organizations become self-aggrandizing. Therefore, because of the basic nature of trade unions, they would be geared much more toward furthering industrialization, than maintaining a balance between modernization and tradition.

While modernizing nationalism is not as prevalent in Africa as are the negative or integrative varieties, it is significant

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[35] Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 234.

[36] S.A. Akintoye, op. cit., p. 15.

[37] Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 61, 125.

that progressive organizations and institutions can be the home of nationalistic tendencies in society. Modernizing nationalism is a process that can further the development of the nation-state, but what is worrisome about the variety, is that such rapid modernization surely would lead to massive dislocations in society, and the chaos which follows such movements.

iii Integrative Nationalism: Freedom Through Development and Respect for the Past

Previously, we have explored two very different ways that nationalism has been used in African countries. We have seen that the concept could be used as a device that showed the superiority of one people over another. On the other hand, nationalism could be used effectively by modern institutions to strengthen their particular position against others. Our third category, integrative nationalism, is a complex inter-mingling of the two aforementioned varieties, which creates a theory that is useful in the smooth development of African nation-states.

Emerson suggests that the nation-state continues to be the most extensive community to which man can give effective alleg-iance. He goes on to state that to undermine nationalism with-out a better community as an alternative would be worse than living with nationalism.[38] This is a well taken point and, as Enloe also suggests, any integrationist programme that is too

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[38] Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 385.

far reaching can raise men's hopes to the point that if they are not realized the response could well be ideological in nature.[39] Thus, it would seem that if integration is to proceed, which is a historical fact, the process must be geared toward obtaining structures within the bounds of reality, if the chaos of disorganization is to be avoided.

As we know, the colonial territories that were created usually did not follow traditional boundaries.[40] Creating a national spirit within the boundaries of entities that are not historical in nature, would not appear to resemble European ideas about nationalism. Integrative nationalism can be defined more positively as a concept that can mediate the harsh social and psychological effects of rapid social change, while at the same time creating a sense of community in the African states. This is a somewhat different perception of nationalism than we find in most of the literature on European nationalism. We find sympathy for this position in Emerson, when he discusses the virtues of nationalism for colonial peoples:

> To the peoples emerging from imperial over-lordship
> the major immediate contributions of nationalism
> are a sense of independent worth and self-respect
> and a new social solidarity to replace the tradition-
> al bonds. It is the sword and shield of those who
> are achieving independence. From being "natives"
> they rise to the honorable title of nationals.

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[39] Cynthia H. Enloe, _Ethnic Conflict and Political Development_, p. 76.

[40] S.A. Akintoye, _op. cit._, p. 4.

> Through self-assertion they achieve the spiritual
> satisfaction of demonstrating that they can make
> their own forms on which the superior imperial
> powers pride themselves. They achieve also the
> more tangible satisfaction of overcoming the lack
> of social-political cohesion which earlier played
> so large a role in rendering them unable to resist
> the imperial process of consolidated nations.[41]

And in Ginsberg, we find:

> It is not accidental that nationalism has swept the
> developing world, any more than that Catholicism
> became the dominant creed in Europe after the decline
> of the Roman Empire. Each offered a prospect of
> hope, freedom, and betterment to large numbers en-
> trapped by an oppressive environment that they
> could not master or surmount.[42]

While the nation-state is considered to be too confining by

many European integrationists, in Africa the nation-state is a

step forward, a broadening of the political and social devel-

opment of the region.[43]

Building a nation-state is an extremely complicated

process, whereby a centralized administration exerts control

over a diverse population. This process also involves formally

making government more autonomous and differentiated from non-

governmental organizations, more coordinated internally, and

more able to penetrate the various geographical sectors of

society.[44] But more fundamentally, this new community becomes

a political grouping:

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[41] Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 380.

[42] Eli Ginzberg, Manpower for Development: Perspectives on
Five Continents (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1976),
p. 315.

[43] Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 385.

[44] Cynthia H. Enloe, Police, Military, and Ethnicity:
Foundations of State Power, p. 157.

> This new society is above all political. There
> is essentially one social bond and one status
> system; it is based on political office and
> political power. Politics is primary. The
> central political authority in African states
> does not merely provide internal order, external
> security, and justice, and build roads and
> schools. It builds new villages and whole
> cities, runs most of the economy, and dominates
> the cultural life. The political elite has no
> competitors in independent business, professinal
> or intellectual elites; African society is pol-
> iticized from the seats of government to the most
> remote villages. "Seek ye first the political
> kingdom," said Kwame Nkrumah. All else is deriv-
> ative. Nation building means building not only
> a political structure but a new society and a new
> economy. It is through politics, that the African
> having won his freedom, seeks to win his unity and
> to find his identity.[45]

The creation of a political community is a significant develop-

ment since it means a society has matured to the point where it

sees the nation-state as being a legitimate organization within

which it must act to gain whatever societal values it desires.

At this point, the central government can create and manipulate

new national symbols to consolidate the integration that already

has taken place.[46]

Before a movement can be classed as being truly national-

ist, it must succeed in co-ordinating its actions in all parts

of the territory, and have gained the support of the masses.[47]

The dual pursuits of independence and freedom from oppression

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[45] Victor C. Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 117.

[46] Timothy M. Shaw, "The Actors in African International
Politics," in Timothy M. Shaw, and Kenneth A. Heard (eds.)
The Politics of Africa, Dependence and Development (New York:
Africana Publishing Company, 1979), p. 361.

[47] N.E. Davis, Africa in the Modern World (Nairobi: Oxford
University Press, 1973), p. 45.

are the two major ideas that are interwoven in African integrative nationalism. We can see in this variety traits of nineteenth century liberalism which saw the creation of nation-states as a culmination of a people's drive for freedom. Since those who practice integrative nationalism in Africa see nationalism in the same manner as did the liberals of the previous century, they likely will not be swayed by European arguments that suggest that nation-state sovereignty is obsolete and non-progressive.[48]

One of the principal appeals of integrative nationalism is its concern for the freedom of the individual. Functionalist anthropology and its neutral concept of cultural relativity gave African nationalists some room to argue their case. They could argue that Africans had strong and humanitarian cultures that emanated from antiquity, and this fact justified their search for freedom.[49] However, before this freedom could be realized, Toure contended total independence must be won:

> If the problem of the individual is a concern in
> other continents -- in countries that are free and
> independent -- the first and only true problem for
> the colonial peoples is that of the attainment of
> independence. It is consequently a collective
> problem, a political reality engendered by national-
> ist sentiments.[50]

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[48] Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 379.

[49] O. Onoge, "Revolutionary Imperatives in African History," in Peter C.W. Gutkind, and Peter Waterman (eds.) African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1978), pp. 34-35.

[50] Sekou Toure, "African Emancipation," in Paul Sigmund (ed.) op. cit., p. 212.

Generally, African leaders see the problem of independence as the major stumbling block to obtaining personal freedom. If they are able to obtain independence and individual freedom, praiseworthy goals like human dignity, self-respect, spiritual development, economic improvement and cultural emancipation are seen to follow.[51] There seems to be quite a simple relationship at work here: independence means freedom and freedom means human dignity and development. What separates this form of nationalism from the other two varieties is that it is imbued with the spirit of liberalism which seeks equality, but not superiority.

The second thrust of integrative nationalism is its attempt to create unity within the bounds of the loosely constructed African nation-states. This is an extremely hard task because these states are racked by numerous cleavages.[52] Thus, it is exceptionally difficult to develop a sense of community as Fanon points out in The Wretched of the Earth:

> National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystalization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been. The faults that we find in it are quite sufficient explanation of the facility with which, when dealing with young and independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state. These are the cracks in the edifice which show the process of retrogression, that is so harmful and prejudicial to national effort and national unity.[53]

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[51] Charles F. Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism," in David E. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, p. 183.

[52] Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, pp. 75-76; S.A. Akintoye, op. cit.; pp. 4, 86; Edward McWhinney, Federal Constitution-Making for a Multinational World, p. 42.

[53] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1977), pp. 148-149.

When trying to develop nation-states, we must agree with Deutsch, who suggests that "when all these developments have to be crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations, the chances for assimilation to work are much smaller. The likelihood is much greater that people will be precipitated into politics with their old languages, their old tribal loyalties still largely unchanged."[54]

Creating national unity is not just a matter of political expediency, but is a part of a broader process that includes historical, social, economic, and psychological issues.[55] The question then becomes, what contributes to the development of such unity? Some pundits suggest that modernization is the major factor in creating unity in new nation-states. Thus, the modernizing elites will be the main source of integration.[56] This approach would appear to be the standard theory of Deutsch and others, who see the creation of infrastructures as being all important to the integration of new societies.[57] To be sure, modernization must be considered as a prime mover behind national integration. However, it also must be considered to be a double-edged process:

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[54] Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives, p. 73.

[55] B.W. Hodder, and D.R. Harris, "Introduction: The African Scene," in B.W. Hodder and D.R. Harris (eds.) Africa in Transition (London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1967), p. 20.

[56] Colin Legum, et. al., Africa in the 1980's: A Continent in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980), p. 29.

[57] Karl W. Deutsch, Jorge I. Dominquez, and Hugh Heclo, Comparative Government: Politics of Industrialized and Developing Nations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1981), p. 389; Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives, pp. 9-10.

> The process of development and modernization tend
> to facilitate national integration on the one hand,
> and to create circumstances conducive to the growth
> of tribalism on the other. While society is being
> transformed, the new non-tribal links and groups
> take shape, the process also induces group conscious-
> ness. In most African states, all the ethnic groups
> within the state are "minorities." They do not all
> have equal influence, but the absence of a single
> dominant group makes maneuver possible, and even a
> disadvantaged group can increase its share of power
> if it manages its political alliances skillfully.[58]

It seems that modernization can cause integration through the

development of pluralism within society. Such slogans as "Unity

in Diversity" in Nigeria, and Harambee (Let us pull together)

in Kenya are used to further pluralist integration.[59] The

problem with pluralism in African countries is centred around

how to manipulate the masses in a positive way to create a

sense of community, without creating a sense of negativism to-

wards the outside world.

As with other varieties of African nationalism, integrative

nationalists perceive their economic position as a major source

of disintegration in their communities. Writing in 1911,

Casely-Hayford saw the economic question as being of supreme

importance in the fight for African liberation:

> A twofold danger threatens the African everywhere.
> It is the outcome of certain economic conditions
> whose method is the exploitation of the Ethiopian
> (the term used by the first generation of modern
> African thinkers to denote African or Negro peoples)
> for all he is worth. He is said to be pressed into
> the service of man, in reality, the service of the

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[58] Saadia Touval, op. cit., p. 29.

[59] S.A. Akintoye, op. cit., p. 89.

> Caucasian.   That being so, he never reaps the full
> meed of his work as a man.   He materially contributes
> to the building of pavements on which he may not walk
> -- take it as a metaphor, or as a fact, which way you
> please.   He helps to work up the revenues and to fill
> up exchequers over which, in most cases, he has no
> effective control, if any at all.[60]

In recent years, this perception has been used by militant

factions within the emerging nations to show that this relation-

ship "was not only economically expoitative, but was actually

retarding the various facets of development of the subject

people."[61]

This "unhappy, execrable accident,"[62] as Fanon referred to

the colonial experience, has made it necessary for the consoli-

dating nation-states to seek alternative economic and political

methods to develop themselves as viable social units.   Because

most African states do not possess a highly developed political

apparatus, the legalism and secularism associated with Western

pluralist democracies is rejected, as is the Marxist view that

class conflict is inevitable in the process of human develop-

ment.[63]   This dual rejection came in a time when interest in

the region by both the Soviet Union and the United States began

to increase noticeably.   By the mid-1960's, the United States

was the second largest investor in nearly every African country,

while the Soviets increased their attempts at building a commun-

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[60] J.E. Casely-Hayford, "Race Emancipation and African Nation-
ality," in Rupert Emerson, and Martin Kilson (eds.) op. cit., p.30.

[61] Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The
Country-side Version (London: Penquin Books Ltd., 1974), p. 287.

[62] Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution: Political
Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 101.

[63] Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Develop-
ment, p. 74.

ist bloc of countries in the region.[64]   The Soviet initiatives

probably failed because of their general ineptitude in the

region, while the Americans failed because the Third World

points to the continued inequalities of the western economic

system:

> Economic growth has been so much faster in some
> countries than in others that today living stand-
> ards of Australian and Hindu Farmers may well be
> even farther apart than they were a hundred years
> ago. That the difference in poverty is so great,
> and that the world's poorest peoples are so numer-
> ous -- comprising, as they do, more than one-half
> of mankind -- these are perhaps the fundamental
> facts behind much of today's nationalistic insistence
> on national separateness and economic and political
> barriers. Not before the bottom of the barrel of the
> world's large peoples has been reached, not before
> inequality and insecurity will become less extreme,
> not before the cast poverty of Asia and Africa, will
> be reduced substantially by industrialization, and
> by gains in living standards and in education -- not
> before then will the age of nationalism and national
> diversity see the beginning of its end.[65]

It becomes obvious that a new system that can develop a polit-

ical community and create economic benefits is more desirable

than trying to implement either the Soviet or American system

of development in a newly formed nation-state. Most African

leaders see this type of integrative nationalism as being

effective in political communities where there is only one

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[64] Y. Tandon, "The Interpretation of International Institu-
tions from a Third World Perspective," in Paul Taylor, and
A.J.R. Groom (eds.) International Organizations: A Conceptual
Approach, p. 363; G. Mennen Williams, "Communism's Impact on
African Nationalism," in William J. Bossenbrook (ed.), op. cit.,
pp. 98-99.

[65] Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication:
An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge:
The M.I.T. Press, 1975), p. 191.

legitimate political actor.[66] Whether or not we, from our own

particular Western perspective, believe that a one-party system

is detrimental to the formation of an integrated society, it

makes sense to see a flexible one-party system as being more

integrative than a pluralist system, where politics often becomes

divisive over seemingly non-contentious issues.

Of the three varieties of nationalism studied here, integra-

tive nationalism would appear to be the most worthwhile path

for the newly developing societies of Africa to follow. There

always remains the danger that the sentiments aroused by any

form of nationalism will be corrupted, and instead of creating

an integrated society, will become the agents of disintegration

and succession. However, this is the chance that a society

takes when it employs a flexible idea in the pursuit of con-

crete political goals.

iv   Chapter Three: Conclusion

We explored one of the major arguments of our thesis in

this Chapter. How nationalism contributes to the integration

of diverse groups into political units was examined, and it

was found that the idea was indeed a potent force in the devel-

opment of integrated polities. It also became obvious that

while nationalism was an important instrument in this process,

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[66] Jack Goody, "Marriage Policy and Incorporation in North-
ern Ghana," in Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (eds.) From Tribe
to Nation: Studies in Incorporation Processes (Scranton: Chand-
ler Publishing Company, 1970), p. 138. See also Bismarch U.
Mwansasu, "The Changing Role of the Tanganyika African National
Union," in Bismarch U. Mwansasu, and Cranford Pratt (eds.) Toward
Socialism in Tanzania (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

its diffuse nature allowed the concept to be used by many
different movements to further a variety of causes.

In the Chapter we looked at three ways that nationalism
was used to further the development of nation-states in Africa.
The idea was used negatively to help consolidate national
communities by exemplifying supposed cultural and moral super-
iority over other people. Secondly, nationalism was seen to be
used by people who wanted to revolutionize African society.
And finally, we contended that there was a variety of national-
ism at work in Africa that was a combination of respect for the
past and a progressive modernizing spirit. However questionable
the uses of nationalism were in Africa, the fact remains that
nationalism is a powerful force in the unification and develop-
ment of national communities.

Having reached the conclusion that our thesis so far is
valid, we can now proceed to examine the other main contention
in our thesis. The next chapter will explore how nationalism
hinders integration when such integration is not beneficial to
the individuals who inhabit the integrating sub-units.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONALISM IN THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM

We live in a complex world. The number and intensity of
contacts between modern states would have been considered to
be in the realm of fantasy a century ago. As the world devel-
oped, great nations -- both in size and population -- emerged
and the old nations of Europe began to look like "a political
patchwork quilt made of nations ranging from small to minute,
but none, by world standards, large."[1] Whether the tradition-
al nations of Europe can withstand the supranational pulls that
have increased in the years since World War II is open to debate.
Therefore, the thrust of this Chapter is to investigate how
nationalism has been used to counteract the tendencies to create
a larger political entity on the European continent.

There is no doubt that nationalism is largely a European
concept in origin. It was refined and its political uses were
first explored and put into practice in Europe. What was
finally understood in Western Europe about nationalism, was that
it was a universal concept. Thus, it could not be captured by

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[1] Geoffrey Parker, The Logic of Unity: A Geography of the
European Economic Community (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1981),
p. 1.

one people or grouping of peoples to be used by them exclus-
ively. Some would say that nationalism brought the experiences
of Asia, Africa and the Pacific into relation with those of
Europe, therefore, creating a universal experience.[2] However,
unlike the nationalism that developed in the colonies, European
nationalism has been at play on the continent for long periods
of time, and we would expect that its strength would be greater
than the newer versions.

Two basic principles that nationalism has embraced eagerly
were the ideas that in any particular territorial unit only one
sovereignty can be exercised, and in the international arena,
the supranational community must be little more than a network
of interactions between sovereign states.[3] Ideas about strong
organizations being capable of exerting control over all facets
of human existence were found in many academic disciplines,
particularly in the study of politics and economics.[4] There
seems to be a pre-occupation within nation-states with establish-
ing the dominance of the state apparatus over all other con-
tenders. While these feelings of exclusiveness of the nation-
state are still prevalent in today's world, there is a contrary

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[2] Eugene Kamenka, "Political Nationalism: The Evolution of
the idea," in Eugene Kamenka (ed.) Nationalism: The Nature and
Evolution of an Idea (Canberra: Australian National University,
1973), p. 3.

[3] Pierre Pescatore, The Law of Integration: Emergence of a
New Phenomenon in International Relations, Based on the Exper-
ience of the European Communities (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff Inter-
national Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 30, 5.

[4] B.J. McCormick, and et. al., Introducing Economics
(London: Penquin Books Ltd., 1978), p. 794.

school of thought being developed which questions the unique-
ness and continued relevance of the nation-state as a political
institution.

One such area where there is concern about the usefulness
of the nation-state is in the area of human rights. We find
a good exploration of what is meant by human rights in Fawcett:

> Human rights are sometimes called fundamental rights
> or basic rights or natural rights. As fundamental or
> basic rights they are those which must not be taken
> away by any legislature or any act of government and
> which are often set out in a constitution. As natural
> rights they are seen as belonging to men and women by
> their very nature. Another way to describe them
> would be to call them 'common rights', for they are
> rights which all men and women in the world should
> share, just as the common law in England, for example,
> was the body of rules and customs which, unlike local
> customs, governed the whole country.[5]

Obviously, since the world has been through two wars -- one
fought on the principle of attrition and the other, geared to-
ward the extermination of whole peoples -- there is little
doubt that the nation-state has not been successful in protect-
ing the fundamental rights of their citizens. Since the nation-
state has been deficient in this important area, Deutsch con-
cludes that people could become action oriented in their pursuit
of a better social reality.[6] This movement towards action by
society is probably a natural development resulting from the
abhorrence that people feel about the present world situation.

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[5] J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1968), p. 151.

[6] Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International
Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement (New York: Archon
Books, 1970), p. 3.

Movement away from the nation-state to some higher form of political organization is a complex phenomenon that can not be explained easily. Some would attribute this drive for higher integration to the development of a pervasive mass media, which tends to blur the separateness of one nation from another.[7] Others would suggest that because the technological society in which we live has made it possible for the intermingling of the peoples of the world,[8] sense of a common destiny among the citizens of various nation-states has been created.

There have been various new ideas promoted that would lead to the elimination, or at the very least, curtailment of the powers of the nation-state. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore the historical nature and manifestations of such a move away from the traditional nation-state system.

i   The Movement Towards European Integration

If we take integration to mean that various groups have extended their consciousness to form a community with each other -- thus creating complexity from diversity -- we can see that

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[7] Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 303.

[8] Uri Ra'anan, "Resurgence of Ethnic Self-Assertion in the West: Causes and Effects," in Uri Ra'anan (ed.) Ethnic Resurgence in Modern Democratic States: A Multi Disciplinary Approach to Human Resources and Conflict (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. xiii-xvi.

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this process has been at work since the beginning of recorded history. In the early seventeenth century, Duc de Sully proposed the creation of a "most Christian Council" that would keep the peace with an all European army and a century later Saint Pierre developed the idea that 11 sovereigns of Europe should delegate part of their sovereignty to a European senate, and support it both financially and militarily.[9] And finally, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century we find the Austrian Count Coudenhove - Kalergi suggesting, in rather vague terms, the creation of some form of federated Europe.[10]

While there were ideas around about internationalism in Europe, however, they appeared to be little more than philosophical musings. Nationalism was still too strong, and its strength was increased as a result of the World War I.[11] But that war also increased the recognition of human rights as a legitimate political issue.[12] Thus, World War I stimulated the search for a new political system that could protect individual freedom on the one hand, and on the other, have the effect of strengthening the nation-state as the sole legitimate actor on the international stage.

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[9] F. Roy Willis, "Introduction," in F. Roy Willis (ed.) European Integration (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1975), pp. ix-x.

[10] Altiero Spinelli, "The Growth of the European Movement Since the Second World War," in Michael Hodges (ed.) European Integration: Selected Readings (London: Penquin Books, Ltd., 1972), pp. 43-44.

[11] Leon N. Lindberg, and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be-Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 6.

[12] J.E.S. Fawcett, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

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It was World War II that made many people believe that the nation-state was obsolete, and that international cooperation was imperative so that the barbarity of that war would never be repeated.[13] To these and other critics, a radical alternative to the nation-state system was needed:

> To the transcenders, re-establishment of the
> old order would be little more than the
> prelude to a new round of destruction.
> Nation-states could aggregate terrifying
> amounts of power, but they could no longer
> protect their citizens; the hard shells
> which the territorial states had thrown up
> around themselves were now permeable. Wars
> were no longer confined to border regions
> but were fought center-to-center. Awesome
> destructive power combined with relatively
> meager defensive capabilities led inexor-
> ably toward insecurity and war.[14]

Although Etzioni has argued that early post-war attempts at integration were largely unsuccessful,[15] nevertheless, the seeds of integration were firmly implanted in the imaginations of the majority of politically significant elites.

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[13]Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Its Nature and Interpreters (Washington: American Historical Association, 1976), p. 4.

[14]Leon L. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community, p. 6.

[15]Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, pp. 264-265.

The first meeting to discuss post-war unification in Europe took place in Geneva in 1944.[16] What was started in this, and other such meetings, was a process that would come to challenge the very nature and legitimacy of the nation-state. This challenge was directed both at the internal and external functioning of the traditional nation-state. Firstly, the system was attacked on moral grounds (it was denounced for its inherently totalitarian implications), and also in terms of power (modern technological developments made nation-states obsolete).[17] In the international arena, it was contended that war was a direct consequence of the lack of community and consensus between nation-states.[18] The stage was set, therefore, for the first real political attack on the nation-state. In a memorandum sent to the French Ministers Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault on May 4, 1950, by civil servant Jean Monnet, we find the initial desire to break the political deadlock that existed in Europe at that time:

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[16]Ibid., p. 252.

[17]Edward Hallet Carr, op. cit., p. 38.

[18]Abdul A. Said, and Luiz Simmons, "The Ethnic Factor in World Politics," in Abdul A. Said, and Luiz Simmons (eds.) Ethnicity in an International Context (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 16.

> Wherever we look in the present world situation we
> see nothing but deadlock -- whether it be the in-
> creasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be
> inevitable, the problem of Germany, the continuation
> of French recovery, the organization of Europe, the
> very place of France in Europe and in the world.
> From such a situation there is only one way of
> escape: concrete resolute action on a limited but
> decisive point, bringing about on this point a
> fundamental change, and gradually modifying the
> very terms of all the problems.[19]

And later in the same memorandum, we find:

> The course of events must be changed. To do this,
> men's minds must be changed. Words are not enough.
> Only immediate action on an essential point can
> change the present static situation. This action
> must be radical, real, immediate, and dramatic, it
> must change things and make a reality of the hopes
> which people are on the point of abandoning. And
> thereby give the peoples of the 'free' countries
> faith in the more distant goals that will put to
> them, and the active determination of pursue them.[20]

It would be easy to conclude with Emil Lengyel that since nation-
alism is not merely a political phenomenon, but is linked to a
myriad of economic and social issues, the West in its new
spirit of cooperation, was showing signs of yielding to a
higher form of integration.[21]

The movement that was started by Monnet, would lead to the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and

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[19] Richard Vaughan, Post-War Integration in Europe: Documents
of Modern History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 51.

[20] Ibid., p. 52.

[21] Emil Lengyel, Nationalism: The Last Stage of Communism
(New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. xiii-xiv.

later to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC).
This process was based upon the functional approach of Mitrany,
who described it in the following way:

> Whenever it (functionalism) is used it can serve both
> ends at the same time because it is the only concept
> that breaks away from the long durance to the dogma
> of sovereign territorial division -- which, after all,
> is only a modern invention and not a law of social
> nature. Hence, it is the only one which allows social
> organization to find and follow its natural bent and
> range; the only one capable of adapting itself to our
> endless changes in needs and conditions without polit-
> ical upheaval. And all that and always patently for
> the benefit of all the peoples in the partnership.[22]

We seem to be confronted with a new approach that would do away
with the pettiness of the nation-state system -- an approach
that would create peaceful organizations in which people could
function to their fullest. This was the hope of the first
group of intrepid integration theorists in the 1940's and 1950's.

ii   European Integration and the Supposed Defeat of Nationalism

There has been a constant struggle between the various
peoples of Europe for the dominant position on the continent.
However, as a result of the World War II and the power shift
that the war brought about, competition for continental supremacy
became a contest between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Since the European nations were no longer predominant powers,
they began to see themselves more as allies, than as adversaries.

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[22] David Mitrany, "A Political Theory for the New Society,"
in A.J.R. Groom, and Paul Taylor (eds.) Functionalism: Theory
and Practice in International Relations, p. 32.

The pull toward each other would seem only natural because the whole concept of the nation-state had been under intense and hostile scrutiny by most of the non-political elites that survived the war. It was also contended the nation not have any intrinsic rights which would make it a clearly recognizable entity in nature such as the family.[23]

Since it was almost a forgone conclusion that the nation-state was dysfunctional, some form of community had to be developed to take its place. However, there remained a basic paradox that troubled many European supranationalists:

> The world is bursting in on us. It is less important
> that we are French, German, British and so on than
> that we are Europeans, and less important that we are
> Europeans than that we are human beings. Because of
> the recent revolutions in transport, communications,
> and weaponry, it is world forces and world factors
> which shape our lives, and sometimes threaten them.
> But it is still as citizens of a single nation that
> we entrust power to those who must guide and protect
> us. Events are global, while political legitimacy
> remains national.[24]

Continued integration was seen to be the only method which reduced the tensions resulting from this paradox. Pescatore is quite right when he asserts that relationships which define the spheres of competence and power between societies is what integration is all about.[25] When attempts were made to do just

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[23] Edward Hallet Carr, op. cit., p. 34.

[24] Wayland Kennet, "Introduction," in Wayland Kennet (ed.) The Futures of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 1.

[25] Pierre Pescatore, op.cit., p. 26.

that in the early post-war years, they often ended in dismal failure.[26] Nevertheless, the hope still was "to construct a Government of Europe that the door to reasonable progress is always open as far as we, the people, indicate, and the door to tyranny always, unalterably and implacably bolted, barred and everlastingly locked."[27]

What seemed to be hindering European integration was the lack of a wide variety of institutions capable of developing a functional recognition of community within the European societies. The eminent federalist, Carl Friedrich, has dealt with the need to create common institutions in a successful political community:

> All political order rests upon political community. Hence its institutions reflect, to the extent to which they are adequate, the social structure of the community. They are permeated by the values and beliefs prevalent in the community and, at the same time, provide a framework for the realization of interest through conflict and compromise. The reasons for repeating these generally acknowledged empirical truths is that they call for a patterning of values, beliefs and interests . . .[28]

In Crawford, these sentiments are expressed again with particular reference to Europe:

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[26] Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 252.

[27] Oliver Crawford, Done this Day the European Idea in Action (London: Rupert Hart - Davis, 1970), p. 6.

[28] Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 24.

> Our European ship of state is already built, but our
> shipyard is still disordered. Some day this ship of
> state must set sail across the unknown sea of our
> future, but the charts of this future have scarcely
> yet been drawn and our course is not yet agreed. Our
> ship has therefore so to be built and manned that it
> can sail across unknown seas -- not merely without
> ship wreck -- but cheerfully and in a spirit of high
> adventure.[29]

Since the creation of a community depends largely on the trans-
fer of loyalty, a pan-European movement would have to be strong
enough to wrest people's allegiances from the nation-state.

The first step toward creating this sense of community in
Europe was supposed to have been the development of the ECSC.
While the main function of the organization was to coordinate
coal and steel production in France and Germany, the policy
behind the programme had far-reaching implications. In inte-
grating two important areas like coal and steel, the possibility
of war between the two societies would be greatly decreased,
since each community would have significant control over each
other's key war sectors. And those who were imbued with function-
alist ideology thought the ECSC would trigger a spill-over pro-
cess that would eventually lead to the economic and political
unification of Europe.[30]

From the time of the Messina conference in 1955, to the
actual creation of the EEC and Euratom, the gradualist approach
that was adopted to counteract the supposed negative, that was
associated with nationalism, seemed to be working.[31] The lim-
itation of sovereignty that was behind the ECSC was brought to

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[29] Oliver Crawford, op. cit., p. 388.

[30] Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study
of Leaders and Forces, pp. 266-267.

[31] Ibid., p. 270.

fruition in the larger communities. Each organization was to coordinate many areas of the internal and external development of the member nation-sates.[32] We can see that the structure of the new community was geared toward supranationalism. Its staff was pledged to the service of the community and to denounce their allegiance to their nation-state.[33] Thus, there was a concerted attempt to create an elite whose sole loyalty was directed toward the new entity. A loyal systems elite would be a powerful instrument in the process of social-ization. This idea that an elite can be created so easily is questionable. However, it does serve to show the basic ideol-ogy of the integrationists. Peace demands that people become more alike. Therefore, any institution that serves to differ-entiate individuals must be altered in the name of progress.

Robert Schuman, who brought the European unification pro-posal into the political arena, concluded some years later that the process was "always prescribed by geography, always pre-vented by history,"[34] Thus, if the integration movement was to be advanced in Europe, it must be shown to be mutually benefic-ial to all the parties concerned. Also, the national elites had to be shown that the nature of the new system, its predict-ability and effectiveness, would be greater than the old nation-

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[32] Richard Rosecrance, op. cit., p. 21.

[33] Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 231.

[34] Geoffrey Parker, op. cit., p. 149.

state system.[35] Non-German and particularly French elites were thought to desire such a new system because it would effectively fetter German power.[36] Lindberg and Schiengold described what an integrative process like the aforementioned one should accomplish:

> The autonomy of functional contexts can also be gradually corroded and growth-inducing coalitions encouraged as the immediate participants in the policy-making process, from interest groups to bureaucrats and statesmen, begin to develop new perspectives, loyalties, and identifications as a result of their mutual interactions. This is the actor socialization mechanism that's potential in the integration process.[37]

And in Deutsch, we find:

> If several individuals or groups experience high levels of transactions with a postitive covariance of rewards, they may wish to increase their ties to one another, at least to a moderate degree. We may speak of them as being favourable candidates for integrations into a common system that includes them all. The states of Western Europe, for instance, are already connected in many respects by high mutual transactions and a positive covariance of rewards. To the extend that this is the case, it should be easier to promote further integration of these countries into a single political system, such as a confederation of Western Europe.[38]

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[35] Robert S. Robins, _Political Institutionalism and the Integration of Elites_ (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 189.

[36] John Spanier, _American Foreign Policy Since World War II_ (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 58; Marie-Elizabeth De Bussy, Helene Delorme, and Francoise De La Sevre, "Theoretical Approaches to European Integration," in Foy R. Willis (ed.) op. cit., pp. 86-87.

[37] Leon N. Lindberg, and Stuart A. Schiengold, _Europe's Would-Be Polity_, p. 119.

[38] Karl W. Deutsch, _Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate_, p. 150.

Integration in Europe, more often than not, is perceived
to be a natural progression of mankind toward a higher level
of civilization. Technology, urbanization, and a myriad of
other phenomena have created a bundle of complex human needs
and desires which rendered the nation-state impotent as an
organizing structure.[39] Since the nation-state was no longer
considered a useful institution for social organization,
European integrationists adopted an incremental regional policy
with full integration as its goal. Regionalism is, however,
not without its critics:

> Objections to regionalism revolve around the fact
> that the world cannot be neatly divided into region-
> al units. Regional divisions are hard to draw
> precisely and are, as a rule, useful only for some
> specific purposes, the region being redefined as
> the nature of the purpose changes say, from trade to
> defense . . . Beneath the surface of regional har-
> mony, animosities frequently pose insurmountable
> obstacles to the regional solution of problems.[40]

However, many scholars see the regional approach as being com-
plementary to their ultimate goal of creating a supranational
community.[41]

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[39] Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process:
Guidelines for Analysis of the Basis of Political Community,"
in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.) The Integration
of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1964), p. 1; Abdul Said and Luiz Simmons, "The Ethnic Factors
in World Politics," in Abdul Said and Luiz Simmons (eds.) op.
cit., p. 18.

[40] Minerua M. Etzioni, The Majority of One: Towards a Theory
of Regional Compatibility (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1970), p. 17.

[41] Ibid., p. 15.

Regional incrementalism is seen as a major way to further economic integration in Europe. In most cases, economic integration means a process for the "removal of discrimination," and the "application of co-ordinated and common policies on a sufficient scale to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives are fulfilled." Thus, "it follows that economic union is a state in which discrimination has been largely removed, and common policies have been and are being applied on a sufficient scale."[42] The incrementalism of the economic approach to integration has filtered into all areas of European integrative procedures, and would seem to have achieved the stability that was at the heart of the movement. Deutsch has seen the process in the following way:

> Since World War II, Western European countries have
> largely ceased thinking about fighting each other.
> For the most part they no longer prepare large armed
> forces, build fortifications, or deploy and train
> troops for intra-Western European warfare. In the
> same years during which very few federations have
> been founded or moved forward, we thus have seen the
> growth of several pluralistic security communities.[43]

Whether we look at the European experiment in terms of security, communities, federations, or some other imaginative method, we can agree that the continent is a more stable entity today than it was before any serious integration attempts were made.

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[42] John Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC," in F. Roy Willis (ed.) op. cit., p. 53.

[43] Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives, p. 123.

iii   The Problems of Integration: Nationalism in the Defense
                                of Freedom

Integration in Europe has been studied primarily by his-

torians, jurists, and economists.[44] If we work from these per-

spectives, we can see that through the annals of history there

have always been empires developing and declining. Therefore a

consolidated supranational entity could be seen merely as the

continuation of the natural progression of history. Earlier in

the study, we looked at the four common approaches to integra-

tion and found a great variance in how each theory approaches

the subject.[45] What we found particularly disturbing about

functionalism and neofunctionalism was that both attempted to

subvert the nation-state through non-political means. Theories

such as these see the world as a free system that is evolving

constantly in new and complex ways. Fundamental change is seen

as the only means of survival for a system:

> An open system, whether social or biological, in a
> changing environment either changes or perishes.
> In such a case the only avenue to survival is change
> . . . If a complex social organization is to survive
> critical changes in its environment, it can do so
> only by changing its structure and behavior.[46]

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[44] Marie-Elizabeth De Bussy, Helene Delorme, and Francoise
De La Serre, "Theoretical Approaches to European Integration,"
in F. Roy Willis (ed.) op. cit., pp. 84-85.

[45] For an excellent account of modern theories of integra-
tion in Europe, see Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Inte-
gration (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1983).

[46] Mervyn L. Cadwallader, "The Cybernetic Analysis of
Change," in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.) Social Change:
Sources, Patterns, and Consequences, p. 160.

Since the total population of Western Europe is not unmanageable in terms of size, taking into account the size of China, the Soviet Union and the United States, implementation of the three principles of supranationality -- institutionalization, the immediacy of the excercise of power, and the ability to constrain the actions of subunits[47] -- is not out of the bounds of reality. Once these principles have been implanted firmly in the integrated community, Galtung would like to see Europe consist of small social units which would be bigger than municipalities, but smaller than regions.[48] To break the traditional boundaries of the integrating nation-states would certainly enhance the survival of the supranational organization, since there would be no contenders at the sub-national level which would be powerful enough to attempt to usurp the power of the higher organization.

Philosophizing about how a new organization would be much more peaceful and functional than the existing structures of society is interesting academically. However, we must not fall into the trap of believing that what is new and unique surely must be better than our present troublesome system. In pursuing such revolutionary policies, a caution must be employed for many reasons. Marx and Engels spoke of the possibility, even the

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[47] Pierre Pescatore, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

[48] Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making: (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget Ltd., 1973), p. 131.

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inevitability, of a revolution degenerating if it did not

correlate to the historical conditions in society.[49] And

Michael Polanyi concluded in The Logic of Liberty: Reflec-

tions and Rejoiners that what is created from the breakup of

traditional society may bring about far greater evils than

currently exist in society.[50] We know the various shortcomings

of the nation-state, since most of recent history has been pre-

occupied with its creation and development. The spirit of the

nation-state has been turbulent. However, the institution has

served as a protective device against the development of tyr-

annical empires. As Kant said, war was better than peace

brought about by universal despotism.[51] World war is intoler-

able in the present nuclear age, yet, we can modify Kant's state-

ment by suggesting that the tensions of the current nation-state

system are preferable to a rigidly controlled supranational

organization.

However appealing supranationalism appears to be, the

experience of the EEC in Europe disputes two long-standing con-

tentions of the integrationists. Firstly, integration does not,

as it claims, create economic equality within the system.

Economic growth within the EEC has not been altered significantly,

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[49] Roy A. Medvedev, "The Social Basis of Stalinism," in
Robert V. Daniels (ed.) The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of
Soviet Totalitarianism (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972),
p. 213.

[50] Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and
Rejoiners (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951), p. 200.

[51] Elie Kedourie, op. cit., p. 53.

and the richer nations continue to grow faster than the poorer ones.[52] If the supranational community does not create the equality that was promised, then it only stands to reason that the resulting alienation would create tensions that the system was supposed to reduce. The second troubling aspect of the EEC has to do with the political aspects of the new organization. As we know, France wanted European integration so German economic and military strength could be harnessed.[53] This may have been the initial reason for the French desire to create an integrated Europe. However, the French have been able to use the organization's political apparatus for their own national interests. More than once, the French used the EEC to create favorable policies for themselves, at the expense of what might have been best for the other members, and the EEC itself.[54] This integrated system would appear to be no less political than the nation-state, and in fact the organization easily could become the instrument of the dominant members. The idea behind integration was to take the politics out of political organization. This proved to be more fantasy than reality.

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[52] Dudley Seers, "Conclusions: The EEC and Unequal Development," in Dudley Seers, and Constantine Vaistsos (eds.) Integration and Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 307.

[53] John Spanier, op. cit., p. 57.

[54] Francois De La Serre, "The European Economic Community and the 1965 Crisis," in F. Roy Willis (ed.) op. cit., p. 131; Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, pp. 234-235.

Integration has to do with power and how it is distrib-
uted. After World War II, there were very real concerns about
the concept and what it meant. In an interesting book, Brian
Crozier concluded that: "Men are afraid of power, and yet they
need it. Those who claim examption from that need are them-
selves in danger of falling victims to the nearest petty
tyrant."[55] We all have our individual freedom curtailed to a
certain degree in order to create stability and order in society,
but when authority becomes abstract, as it would in an inte-
grated system, the possibility of creating an uncontrollable
political monster is very real. Speaking in 1957, Jean Monnet
told a British manufacturer's association that the organization
which he helped form was "outward looking, not inward looking."[56]
However, the leaders of such a community must be somewhat insen-
sitive to the outside world, because the majority of their
attention would have to be directed toward the ongoing struggle
to maintain the organization.[57] We must remember that civil war
often was needed to keep other forms of social structure together,
and we have no guarantees that an integrated community would not
disintegrate in such a manner.

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    Brian Crozier, The Masters of Power (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1969), p. 33.
[56]
    Geoffrey Barraclough, "The EEC and the World Economy,"
in Dudley Seers, and Constantine Vaitsos (eds.) op. cit.,
p. 57.
[57]
    Karl W. Deutsch, Ideas Among Nations (New York: The Free
Press, 1979), pp. 188-189.

It is questionable whether any form of supranational community can be as humane, as can be the nation-state. As the proponents of integration proceed with their plans, they:

> . . . will find that it is no less difficult to
> reconcile the resistance of local nationalisms
> and regional identities to its increasingly remote
> and cumbersome centralizing activities, and that
> it is easier to propound novel formulae to this
> end . . . to state that the good is to create "a
> nation made of nations," or a confederation which
> preserves the identity of the member nations, or
> a governing "community" which is neither federal
> nor confederal in form -- than it is to implement
> them.[58]

Loyalties to institutions will remain long after technological philosophers proclaim their obsolescence to the public. Some would argue that the family is obsolete because modern society tears the members more and more away from the intimate and intense contact that the institution once enjoyed. However, when it comes to the crunch individuals will still feel more warmth for their family members than outsiders. The same conclusions can be reached about how people react to attempts to usurp the power of the nation-state. Thus, we would have to agree with Carr:

> Nevertheless, the nation is something far more than a
> voluntary association; and it embodies in itself,
> though overlaid with conventional trappings, such
> natural and universal elements as attachment to one's
> native land and speech and a sense of wider kinship
> than that of family. The nation is a historical group.
> It has its place and function in a wider society, and
> its claims cannot be denied or ignored.[59]

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[58] F.H. Hinsley, op. cit., p. 168.

[59] Edward Hallet Carr, op. cit., p. 39.

Along the same lines, integration is based upon resolving disputes in an equitable manner for all the parties concerned. Duverger defines this principle as follows:

> The principle of compromise is 'to cut the cake in two' and to give each side half. The ideal and perfect compromise would weigh in the balance the advantages and sacrifices of each member of the community; thus it would be based on justice in its elementary form of equality symbolized by the scales. Thus each individual group or class could be satisfied and the reason for fighting disappear.[60]

But we must wonder how much compromises can be obtained in a system where member units do not have the same influence and control over the integrated system. A people with a strong sense of separateness, such as the French, conceivably could make limited concessions to a body such as the EEC. However, when it comes to delivering a significant amount of sovereignty to the altar of the new integrated system, the national consciousness of people would deny the organization further penetration into their national territory. This trait already has been shown by France's reluctance to become involved in organizations like NATO, which threatened their sovereignty -- and in some policy decisions of the EEC.

The second concern about the integration process is a concern about the possibility of the newly created system falling prey to one of its stronger sub-units. Any organization that comes to possess any amount of sovereignty -- contrary to what the modern techological integrationalist would suggest -- becomes a political system by its very nature. If this is the case, then the system would be open to the abuses that the inte-

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60 Maurice Duverger, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

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grationists claim to have been at the root of the evils of the nation-state. The notion that a system elite would emerge and be totally loyal to the new organization might be feasible. However, until such time this elite loses its national loyalty, the system could disintegrate into a new form of supranational imperialism, with the most powerful sub-units dominating their fellow partners in the integrated system.

National consciousness that grows in older states helps defend against intrusions of this sort by those who seek to subvert it in the name of some higher form of community. This sort of nationalism is a positive approach, since there are too many unanswered questions about supranationalism to make it an overbearing consideration when attempting to make the international community a more peaceful system.

iv   Chapter Four: Conclusion

In this final chapter, we explored the role of nationalism in the post World War II era. This period saw the development of many supranational institutions which threatened the very basis of the nation-state. Where nationalism helped unify the new nation-states of Africa, the role that it played in this era would seem to justify the final contention presented in our thesis. It was argued that nationalism would help further integration only to the point where such integration is beneficial both to the individual and the integrating sub-units. Because of the high level of complexity that has been reached in society

today, nationalism as a barrier to further integration was seen to be a positive function. This resistance to integration in the post World War II period must be considered to be positive, since any more movements toward integration would create individual alienation. The result of this alienation could well be chaos and social disorganization.

CONCLUSION

NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION

It is always a difficult task to summarize a large body
of research in a few pages. An appropriate concluding question
might be: What have we learned about nationalism and integra-
tion? But before we try to answer the question we should state
our thesis once again. The thesis had two interlocking but
separate parts. Firstly, it was contended that nationalism
contributed to the integration of diverse groups when it was
beneficial to the individuals and communities involved. The
second major argument of the thesis was that while nationalism
contributed to the integration of communities, it nonetheless
mediated against the process when the integrated complexity of
society threatened the continued survival of the lower communi-
ties.

To study the thesis as thoroughly as possible, we looked
at it in historical, theoretical and concrete terms. Chapter
One looked at the history of nationalism. Chapter Two explored
how nationalism was treated in the theoretical integration lit-
erature. Chapter Three examined how nationalism contributed to
the development of integrated national communities in post-
imperial Africa. And finally, Chapter Four studied how nation-

alism hindered the oppressive tendency to create larger and more complex supranational structures in post World War II society.

A review of each chapter at this point would serve to exemplify the major conclusions that we reached in the study. In Chapter One we explored the history and development of nationalism. We found that a sense of national uniqueness arguably existed among the ancient Jews and Greeks. It is not an easy task to determine the strength of these feelings. When we talk about the development of a national consciousness we are leaving the concrete world and entering a highly abstract reality. Nevertheless, our research seemed to indicate that the creation of this consciousness in communities is a natural event in the progression of humanity. We then looked at nationalism as an integrating device on the European continent. It was seen that the three major varieties of Western European nationalism were more often than not geared toward obtaining freedom and equality. Also, while a sense of nationality is a natural phenomenon within a community, it was found that it is not an ideology like liberalism or socialism. In short, nationalism has no complex series of strategies, devices or methods to further its cause. Because of its diffuse nature, nationalism can be used to obtain negative or positive goals. Through the years we have seen many negative uses of nationalism: Napoleonism, Fascism and Nazism all used the concept to justify gross economic, political and social violations against their neighbors. On the other hand, nationalism has been used in the

service of many positive movements. It has contributed to many movements that sought to liberate the national community from alien oppression (Poland, Hungary, African liberation movements). Nevertheless, Chapter One served to show us that nationalism is a potent force in the development of integrated communities.

Chapter Two explored the relationship between nationalism and the modern schools of integration. With our findings from Chapter One, we would have expected that there would have been an acceptance of nationalism as an idea which could be used in the integration process. However, this was not the case. Of the four theories examined, only pluralism seemed to recognize that individuals feel more secure in situations where societal authority is not obscured by numerous levels of government. Federalism marginally shares this concern with pluralism. The legalism involved in federalism, however, is worrisome to the nationalist. A diverse federation can become a unitary structure by a few decisions made in the court system. To be sure, federalism has been successful when confronted with relatively small areas. But we must remember that large federations are often plagued by internal pressures that range from mild political unrest to outright civil war, as was the case in the United States. We contended that the two functionalisms were geared toward taking the politics out of community organization. Thus, they see more value in technological and economic imperatives that cause integration than exploring the consequences of such change on the integrating communities. Another problem

with the two functionalisms is that they tend to leave the spectrum of political reality. By giving priority to the machine over the individual, humanity becomes secondary to efficiency. In conclusion, it seemed for the most part nationalism in the integration theories was treated as an inevitable evil or ignored completely.

In Chapter Three we entered a more concrete area, and explored how nationalism was used in the transition from the colonial situation to the creation of sovereign nation-states in Africa. It was seen that nationalism was an intrinsic part in the process and again, the concept was shown to be a catalyst that could be used in a number of different ways. Firstly, nationalism was used in a negative sense to promote the creation of integrated states by suggesting that Africans were somehow morally superior to their colonial masters. Secondly, nationalism was used as a device for totally modernizing the region. And finally, nationalism was put to work in its most positive form, integrative nationalism. This variety of nationalism welded tradition and modernization together to give the newly created nation-state a good sense of community, and a balanced outlook on the international stage. This section seemed to prove our hypothesis that nationalism is not a rigid theory, thus, it can be mobilized in a number of ways to obtain a myriad of ends.

The final chapter took a significantly different approach to the question of nationalism and integration in society. In this section, nationalism was looked at as being an idea that

could protect the nation-state from the intrusions of those who seek to destroy and create some higher form of organization in the name of peace and progress. It was argued that however well-intentioned these attempts were, they ran the risk of creating even more tensions in society. This worry is centred around the concern that one particular group could come to dominate the new system at the expense of other participants in the integrated system.

After examining our findings, we must harken back to the first sentence of the paper and conclude that nationalism, like politics, does not lend itself toward definitive statements. One of the major concerns of this study was the lack of regard for nationalism in the integration literature. Nevertheless, the study found nationalism to be an idea that binds people together into workable communities. To bring about integration without proper regard for nationalism is to invite the circumstances that could lead to a situation of horrendous disorganization, and ultimately to human calamity.

The inability to find peaceful resolutions to the problems of allocating societal values is at the heart of most of the tensions that plague the world today. As we have suggested throughout the study, nationalism is little more than a catalyst. The concept can be used to enslave people, but it can also be used to free oneself and community from the grip of tyranny. There is an old saying that one shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Maybe we shouldn't discard nationalism with the dysfunctional human qualities that often surround the concept.

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